[G.R. No. L-6897. November 29, 1956.

]
In the Matter of the Claim for Attorneys Fees. CLARO M. RECTO, claimant-Appellee, vs. ESPERANZA P.
DE HARDEN and FRED M. HARDEN, Defendants-Appellants.

DECISION
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is an appeal taken by Esperanza P. de Harden and Fred M. Harden from a decision of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, the pertinent part of which is of the following tenor:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary.
The contingent fee to which the claimant is entitled under paragraph 3 of the contract, Exhibit JJJ or 20, is 20%
of P1,920,554.85 or the sum of P384,110.97.
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves the recommendation of the Commissioner with the above-stated
modification, and finds that Attorney Claro M. Recto is entitled to the sum of THREE HUNDRED EIGHTY-FOUR
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED AND TEN PESOS AND NINETY-SEVEN CENTAVOS (P384,110.97),
representing 20% of Esperanza P. de Hardens share in the conjugal properties owned by her and her husband,
Fred M. Harden, as contingent fee stipulated in paragraph 3 of the Contract of Professional Services, Exhibit JJJ
or 20, and the said Esperanza P. de Harden is hereby ordered to pay the said amount above-stated. It appears
that sometime in July, 1941, Appellant, Mrs. Harden, and Appellee, Claro M. Recto, executed the
following:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
CONTRACT OF PROFESSIONAL SERVICES
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
That I, ESPERANZA PEREZ DE HARDEN, of age, married to Fred M. Harden, and temporarily residing in the
Philippines, with address at 534 Sales Street, Manila, have engaged the services of Attorney Claro M. Recto to
appear and act as my counsel in the action which I will file against my husband, Fred M. Harden, for the purpose
of securing an increase in the amount of support being received by me from the conjugal partnership of myself
and said Fred M. Harden, and for the purpose likewise of protecting and preserving my rights in the properties of
the said conjugal partnership, in contemplation of the divorce suit which I intent to file against him in the
competent Court of California and of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership between us, this contract of
services to be under the following conditions:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. That in lieu of retainer fee, which under the circumstances I am not in a position to pay, I hereby agree to pay
Attorney Claro M. Recto, such payment to be made monthly, during the pendency of the litigation and until the
termination of the same, twenty-five (25%) per cent of the total increase in allowance or pension which may be
awarded to me by the court over and above the amount of P1,500.00 which I now receive monthly
from Defendant Fred M. Harden out of the funds of the conjugal partnership; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryProvided,
that should the case be terminated or an amicable settlement thereof be arrived at by the parties before the
expiration of two years from the date of the filing of the complaint, I shall continue to pay the said twenty-five
(25%) per cent up to the end of said period.
2. That the aforesaid monthly payments shall be in addition to whatever amount may be adjudged by the court
against the Defendant Fred M. Harden or against the conjugal partnership by way of litis expense, that is,
attorneys fees chargeable as expenses of litigation.
3. That as full and complete satisfaction of the fees of Attorney Claro M. Recto in connection with the case
above referred to, and said case being for the purposes aforestated, that is, to secure an increase in the amount
of support I now receive as well as to protect and preserve my rights and interest in the properties of the conjugal
partnership, in contemplation of divorce and of the liquidation of said partnership, I hereby agree to pay said
Attorney Claro M. Recto twenty (20%) per cent of the value of the share and participation which I may receive in
the funds and properties of the said conjugal partnership of myself and Defendant Fred M. Harden, as a result of
the liquidation thereof either by death, divorce, judicial separation, compromise or by any means or method by
virtue of which said partnership is or may be liquidated.
4. All expenses in connection with the litigation are to be for my account, but the same may be advanced by
Attorney Claro M. Recto, to be reimbursed to him either from the money which I receive by way of support or
from the funds of the conjugal partnership.
5. It is hereby understood that this contract includes the services of Attorney Claro M. Recto in connection with
the securing of the liquidation of the properties and assets of the conjugal partnership of myself and Fred M.
Harden, upon dissolution of said partnership or for any other cause mentioned in Paragraph (3) hereof.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have signed these presents in the City _____ of Manila, Philippines this _______ day
of July, 1941.
s/ Esperanza P. de Harden
 t/ ESPERANZA P. DE HARDEN
ACCEPTED:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
s/ Claro M. Recto
t/ CLARO M. RECTO
In compliance therewith, on July 12, 1941, the Appellee, as counsel for Mrs. Harden, commenced Civil Case No.
59634 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled Esperanza P. de Harden vs. Fred M. Harden and Jose
Salumbides. In the complaint therein filed, it was prayed, among other things:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (a) that
Mrs. Harden be given the exclusive administration of the business and all properties of the conjugal partnership
of Mr. and Mrs. Harden; chan roblesvirtualawlibrary(b) that, in the event of denial of this prayer,
the Defendants be ordered to inform her of everything pertaining to the administration of said business and
properties, as well as to render accounts thereof and to permit her to examine the books and records pertinent
thereto; chan roblesvirtualawlibrary(c) that Mr. Harden be ordered to account to Mrs. Harden, and to return to this
jurisdiction, the sum of P449,015.44 allegedly withdrawn by him from the Philippines or sent by him to Hongkong
on April 1, 1941; chan roblesvirtualawlibrary(d) that Defendant Salumbides be ordered to account for all moneys,
amounting to P285,000.00, belonging to the business and assets of said conjugal partnership and deposited by
him in a safety box, either in his name, or in that of Antonio Wilson, from January 23 to December 23, 1940; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrary(e) that the transfer, in the name of Salumbides, of certain shares of stock, allegedly
belonging to the conjugal partnership, be rescinded and said Defendant ordered to transfer said shares of stock
in the name of Mrs. Harden or in that of Mr. and Mrs. Harden, should Mr. Harden be allowed to continue as
administrator of said partnership; chan roblesvirtualawlibrary( f ) that the transfer, made by Mr. Harden and/or
by Defendant Salumbides, as his attorney-in-fact, of 36,000 shares of stock of the Angelo Mining Company, to
some residents of Hongkong, be rescinded and said shares returned to the assets of the conjugal partnership
and placed in the name of Mr. and Mrs. Harden; chan roblesvirtualawlibrary(g) that the monthly allowance of Mrs.
Harden be increased from P1,500 to P15,000; chan roblesvirtualawlibrary(h) that, pending final decision, Mr.
Harden be ordered to increase the allowance or pension of Mrs. Harden and their daughter Sarah Elizabeth to
P10,000 a month; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand (i) that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining
the Defendants from disposing of the assets of the conjugal partnership in fraud of Mrs. Harden.
By an order dated July 12, 1941, the court authorized the issuance of said writ, upon the filing of the
corresponding bond. It appears that, pursuant to an agreement submitted by both parties, and with a view to
avoiding unnecessary embarrassment, restraint or inconvenience in the financial operations of the business
enterprises affected by said writ of preliminary injunction, the same was amended by an order dated July 19,
1941, in the sense that.
cralaw without prejudicing in any way the rights of the parties in this case, a separate bank account be
established in the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China, of Manila, and all transactions in connection with
the aforesaid businesses passed through that account by Mr. Harden or his duly authorized representative, who
at present is Mr. Salumbides, without the necessity of securing a particular order from this Court on each
occasion; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat the present funds in the Philippine National Bank in the name of Plaza
Lunch and Fred M. Harden be utilized for the purpose of starting said special bank account in the Chartered Bank
of India, Australia and China; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat all income from the aforesaid businesses be
deposited in this special bank account and no checks be drawn upon the same, except to pay the necessary
overhead and running expenses including purchases of tobacco, merchandise, etc., required for the proper
operation of said businesses; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat a new set of books be opened by Mr. Harden or his
duly authorized representative covering all business transactions passed through said special bank account and
the same be opened for inspection by the Plaintiffs duly authorized representative.
The order of injunction of July 12, 1941, is modified only to the above extent, and in all other respects is
maintained.
Subsequently, the Philippines was invaded by the Japanese and placed under military occupation. Then came
the liberation, in the course of which the records of this case were destroyed. On October 23, 1946, said records
were reconstituted at the instance of Appellee herein. Thereafter, the proceedings were resumed and, in due
course, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered, on or about October 31, 1949, a decision the dispositive
part of which we quote:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In view of the foregoing considerations, this court finds and so holds that
(a) Fred M. Harden abandoned his domicile of origin in New Jersey and established a domicile of choice in
Manila, Philippines, since 1901;
(b) The matrimonial domicile of Fred M. Harden and Esperanza P. de Harden was established in Manila,
Philippines, from the date of their marriage on December 14, 1917;
(c) Since they did not execute any antenuptial contract before their marriage, all the properties, real or personal,
acquired by either or both of them on and after December 14, 1917, up to the present, over and above the sum of
P20,000.00 representing Fred M. Hardens capital, are hereby declared conjugal properties;
(d) The total amount of P1,944,794.37 representing deposits in safety deposit boxes in the name of Jose
Salumbides, the selling price of the house in Los Angeles, California, and the pre-war and post-war remittances
abroad of Fred M. Harden, from which has already been deducted the sum of P160,000.00 covering payments
for deficiency Federal income taxes and attorneys fees, both in the tax case and the present one, is hereby
declared chargeable to the share of Defendant Harden and deductible from whatever participation he may still
have in the said conjugal partnership upon the liquidation thereof, upon his failure to return and deposit them in
the name of the Plaza Lunch with the Manila branch of the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China up to the
time this decision shall become final;
(e) A conjugal lien be annotated in the original and owners duplicate of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
24393, 52436 and 54911 of the Register of Deeds of Manila and in Original Certificate of Title No. 2292 of
Quezon Province, and on all the certificates of shares belonging to said conjugal partnership, as well as in the
corresponding books of the companies or corporations issuing them, whereby it will be made to appear that any
subsequent alienation or encumbrance of said properties by Fred M. Harden alone or his representative without
the consent of his wife will be deemed fraudulent and subject to revocation or cancellation for being in fraud and
prejudicial to the right of Esperanza P. de Harden;
( f ) Within a period of fifteen (15) days after this decision shall have become final, Fred M. Harden and
Esperanza P. de Harden are hereby ordered to execute a document to be approved by this court creating and
express active trust upon the remaining cash assets and income of the conjugal partnership in the Philippines,
whereby the Philippine Trust Company, with offices in Manila, will act as trustee, subject to the right of Fred M.
Harden to receive therefrom the sum of P2,500,00 a month by way of allowance and an equal amount for
the Plaintiff as separate support and maintenance;
(g) Within thirty (30) days after this decision shall have become final, Fred M. Harden shall inform the Plaintiff of
all the properties and businesses of the conjugal partnership, be they in the Philippines or abroad, and render a
true and complete accounting of the earnings and profits thereof;
(h) The Plaintiff is entitled to litis expensae in the amount of P175,000.00 for services rendered by her counsel
up to the rendition of this judgment, which Fred M. Harden or the herein receiver is ordered to pay within a period
of fifteen (15) days after this decision has become final; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand
(i) The writ of preliminary injunction of July 12, 1941, is hereby declared permanent and the order of
receivership of November 20, 1946, is hereby maintained, but said auxiliary remedies will be automatically lifted
upon the conclusion of the annotation of the conjugal lien and the execution of the deed of trust above
mentioned. Without costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
The Defendants appealed from said decision to this Court, where the case was docketed as case No. L-3687.
While the appeal was thus pending before us, herein Appellee filed a manifestation and a motion, both dated
February 20, 1952. In said manifestation, Appellee stated that Mrs. Harden had instructed him, by letter, to
discontinue all proceedings relative to said case, vacate all orders and judgments rendered therein, and
abandon and nullify all her claims to the conjugal partnership existing between her and Mr. Harden, in
accordance with several instruments dated January 29, 1952, and executed without the knowledge, advise and
consent of said Appellee, as counsel for Mrs. Harden, whereby:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (1) Mr. and Mrs.
Harden had purportedly agreed to settle their differences in consideration of the sum of $5,000 paid by Mr.
Harden to Mrs. Harden, and a monthly pension of P500 to be paid by him to her; chan roblesvirtualawlibrary(2)
Mr. Harden had created a trust fund of $20,000 from which said monthly pension of $500 would be taken; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryand (3) Mr. and Mrs. Harden had mutually released and forever discharged each other from
all actions, debts, duties, accounts, demands and claims to the conjugal partnership, in consideration of the sum
of $1. It was further asserted, in Appellees manifestation, that the purpose of the said instruments, executed by
Mr. and Mrs. Harden, was to defeat the claim of the former for attorneys fees, for which reason, he prayed, in his
aforementioned motion, that
a) Pending the resolution of this motion, the receiver appointed herein be authorized to continue holding the
properties above mentioned in his custody in order not to defeat the undersigneds inchoate lien on them;
b) A day set aside to receive the evidence of the undersigned and those of the Plaintiff and the Defendant Fred
M. Harden, in order to determine the amount of fees due to the undersigned, by the appointment of a referee or
commissioner for the reception of such
c) After due hearing, the undersigned be declared entitled to the sum of P400,000.00 as his fees for services
rendered in behalf of the Plaintiff in this case, under paragraph 3 of the contract, Annex A, and to that end a
charging lien therefore be established upon the properties above-mentioned;
d) And the receiver be ordered to pay to the undersigned the full amount of the fees to which the latter is found
to be entitled.
Counsel for the Defendants-Appellants, in turn, moved for the dismissal of the case, to which Appellee objected.
Acting upon the issues raised in such motion for dismissal and in Appellees motion to establish and enforce his
charging lien, as counsel for Mrs. Harden, this Court issued on July 22, 1952, a resolution the pertinent part of
which reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It will be seen from the above that the Defendants-Appellants pray for the complete dismissal of the above
entitled case without prejudice to the annotation of the contingent claim of Attorney Claro M. Recto on the
property under receivership, other than the 368,553 shares of the Balatoc Mining Company which belong to Fred
M. Harden. On the other hand, Attorney Claro M. Recto agrees to the lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction,
the orders of contempt and commitment, and all other interlocutory orders which were issued in the course of this
case, with the exception of the receivership, but objects to the dismissal of the case on the ground that, since
receivership is merely an auxiliary remedy, the present case should be allowed to remain pending for the purpose
of maintaining the receivership to safeguard his right to collect the fees that may be due him.
Attorney Claro M. Recto prays that a commissioner or referee be immediately appointed by this Court to receive
evidence in support of his allegations as to his attorneys lien and its enforcement. Counsel for the Defendants-
Appellants does not object to this proceeding provided that the restrictions set forth by him be observed.
However, this Court does not have the proper facilities for receiving evidence in order to determine the amount of
the fees claimed by Attorney Claro M. Recto, and it is deemed advisable that this matter be determined by the
Court of First Instance. This is specially so considering the opposition to the claim of Attorney Claro M. Recto
filed by Attorney J. W. Ferrier, Sr. in behalf of Esperanza P. de Harden.
In view of the foregoing, the above entitled case is hereby remanded to the court of origin in order to determine
the amount of fees claimed by Attorney Claro M. Recto in his motion dated February 20, 1952.
It is understood that, after said fees had been finally determined and paid, this case will be completely dismissed
as prayed for by the Defendants-Appellants, without prejudice to considering the claim of the receiver for
compensation as stated in his urgent motion dated July 2, 1952. Pending the determination of the amount of
fees claimed by Attorney Claro M. Recto, the writ of preliminary injunction, the orders of contempt and
commitment, and all interlocutory orders which were issued in the course of this case, are hereby lifted and
vacated, and with regard to the receivership, the same is hereby dissolved, only with respect to the 368,553
shares of the Balatoc Mining Company. As to the rest of the properties, the receivership shall be maintained.
In compliance with said resolution, the records of this case were remanded to the lower court, which, on
September 2, 1952, designated a commissioner to receive evidence on the amount of the fees collectible by
herein Appellee and to report thereon. After due hearing, said commissioner submitted, on February 6, 1953, a
report of about one hundred (100) pages of the printed record on appeal, setting forth, in detail, the evidence
introduced by both parties, and his findings of fact, with the following conclusion and
recommendation:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Taking into consideration the value of the properties involved in this litigation, the length of time in which
claimant had handled the same for Esperanza Harden, the volume and quality of the work performed, the
complicated legal questions involved, the responsibility assumed by the claimant as counsel, his reputation in the
bar, the difficulties encountered by him while handling the same in which he had to work hard every inch of the
way because of the stiff oppositions filed by adverse counsel, the diligence he employed not only in the
preservation of the records in his possession during the days of enemy occupation but also in the protection of
the interests of Esperanza Harden, his successful handling of said case and those cases growing out of it which
reached the Supreme Court, and the extra services he rendered in her behalf in the tax and other court cases,
the undersigned Commissioner concludes that claimant is entitled to the full amount of 20% of Esperanza
Hardens share of the conjugal properties, as provided in paragraph 3 of the Contract of Professional Services,
Exhibit JJJ.
