495 SCRA 170 Political Law Constitutional Law Legislative Branch Question Hour

Constitutionality of E.O. 464

In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project as well as
the Garci tapes surfaced. This prompted the Senate to conduct a public hearing to investigate
the said anomalies particularly the alleged overpricing in the NRP. The investigating Senate
committee issued invitations to certain department heads and military officials to speak before
the committee as resource persons. Ermita submitted that he and some of the department
heads cannot attend the said hearing due to pressing matters that need immediate attention.
AFP Chief of Staff Senga likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon, the senate president, excepted
the said requests for they were sent belatedly and arrangements were already made and
scheduled. Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which took effect immediately.
EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive departments who
in the judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege; Generals
and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the
judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege; Philippine National
Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other officers who
in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege; Senior national
security officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by the
executive privilege; and Such other officers as may be determined by the President, from
appearing in such hearings conducted by Congress without first securing the presidents
approval.
The department heads and the military officers who were invited by the Senate committee
then invoked EO 464 to except themselves. Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing
proceeded with only 2 military personnel attending. For defying President Arroyos order
barring military personnel from testifying before legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig.
Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their military posts and were made to face
court martial proceedings. EO 464s constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged that it
infringes on the rights and duties of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and
conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional.
HELD: The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the validity of the
provisions of EO 464, the SC sought to distinguish Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of the
1987 Constitution. The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of
Article VI of the Constitution. Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly
investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to
the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is
so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of
inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information
respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the
legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information which is not infrequently
true recourse must be had to others who do possess it.
Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The Question Hour is closely
related with the legislative power, and it is precisely as a complement to or a supplement of
the Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the members of Cabinet would be very, very
essential not only in the application of check and balance but also, in effect, in aid of
legislation. Section 22 refers only to Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer
specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under which anybody for that matter, may be
summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt of the House. A distinction was thus
made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While attendance was
meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of
legislation. Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each
other, should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One
specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is
to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to
conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress
oversight function. Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive
officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle
of separation of powers.
While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the
power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information. When
Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt
themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact
that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this
power the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of
Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest
official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of
government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom. The requirement then to secure
presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour,
is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of
department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot,
however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of
legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department
head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either
by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing
the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of
the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their
performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation
of powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the
inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is in aid of legislation under Section 21,
the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.

203 SCRA 767 Political Law Constitutional Law The Legislative Department Inquiry
in Aid of Legislation When not Allowed
It was alleged that Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez and his wife together with the Marcoses
unlawfully and unjustly enriched themselves at the expense of the Filipino people. That they
obtained with the help of the Bengzon Law Office and Ricardo Lopa Corys brother in law,
among others, control over some of the biggest business enterprises in the country including
MERALCO, PCI Bank, Shell Philippines and Benguet Consolidated Mining Corporation.
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile subsequently delivered a privilege speech alleging that Lopa took
over various government owned corporations which is in violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. Contained in the speech is a motion to investigate on the matter. The
motion was referred to the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers or the Blue Ribbon
Committee. After committee hearing, Lopa refused to testify before the committee for it may
unduly prejudice a pending civil case against him. Bengzon likewise refused invoking his right
to due process. Lopa however sent a letter to Enrile categorically denying his allegations and
that his allegations are baseless and malicious.
Enrile subsequently took advantage of the Senates privilege hour upon which he insisted to
have an inquiry regarding the matter. The SBRC rejected Lopas and Bengzons plea.
Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to subpoena them and require
their attendance and testimony in proceedings before the Committee, in excess of its
jurisdiction and legislative purpose, in clear and blatant disregard of their constitutional rights,
and to their grave and irreparable damage, prejudice and injury, and that there is no appeal
nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, Bengzon et
al filed a petition for prohibition with a prayer for temporary restraining order and/or injunctive
relief against the SBRC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the inquiry sought by the SBRC be granted.
HELD: No, the inquiry cannot be given due course. The speech of Enrile contained no
suggestion of contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a
possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. In other words, the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by the Blue Ribbon
Committee was to find out whether or not the relatives of Cory, particularly Lopa, had violated
the law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Kokoy
to the Lopa Group. There appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation involved. Hence,
the contemplated inquiry by the SBRC is not really in aid of legislation because it is not
related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the investigation is
to find out whether or not the relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated
Section 5 of RA No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, a matter that appears
more within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature. Besides, the Court may
take judicial notice that Mr. Ricardo Lopa died during the pendency of this case.

