MERCEDES M. TEAGUE vs.
ELENA FERNANDEZ not been complied with in connection with the construction and use of the
SOURCE OF OBLIGATION:Quasi- Delict
CAUSE OF ACTION: Death of Students due to a stampede.
FACTS:The Realistic Institute, admittedly owned and operated by defendant-
appellee Mercedes M. Teague was a vocational school for hair and beauty
culture situated on the second floor of the Gil-Armi Building, a two-storey,
semi-concrete edifice located at the corner of Quezon Boulevard and Soler
Street, Quiapo, Manila. The said second floor was unpartitioned, and
although it had only one stairway, of about 1.50 meters in width, it had eight
windows, each of which was provided with two fire-escape ladders, and the
presence of each of said fire-exits was indicated on the wall.
At about four o'clock in the afternoon, a fire broke out in a store for surplus
materials located about ten meters away from the institute. Soler Street lay
between that store and the institute. Upon seeing the fire, some of the
students in the Realistic Institute shouted 'Fire! Fire!' and thereafter, a panic
ensued. Four instructresses and six assistant instructress of the Institute
were present and they, together with the registrar, tried to calm down the
students, who numbered about 180 at the time, telling them not to be afraid
because the Gil-Armi Building would not get burned as it is made of concrete,
and that the fire was anyway, across the street. They told the students not to
rush out but just to go down the stairway two by two, or to use the fire-
escapes. Prieto, one of the instructresses, took to the microphone so as to
convey to the students the above admonitions more effectively, and she even
slapped three students in order to quiet them down. Miss FrinoMeliton, the
registrar, whose desk was near the stairway, stood up and tried with
outstretched arms to stop the students from rushing and pushing their way to
the stairs. The panic, however, could not be subdued and the students, with
the exception of the few who made use of fire-escapes kept on rushing and
pushing their way through the stairs, thereby causing stampede therein.
Indeed, no part of the Gil-Armi Building caught fire. But, after the panic was
over, four students, including Lourdes Fernandez, a sister of plaintiffs-
appellants, were found dead and several others injured on account of the
stampede. The deceased's five brothers and sisters filed an action for
damages against Mercedes M. Teague as owner and operator of Realistic
Institute.
Court of First Instance: Dismissed the case.
Court of Appeals: Rendered a judgment of reversal and sentenced the
defendant to pay damages. The decision of the appellate court declared that
the defendant, hereinafter to be referred to as the petitioner, was negligent
and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the death of Lourdes
Fernandez. This finding of negligence is based primarily on the fact that the
provision of Section 491 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila had
Gil-Armi building where the petitioner's vocational school was housed. The
alleged violation of the ordinance above-quoted consisted in the fact that the
second storey of the Gil-Armi building had only one stairway, 1.5 meters
wide, instead of two of at least 1.2 meters each, although at the time of the
fire the owner of the building had a second stairway under construction.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the violation the petitioner of the ordinance
constitutes negligence;
2) Whether or not the failure to comply with the requirement of the
ordinance was the proximate cause of the death of Lourdes
Fernandez.
RULING:
1. Yes, the violation of such ordinance constitute negligence. The mere fact
of violation of a statute is not sufficient basis for an inference that such
violation was the proximate cause of the injury complained. However, if the
very injury has happened which was intended to be prevented by the statute,
it has been held that violation of the statute will be deemed to be proximate
cause of the injury.
The generally accepted view is that violation of a statutory duty constitutes
negligence, negligence as a matter or law, or, according to the decisions on
the question, negligence per se for the reason that non-observance of what
the legislature has prescribed as a suitable precaution is failure to observe
that care which an ordinarily prudent man would observe, and, when the
state regards certain acts as so liable to injure others as to justify their
absolute prohibition, doing the forbidden act is a breach of duty with respect
to those who may be injured thereby; or, as it has been otherwise expressed,
when the standard of care is fixed by law, failure to conform to such
standard is negligence, negligence per se or negligence in and of itself,
in the absence of a legal excuse. According to this view it is immaterial,
where a statute has been violated, whether the act or omission constituting
such violation would have been regarded as negligence in the absence of
any statute on the subject or whether there was, as a matter of fact, any
reason to anticipate that injury would result from such violation.
2. Yes, the failure of the petitioner to comply with the ordinance was the
proximate cause of the death. According to the petitioner "the events of fire,
panic and stampede were independent causes with no causal connection at
all with the violation of the ordinance." The weakness in the argument
springs from a faulty juxtaposition of the events which formed a chain and
resulted in the injury. It is true that the petitioner's non-compliance with the
ordinance in question was ahead of and prior to the other events in point of
time, in the sense that it was coetaneous with its occupancy of the building.
But the violation was a continuing one, since the ordinance was a
measure of safety designed to prevent a specific situation which would
pose a danger to the occupants of the building. That situation was undue
overcrowding in case it should become necessary to evacuate the building,
which, it could be reasonably foreseen, was bound to happen under
emergency conditions if there was only one stairway available. It is true that
in this particular case there would have been no overcrowding in the single
stairway if there had not been a fire in the neighborhood which caused the
students to panic and rush headlong for the stairs in order to go down. But it
was precisely such contingencies or event that the authors of the ordinance
had in mind, for under normal conditions one stairway would be adequate for
the occupants of the building. Thus, as stated in 38 American Jurisprudence,
page 841: "The general principle is that the violation of a statute or ordinance
is not rendered remote as the cause of an injury by the intervention of
another agency if the occurrence of the accident, in the manner in which it
happened, was the very thing which the statute or ordinance was intended to
prevent." To consider the violation of the ordinance as the proximate cause
of the injury does not portray the situation in its true perspective; it would be
more accurate to say that the overcrowding at the stairway was the
proximate cause and that it was precisely what the ordinance intended to
prevent by requiring that there be two stairways instead of only one. Under
the doctrine of the cases cited by the respondents, the principle of proximate
cause applies to such violation.
CIPRIANO V CA
CAUSE OF ACTION: Claim for damages for the car destroyed by fire
Source: Quasi-Delict
Facts:
Petitioner Elias S. Cipriano is the owner of E.S. Cipriano Enterprises, which
is engaged in the rustproofing of vehicles, under the style Motobilkote. On
April 30, 1991, private respondent Maclin Electronics, Inc., through an
employee, brought a 1990 model Kia Pride Peoples car to petitioners shop
for rustproofing.
The vehicle was received in the shop under Job Order No. 123581, which
showed the date it was received for rustproofing as well its condition at the
time. Neither the time of acceptance nor the hour of release, however, was
specified. According to the petitioner, the car was brought to his shop at 10
oclock in the morning of April 30, 1991 and was ready for release later that
afternoon, as it took only six hours to complete the process of rustproofing.
In the afternoon of May 1, 1991, fire broke out at the Lambat restaurant,
which petitioner also owned, adjoining his Mobilkote rust proofing shop. The
fire destroyed both the shop and the restaurant, including private
respondents Kia Pride. The car had been kept inside the building, allegedly
to protect it from theft. Petitioner claimed that despite efforts to save the
vehicle, there was simply not enough time to get it out of the building, unlike
three other cars which had been saved because they were parked near the
entrance of the garage.
On May 8 1991, private respondent sent a letter to petitioner, demanding
reimbursement for the value of the Kia Pride. In reply, petitioner denied
liability on the ground that the fire was a fortuitous event. This prompted
private respondent to bring this suit for the value of its vehicle and for
damages against petitioner. Private respondent alleged that its vehicle was
lost due to the negligence and imprudence of the petitioner, citing petitioners
failure to register his business with the Department of Trade and Industry
under P.D. No. 1572 and to insure it as required in the rules implementing
the Decree.
Issue:
Whether petitioner was required to insure his business (PD1572) and the
vehicles received by him in the course of his business and, if so, whether his
failure to do so constituted negligence, rendering him liable for loss due to
the risk required to be insured against.
Ruling:
1. Violation of a statutory duty is negligence per se.
2. Petitioner's negligence is the source of his obligation. He is not being held
liable for breach of his contractual obligation due to negligence but for his
negligence in not complying with a duty imposed on him by law. It is
therefore immaterial that the loss occasioned to private respondent was due
to a fortuitous event, since it was petitioners negligence in not insuring
against the risk which was the proximate cause of the loss.
3. Thus, P.D. No. 1572, 1 requires service and repair enterprises for motor
vehicles, like that of petitioners to register with the Department of Trade and
Industry. As condition for such registration or accreditation, Ministry Order
No. 32 requires covered enterprises to secure insurance coverage.
4. There is thus a statutory duty imposed on petitioner and it is for his failure
to comply with this duty that he was guilty of negligence rendering him liable
for damages to private respondent. While the fire in this case may be
considered a fortuitous event, this circumstance cannot exempt petitioner
from liability for loss.
AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC vs. CORDERO
FACTS
Petitioner is a foreign corporation that issues charge cards to its customers,
which the latter then use to purchase goods and services at accredited
merchants worldwide. Nilda Cordero, wife of respondent Noel Cordero,
applied for and was issued an American Express charge card. The issuance
of the charge card was covered by an Amex Card member Agreement. As
cardholder, Nilda, upon signing the back portion of the card, manifested her
acceptance of the terms of the agreement. An extension charge card was
likewise issued to respondent Noel Cordero, which he also signed.
Respondent together with his wife, daughter, and sister-in-law and uncle-in-
law went on a three-day holiday trip in Hong Kong. The group went to the
Watsons Chemist Shop; Noel picked up some chocolate candies and
handled to the sales clerk his American Express extension charge card to
pay for his purchases. The sales clerk verified the card by making a
telephone call to the American Express Office in Hong Kong. Moments later,
Susan Chong, the store manager emerged from behind the counter and
informed respondent that she had to confiscate the card. Thereupon, she cut
respondents American Express card in half with a pair of scissors. This,
according to respondent, caused him embarrassment and humiliation
considering that it was done in front of his family and the other customers
lined up at the check out counter. Hence, Nilda had to pay for the purchases
using her own American Express charge card.
Nilda called up Amexs office in Hong Kong where it was learned through the
Senior Authorized that a person in Hong Kong attempted to use a charge
card with the same number as respondents card. The Hong Kong Amex
Office called up respondent and after determining that he was in Manila and
not in HK, placed his card under the IASS (a system used by AMEX to
protect both company and its cardholders from fraudulent use of their charge
cards; once a card suspected of unauthorized use is placed in the system,
the person to whom the card is tendered must verify the identity of the
holder. If the true identity of the card owner is established, the card is
honored and the charges are approved; otherwise the card is revoked or
confiscated.)
Respondent filed with RTC complaint for damages against AMEX.