WHEREFORE, the undersigned Commissioner respectfully recommends that Atty. Claro M. Recto be paid the
equivalent amount of 20% of Esperanza P. de Hardens share of the conjugal properties or the sum of
P369,410.04 as his contingent fee for services rendered in her behalf.
After appropriate proceedings, the lower court rendered a decision dated April 30, 1953, adopting substantially
said report of the commissioner, but increasing the contingent fee of Appellee herein from P369,410.04, the sum
recommended in the report, to P384,110.97. Hence, this appeal taken by Mr. and Mrs. Harden.
The first question for determination therein is the validity of the above-quoted contract of services, which
the Appellants assail as void, mainly, upon the ground:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (1) that Mrs. Harden cannot
bind the conjugal partnership without her husbands consent; chan roblesvirtualawlibrary(2) that Article 1491 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines in effect prohibits contingent fees; chan roblesvirtualawlibrary(3) that the contract
in question has for its purpose to secure a decree of divorce, allegedly in violation of Articles 1305, 1352 and
1409 of the Civil Code of the Philippines; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand (4) that the terms of said contract are
harsh, inequitable and oppressive.
The first objection has no foundation in fact, for the contract in dispute does not seek to bind the conjugal
partnership. By virtue of said contract, Mrs. Harden merely bound herself or assumed the personal obligation
to pay, by way of contingent fees, 20% of her share in said partnership. The contract neither gives, nor
purports to give, to the Appellee any right whatsoever, personal or real, in and to her aforesaid share. The
amount thereof is simply a basis for the computation of said fees.
For the same reason, the second objection is, likewise, untenable. Moreover, it has already been held that
contingent fees are not prohibited in the Philippines and are impliedly sanctioned by our Cannons (No. 13) of
Professional Ethics. (see, also, Ulanday vs. Manila Railroad Co., 45 Phil., 540, 554.) Such is, likewise, the rule in
the United States (Legal Ethics by Henry S. Drinker, p. 176).
cralaw in the United States, the great weight of authority recognizes the validity of contracts for contingent fees,
provided such contracts are not in contravention of public policy, and it is only when the attorney has taken an
unfair or unreasonable advantage of his client that such a claim is condemned. (See 5 Am. Jur. 359 et
seq.; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryBallentine, Law Dictionary, 2nd ed., p. 276.)
Needless to say, there is absolutely nothing in the records before us to show that Appellee herein had, in any
manner, taken an unfair or unreasonable advantage of his client Mrs. Harden.
The third objection is not borne out, either by the language of the contract between them, or by the intent of the
parties thereto. Its purpose was not to secure a divorce, or to facilitate or promote the procurement of a divorce. It
merely sought to protect the interest of Mrs. Harden in the conjugal partnership, during the pendency of a divorce
suit she intended to file in the United States. What is more, inasmuch as Mr. and Mrs. Harden are admittedly
citizens of the United States, their status and the dissolution thereof are governed pursuant to Article 9 of the
Civil Code of Spain (which was in force in the Philippines at the time of the execution of the contract in question)
and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines by the laws of the United States, which sanction divorce. In
short, the contract of services, between Mrs. Harden and herein Appellee, is not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy.
The last objection is based upon principles of equity, but, pursuant thereto, one who seeks equity must come with
clean hands (Bastida, et al., vs. Dy Buncio & Co., 93 Phil., 195; chan roblesvirtualawlibrary30 C.J. S. 475),
and Appellants have not done so, for the circumstances surrounding the case show, to our satisfaction, that their
aforementioned agreements, ostensibly for the settlement of the differences between husband and wife, were
made for the purpose of circumventing or defeating the rights of herein Appellee, under his above-quoted
contract of services with Mrs. Harden. Indeed, having secured a judgment in her favor, acknowledging her rights
to the assets of the conjugal partnership, which turned out to be worth almost P4,000,000 in addition to litis
expensae in the sum of P175,000, it is inconceivable that Mrs. Harden would have waived such rights, as well as
the benefits of all orders and judgments in her favor, in consideration of the paltry sum of $5,000 allegedly paid to
her by Mr. Harden and the additional sum of $20,000 to be paid by him in installments, at the rate of $500 a
month. In fact, no explanation has been given for this most unusual avowed settlement between Mr. and Mrs.
Harden. One cannot even consider the possibility of a reconciliation between the spouses, the same being
inconsistent with the monetary consideration for said alleged settlement. What is more, the records show that the
relations between said spouses which were bad indeed, not only in July, 1941, when Mrs. Harden engaged
the services of the Appellee, but, even, before, for Mr. and Mrs. Harden were separated since 1938 had
worsened considerably thereafter, as evidence by an action for divorce filed by Mr. Harden in New Jersey, in July
1948, upon the ground of repeated acts of infidelity allegedly committed by Mrs. Harden in 1940 and 1941.
Again, it appears that Appellee had rendered, under the contract in question, the following services, for the
benefit of Mrs. Harden:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. He succeeded in defeating Defendants motion for the dissolution of the writ of preliminary injunction, issued
by the Court on July 12, 1941, and amended on July 19, 1941.
2. On November 12, 1946, Appellee moved for the appointment of a receiver, upon the ground that, despite said
writ of preliminary injunction, the Defendants had been disposing of the properties of the conjugal partnership for
the purpose of defrauding Mrs. Harden. After due hearing, the court, by an order dated November 20, 1946,
directed the appointment of Abelardo Perez as receiver of said properties, upon the filing of a P10,000
bond. Defendants asked, on February 13, 1947, that the receivership be suspended, or else, that they be allowed
to file a bond for the discharge of the receivership. Appellee replied objecting thereto, unless
the Defendants posted a P4,000,000 bond. Subsequently or on March 5, 1947, the Defendants sought a
reconsideration of the order of November 20, 1946, and the discharge of the receiver. By an order dated March
21, 1947, the Court authorized said discharged upon the filing, by the Defendants, of a bond in the sum of
P500,000, provided that Mr. Harden should bring back all the 368,553 shares of the Balatoc Mining Co., in his
name to the Philippines for deposit with the Clerk of Court, or with the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and
China, at Manila cralaw
3. On motion of the Appellee dated March 4, 1947, the Court, by an order dated April 5, 1947, directed Mr.
Harden to remit to Mrs. Harden the sum of $2,500, to be charged against her litis expensae. Upon similar motion,
filed by Appellee on or about April 26, 1947, the Court ordered Mr. Harden, on May 13, 1947, to furnish Mrs.
Harden the sum of $5,000, under the same conditions.
4. On June 21, 1947, the Defendants instituted Civil Case No. G. R. No. L-1499 of this Court, entitled Fred M.
Harden and Jose Salumbides vs. Emilio Pea, Abelardo Perez and Esperanza P. Harden for the purpose of
annulling and setting aside, by writ of certiorari, the aforementioned orders of the lower court dated July 12, 1941,
November 20, 1946, and April 5 and May 13, 1947, and to restrain, in the meantime, the enforcement thereof.
After appropriate proceedings, in the course of which Appellee appeared as counsel for Mrs. Harden, and like
counsel for the Petitioners therein, filed several lengthy, detailed pleadings and memoranda, decision was
rendered on November 21, 1950, denying the writ of certiorari prayed for.
5. On or about September 9, 1947, Appellee filed a motion alleging that despite the writ of preliminary injunction
above mentioned, the Defendants had, fraudulently and without judicial consent, remitted abroad several sums of
money aggregating P1,000,608.66, and praying that Mr. Harden be ordered to return this sum to the Philippines,
within a stated period, said sum to be deposited with the account of the Plaza Lunch at the Manila Branch of the
Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China. Mr. Harden objected to said motion. Appellee filed a rejoinder, to
which Mr. Harden replied. Appellee filed a rejoinder to the rejoinder. On October 7, 1947, the Court
granted Appellees motion. Mr. Harden sought a reconsideration, which was opposed by the Appellee on October
27, 1947, and denied by an order dated November 13, 1947. Mr. Harden moved, on November 18, 1947, for the
suspension of this order, which was immediately objected to by the Appellee and then denied by the Court.
6. Inasmuch as said order of November 13, 1947 had not been complied with, Appellee filed on November 27,
1947, a motion praying that Mr. Harden be declared in contempt of court and punished accordingly. Meanwhile,
or on November 24, 1947, Mr. Harden had instituted case G. R. No. L-1816 of this Court against Hon. Emilio
Pea, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and Mrs. Harden. In the petition therein filed, Mr. Harden
applied for a writ of certiorari annulling said orders of Judge Pea of October 7 and November 13, 1947, and
prayed that, pending disposition of the case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining
the Respondents therein from enforcing said orders, particularly through contempt proceedings. Hence, the lower
court deferred action on the aforementioned motion of November 27, 1947. After due hearing, this Court, in a
resolution dated February 12, 1948, refused to issue the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for. Subsequently,
or on November 21, 1950, decision was rendered denying the petition for a writ of certiorari.
7. Soon after the issuance of our resolution in said case G. R. No. 1816, dated February 12, 1948, or to be exact
on March 27, 1948, the lower court issued an order directing Mr. Harden to comply, within five (5) days from
notice, with the order of October 7, 1947. On April 6, 1948, Appellee filed with the lower court the corresponding
formal charges against Mr. Harden for contempt of court. After due hearing, Mr. Harden was, by an order of April
28, 1948, found guilty as charged and ordered confined until he complies with the aforementioned orders of
October 7, 1947 and March 27, 1948. On motion of Mr. Harden, said order of April 28, 1948 was suspended until
May 4, 1948, on which date he was arrested and placed in confinement at the New Bilibid Prison, in Muntinglupa,
Rizal. On July 10, 1948, he filed with this Court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus against the Director of
Prisons, (G. R. No. L-2349, entitled Fred M. Harden vs. The Director of Prisons), which, in due course was
denied in a decision promulgated on October 22, 1948.
8. During the military occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese, the Appellee made representations with the
Japanese Government to prevent the commandeering of a business establishment belonging to Mr. and Mrs.
Harden. Moreover, he succeeded in persuading the Japanese to refrain from interning Mrs. Harden and her
daughter and to allow her to withdraw, from the formers deposit in a local bank, from P200 to P250 a month, for
their subsistence. He, likewise, lent her money to meet her needs and spent the sum of P55,000 in the
preservation of the records and papers pertaining to the business and other properties of the conjugal partnership
of Mr. and Mrs. Harden.
9. Appellee assisted, also, the receiver, as his counsel and, in such capacity, took all steps essential for the
proper discharge of the duties of the former. Among other things, Appellee sought and obtained judicial authority
for some important acts of administration of, and disposition by, the receiver. He (Appellee) secured judicial
intervention for the protection and preservation of the assets of the conjugal partnership, including orders for the
delivery of certificates of stock, the return thereof and/or its deposit with the clerk of court. He, likewise,
represented the receiver in seeking war damage payments.
10. In civil case No. 6222 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled Francisco Dalupan vs. Fred M.
Harden for the recovery of P113,837.17, it was decided, through Appellees intervention, that the conjugal assets
would bear the payment of P22,767.43 only, the balance to be chargeable exclusively against Mr. Hardens share
of the conjugal partnership.
11. Appellee instituted civil case No. 6940 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled Abelardo Perez vs.
Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China and Fred M. Harden, for the recovery of P1,000,608.66 and the
return of stock certificates of the Balatoc Mining Co., which had been sent abroad.
12. He (Appellee) represented Mrs. Harden in connection with a million-peso federal tax case against Mr. and
Mrs. Harden.
13. Appellee successfully blocked Mr. Hardens attempts to withdraw:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (1) $53,000 and
forward the same to the Collector of Internal Revenue of Los Angeles, California; chan roblesvirtualawlibrary(2)
$50,000.00, allegedly to defray expenses in resisting a new tax assessment against him in the United
States; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand (3) P65,000 for his expenses.
Then too, the conjugal partnership had varried and extensive business interests and its assets were worth almost
P4,000,000. The pleadings, motions, oppositions, rejoinders, and memoranda filed, and the evidence introduced,
in the aforementioned cases in which Appellee was pitted against one of the most experienced and able
members of the Philippine Bar were numerous, extensive and exhaustive. For instance, the record on appeal
in one of those cases, namely, G. R. No. L-3687, consisted of 966 pages.
In short, considering the character of the services rendered by the Appellee, the nature and importance of the
issues in said litigations, the amount of labor, time (1941 to 1952) and trouble involved therein, the skill displayed
in connection with said cases, the value of the property affected by the controversy, the professional character
and standing of the Appellee, the risks assumed and the results obtained, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that
the contract of services in question is neither harsh nor oppressive or inequitable.
Under their second assignment of error, Appellants maintain that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The lower court erred in failing to find as a fact borne out by the evidence that the legal services of Attorney
Claro M. Recto to Mrs. Esperanza P. de Harden, payment, for which is sought by him in this case, have already
been paid by his immediate execution pending appeal of the decision in Civil Case No. CFI-R-59634 (SC-G.R.
No. L- 3687), wherein he collected the sum of P176,000.00 for all such legal services.
Said decision, however, states clearly that the aforementioned sum of P175,000 represents litis expensae, and
the contract between the Appellee and Mrs. Harden explicitly declares that said litis expensae shall be in
addition to Appellees share of 25% of the increase in the allowance of Mrs. Harden and his attorneys fees of
20% of her share in the conjugal partnership. The second assignment of error is, therefore, devoid of merit.
Appellants, further contend, that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
3. The lower court erred in holding that the inchoate share of the wife, Esperanza P. de Harden, in the
undissolved and unliquidated conjugal partnership properties of the Harden spouses, is capable of certain
valuation before such dissolution and liquidation, and summarily assessing the value of Mrs. Hardens share in
such conjugal properties without proper evidence.
4. The lower court erred in awarding 20% of such inchoate share to Attorney Claro M. Recto from Mrs. Hardens
interests in the Harden conjugal properties, summarily assessing such 20% inchoate share as of a value of
P384,110.97, and ordering the payment of said sum to Attorney Recto in pursuance of the provisions of
paragraph 3 of the Contract of Professional Services.
Appellants arguments in support thereof may be summarized as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary The contract
of services in question provides that Appellees contingent fees shall be 20% of the share of Mrs. Harden in the
conjugal partnership. Pursuant to law, the share of Mrs. Harden shall be determined upon the liquidation of said
partnership, which has not taken place, as yet. What is more, it cannot be effected until the dissolution of the
marriage relation between Mr. and Mrs. Harden. Inasmuch as this relation subsists, it follows that the amount of
attorneys fees due to Appellee herein should not have been determined in the decision appealed from.
This line of argument overlooks the fact that said contract of services was made, principally, in contemplation of a
suit for divorce that, according to Mrs. Harden, she intended to file before a competent court in California, and of
the liquidation of the conjugal partnership between her and Mr. Harden. Had she filed said action for divorce and
secured a decree of divorce, said conjugal partnership would have been dissolved and then liquidated, and the
share of Mrs. Harden therein would have been fixed. However, this cannot take place, either now, or in the
foreseeable future, owing to the aforementioned agreements between Mr. and Mrs. Harden, which were made for
the evident purpose of defeating Appellees claim for attorneys fees. In other words, the occurrence, within the
time contemplated by the parties bearing in mind the nature of, and the circumstances under which they
entered into, said contract of services of the event upon which the amount of said fees depended, was
rendered impossible by Mrs. Harden. Hence, whether such event be regarded as a condition or as a period, she
may not insist upon its occurrence, prior to the enforcement of the rights of the herein Appellee, for the condition
shall be deemed fulfilled when the obligor voluntarily prevents its fulfillment (Art. 1186, Civil Code) and the
debtor shall lose every right to make use of the period when he violates any undertaking, in consideration of
which the creditor agreed to the period. (Art. 1198, Civil Code.)
It should be noted, also, that the compensation agreed upon for Appellees services, consists of three (3) parts,
namely:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (a) 25% of the increase in the allowance of Mrs. Harden; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrary(b) litis expensae; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand (c) 20% of her share in the conjugal
partnership. The first part was dealt with in the first paragraph of their contract of services. The second and third
parts were the object of the second and third paragraphs, respectively. The first paragraph limited the rights
of Appellee thereunder to two (2) years, in the event of termination of the case or amicable settlement thereof
within two (2) years from the filing of the complaint. No such limitation appears in the second and third
paragraphs of said contract. Hence, the same were intended by the parties to be fully operative under any and all
conditions.
It may not be amiss to add that the value of the properties involved has been assessed, not summarily, but after
due notice and full dress hearing, in the course of which both parties introduced testimonial and documentary
evidence. Appellants presented Exhibits 1 to 58, whereas those of the Appellee were so numerous that, having
begun with Exhibit A, his last piece of documentary evidence was marked Exhibit 26 Ys. The transcript of the
hearing, which lasted ten (10) days, covers over 220 pages.
The other assignments of error made by Appellants herein are mere corollaries of those already disposed of,
and, hence, no further discussion thereof is necessary.
In conclusion, it appears that the assets of the conjugal partnership between Mr. and Mrs. Harden are reasonably
valued at P3,841,109.70. One-half (1/2) thereof, representing the share of Mrs. Harden, is therefore, worth
P1,920,554.85. Twenty percentum (20%) of this sum is P384,110.97, which is the contingent fee due to
the Appellee, apart from the litis expensae already paid to him. Inasmuch as the Appellee has collected, also, the
sum of P80,000.00, on account of said contingent fees, there results in his favor a balance of P304,110.97.
Subject to this qualification, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, therefore, with costs against
the Appellants. SO ORDERED.

