TOLENTINO v.

COMELEC GR 1488334 (01/21/04)

Facts:
Pres. GMA, after her succession to the presidency in 2001, nominated Senator Guingona as Vice-President, thus, leaving a vacancy
in the Senate. The Senate passed Res. 84 calling on COMELEC to fill the said vacancy through a special election to be held
SIMULTANEOUSLY with the regular elections on May the same year. 12 senators each with a 6-yr term were to be elected. Res. 84
provided that the candidate with the 13th highest number of votes shall serve for the unexpired term of former Sen. Guingona (3 years).
Gregorio Honasan ranked 13th in the polls. COMELEC issued Res. 01-005 provisionally proclaiming the 12 senators (with 6-yr terms)
and the 13th senator (for the unexpired term).
Petitioners (Tolentino and Mojica) filed a petition for prohibition against COMELEC, enjoining them from the final proclamation the
13th senator, and prayed for the nullification of Res. 01-005.

Issues:
1. Procedural: WON petition is actually for quo warrantoi to be decided by the Senate Electoral tribunal (and not the SC)
2. On the merits: WON the special election was held validly:
a. WON Comelecs failure to give notice as to the time of the special election negate the calling of said election
b. WON Comelecs failure to give notice of office to be filled and the manner of determining the winner misled voters
c. WON separate canvassing and documentation for the special election was required
Held:
1. No. The petitioner does not seek to determine Honasans right in the exercise of his office in the Senate. What the petitioners
allege is COMELECs failure to comply with certain requirements pertaining to the conduct of the special election. Hence, the
court has jurisdiction.
2. Yes. Special election was held validly. Hence, petition has no merit.
a. No. Sec. 2 of RA 6645 (which was passed to implement art 6, sec. 9 of the constitution), EXPRESSLY PROVIDES that in
case of a vacancy in the Senate, the special election shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election.
In a special election, the rule is that if a statute expressly provides that an election to fill the vacancy shall be held at the
next regular election, the statute FIXES the date, hence, the election is NOT INVALIDATED by the fact that the body charged
by law with the duty (in this case, COMELEC) failed to do so. (as opposed to if the law does not fix the time and place but
empowers some authority to fix those, the statutory provision on the giving of notice is considered mandatory and failure to
do so will make election void) The law then charges the voters with knowledge of the statutory notice and COMELECs
failure to give additional notice does not negate the election.
b. No. The test in determining the validity of a special election in relation to the failure to give notice is whether the lack of
notice resulted in misleading a sufficient number of voters. The petitioners were not able to prove that COMELECs failure
to give the notice misled a sufficient number of voters as would change the result of the vote.
c. No. No such requirements exist. What is mandatory under RA 6645 is for COMELEC to fix the date if necessary and state
the office/s to be voted for. The method adopted by COMELEC merely implemented RA No.84 that the senatorial candidate
garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Sen. Guingona (an amendment
introduced by Sen. Roco)

i
A quo warranto proceeding is one that determines the right of a public officer in the exercise of his office

Pimentel vs. COMELEC GR 161658, Nov. 3, 2008

Facts: Congress passed RA 9165, Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and makes it mandatory for candidates for public
office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the
prosecutors office with certain offenses, among other personalities, to undergo a drug test. Hence, Senator Pimentel, who is a
senatorial candidate for the 2004 synchronized elections, challenged Section 36(g) of the said law.

Issue: is the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office an unconstitutional imposition of additional qualification on
candidates for Senator?

Held: Yes. Section 36 (g) of RA 9165, requiring all candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or local
government undergo a mandatory drug test is UNCONSITUTIONAL. Under Sec.3, Art. VI of the Constitution, an aspiring candidate for
Senator needs only to meet 5 qualifications: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. The Congress
cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a
constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge the Constitution. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the
Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of
government have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.

Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC

[G.R. No. 136781. October 6, 2000]
Facts:
COMELEC proclaimed 14 party-list representatives from 13 parties which obtained at least 2% of the total number of votes cast for the
party-list system as members of the House of Representatives. Upon petition for respondents, who were party-list organizations, it
proclaimed 38 additional party-list representatives although they obtained less than 2% of the total number of votes cast for the party-
list system on the ground that under the Constitution, it is mandatory that at least 20% of the members of the House of Representatives
come from the party-list representatives.

Issue #1: Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution,
mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words, should the twenty percent allocation for party-list solons be filled up completely and
all the time?

Ruling:
It is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for the party-list seats in the House of Representatives. The Constitution vested
Congress with the broad power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system of representatives. In the exercise of its
constitutional prerogative, Congress deemed it necessary to require parties participating in the system to obtain at least 2% of the total
votes cast for the party list system to be entitled to a party-list seat. Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties having a
sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in Congress.

