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What is This?
A RT I C L E
The language of felt experience: emotional,
evaluative and intuitive
William Downes, University of East Anglia, UK
Abstract
How do felt experiences relate to language? For me, this problem has arisen in the
study of religious language. In section 4, I will discuss examples drawn from
Julian of Norwichs Showings, a late 14th or early 15th century mystical and
theological work of great religious depth (Jantzen, 1987). It is the first book that
we know of written in English by a woman. The texts are reproduced in the
Appendices. I shall examine two short passages from Chapters 4 and 54 of the
authoritative modernization by Colledge and Walsh (1978b), Appendices I (b) and
II (b). Middle English versions of the same passages edited and collated from
extant manuscript sources by Colledge and Walsh (1978a) are included for
comparison, Appendices I (a) and II (a).
It is commonly agreed that language has an ideational function which
represents the speakers experience, including inner mental experience (Halliday,
1994: 1067; Jakobson, 1960: 363). There is a representational stance towards
experiences which analyses them as abstracted and encoded by language in
propositional, truth conditional terms. That is, language represents experiences as
One reason why felt experiences elude language is that they are, partly, outside
2.1 Emotion
I am proposing a semiotic theory of emotion. This is not original, since C.S.
Peirces theory is of this type (Savan, 1981). Psychological and neuroscientific
theories, such as those of Mandler (1984) and Damasio (1996), and social con-
structivist views like those of Rom Harr (1986) can be interpreted as semiotic.
My definition is: emotions are construals of bodily states of arousal in
contexts of situation and culture (Figure 1, 1.ii, column A). Emotions are
semiotic because they are systematic relationships between meanings and
physical substance in contexts of culture and situation, as presented at the top of
Figure 1 (1.i). The physical substance is a state of the body. By meanings, I mean
interpretations of that physical state. The relation of signifier and signified can be
coded, making an arbitrary Saussurean sign, but interpretations of the signifier
do not have to be of this type. The relation can be a causal link or a contextual
inference. Thus, the semiotic can include what Sperber (1975) calls the
cognitive. Emotions are usually context-dependent inferential signs and thus
cognitive in Sperbers sense.
Consider jealousy as a relatively simple example. What is it? It is a bodily
arousal, perhaps felt as a pounding heart, a sick sinking in the stomach, an urgent
2.2 Evaluations
The second felt experience is evaluation. In this case my definition is:
evaluations are construals of experiences in context on binary scales between
positive and negative: good (plus value) vs bad (minus value), desirable vs
undesirable, important vs not important, lovely vs hideous etc. (See also
Figure 1, 1.ii, column B.) Evaluations are semiotic because again a meaning, the
positive or negative, is mapped onto the substance of an experience in contexts of
situation. There is the same pairing of publicly determinable category (good vs
bad) and a phenomenologically private experience (positive vs negative
judgement) as discussed earlier with respect to emotion. In this case, the
experience is not of bodily arousal, although it can be. Emotions always also
simultaneously involve evaluation on one or more of the scales. For example,
jealousy is bad and undesirable. But I can evaluate without expressing an
emotion. Consider a response to a perception or a memory. I look at or remember
a building, the Millennium Dome in Greenwich, England. And that perceptual or
memory experience is inextricably involved with negative evaluations which I
must conceptualize using the semantic resources of language, morally, as such a
waste of resources, or aesthetically, as an engineering marvel. But my language
is not necessarily expressing an emotion, but simply an evaluation. I do not have
to admit to feeling a labelled emotion, or indeed anything; no frustration or
2.3 Intuitions
This is the hardest of the experiences to talk about. I am trying to characterize our
ordinary sense of the word intuition as a compulsive felt sense of the correctness
of some view or a feeling of comprehending something which neither consciously
involves reasoning nor is empirical in the normal way. It is a jumping to an
insight. This puts intuition into the arena of felt experience. (It also differs from
the technical uses of the term in, for example, Kant [1954] or Sperber [1996].) I
argue that intuitions are construals of the system of representation itself. This
includes, in particular cases, information already represented in it. But we have an
intuitive sense of meaning potentials which come from properties and problems
intrinsic to our semiotic systems themselves and the reality they presuppose (see
Figure 1, 1.ii, column C).
