Valsiner 1

Culture in Minds and Societies:

Foundations of Cultural Psychology

Jaan Valsiner

Clark University, USA

Worcester New Delhi

May, 2006
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Authors Preface

This book is an adventure into the synthesis of ideas in the field of cultural
psychologybuilding on the know-how of developmental science, anthropology,
sociology, history, semiotics, and philosophy. Its basic focus is deeply
phenomenologicalhuman lived-through experiencerather than behavior-- is
taken as the basis for the science of psychology. Psychology has in its history
constantly struggled to prove its belonging to the pantheon of scienceby way of
adopting superficial understanding of the objectivity of its subject matter (in case
of the widespread notion that it studies behavior), or of its methods. None of
these efforts have succeeded, and in the case of the topic of the present book
cultural psychologywe face the most complex and most fascinating task of
suggesting new leads for the construction of a discipline that is both general in its
basic knowledge through representing human particulars in all their richness.
Psychology can become science through fully accepting the centrality of
human living experience within its social contexts and in all of its uniqueness.
Yetas a Wissenschaftit builds abstract, generalized knowledge. I do not
subscribe to the empiricist claim that is widespread in much of contemporary
social sciences that the latter cannot lead to generalized knowledge because of
the extreme context-dependency of its phenomena and the uniqueness of human
experience. Somewhat paradoxicallyor it may seem so at the first glanceI
claim that it is precisely because of the maximum uniqueness of human
psychological phenomena 1 that the science of human psychology can arrive at
general knowledge. Yet this knowledge is not of the classic Aristotelian
classificatorykind. It entails the focus on basic processes of experiencing that
generate the whole range of human life experiences. The specific forms of
human psychological phenomena vary across time, persons, and contexts but
the ways they are organized are universal.

This is a book within psychologyyet without the orthodox mindset of

contemporary psychology. It is meant for readers who want to find answers to
the basic questionhow is every person who lives in any location in the
contemporary World integrating culture into ones psychological life. How is
culture present in human feeling, thinking, and actingand how do human
beings guide their own subjectivity through various cultural means. with a goal
orientation of outlining the basic foundations for cultural psychology as a basic
social science.

My special gratitude for reading various drafts of the chapters, and giving
me criticisms which did not let me become intellectually lazy through writing
down too many words, go to my colleagues in various universities (Nandita

1
This is axiomatically given by the irreversibility of human life-time.
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Chaudhary at Lady Irwin College, New Delhi; Angela Branco at University of

Brasilia, Brady Wagoner at University of Cambridge, UK.) and to my students in
the Advances in Cultural Psychology seminar in Spring 2006, where we
discussed various drafts of the first seven chapters. The helpful additions to the
materials in the book by Anna Kupik, passionate reading of the text by Jayme
Harrison, constructively ironic challenges by Kirsten Reed, and complementary
suggestions by Alessa Zimmerman made significant contributions to the re-
writing of the initial drafts. Danielle Kenneally, Scott Bernhegger, and Jen Bartko
were always careful readers of the chapters and made very useful suggestions
for extending the existing text when it was becoming too much abbreviated. Dave
Messing was adamant in his insistence on the elaboration of human values that
were visible behind my abstract schemes in the book, and Jonathan Mathews set
his photographers mind up to suggest betterment of both text and figures. Boyd
Timothy productively challenged my sometimes too excessive critiques of the
existing normal science practices of contemporary psychology. Of course it is
only some of the constructive solutions that were offered during the four months
of the weekly seminar that I could use in the final version of the book. But the
ideas will live on and may re-appear in the next work. Selective discussion of
some of the ideas of semiotic mediation in our Kitchen Seminar at Clark,
particularly the intellectual input of Nick Thompson, Roger Bibace, Vinny Havern,
Emily Abbey, Sarah Strout, Rose Sokol, and Genie Giaimo is gratefully
acknowledged. Part of my focusing on the dynamic social structure of humab
living received input from my teaching a seminar on cultural and social
psychology of genocides. The discussions of how most ordinary people may
move between amity and atrocity with Becky Phillips, Tiberiu Galis, Naama
Haviv, Stephanie Fischer and others were helpful for my better understanding of
that part of human psyche we usually prefer not to think ofviolence and politics.

The book began as a plan to re-write my monograph of 2001

Comparative study of human cultural development, published in Madridbut
very quickly moved on to become a new book on its own. Still a few themes
and materialscarried over from that book. Some themes were borrowed from
my other bookone can find a new version of the coverage of family and
marriage here that started from my Culture and human development (London:
Sage, 2000, chapter 6). While preserving the theoretical developmental core of
my thinking in previous books, the present one is unique in its elaboration of the
dynamic social structure within which human beings exist. The focus on child
development that was present in the previous books has here almost but
vanished, and replaced by a generalized interest in human development at any
age level.

A number of colleagues graciously allowed me then to re-print their

photographic materials, as well as provided with valuable feedback. Usha
Menon of Drexel University helped me with the figure of Kali (Figure 5.9.), as well
as with my interpretation of the role of that powerful and ever-transforming deity.
A special gratitude goes to my Editor at Sage, Tejeshwar Singh, who carefully
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charted out the making of this book, and its fit into the wider framework of the
readership in India, as well as elsewhere. I am particularly pleased to publish this
book in India so that my efforts to slowly learn about the intricacies of living in
varied social contexts in the rich and heterogeneous cultural worlds present
within the borders of India. I have so far learned from distanceand I hope the
results of this learning would be a starting point for my direct experiencing of
India in the future.

In my personal development, this book is a milestone in a number of

ways. First, it is the first time that I fully accept the identity of belonging to cultural
psychology. Despite editing the major journal Culture & Psychology in that field
since 1995, I had been reluctant to use the label cultural psychology for many
years, despite many colleagues good advice. In a way, my own relationship to
the imaginary ingroup of cultural psychology is as liminal as is the notion of
the generic person who strives towards the centerwhile keeping oneself on the
periphery. To me the label cultural psychology seemed too vagueor too
fashionablewhich for me are both good reasons to not take it seriously. The
world is filled with nice labels that fight for social recognition at a superficial level,
and I did not want to join the race for the fame with inventors of the world-saving
claims of emotional intelligence, codes in the paintings of well-known artists, or
mystiques of the psyche of a young boy. There is no suspense in this book.
Instead, the reader finds here systematic, sometimes very realistic (and other
times very remote) effort to construct a general theoretical framework of cultural
psychology. After finding a satisfying solution of translating the ill-defined notion
of culture into by far more circumscribed notion of semiotic mediation, I found
that the identity of cultural psychology becomes acceptable for myself. A by-
product of that focus is the synthesis of psychology and semiotics in this book.

Secondly, the book emerged very quickly in the process of becoming well
after a sojourn as a participant observer of the life of hospitals. The resulting
desire for living passionately and moving ahead with ideas is behind the urge to
get this book written. I would feel gratified if the result provides serious reading
for intellectually sophisticated thinkers. The real joy of human living is in the
playof ideas, and practices. Cultural psychology as conceived here is the study
of the extraordinary nature of the most ordinary aspects of human daily living in
any place on the Globe. We are all oneby being individually unique.

Jaan Valsiner
May, 2006 Worcester, Ma.Chapel Hill, N.C
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List of Contents
Chapter 1. Approaches to Culture Semiotic Bases for Cultural
Psychology

Culture within the tradition of cross-cultural psychology

Social anthropology, folk psychology, and cultural psychology
The question of transfer of culture
Semiotic basis for culture: the legacy of Charles S. Peirce
Ambiguity re-presented: combining icon, index, and symbol
The principle of redundant control
Regulating the subjective future: the Promoter Sign
Constraining dynamics across the semiotic regulatory hierarchy
Summary: Culture as semiotic regulation system

Chapter 2. Society and Community: Interdependence of Social

Webs

Societya functional abstraction and a semiotic mediator

Social Structures and their Differentiation
Communication Processes-- Within society and community
Generalized meaning fields: collective making of the society
Summary: Socially guided subjectivity

Chapter 3. Making Oppositions: Dialogical Self and Dualities in

Meaning Making

Boundaries: created in space and irreversible time

Looking at the others: multiple ways
Bi-directionality of cultural understanding: partnership
Duality in the social sciences: Dialogical models
The Dialogical Self (DS) Theory
Meanings emerge through oppositions
Summary: oppositions in the semiotic fields of the self

Chapter 4. Minimal Communities and Their Organization: Kinship groups,

families, and marriage forms

Quasi-stability of social identity environments

The family: Ideologically presented unity of a part of the kin group
Efforts to specify types of family
Family as an organized small group
Psychological functioning of the joint family context
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Marriages as arranged frameworks

Marriage as transformation of relationship forms
The polygynic marriage
The polyandrous marriage
The conjoint (polygynandrous) marriage
The monogamous marriage
Summary: minimal communities in action

Chapter 5. Cultural Wholes on the Move: Maintenance and

Crossing of Boundaries in the Semiotic Universes
Meanings and movements
Cultural psychology of pilgrimage
Crusades: unity of war and pilgrimage
The CONSTRUCTION<>DESTRUCTION dialectics
Crossing borders: within personal cultures, and between
Rhetorical guiding of human development
Ernst Boeschs symbolic action theory
Basic duality: myths and counter-myths
Dialogical processes in myth stories
Conclusions: Textured dramas

Chapter 6. Thinking as a cultural process

Three logical processes in human reasoning
Generalization and indeterminacy.
Unity of reasoning through abduction
Abductive reasoning in practice
Overcoming uncertainties: probability as logic
Cognitive heuristics as cultural mediation complexes
Strategic uses of reasoning
Conclusions: abduction as process of innovation

Chapter 7. Semiotic fields in action: Affective guiding of the

internalization/externalization process
Human development: microgenesis, mesogenesis, and ontogenesis
Affectfeeling fields and emotion categories
Semiotics of the domain of feelings
Cultural-historical promotion of affective field construction
Rituals as promoters of hyper-generalized feeling fields
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Promotion of different levels of affective sign fields in different

societies
Cultural framing of affective development
Dynamics of affective fields: coordination of person al and collective
cultures
Internalization and externalization
Creating as-if structures through internalization/ externalization
Structure of the internalization/ externalization process
Conclusion: Functions of the multi-level affective self-regulation

Chapter. 8. Methodology for Cultural Psychology: Systemic,

Qualitative, and Idiographic
Reliance on impossible axioms
Methodological objectives of cultural psychology
Where democracy fails: in contributions to the literature
Methodology as knowledge construction process
Looking at culturally directed psychological phenomena
Systemic Causality
What is experiment in the realm of cultural psychology?
Modulation of researcher<> phenomena distance
The conditional-genetic analysis
Generality expressed within specificity
Conclusion: systemic methodology within cultural psychology

General Conclusion: Culture in minds and societies

References
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Chapter 1. Approaches to Culture Semiotic Bases for

Cultural Psychology

K: Sir, what does that word culture

mean? To cultivate?
B: It is based on cultivate.
K: That is to grow. So we mean by
culture that which grows, that which is
capable of growth. What benefit is given
by culture?
B: Science, art, music, literature and
technology. Every culture has a certain
technology with which it approaches
reality; certain methods have been
developed to live, to grow things, to
make things.
K: Has thought created culture? Of
course it has.
B: Some culture seems to be necessary
for man to survive.
K: I wonder if it is necessary.
B: Perhaps it isnt, but at least it appears
to be.
(Krishnamurti & Bohm, 1999, p. 85)

Culture has been a difficult term to use in both everyday and scientific
discourses in the history of human societies. As a term, it indeed implies some
constructive modification of the natural course of affairs. This can take the form
of some kind of goal-directed cultivation of features or properties of objects -- be
those plants, domesticated animals, or children-- in the process of their
development. The whole world of human beings is a cultivated world, where our
natural resources of ourselves, and of our environmentare transformed into
meaningful world of objects. Some of those objects become exchangeable as
commoditieswhile others attain the status of personalized and sacred non-
exchangeable belongings. Meanings of objects carry their cultivated valueand
the objects have their own cultural biographies. Thus, cars lose value as they
age, untilabout the age of thirty they start to belong to the category of
antiques and as such rise in value year by year (Kopytoff, 1986, p. 80). The
same applies to furniture or other household objects of durable character 2only
at a different time scale.

2
Such as vases, silverware, rugsbut not plastic cups and plates that are functional precisely in their
planned disposability.
Valsiner 9

Similar value is often put upon human beingsthey become symbols for
regulating other persons social relationships. Together with assuming social
roles in different areas of the World differentlywith age, persons may acquire
more social value as wise persons and may be trusted with complex decisions.
This cultural model preserves the accumulation of experiences of persons
lifetimes. If such focus is not considered of relevance, social actions may
privilege the value of the young and inexperienced over the older persons. In
various social institutions older people may be forced into retirement and their
social value may be limited to the family circles as loving grandparents. At times
the value of human beings is expressed in monetary termsthe sizes of
payments made to persons in the social roles of slaves, business leaders,
professional athletes, lawyers, doctors or academics as communicated in public
are examples of creating collective value for the cultivation of social role images.
In shortcultivation has its varied time lines, and areas of focus. All
human socially differentiated roles are cultivated. What are the ways in which
such cultivation takes place in human relations? Note that the noun-- culture --
does not carry the functions that its verb-kind extensions-- "to cultivate" or "to
culture"-- might carry. The crucial tension in psychologists' discourse about
culture is that between treating it as an existing entity (e.g., "culture IS X"), and a
process of becoming (e.g., "culturing leads to X"). All through this book we will
emphasize the dynamic, processual nature of the functioning of culture within
human psychological systemsboth intra-personal (feeling, thinking, acting) and
interpersonal (conduct in relation with other human beings).

Values in culture. Culture has been in lay usea value-laden term. The
contrast between cultured and primitive tribes has been flourishing in
European discourse until it has become censored out by our contemporary social
norms. Furthermore, the contrasts between high culture and low culture have
been used in social stratification within a social unit. In line with the appeal of the
high culture we often tend to emphasize our personal ties with people we label
cultured, in discrimination of the others towards whom we may show some
implicitly derogatory attitude behind the mask of social equality.
The notion of culture has had a long history in the social thought (see
Jahoda, 1993 for a comprehensive overview). In the present state of affairs, the
notion of culture is used in psychology in two meanings. First, it has been used to
designate some group of people who belong together by value of some shared
features. Thus, all the Norwegians belong together as they are assumed to
share the common language 3 and happen to also be citizens of the same
country. The Welsh belong together as they share the common heritage of
language, music, and the area of the British Isles where they have lived. The
Basques or Kurds belong together by way of their shared language and
customs, but not by the countries (Spain or France; and Iraq, Turkey, Syria and
Iran, respectively) in which they live. India poses a major puzzle for delineating
the Indian culturegiven the 1612 different languages spoken within the

3
This of course, is outsiders belief about the Norwegians who actually share the co-presence of
multiple Norwegian languages
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borders of the State of India (Chaudhary, 2004), and 675 various small kingdoms
into which the present-day country was divided in its pre-colonial history 4, and
not to even mention the caste segregationwhat could qualify as the Indian
culture remains a prevailing mystery. Of course in our everyday talk the use of
such general labels X-ian culture provides some cognitive economy to the
speakersyet the analytic usefulness of such labels is legitimately questioned.

Person and culture: three forms of relations. In the examples above,

individual persons belong to a culture. This form of making sense of person and
culture-- PERSON BELONGS TO CULTURE-- simultaneously denotes the
commonality of such belonging (the descriptive, or classificatory role of the use of
the term), and someusually unspecifiedcausal system that guarantees the
relative similarity of all the persons who belong to the given culture. This
meaning prevails in cross-cultural psychology.
Secondly, culture has been treated as an inherent, systemic organizer of
the psychological systems of individual persons-- CULTURE BELONGS TO THE
PERSON. Cultural means are brought into the personal subjective worlds where
they transform subjectivities in uniqueyet culturally guidedways. In this
sense, culture belongs to each individual person (Boesch, 1991, 2000, 2002a,
2002b; 2005see chapter 5). It is irrelevant to which ethnic group, or country,
the persons belong to, since culture is functioning within the intra-psychological
systems of each person. The cultural meansnuances of language meanings,
social norms, religious beliefs, etc that were developed in the country of origin
do not stop to function in the deep subjective worlds of a guest worker or an
immigrant to another country.
Thirdly, CULTURE BELONGS TO THE RELATING OF THE PERSON
AND THE ENVIRONMENT. Here culture becomes exemplified through different
processes by which persons relate with their worlds. If the person and
environment are considered as inclusively separated, culture is considered as a
process of internalization and externalization or mutual constituting between
person and the social world (Shweder, 1990). If the researcher decides to
introduce a boundary between person and the social world (e.g., Rogoff, 1990;
2003; Wertsch, 1998), the process of culture becomes elaborated in terms of
appropriation, guided participation, or mastery. Culture here "is" these posited
processes, rather than an entity.
Study of culture as it is manifested in psychology exists along two different
trajectoriesthose of cross-cultural psychology, andmore recentlyof cultural
psychology. Despite the fact that both of these sub-disciplines use the term
culture, and study human beings, their ways of creating knowledge are quite
different.

4
not to speak about the heterogeneity of religious systems that have different histories in the North and
South of IndiaKurien, 2002
Valsiner 11

Culture within the tradition of cross-cultural psychology

Cross-cultural psychology is a branch of traditional psychology of group

comparisons. The groups thus compared are different ethnic, geographic, or
administratively united groups--labeled cultures. Cross-cultural psychology
mostly uses the first model outlined above (PERSONS BELONG TO CULTURE).
As such, cultures in cross-cultural psychology have implied properties:

1. Qualitative homogeneity. It is assumed that each and every member of

the culture (that is, person who belongs to that culture) shares with
each and every other member the same set of cultural features. There
can be inter-individual differences in the quantitative side of such
sharing (some persons share more of the given feature than others), yet
all of them share the same features.

2. Temporal stability. It is assumed that the set of cultural features (shared

by the persons who are members of the culture) is the same over
timeeven as the membership of persons in a culture changes from
generation to generation. Even if historical changes take place in a
given society, culture is expected to be characterized by its stability.
Thus, the guillotines of the French Revolution, or the political homicides
of Stalinist Russia, Pol Pot's Cambodia, etc. are not assumed to
dramatically modify the cultures involved.

Both of these assumptions fit with those made in non-developmental

axioms about groups of persons (united by some characteristics, e.g., male
versus female). Inter-individual differences are viewed as quantitative-- a matter
of degree rather than another quality, The characteristics by which the groups
are contrasted with one another are seen as ontological givens --rather than
open to development. Thus, homogeneous culture groups are compared with
one another in cross-cultural psychology. For example, the American culture
might be represented by a sample of college undergraduates, and be compared
with the Italian culture represented by a sample of university students from
Palermo.
In Figure 1.1., the basic structure of generalization of knowledge about
culture in psychological issues. Let us begin from an admittedly simplified
hierarchical structure of societies, which entails individual persons, social
institutions, societies themselves, and an over-generalized notion of humankind
at the ultimate top of the hierarchy. This picture is simplified as it overlooks a
number of existing intermediate levels within the hierarchythose of transient
social groups (between individuals and institutions), government bureaucracies
(which, as institutions themselves, introduce sub-hierarchy into the institutions <>
society connection of levels). Nevertheless, the simplified picture illustrates the
complexity of the social hierarchy and the ways in which cross-cultural
psychology constructs its knowledge.
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Figure 1.1. The use of the notion of culture in cross-cultural psychology

The hierarchy in Figure 1.1. entails multiple connections. The same

individual person can be participant in more than one social institution (e.g.,
individuals X, Y, V), some can even simultaneously belong to institutions of
different societies (Z). The specific ties with specific institutions may change over
the persons life course. A politician in the government (institution S) of society A
may be simultaneously a member of the central intelligence agency (institution T)
of country B. Children who have at times lived in one country and experienced
its formal schooling institution, may migrate to another society and encounter a
very different schooling environment. As a result, the children may develop self
systems adapted for both societies differently.

Cross-cultural psychology utilizes the traditional strategy of group

comparisons in establishing knowledge about culture. The particular societies (A,
B., in Figure 1.1.) become re-labeled as culture A and culture B. Individual
persons on the bottom of the social hierarchy become members of the culture (A
or B). After such semantic change, it becomes meaningful in cross-cultural
psychology to establish knowledge about culture A and culture B by comparing
the two on the basis of psychological data derived from their members.
Since the set of members in A (as in B) is considered qualitatively
homogeneous, it is possible for cross-cultural psychology to think in terms of
Valsiner 13

random sampling from the pool of culture members in an effort to let the sample
data represent the abstraction called population.

What is the population? Population is the abstract full representation of all

members of the given culture, and it is hoped that data that characterize the
population (as taken from the sample) can characterize the culture (population
= culture A). Hence it makes sense in cross-cultural psychology to make
comparisons between populations (=cultures) A and B, of the general kind:

A --- is (or is not) different from-- B

Such kind of knowledge is the end result of inductive generalizations made

in cross-cultural psychology. It can empirically map out psychological
differencesdependent upon the methods usedbetween different groups of
persons, labeled culture members, and considered to be a homogeneous set.
The empirical reality is that of comparisons between sample, generalization from
it moves instantly to abstracted claims about differences of cultures (see Figure
1.1.)
It is possible to see from Figure 1.1. that the cross-cultural knowledge
construction strategy overlooks the hierarchical organization of human social life.
The organizing role of different levels (and combinations) of social institutions is
not taken into account in this construction of data about cultures as represented
by populations of assumedly homogeneous kinds. Explanation of the empirically
discovered differences in cross-cultural psychology are not explainable within the
theoretical system of cross-cultural psychology, except in tautological terms (e.g.,
Culture A causes the sample from A to be different from sample from B, which
is caused by culture B). In cross-cultural psychology, a similar move of turning a
descriptive label into explanatory essence can be observed. For example, the
italian-ness of Italian subjects can be recruited to explain their behavior, in
contrast to the american-ness of the American subjects. The construction of
explanations like this is circular-- Italians are found to be Italian because they are
from Italy; and Americans to be American because they are from America (or
from the United States). To talk of Indian-ness given the enormous social,
economic, and linguistic heterogeneity in India as a causal entity that generates
all of the richness of some peopleas well as poverty of many otherswould be
absurd. It would amount to constructing a bogus explanatory label of the kind
similar to that of phlogiston in pre-scientific physics.
It is obvious that cross-cultural psychologys use of the term culture is
limited to being an overgeneralizing label. If some evidence allows to treat
particular phenomena (as found within a sample) as if these represent a larger
collective unit (labeled culture a given ethnic or language group, or a political-
administrative unit-- a country), then the evidence obtained becomes generalized
to all "members of the culture." This is possible only under the assumption of
qualitative homogeneity (as described above). Not only is such assumption
unwarranted, but it also leads to making comparisons that obscure, rather than
reveal, the underlying phenomena.
Valsiner 14

The universal nature of the limit for inference in cross-cultural psychology.

The limits of the empirical generation in cross-cultural psychology are the same
for all group-comparisons based investigations in psychology. All of
psychologynot only the cross-cultural sidestruggles with the problem of
making sense of group comparisons. The usual solution to explaining group
differences is the turning of the descriptive features of the group into causal
essences. For example, a comparison of males and females (samples of
persons, described as males and females) leads to interpretation of the
differences as if those are caused by gendermaleness is seen to cause the
difference of the males from the females, whose difference is caused by
femaleness. Notice the shift from detected (descriptive) group differences to
absolute causal statements about posited "essences" that are projected into
each male and female person as if those were basic parts of their psychological
systems. Undoubtedly the biological nature of maleness -- XY chromosomes--
and femaleness-- XX chromosomes) is systemic in the biological constitution of
the body. Yet that difference is not a part of the psychological system in itself. It
can become translated into gender differences at the psychological level by way
of numerous organizing conditions that guarantee inter-individual variability.
Cross-cultural psychology has followed the lead of the rest of psychology
to make use of variabilityin this case that of between ethnologically described
societiesto arrive at universal generalizations through correlational
approaches (e.g., by use of Human Relations Area FilesEmber & Ember,
2000; Murdock, 1981). The fallacy of using relative comparisons between
societies for making absolute statements about societies of particular kind has
become the methodological norm in such applications. Such cross-sectional
take on variability between described social units (societies, ethnic or language
groups as cultures) is vulnerable to violation of the assumption of independence
of the sampled units (cultures), some of which share joint histories.

Social anthropology, folk psychology, and cultural psychology

The traditions of social anthropology in thinking about culture have partially

supported this extra-personal look at culture. Thus, according to Bronislaw
Malinowski,

Culture is an integral composed of partly autonomous, partly

coordinated institutions. It is integrated on a series of principles
such as the community of blood through procreation; the contiguity
in space related to cooperation; the specialization in activities; and
last but not least, the use of power in political organization. Each
culture owes its completeness and self-sufficiency to the fact that it
satisfies the whole range of basic, instrumental and integrative
needs. (Malinowski, 1944, p. 40)
Valsiner 15

Here culture operates as the set of external organizing principles (and

institutions) for human beings in their social contexts. What was missed in cross-
cultural psychologythe structure of social organizational forms that make up
society was clearly highlighted in social anthropology. On the intra-personal
side, the reference to need satisfaction indicates that culture remains a tool for
such satisfaction, rather than becoming part of those basic, instrumental, and
integrative needs itself.
However, for psychology, Malinowskis look at culture through social
institutions is insufficient. The personal side of living experiences within culture
being both in culture and having culture in ones own feelings and thoughts-
was left out by social anthropologists. Our contemporary sub-are of psychology
that is labeled cultural psychology overcomes that limitation.
In contrast with cross-cultural psychology, different versions of cultural
psychology operate with notions of culture of inherently systemic kind. There is
continuity in cultural psychology with the systemic traditions of folk psychology of
different kinds (Wilhelm von Humboldts and Wilhelm Wundts traditions) as well
as those of European ethnology and social and cultural anthropology. In the
1990s, the scene of psychology experiences a re-birth in the notion of culture.
This re-birth of old traditions of Vlkerpsychologie in the form of different versions
of cultural psychology constitutes another attempt to make sense of complex
psychological phenomena. All these efforts are united by treating culture as a
part of the persons psychological system. Here culture belongs to the individual
psychological system and plays some functional role in it. The person of course
belongs to one or another country, language or ethnic group, or religious belief
system. That social participation undoubtedly provides material for the
psychological system within which culture is located. Thus, the language the
person uses to interact within his or her society is a semiotic tool within the
persons intra-psychological system. It guides the ways the person thinks, feels,
and formulates utterances.
As a result, the ways of knowledge construction in cultural psychology
differ cardinally from those of cross-cultural psychology (see Figure 1.2.). Cultural
psychology begins from sampling of an individual person together with his or her
participation in social institutions (e.g., V in Figure 1.2). Based on the systemic
analysis of the individual-in-social-context, a generalized model of the cultural
functioning of the person is constructed. That systemic model is further tested
empirically on the basis of another selected individual (e.g., z who belongs to two
societies), which leads to the modification of the systemic model. The modified
model is further tested on a selected individual case, and so on. Together with
such hermeneutic construction of knowledge about person as culturally
functioning system, the generalized model becomes ideally applicable to human
beings in their generic state. Such generalizations thus apply to all humankind,
as these are seen to generate the inter-individual differences between persons.
Cultural psychology is part of the psychological science that is oriented towards
discovery of basic fundamental principles. Thus, cultural psychology is part of
general psychology as a basic science, while cross-cultural psychology belongs
to differential psychology.
Valsiner 16

Figure 1.2. The use of the notion of culture in cultural psychology

Different specific versions of cultural psychology

There are two basic directions within cultural psychology. One can
distinguish the semiotic (sign-mediated) and activity orientations in using culture.

Culture as semiotic mediation. Culture can refer to semiotic (sign) mediation

that is part of the system of organized psychological functions. These functions
can be intra-personal (i.e., the functioning of a persons intra-psychological
processes while being involved in experiencing the world: feeling, thinking,
memorizing, forgetting, planning, etc.). Thus, a person -- observing a painting--
who says to oneself (in the mind) "I like this" is involved in an act of intra-
psychological semiotic regulation of one's feelings. Complexity of such intra-
psychological semiotic mediation devices can include created hierarchies. A
person can create -- in one's intra-psychological system-- an "alter ego"-- with
Valsiner 17

whom one can enter into lengthy internal dialogues. Such dialogues involve the
use of signs, including in ways that entails hierarchical relations between those.
Semiotic mediation can also take place in the inter-personal realm:
different persons are involved in chatting, fighting, persuading each other,
avoiding (one another, or some domains of experiencing). This kind of discursive
practice can entail much more than mere interaction or "exchange of
information". It can include strategic interactions, setting up the "semiotic traps"
for the interlocutors, and ideological declarations.
A semiotic trap is a form of symbolic capture of the other persons self in
the web of shame, inferiority, or other form of showing the trappers superior
relation to the trapped. It takes the form of a three-stage sequence in
communication: TRUST ME, do X HOW COULD YOU HAVE??? DONE X
MAINTENANCE OF THE TRAPPED in the set-up state as long as the trapper
decides. Consider an example of deterioration of friendly relation of a young
woman:

I have a friend who got a nose job [plastic surgery on the nose] 3
days before my return to college. She has a son who I regularly
baby-sit for when I am home. She asked that I stay over the night
before her surgery and take her son to school in the morning as
well as stopping by after her surgery if I had time. I stopped back 2
times the next day, before I went to work for 5 hours and then after
I left work. Though I was there to keep her company, she did not
want me to ask her questions, talk, move.
It was uncomfortable to sit in silence and be yelled at when
speaking. Never had I before experienced a plastic surgery or
helped someone who had. I tried to talk about what anesthesia felt
like, since I had some bad times with that, like when I had my
wisdom teeth out, so that I could try to relate. I had many things to
do the following day and then I returned to school the day after that.
Since she had been in such a bad mood, I figured I would see if
she wanted me to stop by on Saturday after running some errands.
Because talking had been hard for her, I sent her an instant
message instead, her reaction was much unexpected to me.
She was furious that I was out doing errands, I would assume-
- instead of taking care of her. Also she was furious that I didnt
offer to baby-sit on Friday, using my 2 hours of free time that day
between jobs. I was deemed a bad friend, selfish, ungrateful for all
that she had done for me, because of all of her allegations. How
could you compare getting a nose job to getting your wisdom teeth
being taken out, thats like saying I broke a nail, she said to me.
As I said before this reaction was very unexpected, and was quite
hurtful. Since that time, she had had instant messaged me the day
after I got to school, with similar allegations and expressing her
extreme distaste for me. We have not spoken again. (A. Kupik,
personal communication, February, 25, 2006, added emphases)
Valsiner 18

The intentions of the sympathetic helper were crushed by the pouring out
of the how could you!!! dramatization of making a simple comparison of two
non-lethal medical procedures. Since the decision of what kind of material to use
for trapping is in the hands (mind) of the trapper, the victim of the trapping has
limited possibilities to predict the first (or next) episode of such events.
Communication always depends on the meta-communicational strategies that set
up the ways in which signs are used for particular purposes (see also Chapter
4Example 4.4.)
Semiotic mediation is also a tool in the goals-oriented actions by social
institutions, which try to regulate both the inter-personal and intra-personal
psychological functions. Such institutions set up the social rules for interaction,
monitor their maintenance, and expect that situated activity and interaction to
lead to intra-psychological transformation of the personal cultural systems. The
use of uniforms, activities like marching, chanting, and group dancing set up such
semiotic mediation system. Social institutions are active semiotic trappers of
human beings for their particular purposes.

Culture and cognition. One of the forms of sign mediation is the use of folk
models (in anthropological terminology) or social representations (in terms of
social psychology). Both of these directions in understanding culture take into
account the two opposite credos in the psychology of the 20th century
psychoanalysis and behaviorism (Jahoda, 2002). The notion of folk models is in
some ways a synthesis of selected ideas from boththey are declared to be
learned through experience (i.e., fitting the behaviorist belief system), while they
operate as sign complexes to guide the intra-psychological processes of
distorted satisfactions (i.e., a tribute to psychoanalysis).
In contemporary cognitive anthropology the notion of folk modelssocial
representations carried by persons but set up through social constructionhas
gained ground. The notion of folk models is a fitting compromise for anthropology
and cognitive science. From the standpoint of cognitive anthropology, there exist
three major kinds of views on "culture" in anthropology (elaborated after
D'Andrade, 1984, pp. 115-116):

1) Culture is seen as existing knowledge: it is the accumulation of

information (irrespective of the extent to which that information is shared
between people who belong to the group which has access to the
information). Here the focus is on the socially shared knowhow and
cognitive operations by which such knowhow can be handled.
2) Culture is seen as consisting of existing core conceptual structures that
provide basis for intersubjectively shared representation of the world in
which the persons live. This perspective does not emphasize the
moment of accumulation (of information), but is rather a set of rules that
makes it possible for persons to arrive at shared understandings. The
Valsiner 19

notion of collective and social representations (see chapter 7) belongs

here.
3) culture is construction of conceptual structures by activities of persons.
This perspective entails a look at how cognitive mechanisms come into
being-- in ontogeny and in cultural history.

Culture and action. A parallel approach to the focus on culture as semiotic

mediation exists in current cultural psychology in the realm of activity-theoretic
perspectives. These perspectives grow on the basis of Alexey N. Leontievs (and
Pierre Janets) foci on human activity and its structural-dynamic organization, and
borrow from the pragmatist philosophy of John Dewey. The focus on the unified
whole of human cultural existence can be summarized in general terms:

Humans develop through their changing participation in the socio-

cultural activities of their communities, which also change. (Rogoff,
2003, p. 11)

This general perspective needs to be qualified by five elaborations:

1. Culture is not just what people dobut also what people observe in the
various activities of other human beings who assume different social roles.
2. Understanding cultural heritagesones own, or othersrequires the
drawing of contrasts between communities so as to overcome the blinders
of existing tacit assumptions
3. Cultural practices are mutually interdependent. They form a dynamic
Gestaltit is not possible to explain differences between communities by
single (or few) causal attributions.
4. Cultural communities changeas do individuals. Individuals change the
communities and through thatthemselves.
5. Learning from other communities does not mean the loss of the values of
ones own, but rather is a way to transform ones own.

Acting and reflecting: culture as a psychological distancing device.

It is precisely the capacity and propensity to make and use semiotic

devices that allows human beings to become distanced in relation to their
immediate life contexts. The person becomes simultaneously an actor who is
immersed in the given "situated activity context", and a reflexive agent who is
distanced from the very setting in which one is immersed. This duality is relevant
for transcending the adaptational demands of the here-and-now context, and
guide the development towards increasing autonomy. Yet any autonomy is a
result of the immediate dependence upon the here-and-now context (as the
open-systemic nature of any developing system-- be it biological, psychological,
or social-- entails).
Valsiner 20

Psychological distancing always includes the context within which the

person is, and in relation to which the distancing takes place. The person does
not go away from the contextthat would be as impossible as staying alive
under cessation of our supply of oxygen. The person creates a distanceby way
of semiotic mediationin relation to the here-and-now context. It takes the form
of I reflect upon this context in which I am a part. This reflection-- which is
cognitive and affective at the same time-- allows the psychological system to
consider contexts of the past, imagine contexts of the future, and take
perspectives of other persons (in the form of empathy). Without distancing, no
considerations by a person of contexts other than the given here-and-now would
be possible.

Culture as dynamic substance for human living. As a part of every persons

psychological organization, culture is the primary tool for human living. Human
personality is an integrated system of semiotic mediators at various levels
(Valsiner, 1998). Human beings have created numerous cultural tools for
construction (building technologies and materials, food for healthy and fertile
living, medicines to prevent or cure illnesses), destruction (military technologies
from spears to tanks and nuclear bombsand symbolic means for justification of
their use), coping with uncertainties (myths and ideologies), and realms of
aesthetic needs and their satisfaction (art, music, theatreinstruments,
performers, and meaning systems for beauty and artistic discourse).
In summary, it can be seen that the use of culture in psychology has
proceeded in two different ways. One of thosethe external/formal use of
culture as a descriptive termhas been utilized in cross-cultural psychology.
Culture is an extrinsic organizeror causal attribution meansfor the myriad of
action, feeling, and thinking patterns that persons in various countries (societies,
cultures) demonstrate. The othertreating culture as an inherent part of human
psychological functionshas been used in cultural psychology. In this book, our
coverage is that of the secondintrinsiclook at culture within psychological
processes.

The question of transfer of culture

How is it possible to transfer ones created cultural system from one

person to another? As was shown above, culture can be viewed as a process
(rather than an entity). How is it possible to transfer the constructed cultural
mediating devices from the parents to their offspring? Such inter-generational
transfer is extremely important for continuity of society. Yet simultaneously it has
to guarantee constant adaptation of the persons (through their culture) to novel
circumstances of life.

The unidirectional culture transfer model. The unidirectional notion considers

the developing person-- the recipient of the cultural transmission or socialization
endeavours-- passive in his acceptance (or failure of it-- a "miss" or an "error" of
the transmission) of the cultural messages. The recipient's role is merely either
Valsiner 21

to accept the messages aimed at him, or perhaps fail to do so-- but in any case
the recipients are not assumed to re-organize the received message.
The messages are de facto viewed as fixed entities. They are either
accepted by the receiver as givens, or (in case of their incomplete acceptance)
with an "error of transmission". The most widespread concrete application of
such uni-directional model is in technical systems. The role of the recipient of
these messages is that of the mere acceptor of all the "influences", rather than
that of a constructive (albeit limited) modifier of those.
The unidirectional model is deeply rooted in our common sense fits with
the nature of technological systems, where the information to be transmitted is
fixed, closed to development, and where the exact copy-like nature of
transmission of the given message is a desired goal.
We depend increasingly upon modern slavestechnological devices. We
expect those devices to transfer messages without errors. Nobody is happy
about modifications in computer files or poor quality xerox copies. In both cases,
the desired transmission quality is 100% replication of the original, and anything
less than that may be a serious fault or error. Both of course we are not
expecting xerox copies to develop, in relation to the original, any new properties!
A similar case is with the uni-directional model of culture transfer. Each
next generation is expected to take over the cultural knowhow of their parent
generation as it is given. This is depicted in Figure 1.3.

Figure 1.3. The unidirectional culture transfer scheme

PERSO PERSO
N X X' N

As is depicted in Figure 1.3., the initiator of cultural transfer (person A)

sets up some communicative goals (by estimation of the recipients current
psychological state), and sets forth a message (X) for the recipient to take over.
In accordance with this model, the message X is taken over intact (X=X) by the
recipient (person B). While person A creates a message on the basis of ones
internal knowledge structure (X) and on the basis of communicative goals, the
recipient (B) is assumed to accept the communicated message exactly as it is
given to him or her.
The unidirectional model of transmission is widespread -- it permeates our
common language meanings. It is preferred by social institutions which try to
Valsiner 22

regulate the lives of individual persons. Thus, it has its counterpart in the
language of psychology and education. Thus, it is often considered that children's
psychological functions are "shaped" or "molded" by their parents, teachers, or
peers. Knowledge is viewed as something given-- which is to be "learned" (as
opposed to re-created). Discourse in traditional education, anthropology, and
child psychology has habitually accepted the implications of the unidirectional
transfer view. This has been possible by the lack of understanding of basic
processes of development.

The bi-directional transfer model: active co-construction. Development of

any kind and level (biological, psychological, sociological) is an open-systemic
phenomenon in which novelty is constantly in the process of being created.
Hence the unidirectional transfer model cannot fit any of the open-systemic
processes. It is the second model-- the bi-directional transfer model-- which can
fit the nature of open systems (see Figure 1.4.).

Figure 1.4. The bi-directional (mutually constructive) culture transfer

scheme

PERSO PERSO
X X
N N

Figure 1.4. is similar to Figure 1.3., with the important modification that the
role of the recipient (B) is depicted as active analyzer of the suggested message
(X) into its components, together with a synthesis of a new internalized form of
the message (X). In that process, some parts of the initial message are
eliminated, others modified, and still others added.
The bi-directional model is based on the premise that all participants in the
cultural transfer of knowledge are actively transforming the cultural messages. In
fact, it might be more adequately called multi-directional transfer model-- since
the active role of all participants leads to multiple courses of reconstruction of
messages.
The "older" generation-- parents, teachers, older peers, mass media, etc--
actively assemble messages of a certain unique form, which are meant to
Valsiner 23

canalize the development of the younger persons. Yet these younger persons--
equally actively-- analyze the messages, and re-assemble the incoming cultural
information" in a personally novel forms. Thus, their analysis/synthesis of these
messages is the process of exchange relations with their cultural environments
that developmental sciences would study. Novelty is expected to result from the
syntheses some of the time-- in forms that are personally unique (even if they
resemble socially known phenomena. For example, a child's first synthesis of a
word meaning is new for that child, while the word may be well defined in the
given language), as well as in forms that are unique in general (e.g., new
inventions in technology, arts, or sciences).
This view of cultural transmission entails construction of novelty both
during encoding and decoding of the cultural messages. In some sense, the
"message" as such never exists in any "given" form, as it is reconstructed by the
encoder (who may start with a certain goal in mind, but shift it while creating the
message), and by the decoder in a similar manner. As the roles of the encoder
and decoder are constantly being changed into each other, cultural transmission
involves transformation of culture in real time, by participants in the social
discourse. This is well known in language theory (Bhler, 1990) as well as in the
philosophical look at intersubjectivity (Rommetveit, 1992). Messages transferred
through communication channels are necessarily ambiguous because the goal
orientations of the communicators and recipients do not usually coincide. Meta-
communicative processes (Branco and Valsiner, 2005) are set up to regulate
such ambiguitybut it cannot be eliminated.