ISSUE
Whether or not AMEX is liable to Cordero for the humiliation suffered by the
latter.
RULING
NO. Respondent anchors his cause of action on Article 2176. In order that an
obligation based on quasi-delict may arise, there must be pre existing
contractual relation between the parties. But there are exceptions. There may
be an action for quasi-delict notwithstanding that there is a subsisting
contract between the parties. A liability for tort may arise even under a
contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract. Stated differently,
when an act, which constitutes a breach of contract, would have itself
constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability, the contract can be said to
have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.
Furthermore, to constitute quasi-delict, the fault or negligence must be the
proximate cause of the damage or injury suffered by the plaintiff. Proximate
Cause is the cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the
result would not have occurred. Proximate cause is determined by facts of
each case upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, policy and
precedent.
As explained by respondent himself, he could have used his card upon
verification by the sales clerk of Watson that indeed he is the authorized
cardholder. This could have been accomplished had respondent talked to
AMEXs representative, enabling the latter to determine that respondent is
indeed the true holder of the card. Clearly, no negligence which is breaches
the contract can be attributed to AMEX. If at all, the cause of respondents
humiliation and embarrassment was his refusal to talk to AMEXs
representative.
There was testimony to that effect which showed that when Watson
Company called AMEX for authorization, AMEX representative requested
that he talk to Mr. Cordero but he refused to talk to any representative of
AMEX. AMEX could not prove then that he is really the real cardholder.
Additionally, according to terms of CARDMEMBER AGREEMENT. AMEX
can revoke respondents card without notice. Again the subject card would
not have been confiscated and cut had respondent talked to AMEXs
representative and identified himself as the genuine cardholder. Clearly,
there was no negligence on the part of AMEX.
BJDC CONSTRUCTION vs. LANUZO
Facts
On January 5, 1998, Nena E. Lanuzo (Nena) filed a complaint for damages
against BJDC Construction (company), a single proprietorship engaged in
the construction business under its Manager/Proprietor Janet S. de la Cruz.
The company was the contractor of the re-blocking project to repair the
damaged portion of one lane of the national highway at Camarines Sur.
Nena alleged that she was the surviving spouse of the late Balbino Los
BaosLanuzo (Balbino) who figured in the accident that transpired at the site
of the re-blocking work; that Balbinos Honda motorcycle sideswiped the road
barricade placed by the company in the right lane portion of the road,
causing him to lose control of his motorcycle and to crash on the newly
cemented road, resulting in his instant death; and that the companys failure
to place illuminated warning signs on the site of the project, especially during
night time, was the proximate cause of the death of Balbino. She prayed that
the company be held liable for damages.
In its answer, the company denied Nenas allegations of negligence, insisting
that it had installed warning signs (containing the words SLOW DOWN
ROAD UNDER REPAIR AHEAD; SLOW DOWN ROAD UNDER REPAIR
and SLOW DOWN MEN WORKING) and lights along the highway and on
the barricades of the project; that at the time of the incident, the lights were
working and switched on; that its project was duly inspected by the
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), the Office of the Mayor
of Pili, and the Pili Municipal Police Station; and that it was found to have
satisfactorily taken measures to ensure the safety of motorists.
The company insisted that the death of Balbino was an accident brought
about by his own negligence, as confirmed by the police investigation report
that stated, among others, that Balbino was not wearing any helmet at that
time, and the accident occurred while Balbino was overtaking another
motorcycle; and that the police report also stated that the road sign/barricade
installed on the road had a light.
RTC in favor of the Company
CA in favor of the Heirs ofBalbinos heirs
Issue:
Whose negligence was the proximate cause of the death of Balbino?
Ruling:
The proximate and immediate cause of the death of Balbino was due to his
own negligence. The Balbino heirs, the parties carrying the burden of proof,
did not establish by preponderance of evidence that the negligence on the
part of the company was the proximate cause of the fatal accident of Balbino.
The company credibly refuted the allegation of inadequate illumination.
Zamora, its flagman in the project, rendered an eyewitness account of the
accident by stating that the site had been illuminated by light bulbs and gas
lamps, and that Balbino had been in the process of overtaking another
motorcycle rider at a fast speed when he hit the barricade placed on the
newly cemented road. On his part, SPO1 Corporal, the police investigator
who arrived at the scene of the accident on October 30, 1997, recalled that
there were light bulbs on the other side of the barricade on the lane coming
from Naga City; and that the light bulb on the lane where the accident had
occurred was broken because it had been hit by the victims motorcycle.
Witnesses Gerry Alejo and Engr. Victorino del Socorro remembered that light
bulbs and gas lamps had been installed in the area of the project.
Additionally, the company submitted the application for lighting permit
covering the project site (Annex 7) to prove the fact of installation of the
electric light bulbs in the project site.
Moreover, by the time of the accident, the project, which had commenced in
September 1997, had been going on for more than a month and was already
in the completion stage. Balbino, who had passed there on a daily basis in
going to and from his residence and the school where he then worked as the
principal, was thus very familiar with the risks at the project site. Nor could
the Lanuzo heirs justly posit that the illumination was not adequate, for it
cannot be denied that Balbinos motorcycle was equipped with headlights
that would have enabled him at dusk or night time to see the condition of the
road ahead. That the accident still occurred surely indicated that he himself
did not exercise the degree of care expected of him as a prudent motorist.
According to Dr. Abilay, the cause of death of Balbino was the fatal
depressed fracture at the back of his head, an injury that Dr. Abilay opined to
be attributable to his head landing on the cemented road after being thrown
off his motorcycle. Considering that it was shown that Balbino was not
wearing any protective head gear or helmet at the time of the accident, he
was guilty of negligence in that respect. Had he worn the protective head
gear or helmet, his untimely death would not have occurred.
BAKA ITANONG; The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur had no application
here.For the doctrine to apply, the following requirements must be shown to
exist, namely: (a) the accident is of a kind that ordinarily does not occur in the
absence of someones negligence; (b) it is caused by an instrumentality
within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants; and (c) the
possibility of contributing conduct that would make the plaintiff responsible is
eliminated.
Based on the evidence adduced by the Lanuzo heirs, negligence cannot be
fairly ascribed to the company considering that it has shown its installation of
the necessary warning signs and lights in the project site. In that context, the
fatal accident was not caused by any instrumentality within the exclusive
control of the company. In contrast, Balbino had the exclusive control of how
he operated and managed his motorcycle. The records disclose that he
himself did not take the necessary precautions. As Zamora declared, Balbino
overtook another motorcycle rider at a fast speed, and in the process could
not avoid hitting a barricade at the site, causing him to be thrown off his
motorcycle onto the newly cemented road. SPO1 Corporals investigation
report corroborated Zamoras declaration. This causation of the fatal injury
went uncontroverted by the Lanuzo heirs.
National Power Corporation vs Casionan
Source of Obligation: Quasi-delict
Cause of Action: Negligence on the part of NPC for not fixing their sagged
and dangled submission lines, which causes for the electrocution of
respondent.
Facts:
Respondents are the parents of Noble Casionan, 19 years old at the time of
the incident that claimed his life on June 27, 1995. He worked as a pocket
miner in Dalicno, Ampucao, Itogon, Benguet.
A trail leading to Sangilo, Itogon, existed in Dalicno and this trail was
regularly used by members of the community. Sometime in the 1970s,
petitioner NPC installed high-tension electrical transmission lines of 69
kilovolts (KV) traversing the trail. Eventually, some of the transmission lines
sagged and dangled reducing their distance from the ground to only about
eight to ten feet. This posed a great threat to passersby who were exposed
to the danger of electrocution especially during the wet season.
As early as 1991, the leaders of Ampucao, Itogon made verbal and written
requests for NPC to institute safety measures to protect users of the trail
from their high tension wires. On June 18, 1991 and February 11, 1993,
Pablo and Pedro Ngaosie, elders of the community, wrote Engr. Paterno
Banayot, Area Manager of NPC, to make immediate and appropriate repairs
of the high tension wires. They reiterated the danger it posed to small-scale
miners especially during the wet season. They related an incident where one
boy was nearly electrocuted.
Engr. Banayot informed Itogon Mayor Cresencio Pacalso
that NPC had installed nine additional poles on their Beckel-Philex 60 KV
line. They likewise identified a possible rerouting scheme with an estimated
total cost of 1.7 million pesos to improve the distance from its deteriorating
lines to the ground.
Noble and his co-pocket miner, Melchor Jimenez, were at Dalicno. They cut
two bamboo poles for their pocket mining. One was 18 to 19 feet long and
the other was 14 feet long. Each man carried one pole horizontally on his
shoulder: Noble carried the shorter pole while Melchor carried the longer
pole. Noble walked ahead as both passed through the trail underneath the
NPC high tension transmission lines on their way to their work place.
As Noble was going uphill and turning left on a curve, the tip of the bamboo
pole he was carrying touched one of the dangling high tension
wires. Melchor, who was walking behind him, narrated that he heard a
buzzing sound when the tip of Nobles pole touched the wire for only about
one or two seconds. Thereafter, he saw Noble fall to the ground. Melchor
rushed to Noble and shook him but the latter was already dead. Their co-
workers heard Melchors shout for help and together they brought the body of
Noble to their camp.
The elders and leaders of the community, through Mayor Cresencio Pacalso,
informed the General Manager of NPC in Itogon of the incident. After
learning of the electrocution, NPC repaired the dangling and sagging
transmission lines and put up warning signs around the area.
Issue: Whether or not there is a contributory negligence on the part of the
respondent?
Ruling:
No, there is no contributory negligence on the part of Casiano.
Negligence is the failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of
another person, that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.On
the other hand, contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the
injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered,
which falls below the standard which he is required to conform for his
own protection. There is contributory negligence when the partys act
showed lack of ordinary care and foresight that such act could cause him
harm or put his life in danger. It is an act or omission amounting to want of
ordinary care on the part of the person injured which, concurring with the
defendants negligence, is the proximate cause of the injury.
The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is
partly responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to recover
damages in full but must bear the consequences of his own negligence.
Here, members of the community regularly used the trail where Noble was
electrocuted. There were no warning signs to inform passersby of the
impending danger to their lives should they accidentally touch the high
tension wires. Also, the trail was the only viable way from Dalicon to
Itogon. Hence, Noble should not be faulted for simply doing what was
ordinary routine to other workers in the area.
Petitioner further faults the victim in engaging in pocket mining, which is
prohibited by the DENR in the area. However, it has been decided by the
Supreme Court that, the violation of a statute is not sufficient to hold that the
violation was the proximate cause of the injury, unless the very injury that
happened was precisely what was intended to be prevented by the statute.