RECTO V. HARDEN (1959)

Short summary: Recto was hired by American wife to represent her in RP case for protection of her interest in the
conjugal property, vs. American husband, in conjunction with the divorce proceeding she's going to file in US.
They won in TC, but on appeal, American H & W agreed to settle. Recto now wants to collect fees for services,
but as defense, Harden spouses argues that the contract's object was unlawful (Divorce not allowed in RP) so it
is invalid, thus, Recto cannot enforce it against them. Court ruled for Recto
Facts:
Mrs. Harden, US Citizen, engaged services of Claro M. Recto, for suit
to secure an increase in the amount of support she was receinging
to preserve her rights in the properties of the conjugal partnership
in contemplation of a divorce suit she's going to file in the US.
Compensation for RECTO: 20% of value of her share of conjugal partnership after liquidation
TC: for Mrs. Harden
CA: Harden Sps. Mutually released and forever discharged each other from all actions, debts, duties, and claims
to the conjugal partnership
-Recto filed motion contesting agreement
-defense: contract of services invalid: to secure a divorce decree in violation of our laws
WON RECTO COULD ENFORCE THE AGREEMENT? YES
*CONTRACT OF SERVICES IS NOT CONTRARY TO LAW, MORALS, GOOD CUSTOMS, PUBLIC ORDER,
OR PUBLIC POLICY
The contract has a lawful object: it is to protect the interests of Mrs. Harden in the conjugal partnership during the
pendency of a divorce suit
-NOT
to secure divorce
to facilitate or promote procurement of divorce
Divorce can be granted to the Sps Harden, they being nationals of country whose laws allow divorce (following
the nationality principle in determining the status and dissolution of the marriage)
*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*
LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION V. JUDICIAL JURISDICTION
*status, once established by the personal law of the party, is given universal recognition. (UNIVERSALITY OF
STATUS)
-once status is set by Country A, Country B is bound to attribute to a person of Country A the status that is
established in Country A
-Courts of Country B also cannot introduce exceptions or qualifications that are not set in Country A
If ALIENS sue and are sued in RP Courts
*RP would apply RP Procedural rules relevant to status and capacity (JUDICIAL JURISDICTION)
BUT would apply personal law of the alien to determine status and capacity (LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION)

G.R. No. L-770 April 27, 1948

ANGEL T. LIMJOCO, petitioner,
vs.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO O. FRAGRANTE, deceased, respondent.

Angel Limjoco, Jr. and Delfin L. Gonzales for petitioner.

Bienvenido A. Tan for respondent.

HILADO, J.:

Under date of May 21, 1946, the Public Service Commission, through Deputy Commissioner Fidel Ibaez,
rendered its decision in case No. 4572 of Pedro O. Fragante, as applicant for a certificate of public convenience
to install, maintain and operate an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal, whereby said commission held that the evidence
therein showed that the public interest and convenience will be promoted in a proper and suitable manner "by
authorizing the operation and maintenance of another ice plant of two and one-half (2-) tons in the municipality
of San Juan; that the original applicant Pedro O. Fragante was a Filipino Citizen at the time of his death; and that
his intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service". The commission, therefore,
overruled the opposition filed in the case and ordered "that under the provisions of section 15 of Commonwealth
Act No. 146, as amended a certificate of public convenience be issued to the Intestate Estate of the deceased
Pedro Fragante, authorizing said Intestate Estate through its Special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the
proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate an ice plant with a daily productive capacity of two
and one-half (2-1/2) tons in the Municipality of San Juan and to sell the ice produced from said plant in the said
Municipality of San Juan and in the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Rizal, and in Quezon City", subject to the
conditions therein set forth in detail (petitioner's brief, pp. 33-34).

Petitioner makes four assignments of error in his brief as follows:

1. The decision of the Public Service Commission is not in accordance with law.

2. The decision of the Public Service Commission is not reasonably supported by evidence.

3. The Public Service Commission erred in not giving petitioner and the Ice and Cold Storage Industries
of the Philippines, Inc., as existing operators, a reasonable opportunity to meet the increased demand.

4. The decision of the Public Service Commission is an unwarranted departure from its announced
policy with respect to the establishment and operation of ice plant. (Pp. 1-2, petitioner's brief.)

In his argument petitioner contends that it was error on the part of the commission to allow the substitution of the
legal representative of the estate of Pedro O. Fragante for the latter as party applicant in the case then pending
before the commission, and in subsequently granting to said estate the certificate applied for, which is said to be
in contravention of law.

If Pedro O. Fragante had not died, there can be no question that he would have had the right to prosecute his
application before the commission to its final conclusion. No one would have denied him that right. As declared
by the commission in its decision, he had invested in the ice plant in question P 35,000, and from what the
commission said regarding his other properties and business, he would certainly have been financially able to
maintain and operate said plant had he not died. His transportation business alone was netting him about P1,440
a month. He was a Filipino citizen and continued to be such till his demise. The commission declared in its
decision, in view of the evidence before it, that his estate was financially able to maintain and operate the ice
plant. The aforesaid right of Pedro O. Fragante to prosecute said application to its conclusion was one which by
its nature did not lapse through his death. Hence, it constitutes a part of the assets of his estate, for which a right
was property despite the possibility that in the end the commission might have denied application, although under
the facts of the case, the commission granted the application in view of the financial ability of the estate to
maintain and operate the ice plant. Petitioner, in his memorandum of March 19, 1947, admits (page 3) that the
certificate of public convenience once granted "as a rule, should descend to his estate as an asset". Such
certificate would certainly be property, and the right to acquire such a certificate, by complying with the requisites
of the law, belonged to the decedent in his lifetime, and survived to his estate and judicial administrator after his
death.

If Pedro O. Fragrante had in his lifetime secured an option to buy a piece of land and during the life of the option
he died, if the option had been given him in the ordinary course of business and not out of special consideration
for his person, there would be no doubt that said option and the right to exercise it would have survived to his
estate and legal representatives. In such a case there would also be the possibility of failure to acquire the
property should he or his estate or legal representative fail to comply with the conditions of the option. In the case
at bar Pedro O. Fragrante's undoubted right to apply for and acquire the desired certificate of public convenience
the evidence established that the public needed the ice plant was under the law conditioned only upon the
requisite citizenship and economic ability to maintain and operate the service. Of course, such right to acquire or
obtain such certificate of public convenience was subject to failure to secure its objective through nonfulfillment of
the legal conditions, but the situation here is no different from the legal standpoint from that of the option in the
illustration just given.

Rule 88, section 2, provides that the executor or administrator may bring or defend actions, among other cases,
for the protection of the property or rights of the deceased which survive, and it says that such actions may be
brought or defended "in the right of the deceased".

Rule 82, section 1, paragraph (a), mentions among the duties of the executor or administrator, the making of an
inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased which shall come to his possession or
knowledge, or to the possession of any other person for him.

In his commentaries on the Rules of Court (Volume II, 2nd ed., pages 366, 367) the present chief Justice of this
Court draws the following conclusion from the decisions cited by him:

Therefore, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, any action affecting the property
or rights (emphasis supplied) of a deceased person which may be brought by or against him if he were
alive, may likewise be instituted and prosecuted by or against the administrator, unless the action is for
recovery of money, debt or interest thereon, or unless, by its very nature, it cannot survive, because
death extinguishes the right . . . .

It is true that a proceeding upon the application for a certificate of public convenience before the Public Service
Commission is not an "action". But the foregoing provisions and citations go to prove that the decedent's rights
which by their nature are not extinguished by death go to make up a part and parcel of the assets of his estate
which, being placed under the control and management of the executor or administrator, can not be exercised
but by him in representation of the estate for the benefit of the creditors, devisees or legatees, if any, and the
heirs of the decedent. And if the right involved happens to consist in the prosecution of an unfinished proceeding
upon an application for a certificate of public convenience of the deceased before the Public Service
Commission, it is but logical that the legal representative be empowered and entitled in behalf of the estate to
make the right effective in that proceeding.

Manresa (Vol. III, 6th ed., p. 11) says that No. 10 of article 334 and article 336 of the Civil Code, respectively,
consider as immovable and movable things rights which are not material. The same eminent commentator says
in the cited volume (p. 45) that article 336 of the Civil Code has been deficiently drafted in that it is not sufficiently
expressive of all incorporeal rights which are also property for juridical purposes.

Corpus Juris (Vol. 50, p. 737) states that in the broad sense of the term, property includes, among other things,
"an option", and "the certificate of the railroad commission permitting the operation of a bus line", and on page
748 of the same volume we read:

However, these terms (real property, as estate or interest) have also been declared to include every
species of title, inchoate or complete, and embrace rights which lie in contract, whether executory or
executed. (Emphasis supplied.)

Another important question raised by petitioner is whether the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante is a "person" within
the meaning of the Public Service Act.

Words and Phrases, First Series, (Vol. 6, p, 5325), states the following doctrine in the jurisdiction of the State of
Indiana:

As the estate of the decedent is in law regarded as a person, a forgery committed after the death of the
man whose name purports to be signed to the instrument may be prosecuted as with the intent to
defraud the estate. Billings vs. State, 107 Ind., 54, 55, 6 N. E. 914, 7 N. E. 763, 57 Am. Rep. 77.

The Supreme Court of Indiana in the decision cited above had before it a case of forgery committed after the
death of one Morgan for the purpose of defrauding his estate. The objection was urged that the information did
not aver that the forgery was committed with the intent to defraud any person. The Court, per Elliott, J., disposed
of this objection as follows:
 . . . The reason advanced in support of this proposition is that the law does not regard the estate of a
decedent as a person. This intention (contention) cannot prevail. The estate of the decedent is a person
in legal contemplation. "The word "person" says Mr. Abbot, "in its legal signification, is a generic term,
and includes artificial as well as natural persons," 2 Abb. Dict. 271; Douglas vs. Pacific, etc. Co., 4 Cal.
304; Planters', etc., Bank vs. Andrews, 8 Port. (Ala.) 404. It said in another work that 'persons are of two
kinds: natural and artificial. A natural person is a human being. Artificial persons include (1) a collection
or succession of natural persons forming a corporation; (2) a collection of property to which the law
attributes the capacity of having rights and duties. The latter class of artificial persons is recognized only
to a limited extent in our law. "Examples are the estate of a bankrupt or deceased person." 2 Rapalje &
L. Law Dict. 954. Our own cases inferentially recognize the correctness of the definition given by the
authors from whom we have quoted, for they declare that it is sufficient, in pleading a claim against a
decedent's estate, to designate the defendant as the estate of the deceased person, naming him. Ginn
vs. Collins, 43 Ind. 271. Unless we accept this definition as correct, there would be a failure of justice in
cases where, as here, the forgery is committed after the death of a person whose name is forged; and
this is a result to be avoided if it can be done consistent with principle. We perceive no difficulty in
avoiding such a result; for, to our minds, it seems reasonable that the estate of a decedent should be
regarded as an artificial person. It is the creation of law for the purpose of enabling a disposition of the
assets to be properly made, and, although natural persons as heirs, devises, or creditors, have an
interest in the property, the artificial creature is a distinct legal entity. The interest which natural persons
have in it is not complete until there has been a due administration; and one who forges the name of the
decedent to an instrument purporting to be a promissory note must be regarded as having intended to
defraud the estate of the decedent, and not the natural persons having diverse interests in it, since ha
cannot be presumed to have known who those persons were, or what was the nature of their respective
interest. The fraudulent intent is against the artificial person, the estate and not the natural persons
who have direct or contingent interest in it. (107 Ind. 54, 55, 6 N.E. 914-915.)

In the instant case there would also be a failure of justice unless the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante is considered a
"person", for quashing of the proceedings for no other reason than his death would entail prejudicial results to his
investment amounting to P35,000.00 as found by the commission, not counting the expenses and disbursements
which the proceeding can be presumed to have occasioned him during his lifetime, let alone those defrayed by
the estate thereafter. In this jurisdiction there are ample precedents to show that the estate of a deceased person
is also considered as having legal personality independent of their heirs. Among the most recent cases may be
mentioned that of "Estate of Mota vs. Concepcion, 56 Phil., 712, 717, wherein the principal plaintiff was the
estate of the deceased Lazaro Mota, and this Court gave judgment in favor of said estate along with the other
plaintiffs in these words:

. . . the judgment appealed from must be affirmed so far as it holds that defendants Concepcion and
Whitaker are indebted to he plaintiffs in the amount of P245,804.69 . . . .

Under the regime of the Civil Code and before the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure, the heirs of a
deceased person were considered in contemplation of law as the continuation of his personality by virtue of the
provision of article 661 of the first Code that the heirs succeed to all the rights and obligations of the decedent by
the mere fact of his death. It was so held by this Court in Barrios vs. Dolor, 2 Phil., 44, 46. However, after the
enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure, article 661 of the Civil Code was abrogated, as held in Suiliong & Co.
vs. Chio-Taysan, 12 Phil., 13, 22. In that case, as well as in many others decided by this Court after the
innovations introduced by the Code of Civil Procedure in the matter of estates of deceased persons, it has been
the constant doctrine that it is the estate or the mass of property, rights and assets left by the decedent, instead
of the heirs directly, that becomes vested and charged with his rights and obligations which survive after his
demise.

The heirs were formerly considered as the continuation of the decedent's personality simply by legal fiction, for
they might not have been flesh and blood the reason was one in the nature of a legal exigency derived from
the principle that the heirs succeeded to the rights and obligations of the decedent. Under the present legal
system, such rights and obligations as survive after death have to be exercised and fulfilled only by the estate of
the deceased. And if the same legal fiction were not indulged, there would be no juridical basis for the estate,
represented by the executor or administrator, to exercise those rights and to fulfill those obligations of the
deceased. The reason and purpose for indulging the fiction is identical and the same in both cases. This is why
according to the Supreme Court of Indiana in Billings vs. State, supra, citing 2 Rapalje & L. Dictionary, 954,
among the artificial persons recognized by law figures "a collection of property to which the law attributes the
capacity of having rights and duties", as for instance, the estate of a bankrupt or deceased person.

Petitioner raises the decisive question of whether or not the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante can be considered a
"citizen of the Philippines" within the meaning of section 16 of the Public Service Act, as amended, particularly
the proviso thereof expressly and categorically limiting the power of the commission to issue certificates of public
convenience or certificates of public convenience and necessity "only to citizens of the Philippines or of the
United States or to corporations, copartnerships, associations, or joint-stock companies constituted and
organized under the laws of the Philippines", and the further proviso that sixty per centum of the stock or paid-up
capital of such entities must belong entirely to citizens of the Philippines or of the United States.

Within the Philosophy of the present legal system, the underlying reason for the legal fiction by which, for certain
purposes, the estate of the deceased person is considered a "person" is the avoidance of injustice or prejudice
resulting from the impossibility of exercising such legal rights and fulfilling such legal obligations of the decedent
as survived after his death unless the fiction is indulged. Substantially the same reason is assigned to support the
same rule in the jurisdiction of the State of Indiana, as announced in Billings vs. State, supra, when the Supreme
Court of said State said:

. . . It seems reasonable that the estate of a decedent should be regarded as an artificial person. it is the
creation of law for the purpose of enabling a disposition of the assets to be properly made . . . .

Within the framework and principles of the constitution itself, to cite just one example, under the bill of rights it
seems clear that while the civil rights guaranteed therein in the majority of cases relate to natural persons, the
term "person" used in section 1 (1) and (2) must be deemed to include artificial or juridical persons, for otherwise
these latter would be without the constitutional guarantee against being deprived of property without due process
of law, or the immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures. We take it that it was the intendment of the
framers to include artificial or juridical, no less than natural, persons in these constitutional immunities and in
others of similar nature. Among these artificial or juridical persons figure estates of deceased persons. Hence, we
hold that within the framework of the Constitution, the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante should be considered an
artificial or juridical person for the purposes of the settlement and distribution of his estate which, of course,
include the exercise during the judicial administration thereof of those rights and the fulfillment of those
obligations of his which survived after his death. One of those rights was the one involved in his pending
application before the Public Service Commission in the instant case, consisting in the prosecution of said
application to its final conclusion. As stated above, an injustice would ensue from the opposite course.

