SPS.
BUENAVENTURA JAYME AND ROSARIO JAYME, petitioners,
vs.
RODRIGO APOSTOL, FIDEL LOZANO, ERNESTO SIMBULAN,
MAYOR FERNANDO Q. MIGUEL, MUNICIPALITY OF KORONADAL
(NOW CITY OF KORONADAL), PROVINCE OF SOUTH COTABATO,
represented by the MUNICIPAL TREASURER and/or MUNICIPAL
MAYOR FERNANDO Q. MIGUEL, and THE FIRST INTEGRATED
BONDING AND INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., respondents.
G.R. No. 163609 [November 27, 2008]
FACTS:
On February 5, 1989, Mayor Miguel of Koronadal, South Cotabato was
on board the Isuzu pick-up truck driven by Fidel Lozano, an employee
of the Municipality of Koronadal. The pick-up truck was registered under
the name of Rodrigo Apostol, but it was then in the possession of
Ernesto Simbulan. Lozano borrowed the pick-up truck from Simbulan to
bring Miguel to Buayan Airport at General Santos City to catch his
Manila flight.
The pick-up truck accidentally hit Marvin C. Jayme, a minor, who was
then crossing the National Highway in South Cotabato. The intensity of
the collision sent Marvin some 50 meters away from the point of impact,
a clear indication that Lozano was driving at a very high speed at the
time of the accident. Marvin sustained severe head injuries. Despite
medical attention, Marvin expired six (6) days after the accident.
ISSUE:
MAY a municipal mayor be held solidarily liable for the negligent acts of
the driver assigned to him
MAY an LGU be held liable for the tortuous act of a government
employee.
RULING:
1. It is uncontested that Lozano was employed as a driver by the
municipality. That he was subsequently assigned to Mayor Miguel
during the time of the accident is of no moment. The Municipality of
Koronadal remains to be Lozanos employer notwithstanding Lozanos
assignment to Mayor Miguel. Even assuming arguendo that Mayor
Miguel had authority to give instructions or directions to Lozano, he still
cannot be held liable. In Benson v. Sorrell, the New England Supreme
Court ruled that mere giving of directions to the driver does not
establish that the passenger has control over the vehicle. Neither does
it render one the employer of the driver.
Mayor Miguel was neither Lozanos employer nor the vehicles
registered owner. There existed no causal relationship between him
and Lozano or the vehicle used that will make him accountable for
Marvins death. Mayor Miguel was a mere passenger at the time of the
accident.
2. The municipality may not be sued because it is an agency of the
State engaged in governmental functions and, hence, immune from
suit. This immunity is illustrated in Municipality of San Fernando, La
Union v. Firme, where the Court held that municipal corporations are
suable because their charters grant them the competence to sue and
be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed
by them in the discharge of governmental functions and can only be
held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in
proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued, the State
merely gives the claimant the right to show that the defendant was not
acting in governmental capacity when the injury was committed or that
the case comes under the
exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover.
Liability attaches to the registered owner, the negligent driver and his
direct employer. Settled is the rule that the registered owner of a vehicle
is jointly and severally liable with the driver for damages incurred by
passengers and third persons as a consequence of injuries or death
sustained in the operation of said vehicles. Regardless of who the
actual owner of the vehicle is, the operator of record continues to be the
operator of the vehicle as regards the public and third persons, and as
such is directly and primarily responsible for the consequences incident
to its operation.
The petition is DENIED.
Roble Arrastre, Inc. v. Hon. Villaflor, et al.
G.R. No. 128509, 22 August 2006
Facts: Petitioner Roble Arrastre, Inc. is a cargo handling service
operator, authorized by the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) to provide
and render arrastre and stevedoring services at the Municipal Port of
Hilongos, Leyte, and on all vessels berthed thereat, from September
1992 to September 1993.
In December 1993, pending final consideration of petitioners
application for renewal with the PPA Office, Manila, the PPA through its
Port Manager Salvador L. Reyna of the Tacloban Port Management
Office issued a 90-day holdover authority to petitioner. Stated therein
was the proviso that notwithstanding the 90day period aforementioned,
the authority shall be deemed ipso facto revoked if an earlier
permit/contract for cargo handling services is granted or sooner
withdrawn or cancelled for cause pursuant to PPA Administrative Order
No. 1081. Meanwhile, petitioner filed with respondent mayor an
application for the renewal of its business permits, which, in turn, was
denied. Petitioner thus filed for a petition for mandamus with preliminary
injunction, and enjoined respondent mayor to issue the business
license sought.
On the other hand, the respondent mayor averred that the remedy of
mandamus does not lie as the issuance of the permit sought is not a
ministerial function, but one that requires sound judgment and
discretion. In denying petitioners application, respondent mayor invoked
Municipal Resolution No. 9327, passed by the Sangguniang Bayan of
Hilongos, Leyte which prohibits any party which likewise operates
shipping lines plying the route of Cebu to Hilongos and vice versa, from
engaging in arrastre and stevedoring services at the port of Hilongos.
Issue: Is respondent mayors issuance of the permit a discretionary
duty?
Held: Yes.
It can be deduced from Section 444(b)(3)(iv) of the Local Government
Code that the limits in the exercise of the power of a municipal mayor to
issue licenses and permits, and suspend or revoke the same can be
contained in a law or ordinance The said section is pursuant to Section
16 of the LGC, known as the general welfare clause, which
encapsulates the delegated police power to local government units.
Thus, under the LGC, the municipal mayor has the power to issue
licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any violation
of the conditions upon which said licenses or permits had been issued,
pursuant to law or ordinance.
1

The pursuit of its duty under the police power necessarily entails
exercise of official discretion in order for any local officials to ascertain
which will better serve their constituents who elected them into office.
Full discretion must necessarily be granted them to perform their
functions and it will not be sound logic to simply make them perform
purely ministerial functions. And when the discharge of an official duty
requires the exercise of official discretion or judgment, it is never a
ministerial one.
Furthermore, where the only power given to a municipal corporation or
official is to issue license, as in Section 444 of the Local Government
Code, it is clearly regulatory in nature rather than a revenue raising one.