FORMULA FOR
determination of total number of party-list representatives = #district representatives/.80 x .20
additional representatives of first party = # of votes of first party/ # of votes of party list system
additional seats for concerned party = # of votes of concerned party/ # votes of first party x additional seats for concerned party

Issue #2: Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

Ruling:
Yes. In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties, organizations and coalitions having a
sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in Congress. This intent can be gleaned from the
deliberations on the proposed bill. The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the Constitution and
the law, but with the very essence of "representation." Under a republican or representative state, all government authority emanates
from the people, but is exercised by representatives chosen by them. But to have meaningful representation, the elected persons must
have the mandate of a sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list system, the result might be the
proliferation of small groups which are incapable of contributing significant legislation, and which might even pose a threat to the
stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned according to "the number of their respective inhabitants, and on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" to ensure meaningful local representation.

Issue #3:
How should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined?

Held:
Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private respondents, as well as the members of this Court that
the initial step is to rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions from the highest to the lowest based on the number of
votes they each received. Then the ratio for each party is computed by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all the parties
participating in the system. All parties with at least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only these parties shall
be considered in the computation of additional seats. The party receiving the highest number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as
the first party.

Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to, in order to be able to compute that for the other
parties. Since the distribution is based on proportional representation, the number of seats to be allotted to the other parties cannot
possibly exceed that to which the first party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes.

Step Three. The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified parties are entitled to, based on
proportional representation

BANAT v COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271

NOTE: This case is consolidated with BAYAN Muna vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 179295).
In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, made a partial proclamation of the winners in the
party-list elections which was held in May 2007.
In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered the following rules:
1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while the remaining 20% shall come from party-list
representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987 Constitution);
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which garners at least 2% of the total votes cast in the
party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat;
3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least 6%, then it is entitled to 3 seats this is pursuant to
the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban Formula from the case of Veterans Federation Party vs COMELEC.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners more than 6% of the votes cast for the party-list election (3
seat cap rule, same case).
The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a party-list candidate, questioned the proclamation as
well as the formula being used. BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its provision that a
party-list, to qualify for a congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes cast in the party-list election, is not supported by the
Constitution. Further, the 2% rule creates a mathematical impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed by the Constitution.
BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is mandatory, then with the 2% qualifying vote, there would
be instances when it would be impossible to fill the prescribed 20% share of party-lists in the lower house. BANAT also proposes a new
computation (which shall be discussed in the HELD portion of this digest).
On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity of the 3 seat rule (Section 11a of RA 7941). It also
raised the issue of whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections or is the said elections limited
to sectoral parties.
ISSUE #1. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower house?
I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats allotted for legislative districts, there shall be one seat allotted for
a party-list representative. Originally, the 1987 Constitution provides that there shall be not more than 250 members of the lower house.
Using the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will be from legislative districts, and 50 would be from party-list representatives. However, the Constitution
also allowed Congress to fix the number of the membership of the lower house as in fact, it can create additional legislative districts as it
may deem appropriate. As can be seen in the May 2007 elections, there were 220 district representatives, hence applying the 80-20 rule
or the 5:1 ratio, there should be 55 seats allotted for party-list representatives.
How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:
(Current Number of Legislative District Representatives 0.80) x (0.20) = Number of Seats Available to Party-List Representatives
Hence, (220 0.80) x (0.20) = 55
ISSUE #2. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a mere ceiling.
II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling meaning, the number of party-list representatives shall not exceed
20% of the total number of the members of the lower house. However, it is not mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.
ISSUE #3. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.
III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis to allow that only party-lists which garnered 2% of the
votes cast are qualified for a seat and those which garnered less than 2% are disqualified. Further, the 2% threshold creates a
mathematical impossibility to attain the ideal 80-20 apportionment. The Supreme Court explained:
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100 participants in the
party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further
assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because
of the operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list seats to
60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get two percent
of the votes for every party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as
the two percent threshold is present.

It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI
of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House
of Representatives.

ISSUE #4. How are party-list seats allocated?

IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes cast, then it is guaranteed a seat, and not qualified.
This allows those party-lists garnering less than 2% to also get a seat.
But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered
during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be
entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion
to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already been allocated, at one
seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as additional seats are the maximum seats reserved
under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941
allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In the first round, all party-lists which garnered at least 2%
of the votes cast (called the two-percenters) are given their one seat each. The total number of seats given to these two-percenters are
then deducted from the total available seats for party-lists. In this case, 17 party-lists were able to garner 2% each. There are a total 55
seats available for party-lists hence, 55 minus 17 = 38 remaining seats. (Please refer to the full text of the case for the tabulation).
The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second round, particularly, in determining, first, the additional seats
for the two-percenters, and second, in determining seats for the party-lists that did not garner at least 2% of the votes cast, and in the
process filling up the 20% allocation for party-list representatives.
How is this done?
Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it against the remaining number of seats. The product, which shall
not be rounded off, will be the additional number of seats allotted for the party list but the 3 seat limit rule shall still be observed.
Example:
In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of 1,169,234 which is 7.33% of the total votes cast for the party-list
elections (15,950,900).
Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x (remaining seats) = number of additional seat
Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79
Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79 remains 2. BUHAY was able to reach two-percent which means it has a
guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or a total of 3 seats. Now if it so happens that BUHAY got 20% of the votes cast, it will still
get 3 seats because the 3 seat limit rule prohibits it from having more than 3 seats.
Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed and additional seats, and there are still unoccupied seats, those seats shall
be distributed to the remaining party-lists and those higher in rank in the voting shall be prioritized until all the seats are occupied.
ISSUE #5. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections.
V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major political parties (the likes of UNIDO, LABAN, etc) from participating
in the party-list elections.
Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no prohibition either from the Constitution or from RA 7941 against major
political parties from participating in the party-list elections as the word party was not qualified and that even the framers of the
Constitution in their deliberations deliberately allowed major political parties to participate in the party-list elections provided that they
establish a sectoral wing which represents the marginalized (indirect participation), Justice Puno, in his separate opinion, concurred by 7
other justices, explained that the will of the people defeats the will of the framers of the Constitution precisely because it is the people
who ultimately ratified the Constitution and the will of the people is that only the marginalized sections of the country shall participate in
the party-list elections. Hence, major political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.
ISSUE #6. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.
VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that no one party shall dominate the party-list system.