How about the point of citizenship? If by legal fiction his personality is considered extended so that any debts or
obligations left by, and surviving, him may be paid, and any surviving rights may be exercised for the benefit of
his creditors and heirs, respectively, we find no sound and cogent reason for denying the application of the same
fiction to his citizenship, and for not considering it as likewise extended for the purposes of the aforesaid
unfinished proceeding before the Public Service Commission. The outcome of said proceeding, if successful,
would in the end inure to the benefit of the same creditors and the heirs. Even in that event petitioner could not
allege any prejudice in the legal sense, any more than he could have done if Fragrante had lived longer and
obtained the desired certificate. The fiction of such extension of his citizenship is grounded upon the same
principle, and motivated by the same reason, as the fiction of the extension of personality. The fiction is made
necessary to avoid the injustice of subjecting his estate, creditors and heirs, solely by reason of his death to the
loss of the investment amounting to P35,000, which he has already made in the ice plant, not counting the other
expenses occasioned by the instant proceeding, from the Public Service Commission of this Court.

We can perceive no valid reason for holding that within the intent of the constitution (Article IV), its provisions on
Philippine citizenship exclude the legal principle of extension above adverted to. If for reasons already stated our
law indulges the fiction of extension of personality, if for such reasons the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante should be
considered an artificial or juridical person herein, we can find no justification for refusing to declare a like fiction
as to the extension of his citizenship for the purposes of this proceeding.

Pedro O. Fragrante was a Filipino citizen, and as such, if he had lived, in view of the evidence of record, he
would have obtained from the commission the certificate for which he was applying. The situation has suffered
but one change, and that is, his death. His estate was that of a Filipino citizen. And its economic ability to
appropriately and adequately operate and maintain the service of an ice plant was the same that it received from
the decedent himself. In the absence of a contrary showing, which does not exist here, his heirs may be assumed
to be also Filipino citizens; and if they are not, there is the simple expedient of revoking the certificate or enjoining
them from inheriting it.

Upon the whole, we are of the opinion that for the purposes of the prosecution of said case No. 4572 of the
Public Service Commission to its final conclusion, both the personality and citizenship of Pedro O. Fragrante
must be deemed extended, within the meaning and intent of the Public Service Act, as amended, in harmony with
the constitution: it is so adjudged and decreed.

Decision affirmed, without costs. So ordered.

Moran, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla and Tuason, JJ., concur.
Paras, J., I hereby certify that Mr. Justice Feria voted with the majority.
Separate Opinions

PERFECTO, J., dissenting:

Commonwealth Act No. 146 reserves to Filipino citizens the right to obtain a certificate of public convenience to
operate an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal. The limitation is in accordance with section 8 of Article XIV of the
Constitution which provides

No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be
granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or other entities organized under the laws
of the Philippines, sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by citizens of the Philippines, nor
such franchise, certificate or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty
years. No franchise granted to any individual, firm or corporation, except under the condition that it shall
be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by Congress when the public interest so requires.

The main question in this case is whether the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante fulfills the citizenship requirement. To
our mind, the question can be restated by asking whether the heirs of Pedro O. Fragrante fulfill the citizenship
requirement of the law.

The estate is an abstract entity. As such, its legal value depends on what it represents. It is a device by which the
law gives a kind of personality and unity to undetermined tangible persons, the heirs. They inherit and replace the
deceased at the very moment of his death. As there are procedural requisites for their identification and
determination that need time for their compliance, a legal fiction has been devised to represent them. That legal
fiction is the estate, a liquid condition in process of solidification.

The estate, therefore, has only a representative value. What the law calls estate is, a matter of fact, intended to
designate the heirs of the deceased. The question, therefore, in this case, boils down to the citizenship of the
heirs of Fragrante.

There is nothing in the record to show conclusively the citizenship of the heirs of Fragrante. If they are Filipino
citizens, the action taken by the Public Service Commission should be affirmed. If they are not, it should be
reversed.

Petitioner alleges that the estate is just a front or dummy for aliens to go around the citizenship constitutional
provision. It is alleged that Gaw Suy, the special administrator of the estate, is an alien.

We are of the opinion that the citizenship of the heirs of Fragrante should be determined by the Commission
upon evidence that the party should be present. It should also determine the dummy question raised by the
petitioner.

We are of opinion and so vote that the decision of the Public Service Commission of May 21, 1946, be set aside
and that the Commission be instructed to receive evidence of the above factual questions and render a new
decision accordingly.

G.R. No. L-2935 March 23, 1909

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GEORGE I. FRANK, defendant-appellant.

Bishop and O'Brien for appellant.

Attorney-General Wilfley for appellee.

JOHNSON, J.:

Judgment was rendered in the lower court on the 5th day of September, 1905. The defendant appealed. On the
12th day of October, 1905, the appellant filed his printed bill of exceptions with the clerk of the Supreme Court.
On the 5th day of December, 1905, the appellant filed his brief with the clerk of the Supreme Court. On the 19th
day of January, 1906, the Attorney-General filed his brief in said cause. Nothing further was done in said cause
until on or about the 30th day of January, 1909, when the respective parties were requested by this court to
prosecute the appeal under the penalty of having the same dismissed for failure so to do; whereupon the
appellant, by petition, had the caused placed upon the calendar and the same was heard on the 2d day of
February, 1909.

The facts from the record appear to be as follows:

First. That on or about the 17th day of April, 1903, in the city of Chicago, in the state of Illinois, in the United
States, the defendant, through a respective of the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands, entered into a
contract for a period of two years with the plaintiff, by which the defendant was to receive a salary of 1,200 dollars
per year as a stenographer in the service of the said plaintiff, and in addition thereto was to be paid in advance
the expenses incurred in traveling from the said city of Chicago to Manila, and one-half salary during said period
of travel.

Second. Said contract contained a provision that in case of a violation of its terms on the part of the defendant,
he should become liable to the plaintiff for the amount expended by the Government by way of expenses incurred
in traveling from Chicago to Manila and one-half salary paid during such period.

Third. The defendant entered upon the performance of his contract upon the 30th day of April, 1903, and was
paid half-salary from that date until June 4, 1903, the date of his arrival in the Philippine Islands.

Fourth. That on the 11th day of February, 1904, the defendant left the service of the plaintiff and refused to make
further compliance with the terms of the contract.

Fifth. On the 3d day of December, 1904, the plaintiff commenced an action in the Court of First Instance of the
city of Manila to recover from the defendant the sum of 269.23 dollars, which amount the plaintiff claimed had
been paid to the defendant as expenses incurred in traveling from Chicago to Manila, and as half salary for the
period consumed in travel.

Sixth. It was expressly agreed between the parties to said contract that Laws No. 80 and No. 224 should
constitute a part of said contract.

To the complaint of the plaintiff the defendant filed a general denial and a special defense, alleging in his special
defense that the Government of the Philippine Islands had amended Laws No. 80 and No. 224 and had thereby
materially altered the said contract, and also that he was a minor at the time the contract was entered into and
was therefore not responsible under the law.

To the special defense of the defendant the plaintiff filed a demurrer, which demurrer the court sustained.

Upon the issue thus presented, and after hearing the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause, the lower
court rendered a judgment against the defendant and in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of 265.90 dollars. The
lower court found that at the time the defendant quit the service of the plaintiff there was due him from the said
plaintiff the sum of 3.33 dollars, leaving a balance due the plaintiff in the sum of 265.90 dollars. From this
judgment the defendant appealed and made the following assignments of error:

1. The court erred in sustaining plaintiff's demurrer to defendant's special defenses.

2. The court erred in rendering judgment against the defendant on the facts.

With reference to the above assignments of error, it may be said that the mere fact that the legislative department
of the Government of the Philippine Islands had amended said Acts No. 80 and No. 224 by the Acts No. 643 and
No. 1040 did not have the effect of changing the terms of the contract made between the plaintiff and the
defendant. The legislative department of the Government is expressly prohibited by section 5 of the Act of
Congress of 1902 from altering or changing the terms of the contract. The right which the defendant had acquired
by virtue of Acts No. 80 and No. 224 had not been changed in any respect by the fact that said laws had been
amended. These acts, constituting the terms of the contract, still constituted a part of said contract and were
enforceable in favor of the defendant.

The defendant alleged in his special defense that he was a minor and therefore the contract could not be
enforced against him. The record discloses that, at the time the contract was entered into in the State of Illinois,
he was an adult under the laws of that State and had full authority to contract. The plaintiff [the defendant] claims
that, by reason of the fact that, under the laws of the Philippine Islands at the time the contract was made, male
persons in said Islands did not reach their majority until they had attained the age of 23 years, he was not liable
under said contract, contending that the laws of the Philippine Islands governed. It is not disputed upon the
contrary the fact is admitted that at the time and place of the making of the contract in question the defendant
had full capacity to make the same. No rule is better settled in law than that matters bearing upon the execution,
interpretation and validity of a contract are determined by the law of the place where the contract is made.
(Scudder vs. Union National Bank, 91 U. S., 406.) Matters connected with its performance are regulated by the
law prevailing at the place of performance. Matters respecting a remedy, such as the bringing of suit, admissibility
of evidence, and statutes of limitations, depend upon the law of the place where the suit is brought. (Idem.)

The defendant's claim that he was an adult when he left Chicago but was a minor when he arrived at Manila; that
he was an adult at the time he made the contract but was a minor at the time the plaintiff attempted to enforce the
contract, more than a year later, is not tenable.

Our conclusions with reference to the first above assignment of error are, therefore:

First. That the amendments to Acts No. 80 and No. 224 in no way affected the terms of the contract in question;
and

Second. The plaintiff [defendant] being fully qualified to enter into the contract at the place and time the contract
was made, he can not plead infancy as a defense at the place where the contract is being enforced.

We believe that the above conclusions also dispose of the second assignment of error.

For the reasons above stated, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed, with costs.

SOTTOMAYOR V. DE BARROS, 47 LJP 23 (1879)

FACTS: Ignacia Sottomayor and Gonzalo De Barros were married in England in 1866. Subsequently,
Sottomayor filed a petition for divorce.
1. She alleged that:
a. She and De Barros were both natives of Portugal and domiced in the same at the time of their
marriage
b. They were natural and lawful first cousins
c. The laws of Portugal provides that first cousins are incapable of contracting marriage on the ground
of consanguinity
2. It appears that in 1858, petitioner Sottomayor, her parents, and her uncle De Barros and his family
(respondent De Barros is the eldest sons petitioners uncle) occupied a house in London. Petitioners
father stayed in London due to his health and De Barros stayed there for the education of his sons and
their wine business. Sottomayor family and De Barros family occupied the same house.
3. On June 21, 1866, Sottomayor, then 14 years old, and De Barros, then 16, married in London (Reason:
To save the business of their family). No religious ceremony followed. And although they lived in the
same house until 1872, Sottomayor and De Barros never consummated the marriage.
4. De Barros entered his appearance but did not file a reply.
5. The Queens Proctor (solicitor) then obtained leave to intervene and file pleas.
6. The court ordered (based on the consent of both parties) that the questions of law referred to the
Queens Proctor be heard first before the questions of fact, without prejudice to either party
7. Sir Robert Phillimore refused to set aside the case on the ground of incapacity of age, or collusion or
fraud, and held that marriage having been contracted in England and valid by English law, cannot be
declared null on the ground that the parties were incapacitated from contracting marriage under the law
of Portugal.
8. Petitioner appealed and the case was remitted to Divorce Division on the questions of fact

ISSUE: WON a marriage solemnized in London between two parties not domiciled in the same is valid

HELD: No. It is a well-settled principle in law that the question of personal incapacity to enter into any contract is
decided by the law of domicile. In short, where personal capacity depends on the law of domicile.

The marriage is invalid. The law of a country where marriage is solemnized must decide all questions relating to
the validity of the ceremony by which the marriage is alleged to have been constituted; but as regards questions
on personal capacity, it must depend on the law of the domicile, and if the laws of any country prohibit its subjects
within certain degrees of consanguinity from contracting marriage and treats such as incestuous, this imposes on
the subjects a personal incapacity which continues to affect them so long as they are domiciled in said country
and renders such marriage invalid wherever it may have been solemnized.
Since both parties, being minor at the time the marriage was contracted, their domicile follows that of their
parents, i.e. Portugal. Since the law of Portugal prohibits marriage between parties who are related by
consanguinity, it follows then that the marriage between Sottomayor and De Barros is void.

305 N.Y. 486, 114 N.E.2d 4

In the Matter of the Estate of FANNIE MAY, Deceased. ALICE M. GREENBERG et al., Appellants; SAM
MAY et al., Respondents.

Facts
Sam May traveled with his niece by half-blood, Fannie May, from New York to Rhode Island, where the Mays
were married in a traditional Jewish ceremony. Later, Sam and Fannie had six children. After Fannies death,
Alice Greenberg (plaintiff), one of the children, filed a petition for the letters of administration of Fannies estate in
New York. Sam objected, arguing that as the surviving husband, pursuant to state law, Sam had a superior right
to administer Fannies estate. Greenberg, along with two of her sisters, argued that Sam was not the surviving
spouse of Fannie, because the Mays marriage, although valid in Rhode Island, was contrary to the laws of New
York. The trial court agreed and held in favor of Greenberg. Sam appealed. The appellate court reversed and
concluded that the marriage between Sam and Fannie was valid in New York, because the degree of
consanguinity of uncle and niece was not repugnant to state statute. Greenberg and her sisters appealed.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Argued April 20, 1953.

Decided July 14, 1953.

[**4] [*487] COUNSEL: Helen M. Clark, New York City, for appellants.
[*488] Morton L. Kimmelman and Matthew H. Bowcock, New York City, for respondents.

[*486] HEADNOTE: Marriage

Marriage between uncle and niece Conflict of laws Costs (1) Uncle and niece, of Jewish faith, were
validly married by rabbi in Rhode Island under law of that State permitting marriages among Jews within degrees
of consanguinity allowed by their religion; marriage was therefore valid in New York, and husband is entitled to
letters of administration on her estate (2) No positive law of this State interdicts uncle-niece marriage, valid in
foreign State (3) Uncle-niece marriage approved by parties religion and by law of Rhode Island not offensive
to natural law (4) Court of Appeals will not interfere with Appellate Divisions discretion in awarding costs
against party personally (Surrogates Ct. Act, 283, subd. 2)

1. Decedent and her uncle, of whom she was a niece by the half blood, were both adherents of the Jewish faith.
A month after he had come to New York from Wisconsin, they had gone to Rhode Island, where, in 1913, they
were married by a Jewish rabbi. A certificate issued upon the marriage gave New York as their residence. Two
weeks after their marriage, they returned to New York and resided here for thirty-two years thereafter until her
death. During that time six children were born to them. A Rhode Island statute, which forbids marriage between
uncle and niece, expressly excepts therefrom and declares valid any marriage which shall be solemnized among
the Jews, within the degrees of affinity or consanguinity allowed by their religion. According to Biblical law and
Jewish tradition, which were made the subject of proof in this case, uncle and niece may marry. The marriage,
being valid in Rhode *487 Island, was valid in New York. Decedents husband is entitled to letters of
administration on her estate.

2. The legality of a marriage between persons sui juris is determined by the law of the place where the marriage
is solemnized. Our Legislature could have regulated within the State the marriages of its domiciliaries solemnized
in another State, or it could have declared that marriages contracted in another State which would be void if
contracted here should have no force here; but it did not do so, and hence it cannot be said that there is any
positive law in this State interdicting this marriage which was valid in Rhode Island.

3. Nor can it be said that this marriage was inhibited by natural law. It was solemnized in accord with the ritual of
the parties faith in a State whose legislative body has declared such a marriage to be good and valid in law. It
cannot be said that such a marriage was offensive to the public sense of morality to a degree regarded generally
with abhorrence.
4. The award of costs in the Appellate Division against a party personally was a matter of statutory discretion
(Surrogates Ct. Act, 283, subd. 2) with which the Court of Appeals will not interfere.

Matter of May, 280 App. Div. 647, affirmed.

APPEAL from a decree of the Ulster County Surrogates Court, entered December 1, 1952, upon an order of the
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the third judicial department, which (1) reversed, on the law, a decree
of said Surrogates Court (STERLEY, S.), granting letters of administration to petitioner Alice M. Greenberg, upon
the estate of Fannie May, deceased, and (2) remitted the matter to the Surrogates Court with directions to grant
such letters of administration to respondent Sam May.