549 SCRA 77 Political Law Constitutional Law The Legislative Department Inquiry in
aid of legislation Executive Privilege
Legislative (Sec 21) & Oversight (Sec 22) Powers

In April April 2007, DOTC entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications
Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband
Network (NBN) Project in the amount of $329,481,290.00 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos).
The Project was to be financed by the Peoples Republic of China. The Senate passed
various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. On the other hand, Joe De Venecia issued a
statement that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence
to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He
appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted
that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the
NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt
and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what
they discussed about the NBN Project, Neri refused to answer, invoking executive privilege.
In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo
followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c)
whether or not she directed him to approve. He later refused to attend the other hearings and
Ermita sent a letter to the SBRC averring that the communications between GMA and Neri is
privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermitabe applied. The
SBRC cited Neri for contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not the three questions sought by the SBRC to be answered falls under
executive privilege.
HELD: The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to
the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.
The communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential
communications privilege.
1st, the communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the
President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This
authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the
Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.
2nd, the communications are received by a close advisor of the President. Under the
operational proximity test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member
of President Arroyos cabinet. And
3rd, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the
privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.

504 SCRA 704 Political Law Inquiry in aid of legislation public officers
On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago introduced Senate Res. No. 455
directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines
Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite
Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the
alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors. Pursuant to
this, on May 8, 2006, Senator Richard Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo Sabio of the PCGG
inviting him to be one of the resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the
Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public
Services. Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment. At the same
time, he invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 No member or staff of the Commission shall be
required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding
concerning matters within its official cognizance. Apparently, the purpose is to ensure
PCGGs unhampered performance of its task. Gordons Subpoenae Ad Testificandum was
repeatedly ignored by Sabio hence he threatened Sabio to be cited with contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 4 of EO No. 1 is constitutional.
HELD: No. It can be said that the Congress power of inquiry has gained more solid existence
and expansive construal. The Courts high regard to such power is rendered more evident
in Senate v. Ermita, where it categorically ruled that the power of inquiry is broad enough to
cover officials of the executive branch. Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine
in Arnault that the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a
proper subject for investigation and that the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power
to legislate. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
Article III, Section 7
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law.
These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making and
in the operations of the government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to
enable them to exercise effectively their constitutional rights. Armed with the right information,
citizens can participate in public discussions leading to the formulation of government policies
and their effective implementation.

155 SCRA 421 Political Law Inquiry in Aid of Legislation LGUs

In 1985, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Dumaguete sought to conduct an investigation
in connection with pending legislation related to the operations of public utilities. Invited in the
hearing were the heads of NORECO II (Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative, Inc.) Paterio
Torres and Arturo Umbac. NORECO II is alleged to have installed inefficient power lines in
the said city. Torres and Umbac refused to appear before the SP and they alleged that the
power to investigate, and to order the improvement of, alleged inefficient power lines to
conform to standards is lodged exclusively with the National Electrification Administration
(NEA); and neither the Charter of the City of Dumaguete nor the [old] Local Government Code
(Batas Pambansa Blg. 337) grants the SP such power. The SP averred that inherent in the
legislative functions performed by the respondent SP is the power to conduct investigations
in aid of legislation and with it, the power to punish for contempt in inquiries on matters within
its jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not LGUs can issue contempt.
HELD: No. There is no express provision either in the 1973 Constitution or in the LGC (BP
337) granting local legislative bodies, the power to subpoena witnesses and the power to
punish non-members for contempt. Absent a constitutional or legal provision for the exercise
of these powers, the only possible justification for the issuance of a subpoena and for the
punishment of non-members for contumacious behavior would be for said power to be
deemed implied in the statutory grant of delegated legislative power. But, the contempt power
and the subpoena power partake of a judicial nature. They cannot be implied in the grant of
legislative power. Neither can they exist as mere incidents of the performance of legislative
functions. To allow local legislative bodies or administrative agencies to exercise these
powers without express statutory basis would run afoul of the doctrine of separation of
powers. There being no provision in the LGC explicitly granting local legislative bodies, the
power to issue compulsory process and the power to punish for contempt, the SP of
Dumaguete is devoid of power to punish the petitioners Torres and Umbac for contempt. The
Ad Hoc Committee of said legislative body has even less basis to claim that it can exercise
these powers. Even assuming that the SP and the Ad-Hoc Committee had the power to issue
the subpoena and the order complained of, such issuances would still be void for being ultra
vires. The contempt power (and the subpoena power) if actually possessed, may only be
exercised where the subject matter of the investigation is within the jurisdiction of the
legislative body.