Borja vs Comelec Case Digest

Facts:
Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected as Vice-Mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term ending on June 30, 1992. On September 2,
1989, he became Mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. Thereafter, Capco was elected and served
as Mayor for two more terms, from 1992 to 1998. On March 27, 1998, Capco filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Pateros in the
May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought Capcos disqualification on the
ground that Capco would have already served as Mayor for 3 consecutive terms by June 30, 1998; hence, he would be ineligible to serve
for another term. The Second Division of the Comelec declared Capco disqualified but the Comelec en banc reversed the decision and
declared Capco eligible to run for mayor. Capco was subsequently voted and proclaimed as mayor.

Issue: Whether or not a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of law and serves the remainder of the term is
considered to have served a term in that office for the purpose of the three-term limit.

Held:
No. The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve the same elective
position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also
have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply. Capco was qualified to
run again as mayor in the next election because he was not elected to the office of mayor in the first term but simply found himself thrust
into it by operation of law. Neither had he served the full term because he only continued the service, interrupted by the death, of the
deceased mayor. The vice-mayors assumption of the mayorship in the event of the vacancy is more a matter of chance than of design.
Hence, his service in that office should not be counted in the application of any term limit.

The policy embodied in the constitutional provision (Art. X, 8) is not only to prevent the establishment of political dynasties but also to
enhance the freedom of choice of the people. A consideration of the historical background of Art. X, 8 of the Constitution reveals that
the members of the Constitutional Commission were as much concerned with preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they
were with preventing the monopolization of political power. In discussing term limits, the drafters of the Constitution did so on the
assumption that the officials concerned were serving by reason of election. To consider Capco to have served the first term in full and
therefore ineligible to run a third time for reelection would be not only to falsify reality but also to unduly restrict the right of the people to
choose whom they wish to govern them.

Latasa vs. Comelec

Facts:

Petitioner Latasa, was elected mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur in the elections of 1992, 1995, and 1998. In February
2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor for the 2001 elections. He stated therein that he is eligible therefor, and likewise
disclosed that he had already served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos and is now running for the first
time for the position of city mayor.

Sunga, also a candidate for city mayor in the said elections, filed before the COMELEC a petition to deny petitioner's candidacy since the
latter had already been elected and served for three consecutive terms. Petitioner countered that this fact does not bar him from filing a
certificate of candidacy for the 2001 elections since this will be the first time that he will be running for the post of city mayor.

The Comelecs First Division denied petitioner's certificate of candidacy. However, his motion for reconsideration was not acted upon by
the Comelec en banc before election day and he was proclaimed winner. Only after the proclamation did the Comelec en banc issue a
resolution that declared him disqualified from running for mayor of Digos City, and ordered that all votes cast in his favor should not be
counted.

Petitioner appealed, contending that when Digos was converted from a municipality to a city, it attained a different juridical personality
separate from the municipality of Digos. So when he filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor, it should not be construed as vying
for the same local government post.

Issue: Is petitioner Latasa eligible to run as candidate for the position of mayor of the newly-created City of Digos immediately after he
served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos?

Held:

As a rule, in a representative democracy, the people should be allowed freely to choose those who will govern them. Article X, Section 8
of the Constitution is an exception to this rule, in that it limits the range of choice of the people.
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years
and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not
be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

An elective local official, therefore, is not barred from running again in for same local government post, unless two conditions concur: 1.)
that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms to the same local government post, and 2.) that he has fully
served three consecutive terms.

True, the new city acquired a new corporate existence separate and distinct from that of the municipality. This does not mean, however,
that for the purpose of applying the subject Constitutional provision, the office of the municipal mayor would now be construed as a
different local government post as that of the office of the city mayor. As stated earlier, the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Digos is the
same as that of the municipality. Consequently, the inhabitants of the municipality are the same as those in the city. These inhabitants
are the same group of voters who elected petitioner Latasa to be their municipal mayor for three consecutive terms. These are also the
same inhabitants over whom he held power and authority as their chief executive for nine years.
The framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception to the peoples freedom to choose those who will govern them in order
to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in
the same office. To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor after having served for three consecutive terms as a
municipal mayor would obviously defeat the very intent of the framers when they wrote this exception. Should he be allowed another
three consecutive terms as mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly holding office as chief executive over the same
territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive years. This is the very scenario sought to be avoided by the
Constitution, if not abhorred by it.(Latasa vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 154829, 10 December 2003)

Note:

It cannot be denied that the Court has previously held in Mamba-Perez v. COMELEC that after an elective official has been proclaimed
as winner of the elections, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to pass upon his qualifications. An opposing party's remedies after
proclamation would be to file a petition for quo warranto within ten days after the proclamation. Time and again, this Court has held that
rules of procedure are only tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that when rigid application of the rules tend to
frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, this Court is empowered to suspend their operation. We will not hesitate to set aside
technicalities in favor of what is fair and just.