Helen M. Clark for appellants. I. Petitioner-appellant is entitled to letters of administration by virtue of section 118
of the Surrogates Court Act. (Audley v. Audley, 196 App. Div. 103; Matter of Dobess Realty Corp. v. Magid, 186
Misc. 225; People ex rel. Knott Management Corp. v. Graves, 286 N. Y. 377; Smith v. Smith, 179 Misc.
19; Matter of Incuria v. Incuria, 155 Misc. 755; People ex rel. Bd. of Supervisors of Rockland Co. v. Travis, 184
App. Div. 730; People ex rel. Jackson v. Potter, 47 N. Y. 375; Van Voorhis v. Brintnall, 86 N. Y. 18; Cunningham
v. Cunningham, 206 N. Y. 341; Cruickshank v. Cruickshank, 193 Misc. 367.) II. It was an abuse of discretion for
the Appellate Division to award costs to objectant as against respondent personally. (Matter of Page, 107 N. Y.
266; Matter [*488] of Shapiro [Cohn], 147 Misc. 526; Matter of Reimers, 261 N. Y. 337; Matter of Boyer, 54
Misc. 182; Matter of Ordway, 196 N. Y. 95; Texido v. Merical, 132 Misc. 764; Perrin v. Harrington, 146 App. Div.
292; Day v. Town of New Lots, 107 N. Y. 148.)

Morton L. Kimmelman and Matthew H. Bowcock for respondents. I. A marriage valid where contracted is valid in
this jurisdiction. (Van Voorhis v. Brintnall, 86 N. Y. 18; Thorp v. Thorp, 90 N. Y. 602; Cunningham v. Cunningham,
206 N. Y. 341; Weisberg v. Weisberg, 112 App. Div. 231; Stevenson v. Gray, 56 Ky. 193; Fersterwald v. Burk,
129 Md. 131; Burnside v. Whitney, 21 N. Y. 148; Matter of Carnegie Trust Co., 151 App. Div. 606, 206 N. Y.
390; People v. Bord, 243 N. Y. 595; Earle v. Earle, 141 App. Div. 611.) II. Sound public policy requires
recognition of this marriage. (Cunningham v. Cunningham, 206 N. Y. 341.)

OPINION BY: LEWIS, Ch. J.

In this proceeding, involving the administration of the estate of Fannie May, deceased, we are to determine
whether the marriage in 1913 between the respondent Sam May and the decedent, who was his niece by the half
blood which marriage was celebrated in Rhode Island, where concededly such marriage is valid is to be
given legal effect in New York where statute law declares incestuous and void a marriage between uncle and
niece. (Domestic Relations Law, 5, subd. 3.)

The question thus presented arises from proof of the following facts: The petitioner Alice May Greenberg, one of
six children born of the Rhode Island marriage of Sam and Fannie May, petitioned in 1951 for letters of
administration of the estate of her mother Fannie May, who had died in 1945. Thereupon, the respondent Sam
May, who asserts the validity of his marriage to the decedent, filed an objection to the issuance to petitioner of
such letters of administration upon the ground that he is the surviving husband of the decedent and accordingly,
under section 118 of the Surrogates Court Act, he has the paramount right to administer her estate.
Contemporaneously with, and in support of the objection filed by Sam May, his daughter Sirel Lenrow and his
sons Harry May and Morris B. May who are children of the challenged marriage filed objections to the
issuance of *489 letters of administration to their sister, the petitioner, and by such objections consented that
letters of administration be issued to their father Sam May.

The petitioner, supported by her sisters Ruth Weisbrout and Evelyn May, contended throughout this proceeding
that her father is not the surviving spouse of her mother because, although their marriage was valid in Rhode
Island, the marriage never had validity in New York where they were then resident and where they retained their
residence until the decedents death.

The record shows that for a period of more than five years prior to his marriage to decedent the respondent Sam
May had resided in Portage, Wisconsin; that he came to New York in December, 1912, and within a month
thereafter he and the decedent both of whom were adherents of the Jewish faith went to Providence,
Rhode Island, where, on January 21, 1913, they entered into a ceremonial marriage performed by and at the
home of a Jewish rabbi. The certificate issued upon that marriage gave the age of each party as twenty-six years
and the residence of each as New York, N. Y.. Two weeks after their marriage in Rhode Island the respondent
May and the decedent returned to Ulster County, New York, where they lived as man and wife for thirty-two years
until the decedents death in 1945. Meantime the six children were born who are parties to this proceeding.

A further significant item of proof to which more particular reference will be made was the fact that in Rhode
Island on January 21, 1913, the date of the marriage here involved, there were effective statutes which prohibited
the marriage of an uncle and a niece, excluding, however, those instances of which the present case is one
where the marriage solemnized is between persons of the Jewish faith within the degrees of affinity and
consanguinity allowed by their religion.
In Surrogates Court, where letters of administration were granted to the petitioner, the Surrogate ruled that
although the marriage of Sam May and the decedent in Rhode Island in 1913 was valid in that State, such
marriage was not only void in New York as opposed to natural law but is contrary to the provisions of subdivision
3 of *490 section 5 of the Domestic Relations Law. Accordingly the Surrogate concluded that Sam May did not
qualify in this jurisdiction for letters of administration as the surviving spouse of the decedent.

At the Appellate Division the order of the Surrogate was reversed on the law and the proceeding was remitted to
Surrogates Court with direction that letters of administration upon decedents estate be granted to Sam May who
was held to be the surviving spouse of the decedent. In reaching that decision the Appellate Division concluded
that the 1913 marriage of Sam May and the decedent in Rhode Island, being concededly valid in that State, is
valid in New York where the degree of consanguinity of uncle and niece is not so close as to be repugnant to our
concept of natural law, and that the statute (Domestic Relations Law, 5, subd. 3) which declares such a
marriage to be incestuous and void lacks express language which gives it [**6] extraterritorial force. The case
comes to us upon appeal as of right by the petitioner and her two sisters Ruth Weisbrout and Evelyn May.

We regard the law as settled that, subject to two exceptions presently to be considered, and in the absence of a
statute expressly regulating within the domiciliary State marriages solemnized abroad, the legality of a marriage
between persons sui juris is to be determined by the law of the place where it is celebrated. (Van Voorhis v.
Brintnall, 86 N. Y. 18, 24; Thorp v. Thorp, 90 N. Y. 602, 605-606; Moore v. Hegeman, 92 N. Y. 521, 524; Medway
v. Needham, 16 Mass. 157, 159-160; Fensterwald v. Burk, 129 Md. 131; Restatement, Conflict of Laws, 121.
131, 132; Story on Conflict of Laws [7th ed.], 113; 2 Beale. Conflict of Laws, pp. 669-670; 1 Bishop on
Marriage, Divorce and Separation, 856.)

In Van Voorhis v. Brintnall (supra) the decision turned upon the civil status in this State of a divorced husband
and his second wife whom he had married in Connecticut to evade the prohibition of a judgment of divorce which,
pursuant to New York law then prevailing, forbade his remarriage until the death of his former wife. In reaching its
decision, which held valid the Connecticut marriage there involved, this court noted the fact that in the much
earlier case of Decouche v. Savetier (3 Johns. Ch. 190, 211 [1817]), Chancellor KENT had recognized the
general [*491] principle * * * that the rights dependent upon nuptial contracts, are to be determined by the lex
loci. Incidental to the decision in Van Voorhis v. Brintnall (supra) which followed the general rule that * * *
recognizes as valid a marriage considered valid in the place where celebrated (id., p. 25), this court gave careful
consideration to, and held against the application of two exceptions to that rule viz., cases within the
prohibition of positive law; and cases involving polygamy or incest in a degree regarded generally as within the
prohibition of natural law.

We think the Appellate Division in the case at bar rightly held that the principle of law which ruled Van Voorhis v.
Brintnall and kindred cases cited (supra) was decisive of the present case and that neither of the two exceptions
to that general rule is here applicable.

The statute of New York upon which the appellants rely is subdivision 3 of section 5 of the Domestic Relations
Law which, insofar as relevant to our problem, provides:

5. Incestuous and void marriages.

A marriage is incestuous and void whether the relatives are legitimate or illegitimate between either:

1. * * *

2. * * *

3. An uncle and niece or an aunt and nephew.

If a marriage prohibited by the foregoing provisions of this section be solemnized it shall be void, and
the parties thereto shall each be fined not less than fifty nor more than one hundred dollars and may,
in the discretion of the court in addition to said fine, be imprisoned for a term not exceeding six
months. Any person who shall knowingly and wilfully solemnize such marriage, or procure or aid in the
solemnization of the same, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be fined or imprisoned
in like manner.

Although the New York statute quoted above declares to be incestuous and void a marriage between
an uncle and a niece and imposes penal measures upon the parties thereto, it is important to note that
the statute does not by express terms regulate a marriage solemnized in another State where, as in
our present case, the marriage was concededly legal. In the case at hand, as we *492 have seen, the
parties to the challenged marriage were adherents of the Jewish faith which, according to
Biblical [**7] law and Jewish tradition made the subject of proof in this case permits a marriage
between an uncle and a niece; they were married by a Jewish rabbi in the State of Rhode Island
 where, on the date of such marriage in 1913 and ever since, a statute forbidding the marriage of an
uncle and a niece was expressly qualified by the following statutory exceptions appearing in 1913 in
Rhode Island General Laws (tit. XXIV, ch. 243, 4, 9; now tit. XXXVI, ch. 415, 4, 9):

4. The provisions of the preceding sections shall not extend to, or in any way affect, any marriage
which shall be solemnized among the Jews, within the degrees of affinity or consanguinity allowed by
their religion.

9. Any marriage which may be had and solemnized among the people called Quakers, or Friends,
in the manner and form used or practised in their societies, or among persons professing the Jewish
religion, according to their rites and ceremonies, shall be good and valid in law; and wherever the
words minister and elder are used in this chapter, they shall be held to include all of the persons
connected with the society of Friends, or Quakers, and with the Jewish religion, who perform or have
charge of the marriage ceremony according to their rites and ceremonies.

As section 5 of the New York Domestic Relations Law (quoted, supra) does not expressly declare void a
marriage of its domiciliaries solemnized in a foreign State where such marriage is valid, the statutes scope
should not be extended by judicial construction. (Van Voorhis v. Brintnall, supra, p. 33.) Indeed, had the
Legislature been so disposed it could have declared by appropriate enactment that marriages contracted in
another State which if entered into here would be void shall have no force in this State. (Putnam v. Putnam,
25 Mass. 433, 435.) Although examples of such legislation are not wanting [FNa1], we find none in New York
which serve to give subdivision 3 of section 5 of the Domestic Relations Law extraterritorial effectiveness. (Van
Voorhis v. Brintnall, supra, pp. 25-37.) Accordingly, as to *493 the first exception to the general rule that a
marriage valid where performed is valid everywhere, we conclude that, absent any New York statute expressing
clearly the Legislatures intent to regulate within this State marriages of its domiciliaries solemnized abroad, there
is no positive law in this jurisdiction which serves to interdict the 1913 marriage in Rhode Island of the
respondent Sam May and the decedent.

a1. See 2 Beale, Conflict of Laws, 129.6, p. 681, and statutes there collated.

As to the application of the second exception to the marriage here involved between persons of the Jewish
faith whose kinship was not in the direct ascending or descending line of consanguinity and who were not brother
and sister we conclude that such marriage, solemnized, as it was, in accord with the ritual of the Jewish faith
in a State whose legislative body has declared such a marriage to be good and valid in law, was not offensive to
the public sense of morality to a degree regarded generally with abhorrence and thus was not within the
inhibitions of natural law.

A remaining point relates to an assertion by the petitioner-appellant that it was an abuse of discretion for the
Appellate Division to have awarded costs against her personally. The award of costs in the Appellate Division
was a matter of statutory discretion (Surrogates Ct. Act, 283, subd. 2) with which we will not interfere.

The decree of the Surrogates Court should be affirmed, with one bill of costs to respondents, payable out of the
estate.

DESMOND, J. (dissenting).

It is fundamental that every State has the right to determine the marital status of its [**8] own citizens (Maynard
v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190; Hunt v. Hunt, 131 U. S., Appendix, clxv; Kinnier v. Kinnier, 45 N. Y. 535, 544; Wade v.
Kalbfleisch, 58 N. Y. 282; Cunningham v. Cunningham, 206 N. Y. 341, 347; Bell v. Little, 204 App. Div. 235, 237,
affd. 237 N. Y. 519). Exercising that right, New York has declared in section 5 of the Domestic Relations Law that
a marriage between uncle and niece is incestuous, void and criminal. Such marriages, while not within the
Levitical forbidden degrees of the Old Testament, have been condemned by public opinion for centuries (see 1
Bishop on Marriage, Divorce and Separation, 738), and are void, by statute in (it would seem) forty-seven of the
States of [*494] the Union (all except Georgia, see Martindale-Hubbel, Law Digests, and except, also, that
Rhode Island, one of the fortyseven, exempts from its local statute any marriage which shall be solemnized
among the Jews, within the degrees of affinity or consanguinity allowed by their religion, Gen. L. of R. I., ch. 415,
4). It is undisputed here that this uncle and niece were both domiciled in New York in 1913, when they left New
York for the sole purpose of going to Rhode Island to be married there, and that they were married in that State
conformably to its laws (see above) and immediately returned to New York and ever afterwards resided in this
State. That Rhode Island marriage, between two New York residents, was, in New York, absolutely void for any
and all purposes, by positive New York law which declares a strong public policy of this State (see Penal Law,
1110).

The general rule that a marriage valid where solemnized is valid everywhere (see Restatement, Conflict of
Laws, 121) does not apply. To that rule there is a proviso or exception, recognized, it would seem, by all the
States, as follows: unless contrary to the prohibitions of natural law or the express prohibitions of a statute
(see Thorp v. Thorp, 90 N. Y. 602, 605). Section 132 of the Restatement of Conflict of Laws states the rule
apparently followed throughout America: A marriage which is against the law of the state of domicil of either
party, though the requirements of the law of the state of celebration have been complied with, will be invalid
everywhere in the following cases: * * * (b) incestuous marriage between persons so closely related that their
marriage is contrary to a strong public policy of the domicil (see 35 Am. Jur., Marriage, 180; 55 C. J. S.,
Marriage, 16; Grosman, New York Law of Domestic Relations, 34). The old and famous New York case of
Wightman v. Wightman (4 Johns. Ch. 343, 349, 350). decided in 1820 when there were no marriage statutes in
our State, says that marriages may be declared by appropriate legislation, to be incestuous. New York, as a
sovereign State with absolute powers over the marital status of its citizens, has enacted such legislation, but we,
by this decision, are denying it efficacy.

Van Voorhis v. Brintnall (86 N. Y. 18) does not save this marriage. That case dealt not with a marriage void under
section *495 5 of the Domestic Relations Law, but one forbidden by section 8 thereof. Section 8 forbids the guilty
party, in a New York divorce judgment, to marry again within a certain time, and the Van Voorhis ruling was that,
by section 8, the Legislature did not intend to make such marriages contracted outside this State absolutely void,
but merely stated an in personam prohibition against the adjudged adulterer marrying, for a period of time (see
analysis of Van Voorhis v. Brintnall in Mitchell v. Mitchell, 63 Misc. 580, 586). This courts opinion in the Van
Voorhis case, while stating the general rule that the validity of a marriage depends on the law of the place of
marriage, noted that there are exceptions thereto in cases of incest, within the prohibition of natural law, and
prohibition by positive law (86 N. Y., at p. 26). Section 5 of the Domestic Relations Law, the one we are
concerned with here, lists the marriages which are incestuous [**9] and void in New York, as being those
between parent and child, brother and sister, uncle and niece, and aunt and nephew. All such misalliances are
incestuous, and all, equally, are void. The policy, language, meaning and validity of the statute are beyond
dispute. It should be enforced by the courts.

The order should be reversed and the proceeding remitted to the Surrogate for appropriate proceedings, with
costs to abide the event.

CONWAY, DYE, FULD and FROESSEL, JJ., concur with LEWIS, Ch. J.; DESMOND, J., dissents in opinion;
VAN VOORHIS, J., taking no part.
Decree affirmed.

G.R. No. 99358 January 30, 1995

DJUMANTAN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANDREA D. DOMINGO, COMMISSIONER OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION, HON. REGINO R.
SANTIAGO and HON. JORGE V. SARMIENTO, COMMISSIONERS BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND
DEPORTATION, respondents.

QUIASON, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court with preliminary injunction, to reverse
and set aside the Decision dated September 27, 1990 of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID),
ordering the deportation of petitioner and its Resolution dated January 29, 1991, denying the motion for
reconsideration.

