Richard of St.

Victors Theory of Imagination

Investigating Medieval Philosophy

Managing Editor

John Marenbon

Editorial Board

Margaret Cameron
Simo Knuuttila
Martin Lenz
Christopher J. Martin

VOLUME 8

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Richard of St. Victors Theory
of Imagination

By

Ritva Palmn

LEIDEN | BOSTON
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Palmn, Ritva, author.

Richard of St. Victors theory of imagination / by Ritva Palmn.
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Contents

Acknowledgementsvii

1 Introduction1

2 Imagination in Classical and Medieval Thought13

2.1 Antiquity13
2.2 Christian Neoplatonism24
2.3 The Middle Ages to the 1100s34

3 The Fundamentals of Richards Anthropology

3.1 Richards Theological Anthropology50
3.2 The Rational Power of the Soul: Sensus, Imaginatio, Ratio, and
Intelligentia58
3.3 The Affective Power of the Soul 65
3.4 Richards Theological Method70

4 The Role of Imagination as the Soul Prepares for Contemplation82

4.1 Introduction to Benjamin Minor82
4.2 Imagination in Benjamin Minor88
4.3 Three Modes of Imagination in Benjamin Minor92
4.3.1 Bala-Imagination92
4.3.2 Two Forms of the Rational Imagination101
4.3.3 Dan-Imagination105
4.3.4 Naphtali-Imagination112
4.4 Guarding the Inner City of the Soul124

5 Imagination in the First Two Kinds of Contemplation134

5.1 Introduction to Benjamin Major134
5.2 Three Ways of Knowing: Cogitation, Meditation, Contemplation137
5.3 Richards Idea of Contemplation143
5.4 The First Kind of Contemplation152
5.5 The Second Kind of Contemplation167

6 The Third Kind of Contemplation179

6.1 Introduction179
6.2 The Objects of Contemplation in the Third Kind of Contemplation:
Similitudes (Similitudines)181
vi contents

6.3 The Inner and Outer Person201

6.4 The Transition from Visible to Invisible in Benjamin Major,
Benjamin Minor, and In Apocalypsim Joannis211

7 Imagination at the Uppermost Stages of Contemplation223

7.1 Is There Any Role for Imagination After the Third Kind of
Contemplation?223
7.2 The Three Heavens231
7.3 Imagination as an Object of Contemplation235

8 Conclusion255

Bibliography267
Index292
Acknowledgements

The great medieval teacher and scholar Hugh of St. Victor wrote: Please! Spare
yourself for my sakethere is only drudgery in those papers! Go run in the
open air! (Didascalicon III, 7). While conducting this study, I have at times
similarly wondered if I should indeed run around in the open air and leave the
efforts of this research behind. Even though I have occasionally lacked confi-
dence in this project and my own skills, a great many friends and colleagues
have helped and encouraged me to continue this work, and it is a pleasure for
me to record my debts to them here.
As a student, the first one to inspire me to continue my studies in medieval
scholarship was Tuomas M.S. Lehtonen who invited me to participate in his
research group and impressed me by his enduring curiosity about historical
phenomena and human thinking. He taught me many important things about
academic life, good food and friendship. His support, enthusiasm and motiva-
tion has been unfailing and surprised me time and again during these past
years of leisure and labour.
My warmest gratitude goes to my supervisor Simo Knuuttila, who has
patiently read and commented on various versions of the study, encouraged
and benevolently guided me through this long process. His erudition has been
unrivalled. I realize how fortunate I have been.
Toivo Holopainen has made many useful suggestions, asked questions and
made remarks on several stages of my study. I deeply respect him for his learn-
ing and his precise reading of this work. At the final stage, my study has signifi-
cantly benefited from the important comments of Professor Lauge O. Nielsen
from University of Copenhagen. I am also grateful to John Marenbon and the
board of Investigating Medieval Philosophy for accepting to publish my book in
their series.
I would like to thank the staff and researchers in the faculty of systematic
theology in the University of Helsinki for their collegiality and long-lasting
friendship. I have been lucky to be able to work in this department, surrounded
by so many fine people. My gratitude goes equally to all of them. In particular,
I would like to thank Pauli Annala, Reijo Tyrinoja and Vesa Hirvonen, who all
guided me in the early stages of my work; Jaana Hallamaa for her extraordi-
nary, wonderful personality and company in Unisport, Pekka Krkkinen for
his generous advice on various topics; and Jussi Varkemaa for his practical
guidance and encouragement.
This work has been funded by the Academy of Finland research projects
Status, imaginatio and historia. Change, social hierarchy, human faculties and
viii acknowledgements

historiography in the Latin West and Byzantium (9501350) and Philosophical

Psychology, Morality and Politics Research Unit (pmp). I appreciate the opportu-
nity to finish the final version of the book as a member of the Academy of
Finlands Centre of Excellence Reason and Religious Recognition. I acknowl-
edge the organizations and the participants of these projects with gratitude.
A great many friends and relatives have offered enormous support and relief
for me and my family during this wonderful but challenging period of research.
I thank my parents, my adorable sisters and their families as well as my
parents-in-law and sisters-in-law. Mere words do not express the gratitude
I feel towards my spouse Lauri and our children Toivo, Elsa, Saimi, and Iines,
who all have shown me a great amount of tolerance and love. My best cre-
ations ever are our own children, being wonderfully down to earth with their
comments, needs and sincere attachment. They have guided me to venerate
the true value of life.
 Chapter 1

Introduction

The imagination forms an integral part of the human mind, allowing us to

picture all kinds of things in our minds, be they real or unreal. Richard of
St.Victor (d. 1173)1 wrote nearly a thousand years ago: For example, we have
seen gold and we have seen a house, but we have never seen a golden house.
However, if we wish, we can imagine a golden house.2 This simple illustration
of the operation of imagination is easy to understand and we can test it in our
own minds. The features of various images can be repeatedly removed, added,
and edited. Accordingly, the human mind may create such things as pictures of
a centaur, a quadruped black swan, or even the vast sea in a glass of water.3
In medieval culture, imagination was used to picture, make present, and
envision details of the texts: the colours and dimensions of things, the cloth-
ing, the bearing, actions, and the environment. In his famous book on medi-
eval learning and monasticism, The Love of Learning and the Desire for God,
Jean Leclerq praises medieval monastic theologians and monks for their vigor-
ous and lively ability to imagine. Leclerq considers that the monks had superb
abilities for utilizing carnal images, but this was done only in order to replace
them with the holy images. Leclerq calls this process the sanctification of
imagination.4 But did these theologians, as they were reading and interpreting
the biblical texts, writing spiritual treatises, or speculating on theological ques-
tions, consider that they were using their faculty or ability to imagine? In the
medieval theories of the human soul, the general attitude towards imagination
is usually unfavourable. However, closer examination reveals that there was a
variety of ideas and formulations concerning the human imaginative activities
in the Middle Ages. Some of these formulations harbour reservations about
imagination, whereas others assess imagination more positively.

1 Richards name in Latin is either Richardus de sancto Victore or Richardus S. Victoris.

Richards name is written in French as Richard de Saint-Victor, in German as Richard von
St.Victor and in Italian as Riccardo di S. Vittore.
2 bmin XVI, p. 132.1013: Verbi gratia: aurum uidimus, domum uidimus, auream autem domum
nunquam uidimus, auream tamen domum imaginari possumus, si uolumus.
3 Boethius discusses envisioning the centaur in his In Isagogen Porphyrii commenta II.1,
p. 164.810 (84C). The example of the sea comes from Augustines Epistula 7.3.6., and the
swan is in Augustines De Trinitate 11.10.17.
4 Leclerq 1982, 75. Leclerqs book was printed in 1957 as LAmour des lettres et le dsir de Dieu:
Initiation aux auteurs monastiques du moyen ge.

koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2014|doi 10.1163/9789004279452_002

2 Chapter 1

The twelfth-century ideas of the human imagination have not been

researched thoroughly thus far. The Theory of Imagination in Classical and
Medieval Thought written by Murray Wright Bundy as early as 1927 is the most
extensive study of this subject.5 Bundy also briefly examines the writings of
Richard of St. Victor (d. 1173). He considers Richards view on the imagination
as an interesting attempt to point out the necessity of its operation in relation
to rational thinking.6
Raymond DiLorenzo examines the concept of imagination (imaginatio) in
Richards treatise Benjamin Minor, claiming that Richards views about the
imagination deserve more attention and that they are surprisingly positive.7
Jean Chtillon, the well-known editor of Victorine works, analyses Richards
anthropology at a general level, assessing that the notion of the imagination
has an especially significant role in Richards philosophy of mind. However, his
own analysis regarding Richards theory of imagination remains brief. For the
present, no single study exists in which Richards ideas of the imagination are
thoroughly described and analysed.8 Neither has the influence of Richards
ideas on imagination been systematically researched.9

5 Bundy 1927. On the faculty of imagination in the Middle Ages in general, see Chenu 1946,
593602; Bautier 1988, 81104; Hamesse 1988, 153184. For imagination in the French and
English poetry of the Middle Ages, see Kelly 1978. In her book on the history of memory
(1992), Coleman also discusses related terms, such as imagination and phantasy. Summers
surveys the history of the imagination in his treatise concerning the senses from Antiquity up
to the 17th century; see Summers 1987. For the influential Arabic ideas of the imagination and
its reception in Western scholasticism see Harvey 1975, 4346; Davidson 1992, 95102; Black
1993, 224244; Black 2000, 5975; Hasse 2000, 127153; Michon 2001, 330334. See also the
general studies on imagination in Brann 1988; Kearney 1988; Cocking 1991.
6 Bundy 1927, 200207. Bundy does not consider the notion of imagination in Richards
Benjamin Major.
7 DiLorenzo 1982, 7799.
8 Chtillon 1988, 635636. Some researchers mention Richards analysis of the imagination; De
Bruyne 1946, 219236; Javelet 1967, 371374; Kearney 1988, 119123 and Cocking 1991, 147148. See
also Renevey on Richards ideas on the imagination and biblical exegesis. Renevey 2001, 921.
9 The possible impact of his theory of the imagination on Langlands Middle English Piers
Plowman (c. 1360c. 1387) has provoked some discussion. Richards Benjamin Minor had been
translated into Middle English by the middle of the fourteenth century and was probably
known by Langland, who describes the operation of the imagination extensively. His works
had a marked influence on theories concerning the concept of imagination in 19th-century
romanticism. See Jones 1914, 583588; Quirk 1954, 8183; Minnis 1981, 7576 and White 1986,
241247. Bundy also interestingly states that Richard has some impact on Dantes famous
work The Divine Comedy as well as Dantes own theory of the imagination. Bundy 1927, 230,
234, 239.
Introduction 3

The purpose of my work is to examine Richard of St. Victors views on the

imagination (imaginatio) as he understands its function as a psychological fac-
ulty.10 My study is related to the historical study of philosophical psychology,
the aims being to provide a systematic investigation of the main features of
Richards idea of the nature of the imagination and its relation to other cogni-
tive functions, to reveal his philosophical assumptions, and to analyse concep-
tual distinctions in his arguments.
Furthermore, my research assesses Richards view of the structure of being
as well as his general theological method in so far as they are relevant to his
understanding of the imagination. Richards writings build on Neoplatonic
dualism, which divides the hierarchy of being into two major levels: material
and spiritual. These two levels are hierarchically structured to form an orga-
nized ascending pattern from the lowest to the highest levels of being. This
hierarchy is revealed in various respects in the division between visible and
invisible reality and in the individual himself and his soul. This conception of
reality has some important effects on Richards psychology, spirituality, his
theory of language and signification, as well as on his theological method
at large.
The study also evaluates some main features of Richards spiritual thinking.
Richards dualist position makes the union between body and soul difficult to
understand and, like many contemporary writers, he attempts to find an
appropriate mediating entity between these two extremes. The unification of
disparate elements and levels is effected by finding appropriate mediating
terms through spiritual exercises. This endeavour is one of the main issues in
Richards spirituality.
The study considers the role of the imagination as a link between sensible
reality and the intellectual functions of the soul in Richards texts. In his
scheme, the lower levels of the human soul and their contact with the sensible
world receive much attention, as can be seen in his Benjamin Minor, which
mainly concerns the affective parts of the soul, the cultivation of virtues, and
sense perception and imagination. The highest functions of the soul are dealt
with only in the few last paragraphs of the work. The emphasis on sensible
reality is evident in various respects in the Benjamin Major as well. Even though

10 Note that in this study psychology means the theory of the soul and does not include
modern connotations. When referring to the ability of the human being to imagine pic-
tures in the mind, Richard uses the term imaginatio almost without exception. In
Benjamin Major, he utilizes the expressions phantasia and phantasma when he writes
about figurative material which is processed in the mind; see bmaj III, I, p. 55.1718, for
example.
4 Chapter 1

its main focus is the description of the levels of contemplation and its modes,
it deals comprehensively with the functioning of the lower parts of the soul,
particularly imagination and its significance. These two Benjamins contain
Richards main observations on the imagination and evaluation of its impor-
tance for mankind in general. Richard mentions imagination in his other
works only rarely.11
Richards Christian Neoplatonism derives from Hugh of St. Victor, whose
impact on Richards ideas is decisive in many respects. Apart from the logical
textbooks of Aristotle, Hugh was influenced by Augustine, Boethius, and
Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite. He claims that the human being is the mid-
dle point of creation, placed between the angelic invisible realities and the
visible reality, in both of which he participates.12 He elaborates this model in
his psychology and epistemology, dealing with such matters as imagination,
symbols, and the theory of signification. In this study, the importance of Hughs
ideas to Richards thinking on the human soul, spirituality and methods will be
under consideration. I shall also pay attention to Richards further develop-
ment of Hughs views.
Though Richard uses the notion of the imagination as well as other psycho-
logical and anthropological concepts of the time extensively, the imagination
is difficult to define on the basis of his own works, since he does not present an
unequivocal theory about the human mind or the powers of the soul. Richard
does not examine imagination in a scholarly fashion with clear definitions and
classifications either, preferring to describe its operation and the objects of its
attention. For this reason, the analysis of the contexts in which he utilizes this
concept is important in assessing Richards ideas.
In this study, my primary sources are Richards treatises Benjamin
Minor (bmin) and Benjamin Major (bmaj), both of which have been critically
edited and published in recent years.13 Benjamin Minor, probably completed in

11 Apart from Benjamin Minor and Major, one can find remarks on imagination (imaginatio)
in Mysticae adnotationes in Psalmos, pl 196, 276D; In Apocalypsim Joannis, pl 196, 704D;
De exterminatione mali et promotione boni, pl 196, 1079A, 1114A; De eruditione hominis inte-
rioris, pl 196, 1312A; Liber exceptionum I, I, cap. XXIII, p. 111.910; Exiit edictum III, p. 78.
910; Causam quam nesciebam VI, p. 214.169. I will explore this material when it is relevant
to understanding Richards theory of the imagination.
12 Kleinz 1944, 67. See Hugh of St. Victors De tribus diebus XIV, p. 31.488490 (822C): Homo
ergo, quasi in quodam medio collocatus, habet super se Deum, subter se mundum, et
corpore quidem deorsum mundo coniungitur, spiritu autem sursum ad Deum
subleuatur.
13 Marc-Aeilko Aris, Contemplatio: Philosophische Studium zum Traktat Benjamin Maior
des Richard von St. Victor, mit einer verbesserten Edition des Textes. Fuldaer Studien 6,
Introduction 5

the 1160s,14 is one of Richards best-known works. In medieval manuscripts,

Benjamin Minor is usually called De duodecim patriarchis, The Twelve
Patriarchs.15 Benjamin Minor, intended as a spiritual manual for novices, con-
sists of 87 chapters of varying length. Richard writes vivid and engaging
descriptions of the separate functions of the soul, illustrating their role in spiri-
tual life with numerous examples. Benjamin Minor ends with the descriptions
of ecstatic contemplation. A few years after completing this work, Richard
wrote a parallel work which is nowadays known as Benjamin Major.16 In the
oldest manuscripts, the title is De arca mystica, The Mystical Ark.17 Benjamin
Major is considerably more wide-ranging than Benjamin Minor, consisting of
five different books and several subsections. In Benjamin Major, the investiga-
tion of contemplation continues and is made fuller. Unlike Benjamin Minor,
Benjamin Major was written for readers who have already advanced further in
their spiritual lives. According to Bernard McGinn, Benjamin Major is the most
complete treatment of the forms of contemplation written in the twelfth cen-
tury. Some researchers have even regarded Benjamin Major as one of the most
valuable works of Western spirituality, even though, on Richards own testi-
mony, it has been doubted if he himself ever experienced the highest mode of
contemplation described in his works.18 In addition to spiritual matters, both

Frankfurt am Main 1996. Richard de Saint-Victor, Les douze patriarches ou Benjamin

Minor. Texte critique et traduction par Jean Chtillon et Monique Duchet-Suchaux; intro-
duction, notes et index par Jean Longre, Sources Chrtiennes 419, Paris 1997. Richards
writings have mainly been published in volume 196 of Patrologia Latina. For a list of
Richards works, their editions, and translations, see Longre 1997, 1217. See also Coolman
and Coulter 2011, 1619. For the grouping of manuscripts of Richards works, see
Cacciapuoti 1998, 4995.
14 It is difficult to define the chronology or the exact completion dates of Richards works.
See Chtillon 1952, 259260; Dumeige 1952, 168169; Coulter 2006, 248255.
15 Longre 1997, 1719. In the oldest manuscripts, the work is entitled Liber de duodecim
patriarchis. However, the complete title in Patrologia Latina is De preparatione animi ad
contemplationem liber dictus Beniamin Minor, as a consequence of which Benjamin Minor
has since become the established name of the work even though it is not its original name.
16 The exact completion date of the work is not known, but it is generally considered to have
been written after Benjamin Minor. Dumeige 1952, 169; Chtillon 1988; 615.
17 Patrologia Latina renders the title as Benjamin Major, which has an established position.
The complete title in Patrologia Latina is Benjamin Maior, De gratia contemplationis. The
subtitle represents the intentions of the work quite aptly. In the oldest manuscripts, the
titles De arca Moysi, De arca mystica, and De gratia contemplationis appear. See Chtillon
1988, 615. Chtillon (1952, 171) lists the most significant editions of the work.
18 McGinn 1995, 405406. See Richards personal remarks about his efforts in contemplation,
bmaj V, I, p. 123.2934; bmaj V, XIX, p. 148.2730. In Benjamin Major, the highest mode
6 Chapter 1

Benjamins contain descriptions of the human epistemological and psychologi-

cal processes. Thus their scope extends to more technical questions of the soul
and its parts, as well as to various objects of knowledge.19 In these works,
Richard presents his systematic, spiritual doctrine, which is based on psychol-
ogy, but aims to show the path to the highest mystical experience.
Our knowledge about Richards life is slight. He was probably born in
Scotland in the early part of the twelfth century. However, we know that he left
his native country and arrived in Paris, the leading scholarly and administra-
tive centre of that time, by 1140.20 There he settled into the flourishing monas-
tery of St. Victor, which had been established in 1108 and observed the
Augustinian rule.21 Richard succeeded in his studies and gained responsibility
in his community. It is likely that soon after his entrance he was teaching at the
external school of St. Victor.22 In 1159, he became sub-prior of the monastery,
and he was elected prior in 1162. In the same year, Ervisius was chosen as the
new abbot of the monastery. Ervisius was a difficult person who ignored the
rules of St. Victor and, after many conflicts, he was removed from his tasks by

of contemplation is the alienation of the mind (alienatio mentis) in ecstasy. bmaj V, V,

p. 129.
19 Ebner 1917, 5.
20 Richards short biography is included in Liber antiquitatum sancti Victoris, written by Jean
de Toulouse in the 1650s. In Patrologia Latina appears Richards opera omnia in which the
details of the biography are repeated; see pl 196, IXXIV. There is no certain information
concerning Richards native land. He has been considered as both Scottish and English,
Chtillon 1988, 594. The estimates of the time of his arrival at the monastery vary greatly.
In the opinion of Longre and Chtillon, he might have attended the last lectures of Hugh
of St. Victor in the 1140s; however, according to Ottaviano, Richard was familiar with
Hughs thinking only through written sources. Coulter considers that Richard arrived
at St. Victor sometime between 1145 and 1150. Ottaviano 1933, 414; Chtillon 1988, 595;
Longre 1997, 8; Coulter 2006, 246.
21 William Champeaux founded this community of canons regular in 1108. The communal
life of St. Victor was planned to strengthen the spiritual life among the secular canons at
Notre Dame. William also established a school of St. Victor, which was open to all stu-
dents. Concerning the foundations of the monastery of St. Victor, and its Augustinian rule
as well as its literary tradition, see especially Chtillon 1969, 5385; Bautier 1991, 2352;
Coulter 2006, 233240; Fassler 2011, 187206. For the Augustinian monasteries in general,
see Dickinson 1950. The library of the monastery of St. Victor was famous; unfortunately,
its catalogues have not been preserved. See Franklin for the history of the library,
1867/1968, 135185.
22 Chtillon suggests that Richard taught at the school for novices and was novice master.
Chtillon 1988, 596. For the duties of the master (magister), see Jaeger 1994, 248250.
Introduction 7

the order of Pope Alexander III in 1171.23 During this time, Richard had no
choice but to operate under the rule of Ervisius. Only in his few last years did
Richard enjoy a more peaceful life. He died in March 1173.24
Richard is one of the best-known theologians of the twelfth century. His
impact on the Western theology of spirituality is considerable, since he is reck-
oned as one of the leading theoreticians of the medieval theology of spiritual-
ity.25 Furthermore, some of Richards ideas on the theology of the Trinity are
often mentioned in later scholarly discussions in the Middle Ages.26 Richard
seems to have been well-informed about important theological innovations of
his time, although he was reluctant to participate in controversy.27 Modern
research has mainly explored the basics of his doctrine of the Trinity and his
spiritual literature, whereas his philosophical anthropology has not yet been
fully charted.28
Basically, Richards writings may be considered as Augustinian and his psy-
chological views as determined by Augustines idea of the active human soul
and divine illumination.29 Along with Augustines works, Richard was inspired
by Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagites writings and mystical theology, trans-
mitted through translations of John Scotus Eriugena and Hugh of St. Victors

23 On Ervisius, see Lohrmann 1991, 181193.

24 Chtillon 1988, 598.
25 In the thirteenth century, Richard was seen as a representative of the ideas of Pseudo-
Dionysius the Areopagite. In this respect, Bonaventure (d. 1274), Thomas Gallus (d. 1249),
and Jean Gerson (d. 1429) received significant influences from Richard. See Chtillon
1988, 611612. Emery 2003, 591593.
26 Richards writings on the Trinity are discussed by Bonaventure, Alexander of Hales,
Albertus Magnus, Henry of Ghent, and John Duns Scotus, among others. For the influence
of De Trinitate, see Coolman 2011, 4246.
27 See Den Bok 1996, 96, who also claims that as a theological author Richard was both con-
servative and creative in form and content.
28 Richards doctrine of the Trinity has been analysed by Salet 1959; Den Bok 1996;
Cacciapuoti 1998 and Evans 2011. For a survey of research into Richards trinitarian theol-
ogy, see Den Bok 1996, 8393. Richards theology of spirituality is discussed by Kirchberger
1957; Chase 1995 and Aris 1996. For an overview of Richards works, see Walker 1958 and
Chtillon 1988. Concerning Richards theory of the emotions, see Dumeige 1952; Van
t Spijker 1996, 147160 and Knuuttila 2004, 201204. Coulter aims to establish a more
holistic view of Richards works and method. Coulter 2006.
29 Augustines doctrine of divine illumination has been characterized as elusive and hard to
define. The light of God or Christ lightens the human mind in such a way that it discerns
the objects of intellectual vision, or more broadly, everything the human being under-
stands. See Matthews 2001, 180181.
8 Chapter 1

commentary on Dionysius Celestial Hierarchies. New translations of Aristotles

works were spreading during the latter part of the 12th century, but there is no
evidence of the direct presence of these translations in the Victorine surround-
ings during Richards lifetime. However, the Aristotelian dialectic was well-
covered in the several commentaries and manuals of dialectics at the
monastery of St. Victor. Furthermore, some peripatetic epistemological prin-
ciples were familiar to the Victorines through Boethius works, which were
extensively used in the teaching of the school.30 Richard also utilized Anselm
of Canterburys ideas in his Trinitarian works.31 However, the most enduring
influence on Richard comes from Hugh of St. Victor, whose impact on Richards
thinking is unrivalled. Peter Lombard studied at the school of St. Victor and
was Hughs pupil. He wrote his famous books of Sentences during the 1150s;
however, his impact on Richard is controversial.32 There is also some evidence
of Peter Abelards effect on Richards writings. As Luscombe puts it, Richard
shared with Abelard a concern to emphasize the value of a rational approach
to theology. This can be seen in De Trinitate, for instance, in which Richard
presents rational proofs of Gods existence and the Trinity.33 He asks for

30 As Fredborg shows, William Champeaux was familiar with Ciceronian tradition and
composed commentaries on both Ciceros De inventione and Rhetorica ad Herennium.
Fredborg 1976, 139. Iwakuma has studied Williams series of glosses on Aristotles
Categories and Periermeneias as well as Porphyrys Isagoge. Iwakuma 1993, 4750.
Iwakuma claims that Williams Introductiones is one of the earliest manuals of dialectic in
the twelfth century, but the attribution to William has been recently disputed.
See Marenbon 2008, 71, 77. However, through Williams other works, the theories of dia-
lectic were firmly established in the school and monastery of St. Victor; see Mews 2005,
8789.
31 As argued by Ribaillier and Chtillon, Anselms Cur Deus homo has an obvious impact on
Richards Ad me clamat ex Seir, which aims to affirm the appropriateness of the Son for
the Incarnation; see Ribaillier 1967, 241249; Chtillon 1988, 607.
32 Scornful references to Peter Lombards Sentences appear in Richards writings: see
De potestate ligandi et solvendi XII, p. 92: Tam frivola, ut ridenda videatur potius
quam refellenda; De Trinitate VI, XX, p. 259.2239. See Luscombe 1970, 302. For a compari-
son of Richards and Lombards texts, see Ribaillier 1958, 11; 1967, 6062. Ribailliers edito-
rial comments in Richards De Trinitate (1958) and theological works (Opuscules
thologiques, 1967) include several references to Lombards works, particularly to the
Sentences.
33 Luscombe 1970, 300. As stated by Luscombe, numerous manuscripts which contain
several works by Peter Abelard, including some smaller treatises, have survived from the
library of St. Victor; among others, Theologia Scholarium and a copy of glosses on
Aristotles De interpretatione.
Introduction 9

arguments instead of authorities.34 Richard remarks that admiration for the

fathers does not require us to discuss carelessly those things they overlooked.35
Richard is a monastic writer, and his overall intention and motivation arises
from spiritual questions. Though the monastic literature is not philosophical
as such, it contains elements of philosophical analysis.36 It has been claimed
that in the premodern era some of the most significant sources of the history
of the emotions and sensory experiences are monastic books of prayer and
meditation.37 In many of these writings, one finds a solid substratum of psy-
chological teaching, which provided a basis for an almost scientific theory of
spiritual life.38 This is also true in Richards treatises. As Richard develops his
theory of the souls spiritual ascent towards God, his texts extend to philosoph-
ical issues as well. In Richards writings, the central idea is to rise to the under-
standing of the supreme heights of the invisible divine realities. In the analysis
of this ascent, he includes philosophical discussions concerning the soul and
its instruments. Richard also has to deal with many fundamental problems of
sensation and abstraction. How can the soul investigate anything outside
itself? How can the material quantities be known by the immaterial soul?
What is the relation between the body and the soul?
Richard has been regarded as a moderate realist, rejecting both the nomi-
nalism of Abelard and the ontological particularism of Gilbert of Poitiers. His
intellectualism is not abstract and it has been noted that his argumentation
customarily starts from experience and is thus inductive, not deductive.39
However, the philosophical analysis of Richards psychological ideas is diffi-
cult, since psychological discussions are scattered throughout his works.40

34 De Trinitate I, V, p. 91.2228: Haec omnia frequenter audio vel lego, sed unde hec omnia
probentur me legisse non recolo; abundant in his omnibus auctoritates, sed non eque et
argumentationes; in his omnibus experimenta desunt, argumenta rarescunt. Puto itaque
me nonnichil fecisse, sicut superius jam dixi, si in hujusmodi studio studiosas mentes
potero vel ad modicum adjuvare, etsi non detur posse satisfacere. Richard seems to be
indicating that he is doing something new, which is a bold undertaking and might lead to
disapproval by some of his contemporaries. See Coulter 2006, 203204.
35 In visionem Ezechielis, prologue, pl 196, 527CD. De Trinitate III, I, p. 135.2226.
36 Knuuttila 2002, 56.
37 Largier 2003, 3.
38 This is Talbots formulation of Bernard Clairvauxs spiritual writings; see Talbot 1952, 24.
39 Ribaillier 1958, 21: Lintellectualisme de Richard na rien dabstrait. On a remarqu que son
argumentation nest gnralement pas dductive, mais plutt inductive; car pour lui
lexprience est, au mme titre que les donnes de la foi, le point de dpart de toute
spculation.
40 Gilson 1980, 634.
10 Chapter 1

Hisvocabulary and use of language is rich but often imprecise. Even Richard
himself seems to be conscious of the occasional opacity and obvious lack of
coherence in his terminology. As he remarks in Benjamin Major, the scarcity of
words (inopia verborum) sometimes compels the writer to extend their signifi-
cance, at other times to restrict it or vary it appropriately under the pressure of
necessity.41 In De Trinitate, Richard explicitly refers to the equivocation of
words and incorrect use of language which may confuse the meaning of the
term.42 He also sometimes uses philosophical vocabulary without giving
detailed philosophical analysis, an obvious challenge for every interpretation
of Richards philosophy of mind.43
The present study consists of six chapters. In Chapter 2, I discuss some ideas
of the notion of the imagination in antiquity as well as in the Middle Ages. The
Western philosophical tradition has ascribed many important functions to the
imagination, having been placed in a central position between the senses and
rational faculties and assigned an intermediary role between the soul and the
world. I shall introduce some basic features of the complex foundation upon
which Richard built his own theory of the mind and imagination. This histori-
cal survey offers a frame of reference for analysis of Richards own terminology.
It also shows how the concept of the imagination has evolved and been vari-
ously understood up to his time.
In Chapter 3, I will briefly introduce the essentials of Richards anthropology
and the basic principles of his theological methodology. These two fields
offer an overall framework for his ideas of the human being in general and the

41 bmaj III, XVIII, p. 76.1517: Sed cogit nos utique verborum inopia verborum significatio-
nes modo extendere, modo restringere et pro necessitatis incongruentia congruenter
variare. Richard has numerous statements about the meaning of a term and how it may
be expanded or restricted depending on what the writer wants to do. Coulter has identi-
fied the following references: bmaj II, IX, p. 67.37; bmaj III, XVIII, p. 76.1517; Mysticae
adnotationes in Psalmos, pl 196, 382A; De Trinitate II, XIII, p. 120; De Emmanuele II, IX, pl
196, 644D. For Richards use of language in different contexts and his willingness to find
appropriate words for the invisible reality, see Evans 2011, 258359. Evans refers to
Richards texts where one can observe him playing around with various expressions, neol-
ogisms, and paradoxes.
42 De Trinitate II, XIII, p. 120121. This discussion of unequivocal and equivocal predication
derives from Boethiuss In Categorias, pl 64, 163D167A; Evans 2011, 367.
43 He knows the classics, referring for instance to Cicero and using the Aristotelian formula
of virtue; see Liber exceptionum I, I, cap. IV, p. 105.212. For the things properties, see e.g.,
Liber exceptionum I, II, cap. V, p. 116.24. For the reference to Aristotles categories, see
bmaj III, XXI, p. 80.1219. For the division of substance into generalis, specialis, and indi-
vidualis, see De Trinitate II, XII, p. 119.1112.
Introduction 11

methods by which one gains a better understanding of the visible and invisible
reality. This general examination of his views will make Richards ideas con-
cerning the notion of the imagination more comprehensible. In Chapter 4,
I will focus on the notion of the imagination in Benjamin Minor. In addition to
spiritual exercise, it features some fundamentals of Richards psychology. In
Benjamin Minor, he analyses the processes of imagination (imaginatio) and
reason (ratio), eventually pointing out at least three different modes of imagi-
nation. The first is the basic operation of imagination (imaginatio), the second
is imagination directed by reason (imaginatio per rationem disposita), and the
third is imagination which is mixed with understanding (imaginatio intelligen-
tiae permixta). I describe these three modes and analyse the concepts used in
them. Moreover, in Benjamin Minor Richard discusses the human ability to
fantasise the future by means of imagination and reason. Furthermore, Richard
introduces this use of imagination into his moral teaching and practices.
In Benjamin Major, Richard presents his scheme of the six kinds of contem-
plation. Richard differentiates contemplation into six kinds, which are classified
with the help of three abilities of the soulimagination, reason, and under-
standing, and their combinations. The two lowest kinds of contemplation are
said to be formed according to imagination, the middle two are formed accord-
ing to reason, and the two highest kinds are formed according to understanding.
In Chapter 5, I examine the first and second kinds of contemplation and the
ideas of the imagination and its operation which appear in them. Richards view
of the human imagination becomes more elaborated than in Benjamin Minor.
In describing the process of spiritual advancement, he refers several times to the
notion of imagination by pointing out its main functions, and distinguishing its
objects. In Benjamin Major, he also considers the application of imagination to
the liberal arts. In both Benjamin Minor and Major, Richard uses similar philo-
sophical concepts, which signify different processes of the human mind, such as
reason, imagination, and understanding. Occasionally, however, the use of these
concepts varies greatly. I will pay special attention to the connection between,
significance of, and variation in these concepts.
Chapter 6 explores Benjamin Majors descriptions of the imaginative activ-
ity in the third kind of contemplation. I begin by analysing Richards idea of
similitudes, which the soul uses in order to proceed to the investigation of the
invisible things. I will then discuss his notions of the inner and outer person.
The chapter ends with consideration of image, similitude, and symbol and
their relation to the faculty of imagination in both Benjamins as well as
Richards commentary on Johns Apocalypse.
In Chapter 7, the fourth and fifth kinds of contemplation will be assessed.
I will also briefly describe the ultimate experiences of contemplation and the
12 Chapter 1

dynamics of the soul and its powers in mystical union with God. I consider
Richards analysis of this union after the soul has returned to its normal state.
Moreover, in the light of some of the Benjamin Major passages, I discuss
whether the soul can produce new objects by means of imaginative activity
only. The main questions are how imagination produces new objects, and
whether the operation of the imagination can be considered creative. Some
passages in Benjamin Major indicate this kind of possibility.
 Chapter 2

Imagination in Classical and Medieval Thought

2.1 Antiquity

This chapter deals with the history of the notion of imagination from Antiquity
up to the 12th century.1 The aim is to give an overview of the various theories of
philosophy of mind in which imagination is considered as a distinctive func-
tion or faculty of the soul. This background provides some useful knowledge
of the history of ideas which will improve the understanding of Richard of
St. Victors formulations of imagination.
According to Jaqueline Hamesse, since there is a heterogeneous historical
background for the medieval discussion concerning imagination, the termi-
nology related to imagination became multifaceted in the Middle Ages.
Hamesse divides this tradition into six parts as follows:2

1 Antiquity (Plato, Aristotle, Neoplatonism)

2 Augustine and some texts falsely attributed to Augustine3
3 Boethius

1 Imagination in this introduction means the imaginative activities of the soul and the power
of imagination in general. The terminological variation is considerable. The term phantasia
was initially produced by Greek philosophy. In late ancient philosophy, the Latin term imagi
natio appeared alongside phantasia. Cicero translated phantasia as visum, visio, impressio,
and cogitatio. Augustine established the notions of imaginatio and cogitatio. Of the English
words, I prefer fantasy in the analysis of the Greek sources and imagination in the Latin texts.
For succinct definitions of phantasia and imaginatio in classical thought, see Labarrire and
Rnsch-Trill 2012. For Ciceros terminology, see Watson 1994, 4791 and Brittains introduction
to Ciceros On the Academic Scepticism, 2006, XLLXIII. For Augustine, see Chapter 2.2.
2 Hamesse 1988, 154165. Hamesse also mentions the impact of Jewish texts, and gives an
account of the medieval dictionary definitions of imaginatio and phantasia. In addition to
the six traditions which Hamesse mentions, the significance of the monastic impact should
be noted. In spiritual writings, the ability to imagine and terms which are related to it often
occur in a practical context without exact conceptual analysis.
3 Obviously the most significant text in this respect is De spiritu et anima, which was taken to
be written by Augustine, but was probably composed in the latter half of the 1100s by a
Cistercian monk. There is no certainty about the author of the work, but McGinn assumes
that the writer was the Cistercian, Alchar of Clairvaux. The text incorporates many ideas that
are typical of the Victorine writers, which is why it has been suggested that the writer was

koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2014|doi 10.1163/9789004279452_003

14 Chapter 2

4 Eastern philosophical and theological influence (Nemesius of Emesa,

Gregorius of Nyssa, and John Damascene)
5 The Arabic tradition (Avicenna)
6 Medical texts (Isagoge ad Tegni Galeni, Canon, Pantegni)

I shall describe the basic ideas which the philosophers and theologians of the
early Middle Ages used in order to treat the operation of imagination and its
significance.
I begin by briefly introducing Plato (d. 347 bc), Aristotle (d. 322 bc) and the
ideas of the Stoic tradition regarding human imaginative abilities. There are
two terms in Platos dialogues, eikasia and phantasia,4 which refer to the pro-
cess of imagining, or to the pictures and the imitations of visible objects. The
terms vary according to the context and are not clearly defined. However, Plato
uses the concept of eikasia when referring to the belief or supposition which is
directed to the images. Phantasia, in turn, is usually related to impressions
which are unreal. In Platos writings, the production and use of images in vari-
ous mental processes is generally understood as a mimetic and insignificant
ability of the human being.5
In his dialogue Philebus, Plato relates the human imaginative abilities to
questions concerning emotions and ethics. He describes the soul of the human
being as if it was a book, explaining that there is a kind of writer in the soul.
The opinions and perceptions retained in the memory are written as words in
our souls. If the truth is written, one may produce true opinions and proposi-
tions. In addition, there is a sort of painter in the soul who inscribes images on
the soul to illustrate the words. The dialogue states that the painter within the
soul can illustrate the events of the future as well, not merely present actions
or the events of the past. If hopes for future enjoyment have been written in
the soul, the painter of the soul can further imagine them. These imagined
phantasms (phantasma) of the future cause pleasure in the human soul, which

associated with the school of St. Victor. For the chronology of the work previous to 1170 and
its problems of attribution, see McGinn 1977, 6374. There are some significant affinities
between Richard of St. Victors works and De spiritu et anima. Cf. bmaj III, XXI, p. 80 and De
spiritu et anima, pl 40, 808.
4 Plato uses the word phantasia seven times in his dialogues. As Notomi states, the term phan
tasia exists nowhere in Greek literature before Plato. The notion of phantasia has since devel-
oped into our notions of fantasy and imagination. Notomi 1999, 250. For Platos use of
phantasia and eikasia, see Bundy 1927, 1959; Watson 1986, 2934; Kearney 1988, 88106;
Notomi 1999, 219252. For a general introduction to Platos theory of knowledge, see Gulley
1986.
5 Kearney 1988, 88, 416n.23.
Imagination In Classical And Medieval Thought 15

is based on the corresponding image of oneself enjoying something. If some-

one thinks that he has gold in limitless quantities and gets great enjoyment
from it, he then sees a picture of himself as enormously happy.6 The reminis-
cence of the pleasing memories causes similar pleasure. This idea of inner
words and images is a preface to the analysis of true and false pleasures.
Righteous people have decent wishes and enjoyments anticipating the future,
but the fact that ill-intentioned people can have groundless wishes and thus
erroneous enjoyments is problematic.7 The information which is acquired
through the imagining process can be useful, although one has to maintain an
appropriate degree of caution.8 The association between imagined pictures
and emotions as well as the problem of future imagined hopes are major
themes in Aristotelian as well as Stoic ethics. This debate was further elabo-
rated in several discussions in the Middle Ages, as will be seen below.
Plato also analyses the nature of images and human imagination in his
Republic, in which he explains his famous idea of the line divided into two
unequal segments. The higher represents the intelligible realm and the lower
the visible realm. The visible realm is analogous to the invisible realm and can
be seen as an image of it. The lower segment of the visible realm is further
subdivided into visible things and their likenesses. The divided line has its
ontological as well as psychological interpretation, as well as its corresponding
counterparts in the soul, which are reason (nosis), understanding (dianoia),
belief (pistis), and imagination or supposition (eikasia). Plato discusses the
physical objects and their images, but is not that clear about the kind of think-
ing that corresponds to them. However, the significance of imagination is
minor because, according to Plato, the material world caught by it is in any
case the mere shadow of the world of ideas.9
In his Sophist, Plato introduces his idea of how a philosopher should differ
from a sophist. He writes that wherever there are images, likenesses and phan
tasia, there is also deception. Plato also claims that we should enquire into the

6 Philebus 39a40a. For a recent interpretation of Philebus and emotions, see Moss 2012,
266269.
7 Philebus 40bc: Now, do we want to say that in the case of good people these pictures are usu-
ally true, because they are dear to gods, while quite the opposite usually holds in the case of
wicked ones, or is this not what we ought to say? And wicked people nevertheless have
pleasures painted in their minds, even though they are somehow false? So wicked people
as a rule enjoy false pleasures, but the good among mankind true kinds? For a more com-
plete idea of Platos account of the wrong pleasures in Philebus, see Reidy 1998, 343356.
8 Bundy 1927, 4748.
9 Republic 509d511e. For an analysis of the divided line and the evolution of Platos thought in
the Republic, see Dorter 2006, 190199.
16 Chapter 2

nature of discourse (logos), opinion (doxa), and phantasia in order to deter-

mine whether they somehow participate in non-being. After showing that dis-
course may at times be false, he continues to investigate opinion and phantasia
more closely. Opinion is a kind of inner speech, which takes place silently in
the mind according to some thought. Plato further says that opinion occurs by
itself, but phantasia comes through sense-perception. Thus phantasia is a mix-
ture of sensation and opinion, which can be described as similar to opinion.
Just like discourse and opinion, phantasia may be either true or false.10
However, it should be separated from phantasma, which can be understood as
an image, and does not represent the true proportions of the original object in
the image-making art.11
Furthermore, in Timaeus Plato analyses dreaming about and predicting the
future. The human being sees images (phantasmata) in dreams, which can be
rememorized later when one is awake. Dreams are thus imaginary series of
events that may be experienced in the mind. These dreams originate from the
extraordinarily large movements of the fire, i.e., sensations of sight. Plato com-
pares dreams with images which are reflected in mirrors and curved surfaces.12
According to Platos theory of dreams, sleep is the operation of the lower part
of the soul, so that they are mere fantasies, not accurate images of the external
world. In this same dialogue, Plato also introduces the idea that a god may
directly affect sleep. The Timaeus emphasizes that prediction is possible only
in sleep or during a mental disturbance; in other words, particularly when the
rational part of the mind does not operate. However, the evaluation of prophe-
cies and their interpretation must be performed with full command of the
reason.13

10 Sophist 260c, 260e, 263de, 264a.

11 Notomi 1999, 252258. For the notion of phantasia in Sophist related to Republic and
Theaetetus, see Notomi 1999, 263269.
12 Timaeus 45de, 46a. For Platos account of images in Timaeus, see Moss 2012, 270280.
13 According to Plato, the lower, appetitive part of the soul does not understand rational
things but is able to perform some kind of observation. This part of the soul can be led
astray easily, especially through phantasms and pictures. In order to prevent this, God
invented and constructed a liver and placed it in the location of the lower part of the soul.
Plato states that the liver has been fashioned to be dense and smooth and bright and
sweet, yet containing bitterness, so that the power of thoughts which proceed from the
mind, moving in the liver as in a mirror which receives impressions and provides visible
images, should frighten this part of the soul. On the other hand, reason can also send
thoughts which make the lower soul happy and peaceful, so that it will predict the future
asleep even it has no part in reason and understanding. By placing the skill of the predic-
tion in the liver, God has given the art of divination not to the wisdom, but foolishness of
Imagination In Classical And Medieval Thought 17

In the 1100s, only three of Platos texts were available: Phaedo, Meno and the
first part of the Timaeus dialogue14 which Calcidius had translated and on
which he had written a commentary in the latter half of the 4th century.15 The
Timaeus was commented on by 12th century theologians of the Chartres
school.16 Nevertheless, other dialogues by Plato, from which the ancient philo-
sophical and theological authors copied and transmitted many ideas, also had
a considerable indirect influence in the Middle Ages.17
It has been claimed that Aristotle formulated the first extended analytical
description of imagination as a distinct faculty of the soul. He also drew atten-
tion for the first time to the difficulty of gaining an adequate philosophical
understanding of fantasy.18 Aristotle exploits the notion of phantasia, which
could be understood on the basis of the context as a capacity of the mind, a
process of the mind, or the result of the process itself. According to Frede,
phantasia has several different uses in Aristotle. While the primary use is
appearance, which includes all the basic functions of phantasia, i.e., the capac-
ity to experience the appearance, the appearance itself, and what appears, he
also mentions fantasy which creates appearances. In addition, Aristotle distin-
guishes between true and false phantasies. Occasionally he uses the notion of
phantasma in referring to the product of phantasia, and phantastikon in dis-
cussing the capacity of phantasia.19

man. Timaeus 69e, 71a72a. Cf. Aristotles sharp comment that dreams are not sent by the
gods and thus are no means to prophetic truth. However, Aristotle considers that dream-
ing is the operation of fantasy and the origin of dreams lies in human nature. De divina
tione per somnum 463b ff. For Aristotles theory of sleep and dreaming, see Gallop 1996,
2128 and Van der Eijk 2005, 143145.
14 Timaeus 17a53c.
15 Phaedo and Meno were translated into Latin in the middle of the 1100s. Dod 1982, 56.
16 For the reception of Timaeus in the ninth century, see McKitterick 1992, 8595. For the
influence of Timaeus on the mind-body relation, see Sorabji 2003, 152162.
17 For the significance of the Platonist tradition, Platos works, translations and comments,
as well their transition into the Middle Ages, see Klibansky 1939. Concerning the influence
of Platos idea of phantasia, see Watson 1994, 47884789.
18 Schofield 1992, 249. Aristotles idea of fantasy has been discussed extensively. See, for
instance, Nussbaum 1985; Modrak 1987; Watson 1988a, 1434; Wedin 1988; Frede 1992,
279298; Schofield 1992, 249278; Caston 1996, 2055 and Everson 1997, 157221. On the
fundamentals of Aristotles philosophy of mind, see also Kenny 1973.
19 Frede describes Aristotles language and terminology concerning phantasia as full of rep-
etitions, new modifications, and even inconsistencies. For these terms, see Frede 1992,
279281.
18 Chapter 2

De anima contains Aristotles most extensive and most significant discus-

sion of fantasy.20 Aristotle begins the analysis of fantasy by rejecting Platos
view that phantasia is a kind of combination of sensation and belief which
cannot appear in the animals. He states that fantasy can never come about
without sensation, but still cannot be considered as mere sensing. He justifies
his opinion by the fact that the soul may use its power for fantasy without the
need of the actual sensation, because the human can see fantasies with eyes
closed or asleep. On the other hand, if fantasy and sensation were identical, all
the animals should have the ability to fantasize. However, this is not the case,
because in Aristotles opinion creatures like the ant and the bee do not have
fantasy. Aristotle also states that the sense-perceptions are always truthful if
the senses operate properly, but fantasy can make mistakes and indeed often
does so.21
Related to fantasy, Aristotle introduces his idea of common sense in De
anima, which explains the unity of perceptual cognition and reflexive per
ception. Thus with the help of common sense one can combine various
sense-perceptions coming through different senses. This also facilitates the
perception of perception. Aristotle did not ascribe a distinct cognitive role to
common sense, but the later Aristotelian tradition developed the specific cog-
nitive functions which were attributed to it.22
According to Aristotle, fantasy must not be confused with the notion of
opinion (doxa), because opinion is accompanied by conviction about its truth-
fulness, which is not necessarily the case with regard to fantasy. Human beings
cannot maintain an opinion if they do not believe in its correctness. Thus the
conviction which belongs to opinion also stirs feelings such as fear. However,
fantasy does not necessarily stir up a feeling more than a painting which

20 Wedin nominates the analysis of imagination in the De anima as Aristotles canonical

theory. Wedin 1988, 23. However, as Nussbaum notes, there seems to be no canonical the-
ory of phantasy in Aristotle, but more like assorted observations, which are sometimes
inconsistent. For this reason, the exposition of De anima III.3, being internally inconsis-
tent on many points, should not be used as an interpretative key to understanding
Aristotles general view on phantasy. Nussbaum 1985, 222. The concept of phantasia in De
anima is difficult to translate; for the various efforts to do this, see Schofield 1992, 250253.
Jacob of Venice translated De anima from Greek to Latin in the 1150s. Hasse 2000, 9.
21 De anima 428a115, 434a15. The idea of some animals lacking phantasy seem to contra-
dict Aristotles assertion elsewhere that all movable animals, even the undeveloped ones,
have at least a rudimentary kind of ability to phantasize. Cf. De Anima 433b29; 433b31
434a10. See Nussbaum 1985, 233234 and Wedin 1988, 4142 for the animals and their abil-
ity of fantasy in Aristotle.
22 Gregoric 2007. Tuominen 2013, 107129.
Imagination In Classical And Medieval Thought 19

describes, say, some frightening thing.23 However, fantasy and opinion are sim-
ilar in that they both may err.24
Fantasy is neither perception nor opinion or some kind of combination of
them. Fantasy transmits and reformulates the sense material with the help of
which the mind can construct judgements. It is a kind of movement that does
not occur without sense-perception but comes to be as a result of the activity of
sense-perception, and is thus like perception.25 Aristotle claims that the name
for phantasia is taken from phaos, light. This is because without the light it is
impossible to see and the products of phantasia are similar to perceptions.26
Aristotles view on fantasy is related to his theory of emotions in many ways.
The appetitive part of the human soul compels one to seek pleasure and avoid
pain. Fantasy may cause movements in this part of the soul. For example, if the
human being remembers something pleasant, or waits for something pleasing
to take place, the fantasy keeps an impression of what has created the pleasure.
In consequence of this, the mere remembering or waiting for the pleasure with
the help of images is enough for experiencing pleasure as well. However, this
kind of image which is directed at the past or the future does not cause such an
intense feeling as those objects which caused the enjoyment would if actually
present.27
Fantasy is an important factor in Aristotles theory of action in animals as
well as humans. As Aristotle shows in De motu animalium, both fantasy and
desire are necessary for animal motion. The proximate cause of action is desire.
However, fantasy must prepare desire before desire can lead to action. Fantasy
comes either through sense-perception or thinking, which indicates that it can
have two different sources. The task of fantasy is to present the object of per-
ception or thought to the subject, after which it can be moved to act. The mere
thought of an object is not sufficient to cause motion.28
As Aristotle asserts in De Anima, some animals have the ability of fantasy,
but only people have a special higher form of fantasy. Only the kind of fantasy

23 De anima 427b1525. See Caston 1996, 4346 on Aristotles attempt to define fantasy in
relation to sensing, conceptual thinking, and belief. See also Knuuttila 2004, 37.
24 De anima 428a2025. See Caston 1996, 4652 on false fantasies.
25 De anima 428b1015. Frede 1992, 281. At this point, Frede claims that phantasia does not
have a faculty of its own but is parasitic on sense perception.
26 De anima 428b30. This etymology is doubtful. Hamlyn 1968, 135.
27 Rhetoric 1370a2829. See the interpretation by Wedin 1988, 89. For Aristotles theory of
emotions and their relation to the fantasy, see Richardson 1992, 396 and Knuuttila 2004,
2447.
28 De motu animalium 701a3436, 702a1821. For the interpretation of these passages, see
Nussbaum 1985, 232241 and Schofield 2011, 119134.
20 Chapter 2

which characterizes humans can be exploited as an instrument in both practi-

cal and theoretical thinking.29 The soul may produce images for rational think-
ing which function as if sense perceptions were really present.30 This is seen
especially in the area of moral consideration, because the soul chooses between
various recommendations for action by using images as its aid. As the soul
selects between different models of operation, one can estimate various alter-
natives and calculate the best one, which requires the use and joining of sev-
eral images.31 The human being does not use abstract concepts, such as honour,
love, fear, or cowardice, in his ethical deliberations and choices and thus does
not select a suitable model in that way. He exploits concrete images; for exam-
ple, the feeling of being ashamed results from the image in which the human
being has lost his reputation. Aristotle also states that in order to make a deci-
sion, the person must form for himself the image of some future good, a worth-
while aim. The human being can separate and join different images with each
other, which is something that an animal is incapable of doing. For example,
human beings are helped to be courageous by an image of a brave human
being, not by the abstract concept of courage. Likewise fear can be defined as
the pain which is caused by an image representing some bad thing in the
future.32
Beside these imaginative functions in practical reasoning, Aristotle also
concedes that theoretical reasoning cannot do without images. He also claims
that the intelligible objects of all thought, even in abstract sciences, are
contained in sensible objects, thus coming to the broad conclusion that one
could not get to know intelligible objects or understand them without sense-
perception, and that one cannot think without images. Images in turn are like
sense-perceptions without matter, so that reason thinks the forms in the
images.33 In the Middle Ages, this idea of Aristotles was reformulated by
Thomas Aquinas as conversio ad phantasmata. He claims that the human
intellect has to turn towards phantasms at the beginning of the thinking pro-
cess as well as after the acquisition of knowledge. This means that people are
unable to consider any intelligible forms without phantasms which represent
examples of the form in question. Phantasms are the images of bodies or like-
nesses of particular things, which thinking continually requires.34 Aristotles

29 See Frede 1992, 288292 for the cognitive role of fantasy.

30 De anima 431a15.
31 De anima 434a510.
32 De anima 431a14, 433a14; Rhetoric 1382a32, 1384a23. Nussbaum 1985, 262264.
33 De anima 431a14, 431b2, 431b20; 432a39; De Memoria 449b20450a1.
34 For this subject, see Pasnau 2002, 267295.
Imagination In Classical And Medieval Thought 21

influence on the development of the vocabulary concerning the imaginative

activities is considerable, as is clearly seen in the philosophical texts of the
Middle Ages. Translated into Latin, Aristotles works formed the basis of uni-
versity education throughout the Middle Ages.35
Many of Platos and Aristotles successors paid particular attention to the
uncertainty of the information offered by imagination or fantasy (phantasia).
New theories concerning fantasy were not really developed among Platos
academy, or in Peripatetic or Epicurean circles. However, a significant new
development concerning the notion of fantasy and its related terms was cre-
ated by the Stoics. Fantasy was an important as part of Stoic epistemology and
ethics.36 Since the views of the Stoic ethics later spread widely among early
Christian thinkers,37 many church fathers had adopted the fundamentals of
Stoic moral principles as part of their idea of the human being since early
Christianity. In consequence of this, it is difficult to identify a direct Stoic influ-
ence in the Middle Ages.38
According to the Stoics, phantasia means impressions (typsis) or changes
(heteroiosis) in the central faculty (hgemonikon) which directs the soul.
The objects of the exterior world cause traces and changes in the soul of the

35 Aristotles five logical works (Categories, De interpretatione, Topics, Sophisti Elenchi, and
Prior Analytics) were translated and commented on by Boethius (d. 524). For the content
and importance of these works, see Ebbesen 2009 and Martin 2009. It was not until the
twelfth century that the new translations from Greek and Arabic were provided by James
of Venice (fl. 1136), Burgundio of Pisa (d. 1193), and Gerard of Cremona (d. 1187). For the
availability of Aristotles works and their translations in the Middle Ages, see Dod 1982,
4579; Burnett 2007, 12201230, 13081310. For Aristotles works and their interpretation in
the Middle Ages, see Lohr 1982, 8098. However, many important texts, such as De anima,
remained unavailable to most Western authors during Richards lifetime.
36 On the idea of phantasia in the Stoics, see Sandbach 1971, 922; Watson 1988b; Watson
1994, 47694791; Long 1996, 266285; Long 1999, 574580. For the Stoic and Hellenistic
philosophy of mind in general, see Annas 1992. For Stoic epistemology, see Frede 1999,
295322.
37 The views of the Stoics have an extensive influence, which is seen particularly in moral
theology texts in the Middle Ages. There were only a few Stoic texts directly available in
the 1100s, such as Senecas De beneficiis and De clementia. However, many Stoic themes
were transmitted to the Middle Ages via Cicero. These significant sources of the Stoic eth-
ics were De finibus, De officiis, De legibus, and Paradoxa Stoicorum Tusculanarum disputa
tionum by Cicero. See Lapidge 1988, 92; Engberg-Pedersen 2010, 114.
38 Lapidge 1988, 89. Evaluation of the direct influence of Seneca and Cicero on the philoso-
phy of the 1100s is difficult because so much of their material is indirectly inherited from
the church fathers. For example, Ambrose utilizes Ciceros themes faithfully in his
De officiis.
22 Chapter 2

perceiver. Thus the Stoics consider phantasia as a mental faculty capable of

encompassing all objects of awareness.39 As the soul observes some external
object, it is being affected by it and made aware of it simultaneously. The thing
of which the person is aware is phantasia, the cause of representation.40
The Stoic idea of phantasia has a central position in epistemology. The rep-
resentations themselves may be true or false. Stoics held that representations
which derive from the perception of some real object and from reasoning give
sound evidence concerning its cause. These may be called kataleptic phanta-
sies and should be distinguished from figments (phantasmata) that derive
from dreams, or illusions of madness. Such phantasms are dangerous because
they can lead to defective reasoning. Although caution concerning faulty and
illusory phantasms is strongly emphasized in Stoic texts,41 the idea of katalep
tic phantasia reflects the Stoic conviction that knowledge of the world is pos-
sible, and that the wise individual is able to identify the accurate representations
necessary for rational actions and reject those which derive from uncertain
sources.42 The theory of cognitive impressions initiated lively discussion
among the Stoics, producing multiple new interpretations.43
According to the Stoics, there are two kinds of presentation of objects: first,
images originate directly from the senses (aisthetike phantasiai) and second,
new images are produced from images that have been perceived earlier. Both
the Stoics and Aristotle maintain that it is the latter function of fantasy which
distinguishes humans from other animals because only humans are able to
produce different combinations of images. Thus, people are able to construct
images in their minds which might not have been perceived in external reality
but which have come about by joining, separating, adding, or reducing the
properties of the perceptible images in the mind. This is how monstrous beings

39 According to Long, all the sensations, transient thoughts, feelings, and recollections can
be defined as representations of phantasia. This means that phantasia is anything that
appears to the human being and constitutes an instance of awareness. Long 1996, 274.
40 This is the case, for example, in Chrysippus. Long 1996, 266275. See also Sandbach
1971, 10.
41 Long 1996, 275285. The terminological applications of the fantasy in Stoicism come out
most clearly in the ethical theories. The Stoic moralist Epictetus (d. 138), for example,
considers the significance of such fantasies and impressions on which there is no direct
external stimulus. According to him, the ethically good life requires correct use of repre-
sentations. This question forms the core of the moral programme of Stoicism.
42 Long and Sedley 1987, 249253.
43 There is a good selection of these Stoic discussions on phantasia and cognitive impres-
sions in Long and Sedley 1987, Chapter 40.
Imagination In Classical And Medieval Thought 23

can be imagined; for example, different designs can be created, and an attempt
can be made to imagine good and truthful things.44
Stoics also introduced the idea of premeditation, which is related to the
imagining process. Premeditation is an efficient tool to neutralize possible
misfortunes by thinking of unpleasant incidents in advance. Recollecting the
results of premeditation in the actual situation brings into ones mind an
objective evaluation created during the calmer period. This premeditation is
one of the important components of the Stoic idea of cognitive therapy, which
aims at eliminating emotional reactions, and increasing awareness of ones
role as a rational agent.45
The philosophy of the Commentators (200600) has been characterized as
being the transition from ancient to medieval philosophy and theology. Many
of the Commentators created their own philosophical ideas by way of com-
mentary on earlier philosophers works, mostly those by Aristotle. Neoplatonism,
the new philosophical trend based on earlier schools and ideas, became domi-
nant. During the era of the Commentators, the impact of Christian thinking
gradually increased and the theology and spirituality of Christian philosophy
were eventually profoundly influenced by Neoplatonism.46
It has been suggested that in the writings of the Commentators, fantasy was
increasingly considered as a specific capacity or activity of the soul, capable of
supporting mental images.47 One of the innovations was the idea of Plotinus
(d. 260?) of distinguishing two separate faculties of phantasia, one considered
with the sensibles, the other dealing with the intelligibles. This is because the
rational and irrational souls of the human being are separate and possess their
own kind of phantasia. However, these two phantasias may co-operate, as
a consequence of which the most powerful dominates and only a single image
is produced. The reason for a specific higher form of phantasia is that the dis-
embodied rational soul needs some memory of its earthly life before ascend-
ing to intelligible world. The memory is based on phantasia. Those who have
a strong image-storing capacity also have a powerful memory. Memories
assurethe permanence of the personality of the disembodied, individual soul.

44 Sextus Empiricus and Diogenes Laertius, among others, refer to this kind of imagination.
See Watson 1988a, 215.
45 Knuuttila 2004, 74, 7879.
46 Sorabji 2004, 1. In the Commentators texts there are many valuable fragments of the writ-
ings of the ancient philosophers otherwise lost. However, their own philosophical impact
may also be considered valuable. See the list of the most notable Commentators, Sorabji
2004, 417420.
47 For the Neoplatonistic theories concerning imagination and their later influence, see
Rosenmeyer 1986, 197248 and Sorabji 2004, 6085.
24 Chapter 2

Furthermore, the embodied soul uses various imaginative analogies and

thought experiments as it seeks to reason about the intelligible world.48 This
has been regarded as an opportunity for a role for phantasia as the servant of
intellectual speculation.49
Proclus (d. 485) in turn defines phantasia as a kind of intellectual power
which gives shape to ideas. It can be described as a weak kind of reason
descending into the body and the last echo of the intellect.50 In his Commentary
on Euclids Elements, Proclus shows that phantasia has some important func-
tions in geometry, which accomplishes its proofs about the shapes created in
ones imagination. Although the geometrical objects are immaterial and unex-
tended, people talk about various angles and magnitudes as well as other con-
figurations in geometrical figures. This means that geometrical thinking cannot
limit itself to the level of unextended objects. The extended shapes are pro-
jected into the imagination from the unextended concepts in ones thought. In
order to accomplish this one needs imagination, which is inferior to reason.
Thus the insights of geometry involve imagination. The projection of particu-
larized images that have divisible extension and shape is the task of imagina-
tion. It is not able to represent the actual geometric entities like the circle, but
it can show one out of a number of circles. The combining and dividing of fig-
ures takes place in the imagination and this knowledge is a path to intelligible
things. The geometer studies the dianoetic entities, but makes demonstrations
of them in phantasia. Proclus also compares the imagination to a mirror to
which the concepts of the mind are sent and in which they are displayed.51

2.2 Christian Neoplatonism

Perhaps the most significant individual author behind the ideas concerning
imagination in the 1100s is the Latin church father, Augustine (d. 430), the
bishop of Hippo, through whose texts many of the classical ideas of the notion
of imagination and other related terms were transferred to the theologians of
the Middle Ages.52 The works of Augustine were widely read, and his texts had

48 Sorabji 2004, 64. For Plotinus theory of the two faculties of phantasia, see Dillon 1986, 5564.
49 Dillon 1986, 56.
50 For Proclus ideas on phantasia, see Bundy 1927, 138143; Blumenthal 1975, 123147; Evrard
1988, 5768. For Proclus thinking on geometry, see Opsomer 2009, 220222.
51 Sorabji 2004, 68, 7679. Proclus Commentary on Euclids Elements I, 53, 1855, 13; 121, 2; 141,
219. (Texts translated in Sorabji). See also Tuominen 2013, 123125.
52 I will concentrate in this context only on the Christian Neoplatonic texts.
Imagination In Classical And Medieval Thought 25

an undisputed authority in, for example, the monastery of St. Victor, which
observed the Augustinian rule.
According to Augustines psychology, the human soul is incorporeal, unex-
tended and indivisible by nature. Augustine ascribes particular importance to
the active nature of perception. This means that the perception is not a passive
reception of sensory stimulus, but the souls active awareness of an affection of
the body.53 The images which are objects of perception have a non-corporeal
nature.54 Augustine usually defines the imaginative process as contracting and
expanding the images and considers the activity of will as an important part of
this process.55
It is interesting to note that Augustine was one of the first to translate the
notion of phantasia into Latin as imaginatio56 and is responsible for the con-
cept of imaginatio establishing its position in the Latin philosophical literature
of the Middle Ages. The Greek terms phantasia and phantasma also occur from
this time on in Latin texts, as well as cogitatio, Ciceros Latin translation of
phantasia. Thus the capacity of imagination and its functions could be referred
to by using several different concepts, which made the analyses quite com-
plex.57 The abundance of terms and their variation caused confusion and mis-
taken interpretations. Even Augustine himself does not define terms like
phantasia, imaginatio, and cogitatio unambiguously.58
Augustine discusses the significance of the human imagination, especially
in the correspondence with his friend, Nebridius, as well as in his De musica,

53 In Augustines theory, the ability to perceive presupposes the incorporeality of the soul.
He rejects the notion that any physical body can exert a direct causal effect on the soul
and emphasizes the activity of the soul in perception. The soul is aware of or attends to
(intentio) bodily events and objects. For Augustines ideas on non-rational perception and
its Stoic background, see Brittain 2002, 274279.
54 De civitate Dei 11.26: non enim ea sicut illa, quae foris sunt, ullo sensu corporis tangimus, uelut
colores uidendo, sonos audiendo, odores olfaciendo, sapores gustando, dura et mollia con-
trectando sentimus, quorum sensibilium etiam imagines eis simillimas nec iam corporeas
cogitatione uersamus, memoria tenemus et per ipsas in istorum desideria concitamur
55 ODaly 1987, 8087, 108, 112.
56 The views of Augustine about imagination have been dealt with in several works; see, for
instance, Bundy 1927, 153172; Brann 1991; ODaly 1987, 106131; Watson 1986, 4450;
Watson 1988a; Watson 1988b; Watson 1994, 48024806. Watson 1986, 46, states that the
concept of imaginatio was already in limited use before Augustine.
57 Watson 1994, 4791.
58 Watson 1986, 48. ODaly notes that Augustine seems to be unaware of the ambiguity of
the concept of phantasia, in that it may refer to the mental faculty, the process of the
faculty, and the product of that faculty. ODaly 1987, 107. However, his conclusion is not
convincing.
26 Chapter 2

De Trinitate, and De Genesi ad litteram.59 In De musica, Augustine claims that

there are two kinds of imagination, that which repeats and that which pro-
duces. The reproductive imagination repeats the pictures of perceived objects
in the memory. The productive imagination is also based on the working of the
memory. Even though productive imagination is dependent on material pro-
duced by sense perception, it does not need real sensible objects as its starting-
point. The most important precondition controlling the productive imagination
is the souls inborn ability to add and to reduce the properties of previously
sensed objects. A person can give birth to objects which have no equivalent in
reality. According to Augustine, a person can imagine (cogitare) his father
whom he has seen as well as the grandfather whom he has never met. However,
the processes of imagining are different in each case. The image of the father is
found directly in the memory and can be called phantasia, whereas the grand-
fathers image is created according to various pictures in the memory and may
thus be referred to as phantasma.60 However, the starting-point in both cases
is always the sensation, because if a person has never seen a human body, for
example, he cannot imagine one by thinking only.61
In his letters to Nebridius, Augustine separates three different ways in which
the mind uses images. First of all, the human being is able to recall some object
that he has already perceived. A person can think in his mind (in se animus
format) of his absent friend or his former home town. For example, Augustine
could clearly recall a picture of Carthage, which he is familiar with. In these
cases, an attempt is made to see the picture as accurately as possible compared

59 In addition to these works, Augustine discusses the faculties and objects related to imagi-
nation in his other treatises as well. Augustine is particularly famous for his analysis of
memory in his Confessiones, which touches on many topics associated with imagination,
such as images and their processing in the mind. For this, see Confessiones 10.8.1215
especially.
60 De musica 6.32: Aliter enim cogito patrem meum quem saepe vidi, aliter avum quem
nunquam vidi. Horum primum phantasia est, alterum phantasma. Illud in memoria
invenio, hoc in eo motu animi, qui ex iis ortus est quos habet memoria. Quomodo autem
oriantur haec, et invenire et explicare difficile est. Arbitror tamen, quod si nunquam
humana corpora vidissem, nullo modo ea possem visibili specie cogitando figurare. Quod
autem ex eo quod vidi facio, memoria facio: et tamen aliud est in memoria invenire phan-
tasiam, aliud de memoria facere phantasma. The same idea is in De Trinitate 8.6.9; 9.6.10.
The starting-point for Augustine seems to be Stoic. It has been supposed that Porphyry
had adapted this distinction and influenced Augustine, but there is no clear evidence for
this. See ODaly 1987, 106107.
61 De musica 6.32: arbitror tamen, quod si nunquam humana corpora uidissem, nullo modo
ea possem uisibili specie cogitando figurare. Augustine argues this in several text sec-
tions; see the list in ODaly 1987, 108.
Imagination In Classical And Medieval Thought 27

to the original perception. Secondly, the human may think (putare, fingere) of
various fictional pictures in his mind. This happens, for example, when one is
listening to someone telling stories. Thirdly, the human being is able to imag-
ine some desired objects which cannot actually be perceived, although the fan-
tasy of them is necessary for thinking. For example, it is useful to imagine the
whole universe for better understanding of it or to employ various ancillary
pictures in theoretical sciences such as geometry and music. The image of the
universe is probably deficient, but it is still necessary in visualising complex
entities, which is why reason should guard the working of the imagination.62
The human has an inborn capacity for subtraction and addition of some fea-
tures of objects which the senses have received. On the basis of this data, the
mind is able to produce some new imaginable objects with the exercise of
imagination. Augustine ends his letter with a personal remark about his child-
hood, relating that he used to imagine the sea when he was still a boy, brought
up in an inland district. However, he could already form some idea of the sea,
after seeing water in a small cup. The flavour of strawberries and of cherries he
could not imagine before he had tasted these fruits in Italy.63
Augustine analyses the divine Trinity and its innumerable reflections in
De Trinitate. Equally, he presents his view on the movements of the human
soul. Augustine holds that there are certain traces of the Trinity which are
revealed in the human psychology, just as in the entire creation. In the
human, these reflections of the Trinity are detectable even from the lowest
abilities of the soul.64 In consequence of this, Augustine also describes the pro-
cess of perception using the concept of the trinity. The course of perception,
he argues, can be divided into two parts, the external trinity and the internal
trinity. The external trinity consists of the object to be perceived, the act of see-
ing (visio), and intention of the mind (animi intentio). Since this intention is
mental concentration, which makes the perception active, the indivisible
series of external perception is formed by the perceivable object, sight,
and intention.65 An impulse produced by intention brings the object to be

62 Epistula 7.2.4. The first form of activity of imagination represents the repeating mode of
imagination, while the second and third forms of imagination are productive.
63 Epistula 7.3.6.
64 De Trinitate 11.5.8. By the notion of the external or outer human being Augustine means
the abilities and processes of the soul that operate with the sensible world. However, he
remarks that the trinity of the external human being/person (homo exterior) cannot be
the actual image of God in the human being.
65 De Trinitate 11.1.1.; 11.2.2. As stated by ODaly, Augustine ascribes particular importance to
the active nature of perception. ODaly 1987, 8487. See Caston 2001, 3341 on the idea of
28 Chapter 2

perceived and the act of seeing together, as a consequence of which the corpo-
real form (species corporis) of the perceived object informs the sight and imprints
its image (visio, imago) there.66 Thus Augustine distinguishes the object which is
externally perceived, its form, and the image of that form in the senses.
The mind is able to retain a simple impression or image (visio, imago) with-
out any sense perception produced by the external object. The internal trinity
consists of the image in the mind (visio), intention (intentio), and the eye of the
mind (animi acies), which here refers to the thinking subject. The eye of the
mind is directed to the image (visio) by the act of will, which creates the inter-
nal vision (phantasia, similitudo). Augustine points out that the image (visio)
of the object in the sense-perception and fantasy (phantasia, similitudo)
are not the same thing and that they can be rationally distinguished from
eachother.67
In his treatise De Genesi ad litteram, Augustine develops an idea concerning
the three parts of the soul: corporeal, intermediary spiritual, and intellectual.
Each of these parts possesses their specific mode of vision, these being corporeal
vision (visio corporealis), spiritual vision (visio spiritualis/visio imaginativa68),

intention in the De Trinitate of Augustine. Caston emphasizes the significance of inten-

tion as a kind of controller of the imagination. Intention connects and separates pictures
in the memory, which is why it is responsible for the new objects produced by the imagi-
nation. Caston considers the theory of Augustine as the first description of an active
selective awareness. See De Trinitate 11.10.17.
66 Augustine uses several different terms in this context about the form of the object and the
image of the form which is impressed on the sight, such as visio, sensus, forma, similitudo,
imago, species, and phantasia. See De Trinitate, 11.2.3.; 11.2.4.; 11.2.5.
67 De Trinitate 11.3.6.; 11.4.7.; 11.7.11. Augustine discerns two different forms, the form of the
perceived object and the form induced in the sense. As ODaly notes, this distinction is
merely nominal; the two forms are united in a perceptive act so that the actual determina-
tion of their duality is impossible. ODaly 1987, 96.
68 In De Genesi ad litteram the notion of spiritus resembles the Neoplatonic concept of
pneuma, which was translated into Latin as spiritus. In the background lies the theory of
physical spirit (pneuma). As noted by Markus, Augustine relies on Porphyry, who distin-
guished between the intellectual part of the soul and its lower spiritual part, which grasps
images of corporeal objects. For the concept of spiritus in Augustine, see Taylor 1949;
Markus 1981, 204211 and Taylor 1982, 301n.13. There have been various philosophical and
medical theories concerning pneuma, which means both wind and breath in Greek. For
the origins and development of the notion of pneuma, see, e.g., Annas 1992 and Van der
Eijk 2005, 119138. Summers notes that Augustine passed the fully developed pneumatic
psychology on to the Christian Middle Ages, thus providing a framework for the recovered
psychology of Aristotle. Summers 1987, 112116. In general, the impact of medical terms in
De Genesi ad litteram is interesting. Augustine explains the anatomical model of the brain
Imagination In Classical And Medieval Thought 29

and intellectual vision (visio intellectualis). These three visions of De Genesi ad

litteram have greatly influenced the philosophy and theology of the Middle Ages.
The first vision is a simple sense impression. The second is spiritual, through
which absent people, for example, can be imagined. The third vision described
by Augustine is the intellectual vision of the mind, which does not include figu-
rative material and cannot err as the two lower visions may.69 Augustine states
that the second (spiritual) vision allows the human being to think of everything
on earth and in heaven, even when sitting in the dark, the bodily eyes seeing
nothing. The human being can imagine (cogitare) bodily images and similitudes
(imagines, similes, similitudines) in his mind. These pictures may either be like
the original perceptions, or may be produced in the mind.70 This kind of spiritual
vision is not corporeal, but is similar to it to the extent that it is an appropriate
mediating factor between the sense perception and intellectual operation.71
Thus, in this context Augustine defines spiritus as a power of the soul (vis ani
mae), which is inferior to mind (mens) and where corporeal things are expressed.
The activity of spiritus is referred to as cogitation (cogitatio) of absent images.72
Augustine emphasizes that it is not the body which perceives, but the soul
by means of the body. The soul uses the bodily senses as messengers in order to
form the object of the exterior world within itself.73 Animals also have visio spiri
tualis, which controls their sense-activities and recognizes their data.74

and its ventricles, for instance, and refers to medical writers. De Genesi ad litteram 7.13.20;
7.15.21; 7.18.24.
69 De Genesi ad litteram 12.6.7.
70 The human being can imagine either the true pictures or the fictional pictures in his
mind. De Genesi ad litteram 12.6.15: Animo tamen corporales imagines intuemur, seu
veras, sicut ipsa corpora videmus, et memoria retinemus, seu fictas, sicut cogitatio for-
mare potuerit.
71 De Genesi ad litteram 12.24.51: Quapropter non absurde neque inconvenienter arbitror
spiritualem visionem inter intellectualem et corporalem tanquam medietatem quam
dam obtinere. Puto enim non incongruenter medium dici, quod corpus quidem non est,
sed simile est corporis, inter illud quod vere corpus est, et illud quod nec corpus est, nec
simile corporis.
72 De Genesi ad litteram 12.9.20: qui modo quodam proprio vocatur spiritus, vis animae
quaedam mente inferior, ubi corporalium rerum similitudines exprimuntur. inquam,
distinctionem spirituale nunc appellavimus tale genus visorum, quali etiam corporum
absentium imagines cogitamus. Augustine summarizes the functions of imagination
(visio spiritualis) in 12.23.49.
73 De Genesi ad litteram 12.24.51: Neque enim anima sentit, sed anima per corpus, quo velut
nuntio utitur ad formandum in seipsa quod extrinsecus nuntiatur.
74 De Genesi ad litteram 12.11.22. ODaly 1987, 91.
30 Chapter 2

Augustine combines the imaginative and spiritual visions with his theory of
rewards and punishments of the soul. When the soul is released from the body,
it will be transferred to the spiritual sphere which resembles corporeal reality,
and will experience various rewards or punishments there. These cannot be
considered as false but are true joys and sorrows which are experienced with
the help of the imaginative ability of the soul, just like the joy and terror we
experience in dreams.75
In addition to Augustine, another notable mediator of philosophical models
of the mind to the Middle Ages is Boethius (d. 524), whose thinking clearly
shows the influence of Neoplatonism and knowledge of the works of Augustine
and Aristotle. Such a diverse tradition produced many important new philo-
sophical discussions and even controversial interpretations in the Middle
Ages.76 Boethius explains the significance of the imagination in his Consolation
of Philosophy, his commentaries on Aristotles De Interpretatione, and his com-
mentaries on Porphyrys Isagoge.77
Boethius offers his view concerning the abilities of the human mind in the
fifth book of the Consolation of Philosophy. He exploits the well-known divi-
sion of the instruments of the mind which lists sensation (sensus), imagina-
tion (imaginatio), and reason (ratio). However, Boethius adds the fourth ability,
i.e., understanding (intelligentia), which in a way surpasses all the other abili-
ties of the soul. In this respect, he clearly deviates from the Aristotelian
tradition on the basis of a Neoplatonic view of the abilities of the soul.78

75 De Genesi ad litteram 12.6.15; 12.24.51; 12.32.6061. Watson 1986, 47. Watson also claims that
Augustine attempts to show in the twelfth book of De Genesi ad litteram how the theory
of pneuma could be used to support the Christian doctrine of the resurrection of the
body. The mediating role of imagination is extended to the afterlife as well. Watson 1994,
48044805.
76 Erismann analyses the important discussion concerning the images and forms in the
twelfth century, noting that Boethius transmitted the Platonic principle that the forms of
the sensible world are not real ones but only images of real forms, in his Opuscula sacra.
This thesis was accepted in the Chartrian circles. However, Boethius commentaries on
Aristotle suggest a different interpretation concerning the meaning of forms. On this
Aristotelian interpretation, which prevailed in the Parisian logical debates, individuals
are the real substantial elements. Substantiality is guaranteed by placing the universals in
it, as the founder of the school of St. Victor, William Champeaux, did. Erismann 2009,
166167. See Chadwick 1981 and Marenbon 2009 for the philosophy of Boethius in general.
For the contribution of Boethius to medieval philosophy and the syncretist Platonism of
the twelfth century particularly, see Chenu 1957, 7379.
77 For the concept of imagination used by Boethius, see Bundy 1927, 172178 and Magee 1989,
100107.
78 Magee 1989, 142.
Imagination In Classical And Medieval Thought 31

Thefour-part series of the functions of the soul established by Boethius had

some influence on the spiritual theology of the Middle Ages as well as on the
philosophical speculations.79
Boethius writes about the dilemma of human free will and the omni-
science of God. He claims that God knows all particular things simultane-
ously and perfectly, whereas human knowledge is a process which proceeds
from sense perception (sensus) via imagination (imaginatio) to reason (ratio),
and finally achieves understanding (intelligentia). The senses, imagination,
reason, and understanding examine objects in their own distinct ways. The
senses perceive the form of an object as it is found in matter. However, imagi-
nation (imaginatio) can study the figure (figura) without matter. Reason
(ratio) will go even further because it examines particular objects compre-
hensively and compares them with universal forms, thus proceeding to the
universal objects of knowledge (species universales). Understanding (intelli
gentia) in turn surpasses all the other abilities of the soul and seeks the sim-
ple form (forma simplex) behind the many forms. Boethius remarks that a
higher ability of the soul can always embrace a lower ability, but a lower abil-
ity cannot rise to the level of the soul, which is higher than itself. The senses
cannot be used for other than perception of objects, and imagination cannot
see general forms in the same way as reason. In Boethius model, the role of
understanding is quite superior because understanding looks at reality as if
from above and is able to comprehend it entirely without the lower abilities
of the soul. Understanding diverges from the other instruments which are
used in knowledge formation such that understanding sees everything as if in
one vision, and even the operation of the senses, imagination, and reason are
not necessary.80
Boethius distinguishes reason and imagination from each other clearly.
When reason (ratio) considers an object, it does not use imagination or the
senses in order to understand objects which are imaginable or sensible. Reason
itself understands the objects of knowledge and defines them. As the human
being uses general concepts, he knows that they refer to things that may
be imagined or sensed. According to Boethius, this can be compared to the

79 See Courcelle 1967 for the influence of Boethius.

80 Consolatio Philosophiae V, p. 4: Ipsum quoque hominem aliter sensus, aliter imaginatio,
aliter ratio, aliter intellegentia contuetur. Sensus enim figuram in subiecta materia consti-
tutam, imaginatio uero solam sine materia iudicat figuram. Ratio uero hanc quoque tran-
scendit speciemque ipsam quae singularibus inest uniuersali consideratione perpendit.
Intellegentiae uero celsior oculus exsistit; supergressa namque uniuersitatis ambitum
ipsam illam simplicem formam pura mentis acie contuetur.
32 Chapter 2

relation between senses and the imagination in that the imagination can func-
tion with the power of its own ability which may produce images without
actual sense perceptions. Thus every instrument of the soul uses its own abili-
ties and powers.81 The characteristic of the human being is the ability to rea-
son. Nevertheless, imagination belongs to all moving animals, because they
seem to have an ability to avoid or to strive for various things, but reason is
exclusively a property of the human race.82
Boethius provided Latin translations and commentaries on Aristotle, which
were a foundation for the teaching of logic in the Middle Ages. In his commen-
tary on Aristotles Peri hermeneias (De Interpretatione) Boethius analyses the
notion of imagination in relation to understanding the signification of words
and language. In this work, Boethiuss psychology differs in some respects from
the Consolation of Philosophy. Boethius noted that the relationship between
language and reality can be understood by the analysis of things (res), thoughts
(intellectus), and spoken sounds (vox). A thing is conceived by a thought.
Spoken sounds in turn signify the conceptions of the mind and thoughts. The
thoughts both conceptualize the underlying things and are signified by spoken
sounds.83 The thoughts themselves imply a series of activities that are associ-
ated with cognitive processes. In this discussion, Boethius outlines the stages
of cognition, during which such terms as sensus, imagination, thought, simili-
tude, and the passions of the soul are expounded.84

81 Consolatio Philosophiae V, p. 4: In quo illud maxime considerandum est: Nam superior

comprehendendi uis amplectitur inferiorem, inferior uero ad superiorem nullo modo
consurgit. Neque enim sensus aliquid extra materiam ualet uel uniuersales species imagi-
natio contuetur uel ratio capit simplicem formam; sed intellegentia quasi desuper spec-
tans concepta forma quae subsunt etiam cuncta diiudicat, sed eo modo quo formam
ipsam, quae nulli alii nota esse poterat, comprehendit. Nam et rationis uniuersum et
imaginationis figuram et materiale sensibile cognoscit nec ratione utens nec imagina-
tione nec sensibus, sed illo uno ictu mentis formaliter, ut ita dicam, cuncta prospiciens.
Ratio quoque cum quid uniuersale respicit nec imaginatione nec sensibus utens imagi
nabilia uel sensibilia comprehendit. Haec est enim quae conceptionis suae uniuersale ita
definit: Homo est animal bipes rationale. Quae cum uniuersalis notio sit, tum imagina-
bilem sensibilemque esse rem nullus ignorat quod illa non imaginatione uel sensu sed in
rationali conceptione considerat. Imaginatio quoque, tametsi ex sensibus uisendi for-
mandique figuras sumpsit exordium, sensu tamen absente sensibilia quaeque collustrat
non sensibili sed imaginaria ratione iudicandi. Uidesne igitur ut in cognoscendo cuncta
sua potius facultate quam eorum quae cognoscuntur utantur?
82 Consolatio Philosophiae V, p. 5. For the applicability of different activities of the soul to
various forms of life, see Magee 1989, 142143.
83 In librum Aristotelis Peri hermeneias II.1, p. 20.1520. (Transl. Smith 2010, 25.)
84 For the analysis of this process and Boethius sources, see Magee 1989, 98141.
Imagination In Classical And Medieval Thought 33

Even though the focus of Boethius commentary on Peri hermeneias is

mainly on the problems of predication and universals, the activity of the know-
ing mind, the progress from sensation to intellection, is also considered.
According to Boethiuss account, the faculties of sense perception extract the
forms and attributes which are actually immanent in material objects.
Imagination is the precondition for thought (intellectus). Sensation and imagi-
nation are a kind of foundation upon which the mind rests. Boethius refers to
Aristotle by saying that thoughts are not images but cannot exist without
images.85 In his commentary on Porphyrys Isagoge, Boethius elaborates his
views on imagination further by discussing the threefold power of the soul in
animating the body. The first power vivifies the soul, supplying it with life so
that it may be born and grow. The second power is composite, belonging to all
those beings which possess sense perception. Each animal is able to appre-
hend the forms of things, but is also capable of holding images of them after
the sensible objects are no longer present. Animals retain these images accord-
ing to their abilities, but since they can possess images only as confused and
unclear, they are incapable of achieving anything from joining them. Such
beings have no knowledge at all of the future. However, the third kind of power,
belonging to humans only, uses the prior nutritional and sense-perceiving
powers as its handmaids and servants. Being firmly based in reason, this power
grasps perfect and well-formed sensory images, as well as explaining and con-
firming by the perfect act of understanding which imagination has suggested
it. In this pattern, imagination may provide true representations of extramen-
tal objects in the soul, but it may also produce misrepresentations of objects.86
Occasionally, however, Boethius describes how imagination may form such
things as chimeras, but he usually sees the task of combination and separation
as belonging to intellect alone.87
The impact of this discussion of cognitive faculties and epistemology in
connection with the theory of signification has far-reaching applications in
medieval theories of the imagination. These linguistically based theories of

85 In librum Aristotelis Peri hermeneias II.1, p. 2829. (Transl. Smith 2010, 2930.)
86 In Isagogen Porphyrii commenta II.1, p. 136.13137.11 (71C72A).
87 In Categorias, pl 64, 229CD. Magee 1989, 84. Sense-perception and imagination are not
the only faculties involved in the cognitive process from thing (res) to thought (intellec
tus). In accordance with imagination, Boethius associates the notion of similitude with
the maintenance of images in the memory, which forms the connection between imagi-
nation and thought. He further analyses the concept of animae passiones, which refer to
cognitive activities closely related to and prior to thought. Boethius sees thought (intel
lectus) as interchangeable with all these faculties, since thought includes all the lower
stages of cognition. Magee 1989, 104105, 113115; Cameron 2009, 8893.
34 Chapter 2

knowing were elaborated in monastic writings, such as Hugh of St. Victors

works, as well as among dialecticians, most obviously by Peter Abelard in his
psychology of signification.88

2.3 The Middle Ages to the 1100s

The channels through which the anthropological speculations of the ancient

world reached the medieval period were many and varied. The views of
Augustine and Boethius had a considerable influence on the writings of the
Middle Ages. In addition to this tradition, the literature which explored
the notion of the human soul from a new perspective also began to spread, the
texts of the Arab philosophers reaching Western Europe as translations.89
Beside the traditional material, the various schools utilized this new medical
and philosophical influx. Furthermore, Aristotles psychology became indi-
rectly known in Latin Europe through the translations of Arabic philosophical
works.90 Simultaneously, the works of many church fathers were diligently
copied; Greek texts were translated into Latin, and material from the
eclectictradition was transmitted, in consequence of which new, productive
discussions concerning the philosophy of mind began.91 Scholars combined
Aristotelian logic with the Platonist ontology, which initiated an ongoing

88 For Peter Abelards theory of mind, signification and images, see Guilfoy 2004, 203214
and Wilks 2008, 8592. According to Abelard, the act of intellection presupposes an act of
sense-perception and employs images created by the imagination. Even though intellec-
tion uses images or similitudes of things, it can also construct likenesses by itself. This is
because intellection is able to transform itself into all things. Commentary on Peri herme
neias, Glossae super Periermeneias p. 313.33: quia per formas quasdam imaginarias quas
sibi animus fingit, prout vult, rerum naturam contemplatur, imaginationem sive intel-
lectum saepe retinens. See also p. 315.5. For discussion, see Spruit 1994, 113114.
89 The amount of literature available in Western Europe multiplied and was rapidly diversi-
fied in the 1100s. The research literature often refers to it as the twelfth-century renais-
sance, one of the first being Haskins in 1927. The study of the twelfth-century renaissance
has been enthusiastic since; see, for example, Chenu 1957; Dronke 1988; Constable 1996.
90 Spruit 1994, 109.
91 See Jacquart 1988, 407428 and Jolivet 1988, 113150 for the significance of Arabic philoso-
phy in the twelfth century. Concerning the medieval Arabic philosophers theories of
mind, see Harvey 1975 and Davidson 1992. The eclectic tradition refers to the body of texts
from the early fourth century to the late sixth century containing both pagan and
Christian anthropological material. Porphyry, Calcidius, and Macrobius may be classified
as part of this tradition. For this subject, see McGinn 1977, 1113. Furthermore, the medical
discussions were already familiar through Nemesius of Emesa and John Damascene.
Imagination In Classical And Medieval Thought 35

debate concerning the relation between reason and senses, flesh and spirit. As
Coleman writes, the Boethian Aristotle would be read by Augustinian eyes.92
In the twelfth century, the theologians and philosophers eagerly discussed
the soul of the human being and its distinct structures and abilities.93 The
schools of Chartres and St. Victor as well as the Cistercians discussed the nature
of the soul, the classification of its powers, and the manner of its union with the
body. As McGinn writes, these systematic thinkers were open-minded towards
the two novel components of twelfth-century thought, the Judeo-Arabic medi-
cal and philosophical material and the writings of the Greek church fathers.94
Chenu in turn notes that this blending of diverse elements created unstable but
very significant theological and philosophical reflections.95
Many medieval texts contain discussions concerning the properties of the
soul which nowadays would be classified as pertaining to psychology or biology.
The shared medical tradition of the Middle Ages originates mostly from the
Greek theory of medicine which was preserved, remodelled, and transmitted
further through Arabic texts. In the background of this trend lies a combination
of Galens medical theory and a simplified model of Aristotles psychology.
These factors together comprise the popular descriptive psychology or psychol-
ogy of faculties which had a far-reaching impact in the Middle Ages.96
In the psychology of the faculties, each mental function is located in a
specific part of the ventricles in the brain.97 Sense perception is created by