One class of such intuitions are the hypotheses (implicated premises) which
mysteriously pop into mind in the process of thinking about experience. These
serve to connect new experiences with previous inductive generalizations, from
which the former may be deduced. Sperber and Wilson (1995) argue that this
process is governed by relevance. A related kind of intuition is being struck by
an analogy. This is another case of hypothesis. It is the process of judging that
there are structural similarities between the representations of otherwise dissimilar
domains. It also reflects the urge to unify. I would suggest that the principle of
simplicity, Occams Razor, is a higher-level intuition. In intuitions, the semiotic
treats representations as signifiers, and searches for new unifying signifieds. The
norm of simplicity is one consequence of this search.
More important for religious language are a second major class of intuitions.
These are the class which when asserted lead to paradox or contradiction, and yet
are felt to be true. There are discussions of similar phenomena in Kants
transcendental dialectic (Kant, 1954: 208 ff; see also Krner, 1955: ch. 5) and in
Kenneth Burkes The Rhetoric of Religion (1961). Another analysis, one which is
rigorously naturalistic in outlook, leads Sperber (1975) to treat such symbolic
utterances as creating an evocational field. In his later work, Sperber (1996)
worse, has rights, potential authenticity and so on. We try to get in touch with
our true selves.
We can try to apply such ideas to more contemporary generalizations about
semiosis or representation. The correspondence notion of truth and its relation to
inquiry is a good example. It is easy to think of propositions in practical domains
which can clearly be true or false. We have methods of inquiry which allow us to
assign a definite truth value in such cases. For example, we can find out whether
the back door is locked or whether water boils at 100C. It is then possible to
generalize this process and arrive at a notion of absolute truth, which would
define reality. This would be the totality of true propositions at the end of all
inquiry. Reality would be a determinate state of the world the state that makes
those propositions true. But such a state cannot empirically exist or ever be or be
humanly discovered without paradox, because of the temporal nature of inquiry.
Nevertheless, considered as an ideal or normative principle, such a conception of
truth is compulsive and motivates inquiry. After all, if there is no final
determinate reality, what is the status of science? One position is to accept
absolute truth as a normative principle governing our practices of inquiry.
I conclude this section by briefly examining lines 79 from Chapter 54 of the
modernized long text of Showings which illustrates how intuition is
characteristically realized (see Appendix I[b] for the full text):
Greatly ought we to rejoice that God dwells in our soul; and more greatly
ought we to rejoice that our soul dwells in God. Our soul is created to be Gods
dwelling place, and the dwelling of our soul is God, who is uncreated.
In this passage, two distinct Kantian Ideas of Reason, God and our soul, are
linguistically presented as having spatio-temporal location. But the two entities
dwell each within the other, which is impossible. A cannot dwell, be enclosed,
within B and at the same time B dwell, be enclosed, within A if A, B and
dwell have constant senses. But this paradox is hardly felt as a paradox at all.
This is because God is also believed to be omnipresent; that is, present at all and
any spatio-temporal locations including the location of our substantial self (also of
course, as the Creator, not in space and time at all, another contradiction). If God
is everywhere, our substantial self must be in God and God in us. And this
resolution then both forces us to try to conceive of an impossible object, one that
is everywhere, and also its relation to an another object, our substantial self,
within us. It follows that the two will be at the same place at the same time. In
naturalistic language, they are therefore the same thing. They are not just the same
thing under different descriptions, they are two distinct things which are
paradoxically the same thing. The Ideas of Reason involved are the most perfect,
unifying generalization possible, of one absolute substance or Being, which is
God, and which is identical with the true substance of ourself, our soul. Clearly,
neither of these are normal objects of the sort which language presupposes as
individuals, or objects of empirical experience, that can be inside or outside
particular places at particular times. The space-time location of such things has
broken down; they are transcendent. But the inference that these two things are
at the same place at the same time, are thus logically the same individual, makes
us try to grasp at a sense of their unity. This felt intuition of unity is thus
symbolically expressible through the paradox of mutual indwelling.