Montebon vs. Comelec

Facts:
Montebon had been elected for three consecutive terms as municipal councilor of Tuburan, Cebu in 1998, 2001, and 2004 elections.
However, in January 2004, or during his second term, he succeeded and assumed the position of vice-mayor of Tuburan when the
incumbent vice-mayor retired. When he filed his certificate of candidacy again as municipal councilor for 2007 elections, a petition for
disqualification was filed against him based on the three-term limit rule. In his answer, Montebon argued that he cannot be disqualified
on the ground of the 3-term limit rule because his second term was interrupted when he assumed the position of vice-mayor due to the
retirement of elected vicemayor Petronilo Mendoza. Petitioners maintained that Montebon's assumption of office as vice-mayor in January
2004 should not be considered an interruption in the service of his second term since it was a voluntary renunciation of his office as
municipal councilor.

Issue: Was Montebon's assumption to the vice-mayoralty position considered an involuntary severance or interruption?

Held:
Yes. Succession in local government offices is by operation of law. Section 44 of Republic Act No. 7160, provides that if a permanent
vacancy occurs in the office of the vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member shall become vice mayor.

The legal successor is not given any option under the law on whether to accept the vacated post or not. Section 44 of the Local
Government Code makes no exception. Only if the highest-ranking councilor is permanently unable to succeed to the post does the law
speak of alternate succession. Under no circumstances can simple refusal of the official concerned be considered as permanent inability
within the contemplation of law. Essentially therefore, the successor cannot refuse to assume the office that he is mandated to occupy
by virtue of succession. He can only do so if for some reason he is permanently unable to succeed and occupy the post vacated.

Thus, succession by law to a vacated government office is characteristically not voluntary since it involves the performance of a public
duty by a government official, the non-performance of which exposes said official to possible administrative and criminal charges of
dereliction of duty and neglect in the performance of public functions. It is therefore more compulsory and obligatory rather than voluntary.

In this case, a permanent vacancy occurred in the office of the vice-mayor due to the retirement of Vice Mayor Mendoza. Montebon,
being the highest ranking municipal councilor, succeeded him in accordance with law. Thus, Montebon's assumption of office as vice--
mayor in January 2004 was an involuntary severance from his office as municipal councilor, resulting in an interruption in the service of
his 2001-2004 term. It cannot be deemed to have been by reason of voluntary renunciation because it was by operation of law. (Montebon
vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 180444. April 9, 2008)

Note:
Since the law no less allowed Montebon to vacate his post as councilor in order to assume office as vicemayor, his occupation of the
higher office cannot, without more, be deemed as a voluntary renunciation of his position as councilor.

Aldovino VS COMELEC

FACTS: Lucena City councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo was elected to the said office for three consecutive terms: 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and
2004-2007. In September 2005, during his third term of office, the Sandiganbayan issued an order of 90-day preventive suspension
against him in relation to a criminal case. The said suspension order was subsequently lifted by the Court, and Asilo resumed the
performance of the functions of his office.
Asilo then filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position in 2007. His disqualification was sought by herein petitioners on the
ground that he had been elected and had served for three consecutive terms, in violation of the three-term Constitutional limit.

ISSUE: WON the suspensive condition interrupts the three-term limitation rule of COMELEC?

RULING:
NO. The preventive suspension of public officials does not interrupt their term for purposes of the three-term limit rule under the
Constitution and the Local Government Code (RA 7160).
The candidacy of Lucena City Councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo for a fourth term in the 2007 elections was in contravention of the three-term
limit rule of Art. X, sec. 8 of the Constitution since his 2004-2007 term was not interrupted by the preventive suspension imposed on
him, the SC granted the petition of Simon B. Aldovino, Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong seeking Asilos disqualification.
Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective interruption of service within a term and should therefore not be a
reason to avoid the three-term limitation, held the Court. It noted that preventive suspension can pose as a threat more potent than
the voluntary renunciation that the Constitution itself disallows to evade the three-term limit as it is easier to undertake and merely
requires an easily fabricated administrative charge that can be dismissed soon after a preventive suspension has been imposed.

Lonzanida vs. Comelec

Facts:

Romeo Lonzanida was elected and had served as municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in terms 1989-1992, 1992-1995 and
1995-1998. However, his proclamation relative to the 1995 election was protested and was eventually declared by the RTC and then by
COMELEC null and void on the ground of failure of elections.

