C.

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
April 29, 1988
AYER PRODUCTIONS PTY. LTD. and McELROY & McELROY FILM
PRODUCTIONS, vs. HON.IGNACIO M. CAPULONG and JUAN PONCE
ENRILE
FACTS:
Petitioners envisioned filming the historic peaceful struggle of the
Filipinos at EDSA. They consult Fidel V. Ramos and Senator Juan Ponce
Enrile, who had played major roles in the events. Fidel Ramos signified
his approval of the motion picture entitled The Four Day Revolution.
But respondent Enrile replied that he would not approve the use and
reproduction of his name, or picture, or any member of his family to
matters personal to them. Petitioners then deleted respondent from the
movie script, and proceeded to the film.
Private respondent filed a TRO and Writ of Injunction alleging that
petitioners' production of the film is without his consent and over his
objection, constitutes an obvious violation of his right of privacy.
Hal McElroy contended that the film would not involve the private life of
Enrile nor his family and a preliminary injunction would amount to a prior
restraint on their right of free expression. Ayer Productions also
contended alleging lack of cause of action as the film had not yet been
completed. They also claim that they are exercising their freedom of
speech and expression protected under our Constitution. Respondents,
on other hand, asserts a right of privacy and such film would constitute
an unlawful intrusion into his privacy which he is entitled to enjoy.
ISSUE: WON the filming of the motion picture, The 4-day Revolution,
violated the right of privacy of respondent
RULING:
The Court would once more stress that this freedom includes the
freedom to film and produce motion pictures and to exhibit such motion
pictures in theaters or to diffuse them through television. In our day and
age, motion pictures are a universally utilized vehicle of communication
and medium of expression. Along with the press, radio and television,
motion pictures constitute a principal medium of mass communication
for information, education and entertainment.
publicity, from the wrongful publicizing of the private affairs and
activities of an individual which are outside the realm of legitimate public
concern.
The production and filming by petitioners of the projected motion
picture "The Four Day Revolution" does not, in the circumstances of this
case, constitute an unlawful intrusion upon private respondent's "right
of privacy." the projected motion picture was as yet uncompleted and
hence not exhibited to any audience. Neither private respondent nor the
respondent trial Judge knew what the completed film would precisely
look like. There was, in other words, no "clear and present danger" of
any violation of any right to privacy that private respondent could
lawfully assert.
Such public figures were held to have lost, to some extent at least, their
tight to privacy. Three reasons were given:
that they had sought publicity and consented to it, and so
could not complaint when they received it;
that their personalities and their affairs has already public, and
could no longer be regarded as their own private business;
and
that the press had a privilege, under the Constitution, to
inform the public about those who have become legitimate
matters of public interest.
The right of privacy of a "public figure" is necessarily narrower than that
of an ordinary citizen. Private respondent has not retired into the
seclusion of simple private citizenship. He continues to be a "public
figure." After a successful political campaign during which his
participation in the EDSA Revolution was directly or indirectly referred
to in the press, radio and television, he sits in a very public place, the
Senate of the Philippines.
To the extent, "The Four Day Revolution" limits itself in portraying the
participation of private respondent in the EDSA Revolution to those
events which are directly and reasonably related to the public facts of
the EDSA Revolution, the intrusion into private respondent's privacy
cannot be regarded as unreasonable and actionable. Such portrayal may
be carried out even without a license from private respondent.

This freedom is available in our country both to locally-owned and to

foreign-owned motion picture companies. Furthermore the
circumstance that the production of motion picture films is a commercial
activity expected to yield monetary profit, is not a disqualification for
availing of freedom of speech and of expression. Commercial media
constitute the bulk of such facilities available in our country and hence
to exclude commercially owned and operated media from the exercise
of constitutionally protected freedom of speech and of expression can
only result in the drastic contraction of such constitutional liberties in
our country

The right of privacy or "the right to be let alone, like the right of free
expression, is not an absolute right. A limited intrusion into a person's December 13, 2005
privacy has long been regarded as permissible where that person is a
public figure and the information sought to be elicited from him or to PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS, INC. (PEOPLES JOURNAL), ZACARIAS
be published about him constitute of a public character. Succinctly put, (publisher) NUGUID, JR. and CRISTINA LEE (reporter), vs.
the right of privacy cannot be invoked resist publication and FRANCIS THOENEN
dissemination of matters of public interest. The interest sought to be
protected by the right of privacy is the right to be free from unwarranted FACTS:
The principal source of the article reported by Lee was a letter by a
certain Atty. Angara: RESIDENTS of Paraaque BH Homes have asked the
Bureau of Immigration to deport a Swiss who allegedly shoots wayward
neighbors pets that he finds in his domain.
The BF Homes residents through lawyer Atty. Efren Angara complained
that the deportation of Francis Thoenen (retired engineer; married to a
Filipina; permanent resident in the Philippines) could help prevent the
recurrence of such incident in the future."
Angara explained that house owners could not control their dogs and
cats when they slip out of their dwellings unnoticed.
An alleged confrontation between Thoenen and the owner of a pet he
shot recently threatens to exacerbate the problem, Angara said.
Respondent claimed that the report was false and defamatory, and that
the petitioners acted irresponsibly in failing to verify the truth of the
same prior to publication. He filed a civil case for damages against
petitioners for the impairment of his reputation and standing in the
community.
Petitioners claim that they acquired a copy of the letter from a trusted
source in the CIDs Intelligence Division. They claimed to "have
reasonable grounds to believe in the truth and veracity of the
information derived (from their) sources. Further claimed that the
constitutional protections extended by the freedom of speech and of the
press clause of the 1987 Constitution against liability for libel, claiming
that the article was published in fulfillment of its social and moral duty
to inform the public "on matters of general interest, promote the public
good and protect the moral [fabric] of the people.
ISSUE: WON petitioners be granted his constitutional right under the
freedom of speech and press against liability
RULING
We hold that the constitutional privilege granted under the freedom of
speech and the press against liability for damages does not extend to
the petitioners in this case.
The freedom of speech and of the press is not absolute. The freedom of
speech and press and assembly, first laid down by President McKinley in
the Instruction to the Second Philippine Commission of 07 April 1900, is
an almost verbatim restatement of the first amendment of the
Constitution of the United States. Enshrined in Section 4, Article III of the
Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution, it states, "No law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government
for redress of grievances."
But not all speech is protected. "The right of free speech is not absolute
at all times and under all circumstances. There are certain well-defined
and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment
of which has never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.
These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the
insulting or fighting words - those which by their very utterance inflict
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been
well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth
that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by
the social interest in order and morality.
The article is not a privileged communication. A privileged
communication may be either absolutely privileged or qualifiedly
privileged. Absolutely privileged communications are those which are
not actionable even if the author has acted in bad faith. An example is
found in Sec. 11, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution which exempts a
member of Congress from liability for any speech or debate in the
Congress or in any Committee thereof. Upon the other hand, qualifiedly
privileged communications containing defamatory imputations are not
actionable unless found to have been made without good intention or
justifiable motive. To this genre belong private communications and
fair and true report without any comments or remarks. Petitioners story
is not privileged in character, for it is neither "private communication"
nor a fair and true report without any comments or remarks. A written
letter containing libelous matter cannot be classified as privileged when
it is published and circulated in public, which was what the petitioners
did in this case.
This argument is unavailing to the petitioners. Respondent is a private
individual, and not a public official or public figure. We are persuaded
by the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., that a newspaper or broadcaster publishing defamatory
falsehoods about an individual who is neither a public official nor a
public figure may not claim a constitutional privilege against liability, for
injury inflicted, even if the falsehood arose in a discussion of public
interest.
Having established that the article cannot be considered as privileged
communication, malice is therefore presumed, and the last requisite for
libel to attach to the petitioners is met. The news article is therefore
defamatory and is not within the realm of protected speech.
D. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND THE ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE (contempt of court)
July 29, 2002
IN RE: PUBLISHED ALLEGED THREATS AGAINST MEMBERS OF THE
COURT IN THE PLUNDER LAW CASE HURLED BY ATTY. LEONARD
DE VERA
FACTS:
The Court en banc directed respondent Atty. De Vera to explain why he
should not be cited for indirect contempt of court for uttering some
allegedly contemptuous statements in relation to the case involving the
constitutionality of the Plunder Law.
Respondent admitted the report in the November 6, 2002 issue of the
Inquirer that he "suggested that the Court must take steps to dispel once
and for all these ugly rumors and reports" that "the Court would vote in
favor of or against the validity of the Plunder Law" to protect the
credibility of the Court.

He also argued that he was merely exercising his constitutionally

guaranteed right to freedom of speech when he said that a decision by
the Court declaring the Plunder Law unconstitutional "would trigger
mass actions, probably more massive than those that led to People
Power II. He justified his statement and said that "the people wouldnt
just swallow any Supreme Court decision that is basically wrong" as an
expression of his opinion and as "historically correct.

However, respondent denied having made the same to degrade the

Court, to destroy public confidence in it and to bring it into disrepute.

ISSUE: WON respondent is guilty of indirect contempt of court

RULING:

The Court finds his explanation unsatisfactory and hereby finds him
guilty of indirect contempt of court for uttering statements aimed at
influencing and threatening the Court in deciding in favor of the
constitutionality of the Plunder Law.

Respondent cannot justify his contemptuous statements--asking the

Court to dispel rumors that it would declare the Plunder Law
unconstitutional, and stating that a decision declaring it as such was
basically wrong and would not be accepted by the peopleas
utterances protected by his right to freedom of speech.

Indeed, freedom of speech includes the right to know and discuss

judicial proceedings, but such right does not cover statements aimed at
undermining the Courts integrity and authority, and interfering with the
administration of justice. Freedom of speech is not absolute, and must
occasionally be balanced with the requirements of equally important
public interests, such as the maintenance of the integrity of the courts
and orderly functioning of the administration of justice.

Thus, the making of contemptuous statements directed against the

Court is not an exercise of free speech; rather, it is an abuse of such right.
Unwarranted attacks on the dignity of the courts cannot be disguised as
free speech, for the exercise of said right cannot be used to impair the
independence and efficiency of courts or public respect therefor and
confidence therein. It is a traditional conviction of civilized society
everywhere that courts should be immune from every extraneous
influence as they resolve the issues presented before them.
Clearly, respondents utterances pressuring the Court to rule in favor of
the constitutionality of the Plunder Law or risk another series of mass
actions by the public cannot be construed as falling within the ambit of
constitutionally-protected speech, because such statements are not fair
criticisms of any decision of the Court, but obviously are threats made
against it to force the Court to decide the issue in a particular manner,
or risk earning the ire of the public. Such statements show disrespect not
only for the Court but also for the judicial system as a whole, tend to
promote distrust and undermine public confidence in the judiciary, by
creating the impression that the Court cannot be trusted to resolve cases
impartially and violate the right of the parties to have their case tried
fairly by an independent tribunal, uninfluenced by public clamor and
other extraneous influences.
August 8, 2008
RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE ALLEGATIONS CONTAINED IN THE
COLUMNS OF MR. AMADO A.P. MACASAET PUBLISHED IN
MALAYA DATED SEPTEMBER 18, 19, 20, AND 21, 2007
FACTS:
The case stemmed from certain articles that appeared in the Business
Circuit column of Amado P. Macasaet in the Malaya, a newspaper of
general circulation of which he is the publisher. The articles containing
statements and innuendoes about an alleged bribery incident in the
Supreme Court.
5 boxes containing cash worth P10 million were delivered to the Court
and received by a certain "Cecilia," a staff of an unnamed lady Justice,
who opened one of the boxes and saw its contents. Forthwith, the Justice
terminated "Cecilias" employment. The payoff was made allegedly in
connection with a reversal of the decision rendered by the Justice
"acquitting" a certain Henry Go of a graft case. Macasaets story, which
carried commentaries on the state of the judiciary and reputation of
judges, exhorted "Cecilia" to divulge everything she knows about the
alleged bribery and the Court to investigate the matter.