Social norms as cultural tools

How does temporary stability of cultural forms emerge from the bi-
directional culture transfer process. As emphasized above, the bi-directional
process is that of constant decomposing and recomposing of communicative
messages. Yet, in some way, some relatively stable meaningsand their
carrying formsemerge from that process.
A reasonable answer to that question was provided by Muzafer Sherif in
the 1930s. Sherifs classic work The psychology of social norms (Sherif, 1936),
and his ingenious experimental study of the autokinetic movement (Sherif, 1937)
are known in social psychology. However, the developmental and cultural basis
that led Sherif to his clever experimental demonstrations is often overlooked.
Muzafer Sherif was a Turkish psychologist who moved back-and-forth
between academic positions in Turkey and the U.S. As such, he had an insiders
view of both worlds, and could see very clearly the greatest intellectual difficulty
that faces psychology at large. In his own words,

When, in his studies, a psychologist or sociologist imposes the

norms of his own community-centrism upon the community-
centrism of other peoples, the outcome is an impossible confusion.
(Sherif, 1936, p. 16)
Valsiner 24

This verdict fits cultural and cross-cultural psychologies in the 1990s as

well as it fitted psychology in the 1930s. Sherif saw the necessity for a scientist to
raise above both ones own culturally constructed values and beliefs, as well as
those of the persons under study.

Social norms as cultural constructions. Sherifs look at the emergence and

transformation of social norms was explicitly developmental:

Social norms are not absolutes. They develop in the course of

actual relationships between individuals. They presuppose for their
formation the contact of individuals striving toward the satisfaction
of their needs and the realization of what they consider I or We,
the latter indicating the group with which I identifies itself.
Therefore the norms may change, and do change eventually with
the important changes in the structure of the situation that gave
rise to those norms in the beginning (Sherif, 1936, p, 17)

For Sherif it was important to take into account the whole cultural history
of different societies. The cultural history is often closely intertwined by the
history of major social institutionsespecially those which have guided
individuals over many generations towards their internalized reconstruction of the
value systems, exemplified in specific activity practices (or their avoidances).
History of cultural belief systems entails constructive replicationat times
involving attenuation, at timesamplificationof the specific meaning
action complexes by persons in each new generation. A particular historically
maintained beliefreligious or politicalcan be reconstructed by the young in a
given society in an escalated (exaggerated) wayas a means to negotiate their
roles within the changing society. This negotiation process has a parallel at the
level of social organizations. Within a larger social organization (state) new
religious cults emerge, may proliferate and disappear. Christianity was in the 3rd-
4th Centuries of our era persecuted and stigmatized as a cult. Its survival and
proliferation into a worldwide religious system is a historical productwhich by
now creates the axis of opposition in the World with another former small cult
Islam.
Sherifs example also holds a key to the emergence of interpersonal and
inter-group segregation. The person who finds pig-eating disgusting (as a result
of ones personal internalization of values) reconstructs also the other (pig-eater)
as such. Generalization here takes place from the act (of eating) to the person
(the eater), and then to the assumed class of similar persons.

Experimental demonstration of social norm construction. The autokinetic

movement occurs if in a completely dark room a single point of light, fixed at
some distance from the viewers, is perceptually seen as moving, since it lacks
any background framework relative to which its location can be fixed subjectively.
If a person is asked to report the extent of the evaluating the movement differ.
Yet if they are requested to report their estimates movement, he (or she)
Valsiner 25

establishes subjectively a range and a point (in the dark), relative to which the
stationary point is subjectively seen as moving (due to the viewer's own eye
movements).
When different persons view the same light point, their personally
constructed norms for in publicly accessible ways, or discuss them in group, their
subjective norm system becomes collectively coordinated. A group norm for how
to see the stationary point "moving" becomes established. Sherif's experiments
with autokinetic movement demonstrated clearly how human beings create
mental evaluation norms (for illusory perceptual experiences-- such as the
perceived movement of a non-moving light point), how they homogenize these
norms inter-personally to create group norms. Furthermore, once such group
norms are established, the members of the group can turn those into their
internal standards of evaluation. Group consensus can create social illusions
(based on perceptual ones) which become to regulate the person's own
psychological system, as well as his or her expectations for others.

Social norms co-constructed within a group. The social construction of group

norms, and the resiliency of these norms, is constantly evidenced by various
kinds of religious sects that establish their own standards for how to live
themselves, and how to evaluate others' living their lives.
A classic description of such cult is given by Festinger, Riecken and
Schachter (1956). A group of people becomes united around the calling by the
cult leader to be "prepared for the end of the World". The expected event-- the
collapse of the whole World-- was fortified by the "miracle of God's revelation" to
the group leader. It constituted the "symbolic version" of the stationary light
(viewed as moving) in Sherif's autokinetic experiment. An event expected in the
future-- but prepared for today-- is indeterminate-- and therefore open for the
construction of group norms by people oriented towards that outcome. The goal-
oriented group establishes its internal norms, ingroup/outgroup distinction ("we
the special people versus "the others"). The only difficulty may arise if the known
doomsday passes without the event. Under conditions of rationality, this should
falsify the system of group norms and beliefs. Yet, under the circumstances of
sect-like groups, the disconfirmation can fortify the norms. Thus any social norm
(or belief) can develop in three possible ways when being challenged (see Figure
1.5.)
Valsiner 26

Figure 1.5. Transformation of social norms

The crucial issue for cultural psychology is how to understand the

mechanisms operating in that bifurcation point (Directionality Node). Under what
conditions would the norm be fortified, and under what other conditions may it
become extinct? The reality of such bifurcation is made possible by the bi-
directional notion of culture transfer (but not by the uni-directional transfer
notion).

The centrality of the person in cultural construction. The person's

constructed intention to maintain the present social norm may distinguish
between the two trajectories following disconfirmation. Thus, the two conditions
can be analyzed in the following way:

Disconfirmation Extinction: Disconfirmation Fortification:

X is the current norm X is the current norm

Evidence disconfirms X Evidence disconfirms X
"I don't care about X" "I want to believe in X
X becomes extinguished X becomes defended & fortified

The return to the discredited notion 5 of personal will is an inevitable link

between person and the social world. However, we will give that notion a

5
In psychology, since the beginning of 20th century, the notion of personal willintention, determination,
etchas been rarely considered as a central psychological notion. It allows the person the freedom to break
out of the structural confines set up by social norms, behavioral rules, etc.in total, it forces psychology to
Valsiner 27

different meaning. Personal will can be viewed as means that provides generic
orientation of the self towards the future, selectively highlighting some aspects of
the present. When viewed from this angle, culture (as the system of semiotic
operators) guarantees that any person would be ready to resist and counter-act
social suggestions (and disconfirmation of beliefs) by the environment. Culture
makes persons free from the demands of the immediate social environments.

Semiotic basis for culture: the legacy of Charles S. Peirce

Semiotics is the science of signs and their uses. It was built on the
philosophical and mathematical integration of ideas of Charles Sanders Peirce
(born on September, 10, 1839-- died on April, 19, 1914) who was one of the
institutionally non-tolerated leading scholars in late 19th century U.S. His work
has become prominent in cultural psychology of our time (Rosa, 2006).
A sign, according to Peirce, is an object which stands for another to some
mind (Peirce, 1873/1986, added emphasis). Signs are made by mindsand
minds operate through signs. Hence signs are cultivated tools for our
relationships with ourselvesthrough linking with the objects in the external
environment.
Peirce further specified the sign<>interpretant<>ground triadic relation:

is something which stands for somebody for something in some

respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates in the
mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more
developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the interpretant of
the first sign. The sign stands for something, its object. It stands for
that object, not in all respects but in reference to a sort of idea,
which I have sometimes called the ground. (Boucher, 1955, p. 99)

Three kinds of signs

A sign is either an icon, an index, or a symbol. The latter for Peirce was
an object that conventionally is set to present something else (e.g., X presents
some phenomenon of reality as its abstract symbol). However the notion of
symbol can have an additional meaning of vague openness of the meaning for
various intuitive interpretations where the interpretational possibilities of the sign
are imprecise.

The iconic sign. Our capacity to see the world in ways that are different from
yet analogical with- the objects in that world allows us to build up signs that are
images of these objects. As Peirce elaborated,

recognize the principled uncontrollability (and unpredictability) of human psyche. This idea was anathema
to the behavioral control ethos that governed much of psychology through the 20th century.
Valsiner 28

An icon is a sign which would posses the character which renders it

significant, even though its object had no existence; such as a lead-
pencil streak as representing a geometrical line. (Peirce, 1902, p.
527)

As an image of an objectwhether the latter is present or noticon is one

of the two loci of emergence of signs. Its power is in its similarity to its object
both in its form and in the width of the coverage (whether the sign represents a
minimal class on 1a unique objector a class of many objects). All signs are
results of generalization processsome features of their objects are
emphasized, others lost.
Iconic signs emerge from the phenomenavisual, acoustic, or of any
other sense systemas generalized presentations of the object. Icon is the locus
for emerging abstractionwhich subsequently loses the feeling of being abstract!
Icons become schematasimplified replicas of the object they present, or
pleromata 6 hyper-rich depictions of reality that stand for some other realities (or
irrealities). As Mieczyslaw Wallis explained,

Schemata occur in the pictograms of many peoples, in traffic signs,

in diagrams of scientific works, in childrens drawings, in the works
of some modern painters such as Klee or Dubuffet. Pleromata
occur in fifteenth century Dutch painting, in seventeenth century
Dutch still lives, in paintings by the nineteenth century Naturalists or
the twentieth century Surrealists, in many photographs and films.
(Wallis, 1973, p. 487)

The immediate perception of an object can thus become either less rich in
detail (schematizing) or more rich (pleromatizing) in detail than its original object,
while becoming an icon. The pleromatized iconic signs present a generalized
concept of what is depicted by way of transcending the particular object that is
depicted by the sign. A realist painting does not seem abstract 7, yet it is an
iconic pleromatized sign that operates as a sign-field (see chapter 7). The
pleromatized semiotic universe we inhabit matches with our abductive
generalization readiness (see Magarios de Morentin, 2005) and operates
through a socialized non-verbal level (see chapter 7)
A similar process of invisible abstraction happens in the case of
schematized iconic signs. In Peirces words, a geometric diagram (say, a
triangle) is an icon of high level of abstraction from the real worldyet one that
does not look abstract:

A diagram, so far as it has a general signification, is not a pure

icon; but in the middle part of our reasonings we forget that
abstractness in great measure, and the diagram is for us the very

6
From Greek pleroma, or fullness
7
Architecture is filled with iconic abstractions of pleromatized kindtemples and churches are rich in
detail, yet their holistic meaning is in the abstract messages these details carry (Wallis, 1975)
Valsiner 29

thing. So in contemplating a painting, there is a moment when we

lose the consciousness that it is not the thing, the distinction of the
real and the copy disappears, and it is for the moment a pure
dreamnot any particular existence, and yet not general. At that
moment we are contemplating an icon. (Peirce, 1885/1986, p. 163)

Iconicity allows for the abstracting/generalizing processes to move

smoothly between the real object and its sign presentation. The establishment of
a boundary onto that dynamic continuum creates another kind of signthe
symbol. A symbol is

a sign which would lose the character which renders it a sign if

there were no interpretant. Such is any utterance of speech which
signifies what it does only by virtue of its being understood to have
that signification. (Peirce, 1902, p, 527)

The index
The third kind of signindexis a sign that enforces our attention to an
objectit only says There! (Peirce, 1885/1993, p. 163). Demonstratives and
relative pronouns are close to pure indicesthey denote things without
describing them. As Peirce pointed outan index is a sign that would lose its
character if its object were to be removedbut not if there is an interpretant. The
latter becomes a new sign that denotes the act of indicating together with the
object (i.e., the object as it has been indicated):

Such, for instance, is a piece of mould with a bullet-hole in it as a

sign of a shot; for without the shot there would have been no hole;
but there is a hole there, whether anybody has the sense to
attribute it to a shot or not. (Peirce, 1902, p. 527)

This explanation shows how index has also been conventionally viewed
as a sign created by the impact of the object. Thus, a footprint is an indexical
sign for the animal who has left the printsand an iconic sign of the paw/foot of
that particular animal species. The name of the speciesdetected by the unity
of iconic and indexical depictionis a symbol.

Hybrid nature of signs

All classifications are artifactsand so is Peirces scheme of three sign

8
types . Conventionalized icons can become symbols if their iconicity is
eliminatedeither by schematization or by pleromatization. Indexicality is close
to the creation of an iconic sign (as making of an image of something is an index)
Likewise, any arbitrary assignment of an object to present another becomes a
symbol.

8
Actually, Peirce had a 3 x 3 table of signssee Rosa, 2007.
Valsiner 30

Figure 1.6. Memorial in a park: symbolic flavoring of the surrounding

Consider a memorial in a park (Figure 1.6.)--he marking of a tree in a park by a

memorial plate to a murdered woman is a hybrid of symbolic (two languages and
the cross) and indexical (the given location of the event) signs. What is missing is
a photo or a painting of the woman (iconic sign).

Dynamics of semiosis. All signs are viewed by Peirce as dynamically

transforming and transformable. Peirce emphasized the dynamic nature of
signs:

Symbols grow. They come into being by development out of other

signs, particularly from icons, from mixed signs partaking of the
nature of icons and symbols. We think only in signs. These mental
signs are of mixed nature; the symbol-parts of them are called
concepts. If a man makes a new symbol, it is by thoughts involving
concepts. So it is out of symbols that new symbol can grow.
(Peirce, 1955, p. 115)
Valsiner 31

For Peirce, the creation and use of signs permeates the human existence-- both
in its intra-mental and inter-psychological domains. A sign-maker makes the
created sign available to others-- and in the case of those others some of the
signs are supposed to excite in the intra-psychological world familiar images,
based on their memories of past life experiences. For example, in Figure 1.6.
above, the memorial to a woman killed on the given spot in a city park is a
symbol that flavors the whole peaceful setting of the park. Likewise, the
architectural structures of homes (Salmin, 1998) or temples (Rajan, 1974) is filled
with semiotic encoding of the cultural history for the current regulation of the
social and personal orders.

From personal and social pasttowards the future. Different life

experiences of the past-- the more recent ones more than the more distant ones-
- insist upon framing the person's way of making sense of the present. At the
same time, the imagery of the possible future-- from most immediate to most
distant-- creates the contrasting "pull" for the sense of the present. It is the
present that affects the future through personal semiotic construction:

...feeling which has not yet emerged into immediate consciousness

is already affectible and already affected. In fact, this is habit, by
virtue of which an idea is brought up into present consciousness by
a bond that had already been established between it and another
idea while it was still in futuro.
... the affected idea is attached as a logical predicate to the
affecting idea as subject. So when a feeling emerges into
immediate consciousness, it always appears as a modification of a
more or less general object already in the mind. The word
suggestion is well adapted to expressing this relation. The future is
suggested by, or rather is influenced by the suggestions of, the
past. (Peirce, 1935, pp. 104-105 [6.141 and 6.142])

Time flow guarantees the constantly active novelty of semiotic processes.

Therefore, for Peirce, the sign could not be something repetitive-- each time it is
taken up it appears in a new act of semiosis.
Valsiner 32

Figure 1.7. Gedchtniskirche in Berlin: unity of semiotic presentation

by a whole combining iconic, indexical, and symbolic means

Example 1.1. A church that has become a sign. In the middle of West Berlin
stands a church in ruins- Gedchtniskirche. It was devastated in World War II,
and after the war was left standing as a testimony of the destruction of the war
in the middle of otherwise re-built large city. As it presents the history of
devastation, the Gedchtniskirche acts as a generalized indexical signfor the
devastation of war in general, not just merely as a sign denoting the particular
bombs that half-demolished the church. As a ruin 9 of church it stands as an
iconic sign representing all churches and adding to that idea the notion of
damage. In its iconicity, it is an example of a pleromatized sign.

9
See Georg Simmels account of the meaning of ruins :

The aesthetic value of the ruin combines the disharmony, the eternal becoming of the
soul struggling against itself, with the satisfaction of form, the firm limitedness, of the work
of art. For this reason, the metaphysical-aesthetic charm of the ruin disappears when not
enough remains of it to let us feel the upward-leading tendency. The stump of the pillars
of the Forum Romanum are simply ugly and nothing else, while a pillar crumbledsay,
halfway downcan generate a maximum of charm. (Simmel, 1959b, p. 265)
Valsiner 33

The ruin of a church here is not merely a ruinbut a result of purposeful

destruction in the course of a war. Its indexical function points to the history of
horrors of the impact of the bombs that destroyed the long-term standing
symbolic building -- the church. In contrast, the same air attack destroyed
buildings next to that churchwhich were demolished as ruins to build new
buildings in their stead. Likewise, other symbolic buildingssuch as the Berlin
Castle equally damaged in the warwere not turned into a war memorial
(symbolic sign) through their unity of iconicity (castle-ness given by its
architecture before the bombings) and indexicality (indicating the impact of the
bombs). The Berlin Castle was demolishedand the parliament building of
former German Democratic Republic built up on the same spot 10.
However, the semiotic use of the church does not end in its generalized
presentation of the horrors of the past or of the heavenly promises of the
particular architectural object. Its centrality in the public life of the city makes it a
place for presenting the future pleasures in the form of large-size
advertisements attached to the side of the church (see Figure 1.7.). The
cosmetics advertisement is in itself a combination of iconic (picture of woman),
indexical (the impact of the cosmetics on her skin) and symbolic functions of the
new sign attached to the architectural sign. The merging of features of a new
symbolic complex onto a previous architectural form constitutes a symbolic
takeover of the semiotic mediation system. The hybrid of Byzantine and Islamic
symbolism in the center of IstanbulHagia Sofiais a testimony of the conquest
of the symbolic world through iconicity and indexicality.

Representation of symbolic signsnodes and fields

The encoding of human experience (duration) in different kinds of signs

has to present those aspects of the phenomena that are relevant for the
phenomena. Consider the encodings in Figure 1.8.
The very same experienceduration (dure in terms of Henri Bergson)
can be presented by way of different kinds of signs, as Figure 1.8. shows. What
the presenter can do with these different kinds of signs varies. For example,
numeric sign constructs are used widely in sciences to allow for further
quantitative analyses. Hence much of social sciences turns complex
psychological phenomena into numeric signsfor example, through the use of
rating scales (Wagoner & Valsiner, 2005). It is not certain what a particular
numerical ratinglike a mark of 3 on a scale from 1 to 5precisely means. Yet
it is open to further manipulation of numbers as if its original meaning were clear
in the framework of the meaning of the scale (given by the two end points).

10
The location itself carries symbolic functionreplacement of one symbolic building by another on the
same spot is known to lead to centuries-long frictions between different communities, and at times erupt to
violent clashesas the history of Babri Masjid in Ayodha (U.P.) showed in 1992.
Valsiner 34

Figure 1.8. Different kind of signs to present an event

Experience Sign
HORROR
{all the turmoil (point-like sign, a word)
I lived through
when my village
7 (numeric point-like
was devastated
sign, a rating on Richter
by an earthquake}
scale)

(irregular field-like sign:

my drawing of my
feelings about the
turmoil in myself)
Figure 1.9. Theoretical terms point or field kindused to represent the
fluidity of phenomena of dure (from Valsiner & Diriwchter, 2005)

DEPICTION NODE(POINT)-DESCRIPTION FIELD-DESCRIPTION

IN ABSTRACT regular irregular
TERMS X 5
A
B

FLUID FORMS
OF ORIGINAL
PHENOMENA
Valsiner 35

Figure 1.10. Relations between nodes and fields

expansion

NODE FIELD

constriction

INTERNALLY
DIFFERENTIATING

Signs can be of different structurenodes or fields, regular or irregular. In

Figure 1.9. a number of different sign-depiction possibilities is given. The fuzzy,
always floating personal experienceintra-psychological or inter-psychological
can be encoded into node-type signs (graphically given as: a dot, X, 5), or
into field-like depictions (regular or irregular field). Any efforts to query
respondents in node-like terms (all our questions are semiotic complexes that
suggest a certain kind of answering mode) lead to a selection from the field of
reality. Similarly, a narrative elicitation leads to a field-like sign encoding. Artistic
depictions of reality can be seen as creating an irregular sign type of graphic
representation of the experience.
The two kinds of signs are not exclusive opposites. If one looks at the
relationships between node- and field-representations, it is clear that a node is a
minimal field, and fielda maximized node which is internally undifferentiated
(Fig. 1.10.). The theoretical benefit of considering our concepts in terms of fields,
rather than nodes, is in the possibility of conceptualizing the heterogeneous
structure of the field.

Ambiguity re-presented: combining icon, index, and symbol

As could be seen in this chapter, human construction of meanings is itself

filled with ambiguitiesof the boundary of time, social classes, and we <>
they distinctions. The signs that are utilized on that boundary are themselves
representative of such ambiguities of the opposite sides of the everyday reality
Valsiner 36

where earthquakes may happen in the middle of festivities, or the next group of
visitors to ones village may bring long-expected relief, or be genocidal.
The puzzle of mutually embedded opposite sides within a sign is well
captured by Ren Magritte in multiple versions of his drawing the pipe-that-is-
not-the pipe-- since 1926 for 40 years. It indicates a contradiction in the direction
of interpretation of signs. It has drawn previous efforts to interpret the mutually
contradictory messages in the drawingthe symbolic (verbal) denial of the iconic
(pictorial) presence of the pipe (Foucault, 1983).
We here use a version of the many this is not a pipe pipe-figures that
Magritte created (dates to 1966, 40 years after the theme first appeared in his
work). The focus here is on the confluence of different sign forms that create
inherent duality within the sign complex.

Figure 1.11. Multi-level sign construct: pipe that is a non-pipe in frames

Figure 1.11. involves combination of three kinds of signsicon, index, and

symbolwith a frame. The framing of the primary signan icon (depiction of the
pipe) and index (the impact of the pipesmoke) complexbeing framed by a
symbol that negates it (this is not a pipebut smoke emerges from the pipe).
The framing itself is ambiguousas the smoke is seen to flow on and out of the
frame. The whole complex and its symbolic frame are further framed (meta-
frame) by the painted white border picture frame.
Valsiner 37

Such framing can take on multiple levels of self-reflexivity (Lefebvre, 2000)

as Magrittes other versions of it indicate. By creating ambiguity of the sign
presentations across multiple levels of abstraction human beings create a wide
applicability of the cultural tools they themselves generate. Magrittes painting is
a sign complex on the other extreme from the If God asks me Id get tattoos all
over my body (see chapter 3). While the latter is fixated by a regulatory sign
(Gods will) in a steady state, the pipe-that-is-not-a pipe is a sign of multiple
open levels of reflexivity. Yet it is very similar in its openness to the hyper-
generalized meaning fields of Gods will (or love or justice)as it allows for
specific contextualizations in a variety of contexts.
The richness of various types of signs all woven into a complex makes
such varied use possible. As a contrast, consider Figure 1.12. that juxtaposes
two opposite symbolic messages.

Figure 1.12. An inherently contradictory sign: symbolic form encountering

a verbal message

DO
NOT
STOP
HERE

It is usable to make the point of the inherent contradictions within the

messageyet its immediate action regulating nature allows for no richness in its
useit is either a mistake on the roadside, or an inconsiderate jokebut not a
sign to regulate the complex personal-cultural feeling systems. Most of the
objects in our environment are combined signs where the symbolic seeming
arbitrariness of the sign may be supported by iconic or indexical means. These
combined signs trigger human meaning-making within the possible semiotic
world (Magarios de Morentin, 2005)interpretations that guide human conduct
without necessarily involving the verbal level of mediation (see chapter 7). The
abductive rupture in the emergence of meaning (Lotman, 2002a; Santaella,
2005)or the Aha-Erlebnis described by Karl Bhler back in the beginning of the
Valsiner 38

20th centuryare examples of turning the field of possible semiotic world into an
actual understanding.

Making of hyper-generalized field-type signs out of everyday activities. The

use of the notion of field-like signs allows us to consider the complexity of real-life
experiences as complex signs. The honoring of bread or corn (in Mexico--see
Sandstrom, 1990), wine (for the Mediterranian areas), beer (for Germans), or rice
(Ohnuki-Tierney, 1993) by linking them symbolically with persons and deities.
These crucial objects-- food-- of everyday existence perform the role of transfer
of the values within the indicated field of meanings. Such transfer takes place
through symbolic generalization. The object-- for instance, rice for the Japanese-
- may through its symbolic generalization link the person, the unity of persons,
with the indefinite (but important) world of values and supernatural beings. Thus
(see Ohnuki-Tierney, 1993, p. 55) a symbolic equivalence can be established:

RICE = SOUL = DEITY = NIGITAMA (peaceful/positive power of the deity)

Furthermore, the linkage of the person with the immediate social unit (the
"we-unit") can occur through the given food ("our rice", "our bread", "our
hamburger"). The process of generalization of the symbolic value allows for such
linkages to be made through what was known in Gestalt psychology as vertical
transferin contrast to its horizontal counterpart 11. The notion of vertical
transfer entails abstraction of selected features from one phenomenon in the
form of a superordinate general whole. That higher-order Gestalt is the vehicle
for re-organizing another settingso the transfer of knowledge from one situation
to another proceeds through a thirdhigher level mediator (see chapter 7).
Everyday life experiences of the whole life environment may give rise to
complex sign fields. For the Finns, the notion of summer nights silence, or for
the Brazilians and Portuguese the notion of saudade (Loureno, 1999) are
easily communicable inter-personally but basically untranslatable into other
languages. To convey the whole richness of the silence of a summers night, it
would

require verbose explanations of the different Finnish seasons, the

light of the Nordic summer, the softness of the green, and
especially the mental state from which the meaning of this
expression or image wells forth. As a matter of fact, the silence of a
summer night is not composed of mere silence; instead, it is a state
of mind filled with multitudes of meanings and sensations of nature.
It is also an illusion representing an ideal concept of reality.
(Vainomki, 2004, p. 349)

11
This was set up in opposition to behaviorist notion of transfer by way of identical elements: if setting
A and B have 90% identical elements in common, and A and C only 10%, the skills mastered in A are more
likely to be transferred to B rather than C
Valsiner 39

Furthermore, the totality of experience entails the encoding of such

complex experiences into more complex signsa symphony (i.e., a system of
musica version on non-silence) on the theme of the silence of the summers
night. Or Paul Simon and Art Garfunkel invite their listeners to listen to the sound
of silence. Like living experience, the sign construction experience creates
paradoxical semiotic forms.

Ambiguity of signs. The ambiguity of human semiotic constructions is as

important as the continuous ambiguities of living (Valsiner & Abbey, 2006). The
open ambiguity of the signs makes it possible to reduce ambiguity within living
and the ambiguities of living lead to the abstracted signs of ambiguous nature.
Such ambiguity parallels their makingbeing both re-presentational
(Darstellung) and pre-presentational (Vorstellung) tools signs are necessarily
ambiguous. If culture is to be explained through semiosis, then the notion of
ambiguity is necessarily in the center of any of our theoretical constructsas
much as it plays a central role in our life experiences. Thus,

ambiguity is intrinsic to the Hindu concepts of the sacred, and

like the sacred, ambiguity is not confined to a small piece of the
Hindu world, but pervades it all, from speech to sexuality, from
dreaming to blood. If it is at all legitimate to think of Indian culture
as an organic whole, a system that can be modeled and described
as such, then ambiguity must be a key component of that whole, a
key feature of the communicative system by which the whole is
maintained. (Trawick, 1992, p. 41)

If the most general signthat of sacredis inherently ambiguous in a

given collective unit, it is likely to be infinitely ambiguous in the multiplicity of
personal constructions that make use of it. With its help persons face new
ambiguities in lifemaking new signs in ways that present the ambiguities of
living through (different) kinds of ambiguities in the signs.
There are some ground rules for emergence of complex signs at the
intersection of iconicity, indexicality, and symbol formation. While the symbolic
side of sign making can operate with wide freedom of making symbolic tries (see
Werner & Kaplan, 1963), the iconic and indexical signs remain linked with the
perceptual qualitiesvisual, acoustic, olfactory, or tactileof the object of
presentation.

The process of sign-production and transformation

How do persons create signs? Frederick Bartlett's effort to highlight the

semiogenesis process included the focus upon different systems of "reaction
tendencies" in the human psychological whole to enter into specific relations with
one another, thus making one of the tendencies to produce symbols for the
other. He posited a general mechanisms of the emergence of symbols in the
sphere of mental processes:
Valsiner 40

Material arouses a given tendency, is attended to, and put into

relation with other material to help to form a particular mental
system. At the same time another tendency comes into play, and
by it the same material gains different relations and a place in a
different mental system. Mental systems, however, are not normally
isolated. They are linked together, first, because they share
common materials, and secondly because among all the
tendencies which take a share in their formation, one or two are
always masterful. The masterful tendencies set the systems
migrating, so to speak, and the watchword of the growth of symbols
in the individual mental life is the 'contact of mental systems.'
(Bartlett, 1924, p. 281, emphases added)

Bartlett's effort to provide an account of the psychological processes

involved in semiogenesis is actually very contemporary. It entails simultaneous
input from some experiential event (A) into two (or more) parts of a hierarchically
organized psychological system ("tendencies" which are "not normally isolated"):
X ==>>== Y (where >> indicates the previous dominance relation in the holistic
system). By way of A relating to Y, it becomes related to X, and integrated into
the hierarchical structure, letting the latter be transformed (similarly to
assimilation/ accommodation notion of Piaget). It would then be a question of
how the new material (A) becomes seen as if it represents the dominant
tendency. Thus, any oblong-shaped object (A) in the psychoanalytic field of
meaning construction could be viewed to be a symbolic representation of the
penis (Y), because of the dominant tendency of the complex of sexuality (X)
already linked with the notion of penis. As Bartlett himself remarked,

If we are considering the growth of symbols in the individual life, the

most important clue to the whole process is to be found in the fact
that, in the case of any individual, there are always certain
tendencies, or groups of tendencies, which take the leading place,
and dominate the others... The master tendencies of an individual
always determine the direction along which his own symbolism
proceeds. It may be said that, in general, two groups of tendencies
have, in the past, stood out as master impulses of an individual life
more frequently than any others. They are the religious group and
the sex group; and as a result there is scarcely anything that a
human being can attend to that has not at some time or another
served as a religious or a sexual symbol. (Bartlett, 1924, p. 281)

Signs emerge in the process of overcoming the demands of the given

process. They come to change the process, and can lead to its disappearance.
Sign abandonment by the processes that led to their emergence allows for
personal construction of cultural tools freed for other applications. These further
applications (construction of regulation of some process in other time-context by
Valsiner 41

the person) involve signs operating as constraining devices. Signs make the
distinction between the immediate next possibilities, impossibilities, and potential
possibilities of our feeling and thinking, facing the future

From mediator to regulator: overdetermination by meaning. The move of a

sign into a regulators role creates the minimal case of a hierarchical dynamic
system of regulators. I here try to make sense of the minimal case, admitting that
it is an artificial exercise. In real life, we may encounter ever-increasing and ever-
generalizing growth of the semiotic regulatory system
In this respect human conduct is overdetermined by meaning (Boesch,
2000, chapter 1; 2002a, 2002b- see also chapter 5). The very same objective
goal orientation, immediate or recurrent task in livingsuch as dressing (and
undressing) oneself, or preparing and eating food (and the processes of
elimination), giving birth and education to children, disputing property claims and
making future investmentsall entail redundancy and multiplicity of meanings.
On the side of a personwho lives through some experiencethe
overdetermination by meaning takes the form of semiotic marking of the event at
different levels of symbolization (Obeyesekere, 1990, pp. 56-58). The navigation
by the person across these different levels is highly flexiblethe same person
may at one time use a low symbolization tactic (I made a mistake), at another
a medium one (my mother-in-laws jealousy made me make the mistake to the
highest (the Gods will made me to make this mistake). All these levels are
perfectly legitimate within the collective-cultural field of meanings, and coincide in
it. Yet the freedom of what level of symbolization to adopt is that of the person
within the boundaries of the field of meanings at the given historical period. I
would add here that such overdetermination is flexible-- in some moments it is
enhanced, at others limited to only one sign level (or not available at all-- e.g.,
there are aspects of human automated actions that have become freed from
semiotic control in development).
I will not look at the process of generalization within such hierarchies
here. I limit my coverage to the relations of two adjacent levels of the sign control
hierarchy (SIGN and META-SIGN), and their relation to the target of regulation,
as well as their self-regulation:

Sign X as meta-sign in
respect to Y

Sign X Sign Y Sign Y

Valsiner 42

Constructed signs create the unity of both stability and flexibility. The meta-level
sign as the regulator defines the boundaries of stability of the sign. By defining
such boundaries it necessarily also defines the realms of instabilitythe
possibilities for breaking through these boundaries (in accordance with co-
genetic logicsee chapter 3; also Herbst, 1995). This is the universal principle
of bounded indeterminacy (Valsiner, 1997) in its work in everyday worldevery
wall built in the middle of a city to separate two parts of the town, or every
parental restriction of time curfew for adolescents return to home creates two
new possibilitiesto uphold the rule of separation (or follow the home rules), or
to transgress these. Creating such bifurcation pointthe moment of decision
whether to act in one way or the otheris every time a psychological process
filled with ambivalence. There can be the tension of temptation to transgress
which is tempered by the self-regulatory cultural tool (meaning) that blocks the
transgression desire. The social rules are maintainedand fortifiedby that self-
regulatory act.
What happens if different levels of signs become united in mutual control
feed-forward loop that operates by the logic of intransitivity. Consider the
example where a person creates one's own "personal deity"-- be it a figure of a
god, ancestor's spirit, or any other powerful intra-psychological "social other."
Such deity is set up as the powerful source to whom to turn for help-- yet that
source is set up by the person oneself. Thus, the person's semiotic mediation
system includes two hierarchical layers:

HIGHER LEVEL: "I (person) govern YOU (deity)--

as you are my construction"
LOWER LEVEL: "As powerful deity, YOU should govern ME"
(cf. Valsiner, 1999)

This example indicates the flexibility of intra-psychological semiotic

mediation-- a system like the one described is an example of cyclical hierarchy
(where PERSON > DEITY > PERSON > DEITY> etc in a cycle). Such cyclical
hierarchies dominate in flexible social systems where the system needs to be
ready to cope with varied survival demands. Human feeling and thinking in its
reality which is ambiguous and filled with ambivalence (Abbey, 2006; Buller,
2006)is regulated by cyclical sign hierarchies that follow the logic of
intransitivity. Some signs are madetemporarily, or in a quasi-stable formatto
regulate the meanings created by other signs. This is particularly crucial for
setting the stage for facing future needs for meaningful adaptation to changing
life circumstances. For that, the promoter function of generalized signs is of
crucial relevance.
Valsiner 43

Figure 1.13. The principle of redundant control

.
The principle of redundant control

Redundancy is the coverage of the same function by more than one

control system. It guarantees safety of development because of the
compensatory possibilities that are built into the system. Consider the two control
systems in Figure 1.13. Figure 1.13..A. gives an example of a singular
mechanism over a hypothetical process. If that control becomes dysfunctional,
the function cannot continue. In contrast, the function remains in case of
redundant control (Figure 1.13.B.) where the role of the damaged control (A) is
taken over by another (B), and can also be catered for by C
Valsiner 44

Through overproduction of such redundant control systems, human

psychological systems can operate with relatively high stability within constantly
changing environmental conditions.
As an example, consider how the cultural value-- respect for others-- can
be set up in a developing person's world. The set of potential agents of such set-
up differs-- it may first include parents and older siblings, then teachers, then
peers. The arenas for such promotion are also variable-- from infant and toddler
activity fields to classrooms at school, or shopping malls where adolescents hang
out. The examples the developing person experiences are likewise variable--
ranging from positive examples (e.g. young person showing respect for an old
one) to negative ones (adolescent gang beating up an adult, and the trauma of
observing that happen). If one of these agents or arenas is absent (or
dysfunctional for the promotion of the given value), others take over.

Regulating the subjective future: the Promoter Sign

Human living is focused on future-oriented temporal extension. This

extension comes through setting up specific signs of sufficient abstractness that
begin to function as guiders of the range of possible constructions of the future.
These signsor parts of signsoperate as promoter signs (Valsiner, 2004;
2006b). Given their generality they are best described through the use of field-
like graphic depictions. Phenomenologically these promoter signs are deeply
internalized and operate as personal value-orientations.
Every semiotic mediator can function as a promoter signguiding the
possible range of variability of meaning construction in the future. This is in
analogy with the sequences in human genetic organization that promote the
expression of other parts of the gene). Each meaningsignthat is in use
during the infinitely small time window we conveniently call the present is a
semiotic mediating device that extends from the past to the possible, anticipated
(but not knowable) future. The promoter role of these signs is a feed-forward
functionthey set up the range of possible meaning boundaries for the
unforeseeableyet anticipatedfuture experiences with the world. The person
is constantly creating meaning ahead of the time when it might be needed
orienting oneself towards one or another side of the anticipated experience, and
thus preparing oneself for it.

Operating on the outer boundaries of possibilities. The signs in the present

are promoters of the ranges of possible future meaning making, not specific
meanings. The range includes each and every point within the constraints that
specify the boundary of the meaning field. Hence each and every possible
specific meaning is included in the range that is afforded by the promoter signs.
 Valsiner 45

Figure 1.14. The promoter function of signs at different

levels of generalized abstraction

General General
Meaning
Range B

Of B

New
Meaning A
Range Meanin
Of A g C

Specific

PAST PRESENT FUTURE

Once establishedin a generalized version a sign becomes a promoter

sign through canalizing future actions andmost importantly becoming
internalized in the form of feelings. Consider the description of a persons deeply
ingrained feeling of respect for paper:

Whether written on or not, printed or not, I feel respect for every

kind of writing paper. I cant stand the edges of notebooks being
curled, or stacks of paper being out of order. After reading the
newspaper, I cant leave it as it is, turned inside out, with pages out
of order. For instance, if someone sitting opposite me on a public
conveyance raggedly opens the pages of the magazine or book in
his hand, with a rip of his finger or a comb, I become upset right
then and there. (Nesin, 1990, p. 42)
Valsiner 46

The generalized field-type sign we summarily can label respect for paper
colors the persons every moment of relating with the environment. In the
authors reconstruction of his past, that respect was developed by a series of
repetitive symbolic events in the childhoodfour decades before:

in my childhood, whether he could read or write, whether villager

or from the city, every Turk would immediately pick up two things
from the ground and put them on top of a wall, between siding
boards, in a hole in a tree, or some place high above the ground.
One of these was bread, the other, printed paper. These two things
were not to be stepped on. Bread was Gods gift and the printed
page was holy. That is to say, he who picked up the bread, first
kissed it and touched it to his forehead, then put it in a high place
where it couldnt be stepped on. It would not even be thought that
something evil might be printed on the paper. (ibid.)

The generalized notion of holy respect was promoted by unity of action

prohibition, rituals, and meanings in childhood. Once in place, it pre-emptively
set the stage for feeling toward any further encounters with printed materials. All
actual encounters with paper (meaning A in Fig. 1.14.) would be subsumed
under the generalized feeling (B in Figure 1.14.) over a very wide range of
circumstances. It is this process of abstractive generalization of signsto set up
the feeling towards the ambience-to-be encounteredthat is built through the
promoter signs. Or, in other termsgeneralized continuity of the developing self
is the product of externalization of internalized signs that have begun to function
as promoter signs.
How can this general claim be situated in the context of the study of
human lives? Human beings develop by way of high variety of life-course
trajectories, and are capable of demonstrating remarkable moment-to-moment
flexibility in their relating to their environments. One tendency within cultural-
historical perspectives on human development declares the role of signs
(semiotic mediation) to be of central role in this. Yet the question remains-- how
is such flexibility (and variability) actually created? The developmental
orientation within cultural psychology can attempt to answer that question.