On February 27, 1998, or about three months before the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida vacated the mayoralty post in light of a
COMELEC order and writ of execution it issued. Juan Alvez, Lonzanidas opponent assumed office for the remainder of the term.

In the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy. His opponent, Efren Muli, filed a petition for disqualification
on the ground that Lonzanida had already served three consecutive terms in the same post. On May 13, 1998, petitioner Lonzanida
was proclaimed winner.

The COMELEC granted the petition for disqualification.

Petitioner Lonzanida challenged the validity of the COMELEC resolution maintaining that he was duly elected mayor for only two
consecutive terms and that his assumption of office in 1995 cannot be counted as service of a term for the purpose of applying the
three term limit for local government officials, because he was not the duly elected mayor of San Antonio in the May 1995 elections. He
also argued that the COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction over the petition for disqualification after he was proclaimed winner in the
1998 mayoral elections as the proper remedy is a petition for quo warranto with the appropriate regional trial court under Rule 36 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

The private respondent maintained that the petitioners assumption of office in 1995 should be considered as service of one full term
because he discharged the duties of mayor for almost three years until March 1, 1998 or barely a few months before the next mayoral
elections.

Issues:

1. WON petitioners assumption of office as mayor of San Antonio Zambales from May 1995 to 1998 may be considered as service of
one full term for the purpose of applying the three-term limit for elective local government officials.

2. WON COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction over the petition for disqualification after petitioner was proclaimed winner.

Held:

1. NO. Two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: 1) that the official concerned has been elected for three
consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.

To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in
the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local
office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.
The two requisites for the application of the three term rule are absent. First, the petitioner cannot be considered as having been duly
elected to the post in the May 1995 elections, and second, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term by reason of
involuntary relinquishment of office.

After a re-appreciation and revision of the contested ballots the COMELEC itself declared by final judgment that petitioner Lonzanida
lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections and his previous proclamation as winner was declared null and void. His assumption of office as
mayor cannot be deemed to have been by reason of a valid election but by reason of a void proclamation. It has been repeatedly held
by this court that a proclamation subsequently declared void is no proclamation at all and while a proclaimed candidate may assume
office on the strength of the proclamation of the Board of Canvassers he is only a presumptive winner who assumes office subject to
the final outcome of the election protest. Lonzanida did not serve a term as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales from May 1995 to March
1998 because he was not duly elected to the post; he merely assumed office as presumptive winner, which presumption was later
overturned by the COMELEC when it decided with finality that Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections.

Second, the petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to vacate his post before
the expiration of the term. The respondents contention that the petitioner should be deemed to have served one full term from May
1995-1998 because he served the greater portion of that term has no legal basis to support it; it disregards the second requisite for the
application of the disqualification, i.e., that he has fully served three consecutive terms. The second sentence of the constitutional
provision under scrutiny states, Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected. The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to
circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the peoples choice and grant their
elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in
the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term
provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next
mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC
to that effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve
the 1995-1998 mayoral term.

In sum, the petitioner was not the duly elected mayor and that he did not hold office for the full term; hence, his assumption of office
from May 1995 to March 1998 cannot be counted as a term for purposes of computing the three term limit. The Resolution of the
COMELEC finding him disqualified on this ground to run in the May 1998 mayoral elections should therefore be set aside.

2. NO. It was held in the case of Sunga vs. COMELEC that the proclamation or the assumption of office of a candidate against whom a
petition for disqualification is pending before the COMELEC does not divest the COMELEC of jurisdiction to continue hearing the case
and to resolve it on the merits.

Section 6 of RA 6646 specifically mandates that:

Sec. 6. Effects of disqualification Case.- any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted
for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to
be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the court or commission shall continue
with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the
pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
The clear legislative intent is that the COMELEC should continue the trial and hearing of the disqualification case to its conclusion i.e.,
until judgment is rendered. The outright dismissal of the petition for disqualification filed before the election but which remained
unresolved after the proclamation of the candidate sought to be disqualified will unduly reward the said candidate and may encourage
him to employ delaying tactics to impede the resolution of the petition until after he has been proclaimed.

It must be emphasized that the purpose of a disqualification proceeding is to prevent the candidate from running or, if elected, from
serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the election laws. Obviously, the fact that a candidate has been proclaimed elected does not
signify that his disqualification is deemed condoned and may no longer be the subject of a separate investigation. (Lonzanida vs.
Comelec, G.R. No. 135150. July 28, 1999)

Rivera III vs. Comelec

Facts:

In the May 2004 elections, respondent Marino "Boking" Morales ran as candidate for mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga for the term 2004-
2007. Petitioner Dee filed with the COMELEC a petition to cancel Morales Certificate of Candidacy on the ground that he was elected
and had served three previous consecutive terms as mayor of Mabalacat. They alleged that his candidacy violated Section 8, Article X
of the Constitution and Section 43 (b) of RA 7160.

Respondent Morales admitted that he was elected mayor of Mabalacat for the term 1995-1998 (first term) and 2001-2004 (third term),
but he served the second term from 1998-2001 only as a "caretaker of the office" or as a "de facto officer" since his proclamation as
mayor was declared void by the Regional Trial Court (RTC). He was also preventively suspended by the Ombudsman in an anti-graft
case from January to July 1999.