84 Phil. 368 Political Law First Emergency Powers Cases

Antonio Araneta is being charged for allegedly violating of Executive Order 62 which
regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings. Judge Rafael Dinglasan was
the judge hearing the case. Araneta appealed seeking to prohibit Dinglasan and the Fiscal
from proceeding with the case. He averred that EO 62 was issued by virtue of Commonwealth
Act (CA) No. 671 which he claimed ceased to exist, hence, the EO has no legal basis.
Three other cases were consolidated with this one. L-3055 which is an appeal by Leon Ma.
Guerrero, a shoe exporter, against EO 192 which controls exports in the Philippines; he is
seeking to have permit issued to him.
L-3054 is filed by Eulogio Rodriguez to prohibit the treasury from disbursing funds [from 49-
50] pursuant to EO 225.
L-3056 filed by Antonio Barredo is attacking EO 226 which was appropriating funds to hold
the national elections.
They all aver that CA 671, otherwise known as AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL
EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND
AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO
MEET SUCH EMERGENCY or simply the Emergency Powers Act, is already inoperative and
that all EOs issued pursuant to said CA had likewise ceased.
ISSUE: Whether or not CA 671 has ceased.
HELD: Yes. CA 671, which granted emergency powers to the president, became
inoperative ex proprio vigore when Congress met in regular session on May 25, 1946, and
that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of law. In
setting the first regular session of Congress instead of the first special session which
preceded it as the point of expiration of the Act, the SC is giving effect to the purpose and
intention of the National Assembly. In a special session, the Congress may consider general
legislation or only such subjects as he (President) may designate. Such acts were to be good
only up to the corresponding dates of adjournment of the following sessions of the Legislature,
unless sooner amended or repealed by the National Assembly. Even if war continues to
rage on, new legislation must be made and approved in order to continue the EPAs, otherwise
it is lifted upon reconvening or upon early repeal.

92 Phil. 603 Political Law Second Emergency Powers Cases

Eulogio Rodriguez et al seek to invalidate Executive Orders 545 and 546 issued in 1952, the
first appropriating the sum of P37,850,500 for urgent and essential public works, and the
second setting aside the sum of P11,367,600 for relief in the provinces and cities visited by
typhoons, floods, droughts, earthquakes, volcanic action and other calamities. They sought
to have Vicente Gella, then National Treasurer, be enjoined from releasing funds pursuant to
said EOs. These EOs were pursuant to Commonwealth Act 671. Note that prior to Araneta
vs Dinglasan, Congress passed House Bill 727 intending to revoke CA 671 but the same was
vetoed by the President due to the Korean War and his perception that war is still subsisting
as a fact. Note also that CA 671 was already declared inoperative by the Supreme Court in
the same case of Araneta vs Dinglasan.
ISSUE: Whether or not the EOs are valid.
HELD: No. As similarly decided in the Araneta case, the EOs issued in pursuant to CA 671
shall be rendered ineffective. The president did not invoke any actual emergencies or
calamities emanating from the last world war for which CA 671 has been intended. Without
such invocation, the veto of the president cannot be of merit for the emergency he feared
cannot be attributed to the war contemplated in CA 671. Even if the president vetoed the
repealing bill the intent of Congress must be given due weight. For it would be absurd to
contend otherwise. For while Congress might delegate its power by a simple majority, it might
not be able to recall them except by two-third vote. In other words, it would be easier for
Congress to delegate its powers than to take them back. This is not right and is not, and ought
not to be the law. Act No. 671 may be likened to an ordinary contract of agency, whereby
the consent of the agent is necessary only in the sense that he cannot be compelled to accept
the trust, in the same way that the principal cannot be forced to keep the relation in eternity
or at the will of the agent. Neither can it be suggested that the agency created under the Act
is coupled with interest.