92 Coleman 1992, 156.

93 The articles by Reypens 1937, 433469; Michaud-Quantin 1949, 1534; Talbot 1952, 3247;
and McGinn 1977, 1100 are among the few studies which deal with the general anthropol-
ogy of the 1100s. See also Hasse 2010, a useful general introduction to medieval ideas of the
souls faculties. The concept of imagination in the twelfth century in particular is anal-
ysed by Bautier 1988, 81104 and Hamesse 1988, 153184. Concerning the interesting theo-
logians who analyse the concept of imagination, Hamesse mentions Thierry of Chartres,
Clarembaud of Arras, Hugh of St. Victor, and the Cistercians in general. Hamesse does not
pay attention to other Victorine theories of imagination, that is, to the theories of Richard
and Godfrey of St. Victor. The article by Bautier includes a collection of authors who deal
with the ability to imagine and summary descriptions of their ideas. However, the analy-
sis of the development of the terminology of imagination among the Victorines is per-
functory. For a useful introduction to medieval theories of internal senses with a collection
of primary texts, see Knuuttila and Krkkinen 2013, 131145.
94 McGinn 1977, 2021.
95 Chenu 1957, 46.
96 Harvey 1975, 2, 35.
97 In the Middle Ages, several interpretations concerning the processes of the mind associ-
ated with these chambers appeared. Authors usually mention three chambers. In most of
these theories, sensation and imagination occupy the first chamber, which is located in
36 Chapter 2

stimulating the five senses, after which the data of sensation transform into
the material of conceptual thinking. This happens through the minds internal
process, which includes distinct inward sense(s) or inward wits.98 One of the
influential theories of human cognition was written by the Greek bishop of
Syria, Nemesius of Emesa (d. 400?), who drew up a summary which describes
the functioning of the human being. This includes the theory of three
chambers or ventricles of the brain.99 Nemesius of Emesa places imagination
(imaginatio, phantasia) in the first chamber, reason (ratio) in the middle cham-
ber, and memory (memoria) in the third. Imagination is a power of the non-
rational part of the soul that acts through the sense-organs. The organs of
imagination include the frontal cavities of the brain, the psychic pneuma
which is located in them, the nerves which leave from the brain moisturized by
the spirit, and all the senses.100 The faculty of imagination transmits the things
imagined to the faculty of thinking or reasoning, which receives and judges
them, and passes them on to the faculty of memory.101 Nemesius connects
the faculty of imagination with the emotions as well, defining affection as a

the frontal lobe. In the second, located in the middle of the brain, lie rational abilities; and
finally, memory operates in the third and posterior chamber. The theory of ventricles has
often been attributed to Galen but, as shown by Green, later scholars developed the idea
of placing the mental faculties in the actual ventricles. See Green 2003, 131142.
98 The notion of internal senses (wits) refers to a group of faculties to which medieval think-
ers assigned various functions associated with the imagination in Aristotles works. See
Harvey 1975; Black 2000, 69.
99 Nemesius of Emesas treatise De natura hominis (peri fyseon anthrpon) was translated
into Latin twice, first by Alfanus of Salerno (ca. 1050), then by Burgundio of Pisa (d. 1193).
It was also referred to in Latin as Premnon physicon. Nemesius text retained its influential
position inasmuch as it was attributed to Gregorius of Nyssa. For the introduction to
Nemesius book and ideas, see Sharples and Van der Eijk 2008, 132.
100 Nemesius exploits many Stoic concepts associated with medical views. In the fifth para-
graph of the book, Nemesius mentions that the Stoics use four different concepts, each
meaning imagination in its own distinctive way. These terms are imaginativum, imag
inabile, imaginatio, and phantasma. All four refer to the power of imagination which
arises from sense perceptions. According to Nemesius, these four concepts articulate
the same idea in practice. De natura hominis V, 70.4171.54: Stoici autem quattuor haec
esse aiunt: imaginationem, imaginabile, imaginativum, phantasmaDissonantia autem
his fit circa transmutationem nominum. Organa autem eius sunt anteriores cerebri ven-
tres et qui in eis est animalis spiritus et hi qui ex his sunt nervi, perfusi ab animali spir-
itu, et constructio membrorum sensuum. See the commentary by Telfer 1955, 321324
and McGinn 1977, 1516. See the translation and notes in Sharples and Van der Eijk 2008,
100102.
101 De natura hominis XII, 88.9799.
Imagination In Classical And Medieval Thought 37

perceptible movement in the faculty of appetite on the occasion of an imagi-

nation of good or evil.102
In Avicenna (9801037), one finds a new development in descriptive psy-
chology which can be described as a psychology of the faculties. Avicenna was
a well-known physician and philosopher who wrote influential treatises on
various subjects.103 Avicennas theory of imagination is an original combina-
tion of medical theories and philosophical considerations about the opera-
tions of the mind. Aristotles psychology becomes part of the medieval
philosophy of mind through these works. The influence of this transmission to
scholasticism is substantial.104
Avicenna states in his De anima that the first internal sense is the so-called
common sense (sensus communis), which is located in the front ventricle of
the brain. The common sense which collects all the individual content of sen-
sations together is needed because each sense is able to perceive only the per-
ceptions of its own area of operation. The common sense holds the impressions
for a short interval, after which it transfers them to the next power. Behind the
general sense in the front chamber, there is a kind of store of images (imagina
tio), which receives and preserves images for further processing. This image
memory does not discern or judge what it contains in any way; it is merely a
storehouse of impressions.105

102 De natura hominis XV, 93.1213. For Nemesius other accounts of the emotions, see
Knuuttila 2004, 103110.
103 In Western Europe, Avicennas best-known treatise was the Canon, which was translated
by Gerard of Cremona (d. 1187). There has also been some supposition about another
translator, Gerard Sabloneta (12th century). The Canon presents a clear and organized
summary of all the medical knowledge of the time and had a powerful influence on medi-
cal theories up to the 18th century. Avicennas other works, De viribus cordis and De medi
cinalibus, which were often attached to the Canon, circulated widely as well. Dominicus
Gundissalinus translated Avicennas philosophical work sifa into Latin in c. 1160, and its
psychological part came to be known as De anima. This work had significant resonance in
medieval discussions concerning the soul until the middle of the 13th century. The exact
dating and transmission of the translations is difficult; see Jolivet 1988, 113148. For the
medieval reception of De anima, see Hasse 2000. It is doubtful that Richard would have
been familiar with Avicennas works.
104 There is a considerable amount of research on Avicennas ideas of the imagination and its
reception in Western scholasticism; see, for instance, Harvey 1975, 4346; Davidson 1992,
95102; Black 1993, 224244; Black 2000, 5975; Hasse 2000. For the degrees of abstraction
in Avicenna and extensive references to the literature, see DAncona 2008, 4771.
105 Avicenna uses the term vis formalis in referring to the ability to imagine. Imaginatio
resembles Aristotles phantasia closely; see Harvey 1975, 72n.140. The two internal senses
of the front chamber may also be defined as phantasia.
38 Chapter 2

However, Avicenna places two separate internal senses in the central ven-
tricle of the brain. First of all, there is the capacity which can be named after its
function either as imaginative or cogitative. This ability is called imaginative as
it relates to the animal soul and cogitative in relation to the human soul.
Through these capacities, the soul can combine sensible pictures with each
other and form such images as the emerald mountain or the flying man. The
compositive imagination engages easily in random creation of new images.
However, this random activity can be controlled. When the editing of pictures
is controlled by the rational soul, this function of the soul may be referred as vis
cogitativa. As noted by Black, this cognitive faculty includes the analysis and
synthesis of propositions and syllogistic reasoning.106
There is another internal sense located in the central ventricle, i.e., vis estima
tiva, which is the highest ability of thought in the animals. All animals and some
men order their lives solely according to its prescriptions. Its task is to perceive
different intentions or purposes in sensations transmitted to it by the previous
powers. The intentions of the sensations perceived by the animal allow it to
estimate whether the object before it is useful or harmful to it with the help of
the vis estimativa and therefore choose a plan for its action. For example, the
sheep can estimate the harmful intentions of the wolf and run away. Vis estima
tiva serves as a type of instinct, but it also estimates on the basis of previous
experiences. The operation of vis estimativa is supported by the minds ability to
join and separate images and, in trying to make estimates, utilizes the products
of vis imaginativa or vis cogitativa. Avicenna formulated the human estimative
faculty in order to explain the complex human judgements that are pre-intellec-
tual, but more than merely sensible. The estimated intentions of objects are
shifted into the memory (vis memorialis et reminiscibilis), which is located in
the posterior ventricle of the brain. Memory stores up the intentions of the
individual sensible things which are apprehended by vis estimativa.107
Many philosophers in the Latin West received their outlines of the internal
senses from the Islamic philosophers, mainly from Avicenna. However, it has
been noted that their views are not accurate representations of the Arabic
sources. Latin authors further modified the complexity of the functions of the
internal senses, such as imagination and estimation. For example, the power of
estimation was seen as the animal counterpart of the practical intellect, and
was replaced in humans by the distinctive cognitive functions.108

106 Black 2000, 5962; Black 2005, 315.

107 For the ability of vis estimativa and intentions, see Harvey 1975, 4546; Black 1993, 219
258; Hasse 2000, 127153; Michon 2001, 330334.
108 Black 2000, 59.
Imagination In Classical And Medieval Thought 39

After examining medical theories of the faculties of the brain, it is interest-

ing to consider the ideas of the so-called theology of spirituality in the 1100s. In
many treatises, various abilities and functions concerning the soul were also
meticulously classified. This spiritually motivated line of thought cannot be
categorized as separate from the discussion of the psychology of faculties,
because the terminology concerning the soul of the human being is conver-
gent in many texts. However, the masters of spiritual exercise were not satis-
fied with the detailed description of the merely psychological process, because
the fundamental purpose of the analysis of the functions of the soul was to
improve the understanding of the souls journey towards God. In this progres-
sion, it was important to analyse the movements of the soul in detail, and its
turning to contemplate eternal and unchanged reality instead of the subjects
of the external, changing reality.109 This slight appreciation of the sensible
world and the ability of the imagination prevails in some theological texts,
however; the capacity of imagination to function in the zone between material
and immaterial reality is also seen as the souls unique resource, for example,
in the Cistercian circles and the school of St. Victor.110
The preoccupation with analysing the inner structures of the human being
has long been seen as an important element in the monastic spiritual litera-
ture. In religious communities, the process of interiorization emphasized the
idea of knowing oneself thoroughly in order to be able to contemplate Gods
image and likeness from within.111 The speculations of the theologians com-
bined old concepts and the novelties of the era and produced some quite new
formulations concerning the human soul and inner life in general. The
Victorine School as well as the Cistercians were interested above all in deter-
mining the various stages in the souls ascent to God. In order to do this, these

109 This can be seen, for instance, in William of St. Thierrys book The Nature of the Body and
Soul, (De natura corporis et animae, pl 180, 695726) which includes much medical dis-
cussion, but still attempts to be consistent with his theological and mystical thinking.
McGinn 1977, 4445.
110 McGinn 1977, 2122; McGinn 1995, 285. See the collection of negative descriptions of the
functioning of imagination in Bautier 1988, 9193. In these examples, imagination is usu-
ally referred to by the notion of phantasia.
111 This idea was formulated during the establishment of Christian monasticism; for
instance, in the writings of Origen (d. 254), Gregory of Nyssa (d. 395), and Evagrius
Ponticus (d. 399). For the origins of the Christian mystical tradition, see Louth 1981. For
the idea of formation of the self and inner life in the eleventh and twelfth centuries and
this idea as related the school of St. Victor, see Van t Spijker 2004, 59184. The studies
concerning the idea of inner life in the early Middle Ages are extensive. See, among oth-
ers, Chenu 1957; Javelet 1959; Javelet 1967; Constable 1996.
40 Chapter 2

scholars turned their attention to questions of classification and the dilemma

of the union of the body and soul.112
In this section I will briefly examine the texts of the theologians of the
school of St. Victor, and the literature of Cistercians, William of St. Thierry
(d.1148), Aelred of Rievaulx (d. 1167), and Isaac of Stella (d. 1169/1174?), all of
whom represent spiritually oriented philosophy of the mind in the 1100s.113
Among the theologians of St. Victor, there was considerable interest in the
functions of human imagination (imaginatio). Various aspects of imagination
were studied by Hugh (d. 1141), Richard (d. 1173), and Godfrey (d. 1191). They all
consider imagination as a necessary and beneficial ability of the soul.114
First of all, Hugh of St. Victor discusses the functions of the imagination
(imaginatio) mainly in his influential Didascalicon and his short tract De unione
corporis et spiritus, which deals with the connection between the body and the
soul. Hugh utilizes the models of both Augustine and Boethius concerning the
abilities of the soul. Furthermore, Hugh incorporates elements from the writings
of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite (d. 500?) into his theory of the human soul.115
Hughs psychology has been characterized as a blend of an unusual kind of eclec-
ticism, Peripatetic elements, Stoic doctrines and Augustinian tendencies.116
In his commentary on Dionysius the Areopagites text, Hugh claims that the
human being is able to achieve knowledge of external reality through various
kinds of senses. The external senses are five, of which Hugh discusses mainly
sight. According to his theory, the bodily sight of the human being operates
properly only if some external source sheds sufficient light on the object to be
examined. Furthermore, the human soul includes three inner capacities which
deal with the sensitive material that the external senses transmit. These capac-
ities are imagination (imaginatio), memory (memoria), and a kind of presenti-
ment (providentia).117

112 McGinn 1977, 21.

113 There are many useful references on Cistercian anthropology. See especially McGinn 1977,
who deals with William of St. Thierry, Isaac of Stella, and the anonymous text of De spiritu
et anima, as well as Talbot 1952, 951.
114 Delhaye 1951, 106.
115 For the background of Hughs thinking, see Kleinz 1944; Baron 1957; Taylor 1961; Rorem
2009b. For the influence of Pseudo-Dionysius on Hugh, see Roques 1962, 294364. Hughs
commentary on Pseudo-Dionysius established an enduring reputation, its influence
upon medieval writers being considerable. See Luscombe 2000, 159175. For Hughs theo-
logical ideas, see Coolman 2010.
116 Spruit 1994, 114.
117 Commentaria in Hierarchiam coelestem, pl 175, 1119AB: Primus enim gradus corpo-
reae vitae est sensificatio; secundus per sensum ingrediens, imaginatio; tertius per
Imagination In Classical And Medieval Thought 41

The Didascalicon is an influential pedagogical treatise in which Hugh

attempts to identify and define all the branches of knowledge important to
humanity. Hugh writes in Didascalicon that both animals and humans possess
an ability to retain the images of sense-perceived forms and thus are capable
of building a memory of them. Animals are not able to achieve anything mean-
ingful by combining or joining these images, whereas humans have reason,
which can explain what the imagination suggests.118 In his brief analysis of
mathematics, Hugh proposes that the soul may use sense organs and thus
descend into the apprehension of physical objects. The similitude (similitudo)
of these objects is then drawn into the soul through the imagination.119 He
further specifies that souls degenerate from being solely intellectible (imper-
ceptible, incorporeal) things to being intelligible things. This process occurs as
the soul descends from the understanding of the sole principles of things to
the imagination of visible objects. Hugh is clear that the intellectible in us is
what understanding is, whereas the intelligible is what imagination is.
Imagination itself is a sensible memory which is made up of the traces of
corporeal objects inhering in the mind. It includes no certain source of

imaginationem conceptorum, memoria; quartusquaedam sine intelligentiae discre-

tione providentia. Hugh does not really discuss the significance of memory at all, claim-
ing merely that it is mainly a manifestation of the imagination. Hugh introduces the
interesting notion that the so-called presentiment (providentia) is located in the fourth
stage of the sensing process. In Hughs model, presentiment is a kind of instinctive behav-
iour whose task is to estimate the usefulness or harmfulness of the perceived object, but
which operates without any rational consideration. Providentia can be regarded as analo-
gous to the rational operation, but it belongs to the sensing part of the soul. Avicennas
and Thomas Aquinas ideas on vis aestimativa correspond to this notion to some extent.
For Hughs notion of providentia, see Kleinz 1944, 37.
118 Didascalicon I, III, p. 8.1825 (743D): sed abscedente quoque sensu sensibilibus que
sepositis, cognitarum sensu formarum imagines tenent, memoriam que conficiunt, et
prout quodque animal valet, longius brevius que custodit. sed eas imaginationes confusas
atque ineuidentes sumunt, ut nihil ex earum coniunctione ac compositione efficere pos-
sint Didascalicon I, III, p. 9.1115 (744A): haec tantum humano generi praesto est, quae
non solum sensus imaginationes que perfectas et non inconditas capit, sed etiam pleno
actu intelligentiae, quod imaginatio suggessit, explicat atque confirmat. Hugh quotes
Boethiuss In Isagogen Porphyrii commenta II.1, p. 136.17137.11 (71C72A).
119 Didascalicon II, III, p. 27.612 (753CD): intelligibile autem quod ipsum quidem solo perci-
pitur intellectu, sed non solo intellectu percipit, quia imaginationem vel sensum habet,
quo ea quae sensibus subiacent comprehendit. tangendo ergo corpora degenerat, quia,
dum inuisibiles corporum formas per sensuum passiones procurrit eas que attactas per
imaginationem in se trahit, toties a sua simplicitate scinditur, quoties aliquibus contra
riae passionis qualitatibus informatur.
42 Chapter 2

knowledge.120 In his scheme of the sciences, Hugh ascribes an important role

to imagination. When it comes to the quadrivium, he writes that the abstract
quantity is the form, visible in its linear dimension, and rooted in imagination.
He adds that mathematics never operates without imagination, which is why
it possesses its objects in a composite manner.121
In his De unione corporis et spiritus, Hugh adopts a different point of view on
the imagination. The basic problem is the essential disparity between the body
and the human soul. Mediating between the body and the spirit is a hierarchy
of abilities which enables the human to ascend to higher stages of knowledge.
He considers that the human being has a kind of bodily spirit (spiritus corpo
reus) consisting of the thin essence of fire, which represents the most refined
matter and may serve as a medium between the body and the soul. Imagination
is the highest form of the bodily spirit. Hugh indeed states that imagination
(imaginatio) rises above the senses and embodies the most sublime form of
corporality. Hugh writes about the external sensing that every sense receives
the form of an external object, and moves it forward into the first ventricle of
the brain, which he calls chamber of fantasy (cella phantastica). Here imagina-
tion (imaginatio) changes the external form of the object into an image (imagi
natio), which is the mere internal variant of the external form in the mind.122

120 Didascalicon II, V, p. 29.1324 (755AB): quomodo anime de intellectibilibus ad intelligi-

bilia degenerant, quando a puritate simplicis intelligentie, quae nulla corporum fuscatur
imagine, ad uisibilium imaginationem descendunt, est igitur, ut apertius dicam, intel-
lectibile in nobis id quod est intelligentia, intelligibile vero id quod est imaginatio. intel-
ligentia uero est de solis rerum principiis, id est, Deo, ideis, et hyle, et de incorporeis
substantiis, pura certa que cognitio. imaginatio est memoria sensuum ex corporum reli
quiis inherentibus animo, principium cognitionis per se nihil certum habens.
121 The close connection between mathematical sciences and imagination is clear in Hughs
theory. Didascalicon II, VI, p. 30.14 (755B): quantitas abstracta nihil est aliud nisi forma
uisibilis secundum lineamentarem dimensionem animo impressa, quae in imaginatione
consistit. Didascalicon II, XVII, p. 36.18 (758D): mathematica autem nunquam sine imagi-
natione est, ideo que nihil uere simplex habet.
122 De unione corporis et spiritus p. 885.82886.91 (pl 177, 287AB): Nichil autem in corpore
altius vel spirituali naturae vicinius esse potest quam id ubi post sensum et supra sensum
vis imaginandi concipitur; quod quidem, in tantum sublime est, ut quidquid supra illum
est, aliud non sit quam ratio. Ipsa utique vis ignea, quae extrinsecus formata sensus dici-
tur, eadem forma usque ad intimum traducta imaginatio vocatur. Forma namque rei sen-
sibilis per radios visionis foris concepta operante natura ad oculos usque retrahitur, atque
ab eisdem suscepta visio nominatur; deinde per septem oculorum tunicas et tres humores
transiens novissime purificata et colata introrsum ad cerebrum usque transducitur et
imaginatio efficitur. Hughs source here is probably Pantegni, which was translated by
Constantine the African (d. 1087). Obviously he also knew the writings of Nemesius of
Imagination In Classical And Medieval Thought 43

Hugh uses the same notion of imaginatio to refer both to the ability of the soul
and the image. Thus imagination may designate the faculty as well as the activ-
ity or content of the soul.123
Images (imaginationes) which have been created in the chamber of fantasy
are entirely material, and both animals and humans use them. For human
beings, the images can exceed the chamber of fantasy, in which case they may
proceed into the middle chamber of the brain. There these images will be puri-
fied by reason (ratio), after which reason can utilize them.124 With the help of
imagination, the human being is able to construct the contact between the
soul and the body which is needed in the formation of knowledge. Still, imagi-
nation retains its own material nature and stays outside the substance of
thesoul.125
Hugh describes a kind of progression of capacities from the lowest corpo-
real part of the soul up to the incorporeal spirit. This process begins with the
senses and the imagination, which belong to the corporeal part of the soul.
Above imagination lies the lowest point of the incorporeal part of the soul,
which is called an imaginary affection (affectio imaginaria). There the rational
soul is affected by contact with corporeal likeness. Superior to imaginary
affection is reason, which acts on imagination (ratio in imaginationem

agens),whereas the pure reason (ratio pura) works without any imagination.
Thus imagination can assist in rational consideration, since reason acquires

Emesa. Kleinz 1944, 33. The impact of Augustine should be taken into account as well. In
his De Genesi ad litteram, Augustine employs the idea that the fire, or rather light and air,
mediate between the soul and the body. These elements are almost spiritual, which is why
the soul acts upon the body through them. De Genesi ad litteram 7.15.21; 7.20.26. For
Hughs interesting vocabulary and evaluation of sources, see Ricklin 1998, 6375.
123 Baron 1957, 58n.129. This has caused some unclarity in the analyses of De unione corporis
et spiritus. Hamesse 1988, 169 and Delhaye 1951, 1071, for example, do not pay attention to
this point, whereas in the study by Taylor 1961, 201 it is essential for the understanding of
Hughs ideas.
124 De unione corporis et spiritus p. 886.112887.115 (pl 177, 288A): Quae quidem imaginatio in
brutis animalibus phantasticam cellam non transcendit; in rationalibus autem usque ad
rationalem progreditur, ubi ipsam incorpoream animae substantiam contingit, et excitat
discretionem.
125 De unione corporis et spiritus p. 886.9195, 103105 (pl 177, 287bc): Postea eadem imagi-
natio ab anteriore parte capitis et mediam transiens ipsam animae rationalis substantiam
contingit, et excitat discretionem, in tantum iam purificata et subtilis effecta, ut ipsi spiri-
tui inmediate coniungatur veraciter tamen naturam corporis retinens et proprietatem ut
constet quod scriptum est. Quod enim imaginatio extra substantiam animae rationalis
sit, argumentum est quod bruta animalia vim imaginandi habere probantur, quae ratio-
nem omnino non habent.
44 Chapter 2

knowledge of external reality through imagination.126 Reason can make use of

the images in order to form scientific knowledge (scientia). When reason is
illuminated by the divinity, reason knows purely, and knowledge is sapiential
(sapientia). Although imagination is below understanding, both imagination
and understanding inform (informare) reason.127
Hugh does not give a minute description of how the transition between
physiologically oriented senses and the immaterial rational soul actually hap-
pens. Spruit suggests that one might understand the movement from below as
a mechanical process of knowledge formation, but adds that Hughs
Augustinian background excludes this interpretation. However, Hugh deviates
from his contemporary Platonic ideas by giving relatively great autonomy to
the senses in relation to the rational soul.128
Hughs ideas were further developed in the works of Richard (d. 1173) and
Godfrey (d. 1194) of St. Victor.129 Godfrey claims that the images of imagination
are generated by four abilities or powers of the soul, namely, ingenium,130
memory (memoria), the irascible power (irascibilitas), and the concupiscible
power (concupiscibilitas). Imagination is occupied with images which inge
nium will find, memory (memoria) retains, the concupiscible power (concupis
cibilitas) attracts, and the irascible power (irascibilitas) rejects. Thus Godefroy
connects the operation of the imagination with the affective part of the soul.
With the help of imagination, the soul may gaze at different images which
bring out feelings. Imagining sad things of the past, or waiting for coming
unpleasant matters awakes the feeling of sorrow. Godfrey also states that the

126 De unione corporis et spiritus p. 888.150154 (pl 177, 288D): Sic itaque ab infimis et extre-
mis corporibus sursum usque ad spiritum incorporeum quaedam progressio est per sen-
sum et imaginationem, quae duo in spiritu corporeo sunt. Postea in spiritu incorporeo
proxima post corpus est affectio imaginaria, qua anima ex corporis conjunctione afficitur,
supra quam est ratio in imaginationem agens. The soul is affected by the conjunction
with the body, but the dualist Augustinian position remains.
127 De unione corporis et spiritus p. 888.156159 (pl 177, 289A): Quando autem ab anima sur-
sum itur ad deum, prima est intelligentia, quae est ratio ab interiori formata, quia rationi
concurrens coniugitur praesentia divina, quae sursum informans rationem facit sapien-
tiam sive intelligentiam. Sicut imaginatio, deorsum informans rationem, scientiam facit.
Gersh suggests that the content of imagination can act as polysemous objects in dis-
course in Hughs theory; Gersh 2000, 98.
128 Spruit 1994, 113115. Spruit points out that Hughs ideas anticipate the species doctrine,
which was formulated later in the Middle Ages.
129 Delhaye 1951, 108109.
130 Cf. Didascalicon III, VII, p. 57.19 (771B): ingenium est uis quaedam naturaliter animi insita
per se valens.
Imagination In Classical And Medieval Thought 45

human being is able to imagine future pains and rewards and is thus able to
direct the soul to promote virtues and avoid vices.131
The Cistercian William of St. Thierry composed several treatises concerning
contemplation, the functions of the soul and its powers. In Williams works,
one finds two competing classifications of the faculties of the human soul, one
depending on the medical tradition, and the other on the classifications of
Augustine and Boethius.132
Williams De natura corporis et animae is a particularly interesting work,
since he integrates speculative medical writings, such as Pantegni, as one com-
ponent.133 William constructed an anthropology based on the idea of the
human body as an image of the universe and the human soul as an image and
likeness of God.134 The first part of De natura corporis et animae concerns
the physiology of the body, while the second part is dedicated to the physics of
the soul. The first part of the book is notable for its strong adherence to the
new medical theories. For instance, William discusses three different powers
(spiritus) that control the body. Man has natural, spiritual, and animal powers.
The spiritual power is common to all humans and animals, whereas humans
and only some animals possess the animal power.135 When William analyses
the action of the animal power (spiritus animalis), he distinguishes three
chambers in the brain through which this power passes. The front chamber
contains sensation and imaginative power (phantasia), the middle chamber is
for reason and discernment, and the rear chamber is meant for memory and
movement. As the animal spirit moves through the passage between the front
and rear chambers, it creates sensation, imagination, and memory. Imagination

131 Microcosmus 25, p. 50.1820: Quatuor sunt ymaginationis origines, omnium ymaginum
monstra generantes, scilicet ingenium, concupiscibilitas, memoria, irascibilitas.
Microcosmus 25, p. 51.35: Itaque ymaginatione occupata circa ymagines quas ingenium
inuenit, memoria retinet, concupiscentia attrahit, ira refugit. See Delhaye, 1951, 109111. In
the texts by Richard and Godfrey, there are many similar elements and conceptual simi-
larities. Godfrey had been one of Richards pupils and fellow workers. See the introduc-
tion and notes to the English translation of Microcosmus in Feiss 2012.
132 Coleman 1992, 200201. For an overview of Williams works and ideas, see McGinn 1994,
225274. For an analysis of Williams account of the religious experience, see Van t Spijker
2004, 185231.
133 For the medical manuscripts used by William, Isaac of Stella, and Hugh of St. Victor, see
Burnett 1994, 107. For Williams sources, see also Ricklin 1998, 2949.
134 Williams basic anthropological principles are formulated by McGinn 1995, 229234. For a
modern interpretation of Williams and Hugh of St. Victors accounts, see Agamben 1993,
9698.
135 De natura corporis et animae, pl 180, 700bc.
46 Chapter 2

and memory are perfect only in rational animals. William insists that these
three powers are corporeal instruments of the soul; the spiritual soul itself is
quite a different thing.136
In his Meditationes, William admits that the soul tends to think in terms of
images of phantasms (phantasmata), particularly when the senses do not
transmit any material. However, these images are useful only at a preliminary
stage on the way to the visionary level, which is beyond mental conceptualiza-
tion of any kind.137 William also deals with the role of imagination and images
in his Expositio altera cum cantica canticorum (Commentary on the Song of
Songs) and his Epistola aurea (Golden letter), in which he posits his notion of
three different stages which reflect various aspects of Christian life and prayer,
i.e., animal, rational, and spiritual. The animal stage represents the beginner
who cannot think or pray without corporeal images. It is characteristic of the
animal person to use images of corporeal pleasures, which is why one often
suffers from noxious images and vain fantasies. Such images easily corrupt
prayer. However, the rational person should learn to know himself better and
turn to contemplate the inner structures of his own soul, and finally become a
spiritual person. As William estimates the value of imaginary language in his
Expositio, he claims that images can serve as an aid rather than an impedi-
ment. They are a kind of corporeal vehicle leading towards truth, because the
inward spiritual love can be expressed outwardly in images borrowed from car-
nal love.138
In Augustinian fashion, Aelred of Rievaulx writes that the soul is constituted
by memory, reason, and will. Whatever it perceives by the senses is further
preserved in memory. Reason makes judgements upon this material and the

136 De natura corporis et animae, pl 180, 700C, 702B. For the terminology of spiritus in the
Middle Ages, see Chenu 1957b, 209232.
137 Meditativae orationes, pl 180, 210A: Nam ab usu vel ab oblectatione sensuum et sensibil-
ium expergefactae animae meae prima occurrit imaginatio, quae assuetam sensibilibus
animam, sensibus obturatis, sensibilium obscurat imaginibus: ut sicut tota sensibilibus
solebat vacare, sic nihil jam nisi imaginationem sensibilium cogitare sciat vel intelligere.
pl 180, 211A: Cordis sui phantasmata de te abominatur ut idola. Bell 1984, 9495.
138 Expositio altera cum cantica canticorum III, 20. p. 29.180181: et si occurrunt imaginatio-
nes, seruiunt et adiuuant potius quam impediant. Non enim infirmioribus oculis semper
inutilis est uel noxius omnis intercurrentium imaginationum usus; quarum quasi corpo-
rali vehiculo, ipso usu videndi et cogitandi corpora et corporalia assuefactus spiritus oran-
tis uel contemplantis, defertur ubi est ueritas; et licet in imagine, tamen per ipsum
cogitatae imaginis pertransit homo in idipsum afficientis ueritatis. For Williams notion
of carnal vocabulary and fleshly love as lesser expressions of spiritual love, see Renewey
2001, 2265 and Van t Spijker 2004, 199210.
Imagination In Classical And Medieval Thought 47

will consents. The body can unite with the soul through the necessary physical
medium containing the elements of air and fire, called the sensual power
(sensualis vis).139 Aelred also lists four powers of cognition, i.e., sense, imagina-
tion, reason, and understanding in Boethian manner. Aelred claims that it is
the imaginative power which ties the human being to the world. As long as
body and soul are joined, sense organs receive corporeal images. These images
are so deeply impressed in our souls that the soul is occupied with images even
in our sleep. Aelred also separately mentions imaginary, phantastical, and
spiritual visions which lie between sensual and rational visions.140
The Cistercian Isaac of Stella comments briefly on the functions of imagina-
tion in his treatise Epistola de anima.141 Isaacs overall intention is to establish
a link between the body and the soul, or the lower and higher faculties. He
analyses the abilities of the soul which are used in the knowing process by
relating two different models of the mind to each other. The first can be called
the temporal scheme of abilities.142 This model consists of forethought (inge
nium) which is directed to the future; reason (ratio), which concentrates on the
present, and memory (memoria), which contains past things. Ingenium seeks
unknown things, reason judges the things found, and memory conserves the
things that are already judged, and presents them for further consideration.
This temporal process of human knowledge formation can be compared with
Gods simultaneous intuitive understanding of everything.143

139 De anima III, p. 130.37: nullo modo animam teneri in corpore, et misceri posse cum
carne, memini disputatum, nisi mediante aliqua ui subtiliori, quae licet non sit spiritus,
pro sui tamen subtilitate ita est uicina spiritui, ut etiam spiritus appelletur. ipsa est uis
sensualis For the Cistercian Aelred of Rievaulx, see Talbot 1952; Talbot 1981; Coleman
1992, 208215; Sommerfeldt 2005.
140 Sermones de oneribus, pl 195, 368A: Est quippe visio sensualis, visio imaginaria, visio
phantastica, visio spiritualis, visio rationalis, visio intellectualis. Visio sensualis est, qua
corporeis sensibus corporalia sentiuntur. Visio imaginaria, qua earum rerum, quae per
corpus sentiuntur, intus imagines cernuntur, vel ex eis quae percepta sunt, alia quae non
sunt sensa finguntur. Visio vero phantastica est, qua corporalium rerum phantasmata vel
oculis vel animo objiciuntur.
141 For the philosophy of the mind in Isaac of Stellas works, see McGinn 1977, 4763; McGinn
1995, 284296; Deme 2007, 179192. There are some other Cistercians who wrote signifi-
cant studies on the soul and imagination. De spiritu et anima, written by an unknown
author (pl 40, 780832), is especially interesting in this respect. See Michaud-Quantin
1949, 2032; McGinn 1977, 101152, 179288.
142 McGinn 1995, 289.
143 Epistola de anima 7, pl 194, 1879CD: Ingenium ergo exquirit incognita, ratio judicat
inventa, memoria recondit judicata, et offert adhuc dijudicanda.
48 Chapter 2

Isaac also lists the anagogic abilities of the mind through which the indi-
vidual is able to rise from the knowledge of sensible things even up to divine
objects. According to Isaac, his anagogic model incorporates five different
stages, which are sense perception (sensus), imagination (imaginatio), reason
(ratio), intellect (intellectus), and understanding (intelligentia). These together
are the soul itself.144 The same five steps of knowing can be used for classifying
various kinds of objects. This means that only material objects are naturally
perceived through the function of the senses, whereas the objects of imagina-
tion (imaginatio) are images of material things. Sense perception and imagina-
tion together are useful in perceiving and mediating natural phenomena to
reason. Further, with the assistance of reason (ratio), one may perceive the
dimensions or forms of corporeal objects. These are the first incorporeal things
which still need the body to subsist. With intellect (intellectus), one can then
study created souls (the human and the angelic), and God is approached via
understanding (intelligentia). Understanding is exclusively able to exceed the
limits of time, since through understanding the soul perceives the purely
incorporeal which does not need a location to be somewhere, nor duration in
order to be at some time or other.145
Imagination (imaginatio), according to Isaac, is the capacity of the soul
which perceives the corporeal forms (forma corporearum) of bodily things that
are not present. These forms may be designated as the images and similitudes
(imagines, similitudines corporum, phantasia) of objects. Isaac points out that,
since imagination deals with forms, images, and similitudes, it has some dis-
tance from real bodily things. Thus Isaac claims that imagination is nebulous,
but still not an incorporeal thing. It is the ultimate exertion of the bodily
spirit towards invisible reality.146 In Isaacs theory, the highest point of the

144 However, the powers of the soul are not identical with it, but its unfoldings. Isaac com-
pares these five powers with the five material components of the universe. These compo-
nents are earth, water, air, ether/firmamentum and heaven/empyreum. Epistola de anima
8, pl 194, 1879D1880A: Dicitur ergo sensus corporeus, imaginatio, ratio, intellectus, intel-
ligentia. Haec tamen omnia in anima, non aliud sunt quam anima. Aliae et aliae inter se
proprietates propter varia exercitia, sed una essentia rationalis, et una anima. Cf. Isaacs
Sermones, pl 194, 1702A.
145 Epistola de anima 1016, pl 194, 1880C1885B. McGinn 1995, 290.
146 Epistola de anima 11, pl 194, 1881B: Imaginatio autem ea vis animae est, quae rerum cor-
porearum percipit formas, sed absentes. imaginatio vero ipsorum verorum tantum
similitudines et imagines, unde imaginatio nominatur: quae cum non sint vera corpora,
nec verae corporum qualitates, elongatio quaedam et evaporatio a corporeis et imagina-
tio, nec tamen ad incorporeum perventio, extremi spiritus corporei conatus.
Imagination In Classical And Medieval Thought 49

body (corporis supremum) is the faculty of the sense (sensualitas carnis),147

whereas the lowest point of the soul (infimum spiritus) is called the ability of
imagination (phantasticum animae). These extremities are similar in each to
the extent that body and soul may be joined in a personal union without the
confusion of nature.148 Still, imagination must always be described as on the
edge of the corporeal, since it has no capacity to transcend the level of corpo-
real similitudes at which it operates. Only reason (ratio) is able to perceive the
natures, forms, and proper accidents of corporeal things.149 The five powers of
the soul, sense perception, imagination, reason, intellect, and understanding,
are structured like ascending steps to knowledge for the soul as it makes its
pilgrimage in the visible world in its body. These powers resemble internal feet
which carry the spirit into itself and eventually into the fullness of wisdom.150
McGinn notes that the abstraction process is not Aristotelian, since instead of
a continuum of impressions starting from corporeal world, Isaac provides an
analogous operation of the soul in which sensations are intelligible impres-
sions. This means a clear break between the lower stages of epistemological
functions and the higher stages of knowing.151

147 McGinn points out that this faculty is the same as physical spirit, spiritus corporeus. Isaac
has a number of terms for this faculty, such as spiritus vitalis and spiritus pecoris. McGinn
1977, 57n.230.
148 Epistola de anima 11, pl 194, 1881C: Sunt tamen utriusque quaedam similia, corporis vide-
licet supremum, et spiritus infimum in quibus sine naturarum confusione, personali
tamen unione, facile necti possunt. facile et convenienter uniuntur in suis extremitati-
bus, id est in phantastico animae; quod fere corpus est, et sensualitate carnis, quae fere
spiritus est. Isaacs vocabulary is not clear in this respect. It would seem that he distin-
guishes the notions of imagination (imaginatio) and an ability of the imagination (phan
tasticum animae). Phantasticum animae is the lowest point of the soul. Isaac writes that
the most sublime part of the body is the faculty of sensation (sensualitas carnis). In addi-
tion, he claims that imagination is the ultimate effort of the bodily spirit, still not yet
incorporeal. See the table in McGinn 1977, 9798.
149 Epistola de anima 14, pl 194, 1883D1884B.
150 Epistola de anima 8, pl 194, 1880AB. In this connection Isaac refers to the cosmic dimen-
sion of the soul, where earth, water, air and ether have their counterparts in the human
soul and its abilities.
151 McGinn 1972, 173. Epistola de anima 8, pl 194, 1880AB.
 Chapter 3

The Fundamentals of Richards Anthropology

3.1 Richards Theological Anthropology

As Hugh of St. Victor says, what is the human being but the soul?1 According to
Richard, if the soul does not practise self-analysis and know itself, it will never
be able to rise to know God.2 This dictum is supported by the classic maxim of
the Greek tradition, Know thyself, gnthi seauton, which is also repeated in
Richards texts.3 I will next discuss the basics of Richards anthropology and the
essential concepts of the soul he uses.4
The human soul, its potencies, abilities, parts and motions occupy a central
position in Richards thinking, issues which are evident in most of his texts. For
instance, in Liber exceptionum Richard introduces his basic model of fallen
man and his soul. De exterminatione mali et promotione boni reflects the ideas
of the active and contemplative life and the beginning of ascent towards God,
and De statu interioris hominis discusses the condition of the inner man and
examines free will. Both Benjamin Minor and Major contain analysis related to
the operation of the soul and its epistemological and spiritual processes.
Richard turns to consider the problem of the human soul even in his more
theological works such as De Trinitate.

1 De sacramentis II, i, 11. pl 176, 407D: Quid enim magis est homo, quam anima?
2 bmin LXXI, p. 296.1417: Prius est ut cognoscas inuisibilia spiritus tui, quam possis esse ido-
neus ad cognoscenda inuisibilia Dei. Alioquin, si non potes cognoscere te, qua fronte praesu-
mis apprehendere ea quae sunt supra te?
3 bmin LXXVIII, p. 316.710, 1314: De coelo enim descendit gnoothi seauton illud, id est:
Nosce teipsum. Richard makes an audacious statement here. Chtillon sees a reference to
Juvenals Satire XI, 27 via Macrobiuss Somnium Scipionis. See Longre 1997, 316 ref. Cf. anony-
mous/Hugh of St. Victors De contemplatione et ejus speciebus II, p. 43.5. De contemplatione et
ejus speciebus has an important relationship with Richards works and vocabulary. The attri-
bution of this work has been disputed, its author been thought to be Hugh, his disciples, or
even Richard himself. Bejczy 2004, 433443. The principle of the so-called Christian Socratism
derives from the era of Origen; see Courcelle 1974, 243.
4 For Richards anthropology and psychology, see Ebner 1917; Ottaviano 1933, 411541; Ribaillier
1967, 1429 and Chtillon 1988, 632639. Chtillon considers that the studies by Ebner and
Ottaviano are somewhat inaccurate and out-of-date; see Chtillon 1988, 634. Cf. interesting,
recent related studies by Aris 1996; Den Bok 1996, 124137; Van t Spijker 2004, 129184;
Coulter2006.

koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2014|doi 10.1163/9789004279452_004

The Fundamentals Of Richards Anthropology 51

In his Liber exceptionum, which was composed as preliminary reading for

beginners, Richard reveals some fundamental principles of his anthropologi-
cal and epistemological theories.5 The foundation of Richards idea of the
human being is the image (imago) and likeness (similitudo) of God, which is
impressed in the very essence of man in creation.6 He justifies his main anthro-
pological principle using the first chapter of Genesis: Let us make man in our
image, after our likeness (Gen. 1:26). The individual will find permanent ves-
tiges of the creator in his own soul. Richard affirms that the image of God
(imago Dei) in man is his rationality, whereas the similitude of God (similitudo)
refers to the love or affectivity of the soul.7 The double power (gemina vis) of
reason and affection is often mentioned in Richards texts. Reason (ratio) con-
tains all the operations of the soul which are related to the gaining of knowl-
edge, whereas affection (affectus) subsumes the operations of the emotional
life and the will. Reason and affection are the two constitutive elements
required for balanced unity.8

5 This work by Richard was edited by Chtillon in 1958 from the scattered manuscripts and
fragments which were previously attributed to Hugh of St. Victor (Textes philosophiques du
Moyen Age 5). At the beginning of his years at St. Victor, sometime between 1153 and 1159,
Richard wrote this large treatise, probably for the novices of the school. Richards aim is to
offer an encyclopedic overview in the tradition of Hugh of St. Victors Didascalicon. Liber
exceptionum gathers together basic principles of the time concerning the arts, the forms of
knowledge, the subjects of secular and divine writings, the senses of the scripture, geography,
and biblical history. For an introduction to the subjects of Liber exceptionum, see Chtillon
1958, 711, 6893; Van t Spijker 2004, 132136; Coulter 2013, 289296.
6 Chtillon 1988, 632.
7 Liber exceptionum I, I, cap. I, p. 104.49: Fecit autem eam ad imaginem et similitudinem
suam: ad imaginem suam secundum rationem, ad similitudinem suam secundum dilectio-
nem. Ad imaginem suam secundum cognitionem veritatis, ad similitudinem suam secun-
dum amorem virtutis. Ad imaginem suam secundum intellectum, ad similitudinem suam
secundum affectum, In Richards model of the soul, affectivity refers to love (dilectio). The
influence of Hugh of St. Victor is evident; see De sacramentis I, VI, 2. pl 176, 264C: Factus est
homo ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei,imago secundum rationem, similitudo secundum
dilectionem. Richard gives another definition of this topic in his De statu interioris hominis,
which was probably inspired by the De gratia et libero arbitrio of Bernard of Clairvaux. See De
statu interioris hominis c. XIV, p. 78 (pl 196, 1126CD): Hujusmodi namque consensus cur non
recte dicatur ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei factus, in quantum liber, ad imaginem, in
quantum rationalis, ad similitudinem? Cf. also bmin LXV, p. 274.2831: Inter omnia Dei dona
quae ad salutem hominis spectare uidentur, primum et principale donum bona uoluntas
esse cognoscitur, per quam in nobis diuinae similitudinis imago reparatur.
8 bmin III, p. 96.37: Omni spiritui rationali gemina quaedam uis data est ab illo Patre lumi-
num, a quo est omne datum optimum, et omne donum perfectum. Una est ratio, altera affec-
tio; ratio, qua discernamus, affectio, qua diligamus; ratio, ad ueritatem, affectio, ad uirtutem.
52 Chapter 3

However, Richard continues to explain that Gods image and similitude in

man have been distorted by the fall. As a consequence of this, our natural abili-
ties have been significantly weakened and disrupted. As Richard writes in his
Sermones, the human being was left half-alive (semivivus), since the divine
image, reason, was not completely erased.9 The aim of the various theories
concerning the soul and the body is to analyse the state of the fallen soul and
to show the way back towards incorrupt humanity.10 The weakened function of
the soul, and attempts to find adequate remedies are dealt with in many of
Richards works, such as Liber exceptionum,11 De statu interioris hominis post
lapsum,12 De exterminatione mali et promotione boni,13 and De eruditione homi-
nis interioris14 as well as both Benjamin Minor and Benjamin Major. Just like the
other Victorines, Richard describes the consequence of the fall as the impair-
ment of the abilities which are related to the epistemic processes and instru-
ments of the soul. Thus the theory of knowledge and consequences of sin are
intertwined in his writings.
In his De statu interioris hominis, Richard deals with some specific features
of his anthropology, which are partly related to the medical theories of the
time. First of all, he states that man is a microcosm, and urges that this small
world should be examined in order to find the image and similitude of God.15
There is continuity between man and the cosmos, which means that the

9 Sermones centum, pl 177, 1120C: Homo igitur spoliatus et vulneratus, spoliatus bonis, vul-
neratus malis, semivivus est relictus, quia etsi in humana natura possit divina similitudo,
quae in dilectione est, penitus corrumpi, divina tamen imago, quae est in ratione, non
potest penitus deleri.
10 Salet considers this idea in a more theologically oriented work by Richard, De Trinitate.
Salet 1964, 7388.
11 Liber exceptionum I, I, cap. IV, p. 105.
12 De statu interioris hominis post lapsum. Ed. by Ribaillier, Archives dHistoire Doctrinale et
Littraire du Moyen Age, 42 (pl 196, 11151160).
13 De exterminatione mali et promotione boni, pl 196, 10731114.
14 De eruditione hominis interioris, pl 196, 12991366.
15 De statu interioris hominis post lapsum c. XIV, p. 78 (pl 196, 1126C): Quaere, obsecro, in
microcosmo, nam et sic dictus est homo, quaere inquam, in microcosmo, hoc est minore
mundo, quaere in corde humano quid sit illud quod ad imaginem et similitudinem
Dei formatur. The idea of a reduced world also appears in Benjamin Major. bmaj III, XX,
p.78.2879.1: quomodo sit per tot corporis membra diffusa, cum sit ipsa simplex parti-
busque carens individua essentia, quomodo in toto corpore suo quasi in suo quodam
mundo sit utique ubique tota, quemadmodum Deus invenitur ubique totus in omni crea-
tura sua. The idea of man as a microcosm was popular among the medieval theologians.
For the various theories of the microcosm as an image of the macrocosm, see Chenu 1957,
2437; Wber 1991, 6173.
The Fundamentals Of Richards Anthropology 53

v arious cosmic principles are represented in man. Furthermore, the continuity

is not all, since there is some reciprocity involved as well. The disorder of man
provokes instability in the universe. The inner conflict between affections,
vices, virtues and thoughts are reflected in the ongoing battles between
nations, wars, and even family quarrels. The individual is put into the middle
of the material and spiritual worlds, in both of which one participates.16
However, the dualism of the body and the soul is evident even though,
according to Richard, man is essentially a spiritual and corporeal entity. He
seems to be consistent in thinking that man is made up of both the soul and
the body. The disunity of body and soul is the consequence of sin.17
The perfect union of the body and soul of the human being is a necessary
precondition for a balanced life. Achieving this harmony however requires
mainly the well-regulated operation of the soul. In consequence, it is not that
important to examine the physiological details of the body, and the anatomy of
the human being is presented in a simplistic form. Man is constructed of three
principal organs, the head, the heart, and the legs. Richard straightforwardly
names their counterparts in the soul: the head represents free will, the heart
deliberation, and the legs carnal desires, which represent the affects or the
appetite.18 The human body is a living organism which is regulated by humours.
Richard mentions the four classical humours (blood, phlegm, black bile, and
yellow bile), each of which should have its appropriate measure in order to
constitute a healthy life in man.19 This definition of healthiness is clearly

16 De statu interioris hominis c. XVIIXIX, p. 8184 (pl 196, 1128A1130B). Ribaillier 1967, 16.
17 Den Bok 1996, 378n.12. Den Bok remarks that Richard values the body as an important
part of the human person. De Trinitate III, IX, p. 144.1214: Constat namque homo ex cor-
pore et anima, et hec duo simul nonnisi una persona. Cf. Hughs discussion in De
Sacramentis II, i, 11. pl 176, 403B: Quia in natura hominis duo sunt: anima et caro. Ubi
haec duo sunt, totus homo est.
18 De statu interioris hominis c. II, p. 65 (pl 196, 1118B): Scimus autem quia in humano cor-
pore caput tenet summum locum, pes imum, cor medium et intimum. Caput liberum
arbitrium, cor consilium, pes carnale desiderium. This anatomical model is inspired by
verses in Isaiah (1,56) which mention these three organs. Cf. the idea in Liber exceptio-
num, II, X, cap. XXI, p. 413415. Richard discusses the possibility of spiritual members of
the soul. The head represents the mind, the colours of the hair represent the thoughts, the
eyes signify contemplation, and so on. 413.711: Habet membra spiritualia, scilicet virtu-
tes. Sicut enim exterius membris sibi convenientibus formatur, sic interius virtutibus sibi
concordantibus mirabiliter disponitur et ordinatur, et ipsa membra corporis virtutes figu-
rant substantiae spiritualis. p. 414.5758: Membra igitur hominis exteriores virtutesdesig
nant hominis interioris.
19 De statu interioris hominis c. XXXIV, p. 101 (pl 196, 1141BC): sanitas corporis est integritas
naturalis complexionis humorumque omnium commensuratio proportionalis. Infirmitas
54 Chapter 3

influenced by Arabic medical texts.20 Richards discussion moves swiftly on to

questions of parallelism between health in the body and the soul, because he
considers that spiritual and bodily unsoundness correlate. Furthermore, the
four humours correspond to the four elements of fire, air, water, and earth, and
have a connection with the four principal affections as well.21 However, Richard
prefers to discuss only their relations with the affections and the inner life. The
general physiologically oriented theory of psychological faculties does not
seem to interest Richard much in spite of his knowledge of its basic princi-
ples.22 Still, he briefly comments on the idea of three different spirits (spiritus)
which are instruments utilized by the souls various powers.23
In Benjamin Major, Richard gives a brief description of the soul in general,
writing that it is a kind of perpetual life that cannot ever be extinguished by
any pain or torment. In addition, the soul is able to animate the body into a
living and sensing being. The soul needs no external support, and is able to
subsist eternally without assistance. It is diffused through many members of
the body, and exists completely in a kind of world of its own. The soul moves

autem est sanitatis privatio integritatisque corruptio. Quatuor ergo sunt humores ex
quibus omne corpus conficitur, vegetatur, moderatur, nutritur atque conservatur.
20 Ribaillier notes that Richards definition is exactly the same as in Pantegni by Con
stantine the African. It is unclear whether this was Richards direct source, since many
authors known to Richard exploit these same passages, as is the case in William of
St.Thierrys De natura corporis et animae and Hugh of Fouilloys De medicina animae.
Ribaillier 1967, 18.
21 De statu interioris hominis c. XXXIV, p. 102 (pl 196, 1141C): Quod autem sunt quatuor
humores in corpore, hoc sunt quatuor principales affectiones in corde, et quod est sensus
in carne, hoc est intellectus in mente. The four principal affections are love, hatred, joy,
and sorrow.
22 Richard seems to know the works which contain descriptions of the human being which
are related to the Galenic medical tradition, such as Nemesius of Emesas De natura homi-
nis, which was translated into Latin in the eleventh century, and John Damascenes De fide
orthodoxa. In the treatise De statu interioris hominis, Richard uses one of William of
St. Thierrys books, De natura corporis et animae and its first part, in which physiological
psychology is clearly represented. The important teacher of Richard, Hugh of St. Victor,
introduces the basic ideas of physiological psychology in his influential tract, De unione
corporis et spiritus. See above.
23 De statu interioris hominis c.VII, p. 69 (pl 196, 1120C): Ut secundum phisicos de his
aliquid loquar, sicut sedem habet in capite spiritus animalis et in epate spiritus natu-
ralis, sic sedem sortitur in corde spiritus vitalis; et, sicut per spiritum animalem corpus
sensificatur et modificatur, et sicut per spiritum naturalem vegetatur, sic per spiritum
vitalem vivificatur. For a short account of corporeal spirit, see De Trinitate VI, X,
p.239.1215.
The Fundamentals Of Richards Anthropology 55

and directs all things by will alone.24 Although Richard emphasizes the sim-
plicity and identity of the soul, he seems to admit a distinction between the
soul and its powers. The mind uses its faculties as instruments through which
it is able to grasp different kinds of objects. Richard writes that the mind uses
imagination as an instrument in order to imagine something.25 The minds
instruments allow one to understand the difference between objects of knowl-
edge as well.26
In his De exterminatione mali et promotione boni, Richard briefly presents
his theory of the human souls single nature, which is constituted as one sub-
stance. Richard describes how the word of God splits the souls indivisible
single essence into two, spirit (spiritus) and soul (anima). However, he points
that man does not have an essence which is spirit and something else which is
soul. Nor must we, according to him, understand spirit and soul to mean a
twofold substance. Richard claims that one can distinguish between the twin
powers of the same essence. The higher is called spirit (spiritus) and the lower
soul (anima). In this division, the soul, and that which is animal (animale),
remain below, but the spiritual part reaches upwards, not needing any material
images in the upper stages of its ascent.27 According to his general theory of

24 bmaj III, XX, p. 78.2379.2: In primo itaque gradu huius contemplationis consideramus
ea, quae pertinent ad animae qualitatem vel essentiae ipsius proprietatem, quod vita
quaedam et perpetua sit quae nullis poenis, nullis umquam tormentis extingui possit,
quod non solum possit ipsa in perpetuum vivere, sed corpus etiam ad vitam et ad sensum
animarequod sine subsidio sempiterne subsistat, quomodo sit per tot corporis membra
diffusa, cum sit ipsa simplex partibusque carens individua essentia, quomodo in toto cor-
pore suo quasi in suo quodam mundo sit ubique unique tota, quomodo in illo suo
mundo sola voluntate omnia movet atque disponit.
25 bmin XVII, p. 134.1519: Imaginatio ergo, quando instrumentum significat, est illa uis ani-
mae qua cum voluerit quodlibet imaginari potest. Hoc instrumento, cum ad aliquid imag-
inandum mens utitur, actio proculdubio quaedam efficitur, quae similiter imaginatio
nominatur. Cf. Nonnullae allegoriae tabernaculi foederis, pl 196, 197A. The question about
the souls essence and its relation to its powers was widely-canvassed among medieval
thinkers. Appealing to the Augustinian tradition, some theologians refused to distinguish
the soul and its operations. However, Hugh of St. Victor, among others, accepts a distinc-
tion between the soul and its faculties, maintaining that the soul operates through its
faculties. This distinction is then reduced to a minimum; the faculties are accidents or
affections of the soul. For this subject, see Gilson 1936, 444445.
26 bmaj III, II, p. 57.1114.
27 De exterminatione mali et promotione boni, pl 196, 1114B1115A: Neque enim in homine
uno alia essentia est eius spiritus, atque alia ejus anima, sed prorsus una eademque sim-
plicisque naturae substantia. Non enim in hoc gemino vocabulo gemina substantia intel-
ligitur; sed, cum ad distinctionem ponitur gemina vis ejusdem essentiae, una superior per
56 Chapter 3

the soul, Richard, however, usually disregards this distinction and exploits
such terms as animus, anima, spiritus, and mens synonymously, even though
he prefers the notions of animus and mens.28 The interchangability of these
terms is characteristic of twelfth-century theology.29 In Benjamin Minor, how-
ever, Richard defines animus as a distinctive rational soul.30
Occasionally Richard formulates a triadic principle of posse, scire, and velle
to describe three distinct activities of the soul, power, knowing, and will.
Richard notes that these activities cannot be separated from each other, just
like length, breadth, and height in the three-dimensional object.31 He reformu-
lates this triad in Benjamin Major, claiming that it is natural for every rational
creature to exist, to know, and to will (esse, scire, velle).32
In an article which deals with the philosophy of mind in the twelfth century,
Pierre Michaud-Quantin claims that it is difficult, not to say impossible, to con-
struct a specific Victorine classification or hierarchy of the potencies of the

spiritum, alia interior per animam designatur. In hac itaque divisione, anima et quod
animale est in imo remanet; spiritus autem et quod spirituale est ad summa evolat.
Cf.Mysticae adnotationes in Psalmos, pl 196, 363B: Duo nominantur anima, et spiritus.
Duo quidem non per essentiam, sed per efficientiam. Anima vivit, spiritus discernit
Richard does not talk about the substance of the body or flesh in this respect. Richards
discussion about the nature of the human being which consists of one person and two
substances can be found in his De Trinitate III, IX, p. 143144 and IV, XXV, p. 190192. For
this idea, see Den Bok 1996, 377378.
28 See, for instance, the opening chapters of Benjamin Major, in which Richard employs the
notions of animus and mens. They are clearly synonyms. See bmaj I, IV, p. 9.2530. For
some reason, Richard refers more frequently to the notion of anima in the last three
books of the Benjamin Major. For this, see bmaj III, XIV, p. 7172; III, XXIII, p. 83.
Augustines terminology undoubtedly has an influence on Richards text. In Augustines
theory of the soul, since anima refers to the soul of man and animals, anima and animus
may be used interchangeably. The mind, mens, is the best part of the soul. Animus may
also refer to this part. Spiritus, in turn, can also be equated with mens. For this rich termi-
nology and its sources in Augustine, see ODaly 1987, 78.
29 Cf. William of St. Thierrys theory of the human soul. The references appear in Bell
1984, 96.
30 This appears in many passages in Benjamin Minor, see, e.g., bmin IV, p. 94.13; bmin XL,
p.208.30. A similar idea of the rational soul, animus, is also found among the Cistercians.
McGinn 1977, 37.
31 Causam quam nesciebam III, p. 210, 105110: Dum enim in unoquoque nostrum posse,
scire, velle a se non discrepant, quasi longitudo, latitudo et altitudo in nullo discordant.
Cf. Achard of St. Victors ideas on the three inner dwellings of Christ in the soul of man.
Chtillon 1969, 224.
32 bmaj III, XII, p. 70.56: Ex ipsa creationis suae conditione naturale est omni rationali
creaturae esse, scire et velle.
The Fundamentals Of Richards Anthropology 57

soul (potentiae animae). Distinct De anima literature never existed among the
Victorines.33 This can be considered as an overstatement, since the basic
twelfth-century terminology which describes the cognitive and affective
aspects of the human being was utilized in many Victorine works. However,
since the concepts are fluid, no clear-cut classification was devised.34 In addi-
tion, Richard himself does not mention his sources.35 These circumstances
lead to problems in the analysis of his anthropological theory. Because Richard
espouses several different models of the soul, it is difficult to suggest any
straightforward philosophical theory or list of its abilities. Analysing the vari-
ous concepts concerning the human being is challenging since the terms can
vary considerably even within one treatise.36
Although Richard does not provide a fixed anthropological or epistemologi-
cal terminology, it is useful to make some general remarks on his basic terms
related to the abilities or functions of the soul.
I will next offer a brief introduction to the notions of sense-perception (sen-
sus), imagination (imaginatio), reason (ratio), understanding (intelligentia),
and affection (affectio) in Richards writings. According to Benjamin Minor and
Benjamin Major, every rational human spirit (spiritus rationalis) has two pow-
ers (vis), i.e., reason and affection. The power of reason includes the senses, the
imagination, reason, and understanding, while the power of affection consists

33 Michaud-Quantin 1949, 3233.

34 In addition to Richard and Hugh of St. Victor, Godfrey of St. Victor (d. 1194) and Achard of
St. Victor (d. 1171) composed treatises concerning the human soul and its abilities. Godfrey
is known for his De Microcosmo (Le Microcosmus de Godefroy de Saint-Victor) and Achard
for his De discretione animae, spiritus et mentis.
35 The sources of inspiration of Richards extensive production have never been systemati-
cally investigated and he does not really mention his sources at all. His dependence, how-
ever, on many classical poets is clear, as well as the church fathers, especially Augustine,
Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, Boethius, Peter Lombard, and Bernard of Clairvaux.
Nevertheless, above all Richard is a faithful disciple of Hugh, echoes from the writings of
the master of the school of St. Victor being found throughout his work. Even if Richard
indeed binds himself clearly to the tradition, he uses the material in an original way and
is considered an individual thinker, particularly in his spiritual theology. Chtillon 1988,
628629. See attempts to determine the texts used by Richard, Dumeige 1952, 11, 12, 19n.2
and Chase 1995, 164. Ribaillier 1967, 1518 considers the influence of the contemporary
anthropological trends in Richards ideas.
36 Chtillon 1988, 628 writes of Richards anthropological terminology: La vocabulaire de
Richard est dune grand lasticit. De mots diffrents peuvent dsigner une mme ralit,
et une mme mot peut correspondre des objects dissemblables. Richard largit ou
restreint la signification des termes quil emploi selon les circonstances ou selon les exi-
gences de sa rhthorique.
58 Chapter 3

of affections (affectiones) and sensitivity (sensualitas), as well as free will.37

However, it should be remembered that Richard considers these two powers of
the soul as dependent on each other in a complex way. Since both these pow-
ers of the soul are rooted in corporeality, the union of the body and soul is
shown by the fact that both mental powers have their firm connection with
their corporeal counterparts. These are sense perception (sensus) and sensual-
ity (sensualitas).38

3.2 The Rational Power of the Soul: Sensus, Imaginatio, Ratio,

and Intelligentia

The rational power of the soul includes all the human epistemological equip-
ment, in other words, those instruments of the mind used to achieve knowl-
edge about the surrounding reality and oneself. According to Richard, man can
gain knowledge through a process which proceeds from sense perception (sen-
sus) to imagination (imaginatio) and reason (ratio) and culminates in under-
standing (intelligentia). Richard uses this four-part series of perception,
imagination, reason, and understanding as the main principle which is to be
found in the philosophical theories in both Benjamin Minor and Major. In ana-
lysing the rational soul and epistemology, Richard clearly leans on Augustine,
Boethius, and Hugh of St. Victor.39

37 In this study, I will use the notion of ability or power of the soul, as I am referring to imagi-
nation, reason or understanding. Richard tends to avoid the standard notion of faculty,
preferring to use the phrase double power (gemina vis) of the mind. These two powers are
like sisters or sister-wives. bmin III, p. 96.35: Omni spiritui rationali gemina quaedam
uis data est ab illo Patre luminum, a quo est omne datum optimum, et omne donum per-
fectum. Una est ratio, altera affectio. Occasionally Richard refers to the imagination as a
faculty as well. See bmaj III, XXI, p. 79.2627. In Benjamin Minor, Richard also uses the
term instrument (instrumentum). bmin XVII, p. 134.24.
38 Den Bok 1996, 389. For the close relationship and interdependence between the affective
and rational parts of the soul, and their connection with the senses and sensuality, see
bmin III, p. 96.317; Liber exceptionum I, I, cap. I, p. 104; Mysticae adnotationes in Psalmos,
pl 196, 363B, 369D; 367D: Ad intellectum enim pertinet sapere, intelligere, discernere,
scire; ad affectum confidere, diligere. Sed scimus quia omnis affectio ex cogitatione ori-
tur. Nunquam enim mens circa aliquid afficitur, nisi prius res ipsa per cogitationem videa-
tur. bmaj IV, X, p. 97.2730: Debet itaque in nobis crescere semper et ex cognitione
dilectio et nichilominus ex dilectione cognitio et mutuis incrementis mutua incrementa
ministrare debent et alternis augmentis alterna augmenta accrescere habent.
39 Chtillon 1988, 628; Aris 1996, 50; Brown 2001, 16.
The Fundamentals Of Richards Anthropology 59

Richard writes that we are used to seeing corporeal things visibly, presently
and corporeally by means of corporeal sense,40 emphasizing the significance
of sensible objects (sensibilia) as a starting-point for human knowledge forma-
tion. In Benjamin Major, this appears in the ordering of contemplation into six
kinds, of which the first should consider all those things that enter into the
soul through the five bodily senses.41
Sensible objects (sensibilia) are grasped with the help of the five senses, for
which Richard uses varying concepts, including sensus, sensus corporeus, and
sensus carnis.42 The notion of sensus is ambiguous, and without the additional
attributes like corporeal (corporeus), fleshly (carnis) or external (externa, foris)
it does not necessarily refer to bodily senses only. It can also denote other pow-
ers of immediate acquaintance. This being the case, Richard often uses some
clarifying attribute in connection with the term sensus. These attributes may
be such as intellectualis, spiritualis, or rationalis.43 It should be noted that

40 bmaj III, IX, p. 66.1922: Sed sicut corporalia corporeo sensu videre solemus visibiliter,
praesentialiter atque corporaliter, sic utique intellectualis ille sensus invisibilia capit
invisibiliter quidem, sed praesentialiter, sed essentialiter.
41 bmaj II, I, p. 22.57.
42 Sensus corporeus, see bmin V, p. 102.2324; bmin LXXXII, p. 326.1516; bmaj II, II, p. 23.13
14; De eruditione hominis interioris, pl 196, 1261B; sensus carnis, see bmin V, p. 102.21,22;
bmaj II, XVII, p. 41.18; Mysticae adnotationes in Psalmos, pl 196, 331A.
43 See, for example, De eruditione hominis interioris, pl 196, 1300D: Quid hic intelligitur per
stratum, nisi intimae quietis otium, visio vero capitis, illuminatio sensus intellectualis. In
Apocalypsim Joannis, pl 196, 705C: Spiritualiter enim videre, intelligere est. Sicut enim
oculo carnis videmus visibilia, sic per intelligentiam invisibilia videmus. Also bmaj IV,
XXIII, p. 121.1719: Ad illum maxime pertinet sensus rationalis, ad istum vero sensus intel-
lectualis. In illo sane speculamur invisibilia nostra, in isto contemplamur invisibilia div-
ina. bmin III, p. 96, 1013: Ex ratione oriuntur consilia recta, ex affectione desideria
sancta. Ex illa spirituales sensus, ex ista ordinati affectus. Ex ista denique omnis uirtus, ex
illa uero ueritas omnis. Richard discusses spiritual sensation mainly in his De IV gradibus
violentae caritatis. For the interesting example of spiritual hearing, see In Apocalypsim
Joannis, pl 196, 704C704D: Credibile est, quod sicut spiritualiter vidit, ita etiam spiritu-
aliter audivit, et sicut fuit spiritualis visio, sic quoque fuit spiritualis auditio. See also Liber
exceptionum II, X, cap. V, p. 386.3335: Fenestre hujus domus sunt sensus spirituales, per
quos divina cognitio nobis irradiat et penetralia nostre mentis illustrat. The idea of the
house and its windows is interesting, since there is a long literary tradition according to
which the five external senses are like the windows through which the mind perceives.
See Vinge 1975, 35. On the theme of sensus spiritualis in Richard, see Tedoldi 1999, 8488.
de Lubac points out that divine objects, such as the incarnate word, are revealed only to
the eyes of the heart, inner eyes, spiritual eyes, eyes of the soul, and the eyes of faith.
See de Lubac 2000, 108.
60 Chapter 3

Richard distinguishes the external senses from the sense of the heart (sensus
cordis).44 He also lists the senses of the mind (sensus mentis), which include
thinking (cogitatio), imagination (imaginatio), reason (ratio), memory (memo-
ria) and understanding (intelligentia), and are distinguished from the bodily
senses (sensus corporei).45
The five bodily senses are sight, taste, smell, touch, and hearing, of which
the sense of sight occupies a special position in the Christian (and Platonic)
tradition. As an example of bodily senses, Richard reiterates that white and
black, hot and cold, sweet and sour are perceivable by corporeal sense only,
and cannot be proved by reasoning.46 As Richard enumerates five exterior
senses, he affirms that the soul is not able to know anything about the invisible
realities without these senses.47 It is clear throughout Richards texts that he
values the significance of sensible experience highly and thus excludes interi-
orism.48 The human beings dependence on sense perception is essential in
the sense that it was true even before the fall.49 However, as a spiritual author,

44 bmin V, p. 102.2223: Est ergo sensus carnis totus extrinsecus, sensus uero cordis totus
intrinsecus. It should be noted that Richard exploits the term eye (oculus) in many different
connections. In Benjamin Minor and Major, Richard refers to the eyes of the heart, the eyes
of the mind, and the eye of reason. See, e.g., bmaj III, VI, p. 6364 (eye of understanding and
mind); bmaj II, IV, p. 26 (eye of reason). Mysticae adnotationes in Psalmos, pl 196, 359B.
Richard claims that the inner person (homo interior) has two eyes, which are the eye of dis-
cretion and the eye of circumspection. Richard also discusses the eyes of providence and of
understanding. Mysticae adnotationes in Psalmos, pl 196, 280A. Richard refers to the corpo-
real eyes (oculus corporeus) as well. See, for example, De Trinitate IV, II, p. 163.1011 and bmin
XXII, p. 150, 3334. Like many medieval writers, Richard favours language which uses concepts
related to sight and light. For the language of sensation in the Middle Ages, see Rudy 2002.
45 Mysticae adnotationes in Psalmos, pl 196, 276CD: Sicut autem per somnum exteriorem
sopiuntur omnes sensus corporis, sic per hunc de quo loquimur interioris hominis
somnum exsuperantur omnes sensus mentis. Simul enim absorbet cogitationem, imagi-
nationem, rationem, memoriam, intelligentiam, ut constet quod Apostolus scribit, quia
exsuperat omnem sensum.
46 bmaj IV, II, p. 87.78: Candida et nigra, calida et frigida, dulcia et amara sensu corporeo
discimus, non ratiocinando probamus.
47 bmin V, p. 102; bmaj II, XVII, p. 41.1213; bmaj IV, V, p. 90.1116: Debemus ergo a novissimis
et notissimis incipere et scientiae nostrae promotionem paulatim sublevare et per exte-
riorum notitiam ad invisibilium cognitionem ascendere. Cum enim exteriorem scientiam
apprehenderis et in eorum doctrina exercitatos sensus habueris, debes ad altiora ascend-
ere et spiritualium creaturarum scientiam comparare.
48 Ottaviano 1933, 454456; Chtillon 1988, 635.
49 bmaj II, XVII, p. 41.2426: Certe et si homo minime peccasset, in cognitione rerum sensus
exterior interiorem adiuvaret. The same idea occurs later in Benjamin Major; see bmaj V,
XIII, p. 140.1013.
The Fundamentals Of Richards Anthropology 61

Richard stresses that knowledge of exterior things is important simply because

it leads to knowledge of interior and invisible things.50
The external senses somehow disengage the forms and attributes that are
actually immanent in matter and move them directly towards the inner abili-
ties of the mind. The first to receive these forms is the imagination (imagina-
tio), which functions between senses and reason, using the material collected
with the help of the senses.51 In Benjamin Minor and Major, the area of the
imaginations operation is extensive. It has close contact with the five senses,
but, as a servant of reason, its properties have nearly rational features. Richard
compresses the operation of imagination into three words: it is the creator,
director, and reconstructor (creatrix, moderatrix, reparatrix) of corporeal
phantasms (phantasma).52 Richard distinguishes the animal (imaginatio bes-
tialis) and rational imagination (imaginatio rationalis) from each other.53
Imagination is usually understood as the specific ability (instrumentum) of the
soul, but it may also designate the activity or power of the soul or sensible
images in general.54 As Richard notes in his De eruditione hominis interioris,
seeing the substances of things in their genera and species and seeing singular
things in individual subjects are different things. The latter takes place in sense
or imagination, but the former is the first task of reason and contemplation.55
However, sometimes Richards intention concerning the notion of imagina-
tion remains unclear or is unspecified.56

50 bmaj III, III, p. 58.2021: Quo enim tibi scientia exteriorum nisi forte te adiuvet ad scien-
tiam interiorum.
51 A more extensive analysis of the imagination will be provided in the following chapters.
52 bmaj III, I, p. 55.1620: Quid hic facit phantasmatum corporalium creatrix, moderatrix et
reparatrix imaginatio? Recedat procul ab hoc negotio tot phantasiarum formatrix imagi-
natio, quae tot corporalium formas quotidie novas creat, antiquas reparat et peritam mul-
tiplices variosque modos pro arbitrio disponit et ordinat.
53 bmin XVI, pp. 130, 132.510.
54 See, for example, bmin XVII, p. 134.1519; Causam quam nesciebam II, p. 206.54.
55 De eruditione hominis interioris, pl 196, 1312A: Aliud est videre rerum substantias in suis
generibus et speciebus, atque aliud videre singulas in suis individuis. Istud est sensus seu
imaginationis, illud vero primum est rationis et contemplationis. Thus Richard claims
that by reasoning the human being studies the natures of general properties, but through
imagination one can establish the individual being which possess those properties. Both
imagination and reason perceive substances of things, but their perspectives are
different.
56 See, for instance, the speculation of the so-called imaginative heaven. bmaj III, VIII,
p.65.2729: Et ut hoc triplex caelum congrua possimus distinctione discernere, primum
dicatur imaginale, secundum est rationale, tertium intellectuale. Tenet itaque imaginatio
vicem primi caeli
62 Chapter 3

Richard emphasizes the operation of the imagination instead of memory

(memoria).57 This dismissal of memory is characteristic of Victorine texts. For
Hugh, memory is just an aspect of imagination, the retention of images
received in imagination. Memory is useful, but only in respect to its ability to
bring its images to mind when the object of thought is not present to the
senses.58 Thus, Richard does not analyse the functions of the memory system-
atically. He writes that the memory is like a huge chamber, which compre-
hends, conceals and preserves various things, like substances, forms, genus,
species, individuals, particular natures, qualities, quantities, actions, and pas-
sions.59 In Benjamin Minor, Richard notes that the memory of exterior things
fails when the mind rises above itself in ecstasy.60
In both Benjamin Minor and Major, the crucial ability of the human soul is
reason (ratio).61 In the background of the notion of reason is the Augustinian
theory of illumination, according to which the divine light enlightens the
human reason to enable it to approach the truth.62 Reason can refer to a spe-
cial ability (capacitas) of the soul. With the help of reason, one can observe
visible and invisible created objects and their properties and, above all, the

57 bmin VI, p. 106.1921. Chtillon 1988, 635. Chtillon remarks that the distinction between
imagination and memory is merely nominal.
58 Kleinz 1944, 32. As Carruthers points out, the overlap between the tasks of memory
(memoria) and imagination (imaginatio), and their mutual convertibility is typical of the
texts of the monastic tradition during the Middle Ages. Carruthers 1998, 68.
59 bmaj III, XXI, p. 80.1219: Sic sane si memoriae capacitatem eiusque amplitudinem atten-
das, invenies absque dubio quod digne mirari debeas. Quantus, quaeso, est ille tam
immensae amplitudinis sinus, qui tot rerum substantias, tot substantiarum formas, tot
genera rerum, tot species generum, tot individua specierum, individuorum vero tot pro-
prietates, tot qualitates, tot quantitates, actiones et passiones, habitus, situs, loca et tem-
pora latitudinis suae ambitu comprehendit, abscondit, atque custodit diuque custodita
iterum in medium producit. Note that Richard lists Aristotles categories here, excluding
only the category of relation.
60 bmin LXXXIII, p. 326.1318. For the brief analysis of ecstatic experiences in Benjamin
Minor, see Chapter 4.4.
61 Ebner 1917, 2943; De Bruyne 1946, 229, and Salet 1959, 3745. See Gersh 1988, 260261 for
the use of the term ratio in Anselm which corresponds to Richards theory. For the solu-
tions of Augustine in this respect and the problems of the definition of ratio, see ODaly
1987, 187.
62 However, Richards own theory of illumination remains indefinite. He has great confi-
dence in reason, since even the pagan philosophers conceive the triune God in part. Yet
Richard notes several times that human understanding and contemplation arises from
illumination or that they are somehow related. As Evans notes, Richards optimism in
natural reason was shared by Peter Abelard and Hugh. Evans 2011, 207208.
The Fundamentals Of Richards Anthropology 63

invisible properties of ones own soul.63 Reason is nearly like the soul itself,
assessing and considering various objects in epistemological processes and in
moral questions. Furthermore, the sphere of reason includes the special ability
of discretion (discretio), which refers to the perfect self-knowledge of the
human being. Discretion ought to know the entire state and quality of the
inner and outer person fully and seek to know what kind of person one ought
to be. This is performed by practising individual virtues and keeping them
ordered and moderated.64 The idea that discretion is born from reason alone is
slightly misleading, since its area of operation is clearly connected to virtues,
the affective power of the soul. It is, in a way, practical reason.
Even above reason lies understanding (intelligentia), which addresses itself
to the divine objects and the Trinity. However, all the objects perceived by the
lower abilities of the soul (senses, imagination, and reason) can also be
explored by the operation of understanding, the summit of human cognition.
Richard uses the concept of understanding in various contexts and tasks, using
terminology which is downright ambivalent at times.65 He defines understand-
ing as mixed, pure, and simple. Understanding in its mixed form (intelligentia
permixta) operates by assisting the other abilities of the soul.66 Pure under-
standing (pura intelligentia) excludes all the operations of imagination and
seems to be synonymous with reason. Simple understanding (intelligentia
s implex) is even above discursive thinking and refers to the highest level of
theintellectual operation.67 Sometimes Richard discusses the functioning of

63 Den Bok 1996, 125131.

64 bmin LXVII, p. 282, 815; bmin LXVIII, p. 286; bmin LXX, pp. 292, 294. Richard deals with
the notion of discretion mainly in Benjamin Minor and De exterminatione mali et promo-
tione boni. See also Richards idea of discretion as one of prudences five grades, Mysticae
adnotationes in Psalmos, pl 196, 382A. For the concept of discretio in Richard, see Ebner
1917, 3236. Concerning this notion in monastic literature in general, see Cabassut 1957,
1323. In medieval texts, discretion is often allied with prudence (prudentia); see for
instance Abelards Collationes II, 115, p. 130. As Marenbon notes, Ciceros De Inuentione ii.
53.160 lies in the background. See also De Contemplatione et ejus speciebus, p. 58.1824.
65 Chtillon 1988, 636.
66 bmin XVIII, p. 136.4; bmaj I, III, p. 9.24: Similiter ea, quae imaginatio vel ratio compre-
hendunt, sub intelligentia cadunt et ea, quae illae comprehendere non possunt. Vide ergo
quam late contemplationis radius se expandat, qui omnia lustrat.
67 bmaj I, VI, p. 13.3637; bmaj I, VIII, p. 16.9; bmin LXXXVII, p. 344.2021: Intelligentiam
puram dicimus, quae est sine admixtione imaginationis. bmaj I, IX, p. 17.12: Simplicem
intelligentiam dico quae est sine officio rationis, puram vero quae est sine occursione imag-
inationis. See also In Apocalypsim Joannis, pl 196, 704D. John Scotus Eriugena uses a similar
idea about the pure undestanding, in which the fantasies are excluded from the working
64 Chapter 3

understanding using such notions as sensus intellectualis, oculus intellectualis,

and habitus intellectualis,68 which supports Den Boks suggestion that under-
standing is a kind of sense of the soul for invisible things. Thus understanding
can be seen as a counterpart of the souls sense of visible things.69 Richard also
uses the notion of intellect (intellectus) when referring to the higher, intellec-
tual part of the soul in general.70
Because man has a comprehensive essence which consists of the body as
well as various abilities of the soul and their combinations, one is able to deal
with a variety of objects. Richard divides all the objects into three groups
according to their origin and materiality. He also shows how the abilities of
the soul correspond to these groups of objects. In the first group, the objects
are sensible (sensibilia), i.e., created and visible. Observing these material
objects belongs to the senses and the imagination (sensus, imaginatio). The
objects in the second group are intelligible (intelligibilia). When the mind
focuses on things that are created but invisible, man uses his reason and imag-
ination. The objects in the third group are uncreated and invisible objects
which Richard calls intellectible (intellectibilia). The only way to approach
them is via understanding (intelligentia).71 This grouping derives from Hughs
Didascalicon.72

of understanding; see Expositiones in Ierarchiam coelestem II, p. 20.1022. Hugh of

St. Victor employs the same idea as he defines various sciences in his Didascalicon II, XVII,
p. 36.1518 (758D). Since pure understanding deals with things which are not composite
or clouded by the images (physics, mathematics), logic employs pure understanding. See
also Richards Liber exceptionum, I, I, cap. XXIII, p. 111.910: Ideo logica aliquando pura
intelligentia utitur, mathematica nunquam sine imaginatione est.
68 Occasionally Richard uses the term sensus intellectualis, which refers to spiritual sensing
in a supernatural area. bmaj III, IX, p. 66.16: Intelligentiae siquidem oculus est sensus ille,
quo invisibilia videmus. At times he uses the rarer expression habitus intellectualis. See,
for example, Nonnullae allegoriae tabernaculi foederis, pl 196, 191D.
69 Den Bok 1996, 132.
70 De statu interioris hominis c. XXXIV, p. 102 (pl 196, 1141C): quod est sensus in carne, hoc est
intellectus in mente. Cf. bmin XIII, p. 126.1013; bmin XVII, p. 134.9. bmaj III, I, p. 55.16.
71 bmaj I, VII, p. 14.2631: Duo itaque ex his imaginatione consistunt, quia solis sensibilibus
intendunt. Duo in ratione consistunt, quia solis intelligibilibus insistunt. Duo vero in
intelligentia subsistunt, quia solis intellectibilibus intendunt. Sensibilia dico quaelibet
visibilia, et sensu corporeo perceptibilia. Intelligibilia autem dico invisibilia, rationi
tamen comprehensibilia. Intellectibilia hoc loco dico invisibilia, et humanae rationi
incomprehensibilia.
72 See above. Didascalicon II, V, p. 29.1324 (755AB).
The Fundamentals Of Richards Anthropology 65

3.3 The Affective Power of the Soul

In his many writings, Richard emphasizes the significance of the affective

power of the soul using the terms affectio as well as affectus.73 His extensive
view of the affective power of the soul incorporates the affections (affectiones),
will (voluntas), and sensuality (sensualitas) in Benjamin Minor.74
Richards texts contain many different analyses and lists of affections (affec-
tus, affectiones, perturbationes).75 The number of principal emotions varies
from four to seven. In De statu interioris hominis, the four principal emotions
listed by Richard are love, hatred, joy, and sorrow (amor, odium, gaudium,
dolor), which subsist in the heart as four bodily fluids subsist in the body.76
This list of four principal emotions is a standard twelfth-century systematiza-
tion of the types of emotion.77 However, Richard states in Benjamin Minor that
there are in fact seven principal emotions, which are hope, fear, joy, sorrow,
hatred, love, and shame (spes, timor, gaudium, dolor, odium, amor, and
pudor).78 He does not consider the various groupings as a problem, stating that
the emotions could well be presented in a different order.79 The emotions can
take innumerable forms, and radically different emotions may subsist in the

73 Chtillon 1988, 638. For Richards theory of the emotions, see Chtillon 1949, Dumeige
1952; Van t Spijker 1996, 147160; Knuuttila 2004, 201204; Feiss 2012, 8394.
74 Zinn 1979, 11.
75 For this terminology, see Chtillon 1988, 638639. Cf. Augustines terminology, in which
emotions are perturbationes, affectiones, affectus, and passiones. For these terms, see
Knuuttila 2004, 156.
76 De statu interioris hominis c. XXXIV, p. 102 (pl 196, 1141CD): Quod autem sunt quatuor
humores in corpore, hoc sunt quatuor principales affectiones in corde, et quod est sensus
in carne, hoc est intellectus in mente. Usus etiam habet sensum cordis sicut sensum cor-
poris nominare, unde et sententiam a cordis non a corporis sensu solemus dicere. Amor
itaque et odium, gaudium et dolor quatuor principales affectiones sunt ex quibus caetera
omnia desideriorum, voluntatum, votorum, affectionumque originem trahunt.
77 However, this four-part series deviates slightly from the standard classification of the
principal emotions, since Richard mentions hatred (odium) instead of fear (timor). See
Knuuttilas illustrative list of various standard classifications of emotions and their trans-
lations. Knuuttila 2004, 232233.
78 bmin VII, p. 108.1012.
79 Misit Herodes, pl 141, 284AB. For example, Richard introduces a series of 12 emotions in
De exterminatione mali et promotione boni, pl 196, 1106D which differs from the series in
De statu interioris hominis and Benjamin Minor. Furthermore, in Exiit edictum III, p. 7274,
Richard states that there are in fact four affections, which are sadness (meror), shame
(pudor), trembling (tremor), and sorrow (dolor). Chtillon 1988, 638 analyses the number
and order of emotions employed by Richard.
66 Chapter 3

soul at the same time, even contrary ones.80 Richard compares the carnal
desires with the legs. These emotions, like feet, carry the inner person wher-
ever it goes.81
Affections (affectiones) can be directed to good or evil. If they are directed to
good, they are moderated and disposed, in which case they will become vir-
tues (virtutes). The task of the affections as virtues is to guide the will to the
right course. However, the affects become vices unless reason, self-knowledge,
and grace direct them.82 In Liber exceptionum, Richard refers to the classical
Ciceronian idea that virtue is a habit of mind consonant with the order of
nature and with reason, by adding an Aristotelian formula of habit as a quality
which is applied to the soul and is hard to change.83
In Benjamin Minor, it is made clear that the training of the affections as
virtues is difficult, and the command of the affective part of the soul hard, but
still necessary since the affects cause reason to long for understanding and
wisdom. This longing (desiderium) sends the soul to look for genuine spiri-
tual knowledge; in other words, the affections motivate human rationality
positively.84 Especially in Benjamin Minor, the appearance of the first four

80 De statu interioris hominis c. IXX, p. 7175 (pl 196, 1121D1124B). Van t Spijker 1996, 149.
81 De statu interioris hominis c. II, p. 16 (pl 196, 1118B): Scimus autem quia in humano cor-
pore caput tenet summum locum, pes imum, cor medium et intimum. Caput liberum
arbitrium, cor consilium, pes carnale desiderium. Pes in imo jacet, et carnale desider-
ium per appetitum infimis inhaeret. Cf. Augustines Enarrationes in psalmos 9, 15: in mus-
cipula ista, quam occultauerunt, comprehensus est pes eorum (Ps 9, 16) muscipula
occulta est dolosa cogitatio. pes animae recte intellegitur amor; qui cum prauus est, uoca-
tur cupiditas aut libido; cum autem rectus, dilectio uel caritas.
82 bmin VII, p. 108.59: Septenaria utique Liae proles, septem sunt uirtutes. Siquidem, nichil
aliud est uirtus quam animi affectus ordinatus et moderatus. Ordinatus, quando ad illud
est ad quod esse debet; moderatus, quando tantus est quantus esse debet. Cf. Exiit edic-
tum IV, p. 102.2022: Affectiones itaque tue contra te ueniunt, quando sunt inordinate;
tibi ueniunt quando sunt ordinate. bmaj III, XXIII, p. 82.57: Cum enim nihil aliud sit
virtus quam affectio ordinata et moderata ex intentione bona, agitur ut sit affectio ordi-
nata et per discretionem efficitur ut fiat moderata. Unlike other Victorines, Richard is
relatively interested in the notion of the cardinal virtues and classical moral philosophy;
see Bejczy 2011, 103.
83 Liber exceptionum I, I, cap. IV, p. 105.69: Virtus est habitus animi, in modum nature
rationi consentaneus. Est autem habitus qualitas veniens per applicationem subjecti dif-
ficile mobilis, sicut est dispositio qualitas veniens per applicationem subjecti facile mobi-
lis. Richard cites Hughs Didascalicon, where Hugh refers to Ciceros formulation in De
Inventione ii.iii. Didascalicon VI, XIV, p. 130.18 (809C). For Richards explanation of habit,
cf. Aristotles Categories 8b35.
84 bmin XIII, p. 126.1723. The same idea appears in bmaj V, XVII, p. 146.
The Fundamentals Of Richards Anthropology 67

affections in the soul, i.e., fear, sorrow, hope, and love, characterizes a kind of
waking of the soul to the existence of spiritual reality.85 Richards most thor-
oughgoing account of the affection of shame (pudor) appears in Benjamin
Minor.86 In Benjamin Major, Richard hints that in the most sublime kind of
ecstasy there is some supermundane kind of affection, like a kind of marvel-
lous happiness,87 into which the mind can be transformed.88 Richard also con-
siders devotion to be one of the essential factors which leads the soul into
alienation of the mind, which is described as the highest mode of contempla-
tion. Here devotion refers to inner love, which liquefies the soul until it resem-
bles smoke.89 When the human soul has reached the spiritual level, it is useful
to feel (sentire) spiritual and true delight.90
In Benjamin Minor, the affective power of the soul includes the ability
whichRichard calls sensuality (sensualitas).91 Sensuality submits to affection

85 Zinn 1977, 193. The same fourfold series can also be seen in two works by Hugh of St.
Victor. See De archa Noe II, VII, p. 45.5979 (pl 176, 642A642C) and Libellus de formatione
arche, IV p. 140.5357 (pl 176, 692C). These treatises have probably inspired Richard in
this respect.
86 bmin XLVLIX, p. 222262. Richard presents a detailed analysis of shame and its phases
of development. Good shame, a spiritual virtue, takes place in ones conscience and is
thus reflective. The obstacles to the development of feeling of shame are spiritual pride
and egoism. On the other hand, excessive severity towards the sinner can prevent the feel-
ing of the right kind of shame. According to Richard, distorting shame can even lead to
spiritual death or to permanent bodily damage. For Richards original discussion of
shame, see Knuuttila 2012, 246247.
87 bmaj V, V, p. 129.2021: In supermundanum quondam affectum sub quodam mirae felici-
tatis statu raptim transformatur.
88 bmaj V, IX, p. 134.59: Sed in eiusmodi sublevatione, dum mens humana semper ad
altiora crescit, dum diu crescendo tandem aliquando humanae capacitatis metas tran-
scendit, fit demum ut a semetipsa penitus deficiat et in supermundanum quondam trans-
formata affectum tota supra semetipsam eat.
89 bmaj V, V, p. 129.68: Magnitudine devotionis, mens humana supra semetipsam elevatur,
quando tanto caelestis desiderii igne succenditur, ut amoris intimi flamma ultra humanum
modum excrescat, quae animam humanam ad cerae similitudinem liquefactam a pristino
statu penitus resolvat et ad instar fumi attenuatam in superna elevet et ad summa emittat.
90 bmaj V, XVII, p. 146.2325,2728: quo profundius per affectum tangitur, tanto efficacius
ad sua desideria renovatur. Cur autem de spirituali et vera delectatione non sentiamus,
quod de corporali et vana delectatione cotidiano experimento probamus.
91 Hugh of St. Victor uses the notion of sensualitas in many of his texts. In his De sacramentis
I, VIII, 13. pl 176, 315D, Hugh claims that three things reside in the human being: wisdom,
prudence, and sensuality (sensualitas). Wisdom is a higher kind of reason, directed
towards invisible things, whereas prudence is a lower kind of reason concerned with cor-
poreal and visible things. Sensuality is affection (affectus) or desire (appetitus), which
68 Chapter 3

(affectio). The human being needs this ability, because without sensuality one
cannot have a sense of anything.92 Sensuality offers sensual representation to
affection and thus gives rise to the desire to experience bodily pleasures.
Sensuality ismorally neutral in itself, but the fall of man has been disordered
it, causing problems for the soul. As Richard puts it, its desire is bottomless and
no worldly joys can satisfy it. Affection (affectio) is not able to resist temptation
because its own judgement is clouded.93 A significant goal of spiritual exercise
is to suppress sensuality and thus to create an ability to restrain pleasures and
to be patient with regard to the pleasures and sufferings experienced by the
fleshly senses.94

deals with earthly things. See also Hughs De unione corporis et spiritus p. 883.1723
(pl177, 285BC). Later the notion of sensuality was associated with discussion concern-
ing the first movements of the soul and the doctrine of the stages of sin. This tradition
usually distinguished between brute and human sensuality. For instance, William of
Auxerre thought that brute sensuality produced irrational non-voluntary movements and
should not be regarded as sinful as such. Human sensuality, however, produces move-
ments which may be voluntarily controlled. Human sensuality belongs to the concupis-
cible faculty, which has two parts: the higher desires eternal things and the lower desires
temporal things. The fallen state of the human soul is inclined to create impulses to move-
ments towards illicit things. For this tradition, see Lottin 1931, 49136. See the discus-
sion in Knuuttila 2004, 182195.
92 bmin V, p. 100.23: Obsequitur sensualitas affectioni. bmin V, p. 102.610: Nam sine imag-
inatione ratio nichil sciret, sine sensualitate affectio nil saperet. Vt quid enim Lia (affectio)
circa labentium rerum amorem tam uehementer afficitur, nisi quia in eis per ancillae
suae, hoc est sensualitas, obsequium multiformiter delectatur? See also Liber exceptio-
num II, X, cap. II, p. 377.2833.
93 bmin V, p. 104.4143,4750: Quae enim alia est quam sensualitas quae animi affectionem
carnalium voluptatum desiderio inflammat et earum delectatione inebriat? Hinc est
quod Lia, animi videlicet affectio, nunc contemnenda diligit, nunc diligenda contempnit,
quia dum eius oculis in rerum iudicio caligat, carnis appetitum sequi non erubescit.
Richard describes the operation of sensuality and its sins colourfully: Zilpah (sensualitas)
incites the feeling part of the soul (affectio) to fleshly pleasures. Zilpah drinks the wine of
pleasures, of which there is never enough to slake her thirst, because the more she drinks,
the more her thirst increases, and her mouth gapes open. Affection (affectio, Lea) lacks
judgement in relation to Zilpah and thus becomes attached to the wrong things. bmin VI,
p.106.611: Vinum quod Zelpha sitit, qaudium est uoluptatis. De quo quanto plus bibit,
tanto amplius sitit, nam ad satiandum sensualitatis appetitum totus mundus non sufficit.
Quia ergo quantumcunque bibat, semper ad bibendum inhiat, recte Zelpha, hoc est os
inhians, uocatur, sitis cuius nunquam extinguitur.
94 bmin XXVI, p. 162.5053: Immo per Gad et Aser intelligimus omnis superfluae delectatio-
nis, aut cuiuslibet corporalis afflictionis abstinentiam uel patientiam, in omnibus quae
per quinque sensus carnem delectant aut cruciant.
The Fundamentals Of Richards Anthropology 69