Cultural mediation of personal autonomy: personal culture

At the human level, ontogeny entails the construction and use of signs to
regulate both inter-personal and intra-personal emergent psychological
phenomena. The latter are described as the build-up of hierarchical regulatory
mechanisms of increasing generalizability: through the use of signs, human
beings can transcend any here-and-now situated activity context by way of
subjectively constructed personal meanings (or "personal culture"). The personal
culture is interdependent with (but not determined by) the realm of inter-personal
signs-mediated communicative processes, which are goal-oriented by the active
efforts of persons-in-their-assumed social roles. The multiplicity of such
Valsiner 47

communicative messages (or "collective culture" in the present terminology)

constitutes the heterogeneous "input" into the self-construction by individual
human beings.
Dramatic nature of the personal culture can be observed in the case of
feed preferences:

Present freshly boiled pork chops to two hungry men. One of our
hungry men is a Mohammedian whose religion tells him that
anything connected with pigs is disgustingthis is an established
taboo, a norm. The other person is a Christian. He will seize the
chops and eat them with gusto. The first person will not only not
touch the chops, he will be filled with disgust for them and for the
person who eats such filthy things. (Sherif, 1936, p. 28, added
emphases)

Sherifs example illustrates the ways in which cultural internalization works

at the level of persons affective processes. The rejection of the inedible in the
collective-cultural meaning system by a person takes place at the level of deep
subjective feelings (and at timesof physiological responses). At the same time,
the externalization of that personal-cultural sense enters into the making of
distinctions between the social unit one claims to belong (ingroup) in contrast to a
dis-valued outgroup.
The dual process of internalization and externalization guarantees the lack
of isomorphism between the collective and personal cultures, thus making each
individual into a unique person, while based on the same general background of
collective culture. This is guaranteed by the bi-directional culture transfer notion
(Figure 1.4. above)while the incoming messages can be similar for different
individuals, the ways in which these messages become transformed and
reconstructed is necessarily personally unique. Personal cultures are relatively
autonomous of the collective culture.
Why such focus on autonomy? And how can autonomy emerge? In
ontogeny, the developing child is constantly operating upon the breaking of the
current relations with the immediate activity settings. Semiotic mediation allows
for both such break, and for retaining the breaking experience for later
encounters.
In their generalized form, acts of personal-cultural creation can be
summarized by the following:
Valsiner 48

The PERSON constructs MEANING COMPLEX X

...OBJECTIFIES it by FIXING ITS FORM..,

(e.g. internalinternalized social norm, or
externalmonument, picture of deity, figurine)

...and starts to act AS IF the objectified

meaning complex X is an external agent that
controls the PERSON

Most of the Worlds religious architecture, art, rituals, and reasons for all
kinds of quarrels are due to this simple projective-constrictive process. We
construct the meanings that lead us to reconstructing the objective worldand
the reconstructed world guides our further construction of meanings. Both the
Notre Dame and the McDonalds are architectural objective realities in this
subjective chain of meaning construction. Human beingsthanks to their
capacity for transcending the here-and-now settings through signsconstantly
live with the tension of the world AS IS and the imaginaryanticipated or
treadedworld AS-IF (Vaihinger, 1911/1935).
It is here where culture enters into the human psycheand infinitely
complicates the construction of the sciences of the human mind. Not only do
these sciences need to depict the realms of psychological phenomena as those
arebe these behavioral, emotional, or cognitivethey also have to capture the
domain of what they seem to be (the AS-IF worlds), and what they might
become. The methodological innovation needed (see chapter 9) is of the kind of
developing new scientific promoter signs for better study of psychological
realities. All scientific terminologysimilarly to its everyday counterpart-- is in fact
a version of such regulating system that entails promoter signs of abstract kind. It
is that part that is meant to objectively and abstractly explain the complexity of
our psychological phenomenaa scientific theory is a kind of a mental cathedral
that stands in the center of the booming and buzzing confusion we call living a
life.

Unity of opposites and directional nature of meanings. Growth of semiotic

control systems guarantees human psychological flexibility, together with its
opposite (inflexible fixing of a way of thinking or feeling about something). Some
authors claim (at times all too actively) that human development is a co-
construction process. As such, it entails both the active person and the active
environment. If this is the case, it is necessary to make explicit what that means.
This is worked out in the encounter between levels.
Both the level of the psychological function that is to be regulated (base
level) and that of semiotic mediators (first meta-level) we can posit the existence
Valsiner 49

of directionality. The psychological functions are historical, in the sense of

bounded within the irreversibility of time. Their directionality can be described in
terms of goal orientedness. It is posited here that human lower psychological
functions are goals-oriented (rather than goals-directed), as their directionality
can be specified (bus specific goals can not be, as these are constructions about
some possible future). Similarly, signs are specifiable by their presentational
orientedness. A use or invention of a word depicting something is not only a
referring to the denoted referent, but presenting that referent for some purposes,
directions.
For instance, if somebody in a room mentions the door is open (which
may be true about the state of a given door here)this is not merely a case of
reiterating the obvious (which you can see anyway), but presenting that aspect of
the environment for some purposes. A person need not have specific goals in
mind while making such statement, yet the statement (about the obvious) is
simultaneously re-presentation, co-presentation, and pre-presentation. If its re-
presentation is obvious, its co-presentation (function of mentioning it in the
setting) is unclear, and so are its pre-presentational functions.

Example 1. 2. Feeling something. Let us consider a more mundane

example. A person is feeling something (but it is not yet clear to oneself what that
something is). In reality, it is a field (range) of affective phenomena, not clearly
specified. It is clear that the various manifestations of the feeling are precisely
like, it is only clear that the feeling is moving (by the persons introspective)
towards becoming narrowly focused. Then, at some instant, the person realizes
I am angry The range of possible senses in which the notion angry has
developed prior to this connection point of levels is limited by the boundary of its
opposite (non-angry or non-A), and changes over time.
From the instant of the recognition I am angry, the feeling realm (at level
A) becomes re-directed. The previous feeling becomes now as part of the system
of anger, and widens to include other feeling-phenomena through the sign of
anger. This widening guides re-defining the range of senses at the sign level.
The widening of the feeling may reach a point where it becomes shut
down by the constraining role of another sign (e.g., I am ashamed), which -- if
applied as canalizer -- can eliminate the previous (canalized) feeling flow. Thus,
autodialogue of the person may include I feel angry, I am ashamed at it, I should
not feel that way, followed by the dampening of the whole feeling (the person
can report feeling nothing, or feeling just numb, speechless). In many
situations, human beings just run out of words-- even in their autodialogue.
Valsiner 50

Figure 1.15. Autoregulation and heteroregulation of signs

It is an adaptive way of using semiotic devices to eliminate some of the lower

psychological processes. Of course there is a similar variability ranging from
being speechless to that of unstoppable talkativeness present in interpersonal
interaction. Both making and breaking silence (see further chapter 2) in human
psychological worlds is a result of semiotic regulation.

The parallel process of heteroregulation and autoregulation

Signsas we create and use them-- regulate themselves (autoregulation)

and their target processes, as well as other signs (heteroregulation). Hence any
investigation of the semiotic mediation processes needs to make explicit these
two regulatory roles at the same time. Furthermore, the two processes are
located in the hierarchy of the semiotic regulatory system (Figure 1.15).
Valsiner 51

If we look at the Level n sign, which can generate a superordinate (n+1)

level of meta-sign, or relate to other level-n signs, aside from regulating the
subordinate process, then we see that each sign can be involved in three
relations of autoregulatory kind at the same time (downwards, upwards, and
horizontally). These autoregulatory processes guarantee that any level of signs
cannot be isomorphic with the lower processes (nor with one another).
Psychologists have disputed the issue of consistency between behavior and self
report, usually lamenting that such consistency is low. From the present
viewpoint, low consistency is a necessary result from the role signs play in
regulation of conduct. To expect full consistency here (i.e., that self-reports fully
and accurately depict behavior) would deny both the heteroregulatory and
autoregulatory functions of the signs. This feature of human psychological
system has profound implications for the methodology (see chapter 8).

Constraining dynamics across the semiotic regulatory hierarchy.

Study of human development has been struggling with how to take time
into account in its methodology. In that struggle, the necessity to consider
dynamic hierarchies of semiotic regulation have not been emphasized. Yet what
follows from the present exposition is that it is precisely the work of such
hierarchies (on line, or in real time, so to say). Two processes can be present in
the regulatory hierarchies-- abstracting generalization and contextualizing
specification.
Abstracting generalization creates new levels of semiotic regulators,
removing the re-co-pre-presentational role increasingly further towards higher
complexity of abstraction. For example, human values are generalizations of
abstracted kind. Extremely general terms like love, justice, freedom etc are
meaningful in their hyper-generalized abstractness. As such, these can be
brought to bear upon regulating very specific contexts (by process I call
contextualizing specification), yet in their abstract form they are impossible to
define in their entirety. Consider, for example, frequent exclamations in some
concrete settings about somethingthis is not fair!the use of the semiotic
field fair is in principle undefinableyet usable in relation to very specific issues.

Regulation: enabling mutually linked opposites.

It is the unity of flexibility and inflexibility that characterizes how human

beings regulate themselves through the construction and use of signs. This unity
of stability and flexibility is made possible by self-constructed hierarchical
semiotic control systems (Valsiner, 1998, 1999). Such hierarchies of signsbe
those of the kind of well-defined meanings or ill-definable fields of meaningful
affect are constantly constructed by the self.
The crucial issue in such proliferating semiotic mediation of experience is
the self-organizing capacity of the regulatory system to stop its own growth.
Meaning-making is adaptive when it can flexibly lead to generalization of some of
Valsiner 52

the experience, while avoiding similar generalization for others. Growing

semiotic regulation system gives rise to generalized meanings (contextual fields)
that either allow the system to grow (as long as the contextual field is of kind X)
until its change takes place (kind Y). Note that kind X and kind Y
(respectively) operate as examples of non-A in the meaning making system
described elsewhere (Josephs, Valsiner & Surgan, 1999see elaboration in
Chapter 3). It is through the sub-dominant (generalized) context for C1 (non-C or
kid Y) that the semiotic regulation system creates its own block. A meta-
regulatory stop sign (here-and-now no more signs are needed) leads the
regulatory process to the breakdown of the hierarchy just created.

Example 1.3.. Let us consider an empirical exampletaken from a published

autobiography of a schizophrenic girl Renee (Sechehaye, 1951). After childhood
filled with hypersensitivity towards objects and persons in the environment,
Renee became Marguerite Sechehayes (referred to as Mama by her)
psychoanalysis patient as a teenager. The episode quoted below came after
Renee had developed in her psyche a complex of Persecutor (the System) that
was giving her commands for action. Renee was fighting against these
commandsusing the psychotherapy process as a venue. Before the episode
quoted below, Renee noted the development of exaggerated animism 12. The
following example gives us a glimpse of the intense struggle that Renee was
undergoing in dealing with all the voices in her mind:

I was preparing to do some typing, suddenly, without any

warning, a force which was not an impulse but rather resembled a
command, ordered me to burn my right hand or the building in
which I was. With all my strength I resisted the order. I telephoned
Mama [the psychotherapist] to tell her about it. Her voice, urging me
to listen to her and not to the System, reassured me. If the System
became too demanding I was to run to her. This calmed me
considerably, but unfortunately only for a moment.
An indescribable anguish squeezed my heart, an anguish no
resolve could allay. If I refused to obey, I felt guilty and cowardly for
not daring, and the anguish mounted. Then the order became more
insistent. If, finally to obey, I went to the fire and stretched out my
hand, an intense feeling of guilt overcame me as though I were
doing something wicked, and the anxiety waxed in proportion. I
should say, however, that the latter alternative provoked the greater
disturbance, for I felt that if I obeyed the order, I should commit an
act irreparably damaging to my personality. And yet in both cases,

12
Inanimate objects suddenly seemed to Renee to exist as if alive: My eyes met a chair, then a
table; they were alive asserting their presence. I attempted to escape their hold by calling out
their names. I said, chair, jug, table, it is a chair. But the word echoed hollowly, deprived of all
meaning; it had left the object, was divorced from it, so much that on one hand it was living,
mocking thing, on the other, a name, ribbed of sense, an envelope emptied of content.
(Sechehaye, 1951, p. 35)
Valsiner 53

obedience or disobedience was something artificial, something

theatrical. (Sechehaye, 1951, p. 36, added emphases)

Here we see an account of the intra-self opposition of two voices both of

which are attributed to social agents ("the System", Mama) outside of the self
yet have their role inside of Renees internal self. Renees own central voice
becomes the counter-actor to the impending voices of the othersshe resists
them, in ways that lead to the affective overgeneralization of her self (into
anguish, guilt), fortified by meanings used as semiotic controllers (wicked.
damaging to personality). Finally, distancing through hyper-generalized
meaning (something theatrical) was a result.
Examples from psychopathological cases often demonstrate how the mind
functions when the construction of the constraining of semiotic mediation is in
some ways altered. If the stop signs are missing in the process of self-
regulation (i.e., the decision at junction new level, n+1? in Figure 1.12. is
always answered affirmatively), the self would not be able to function in the
actual life environment. The absence (or elimination) of the meta-regulator
production capacity leads to the over-proliferation of ever further abstract and
hyper-generalized meanings without limits. The free flow of schizophrenic
thought may be available not merely by the capacity for the thoughts to fly in all
directions, but simply due to the absence of meta-regulators that would stop that
flow in many directions, and constrain it towards conventional and situation-
appropriate ways of regulating the experience 13.

Synthesis of regulators and meta-regulators. The dialogical self can be seen

as self-regulating of the ongoing action process while creating general personal
sense of the kind of what is it that is going on. That latter meaning-making is a
by-product of the ongoing semiotic regulation process. Human beings go on
living within their here-and-now life worlds, regulating their relationships with the
world from the ego-centered basis. Their reflection upon these worlds emerges
as a by-product of the regulation effortsthrough over-generalized affective
meanings that become maintained as feed-forward organizes of further
construction of semiotic control systems. The co-emergence of semiotic
regulators and generalized meanings guarantees the self-regulation of the
semiotic hierarchy over time (and contexts). The crucial issue of semiotic
regulation system is to grant its sufficiency for regulation of the immediate
experience, blocking unnecessary proliferation of the evoking of signs in any
here-and-now context.
The semiotic mediation process allows us to overlook a myriad of
possibilities that are unlikely at the given moment, and can be ignored for all
13
This perspective provides a slightly unusual look at the phenomena that are usually labeled
"creativity". It is not the capacity to produce novel versions of whatever is the object domain of
creativity, but to develop a system of meta-regulators that allows to guide the created versions in
directions that are within the "zone of proximal development" of what the sets of current
conventions allow to be treated as "creative". Here, again, the three-part field (A= "creative", non-
A = "non-creative" but conventional; not-A = not conventional and not creative) is applicable
(Bateson, 1971). For further coverage see chapter 3.
Valsiner 54

practical purposes. For example, we do not expect the roof to collapse over our
heads (even if that is a possible scenario), we do not expect to fall down at every
step we take-- even as walking can be analyzed as a process of constant losing
and re-gaining of upright balance, which takes quite a bit of time to establish in
ones second life-year). Thus, general psychological discounting blocks a number
of scenarios from arriving at a dysfunctional synthesis. Without such semiotic
blockers any action would be impossiblePierre Janet (1921) has provided
elegant evidence for that from psychiatric cases. A patient is caught in block of all
movementssince every possible course of action may trigger a negative
outcome 14.

Example 1.4. The fear of action. Janet reports a case of a 49 year old man
who blocks each of his action by a semiotic mediation device that he invents. The
man is self-reflective of his inability to act. He describes it:

I cannot perform a single new activity without representing it to

myself that it is going to entail diabolical consequences. If I buy new
shirts it seems as if I were preparing for the assassination of my
two children. If I rent an apartment it is only in order that I may
place under the big entrance door the coffin of my wife where it will
rest very nicely.; I have selected this apartment (it would seem)
only because of the convenience which the entrance way presents
for the coffin of my wife. If I open this book it is with the idea that I
am preparing a cataclysm which will involve the whole city of Paris.
All this frightens me so that I take back my recent purchase of shirts
with the excuse that they do not fit: I give up the apartment, and I
close the book. (Janet, 1921, pp, 153-154)

For our present analysis this psychopathological example from the past
constitutes an extension of the general sign-hierarchy of semiotic mediation. Its
functional structure is:

META-FEELING FIELD Z
(it all frightens me)

MEANING FIELD Y (reflecting upon X)

{ACTION X <versus> NON-ACTION} or {REVERSAL OF X}

(buy shirts; rent an apartment; open a book)

14
Janets general comment on patients who turn towards self-reflection is indicative of psychology: The
patients who are ill-satisfied with their action watch themselves, and by dint of observations, through
anxiety about themselves, they fall into a sort of perpetual auto-analysis. They become psychologists;
which is in its way a disease of the mind (Janet, 1921, p. 152)
Valsiner 55

In this functional structure, it is the affective fieldfield-like sign of

generalized kind (it frightens me) that leads to the abandonment of the actions.
Less dramatic examples may be found in ordinary daydreaminga person thinks
of a situation, makes connections of the particular acts within the situation with a
larger meaning system, and thenbased on an overwhelming feeling fieldlets
oneself to drop the imagined situation 15. It is in our imaginationin continuity
with play-- where we build up our future development (Vygotsky, 1931, 1966,
1994).
The process of disorganization of the semiotic self-regulatory system is
further exemplified by a young anorexic woman (Isabella). She explained,

I assure you I am not at all possessed with the idea of not eating;
it seems to me even that I should like to eat; but at the moment of
beginning, the thought of it chokes me, disgusts me, and I cannot.
Why? I dont know; I assure you it is not that I wish to die; I begin
even to be afraid that I may; but despite all my efforts to eat there is
something that prevents me. (Janet, 1901,. Pp. 288-289, added
emphases)

Here we can observe the rivalry of a number of meta-feeling sign fields in

a dialogue (see further on Dialogical Self in chapter 3). In Isabellas dream
material as well as in her delirium states, the inter-personal symbolic regulators
become clarified:

Her mother, who is dead, appears to her during the attacks, blames
her for some fault she has committed, tells her that she is not
worthy to live and that she ought to join her in heaven, and bids her
for this reason not to eat. (Janet, 1901, p. 289)

The proof that this semiotic organizer (an External I-Positionsee

Chapter 3) is indeed the major meta-level regulator of Isabellas relating to
herself via eating comes from hypnotic suggestion to her that undoes the
mothers image. When waking up, Isabella finds herself eating with easeuntil
the next episode of delirium occurs.

These examples indicate what kinds of pathological trajectories of action

may become constructed if the semiotic regulatory processes are out of order. In

15
Precisely similar process of sense-making can be observed in the Medieval Catholic Europe in the
process of decision by a womanand her inquisitorabout whether she has felt she had been in sexual
relations with a demon. The search in the dream for specific features of the assumed demon (e.g., one of
the feet being of the form of a birds foot; or too enjoyable pleasure in intercourse) would lead to the
affectively flavored meta-meaning of the eventresulting in confession, followed by pardoning, or in
persecution of the woman as a witch (see Stephens, 2002, chapter 4; also Behar, 1987)
Valsiner 56

our ordinary ways of living, we can dismiss the morbid images linked with buying
shirts, or renting an apartment, by way of immediate use of circumvention
strategies (Josephs & Valsiner, 1998). Such morbid ideas just are not given an
opportunity to growlet along become dominant. In our ordinary lives, semiotic
discounting mechanisms (SDM) make it possible for us to live with limited
construction of fears of accidents. The power of the human mind is in the gross
discounting of the myriad of possible accident scenarios. Our capacity to
selectively suppress most of these scenarios or merely pay no attention to
themis the basis for our mental health.

Example 1.5. How is it so that we are not paranoic?

How is paranoia possible? Emergence of paranoia is an example of how

the construction process entails the replacement of the general discounting
regulator by its opposite. Thus, from the duality of meaning opposition
(boldfaced part dominant)

{IT IS POSSIBLE, BUT NOT LIKELY} IT IS POSSIBLE, AND LIKELY

that operates as a regulator, the meaning-maker first arrives at the dominance

reversal within the opposition (i.e. IT IS POSSIBLE, AND LIKELY becomes
dominant). If from here follows de-coupling of the opposites (the possible-not-
likely part gets dropped), and an escalatory pattern of the dominant de-coupled
part {IT IS POSSIBLE, AND LIKELY} in relation to some specific experience
becomes established, then we come to the doorstep of emergence of worries,
and (eventually) of paranoia. That could entail the creation of the meaning of a
danger, which, when fed back into the process, becomes escalated and hyper-
generalized. In and by itself, being realistic about potential dangers one can
encounter within environments is not sufficient for emergence of paranoia. For
the latter,
when a paranoiac person falsely ascribes functions, attitudes,
and intentions to other persons, he does far more than merely to
put his thoughts into them. He sets up hypothetical
interrelationships between other persons and himself, and he
organizes them functionally into a pseudo-community, made up of
objective persons with imaginary functions. These imaginary
functions are built up out of fragments of the social behavior of
social persons. The fragments of behavior are misunderstood by
the paranoiac in the direction of his expanding system. The actual
movements, remarks, and other actions of people around him
become cues, signals, threats and warnings within a pseudo-
community of plotters. Out of these raw materials in his
surroundings the paranoiac organizes a functionally interrelated
Valsiner 57

environment, of which he is the focal point. Its pattern develops

from his sensitivities and preoccupations, as well as from the more
accidental character of the corroborative detail he finds about him.
Eventually he reacts overtly to this whole structure. In most
instances he begins to take protective or aggressive measures and
counter-measures, until the whole thing finally erupts into the social
field. (Cameron, 1943, p. 231)

Ordinary misunderstanding and misinterpretation of the social world

become escalated into delusions of persecution and rigidified. The constructed
pseudo-community becomes a catalytic condition for synthesis of understanding
of the actions of real people. In the paranoiacs life-worldas well as everybody
elsessuch imagined community is a semiotic vehicle for self-regulation.
The dynamics of emergence of paranoia can be seen as similaron the
opposite end of contentsto the emergence of any positive identification of a
person with a social entity. A paranoiac has constructed the stable expectation
for the outside world to be after him or her. In a similar vein, the person with
positive identification has constructed the unconditional positive value of the
identification object in the world with which one is aligned. If one misinterprets
the neutral inputs from the world as negative (and positive ones as suspect), the
other accepts even negative inputs from the world in terms of their constructed
benevolence 16. The latter is an interpretation similar to that of the paranoiac, only
in the opposite direction. In this sense, the opposites of positive social identities
and paranoiac pathological patterns are created by the same basic
organizational system within the dialogical self.

Summary: Culture as semiotic regulation system

Culture is a part of the systemic organization of human psychological

functions. It takes the form of constructing and using signs to transform the here-
and-now setting of the human being. The human beings can distance themselves
from any current setting through such cultural (semiotic) means. Yet they remain
parts of the setting. Hence, human cultural relating to the world entails
simultaneous closeness to, and distancing from, the actual situation the person is
in.
This dynamic and constructionist view on culture creates the bridge
between cultural and developmental psychologies. The former investigates the
process of sign construction, use, and its results. These results involve novelty--
the emergence of psychological phenomena that did not exist prior to the
creation of new understanding, here-and-now, by way of a sign. Cultural

16
On the basis of social, political, or religious identity formation individuals can view acts of limitations of
their personal freedoms through the lens of positive affect. Thus, for a proud citizen of a country, the
demand by a tax official to pay taxes is an act of proud identity, while a similar demand for a paranoiac is
interpretable as an act of persecution.
Valsiner 58

psychology looks at the micro-settings of construction of the new through the

creation and use of signs. Umberto Eco has captured that focus:

Perhaps we are, somewhere, the deep impulse which

generates semiosis. And yet we recognize ourselves only as
semiosis in progress, signifying systems and communicational
processes. The map of semiosis, as defined at a given stage of
historical development (with the debris carried over from previous
semiosis), tells us who we are and what (or how) we think. (Eco,
1984, p.45)

Persons thus make signsutilizing their sign-construction historyunder

the guidance of other human beings who are collectively guided in this meaning-
making enterprise by different social institutions. Our focus in this book is on
how the interface between these social units and active semiotic agents
persons living their livesis structured.
Valsiner 59

Chapter 2. Society and Community: Interdependence of Social

Webs

Our society is an institution which inhibits what it

stimulates. It both tempers and excites aggressive,
epistemic, and sexual tendencies, increases or
reduces the chances of satisfying them according to
class distinctions, and invents prohibitions together
with the means of transgressing them. Its sole
purpose, to date, is self-preservation, and it opposes
change by means of laws and regulations. It
functions on the basic assumption that it is unique,
has nothing to learn, and cannot be improved.
Hence its unambiguous dismissal of all that is
foreign to it. Even its presumed artificiality, which
might be considered a shortcoming, is taken, on the
contrary, for a further sign of superiority, since it is
an attribute of mankind. (Moscovici, 1976, p. 149,
added emphasis).

This book is about how human beings live in a societyand hoe the
society lives within the human beings. In our everyday talk we hear statements
about societys needs, prescriptions, states of crises, and so one. Such talk is
authored by human beingsyet pertains to the abstraction society. We all
seem to know what our society is and what it wants but the society is actually
an abstraction. It is a collectively createdand sharedmyth story that
functions as a sign. Yet there is the interesting feature of such myth stories
once told (and re-told), they create a social field that operates by constructed
normswhich have very real guiding impact on real human beings. Society is a
mythological web that creates very real conditions for the lives of human beings
enmeshed in that web. In fact, these human beings are involved in constructing
and reconstructing that webthey exercise their freedom to act to create the
guiding constraints for their own living (Valsiner, 1997, 1998a).
As this book is about semiotic foundations of cultural psychology, we can
look at the notion of society as a sign. It is a word that denotes a myriad of
phenomena. That nature of society sets it us as an example of a field-like sign
(as contrasted with a point-like sign-- Chapter 1)a hyper-generalized sign that
permeates our thinking and feeling in their totality. Such signs are everywhere
and at the same time nowhere in our culturally constituted minds. They form a
semiosphere (Lotman, 1990, 1992), which is
Valsiner 60

the semiotic space necessary for the existence and functioning

of languages, not the sum total of different languages; in a sense
the semiosphere has a prior existence and is in constant interaction
withy languages (Lotman, 1990, p. 123)

The notion of semiosphere is borrowed by analogy from the biological

world its twin notion is that of biosphere. Both are holistic field concepts.
The semiosphere is characterized by its heterogeneitydiversity of elements
and their functions. The elements of the field exist in binary relationswhich are
viewed as asymmetric (center<>periphery, etc.)
The general notion of society is one of the general terms within our
semiosphere. We operate in our everyday lives through the use of the notion of
society by taking its demands into account, wanting to belong to it, or even
dedicating our lives to it. The ever-present war memorials that can be found all
over the World are a testimony for the human history of giving up ones life at the
patriotic duty call of the given society at the given time.

Societya functional abstraction and a semiotic mediator

As a conceptual abstraction, the society becomes put into everyday

practices by different social institutionsgovernments, police, armies,
manufacturers, sellers, etc. All these institutions are real and powerful agents in
the social lifeyet none of them individually equals the full extent to which the
society refers. Even the most self-assured monarchwho may claim I am the
societyor a political party that has established full control over the functioning
of a governmentare not telling us the truth. No personor single institution
can be the society. Yet these political uses of the term indicate that efforts to
show oneself as if one were the society are of some functional use. Different
social actorspoliticians, religious leaders, political parties, civil and uncivil (i.e.,
secret) services of a countryall attempt to appropriate the symbolic value of the
signthe society for their particular purposes.
The notion of the society is itself a relatively recent social constructionit
came into use in the 19th century, allowing the emergence of areas of inquiry
(called social sciences) to study it. Yet it was built upon the ambiguity of being
between the social power of the state, and the domestic worlds of individual
human beings:

From the mid-eighteenth century onward, the term society came

to be used in the moral and political sciences, in particular within
French and Scottish debates, and it became the denomination for
the key object of sociopolitical life there. Originally, in combination
such as political society and civil society, it referred to nothing
else but the state, but from a point of view of contract theory,
namely as the aggregation of human beings that have come
Valsiner 61

together for a purpose. But in some late eighteenth-century

theories, civil society came to be seen as a phenomenon that was
different from the statebut different from the individual
households as well. (Wagner, 2000, p. 133, added emphases)

The notion of the society is thus a meaning at the intersection of the

private and the public domains of human existence. The well-established kinship
groupsthe family, the clanbound together by blood (and inheritance) ties did
not need a new designation. It would not be of any use to call the complex
households of Turkish sultans or French kingsas Topikapi society or
Versailles society. Nor would the change of a name of a mediaeval guild of
professional specialists in a Hansatown from the goldsmiths guild into society
of goldsmiths be more than an inconsequential re-labeling act. The use of the
term becomes functional when new social purposes for people coming together
emergewhen the state organization of social roles becomes negotiated by the
groups of individuals in relations to state power.
The notion of the society acts as a semiotic mediatora signin human
communication processesboth between persons and institutions, and as an
intra-psychological regulator. As a sign, the society is an example of a hyper-
generalized field of signification. Such hyper-generalized signs are widely used
by us as promoters of our ways of feeling and thinking as we transverse the
myriad of real-life settings that we inhabit. They not only provide us with
generalized, abstracted knowledge about our worlds, but also carry with them
affective suggestions that we use in our everyday ways of living. Not only
different assumed needs or duties-- given to us by the societybut also notions
such as justice, love, success, profit, sin, etcall are used by our individual
selves to regulate our relations with others (and with ourselves) in these settings.

Signs create fields. Moscovicis point about the dual nature of the society, as it
both tempers and excites different tendencies-- aggressive, epistemic, and
sexualand increases or reduces the chances of satisfying themleads us to
the ways in which hyper-generalized signs actually regulate human psyche. The
important feature of such regulation is the unity of the opposites within the same
wholethe notion of the society makes distinctions, and inserts into the
differentiated field of such distinctions both prohibitions (boundaries) and the
ways and conditions of transgressing those.
The society operates in human discourse as a meta-sign that regulates
other meanings used in everyday life, by attributing personified agency to an
abstract socially constructed entity. Consider statements like
the society needs X or the society wants Y. By attributing the functions of
wanting ,needing, deserving and so on to the vague notion the society human
beings create a secular deity for themselves that is created by their own minds (it
is a personan Iwho says the society wants me to do Xand then follows,
or resists, that want of the otherValsiner, 1999, and above in Chapter 1
cyclical sign hierarchy).
Valsiner 62

Figure 2.1. An example of a unity of opposites and their relationship

dynamics

X <> Y
|
Z

THE
SOCIET
Y:You
THE SHOUL
SOCIETY: D
You
MUST

FIELD A

Corresponding FIELD non-A

BOUNDARY of A and non-A

(with conditions of
permeability X, Y, Z)

Consider the moral imperative of you should not kill that the society can
be said to insert into the field of meanings of persons (Figure 2.1.). The
generalized meaning fieldof aggression towards anotheris divided by the
distinction made by the boundary. The boundary, however, is conditionally
permeable (the X-Y-Z catalyst deciding under which conditions the opposite of
you should not kill becomes turned into you must kill (see also Chapter 1 on
catalytic causality).
Obviously, the critical condition of the functioning of this field (kill or not to
kill) as attributed to the society is in the conditional catalyzers (X-Y-Z) that
maintain both the boundary as a limit and allowunder specifiable
circumstancesit to be passed. This leads to the dominance of the previously
sub-dominant (or even seemingly absent) part of the system. If X = peace and
Y= war, and Z= this time, we see the semiotic complex of the society fitting to
allow all meanings (and their implied action suggestions) to be under social
control. Any social powera kind, a president, a parliament, or a band of
rebels who uses the attributions to societys wishes negotiates social control
Valsiner 63

of persons within the given state. The society here becomes the functional ruler
of the given social unit.
Through covering all possible conditions of the {A<>non-A} field (see
elaboration of theories of that kind in Chapter 3), the society (as the attributed
agent of the meanings involved within the field) can assume control over all
possible courses of action imaginable within the given content domain. Thus, in
peacetime it may be self-evident not to kill your neighbor, while at the time of
genocide it becomes more than acceptable to do so if the neighbor is of some
specifiable characteristic (e.g., Hutu/Tutsi relationships Mamdani, 2001;
Semujangga, 2003, the historical roots of the Darfur conflict in Sudande Waal,
1997, 2005). At the same time the killing of bothersome insectsflies or
mosquitoeswho are also considered dangerous may be unproblematicuntil
the notion of the secret benevolent power of these insects becomes generated
by somebody, and proliferated by the society. Then the moral imperative of the
society may prescribe the preservation of insects ahead of the human
neighborsan unlikely scenario, but one to illustrate the centrality of boundary
maintenance as depicted in Figure 2.1. and to elaborate Moscovicis idea.
An important general axiom that will be followed all through this book is
illustrated by Figure 2.1. in case of social and psychological phenomena, as
well as their relations, it is the process dynamics of the relations between
opposites embedded within the same whole that generates the whole range of
ways of beingof societies, communities, and persons. Thus, we are not
interested in arriving at solutions to ontological questions, such as what is
Society X like? or what personality traits are there in person N?. Sure, it is
possible to describe any person, community, or country or ethnic group in its
relatively stable state. Yet it is not that stable statea steady state in terms of
open systems theorythat embeds in itself some inherent essential cause to
which one can attribute responsibility for a particular outcome. Rather, any stable
state of an organism, or social unit, is a result of a dynamic process that
maintains it. We here are interested in unraveling these dynamic processes
made possible by semiotic mediation (culture)that generate the whole range of
outcomes, under varied circumstances.

Example 2.1. How psychologists think about individualism and

collectivism. As an example of essentialist ways of thinkingthe ones we this
book is not usingconsider the widespread discussion in cross-cultural
psychology about individualist and collectivist societies. The practice of
making such distinction (e.g., Indians and Japanese are collectivistic or North
Americans are individualistic) may fare sufficiently well in everyday discourse
but fails when it is taken over to scientific explanations. Thus, to posit that a
latent causecollectivismproduces all Japanese, Indian, or any other
societys social and psychological phenomena, would be grossly inadequate.
Likewise, claims that American individualism causes individualistic conduct is
simply tautological. Such attribution would be similar to magic projection of the
causal powers of X into the X itself (water spirits into water, tree spirits into
trees, etc). While magical thinking helps everyday life (and is meant to be
Valsiner 64

functional for common sense), its uses for scientific language constitute an
impasse that would bring psychology close to alchemy 17.

For scientific uses of these concepts, the unity of the opposites is

adequate. Thus, all persons (and social unitsgroups, communities, institutions,
countries, etc) are both individualistic and collectivistic at the same time.
These two opposites are embedded within the same whole. When viewed as a
dynamic whole, it is the relationship between the two opposites that generates all
outcomes. These outcomes may be classified as individualistic, ambiguous,
collectivistic or into whatever other categoriesyet the system that produced all
of those is one that includes the dynamically related opposites (Figure 2.2.). It is
only rarely that the unity of these opposites has been recognized in
contemporary social psychology (see Sinha and Tripathi, 2001).

Why not focus on relationships? The impact of masked power.

A reasonable question, then, iswhy has psychology so adamantly denied the

route of constructing theoretical concepts that unify the opposites and allow to
explain the outcomes of varied kind through such opposites. Instead, the
constant re-making of ever new entified explanatory concepts remains rampant
in the social sciences. The making of The Big Five personality concepts, or of
the separation of masculinity from femininity (and their use in explanatory
efforts), invention of ever-new versions of intelligence (social, emotional,
etc.)are all examples of the monologizing mindset 18 of researchers.
This monologizing mindset of researchers can be traced to the guidance of the
social representing of where explanations for complex phenomena are to be
foundor, more realistically, constructed. Psychology established itself as an
independent discipline in the 19th century in the European context that was
dominated by around 1500 years of impact of the ideology of Christianity in its
multiple forms and transformations-- the Byzantine/Roman split in the 10th
century, and the Protestant/Catholic split of the 16th century. History of the 18th
century includes the focus on the Renaissance philosophy of enlightening of the
soul by its individualist ethos. Hence it was socially guided towards constructing
explanatory principles that would turn the mystical or religious explanations (in
terms of acts of God or those of the soul) into acceptable secular terms (e.g.,
the self, personality traits, individualism etc.).

17
The concepts of alchemists were similar to present-day psychology: before the emergence of the
science of chemistry many alchemists, for example, believed that names were absolute. Far from terms
being arbitrary, as they were later regarded, they were treated in the extreme as if they were equivalent to
things (Crosland, 1995, p. 31). The entification tradition in psychologyconsidering intelligence.
personality traits etc. as if these were real (and causal) entities in the mind is an epistemological move
of similar kind
18
See chapter 3 on the dialogical orientation in theory construction. This orientation starts from the axiom
of multiple causes creating singular outcome. Differently from the acceptance of unstructured set of such
multiplicity, the dialogical perspectives assume a relationship between these posited parts of the causal
systemof the kind of dialogue
Valsiner 65

Figure 2.2. A functional model of individualistic collectivism (or

collectivistic individualism)

AMBIGUOUS
or collectivist
AMBIVALENT OUTCOMES

collec-
indi- tivist
vidualist domain
domain

AMBIGUOUS
indi-
or
vidualist AMBIVALENT
OUTCOMES

Added to this translation was the focus of European semiotic construction of

supremacythe others in newly discovered African, Asian, and American
worlds were to be civilized (see chapter 3). It is therefore not surprising that
even in our contemporary cross-cultural psychology the tension remains between
the assumed values of individualism versus collectivism (rather than:
individualism within collectivism, and vice versa). While accepting the equality
of these two orientations, the researchers confront and fight againstthe
historically set representation of collectivism as inferior to individualism. What
they do not understand, however, that this fight for equality and justice of social
representation is itself a cultural-historic blinder set forth by the masking of power
in the history of Christian ideology. The collective agentsthe unnamable
multitude of ideologues of Christianity over centurieshave maintained the
power of their ideology through insisting that the ideology has no powerall is
delegated to the individuals. Yet the very individuals are in power because of the
sourcecollective social institutions that use the ideologyhas designated them
to be in those (individual) roles. In the psychological wisdom of ruling
ideologiesand every ruling ideology in Worlds history has survived because of
such wisdomthe individual is always necessarily captured in the domineering
field of the social order. Thus,
Valsiner 66

Christianity did not extend absolute moral freedom to the individual:

it enfranchised the individual as a potentially self-sustaining moral
agent under the condition that he or she ascribe to the life
coextensive with God, Christ, and the church. Simply put, the core
premise of individualismthe belief that the individual is the final
arbiter of truthrequires a secularization that, while it may have for
all intents and purposes existed for many in the Renaissance,
cannot be said to have pervaded the moral landscape. The very
superstitions to which the Renaissance was so attractednot to
mention the dependence on sacraments and ceremonies and the
outbreaks of religious revivalism so common to the periodmake it
clear that the Renaissance was far from being the secular age that
would be necessary to give rise to a true individualism. (Shanahan,
1992, p. 57)

The situation is not different in the 21st century where a U.S. President may use a
pledge of allegiance to the Bible to preach the freedom of choice needed for all
individualsno matter in what part of the World, and within which other historic-
religious traditionsthey may live. The unity of community-centeredness
combined with focus on individual action has been the peculiarity of the U.S.
social order (Mead, 1930/2001; Stearns, 2001). Psychology is a product of such
guidancethe masking of dependence on collectivity of ideology through
separationexclusiveof the person from the social context, paired with search
for explanations for the persons conduct within the posited psychological
characteristics within thus separated person. In simple terms, the social order to
psychologists is: you search for explanations for all illssocial or others- in the
person, and dont dare to look at our ideological background that might have
helped these ills to emerge! The social sciences are set up to operate in the
next-door neighbor comfort zonetopics that are too close for comfort of the
social institutions that hold power are made into no-study zones (see below on
Semiotic Demand Settings), while otherssufficiently far for not endangering the
social power while keeping the socially constructed public interest-- are
designated to be intensively studied (hyper-study zones 19).
Of course such social guidance of research is likely to crumble under the new
ideology of globalizationwhich at its inception is yet another symbolic act of
social guidance by economically dominant institutions. Yet by transposing
economic production capacities to be distributed all over the World (for maximum
profits in only some parts of the World), the social system is opened for further
transformation of the economic and social power within the World. Together with
19
A good example is the social construction of AIDS scare in the European and North American
societies (see Preda, 2005) and the conspicuous absence of its equivalent Ebola scare. The link of AIDS
with the moral topic of repression of unguided sexuality in the Christian world makes AIDS a cultural
vehicle for social regulation of European and N-American societiestogether with invention of new
moral superiority stands against governments in Africa (where the HIV infections are by far more
rampant that in Europe or the Americas) which mayfor their own social institutional purposesconsider
the issue of AIDS as part of no talk/no study domains.
Valsiner 67

such transformation come opportunities for change in the ways in which social
sciences construct their theoretical bases. Thus, psychology in the future is likely
to abandon its overemphasized dependence on just one myth of Greek origin
that of Oedipus. Instead one may see the use of previously under-emphasized
yet historically well establishedother myths. Maybe the future of psychology
will be based on the images of Ganesa or Kali in theory constructionin that
case, some aspects of everyday psychological realities may get more elaborate
focus than psychology provides at our time. At the same time in such conceptual
liberation its oppositeconceptual constriction-- is immediately embedded. After
allis any kind of mythof any cultural-religious backgrounda reasonable
starting point for a science? Maybe psychology needs to begin from the myth of
mythlessnessor meaningful field of nothingness 20to become sufficiently
general in its understanding of concrete realities.

General implications: models of dynamic functioning of systems

There is a general principle of theoretical construction inherent in the

example of individualism <> collectivismopen systems of biological,
psychological, and social kind can be conceptualized only through models that
entail the unity of the parts of the system and the nature of that unity. Figure 2.2.
shows how a dynamic mutuality system of constant movement between the
opposites leads to all kinds of results of that system. The same system behaves
in any of the different modesas its behavior consists of by-products of the
dynamic link between the two domains. It depends upon the catalytic conditions
(see Figure 2.1.) when in the cycle 21 one or another outcome is being produced.
The model in Figure 2.2 above is extremely simple. It operates with the
common-sense meanings (individualism, collectivism), yet instead of treating
those as causal essences it treats them as dynamically maintained domains in
a system that is defined by their mutual relationship. The model is a kind of
perpetum mobileit is existing, maintaining itself, but is not developing further,
nor breaking down. In this respect, the model is inadequate as given hereyet it
is by far more sophisticated than is usual in the treatment of the
individualism/collectivism issue in cross-cultural psychology.