Bernard Banez, the husband of Marina Cabael, went to Indonesia as a contract worker.

On April 3, 1974, he embraced and was converted to Islam. On May 17, 1974, he married petitioner in
accordance with Islamic rites. He returned to the Philippines in January 1979.

On January 13, 1979, petitioner and her two children with Banez, (two-year old Marina and nine-month old
Nikulas) arrived in Manila as the "guests" of Banez. The latter made it appear that he was just a friend of the
family of petitioner and was merely repaying the hospitability extended to him during his stay in Indonesia.

When petitioner and her two children arrived at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport on January 13, 1979,
Banez, together with Marina Cabael, met them.

Banez executed an "Affidavit of Guaranty and Support," for his "guests," stating inter alia, that:
 That I am the guarantor for the entry into the Philippines of Mrs. Djumantan, 42 years old, and
her two minor children, MARINA, 2 years old, and NIKULAS, 9 months old, all Indonesian
citizens, who are coming as temporary visitors.

That I am willing to guaranty them out of gratitude to their family for the hospitality they have
accorded me during the few years that I have stayed in Indonesia in connection with my
employment thereat.

That I guaranty they are law abiding citizens and I guaranty their behavior while they are in the
Philippines; I also guaranty their support and that they will not become a public charge.

That I guaranty their voluntary departure upon the termination of the authorized stay granted
them by the Government (Rollo, p. 41).

As "guests," petitioner and her two children lived in the house of Banez.

Petitioner and her children were admitted to the Philippines as temporary visitors under Section 9(a) of the
Immigration Act of 1940.

In 1981, Marina Cabael discovered the true relationship of her husband and petitioner. She filed a complaint for
"concubinage" with the Municipal Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan against the two. This case was, however,
dismissed for lack of merit.

On March 25, 1982, the immigration status of petitioner was changed from temporary visitor to that of permanent
resident under Section 13(a) of the same law. On April 14, 1982, petitioner was issued an alien certificate of
registration.

Not accepting the set-back, Banez' eldest son, Leonardo, filed a letter complaint with the Ombudsman, who
subsequently referred the letter to the CID. On the basis of the said letter, petitioner was detained at the CID
detention cell. She later released pending the deportation proceedings (DEP Case No. 90-400) after posting a
cash bond (Rollo, pp. 15-16). Thereafter, she manifested to the CID that she be allowed to depart voluntarily from
the Philippines and asked for time to purchase her airline ticket (Rollo, p. 10). However, she a change of heart
and moved for the dismissal of the deportation case on the ground that she was validly married to a Filipino
citizen (Rollo, pp. 11-12).

In the Decision dated September 27, 1990, the CID, through public respondents, disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Board of Commissioners finds the second
marriage of Bernardo Banes to respondent Djumantan irregular and not in accordance with the
laws of the Philippines. We revoke the Section 13(a) visa previously granted to her (Rollo, p.
23).

Public respondents denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in their Resolution dated January 29, 1991
(Rollo, pp. 31-33).

Hence, this petition.

We issued a temporary restraining order, directing public respondents to cease and desist from executing or
implementing the Decision dated September 27, 1990 and the Resolution dated January 29, 1991 (Rollo, pp. 34-
36).

On September 20, 1994, Leonardo C. Banez manifested that his father died on August 14, 1994 and that he and
his mother were withdrawing their objection to the granting of a permanent resident visa to petitioner (Rollo, pp.
173-175).

II

Petitioner claims that her marriage to Banez was valid under Article 27 of P.D. No. 1085, the Muslim Code, which
recognizes the practice of polyandry by Muslim males. From that premise, she argues that under Articles 109 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, Article 68 of the Family Code and Article 34 of the Muslim Code, the husband
and wife are obliged to live together and under Article 110 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the husband is
given the right to fix the conjugal residence. She claims that public respondents have no right to order the couple
to live separately (Rollo, pp. 5-7).

When asked to comment on the petition, the Solicitor General took the position that the CID could not order
petitioner's deportation because its power to do so had prescribed under Section 37 (b) of the Immigration Act of
1940 (Rollo, pp. 57-74).

III

We need not resolve the validity of petitioner's marriage to Banez, if under the law the CID can validly deport
petitioner as an "undesirable alien" regardless of her marriage to a Filipino citizen. Therefore, to be first resolved
is the question on petitioner's immigration status, particularly the legality of her admission into the country and the
change of her status from temporary visitor to permanent resident. Upon a finding that she was not lawfully
admitted into the country and she did not lawfully acquire permanent residency, the next question is whether the
power to deport her has prescribed.

There was a blatant abuse of our immigration laws in effecting petitioner's entry into the country and the change
of her immigration status from temporary visitor to permanent resident. All such privileges were obtained through
misinterpretation.

Never was the marriage of petitioner to Banez disclosed to the immigration authorities in her applications for
temporary visitor's visa and for permanent residency.

The civil status of an alien applicant for admission as a temporary visitor is a matter that could influence the
exercise of discretion on the part of the immigration authorities. The immigration authorities would be less
inclined to allow the entry of a woman who claims to have entered into a marriage with a Filipino citizen, who is
married to another woman (Cf. Shiu Shin Man v. Galang, 3 SCRA 871 [1961]).

Generally, the right of the President to expel or deport aliens whose presence is deemed inimical to the public
interest is as absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their entry into the country
(Annotations, 8 ALR 1286). this right is based on the fact that since the aliens are not part of the nation, their
admission into the territory is a matter of pure permission and simple tolerance which creates no obligation on the
part of the government to permit them to stay (3 Am. Jur. 2d. 72).

The interest, which an alien has in being admitted into or allowed to continue to reside in the country, is protected
only so far as Congress may choose to protect it (United States ex rel. Kaloudis v. Shauhnessy 180 F. 2d. 489).

There is no law guaranteeing aliens married to Filipino citizens the right to be admitted, much less to be given
permanent residency, in the Philippines.

The fact of marriage by an alien to a citizen does not withdraw her from the operation of the immigration laws
governing the admission and exclusion of aliens (United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shauhnessy, 338 US 537 94 L.
Ed. 317, 70 S. Ct. 309 [1950]; Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 US 460 56 L. Ed. 1165, 32 S. Ct. 734 [1912];
Annotations, 71 ALR 1213). Marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino husband does not ipso facto make her a
Filipino citizen and does not excuse her from her failure to depart from the country upon the expiration of her
extended stay here as an alien (Joaquin v. Galang, 33 SCRA 362 [1970]).

Under Section 9 of the Immigration Act of 1940, it is not mandatory for the CID to admit any alien who applies for
a visitor's visa. Once admitted into the country, the alien has no right to an indefinite stay. Under Section 13 of
the law, an alien allowed to stay temporarily may apply for a change of status and "may be admitted" as a
permanent resident. Among those considered qualified to apply for permanent residency if the wife or husband of
a Philippine citizen (Immigration Act of 1940, Sec. 13[a]). The entry of aliens into the country and their admission
as immigrants is not a matter of right, even if they are legally married to Filipino citizens.

IV

We now address the issue raised by the Solicitor General that the right of public respondents to deport petitioner
has prescribed, citing Section 37(b) of the Immigration Act of 1940.

Said Section 37(b) provides:

 Deportation may be effected under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of paragraph (a) of this section at
any time after entry, but shall not be effected under any clause unless the arrest in the
deportation proceedings is made within five years after the cause for deportation arises.
Deportation under clauses 3 and 4 shall not be effected if the court, or judge thereof, when
sentencing the alien, shall recommend to the Commissioner of Immigration that the alien be
not deported (As amended by Rep. Act No. 503).

Section 37(a) of the said law mentioned in Section 37(b) thereof provides:

The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or
of any other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the
Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the
existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien:

1) Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act by means of false and
misleading statements or without inspection and admission by the immigration authorities at a
designating port of entry or at any place other than at a designated port of entry.

2) Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act, who was not lawfully
admissible at the time of entry;

3) Any alien who, after the effective date of this Act, is convicted in the Philippines and
sentenced for a term of one year or more for a crime involving moral turpitude committed within
five years after his entry, is so convicted and sentenced more than once;

4) Any alien who is convicted and sentenced for a violation of the law governing prohibited
drugs;

5) Any alien who practices prostitution or is an inmate of a house of prostitution or is connected

with the management of a house of prostitution, or is a procurer;

6) Any alien who becomes a public charge within five years after entry from causes not
affirmatively shown to have arisen subsequent to entry;

7) Any alien who remains in the Philippines in violation of any limitation or condition under
which he was admitted a non-immigrant;

8) Any alien who believes in, advises, advocates or teaches the overthrow by force and
violence of the Government of the Philippines, or of constituted law and authority, or who
disbelieves in or is opposed to organized government, or who advises, advocates, or teaches
the assault or assassination of public officials because of their office, or who advises,
advocates, or teaches the unlawful destruction of property, or who is a member of or affiliated
with any organization entertaining, advocating or teaching such doctrines, or who on any
manner whatsoever lends assistance, financial or otherwise, to the dissemination of such
doctrines;

9) Any alien who commits any of the acts described in Sections forty-five and forty-six of this
Act, independent of criminal action which may be brought against him: Provided, That in the
case of an alien who, for any reason, is convicted and sentenced to suffer both imprisonment
and deportation, said alien shall first serve the entire period of his imprisonment before he is
actually deported: Provided, however, That the imprisonment may be waived by the
Commissioner of Immigration with the consent of the Department Head, and upon payment by
the alien concerned of such amount as the Commissioner may fix and approved by the
Department Head, and upon payment by the alien concerned of such amount as the
Commissioner may fix and approved by the Department Head (as amended by R.A. No. 144);

10) Any alien who, at any time within five years after entry, shall have been convicted of
violating the provisions of the Philippine Commonwealth Act Numbered Six hundred and fifty-
three, otherwise known as the Philippine Alien Registration Act of 1941 (now Republic Act No.
562), or who, at any time after entry, shall have been convicted more than once of violating the
provisions of the same Act;
 11) Any alien who engages in profiteering, hoarding, or black-marketing, independent of any
criminal action which may be brought against him;

12) Any alien who is convicted of any offense penalized under Commonwealth Act Numbered
Four hundred and seventy-three, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Laws of the
Philippines, or any law relating to acquisition of Philippine citizenship;

13) Any alien who defrauds his creditor by absconding or alienating properties, to prevent them
from being attached or executed.

Under clause 1 of Section 37(a), an "alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act by means
of false and misleading statements or without inspection and admission by the immigration authorities at a
designated port of entry or at any place other than at a designated port of entry" is subject to deportation.

The deportation of an alien under said clause of Section 37(a) has a prescriptive period and "shall not be effected
... unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within five years after the cause for deportation
arises" (Immigration Act of 1940, Sec. 37[b]).

Congress may impose a limitation of time for the deportation of alien from the country (Costanzo v. Tillinghast,
287 US 341 77 L. Ed. 350, 53 S. Ct. 152 [1932]; Guiney v. Bonham [CA 9] 261 F. 582, 8 ALR 1282).

In Board of Commissioners (CID) v. Dela Rosa, 197 SCRA 853 (1991), we held that under Section 37(b) of the
Immigration Act of 1940, the deportation of an alien may be barred after the lapse of five years after the cause of
deportation arises. Justice Feliciano, in his dissenting opinion, qualified the broad statement of the law as follows:

Examination of the above quoted Section 37 (b) shows that the five (5) year limitation is
applicable only where deportation is sought to be effected under clauses of Section 37 (a)
other than clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12; that where deportation or exclusion is sought to be
effected under clauses of Section 37(a), no period of limitation is applicable; and that to the
contrary, deportation or exclusion may be effected "at any time after entry."

Justice Davide, in his dissenting opinion, clarified:

Note that the five-year period applies only to clauses other than 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of paragraph
(a) of the Section. In respect to clauses 2, 7, 8, 11, and 12, the limitation does not apply.

In Lam Shee v. Bengzon, 93 Phil. 1065 (1953), the alien admitted that she had gained entrance into the
Philippines fraudulently by making use of the name of a Chinese resident-merchant other than that of her lawful
husband. The Court, however, held that she could no longer be deported "for the simple reason that more than 5
years had elapsed from the date of her admission."

The right of public respondents to deport petitioner has prescribed.

Petitioner was admitted and allowed entry into the Philippines on January 13, 1979 on the basis of false and
misleading statements in her application and in the other supporting documents submitted to the immigration
authorities. Leonardo C. Banez first complained with the CID on November 19, 1980 about the manner petitioner
was admitted into the country and asked for her deportation (Rollo, pp. 77-78). After the EDSA Revolution, he
sent a follow-up letter to the CID requesting action on his 1980 letter-complaint (Rollo, p. 78).

Tolling the prescriptive period from November 19, 1980, when Leonardo C. Banez informed the CID of the illegal
entry of petitioner into the country, more than five years had elapsed before the issuance of the order of her
deportation on September 27, 1990.

In their Comment, public respondents urged that what is barred under Section 37(b) is the deportation of an alien
and claimed that what they ordered was not the deportation of petitioner but merely the revocation of Section
13(a) which refers to the visa previously granted her (Rollo, p. 102).

The "arrest" contemplated by Section 37(b) refers to the arrest for the purpose of carrying out an order for
deportation and not the arrest prior to proceedings to determine the right of the alien to stay in the country. When
public respondents revoked the permanent residence visa issued to petitioner, they, in effect, ordered her arrest
and deportation as an overstaying alien.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the temporary restraining order issued on June 4, 1991 is MADE
PERMANENT.

The Decision of the Board of Commissioners dated September 27, 1990 revoking the issuance of the permanent
resident visa to petitioner and the Resolution dated January 29, 1991 are REVERSED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and
Mendoza, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-19671 November 29, 1965

PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
VICENTA F. ESCAO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

I. V. Binamira & F. B. Barria for plaintiff-appellant.

Jalandoni & Jarnir for defendants-appellees.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Direct appeal, on factual and legal questions, from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, in its Civil
Case No. R-4177, denying the claim of the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor B. Tenchavez, for legal separation and one
million pesos in damages against his wife and parents-in-law, the defendants-appellees, Vicente, Mamerto and
Mena,1 all surnamed "Escao," respectively.2

The facts, supported by the evidence of record, are the following:

Missing her late afternoon classes on 24 February 1948 in the University of San Carlos, Cebu City, where she
was then enrolled as a second year student of commerce, Vicenta Escao, 27 years of age (scion of a well-to-do
and socially prominent Filipino family of Spanish ancestry and a "sheltered colegiala"), exchanged marriage vows
with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an engineer, ex-army officer and of undistinguished stock, without the
knowledge of her parents, before a Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares, in the house of one Juan Alburo in the
said city. The marriage was the culmination of a previous love affair and was duly registered with the local civil
register.

Vicenta's letters to Pastor, and his to her, before the marriage, indicate that the couple were deeply in love.
Together with a friend, Pacita Noel, their matchmaker and go-between, they had planned out their marital future
whereby Pacita would be the governess of their first-born; they started saving money in a piggy bank. A few
weeks before their secret marriage, their engagement was broken; Vicenta returned the engagement ring and
accepted another suitor, Joseling Lao. Her love for Pastor beckoned; she pleaded for his return, and they
reconciled. This time they planned to get married and then elope. To facilitate the elopement, Vicenta had
brought some of her clothes to the room of Pacita Noel in St. Mary's Hall, which was their usual trysting place.

Although planned for the midnight following their marriage, the elopement did not, however, materialize because
when Vicente went back to her classes after the marriage, her mother, who got wind of the intended nuptials, was
already waiting for her at the college. Vicenta was taken home where she admitted that she had already married
Pastor. Mamerto and Mena Escao were surprised, because Pastor never asked for the hand of Vicente, and
were disgusted because of the great scandal that the clandestine marriage would provoke (t.s.n., vol. III, pp.
1105-06). The following morning, the Escao spouses sought priestly advice. Father Reynes suggested a
recelebration to validate what he believed to be an invalid marriage, from the standpoint of the Church, due to the
lack of authority from the Archbishop or the parish priest for the officiating chaplain to celebrate the marriage. The
recelebration did not take place, because on 26 February 1948 Mamerto Escao was handed by a maid, whose
name he claims he does not remember, a letter purportedly coming from San Carlos college students and
disclosing an amorous relationship between Pastor Tenchavez and Pacita Noel; Vicenta translated the letter to
her father, and thereafter would not agree to a new marriage. Vicenta and Pastor met that day in the house of
Mrs. Pilar Mendezona. Thereafter, Vicenta continued living with her parents while Pastor returned to his job in
Manila. Her letter of 22 March 1948 (Exh. "M"), while still solicitous of her husband's welfare, was not as
endearing as her previous letters when their love was aflame.
Vicenta was bred in Catholic ways but is of a changeable disposition, and Pastor knew it. She fondly accepted
her being called a "jellyfish." She was not prevented by her parents from communicating with Pastor (Exh. "1-
Escao"), but her letters became less frequent as the days passed. As of June, 1948 the newlyweds were
already estranged (Exh. "2-Escao"). Vicenta had gone to Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, to escape from the
scandal that her marriage stirred in Cebu society. There, a lawyer filed for her a petition, drafted by then Senator
Emmanuel Pelaez, to annul her marriage. She did not sign the petition (Exh. "B-5"). The case was dismissed
without prejudice because of her non-appearance at the hearing (Exh. "B-4").