Conclusively, regulation being the object of the power to issue license
and permits the exercise of discretion by the issuing authority becomes
an inescapable prerogative. This could be the very same reason why
business permits and licenses are renewed almost annually in order
that the licensing officials in carrying out their functions could examine
and evaluate availing circumstances and conditions and with the
exercise of discretion determine whether to grant or deny the
application or, to revoke a license or permit already issued. It should
also be understood that a municipal license is not a property such that it
is revocable when public interest so requires.
However, the fact that there only was the Resolution No. 93-27, and no
ordinance nor law, petitioners cause still cannot prosper because the
proper action is certiorari to determine whether grave of abuse of
discretion had been committed, and not mandamus.
MANUEL ZAMORA VS. GOV. JOSE CABALLERO, ET AL.
G.R. No. 147767. January 14, 2002
Facts: Manuel Zamora, a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Compostela Valley, filed before the RTC a petition to invalidate all acts
executed and resolutions issued by the Sanggunian during its sessions
held on February 8 and 26, 2001 for lack of quorum. Said sessions
noted the resignation letter of Board Member Sotto, declared the entire
province under a state of calamity and approved the Governor to enter
into the contract with the Allado Company. Zamora, the petitioner,
argued that the Sanggunian, during its February 26 session, conducted
official business without a quorum since only 7 out of the 14 members
were present. He further questioned the February 8 sessions validity
arguing that only 7 members were present and the failure to provide
written notice to all members at least 24 hours before the holding of the
special session. Respondents argued that Board Member Sotto was in
the United States during such sessions and that the actual number of
Board Members in the country was only 13 which, they claimed, should
be the basis for the determination of a quorum. Such petition raised by
Zamora was dismissed by the RTC but reversed and granted by the
Supreme Court.
Issues: 1) Whether or not Section 53 (a) of the LGC provides and
specifies applicable rule regarding the determination of a quorum.
2) Whether or not Sanggunian Members who are abroad should not be
included in the counting of the entire Sangguniang body.
3) Whether or not the approved decisions during the sessions, alleged
to be without quorum, is deemed to be valid.
2
Held: Section 53 (a) of the LGC states that : A majority of all members
of the Sanggunian who have been elected and qualified shall constitute
a quorum to transact official business. Quorum is defined as the
number of members of a body which, when legally assembled, will
enable the body to transact its proper business or that number which
makes a lawful body and gives it power to pass upon a law or
ordinance or do any valid act. When required to constitute a quorum,
majority means the number greater than half or more than half of the
total.
As further stated, it requires the majority of ALL members of the
Sanggunian. Quorum should, thus, be based on the total number of
members regardless of whether or not a member is said to be abroad.
Therefore, in cases where decisions have been made during sessions
deemed to have not met the required quorum, such sessions and
decisions shall be considered void.
BATANGAS CATV, INC. vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE
BATANGAS CITY SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD and BATANGAS
CITY MAYOR [G.R. No. 138810. September 29, 2004]
FACTS:
On July 28, 1986, respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted
Resolution No. 210 granting petitioner a permit to construct, install, and
operate a CATV system in Batangas City. Section 8 of the Resolution
provides that petitioner is authorized to charge its subscribers the
maximum rates specified therein, provided, however, that any increase
of rates shall be subject to the approval of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod.
Sometime in November 1993, petitioner increased its subscriber rates
from P88.00 to P180.00 per month. As a result, respondent Mayor
wrote petitioner a letter threatening to cancel its permit unless it secures
the approval of respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod, pursuant to
Resolution No. 210.
Petitioner then filed with the RTC, Branch 7, Batangas City, a petition
for injunction alleging that respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod has no
authority to regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators
because under Executive Order No. 205, the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC) has the sole authority to
regulate the CATV operation in the Philippines.
ISSUE :
may a local government unit (LGU) regulate the subscriber rates
charged by CATV operators within its territorial jurisdiction?
HELD: No.
xxx
The logical conclusion, therefore, is that in light of the above laws and
E.O. No. 436, the NTC exercises regulatory power over CATV
operators to the exclusion of other bodies.
xxx
Like any other enterprise, CATV operation maybe regulated by LGUs
under the general welfare clause. This is primarily because the CATV
system commits the indiscretion of crossing public properties. (It uses
public properties in order to reach subscribers.) The physical realities of
constructing CATV system the use of public streets, rights of ways,
the founding of structures, and the parceling of large regions allow an
LGU a certain degree of regulation over CATV operators.
xxx
But, while we recognize the LGUs power under the general welfare
clause, we cannot sustain Resolution No. 210. We are convinced that
respondents strayed from the well recognized limits of its power. The
flaws in Resolution No. 210 are: (1) it violates the mandate of existing
laws and (2) it violates the States deregulation policy over the CATV
industry.
LGUs must recognize that technical matters concerning CATV
operation are within the exclusive regulatory power of the NTC.
Raul Villegas vs Valentino Legaspi
January 4, 2012 No comments
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113 SCRA 39 Political Law The Legislative Department
Appearance in Court by a Congressman
This case is a consolidation of two cases involving the issue of whether
or not a member of Congress may appear before the regular courts as
counsel for ordinary litigants.
Case 1
In September 1979, Raul Villegas filed a civil case against spouses
Vera Cruz et al before the Court of First Instance (CFI) Cebu. The Vera
Cruz spouses filed their answer to the complaint and they were
represented by Valentino Legaspi, then a member of the Batasang
Pambansa. Villegas then challenged the representation made by
Legaspi as counsel for the spouses on the ground that it is
unconstitutional; as pointed out by Villegas no member of the
Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel before any court without
appellate jurisdiction. The presiding judge however overruled Villegas
challenged and proceeded with the trial. The judge said that CFIs have
appellate jurisdiction.
Case 2
In July 1979, Edgardo Reyes filed a civil case against N. V. Verenigde
Buinzenfabrieken Excelsior-De Maas, a corporation, before CFI Rizal.
Estanisalo Fernandez appeared as counsel for the corporation. Reyes
questions the appearance of Fernandez as counsel for the corporation
on the same ground invoked in Case 1 because Fernandez is also a
member of the Batasang Pambansa.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said members, Estanislao Fernandez and
Valentino Legaspi, of the Batasang Pambansa may appear as counsels
before the said CFIs.