The court said that, The pocket miners, although they have no permit to do
pocket mining in the area, are also human beings who have to eke out a
living in the only way they know how. The fact that they were not issued a
permit by the DENR to do pocket mining is no justification for NPC to simply
leave their transmission lines dangling or hanging 8 to 10 feet above the
ground posing danger to the life and limb of everyone in said community.
Lambert vs. Heirs of Ray Castillon 452 SCRA 285 , February 23, 2005
Source of Obligation of Parties: Quasi-Delict
Cause of Action: Death of Ray Castillon
FACTS:
- Ray Castillon visited the house of his brother Joel Castillon at
Tambo, Iligan City and borrowed his motorcycle. He then invited his
friend, Sergio Labang, to roam around Iligan City. Ray drove the
motorcycle with Sergio as the backrider. After eating supper at
Honas Restaurant and imbibing a bottle of beer, they traversed the
highway towards Tambo at a high speed.
- Upon reaching Brgy. Sto. Rosario, they figured in an accident with a
Tamaraw jeepney, owned by petitioner Nelen Lambert and driven by
Reynaldo Gamot, which was travelling on the same direction but
made a sudden left turn. The incident resulted in the instantaneous
death of Ray and injuries to Sergio.
- The heirs of Ray Castillon, thus filed an action for damages with
prayer for preliminary attachment against the petitioner Nelen
Lambert.
- Trial court rendered decision in favor of the private respondents but
reduced petitioners liability by 20% in view of the contributory
negligence of Ray.
- Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence the
petition.
ISSUE: WON Ray Castillon is guilty of contributory negligence.
RULING:
- Yes, SC agreed with the trial court that Ray Castillon was guilty of
contributory negligence.
- Petitioner misunderstood our ruling in Raynera v. Hiceta. That case
also involved a motorcycle crashing into the left rear portion of
another vehicle, and we declared therein that drivers of vehicles
who bump the rear of another vehicle are presumed to be the
cause of the accident, unless contradicted by other evidence. In
Raynera, the death of the victim was solely attributable to his own
negligence in bumping the rear of the trailer truck which was
travelling ahead of him at 20 to 30 kilometres per hour. Raynera,
being the driver of the rear vehicle, had full control of the situation as
he was in a position to observe the vehicle in front of him. The trailer
truck therein did not make a sudden left turn as in the case at bar.
Thus, the theory that drivers of vehicles who bump the rear of
another vehicle are presumed to be the cause of the accident is, as
in this case, sufficiently contradicted by evidence, which is the
sudden left turn made by Reynaldo which proximately caused the
collision.
- In the case at bar, it was established that Ray, at the time of the
mishap: (1) was driving the motorcycle at a high speed; (2) was
tailgating the Tamaraw jeepney; (3) has imbibed one or two bottles
of beer; and (4) was not wearing a protective helmet. These
circumstances, although not constituting the proximate cause of his
demise and injury to Sergio, contributed to the same result. The
contribution of these circumstances are all considered and
determined in terms of percentages of the total cause. Hence,
pursuant to Rakes v. AG &P, the heirs of Ray Castillon shall recover
damages only up to 50% of the award. In other words, 50% of the
damage shall be borne by the private respondents; the remaining
50% shall be paid by the petitioner.
SPS. VERGARA vs. SONKIN
Source of Obligation: Quasi-delict
Cause of Action: Damage to the property of the respondent
Facts:
Petitioners Sps. Vergara and Sps. Sonkin are adjoining landowners in
Bulacan. In view of the geographical configuration of the adjoining properties,
the property owned by Sps. Sonkin (Sonkin Property) is slightly lower in
elevation than that owned by Sp s. Vergara (Vergara Property).
When Sps. Sonkin bought the Sonkin Property sometime in 1999, they
raised the height of the partition wall and caused the construction of their
house thereon. The house itself was attached to the partition wall such that a
portion thereof became part of the wall of the masters bedroom and
bathroom.
Thereafter, petitioner leveled the uneven portion of the Vergara Property by
filling it with gravel, earth, and soil. As a result, the level of the Vergara
Property became even higher than that of the Sonkin Property by a third of a
meter. Eventually, respondent began to complain that water coming from the
Vergara Property was leaking into their bedroom through the partition wall,
causing cracks, as well as damage, to the paint and the wooden parquet
floor. Respondent repeatedly demanded that petitioners to build a retaining
wall on their property in order to contain the landfill that they had dumped
thereon, but the same went unheeded. Hence, Sps. Sonkin filed the instant
complaint for damages and injunction with prayer for preliminary mandatory
injunction and issuance of a temporary restraining order against petitioners.
CA ruled that while the act of the Sps Vergara in elevating their property
was the proximate cause of the water seepage, the Sps. Sonkin were guilty
of contributory negligence in building their house directly abutting the
perimeter wall. Thus, it deleted the actual damages ordered by the RTC. It
nevertheless awarded the Sonkins moral damages and attorneys fees.
Issue:
WON Sps. Sonkin are guilty of contributory negligence.
Ruling:
Yes.
Article 2179 of the Civil Code reads:
Art. 2179. When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his
negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the
injury being the defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover
damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
Verily, contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party,
contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below
the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection.
The CA correctly held that while the proximate cause of the damage
sustained by the house of Sps. Sonkin was the act of Sps. Vergara in
dumping gravel and soil onto their property, thus, pushing the perimeter wall
back and causing cracks thereon, as well as water seepage, the former is
nevertheless guilty of contributory negligence for not only failing to observe
the two (2)-meter setback rule under the National Building Code, but also for
disregarding the legal easement constituted over their property. As such,
Sps. Sonkin must necessarily and equally bear their own loss.
In view of Sps. Sonkins contributory negligence, the Court deleted the award
of moral damages in their favor. The Court ordered Sps. Vergara to provide
the adequate drainage system and Sps. Sonkin is ordered to remove the
portion of the house directly abutting the partition wall.The underlying precept
on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his
own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must bear the
consequences of his own negligence. The defendant must therefore be held
liable only for the damages actually caused by his negligence.
MARGARITA AFIALDA vs.SPS. HISOLE
Source of Obligation: Law
Cause of Action: Death of Afialda
Facts:
Afialda was the caretaker of the carabaos of Sps. Hisole, and while tending
the animals he was gored by one of them and later died as a consequence of
his injuries; that the mishap was due neither to his own fault nor to force
majeure; and that plaintiff, his elder sister and heir depending upon him for
support.
Plaintiff seeks to hold defendants liable under article 1905 of the Civil Code,
which reads:
The possessor of an animal, or the one who uses the same, is liable
for any damages it may cause, even if such animal should escape
from him or stray away.
This liability shall cease only in case, the damage should arise
from force majeure or from the fault of the person who may have
suffered it.
The lower court took the view that the owner of an animal is answerable only
for damages caused to a stranger, and that for damage caused to the
caretaker of the animal the owner would be liable only if he had been
negligent or at fault under article 1902 of the same code. The plaintiff
contends that the article 1905 does not distinguish between damage caused
to the caretaker and makes the owner liable whether or not he has been
negligent or at fault citing a Spanish Supreme Court Case.
Issue:
Whether the Sps. Hisola can be made liable to the death of Afialda
Ruling
No.
The Spanish Supreme Court decision has been rendered in a case where an
animal caused injury to a stranger or third person. It is not the same with the
case at bar, since Afialda being caretaker has an authority over the animals.
The distinction is important because the statute names
the possessor or user of the animal as the person liable for "any damages it
may cause," and this for the obvious reason that the possessor or user has
the custody and control of the animal and is therefore the one in a position to
prevent it from causing damage.
In the case, the animal was in custody and under the control of the caretaker,
who was paid for his work. Obviously, it was the caretaker's business to try to
prevent the animal from causing injury or damage to anyone, including
himself. And being injured by the animal under those circumstances, was
one of the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for
which he must take the consequences.
In a addition the decision of the Spanish Supreme Court, was made under
the labor laws rather than under article 1905 of the Civil Code. The present
action, is not brought under the Workmen's Compensation Act
Philippine National Railway Corp v. Vizcara
Source of Obligation: Quasi-delict
Cause of Action: Death and Injury suffered by the victims
Facts
Reynaldo Vizcara (Reynaldo) was driving a passenger jeepney to deliver
onion crops, with Cresencio, Crispin, Samuel, Dominador and Joel. While
crossing the railroad track a PNR train, being operated by respondent Japhet
Estranas (Estranas), suddenly turned up and rammed the passenger
jeepney. The collision resulted to the instantaneous death of Reynaldo,
Cresencio, Crispin, and Samuel while Dominador and Joel, sustained serious
physical injuries.
At the time, there was no level crossing installed at the railroad crossing.
Additionally, the Stop, Look and Listen signage was poorly maintained. The
Stop signage was already faded while the Listen signage was partly blocked
by another signboard.
Joel and Dominador, together with the heirs of the deceased victims filed an
action for damages against PNR, Estranas and Ben Saga, the alternate
driver of the train. They contend that it was PNRs gross negligence in not
providing adequate safety measures to prevent injury is the proximate cause
of the
fatalities and serious physical injuries sustained by the victims. They pointed
out that there was no level crossing bar, lighting equipment or bell installed to
warn motorists of the existence of the track and of the approaching train.
Petitioners claimed that they exercised due diligence in operating the train
and monitoring its roadworthiness. They assert that right before the collision,
Estranas was driving the train at a moderate speed. 400 meters away from
the railroad crossing, he started blowing his horn to warn motorists of the
approaching train and when the train was only 50 meters away from the
intersection, Estranas noticed that all vehicles on both sides of the track were
already at a full stop. Thus, he carefully proceeded at 25 KPH, still blowing
the trains horn. However, when the train was already ten (10) meters away
from the intersection, the passenger jeepney suddenly crossed the tracks.
Estranas immediately stepped on the brakes to avoid hitting the jeepney but
due to the sheer weight of the train, it did not instantly come to a complete
stop until the jeepney was rammed.
Petitioners maintain that the proximate cause of the collision was the
negligence and recklessness of the driver of the jeepney. They argue that as
a professional driver, Reynaldo is presumed to be familiar with traffic rules
and regulations, including the right of way accorded to trains at railroad
crossing and the precautionary measures to observe in traversing the same.
However, in utter disregard of the right of way enjoyed by PNR trains, he
failed to bring his jeepney to a full stop before crossing the railroad track and
thoughtlessly followed the ten-wheeler truck ahead of them. His failure to
maintain a safe distance between the jeepney he was driving and the truck
ahead of the same prevented him from seeing the PNR signage displayed
along the crossing
RTC and CA found negligence on the part of the petitioners. The PNR's
failure to install sufficient safety devices in the area, such as flagbars or
safety railroad bars and signage, was the proximate cause of the accident.