Issue:
1. Has Morales already served his 3 consecutive term?
2. If so, who should then take his position?

Held:

1. For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the
official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he has fully served
three consecutive terms.

Respondent Morales was elected for the term 1998-2001. He assumed the position. He was mayor for the entire period notwithstanding
the Decision of the RTC in the electoral protest case filed by petitioner Dee ousting him (Morales) as mayor (because the trial courts
ruling was promulgated only after the expiry of the 1998-2001 term). Respondent Morales is now serving his fourth term. He has been
mayor of Mabalacat continuously without any break since 1995. In just over a month, by June 30, 2007, he will have been mayor of
Mabalacat for twelve (12) continuous years. His assumption of office for the second term constituted service for the full term and
should be counted as a full term served in contemplation of the three-term limit prescribed by the constitutional and statutory provisions
barring local elective officials from being elected and serving for more than three consecutive terms for the same position.

The framers of the Constitution, by including this exception, wanted to establish some safeguards against the excessive accumulation
of power as a result of consecutive terms. Therefore, having found respondent Morales ineligible, his Certificate of Candidacy dated
December 30, 2003 should be cancelled. Not being a candidate, the votes cast for him SHOULD NOT BE COUNTED and must be
considered stray votes.

2. The question now is whether it is the vice-mayor or petitioner Dee who shall serve for the remaining portion of the 2004 to 2007 term.
In Labo v. Comelec, this Court has ruled that a second place candidate cannot be proclaimed as a substitute winner, thus:

The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next
highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.
As a consequence of petitioners ineligibility, a permanent vacancy in the contested office has occurred. This should now be filled by the
vice-mayor in accordance with Section 44 of the Local Government Code, to wit:

Sec. 44. Permanent vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor and Vice-Mayor. (a) If a permanent vacancy
occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or the vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or
mayor. (Rivera III vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 167591. May 9, 2007)

Adormeo vs Comelec Case Digest

Facts:
Ramon Talaga, Jr. served as mayor of Lucena City during terms 1992-1995 and 1995-1998. During the 1998 elections, Talaga lost to
Bernard G. Tagarao. However, before Tagaraos 1998-2001 term ended, a recall election was conducted in May 2000 wherein Talaga
won and served the unexpired term of Tagarao until June 2001. When Talaga ran for mayor in 2001, his candidacy was challenged on
the ground that he had already served as mayor for three consecutive terms in violation of the three term-limit rule. Comelec found
Talaga disqualified to run for mayor. Talaga filed a motion for reconsideration which Comelec granted. Talaga was then elected Mayor.

Issue: Whether Talaga was disqualified to run as mayor given that he had already served two full terms and he won in the 2000 recall
elections.

Held:
The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective
position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also
have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.

For nearly two years Talaga was a private citizen. The continuity of his mayorship was disruptedby his defeat in the 1998 elections. The
time between his second term and the recall election is sufficient interruption. Thus, there was no three consecutive terms as
contemplated in the disqualifications in the LGC.

Talaga only served two consecutive full terms. There was a disruption when he was defeated in the 1998 elections. His election during
the 2000 recall election is not a continuation of his two previous terms which could constitute his third term thereby barring him for
running for a fourth term. Victory in the 2000 recall election is not the voluntary renunciation contemplated by the law. (Adormeo vs
Comelec, G.R. No. 147927, February 4, 2002)

Socrates vs COMELEC, 391 SCRA 457; G.R. No. 154512, November 12, 2002

Facts:
COMELEC gave due course to the Recall Resolution against Mayor Socrates of the City of Puerto Princesa, and scheduled the recall
election on September 7, 2002. On August 23, 2002, Hagedorn filed his COC for mayor in the recall election. Different petitioners filed
their respective petitions, which were consolidated seeking the disqualification of Hagedorn to run for the recall election and the
cancellation of his COC on the ground that the latter is disqualified from running for a fourth consecutive term, having been elected and
having served as mayor of the city for three (3) consecutive full terms in 1992, 1995 and 1998 immediately prior to the instant recall
election for the same post. COMELECs First Division dismissed in a resolution the petitioner for lack of merit. And COMELEC declared
Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election.

Issue: WON one who has been elected and served for 3 consecutive full terms is qualified to run for mayor in the recall election.

Held:
Yes. The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article X of the Constitution, which states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be
three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.

This three-term limit rule is reiterated in Section 43 (b) of RA No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, which
provides:
Section 43. Term of Office. (a) x x x
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation
of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for
which the elective official was elected.

The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms. The clear intent is that
only consecutive terms count in determining the three-term limit rule. The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for
any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for any length
of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before and after the interruption from being joined together to form a
continuous service or consecutive terms.

After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate re-election for a fourth term. The prohibited election
refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a
recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an
immediate re-election after three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the
continuity of service.