Society as a Dynamic System

20
And thus become a part of a Buddhist myth of meaningful everything that equals fulfilled feeling of
emptiness. This may demonstrate the possibility of relativenot absolutedistancing of science from
philosophies.
21
This cycle takes the form of reverberating Mbius stripwhere the quality of one end pole turns into
the other when the process reverberates between the two poles.
Valsiner 68

Here we depart from the usual description of society in terms of its

snapshot of what it is (ontology). Instead, we move to look at society as a
dynamic system that constantly re-organizes itself in the course of maintenance
of its steady state while also setting the stage for its own transformations into
new states. All the social institutions that make up the structure of society are in
constant interaction with one another, re-aligning their mutual roles and power.
Furthermoreas all biological, psychological, and social phenomena
society is an open system. Its systemic organization is made possible by its
constant exchange relationship with its environment. First of all, it is the
resources of the natural environment that are the core for the functioning of
society. These are turned into cultural productswhich then become part of the
societys environment of symbolic resources (Zittoun, 2006). The dynamics of
transformation of societies depends on the availability of both cultural and natural
resources. Any economic progressor collapseof a society is a result of ways
in which the resources are being utilized within the society.
The society can move through a variety of intermediate organizational
forms in the preservation of its steady state. Within such move is the beginning
of its own transformation. All societies are, thus, simultaneously open (as
necessary defining condition for them)with the opposite tendency towards
becoming closed. It may be adequate to view societies as involved in the act of
balancing their state of affairs under the conditions of constant pressures towards
the loss of balance. The ease with which a society moves from a state of peace
to that of war indicates the systemic nature of any society. As pointed out by
Georg Simmel,

Distinctions of differences of value and of purpose are so much a

part of the tendencies of the human mind that we cannot refrain
from representing to ourselves the unbroken flow of alternating
periods through such distinctionsThe same relationship may be
asserted of struggle and peace. Both in the serial and in the
contemporary aspect of social life these conditions are so
interwoven that in every peaceful situation the conditions for further
conflict, and in every struggle the conditions for future peace, are
developing (Simmel, 1904, p. 799, added emphasis).

The very same social system that maintainsand reproducespeace,

builds up its potential to generate military conflicts. When conditions for the
functioning of the society changeor such change is of use for some social
institutionwar can be started. The social system can rely upon the basic
obedience of the persons to authority (Milgram, 1974) to acceptsometimes
enthusiasticallythe substation of the construction focus of peacetime by the
destructive foci of war. While the transition from peace to war (or back) occurs,
the cultural meanings of environment change (Lewin, 1917).
Valsiner 69

The cultural nature of economic relations. All societies are dependent upon
their economic relationswhich are themselves products and means of history of
the societies. The dominant economic systems of European kind

must be seen as an institution composed of systems of

production, power, and signification. The three systems, which
coalesced at the end of the eighteenth century, are inextricably
linked to the development of capitalism and modernity. They should
be seen as cultural forms through which human beings are made
into producing subjects. The economy is not only, or even
principally, a material entity. It is above all a cultural production, a
way of producing human subjects and social orders of a certain
kind (Escobar, 1995, p. 59, added emphases)

The nature of society is precisely located in the feed-forward loop between

the cultural values and activities system we label economy, and its material
results in the form of construction and destruction of material sides of life.
Production entails bothnatural resources are being destructed for the sake of
new constructions. For the purposes of production, the processes of labor need
to be set up in a society.
Labor has two facets. From the economic perspective it can be viewed as
human goals-directed activity that is aimed at the satisfaction of human needs
through relating with the selected features of the environment. The process of
human cultural construction also entails the symbolic construction of ever novel
needs. This is made possible by the semiotic generativity of the human species
who can create new needsand invent ways for their satisfaction. The fetishes
of modern consumer society become understandable in their functional side
once the basic needs of human beings become satisfied, they proceed to
construct new (non-basic) needs, fixate those symbolically as absolutely
necessary through signs, and thencreate an economic framework for their
satisfaction. The guarantee of survival of humankind is thus provided by the
capacities of fetish innovation.
The second facet of labor is its role in setting up the framework for
socialization. In the process of labor, the person

learns to receive and transfer information, react to external

pressures and resolve conflict situations, fine tune ones efforts and
pretend to be actively involved, establish contacts and create the
image of authority-- accumulate capital in all its variable forms. By
becoming a worker, the person acquires more than only
professional roles. He learns what it means to be the boss or the
subordinate or outsider or colleague, peredovik 22, or lagger-
behind. Labor is a school of socialization in which we live a

22
In literal translation from Russianthe person ahead of others. The term was used in the Soviet Union
to signify the role of an especially productive worker (peredovik truda). It carried an implicit ideological
positive valuation in the context of the Soviet society.
Valsiner 70

substantial part of our lives. Aside from the making of products and
services, labor plays the role of production and reproduction of the
person oneself (Radaev, 2006, p. 117)

The involvement in the process of labor involves semiotic linking of the

domains of human activity on the landscape of social institutions with the
abstracted meaning system that is socially suggested for the persons. Thus, a
person from place A migrated to location B in order to work in a factory and earn
money for ones family back in A. This act of migration and labor is meaningful
for the person who needs to support ones family. An external observer of the
persons work in place B who comes from yet another place (C) may find the
active work in B to be sweat-shop exploitation. Children who are involved in
labor are viewed as lacking childhood (rather than acquiring skills)while
children who go to school are viewed as becoming educated (rather than
deprived from work experience). The difference here is in which social
institutional domainthat of production industry or educational establishment
provides meaning to the particular activities of the children.

Belonging to society: a real effort at an impossible task

All human beings are said to belong to societyor societies. Yet they do
so in different waysthey are at different distances from the idealized core
(center) of whatever is meant by a given society. In fact, by assuming there are
such centers of any society (e.g., the core center of the Japanese society)
we as researchers superimpose a homogenizing categorization device onto
otherwise heterogeneous field of human beings relating with one another by a
myriad of kinship, friendship, apprenticeship, or dominance ties that are
established through blood or ownership relations, and differentiated mutually
interdependent social roles. The reality of society X is that of heterogeneous
multitude of human dramas of everyday lives. Yet our depiction of that reality
presents it as if it could be categorized into crisp sets (e.g. a person is either a
member of society X or not; or society X is characterized by features P, Q, and
Sassuming each member is also characterized by these features).
Heterogeneity also dominates the class of all societies. Looking all across
the globe-- the whole World is filled with a great multitude of societies that are in
constant fluxyet maintaining their own relative stability in the middle of that flux.
It is possible to trace similarity of events in a society across its historyusually in
the form of basic existential events (war/peace; birth/death, etc) as well as
various cultural rituals (initiation rituals, weddings, funerals) and their encoding
into fixed cultural spaces (architecture of temples, fortresses, monuments, and
supermarkets).
Persons play different roles in that stability<>instability processes of
societies. They are differentially and dynamically peripheral members of a
society. In fact, the idealized construct of a core of an idealized society
guarantees that only one person (or his/her twin brother or sister) can be the
Valsiner 71

personal accomplishment of the construct A belongs to society X in its fullest

sense (see Figure 2.3.).
If we posit a society as a spacea fieldwith a calculable center (given
the defined boundaries of the fieldFigure 2.3. A.) then it is only one point that
would fit onto the idealized central place of that field. The story is even more
complex if we add to our idealized picture of the society the conditions for ill-
defined boundaries (Figure 2.3.B. i.e., assumption that the frontiers of the field
are constantly moving) and personal movement of all members of the society
within this abstract field. It becomes clear that under such conditions no single
person can occupy the central point of the fieldbut many may pass through it
temporarily in the dynamics of their lives within the field. What follows from this
depiction is the opposite of positing membership in society as a static state or
essence of persons. Instead, belonging to a society is necessarily liminal in its
personal core. This liminality is the result of viewing personseven in their stable
states of being as entailing tension between as-is and as-if (or as-could-
be) states. A person is always operating at the boundary of these two
domainsand being on boundary is the bestas well as the most ambiguous--
place for acquiring knowledge. Paul Tillich has summarized that ambiguity in his
autobiographical notes as the basic dialectic of existence:

each of lifes possibilities drives of its own accord to a boundary

and beyond the boundary where it meets that which limits it. The
man who stands on many boundaries experiences the unrest,
insecurity, and perfection. This holds true in life as well as in
thought (Tillich, 1966, p. 97-98, added emphasis)

Human living is thus boundaries-making, boundaries-crossing, and

boundaries re-making activity. One of the primary mechanisms of creating
meaningful uniquenessor semiotic individuationis the boundary, which

can be defined as the outer limit of a first-person form. This

space is ours, my own, it is cultured, safe, harmoniously
organized, and so on. By contrast their space is other, hostile,
dangerous, chaotic. The boundary may separate the living from
the dead, settled people from nomadic ones, the town from the
plains; it may be a state frontier, or a social, national, confessional,
or any other kind of frontier. (Lotman, 1990, p. 131)

As constant movers across boundaries, we are all perpetual migrants

moving through self-created labyrinths of meanings, social rules, andmost
importantlyambiguity that is present as a normal state of affairs in that
movement (Abbey, 2006). Human living has agentive directivity the telos is the
center of our movements.
Valsiner 72

Figure 2.3. The abstract depiction of a society and persons belonging to

it (a and b are persons in the given society field)

A. a fixed-boundary field B. Ill-defined

boundaries field

a a
b
b

center point center point

C. movements within the fixed-boundary field

(person a moved towards center in the past, now escapes it
person b moved towards center in the past and continues in future)

While operating constantly under such boundary conditionsin the

context of all the uncertainties of liminal movement in some direction (and away
from some other direction), persons create signs that stabilize their state of
affairs as if they were in a stable, stationary position. Rituals and social roles can
be seen as such guiding promoter signsthey are set up to be relatively stable
(yet can be flexibly re-enacted in novel ways in terms of the ludic features in
human livingKoepping, 1997). Yet in their set-up as reflected by the persons
as well as the socio-legal systemsthe roles and rituals are presented as if
stable. Sometimesin maximum cases of symbolization-- they are presented as
hyper-fixedno actions violating their sanctity are allowed 23. Under ordinary
circumstances,

23
Consider legal regulations of acting upon symbols of statehood (flags, emblems) or economic power
(banknotes). The very image of a piece of cloth (flag) being burned, or a piece of paper (banknote) being
torn into halves, is not just socially illegal or at least reproachable, and personally horrifying, or at least
unpleasant.
Valsiner 73

a social role involves continual interaction between the performer

and other people. .. in a theatrical drama the role is created by the
dramatist once and for all: Hamlet is the same role in each
Valsiner 74

particular performance though different actors may play it

differently. In social life each person enacts his own separate role;
the roles of many particular physicians, merchants, or housewives
are only similar because, and so far as, they follow the same
cultural pattern recognized as binding in certain collectivities.
(Znaniecki, 1939, p. 806, added emphasis)

Thus, the social person a subjective being within a social settingis

constantly acting within the range of possibilities of the social role, or normand
testing its boundaries in efforts to re-organize the social roles themselves. The
social web is constantly constructed by collective actions of individualswho
then proceed to destruct it in order to re-assemble it in ever new ways. The
transitions in social order come by the goal-oriented and meaningful personal
violations of the previous order which may be of dire consequences 24. Still, the
bonds of social bindings are being changedboth in the social and personal
realms (Lawrence, Benedikt & Valsiner, 1992).
This understanding of centrality of liminality of belonging opens the door
for analysis of direction of personal movement within the field of society.
Liminality may often symbolize a creative transcendence of the given categories
of a system (Das, 1976, p. 261). This creative transcendence is based on the
bidirectionality in culture transfer (see chapter 1, esp. Figure 1.4.) and is made
possible by the active role of persons in the construction of their own selves.
Children transcend their here-and-now settings in play (Vygotsky, 1933/1966),
adolescentsin their imagination (Vygotsky, 1994), and adultsin their day-
dreaming (Pereira and Diriwchter, 2007). Through all these means persons
create discontinuitiesadventures (Lightfoot, 1997)-- into their on-going ways of
living. Construction of meaningful discontinuitiesin counteraction to routines
and boredomis present even in case of performing seemingly fixed cultural
rituals (Koepping, 1997).
It could be stated in general that human beings are constantly and
consistently making themselves liminalor: being adventurous is deeply human.
Yet its functionof striving for the unknown- has the function to modify the well-
known, rather than abandon it (Abbey & Davis, 2003). As Georg Simmel has
noted,

Something becomes an adventure only by virtue of two conditions:

that it itself is a specific organization of some significant meaning
with a beginning and an end; and that, despite its accidental nature,
its extraterritoriality with respect to the continuity of life, it
nevertheless connects with the character and identity of the bearer
of that lifethat it does so in the widest sense, transcending, by a

24
As we know, human social and political history is filled with imprisonment, torture, and execution of
individuals who have violated a given social order.
Valsiner 75

mysterious necessity, lifes more narrowly rational aspects (Simmel,

1959a, p. 246).

Persons are not statically situated in a societybut their belonging

entails the detection of their current position within the field, their trajectories of
movements within the field in the past, and their direction of striving to move
within the field between present and future. They are simutaneously striving
towards the foreign and the home (Fernweh and Heimweh Boesch, 1997-
see also chapters 1 and 3)similarly to little childrens approach/avoidance
routines in contacting a stranger (Valsiner and Hill, 1989).
On the ontogenetic scale, the unity of past, present, and future directions
amounts to a personal life histories approach to the issue of belonging to a
society. Persons are on a constant and inevitable move from their pasts towards
the future (see Figure 2.3.C.). By recording at this moment that they are all in a
similar state (e.g., belong to middle class) we do not know if their past life
courses are similar or not. Some may belong to the middle class over
generations, other may be ascendants from the lower classes or descendants
from the upper classesin case of such simple three-part distinction with
allowed crossings of class boundaries. Likewise, some of them aspire towards
upper class status in their imagined future (i.e. the phenomenon of upward
mobility) while others try to maintain their class status.
Furthermorepersons can belong to different societies at the same
time as migrant workers, missionaries, or immigrants from society X residing in
society Y; or as temporary residents traders, tourists, peacekeepers or other
invaders from the outside of society Y. Such multiple membershipsbrought
by through migration between the societiesfurther complicate the issue of
belonging to a society. Soin sumwe can say that human beings belong to
their own lives. This happens biologically (e.g., bodily capacities, biological role in
reproduction, and illness histories), socially (roles in a social or kin group,
community, etc.) and culturally (uses of semiotic mediation devices in regulating
their own development and relations with others). From our person-centered
angle the story of belonging is turned inside outit is the different societies
that belong to the person who migrates constructively through ones own life.

Societies and communities

As we discover, society is a very convenient fiction. It is a fiction because

it entails unity between persons, their life spaces and ways of living, as well as in
the social organization of their conduct. It is convenient since reference to it can
be used to make an indefinite general notion definite by its personification
(society needs X, society is open etc.). Society is turned into a concept with
inherent moral valueit is either good (and people are to serve it) or bad (and
people should change it).
Real people of course live in their immediate social environments
communities. Ferdinand Tnnies introduced in 1887 the distinction of community
(Gemeinschaft) and society (Gesellschaft). Not surprisingly, his image of the
Valsiner 76

community was based on that of German village. Beginning from the issue of
how goals-oriented human beings relate to one another, he introduced the
contrast person<>community<>society in dynamic terms:

Every such relationship is a mutual action, inasmuch as one party

is active, or gives, while the other party is passive, or receives.
These actions are of such a nature that they tend either toward
preservation or destruction of the other will or life; that is, they are
either positive or negative. .. Every such relationship represents
unity in plurality and plurality in unity. It consists of assistance,
relief, services, which are transmitted back and forth from one party
to another and are to be considered as expressions of wills and
their forces
The relationship itself is conceived of either as real and organic
lifethis is the essential characteristic of the Gemeinschaft
(community); or as imaginary and mechanical structurethis is the
concept of Gesellschaft (society) (Tnnies, 1957, p. 33)

The community is an organically differentiating social unitbased on the

persons social immersion among other human beings. Gemeinschaft is the
lasting form of social life of persons who are united together by different ties.
Gesellschaft, in contrast, is transitory and superficial.
Tnnies contrast was a product of Germany of his timerecently united
(1870) country of course could not show any other form of society as that of a
mechanical (political) aggregate, while the immediate communities had longevity
beyond generations. Alsothe delineation of communities was relatively easy by
the mere fact of mostly sedentary lifestyle. Within the community, differentiation
by way of authority (by age, by force, and by wisdom) could be delineated by
Tnnies. Yet the Gemeinschaft was a growing, differentiating, andeventually
hierarchically integrated social unit. A distanced, differentiated form of
Gemeinschaft was the basis for Gesellschaft.
That would be the developmental/historical interpretation of Tnnies idea.
Yet as is usual in the social sciences, the historical view was easily replaced by
treating community and society as two separate and mutually opposed
categoriesa typology. A comparison of the two gets rid of the transformation
process of one into the other. The highly differentiated nature of the society can
eliminateor hideits integrative ties. Thus, Tnnies himself led to the
juxtaposition of the two at the level of their outcome states. In Gesellschaft,
individuals

are essentially separated in spite of all uniting factors we find

no actions that can be derived from an a priori and necessarily
existing unity; no actions, therefore, which manifest the will and
spirit of the unity even if performed by the individual; no actions
which, in so far as they are performed by the individual, take place
on behalf of those united with him. (Tnnies, 1957, p. 65)
Valsiner 77

Typologies are synchronic comparisons. The contrast between society

and community was made by Tnnies between an organically functioning,
mutually interdependent wholecommunityand a mechanical externally
organized conglomerate (society). The critical distinction between them is made
on the basis of the role of individualswhile community is made possible and
functions due to the interdependence of persons in the community, their role in
society is circumscribed by the formal roles and role relationships. Thus, my
uncle Thomas may be the policeman in my little villageand in that role he is
simultaneously a member of the village communityas a person all know, revere
or fear, but recognize as our ownand that of societyas a carrier of the
social role policeman that is defined by some government far beyond my
village. Yet that government provides uncle Tom the expected uniform that
makes him marginal in the communitythe uniform signifies a break with the
local community, ascription of power role that represents social unity of the
institutions of the society. Thus, by way of multiple ties with social
organizationslocal and nationalmy uncle Thomas becomes a liminal member
of the local community (as seen in Figure 2.4.). Belonging to a communityand
participating in a societyis a process of inevitable ambivalence.
In Figure 2.4., the person A is in between the local Community X and the
wider Society Ywhere Y includes X. Yet there is inevitably a difference
between the modes of functioning of X and Y (see Tnnies
Gesellschaft/Gemeinschaft distinction above), and between the goals of the
agentspersonal and institutionalwho constantly re-negotiate the
community/society borderlands. Mohana person appointed to the role of a
policeman on the Andaman Islands, reflects this sentiment:

What good has happened to me! I had a uniform to wear and be in

the world outside the forest. But can the world outside take me, as I
am an Ongee [local ethnic group] policeman and not a policeman?
For my people I am neither policeman nor an Ongee. I make
enough money to get all my requirements from the nearby market,
why should I bother with working in the forest? No wonder many
Ongees resent me! (Pandya, 2005, p. 401)
Valsiner 78

Figure 2.4. The ambivalence of belonging to two different social units

community and society-- simultaneously

SOCIETY
A Communi
ty

This ambivalence is even more profound if we consider all persons-in-

community (who are simultaneously members of a society) to be constant
migrantseither between socio-economic strata (some become richer, others
poorer), or between geographical locations for living and working. Thus, todays

sub-Saharan Africas most prominent place is no longer the

shade tree of the village but the central bus station, and time in
Africas Muslim societies is no longer marked by the adhan, the call
for prayers of the local muadhdhin, but by the daily programmes of
a multitude of radio and TV stations. Also, the khutba, the Friday
sermon, is rendered today, in many sub-Saharan Muslim societies,
in the relevant vernacular language and transmitted in national
radio and TV programmes. (Loimeier, 2005, p. 404)

Societies that are undergoing change set up migratory patterns for

communities. People migrate to cities, or other countries, in search for better
economic life conditions. At the same time, our modern technology makes us
migrants right in our homesbringing socially pre-fabricated suggestive images,
narratives, and events to us beyond the private/public space borders that exist in
any community. At the same time, it also allows for quick and far-off migration of
persons who may enter a far-off society by taking an airplaneor a barge that
smuggles them to a dream society against the dangers of weather, smugglers
greed, and the tough immigration laws of that country of ones dreams.
Valsiner 79

Social Structures and their Differentiation

History of societies provides us with a picture of evolved and relatively

stable differences, oppositions, and other forms of interdependencies between
social categories by which human beings are considered united into
homogeneous classes. Such classesnations, social classes, gender groups,
age cohorts, professional guilds, or castesare all semiotic management
devices of the process of regulating social orders. Classes are results of semiotic
distinctionspartitions of the heterogeneous class of human beings into
homogeneous groups. Thus, the traditional Marxist distinction of classes by the
criterion of their relationship with the means of production (the bourgeoisie, the
proletariat, the intelligentsia) treats all the classes as unified by that criterion.
Likewise, the feminist distinction of human beings into males (or oppressors)
and females (or victims) assumes a value-laden contrast of homogeneous
classes. The usual distinction of classes in the social sciences combining
educational level, occupation, and income (Hollingshead SES index) creates the
distinction of higher, middle, and lower classes along similar lines.
However, the reality of human existence remains heterogeneous. As
Pierre Bourdieu has remarked,

The individuals grouped ion a class that is constructed in a

particular respect always bring with them, in addition to their
pertinent properties by which they are classified, secondary
properties This means that a class or class fraction is defined not
only by its position in the relations of production, as identified
through indices such as occupation, income, or even educational
levelby a whole set of subsidiary characteristics which may
function, in the form of tacit requirements, as real principles of
selection or exclusion without ever being formally stated (this is the
case with ethnic origin and sex). A number of official criteria in fact
serve as a mask for hidden criteria: for example, the requiring of a
given diploma can be a way of demanding a particular social origin.
(Bourdieu, 1984, p. 102)

Thuswhile the external (official) classification of persons into social

classes serves different administrative (privileging, stigmatizing, eradicating)
functions, the actual functioning of social class markers in the processes of inter-
personal and social-institutional interaction allows the notion of social class to
become a functional hyper-generalized sign that is used in particular contexts.

How to understand transformations: The differentiation principle

Valsiner 80

When seen in movement, societies are conglomerates of social

institutions that are constantly involved in a process of differentiation and de-
differentiation. The theoretical notion of differentiation and hierarchical
integration is known through the work of Heinz Werner in developmental
psychology (Valsiner, 2005b; Werner, 1957). Its roots go back to the natural
philosophy of Johann Wolfgang Goethe. In its general form, the Orthogenetic
Principle is usually given as:

Developmental psychology postulates one regulative principle of

development; it is an orthogenetic principle which states that
wherever development occurs it proceeds from a state of relative
globality and lack of differentiation to a state of increasing
differentiation, articulation, and hierarchical integration. (Werner,
1957, p. 126)

Here, a number of further features are important. First, it is important to

emphasize Werner's focus on the emergence of the polarity (=differentiation) of
the Subject (of action) and its Object:

...increasing subject-object differentiation involves the corollary that

the organism becomes increasingly less dominated by the
immediate concrete situation; the person is less stimulus-bound
and less impelled by his own alternative states. A consequence of
this freedom is the clearer understanding of goals, the possibility of
employing substitutive means and alternative ends. There is hence
a greater capacity for delay and planned action. The person is
better able to exercise choice and willfully rearrange a situation. In
short, he can manipulate the environment rather than passively
respond to the environment. This freedom from the domination of
the immediate situation also permits a more accurate assessment
of others. (Werner, 1957, p. 127)

At the level of human social institutions, such capacity for delay manifests
itself in long-term planning and efforts to fixate symbolic distances between
social classes or historical periods. The capacity for delayed action is made
possible through semiotic mediation.
Meanings are made to function in the given contextbut in ways that
transcend the realities of that context. They reflect the effort to guide the future
history in directions that are invented currently. Thus, the notion of building a
society X (where X can be communism, market economy, happiness for all
people, etc.) is a semiotic direction that is given so as to guide the feelings and
thoughts of the people in the given context. Much of the activities of the meaning
maker belong to the realm of creating mediating devices that are not realistic
here-and-now, but are expected to become real later (there-and-then). Carried
over to the level of societies/communities as open systems, Werners principle
Valsiner 81

entails the making of new social representations (and re-making previously

constructed ones) to face the future.
Differentiation includes its opposite-- de-differentiation-- as its
complementary part. The process of hierarchical integration involves qualitative
re-organization of the "lower" (i.e. previously established) levels of organization,
when the higher levels emerge in their specificity:

...development...tends towards stabilization. Once a certain stable

level of integration is reached, the possibility of further development
must depend on whether or not the behavioral patterns have
become so automatized that they cannot take part in
reorganization... The individual, for instance, builds up sensorimotor
schemata ... these are the goal of early learning at first, but later on
become instruments or apparatuses for handling the environment.
Since no two situations in which an organism finds itself are alike,
the usefulness of these schemata in adaptive behavior will depend
on their stability as well as on their pliability (a paradoxical "stable
flexibility")
...if one assumes that the emergence of higher levels of
operations involves hierarchic integration, it follows that lower-level
operations will have to be reorganized in terms of their functional
nature so that they become subservient to higher functioning. A
clear example of this is the change of the functional nature of
imagery from a stage where images serve only memory, fantasy,
and concrete conceptualization, to a stage where images have
been transformed to schematic symbols of abstract concepts and
thought. (Werner, 1957, pp. 139-140)

Werner's perspective on Subject-Object differentiation consistently led to

the notion of psychological mediating devices emerging as human-made
organizers of the mental and affective processes (see chapter 7). If we look at
the history of human societies, we can see that the primary arena for social
guidance efforts by institutions is the personal-affective domain of individuals,
followed by its derivate- the rational actions. In other termsthe passionately
claimed rationality of the decisions of rulersbe these kings, corporations,
political parties, or market forcesproves the primacy of irrationality in human
social life. We are rational through being irrationaland this version of
dependent independence (see Valsiner, 1997) is set up through semiotic
differentiation and de-differentiation processes in our collective organization of
human lives.

Differentiation and de-differentiation of social classes within a society. As

seen above, all social systems are involved in constant
differentiation/dedifferentiation processes (Simmel, 1890). The discourses about
social stratification are markingsociallythe stable states of social being that
have emerged through these processes. Thus, being middle class is an
Valsiner 82

ontological statement (about being), while it is created and maintained by the

myriad of everyday life actions and valuations of the persons who either consider
themselves being middle class or aspire towards becoming such.
The making of distinction between social strata is based on the symbolic
marking of the environmentand of oneself. In the process of establishing social
power hierarchies different social classes negotiate their power relations by way
of physical (or military) force, ownership of economic resources, educational
markers (licenses, diplomas, etc.) and by creating explicit or implicit boundaries
for separation of the strata. Consider the notion of caste as a social category of
separation of strata. A caste is

a functionally specialized unit that is (and is perceived as being)

an interdependent part of a larger social system. The differentiation
of and interdependence between castes has generally been
economically, socially, and ritually institutionalized in a wide variety
of ways. (Kurien, 1994, p. 389).

The example of caste illustrates how the making of class distinctions can
both separate and unite the distinguished social strata. In the context of history of
castes we can observe the distinction-with-unification. Different castes are
segregated and there are clear symbolic limits upon their possible contacts (e.g.,
no entry into one anothers territory, specific ritual markers of difference,
prohibitions upon marriage between castes, etc.). Yet, at the same time, the
castesseparated from one anotherdepend upon one another in the
performing of specific tasks. This is an example of the abstract operation of
inclusive separation (Valsiner, 1997)parts of the system are distinguished, and
separated, from one anotherand their relationship becomes the basis for the
functioning of the system that includes them (see Figure 2.1., above, for an
example). In contrast, the abstract operation of exclusive separation entails the
segregation of parts of a system from one another and disallowance of any links
between the parts. That operation is the basis for classical-logical classifications
of either/or variety. Exclusive separation eliminates systemic connections
between the parts, thus eliminating the systemic nature of the phenomena from
our consideration. Following that logic, if we say Taylor is a man it follows by
the logic of exclusive separation that Taylor is not a woman. The possibility of
androgynyunity of both male and female components in the personalities of
both men and womenis thus logically eliminated from consideration. Erich
Fromm has noted about the history of womens liberation the past two centuries
of the development of European societies,

womens equality meant that she, in her very essence, was the
same as man in bourgeois society. Emancipation did not mean,
therefore, that she was free to develop her specific, as yet
unknown, traits and potentialities; on the contrary, she was being
emancipated in order to become a bourgeois man. The human
Valsiner 83

emancipation of woman really meant her emancipation to become

a bourgeois male. (Fromm, 1997, p. 26).

Equality here means not androgyny (a person is includes both male and
female, mutually intertwined, features) but an exclusive separation (male versus
female) with appropriation of the other category into the politically dominant one
(male = male males + females-- transformed into-- functionally males). In
contrast, inclusive separation would also recognize the contrast man<>
woman, but would use that contrast to have a careful look at the boundary of
the two categories. That boundary is by far more complex than Eurocentric
cultural assumptions axiomatically prescribe (Njambi & OBrien, 2005).
Which of the two abstract operations is put to practice on different
occasions of argumentations depends on the goal orientations of the meaning
makers. If their goal is to create a social or psychological divide (of the well-
known divide and govern political strategy), exclusive separation tactics can be
used. Thus, despite the fact that all military actions demand coordinated
(hencemutually inclusive) actions of the adversaries (e.g., attack requires
defense, if there is no opponent there is no attack), the warring opponents
present each other as totally dissimilar to themselves. The enemy is always
stigmatized as sub-human, animal-like (we are different from them)thus
making the act of hunting applicable to the acts undertaken in respect to the
enemy.

Differentiation of the social structures: The abstract case. Here we apply the
orthogenetic principle to the dynamics of societies. Society is an abstraction
conglomerate of many mutually overlapping communities. The first differentiation
entails the emergence of

{society}
|
|
{community 1community N}

subordination structure (Figure 2.5.). The relationships that develop between the
various communities through their regulation from above are crucial for the
integration of the whole society.
It is from the relationships between individual people with their family
(clan) histories that the differentiation of communities (A,B) takes place. That
differentiation can lead to hierarchical structure where the society C establishes
its regulatory role over the emerged communitiessetting the stage for their
relationships of inequality and mutual non-penetration, or to equality and mutual
permeability.
Within the differentiation/de-differentiation processes we can chart out
directions of transformation in relation between different parts of the
differentiating structure. Thus, if the concurrent directions of two social
institutions are oriented towards the same future goals we can speak of
Valsiner 84

convergence of the differentiation processes of these institutions. If, instead,

their goal orientations differ, we can consider the divergence of the differentiation
processes.

Figure 2.5. Differentiation of community/society structures

Society X

A
A

B A

B
B

UNDIFFERENTIATED DIFFERENTIATED HIERARCHICALLY

INTEGRATED

The process of social differentiationas it entails the complex of

public<>private domainsnecessarily entails divergence, as Georg Simmel
emphasized years ago as a process of cultural differentiation:

historical development brings out the deeper real significance:

that which in its nature is public, which in its content concerns all,
becomes also externally, in its sociological form, more and more
public; while that which in its inmost nature refers to the self
alonethat is, the centripetal affairs of the individualmust also
gain in sociological position a more and more private character, a
more decisive possibility of remaining secret. (Simmel, 1906, p.
469)

Simmels idea is proven in the development of a high variety of secrecy

techniquespaper shredders, passwords, electronic and other locks, etcin the
contemporary urbanizing open societies all over the World. The fight of the
paparazzis for the publics right to know (and their right to earn from making
Valsiner 85

private moments public) is paralleled by increasing secrecy of the homes, travel

schedules, andlast but not leastof the interiors of human selves.

The function of secrecy. Secrecy develops in parallel with opennessit is a

semiotic act of creating meaning by way of concealing, adding value to the given
contentif one thinks of the following contrast:

THIS IS X
and
THIS IS [only I know it]
and
[nobody else
should know it]

Creating the boundary around the particular meaning (X) by way of meta-
marker (nobody else should know it) creates the feeling of meaning
empowerment for the constructor (only I know it). In the inter-personal domain,
it creates the efforts to overcome the boundary of the limit on the meaning. It
motivates the otherspersons or institutionsto break the code or secrecy.
The limits of access to X create a motivating social force to gain access to X.
Hence the invention of meta-semiotic marker this is a secret is a way to create
extra value out of the mundane:

Secrecy secures the possibility of a second world alongside of

the obvious world, and the latter is most strenuously affected by the
former. Every relationship between two individuals or two groups
will be characterized by the ratio of secrecy that is involved in it.
(Simmel, 1906, p. 462)

As with all meaning field boundaries, the SECRET<>NON-SECRET

boundary is constantly being re-organized. Often the maker of the meaning adds
further value to it by selectively letting into the secret domain another person (I
tell you a big secret This is Xdo not tell this secret to anybody else!). This
technique of spreading messages around (i.e., telling the other not to tell
anybody elseexpecting that the other definitely tells it) is well-known and widely
used in social practices. Its usefulness is built on the assumption thatby way
of creating added value to the message by pointing out its secrecythe recipient
is tempted to make use of it in the communication networks for ones particular
purposes. Secrecyby its act of positive and negative concealmentis indeed
one of the greatest accomplishments of humanity.
Valsiner 86

The making (and unmaking) of the private/public access boundary is not

limited to the constructed meanings within the personal cultures. It is embedded
within our social environmentsfences, doors, social rules of requesting
entrance rights or pretending not to see what is visibleare all examples of
cultural regulation of the secrecy boundaries. The personal-cultural phenomena
of dressingmost importantly, based on the example of dialogues in veiling
would be of interest in elaborating these boundaries. Here we can consider its
society<>community dynamics counterpartdealing with various forms of
convergence/divergence in the actions of social institutions.

Example 2.2. Community secrecy as its defense: Never tell friendly

strangers who your father is! The history of the United States is rich in inter-
community strainswhich nevertheless, by and large, have found a rather stable
equilibrium state in the dynamics of that country which professes religious piety
together with capitalist secularism. As such, the history of the United States is
unique, and its social system an adaptation to the particular circumstances of its
development: large territory (captured through conquest from the natives, wars
with Spain, Britain, and France, and purchases from Russia and the
Netherlands), combined with

focus on immigration (at different times legislated to exclude some

racial groups),
enforced import of labor (participation in trans-Atlantic slave trade up
to mid 19th century),and
distrust of centralized state power (which nevertheless insists on its
centrality).

Further peculiarities of the U.S. history is the movement of different

internally homogeneous (usually on religious grounds) communities around in the
vast territories (especially as the conquest of land moved from the East Coast
towards the West). This led to the establishment of a parallel existence of many
different communities at geographical or symbolic distance from one another.
Yet all these different communities were expected to accept the dominant
religious belief systemChristianity in its varied formsand individuals were
expected to internalize the basic Protestant belief in the inviability of the
Scriptures and their extensionsthe secular laws. Yet the latter could be
constantly re-negotiated, yet in relation to the outsiders (beyond the borders of
the United States) the faade presentation of the America 25 was set to be that
of exceptionalism. The United States were set to be the country of freedom and
benevolencewith strong missionary zeal in case of exporting its religious and
economic mores (cf. Rosenberg, 2003). The success of the economic mission

25
This appropriation of the equivalence America= the United States (rather than both North and South
America, or at least Canada, U.S.,, and Mexico) prevails in our present day. Thus, the official sign at the
door of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow in December 2005 states American Embassyyet its consular
section would be hard pressed to issue visas to citizens of the Russian Federation to Mexico, or Canada.
Valsiner 87

has surely been prominentyet the transfer of U.S. kind of social organization
(American democracy) has had controversial results 26.
A localNorth-Americantest of the limits of the notion of freedom of
religion happened in the years 1852-1890 in the U.S. Federal territory (later
state) of Utah. It involved the emergence of a new religious movement on the
North American soil (in New York State 27) that of Latter Day Saints (commonly
referred to as Mormons). The new religious calling movedthrough a revelation
recorded by its leader, Joseph Smith, in 1843to accept and propagate the
polygynic marriage form within its community as a way of guaranteeing
reproductive success of its members. This innovation came with the social and
economic security that kinship-based plural marriage forms grant their
participants (see discussion of functioning of marriage forms in chapter 4). Of
course the goal of introduction of the historically provenbut antithetical to basic
forms of Christianitya marriage form was not that of liberation of men and
women from the ties of their social roles, but brining them into further loyalty
relations to the new community. It was the Church that strictly regulated the
marriages (and divorces) of the members of the community (Daynes, 2001).
Still the effort by the newly established Mormon community was a direct
challenge to the Protestant communities around themviolent frictions in New
York State as well as Ohio and Illinois led Mormons to negotiate re-settlement to
new territories not yet colonized by the U.S.that of present-day Utah. It was
there that in 1852 the polygynic marriage form was declared legitimate in
Mormon society (which was dominant in the newly established1850-- Federal
Territory of Utah). Thus, the conflict between the local administration of Utah
and the U.S. Federal Government was in the making. It was a power-struggle
between two different in marriage practices, but similar in their basic Christian
religious orientationsocial systems (see Figure 2.4 as a depiction of persons at
the intersection of a society/community tensions).
The central political power (U.S.) had one of its parts (Utah) that was
deviating from the homogeneous norm (of patriarchal family organization of
subdomination of women in marriages). The history of this conflict is described
elsewhere (Daynes, 2001)here it is sufficient to emphasize the basic core of its
course: the 1862 Morill Anti-Bigamy Act provided penalties for persons living in
polygynic unions, the Edmunds Act of 1882 designated polygyny as a crime
followed in 1887 by Edmunds-Tucker Act. Utah was under increasing political
dominance of the U.S. for most time after 1857 contingents of the U.S. army
were stationed there, by 1880s the Federal government was intervening directly
in Mormon community practices. Not surprisingly, the Mormon Church (in 1890)
had to declare that it gives up its endorsement of polygyny as a socially approved
practice.
Starting from 1882 and over the following decade, communities and
families in Utah had to live through The Raidintervention by Federal
officialslegal or military representatives, or spiesto find and arrest the

26
The only country where it has been attempted at earnest is Liberia.
27
In Fayette, New York, on April, 6, 1830six men of average age 24 led by Joseph Smith, started the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Daynes, 2001, p. 18)
Valsiner 88

criminalswho were respected and deeply religious members of the Mormon

community. This life task of survival created a number of complex situations for
the familiesand for the children growing up in the families. Wives were
expected to testify against their husbandsand at their refusal could be
imprisoned together with their small children (Bradley, 1983, p. 141). Federal
marshals burst into private homes at night in their search of polygynistswith the
understandable (and pre-planed) effects on the familys affective atmospheres.
As a Mormon woman remembers her childhood experience at age 5,

It was Valentine night, 1889. Estella and I had been out with most
of our valentines and were warming up by the fireplace ready to go
one more place, when there was a knock on the door. We rushed
to open the door, expecting more valentines, but instead there
stood two strange men. They did not wait to be asked in, but came
boldly into the room. They were the U.S. Deputy Marshals and
informed mother that she and Estella, only nine years old, were
subpoenaed to appear in court, at some future date, in Provo, to
give testimony against father. Mother was very angry and told the
men what she thought of them in no uncertain terms. Father was
serving a sentence in the State Prison at the time
We were all so frightened we could not control ourselves. Estella
was crying as hard as she could and jumping up and down saying
over and over I dont want to go. This frightened me more than
ever and I was crying too (Bradley, 1983, p. 144)

Children who had been previously taught to tell the truth were to be re-oriented to
not say anything to any unknown person who might ask them about who their
parents were. They were carefully taught strategies of how to avoid being
questionedand if not avoidablehow to create confusion and misinform the
askers. The Mormon community as a wholeincluding men, women, and
childrencreated a boundary of silences and counter-active opposition
strategies to face the powerful and malevolent social other of the Federal
government representatives. Talkability about parenthood became socially
silenced (see below), even within the Mormon community as a whole:

President Woodruff, who was then President of the Church, noticed

my attention to my little girl who was then playing on the floor. He
asked if the little belonged to me. When I answered in the
affirmative, he said, And who is the happy father? I hesitated a
little and Brother Canon, who had married us, came to my rescue
by saying This is hardly a fair question, is it, Brother Woodruff?
(Tanner, 1969, p. 110-111, added emphases).

The fight for social power in Utah in 1850-1890 could perhaps be

rhetorically at leastconsidered to be the Second Civil War in the history of the
United States (with the North/South conflict being the First Civil War). While it is
Valsiner 89

true that war had no physical casualties, it certainly produced numerous

psychological interventions that stayed with children in the families of the time
and all through their lives. The unofficial history of Utah transferred through
families over generationsmight designate Utah as the community where the
official and unofficial histories diverge. As Wertsch (1998) has demonstrated,
such divergence creates a dialogical situation that makes the given society open
to rapid development when the political regime changes. For example, Estonia
moved rapidly into independence in 1920, and again in 1991, after getting rid of
the Soviet rule and its corresponding official history of Estonia. The unofficial
history was ready to guide that move. Likewise, the resistance of Latin
American countriesof former Spanish colonial dominationto superimposition
of the European official history of the role of Columbuss discovery of
America 28 is a notable symbolic feature of social resilience (see Carretero,
Jacott, & Lpez-Manjn, 2002).
Interestingly, the fight for power in Utah has parallels in a location and
historical periodfar apart from the local affairs of the United States in the 19th
century. The power struggle of all British colonial empire in the eradication of
matrilineal power organization in Africa and Asia is a notable transformation
process of oppositions, coalition formations, and of the relevance of history in the
ways human beings live in their presents.