In his two Benjamins, Richard almost excludes the notion of will. However,
in his De eruditione hominis interioris and De statu interioris hominis, works in
which the impact of Bernard of Clairvauxs ideas concerning the free will is
evident, Richard takes the notion of will as his main subject.95 Will, a word
used for various aspects of human nature, has a wide range in Richards works,
exhibiting a clear connection with functions such as affection, deliberation,
and free consent. The terminology varies considerably between Richards writ-
ings, a variation Richard refers to as an explanation for the manifold interpre-
tations of the notion of will. However, he usually discusses the notion of will in
relation to the affective power of the soul. This interconnectedness becomes
clear as one compares the expressions Richard uses. Wills (voluntates) as well
as affections may be stronger or weaker, and occasionally either contradict or
agree with each other.96
In Benjamin Major, Richard writes that we are accustomed to call will that
power of the soul which is able to form itself into many affections. He adds that
the instrument and activity of that instrument are similarly referred to as will.
These acts of willing are brought about by either natural motion (operatio
naturae), or by human activity (opera industriae). The latter is also called delib-
eration (deliberatio). Every consent of the soul, and the things that are done in
the soul from consent can be defined as belonging to deliberation.97
Because a virtue is an ordered and moderated affection, the right kind of
intention is important. In Benjamin Major, Richard claims that it is the power
of deliberation which is able to form the affections into virtues by means of
discretion and fixing affections in good intention. The power of deliberation
also restrains bad affections. As Richard puts it, it is the function of delibera-
tion to put the whole clamour of the internal family of thoughts and affections
in order.98 Here the power of deliberation is an essential means to construct

95 Javelet 1971, 2728.

96 bmin LXIV, p. 276.38; De statu interioris hominis c. XXIII, p. 88 (pl 196, 1132D).
97 bmaj III, XVIII, p. 76.36,1012: Nemo putet eandem esse considerationem illam, quam
superius posuimus voluntatis et hanc, quam modo latitudini assignavimus deliberationis.
Nam ad illam pertinent quod in mente agitur ex sola operatione naturae, ad istam autem
quod in ipsa actitatur ex opera industriae. et quidem solemus vim illam animae, quae
se valet et solet in tot affectus formare et per tam multiplices modos variare, vim illam
animae, inquam solemus voluntatem nominare. For the concept of will and its relation to
the affects in Richards texts, see Den Bok 1996, 395416.
98 bmaj III, XXIII, p. 82.37, 1720: virtutem deliberationis contemplamur pariter et admira-
mur, quomodo tot animi affectiones cotidie in virtutes redigit, in quantum eas et per dis-
cretionem disponit et in bona intentione figit. Cum enim nihil aliud sit virtus quam
affectio ordinata et moderata ex intentione bona, agitur ut sit affectio ordinata et per
70 Chapter 3

inner balance in the soul, pressing various rebellious thoughts and carnal long-
ings down with severe punishments, but nourishing virtues. This idea of spiri-
tual battle reoccurs in various forms in his writings.99 In this connection, the
notion of will is linked with moral issues. The questions of venial and mortal
sin in connection with involuntary or voluntary movements of the soul were
analysed in detail in the medieval period, the crucial question being whether
the soul consents to sinful suggestion or not. This is the precise point for
whichRichard has designed his theory of deliberation. With the help of delib-
eration, one discerns what sins one is subject to and what punishment one is
to expect.100

3.4 Richards Theological Method

Richards basic anthropological principles correspond well with his theological

method, which has been formulated as per visibilia ad invisibilia, i.e., from vis-
ible things to invisible things. This idea derives from Pauls letter to the Romans
(Rom. 1:20) and is one of the most important themes in Richards works, includ-
ing the dogmatic treatise De Trinitate.101 The importance of visible reality as a
basis for understanding the invisible reality can be seen in several aspects of
Richards thinking. First, he strongly emphasizes experience; second, he values
signs and symbols as material guides to invisible reality; third, he considers
historical interpretation as the foundation for the spiritual interpretation of
the Bible; and fourth, his pedagogical thinking prefers various demonstrative
methods, like drawings and personification. Furthermore, Richards method
has its anthropological implications. In his theory of the soul, one of the

discretionem efficitur ut fiat moderata. Nonne illius officium est totam illam internae
familiae turbam tot cogitationum, tot affectionum pro arbitrio disponere et imperantis
more suis legibus subiugare, cotidie iudicium et iustitiam facere.
99 Richard employs a similar idea in Benjamin Minor, where he interestingly claims that it is
the co-operation between reason and the imagination which is able to produce an effi-
cient means to achieve internal stability. This is done using various images of heaven and
hell. See Chapters 4.3. and 4.4.
100 bmaj III, XVIII, p. 76.3377.2: Ex secunda autem consideratione intelligit homo, quibus
culpis subiacet vel quibus meritis emineat et quid pro his poenae vel praemii exspectare
debeat, quantum cotidie proficiat vel deficiat vel quanta animi industria satagat praeter-
ita mala delere, praesentia declinare, futura praevenire
101 For the per visibilia ad invisibilia principle in De Trinitate, see Den Bok 1996, 157171. For
Richards theological method in general, see Coulter 2006, 1618. Coulter interestingly
analyses the idea of the ascent as a journey or transition. Coulter 2006, 2637.
The Fundamentals Of Richards Anthropology 71

rincipal features of the per visibilia ad invisibilia principle is highlighting the

p
importance of the senses and the imagination.
It is typical of Richards spiritual texts as well as De Trinitate to emphasize
concrete phenomena in arguing something about the invisible reality.102 In De
Trinitate he introduces his theological method, pointing out that we gather
(colligere) by sound reasoning from the things which we see that there are
things which we do not see. From transitory things we comprehend the eter-
nal, from the worldly we comprehend the otherworldly and from human things
we comprehend the divine. Richard adds the basic biblical line (Rom. 1:20)
legitimating his method: Since the invisible things of God from the creation of
the world are clearly seen, being understood by means of those things which
are made.103 He claims that we use the visible similitudes of things to form a
kind of ladder with which we may ascend to see divine things.104 In De Trinitate,
Richard also asserts his ratio Richardi,105 which aims at reasoning from specific
ontological features of created things to the things that are invisible and uncre-
ated.106 This same ascending pattern can also be detected in his spiritual writ-
ings, most obviously in Benjamin Major. Even though De Trinitate represents
speculative theology and Benjamin Major is a spiritual exercise, their topics are
interconnected. Benjamin Major supplies the necessary skills and techniques
of contemplation, whereas De Trinitate represents their application.107

102 Many researchers have noted Richards confidence in experience. Ottaviano 1933, 456;
Chtillon 1988, 631; Coulter 2006, 228229; Feiss 2012, 3642. Richards predilection for
concrete or everyday examples is well represented in his Carbonum et cinerum. In this
treatise, Richard describes the human soul as bread on its way to the oven. He differenti-
ates four different kinds of bread and heaters and uses rich domestic vocabulary.
103 De Trinitate I, VIII, p. 93.1316: Sic sane ex eis que videmus, ratiocinando colligimus et ea
esse que non videmus, ex transitoriis eterna, ex mundanis supermundana, ex humanis
divina. Invisibilia enim Dei, a creatura mundi, per ea que facta sunt, intellecta
conspiciuntur.
104 De Trinitate V, VI, p. 201.811.
105 Ratio Richardi is a formulation by John Duns Scotus in his Lectura I 2.41,123 and Ordinatio
I 2.180. For references and discussion, see Vos 2006, 336337.
106 Den Bok refers to Copleston, who has noticed the originality of Richards proof of the
existence of God. Den Bok 1996, 172n.87. As Coulter concludes, there has been some dis-
cussion concerning whether Richards argument is a priori, a posteriori, or a combination.
Coulter 2006, 209n.105. Copleston regards the argument as Anselmian, moving through
the degrees of being. Ottaviano considers the argument as empirical, while Ebner sees
both elements in the argument. Ebner 1917, 73; Ottaviano 1933, 505; Copleston 1972, 98.
107 Coulter 2006, 147. On the close connection between the spiritual treatises of Richard and
his doctrinal De Trinitate, see Salet 1964, 7388.
72 Chapter 3

Richard argues at the start of his De Trinitate that there are three different
ways in which the human being can attain knowledge, i.e., through experience,
reason, and faith.108 Richard ascribes an important role to experience (experi-
entia), claiming that for most people experiencing of things is the most persua-
sive way to prove things and is thus more certain than something gained by
reasoning only.109 Since one cannot doubt ones daily experiences, they give
the greatest certainty in proving (probare) things. It is difficult for the individ-
ual to believe things that cannot be confirmed by experience.110 He also argues
that every rational process has its origin in the experience (experientia) of vis-
ible things through which the individual may gather information about invisi-
ble things.111 The experiencing of things suggests what we should seek in the
divine reality. Based on this information, the individual is able to start to build
a ladder in order to ascend to see things that cannot be seen by sight.112 Richard
clearly states that the kind of knowledge which is not aided and confirmed by

108 De Trinitate I, I, p. 86.5p. 87.10: Rerum itaque notitiam, ni fallor, modo triplici apprehen-
dimus: nam alia experiendo probamus, alia ratiocinando colligimus, aliorum certitudi-
nem credendo tenemus. Ebner 1917, 15.
109 De Trinitate IV, VIII, p. 170.1415: Sed magis judicant homines juxta id quod experientia
probat quam juxta id quod ratiocinatio dictat. See Den Bok 1996, 146. The emphasis on
experience (experientia) was an important part of twelfth-century spiritual writings.
Researchers have paid special attention to Bernard of Clairvauxs use of experience in his
Sermons on the Song of Songs. On Bernard, see McDonnell 1997, 318. For the notion of
experience in spiritual writings, also consult Stock 1975, 224267; Kpf 1982, 111113.
110 De iudiciaria potestate in finali et universali iudicio X, p. 152: Quia per experientiam interim
probare non possumus, difficile credimus. Cf. De Trinitate IV, II, p. 163.23: Quam multa
sunt que humana intelligentia non comprehendit, que tamen propria experientia ipsam
latere non sinit.
111 Richard puts the method of De Trintate succinctly. De Trinitate I, X, p. 95.1217: Quotiens
igitur per visibilium speculationem ad invisibilium contemplationem assurgimus, quid
aliud quam quamdam velud scalam erigimus, per quam ad ea que supra nos sunt, mente
ascendamus? Inde est quod in hos tractatu omnis ratiocinationis nostre processus ini-
tium sumit ex his que per experientiam novimus. De Trinitate I, VII, p. 92.47: Ab illo
itaque rerum genere incipere debemus, de quibus nullo modo dubitare possumus, et per
illa que per experientiam novimus, ratiocinando colligere quid de his que supra experien-
tiam sunt, oportet sentire. Later in De Trinitate, Richard writes that we should use our
daily experiences and natural instinct (naturalis instinctus) in proving things. De Trinitate
V, II, p. 196.57: Primo itaque illud dicamus, quod naturali quodam instinctu omnes in
commune agnovimus, et usu continuato cotidianis experimentis probamus. De Trinitate,
III, X, p. 145.2425: sed quod non capit intelligentia, persuadet michi tamen experientia.
Cf. Hugh of St. Victors Expositio in Hierarchiam Coelestam, pl 175, 1061B: magistra intel-
ligendi experientia est.
112 De Trinitate V, VI, p. 201.411.
The Fundamentals Of Richards Anthropology 73

experience of things is relatively uncertain and thus insufficient.113 Because of

Richards strong emphasis on experience, his philosophical method has been
characterized as reasoning a posteriori.114
Experience may refer to both inner and outer experiences. Through outer
experience one is able to discern visible, created objects and various natural
operations.115 The individual knows the invisible things of the human soul by
inner experience.116 The immediate experience of Gods presence in inner life
is essential for spiritual progress. The experience of ones own inner state is
also needed for full knowledge of ones limitations and for moral self-examina-
tion.117 Experience is important even in the highest stages of spiritual life in
that the person who has personally experienced ecstasy of the mind enjoys a
particular authority in spiritual matters.118 One may even experience the inner
peace between flesh and spirit.119 Ones own experience gives the best knowl-
edge of the fruits of reading the sacred texts.120 The experience of love interests
Richard particularly: he claims that manifold experience teaches us that
nothing is more pleasant in human life than charity.121 In De Trinitate he uses
examples of the experience of love as a foundation for seeking reasons for
theTrinitarian relations, and De IV gradibus violentae caritatis compares the
aspects of profane love to the love of God.122

113 De eruditione hominis interioris, pl 196 1317C: Parva et parum certa est illa scientia, quam
non adjuvat et confirmat rerum experientiam.
114 Ribaillier 1958, 21.
115 bmaj II, XVII, p. 41.1618: Quoties ergo cognoscendarum rerum per corporeum sensum
experientiam capere cogitur, toties nimirum interior homo noster ducem suum sequi
videtur quia nisi prius sensibilia per sensum corporeum animus caperet, omnino non
inveniret, quid de eis saltem cogitare potuisset. Here Richard explains that the interior
person follows the outer person. The outer person means the sensory soul.
116 bmaj I, VI, p. 13.25: quando invisibilia nostra, quae per experientiam novimus bmaj III,
XIV, p. 71.2631. See also De Trinitate III, IX, p. 144.1617: Conferamus in unum, si placet,
que ratiocinando invenit in natura divina, et ea que experientia reperit in natura humana.
117 De differentia sacrificii Abrahae a sacrificio Beatae Mariae Virginis, pl 196, 1052D: donec
experientiae magisterio docearis de tua infirmitate vera sentire Feiss 2012, 38.
118 bmaj V, XIX, p. 148.2931: Melius in hoc nos illorum peritia instruit, quos ad scientiae huius
plenitudinem non tam aliena doctrina quam propria experientia provexit. On personal
experience as opposed to knowledge of others in both Benjamins, see Zinn 2010, 99n.58.
119 Exiit edictum IV, p. 106.912: Sopitur interim illa discordia que est inter carnem et spiritum, et
felici experientie magisterio edoceri incipit que est illa pax que exuperat omnem sensum.
120 Liber Exceptionum II, prolog., p. 211.23.
121 De Trinitate III, III, p. 138.813: nichil caritate melius, sic nichil caritate jocundius. Hoc nos
dicet ipsa natura, idem ipsum multiplex experientia.
122 Feiss 2012, 39.
74 Chapter 3

Richards emphasis on experience is seen in the christological speculation

in his De Emmanuele as well. Arguing on behalf of literal interpretation of the
Bible, he reminds his readers that according to the Apostle Christ progressed
truly in wisdom as in age. Although Christ is omniscient, he made real progres-
sion in experimental knowledge from the moment of his incarnation until His
death. Through experience, Christ came to know what it is to be a human
being in the flesh.123 This idea is contrary to both Hugh of St. Victor and Peter
Lombard.124
The confidence in experience and reasoning from experience gives further
importance to images and sensible objects in general. Many authors shared the
conviction that all natural things possess significations which transcend their
simple reality and that the individual should find the symbolic dimension of
that reality.125 Hugh of St. Victor writes in his commentary to Ecclesiastes that
the species of visible things are the veins through which invisible beauty mani-
fests itself and pours down for us.126 According to a famous metaphor, the soul
can use created material objects as mirrors (speculum) with the help of which
it can rise to examine the invisible objects.127 As Richard claims in several texts,
sensible matter offers a helping hand (manuductio materialis) which leads the
individual to attend to rational principles and the natural laws which domi-
nate the world.128

123 De Emmanuele, pl 196, 650D651A: Qui igitur formam servi accepit, qui in similitudinem
carnis peccati venit, profecto ab ipsa hora conceptionis per experientiam didicit, et novit
quid esset bonum sensibilitatis, et malum passibilitatis, utpote qui carnem sensibilem et
passibilem accepit. De Emmanuele, pl 196, 653A: Pro certo virtutum omnium efficaciam
ab initio habuit, sed non omnium simul efficentiam exhibuit, sed juxta singularum con-
gruentiam suo tempore dispensavit. Exercendi peritiam ab initio habuit, sed ad experien-
tiae notionem per accessum temporis accrevit.
124 See the discussion in Murray 1963, 1516 and Colish 1994, 438443.
125 Chenu 1957, 102. Peter Dronke has introduced some of these discussions, which deal with
the analysis of William of Conches and Peter of Abelards works, in his own research. See
especially Dronke 1974.
126 In Salomonis Ecclesiasten homiliae, pl 175, 142D: Nam species rerum visibilium quasi
venae tantummodo quaedam sunt, per quas invisibilis pulchritudo se manifestans ad nos
usque emanat.
127 See Alanus ab Insulis dictum in his De incarnatione Christi rhytmus perelegans, pl 210,
579A: Omnis mundi creatura, Quasi liber, et pictura, Nobis est, et speculum.
128 In Apocalypsim Joannis, pl 196, 688AB. The term in question is quoted by Richard and
Hugh from Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagites Celestial Hierarchies. See De caelesti ierar-
chia, pl 122, 1038D1039A. Hugh writes in his Commentaria in Hierarchiam coelestem, pl
175, 984A that Materialem autem manuductionem corporalia signa intelligit, quorum
quasi manuductione mens humana utitur, ut ex visibilibus ad invisibilium imitationem et
The Fundamentals Of Richards Anthropology 75

Richard agrees with Hugh of St. Victor, who maintains that all the perceiv-
able objects as well as the text of the Bible can act as symbols which are capa-
ble of referring to the invisible reality.129 In Richards writings, the notion of
matters helping hand can refer either to the object to be perceived by the
senses, or the literal method of interpretation of the Bible. In the latter case,
matter means sensible objects in the Biblical text, that is, littera.130 An essential
part of Richards theological method per visibilia ad invisibilia is his biblical
hermeneutics, which is an important element of his writings, determining
their methods and topics.131 In Victorine tradition, the Bible differs from any
other kind of writing. Richard follows the basic medieval theory of biblical
interpretation, according to which the process of interpretation begins at the
level of signs and things. First, words (voces) are signs that point to a signified
thing (res). This kind of interpretation is the foundation for the historical or
literal meaning of the text. Second, not only words (voces) signify, but the
things (res) which the words of the Bible refer to also have their distinctive,

contemplationem dirigatur. In Benjamin Major, Richard refers to the manuduction of the

imagination. bmaj I, XI, p. 20.14; bmaj II, XVII, p. 41.3.
129 Hugh of St. Victor puts this as follows: Sensibilia symbola materialia sunt signa, sive in
creaturis, sive in Scripturis, sive in sacramentis divinis ad demonstrationem invisibilium
proposita. Commentaria in Hierarchiam coelestem, pl 175, 1053C.
130 In the passages of Benjamin Minor and Major, it will become clear that the objects to be
sensed means both proper external objects (sensibilia) and the text of the Bible. For
example, in Benjamin Minor the sensible images of heaven used by imagination originate
from beautiful descriptions in The Song of Songs; see bmin XXIV, p. 154.412. However, a
beautiful sensible picture can be obtained by looking at the sun. bmin XXII, p. 148.1117.
For Richards interpretation of Bible, especially emphasizing word-for-word interpreta-
tion (secundum litteram), see Smalley 1952, 106111; Chase 1995, 813. For the theoretical
framework of literal exegesis in Victorine texts, see Coulter 2006, 6592; Coulter 2010,
101124.
131 For basic studies on medieval hermeneutics dealing with Richard and other Victorines,
see Smalley 1952; de Lubac 1961; Van Zwieten 1987. As Den Bok remarks, these studies usu-
ally stress only the increased sensibility of Richard and the Victorines for the literal mean-
ing of the Bible. It should be noted that Richard was genuinely interested in both the
literal and spiritual meaning of the text. According to Den Bok, Richards innovative con-
tribution is his emphasis on the precise analysis of the letter and accurate analysis of
things expressed in it. Den Bok also remarks that Richard has a special talent for discover-
ing parallels between the structure of the letter and its spiritual reference. See Den Bok
1996, 111. Coulter points out that Richards method begins with the analysis of words and
their referents as the way to understand the visible world. According to his thesis, the first
three kinds of contemplation in Benjamin Major form part of the enterprise of interpret-
ing texts because they concern interpreting the visible world. Coulter 2006, 18.
76 Chapter 3

divinely intended meaning.132 The things these words refer to may also func-
tion as signs. This further signification of things is the basis for allegorical, tro-
pological, and anagogical meaning.133 The ability of material reality to bear
significances, significare, is the common property of both the text of the Bible
and the entire visible creation. The visible properties of the beings refers to the
properties of invisible objects. The variations in signification are as multiform
as the world itself.134 Since things also have their significations, the human
being needs information about the things themselves to be able to associate
with either the individual beings or their properties. The significations of
things (res) of the Bible may be seen as a web of interpretations which raises
the reader towards increasingly better understanding of the Scriptures.
However, without sensation and the ability to perceive material objects, the
individual is unable to comprehend any external things. This information
offered by the sense perceptions is in turn necessary as one seeks for knowl-
edge concerning the invisible reality.135
Richard shares the usual four-sense hermeneutics, as a consequence of
which his own definition of the separate senses of scripture is clear, since he
mentions the traditional means of interpretation, which are historical, alle-
gorical, tropological, and anagogical.136 In historical interpretation (historia

132 Liber exceptionum I, II, cap. III, p. 115.812: Et in hoc valde excellentior est divina scriptura
scientia seculari, quod in ea non solum voces, sed et res significative sunt. Sicut igitur in
eo sensu qui est inter voces et res, necessaria est cognitio vocum, sic in eo sensu qui inter
res et facta vel facienda mistica versatur, necessaria est cognitio rerum. When Richard
uses the concept of res, he refers to the object underlying the word, verbum, and talks
especially about the text of the Bible.
133 Coolman 2010, 128; Coulter 2011, 163n.27.
134 Den Bok 1996, 112n.65; Jussila 1995, 129. Richard considers that the determination of refer-
ents of the terms is important for a better understanding of authorial intentions. The
terms may be restricted or extended under pressure of necessity. For the background of
this twelfth-century version of the Boethian theory of signification, see Coulter 2006,
99106.
135 bmaj II, XVII, p. 41.1316: Merito ergo exteriorem hominem homo interior ducem suum
dicit, sine cuius ministerio vel potius magisterio ad visibilium cognitionem non pertingit,
sed nec ad invisibilium quidem, cum ad illa cognoscenda sine horum notitia assurgere
non possit. In Apocalypsim Joannis, pl 196, 688C: Necessarium erat enim nostrae infirmi-
tati quae summa nonnisi per ima, spirituali nonnisi per corporalia valet capere, non
ignota per ignotiora, sed ignota per cognita noscere Animus noster quia visibilia
novit, invisibilia non novit, nisi uteretur manuductione materiali, id est corporalium
similitudine.
136 Liber exceptionum I, II, cap III, p. 115.28: Tractat de materia sua triplici modo scriptura
divina: secundum historiam, secundum allegoriam, secundum tropologiam. Historia est
The Fundamentals Of Richards Anthropology 77

orlittera), the reader can analyse the textual and grammatical level of the text
(littera), and study the texts literary and historical aspects (sensus) as well as
its theological content (sententia).137 In allegory, one event signifies some other
event, in the past, present or future. This is based on the idea of the significa-
tion of things and has a close relation to Christian doctrine. In tropological
interpretation, the reader uses the events of the text to recognize what one
should do in ones own life. Richard prefers the tropological interpetation in
his biblical exegesis. In the twelfth century, the tropological interpretation of
the Bible usually pertained to a spiritual way of life in general and was not
restricted to moral issues exclusively. Thus it is understandable that in Richards
many writings the principal tropological themes deal with the faculties and
affections of the soul as well as the ascent of the soul to contemplation, but not
ethics or morals in the modern sense.138
Richards idea of anagogical interpretation varies. The standard definition
of anagogy is that it refers to seeing the desired rewards of the future in
advance. This is also the definition of anagogical interpretation according to
Richard.139 He writes in In Apocalypsim Joannis that the anagogical vision is

rerum gestarum narratio quae in prima significatione littere continetur. Allegoria est cum
per id quod factum dicitur, aliud factum sive in preterito, sive in presenti, sive in futuro
significatur. Tropologia est cum per id quod factum legimus, quid nobis sit faciendum
agnoscimus. For Richards use of different senses in exegesis, see also Chase 1995, 413.
According to his interpretation, Richard varies between threefold and fourfold senses of
scripture because he does not consider the details of classification important. The
Victorine approach is eclectic and pragmatic, not coherent or concordant. The Victorine
interpretation of the Bible has provoked much literature and discussion. See the useful
bibliographical note and article by Berndt 2000, 467495. See de Lubac 1959/1961/1964
for the various methods of Bible interpretation (trans. de Lubac 1998, 2000). For the
genres, forms, and methods of biblical interpretation in the Middle Ages, see Dahan 2000,
196236.
137 This is Hughs definition; see Didascalicon III, VIII, p. 58.1520.
138 For the idea of Victorine tropology as spiritual interpretation of the souls ascent, see
Rorem 2009b, 119121. The tropology culminates in the restoration of the edifice of the
human in the image and likeness of God. Van t Spijker remarks that in Richards case
tropological exegesis become almost synonymous with the idea of composing the inner
person. See Van t Spijker 2004, 16.
139 Mysticae adnotationes in Psalmos, pl 196, 370A: Per historiam quid factum sit discimus,
per moralitatem quid faciendum sit cognoscimus, per allegoriam sacramenta Ecclesiae
quomodo praecedentium rerum figuris praenuntiata sint intelligimus, per anagogen
invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspicimus. Nonnullae allegoriae taber-
naculi foederis, pl 196, 200C: Ad anagogem spectat sperandorum praevidentia
praemiorum.
78 Chapter 3

pure and rises up to contemplation through internal aspiration, not using

images or figures.140 However, anagogy may also refer to the general uplifting
movement of the soul towards God.141 In practice, Richard adapts these vari-
ous biblical interpretations quite freely.
Richards theological method per visibilia ad invisibilia can be seen in his
pedagogical thinking as well, which stresses the visualization of important
topics in various respects and uses literary devices like personification. The
Victorines are famous for their pedagogical initiatives, since they attempted to
organize their own presentations in a way that their students could learn effi-
ciently.142 Richards pedagogical thinking at work is well represented in his
many treatises, including Benjamin Minor and Benjamin Major.
Benjamin Minor can be portrayed as a tropological interpretation of Genesis,
which relates the text to morality and the various operations of the soul. In
Benjamin Minor, Richard uses personification allegory as a literary tool. In per-
sonification allegory abstract qualities, faculties, and other philosophical ideas
are given human characteristics. Abstractions are equipped with human form,
and made to act in a story which is an external representation of some philo-
sophical discussion.143 In Benjamin Minor Richard allegorizes the famous bibli-
cal narrative of Jacob, his wives, and their handmaids. He also operates with
the characters of the whole offspring of Jacobs family. This literary device
enables Richard to describe the complex dynamics of the soul by illustrating
its various potencies through the figures of the family. An entire structure of
the human soul is signified in the features of Jacob, his wives, their handmaids
as well as their children.144

140 In Apocalypsim Joannis, pl 196, 686D687C.

141 Mysticae adnotationes in Psalmos, pl 196, 370A. Cf. Hugh of St. Victor, who claims that
anagogical interpretation occurs when understanding (intelligentia) leads the soul from
visible things to invisible things. Thus visible things signify invisible things. Hugh also
states that in simple allegory visible things signify other visible things. Sententie de divini-
tate, prologus p. 918.180191: Allegoria uero alia simplex allegoria, alia est illa que dicitur
anagoge. Simplex est quando per res uisibiles significantur alie res uisibiles Cum autem
per res uisibiles significantur res inuisibiles, hec quod allegoria dicitur anagogesic ana-
gogicus sensus est cum intelligentia ab his uisibilibus ducit nos ad ea que non uidetur.
See also de Lubac 2000, 180181.
142 For Victorine pedagogics, see Rorem 2009, 1137.
143 The well-known example of personification allegory is Psychomachia by Prudentius
(c.405), which describes the battle between personified vices and virtues. As C.S. Lewis
notes, personification allegory is a fine method for dealing with psychology and intrapsy-
chic conflicts. Lewis 1958, 73, 118. For the general introduction to the history and theories
of personification allegory, see Paxson 1994.
144 For the personification allegory in Richards texts, see Zinn 1977, 190217.
The Fundamentals Of Richards Anthropology 79

In Benjamin Major, Richard describes the various kinds of contemplation by

following the structures of the historical Ark of the Covenant. The examina-
tion of the measurements and materials of the Ark is simultaneously an analy-
sis of contemplation. Van t Spijker mentions how the process of composing
oneself in Benjamin Major is paralleled by an epistemological operation linked
with the architectural images of building the Ark. The process of knowing is
elaborated and made into an object of contemplation.145
On the whole, Benjamin Major can be described as a hermeneutic work
which aims at interpreting the Scripture, even though the text of the Bible
often remains merely the inspirational background. First, Richard deals with
the verses of Exodus in which the structure of the Ark of the Covenant is shown
(Ex. 25:822), stating that his purpose is to formulate a tropological interpreta-
tion of its description. Consequently, in both Benjamins Richard makes use of
the same method of biblical interpretation, that is, tropology. Richard explains
this solution by asserting that many learned theologians have written detailed
investigations of the allegorical significance of the Ark before. In these inter-
pretations, the Ark represents Christ whereas, according to the tropological
sense, the Ark is the Ark of Sanctification, i.e., the examination of the persons
inner life, moral purification and, finally, the preparation of the soul for the
mystical union with God. Richard does not limit himself to the moral interpre-
tation of the Bible, but considers the subject especially from the point of view
of the contemplative life. This means that he attends to the structure of the
human soul and its operation at different stages of contemplation, maintain-
ing that the Ark can be considered as the representation of the soul or, in the
narrower sense, as the symbol of the human understanding (intelligentia).146
It has been said that Benjamin Major discusses the intellectual soul of the

145 Van t Spijker 2004, 144.

146 bmaj I, I, p. 5.1014: Quid iuxta allegoricum sensum haec arca mystice designet vel quo-
modo Christum significet, a doctoribus iam ante nos dictum et a perspicacioribus
pertractatum est. Nec idcirco tamen temeritatis incuriam incurrere nos suspicamur,
sialiquid adhuc in eandem materiam moraliter loquamur. bmaj I, II, p. 7.78: Quae erit
arca in id negotii idonea nisi humana intelligentia? In Benjamin Major, it is not directly
stated that the Ark of the Covenant in fact symbolizes the soul, but in his Liber exceptio-
num Richard says explicitly that in the tropological sense, the Tabernacle signifies the
human soul. Liber exceptionum II, X, cap. II, p. 377.23: Tabernaculum Domini secundum
sensum tropologicum est anima. In Liber exceptionum also, the Ark of Noah represents
the human soul. Richard briefly presents the parts and measures of the Noahs Ark, as well
as the abilities of the soul in a parallel series. This pattern resembles some of Benjamin
Majors basic ideas. See Liber exceptionum II, I, cap. XIVXV, p. 229231. Cf. also De exter-
minatione mali et promotione boni, pl 196, 1102C.
80 Chapter 3

human being and the souls individual abilities. This solution is exceptional in
the history of interpretations of the Ark of the Covenant.147
In Benjamin Major every small detail of the few verses from Exodus is care-
fully analysed: Richard does not overlook even a single aspect of the text. With
the aid of these descriptions, the readers task is to imagine the model of the
Ark in his mind and then to understand the interconnections between the
Arks specific structure and the operation of the abilities of the human soul.
The reader should construct an Ark of understanding and, thus guided by the
divine inspiration, move towards the grace of contemplation and thus God.148
This method is pedagogically efficient, and some researchers consider it
probable that Richard even built a scale model of the Ark for studying the
themes of Benjamin Major.149 Here he followed his teacher, Hugh of St. Victor,
who similarly utilized visual methods by constructing a model of the Ark of
Noah to support the understanding of his work of the same name. In Richards
writings, the influence of the two treatises dedicated to Noah (De Archa Noe,
Libellus de formatione arche) is considerable. Their themes, pedagogy, and ter-
minology are especially apparent in Benjamin Major.150 Richard suggests to his
audience that they should make drawings or constructions which support the
examination of these spiritual matters.151 While the model is externally drawn,

147 Chase 1995, 1320. Many significant church fathers and theologians have written allegori-
cal interpretations of the Ark of the Covenant which Richard surely knew well. In these
interpretations the Ark symbolizes Christ, the Virgin Mary, the Church, or the Holy
Trinity. In many of these interpretations, the cherubs manifest wisdom but the complete
method of interpretation is not tropological. See de Lubac 2000, 99, 134, 198.
148 bmaj I, II, p. 7.810: Haec autem arca divino magisterio fabricatur et deauratur, quando
humana intelligentia divina inspiratione et revelatione ad contemplationis gratiam
promovetur.
149 Cahn 1994, 3368. For example, the manuscripts of Richards commentary on Ezekiel
include almost without exception diagrams of the temple of Jerusalem seen by Ezekiel in
the revelation. Several manuscripts of Richards works indicate that he and his pupils
drew up diagrams and scale models regularly. According to Cahn, these illustrations are
not meant to decorate the text, but can be conceived as an integral part of Richards
demonstrative intentions. For the analysis of depictions in In visionem Ezechielis (pl 196,
9951011), see Cahn 1994, 3368. See also Sicard 1993, 143144.
150 For these interesting books, De archa Noe, and Libellus de formatione Arche, see Sicard
1993; McGinn 1995, 376383; Zinn 1995, 99116; Rorem 2009, 129151 and Coolman 2010,
180191. Both of these texts have been edited by Poirel 2001.
151 bmaj III, XII, p. 6970. Richard might be indicating here some kind of internal drawings,
which the contemplative person should consider in order to understand the various
internal stages of the soul.
The Fundamentals Of Richards Anthropology 81

its separate parts and their references to spiritual life should be interiorized.
Pierre Sicard calls this method psychocosmography, adding that it is espe-
cially typical of the Victorines to construct various diagrams or scale models
corresponding to their texts, which usually concern the constitution of the
human soul.152

152 Sicard 1993, 149.

 Chapter 4

The Role of Imagination as the Soul Prepares

for Contemplation

We often use such an imagination when we more diligently examine what the
goods and the evils of the future life are. For no things here in this world are
good only; no things here are evil only; good and evil are mixed together.1

4.1 Introduction to Benjamin Minor

In this chapter, I will concentrate on Richard of St. Victors ideas on imagination

(imaginatio) in Benjamin Minor, in which he analyses the relation between
imagination and reason, and points out at least three different forms of the
activity of the imagination. In this connection, Richard considers the souls abil-
ity to imagine future events with the co-operation of imagination and reason.
He also describes how the imagination can serve as a useful instrument for inter-
preting the Bible. At the end of the chapter, I will illustrate how Richard aims to
adapt the co-operation between reason and imagination to the spiritual life.
I begin my study by exploring the themes of Benjamin Minor at a general
level. Benjamin Minor consists of 87 chapters which deal with both spiritual
and psychological issues. The basic objective is to produce an idea of the soul
and its operation which would be as useful as possible for the contemplative
life, guiding the students of St. Victors school in their spiritual exercise and
self-reflection.2 In his spiritual psychology, Richard describes how the soul is
on a journey from the material and visible world towards the invisible God and
divine reality. This idea constitutes a particular scheme of discipline through
which students may pass in pursuing contemplation. As Grover Zinn states,
the works of Richard are thoroughly practical in their intent.3 Even though
mystudy focuses on Richards use of concepts which derive from traditional
theories of the soul, this practical dimension and close relationship to the

1 BMin XVI, p. 132.1418: Huiusmodi imaginatione saepe utimur, cum quae sint futurae vitae
bona vel mala diligentius rimamur. Nusquam hic sola bona, nusquam hic sola mala, sed
permixta simul et bona et mala.
2 Bmin I, p. 9092; Bmin III, p. 94.2122.
3 Zinn 1979, 7.

koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2014|doi 10.1163/9789004279452_005

The Role of Imagination 83

monastic life should not be forgotten. Although his text is not philosophical in
character, the movements and emotions of the soul as well as its instruments
and actions are analysed in detail. The vocabulary covers many concepts and
ideas which are closely connected to the philosophical topics of the time.
Richard wrote Benjamin Minor for a particular audience, the members of
the school and monastery of St. Victor. Thus Benjamin Minor had its own
restricted communal purpose and communal life is evident in the text.
According to Chtillon, a few passages in Richards production even echo his
own ambition to guide his own community to a more balanced way of life.4
However, in general it is difficult to find any exact details about the life of St.
Victor or its rulethe text is more like the universal analysis of an individual
soul and its inner experiences.
In Benjamin Minor, Richard offers a tropological interpretation of the bibli-
cal history of Jacob and his family. According to the well-known narrative in
Genesis, Jacob had two wives, the wonderful, young and tender Rachel, and the
laborious Leah. Jacobs falling in love with Rachel leads him to work for Rachels
father, Laban, for seven years. After these years of labour, Jacob marries, but
after the wedding unexpectedly realizes that he has been deceived and he has
in fact been married to Rachels sister Leah. With the power of burning love,
Jacob endures another seven years in the employment of Laban until he even-
tually makes Rachel his own. In addition to Rachel and Leah, Jacob also has
two concubines, Rachels and Leahs handmaids. Rachel chooses Bala to be her
handmaid, while Leah prefers Zelpha. Jacob fathers twelve sons altogether by
his two wives and their two handmaids. These twelve sons are the origin of
Israels twelve tribes. Furthermore, Jacob begets one daughter, Dina, by Leah.
Rachel suffers from infertility and only after a long time of waiting does she
give birth to her own two children, Joseph and finally Benjamin, after whose
birth Rachel dies.5
Because the basic structure of Benjamin Minor is adopted from this legend
of Jacob and his wives, it is essential to get a general overview of his analysis of
the story in order to understand Richards concept of imagination (imagina-
tio). According to Richard, each member of Jacobs family represents a particu-
lar affect or faculty of the soul, or even a combination of the souls faculties.
AsRichard follows the growth of the family and the fates of its members in

4 Bmin XLI, p. 210211; Bmin XLVI, p. 224; Bmin LVII, p. 226227; BMAJ II, II, p. 2324; BMAJ II,
XV, p. 3738, See also Mysticae adnotationes in Psalmos, pl 196, 354B. For the interpretations
of these texts, see Chtillon 1988, 597.
5 Gen. 2930, 3435, 49. For the significant interpretative role of Psalms in Benjamin Minor,
see Zinn 2010, 8894.
84 Chapter 4

Benjamin Minor, he simultaneously analyses the various properties of the abil-

ities of the soul which correspond to them. The children of Jacobs wives and
their handmaids are born in a particular order, which describes the develop-
ment of the parts of the soul as a dynamic whole. As Van t Spijker puts it, the
order in which the children are born indicates the order in which the novices
spiritual development takes place.6 Leah, Rachel, and the handmaids chosen
by them together establish a community of four women whose special charac-
ters and experiences describe all the most important features of the soul. In
this interpretation of Jacobs family, Richard also describes the faculty of imag-
ination through personification. Rachels garrulous (garrula) handmaid Bala
stands for the imagination (imaginatio).7

Benjamin Minors tropological system8

Jacob, intellectual soul (animus): the father
Leah, affection (affectio), the love of justice (desiderium justitiae): Leahs
seven children represent ordered affections. Leahs first four children9
1. Reuben, fear (timor) of punishment
2. Simeon, grief (dolor) of penance
3. Levi, hope (spes) of forgiveness
4. Judah, love (amor) of justice

Bala, imagination (imaginatio): Rachels handmaid, two children

5. Dan, judgement (iudicium), images of material objects
6. Naphtali, transfer (conuersio), images of spiritual objects

Zelpha, sensuality (sensualitas): Leahs handmaid, two children

7. Gad, the rigour of abstinence (abstinentia) from superfluous delight
8. Asher, the vigour of patience (patientia) in any affliction of the body

6 Van t Spijker 2004, 139.

7 Bmin V, p. 104.5153: Haec sunt duarum uxorum Iacob ancillae duae, quas scriptura nominat
Zelpham et Balam, Balam Rachelis et Zelpham Liae. Bmin VI, p. 104.2: Est enim Bala garrula,
Zelpha temulenta.
8 For the inspiration of this diagram, see McGinn 1995, 402, Figure4.
9 The appearance of the first four affections in the soul describes a kind of waking of the soul
to the existence of the spiritual reality. Zinn 1977, 193. The same fourfold series can be seen in
two works by Hugh of St. Victor. See De archa Noe II, VII, p. 45.5979 (pl 176, 642A642C) and
Libellus de formatione arche IV, p. 140.5357 (pl 176, 692C); p. 148.112 (pl 176, 696C). Knuuttila
points out that Benjamin Minors first four emotions correspond to the standard doctrine, in
which the compunction of fear and distress is the first stage of spiritual progress. After this
stage, hope and love may follow. Knuuttila 2004, 202.
The Role of Imagination 85

Leahs second set of offspring

9. Issachar, the joy (gaudium) of interior sweetness
10. Zabulon, hatred (ira) of vices

Interlude
(a) Dina, the only daughter of Jacob, represents ordered shame
(pudor). She is raped by Sichem, who represents love of vain-
glory. Sichem is a son of Emor. Emor stands for love of ones
own excellence.10
(b) Sichem is murdered by Simeon and Levi. This describes bad
spiritual advice.

Rachel, reason (ratio, studium sapientiae): two children

11. Joseph, discretion, self-control (discretio)
12. Benjamin, ecstasy in contemplation (excessus mentis)

The story of Jacobs family had stimulated innumerable interpretations even

before Richards Benjamin Minor.11 Consequently, the tropological interpreta-
tions of Leah, Rachel, and their children were already common and multiform
in the Middle Ages. Thus Richard could operate with plenty of material and
may have used both the authorized texts as well as his own contemporaries
views on the roles of the members of Jacobs family.12 His detailed descriptions

10 In Benjamin Minor Richard also briefly discusses the vices of the soul. In his tropological
interpretation, Sichem and Emor represent love of vainglory and pride. The love of ones
own excellence is the definition of pride for Augustine. See, for example, De Genesi ad
litteram 11.14.18: porro autem inuidia sequitur superbiam, non praecedit; non enim causa
superbiendi est inuidia, sed causa inuidendi superbia. cum igitur superbia sit amor excel-
lentiae propriae, inuidentia uero sit odium felicitatis alienae.
11 For these interpretations, see Longre 1997, 1939. Philo of Alexandria had already begun to
study the family saga of Jacob, seeking people as moral and spiritual examples. In his inter-
pretation, Leah and Rachel are the two different legitimate representatives of asceticism.
Hieronymus put forward an etymological interpretation of Leahs and Rachels names,
being the first to describe Leah as the hard-working and difficult wife and Rachel as inno-
cent and gentle one. Augustine and Gregory the Great associated Leah and Rachel with
Martha and Mary, famous women of the New Testament, in their own texts. Concerning the
interpretations of Martha, Mary, Leah, and Rachel, see Constable 1995, 193.
12 In this respect, one should mention Guibert of Nogent (d. 1124), an influential contempo-
rary of Richard, who gathered many earlier teachings about Jacobs family in his Moralia
in Genesin VIII, 29, pl 156, 218219. In this text, Leah represents the active life, morality,
and love for ones neighbour, while Rachel represents the contemplative life, wisdom, and
union with God. Guibert also writes about the whole offspring of Jacob, an influence
which is very clear in Richards Benjamin Minor. Richard himself writes an interpretation
86 Chapter 4

of Leah and Rachel form the main plot of Benjamin Minor.13 Richard has cho-
sen a traditional version of their roles: in Benjamin Minor, Leah represents the
active life while Rachel represents the contemplative life. Leah and Rachel are
personifications of affectivity and rationality, the two most important aspects
of the soul. Affection (affectio) and reason (ratio) together form a kind of dou-
ble power (gemina vis) of the soul.14 Rationality contains all those operations
of the soul which are related to the formation of knowledge while affection
(affectio) contains various forms of emotional life.15 Here Richard follows Hugh
of St. Victor, who writes that the whole nature of the rational soul is composed
of two things, cognition and affection, that is, wisdom and love.16
Leah (affectio) is a fertile woman who gives birth to several children,
butRachel (ratio) suffers from infertility. Leahs children incite Rachel to want
children of her own still more passionately, which means that progress in the

concerning Jacobs twelve sons in his De exterminatione mali et promotione boni. This ver-
sion differs from Benjamin Minors account in many respects. However, some of the defi-
nitions are similar. See pl 196, 1106C1116C. De exterminatione mali et promotione boni
is considered to have been written between Benjamin Minor and Benjamin Major.
Kirchberger 1957, 22; Chtillon 1988, 617.
13 Considered from this point of view, it is surprising how little attention Richard leaves for
Jacob, the head of the family. Jacob acts as the progenitor and gives the children an official
position as the abilities or the properties of the soul. He does not actively take part in the
story, however. Jacobs main task is to represent the rational, intellectual, or spiritual soul
(animus) which falls in love with Rachel (ratio), but is forced to marry Leah (affectio) first.
According to Richard, this describes how one has to exercise the virtues and uprightness
before really seeking true wisdom. Thus the intellectual soul needs both affection and
reason. Bmin IV, p. 98.18.
14 BMIN III, p. 96.35: Omni spiritui rationali gemina quaedam uis data est ab illo Patre lumi-
num, a quo est omne datum optimum, et omne donum perfectum. Una est ratio, altera affec-
tio. See Nardini 1986, 205228 for Richards views of affection and reason in Benjamin Minor.
15 BMIN III, p. 96.57: Una est ratio, altera est affectio; ratio qua discernamus, affectio qua
diligamus; ratio ad ueritatem, affectio ad uirtutem.
16 Hugh writes as follows: Duo quippe sunt, quibus animae rationalis natura tota disponi-
tur, videlicet cognitio et affectus, id est sapientia et amortota ergo animae rationalis
substantia his duobus regiturut per sapientiam quidem veritatem inveniat, per amorem
autem amplectatur virtute. In Salomonis Ecclesiasten homiliae, pl 175, 141B. Hugh even
states in his De sacramentis that faith is constituted by knowing and affection. Knowing is
the material of faith as affection is its essence. De sacramentis I, X, 3. pl 176, 331BC: Duo
sunt in quibus fides constat: cognitio et affectus. In affectu enim substantia fidei inveni-
tur; in cognitione materia. Aliud enim est fides qua creditur, et aliud quod fide creditur. In
affectu invenitur fides, in cognitione id quod fide creditur. Propterea fides in affectu habet
substantiam, quia affectus ipse fides est. Moreover, Hugh writes that cognition and affec-
tion are the formal principles of the human soul. Miscellanea, pl 177, 518C.
The Role of Imagination 87

area of the affective soul also accelerates the operation of the rational soul.17
Benjamin Minor indeed contains long and detailed descriptions of various feel-
ings and their formation as well as the impact they have on the rational soul.
The aim of Benjamin Minors spiritual programme is the ascent of the soul to
see God in ecstatic contemplation. Richard cites the Book of Wisdom for his
young novices:

I have loved and sought out for her since my youth; I have desired to take
her as my bride, and I have been made a lover of her beauty. nothing is
loved more passionately or is sweeter to possess than wisdom. This is why
all wish to be wise, yet few are able to be wise.18

According to Richards tropological teaching, it is the burning love of Jacob for

Rachel that shows longing for wisdom; the soul yearns for reason to be its own
and is therefore ready to labour indefatigably in order to attain its goal. Richard
describes how Rachel (ratio) is beautiful, represents right doctrine and teach-
ing, but is infertile in wisdom. Rachel meditates, contemplates; she makes dis-
tinctions and understands. Human reason can become the reason represented
by Rachel only if the reason is set on fire by divine revelation.19 It still often
happens that while Rachel is hoped for, she is replaced by Leah. This happens
when the mind puts itself in Rachels bedroom when it is not yet sufficiently
purified. Rachels bedroom, where the divine wisdom hides under the decent
covering of allegories, as Richard puts it, is associated with the readers capac-
ity to interpret scripture.20 Here Richard hints that one of the main goals in

17 Bmin XIII, p. 126.1823: Vbi amor, ibi oculus; libenter aspicimus quem multum diligimus.
Nulli dubium quia qui potuit bona inuisibilia diligere, quin uelit statim cognoscere, et per
intelligentiam uidere, et quanto plus crescit Iudas (amor), affectus uidelicet diligendi,
tanto amplius in Rachel feruet desiderium pariendi, hoc est studium cognoscendi.
Cf.Mysticae adnotationes in Psalmos, pl 196, 369D371A. Richard deals with the sterility
of both the affective and the rational powers of the soul. He considers that intentions,
speech, and actions may be sterile as well.
18 Bmin I, p. 92.3134, 3841: Hanc amaui, inquit, et exquisiui a iuuentute mea, ei quaesiui
sponsam michi eam assumere, et amator factus sum formae illius. Nichil enim hac, ut
diximus, sapientia ardentius diligitur, nil dulcius possidetur. Hinc est enim quod sapien-
tes omnes esse uolunt, pauci tamen admodum esse sapientes possunt.
19 Bmin I, p. 90.1518: Rachel fere sterilis, sed formae singularisRachel doctrina ueritatis,
Rachel studium sapientiae. Bmin IV, p. 100.2428: Rachelis est meditari, contemplari,
discernere, intelligere, Rachel est ratio diuina reuelatione inflammata.
20 Bmin IV, p. 98.911: Quid enim Scipturam sacram, nisi Rachel cubiculum dicimus, in qua
sapientiam diuinam sub decenti allegoriarum uelamine latitare non dubitamus? See Van
88 Chapter 4

Benjamin Minor is to find suitable instruments of the soul for the interpreta-
tion of the Bible and to describe their operation and development in ones
spiritual life.

4.2 Imagination in Benjamin Minor

It is important to understand that Richard does not analyse the concept of

imagination systematically in Benjamin Minor, even though he discusses its
functions extensively. He avoids strict definitions of imagination, which would
specify its status in the hierarchy of the faculties of the soul, preferring to
describe its various operations and its co-operative functions with reason or the
higher part of the soul, not the faculty of imagination itself. In Benjamin Minor,
Richard sees the role of imagination as three different modes of operation. First,
I briefly describe these three modes, after which I shall consider them in detail.
Richard picks up three members of Jacobs family whose life and acts por-
tray three different modes of imagination. First, he shows the significance of
imagination through Rachels handmaid Bala, who represents the basic opera-
tion of imagination (imaginatio). Second, Richard analyses the role of Balas
son, Dan, who stands for imagination directed by reason (imaginatio per ratio-
nem disposita). Lastly, Richard considers the significance of Naphtali, Balas
younger son and Dans brother. He defines Naphtali as imagination which is
mixed with understanding (imaginatio intelligentiae permixta). In short, these
three modes of imagination can be described as follows:

(1) imagination in its basic activity (imaginatio)

(2) imagination ordered by reason (imaginatio per rationem disposita)
(3) imagination mixed with understanding (imaginatio intelligentiae permixta)

The first mode of imagination is able to transfer sensory material to be further

processed by reason. Reason in turn needs imagination, since it is not able to
understand anything without images produced by the imagination As Richard
obsevers:

For without imagination, reason would know nothing, from this it is

manifestly gathered that reason could never rise to knowing of invisible

t Spijkers interpretation, Van t Spijker 2004, 137138. Cf. Bernard of Clairvauxs notion
of cubiculum, which refers to the place where mystical union in contemplation is about to
happen. For the terminology, see Gilson 1990, 103n.142.
The Role of Imagination 89

things unless her handmaid, namely imagination, represent to her the

form of visible things. Consequently imagination runs (because she is a
handmaid), between mistress and servant, between reason and sense.
And whatever it draws up extrinsically through the sense of the flesh,
itrepresents inwardly for reason.21

The imagination even presents the forms of external objects to reason when
senses do not operate so that imagination can be said to act as a kind of mem-
ory for sensory material.22 Richard mentions no sensus communis, or common
sense, which would combine different sensations and function as an interface
between the senses and the imagination.23 Obviously the necessary operation
of the common sense, which unites perceptual cognition, belongs to the activi-
ties of the basic imagination in Richards scheme. The simple repetition of
sense perceptions as well as transferring them for the use of reason is the
task most commonly ascribed to the imagination in Antiquity and the
MiddleAges.24
In the definitions of the two higher modes of imagination, Richard uses the
following notions: reason (ratio) and understanding (intelligentia). In his
scheme, reason investigates, explains and argues with regard to visible and
invisible created objects and their reasons, but understanding is capable of

21 Bmin V, p. 102.6,1215,2730: Nam sine imaginatione ratio nichil sciret,inde manifeste

colligitur quia ad inuisibilium cognitionem nunquam ratio assurgeret, nisi ei ancilla sua,
imaginatio uidelicet, rerum uisibilium formam repraesentaret. Discurrit ergo imagina-
tio, utpote ancilla, inter dominam et seruum, inter rationem et sensum, et quicquid
extrinsecus haurit per sensum carnis, intus repraesentat ad obsequium rationis.
22 Bmin V, p. 104.3133: Semper ergo imaginatio rationi assistit, nec ad momentum quidem
ab eius famulatu se subtrahit, nam sensu etiam deficiente ipsa ministrare non desinit.
23 The idea of sensus communis explains how each set of sensible objects has its own par-
ticular sense organ, but the human being or animal is still able to perceive the properties
of the object which is the origin of the information conveyed by several senses. There are
also classes of perceptions which have no separate sense organ of their own; for instance,
motion, form, and number are perceived only with the help of common sense. In the
Middle Ages, many authors thought that sensus communis, located in the front ventricle
of the brain, belonged among the so-called internal senses. The sense-impressions of the
five senses proceed along the sensory nerves to the front of the front ventricle, occupied
by sensus communis. Each sense is able to perceive only the range of its own sensible
objects, but the general power of sensus communis grasps all sensible objects in order to
compare and relate them. For the common sense in the Middle Ages, see Harvey 1975,
4344. For the origins of the idea of the common sense, see Tuominen, 2013.
24 See Chapters 2.1. and 2.2.
90 Chapter 4

intuiting divine objects and even triune God.25 Richard regards the second
mode of imagination as the imagination ordered by reason (imaginatio per
rationem disposita):

But another kind of rational imagination is ordered by reasonWe use it

when according to a known outward appearance (species) of visible
things we fashion some other visible thing in the mind, yet without think-
ing of some invisible thing on the basis of it.26

Imagination which is ordered by reason does not need immediate sense per-
ceptions in order to produce new images, since it is able to use material per-
ceived earlier. This takes place by joining and separating the various properties
of the images, which are stored in the memory. The human being directs the
operation of the rational imagination with the help of the will.27 In the ancient
and medieval literature on the soul, typical modes of operation of imagination
are joining and separating images as well as producing new ones.28
The third mode of the operation of imagination is closer to intellectual abil-
ities than the two previous modes. Richard calls the third mode imagination
mixed with understanding (imaginatio intelligentiae permixta):

But one kind of rational imagination is ordered by reason, and another

kind is mixed with understandingWe use the latter, when we strive
to ascend by means of the outward appearance of visible things to

25 BMAJ I, VI, p. 1214; Feiss 2012, 84.

26 Bmin XVIII, p. 136.37: Sed rationalis imaginatio alia est per rationem dispositaIlla
utimur quando secundum uisibilium rerum cognitam speciem uisibile aliquid aliud
mente disponimus, nec tamen ex eo inuisibile aliquid cogitamus.
27 Bmin XIX, p. 140.89,1317: Dan secundum praesentium rerum imaginationem ueram
repraesentat rerum futurarum imaginationem fictam. absque culpa sit tormenta malo-
rum multo aliter quam sunt per imaginationem cernere. Sed quisque ea pro arbitrio
mentis non qualia sunt, sed qualia fingere nouit, figurando describit.
28 For instance, the writings of Augustine contain many examples of the ability of mind
which is able to produce new images with the help of imagination. This production takes
place by combining and separating different properties of pictures contained in the
memory. For these texts, see De Musica 6.32. Epistula 7.3.6. Epistula 7.2.4. De Genesi ad lit-
teram 12.6.15. De Trinitate 8.6.9.; 9.6.10. See Chapter 2.2. of this study. See also Anselm of
Canterburys Monologion 11, p. 26.912: Faber vero penitus nec mente potest aliquid cor-
poreum imaginando concipere, nisi id quod aut totum simul aut per partes ex aliquibus
rebus aliquomodo iam didicit; nec opus mente conceptum perficere, si desit aut materia
aut aliquid sine quo opus praecogitatum fieri non possit.
The Role of Imagination 91

k nowledge of invisible things. In the latter understanding is not with-

out imagination.29

The third mode processes new images as well as the second mode of imagina-
tion. Its special feature is to model invisible objects with the help of visible
images. In the twelfth-century texts, there appear to be no other similar discus-
sions of the imaginations activity that correspond to this third mode, which
Richard mentions.30 The human being can employ the second and third modes
of the activities of the imagination when aiming, for example, to imagine
something absolutely good or bad.31 Therefore they appear to possess some
kind of cognitive inclination.
In Richards model, all three modes of imagination and their activities seem
to operate between the senses and reason. The only unclear factor in this
respect is the third mode, imagination mixed with understanding, since he
does not fully explore the relationships between imagination, reason, and
understanding.
In many twelfth-century texts, imagination is seen as the necessary connec-
tion and the mediator between sensitive and intellectual abilities. Richard fol-
lows this basic principle in his own explanation. De anima literature contains
several examples intended to clarify the dilemma of the disparity between the
body and the soul, offering the operation of imagination (imaginatio or phan-
tasia) as a solution.32 One of the most influential theories of the soul in the

29 Bmin XVIII, p. 136.34,710: Sed rationalis imaginatio alia est per rationem disposita, alia
intelligentiae permixta. Ista (Naphtali) uero tunc utimur, quando per uisibilium rerum
speciem ad inuisibilium cognitionem ascendere nitimur. In illa est imaginatio non sine
ratione, in ista intelligentia non absque imaginatione.
30 Some Neoplatonist theories of the human soul ascribe similar tasks to the imagination.
For example, Proclus suggests that the imagination assists in cognitive tasks. This is seen
especially in geometry, in which imagination produces the information which leads the
soul to the understanding of intelligible objects by joining and separating the properties
of sensible pictures. Sorabji 2004, 7778. The close connection between mathematical
sciences and imagination is evident in Hughs theory too. Didascalicon II, VI, p. 30.14
(755B); Didascalicon II, XVII, p. 36.18 (758D). However, Hugh does not refer to imagination,
which would be mixed with understanding.
31 Bmin XVI, p. 132.2329: Quotiens igitur ex multis bonis uel malis quae in hac uita sensus
corporeus experitur, quale uel quantum esse possit illud futurae uitae summum bonum
siue malum colligitur, et ex eorum imaginatione quaedam futurorum imago figuratur,
talis utique imaginatio rationalis esse facile conuincitur et ad Balam [imaginatio] et ad
Rachel [ratio] pertinere uidetur.
32 For examples, see Hugh of St. Victors De unione corporis et spiritus p. 888.156159
(pl 177, 289A) and Didascalicon I, III, p. 9.1115 (744A) as well as Isaac of Stellas Epistola de
92 Chapter 4

Middle Ages is the exact psychological description by Avicenna, which analy-

ses the separate activities of imagination and the internal senses. Obviously
this theory was not familiar to Richard.33 No doubt Richard knew Hugh of
St. Victors short treatise, De unione corporis et spiritus, in which imagination
(imaginatio) plays a significant role and its operation is analysed, among other
faculties of soul, in the light of the physiological knowledge of the time.34
Richard adapts this standard idea of imagination to the context of spiritual
theology. Nevertheless, Richard omits the terminology of physiological psy-
chology almost completely in Benjamin Minor. This decision seems to be very
conscious because he was familiar with many texts which are intimately
related to the subject and in which the dilemma between the soul and the
body is discussed using the terminology of physiological psychology.35

4.3 Three Modes of Imagination in Benjamin Minor

4.3.1 Bala-Imagination
Richard considers the first and simplest mode of imagination when dealing
with the special qualities of reason (ratio) in relation to the bodily senses.36
According to Richard, reason is not able to operate without sense perceptions.
He justifies this by an appeal to the letter to the Romans: Since the invisible
things of God from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being under-
stoodby means of those things which are made (Rom. 1:20). This means that

anima 11, pl 194, 1881C and William St. Thierrys De natura corporis et animae, pl 180,
702AB. William uses the term phantasia in referring to the imagination. There is also an
interesting text attributed to Augustine, De spiritu et anima, pl 40, 786D787A, which
describes the necessity of the imagination and its operations between the senses and
reason in detail. See McGinn 1977, 181288.
33 Avicennas philosophical work al-sifa was translated into Latin in 1160. Its famous psycho-
logical part was later called De anima. There is no evidence of De animas presence in the
library of St. Victor during Richards lifetime. For Avicennas theory, see Chapter 2.3.
34 De unione corporis et spiritus p. 886, 8595 (pl 177, 287BD). See above, Chapter 2.3.
35 Richard knew Hughs works thoroughly as well as the Cistercian De anima literature. He
also uses some standard physiological terminology, like a definition of healthiness and
the four humours, in his other works. See, e.g., De statu interioris hominis c. XXXIV, p. 101
(pl 196, 1141BC). For physiological psychology in the Middle Ages, see Chapter 2.2.
36 Richard had obviously further developed the thought of Guibert of Nogent, in which
Rachels handmaid Bala is associated with the souls imaginative ability (phantasia in
Guiberts terminology). Guibert separates the abilities of fantasy (phantasia) and imagi-
nation (imaginatio) in contrast to Richard, who does not distinguish clearly between
these terms. See Guiberts Moralia in Genesin, pl 175, 222C, 224A.
The Role of Imagination 93

invisible immaterial objects can be approached by studying the different

aspects of the world of sensible objects.37
However, there is always a clear division between reason and the senses in
Richards anthropology. This means that sensus carnis, in other words, the
fleshly senses, will perceive visible objects, and the oculus cordis, eye of the
heart, or reason, is directed to invisible objects.38 Richard writes: The young,
beautiful, and sensitive daughter can neither roam the streets nor is the ser-
vant allowed to rush into her mistresss private bedroom. As Richard says about
the distinction between the soul and the body, reason (ratio) cannot step out;
senses (sensus) cannot come in.39 This divide between the visible and invisible
world is bridged by imagination (imaginatio), because it operates between the
senses and reason and is able to function as a link between them. Therefore
imagination is necessary to reason. Richard claims that without imagination
reason is unable to know anything (sine imaginatione ratio nichil sciret).
Imagination represents (repraesentare) forms (formae) of visible objects,
which reason needs in order to rise to know invisible things.40 He asserts that

37 Bmin V, p. 102.1015: Item, cum scriptum sit quia inuisibilia Dei, a creatura mundi, per
eaquae facta sunt, intellecta conspiciuntur, inde manifeste colligitur quia ad iuisibilium
cognitionem nunquam ratio assurgeret, nisi ei ancilla sua, imaginatio uidelicet, rerum
uisibilium formam repraesentaret.
38 Bmin V, p. 102.2023: Visibilia enim solus intuetur sensus carnis, inuisibilia uero solus uidet
oculus cordis. Est ergo sensus carnis totus extrinsecus, sensus uero cordis totus intrinsecus.
Similarly to Augustine, Gregory the Great and Hugh of St. Victor, Richard associates know-
ing with the inner sense of sight. Richards idea of oculus cordis probably derives from Hugh
of St. Victor. For Hughs terminology, see Sicard 1993, 187189. For the spiritual terminology
of sensation, see Rudy 2002, 1744 and Gavriyluk and Coakley 2012, 120.
39 Bmin V, p. 102.2327: Ratio foras exire non potest, sensus corporeus ad illam intrare non
potest. Non enim decebat filiam delicatam et teneram, et singulariter formosam foris per
plateas discurrere, sed nec seruum conueniebat dominae suae penetralia secretiora
irreuerenter irrumpere.
40 Richard is indefinite about the knowledge of invisible things (cognitio rerum inuisibilium).
The invisible things can refer to reasons, properties, or qualities of invisible things in gen-
eral, to the invisible properties of the human soul, or even divine objects like the Trinity.
Richard often mentions the invisible things of God; see, for instance, Mysticae adnotatio-
nes in Psalmos, pl 196, 370A; BMAJ II, XII, p. 34.69; Bmin LXII, p. 268.2933. For invisible
things of both the human spirit and God, see Bmin LXXI, p. 296.1215: Prius discat homo
cognoscere inuisibilia sua, quam praesumat posse apprehendere inuisibilia divina. Prius
est ut cognoscas inuisibilia spiritus tui, quam possis esse idoneus ad cognoscenda inuisi-
bilia Dei. In Benjamin Major, Richard claims that invisible things can be both comprehen-
sible by reason (intelligibilia) and incomprehensible by reason (intellectibilia), see BMAJ
I, VII, p. 12. Richard also points out that the human being may perceive invisible things
94 Chapter 4

seeing visible things leads the soul to knowledge of invisible things as often as
one draws a similitude (similitudo) from visible things to invisible things.41
Thus imagination operates here with forms (formae) as well as with simili-
tudes (similitudines).42 At this point, Richard does not focus on how exactly
the transition from visible objects to invisible objects is achieved. Furthermore,
he does not specify what the similitudes of visible and material forms are.
Imagination, the link between the senses and reason, is represented by the
handmaid (ancilla) called Bala.43 This basic form of imagination is an active

intellectually on the basis of their similitude or picture. BMAJ II, XVIII, p. 44.1317. For
the nature (natura) of invisible things Bmin XXIII, p. 152.2533.
41 Bmin V, p. 102.47,1218: unaquaeque ancillarum dominae suae necessaria esse cognosci-
turNam sine imaginatione ratio nichil sciretinde manifeste colligitur quia ad inuisi-
bilium cognitionem nunquam ratio assurgeret, nisi ei ancilla sua, imaginatio uidelicet,
rerum uisibilium formam repraesentaret. Per rerum uisibilium speciem surgit ad rerum
inuisibilium cognitionem, quotiens ex his ad illa quandam trahit similitudinem. Note
that Richard uses the term species in various senses. Species may refer to seeing something
in general, but it is possible to translate species as appearance, or the image of a thing as
well. This interpretation stresses the epistemological process associated with imagina-
tion. In Benjamin Minor, Richard also points out that things may be defined according to
their genus and species. However, in Benjamin Major Richard claims that the sensible
objects have their own visible forms, species, which may be considered in the first kinds
of contemplation. See Chapter 5.4. This epistemological interpretation of species is used
also in Liber exceptionum I, II, cap. II, p. 115.2224.
42 Richard uses such terms as forma, species, imago, imaginatio and figura nearly synony-
mously. Similitudo and symbolum differ from these terms in that they may contain refer-
ence to invisible objects. For a fuller account of Richards idea of similitudes, see Chapter
6.2. For the difficulty of interpreting the terminology concerning images, pictures, spe-
cies, and forms in the twelfth-century writings, see Javelet 1967, ixxxxii.
43 The idea of imagination as a female slave (famula) of reason is already present in Boethius
In Isagogen Porphyrii commenta II.1, p. 136137 (71C72A). The same notion is repeated in
Hughs Didascalicon I, III, p. 9.5 (743D). Richard also refers to reasons handmaid as pedis-
sequa, maidservant, which refers to the wisdom of the world. Bmin III, p. 98.4. Cf. Peter
Abelards Collationes II, 68, p. 84: Longe quippe aliorum studia citra summum bonum
remanent nec beatitudinis contingunt eminentiam, nec ullus in eis fructus apparet nisi
quantum huic summe deseruiunt philosophie, tamquam circa dominam occupate pedis-
seque. Quid enim ad studium grammatice uel dialectice uel caeterarum artium de uera
hominis beatitudine uestiganda? Longe omnes inferius ab hac eminentia iacent nec ad
tantum se attollere ualent fastigium; sed quedam genera locutionum tradunt uel rerum
aliquas exercent naturas, quasi quosdam gradus ad hanc celsitudinem parantes, cum de
ipsa nobis disserendum et aliquas rerum naturas in exemplum uel similitudinem quasi
fuerit afferendum; ut per illas quasi quodam pedissequarum ducatu pertingamus ad
dominam, in illis quidem progressionis nostrae transitum habentes, in hac requiem et
The Role of Imagination 95

and quick ability of the soul. Balas main duty is to serve Rachel, who repre-
sents reason. Richard clarifies how imagination acquires material from outside
through the fleshly senses (extrinsecus haurit per sensus carnis). Immediately
after this, imagination represents this material inwardly (intus repraesentare)44
for the service of reason. Thus imagination always assists reason, never with-
drawing itself from its tasks for a single moment. Richard seems to imply that
reason is permanently dependent on the assistance of the imagination. Even if
the operation of the senses fails, the imagination does not stop providing
material for reason. For example, when a human being is placed in the dark
and is able to see nothing, he can still imagine (imaginari) anything (quaeli-
bet).45 Richard uses this example to show how the imagination functions
voluntarily46 and is capable of using material stored in the memory (memoria)
as well.47

nostrae fatigationis finem adepti. For the idea of ancilla as a representative of the liberal
arts, see Brown 1990, 9396.
44 The idea of representing (repraesentare) visible forms has been studied by Lagerlund
2007, who claims that Avicenna introduced the connection between the inner represen-
tation of an object and the imagination. According to Lagerlund, Avicennas model
formed the basis for the idea of mental representations in the Middle Ages. See Lagerlund
2007, 1133. However, Richard offers a similar solution in both Benjamin Minor and Major,
claiming several times that the imagination is able to represent things for reason. Richard
states that making representations is also possible for two forms of the rational imagination.
Bmin V, p. 102.15,30; Bmin XIX, p.140.19,21. Richard also uses similar expressions in Benjamin
Major. BMAJ II, XI, p. 34.1; BMAJ II, XII, p. 34.28; BMAJ II, XVII, p. 41.5,89; BMAJ II, XVIII,
p. 44.9. Cf. the related terminology in Isaac of Stellas Epistola de anima 10, pl 194, 1880D.
45 Bmin V, p. 102, 104.2736: Discurrit ergo imaginatio, utpote ancilla, inter dominam et
seruum, inter rationem et sensum, et quicquid extrinsecus haurit per sensum carnis,
intus repraesentat ad obsequium rationis. Semper ergo imaginatio rationi assistit, nec ad
momentum quidem ab eius famulatu se subtrahit, nam sensu etiam deficiente ipsa min-
istrare non desinit. Nam in tenebris positus nil video, sed quaelibet illic imaginari possum
si uolo. Sic semper et in omnibus imaginatio praesto est, et eius obsequio ubique ratio
utipotest.
46 For the acts of imagination, see also Bmin XVII, p. 134.1617: Imaginatio ergo, quando
instrumentum significat, est illa uis animae qua cum uoluerit quodlibet imaginari potest.
Even though Richard uses such phrases as si uolo and cum uoluerit, imagination occa-
sionally seems to act spontaneously or involuntarily too, as shown below.
47 Bmin VI, p. 106.1921: Quaeque etenim uisa uel audita, quandoque quae ipsi gessimus uel
diximus, ad memoriam reuocat. Augustine uses similar expressions about the function-
ing of the memory. See, for instance, Confessiones 10.8.13: nam in tenebris atque in silentio
dum habito, in memoriam ea profero, si volo, colores, et discerno inter album et nigrum
et inter quos alios volo.
96 Chapter 4

Richard reveals that the basic operation of the imagination is not always
unproblematic, explaining that imagination may also act involuntarily. He
states that imagination may function in a harmfully active way because it
sometimes produces plenty of unnecessary material for reason to use. Thus
human rational thinking can be disturbed by a vast amount of pictorial sense-
data. In Benjamin Minor, Richard describes the operations of Bala-imagination
colourfully. Bala is a chatterbox who continually repeats everything that a per-
son has seen or heard, said and done, without the soul actually needing all this
material. The matters which already have been fully accounted for are repeated
again and again by the imagination. Richard warns that during prayer or while
saying the psalms we wish to expel phantasies of thoughts (fantasias cogitatio-
num) and all kinds of images of things (quaslibet imagines rerum) from the
ears of the heart,48 but we are not able to do so. Bala-imagination maintains
the discussion even though nobody listens, which is why he calls imagination
an aged gossip (inveterata anus) or a senile old man (senes decrepitus).49 As a
conclusion, the activity of imagination at the service of rational thinking can
also turn out to be one of its vices.
Richard continues that imagination may be either rational (imaginatio
rationalis) or bestial (imaginatio bestialis). The bestial imagination (imaginatio
bestialis) is that which has fallen into the role of a gossip. In this case, the mind
is wandering here and there (huc illucque) purposelessly (sine ulla utilitate),
without any deliberation. Thus bestial imagination is an involuntary function
of the soul. Animals also have this kind of imagination.50 Rational imagination

48 In this passage, Richard utilizes sensory language: the heart has ears (aures cordis) and an
eye (oculus cordis).
49 Bmin VI, p. 106.1122, 2527: Imaginatio autem cum tanta importunitate in auribus cordis
perstrepit, quatinus eius clamorem, ut diximus, ipsa Rachel uix uel omnino cohibere non
possit. Hinc est quod saepe dum psallimus uel oramus, fantasias cogitationum uel quasli-
bet imagines rerum ab oculis cordis amouere uolumus, nec ualemus. Quoniam ergo hui-
usmodi perstrepentium cogitationum tumultus cotidie etiam inuiti patimur, qualis uel
quanta sit Balae garrulitas cotidiano experimento docemur. Quaeque etenim uisa uel
audita, quandoque quae ipsi gessimus uel diximus, ad memoriam reuocat, et quae ipsa
iam enarrando explicauit, eadem iterum atque iterum replicare non cessat. Sic utique
decrepiti senes uel inueteratae anus solent quaelibet absque omni auditore referre, et
quasi aliquibus praesentibus cum eis sermonem conferre. For some reason, Richards
account of aged people is clearly negative. Does this mean that Richard wrote Benjamin
Minor when he was young?
50 Bmin XVI, p. 130, 58: Bestialis itaque imaginatio est, quando per ea quae paulo ante
uidimus uel fecimus, sine ulla utilitate, absque omni deliberatione, huc illucque uaga
mente discurrimus. Haec utique bestialis est, nam et hoc bestia facere potest. It is indeed
interesting that the Benjamin Majors first kind of contemplation consists of the free
The Role of Imagination 97

(imaginatio rationalis), in turn, operates voluntarily and forms some new

images, if necessary, on the basis of bodily sensations. These new images are
obviously created by joining, separating, reducing, and enlarging sensible pic-
tures in the mind.51 Richard writes that one can fabricate something else from
what the human being acquires through the bodily senses by imagining (quae
per sensum corporeum nouimus, aliquid imaginabiliter fingimus). The human
being can, for example, form images of gold and a house, and connect them as
an image of a golden house (domus aurea). An animal is not able to do so, but
a rational being such as a human being can.52 This idea of the golden house
evidently anticipates the later medieval discussions of the imaginations
function as a combiner of images and the basic example of the golden
mountain.53
Richard has perhaps adopted the idea of bestial imagination from Hugh of
St. Victors Didascalicon which mentions that the animals can retain images of
sense-perceived forms and build a memory of them. However, animals possess
these images in a confused manner, so that they can achieve nothing from join-
ing or combining them. Animals cannot foresee the future either, because they
lack the ability to combine images voluntarily.54 Richard evaluates the idea of

wandering of the mind, which in Benjamin Minor is described as an operation of the soul
that should be avoided. See for example BMAJ I, VI, p. 12.2528.
51 Here Richard follows Augustines idea that the mind has the power to produce images of
things which it has never experienced. Augustine says in De Trinitate that the images are
fabricated. De Trinitate 11.5.8: Sed quia praevalet animus, non solum oblita, verum etiam
non sensa nec experta confingere, ea quae non exciderunt augendo, minuendo, commu-
tando, et pro arbitrio componendo, saepe imaginatur quasi ita aliquid sit, quod aut scit
non ita esse, aut nescit ita esse.
52 Bmin XVI, p. 132.914: Rationalis autem est illa, quando ex his quae per sensum corpo-
reum nouimus, aliquid imaginabiliter fingimus. Verbi gratia: aurum uidimus, domum uidi-
mus, auream autem domum nunquam uidimus; auream tamen domum imaginari possumus,
si uolumus. Hoc utique bestia facere non potest, soli rationali creaturae hoc possibile est.
53 Minnis 1981, 76. Pasnau 2002, 282.
54 Didascalicon I, III, p. 8.25p. 9.4 (743D): Sed eas imaginationes confusas atque ineuidentes
sumunt, ut nihil ex earum coniunctione ac compositione efficere possint, atque idcirco
meminisse quidem nec aeque omnia, amissam vero oblivionem recolligere ac reuocare
non possunt. Futuri uero his nulla cognitio est. Hugh quotes this chapter directly from
Boethius In Isagogen Porphyrii commenta II.1, p. 136137 (71C72A). In addition, Peter
Abelard exploits this idea in his commentary on Aristotles Peri hermeneias, Glossae super
Periermeneias p. 316.18. Augustine also writes that the difference between animal and
human imagination is that imagination (spiritus in this context) is irrational (irrationalis)
with the animals, but with rational soul (anima rationalis) reason is able to understand
the pictures of the mind. De Genesi ad litteram 12.11.22. Guibert of Nogent mentions
98 Chapter 4

bestial imagination (imaginatio bestialis) only briefly, without focusing strictly

on what kind of imagination animals do have and how it functions. Whether
the images are confused or inevident without reasons explication is also left
unspecified. Instead, he refers several times to the rational imagination (imagi-
natio rationalis) in both Benjamin Minor and Major. These texts share the
ideathat the rational imagination is co-operation between imagination and
the higher faculties of the soul, such as reason (ratio) and understanding
(intelligentia).55
At this point it should be asked whether the basic mode of operation of the
imagination in Benjamin Minor represents bestial imagination and whether
animals possess the same mode of imagination figured by Bala. It is difficult
to decide on the basis of Richards thinking whether he considers Bala-
imagination to be bestial or rational. In his scheme, the simple operation of
imagination between senses (sensus) and reason (ratio) sometimes seems to
involve bestial features. Richard states that the Bala-imagination is like a gar-
rulous old person who endlessly produces pictures in the mind without any
clear benefit.56 However, this rapid and tireless activity of the imagination is
necessary for the operation of reason. This does not mean that imagination
should be characterised here as clearly rational, but simply that its utility for
reason is unquestionable. In conclusion, Richard seems to understand the
basic form of imagination as both bestial and rational; rational in the sense
that it is needed by reason; bestial, because it cannot combine pictures of
sense-perception and may sometimes function purposelessly, and is an invol-
untary function of the soul in this respect.
In many texts of Antiquity and the Middle Ages, the imagination is accused
of being an unreliable ability which not only serves the operation of reason but
produces pictures in the mind without a special purpose. In other words, the

that humans and animals use similar corporeal images. pl 156, 91A. Robert Pullus
(d.1147/1150) states that both human beings and animals dream with the help of their
imagination. People are able to estimate these dreams rationally, unlike animals.
Sententiae, pl 186, 740C741A: Et siquidem spiritus irrationalis est, veluti pecoris, hoc
usque oculi nuntiant. Si autem anima rationalis est, etiam intellectui nuntiatur, qui et
spiritui praesidet. Imaginationes corporum cum bestiis habemus communia, sed cum
Deo et angelis participamur rationis gloria.
55 Bmin XVIII, p. 136.310. Richard claims that imagination (imaginatio) and reason (ratio)
as well as understanding (intelligentia) can act together for a common purpose. In BMAJ
I, VI, p. 1213, Richard lists six kinds of contemplation. The second as well as the third kind
involve distinct modes of co-operation between imagination (imaginatio) and reason
(ratio).
56 Bmin VI, p. 106.1629.
The Role of Imagination 99

imagination is described as bestial or involuntary. Imagination or phantasy

may be the cause of various incorrect sensations, superfluous dreams or
prophecies.57 The hyperactive operation of the imagination is also related to
the abnormal functions of the mind and body. Moreover, epistemologically
one can see imagination as an untrustworthy faculty of the soul, because it
may be a source of error by, for instance, producing images of beings and sights
which have no factual equivalents in reality. This production of an illusory
world is often the most problematic feature of the imagination. However,
Richard does not discuss the problems of illusory images created by imagina-
tion. The feature which can disturb the soul is the disorganized, overly active,
or purposeless operation (sine ulla utilitate) of the imagination.58 He mentions
imagination with negative emphasis mainly when comparing its operation to
understanding (intelligentia) or reason (ratio), or discusses the souls journey
to the higher stages of contemplation.59
Unfortunately Richard deals with the basic form of imagination fairly
briefly, since Benjamin Minor concentrates mainly on the affective power of
the human soul. However, he still makes it clear that with respect to the souls
knowledge of itself understanding the roles of Bala-imagination (imaginatio)
and Rachel-reason (ratio) and their relationship is an essential stage. The
necessity of imagination for the rational action of the human being is obvious,
but the individual who ascends to contemplation must be prepared for the by-
products of its activity.
In Benjamin Minor, Richard warns against the extended activity of the imag-
ination before proceeding to discuss affections and their moderation. In his
opinion, affections are virtues (virtutes) when they are rightly ordered and
moderated.60 When dealing with the significance of the affection of fear

57 Bundy 1927, 99, 191; Bautier 1988, 9093. See, for instance, De Genesi ad litteram 12.12.25.,
where Augustine describes how an excessive application of thought, or the influence of
some disorder (as in delirium or fever), or the agency of good or evil spirit may sometimes
cause images of objects which lack real equivalents. See also Honorius Augustodunensis
Scala coeli major, pl 172, 1232D: Nonus, cum invalitudine corporali perturbatis sensibus
variae phantasiae imaginantur, ut phreneticis fieri solet.
58 Bmin XVI, p. 130.58.
59 For this, see BMAJ III, I, p. 55.1530.
60 Bmin VII, p. 108.59: Septenaria utique Liae proles, septem sunt uirtutes. Siquidem, nichil
aliud est uirtus quam animi affectus ordinatus et moderatus. Ordinatus, quando ad illud
est ad quod esse debet; moderatus, quando tantus est quantus esse debet. The analysis of
the affective power of the soul is based on the tropological interpretation of the Bible.
Leah, who presents the affective power of the soul, has children before Rachel, who rep-
resents rationality. The first four children of Leah are Reuben, Simon, Levi, and Judah,
100 Chapter 4

(timor),61 Richard returns to Bala, the basic form of imagination. As he states,

fear is a human affection which is especially strong. Richard points out that in
the Bible Reuben (fear) ruins his mothers handmaid Bala (imagination). This
means that Reuben commits a sin by having sexual intercourse with Bala. This
story reminds us of how easily imagination wanders shamelessly and without
order. Thus superfluous fear abuses (prostituit) the imagination. Richard
remarks that overwhelming fear can feed the wrong pictures to the imagina-
tion, especially during prayer. Uneasy images (fantasiae) and thoughts of this
kind caused by fear rise above all the worries and obligations of the external
world. He also says that these images are like changing appearances (apparen-
tia), which gives extra power to fear. If in prayer the soul tries to concentrate on
the image of eternal punishment in hell, for example, the owerwhelming fear
may disturb the soul enough to imagine the problems and dangers of the
world. This example shows how the affections may change the content of
theimagination.62

who represent the four principal affections (affectus) i.e., fear, sorrow, hope, and love.
Bmin VII, p. 108Bmin XII, p. 124.
61 Richard has written a whole sermon concerning the affection of fear, in which he
stresses that fear of the Lord is more important than earthly philosophizing, or even the
wisdom of theologians. In this sermon, he distinguishes between servile and filial fear.
Servile fear originates from dread, but filial fear has its foundation in love. The cause of
servile fear is the fear of punishment. See Liber exceptionum II, X, cap.X, p. 395398. For
an analysis of Richards sermon concerning fear, and his sermons in general, see Old
1999, 306321.
62 Bmin LXIII, pp. 270,272.617: Sed quae est Balae corruptio, nisi cogitationis uel imagina-
tionis inordinata et impudens euagatio? In tantum enim quandoque timor superfluus
imaginationem, non dicam corrumpit, sed prostituit, ut quidem in tempore orationis a
suis se fornicationibus temperare uix aut omnino non possit. Cum enim prae nimia sol-
licitudine inter orandum etiam saepe mundanorum negotiorum fantasias mens per
imaginationem recipit, quid aliud Bala quam ad fornicationes Ruben sinum suum expan-
dit. Bmin LXV, p.278.3538. In these sections of the text, the cause of fear is frightening
images. However, these images concern temporal anxieties. This same relation between
fear and the imagination is discussed by John of Damascene (d. 749) in De fide orthodoxa,
who claims that the imagination has a strong connection with fear. He divides fear into
six subclasses, two of them containing the impact of imagination. De fide orthodoxa II,
cap. 29 (p. 121122): Dividitur autem et timor in sex: in segnitiem, in erubescentiam, in
verecundiam, in admirationem, in stuporem, in agoniam. Segnities igitur est timor futu-
rae operationis. Admiratio est timor ex magna imaginatione. Stupor vero est timor ex
inassueta imaginatione. John Damascene himself copies Nemesius of Emesas De natura
hominis XX, 103.3247 without reference. In the twelfth century, both these books were
translated into Latin by Burgundio of Pisa.
The Role of Imagination 101

4.3.2 Two Forms of the Rational Imagination

Once Richard has briefly analysed the basic form of imagination and intro-
duced fear, grief, hope, and love, the four principal affects, he considers the
operation of imagination further. This time he presents two modes of the
activity of the imagination, both of which differ from the basic form repre-
sented by Bala. Richard utilizes the story of the infertile Rachel (reason, ratio)
who passionately desires offspring (Rachel feruet desiderium pariendi).63 As
Rachel sees Leahs wonderful children (virtues, virtutes), her longing increases
and she says to Jacob: Give me children, otherwise I shall die. Richards inter-
prets this to mean that reason tries to be fertile and pursue knowing.64 In his
thinking, however, the desire for wisdom cannot be fruitfully consummated
until the necessary moral reformation occurs.65 This means that Rachel
remains sterile. The desolate Rachel-reason offers Bala (imagination, imagina-
tio) to Jacob, so that she can at least have children with the help of her hand-
maid. This is how the two sons of Bala, Dan and Naphtali, who represent the
two forms of rational imagination (imaginatio rationalis), are born. When
dealing with Bala-imagination, Richard warns against bestial imagination and
introduces his idea of rational imagination, which, he notes, fabricates new
images on the basis of sensory material.66 This fabrication is the basic function
of both Dan-imagination and Naphtali-imagination.
Richard explains Rachels solution of giving Bala to Jacob by the inner
dynamics of the soul. Reason needs more wisdom, because it pertains to her to
know.67 Richard describes the operation of reason very emotionally. Reason
wants, suffers, cries, and experiences pains when attempting to attain wis-
dom.68 The rationality of the human being is strongly motivated, particularly
by the affectivity of the soul, and reason itself also seems to contain affective

63 Bmin XIII, p. 126.2223.

64 Bmin XIII, p. 124.57: Da michi, inquit, liberos, alioquin moriar. Absque dubio studium
sapientiae si non proficit, citius deficit.
65 DiLorenzo 1982, 82.
66 Bmin XVI, p. 132.910: Rationalis autem est illa, quando ex his quae per sensum corpo-
reum nouimus, aliquid imaginabiliter fingimus.
67 Bmin XIII, p. 126.1013: Diximus superius quia sicut ad Liam, id est animi affectionem,
pertinent diligere, sic Rachelis, id est rationis, est cognoscere. Ex illa namque oritur quili-
bet affectus ordinatus, ex ista sensus seu intellectus purus. Pure sensus or intellect is cre-
ated from the ratio. Richards phrase refers to a cognitive power of the soul in general. The
cognitive power at its best can be called pure.
68 Bmin XIII, p. 124.9: Rachel ad amorem prolis solito amplius inardescit. Bmin XIII,
p. 126.17, 2223: incipit Rachel amore prolis aestuareIn Rachel feruet desiderium pari-
endi, hoc est studium cognoscendi. See also Bmin LXXIII, p. 300.
102 Chapter 4

elements. After seeing the products of affection, reason grows ardent in the
desire to produce wisdom. The birth of Judah, i.e., love, particularly motivates
reason to seek knowledge. Ubi amor, ibi oculus, says Richard.69
Even though reason wants wisdom, it realises that it still is untrained. The
mind70 is actually seeing forms of the visible objects (formae rerum visibilium)
and images of material objects (imagines rerum corporalium).71 Basically, the
mind tries to use reason and to approach the rational principles of reality, but
it sees only forms and images of things. Thus, the human being has to be satis-
fied with imagination and with the visible objects examined by it. Richard says
clearly that the use of imagination is the first step as one proceeds toward
invisible objects of contemplation.72 The mind uses imagination and visible
beauty so as to see at least a distant reflection of invisible beauty. It is reason-
able to think about true good things in any mode, like imagining. This way the
mind kindles a longing for good things by a kind of imaginary beauty (imagi-
naria pulchritudo) rather than fixing thought on false and deceptive goods.73
This is exactly why Richard sees the role of imagination as so important; it
prepares the soul for contemplation. The mind thinks with the help of imagi-
nation (cogitat per imaginationem), because it does not yet see through pure
understanding (per intelligentiae puritatem). Contrasted with knowing through
the purity of understanding, this first way appears imperfect; however, it is
easier for the unskilled mind.74
In Benjamin Minor, the most extensive examination of rational imagination
(imaginatio rationalis) is the section which focuses on the souls ability to
imagine future events. Here Richard needs to sharpen his terminology. How do

69 Bmin XIII, p. 126.1821: Vbi amor, ibi oculus; libenter aspicimus, quem multum diligimus.
Nulli dubium quia qui potuit bona inuisibilia diligere, quin uelit statim cognoscere, et per
intelligentiam uidere.
70 Here Richard refers to the carnal mind (mens carnalis).
71 Bmin XIV, pp. 126, 128.69: Quaerit inuisibilia uidere, et nil occurrit nisi formae rerum
uisibilium; desiderat incorporea intueri, et nil somniat nisi imagines rerum corporalium.
72 Bmin XIV, p. 126.2526: Quae sit prima uia omni ingredienti ad inuisibilium contempla-
tionem, uidelicet per imaginationem. Bmin XIV, p. 128.2628: Hanc esse primam uiam
omni ingredienti ad inuisibilium contemplationem nemo ignorat, nisi forte quem ad
hanc scientiam necdum experientia informat.
73 Bmin XIV, p. 128.2124: Suadet ergo ratio commodius esse qualicunque modo vera bona
cogitare, et imaginaria quadam saltem pulchritudine ad eorum desiderium animum
accendere, quam in falsis et deceptoriis bonis cogitationem figere Javelet claims that
the notion of imaginaria should be understood as a fictive image of something. Javelet
1967, II, XXXIV.
74 Bmin XVI, p. 128.1415: Cogitat per imaginationem, quia necdum uidere ualet per intelli-
gentiae puritatem.
The Role of Imagination 103

the notions of imagination and rational imagination differ from each other? In
order to clarify his ideas, he compares imagination to a mother and rational
imagination to a child. This is a brief justification for the idea of Bala-
imagination and her two children, who represent rational imagination. He also
gives a more philosophical analysis of the notion of imagination, claiming that
it (imaginatio) is the instrument (instrumentum) of the mind. It may also be
termed the power of the soul (vis animae). Rational imagination (imaginatio
rationalis) is one of the imaginations acts (actus),75 which means that imagi-
nation here is the genus and the two rational imaginations represent species of
imagination. It seems to be that reason and understanding in turn characterize
the necessary difference, which is joined to genus. The species may then be
produced.
At this point, Richard also introduces his own view on the significance of
language and the ability terms have to refer to various objects. Both the instru-
ment and its act can similarly be called (nominare, apellare) imagination, even
though it is well known that the instrument is always prior to its action and is
able to exist without it. The referent of a term can be extended or restricted
depending on the context in which it is employed. To put it simply, imagina-
tion (imaginatio) is the instrument of the mind which allows the human being
to imagine things whenever he wishes. When the mind uses this instrument to
imagine something, one can again use the term imagination (imaginatio),
even if a particular act (actus) of imagination is meant. Many other terms
related to the operations of the mind, such as reason (ratio) and will (voluntas),
can be understood likewise.76
After introducing the idea of imaginary beauty and the terminological anal-
ysis of imagination, Richard shows how rational imagination (imaginatio ratio-
nalis) should be used in practice. In Benjamin Minor, the most important task
of rational imagination is to construct images which are related to the future.
According to Richard, the human being is able to imagine heaven and hell; in
other words, the images concerning the punishments or rewards which the
soul will encounter in its future life. He claims that good and evil are always
mixed with each other (permixta simul et bona et mala) in this world. Just as we

75 Bmin XVII, p. 134.24: Sed hoc uolo esse inter matrem et filium, quod est inter instrumen-
tum et actum, uel hoc est inter matrem et eius prolem, quod est inter genus et speciem.
Nam genus, adiuncta sibi differentia, ex se species generat, quemadmodum copula uiri
feminam ad prolem fecundat.
76 Bmin XVII, p. 134.1519: Imaginatio ergo, quando instrumentum significat, est illa uis ani-
mae qua cum voluerit quodlibet imaginari potest. Hoc instrumento, cum ad aliquidimagi
nandum mens utitur, actio proculdubio quaedam efficitur, quae similiter imaginatio
nominatur.
104 Chapter 4

do not find good or evil in their purity, so do we not find the highest of either.
It is still unquestionable that, in the life to come, both unmixed good and evil
and their highest forms will exist.77 With the help of his imagination, the indi-
vidual produces images by joining and separating the properties of the differ-
ent objects and thus creates the images of the highest good and evil (summi
boni vel mali imaginationes). One can gather (colligere) from experiences
acquired through the external senses what kind of good or evil might be the
highest.78 Imagination assists in the reasoning process and thus helps one to
proceed from individual images to generalizations; in other words, one is able
to construct the image of a perfectly good object on the basis of many fairly
good objects.79

77 In his De exterminatione mali et promotione boni, Richard discusses the same idea of good
and evil being mixed in this life. He explains how both good and evil exist in this life, but
in the life to come there is either good or evil. This present life lies in between the two.
However, its good things are joined to the absolute goodness by a figurative likeness, and
its evil things are associated with the future absolute evils through a prefiguring affinity.
Heaven is represented by similitudes (umbratilis similitudo) and hell is associated by pre-
figuring affinity (imaginaria affinitas). See De exterminatione mali et promotione boni, pl
196, 1079A. Richard does not take into account the possible operation of imagination in
this context. For the overall context and interpretation of this passage, see Van t Spijker
2004, 164. For good and evil being mixed in this life, see also Mysticae adnotationes in
Psalmos, pl 196, 323D. In his De Sacramentis, Hugh briefly discusses the pure forms of
good and evil, the wordly life containing both good and bad elements. De Sacramentis, pl
176, 306C-307B. Cf. also Peter Abelards Collationes, which discusses the highest goods and
greatest evils and their mixed forms in the present life. Collationes II, 108 p, 126.
78 Bmin XVI, p. 132.1427: Huiusmodi imaginatione saepe utimur, cum quae sint futurae
uitae bona vel mala diligentius rimamur. Nusquam hic sola bona, nusquam hic sola mala,
sed permixta simul et bona et mala, et quamuis in utroque genere sint multa, nunquam
tamen inueniuntur sola. Ibi inueniri possunt et bona sine ammixtione malorum, et mala
nichilominus sine ammixtione bonorum. Item hic sicut nec sola, sic nec summa inueni-
mus, ibi et summa et impermixta, bona uel mala esse non dubitamus. Quotiens igitur ex
multis bonis uel malis quae in hac uita sensus corporeus experitur, quale uel quantum
esse possit illud futurae uitae summum bonum siue malum colligitur, et ex eorum imagi-
natione quaedam futurorum imago figuratur. Cf. Augustines De Genesi ad litteram, which
deals with the essence of heaven and hell as well as the composition of celestial bodies. In
this context, Augustine briefly speculates on the idea of hell and heaven being like corpo-
real images. De Genesi ad litteram 12.32.60.
79 This technique is similar to Aristotles idea in De anima that the human being is able to
make use of concrete images or fantasies in his moral consideration. When the soul
chooses between various operations, one can estimate different options and calculate the
best possible alternative. See De anima 434a510. The commentators reformulated this
theory; see, e.g., Themistius On Aristotle on the Soul 121,20 (p.148). Themistius claims that
The Role of Imagination 105

Richard claims that the human being can use two different forms of rational
imagination to visualize the future, describing these as two kinds of specula-
tion arising from the imagination. Both are generated (generare) in the
imagination, but reason moderates and directs (moderare, disponere) their
operation.80

4.3.3 Dan-Imagination
The first of the two speculations is closer to the operation of the senses and
accordingly it is the lower form of the rational imagination. Richard relates this
kind of imagination to the first son of Bala, Dan, the boy Rachel adopts as her
own son.81 This also means that the Dan-imagination is rational imagination,

the human being can combine images and reach single conclusions on the basis of sev-
eral images.
80 Bmin XVI, p. 132.3033: Talis itaque proles, et imaginationis est per natiuitatem, et ratio-
nis per adoptionem. Huiusmodi enim prolem una generat, sed altera educat. Ex Bala
namque nascitur, sed per Rachel moderatur. Bmin XVIII, p. 136: De gemina speculatione
quae surgit ex imaginatione. Richards texts include the interesting question of specula-
tion as against contemplation. Sometimes Richard distinguishes clearly between these
two terms, as is shown in Benjamin Minor, where two distinct forms of speculation pre-
cede contemplation, which is analysed in the last chapters of the book. Since, as stated by
Richard, the act of speculation is produced by imagination, imagination cannot be part of
contemplation in Benjamin Minor. This idea also occurs in Exiit edictum III, p. 78.510:
Uiri itaque Galilei qui in terra stabant, celestibus tamen intendebant, congrue satis spec-
ulatiuos designant; dum enim per rerum uisibilium similitudinem nituntur ad rerum
inuisibilium cognitionem, terrenis quidem inheret per imaginationem. Cf. also Mysticae
adnotationes in Psalmos pl 196, 355C344A and Ad me clamat ex Seir. However, in
Benjamin Major Richard refers to the six kinds of contemplation as speculation (specula-
tio). Speculation and contemplation seem to be synonymous at least up to the point
where he proceeds to discuss the most sublime divine vision in contemplation, where all
human industry is absent. For the terminology, see Zinn 1977, 25 and Coulter 2006, 144.
81 Richard carefully considers the different significances of the name of Dan. Because in
Genesis (Gen. 30:6) Dan signifies Judgement Day, this rational imagination (imaginatio
rationalis) can consider only questions which are related to the Judgement. In his Liber de
nominibus hebraicis, Jerome offers an etymological interpretation of Jacobs sons names.
Since this work was widely disseminated and well-known in the Middle Ages, it is no
surprise that Richard utilizes it in his Benjamin Minor. Rufinus of Aquila (d. 407) was
probably the first to present a moral interpretation of the sons of Jacob. Because of Jacobs
words, Dan has been related in some interpretations even to the Antichrist: Dan shall be
a serpent in the way, a viper by the path, that bites the horses heels, so that his rider falls
backward. (Gen. 49:17). For the interpretation of Gregory the Greats Moralia in Job XXXI,
par. 24,3245. Isidore of Seville also characterizes Dan as the Antichrist. For references,
see Longre 1997, 3235.
106 Chapter 4

i.e., imagination directed by reason. Imagination controlled by reason pro-

duces new images on the basis of seeing visible objects. Since the new images
are sensory and material, just like the original ones, their ontological status is
exactly the same. The human being uses this kind of rational imagination
when according to the known image of the visible thing the mind disposes
some other visible image (secundum uisibilium rerum cognitam speciem uisibile
aliquid aliud mente disponimus). Richard stresses that the products of this kind
of imagination should not be regarded as something invisible.82
Richard attributes an unpleasant duty to Dan-imagination since envisaging
the future torments of hell, the flames of Gehenna, and outer darkness belongs
particularly to the rational imagination represented by Dan. From the images
that have been formed in the present, the rational imagination produces fic-
tions concerning the future. By utilizing images which have real equivalents
(imaginatio uera), imagination advances to consider made-up pictures (imagi-
natio ficta).83 These pictures are not accurate images of some existing sensible
or insensible objects.84
The rational Dan-imagination can imagine only material objects even
though the images produced by it are far from the real sensations of the human
being. The flames of hell cannot be sensed in this present world, but can still
be genuinely physically perceived somewhere. On Richards interpretation,
many descriptions of hell in the Bible can be interpreted literally. Thus it

82 Bmin XVIII, p. 136.37: Sed rationalis imaginatio alia est per rationem dispositaIlla
utimur quando secundum uisibilium rerum cognitam speciem uisibile aliquid aliud
mente disponimus, nec tamen ex eo inuisibile aliquid cogitamus. Species is difficult to
translate. In this text; it may mean either sight or the form or image of a visible thing.
83 Bmin XIX, p. 140.89: Dan secundum praesentium rerum imaginationem ueram reprae-
sentat rerum futurarum imaginationem fictam. Cf. Hugh of St. Victors idea of imaginary
pain as fictum. In Salomonis Ecclesiasten homiliae, pl 175, 127ab.
84 Peter Abelard claims that various invented images are able to represent the true meta-
physical composition of extra-mental items. However, the limited power of imagination
impedes the formation of accurate images. What is more important as the soul uses such
images is the attention of discretion. In fact, any image is useful only if the act of under-
standing grasps the relevant nature or property of the insensible item. See Guilfoy 2004,
209211. In Abelards theory, a special mental imaginary object is produced by an intel-
lectual act in the process of thinking. This mental object is a fiction (fictum) which is
contrived by the mind wherever and whenever needed. Glossae super Porphyrium
p. 20.3035; Glossae super Periermeneias p. 313.34. For the interpretation, see Panaccio
2010, 350. See also Augustines De Genesi ad litteram, where the human being can imagine
either true pictures or fictional pictures in his mind. De Genesi ad litteram 12.6.15: Animo
tamen corporales imagines intuemur, seu veras, sicut ipsa corpora videmus, et memoria
retinemus, seu fictas, sicut cogitatio formare potuerit.
The Role of Imagination 107

should not be difficult for the imagination to produce quite new images in the
mind on the basis of sensory appearances collected by the senses. He stresses
in considering future torments that the mind works by imagination alone,
although the imagination cannot manage such labour without the ordering of
reason. The rational imagination presents its images to the eyes of the heart
(oculis cordis).85
In the history of ancient and medieval philosophy of mind, the imagina-
tion was conventionally associated with anticipating the future.86 The
monastic Christian tradition has since used horrible and frightening images
as part of spiritual life. As Coleman notes, a monks memory was filled with
images of eternal life, achieved through the customary technique of memo-
rizing the rule.87 According to Mary Carruthers, a branch of literature flour-
ished in the Middle Ages in which the horrors of hell were described using
the most fearsome images. The emotion of fear was provoked by detailed
imaging, a technique familiar to many Christian writers.88 According to

85 Bmin XVIII, p. 136.1824: Infernalia tormenta longe a sensu corporeo remota non dubita-
mus, quia ubi uel qualia sint uidere non possumus, sed tamen haec quotiens uolumus per
ministerium Dan prae oculis cordis habemus. Nemo fidelium, cum infernum, flammam
gehennae, tenebras exteriores in Scripturis sanctis legit, haec figuraliter dicta credit, sed
ista ueraciter et corporaliter alicubi esse non diffidit. Bmin XVIII, p. 138.2831: Recte ergo
horum considerationem ad Dan specialiter pertinere iam diximus, ubi sola imaginatione
opus habemus, quamuis eam in tali negotio non sine rationis dispositione tractemus.
86 In Platos Philebus an individual produces images in his mind related to the future created
by diverse fears and wishes. Aristotle also studied the link between emotions and the
future. An image directed at the future can cause pleasure or fear even if the objects
which cause these feelings are imaginary. See Chapter 2.1. According to Augustine, the
human being is able to imagine future events beforehand with the help of signs (signa),
anticipating what may happen from events which already have taken place. ODaly 1987,
127128. Augustine states in his Confessiones that the human being can consider the
events of the past and combine them with new images which arise from experiences or
beliefs. These constructed images allow future events or wishes to be imagined just as if
really present. Confessiones 10.8.14. See also Hughs idea that present, past, and future
things have their own kind of existence in the human mind. In this respect, the rational
soul has a kind of similarity to God, whose mind contains everything eternally, without
any temporal differentation. De Archa Noe II, I, p. 33.512 (pl 176, 635AB). The joining of
different thoughts and feelings together, for example, the coming annihilation, is familiar
to Richard as well; see De IV gradibus violentae caritatis 19, p. 147.
87 Coleman 1992, 131.
88 For references, see Carruthers 1998, 104, 308. For example, some of the best-known
detailed imaginings of hell are in several meditations and prayers composed by Anselm
of Canterbury. By reading the prayers one should produce emotional images, particularly
reflecting memories of ones sinful state and of hell in lively sensual detail.
108 Chapter 4

Augustine, the first step to wisdom is to awake the feeling of fear. This is
achieved by scaring and wounding oneself in imagination. For example,
Augustine frightened himself with thinking of his own death until his hairs
stood up like little nails.89
In the patristic era it was thought that desires which cause temptations
could be destroyed by keeping future events in the mind. The thought which
contains evil representations (logismoi, cogitationes) causes immoral move-
ments in the soul. These thoughts can be destroyed or repelled by some other
thoughts, because a person can have only one sensible image at a time in his
mind.90 For instance, Basil of Caesarea (d. 379) explains how evil desires can be
repelled by thinking of how a present pleasure might end in bitterness, and
how the sinful body will suffer in the eternal fire of hell.91 John Cassian gives
similar instructions in his writings, which had a great influence on monastic
piety. He also emphasizes the replacement of a sinful thought by the thought
of eternal punishment. One of the main objectives of every monk is to obtain
an image of the state of blessedness (imago futurae beatitudinis) in his mind.
However, fear and hope should be transformed through the exercise of an
advanced monk into love for his fellow man.92 Richard writes in the same way
that thoughts can be corrected by other thoughts (cogitationes cogitationibus
castigare). The representations of punishment restrain evil desires.93 Using
images of future events to control emotions forms only an intermediate stage
in the process of perfection of the soul, however, since images of rewards and
punishments are merely pedagogical means for weak souls. In a similar way,
Richard emphasizes that fantasizing about future events is only one of the
many aspects of the spiritual life.