235 SCRA 630 (1994) 249 SCRA 635 (1995) Political Law Origination of Revenue
Bills EVAT Amendment by Substitution
Arturo Tolentino et al are questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as the
Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not
exclusively originate from the House of Representatives as required by Section 24, Article 6
of the Constitution. Even though RA 7716 originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3
readings in the HoR, the same did not complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the
1st reading it was referred to the Senate Ways & Means Committee thereafter Senate passed
its own version known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate could have
done is amend HB 11197 by striking out its text and substituting it with the text of SB 1630 in
that way the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the
text) of the HB. (Its ironic however to note that Tolentino and co-petitioner Raul Roco even
signed the said Senate Bill.)
ISSUE: Whether or not the EVAT law is procedurally infirm.
HELD: No. By a 9-6 vote, the Supreme Court rejected the challenge, holding that such
consolidation was consistent with the power of the Senate to propose or concur with
amendments to the version originated in the HoR. What the Constitution simply means,
according to the 9 justices, is that the initiative must come from the HoR. Note also that there
were several instances before where Senate passed its own version rather than having the
HoR version as far as revenue and other such bills are concerned. This practice of
amendment by substitution has always been accepted. The proposition of Tolentino concerns
a mere matter of form. There is no showing that it would make a significant difference if
Senate were to adopt his over what has been done.
 148 SCRA 208 Political Law Transfer of Funds Power of the President to Realign
Funds
Demetrio Demetria et al as taxpayers and members of the Batasan Pambansa sought to
prohibit Manuel Alba, then Minister of the Budget, from disbursing funds pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 1177 or the Budget Reform Decree of 1977. Demetria assailed the
constitutionality of paragraph 1, Section 44 of the said PD. This Section provides that:
The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different
departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included
in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department,
bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.
Demetria averred that this is unconstitutional for it violates the 1973 Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not Paragraph 1, Section 44, of PD 1177 is constitutional.
HELD: No. The Constitution provides that no law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of
appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commissions may by law be authorized
to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings
in other items of their respective appropriations.
However, paragraph 1 of Section 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted
under the Constitution. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one
department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or
activity of any department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or
approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or not the funds to be
transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken, or
whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is
to be made. It does not only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law,
thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond
the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null
and void.
But it should be noted, transfers of savings within one department from one item to another
in the GAA may be allowed by law in the interest of expediency and efficiency. There is no
transfer from one department to another here.

Subject Shall Be Expressed in the Title Police Power Not Validly Exercise
Vicente De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They assail the constitutionality of
Ord. No. 84, Ser. of 1975 or the Prohibition and Closure Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. De
la Cruz averred that the said Ordinance violates their right to engage in a lawful business for
the said ordinance would close out their business. That the hospitality girls they employed
are healthy and are not allowed to go out with customers. Judge Paras however lifted the
TRO he earlier issued against Ord. 84 after due hearing declaring that Ord 84. is constitutional
for it is pursuant to RA 938 which reads AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY
BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT,
MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN
THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS. Paras ruled that the prohibition is a
valid exercise of police power to promote general welfare. De la Cruz then appealed citing
that they were deprived of due process.
ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can, prohibit the exercise
of a lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such
clubs employing hostesses pursuant to Ord 84 which is further in pursuant to RA 938.
HELD: The SC ruled against Paras. If night clubs were merely then regulated and not
prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance would pass the test of validity. SC had stressed
reasonableness, consonant with the general powers and purposes of municipal corporations,
as well as consistency with the laws or policy of the State. It cannot be said that such a
sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify under the term reasonable.
The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable end can be attained by a
measure that does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the ordinance on its face is
characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained
by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. Pursuant to the title of the
Ordinance, Bocaue should and can only regulate not prohibit the business of cabarets.