Vitug, EIC of Newsbreak, faxed a letter to SC Associate Justice Consuelo

Ynares-Santiago asking an explanation of the reversal of his decision of
the graft case of Henry Go, the 10 million cash gift and the removal of
her secretary, Cecilia. Upon receipt of the Justice Ynares-Santiago called
for ACA Marquez to tell Vitug that he had been consistent on her
position in the Go case, that she never reversed herself, that she never
received a cash gift, and that no secretary was terminated for opening a
gift-wrapped box containing money.
Daisy Cecilia Muoz Delis (the named secretary who received the bribe
and was terminated), went to see Justice Ynares-Santiago and gave the
latter copies of her letter to respondent Macasaet and her affidavit. Delis,
in her letter to respondent Macasaet, described his articles as "baseless
reports." She clarified that she was a Judicial Staff Officer, and not a
secretary as the articles claimed she was; that she voluntarily resigned
from office and was not fired; that as a matter of procedure, she would
not have been tasked to receive boxes, as such was a duty assigned to
their utility personnel; that it was "highly unlikely for something as
blatant as a bribery attempt to have been done right in the doors of the
Court."
Justice Ynares-Santiago called ACA Marquez and gave copies of her
written statement "categorically denying the accusations and
insinuations, all malicious and unfounded, published in Malaya and in
Newsbreak;" and underscoring "that these are blatant lies clearly aimed
at smearing and maligning my character and person, and the integrity
of the Judiciary which (she has) been faithfully serving for 34 years now.
The Newsbreak report named Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago as the
member of the Court involved in the alleged bribery and one Cecilia
Delis as her staff whose employment she terminated. Court en banc
required Macasaet to explain "why no sanction should be impose[d] on
him for indirect contempt of court"
Macasaet, Vitug and Rufo uniformly testified that they obtained the
information on the alleged bribery from their respective confidential
sources. Finding sufficient basis to hold respondent Macasaet in indirect
contempt of court
The Committee found that there exist valid grounds to cite Macasaet for
indirect contempt. The Report found that (1) Macasaets publications
were false, baseless, unbelievable, and malicious and (2) Macasaet was
negligent in failing to ascertain the veracity of his story. The Committee
concluded that Macasaets publications generated public distrust in the
administration of justice and thus, contumacious. The majority finds the
Reports findings and conclusion well-taken and accordingly imposes a
punitive fine on Macasaet.
ISSUE: WON respondents invocation of his right to press freedom as a
defense can be sought
RULING:
Closely linked with the right to freedom of speech and of the press is the
public right to scrutinize and criticize government. The freedom to
question the government has been a protected right of long-standing
tradition throughout American history. There is no doubt that the
fundamental freedom to criticize government necessarily includes the
right to criticize the courts, their proceedings and decisions. Since the
drafting of their Constitution over 200 years ago, American judges have
anticipated and sometimes even encouraged public scrutiny of
themselves, if not of the judiciary as a whole.
This open justice principle, which is as fundamental to a democratic
society as freedom of speech, has been an accepted doctrine in several
jurisdictions. It is justified on the ground that if the determination of
justice cannot be hidden from the public, this will provide: (1) a
safeguard against judicial arbitrariness or idiosyncrasy, and (2) the
maintenance of the publics confidence in the administration of justice.
While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to
maintaining a free and democratic society, there is also a general
consensus that healthy criticism only goes so far. Many types of criticism
leveled at the judiciary cross the line to become harmful and
irresponsible attacks. These potentially devastating attacks and unjust
criticism can threaten the independence of the judiciary.
Accordingly, it has been consistently held that, while freedom of speech,
of expression, and of the press are at the core of civil liberties and have
to be protected at all costs for the sake of democracy, these freedoms
are not absolute. For, if left unbridled, they have the tendency to be
abused and can translate to licenses, which could lead to disorder and
anarchy.
Thus, in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, this Court ruled that "from
the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear
that the right (to free expression) is not susceptible of any limitation. No
law may be passed abridging the freedom of speech and of the press.
The realities of life in a complex society preclude, however, a literal
interpretation. Freedom of expression is not absolute. It would be too
much to insist that, at all times and under all circumstances, it should
remain unfettered and unrestrained. There are other societal values that
press for recognition."
Indeed, freedom of speech cannot be absolute and unconditional. In
legal, political, and philosophical contexts, it is always regarded as liable
to be overridden by important countervailing interests, such as state
security, public order, safety of individual citizens, protection of
reputation, and due process of law, which encompasses not only the
right to a fair trial, but also the preservation of public confidence in the
proper administration of justice
Even the major international and regional human rights instruments of
civil and political rights protect both freedom of expression and the
administration of justice. Freedom of expression is protected under
Article 19 of the ICCPR
(1) Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
(2) Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall
include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all
kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the
form of art, or through any other media of his choice.
In determining the liability of the respondent in this contempt
proceeding, we weigh the conflicting constitutional considerations
respondents claim of his right to press freedom, on one hand; and, on
the other hand, ensuring judicial independence by upholding public
interest in maintaining the dignity of the judiciary and the orderly
administration of justice both indispensable to the preservation of
democracy and the maintenance of a just society.
Unfortunately, the published articles of respondent Macasaet are not of
this genre. On the contrary, he has crossed the line, as his are baseless
scurrilous attacks which demonstrate nothing but an abuse of press
freedom. They leave no redeeming value in furtherance of freedom of
the press. They do nothing but damage the integrity of the High Court,
undermine the faith and confidence of the people in the judiciary, and
threaten the doctrine of judicial independence.
To reiterate the words of the Committee, this case is "not just another
event that should pass unnoticed for it has implications far beyond the
allocated ramparts of free speech." To allow respondent to use press
freedom as an excuse to capriciously disparage the reputation of the
Court and that of innocent private individuals would be to make a
mockery of this liberty

Indeed, the confidential information allegedly received by respondent

by which he swears with his "heart and soul" was found by the
Investigating Committee unbelievable. It was a story that reeked of
urban legend, as it generated more questions than answers.

The Court declares respondent Amado P. Macasaet GUILTY of indirect

contempt of court and sentences him to pay a fine of P20, 000.00, in
accordance with Rules of Civil Procedure.

December 14, 2010

ANTONIO LEJANO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

FACTS:

Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela, nineteen years old, and
Jennifer, seven, were brutally slain at their home- the Vizconde massacre

The trial court smelled a frame-up. presented star-witness Jessica M.

Alfaro, who claimed that she witnessed the crime. She pointed to
accused Hubert Webb, Antonio Lejano, Artemio Ventura, Michael A.
Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel Rodriguez, and
Joey Filart as the culprits.

Some of the accused denied any part in the crime and saying they were
elsewhere when it took place. Webbs alibi appeared the strongest since
he claimed that he was then across the ocean in the United States of
America. The trial court thought little of the denials and alibis and it
found sufficient evidence of in raping and killing Carmela and in
executing her mother and sister.

Webb requested to submit for DNA analysis the semen specimen from
Carmelas cadaver, which specimen was then believed still under the
safekeeping of the NBI. But NBI informed the Court that it no longer has
custody of the specimen for it had been turned over to the trial court
but it was not among the object evidence that offered in evidence. This
prompted accused Webb to file for acquittal on the ground that the
governments failure to preserve such vital evidence has resulted in the
denial of his right to due process.

ISSUES:

1. WON Webb presented sufficient evidence to prove his alibi and rebut
Alfaros testimony that he led the others in committing the crime.

2. WON Alfaros testimony describing the crime and identifying the

accused is entitled to belief; and

RULING:

1. Webb is not entitled to acquittal for the failure of the State to produce
the semen specimen at this late stage. For one thing, the ruling in Brady
v. Maryland that he cites has long be overtaken by the decision in
Arizona v. Youngblood, where the U.S. Supreme Court held that due
process does not require the State to preserve the semen specimen
although it might be useful to the accused unless the latter is able to
show bad faith on the part of the prosecution or the police. Here, the
State presented a medical expert who testified on the existence of the
specimen and Webb in fact sought to have the same subjected to DNA
test.
For, another, when Webb raised the DNA issue, the rule governing DNA
evidence did not yet exist, the country did not yet have the technology
for conducting the test, and no Philippine precedent had as yet
recognized its admissibility as evidence. Consequently, the idea of
keeping the specimen secure even after the trial court rejected the
motion for DNA testing did not come up. Indeed, neither Webb nor his
co-accused brought up the matter of preserving the specimen in the
meantime.
2. The trial court and the Court of Appeals are one in rejecting as weak
Webbs alibi. Their reason is uniform: Webbs alibi cannot stand against
Alfaros positive identification of him as the rapist and killer of Carmela
and, apparently, the killer as well of her mother and younger sister.
Because of this, to the lower courts, Webbs denial and alibi were
fabricated.
But not all denials and alibis should be regarded as fabricated. Indeed, if
the accused is truly innocent, he can have no other defense but denial
and alibi. So how can such accused penetrate a mind that has been made
cynical by the rule drilled into his head that a defense of alibi is a
hangmans noose in the face of a witness positively swearing, "I saw him
do it."? Most judges believe that such assertion automatically dooms an
alibi which is so easy to fabricate. This quick stereotype thinking,
however, is distressing. For how else can the truth that the accused is
really innocent have any chance of prevailing over such a stone-cast
tenet?
Rather, to be acceptable, the positive identification must meet at least
two criteria:
1. The positive identification of the offender must come from a
credible witness. She is credible who can be trusted to tell the
truth, usually based on past experiences with her. Her word
has, to one who knows her, its weight in gold.
2. The witness story of what she personally saw must be
believable, not inherently contrived. A witness who testifies
about something she never saw runs into inconsistencies and
makes bewildering claims.
Here, as already fully discussed above, Alfaro and her testimony fail to
meet the above criteria.
She did not show up at the NBI as a spontaneous witness bothered by
her conscience. She had been hanging around that agency for some time
as a stool pigeon, one paid for mixing up with criminals and squealing
on them. Police assets are often criminals themselves. She was the
prosecutions worst possible choice for a witness. Indeed, her superior
testified that she volunteered to play the role of a witness in the
Vizconde killings when she could not produce a man she promised to
the NBI.
Requisites: to establish alibi, the accused must prove by positive, clear,
and satisfactory evidence that: (a) He was present at another place at the
time of the perpetration of the crime; and (b) that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime
Webbs documented alibi altogether impeaches Alfaro's testimony, not
only with respect to him, but also with respect to his co-accused. For, if
the Court accepts the proposition that Webb was in the U.S. when the
crime took place, Alfaros testimony will not hold together. Webbs
participation is the anchor of Alfaros story. Without it, the evidence
against the others must necessarily fall. SC acquitted all the accused of
the crimes charged for failure to prove their guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
March 8, 2011
RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED "RESTORING
INTEGRITY: A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF
PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION IN THE SUPREME COURT"
FACTS:
The ponencia of Associate Justice Del Castillo in Vinuya, et al. v. Executive
Secretary was promulgated. The counsel for Vinuya, et al. (the "Malaya
Lolas"), filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MFR) of the Vinuya decision.
Counsel for the Malaya Lolas, filed a Supplemental MFR, where they
posited for the first time their charge of plagiarism as one of the grounds
for reconsideration of the Vinuya decision.
According to Attys. Roque and Bagares, the works allegedly plagiarized
in the Vinuya decision were: (1) Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Decents
article (2) Christian J. Tams book; and (3) Mark Ellis article.
A statement entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of
the University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of
Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court" was posted in
Newsbreaks website and on Atty. Roques blog. A report regarding the
statement also appeared on various on-line news sites. The statement
was likewise posted at the UP College of Laws bulletin board and at said
colleges website
In a Resolution, the Court en banc made the following observations
regarding the UP Law Faculty Statement:
x x x Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks which raise concern
for the Court. The opening sentence alone is a grim preamble to the institutional
attack that lay ahead.
The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya v.
Executive Secretary as a reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by
the Highest Court of the land. x x x.
The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of
deliberately delaying the resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the basis of
"polluted sources," the Courts alleged indifference to the cause of petitioners [in
the Vinuya case], as well as the supposed alarming lack of concern of the members
of the Court for even the most basic values of decency and respect.34 x x x.
This runs contrary to their obligation as law professors and officers of the Court to
be the first to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which they owe
fidelity according to the oath they have taken as attorneys, and not to promote
distrust in the administration of justice.
Thus, the Court directed the 35 lawyers and UP Law professors, herein
respondents, to show cause why they should not be disciplined as
members of the Bar for violation of Canons 1, 11 and 13 and Rules 1.02
and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The 35 respondents filed on a common compliance. By way of
explanation, the respondents emphasized the following points:
Freedom of expression. In paragraphs 28 to 30 of the Common
Compliance, respondents briefly discussed their position that in issuing
their Statement, "they should be seen as not only to be performing their
duties as members of the Bar, officers of the court, and teachers of law,
but also as citizens of a democracy who are constitutionally protected in
the exercise of free speech."
Academic freedom. In paragraphs 31 to 34 of the Common
Compliance, respondents asserted that their Statement was also issued
in the exercise of their academic freedom as teachers in an institution of
higher learning. They relied on Section 5 of the University of the
Philippines Charter of 2008 which provided that "the national university
has the right and responsibility to exercise academic freedom." They
likewise adverted to Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola
School of Theology70 which they claimed recognized the extent and
breadth of such freedom as to encourage a free and healthy discussion
and communication of a faculty members field of study without fear of
reprisal. It is respondents view that had they remained silent on the
plagiarism issue in the Vinuya decision they would have "compromised
[their] integrity and credibility as teachers; [their silence] would have
created a culture and generation of students, professionals, even
lawyers, who would lack the competence and discipline for research and
pleading; or, worse, [that] their silence would have communicated to the
public that plagiarism and misrepresentation are inconsequential
matters and that intellectual integrity has no bearing or relevance to
ones conduct.
ISSUES: (1) WON Show Cause Resolution deny respondents their
freedom of expression (2) WON the Show Cause Resolution violate
respondents academic freedom as law professors
RULING:
1. The Show Cause Resolution does not deny respondents their freedom
of expression.
It is respondents collective claim that the Court, with the issuance of the
Show Cause Resolution, has interfered with respondents constitutionally
mandated right to free speech and expression. It appears that the
underlying assumption behind respondents assertion is the
misconception that this Court is denying them the right to criticize the
Courts decisions and actions, and that this Court seeks to "silence"
respondent law professors dissenting view on what they characterize as
a "legitimate public issue."
This is far from the truth. A reading of the Show Cause Resolution will
plainly show that it was neither the fact that respondents had criticized
a decision of the Court nor that they had charged one of its members of
plagiarism that motivated the said Resolution. It was the manner of the
criticism and the contumacious language by which respondents, who are
not parties nor counsels in the Vinuya case, have expressed their opinion
in favor of the petitioners in the said pending case for the "proper
disposition" and consideration of the Court that gave rise to said
Resolution. The Show Cause Resolution painstakingly enumerated the
statements that the Court considered excessive and uncalled for under
the circumstances surrounding the issuance, publication, and later
submission to this Court of the UP Law facultys Restoring Integrity
Statement.
To reiterate, it was not the circumstance that respondents expressed a
belief that Justice Del Castillo was guilty of plagiarism but rather their
expression of that belief as "not only as an established fact, but a truth"
when it was "of public knowledge [that there was] an ongoing
investigation precisely to determine the truth of such allegations." It was
also pointed out in the Show Cause Resolution that there was a pending
motion for reconsideration of the Vinuya decision. The Show Cause
Resolution made no objections to the portions of the Restoring Integrity
Statement that respondents claimed to be "constructive" but only asked
respondents to explain those portions of the said Statement that by no
stretch of the imagination could be considered as fair or constructive,
The accusatory and vilifying nature of certain portions of the Statement
exceeded the limits of fair comment and cannot be deemed as protected
free speech. Even In the Matter of Petition for Declaratory Relief Re:
Constitutionality of Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v. Commission on
Elections, relied upon by respondents in the Common Compliance, held
that:
From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it
would appear that the right is not susceptible of any limitation. No law
may be passed abridging the freedom of speech and of the press. The
realities of life in a complex society preclude however a literal
interpretation. Freedom of expression is not an absolute. It would be too
much to insist that at all times and under all circumstances it should
remain unfettered and unrestrained. There are other societal values that
press for recognition. x x x.
One such societal value that presses for recognition in the case at bar is
the threat to judicial independence and the orderly administration of
justice that immoderate, reckless and unfair attacks on judicial decisions
and institutions pose.
2. The Show Cause Resolution does not interfere with respondents
academic freedom.
It is not contested that respondents herein are, by law and jurisprudence,
guaranteed academic freedom and undisputedly, they are free to
determine what they will teach their students and how they will teach.
We must point out that there is nothing in the Show Cause Resolution
that dictates upon respondents the subject matter they can teach and
the manner of their instruction. Moreover, it is not inconsistent with the
principle of academic freedom for this Court to subject lawyers who
teach law to disciplinary action for contumacious conduct and speech,
coupled with undue intervention in favor of a party in a pending case,
without observing proper procedure, even if purportedly done in their
capacity as teachers.
A novel issue involved in the present controversy, for it has not been
passed upon in any previous case before this Court, is the question of
whether lawyers who are also law professors can invoke academic
freedom as a defense in an administrative proceeding for intemperate
statements tending to pressure the Court or influence the outcome of a
case or degrade the courts.
Applying by analogy the Courts past treatment of the "free speech"
defense in other bar discipline cases, academic freedom cannot be
successfully invoked by respondents in this case. The implicit ruling in
the jurisprudence discussed above is that the constitutional right to
freedom of expression of members of the Bar may be circumscribed by
their ethical duties as lawyers to give due respect to the courts and to
uphold the publics faith in the legal profession and the justice system.
To our mind, the reason that freedom of expression may be so delimited
in the case of lawyers applies with greater force to the academic freedom
of law professors.
 FACTS

In 1984 Republican National Convention, respondent Johnson

participated in a political demonstration to protest the policies of the
Reagan administration and some Dallas-based corporations. Johnson
burned an American flag while protesters chanted. Several witnesses
were seriously offended by the flag burning.

Johnson was convicted of desecration of a venerated object in violation

of a Texas statute, and a state court of appeals affirmed. But, the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, holding that the State, consistent
with the First Amendment, could not punish Johnson for burning the flag
in these circumstances.

The court first found that Johnson's burning of the flag was expressive
conduct protected by the First Amendment. The court concluded that
the State could not criminally sanction flag desecration in order to
preserve the flag as a symbol of national unity. It also held that the
statute did not meet the State's goal of preventing breaches of the
peace, since it was not drawn narrowly enough to encompass only those
flag burnings that would likely result in a serious disturbance, and since
the flag burning in this case did not threaten such a reaction. Further, it
stressed that another Texas statute prohibited breaches of the peace and
could be used to prevent disturbances without punishing this flag
desecration.

ISSUE

WON Johnson be convicted of desecration of a venerated object

RULING

Johnson's conviction for flag desecration is inconsistent with the First

Amendment.

(a) Under the circumstances, Johnson's burning of the flag constituted

expressive conduct, permitting him to invoke the First Amendment. The
State conceded that the conduct was expressive. Occurring as it did at
the end of a demonstration coinciding with the Republican National
Convention, the expressive, overtly political nature of the conduct was
both intentional and overwhelmingly apparent.

(b) Texas has not asserted an interest in support of Johnson's conviction

that is unrelated to the suppression of expression and would therefore
permit application of the test set forth in United States v. O'Brien
whereby an important governmental interest in regulating non-speech
can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms when
speech and non-speech elements are combined in the same course of
conduct. An interest in preventing breaches of the peace is not
implicated on this record. Expression may not be prohibited [p398] on
the basis that an audience that takes serious offense to the expression
may disturb the peace, since the Government cannot assume that every
expression of a provocative idea will incite a riot, but must look to the
actual circumstances surrounding the expression. Johnson's expression
of dissatisfaction with the Federal Government's policies also does not
fall within the class of "fighting words" likely to be seen as a direct
personal insult or an invitation to exchange fisticuffs. This Court's
holding does not forbid a State to prevent "imminent lawless action"
and, in fact, Texas has a law specifically prohibiting breaches of the
peace. Texas' interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood
and national unity is related to expression in this case and, thus, falls
E. SYMBOLIC EXPRESSION- The Flag-burning case
outside the O'Brien test.

(c) The latter interest does not justify Johnson's conviction. The
Texas vs Johnson (1984)
restriction on Johnson's political expression is content based, since the
Texas statute is not aimed at protecting the physical integrity of the flag
in all circumstances, but is designed to protect it from intentional and
knowing abuse that causes serious offense to others. It is therefore
subject to "the most exacting scrutiny." Boos v. Barry, the Government
may not prohibit the verbal or nonverbal expression of an idea merely
because society finds the idea offensive or disagreeable, even where our
flag is involved. Nor may a State foster its own view of the flag by
prohibiting expressive conduct relating to it, since the Government may
not permit designated symbols to be used to communicate a limited set
of messages. Moreover, this Court will not create an exception to these
principles protected by the First Amendment for the American flag
alone.
F. ASSEMBLY and PETITION
March 25, 1999
LUZVIMINDA DE LA CRUZ, MERCY DE LEON, TERESITA EUGENIO,
CORAZON GOMEZ, ELENA GUEVARRA, ROSALINA JINGCO, LOIDA
IGNACIO, and EMERITA PIZARRO vs. CA, CSC and THE SECRETARY
OF DECS
FACTS:
Petitioners are public school teachers from various schools in Metro
Manila who were simultaneously charged, preventively suspended, and
eventually dismissed by Secretary Isidro D. Cario of DECS.
Petitioner teachers participated in the mass action/illegal strike in and
subsequently defied the return-to-work order issued by this Office,
which acts constitute grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty and
violation of CSC Rules, gross insubordination conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service and absence without official leave.
Required to explain within a period but respondents failed to submit the
required answer within the given time up to the present, which failure, is
considered a waiver on their part of their right to answer the charges
and to controvert the same.
CSC found petitioners guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of the service for having participated in the mass actions.
ISSUE: WON petitioners right to free assembly has been violated
RULING:
We denied the claim that the teachers were thereby denied their rights
to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances reasoning that this constitutional liberty to be upheld, like
any other liberty, must be exercised within reasonable limits so as not to
prejudice the public welfare. The public school teachers in the case of
the 1990 mass actions did not exercise their constitutional rights within
reasonable limits. On the contrary, they committed acts prejudicial to the
best interest of the service by staging the mass protests on regular
school days, abandoning their classes and refusing to go back even after
they had been ordered to do so. Had the teachers availed of their free
time recess, after classes, weekends or holidays to dramatize their
grievances and to dialogue with the proper authorities within the
bounds of law, no one not the DECS, the CSC or even the Supreme
Court could have held them liable for their participation in the mass
actions.
The persistent refusal of the striking teachers to call the mass actions by
the conventional term "strike" did not erase the true nature of the mass
actions as unauthorized stoppages of work the purpose of which was to
obtain a favorable response to the teachers' economic grievances. We
again stressed that the teachers were penalized not because they
exercised their right to peaceably assemble but because of the manner
by which such right was exercised, i.e., going on unauthorized and
unilateral absences thus disrupting classes in various schools in Metro
Manila which produced adverse effects upon the students for whose
education the teachers were responsible.