89 De doctrina christiana 2.7.9. Carruthers states how the monastic spirituality emphasized
the feeling of fear. Practising fear was a natural part of both the novices life as well as
the daily spirituality of the more advanced members of the community. Carruthers
1998,266.
90 Knuuttila 2004, 128129, 142143. For the underlying Stoic thought in question and its
equivalent Christian tradition, see Sorabji 2000, 343371.
91 pg 31, 213BC. A similar thought is also found in one of the best-known monastic texts,
the Life of Antonius (Vita Antonii), which requires one to be afraid of death every day and
to think of the separation of the soul from the body. The desire for women is thus made to
disappear and the allurement of the desires can be destroyed at their initial stage. Vita
Antonii pg 26, 838976. References in Knuuttila 2004, 128, 138139.
92 Conlationes X, 7, p. 222; XI, 6, p. 317.
93 Bmin XX, p. 142.2326: Nonne magis eas oportet acriter arguere, et, ut dictum est, per
repraesentationem poenae reprimere irritationem culpae, et cogitationes cogitationibus
castigare?
The Role of Imagination 109

One may ask how accurately possible rewards and punishments can be
described using the imagination, since the imaginary expressions do not have
a truth-value and are voluntary.94 Even though the images of hell produced by
imagination are fiction, the differences between the real hell and the imagin-
able hell do not cause any problem for Richard. He actually states that the
human being is able to direct the operation of his imagination with the help of
his will. Thus he is able to produce a useful fiction which need not have an
equivalent in the real world at all. The lesson of experience is not necessary.
The individual does not know where hell is located and exactly what kind of
horrors there will be, but everyone produces different images according to his
own will (in cuiusque mente ex proprio iudicio format).95 The human being pro-
duces the images along with his own judgement, e.g., his own subjective hell.
As long as the minds attention or discretion is the right one, it is not relevant
what kinds of image one employs and arranges. When human beings think
about hell, their attentions are the same and true even though they constitute
diverse images in order to grasp the relevant attributes of this particular item.96

94 This problem also arises in Platos Philebus, since Plato explains how a misguided person
may, for example, have images of groundless pleasures which are surely distorted images
of the future. Philebus 40bc. See Chapter 2.1.
95 Bmin XIX, p. 140.1323: absque culpa sit tormenta malorum multo aliter quam sunt per
imaginationem cernere. Sed quisque ea pro arbitrio mentis non qualia sunt, sed qualia
fingere nouit, figurando describit. Vnde fortassis hic talis filius Dan, id est judicium, uoca-
tur, quia in tali repraesentatione non experientiae documentum, sed suae discretionis
sequitur arbitrium. Nam quoniam Dan futurarum rerum repraesentationem in cuiusque
mente ex proprio iudicio format, recte quis, ut arbitror, artificem talium Dan, id est iudi-
cium uocat. In De statu interioris hominis, Richard conjectures that there are two distinct
operations of the mind, i.e., discretio and deliberatio, that are capable of judging between
various degrees of good and evil. See De statu interioris hominis XXVII, p. 93XXVIII, p. 94.
(pl 196, 1136A1137B). The notion of imagination is disregarded in this context, which
shows how Richard is accustomed to vary between different models of the soul and
changes concepts according to the needs of the text. The same variation appears in
Benjamin Minor. The ability of discretion (discretio) is said to be to discern future dangers
and to have foresight. See Bmin LXVIII, p. 286.612 and Bmin LXX, p. 292.17.
96 Augustine analyses the operation of the imagination in a similar manner, indicating how
the images used by people may vary. Even according to Augustine, this is not important;
more significant is the purpose for which the image produced by the fantasy is utilized. De
Trinitate 8.4.7: Necesse est autem cum aliqua corporalia lecta vel audita quae non vidi-
mus credimus, fingat sibi animus aliquid in lineamentis formisque corporum sicut occur-
rerit cogitantinon hoc tamen fide ut teneamus aliquid prodest, sed ad aliud aliquid utile
quod per hoc insinuatur. This idea is propounded in the 12th century by Peter Abelard in
his commentary on Aristotles Peri hermeneias, Glossae super Periermeneias p. 329.310:
110 Chapter 4

In Benjamin Minor, Richard assigns a distinct task for this kind of rational
imagination in the spiritual life. The mind guards itself against drifting into
shameful thoughts.97 By imagining, the individual punishes himself with series
of images declaring destruction before the impermissible thoughts find time
to grow and become indecent desires and sinful acts. The soul can smash
fraudulent thoughts to smithereens by bringing the tortures of hell to the
mind.98 It is especially important to guard thoughts, because they can unex-
pectedly become evil, even against ones will.99 Richard particularly warns
against thoughts that are seductive, shameful, vain, useless, disordered or
without any understanding. Through the functioning of rational imagination,
the human being can perceive, condemn, and destroy unnecessary or absurd
thoughts which can disturb prayer, for example. Adepts are accustomed to
punish themselves immediately by considering punishment and destroying
the allurements of sin.100 In the background of Richards theory lies a monastic

Cum enim vim et naturam rerum insensibilium attendimus sicut spirituum vel qualita-
tum quas non sentimus, alius aliam fingit imaginem et alius aliam, cum tamen uterque
vim naturae recte attendat. Cum enim de rationalitate ego et alius cogitamus eamque in
eo attendimus quod animam potentem discernere faciat, vera est utriusque attentio et
eadem, licet diversas imagines pro eadem constituamus, prout quisque aliquo signo ute-
tur, ipsum ad voluntatem suam instituere debet. As Marenbon notes, Abelard thinks that
images can be used as mere pointers. People may form different images in their minds
and still think the same things. Marenbon 1997, 168.
97 Note how Cassian warns about aimless and unproductive wandering of the mind, which
he categorizes as a form of mental fornication. It is essential to focus a wandering mind in
verse, psalm or prayer, so that the comings and goings of our thoughts should not flow in
and out, but hold together as composition. Conlationes X, 1314, p. 306307.
98 Bmin XXI, p. 146.1722: Sed ad Dan pertinet exurgens malum, statim cum per cogitatio-
nem pulsat in iudicium adducere, diligenter discutere, et deprehensum damnare, et
deceptoriam cogitationem ex alia consideratione percutere, et temptantia mala ex tor-
mentum recordatione extinguere. Here Richard refers to the connection between imagi-
nation and memory. Tortures are called to mind (recordare).
99 Bmin XXI, p. 146.1417: Nunquam enim malum approbo, nunquam malo consentio, nun-
quam malum perficio, nisi ipse uoluero; malum autem per cogitationem occurrere potest
etiam inuito.
100 Bmin XX, p. 142.712: Hoc igitur modo in se statim per considerationem poenae ulciscun-
tur, et damnant blandimenta culpae. Quia ergo per officium Dan illecebrosas cogitationes
deprehendimus, arguimus, damnamus, castigamus, recte eum Dan, id est iudicium, voca-
mus. For this theme in BMAJ IV, XV, p. 105106: Omnes cogitatus, tam vani quam noxii,
extranei iudicandi sunt, qui nulli nostrae utilitatis deserviunt. Cf. Causam quam nescie-
bam III, p. 206.53p. 207.55: Cum caro quieta, mens piis studiis intenta, magna utaque
pace fruitur, quaedam illecebrosarum imaginationum frequentia cum magna importuni-
tate oculis mentis ingreditur. Here Richard warns against illicit imaginations instead of
The Role of Imagination 111

idea which stresses that the mind should be filled with the right ideas. For
instance, Peter Damian stresses how the mind cannot remain vacant; it has to
be occupied with something. Various considerations which deal with useful
things assist one to focus on eternity and to exclude the follies of vain thinking
and a wandering mind.101
In his other treatises, Richard gives some further attention to Jacobs son
Dan. It is interesting to see that in De exterminatione mali et promotione boni
Richard conceives the significance of Dan differently from Benjamin Minor.
Dan does not refer to imagination but to careful attentiveness or circumspec-
tion (circumspectio). However, the tasks of this attentiveness are similar to the
tasks of Benjamin Minors Dan-imagination in that circumspection includes
the idea of sagacious consideration as well as refusal of evil things in the past,
present, and future.102 In his treatise De eruditione hominis interioris, Richard
mentions the circumspection of the souls inner dynamics as one of the most
important factors in the spiritual life along with discretion and deliberation. If
one wishes to pray devotedly, circumspection in ones life is essential in order
to be able to separate good things from evil. In circumspection, since one
brings ones own morals and habits into consideration, there is an obvious
similarity to the duties of rational imagination.103 This linking of imagination

cogitations. In this same treatise, Richard also mentions concupiscent fantasies, Causam
quam nesciebam III, p. 208.73. Later he writes that representations of things arise in the
mind via imagination. Causam quam nesciebam IV, p. 214.168171: Cum enim non res
ipsas, sed rerum simulacra per imaginationem in mente versamus, quid aliud quam, ut ita
dixerim, quasi quasdam temptatoris nostri depictas tacite scripturas attendimus.
101 According to a metaphor introduced by Peter Damian, the mind is a room, the walls of
which are painted. The mind catches various images which are then reproduced on its
walls. Depending on the nature of these images, the room may be seen either as earth or
as heaven. For Damians idea of the inner room, see Van t Spijker 2004, 4043.
102 De exterminatione mali et promotione boni pl 196, 1111B: Quid enim est aliud circumspec-
tio, nisi circumstantium malorum sollicita sagaxque perscrutatio. Ad hanc pertinet prae
teritorum malorum retractatio, praesentium consideratio, futurorum praemeditatio, ut
secundum nomen suum veraciter circumspectio. Hujus assiduitas hominem cautum
efficit, et quantum possibile est, tutum reddit. In Benjamin Minor, Richard later writes
that Rachels firstborn son, Joseph, represents circumspection as well as discretion. Bmin
LXXXVII, p. 344.1619: Per Ioseph illud genus meditationis quod est in moribus.
Comprehensio siquidem rerum inuisibilium pertinet ad intelligentiam puram; circum-
spectio uero morum pertinet ad prudentiam ueram.
103 De eruditione hominis interioris, pl 196 1248B1248C: Si enim intime et devote orare
volumus, primum est ut vitam nostram circumspiciamus. Videamus quibus studiis vel
exercitiis occupari consuevimus, vel quibus adhuc occupari sumus, vel quale propositum
inhis de futuro habemus. Sed quid ista juvat in considerationem adducere, nisi eadem
112 Chapter 4

and circumspection underlines the significance of imaginative activities in

moral consideration, as well as strengthening the relation between the affec-
tive and intellectual powers of the soul.

4.3.4 Naphtali-Imagination
After analysing the Dan-imagination, Richard turns to the third form of activ-
ity of the imagination, represented by Dans brother, Naphtali. Although both
brothers are born (per natiuitatem) from imagination, they differ from each
other in many ways. According to Richard, while the Dan-imagination is
directed by reason (imaginatio per rationem disposita), Naphtali is mixed with
understanding (imaginatio in intelligentiam permixta). This pattern shows a
clear ascent from a lower to a higher form of speculation. The soul uses differ-
ent abilities and their combinations for various needs.
The basis for examining the Naphtali-imagination, the absence of the abso-
lute forms of good and evil in the human reality, is exactly the same as for the
Dan-imagination. Absolutely evil things cannot be perceived anywhere in the
visible world just as there are no wholly good things either. However, both good
and evil are manifested as mixed with each other. As already mentioned, the
Dan-imagination ordered by reason tries to imagine something absolutely evil,
while the Naphtali-imagination, which is mixed with understanding (imagina-
tio intelligentiae permixta), hurries on with the more challenging task. With its
help, people can attempt to imagine a good which can be realized only in the
future, i.e., in the life to come in heaven. Nevertheless, the simple co-operation
of imagination and reason alone is inadequate for producing images of per-
fectly good things. The imagination must thus be connected with the highest
of human capacities, that is to say, understanding (intelligentia).104

sollicitudine satagamus singula quaeque forti examinatione discernere, et bona a malis

vigili sagacitate secernere, ut sciamus pro quibus debeamus Domino supplicare, seu
etiam gratias agere? See also De eruditione hominis interioris, pl 196, 1248B1249B,
1298A, 1317A, 1318B and Mysticae adnotationes in Psalmos, pl 196, 274bc and 359BC.
In Mysticae adnotationes in Psalmos, pl 196, 359B, Richard relates how the inner person
has two eyes, one being discretion and the other circumspection. See also BMAJ V, VI,
p. 91.31. In De institutione nouitiorum, Hugh of St. Victor presents circumspection as an
essential part of the novices spiritual life in its initial stages. De institutione nouitiorum,
p. 4446. Hugh also deals with the notion of circumspectio in a similar manner in his
treatise De archa Noe. See also De contemplatione et ejus speciebus, p. 4446.
Circumspection includes among other things the discernment (discretio) of good and
bad. See Barons analysis, Baron 1954, 103.
104 Bmin XVIII, p. 136.39, 1315: Sed rationalis imaginatio alia [Dan] est per rationem dispos-
ita, alia [Naphtali] intelligentiae permixta. Ista [Naphtali] uero tunc utimur, quando per
The Role of Imagination 113

When Richard defines the higher mode of rational imagination, he intro-

duces the idea of special human understanding. Understanding (intelligentia)
which contemplates the Divine Trinity and other divine objects is more sub-
lime than even reason. As Den Bok puts it, understanding is a kind of intuition
of the Divine, which can be developed by integrating the other mental activi-
ties.105 Since the human souls integrating capacity and range are in fact uni-
versal, understanding is not directed at divine things only. This means that all
objects considered by the various faculties of the human soul are similarly
within the range of understanding (intelligentia).106 Richard is willing to link
the distinct divine illumination and grace to the operation of understanding.
The idea of divine intervention in the human soul makes the analysis of the
distinct faculties of the soul difficult.107
As Richard has indicated earlier, the rational imagination is able to produce
new images, such as a golden house. Even though the images are distant echoes
of direct sense experiences, they still are understood as a kind of material
object. He points out that Dan-imagination directed by reason produces new

uisibilium rerum speciem ad inuisibilium cognitionem ascendere nitimur. Ad Neptalim

pertinet speculatio futurorum bonorum. In De exterminatione mali et promotione boni,
Richard presents Naphtali in a role which deviates from Benjamin Minor. Naphtali refers
to the assiduity of study or speculation (assiduitas speculationis). The duties assigned to
Naphtali in these works are, however, quite similar to each other. In both, Naphtali refers
to the ladder of similitudes (scala similitudinis), by which the human being ascends to
gaze on invisible forms with the help of visible similitudes. pl 196, 1111C1112C.
105 Den Bok 1996, 132. Richards idea of understanding is in many respects similar to that of
Boethius. See Chapter 2.2. In Boethius theory, understanding is superior to the lower
abilities of the soul. Consolatio Philosophiae V, p. 4.
106 BMAJ I, III, p. 9.24: Similiter ea, quae imaginatio vel ratio comprehendunt, sub intelli-
gentia cadunt et ea, quae illae comprehendere non possunt. Vide ergo quam late contem-
plationis radius se expandat, qui omnia lustrat. Richard uses the concept of understanding
(intelligentia) in very different contexts and tasks. Understanding (intelligentia) can be
divided into its mixed, pure, and simple forms Bmin XVIII p. 136.10; BMAJ I, III, p. 9.1720.
Understanding in its mixed form (intelligentia permixta) operates in the area of all the
faculties of the soul, thus assisting them. Bmin XVIII, p. 136.4 ; BMAJ I, III, p. 9.1720. Pure
understanding (pura intelligentia) considers invisible objects without the help of imagi-
nation. See Bmin LXXXVIII, p. 344.2021: Intelligentiam puram dicimus, quae est sine
admixtione imaginationis. BMAJ I, IX, p. 17.12: Simplicem intelligentiam dico quae est
sine officio rationis, puram vero quae est sine occursione imaginationis.
107 Richard often associates such terms as illuminatio, revelatio, and inspiratio with the operation
of understanding; see, for example, De eruditione hominis interioris, pl 196, 1264B andBMAJ
I,II,p. 7.810: Haec autem arca divino magisterio fabricatur et deauratur, quandohumana
intelligentia divina inspiratione et revelatione ad contemplationem promovetur.
114 Chapter 4

fictional pictures (fictae imaginationes) from the real pictures. However,

Naphtali-imagination functions in co-operation with intellectual abilities and
thus with invisible objects as well. Richard continues by describing how this
kind of rational imagination rises to true understanding of things through fic-
tional imagination.108 Mixed with understanding (imaginatio intelligentiae
permixta), the third form of imagination exerts itself through the appearances
of visible things to knowledge of invisible things (per visibilem rerum speciem
ad invisibilium cognitionem ascendere).109 Consequently, the two forms of
rational imagination can be best distinguished from each other by comparing
the status of the objects processed. The Dan-imagination processes and pro-
duces sensible images, while the Naphtali-imagination attends to grasping
spiritual objects.
It is important to understand that, for Richard, the transition from visible to
invisible objects means conversion from literal interpretation and the material
images of the Bible to a spiritual interpretation. In his theory, the anthropo-
logical scheme has its interpretational counterpart in biblical exegesis. The
human being can use images adapted from the Scripture by means of his imag-
ination and thus form various new images which are fictional combinations of
images from non-existent things. In the Bible, heaven is described as a place
where milk and honey flows; its gates shine like pearls and the roads are made
of gold. Naphtali-imagination can, for example, combine the images of pearls
and a gate, to produce the new image of the gates of pearl. With the help of this
desirable image, one may proceed to understand spiritual things such as the
idea of heaven. Richard writes:

But when we read about a land flowing with milk and honey or heavenly
Jerusalem having walls of precious stones, gates of pearl and streets of
gold, what person of sane sense would wish to accept these things accord-
ing to the literal sense? Therefore he immediately has recourse to spiritual
understanding, and searches for what is contained there mystically.110

108 Bmin XIX, p. 140.811: Dan secundum praesentium rerum imaginationem ueram reprae-
sentat rerum futurarum imaginationem fictam, Neptalim vero saepe per descriptae rei
imaginationem fictam surgit ad intelligentiam veram.
109 Bmin XVIII, p. 136.410: Illa utimur quando secundum uisibilium rerum cognitam
speciem uisibile aliquid aliud mente disponimus, nec tamen ex eo inuisibile aliquid cogi-
tamus. Ista uero tunc utimur, quando per uisibilium rerum speciem ad inuisibilium cog-
nitionem ascendere nitimur. In illa est imaginatio non sine ratione, in ista intelligentia
non absque imaginatione.
110 Bmin XVIII, p. 138.3236: Sed cum terram lacte et melle manantem, coelestis Ierusalem
muros ex lapidibus pretiosis, portas ex margaritis, plateas ex auro legerit, quis sani sensus
The Role of Imagination 115

Richard insists that these passages full of desirable images demand spiritual
interpretation, since their literal interpretation (iuxta litteram) would be com-
pletely senseless. He claims that imagination which is mixed with understand-
ing (imaginatio intelligentiae permixta) is able to envisage the wonderful gates
and roads of the celestial city. When it comes to the question of various inter-
pretations of Jerusalem, Richard is not alone. One of the favourite subjects in
monastic literature is the contemplation of the glory which God enjoys with
the elect in Heaven. The final goal is the spiritual Jerusalem of which the
earthly Jerusalem is only a representation.111 This idea derives from John
Cassian (d. 435), who presented an established four-part interpretation of
Jerusalem in the fifth century in which only one of the methods of interpreta-
tion is word-for-word, i.e., historical. The three other ways of interpreting the
meaning of Jerusalem are allegorical, tropological, and anagogical. Allegorically
Jerusalem represents Christs Church, tropologically the soul of the human
being, and anagogically the heavenly realm of God.112 Thus Richard utilizes the
most common form to interpret Jerusalem in the Middle Ages in this example
of rational imagination.113

homo haec iuxta litteram accipere uelit? Vnde statim ad spiritualem intelligentiam recur-
rit, et quid ibi misticum contineatur exquirit.
111 Leclercq 1982, 5468. However, the production of these future images with the help of the
power of imagination is rare. For instance, Mary Carruthers shows how the images of
heaven and hell are produced by using the abilities of memory (memoria) in many medi-
eval texts. Carruthers 1998, 132.
112 Smalley 1952, 28; de Lubac 1998, 108; de Lubac 2000, 199. The oldest corresponding inter-
pretations already exist in texts by Origen. de Lubac writes that the name of Jerusalem is
applied especially to the anagogical Jerusalem. Jerusalem is one of the most typical illus-
trations of the four-fold sense of the Scriptures. For the quotation of Cassian, see
Conlationes XIV, 8, p. 405.
113 As noted above in Chapter 3.4, the notion of anagogy in Richards texts varies. In many
cases, the anagogical method requires the specific use of intellectual abilities, making
sense perceptions or imagining inappropropiate for the anagogical interpretation. See In
Apocalypsim Joannis, pl 196, 686D687C: De istis duobus modis visionum qui non corpo-
raliter, sed spiritualiter fiunt. Unum quo formis et figuris, et similitudinibus rerum
occultarum veritas obumbratur. Aliud quo nude et pure sicut absque integumento
exprimitur. Cum itaque formis, et signis, et similitudinibus manifestatur quod occultum
est, vel quod manifestum est describitur, symbolica demonstratio est; cum vero pura et
nuda revelatione ostenditur, vel plana et aperta ratione docetur, anagogica. Based on
Richards notion of symbolic vision, one could say that the fantasy of the celestial city
which takes place in Benjamin Minor belongs actually to the area of the symbolic inter-
pretation defined by Richard himself. In his Mysticae adnotationes in Psalmos, how-
ever,Richard considers anagogy as the souls general uplifting movement of the soul from
116 Chapter 4

Richard separates two different techniques by which the Naphtali-imagination

can lead the soul to contemplate invisible objects through visible images. In
both of these techniques, imagination is mixed with understanding (imaginatio
intelligentiae permixta).114 The first technique is called comparison (comparatio)
of various images. The second method, by which the soul uses its rational imagi-
nation, is referred to as transfer (translatio) or translation (conuersio).
First Richard examines the method of comparison (comparatio). When the
soul uses its ability to compare, it focuses on the multitude and magnitude of
present goods, estimating the possible multitude and magnitude of the joys of
the heavenly life on that basis. He gives the following example: a person may
often look at the brightness of the visible sun. By means of comparison, he is
able to gather how great the future spiritual light will be since even the corpo-
real light is so large and marvellous. The human being can compare the mirac-
ulousness of the visible light with that light he will share with angels in the
future. All materials obtained by any of the senses are similarly useful for the
comparison. Richard describes the variety of sense pleasures experienced by
the body in the visible world and considers them as self-evident starting-points
for heavenly joys. He suggests quantitative comparison between the bodily
and spiritual joys:115

How many delights of the eyes, how many delights of the ears and other
senses are there? How many colours, how many odours, how many fla-
vours are there? Therefore if there are so many delights of bodies, how
many delights of spirits will there be? If we possess so much in this tem-
poral life, how great will be those things which we expect in eternity?116

created things towards the invisible things of God. Mysticae adnotationes in Psalmos, pl
196, 370A.
114 Coulter mistakenly claims that the working of Naphtali refers exclusively to the operation
of understanding and can be defined as a genus of contemplation. See Coulter 2006,
152154.
115 Bmin XXII, p. 148.813: Comparatione quando ex praesentium bonorum multitudine uel
magnitudine colligit illa futurae uitae gaudia, quot uel quanta esse possint. Verbi gratia:
Inspecta saepe solis claritate, corporeo uidelicet lumine, considerat quanta futura erit lux
illa spiritualis, si tanta tamque mirabilis est lux ista corporalis. In Benjamin Major, Richard
employs the idea of the sun in his analysis of the ecstasy of the mind. BMAJ V, X, p. 135.912:
Consideramus ergo in orbe solis magnitudinem claritatis atque caloris indeque colligamus
in huius mentis sublevatione ascensionis promotionem promotionisque consummationem,
quae quidem quasi ab aurora incipit et tandem aliquando in se solis similitudinem trahit.
116 Bmin XXII, p. 148.1925: Quot sunt oblectamenta oculorum, quot sunt oblectamenta
auriumceterorumque sensuum? Quot sunt colores, quot odores, quot sapores? Si ergo tot
The Role of Imagination 117

As a result, the human being may infer (conicere) the multitude of heavenly
joys with the help of comparison.117 It seems that collecting images includes
the composition of mental images as well. The various sense perceptions and
the pleasures experienced are necessary material for the rational imagination
and the technique of comparison. On the other hand, do the abundant sense
experiences ensure a more exact or somehow better image of heaven? In terms
of Richards argument, one might conclude that the extent of sense experi-
ences and their proper use in the spiritual exercise will guarantee useful and
clear images of future rewards. In this argument, the worldly joys and heavenly
joys seem to be commensurable.
In addition to comparison (comparatio), imagination mixed with under-
standing can also function through transfer or translation (translatio).
Translation (translatio) is a technique by which the individual can move
(transferre) to the signification of an invisible object through the description
of a visible one.118 Richard utilizes the image of light as an example of transla-
tion. In Scripture, it has been written that God is living in the light which can-
not be approached (I Tim. 6:16). Now the human being can imagine what kind
of entity this immaterial light which the invisible and incorporeal God inhab-
its might be. Here one may formulate an analogy: just as the exterior light illu-
minates the external eyes of the body (oculus corporeus) so the spiritual light
illuminates the eyes of the heart (oculus cordis). In agreement with the tech-
nique of translatio, the invisible light in this case signifies the wisdom of
God.119 It is likely that Richard reads that the sun in fact signifies Christ, because
he offers this interpretation in his Liber exceptionum.120 The example of light is

sunt deliciae corporum, quot erunt deliciae spirituum? Si tanta possidemus in tempore,
quanta sunt quae expectamus in aeternitate? In hunc igitur modum utitur comparatione.
117 Bmin XXII, p. 148.1718: Item multiplicitatem bonorum inuisibilium conicit ex multitu-
dine bonorum uisibilium.
118 Bmin XXII, p. 148.2628: Utitur nichilominus, ut dictum est, translatione, quando rerum
uisibilium quamlibet descriptionem transfert ad rerum inuisibilium significationem.
119 Bmin XXII, pp. 148, 150.2835: Verbi gratia: Audit in Scripturis nominari lucem, sicut de
Deo scriptum est quia inhabitat lucem inaccessibilem. Quaerit ergo quae lux ista sit incor-
porea quam inhabitat inuisibilis et incorporea Dei natura, et inuenit quia lux ista est ipsa
Dei sapientia, quia ipsa est lux uera. Sicut enim lux ista exterior illuminat oculos corpo-
rum, ita illa absque dubio illuminare consueuit oculos cordium. Cf. Bmin V, p. 102.2023:
Visibilia enim solus intuetur sensus carnis, inuisibilia uero solus uidet oculus cordis. Est
ergo sensus carnis totus extrinsecus, sensus uero cordis totus intrinsecus.
120 Liber exceptionum II, I, cap. V, p. 225.2: Solent doctores sancti per solem accipere Christum,
per lunam Ecclesiam, per singulas stellas singulos fideles. Per solem Christum, quia sicut
sol perfectus est in se nec mutatur, sic Christus, quia immensus est, non potest augeri, et
118 Chapter 4

instructive, since the notion of light can be considered as a kind of absolute

metaphor in Christian theology.121
The idea of translation introduces a quite different kind of rationale for the
operation of imagination compared to the activities of the basic form of imagi-
nation (Bala) and the first form of rational imagination (Dan). The human
being may use translatio to switch from the image of some visible thing to
spiritual understanding of invisible things. The rational imagination rises to
invisible things by means of visible qualities (per rerum uisibilium qualitatem).
Richard also uses the expression that the nature (natura)122 of the visible thing
is the object of transfer or translation. He states that the nature of the visible
thing can be translated or spiritually interpreted (convertere ad spiritualem
intelligentiam), adding that this form of rational imagination is actually able to
convert almost everything written into spiritual understanding, thus receiving
the name of conversion.123 The notion of conversion derives from Hugh, who
writes that the individual must learn to convert (vertere) corporeal things into
spiritual.124 Because Richard describes the replacement of images of visible
things with invisible ones fairly briefly in Benjamin Minor, the actual character
of the visible things and their natures remains unclear. The things to be exam-
ined sometimes seem to be genuinely visible things to be perceived directly

quia eternus est, non potest mutari. Cf. I Cor. 1:24: ipsis autem vocatis Iudaeis atque
Graecis Christum Dei virtutem et Dei sapientiam.
121 As Eriugena puts it, the Creator himself is the ultimate light, and that which has been cre-
ated reflects the light which reveals something about its Creator. In everything, even
stones or pieces of wood, the divine light shines through and illuminates the road of the
soul towards God. Eriugena declares that the images of the divine wisdom (imaginatio-
nes) shine through in the most significant lights of material reality in other words, in the
sun, the morning star, and the ether. Expositiones in Ierarchiam coelestem II, p. 46.969
975. Eriugena uses the following terms referring to divine reflections: imagines, imagina-
tiones, and phantasiae. For Eriugenas terminology, see Bautier 1988, 8390. Eriugenas
writings were well-known in St. Victor. See, for instance, McEvoy 2002, 183202; Rorem
2009a.
122 In Benjamin Major, Richard gives a more extensive analysis of the nature (natura) of an
object (res). The notion of nature refers to the inner physical qualities (qualitas intrin-
seca) of an object, which may be perceived with other senses than sight. BMAJ II, IV,
p.2526.See Chapter 5.4.
123 BMIN XXII, p. 150.3536, 3943: Neptalim per rerum uisibilium qualitatem, surgit ad
rerum inuisibilium cognitionem. Solet namque cognitam quamlibet rerum uisibilium
naturam conuertere ad spiritualem intelligentiam. Quia ergo pene quicquid scriptum
reperit ad spiritualem intelligentiam conuertit, recte conuersionis nomen accepit.
124 De tribus diebus IV, p. 10.110112 (814C).
The Role of Imagination 119

with the bodily senses, but his argument sometimes refers explicitly to the text
of the Bible and to its separate interpretations.125
By the end of the analysis of rational imagination, however, Richard gives a
further definition of the visible things, stressing that every person who uses
such images of visible things has to understand, however, that these loveli-
nesses of the Bible are not images (species) of actual objects but similitudes
(similitudines) which signify something else.126 Even though Richard hints that
there is a distinct difference between the notion of image and similitude, he
does not define these concepts in detail in this context. Still, Benjamin Major
offers a structured theory according to which images (species) and similitudes
(similitudines) have to be conceptually separated from each other.127
It is regrettable that Richard gives only a few examples of the technique of
translation (translatio). However, it is interesting to note that he also exploits
the techniques of comparison and transference in the theological analysis
of the divine essence in his De Trinitate. The usual method in this treatise is to
use the conventional language and transfer its words to signify the divine real-
ity. Richard points out that people are accustomed to transfer the terms of
human reality to the divine reality. This happens when such words as father,
son, or person are transferred from the human language out of necessity in
order to refer to different aspects of divine reality. Furthermore, in his De
Trinitate Richard urges the simple-minded reader to use the technique of com-
parison (comparatio) in order to understand different perspectives, like sim-
plicity and the multiplicity of some visible thing, and use this knowledge to
understand something about divine incomprehensibility.128 In these argu-
ments, however, he does not refer to the use of the imagination or reason.
Translatio and comparatio are both standard rhetorical terms. It seems that
analysing the operation of rational imagination with the help of the notions of
comparatio and translatio in Benjamin Minor is Richards innovation. Translatio
is a Latin translation from the Greek concept of metaphor, which means in fact
transfer from one place to another. The notion of metaphor has been used in

125 Smalley 1952, 107110; Chenu 1957, 116119. Richard himself mentions incidentally that the
Naphtali-imagination translates the written texts. Bmin XXII, p. 150.4143: Quia ergo
pene quicquid scriptum reperit ad spiritualem intelligentiam conuertit, recte conuersio-
nis nomen accepit.
126 Bmin XV, p. 130.1415: Talium namque nichil ibi est per speciem, ubi tamen totum est per
similitudinem. Cf. Bmin V, p. 102.18. Note that species may refer here either to the exterior
appearance of things or to act of seeing in general.
127 BMAJ I, VI, p. 13.15; BMAJ II, XII, p. 35.14.
128 De Trinitate II, XXI, p. 127128.
120 Chapter 4

the theories of rhetoric especially,129 as is also done by Hugh of St. Victor in his
De Grammatica, where he writes that metaphor is a translation of things and
words.130 The Roman rhetorician Quintilian also states that the techniques of
comparison and translation are closely connected to the idea of metaphor,
since the Latin equivalent of the Greek word metaphor is translatio. Quintilian
writes that the poverty of language requires metaphors because they add rich-
ness to language by interchanging words. A noun or a verb is transferred from
its proper place to another one where no literal term exists, or where the trans-
ferred one is better than the literal. Moreover, metaphor brings decorativeness
and additional significance to language.131 Quintilian argues that comparatio
and translatio can be separated from each other. Comparatio means compar-
ing some object to the thing which we wish to describe. In this case the com-
parison is explicit. However, translatio involves implicit, abbreviated
comparison. It is a comparison when one says that a man did something like a
lion, it is a metaphor when one says of him that He is a lion.132 The proper word
shares the same characteristics as the term onto which it is transferred. The
problem arises where there is no analogy at all or the relation between the
transferred word and the literal word is imprecise. This lack of analogy is called
dissimilarity (dissimilitudo).133 Hugh of St. Victor discusses a similar lion image
in his theory of biblical interpretation., claiming that Christ is like a lion,
butthat the reader is not able to appreciate this image if he does not know

129 Carruthers 1998, 119. Quintilian in particular explains the concept of metaphor as transla-
tion in his Institutio oratoria 1.4.18 and 8.6.4. See Copeland 1991, 235n.74 and Terkla 2000,
254260. For the concept of translatio in Cicero, Augustine, Eriugena, and Abelard, see
Zemler-Cizewski 1994, 3749. Dronke also remarks that translatio is the most common
word for metaphor in the twelfth century. Dronke 1974, 21. For the notion of translatio, see
also Chenu 1957, 138; Evans 1984, 110, and Ashworth 2007, 316319.
130 De Grammatica XX (p.150151): Tropos grammatici uocant modos locutionum qui fiunt a
propria significatione ad non propriam similitudinem, et diffinitur sic tropus Metaphora
est rerum uerborumque translatio.
131 For Quintilians idea of translation, see Institutio oratoria 8.6.5. The influence of
Quintilians Institutio oratoria in the texts on rhetoric in the Middle Ages has caused some
dispute among scholars. According to the generally accepted opinion, his thinking had a
considerable effect in the Middle Ages even though his texts have been available only in
fragments. See Ward 1995, 231284. For the influence of Quintilian, Cicero, and Ad
Herennium in St. Victor, see Zinn 1974.
132 Institutio oratoria 8.6.89: In totum autem metaphora brevior est similitudo: eoque
distat, quod illa comparatur rei, quam volumus exprimere, haec pro ipsa re dicitur.
Comparatio est cum dico fecisse quid hominem ut leonem, translatio cum dico de
homine leo est.
133 Kirchner 2010, 184.
The Role of Imagination 121

something about real lions. Hugh also points out that the term (dictio) itself
does not signify Christ, the term being only a conventional sign indicating an
animal or res.134
Richard also mentions the important role of rational imagination in elo-
quence, which underlines the link between rhetoric and imagination.
Imagination which has joined with understanding (imaginatio intelligentiae
permixta) envisions various beautiful images and thus represents eloquence.
This ability of the imagination to produce different scenes can be utilized,
especially in speeches and sermons. The speaker can use the various images
effectively to exert influence on unlearned people. This is also useful in the
spiritual life of untrained people, where rational imagination brings pleasure
caused by the beautiful appearances.135 It is especially important to awake
feelings in the listeners minds, the materialization of which facilitates the
operation of memory and the power of speech. When someone reads or listens
to the speech, he tries to produce pictures in his mind which correspond to the
story. The good speaker utilizes this human ability by offering his public vari-
ous images which appeal to the feelings. Thus the listeners attention is firmly
fixed on the speech. Consequently, the speech may be made more effective by
creating persistent memories.136 This means in fact that the images are not
used only to illustrate words but actually create feelings, which in turn may
support the cognitive process and the operation of the memory.137

134 De Scripturis et scriptoribus sacris, pl 175, 12BC, 13CD. For further discussion of Hughs
account of voces, res, and signification, see Coulter 2006, 7475, 81. Coulter also expounds
the influence of Robert of Melun as a further transmitter of Hughs account. Robert sug-
gests that the terms (voces) are not applicable to the transference of meaning since it is
the things, res, which should be explored.
135 Bmin XXIII, pp. 150, 152.510: Est enim prae ceteris rudibus quidem adhuc mentibus
minusque exercitatis, et ad intelligendum facilior, et ad audiendum iocundior. Siquidem
haec meditanti facilius occurrit, et audientem dulcius afficit. Est plane et promptior in
meditatione, et affabilior in sermone.
136 Quintilian analyses the significance of imagination in good speech at length, pointing out
that in this connection the Greeks are accustomed to talk about fantasies (phantasiae), as
the Romans prefer visions (visiones). However, they both mean images of objects which are
inaccessible to the perceptive powers. Quintilian notes that when the mind is occupied by
some hopes or daydreams, visions may be so vivid that one imagines such things as travel-
ling abroad, crossing the sea, or fighting. He also wonders if it is possible to turn this kind of
mental activity to some profit. Institutio oratoria 6.2.2932. Quintilian finds it self-evident
that these images vary from individual to individual and that the public also adds details to
images which the speaker does not mention. Institutio oratoria 8.3.52, 6275. For the idea of
persuasion with the help of imagination in Ancient rhetoric, see Webb 2009, 87106.
137 Carruthers 1998, 132.
122 Chapter 4

However, the even more important application of comparison and transla-

tion in Richards scheme deals with the biblical interpretation and Christian
metaphors in general. He argues that rational imagination provides an indis-
pensable method by which the most central Christian metaphors can be trans-
lated and revealed for readers. Translatio verborum, i.e., the transfer of words,
was a usual practice in biblical exegesis in the Middle Ages. It was considered
to be a necessary method in the spiritual interpretation of the figurative mate-
rial of holy texts.138 John Scotus Eriugena states that all talk regarding God is
always ultimately metaphorical. He thus finds it necessary to explain that a
metaphor is a transition from that which has been created to the Creator him-
self (metaphorica fieri, id est a creatura ad creatorem translata).139
Richard emphasizes how imagination mixed with understanding is an espe-
cially important ability of the soul in interpreting the beautiful descriptions of
the Bible. This kind of rational imagination has a creative linguistic role as a
producer of metaphors.140 As he says, the text of the Bible is an excellent exam-
ple of an imaginary beauty (pulchritudo imaginaria) for weak people because
it represents invisible things through visible forms. Thus the memory of charm-
ing and beautiful images is imprinted in the mind. However, how that memory
is created and how the memory of the human being functions in relation to the
sensing, imagining, or thinking powers remains unclear.141 In any case, the bib-
lical descriptions of scents, birds, and the pearls and treasures of the heavenly
Jerusalem are material for the imagination in order that it should show this
beauty to reason (ratio).
The rational imagination mixes carnal things with the spiritual and describes
incorporeal things in terms of the corporeal so that the twofold (bodily and
spiritual) nature of the human being can refresh itself. As a conclusion, the

138 Chenu 1957, 120. Augustines De doctrina christiana has a major influence on the develop-
ment of the technique of transferring the words (translatio verborum, signa translata).
139 Periphyseon I, p. 27.699706 (458C); Periphyseon I, p. 31.827838 (461C). See the interpreta-
tion of Zemler-Cizewski 1994, 44. De Bruyne 1946, 353 explains how Eriugena uses the
terms translate, figurate, metaphorice, and symbolice synonymously.
140 Renevey 2001, 11.
141 Bmin XIV, p. 128.1719, 2124: dulce est ei saltem imaginando eorum memoriam retinere,
quorum intelligentiam nondum ualet ratiocinando apprehendere. Suadet ergo ratio
commodius esse qualicunque modo uera bona cogitare, et imaginaria quadam saltem
pulchritudine ad eorum desiderium animum accendere, quam in falsis et deceptoriis
bonis cogitationem figere. Bmin XV, p. 130.36: Res enim inuisibiles per rerum uisibilium
formas describunt, et earum memoriam per quarumdam concupiscibilium specierum
pulchritudinem mentibus nostris imprimunt.
The Role of Imagination 123

individual may experience pleasure as his imagination operates.142 The erotic

language of the Song of Songs is especially good material for the techniques of
comparison and translation. In Richards opinion, the texts are most pleasing
when they do not seem to mean anything in their literal sense. He quotes the
Song of Songs as an example of this kind of text: Your hair is like a flock of
goats moving down the slopes of Gilead. Your teeth are like a flock of shorn
sheep that come up from the washing.143 This kind of text seems very delight-
ful (iocunda) but cannot be admired appropriately if the sense of the letter
only is followed. The enjoyable silliness (fatuitas) of the text forces the reader
to take refuge in the spiritual understanding and to utilize the power of
imagination.144
Albeit Richard emphasizes the importance of imagination for the soul, he
adds that the transition to the invisible reality with the help of imagination is
never complete. The visible reality follows like the shadow145 (rerum corpo-
reum secum umbram trahens) of the soul which attempts to ascend to contem-
plation. This is why in Benjamin Minor the operation of imagination is
described by comparing its activities with the hind leaping. The rational imagi-
nation seeks the nature of invisible things by means of the form of visible
things by making a kind of leap. However, it does not possess the strength for
full flight, since the jumps always return to the earthit cannot fly like a
bird.146 This means that the individual has not progressed enough in spiritual

142 Bmin XXIV, p. 154.1417: Sic nouit Neptalim carnalia cum spiritualibus permiscere, et per
corporalia incorporea describere, ut utraque hominis natura in eius dictis inueniat unde
se mirabiliter reficiat, qui ex corporea et incorporea natura constat. Augustine describes
the reading of the Song of Songs in a similar manner, explaining how the similitudes
contained in biblical images bring joy to the reader. See De doctrina christiana 2.6.7: Num
aliud homo discit, quam cum illud planissimis verbis sine similitudinis huius adminiculo
audire? Et tamen nescio quomodo suavis intueor sanctos, cum eos quasi dentes ecclesiae
video praecidere ab erroribus homines atque in eius corpus emollita duritia quasi demor-
sos manosque transferre?
143 Song of Songs 4: 12.
144 Bmin XXIV, p. 156.2833: iocunda ualde esse uidentur, et tamen in his omnibus si solum
litterae sensum sequimur, in eis nil inuenimus quod digne miremur. Sed forte in huius-
modi dictis, hoc est quod tam libenter amplectimur, quod ex iocunda quadam, ut ita
dicam, litterae fatuitate ad spiritualem intelligentiam confugere coartamur.
145 Cf. Hugh of St. Victors In Salomonis Ecclesiasten homiliae, pl 175, 169C: Quae est umbra?
Species rerum visibilium umbra est.
146 Bmin XXIII, p. 152.2533: Notandum sane quam recte non aui uolanti sed ceruo currenti
comparetur, nam auis quidem uolando longe a terra suspenditur, ceruus autem ad dan-
dos saltus terrae innititur, sed nec in ipsis suis saltibus longius a terra separatur. Sic
nimirum, sic Neptalim, dum per rerum uisibilium formam rerum inuisibilium naturam
124 Chapter 4

practice to disengage from visible things. Richard remarks that the use of the
imagination is typical of those who are still untrained for contemplation.147
Richard admits that imagination can help the soul to strive for invisible real-
ity and thus contemplation, but its abilities are limited in this respect.
Imagination which is mixed with understanding (imaginatio intelligentiae per-
mixta) is at its best in meditation (meditatio) especially.148 This becomes clear
at the end of Benjamin Minor, where he describes the two distinct forms of
contemplation, both of which exclude the ability of the imagination and its
services.149

4.4 Guarding the Inner City of the Soul

In Benjamin Minor, Richard presents a vivid picture of the human soul as a

kind of inner city (civitas) or house (domus). He sees it as crucial to instruct the
reader to build a perfect internal defence system for the soul. This system is to
maintain the balance of the soul and protect it against various sinful tempta-
tions.150 Furthermore, Richard specifies that in the narrow sense the city or

quaerit, quosdam saltus dare, non autem ad plenum uolatum conualescere consueuit,
quia in eo quod se ad summa erigit, rerum corporearum secum umbram trahens, ima
omnino non deserit. Richard similarly illustrates the notion of speculation as a leaping
animal in Mysticae adnotationes in Psalmos, pl 196, 342AB. In Benjamin Major, Richard
returns to the idea of leaping animals and speculation in connection with contemplation.
BMAJ V, XIV, p. 142.
147 Bmin XXIII, p. 150.14.
148 Bmin XXIII, pp. 150, 152.510: Est enim prae ceteris rudibus quidem adhuc mentibus
minusque exercitatis, et ad intelligendum facilior, et ad audiendum iocundior. Siquidem
haec meditanti facilius occurrit, et audientem dulcius afficit. Est plane et promptior in
meditatione, et affabilior in sermone. Bmin XXIII, p. 152.1518, 2728: Recte ergo, nisi fal-
lor, Neptalim ceruus emissus dicitur, quia per contemplationis gratiam multa percurrere
ualet, et propter contemplationis dulcedinem multum ei currere placet. ceruus autem
ad dandos saltus terrae innititur, sed nec in ipsis suis saltibus longius a terra separatur.
149 Bmin LXXXVI, p. 340.412. According to Richard, the first kind of contemplation is above
reason, but not beyond reason; however, the second kind of contemplation is both above
and beyond reason. These two kinds of contemplation correspond to the fifth and sixth
kinds of contemplation in Benjamin Major. Cf. BMAJ IV, III, p. 87.3188.3.
150 Guarding a fort or the inner city of the soul is a typical Victorine theme. See Battles 1949,
220240. The theme of inner spiritual combat in monastic life is traditional. As pointed
out by Smith, monastic theologians employed a wide range of military analogies to
describe the various stages of their spiritual development. Smith 2011, 3. See especially
Bernard of Clairvauxs ideas on this topic in writings such as his In Dedicatione ecclesiae,
The Role of Imagination 125

house could be interpreted as the conscience or awareness of oneself (consci-

entia).151 He uses warlike vocabulary in Benjamin Minor: the protection of the
soul is secured, the armies of tempting thoughts attack, the attackers are killed,
the citizens rebel, there are traitors among them, enemies are spotted from the
watchtowers, and peace among the citizens is sought. The two previously out-
lined forms of rational imagination (imaginatio rationalis) are essential parts
of this defence system of the soul, but they must work in co-operation with its
other abilities too.152 To thoroughly understand the mechanisms of these abili-
ties of the soul was no doubt an important part of the novices spiritual train-
ing at the school of St. Victor. In this section, I consider how Richard believes
that the various forms of activity of the imagination can assist the soul in its
defensive activities as well as its efforts to secure inner serenity. The final goal
in building this defence system and guarding the inner city of the soul is to
prepare the soul for contemplation.

370398. On the concept of militia Christi, see Auer 1980, cols. 12101223. Cf. also De
spiritu et anima, pl 40, 807: Nobilis creatura est anima. Civitas namque Dei est, de qua
tam gloriosa dicta sunt (Ps 86, 3), quod ad imaginem et similitudinem De facta est. The
author also argues that the citizens of the city are the natural and inborn powers of
thesoul. The image of the city serves as an example for understanding the structures of
the human soul. Intellectual senses are like counsellors, rational like soldiers and animal
like common people. For the interpretation of this text and its platonic background, see
Dutton 1983, 107108.
151 Bmin XXXV, p. 188.4849: Haec est domus, uel ciuitas illa, conscientia uidelicet nostra.
Conscience does not have a distinct moral implication here, since the conscience refers
to awareness of oneself in general in this passage. As noted by Constable, the distinction
between the inner self-awareness and moral arbiter is not always clear in the twelfth cen-
tury. Constable 1996, 271.
152 Bmin XXXI, p.174Bmin XXXIII, p. 188. Richard describes this kind of warfare against vices
in his other writings as well. Cf. De eruditione hominis interioris, pl 196, 1243B1244A. In
his De statu interioris hominis XVIIXIX, p. 8184 (pl 196, 1128A1130B), Richard describes
how various affections, virtues, and vices may contradict each other, which leads to inner
instability. See also BMAJ III, XXIII, p. 8283, where Richard uses almost exactly the same
wordings about the spiritual combat as in Benjamin Minor. However, it is the power of
deliberation which is able to condemn certain illicit affections and wandering thoughts.
Deliberation crushes the hostile army of vices and nurtures virtues. Richard urges the
reader to consider the abundance of future goods as well. In Exiit edictum Richard dis-
cusses the citadel of the soul and its inner security (securitas). Exiit edictum III, p. 72.21
24. Richard often refers to internal enemies, usually depraved thoughts or vices, but he
does not exclude the existence of external tempters either. For this, see, e.g., Bmin XXXI,
p. 176.1214: Solet nimirum inimicus, nunc ab intus ministrare consilia erroris, nunc a
foris admouere incitamenta uoluptatis.
126 Chapter 4

Richard begins the discussion of this idea of the inner defence system of the
soul by claiming that four different combinations of the abilities of the soul are
necessary for its full protection. Every one of these inner safeguards is repre-
sented by some form of co-operation between the abilities of the soul. The first
one is imagination directed by the reason (imaginatio per rationem disposita),
that is, Dan-imagination. The second one is the rational imagination, which
has combined with the understanding (imaginatio intelligentiae permixta), i.e.,
Naphtali-imagination. The third protector of the soul has been procreated by
the rational soul and born from sensuality (sensualitas). He has been adopted
by affection (affectio) and is named Gad. He is also referred to as the rigor of
abstinence (abstinentia). Finally, the fourth guardian of the soul is also born
from sensuality (sensualitas) and then adopted by affection (affectio), an off-
spring who is called Asher, or the vigor of patience (patientia).153 The two
adopted sons of the affection mentioned above can be understood as a form of
practical virtue. Both Gad and Asher particularly strengthen the control of the
body, Gad maintaining abstinence against the superfluous desires and Asher
representing patience when the body is afflicted by torments.154
Richard makes it clear that all these four guardians are needed to attain the
perfect fort which sufficiently protects the soul against its enemies.155 He justi-
fies the notion of inner safeguards by stressing the importance of controlling
both the soul and the body. This control is necessary for the soul seriously striv-
ing for the heights of contemplation. The first step in this control is the order-
ing of imagination. Richard specifies that before it is possible to begin to
command sensual desires, the wandering of images has to be restricted (imagi-
nationis euagatio restringitur). Here he refers to the bestial form of imagina-
tion (imaginatio bestialis) which is not moderated or ordered by reason.156

153 Alluding to Genesis, Richard interprets the birth of the four protectors of the soul as fol-
lows. The handmaid of Leah, Zelpha, gives birth to two sons of Jacob. Just as Rachel
adopts the children of Bala, Leah adopts the sons of Zelpha. The offspring of Bala are the
two forms of the rational imagination, in other words, Dan and Naphtali, while the chil-
dren of Zelpha represent the two forms of combined affectivity and sensuality, in other
words, Gad and Asher. Bmin XXV, p. 158.1011: Isti sunt Gad et Aser, duo filii Zelphae, rigor
uidelicet abstinentiae, et uigor patientiae.
154 Bmin XXVI, p. 162.5053: Immo per Gad et Aser intelligimus omnis superfluae delectatio-
nis, aut cuiuslibet corporalis afflictionis abstinentiam uel patientiam in omnibus quae
per quinque sensus carnem delectant aut cruciant.
155 Bmin XXXI, p. 174.18. At this point, Richard writes that will pertains to the sons of Leah,
thought to the sons of Bala, and action to the sons of Zelpa. Bmin XXX, p. 174.1819.
156 Bmin XVI, p. 130.57: Bestialis itaque imaginatio est, quando per ea quae paulo ante uidi-
mus uel fecimus, sine ulla utilitate, absque omni deliberatione huc illucque uaga mente
The Role of Imagination 127

Hestates that since unnecessary thoughts (cogitationes) have to be removed

from imagination so that the sensual desires can be successfully repelled, the
control of thoughts should come before the control of the body. This is because,
in Richards opinion, imagining fleshly delights leads eventually to losing con-
trol of sensation. Surveying future pains and rewards helps the affective part of
the soul to reject earthly enjoyments.157 If the human being does not have any
abstinence (abstinentia) in regard to external vices it becomes difficult to
guard the thoughts as well. The killing of fleshly lusts guarantees the opportu-
nity for internal peace.158
The four different safeguards of the soul have their own sphere of responsi-
bility, where they have actively to protect the individual against various dan-
gers. A temptation can arise both externally and internally: internal temptations
arrive via thoughts/cogitation (intus per cogitationem); external temptations,
however, through bodily senses (exterius per sensum).159 First, Dan-imagination
(imaginatio per rationem disposita) protects internally (intrinsecus), because it
suppresses (reprimere) evil arising from within. The internal temptations arise
through cogitation (per cogitationem), as a result of which the soul fails to
maintain its internal balance. For example, the enemy can produce poor

discurrimus. The same idea of the idle and useless thoughts re-occurs in Bmin
XX,p.142.1217: Sed quid hoc de turpibus tantum cogitationibus loquimur, quandoqui-
dem uanas et inutiles perfecti uiri non leuiter abhominantur propter illud quod scriptum
inuenitur: Vae qui cogitatis inutile, et illud: Scriptus sanctus disciplinae effugiet fictum, et
auferet se a cogitationibus quae sunt sine intellectu. In this text, Richard speaks negatively
about the fictions (ficta) in the mind. Cf. the productions of rational imagination, which
are also called ficta. Bmin XIX, p. 140.9.
157 Bmin XXVII, p. 164.59: Si enim imaginationis euagatio, quae fit per inutiles cogitationes
prius non reprimitur, absque dubio sensualitatis appetitus immoderatus minime tem-
peratur. Qui igitur uult corporalium uoluptatum desideria temperare, prius assuescat car-
nales delicias nunquam uel saltem raro cogitare. As Zinn points, this is something of a
reversal of ascetic practice in which discipline of the body precedes discipline of thought.
Zinn 1977, 195.
158 Bmin XXXII, p. 176.14: Hoc autem nosse oportet quia disciplina corporis absque discip-
lina cordis, absque dubio inutilis est; disciplina uero cogitationum, sine disciplina sen-
suum, omnino obseruari non potest.
159 Bmin XXXI, p. 176.912: Omnes namque scimus quia temptatio omnis surgit aut exterius,
aut interius. Interius per cogitatum, exterius per sensum. Modo enim intus per cogitatio-
nem pulsat, modo de exterioribus per sensus irrumpere parat. For the outer and inner
temptations in Benjamin Major, see BMAJ V, XIII, p. 139.36: Quis nesciat irritamenta
voluptatum modo a foris, modo ab intus surgere, a foris ex delectatione, ab intus ex sug-
gestione, per delectationem in carne, per suggestionem in mente. Modo namque sordida
titillatione caro inflammatur, modo vero foeda cogitatione animus sordidatur.
128 Chapter 4

advice, which affects the cogitations internally. Because Dan-imagination is

able to keep these thoughts under control, its vigilance is especially important
for the soul. Richard compares the thoughts of the mind with the discordant
inhabitants of a city whose quarrel has to be silenced with the help of Dan.
Some inhabitants may be traitors, but these can be revealed and condemned
with the operation of the rational imagination. If one has not been trained
enough to use his rational imagination, one will be easily deceived.160
Richard does not really explain how the rational imagination is able to eval-
uate cogitations or thoughts and recognize and condemn inappropriate
ones.161 According to Benjamin Minor, it seems that the cogitation (cogitatio)
essentially refers to images shown in the mind. The rational part of the rational
imagination performs the necessary evaluation of various cogitations in order
to condemn images which are incorrect or distorted. However, Richard consid-
ers in Benjamin Minor that imagination controls and judges (moderare, iudi-
care) the possible influence of thoughts on the soul.162 This evaluative ability
appears to be quite a significant task for the rational imagination, since ratio-
nal imagination is based on the activity of the imagination and is said to be one
of its acts.163 When dealing with the two rational forms of imagination, Richard
does not investigate the mistakes that might result from flawed judgements.
Obviously their rationality guarantees proper operation, so that both Dan and
Naphtali can protect the soul faultlessly. Dan is able to show a sufficient num-
ber of images of hell and guide the mind to focus on right thoughts. Naphtali

160 Bmin XXXI, p. 174.411: Primogenitus namque Balae [Dan] eam componit intrinsecus.
Per Dan reprimuntur mala intus exsurgentia. Omnes namque scimus quia tentatio omnis
surgit, aut exterius aut interius. Interius per cogitatum, exterius per sensum. Bmin XXXI,
p.176.1213, 1517, 18, 2122: Solet nimirum inimicus, nunc ab intus ministrare consilia
erroris. Sed quia ad Dan pertinet disciplina cogitationum, ad Gad autem spectat discip-
lina sensuum, debet utique Dan euigilare ad discretionis iudicium Vnius [Dan] est
sedare civilem discordiam Dan namque negligente, mens facile decipitur.
161 The idea of sorting various cogitationes is obviously not original with Richard. For
instance, Peter Damian writes that one has to continuously guard ones thoughts and be
able to distinguish between good and evil thoughts. Richards own contribution is that it
is the power of rational imagination which actively assesses the thoughts. For Damian,
see Van t Spijker 2004, 4849.
162 Bmin XX, p. 144.3034. However, it is also possible that Richard describes the functioning
of the soul in general and does not intend to attribute something as sophisticated as dis-
criminating between various thoughts to the imagination as such.
163 Bmin XVII, p. 134.1519: Imaginatio ergo, quando instrumentum significat, est illa uis ani-
mae qua cum voluerit quodlibet imaginari potest. Hoc instrumento, cum ad aliquid imag-
inandum mens utitur, actio proculdubio quaedam efficitur, quae similiter imaginatio
nominatur.
The Role of Imagination 129

neither resorts to soothing the soul in vain nor allowing wicked people to enjoy
false pleasures.
The soul can become internally disordered only through cogitation, and sin
can break in from outside only through the five senses.164 The very foundation
of the shelter for the soul is the inner self controlling the thoughts with the
help of rational imagination, but it needs the restriction of the senses through
abstinence (abstinentia), i.e., external constraint. As noted above, abstinence
is a combination of affection and sensuality and is represented by Gad.165
Richard states that when a seductive thought is suggested, the human being
must learn to cut it off immediately with the rational imagination. Here he
discusses the essence of sin and its various manifestations in the human soul.
In the twelfth-century writings sin is often described as a process of sugges-
tion, delectation, consenting, and action. This process starts when the seduc-
tive thoughts are suggested in the mind. At this point, the rational imagination
should immediately cut them off, otherwise suggestion will carry on to
depraved delectation, which is likely to lead to depraved consent and finally to
sinful action. According to Anselm of Laon (d. 1107), sin is venial if delight hap-
pens against ones own will. If a person lets delectation grow and thus consents
to the sin, the sin is mortal.166 Richard writes in his De statu interioris hominis
that vice and illicit pleasure lead us to consent to evil and eventually to commit

164 Bmin XXXI, p. 174.78: per Gad repelluntur mala exterius insurgentia. Bmin XXXII, p.
178.8, 2123: nisi studeat Gad per portas sensuum irritamenta uitiorumTunc Gad forti
praelio dimicat, quando desideria carnalia per carnis mortificationem trucidat. The five
senses are like portals (portae) through which incitements of the vices come into view.
For this notion of the gates of the senses, see Vinge 1975, 6368. The imagery of portals is
the same as in Peter Damians letter urging the reader to close the gates of the senses of
the body and block the inrushing vices. Epistola 174 (vol. IV, p. 276): Has itaque corpora-
lium sensuum portas, dilectissimi, et vitiorum irruentium falangis obstruite, et virtutum
spiritalium agminibus aperite.
165 Bmin XXXII, p. 178.2830: In hunc itaque modum, ut omnes experiri possumus, Dan civi-
tatem nostram componit intrinsecus, Gad munit extrinsecus.
166 For this subject, and its further modifications in the Middle Ages, see Marenbon 1997,
235236; Knuuttila 2004, 178179. In Richards theory of imagination, one may detect an
implicit connection between the operation of the imagination and suggestion. However,
suggestion is not straightforwardly caused by imagination in Richards model, but is
caused by the rational soul, and it is the task of imagination to illustrate this suggested
material for the mind. See BMAJ III, XXI, p. 79.2829. This material may contain some illicit
thoughts, but not necessarily. Bmin XX, p. 140.2142.7: Sancti etenim uiri, quotiens se sen-
tiunt turpibus cogitationibus pulsari, et ad illicitam delectationem incitari, totiens solent
in ipso etiam temptationis aditu futura tormenta ante mentis oculis ponere, et ex tali con-
sideratione quicquid illicitum mens suggerit ante turpem delectationem extinguere.
130 Chapter 4

sin.167 It seems that evil desires rise involuntarily and it is the duty of rational
imagination to prevent them from growing. Moral integrity will be preserved
when imagination guards the soul. Traditionally, imagination was seen as a
destabilizing factor, but Richard reverses the traditional perception of the
imagination, inasmuch as its operation becomes one of the main defenders of
the fort of the soul.168
Next, Richard proceeds to analyse the imagination mixed with understand-
ing (imaginatio intelligentiae permixta), in other words, Naphtali. This second
mode of rational imagination also has a task of its own. Naphtali tries to create
internal peace between the various thoughts. When Dan threatens, Naphtali
will conciliate (blandire). This operation of the higher form of rational imagi-
nation will reward good people. Imagination calms the soul with the hope of
eternal happiness. The soul will be soothed through the incessant eloquence
(eloquia pulchritudinis) of Naphtali.169

Richard explores the problem of mortal and venial sins mainly in his De differentia peccati
mortalis et venialis, pl 196, 11911194.
167 De statu interioris hominis XXXIX, p. 109110 (pl 196, 1147AB): aliud est vitium atque aliud
est peccatum. Sic aliud est quando malum in sola cogitatione etiam ab invito sentitur,
atque aliud quod nutu spontaneo ex deliberatione committitur. Vitium itaque est ipsa
infirmitas naturalis corruptionis, peccatum vero est ipsa prava assentatio temptantis
infirmitatis. Vitium est quasi quaedam passio naturae, peccatum vero est spontanea
quaedam actio industriae. Vitium est ipse appetitus mali qui solet precedere vel provo-
care consensum, peccatum autem ipse est consensus mali qui solet sepe subsequi vel
comitari appetitum. There is some similarity between Richards and Peter Abelards ideas
concerning vice, sin, and consent. Richard also follows the traditional distinction between
mortal and venial sin. Only mortal sin suffices in itself for damnation. See Luscombe 1970,
306307. In his De statu Richard also states that sins of action (peccatum actionis) are less
dangerous than sins of thought (peccatum cogitationis). The open sins may be corrected
by a fellow Christian, but sins of thought remain hidden and uncorrected. De statu interi-
oris hominis XLII, p. 114 (pl 196, 1150C).
168 Bmin XXXI, p. 174.14: Hoc autem de duarum istarum filiis ancillarum non neglicenter
praetereundum, sed iugi memoria retinendum, quod ex eorum uigilantia uigilique custo-
dia, conscientiae nostrae ciuitas mire custoditur, multumque protegitur. Richard explains
that every error is corrected by its parallel, i.e., illicit thought should be replaced by
another thought. Bmin XX, p. 144.3032: Quaelibet ergo cogitatio quasi in sua tribu iudi-
catur, quando omne erratum per suum simile corrigitur.
169 Bmin XXXIII, p. 180.513: Hinc ergo Dan minatur, illinc Neptalim blanditur. Dan terret
minis, Neptalim fouet promissis. Ille punit malos, iste remunerat bonos. Vnus terrore
gehennae corda perterret, alter spe felicitatis aeternae animos demulcet. Quantum ergo,
putas, Neptalim iste, dans eloquia pulchritudinis, fratrem suum in tali negotio adiuuat, qui
animas auditorum dulcedine eloquii sui pene absque mora quo uult inclinat?
The Role of Imagination 131

In Benjamin Minor, Richard makes it clear that the individual does not
receive and use impressions and images arbitrarily, but that the imagination
is a voluntary ability of the mind. The soul is able to direct the pictures of the
mind and thus to produce fantasies which guide the soul to contemplation
and salvation. Nevertheless, one can equally well think of someone who is
able to choose pictures which lead him not to salvation but to eternal dam-
nation. Richard does not entertain such an idea. As he puts it in Benjamin
Minor, it is the personal task of everyone to regulate the state of his own soul.
The fundamental motivation here is the well-known medieval idea of
Christian Socratism, according to which the individual must learn to know
himself (gnthi seauton). This happens via self-reflection, which supports a
balanced inner life of the soul and thus prepares it for divine illumination
and salvation.170
The ultimate affections, inner joy (gaudium), hate (odium) and shame
(pudor), may arise after perfect abstinence and patience and their successful
co-operation with the two rational forms of imagination. Simultaneously there
seems to be a shift to a more spiritual understanding of affections, since
Richard writes that true joy causes interior sweetness, which should be sepa-
rated from exterior delight. This inner joy may be experienced by spiritual
people only. His language has elements which refer to a distinctive sense of
spiritual nature. The inner sweetness is something that can be tasted and is
intoxicating, but is still beyond the range of the exterior senses.171 However,
tasting inner sweetness produces good and ordered hatred. Hate is also spiritu-
alized and directed against the vices.172 Only after learning to hate sin is one

170 Bmin LXXVIII, p. 316.710, 1314: Ascende in montem istum, disce cognoscere teipsum.
Vis uidere et absque ullo indice cognoscere Moysen et Helyam, uis absque doctore, sine
expositore, intelligere legem et prophetiam? De coelo enim descendit gnoothi seauton
illud, id est: Nosce teipsum. Cf. De contemplatione et ejus speciebus, p. 43.5. For the back-
ground of this unusual comment, see Bmin LXXVIII, note 2, p. 316. For the Christian
Socratism of Richard, see Courcelle 1974, 242246.
171 Bmin XXXVI, p. 190.1315, 1921: Corporales deliciae sicut et ipsum corpus, corporeo oculo
uideri possunt: delicias cordis, sicut nec ipsum cor, oculi carnis uidere nequeunt. Hoc
itaque internum gaudium, spiritualis ista dulcedo quae intus sentitur, est ille filius Liae qui
ei quinto loco nascitur. Bmin XXXVII, p. 194.12, 1621: Hanc autem internae dulcedinis
degustationem Scriptura sacra nunc gustum, nunc ebrietatem uocat Merito tantillum
de tanto, gustus quidem dicitur; merito nichilominus quae mentem a seipsa alienat,ebrie
tas nominatur. Gustate, inquit Propheta, et uidete, quoniam suauis est Dominus. Et
Apostolus Petris: Si tamen gustastis quoniam dulcis est Dominus. Bmin XLVII, pp. 226,
228.34: Ecce de carnalibus omitto, cum spiritualibus tantum interim sit michi sermo.
172 Bmin XL, p. 206.46: Odium bonum, odium ordinatum, odium uitiorum.
132 Chapter 4

able to feel ashamed of it. Richard reminds us that shame felt because of a
damaged reputation is not good and ordered shame.173
Benjamin Minor ends with a discussion of perfect self-knowledge. The final
goal of pursuing self-knowledge is that the image and similitude of God is
reflected in the human soul. The soul is then prepared for ecstatic contempla-
tion, in other words, envisioning the divine truths. In the last chapters of
Benjamin Minor, Richard describes Rachel dying when her son Benjamin is
born. This indicates that the human reason (ratio) will darken after having
exhausted its powers. The figure of Benjamin personifies contemplation,
which takes place in ecstasy (excessus mentis). As the soul achieves contempla-
tion, the human senses, memory, and reason will cease to operate. Even though
imagination is not mentioned in this discussion, one can suppose that it
belongs to this same series of faculties of the mind.174 Richard adds that there
are two different forms of contemplation above reason, both related to
Benjamin. The first one is above reason (supra rationem), and the second is
above and beyond reason (supra et praeter rationem). The first contemplation
is of such a nature that reason still knows and experiences the existence of the
objects perceived, even though they cannot be investigated or revealed by rea-
son. The objects of the second contemplation seem to contradict all human
reason. The first contemplation pertains to the death of Rachel (reason), the
other to the ecstasy experienced by Benjamin.175 However, the idea of ecstasy

173 Bmin XLVI, p. 224.110. The long description of shame is interesting. Richard considers
good shame as a spiritual virtue which moderates other virtues. It makes the soul beauti-
ful. Ambrose of Milans De officiis, which was widely known during the Middle Ages, might
underlie this notion. In De officiis, Ambrose deals with such passions as hate and shame
extensively. Ambrose in turn echoes Ciceros famous De officiis, in which these concepts
are also expounded. For Ambroses notion of shame, see Davidson 2006, 345352.
174 Bmin LXXXII, p. 326.1318: ni fallor, per mortem Rachel et casum discipulorum figuratur,
nisi quod trium in tribus discipulis, sensus uidelicet, memoriae, rationis defectus ostendi-
tur. Ibi enim sensus corporeus, ibi exteriorum memoria, ibi ratio humana intercipitur, ubi
mens supra semetipsam rapta in superna eleuatur.
175 Bmin LXXXVI, p. 340.112: Possumus tamen per mortem Rachel et per excessum
Beniamin diuersa contemplationum genera non inconuenienter intelligere. Constat siq-
uidem duo contemplationum genera supra rationem esse, et utrumque ad Beniamin per-
tinere. Et primum quidem est supra rationem, sed non praeter rationem, secundum autem
et supra rationem et praeter rationem. Illa sane supra rationem et praeter rationem non
sunt, quae quamuis ratio patitur esse, nulla tamen humana ratione inuestigari vel conu-
inci possunt. Illa tamen dicimus et supra rationem, et praeter rationem esse, quibus uide-
tur omnis humana ratio contraire. Bmin LXXXVI, p. 342.1921: Haec sunt itaque duo illa
genera contemplationum, quorum unum ad mortem Rachel, alterum pertinet ad Beniamin
The Role of Imagination 133

in the final chapter of Benjamin Minor ends in the descent of contemplation

into imagination (contemplatio ad imaginationem descendit). Richards puz-
zling remark here probably anticipates his next work, Benjamin Major, in
which the six-part series on contemplation begins with that which is formed in
the imagination.176
In conclusion, in Benjamin Minor Richard describes imagination as an
essential part of spiritual life. He adapts materials from various traditions and
creates an original synthesis of the function of the human imagination. The
basic character of Benjamin Minor as a spiritual guidebook meant for novices
is apparent in Richards orientation towards the imagination. In Benjamin
Minor, Richard shows how a person is able to produce images of heaven and
hell with the help of the rational imagination. The individual can adjust his
own actions in accordance with these images. This idea of envisioning images
of heaven and hell in a spiritual exercise is common to the monastic tradition
of the Middle Ages. Richard argues that the main application of the imagina-
tion is to protect the soul against various inner and outer disturbances.
However, he also shows the importance of imagination in epistemology, rheto-
ric, and questions concerning biblical interpretation. In addition, since there
are many details in Benjamin Minor which are related to imagination and its
operation, it seems that Richard has quite consciously aimed to establish the
faculty of imagination as an acceptable and in many ways necessary ability of
the soul. Unfortunately, it is hard to evaluate the sources Richard utilizes in his
theory concerning imagination, since he does not refer directly to them.
Because of this, it is difficult to be sure how Richard makes use of the earlier
written tradition and what is independent development in his thinking. In any
case, it is evident that he knew at least the views of Hugh of St. Victor, John
Scotus Eriugena, Augustine, and Boethius on the imagination and its opera-
tion. In addition, Richards knowledge of Aristotelian tradition through
Boethius commentaries and translations may be assumed, as well as the use of
Quintilians texts on rhetoric. Richard weaves the materials of these very
diverse traditions into his own work and thus develops his spiritual theology
and philosophy of mind in original ways.

excessum. These two kinds of contemplation are similar to the fifth and sixth kinds of
contemplation in Benjamin Major. See descriptions of them in BMAJ I, VI, p. 14.623.
176 Bmin LXXXVII, p. 346.3537: In morte Rachel contemplatio supra rationem ascendit; in
introitu Beniamin in Aegyptum contemplatio usque ad imaginationem descendit
 Chapter 5

Imagination in the First Two Kinds

of Contemplation

5.1 Introduction to Benjamin Major

This chapter will examine Richards views on the imagination and its opera-
tion in the first two books of Benjamin Major. After some introductory remarks
in Section5.1, I shall analyse the ways of knowing and Richards ideas of con-
templation in general in Sections5.2 and 5.3. In Section5.4, I will examine his
theory by exploring the first kind of contemplation, which begins his six-fold
model of contemplation. Section5.5 deals with the second kind of contempla-
tion. The four highest kinds will be examined in Chapters 6 and 7. This chapter
explores Richards ideas concerning the initial stages of contemplative life, i.e.,
the lower levels of the spiritual ascent. In this analysis, his interest in the role
of the imagination and its significance for contemplation becomes evident.
Moreover, the study also assesses Hugh of St. Victors impact on Richards
Benjamin Major and attempts to show how Richard developed many of Hughs
ideas in an original way. The themes of the Benjamin Major derive mostly from
Hughs works such as Didascalicon, De archa Noe, De unione corporis et spiritus,
and De tribus diebus, which had a special impact on Richards vocabulary and
basic orientation. However, his work is a new synthesis in which the received
terminology of the time is reshaped and reinterpreted.
Richard wrote the Benjamin Major after having finished the Benjamin Minor.
Benjamin Major is a much longer work, and is clearly meant for readers who
are already advanced in their studies and spiritual life.1 The basic idea in
Benjamin Major is to divide contemplation into its various kinds using the
triple series of abilities of the soul that has already been expounded in
BenjaminMinor. These abilities are imagination (imaginatio), reason (ratio),
and understanding (intelligentia). With the help of this triad, Richard con-
structs a theory of contemplation which contains six different kinds (genera)
of contemplation.2 His ambition in Benjamin Major is to analyse these six

1 Dumeige 1952, 169; Chtillon 1988, 615.

2 Richards theory of the six kinds of contemplation derives from the idea of six wings of con-
templation. With the help of these wings, the soul may ascend to the spiritual spheres. The
ultimate source is Isaiahs vision in 6:2, which describes seraphim, each with six wings. With

koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2014|doi 10.1163/9789004279452_006

Imagination In The First Two Kinds Of Contemplation 135

kinds of contemplation in detail. One of his main presuppositions is that the

abilities of the soul may form different combinations of co-operation, a mixing
of various abilities which gives a lot of flexibility to his theory.3 Additionally,
Richard specifies all six kinds of contemplation carefully according to the abili-
ties of the soul as well as the class of objects examined in each particular
contemplation.4
In spite of detailed terminological divisions, Benjamin Major has an appar-
ently practical intention. Richard first and foremost tries to understand the
experience of the spiritual life with the help of the material derived from
the traditions of monastic literature; in addition, the new scholarly trends of
the 1100s can be detected.5 Because he does not use direct quotations from
other texts or references to other authors in Benjamin Major, analysing the text
is demanding, especially finding analogies for the concept of imagination as
expounded in Benjamin Major.
The anthropological models of Benjamin Minor and Major differ from each
other in many ways. While the structure of the soul and its operations are
partly described in the same terms in both works, the terminology and the
context of the concepts of Major also clearly deviate from the solutions of
Minor. At the same time, the concepts will become less definite. Furthermore,
in Benjamin Major Richard examines the significance of the imagination
more extensively than in Benjamin Minor. The imagination is dealt with in the
first three of the six kinds of contemplation and does not disappear com-
pletely even after this. The examination of the affective part of the soul is
largely missing from Major, which is surprising since in Minor the affective
part is one of the two dominant powers of the soul. The reason for this is that
Richard limits himself here to considering the purification of the soul with
respect to its intellectual abilities so that he does not really need to address
questions which apply to its affective part. For instance, the theme of repel-
ling sinful thoughts which is dealt with in Minor is almost absent, apparently

two wings they covered their faces, with two they covered their feet, and flew with the
remaining two. The idea of six wings of contemplation occurs frequently in the medieval
texts. Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagites analysis of a seraph is especially significant in this
respect. For this tradition, see Chases introduction to this notion and the collection of medi-
eval texts in Chase 2002. Chase also notes that in the medieval texts cherubim and seraphim
are repeatedly misconstrued and confused compared to Pseudo-Dionysiuss description of
angels. Chase 2002, 124.
3 BMAJ I, IX, p. 1617.
4 For the synopsis of the six kinds of contemplation and the faculties of soul related to them,
see BMAJ I, VI, p. 1214.
5 For the new trends, see Chapter 2.3.
136 Chapter 5

because of the concentration on the higher parts of the soul, which is not the
usual initiator of the sinful motions in the soul. In his De exterminatione,
Richard writes that the affections pave the way for the Ark of the tabernacle,
thus intimating that the affections should be moderated and controlled after
which the Ark may be constructed. First come affections, then intellection.
The extended analyses of various affections come first in Benjamin Minor,
which is for beginners, whereas Benjamin Major is dedicated to the intellec-
tual parts of the soul.6
Benjamin Major is divided into five books and these into several subsec-
tions. The first book is a kind of a summary of the whole treatise and at the
same time an introduction to its subject matter. Richard himself states that the
first book has been written for busy people who perhaps prefer some kind of
general view of the contents of the whole.7 In the remaining four books, more
exact and longer analyses dealing with the separate kinds of contemplation
and their sub-categories follow.8 Furthermore, Richard adds an appendix in
which he deals with some particular notions from the point of view of biblical
interpretation. The appendix contains many points which supplement the
textof Major.9

6 De exterminatione mali et promotione boni, pl 196, 1091B: Praecedat arcam affectionum

turba, ut turbam subsequatur contemplationis arca. The distinction between affections and
intellection is not clear, since, as noted in Benjamin Minor, the intellectual part of the soul
seems to contain some kinds of affect as well. See Chapter 4.3.
7 BMAJ I, XII, p. 21.2729: Occupatis ista compendiosa brevitate succinximus, otiosis autem
eadem repetendo latius replicamus, simul utrumque praecaventes et festinos viatores contra
propositum detinere et curiosos novitatum exploratores contra votum urgere. Richard notes
that the treatise is meant for people at leisure. The sacred leisure (sacra otiosus) is an atten-
tive and listening attitude to life, slow and continuous realization of divine perfection. For
the idea of leisure in monastic life and reading, see Pranger 2003, 712. Richard points out
that he himself is otiosus and speaks primarily to those who are otiosi as well. BMAJ I, XII,
p. 21.2122: Sed otiosi sumus et otiosis loquimur. Richard also warns against seeking for
novelties. He does not explain who the busy people (occupati) might be, but this short com-
ment reveals that Richard thought his work might have a larger audience among the intel-
lectuals of the time.
8 Underhill puts it accordingly: Richard had the medieval passion for elaborate allegory,
neat arrangement, rigid classification and significant numbers of things. these writers
divide and subdivide the stages of contemplation, the states of the soul, the degrees of
Divine love: and performed terrible tours de force in the course of compelling all the living
spontaneous and ever-variable expressions of mans spiritual vitality to fall into orderly and
parallel series, conformable to the mystic numbers of Seven, Four, and Three. Underhill
1930, 459.
9 Nonnullae allegoriae tabernaculi foederis, pl 196, 191D202B.
Imagination In The First Two Kinds Of Contemplation 137

5.2 Three Ways of Knowing: Cogitation, Meditation, Contemplation

In this subsection, I will analyse Richards idea of three ways of knowing, which
are cogitation, meditation, and contemplation. These three ways are further
linked to imagination, reason and understanding, the three abilities of the
soul. The source of his inspiration is clearly Hugh of St. Victor. At the beginning
of Benjamin Majors first book, Richard expounds Hughs idea of cogitation,
meditation, and contemplation in detail, basing his own ideas of the souls
ways of knowing on this same series. However, he devises a new version of the
tripartite system which partly conflicts with Hughs original scheme. Richards
most obvious change to Hughs model is the linking of the abilities of the soul
and the three ways of knowing.
According to the well-known definition by Hugh of St. Victor, one can exam-
ine various objects in three different ways; by cogitating (cogitatio), meditating
(meditatio), or contemplating (contemplatio). Hugh calls these forms of visions
(visiones) which may be utilized by the rational soul. In cogitation, the mind is
touched in passing by the notions of things when the thing itself is presented
by its image to the soul. This image may arise either from the senses or from
memory. Meditation, next, is hard-working and sagacious reconsideration of
thoughts (cogitationes). Meditation tries to reveal complicated things and
scrutinize obscurities. However, contemplation is the souls free and clear-
sighted gaze (contuitus), which spreads out everywhere in perceiving things
which can be grasped.10 Hugh describes the ascent of the soul towards God as
a tripartite movement in which the soul is purified and moves toward immedi-
ate vision. Hughs presentation can also be seen as a mystics way of describing
an epistemological process which approaches conceptual abstractions from
sense perception.