104 SCRA 710 Political Law One Subject Embraced in the Title of a Bill
Insular Lumber Company (ILC) is an American company engaged as a licensed forest
concessionaire. The ILC purchased manufactured oil and motor fuel which it used in the
operation of its forest concession. In 1956, Republic Act No. 1435 was passed. Section 5
thereof provides that there should be a partial tax refund to those using oil in the operation of
forest and mining concessions.
In 1964, ILC filed with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) to have a tax refund of
P19,921.37 pursuant to the said RA. The Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) ruled that ILC is
not covered by such provision because Sec. 5, RA 1435 is only effective 5 years from its
enactment. Hence, in 1961 the provision ceased to be effective. ILC appealed the issue to
the CTA and the CTA ruled the operation of a sawmill is distinct from the operation of a forest
concession, hence, the refund provision of Sec 5, RA 1435 allowing partial refund to forest
and mining concessionaires cannot be extended to the operators of a sawmill. And out of the
P19,921.37 claimed, only the amount of P14,598.08 was paid on oil utilized in logging
operations. The CTA did not allow the refund of the full amount of P14,598.08 because the
ILCs right to claim the refund of a portion thereof, particularly those paid during the period
from January 1, 1963 to April 29, 1963 had already prescribed. Hence, ICL was credited the
refund of P10,560.20 only. Both parties appealed from the decision of the CTA.
The CIR averred that CTA should not have ruled this way: The title of RA 1435 is An Act to
Provide Means for Increasing The Highway Special Fund. The CIR contends that the subject
of RA 1435 was to increase Highway Special Fund. However, Section 5 of the Act deals with
another subject which is the partial exemption of miners and loggers. And this partial
exemption on which the Company based its claim for refund is clearly not expressed in the
title of the aforesaid Act. More importantly, Section 5 provides for a decrease rather than an
increase of the Highway Special Fund.
ISSUE: Whether or not to grant the partial tax refund to ILC.
HELD: Yes, but only in the amount as found by the CTA. The Supreme Court ruled that there
is no merit in the contention of the CIR. RA 1435 deals with only one subject and proclaims
just one policy, namely, the necessity for increasing the Highway Special Fund through the
imposition of an increased specific tax on manufactured oils. The proviso in Sec 5 of the law
is in effect a partial exemption from the imposed increased tax. Said proviso, which has
reference to specific tax on oil and fuel, is not a deviation from the general subject of the law.
The primary purpose of the aforequoted constitutional provision is to prohibit duplicity in
legislation the title of which might completely fail to apprise the legislators or the public of the
nature, scope and consequences of the law or its operation. But that is not so for in the
passage of RA 1435 since, as the records of its proceedings bear out, a full debate on
precisely the issue of whether its title reflects its complete subject was held by Congress
which passed it.

24 SCRA 172 Political Law Title Must Express One Subject

In 1961, Republic Act No. 3043 (An Act to Further Amend Commonwealth Act Numbered
One Hundred Twenty, as Amended by Republic Act Numbered Twenty Six Hundred and
Forty One) was passed. This law amended the charter of NAPOCOR (National Power
Corporation). Section 3 of RA 3043 provides that:
a. contractors being supplied by NAPOCOR shall not exceed an annual profit of 12%;
b. if they do, they shall refund such excess to their customers;
c. that NAPOCOR has the power to renew all existing contracts with franchise holders for the
supply of energy.
Santiago Alalayan and the Philippine Power and Development Company (PPDC) assailed
the said provision.They averred that Section 3 is a rider because first, it was not included in
the title of the amending law nor was it included in the amended law. Second, the main
purpose of RA 3043 was to increase the capital stock of NAPOCOR hence Alalayan et al
believed that Section 3 was not germane to RA 3043.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 3 of RA 3043 is constitutional.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court simply ruled that the Constitution does not require Congress
to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or
catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve
the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested
in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the
proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study
and discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud
upon the legislators.