3
HELD: No. Members of Congress are prohibited to appear as counsel
berfore CFIs acting in their original jurisdiction. CFIs have dual
personalities. They can be courts of general original jurisdiction (courts
of origin) or appellate courts depending on the case that they took
cognizance of. In the cases at bar, CFI Cebu and CFI Rizal acted as a
courts of general original jurisdiction. Both cases were not elevated to
the said CFIs from any lower courts. Thus, the CFIs in the case at bar
are courts without appellate jurisdiction.
Read full text
NOTE: Under Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution:
No Senator or member of the House of Representatives may personally
appear as counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral
Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither
shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract
with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government,
or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any
government-owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during
his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office
of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called
upon to act on account of his office.
Appearance of the legislator is now barred before all courts of justice,
regardless of rank, composition, or jurisdiction. The disqualification also
applies to the revived Electoral Tribunal and to all administrative bodies,
like the Securities and Exchange Commission and the National Labor
Relations Commission. Courts martial and military tribunals, being
administrative agencies, are included. (From
https://www.senate.gov.ph/senators/terms.asp, accessed 09/17/2014)
Herminio Noriega vs Atty. Emmanuel Sison
September 5, 2012 No comments
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125 SCRA 293 Legal Ethics Isolated Practice of Law
In 1981, Noriega filed a disbarment case against Sison. Noriega alleged
that Sison as a hearing officer of the Securities and Exchange
Commission is not allowed to engage in the private practice of law; yet
Noriega alleged that Sison has created another identity under the name
Manuel Sison in order for him to engage in private practice and
represent one Juan Sacquing before a trial court in Manila.
Sison, in his defense, argued that he is in fact representing Juan
Sacquing but the same is with the permission of the SEC
Commissioner; that he never held himself out to the public as a
practicing lawyer; that he provided legal services to Sacquing in view of
close family friendship and for free; that he never represented himself
deliberately and intentionally as Atty. Manuel Sison in the Manila
JDRC where, in the early stages of his appearance, he always signed
the minutes as Atty. Emmanuel R. Sison, and in one instance, he
even made the necessary correction when the court staff wrote his
name as Atty. Manuel Sison; that due to the inept and careless work
of the clerical staff of the JDRC, notices were sent to Atty. Manuel
Sison,
ISSUE: Whether or not the disbarment case should prosper.
HELD: No. The arguments of presented by Sison is well merited and
backed by evidence. The allegations in the complaint do not warrant
disbarment of the Sison. There is no evidence that Sison has
committed an act constituting deceit, immoral conduct, violation of his
oath as a lawyer, willful disobedience of any lawful order of the court, or
corruptly and willfully appearing as an attorney to a part to a case
without attorney to do so. His isolated appearance for Sacquing does
not constitute private practice of law, more so since Sison did not derive
any pecuniary gain for his appearance because Sison and Sacquing
were close family friends. Such act of Sison in going out of his way to
aid as counsel to a close family friend should not be allowed to be used
as an instrument of harassment against him.
Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board, G.R. No. 157870
(and other consolidated petitions), November 3, 2008
DECISION
(En Banc)
VELASCO, J.:
I. THE FACTS
These consolidated petitions challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 36
of R.A. 9165, the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar
as it requires mandatory drug testing of (1) candidates for public office;
(2) students of secondary and tertiary schools; (3) officers and
employees of public and private offices; and (4) persons charged before
the prosecutors office of a crime with an imposable penalty of
imprisonment of not less than 6 years and 1 day.
The challenged section reads:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. Authorized drug testing shall be
done by any government forensic laboratories or by any of the drug
testing laboratories accredited and monitored by the DOH to safeguard
the quality of the test results. x x x The drug testing shall employ,
among others, two (2) testing methods, the screening test which will
determine the positive result as well as the type of drug used and the
confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening test. x x x The
following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools. Students of secondary
and tertiary schools shall, pursuant to the related rules and regulations
as contained in the school's student handbook and with notice to the
parents, undergo a random drug testing x x x;
(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. Officers and
employees of public and private offices, whether domestic or overseas,
shall be subjected to undergo a random drug test as contained in the
company's work rules and regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing
the risk in the workplace. Any officer or employee found positive for
4
use of dangerous drugs shall be dealt with administratively which shall
be a ground for suspension or termination, subject to the provisions of
Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil
Service Law;
xxx xxx xxx
(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with a criminal
offense having an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than
six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory drug test;
(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in
the national or local government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.
Sec. 36(g) is implemented by COMELEC Resolution No. 6486.
II. THE ISSUES
1. Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486
impose an additional qualification for candidates for senator?
Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications for
candidates for senator in addition to those laid down by the
Constitution?
2. Are paragraphs (c), (d), and (f) of Sec. 36, RA 9165
unconstitutional?
III. THE RULING
[The Court GRANTED the petition in G.R. No. 161658 and declared
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 as
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. It also PARTIALLY GRANTED the petition in
G.R. Nos. 157870 and 158633 by declaring Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA
9165 CONSTITUTIONAL, but declaring its Sec. 36(f)
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Court thus permanently enjoined all the
concerned agencies from implementing Sec. 36(f) and (g) of RA 9165.]
1. YES, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486
impose an additional qualification for candidates for senator; NO,
Congress CANNOT enact a law prescribing qualifications for
candidates for senator in addition to those laid down by the
Constitution.
In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 6486 illegally impose an additional qualification on
candidates for senator. He points out that, subject to the provisions on
nuisance candidates, a candidate for senator needs only to meet the
qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1)
citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency.
Beyond these stated qualification requirements, candidates for senator
need not possess any other qualification to run for senator and be voted
upon and elected as member of the Senate. The Congress cannot
validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it
cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional
mandate, or alter or enlarge the Constitution.
Pimentels contention is well-taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165
should be, as it is hereby declared as, unconstitutional.
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed
COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges the qualification
requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. As
couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires a candidate for senator
to be certified illegal-drug clean, obviously as a pre-condition to the
validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a
condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed
as senator-elect. The COMELEC resolution completes the chain with
the proviso that [n]o person elected to any public office shall enter
upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug
test. Viewed, therefore, in its proper context, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165
and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add another qualification
layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires for
membership in the Senate. Whether or not the drug-free bar set up
under the challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after election
is really of no moment, as getting elected would be of little value if one
cannot assume office for non-compliance with the drug-testing
requirement.