On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, she applied for a passport, indicating in her application that she
was single, that her purpose was to study, and she was domiciled in Cebu City, and that she intended to return
after two years. The application was approved, and she left for the United States. On 22 August 1950, she filed a
verified complaint for divorce against the herein plaintiff in the Second Judicial District Court of the State of
Nevada in and for the County of Washoe, on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." On 21
October 1950, a decree of divorce, "final and absolute", was issued in open court by the said tribunal.

In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escao filed a petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to annul their daughter's
marriage to Pastor (Exh. "D"). On 10 September 1954, Vicenta sought papal dispensation of her marriage (Exh.
"D"-2).

On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. She now lives with him in
California, and, by him, has begotten children. She acquired American citizenship on 8 August 1958.

But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar by a complaint in the Court of First Instance
of Cebu, and amended on 31 May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escao, her parents, Mamerto and Mena Escao,
whom he charged with having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and alienating her
affections, and against the Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the
annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal separation and one million pesos in damages. Vicenta claimed a
valid divorce from plaintiff and an equally valid marriage to her present husband, Russell Leo Moran; while her
parents denied that they had in any way influenced their daughter's acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages.

The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation, but freed the plaintiff from supporting his wife and to
acquire property to the exclusion of his wife. It allowed the counterclaim of Mamerto Escao and Mena Escao
for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees against the plaintiff-appellant, to the extent of P45,000.00,
and plaintiff resorted directly to this Court.

The appellant ascribes, as errors of the trial court, the following:

1. In not declaring legal separation; in not holding defendant Vicenta F. Escao liable for damages and
in dismissing the complaint;.

2. In not holding the defendant parents Mamerto Escano and the heirs of Doa Mena Escao liable for
damages;.

3 In holding the plaintiff liable for and requiring him to pay the damages to the defendant parents on their
counterclaims; and.

4. In dismissing the complaint and in denying the relief sought by the plaintiff.

That on 24 February 1948 the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor Tenchavez, and the defendant-appellee, Vicenta
Escao, were validly married to each other, from the standpoint of our civil law, is clearly established by the
record before us. Both parties were then above the age of majority, and otherwise qualified; and both consented
to the marriage, which was performed by a Catholic priest (army chaplain Lavares) in the presence of competent
witnesses. It is nowhere shown that said priest was not duly authorized under civil law to solemnize marriages.

The chaplain's alleged lack of ecclesiastical authorization from the parish priest and the Ordinary, as required by
Canon law, is irrelevant in our civil law, not only because of the separation of Church and State but also because
Act 3613 of the Philippine Legislature (which was the marriage law in force at the time) expressly provided that

SEC. 1. Essential requisites. Essential requisites for marriage are the legal capacity of the contracting
parties and consent. (Emphasis supplied)
The actual authority of the solemnizing officer was thus only a formal requirement, and, therefore, not essential to
give the marriage civil effects,3 and this is emphasized by section 27 of said marriage act, which provided the
following:

SEC. 27. Failure to comply with formal requirements. No marriage shall be declared invalid because of
the absence of one or several of the formal requirements of this Act if, when it was performed, the
spouses or one of them believed in good faith that the person who solemnized the marriage was
actually empowered to do so, and that the marriage was perfectly legal.

The good faith of all the parties to the marriage (and hence the validity of their marriage) will be presumed until
the contrary is positively proved (Lao vs. Dee Tim, 45 Phil. 739, 745; Francisco vs. Jason, 60 Phil. 442, 448). It is
well to note here that in the case at bar, doubts as to the authority of the solemnizing priest arose only after the
marriage, when Vicenta's parents consulted Father Reynes and the archbishop of Cebu. Moreover, the very act
of Vicenta in abandoning her original action for annulment and subsequently suing for divorce implies an
admission that her marriage to plaintiff was valid and binding.

Defendant Vicenta Escao argues that when she contracted the marriage she was under the undue influence of
Pacita Noel, whom she charges to have been in conspiracy with appellant Tenchavez. Even granting, for
argument's sake, the truth of that contention, and assuming that Vicenta's consent was vitiated by fraud and
undue influence, such vices did not render her marriage ab initio void, but merely voidable, and the marriage
remained valid until annulled by a competent civil court. This was never done, and admittedly, Vicenta's suit for
annulment in the Court of First Instance of Misamis was dismissed for non-prosecution.

It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escao
remained subsisting and undissolved under Philippine law, notwithstanding the decree of absolute divorce that
the wife sought and obtained on 21 October 1950 from the Second Judicial District Court of Washoe County,
State of Nevada, on grounds of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." At the time the divorce decree was
issued, Vicenta Escao, like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen. 4 She was then subject to Philippine law, and
Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386), already in force at the time, expressly provided:

Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit absolute divorce, quo ad vinculo matrimonii; and
in fact does not even use that term, to further emphasize its restrictive policy on the matter, in contrast to the
preceding legislation that admitted absolute divorce on grounds of adultery of the wife or concubinage of the
husband (Act 2710). Instead of divorce, the present Civil Code only provides for legal separation (Title IV, Book
1, Arts. 97 to 108), and, even in that case, it expressly prescribes that "the marriage bonds shall not be severed"
(Art. 106, subpar. 1).

For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a foreign decree of absolute divorce
betiveen Filipino citizens could be a patent violation of the declared public policy of the state, specially in view of
the third paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code that prescribes the following:

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public
order, policy and good customs, shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or
by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such foreign divorce decrees would, in effect, give rise to
an irritating and scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens, to the detriment of those members of our
polity whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute divorces outside the Philippines.

From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant Pastor Tenchavez should have appeared in the Nevada
divorce court. Primarily because the policy of our law cannot be nullified by acts of private parties (Civil Code,Art.
17, jam quot.); and additionally, because the mere appearance of a non-resident consort cannot confer
jurisdiction where the court originally had none (Area vs. Javier, 95 Phil. 579).

From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as a necessary consequence that in this jurisdiction
Vicenta Escao's divorce and second marriage are not entitled to recognition as valid; for her previous union to
plaintiff Tenchavez must be declared to be existent and undissolved. It follows, likewise, that her refusal to
perform her wifely duties, and her denial of consortium and her desertion of her husband constitute in law a
wrong caused through her fault, for which the husband is entitled to the corresponding indemnity (Civil Code, Art.
2176). Neither an unsubstantiated charge of deceit nor an anonymous letter charging immorality against the
husband constitute, contrary to her claim, adequate excuse. Wherefore, her marriage and cohabitation with
Russell Leo Moran is technically "intercourse with a person not her husband" from the standpoint of Philippine
Law, and entitles plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez to a decree of "legal separation under our law, on the basis of
adultery" (Revised Penal Code, Art. 333).

The foregoing conclusions as to the untoward effect of a marriage after an invalid divorce are in accord with the
previous doctrines and rulings of this court on the subject, particularly those that were rendered under our laws
prior to the approval of the absolute divorce act (Act 2710 of the Philippine Legislature). As a matter of legal
history, our statutes did not recognize divorces a vinculo before 1917, when Act 2710 became effective; and the
present Civil Code of the Philippines, in disregarding absolute divorces, in effect merely reverted to the policies
on the subject prevailing before Act 2710. The rulings, therefore, under the Civil Code of 1889, prior to the Act
above-mentioned, are now, fully applicable. Of these, the decision in Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855, is of
particular interest. Said this Court in that case:

As the divorce granted by the French Court must be ignored, it results that the marriage of Dr. Mory and
Leona Castro, celebrated in London in 1905, could not legalize their relations; and the circumstance that
they afterwards passed for husband and wife in Switzerland until her death is wholly without legal
significance. The claims of the very children to participate in the estate of Samuel Bishop must therefore
be rejected. The right to inherit is limited to legitimate, legitimated and acknowledged natural children.
The children of adulterous relations are wholly excluded. The word "descendants" as used in Article 941
of the Civil Code cannot be interpreted to include illegitimates born of adulterous relations. (Emphasis
supplied)

Except for the fact that the successional rights of the children, begotten from Vicenta's marriage to Leo Moran
after the invalid divorce, are not involved in the case at bar, the Gmur case is authority for the proposition that
such union is adulterous in this jurisdiction, and, therefore, justifies an action for legal separation on the part of
the innocent consort of the first marriage, that stands undissolved in Philippine law. In not so declaring, the trial
court committed error.

True it is that our ruling gives rise to anomalous situations where the status of a person (whether divorced or not)
would depend on the territory where the question arises. Anomalies of this kind are not new in the Philippines,
and the answer to them was given in Barretto vs. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 667:

The hardship of the existing divorce laws in the Philippine Islands are well known to the members of the
Legislature. It is the duty of the Courts to enforce the laws of divorce as written by Legislature if they are
constitutional. Courts have no right to say that such laws are too strict or too liberal. (p. 72)

The appellant's first assignment of error is, therefore, sustained.

However, the plaintiff-appellant's charge that his wife's parents, Dr. Mamerto Escao and his wife, the late Doa
Mena Escao, alienated the affections of their daughter and influenced her conduct toward her husband are not
supported by credible evidence. The testimony of Pastor Tenchavez about the Escao's animosity toward him
strikes us to be merely conjecture and exaggeration, and are belied by Pastor's own letters written before this suit
was begun (Exh. "2-Escao" and "Vicenta," Rec. on App., pp. 270-274). In these letters he expressly apologized
to the defendants for "misjudging them" and for the "great unhappiness" caused by his "impulsive blunders" and
"sinful pride," "effrontery and audacity" [sic]. Plaintiff was admitted to the Escao house to visit and court Vicenta,
and the record shows nothing to prove that he would not have been accepted to marry Vicente had he openly
asked for her hand, as good manners and breeding demanded. Even after learning of the clandestine marriage,
and despite their shock at such unexpected event, the parents of Vicenta proposed and arranged that the
marriage be recelebrated in strict conformity with the canons of their religion upon advice that the previous one
was canonically defective. If no recelebration of the marriage ceremony was had it was not due to defendants
Mamerto Escao and his wife, but to the refusal of Vicenta to proceed with it. That the spouses Escao did not
seek to compel or induce their daughter to assent to the recelebration but respected her decision, or that they
abided by her resolve, does not constitute in law an alienation of affections. Neither does the fact that Vicenta's
parents sent her money while she was in the United States; for it was natural that they should not wish their
daughter to live in penury even if they did not concur in her decision to divorce Tenchavez (27 Am. Jur. 130-132).

There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives, aided and abetted her original suit for
annulment, or her subsequent divorce; she appears to have acted independently, and being of age, she was
entitled to judge what was best for her and ask that her decisions be respected. Her parents, in so doing,
certainly cannot be charged with alienation of affections in the absence of malice or unworthy motives, which
have not been shown, good faith being always presumed until the contrary is proved.
 SEC. 529. Liability of Parents, Guardians or Kin. The law distinguishes between the right of a parent
to interest himself in the marital affairs of his child and the absence of rights in a stranger to intermeddle
in such affairs. However, such distinction between the liability of parents and that of strangers is only in
regard to what will justify interference. A parent isliable for alienation of affections resulting from his own
malicious conduct, as where he wrongfully entices his son or daughter to leave his or her spouse, but he
is not liable unless he acts maliciously, without justification and from unworthy motives. He is not liable
where he acts and advises his child in good faith with respect to his child's marital relations in the
interest of his child as he sees it, the marriage of his child not terminating his right and liberty to interest
himself in, and be extremely solicitous for, his child's welfare and happiness, even where his conduct
and advice suggest or result in the separation of the spouses or the obtaining of a divorce or annulment,
or where he acts under mistake or misinformation, or where his advice or interference are indiscreet or
unfortunate, although it has been held that the parent is liable for consequences resulting from
recklessness. He may in good faith take his child into his home and afford him or her protection and
support, so long as he has not maliciously enticed his child away, or does not maliciously entice or
cause him or her to stay away, from his or her spouse. This rule has more frequently been applied in the
case of advice given to a married daughter, but it is equally applicable in the case of advice given to a
son.

Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social discrimination and with having
exerted efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and divorce, unquestionably caused them unrest and
anxiety, entitling them to recover damages. While this suit may not have been impelled by actual malice, the
charges were certainly reckless in the face of the proven facts and circumstances. Court actions are not
established for parties to give vent to their prejudices or spleen.

In the assessment of the moral damages recoverable by appellant Pastor Tenchavez from defendant Vicente
Escao, it is proper to take into account, against his patently unreasonable claim for a million pesos in damages,
that (a) the marriage was celebrated in secret, and its failure was not characterized by publicity or undue
humiliation on appellant's part; (b) that the parties never lived together; and (c) that there is evidence that
appellant had originally agreed to the annulment of the marriage, although such a promise was legally invalid,
being against public policy (cf. Art. 88, Civ. Code). While appellant is unable to remarry under our law, this fact is
a consequence of the indissoluble character of the union that appellant entered into voluntarily and with open
eyes rather than of her divorce and her second marriage. All told, we are of the opinion that appellant should
recover P25,000 only by way of moral damages and attorney's fees.

With regard to the P45,000 damages awarded to the defendants, Dr. Mamerto Escao and Mena Escao, by the
court below, we opine that the same are excessive. While the filing of this unfounded suit must have wounded
said defendants' feelings and caused them anxiety, the same could in no way have seriously injured their
reputation, or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a common occurrence in present society. What
is important, and has been correctly established in the decision of the court below, is that said defendants were
not guilty of any improper conduct in the whole deplorable affair. This Court, therefore, reduces the damages
awarded to P5,000 only.

Summing up, the Court rules:

(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil
Code (Rep. Act 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage
contracted with another party by the divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce, entitled to
validity in the country;

(2) That the remarriage of divorced wife and her co-habitation with a person other than the lawful husband entitle
the latter to a decree of legal separation conformably to Philippine law;

(3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one consort entitles the other to recover
damages;

(4) That an action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does not lie in the absence of
proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part.

WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;

(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from defendant Vicenta
F. Escao;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escao to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of P25,000
for damages and attorneys' fees;

(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escao and the estate of his wife, the
deceased Mena Escao, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.

Neither party to recover costs.

G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985

ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,

vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National
Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\

In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set aside the Orders, dated
September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No. 1075-P, issued by respondent Judge, which denied
her Motion to Dismiss said case, and her Motion for Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order, respectively.

The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen
of the United States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage, they established their
residence in the Philippines; that they begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975,
respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married
also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.

Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for
short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that
business, and that private respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved
to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce
proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no
community property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case
on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in
the case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.

Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory and is not subject to appeal. certiorari
and Prohibition are neither the remedies to question the propriety of an interlocutory order of the trial Court.
However, when a grave abuse of discretion was patently committed, or the lower Court acted capriciously and
whimsically, then it devolves upon this Court in a certiorari proceeding to exercise its supervisory authority and to
correct the error committed which, in such a case, is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition would then lie
since it would be useless and a waste of time to go ahead with the proceedings. 2 Weconsider the petition filed in
this case within the exception, and we have given it due course.

For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal property in the
Philippines.

Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal property because of
the representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the American Court that they had no community of
property; that the Galleon Shop was not established through conjugal funds, and that respondent's claim is
barred by prior judgment.

For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the
prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign Court
cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain
matters within its jurisdiction.

For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property relations between petitioner
and private respondent, after their marriage, were upon absolute or relative community property, upon complete
separation of property, or upon any other regime. The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the
parties.

The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared in
person before the Court during the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who,
giving his address as No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco, California, authorized his attorneys in the divorce
case, Karp & Gradt Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the understanding that there
were neither community property nor community obligations. 3 As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he
executed in favor of the law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent him in the
divorce proceedings:

xxx xxx xxx

You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer, appear on my
behalf and do an things necessary and proper to represent me, without further contesting,
subject to the following:

1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.

2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.

3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.

xxx xxx xxx 4

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The
decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue
petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not
valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5 only Philippine nationals
are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public
police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law. 6 In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private
respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:

The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of
competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and
wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie when thus severed as to one party,
ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the
law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty. that the guilty party shall not marry
again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former
marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he
is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose
decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his
right over the alleged conjugal property.

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to
private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be
just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to
private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property.
She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the Complaint filed in
Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.