6 SCRA 418 Political Law One Title, One Subject Rule Tenancy Act
Manuel Cordero was the trial lawyer of the Tenancy Counsel Unit (TCU) of the Agricultural
Tenancy Commission of the Department of Justice. He later appeared as the counsel of
indigent tenant Vicente Salazar who filed a case against landlord Leonardo Sta. Romana in
order to reinstate and reliquidate past harvests. Sta. Romana filed a motion to disqualify
Cordero as counsel for Salazar and he invoked Sec. 54 of Republic Act No. 1199 or The
Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines. The said section indicates that representation by
counsel of tenants who cannot afford to pay should be done by the public defenders of the
Department of Labor.
Judge Jose Cabatuando ruled in favor of Sta. Romana. Cordero appealed. During pendency
of the appeal Republic Act No. 2263, AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF
REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED ONE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED NINETY-NINE,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE AGRICULTURAL TENANCY ACT OF THE PHILIPPINES,
was passed. This law, particularly Sections 19 and 20 thereof, amended the previous law and
now allows trial lawyers from the TCU to represent indigent tenants and it is also the basis of
the creation of the Tenancy Mediation Division. Cordero filed a Manifestation averring that by
virtue of the amendment the issue has now become moot and academic. Cabatuando
countered that the provisions were not embraced in the title of the amending law nor in the
amended law hence void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of the TMD is embraced in the title of the bill and whether
or not to allow trial lawyers from TCU to appear as counsel for indigent tenants should be
allowed.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that that the constitutional requirement in question is
satisfied if all parts of the law are related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed
in the title of the bill.The constitutional requirement is complied with as long as the law, as in
the instant case, has a single general subject which is the Agricultural Tenancy Act and the
amendatory provisions no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not
inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, will be regarded as valid. To declare
sections 19 and 20 of RA 2263 null and void would in effect upset the transfer of the duty of
representing indigent tenants from the public defenders of the Department of Labor to the
trial attorneys in the Mediation Division of the Agricultural Tenancy Commission of the
Department of Justice. In other words, a declaration of nullity of these provisions of RA 2263
would do harm to, and would be nugatory of, the intention of Congress to consolidate the
function of enforcing our tenancy laws in the Department of Justice.

Equal Protection Oil Deregulation Law

Considering that oil is not endemic to this country, history shows that the government has
always been finding ways to alleviate the oil industry. The government created laws
accommodate these innovations in the oil industry. One such law is the Downstream Oil
Deregulation Act of 1996 or RA 8180. This law allows that any person or entity may import
or purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic
source, lease or own and operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities and market
such crude oil or use the same for his own requirement, subject only to monitoring by the
Department of Energy. Tatad assails the constitutionality of the law. He claims, among others,
that the imposition of different tariff rates on imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum
products violates the equal protection clause. Tatad contends that the 3%-7% tariff differential
unduly favors the three existing oil refineries and discriminates against prospective investors
in the downstream oil industry who do not have their own refineries and will have to source
refined petroleum products from abroad.3% is to be taxed on unrefined crude products and
7% on refined crude products.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8180 is constitutional.
HELD: The SC declared the unconstitutionality of RA 8180 because it violated Sec 19 of Art
12 of the Constitution. It violated that provision because it only strengthens oligopoly which is
contrary to free competition. It cannot be denied that our downstream oil industry is operated
and controlled by an oligopoly, a foreign oligopoly at that. Petron, Shell and Caltex stand as
the only major league players in the oil market. All other players belong to the lilliputian
league. As the dominant players, Petron, Shell and Caltex boast of existing refineries of
various capacities. The tariff differential of 4% therefore works to their immense benefit. Yet,
this is only one edge of the tariff differential. The other edge cuts and cuts deep in the heart
of their competitors. It erects a high barrier to the entry of new players. New players that
intend to equalize the market power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by building refineries of their
own will have to spend billions of pesos. Those who will not build refineries but compete with
them will suffer the huge disadvantage of increasing their product cost by 4%. They will be
competing on an uneven field. The argument that the 4% tariff differential is desirable
because it will induce prospective players to invest in refineries puts the cart before the horse.
The first need is to attract new players and they cannot be attracted by burdening them with
heavy disincentives. Without new players belonging to the league of Petron, Shell and Caltex,
competition in our downstream oil industry is an idle dream.
RA 8180 is unconstitutional on the ground inter alia that it discriminated against the new
players insofar as it placed them at a competitive disadvantage vis--vis the established oil
companies by requiring them to meet certain conditions already being observed by the latter.