Historical organizational forms: transitions between matriliny and patriliny

A look at development of societies as differentiating and hierarchically

self-organizing requires a historical look. The forms of organization of human life
trajectories is given by the sanctioning of transitions between generations in
economic terms (who inherits wealth from dead parents and how it is distributed),
or in terms of locality of marriage. Matrilineality is the transfer of resources
through the female line (mothers to daughters), while patrlineality constitutes the
transfer along male lines (father sons).
Notably, the biological continuity of the species is always unambiguously
granted through the female line (mother her children). This biological fact had
found its sociological elaboration by Johannes Bachofen in his Mothers right
philosophy of historythe transition in human history from matriarchal to
patriarchal dominance in societies (Bachofen, 1861). Yet most important for
cultural psychology is the contrast between the mother- and father-dominated
social orders that has been formulated by Erich Fromm:

the patricentric individualand societyis characterized by a

complex of traits in which the following are predominant: a strict
superego, guilt feelings, docile love for paternal authority, desire
and pleasure at dominating weaker people, acceptance of suffering

28
In this casediscourse of Columbus voyages and its subsequent Spanish colonizationthe label
America applies to both South and North America, even though strictly speaking Columbus discovered
the Caribbean.
Valsiner 90

as a punishment for ones guilt, and damaged capacity for

happiness. The matricentric complex, by contrast, is characterized
by a feeling of optimistic trust in mothers unconditional love, far
fewer guilt feelings, a far weaker superego, and a greater capacity
for pleasure and happiness. Along with these traits there also
develops the ideal of motherly compassion and love for the weak
and others in need of help. (Fromm, 1997, p. 41)

Fromms contrast of the two complexes creates an opposition of the

exclusively separated kindwhile it would be by far more functional for the study
of dynamics of the phenomena to treat it in terms of inclusive separation and
mutual integration (see Figure 2.2., above). As we see below, the history of
Kerala (Example 2.2) demonstrates how the dominance of the matrilineality was
reversed over three centuries to turn into patrlineally dominatedbut not fully
patriarchala form of co-existence of communities. The systemic organization of
the mutuality of the matricentric<>patricentric unity became altered by concrete
legal, prejudicial, and value transformations.

Worldwide distribution. Matrilineal societies have existed in human history all

over the World. They have been slowly diminished in their centrality by the
reconstruction of the economic relationships within communities. We can find
such societies in different states of Indiamostly in Ghana (Akan) and in India
(Assam, e.g. KhasiBareh, 1968, and CaroNakane, 1967; Bengal, Kerala
the Nayarsee Example 2.3 below). In Africa, matrilinear societies are widely
spread from West- sub-Saharan regions down Southwards (see Figure 2.6) and
are most prominent in current political units of Ghana, Tanzania, and
Mozambique (Beidelman,1967)
Valsiner 91

Figure 2.6. Distribution of matrilineal societies in Africa

(from Parin, Morgenthaler and Parin-Matthy, 1980, p.6)

Example 2.3. The functional structure of Nayar matriliny and its historical
transformations

History of Kerala provides an illustrative picture of how matrilineal communities

existed in history, how they were symbiotically related with their surrounding
(patrilineal) communities, and how the tension between matriliny and patriliny
together with colonial powershas led to a state of affairs where patriliny is
legally dominant over its counterpart. Yet traces of matrilineal organization stay.
The unique history of Kerala of early migration of Christians to Malabar coast,
spice trade with the Middle East, and the waves of colonial influence (Portuguese
from 1498 until 1663Menon, 2000; the Dutch from 1663 to 1766Poonen,
1978, and the British from 1795 until Indias independence in 1947Arunima,
2003)provides us with a case history of differentiation and de-differentiation of
the whole of society through economic, legal, and social normative ways. Kerala
is unique in its political history (Menon, 1994), and its achievement of high levels
of literacy of the population (90.59 % in 1991compared with 57% for India as a
whole).
Valsiner 92

The immigration history of the Malabar coast is old. The early Christians
arrived in the 1st-4th century AD, followed by the insertion of Islam by Arab
travelers in the 9th century. The spice trade with Arabia constituted the crucial
economic feature of the transformation of the Malabar area over centuries. It
created the political strain between European and Arabian economic interests,
and led to centuries-long demise of matrilineal kinship system and the escalation
of tensions between religious groups (Dale, 1980).
Different social strata in Kerala were separated from one another with
great symbolic strictness 29yet at the same time they were symbiotically related
within the whole of the society. The Nambudiri Brahmins were a social stratum
that for a millennium dominated the social structure of Kerala. Closest to the local
rulers (kings) they owned substantial economic resources in the 10-15th century
(Menon, 2002, pp. 783-795). Being patrilineal and patrilocal, the Nambudiri
Brahmins limited the marriageability of their sons (after the eldest) within the
community. Yet they could enter into marriages of hypergamous kind with the
Nayarsthe social stratum one level below. These marriagessambadham
liaisonsconstituted a marriage form that was well fitted to Nayar ways of living.
The Nayar matrilineal and matrilocal living pattern made such liaisons logistically
simple- as the woman continued to live in her tharavadu [matrilineal household]
and the children from these liaisons were hersclassified as Nayar.
Through the sambadham kind of liaisons, the same Nayar woman could
be linked with more than one husbandthus turning monogamy into polyandry
(see chapter 4). Centrality of the women in the tharavadu system made the role
of menhusbandssecondary to the primary mother-children ties. Polyandry
could develop easily:

There are several reports to show that women entertained several

husbands simultaneously, but on a sort of turn system, the sandals,
or sword and shield in front of her closed door signifying that the
next husband must wait his turn. Serial polyandry was also
practiced in the sense that divorce was easy, but a divorced
husband could re-establish sambandham later on, though she
might have, in the meantime, entered into sambandham with
several others. This type of polyandry was not limited to the
fraternal or adelphic type, but extended to all men, who, by sub-
caste status, were acceptable as husbands of a woman. (Menon,
2002, p. 802)

It is obvious that the symbiotic relation of Nambudiri patriliny (with the goal
of limiting reproductive success) and Nayar matriliny (with the goal of enhancing
reproductive success by genetic input from the same or higher social prestige
level) was dependent on the particular historical conditions of the two higher
social strata. Nayars were historically warriorsserving in the armies of the local

29
While untouchability existed all over India, as Kurien (1994, p. 392) points out, in Kerala the symbolic
separation reached the extreme level to include atmospheric pollutionpollution from a distance, in case
of lowest casteseven by sight.
Valsiner 93

rulers. Lower social strata in Kerala at the same timeEzhava Hindusor

parallel religious and economic groups such as Christians and Muslims
(Mappila)were not involved in the sambadham kind of system. All of the spice
trade was over centuries in the hands of the Mappila inhabiting the coastal
regionsuntil the Portuguese invasion in the beginning of the 16th century led to
their being driven inland and turning to agriculture. The Portuguese invasion also
created a pressure to the traditional (Syrian) Christians to accept the Roman
papal hegemony. That effort was resisted, but led to the proliferation of a variety
of versions of Christian communities in Kerala (Dempsey, 2001).
Relations between social groupscastes in the Malabar region in the
th
15 century were of inclusive separation kindwhile the strata were clearly
segregated from one another and their hierarchical relations fixed, they were
involved in mutually beneficial and needed exchange of goods, services, and
genetic material (Nambudiri Nayar sambadham relation). Efforts to establish
control over the social texture of the region by each of the three European
colonizers were operating with the mindset of exclusive separation. The
Portuguese fought the Arabian merchants to take over the spice trade, and
forced the local Muslim Mappila community out of their trading roles forcing them
to become land cultivators.
The matrilineal system of Nayars became a target of eradication by the
Europeansin coalition with Hindu legal system and collaboration by dissatisfied
younger male members of theravadu (Arunima, 2003). As an intermediate step of
appropriation of womens centrality in the theravadu, in early 19th century the
power of leadership in the matrilineal and matrilocal household was given over to
the eldest male in the household (karanavan) the elder brother of the female
household head. The colonial Christian ideology considered both the Nayar
marriage system and the economic power in the hands of women
inappropriateyet of course could not change it. With the inclusion of the Nayar
theravadu system into the social discourse of Hindu joint family, and the
exclusive separation of the Nayars themselves from their historical
interdependence with the Nambudiri (Arunima, 2003, p. 142 ff) as an act of
development of their caste consciousness, the British colonial regime used the
effort of Indian society to become unified to eradicate the matrilineal system (and
Nayar sambadham). This was codified by the new marriage and inheritance
lawsof 1891, and 1933.
What had happened? By cultivating new caste consciousness in the
Indian society, the previous historical Gemeinschaft relations between the castes
around the theravadu system became replaced by a focus on the distinction and
counter-positioning of the castes:

It is this emphasis on a homogeneity of caste interests that allowed

the class, and often the sub-caste, differences between the
tharavadu members and the tenants to merge. Matrilineal kinship
within this discourse, as exemplified by the tharavadu, came to be
seen increasingly as a relic of the barbaric past of the Nayars.
Paradoxically, even as the emergent caste movement rejected the
Valsiner 94

narrow-minded divisiveness of tharavadu identities, it did not attack

the basis of caste inequality itself. (Arunima, 2003, pp. 157-158,
added emphasis)

What had happened was a social re-focusing of inter-group relations,

without elimination of the hierarchical relations. Instead of the previous social
hierarchy of local household dominance and inter-caste interdependencies a
system of wider, abstracted from local interdependencies, a hierarchy emerged.
In that hierarchy, the male line of property ownership and inheritance took over
the power of matriliny.

The powerful powerless: women in communities. Womens role in any

society is filled with ambiguitiesbeing both the biologically central
(reproductive) and economically important, they are nevertheless under constant
negotiation by the social institutions to either diminish or (at times) increase their
centrality in a society at the given time. In a matrilineal society,

On the one hand they can be regarded as public treasures, to be

protected and controlled by their matrilineal kin (usually senior male
members). On the other hand, they can be regarded as the others
who have the power to endanger their matrilineage through
miscarriage, infertility and unrestrained sexual activities. (Ishii,
2005, p. 272)

Obviously, matrilineality does not mean female poweras social power

is necessarily a relation between the power-ful and power-less-- but a different
pattern (from patrilineal societies) of social regulation of the conduct of all kin
group members (female and male alike) under the condition of inheritance of
values along the female lines. The combination of transfer of economic resources
through matriline with the location of family life within the same household
(matrilocality) over generations created a unique women-centered dominance
structure for the households. As Nur Yalman has cautioned how social sciences
tend to think of the {matri- versus patri-} contrasts:

the matrilineal puzzle is not matrilineal at all, but rather a

question of relative obligations of siblings toward one another and
toward their in-lawsobligations that are variously handled in
different social systems. (Yalman, 1971, p. 305)

Even in cases of high-class patrilineal descent and patrilocal residence

such as the aristocratic higher classesthe womens centrality in crucial
moments of social life remains unquestioned 30. It becomes diminished in case of

30
Consider the 19th century equivalent of a soap opera in the court case of inheritance of the raja of
Pittaporewhere his co-wives testimonies (given to the courts from behind veils) about the sexual
capacity-- or its absence-- of the all-powerful deceased husband, and the accounts of servants as only
Valsiner 95

patrilocal residence linked with patrilineal inheritance patternshere we see the

migration of women in conjunction with marriage to a completely foreign (i.e.,
husbands kin) householdand her subjugation to the power of another woman
(her mother-in-law). What these life organization patterns specify are the
structural conditions of regulation of differentiated power hierarchies within the
kinship groupsrather than the simplified image of male dominance over
women that permeates the communicative rhetoric of the mass media that has
been historically built on European cultural-historical models.

Communication Processes-- Within society and community

Human beings are talking animals. They create textsoral and written
onesthat both represent their purposeful view of what isand presents the
world in ways they desire it couldor shouldbe. Each person is literally
wrapped into the manifold of social discourse that guide him/her in somemore
or less specifieddirection.
An important feature of human talking is silencethe first decision for a
talker-to-be is to decide if one has anything to say at all. Different ethnic groups
differ by the role allotted to silencesbeing talkative can be viewed as matter of
low intelligence, low class, or incapacitywhile silence can be viewed as
belonging to a dignified social status,.
Human life proceeds through negotiation between the perception and
action that unite the actor and context, and the suggestions for feeling, thinking
and acting that are proliferated through communication. Semiotic Demand
Settings (SDS) are human-made structures of everyday life settings where the
social boundaries of talk are set (Valsiner, 2000, p. 125).
Figure 2.7. depicts a case relation between the two opposing opinions
within the field of promoted talking. By engaging persons within that sub-field
and encouraging opposing viewpointsthe SDS guarantees that through hyper-
talk in this domain the attention is not taken to side stories (the maybe-talk
zone) and is prevented from touching upon the taboo zone. It is obvious that
here the real differences between open and closed societies disappearboth
kinds of societies disallow talking about taboo zones, but the open ones guide
people to hyper-talk in some area of meaning construction (while the closed
ones have no promoted talking zones).
Any human life contextincluding that of schoolbecomes culturally
guided by some socio-institutional focusing of the persons attention to it in three
ways. First, there is the realm of NO-TALKthe sub-field of personal
experiences that are excluded. The rest of the field is the MAYBE-TALK.
Experiences within that field can be talked aboutbut ordinarily are not, as long
as there is no special goal that makes that talking necessary. Most of human
experiences belong to MAYBE-TALK. The third domain of talkingthe HYPER-
TALKis the socially (and personally) highlighted part of MAYBE-TALK that is

possible observers of pregnancy and childbirth-- were the core of legal dispute about (obviously
substantial) inheritancePrice, 2004).
Valsiner 96

turned from a state of ordinary talking to that of obsessive talking (see Kim,
2002, and Kim & Markus, 2002 on the functions of talking in North America and
Asia).
How is the HYPER-TALK domain created? It starts from the social
marking of the highlighted zone. The suggested focus (see Figure 2.7., below)
can operate in two ways. First, it guides the person to reflect upon the focused
experiencethe zone of promoted talking. Secondly, it provides the blueprint
for talking in socially legitimized ways (Discourse ways marked by numbers 1
and 2, leading to Opinion A and Opinion non-A, respectively).

Figure 2.7. Semiotic Demand Setting (from Valsiner, 2000a, p.125)

The acceptability (or non-acceptability) of opposition is thus enabled. In our

everyday life contexts, this is the key to multi-voiced discourses in the contexts
we easily call the civil society (for further analysis, see Valsiner, 2005b). In the
educational contextssuch as classroomsthe promotion of talking for the sake
of self-expressions may create a basis for both thinking and talking for the sake
of talking. Creative acts may emerge in such discourseor be completely dis-
allowed by the intense repetitive use of existing social representations.
Valsiner 97

Dissociation of talking and acting. Each of the three discursive domainsNO-

TALK, MAYBE-TALK, and HYPER-TALKare in parallel either connected or
disconnected with the action domain. The NO-TALK domain is most likely to
remain connected with action domain even if the MAYBE-TALK and HYPER-
TALK are disconnected. An example of that case may be a society where
individuals step in to correctby actionanybodys violation of the NO-TALK
zone boundaries. Some experienced events are purposefully left outside of
talkability zone for the sake of preservation of social order 31.
Talk in public domains is not the same as actionit is at a meta-level
position in relation to acting. As such, it can promote, neutralize, or displace
action. The state of disconnection from action makes these topics open for
talkas the reality of ordinary living is not threatened by it. Furthermore, the
symbolic resources of the collective culture may guide persons to talk about
ones affective domains (Zittoun, 2006), or feel about the taboo zones as ruled
out from the talking fields. The limitation on talking can be related to the social
norms of self presentation. Thus, for example, Balinese expression of grief is
collective-culturally limited as to its talkability (Wikan, 1990). In general, in
situations involving grief finding words may be a difficult taskwhich is solved by
providing a set script for expressing condolences to someone whose close
person has passed away.
The social regulation of talkabilitya collective-cultural concept-- has its
counterpart in the personal-cultural domainin the form of tellability. A person
may have a script for how to perform a socially appropriate and expected act of
speakingand yet struggle with the intra-personal affective limits set upon
oneself. What may be collectively talkable need not be personally tellableas
anybody who refuses to tell dirty stories 32 in appropriate public contexts
understands. On the other sidea speaking person is constantly negotiating the
lower boundary of tellability of a particular message within the given context. The
whole field of possible messages to be brought by a person to the public domain
is culturally structured:

we need a two-sided notion of tellability: Some events bear too

little significance (for this teller, this setting, these listeners) to reach
the lower-bounding threshold of tellability, while others are so
intimate (so frightening) that they lie outside the range of the
tellable in the current context. Similarly, one narrative rendering of
an event may fail to bring out its significance (humor, strangeness),
and thus fail to reach the threshold of tellability, while another telling
might render the event so frightening (intimate) that the story is no
longer tellable. Hence, the more strange (salacious, frightening) an

31
As Arnfred (2004, p. 74) remarks based on her observations in Northern Mozambique: what actually
goes on in terms of extra-marital sexual relations is one thing, but to talk about it is another. Discretion is
important As long as you do not talk about a extra-marital affair, nobody has to take action against it
32
There is important ambiguity in the label dirty storyit is something within the talkability domain (as a
legitimate story)yet its communicative power is in its nearness to the boundary of NO TALK zone
(Figure 2.7.)
Valsiner 98

event (or narrative rendering of it) is, the more tellable the story
becomes, seen from the lower-bounding side, but the less tellable it
becomes, seen from the upper-bounding side, due to the potential
transgressions of taboos. (Norrick, 2005, p. 327, added emphasis)

The field of tellability can be described as a dynamic system with two

attractor regions where each acts as a repeller for the other (Andersen, 2000).
This combination generates the ambivalence of any decision about
communication starting from the act of whether to say anything at all (cf.
American Indian encoding of meaning of talkativeness--Basso, 1970). If the
decision is affirmative, the question of how to encode the message under the
present circumstances becomes important.

Why talk? Social control over primary social group

Family -- as we will see later (chapter 4)-- is a poorly defined term. Yet it is
a term we encounter very frequently in the processes of social communication--
in chats at dinner parties, journalists discussions of the fate of contemporary
family on TV-screens, and in preachers attacks on anybody who tries to
undermine the purity of family values 33
Social talk about some target object (e.g., family) is not about what that
object is actually like, but an effort to propagate some ideal of that object, as it
could-- or should- be. Different social institutions attempt to orient the activities of
the primary caregiving group-- the family-- in directions that are relevant for them,
and only tangentially in the interests of the family. Thus, discussions about
modern family in terms of its progress or decline, problems in it, etc. is
discussion that utilizes family as the battleground for social fights of different
ideologies of institutions. The family as the actually functioning primary social
group functions anyway-- without any need to become involved in any discussion
of its own functioning. Once such discussions surface in the social discourse field
of a given society, their function is to organize the social world at large through
the alteration (or preservation) of the family. In other terms-- declared problems
of the family are actually problems of the given society exemplified on the basis
of the discourse about family.

Redirecting sexuality. The health-care discourse in the history of Europe was

filled with myth stories claiming that masturbation leads to physical decline (in the
18th Century) or to insanity -- in the 19th Century. Here the focus of the
communication effort was not to describe the actual functions of autoerotic
practices, but to fight for repression of the notion of pleasure in sexual activities
by stern messages about dangers to the healthy persons. The intense discourse
was goal-directed canalization effort-- to eliminate the "solitary vice" (of
masturbation) in favour of the "healthy and legitimate" goal of heterosexual child-

33
This phenomenon of preaching on the topic of family values is prominent in the contemporary United
States, yet it is not unknown in most other countries
Valsiner 99

bearing. Social construction of anxieties about masturbation included massive

direction of parents to be on the lookout for early "tendencies" and to stop those
in the beginning. It was presented publicly as act of "impurity", and even wax
models were used to display the "dreadful consequences". The collective-cultural
canalization of sexuality continues in the 21st centurywhere the 200+ years old
discourse about the negative flavor of masturbation is imported into the talk
about new narrative contextssuch as donor insemination (see Kirkman, 2004).
Why such concern about a basic biological function? The goal of
repression of personal sexuality was mandated by the desire to control the
activities of human beings by social and religious institutions. Likewise, our 20th
Century focus on the relevance of attachment formation in the first year of life,
and our concern about the dangers of AIDS, are examples of social guidance of
the conduct of these persons whose feelings of responsibility are targeted for
intervention (Preda, 2005).

Collective guidance of persons by talking: family values. Much of public talk

is about the family. As a social unit, family is an ambiguous one (see chapter
4)yet its generalized meaning allows it to be used in social discourse very
efficiently. Consider, for instance, frequent discussions of child-rearing which
often emphasize the centrality of the family in this role.
This focus gives a fresh look at why people-- laypersons, journalists,
politicians, psychologists-- talk about family. Frequent discussions of child-
rearing which often emphasize the centrality of the family in this role are a vehicle
to regulate the personal lives within the closest social groupthe familyin ways
of interest to the varied social institutions (governments, NGOs, religious
institutions). Issues of child-rearing bring into a topic of communication between
the persons who actually do it (older siblings, parents, grandparents) and those
who attempt to direct it. The latter are ideologically guided, their efforts to
communicate about child-rearing are guided by specific set goals. The latter
need not be oriented toward the manifest target of the messages (e.g., the well-
being of the child in development), but rather use these manifest objects as
means to attempt other kinds of social objectives.

Talking about women. Perhaps the clearest example of the goal-orientedness

of human communicative efforts is the talk about women. In different societies,
social discourse about women can take place with different talk-goals. The
simplest one is ontological-- simple reflection of the true state of affairs. In this
case, the statement women are inferior to men does not carry any performative
or evaluative role, there are no goal-orientations involved This is different if the
same statement is made in another mode-- prescriptive. Here the ontological
statement is supplemented by the hidden agenda of some prescription for action,
for instance (Figure 2.8.)
Valsiner 100

Figure 2.8. Various implications from an ontological claim

Women are inferior to men

or Men are inferior to women
or Men and women are inferior to children
||
==============================================
| | | |
V V V V
thats fine thats awful they they
should should
be kept as be libe-
such rated

Very often, social sciences utilize the phenomena from across ones own
boundaries of societies, but having mind goals of changing ones own. Much of
anthropological or cross-cultural psychological research is of such kind. Margaret
Meads descriptions of the permissive sexual attitudes of Samoa adolescents
were a commentary upon the U.S. society at the time. In our present days, many
efforts to demonstrate womens inferior status in non-Western societies is
linked with the missionary efforts of our times. Thus, women in non-Western
societies are perceived to be enslaved by some exotic practice (e.g., such as
wearing a veil, or restrictions on occupying public space, in Islamic societiesthe
hajib in generalsee El-Guindi, 1999; Shirazi, 2001; Zuhur, 1992), and social
calls for social change are made on that basis. Yet such interpretation may turn
out to be nothing more than the researchers projection of their own cultural
meanings onto the phenomena of another society. The different modes of
interpretation-- ontological and prescriptive-- afford such act of meaning
construction. For example, concerning female roles in Christian and Islamic
contexts, Fatima Mernissi remarks:

In Western culture, sexual inequality is based on the belief in

womens biological inferiority. This explains some aspects of
Western womens liberation movements, such that they are almost
always led by women, that their effect is often very superficial, and
that they have not yet succeeded in significantly changing the male-
female dynamics in that culture. In Islam there is no such belief in
female inferiority. On the contrary, the whole system is based on
the assumption that women are powerful and dangerous beings. All
sexual institutions (polygamy, repudiation, sexual segregation, etc.)
can be perceived as a strategy for containing their power.
(Mernissi, 1987, 19)
Valsiner 101

The limited view of Western scholarship on women is also revealed by

African feminists who point out that in the view on womens limited public roles in
politics and the society as a whole is a result on the primary focus of the
Western cultural history on repression (rather than regulation) of womens
sexuality. This is demonstrated in Euro-American researchers primary interest in
female circumcision in Africa 34 (but not male circumcision in N-American
hospitals), the lack of freedom in choosing marital partners, and negative
effects of plural marriage forms. These phenomenawhile undoubtedly having
their place in the big puzzle of cultural ways of livingare secondary to issues of
fertility as the central concern for women in Africa, at least up to now (Oyewumi,
1997). As long as fertility is the culturally significant semiotic marker of womens
lives in a given social unit, and is used in everyday interaction between women to
negotiate their social power relations (see Hutchinson, 1996, chapter 1 on Nuer
distinction of girl/woman) and issues of sexuality are accepted as givens (e.g.,
similarly to feeding in our Western world)the Western feminist ideology misses
its targets 35.

Keeping women in the role of mothers: the moral implications of milk.. The
primary function of the 18th and 19th Century European social discourse about
"mother's milk" was to keep the women in their role as mothers. The discourse
was specifically that of affluent social classes-- in which case the role of the
woman included many other potential activities than being mother and worker (as
it would be in case of lower-class women in rural areas of France, England, or of
the U.S.). By suggesting to the women in affluent families that their breast-
feeding their own infants-- rather than using milk of another lactating woman (a
wet-nurse) or of an animal-- the women's concerns and activities would be
constrained to the realm of children in the domestic sphere. The latter was
presented in terms of its importance to the children, as well as fortified by its
moral value (of good woman and mother image). The threat of the opposite--
"bad" mother who is involved in social gatherings, gossiping with her female
friends, dancing at parties, going to theaters, and having illicit affairs with male
friends-- was the alternative social role for the woman which was made the target
for social eradication 36.

34
An anthropologists account:

the women I interviewed got tired of my questions concerning circumcision. It is done so that the girl
can pray and be initiated. Thats all! Surely it hurts, but then it heals up and is forgotten, the women
constantly repeated, unable to understand why on earth I was so interested in this simple act of cutting. In
the end, I became truly embarrassed, as I could not help asking myself the same question: Why would I
wish to talk about their genitals or lost genitals all the time? There are so many harmful practices and
alarming situations in the world, situations that cause people suffering, why does just this one worry us and
so get headline attention in our newspapers? (Dellenborg, 2004, p. 79)
35
Of course, the rapid wave of religious conversion into Christianity all over Africa, as well as promotion
of new economic activities of urbanized kind and formal education are working towards elimination of this
centrality of fertility in the cultural definition of womanhood.
36
The use of alternative feeding sources-- wet nurses, or milk from animal sources-- was certainly socially
legitimate in case of medical necessities, such as the mother not having sufficient milk.
Valsiner 102

For example, an 18th Century English medical doctor was adamant about
the moral downfall of the society:

It is grievously to be lamented, that so many Mothers, not only of

high rank, but even of the common Sort, can with so much
Inhumanity, and more than brutish Cruelty, desert their tender
Offspring, and expose them to so many Dangers of mercenary
Nurses, who are greedy only of the profuse Rewards bestowed on
them at the Christening, and flight the small weekly Income that
follows; and so being weary of the present Employment, perform it
negligently, while they are looking out for a new Prey. But let us
take a Survey of the Advantages that prompt Mothers so commonly
to sacrifice their beloved Offspring. They are the more free
Enjoyment of Diversions; the greater Niceness of adorning their
Persons; the Opportunity of receiving impertinent Visits, and
returning those insipid Favours; the more frequent Attendance of
the Theatre, or the spending of the greatest Part of the Night on
their beloved cards. These are the important Reasons, for which
Mothers frequently banish their newborn Infants from their Sight,
and rashly deliver them up into very doubtful Hands, whithersoever
Fortune or Fate, either good or bad, happens to lead them. But
these nice Ladies afterwards suffer deserved Punishments, for the
Love of their Children, if they happen to survive, is more cool
towards them, but warm and affectionate towards the Nurse who
took them up, and performed the Duties of a real Mother. (Harris,
1742, pp. 18-19)

Texts like these were meant to create insecurity in the women, and guide
them towards assuming the "duties of real mothers" themselves (instead of
delegating those to servants). The cultural model of motherhood served as the
semiotic organizer of women's socio-moral roles. It can be seen as a general
rule-- at any time a social institution of any society sets itself a goal of modifying
women's conduct, that effort becomes translated into social suggestions--
promotions and prohibitions-- of issues of the women's everyday lives that are
relevant for their selves, and their social roles as women and child-bearers.
Efforts of social control take place in realms of personal-cultural importance.
These realms are also filled with uncertainties-- be these about future, or present,
or feelings about the past. In this respect, the European fight for affluent mothers'
own care of their babies is functionally analogous to the creation of many
pregnancy taboos.
Like most of moral crusades, the efforts to keep affluent women confined
to their full motherhood could only be partially successful. The use of feeding
alternatives became widespread in Europe, as well as in North America. Aside
from liberating the woman from the regular dependency on the baby's feeding,
the use of a wet-nurse paved the way to the return of the mother to her role of
the wife to her husband. It was suspected (as reflected in the American discourse
Valsiner 103

about wet-nursing-- see Golden, 1996) that on many occasions the initiators of
wet-nursing were the husbands of the new mothers, who desired to return to the
regular cohabitation with their lawfully wedded wife 37. The belief in the benefit of
human milk for babies-- in contrast to cow's milk-- created the special social role
of the wet nurse. Ostensibly such discourse was about childrens health-- yet its
social function was to attempt to regulate mothers conduct by letting them
persuade themselves that they should breast-feed their babies.

Generalized meaning fields: collective making of the society

The myriad of social suggestions that exists in the discursive space of a

society is organized by meta-level signsfield-like semiotic organizers of the
general tone of the kinds of talk to be expected. Such meaning atmosphere
flavors all the communication processes in the given collective-cultural domain. It
gives the social discourses a general direction of what themes to emphasize,
how to present these themes in their affective coloring, and what outcomes (if
any) to expect from such discourses. This is accomplished by way of meta-signs
(high-level social representations) that guide the affective flavor of the discourse.
For instance, if the meta-sign complex we could call fatalism flavors the meaning
tone, any aspect of reality people talk about becomes flavored by it. In contrast,
the sign complex of boundless optimism would give us an opposite picture.
Such general meaning tones change historically within the given social
unitgroup, community, or country. For example, changes in the British ways of
talkingand feeling about oneselfare said to have undergone an interesting
reversal:

Even if the reality of the stoicism and understatement of the

British people was overstated in the past, nowadays such
characteristics are rarely claimed to be desirable. The
culturally dominant version of personhood considers it usual
for people to respond to adverse life events by becoming
overwhelmed and engulfed by them, and desirable that they
should admit being so. The expectation is not that people will
be able to cope, but that they will find it difficult, perhaps
impossible, to do so In consequence, the idea of
psychological fragility and vulnerability of the self has
become the dominant cultural point of reference. (Lee,
2003, p. 74, added emphasis)

If such shift from not talking (and coping oneself) to talking (and making
oneself feel vulnerable) occurs, we get through social discourses to the
phenomenon of syndrome society. It is a condition of discourse in a society
where through consensus on how people talk about their lives leads to recurrent

37
In the British North America (later the United States and Canada), like in many other traditional
societies, the post-partum period of breast-feeding was linked with abstinence from regular sexual relations
until the mother breastfed the baby.
Valsiner 104

labeling of different features of the strain of living as symbolically pathological

(syndromes)suggesting the turn to the pertinent social institutions (doctors,
shamans, pharmacists, psychologists) to treat the problems.
Our contemporary history indicates how effectively human societies set up
the socially constructed notion of being-at-risk for something. Creating the
feeling of vulnerability in different knowledge domains is part of differentiation of
the social roles of EXPERT and its corresponding roles of CONSUMER OF
EXPERTISE. The social representations utilized in the making of such domains
of psychological vulnerability (DPV) both select the sub-field of life issues and
insert a social prescription of how to deal with it
It is easy to see how the construction of the vulnerability of the persons by
way of a generalized meaning tone functions in the social world where
consumption of high-volume mass produced goods and services is a goal of
many social institutions. The potential customers of such consumer goods
constitute a crowda mass audienceand the cultivation of the need for expert
guidance for individuals in that crowd is the psychological key to success in the
sales of such goods. Through moving the notion of expert advice to a central
position in social talk, the recipients of the social suggestions are kept carefully
under institutional controlby way of their own trust in the experts, and by the
feeling that their individual decisions must involve expert advice.

Negotiation of asymmetries of power

All power relations entail inequalitybe it temporary or relatively stable.
All social roles that human beings assume relate to others based on power. The
history of humankind is filled with making of power asymmetries (boss >
employee; master > slave etc.) and their reversals at times of revolutions.
Transformation of role relations in terms of power depend upon the
function of the person within a community. In the history of African slavery,

Slaves had become so by being ejected or torn from their own

communities, thus losing the protection that went with membership
of their own kin group. It was the lack of the free persons normal
social resources which was the essential feature of the slaves
condition. Yet there was a gradient from the extreme vulnerability
of the newly taken slave through various degrees of social
incorporation as the slave settled into his captors community.
Despite this, slaves did bitterly resent their condition, which
condemned them to a kind of perpetual juniority for their lifetimes if
they did not get themselves out of it. (Peel, 2000, p.63)

Slaves were indeed propertyto be owned, sold, and inherited. It is not

surporising that in the beginning of the 19th century United States the notion of
life insurance was applicable to slaves (whose lives had monetary value for their
owners), and not to the owners (whose lives had no re-sell value). Yet the case
Valsiner 105

of trans-Atlantic slave tradeimportant as it is in the histories of Africa and both

Americasis not the quintessential example of the ways slavery as a social
mode of relating with others works in general. Ancient Greek states were built on
slave labor, and slavery was a widespread form of establishing dependence
relations between the persons who became slaves and others (who became their
owners). The social stratification of the slave owners carried its role in
determining the role of slaves being a slave in the royal household in Kano
(nowadays located in Northern part of what is Nigeria) meant a high position of
social power in the whole of the social system, albeit with limits (Stilwell, 2004).
The whole story of slavery as a form of social subordination has been
veiled in the European and North American discourse based on largely the
images of slave ships sailing from Africa to the Americas with forcefully captured
victims. Yet slavery existed in many formsin Ancient Greece, in the Himalayas
(Levine, 1980), etcand was part of the social and economic texture of most
social groupings over their histories (Kopytoff, 1982). This included various forms
of slavery by African tribes in relation to individuals captured from other tribes.

Missionary activities: efforts at building the control over the Other

The missionary spirit of some kind would exist in any social organization
where membership in a social organization depends on a persons choice, and is
not given by blood or dependence ties. It is a universal cultural invention at the
hight of a societys self-directed intervention. It entails the dialogical separation
of what we are now and what we should be, and a series of strategies for
moving towards the latter. It is clear that any adult creates the socialization
framework for ones offspring at the intersection of that dialogicality. Soall
child-rearing and education is inherently some kind of missionary effort.
In the case of colonial education this contrast becomes expanded by the
We<>They distinction that entails the tension of viewing of the other. Of
course such contrast is reciprocalEuropeans felt the need of civilizing the
African cannibals in ways similar to people from African tribes were worried
about Europeans being involved in precisely the same activity (Jahoda, 1999, p.
109see also chapter 3 on Maori co-construction of the battlefield canibalism
images).
In the course of Christian missionary efforts outside of Europe, the key to
social control over the local communities has always been through re-negotiation
of meanings of womens lives. This is due to the key role of women in any society
in reproduction and production of the environmental contexts (making of home, of
social relations within home and in womens social networks). In Africa, the
missionary effort was to liberate women from the confines of their traditional
social contexts, and offer them new roles that turn the focus of their lives from
fertility to overcoming of sexualitywith chastity as the revered ideal (Arnfred,
2004, p, 72). Matrilineal social orders were targets for eradication in favor of the
social dominance of the patriarchal worlds. As religious pamphlets in West Africa
indicate,
Valsiner 106

Christian discourse has given male authors a vocabulary, a logic

and an ideology with which to assert control over women in the
home. Vindicated by select quotations from the Bible, they insist
repeatedly on womens subordinate status in the nuclear family
structure. They find masculine power to be supported by the Bible
and produce a version of Christianity in which ideal wives are
utterly subservient creatures. Few real West African wives will
embody this behavioural ideal, which is divorced from the socio-
economic realities of a world in which women will work and control
their own money as a matter of course. (Newell, 2005, p. 310).

The efforts of social institutions to change the mores of the others can be
viewed in the context of persons always being liminal members of a social group
(Figure 2.3., above). Not only are persons themselves in movementtowards or
away from the ideal centerbut that movement is suggested by interested
social powers in the society. The latters abstract form comes to real human
beings through suggestions, orders, teasing, and persuasions of the others.

Summary: Socially guided subjectivity

In this chapter, we could see how human beings- from birth to death (and
ostensibly after thatin the beliefs of the lining in the other lives of the dead)
are operating under the influenceof the highly heterogeneous and
redundantly semiotically encoded field of social suggestions. However, they are
not passive recipients of these suggestions, but active participants in the
reconstruction of the social orders. By preserving the social orders, persons
assuming their different social rolesactually transform these orders. They make
distinctions, attach value to the distinctions madethrough their semiotic
markingand act on the basis of such added value as if it were not set up by
themselves. How that happens is analyzed in chapter 3.
Valsiner 107

Chapter 3. Making Oppositions:

Dialogical Self and Dualities in Meaning Making
the present is half past
and half to come
(Peirce, 1892/1923, p. 219).

The whole of our psychological system is set up to make distinctions

within the field within which we are constantly moving. Our perceptual system
operates in the pickup of the information flow of forms-in-movementin all sense
domains (visual, auditory, tactile, haptic, olfactory). Furthermore, our attention
mechanisms further sieve the perceptual input, making it open for semiotic
reconstruction and presentation. The latter sets up our facing for the futureby
presentation of the past experience through signs we create the next moment of
our experience.
We experience the worldand create its meaningfulness by way of
signs. We are simultaneously fully interdependent with our environment, and
distancing ourselves from that here-and-now setting by way of creating
meaningthrough signs. All this selectivity operates on the edge that of time.
The irreversibility of time guarantees the uniqueness of experienceswhile the
making of distinctions and their semiotic organization works precisely towards the
opposition of that uniqueness. Through our selective attention, and perceptual,
and semiotic distinctions we create a subjective world that appears to us as
relatively stable. It is, of course, an illusionyet a highly functional one. It can be
argued that the emergence of ever complex semiotic regulatory systems in
phylogeny is a human adaptation to the lurking chaos (Boesch, 2002) of the
uncertainties of expected future experiences. The future is uncertainand the
past is constantly being re-constructed as we face the uncertainty of the future.
Here we encounter a new facet of being on the border--not only are
human beings liminal in terms of their membership in social conglomerates
groups, communities, and societies (as was outlined in Chapter 2), they are also
liminal in respect to their own developing life course. The present moment in
ones living is that border. We move from our personal pasts towards their
personal futuresand the infinitely small moment of the present is the
inevitable boundary that is being crossedonly to be re-made in a new form.

Boundaries: created in space and irreversible time

The PAST PRESENT FUTURE distinction is an example of Herbsts

(1995) co-genetic logical operation where the object is knowable by its boundary
(Figure 3.1.) The figure/ground system emerges together through the emergence
of boundary.
Valsiner 108

Figure 3.1. The emergence of figure and ground, and their boundary (basis
for David Herbsts co-genetic logic)

BOUNDARY that creates the

FIGURE/GROUND distinction

INSIDE
NO PRE- of the NO
EXISTING FIGURE POST-
FORM EXISTING
FORM

OUTSIDE of the
FIGURE = GROUND

In terms of co-genetic logic, the triplet{figure, ground, boundary that

separates figure from ground} emerge always together, are mutually co-definitive
(define one another), and vanish together.
What is the nature of the boundary? Charles S. Peirce arrived at the notion
of the boundary through an example of the color of the boundary between different
surfaces (see Figure 3.2.A.). Of course the spatial boundary of color is in itself non-
dynamic. As Peirce stated,

Suppose a surface be part red and part blue; so that every point on it
is either red or blue, and of course no part can be both red and blue.
What, then, is the color of the boundary line between the red and the
blue? The answer is that red or blue, to exist at all, must be spread
over a surface; and the color of the surface is the color of the surface
in the immediate neighborhood of the point as the parts of the
surface in the immediate neighborhood of any ordinary point upon a
curved boundary are half of them red and half blue, it follows that the
boundary is half red and half blue. In a like manner, we find it
necessary to hold that consciousness essentially occupies time; and
what is present to the mind at any ordinary instant, is what is present
during a moment in which that instant occurs. (Peirce. 1892/1923, p.
219)
Valsiner 109

Figure 3.2. An illustration of Peirces Boundary

Question

A. The spatial distribution case

IS THIS BOUNDARY
RED OR BLUE?

B. The boundary question within irreversible time

TIME

The questionphrased ontologically in Figure 3.2.A.is impossible to

answer. It becomes possibleyet with the addition of extra theoretical challenges
as it becomes a basic question for human life (see Figure 3.2.B.).. Yet the
transposition of the physical question (color of the boundary of two surfaces) to the
process of organic growth of consciousness by Peirce can be viewed only as an
effort to indicate the role of the present as a boundary. The boundary within the
visual stimulus as in Figure 3.2. does not show us anything about the way in which
it becomes perceivedeither directly (in the Gibsonian sense) or through particular
constructive process of percept-making-- and meaning-making as that is
Valsiner 110

intertwined with the latter. The notions red and blue are signsof verbal kind
that are put into function by the meaning-making human being who tries to make
sense of the boundary given in the stimulus field. It is through the construction of
signsiconic, indexical, and symbolicthat the perceiving/acting organism faces
the future. Cultural psychology assumes the act of construction of novelty by the
organism, based on the resources of the given setting and the experiences of the
past transposed to the present (see chapter 8).

Unity of time. Past and future are inseparable. When taken to the issues of time,
the GROUND--|BOUNDARY|--FIGURE distinction (Figure 3.1.) becomes
PAST|PRESENT|FUTURE distinction (Figure 3.2.B.). In all dynamic
processes that take place within irreversible time the boundary of the PRESENT
separates the not-yet-known figure of FUTURE from the already known (and
selectively vanishing) ground of the PAST. As an infinitesimal boundary between
the past and the future, the present is the birthplace of the next present. In Figure
3.2.B., the blue of the future is being turned into the red of the past through the
processes of transformation at the boundary. It is the notion of transformation
creative synthesisthat moves from the past experiences towards making the
future relations with the world that matters. Such transformation is necessarily
ambivalent. Differently from the mere being of a physical boundary (e,g., the red &
blue nature of the boundary of surfaces in Peirces example) the moving boundary
of the present is not that of a co-presence of the past and the future (as some kinds
of already existing surfaces), but a process of emergence.