3.1.3 Connotation of lexical items It has long been claimed that individual lexical
items have affective connotations and language has an emotive use (Ogden and
Richards, 1923). In this case, in theories where there is a lexicon, each lexical
entry, for every content word, would possess a context-sensitive evaluative layer
with respect to its sense. This would be the result of its history. It would
determine its appropriateness for selection within a given genre, in a given
register and its place with respect to the systems of categorization discussed
above in section 3.1.2.
scales of more or less. Since intuitive experiences lead to contradiction, that is,
violations of the literal use of language, their main realizations lie within the
figurative.
The main systems are: (i) phonetic features, in particular prosodic features like
intonation and its written evocation; (ii) expression of propositional attitudes
through use of mental processes; (iii) grading: a complex of interacting systems
consisting of (a) intensifiers, (b) implicit and explicit comparison, (c) quantifiers,
(d) mood and modality, and (e) negation. The next is (iv), clause complexes,
mainly paratactic recursion (repetition) and speaker-intrusive interpersonal
metaphor, as discussed in Halliday (1994: 354 ff.). Finally, there is (v),
figurativeness and the poetic function which shows felt experiences and is
relevant to the intuitive as well as being affective.
I will comment on the less obvious (i), (iii), and (v). All five will be illustrated
below. As regards (i), studies have explored the systematic relation between
intonation and attitude (Bolinger, 1986; Crystal, 1969; Halliday, 1967; Tench,
1996). The meanings which are sytematically associated with tones relate to
communicative function, while secondary tones express finer ranges of speaker
attitude to propositions and to interlocutor (for summary see Tench, 1996: ch. 5).
According to Crystal (1969), not only primary and secondary tone but most non-
segmental phonation, pitch range, loudness, tempo, length, rhythm and pauses,
tension, degree and type of voicing are all incorrigibly adjusted to express attitude
in context (Crystal, 1969: 128 ff.). Just as there is systematicity in the case of
secondary tones, Jakobson (1960: 354) argues that in the case of vowel length
the contrast between [big] and [bi:g] iconicity takes on a coded dimension
symbolic of emotional arousal. More specifically, intonation has an intrinsic
iconic and gestural quality which is expressive. Bolinger (1986: 195) writes:
Intonation is part of a gestural complex whose primitive and still surviving
function is the signalling of emotion. He relates this to the cognitive orientational
metaphor of UP=good and DOWN=bad (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 14 ff.). UP
and DOWN are one aspect of the more general analogue of INCREASE and
DECREASE to the intensity (or absence and waning) of arousal and evaluation.
The ability of phonation to express relative intensity in an analogue way is the
origin of the system of focus or tonicity, the relative prominence of the tonic
syllable expressing what is evaluated as most important in communication.
Within this evaluation, further degrees of prominence (pitch change, loudness,
length) express intensity of arousal.
As regards (iii), phenomena graded on some scale, these areas of grammar are
closely interwoven. I will take the attitudinal nature of mood and modality for
granted and merely note the relationship with negation (for modality see Halliday,
1994; Lyons, 1977, vol. 2). As Halliday (1994: 356) remarks, modality refers to
the area of meaning that lies between yes and no the intermediate ground
between positive and negative polarity. It allows for a scale of epistemic and
deontic attitude between those poles. It is important to note that modality is
expressed in a variety of ways, not just by the modal operators.