10 In Salomonis Ecclesiasten homiliae, pl 175, 116D117A: Tres sunt animae rationalis visio-
nes, cogitatio, meditatio, contemplatio. Cogitatio est, cum mens notione rerum transito-
rie tangitur cum ipsa res, sua imagine animo subito praesentatur, vel per sensum
ingrediens, vel a memoria exsurgens. Meditatio est assidua et sagax retractatio cogitatio-
nis, aliquid, vel involutum explicare nitens, vel scrutans penetrare occultum.
Contemplatio est perspicax, et liber animi contuitus in res perspiciendas usquequaque
diffusus. Hugh also employs this cogitatio-meditatio-contemplatio trilogy in his Libellus
de formatione arche IV, 5859 and De Archa Noe Morali IV, IX, p. 138140. For Hughs idea
of meditative practices, and the differences between the three rational visions, see
Coolman 2010, 163167. Hughs idea of cogitation-meditation-contemplation was influ-
ential in later medieval and early modern philosophy. Hughs and Richards terms intui-
tus and contuitus can be taken as technical terms for seeing unities through the
multiplicity of evidence.
138 Chapter 5

As in Hughs scheme, Richard begins by stating that the human being can
know (scire)11 things in three different ways, each directed to the same object,
but approaching its goal in its own distinctive way. When one varies the proce-
dure, the perspective on the object changes too. Similarly, the ability of the
soul alternates. Richard writes:

We can look at one and the same subject matter in one way by means of
cogitation (per cogitationem intuemur); we examine it in another way by
means of meditation (per meditationem rimamur), and we admire it another
way by means of contemplation (per contemplationem miramur).12

Moreover, he adds that cogitation is the operation of imagination (ex imagina-

tione cogitatio), meditation is the operation of reason (ex ratione meditatio),
and contemplation is the operation of understanding (ex intelligentia contem-
platio).13 The definitions of meditation and cogitation are concise in Benjamin
Major, since Richard is mainly interested in analysing contemplation, to which
he has dedicated the whole treatise.
Even though the three modes of knowing differ in many respects from each
other, one can use all of them to examine any given subject matter.14 The first
and lowest level of knowing is cogitation (cogitatio). When the soul uses the
cogitation mode it is wandering to and fro (passim huc illucque vagatur). Thus

11 Richard uses the Latin verb scire in a broad sense. In the third book of Benjamin Major, he
distinguishes three spiritual goods. These are the human beings fundamental abilities to
exist, to know (scire), and to will. BMAJ III, XIII, p. 70.56: Ex ipsa creationis suae condi-
tione naturale est omni rationali creaturae esse, scire, velle. Later Richard notes that scire
refers to those things that are used for knowing and lead to an increase in knowledge. As
an example of the components of gaining knowledge (scientia), Richard mentions
cogitation, imagination, ingenium, discretion, memory, and understanding. BMAJ III, XXI,
p.79.1417: In secundo huius contemplationis gradu considerantur illa, quae ad cognitio-
nem sunt vel veritatis studio deservire possunt et quaecumque in augmenta scientiae
concurrunt atque conducunt.
12 BMAJ I, III, p. 8.1315: Sciendum itaque est quod unam eandemque materiam aliter per
cogitationem intuemur, aliter per meditationem rimamur, atque aliter per contemplatio-
nem miramur. In Benjamin Minor Richard defines meditation and contemplation as the
acts of reason (ratio). Rachel (ratio) gives birth to Joseph and Benjamin; meditation refers
to Joseph and contemplation to Benjamin. BMIN LXXXVII, p. 344.1113.
13 BMAJ I, III, p. 8.2526: Ex imaginatione cogitatio, ex ratione meditatio, ex intelligentia
contemplatio.
14 BMAJ I, III, p. 8.1518: Multum a se invicem haec tria in modo differunt, quamvis quan-
doque in materia conveniunt. De una siquidem eademque materia, aliter cogitatio, aliter
meditatio, longeque aliter agit contemplatio.
Imagination In The First Two Kinds Of Contemplation 139

cogitation does not seem to lead anywhere; it is inconsistent, random, and a

winding operation of the soul.15 Richard writes that the soul creeps carelessly
when it uses this lowest way of knowing and moves from one thing to other
in unstable wandering (vago motu). It stops to look at all kinds of things,
including the improper and frivolous. Because discretion does not prevent
the progress of cogitation, the soul rushes headlong into everything.16 This
description of cogitation in Benjamin Major resembles bestial imagination
(imaginatio bestialis), which Richard analyses in Benjamin Minor, in many
respects.17 In both bestial imagination and cogitation, the soul does not
labour and does not comprehend anything (Cogitatio est sine labore et
fructu).18 Despite the fact that in Benjamin Major Richard describes cogita-
tion dismissively, it still is said to be one of the ways of knowing (scire) and
may thus be considered as a kind of pre-intellectual activity.19 In the third
book of Benjamin Major, he lists the epistemological instruments of the soul,
stating that cogitation is one of the activities which are meant to increase
human knowledge.20
In the last passages of Benjamin Major, Richard illustrates the operation of
cogitation in the following way. First, he notes that we see in exterior things
what we should think about interior things. He then equates cogitation with
water, which always moves to the lowest place if it is not held back by some
barrier. However, water that has been collected in a vase represents cogitation
which is intended for meditation, and is thus fixed. Furthermore, as water
reflects the light, cogitation is connected with higher forms of knowledge

15 BMAJ I, III, p. 8.1819, 21: Cogitatio per devia quaeque lento pede, sine respectu perventio-
nis, passim huc illucque vagatur. Cogitatio serpit.
16 BMAJ I, IV, p. 9.3132: Cogitatio autem est improvidus animi respectus ad evagationem
pronus. BMAJ I, IV, p. 10.13: Sed in hoc sane solent maxime a cogitatione differre, quae se
singulis paene momentis consuevit ad inepta et frivola relaxare et sine ullo discretionis
freno ad omnia se ingerere vel praecipitem dare. BMAJ I, III, p. 9.7: Cogitatio semper vago
motu de uno ad aliud transit.
17 BMIN XVI, p. 130.58: Bestialis itaque imaginatio est, quando per ea quae paulo ante uidi-
mus uel fecimus, sine ulla utilitate, absque omni deliberatione huc illucque uaga mente
discurrimus. Haec utique bestialis est, nam et hoc bestia facere potest.
18 BMAJ I, III, p. 8.23.
19 Sepper notes that Richards term cogitatio can be understood as including components of
the function of vis cogitativa in moving from mere registration of things to minor judge-
ments on them. Sepper 1996, 258.
20 Beside cogitation, Richard mentions imagination, ingenium, discretion, memory,
and understanding. BMAJ III, XXI, p. 79.1426. For further analysis of this passage, see
Section7.3.
140 Chapter 5

which it resonates. However, this kind of reflection of higher knowledge in

cogitation is possible only at the ecstatic level of contemplation.21
Hugh of St. Victor interestingly states that cogitation occurs when the ideas
of things (notiones) superficially touch the mind. This happens when the soul
uses images that have been obtained both from the senses and recollection.22
Since Hugh connects particular images with the method of thinking, it is easy
for Richard to state that cogitation is the operation of imagination (ex imagi-
natione cogitatio). According to Richard, the basic tasks of imagination after all
include the creating, directing, and reconstructing of images.23 Nevertheless,
cogitatio is usually translated as thinking or thought, which is slightly mislead-
ing. This translation fails to reflect the role of images and imagination in this
operation of the soul.24
The second mode of knowing is meditation (meditatio), which is more sub-
lime than cogitation (cogitatio). In Richards model, meditation differs from
cogitation in that when the soul is meditating, it presses itself forward with
great activity, labours energetically and thus achieves results (in meditatione
est labor cum fructu). Meditation is an operation which is characteristic of
reason (ex ratione meditatio). In meditation, the soul studies an object by

21 BMAJ V, XI, p. 135.1718, 2932: Videmus in rebus exterioribus, quid de rebus interioribus
aestimare debemus. Quid est aqua, nisi cogitatio humana, quae semper ad inferiora
labitur, nisi sub districtionis magnae moderamine cohibeatur? Aqua in vase collecta,
cogitatio meditatione intenta et per intentionem defixa. Aquae collectio, cordis
meditatio.
22 In Salomonis Ecclesiasten homiliae, pl 175, 116D117A.
23 See, for example, BMIN XVI, p. 132.910 and BMAJ III, I, p. 55.1517.
24 The vocabulary is not definite, since medieval writers used the word cogitatio for the pro-
cess of thinking, having a thought, and the thought itself. For the interpretations of cogi-
tatio in the twelfth century, see Javelet 1967, II, 175176. According to Watson, the notions
of cogitation (cogitatio) and imagination (imaginatio) are interrelated. When the Greek
texts were translated into Latin, cogitatio was often used as the Latin equivalent for the
Greek phantasia. In this case, the emphasis is on the process of fantasizing. The results of
the fantasy, however, are often called visions or images (visiones, imagines). Cicero in par-
ticular established the terminology. See Summers 1987, 198200 and Watson 1988a, 231
232. Carruthers points out that the single thought, cogitatio, is like a small-scale
composition, which brings together various memory images. Carruthers 2001, 3940.
However, the most familiar source for the Victorines is probably the works of Augustine,
in which cogitatio mainly means the visualization of memories. See Confessiones 10.11.18.
and De Trinitate 15.10.19. For the idea of cogitatio in Benjamin Minor, see Section4.4. In
Benjamin Minor, Richard focuses on analysing the notion of cogitatio in an ethical frame-
work, such as the process of consenting to sin.
Imagination In The First Two Kinds Of Contemplation 141

analysing its properties in a concentrated and attentive manner. Meditation

endeavours to operate usefully and seeks wisdom, knowledge, and truth.25
Hugh of St. Victor considers that cogitation and meditation are closely
related. Meditation, he writes, is a kind of frequent cogitation, which aims at
exploring the mode, cause, and reason for everything.26 Richard defines the
connection between cogitation and meditation similarly, writing that while
the soul is occupied in wandering thoughts, it may encounter something it
wishes to know better and start to pursue that object more particularly. In this
process, the mind desires to inquire into the object by cogitating. However, by
using cogitation the mind may move beyond it and pass into meditation.27
Thus cogitation provides some premilinary knowledge of the world and its
objects, which enables the mind to focus on specific objects and continue to
investigate them more thoroughly in meditation.
The third mode of approaching objects is contemplation, which Richard
describes as free flight (contemplatio libero volatu) in which the knowledge is
attained without labour (sine labore cum fructu). Moreover, contemplation is
defined as the operation of understanding (intelligentia).28 In conclusion,

25 BMAJ I, III, p. 8.1920: Meditatio per ardua saepe et aspera ad directionis finem cum
magna animi industria nititur. BMAJ I, IV, p. 9.2831: Meditatio vero est studiosa mentis
intentio circa aliquid investigandum diligenter insistens vel sic: Meditatio est providus
animi obtutus in veritatis inquisitione vehementer occupatus. BMAJ I, IV, p. 9.34p. 10.1,
68: Commune est autem tam contemplationi quam meditationi circa utilia occupari et
in sapientiae vel scientiae studiis maxime immo assidue versari. meditatio(ne), cuius
studium est semper quovis industriae labore, qualibet animi difficultate ardua quaeque
apprehendere, obstrusa irrumpere, occulta penetrare. Cf. De exterminatione mali et pro-
motione boni, pl 196, 1102C: Meditationis est perscrutari occulta, contemplationis est
admirari perspicua. Siquidem meditatio est occultae veritatis studiosa investigatio.
Contemplatio est perspicuae veritatis jucunda admiratio.
26 De meditatione, p. 44.13: Meditatio est frequens cogitatio modum et causam et rationem
uniuscuisque rei investigans. Modum: quid sit. Causam: quare sit. Rationem: quomodo sit. Cf.
De contemplatione et ejus speciebus, p. 41.1012: Meditatio est cogitatio in consilio frequens,
que causam et originem, modum et utilitatem uniuscuisque rei prudenter inuestigat.
27 BMAJ I, IV, p. 10.811: Fit tamen saepe ut in cogitationum nostrarum evagatione tale aliq-
uid animus incurrat, quod scire vehementer ambiat fortiterque insistat. Sed dum mens
desiderio suo satisfaciens eiusmodi inquisitione studium impendit, iam cogitationis
modum cogitando excedit et cogitatio in meditationem transit.
28 BMAJ I, III, p. 8.2326: Cogitatio est sine labore et fructu. In meditatione est labor cum
fructu. Contemplatio permanet sine labore cum fructu. In cogitatione evagatio, in medi-
tatione investigatio, in contemplatione admiratio. Ex imaginatione cogitatio, ex ratione
meditatio, ex intelligentia contemplatio. Note the characteristic movements of each way
142 Chapter 5

heconnects the three ways of knowing and the three abilities of the soul. These
three cognitive activities of cogitation, meditation, and contemplation are not
fully differentiated from each other because the higher operation of the soul
can always utilize its lower functions. Everything that is subject to the lower
sense is also necessarily subject to the higher.29 Here Richard follows the
notion already discussed by Boethius, who claims that all the higher abilities
of the soul are always able to utilize the information produced by its lower
abilities, but the reverse is not true.30 Meditation thus utilizes cogitation, and
contemplation both cogitation and meditation.
As Richard points out, the difference between the three ways of knowing
lies in the mode (in modo) and intensity of activity required by the soul rather
that what (in materia) it perceives.31 The shared characteristic of the essence of
these three ways of knowing is that they are a kind of sight of the soul (aspectus
animi).32 When nothing is observed by the soul, none of these ways of knowing
can be said to operate. The individual can vary the way of knowing in use and
simultaneously change the perspective on the object.33 Thus, when directed at
some object, the soul may operate in the three ways, as outlined above.34

of knowing, that is, evagatio, investigatio, and admiratio. This triad shows how Richard
sees the modes of knowing as a dynamic process by which the mind advances from wan-
dering movement to investigation, and finally achieves admiration.
29 BMAJ I, III, p. 8.2830: Omnia quae subiacent sensui inferiori, necesse est ea etiam subia-
cere sensui superiori. Sed non aeque ea, quae subiacent sensui superiori, necesse est
etiam subiacere sensui inferiori.
30 Cf. Consolatio Philosophiae V, p. 4: In quo illud maxime considerandum est: Nam superior
comprehendendi uis amplectitur inferiorem, inferior uero ad superiorem nullo modo
consurgit. See Chapter 2.2.
31 BMAJ I, III, p. 8.1516: Multum a se invicem haec tria in modo differunt, quamvis quan-
doque in materia conveniunt.
32 The notion of aspectus animi derives from Augustine, who considers it as the gaze of the
rational soul, a capacity to see something up close. In De immortalitate animae 6.10. Augustine
writes that aspectus animi is the minds sight, by means of which it sees the truth directly and
not through the body. For Augustines definition of reason and aspectus animi, see ODaly
1987, 187. Richards account of aspectus animi seems to be broader than Augustines. Richards
text suggests the likelihood that the human being has some contact with external objects,
res. However, Richard dismisses the question here of whether the exterior senses produce
some material for the soul, and focuses solely on the inner operations of the soul.
33 BMAJ I, IV, p. 9.3234.
34 BMAJ I, III, p. 9.46: Et licet saepe eandem rem, alius per cogitationem, alius per medita-
tionem, alius per contemplationem occupetur. All six kinds of contemplation likewise
can fix their focus on observation of the same object. This object can, in principle, be any
given thing, res. BMAJ I, V, p. 11.2124: Tunc autem in uno eodemque loco considerationis
Imagination In The First Two Kinds Of Contemplation 143

Richard compares these cognitive activities of the soul, claiming that a shared
characteristic of contemplation and cogitating is that they move about here
and there by a kind of free motion and according to a spontaneous command
(spontaneus nutus) which no obstacles hinder.35 Unfortunately he is quite
brief with regard to the cognitive activities and abilities of the soul.

5.3 Richards Idea of Contemplation

Richards use and understanding of contemplation has been regarded as inter-

esting, but hard to define.36 He offers two different definitions of contempla-
tion in Benjamin Major. First, he writes that contemplation is the free and clear
sight of the mind concerning the manifestations of wisdom, supported by
admiration (contemplatio est libera mentis perspicacia in sapientiae spectacula
cum admiratione suspensa).37 Second, Richard quotes Hugh of St. Victors text,
arguing that contemplation is the souls free and clear-sighted gaze (contuitus),
which spreads out everywhere in perceiving things which can be grasped.38
Following these definitions, Richard adds that contemplation is capable
ofreaching out to innumerable things, because understanding (intelligentia)
is able to utilize all the acheivements of the other abilities of the soul.
Contemplation pierces the object so that it is comprehensively grasped.
Expanding itself, a ray of contemplation illuminates everything.39 Richard

nostrae defixio quasi immobilis sistitur, quando in qualiscumque rei esse vel proprietate
perspicienda atque miranda contemplantis intentio libenter immoratur.
35 BMAJ I, IV, p. 10.36: Commune vero est contemplationi et cogitationi libero quodam
motu et secundum spontaneum nutum huc illucque circumferri et nullo difficultatis
obstaculo a discursionis suae impetu praepediri.
36 There have been some attempts to define Richards theory of contemplation. See, for
instance, Den Bok 1996, 120124; Coulter 2006, 126139. Coulter claims that Richard has at
least three general variations on the notion of contemplatio. Contemplation is: 1. the con-
templative life, where leisure becomes dominant; 2. a kind of mental activity separate
from cogitation and meditation; 3. a kind of vision separated from speculation, which is
the effect of mental activity/grace. See also Barons illuminating analysis of Hughs notion
of contemplation, which roughly corresponds to Richards theory. See Baron 1954, 97.
37 BMAJ I, IV, p. 9.2526: Contemplatio est libera mentis perspicacia in sapientiae spectac-
ula cum admiratione suspensa. Cf. Nonnullae allegoriae tabernaculi foederis, pl 196, 193B.
38 BMAJ I, IV, p. 9.2728: Contemplatio est perspicax et liber animi contuitus in res perspicien-
das usquequaque diffusus. Cf. Hughs In Salomonis Ecclesiasten homiliae, pl 175, 116C117A.
39 BMAJ I, III, p. 9.24: Similiter ea, quae imaginatio vel ratio comprehendunt, sub intelli-
gentia cadunt, et ea quae illae comprehendere non possunt. Vide ergo quam late contem-
plationis radius se expandat, qui omnia lustrat.
144 Chapter 5

remarks that since contemplation reviews all kinds of objects, there is nothing
which is worthless as an object of analysis by contemplation.40 Even though in
Benjamin Majors first book Richard defines three different cognitive activities
and connects three abilities of soul with them, he nevertheless leaves this
model almost at once and proceeds to deliberate on the activity of contempla-
tion exclusively.
In Benjamin Major, Richard divides contemplation into six different kinds
(genera) which furthermore include several subspecies.41 These six kinds of
contemplation are classified using the souls three abilities of imagination, rea-
son, and understanding and their combinations. This is remarkable, because
he has just stated that cogitation is the operation of imagination (imaginatio),
meditation the activity of reason (ratio), and contemplation the operation of
understanding (intelligentia). He claims, however, that the first kind of con-
templation is employed in imagination and is formed according to the imagi-
nation (contemplatio in imaginatione secundum imaginationem formatur).
Even though contemplation is said to be the operation of understanding, both
the imagination and reason have independent and necessary roles in the lower
forms of contemplation. As Richard puts it, understanding is present primarily
in the first three kinds of contemplation through the mediation of imagination
and reason and uses them as its instruments.42 He also mentions from time to
time that contemplation cannot exist at all without a certain liveliness of
understanding (vivacitas intelligentiae). This means that the upper, intellectual

40 BMAJ I, III, p. 9.1719: Haec propter illos dicta sunt, qui ista inferiora sub intelligentiae
aspectum cadere vel ad contemplationem usquequaque pertinere, indignum ducunt.
Some researchers have criticized Richards definitions of contemplation, arguing that
they are by nature too general. His idea of contemplation has also been adjudged too
intellectual, because in the text the significance of mercy and love does not appear dis-
tinctly. Longre 1997, 51. For an analysis of Hughs notion of contemplation, see Baron,
according to whom Hugh occasionally uses the concept of contemplation in its broad
etymological significance, in which case it simply means the examination of an object.
For the list of text sections in which the concept of contemplatio occurs, see Baron 1957,
192193.
41 Richard uses also the term species for the various kinds of contemplation. See the BMAJ II,
VIII, p. 29.27: Qui igitur ad secundum huius contemplationis speciem iam profecit For
the Platonist background of Richards sixfold model of contemplation, see Robilliards
brief article, 1939, 229233.
42 BMAJ I, VI, p. 14.13: Nam licet illis prioribus contemplationum generibus videatur non
deesse, nusquam tamen inest paene nisi mediante ratione seu etiam imaginatione. Illic
quasi instrumento utitur et velut per speciem contemplatur. Coulter notes that neither
imagination nor reason is responsible for the contemplative mental act. This kind of
mental vision is always the product of understanding. Coulter 2006, 138139.
Imagination In The First Two Kinds Of Contemplation 145

part of the soul is activated. Understanding (intelligentia) obviously illumi-

nates, i.e., enlightens, the lower abilities of the soul, in which case they can act
more appropriately in contemplation.43
It is typical of Richard to include admiration or astonishment (admiratio) as
a constitutive element of contemplation.44 Indeed, he utilizes this notion sep-
arately in connection with all six kinds of contemplation.45 The heavy empha-
sis on the idea of admiration derives from Hugh. In his In Salomonis Ecclestiasten
Homilie, Hugh enumerates three different kinds of mental vision which are
meditation, admiration, and contemplation. Admiration is a lower type of
contemplation which consists of venerating various kinds of things.46 In his De
tribus diebus, Hugh gives lengthy expositions of various visible creatures and
their qualities, which should be first wondered about and then the higher steps
of contemplation proceeded to.47 In his De meditatione, he explains that admi-
ration is a kind of disposition that generates questioning, which in turn leads
to investigation of things.48 Richard seems to emphasize the importance of
admiration even more than Hugh does. He writes in his Mysticae adnotationes

43 BMAJ I, III, p. 9.1112: Nunquam enim contemplatio potest esse sine quadam vivacitate
intelligentiae. See also BMAJ II, V, p. 27.910. The theory of illumination comes out more
clearly in De exterminatione mali et promotione boni than in Benjamin Major. In De exter-
minatione et promotione boni, contemplation is described throughout as illumined. pl
196, 1102D. The idea of liveliness of understanding (vivacitas intelligentiae) in contempla-
tion is employed by Hugh in his In Salomonis Ecclesiasten homiliae, pl 175, 117A:
Contemplatio est vivacitas illa intelligentiae quae cuncta in palam habens, manifesta
visione comprehendit. In Didascalicon, Hugh writes that the liveliness (vivacitas) of rea-
son is useful in mathematics. Didascalicon II, XVII, p. 36.5 (758B).
44 For a brief analytical note on admiratio, see Dumeige 1955, 191192. Dumeige claims that
Richard was among the first spiritual writers to note the importance of admiration in
contemplation.
45 See, for instance, BMAJ I, VI, p. 12.28,32; BMAJ III, XVIII, p. 77.6; BMAJ IV, II, p. 87.2526;
BMAJ IV, XII, p. 100.2324.
46 In Salomonis Ecclesiasten homiliae, pl 175, 118B.
47 The internal structure of De tribus diebus has an obvious influence on Richards idea of
the six kinds of contemplation. Hugh analyses various aspects of visible creatures and
their qualities extensively and then proceeds to ponder the invisible things of creation,
finally contemplating the invisible things of God. In Hughs account, wondering about the
various phenomena of created nature has a major role. Hugh discusses, for instance, the
situation, motion, species, and quality of things, as well as the external beauty of animals,
shapes of the earth, times, colours, and figures. For this interesting piece of work, see
Cizewski 1987, 6588; Poirel 2002; Feiss 2011.
48 De meditatione, p. 44.810: In primo admiratio quaestionem generat, quaestio investiga-
tionem, investigatio inventionem. Admiratio est dispositionis, quaestio causae, investiga-
tio rationis.
146 Chapter 5

in Psalmos that admiration and contemplation support each other, in a way

that the quantity of admiration increases from the quality of contemplation.49
Admiration begins when we discern something beyond hope and above expec-
tation. It is also one of the basic factors in the souls ascent to ecstacy.50 Thus
admiration seems to entail some cognitive component, being a kind of stimu-
lus and incentive to the investigation of things.51 Moreover, admiration
includes affective elements as well. For example, John Damascene and
Nemesius of Emesa define admiration as a kind of fear caused by an enormous
impression.52 In Richards thinking, admiration is a kind of intellectual affec-
tion, which significantly promotes understanding.
On the whole, Richards own interest lies in the objects and direction of con-
templation. In addition, he points out three modes (modus) with which each of
the six kinds of contemplation can operate. These are the expansion of the
mind (dilatatio mentis), rising of the mind (sublevatio mentis), and alienation
of the mind (alienatio mentis) which is divided still further into three sub-
categories. In the alienation of the mind, the soul forgets the world and itself.53

49 Mysticae adnotationes in Psalmos, pl 196, 274D: Absque dubio quanto limpidius contem-
platur, tanto vehementius miratur, et quanto amplius miratur, tanto avidius, tanto atten-
tius contemplatur. Crescit itaque quantitas admirationis ex qualitate contemplationis, et
ex vehementia admirandi crescit diligentia contemplandi.
50 BMAJ V, IX, p. 133.1819, 2124: Quis autem nesciat inde fieri admirationem, cum aliquid
cernimus praeter spem et supra aestimationem? Ille igitur mentis excessus, qui ex
admiratione oritur, attende quam convenienter describatur in eo, quod dicituret unde,
quaeso, admiratio, nisi ex inopinato incredibilique spectaculo. BMAJ V, XII, p. 137.1921:
Meditatione profecto assurgitur in contemplationem, contemplatione in admirationem,
admiratione in mentis alienationem.
51 BMAJ V, IX, p. 133.2931: Crescit itaque ex admiratione attentio et ex attentione cognitio.
Mens itaque velut aurora consurgit, quae ex visionis admiratione paulatim ad incrementa
cognitionis proficit. For the notion of admiration in medieval writings, see Bynum 2001,
3775. Bynum claims that admiration is a kind of recognition of the singularity and sig-
nificance of the thing encountered. Medieval theorists understood admiration as some-
thing cognitive, non-appropriative, perspective, and particular.
52 Nemesius Emesa and John Damascene sort the emotion of fear into six different sub-
classes, one of which is admiration (admiratio), i.e., the fear of enormous imagination (or
impression). De fide orthodoxa II, cap. 29 (p. 121122): Dividitur autem et timor in sex
Admiratio est timor ex magna imaginatione. This is a Latin translation of Burgundio of
Pisa. See the Latin translations of both Nemesius and Damascene in Dobler 2002, 91.
53 In the Middle Ages, many theological and philosophical writers considered that alien-
ation of the mind was the appropriate common expression for many serious mental dis-
orders. Thus alienatio mentis could be understood as a comprehensive term for various
Imagination In The First Two Kinds Of Contemplation 147

In every kind of contemplation, the mind can function in all these modes.54
The theory of sixfold contemplation and its three modes had considerable
influence on the theology of spirituality, since Bonaventure (d. 1274) adopted
Richards model of contemplation as a basis for his famous Itinerarium mentis
in Deum.55
Richard presents the following six kinds of contemplation in Benjamin
Major

1. Contemplation in imagination and according to imagination (in imagi-

natione et secundum imaginationem)
2. Contemplation in imagination and according to reason (in imaginatione
et secundum rationem)
3. Contemplation in reason and according to imagination (in ratione et
secundum imaginationem)
4. Contemplation in reason and according to reason (in ratione et secundum
rationem)
5. Contemplation above reason but not beyond reason (supra sed non
praeter rationem, in intelligentiam)
6. Contemplation above reason and beyond reason (supra rationem et
praeter rationem, in intelligentiam)

The scheme of the sixfold division of objects that may be contemplated in the
six kinds of contemplation:

mental anomalies, like the blow of madness, epileptic seizures, and paralyzing fear.
However, many spiritual texts define alienatio mentis as a state of spiritual intoxication or
excess of joy. See the analysis and examples in Newman 2005, 9. According to Richard, in
the alienation of the mind the soul is liquefied and thinned out to the similitude of
smoke. It is completely inebriated by inner sweetness and forgets what it is. BMAJ V, V,
p.129.621.
54 The human mind can function in all three modes in each of the six kinds of contempla-
tion. These modes of contemplation are discussed in the fifth book of Benjamin Major.
See BMAJ V, II, p. 124.1820: Tribus autem modis, ut mihi videtur, contemplationis quali-
tas variatur. Modo enim agitur mentis dilatatione, modo mentis sublevatione, aliquando
autem mentis alienatione. For the three modes of contemplation in Richards texts, see
Chtillon 1940, 326.
55 McGinn 1974, 535552; Javelet 1988, 6396 and Brown 2000, 16. An interesting difference
between the models of Bonaventure and Richard is the role they give to imagination.
Richard analyses the imagination more extensively and values its functioning more than
Bonaventure does.
148 Chapter 5

I sensible objects (sensibilia)

1. Images, forms, and species of visible things
(imagines, formae, species rerum visibilium)
2. Reasons of visible things
(rationes rerum visibilium)

II intelligible objects (intelligibilia)

3. Qualities of invisible things by means of the similitude of visible
things
(qualitates rerum invisibilium per rerum visibilium similitudinem)
4. The invisible things of ourselves and the spirits of celestial souls,
rational principles
(spiritus humani et angelici)

III intellectible objects (intellectibilia)

5. The unity of the highest and simple divine essence, the rational simili-
tudes of ourselves
(natura divina per rationem similitudinis)
6. The persons of the Trinity
(Trinitas)

In the first kind of contemplation, the soul exploits imagination for gazing
at visible objects and the soul wonders at their beauty, while in the second
kind the soul proceeds to seek for the rational principles of the visible
objects in imagination which is directed by reason. In the third kind, imag-
ination helps reason to ascend by means of visible objects to contempla-
tion of invisible objects. The fourth kind is formed only in reason and
according to reason. In this kind, one turns to examine ones own soul. In
the fifth kind of contemplation, the divine nature and its simple essence
are contemplated whereas in sixth kind of contemplation ones attention is
directed to the Holy Trinity. The objects of the sixth kind of contemplation
have a suprarational essence.56
In Richards idea of the six kinds of contemplation, the epistemological
capacities form an ascending hierarchy, which structures this spiritual exer-
cise. Richard also posits an isomorphic relationship between the epistemologi-
cal structure and ontological levels of being. Thus, to begin the study of the six
kinds, he offers a complex consideration of various objects of contemplation.

56 BMAJ I, VI, p. 1214.

Imagination In The First Two Kinds Of Contemplation 149

As shown in the table above, he divides all objects into three classes according
to their relation to reasonableness and sensibility. The first class consists of
sensible objects (sensibilia), which are visible, accessible to the corporeal
senses, and created things. These objects include visible images (imagines, for-
mae, species)57 and rational principles (rationes) of visible things. Sensible
objects can be engaged in the mind by imagination (imaginatio). In the second
class, the objects are created and invisible and thus in the domain of reason
only. Richard defines these objects as intelligible (intelligibilia). Objects in the
third class are unattainable by the senses and reason, consisting of invisible
and uncreated objects, which he calls intellectible (intellectibilia). It is possible
to approach them only with the help of understanding (intelligentia).58
Next Richard proceeds to relate his model of sixfold contemplation to the
division of objects into three classes. As stated above, the first and second
kinds of contemplation direct their attention to sensible objects (sensibilia),
the two middle kinds concern invisible but created things (intelligibilia), and
the two highest kinds of contemplation direct themselves to invisible and

57 In this context, Richard clearly sees these notions as synonyms. In dealing with the first
kind of contemplation more extensively, Richard refers to images in the mind using the
notion of species. See BMAJ II, VII, p. 29. See also Richards description of the first and
second kinds of contemplation in Nonnullae allegoriae tabernaculi foederis, pl 196, 193D:
Rerum visibilium speciem speculamur imaginando, rerum visibilium causas rimamur
ratiocinando. In his Liber exceptionum, Richard defines the species as the visible form
which the bodily eyes may perceive, and which consists of the matter and image. Liber
exceptionum I, II, cap. II, p. 115.2223: Species est forma visibilis que oculo discernitur,
sicut colores et figure corporum. Cf. Hughs De tribus diebus I, p. 4.19; IV, p. 8.80. (812C,
814A). Hugh considers that the beauty of created things consists of four things, these
being the appearance (species), structure, motion, and quality of the thing. Hugh lists the
kinds of admirable species accordingly: great size, smallness, rarity, beauty, oddity, mon-
strosity, etc. De tribus diebus IX, p. 2227 (819A821B). For an interesting analysis of the
concept of species in medieval philosophical terminology, see Michaud-Quantin 1970,
113150. He remarks, for instance, that species may often be considered as objects of inte-
rior senses (imaginatio, memoria) and are occasionally called phantasmata as well
(p.121).
58 BMAJ I, VII, p. 14.2631: Duo itaque ex his in imaginatione consistunt, quia solis sensibili-
bus intendunt. Duo in ratione consistunt, quia solis intelligibilibus insistunt. Duo vero in
intelligentia subsistunt, quia solis intellectibilibus intendunt. Sensibilia dico quaelibet
visibilia et sensu corporeo perceptibilia. Intelligibilia autem dico invisibilia, rationi tamen
comprehensibilia. Intellectibilia hoc loco dico invisibilia, et humanae rationi incompre-
hensibilia. Interestingly, sensibles, the first class of objects, includes rational principles of
visible things, which are the objects of the second kind of contemplation. BMAJ I, VI,
p.13.2832.
150 Chapter 5

uncreated objects (intellectibilia).59 Richards basic idea in this elaborate the-

ory of objects and kinds of contemplation is to explain how the immortal soul
is able to grasp everything within its reach, whether visible or invisible, and
thus can apprehend all kinds of objects. Here he is again following his teacher,
Hugh of St. Victor. Similar understands similarto be able to examine various
kinds of objects is why the human being has various abilities of the soul.60
Richard has adopted Benjamin Majors basic structure of contemplation
mainly from Hughs treatises. However, the substantial impact of Boethius
writings on Hughs works is significantly felt in Richards own thinking.61 First
of all, the classification of the abilities of the soul as imagination (imaginatio),
reason (ratio), and understanding (intelligentia) was taken over from the text
of Consolatio Philosophiae. In addition, the differentiation of the objects of
contemplation into three groups is a variant of Boethius model in In Isagogen
Porphyrii commenta.62 Boethius introduces the idea of three sectors of specu-
lative philosophy, which have been separated according to the objects exam-
ined by them. These objects are natural (naturalia) objects, objects of reason
(intelligibilia), and objects of understanding (intellectibilia).63 It is probable

59 BMAJ I, VII, p. 14.3115.2: Ex his ergo sex contemplationum generibus quattuor inferiora
versantur maxime in rebus creatis. Duo vero suprema in rebus increatis atque divinis.
Item ex his quattuor duo superiora versantur circa invisibilia. Duo vero infima circa visi-
bilia atque corporea. Infima namque duo procul dubio versantur in rebus visibilibus
atque creatis. Duo autem suprema maxime versantur in rebus invisibilibus et increatis.
Duo vero media maxime in rebus invisibilibus atque creatis.
60 In the first book of Didascalicon, Hugh writes that similar things are comprehended by
similar, which is why in order to comprehend things, the rational soul must somehow be
analogically composed of them. Didascalicon I, I, p. 5.45 (742A): Pythagoricum namque
dogma erat similia similibus comprehendi, ut scilicet anima rationalis nisi ex omnibus
composita foret, nullatenus omnia comprehendere posset. On this, see Kleinz 1944,
41,100.
61 For the influence of Boethius epistemological theories on Richards works, see Robilliard
1939; Kleinz 1944, 6675; Brown 2000; Coulter 2006, 64, 7273, 99101, 139. Boethius influ-
ence on the Victorines is substantial, and it has been shown that Hugh was lecturing on
Boethius as part of his teaching. See Coulter 2006, 239. The founder of the monastery of
St. Victor, William of Champeaux, wrote several important commentaries on Boethius
works, as well as on Porphyrys Isagoge, Aristotle, and Cicero. See Mews 2005, 7990.
62 Consolatio Philosophiae V, 4; In Isagogen Porphyrii commenta I.1, p. 8 (11bc).
63 In Isagogen Porphyrii commenta I.1, p. 8.48 (11BC): est igitur theoretices, id est contem
platiuae uel speculatiuae, triplex diuersitas atque ipsa pars philosophiae in tres species
diuiditur. est enim una theoretices pars de intellectibilibus, alia de intellegibilibus, alia de
naturalibus. A similar division is adduced in De contemplatione et ejus speciebus, p. 68.24
69.13. Understanding (intellectus) can examine its objects in three ways; first rising from
Imagination In The First Two Kinds Of Contemplation 151

that Richard has further elaborated his theory of the six kinds of contempla-
tion on the basis of these three classes of objects. This division of contempla-
tion into six kinds gives him the opportunity carefully to analyse the abilities
of the soul and their combinations. As Stephen Brown puts it, Richard postu-
lates the possibility of a certain continuity, interplay, or overlap in the acts of
our knowing powers. The multiplication of the kinds of contemplation beyond
the tripartite division of Boethius seems necessary to cover his more subtle
awareness regarding the acts and powers of contemplation. Brown also notes
that the objects of contemplation at each level reveal something about God:
the sensibilia are vestiges of God, intelligibilia images of God; the intellectibilia
the Divine reality itself.64 Nevertheless, it was not original as such to adapt the
theories of Boethius in the context of the 1100s; for example, the same Boethian
structure can be found in the anonymous De contemplatione et ejus speciebus.65
Isaac of Stella (d. 1167), a contemporary of Richard, also uses a very similar basic
structure in his own works. Still, it has been claimed that the application of the
epistemological theory of Boethius in Richards spiritual theology is a precondi-
tion for one of the most systematic descriptions of contemplation in the 1100s.66
As a conclusion, the three abilities of the soul and the three classes of objects
form the basic structure of six kinds of contemplation. In order to make these
complex classifications more accessible, Richard illustrates the divisions by
way of a very meticulous exposition of the Biblical description of the Ark. Its
various details and the exact measurements are mentioned in the Bible. It is
written in Exodus that the Ark must be built of wood, and the wooden parts
should be gilded. The top of the Ark is encircled by a golden crown. A golden
propitiatory in which there are two golden cherubs wings raised face to face is
placed over the Ark.67

visible objects to invisible, then from the invisible things of the world to the invisible
things of the soul and, eventually, from the invisible things of the soul to the invisible
substances. These three activities consist of three disciplines, which are mathematics,
physics, and theology. In his De Trinitate, Boethius similarly establishes the division of
sciences into three classes.
64 Brown 2000, 5.
65 De contemplatione et ejus speciebus, p. 66.1319: Distat autem inter reuelationem et emis-
sionem et inspirationem. Prima fit cum materia et forma; secunda sine materia cum
forma; tertia sine materia et forma. Prima est realis, secunda spiritualis, tertia intellectua-
lis; uel prima mundana, secunda humana, tertia diuina: uel prima est sensibilis, secunda
intelligibilis, tertia intellectibilis. See Barons comment; Baron 1954, 118n.70.
66 McGinn 1995, 399. Chenu notes that Boethius vocabulary and various definitions intro-
duced a humanistic strain into many spiritual writings. Chenu 1957, 75.
67 Ex 25: 822.
152 Chapter 5

In Benjamin Major, Richard shows how every part and material of the Ark
has its equivalent in the abilities of the soul or their properties. The wooden
parts of the Ark always refer to imagination (imaginatio), the golden parts to
reason (ratio), and the cherubs to understanding (intelligentia). The reader can
compare the differences in the wood, gold, and cherubs in his mind and thus
understand the scale of dignity between the separate abilities of the soul ana-
logically.68 Another visual aid provided by Richard describes the six wings of
contemplation. The first pair of wings is received by the human being consid-
ering earthly and corporeal things in the first and second kinds of contempla-
tion. The second pair of wings is those with which one is able to rise to the
heavenly and invisible things. The last pair is meant for those who are striving
to ascend to the third heaven and the hidden things of divinity.69
As Richard proceeds to analyse the different kinds of contemplation, he
does not examine the abilities of the soul in a scholarly fashion with clear defi-
nitions and classifications; he rather describes the operation of the ability in
question and the objects of its attention. This kind of indirect approach leaves
many alternatives for interpreting the abilities of the soul, such as imagination.
In Benjamin Major, Richard gives up the personification allegory used in
Minor which, while a method easily applied to describing the functions of
the abilities of the soul, at the same time creates more fixed limits to their
activity. However, Benjamin Majors conceptual flexibility and the lack of
clearcut distinctions occasionally lead to seeing the abilities of imagination,
reason, and understanding as special attitudes towards spiritually relevant
objects rather than distinct faculties of the soul with definite tasks in the
epistemic processes.

5.4 The First Kind of Contemplation

Imagination has a central task in the first three kinds of contemplation. In this
section, I examine the first kind of contemplation, which is defined by Richard
as being in imagination and according to imagination only (in imaginatione et
secundum solam imaginationem). He further specifies that it takes place in
imagination and is formed according to imagination (contemplatio in imagina-
tione versatur et secundum imaginationem formatur).70 Richard also uses a par-
allel expression which indicates that the first kind of contemplation stays with

68 BMAJ I, XI, p. 1920.

69 BMAJ I, X, p. 1819. For the imagery of six-winged heavenly creatures, see note 2 above.
70 BMAJ I, VI, p. 12.1314, 18, 2427.
Imagination In The First Two Kinds Of Contemplation 153

the image and roams according to imagination (hoc contemplationis genus in

imagine subsistit vel secundum imaginationem discurrit).71
Richard seems to posit some kind of relationship between the first mode of
knowing, cogitation, and the first kind of contemplation. He states briefly that
in the first kind of contemplation cogitation (cogitatio) is led by admiration
and follows imagination. Richard also mentions that imagination draws cogi-
tation (cogitatio) after it in the first kind of contemplation.72
In the abridgement of Benjamin Majors first book, Richard writes that:

Without doubt, our contemplation is employed (versatur) in imagina-

tion, when the form and image (forma et imago) of the visible things are
brought into our consideration. Then, being amazed, we give attention,
and giving attention we are amazed at these corporeal things that we
draw by means of corporeal sense. How many, how great, how diverse,
how beautiful and joyful these are! In all these things we marvelling ven-
erate and venerating we marvel at the power, wisdom, and generosity of
that creative superessence.73 Thus, our contemplation is employed in
imagination and is formed according to imagination only when we seek
nothing by means of argumentation and investigate nothing by means of
reasoning, but rather our mind runs freely here and there, wherever
admiration moves it in this kind of manifestation.74

71 BMAJ II, VI, p. 28.2426: Quomodo autem hoc contemplationis genus in imagine subsi-
stat vel secundum imaginationem discurrat, superior ratio perdocuit et hic iterare non
oportebit.
72 BMAJ II, XI, p. 33.2425: Nam in prima quidem cogitatio, quo eam ducit admiratio, solam
sequitur imaginationem. BMAJ II, XI, p. 33.3031: Sicut itaque in priori imaginatio post se
cogitationem trahit
73 Note Richards notion of superessence (superessentialis), which derives from John Scotus
Eriugena. In De Trinitate, Richard also uses the expression essentia supersubstantialis, for
example, De Trinitate IV, XVI, p. 178.10. For these terms, see Ribaillier 1958, 24.
74 BMAJ I, VI, p. 12.1828: In imaginatione contemplatio nostra tunc procul dubio versatur,
quando rerum istarum visibilium forma et imago in considerationem adducitur, cum
obstupescentes attendimus et attendentes obstupescimus corporalia ista, quae sensu cor-
poreo haurimus, quam sint multa, quam magna, quam diversa, quam pulchra vel iucunda
et in his omnibus creatricis illius superessentiae potentiam, sapientiam, munificentiam
mirando veneramur et venerando miramur. Tunc autem contemplatio nostra in imagina-
tione versatur et secundum solam imaginationem formatur, quando nihil argumentando
quaerimus vel ratiocinando investigamus, sed libera mens nostra huc illucque discurrit,
quo eam in hoc spectaculorum genere admiratio rapit. Cf. Abelards similar expres
sions in his commentary on Peri hermeneias, Glossae super Periermeneias p. 318.39: Per
imaginationem ergo imaginem rei tantum capimus, unde fortasse imaginatio dicta est ex
154 Chapter 5

Some basic ideas of Richard concerning the operation of imagination in the

first kind of contemplation emerge here. Imagination examines only sensible
things (corporalia), which the soul has received through the bodily senses (sen-
sus corporeus). He calls these sensible objects the form and image of the visible
things (rerum visibilium forma et imago). He further describes how the soul
admires (admirare, mirari) and venerates (venerari) objects examined by the
imagination. Richard repeats this idea at every step of the first kind of contem-
plation. The admiration arises from the consideration (ex consideratione) of
various properties of objects of contemplation.75 Pointing to the notion of con-
sideration suggests that he already sees some cognitive attention towards
objects in the preliminary kinds of contemplation.76 However, the objects of
the first kind of contemplation are not yet the objects of knowledge. Richard
states that argument and reasoning do not belong to the operation of the imag-
ination, since the free (libera) movement of the mind is required in the first
kind of contemplation. However, the marvelling at and veneration for objects

imagine quam capit; per intellectum vero ipsam imaginem, ut dictum est, quibusdam
naturis vel proprietatibus depingimus, quam per imaginationem cepimus et tenemus, ut
imaginatio tantum imaginem teneat confuse quidem quasi obstupescens et admirans et
nil attendens in ea vel definiens sicut facit intellectus.
75 According to Richard, the first kind of contemplation includes seven different stages (gra-
dus). These seven stages can be divided into three groups, the contemplation of things,
works, and morals. All the objects of these stages should be admired. This admiration
arises from consideration of various kinds of objects. See below. BMAJ II, VI, p. 28.1120:
Primus namque consistit in illa admiratione rerum, quae surgit ex consideratione mate-
riae. Secundus autem gradus consistit in illa admiratione rerum, quae surgit ex consider-
atione formae. Tertius vero consistit in illa rerum admiratione, quam gignit consideratio
naturae. Quartus autem huius contemplationis gradus versatur in consideratione et
admiratione operum circa operationem naturae. Quintus nihilominus versatur in consid-
eratione et admiratione operum, sed secundum operationem industriae. Sextus vero gra-
dus constat in considerandis et admirandis institutionis humanis. Septimus demum
subsistit in considerandis et admirandis institutionisbus divinis.
76 At every stage of the first kind of contemplation, Richard repeats the notion of consider-
ation (consideratio). This idea and its close relation to admiration is evident in the higher
kinds of contemplation as well. Cf. Bernard of Clairvauxs book De consideratione, which
differentiates three kinds of consideration. These suggest three different modes of attain-
ing knowledge. The first kind of consideration uses exterior senses and sensible things for
common goods. The second kind is active investigation of things by philosophical meth-
ods. The third kind is an internal process of the soul, by which the estimation of the soul
itself is attended to. In general, Bernard claims that consideration should be regarded as
active in investigation, and the concentration of the intellectual soul pursuing truth. For
an analysis of Bernards idea of consideration, see Evans 2000, 5254.
Imagination In The First Two Kinds Of Contemplation 155

is already directed to Gods power, wisdom, and generosity, which are seen
through created objects.
Comparing this passage with Benjamin Majors first chapters and Benjamin
Minor, one can see that there is some variation in the terminology Richard
uses. In the first kind of contemplation, the mind moves to and fro (libera
mens nostra huc illucque discurrit). This free movement is presented as some-
thing positive. Richards view here is very different from the beginning of
Benjamin Major, in which he analyses the souls three ways of knowing, the
first of these being cogitation (cogitatio). He defines cogitation as the opera-
tion of the imagination and describes how in cogitation the mind goes to and
fro (passim huc illucque vagatur), apprehending its objects poorly if at all.77
This wandering in ones mind is certainly not something desirable.
Furthermore, in Benjamin Minor, Richard writes how the indefinitely wander-
ing imagination can be called animal or bestial imagination (imaginatio bes-
tialis). According to Benjamin Minor, bestial imagination (imaginatio bestialis)
moves to and fro without deliberation and utility (sine ulla utilitate, absque
omni deliberatione, huc illucque vaga mentis discurrit).78 In the Middle Ages,
this negative attitude towards the minds wandering is typical of devotional
texts. However, Richard seems to consider just this kind of wandering of the
mind in the first kind of contemplation as an important and necessary stage
in spiritual life.79
Richard emphasizes that the first kind of contemplation which takes place
in and according to the imagination (in imaginatione secundum imaginatio-
nem formatur) is not some arbitrary movement of the mind. Although the first
kind of contemplation is situated below reason, it is still not irrational and
wholly contrary to reason. He claims that its agreement (consentaneus) with

77 BMAJ I, III, p. 8.1819: Cogitatio per devia quaeque lento pede, sine respectu perventionis,
passim huc illucque vagatur.
78 BMIN XV, p. 130.58: Bestialis itaque imaginatio est, quando per ea quae paulo ante vidi-
mus vel fecimus, sine ulla utilitate, absque omni deliberatione, huc illucque vaga mente
discurrimus. Haec utique bestialis est, nam et hoc bestia facere potest. In Benjamin Major,
Richard sometimes refers to the wandering of the mind as something unfavourable. See,
for instance, BMAJ II, XXV, p. 53.1213: Quid ergo necesse erit alia pro aliis quaerere, et per
vana huc illucque cogitationum evagatione discurrere. BMAJ V, VI, p. 92.1213.
79 As examples of the harmful wandering of the mind (vaga mentis), Cassian mentions the
leaping of the mind between psalms or verses of the Bible. Conlationes X, 13, p. 306.1620:
Cum enim capitulum cuiuslibet psalmi mens nostra conceperit, insensibiliter eo sub-
tracto ad alterius scripturae textum nesciens stupens que deuoluitur. Cumque illud in
semet ipsa coeperit uolutare, necdum illo ad integrum uentilato oborta alterius testimo-
nii memoria meditationem materiae prioris excludit.
156 Chapter 5

rational operation through attention and disposition is apparent.80 How this

kind of rationality is justified is not further elaborated. Obviously, Richard
refers to the idea that understanding pierces all functions of the soul and thus
illuminates the operations of the imagination sufficiently to prevent all irratio-
nal associations.
The first kind of contemplation considers and admires (consideratio, admi-
ratio) corporeal things insofar as these objects are made accessible to the
human soul by the five bodily senses.81 Richard often refers to the first kind of
contemplation as speculatio, which may be translated as to speculate, to look,
or to observe.82 Speculation is an admiring astonishment in the presence of
visible things. According to his description, one may discover something mar-
vellous, laudable, and lovable, even among the lowest of all created things.83
The assignment of the soul is to choose suitable material things as the first
objects of contemplation, after which the soul may begin to construct its
own Ark of understanding from these objects. Human beings are able to
perceive innumerable objects with their senses, which makes the first kind of
contemplation pleasant in that the number of possible objects for contempla-
tion is huge. Richard compares these sensible objects of contemplation to a

80 BMAJ I, IX, p. 17.1116: Non autem hoc primum et infimum contemplationis genus idcirco
infra rationem vel potius ratiocinationem subsistere dicitur quasi irrationabile et omnino
contra rationem esse videatur cum per intentionem seu etiam per dispositionem rationi
consentaneum facile convincatur; sed quod in eo, ut dictum est, quantum ad eius proprie
tatem attinet, nihil ratiocinando colligitur.
81 BMAJ II, I, p. 22.57: Primum itaque contemplationis genus est in consideratione et admi-
ratione rerum corporalium in omnibus eis, quae per quinque sensus corporeos ingredi-
untur ad animum.
82 See, for example, BMAJ II, III, p. 24.30. This terminological variation is caused by Hugh of
St. Victors idea of dividing contemplation into two parts. The lower form of contempla-
tion is directed to visible things and is, by definition, speculatio. However, the higher form
of contemplation is directed to the uncreated divine properties of God. See In Salomonis
Ecclesiasten homiliae, pl 175, 118B. Again, Boethius translates the Greek word theoria as
speculatio when commenting on the Isagoge of Porphyry. Speculatio refers especially to
the aim of distinguishing incorporeal nature from matter in order to attain the pure
forms. See Kleinz 1944, 123; Chadwick 1981, 133. For the distinction between speculation
and contemplation, see also Coulter 2006, 144. Coulter sees these two terms as synony-
mous in Benjamin Major. It is only when Richard proceeds to deal with kinds of vision
which result exclusively from divine initiative, such as alienation of the mind, that con-
templation is differentiated from speculation.
83 BMAJ II, I, 22.2831: Ille vanitatis contemplationem non in vanum assumit, qui ex eo quod
in imo respicit in laudem creatoris assurgit, qui eum in omnibus operibus suis mirabilem,
laudabilem, amabilem reperit.
Imagination In The First Two Kinds Of Contemplation 157

forest in which each individual can choose the matter (timber) which one
admires most.84
There is a slight ambiguity in Richards idea of subject matter (materia) in
his analysis of the first kind of contemplation. The material things which
should be contemplated are images or species of visible things. He also men-
tions the possibility that the objects of the first kind of contemplation might
be true assertions or firm declarations concerning corporal things.85 In his
DeArcha Noe Morali, Hugh of St. Victor speculates that the ark of wisdom is a
mental construct which has been built out of the right kind of thoughts. As he
puts it, the matter is cogitations (cogitationes).86 Richard himself writes that
one must know how to choose such images so as not to end up thinking any-
thing contrary to the teaching of the church. The incitements to pleasure
should also be removed from the view of the consideration.87 Even though the
human soul is free to make its decisions, the authority of the church must be
taken into consideration.88

84 BMAJ II, II, 23.1316: Habet itaque materiam haec contemplatio, ut iam dictum est, omnia,
quae sensus corporeus contingere potest, copiosa sane materia et silva non modica.
Currant omnes, intrent singuli, nemo prohibetur, eligat quisque quod magis miretur.
Superabundant satis cuique materia ad faciendam sibi arcam. In the Neoplatonist tradi-
tion, silva refers to something material in general; see Calcidius commentary on Platos
Timaeus 273, 1516: Necessitatem porro nunc appellat hylen, quam nos Latine siluam
possumus nominare. Cf. Aristotelis silva, which was considered something to be avoided
by some medieval theologians. See de Lubac 1998, 65. In his Apocalypsim, Richard writes
about the thick forest (silva condensa) of allegories; see In Apocalypsim Joannis, pl 196,
701AB. Eco notes that the church fathers described the multiple meanings in Scripture as
a forest or ocean. Eco 1984, 149.
85 See BMAJ II, I, p. 23.49: Pertinet itaque aeque ad ligna Setim, ad ligna imputribilia de
rebus corporeis quaelibet assertio vera, sententia rata. Facienda est itaque haec sapientia
arca de lignis imputribilibus, de sententiis irrefragabilibus, ut sentiamus haec omnia,
quae videntur in mundo facta ab uno Deo et creata ex nihilo, nihil in his omnibus diffini-
entes, quod dissonet a vero.
86 De Archa Noe II, I, p. 33.1920: Habeamus ergo rectas, habeamus utiles et castas cogitatio-
nes, quia de tali materia fabricamus archam nostram. De Archa Noe IV, I, p. 86.69:
Primum designandus est locus in quo edificari oporteat domum Domini, deinde describi-
enda materia. Locus est cor hominis, materia cogitationes munde. For an analysis of
Hughs idea of forming the ark in the mind, see Coolman 2010, 182183, 190.
87 BMAJ II, I, p. 22.2122: Debet ergo a considerationis suae respectu voluptatum irritamenta
amovere, qui cupit de internae incorruptionis perpetuitate gaudere.
88 BMAJ II, II, p. 23.1617: Discat tamen quisque eligere ligna imputribilia, ut nihil sentiat
contra traditionem veram.
158 Chapter 5

Richard divides the object to be examined in the first kind of contemplation

into three main categories, which is typical of him.89 This time, the classifica-
tion is based on the three-dimensionality of the Ark of the Covenant, that is, its
length, width, and height. Richard argues on the basis of three-dimensionality,
because according to him, we should reflect on the nature of exterior things
and then proceed to spiritual things. He writes that in every exterior thing the
bodily thickness begins with length, increases with width, and ends with
height. These dimensions are indications of spiritual understanding.90
The first dimension is concerned with (1) things (res), which in this context
means mainly material objects or at least images which are material. The sec-
ond dimension covers the (2) works (opera) of nature and the human being, to
which the width of the Ark refers. Finally, the third dimension of the first kind
of contemplation is associated with the (3) morals (mores), the inspirer of
which is the height of the Ark.91
The human being should first contemplate objects, then activities and last
morals. Richard justifies this order using geometry: length is naturally prior to
width and width holds a prior place with respect to height. This is how three-
dimensional objects and the inner structure of the objects of contemplation
correspond to each other. In Richards model, the text of the Bible relates to
the laws of geometry. Consequently, he states that consideration which is
with regard to things is naturally prior to the consideration of works and
morals.92

89 This classification is repeated and further analysed from different perspectives in the first
three kinds of contemplation.
90 BMAJ III, XI, p. 69.711.
91 BMAJ II, III, p. 24.3025.2: Haec igitur speculatio triplici ratione consideratur. Prima in
rebus, secunda in operibus, tertia in moribus. Illa, quae est in rebus, pertinet ad arcae
longitudinem. Illa, quae est in operibus, pertinet ad latitudinem. Illa, quae est in moribus,
pertinet ad altitudinem.
92 BMAJ II, III, p. 25.518: Sed altitudo sine latitudine vel latitudo sine longitudine nec valet
esse, nec licet intelligere. Simplex namque longitudo intelligitur, quando quantitas de
puncto ad punctum et per sola puncta discurrens in lineam sola saltem cogitatione pro-
trahitur. Simplicem latitudinem dicimus, quando quantitatem de linea in lineam et per
solas lineas mente distendimus et in superficiem dilatamus Altitudo autem est,
quando quantitas de superficie in superficiem densescit et corpus solidum reddit, quod
tres dimensiones suscipit. Sic sane illa consideratio, quae est in rebus, naturaliter prior
est et illa consideratione, quae in operibus, et illa quae est in moribus. Quis enim nesciat
res ipsas earum operationibus quandoque etiam tempore, semper autem naturaliter
priores esse, ex quibus et in quibus quaelibet operationes habent, nec aliter omnino
existere?
Imagination In The First Two Kinds Of Contemplation 159

Richard then turns to scrutinize the first kind of contemplation in detail,

asserting that the first stage concerns material things (res).93 These can be con-
sidered from three different perspectives.94 The object of contemplation may
be the matter (materia), the form (forma) or the nature (natura) of a thing.
These three elements together compose the corporeal substance of an object:
they cannot be separated from each other. He explains that this is how the
uniform line which represents the length of the Ark is created.95
It is likely that Richard has adopted this kind of division of the properties of
objects from Hugh of St. Victor. Hugh repeatedly separates the properties of
objects into external and internal qualities; the former include the form and
figure (forma, figura), the latter the nature (natura) of an object. He also main-
tains that the sense of sight perceives the exterior qualities of objects and the
other senses distinguish the interior qualities of things.96

93 Hugh writes that things (res) refer to any material objects, either inanimate celestial sub-
stances or terrestrial objects, such as stones, trees, and herbs. De scripturis et scriptoribus
sacris, pl 175, 21AB: Res autem in hoc loco intelligimus in materia quacunque, vel sub-
stantia inanimata coelestium vel terrestrium, constitutas: ut sunt lapides, ligna, herba, et
cetera hujusmodi, quae in elementis vel ex elementis sunt.
94 Coulter analyses Richards notion of thing (res) in an interesting way. Coulter sees things
as pertaining essentially to literal interpretation of the Bible. Thus he deals in succession
with the first three kinds of contemplation as a program of reading the things of the visi-
ble world in the service of scriptural interpretation. See Coulter 2006, 106123. This point
of view offers some valuable insights into Richards ideas, but does not undermine his
epistemological account or theory of perception in general. In order to understand
Richards structure in Benjamin Major, all these perspectives should be taken into
consideration.
95 BMAJ II, IV, p. 25.2930: Tripartitur autem trium illarum consideratio prima. Prima itaque
huius subdivisionis consideratio est in materia, secunda in forma, tertia in natura.
BMAJ II, IV, p. 26.1416: Haec itaque tria, materia scilicet, forma et natura, quia in substan-
tia corporea simul sunt et a se invicem dividi non possunt, se quasi in lineam extendunt
et ad arcae longitudinem se pertinere ostendunt.
96 Hugh specifies qualities as objects of perception. Objects may be known through their
outer form (configuration), or interior nature, which are the proper sensibles of the vari-
ous organs. See De sacramentis 1. prolog 5, pl 176, 185: Cogitatio rerum circa duo versatur,
id est formam et naturam. Forma est in exteriori dispositione; natura in interiori quali-
tate. See also De scripturis et scriptoribus sacris, pl 175, 21BC: Omnis igitur res aut secun-
dum interiorem naturam aut secundum exteriorem formam significat. Sub forma figurae
rerum et colores continentur, quae visu percipimus. Ad interiorem naturam pertinent
alia rerum proprietates, quas caeteris sensibus comprehendimus. Cf. Hughs De tribus die-
bus I, p. 5.2429. (812C813A): Species est forma visibilis, quae oculo discernitur, sicut
colores, et figurae corporum. Qualitas est proprietas interior, quae caeteris sensibus per-
cipitur, ut melos in sono auditu aurium, dulcor in sapore gustu faucium, fragrantia in
160 Chapter 5

Richard writes that since it is easy for the human being to perceive the mat-
ter (materia) and the form (forma) of a thing, one can reliably distinguish a
stone from a tree, or a triangle and square from each other, for example.97
However, he uses the notion of the form in a restricted sense here.98 In this
context, the form is constituted by the external qualities (qualitas extrinseca)
of an object which are colour (color) and figure (figura).99 It is evident in
Richards text that the form of an object is perceived by means of bodily power
(vis corporeus), that is, the sense of sight. However, other bodily senses can be
used to perceive the nature (natura) of an object. The notion of nature refers
here to the inner qualities (qualitas intrinseca) of an object, which Richard
explicitly mentions as being partly perceivable by the exterior senses. Richard
uses sensing flavours by taste and odours by smell as an example of perceiving
the inner qualities of things.100 He adds that the nature (natura) of the object
is truly difficult to contemplate, because it remains partly inaccessible to
human senses. Even in the state of innocence man was not able to completely
perceive the nature of an object without the assistance of reason (ratio).101

odore olfactu narium, lenitas in corpore tactu manuum. The same idea occurs in Hughs
In Salomonis Ecclesiasten homiliae, pl 175, 140AB.
97 BMAJ II, IV, p. 25.3032: Materiam et formam visu corporeo facile deprehendimus. Nam
lapidem a ligno, triangulum a quadrato sine errore discernimus.
98 Richard also uses the word forma more extensively, in which case it refers to the image of
a visible object. In this case, such terms as species and imago may be used as the synonyms
for forma. Concerning the first kind of contemplation, for example, Richard writes that
our imagination is employed (versatur) in imagination, when the form and image (forma
et imago) of the visible things are brought to our consideration. BMAJ I, VI, p. 12.1820: In
imaginatione contemplatio nostra tunc procul dubio versatur, quando rerum istarum
visibilium forma et imago in considerationem adducitur.
99 Cf. De eruditione hominis interioris, pl 196, 1345A: Figura est qualitas extrinseca, exterior
videlicet corporis forma. Liber exceptionum II, X, cap. VIII, p. 391.56: corporalibus rebus
inveniuntur proprietates, sive intus in natura, sive foris in forma.
100 BMAJ II, IV, p. 25.3526.1: Qualitas autem rerum interior ex magna parte corporeo percipitur
sensu, sicut sapores gustu, odores olfactu. BMAJ II, XV, p. 38.9, 1214: Qualitas extrinseca con-
stat in colore et figura. Nota quod extrinseca qualitas pertinet ad solum visum, quemadmo-
dum intrinseca qualitas ad quemlibet ceterorum sensuum. Cf. Liber exceptionum I, II, cap. II,
p. 115.2224: Species est forma visibilis que oculo discernitur, sicut colores et figure corporum.
Qualitas est proprietas interior que ceteris sensibus percipitur. Cf. Hugh of St. Victors De tri-
bus diebus IX, p. 22.328330. (819A): Species est forma visibilis, quae continet duo: figuras et
colores. Species is the form of the visible thing, which consists of figure and colour.
101 BMAJ II, IV, p. 25.3235: Illud autem quod ad naturam pertinet, partim expositum sensui,
partim autem profundis latens repositum erat rationi. Natura siquidem consideratur in
rerum qualitate intrinseca, quemadmodum et forma consistit in qualitate extrinseca.
Imagination In The First Two Kinds Of Contemplation 161

It can be argued from this idea of internal and external qualities, that the
idea of common sense (sensus communis) is excluded from the theories of
both Victorines.102 There is no common meeting-point for the separate sensa-
tions where one united sensation of the object could be formed. Both
Richards and Hughs models emphasize the significance of other senses than
vision. Richard holds that the nature (natura) which consists of the internal
physical properties of the object is a more valuable aspect than the mere
outer form (forma) of the object.103 He does not analyse the relationship
between imagination and other senses than sight. It also remains unclear
whether such terms as forma and species are applicable to other sensations
than sight.
As noted above, the first kind of contemplation is claimed to be in imagi-
nation and formed according to imagination. However, the mind can still
approach the nature of an object which is said to be an internal property
(natura siquidem consideratur in rerum qualitate intrinseca). How can such a
property be perceived using mere imagination? There seems to be a slight
terminological ambiguity in Richards thinking, which is probably inherited
from the writings of Hugh. Neither of the two Victorines understands the
nature of an object merely as an abstract property. However, it can be consid-
ered as a unity formed by four elements, a wholeness which can also be phys-
ically apprehended.104 Richard says clearly that nature is in a corporeal
substance.105 Still, even human reason is unable to grasp the nature of an
object perfectly, as the consequence of sin.106 Indeed, the only way for fallen
man to apprehend the nature of the object is to proceed by means of experi-
ence (experientia). We rather touch its nature through an argument from
experience than see it.107 Richard does not offer a more exact analysis of
nature and its accessibility withhuman abilities. However, Richard mentions
in Benjamin Minor that the technique of translation (translatio) may use the

102 The idea concerning common sense is from Aristotle; see, for example, Frede 1992, 283
284. The notion of common sense was conveyed to the Latin literature of the Middle Ages
via the works of Avicenna; see Harvey 1975, 4344. It is unlikely that these texts were
familiar to the Victorines.
103 This is seen in the fact that this nature is found only with the help of other senses than
vision and the abilities of reason are needed in order to approach the nature of an object.
104 De sacramentis 1, prolog 5. pl 176, 185B. Kleinz 1944, 35.
105 BMAJ II, IV, p. 26.1415: Haec itaque tria, materia scilicet, forma et natura, quia in substan-
tia corporea simul sunt et a se invicem dividi non possunt.
106 BMAJ II, IV, p. 26.35.
107 BMAJ II, IV, p. 26.57: Modo autem ignorantiae tenebris involuti quoties de ea aliquid
quaerimus, per experientiae argumenta palpamus potius quam videmus.
162 Chapter 5

nature of a visible object as a starting-point for the spiritual interpretation

ofthe Bible.108
Having examined the first stage (gradus) of the first kind of contemplation,
Richard proceeds to the second stage. He explains that after the length of the
Ark has been apprehended by analysing the matter, form and nature of an
object, one can move to examine the width of the Ark. The second stage of the
first kind of contemplation is further divided into two parts. The first is con-
cerned with the activities of nature (operatio naturae), while the second is
focused on the contemplation of the artificial activities of man (opera artificia-
lia), a dichotomy deriving from Hugh of St. Victors Didascalicon.109 The activi-
ties of nature refer to such things as grass, trees and animals: how they grow
and mature, bud, blossom and bear fruit, how they conceive, give birth, grow
and die.110 The pleasure caused by examining the rhythm and regularity of
nature becomes clear in Richards text. The beauty lies in natures movement
(motus), as Hugh puts it in his De tribus diebus.111 Although wondering about

108 BMIN XXII, p. 150.3941: Solet namque cognitam quamlibet rerum uisibilium naturam
conuertere ad spiritualem intelligentiam.
109 In Didascalicon Hugh separates three different kinds of works (opera). Didascalicon I, IX,
p. 16.711 (747C): Sunt etenim tria opera, id est, opus Dei, opus naturae, opus artificis
imitantis naturam. opus Dei est, quod non erat creare. unde illud: In principio creavit
Deus caelum et terram. opus naturae, quod latuit ad actum producere. opus artificis est
disgregata coniungere vel coniuncta segregare. Taylor notes that Hughs scheme is
adapted from Chalcidius commentary on the Timaeus, but Hugh makes radical changes
in the meaning of his source. Taylor 1961, 190n.59. Cf. In Salomonis Ecclesiasten homiliae
where Hugh presents a fourfold division of works. pl 175, 215C: Primum est opus Dei,
secundum est opus naturae; tertium est opus artificis cum natura; quartum est opus
solius artificis sine natura. Richard also deals with the notions of operatio naturae and
industria in BMAJ II, XIV, p. 37.711; De Trinitate I, VII, 92, and in Nonnullae allegoriae tab-
ernaculi foederis, pl 196, 194C.
110 BMAJ II, V, p. 26.2329: Operationem naturae facile deprehendere possumus ut in gramini-
bus, arboribus, animalibus: in graminibus quomodo crescunt, maturescunt; in arboribus
similiter quod frondent, florent, fructificant; in animalibus quomodo concipiunt et pari-
unt, quod alia nascuntur et alia moriuntur. Denique quoties attendimus quomodo omnia
orta occidunt et aucta senescunt, in naturalis operationis inspectione mentem nostram
exercemus. The same idea appears in Liber exceptionum II, X, cap. XIII, p. 401.29.
111 De tribus diebus VIII, p. 21.311315 (818D): Quid eciam de motu naturali dicam? Quis putas
nascentibus cunctis incrementum tribuit, et quasi de quodam occulto naturae sinu in
apertum germinantia educit, rursumque eadem marcentia illuc unde ueberat reuerti
facit? Satis haec diligenter intuentibus mirabilia apparebunt. Hugh suggests that the
movement may be divided into four different classes: local, natural, animal, and rational
movement.
Imagination In The First Two Kinds Of Contemplation 163

natural phenomena is easy and pleasant for the human being, he is unable to
understand them perfectly. Richard points out that it is usually easy to know
what fruit is borne on a given plant. However, it is impossible for the human
being to know why just this happens.112
The functions which constitute human activities (opera artificialia) can be
grasped by the first kind of contemplation without difficulty. According to
Richard, the artificial activities are those in which man imitates the operations
of nature. He mentions specially engraving, painting, writing, and agriculture
as examples of such works.113 Richard claims that there is a kind of mutual aid
between natural and artificial activities, which collaborate with each other and
are thus united in mutual conjunction. The activities of human industry (opus
industriae) have their beginning in natural activities, which make progress
with the support given by artificial activity.114
When Richard refers to artificial activity, he obviously has in mind the
mechanical sciences,115 which he investigates in more detail in his Liber excep-
tionum, where he explains how the activities of man have come into existence
by imitating the activities of nature. Nevertheless, the human being can
improve the operations of the nature with his own work. Here Richard perhaps
means agriculture, which he investigates in connection with the mechanical
sciences in Liber exceptionum.116
Richard unfortunately does not give a single example of the first and second
stages of the first kind of contemplation. His argument makes it clear that
theobject of contemplation may be any given thing (res), activity of nature

112 BMAJ II, V, p. 27.58.

113 BMAJ II, V, p. 26.2932: Opus artificiale opus videlicet industriae consideratur, ut in cela-
turis, in picturis, in scriptura, in agricultura et in ceteris operibus artificialibus, in quibus
omnibus innumera invenimus, pro quibus divini muneris dignationem digne mirari et
venerari debeamus.
114 BMAJ II, V, p. 26.3234: Opus itaque naturale et opus artificiale, quia sibi invicem cooperan-
tur, quasi e latere sibi altrinsecus iunguntur et sibi invicem mutua complexione copulantur.
115 Hugh writes that human work (opera humanum) is just an imitation of nature and thus is
fitly called mechanical (mechanicum). Didascalicon I, IX, p. 16.1517 (747 D).
116 In Liber exceptionum, Richard claims that mechanics (mechanica) can be seen as the
necessities (necessitas). This means that in order to survive the human being needs knowl-
edge of the fields which are related to mechanics. Mechanics includes the making of all
kinds of objects and sustaining oneself in external trials. Mechanics is based on the imita-
tion of the functions of nature. Richard divides mechanics into seven parts, which are the
making of clothes, armaments, seafaring, farming, hunting, medicine, and theatre (Liber
exceptionum I, I, cap. XIVXXI, p. 109111). Cf. Bernard of Clairvauxs idea of necessitas
which, according to Gilson, concerns necessity which is neither external, nor of precept,
but internal and natural, although aggravated in punishment of sin. Gilson 1990, 222n.34.
164 Chapter 5

(operatio naturae), or artificial activity (operatio artificialis). These objects are

not rationally considered in any way, the soul simply admiring the matter,
form, and nature of the object in question as well as various activities of nature
and humankind. According to some researchers, this kind of wondering obser-
vation recalls the aesthetic experience in which the soul gets impressions
freely from the perceived objects.117 As Leclercq puts it, the medieval monastic
theologians did not usually consider nature itself in order to admire it; they
saw it through literary reminiscences coming through the Bible or the church
fathers. The pleasurable aspect they appreciated had to include some refer-
ence to spirituality. In nature, everything was symbolic, writes Leclercq.118
Even though Richard writes speculatively and is truly fascinated by the beauty
in various objects, we should remember that his texts always have these practi-
cal applications. No doubt it is possible to think of the inhabitants of the school
of St. Victor practising spiritual exercises according to Richards instructions
about contemplation. In the monastery of St. Victor, which operated actively in
various fields, it may have been very reasonable to concentrate at times on
contemplating the multiplicity of human activities.119
In the first kind of contemplation, one lets the mere sense impressions flow
past ones mind without grasping them reasonably. Richard writes that the soul
is wandering to and fro (huc illucque discurrit) with a vigilant mind (acumen
ingenii) among images and forms in manifold ways. Liveliness of understand-
ing (vivacitas intelligentiae) empowers this process.120 In this context, he uses
the rare term vigilance or acuteness of mind (acumen ingenii). Even though
this has some features in common with imagination, it seems to refer to the
ability to reason.121

117 De Bruyne states that Richard exceptionally emphasizes aesthetic emotions in accor-
dance with contemplation. De Bruyne 1946, 236: Le premier degr de la contemplation
correspond lesthtique moderne des qualits sensibles, intuitivement perues. For a
similar interpretation, see Eco 1983, 6667, 112. Tatarkiewicz also considers that Richards
idea of contemplation is specifically aesthetic. Tatarkiewicz 2005, 195197.
118 Leclercq 1988, 129131.
119 Chenu 1974, 12531263 claims that the urban location of the monastery of St. Victor prob-
ably strengthened the interest of Victorines in the mechanical sciences, and thus led to
the exact study of the activities of the human being.
120 BMAJ II, V, p. 27.811: Quando ergo ingenii nostri acumen in hac gemina naturalis et arti-
ficialis consideratione circumquaque se diffundit et mira intelligentiae vivacitate multi-
pliciter huc illucque discurrit, arcae nostrae latitudo secundum divinae institutionis
modum congruam sibi mensuram accipit.
121 Ibid. See Chapter 7.3 for the similarities between ingenium and reason in Richards
account. However, according to Wetherbee the notions of imaginatio and ingenium share
Imagination In The First Two Kinds Of Contemplation 165

After the first stage, which is with regard to things, and the second, which is
with regard to activities, the third stage of the first kind of contemplation fol-
lows. This stage is concerned with morals or habits (mores). Richard reminds
the reader that contemplation of things and activities pertains to the length
and width of the Ark, adding that the height of the Ark is formed by the con-
templation of institutions. The third stage of the first kind of contemplation is
further divided into contemplation of the human institutions (humanae insti-
tutiones) and divine institutions (divinae institutiones). The social and church
legislation and other laws and regulations, among other things, belong to the
area of human institutions. The divine institutions include the liturgy and
the sacraments. The human institutions guarantee the welfare and peace of
the temporal life, whereas the divine regulations support preparing the soul
for eternal life.122 If human activities (opera) are ordered and moderated, they
form part of good morals, but if they are disordered and unreasonable, they
represent bad morals.123 Here Richard repeats the basic principle of Benjamin
Minor, according to which the affects must be ordered and moderated in order
to become a virtue.124 Man is able to exploit human regulations as the objects

many common features, especially in the twelfth-century texts. He analyses the sections of
Bernard of Chartres and John of Salisbury dealing with ingenium, claiming that this concept
corresponds to the terms vis imaginativa and phantasia. Wetherbee 1976, 47. For instance,
John of Salisbury describes three species of ingenium, of which the first is ingenium advo-
lans, the second ingenium infimum and the third ingenium mediocre. The first one of these
flies restlessly between the objects, the other is firmly tied up with the senses and the third
assists in practising the sciences. See Metalogicon 1.11. This classification by John of
Salisbury may be compared to Richards ideas pertaining to imagination (imaginatio); for
example, the first kind of contemplation resembles Johns idea of ingenium advolans.
122 BMAJ II, VI, p. 27.1723: Disciplina itaque morum partim ex institutione divina partim
processit ex institutione humana. Ad divina instituta pertinent obsequia divina et quaeli-
bet ecclesiae sacramenta. Ad instituta humana pertinent humanae leges, consuetudines,
urbanitates, plebiscita, iura civilia et huiusmodi alia multa. Humana institutio propter
vitam inferiorem, divina institutio propter vitam superiorem. Illa ad obtinendam salutem
et tranquillitatem vitae temporalis, ista ad capessendam salutem et plenitudinem aeter-
nae beatitudinis. Cf. Hugh of St. Victors ideas on this subject in De meditatione, p. 4850,
which deals with meditation on morals.
123 BMAJ II, III, p. 25.2022: Nam opera utique hominum magna ex parte, in quantum sunt
ordinata et moderata, pertinent ad mores bonos; in quantum vero sunt inordinata et
immoderata, pertinent nihilominus ad mores malos.
124 For the affections and virtues in Benjamin Minor, see BMIN VII, p. 108.59: Septenaria
utique Liae proles, septem sunt uirtutes. Siquidem, nichil aliud est uirtus quam animi
affectus ordinatus et moderatus. Ordinatus, quando ad illud est ad quod esse debet; mod-
eratus, quando tantus est quantus esse debet.
166 Chapter 5

of contemplation in the first kind of contemplation perfectly, whereas the

divine sacraments are only partly useful in this contemplation. This is because
a person may gain external knowledge of the sacraments, but their spiritual
power is hidden and is a matter of faith. Examining the usefulness of the sacra-
ments and human regulations in contemplation ends the analysis of the first
kind of contemplation.125
Summing up, the first kind of contemplation comprises three different cat-
egories, which include seven steps. These are the contemplation of matter,
form, the nature of the thing, the activities of man and nature, and finally,
human and divine instructions. It should be pointed out that it is the images,
i.e., species (species) of these objects that are under consideration.126 These
steps form a carefully considered structure, every stage of which the soul must
study diligently in the imagination and according to imagination (in imagina-
tione, secundum imaginationem). However, the experience of beauty elevates
the longing of the soul for the invisible reality, because all the visible forms can
be seen as the symbols of the eternal and uncreated beauty. The condition of
experiencing this kind of beauty, however, is commitment to the pursuit of
mysticism and the sublime intentions of contemplation.127 In the higher kinds
of contemplation, Richard is more severe. Even though the mutability of
earthly things should be observed and admired, these things should be
despised and left behind bravely.128
Finally, it should be stressed that in Benjamin Major imagination functions
actively in the first kind of contemplation. It is interesting to note that this defi-
nition deviates from Benjamin Minor, in which Richard does not see any con-
nection between the operation of imagination and contemplation.129 The
simplest form of imagination in Benjamin Minor is that which delivers simple

125 BMAJ II, VI, p. 2728.

126 BMAJ I, VI, p. 12.1828. BMAJ II, VII, p. 29.12: igitur primum contemplationis genus recte
intelligitur esse in consideranda specie rerum corporalium
127 De Bruyne 1946, 212. De Bruyne quotes the chapter which deals with the basic principle of
Hugh of St. Victors aesthetics of symbolism: Quia enim in formis rerum visibilium pul-
chritudo earumdem consistit, congrue ex formis visibilibus invisibilem pulchritudinem
demonstrari dicit, quoniam visibilis pulchritudo invisibilis pulchritudinis imago est.
Expositio in Hierarchiam Coelestam, pl 175, 949B. This interest in aesthetics shown by the
Victorines is a clear sign of the influence of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagites ideas,
which were transmitted through John Scotus Eriugena.
128 BMAJ III, II, p. 57.3658.1: absque ulla dubitatione mundanorum mutabilitas quanto dili-
gentius conspicitur, tanto melius, tanto manifestius et per fortitudinem fugienda et per
despectum calcanda cognoscitur.
129 BMIN LXXXVI, pp. 340, 342.
Imagination In The First Two Kinds Of Contemplation 167

sense material to reason. When dealing with the special modes of rational
imagination (imaginatio rationalis), Richard insists that imagination is the first
way to the contemplation of invisible things.130 This claim acquires concrete
application in the sixfold model of contemplation in Benjamin Major. The first
kind of contemplation genuinely forms in imagination (in imaginatione).
Next I will analyse the operation of imagination in the second kind of
contemplation.

5.5 The Second Kind of Contemplation

The first kind of contemplation is said to be in imagination and formed accord-

ing to imagination. In the second kind of contemplation, reason (ratio) is acti-
vated, the soul not functioning on mere imagination any longer. The wooden
parts of the Ark of the Covenant get their gilding, in other words, as imagina-
tion and reason start to co-operate. While the visible manifestations of corpo-
real objects (forma, imago, species) were considered in the first kind of
contemplation, in the second kind an attempt is made to analyse the rational
principles (rerum visibilium ratio, rationes) of these visible objects.131 The first
kind of contemplation was divided into three stages. These stages are also uti-
lized in the second kind of contemplation, but the soul uses the combination
of its abilities, i.e., the imagination and reason. Henceforth the task of the soul
is to examine the matter, form and nature of things, the activities of nature
andof man, as well as morals and the holy sacraments in order to seek their

130 BMIN XIV, p. 126.2526: Quae sit prima uia omni ingredienti ad inuisibilium contempla-
tionem, uidelicet per imaginationem.
131 BMAJ II, VII, p. 29.14: Si igitur primum contemplationis genus recte intelligitur esse in
consideranda specie rerum corporalium, consequenter, ut arbitror, intelligi oportet
secundum genus contemplationis esse in perspicienda ratione earumdem rerum. In con-
nection with the second kind of contemplation, translating ratio and rationes is problem-
atic. These notions have been translated as rational principle, idea, and purpose. For the
discussion, see Coulter 2006, 112115. Coulter also makes an interesting comparison
between Benjamin Majors second kind of contemplation and the interpretation of
dreams and visions in De eruditione homninis interioris. In the latter treatise, Richard
writes that interpreting the dream means discovering divine providence in the world.
Thus reason (ratio) is the rationale or purpose behind divine judgements within scrip-
ture. In Benjamin Major, the reader should try to find these reasons in the things (res) as
they appear in the biblical narrative. The reader can use the imagination to extract things
from their textual order and begin to relate them to divine wisdom. Cf. De eruditione
hominis interioris, pl 196, 1280B; 1303BC; 1331A1332D.
168 Chapter 5

reasons.132 Richard writes that in these two lowest forms of contemplation

people are taught the knowledge of exterior and corporeal things. He also
recalls the principle that the individual should start with the lowest and best-
known things and ascend by means of the exterior knowledge to knowledge of
invisible things.133
According to Richard, any imaginable object can be analysed in order to
assess its rational principles.134 As he explains:

The second kind of contemplation is that which assuredly exists in imagi-

nation, yet is formed according to reason and proceeds according to rea-
son. This happens when we seek and find the reason related to those
things that we turn over in imagination or, rather, having found and
learnt it we bring it into consideration with admiration. In the first kind
of contemplation we thus consider the things themselves; in the second
we undoubtedly examine, explore and marvel at the reason, order, and
disposition of these things as well as the cause, mode, and utility of any
one of them.135

Thus, the mind will examine the reason, order, cause, utility, mode and disposi-
tion (ratio, ordo, causa, utilitas, modus, dispositio) of the things which are
engaged in imagination. Later he adds that the effect (effectus) of things should
be sought as well.136 Richard remarks that the second kind of contemplation

132 BMAJ II, X, p. 32.912, 1718.

133 BMAJ IV, V, p. 90.89: In duobus namque primis erudimur ad scientiam rerum exteriorum
et corporalium. BMAJ IV, V, p. 90.1116: Debemus ergo a novissimis at notissimis incipere
et scientiae nostrae promotionem paulatim sublevare et per exteriorum notitiam ad
invisibilium cognitionem ascendere.
134 BMAJ II, VII, p. 29.24; Nonnullae allegoriae tabernaculi foederis, pl 196, 194D195A.
135 BMAJ I, VI, p. 12.2813.1: Secundum autem contemplationis genus est quod in imagina-
tione quidem consistit, secundum rationem tamen formatur atque procedit: quod fit
quando ad ea, quae in imaginatione versamusrationem quaerimus et invenimus, immo
inventam et notam in considerationem cum admiratione adducimus. In illo itaque res
ipsas, in isto earum utique rationem, ordinem, dispositionem et uniuscuiusque rei
causam, modum et utilitatem rimamur, speculamur, miramur.
136 BMAJ II, VII, p. 29.910: Arcam nostram deauramus, quando cuiusque rei causam, modum
et effectum, utilitatem et rationem consideramus. Cf. BMAJ III, II, p. 57.2526: Ibi ergo
ligna quaedam velut auri fulgore ornamus ubi rerum causam, modum, dispositionem
cum rationis assignatione discutimus. Note the variation in terminology: all the texts
include the concepts of reason, cause, and modus. Two of them mention disposition and
utility. Richard refers to order and effect only once in separate texts. Cf. also Nonnullae
allegoriae tabernaculi foederis, pl 196, 193D.
Imagination In The First Two Kinds Of Contemplation 169

also occurs in imagination, but reason shapes its operation (in imaginatione
consistit, secundum rationem formatur). Reason reaches as far down as possible
in analysing these visible images of the imagination.137 Again the mind admires
and wonders about the objects examined by it, but this time the admiration is
based on finding rational principles. This idea of admiration and astonishment
will come forth in many of Benjamin Majors sections.138
The first and the second kinds of contemplation are similar in that they are
both directed towards sensible (sensibilia) objects.139 As Richard defines it,
they both are employed in imagination (versare in imaginatione). However,
imagination does not move and associate freely among the sensible objects of
contemplation in the second kind of contemplation. He describes how imagi-
nation is bound in the co-operation between imagination and reason, in which
case reason can guide imagination so as to serve it. Thus the imagination is
shaped, disposed and moderated by reason (imaginatio formatur, disponitur et
moderatur per rationem). Because imagination is thus under the control of rea-
son, the object of contemplation appears in a different form even though it still
is the same material object.140 Assigning the rational principle of visible things
is then the issue.141

137 BMAJ I, VIII, p. 16.1213: Item, cum sit quattuor mediis commune sine ratiocinatione non
esse, in secundo contemplationis genere ratio imaginationi quasi ad ima condescendit
This means that the second, third, fourth and fifth kinds of contemplation cannot exist with-
out reason. In the second kind of contemplation reason descends to its lowest possible level.
138 See especially BMAJ II, VII, p. 28.2829: Quod secundum contemplationem genus constat
in consideranda et admiranda rerum visibilium ratione. BMAJ II, VII, p. 29.56: rerum
visibilium rationem rimamur et in eiusdem rationis inventae et perspectae admiratione
suspendimur.
139 BMAJ I, VII, p. 14.26: Duo itaque ex his in imaginatione consistunt, quia solis sensibilibus
intendunt.
140 BMAJ II, XI, p. 33.1014, 2226: Dictum est autem hoc contemplationis genus hoc habere
commune cum superiori in imaginatione videlicet versari et circa rerum visibilium atque
imaginabilium considerationem occupari. In hoc tamen maxime distant, quod in illo qui-
dem nihil ratiocinando quaeritur, sed totum secundum imaginationem ducitur. Istud
ratiocinatione texitur et secundum rationem formatur. Adeo autem haec, de qua modo
loquimur, speculatio secundum rationem agitur, ut ipsa etiam imaginatio in ea secun-
dum rationem disponi et ordinari videatur. Nam in prima quidem cogitatio, quo eam
ducit admiratio, solam sequitur imaginationem; in hac autem ipsa imaginatio formatur,
disponitur et moderatur per rationem.
141 BMAJ II, X, p. 32.1718: Diximus autem arcae nostra deaurationem constare in assignanda
rerum visibilium ratione. Later in Benjamin Major, Richard says that gilding is a kind of
deception of the exterior senses. BMAJ III, III, p. 58.1617: Quid enim deaurationem rec-
tius apellem quam quandam sensus exterius illusionem?
170 Chapter 5

Richard writes that reason surrounds and leads the imagination around
(ratio imaginationem circumducit atque disponit). He emphasizes how both
kinds of contemplation are said to be in imagination because both are occu-
pied by attention and investigation with that which we represent by means of
the imagination. He adds that this representation will happen as often as we
wish.142
There is no doubt that imagination directed by reason in the second kind of
contemplation is some kind of modification of the notion of rational imagina-
tion in Benjamin Minor (imaginatio rationalis), in which reason also directs
(disponere) the imagination and adopts it. Another attribute of rational imag-
ination in Benjamin Minor, mentioned repeatedly in Benjamin Major, is its sub-
ordination to will. On the other hand, in Minor rational imagination is
essentially defined as an active ability which is able to form new images by
joining them to each other.143 It is interesting that this feature of rational imag-
ination is not explicitly mentioned in Benjamin Major as Richard is analysing
the second kind of contemplation. There are some indirect remarks later in
Benjamin Major which may refer to this combining function of the rational
imagination.144
One of the basic elements of Richards world-view which does not really
play a role in Benjamin Minor emerges in the analysis of the second kind of
contemplation. Richard now calls the whole of visible reality the machine of
the world (mundana machina). The basic task of the second kind of contem-
plation is the rational analysis of the reasons for various phenomena, the dis-
position of the world, and the powers of elements.145 This idea clearly shows

142 BMAJ II, XI, p. 33.3034.1: Sicut itaque in priori imaginatio post se cogitationem trahat, sic
in ista ratio imaginationem circumducit et disponit. Idcirco autem utraque in imagina-
tione consistere dicitur, quia circa illa quidem utraque per intentionem vel investigatio-
nem occupatur: quae quoties volumus per imaginationem repraesentamus. See also
BMAJ III, I, p. 55.20; BMAJ III, XXI, p. 80.3; BMAJ IV, XX, p. 115.24. For Richards conception
of the will, see Den Bok, 1996, 412.
143 Cf. BMIN XV, p. 130.1620; BMIN XVI, p. 132.910.
144 BMAJ III, XXI, p. 79.3233. Here Richard discusses the imaginations ability to produce
representations of things. These representations can be removed and changed, and their
shape enlarged or diminished as well.
145 BMAJ II, VII, p. 29.410: Toties igitur in arcae nostrae deauratione occupamur, quoties
rerum visibilium rationem rimamur et in eiusdem rationis inventae et perspectae admi-
ratione suspendimur, quoties attendentes intelligimus et intelligentes attendimus huius
mundanae machinae, quae videntur omnia quam sint mirabiliter facta, quam convenien-
ter ordinata, quam sapienter disposita. Arcam nostram deauramus, quando cuiusque rei
causam, modum et effectum, utilitatem et rationem consideramus. At the beginning of
Imagination In The First Two Kinds Of Contemplation 171

the characteristic intention of twelfth-century natural theology to explain

causal relations, and attempts to find rational explanations for the questions
concerning the origin of the universe and the various phenomena of the
cosmos.146 Because the created world is the last link in the chain of reason
established by the first reason, it is natural to retrace this same chain back-
wards towards the first cause, God.147 Richard does not give an exact account
of the essence of rational principles, but does quote the Book of Wisdom in
a way which gives a good notion of the products of the second kind of
contemplation:

For it is he who gave me unerring knowledge of what exists, to know the

structure of the world and the activity of the elements; the beginning and
end and middle of times, the alternations of the solstices and the changes
of the seasons, the cycles of the year and the constellations of the stars,
the natures of animals and the tempers of wild animals, the powers of
spirits and the thoughts of human beings, the varieties of plants and the
virtues of roots.148
Wisd. 7: 1720

Richards descriptions of the machine of the world as well as its objects reveal
his effort to explain the various phenomena of nature rationally. He is clearly
associating the natural sciences of his time with his spiritual programme.
Hugh of St. Victor writes in his Didascalicon that the discipline of philoso-
phy comprehensively investigates the reasons for all things, human and
divine.149 In his In hierarchiam coelestem, he says that there are three kinds
of theoretical science. Mathematics speculates on the visible forms of the
visible things. Physics seeks the invisible causes of visible things. Via these
invisible causes, the soul ascends to the invisible substances of things in

Benjamin Minor, Richard refers to the wisdom of the world as well as to the philosophers
of the world, writing that the wisdom of the world is like a maidservant (pedissequa) for
true wisdom. BMIN III, p. 98.3236: Iam, ut arbitror, non miraris quod Rachel tantum dil-
igitur, cum eius etiam pedissequa, sapientiam mundi loquor, quae in dominae suae com-
paratione stultitia reputatur, tanto, ut cernimus, a mundi philosophis amore requiratur.
The maidservant is reasons auxiliary, who refers implicitly to the imagination in this text.
146 For this twelfth-century natural theology, see, for instance, Gregory 1955 and Chenu 1957,
424 especially.
147 For this platonic idea of reddere rationes and its continuation in medieval tradition, see
Klibansky (1939/1982), 75. Richard himself refers to this idea in BMAJ II, VIII, p. 29.22.
148 BMAJ II, VII, p. 29.1217. Trans. nrs version.
149 Didascalicon I, IV, p. 11.1214 (745A).
172 Chapter 5

theology.150 In the light of Richards own assimilation, it is clear that he shares

Hughs ideas concerning the importance of the various kinds of science and
their connection with the contemplative life. It is evident that a special char-
acteristic of the second kind of contemplation is the fixed connection of its
subjects to the so-called liberal arts or sciences. Richard thus has to take into
account the significance of science and philosophy as a part of spiritual
training. He argues that the questions which are related to the second kind of
contemplation are in fact the same as those which many philosophers have
worked on before. Richard specifies how some philosophers have laboured
and obtained plenty of information about the world and thus have also gilded
their ark of understanding. Nevertheless, his opinion on the significance of
these philosophers work is slightly ambiguous. On the one hand, he praises
the philosophers achievements and claims that the contemplative person
utilizes the efforts of philosophy in his own spiritual training as he proceeds
to the second kind of contemplation. On the other hand, Richard warns them
against the vanity (vanitas) of the mundane savants and invites them to judge
the usefulness of philosophy for contemplation carefully.151
The theme of the vanity of philosophers seem to conflict with Richards
equally open praise for sciences as an important step in the spiritual ascent.
According to Richard, the most interesting products of philosophy relate to the
examination of the hidden causes and physical principles. As he points out,

150 Commentaria in Hierarchiam coelestem, pl 175, 927D928A: Prima enim, id est mathe-
matica, speculatur visibiles rerum visibilium formas. Secunda autem, id est physica, scru-
tatur invisibiles rerum visibilium causas. Tertia vero sola, id est theologia, contemplatur
invisibiles substantias, et invisibilium substantiarum invisibiles naturas. Et est in his
quasi progressio quaedam, et profectus mentis ad cognoscendum verum conscendentis.
Per visibiles enim visibilium formas pervenitur ad invisibiles visibilium causas; et per
invisibiles visibilium causas ascenditur ad invisibiles substantias, et earum cognoscendas
naturas. Note how Hugh defines the objects of the sciences and how they roughly corre-
late with the first three kinds of contemplation and their objects in Richards scheme. See
also Hughs Sententie de divinitate, prologus, p. 920.226229.
151 BMAJ II, IX, p. 31.1416: Cito siquidem eorum defecit pecunia, nec erat eis auri tanta copia,
quo possent eam deaurare intrinsecus, quippe quibus pecunia defecerat ad eam ex inte-
gro deaurandam extrinsecus. BMAJ II, X, p. 32.1316: Si quis autem satagat se in hoc opus
accingere et arcam suam ambiat auro superducere nihil obest ab exterioribus scientiis et
saecularibus disciplinis scientiae aurum mutuare, dummodo sciat ipsum ab omni falsita-
tis vel vanitatis scoria mundare See also the positive account of philosopherss abilities
in seeking knowledge of God in De Trinitate, prologus, p. 81.3236: satagamus, in quan-
tum possumus, ut intelligamus quod credimus. Cogitemus quantum in hujusmodi cogni-
tione studuerint, vel quousque profecerint mundi hujus philosohi, et pudeat nos in hac
parte inferiores illis invenire
Imagination In The First Two Kinds Of Contemplation 173

the pagan philosophers too have broken into the hidden bosom of nature and
have explained the invisible causes of various phenomena, such as the origin
of earthquakes and the movements of the sea.152 Richard writes about the sig-
nificance of these studies:

Who would not know that almost all earthly philosophy labours chiefly
in this, so that by means of its erudite investigation, it may find and pro-
duce in public the hidden causes of visible things? See how great, how
many riches of doctrine and treasures of knowledge these excellent
geniuses among the philosophers collected, preserved and bestowed on
you for this kind of use.153

Still, Richard does not cease to recall the philosophers mistakes and their
inadequate knowledge. He presents the philosophers as active and eager col-
lectors of information who strive to clarify the hidden reasons for things but
who are never able to achieve perfect wisdom. Their understanding is insuffi-
cient to find rational principles for all the wonders of nature. Above all, the
world of divine operations and justice is, of course, beyond the reach of a phi-
losopher. Richard remarks that in his time some pseudo-philosophers have
arisen who, wanting to make a name for themselves, are eager to discover new
things. They are caught up in their own inventions, handing on new opinions,
thinking wisdom was born and would die with them. Richard refers to those
who were previously swearing by Aristotles name, and notes that they are now
finally working with Christs workshop where they will achieve wisdom in cer-
tainty. He mentions ancient schools like the Academics, Stoics and Peripatetics

152 BMAJ II, IX, p. 31.57, 912: Satagebant itaque et ipsi gentium philosophi sapientiam tra-
here de occulto occultas rerum causas rimantes et usque ad abditos naturae sinus ingenii
sui acumine penetrantes eruebant aurum de profundo. Invenerunt itaque multa inves-
tigatione profunda et admiratione digna, unde tremor terris, qua vi maria alta tumescunt,
et cetera multa in hunc modum invenientes scriptoque commendantes ad posteros trans-
mittere curaverunt. Richard is referring to Augustine here, who in turn is quoting Vergil:
Enchiridion. 16: non nobis uideatur ad felicitatem consequendam pertinere si sciamus
causas magnarum in mundo corporalium motionum quae abditissimis naturae finibus
occuluntur: unde tremor terris, qua ui maria alta tumescent obicibus ruptis, rursusque in
se ipsa residant [Verg. Georg. 2479 sq.], et cetera huiusmodi.
153 BMAJ II, X, p. 32.1823: Quis autem nesciat quomodo tota paene mundana philosophia in
hoc maxime laborat, ut latentes rerum visibilium causas sagacitatis suae investigatione
inveniat et in palam producat. Vide quam magnas, quam multas doctrinae opes, scien
tiaeque gazas praeclara illa philosophorum ingenia conquisierunt, reposuerunt, tibique
in eiusmodo usus reliquerunt.
174 Chapter 5

and asks where their arks of wisdom are now.154 He also states that philoso-
phers are deceived by the appearances of things and overturned by the concu-
piscence of their own hearts.155
Richard claims that man will never attain knowledge of the rational princi-
ples of all the things he examines. Where the rational abilities end, man has to
move on to the area of faith. What man cannot understand, he can at least
believe. He continues that the individual can believe that nothing takes place
on earth without a cause.156 According to McGinn, Richard agrees with the
basic Augustinian idea that emphasizes the necessity of belief for understand-
ing.157 In Richards opinion, one of the philosophers bad mistakes is to imag-
ine that something can take place in the world by chance or that the goddess
Fortuna does not pay attention to good or bad deeds of people and that their
fate is random.158
Evidently, the second kind of contemplation that has been considered in
Benjamin Major is an attempt to integrate philosophy into theology and, to be
more specific, contemplation. This is a natural solution for Richard because,
according to the Victorine theologians, philosophy and theology, sciential and
sapiential knowledge can never be distinguished perfectly from each other. All
the forms of human knowing, even though being damaged as the consequence
of the fall, directly or indirectly, serve the return of the human being to the
image and similitude of God. The goal of this return is the mystical experience
of the presence of God in contemplation.159

154 BMAJ II, II, p. 24.914: Et ecce quam multi, qui prius fabricabant in officina Aristotelis,
tandem saniori consilio discunt cudere in officina Salvatoris et qui prius fabricabant vasa
contumeliae, nunc docentur fabricare vasa gloriae cotidie confitentes Domino in vasis
psalmi, eo quod paeniteat eos fecisse opus confusione dignum et diu fuisse fabricatores
mendacii. Ubi sunt nunc, quaeso, sectae academicorum, stoicorum, peripateticorum? Ubi
sunt arcae eorum? Cf. BMAJ II, X, p. 3233; BMAJ II, IX, p. 31.1619: Non enim erat eiusdem
facultatis physicas rerum rationes invenire et occultas in his, quae accidunt, iustitiae cau-
sas diiudicare. Longe alius est latentes rerum causas secundum physicam rationem inves-
tigare et astruere et longe alius divinorum iudiciorum rationem non ignorare.
155 BMAJ III, III, p. 58.3132: Falleris, falleris, philosophe: species enim decepit te et concupis-
centia subvertit cor tuum.
156 BMAJ II, X, p. 33.36: Sed quod intelligere non potes, credere potes. nihil fit in terra sine
causa.
157 McGinn 1995, 369.
158 BMAJ II, IX, p. 31.2126.
159 The human being is able to gain knowledge about the corporeal objects through the
senses and the imagination. When the reason turns below to examine sensible images
critically, the result is knowledge (scientia). As the reason turns upward toward spiritual
objects and God, it operates with the concurrent aid of divine inspiration and revelation
Imagination In The First Two Kinds Of Contemplation 175

Richard does not discuss what abilities of the soul are needed in the various
kinds of sciences in either Benjamin Major or Minor. The analysis of Benjamin
Majors first and second kinds of contemplation shows, however, that in the
practice of natural philosophy the soul obviously utilizes either the ability of
imagination (imaginatio), or the combination of imagination and reason
(ratio) in accordance with senses and memory. He distinctly compares the
efforts of philosophy with the various aspects of first and second kinds of con-
templation. He also gives the impression that, in particular with these two first
kinds, the knowledge obtained by the philosophers can be best employed.
Nevertheless, in his Didascalicon Hugh sketches a model in which the rela-
tionship between the abilities of the soul and the sciences is clearly stated.
Even though Richard does not mention Hughs model directly, similarities in
the theory can be found in the framework of both the Benjamin Minor and
Major.160 Moreover, Richard lists various sciences in his Liber exceptionum
faithfully according to Hughs scheme.161 Hugh maintains in Didascalicon that
philosophy must comprise four master-categories of arts and disciplines: theo-
retical, practical, mechanical, and logical.162 As claimed by Hugh, the highest
operation of philosophy is theoretical, which has been further divided into
theology, mathematics and physics. Considering the faculty of imagination
(imaginatio), theoretical science is interesting, since the special abilities of the
imagination along with reason are required in the disciplines of mathematics
and physics.163 Hugh associates the abilities of the soul with the theoretical

and is illuminated by understanding. Thus the sapiential knowledge will be attained.