2. NO, paragraphs (c) and (d) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 are NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL; YES, paragraphs (f) thereof is
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
As to paragraph (c), covering students of secondary and tertiary
schools
Citing the U.S. cases of Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton and
Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of
Pottawatomie County, et al. v. Earls, et al., the Court deduced and
applied the following principles: (1) schools and their administrators
stand in loco parentis with respect to their students; (2) minor students
have contextually fewer rights than an adult, and are subject to the
custody and supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools; (3)
schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and
well-being of their students and may adopt such measures as may
reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty; and (4) schools have
the right to impose conditions on applicants for admission that are fair,
just, and non-discriminatory.
Guided by Vernonia, supra, and Board of Education, supra, the Court is
of the view and so holds that the provisions of RA 9165 requiring
mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are
constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of educational
institutions to require, as a condition for admission, compliance with
reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. To be sure, the
right to enrol is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and
equitable requirements.
As to paragraph (d), covering officers and employees of public and
private offices
As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is
couched and as has been held, reasonableness is the touchstone of
the validity of a government search or intrusion. And whether a search
at issue hews to the reasonableness standard is judged by the
balancing of the government-mandated intrusion on the individual's
privacy interest against the promotion of some compelling state interest.
In the criminal context, reasonableness requires showing of probable
cause to be personally determined by a judge. Given that the drug-
testing policy for employeesand students for that matterunder RA
9165 is in the nature of administrative search needing what was
referred to in Vernonia as swift and informal disciplinary procedures,
the probable-cause standard is not required or even practicable. Be that
5
as it may, the review should focus on the reasonableness of the
challenged administrative search in question.
The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature
of the privacy interest upon which the drug testing, which effects a
search within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution, intrudes.
In this case, the office or workplace serves as the backdrop for the
analysis of the privacy expectation of the employees and the
reasonableness of drug testing requirement. The employees' privacy
interest in an office is to a large extent circumscribed by the company's
work policies, the collective bargaining agreement, if any, entered into
by management and the bargaining unit, and the inherent right of the
employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in the workplace. Their
privacy expectation in a regulated office environment is, in fine,
reduced; and a degree of impingement upon such privacy has been
upheld.
Just as defining as the first factor is the character of the intrusion
authorized by the challenged law. Reduced to a question form, is the
scope of the search or intrusion clearly set forth, or, as formulated in
Ople v. Torres, is the enabling law authorizing a search "narrowly
drawn" or "narrowly focused"?
The poser should be answered in the affirmative. For one, Sec. 36 of
RA 9165 and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR), as couched,
contain provisions specifically directed towards preventing a situation
that would unduly embarrass the employees or place them under a
humiliating experience. While every officer and employee in a private
establishment is under the law deemed forewarned that he or she may
be a possible subject of a drug test, nobody is really singled out in
advance for drug testing. The goal is to discourage drug use by not
telling in advance anyone when and who is to be tested. And as may be
observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165 itself prescribes what, in Ople, is a
narrowing ingredient by providing that the employees concerned shall
be subjected to random drug test as contained in the companys work
rules and regulations x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the work
place.
For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken under
conditions calculated to protect as much as possible the employee's
privacy and dignity. As to the mechanics of the test, the law specifies
that the procedure shall employ two testing methods, i.e., the screening
test and the confirmatory test, doubtless to ensure as much as possible
the trustworthiness of the results. But the more important consideration
lies in the fact that the test shall be conducted by trained professionals
in access-controlled laboratories monitored by the Department of
Health (DOH) to safeguard against results tampering and to ensure an
accurate chain of custody. In addition, the IRR issued by the DOH
provides that access to the drug results shall be on the need to know
basis; that the drug test result and the records shall be [kept]
confidential subject to the usual accepted practices to protect the
confidentiality of the test results. Notably, RA 9165 does not oblige the
employer concerned to report to the prosecuting agencies any
information or evidence relating to the violation of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act received as a result of the operation of the drug
testing. All told, therefore, the intrusion into the employees privacy,
under RA 9165, is accompanied by proper safeguards, particularly
against embarrassing leakages of test results, and is relatively minimal.
Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation
of privacy on the part of the employees, the compelling state concern
likely to be met by the search, and the well-defined limits set forth in the
law to properly guide authorities in the conduct of the random testing,
we hold that the challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited
context of the case, reasonable and, ergo, constitutional.
Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and
employees also labor under reasonable supervision and restrictions
imposed by the Civil Service law and other laws on public officers, all
enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the public service. And
if RA 9165 passes the norm of reasonableness for private employees,
the more reason that it should pass the test for civil servants, who, by
constitutional command, are required to be accountable at all times to
the people and to serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency.
: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. THE
SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION) and ALEJANDRO A.
VILLAPANDO, Respondents.
Double Jeopardy
Requisites
G.R. No. 164185 July 23, 2008
FACTS:
During the May 11, 1998 elections, Villapando ran for Municipal Mayor
of San Vicente, Palawan. Orlando M. Tiape, a relative of Villapandos
wife, ran for Municipal Mayor of Kitcharao, Agusan del Norte.
Villapando won while Tiape lost. Thereafter, on July 1, 1998, Villapando
designated Tiape as Municipal Administrator of the Municipality of San
Vicente, Palawan.
On February 2000, Solomon B. Maagad and Renato M. Fernandez
charged Villapando and Tiape for violation of Article 244 of the Revised
Penal Code before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon.
The complaint was resolved against Villapando and Tiape and the two
were charged for violation of Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code with
the Sandiganbayan.
Upon arraignment on September 3, 2002, Villapando pleaded not guilty.
Meanwhile, the case against Tiape was dismissed after the prosecution
proved his death which occurred on July 26, 2000. Villapando filed his
Demurrer to Evidence the Sandiganbayan found with merit and
acquitted him of the crime charged.
The Ombudsman filed a petition through the Office of the Special
Prosecutor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Villapando can be prosecuted despite of his acquittal
before the Sandiganbayan.