The first part of the fourth chapter, reproduced in Appendix II (a) and (b),
illustrates all the features. I will discuss II (b), the modernized text. Virtually
every detail organizes felt experience rather than developing an argument. The
text constructs a very complex epistemic and felt experience. The main feelings
are joy (line 7) and astonishment (line 14), the latter an epistemic attitude of
bafflement at warranted belief, stronger than surprise.
The two most obvious devices are the emotional and evaluative connotation of
specific lexical items and the overt expression of attitudes. Upon analysis, most
lexical items have either a positive (or neutral) stereotypical affect; only suffer
(line 4), sinful (line 15) and wretched (line 15) are stereotypically negative, and
these evaluations are transformed in this context. Consider the positive affect
associated with the following items: freely, copiously, living, stream, blessed, true,
powerful, show, revelation, fill, full, great, joy, understand, heaven and so on.
Julian also overtly specifies her propositional attitudes and mental states, for
example: I saw (line 1), I perceived, truly and powerfully (lines 34), who
showed it to me (line 5), the Trinity filled my heart (line 6), I understood (line
7), and so on. Halliday (1994: 354 ff.) terms examples like I perceived and I
understood interpersonal metaphors. This is a device for making the subjective
modality of the proposition, that is Julians modal stance, fully explicit. She is
overtly asserting that It is certain that he showed it to me. She is projecting this
evaluation into the text. This device is prosodic throughout. In lines 1213, we get
an overt exclamation, Benedicite dominus bursting out into Latin1 with its
But then, in a series of further identifying clauses, the four repeated tokens of
the Trinity (lines 89) are given a repetitive series of further new values relevant
to us, our maker, our protector, our everlasting lover, our endless joy and
our bliss, which explain the source of Julians joy. This rhapsodically defines the
three relationships we have with the perfections of the Trinity as maker (power),
protector (wisdom) and lover (goodness), which are the endless joy of heaven,
the revelatory experience of which Julian is trying to express. The Trinity, namely
God, transforms our basic affective response at the horror of blood into joy
because (one of it, he, they, she) suffers exactly because (all of it, he, they, she)
loves us. These intuitions do not have clear propositional forms, truth conditions
that do not lead to contradiction, let alone verification conditions. They are non-
propositional signs. But they manifest a most intense emotional, evaluative and
intuitive experience of unity in love, the experience of beatitude, which simply
saturates the text.
Much textual study is intellectualistic; it gives verbal interpretations. The
approach sketched here gives us a new way to understand language as also the
social and historical working out of complex felt experiences. The experiences of
nationalism, agapistic love, personal ambition, perhaps even happiness or the
concept of having fun provide examples. These all also have institutional
expression. It is not only thought which has a history. And we do not comprehend
texts only in propositional terms.
I have distinguished emotions, evaluations and intuitions as semiotic or
cognitive phenomena and attempted to begin to categorize the linguistic resources
for the expression of felt experience. These are not conveyed by propositional
forms, yet they are intensely meaningful. The third type, intuitions, were said to
be implicit in properties of representation itself, when it operates non-empirically.
Much more work is required to clarify all three types, especially the third and its
relation to the figurative. Affect and evaluation are clear features of many textual
genres, both literary and non-literary. Intuition as defined is clearly part of
language which expresses religious experience. More problematic is its relation to
literariness and the poetic. All three types were illustrated from the Showings of
Julian of Norwich.