Issues
1. Whether the proximate cause is attributable to the Petitioners
2. Whether the doctrine of last clear chance is present in this case.
Ruling
1. YES. Petitioners failed to install safety railroad bars to prevent motorists
from crossing the tracks in order to give way to an approaching train. Aside
from the absence of a crossing bar, the Stop, Look and Listen signage
installed in the area was poorly maintained, hence, inadequate to alert the
public of the impending danger. A reliable signaling device in good condition,
not just a dilapidated Stop, Look and Listen signage, is needed to give notice
to the public. It is the responsibility of the railroad company to use reasonable
care to keep the signal devices in working order. Failure to do so would be
an indication of negligence.
In addition there is no contributory negligence on the part Reynaldo, before
the incident he was following a 10 wheeler truck, that was already crossing
the railroad and that they were no safety bars was on the way, thus, relying
on his faculties of sight and hearing, Reynaldo had no reason to anticipate
the impending danger. What clearly appears is that the accident would not
have happened had the petitioners installed reliable and adequate safety
devices along the crossing to ensure the safety of all those who may utilize
the same.
As an institution established to alleviate public transportation, it is the duty of
the PNR to promote the safety and security of the general riding public and
provide for their convenience, which to a considerable degree may be
accomplished by the installation of precautionary warning devices. Every
railroad crossing must be installed with barriers on each side of the track to
block the full width of the road until after the train runs past the crossing. To
even draw closer attention, the railroad crossing may be equipped with a
device which rings a bell or turns on a signal light to signify the danger or risk
of crossing. It is similarly beneficial to mount advance warning signs at the
railroad crossing, such as a reflectorized crossbuck sign to inform motorists
of the existence of the track, and a stop, look and listen signage to prompt
the public to take caution. These warning signs must be erected in a place
where they will have ample lighting and unobstructed visibility both day and
night
2. The doctrine of last clear chance is not applicable.
The doctrine of last clear chance provides that where both parties are
negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in point of
time than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine
whose fault or negligence brought about the occurrence of the incident,
the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm
but failed to do so, is chargeable with the consequences arising
therefrom. Stated differently, the rule is that the antecedent negligence of a
person does not preclude recovery of damages caused by the supervening
negligence of the latter, who had the last fair chance to prevent the
impending harm by the exercise of due diligence.To reiterate, the proximate
cause of the collision was the petitioners negligence in ensuring that
motorists and pedestrians alike may safely cross the railroad track. The
unsuspecting driver and passengers of the jeepney did not have any
participation in the occurrence of the unfortunate incident which befell them.
Likewise, they did not exhibit any overt act manifesting disregard for their
own safety. Thus, absent preceding negligence on the part of the
respondents, the doctrine of last clear chance cannot be applied
Achevara vs Ramsos
Source of Obligaton: Quasi-delict = negligence of the Respondent
Cause of Action: Death of the husband of the R because of reckless
driving of Ps driver
Facts:
Elvira Ramos and her two minor children filed for a complaint for damages
against the driver and the operator of the passenger jeepney for the death of
Arnulfo Ramos, her husband, in a vehicular accident. It was alleged that
Valdez (jeepney driver) was driving a passenger jeep heading north on the
national highway in Barangay Tablac, Candon, Ilocos Sur in a reckless,
careless, and negligent manner. He tried to overtake a motorcycle, causing
the passenger jeep to encroach on the opposite lane and bump the
oncoming vehicle driven by Arnulfo Ramos. The injuries sustained by Arnulfo
Ramos caused his death, notwithstanding prompt medical assistance.
Respondents alleged that Crescencia Achevara failed to exercise due
diligence in the selection and supervision of Benigno Valdez as driver of the
passenger jeep.
On the other hand, the Petitioners contend that it was Ramos who was
running his owner type jeep in a zigzag manner and encroaching on the west
lane of the road. To avoid a collision, Valdez drove the passenger jeep
towards the shoulder of the road, west of his lane, but the owner-type jeep
continued to move toward the western lane and bumped the left side of the
passenger jeep. Petitioners alleged that it was Arnulfo Ramos who was
careless and negligent in driving a motor vehicle, which he very well knew
had a mechanical defect. Hence, respondents had no cause of action against
petitioners.
(may mga prinesent na witnesses pero ang nag prevail is yung owner type
jeep was wiggling and running fast in a zigzag manner)
Issue:
WON Achevara is liable for the death of Ramis
Ruling:
No, cannot recover damages.
Foreseeability is the fundamental test of negligence. To be negligent, a
defendant must have acted or failed to act in such a way that an ordinary
reasonable man would have realized that certain interests of certain persons
were unreasonably subjected to a general but definite class of risks.
Seeing that the owner-type jeep was wiggling and running fast in a zigzag
manner as it travelled on the opposite side of the highway, Benigno Valdez
was made aware of the danger ahead if he met the owner-type jeep on the
road. Yet he failed to take precaution by immediately veering to the rightmost
portion of the road or by stopping the passenger jeep at the right shoulder of
the road and letting the owner-type jeep pass before proceeding southward;
hence, the collision occurred. The Court of Appeals correctly held that
Benigno Valdez was guilty of inexcusable negligence by neglecting to take
such precaution, which a reasonable and prudent man would ordinarily have
done under the circumstances and which proximately caused injury to
another.

On the other hand, the Court also finds Arnulfo Ramos guilty of gross
negligence for knowingly driving a defective jeep on the highway. An
ordinarily prudent man would know that he would be putting himself and
other vehicles he would encounter on the road at risk for driving a
mechanically defective vehicle. Under the circumstances, a prudent man
would have had the owner-type jeep repaired or would have stopped using it
until it was repaired. Ramos was, therefore, grossly negligent in continuing to
drive on the highway the mechanically defective jeep, which later encroached
on the opposite lane and bumped the passenger jeep driven by Benigno
Valdez. Gross negligence is the absence of care or diligence as to amount to
a reckless disregard of the safety of persons or property. It evinces a
thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid
them.
The acts of negligence of Arnulfo Ramos and Benigno Valdez were
contemporaneous when Ramos continued to drive a wiggling vehicle on the
highway despite knowledge of its mechanical defect, while Valdez did not
immediately veer to the rightmost side of the road upon seeing the wiggling
vehicle of Ramos perhaps because it still kept to its lane and Valdez did
not know the extent of its mechanical defect. However, when the owner-type
jeep encroached on the lane of the passenger jeep, Valdez realized the peril
at hand and steered the passenger jeep toward the western shoulder of the
road to avoid a collision. It was at this point that it was perceivable that
Ramos must have lost control of his vehicle, and that it was Valdez who had
the last opportunity to avoid the collision by swerving the passenger jeep
towards the right shoulder of the road
The doctrine of last clear chance applies to a situation where the plaintiff was
guilty of prior or antecedent negligence, but the defendant who had the
last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is made
liable for all the consequences of the accident, notwithstanding the prior
negligence of the plaintiff. However, the doctrine does not apply where the
party charged is required to act instantaneously, and the injury cannot be
avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should
have been discovered.
The doctrine of last clear chance does not apply to this case, because even if
it can be said that it was Benigno Valdez who had the last chance to avoid
the mishap when the owner-type jeep encroached on the western lane of the
passenger jeep, Valdez no longer had the opportunity to avoid the collision.
The Answer of petitioners stated that when the owner-type jeep encroached
on the lane of the passenger jeep, Benigno Valdez maneuvered his vehicle
towards the western shoulder of the road to avoid a collision, but the owner-
type jeep driven by Ramos continued to move to the western lane and
bumped the left side of the passenger jeep. Thus, petitioners assert in their
Petition that considering that the time the owner-type jeep encroached on the
lane of Valdez to the time of impact was only a matter of seconds, he no
longer had the opportunity to avoid the collision. Although the records are
bereft of evidence showing the exact distance between the two vehicles
when the owner-type jeep encroached on the lane of the passenger jeep, it
must have been near enough, because the passenger jeep driven by Valdez
was unable to avoid the collision. Hence, the doctrine of last clear chance
does not apply to this case.
Article 2179 of the Civil Code provides:
When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause
of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only
contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the
defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the
courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
In this case, both Arnulfo Ramos and Benigno Valdez failed to exercise
reasonable care and caution that an ordinarily prudent man would have
taken to prevent the vehicular accident. Since the gross negligence of
Arnulfo Ramos and the inexcusable negligence of Benigno Valdez were the
proximate cause of the vehicular accident, respondents cannot recover
damages pursuant to Article 2179 of the Civil Code.
Bank of America v Philippine Racing Club
Source: Law
Cause of action: Failure of the bank to make a verification regarding the
encashment of checks
Facts:
PRCI maintained a Current Account with Bank of America (BA). The
authorized joint signatories were plaintiff-appellees President (Antonia
Reyes) and Vice President for Finance (Gregorio Reyes).
The President and Vice President corporation were scheduled to go out of
the country in connection with the corporations business. In order not to
disrupt operations in their absence, they pre-signed several checks relating
to the current account. The internal arrangement was, in the event there was
need to make use of the checks, the accountant would prepare the
corresponding voucher and thereafter complete the entries on the pre-signed
checks.
While the President and VP were away, a John Doe presented to the bank
for encashment a couple of corporation checks with the indicated value of
P110,000.00 each.
The two (2) checks had similar entries with similar infirmities and
irregularities. On the space where the name of the payee should be indicated
(Pay To The Order Of) the following 2-line entries were instead typewritten:
on the upper line was the word CASH while the lower line had the following
typewritten words, viz: ONE HUNDRED TEN THOUSAND PESOS ONLY.
Despite the highly irregular entries on the face of the checks, defendant-
appellant bank, without as much as verifying and/or confirming the legitimacy
of the checks considering the substantial amount involved and the obvious
infirmity/defect of the checks on their faces, encashed said checks. A
verification process, even by was of a telephone call to PRCI office, would
have taken less than ten (10) minutes. But this was not done by BA.
Investigation conducted by plaintiff-appellee corporation yielded the fact that
there was no transaction involving PRCI that call for the payment of
P220,000.00 to anyone. The checks appeared to have come into the hands
of an employee of PRCI (one Clarita Mesina who was subsequently
criminally charged for qualified theft) who eventually completed without
authority the entries on the pre-signed checks. PRCIs demand for defendant-
appellant to pay fell on deaf ears. Hence, the complaint.
Issue: Whether the proximate cause of the wrongful encashment of the
checks in question was due to (a) petitioners failure to make a verification
regarding the said checks with the respondent in view of the misplacement of
entries on the face of the checks or (b) the practice of the respondent of pre-
signing blank checks and leaving the same with its employees.