RULING:
Yes, because the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Although this Court held that once a court grants the demurrer to
evidence, such order amounts to an acquittal and any further
prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional proscription
on double jeopardy, this Court held in the same case that such ruling on
the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of
discretion.
6
The Office of the Ombudsman argues that the Sandiganbayan, Fourth
Division acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction because its interpretation of Article 244 of the
Revised Penal Code does not complement the provision on the one-
year prohibition found in the 1987 Constitution and the Local
Government Code, particularly Section 6, Article IX of the 1987
Constitution which states no candidate who has lost in any election
shall, within one year after such election, be appointed to any office in
the government or any government-owned or controlled corporation or
in any of their subsidiaries. Section 94(b) of the Local Government
Code of 1991, for its part, states that except for losing candidates in
barangay elections, no candidate who lost in any election shall, within
one year after such election, be appointed to any office in the
government or any government-owned or controlled corporation or in
any of their subsidiaries. Petitioner argues that the court erred when it
ruled that temporary prohibition is not synonymous with the absence of
lack of legal qualification.
The Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division held that the qualifications for a
position are provided by law and that it may well be that one who
possesses the required legal qualification for a position may be
temporarily disqualified for appointment to a public position by reason of
the one-year prohibition imposed on losing candidates. However, there
is no violation of Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code should a person
suffering from temporary disqualification be appointed so long as the
appointee possesses all the qualifications stated in the law.
In this case, the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, in disregarding basic
rules of statutory construction, acted with grave abuse of discretion. Its
interpretation of the term legal disqualification in Article 244 of the
Revised Penal Code defies legal cogency. Legal disqualification cannot
be read as excluding temporary disqualification in order to exempt
therefrom the legal prohibitions under the 1987 Constitution and the
Local Government Code of 1991.
Grave abuse of discretion generally refers to capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse
of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to
act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.
FRIVALDO VS COMELEC
Posted by kaye lee on 10:58 PM
G.R. No. 87193, 23 June 1989 [Naturalization; Reacquisition]
FACTS:
Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor of the province of Sorsogon
and assumed office in due time. The League of Municipalities filed with
the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo on the ground
that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United
States.
Frivaldo admitted the allegations but pleaded the special and affirmative
defenses that he was naturalized as American citizen only to protect
himself against President Marcos during the Martial Law era.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Frivaldo is a Filipino citizen.
RULING:
No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified
voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines,
this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V,
Section 1, of the Constitution.
He claims that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of valid
repatriation. He claims that by actively participating in the local
elections, he automatically forfeited American citizenship under the
laws of the United States of America. The Court stated that that the
alleged forfeiture was between him and the US. If he really wanted to
drop his American citizenship, he could do so in accordance with CA
No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD 725. Philippine citizenship
may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by
repatriation.
Categories: Citizenship, Constitutional Law 1
REPUBLIC VS DELA ROSA
Posted by kaye lee on 12:16 AM
G.R. No. 104654, 6 June 1994 [Citizenship; Naturalization;
Naturalization Proceedings; C.A. No. 473]
FACTS:
September 20, 1991 - Frivaldo filed a petition for naturalization under
the Commonwealth Act No. 63 before the RTC Manila.
October 7, 1991 - Judge dela Rosa set the petition for hearing on
March 16, 1992, and directed the publication of the said order and
petition in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation,
for 3 consecutive weeks, the last publication of which should be at least
6 months before the date of the said hearing.
January 14, 1992 - Frivaldo asked the Judge to cancel the March 16
hearing and move it to January 24, 1992, citing his intention to run for
public office in the May 1992 elections. Judge granted the motion and
the hearing was moved to February 21. No publication or copy was
issued about the order.
February 21, 1992 - the hearing proceeded.
February 27, 1992 - Judge rendered the assailed Decision and held
that Frivaldo is readmitted as a citizen of the Republic of the Philippines
by naturalization.
Republic of the Philippines filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Revised Rules of Court in relation to R.A. No. 5440 and Section 25
of the Interim Rules, to annul the decision made on February 27, 1992
and to nullify the oath of allegiance taken by Frivaldo on same date.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Frivaldo was duly re-admitted to his citizenship as a
Filipino.
RULING:
No. The supreme court ruled that Private respondent is declared NOT a
citizen of the Philippines and therefore disqualified from continuing to
serve as governor of the Province of Sorsogon. He is ordered to vacate
his office and to surrender the same to the Vice-Governor of the
Province of Sorsogon once this decision becomes final and executory.
The proceedings of the trial court was marred by the following
irregularities:
(1) the hearing of the petition was set ahead of the scheduled date of
hearing, without a publication of the order advancing the date of
hearing, and the petition itself;
7
(2) the petition was heard within six months from the last publication of
the petition;
(3) petitioner was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before the
finality of the judgment; and
(4) petitioner took his oath of allegiance without observing the two-year
waiting period.
CAYAT V. COMELEC G.R. No. 163776 April 24, 2007
FACTS:
Fr.Nardo Cayat and Thomas Palileng are the only mayoralty candidates
for the May 2004 elections in Buguias Benguet.
Palileng filed a petition for cancellation of the COC of Cayat on the
ground of misrepresentation. Palileng argues that Cayat misrepresents
himself when he declared in his COC that he is eligible to run as mayor
when in fact he is not because he is serving probation after being
convicted for the offense of acts of lasciviousness.
Comelec, granted the petition of Palileng and Cayat filed a motion for
reconsideration. Such, MR was denied because Cayat failed to pay the
filing fee and hence, it was declared final and executory.
Despite this decision, Cayat was still proclaimed as the winner and
Palileng filed a petition for annulment of proclamation. Comelec
declared Palileng as the duly elected mayor and Feliseo Bayacsan as
the duly elected vice mayor.
Bayacsan argues that he should be declared as mayor because of the
doctrine of rejection of second placer.
ISSUE:
WON the rejection of second placer doctrine is applicable.
HELD:
The doctrine cannot be applied in this case because the disqualification
of Cayat became final and executory before the elections and hence,
there is only one candidate to speak of.
The law expressly declares that a candidate disqualified by final
judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him
shall not be counted. As such, Palileng is the only candidate and the
duly elected mayor.