Didascalicon I, VIII, p. 15.2124 (747BC). See the commentary by Taylor 1961, 190n.57.
Cf. Liber exceptionum II, X, cap. X, p. 395.78. For this theme, see also Baron 1957,
221223 and McGinn 1998, 371.
160 Javelet 1967, 146147.
161 Liber exceptionum I, I, cap. VXXV, p. 105113 introduces the various disciplines. Liber
exceptionum was composed for the person who asks for advice about the reading of the
Bible. Richard begins his work by introducing the seven liberal arts. This describes the
Victorine idea that the whole world with its various phenomena has to be comprehended
as part of the interpretation of the holy texts. For comparison between the theories of
Hugh and Richard concerning the liberal arts, see Javelet 1969, 557568.
162 Taylor 1961, 7. The foundation of the four-part model of the sciences presented by Hugh is
Aristotelian in origin. For Hughs and Richards division of the sciences, see Baron 1969,
551555; Javelet 1969, 557568; Luria 1969, 541549.
163 The sciences of mathematics include arithmetic, music, astronomy, and geometry.
Physics searches out and considers the causes of things and their effects, and the effects
derived from certain causes. Didascalicon II, III, p. 27.6 (753C): Intelligibilis autem quod
ipsum quidem solo percipitur intellectu, sed non solo intellectu percipit, quia imaginatio-
nem vel sensum habet, quo ea quae sensibus subjacent comprehendit. For physics,
176 Chapter 5

sciences in his theory as follows. Theology inquires into the contemplation of

God and the incorporeality of the soul, i.e., the intellectible objects (intellect-
ibilia), which can be examined by understanding (intelligentia) only.
Mathematics in turn is called instructional or intelligible, since it considers
intelligible (intelligibilia) objects. This is precisely where the operation of
imagination (imaginatio) in accordance with reason is required. Hugh explains
how the imperceptible and simple intellectible substances degenerated into
intelligible when they came into contact with matter.164 In various respects,
then, the same thing is both intellectible and intelligible: intellectible in being
by nature incorporeal; intelligible in being a similitude of sensible things.
Imagination and senses (sensus) are needed as the soul attempts to abstract
the simple essence of an object.165 As Hugh puts it, imagination (imaginatio) is
a sensible memory which contains traces of the corporeal objects, and so does
not contain any sure source of knowledge.166
In his Liber exceptionum Richard follows this basic idea, justifying the sig-
nificance of sciences by appealing to the same authority as Didascalicon: the
fallen state of man should be restored as the very image of God. He states that
theoretical sciences can be divided into three groups according to the objects
examined by them. Theology approaches intellectible (intellectibilia) objects,
mathematics intelligible (intelligibilia), and physics natural (phisiologica), i.e.,

see Didascalicon II, XVI, p. 34.2735.10 (757D758A). Cf. Hughs De Scripturis, pl

175, 20C: Physica interiores rerum naturas, mathematica exteriores figuras et numeros
docet.
164 Hugh has adapted this Neoplatonic theory of degeneration, with some alterations, from
Macrobius In somnium Scipionis. For this, see Taylor 1961, 198n.23.
165 Didascalicon II, III, p. 27.113 (753CD): eadem igitur res diversis respectibus intellectibilis
simul et intelligibilis est. intellectibilis eo quod incorporea sit natura, et nullo sensu com-
prehendi possit. intelligibilis vero ideo, quod similitudo quidem est sensibilium, nec
tamen sensibilis. intellectibile est enim, quod nec sensibile est, nec similitudo sensibilis.
intelligibile autem quod ipsum quidem solo percipitur intellectu, sed non solo intellectu
percipit, quia imaginationem vel sensum habet, quo ea que sensibus subiacent compre-
hendit. tangendo ergo corpora degenerat, quia, dum inuisibiles corporum formas per sen-
suum passiones procurrit eas que attactas per imaginationem in se trahit, toties a sua
simplicitate scinditur, quoties aliquibus contrarie passionis qualitatibus informatur. cum
vero ab hac distractione ad puram intelligentiam conscendens in unum se colligit, fit
beatior intellectibilis substantie participatione. Cf. Isaac of Stellas account, in which he
claims that sensory knowledge and imagination are excluded from the mathematical sci-
ences. Epistola de anima 16, pl 194, 1884C.
166 Didascalicon II, V, p. 29.23 (755B): imaginatio est memoria sensuum ex corporum reliquiis
inherentibus animo, principium cognitionis per se nihil certum habens. See Chapter 2.3.
for a more extensive analysis of Hughs theory of the imagination.
Imagination In The First Two Kinds Of Contemplation 177

sensible objects.167 In Benjamin Major, Richard divides the objects of contem-

plation into three classes similar to what we saw before: intellectible (intellect-
ibilia), intelligible (intelligibilia), and sensible (sensibilia) objects.168 He
subsequently describes the operation of the second kind of contemplation in
Benjamin Major, as well as the significance of mathematics and physics in
Liber exceptionum by using similar expressions and terminology.169
Hugh considers that mathematics concerns abstract quantity, which refers
to the form of an object. This form is visible in its linear dimension, is impressed
upon the mind and exists in imagination.170 Richard agrees with Hugh about
the abstract quantity, but does not mention imagination in this context in his
Liber exceptionum.171 However, he briefly notes that mathematics cannot be
practised without imagination.172 For Richard, the study of the regularities of
nature seems to hold a more prominent position than the mathematical sci-
ences. The second kind of contemplation concentrates on examining and
admiring the reasons for and effects of appearances and things. Richard is not

167 Liber exceptionum I, I, cap.VII, p. 106.2107.9: Theorica dividitur in theologiam, phisicam,

mathematicam. Aliter theorica dividitur in intellectibilem, phisiologiam, intelligibilem.
Aliter theorica dividitur in divinalem, naturalem, doctrinalem. Theologia tractat de
invisibilibus invisibilium essentiis, phisica tractat de invisibilibus visibilium causis, math-
ematica tractat de visibilibus visibilium formis. In his Epitome Dindimi in philosophiam,
20 (p. 195196) Hugh writes: Theorica uero, cuius prima pars, id est mathematica, uisi-
biles rerum uisibilium formas explicationi sue, demonstrationi sue, subiectas habet;
secunda, id est physica, inuisibiles rerum uisibilium causas persequitur; tertia, id est theo-
logia, inuisibiles substantias contemplatur. Richard reproduces many ideas of the
Epitome in his Liber exceptionum, such as the pattern of three evils, and the corresponding
three goods promoted by the three categories of arts. See Taylor 1961, 183n.30.
168 BMAJ I, VII, p. 14.2631: Duo itaque ex his imaginatione consistunt, quia solis sensibilibus
intendunt. Duo in ratione consistunt, quia solis intelligibilibus insistunt. Duo vero in
intelligentia subsistunt, quia solis intellectibilibus intendunt. Sensibilia dico quaelibet
visibilia et sensu corporeo perceptibilia. Intelligibilia autem dico invisibilia, rationi
tamen comprehensibilia. Intellectibilia hoc loco dico invisibilia, et humanae rationi
incomprehensibilia.
169 Cf. BMAJ II, IX, p. 3132 and Liber exceptionum I, I, cap. VII, p. 106107.
170 Didascalicon II, VI, p. 30.13 (753A): quantitas abstracta nihil est aliud nisi forma uisibi-
lis secundum lineamentarem dimensionem animo impressa, que in imaginatione
consistit.
171 Liber exceptionum I, I, cap. VII, p. 107.1617: Mathematica est que abstractam considerat
quantitatem. Abstracta autem quantitas nichil est aliud quam forma visibilis secundum
liniamentarem dimensionem animo impressa.
172 Liber exceptionum I, I, cap. XXIII, p. 111.910: Ideo logica aliquando pura intelligentia uti-
tur, mathematica nunquam sine imaginatione est.
178 Chapter 5

interested in speculating about the role of imagination in geometry, for exam-

ple, even though the operation of the imagination is traditionally connected
with constructing mathematical and geometrical models, and thus has been
seen as an essential part of mathematics training.173
In conclusion, in Benjamin Major Richard seems to avoid associating the
abilities of the soul with sciences. The second kind of contemplation focuses
on the study of rational imagination and emphasizes admiration (admiratio)
of the objects of knowledge, but omits the examination of disciplines mani-
fested in Liber exceptionum. However, the main motivation for the second kind
of contemplation is to integrate the knowledge of the secular sciences as part
of the preliminary stages of contemplation.

173 For Augustines idea of the use of the imagination in the mathematical sciences like
geometry and music, see ODaly 1987, 110. Some Neoplatonists, such as Simplicius and
Proclus, thought that the imagination could be utilized in geometry. According to these
Neoplatonists, an accurate geometrical figure cannot be imagined by means of abstrac-
tion from sense objects, but by projecting concepts inherent in the discursive reason into
imagination as figures and magnitudes. See Sorabji 2004, 7679.
 Chapter 6

The Third Kind of Contemplation

6.1 Introduction

This chapter will discuss the third kind of contemplation in Benjamin Major.
Iwill also analyse Richards ideas concerning similitudes, which he regards as
an essential component of this contemplation. Accordingly, I will evaluate
Richards related anthropological speculation, which he expresses through the
notions of the inner and outer person. I will also compare his views concerning
the function of the imagination in the transition from visible things to invisible
things in Benjamin Major, Benjamin Minor, and In Apocalypsim Joannis.
Dealing with the higher levels of contemplation, Richard supports his treat-
ment by utilizing tropological interpretation of selected features in the descrip-
tion of the Ark of the Covenant. As stated in the preceding chapter, the first kind
of contemplation refers to the wooden parts of the Ark, while the second kind
denotes their gilding. In the third kind of contemplation, the Ark gets a golden
crown and in the fourth kind it is covered by the golden propitiatory. The two
golden cherubs who spread their wings over the Ark represent the fifth and sixth
kinds of contemplation. Richard examines the details and measurements of the
Ark scrupulously, giving them a tropological interpretation on the basis of how
the four highest kinds of contemplation are further divided into different stages.1
The characterization of the third kind of contemplation differs from the
definitions of the first and second kinds. The third kind is said to take place
completely in reason (in ratione) and not in imagination (in imaginatione).
However, it is formed in reason, according to imagination (formatur in ratione
secundum imaginationem).2 Furthermore, Richard uses the parallel notion
that the third kind agrees with reason but follows imagination (constat in rati
one sed sequitur imaginationem).3 He also states that reason draws (trahit)
imagination with it to consider higher things, in which case imagination rises
above itself.4 However, Richard reminds the reader that the third kind is in

1 BMAJ I, XI, p. 1921; BMAJ III, IV, p. 6061.

2 BMAJ I, VI, p. 13.89: Tertium contemplationis genus esse diximus quod in ratione secundum
imaginationem formatur.
3 BMAJ II, XVII, p. 40.2728.
4 BMAJ I, VIII, p. 16.8, 1314, 19, 2122: In tertio imaginatio ad rationem ascenditin tertio
imaginationem secum quasi ad altiora trahit.in tertio imaginatio supra semetipsam ascen-
dit.in tertio imaginatio ascendit ad summum.

koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2014|doi 10.1163/9789004279452_007

180 Chapter 6

reason, and both its attention and investigation go beyond the scope of mere
imagination.5
Since this shift to the area of reason in the third kind of contemplation is
a significant breakthrough in the spiritual life, Richard does not hesitate to
describe it in poetic terms. He values the co-operation between imagination
and reason because it provides the opportunity to approach the things in
invisible reality. Thus Richard explains how one unlearns being an animal
being and learns to be made into a spiritual being, which is required for
grasping the sublime objects of contemplation. One should make a daily
effort to taste those things which are spiritual.6 He also incidentally men-
tions how the distinct new senses (novitas sensus) begin to take shape in the
third kind of contemplation, in consequence of which the human being
grows into a spiritual (spiritualis) person. Here Richard is likely to refer to the
special spiritual senses. He tells the reader that now is the moment when the
heavenly visions flowing from divine wisdom begin. Here the soul finally
recovers its ancient dignity and wins back its inborn honour and freedom.7
This is Neoplatonist language which strongly emphasizes the significance of
illuminating knowledge.8
Richard repeatedly stresses that a person cannot rise to know invisible
things without the exterior foundation of ascent. He also explains that the
knowledge of exterior things (notitia exteriorum) is needed in this transition.
One should begin with the lowest and best-known and ascend little by little by

5 BMAJ I, VI, p. 13.1112: Haec vero speculatio in ratione consistit, quia his solis, quae imagina-
tionem excedunt, per intentionem et investigationem insistit.
6 BMAJ II, XIII, p. 35.810: In hoc primo statu dedocetur homo esse animalis et discit effici
spiritualis, eo quod tunc incipiat spiritualia comparare et reformari in novitate sensus sui
satagens cotidie magis magisque sapere quae sursum sunt non quae super terram. For the
notion of sensus spiritualis in Richards texts, see Tedoldi 1999, 8488.
7 BMAJ II, XIII, p. 35.1215,1723: Hic primo illa quae docet hominem scientiam, dei sapientia,
lux illa, quae illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum, incipit se ingerere et
lucis suae radios nunc mentis oculis infundere, nunc subtrahendo iterum abscondere.
Incipit hic demum quoddam mirae visionis praeludium ante intuentis aspectum formare et
sicut aquila provocans ad volandum pullos suos assiduo revelationum suarum evolatu et
revolatu, seipsam in diversa rapere et contemplantis animum ad volandi desiderium primo
inflammare et quandoque ad plenum volatum perfecte informare. Hic primum animus anti-
quam dignitatem recuperat et ingenitum sibi propriae libertatis honorem sibi vindicat.
8 Richards ideas derive from Augustines theory of illumination, which emphasizes the need
for divine illumination for knowledge. According to Augustine, all human knowledge arises
from illumination. It also grants access to invisible realities, which are beyond the senses. For
Augustines theory of illumination, see Matthews 2001, 179183.
The Third Kind Of Contemplation 181

means of the knowledge of exterior things to knowledge of invisible things.9

Consequently, in what follows I will analyse the operation of the imagina-
tion (imaginatio) and its co-operation with reason in the third kind of
contemplation.

6.2 The Objects of Contemplation in the Third Kind of Contemplation:

Similitudes (Similitudines)

This subsection will examine Richards idea of similitudes. These turn out to be
of major importance as he characterizes the operation of the third kind of con-
templation. Furthermore, the investigation of Richards idea of similitudes
offers significant insight into his epistemological and ontological theories. His
text makes it clear that the notion of similitude denotes a specific kind of rela-
tion between the sensible object and the invisible object. In epistemology, this
relation is asymmetrical, since the knowledge of visible objects leads the soul
to contemplate invisible objects. The asymmetrical epistemological relation is
based on Hugh of St. Victors idea of the order of cognition (ordo cognitionis),
which means that mans knowledge of invisible things always starts from the
visible, corporeal creation. However, ontologically this relation may be consid-
ered as symmetrical. The foundation of Richards view of the structure of being
is the order of creation (ordo conditionis),10 God being the ultimate reason for
every created thing. As Hugh argues, from the point of view of the human

9 BMAJ IV, V, p. 90.1116: Debemus ergo a novissimis et notissimis incipere et scientiae nos-
trae promotionem paulatim sublevare et per exteriorum notitiam ad invisibilium cogni-
tionem ascendere. Cum enim exteriorum scientiam apprehenderis et in eorum doctrina
exercitatos sensus habueris, debes ad altiora ascendere et spiritualium creaturarum sci-
entiam comparare. BMAJ II, XVII, p. 41.1113: Certum namque est quia nisi per corporeum
sensum animus ad exteriorum notitiam pervenire non potest.
10 De tribus diebus XXV, p. 6061.10721082. (835A): Quando pridem de uisibilibus ad inues-
tiganda inuisibilia progredi cepimus, primo a corporea creatura ad incorpoream, hoc est
rationalem transiuimus, ac deinde a rationali creatura usque ad sapientiam Dei perueni-
mus; nunc uero redeuntes, primo a sapientia Dei ad rationalem creaturam, deinde a ratio-
nali creatura habita consideratione, ad creaturam corpoream procedemus. Ille ordo est
cognitionis, iste conditionis, quia primum corporea creatura quae uisibilis est in cogniti-
one occurrit; deinde a corporea creatura ad incorpoream transit; postremo uia inuestiga-
tionis aperta usque ad conditorem utriusque peruenit. De tribus diebus XXV, p. 62.
10991101. (835C): Ordo autem cognitionis in mente humana semper precedit ordinem
conditionis. In these passages, Hugh affirms basic Victorine epistemological and onto-
logical principles and their mutual interdependence.
182 Chapter 6

being, the order of cognition always precedes the order of creation. The same
principle systematizes both Benjamins, in which imagination, as part of the
order of cognition, serves as a necessary link to the visible world and thus
receives much attention. This becomes evident in the analysis of the third kind
of contemplation and similitudes as well.
Richard does not give any clear definition of the notion of imagination in
the third kind of contemplation, but does describe its operation and objects.
He has characterized the first two kinds as being directed to visible and created
objects.11 As distinct from these, the third kind of contemplation is directed to
invisible things, which he defines as intelligible (intelligibilia).12 Richard explic-
itly states that the operation of reason is needed for studying such objects.13
However, in the third kind of contemplation reason does not examine the
intelligible things alone; it is assisted by imagination.14
Richard explains how invisible things are contemplated in the co-operation
between reason and imagination. For this purpose he introduces the concept
of similitude (similitudo). Richard uses the notion of similitude throughout
hiswritings, with various connotations.15 He claims that in the third kind of

11 BMAJ I, VII, p. 14.2627,33: Duo itaque ex his imaginatione consistunt, quia solis sensibili-
bus intendunt. Duo in ratione consistunt, quia solis intelligibilibus insistunt. Item ex his
quattuor duo superiora versantur circa invisibilia. BMAJ I, VII, p. 15.12: Duo vero media
maxime in rebus invisibilibus atque creatis. The concepts used by Richard are very simi-
lar to those in Hughs Didascalicon. The division of objects into the intellectible and intel-
ligible and the relation between the various faculties of the soul and these groups is based
on the second book of Didascalicon. See Didascalicon II, III, p. 27.612 (753CD) and
Didascalicon II, V, p. 29.1324 (755AB).
12 BMAJ I, VII, p. 14.27. Richard is not quite consistent in his definition. Later in the Benjamin
Major he remarks that the first three kinds of contemplation arise from visible things.
BMAJ II, XXVII, p. 54.57: postquam de triplici contemplationis genere mystica descriptio
digessit, quod, uti superius monstratum est, de rebus visibilibus surgit.
13 BMAJ I, VI, p. 13.1113: Haec vero speculatio in ratione consistit, quia his solis, quae imagi-
nationem excedunt, per intentionem et investigationem insistit, quia solis invisibilibus
intendit et his solis maxime, quae per rationem comprehendit.
14 BMAJ II, XVII, p. 40.30p. 41.4; BMAJ II, XVIII, p. 44.711.
15 Richard works with the notion of similitude mostly in his In Apocalypsim Joannis, In visio
nem Ezechielis, De eruditione hominis interioris, De Trinitate, and Benjamin Major. In
Apocalypsim Joannis, In visionem Ezechielis, and De eruditione hominis interioris associate
the similitudes with the imaginary level of prophetic vision. The most detailed explora-
tion of similitudes appears in Benjamin Major, in which at least six different categories are
distinguished. (1) The corporeal similitudes (2) The reasons for similitude or rational
similitudes (3) Angelic similitude, which should be imitated by the soul (4) The similitude
of God in the human soul (5) Similitudes between the persons of the Trinity (6) The inner
The Third Kind Of Contemplation 183

contemplation, the objects of intelligible and thus invisible reality can be

sought by using similitudes (similitudines) which can be found in all visible
objects.16 Furthermore, he states that the similitudes which are utilized in this
kind of contemplation are corporeal (corporales).17 Even though the similitude
is said to be corporeal, it can only be dealt with by imagination and reason
alone. The bodily senses have no access to the objects of the third kind of
contemplation.18
In the background of Richards idea of similitudes lies Hughs Neoplatonic
understanding of the souls ability to grasp both sensible and suprasensible
objects, as well as Pythagorean philosophy, which teaches that similar under-
stands similar (similia similibus comprehendi).19 As Hugh writes in his
Didascalicon, the soul goes out to sensible things through its senses and rises to
invisible things through its understanding, drawing the similitudes of all things
to itself. The human mind has the innate power to grasp everything and con-
tains every substance and nature, because it represents them in a similitude
within itself.20 The mind is thus imprinted with similitudes and is said to

ecstatic vision is made understandable by the application of similitudes. In many cases,

Richard does not give any specific explanation for the similitude. Because similitude may
refer to the relation between two members of this relation, as well as the members them-
selves, the interpretation of individual passages is difficult in many cases. However,
Richard makes an important distinction between the corporeal and rational similitudes
in Benjamin Major. Corporeal similitudes can be found in the created and visible things,
whereas rational similitudes reside in the human soul and its properties. For rational
similitudes, see BMAJ IV, XX, p. 115.8,14, for instance. The idea of rational similitudes is
further elaborated in chapter 7.3. For similitudes and dissimilitudes in De Trinitate, see
Salet 1959, 522. For the general interpretations of the notion of similitudines in the
twelfth century, see Javelet 1967, xxiii.
16 BMAJ I, VI, p. 13.911: Hoc autem contemplationis genere veraciter tunc utimur, quando
per rerum visibilium similitudinem in invisibilium rerum speculationem sublevamur.
BMAJ I, VII, p. 15.1920: Tertio et quarto constat esse commune invisibilibus et intelligi-
bilibus intendere; BMAJ II, XIV, p. 36.2628.
17 BMAJ II, XII, p. 34.21.
18 See the abridgement of different kinds of contemplation and the objects corresponding
to them in BMAJ I, VI, p. 1213. BMAJ II, XVII, p. 40.30p. 41.1: In eo itaque haec speculatio
in ratione consistit, quod illis solis investigandis insistit, quae corporeus sensus omnino
capere nequit.
19 Didascalicon I, I, p. 5.45. (742A): Pythagoricum namque dogma erat similia similibus
comprehendi, ut scilicet anima rationalis nisi ex omnibus composita foret, nullatenus
omnia comprehendere posset.
20 Didascalicon I, I, p. 4.17 p.5.13. (742A): quia et inuisibiles per intelligentiam rerum cau-
sas comprehendit, et uisibiles actualium formas per sensuum passiones colligit, secta que
184 Chapter 6

receive its components from all things. However, it contains these components
virtually and potentially, not formally.21
Furthermore, Hugh maintains in his commentary on Pseudo-Dionysius
Celestial Hierarchy that the created world offers proofs of a higher reality. These
proofs consist of signs, which can be interpreted as similitudes (similitudines)
of the invisible beauty. Through the understanding of these signs, one may be
illumined, receive theophanies, and ascend into the contemplation of divine
spheres. This retracing of creation back to its ultimate source is effected by
various hierarchies of beings.22 As Luscombe observes, Hughs commentary
provided an opportunity to examine the significance of symbols and signs, a
topic which was otherwise rare among Hughs contemporaries.23 Richards
idea of similitude is also related to this discussion, which explains that such
notions as imago, similitudo or translatio can have some cognitive function.24
Three different aspects should be taken into account in the analysis of
similitudes in Benjamin Majors third kind of contemplation. First, similitudes

in orbes geminos motum glomerat, quia siue per sensus ad sensibilia exeat siue per intel-
ligentiam ad inuisibilia ascendat. ad seipsam rerum similitudines trahens regyrat, et hoc
est quod eadem mens, que uniuersorum capax est, ex omni substantia atque natura, quo
similitudinis representet figuram, coaptatur.
21 Didascalicon I, I, p. 5.1416. (742B): neque enim hec rerum omnium similitudo aliunde aut
extrinsecus anime aduenire credenda est, sed ipsa potius eam in se et ex se natiua
quadam potentia et propria uirtute capit. Didascalicon I, I, p. 5.2630 (742C): sic nimirum
mens, rerum omnium similitudine insignita, omnia esse dicitur, atque ex omnibus com-
positionem suscipere, non integraliter, sed uirtualiter atque potentialiter continere. Note
the difference between Hughs and Richards ideas on similitudes. Hugh writes in
Didascalicon that the mind has a natural capacity to grasp the similitudes in and of itself,
but Richard emphasises that similitudes can be found in the visible reality. Richards
interpretation does not exclude the possibility that a similitude can be grasped within the
mind as well. In Hughs theory, the mind is imprinted with similitudes of everything and
is said to be all things and to receive its composition from all things.
22 For the references, see Luscombe 2000, 165166. As Luscombe shows, Hughs vocabulary
is rich: the objects of created reality may be seen as forms, similitudes, simulacra, specu
lamina, lights, figures, and images.
23 Luscombe 2000, 166. Hughs theory of symbols has been studied extensively. See espe-
cially Chenu 1957, chap. 2 and 3; Zinn 1973, 317341; Zinn 1977, 143169; Baron 1957, 181183;
Roques 1962, 294364; Zemler-Cizewski 1987, 6588; Sicard 1993, 84187; Chase 1995,
5558.
24 While these terms are being considered, it should be remarked that these notions have
ambiguous semantic connections with each other as well as such terms as symbolum,
significatio, typus, allegoria, velamen, visio, imaginatio, agalma, figura, figuratio, forma,
umbra and enigma, since they all share some reference to sensible and material reality.
The Third Kind Of Contemplation 185

can be seen as part of Richards conception of the epistemological process,

which is one of the implicit discussions in the six kinds of contemplation.
Second, they are viewed as necessary elements in biblical interpretation as
well as in rhetoric. Third, similitudes are constitutive fundamentals in Richards
theological method, which seeks similitudes or analogies between various
ontological levels.
In Benjamin Minor, Richard states without any further explanation that the
human soul can ascend to knowledge of invisible things through seeing visible
things if it draws a similitude from visible to invisible. Reason needs visible
objects in order to rise to the contemplation of heavenly things. It is assumed
that there is a kind of similitude in visible objects which corresponds to the
invisible objects.25 In Benjamin Major, Richard similarly argues that in the
third kind of contemplation the similitude (similitudo) should be drawn (tra
here) from the image of a visible thing (ex rerum visibilium imagine).26 The idea
of eliciting or drawing (trahere) similitudes is important, describing as it does
the process of identifying the analogies between visible and visible realities to
establish the relation between visible and invisible things.27
It may be presumed that the notion of similitude refers to the relation
between visible and invisible objects, not the visible or invisible object itself.

25 BMIN V, p. 102.6,1218: Nam sine imaginatione ratio nichil sciretinde manifeste colligi-
tur quia ad inuisibilium cognitionem nunquam ratio assurgeret, nisi ei ancilla sua, imagi-
natio uidelicet, rerum uisibilium formam repraesentaret. Per rerum enim uisibilium
speciem surgit ad rerum inuisibilium cognitionem, quotiens ex his ad illa quandam trahit
similitudinem. In Benjamin Minor, the similitudes, however, are less often mentioned
than in Benjamin Major and their significance is not as clear as in Benjamin Major. In
addition to the aforementioned passage, Richard acknowledges a visible similitude only
once in Benjamin Minor, see BMIN XV, p. 130.15. Benjamin Major includes several refer-
ences to similitudes.
26 BMAJ I, VI, p. 13.812,1415: Tertium contemplationis genus esse diximus quod in ratione
secundum imaginationem formatur. Hoc autem contemplationis genere veraciter tunc
utimur, quando per rerum visibilium similitudinem in invisibilium rerum speculationem
sublevamur. Haec vero speculatio in ratione consistit, quia his solis, quae imaginationem
excedunt per intentionem et investigationem insistit,quia ex rerum visibilium imagine
in hac speculatione similitudo trahitur. Cf. Gregory the Greats Homiliae in Evangelica, pl
76, 1295C: debemus ex rebus exterioribus introrsus aliquam similitudinem trahere. See
also Hugh of St. Victors In Salomonis Ecclesiasten homiliae, pl 175, 138C: Magnum ergo
hic spectaculum sanctis mentibus praeparatum est, quae norunt ex visibilibus trahere
invisibilium cognitionem. Richard also writes about extracting significations from things.
See also Richards alternative formulation in Sermones centum, pl 177, 932B: Possumus
autem de myrrha, propter ejus amaritudinem, multiplices trahere significationes.
27 For the significance of trahere, see Ward 1990, 4143.
186 Chapter 6

Thus, in the third kind of contemplation, the concept of similitude should be

understood as a relational term based on the visible object or, to be more pre-
cise, the image of the visible object.28 Richards language is indefinite in the
sense that even though similitude refers in most cases to the relation between
two things, he also occasionally refers to the elements of this relation as simili-
tudes. Thus he leaves it unclear in some places how the notion of similitude
should be interpreted.
An image is a necessary corporeal starting-point for the relation with some
invisible thing. Richard emphasizes the difference between mere image and
similitude by claiming that a similitude must always be looked for even if some
image seems to be sufficient for understanding an invisible thing. People can
thus use the things they know to in order to understand the things they are
unfamiliar with.29 In Benjamin Minor also, Richard differentiates image from
similitude, which has a closer contact with invisible objects. As an example of
this, he states that some verses of the Bible appeal to similitude with respect to
the invisible reality, but not to sensible images which should be understood
asspecies.30

28 BMAJ I, VII, p. 15.1319: Secundum et tertium [genus contemplationis] hoc habent com-
mune, sed prae ceteris singulare, quod in utroque pariter sibi commisceri videntur imagi-
natio cum ratione, ratio cum imaginatione. Differunt autem in eo, quod in secundo
quidem ad visibilia ratio, ut dictum est, quaeritur et accomodatur; in tertio vero ad invisi-
bilium investigationem ratio a visibilibus trahitur et in illo saepe ex visibilibus ad visibilia
erudimur et alia ex aliis conicimus. In isto ex visibilium inspectione ad invisibilium cog-
nitionem promovemur.
29 BMAJ II, XII, p. 35.14: Ab ipsis ergo, quae ad illa vicinius accedunt et quae invisibilium
imaginem evidentiorem gerunt, debemus utique similitudinem trahere, ut ad ea, quae
per experientiam non novimus, per ea quae cognovimus intelligentia nostra possit ascen-
dere. This principle of differentiation between image and similitude appears in Hughs
Commentaria in Hierarchiam coelestem, pl 175, 935D936A. See also Hughs Pro assump
tione Virginis, pl 177, 1215B: Rerum visibilium species, quas sensus hominis novit, et ipsae
jucundae sunt, et suaves hominibus; ipsae ad similitudinem proponuntur, ut ex eis
cogitet homo quae non novit.
30 Richard states that the invisible things can be presented to the unskilled person by means
of the visible forms (formae) such that the text of the Bible impresses the memories of
these forms through the beauty of desirable appearances (species). For this reason, the
Bible describes flowers, sweet smells, pearls, and other beautiful things. BMIN XV,
p. 130.36: Res enim inuisibiles per rerum uisibilium formas describunt, et earum
memoriam per quarumdam concupiscibilium specierum pulchritudinem mentibus
nostris imprimunt. However, Richard reminds us that in the spiritual realm nothing
exists through seeing, or as images, but as similitude. BMIN XV, p. 130.1215: Et scimus
quidem quia horum omnium nichil ibi est, ubi tamen nichil omnino deesse potest.
The Third Kind Of Contemplation 187

Furthermore, Richards conception of the notion of similitude seems to be

based on Augustines doctrine of similitudes, signs, and species. Augustine
deals with specific corporeal similitudes in several sections of his De Genesi ad
litteram. In this treatise, Augustine analyses the so-called spiritual vision,
which turns out to be an important image-making activity of the soul.
Augustine summarizes the similitudes of corporeal things as being formed in
the human spiritual nature. These similitudes may come into the mind from
various sources. In the normal state, when the human touches some bodily
thing with some bodily sense, a similitude of that thing is immediately formed
in the spirit.31 Some corporeal similitudes anticipate the future,32 some are
caused by ecstasy, angels or demons, and others are productions of dreams or
illness.33 However, the spiritual nature offers visions which are inferior to the
visions of the mind or intelligence.34
As Spruit points out, Augustine assumes the existence of a chain of enti-
ties which he interchangeably refers to as forms, images, similitudes, or
species. These originate in sensible objects, and then penetrate the sense
organs and eventually reach the perceptual and cognitive faculties. Thus the
mind forms a sensible image of the visible object through this process, dur-
ing which all the contingent properties of the object are stripped away, with
only the species or similitude (species, similitudo) remaining. At the next
level of the process, the soul uses the species or similitude to acquire the cor-
responding idea. As the soul advances through the similitudes to examine
the properties of invisible things, it moves closer to God, the primary cause

Talium namque nichil ibi est per speciem, ubi tamen totum est per similitudinem. Note
the difficulty of translating species. In these passages, it may refer to the exterior appear-
ance of the thing or the act of seeing something in general.
31 De Genesi ad litteram 12.23.49: Quod autem nunc insinuare satis arbitror, certum est esse
spiritualem quamdam naturam in nobis, ubi corporalium rerum formantur similitudines;
sive cum aliquod corpus sensu corporis tangimus, et continuo formatur ejus similitudo in
spiritu, memoriaque reconditur; sive cum absentia corpora jam nota cogitamus, ut ex eis
formetur quidam spiritualis aspectussive cum eorum corporum quae non novimus, sed
tamen esse non dubitamus, similitudines, non ita ut sunt illa, sed ut occurrit intuemur;
sive unde unde, neque id agentibus, neque volentibus nobis variae formae corporalium
similitudinem versantur in animo. For the interpretation of Augustines notion of spiri-
tual nature and similitudes, see Cranz 2006, IV, 912.
32 De Genesi ad litteram 12.22.48.
33 De Genesi ad litteram 12.9.20; 12.13.27; 12.30.58.
34 De Genesi ad litteram 12.24.50: Haec igitur natura spiritualis, in qua non corpora, sed cor-
porum similitudines exprimuntur, inferioris generis visiones habet, quam illud mentis
atque intelligentiae lumen
188 Chapter 6

of all being.35 Thus, the similitudes are mental material without which the
invisible objects cannot be reached.36 They are neither unconscious con-
cepts, nor immaterial copies of sensory representations.37 Spruit also deals
with Hugh of St. Victors ideas, remarking that Hughs notion of intelligible
objects (intelligibilia) in Didascalicon is important in this respect.38 According
to Hugh, intelligible things can be known by the intellect with the aid of the
senses and imagination. Hugh also mentions that the incoporeal soul
descends to apprehension of sensible things by drawing into itself simili-
tudes of sensible things through its imagination.39 Hughs theory is an essen-
tial theoretical framework for Richards understanding of similitudes and
their use in the third kind of contemplation. However, it is unclear whether
Hughs and Richards idea of similitudes should be interpreted as belonging
to the discussion concerning intelligible species, in which case similitudes
might be understood as mental representations of things; or, are they rather
like analogies or relations between different things? It is possible that their

35 De Trinitate 11.9.16: In hac igitur distributione cum incipimus a specie corporis et perveni-
mus usque ad speciem quae fit in contuitu cogitantis, quatuor species reperiuntur quasi
gradatim natae altera ex altera; secunda, de prima; tertia, de secunda; quarta, de tertia.
Aspecie quippe corporis quod cernitur, exoritur ea quae fit in sensu cernentis; et ab hac,
ea quae fit in memoria; et ab hac, ea quae fit in acie cogitantis. Quapropter voluntas quasi
parentem cum prole ter copulat: primo speciem corporis cum ea quam gignit in corporis
sensu: et ipsam rursus cum ea quae fit ex illa in memoria; atque istam quoque tertio cum
ea quae ex illa partitur in cogitantis intuitu. Richard replaces Augustines concept of
memory with the concept of imagination (imaginatio). For Augustines theory of species
and knowledge of sensible reality, see Spruit 1994, 179186.
36 For the concept of the mental representation and similitudes (similitudines) in scholasti-
cism, see Panaccio 2001, 185201. Dronke notes that the definitions of the similitude com-
posed by the ancient rhetoricians may assist deeper understanding of the medieval
notion of similitudo. For instance, in the Ad Herennium it is written that similitudo est
oratio transducens ad rem quampiam aliquid ex re dispari simile. Cicero in turn accord-
ingly writes in his De Inventione: imago est formae cum forma cum quodam similitudine
conlatio. He also says that imago est oratio demonstrans corporeum aut naturarum
similitudinem. Dronke 1974, 41.
37 Spruit 1994, 2, 2427.
38 Spruit 1994, 100.
39 Didascalicon II, III, p. 27.3, 612 (753CD): intelligibilis uero ideo, quod similitudo quidem
est sensibilium, nec tamen sensibilisintelligibile autem quod ipsum quidem solo perci-
pitur intellectu, sed non solo intellectu percipit, quia imaginationem vel sensum habet,
quo ea quae sensibus subiacent comprehendit. Didascalicon II, III, p. 26.2225: sed quia
per instrumenta sensuum non uniformiter ad sensibilia comprehendenda descendit,
eorum que similitudinem per imaginationem ad se trahit, in eo quodammodo suam sim-
plicitatem deserit, quo compositionis rationem admittit.
The Third Kind Of Contemplation 189

idea of corporeal similitudes includes both of these elements in some

indefinite way.
Richards aim in the description of the third kind of contemplation is to
present an exact report on the similitudes and their utility in spiritual activity.
He writes that the third kind of contemplation may support its operation on
the corporeal similitudes and thus lift itself higher, like climbing up a ladder
(scala). Richard specifies that the properties of corporeal things (rerum corpo
rearum proprietates) constitute the steps of the ladder.40 These steps refer to
the ladder of Jacob, which represents the rising of the soul up the ladders of
external knowledge to examine the spiritual reality.41 In ascending these lad-
ders, the soul begins to apprehend the qualities of invisible things when it
draws the similitude of the visible objects to invisible objects.42
Regrettably, Richard does not clarify what he means by the qualities of invis-
ible things. However, it could be assumed that the question concerns the invis-
ible properties of God (invisibilia Dei), which are seen everywhere in the
created world. Hugh identifies invisibilia Dei as the divine power, wisdom, and
kindness in his De tribus diebus.43 Richard is not as explicit about invisible

40 BMAJ II, XII, p. 34.1012: Recte autem haec contemplatio, quae, ut ad invisibilia ascendat,
baculo se corporae similitudinis sustentat et quadam, ut ita dicam, corporalium proprie-
tatum scala se ad alta sublevat. Cf. De Trinitate VI, XXIII, p. 261.47. For the concept of
proprietas in Richard, see Den Bok 1996, 140. Richards term proprietas primarily means
that feature which characterizes a things proprium, a non-accidental feature of that
thing. Since the proprium itself does not have to be an individual property, the property is
a distinctive non-accidental feature. For the term proprietas in connection with significa
tio, see also Liber exceptionum I, II, cap. V, p. 116.24: Voces non plus quam duas aut tres
habent significationes. Res autem tot possunt habere significationes quot habent pro
prietates. Every object (res) can have as many significations (significationes) as it has
properties (proprietates).
41 The same idea is also repeated in Benjamin Minor. BMIN LXII, p. 268.2933: Haec aqua
cuique tunc in uinum uertitur, quando, aspirante Deo, per exterioris scientiae scalam ad
inuisibilium intelligentiam subleuatur, quando inuisibilia Dei a creatura mundi per ea
quae facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur (Rom. 1:20). Cf. also De exterminatione mali et pro
motione boni, pl 196, 1112A and De Trinitate VI, XXIII, p. 261.5 in which the ladder is con-
structed out of similitudes. See also De Trinitate, in which Richard mentions the similitude
of visible things. De Trinitate V, VI, p. 201.811: Rerum ergo visibilium similitudine pro
scala utamur, ut que in semet ipsis per speciem videre non valemus, ex ejusmodi specula
et velut per speculum videre mereamur. For Jacobs ladder, see Gen 28:12.
42 BMAJ II, XII, p. 34.1618: Sic nimirum, sic ista speculatio usque ad indagandas rerum corpo-
rearum proprietates sponte se inclinat, ut habeat unde ex istis ad illa similitudinem trahat.
43 De tribus diebus I, p. 34.69 (811C): Tria sunt inuisibilia Dei: potentia, sapientia,
benignitas. Ab his tribus procedunt omnia, in his tribus consistunt omnia, et per haec tria
190 Chapter 6

qualities in Benjamin Major, mentioning them only once.44 When Richard

refers to invisible things or qualities he uses such notions as the invisible things
of God (invisibilia Dei) and invisible good things (invisibilia bona).45 These
invisible things may allude to the ideas in the mind of God, the fundamental
causes of creation, or to divine properties as such.46 In his Liber exceptionum,
Richard states like Hugh that invisibilia Dei refer to divine power, wisdom,
and kindness.47 Both Victorines see these three attributes as reflections of
the three persons of the Trinity.48 Invisible qualities may also refer to those
invisible things which are contemplated in the fourth kind of contemplation,

reguntur omnia. Potentia creat, sapientia gubernat, benignitas conservat. The same idea
appears in De contemplatione et ejus speciebus, p. 80.67: Tria quidem sunt Dei inuisi-
bilia, potentia, sapientia, bonitas.
44 In Benjamin Minor, Richard still presents the higher form of rational imagination, which
assists the soul in rising from the visible image of the sun to apprehend the wisdom of
God. BMIN XXII, p. 148.30p. 150.33. Wisdom is an invisible uncreated, substantial attri-
bute of God.
45 BMAJ II, XII, p. 34.8,29. Richard quotes again Rom. 1:20. BMAJ II, XII, p. 34.69: Ad hoc
genus pertinet quoties per rerum visibilium similitudinem rerum invisibilium qualitatem
deprehendimus, quoties per visibilia mundi invisibilia Dei cognoscimus, ut constet quod
scriptum reperitur, quia invisibilia Dei a creatura mundi per ea, quae facta sunt, intellecta
conspiciuntur. For example, in BMAJ II, XII, p. 34.26,29 and BMAJ II, XVI, p. 39.15 Richard
uses the invisibilia bona notion as he refers to the invisible properties of God. He also
states that the invisible things in the third kind of contemplation represent spiritual
knowledge (scientia spiritualis). BMAJ II, XIII, p. 35.30. Furthermore, Richard claims that
the soul can receive a seed of doctrine (doctrinae semina) in the third kind of contempla-
tion. BMAJ II,XV, p. 38.30.
46 This idea frequently appears in the Christian texts which have Neoplatonic tendencies.
See Augustines De civitate Dei 8.6., for example, where Augustine uses the following
notions concerning the divine ideas: species, rationes primordiales, causales rationes, and
primae causae. Hugh of St. Victor mentions the primordial reasons (causes primordiales)
in his De sacramentis II, I, 23. pl 176, 206207. In the twelfth century, theologians debated
whether these reasons were created or uncreated, and how they were related to the
essence of God. For the varying comments concerning the Victorines on this debate, see
Salet 1959, 474 and Ribaillier 1958, 29.
47 Liber exceptionum I, II, cap. II, p. 114.3p. 115.7: Nec pretereundum quod per opus conditio
nis tria invisibilia Dei demonstrantur: Invisibilia enim ipsius, a creatura mundi, per ea que
facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur. Tria sunt invisibilia Dei: potentia, sapientia, benigni-
tas. Ab his tribus procedunt omnia, in his tribus consistunt omnia, per hec tria reguntur
omnia. Cf. BMAJ I, VI, p. 12.2223.
48 For the analysis of this triad and its relationship with Abelards similar idea, see Feiss 2011,
5558.
The Third Kind Of Contemplation 191

which are described as incorporeal and invisible essences, i.e., angelic and
human spirits.49
Visible things may exalt the soul so much that it will eventually reach the
invisible, spiritual things. The soul discerns that, compared to visible things,
the invisible things are more abundant, and are more excellent in dignity as
well.50 It could be argued that contemplation has a physical foundation,
because in the third kind of contemplation one spontaneously attempts to
comprehend the properties of the corporeal things in which similitudes can be
found.51 Still, Richard reminds the reader that the soul must also be able to
compare these similitudes with one another in the third kind of contempla-
tion, since finding the similitudes is not sufficient. The soul is not satisfied with
the knowledge it gathers from mere similitudes of things, but starts to prove
different things by various arguments, and gathers things by means of reason-
ing (alia ex aliis argumentando coniciens et ratiocinando colligens). The soul
also infers consequences of things (consequentiae).52 The method of moving
from visible things to invisible has features which emphazise that the thinking
processes start from experience and experiential reasoning.
How is it possible for the soul to examine invisible qualities of things from
the similitude of some visible object? Richard mentions the similitudes repeat-
edly, but he also points out that the reason or rationale for these similitudes
should also be found. Richard stresses that the soul must learn to make use of

49 BMAJ III, I, p. 55.68: Constat itaque hoc contemplationis genus, uti superius iam diximus,
in incorporeis et invisibilibus essentiis utpote spiritibus angelicis et spiritibus humanis.
50 BMAJ II, XII, p. 34.2427: Tunc autem corona, quam arca se et expandit latius et erigit
altius, quando subtilis contemplator manifeste deprehendit bona invisibilia visibilibus et
multitudine ampliora et dignitate excellentiora.
51 BMAJ II, XII, p. 34.1618: Sic nimirum, sic ista speculatio usque ad indagandas rerum cor-
porearum proprietates sponte se inclinat, ut habeat unde ex istis ad illa similitudinem
trahat.
52 BMAJ II, XII, p. 34.1821: Veruntamen se latius expandens inferiorum angustias intra se
includit nec his contenta, quae ex similitudine collegit, sed ad alia ex aliis argumentando
coniciens et ratiocinando colligens consequentiarum exsecutione omnem corpoream
similitudinem longe post se relinquit. The same idea occurs in BMAJ I, VII, p. 15.1819: ex
visibilibus ad invisibilia erudimur et alia ex aliis conicimus. In isto ex visibilium inspec-
tione ad invisibilium cognitionem promovemur. Note that this passage contains termi-
nology which is related to the twelfth-century logical theory of inference; for instance,
consequentia deal with logical relations between sentences, particularly the entailment or
valid inference of things. Richard uses this notion mainly in his De Trinitate, in which
most of his arguments about Trinity are concatenations of syllogisms. See, for instance,
De Trinitate II, XI, p. 118.2125; De Trinitate II, XVIII, p. 125.1318. For Richards use of logical
inferences in De Trinitate, see Den Bok 1996, 180184.
192 Chapter 6

the reasons for similitudes and by means of them gradually rise to know the
invisible properties. He explains his theory as follows: It is the characteristic
feature of this speculation to draw a similitude from visible to invisible things
and to rise from the consideration of the former to knowledge of the latter by
the assignment of the proposed similitude.53 Since the similitude of a visible
thing as such is not enough to grasp the invisible qualities of things, Richard
adds that in the similitudes one must find or even draw out (eruere) the appro-
priate reason (ratio). Satisfactory reasons means that one should find adequate
resemblances between the property of the similitude and the invisible thing.54
Similitudes of visible objects are different in that some objects include
clearer and stronger similitudes to invisible things than others. However, all
possible visible objects have at least some slight similitude, albeit exceedingly
remote and almost foreign, so that all the objects are valuable for the third kind
of contemplation. Some things are very near to the invisible qualities to which
they refer. In such cases, the two forms of reality, material and immaterial,
approach each other to the point where the border between them sometimes
seems to become fuzzy. Richard explains that the similitude of some visible
things to the invisible may be so apparent that it expresses the invisible quality
completely. This kind of similitude no longer appears to approach by means of
visible things but seem to inhere in and be grafted onto the invisible thing.55

53 BMAJ II, XIV, p. 36.2124: proprium huius speculationis est a visibilibus ad invisibilia
similitudinem trahere, et ex illorum consideratione ad istorum cognitionem propositae
similitudinis assignatione ascendere. Cf. Hughs De scripturis et scriptoribus sacris, pl 175,
14C: per similitudinem propositas, eorum quae spiritualiter intelligenda sunt, claram
demonstrationem figuravit.
54 BMAJ II, XIV, p. 36.3032: Ex his itaque omnibus ad invisibilium investigationem con-
gruas similitudinum rationes eruere possumus et debemus For the extended analysis
of the Victorine idea of fittingness (convenientia, congruere) between different things, res,
see Coulter 2006, 176189. Coulter differentiates three systems of discussion concerning
fittingness: (1) the metaphysical criterion; (2) an aesthetic criterion; (3) the logical crite-
rion. Coulter also mentions Richards idea of the interrelationship between the literal and
spiritual senses of the Bible. One important criterion for transferring from literal interpre-
tation to spiritual interpretation is congruence, fittingness. The spiritual sense is drawn
out and formed according to congruent similitudes found at the literal level. Coulter 2006,
189. See Richards In visionem Ezechielis, pl 196, 527AB.
55 BMAJ II, XII, p. 34.28p. 35.1: Habent tamen corporea omnia ad invisibilia bona similitu-
dinem aliquam, sed alia infimam quandam et valde longinquam et paene extraneam, alia
autem viciniorem et manifestiorem et quanto propinquiorem, tanto evidentiorem et
supra haec alia valde propinquam et cognatam, ut sic dicam, et penitus expressam, in
tantum ut videantur invisibilibus non iam appropinquare, sed inhaerere et inseri potius
quam accedere.
The Third Kind Of Contemplation 193

He does not give any examples of visible things which have this kind of
close similitude, simply stating that the similitudes in question allow the
human being to utilize what he already knows in order to understand those
things which we do not know through experience.56 Our knowledge of
thingsmay be more appropriate or adequate when a stronger similitude can be
recognized.57
The similitudes can be divided into five different sub-categories. Thus the
third kind of contemplation becomes a five-fold spiritual exercise in which the
similitude between one thing and another is adopted and formed by varying
modes.58 On the basis of these modes, Richard classifies five different groups
of objects pertaining to the third kind of contemplation: the similitudes of (1)
matter, (2) form, (3) nature, (4) the works of nature, and (5) the works of man.59

56 BMAJ II, XII, p. 35.14: Ab ipsis ergo, quae ad illa vicinius accedunt et quae invisibilium
imaginem evidentioren gerunt, debemus utique similitudinem trahere, ut ad ea, quae per
experientiam non novimus, per quae cognovimus intelligentia nostra possit ascendere.
57 BMAJ IV, VIII, p. 95.57: Constat autem illa facilius posse comprehendi et viciniora mag-
isque propinqua atque consentanea esse rationi, quae se sinunt ad aliquam similitudi-
nem applicari. For the analysis, see Den Bok 1996, 113.
58 BMAJ II, XV, p. 37.2931: Cum enim similitudo ex aliquo ad aliquid assumitur, secundum
eosdem modos vario ordine formatur. In this division, Richard is again basing his con-
struction on the biblical description of the structure of the Ark of the Covenant. The
golden crown which circles the ark is built in the third kind of contemplation. The length
of the crown is two and half cubits, and the width one and a half cubits. These measures
correspond to the measurements of the Ark, which leads Richard to conclude that every-
thing that has been analysed earlier in connection with the first and second kinds of con-
templation should also be the material for the third kind. BMAJ II, XIV, p. 36.1618: Constat
itaque eam secundum dimensionem arcae duos cubitos et semissem in longitudine, cubi-
tum autem unum et semissem habere in latitudine.
59 In addition to this five-fold division of the corporeal similitudes, Richard offers another
way of grouping the forms of the third kind of contemplation. According to him, in the
third the human being can experience three different kinds of joy. The first and weakest
joy of these three arises from the speculation caused by the visible corporeal things. The
second joy is brought about in the ardent longing for charity produced by the delightful-
ness of the mutual vision (visio mutua) of spiritual people. The third joy expresses the
indescribable joy which is caused by the constant contemplation of the Creator. For this
classification, see BMAJ II, XVI, p. 40. Richard emphasizes the significance of spiritual
comfort, which springs from the joy which arises from visible things. BMAJ II, XVI,
p. 40.1014: Vides certe, quod spiritualia pascua inveniuntur non solum in interioribus,
verum etiam in rebus exterioribus, in rebus corporalibus. Absque dubio corporalia bona,
in quantum bonis invisibilibus et incorporeis similia sunt, spiritibus nec mirum spiritua-
lia pascua ministrare possunt.
194 Chapter 6

These five categories correspond to the two main categories of objects which
I have dealt with in the preceding chapter in connection with the first and
second kinds of contemplation, namely, the things and works. First, the human
being should endeavour to study the similitudes which arise from particular
properties of matter. He can then begin to examine the similitudes of the form
and nature of a thing. As maintained by Richard, form is an external property
of an object. The study of form can be further divided into examining the
colour and figure of the object, external properties which may be defined as
the subjects of the sense of sight. The nature of an object (natura) refers to the
internal qualities of a thing, and the examination of this inner nature rests on
the testimony of the other four senses of hearing, feeling, smell, and touch. In
external and internal qualities, one may find suitable similitudes to deal with
in the third kind of contemplation.60
The fourth and fifth groups of similitudes are provided by the works of
nature and man. The movement of nature (motus naturalis) denotes the neces-
sary movement behind the various natural phenomena. The similitude may be
drawn from diverse natural operations. The fifth group of similitudes is gath-
ered from those things which are performed by an artificial mode (modus
a rtificialis), something that takes place because of the human will.61
Richard also discusses whether human and divine institutions (humana et
divina instituta) can be the basis of similitudes. This issue is founded on his
analyses of the first and second kinds of contemplation, in which the contem-
plation of these institutions is an important part of the spiritual ascent. The
human institutions include social and church legislation, whereas the divine
institutions consist of the liturgy and the sacraments.62 How can one find suit-
able similitudes from this kind of object? Richard thinks that from divine insti-
tutions (divina instituta) it is easy to draw similitudes with the invisible reality
but with regard to the possible similitudes of the human institutions (humana
instituta) he is in doubt. He states that from human institutions it is possible to

60 BMAJ II, XV, p. 38.27,9,1214: Primus ergo huiuscemodi ratiocinationis modus in hac spe
culatione trahitur ex materiae proprietate; secundus et tertius ex rei ipsius qualitate, sed
secundus, ex qualitate extrinseca, quod diximus formam, tertius vero ex qualitate intrin-
seca, quod superius diximus naturam. Quartus autem modus colligitur ex eo, quod in re
ipsa vel ab ipsa fit secundum motum naturalem. Quintus demum ex eo, quod agitur
secundum modum artificialem. Qualitas extrinseca constat in colore et figura. Nota
quod extrinseca qualitas pertinet ad solum visum, quemadmodum intrinseca qualitas ad
quemlibet ceterorum sensuum.
61 BMAJ II, XV, p. 37.35p. 38.1: Quartus vero ex eo, quod per ipsum fit impulsu quodam
necessitatis. Quintus autem ex eo, quod per ipsum fit sed proposito voluntatis.
62 BMAJ II, VI, p. 27.1621.
The Third Kind Of Contemplation 195

depict only very remote and distant similitudes (longinqua et omnino pere
grina similitudo) with spiritual objects. This is explained by the fact that human
institutions have been established in response to the needs of worldly life, not
for the description of eternity.63 In spite of this, they still reflect the shadow of
future good things.64 As the human institutions also imitate the operation of
nature, they reflect invisible things in themselves like a shadow.65 Here Richard
indirectly refers to imagining the future, which is otherwise a rare topic in
Benjamin Major.66 In Benjamin Minor, by contrast, he offers a clear model
according to which the human being is able to formulate images of rewards
and punishments which will take place in the future by means of the
co-operation of the imagination (imaginatio) and reason or understanding
(ratio, intelligentia).67
There is no doubt that the principal motive for the theory of similitudes is
the interpretation of biblical texts. It is characteristic of Richard to proceed
through exegesis to contemplation. This method is more obvious in his In
v isionem Ezechielis, where he explains that there is a connection between
the literal and mystical senses of the Bible, which should be detected with
the help of congruent similitudes. The reader must draw out (eruere) and
form (formare) these similitudes in order to link literal and spiritual things
together.68 He defines similitudes similarly in Benjamin Major.69 As Evans
writes in TheLanguage and Logic of the Bible, it is possible to make the leap of

63 BMAJ II, XIV, p. 37.415. The third main group of objects of contemplation, human and
divine morals (mores), bother Richard particularly. The Bible does not say anything else
concerning the height of the Ark than that the crown has been placed on top. He indeed
states that there are only very remote similitudes in human morals with respect to invis-
ible things. On the other hand, human morals may contain similitudes when they imitate
divine morals.
64 Hebr. 10: 1.
65 BMAJ II, XIV, p. 37.711: Creatoris autem opera quaelibet visibilia ad hoc sunt creata, sic
sunt disposita, ut et praesentis vitae usibus ministrarent et futurorum bonorum umbram
gererent, unde fit etiam ut operatio industriae in quantum imitatur naturam, in tantum
in se gestet invisibilium vel futurorum umbram.
66 For similar passage, see BMAJ II, XVI, p. 3940.
67 BMIN XVI, p. 132.1419: Huiusmodi imaginatione saepe utimur, cum quae sint futurae
uitae bona uel mala diligentius rimamur. Nusquam hic sola bona, nusquam hic sola mala,
sed permixta simul et bona et mala, et quamuis in utroque genere sint multa, nunquam
tamen inueniuntur sola.
68 In visionem Ezechielis, pl 196, 527B, 528A. The idea of congruence between literal and
spiritual meanings of the Bible in Richards In visionem Ezechielis and De Emmanuele is
discussed by Coulter 2006, 189201.
69 BMAJ II, XIV, p. 38.3032.
196 Chapter 6

understanding required, because one can perceive a likeness or similitude

between the concrete and the abstract. The similitudes are necessary since
they help the mind to enter into the things that lie beyond its normal scope.70
This is apparent in Richards texts as he proceeds to give examples of various
kinds of similitude. In his thought, similitudes form a kind of representational
system. Their function may be understood only in the associated system of
interpretation that is the Bible and its historical and conventional readings.
Whether the similitude is intelligible depends on its relation to the hermeneu-
tic system.
Thus, the similitudes of the invisible reality should be sought above all in
Scripture, which contains numerous examples of the various similitudes. In
order to clarify his attitude to the similitudes, Richard offers an illustration for
each of the five groups. When it is said in the Song of Songs that the beloveds
legs are like marble columns, the similitude is drawn from the particular nature
of matter. The appearance of wheels in the book of Ezekiel refers to the simili-
tude contained in the form. He then presents applications in which the simili-
tudes are drawn from hearing, smell, taste, and touch.71 These examples show
that when the sense of smell, for instance, is mentioned in the biblical text, the
reader should search out the spiritual understanding of the passage, i.e., an
analogical interpretation.72 The activities of nature and man are also dealt
with. In the last part of the Benjamin Major, Richard gives a vivid example of
how to use the similitude of the sun by urging us to consider the great bright-
ness and heat in its orb. In seeing exterior things such as the sun, one under-
stands what should be thought of in the realm of interior things. Just as the
sunlight reflects from the surface of the water, Gods self-disclosure rebounds
from the meditation of the heart and ecstasy of the mind may occur. From this
one may infer the advancement of the ascent of the mind in contemplation.73

70 Evans 1984, 102.

71 BMAJ II, XV, p. 38.712: Ex proprietate materiae similitudo trahitur, cum dicitur: Crura
illius columnae marmoreae, quae fundatae sunt super bases aureas. A colore similitudo
assignatur in eo, quod legitur: Dilectus meus candidus et rubicundus; a figurae qualitate
similitudo sumitur, ubi mystica descriptione sacrae scripturae qualitas commendatur:
Aspectus earum et opus earum quasi si sit rota in medio rotae.
72 Hugh of St. Victor deals with this same idea of similitudines in his treatise Commentaria in
Hierarchiam coelestem, pl 175, 959D950B. Hugh writes that visible forms correspond to
images of invisible beauty. He then enumerates five bodily senses and draws a kind of
similitude from them with spiritual invisible reality. The outer appearance (sight) is vir-
tue, the form (sight) is justice, sweetness (taste) is love, odour (smell) is desire, song (hear-
ing) is joy, and touching is finding the good.
73 BMAJ V, X, p. 135.212.
The Third Kind Of Contemplation 197

We see in exterior things what we should think of interior things.74 The exte-
rior indications for the use of similitudes may be something that we see daily.
Richard gives some applications of his theory of similitudes in Benjamin Major,
urging us to observe how, for instance, animals behave or the existing topogra-
phy. From these natural phenomena, the human being may draw similitudes.
The similitudes of hills and mountains, the playing of the rams and lambs, or
the leaping of fish may then be used as examples of the various kinds of ecstasy
of the human mind.75
Richards examples may be considered as insufficient because the proper-
ties of invisible things are not mentioned at all, i.e., the other element of the
similitude is missing, only the corporeal starting point of the similitude being
cited.76 The reasons for similitudes are not analysed either. However, it is clear
in the light of these examples that the actual task of the third kind of contem-
plation is the interpretation of figurative expressions found in the Bible. It may
be concluded that the third kind offers a theoretical framework and justifica-
tion for the allegorical method of interpretation. The collaboration between
reason (ratio) and imagination (imaginatio) results in a combination of the
powers of the mind without which allegory and figurative speech would lose
all meaning and purpose.77
In the overall structure of Benjamin Major, the literal interpretation of
Scripture is closely followed by mystical interpretation. For example, the

74 BMAJ V, XI, p. 135.1718: Videmus in rebus exterioribus, quid de rebus interioribus aesti-
mare debeamus.
75 BMAJ V, XIV, p. 142.1114: Huius sane rei formam etiam in animalibus cotidie possumus
percipere. Solent namque in suis lusibus saltus quosdam dare et sua corpora quantulum-
cumque in aera suspendere. Sic saepe et pisces, dum in aquis ludunt. These illustrations
show how the biblical interpretation is like a web of associations in which a mere allusion
to some word in Scripture evokes new quotations and their significations elsewhere in the
Bible. For the monastic reading of the Bible, see Leclercq 1982, 7475. For the visualizing
of rams and lambs as well as mountains, see also Mysticae adnotationes in Psalmos, pl 196,
337D343A, in which Richard mentions that, unlike contemplation, speculation uses cor-
poreal similitudes.
76 Richard further illustrates the use of similitudes in his analysis of the ecstatic meeting
with God in the higher levels of contemplation. In the ecstasy of the mind there is no
need whatsoever for figures or the symbolic representations. However, after the divine
vision, the individual can make his vision understandable as well as expressible for
others. This is possible either by reasoning or application of similitudes. BMAJ IV, XI,
p. 99100. For this, see also chapter 7.3.
77 A similar transfer from the classifications and levels of objects of contemplation to the
interpretation of the Bible is expounded in De contemplatione et ejus speciebus,
p.69.119.
198 Chapter 6

wooden parts of the Ark represent things, the gilding of these parts and the
golden crown refer to reason and cherubs to the one and triune God. This is
how Richard shows how the similitudes with invisible reality and mystical
interpretation should be drawn from the literal level of the Bible in practice in
his own work. In this way, the literal understanding (sensus literalis) is sup-
posed to give rise to a threefold figurative understanding. Richards mystical
sense often covers three specific levels of interpretation, i.e., allegorical, tropo-
logical, and anagogical.78 Furthermore, one may argue that there is some paral-
lelism between the kinds of contemplation in Benjamin Major and the different
senses of Scripture. The first and second kinds of contemplation roughly cor-
respond to the literal meaning of the Bible, whereas the higher ones produce
the theoretical framework for the three spiritual meanings.79 Inspite of this
scriptural application, it must be remembered that sensible things and their
similitudes are to be found in the visible world and its objects as well.80
Richards idea that the human soul may use reason and imagination in com-
bination in order to study similitudes is interesting. However, some compo-
nents of his theory may be traced back to the writings of Augustine, John
Scotus Eriugena, and Hugh of St. Victor. First, Augustine uses the concept of
corporeal similitudes or similitudes in De Genesi ad litteram, as well as in his
other texts.81 Second, John Scotus Eriugena writes in his Periphyseon that simil-
itudes (similitudines) are the same things as fantasies (phantasiae).82 Third,
Hugh refers to the concept of similitude (similitudo) in Celestial Hierarchies,
his commentary on Pseudo-Dionysius, several times. Hugh suggests that the
creation offers signs and that these may be interpreted as similitudes (similitu
dines) of the invisible reality.83 In his Didascalicon, Hugh argues that the

78 See Den Bok 1996, 102103; 109113 and Coulter 2006, 6163, 9297.
79 See a similar interpretation in Coulter 2006, 62, 8485, who claims that the first three
kinds of contemplation constitute the background for literal exegesis.
80 BMAJ II, XII, p. 34.2830.
81 De Genesi ad litteram 12.23.49, 12.22.48, 12.24.50; Confessiones 10.8.1314.
82 Periphyseon II, p. 98, 100 (569B, 569D): Sensus est sensibilium rerum fantasia per instru-
menta corporis assumpta. per quinquepertitum corporis instrumentum ueluti per
quasdam cuiusdam ciuitatis portas sensibilium rerum similitudines ex qualitatibus et
quantitatibus exterioris mundi venientes. See the commentary by Sheldon-William 1983,
236n.309. For Eriugenas original imaginatio/phantasia terminology, see Foussard 1977,
337348 and Bautier 1988, 8290.
83 Commentaria in Hierarchiam coelestem, pl 175, 935936, 949C, 956C. See also the complex
hierarchy of similitudes in the arts in Didascalicon II, III, p. 27.18. (753BC). Cf. Isaac of
Stella, who relates the corporeal similitudes to the souls ability of imagination. See
Epistola de anima, PL194, 1880C, 1881B.
The Third Kind Of Contemplation 199

imagination is an ability to draw similitudes of sensible things for the use of

reason.84
In his analyses of the various aspects of the third kind of contemplation,
Richard uses epistemological concepts as a part of the account of the spiritual
exercise.85 Even though the description of the process of knowledge forma-
tion is not central to the Benjamin Major, his epistemological theory is inter-
mingled with the steps of spiritual ascent to invisible objects. In the first and
second kinds of contemplation, the human soul moves from sense experi-
ences towards rational thinking. In the third kind of contemplation, the most
problematic stage is associated with the change from visible reality to invisible
reality. Richards epistemological framework is derived in many respects from
texts in which Hugh explains how the knowledge of invisible things begins
with the investigation of corporeal creatures.86 There is a fivefold p
rogession
of cognition from the most lowly material things up to the incorporeal spirit.
This progession goes through sense and imagination, both of which turn out
to be essential instruments for comprehending the sensible world. Having
attained this stage, the soul may move on to use its rational instruments.87

84 Didascalicon II, III, p. 26.2225.

85 For the analysis of Richards epistemological terminology, see Ebner 1917. The use of epis-
temological discussions together with spiritual issues and Biblical interpretation is com-
mon to the Victorines. For example, Hugh ties the epistemological hierarchy of things to
different levels of biblical interpretation, enumerating three kinds of contemplation with
their corresponding objects. The first kind concerns visible objects which are considered
in the literal interpretation of the Bible. The second kind deals with the shift from visible
objects to invisible ones. This refers to the transition from the literal meaning of the
Scripture to the higher senses of interpretation. The third kind of contemplation is about
the invisible objects and mystical senses of the Bible. Miscellanea I, pl 177, 505C: Prima
contemplatio est de visibilibus. Secunda de visibilibus ad invisibilia. Tertia de invisibili-
bus. Sic prima eruditio est in littera, secunda de littera ad sensum, tertia in sensu. For the
origin and attribution of these miscellaneous writings, see Chtillon 1948, 304; Sicard
1993, 28n.23.
86 De tribus diebus XXV, p. 6061.10721082. (835A); De tribus diebus XXV, p. 62.10991101.
(835C): Ordo autem cognitionis in mente humana semper precedit ordinem conditionis.
Hugh explains Victorine epistemological and ontological basic principles and their
mutual interdependence in these passages.
87 De unione corporis et spiritus p. 888.150152 (pl 177, 288D): Sic itaque ab infimis et extre-
mis corporibus sursum usque ad spiritum incorporeum quaedam progressio est per sen-
sum et imaginationem, quae duo in spiritu corporeo sunt. Miscellanea, pl 177, 485B:
Quinque sunt progressiones cognitionis: prima est in sensu, secunda in imaginatione,
tertia in ratione, quarta in intellectu, quinta in intelligentia.
200 Chapter 6

AsHugh puts it, the Creator is prior to creatures in dignity, not in the order
ofknowledge.88
Richard sketches the process of a causal progression from the sensible
objects to invisible reality using biblical symbols. He states that the Ark of the
Covenant in the third kind of contemplation receives the golden crown which
encircles the Ark on each side. This explains, as maintained by Richard, that
the third kind of contemplation rests perfectly on the basis of the first two
kinds formed in imagination. This implies that the foundation of the Ark (and
contemplation), lies in the visible things. According to Richard, all the visible
(visibilia) objects are available in the third kind of contemplation, because
similitudes to invisible things can and should be detected in any given visible
object.89
In connection with the third kind of contemplation, Richard states clearly
that imagination (imaginatio) is the beginning of all argumentation (omnis
ratiocinatio et argumentatio ab imaginatione fundamentum sumit, et firmamen
tum capit).90 This raises the question of the nature of the causal chain from
sensible objects to objects to be comprehended only through reason and
understanding. Is all humanly attainable knowledge based on the senses and
are the intellectible (intellectibilia) things therefore unattainable without the
assistance of the senses (sensus) and imagination (imaginatio)? This seems to
be the case in Richards account. As noted at the beginning of this section, his
epistemological theory suggests an asymmetrical relation between visible and
invisible reality which is explained by the idea of corporeal similitudes and the
use of imagination.91 However, Richards epistemological theory is justified by

88 Sententie de divinitate, prologus, p. 927.515p. 928.518: creator quidem prior est creaturis
dignitate, non autem cognitione. Rationalis namque creatura primo figurat mentem in
cognitione horum uisibilium et sensibilium, ex quibus postea se erigit ad altiora cogno-
scenda, id est iuisibilia.
89 BMAJ II, XII, p. 34.1214,2224: huiusmodi speculatio per coronam arcae designatur, quae
ab inferiori quidem parte ligno affigitur, sed a parte superiori ligni mensuram supergredi-
tur. In hunc itaque modum arcae corona innititur, dum in altum erigitur, quia contem-
plantis animus ad invisibilia comprehendenda ex rerum visibilium similitudine non
parum adiuvatur.
90 BMAJ I, VI, p. 13.1620: Et recte quidem haec contemplatio in ratione quidem, sed secun-
dum imaginationem esse dicitur, quamvis ratiocinando promovetur, quia omnis eius
ratiocinatio et argumentatio ab imaginatione fundamentum sumit, et firmamentum
capit, et ab imaginabilium proprietate investigationis et assertionis suae rationem trahit.
91 Thus Richard seems to support the Aristotelian idea of imagination as a basis for reason-
ing. Richards Aristotelian tendency probably derives from Hugh and Boethius. Boethius
writes in his commentary on Aristotles text that the senses and imagination provide a
The Third Kind Of Contemplation 201

the Neoplatonic ontological framework, which maintains that the ideas are
reflected in the visible world through creation.92 The ontological hierarchy
guarantees the right direction for reasoning a posteriori and the use of imagi-
nation the human soul finally reaches the proper invisible objects and the
relation between visible and invisible things is not random. Even though
Richards epistemological system emphasizes that mans knowledge of the
invisible things starts from the investigation of sensible things, it cannot be
classified as peripatetic. Richard simply stresses that the external objects rouse
the mind to action.