Ruling:
Indeed, taking this with the testimony of petitioners operations manager that
in case of an irregularity on the face of the check (such as whenblanks were
not properly filled out) the bank may or may not call the client depending on
how busy the bank is on a particular day, we are even more convinced that
petitioners safeguards to protect clients from check fraud are arbitrary and
subjective. Every client should be treated equally by a banking institution
regardless of the amount of his deposits and each client has the right to
expect that every centavo he entrusts to a bank would be handled with the
same degree of care as the accounts of other clients.Perforce, we find that
petitioner plainly failed to adhere to the high standard of diligence expected
of it as a banking institution.
However, we do agree with petitioner that respondents officers practice of
pre-signing of blank checks should be deemed seriously negligent behavior
and a highly risky means of purportedly ensuring the efficient operation of
businesses. It should have occurred to respondents officers and managers
that the pre-signed blank checks could fall into the wrong hands as they did
in this case where the said checks were stolen from the company accountant
to whom the checks were entrusted.
Nevertheless, even if we assume that both parties were guilty of negligent
acts that led to the loss, petitioner will still emerge as the party foremost
liable in this case.In instances where both parties are at fault, this Court has
consistently applied the doctrine of last clear chance in order to assign
liability.
In Westmont Bank v. Ong, we ruled:
[I]t is petitioner [bank] which had the last clear chance to stop the
fraudulent encashment of the subject checks had it exercised due
diligence and followed the proper and regular banking procedures in
clearing checks. As we had earlier ruled, the one who had a last
clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm but failed to do so
is chargeable with the consequences thereof.
In the case at bar, petitioner cannot evade responsibility for the loss by
attributing negligence on the part of respondent because, even if we concur
that the latter was indeed negligent in pre-signing blank checks, the former
had the last clear chance to avoid the loss. To reiterate, petitioners own
operations manager admitted that they could have called up the client for
verification or confirmation before honoring the dubious checks. Verily,
petitioner had the final opportunity to avert the injury that befell the
respondent. Failing to make the necessary verification due to the volume of
banking transactions on that particular day is a flimsy and unacceptable
excuse, considering that the banking business is so impressed with public
interest where the trust and confidence of the public in general is of
paramount importance such that the appropriate standard of diligence must
be a high degree of diligence, if not the utmost diligence. Petitioners
negligence has been undoubtedly established and, thus, pursuant to Art.
1170 of the NCC,it must suffer the consequence of said negligence.
TIU vs. ARRIESGADO
SOURCE OF OBLIGATION: Contract (Breach of Contract of Carriage)
CAUSE OF ACTION: Death of the plaintiffs wife, Felisa Pepito Arriesgado
FACTS:
At about 10:00 p.m. of March 15, 1987, the cargo truck marked Condor
Hollow Blocks and General Merchandise bearing plate number GBP-675 was
loaded with firewood in Bogo, Cebu and left for Cebu City. Upon reaching
Sitio Aggies, Poblacion, Compostela, Cebu, just as the truck passed over a
bridge, one of its rear tires exploded. The driver, Sergio Pedrano, then
parked along the right side of the national highway and removed the
damaged tire to have it vulcanized at a nearby shop, about 700 meters
away. Pedrano left his helper, Jose Mitante, Jr. to keep watch over the
stalled vehicle, and instructed the latter to place a spare tire six fathoms
away behind the stalled truck to serve as a warning for oncoming vehicles.
The trucks tail lights were also left on. It was about 12:00 a.m., March 16,
1987. At about 4:45 a.m., D Rough Riders passenger bus with plate number
PBP-724 driven by Virgilio TeLaspias was cruising along the national
highway of Sitio Aggies, Poblacion, Compostela, Cebu. Among its
passengers were the Spouses Pedro A. Arriesgado and
FelisaPepitoArriesgado, who were seated at the right side of the bus, about
three (3) or four (4) places from the front seat.As the bus was approaching
the bridge, Laspias saw the stalled truck, which was then about 25 meters
away.He applied the breaks and tried to swerve to the left to avoid hitting the
truck. But it was too late; the bus rammed into the trucks left rear. The impact
damaged the right side of the bus and left several passengers injured. Pedro
Arriesgado lost consciousness and suffered a fracture in his right colles. His
wife, Felisa, was brought to the Danao City Hospital. She was later
transferred to the Southern Island Medical Center where she died shortly
thereafter.
Respondent Pedro A. Arriesgado then filed a complaint for breach of contract
of carriage, damages and attorneys fees before the Regional Trial Court
against the petitioners, D Rough Riders bus operator William Tiu and his
driver, Virgilio TeLaspias on May 27, 1987.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance is applicable in the case at
bar.
RULING:
No, Contrary to the petitioners contention, the principle of last clear chance
is inapplicable in the instant case, as it only applies in a suit between the
owners and drivers of two colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a
passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual
obligations, for it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver and its
owner on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence.
The common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant
recovery to a plaintiff who has also been negligent provided that the
defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so.
Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any, the common law of last clear
chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept
of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has
itself been rejected, as it has been in Article 2179 of the Civil Code.
Thus, petitioner Tiu cannot escape liability for the death of respondent
Arriesgados wife due to the negligence of petitioner Laspias, his employee,
on this score.
Ferrer v Ericta
Cause of Action: Damages and reimbursement of medical expenses against
Respondent due to its negligence
Source: Quasi Delict
Facts:
In a complaint for damages against respondents, dated December 27, 1974
but actually filed on January 6, 1975, and assigned to the sala of respondent
Judge, it was alleged that defendants Mr. and Mrs. Francis Pfleider,
residents of Bayawan, Negros Oriental, were the owners or operators of a
Ford pick-up car; that at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of December 31,
1970, in the streets of Bayawan, Negros Oriental, their son, defendant
Dennis Pfleider, who was then only sixteen (16) years of age, without proper
official authority, drove the above-described vehicle, without due regard to
traffic rules and regulations, and without taking the necessary precaution to
prevent injury to persons or damage to property, and as a consequence the
pick-up car was overturned, causing physical injuries to plaintiff Annette
Ferrer, who was then a passenger therein, which injuries paralyzed her and
required medical treatment and confinement at different hospitals for more
than two (2) years; that as a result of the physical injuries sustained by
Annette, she suffered unimaginable physical pain, mental anguish, and her
parents also suffered mental anguish, moral shock and spent a considerable
sum of money for her treatment. They prayed that defendants be ordered to
reimburse them for actual expenses as well as other damages.
On September 23, 1975, respondent judge, without setting aside the order of
default, issued an order absolving defendants from any liability on the
grounds that: (a) the complaint states no cause of action because it does not
allege that Dennis Pfleider was living with his parents at the time of the
vehicular accident, considering that under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the
father and, in case of his death or incapacity the mother, are only responsible
for the damages caused by their minor children who live in their company;
and (b) that the defense of prescription is meritorious, since the complaint
was filed more than four (4) years after the date of the accident, and the
action to recover damages based on quasi-delict prescribes in four (4) years.
Hence, the instant petition for mandamus.
Issue:
Whether the defense of prescription had been deemed waived by private
respondents' failure to allege the same in their answer.
Ruling:
In the present case, there is no issue of fact involved in connection with the
question of prescription. The complaint in Civil Case No. Q-19647 alleges
that the accident which caused the injuries sustained by plaintiff Annette
Ferrer occurred on December 31, 1970. It is undisputed that the action for
damages was only filed on January 6, 1975. Actions for damages arising
from physical injuries because of a tort must be filed within four years. The
four-year period begins from the day the quasi-delict is committed or the date
of the accident.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for mandamus is hereby DISMISSED,
without pronouncement as to costs.
KRAMER vs. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS
In the early morning of April 8, 1976, a fishing boat owned by Kramer figured
in a collision en route from Marinduque to Manila with an inter-island vessel
the M/V Asia Philippines owned by the private respondent Trans Asia
Shipping Lines inc.
The F/B Marjolea sank, taking with it its fish catch.
After the mishap, the captains of both vessels filed their respective marine
protests with the Board of Marine Inquiry of the Philippine Coast Guard.
The Board conducted an investigation for the purpose of determining the
proximate cause. On October 19, 1981, the Board concluded that the loss of
the F/B Marjolea and its fish catch was attributable to the negligence of the
employees of the private respondent who were on board the M/V Asia
Philippines during the collision. The finding made by the board served as the
basis of a subsequent Decision of the Commandant of the Philippine Coast
Guard wherein the second mate of the M/V Asia Philippines was suspended.
The petitioners instituted a complaint for damages against private
respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a complaint for damages instituted by Kramer against Trans
Asia arising from a marine collision barred by statute of limitation.
RULING:
BARRED. The Trans Asia filed a motion seeking dismissal of the complaint
on the ground of prescription. He argued that under article 1146, the
prescriptive period for instituting a Complaint for damages arising from quasi-
delict like marine collision is 4 years. He maintained that Kramer should have
filed their complaint within 4 years from the date when their cause of action
accrued. From April 8, 1976 when the maritime collision took place and that
accordingly, the complaint filed on May 30, 1985 was instituted beyond the 4-
year prescriptive period.
The Kramer argued that the running of the prescriptive period was tolled by
the filing of the marine protest and that their cause of action accrued only on
April 29, 1982, the date when the decision ascertaining the negligence of the
crew of the M/V Asia Philippines had become final.
The prescriptive period begins from the day the quasi-delict was committed.
The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action which
consists of 3 elements, namely a. a right in favor of plaintiff by whatever
means and under whatever law it arises or created; b. an obligation on part
of the defendant to respect such right; c. an act or omission on the part of
such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff. It is only when the last
element occurs or takes place that it can be said in law that a cause of action
has arisen.
The prescriptive period must be counted when the last element occurs of
takes place, that is the time of the commission of an act or omission violative
of the right of the plaintiff, which is the time when the cause of action arises.
Thus, the court correctly found that the action of Kramer has prescribed. The
collision occurred on April 8, 1976. The complaint was filed in court only on
May 30, 1985, was beyond the 4-year prescriptive period.
SANTOS vs. PIZARDO
Facts
In an Information dated April 25, 1994, Dionisio M. Sibayan (Sibayan) was
charged with Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Multiple Homicide and
Multiple Physical Injuries in connection with a vehicle collision between a
southbound Viron Transit bus driven by Sibayan and a northbound Lite Ace
Van, which claimed the lives of the vans driver and three (3) of its
passengers, including a two-month old baby, and caused physical injuries to
five (5) of the vans passengers.After trial, Sibayan was convicted and
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months.However, as
there was a reservation to file a separate civil action, no pronouncement of
civil liability was made by the municipal circuit trial court in its decision
promulgated on December 17, 1998.
