1. UYPITCHING V.

QUIAMCO 510 SCRA 172 (2007)

Honeste vivere, non alterum laedere et jus suum cuique tribuere.
To live virtuously, not to injure others and to give everyone his due. These supreme norms of justice are the
underlying principles of law and order in society.
FACTS:
In 1982, respondent Quiamco was approached by Davalan, Gabutero and Generoso to settle the civil
aspect of a criminal case for robbery filed by Quiamco against them.
They surrendered to him a red Honda motorcycle and a photocopy of its certificate of registration.
Respondent asked for the original certificate of registration but the three accused never came to see him
again.
Meanwhile, the motorcycle was parked in an open space inside respondents business establishment,
where it was visible and accessible to the public.
It turned out that, in October 1981, the motorcycle had been sold on installment basis to Gabutero by
Uypitching Sons, Inc. And to secure its payment, the motorcycle was mortgaged to petitioner corporation.
When Gabutero could no longer pay the installments, Davalan assumed the obligation and continued
the payments.
In September 1982, however, Davalan stopped paying the remaining installments.
Nine years later, petitioner Uypitching, accompanied by policemen, went to Avesco-AVNE Enterprises to
recover the motorcycle.
The leader of the police team talked to the clerk in charge and asked for respondent. While P/Lt.
Vendiola and the clerk were talking, petitioner Uypitching paced back and forth inside the establishment
uttering "Quiamco is a thief of a motorcycle."
Unable to find respondent, the policemen on petitioner Uypitchings instructionand over the clerks
objection, took the motorcycle.
Petitioner Uypitching filed a criminal complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing
Law against respondent but was dismissed.
Respondent filed an action for damages against petitioners in the RTC
The trial court rendered a decision finding that petitioner Uypitching was motivated with malice and ill
will when he called respondent a thief, took the motorcycle in an abusive manner and filed a baseless
complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law
Petitioners appealed the RTC decision but the CA affirmed the trial courts decision.

ISSUE:
WON the filing of a complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law warranted the award
of moral damages, exemplary damages, attorneys fees and costs in favor of respondent.

HELD: YES.
They were held liable for damages not only for instituting a groundless complaint against respondent but also
for making a slanderous remark and for taking the motorcycle from respondents establishment in an abusive
manner .Petitioners Abused Their Right of Recovery as Mortgagee(s)
A mortgagee may take steps to recover the mortgaged property to enable it to enforce or protect its
foreclosure right there on. There is, however, a well-defined procedure for the recovery of possession of
mortgaged property: if a mortgagee is unable to obtain possession of a mortgaged property for its sale on
foreclosure, he must bring a civil action either to recover such possession as a preliminary step to the sale, or
to obtain judicial foreclosure. Petitioner corporation failed to bring the proper civil action necessary to acquire
legal possession of the motorcycle. Instead, petitioner Uypitching descended on respondents establishment
with his policemen and ordered the seizure of the motorcycle without a search warrant or court order. Worse,
in the course of the illegal seizure of the motorcycle, petitioner Uypitching even mouthed a slanderous
statement.
Petitioners acts violated the law as well as public morals, and transgressed the proper norms of human
relations.
The basic principle of human relations, embodied in Article 19 of the Civil Code .Article 19, also known as the
"principle of abuse of right," prescribes that a person should not use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty
and good faith ,otherwise he opens himself to liability. There is an abuse of right when it is exercised solely to
prejudice or injure another.
The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established and must not be
excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to harm another.
In this case, the manner by which the motorcycle was taken at petitioners instance was not only attended by
bad faith but also contrary to the procedure laid down by law. Considered in conjunction with the defamatory
statement, petitioners exercise of the right to recover the mortgaged vehicle was utterly prejudicial and
injurious to respondent.

Petitioners acted in an excessively harsh fashion to the prejudice of respondent.