The doctrine will apply in Bayacsans favor, regardless of his
intervention in the present case, if two conditions concur: (1) the
decision on Cayats disqualification remained pending on election day,
10 May 2004, resulting in the presence of two mayoralty candidates for
Buguias, Benguet in the elections; and (2) the decision on Cayats
disqualification became final only after the elections.
Rivera III vs. Comelec
Facts:
In the May 2004 elections, respondent Marino "Boking" Morales ran as
candidate for mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga for the term 2004-2007.
Petitioner Dee filed with the COMELEC a petition to cancel Morales
Certificate of Candidacy on the ground that he was elected and had
served three previous consecutive terms as mayor of Mabalacat. They
alleged that his candidacy violated Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution and Section 43 (b) of RA 7160.
Respondent Morales admitted that he was elected mayor of Mabalacat
for the term 1995-1998 (first term) and 2001-2004 (third term), but he
served the second term from 1998-2001 only as a "caretaker of the
office" or as a "de facto officer" since his proclamation as mayor was
declared void by the Regional Trial Court (RTC). He was also
preventively suspended by the Ombudsman in an anti--graft case from
January to July 1999.
Issue:
1. Has Morales already served his 3 consecutive term?
2. If so, who should then take his position?
Held:
1. For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to
apply, two conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the
official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the
same local government post, and (2) that he has fully served three
consecutive terms.
Respondent Morales was elected for the term 1998-2001. He assumed
the position. He was mayor for the entire period notwithstanding the
Decision of the RTC in the electoral protest case filed by petitioner Dee
ousting him (Morales) as mayor (because the trial courts ruling was
promulgated only after the expiry of the 1998-2001 term). Respondent
Morales is now serving his fourth term. He has been mayor of
Mabalacat continuously without any break since 1995. In just over a
month, by June 30, 2007, he will have been mayor of Mabalacat for
twelve (12) continuous years. His assumption of office for the second
term constituted service for the full term and should be counted as a
full term served in contemplation of the three--term limit prescribed by
the constitutional and statutory provisions barring local elective officials
from being elected and serving for more than three consecutive terms
for the same position.
The framers of the Constitution, by including this exception, wanted to
establish some safeguards against the excessive accumulation of
power as a result of consecutive terms. Therefore, having found
respondent Morales ineligible, his Certificate of Candidacy dated
December 30, 2003 should be cancelled. Not being a candidate, the
votes cast for him SHOULD NOT BE COUNTED and must be
considered stray votes.
2. The question now is whether it is the vice-mayor or petitioner Dee
who shall serve for the remaining portion of the 2004 to 2007 term. In
Labo v. Comelec, this Court has ruled that a second place candidate
cannot be proclaimed as a substitute winner, thus:
The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority
votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest
number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated
candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.
8
As a consequence of petitioners ineligibility, a permanent vacancy in
the contested office has occurred. This should now be filled by the vice-
mayor in accordance with Section 44 of the Local Government Code, to
wit:
Sec. 44. Permanent vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-
Governor, Mayor and Vice-Mayor. (a) If a permanent vacancy occurs
in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or the vice-
mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. (Rivera III vs.
Comelec, G.R. No. 167591. May 9, 2007)
Jalosjos v. COMELEC Case Digest [G.R. No. 191970 April 24, 2012]
FACTS:
Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City. He Migrated to
Australia and acquired Australian citizenship. On November 22, 2008,
at age 35, he returned to the Philippines and lived with his brother in
Barangay Veterans Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Upon his return,
he took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and was
issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship. He then
renounced his Australian citizenship in September 2009.
He acquired residential property where he lived and applied for
registration as voter in the Municipality of Ipil. His application was
opposed by the Barangay Captain of Veterans Village, Dan Erasmo, sr.
but was eventually granted by the ERB.
A petition for the exclusion of Jalosjos' name in the voter's list was then
filed by Erasmo before the MCTC. Said petition was denied. It was then
appealed to the RTC who also affirmed the lower court's decision.
On November 8, 2009, Jalosjos filed a Certificate of Candidacy for
Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay Province. Erasmo filed a petition to
deny or cancel said COC on the ground of failure to comply with R.A.
9225 and the one year residency requirement of the local government
code.
COMELEC ruled that Jalosjos failed to comply with the residency
requirement of a gubernatorial candidate and failed to show ample
proof of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil. COMELEC
en banc affirmed the decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that Jalosjos failed
to present ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile
in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
RULING:
The Local Government Code requires a candidate seeking the position
of provincial governor to be a resident of the province for at least one
year before the election. For purposes of the election laws, the
requirement of residence is synonymous with domicile, meaning that a
person must not only intend to reside in a particular place but must also
have personal presence in such place coupled with conduct indicative
of such intention.
The question of residence is a question of intention. Jurisprudence has
laid down the following guidelines: (a) every person has a domicile or
residence somewhere; (b) where once established, that domicile
remains until he acquires a new one; and (c) a person can have but one
domicile at a time.
It is inevitable under these guidelines and the precedents applying them
that Jalosjos has met the residency requirement for provincial governor
of Zamboanga Sibugay.
Quezon City was Jalosjos domicile of origin, the place of his birth. It
may be taken for granted that he effectively changed his domicile from
Quezon City to Australia when he migrated there at the age of eight,
acquired Australian citizenship, and lived in that country for 26 years.
Australia became his domicile by operation of law and by choice.
When he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his
brother in Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that Jalosjos did so with
intent to change his domicile for good. He left Australia, gave up his
Australian citizenship, and renounced his allegiance to that country. In
addition, he reacquired his old citizenship by taking an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in his being
issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the
Bureau of Immigration. By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to
live in Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his domicile there. And
he has since lived nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
To hold that Jalosjos has not establish a new domicile in Zamboanga
Sibugay despite the loss of his domicile of origin (Quezon City) and his
domicile of choice and by operation of law (Australia) would violate the
settled maxim that a man must have a domicile or residence
somewhere.
The COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos has not come to settle his
domicile in Ipil since he has merely been staying at his brothers house.
But this circumstance alone cannot support such conclusion. Indeed,
the Court has repeatedly held that a candidate is not required to have a
house in a community to establish his residence or domicile in a
particular place. It is sufficient that he should live there even if it be in a
rented house or in the house of a friend or relative. To insist that the
candidate own the house where he lives would make property a
qualification for public office. What matters is that Jalosjos has proved
two things: actual physical presence in Ipil and an intention of making it
his domicile.