Acknowledgements
Notes
1 Benedicite Dominus is hard to interpret. The sentence appears grammatically ill-formed: the verb
is 2nd person plural imperative of benedicere, to praise or bless, and the noun is singular
nominative. If this was a salutation addressed to God, the noun should be vocative singular,
Domine. If God was the Goal, Range or Beneficiary, then it should be accusative, Dominum, or
perhaps dative, Domino. Colledge and Walsh (1978a: 211) think that it is hardly possible to
decide what Julian actually said, and whether it was a blessing, thanking or praising. But they
add that it is clear that this passage provides no evidence for or against her being a woman that
could not letter. The phrase is very similar to varying titles or beginnings to the Canticle of the
Three Young Men, which was a popular mediaeval devotion. The Oxford English Dictionary
(1989: Vol. II, 109) has an entry for Benedicite as an interjection either expressing a wish, Bless
you!, or expressing astonishment or remonstrance, Bless us! Good gracious. Citations for
these last readings are exactly at the time of Julians writing; for example, 1377, Langland, 1393,
Gower and 1374, Chaucers Troylus 1. 780 What? liveth not thy lady, benedicite?. The term is
clearly an English idiom, a loan word, used as an exclamation of astonishment. That is a
plausible use for it here. If so, then it is not the main verb of a Latin sentence and the issue of
cases is not relevant. Thanks to Michael Cummings for assistance with this problem.
2 the Trinity filled my heart full of the greatest joy (lines 67) is Colledge and Walshs
(1978a) interpretation of the Middle English, the trinitie fulfilled my hart most of joy,
Appendix II(a), line 6. Modern fulfilled does not retain the literal material sense of fill X full
of Y, from OE, fullfyllan. But this is preserved in Julians time. Middle English also applies this
to physiology, humours, and emotion, the Holy Ghost, wisdom (Kurath, 1952: 933). Both
Kurath and the OED (1989: Vol. VI, 2445) attest various abstract meanings in Julians time, for
example in the OED: 1290, To carry out or bring consummation. The question then arises
whether Julians ME sentence is beautifully ambiguous between a material physiological-
emotional and an abstract theological reading, whereby her soul reaches its destined state of
bliss, and this is lost in the translation. Julian does use the device of ambiguity. However, a
problem is that the abstract uses are not diatransitive, but simple transitive: X fulfilled Y, or
passive transitive, Y was fulfilled, and not X fulfilled Y of/with Z (although such a use is
attested in the poetic language of Tennyson). When all Julians uses of fulfill are examined, she
is seen to frequently use fulfill in the material sense, which seems its more fundamental
meaning for her. So Colledge and Walshs translation is justified on the grounds that the more
basic use should be assumed unless there is reason to the contrary. Again, I would like to thank
Michael Cummings for his help.
References
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Black, M. (1962) Models and Archetypes, in M. Black Models and Metaphors, pp. 21943. Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press.
Black, M. (1979) More about Metaphor, in A. Ortony Metaphor and Thought, pp. 1943.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bolinger, D. (1986) Intonation and Its Parts. London: Edward Arnold.
Burke, K. (1961) The Rhetoric of Religion. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
Colledge, E. and Walsh, J. (eds) (1978a) A Book of Showings to the Anchoress Julian of Norwich, Part
Two. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.
Colledge, E. and Walsh, J. (trans.) (1978b) Julian of Norwich, Showings. Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press.
Crystal, D. (1969) Prosodic Systems and Intonation in English. Cambridge: Cambridge University
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Damasio, A. (1996) Descartes Error. London: Macmillan.
Darwin, C. (1872) The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals. New York: New York
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Appendix I(a)
Collated ME Text
The liiij Chapter
Ande for the grete endless loue that god hath to alle mankynde, he makyth
no depertyng in loue betwen the blessyd soule of Crist and the lest soule that shall
be savyd. For it is full esy to beleue and truste that the dwellyng of the blessyd
soule of Crist is full hygh in e glorious godhede; and truly as I vnderstode in oure
5 lordes menyng, where the blessyd soule of Crist is, there is the substance of alle the
soules that shall be savyd by Crist.
Hyely owe we to enjoye at god dwellyth in oure soule; and more hyly we
owe to enjoye that oure soule dwellyth in god. Oure soule is made to be goddys
dwellyng place, and the dwellyng of oure soule is god, whych is vnmade. A hye
10 vnderstandyng it is inwardly to se and to know that god, whych is oure maker,
dwellyth in oure soule, and a hygher vnderstandyng it is and more, inwardly to se
and to know oure soule that is made dwellyth in god in substance, of whych
substance by god we be that we be.