2. HSBC INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEE LIMITED, petitioner, vs. CECILIA DIEZ CATALAN, respondent. G.R. No. 159590 &
159591 October 18, 2004|

FACTS Frederick Arthur Thomson drew 5 checks payable to Catalan in the total amount of HK$3.2 million. Catalan
presented these checks to HSBC [Bank]. The checks were dishonored for having insufficient funds. Thomson demanded
that the checks be made good because he, in fact, had sufficient funds. Catalan knowing that Thomson had
communicated with the Bank, asked HSBCBank to clear the checks and pay her the said amount. HSBC did not heed her.
Thomson died but Catalan was not paid yet. The account was transferred to HSBC [Trustee]. Catalan then requested
Trustee to pay her. They still refused and even asked her to submit back to them the original checks for verification.
Catalan and her lawyer went to Hongkong on their own expense to personally submit the checks. They still were not
honored, leading Catalan to file a suit against HSBC to collect her HK$3.2M

ISSUES Whether or not HSBC Bank and Trustee are liable to pay damages to Catalan on the ground of Abuse of right
under Article 19 of the Civil Code

ARGUMENTS
Petitioner: HSBC claims that they are a foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines thus the courts do not
have jurisdiction over them. Moreover, there is no cause of action because it was not alleged in the there was abuse of
right.
Respondent: Catalan claims that although HSBC has the right to examine the checks, they did so in bad faith because
they required her to submit all sorts of documents and yet even upon showing that the checks were good, the Bank still
refused to release the money to her. There was abuse of right on the part of the Bank. HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
THERE IS CAUSE OF ACTION, IT NEED NOT BE EXPRESSLY STATED, THE FACTS SUFFICIENTLY DESCRIBE THAT THERE WAS
AN ABUSEOF RIGHT.

APPLICATION: Article 19 of the Civil Code speaks of the fundamental principle of law and human conduct that a person
"must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith." It sets the standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of ones rights
but also in the performance of ones duties. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the
norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be held responsible. But a right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such,
may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. A person should be protected only when he acts in the
legitimate exercise of his right, that is, when he acts with prudence and in good faith; but not when he acts with
negligence or abuse. There is an abuse of right when it is exercised for the only purpose of prejudicing or injuring
another. The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established, and must not be
excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to injure another. Thus, in order to be liable under the abuse of
rights principle, three elements must concur, to wit: (a) that there is a legal right or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad
faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. HSBANK is being sued for unwarranted failure to pay
the checks notwithstanding the repeated assurance of the drawer Thomson as to the authenticity of the check sand
frequent directives to pay the value thereof to Catalan. Her allegations in the complaint that the gross inaction of
HSBANK on Thomsons instructions, as well as its evident failure to inform Catalan of the reason for its continued
inaction and non-payment of the checks, smack of insouciance on its part, are sufficient statements of clear abuse of
right for which it may be held liable to Catalan for any damages she incurred resulting therefore. HSBANKs actions or
lack thereof, prevented Catalan from seeking further redress with Thomson for the recovery of her claim while the latter
was alive

DECISION OF THE COURT: The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated August 14, 2003, in CA-G.R. SP No. 75757
dismissing the petition for certiorari of the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited is AFFIRMED. The
petition in G.R. No. 159591 is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated August 14, 2003, in CA-G.R. SP No.
75756 dismissing the petition for certiorari of the HSBC International Trustee Limited is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, Bacolod City is declared without jurisdiction to take cognizance of Civil Case No. 01-
11372 against the HSBC International Trustee Limited, and all its orders and issuances with respect to the latter are
hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The said Regional Trial Court is hereby ORDERED to DESIST from maintaining further
proceedings against the HSBC International Trustee Limited in the case aforestated.
4. MVRS vs Islamic DaWah Council of the Phils. (2003) Bellosillo, J.