Further, it is not disputed that Jalosjos bought a residential lot in the
same village where he lived and a fish pond in San Isidro, Naga,
Zamboanga Sibugay. He showed correspondences with political
leaders, including local and national party-mates, from where he lived.
Moreover, Jalosjos is a registered voter of Ipil by final judgment of the
Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga Sibugay.
While the Court ordinarily respects the factual findings of administrative
bodies like the COMELEC, this does not prevent it from exercising its
review powers to correct palpable misappreciation of evidence or wrong
or irrelevant considerations. The evidence Jalosjos presented is
sufficient to establish Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, as his domicile. The
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in holding otherwise.
Jalosjos won and was proclaimed winner in the 2010 gubernatorial race
for Zamboanga Sibugay. The Court will respect the decision of the
people of that province and resolve all doubts regarding his qualification
in his favor to breathe life to their manifest will.
9
Court GRANTED the petition and SET ASIDE the Resolution of the
COMELEC.
LABO vs. COMELEC Case Digest
LABO vs. COMELEC
176 SCRA 1
Facts: Petitioner Ramon Labo, elected mayor of Baguio City was
questioned on his citizenship. He was married in the Philippines to an
Australian citizen. The marriage was declared void in the Australian
Federal Court in Sydney on the ground that the marriage had been
bigamous. According to Australian records, Labo is still an Australian
citizen.
Issue: Whether or not Petitioner Labo is a citizen of the Philippines.
Held: The petitioners contention that his marriage to an Australian
national in 1976 did not automatically divest him of Philippine
citizenship is irrelevant. There is no claim or finding that he
automatically ceased to be a Filipino because of that marriage. He
became a citizen of Australia because he was naturalized as such
through a formal and positive process, simplified in his case because
he was married to an Australian citizen. As a condition for such
naturalization, he formally took the Oath of Allegiance and/or made the
Affirmation of Allegiance, renouncing all other allegiance. It does not
appear in the record, nor does the petitioner claim, that he has
reacquired Philippine citizenship.
Ramon Labo, Jr. vs COMELEC [211 SCRA 297;GR 105111, July 3,
1992]
Posted by Pius Morados on November 6, 2011
(Municipal Corporation, Disqualification, 2nd Highest Number of Votes)
Facts: For the second time around, believing that he is a Filipino ctizen,
Ramon Labo, Jr filed his COC for mayor of Baguio City on March 23,
1992 for the May 11, 1992 elections. Petitioner Roberto Ortega on other
hand, also filed his COC for the same office on March 25, 1992.
On March 26, 1992, petitioner Ortega filed a disqualification proceeding
against Labo before the COMELEC on the ground that Labo is not a
Filipino citizen.
On May 9, 1992, respondent Comelec issued the assailed resolution
denying Labos COC.
On May 10, 1992, respondent Comelec issued an Order which reads:
Acting on the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Clarification, filed by
respondent (Labo) on May 9, 1992, the Commission resolves that the
decision promulgated on May 9, 1992 disqualifying respondent Ramon
L. Labo, Jr., shall become final and executory only after five (5) days
from promulgation pursuant to Rule 18, Section 13, Paragraph (b) of
the Comelec Rules of Procedure.
Accordingly, respondent (Labo) may still continue to be voted upon as
candidate for City Mayor of Baguio City on May 11, 1992 subject to the
final outcome of this case in the event the issue is elevated to the
Supreme Court either on appeal or certiorari.

On May 13, 1992, respondent Comelec resolved, motu proprio to
suspend the proclamation of Labo in the event he wins in the elections
for the City Mayor of Baguio.
On May 15, 1992, petitioner Labo filed the instant petition for review
with prayer, among others, for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order to set aside the May 9, 1992 resolution of respondent Comelec; to
render judgment declaring him as a Filipino citizen; and to direct
respondent Comelec to proceed with his proclamation in the event he
wins in the contested elections.
Petitioner Ortega argues that respondent Comelec committed grave
abuse of discretion when it refused to implement its May 9, 1992
resolution notwithstanding the fact that said resolution disqualifying
Labo has already become final and executory.
Petitioner Ortega submits that since this Court did not issue a
temporary restraining order as regards the May 9, 1992 resolution of
respondent Comelec cancelling Labos certificate of candidacy, said
resolution has already become final and executory. Ortega further
posits the view that as a result of such finality, the candidate receiving
the next highest number of votes should be declared Mayor of Baguio
City.
Sec. 78 of the Omnibus Election Code provides: Petition to deny due
course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
(e) The decision, order, or ruling of the Commission shall, after five (5)
days from receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, be final and
executory unless stayed by the Supreme Court.
Issue:
WON Petitioner Labo who had the highest number of votes is qualified
to assume as Mayor of Baguio City.
WON disqualification of petitioner Labo entitles the candidate (Ortega)
receiving the next highest number of votes to be proclaimed as the
winning candidate for mayor of Baguio City.
Held:
First Issue:
No. At the time petitioner Labo filed his petition on May 15, 1992, the
May 9, 1992 resolution of respondent Comelec cancelling his (Labos)
certificate of candidacy had already become final and executory a day
earlier, or on May 14, 1992, said resolution having been received by
petitioner Labo on the same day it was promulgated, i.e., May 9, 1992
and in the interim no restraining order was issued by this Court.
The resolution cancelling Labos certificate of candidacy on the ground
that he is not a Filipino citizen having acquired finality on May 14, 1992
constrains the SC to rule against his proclamation as Mayor of Baguio
City.
Sec. 39 of the LGC provides that an elective local official must be a
citizen of the Philippines. Undoubtedly, petitioner Labo, not being a
Filipino citizen, lacks the fundamental qualification for the contested
office. Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding
an elective office. The fact that he was elected by the majority of the
electorate is of no moment.
10
Second Issue:
No. The disqualification of petitioner Labo does not necessarily entitle
petitioner Ortega as the candidate with the next highest number of
votes to proclamation as the Mayor of Baguio City.