D. CONTENT-NEUTRAL RESTRICTIONS
1. Regulation of Political campaign/election activity
March 31, 1998
EMILIO M. R. OSMEA and PABLO P. GARCIA vs. COMELEC
FACTS:
Petitioners are candidates for public office in the forthcoming elections.
(Osmena for President of the Philippines; Garcia for governor of Cebu)
They have called into question the validity of the Sec.11 (b) of R.A. No.
6646 which NPC upheld to be valid. Petitioners claim that the experience
in the last 5 years since the decision in that case has shown the
"undesirable effects" of the law because "the ban on political advertising
has not only failed to level the playing field, [but] actually worked to the
grave disadvantage of the poor candidate[s]" by depriving them of a
medium which they can afford to pay while their more affluent rivals can
always resort to other means of reaching voters like airplanes, boats,
rallies, parades, and handbills.
ISSUE: WON Sec.11 (b) of R.A. No. 6646 can be regulated
RULING:
1. Test for Content-Neutral Restrictions was formulated in United
States v. O'Brien. It is an appropriate test for restrictions on speech
which, like Sec.11 (b), are content-neutral. Unlike content-based
restrictions, they are not imposed because of the content of the speech.
For this reason, content-neutral restrictions are tests demanding
standards. For example, a rule such as that involved in Sanidad v.
COMELEC, prohibiting columnists, commentators, and announcers from
campaigning either for or against an issue in a plebiscite must have a
compelling reason to support it, or it will not pass muster under strict
scrutiny. These restrictions, it will be seen, are censorial and therefore
they bear a heavy presumption of constitutional invalidity. In addition
they will be tested for possible overbreadth and vagueness.
It is apparent that these doctrines have no application to content-neutral
regulations which, like Sec. 11(b), are not concerned with the content of
the speech. These regulations need only a substantial governmental
interest to support them. A deferential standard of review will suffice to
test their validity.
2. The clear-and-present-danger test argues that "media ads do not
partake of the 'real substantive evil' that the state has a right to prevent
and that justifies the curtailment of the people's cardinal right to choose
their means of expression and of access to information." The clear-and-
present-danger test is not, however, a sovereign remedy for all free
speech problems. As has been pointed out it was originally formulated
for the criminal law and only later appropriated for free speech cases. It
is inappropriate as a test for determining the constitutional validity of
laws which, like Sec.11 (b) of R.A. No. 6646, are not concerned with the
content of political ads but only with their incidents.
The reason for this difference for the restriction of speech is that
content-based restrictions distort public debate, have improper
motivation, and are usually imposed because of fear of how people will
react to a particular speech. Hence, applying the O'Brien test in this case,
we find that Sec.11 (b) of R.A. No. 6646 is a valid exercise of the power
of the State to regulate media of communication or information for the
purpose of ensuring equal opportunity, time and space for political
campaigns; that the regulation is unrelated to the suppression of speech;
that any restriction on freedom of expression is only incidental and no
more than is necessary to achieve the purpose of promoting equality.

January 28, 2000
ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION vs. COMELEC
FACTS:
Resolution was issued by the COMELEC to stop ABS-CBN or any other
groups, its agents or representatives from conducting such exit survey.
The resolution was issued because COMELEC received an information
from a reliable source that ABS-CBN has prepared a project, with PR
groups, to conduct radio-TV coverage of the elections and to make an
exit survey vote during the elections for national officials particularly for
President and Vice President, results of which shall be broadcast
immediately. The electoral body believed that such project might conflict
with the official COEMELEC count, as well as the unofficial quick count
of NAMFREL. Also, it had not authorized petitioner to undertake the exit
survey.
Petitioner argues that the holding of exit polls and the nationwide
reporting their results are valid exercises of the freedoms of speech and
of the press. Public respondent, on the other hand, denies that, in issuing
the assailed Resolution, it gravely abused its discretion. It insists that the
issuance thereof was "pursuant to its constitutional and statutory powers
to promote a clean, honest, orderly and credible May 11, 1998 elections";
and "to protect, preserve and maintain the secrecy and sanctity of the
ballot." It contends that "the conduct of exit surveys might unduly
confuse and influence the voters,"
ISSUE: WON COMELECs resolution is valid
RULING:
An exit poll is a species of electoral survey conducted by qualified
individuals or groups of individuals for the purpose of determining the
probable result of an election by confidentially asking randomly selected
voters whom they have voted for, immediately after they have officially
cast their ballots. The results of the survey are announced to the public,
usually through the mass media, to give an advance overview of how, in
the opinion of the polling individuals or organizations, the electorate
voted.
Admittedly, no law prohibits the holding and the reporting of exit polls.
The question can thus be more narrowly defined: May the COMELEC, in
the exercise of its powers, totally ban exit polls? In answering this
question, we need to review quickly our jurisprudence on the freedoms
of speech and of the press.
Our Constitution clearly mandates that no law shall be passed abridging
the freedom of speech or of the press. In the landmark case Gonzales v.
COMELEC, this Court enunciated that at the very least, free speech and
a free press consist of the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any
matter of public interest without prior restraint.
Limitations. Unquestionably, this Court adheres to the "clear and
present danger" test. In setting the standard or test for the "clear and
present danger" doctrine, the Court echoed the words of Justice Holmes:
"The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has
a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree."
A limitation on the freedom of expression may be justified only by a
danger of such substantive character that the state has a right to prevent.
Unlike in the "dangerous tendency" doctrine, the danger must not only
be clear but also present. "Present" refers to the time element; the
danger must not only be probable but very likely to be inevitable. The
evil sought to be avoided must be so substantive as to justify a clamp
over one's mouth or a restraint of a writing instrument.
Justification for a Restriction. The Court has always ruled in favor of
the freedom of expression, and any restriction is treated an exemption.
The power to exercise prior restraint is not to be presumed; rather the
presumption is against its validity. And it is respondent's burden to
overthrow such presumption. Any act that restrains speech should be
greeted with furrowed brows.
The freedoms of speech and of the press should all the more be upheld
when what is sought to be curtailed is the dissemination of information
meant. To add meaning to the equally vital right of suffrage. We cannot
support any ruling or order "the effect of which would be to nullify so
vital a constitutional right as free speech. When faced with borderline
situations in which the freedom of a candidate or a party to speak or the
freedom of the electorate to know is invoked against actions allegedly
made to assure clean and free elections, this Court shall lean in favor of
freedom. For in the ultimate analysis, the freedom of the citizen and the
State's power to regulate should not be antagonistic. There can be no
free and honest elections if, in the efforts to maintain them, the freedom
to speak and the right to know are unduly curtailed.
May 5, 2001
SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS, INCORPORATED and KAMAHALAN
PUBLISHING CORPORATION, doing business as MANILA
STANDARD vs. COMELEC
FACTS:
Petitioner SWS, social research institution, wishes to conduct an election
survey throughout the period of the elections both national and local
levels and release to the media the survey results and publish them
directly. Kamahalan Publishing Corporation also intends to publish
election survey results up to the last day of the elections.
Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election
survey results constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of
speech without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint.
There is no empirical or historical evidence to support the conclusion
that there is an immediate and inevitable danger to tile voting process
posed by election surveys.
Thus, petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the
COMELEC from enforcing 5.4 of RA. No.9006 (Fair Election Act),
Respondent justifies the restrictions in 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 as necessary
to prevent the manipulation and corruption of the electoral process by
unscrupulous and erroneous surveys just before the election.
ISSUE: (1) WON Sec.5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional
abridgment of freedom of speech, expression, and the press (2) What
test should be employed to determine its validity
RULING:
1. We hold that Sec. 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional
abridgment of freedom of speech, expression, and the press.
Sec. 5.4 lays a prior restraint on freedom of speech, expression, and the
press prohibiting the publication of election survey results affecting
candidates within the prescribed periods of fifteen (15) days immediately
preceding a national election seven (7) days before a local election.
Because of tile preferred status of tile constitutional rights of speech,
expression, and he press, such a measure is vitiated by a weighty
presumption of invalidity.2 Indeed, any system of prior restraints of
expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy Presumption against its
constitutional validity
2. What test should then be employed to determine the constitutional
validity of Sec. 5.4? The United States Supreme Court, held in United
States v. O 'Brien:
[A] Government regulation is sufficiently justified: [1] if it is within the
constitutional power of the Government; [2] if it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; [3] if the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and [4] if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms [of speech, expression
and press] is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest.
Under this test, even if a law furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest, it should be invalidated if such governmental
interest is "not unrelated to the Expression of free expression.
First, Sec. 5.4 fails to meet criterion [3] of the O 'Brien test because the
causal connection of expression to the asserted governmental interest
makes such interest "not related to the suppression of free expression."
The constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression means that "the
government has no power to restrict expression because of its message,
its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." The inhibition of speech
should be upheld only if the expression falls within one of the few
unprotected categories dealt with in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, thus:
These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the
insulting or 'fighting' words - those which by their very utterance inflict
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. Such
utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of
such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order
and morality.
Second, Sec. 5.4 fails to meet criterion [4] of the O'Brien test. 5.4 aims
at the prevention of last-minute pressure on voters, the creation of
bandwagon effect, "junking" of weak or "losing" candidates, and resort
to the form of election cheating called "dagdag-bawas." Praiseworthy as
these aims of the regulation might be, they cannot be attained at the
sacrifice of the fundamental right of expression, when such aim can be
more narrowly pursued by punishing unlawful acts, rather than speech
because of apprehension that such speech creates the danger of such
evils.
To summarize then, we hold that Sec. 5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes
a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total
suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression
is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to
be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of
freedom of expression.
D. CONTENT-NEUTRAL RESTRICTIONS
2. Freedom of Assembly
April 25, 2006
BAYAN vs. EDUARDO ERMITA as Executive Secretary
FACTS:
Petitioners come in three groups. Bayan et. al, Jess Prado et. al, and KMU
et. al, alleged that their rights as organizations and individuals to
conduct peaceful mass actions and right to peaceful assembly were
violated when they were violently dispersed by policemen in
implementing BP 880 (Public Assembly Act of 1985). They content that
BP 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties.
Petitioners argue that BP 880 requires a permit before one can stage a
public assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and
present danger. Also, the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the
freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly
form part of the message for which the expression is sought.
Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass
actions in support of the government.
Respondents content that neither BP 880 nor CPR is void on its face.
Petitioners cannot honestly claim that the time, place and manner
regulation embodied in BP 880 violates the 3-pronged test for such a
measure, to wit: (a) B.P. No. 880 is content-neutral, i.e., it has no reference
to content of regulated speech; (b) BP880 is narrowly tailored to serve a
significant governmental interest, i.e., the interest cannot be equally well
served by a means that is less intrusive of free speech interests; and (c)
BP 880 leaves open alternative channels for communication of the
information.
ISSUE: WON BP 880 is constitutional
RULING:
The right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances
is, together with freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, a
right that enjoys primacy in the realm of constitutional protection. For
these rights constitute the very basis of a functional democratic polity,
without which all the other rights would be meaningless and
unprotected.
It is very clear, therefore, that B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of
public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place
and manner of the assemblies. This was adverted to in Osmea v.
Comelec, where the Court referred to it as a "content-neutral" regulation
of the time, place, and manner of holding public assemblies.
A fair and impartial reading of BP 880 thus readily shows that it refers to
all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places. The reference
to "lawful cause" does not make it content-based because assemblies
really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be
"peaceable" and entitled to protection. Neither are the words "opinion,"
"protesting" and "influencing" in the definition of public assembly
content based, since they can refer to any subject. The words
"petitioning the government for redress of grievances" come from the
wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally,
maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and
is independent of the content of the expressions in the rally.
Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and
present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public
morals or public health. This is a recognized exception to the exercise of
the right even under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Hence, BP 880 cannot be condemned as unconstitutional; it does not
curtail or unduly restrict freedoms; it merely regulates the use of public
places as to the time, place and manner of assemblies. Far from being
insidious, "maximum tolerance" is for the benefit of rallyists, not the
government. The delegation to the mayors of the power to issue rally
"permits" is valid because it is subject to the constitutionally-sound
"clear and present danger" standard.
In this Decision, the Court goes even one step further in safeguarding
liberty by giving local governments a deadline of 30 days within which
to designate specific freedom parks as provided under B.P. No. 880. If,
after that period, no such parks are so identified in accordance with
Section 15 of the law, all public parks and plazas of the municipality or
city concerned shall in effect be deemed freedom parks; no prior permit
of whatever kind shall be required to hold an assembly therein. The only
requirement will be written notices to the police and the mayors office
to allow proper coordination and orderly activities.
 the offices of the justices, judges, and court officials and employees be
obstructed.