FACTS: a. Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc., a local federation of more than seventy (70) Muslim religious
organizations, and individual Muslims (Linzag, Arcilla, de Guzman, da Silva, Junio) filed in the RTC a complaint for
damages in their own behalf and as a class suit in behalf of the Muslim members nationwide against MVRS Publications,
Inc., arising from an article published in the 1 August 1992 issue of Bulgar, a daily tabloid. The article reads: "ALAM BA
NINYO? Na ang mga baboy at kahit anong uri ng hayop sa Mindanao ay hindi kinakain ng mga Muslim? Para sa kanila
ang mga ito ay isang sagradong bagay. Hindi nila ito kailangang kainin kahit na sila pa ay magutom at mawalan ng ulam
sa tuwing sila ay kakain. Ginagawa nila itong Diyos at sinasamba pa nila ito sa tuwing araw ng kanilang pangingilin lalung-
lalo na sa araw na tinatawag nilang 'Ramadan'."

b. Islamic DaWah: the libelous statement was insulting and damaging to the Muslims; not only published out of sheer
ignorance but with intent to hurt the feelings, cast insult and disparage the Muslims and Islam,; that on account of these
libelous words Bulgar insulted not only the Muslims in the Philippines but the entire Muslim world c. MVRS Publications,
Inc.,: the article did not mention respondents as the object of the article and therefore were not entitled to damages;
and, that the article was merely an expression of belief or opinion and was published without malice nor intention to
cause damage d. RTC: dismissed the complaint; persons allegedly defamed by the article were not specifically identified
e. CA: reversed RTC decision. The defamation was directed to all adherents of the Islamic faith. The suit for damages was
a "class suit" and that ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.'s religious status as a Muslim umbrella
organization gave it the requisite personality to sue and protect the interests of all Muslims.

ISSUE: WON in the alternative, the action can be considered as one is for intentional tort and not libel. NO.

RATIO: Regarding the argument that the present case is an intentional tortious act causing mental distress and not an
action for libel. Invoking Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire where the U.S. SC held that profanity, intended merely to incite
hostility, have no social value and do not enjoy protection; and Beauharnais v. Illinois where it was also ruled that hate
speech against a group (based on religion, ethnicity, etc.) may validly be prohibited.

COURT: NO. "Emotional distress" tort action is personal in nature; it is a civil action filed by an individualto assuage the
injuries to his emotional tranquility due to personal attacks on his character. APPLICATION: no particular individual was
identified in the disputed article of Bulgar. Here, it is relational harm which includes harm to social relationships in the
community in the form of defamation; as distinguished from the principle of reactive harm which includes injuries to
individual emotional tranquility in the form of an infliction of emotional distress.

DOCTRINES:
Second Restatement of the Law, to recover for the intentional infliction of emotional distress the plaintiff must show
that: (a) The conduct of the defendant was intentional or in reckless disregard of the plaintiff; (b) The conduct was
extreme and outrageous; (c) There was a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's mental
distress; and, (d) The plaintiff's mental distress was extreme and severe.
"Extreme and outrageous conduct" means conduct that is so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to
go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in civilized society.
"Emotional distress" means any highly unpleasant mental reaction such as extreme grief, shame, humiliation,
embarrassment, anger, disappointment, worry, nausea, mental suffering and anguish, shock, fright, horror, and chagrin.
"Severe emotional distress," - he or she has suffered emotional distress so severe that no reasonable person could be
expected to endure it; severity of the distress is an element of the cause of action, not simply a matter of damages. 31
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell: A parody appeared in Hustler magazine featuring Reverend Falwell depicting him in an
inebriated state having an incestuous, sexual liaison with his mother. US Court held that it was not libelous, because no
reasonable reader would have understood it as a factual assertion. But still $200,000 awarded on a separate count of
"intentional infliction of emotional distress," a cause of action that did not require a false statement of fact to be made.
Here, an intentional tort causing emotional distress gives way to the fundamental right to free speech.

APPLICATION: the conduct of petitioners was not extreme or outrageous. Neither was the emotional distress allegedly
suffered by respondents so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it. There is no evidence on
record that points to that result.