68 Phil. 912 (299 U.S. 410) Political law Bill Veto Veto a Bill
Juan Bengzon was appointed as Justice of the Peace in 1912 in Lingayen, Pangasinan. Upon
reaching 65 years of age in 1933 he would have to retire in accordance with the law. He later
sought to claim gratuity pursuant to Act 4051 An Act to provide for the payment of retirement
gratuities to officers and employees of the Insular Government retired from the service as a
result of the reorganization or reduction of personnel thereof, including the justices of the
peace who must relinquish office in accordance with the provisions of Act Numbered Thirty-
eight hundred and ninety-nine, and for other purposes.
Section 7 thereof specifically provides that gratuity may be availed of by justices like Bengzon
but that provision has been vetoed by the governor-general. Bengzon said the veto is beyond
the power of the governor-general hence he filed a petition for mandamus to compel the
Secretary of Justice to implement the gratuity provision of the said law.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bengzon is entitled to the gratuity provision of the Retirement Gratuity
Law.
HELD: No. The governor-general in vetoing the said item of the law has acted within his
power; for this is also in compliance with the Organic Act. Section 19 of the former Organic
Act, the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, established the practice for the enactment of a
law, including the sanctioning of the veto power by the Governor-General. Specifically it
provided:
The Governor-General shall have the power to veto any particular item or items of an
appropriation bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.
The SC then is constrained to rule against Bengzon and to hold that the veto by the Governor-
General of section 7 of Act No. 4051 was in conformity with the legislative purpose and the
provisions of the Organic Act.

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NOTE: Quite interestingly, while I was doing some research on this, it appears that this case
was further appealed (via certiorari) to the U.S. Supreme Court (299 U.S. 410). That was
allowed then because the Philippines was under the Commonwealth regime. The U.S.
Supreme Court reversed the decision. You can read it here. It was ruled that the Governor-
General did not have the power to veto such item in the said law because in truth and in fact,
the said law was not an appropriations law. hence, no line item veto can be had.

11 SCRA 486 Political Law Veto Power Condition Attached to an Item

Bolinao Electronics Corporation was the co-owner and a co-petitioner of Chronicle
Broadcasting Network, Inc. (CBN) and Montserrat Broadcasting System Inc. They operate
and own television (channel 9) and radio stations in the Philippines. They were summoned
by Brigido Valencia, then Secretary of Communications, for operating even after their permit
has expired. Valencia claimed that because of CBNs continued operation sans license and
their continuing operation had caused damages to his department.
ISSUE: Whether or not Valencia is entitled to claim for damages.
HELD: The SC ruled in the negative. Valencia failed to show that any right of his has been
violated by the refusal of CBN to cease operation. Further, the SC noted that as the records
show, the appropriation to operate the Philippine Broadcasting Service as approved by
Congress and incorporated in the 1962-1963 Budget of the Republic of the Philippines does
not allow appropriations for TV stations particularly in Luzon. Hence, since there was no
appropriation allotted then there can be no damage; and if there are expenditures made by
Valencias department they are in fact in violation of the law and they cannot claim damages
therefrom. And even if it is shown that the then president vetoed this provision of the Budget
Act, such veto is illegal because he may not legally veto a condition attached to an
appropriation or item in the appropriation bill.
Note: This ruling, that the executives veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out
conditions or restrictions, has been adhered to in subsequent cases. If the veto is
unconstitutional, it follows that the same produced no effect whatsoever; and the restriction
imposed by the appropriation bill, therefore, remains.

Political Law Veto Power Inappropriate Provision in an Appropriation Bill

Gonzales, together w/ 22 other senators, assailed the constitutionality of Corys veto of
Section 55 of the 1989 Appropriations Bill (Sec 55 FY 89, and subsequently of its counterpart
Section 16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill (Sec 16 FY 90). Gonzalez averred the following:
(1) the Presidents line-veto power as regards appropriation bills is limited to item/s and does
not cover provision/s; therefore, she exceeded her authority when she vetoed Section 55 (FY
89) and Section 16 (FY 90) which are provision; (2) when the President objects to a provision
of an appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the item-veto power but should veto the entire
bill; (3) the item-veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or
restrictions for that would be legislation, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers;
and (4) the power of augmentation in Article VI, Section 25 [5] of the 1987 Constitution, has
to be provided for by law and, therefore, Congress is also vested with the prerogative to
impose restrictions on the exercise of that power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President exceeded the item-veto power accorded by the
Constitution. Or differently put, has the President the power to veto `provisions of an
Appropriations Bill.
HELD: SC ruled that Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill matters that
should be more properly enacted in separate legislation, and if it does that, the inappropriate
provisions inserted by it must be treated as item, which can be vetoed by the President in
the exercise of his item-veto power. The SC went one step further and rules that even
assuming arguendo that provisions are beyond the executive power to veto, and Section 55
(FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) were not provisions in the budgetary sense of the term,
they are inappropriate provisions that should be treated as items for the purpose of the
Presidents veto power.

