First submission

Turtonias prosecution of Peaps under the IA violates his FOE. Under this submission, I have two points:
First point. The prosecution fails to satisfy the 3-part test of Article 19 of the ICCPR.
Second. Assuming without conceding that the IA is valid, Peaps did not violate Section 1 (b) of the law.
For my first point, the prosecution of Peaps under the IA fails the standards provided by the 3-part test.

Going to my first submission: The prosecution of Peaps under the IA fails the 3-part test.
First, the prosecution and the IA are not prescribed by law.
Much like our previous submissions against the ODPA,
1. Applicants submit that the IA is not prescribed by law because Peaps could not have reasonably
foreseen the liability of his expressions.
In a 2014 case decided by the High Court of Zambia, Chipenzi v. People. It was held that Section 67 of the
Zambia penal code prohibiting the publication of false information likely to cause public fear was
impermissibly overbroad as it not only prohibits:
a. False news but also;
b. Those with honest beliefs of the truthfulness of their statements
(Back-up: case decided by Supreme Court of Mexico, Article 373 of the Mexican Penal Code)
Penalizing false speech that disturbed public order.
Peaps prosecution is comparable to this case.

Second, the prosecution does not pursue a legitimate state aim.

As argued earlier by my co-counsel, legitimate state aims are
Respondents argue in page __ of their memorial that the IA is for protection of public order.
YE, In a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, Brandenburg v Ohio, Restriction on the
ground of public order requires that there must be an actual danger to prevent or the speech itself must
direct an imminent lawless action.
(Back-up: Gunduz v. Turkey
Peaps words do not reach this high threshold. Peaps words do not encourage anyone to act violently
against the government. This brings me to my third point under this submission

Third and lastly, the prosecution is not necessary because it does not address a pressing social
need. There is no direct connection with the post of Peaps and the violence that ensued afterwards.
Par. 4.1 Turton Power, the immigration influx caused a furor among the Turtonians.
Par. 9.3 After the post, Turton Times ran an opinion piece citing that the Aquarians were
stealing jobs. This caused the increased protesters and the killings of two Aquarians.

Second point. Assuming without conceding that the the IA is valid, Peaps did NOT violate 1b of the IA.
Applicants submit that Peaps should not be liable because the post was never proven to be false.
Onus probandi incumbit actori.
A case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States. NY times v. Sullivan.
Par. 12.3 It was never found by the trial court that the post was false.

Therefore, we have established that the prosecution of Peaps under the IA violates international law.

Proceeding to our Second submission

Turtonias prosecution of Scoops under the IA violates Article 19 of the ICCPR.
Under this submission, I have two points:
First, the prosecution fails the three-part test.
Second, in any case, Scoops did not violate the IA.

For my first point, As applied to Scoops, the prosecution under the IA fails the three-part test.
1. YE, Applicants submit that the IA does not pursue a legitimate state aim.
The prosecution misapplies the protection of the rights and reputations of others.
Following the public figure doctrine, Kola is a public figure whose activities as Minister of Immigration is
of public interest. I have two cases two illustrate the doctrine.
a. First, in a 1986 case decided by the European Court of Human Rights, Lingens v.
Austria
b. Second is a 2004 case, decided by the Supreme Court of Uganda Obbo and another
v. Attorney General.

Therefore, public officials should tolerate speech made against them considering their position in society.
Furthermore, YE, if I may direct your attention to Par. 8.3, The post was merely informing the public of
her use and abuse of her position to bring in terrorists in Turtonia, which is essentially of public interest.
Applicants also reiterate our earlier arguments that the post is protected political speech that contributes
to public debate as it concerns national security.

2. Applicants submit that the IA is not necessary in a democratic society because it is not the least
intrusive measure.
a. In the 2007 decision by the ECtHR, Muscio v. Italy
Apply least restrictive measures: look at the facts; give judges an alternative
Advocacy: arbiters of truth

For my second point, Scoops did not violate the IA. 2 points.
Assuming, without conceding that Peaps post is unlawful, Scoops is immune from liability under
Section 3 of the IA. Applicants submit that all elements of Section 3 are present. However, we would like
to focus on paragraphs b and c.
First point, Scoops did not have actual knowledge of infringing nature of the post and was never
properly notified, legally speaking.
Second point, Scoops expeditiously remove the post upon the request of Kola, despite not having
able to properly assess its infringing nature.
Delf v. Estonia. UK and Denmark OSPs online evaluation period.