6.3 The Inner and Outer Person

In the middle of the analysis of the third kind of contemplation, Richard intro-
duces a new theme, interrupting the investigation of imagination. In deter-
mining the positions of imagination and reason in the third kind of
contemplation, he explains that there may be both an inner and outer person
(homo interior, homo exterior) in one individual. As Richard affirms, the border
between visible and invisible reality runs through the whole universe and its
objects, the individual and his soul. Human beings themselves are located at
the intersection of the two realities, since the material and immaterial forms of
reality are present in them. First of all, the individual consists of both body and
soul. Some of the abilities of the soul represent the outer person while others
belong to the inner person. Richard implies that imagination is part of the
outer person (homo exterior), while reason belongs to the inner person (homo
interior).93 With regard to his theory of the inner and outer person, it is even

foundation for intellectual activities. When something is perceived by the senses, some
kind of image is created. The intellect then explains everything that was confusedly
understood by the imagination. In librum Aristotelis Peri hermeneias II.1, p. 28.28: Qui
intellectus praeter imaginationem fieri non potest. Sensus enim atque imaginatio
quaedam primae figurae sunt, super quas uelut fundamento quodam superueniens intel-
ligentia nitatur. Cf. Petrus Abelards Glossae super Periermeneias p. 317.823. See also
Guilfoys analysis of Abelards account of images as the most important means to appre-
hend universals and insensible things in general. Guilfoy 2004, 207211. See also Wilks
2008, 89.
92 Richards prologue and argument for the investigation of imagination and its functions in
Benjamin Minor can be found in the letter to the Romans (Rom. 1:20). BMIN V, p. 102.1015.
93 It should be mentioned here that Richard does not state precisely that imagination is part
of the outer person and reason belongs to the inner person, but writes a fairly lengthy
description of Adam and Eve and their representations as the inner and outer person.
202 Chapter 6

legitimate to say that the ability to imagine may be seen as the chief represen-
tation of the outer person.
In this account, Richard gathers together many influential views and con-
structs an interesting theory of human nature which accomodates ideas from
the teachings of Hugh of St. Victor, Augustine, and John Scotus Eriugena. Even
so, the fundamental notion behind Richards description is faithful to his
Victorine legacy. Hugh of St. Victor writes in his De sacramentis that the human
being has a twofold nature.94 The rational soul may grasp visible things through
the flesh, and invisible things through the reason, so that both visible and
invisible things may arouse it to praise God.95 Both these natures are perfect in
themselves and thus good. The human being is situated in a kind of middle
position, so that he might attain things without and within; within through
reason and without through the carnal senses. In his De verbo Dei, Hugh gives
an alternative interpretation of this by explaining his anthropological model.
In the human being there are three things: flesh, spirit, and mind (caro, spiri
tus, mens). Delight (delectatio) pertains to the flesh and is denoted by the ser-
pent, cogitation (cogitatio) pertains to the spirit and is represented by Eve,
whereas discretion (discretio) belongs to the mind and is represented by
Adam.96 Augustine employs the idea of the inner and outer person in his De
Trinitate, writing that whatever the human mind has in common with the
beasts is rightly said to belong to the outer person. He also explains that images

The outer person helps the inner one, just as Adam follows Eves instructions. Richard
concludes from this that imagination directs reason in the third kind of contemplation.
BMAJ II, XVII, p. 4044. Richard construes the story of Adam and Eve differently in his
Mysticae adnotationes in Psalmos, where he considers that Adam signifies reason and Eve
affection, which may also be further interpreted as the soul and the spirit. See Mysticae
adnotationes in Psalmos, pl 196, 363B. Cf. Liber exceptionum II, I, cap. IX, p.227.2., in which
Richard writes that Adam refers to spirit (spiritus), and Eve to flesh (caro). For a brief
survey of the notions of the inner and outer person, see Evans 1998, 1216. For Augustines,
Origens, and Ambroses discussions on the topic, see Heidl 2003, 112133.
94 This idea appears in De sacramentis I, VI, 56. pl 176, 266B268B.
95 De sacramentis I, vi, 56. pl 176, 266B: Anima autem rationalis idcirco duplici sensu
instructa est, ut visibilia foris caperet per carnem et invisibilia intus per rationem quate-
nus et visibilia et invisibilia ad laudem Creatoris illam excitarent. Van t Spijker explores
Hughs ideas on Adam and Eve as representations of the rational and sensual parts of the
soul. See Van t Spijker 2004, 102112. Hughs account turns out to be slightly different from
Richards, although there are similarities as well.
96 De verbo Dei, p. 64.6569: In unoquoque homine tria sunt: caro et spiritus et mens. Ad
carnem pertinet delectatio, ad spiritum cogitatio, ad mentem discretio. Delectatio est
serpens, cogitatio Eva, discretio Adam.
The Third Kind Of Contemplation 203

of outward things already perceived, fixed in memory, and seen again by recol-
lection, pertain to the outer person.97
There is no doubt that Richard was inspired by Hughs ideas and incorpo-
rated them as a part of the analysis of the third kind of contemplation. He has
associated his theory of imagination with Hughs idea of a persons twofold
nature and added an Augustinian vocabulary of the inner and outer person
(homo interior, exterior) to his account. However, he has also maintained
Hughs positive assessment of that part of the soul which is directed to the
sensible world.
One of the most central features of Richards anthropology is the link
between the seen and invisible reality in the very essence of the human being.
This is why he remarks in his discussion of the third kind of contemplation
that the body and the soul were already essential human constituents before
the fall and that even if man had not sinned at all, the exterior sense would aid
the interior person in the knowledge of things.98 In a similar manner, Hugh
claims that mans intellectual progress in childhood would be same even if he
had not sinned. This means that the use of sense-knowledge precedes the cog-
nition of invisible things. For children, it is natural to progress according to
sense-impressions only. Since the fall, the intellectual operations also arise
painfully from without through the senses in adults.99
Victorines follow the traditional idea of interpreting the first humans in
paradise as the souls two basic components. For instance, Eriugena states that
Adam represents the rationality of the human being, whereas Eve stands
for the senses. Mans fall signifies the conquest of reason by the senses.100

97 De Trinitate 12.1.1. Augustine does not mention imagination explicitly in this context. Cf.
also Confessiones 10.6.9. For Augustines theory of the inner and outer person, see Taylor
1989, 127142; Cary 2000, 4749; Heidl 2003, 117124.
98 BMAJ II, XVII, p. 41.2426: Certe et si homo minime peccasset, in cognitione rerum sensus
exterior interiorem adiuvaret. For the same idea later in Benjamin Major, see BMAJ V, XIII,
p. 140.1013: Cogita illum exitum, quem primus homo habuit antequam peccavit vel
quem homo adhuc haberet, si omnino non peccasset; per quem sane exitum, quoties
oporteret, facilem transitum habere potuisset de mundanis ad supermundana, de visibili-
bus ad invisibilia, de transitoriis ad aeterna
99 De Sacramentis I, VI, 26. pl 176, 278D280B: naturale siquidem humanae naturae est, in
prima aetate secundum solos sensuum affectus moveri atque incedere. For Hughs
account, see Kleinz 1944, 6566.
100 Periphyseon IV, p. 106.31473148 (815D): Est etiam u tanquam Adam, et est i, id
est sensus, tanquam Eva. There is plenty of literature concerning Eriugenas interpreta-
tion of Paradise and the influence of Origen and Ambrose on Eriugenas account. See, for
instance, Dronke 1990, 213229; Otten 1991, 169171, 194; Otten 2002, 516526; Steel 1994,
204 Chapter 6

For Eriugena, paradise is not a spatio-temporal place. On the contrary, it

describes allegorically the perfect state of the inner life of man before the fall.
Moreover, the fall and the consequent expulsion from paradise signify the radi-
cal disturbance of mans original balance.101 Richard interprets the events in
paradise very similarly, noting that Eve assisted Adam even before the fall,
which means that the outer man helped inner right from the creation of man.
Richard further explains that Adam was inclined to consent to Eves counsel
and, having been weakened by the punishment for his lying, had necessarily to
go after her, Adam remains in need of Eves guidance up to the present.
Consequently, the outer and inner persons are not equal partners, since the
outer person leads the soul to examine the invisible reality.102 His argument

239250; Moran 2002, 500506. Eriugena is not consistent in his views concerning
paradise. In Periphyseon, Eriugena also claims that only the inner person is formed in
paradise after the image of God, whereas the outer and corruptible person is formed from
the clay of the earth, outside and below paradise. Periphyseon IV, p. 108.32233236
(817C). For this idea of dual creation and further references to it in Eriugenas texts, see
McGinn 1996, 70, 79n.70. In his influential work Libri quatuor sententiarum, Peter
Lombard (d. 1160) views the significance of Adam and Eve differently, claiming that Eve
represents the lower part of rationality and Adam its higher part. The knowledge repre-
sented by Eve is directed to the evaluation of worldly life; however, Adam denotes the
knowing of the eternal truths that is sapiential wisdom. Sententiarum II, dis. XXIV, cap.
V,VII,IX,XXII. This notion appears in the texts of Augustine, see De Trinitate 12.3.34.
Associating Eve and Adam with sciential and sapiential modes of knowing is further
stressed in Hugh of St. Victors anthropology in maintaining that the mode of knowing
which is assisted in imagination should be associated with sciential knowledge; see
Didascalicon I, VIII, p. 15.2124 (747BC). The tradition within which Adam refers to the
mind and Eve to the senses is long. Philo of Alexandria was probably the first who pon-
dered this dichotomy in his explication of Genesis. This was further adopted by Latin
Christian writers. See Vinge 1975, 24.
101 Moran 2002, 500. Periphyseon IV, p. 114.34223431 (822A); p. 140.42664275 (840A).
102 BMAJ II, XVII, p. 41.2330: Sensus siquidem corporeus incorporea non capit atque tamen
sine eius manuductione ratio non ascendit, sicut iam supra monstrata ratio docuit. Certe
et si homo minime peccasset, in cognitione rerum sensus exterior interiorem adiuvaret:
nam Evam suam in adiutorium accepisse Adam quis neget? Aliud vero est cursus sui
comitem habere et aliud est itineris sui ducem quaerere. Nam quoniam Eva virum suum
semel contra Dei consilium vel praeceptum post se traxit et ad consilii sui consensum
inclinavit, praevaricationis suae poena infirmatus Adam iam eam sequi necesse habet et
usque nunc cotidiano eius magisterio eget. Cf. Eriugenas Periphyseon IV, p. 160.49334937
(855D): Ubi aperte datur intelligi, quod, si homo non peccaret, non solum interiori intel-
lectu, verum etiam exteriori sensu naturas rerum et rationes summa facilitate, omni ratio-
cinationis necessitate absolutus, purissime contemplaretur. For the sensitive knowledge
before the fall and the metaphysics of epistemology, see Tyrinoja 2000, 115131.
The Third Kind Of Contemplation 205

suggests that Eve stands for sensory soul and Adam reason, i.e., the outer per-
son is also represented in the ability of imagination. This can be seen in some
formulations in the context where Richard exploits such a concept as bodily
sense and the sense of the flesh in referring to the function of the
imagination.103
In Richards opinion, the unanimity and friendship of the outer and inner
man can be understood on the basis of everyday experience.104 There is no
doubt that this unanimity or solidarity is an important aspect of Richards
anthropology, which aims to establish a microcosmic balance between visible
and invisible reality. Unanimity can be seen in the quick flow of information
between the body and soul. He writes:

Think now, how the motion of the body actually reaches the motion of
the heart, and you will discover very quickly how it may be of one mind.
The foot or hand is moved immediately, whenever the soul wills. At its
command, the eye is moved about. According to its decision the tongue
is moved and the lips or any other members whatsoever of the body are
moved.105

In turn, the friendship between the soul and body will become apparent when
the body experiences suffering or enjoyment. All the sensations of the body
arrive without delay for the information of the soul, so that the soul may almost
anticipate the future experiences of the body and thus be instantly affected by

103 BMAJ II, XVII, p. 41.1620: cognoscendarum rerum per corporeum sensum experien-
tiam capere cogitur, toties nimirum interior homo noster ducem suum sequi videtur.
Absque dubio sensus carnis sensum cordis in cognoscendis rebus praecedit, quia nisi
prius sensibilia per sensum corporeum animus caperet, omnino non inveniret, quod de
eis saltem cogitare potuisset. In this chapter, sensus exterior and sensus carnis refer to the
sensitive activities of the soul, and particularly to the activity of the imagination.
104 BMAJ II, XVII, p. 42.25: Quid, quaeso, in rerum natura dissimilius quam spiritus et cor-
pus? Veruntamen ibi, obsecro, tantam tam perfectae concordiae unanimitatem inveni-
mus, ut paene immo penitus eodem tempore, sit fieri velle et fieri, moveri velle atque
moveri. In the background is Augustines idea of the souls relation to body as a kind of
symbiosis, mixture, or a conjugal union. For this, see ODaly, 1987, 4054; Rist 1994, 99102,
108112. Both Hugh and Richard consider that music represents the natural bond or
friendship between the body and the soul. See Liber exceptionum I, I, cap. X, p. 108.1215.
105 BMAJ II, XVII, p. 41.35p. 42.2: Cogita nunc quomodo motui cordis motus corporis ultro
occurrit, et citius invenis quam unanimis ei sit. Statim ut vult animus movetur pes vel
manus. Ad nutum eius circumfertur oculus. Ad eius arbitrium movetur lingua, moventur
et labia vel alia quaelibet corporis membra.
206 Chapter 6

them. On the other hand, the joys and longings of the soul have an immediate
effect on the body.106 Richard declares: Choose what you shall marvel at more:
either such quick obedience of the body to the soul or such intimate knowl-
edge of the soul for the body.107
Richard clarifies the relation between imagination and reason in the third
kind of contemplation by way of an analysis of the outer and inner person. He
then continues the description of imagination and reason. The narrative of
Adam and Eve supports Richards choice to give the imagination an important
task in this contemplation. The co-operation between imagination and reason
is like a journey together:

This speculation is in reason, because it pursues the investigation of only

those things which bodily sense is wholly incapable of grasping. But since
the investigation of this speculation is not led to the knowledge of invis-
ible things without the assistance of corporeal similitudes (similitudo
corporalis), reason seems to be following the guiding hand of imagina-
tion in this part and is shown clearly to hold on to it, like the leader (dux)
of the journey, in the course of its search.108

Here Richard articulates that reason (ratio) and imagination (imaginatio)

travel towards invisible objects together; imagination, however guides rea-
son.109 At this point it should be remembered that the objects of the third kind

106 BMAJ II, XVII, p. 42.1020.

107 BMAJ II, XVII, p. 42.2021: Elige quid magis mireris: aut corporis ad animum tam celerem
oboedientiam aut animi ad corpus tam familiarem notitiam.
108 BMAJ II, XVII, p. 40.30p. 41.4: In eo itaque haec speculatio in ratione consistit, quod illis solis
investigandis insistit, quae corporeus sensus omnino capere nequit. Sed quia huius specula-
tionis investigatio ad invisibilium cognitionem sine corporalium similitudinum adiutorio
non perducitur, imaginationis manuductionem in hac parte ratio sequi videtur et in inquisi-
tionis suae cursu eam quasi ducem itineris habere convincitur. Manuductio materialis is the
term used by Hugh of St. Victor, who explains that the human soul is like a blind person using
the material images as a helping hand. Commentaria in Hierarchiam coelestem, pl 175, 948AB:
quam si caecus manuductione utens; noster animus horum imaginum ductione utens.
Richard in turn explicitly claims that imagination is this guide, not material images, for
instance. Both Victorines adopt the ideas of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite here, espe-
cially from his The Celestial Hierarchies. See De caelesti ierarchia, pl 122, 1038D1039A.
109 In the analysis of the third contemplation, Richard uses terminology which is related to
leading and directing something. In this context, leading refers to the matter, symbol, or
the operation of imagination (imaginatio) acting as a leader or guide for the reason. See,
for example, dedocetur BMAJ II, XIII, p. 35.8; manuductio BMAJ II, XVII, p. 41.3; perducitur/
manuductio/ductum itineris BMAJ II, XVII, p. 4041; conducere BMAJ II, XVII, p. 41.7.
The Third Kind Of Contemplation 207

of contemplation are said to be invisible (invisibilia). To be more exact, the

individual tries to identify the invisible properties of the objects to be exam-
ined. However, the third kind of contemplation is formed according to imagi-
nation (secundum imaginationem formatur).
The terminology used by Richard is intriguing. He claims that imagination
not only serves reason but that it leadership (magisterium).110 With its leading
hand (manuductio), imagination guides reason to examine the invisible prop-
erties of things, which is why he calls imagination a kind of leader (quasi
ducem) of reason. Richard writes:

As imagination presents the external forms of visible things to reason

and prepares it for the investigation of invisible things through the simili-
tude of these visible things, in some way it leads reason to where it is
incapable of going by itself. Reason would never rise to the contempla-
tion of invisible things if imagination did not present and display to it the
forms of visible things, in order that reason might draw similitudes
of invisible things from them, forming its mode of investigation in
thatway.111

Imagination presents (repraesentare) the external forms of things to reason

and instructs (informare) it to investigate invisible things through their simili-
tude. Imagination shows (exhibere) what reason should draw similitudes from,
forming its mode of investigation (investigationis suae modum formaret) in that
way. In this passage the close relationship between imagination and reason is
evident: reason follows imagination and adapts its findings for its own use.112

For this terminology, see Chase 1995, 196197. Carruthers analyses the notion of ductus
and its use in the monastic tradition and rhetoric in the Middle Ages. Carruthers 1998,
7781.
110 BMAJ II, XVII, p. 41.1315: Merito ergo exteriorem hominem homo interior ducem suum
dicit, sine cuius ministerio vel potius magisterio ad visibilium cognitionem non
pertingit.
111 BMAJ II, XVII, p. 41.410: Dum enim imaginatio rationi rerum visibilium formas repraesentat
et ipsam ex earundem rerum similitudine ad invisibilium investigationem informat, quo-
dammodo illuc eam conducit, quo per se ire nescivit. Numquam enim ratio ad invisibilium
contemplationem assurgeret, nisi ei imaginatio rerum visibilium formas repraesentando
exhiberet, unde ad illa similitudinem traheret et investigationis suae modum formaret.
112 Richards source is probably Hugh of St. Victor, who writes in his De unione corporis et
spiritus that imagination informs (informare) reason from below. De unione corporis et
spiritus p. 888.159 (pl 177, 289A): Sicut imaginatio, deorsum informans rationem, scien-
tiam facit.
208 Chapter 6

Subsequently, the similitudes which are obtained from the visible forms by
means of imagination can be used to assist the soul in rising to contemplate
invisible things. Imagination does not have light or brightness in itself, but it is
accustomed to raise reason to discretion and direct (dirigere) it to investigate
knowledge.113 Richard puts it vividly: imagination leads the soul along the
stony path of similitudes (similitudinum calle perducit). Nevertheless, even
though imagination acts as the guide, it is not able to enter into the examina-
tion of invisible objects. It eventually has to give way and let reason go past.114
This is the point at which the soul is ready to proceed to the fourth kind of
contemplation, which is formed entirely in reason and according to reason
(inratione, secundum rationem formatur).115 Richard further explains that the
human being can perceive the invisible things (invisibilia) only mentally
(mente); nevertheless, he forms (formare) them in his mind out of the simili-
tude of visible things (ex rerum visibilium similitudine). This is possible because
the form of the visible things is a kind of picture of the invisible things (pictura
rerum invisibilium).116

113 BMAJ I, XI, p. 20.68: Sic sane imaginatio nullum in se prudentiae lumen, nihil praecla-
rum habet, nisi quod rationem ad discretionem excitare et ad scientiae investigationem
dirigere solet.
114 BMAJ II, XVIII, p. 44.711: In eo enim exterior homo in investigationis suae cursu interi-
orem adiuvat, quo ei invisibilium imaginem per rerum visibilium imaginationem reprae-
sentat. Et, dum ducatus sui officium explet, illuc istum similitudinum calle perducit, quo
ille intrare non audet. BMAJ II, XVIII, p.44.3033: Veruntamen tunc de adiutoris sui ducatu
non solum confunditur, sed et gloriatur, quando interveniente eius obsequio ad invisibil-
ium contemplationem corporearum similitudinem calle perducitur. Here Richard is echo-
ing Isaac of Stellas Letter on the soul (Epistola de anima) in which Isaac writes that sense
knowledge and imagination direct the incorporeal form to reason. They are able to bring
reason to this level, but they cannot follow it to consider the incorporeal forms of corporeal
things. pl 194, 1884D: Circa naturales ergo rerum corporearum status sensus et imaginatio
vigent, sed absque ratione non satis valent; ad rationalem vero non ascendunt, sed infra
remanentes, eum ascendenti rationi quasi a longe ostendunt. Deducere nimirum rationem
ipsam aliquatenus possunt, sed usque ad rerum corporearum incorporeas formas comitari
eum non possunt. Cf. the same idea in De spiritus et anima, pl 40, 788: Sensus vero et
imaginatio ad rationem non ascendunt, sed infra remanentes eam aliquatenus deducere
possunt, et quasi a longe quaedam ostendere, ad quae non possunt pervenire.
115 BMAJ I, VI, p. 13.2124: Quartum genus contemplationis est quod in ratione et secundum
rationem formatur; quod utique fit quando, semoto omnis imaginationis officio, solis illis
animus intendit, quae imaginatio non novit, sed quae mens ex ratiocinatione colligit vel
per ratiocinationem comprehendit.
116 BMAJ II, XVIII, p. 44.1317: hoc contemplationis genus esse quidem in ratione et secundem
imaginationem intelligere debeamus, quia et invisibilia sunt, quae mente conspicimus,
The Third Kind Of Contemplation 209

The only example that Richard is willing to give in this connection deals
with conceiving the idea of a lion. First, it is possible to portray the image on
some surface. Second, the thing that should be thought of is immediately
brought to mind by seeing this picture. Thus the features portrayed on the sur-
face enable one to form the solid limbs and the living animal itself in ones
mind. Richard advices to consider the difference between the object that we
see externally and the thing which it shapes internally in the mind. Similarly,
the invisible things that we engage in the mind differ greatly from those that
we perceive by the means of the imagination. Yet we are, according to Richard,
able to draw the similitude out of the latter to portray the former.117 In this
example, the idea of similitude as a relation between visible and invisible is
reaffirmed. The mind draws (trahere) similitude from visible things (ex istis) to
invisible things (ad illa) with the help of imagination and reason.
It is interesting to compare the full analysis of Benjamin Majors third kind
of contemplation with Benjamin Minors second form of rational imagination
(imaginatio rationalis) which is respresented by Naphtali. Even though the
conceptual systems of these two Benjamins are different, they share many fea-
tures in their interpretations of the operation of the imagination. Indeed, it
seems that Richard has utilized Benjamin Minors ideas of the imagination as
he was composing Benjamin Major, in which he further developed the notion
of imagination in the context of the six-fold model of contemplation. This
appears in at least two sections. First of all, in both these works the task of
imagination is to transcend the boundary between the visible and invisible.
This transition is indistinctly described in Benjamin Minor, in which Richard is

et tamen ex rerum visibilium similitudine illa nobis formamus. Quid enim dixerim rerum
visibilium formam nisi quandam quasi rerum invisibilium picturam? Richard favours the
word imago and uses pictura only seldom. The word is also apologized for in this
context.
117 BMAJ II, XVIII, p. 44.1726: Sit modo aliquis qui numquam leonem vidisse se dicat, quem
tamen videre desiderat, si ei leonis imago in pictura aliqua convenienter expressa osten-
ditur, profecto qualem eum cogitare debeat ex eo quod videt statim admonetur. Denique
secundum lineamenta, quae superficietenus expressa considerat, solida membra et
vivum animal sibi in mente format. Cogita nunc quantum sit inter illud, quod videt exte-
rius, et inter hoc, quod in sua cogitatione sibi fingit interius. Sic sane in hoc contemplatio-
nis genere longe a se distant invisibilia, quae in mente versamus, et ea, quae per
imaginationem cernimus et tamen ad illa exprimenda ex istis similitudinem trahimus.
See the discussion about metaphors and rhetorical tradition in chapter 4.3. The example
of the lion derives from Hugh of St. Victors De Scripturis et scriptoribus sacris, pl 175,
12BC. The idea of using a lion in explaining the nature of metaphors has a long tradition,
since Aristotle utilizes it in his Rhetoric (1406b2024).
210 Chapter 6

content with the idea that imagination is mixed with the understanding in a
special way (in intelligentiam permixta). The exact analysis of the objects of
speculation and similitudes is lacking. Conversely, in Major Richard develops
his theory by providing imagination with a short-term leading position in rela-
tion to reason. Furthermore, in Major he operates with a more technical termi-
nology and epistemological model for the idea of similitudes than in Minor.
The second parallel between Benjamin Minor and Major is the fact that the
questions concerning biblical interpretation and analysis of the activities of
the imagination are connected with each other. In both of these texts, the sig-
nificance of the imagination is documented by the need to explain numerous
pictorial biblical passages. In addition, the possibility of the biblical interpreta-
tion becomes central only on the uppermost levels of the activity of the imagi-
nation. In Benjamin Minor as well as Benjamin Major, the various beautiful
passages of the Bible and the expressions which somehow describe the sensing
of something are typically designed to be expounded by the operation of the
imagination.
The technical terminology concerning biblical interpretation varies inter-
estingly as well. In Benjamin Minor, Richard adopts the term translation (trans
latio), which is found in the textbooks of the late Roman world. In exegesis, the
meaning of the word is transferred from its usual use to designate something
else, when one shifts from the description of the visible thing to the significa-
tion of some invisible thing.118 In Benjamin Major, Richard does not deal with
the techniques of translation or conversion at all. However, he develops the
idea of various similitudes and their properties. In both works, Richard com-
bines the co-operative acts of the imagination and reason with these terms.
Still, it is clear that he is aiming at analysing the same core issue in biblical
interpretation: how can words and things signify something which cannot be
articulated in any language?
In spite of these similar designs, one cannot conclude that Richard planned
to construct a uniform model of the human soul and the theory of imagination
in both Benjamin Minor and Major. Even though there are many similar fea-
tures in the concepts and the descriptions of the abilities of the soul, the differ-
ences remain. For example, the basic tasks of imagination in Benjamin Majors
third kind of contemplation and Benjamin Minors second kind of rational
imagination (Naphtali) are different. Benjamin Minor emphasizes the tasks
of pastoral care. Above all, the basic intention of the rational imagination
is to console the soul by imagining heaven and future rewards. This role of

118 BMIN XXII, p. 148.2628: Utitur nichilominus, ut dictum est, translatione, quando rerum
uisibilium quamlibet descriptionem transfert ad rerum inuisibilium significationem.
The Third Kind Of Contemplation 211

imagination is only incidentally mentioned in Benjamin Major.119 On the other

hand, in Benjamin Major the operation of imagination can be defined as intel-
lectual since it participates actively in contemplation. However, in Benjamin
Minor contemplation will be only attained once the testimonies of imagina-
tion (imaginatio), the senses (sensus), and even reason (ratio) are ignored.120
As a conclusion, the third kind of contemplation is in a crucial position
compared to other kinds of contemplation in Benjamin Major. The transition
from the perceivable external world to the inner, invisible reality is said to take
place in the third kind of contemplation. Richard analyses this change by dis-
cussing co-operation between imagination and reason. In this collaboration,
imagination directs the operation of reason and assists it in pursuing its actual
tasks of surveying invisible objects. He does not define or evaluate these invis-
ible things, which makes it difficult to understand of the third kind of contem-
plation. The intention of the third kind is directed towards the similitudes
(similitudines) which are found only with the support given by the imagina-
tion, while the senses and reason are unable to approach them by themselves,
as already indicated.

6.4 The Transition from Visible to Invisible in Benjamin Major,

Benjamin Minor, and In Apocalypsim Joannis

Next I will compare the following texts by Richard: In Apocapypsim Joannis,

Benjamin Minor, and Benjamin Major, my main interest being the transition
from visible things to invisible. In the analysis of this transition, I concentrate
on the objects of the various operations of the mind. The classifications of
these objects seem to differ little between these treatises, even though some
key concepts as well as the naming of the minds activities vary. The most sig-
nificant of these differentiations is that the term symbolum121 occurs only in In
Apocalypsim Joannis while the notion of imagination (imaginatio) is used
mainly in the two Benjamins.

119 BMAJ II, XVI, p. 39; BMAJ III, I, p. 5556.

120 BMIN LXXXII, p. 326.818.
121 The first one to use the term symbolum as a technical term was John Scotus Eriugena who
translated Pseudo-Dionysius Commentary on the Celestial Hierarchy in the ninth century.
The notion of symbolum had previously been used in Latin texts as the name for the
Creed. Eriugena writes that there are two different kinds of symbol, similar and dissimilar.
Similar symbols have some similarity to their meaning, while dissimilar differ from their
proper meanings. For the analysis of Eriugenas symbolism, see Bonfiglioli 2007, 238252.
For Eriugenas idea of spiritual exegesis of the Bible, McGinn 1996, 5580.
212 Chapter 6

I start the analysis with the more thorough study of four forms of vision in
In Apocalypsim Joannis, and then proceed to compare some of its key terms
with those explored in Benjamin Minor and Major. The notions of symbolum,
species, similitudo, and imaginatio will be central to this investigation. These
may all be considered as compositions of sensible forms, which have anagogi-
cal function, i.e., they lead the individual towards God.122 Richards theory of
signs, symbols and similitudes is based on a tradition which is complex and
contains somewhat conflicting elements. The simultaneous application of
Augustines and Pseudo-Dionysius ideas becomes evident in his terminologi-
cal variation.123 However, the Augustinian theory of signs had significant
extensions in Hugh of St. Victors theory of symbolism, further adapted by
Richard. It is obvious that merging these two different types of tradition is not
unproblematic in Richards writings. Richard usually follows the Augustinian
line of thought remodelled by Hugh. Nevertheless, some basic ideas of Pseudo-
Dionysius are elaborated in his works, such as the ideas of similar and dissimi-
lar symbols and hierarchies which structure the whole visible universe.124
Richard formulates his idea of the four different visions in his commentary
on Johns Apocalypse, In Apocalypsim Joannis.125 He develops the theory of the
four visions which can be further divided into two sub-categories, namely,
bodily and spiritual visions (visiones corporales et spirituales).126 The first of

122 This is Eriugenas idea; see Expositiones in Ierarchiam coelestem I, p. 13.445459. Bonfiglioli
2007, 240, 251.
123 This shows in the fact that Richard uses both the Augustinian notion of signum as well as
the concept of symbolum in similar contexts, even if both of these concepts have different
traditions of signification. The signum is an elementary part of Augustines theory of lan-
guage. Augustine gives a restricted meaning for the sign (signum), according to which the
object signified cannot itself act as a sign. For Augustines theory of signs, see ODaly 1987,
171178; Marcus 1996, 71104. However, in the opinion of Pseudo-Dionysius all of reality is
consummated in the symbolic representations. The symbol is the first source of knowl-
edge, initiation itself. Chenu 1957, 103, 123127.
124 Yet, as claimed by Ren Roques, Pseudo-Dionysius intellectual objectivity turns towards
Augustinian interiorism in the texts of the Victorines. Roques 1962, 325. See also Dumeige
1957, 328.
125 For a general introduction to Richards commentary on Johns Apocalypse, see Kraebel
2013, 329340.
126 Richards idea of four visions deviates from the standard pattern of Augustines three
visions. Cf. De Genesi ad litteram 12.6.7. Richard also quotes this Augustinian model
directly; see Mysticae adnotationes in Psalmos, pl 196, 355D. Adnotatiunculae in Joelem, pl
175, 355D356A, attributed to Hugh of St. Victor but probably written by Richard, clearly
delineates the connection between the visions and phantasmas. Cf. this theory
withHonorius of Augustodunensis Scala coeli Major, pl172, 1232CD, in which Honorius
The Third Kind Of Contemplation 213

these four visions, bodily vision (corporalis), is external; for example, the visual
perception of some external object. According to Richard, the individual is
able to perceive the figures, colours, and movements of the different external
objects through physical sight. This observation of external objects is the low-
est form of vision.127
In the second external, corporeal vision the soul finds a deeper meaning in
something that it observes. Here the individual discerns that physical objects
refer to spiritual things as well. Richard states that a kind of external showing
(species)128 or action (actus) is revealed to our exterior sight. These appear-
ances and acts have interior mystical signification (mystica significatio). Such
mystical or hidden signification (mystica significatio) is manifested, for exam-
ple, in the story of Moses and the burning bush. In Richards opinion, this
external phenomenon, which is physically perceived, refers to the Virgin Mary
and the incarnation.129 He claims that any object that has been externally per-
ceived can refer to divine things. These images of the divine things can be
found in the biblical passages especially.130
Above the two bodily visions (corporalis) there are two spiritual visions
(visio spiritualis). The third vision is the most interesting of the four, since
Richard fuses the eclectic terminology of Pseudo-Dionysius with the standard
Augustinian formulations. Through this lower form of the two spiritual visions
the rational soul (animus) seeks knowledge of the invisible things by means of
similitudes and images (similitudines, imagines) of visible things. These simili-
tudes and images operate like figures and signs (figura et signum) through

elaborates the idea of spiritual vision extensively. He divides the spiritual vision into
twelve subclasses, in connection with which he introduces several tasks that have usually
been ascribed to the faculty of imagination. For Augustines scheme of three visions and
their adaption in Apocalypse commentaries, see Kraebel 2013, 330336.
127 In Apocalypsim Joannis, pl 196, 686B: Visio namque corporalis est, quando oculos ad
exteriora et visibilia aperimus, et coelum, et terram, figuras et colores rerum visibilium
videmus. Sed haec visio infima et infirma est.
128 Note again the difficulty of translating species. In In Apocalypsim Joannis it seems to refer
to external showing or sight.
129 In Apocalypsim Joannis, pl 196, 686BC: Alia quoque visio corporalis est, quando species,
vel actio sensui visus, foris ostenditur, et intus magna mysticae significationis virtus con-
tinetur, qualis fuit visio quae Moysi in rubo quidem extrinsecus visibiliter apparuit, sed
typica significatione plena fuit. (Punctuation altered.) Here Richard probably follows the
text of Gregorius of Nyssa, De vita Moysis, II.21, p 59.
130 Zinn 1977, 201 suggests that the second vision has two aspects in fact: first, the general idea
of experience of things in the world as a symbolic representation of the divine; second,
the more specific idea of the figurative interpretation of Scripture. It is interesting that
the deeper senses of Scripture are identified with the external kind of knowledge here.
214 Chapter 6

which the Holy Spirit leads the soul to know the invisible objects. In the third
kind of vision, the soul has the opportunity to ascend to the contemplation of
immaterial things by the manuduction of what is material (manuductio mate
rialis).131 Richard stresses that in the lower form of spiritual vision the soul
does not use fleshly eyes but the eyes of the heart (non fit oculis carnis, sed
oculis cordis).132 This idea raises a question concerning the origin of the images
in the third vision: are they obtained with the help of the five external senses
or do they have some supernatural source? After all, Richard says clearly that
these pictures and similitudes (imagines, similitudines) are viewed with the
eyes of the heart (oculis cordis). He does however state that the objects of the
third vision may be called formal similitudes of visible things (formales rerum
visibilium similitudines). He continues that forms, signs, and similitudes are
used to indicate hidden things. Thus the third vision can also be called a sym-
bolic demonstration (symbolica demonstratio).133 In fact, according to Richard,
Johns Apocalypse is an example of the symbolic mode of representation.134 He
defines a symbol as the collection of visible forms with the help of which an
attempt is made to present invisible things (symbolum est collectio formarum
visibilium ad invisibilium demonstrationem).135 In his texts, Richard repeatedly

131 In Apocalypsim Joannis, pl 196, 688BC: Animus, itaque noster qua visibilia novit, invisi-
bilia non novit, nisi uteratur manuductione materiali, id est rerum corporalium similitu-
dinead immaterialem minime posset ascendere contemplationem.
132 In Apocalypsim Joannis, pl 196, 686D: Tertius visionis modus non fit oculis carnis, sed
oculis cordis: quando videlicet animus per Spiritum sanctum illuminatus formalibus
rerum visibilium similitudinibus, et imaginibus praesentatis quasi quibusdam figuris et
signis ad invisibilium ducitur cognitionem.
133 In Apocalypsim Joannis, pl 196, 687B: Unum quo formis, et figuris, et similitudinibus
rerum occultarum veritas obumbraturCum itaque formis, et signis, et similitudinibus
manifestatur quod occultum est, vel quod manifestum est describitur, symbolica demon-
stratio est.
134 In Apocalypsim Joannis, pl 196, 687D: Liquet igitur quod eam tertio videndi modo con-
templatus sit, eo praesertim quod liber iste formalibus rerum temporalium plenus sit
similitudinibus, videlicet coeli, solis, lunae, nubium, imbrium, grandinum, fulgurum
Cf. Augustines idea that the Apocalypse is a spiritual vision of future events. In Augustines
De Genesi ad litteram, spiritual vision refers to the activity of the imagination. This kind of
vision includes various likenesses of bodies. De Genesi ad litteram 12.26.53.
135 In Apocalypsim Joannis, pl 196, 687A. For this subject, see Dumeige 1957, 325. Richard has
drawn this definition from Hugh, with slight changes. See Commentaria in Hierarchiam
coelestem, pl 175, 960D: symbolum, collatio videlicet, id est coaptatio visibilium for-
marum ad demonstrationem rei invisibilis propositarum. Hugh goes on to ponder how
one may mix human faces and wings and thus construct the idea of an angel. Chenu
argues that Richard has replaced Hughs notion of collatio with collectio. The meaning
The Third Kind Of Contemplation 215

discusses the gathering or collecting together of visible forms into some mean-
ingful unity.136 The collection of sensible and created forms is occasionally
explained by various technical terms, such as symbolum and similitudines, but
it can also be understood as a general method in the minds upward movement
from the lower level of sensible things to the higher level of invisible things.137
The combinations of images are needed in this particular text to understand
how the Apocalypse is full of formal similitudes of temporal things, such as the
sun, wind, birds, fish, animals, and trees. It is necessary to use familiar images
to gain some understanding of unknown things like angels. The images are first
brought together and then combined in order to demonstrate something invis-
ible. In his definition of the symbol, Richard quotes Pseudo-Dionysius the
Areopagites treatise The Celestial Hierarchies directly, especially the first three
paragraphs. Pseudo-Dionysius describes the human beings inability to rise
directly to intellectual contemplation and thus suggests that one should use
the assistance of material forms and images for the ascent. Thus man can be
raised by means of material things as far as the contemplation of immaterial
archetypes, that is, to the divine ideas.138

remains the same, however. Chenu 1927, 445. For the notion of collation in Hughs writ-
ings, see Sicard 1993, 1420, 261262.
136 However, as both Carruthers and Coulter remind us, the collection of visible forms
(collectio formarum visibilium) may be interpreted as a mental map or rhetorical device
for the audience as well. This sounds plausible if one keeps in mind Hughs descriptions
of Noahs Ark as well as Richards minute depiction of the tabernacle in Benjamin Major
and his treatise concerning the vision of Ezekiel. Richards commentary in Johns
Apocalypse in particular deals with numerous odd combinations of images. Thus sym-
bols may act as metaphors, but they are also valid as mnemonics and teaching aids in
monastic life. Carruthers 1998, 3235; Coulter 2006, 148151. Coulter in fact regards the
use of symbols in rhetoric and pedagogy as diminishing the meaning of symbols as
metaphor. For Coulters reservation on the Dionysian approach, see Coulter 2006,
161170.
137 Richard also refers to figura, aenigma (BMAJ IV, XV, p. 104.20), and simulacra (BMAJ III, I,
p.55.21).
138 De caelesti ierarchia, pl 122, 1039AB, 1042B; 1043AB. This same idea is repeated by
Eriugena; see Expositiones in Ierarchiam coelestem II, p. 44.900907: Sicut enim imago
vocis ex rupe quadam seu aliqua concavitate, vel sicut imago corporis ex specilla resul-
tat, ita intellectualis pulchritudinis celestium virtutum imaginationes ex omni terrena
vilissimaque materia respondent. Ideoque possibile est nostrum animum reduci per eas
resonantias ad immateriales primas formas, quas Greci Archetypia appellant. For
Eriugenas impact on medieval philosophy and theology, see Moran 1989, 269281.
Rorem considers that Eriugenas impact on Hughs theology is less than usually thought.
See Rorem 2009a; 2009b.
216 Chapter 6

The fourth, uppermost vision does not include any images or forms, since
the soul rises directly to contemplation via internal aspiration (aspiratio).139
Richard calls the fourth vision an anagogic vision. As he mentions, these
notions of symbolic and anagogic visions are direct quotations from Pseudo-
Dioysius the Areopagite.140
All the three works, In Apocalypsim Joannis, Benjamin Minor, and Benjamin
Major describe the rising of the soul to the examination of invisible objects. In
Apocalypsim Joannis enumerates four visions; Benjamin Minor is concerned
with speculation or consideration and, finally, Benjamin Major focuses on the
analysis of the six kinds of contemplation. However, it is interesting to see that
all three works begin their analysis of the rising of the soul in a similar manner.
First, they explore the external, physical perception which does not contain
any mystical references.141 Next, in all three Richard continues to discuss vari-
ous exterior manifestations of visible things, which are referred to as imago,
forma, or species. In In Apocalypsim Joannis, the study of external showing
(species) takes place in the second bodily vision, where the soul finds a deeper,
spiritual dimension from the consideration of the external showing or vision.
This uncovering of mystical signification is possible even though the second

139 In Apocalypsim Joannis, pl 196, 686D: Quartus visionis modus est, cum spiritus humanus
per internam aspirationem subtiliter ac suaviter tactus nullis mediantibus rerum visibil-
ium figuris sive qualitatibus spiritualiter erigitur ad coelestium contemplationem.
140 In Apocalypsim Joannis, pl 196, 686D687A: De istis duobus modis visionum qui non
corporaliter, sed spiritualiter fiunt, sic intulit B. Dionysios Areopagita in libro Hierarchiae,
dicens: In sacratissimorum eloquiorum praeter radiatas illuminationes quando possibile
est respiciemus symbolice nobis et anagogice manifestas coelestium animorum, id est
spirituum hierarchias, id est, quantum ad sensum coelestes pontificatus, quantum pos-
sumus considerabimus. Symbolum est collectio formarum visibilium ad invisibilium
demonstrationem. Anagoge, ascensio sive elevatio mentis ad superna contemplanda.
Richard utilizes direct quotations from Pseudo-Dionysius, cf. De caelesti ierarchia, pl 122,
1038D1039A. Hugh cites Pseudo-Dionysius almost verbatim; see his Commentaria in
Hierarchiam coelestem, pl 175, 941B941C.
141 The terminology is not congruent between the commentary on Johns Apocalypse and
Benjamin Major, since in Benjamin Major Richard states that in the first kind of contem-
plation the visible images and forms (visibilium imago, forma) are in focus. However,
nothing is yet rationally searched for; the objects are only admired. BMAJ I, VI, p. 12.1824:
In imaginatione contemplatio nostra tunc procul dubio versatur, quando rerum istarum
visibilium forma et imago in considerationem adducitur, cum obstupescentes attendi-
mus et attendentes obstupescimus corporalia ista, quae sensu corporeo haurimus, quam
sint multa, quam magna, quam diversa, quam pulchra vel iucunda et in his omnibus crea
tricis illius superessentiae potentiam, sapientiam, munificentiam mirando veneramur et
venerando miramur.
The Third Kind Of Contemplation 217

vision is said to be a physical vision (visio corporalis). In Apocalypsim Joannis

differs from Benjamin Minor and Major in this respect. To be precise, Richard
does not mention the operation of the souls various abilities in connection
with the second kind of vision at all or any other visions either. In spite of this,
he nevertheless claims in both Benjamin Minor and Major that the operation of
the imagination is needed for grasping the forms of visible things (formae,
imagines), and in Benjamin Minor that the human soul can use its rational
imagination (imaginatio rationalis) to perceive external forms (formae) from
which it is able to remodel various new forms. This process enables the soul to
move to spiritual understanding of something.142 In his Benjamin Major,
Richard uses similar terminology as he explains the characteristics of the first
kind of contemplation, which is said to exist and be formed by the ability of
imagination (in imaginatione secundum imaginationem formatur). The objects
of this first kind of contemplation are called formae and imagines.143
After examining the visible forms or showings (formae, species), In
Apocalypsim Joannis as well as both Benjamins proceed to examine the simili-
tudes (similitudines). In all three, Richard maintains that the similitudes may
be understood as analogies which lie between the visible forms and invisible
things.144 Furthermore, in Benjamin Major Richard defines the similitudes as
corporeal (corporalis).145 In Benjamin Minor, he does not ascribe any addi-
tional attributes to the similitudes.146 In the commentary on Johns Apocalypse,

142 BMIN V, p. 102.1215: ad uisibilium cognitionem nunquam ratio assurgeret, nisi ei ancilla sua,
imaginatio uidelicet, rerum uisibilium formam repraesentaret. BMIN XVIII, p. 136.410: Illa
utimur quando secundum uisibilium rerum cognitam speciem uisibile aliquid aliud mente
disponimus, nec tamen ex eo inuisibile aliquid cogitamus. Ista uero tunc utimur, quando
per uisibilium rerum speciem ad inuisibilium cognitionem ascendere nitimur. In illa est
imaginatio non sine ratione, in ista intelligentia non absque imaginatione.
143 BMAJ II, VII, p. 29.15: Si igitur primum contemplationis genus recte intelligitur esse in
consideranda specie rerum corporalium, consequenter, ut arbitror, intelligi oportet
secundum genus contemplationis esse in perspicienda ratione earumdem rerum.
144 It is interesting to note at this point how Macrobius, for instance, distinguishes two
spheres of discourse, the one devoted to the divine and supernatural forces immanent in
the universe, the other to the transcendent God, the divine mind, and the ideas contained
in it. In the first, one can admit divine images and effigies (imagines, simulacra); in the
other only analogies and analogical illustrations (similitudines, exempla). It is legitimate
to use these similitudes and exempla as instruments for striving towards approximate
statements. However, no adequate representation will ever be achieved in this higher
sphere. Dronke 1974, 3233.
145 BMAJ II, XII, p. 34.11, 2021.
146 BMIN V, p. 102.1618; BMIN XV, p. 130.15. In the traditional analyses of the figures of Jacobs
family, the use of corporeal similitudes is often connected to the interpretation of Bala.
218 Chapter 6

he discusses the similitudes (similitudines) of visible (visibilia) things. In addi-

tion, he continues that the human being may be guided to the understanding
of spiritual things by means of the similitudes if he is illumined by the Holy
Spirit. The similitudes are seen as similitudes with the eyes of the heart (oculus
cordis). In the commentary, the third vision is not performed by external senses
since it is a spiritual vision (visio spiritualis).147
In spite of the similar terminology, there are still some gaps between the
theories of Benjamin Minor and Major, and the commentary on Johns
Apocalypse. First, the role of the faculties of the soul is essential in Benjamin
Minor and Benjamin Major, but is not discussed in In Apocalypsim Joannis. The
other important difference is the souls separation into inner and outer spheres.
The commentary clearly distinguishes between the internal and external
forms of vision. In Benjamin Minors theory of the souls preparation for con-
templation or in Benjamin Majors model of the six kinds of contemplation,
however, this kind of division between the external and internal elements is
missing. Thus it is difficult to determine whether the third kind of contempla-
tion belongs to the internal (intra) activities of the soul, as does the third kind
of vision in the commentary on Johns Apocalypse, or to the external (foris)
kind of activity of the soul, as the first and second visions do. Furthermore, in
Benjamin Major Richard uses several different terms which are related to the
eyes and vision, but he does not assign them directly to the various levels of
contemplation.148
A comparison between Benjamin Minor, Benjamin Major, and the commen-
tary on Johns Apocalypse suggests some conclusions about their relations
with each other. Benjamin Minor and Major are closely interrelated, their ter-
minology is similar, and the differences are in the details. It has been proposed

For example, Isidore, Rhabanus Maurus, and Peter Damian interpret her role as being the
analogy for using corporeal similitudes in the thinking process. For Isidore, see
Expositiones sacramentorum, pl 83, 261C, Rhabanus Maurus Commentaria in Genesim,
pl 107, 600A; Peter Damian De perfectione monachorum, pl 145, 305A. Richard excludes
this element from Benjamin Minor but, with some adjustments, he gives a significant role
to corporeal similitudes in Benjamin Major.
147 In Apocalypsim Joannis, pl 196, 686D.
148 Steve Chase has presented a model concerning the six kinds of contemplation and the
metaphors of vision related to them. As he claims, in the first and second kinds of con-
templation described in Benjamin Major, person gazes with ones bodily eyes (oculus cor
poreus), but in the third kind one uses the eyes of reason or intellect (oculus rationis,
intellectualis). In the fourth kind, one resorts to the eyes of understanding (oculus intelli
gentiae), while the fifth and sixth kinds are assisted by the eye of faith (oculus fidei). Chase
1995, 148. Chase quotes passages such as BMAJ III, IX, p. 66.1622.
The Third Kind Of Contemplation 219

that In Apocalypsim Joannis is an early writing by Richard.149 He quotes the

thinking and expressions of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite directly; for
example, the Pseudo-Dionysian notion of theophania (divine revelation or
vision) in connection with the third and fourth visions.150 In these revelations,
the Holy Spirit produces the similitudes and forms of invisible things in the
mind which the soul is able to use to apprehend invisible objects.151 In this
model it is unclear whether genuine material images are needed at all, or
whether all the images and similitudes which refer to divine things are obtained
directly from God.
However, in Benjamin Major Richard deviates from the direct influence of
Hugh and Pseudo-Dionysius, presenting a systematic description of the forms
and similitudes connected to the various abilities of the soul. In Benjamin
Major, Richard does not use the concept of theophania any more, even though
it seems that God illuminates the objects of contemplation.152 Furthermore,
the progress from sense perception to the invisible objects of contemplation is
continuous inasmuch as there is no clear gap between the seen and the invisi-
ble reality. Richards understanding of symbols, forms, images, and similitudes
is obviously a complex one, which is why researchers have had difficulty in
establishing any unanimous view of the effect of Pseudo-Dionysian ideas on
Richards thinking, theory of symbols, and world-view.153 The Pseudo-Dionysian

149 Chtillon 1948, 4951.

150 In Apocalypsim Joannis, pl 196, 687B: Notat autem hic duplicem modum revelationis
divinae, quae theologorum et prophetarum mentibus infusa est per visiones et demon-
strationes, quas Graeci vocant theophanias, id est divinas apparitiones, quae aliquando
per signa sensibilibus similia invisibilia demonstrata sunt. Richard mentions the notion
of theophania once in Benjamin Major. BMAJ IV, XII, p. 101.911: Exterius visum nobiscum
introducimus cum theophaniam raptim perceptam ad communem intelligentiam ratio-
cinando postmodum paululum inclinamus.
151 In Apocalypsim Joannis, pl 196, 687B.
152 See, for example, BMAJ I, III, p. 9.1112. Richard states that the special kind of lively under-
standing (vivacitatis intelligentiae) is always present in all kinds of contemplation.
Understanding (intelligentia), in turn, is illuminated by God.
153 Pseudo-Dionysius impact on Richards thinking has provoked lively discussion.
Kirchberger 1952, 4756 and Dumeige 1957, 324329 list several of Pseudo-Dionysius
expressions in Richards texts, but they draw nearly the reverse conclusions. In the opin-
ion of Kirchberger, Richard endorses a considerable part of Pseudo-Dionysius thinking,
even though he has modified several ideas to suit his own aims. According to Dumeige,
however, Richard has converted the thinking of Pseudo-Dionysius into entirely
Augustinian form. Furthermore, one of the principal intentions of Chases work is to show
how the texts of Pseudo-Dionysius have a powerful influence in the themes and vocabu-
lary in Benjamin Major. Chase 1995, 28. Coulter discusses this debate in his own research,
220 Chapter 6

idea of different hierarchies is transmitted to the diffuse net of similitudes,

which manifests itself at various levels of human and divine reality.
It is probable that Richard has inherited the idea of relating the abilities of
imagination with symbols, similitudes, and biblical interpretation from the
writings of John Scotus Eriugena. In his commentary on Pseudo-Dionysius
Celestial Hierarchies, Eriugena assimilates the Latin terminology of images and
imagination with the Neoplatonic symbolism of Pseudo-Dionysius. It seems
that Richard has paid attention to this terminology of Eriugena and linked the
theoretical framework of the philosophy of mind of his own time to the discus-
sion of images and similitudes in his Benjamin Minor and Major. Eriugena uses
the notion of imaginationes, which refers to the images, not to the ability to
imagine, several times. He also applies the concept of similitudes (similitudi
nes), but does not seem to define the need for particular visible similitudes as
manifestly as Richard does.154 Thus the precise theory of imagination (imagi
natio, phantasia) as the souls ability to interpret symbols, signs, or similitudes
is incomplete in this respect in the composition by Eriugena. However, accord-
ing to the interpretation by Eriugena, the biblical text can be seen as a poetic
art by which the soul is counseled through fictions of the imagination.155 Such
down-to-earth biblical pictures, as a worm, lion, panther, cornerstone and bear
can be explained in terms of figurative poetry. He states that even the unlikely
pictures of this kind contain at least an echo of intelligible beauty and thus are
capable of raising the fleshly human being towards the conceptual world.156

making a lot of criticism of Chases studies. The main issue is the question of apophatic
theology, the significance of which in the final stages of contemplation Chase underlines,
while Coulter, Den Bok and Javelet insist that certain aspects of God just seem (videtur) to
contradict reason. Chase 1995; Coulter 2006, 161171.
154 See, for example, Expositiones in Ierarchiam coelestem II, p. 21.4064; II, p. 23.124141. For
Eriugenas terminology, see Bautier 1988, 8490.
155 Expositiones in Ierarchiam coelestem II, p. 24.142151: quemadmodum ars poetica, per fic-
tas fabulas allegoricasque similitudines, moralem doctrinam seu physicam componunt
ad humanorum animorum exercitationem hoc enim proprium est heroicorum poeta-
rum, qui virorum fortium facta et mores figurate laudat ita theologia, veluti quedam
poetria, sanctam scripturam fictis imaginationibus ad consultum nostri animi et reduc-
tionem a corporalibus sensibus exterioribus, veluti ex quedam imperfecta pueritia, in
rerum intelligibilium perfectam cognitionem, tanquam in quam interioris hominis
grandevitatem conformat. This idea of Eriugena was later interpreted to mean that the
art of physics could also be read as allegorical. See Stock 1972, 41. For the interpretation of
the second book of Expositiones, see Gersh 1996, 199220. Eriugena analyses the idea of
similitudes and transferred words in his Periphyseon. See Periphyseon I, p. 9293.2873
2892 (509AB). For the discussion, see McGinn 1996, 6465.
156 Expositiones in Ierarchiam coelestem II, p. 4849.10401064.
The Third Kind Of Contemplation 221

There is no doubt that Richard sees the operation of the imagination as a

fundamental instrument for revealing mystical significations since imagina-
tion is, he maintains, the indispensable faculty of the soul designed for exam-
ining these similitudes.157 Here he takes an original step towards a more
profound analysis of the interpretation of symbols. Richard establishes a
scheme in which the abilities of the soul have their distinct tasks and the inner
dynamics of the interpretation of signs, symbols, or similitudes is spelled out
as thoroughly as possible.
It is also clear that a special faculty of uniting the diverse is required when
one utilizes symbols and images in the ascent from known things towards the
unknown, which is what spiritual realities are. The human being must gather
visible things together but, as becomes evident in both Benjamins, one must
also learn to compare these images of visible things with each other. Richard
uses various expressions to illuminate this process: in Benjamin Minor he intro-
duces the idea of comparing (comparatio) and translating (translatio) images,
whereas in Benjamin Major the similitudes of visible things should be found
and compared with each other. The process of comparison and collection of
images is rational in that either reason or understanding is involved. The sup-
port of the imagination is needed, however.
In conclusion, Richards theory of imagination is a part of his understanding
of images and symbols. This means that such notions as imago, species, sym
bolum, and similitudo can be understood as interrelated with his psychological
terminology. It may be suggested that the co-operation of such instruments of
the mind as the imagination and reason have a clear task in the interpretation
of images and their significations, both in Benjamin Major and Minor. In
Benjamin Major, Richard points out that imagination is an essential instrument
for the interpretation of pictorial representations of the Bible. Moreover, imagi-
nation leads the soul to find similitudes of invisible things among visible things,
which are dealt with in the third kind of contemplation. In Benjamin Minor,
Richard ties the exposition and unravelling of Biblical metaphors and symbols
to the second form, of rational imagination. Here the soul rises from the visible
images to knowledge of invisible things. The role of imagination is important in
both of these texts because it promotes the understanding of thebiblical pas-
sages. In addition, with the help of imagination and its co-operative functions

157 BMAJ I, VI, p. 13.811: Tertium contemplationis genus esse diximus quod in ratione secun-
dum imaginationem formatur. Hoc autem contemplationis genere veraciter tunc utimur,
quando per rerum visibilium similitudinem in invisibilium rerum speculationem
sublevamur. See the description of the relation between imagination and similitudes in
BMAJ II, XII, p. 3435.
222 Chapter 6

with other abilities of the soul, the individual is able to explore the created vis-
ible world and find important indications of the Creator. The study of Richards
notion of symbol and symbolic demonstration offers valuable insights into his
theory of the human imagination. To put it more succinctly, the main duty of
imagination is to work in co-operation with higher abilities of the soul as the
interpreter of the signs and symbols which can be found in both the biblical
texts and in sensible reality.
 Chapter 7

Imagination at the Uppermost Stages

of Contemplation

7.1 Is There Any Role for Imagination After the Third Kind
of Contemplation?

In this chapter, I will analyse the passages of Benjamin Major which review the
operation of imagination and its significance for the uppermost level of con-
templation.1 In his Benjamin Major, Richard divides the six kinds of contem-
plation into two grades: the three lowest kinds of contemplation may be
defined as the realm of the operation of the imagination and reason, whereas
the three uppermost kinds are characterized by various combinations of rea-
son and understanding. The two highest kinds are concerned with universal
simple objects, which are indivisible and far from the sphere of the imagina-
tion.2 Thus one might suppose that the mere operation of reason and under-
standing would be discussed in Benjamin Majors analysis of the higher levels
of contemplation, not the faculty of imagination and its tasks. Richard makes
it clear after examining the third kind that the tasks of the imagination are
over, and its contribution is not needed any more. He explicitly claims that its
presence would only disturb contemplation. However, in spite of this, Richard
presents new formulations concerning the notion of imagination as he pro-
ceeds to deal with the fourth and fifth kinds.
The rationale for the appearance of imagination is that the human being
aims at analysing the operation of his soul in the fourth kind of contemplation.
The operation and properties of his imagination will become an object of
speculation as well. Because an attempt is made to find various analogies with
divine nature through the study of the various properties or abilities of the

1 I will discuss the characteristics of the fourth, fifth, and sixth kinds in detail only where nec-
essary in order to understand the notion of imagination in its context. These uppermost
kinds of contemplation have received more attention than the three lower kinds. For exam-
ple, see the studies by Kirchberger 1957; Salet 1964; Chase 1995.
2 BMAJ IV, IV, p. 89.1924: Quid ibi facit imaginatio, ubi nulla est transmutatio nec vicissitudi-
nis obumbratio, ubi pars non et minor suo toto nec totum universalius suo individuo, immo
ubi pars a toto non minuitur et totum ex partibus non constituitur, quia simplex est, quod
universaliter proponitur, et universale, quod quasi particulare profertur, ubi totum singula,
ubi omnia unum et unum omnia.

koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2014|doi 10.1163/9789004279452_008

224 Chapter 7

soul, the ability of imagination can also provide a kind of mirror of the divine
reality.
A stylistic change takes place in Benjamin Major after the description of the
third kind of contemplation. The terminology becomes more profuse, Richard
analysing the properties and abilities of the soul such as will and memory in
detail. The same also applies to the concept of imagination, which is described
from new perspectives. In Benjamin Major, Richard uses such terms as
phantasia and phantasma for the first time in analysing the operation of the
imagination, claiming that these terms refer to images derived from sensory
representations and used by the imagination.3 Thus one may say that the
imagination is the active instrument of the soul and phantasms are the con-
tent of the imaginations acts. In previous books of Benjamin Major, Richard
refers to objects of imagination differently. Imagination works with species
(species), images (imagines), and forms (formae) of sensible things.4 He does
not explain this change in terminology.
As the person ascends to the fourth kind of contemplation, he turns to c onsider
the structures of his own soul. Richard deals exclusively with this kind in the third
book of Benjamin Major. The book is lengthy and contains a thorough analysis of
the human soul which stresses the importance of the fourth kind. The signifi-
cance of this contemplation is based on the demand imposed on the human
being to know his own soul and its operation perfectly, a command Richard
repeats in many of his writings.5 This subject is important in the d iscussions of
both Benjamins, motivating their content and structure significantly.
Because the divine reality has put its mark on the world of creatures, one
should study all visible and created things. Richards view is that one can find
the best possible reflection of divine reality in the structures and operations of
ones own soul, since the human being has been created as the image and
similitude of God (imago et similitudo Dei). This is precisely why the human

3 For the notions of phantasia/phantasma see BMAJ III, I, p. 5556; BMAJ III, II, p. 57.28; BMAJ
III, VIII, p. 66.6; BMAJ III, XXI, p. 80.1; BMAJ IV, IV, p. 89.12. Richard also uses the adjectival
term phantasticum; for example, BMAJ III, VIII, p. 65.32. Richard also refers to these terms in
BMIN VI, 106: BMIN XX, 142; BMIN LXIII, 270; BMIN LXVIII, 286; Mysticae adnotationes in
Psalmos, pl 196, 283B; De Trinitate V, XXIV, and De eruditione hominis interioris, pl 196, 1322D.
4 BMAJ I, VI, p. 12.1820: In imaginatione contemplatio nostra tunc procul dubio versatur,
quando rerum istarum visibilium forma et imago in considerationem adducitur BMAJ II,
VII, p. 29.12: Si igitur primum contemplationis genus recte intelligitur esse in consideranda
specie rerum corporalium.
5 BMIN LXXV, p. 308.1920,35; BMIN LXXXIII, p. 330.811 ; BMAJ III, III, p. 59.2728; BMAJ III, VI,
p. 64.910; BMAJ III, VII, p. 64.2829. De exterminatione mali et promotione boni, pl 196, 1076D;
1077A.
Imagination At The Uppermost Stages Of Contemplation 225

being must turn to himself (redeas ad te ipsum) and study the properties of
his own soul in the fourth kind of contemplation.6 Richard puts it succinctly
in his Benjamin Major: if you prepare to scrutinize the depths of God, first of
all scrutinize the depths of your own spirit.7 The human soul considers itself
by the inner sight of the mind (mentis intuitus) and thus turns back to con-
sider itself.8 Through knowledge of himself, man may rise to contemplate
heavenly things.9 For this reason, Richard painstakingly analyses the divine
image in the soul (imago Dei) in Benjamin Major. The idea is interrelated
withhis theory of symbols discussed in Chapter 6.4 above. One may rise to
spiritual things through the consideration of ones own soul, and thus become
spiritual as well.10
In contrast to first three kinds of contemplation, the fourth kind is in reason
(in ratione), and reason itself forms it (secundum rationem formatur). In this
contemplation the rational soul directs its attention to those things that the
mind gathers by reasoning or understands by means of reason. In addition, the
mind is aware of itself and its own properties. All the objects of the fourth kind
of contemplation are beyond the range of the external senses. During this con-
templation, the ability of imagination cannot be utilized, because it is not able
to grasp the supersensual objects of contemplation.11

6 BMAJ III, III, p. 59.2728,3133: Primum ergo est in hac consideratione, ut redeas ad
teipsum, intres ad cor tuum, discas aestimare spiritum tuum. Haec porta, haec scala, hic
introitus, iste ascensus, hac intratur ad intima, hac elevamur ad summa.
7 BMAJ III, VIII, p. 65.1819: Si ergo et tu scrutari paras profunda Dei, scrutari prius pro-
funda spiritus tui. This idea of ascent through self-knowledge to higher kinds of contem-
plation derives from Augustine. De vera religione, 39.72: noli foras ire, in te ipsum redi, in
interiore homine habitat veritas. et si tuam naturam mutabilem inueneris, transcende et
te ipsum.
8 BMAJ III, VI, p. 64.24,1920: Nescit omninoqui spiritus suum prius non cogitat. Quid
ergo est solem ad locum suum redire, nisi mentis intuitus ad sui considerationem
reflectere?
9 BMAJ III, VII, p. 64.2829: per sui cognitionem in caelestium contemplationem assurgit.
10 BMAJ III, V, p. 62.57: et per spiritus tui considerationem in spirituum contemplationem
assurgere et in hunc modum ex spiritualibus spiritualia comparare, incipis et tu pariter
spiritualis esse. The idea of the soul as a microcosm is explicitly stated in De statu interi
oris hominis, c. XIV, p. 78 (pl 196, 1126C): Quere obsecro, in microcosmo, nam et sic dictus
est homo, quere inquam, in microcosmo, hoc est minore mundo, quere in corde humano
quid sit illud quod ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei formatur.
11 BMAJ I, VI, p. 13.2227: solis illis animus intendit, quae imaginatio non novit, sed quae
mens ex ratiocinatione colligit vel per rationationem comprehendit. Eiusmodi specula-
tioni insistimus quando invisibilia nostra, quae per experientiam novimus et ex intelli-
gentia capimus, in considerationem adducimus.
226 Chapter 7

Thus the fourth kind of contemplation may be distinguished from the first
three on the basis of the instruments of the mind.12 The knowledge of lower
things assists progress to higher things. However, separating the third and
fourth kinds of contemplation from each other is not unproblematic for
Richard. As he notes, the biblical narrative suggests that both these levels of
contemplation are represented by the golden parts of the Ark. They are both
engaged in reasoning as well. He writes that he is unable to deny that these two
kinds of contemplation do not differ at all from each other in the quality of the
material, since they are both said to operate with objects that are described as
golden. However, as to the quantity of material, there is a difference between
the third and fourth kinds of contemplation, because the fourth is engaged
with a much larger amount of gold.13 Obviously the word-for-word interpreta-
tion of the Bible gives Richard some difficulty here.
Richards ambiguous attitude towards imagination emerges immediately in
the introduction to the analysis of the fourth kind of contemplation. He praises
the superiority of reason and the loveliness of the fourth kind of contempla-
tion compared to the previous ones, in which the operation of imagination is a
significant part of the souls activity. Richard admits that understanding is
active in the preliminary kinds of contemplation as well, but he refers to under-
standing as being mixed with reason and imagination.14 Occasionally he men-
tions a certain liveliness of understanding, which is in use in the three lower
kinds of contemplation.15 However, he claims that it is obvious that under-
standing (intelligentia) must be pure (pura) in the fourth kind of contempla-
tion. It seems that the notion of pure understanding is in many ways
synonymous with reason (ratio). Richard himself defines the concept of pure

12 BMAJ III, II, p. 57.1114: Puto quia secundum distantiam essentiarum erit etiam differentia
scientiarum. Quanta autem differentia sit harum, quas hic ad invicem conferimus, specu-
lationum saltem te admoneat utriusque instrumentum. Nonnullae allegoriae tabernac
uli foederis, pl 196, 197A: Hic enim utendum est instrumento rationis sine officio
imaginationis.
13 BMAJ III, IV, p. 60.3033: Ecce enim quod negare non valeo, nihil differunt in materiae
qualitate, sed multum est per omnem modum, quod ab invicem distant in materiae quan-
titate. Utrumque ex auro formatur, quia utrumque in ratiocinatione versatur. This means
that the corporeal similitudes in the third kind of contemplation and the objects of the
fourth kind have the same ontological status.
14 BMAJ I, IX, p. 17.12: Simplicem intelligentiam dico quae est sine officio rationis, puram
vero quae est sine occursione imaginationis. Cf. BMIN LXXXVII, p. 344.2021:
Intelligentiam puram dicimus, quae est sine admixtione imaginationis.
15 BMAJ I, III, p. 9.1112: Numquam enim contemplatio potest esse sine quadam vivacitate
intelligentiae.
Imagination At The Uppermost Stages Of Contemplation 227

understanding as the operation by which the mind functions without the fac-
ulty of imagination. He also compares pure understanding with the internal
sight and separates it from the external sight.16
The use of the notion of pure understanding reminds us that the analysis of
the various kinds of contemplation is related to discussion dealing with the
sciences and ways of knowing things. Richard considers that one uses pure
understanding in logic, which employs concepts at the abstract level. However,
mathematics, which Richard regards as compositional science, cannot be
practised without imagination.17 Furthermore, pure understanding is an
important factor in the idea of the spiritual seeing of God. The internal sight of
the mind must be pure and apathetic. The wandering thoughts of the imagi-
nation distract the soul from God, keeping it at the level of multiplicity.18
In the fourth kind of contemplation, the soul makes use of pure understand-
ing (pura intelligentia) for the first time, because of the concentration on the
pure and invisible essences. This is precisely why imagination must withdraw.
Immediately after this direct statement, Richard describes the activities of
imagination in an affirmative tone but states in a slightly melancholy manner
that it is still not needed:

16 BMAJ I, VI, p. 13.21,2527: Quartum genus contemplationis est quod in ratione et secun-
dum rationem formaturquando invisibilia nostra, quae per experientam novimus et ex
intelligentia capimus, in considerationem adducimus et ex eorum consideratione in cae-
lestium amorem et supermundanorum intellectuum contemplationem assurgimus.
BMAJ I, VI, p. 13.36p. 14.1,34: In hac primum contemplatione humanus animus pura
intelligentia utitur et semoto omni imaginationis officio ipsa intelligentia nostra in hoc
primum negotio seipsam per semetipsam ingerere videturHic per semetipsam operatur
et quasi per speciem contemplatur.
17 See Richards Liber exceptionum I, I, cap. XXIII, p. 111.910: Ideo logica aliquando pura
intelligentia utitur, mathematica nunquam sine imaginatione est. Richard also uses the
notions of mixed and simple understanding. Mixed understanding is occupied with the
ability of imagination, whereas simple understanding rises above reason. See Chapter 3.2.
Richards terminology derives mostly from Hugh. In his Didascalicon, Hugh maintains
that logic uses pure understanding. Imagination, however, never apprehends its objects
in a simple (simplex) or non-composite way. Didascalicon II, XVII, p. 36.1819 (758D).
18 Richard does not use the word apathetic, but refers to the purity of understanding. This
is a notion related to purity of heart (puritas cordis), which is Cassians translation for
apatheia. Richard also writes that a person should purify his heart from every phantasy
and forget the phantasies of corporeal things. BMAJ III, I, p. 56.1416: Quis ille est, qui
sciat aurum suum ab omni scoria mundare, qui noverit cor suum ab omni phantasia adeo
purgare, quantum exigit dignitas operis vel urget auctoritas praeceptoris? For the stan-
dard monastic idea of apathetic prayer and pure seeing of God without images, thoughts,
or concepts, see Louth 1981, 109110; Knuuttila 2004, 150.
228 Chapter 7

You will learn from this that in this consideration you ought to use an
intellect that is subtle and pure. What has imagination, the creator, direc-
tor and reconstructor of corporeal phantasies, to do here? Imagination,
the maker of so many phantasies, which continually creates so many new
forms of corporeal things, restores ancient forms and competently dis-
poses and orders so many and varied modes according to its will, should
withdraw far from this activity. There is no use for its abundant multitude
of corporeal representations (simulacrorum) here.19

In this passage, Richard introduces many appealing questions related to the

notion of imagination. Three tasks for the imagination are first, to create
(creare) new images; second, to direct (moderare) the old ones and, third, to
reconstruct (reparare) images. Directing and reconstructing images is tradi-
tionally considered to be the responsibility of the imagination, while the cre-
ation of quite new images is rarely assumed to be done by the imagination. The
brevity of the passage prevents clarification of Richards argument in more
detail. Nevertheless, it is evident that the human being may create some new
corporeal phantasms (corporalia phantasmata) by means of his imagination.
Of course, these productions cannot be something uniquely new, actual
essences like those God can create. This operation of imagination, which is
said to be creative, probably refers to the so-called rational imagination (ima
ginatio rationalis), which is introduced in Benjamin Minor.20 This being the
case, the soul may produce new images by combining and changing the earlier
ones with the help of imagination and reason. These new images do not neces-
sarily have any real equivalents.
In addition to this perfunctory discussion related to the creative operation
of imagination, the terminology of this passage is interesting. Richard utilizes
the notions of phantasia and phantasma for the first time in Benjamin Major.

19 BMAJ III, I, p. 55.1321: Attende quam recte designetur per propitiatorium, quod erat qui-
dem totum non deauratum, sed aureum totum, de auro solo mundo atque purissimo fac-
tum; Illud iubetur fieri de auro puro et mundo. Tu doceris ex eo in hac consideratione uti
debere intellectu subtili et puro. Quid hic facit phantasmatum corporalium creatrix,
moderatrix, et reparatrix imaginatio? Recedat procul ab hoc negotio tot phantasiarum
formatrix imaginatio, quae tot corporalium formas quotidie novas creat, antiquas reparat,
et peritam multiplices variosque modos pro arbitrio disponit et ordinat. Nihil prosunt,
immo multum obsunt suorum simulacrorum tam copiosa multitudo. In this passage,
Richard uses the notion of intellect (intellectus) as a synonym for understanding (intelli
gentia). Note that the passage includes several unusual terms for Richard, like phantasma,
creatrix, reparatrix, formatrix, simulacra.
20 BMIN XVI, p. 132.910.
Imagination At The Uppermost Stages Of Contemplation 229

The concept of the creatrix used by him is also exceptional. This term, among
others, is applied by Augustine, but it refers exclusively to the Trinity. Ambrose
declares unambiguously that one who is created cannot be the creator
(Creatrix).21 Richard himself refers to the divine wisdom using the notion of
Creatrix.22 Furthermore, he also uses the notion of simulacrum in this passage,
which is otherwise a rare term in his texts.23 It may be translated as corporeal
representation in this context.24
Beside the three tasks of the imagination mentioned above, the passage in
question raises the issue of the relationship between will and imagination.
Richard emphasizes the significance of will in human actions, and its special
connection with the production of images. He also relates the operation of the
imagination to memory and remembering. Imagination has the ability to
retain images, but the person who has proceeded to the fourth kind of contem-
plation has to discipline himself to forget them. He must be able to forget all
the corporeal images, phantasmata, in order to focus undisturbed on rational
study.25 Subsequently, Richard interrelates the significant philosophical con-
cepts of will and memory with the operation of imagination. Otherwise the

21 For the references, see Blaise 1954, 227. See also Peter Lombards Sentences, which dis-
cusses the difference between creating (creare) and making (facere) something. Only God
can be a creator, i.e., He can create certain (things) from nothing and something from
something. Sententiarum II, dis. I, cap. II: Et creare proprie est de nihilo aliquid facere,
facere vero non modo de nihilo aliquid operari, sed etiam de materia. Unde et homo vel
Angelus dicitur aliqua facere, sed non creare, vocaturque factor sive artifex, sed non cre-
ator. Hoc enim nomen soli Deo proprie congruit, qui et de nihilo quaedam et de aliquo
aliqua facit.
22 Sermones centum, pl 177, 1113D: sapientia divina, quae est creatrix et gubernatrix
omnium.
23 This is the only point in Benjamin Major at which Richard applies the term simulacra. For
other passages including the notion of simulacra, see De eruditione hominis interoris, pl
196, 1292D; 1294A; De Trinitate VI, V, p. 233.1; In Apocalypsim Joannis, pl 196, 788B; In illa
die I, p. 128.34; Causam quam nesciebam VI, p. 214.169.
24 For the concepts of simulacrum and similitudo in twelfth-century Platonism, see Dronke
1974, 3447. Hugh of St. Victor elaborates this notion in his Commentaria in Hierarchiam
coelestem, dividing two classes of simulacrum: some refer to the natural realm and the
others to divine reality. pl 175, 926BC: Duo enim simulacra erant proposita homini, in
quibus invisibilia videre potuisset: unum naturae, et unum gratiae. simulcarum naturae
erat species hujus mundi. simulacrum autem gratiae erat humanitas Verbi. Per simula-
cra igitur naturae, Creator tantum significabatur; in simulacris vero gratiae praesens Deus
ostendebatur, quia illa operatus est ut intelligeretur esse; in istis vero operatus est ut
agnosceretur praesens esse.
25 BMAJ III, I, p. 56.811.
230 Chapter 7

analysis of will and memory remains minor in both Benjamins since they have
no independent tasks assigned to different kinds of contemplation as the fac-
ulties of imagination, reason, and understanding do.
Richard reprimands imagination for its disruptive behaviour and asks why
it should participate in the fourth kind of contemplation at all. There is no
need for its poor and undisciplined activity. Imagination should take what it
has and leave.26 After mentioning this, he admits again that there are some
advantages in its operation, mentioning three things. (1) With the help of
imagination, the concupiscent dirt from fleshly delectation may be reconsid-
ered and then used by people who suffer compunction during prayer. (2)
Imagination presents examples of sufferings for the soul in tribulation. (3)
Imagination is able to operate with timber, which means the knowledge of
exterior, sensible things.27 The first two advantages clearly reflect the ideas of
Benjamin Minor, where one should use the rational imagination for producing
images of heaven and hell. These images are important for maintaining the
souls inner balance in the spiritual life. The third reminds the reader about the
first kind of contemplation, in which the process of six-fold contemplation
begins with the sensible things which are referred to as the wood or forest. The
memory of all these things can however confuse rather than assist the soul in
such a noble kind of contemplation as the fourth one is. As Richard puts it, the
more completely the soul forgets the phantasies of corporeal things, the more
freely it examines the invisible things. Thus the intellect should be purified
from all the incursions of phantasms.28 Here he is echoing the traditional
idea which stresses the negative impact of phantasies and imagination on

26 BMAJ III, I, p. 55.2930: Quidquid aliud est quam aurum, quod paras offerre, non interim
eo opus habemus; tolle quod tuum est et vade. BMAJ IV, IV, p. 89.1719: Cedat itaque ima
ginatio interim, cedat penitusque recedat, non est utique in quo hoc opus adiuvare valeat.
27 Richard mentions three things which represent the products or material of imagination:
the pelts of she-goats, the hides of rams, and pieces of wood. BMAJ III, I, p. 55.3032: Nihil
in hoc opere opus habemus caprarum pilis, sed nec pellibus arietinis seu etiam quibusli-
bet lignis. BMAJ III, I, p. 55.33p. 56.6: Pili caprarum sordes concupiscentiarum ex carnis
delectatione foetide diligenter inspectae, saepius retractatae adiuvare possunt compunc-
tos in oratione. Exempla passionumiuvare possunt quavis afflictos tribulatione. Pietatis
operationes et huiusmodi quaelibet arbores per misericordiae opera fructiferae a mundi
silva abscisae et ad iustitiae normam dolatae prodesse possunt sedulis in
administratione.
28 BMAJ III, I, p. 56.811: Quanto enim corporalium phantasmatum perfectius obliviscimur,
tanto profundius, tanto liberius supermundanarum essentiarum occulta rimamur.
Mundet ergo aurum suum studeatque purgare intellectum ab omnium incursione
phantasmatum.
Imagination At The Uppermost Stages Of Contemplation 231

c ontemplation and spiritual life in general.29 One cannot find such emphasis
or terminology in previous kinds of contemplation.

7.2 The Three Heavens

Richards continuing interest in the imagination and its operation is clear in

his formulations concerning some parts of the fourth kind of contemplation,
particularly in the speculation about the so-called three heavens.30
Ones self-examination may be described as a kind of moving to and fro in
three ways.31 Even though the operation of the imagination should be perma-
nently excluded from this kind of exercise in the fourth kind of contemplation,
Richard uses the concept of imagination as he describes the different perspec-
tives of self-knowledge, suggesting that the soul is like a microcosm in which
heaven and earth are reflected. It is possible to find a different kind of orb,
which is full and broad compared to the orb of the earth, in the depths of ones
own spirit. There are three kinds of heavens.32 This emphasizes his declared

29 In Richards texts, the notion of phantasma usually refers to disturbing images of things
in the monks inner life. BMIN VI, p. 106.14; BMIN XX, p. 142.21; BMIN LXIII, p. 270.15; BMIN
LXVIII, p.286.89; Mysticae adnotationes in Psalmos, PL 196, 283B; De Trinitate V, XXIV, p.
224.43 and De eruditione hominis interioris, pl 196, 1322D. When Richard analyses the posi-
tive elements of the imaginative activities of the soul, he generally refrains from using any
words connected to phantasia or phantasma. Many writers urge that the tumult of phan-
tasies (turba phantasiarum) should be removed from the mind during prayer. Phantasies
are described as something vain, false, cloudy, and wanton. See, for instance, Augustines
De Trinitate 8.2.3; Rhabanus Mauruss Commentaria in Matthaeum, pl 107, 816C; Peter
Damians De perfectione monachorum, pl 145, 316A.
30 The idea of the third heaven is originally from Pauls letter to the Corinthians (II Cor. 12:2),
which concerns the man who was known to have been caught in the third heaven. This
theme was later enthusiastically written about in the texts with spiritual theology. The
idea of the interior heaven is interestingly put in the works of Peter Damian (d. 1072), for
instance. He writes that the soul of the saintly person lies in species paradisi, and the
confusion of hell resides in the soul of the rebrobate. Damian also claims that the mind
could be seen as a room the walls of which could be painted with different pictures and
thus become like the earth, or heaven and a temple of God. About this idea, see Van t
Spijker 2004, 30, 4041.
31 BMAJ III, VIII, p. 65.16: De sensu triplici, per quos discurrere habet consideratio sui. Here
Richard characteristically depicts how the soul moves to and fro. The description is simi-
lar to the exposition of imagination in the first kind of contemplation. BMaj I, VI, p. 12.27.
32 BMAJ III, VIII, p. 65.2327: In hoc sane profundo invenies multa stupenda et admira-
tionedigna, ibi invenire licet alium quendam orbem, latum quidem et amplum, et aliam
232 Chapter 7

aim of turning to consider the inner structures of the soul. Next, Richard inter-
relates the abilities of imagination, reason, and understanding with his idea of
the three different heavens. The first is called imaginative (imaginale), the sec-
ond rational (rationale), and the third the intellectual (intellectuale) heaven.
He continues that imagination is like the first heaven, reason the second and
understanding the third.33
As Richard puts it, the first heaven is fleshly (corpulentum) and gross (gros
sum) compared to the two other forms of heaven. This imaginative heaven is in
its own special way touchable and corporeal, because it is phantastical and
imaginary (phantasticum et imaginarium).34 It draws images and similitudes
of visible things (visibilium imagines et similitudines) after itself and retains
them. Richard further explains that it is evident that the exterior heaven is vis-
ible and corporeal and, indeed, the first and lowest of all heavens. Here is his
analogy: what the earth is to this visible heaven, a bodily sense is to that inter-
nal imaginative heaven.35 Richard explains that imagination encloses within

quandam plenitudem orbis terrarum. Ibi sua quaedam terra, suum habet caelum, nec
unum tantum, sed secundum post primum et tertium post primum et secundum. Richard
has an obvious interest in the idea of the three heavens. He examines this theme with
differing interpretations in his Benjamin Minor LXXIV, pp. 302, 304; Benjamin Major III,
VIII, p. 6566; De Trinitate, prologus, p. 8284; De IV gradibus violentae caritatis 35,
p. 193.616. In his Liber exceptionum II, I, cap. III (p. 222223) Richard enumerates vari-
ous readings of heaven and earth. Heaven may mean something superior, invisible, spiri-
tual, excellent, and the contemplative life, whereas the earth signifies visible, material,
human, imperfect, the active life, or something of lower dignity.
33 BMAJ III, VIII, p. 65.2730: Et ut hoc triplex caelum congrua possimus distinctione discer-
nere, primum dicatur imaginale, secundum est rationale, tertium intellectuale. Tenet
itaque imaginatio vicem primi caeli, ratio secundi, intelligentia vero vicem tertii.
34 Phantasticum derives probably from Isaac of Stella, who considers that phantasticum
a nimae is the lowest point of the soul, being almost corporeal. Epistola de anima 11, pl 194,
1881C.
35 BMAJ III, VIII, p. 65.30p. 66.1,36,89: Et horum quidem primum ceterorum comparatione
grossum quiddam atque corpulentum et suo quodammodo palpabile atque corporeum,
eo quod sit imaginarium atque phantasticum post se trahens, et in se retinens formas, et
similitudines rerum corporalium. Sic sane caelum hoc exterius, quod nos dicimus firma-
mentum, absque ulla dubitatione constat esse visibile atque corporeum, et ipsum quidem
primum et omnium infimum. Quod autem est terra ad hoc visibile caelum, hoc est sensus
corporeus ad illud internum phantasticum et imaginarium caelum. sic omnium, quae
sensus attingit, appetitus suggerit, similitudines intra sinum suum imaginatio includit.
Cf. De IV gradibus violentae caritatis, pl 196, 1219D1220A: In hoc gradu contemplatio-
nissuae alis animae sustolluntur supra altitudinem nubium; in hoc gradu ejusmodi alis
evolant usque ad coelum, non solum usque ad primum, sed etiam ad secundum, ita ut
de reliquo dicere possint: Nostra conversatio in coelis est. Supra hoc geminum coelum
Imagination At The Uppermost Stages Of Contemplation 233

its bosom the similitudes of everything the senses touch and the faculty of
desire (appetitus) brings to the mind. He repeats that the similitudes and
images of all visible things are contained in the first heaven. As a conclusion,
he briefly mentions that rational principles, definitions and investigations of
all visible and invisible things belong to the second, rational heaven, and con-
templations and understanding of spiritual things pertain to the third, intel-
lectual heaven.36
Despite the fact that Richards model of the three heavens utilizes the
ascending series of the abilities of the soul, it emphasizes above all the three
different spheres into which the individual can enter. The imaginative or
phantastical heaven can be interpreted as the world of sensible images, the
rational world the inner world of the soul, and the intellectual heaven the tran-
scendental divine reality. In any case, an ascending triple series clearly appears
in his text, in which the basic structure is denoted by the abilities of the soul.
The similarity to the objects of the six kinds of contemplation is evident as well.
It is probable that Richard continues the topic of the heavens already
exploited in Benjamin Minor further in Benjamin Major. In Benjamin Minor, the
three heavens are not yet defined as imaginative, rational, and intellectual, the
first heaven representing the knowledge of oneself, the second the contempla-
tion of angelic spirits, and the third heaven contemplation directed to God.37

est adhuc tertium coelum, quod dicitur coelum coelorum. Ad hoc itaque tertium coelum
omnino ascendere non possunt etiam illi qui ad secundum amoris gradum profecerunt.
Quod est terra ad primum coelum; et quod est primum coelum ad secundum, hoc est
secundum coelum ad coelum coelorum. Secundum itaque coelum, si vultis, terra est, et
coelum, imo et coelum coeli est. Sed coelum coeli est ad primum coelum, terra autem ad
coelum coelorum.
36 BMAJ III, VIII, p. 66.913: In primo itaque caelo continentur omnium visibilium imagines
et similitudines. Ad secundum vero pertinent visibilium omnium rationes, diffinitiones
et invisibilium investigationes. Ad tertium autem spectant spiritualium ipsorum, etiam
divinorum comprehensiones et contemplationes. Cf. other similar speculation in
Honorius Augustodunensis Scala coeli maior, pl 172, 12291240. Honorius analyses the
three heavens as follows. pl 172, 1231B: Tres visiones sunt, corporalis, spiritualis, intellec-
tualis. Corporalis est, qua coelum hoc et terra, et omnia corporalia per corpus videntur: et
haec primum coelum vocatur. Spiritualis est, qua similitudo corporalium in Spiritu nostro
formatur: et haec secundum coelum nominatur. Intellectualis est, qua nec corporalia nec
similitudo corporalium, sed ipsa essentia divinae veritatis, vel angelorum vel animarum
natura, sicuti est, contemplatur, et haec tertium coelum appellatur. He then proceeds to
define twelve different kinds of spiritual vision, which turn out to belong to the sphere of
the imaginative abilities of the soul.
37 BMIN LXXIV. p. 304.2425, 3436: Ad primum itaque coelum pertinet cognitio sui, ad ter-
tium autem pertinet contemplatio Dei. Aliter siquidem Deus uidetur per fidem, aliter
234 Chapter 7

Every mode of heaven has its parallel form of vision (visio). The notion of
vision often refers particularly to the prophetic sight which offers a glimpse of
future events.38 In Richards model, the first of these visions is below reason;
the second is with reason, and the third is above reason.39 The idea of the first
heaven and self-knowledge in Benjamin Minor does not correspond straight-
forwardly to the first heaven of Benjamin Major, in which heaven includes the
similitudes and images. However, in both cases the first heaven is said to be
below reason, and thus has a similar position in regard to the corresponding
faculties of the soul.
Richards direct source in both Benjamin Minor and Majors discussions con-
cerning the three heavens is Augustines De Genesi ad litteram. Augustine lists
three different forms of vision. The first is corporeal vision (visio corporealis)
which means that the invisible reality enwraps itself in a bodily form to be
perceived by the natural senses. Secondly, Augustine mentions the imaginative
vision (visio imaginativa) by which he means the human beings awareness of
other present representations in the sensory soul, such as dreams, or imagin-
ing of some absent or fictional object. Augustine also mentions that one sees
corporeal similitudes of visible objects in the imaginative vision. The third and
highest form of vision is the intellectual vision (visio intellectualis), which is
directed to invisible objects only.40 In this tripartite model of vision, the first
refers to the operation of external senses, while the second refers to an image

cognoscitur per rationem, atque aliter cernitur per contemplationem. See the complete
discussion in BMIN LXXIV, p. 302306. A similar tripartite idea of the heavens may be
found in Richards De Trinitate. De Trinitate, prologus, p. 82.2p. 83.78: Ascendamus de
primo ad secundum, et de secundo ad tertium. Contemplatione ascendentibus de visi-
bilibus ad invisibilia, de corporalibus ad spiritualia, primo occurrit consideratio inmor-
talitatis, secundo consideratio incorruptibilitatis, tertio consideratio eternitatis. Prima
est regio spiritus humani, secunda spiritus angelici, tertia spiritus divini. Here Richard
implies the ascent of the soul from visible things to invisible as one enters the three heav-
ens. For an analysis of this passage, see Evans 2011, 355. For Richards notion of cognitio
sui, see Nakamura 2002.
38 Gardiner 1993, xvi. For example, Macrobius influential commentary upon Scipios dream
lists five different species of dream. In this context, the vision (visio) refers especially to
prophetic prediction. See also Dinzelbacher 1981, 2951.
39 BMIN LXXIV, p. 302.1517: Sed alia est dignitas spiritus humani, alia autem spiritus angel-
ici, et longe alia est excellentia spiritus diuini. BMIN LXXIV, p. 304.3639: Prima ergo uisio
ad primum coelum, secunda ad secundum, tertia pertinet ad tertium. Prima est infra
rationem, secunda cum ratione, tertia supra rationem.
40 De Genesi ad litteram 12.6.1512.9.20.; 12.24.51. The spiritual vision is an intermediary
between the corporeal and intellectual visions. Augustine claims that mind is active in
both seeing and imagining. The objects of seeing are not actual physical things, but simili-
tudes or likenesses (similitudines) of corporeal things. The theory of three visions has
Imagination At The Uppermost Stages Of Contemplation 235

caused by sense perception. The third is accessible to understanding because

it only is able to grasp the content of the previous visions rationally. The enu-
meration of the three visions has become standard since Augustine.41 Richard
also writes in his commentary on Joel that there are three different kinds of
vision: material, spiritual, and intellectual. The first is of matter and with form;
the second is without matter but with form, and the third is without matter
and without form. The first considers elementary things, the second imagined
things, and the third conceives God.42

7.3 Imagination as an Object of Contemplation

In this section, I will discuss one of the most intriguing passages in Benjamin
Major. Richard analyses the properties of imagination, arguing that this kind
of knowledge may profit the fourth and fifth kinds of contemplation. In the

obvious Neoplatonic tendencies, deriving from Augustines reading of Neoplatonic litera-

ture. For Augustines Neoplatonic backround on this, see Markus 1981, 204211. The
impact of Origen is also possible. In his Homilies on Genesis, Origen writes that the human
mind is a kind of first heaven, or firmamentum. Homilies on Genesis 1.2, 28; 1.7, 40. See
Heidls analyses of Origens influence on Augustines writings; Heidl 2003. Newman com-
ments that almost all medieval vision texts belong to Augustines second vision, visio
spiritualis/imaginativa, visions that may be either false or true. Newman 2005, 7.
41 The three visions were further connected with Scriptural senses as well. The three sorts of
vision, corporis, spiritus, and mentis correspond to the three senses of Scripture, litteralis,
spiritalis, intellectualis. This idea was mentioned by Gottfried of Admont (d. 1165).
Homiliae in festa totius anni, pl 174, 999AB: Tres visiones sunt, corporalis, spiritalis, intel-
lectualis. Corporalem visionem dicimus, quod corporalibus oculis corporaliter cernimus.
quia sicut triplex est visio, corporis, spiritus et mentis, ita triplex etiam sensus est in
Scripturis sanctis, litteralis, spiritalis, intellectualis. Litteralem atque spiritalem sensus
egregius ipse doctor gentium tunc transcenderat, et usque ad tertium coelum, intellectu-
alem scilicet sensum, gloriose conscenderat, quando toto cordis intellectu ita coelestibus
est conjunctus, quod utrum in corpore, an extra corpus esset se nescire asseruit.
42 See the interesting definition in Adnotatiunculae in Joelem, pl 175, 355D356A: Tria quo-
que sunt genera visionum. Prima est materialis, secunda spiritualis, tertia intellectualis.
Prima est cum materia et forma; secunda sine materia, sed cum forma; tertia sine materia
et sine forma. Prima concipit elementata, secunda imaginata, tertia ab omni circumscrip-
tione est aliena, utcunque Deum concipiens, virtutes quoque et vitia. Tria sunt quoque
genera somniorum: unum faeculenti animi, alterum sobrii, tertium defaecati. Primum
genus falsitati servit; secundum alterutri aut veritati aut falsitati famulatur; tertium veri-
tatem contemplatur. Et ut aliquid de secretis physicae interseram, primum genus est ante
digestionem realium phantasmatum, secundum in digestione eorum, tertium post diges-
tionem ipsorum. The attribution of this work is uncertain; see Kirchberger 1957, 253;
Javelet 1967, II, xxxiv; Coolman and Coulter 2011, 17.
236 Chapter 7

final three kinds of contemplation, the soul prepares itself for the ecstatic
union with God by examining its own depths.
The investigation of the abilities of imagination culminates in a particular
section which deals with the classification of the souls abilities introduced in
the fourth kind of contemplation. The only ability of the soul capable of the
tasks of the fourth kind of contemplation is reason. In the fourth kind,
the main task of reason is to closely scrutinize the various abilities and parts of
the soul. In doing this, reason directs its attention to the analysis of the human
imagination as well.43
The contemplation in question, Richard argues, can be divided into five
parts. In the fourth kind of contemplation, the following objects are examined:

1. the qualities and immortality of the soul (BMAJ III, XX)

2. the epistemological tools of the human being (BMAJ III, XXI)
3. will and emotion (BMAJ III, XXII)
4. consideration and virtues (BMAJ III, XXIII)
5. the operation of the soul in grace (BMAJ III, XXIV)

In my analysis, only the second part, which deals with epistemological tools of
the human being, is explored. This is because the analysis of the imaginations
functions is found here.44 Richard states that the second part has been dedi-
cated to the study of all things which participate in knowing, or which can
beengaged in the pursuit of truth, and show the way to an increase in knowl-
edge.45 In this second part, Richard pays special attention to fluency of

43 The fourth kind of contemplation is divided into three subspecies. The soul should con-
template the spiritual goods of its creation, its goodness in justification, and glorification
in blessedness. The first of these three subspecies is most fully dealt with; the soul focuses
on exploring those spiritual goods which are related to its creation. In consequence of
this, the soul turns to study its own existence, knowing, and willing. BMAJ III, XIXV,
p. 6973. For the importance of these chapters in Richards production and Richards debt
to Hugh, see Coulter 2006, 4344.
44 In the following passage (BMAJ III, XXII, p. 8081), Richard describes the emotional fragil-
ity of man in a lively way. He illustrates the human beings manifold affection with an
example of the motion of a leaf, which may frighten the soul in the silence of the night.
However, Richard does not discuss the possible effects of the function of imagination on
affections.
45 BMAJ III, XXI, p. 79.1416: In secundo huius contemplationis gradu considerantur illa,
quae ad cognitionem sunt vel veritatis studio deservire possunt et quaecumque in aug-
menta scientiae concurrunt atque conducunt.
Imagination At The Uppermost Stages Of Contemplation 237

cogitation (volubilitas cogitationis), mobility of imagination (agilitas imagina

tionis), sharpness of ingenium (ingenii acumen), judgement (discretio), mem-
ory (memoria), and liveliness of understanding (intelligentia).46 This series is
not a comprehensive survey of the minds apparatus of knowledge formation;
Richard probably offers examples for the epistemological equipment of the
soul. However, at the same time he joins these instruments of the mind to the
series which correspondingly describes the formation of knowledge. Richard
writes that the senses touch the world (sensus attingit), cogitation gives birth
(cogitatio parit), imagination shapes (imaginatio format), ingenium examines
(ingenium investigat), memory retains (memoria conservat) and, finally, under-
standing possesses (intelligentia capit) everything.47 Hence, the process of
knowledge formation in this example proceeds from the senses to cogitation,
then to imagination and to ingenium, which in this case is synonymous
withreason.48

46 BMAJ III, XXI, p. 79.1619: In hac sane consideratione recte miramur volubilitatem cogita-
tionis, agilitatem imaginationis, ingenii acumen, discretionis examen, capacitatem
memoriae, vivacitatem intelligentiae et circa haec alia quaelibet stupenda et admiratione
digna. Cf. Mysticae adnotationes in Psalmos, in which Richard lists these same instru-
ments of the mind, calling them sensus mentis. pl 196, 276CD: Sicut autem per somnum
exteriorem sopiuntur omnes sensus corporis, sic per hunc de quo loquimur interioris
hominis somnum exsuperantur omnes sensus mentis. Simul enim absorbet cogitatio-
nem, imaginationem, rationem, memoriam, intelligentiam, ut constet quod Apostolus
scribit, quia exsuperat omnem sensum.
47 BMAJ III, XXI, p. 80.2427: Quidquid enim sensus attingit, cogitatio parit; quidquid imagi-
natio format, ingenium investigat, memoria conservat. Horum omnium notitiam intelli-
gentia capit, et cum libuerit, in considerationem admittit vel in contemplationem
adducit. It is also possible to understand this as comparing the relations between the
mental instruments. One should consider the relation between senses and imagination
with the relation that imagination has with ingenium and memory. Cf. Anonymous De
spiritus et anima, pl 40, 808: Sensus itaque parit imaginationem, imaginatio cogitatio-
nem, cogitatio meditationem. Meditatio acuit ingenium, ingenium rationem: ratio con-
ducit ad intellectum, intellectus ad intelligentiam, intelligentia per contemplationem
ipsam veritatem admiratur, et per charitatem in ea delectatur.
48 For other references to the notion of ingenium, cf. BMAJ II, IV, p. 26.4; BMAJ II, V, p. 27.8;
BMAJ III, VI, p. 63.31; BMAJ III, XIII, p. 70.24; BMAJ III, XIV, p. 72.13; BMAJ III, XVII, p. 75.23;
BMAJ III, XXI, p.79.17. Ingenium derives probably from Hugh of St. Victors Didascalicon
III, VII, p. 57.19 (771B). Hugh claims that ingenium is essential for learning and may be
honed with exercise. For a discussion of ingenium in the Middle Ages, see references in
Coulter 2006, 136. The notion of ingenium is exploited in classical rhetoric. It is possible
that Hugh has adapted his idea of ingenium from Marius Victorinus commentary on
Cicero. See Explanationes in Ciceronis Rhetoricam III, p. 27.102. Note that Richard occa-
sionally seems to connect ingenium with imagination as well. See BMAJ II, V, p. 27.8.
238 Chapter 7

It is significant that cogitation (cogitatio) in this series is placed between the

senses (sensus) and imagination (imaginatio). In Benjamin Majors first book,
Richard examines the concept of cogitation briefly, but proceeds swiftly to the
concepts of meditation and contemplation. In that context, Richard states that
cogitation (cogitatio) originates from imagination, but that it neither works
nor produces any fruit. It creeps.49 Now, in the fourth kind of contemplation
he does not associate cogitation and imagination with each other, conceiving
them as separate functions of the mind. However, many properties which
Richard usually associates with the operations of imagination are connected
with the description of cogitation here. Richard praises the fluency and perma-
nence of cogitation. Cogitation is manifold and immensely quick, it surveys
innumerable matters, and is neither quiet nor does it rest for a moment.50 It is
just this kind of incessant movement and noise that Richard attributes in
Benjamin Minor to the basic operation of imagination, which transmits sen-
sual images to reason without any outline or enunciation.51
After examining the operation of cogitation, Richard proceeds to deal with
imagination. He asks the reader to reflect on his own instrument of imagina-
tion in the following way:

But concerning the agility of imagination (imaginatio) and the readiness

of its power, what shall we or can we fittingly say about that which paints
with such great swiftness the image of all those things which the soul sug-
gests? Whatever the soul takes in from the outside (a foris) by means of
hearing, whatever it conceives from cogitation alone (ab intus, ex sola
cogitatione), all that imagination forms by means of a representation,
without delay and without any difficulty, and it represents the forms
(forma) of any thing whatsoever with marvellous haste. What is it, I ask,
to produce pictures (pictura) of so many and varied things in a moment,
in a blink of the eye, and again to erase the same things with the same
ease, or to vary in many ways in one and then another manner?52

49 BMAJ I, III, p. 8.21,23: Cogitatio serpit. Cogitatio est sine labore et fructu.
50 BMAJ III, XXI, p. 79.2124: Quae sit illa tam multiplex cogitationis humanae volubilitas,
quae sit eius tam inquieta et infatigabilis velocitas, quae per tam multa, tam varia et tam
infinita discurrit, quae nulla hora, nullo temporis momento quiescit, quae tot spatia loco-
rum, quae tot volumina temporum, in tanta festinatione pertransit. Cogitatio is described
here as the moving and lively ability, whereas in the previous reference it creeps (serpit).
51 BMIN V, p. 104.3136.
52 BMAJ III, XXI, p. 79.2634: Sed de imaginationis agilitate facultatisque eius facilitate
quidnos dicturi sumus vel quid inde digne dicere possumus, quae omnium eorum, quae
animus suggerit, in tanta velocitate imaginem depingit? Quidquid a foris animus per
Imagination At The Uppermost Stages Of Contemplation 239