On October 20, 2000, petitioners filed a complaint for damages against
Sibayan, Viron Transit and its President/Chairman, Virgilio Q. Rondaris, with
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, pursuant to their reservation to file a
separate civil action.

Viron Transit moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of prescription
and laches.
Petitioners opposed the motion to dismiss contending, among others, that
the right to file a separate action in this case prescribes in ten (10) years
reckoned from the finality of the judgment in the criminal action. As there was
no appeal of the decision convicting Sibayan, the complaint which was filed
barely two (2) years thence was clearly filed within the prescriptive period.
The trial court dismissed the complaint on the principal ground that the cause
of action had already prescribed. According to the trial court, actions based
on quasi delict, as it construed petitioners cause of action to be, prescribe
four (4) years from the accrual of the cause of action. Hence, notwithstanding
the fact that petitioners reserved the right to file a separate civil action, the
complaint ought to be dismissed on the ground of prescription.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration pointing out yet again that the
complaint is not based on quasi delict but on the final judgment of conviction
in the criminal case which prescribes ten (10) years from the finality of the
judgment.
Issue
Whether the action claiming for damages has prescribed
Ruling
No.
Our Revised Penal Code provides that every person criminally liable for a
felony is also civilly liable. Such civil liability may consist of restitution,
reparation of the damage caused and indemnification of consequential
damages. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil liability arising from
the offense is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, subject to three
notable exceptions: first, when the injured party expressly waives the right to
recover damages from the accused; second, when the offended party
reserves his right to have the civil damages determined in a separate action
in order to take full control and direction of the prosecution of his cause; and
third, when the injured party actually exercises the right to maintain a private
suit against the offender by instituting a civil action prior to the filing of the
criminal case.
Petitioners assert that by the institution of the complaint, they seek to recover
private respondents civil liability arising from crime. Unfortunately, based on
its misreading of the allegations in the complaint, the trial court dismissed the
same, declaring that petitioners cause of action was based on quasi delict
and should have been brought within four (4) years from the time the cause
of action accrued, i.e., from the time of the accident.
A reading of the complaint reveals that the allegations therein are consistent
with petitioners claim that the action was brought to recover civil liability
arising from crime. Although there are allegations of negligence on the part of
Sibayan and Viron Transit, such does not necessarily mean that petitioners
were pursuing a cause of action based on quasi delict, considering that at the
time of the filing of the complaint, the cause of action ex quasi delicto had
already prescribed. Besides, in cases of negligence, the offended party has
the choice between an action to enforce civil liability arising from crime under
the Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi delict under the Civil Code.
At the time of the filing of the complaint for damages in this case, the cause
of action ex quasi delicto had already prescribed. Nonetheless, petitioners
can pursue the remaining avenue opened for them by their reservation, i.e.,
the surviving cause of action ex delicto. This is so because the prescription of
the action ex quasi delicto does not operate as a bar to an action to enforce
the civil liability arising from crime especially as the latter action had been
expressly reserved.
Seen in this light, the trial court should not have dismissed the complaint on
the ground of prescription, but instead allowed the complaint for damages ex
delicto to be prosecuted on the merits, considering petitioners allegations in
their complaint, opposition to the motion to dismiss and motion for
reconsideration of the order of dismissal, insisting that the action was to
recover civil liability arising from crime.
Gotesco Investment Corp. vs. Chatto
Source of obligation: Quasi-delict
Cause of Action: Physical injury that respondents suffered, after the
collapse of the ceiling of the balcony of the petitioners cinema.
Facts:
Gloria E. Chatto, and her 15-year old daughter, plaintiff Lina Delza E. Chatto
went to see the movie "Mother Dear" at Superama I theater, owned by
defendant Gotesco Investment Corporation. They bought balcony tickets but
even then were unable to find seats considering the number of people
patronizing the movie. Hardly ten (10) minutes after entering the theater, the
ceiling of its balcony collapsed. The theater was plunged into darkness and
pandemonium ensued. Shocked and hurt, plaintiffs managed to crawl under
the fallen ceiling. As soon as they were able to get out to the street they
walked the nearby FEU Hospital where they were confined and treated for
one day.
The next day, they transferred to the UST hospital. Plaintiff Gloria Chatto was
treated in said hospital from June 5 to June 19 and plaintiff Lina Delza Chatto
from June 5 to 11. Per Medico Legal Certificate issued by Dr. Ernesto G.
Brion, plaintiffs suffered physical injuries
Petitioner's claim that the collapse of the ceiling of the theater's balcony was
due to force majeure. Accoriding to the CA, The lower court did not also err
in its finding that the collapse of the ceiling of the theater's balcony was due
to construction defects and not to force majeure.
Issue: Whether or not the collapse of the ceiling is due to force majeur?
Ruling:
No, it is not a force majeure.
In one of the decided cases of the court, they made comparison of what
constitute force majeure.
An examination of the Spanish and American authorities concerning the
meaning of force majeure shows that the jurisprudence of these two
countries practically agree upon the meaning of this phrase.
Blackstone, in his Commentaries on English Law, defines it as Inevitable
accident or casualty; an accident produced by any physical cause which is
irresistible; such as lightning. tempest, perils of the sea, inundation, or
earthquake; the sudden illness or death of a person.
Escriche, in his Diccionario de Legislacion y Jurisprudencia, defines fuerza
mayor as follows.
The event which we could neither foresee nor resist; as for example, the
lightning stroke, hail, inundation, hurricane, public enemy, attack by
robbers; Vis major est, says Cayo, ea quae consilio humano neque provideri
neque vitari potest. Accident and mitigating circumstances.
Bouvier defines the same as Any accident due to natural cause, directly
exclusively without human intervention, such as could not have been
prevented by any kind of oversight, pains and care reasonably to have been
expected.
Corkburn, chief justice, in a well considered English case (1 Common Pleas
Division, 34, 432), said that were a captain Uses all the known means to
which prudent and experienced captains ordinarily have recourse, he does
all that can be reasonably required of him; and if, under such circumstances,
he is overpowered by storm or other natural agency, he is within the rule
which gives immunity from the effects of such vis major.
The term generally applies, broadly speaking, to natural accidents, such as
those caused by lightning, earthquake, tempests, public enemy ,etc.
Petitioner could have easily discovered the cause of the collapse if indeed it
were due to force majeure. To the court, the real reason why Mr. Ong could
not explain the cause or reason is that either he did not actually conduct the
investigation or that he is, as the respondent Court impliedly held,
incompetent. He is not an engineer, but an architect who had not even
passed the government's examination.
Verily, post-incident investigation cannot be considered as material to the
present proceedings. What is significant is the finding of the trial court,
affirmed by the respondent Court, that the collapse was due to construction
defects. There was no evidence offered to overturn this finding. The building
was constructed barely four (4) years prior to the accident in question.
It was not shown that any of the causes denominates as force
majeure obtained immediately before or at the time of the collapse of the
ceiling. Such defects could have been easily discovered if only petitioner
exercised due diligence and care in keeping and maintaining the premises.
But as disclosed by the testimony of Mr. Ong, there was no adequate
inspection of the premises before the date of the accident. His answers to the
leading questions on inspection disclosed neither the exact dates of said.
inspection nor the nature and extent of the same. That the structural designs
and plans of the building were duly approved by the City Engineer and the
building permits and certificate of occupancy were issued do not at all prove
that there were no defects in the construction, especially as regards the
ceiling, considering that no testimony was offered to prove that it was ever
inspected at all.
Besides, even assuming for the sake of argument that, as petitioner
vigorously insists, the cause of the collapse was due to force majeure,
petitioner would still be liable because it was guilty of negligence, which the
trial court denominated as gross. As gleaned from Bouvier's definition of and
Cockburn's elucidation on force majeure for one to be exempt from any
liability because of it, he must have exercised care, i.e., he should not have
been guilty of negligence.
Servando vs. Philippine Steam Navigation Co. 117 SCRA 832
Source of Obligation: Contract
Cause of Action: Loss of goods
FACTS:
- On November 6, 1963, appellees Clara UyBico and Amparo
Servando loaded on board the appellants vessel, FS176, for
 carriage from Manila to Pulupandan, Negros Occidental 1,528
cavans of rice and 44 cartons of toys and general merchandise as
evidence by the corresponding bills of lading issued by the appellant.
- Upon arrival of the vessel at Pulupandan in the morning of
November 18, 1963, the cargoes were discharged, complete and in
good order, unto the warehouse of the Bureau of Customs. At about
2:00 in the afternoon of the same day, said warehouse was razed by
a fire of unknown origin, destroying appellees cargoes. Before the
fire, however, appellee UyBico was able to take delivery of 907
cavans of rice. Appellees claims for the value of said goods were
rejected by the appellant.
- Trial Court declared Philippine Steam navigation liable for damages
for the loss of the appellees cargoes as a result of a fire which gutted
the Bureau of Customs warehouse in Pulupandan, Negros
Occidental and was ordered to pay Amparo Servando and Clara
UyBico.
- Court of Appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court because
only pure questions of law are raised.
- the respondent and his driver
ISSUE: WON Philippine Steam Navigation Co. is liable for the loss of goods.
RULING:
- No, the carrier is not liable.
- Where fortuitous event or force maeure is the immediate and
proimate cause of the loss, the obligor is exempt from liability for
non-performance. The Partidas, the antecedent of Article 1174 of the
Civil Code, defines casofortuito as an event that takes place by
accident and could not have been foreseen. Examples of this are
destruction of houses, unexpected fire, shipwreck, violence of
robbers. In its dissertation of the phrase casofortuito the
EnciclopediaJuridicadaEspanola says: In a legal sense and,
consequently, also in relation to contracts, a casofortuito presents
the following essential characteristics:
o 1. the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence,
or of the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation,
must be independent of the human will
o 2. it may be impossible to foresee the event which
constitutes the casofortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must
be impossible to avoid
o 3. the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for
the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner and
o 4.the obligor must be free from any participation in the
aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor.
- In the case at bar, the burning of the customs warehouse was an
extraordinary event which happened independently of the will of the
appellant. The latter could not have foreseen the event.
- There is nothing in the record to show that appellant carrier incurred
in delay in the performance of its obligation. It appears that appellant
had not only notified appellees of the arrival of their shipment, but
had demanded that the same be withdrawn. In fact, pursuant to such
demand, appellee UyBico had taken delivery of 907 cavans of rice
before the burning of the warehouse. Nor can the appellant or its
employees be charged with negligence. he storage of the goods in
the Customs warehouse pending withdrawal thereof by the appellees
was undoubtedly made with their knowledge and consent.Since the
warehouse belonged to and was maintained by the government, it
would be unfair to impute negligence to the appellant, the latter
having no control whatsoever over the same.