Emergence as a conceptual problem. In all sciences, the treatment of the the

emergence of something new from something known has been a basic conceptual
problem. The possibility of the birth of new galaxies (and their demise), the creation
of new social orders on the basis of previous ones (revolutions and counter-
revolutions), synthesis of new chemical substances, the reproduction of biological
organisms, andfinallythe construction and reconstruction of our personal
meaning systems in our life courseare all processes of emergence. Something
newpreviously unknownemerges from the basis of previously established. But
how? Here we are interested in one side of that storyhow we create new
meanings and set those up to provide values to the distinctions that our perceptual
and action systems have produced?

Signification of perceptual distinctions. A particular perceptual feature

triggers our first distinction in the making. That is followedsometimes
immediatelyby the superimposition of meaning value over it. Usually it is
through iconic nature of signs that such instant meaning making takes placethe
concrete perceptual image of a representative of a classa particular dog, lion,
or person stands in as an iconic sign for the whole complex of feelings and
thoughts about pets, dangerous animals, and friends or foes of ones own
species.
Valsiner 111

Values become added to the depiction of the otherwhat THEY do, or

think, loses neutrality when WE have vested interest in them. If the decision to
move into valuation (by considering value addition fitting the setting), we may
proceed to introduction of one or another kind of two opposite elaborations:

WE are BETTER than THEY

WE ARE X and THEY ARE Z add value? Yes

no
WE are WORSE than THEY

Both of these value additions lead to evocation of action possibilities. So,

one can refrain from action based on a circumvention strategy (so what if we are
worseor betterthan theyJosephs & Valsiner, 1998), or eradicate the
difference in either direction (we become like they, or they like we). Equally likely
is the strategy of accentuating the detected differencewe are better (or worse)
than they-- and we should make sure that we stay so.
Why such action proneness stemming from simple value-meaning
insertion? The reality of human relations takes place in a goal-oriented social
field settings (see chapters 4 and 5) where the particular distinctions of value-
added kinds become bases for real power negotiations and various forms of
social discrimination (Bourdieu, 1984). Social institutions orient individuals
towards internalizing loyalties to them (the we group, even if it merely consists
of one personI), and the realities of social relations lead to the uses of the
they group in various functionsthose of enemy, celebity, social class, political
party, religious group, etc. Distinctions we make about religious, political, or
economic bases have added values that may make them dangerous to ones
health. Of course there are other options to handle the oppositionby
neutralizing it (refusal to add value, or to consider the distinction itself of value),
or integrate the two opposites into one scheme (see Figure 3.3.)
How does the birth of the next present take place in the psychological
domain? It is at the intersection of the tension of the selective insistence from the
past and the uncertain events that might happen in the future that signification
takes place. Signs are created to overcome that tension.

Value-distinction within the sign: semiotically encoded imperatives. Each

interpretation is value-ladenbeginning from the value of the given distinction
itself. This can be called value-laden (or value-added) difference. Furthermore,
the value-laden nature of interpretations is action-prescriptive. Let us consider a
simple examplemaking a distinction (A/B) and its interpretive value (see Figure
3.3.) It is here where the value of social relations enters into the making of the
knowledge. From Figure 3.3. one can deduce three strategies of dealing with the
negative evaluation of the distinctions.
Valsiner 112

Figure 3.3. Suggested imperatives from distinctions made

DISTINCTION A/B
self <> other
is made

VALUATION: positive neutral negative

ACTION accept no need to ACTION

SUGESTI (no need to consider NEEDED
ON to interfere) any action =intervention

(1) ELIMINATIVE (2) ASSIMILATIVE (3)

INTOLERANCE INTOLERANCE TOLERANCE
(eradicate the (change the (eliminate the
unfavorable unfavorable unfavorable
other other into contrast itself from
genocides, favorable the distinction
exclusions) education, self/otherthe
acculturation) A/B distinction
then becomes
positive or neutral

The first strategyeliminative intoleranceis widely used at times of

conflict. The other is turned into a target of elimination, or segregation. This can
happen from the perspective of the politically powerful towards the powerless,
and leads to phenomena of ethnic or cultural cleansing. It can also happen from
the position of a militant underdog who attempts to take over powerlike the
elimination of higher social classes in French and Russian revolutions, or the
various genocides all over human history. Thus, the invention of the guillotine
or of the nuclear bomband their use-- is the quintessential example of cultural
tools created for the service of this strategy.
Valsiner 113

The second strategyturning the unfavourable into the favourable in

ones termscan entail a massive religious conversion effort. It can be also
attempted by introducing formal education. This strategy is most visible in the
notion of acculturationthe expectation that immigrants to another setting
(country, urban area) melt into the social context as it is given to them by the
power authorities.
Both of these have occurred in the colonial history of humankind.
However, the second strategy is also involved in the case of idealization of the
otherthe noble savage can become a set ideal (of purity, of closeness to
religious ideals) towards which the carriers of A may strive. Here, the direction is
towards abandonment of A to become B. Going native as a life-goal of
Europeans migrating to the tender climates of the Pacific islands to escape ones
own background would be an example of this. This strategy can be seen as a
kind of reverse acculturation some representatives of one social group,
dissatisfied by their own background, move away from it to adopt the ways of
being of another group, thus eradicating ones own personal history.
Probably the most interesting of the action strategies listed is (3)
eliminating the contrast between the distinguished A and B. This is the escaping
solution for much of cultural anthropology. Social groups are different (A is
distinguished from B) but not better (or worse) than the others. They are simply
different, incomparable. Of course cross-cultural comparisons of A and B are
made all the time (see chapter 1, Figure 1.1., above), yet valuation of those
comparisons is carefully avoidedat least in the manifest level. Tolerance
comes from disconnecting valuation from detected distinctions.
Interestingly, the avoidance of values in making cross-cultural
comparisons is not at all similar to the positively valued acceptance of differences
of A/B (see the scheme above). Instead, it is a case of overcompensation for the
negative valuation, and can easily revert back to the other strategies. The
possibility of construction of such accusations against people with whom one has
lived at close distanceexemplified by witchcraft accusations-- indicates the
dynamics between tolerance of the other (i.e., the other, while being different,
has the right to be so) and intolerance. The latter is the dialogical opposite of
tolerance.

Figure 3.4. Ontological statements about WE/THEY: where the missionary

world view begins

WE ARE X WE SHOULD BE Y

WE SEE THAT
THEY ARE Z THEY SHOULD BE:
Z? X? Y?
Valsiner 114

A generic semiotic mediatortheir rights to be [X, Y, or Z]

The semiotic organizer of the rights maintains the tolerance, not letting it
revert to either form of intolerance. When the focus on the rights of the other
becomes dissociated from the given ingroup/outgroup relationship, the move
from tolerance to intolerance is facilitated. The ideology of cultural relativism is a
temporary solution to the inferiority/superiority tension in inter-cultural (and inter-
personal) encounters. It does not represent the acceptance of the others, but
merely blocks the latent intolerance from becoming manifested in conduct.
Our general scheme becomes more complex. The generalized goal
orientationsor moral imperatives (should-value) becomes added to the
WE/THEY distinction (Figure 3.4.) This value-addition can be made explicit (and
result in social action in relation to the differing social other). It can also be
tolerated in the public domain (e.g., you as person/group has your own rights,
separate from mine) while dismissing the other in the private domain (e.g., the
rights you may have, but I hate you anyway). It is the coping with negative
value-additions that can lead to examples of pseudo-acceptancecases where
behind the primary mask of public acceptance there exists underlying intolerance
of the others ways of being. Such intolerance can take the form of seemingly
altruistic intentions (helping the otherin the form of making them to become
what they SHOULD BE, or what WE THINK they SHOULD BE).

Looking at the others: multiple ways

Nowhere can one find better examples of the interplay of value-added
comparisons than in the history of colonialism. Modern colonialism of the recent
past has been definable as annexation of a territory by people with ties to a
foreign state who perceive the conquered population as different from
themselves (Steinmetz, 2003, p. 42). Historically that difference was
geographicthe colonized territories were far away from the communities of
origin of the colonizers. That made it easy to superimpose upon the geographical
distance the cultural oneby considering the colonized peoples inherently
inferior, beast- or child-like, and yet appealing in some ways (materialisticallyin
terms of captured resources, or idealisticallyin terms of innocence of souls),
the colonizers justified their own presence to themselves as well as the broad
limits on native policy (Steinmetz, 2003, p. 43). The history of colonization can
be viewed as a long-term social experiment in the cultural-psychological
movement to the future through persistent encountering of Otherness in the
process of conquestboth for the colonizers and for the colonized (see further in
Chapter 5). All versions of the meanings of alterity as expressed in Figure 3.4,
and the different action strategies (Figure 3.3.) can be found in a re-analysis of
colonial histories.
Valsiner 115

It becomes clear that the look into the other is an act that may change
that otherbut it certainly is part of the movement of the looker-in within the
social field. Multiple trajectories of such look exist in parallel. As Amartya Sen
has pointed out, describing outsiders look at India:

Attempts from outside India to understand and interpret the

countrys traditions can be put into at least three distinct categories,
which I shall call exoticist approaches, magisterial approaches and
curatorial approaches. The first (exoticist) category concentrates on
the wondrous aspects of India. The focus here is on what is
different, what is strange The second (magisterial) category
strongly relates to the exercise of imperial power and sees India as
a subject territory from the point of view of its British governors.
This outlook assimilates a sense of superiority and guardianhood
needed to deal with a country that James Mill defined as that great
scene of British action.
The third (curatorial) category is the most catholic of the three
and includes various attempts at noting, classifying, and exhibiting
diverse aspects of Indian culture. Unlike the exoticist approaches, a
curatorial approach does not look only for the strange (even though
the different must have more exhibit value), and unlike the
magisterial approaches, it is not weighed down by the impact of the
rulers priorities. (Sen, 2005, p.p. 141-142)

The goal orientations of the viewer are central to which of the three approaches
prevails. Since the human social world is created and maintained by various
relations between groups of peoplewho colonize (and de-colonize), enslave
(and abolish slavery), provide new jobs (and take those to another location,
creating joblessness), and use the life-ways of the other to address ones own
social problemsthe look onto the others is never socio-morally neutral.
Language useranging for the cute and innocent native to savage to witch
barbarian or devilish monsterindicates the ideological value construction
onto the act of looking.

Example 3.1. Making of the savages. European colonial history is a good

example of socio-political valuation entering into comparisons. The images of the
non-European people were at first described by the colonizers in terms of child-
likeness, bestiality, and curiosity, over the past three centuries. Differences are
both threatening and appealing.
The 14th Century account of the natives of the Canary Islands shows the
ways in which the meanings of the other were being constructed. The
inhabitants of the islands

aroused a great deal of speculative debate, with two groups

adopting radically conflicting positions as a consequence of
selectively emphasizing different aspects of reports on the
Valsiner 116

islanders. Prominent humanistic scholars focused on the

nakedness, lack of interest in gold and silver and generally simple
and seemingly idyllic way of life of the islanders. This led them to
the belief that theirs was the innocence of the mythical Golden
Age. Others connected with the church and the temporal powers
took a less rosy view. They were motivated to justify the conquest
and subsequent conversion of the islanders. Accordingly, they
stressed the seemingly repulsive aspects of the lives of the
islanders They were said to have flat faces like monkeys, to howl
like dogs, to eat raw food and to observe bestial customs; among
these was public sexual intercourse and the sharing of women who
allegedly gave birth like animals. (Jahoda, 1999, p. 11)

Jahodas analysis of the images of the savages speaks about inherent

ambivalence within the ways in which distinctions made are culturally evaluated.
It is through the projection of ones own needs into the social othersand the
savages were a good objects for thatthat the colonizers own world view
could develop in its complex way.
Evaluative contrast-making in our contemporary socio-political discourse
creates new savages. As the valuation of distinctions made are often of negative
kind (e.g., the distinguished other is in some sense not just different, but either
inferior, or "problematic). The reasons for making the given distinction may
already include an action agenda. Thus, efforts to distinguish some group of
people at risk for X from those not at risk entails the social intention for
preventive action (see Figure 3.4. above). Any preventioneven into ones self
is an act of interventionand can, as such, be valued in very different ways.
Thus, fights against smoking or venereal disease (Brandt, 1985, 1997) are
selective appropriations of scientific evidence for socio-moral discourses of the
given social group. The fighters against the persons who espouse such habits or
diseases are primarily involved in their own autodialogues within their selvesall
nicely presentable as socially progressive acts of participation in the society.
Descriptions of the other often have used themes not different from those
used by Europeans in relation to the indigenous people of other races and far-off
countries. There is a long history of downplay of women by men in their power
rolesin terms of womens child-likeness, irrationality, etc. These are themes
that one can observe in the feminist power struggles to come up with a reciprocal
savage image projected upon menwho are childlike, wild, uncontrollable, etc.
In reversing the previous value-laden opposition to its reverse the opposition is
maintained in its naturenot overcome. Transcending it would entail the
transformation of both of the parts of the oppositional relation, and the creation of
a new opposition as a result.
Valsiner 117

Figure 3.5. An Early European depiction of Ganesayear 1615 A.D.

(Lorenzo Pignorias addition to Vincenzo Cartaris Images of the God;
reproduced from Mitter, 1992, p. 29)
Valsiner 118

Most of the oppositions in meaning lead to either reversals of the

dominance polarities, or in mixed combinations of the opposites into hybrid
complexes. Thus, for instance, the purity and bestiality projections into the
others can exist side-by-sidethe innocent native is also a dangerous beast.
This is a result of the duality of meaning construction (see belowduality of
A<>non-A in meaning construction). Such hybridization also occurs in visual
imagesfor instance, the viewer creates a hybrid of the image of the other that
presents relevant meaning bases of ones own (see Figure 3.5.)

Contemporary savages. The making of new savages continues in any society

as there are social needs for such construction. It could be claimed that the basic
mechanism involvedthat of presenting the other as possessing characteristics
that can be evaluated as inferior (be these childish, senile, crazy, bitchy
etc.)comes into action easily when a particular person (or group) pre-emptively
defends itself against the surfacing of his or her (or its) inferiority. Parents have
used such tools in respect to their teenage offspring, and the latter towards
their parents.
The social action intention based on a distinction made can also be
retributive. A distinction made between groups can be used as basis for provision
of new opportunities for the distinguished outgroup. For example, the burgeoning
feminist politics in Europe and North America supports the actions based on
finding gender differences that would provide one of the two groups with new
facilities (and the otherwith blame for not having provided those). This is a
reverse of the social action intentions from the historically older (male dominant)
power perspective, where the difference of women in psychological
characteristics could be considered the basis for not providing any opportunities
because of the research indicating their lack of inherent capacities. When viewed
from the perspective of collective-cultural systems where gender oppositions are
not emphasized (Amadiume, 1987) and some other feature (e.g. senioritysee
the Yoruba description by Oyewumi, 1997), plays a major rolethe making of
the feminist world of social relations makes no sense.

Example 3.2. Legitimate symbolic violencere-education. Pierre Bourdieu

(1985) has outlined the role of social institutions in creating acts of socially
legitimate violence in various forms. As such, education (and re-education) is an
example of such violencesocial powers of outside of the given community
superimpose new ways of acting and thinking (as well as feeling) to members of
the given community that break the latters connection with their collective pasts.
Educational goals in a society are built within the existing stratification system,
and help to maintain it in principle. Yet these are uniformly presented as efforts to
improve the society (or some part of it).
The existing social hierarchybe it based on administrative power,
financial prowess, knowledge, or agesets the stage for education becoming a
mission. The mission moves from the higher to the lower strata in the social
hierarchyso the higher classes attempt to educate the lower classes, rather
Valsiner 119

than the other way around 38. It is only when the focus becomes de-centered to
the other- they-- that we arrive at the doorstep of educational missions. If
theychildrendo not grow up on their own and weadultshave to help
them we have the beginning of a mission.
The psychological function of making a distinction we <versus>they
sets the stage for projection of ones own characteristicspositively or negatively
valuedinto the other, and then relating with that other accordingly. Hence
educating others is actually based on the fulfillment of some role (or need) of the
selfin other termseducation is an ego-centered exercise. It is meant for the
Otheryet it is through that Other that it benefits the Self. The direction of the
help to the Other is set by the Self, the limits of that direction fit the social class
(Smollett, 1975), religious (Niezen, 1991), or economic needs of social
institutions.
Of course that centrality of the helpereducatoris not within the realm
of discourse about education. Like in many other helping professionsdoctors,
nurses, policemen, militarytheir presentatiuons exclude multi-sided coverage of
the helpers whose social roles are depicted in monologically positive terms.
Very often, efforts to help others are functionally those of eliminating some
aspects of the traditions of those others.
Formal education has always been presented as bringing new knowledge
to people. That it simultaneously creates a rupture with the past is rarely
emphasized. An expression by an educationalist from the end of the 19th Century
Oklahoma illustrates the ideology of educational intervention in a rather dramatic
way. Talking of educating American Indian children, the administrator suggested:

let us educate them all. If we look to the schools as one of the

chief factors of the great transformation, why not establish at once
to embrace the entire body of available Indian youth? If there
could be gathered by the end of 1893 nearly all of the Indian
children and they be kept there for ten years, the work would be
substantially accomplished; for there would grow up a generation
of English speaking Indians, accustomed to the ways of civilized
life. Forever after this [they will be] the dominant force among
them. (Ellis, 1996, p. 15)

Formal schooling is indeed a powerful weapon for social change. All

developmentof persons or communitiesis based on ruptures that lead to
subsequent re-organization of the semiotic order (Zittoun, 2006). Education is,
thus, an example of the making of a monopoly of legitimate symbolic violence
(Bourdieu, 1985, p. 205). It works through making the activities of the actors
within the field subservient to the meanings introduced by the social power in

38
If the latter happens, it is usually a part of basic revolutionary rupture within a societylike
Chinese cultural revolution calling for the inexperienced young to re-educate their parents
generation (see Chan. 1985). It is a social strategy by a dominant power group to turn to the
lower classes to act upon the middle strataso in effect it is the same as simple top-down social
control effort, only with a shift in dominance from the powerless to the newly powerful.
Valsiner 120

control, together with promoting active co-construction of new semiotic devices

by the ones who are being educatedalbeit in the socially desired direction.

Example 3.3. The savages fighting back: the narrative making of

battlefield cannibals. However, culture transfer is a bi-directional enterprise
(as seen in Chapter 1), and hence the making of the savages is a more
complex interactive result than merely providing value-added exotic depictions of
the other. The projections of the outsiders description of the natives can be
effectively counter-acted by the latterthrough parody and ridicule attached to
the outsiders lack of understanding. For example, a Maori story-teller would
narrate a British visitor an oral history of a war trip:

When we descended to the cultivations of Waikato a girl was

seen by some of our people.. [description of how she was killed]
When she was dead, Tarau seized her legs and thighs, and
taking her feet in his hands and using her legs as walking-sticks,
proceeded thus to the ovens.

None of our chiefs would cook during the expedition, nor

would they go near, or sit on the leeward side of food in
preparation, for fear their tapu should be interfered with. The ovens
in which the bodies were cooked were left covered over night until
morning, so that the food might be soft and pulpy. The body of the
girl referred to was brought to our camp, and cooked for a long time
(tamoe) that it might be nicely done. (Obeyesekere, 2005, pp. 94-
95)

Commenting upon this story, Obeyesekere points out the surrealistic

features of the story, combined with British paraphernalia (walking sticks,
having meat nicely done). When the visitors ask for exaggerated stories to be
told, the native storytellers are likely to satisfy their appetite. The listener may be
satisfied by proving ones expectations by the data from the informants. In
some sense, the European re-tellers of the Maori exaggerated stories became
cultural cannibals- they were consuming the cultural myths, re-told to them by
their own expectation rulesfor the benefit of actual subordination of the
colonized others.
Making the exaggerated story into a literal oneand believing in it
becomes emphasized by Obeyesekeres mischievous question in the reverse---
would the British be considered cannibals if Jonathan Swifts Modest Proposal
for solution of the Irish famine (i.e., that the Irish could eat their children!) were to
be taken literally by outsiders who would look at the native practices of the
British as recommended to the Irish as help in a difficult situation.
As a result of the stories told to the European interlocutorsand reported
by the latter without understanding of the parody and satirewe reach an
example of symbolic reversal of the information flow. The expectations of the
British of finding battlefield cannibalism among the Maori were met by the
Valsiner 121

narrative exaggerations by the Maori whose ways of being were under study. As
Obeyesekere notes,

The Western discourse on cannibalism existed long before the

discovery of Polynesia; it surfaces there from the late eighteenth
century and reaches its efflorescence in early nineteenth-century
missionary and scholarly thought. Maori discourse on cannibalism-
anthropophagy is for the most part hidden; it must be gleaned from
the British ones. These hidden discourses take many forms,
ranging from the parodic to the serious. By contrast, the British
discourse on Maori cannibalism is much more uniform because
they have successfully insulated Maori cannibalism from related
discourses found in European culture in such things as fantasies,
nursery tales, and the sacrificial symbolism of the Eucharist
I stated that cannibalism is a misnomer for human sacrifice.
Nowhere in the context of sacrifice is there a conspicuous or a
mass consumption of corpses Conspicuous consumption, both
as discourse and embedded practice, emerged in the wake of the
historical contact with the European who then constructed a
European version of Maori cannibalism, including battlefield
cannibalism. (Obeyesekere, 2005, p. 106-107)

Thus, we have a cycle of mutual expectations of each other fulfilledand

escalated. The British wanted to find Maori battlefield cannibalism as a distinct
(and deplorable) characteristic of the other. The actual othera Maori story-
tellerwould fulfill the expectations of the interested outsider by providing
exaggerated accountspossibly parodies of the very narratives of the British
who then recognize themselves in the other, and accept the story as if it were
true.
These examples of creating value-laden differences and proving them by
the facts could remain an obscure story in the history of anthropology, and
declared to be an anachronism by our contemporary science where the
questions of validity of evidence are by far more thoroughly asked than in the
accounts of first European travelers. Yet in our times, we have an equivalent in
the social role of active storytellers who build their importance on the appealing
shock value of the stories. Contemporary journalism guarantees that we are
always forced to attend to exotic details of the lives of celebrities, or to reported
miseries of other human beings far away from our immediate doorsteps. Social
sciences in the 21st century are under pressure to accommodate their knowledge
base and functions of their messages to the journalistic predicament. Clearly
that would result in the subordination of science to social fashions of the day. The
main feature of all communicationits bi-directional and co-constructive nature
would be left out from our investigation. Abandonment of that basic feature of
human meaning-making in the relating of sciences and their object phenomena
would lead to the creation of new social myth stories, rather than new knowledge
Valsiner 122

about the ever-new meaningful personal and social realities. Social sciences can
operate in partnership with their objects of investigation.

Bi-directionality of cultural understanding: partnership

In Chapter 1 the notion of bi-directionality of culture transfermore

properly labeled re-constructionwas emphasized as the core idea for cultural
psychology. Here we reach the junction where such bi-directionality is also the
core of any research encounter between human beings. The researcher attempts
to find out about the other person(s) who are being studiedand who must have
for some unknown reason agreed to participate in the studies. The persons who
assume the role of the ones being studied (who have, at different times and
disciplines, been labeled subjects, observers, informants, hosts, and research
participantsBibace, Clegg & Valsiner, submitted) are involved in counter-
investigation of what the activities of the one who came to study us is trying to
do. They may end up with another set of classificatory groupings for the
researcherssuch as spies 39, fools 40, preachers, donors 41, cannibals 42, etc.
The persons who accept the outsiders to the given community need to
distinguish the intentions of these new actors on the scene (see also Example
2.3. in Chapter 2). The arriving outsiders are inherently ambiguousthey may
be enemies or friends, traders or robbers, journalists 43 , tourists, or fugitives, etc.
The process of counter-investigation is a necessary complementary part of any
investigation.
Roger Bibaces partnership model (Bibace, Dillon & Dowd, 1999, Bibace
et al, 2005) provides a framework for overcoming the centrality of the
researchers perspective in their efforts to study the phenomena of the others.
Its basic axiom is the imperative for checking the system of perspectives of the
research participantsthe one who investigates some phenomenon, and the
other who is being under investigation as to the particular phenomenon. In their
ongoing relationship, questions that are asked by the investigator are not the
ones that are being answeredbut the ones that the respondent interprets the
askers questions to be. Hence it is crucial for the researcher to have access to
these interpretations. The partnership model provides the necessary correction

39
A frequent identity attributed to cultural or social anthropologists in the fielde.g. van Dijk &
Pels, 1996, p.259
40
A designation given by an illiterate Kpelle farmer to a cross-cultural researcher who asked him
how would a fool classify [set of objects]?receiving back a full taxonomic classification that the
farmer has failed to give under regular instructions (where a version of functional classification
was produced)
41
of valuables (in exchange for research evidence) or medical, educational, or psychological
services.
42
A very reasonable interpretation of physical anthropologists who would collect pieces of
skeletons of deceased natives.
43
A very special category in present-day World is the kind of information gatherers is the role of
disaster tourist (de Waal, 2005, p. 20)people who travel to disaster areas for short period of
time to survey the damages, and to be in a position of experts to explain to their others that
we have been there, therefore we know (see also chapter 5)
Valsiner 123

for the tendency to superimpose on the people under study the researchers
ways of thinking.
The centrality of the partnership model does not stop at the doorstep of
research, or of the office of a medical doctorits basic feature of the eternal
effort of overcoming the egocentrism of ones own Self in making sense of The
Other is present in any human relations. This is the fundamental condition of the
existence of our socially embedded selvesstriving towards understanding of
others, recognizing the limitations of such efforts, and trying again. Ernst
Boeschs (1997) emphasis on the dialectical opposition of the Fernweh and
Heimweh is applicable to the partnership process (see chapter 5).

Beyond the practical distinctions: dualities within the whole

In the ideal case of science, its theoretical language is free from the
confines of everyday language. Such freedom entails maintenance of the link
with the empirical phenomenawhile allowing for generalizing abstractions. The
latter make it possible to devise general explanations of highly variable
phenomena. Generality of explanations is in basic abstractions that go beyond
the manifest observable phenomena. Most of psychology has yet to develop
such separation of the abstract from the concreteand the build-up of explicit
explanations of the translation between the two. In other scienceschemistry for
instancesuch construction of linkages of abstract models and concrete
experimental and practical results has taken place in the 17th-19th century. The
abstract meaning of a salt is not given by its perceptual quality (salt is
something that is salty 44) but by its chemical formulae that specify in the
abstract into what kinds of chemical reactions that particular salt can in principle
enter.
In psychology, the prevailing epistemological ethos in the recent century
has been precisely the opposite of that found in chemistry and other natural
sciencesto find one-to-one correspondences between a projected causal entity
(whether it is assumed to be in the person, or in the environment) and its
manifest outcome. Thus, behind the variability in persons personality
manifestations is an assumed personality traitor a number of mutually
independent traits of the kind (as described by ANOVA interaction effects)
rather than a system of functioning mechanisms that result in the given unitary
outcome. In most general termsclaims like childrens psychological
development is due to either nature or nurtureare examples of searching for
one-to-one correspondences. The same is true if that statement is re-phrased in
terms of interaction effects childrens psychological development is due to
interaction of nature and nurture. The meaning complex interaction is a sign
that stands in for the unknown complex mechanisms which are no longer studied
once the causal attribution (to interaction) is made. Even if the attribution infers
the presence of multiplicity of factorsthe question of how these factors are

44
compare with psychologists claim intelligence is something that intelligence tests measure.
Valsiner 124

related to one another to produce our manifest phenomena remains unasked

and unanswered.
The issue at stake is not a matter of careful observation (and inductive
generalization), but of the unity of deductive and inductive lines in scientific
thinking (see Morgan, 2003; Valsiner, 2003). It is the distancing of signsin this
case theoretical conceptsfrom the reality that they present, and their
abstraction beyond the perceivable characteristicsthat provides a science its
generalizing power (Vickers, 1984, pp. 124-125). The relevance of deductive
breakthroughs in genetics is particularly interesting hereMendels deductive
insight about many-to-one kind of correspondences in genes phenotype
relation:

Nobody, apart from Mendel, had been led to the deduction that
inherited factors influencing the characteristics of an organism
come in pairsor at least that they usually do. No amount of clever
mathematics could have led to the deduction that one is dominant
to the other. (Galton understood that many gemmules, as Darwin
had called them, capable of influencing the characteristics of an
organism, must often lie latent, but that wasnt a mathematical
deductionit was based on empirical observation.) No amount of
clever mathematics could have led to the deduction that it is a
matter of chance which part of each paired factors enters into the
gamete that fuses with the gamete of the other parent. (Bateson,
2002, p. 52)

Mendels insight was that of creating a relationship between double parts

of the system (dominance/recessive relation within a pair of genes) that
generates one specific outcome. Our contemporary protein genetics has taken
that invention of multiplicity within the generative system (of portions of the DNA
sequence, operating upon other parts of the sequence) to the level of many-to-
one relationships. As a result, the number of genes as it is increasingly being
discovered surpasses the numbers of produced outcomes by a large factor (e.g.,
in case of the nematode C. elegans, around 19,000 genes encode all of the 302
neurons in the whole nervous system of that species-- where the adult male
consists of 1031 cells. Surely the regulatory mechanisms of the outcomes are
highly complex systems, filled with redundancy of control. The whole issue of
genetic regulation is that of multiple systemic causality for protein synthesis.

Lessons from astronomy. The issue of non-correspondence between the

unitary observable phenomena and the actual systems that produce the
phenomena is known from other sciences where empirical access to phenomena
is limited. Astronomy is one of the examples where distances to celestial objects
of investigation set up the need to invent numerous hypotheses where what is
being observed (e.g. brightness of a star) is merely a sign of the system that
produces it. Fluctuations in the brightness of a star are indicators of its being a
Valsiner 125

binary (or multiple) starrather than one uniform object star that miraculously
alters its brightness.
The existence of double stars is known in astronomy for a long time (since
the time of Ptolemy), yet precise descriptions of their functioning are relatively
recent (in 1651the doubleor binary-- star of Mizar-Alcor in Ursa Major). A
binary star is a pair of stars in orbit around a common center of gravity that is
generated by their mutual gravitational attraction. They are usually different in
brightnessthus the fluctuation of perceivable brightness of one target object
allows astronomers to reconstruct the mutual relations of two (or more 45)
components of the non-unitary star systems. Thus, abstract thought models of
multi-part systems with strictly specifiable relationships have been around in the
physical and biological sciences over centuries. These models reach psychology
through the fascination with Dynamic Systems Theories since 1990s (Lewis,
2005; Thelen & Smith, 1994, van Geert, 1994). Within that theoretical system,
formal models are created that explain the history of changes of dynamic
phenomenabe these development of hurricanes in meteorology, or of
childrens vocabularies, or of emotionstowards some future states. The
contrast of the present and the not-yet-specified future here is seen as actual in
the present.

Duality in the social sciences: Dialogical models

The notion of dialogical self starts from our usual imagery about dialogues
between people, and becomes transposed into intra-psychological dialogue
between parts of the self. Not only do different persons enter into dialogues, but
we all have our own dialogues proceeding within the interior of our personal
cultures. Any perspective that theoretically posits the presence of different parts
of the whole and a relationship between them can be considered dialogical. In
contrast, non-dialogical (monological) views on the world are free from the notion
of systemic mutuality of the parts. Thus, instead of the structure assumed to be in
the complex phenomenon (as the relation in Figure 3.6.A.), the monological
perspective treats the complex reality as a homogeneous point, or field X (in
Figure 3.6.B.).
Monological construction of theoretical terms leads the social sciences to
positing of entified concepts as if those were explanatory for the complex
phenomena. Thus, the unitary data A in Figure 3.6.B. can be explained by X-
ness as its inherent underlying causal entity 46. In contrast, the same complex
phenomenon in Figure 3.6.A. becomes described in terms of data that indicate a
relationship between two opposites, and would be explained by some kind of
systemic causality scheme.

45
There can be more than 2 components in the multiple star systems. Their functioning is similar to
double starsall multiple components move around their joint center of mass, due to their mutual
gravitational interaction. Binary linkages of stars are considered the primary branch of star formation
processhence the presence of high variety of multiple stars in the celestial universe.
46
Refer back to Chapter 1 and the use of such entified explanatory concepts in cross-cultural psychology
Valsiner 126

Figure 3.6. A schematic translation of complex phenomena into dialogical

(A) and monological (B) representations

Complex phenomenon

B
A

X
X relation Non-X

Dialogical relations can entail any number of partsfrom two (e.g., ego
and alii) to small number (e.g., the "ME"-s of G.H. Mead), to a high variety of sub-
components (e.g., Mikhail Bakhtins emphasis on multivoicedness). These parts
can be posited to co-exist simultaneously and provide for dynamic stability in the
phenomena. The demonstration of the blind spot of such processes in the case
of use of rating scales in psychology is an example of treating complex
processes involving mutually opposite vector forces as if those were simple
measurable point-kind phenomena (see chapter 9, also Valsiner, 2006c;
Wagoner & Valsiner, 2005). The dialogical nature of the phenomena is
eliminated at the first stepof superimposing a monological measurement
scheme onto poly-logical reality.
Furthermore, a dialogue can be found in a sequential of meaningsa
question, followed by an answer, may create a tension that is followed by
agreement/disagreement. Sequential dialogical relation can also exist between
two consecutively uttered similar statements (e.g., life is good and life is
good 47). The latter may occur both inter-personally and intra-personally. For
making sense of the dialogical self, both the intra-psychological and inter-
psychological domains are equally important.

47
The reference here is to the difference between logical and dialogical treatments of the repetition of this
statement. From the side of classical (2-valent) logic, these are the same statement. From a dialogical
perspective, these are two sequential remarks following each other in time-- and constitute a specific
dialogical relationship of agreement (Hermans, Kempen, & van Loon, 1992, p. 27)
Valsiner 127

Two processes. A person operates on the basis of two dialogical processes

heterodialogue (with others, including imaginary others), and autodialogue (within
oneself). In fact, those two dialogues are mutually intertwined. A person who
tries to state something to a listener is simultaneously hearing (or reading) one's
own statement, which becomes part of the autodialogic process, irrespective of
any answer from the listener 48. Likewise, an episodic message the person
overhears from somebody may lead into an autodialogue that transcends the
meaning of the overheard message.

The Dialogical Self (DS) Theory

The crucial feature of any dialogue is thus a relation between

communicative messages each message evokes some way of being in the
other, and so on (Salgado & Hermans, 2005). Dialogicality is the property of
systems to entail such relations as definitive for the system. The dialogical self is
a theoretical entity (self) which is organized (exists) through a process of
dialogical relations between its sub-parts:

The dialogical self is conceived as social-- not in the sense that a

self-contained individual enters into social interactions with other
outside people, but in the sense that other people occupy positions
in the multivoiced self. The self is not only "here" but also "there",
and because of the power of imagination the person can act as if
he or she were the other. [in contrast to G.H. Mead's position] I
construe another person or being as a position that I can occupy
and a position that creates an alternative perspective on the world
and myself. (Hermans, Kempen, & van Loon, 1992, p. 29)

This look at the dialogical self retains the person as the center of the
social-- imaginative-- construction of the possible positions of the ego based on
experience in the social world. However, the reliance on as-if one were in the
others position is never equal to the reality of being in that position. The latter is
in principle impossible (Bhler, 1990). The DS creates a tension between being
as-is and modeling ones being as-if one were the other. That tension can be the
birthplace of becoming movement into a new state. As a tension in human
personal-cultural life-worlds it can be empirically investigated.

DS replaces the notion of core self. Usually, the notion of self is viewed as
entailing a central core, and its manifold of context-dependent transformations.

48
this point was made already by George Herbert Mead ( Mead, 1912, p. 403)-- yet its simplicity seems to
disappear in post-Meadian discussions of the social nature of the self. This loss is probably due to the
implicit model of "forced choice" between parts of theoretical constructions, e.g., the person is considered
either in dialogue with others or within oneself-- rather than simply viewing these two dialogues as
mutually embedded processes.
Valsiner 128

This is characteristic of the componential models of the self. Hermans and

Kempen (1993) have rejected the notion of core self, and replaced the notion of
such core by a dynamically moving, multiple, I-Positions. Such positions

are organized in an imaginal landscape. In this conception, the I

has the possibility to move, as in space, from one position to the
other in accordance with changes in situation and time. The I
fluctuates among different, and even opposed, positions and has
the capacity to imaginatively endow each position with a voice so
that dialogical relations between characters in a story, involved in a
process of question and answer, agreement and disagreement.
Each character has a story to tell about its own experiences from its
own stance. These characters exchange information about their
respective ME-s, resulting in a complex, narratively structured self.
In this multiplicity of positions, some positions may become more
dominant than others, so that the voices of the less dominant
positions may be subdued. (Hermans, 1996, pp. 10-11, added
emphases)

So, each I-position creates a voice which relates to other voices (of
other I-positions) in a dynamic relation of dialogicality. The emerging whole is the
narratively structured self, within which dominance relations are established. The
dialogical self is a dynamic field (rather than a static point-kind core), which
nevertheless is a general model for the self as such.
The three zones in Figure 3.7. allow for differently located relations
between I-positions:

External positions refer to people and objects in the environment

that are, in the eyes of the individual, relevant from the perspective
of one or more internal positions In reverse, internal positions
receive their relevance from their relation with one or more external
positions (e.g., I feel a mother because I have children). In other
words, internal and external positions receive their significance as
emerging from their mutual transactions over time. (Hermans,
2001a, p. 252, emphasis added)

In Figure 3.7., an internal I-position A(int) is in a systemic mutual feed-

forward relation with an external I-position A(ext). Both of themand their
relationship entails the internal/external boundary crossing.
Valsiner 129

Figure 3.7. The structure of the Dialogical Self fields of loci of I-positions:
internal, external, and outside (after Hermans, 2001a, p. 253)

Outside

External A(ex)

Internal A(int)

Example 3.4. The pattern of I-positions map. The origin of the empirical
analysis of I-positions comes from Hermans Self-Confrontation Method where
the person explicates different I-positions as meaningful components of the self,
and locates them on the map (e.g., Figure 3.8.). Ali is an Algerian man who is
married to a Dutch woman, who generated 49 internal and 33 external I-
positions, of which the major ones are shown in Figure 3.8. The general I-
positions to be expected from a person who had migrated to another country (I
as an Algerian, I as adapted to Dutch culture, I as integrated in Dutch culture )
were present in his structure of I-positionsbut not prominent.
Valsiner 130

Among the major I-positions, two groups of ingroup and outgroup were
found (upper vs. lower part of Fig 3.8). Ali included in the ingroup both his own
and his wifes parents (while his wife created an ingroup Dutchoutgroup
Algerian dichotomy). What emerges in this example is the negotiation of Alis
self system with the multiplicity of demands that combine ethnic and kinship
group backgrounds, and constitute a compromise within the family context:

Organizing his repertoire in this way, Ali could maintain a double

loyalty. As part of an Algerian family that required absolute loyalty
with the own clan, he included his father and his mother as part of
his in-group, although his wife was opposed to both of them. On the
other hand, Ali could maintain the loyalty with his wife by including
his sister as part of his out-group, in this way agreeing with his wife
and supporting her in disapproving his sisters manipulative
behavior. As a result, his sister was attributed a place in his out-
group and was associated with such internal positions as like to be
alone, disillusioned, and vulnerable. (Hermans, 2001, pp 359-
360).

Figure 3.8. I-positions repertoire of an Algerian man living in the

Netherlands and married to a Dutch woman (from Hermans, 2001, p. 359)

Roots in psychotherapy process. It is no coincidence that Hermans has built

his theoretical model of the dialogical self on the empirical evidence from the
psychotherapy process on the one handand on a version of personal
construction task, on the other. In such contexts, persons can ponder upon
conflicting or mutually uneasy I-Positions over long time, therapists intervention
Valsiner 131

efforts may be slow in their effects --and constitute further dialogical participation
in the self of the client (Gonalves & Guilfoyle, 2006). The centrality of the person
<> social others partnership emerges in a self-inclusive way in therapy
contexts.
In such contexts, the dialogical self can be

effectuated by asking clients to describe different sides of their

own personality and to invite them to formulate from each side a
separate valuation system in their own terms. From a theoretical
perspective, such personality sides are considered opposite I
positions from which the client can tell different or even opposed
stories about him- or herself and formulate different or opposed
valuation systems. (Hermans, 1999, p. 492)

It is important to emphasize that the field of I-positions not only involves

the co-existence of different perspectives, but also construction of hierarchies.
Dominance/subdominance relations between the voices (that represent the I-
Positions) are constantly being negotiated.