208 SCRA 133 Political Law Veto Power of the President

In 1990, Congress sought to reenact some old laws (i.e. Republic Act No. 1797) that were
repealed during the time of former President Ferdinand Marcos. These old laws provided
certain retirement benefits to retired judges, justices, and members of the constitutional
commissions. Congress felt a need to restore these laws in order to standardize retirement
benefits among government officials. However, President Corazon Aquino vetoed the bill
(House Bill No. 16297) on the ground that the law should not give preferential treatment to
certain or select government officials.
Meanwhile, a group of retired judges and justices filed a petition with the Supreme Court
asking the court to readjust their pensions. They pointed out that RA 1797 was never repealed
(by P.D. No. 644) because the said PD was one of those unpublished PDs which were subject
of the case of Taada v. Tuvera. Hence, the repealing law never existed due to non
publication and in effect, RA 1797 was never repealed. The Supreme Court then readjusted
their pensions.
Congress took notice of the readjustment and son in the General Appropriations Bill (GAB) for
1992, Congress allotted additional budget for pensions of retired justices. Congress however
did the allotment in the following manner: Congress made an item entitled: General Fund
Adjustment; included therein are allotments to unavoidable obligations in different brances
of the government; among such obligations is the allotment for the pensions of retired justices
of the judiciary.
However, President Aquino again vetoed the said lines which provided for the pensions of
the retired justices in the judiciary in the GAB. She explained that that portion of the GAB is
already deemed vetoed when she vetoed H.B. 16297.
This prompted Cesar Bengzon and several other retired judges and justices to question the
constitutionality of the veto made by the President. The President was represented by then
Executive Secretary Franklin Drilon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General Appropriations
bill is constitutional.
HELD: No. The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension that is due to
them in accordance to Republic Act 1797 which was never repealed. The president has no
power to set aside and override the decision of the Supreme Court neither does the president
have the power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors much less to
the repeal of existing laws.
The Supreme Court also explained that the veto is unconstitutional since the power of the
president to disapprove any item or items in the appropriations bill does not grant the authority
to veto part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of said item. It appears that in
the same item, the Presidents vetoed some portion of it and retained the others. This cannot
be done. The rule is: the Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all; the Executive
must veto an entire line item in its entirety or not at all. In this case, the president did not veto
the entire line item of the general adjustment fund. She merely vetoed the portion which
pertained to the pensions of the justices but did not veto the other items covering obligations
to the other departments of the government.

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211 SCRA 219 Political Law Congress Authorizing the President to Tax
In November 1990, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 438 which
imposed, in addition to any other duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles
imported into the Philippines, an additional duty of 5% ad valorem tax. This additional duty
was imposed across the board on all imported articles, including crude oil and other oil
products imported into the Philippines. In 1991, EO 443 increased the additional duty to 9%.
In the same year, EO 475 was passed reinstating the previous 5% duty except that crude oil
and other oil products continued to be taxed at 9%. Enrique Garcia, a representative from
Bataan, avers that EO 475 and 478 are unconstitutional for they violate Section 24 of Article
VI of the Constitution which provides:
All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of
local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives,
but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in Congress,
the President may not assume such power by issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478
which are in the nature of revenue-generating measures.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are constitutional.
HELD: Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation,
revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within the province of the Legislative
rather than the Executive Department. It does not follow, however, that therefore Executive
Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be characterized as revenue measures, are
prohibited to be exercised by the President, that they must be enacted instead by the
Congress of the Philippines.
Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows:
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and
subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the
national development program of the Government.
There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the President subject
to such limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may impose to fix within specific limits
tariff rates . . . and other duties or imposts . . . . In this case, it is the Tariff and Customs
Code which authorized the President ot issue the said EOs.