And I sawe no dyfference betwen god and oure substance, but as it were all
15 god; and yett my vnderstandyng toke that oure substance is in god, that is to sey
that god is god and oure substance is a creature in god. For the almyghty truth of
the trynyte is oure fader, for he made vs and kepyth vs in hym. And the depe
wysdome of e trynyte is our moder, in whom we be closyd. And the hye
goodnesse of the trynyte is our lord, and in hym we be closyd and he in vs. We be
20 closyd in the fader, and we be closyd in the son, and we are closyd in the holy gost.
And the fader is beclosyd in vs, the son is beclosyd in vs, and the holy gost is
beclosyd in vs, all myght, alle wysdom and alle goodnesse, one god, one lorde.
And oure feyth is a vertu that comyth of oure kynde substannce in to oure sensuall
soule by the holy gost, in whych vertu alle oure vertues comyn to vs, for without
25 that no man may receyue vertues, for it is nou^t eles but a ryght vnderstandyng
with trew beleue and suer truste of oure beyng, at we be in god and he in vs,
whych we se nott.
Appendix I(b)
Modernized Text
The Fifty-fourth Chapter
And for the great endless love that God has for all mankind, he makes no
distinction in love between the blessed soul of Christ and the least soul that will be
saved. For it is very easy to believe and trust that the dwelling of the blessed soul
of Christ is very high in the glorious divinity; and truly, as I understand our Lord
5 to mean, where the blessed soul of Christ is, there is the substance of all souls
Appendix II(a)
Collated ME text
The iiij Chapter
And in this sodenly I saw the reed bloud rynnyng downe from vnder the
garlande, hote and freyshely, plentuously and liuely, right as it was in the tyme that
the garland of thornes was pressed on his blessed head. Right so, both god and
man, the same that sufferd for me, I conceived truly and mightly that it was him
5 selfe that shewed it me without anie meane.
And in the same shewing sodeinly the trinitie fulfilled my hart most of ioy,
and so I vnderstode it shall be in heauen without end to all that shall come ther.
For the trinitie is god, god is the trinitie. The trinitie is our maker, the trinitie is our
keper, the trinitie is our everlasting louer, the trinitie is our endlesse ioy and our
10 bleisse, by our lord Jesu Christ, and in our lord Jesu Christ. And this was shewed
in the first syght and in all, for wher Jhesu appireth the blessed trinitie is
Appendix II(b)
Modernized Text
The Fourth Chapter
And at this, suddenly I saw the red blood running down from under the
crown, hot and flowing freely and copiously, a living stream, just as it was at the
time when the crown of thorns was pressed on his blessed head. I perceived, truly
and powerfully, that it was he who just so, both God and man, himself suffered for
5 me, who showed it to me without any intermediary.
And in the same revelation, suddenly the Trinity filled my heart full of the
greatest joy,2 and I understood that it will be so in heaven without end to all who
will come there. For the Trinity is God, and God is the Trinity. The Trinity is our
maker, the Trinity is our protector, the Trinity is our everlasting lover, the Trinity
10 is our endless joy and our bliss, by our Lord Jesus Christ and in our Lord Jesus
Christ. And this was revealed in the first vision and in them all, for where Jesus
appears the blessed Trinity is understood, as I see it. And I said: Blessed be the
Lord! This I said with a reverent intention and in a loud voice, and I was greatly
astonished by this wonder and marvel, that he who is so to be revered and feared
15 would be so familiar with a sinful creature living in this wretched flesh.
Julian of Norwich, A Book of Showings,
translated by E. Colledge and J. Walsh
Address
William Downes, School of Languages and Translation Studies, University of East Anglia, Norwich
NR4 7TJ, UK. [email: w.downes@uea.ac.uk]