4. Demonstrators, picketers, rallyists and their sympathizers are

prohibited from camping out on the streets, sidewalks or pavement
adjacent to, in front of, or within a radius of two hundred (200) meters
from, the outer boundary of the Supreme Court Building, any Hall of
Justice, and any other building that houses at least one (1) court sala.
No provisional shelters and kitchens, pickets' quarters, and other similar
makeshift structures shall be established in said areas.

5. Lawyers of parties with cases pending in courts have a duty to

properly apprise their clients on matters of decorum and proper attitude
toward courts of justice when engaged in demonstrations, pickets, rallies
and similar activities. As officers of the court, they must help to preserve
the dignity of the courts and to insulate the courts from all forms of
influence that may adversely affect judicial impartiality and violate a
party's right to due process.

6. Any violation of this resolution shall be treated as contempt of court.

SUPREME COURT CIRCULAR: A.M. 98-7-02-SC July 7, 1998
Re: Guidelines on the Conduct of Demonstrations, Pickets, Rallies
and Other Similar Gatherings in the Vicinity of the Supreme Court
and All Other Courts
EN BANC
Considering the inherent and regulatory power of the courts to control
their proceedings in order to permit the fair and impartial administration
of justice and the constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure
in all courts, and complementing further the Per Curiam Resolution of
the Court in the case of Nestle Philippines, Inc. v. Hon. Augusto S.
Sanchez, et al., dated September 30, 1987, the Court resolves to adopt
formally the following policy and procedural guidelines, regarding the
conduct of demonstrations, pickets, rallies and other similar gatherings
in the vicinity of the grounds and adjacent areas of the Supreme Court
and all other courts:
Members of the Bar violating this resolution may, in addition, be subject
to the administrative sanctions of fine, imprisonment, suspension from
the practice of law or disbarment as circumstances may warrant.
The Clerk of Court is directed to forthwith cause publication of these
Guidelines in two (2) newspapers of general circulation. The Guidelines
shall take effect upon the expiration of fifteen (15) days after such
publication.
The Clerk of Court is further directed to furnish all lower courts, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the PNP, and all agencies of local
governments in charge of issuing permits to hold demonstrations,
rallies, pickets and similar activities, around the vicinity of courts of
justice with copies of this Resolution.
Very truly yours,

1. Courts are the defenders of the people's rights, especially their [Sgd.] LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO
freedom of expression and assembly. Free speech and peaceable
assembly, along with the other intellectual freedoms, are highly ranked Clerk of Court
in our scheme of constitutional values.

These freedoms, however, are not absolute. The right of a citizen to use
the streets for communication of views on national questions must be
balanced with the need of our courts for an atmosphere that will enable
them to dispense justice free from bias and unnecessary pressure. The
courts would not exist and survive to protect the people's most revered
rights if they were unable to preserve the integrity of judicial
proceedings and the dignity of the institution from all forms of
distracting, degrading and prejudicial influences that threaten the fair
and orderly administration of justice.

2. Demonstrators, picketers, rallyists and all other similar persons are

enjoined from holding any activity on the sidewalks and streets adjacent
to, in front of, or within a radius of two hundred (200) meters from, the
outer boundary of the Supreme Court Building, any Hall of Justice, and
any other building that houses at least one (1) court sala. Such activities
unquestionably interrupt and hamper the working condition in the salas,
offices and chambers of the courts.

3. Demonstrators, picketers, rallyists and their sympathizers must keep

all public thoroughfares free and unimpeded to allow the smooth flow
of vehicular and pedestrian traffic. At no time should ingress to and
egress from the premises of the courts and the offices of the courts and
February 24, 2010

IBP vs. HON. MAYOR JOSE "LITO" ATIENZA

FACTS:

IBP filed with the Office of the City Mayor of Manila a letter application
for a permit to rally at the foot of Mendiola Bridge to be participated by
IBP officers and members, law students and multi-sectoral organizations.

Respondent issued a permit allowing the IBP to stage a rally on given

date but indicated therein Plaza Miranda as the venue, instead of
Mendiola Bridge

The rally pushed at Mendiola Bridge. The Manila Police District earlier
barred petitioners from proceeding thereto. MPD instituted a criminal
action for violating the Public Assembly Act in staging a rally at a venue
not indicated in the permit. Petitioners assert that the partial grant of the
application runs contrary to the Pubic Assembly Act and violates their
constitutional right to freedom of expression and public assembly.

The CA denied petitioners petition for it became moot and lacked merit.

ISSUE: WON CA erred in holding that the modification of the venue in

IBPs rally permit does not constitute grave abuse of discretion

RULING:

In modifying the permit outright, respondent gravely abused his

discretion when he did not immediately inform the IBP who should have
been heard first on the matter of his perceived imminent and grave
danger of a substantive evil that may warrant the changing of the venue.
The opportunity to be heard precedes the action on the permit, since
the applicant may directly go to court after an unfavorable action on the
permit.

Respondent failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms

of the permit against the standard of a clear and present danger test
which, it bears repeating, is an indispensable condition to such
modification. Nothing in the issued permit adverts to an imminent and
grave danger of a substantive evil, which "blank" denial or modification
would, when granted imprimatur as the appellate court would have it,
render illusory any judicial scrutiny thereof.

Notably, respondent failed to indicate in his Comment any basis or

explanation for his action. It smacks of whim and caprice for respondent
to just impose a change of venue for an assembly that was slated for a
specific public place. It is thus reversible error for the appellate court not
to have found such grave abuse of discretion and, under specific
statutory provision, not to have modified the permit "in terms
satisfactory to the applicant."
 of work; that the right of government employees to organize is limited
to the formation of unions or associations, without including the right to
strike. In the fairly recent case of Gesite v. Court of Appeals, the Court
defined the limits of the right of government employees to organize in
the following wise:

It is relevant to state at this point that the settled rule in this

D. CONTENT-NEUTRAL RESTRICTIONS jurisdiction is that employees in the public service may not
3. Freedom of association and the right to strike in the public engage in strikes, mass leaves, walkouts, and other forms of
sector mass action that will lead in the temporary stoppage or
disruption of public service. The right of government
employees to organize is limited to the formation of unions or
December 6, 2006 associations only, without including the right to strike, adding
GSIS vs. KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA GSIS that public employees going on disruptive unauthorized
absences to join concerted mass actions may be held liable for
FACTS: conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

A 4-day concerted demonstration, rallies and en masse walkout held in What respondent's members launched or participated in during that
front of the GSIS main office participated by GSIS and members of time partook of a strike or, what contextually amounts to the same thing,
Kapisanan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa GSIS (KMG), a public sector union a prohibited concerted activity. The phrase "prohibited concerted
of GSIS rank-and-file employees. The mass action's target appeared to activity" refers to any collective activity undertaken by government
be petitioner Garcia and his management style. employees, by themselves or through their employees' organization,
with the intent of effecting work stoppage or service disruption in order
GSIS Investigating Unit issued a memo directing 131 union and non- to realize their demands or force concessions, economic or otherwise; it
union members to show cause why they should not be charged includes mass leaves, walkouts, pickets and acts of similar nature.
administratively for their participation in said rally. KMG sought
reconsideration of said directive that the subject employees resumed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED
work in obedience to the return-to-work order issued. Administrative
charges against 110 KMG members for grave misconduct and Garcia
with blatant disregard of Civil Service Guidelines for Prohibited Mass
Action, Section 10 of which exhorts government agencies to "harness all
means within their capacity to accord due regard and attention to
employees' grievances and facilitate their speedy and amicable
disposition through the use of grievance machinery or any other modes
of settlement sanctioned by law and existing civil service rules."

CAs holding that Garcia's "filing of administrative charges against 361

KMG members is tantamount to grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE: WON CA erred in holding that the administrative charges filed

by Garcia was tantamount to grave abuse of discretion

RULING:

The CA equated the right to form associations with the right to engage
in strike and similar activities available to workers in the private sector.

We are unable to lend concurrence to the above CA posture. The

appellate court's position is contrary to what Section 4 in relation to
Section 5 of CSC Resolution No. 02131617 provides.

For instance, in Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of Labor and

Employment, a case decided under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution,
an en banc Court declared that it would be unfair to allow employees of
government corporations to resort to concerted activity with the ever
present threat of a strike to wring benefits from Government. Then came
the 1987 Constitution expressly guaranteeing, for the first time, the right
of government personnel to self-organization to complement the
provision according workers the right to engage in "peaceful concerted
activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law.