Based from the deliberations of a Constitutional Commission, what the Constitution prohibits is an immediate re-election for a fourth
term following three consecutive terms. The Constitution, however, does not prohibit a subsequent re-election for a fourth term as long
as the re-election is not immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. A recall election mid-way in the term following the third
consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an immediate re-election after the third term.
Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate re-election to run in any other subsequent election involving
the same term of office. What the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term.

In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election on September 24, 2002 is not an immediate re-election after his third
consecutive term which ended on June 30, 2001. The immediate re-election that the Constitution barred Hagedorn from seeking
referred to the regular elections in 2001.

Mendoza vs. Comelec

Facts:

Respondent Leonardo B. Roman held the post of Governor of Bataan province a number of times:

a) 1986 1988 Appointed OIC Governor of Bataan by former Pres. Aquino and served up to 1988
b) 1988 1992 Elected Governor and served up to 1992
c) 1994 1995 Elected Governor during the recall election in 1993, assumed office on 28 June 1994 and served up to 1995
d) 1995 1998 Elected Governor and served up to 1998
e) 1998 2001 Elected Governor and served up to 2001.

In 2001, private respondent Roman again filed a certificate of candidacy for the same post in the May 2001 regular elections. On 16
May 2001, Leonardo Roman was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Bataan.

Petitioners Melanio L. Mendoza and Mario E. Ibarra seek to declare respondent Romans election as governor of Bataan as null and
void for allegedly being contrary to Art. X, 8 of the Constitution.
Issue:

Should Roman's incumbency to the post of Governor following the recall elections be included in determining the three-consecutive
term limit fixed by law?

Held:

No. A winner who dislodges in a recall election an incumbent elective local official merely serves the balance of the latter's term of
office; it is not a full three-year term.

The law contemplates a continuous full three-year term before the proscription can apply, providing for only one exception, i.e., when
an incumbent voluntarily gives up the office. If involuntary severance from the service which results in the incumbents being unable to
finish his term of office because of his ouster through valid recall proceedings negates one term for purposes of applying the three--
term limit, it stands to reason that the balance of the term assumed by the newly elected local official in a recall election should not also
be held to be one term in reckoning the three-term limit.

In both situations, neither the elective local official who is unable to finish his term nor the elected local official who only assumes the
balance of the term of the ousted local official following the recall election could be considered to have served a full three-year term set
by the Constitution.

The Constitution does not prohibit elective local officials from serving for more than three consecutive terms because, in fact, it
excludes from the three-term limit interruptions in the continuity of service, so long as such interruptions are not due to the voluntary
renunciation of the office by an incumbent. Hence, the period from June 28, 1994 to June 30, 1995, during which respondent Leonardo
B. Roman served as governor of Bataan by virtue of a recall election held in 1993, should not be counted. Since on May 14, 2001
respondent had previously served as governor of Bataan for only two consecutive terms (1995-1998 and 1998-2001), his election on
that day was actually only his third term for the same position.

A recall term should not be considered as one full term, because a contrary interpretation would in effect cut short the elected officials
service to less than nine years and shortchange his constituents. The desire to prevent monopoly of political power should be balanced
against the need to uphold the voters obvious preference who, in the present case, is Roman who received 97 percent of the votes
cast. (Mendoza vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 154512. November 12, 2002)

MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO v. COMELEC, GR No. 201716, 2013-01-08

Facts:
For four (4) successive regular elections, namely, the 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010 national and local elections, Abundo vied for the
position of municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes.

In the 2004 electoral derby, however, the Viga municipal board of canvassers initially proclaimed as winner one Jose Torres (Torres),
who, in due time, performed the functions of the office of mayor. Abundo protested Torres' election and proclamation. Abundo was
eventually declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral contest, paving the way for his assumption of office starting May 9, 2006
until the end of the 2004-2007 term on June 30, 2007, or for a period of a little over one year and one month. Then came the May 10,
2010 elections where Abundo and Torres again opposed each other.

When Abundo filed his certificate of candidacy for the mayoralty seat, Torres lost no time in seeking the former's disqualification to run
predicated on the three-consecutive term limit rule.

On June 16, 2010, COMELEC issued a Resolution finding for Abundo, accordingly proclaimed 2010 mayor-elect of Viga private
respondent Ernesto R. Vega (Vega) commenced a quo warranto action to unseat Abundo on essentially the same grounds Torres
raised in his petition to disqualify.
Issues: Whether the service of a term less than the full three years by an elected official arising from his being declared as the duly
elected official upon an election protest is considered as full service of the term for purposes of the application of the three consecutive
term limit for elective local officials.

Ruling:
The consecutiveness of what otherwise would have been Abundo's three successive, continuous mayorship was effectively broken
during the 2004-2007 term when he was initially deprived of title to, and was veritably... disallowed to serve and occupy, an office to
which he, after due proceedings, was eventually declared to have been the rightful choice of the electorate.
To constitute a disqualification to run for an elective local office pursuant to the aforequoted constitutional and statutory provisions, the
following requisites must concur:

(1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post; and
(2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.

The Court finds Abundo's case meritorious and declares that the two-year period during which his opponent, Torres, was serving as
mayor should be considered as an interruption, which effectively removed Abundo's case from the ambit of the three-term limit rule.