CASES/AUTHORITY CITED: i.) Professor William Prosser: Liability of course cannot be extended to every trivial indignity.
One must necessarily be expected and required to be hardened to a certain amount of rough language, and to acts that
are definitely inconsiderate and unkind. One cannot recover merely because of hurt feelings. ii.) Professor Calvert
Magruder: There is no occasion for the law to intervene in every case where someone's feelings are hurt. There must
still be freedom to express an unflattering opinion. iii.) Chaplinsky and Beauharnais had largely been superseded by
Cohen and Branderburg. American courts no longer accept the view that speech may be proscribed merely because it is
"lewd," "profane," "insulting" or otherwise vulgar or offensive. iv.) Cohen v. California: Cohen wore a jacket bearing the
words "Fuck the Draft". No one present in the courthouse would have regarded Cohen's speech as a direct personal
insult, nor was there any danger of reactive violence against him. No specific individual was targeted in the allegedly
defamatory words printed on Cohen's jacket. There was no showing that Cohen's jacket bearing the words "Fuck the
Draft" had threatened to provoke imminent violence. v.) Brandenburg v. Ohio: a leader of the Ku Klux Klan was
convicted for advocating unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing reforms; U.S. Supreme Court, held
that the advocacy of illegal action becomes punishable only if such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.

5. [G.R. No. 156841. June 30, 2005] GF EQUITY, INC., petitioner, vs. ARTURO VALENZONA, respondent.

DIGEST DOCTRINE A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless
become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer
must be held responsible.

FACTS: GF Equity hired Valenzona as Head Coach of the Alaska basketball team in the Philippine Basketball Association
under a Contract of Employment where GF Equity would pay Valenzona the sum of P35,000.00 monthly. While the
employment period agreed upon was for two years commencing, the last sentence of paragraph 3 of the contract
carried the following condition: 3. x x x If at any time during the contract, the COACH, in the sole opinion of the
CORPORATION, fails to exhibit sufficient skill or competitive ability to coach the team, the CORPORATION may terminate
this contract. The caveat notwithstanding, Valenzona still acceded to the terms of the contract because of trust and
confidence in Uytengsu ( chief financial officer of GF Equity). Thereafter, Valenzona was terminated as coach of the
Alaska team. Valenzona demanded from GF Equity payment of compensation arising from the arbitrary and unilateral
termination of his employment. GF Equity, however, refused the claim and maintained, on the other hand, that it merely
exercised its right under the contract to pre-terminate his employment due to incompetence. Valenzona thus filed
before the RTC Manila a complaint against GF Equity for breach of contract with damages. The trial court, upholding the
validity of the assailed provision of the contract, dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals, before which Valenzona
appealed, reversed the trial courts decision, and accordingly ordered GF Equity to pay him damages

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner has the right to dismiss the respondent on the basis of their contractual
agreement.
HELD: No. While GF Equitys act of pre-terminating Valenzonas services cannot be considered willful as it was based on
a stipulation, albeit declared void, it, in doing so, failed to consider the abuse of rights principle enshrined in Art. 19 of
the Civil Code which provides: Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. This article, known to contain what is
commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the
exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act with
justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial
limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A
right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some
illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and
results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible.
But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the maintenance of
social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or
Article 21 would be proper. Since the pre-termination of the contract was anchored on an illegal ground, hence, contrary
to law, and GF Equity negligently failed to provide legal basis for such pre-termination, e.g. that Valenzona breached the
contract by failing to discharge his duties thereunder, GF Equity failed to exercise in a legitimate manner its right to pre-
terminate the contract, thereby abusing the right of Valenzona to thus entitle him to damages under Art. 19 in relation
to Article 20 of the Civil Code the latter of which provides: Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or
negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same. In De Guzman v. NLRC,[13] this Court
quoted the following explanation of Tolentino why it is impermissible to abuse our rights to prejudice others. The
exercise of a right ends when the right disappears, and it disappears when it is abused, especially to the prejudice of
others. The mask of a right without the spirit of justice which gives it life is repugnant to the modern concept of social
law. It cannot be said that a person exercises a right when he unnecessarily prejudices another or offends morals or
good customs. Over and above the specific precepts of positive law are the supreme norms of justice which the law
develops and which are expressed in three principles: honeste vivere, alterum non laedere and jus suum quique
tribuere; and he who violates them violates the law. For this reason, it is not permissible to abuse our rights to prejudice
others. The disquisition in Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. Court of Appeals is just as relevant as it is
illuminating on the present case. In that case, this Court declared that even granting that the therein petitioners might
have had the right to dismiss the therein respondent from work, the abusive manner in which that right was exercised
amounted to a legal wrong for which the petitioners must be held liable.