Without costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989

IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,

vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD
GEILING, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:

An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a foreign absolute divorce, only to be followed
by a criminal infidelity suit of the latter against the former, provides Us the opportunity to lay down a decisional
rule on what hitherto appears to be an unresolved jurisdictional question.

On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich
Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at
Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple
lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20,
1980. 1

Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, followed by a separation de
facto between them.

After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in private respondent
initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January,
1983. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April, 1982. 2

Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where the same is still pending as Civil Case
No. 83-15866. 3

On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a
decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to
petitioner. The records show that under German law said court was locally and internationally competent for the
divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage was legally founded on and authorized by the
applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction. 4

On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed two
complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent,
petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus
Chua sometime in 1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A. de los Reyes, Jr., after the corresponding investigation,
recommended the dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. 5 However, upon review, the
respondent city fiscal approved a resolution, dated January 8, 1986, directing the filing of two complaints for
adultery against the petitioner. 6 The complaints were accordingly filed and were eventually raffled to two
branches of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The case entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and
William Chia", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52435, was assigned to Branch XXVI presided by the
respondent judge; while the other case, "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and James Chua", docketed
as Criminal Case No. 87-52434 went to the sala of Judge Leonardo Cruz, Branch XXV, of the same court. 7

On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking that the aforesaid resolution of
respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases against her be dismissed. 8 A similar petition was filed by James
Chua, her co-accused in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. The Secretary of Justice, through the Chief State
Prosecutor, gave due course to both petitions and directed the respondent city fiscal to inform the Department of
Justice "if the accused have already been arraigned and if not yet arraigned, to move to defer further
proceedings" and to elevate the entire records of both cases to his office for review. 9

Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to suspend further
proceedings thereon. 10 As a consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended proceedings in Criminal Case No.
87-52434. On the other hand, respondent judge merely reset the date of the arraignment in Criminal Case No.
87-52435 to April 6, 1987. Before such scheduled date, petitioner moved for the cancellation of the arraignment
and for the suspension of proceedings in said Criminal Case No. 87-52435 until after the resolution of the petition
for review then pending before the Secretary of Justice. 11 A motion to quash was also filed in the same case on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction, 12 which motion was denied by the respondent judge in an order dated
September 8, 1987. The same order also directed the arraignment of both accused therein, that is, petitioner and
William Chia. The latter entered a plea of not guilty while the petitioner refused to be arraigned. Such refusal of
the petitioner being considered by respondent judge as direct contempt, she and her counsel were fined and the
former was ordered detained until she submitted herself for arraignment. 13 Later, private respondent entered a
plea of not guilty. 14

On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a
temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash.
The petition is anchored on the main ground that the court is without jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge of
adultery, which is a private offense that cannot be prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported complainant, a
foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law
prior to his filing the criminal complaint." 15

On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from
implementing the aforesaid order of September 8, 1987 and from further proceeding with Criminal Case No. 87-
52435. Subsequently, on March 23, 1988 Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoez acted on the aforesaid
petitions for review and, upholding petitioner's ratiocinations, issued a resolution directing the respondent city
fiscal to move for the dismissal of the complaints against the petitioner. 16

We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall accordingly issue.

Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against
chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long
since been established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not
merely a formal, requirement. 18 While in point of strict law the jurisdiction of the court over the offense is vested
in it by the Judiciary Law, the requirement for a sworn written complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate since it
is that complaint which starts the prosecutory proceeding 19 and without which the court cannot exercise its
jurisdiction to try the case.

Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who can legally
file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the offenses of seduction, abduction,
rape and acts of lasciviousness, no provision is made for the prosecution of the crimes of adultery and
concubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian of the offended party. The so-called exclusive and
successive rule in the prosecution of the first four offenses above mentioned do not apply to adultery and
concubinage. It is significant that while the State, as parens patriae, was added and vested by the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure with the power to initiate the criminal action for a deceased or incapacitated victim in the
aforesaid offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, in default of her parents,
grandparents or guardian, such amendment did not include the crimes of adultery and concubinage. In other
words, only the offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to initiate the action therefor.

Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that
such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal
action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a
motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition.

The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not mean that the same
requirement and rationale would not apply. Understandably, it may not have been found necessary since criminal
actions are generally and fundamentally commenced by the State, through the People of the Philippines, the
offended party being merely the complaining witness therein. However, in the so-called "private crimes" or those
which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, and the present prosecution for adultery is of such genre, the offended
spouse assumes a more predominant role since the right to commence the action, or to refrain therefrom, is a
matter exclusively within his power and option.

This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in
silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial. 20 Hence, as cogently argued by petitioner, Article 344
of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the
institution of the criminal action for, adultery. This is a logical consequence since the raison d'etre of said
provision of law would be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged
offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case. 21
In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to commence the
action be definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such status or capacity must indubitably exist as of
the time he initiates the action. It would be absurd if his capacity to bring the action would be determined by his
status before or subsequent to the commencement thereof, where such capacity or status existed prior to but
ceased before, or was acquired subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the institution of the case. We
would thereby have the anomalous spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time when he is without the legal
capacity to do so.

To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on the specific issue as to when
precisely the status of a complainant as an offended spouse must exist where a criminal prosecution can be
commenced only by one who in law can be categorized as possessed of such status. Stated differently and with
reference to the present case, the inquiry ;would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal
action for adultery that the marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at
the time of the institution of the action by the former against the latter.

American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari materia with ours, yields
the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute
proceedings against the offenders where the statute provides that the innocent spouse shall have the exclusive
right to institute a prosecution for adultery. Where, however, proceedings have been properly commenced, a
divorce subsequently granted can have no legal effect on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a
conclusion. 22

In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that

'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the complaint of the husband or
wife.' Section 4932, Code. Though Loftus was husband of defendant when the offense is said
to have been committed, he had ceased to be such when the prosecution was begun; and
appellant insists that his status was not such as to entitle him to make the complaint. We have
repeatedly said that the offense is against the unoffending spouse, as well as the state, in
explaining the reason for this provision in the statute; and we are of the opinion that the
unoffending spouse must be such when the prosecution is commenced. (Emphasis supplied.)

We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our jurisdiction, considering
our statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We are convinced that in cases of such nature, the status of the
complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person
who initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the
accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint.

In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic
of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private
respondent is concerned 23 in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons.

Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a divorce was granted by a United States
court between Alice Van Dornja Filipina, and her American husband, the latter filed a civil case in a trial court
here alleging that her business concern was conjugal property and praying that she be ordered to render an
accounting and that the plaintiff be granted the right to manage the business. Rejecting his pretensions, this
Court perspicuously demonstrated the error of such stance, thus:

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the
United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For
instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union.
...

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according
to their national law. ...

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner.
He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to
exercise control over conjugal assets. ... 25
Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had
no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the
time he filed suit.

The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the decree of divorce for
lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this case. When said respondent
initiated the divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no longer be a family nor marriage vows to
protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would there be a danger of introducing spurious
heirs into the family, which is said to be one of the reasons for the particular formulation of our law on
adultery, 26 since there would thenceforth be no spousal relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital
bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not
affect or cast obloquy on the other.

The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by private respondent. In
applying Article 433 of the old Penal Code, substantially the same as Article 333 of the Revised Penal Code,
which punished adultery "although the marriage be afterwards declared void", the Court merely stated that "the
lawmakers intended to declare adulterous the infidelity of a married woman to her marital vows, even though it
should be made to appear that she is entitled to have her marriage contract declared null and void, until and
unless she actually secures a formal judicial declaration to that effect". Definitely, it cannot be logically inferred
therefrom that the complaint can still be filed after the declaration of nullity because such declaration that the
marriage is void ab initio is equivalent to stating that it never existed. There being no marriage from the
beginning, any complaint for adultery filed after said declaration of nullity would no longer have a leg to stand on.
Moreover, what was consequently contemplated and within the purview of the decision in said case is the
situation where the criminal action for adultery was filed before the termination of the marriage by a judicial
declaration of its nullity ab initio. The same rule and requisite would necessarily apply where the termination of
the marriage was effected, as in this case, by a valid foreign divorce.

Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta, hereinbefore cited, 27 must suffer the same
fate of inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case reveals that the offended spouse therein had duly and
seasonably filed a complaint for adultery, although an issue was raised as to its sufficiency but which was
resolved in favor of the complainant. Said case did not involve a factual situation akin to the one at bar or any
issue determinative of the controversy herein.

WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET ASIDE and another one
entered DISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary
restraining order issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 124862 December 22, 1998

FE D. QUITA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN, * respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on 18 May 1941. They were
not however blessed with children. Somewhere along the way their relationship soured. Eventually Fe sued
Arturo for divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. She submitted in the divorce proceedings a private writing
dated 19 July 1950 evidencing their agreement to live separately from each other and a settlement of their
conjugal properties. On 23 July 1954 she obtained a final judgment of divorce. Three (3) weeks thereafter she
married a certain Felix Tupaz in the same locality but their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A.,
she married for the third time, to a certain Wernimont.

On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of letters of administration concerning the estate of Arturo in
favor of the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan (also referred to as Blandina Padlan),
claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and
Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan, named in the children of Arturo Padlan opposed the petition and prayed for the
appointment instead of Atty. Leonardo Casaba, which was resolved in favor of the latter. Upon motion of the
oppositors themselves, Atty. Cabasal was later replaced by Higino Castillon. On 30 April 1973 the oppositors
(Blandina and Padlan children) submitted certified photocopies of the 19 July 1950 private writing and the final
judgment of divorce between petitioner and Arturo. Later Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming to be the sole surviving
brother of the deceased Arturo, intervened.

On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the immediate declaration of heirs of the decedent and the distribution of
his estate. At the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987, private respondent as well as the six (6) Padlan
children and Ruperto failed to appear despite due notice. On the same day, the trial court required the
submission of the records of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after which,
with or without the documents, the issue on the declaration of heirs would be considered submitted for resolution.
The prescribed period lapsed without the required documents being submitted.

The trial court invoking Tenchavez v. Escao 1 which held that "a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens sought
and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386) was not entitled to recognition as valid in
this jurisdiction," 2 disregarded the divorce between petitioner and Arturo. Consecuently, it expressed the view
that their marriage subsisted until the death of Arturo in 1972. Neither did it consider valid their extrajudicial
settlement of conjugal properties due to lack of judicial approval. 3 On the other hand, it opined that there was no
showing that marriage existed between private respondent and Arturo, much less was it shown that the alleged
Padlan children had been acknowledged by the deceased as his children with her. As regards Ruperto, it found
that he was a brother of Arturo. On 27 November 1987 4 only petitioner and Ruperto were declared the intestate
heirs of Arturo. Accordingly, equal adjudication of the net hereditary estate was ordered in favor of the two
intestate heirs. 5

On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the Padlan children were allowed to present proofs that the
recognition of the children by the deceased as his legitimate children, except Alexis who was recognized as his
illegitimate child, had been made in their respective records of birth. Thus on 15 February 1988 6 partial
reconsideration was granted declaring the Padlan children, with the exception of Alexis, entitled to one-half of the
estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and petitioner to the other half. 7 Private respondent was not declared
an heir. Although it was stated in the aforementioned records of birth that she and Arturo were married on 22
April 1947, their marriage was clearly void since it was celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage
to petitioner.

In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, Blandina and her children assigned as one of the errors allegedly
committed by the trial court the circumstance that the case was decided without a hearing, in violation of Sec. 1,
Rule 90, of the Rules of Court, which provides that if there is a controversy before the court as to who are the
lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law,
the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.

Respondent appellate court found this ground alone sufficient to sustain the appeal; hence, on 11 September
1995 it declared null and void the 27 November 1987 decision and 15 February 1988 order of the trial court, and
directed the remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings. 8 On 18 April 1996 it denied
reconsideration. 9

Should this case be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings? Petitioner insists that there is no need
because, first, no legal or factual issue obtains for resolution either as to the heirship of the Padlan children or as
to the decedent; and, second, the issue as to who between petitioner and private respondent is the proper hier of
the decedent is one of law which can be resolved in the present petition based on establish facts and admissions
of the parties.

We cannot sustain petitioner. The provision relied upon by respondent court is clear: If there is
a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive
shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary
cases.

We agree with petitioner that no dispute exists either as to the right of the six (6) Padlan children to inherit from
the decedent because there are proofs that they have been duly acknowledged by him and petitioner herself
even recognizes them as heirs of Arturo Padlan; 10 nor as to their respective hereditary shares. But controversy
remains as to who is the legitimate surviving spouse of Arturo. The trial court, after the parties other than
petitioner failed to appear during the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987 of the motion for immediate
declaration of heirs and distribution of estate, simply issued an order requiring the submission of the records of
birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or without the documents,
the issue on declaration of heirs would be deemed submitted for resolution.
We note that in her comment to petitioner's motion private respondent raised, among others, the issue as to
whether petitioner was still entitled to inherit from the decedent considering that she had secured a divorce in the
U.S.A. and in fact had twice remarried. She also invoked the above quoted procedural rule. 11 To this, petitioner
replied that Arturo was a Filipino and as such remained legally married to her in spite of the divorce they
obtained. 12Reading between the lines, the implication is that petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time
of her divorce from Arturo. This should have prompted the trial court to conduct a hearing to establish her
citizenship. The purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the truth of the matters in issue with the aid of documentary
and testimonial evidence as well as the arguments of the parties either supporting or opposing the evidence.
Instead, the lower court perfunctorily settled her claim in her favor by merely applying the ruling in Tenchavez v.
Escao.

Then in private respondent's motion to set aside and/or reconsider the lower court's decision she stressed that
the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the ruling in Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. 13 that aliens may
obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law. She prayed therefore that the case be set for hearing. 14 Petitioner opposed the motion but failed to
squarely address the issue on her citizenship. 15 The trial court did not grant private respondent's prayer for a
hearing but proceeded to resolve her motion with the finding that both petitioner and Arturo were "Filipino citizens
and were married in the Philippines." 16 It maintained that their divorce obtained in 1954 in San Francisco,
California, U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine jurisdiction. We deduce that the finding on their citizenship pertained
solely to the time of their marriage as the trial court was not supplied with a basis to determine petitioner's
citizenship at the time of their divorce. The doubt persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their
divorce was decreed. The trial court must have overlooked the materiality of this aspect. Once proved that she
was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner
could very well lose her right to inherit from Arturo.

Respondent again raised in her appeal the issue on petitioner's citizenship; 17 it did not merit enlightenment
however from petitioner. 18 In the present proceeding, petitioner's citizenship is brought anew to the fore by
private respondent. She even furnishes the Court with the transcript of stenographic notes taken on 5 May 1995
during the hearing for the reconstitution of the original of a certain transfer certificate title as well as the issuance
of new owner's duplicate copy thereof before another trial court. When asked whether she was an American
citizen petitioner answered that she was since 1954. 19 Significantly, the decree of divorce of petitioner and Arturo
was obtained in the same year. Petitioner however did not bother to file a reply memorandum to erase the
uncertainty about her citizenship at the time of their divorce, a factual issue requiring hearings to be conducted by
the trial court. Consequently, respondent appellate court did not err in ordering the case returned to the trial court
for further proceedings.

We emphasize however that the question to be determined by the trial court should be limited only to the right of
petitioner to inherit from Arturo as his surviving spouse. Private respondent's claim to heirship was already
resolved by the trial court. She and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while the prior marriage of petitioner
and Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous marriage considered void from the beginning under
Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code. Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this
status presupposes a legitimate relationship. 20

As regards the motion of private respondent for petitioner and a her counsel to be declared in contempt of court
and that the present petition be dismissed for forum shopping, 21 the same lacks merit. For forum shopping to
exist the actions must involve the same transactions and same essential facts and circumstances. There must
also be identical causes of action, subject matter and issue. 22 The present petition deals with declaration of
heirship while the subsequent petitions filed before the three (3) trial courts concern the issuance of new owner's
duplicate copies of titles of certain properties belonging to the estate of Arturo. Obviously, there is no reason to
declare the existence of forum shopping.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals ordering the remand of the
case to the court of origin for further proceedings and declaring null and void its decision holding petitioner Fe D.
Quita and Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate heirs is AFFIRMED. The order of the appellate court modifying its
previous decision by granting one-half (1/2) of the net hereditary estate to the Padlan children, namely, Claro,
Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, with the exception of Alexis, all surnamed Padlan, instead of Arturo's
brother Ruperto Padlan, is likewise AFFIRMED. The Court however emphasizes that the reception of evidence
by the trial court should he limited to the hereditary rights of petitioner as the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan.

The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel in contempt of court and to dismiss the present petition for
forum shopping is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.