During the term 2004-2007, and with the enforcement of the decision of the election protest in his favor, Abundo assumed the
mayoralty post for a period of a little over one year and one month. It cannot be said that Mayor Abundo was able to serve fully the
entire 2004-2007 term to which he was otherwise entitled.

In the present case, during the period of one year and ten months, Abundo cannot plausibly claim, even if he wanted to, that he could
hold office of the mayor as a matter of right. Neither can he assert title to the same nor serve the functions of the said elective office.

The reason is simple: during that period, title to hold such office and the corresponding right to assume the functions thereof still
belonged to his opponent, as proclaimed election winner. Abundo cannot be said to have retained title to the mayoralty office as he was
at that time not the duly proclaimed winner who would have the legal right to assume and serve such elective office. For another, not
having been declared winner yet, Abundo cannot be said to have lost title to the office since one cannot plausibly lose a title which, in
the first place, he did not have. Thus, for all intents and purposes, Abundo was not entitled to the elective office until the election protest
was finally resolved in his favor.

Consequently, there was a hiatus of almost two years, consisting of a break and effective interruption of his service, until he assumed
the office and served barely over a year of the remaining term.

Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC, June 26, 2001

Facts: Petitioner under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court challenging Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 issued by the COMELEC, approving
the participation of 154 organizations and parties and denying several others.

Petitioners seek to disqualify the private respondents from participating in the party-list election on the ground that it was intended to
benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; and not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented.

Issues: Whether or not the Commission committed a grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.

Held: SC stated that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and the Constitution. It is their duty as a quasi-
judicial body to apply the law as they find it, not to reinvent or second guess it.

However, the petitions for disqualification cannot be granted outright because there should be a factual determination first.

SC laid down the following guidelines for screening party-list participants.

1. The political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in
Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must show through its constitution, articles of incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of
government and track record that it represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its
membership should belong to the marginalized and underrepresented. And it must demonstrate that in a conflict of interests, it has
chosen or is likely to choose the interest of such sectors.

2. While even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they
must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors x x
x to be elected to the House of Representatives. In other words, while they are not disqualified merely on the ground that they are
political parties, they must show, however, that they represent the interests of the marginalized and underrepresented.

3. The religious sector may not be represented in the party-list system.

4. A party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941.

5. The party or organization must not be an adjunt of, or a project organized or an entity funded or assisted by, the government.

6. The party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees must likewise do so.

7. Not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees.
To repeat, under Section 2 of RA 7941, the nominees must be Filipino citizens who belong to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties.

8. As previously discussed, while lacking a well-defined political constituency, the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole.

Atong Paglaum, Inc. vs Commission on Elections

Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on Elections in the May 2013 party-list elections for various
reasons but primarily for not being qualified as representatives for marginalized or underrepresented sectors.
Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC in
disqualifying them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the said party-lists.
HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT. However, the Supreme
Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC as the Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which abandoned some
principles established in the two aforestated cases. The new guidelines are as follows:
I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or
organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to
represent any marginalized and underrepresented sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and do not field candidates in
legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in
party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an
independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized and underrepresented or lacking in well-defined political constituencies.
It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are marginalized
and underrepresented include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and
overseas workers. The sectors that lack well-defined political constituencies include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the marginalized and underrepresented must belong to
the marginalized and underrepresented sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations
that lack well-defined political constituencies must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations
that represent the marginalized and underrepresented, or that represent those who lack well-defined political constituencies, either
must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national
and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided
that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always been the practice, from participating in the party-list elections.
But, since theres really no constitutional prohibition nor a statutory prohibition, major political parties can now participate in the party-list
system provided that they do so through their bona fide sectoral wing (see parameter 3 above).
Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list elections will encourage them to work assiduously in
extending their constituencies to the marginalized and underrepresented and to those who lack well-defined political constituencies.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission when they were drafting the party-list
system provision of the Constitution. The Commissioners deliberated that it was their intention to include all parties into the party-list
elections in order to develop a political system which is pluralistic and multiparty. (In the BANAT case, Justice Puno emphasized that the
will of the people should defeat the intent of the framers; and that the intent of the people, in ratifying the 1987 Constitution, is that the
party-list system should be reserved for the marginalized sectors.)
III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT RESERVED for the marginalized and underrepresented or
for parties who lack well-defined political constituencies. It is also for national or regional parties. It is also for small ideology-based and
cause-oriented parties who lack well-defined political constituencies. The common denominator however is that all of them cannot, they
do not have the machinery unlike major political parties, to field or sponsor candidates in the legislative districts but they can acquire
the needed votes in a national election system like the party-list system of elections.
If the party-list system is only reserved for marginalized representation, then the system itself unduly excludes other cause-oriented
groups from running for a seat in the lower house.
As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be understood to include only labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature
are economically at the margins of society. It should be noted that Section 5 of Republic Act 7941 includes, among others, in its provision
for sectoral representation groups of professionals, which are not per se economically marginalized but are still qualified as marginalized,
underrepresented, and do not have well-defined political constituencies as they are ideologically marginalized.