It was against the backdrop of the aforesaid provisions of the 1987

Constitution that the Court resolved Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals. We
held, citing MPSTA v. Laguio, Jr., that employees in the public service
may not engage in strikes or in concerted and unauthorized stoppage July 27, 2010
GSIS vs. DINNAH VILLAVIZA et.al

FACTS:

Petitioner Garcia, as President and Gen. Manager of the GSIS, filed formal
charges against respondents Villaviza et.al for Grave Misconduct and/or
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service

Respondent, wearing red shirt together with some employees, marched

to or appeared simultaneously at or just outside the office of the
Investigation Unit in a mass demonstration/rally of protest and support
for Messrs Some of these employees badmouthed the security guards
and the GSIS management and defiantly raised clenched fists led by
Atty.Velasco.

CSC decision which was affirmed by the CA found the respondents guilty
of the lesser offense of Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and
Regulations and reduced the penalty to reprimand. The CSC ruled that
respondents were not denied their right to due process but there was
no substantial evidence to hold them guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the
Best Interest of the Service. Instead,

x x x The actuation of the appellants in going to the IU, wearing red

shirts, to witness a public hearing cannot be considered as constitutive
of such offense. Appellants' (respondents herein) assembly at the said
office to express support to Velasco, their Union President, who pledged
to defend them against any oppression by the GSIS management, can
be considered as an exercise of their freedom of expression, a
constitutionally guaranteed right. x x x

ISSUE: WON CA erred in affirming the decision of CSC

RULING:

As defined in Section 5 of CSC Resolution No. 02-1316 which serves to

regulate the political rights of those in the government service, the
concerted activity or mass action proscribed must be coupled with the
"intent of effecting work stoppage or service disruption in order to
realize their demands of force concession." Wearing similarly colored
shirts, attending a public hearing at the GSIS-IU office, bringing with
them recording gadgets, clenching their fists, some even badmouthing
the guards and PGM Garcia, are acts not constitutive of an (i) intent to
effect work stoppage or service disruption and (ii) for the purpose of
realizing their demands of force concession.

Precisely, the limitations or qualifications found in Section 5 of CSC

Resolution No. 02-1316 are there to temper and focus the application of
such prohibition. Not all collective activity or mass undertaking of
government employees is prohibited. Otherwise, we would be totally
depriving our brothers and sisters in the government service of their
constitutional right to freedom of expression.

Government workers, whatever their ranks, have as much right as any

person in the land to voice out their protests against what they believe
to be a violation of their rights and interests. Civil Service does not
deprive them of their freedom of expression. It would be unfair to hold
that by joining the government service, the members thereof have D. CONTENT-NEUTRAL RESTRICTIONS
4. Movies Censorship
renounced or waived this basic liberty. This freedom can be reasonably
regulated only but can never be taken away.
July 22, 1985
Thus, respondents' freedom of speech and of expression remains intact,
and CSC's Resolution defining what a prohibited concerted activity or JOSE ANTONIO U. GONZALEZ vs. CHAIRMAN MARIA KALAW
mass action has only tempered or regulated these rights. Respondents' KATIGBAK GENERAL WILFREDO C. ESTRADA (Ret.), and THE BOARD
actuations did not amount to a prohibited concerted activity or mass OF REVIEW FOR MOTION PICTURES AND TELEVISION (BRMPT)
action. The CSC and the CA were both correct in arriving at said
conclusion. FACTS:
Jose Antonio U. Gonzalez, President of the Malaya Films, a movie
production outfit.
A resolution of a sub-committee of respondent Board granted a permit
to exhibit the film Kapit sa Patalim under the classification "For Adults
Only," with certain changes and deletions enumerated was granted. A
motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioners stating that the
classification of the film "For Adults Only" was without basis. Acting with
petitioners motion for reconsideration, respondent Board resolves to
affirm in toto the ruling of the sub-committee.
Petitioner asserted that the modified resolution of the Board classifies
Kapit as for-adults-only but the petition does not raise any issue as to
the validity of this classification. All that petitioners assail as arbitrary on
the part of the Board's action are the deletions ordered in the film.
expression censorship, especially so if an entire production is banned,
is allowable only under the clearest proof of a clear and present danger
of a substantive evil to public morals, public health or any other
legitimate public interest. There is merit to the observation of Justice
Douglas that "every writer, actor, or producer, no matter what medium
of expression he may use, should be freed from the censor.
Hence, the BRMPT abused its discretion in classifying the movie Kapit
sa Patalim as For-Adults-Only, but there are not enough votes to
maintain that such an abuse can be considered grave The adult
classification given the film serves as a warning to theater operators and
viewers that some contents of Kapit are not fit for the young.

For petitioners, such classification "is without legal and factual basis and
is exercised as impermissible restraint of artistic expression. The film is
an integral whole and all its portions, including those to which the Board
now offers belated objection, are essential for the integrity of the film.

ISSUE: WON there was a grave abuse of discretion in the classification

of Kapit sa Patalim as For-Adults-Only

RULING:

Censorship or previous restraint certainly is not all there is to free speech

or free press. If it were so, then such basic rights are emasculated. It is
however, except in exceptional circumstances a sine qua non for the
meaningful exercise of such right. This is not to deny that equally basic
is the other important aspect of freedom from liability. Nonetheless, for
the purposes of this litigation, the emphasis should rightly be on
freedom from censorship. It is, beyond question, a well-settled principle
in our jurisdiction. As early as 1909, in the case of United States v.
Sedano, a prosecution for libel, the Supreme Court of the Philippines
already made clear that freedom of the press consists in the right to print
what one chooses without any previous license. There is reaffirmation of
such a view in Mutuc v. Commission on Elections, where an order of
respondent COMELEC giving due course to the certificate of candidacy
of petitioner but prohibiting him from using jingles in his mobile units
equipped with sound systems and loud speakers was considered an
abridgment of the right of the freedom of expression amounting as it
does to censorship. It is the opinion of this Court, therefore, that to avoid
an unconstitutional taint on its creation, the power of respondent Board July 26, 1996
is limited to the classification of films. It can, to safeguard other
constitutional objections, determine what motion pictures are for IGLESIA NI CRISTO, (INC.) vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
general patronage and what may require either parental guidance or be APPEALS, BOARD OF REVIEW FOR MOVING PICTURES AND
limited to adults only. That is to abide by the principle that freedom of TELEVISION and HONORABLE HENRIETTA S. MENDOZA
expression is the rule and restrictions the exemption. The power to
FACTS:
exercise prior restraint is not to be presumed, rather the presumption is
against its validity. Petitioner INC, a duly organized religious organization, has a television
program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" aired on Channel 2 every
The test, to repeat, to determine whether freedom of expression may be
Saturday and on Channel 13 every Sunday. The program presents and
limited is the clear and present danger of an evil of a substantive
propagates petitioner's religious beliefs, doctrines and practices often
character that the State has a right to prevent. Such danger must not
times in comparative studies with other religions.
only be clear but also present. There should be no doubt that what is
feared may be traced to the expression complained of. The causal INC submitted to the respondent Board the VTR tapes of its TV program
connection must be evident. Also, there must be reasonable Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The Board classified the series as "X"
apprehension about its imminence. The time element cannot be ignored. or not for public viewing on the ground that they "offend and constitute
Nor does it suffice if such danger be only probable. There is the an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law."
requirement of its being well-nigh inevitable. The basic postulate,
wherefore, as noted earlier, is that where the movies, theatrical INC alleged that the Board acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse
productions radio scripts, television programs, and other such media of of discretion in requiring petitioner to submit the VTR tapes of its TV
expression are concerned included as they are in freedom of program and in x-rating them.
Trial Court ordered the Board to grant INC the necessary permit for all hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and
the series of the program. CA reversed Trial Courts decision and ruled imminent evil which has taken the life of a reality already on ground.
that: (1) the respondent board has jurisdiction and power to review INC
program; (2) the Board did not act with grave abuse of discretion when
it denied permit for the exhibition on TV of the three series on the
ground that the materials constitute an attack against another religion.
It also found the series "indecent, contrary to law and contrary to good
customs

ISSUES: (1) WON respondent Board has the power to review petitioner's
TV program; (2) assuming it has the power, WON it gravely abused its
discretion when it prohibited the airing of petitioner's religious program,
series Nos. 115, 119 and 121, for the reason that they constitute an attack
against other religions and that they are indecent, contrary to law and
good customs.

RULING:

1. The law gives the Board the power to screen, review and examine all
"television programs." By the clear terms of the law, the Board has the
power to "approve, delete . . . and/or prohibit the . . . exhibition and/or
television broadcast of . . . television programs . . ." The law also directs
the Board to apply "contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard"
to determine those which are objectionable for being "immoral,
indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs, injurious to the prestige
of the Republic of the Philippines and its people, or with a dangerous
tendency to encourage the commission of violence or of a wrong or
crime."

We thus reject petitioner's postulate that its religious program is per se

beyond review by the respondent Board. Its public broadcast on TV of
its religious program brings it out of the bosom of internal belief.
Television is a medium that reaches even the eyes and ears of children.
The Court iterates the rule that the exercise of religious freedom can be D. CONTENT-NEUTRAL RESTRICTIONS
regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear and present 5. Radio broadcast
danger of some substantive evil which the State is duty bound to
prevent, i.e., serious detriment to the more overriding interest of public
July 19, 1985
health, public morals, or public welfare.
EASTERN BROADCASTING CORPORATION (DYRE) vs. THE HON.
2. We reverse the ruling of the appellate court.
JOSE P. DANS, JR
First. Deeply ensconced in our fundamental law is its hostility against all
FACTS:
prior restraints on speech, including religious speech. Hence, any act that
restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and should Petitioner contended that it was denied due process when it was closed
be greeted with furrowed brows. It is the burden of the respondent on the mere allegation that the radio station was used to incite people
Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, to sedition. It alleged that no hearing was held and not a bit of proof
its act of censorship will be struck down. It failed in the case at bar. was submitted to establish a factual basis for the closure

Second. An examination of the evidence, especially Exhibits "A," "A-1,"
"B," "C," and "D" will show that the so-called "attacks" are mere criticisms
of some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions. The
videotapes were not viewed by the respondent court as they were not
presented as evidence. Yet they were considered by the respondent
court as indecent, contrary to law and good customs, hence, can be
prohibited from public viewing under section 3(c) of PD 1986. This ruling
clearly suppresses petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes with its
right to free exercise of religion.
Hence, the records show that the decision of the respondent Board,
affirmed by the respondent appellate court, is completely bereft of
findings of facts to justify the conclusion that the subject video tapes
constitute impermissible attacks against another religion. There is no
showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about
especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior
restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by
The petitioner also raised the issue of freedom of speech. It appears from
the records that the respondents' general charge of "inciting people to
commit acts of sedition" arose from the petitioner's shift towards what
it stated was the coverage of public events and the airing of programs
geared towards public affairs.
Petitioner through its president suddenly filed a motion to withdraw or
dismiss the petition- (1) petitioner has already sold its radio
broadcasting station in favor of Manuel B. Pastrana as well as its rights
and interest in the radio station DYRE in Cebu including its right to
operate and its equipment; and (2) petitioner has no longer any interest
in said case, and the new owner, Manuel B. Pastrana is likewise not
interested in pursuing the case any further.
The case has become moot and academic. But, for the guidance of
inferior courts and administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial
functions, the Court issues the following guidelines:
GUIDELINES:

1. All forms of media, whether print or broadcast, are entitled to

the broad protection of the freedom of speech and expression
clause. The test for limitations on freedom of expression
continues to be the clear and present danger rule that
words are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature
as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring
about the substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to
prevent. The clear and present danger test, however, does not
lend itself to a simplistic and all embracing interpretation
applicable to all utterances in all forums.
2. The clear and present danger test, therefore, must take the
particular circumstances of broadcast media into account. The
supervision of radio stations-whether by government or
through self-regulation by the industry itself calls for
thoughtful, intelligent and sophisticated handling.
3. The government has a right to be protected against
broadcasts which incite the listeners to violently overthrow it.
Radio and television may not be used to organize a rebellion
or to signal the start of widespread uprising. At the same time,
the people have a right to be informed. Radio and television
would have little reason for existence if broadcasts are limited
to bland, obsequious, or pleasantly entertaining utterances.
Since they are the most convenient and popular means of D. CONTENT-NEUTRAL RESTRICTIONS
disseminating varying views on public issues, they also Freedom of Information
deserve special protection.
4. Broadcast stations deserve the special protection given to all
forms of media by the due process and freedom of expression September 4, 2008
clauses of the Constitution.
ROMULO L. NERI vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON
WHEREFORE, the case having become moot and academic, the ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND
petitioner's motion to withdraw or dismiss the petition is hereby INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND
GRANTED. COMMERCE, AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL
DEFENSE AND SECURITY

FACTS:

Petitioner appeared before respondent Committees and testified

for 11 hours on matters concerning the National Broadband Project
("NBN Project"), a project awarded by the DOTC to ZTE. Petitioner
disclosed that then COMELEC Chairman Abalos offered him P200
Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further
narrated that he informed President Arroyo of the bribery attempt
and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. But when
probed on President Arroyo and the discussions relating to the
NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking "executive
privilege." To be specific, petitioner refused to answer the 3
questions: (a) WON President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project;
(b) WON she directed him to prioritize it; (c) WON she directed him
to approve it.

Respondent persisted in knowing petitioners answers to these

three questions by requiring him to appear and testify once more.
Executive Secretary Ermita wrote to respondent and requested
them to dispense with petitioners testimony on the ground of
executive privilege

Respondent issued the show-cause letter requiring him to explain

why he should not be cited in contempt. On petitioners reply to
respondent, he manifested that it was not his intention to ignore
the Senate hearing and that he thought the only remaining
questions were those he claimed to be covered by executive
privilege. He also manifested his willingness to appear and testify
should there be new matters to be taken up. He just requested that
he be furnished "in advance as to what else" he "needs to clarify."
Respondent found petitioners explanations unsatisfactory. They
issued an Order citing petitioner in contempt ordered his arrest and
detention until such time that he would appear and give his
testimony.
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration and insisted that he had
not shown "any contemptible conduct worthy of contempt and
arrest." He emphasized his willingness to testify on new matters,
but respondent did not respond to his request for advance notice
of questions
Court granted his petition on the ground that the 3 questions were
covered by executive privilege. Respondent filed its motion and on
petitioners comment he charges respondent with exaggerating
and distorting the Decision of this Court. He avers that there is
nothing in it that prohibits respondent Committees from
investigating the NBN Project or asking him additional questions.
The Court merely applied the rule on executive privilege to the facts
of the case.
ISSUE: WON there is factual or legal basis to hold that the
communications elicited by the 3 questions are covered by
executive privilege
RULING:
It must be stressed that the Presidents claim of executive privilege
is not merely founded on her generalized interest in confidentiality.
The Letter dated November 15, 2007 of Executive Secretary Ermita
specified presidential communications privilege in relation to
diplomatic and economic relations with another sovereign
nation as the bases for the claim. Thus, the Letter stated:
The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is
that the information sought to be disclosed might impair our
diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Peoples
Republic of China. Given the confidential nature in which this
information were conveyed to the President, he cannot provide the
Committee any further details of these conversations, without
disclosing the very thing the privilege is designed to protect.
Even in Senate v. Ermita, it was held that Congress must not require
the Executive to state the reasons for the claim with such
particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the
privilege is meant to protect. This is a matter of respect for a
coordinate and co-equal department.
With respect to respondent Committees invocation of
constitutional prescriptions regarding the right of the people to
information and public accountability and transparency, the Court
finds nothing in these arguments to support respondent
Committees case.
There is no debate as to the importance of the constitutional right
of the people to information and the constitutional policies on
public accountability and transparency. These are the twin
postulates vital to the effective functioning of a democratic
government. The citizenry can become prey to the whims and
caprices of those to whom the power has been delegated if they
are denied access to information. And the policies on public
accountability and democratic government would certainly be
mere empty words if access to such information of public concern
is denied.
In the case at bar, this Court, in upholding executive privilege with
respect to 3 specific questions, did not in any way curb the publics
right to information or diminish the importance of public
accountability and transparency.
This Court did not rule that the Senate has no power to investigate
the NBN Project in aid of legislation. There is nothing in the assailed
Decision that prohibits respondent Committees from inquiring into
the NBN Project. They could continue the investigation and even
call petitioner Neri to testify again. He himself has repeatedly
expressed his willingness to do so. Our Decision merely excludes
from the scope of respondents investigation the 3 questions that
elicit answers covered by executive privilege and rules that
petitioner cannot be compelled to appear before respondents to
answer the said questions. We have discussed the reasons why
these answers are covered by executive privilege. That there is a
recognized public interest in the confidentiality of such information
is a recognized principle in other democratic States. To put it
simply, the right to information is not an absolute right.
Indeed, the constitutional provisions cited by respondent
Committees do not espouse an absolute right to information. By
their wording, the intention of the Framers to subject such right to
the regulation of the law is unmistakable. The highlighted portions
of the following provisions show the obvious limitations on the
right to information, thus:
Article III, Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters
of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records,
and to documents, and papers pertaining to official records, and to
documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.
Article II, Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by
law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest
In Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, it was
stated that there are no specific laws prescribing the exact
limitations within which the right may be exercised or the
correlative state duty may be obliged. Nonetheless, it enumerated
the recognized restrictions to such rights, among them: (1) national
security matters, (2) trade secrets and banking transactions, (3)
criminal matters, and (4) other confidential information. National
security matters include state secrets regarding military and
diplomatic matters, as well as information on inter-government
exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive
agreements. It was further held that even where there is no
need to protect such state secrets, they must be "examined in
strict confidence and given scrupulous protection."
Incidentally, the right primarily involved here is the right of
respondent Committees to obtain information allegedly in aid of
legislation, not the peoples right to public information. This is the
reason why we stressed in the assailed Decision the distinction
between these two rights. As laid down in Senate v. Ermita, "the
demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant to
his right to information does not have the same obligatory force as
a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress" and "neither does
the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact
testimony from government officials." As pointed out, these rights
belong to Congress, not to the individual citizen. It is worth
mentioning at this juncture that the parties here are respondent
Committees and petitioner Neri and that there was no prior request
for information on the part of any individual citizen. This Court will
not be swayed by attempts to blur the distinctions between the
Legislature's right to information in a legitimate legislative inquiry
and the public's right to information.

For clarity, it must be emphasized that the assailed Decision did

not enjoin respondent Committees from inquiring into the September 21, 2010
NBN Project. All that is expected from them is to respect
matters that are covered by executive privilege. CENTER FOR PEOPLE EMPOWERMENT IN GOVERNANCE (CenPEG)
vs. COMELEC

FACTS:

Petitioner CenPEG, a non-government organization, wrote respondent

COMELEC, requesting a copy of the source code of the PCOS programs,
the BOC CCS programs for the municipal, provincial, national, and
congressional canvass, the COMELEC server programs, and the source
code of the in-house COMELEC programs called the Data Capturing
System utilities.

CenPEG invoked Sec.12 of RA 9369, which provides:

x x x x Once an AES technology is selected for implementation, the

Commission shall promptly make the source code of that technology
available and open to any interested political party or groups which may
conduct their own review thereof.

COMELEC granted the request for the source code of the PCOS and the
CCS, but denied that for the DCS, since the DCS was a "system used in
processing the Lists of Voters which is not part of the voting, counting
and canvassing systems contemplated by R.A. 9369." According to
COMELEC, if the source code for the DCS were to be divulged,
unscrupulous individuals might change the program and pass off an
illicit one that could benefit certain candidates or parties. Still, the
COMELEC did not release even the kinds of source code that it said it
was approving for release.

COMELEC replied that the source code CenPEG wanted did not yet exist
for its reasons. CenPEG rejected COMELECs excuse and filed the petition
for mandamus, seeking to compel COMELEC to immediately make its
source codes available to CenPEG and other interested parties.

COMELEC claimed that CenPEG did not have a clear, certain, and well-
defined right that was enforceable by mandamus because COMELECs
duty to make the source code available presupposed that it already had
the same.

CenPEG did not believe that the source code was still unavailable
considering that COMELEC had already awarded to an international
certification entity the review of the same and that COMELEC had already
been field testing its PCOS and CCS machines.