6. AVELINO CASUPANAN and ROBERTO CAPITULO vs. MARIA LLAVORE LAROYA G.R. No. 145391. August 26, 2002

Facts: Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Mario Llavore Laroya (Laroya for brevity) and the other owned by
petitioner Roberto Capitulo (Capitulo for brevity) and driven by petitioner Avelino Casupanan (Casupanan for brevity),
figured in an accident. As a result, two cases were filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC for brevity) of
Capas, Tarlac. Laroya filed a criminal case against Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 002-99. On the other hand, Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for
quasi-delict, docketed as Civil Case No. 2089. When the civil case was filed, the criminal case was then at its preliminary
investigation stage. Laroya, defendant in the civil case, filed a motion to dismiss the civil case on the ground of forum-
shopping considering the pendency of the criminal case. The MCTC granted the motion in the Order of March 26, 1999
and dismissed the civil case. On Motion for Reconsideration, Casupanan and Capitulo insisted that the civil case is a
separate civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal case. The MCTC denied the motion for
reconsideration in the Order of May 7, 1999. Casupanan and Capitulo filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before
the Regional Trial Court (Capas RTC for brevity) of Capas, Tarlac, assailing the MCTCs Order of dismissal but the Capas
RTC dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit. 16

Issue: Can an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can validly file, simultaneously and
independently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private complainant in the criminal case?

Ruling: Yes. The criminal case is based on culpa criminal punishable under the Revised Penal Code while the civil case is
based on culpa aquiliana actionable under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code. Laroya filed the criminal case for
reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property based on the Revised Penal Code while Casupanan and Capitulo
filed the civil action for damages based on Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Although these two actions arose from the
same act or omission, they have different causes of action. Article 2176 provides that whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter. Further, Art. 2177 reads that responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article
is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff
cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. Any aggrieved person can invoke these
articles provided he proves, by preponderance of evidence, that he has suffered damage because of the fault or
negligence of another. There is nothing in the law or rules that state only the private complainant in a criminal case may
invoke these articles. Hence, either the private complainant or the accused can file a separate civil action under these
articles.
7.
8. HEIRS OF EDUARDO SIMON v. ELVIN CHAN. G.R. No. 157547. February 23, 2011
FACTS:

On July 11, 1997, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MeTC) an
information charging the late Eduardo Simon (Simon) with a violation of BP 22, docketed as Criminal Case No. 275381
entitled People v. Eduardo Simon.

More than three years later, or on August 3, 2000, respondent Elvin Chan commenced in the MeTC in Pasay City a civil
action for the collection of the principal amount of P336,000.00, coupled with an application for a writ of preliminary
attachment (docketed as Civil Case No. 915-00).

On August 9, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City issued a writ of preliminary attachment, which was implemented on August
17, 2000 through the sheriff attaching a Nissan vehicle of Simon.

On August 17, 2000, Simon filed an urgent motion to dismiss with application to charge plaintiffs attachment bond for
damages

On August 29, 2000, Chan opposed Simons urgent motion to dismiss with application to charge plaintiffs attachment
bond for damages,

On October 23, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City granted Simon the urgent motion to dismiss with application to charge
plaintiffs attachment bond for damages. The MTC cites the grounds of litis pendentia and that the case for sum of
money is one based on fraud and hence falling under Article 33 of the Civil Code, still prior reservation is required

Chans motion for reconsideration was denied as well as his appeal with the RTC. On the CA, Chan's appeal was granted.

ISSUE: Whether or not Chan's civil action to recover the amount of the unfunded check (Civil Case No. 915-00) was an
independent civil action.

RULING:

NO. There is no independent civil action to recover the civil liability arising from the issuance of an unfunded check
prohibited and punished under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22).

This is clear from Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which relevantly provides: "The criminal action for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action
separately shall be allowed."

Supreme Court Circular 57-97 also provides that: "1. The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be
deemed to necessarily include the corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file such civil action separately shall
be allowed or recognized."

10.