G.R. No. L-56487 October 21, 1991
GATCHALIAN vs. DELIM
Source of Obligation: Contract of Carriage
Cause of Action: Injury to the petitioner caused by the negligence of
Facts:
On July 11, 1973, petitioner ReynaldaGatchalian boarded, as a paying
passenger, respondent's "Thames" mini bus at a point in Aringay, La Union,
bound for Bauang, of the same province. While the bus was running along
the highway "a snapping sound" was suddenly heard at one part of the bus
and, shortly thereafter, the vehicle bumped a cement flower pot on the side
of the road, went off the road, turned turtle and fell into a ditch. Several
passengers, including petitioner Gatchalian, were injured. They were
promptly taken to Bethany Hospital at San Fernando, La Union, for medical
treatment. Upon medical examination, petitioner was found to have sustained
physical injuries on the leg, arm and forehead.
On 14 July 1973, while injured, passengers were confined in the hospital,
Mrs. Adela Delim, wife of respondent, visited them and later paid for their
hospitalization and medical expenses. Before Mrs. Delim left, she had the
injured passengers, including petitioner, sign an already prepared Joint
Affidavit which stated, among other things:
That we are no longer interested to file a complaint, criminal or civil against
the said driver and owner of the said Thames, because it was an accident
and the said driver and owner of the said Thames have gone to the extent of
helping us to be treated upon our injuries.
Notwithstanding this document, petitioner Gathalian filed with the then Court
of First Instance of La Union an action extra contractu to recover
compensatory and moral damages. She alleged in the complaint that her
injuries sustained from the vehicular mishap had left her with a conspicuous
white scar measuring 1 by 1/2 inches on the forehead, generating mental
suffering and an inferiority complex on her part; and that as a result, she had
to retire in seclusion and stay away from her friends. She also alleged that
the scar diminished her facial beauty and deprived her of opportunities for
employment.
In defense, respondent averred that the vehicular mishap was due to force
majeure, and that petitioner had already been paid and moreover had waived
any right to institute any action against him (private respondent) and his
driver, when petitioner Gatchalian signed the Joint Affidavit on 14 July 1973.
RTC dismissed the complaint upon the ground that when petitioner
Gatchalian signed the Joint Affidavit, she relinquished any right of action
(whether criminal or civil) that she may have had against respondent and the
driver of the mini-bus
CA reversed the trial court's conclusion that there had been a valid waiver
Issue:
WON there was a valid waiver of rights on the part of the petitioner
Ruling:
No. The Court held that the no valid waiver of her cause of action had been
made by petitioner.
A waiver, to be valid and effective, must in the first place be couched in clear
and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a person
to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not
casually be attributed to a person when the terms thereof do not explicitly
and clearly evidence an intent to abandon a right vested in such person.
The degree of explicitness which this Court has required in purported waivers
is illustrated in Yepes and Susaya v. Samar Express Transit (supra), where
the Court in reading and rejecting a purported waiver said:
. . . It appears that before their transfer to the Leyte Provincial Hospital,
appellees were asked to sign as, in fact, they signed the document
Exhibit I wherein they stated that "in consideration of the expenses
which said operator has incurred in properly giving us the proper
medical treatment, we hereby manifest our desire to waive any and all
claims against the operator of the Samar Express Transit."
x xx x xx x xx
Even a cursory examination of the document mentioned above will
readily show that appellees did not actually waive their right to claim
damages from appellant for the latter's failure to comply with their
contract of carriage. All that said document proves is that they
expressed a "desire" to make the waiver which obviously is not the
same as making an actual waiver of their right. A waiver of the kind
invoked by appellant must be clear and unequivocal (Decision of the
Supreme Court of Spain of July 8, 1887)
In applying the standard used in Yepes and Susaya, the Court concluded
that the terms of the Joint Affidavit in the instant case cannot be regarded as
a waiver cast in "clear and unequivocal" terms. Petitioner testified that she
was still reeling from the effects of the vehicular accident, having been in the
hospital for only three days, when the purported waiver in the form of the
Joint Affidavit was presented to her for signing; that while reading the same,
she experienced dizziness but that, seeing the other passengers who had
also suffered injuries sign the document, she too signed without bothering to
read the Joint Affidavit in its entirety. Considering these circumstances there
appears substantial doubt whether petitioner understood fully the import of
the Joint Affidavit (prepared by or at the instance of private respondent) she
signed and whether she actually intended thereby to waive any right of action
against private respondent.
Finally, because what is involved here is the liability of a common carrier for
injuries sustained by passengers in respect of whose safety a common
carrier must exercise extraordinary diligence, the Court must construe any
such purported waiver most strictly against the common carrier. For a waiver
to be valid and effective, it must not be contrary to law, morals, public policy
or good
customs. To uphold a supposed waiver of any right to claim damages by an
injured passenger, under circumstances like those exhibited in this case,
would be to dilute and weaken the standard of extraordinary diligence
exacted by the law from common carriers and hence to render that standard
unenforceable. The Court believe such a purported waiver is offensive to
public policy.
Ruling regarding the negligence of respondent (if ever tanungin):
Respondent was found guilty of gross negligence because respondent did
not exercise the extraordinary diligence required by law. The obvious
continued failure of respondent to look after the roadworthiness and safety of
the bus, coupled with the driver's refusal or neglect to stop the mini-bus after
he had heard once again the "snapping sound" and the cry of alarm from one
of the passengers, constituted wanton disregard of the physical safety of the
passengers, and hence gross negligence on the part of respondent and his
driver.
GAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Source of Obligation: Delict
Cause of Action: Reckless Imprudence
Facts:
Hedy Gan was driving a Toyota car along North Bay Boulevard. While in
front of house no. 694 of North Bay Boulevard, there were two vehicles, a
truck and a jeepney parked on one side of the road, one following the other
about two to three meters from each other. As the car driven by Gan
approached the place where the two vehicles were parked, there was a
vehicle coming from the opposite direction, followed by another which tried to
overtake and bypass the one in front of it and thereby encroached the lane of
the car driven by Gan. To avoid a head-on collision with the oncoming
vehicle, the defendant swerved to the right and as a consequence, the front
bumper of the Toyota car hit an old man name Isidoro Casino who was about
to cross the boulevard from south to north, pinning him against the rear of the
parked jeepney. The force of the impact caused the parked jeepney to move
forward hitting the rear of the parts truck ahead of it. Isodoro was injured, the
Toyota was damaged on its front, the jeep suffered damages on its rear and
front paints, and the truck sustained scratches at the wooden portion of its
rear. Isidoro was brought to the hospital but was pronounced DOA.
Gan was convicted of the crime of Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence in the
RTC but was modified by the CA to Homicide thru Simple Imprudence.
Issue:
Whether Gan is liable to the accident
Ruling:
No. The test for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an
act whereby injury or damage results to the person or property of another is
this: Would a prudent man in the position of the person to whom negligence
is attributed foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable
consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes the
duty oil the doer to take precaution against its mischievous results and the
failure to do so constitutes negligence.
A corollary rule is what is known in the law as the emergency rule. "Under
that rule, one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is
required to act without time to consider the best means that may be
adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if
he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to
have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds
himself is brought about by his own negligence."
CA suggested that if Gan had only stop the car or lessen her speed rather
than swerving her car when she saw the oncoming vehicle she would have
not hit Isidoro. However that course of action would seem reasonable were it
not for the fact that such suggestion did not take into account the amount of
time afforded to Gan to react to the situation she was in. For it is undeniable
that the suggested course of action presupposes sufficient time for appellant
to analyze the situation confronting her and to ponder on which of the
different courses of action would result in the least possible harm to herself
and to others.
There is no evidence that shows that Gan had enough distance from the
parked jeepney and time to reflect on the consequences of her instant
decision to swerve her car to the light without stepping on her brakes. It is too
much from a mere mortal like the Gan who in the blink of an eye had to
exercise her best judgment to extricate herself from a difficult and dangerous
situation caused by the driver of the overtaking vehicle. She certainly could
not be expected to act with all the coolness of a person under normal
conditions. The danger confronting Gan was real and imminent, threatening
her very existence. She had no opportunity for rational thinking but only
enough time to heed the very powerful instinct of self-preservation.
Also, the respondent court itself pronounced that the petitioner was driving
her car within the legal limits therefore "emergency rule" applies with full
force to the case at bar and consequently absolve Gan from any criminal
negligence in connection with the incident under consideration.
DELSAN TRANSPORT LINES, INC. vs. C & A CONSTRUCTION, INC.
Source of Obligation: Quasi-delict
Cause of Action: Death and Injury suffered by the victims
Facts:
C & A Construction, Inc. was engaged by the National Housing Authority
(NHA) to construct a deflector wall in Vitas, Tondo. The project was
completed in 1994 but it was not formally turned over to NHA.
M/V Delsan Express, a ship owned and operated by Delsan anchored at the
Navotas Fish Port for the purpose of installing a cargo pump and clearing the
cargo oil tank. At around 12:00 midnight of October 20, 1994, Capt. Jusep of
M/V Delsan Express received a report from his radio head operator that a
typhoon was going to hit Manila in about 8 hours. At approximately 8:35 in
the morning of October 21, Capt. Jusep tried to seek shelter at the North
Harbor but could not enter the area because it was already congested. At
10:00 a.m., Capt. Jusep decided to drop anchor at the vicinity of Vitas mouth,
4 miles away from a Napocor power barge. At that time, the waves were
already reaching 8 to 10 feet high. Capt. Jusep ordered his crew to go full
ahead to counter the wind which was dragging the ship towards the Napocor
power barge. To avoid collision, Capt. Jusep ordered a full stop of the vessel.
He succeeded in avoiding the power barge, but when the engine was re-
started and the ship was maneuvered full astern, it hit the deflector wall
constructed by respondent. The damage caused by the incident amounted to
P456,198.24.
Petitioner refused to pay the damage, which resulted to a complaint for
damages with RTC. Petitioner claimed that the damage was caused by a
fortuitous event.
The trial court ruled that petitioner was not guilty of negligence because it
had taken all the necessary precautions to avoid the accident. Applying the
emergency rule, it absolved petitioner of liability because the latter had no
opportunity to adequately weigh the best solution to a threatening situation. It
further held that even if the maneuver chosen by petitioner was a wrong
move, it cannot be held liable as the cause of the damage sustained by
respondent was typhoon Katring, which is an act of God.
The CA reversed the decision and held that Capt. Jusep guilty of negligence
in deciding to transfer the vessel to the North Harbor only at 8:35 a.m. of
October 21, 1994.