While Ortega may have garnered the second highest number of votes
for the office of city mayor, the fact remains that he was not the choice
of the sovereign will. Petitioner Labo was overwhelmingly voted by the
electorate for the office of mayor in the belief that he was then qualified
to serve the people of Baguio City and his subsequent disqualification
does not make respondent Ortega the mayor-elect.
Petitioner Ortega lost in the election. He was repudiated by the
electorate. He was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio
City.
Thus, while respondent Ortega (GR No. 105111) originally filed a
disqualification case with the Comelec (docketed as SPA-92-029)
seeking to deny due course to petitioners (Labos) candidacy, the same
did not deter the people of Baguio City from voting for petitioner Labo,
who, by then, was allowed by the respondent Comelec to be voted
upon, the resolution for his disqualification having yet to attain the
degree of finality (Sec. 78. Omnibus Election Code).
The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority
votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest
number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated
candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.
Note: Its useless to file for disqualification when the decision comes out
after the election.
DE LA TORRE vs COMELEC Case Digest
DE LA TORRE vs COMELEC
258 SCRA 483, 1996
Facts: Petitioner Rolando P. Dela Torre was disqualified by the
Commission on Elections from running for the position of Mayor of
Cavinti, Laguna in the May 8, 1995 elections. The ground cited by the
COMELEC was Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991.
Said section provides that those sentenced by final judgement for an
offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one
(1) year or more imprisonment within two (2) years after serving
sentence are disqualified from running for any elective local position. It
was established by the COMELEC that the petitioner was found guilty
by the Municipal Trial Court for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law. It was
contended by the petitioner that Section 40(a) is not applicable to him
because he was granted probation by the MTC.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the crime of fencing involves moral turpitude.
2. Whether or not a grant of probation affects Section 40(a)s
applicability.
Held: The Supreme Court held that actual knowledge by the fence of
the fact that property received is stolen displays the same degree of
malicious deprivation of ones rightful property as that which animated
the robbery or theft which, by their very nature, are crimes of moral
turpitude. Anent the second issue, suffice it to say that the legal effect
of probation is only to suspend the execution of the sentence.
Petitioners conviction of fencing which already declared as a crime of
moral turpitude and thus falling squarely under the disqualification
found in Section 40(a), subsists and remains totally unaffected
notwithstanding the grant of probation.
Mercado v. Manzano Case Digest [G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999]
FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both
candidates for Vice-Mayor of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.
Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered the highest
number of votes. However, his proclamation was suspended due to the
pending petition for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mercado on the
ground that he was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United
States.
From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano is both a Filipino
and a US citizen.
The Commission on Elections declared Manzano disqualified as
candidate for said elective position.
However, in a subsequent resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the
disqualification of the respondent was reversed. Respondent was held
to have renounced his US citizenship when he attained the age of
majority and registered himself as a voter in the elections of 1992, 1995
and 1998.
Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City
on August 31, 1998.
Thus the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public elective office
in the philippines.
RULING:
The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40
(d) and R.A. 7854 Sec. 20 must be understood as referring to dual
allegiance. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former
arises when, as a result of the application of the different laws of two or
more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the
said states. Dual allegiance on the other hand, refers to a situation in
which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to
two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance
is a result of an individual's volition. Article IV Sec. 5 of the Constitution
provides "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest
and shall be dealt with by law."
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore,
be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their
11
status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the
filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship
to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering
that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws
of different states.
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time
forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens
and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from
the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual
has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no
moment.
When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath
that he renounces his loyalty to any other country or government and
solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied with.
The determination whether such renunciation is valid or fully complies
with the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within the province
and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter should apply
the law duly enacted by the legislative department of the Republic. No
foreign law may or should interfere with its operation and application.
The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of respondent
sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any
disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. By declaring in his
certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a
permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend
and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and
allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation,
private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are
concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything
which he may have said before as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the
Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth
and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an
artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of
his election of Philippine citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his
undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are
enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship
through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-
Santiago, the court sustained the denial of entry into the country of
petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized
citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and
declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a
Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one
who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality,
but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his
Philippine citizenship.
The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Jacot vs. Dal
Jacot vs. Dal
Petitioner Nestor Jacot assails the Resolution of COMELEC
disqualifying him from running for the position of Vice-Mayor of
Catarman, Camiguin, in the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections,
on the ground that he failed to make a personal renouncement of US
citizenship. He was a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who
became a naturalized citizen of the US on 13 December 1989. He
sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No.
9225.

ISSUE: Did Nestor Jacot effectively renounce his US citizenship so as

to qualify him to run as a vice-mayor?

HELD: No. It bears to emphasize that the oath of allegiance is a general

requirement for all those who wish to run as candidates in Philippine
elections; while the renunciation of foreign citizenship is an additional
requisite only for those who have retained or reacquired Philippine
citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 and who seek elective public
posts, considering their special circumstance of having more than one
citizenship.

DE GUZMAN VS COMELEC
G.R. NO. 180048 JUNE 19, 2009

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order assails the June 15, 2007 Resolution of the
First Division of COMELEC, disqualifying ROSELLER DE GUZMAN
from running as vice-mayor in the May 14, 2007 elections.
Petitioner was a naturalized American. However, on January 25, 2006,
he applied for dual citizenship under RA
9225. Upon approval of his application, he took his oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines on September 6, 2006. Having
reacquired Philippine citizenship, he is entitled to exercise full civil and
political rights. As such, qualified to run as vice-mayor of Guimba,
Nueva Ecija.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is disqualified from running for vice-mayor of

Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2007 elections for having failed to
renounce his American Citizenship in accordance with RA 9225.

HELD:

We find that petitioner is disqualified from running for public office in

view of his failure to renounce his American citizenship. RA 9225 was
enacted to allow reacquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship for:
Natural born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by
reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country;
Natural born citizens of the Philippines who after the effectivity of the
law, becomes citizens of a foreign country.
The law provides that they are not deemed to have reacquired or
retained their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance.
Petitioners oath of allegiance and certificate of candidacy did not
comply with section(5)2 of RA 9225 which further requires those
seeking elective public office in the Philippines to make a personal and
sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship. Petitioner failed to renounce
his American citizenship; as such, he is disqualified from running for
vice mayor.

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