The ego-centered perspective of DS

The axiomatic starting point of any dialogical process is the person.
Without an obligatory reflexivity about one's own location in the life-space no
definition of any other perspective is possible. In this sense, any dialogical
relation is ego-centered. For example, the notion of I-Position entails a core I
that is needed to assume an I-Position. In any activity, there is an agent whose
active role makes the activity possible. No matter how extensively socially
embedded is an activity, or discoursethe stage for that is set by the existence
of the person(s). The person-- who constructs I-Positions-- does that from the
starting point of some specific location within one's psychological field.
There is a wider epistemological relevance embedded in the
understanding of ego-centeredness of human worlds. The only psychological
phenomena available to a person-- beginning from perception and ending with
meaning-making-- are centered upon the person of the perceiver, actor, and
meaning-maker.
Valsiner 132

Figure 3.9. DS structure as a three-dimensional self-scape guided by

hypergeneralized field-like sign

GENERALIZED DIALOGICAL
OPPOSITION IN SIGNS
e.g.,
MORAL<>IMMORAL

Outside

External A(ex)

Internal A(int)

B(ex)

B(out)

Semiotic construction: abbreviation and abstraction. The obligatory personal

beginning point of meaning-making is the subjective HERE-NOW-I-SYSTEM
("hier-jetzt-ich-System" --Bhler, 1965, p. 149; 1990, p. 169). It unites in an
infinitely minimal fashion the unity of the space (here), time (now) and agent (I).
No dialogical relation is possible without this basic semiotic reflexive
construction. All three components of the point are co-present. For example, a
claim "this is" in actuality entails the unity of the three foci of the point: "this"(not
"that") exists in space; it is existing now; and I perceive and state that it is. In it
elaborate form it can be of the kind "this door of my office is at this moment open
and it is for some reason at this moment important for me to ascertain that". An
important feature of the indexical signs in contrast to their iconic counterparts
becomes obvious herewhile the former are abbreviations of humans goals-
oriented action, the latter are step-by-step abstractions from these actions, or
their components.
Abbreviation thus becomes a major vehicle for sign mediation of the
making of the future. It can be viewed as a result of ontogenetic processes that
Valsiner 133

move through extension of the action schemes to their subsequent shortening

and partial disappearance (Lyra, 1999). Certainly the emergence of language
use over childhood moves towards minimalization of the reflexivity of one's own
personal positioning. Based on such abbreviated ego-centered starting point,
human meaning-making takes place within a constantly extended (and
constricted) sign-field where the person constructs meanings that expand from
the "core ego" to include others ("you", "we") to a case of semiotic infinity ("I as
all of us").

The location of the other. In the theoretical models of dialogical self, the role
of the other is quite flexible. It can be filled by a real person (actual social
others of the developing person, in interaction with him/her), personal
constructions of the real (or imaginary) social others in ones intra-psychological
domain, andfinallycreation of the voices of the others. Furthermore, the
person can use the same objective other in some subjective transformation in
the self-dialogue. At one moment, the other is used in ones concrete action
roles (the man who smiles at the ego), the next momentas an idealized
personal image (John whom the ego has loved for long time), at thirdas a
social role (husband), at fourthas a principle (manlihood in relation to egos
purposeful fussing). The dynamics of dialogical self thus entails variational
construction of the other at different levels of abstraction and generalization.
This feature of dynamic self systems was already anticipated by George Herbert
Mead in his tentative concept of the generalized other (see Dodds, Lawrence &
Valsiner, 1997, for further analysis of that concept). Yet it is the dynamic
hierarchization of such construction that has not been elaborated 49, prior to the
discourse on dialogical self (and forms of dialogicality which differ from).
Figure 3.9. shows how the structure of DS can be changed by guidance
from signs. The hyper-generalized field (Moral Immoral tension field)
emerges from abstracting sign construction from the A(int) A(ext) relations
of I-positions. After its emergence at the level of meanings it starts to canalyze
new I-positions B (ext) B (out). Semiotic guidance of the extension of the
Dialogical Self proceeds through generalization of the sign fields and their
transposition to new contexts.
Hermans DS theory overcomes the limits of the usual exclusive
separation we see as regular tactic in psychologys theory construction. The
different locations of I-positions create relationships across structural boundaries
posited to exist within the DS. This structure fits the notion of inclusive separating
the twothe person is distinct from the social context while being a part of it. The
3-zones distribution of the I-positions allows the researcher to maintain the unity

49
Probably this is a "side-effect" of the opposition by the thinkers who try to turn the notion of self
into a dynamic and contextualized form to overlook the hierarchical nature of any flexible system.
Instead of a hierarchy of static kind ("core" self > components of self) the notion of dialogical self
leads to the conceptualization of self-processes that form hierarchies. Thus, when the notion of
"dominance" between two I-Positions (A dominates over B) is being claimed, a hierarchy of the
simplest kind is created.
Valsiner 134

of person<> environment relations without collapsing the two sides conceptually

into one another.

General axiom: separating with (rather than from). Thisseparate-yet-

non-separatestate of affairs allows for any Subject-Object distinction to be
made, which in its turn can lead to reflection upon the relationship of the two.
Thus, a person completely immersed in the social contextbe it by trance,
dance, or complete devotioncannot reflect upon oneself in that context.
Likewise, a person completely (exclusively) separated from the context has no
basis for viewing ones relationship with that context (e.g., consider the rather
exotic topic such as my life on the Moonor comparable in genre, yet real,
travel stories of European explorers from the newly discovered lands)other
than through projecting imagined scenarios onto the issue, i.e., creating a
relationship in order to reflect upon it (see Valsiner, 1999, on how such relations
are created).
Such distancing is possible in case of the researchers adoption of the
tactic of inclusive separationthe person is separated with the social
environment (in contrast toseparated from). The individual is autonomous
precisely because s/he is fully interdependent with that social world. It is the
European, classical logic mindset that researchers have superimposed onto
human beings from other cultural contexts. The either<>or orientation (exclusive
separation) eliminates the inherent dynamic linkages between the opposites
and hence turns the opposites from being a part of the system into segregated
entified concepts. In contrast, keeping the phenomena in sight would show how
fruitless such schemes are. Talking of the role of individual in South Asia, Parish
emphasized

I do not accept the view that the South Asian tradition obliterates
the individual. Rather, I believe the sharp contrast between
individualism and holism is a Western discourse that obscures and
distorts Newar cultural experience. Newars know the value of
themselves as autonomous individuals and as social beings. They
find meaning in both their individual actions and in relationships.
(Parish, 1994, p. 187).

The person is always autonomous in ones actionsthanks to the

interdependence of these actions withy their physical and meaningful context. In
line with the dialectics of the dialogical self theory, the Newars can be viewed as
a cultural dialecticthe dynamic unity of opposites that produces numerous
states of beingboth socially immersed and individual. In that process

men and women merge, blend, and unite in relatedness,

emerging as selves, then merge again, and re-emerge, producing
the subtle, powerful, cross-currents of moral consciousness. If
Newars see themselves in terms of a union of being with significant
others, embed themselves in social groups, and identify with moral
Valsiner 135

traditions, they also value who they are, what they have done, and
what they want to do. They know themselves in terms of their own
identity and purposes, value their own existence and actions, and
are often acutely, painfully, playfully, ironically, and self-reflectively
conscious of the way self is entangled in living net of
relationships. (Parish, 1994, p. 187, added emphasis)

This description of the dynamic self is not just dialogical (and dialectic), it
also serves as an example of inclusive separation of the Self from The Others
(the social network). It also exemplifies the notion of the self as always in motion
(chapter 2). This creativity of the cultural selvesmoving between feeling
autonomy and mutualityis further corroborated by the creative and playful
nature of rituals. While cultural anthropology has habitually described rituals as
scripts to be performed in standard ways, recent new look at the actual
performance of different rituals shows context-specific and ludic improvisation in
their performance (Handelman & Lindquist, 2005; Koepping, 1997). In case of
ruptures of the ritual its repairs have shown to take on both personal-cultural
(increasing stigmatization of performers) and collective-cultural (re-making of the
form) a role (Freeman, 1981).
This dynamicity of the selfa personal-cultural phenomenonis
supported by the flexibility of meaning systems within the collective cultural
worlds. This is guaranteed by the heterogeneity of meaning fields, as Umberto
Eco (1976, p. 80) has posited:

1. in a given social unit-- at the given time there can exist contradictory
semantic fields;
2. the same cultural toole.g. meaning used for classifying--can itself
become party of complementary semantic fields within the social unit
(e.g., the meaning whale can be used in different contexts which are
mutually incompatibleas a class of mammals, or as a big fish to be
caught in the ocean)
3. within the given social unit a semantic field can disintegrate and vanish
with extreme rapidity and restructure itself into a new field.

Such heterogeneity of meaning fields within the collective culture

guarantees that persons constantly operate at the intersection of different parts
of the semantic fields. New meanings emerge from the relations of previous
ones, and the dialogical self is the agent of synthesis of new semiotic devices.
Valsiner 136

Meanings emerge through oppositions

The focus on the relevance of opposites is prominent in the holistic

"Austrian tradition" of psychology which stems from the work of Franz Brentano.
It is elaborated into the world of meanings by Alexius Meinong, who established
the foundations of Gestalt thought in Graz (Austria) in the 1880s.
Sciences re-write their histories from the viewpoint of social institutional
power. Hence after the migration of psychology from its center of gravity in the
German language room before World War II to that of North-American and
English language dominance fields, the whole history of Continental European
traditions in the discipline has become obscured. In reality, there are two bases
in the psychological thinking of the 1870s that laid the foundation for psychology
of the 20th century. One is well recognizedWilhelm Wundteven as the full
range of his contributions is not (Diriwchter, 2004). The otherFranz
Brentanois recognized among philosophers, rather than by psychologists.
While it is true that the Brentano tradition gave the World a wealth of
philosophical (Edmund Husserl), logical (Kasimir Twardowski), and linguistic
(Anton Marty), there were also major psychological continuities into the 20th
century, such as Carl Stumpf, and especiallyAlexius Meinong.
Meinongs Gegenstandstheorie is the basis for all of the efforts of the
Graz School to develop empirically rooted psychology of phenomena of various
levels of generality. In general terms, the Austrian Gestalt tradition (represented
by the Graz perspective of Alexius Meinong, Stefan Witasek and Vittorio
Benussi), experience is a two-level conception

according to which experienced objects are partitioned into

objects of lower and higher order: the former are, for example,
colors and tones (which are, it is held, given immediately in
sensation), the latter are, for example, shapes and melodies,
complex organized wholes which are founded on the former and
require special, intellectual acts in order to be grasped by
consciousness. (Smith, 1994, p. 137)

The founded objects are higher-order objects (or, in Gestalt terminology

objects with Gestalt qualities) that build upon the distinctions between
elementary objects. Meanings are of such kind. They are constructed on the
basis of perceived or imagined realities.

Meinongs look at meaning construction

Meinongs philosophical interests led to central emphasis on the ways of
constructing meanings. He claimed,
Valsiner 137

as I am apprehending an A, I also apprehend a non-A in some

sense. So we have to do with a difference regarding what is
apprehended a difference regarding what stands opposite
[gegenbersteht] each intellectual experience as its object
[Gegenstand 50]. In the non-A, then, there is a further objective
factor, the "non," as it were, supervening on the A. (Meinong,
1902/1983, pp. 14-15)

Meinong understood the basic asymmetry between the two components of

representation: The non-A operates as negativum in relation to A. The negativum
is always built on the basis of the positive concept (the inferiora). Thus, it is not
possible to think of "non-red" without having a notion of "red" on the basis of which
the negativum is built up. Furthermore, the negativum emerges not only on the
basis of the inferiorum, but in-between that and a wide open field of possible
objects which are clearly different from it. As Meinong explained,

The idea of the negativum does not develop originally from the A
alone; instead, there is also given an X, of which it may be or at least
is asserted that it is not A, in quite the same way that the similarity
must, to begin with, be established between A and some other,
second object, Y. And just as abstraction then sets to work on the
special complex AY formed by means of comparison--so that from
the idea "Y similar to A" there is formed the idea "similarity to A" or
"similar to A"--so too might an abstract representation "something that
is not A" or simply non-A develop out of complex of another sort, AX,
or out of the idea "X is not A." Along with the original duality of the
fundamenta, the matter of the producing activity is also settled: What
is accomplished by comparison in the other case is here
accomplished by judgment--negative judgment, naturally. (Meinong,
1902/1983, p. 16)

Every action we undertake in our life spaces entails making of the basic
distinction-- of the acting agent (Subject), and the layout we act upon (Object).
Such basic distinction introduces the duality of the Subject and the Object. No
knowledge is possible without such duality-- even if the Subject and Object are
confined within the same person (as in intra-mental self-knowing).

50
It is important to emphasize the meaning of Gegenstand hereit entails something that stands against
(Gegen) something else.
Valsiner 138

Figure 3.10. The general structure of the sign (A <> non-A)

The
The NON-A part context
of the signa for the
A semi-open field sign:
of possible new
meanings NOT-A

Semiotic field theory of mutually generating opposites

When a human constructs meaning to relate with their world, the field of
opposites is automatically implied at every moment. This is guaranteed by both
time (as described above) and the space of meaningsthe tension between the
personal culture (system of personal sense) and the social world within the
person is embedded. Let us re-analyze the widely quoted statement taken from
the literary scholarship of Mikhail Bakhtin:

The word of language-- is half alien [chuzoye-- not belonging to me

and unknown-- in Russian] word. It becomes "one's own" when the
speaker inhabits it with his intention, his accent, masters the word,
brings it to bear upon his meaningful and expressive strivings. Until
that moment of appropriation [prisvoenie in Russian] the word is not
existing in neutral and faceless language (the speaker does not
take the word from a dictionary!), but [it exists] on the lips of others,
in alien contexts, in service of others' intentions: from here it has to
be taken and made into one's own. (Bakhtin, 1934/35-- published in
1975, p. 106).
Valsiner 139

Most of the rhetoric uses of this quote in contemporary social sciences

emphasize the word being not ones own themethe social embeddedness of
the words-using person. Yet this quote actually emphasizes the unity and mutual
dynamic interdependence (see Figure 2.2. in Chapter 2, above) of the personal
agency and its field of social environmentthe word as it exists on the lips of
others (rather than is taken from a dictionary). Bakhtin's explicit emphasis on the
active role of the person-- who is the agent who makes the alien word to be one's
own-- restores the focus on duality to the study of persons' relations with their
languages. The latter are not uniform (not taken from a dictionary), but represent
intentional, goal-oriented uses of language for their own personal purposes. The
person is constantly on the border of what is known (e.g. my system of personal
sensesubjective meanings based on my life experiences up to now) and what
is not yet known personally, but socially suggested by others through their use of
semiotic devices (e.g., my reception of the word from the lips of strangers who
present to me a myriad of strange, foreignnot minepersonal worlds). In this
respect, every person is a traveler in strange lands, some of which become his or
her own through the colonization of their meaning.
Following the ideas of Alexius Meinong, we have posited that meaning
arises in the form of complexes of united opposites, (Josephs, Valsiner, &
Surgan, 1999). It is that opposition between the meaning and its opposite that is
the basis for further change. The meaning is a complex sign characterized by
duality of the process of meaning-making and takes the form of a point (or a
circumscribed field) united with a quasi-open field (see Figure 3.10).
This theoretical depiction of the sign in Figure 3.10, is purely structuralit
merely visually highlights the focus on asymmetry in the relationships of the two
parts of the sign (A is visible, the semi-open corresponding field of non-A is
indeterminate because of its open boundaries, and is always in a state of quasi-
differentiation. Its function is to provide the ill-determined opposite for dialogical
transformation of the A. Georg Simmel, writing about love, has captured the
central theoretical issue involved here:

To regard love and hate as exact polar antitheses, as if it were

necessary only to transpose the one into the opposite key in order
to have the other, is completely mistaken. This misconception
results from the fact that some externally practical consequences of
the one appear to be direct antithesis of the consequences of the
other. But even this appearance is hardly exact. I wish one person
good fortune and another sorrow. The presence of one person
delights me, that of another is painful to me. But happiness and
sorrow are not logical antitheses. Even the fact that love relatively
often turns into hate proves nothing as regards their logical
correlation. The opposite of love is not-lovein other words,
indifference. If hate appears instead of indifference, this stems from
completely new positive causes. It may be the case that these
causes are secondarily connected with love: for example, the
Valsiner 140

intimate relationship with the other person, the pain caused by the
fact that one has deceived himself or allowed himself to be
deceived, the grief due to lost opportunities for happiness, and so
on. (Simmel, 1984, p. 164, added emphases)

Simmels not-love maps onto non-A in Figure 3.10. Each sign is given
by its manifest (A) and its field-like nebulous counterpart (non-A). The latterin
dialogic relationship with the formeris the locus for emergence of new
meanings.
New meanings grow in the A<>non-A field through oppositions between
the known (A) and the hidden other (non-A). Such oppositions take the form of
striving towards the otherthe unknown, the disallowed-yet-desired, or to
away from the already established (A).

Example 3. 5. Transformations within the A<>non-A sign fields. In order to

find sufficiently appropriate examples, we need to either enter the realm of poetry or
fiction on the one handor introspectionist psychology of the beginning of the 20th
century, on the other. The latter has been discounted by history writers of
psychologyand masked under other labels in contemporary cognitive science
(e.g., thinking aloud protocols). What has gone missing from psychology of the
second half of the 20th century is the study of psychological processes (see chapter
9 as to ways for its restoration). Yet van analysis of transforming sign fields a
process orientation is mandatory.
The following example comes from the work of Robert Ogden (1917), whose
procedure included purposive introspective scrutiny of the process of arrival at the
meaning of a stimulus word (or phrase). The experimenter told the subject:

Close your eyes and hold yourself as passive as possible, both

mentally and physically. After saying "Ready," "Now," I shall
pronounce a word. Give it your immediate, full attention with the
definite purpose of understanding its meaning. As soon as you are
satisfied that the meaning has been grasped, react with "Yes." Then
recount by introspection your complete experience. Be in no hurry to
react, and let your occupation with the word be as natural as
possible. (Ogden, 1917, p. 79, italics added)
Valsiner 141

Figure 3.11. The growth of new sign B from the field structure (A <> non-A)

NON-A

New sign B
emerging from The
non-A context
for the
A sign:

NOT-A

Ba new
sign
NON-B

As a result of Ogden's instruction (see above), the subject reported the following
in response to the orally presented word "pair" :

[after 5.6 seconds]

1. I was waiting for the word. When it came it associated almost immediately
two meanings: pair, as a pair of something, boots or shoes,
[{A=pair & non-A=non-pair}]
Valsiner 142

2. and pear, briefly, not visualized.

[constructive elaboration and dominance of B=pear => {B=pear & non-
B=non-pear} in non-A]
3. I came back to pair which was probably present all the time.
[immediate dominance reversal to {A & non-A}]
4. This experience was very active and pleasant. I resumed in a very brief
thought a problem in Poincar's book having to do with a certain theory of
logic.
[constructive elaboration of C--Poincar's logic into non-A => {C & non-C}]
5. Lingered over the thought for a moment while some imagery developed,
possibly a vague image of a printed page and the peculiar type of the
French,-- not visualized, I think. There was something about the appearance
of the numbers,--many numbers are scattered through the book.
[growth of C]
6. With the reaction came a visual image of a pear.
[re-emergence of B in non-C, dominance of {B & non-B}]
7. It seemed floating in the air. I could see part of the stem, like tobacco
smoke, vibrating. (Ogden, 1917, p. 98)

The immediate retrospection of the introspective stream was obviously reflexive

of the ambiguous stimulus word (pair/pear). The move from "pair" to "pear"
entailed change from {A=pair & non-A=non-pair} to the constructive elaboration
of "pear" in the non-A part of the sign-field. This was followed by dominance of
{B=pear & non-B=non-pear}). This dominance was reversed back to "pair" (A &
non-A; note the notion of "pleasant"), only to be moved away by constructive
elaboration of C which took over the thought movement. The imagery of printed
page (filled with numbers) would amount to growth within C. Subsequently {B &
non-B}, "pear," re-emerged in the non-C, and took over the dominance again.
Within approximately five seconds, the person proceeded through four take-
over events (including one reversal), and one example of the growth of a new
meaning.
This oppositional meaning construction process can entail also the use of
multi-level semiotic regulatorspromoter signsto regulate the A<>non-A
dynamics. In the following interview excerpt, a young female interviewee, who
has emphasized her religious background before, made a claim that she
dislikes tattoos in total. The interviewer (I) challenges the subject (IEE)
further:

I: You would never get a tattoo?

IEE: Mmm-mm. Nooo.
Valsiner 143

I: Why not?
IEE: I just don't like them.
I: Why not?
IEE: First of all, you know, it's something that I think--first of all, it's
something that I just don't like. Other people it's fine. But I don't want
to, anyway. And most importantly, I don't see how it would, in any way,
glorify God. ()
I: Even if you put like a cross or something?
IEE: Uh-huh. I know what you're saying. I mean, some Christians might
choose to do that, and if they feel called and moved by God that that's
what He wants them to do, that's fine, but I just wouldn't. Unless God
wanted me to. I doubt He would want me to do something like that, but
if He wanted me to, I would.
I: () what if you were having some trouble or you felt like you were
losing your faith, or whatever, and you were talking about it and
somebody said, "Would you consider wearing a crucifix or you should
get a little golden cross on your ankle or somewhere where you could
easily see it." How would you react?
IEE: Well, I would pray about it and if God told me that He wants me to do
it, I would. I wouldn't just--they tell me that? OK. I would pray about it.
"God, do you really want me to get the tattoo?" If He says yes, OK.
Then I'll do it. I'd have a tattoo all over my body if that's what He wants
me to do. (Josephs, Valsiner & Surgan, 1999, p. 276, added
emphases)

The interviewer brings a higher level semiotic organizer (God's will) into
the dialogue. That move immediately challenges the interviewee's meaning
complex. This challenge leads to circumventionovercoming of the strong
dislike when ordered by the deity (see also Valsiner, 1999), whose orders could
get the person to swing to the opposite extremeget tattoos all over her body.
Here we can observe the establishment of circular, unchallengeable loops
of semiotic organizerssimilar to Figure 2.2. in chapter 2. This mutually
integrated loop involves semiotically generated boundary regulators of dual kind
(Figure 3.12.)
Valsiner 144

Figure 3.12. A general scheme of blocking ones possible actions until it

becomes contextually warranted.

I WILL NOT DO X (A dominates non-A)

but

I WILL DO X IF Y where
Y = {B emerges from non-A}
where A is set to dominate over non-A

BUT since B is set up so as to not to emerge from non-A

therefore Y DOES NOT HAPPEN

BUT IF Y WERE TO HAPPEN

(i.e. A dominance over non-A is overcome into B)
THEN I DO X

Here we see a critical self-canalization structure of ones personal culture

that simultaneously creates possibilities and means that make sure such
possibilities cannot be actualized. The A<>non-A field is pre-structured from the
beginning so that the dialogical oppositethe possible {non-A} that is ruled out of
actualityis functionally eliminated (even if recognized as in principle possible).
The Dialogical Self here demonstrates its self-monologizing naturethrough the
creation of dual opposites in the sign fields and setting up the dominance of one
part over the other it eliminates its own manifest dialogical nature 51.
The contextual warranting of such change may be itself determined by the
person oneself who evokes a signified authority that overcomes a previous
semiotic regulator. A fitting example is that of a deeply religious Muslim woman in
SudanHiba (Nageeb, 2004, pp. 131-163) who persuaded her family at accept

51
This elimination is itself a version of a dialogical statethe monological versions of meanings where
the growth of the non-A part of the field is disallowed are nevertheless special (extreme) cases of dialogical
nature.
Valsiner 145

her marriage to a foreigner (an Islamic man from Tanzania), as she describes her
encounter with her mothers uncle (the ultimate social power holder in the family):

I told him that the Prophet advised Muslims to accept the one with a
good level of religiosity, and he said all Muslims are equal. I also
told him that I am not going to be insubordinate to Allah because
you said it is not in the family tradition to marry a foreigner. If the
family tradition does not want to be responsible for this marriage,
no problem. I can do it alone; there is sharaiyya around the corner
(Nageeb, 2004, p. 158, added emphases)

This example parallels historical accounts of young Christian women in

the Middle Ages who turned away from the regular expected life courses
(marriage) to devote themselves to convent life (Weinstein & Bell, 1982).
Likewise, we find similar acts of constructing a higher-level semiotic power
source in the history of the bhakti devotional social role models in mediaeval
Indian history (Ali, 2000). These acts of differentiation of subjective autonomy
which took the form of extensive devotion to another authority (i.e., loss of
autonomy in relation to the latter) were socially disputable also at the peer level
(e.g. Harlan, 1992, chapter 7 on Rajput womens handling of the Mira Bai bhakti
legend). The personally constructed semiotic hierarchies (Valsiner, 1999) are
mapped into the publicly possibleacceptable, but not locally preferred
collective-cultural meaning systems, and negotiated through public acts.

History of basic concepts: the opposition of ecstasy and enstasy. The

A<>non-A perspective on meaning making is applicable in the historical side to
basic concepts that are used widely in the social sciences. For instance, the
usual separation of individualism from collectivism (and vice versa)- see Example
2.1. in chapter 2can gain a different focus by considering individualism as a
result of growth of the meaning from the field of non-collectivism (within the
{collectivism <> non-collectivism field}) in human social history. Likewise, the
central notion of economic and evolutionary discoursesthat of competition
can be viewed as an outgrowth from the {cooperation<>non-cooperation}
meaning fields. Taking the A<>non-A perspective gives a new structure to
various efforts to consider the notion of dialectical synthesis in the social
scienceswith the peculiarity of uneven differentiation of the two parts of the
field structure (A seen as structured, non-A as potential for further growth of
structure).
Gananath Obeyesekeres exposition (2002, pp. 162-173) of the unity of
two opposite directions in human conductoutward exuberant performance with
loss of the selfs boundaries with the world (ecstasy, or trance) and inward
equally extreme loss of selfs boundariescontemplation and the arrival at
meaningful nothingness (enstasy) may give us here a glimpse into potential
historical usefulness of the A<non-A theoretical system. However, Obeyesekere
brings to this scheme a third momentthat of spirit possessionthe widespread
Valsiner 146

belief of the body being vulnerable to possession by external immaterial 52

agents (spirits, demons, etc.). The belief in spirit possessionor its prevention--
can be viewed as an external catalyzer of the actions undertaken in the A<>non-
A fields. Here is where the ecstasy and enstasy may be two different cultural-
psychological strategies to handle the basic threat to the socially interdependent
autonomy of the self:

Spirit possession pertains to illness and its cure, whereas the

monks quest is the overcoming of the ills of existence. The one is
world involved; the other world rejecting. The monks rational
alternative to spirit possession is meditation. The calm and serene
expression of the meditator contrasts with the violence of the
person possessed by spirits. The one involves silence; the other
involves noise. It is very likely that spirit possession is the older
form in South Asia. The contemplative trance of the monk exists in
a schismogenic relationship with the possession trance of the spirit
medium, the practice of the one form heightening the sense of
contrast with the other It must be remembered that meditation, in
its fully developed form in Indian religions, meets the challenge of
possession trance by producing its own form of trance, in which
visions, states of contemplative bliss, or mystical union with the
godhead is achieved. Unlike possession trances, which imply
shaking and violent body movements, meditation attempts to
achieve control and awareness, serenity and calm, all passion
spent. (Obeyesekere, 2002, p. 168, added emphases)

The growth out of the {passion<>non-passion} field is the new passion for
non-passion of the meditative serenity and calmness of passionless being. The
notion of disciplined passionless grows out from the non-passion part of the field
(non-A) and establishes its own form (B). The new {B<>non-B} meaning field
becomes hyper-passionately guarded against relapses to passion. The deeply
passionate nature of people who insist upon rational moral norms or economic
rationality in a world filled with ever-new forms of genetic dramatisms (see
Cirillo & Kaplan, 1983) is a paradox of human existence only if we fail to
understand its semiotic regulation structure. The act of meditation is thus an
intra-psychological action domain aimed at the same outcome as the rituals that
help the person to enter trance in the extra-psychological construction of the
given psychological process of uniting ones self with a non-self worldby acting
or contemplationto create a hyper-generalized semiotic field of affective kind
(see chapter 7).

52
It would be interesting to look at parallels between rituals of handling spirit possession (as powerful,
yet immaterial external agents are involved) and strategies of resolving affect-laden frictions based on
possessiveness of the real other in marital small group relations (see chapter 5).
Valsiner 147

Summary: oppositions in the semiotic fields of the self

The semiotic fields of Dialogical Self are set up to guide the affective
bonding of human beings to their everyday life arrangementsmarriage
arrangements and acceptance of family life in its totality of work and relatedness.
There is probably no other value-laden cultural notion that over-determines all
human minds over the World as the notions of family and marriage. Persons
enter into these social role relationshipswhich entail hard daily work and often
recurrent needs for adaptation to very different social expectations than they are
used to. Yet the value of these frameworks for social living is universallyalbeit
in different forms (as we see in the next chapter)socially promoted and
personally internalized. The power of such social frameworks and their over-
generalized meanings to guide human conduct and affective needs is a powerful
testimony of the centrality of culture within human minds.
Valsiner 148

Chapter 4. Minimal Communities and Their Organization:

Kinship groups, families, and marriage forms

The symbolic ambiguity of human meaning fields is corroborated in the

landscape of their social relationships. Human beings are striving towards
belonging to one or another social unitgroup, community, nation, or even
humankind (e.g., feeling to be the citizens of the world), andconsequently
they are in the process of moving away from the past social relationships. Thus
the notion of participation itself is a semiotic marker of some process of ideal
belonging and non-belonging. In other termsthe phenomena of participation
in social units are personal ideations that are supported by concrete social inter-
actions between persons. Thus, a multi-aged group of persons may tell all others
that they are together in family re-union, but the notion of re-union is a sign that
is made to symbolize the complex interaction event in ways similar to a pipe-that-
is-not a pipe (see Chapter 3). Statements of identity 53 are signs that human
beings construct-- and do not have-- one-to-one correspondence with reality.

Quasi-stability of social identity environments

A person is born into a social group setting, and is part of some version of
such setting all over ones life. Yet as we have seen abovethe person is in
constant movement within ones field of social relationships, and is therefore
necessarily a liminal member of the different social units one encounters in ones
lifetime. Some look permanentsuch as the family group into which a person is
bornbut such permanence may be a case of temporary stability of a dynamic
group system, rather than an inherent characteristic of that group. Depending
upon the collective-cultural organization of the life course, even natal household
group may become distant (e.g., daughters, or sons, moving out in conjunction
with marriage, never to return into the same social role 54). The locality of
marriageneolocal 55may set the formal blueprint for the transition of the
persons role in ones natal family group over the life course. Surely the blood
ties to the parentsparticularly the mothernever vanish, the belonging to

53
This point would resolve the seeming paradox of the Bororo identityknown in anthropology through
the fieldwork of von den Steinen (1894. P. 353 and 512) and Levy-Bruhl (1911, chapter 3). When the
Bororo say We are araras [red parrots] it is interpretable as symbolwith support of indexical signs of
arara feathers used in Bororo head-dresses. It is not an ontological revelation of the truth of identity in the
sense of European-kind logical clasification, but in terms of mystic abstractionsee Levy-Bruhl, 1911,
p, 117, also chapter 8 here).
54
E.g. when divorced daughters return to their natal households, their social roles are not the same as when
they were there before marriage (the case of X in Nageeb, 2004)
55
neolocal an anthropological term to depict the practice of establishing a new household by the
persons who get married; virilocalresidence of married couple with of kin of the husband (e.g., viri-
patrilocal, vs. viri-avunulolocalwith husbands maternal uncle); patrilocal or matrilocalpractice of
residing either in the fathers or mothers household (home compound) after marriage.
Valsiner 149

social group established through blood ties is a symbolic social unit 56, rather than
actual one.
Furthermore, there exist major gender differences in the stability of the
natal family group for the developing son or daughterwith the matrilocal
residence pattern (paired with matrilineal inheritance of symbolic and real
property) guaranteeing continuity of stable social group for daughters, but not for
sons (see the Nayar case in Kerala, chapter 2 and in Arunima, 2003; Kurien,
1994, 2002). In contrast, sons who bring their new wives into their natal
(patrilineal and patrilocal) residence gain their natal groups relative stability,
while completely changing that of their wives.
Thus, even natal family groupslinked by unalterable blood ties in the
symbolic realmare not guaranteed to have continuity over ones lifetime. Even
less so are other social units within which the developing person participates
over ones lifetime. The only continuous social unit in which the person
participates is the persons own personal culturepossibly conceived as
dialogical self (see above, chapter 3). That is the social unit centered on the
person, and extended outwards from the persons I-point 57. It vanishes with the
demise of the person, in accordance with Herbsts co-genetic logic. All other
external to the personsocial units are transitory for the person. That constantly
changing social group situation guarantees sufficient conditions for the
development of all human beings who are involved in the social relations with
one another.

The family: ideologically presented unity of a part of the kin group

One of the most central myths about human social life organization is that
of the centrality of nuclear family. Despite many claims in different societies
about the crucial role of the family as the cornerstone of society, it has proven
impossible to define what family means. As we will see below, this definitional
difficulty is due to the ideological social values that are involved when social
discourse about family takes place.

The word itself. The word family in the sense of residential and biological unit is
a historically recent invention for the European cultural history. Before the 18th
Century, there was no term in European languages to refer to a mother-father-
children groupings as social unit. The Latin familia was a term linked with the
physical location (house) in which the social group (which in Roman times
included servants, and slaves) lived (Gies & Gies, 1987, p. 4).

56
As is exemplified by many family feuds, jealousies, fights for inheritances, etc. in family groups all over
the World.
57
I-point is a theoretical abstraction-- the imaginary, infinitely central point of the beginning of
subjectivityintraceable in the infinity of the intra-personal psychological field (see Stern, 1935, also
Bhler, 1990). Also consider Ernst Boeschs point about culture being created by persons acting at the
border of home (Heim) of dual natureones own (einige) and the foreign (fremde)Boesch, 2002b, p.
70-71.
Valsiner 150

Thus the difficulties to define family in the social sciences are antedated
by the wide uses of the notion long before social sciences emerged themselves.
The immediate reality of the primary social group may make it deceptively simple
to view family as the social group-- based on marriage relation-- who lives
together in a given household.
The role of the lineage of ancestors in defining a family -- by the primary
social group itself-- creates a major difference between functional (i.e., view from
the inside of a family) and demographic efforts to define the family. Surely the
ancestors are not included in any population counts of the living, yet their
psychological role in the family may be substantial. It is clear that the multi-
faceted nature of life organization of the primary social groups is a basic
challenge for the social scientists.
An example of a definition of the family may help here to see both the
confusion and set of parameters used in the definition effort:

I will define family as a social arrangement based on the marriage

and the marriage contract, including recognition of the rights and
duties of parenthood, common residence for husband, wife, and
children, and reciprocal economic obligations between husband
and wife. (Stephens, 1963, p. 8, added emphases)

This definition is a good example of the challenges that social scientists

face. It is clearly ethnocentric-- fitting the European-type societies. It fits the
contemporary European and North-American contexts where there is explicit
focus on rights and duties of persons who enter into a contract (marriage
contract), and where the patterns of life organization prescribe neolocal
residence for a newly constituted family.
Such development of the notion of family is a historical result of economic
processes that have taken place with urbanization and industrialization. As a
result, the mutual relationship entails economic obligations in the horizontal (wife
<--> husband) axis, but not on the vertical one (e.g., children <--> parents axis).
In the latter, the economic obligation -- if mentioned-- may entail parents
obligation to provide for childrens life needs, but not for children (before
adulthood) to provide for parents economic needs. This specific structure of
economic obligations is an outgrowth from a field of kinship-group based
economic obligations that concentrate precisely on the role of children as these
grow up (marrying of the children is an inter-group economic and political
relationship). Historically, children are integrated into productive economic
activities of the whole family and kinship group from early age onwards, and
much of their duty is the care of siblings and the elderly.

The ideologies behind the word. All talk about family is at the level of semiotic
mediationsuch talk re-presents some form of actual co-living around
reproductive successes (or accidental reproduction) and economic collaboration
within kinship groups. Talk about family becomes collective-cultural set of texts
a heterogeneous set that is constantly being co-constructed. Thus,
Valsiner 151

Children making sense of others in their social environment are

constructing a familial text, one which is likely to be different from
whatever they might be able to say about it. They are themselves
assigned a pre-existing meaning in the familial texts that confront
them so coercively with impenetrable closure, texts whose
meanings are potently reinforced by actions and behaviors of
others essential to their survival. The familial texts are hinted at by
innumerable, barely comprehensible other texts in other semiotic
media. They present children with their greatest semiotic challenge
before they have even begun to crack the phonological code;
before they have entered the verbal language. (Hodges & Kress,
1988, p. 206, added emphasis)

Familial texts are collective-cultural ideologies that guide the carving out of
the developing persons social interaction realities all through their life course. As
such, these texts operate as promoter signs (see chapter 3 above), providing
overwhelming affective value to concrete limits that the family entails. The limits
constraintsare both ruling out some ways of acting, and ruling in and
promoting others. Whether it is a newborn or infant about whom the mother says
something derogatory 58 or expresses her fascination, an adolescent discouraged
from the immorality of sexual experiences before marriage, or expected to have
children after getting married (and still not enjoy the sexual acts that leads to
procreation)the collective-cultural constraint systems operate in the same
direction. Through the communication networks of the persons these pre-set
suggestions are put into their place through the use of all kinds of signs as their
mediatorssilences, affective field conditions (see chapter 8), iconic depictions
of improper and proper action models, etcin gossips, explicit confrontations,
or journalistic media texts. Thus, if a new grandmothers continuation of sexual
relationships within her solid marriage is charted out as improper at her age by
gossiping neighbors we can observe an act of collective-cultural canalization of
human personal life course (see also example 4.4. --on younger co-wifes age-
based critique of her older rival) in all cases the family texts operate as cultural
constraint systems upon the life course construction. Family is an abstraction of
ideological value.

58
Cf. A practice widespread over the World to ward of the acts of malevolent spirits who might steal the
child. So, in a Turkish after-birth ceremony very little notice is taken of the baby, and even then only
disparaging remarks are made about it, both by relatives and guests If looked at it is immediately spat
upon, and then left to slumber in innocent unconsciousness of the undeserved abuse it has received.
(McCartney, 1981, p. 12). In South India, mothers are reported sometimes to make the faces of their
children grotesque by painting black marks on the cheeks, forehead or chin, so as to enable them to avoid
the possible admiring gaze of an evil-eyed individual (Woodburne, 1981, p. 63)
Valsiner 152

Efforts to specify types of family

When human beings fail to define a concept, they switch to classifying the
issues subsumed under it. Despite the difficulties of defining family as a key
concept, social sciences have had no difficulty in inventing different ways to
classify families (e.g., Nimkoff & Middleton, 1960). In parallel, multiple criteria can
be used. No single criterion is sufficient. First, if the sharing of household were to
be the single criterion for a family, then any students sharing the same house or
apartment would be considered a family. Or if only recurrent sexual relationships
were sufficient, many of the young peoples intimacies would become labeled
family, despite their lack of common home territory. If marriage were to be the
only criterion, then any marriage partner-- including cases of theogamy-- would
result in a family. Thus, a devout mediaeval girl in an European convent may
consider herself married to Jesus, yet this does not mean that her family now
would include her and Jesus (who may be well unaware of his marital status!).
No single criterion is thus used exclusively, and combining of different criteria
gives us possibilities to create typologies of families.
If family is such fuzzy concept thenwhy bother about defining it at all?
Efforts to do so are by their nature linked to administrative concerns of
developing government institutions of nation states 59, and their interest in
establishing their control over the minimal communities. All forms of hierarchical
social order depend upon its relationship with their subordinate social institutions,
of which the family makes the most functional and hence the most powerful
alternative social power that the higher-order social institutions need to get to
cooperate with them. Along similar lines, talk about family (e.g., family values
etc) which is a collective vehicle for regulating social controlcan well operate
with that term poorly defined as long as it is pre-presenting the social agendas of
the interested institutions.

Combining shared household (and its locality) with marriage as a social

bond. This combination of criteria provides the typology of families by way of
their establishment of household. The fact of marriage is the basis for the use of
the hosehold sharing criterion. In the neolocal family, the married group (couple,
or polygamic group, see below) establishes a new household which becomes
shared for all activities-- economic, reproductive, etc. In the patrilocal family, the
married unit joins the household of the husband (or husbands-- as in the case of
polyandry). In the matrilocal family, the married establish their household with the
wifes natal home.
Obviously, the latter two forms overlap with the criterion of sharing
household with kinship group members. The matri- and patrilocal families are
also extended families-- families where members of different generations
(parents of the married adults) share the household. The parents of the husband

59
see Arunima, 2002, on the role of British colonial administration in India attempting to eradicate Nayar
matriliny partly for the sake of ease in tax collection. The success in that destruction was built on the
gradual move of collective-cultural highlighting of the joint household (theravad) in the social worldsby
displacement of their symbolic roles to temples, separately from their economic roles (Moore, 1985, p. 538)
Valsiner 153

(or wife) share the home territories of the patrilocal and matrilocal cases
(respectively), and maintain a power role within these home territories. The
young married persons enter their home territory and establish their lives there,
guided by the parental generation. The extended family types are often linked
with the kinds of subsistence activity patternsprevailing in environments where
continuous agricultural actions (agriculture, animal husbandry, hunting, fishing)
are the core of subsistence, and less likely in the case of hunting and gathering
without accumulation of property (Nimkof & Middleton, 1960, p. 217). This
evidence is of meta-societal kind (based on the Worlds Ethnographic Sample of
Human Relations Area Files), and is not sensitive to social dynamics of
urbanization and industrialization processes that have been taking place all over
the World. For our purposes, however, we are not interested in any static
typology of families, but want to look at the dynamic processes through which
families as small groups based on kinship and marriage links adjust to new
environmental demands. It is the social and psychological resiliency of ways of
human living in groups of continuous kind that matters from a cultural-
psychological perspective.

Family as an organized small group

Efforts to define family -- of classify family types-- may have overlooked
the functional side of any family-- that it is some version of functioning social
group of different-aged members who are related to one another through some
kinship and joint living relationship. In this respect, family operates as any pre-
structured social groups.