Issues:
Whether Capt. Jusep was negligent
Ruling:
CA was correct in holding that Capt. Jusep was negligent in deciding to
transfer the vessel only at 8:35 in the morning of October 21, 1994 when he
had known the incoming typhoon 8 hours before. The finding of negligence
cannot be rebutted upon proof that the ship could not have sought refuge at
the North Harbor even if the transfer was done earlier. It is not the
speculative success or failure of a decision that determines the existence of
negligence in the present case, but the failure to take immediate and
appropriate action under the circumstances. Capt. Jusep, despite knowledge
that the typhoon was to hit Manila in 8 hours, complacently waited for the
lapse of more than 8 hours thinking that the typhoon might change
direction. He cannot claim that he waited for the sun to rise instead of moving
the vessel at midnight immediately after receiving the report because of the
difficulty of traveling at night. The hour of 8:35 a.m. is way past
sunrise. Furthermore, he did not transfer as soon as the sun rose because,
according to him, it was not very cloudy and there was no weather
disturbance yet.
When he ignored the weather report notwithstanding reasonable foresight of
harm, Capt. Jusep showed an inexcusable lack of care and caution which an
ordinary prudent person would have observed in the same situation.Had he
moved the vessel earlier, he could have had greater chances of finding a
space at the North Harbor. Even if the latter was already congested, he
would still have time to seek refuge in other ports.
The trial court erred in applying the emergency rule. Under this rule, one
who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act
without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid
the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt
what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a
better method, unless the danger in which he finds himself is brought
about by his own negligence. Clearly, the emergency rule is not applicable
to the instant case because the danger where Capt. Jusep found himself was
caused by his own negligence.
Delsan as the employer of Capt. Jusep is solidary liable with the damage.
Farolan vs Solmac Marketing Corp
Source of Obligation: Law? and quasi delict = Public duty of BOC to release
the shipment.
Cause of action: BOC did not release to the R the Polypropylene Film which
caused them damages
Facts:
Private respondent Solmac Marketing Corporationwas the assignee,
transferee, and owner of an importation of Clojus Recycling Plastic Products
of 202,204 kilograms of what is technically known as polypropylene film,
valued at US$69,250.05. On the other hand, the Ps Ramon Farolan was then
the Acting Commissioner of Customs while petitioner Guillermo Parayno was
then the Acting Chief, Customs Intelligence and Investigation Division.
(Polypropylene if not defective is sold at a much higher price, on the other
hand, if defective sold at cheaper price, this one is called OPP film scrap,
which was declared in the description for the Rs bill of lading)
BOC found out that the Clojus shipment was not OPP film scrap,as declared
by the assignee respondent SOLMAC to the Bureau of Customs and BOI
Governor Lilia R. Bautista, but oriented polypropylene the importation of
which is restricted, if not prohibited, under Letter of Instructions (LOI) No.
658-B. Hence, it did not release the shipment.
Parayno wrote to BOI asking for the latters advice on whether or not the
subject importation may be released. So since there were conflicting views in
the BOI, shipment was held in custody by BOC for 2 years. Thus, Solmac
sued Farolan and Parayno in there official capcities for Mandamus and
damages claiming that Ps acted in bad faith for not releasing the shipment.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners acted in good faith in not immediately
releasing the questioned importation, or, simply, can they be held liable, in
their personal and private capacities, for damages to the private respondent.
Ruling:
No, not liable. Good faith is always presumed and it is upon him who alleges
the contrary that the burden of proof lies. No clear and convincing proof
showing the alleged bad faith of the petitioners. The Rs failed to prove bad
faith.
First, there was a report of the National Institute of Science and Technology
(NIST) dated January 25, 1982 that, contrary to what the respondent
claimed, the subject importation was not OPP film scraps but oriented
polypropylene, a plastic product of stronger material, whose importation to
the Philippines was restricted, if not prohibited, under LOI-658-B. It was on
the strength of this finding that the petitioners withheld the release of the
subject importation for being contrary to law.
Second, the petitioners testified that, on many occasions, the Bureau of
Customs sought the advice of the BOI on whether the subject importation
might be released.
Third, petitioner Parayno also testified during the trial that up to that time (of
the trial) there was no clear-cut policy on the part of the BOI regarding the
entry into the Philippines of oriented polypropylene (OPP), as the letters of
BOI Governors Tordesillas and Zayco of November 8, 1983 and September
24, 1982, respectively, ordering the release of the subject importation did not
clarify the BOI policy on the matter.
The conflicting recommendations of the BOI on this score prompted the
petitioners to seek final clarification from the former with regard to its policy
on these importations. This resulted in the inevitable delay in the release of
the Clojus shipment, one of the several of such importations. The confusion
over the disposition of this particular importation obviates bad faith.
When a public officer takes his oath of office, he binds himself to perform the
duties of his office faithfully and to use reasonable skill and diligence, and to
act primarily for the benefit of the public. Thus, in the discharge of his duties,
he is to use that prudence, caution, and attention which careful men use in
the management of their affairs. In the case at bar, prudence dictated that
petitioners first obtain from the BOI the latter's definite guidelines regarding
the disposition of the various importations of oriented polypropylene (OPP)
and polypropylene (PP) then being withheld at the Bureau of Customs.
BPI Express v CA
Source: Contract
Cause of action: An agreement was entered into between the bank and
Marasigan, where the bank will not suspend the use of his credit card
upon payment of P15,000. However, after Marasigan paid the amount,
his card was still temporarily suspended without notice to him
Facts:
Ricardo Marasigan was issued Credit Card with a credit limit of P5,000.00.
His contractual relations with BPI Express went on smoothly until his
statement of account for October, 1989 amounting to P8,987.84 was not paid
in due time. He was informed by his secretary that BPI was demanding
immediate payment of his outstanding account, was requiring him to issue a
check for P15,000.00 which would include his future bills, and was
threatening to suspend his credit card. Ricardo issued a check in the amount
of P15,000.00,which was received by Tess Lorenzo, an employee of the BPI
who in turn gave the said check to Jeng Angeles, a co-employee who
handles the account of the Ricardo. The check remained in the custody of
Jeng Angeles. Mr. Roberto Maniquiz, head of the collection department of
defendant was formally informed of the postdated check about a week later.
BPI served plaintiff a letter by ordinary mail informing him of the temporary
suspension of the privileges of his credit card and the inclusion of his account
number in their Caution List. He was also told to refrain from further use of
his credit card to avoid any inconvenience/embarrassment and that unless
he settles his outstanding account with the defendant within 5 days from
receipt of the letter, his membership will be permanently cancelled.
There is no showing that the Ricardo received this letter. Confident that he
had settled his account with the issuance of the postdated check he invited
some guests at Cafe Adriatico. When he presented his credit card to Caf
Adriatico for the bill amounting to P735.32, said card was dishonored. One of
his guests, Mary Ellen Ringler, paid the bill by using her own credit card.
In a letter addressed to the BPI, he requested that he be sent the exact
billing due to him to withhold the deposit of his postdated check and that said
check be returned to him because he had already instructed his bank to stop
the payment thereof as the defendant violated their agreement that the
plaintiff issue the check to the defendant to cover his account amounting to
only P8,987.84 on the condition that the defendant will not suspend the
effectivity of the card.
He sent defendant another letter dated March 12, 1990 reminding the latter
that he had long rescinded and cancelled whatever arrangement he entered
into with defendant and requesting for his correct billing, less the improper
charges and penalties, and for an explanation within five (5) days from
receipt thereof why his card was dishonored despite assurance to the
contrary by defendant's personnel-in-charge, otherwise the necessary court
action shall be filed to hold defendant responsible for the humiliation and
embarrassment suffered by him. However, all his requests remain unheeded.
Issue/s:
1. Whether petitioner had the right to suspend the credit card of the private
respondent.
2. Whether prior to the suspension of private respondent's credit card on 28
November 1989, the parties entered into an agreement whereby the card
could still be used and would be duly honored by duly accredited
establishments
Ruling:
1. Yes
Any CARD with outstanding balances unpaid after thirty (30) days from
original billing/statement date shall automatically be suspended, and those
with accounts unpaid after sixty (60) days from said original billing/statement
date shall automatically be cancelled, without prejudice to BECC's right to
suspend or cancel any CARD any time and for whatever reason.
By his own admission, private respondent made no payment within thirty
days for his original billing/statement dated 27 September 1989. Neither did
he make payment for his original billing/statement dated 27 October 1989.
Consequently, as early as 28 October 1989, thirty days from the non-
payment of his billing dated 27 September 1989, petitioner corporation could
automatically suspend his credit card.
2. Yes
there was an arrangement between the parties, wherein BPI required the
private respondent to issue a check worth P15,000 as payment for the
latter's billings. However, private respondent was not able to comply with his
obligation.
Clearly, the purpose of the arrangement between the parties on November
22, 1989, was for the immediate payment of the private respondent's
outstanding account, in order that his credit card would not be suspended.
As agreed upon by the parties, on the following day, private respondent did
issue a check for P15,000. However, the check was postdated 15 December
1989. Settled is the doctrine that a check is only a substitute for money and
not money, the delivery of such an instrument does not, by itself operate as
payment. This is especially true in the case of a postdated check.
Thus, the issuance by the private respondent of the postdated check was not
effective payment. It did not comply with his obligation under the
arrangement with Miss Lorenzo. Petitioner corporation was therefore justified
in suspending his credit card.
We do not dispute the findings of the lower court that private respondent
suffered damages as a result of the cancellation of his credit card. However,
there is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the
illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which
results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation
awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury
in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation
of a legal duty. In such cases, the consequences must be borne by the
injured person alone, the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from
an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. These situations are
often called damnum absque injuria.
In other words, in order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries
of which he complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a
breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff - a concurrence of
injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it. The
underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an
individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be a
breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before
damages may be awarded; and the breach of such duty should be the
proximate cause of the injury.
The court disagree with the ruling of the respondent court that the dishonor of
the credit card of the private respondent by Caf Adriatico is attributable to
petitioner for its willful or gross neglect to inform the private respondent of the
suspension of his credit card, the unfortunate consequence of which brought
social humiliation and embarrassment to the private respondent.
It was petitioner's failure to settle his obligation which caused the suspension
of his credit card and subsequent dishonor at Caf Adriatico. He cannot now
pass the blame to the petitioner for not notifying him of the suspension of his
card. As quoted earlier, the application contained the stipulation that the
petitioner could automatically suspend a card whose billing has not been
paid for more than thirty days. Nowhere is it stated in the terms and
conditions of the application that there is a need of notice before suspension
may be effected as private respondent claims.