COMELEC filed a manifestation, stating that it had already deposited the

source code to be used in the May 10, 2010 elections with the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas. Required to comment on this, CenPEG said that the
manifestation did not constitute compliance with Sec.12 of R.A. 9369 but
only with Sec.11 of R.A. 8436.
In its comment, COMELEC claimed, reiterating what it said in its letter to
CenPEG, that it would make the source code available for review by the
end of February 2010 under a controlled environment. This review had
not taken place and was overtaken by the May 10, 2010 elections.
CenPEG filed its prayer for the issuance of a writ of mandamus. It claimed
that the source code remained important and relevant "not only for
compliance with the law, and the purpose thereof, but especially in the
backdrop of numerous admissions of errors and claims of fraud.
ISSUE: WON CenPEGs prayer for the issuance of a writ of mandamus be
granted
RULING:
Section 2(12) of R.A. 9369 describes the source code as the "human
readable instructions that define what the computer equipment will do.
The pertinent portion of Section 12 of R.A. 9369 is clear in that "once an
AES technology is selected for implementation, the Commission shall
promptly make the source code of that technology available and open
to any interested political party or groups which may conduct their own
review thereof." The COMELEC has offered no reason not to comply with
this requirement of the law. Indeed, its only excuse for not disclosing the
source code was that it was not yet available when CenPEG asked for it
and, subsequently, that the review had to be done, apparently for
security reason, "under a controlled environment." The elections had
passed and that reason is already stale.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for mandamus and
DIRECTS the COMELEC to make the source codes for the AES
technologies it selected for implementation pursuant to R.A. 9369
immediately available to CenPEG and all other interested political parties
or groups for independent review.
June 13, 2012
RE: REQUEST FOR COPY OF 2008 STATEMENT OF ASSETS,
LIABILITIES AND NETWORTH [SALN] AND PERSONAL DATA SHEET
OR CURRICULUM VITAE OF THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT
AND OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF THE JUDICIARY
FACTS:
In a letter of Rowena C. Paraan, Research Director of the PCIJ, sought
copies of the SALN of the Justices of this Court for year 2008. She also
requested for copies of the Personal Data Sheet (PDS) or the Curriculum
Vitae (CV) of the Justices for the purpose of updating their database of
information on government officials.
Another letter by Karol M. Ilagan, a researcher-writer also of the PCIJ,
likewise sought for copies of the SALN and PDS of the Justices of the CA
for the same purpose.
The Court resolved to create a special committee to review the policy on
requests for SALN and PDS and other similar documents, and to
recommend appropriate action on such requests.
Meanwhile, several requests (21 requests) for copies of the SALN and
other personal documents of the Justices of this Court, the CA and the
Sandiganbayan were filed.
Pursuant to Sec. 6, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the Court issued
its Resolution denying the subpoena duces tecum for the SALNs and
personal documents of Justice Roland B. Jurado of the SB.
ISSUE: WON request copy SALN, PDS, and CV of the Justices of the SC
and other members of the Judiciary be granted
RULING:
While the Constitution holds dear the right of the people to have access
to matters of concern, the Constitution also holds sacred the
independence of the Judiciary. Thus, although no direct opposition to
the disclosure of SALN and other personal documents is being
expressed, it is the uniform position of the said magistrates and the
various judges associations that the disclosure must be made in accord
with the guidelines set by the Court and under such circumstances that
would not undermine the independence of the Judiciary.
The Court, in the landmark case of Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., elucidated
on the import of the right to information in this wise:
The cornerstone of this republican system of government is
delegation of power by the people to the State. In this system,
governmental agencies and institutions operate within the limits of the
authority conferred by the people. Denied access to information on the
inner workings of government, the citizenry can become prey to the
whims and caprices of those to whom the power had been
delegated. The postulate of public office is a public trust,
institutionalized in the Constitution to protect the people from
abuse of governmental power, would certainly be mere empty
words if access to such information of public concern is denied x x
x.
x x x The right to information goes hand-in-hand with the
constitutional policies of full public disclosure and honesty in the
public service. It is meant to enhance the widening role of the
citizenry in governmental decision-making as well as in checking
abuse in government.
Thus, while "public concern" like "public interest" eludes exact definition
and has been said to embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the
public may want to know, either because such matters directly affect
their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest
of an ordinary citizen, the Constitution itself, under Section 17, Article XI,
has classified the information disclosed in the SALN as a matter of public
concern and interest. In other words, a "duty to disclose" sprang from
the "right to know." Both of constitutional origin, the former is a
command while the latter is a permission.
Like all constitutional guarantees, however, the right to information, with
its companion right of access to official records, is not absolute. While
providing guaranty for that right, the Constitution also provides that the
peoples right to know is limited to "matters of public concern" and is
further subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Jurisprudence has provided the following limitations to that right: (1)
national security matters and intelligence information; (2) trade secrets
and banking transactions; (3) criminal matters; and (4) other confidential
information such as confidential or classified information officially
known to public officers and employees by reason of their office and not
made available to the public as well as diplomatic correspondence,
closed door Cabinet meetings and executive sessions of either house of
Congress, and the internal deliberations of the Supreme Court.
This could only mean that while no prohibition could stand against
access to official records, such as the SALN, the same is undoubtedly
subject to regulation.
While public officers in the custody or control of public records have the
discretion to regulate the manner in which records may be inspected,
examined or copied by interested persons, such discretion does not
carry with it the authority to prohibit access, inspection, examination, or
copying of the records. After all, public office is a public trust.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to GRANT the 21 requests subject to
the limitations and prohibitions provided in R.A. No. 6713 (Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees)s, its
implementing rules and regulations.
D. CONTENT-NEUTRAL RESTRICTIONS
Academic Freedom
November 28, 1975
EPICHARIS T. GARCIA vs. THE FACULTY ADMISSION COMMITTEE,
LOYOLA SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY
FACTS:
Garcia alleged that in summer respondent admitted petitioner for
studies leading to an M.A. in Theology. When Petitioner wanted to enroll
for the same course for the first semester, respondent in a letter
informed her of the faculty's decision to bar her from re-admission in
their school; that the reasons stated do not constitute valid legal ground
for expulsion, for they neither present any violation of any of the school's
regulation, nor are they indicative of gross misconduct
Petitioner spent much time and effort to allow her to enroll but all in
vain. The School Director told her that the compromises she was offering
were unacceptable and their decision was final. Suggested that it were
better for her to seek for admission at the UST Graduate School.
Garcia then made inquiries in UST and was informed that she could
enroll at the UST Ecclesiastical Faculties, but that she would have to fulfill
their requirements for Baccalaureate in Philosophy in order to have her
degree later in Theology which would entail about 4 to 5 years
whereas in the Loyola School it would entail only about two years more.
She prayed for a writ of mandamus for the purpose of allowing her to
enroll in the current semester.
According to respondent, the Petition for Mandamus does not lie, as
there is no duty, much less a clear duty, on the part of respondent to
admit the petitioner therein in the current year to take up further courses
in the Loyola School of Theology. The decision not to allow petitioner to
take up further courses in said seminary "is not arbitrary, as it is based
on reasonable grounds
ISSUE: WON the Petition for Mandamus was proper
RULING:
Petitioner cannot compel by mandamus, the respondent to admit her
into further studies in the Loyola School of Theology. For respondent
has no clear duty to so admit the petitioner. The Loyola School of
Theology is a seminary for the priesthood. Petitioner is admittedly and
obviously not studying for the priesthood, she being a lay person and a
woman. And even assuming ex gratia argumenti that she is qualified to
study for the priesthood, there is still no duty on the part of respondent
to admit her to said studies, since the school has clearly the discretion
to turn down even qualified applicants due to limitations of space,
facilities, professors and optimum classroom size and component
considerations."
Definition of Academic freedom. As for the educator and philosopher
Sidney Hook, this is his version: "What is academic freedom? Briefly put,
it is the freedom of professionally qualified persons to inquire, discover,
publish and teach the truth as they see it in the field of their competence.
It is subject to no control or authority except the control or authority of
the rational methods by which truths or conclusions are sought and
established in these disciplines.
Scope of Academic Freedom recognized by Constitution. For it is to
be noted that the reference is to the "institutions of higher learning" as
the recipients of this boon. It would follow then that the school or
college itself is possessed of such a right. It decides for itself its aims and
objectives and how best to attain them. It is free from outside coercion
or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for
some restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to
the choice of students. This constitutional provision is not to be
construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion. That would
be to frustrate its purpose, nullify its intent
In considering the problems of academic freedom one must distinguish,
therefore, between the autonomy of the university, as a corporate body,
and the freedom of the individual university teacher.
Academic freedom of university teacher. To clarify further the
distinction between the freedom of the university and that of the
individual scholar, he says: "The personal aspect of freedom consists in
the right of each university teacher recognized and effectively
guaranteed by society to seek and express the truth as he personally
sees it, both in his academic work and in his capacity as a private citizen.
Thus the status of the individual university teacher is at least as
important, in considering academic freedom, as the status of the
institutions to which they belong and through which they disseminate
their learning."'
Internal conditions for academic freedom in university. He likewise
quoted from the President of the Queen's University in Belfast, Sir Eric
Ashby: "'The internal conditions for academic freedom in a university are
that the academic staff should have de facto control of the following
functions: (i) the admission and examination of students; (ii) the curricula
for courses of study; (iii) the appointment and tenure of office of
academic staff; and (iv) the allocation of income among the different
categories of expenditure. It would be a poor prospect for academic
freedom if universities had to rely on the literal interpretation of their
constitutions in order to acquire for their academic members control of
these four functions, for in one constitution or another most of these
functions are laid on the shoulders of the law governing body
Thus the mandamus does not lie in this case. There was on the part of
respondent due acknowledgment of her intelligence. Nonetheless, for
reasons explained in the letter of Father Lambino, it was deemed best,
considering the interest of the school as well as of the other students
and her own welfare, that she continue her graduate work elsewhere.
There was nothing arbitrary in such appraisal of the circumstances
deemed relevant.
December 19, 2007
DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY, INC vs. CA
FACTS:
Private respondents Aguilar, Bungubung, Reverente and Valdes are
members of Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity who were expelled by the De La
Salle University (DLSU) and College of Saint Benilde (CSB) Joint Discipline
Board because of their involvement in an offensive action causing
injuries to petitioner Yap and 3 other student members of Domino Lux
Fraternity.
The mauling incidents were a result of a fraternity war which rooted
when Yap overheard two men who were members of Tau Gamma Phi
Fraternity bad-mouthing and angry at Domino Lux. The victims:
petitioner Yap and Pascual, Cano, and Perez, are members of the
"Domino Lux Fraternity," while the alleged assailants, Aguilar,
Bungubung, Reverente and Valdesare members of "Tau Gamma Phi
Fraternity," a rival fraternity.
Yap filed a complaint with the Discipline Board of DLSU charging private
respondents with "direct assault." Similar complaints were also filed by
Pascual and Cano against Lee, Valdes and Reverente. DLSU-CSB Board
issued a Resolution finding private respondents guilty and meted with
the supreme penalty of automatic expulsion
Aguilar filed with the RTC. RTC Judge issued a TRO directing DLSU to
refrain and desist from implementing Resolution and to immediately
desist from barring the enrollment of Aguilar. Bungubung, Reverente,
and Valdes, filed petitions-in-intervention and Judge issued to compel
petitioner DLSU to admit said private respondents. Despite the said
order, Aguilar was refused enrollment by DLSU.
Aguilar filed motion to cite DLSU in contempt of court be compelled to
enroll him at DLSU.
CHED issued its questioned Resolution, summarily disapproving the
penalty of expulsion for all private respondents. As for Aguilar, he was
to be reinstated, while other private respondents were to be excluded.
Notwithstanding the said directive, DLSU, still refused to allow Aguilar
to enroll
Aguilar filed his manifestation stating that he has long completed his
course at DLSU. He finished and passed all his enrolled subjects for the
second trimester as indicated in his transcript of records issued by DLSU.
However, despite having completed all the academic requirements DLSU
has not issued a certificate of completion/graduation in his favor.
ISSUE: WON petitioner DLSU can invoke its right to academic freedom
RULING:
The policy of R.A. No. 7722 is not only the protection, fostering and
promotion of the right of all citizens to affordable quality education at
all levels and the taking of appropriate steps to ensure that education
shall be accessible to all. The law is likewise concerned with ensuring
and protecting academic freedom and with promoting its exercise and
observance for the continued intellectual growth of students, the
advancement of learning and research, the development of responsible
and effective leadership, the education of high-level and middle-level
professionals, and the enrichment of our historical and cultural heritage.
It is thus safe to assume that when Congress passed R.A. No. 7722, its
members were aware that disciplinary cases involving students on the
tertiary level would continue to arise in the future, which would call for
the invocation and exercise of institutions of higher learning of their
right to academic freedom.
Petitioner DLSU, as an institution of higher learning, possesses
academic freedom which includes determination of who to admit
for study.
Section 5(2), Article XIV of the Constitution guaranties all institutions of
higher learning academic freedom. This institutional academic freedom
includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims
and objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside coercion
or interference save possibly when the overriding public interest calls for
some restraint. According to present jurisprudence, academic freedom
encompasses the independence of an academic institution to determine
for itself (1) who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it shall teach,
and (4) who may be admitted to study.

It cannot be gainsaid that "the school has an interest in teaching the

student discipline, a necessary, if not indispensable, value in any field of
learning. By instilling discipline, the school teaches discipline.
Accordingly, the right to discipline the student likewise finds basis in the
freedom "what to teach." Indeed, while it is categorically stated under
the Education Act of 1982 that students have a right "to freely choose
their field of study, subject to existing curricula and to continue their
course therein up to graduation," such right is subject to the established
academic and disciplinary standards laid down by the academic
institution. Petitioner DLSU, therefore, can very well exercise its academic
freedom, which includes its free choice of students for admission to its
school.