In this passage, Richard once more mentions the two basic tasks of imagina-
tion, i.e., presenting images that have been received through direct sense expe-
rience, and putting together different images and their variations. In this
context, imagination is described as a kind of illustrator of various things.
Richard describes two ways the material arrives at the imagination. First, imag-
ination gets material from outside (a foris) by hearing (per auditum), in other
words, through normal sense channels. This is a standard way in regard to
imagination and the senses. It is possible that Richard is thinking here about
sermons or speech, whose contents are illustrated in the soul with the help of
the imaginations productions.53 Second, imagination gets material to work on
from within and cogitation alone (ab intus ex sola cogitatione). It is important
to see that Richard uses the concept of cogitation, i.e., cogitatio, here. One can
assume that the inner material refers to those sense perceptions which have
already been received by cogitation (cogitatio), and it is the task of imagination
(imaginatio) to illustrate this material further. Thus, in this context, the mate-
rial obtained from within would mean simply the fact that no actual external
sensations are necessary for the operation of the imagination.54
This kind of inner illustration of various things in the mind can also be use-
ful in conceptual thinking. This happens when the individual contemplating,
say, some mathematical problem imagines in his mind the auxiliary image
which corresponds to the concept, e.g., of a right-angled triangle. In Richards
texts, there is no example of this kind of straightforward idea of supporting
imagined pictures for conceptual mathematical problem-solving, even though
he states that mathematics is a compositional science and cannot be exercised
without imagination.55 However, since Augustine talks about this kind of

auditum haurit, quidquid ab intus ex sola cogitatione concipit, totum imaginatio absque
mora et omni difficultate seposita per repraesentationem format et quarumlibet rerum
formas sub mira festinatione repraesentat. Quale, quaeso, est tot rerum atque tantarum
in momento, in ictu oculi picturas efficere et iterum easdem eadem facilitate delere vel
alio atque alio modo multipliciter variare?
53 Richard suggests in Benjamin Minor that the rational imaginations ability to produce
images may be useful in sermons. BMIN XXIII, pp. 150, 152.510: Est enim prae ceteris
rudibus quidem adhuc mentibus minusque exercitatis, et ad intelligendum facilior, et ad
audiendum iocundior. Siquidem haec meditanti facilius occurrit, et audientem dulcius
afficit. Est plane et promptior in meditatione, et affabilior in sermone.
54 For example, Augustine refers to the operation of imagination occasionally as cogitare,
see Confessiones, 10.11.18.; De Trinitate 11.3.6.; De Genesi ad litteram 12.6.15. In this case he
means collecting pictures from the memory, co agitare. Taylor 1982, 304n.22.
55 Liber exceptionum I, I, cap. XXIII, p. 111.910: Ideo logica aliquando pura intelligentia uti-
tur, mathematica nunquam sine imaginatione est.
240 Chapter 7

a uxiliary image in mathematics, the idea might also have been familiar to
Richard.56 However, in Benjamin Minor, there is a clear example of assisting
images relating to ones moral purification. The most important task of the
rational imagination in Benjamin Minor is the construction of images which are
related to the future. Richard argues that the human being is able to imagine the
various images of hell and heaven, in other words, the pictures of mind about
the punishments or rewards which the soul will encounter in the afterlife.57
Richard also states that rational soul suggests things, after which imagina-
tion portrays them.58 One may discern this same idea in Benjamin Minor,
where Richard gives practical advice for struggling against illicit thoughts sug-
gested by the mind, not imagination.59 This differs from the scheme presented
by Hugh and Boethius, since both claim that it is in fact imagination which
suggests images for the soul. Reason subsequently discerns, explains, or con-
firms this material.60
Nonetheless, Richard continues the analysis of the abilities of the imagina-
tion in the fourth kind of contemplation. In the following passage, he goes
back to the idea of the imaginative heaven, which had already been discussed
in Benjamin Major.61 He also writes about the close relationship between imag-
ination and will. Richard puts it as follows:

56 Epistula 7.2.4.; Soliloquia 2.20.34. Eriugena repeates this idea in his Periphyseon, stating
that the fantasies are pictures which originate either from visible or invisible objects.
Periphyseon V, p. 143.46374638 (962C): Phantasia uero est imago quaedam et apparitio
de uisibili uel inuisibili specie memoriae impressa. For the analysis of Eriugenas idea, see
De Bruyne 1946, 366367.
57 See Chapter 4.3.
58 BMAJ III, XXI, p. 79.2829: omnium eorum, quae animus suggerit, in tanta velocitate
imaginem depingit.
59 BMIN XX, p. 140.2142.7: Sancti etenim uiri, quotiens se sentiunt turpibus cogitationibus
pulsari, et ad illicitam delectationem incitari, totiens solent in ipso etiam temptationis
aditu futura tormenta ante mentis oculis ponere, et ex tali consideratione quicquid illici-
tum mens suggerit ante turpem delectationem extinguere. It is possible that Richard
views the mind as something that includes all the abilities of the soul and in that case it is
not to be contrasted with imagination.
60 In Isagogen Porphyrii commenta II.1, p. 137.8. (71C72A): haec tantum humano generi
praesto est, quae non solum sensus imaginationes que perfectas et non inconditas capit,
sed etiam pleno actu intellegentiae quod imaginatio suggessit, explicat atque confirmat.
Didascalicon I, III, p. 9.11 (743D): hec tantum humano generi presto est, que non solum
sensus imaginationes que perfectas et non inconditas capit, sed etiam pleno actu intelli-
gentie, quod imaginatio suggessit, explicat atque confirmat. Hugh cites Boethius
verbatim.
61 BMAJ III, VIII, p. 6566. See the discussion above.
Imagination At The Uppermost Stages Of Contemplation 241

When it wishes, does the rational soul not create daily by means of the
imagination new heaven and a new earth, and in that phantastical world,
as if it were another creator, according to its will, it every hour causes
actions and forms creatures of that sort and however great you like?62

Here Richard states that the rational soul with the help of imagination may
create some kind of world which is formed of phantasms. This world has been
produced voluntarily; i.e., first the individual chooses the appearing images
and then remodels them according to his will. This kind of construction of
heaven and earth may include all kinds of phantasms, the size of which may
vary and, as a matter of fact, heaven and earth may be renewed continuously
by the act of the will. There is no doubt that Richard utilizes the terminology
which is clearly related to the creation here: the soul creates (creare) by the
means of imagination, this way the soul is a kind of a creator (quasi creator).
He has already stated that imagination itself is a creator (creatrix).63 A similar
conception of imagination and creative activity is rare among medieval
writers.64
Even if it were so that imagination could create new images on the basis of
those that have been sensed earlier, one can question the accuracy of the anal-
ogy between the ability of imagination which creates, and the actual creative
work of God. The human being may continuously create and revive the heaven
and earth of fantasies with the powers of his imagination, in such a way and of

62 BMAJ III, XXI, p. 79.34p. 80.3: Nonne per imaginationem animus cotidie novum caelum,
novam terram, cum voluerit, creat et in illo phantastico mundo quasi alius quidam cre-
ator quantaslibet eiusmodi generis creaturas omni hora actitat et pro arbitrio format? In
this passage, Richard gives a vivid example of the inner scene of action which is produced
with the help of imagination. In this fantastic world, imagination models various kinds of
creatures according to the will of the rational soul. These figures are then put into action
(actitare) to perform.
63 BMAJ III, I, p. 55.1617: Quid hic facit phantasmatum corporalium creatrix, moderatrix,
reparatrix imaginatio?
64 However, Eriugena writes in a similar manner that the human being may create fantasies
of things that are sensed or remembered. Eriugena briefly discusses the operation of
imagination (imaginatio) and its objects, employing the notion of creare in that context.
Periphyseon IV, p. 35.941951 (765C): Omne quod cognoscitur intellectu et ratione, seu
corporeo sensu imaginatur, putasne in ipso qui intelligit et sentit quodammodo posse
creari et effici? Videtur mihi posse. Rerum siquidem sensibilium species et quantitates et
qualitates, quas corporeo sensu attingo, quodammodo in me creari puto; earum namque
phantasias, dum memoriae infigo, easque intra meipsum tracto, diuido, comparo, ac
ueluti in unitatem quandam colligo, quandam notitiam rerum quae extra me sunt in me
effici perspicio. See also Peter Alfonsis unusual idea in his Ex Judaeo Christiani Dialogi,
242 Chapter 7

a kind as he himself wants. Thus the individual can be an omnipotent mas-

ter in his own restricted world. In this task, one can see a hidden, remote
similarity to the divine creative activity. Richard himself describes the oper-
ation of God as follows: Indeed, if he willed, the Creator could complete
everything by Himself without the work of the creature, just as when he
willed, He was able to create so many and such great things out of nothing.65
The most obvious similarity between the creative activity of God and that of
the human being is the importance of the will and its voluntary actions.
However, Richard connects the operations of imagination and will together
such that the similitude of this combination with the divine creative activity
should be taken into account. It is difficult to assess how far Richard wishes
to draw a parallel between human and divine creativity, exemplified by the
creation of a new heaven and earth, since this kind of illustration clearly
resembles the Bibles first verse, according to which God created the heaven
and the earth.
In the quotations provided above, it has been clear that imagination is able
to produce some quite new combinations of the previously sensed images.
However, the parts of the new image can already exist as individual images;
imagination only joins, separates, reduces, and enlarges these images. By con-
trast, Gods creative activity is not based on any pre-existing material, i.e., it is
ex nihilo. In the context of twelfth-century Christian theological literature, it
seems very surprising to find the idea that the human being could have similar

pl157, 606D607A. According to Peter, the creator has to know in advance what he wills
in order to make anything at all. For to fabricate something in reality, the creator has to
first form things in his mind by imagining, this imagination being his wisdom. pl 157,
606D607A: Cum igitur constet vere substantiam esse, et ipsam creatricem omnium
rerum, et initium initiatarum, et factricem facturarum, necesse est ut habeat sapientiam
et voluntatem, ut scilicet sciat quid facere velit, antequam facere velit quia faciat, et ut
etiam antequam opus in demonstratione prodeat, prius in animo imaginando formatur,
et haec imaginatio est sapientia. Cum autem sic sapit, aut facit, aut non facit. Non autem
facit, si non velit. Si vero facit, et vult, et haec est voluntas. Ergo apparet in nostro ser-
mone, opus praeiri sapientia et voluntate. Mundi ergo Creator, creare aliquid nequivit,
antequam in eo sapere esset et velle.
65 BMAJ III, XVI, p. 73.2830: Et posset quidem, si vellet, sine creaturae opera totum creator
per seipsum explere, sicut potuit, cum voluit tot et tanta creare de nihilo. The good
account of various kinds of operations is provided by Hugh in his De sacramentis. He
enumerates six modes of operation through which God can make something from noth-
ing (ex nihilo), make something into nothing, make a greater new thing from the smaller
and a smaller new thing from a larger. The human being can only divide things into parts
or assemble parts into wholes. De sacramentis I, vi, 37. pl 176, 285A287A. Cf. Miscellanea,
pl 177, 512B513C.
Imagination At The Uppermost Stages Of Contemplation 243

abilities to God, and could create some completely new things. However,
Richard expounds his conception of human creative imagination in the fourth
book of Benjamin Major.66 The analysis of creative imagination provides access
to understanding something about divine creative activity.
Benjamin Majors two final books are highly speculative, and there has been
much discussion about the various topics they contain.67 The influential
ideaof the mystical union with God is described in the fifth and sixth kinds of
contemplation. While ecstasy of the mind may occur in every kind of contem-
plation, it is more likely to take place in these two final contemplations.68
Richard makes it clear that in these uppermost kinds of contemplation the
power of imagination cannot function any longer, and thus holds no advantage
for the soul.69 The reason is that the objects of these last two kinds are super-
sensual and intellectible (intellectibilia). The fifth kind of contemplation,
formed in understanding, lies above rational thinking (in intelligentia, supra
rationem). Richard places the sixth kind of contemplation within the power of
understanding, declaring that its objects exceed reason, and may even disagree
with reason (in intelligentia, supra et praeter seu contra rationem).70
In the fifth kind of contemplation, the objects of contemplation cannot be
made known on the basis of experience. Furthermore, one may not investigate
them fully by reasoning. The objects of the sixth kind of contemplation, in
turn, are customarily in disagreement with examples drawn from experience
and contradict arguments. These objects can be investigated only when the
person is aided by miracles, divine apparitions, and authentic witnesses or

66 BMAJ IV, XX, p. 115.2025.

67 Most of the studies which deal with Richards texts are concentrated on these final stages
of contemplation and the unio mystica. Kirchberger 1957, 3747; Zinn 1979; Chase 1995;
McGinn 1995, 407414.
68 BMAJ IV, XXII, p. 118.1620: Quamvis autem familiare sit et quasi proprium videatur duobus
novissimis contemplationum generibus per mentis excessum videre, econtra autem quat-
tuor primis quasi domesticum est et paene velut singulare sine ulla animi alienatione in
contemplationem assurgere, possunt tamen omnia atque solent modo utroque contingere.
69 BMAJ IV, IV, p. 89.1214, 1720: In hac gemina speculatione nihil imaginarium, nihil phan-
tasticum debet occurrere; longe enim omnem corporeae similitudinis proprietatem
excedit, quidquid spectaculi tibi haec gemina novissimi operis specula proponit. .Cedat
itaque imaginatio interim, cedat penitusque recedat, non est utique in quo hoc opus adi-
uvare valeat. Quid enim imaginatio possit, ubi ratio succumbit? Quid ibi facit imaginatio,
ubi nulla est transmutatio nec vicissitudinis obumbratio.
70 BMAJ I, VI, p. 12.13, 1618: Sex autem sunt contemplationum genera a se et inter se omnino
divisa. Quintum est supra rationem, sed non praeter rationem. Sextum supra rationem
et videtur esse praeter rationemDuo itaque sunt in imaginatione, duo in ratione, duo in
intelligentia.
244 Chapter 7

authorities.71 However, Richard insists that the preliminary kinds of contem-

plation serve as a necessary foundation for the higher kinds. He reiterates that
one should begin with the lowest things and use the knowledge of corporeal
things in order to rise to knowledge of invisible things.72
In Benjamin Major, these two uppermost kinds of contemplation are repre-
sented as the two golden cherubs positioned over the Ark of the Covenant,
turning their faces towards each other, and spreading their wings.73 The exami-
nation of the unity of God is signified by the first of these cherubs, i.e., the fifth
kind of contemplation. The second cherub represents the highest form of
contemplation in which the holy Trinity will be considered.74

71 BMAJ IV, III, p. 88.1322: Supra rationem illa esse dicimus, quae nullo experimento pro-
bare, nulla ratiocinatione ad plenum investigare sufficimus. Praeter rationem autem ea
videntur esse, quibus et exempla contraire et argumenta solent contradicere. In illis siq-
uidem et experimenta desunt et argumenta succumbunt. Istis vero tam exempla quam
argumenta contradicunt. Illa saepe et auctoritatibus probamus et argumentis confirma-
mus et similitudinibus persuademusIsta autem modo miraculis, modo auctoritatibus
persuadentur modo revelationibus discuntur.
72 BMAJ IV, V, p. 90.1116: Debemus ergo a novissimis at notissimis incipere et scientiae nos-
trae promotionem paulatim sublevare et per exteriorum notitiam ad invisibilium cogni-
tionem ascendere. Cum enim exteriorum scientiam apprehenderis et in eorum doctrina
exercitatos sensus habueris, debes ad altiora ascendere et spiritualium creaturarum sci-
entiam comparare.
73 BMAJ IV, XX, p. 115.120; Nonnullae allegoriae tabernaculi foederis, pl 196, 198C: In illa
speculatione quae per propitiatorium intelligitur multa divinorum similitudo, multa
dissimilitudo invenitur. Est enim spiritualis creatura ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei
facta. Unus ergo ex cherubin ante jam dictis teneat latus similitudinis, alter vero ex eis
teneat latus dissimilitudinis. BMAJ I, XII, p. 21.1113, 1718: Vide ergo ne forte in illo
Cherub, qui a dexteris stabat, illud contemplationis genus intelligi debeat, quod est
supra rationem non tamen praeter rationem. In illo autem qui a sinistris illud, quod est
supra rationem et videtur esse praeter rationem. Manifestiora autem sunt rationi
consentanea, occultiora autem rationi adversantia. The definition of cherub is the
same as in Pseudo-Dionysius De caelesti hierarchia, pl 122, 1050B. See also BMAJ IV, I,
p.86.1620.
74 BMAJ I, VI, p. 14.611, 1718, 2122: Quintum contemplationis genus esse diximus quod est
supra rationem non tamen praeter rationem. In hanc autem contemplationis speculam
mentis sublevatione ascendimus, quando ea ex divina revelatione cognoscimus, quae
nulla humana ratione plene comprehendere, quae nulla nostra ratiocinatione integre
investigare sufficimus. Talia sunt illa, quae de divinitatis natura et illa simplici essentia
credimusSextum contemplationis genus dictum est, quod in his versatur, quae sunt
supra rationem et videntur esse praeter seu etiam contra rationem. Talia sunt paene
omnia, quae de personarum Trinitate credere iubemur.
Imagination At The Uppermost Stages Of Contemplation 245

Richard writes that these two golden cherubs not only gaze at one another,
but ought to turn their faces toward the propitiatory when looking at one
another. This golden propitiatory describes the fourth kind of contemplation;
in other words, it refers to the rational, created soul of the human being with
all its properties. The fifth and sixth kinds of contemplation, by contrast, deal
with the divine and uncreated Spirit. In spite of this, the two highest kinds of
contemplation can lean on the results produced by the fourth one, in which
case the ascent from the sensible world, the lowest levels of contemplation, is
claimed to continue without interruption even up to the highest and spiritual
objects of contemplation.75 Richard describes this as the mutual coming
together of the three last kinds of contemplation.76 He explains this combina-
tion as running to and fro between these kinds and explains how it promotes
the perfection of each individual kind of contemplation.77
An important shift in Richards model of spiritual ascent happens here. The
fifth and sixth kinds of contemplation may draw similitudes of reason (simili
tudines rationis) from objects which have been studied in the fourth kind.
Richards terminology is difficult here, since he also writes that the reason or
rationale for similitude (ratio similitudinis) should be investigated here. The
reason for similitude means in this context the similarity between two things
and the reason why they are alike.78 These reasons for similitude are impor-
tant, since they will assist the soul even in the beholding of the suprarational
things such as the Trinity. In his De Trinitate, Richard writes that it is normal to
transfer the meaning of terms of the human relationship to divine reality. This
can be done on the basis of the reason for similitude.79 Richard detects various

75 BMAJ IV, XXI, p. 117.16: Cogita quam magnum sit vel quale omni hora, cum opus fuerit
Deum consulere, et in qualibet necessitate, cum oportuerit divinum consilium quaerere
et accipere, et tunc animadvertere poteris quam sit necessarium vel utile hos tres novis-
simos speculationum modos familiares habere: Inde, inquit, loquar ad te. De quo, quaeso,
loco, vel unde? Desuper propitiatorio, inquit, et de medio duorum cherubim.
76 BMAJ IV, XX, p. 115.2: De mutua collatione trium novissimarum speculationum. Note how
Richard uses the notion of speculation instead of contemplation. These concepts are syn-
onymous here, as Coulter points out. Coulter 2006, 144.
77 BMAJ IV, XXI, p. 117.1517: Quasi inter propitiatorium et duos Cherubim medii discurri-
mus, quando ex mutua trium novissimarum speculationum collatione ad singularum
perfectionem plenius proficimus.
78 For the use of ratio similitudinis in Richard, see the interpretations and translations by
Salet 1959, 375379; Zinn 1979, 194,196; Chase 1995, 39; McGinn 1995, 409; Den Bok 1996,
160166; Coulter 2006, 118123. My interpretation will follow Salets, Den Boks and
Coulters suggestions.
79 De Trinitate VI, II, p. 230.4144: Quoniam igitur solemus juxta divinarum Scripturarum
morem humane germanitatis nomina pro similitudinis ratione ad divina transsumere.
246 Chapter 7

similitudes in De Trinitate by isolating a specific aspect of created things, show-

ing that God has the same or a similar aspect. This sameness is the rationale for
the similitude in question, as Den Bok remarks.80 In this respect, the connec-
tion between Benjamin Majors upper kinds of contemplation and De Trinitate
is clear. In both texts, reasons for similitudes, i.e., analogous relations between
human reality and God, serve as a basis for argument. However, it should be
noted that reasons for similitude which are used in the fifth kind of contempla-
tion differ by their very essence from the corporeal similitudes and their rea-
sons, which were utilized in the third kind of contemplation. Richards theory
of similitudes and their rationale forms a two-level system: at the lower level,
the soul seeks similitudes and their rationale between visible and invisible
things (the third kind of contemplation), while at the higher level one detects
similitudes and their rationale between invisible things, namely between the
soul and God (the fifth kind of contemplation). This is also the method in De
Trinitate.81
Richard continues by emphasizing the primacy of the human soul in the
attempt to approach the invisible forms, angels, and God. The human being
must first contemplate the similitude of his own soul, and proceed in spiritual
life with the help of this knowledge. The similitude has been created in order
to provide special support for the last two and most demanding kinds of
contemplation.82

Richard also writes that we read in created nature what we should think about uncreated
nature; see De Trinitate I, IX, p. 94.1213: In natura creata legimus quod de natura
increata pensare vel estimare debeamus.
80 For analysis of the notion of ratio similitudinis in Richards De Trinitate, see Den Bok 1996,
161166.
81 Note how Richard claims that in the third kind of contemplation one should exploit the
corporeal similitudes and try to draw an analogous rationale from them as well. BMAJ II,
XIV, p. 36.3032: Ex his itaque omnibus ad invisibilium investigationem congruas simili-
tudinum rationes eruere possumus et debemus.
82 BMAJ IV, XX, p. 115.38, 1315: Debent autem duo Cherubim non solum se invicem respi-
cere, verum etiam in ipso alterutro respectu vultum in propitiatorium vertere. Vultum
suum Cherubim designati in propitiatorium vertunt, quando novissima duo contempla-
tionum genera in eo, quod de sublimibus et divinis concorditer sentiunt, ab illis, quae
quarto contemplationis generi subiacent, in assertionis suae testimonium rationis simili-
tudinem trahuntQuia igitur rationalem creaturam ad creatoris imaginem factam cog-
novimus, recte ab illa natura similitudinis rationem familiarius quaerimus modumque
investigationis nostrae formamus. Note that here Richard reiterates the similar idea of
forming the mode of investigation by finding the similitudes. Similarly, in the third kind
of contemplation one should form the mode of investigation by using the corporeal simil-
itudes. In both the third and fifth kinds of contemplation, the soul uses similitudes which
Imagination At The Uppermost Stages Of Contemplation 247

Next Richard lists the three properties of the rational soul from which
reasons for similitude arise, which then point towards the divine essence
and the Trinity. This list is a modification of the scheme in the fourth kind of
contemplation; however, the perspective is now different.83 The first of these
reasons is obtained by studying imagination. The second reason is found in the
fact that the soul of the human being is diffused simultaneously throughout
the body just as God is present everywhere in the world. Thus the stress is on
the souls omnipresence in the body.84 The third reason for similitude is found
in human free will. Richard wonders how God spreads his goodness into the
world without any opposition, entirely at His own will. Likewise the soul can
move, moderate, and direct the body simply by means of a decision of the will.
Richard writes that as far as this third kind of reason is concerned, there is one
mode of action (agendi modus), although it differs in comparison of equality.85

are drawn (trahere) either from corporeal objects (the third contemplation) or the ratio-
nal soul (the fifth contemplation). The idea of finding the reason for similitude is also
repeated. BMAJ II, XVII, p. 41.710: Numquam enim ratio ad invisibilium contemplatio-
nem assurgeret, nisi ei imaginatio rerum visibilium formas repraesentando exhiberet,
unde adilla similitudinem traheret et investigationis suae modum formaret. BMAJ II, XIV,
p.36.3032.
83 Compare BMAJ III, XX, p. 78 and BMAJ III, XXIV, p. 85. The three similar objects of contem-
plation in the fourth and fifth kinds of contemplation are the ubiquity of the soul in the
body, the epistemological process focused on the functions of imagination and, finally,
the modes of will.
84 BMAJ IV, XX, p. 115.2731: Si miraris quomodo unus idemque Deus possit esse omnibus in
locis non per partes divisus, sed ubique totus, attende quod una eademque anima sit per
omnia corporis membra diffusa nec tamen et ipsa per partes divisa, sed in singulis tota et
individua. The same idea of the souls omnipresence is contemplated at the first stage of
the fourth kind of contemplation. BMAJ III, XX, p. 78.2779.2: quod nullo sustentamento
egeat, quod sine subsidio sempiterne subsistat, quomodo sit per tot corporis membra dif-
fusa, cum sit ipsa simplex partibusque carens individua essentia, quomodo in toto cor-
pore suo quasi in suo quodam mundo sit utique ubique tota, quemadmodum Deus
invenitur ubique totus in omni creatura sua, quomodo in illo suo mundo sola voluntate
omnia movet atque disponit Cf. William of St. Thierrys De natura corporis et animae, pl
180, 719D: Cum enim sicut Deus in mundo, sic quodammodo ipsa sit in corpore suo;
ubique scilicet, et ubique According to McGinn, this passage depends on Claudianus
Mamertuss De statu animae as well as Gregory of Nyssas De homine. McGinn 1977, 38,
141142. Cf. also De contemplatione et ejus speciebus, p. 77.2023: In secundo quoque
natura anime quasi quoddam simulacrum est divine essentie. Sicut enim ille ubique est
totus, sic anima per omnis corporis artus.
85 BMAJ IV, XX, p. 115.33116.1: Si miraris quomodo Deus omnia, quae in mundo geruntur,
absque ulla contradictione solo voluntatis nutu ad omne suum beneplacitum inclinat,
248 Chapter 7

He stresses that the reasons for similitude arise from human nature (natura),
which somehow reflects the divine nature.86
Three reasons for similitude are (1) imagination, (2) the omnipresence of
the soul in the body, and (3) the souls commanding position compared to the
body. Together these three exemplify the vestiges of the Trinity (vestigium
Trinitatis) in the human soul. By studying his rational soul diligently, the
human being can find some traces which directly relate to the Trinity.87
However, Richard remarks that in every similarity and trace there is a differ-
ence from the Trinity. This difference or negation in every created thing is
always greater than its similitude to divine reality.88 The notion of reasons for

considera quia et anima quaelibet corporis sui membra pro solo voluntatis arbitrio
movet, moderatur et ordinat. Unus itaque utrobique quantum ad similitudinem agendi
modus, quamvis in aequalitatis comparatione diversus.
86 De Trinitate VI, XXIII, p. 261.410. Richard points out that by using the ladder of similitude
one may ascend to invisible realities. Because human nature (natura) is made in the
divine image and similitude, one is able to draw from it things similar to the divine. Cf. De
Trinitate III, X, p. 145. As Den Bok notes, it is not the person (persona) that reflects the
divine one(s), but his nature (natura). Den Bok 1996, 377.
87 BMAJ IV, XX, p. 116.16: In his omnibus primus Cherub propitiatorium intendit, dum ex
rationali creatura a creatoris sui contemplatione similitudinis rationem trahit. In hac ipsa
rationali creatura, si diligenter attendimus, aliquod ut credimus, summae Trinitatis ves-
tigium invenimus. Est enim ibi aliquid ex mente ipsa, hoc est eius sapienta, et est ibi
aliquid tam de mente ipsa quam de eius sapientia, scilicet dilectio sua. Richard points out
that traces of the Trinity can be found primarily in the human mind (mens), its wisdom
(sapientia) and love (dilectio). Cf. Augustines idea of the trinitarian image in the human
being. This triad consists of the mind (mens), knowledge (notitia), and love (amor). See De
Trinitate 9.3.3.
88 BMAJ IV, XX, p. 116.1517: Vide ergo quia in his, quae pro similitudine adducta sunt, in
rationali animo ad illam summam Trinitatem maior est dissimilitudo quam similitudo. In
Richards discussion of dissimilar symbols, one can see the influence of Pseudo-Dionysius.
Both call attention to the different levels of material similitudes (similitudines), among
which some are more appropriate instruments than others as the soul moves from mate-
rial to immaterial objects. The symbols may even have the so-called double resonance,
i.e., a twofold interpretation in which they are partly similar and partly dissimilar. The same
symbol contains both affirmation and negation, which means that there is something simi-
lar to and different from the object referred to by it. Every symbol includes the negation
which is characteristic of it, and thus carries information concerning the thing it aims to
describe. See Pseudo-Dionysius De caelesti ierarchia, pl 122, 1039C1044B. See Rorems
interpretation, Rorem 1993, 54. Richard elaborates the notion of the picture (figura) in his
In Apocalypsim Joannis, arguing that it embraces both similar and dissimilar factors in rela-
tion to the object to which it refers. Dissimilar similarities lead the mind closer to the truth
by not allowing it to rest in the similitude alone. In Apocalypsim Joannis, pl 196, 689AB.
Imagination At The Uppermost Stages Of Contemplation 249

similitude is exploited by Richard in his De Trinitate as well, in which he writes

that the dissimilarity between human and divine nature is incomparably more
apparent than the reason for similitude. Even so, there is much likeness
between the human and divine natures.89 In the texts of Pseudo-Dionysius, the
significance of dissimilar symbols is often emphasized because strong and
vulgar images compel the human being to extend his interpretative views.
The same idea is repeated by Richard, who maintains that the dialectic
between dissimilar and similar elements of the object brings the individual
closer to the truth by preventing the mind from resting on the mere similarity
(similitudo) of a thing.90 He urges his readers to consider the everyday experi-
ence of our own nature and then proceed to estimate similar and dissimilar
divine things.91 Through the handling of similitudes, the individual may touch
mysteries which he cannot clearly see.92
In the monastic literature of the Middle Ages, it is usual to seek properties
in the soul with the help of which the soul may proceed to contemplate the
divine nature.93 The fact that man is made as an image and similitude of God
(ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei) can give a genuine but very distant indica-
tion of the nature of God and the Trinity.94 However, the similarity which is to
be found in the imagination is original. Richard presents his idea of reasons for
similitude which lies in the ability of imagination succinctly:

89 De Trinitate VI, I, p. 228.1519: Est autem notissimum ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei

hominem factum; et quamvis incomparabiliter copiosior sit dissimilitudinis quam simili-
tudinis ratio, est tamen humane nature ad divinam nonnulla, immo multa similitudo.
90 As an example of the emphasis on dissimilar aspects of the objects, compare De caelesti
ierarchia, pl 122, 1044A and BMAJ II, XII, p. 34.2930. Coulter offers an interpretation
which emphasizes the use of oppositions in Richards text as part of his methodological
technique per visibilia ad invisibilia. Thus Coulter has some doubts concerning Dionysian
influence; Coulter 2006, 220.
91 De Trinitate IV, VIII, p. 170.15171.18: Personas quidem humanas videmus, divinas autem
videre non possumus. In natura humana quot persone, tot substantie. Et compellit eos
cotidiana experientia de divinis similia estimare.
92 De Trinitate VI, XI, p. 241.4648: Ecce in tanta misteriorum profunditate ubi clare videre
non possumus, similitudinum attrectatione palpamus.
93 Bautier 1988, 9091. Javelet 1967, 198224 lists the various images or reflections of the
Trinity, suggesting that the most common correspondences of the Trinity in the twelfth-
century texts are mens, sapientia, dilectio and ratio, memoria, voluntas.
94 Bell 1984, 46. Augustine presented his influential investigation of the human mind in his
De Trinitate, pointing out and reflecting on several psychological triads in order to under-
stand something about the persons of the Trinity. These analyses become a standard
source for both trinitarian speculations and medieval psychology. Clark 2001, 9699.
250 Chapter 7

If you marvel how God, the Maker of everything, brought into actuality
from nothing at the very beginning of the world so much and so many
various species of things just as He willed, think now how easy it is for the
human soul to fashion by means of imagination images of things of
whatsoever at any hour and to form some unique creatures (quasi sui
generis), as it were, as often as it wishes, without pre-existing material
(sine praeiacenti materia) and from nothing as it were (velut ex nihilo
f ormare)In the foregoing you will discover a very remarkable thing: that
[God], who is the supreme truth, reserved the truth of things for Himself;
but he granted to His image the power of forming images of things at
whatever time.95

From this passage, it transpires that Richard acknowledges a clear analogy

between the operation of the human imagination and the creative activity
ofGod.
According to this passage, the various species created by God may be
compared to individual pictures imagined by the human being.96 Second, God

95 BMAJ IV, XX, p. 115.2027: Si miraris quomodo ille omnium opifex Deus tot et tam varias
rerum species, prout voluit, in ipso mundi exordio ex nihilo in actum produxit, cogita, quam
sit humanae animae facile omni hora quaslibet rerum figuras per imaginationem fingere et
quasdam quasi sui generis creaturas quoties voluerit sine praeiacenti materia et velut ex
nihilo formare, et incipiet minus esse mirabile, quod prius forte videbatur incredibile. In
quo et illud invenies valde notabile, quod rerum veritatem, qui summa veritas est, reservavit
sibi, rerum vero imagines qualibet hora formandas suae concessit imagini. Cf. Augustines
Confessiones, where the divine creativity and human ability to produce new objects are
compared. Confessiones 11.5.7: quomodo autem fecisti caelum et terram? et quae machina
tam grandis operationis tuae? non enim sicut homo artifex formas corpus de corpore, arbi-
tratu animae valentis imponere utcumque speciem, quam cernit in semet ipsa interno
oculo (et unde hoc valeret, nisi quia tu fecisti eam?) et imponit speciem iam exsistenti et
habenti See also Anselm of Canterburys Monologion, in which he compares the Divine
creative activity and human artificial activities. Monologion 11 (p. 26). Anselms main point
is that the individual is able to form new images in his mind only if he has somehow already
experienced its components. See also Hughs Sententie de divinitate, II, p. 937.3652.
96 Both Chase and Den Bok analyse this section briefly in their own works, but do not pay
attention to the role of the imagination (imaginatio). Chase talks about the mind (mens)
instead of imagination (imaginatio). Den Bok considers that the previous text section
refers more to the will of the human being in which the Trinitarian vestiges can be found.
The analysis by Den Bok is based on Richards wording omni hora quaslibetquoties volu
erit. See Den Bok 1996, 392. Chase 1995, 86. Javelet 1967, 202 has come to the same inter-
pretation as Chase. Van t Spijker also comments briefly on this passage; see Van t Spijker
2004, 151152.
Imagination At The Uppermost Stages Of Contemplation 251

creates whatever He wants and whenever He wants it. Likewise the human
being can imagine what he wants at any time. Third, God brings beings into
actuality from nothingness (ex nihilo), whereas the human being creates with-
out preceding matter (sine praeiacenti materia) as something that approaches
true creative power from nothingness (velut ex nihilo). The expression used for
this in the text is quite indefinite in describing human creativity. The question
of how the imagination actually functions remains unsettled. What does
Richard mean by a lack of preceding matter? Does this matter refer to sense
content and does Richard refer only to the fact that imagination is able to con-
struct some images even when the senses do not produce new content? This
seems probable because Richard refers to the human creative activity as some-
thing that approaches true creative power. In spite of this, the conclusion can
be drawn that the imaginations function is distantly similar to divine creation,
even though the imagination is not able to operate like the omnipotent God.
The human being has been created as the image and likeness of God, which
means that in this respect his imagination and will themselves are images in
which the unique divine creative power is reflected. Thus imagination can be
called the symbol of the divine creativity in the human being.
The fact that imagination itself is made an object of contemplation empha-
sizes its significance in Richards thinking. As he states, the objects of the
fourth contemplation are invisible and created intelligible (intelligibilia)
objects. One can conclude from this that the imagination is invisible and has
been created as the property of the soul. Its own operation is an essential part
of the first three kinds of contemplation. However, in this higher sphere it is
relevant in a different manner, being a reason for similitude (ratio similitudi
nis) which provides knowledge of the invisible and uncreated properties
ofGod.
In the final analysis, it seems difficult for Richard to extricate himself from
the world of images and the idea of the human imagination. Images are less
and less material and express how imagination should be transcended. Still, he
finds something appealing in the ability of the human soul to produce various
new images, and images in general. Even when the reader is told not to use his
imagination in the fifth and sixth kinds of contemplation, Richard exploits lan-
guage which is rich with images, explaining that the contemplation which
transcends human capacities may be presented as angelic figures (effigies).97

97 BMAJ IV, I, p. 86.2225: Constat itaque supra hominem esse et humanae rationis modum
vel capacitatem excedere, quae ad haec duo novissima contemplationum genera videntur
pertinere. Unde oportuit ea ad similitudinis expressionem non tam humana quam ange
lica effigie repraesentare. The angelic figure refers to the two golden cherubim placed on
252 Chapter 7

He writes that one should produce the cherubim, and envision the images not
of humans, nor even of angels, but of all those surpassing spirits. From the
adumbration of such a figure, the dignity of the last two kinds of contempla-
tion shines out more brilliantly.98 The aim of the soul is to transform itself into
an angels form, hammer out the form of angelic similitude in ourselves, as
Richard puts it.99 In this process, the soul learns to draw the similitude of the
order of spiritual beings by means of imitation.100 But how can one represent
some form that cannot be seen? Richard explains that it is only by ecstasy of
mind and divine revelations that one may acquire suitable knowledge about

top of the Ark. These two figures represent the fifth and sixth kind of contemplation.
In Richards account, there is a substantial difference between phantasies (phan
tasma) and effigies (effigies), even though they both refer to images. Cf. William of
St. Thierrys exposition of the Song of Songs. Expositio altera cum cantica canticorum,
pl 180, 479B (Expositio III, 17, Verdeyen, p. 27, II.1.103106): Cum enim juxtapromis
sum Domini ad diligentem se, venire incipit, et mansionem facere dignatio divinitatis,
aliquatenus innotescit ei; et quoniam non potest homo faciem ejus videre et vivere,
hoc est plenam ejus cognitionem in hac vita apprehendere, collocat in sensu amantis,
et commendat aliquam cognitionis suae effigiem, non praesumpti phantasmatis, sed
piae cujusdam affectionis; quam vivens adhuc in carne, capere possit homo uel susti-
nere. Hoc in ea absque omni phantastica imaginatione agente puritate simplicis affec-
tus et illuminati sensu amoris. Thus there is no representation of imagination involved
here.
98 BMAJ IV, VII, p. 93.1821: Iubemur itaque Cherubim producere et non modo hominum
non demum quorumlibet angelorum, sed superexcellentium spirituum imagines figu-
rare, ut harum novissimarum speculationum dignitas melius elucescat ex eiusmodi
figurativa adumbratione. For this idea, see Van t Spijker 2004, 156157. See also
Sicard 1993, who claims that after leaving the images behind in contemplation, one may
return to them and thus express experiences which are otherwise incommunicable,
(248n.211).
99 BMAJ IV, II, p. 87.2427: Ut igitur in nobis angelicae similitudinis formam quali-
cumque modo possimus excudere, oportet in eiusmodi rerum admiratione animum
nostrum iugi celebritate suspendere et ad sublimes et vere angelicos volatus contem-
plationis nostrae pennas assuescere. BMAJ IV, V, p. 90.2123: Si ergo Cherubim pleni-
tudo scientiae dicitur, vide quam recte illa extrema operis nostri factura Cherubim
nominatur, in qua scientiae omnis summi gradus figuraliter exprimuntur. BMAJ IV,
VII, p. 92.2223. For this process of hammering oneself into an angels similitude, see
Chase 1995, 119126.
100 BMAJ IV, VII, p. 92.1417: in angelis archangelicam sublimitatem ex quadam industriae
suae aemulatione imitatur. Cogita obsecro, cuius sit excellentiae illius ordinis in se simili-
tudinem per imitationem trahere, qui summae claritati immediate adhaeret, qui facie ad
faciem et sine speculo et sine aenigmate videt.
Imagination At The Uppermost Stages Of Contemplation 253

the cherubim.101 Benjamin Major shows clearly that it is difficult to write stir-
ring devotional prose without imagery and depictions of ecstatic experiences,
even though images are not allowed to play any role in the highest kind of
spiritual experience.102
The sphere of images also comes into use in the ecstasy of the mind, which
is described as the contemplation of the light of the highest wisdom, without
any figurative shadows, coverings, mirrors, or enigmas. After the ecstasy one
may draw this exterior vision (visio exterius) into ones mind in the process of
examination and reconsideration, during which the reasoning as well as the
application of similitudes may be employed. This is how the most sublime
intellectible objects of contemplation are made comprehensible and express-
ible for both the contemplator himself as well as other people.103 Here Richard
distinguishes between those divine showings which are somehow under-
standable afterwards by reasoning, and those which are above reasoning and
human assessment. The exterior vision (visio exterius) is not always drawn
inside the mind, since these objects and showings of contemplation are not to
be grasped by human reasoning powers and seem to contradict human opin-
ion. He later explains that the exterior vision refers to theophanies, i.e., divine
revelations. As Richard says, the individual may retain only a kind of memory
(velut memoriam) of them. Some people are better able than others to recol-
lect and examine the visions they see in the alienation of the mind after-
wards.104 Neither how these memories are formed nor what their substance is,
is discussed. However, Richard describes the soul after the ecstasy of the mind,
writing that the individual is entirely unable to recall the clear vision of those
things which are seen during the ecstasy. Still, there is something that can be
retained, as in the middle of a cloud. There is no ability through which one
could comprehend the manner of seeing things or understand the quality of
vision. The soul does not remember and yet it remembers in a marvellous

101 BMAJ IV, VII, p. 9293.

102 For the use of imaginary content in spiritual texts, see Newman 2005, 1213.
103 BMAJ IV, XI, p. 99.2326: Exterius visum introrsum trahit, quando id, quod per excessum
vidit, multa retractatione vehementique discussione capabile seu etiam comprehensibile
sibi efficit et tum rationum attestatione, tum similitudinum adaptatione ad communem
intelligentiam deducit. BMAJ IV, XI, p. 100.1112: et in illo aeternitatis lumine defixus
inspectae imaginis in se similitudinem trahit. BMAJ IV, XII, p. 100.2932: Cum igitur eius-
modi quaelibet per mentis excessum discimus, cognitam exterius visionem quasi nobis-
cum reportamus, si consona rationi ea ipsa postmodum deprehendimus, quae prius per
revelationem didicimus.
104 BMAJ IV; XII, p. 100101; BMAJ V, I, p. 124.114.
254 Chapter 7

way; it sees but does not discern, the intention is directed to something, but it
cannot be grasped.105

105 During the alienation of the mind, the memory of exterior things is also forgotten. BMAJ
V, II, p. 124.2425: Mentis alienatio est quando praesentium memoria menti excidit. BMAJ
IV, XXIII, p. 121.2431: Et item cum ab illo sublimitatis statu ad nosmetipsos redimus, illa,
quae prius supra nosmetipsus vidimus, in ea veritate et claritate, qua prius perspeximus,
ad nostram memoriam revocare omnino non possumus. Et quamvis inde aliquid in
memoria teneamus et quasi per medium velum et velut in medio nebulae videamus, nec
modum quidem videndi nec qualitatem visionis comprehendere vel recordari sufficimus.
Et mirum in modum reminiscentes non reminiscimur et non reminiscentes reminis-
cimur, dum videntes non pervidemus et aspicientes non perspicimus et intendentes non
penetramus.
 Chapter 8

Conclusion

The aim of this work has been to investigate Richard of St. Victors view of the
nature of the imagination as a psychological capacity and the role of this fac-
ulty in his mystical theology. The main sources are Richards two spiritual
works, Benjamin Minor and Benjamin Major, both written between 1160 and
1170. His other works are discussed in so far as they offer insights into his ideas
concerning the imagination. Even though Richards works may be defined as
monastic, inasmuch as their main intention is to present practical advice for
spiritual exercise, they also include parts that are philosophically significant.
Thus, in addition to the fundamentals of devotional practices, Richards works
have more general intellectual aims as well.
Richards theological framework is the contemplative life in which the indi-
vidual strives to see God in mystical ecstasy. The contemplative life forms an
ascending journey from the transitory visible world to invisible divine objects.
He investigates this process from the point of view of the psychological facul-
ties of the mind and their various functions and objects. In Richards analysis,
the imagination plays an important part in this context. Richard offers Biblical
authority as a justification for his interest in the faculty of imagination: the
invisible things of God from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being
understood by means of those things which are made (Rom. 1:20). From this
he concludes that the visible objects may be viewed as images of invisible
objects and these may be explored with the help of the imagination. Without
its mediating role between the sensory world and the spiritual objects, the soul
would never be able to accomplish the high level of abstraction required to
know the most sublime objects of contemplation. Thus, the imagination is an
indispensable ability of the human soul, without which it would not able to
rise to cognition of invisible things. Richards epistemological background is in
many respects derived from Hugh of St. Victors texts, which expound how the
knowledge of invisible things has its beginning in the investigation of the cor-
poreal creature. As Hugh claims, the order of cognition (ordo cognitionis)
always starts with the visible things because visible corporeal creation always
becomes known first.
In order to gain a full understanding of Richards basic ideas on the imagina-
tion, I first explored the historical background of this concept in Chapter 2.
Many influential ideas concerning the imaginative activity of humans and ani-
mals were analysed and argued about in Antiquity. The writings of Plato and

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256 Chapter 8

Aristotle built the foundation for the terminology. Plato uses the notions of
eikasia and phantasia, which refer to the process of imagining and images of
visible objects. These notions are also used to mean beliefs concerning images
or unreal impressions. Platos terminology is undefined and sees the human
ability to use images as a lower form of thinking. Aristotle, in turn, formulated
a more extensive analytical description of imaginative activity. His De anima
was to become one of the most important sources of the philosophical analysis
of imagination and the human soul in general in later Ancient thought. The
theories of Plato and Aristotle were further elaborated by the Stoics and Neo-
platonists, as well as the early Christian theologians.
Many important ancient writings were still unavailable in the twelfth cen-
tury. However, many discussions and formulations concerning the imaginative
functions of the soul were transmitted and reformulated through the early
Christian writings, the most prominent figures of late Antiquity in this respect
being Augustine and Boethius. Augustines letters to Nebridius contain impor-
tant discussions on the imagination and its functions. His treatises Confessiones,
De Trinitate, and De Genesi ad litteram had a profound effect on medieval theo-
ries of the human soul. Their rich terminology concerning images and imagi-
native activities as well as their examples of imagination has been adopted
into later vocabulary. Boethius described epistemological processes, showing
the importance of imagination as a bridge between the sensory content and
abstract thinking. His importance is that he offered Latin translations and
commentaries on Aristotles logical treatises, which were the basis for logical
discussions in early medieval times. In particular, he studied the Aristotelian
theory of signification in connection with the cognitive faculties of the soul.
The impact of both Boethius and Augustine on Richards writings is consider-
able. In addition, I described the theories of imagination in Nemesius of
Emesa, Avicenna, William of St. Thierry, Isaac of Stella, and Hugh of St. Victor.
Above all, Hugh of St. Victors complex theory of imagination combined
diverse traditions. In his philosophy of mind, Hugh integrated Aristotelian
elements, Augustines writings, Stoic ideas, and the new medical psychology of
his time.
Chapter 3 dealt with Richards fundamental anthropological ideas and theo-
logical method. Richards writings show that he was interested in the human
soul, its powers, and movements. His anthropology turns out to be a multifac-
eted construction which interconnects several factors and components of the
soul. The terminology is rich, but somewhat inconsistent. Richards main
anthropological principle is motivated by the idea of Gods creating the human
being in his image and likeness. In Liber exceptionum, Richard claims that the
image of God is shown in the rational power of the human being, whereas the
Conclusion 257

similitude of God is shown in ones affective power. According to this theory, it

is important to search for the divine vestiges of creation by studying the vari-
ous aspects of the human soul. As Richard states, two powers, rational and
affective, reside in the human being. First, the rational power embraces sense-
perception, imagination, reason, and understanding, instruments of the mind
which are involved in the epistemological process. Second, affective power
refers to affections and will.
The last part of chapter 3 discusses the transfer from visible things to invis-
ible things, Richards basic methodological principle in theology. This method-
ological principle can be seen in Richards unshakeable confidence in
experience (experientia) in understanding things and seeking for certainty.
Thus it is characteristic of Richard to emphasize the physical basis of various
arguments concerning invisible reality. He values material reality highly, claim-
ing that signs and symbols as material guides offer an indispensable route to
understanding invisible objects. The analysis of this principle is essential for
understanding the significance that Richard ascribes to both the senses and
the imagination in his anthropological scheme. The chapter ended with the
investigation of Richards biblical hermeneutics and an introduction to the
instructional method of Benjamin Minor and Major.
Chapter 4 analysed the concept of imagination in Richards handbook for
novices, Benjamin Minor, dealing with the orderly process of the souls cultiva-
tion, the final aim of which is to prepare the soul for contemplative ecstasy.
During this process, the main interest is the seven affections, their ordering
and moderation as well as the epistemological instruments of the soul. The
method is personification allegory, which ascribes a human form to some phil-
osophical or abstract quality.
In Benjamin Minor, Richard describes three different modes of imagination,
which the soul needs to prepare for contemplation. The first mode of imagina-
tion transfers sensory data to be further processed by reason, which is consid-
ered as a lower intellectual part of the soul. Richard maintains that reason
needs imagination, since it is not able to understand anything without the
phantasms imagination produces. This first mode of imagination presents the
forms of external objects to reason even when the senses do not operate. As
Richard puts it, reason is unable to know anything without the imagination
(sine imaginatione ratio nichil sciret). This is because the imagination repre-
sents (repraesentare) forms (formae) of visible objects for reasons needs. These
remarks on imagination emphasize the causal process from sensory content to
cognitive functioning. Only after receiving the necessary sensory material is
concept formation and discursive reasoning in the lower intellectual level of
the soul possible. Furthermore, imagination is able to represent various forms
258 Chapter 8

even when the senses do not operate. For example, when placed in the dark
and unable to see anything, one can still imagine anything (imaginari quaeli
bet). However, the first mode of imagination may be damagingly active and
produce unnecessary material as well. Richard describes this over-active mode
of imagination as bestial.
Richard introduces two rational kinds of imagination (imaginatio rationa
lis) as the reverse of bestial imagination. These are combinations of imagina-
tion and the higher mental abilities, namely, reason and understanding. This
mixing of various mental faculties is typical of Richard and seems to be his
original contribution. Both of the rational imaginations are able to fabricate
new images on the basis of sensory material, but they use different combina-
tions of mental abilities and practices. Richard defines the first rational imagi-
nation as imagination which is ordered by reason (imaginatio per rationem
disposita). This kind of imagination does not need direct sense perception in
order to produce new images, since it is able to use material perceived earlier.
This takes place by joining and separating the various properties of images
stored in the memory. In this way, the mind is able to transfer from one visible
image to some other visible image (secundum uisibilium rerum cognitam
speciem uisibile aliquid aliud mente disponimus). However, Richard calls the
second rational imagination imagination which is mixed with understanding
(imaginatio intelligentiae permixta). This third and highest mode of imagina-
tion is also capable of producing new images, but its special feature is to model
invisible objects by utilizing visible images. It is said to ascend to knowledge of
invisible things through seeing visible things (per visibilem rerum speciem ad
invisibilium cognitionem ascendere). This rational imagination may employ
two differing techniques for shifting from visible things to invisible things. The
first is called comparison (comparatio) of various images, whereas the second
is called transfer (translatio) or translation (conuersio) of images. Richard uses
these standard rhetorical terms of his time for structuring his idea of rational
imagination.
With the help of the two kinds of rational imagination, the human being is
able to create images concerning the highest good and evil. As Richard points
out, everything in the created world exists only in mixed forms. However, one
may gather (colligere) from the various sense experiences what kind of good or
evil might be the highest one, thus helping the individual to proceed from sep-
arate images to generalizations, and assist the soul in its reasoning. The first
rational imagination attempts to form fictive images of torments of hell. The
second rational imagination uses its techniques of comparison and translation
to produce spiritual images of heaven. Richard also applies these two rational
imaginations to spiritual life in general. He explains that once seductive
Conclusion 259

thoughts are suggested in the mind, the soul should immediately start to imag-
ine the flames of Gehenna and eternal punishment to prevent the depraved
suggestion leading to sinful action. On the other hand, the rational imagina-
tion comforts the soul and maintains the hope of eternal happiness. The final
goal of these activities is to prepare the soul for contemplation. This emphasis
on spiritual practices has much in common with the monastic psychology of
John Cassian.
Richard develops themes which deal with the interpretation of biblical lan-
guage, metaphors, and even rhetoric in Benjamin Minor. All of these subjects
are approached in connection with the rational imagination, since it provides
an indispensable method by which the most central Christian metaphors can
be translated and revealed for the readers. In his Benjamin Major, Richard con-
tinues this discussion with some new insights.
In Chapter 5, I proceeded to explore Benjamin Major, which is meant for a
learned audience and those who are advanced in spiritual life. In Benjamin
Major, Richard uses a pedagogically efficient method, which is based on some
concrete image or representation of the Bible; in this case, the Ark of the
Covenant. The image of this construction is internally drawn, its various mea-
sures analysed, and finally given a tropological interpretation. In Benjamin
Major, Richard shows how every part and material of the Ark has its equivalent
in the abilities of the soul or its properties.
Even though the terminology in Benjamin Minor and Major is in broad
agreement, there are also many important differences. In Benjamin Major, the
analysis of affective power of the soul has been reduced, while the discussion
of the epistemological process and its instruments is more extensive than in
Benjamin Minor. The philosophical orientation is more evident and the impact
of many philosophical texts, such as those by Boethius, can be traced. At the
beginning of Benjamin Major, Richard introduces three different modes of
knowing, which are cogitation, meditation, and contemplation. He explains
that cogitation arises from the imagination and is defined as the lowest kind
of knowing (scire). After the analysis of cogitation and meditation, Richards
six-fold model of contemplation is introduced. Each of these six kinds of
contemplation may be defined on the basis of three instruments of the
mind imagination, reason, and understanding. Imagination is actively
involved in the first three kinds of contemplation. These forms of contempla-
tion have some similarities to the three modes of imagination in Benjamin
Minor. However, Richard does not attempt to construct a uniform model of
imagination on the basis of the two Benjamins.
The first kind of contemplation is in the imagination according to imagina-
tion only (in imaginatione et secundum solam imaginationem). Richard
260 Chapter 8

also claims that it is engaged in the imagination and formed according to

imagination (contemplatio in imaginatione versatur et secundum imaginatio
nem formatur). In this kind of contemplation, the soul examines only sensible
things (corporalia) the impressions of which it has received through the bodily
senses (sensus corporeus). Richard calls these things forms and images of visi-
ble things (rerum visibilium formae et imagines). It is important to note that the
soul admires (admirare, mirari) and venerates (venerari) objects examined
by the imagination. This admiration arises from the consideration (ex conside
ratione) of various properties of the objects of contemplation. While the
notion of consideration suggests that Richard sees some higher cognitive func-
tions in the preliminary kinds of contemplation, he claims that argument and
reasoning do not belong to this kind of imaginative activity. Richard classifies
the three main groups of objects of examination accordingly. The first group is
concerned with things (res), which in his text relate mainly to material objects
or at least to images which are material. The second group includes the various
works (opera) of nature and the human being. Finally, the third group is related
to morals (mores).
Reason (ratio) is activated in the second kind of contemplation. As Richard
notes, the second kind occurs in imagination (in imaginatione), but reason
forms its operation (secundum rationem formatur). The connection between
reason and imagination is close: he writes that reason leads imagination
around and directs it (ratio imaginationem circumducit atque disponit). Here,
again, Richard refers to the co-operation between different instruments of the
mind. The objects of contemplation are still called sensible (sensibilia); how-
ever, the soul attends to the rational principles of these objects. As he explains,
the mind will examine the reason, order, cause, utility, mode, disposition, and
effect (ratio, ordo, causa, utilitas, modus, dispositio, effectus) of any given imag-
inable object. The examination of these things is directed to the same three
groups of objects as in the first kind of contemplation, i.e., things, works, and
morals. Since the set of the minds powers differs, the perspective on objects is
different as well.
Richards interest in the theology of nature manifests itself in the analysis of
the second kind of contemplation. He calls the entire visible reality the
machine of the world (mundana machina), suggesting that this kind of con-
templation should be the rational analysis of the reasons for the various phe-
nomena, the disposition of the world, and the powers of the elements. Richard
also compares the scientific knowledge of the worldly philosophers and the
second kind of contemplation. In this setting, Richards Liber exceptionum and
Hugh of St. Victors Didascalicon are regarded as the backdrop to Richards
ideas. The first two kinds of contemplation edify the soul about exterior and
Conclusion 261

corporeal things and serve as the foundation for the third kind of contempla-
tion. The leitmotif is the rise from visible things to the invisible.
Chapter 6 has examined Richards descriptions of the imaginative activity
in the third kind of contemplation. The definition of the third kind of contem-
plation deviates from the previous kinds, since it is said to take place com-
pletely in reason (in ratione) and not in imagination (in imaginatione).
However, it is formed in reason according to imagination (formatur in ratione
secundum imaginationem). Richard also writes that reason draws (trahit)
imagination with it to study higher things. This co-operation between imagi-
nation and reason is described as a shared journey during which the imagina-
tion is said to rise above itself.
In his analyses of the various aspects of the third kind of contemplation,
Richard uses epistemological concepts as a part of the account of the spiritual
exercise. Even though the description of the process of knowledge formation is
not Benjamin Majors main theme, Richards epistemological theory is woven
into the ladders of spiritual ascent. In the third kind of contemplation, the
most problematic stage is associated with the change from the visible reality to
the invisible reality. In connection with this kind of contemplation, Richard
states clearly that the imagination (imaginatio) is the beginning of all argu-
mentation (omnis ratiocinatio et argumentatio ab imaginatione fundamentum
sumit, et firmamentum capit). He also calls imagination a kind of leader (quasi
ducem) for reason, because it represents (repraesentare) the external forms of
things to reason and leads it to examine the invisible properties of objects.
The third kind of contemplation involves the use of similitudes (similitudi
nes). In Richards scheme, the notion of similitude is employed to refer to a
specific kind of relation between the sensible object and the invisible object.
I suggest that at the epistemological level the relation is asymmetrical, the cor-
poreal similitudes offering a necessary point of departure for knowledge.
Richards asymmetrical epistemology is justified by the Neoplatonist ontologi-
cal hierarchy, which considers that invisible things of creation are seen in the
visible world. The corporeal similitudes may be found in the images of visible
objects, similitudes which are needed to grasp the qualities of invisible objects.
He stresses that the objects of the third kind of contemplation are invisible and
intelligible in nature, unlike the objects of the first two kinds. It is interesting to
find that, along with reason, imagination is also involved in the examination of
these intelligible objects.
Above all, the similitudes may be revealed by the biblical texts. Richards
theory of imagination turns out to be clearly connected with the interpreta-
tion of the Bibles figurative expressions. Thus, the third kind of contemplation
offers a theoretical framework and justifications for the allegorical method of
262 Chapter 8

biblical interpretation, since the association between reason and imagination

produces a combination of the abilities of the mind through which the
allegory becomes a meaningful form of expression. The chapter ends with the
consideration of the transfer from visible to invisible in both of Richards
Benjamins and In Apocalypsim Joannis.
One of the most important findings in this study is that the third kind of
contemplation attempts to provide a conceptual analysis of both knowledge
formation and the signification of language. Furthermore, both these major
philosophical discussions include important references to the imagination.
These issues are also related to Richards theological method in general. First,
he strongly emphasizes experience and visible reality as a basis for knowledge;
second, he values signs and symbols as material guides to invisible reality; and
third, he considers historical interpretation as the foundation for the spiritual
interpretation of the Bible. All these components are supported by the imagi-
native activities of the soul.
The final chapter (7) explores some of Benjamin Majors interesting and
original passages which consider the operation of imagination and its signifi-
cance for the highest kinds of contemplation. In his analysis of the fourth kind
of contemplation, Richard lists three tasks for the imagination. First, the imag-
ination creates (creare) new images; second, it directs (moderare) the old ones;
third, it reconstructs (reparare) images. Directing and reconstructing images
are standard functions for imagination in traditional texts, while it is rarely
said to create completely new images. While the brevity of the passage pre-
vents a more detailed explication of Richards argument, it becomes evident
that the human imagination may create new phantasms of corporeal things
(corporalia phantasma). Richard also interestingly interrelates the faculties of
imagination, reason, and understanding with his idea of the three different
heavens. He writes that the first heaven may be called imaginative (imaginale),
the second rational (rationale), and the third the intellectual (intellectuale)
heaven.
Richard shows that analysis of the imaginations functioning may profit the
fourth and fifth kinds of contemplation. In these kinds, an individual turns to
consider the properties of his own soul and, knowledge which allows him to
rise to contemplate the invisible properties of God. Here Richard invites the
reader to consider two different ways in which the images may appear to the
imagination. First, the imagination receives material from outside (a foris) by
hearing (per auditum). Second, he writes that the imagination can also obtain
material from within and by cogitation alone (ab intus ex sola cogitatione).
Richard also states that the imagination may create some kind of inner world
which is formed of phantasms.
Conclusion 263

The fifth and sixth kinds of contemplation may draw similitudes of reason
(similitudines rationis) from objects which have been considered in the fourth
kind of contemplation. Richard enumerates the three properties of the ratio-
nal soul from which reasons or a rationale for similitude (rationes similitudinis)
can be found. This reason for similitude means similarity between two things
and justification of why they are alike. The soul may achieve the first reason for
similitude by considering its own ability to imagine (imaginatio). In this con-
nection, Richard outlines a clear analogy between the operation of the human
imagination and the creative activity of God. First, he compares various spe-
cies created by God to individual pictures imagined by the human being.
Second, he notes that God creates whatever He wants and whenever He wants
to. Similarly, the human being can imagine whatever he wants, whenever
he wishes. Third, Richard writes that God creates beings from nothingness
(ex nihilo) into actuality, whereas man creates without the preceding matter
(sine praeiacenti materia) as it were from nothingness (velut ex nihilo).
One may argue that in his Benjamin Major Richard utilizes terminology
which clearly refers to the creation of things. The soul creates (creare) by
means of the imagination and imagination may even be a creator (creatrix).
The imagination also functions as one of the reasons for similitude to Gods
creative act. Drawing on these insights, the imagination can be called the sym-
bol of the divine creativity in the human being.
Richards anthropological terminology is fluid and occasionally even ambig-
uous. He also understands the meaning of the notion of imagination in differ-
ent ways. In this study, I argue that imagination in its basic use means (1) a
faculty or instrument of the mind. However, as Richard himself suggests, it
may also refer to various (2) acts of the imagination. Imagination may also
imply some (3) sensory content, which is processed by the imagination. This
content can also be called phantasma. Finally, the notion of imagination can
also function as (4) a kind of attribute through which Richard tries to describe
the affinity with the sensible world and images, as shows in the ideas of the
imaginative heaven or imaginative beauty.
Richards relationship to the earlier traditions in the interpretation of the
imagination as well as contemporary writings is discussed in all chapters of the
study. Richard does not ordinarily refer to other writers or literature, which
complicates the analysis of his sources and inspiration. Still, the impact of vari-
ous and even conflicting epistemological traditions is evident in his theory of
the imagination. The influence of Augustine is distinctive in Richards funda-
mental anthropological principles. He uses Augustinian examples flexibly,
incorporating Augustines rich terminology of image-making activities into his
own theory. In addition to Augustine, the Boethian terminology of the powers
264 Chapter 8

of the mind as well as classification of objects is evident in Richards Benjamin

Major. Richard appreciates Boethiuss ideas of signification of language as well.
Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagites and John Scotus Eriugenas impact is con-
troversial, but still manifest in his ideas on symbolic representation. Hugh of
St. Victors pedagogical treatise Didascalicon, De tribus diebus, and the short
treatise De unione corporis et spiritus, along with his other writings, have had
the most obvious influence on Richards theory of imagination and thinking in
general. Furthermore, Richard has been profoundly influenced by many
spiritual classics and standard monastic texts and their overall perception
of human life and spirituality. In sum, Richard has constructed his theory
of the imagination upon a broad literary foundation. However, Richard has
also constructed an original theory which fuses together different and even
contradictory ideas. His theory of the imagination includes some novel ideas
whose inspiration is hard to detect. These include the notions of bestial and
rational imagination (imaginatio bestialis, rationalis), comparison (compara
tio) and translation (translatio) of images performed by the rational imagina-
tion, the creative imagination (imaginatio creatrix), the imaginative heaven,
cogitation from imagination, and the idea of mixing the instruments of
the mind.
The analysis of Richards writings concerning imagination raises several fur-
ther questions. The topic which requires most investigation is what kind of
influence Richards terminology has had on the terminological variations in
the concept of imagination and the later history of philosophical and theologi-
cal anthropology. Thus far this subject has remained unexplored. The obvious
explanation of the lack of research might be that in the twelfth century the
contemporary philosophical literature and new translations of the ancient
writings had a powerful effect on the philosophical and theological discus-
sions. The analyses of these traditions, like the Aristotelian impact on the
imagination and medical discussions, have been ascribed a major role among
medieval scholars. It appears unlikely that Richards extensive theory of imagi-
nation would have been completely unknown to or pointless for medieval
theologians. A promising line of investigation would be to explore the indica-
tions of Richards ideas on imagination in the medieval texts which deal with
the human soul and its ascent. Thus far only the possible impact of Richards
theory of imagination on Langlands Middle English Piers Plowman (c.1360-
c.1387) has provoked some discussion.
The study of Richards ideas on imagination introduces many important
discussions of his anthropological philosophy and theology. One of these is the
incentive to find a balance between visible and invisible reality, both in
the created world and in the human soul. Another important question is the
Conclusion 265

analysis of the stages of the cognitive process. In Richards idea of acquiring

knowledge of invisible things, the most profound mediating principle between
the senses and the higher cognitive capacities is the imagination. Finally,
studying the imagination is associated with language, its ability to signify
things, and with rhetoric. In Richards monastic framework, all these questions
are related to the spiritual way of life, and moral progression, the highest aim
of which is to rise to the contemplative vision of divine objects.
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I Abbreviations

ahdlma Archives dhistoire doctrinale et littraire du moyen ge

bmin Benjamin Minor
bmaj Benjamin Maior
cccm Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaevalis
ccsl Corpus Christianorum Series Latina
csel Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum.Wien 1865
pg Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Graeca (ed. J.-P. Migne)
pl Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Latina (ed. J.-P. Migne)
rspt Revue des sciences philosophiques et thologiques
sc Sources Chrtiennes
spck Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge

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Index

abstinence84, 126129, 131 animals45, 46, 56n.28, 80n.23, 98,

abstraction9, 37n.104, 49, 78, 137, 121, 124n.146, 145n.47, 162, 171, 197, 209,
178n.173, 255 215, 255
Achard of St. Victor50n.31, 57n.34 animus, see soul, rational
active life50, 85n.12, 86, 232n.32 Anselm of Canterbury8, 62n.61, 90n.28,
Adam201206 107n.88, 250n.95
admiration142, 143, 145, 146, 153, 154, 168, Anselm of Laon129
169, 178, 260 anthropology7, 10, 35n.93, 45, 50, 93,
Aelred of Rievaulx40, 46, 47 203205, 256, 264
aesthetics164, 166n.127, 192n.54 apatheia227n.18
affections5355, 58, 6567, 69, 77, 84n.9, appearance17, 90, 94n.41, 100, 107, 114,
100, 125n.152, 131, 165n.124, 257 119n.126, 121, 149n.57, 174, 177, 186n.30,
moderation of69, 84, 99, 136, 257 187n.30, 196, 213
affective appetite, see desire
part of the soul3, 44, 57, 58n.38, 66, Arabic influences2n.5, 14, 21n.35,
87, 127, 135 3438, 54
power63, 65, 67, 69, 87n.17, 99, 112, Aristotle10n.43, 13, 14, 1723, 28n.68, 30,
257, 259 3235, 36n.98, 37, 62n.59, 66n.83, 97n.54,
affectivity51, 86, 101, 126n.153 104n.79, 107n.86, 109n.96, 150nn., 161n.102,
affectus, see affections 173, 200n.91, 209n.117, 256
Alanus ab Insulis74n.127 artificial162164, 194, 250n.95
Albertus Magnus7n.26 ascetism85n.11, 127n.157
Alchar of Clairvaux13n.3 Asher84, 126
Alexander III (pope)7 Augustine1n.3, 4, 7, 13, 2430, 34, 40,
Alexander of Hales7n.26 43n.122, 45, 56n.28, 57n.35, 58, 62n.61,
Alfanus of Salerno36n.99 65n.75, 66n.81, 85nn., 90n.28, 92n.32,
allegory7680, 87, 115, 136n.8, 152, 93n.38, 95n.47, 97nn., 99n.57, 104n.78,
157n.84, 184n.24, 197, 198, 204, 220n.155, 106n.84, 107n.86, 108, 109n.96, 120n.129,
257, 261, 262 122n.138, 123n.142, 133, 140n.24, 142n.32,
Ambrose21n.8, 132n.173, 202n.93, 173n.152, 178n.173, 180n.8, 187, 188n.35,
203n.100, 229 190n.46, 198, 202, 203n.97, 204n.100,
anagogic212 205n.104, 212n.126, 213n.126, 214n.134,
abilities48 225n.7, 229n.23, 231n.29, 234, 235, 239,
interpretation7678, 115, 198 248n.87, 249n.94, 250n.95, 256, 263
vision77, 212 Augustinian
analogy15, 24, 49, 117, 120, 124n.150, ideas7, 35, 44, 46, 55n.25, 62, 174, 203,
150n.60, 152, 185, 188, 196, 217, 218n.146, 223, 212, 213, 219n.153, 263
232, 241, 246, 250 rule6, 25, 40
anatomy53 Avicenna14, 37, 38, 41n.117, 92, 95n.44,
ancilla, see handmaid 161n.102, 256
angels4, 48, 116, 135n.2, 182n.15, 187, 191, awareness22, 25, 28n.65, 125, 234
214n.135, 215, 233, 246, 251, 252
anima, see soul Bala83, 84, 88, 92, 9496, 98101, 103, 105,
animal45, 46, 55, 61, 55, 125n.150, 118, 124, 126nn., 217n.146
155, 180 Basil of Caesarea108
Index
beauty74, 87, 102, 103, 122, 145n.47,
148, 149n.57, 162, 164, 166, 184, 186n.30,
196, 220, 263
bedroom87, 93
belief14, 15, 18, 19n.23, 107n.86, 256
Bernard of Clairvaux124n.150, 154n.76,
163n.116, 165n.121
bestial imagination, see imagination
biblical exegesis2n.8, 77, 122, 195, 210,
211n.121
body2426, 29, 30, 33, 45, 48, 49, 5256,
64, 65, 84, 99, 108, 116, 117, 126, 127, 129n.164,
142n.32, 201, 203, 247, 248
and soul relation3, 9, 17n.16, 35,
40, 4244, 47, 49, 53, 58, 9193, 205,
206, 248
Boethius1n.3, 4, 8, 10n.42, 13, 21n.35,
3034, 40, 41n.118, 45, 57n.35, 58, 94n.43,
97n.54, 113n.105, 133, 142, 150, 151, 156n.82,
200n.91, 240, 256, 259, 264
Bonaventure7nn., 147
brain28n.68, 3539, 42, 43, 45, 89n.23
Burgundio of Pisa21n.35, 36n.99, 100n.62,
146n.52
cardinal virtues66n.82
categories10n.43, 62n.59
cause141, 168, 173175, 260
cella phantastica42
chambers, see ventricles
cherubim135n.2, 251n.97, 252, 253
chimera33
Christian socratism50, 131
Cicero8n.30, 10n.43, 13n.1, 21nn., 25,
63n.64, 66n.83, 120nn., 132n.173, 140n.24,
150n.61, 188n.36
circumspection60n.44, 111, 112
Cistercians13n.3, 35, 39, 40, 45, 47,
56n.30, 92n.35
civitas124, 125
cogitation29, 12729, 137144, 153, 155,
202, 237239, 259, 262, 264
cogitationes108, 110n.100, 127, 128n.161,
137, 157
cognition3, 18, 22, 23, 36, 38, 57, 63, 86,
91, 142, 144, 146, 154, 184, 255, 257, 260
faculties of33, 38, 187, 256
order of181, 255
perceptual18, 89
293
power of47, 101n.67
process of32, 33n.87, 121, 265
Commentators23, 104n.79
common sense18, 37, 89, 161
comparison116, 117, 119, 120, 122, 123, 221,
258, 264
concupiscible44, 68n.84
conscience67n.86, 125
consent47, 69, 70, 129, 130n.167,
140n.24, 204
consideration111, 153, 154, 157, 158,
160n.98, 166, 168, 192, 216, 225, 228, 236, 260
Constantine the African42n.122, 54n.20
contemplation passim
ecstatic5, 87, 132, 140, 197n.76, 236
definitions of137, 141152
contemplative life50, 79, 82, 85n.12, 86,
134, 143n.36, 232n.32, 255
conversio ad phantasmata20
desire19, 67n.91, 68, 101, 196n.72, 233
carnal53, 66, 126, 127
evil108, 110, 126, 130
creation4, 38, 51, 71, 92, 145n.47, 181, 182,
184, 190, 198, 201, 204, 228, 236n.43, 241,
242, 251, 255, 257, 261, 263
creatrix61, 229, 241, 263, 264
deduction9
deliberation53, 69, 70, 96, 109n.95, 111,
125n.152, 155
dialectic8, 34
discretion45, 60n.44, 63, 69, 85,
106n.84, 109n.111, 112n.103, 138n.11, 139, 202,
208, 237
dissimilarity120, 183n.15, 211n.121, 212,
248n.88, 249
Dominicus Gundissalinus37n.103
doxa, see opinion
dreaming16, 17n.13, 22, 30, 98n.54,
99, 121n.136, 167n.131, 187, 234
ecstasy, see contemplation
effigy217n.144, 251, 252n.97
eikasia14, 15, 256
eloquence121, 130
emotions, see affections
Epictetus22n.41
Ervisius6, 7
ethics14, 15, 21, 77
294 index

Evagrius Ponticus39n.111 degrees109n.95

Eve201n.93, 202206
experience5, 9, 16, 17, 30, 38, 73, 74, 83,
101, 107n.86, 109, 132, 205, 249
knowledge9, 7073, 97n.51, 161, 191,
193, 199, 250n.95, 257, 262
mystic6, 62n.60, 73, 132, 174,
252n.98, 253
pleasure68, 123, 131, 205
sensible60, 68, 104, 113, 116, 117
spiritual11, 45n.132, 73, 135, 243
eye53n.18, 59n.43, 60n.44, 112n.103, 116,
205, 218, 238
bodily18, 29, 117, 149n.57, 214, 218n.148
of heart59n.43, 90, 93, 96n.48, 107,
117, 214, 218
of mind28, 60n.44
of reason60n.44, 93, 218n.148
of understanding218n.148
fall52, 60, 68, 174, 203, 204
fear18, 20, 65, 67, 84, 99101, 107, 108,
146, 147
servile and filial100n.61
fiction27, 29n.70, 106, 109, 114, 127n.156,
220, 234
figure24, 31, 78, 94n.42, 145n.47, 159, 160,
178n.173, 184nn., 194, 213, 251, 252
firmament48n.144, 235n.40, 261
fittingness192n.54
form20, 28, 30, 31, 33, 41, 42, 48, 49, 61, 62,
89, 9395, 97, 102, 106n.82, 113, 122, 123, 148,
149n.57, 153, 154, 156, 159162, 164, 166, 167,
171, 177, 184, 186n.30, 187, 193, 194, 196, 207,
208, 212, 214217, 219, 224, 228, 234, 235,
238, 246, 257, 260, 261
Fortuna174
Gad84, 126, 129
Galen35, 36n.97, 54n.22
Galenic tradition14, 35, 36n.97,
54n.22
geometry24, 27, 91n.30, 158, 175n.163, 178
Gerard of Cremona21n.35, 37n.103
Gerard Sabloneta37n.103
Gilbert of Poitiers9
Godfrey of St. Victor35n.93, 40, 44,
45n.131, 57n.34
golden house1, 97, 113
good and evil
images of104
mixed82, 103, 104n.77, 112
pure104, 112, 258
grace66, 80, 113, 143n.36, 236
Gregorius of Nyssa14, 36n.99, 39n.111,
213n.129, 247n.84
Guibert of Nogent85n.12, 92n.36,
97n.54
habit62n.59, 64, 66, 111
handmaid33, 78, 83, 84, 88, 89,
92n.36, 94, 95n.43, 100, 101, 126n.153,
171n.145
hatred54n.21, 65, 131
healthiness53, 54, 92n.35
heaven29, 48n.144, 104nn., 112, 114, 115,
240242, 262, 263
images of70n.99, 75n.130,
104n.78, 111n.101, 115n.111, 117, 133, 230,
240, 258
three152, 231234, 235n.40, 262
Henry of Ghent7n.26
hierarchy184, 212, 220
historical interpretation, see literal
interpretation
Honorius Augustodunensis99n.57,
212n.126, 233n.36
Hugh of Fouilloy54n.20
Hugh of St. Victor passim
humours53, 54, 92n.35
illumination7, 62, 113, 131, 145n.43,
180n.8
illustration78, 80n.149, 121, 129n.166, 151,
217n.144, 239
image passim
confused33, 9798
pleasurable19, 46, 107n.86, 109n.94,
121
production of14, 20, 22, 26, 32, 38, 41,
43, 115n.111, 229
see also heaven, images of
image and similitude of God39, 45, 51,
52, 77n.138, 130, 174, 176, 204n.100, 224, 225,
248n.86, 249251, 256
imaginable27, 31, 109, 168, 260
imaginary16, 43, 46, 47, 102, 106nn.,
107n.86, 182n.15, 232, 253n.102
beauty102103, 122
Index
imagination passim
acts of95n.46, 96, 103, 128, 210,
224, 263
bestial61, 9699, 101, 126, 139, 155,
258, 264
creative12, 61, 228, 241, 243, 251,
263, 264
harmful96, 230
in animals18, 19, 20, 22, 29, 32, 33,
38, 41, 43, 45, 46, 9698
involuntary95n.46, 96, 98, 99
leader206208, 210, 221, 261
of future11, 1416, 33, 43, 82, 97, 102,
103, 105107, 112, 115n.111, 116, 195, 210,
214n.134, 240
organ36
rational61, 90, 95n.44, 96, 98, 101107,
110, 111, 113119, 121, 122, 123, 125131, 167,
170, 178, 190, 209, 210, 217, 221, 228, 230,
239n.53, 240, 258, 259, 264
voluntary95, 97, 131, 241
imitation14, 163n.116, 252
impression13n.1, 14, 16n.13, 19, 21, 22, 28,
29, 37, 49, 89n.23, 131, 146, 164, 203, 256, 260
induction9
infer117, 191
ingenium44, 47, 138n.11, 139n.20,
164n.121, 237
instinct38, 41n.117, 72n.111
institution165, 194, 195
intellect20, 24, 33, 38, 48, 49, 64, 101n.67,
188, 201n.91, 218n.148, 228, 230
intellectible41, 176
objects64, 148, 149, 176, 177, 182n.11,
200, 243, 253
intelligible20, 23, 41, 49, 64, 176, 196, 220
objects91n.30, 148151, 176, 177, 182,
183, 188, 251, 261
world15, 23, 24
intention25n.53, 27, 28, 38, 69, 87n.17,
211, 254
inward wits36
irascible power44
Isaac of Stella40, 45n.133, 4749, 91n.32,
95n.44, 151, 176n.165, 198n.83, 208n.114,
232n.34, 256
Jacob78, 8388, 101, 105, 111, 126n.153, 189,
217n.146
James of Venice18n.20, 21n.35
295
Jean Gerson7n.25
Jerusalem80n.149, 114, 115, 122
John Damascene14, 34n.91, 54n.22,
100n.62, 146
John Duns Scotus7n.26, 71n.105
John of Salisbury165n.121
John Scotus Eriugena7, 63n.67, 118n.121,
120n.129, 122, 133, 153n.73, 166n.127, 198,
202204, 211n.121, 212n.122, 215n.138, 220,
240n.56, 241n.64, 264
joy30, 54n.21, 65, 68, 85, 116, 117, 131,
147n.53, 193n.59, 196n.72, 206
knowledge formation31, 44, 47, 59, 199,
237, 261, 262
know thyself, see Christian socratism
ladder71, 72, 113n.104, 189, 248n.86, 261
Leah8387, 99n.60, 101, 126n.153
leisure136n.7, 143n.36
liberal arts11, 95n.43, 172, 175n.161
likeness, see similitude
lion120, 121, 209, 220
literal interpretation70, 7476, 106, 114,
115, 120, 123, 159n.94, 192n.54, 195, 197, 198,
199n.85
love20, 46, 51, 54n.21, 65, 67, 73, 8387,
100102, 108, 144n.40, 196n.72, 248n.87
spiritual46, 67
madness22, 147n.53
Marius Victorinus237n.48
material components48
mathematics41, 42, 64n.67, 91n.30,
145n.43, 151n.63, 171, 175178, 227, 239, 240
matter20, 31, 42, 61, 74, 75, 149n.57,
156n.82, 157, 159, 160, 162, 164, 166, 167, 176,
193, 194, 196, 206n.109, 235, 251, 263
mechanics163, 164n.119, 175
medical14, 28n.68, 34, 35, 36n.100, 37, 39,
45, 52, 54, 256, 264
meditation9, 107n.88, 124, 137145,
165n.122, 196, 238, 259
memory14, 23, 26, 28n.65, 33n.87, 3638,
40, 41, 4447, 60, 62, 89, 90, 95, 97, 107,
110n.98, 115n.111, 121, 122, 132, 137, 138n.11,
139n.20, 140n.24, 175, 176, 188n.35, 203, 224,
229, 230, 237, 239n.54, 253, 254n.105, 258
metaphor119, 120, 122, 209n.117, 215n.
136, 259
296
microcosm52, 205, 225n.10, 231
mimetic14
mind29, 56, 248n.87, 249n.93, 250n.96
alienation6n.18, 67, 146, 147n.54,
156n.82, 253, 254n.105
expansion146
rising146
wandering96, 110n.97, 111, 125n.152,
138, 139, 141, 142n.28, 155, 164, 227
mirror16, 24, 74, 224, 253
monastic life1, 9, 13, 34, 39, 62nn., 83, 107,
108, 110, 115, 124n.150, 133, 135, 136, 164,
197n.75, 207n.109, 215n.136, 227n.18, 249,
255, 259, 264, 265
moral
consideration20, 63, 70, 73, 85n.12,
104n.79, 111, 112
purification79, 101, 130, 240, 265
teaching11, 21, 22n.41, 77
see also ethics
motion19, 69, 89n.23, 143, 145n.47,
149n.57, 205, 236n.44
music27, 175n.163, 178n.173, 205n.104
mystical
experience6, 174
theology7, 39n.109, 255
signification195, 197, 198, 199n.85,
213, 216, 221
union12, 79, 88n.20, 243, 255
Naphtali84, 88, 101, 112114, 116, 119n.125,
126, 128, 130, 209, 210
natural48, 52, 56, 69, 72n.111, 73, 74,
162n.111, 163, 171, 175, 194, 197, 203, 234
objects74, 150, 176
power45, 125n.150, 184n.21
reason62n.62
theology171
nature66, 94n.40, 145n.47, 158, 162164,
166, 171, 173, 177, 194196, 223, 246n.79, 260
corporeal49, 62, 118, 159, 160162, 164,
166, 167, 193, 194
divine248, 249
human17n.13, 49, 69, 122, 187, 202,
203, 248, 249
soul35, 55, 56n.27, 86,
Nebridius25, 26, 256
Nemesius of Emesa14, 34n.91, 36,
44nn., 37n.102, 42n.122, 54n.22, 100n.62,
146, 256
index
Neoplatonism3, 4, 13, 23, 24, 28n.68, 30,
91n.30, 157n.84, 176n.164, 178n.173, 180, 183,
190n.46, 201, 220, 235n.40, 256, 261
nominalism9
notiones140
novice5, 6n.22, 51n.5, 84, 87, 108n.89,
112n.103, 125, 133, 257
nutritional power33
omniscience31, 74
opinion14, 16, 18, 19
Origen39n.111, 50n.3, 115n.112, 202n.93,
203n.100, 235n.40
Pantegni14, 42n.122, 45, 54n.20
Paradise203, 204
passiones, see affections
patience84, 126, 131
pedagogy41, 70, 78, 80, 108, 215n.136, 259
pedissequa, see handmaid
Peripatetic8, 21, 40, 173, 201
person46, 80n.151, 119, 172
human53n.17, 56n.27, 248n.86
inner11, 60n.44, 63, 66, 73n.115,
77n.108, 112n.103, 179, 201206
outer27n.64, 63, 73n.115, 179, 201206
Trinity148, 182n.15, 190, 249n.94
personification70, 78, 84, 86, 152, 257
perturbationes, see affections
per visibilia ad invisiblia70, 71, 75, 78,
190n.45, 249n.90, 255
Peter Abelard8, 9, 34, 62n.62, 63n.64,
74n.125, 94n.43, 97n.54, 104n.77, 106n.84,
109n.96, 120n.129, 130n.167, 153n.74,
190n.48, 201n.91
Peter Alfonsi241n.64
Peter Damian111, 128n.161, 129n.164,
218n.146, 231nn.
Peter Lombard8, 57n.35, 74, 204n.100,
229n.21
phantasia3, 1319, 2126, 28, 36, 37n.104,
39n.110, 45, 48, 91, 92, 140n.24, 165n.121,
198n.82, 220, 224, 228, 231n.29, 256
phantasm3n.10, 14, 16, 17, 20, 22, 25, 26,
36n.100, 46, 61, 149n.57, 212n.126, 224,
228231, 241, 252n.97, 257, 262, 263
phantasticum224n.3
Philo of Alexandria85n.11, 204n.100
philosophers15, 62n.62, 171n.145,
172175, 260
Index
philosophical psychology3
physical15, 25n.53, 28n.68, 41, 49n.147,
118n.122, 161, 172, 191, 213, 216, 217, 257
physics64n.67, 151n.163, 171, 175177,
220n.155, 234n.40
pictura208, 209n.116, 238, 239n.52
Plato1317, 109, 255, 256
pleasure14, 15, 19, 46, 68, 107n.86, 108,
109n.94, 116, 117, 121, 123, 129, 157, 162
Plotinus23, 24n.48
pneuma28n.68, 30n.75, 36
poetry220
Porphyry26n.60, 28n.68, 34n.91, 150n.61,
156n.82
predication10n.42, 33
premeditation23
pride67n.86, 85n.10
Proclus24, 91n.30, 178n.173
property10n.43, 22, 26, 61n.55, 62, 76,
89n.23, 90, 91n.30, 93n.40, 104, 106n.84, 140,
154, 159, 161, 187, 189, 191, 192, 194, 197, 207,
210, 258, 260, 261
divine156n.82, 190, 251, 262
of the soul63, 86n.13, 93n.40,
183n.15, 223225, 245, 247, 249, 251, 259,
262, 263
prophesy16, 17, 99, 182n.15, 234
providence40, 41n.117, 167n.131
prudence63n.67, 67n.91
Prudentius178n.143
Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite4, 7, 8,
40, 57n.35, 74n.128, 135n.2, 166n.127, 184,
198, 206n.108, 211213, 215, 216n.40, 219, 220,
224n.73, 248n.88, 249, 264
punishment30, 70, 84, 100, 103, 108, 109,
110, 163n.116, 195, 204, 240, 259
quadrivium42
quality62, 66, 146, 226n.13, 236
external159161
internal159161, 194
invisible93n.40, 148, 189192, 261
visible118, 145, 149n.57
quantity9, 15, 42, 62, 116, 146, 177, 226
Quintilian120, 121n.136, 133
Rachel8388, 92n.36, 95, 99, 101, 105,
111n.102, 126n.153, 132, 138n.12
rational principles74, 102, 148, 149,
167169, 171, 173, 174, 233, 260
297
reason passim
infertility83, 86, 87, 101
practical20, 28, 63
pure43, 44, 101n.67, 226
reflexive perception18
representation22, 23, 68, 95n.44, 108, 170,
188, 196, 224, 228, 229, 234, 238, 252n.97
Rhabanus Maurus218n.146, 231n.29
rhetoric119121, 133, 185, 188n.36, 207n.109,
209n.117, 215n.136, 237n.48, 258, 265
Robert of Melun121n.134
Robert Pullus98n.54
romanticism2n.9
sapientia44, 174, 175n.159, 204n.100,
248n.87
scientia44, 138n.11, 174, 190n.45, 204n.100
Seneca21n.37
sensation3, 6, 9, 16, 1820, 22n.39, 2638,
45, 48, 49, 57, 58, 60n.44, 76, 89, 90, 92,
9799, 106, 115n.113, 117, 127, 137, 161, 205,
219, 235, 239, 258
spiritual59n.43, 93n.38
senses2n.5, 10, 18, 22, 2632, 40, 4244,
46, 48, 5764, 68, 71, 75, 89, 91, 98, 104, 105,
107, 116, 118n.122, 119, 127, 129, 131, 132, 137,
140, 142n.32, 149, 154, 156, 159161, 165n.121,
169n.141, 174n.159, 176, 180n.8, 183, 188, 194,
196n.72, 200204, 211, 214, 218, 225, 233, 234,
237239, 251, 257, 258, 260, 265
intellectual59, 125n.150
internal35n.93, 36n.98, 37n.105, 38,
89n.23, 92, 149n.57
of mind60
organs89
spiritual59n. 43, 180
sensible
images38, 61, 75n.138, 91n.30, 108, 114,
174n.159, 186, 187, 233
memory41, 176
objects20, 26, 31, 33, 38, 48, 59, 64, 74,
75, 89n.23, 93, 94n.41, 106, 148, 149, 154,
156, 169, 176, 177, 181, 183, 187, 188,
198201, 212, 215, 224, 230, 260, 261
reality3, 27n.64, 30n.76, 39, 184n.24,
199, 203, 222, 245, 263
sensualitas49, 58, 65, 67, 68n.93,
84, 126
seraphim134n.2
Sextus Empiricus23n.44
298
shame20, 57, 65, 85, 131, 132
sight16, 27, 28, 40, 60, 72, 106n.82,
118n.122, 159161, 194, 213, 227
of the mind143, 225, 227
of the soul142
prophetic234
signification3, 4, 3234, 7477, 117,
121n.134, 185n.26, 189n.40, 197n.75, 210,
212n.123, 213, 216, 221, 256, 264
silva157n.84, 230
similitude passim
angelic182n.15
corporeal49, 182n.15, 183, 187, 189,
193n.59, 197n.75, 198, 200, 206, 217n.146,
226n.13, 234, 246, 261
rational148, 245249, 263
see also image and similitude of God
simulacra184n.22, 217n.144, 228, 229
sin52, 53, 68nn., 70, 100, 110, 129131,
140n.24, 161, 163n.116
smell160, 194, 196
soul passim
affective part3, 44, 58n.38, 66, 127, 135
appetitive part16n.13, 19
classification of powers35, 45, 56, 57,
158, 236
essence55
intellectual part28n.68, 64, 79, 84,
86n.13, 136, 144, 257
irrational23
substance43, 55
species28, 62, 74, 90, 94n.41, 106n.82,
119, 145n.47, 148, 149, 151, 157, 160n.98, 166,
167, 186, 187, 190n.46, 212, 213, 216, 217, 221,
224, 250
and genera6, 103, 144n.411
doctrine44n.128, 188n.35
intelligible188
universal31
speculation105, 112, 113n.104, 124n.146,
143n.36, 156, 192, 197n.75, 206, 210, 216,
245n.76
spirit
bodily/corporeal28n.68, 42, 48,
49nn., 54n.23, 148, 187
evil99n.57
holy214, 218, 219
human35, 43, 55, 57, 73, 93n.40, 199,
202, 225, 231
index
spiritual
interpretation70, 75n.131, 77n.138, 114,
115, 122, 123, 162, 192n.54, 195n.68, 196,
198, 262
members53n.18
power45
senses59n.43, 64n.68, 93n.38, 180, 227
vision2830, 47, 187, 212214, 218,
233n.36, 234n.40, 235
spirituality35, 7, 23, 39, 108n.89, 147,
164, 264
Stoic14, 15, 2123, 25, 26n.60, 36n.100, 40,
108n.90, 173, 256
substance10n.43, 43, 55, 56n.27, 61, 62,
151n.63, 159, 161, 171, 176, 183
suggestion70, 129, 259
sun75n.130, 116118, 190n.44, 196, 215
superessence153n.73
symbol4, 11, 70, 75, 94n.42, 122n.138,
184n.24, 211, 212, 214, 215, 219222, 225,
248n.88, 249, 257, 262, 264
taste27, 60, 131, 160, 180, 196
temptation68, 108, 124, 127
theophany184, 219, 253
thought102, 108, 129, 130nn.
intellectus32, 33
touch60, 187, 194, 233, 237
trahere185
transfer, see translation
translation116120, 122, 123, 161, 210,
258, 264
Trinity7, 8, 27, 28, 80n.147, 93n.40, 113,
148, 191n.52, 244, 247249
tropology7679, 80n.147, 8385, 87,
99n.60, 115, 179, 198, 259
understanding11, 3033, 41, 44, 4749, 57,
58, 60, 63, 64, 78n.141, 78, 80, 89, 91, 98, 99,
103, 106n.84, 113, 138, 141, 143, 144, 146, 149,
150, 152, 156, 175n.159, 176, 183, 195, 200, 221,
228n.19, 232, 243, 257
liveliness144, 145n.43, 164, 219n.152,
226, 237
mixed11, 63, 88, 90, 91, 112117, 121, 122,
124, 126, 130, 134, 137, 210, 226, 258
pure63, 64n.67, 102, 226, 227
simple63, 227n.17
universals30n.76, 31, 33
Index 299

ventricle29n.68, 3538, 42, 89n.23 formalis37n.105

vice45, 53, 66, 78n.143, 85, 96, 125n.152, imaginativa38
127, 129, 130n.167, 131 sensualis47
virtue3, 10n.43, 45, 53, 63, 66, 67n.86, 69, voluntas, see will
70, 78n.143, 86n.13, 99, 101, 125n.152, 126,
132n.173, 165, 196n.72, 236 will25, 28, 31, 46, 47, 50, 51, 53, 55, 56, 58,
vision 65, 69, 70, 90, 103, 109, 110, 129, 194, 224,
anagogical77, 216 228, 247, 250, 257
corporeal28, 213, 216, 217, 234 William of Auxerre68n.91
ecstatic183n.15, 197n.76, 253 William of Champeaux6n.20, 8, 30n.76,
imaginative28, 234 150n.61
intellectual29, 234, 235 William of Conches74n.125
spiritual28, 187, 213n.126, 214, 218, William of St. Thierry39n.109, 40, 45,
233n.36, 235 46, 54nn., 56n.29, 92n.32, 247n.84,
symbolic115n.113 252n.97, 256
vis wings34n.2, 151, 152, 179, 214n.135, 244
animae29, 103 works of human and nature154n.75, 158,
cogitativa38, 139n.19 162n.109, 163, 193, 194, 260
corporeus160
estimativa38, 41n.117 Zelpha83, 84, 126n.153