Why contemporary social psychology does not matter. Contemporary social

psychology has accumulated empirical evidence about the functioning of social
groups which are mostly occasional, lack pre-structuring, and are not meant to
work together for substantial goal attainment beyond the encounters with the
researchers. Social psychology of small groups in has been completely a-
historical in its focus, and has rarely taken a developmental (microgenetic)
perspective. The usual object of investigation in experimental social psychology
of small groups is a haphazardly assembled conglomerate of few U.S. college
students on no substantial joint history of relationships and superficial external
motivation of participation (course credit). Instead, social groups that operate in
real social worlds have their group history of the past and joint aspirations for the
future (see Petrovski, 1984, for a critical analysis of social psychology in the
realm of small group research).
In contrast, most real-life small groups operate with specifiable goal
orientations, and can be characterized by their history of internal social
relationships. Family certainly belongs to the realm of such groups. Social
psychology of small groups that is based largely on a-historical selection of
college undergraduates into small group experiments on life-wise irrelevant tasks
is not an adequate model for family.
Valsiner 154

Thus, most of evidence in social psychology cannot be directly used for

making sense of the family. The social-psychological processes that are involved
in the coordination of a family are constrained by the history of the relations
between persons within the family. All participants in the family system develop
interdependently over their particular life courses: children become adolescents
and adults while their parents move through their adult age into old age, and their
grandparents from their old age to the realm of ancestors. The latter -- cultural
construction by the presently living family members of the history of the family--
can constrain present actions. For example, members of European royal families
are restricted by their family histories in the choice of marriage partners. Similar
restrictions do not apply in the families of middle or lower classes in the same
societies. The latter families do not build their current identity upon specific
exclusionary family history. Likewise, the restrictions upon family relations under
conditions of slavery indicate the role of constraints-based organization of family
groups (Kopytoff, 1982).

Family as a minimal community. The central psychological issue in the

functioning of a family is the coordination of goals-oriented actions of the family
members. Given that this group is one with joint history, and be related with other
similar groups, we can consider it to be the minimal community. This involves
strategic action towards ones goals, taking into account the goal-orientations of
other family members. Thus, a 15-year-old girl may set herself the goal of
becoming a school dropout in order to enter a glorious film career in Hollywood,
only to find out that her parents have different goals for their accomplishment of
bringing out their daughter. The latter might entail academic excellence at school,
then at college, and then remarkable career in less fancy occupations like these
of lawyer or medical doctor.
The range of expected goal-orientations is pre-arranged by the social
roles the family members assume. The very fact that parents construct their
notion of responsibility (as parents) for giving their children the best narrows
down their range of goal orientations-- both in respect of their children, and their
own development as adults. Children-- merely because they are children of the
parents-- are not expected to create similar goal-orientations relative to the
parents. Grandparents-- again simply because of their kinship role-- can create
goal-orientations in relation with their grandchildren that differ from these of the
parents. Different family structures can provide varied social role relationship
hierarchies as the starting point for the social group. The role of the father can
be prominent in European Christianity-dominated families, while that of the
mother-in-law can play a similar role in the context of joint/extended family.

Basic social dynamics in families: coalition formation. Our focus on family as

minimal community also includes processes of coalition formation between
different members of that community. In order to reach some goals, children may
make coalition with other siblings, or with grandparents, to re-organize the
parents existing goal orientations. Parents may try to create coalitions with
grandparents in order to have a united front facing the children. The mother and
Valsiner 155

father may have different goal orientations for the child-- and the child can make
coalition with one of the parents, attempting to neutralize or overcome the goal-
orientations of the other. Much of the intra-familial communication is strategic and
future oriented. As an example, let us consider a description of a complex family
contexta joint family.

Psychological functioning of the joint family context.

The joint family involves the sharing of the same household territory by the
parallel kin and their offspring (brothers or sisters, their spouses, and their
children). Even if the actual lodgings of the joint family groupsespecially in
urbanized and economically upwardly mobile casesinvolves separate nuclear
households, the unity of the family group is maintained through communication.
This is yet another indicator how it is impossible to delineate a family by its
residence patterneven if the immediate nuclear families live in diferent
dwellings, the location of these dwellings within the same community and the
regular mutual visitation (or staying with) patterns unify these multiple nuclear
units into one joint and extended family. Our contemporary communication
technologies allow the functioning of such family networks over large
geographical distances, thus increasing the options of individual family members
to belong to such joint groups. In sum-- the issue is of the functionalrather than
structuralnature of the joint family.
The joint family can be viewed as

an ideology and code of conduct whereby the relations of

husband and wife and parent and child are expected to be
subordinated to a larger collective identity (Uberoi, 2003, p. 1077)

Two lines of dominance-- male and female-- are mutually intertwined, both
honoring the age of the participants. It also can involve extended nature of the
family-- where the parents of the married adults are not only present in the
household, but are in the symbolically established leaders of the household
(given the relevance of age). Under the traditional pattern of authority, the eldest
male member of the joint family was considered the head of the whole family. He
had authority over others-- yet not unlimited authority. He could not use the
power arbitrarily, without collectively coordinating his decisions. In the second
generation the eldest son used to hold a superior position among the other male
members of the family, yet had a position subordinate to the head and the elder
women. Thus, decisions within a joint family relied on making of coalitions
between less and more powerful members of the family. The age-respecting
dominance system allowed the older members of the family-- particularly the
older women-- remarkable power.

Historical roots of the concept. As many other concepts in cultural/social

anthropology (e.g., matriline) or psychology (e.g., individualism/collectivism), the
notion of the joint family includes an outsiders perspective on the world of the
Valsiner 156

insiders (Derrett, 1962). In addition, a social intervention focus can be traced if

we look at the history of the concept itself:

Historically, the concept of the Indian joint family was the product
of the engagement of British colonial administration with indigenous
systems of kinship and marriage, notably with respect to the
determination of rights in property and responsibility of revenue
payment. Seeking to understand the principles of Indian legal
systems, the British turned to the Hindu sacred texts, the
Dharmashastras, or, parallely, for the Muslim population of the
subcontinent, to the Shariat and the rulings of Muslim legalists
This approach, retrospectively termed Indological approach to
Indian family studies , confirmed the joint family as typical and
traditional form of family organization in India, located it within the
discursive domain of the law, and defined its special features.
(Uberoi, 2003, pp. 1061-1062)

As any administratively introduced concept, that of joint family

homogenizes the variability within the large populationin its present state, and
over history. In some sense the British sanskritization of the Indian family is
based on the same logic as the example of Maori battlefield cannibalism was
(Chapter 3), albeit with less dramatization. Yet as an abstract formal model of
small group organization of close kin relatives the joint family can be a blueprint
to examine different forms of interpersonal role relations.

Social roles within the joint family. The Hindu joint family can be described
by its unseparatedness (in contrast to jointness) of the different persons who
act within the particular family roles. There is the ideology of

the fundamental sense of mutual belonging, even of the ideal

mutual belonging, which exists respectively in the male lineal
descendants of a common male ancestor and their wives and
unmarried daughters. Mutual belonging, mutual responsibility,
reinforced and expressed in terms of ancestral lands and privileges
and ancestral religious rites and shrines, and the common
unquestioning ideal obedience to the senior, most prestige-worthy
representative of the lineage, still to this day make the rule rather
than the exception. (Derrett, 1962, p. 47)

The joint family framework can be built on the basis of any of the 4 basic
marriage forms, as well as equally for matrilineal or patrilineal descent systems.
The public and private domains of the joint family differed in their gender-
distribution of control spheres. Within the family, the mother-in-law was in full
control over the life of the whole family, with the daughter-in-law doing most of
the practical work (Raina, 1988). The mother-in-law would take care of the
daughter-in-laws basic needs, control and regulate her conduct, and protect her
Valsiner 157

against any offenses from behalf of other family members. She would decide
how frequently the daughter-in-law could visit her natal household. The daughter-
in-law had to be fully obedient and demonstrate that in everyday action: massage
the mother-in-laws body, show respect by ritualistic imitation of drinking the
water in which the mother-in-laws feet had been washed, and remain
subservient generally.
The latter particularly is the case of female members of the joint/extended
family, where the crucial role in the running of the family is in the hands of the
mother-in-law. The particular system of social relations within Hindu joint family
created a collective-cultural meaning system of attributing high value to
becoming mother-in-law (see Menon & Shweder, 1998). Becoming mother-in-law
meant takeover of the running of the whole joint family system in the sphere of
home life. The household is a secluded (from public) small enterpriseusually
under the managerial order of the available network of women. The prospect of
becoming promotedby childbearing and getting young adult children married-
- created a career path in the social context of the joint family. This seems very
similar to the social ascendancy patterns in corporationsthe junior partners
were given a scenario of becoming older and important members of the minimal
community with age, and with toleration of their junior roles.
Becoming mother-in-law obviously required passing through the phase of
being daughter-in-law in the joint family of ones husband. The heavy workload
involved in that phase may work towards internalization of the role and its
expectations for the future. Many women in the daughter-in-law phase of their
lives internalize the value and positive expectations for their promotion to the
upcoming role of mother-in-law which is the state of mature adulthood in Hindu
life course. Agewise, this period could extend from around 30 years to about 50
(Menon & Shweder, 1998); and it follows the active role of daughters-in-law in
bearing children --with preference for male children in case of patriliny; or female
children in matrilineal cases, In the patrilineal form, the eldest son eventually
brings in a daughter-in-law by marriage. For the mother-in-law, such life-course
transition amounts to guaranteeing sufficient life conditions at the time of being
old (when her daughter-in-law, in her turn, has become mother-in-law to her
sons new wife). In the matrilineal versions of minimal community organization
especially if combined with matrilocality of the daughters marriagethe
centrality of social power of the daughter is guaranteed all over her continued
residence in her mothers home compound, and the role of the son-in-law
remains marginal in the household.

The basic function of family and kinship network: real social security. The
joint family system is an organizational framework of a minimal community that
guaranteed lifetime social security within the system of kinship network. Like in
any other society in the history of humankind, it was (and is) the kinship network
that acts as a buffer against possible economic and natural disasters. Modern
governments social institutions that have attempted to take that function over
have usually succeeded administratively at times of economic successes-- but
failed at times of economic calamities. The reason is very simple-- political
Valsiner 158

parties, governments, presidents, and political dictators come and go, but the
specific position of a person in a kinship network remains. In this respect, the
workload of daughter-in-law in the joint family is meaningfully overdetermined
by social expectations of different family members, and by the myth stories about
how one lives as a daughter-in-law. There are also symbolic rituals, and social
support for psychological needs if the relationships in the minimal community are
built up in a positive way. In addition, it is work that just needs to be done, and
the role of the daughter-in-law in getting it done is unquestioningly accepted by
all members of the traditional joint family.

Example 4.1. Daily life in a joint family. A young married Oriya woman (a
daughter-in-law) described her daily routine:

As soon as I get up, I sweep out the house and then I go to the
bathroom. I clean my teeth, have a bath, and then I start the
breakfast. Once the breakfast is done, people come in one by one
to eat. I serve each of them breakfast. Once that is done, we have
our breakfast together. Bou [husbands mother] and I eat together.
And then I start preparing lunch-- what well be eating at two in the
afternoon. Once that is done, again people come in one by one to
eat. By three, we would also have been eaten and I would have
washed up after lunch. Then, I come and sleep in the afternoon. I
sleep for an hour. I get up at four. I again sweep out the house and
go down to start making something to eat with tea. I knead the atta
[wheat flour] and make parathas or rotis [different kinds of bread].
Again, people come one by one to eat. I serve them and then it
would be sundown by now and I offer sandhya [evening worship]
before I start cooking the night meal. I am usually cooking till nine in
the night. Then I go and watch the serial on TV. After that, at about
9:30, everyone will come to eat and I serve them. And then we eat.
After finishing eating, we go to bed. The dishes are left as they are
till morning. I just keep them till the morning when I wash them. In
the morning, the first thing I do is take out and wash the ointha
[polluted by leftovers] dishes, then I leave them out in the sun to
dry, while I sweep out the kitchen, wash it out, and then take the
vessels back in again. (Menon & Shweder, 1998, p. 154)

This self-description of the daughter-in-laws daily activities is revealing as

to how practical (cooking and cleaning) and symbolic (handling of impure
substances) are coordinated. Furthermore, it indicates a special (but in
dominance unequal) relationship with the mother-in-law.
Both the actual household work and symbolic systems of actions (puja)
support the cultural organization of the existing social roles within the joint family.
One of the symbolic acts that has left outsiders baffled is the Hindu daily
traditional ritual symbolism for the daughter-in-law to drink the water in which the
mother-in-laws feet have been washed. The daughter-in-law in the above
Valsiner 159

example mentioned puja in a minimal way. When she was asked explicitly, she
indicated that most of the symbolic rituals are performed by her mother-in-law,
except for the feet-washing ceremony:

All I do is wash the feet of our burhi ma [husbands fathers mother]

and drink the water after my bath and before I go to make
breakfast. I used to do it for bou and nona [husbands mother and
father] in the beginning but they stopped me from doing it. They
said it was enough to do it for burhi ma and get her blessings.
(Menon & Shweder, 1998, pp. 154-155,)

This explanation points to the symbolic role of the feet washing and water
drinking ceremony in the family context. The importance of the act itself is
twofold-- the daughter-in-law demonstrates her subservience in action, and gets
the blessing of the older woman. Not surprisingly, it is the eldest woman in the
family towards whom the ritual here was directed. This symbolic practice
supports the social representation of monotonically increasing symbolic
relevance with age (see chapter 6). The coordination of the symbolic age-value
hierarchy with the mutual sharing of everyday household tasks can create a
psychological atmosphere of mutual support and care. However, it canunder
conditions of rivalriesto intense escalations of intra-group conflict. Both
extremespositive and negative atmospherecan emerge from the same basic
structure of the small group dynamics.

Example 4.2. Tension in a joint family. Like in any kind of social unit, there are
multiple ways of organizing the lives of individuals in themeach of which can
lead to positive, neutral, ambivalent, or negative form of personal-cultural
meaning constructions. In an example reported by Thapan (1997, pop. 186-188),
a 45-year old upper caste Bengali woman, married for 15 years to a Scheduled
Caste husband and living almost all her married life with in-laws, reports about
her household context:

In-laws always tried to play husband against me. Just to make me

suffer, in-laws used to encourage him to drink, stay out late, etc. I
was forced to cook for thirteen or fourteen people every evening,
with separate menus for everyone. Whether I had food or not, no
one was bothered. I stopped eating egg and fish so that my
husband could eat more. But no one was bothered that I was not
eating. That was mental torture. In-laws used to complain about me
to husband and he used to believe them and start shouting or
hitting me. My mother-in-law used to be very happy when he was
shouting at me. And later on, I started complaining but he didnt
believe me as I had earlier not complained. I asked in-laws to tell
one incident in which I actually misbehaved but this could never be
stated.. My sister-in-law (husbands older brothers wife) abused me
and said, You have nowhere to go. Well kick you out, and no one
Valsiner 160

said anything. My mother-in-law was happy that she said it. This
hurt me a lot. (Thapan, 1997, p. 187)

The multi-aged female power structure in the family group here sets the stage for
interpersonal friction. The son/husband plays the expected role in it. In the
particular case, the wife managed to persuade the husband to move out of the
joint family setting to that of a neolocal family. Yet in this situation, the family
atmosphere continued along the lines set in the previous situation. Her husband
now is suspicious of her relations with his colleagues and his sisters husband.
She finds that

very insulting. All the time he is checking on my movements.

When we were living with in-laws, then his mother used to give him
all the information. When he gets angry he hits out
.. I used to be fond of dressing and my friends used to love that.
Now I dont feel like doing anything or going in front of friends. I feel
it does not suit me anymore. My husband is suspicious if I dress up
too much or if I am underdressed. I want to keep an apparent
balance but I dont want to dress up now, for example, bindi Ive
stopped wearing as he always suspects if my bindi has got
smudged or fell of. (ibid.)

Social contexts that promote jealousies can lead to internalized

suspiciousness (see chapter 8). The roots for such internalization are in the
social micro-environments, such as the affective climate within the family.
Examples 4.1. and 4.2. depict two different trajectories through which a
historically formed social family group can operate.

Given the historical transformations within the Indian society over the 20th
Century, both the ways of organizing joint family patterns and deciding upon
marriage choices have changed. The joint family system in India and
elsewhere--is itself an adaptation to the history of mostly rural ways of living,
where multiple generations maintain joint agricultural production capacities.
Contemporary industrialization and migration of young people to cities introduces
substantial changes into the social organization of family. Nuclearization of the
family is a result. It brings with it change in traditional social role relations in the
family (Raina, 1988). The core of any kind of family is a form of marriageand
the basic question of the entrance into marriage of any form. Howand by
whomthe marriages become arranged is the crucial point in understanding the
life-course social dynamic of kinship groups.

Marriages as arranged frameworks

Marriage can be considered

Valsiner 161

... a socially approved relationship between one or more persons

and one or more women, involving sexual union as well as rights
and duties which vary from society to society; any children born
within the relationship are recognized as legitimate offspring of the
spouses (Raha, 1996, p. 2)

All marriages are arranged marriages. This claim may look ridiculous,
outmoded, or even reactionaryyet one is only to be reminded of the fact that
the so-called modern (love-based and neolocal) marriages involve their
arrangement by the marrying persons themselves. Thus the historical transition
in how marriages are made is not that of move from arranged to love
marriages, but from marriages arranged by others (external to the marrying
persons) to those of being arranged by the actors themselves.
When viewed from the standpoint of human cultural history, marrying is a
part of intergenerational continuity of the family system, and not an act of
personally constructed dyadic love relations. Personal pleasure of intimacy that
may be emphasized in the marital relations established on the basis of love is
definitely reduced in its role in the semiotic hierarchy in marriage. In this respect,
the traditions of Christianity and Hinduism coincide:

The classical or normative Hindu understanding of conjugality

enumerates the goals of marriage as: dharma ([dharm], duty), praja
(progeny) and rati (pleasure)in that order of importance.
Obviously, progeny are the outcome of sexual union, but carnality
is not meant to be an independent end in itself (except, possibly, in
the Tantric tradition); nor is sexual passion considered a proper and
lasting basis for marriage 60. On the contrary, it is felt that the
conjugal relation should be governed by the notion of duty; the duty
of a husband to provide adequately for his wife according to his
means, and to impregnate her in her proper season; and of a
woman to make her body available for the purpose, and to serve
her husband as her god with loyalty and unquestioning devotion.
(Uberoi, 1997, p. 153)

Marriage was historically a social duty of persons towards the family and
the community, rather than being primarily of personal interest (see Kapadia,
1958). That social duty to community becomes replaced by a social duty to the
given marital relation (and the outgrowth of itparental duty towards children
emerging from such relation). Furthermore, it becomes internalizedthe central
feature of contemporary marriage is the construction of the social duty to oneself
within the dialogical self frameworkand the inter-personal coordination 61 of
such personal-cultural duties between the marriage partners.

60
compare with the focus in Catholicism to rule out the focus on sexual pleasure within marriage,
replacing it with conjugal duties.
61
phenomena of the failure of such coordination are abundantly available at the times of divorce
arrangements.
Valsiner 162

The social duty to oneself can take many formsexaggeration of the duty
to watch over children (and adolescentsas in European social conditions where
children are turned into vehicles for consumption), or to integrating all family into
a joint framework. In case of the Asante in Ghana,

An Asante child needs reliable care from a competent person, not a

mothers care as such. Although a mother accepts the responsibility
to provide for physical care of her child, her financial responsibility
takes emotional precedence. As one mother explained, Everyone
likes children, so they would not let them stay hungry or hurt
themselves, but no one would work for them the way I do. In
contrast to middle-class families in the United States, Asante do not
seem to consider full-time interaction with the mother or another
intelligent, devoted adult essential to normal intellectual and
psychological growth. When I brought up the idea of staying home
to give children continuous attention, they seemed to find it
ridiculous for an adult who was not herself retarded. (Clark, 1994,
p. 360)

Economic changes bring along new tactics of marriage arrangements.

Educated parents have started to delay marrying off their daughters as soon as
possible (after puberty), but sending them to gain higher education. Under
education, and mass communication bringing down barriers between societies,
new generations of young people in India are reconstructing the previously
normative family and marriage arrangements in new ways. Yet the historical
gender-norm tendencies may leave behind shadows of implicit social
representations that evoke feelings of proper gender and marital roles..

Marriage as a symbolic act.

At the level of personal cultures, marriage can take many forms, which transcend
the realm of human social relations. Such forms need some collective-cultural
support, yet depend upon the personal-cultural construction of person him or
herself. A person may develop a completely secret relationshipreal or
imaginarytowards another person (who might not even know of it!) and feels
married with that person in the depth of ones subjectivity. The feeling here is a
hyper-generalized symbolic meaning that is relevant for the persons
autodialoguerather than for actual living together 62 with the imaginary marital
partner(s).

62
E.g. a young woman who considers herself married to a celebrity, e.g. John Lennonwould utulize the
function of such relationship for her own subjective (secret) world. The possibility of actually living with
thus designated husband (and doing mundane jobs, washing John Lennons socks and putting up with his
snoring at night in the conjugal bed) would be horrifying and unacceptable (cf. also the function of rap
musicAbbey & Davis, 2003).
Valsiner 163

The symbolic nature of marriage becomes most dramatically evident in the

case of theogamy-- marriage of a person to a deity. This entails collective-
cultural acceptance (and promotion) of the adequacy of such marriage, and
personal-cultural internalization of the marriage bond. At times this kind of
symbolic marriage becomes established through real-world human substitutes
(e.g., a woman marries a man she considers her deity-- symbolically she marries
the deity, while in practice-- a man). Theogamy can take other forms, especially
in religious communities (see moments of theogamy in the Oneida Community,
described below).
For example, the Gopastri religious community (in South Canara, India)
included about 120 families grouped together in one quarter of the town (Prince
Peter, 1963, p. 90). The women in this community considered themselves
married to the god Krishna as polygynous spouses. Men were viewed as
incarnations of Krishna-- and treated as husbands. Children born from these
unions remain with the mother, and are considered offspring of Krishna. They
(and their mothers) are maintained with livelihood produced by the temporary
husbands. The community follows matrilineal descent (girls carry on the mothers
position). Examples of such cases of theogamy are historically to be found in the
social group of Hindu temple dancers (the devadasi-- see Valsiner, 1996, 1998).
Theogamy is a good example of harmonization of the everyday reality with an
appealing and unfalsifiable meaning system. By a marriage to a deity the person
gains independence through dependence (Valsiner, 1999) that is not vulnerable
to others intervention.

Social organization of marriage

The existing social order provides the frame (roles, ritual of entrance,
rituals of progression), persons internalize their own versions of such rituals,
make the roles their own. Wedding festivities are common in all societies
whereas divorce celebrations are not. As such, these rituals operate to demand
from all participants (bride, groom, relatives of both sides) the performance of a
sequence of symbolic actions on a regular basis. Such actions are meant to
guide the internalization of the value of the newly established roles (of husband
and wife) and of the whole set of social role expectations that come with it.

Economic background of marriage. In the history of human societies,

establishment of marital relations has usually been related with some form of
economic exchanges between the bride and groom sides of the newly
established relation. The question of material wealth that the family clans would
exchange when their children marry has been the central issue around marriage
as a social form
In the history of Africa, the phenomenon of brideprice has been a
recurrent topic for discourse-- first among missionaries and colonial
administrators, later among anthropologists and social scientists. The
phenomenon of brideprice entails provision by the side of the groom specified
Valsiner 164

economic value to the background family of the bride, as a condition for

becoming married to the bride. The interpretive ambiguity of this practice (on
behalf of European-- especially English) colonizers is obvious, as the language
use here implies the activity of purchasing a wife (and paying for her). This
interpretation was not that of African indigenous kind, where the institution of
brideprice -- especially on behalf of the bride-- was seen as a kind of marriage
insurance protecting the married woman against possible ill-treatment by the
new marital context. For grooms, the brideprice was a way to symbolically mark
the rights to access the genitorial rights for the children the wife would bear. The
activities around paying the brideprice were parts of the lengthy getting-married
rituals.
The nature of the kind of brideprice that has been used in Africa has
changed together with the history of the socio-economic context. Thus, in
Gukuyuland (in Kenya) over the 20th Century, the brideprice has constantly
become transformed to increase monetary liquidity. Fathers of educated girls
would often include the schooling costs into the expected brideprice (Ferraro,
1976, p. 107), thus creating economic stress for the traditional system which has
been crumbling under increasing migratory urbanization. If in the past, the
Gikuyu father could distribute the brideprice paid in cattle between his own and
other relatives households. This increased the agricultural productivity of the
whole kinship system. Under the new tradition of payments in cash the liquidity of
the monetary instrument leads to its investment outside of the kin network
system. As a result, the brideprice can become dysfunctional in terms of
consolidating social ties.
The economic differentiation of costs covered by the sides of the bride and
the groom are not absent in any society where marriages take place. The two
sides of family clans take care of different aspects of contemporary wedding
rituals. Marriage forms are the specific social organization framework that sets up
the structure of the family.

The importance of marriage forms for interested social institutions

Psychological construction of the ambivalence of sexuality among young

persons entering marriages have been utilized by social institutions to bond the
persons with them. The symbolic meaning of blocking of pleasureand
displacing it to self-glorifying desire to refuse pleasureis a major promoter of
the social cohesion of many ideologically organized institutions (Behar, 1987).
The traditions of Christianity have made female sexuality their major playground,
where

the very mark and emblem of civilization is female chastity, and

conversely, uncontrolled free female sexuality is the root of evil,
sin, and disease. (Arnfred, 2004, p. 67)

The main sources of control over the societys mores are the women who
internalize the messages guiding them towards chastity and turn these
Valsiner 165

messages into central moral credos within their personal cultures. The utmost
extent of social control over human beings takes place through the personally
reconstructed and fortified self-control by personswomen and men, old and
young. The power of internalization/externalization mechanisms is well known
for social institutions over human history, thus making the personal-cultural
domain into the main target of all social control efforts. Such control is no longer
external to the personthe person believes in ones own wanting to be what
the external suggestion source indicatesand through that co-construction
fortifies the power of the external source. The scheme is the sameonly
agents are reversedas we say before (chapter 1 I create YOU, see also
chapter 8):
Valsiner 166

Social Institution X to Person Y: You are Z

Person Y to oneself (intra-psychologically): I am Z

Person Y to oneself (intra-psychologically):

I am Z and I want to be Z!!!

Person Y to the Social Institution (externalization):

I want to be Z!!

In the early days of Christianity, the social fight about chastity (avoidance of
marriage, or re-marriage, or entering into virgin marriages) was a topic for the
new religious system to appropriate resources through the personal-cultural
belief systems of rich women who had converted into the new religion (Drijvers,
1987). Propagation of ascetism by St. Jerome to Roman women included the
turn away from healthy, body-fulfilling everyday activities, to the physical and
mental self-torture (including sexual abstinence).
Social institutions insert their symbolic control over persons at times of
criticaland hence ambivalentperiods of life-course transitions. All cultural
rituals concerning childbirth, adolescence, marriage, and death are locations for
such institutional intervention. Religious systems have captured the selves of
young persons precisely during, or around, the issue of entering marriages. In
the mediaeval context, the Catholic Church propagated virginity inside marriages,
leading to the devotion by the married couple to the Church. For example, the
saint Cecilia, who

...was forced to marry the youth Valerian, whom she proceeded to

convert on their wedding night by telling him that there was an
angel who would kill him if he made any sexual advances toward
her. When Valerian asks how he too may see the angel, she
sends him to Pope Urban, who baptizes him. On his return home,
not only does he see the angel, but he and Cecilia are crowned
with two wreaths in token of their commitment to chastity. (Elliott,
1993, p. 64)

Christianity managed to re-direct the meanings of sexuality as signs of

health into that of a procreational tool, which is ambivalent ideologically. A central
notion in the Catholic Church has been the acceptance of the image of Virgin
Valsiner 167

Mary with a focus on the dual themes of virginity and motherhood-- both
positively valued, yet in inevitable tension between themselves. It created two
life-course career tracks for women in the history of Christianity-guided social
settingsto marry a man (and use sexuality in its constrained form for
reproduction), or to marry the God (by entering a convent, and displacing
sexuality by religious devotion for all-potent yet sexually uninterested ideal
husband).
This ambivalence gets further complexity in the personal-cultural domains
of women in contexts where Christian and non-Christian traditions meetsuch
as in Kerala. Christian women in Kerala have been described refraining from
attending Christian church services at the times of their menstruation (polluted
state in Hindu belief system a notion not shared by ChristianityDempsey,
2001, pp. 71-73 63).

Women as targets for social institutions. As key agents of reproductive

success, women are the primary object of social control in any social system that
accepts a religious belief complex as its ideology. Thus,

Indian social reform efforts were largely concentrated on two

issues: the removal of untouchability and the improvement of the
social condition of women. A major emphasis of this latter project
involved community and state interventions to regulate female
sexuality inside and outside of marriage in line with upper-caste,
Sanskritic norms and/or Victorian standards of propriety (Uberoi,
2003, p. 1081)

As a general principle institutional control operates with imperatives that work

at the set symbolic boundaries of the human body (see also Tarlo, 2000-- on the
uses of body in social sterilization campaigns). Such imperatives can outlaw
basic biological functions for the sake of other symbolic value (sexual abstinence
in case of persons in roles of religious devotion). Yet they can also set an
imperative to the opposite e.g. exaggerated sexual orientation in the context of
Tantric religious beliefs. Furthermore, such norms can sub-specify the
imperativeslimiting a particular bodily function (sexual intercourse) to be
socially acceptablebut not expected to be enjoyable 64-- for pro-creation after
the establishment of the marital bond, and before entering into the role of a
grandmother.
By setting up a system of semiotic boundaries and conditions for their
overcoming, the social institutions capture individual human beings into a web

63
The specific personal reasons for doing so are interestingly not linked with religion directlya woman
may claim she is not mentally prepared during her period for church participation, or would not attend
because of respect for the liturgy and the rest of the congregation (p. 72)
64
Procreation is the promoter sign that is used to guide female sexuality in marriages all over the World. In
Mali, for example, a womans recurrent concern about sexual pleasure is often misinterpreted as her
possible deviance from reproduction. Such a presumption has led some people to believe that the practice
of excision seeks to displace womens libido from self-gratification to the social obligation of
childbearing (Diallo, 2004, p. 182)
Valsiner 168

where their action possibilities are meaningfully organized. This includes

semiotic blockingor allowingof transitions between different marriage forms.
All of the existing marriage forms are of equal potential to be workableor even
idealsolutions for individuals organization of their life courses and reproductive
goals. Yet, in terms of interests of social institutions, they are made ideologically
un-equal in ways of inserting value-based boundary conditions for their mutual
transformations. Once these ideologically set social norms for proper ways of
marriage are supported by internalized personal-cultural self-regulatory systems
(which at times fortify the social expectations by escalating the morality value of
the suggestions), a well-set redundant (personal and social) control system of the
marriage practices is set into place.
Coverage of the issue of marriage in the social sciences is itself a result
of being a part of that control systemsocial scientists just happen to provide
evidence for the preferences of their own social backgrounds, by arriving at
value-laden descriptions of one marriage form over another. Or, if that proves to
be impossible by the empirical evidencethey show their continuous inquiry in
the direction of their highlighted hypotheses (e.g. Prince Peter, 1963inquiries
into jealousies in case of polyandrous collective husbands; also the Western
excessive concerns about female genital mutilationnot shared by many
women for whom it is a symbolically relevant practiceDellenborg, 2004). Here
we look at the issues of marriage forms first at the abstract levelas forms
which can be filled in by a whole range of semiotic contents. Each of the forms
can function well (as these have survived in the case of human history)as well
as may produce dysfunctional specific adaptations.

Marriage as transformation of relationship forms

The above discussion of the complexity in defining a family seems to

return consistently to the centrality of one core organizer of the family-- the social
role relations of partners within a marriage. Family is based on the establishment
of marriage ties. However, marriage is a relationship that takes many forms, if it
is viewed cross-culturally and historically.

Marriage as organizer of role relationships. At the level of human societies,

marriage is a framework to organize economic and social role relationships
between persons who assume marital roles. Depending upon its set-up, the
children are considered either legitimate (in case they are born in marriage), or
illegitimate (born out of wedlock or marriage). Ownership of property is
regulated through marriage. Inheritance rights differ from society to society as to
the inclusion or exclusion of offspring born outside of the marriage. There are
many stories of persons trying to get married to gain access and control to the
spouses wealth. Furthermore, economic arrangements around marriage (bride
price) are one of the widely described topics in cultural anthropology. In sum--
marriage provides locally socially legitimate form for economic and procreational
activities of human beings. Different societies provide us with many different
marriage forms (see below), each of which is adequate for the given society at
Valsiner 169

the given historical time as it has been made socially legitimate and personally
acceptable in the collective-cultural construction process. Aside from the
acceptance of a particular marriage form in the given society, persons within that
society would need to internalize their own understandings of the form to make it
personally feasible to live in the given arrangement.

Forms of marriage
There exist four major forms of marriage:

1. monogamy (marriage of one man-- husband-- with one woman-- wife).

2. polygyny (marriage of one man-- husband-- with more than one
woman-- co-wives)
3. polyandry (marriage of more than one men-- co-husbands-- with one
woman)
4. polygynandry or group marriage (marriage of more than one man with
more than one woman)

Of the four types, polygyny and monogamy have been the two more
widespread marriage forms over the history of humankind. By one estimate
(Stephens, 1963, p. 33), 80 % of the societies all over the World (and throughout
recorded history) have allowed polygyny and practiced it, in one way or another.
In contrast, polyandry and polygynandry have been historically rare-- yet viable in
the conditions where these are practiced (Levine, 1988).
Valsiner 170

Figure 4.1. Marriage forms as transformable structures

MONOGAMY
Take away all Take away all but 1
but 1 wife husband

Add 1
or Add 1 or
more more
wife hus-
band

POLYGYNY POLY-
ANDRY

Take
away all Take
but 1 away
hus all
band but 1
wife

Add 1 or more Add 1 or more

husband wife

POLYGYNANDRY

Each of the forms of marriage has emerged under socio-economic

circumstances where it could be a viable option for fulfilling the basic functions of
the marriage bond-- creating the core of the family, and the socially legitimate
reproductive unit. Many of the forms have co-existed in the same society at the
same time-- if ideologically accepted. Thus, monogamy exists in many societies
in parallel with the other (plural) marital forms-- if the latter are legally allowed,
accepted by cultural meaning systems, and economically feasible. If all the latter
conditions are not concurrently present, plural marriage forms will not be
observable in a society. Likewise, if plural forms of marriage are legally outlawed
they may become replaced by hybrids that are allowed and (at least) tolerated
Valsiner 171

such as serial monogamy (see below), when that has been made possible by
legalization of divorce and acceptance of re-marriages of divorcees.

Marriage forms are mutually transformable. Marriage is a process of being in

a marital relation. In this, the process involves its history-- marriages are
established, develop, and end. The existing four major forms of marriage--
monogamy, polygyny, polyandry, and polygynandry-- can be viewed as
potentially transferable into one another, if the social rule system of the given
society allows such transformation. Very often it does not. The general pattern of
transformations is depicted in Figure 4.1. (from Valsiner, 2000, chapter 6)
The picture in Figure 4.1. depicts an unrestricted case of transformations
between the four marriage forms. What is involved is simple addition or loss of
spouses to transform one form into another. Thus, by getting from monogamy to
polygyny, a wife is added to the monogamic arrangement. To revert to
monogamy, a wife is eliminated. In a similar vein, monogamy becomes polyandry
by adding a husband to a monogamic state, and reverts to monogamy by
eliminating a husband. In a similar way, both polygyny and polyandry can
become polygynandry, and revert back either into themselves, or into monogamy
(in case of the breakdown of the polygynandrous group).

Adaptational and social values of the mariage forms. Leaving aside our
usual mono-cultural preferences, the four different forms can be viewed as social
blueprints for creation of minimal communities. Dependent upon the criteria of
evaluation, their rank ordering may proceed in vastly different directions.
Thus, in terms of social group as an adaptational buffer that guarantees
human functioning and social support for all of its members, it is polygynandry
that is the most versatile marriage form, followed by polygyny, polyandry, and--
finally-- monogamy. In polygynandry, the chances for reproductive success of all
co-husbands -- through the reproductive success of the co-wives-- is of
enhanced flexibility. For instance, issues of male infertility, if these occur, are
masked by the group-based treatment of the child-bearing and child-rearing
issues. Such masking is not possible in monogamy or -- especially-- polygyny
(where male infertility is publicly visible through absence of children from co-
wives). In balance, the intra-group social psychological processes in case of
polygynandry may reduce some of this versatility in reality, and make it a fragile
marriage form that may break down into any of the other three forms.
If the criterion of adaptability is used to evaluate the marriage forms, then
monogamy is the least versatile way of organizing marital relations. It is
vulnerable to mishaps-- ranging from no reproduction (male or female infertility)
to threats due to the premature deaths of either the wife or the husband, if there
are children. Not surprisingly, then, societies that emphasize (or selectively
sanction) monogamy build other safety frameworks either informally (through
the monogamic marriages being parts of wider kinship networks that would
compensate in case of need), or formally (e.g., different social programs for
families in trouble, set up by religious or government institutions).
Valsiner 172

The general scheme of transformations in Figure 4.1. is meant to have a

look at the dynamics of the marriage forms in abstract sense. Different societies--
due to specific cultural constructions that have emerged over their histories--
have set up different restrictions upon the acceptable and promoted transitions
between the marriage forms.
As was emphasized above, different marriage forms-- as bases for family
arrangements-- are human culturally constructed means for coping with all the
needs of human lives. As forms that have existedand continue to existin
human history they are all viable organizational frameworks. Their transition from
one state into another usually occurs with economic changes, paired with impact
from religious ideologies.

The polygynic marriage

The polygynic form of marriage is historically the most prominent form

Worldwide (see Clignet, 1970). Such prominence has been based on the
asymmetry between genders in their biological functions: women can bear
children, men cannot. Thus, in socio-economic contexts where it was deemed
necessary to enhance the reproductive success of men (via womens
reproductive functions) in contexts of economic value of children (as economic
assets), polygyny could easily be set into practice (see below-- the case of
Mormon polygyny in Example 4.5.).

The economic basis. Polygyny has been described to exist all over the World,
at different times and socio-economic circumstances. Different religious
frameworks (at our time we usually think of Islam as an example, yet it has
existed under other religious frameworks as easily) have made use of it. Ancient
civilizations of India and China permitted polygyny, signs of it can be seen
reflected in the Old Testament. The pre-Christian tribes in Europe practiced it. It
was the emergence of Christianity in European contexts from 3rd Century A.D.
that started to limit it as a viable marriage form. Slowly it succeeded-- aided by
economic changes and through monopolization of the collective-cultural meaning
system.
Economically, polygyny provides increasing number of participants in both
the household management and economic subsistence. The co-wives are
simultaneously child-bearers and co-workers whose labor guarantees the
livelihood of the whole marriage group and of the wider kinship network.

Social organization. Polygyny can exist in a number of basic forms, each of

which sets up different conditions for the social roles of the participants, and--
consequently-- for the psychological mechanisms of its maintenance. The first
distinction of the forms of polygyny is the contrast between sororal and non-
sororal types.
Valsiner 173

In the case of sororal polygyny, the co-wives are sisters (obviously of different
ages). As sisters, they bring to the marriage their pre-established pattern of
sibling relations. These include (a) age-based dominance hierarchy (elder sisters
-- who probably are first to marry the husband-- have had roles of taking care of
their younger sisters as they grew up together). The female side of the sororally
polygynous marriage is thus based on the long history of relations between
siblings who are turned into co-wives. Such social role basis makes sororal
polygyny better protected against possible psychological problems (e.g.,
jealousies) than a non-sororal polygynic arrangement might be. It is estimated
that about 50% of known polygynous societies practice sororal polygyny (Van
den Berghe, 1979, p. 67).
The second basis for distinguishing forms of polygyny is the residence
pattern. The co-wives may either reside in the same home compound, or in
locations removed geographically from one another. The social role relations in
the case of these two types are necessarily different. In the case of a shared
home compound, the co-wives are in constant contact with one another in
household management matters. They may cooperate in agricultural work, and in
child-rearing issues. In this framework, the power of running the household is in
the hands of co-wives as a small social group-- with its own structure. The latter
is determined by their seniority status (earlier wives dominating over later
married-- or younger-- ones). The role of the husband is limited here-- to the final
arbiter of co-wives possible relationships problems, and to the publicly
presentable figurehead of the household.
In contrast, when co-wives live in separate households, there is no (or
minimal) mutuality of relations between them. They are united through the
husband (who visits each household at some times), yet each co-wife fully
controls her own household in ways similar to single women (of our
contemporary society 65). Here is a case of no need to coordinate the actions in
ones household with any co-wife, and even not with husband (whose temporary
presence equals also lack of control or relevance in the running of the
household). Possible friction between co-wives here are likely on the basis of real
or imagined dangers to the property sharing of the husband, but not on the basis
of immediate, face-to-face, relationship issues (as in case of co-wives inhabiting
the same home compound).

Example 4.3. The dynamics of economic uncertainties in a polygynic

mariage. A Gusii (a tribe in Kenya) woman named Jane (described in LeVine &
Pfeifer, 1982, pp. 71-72) became married to her husband Ongaro at her age 18.
Ongaro already had one wife, who was sick and herself requested that Ongaro
marry a second wife so that there would be help with the farm and with the
household.
At first, Janes marriage entailed separate households. Ongaro moved
with her from Kenya to Tanzania (where he was involved in some trade).

65
note that in wherever polygyny was practiced historically, the status of independent single woman
would not exist. All women would be in some form of marital relation.
Valsiner 174

However, when they returned from the stay in Tanzania, Jane had to share the
home compound with the ailing senior co-wife. Because of the co-wifes ill health,
Jane had to take on the major share of household work. When the co-wife died,
the marriage entered again into a monogamic phase.
Jane had to continue with the full load of the household and farm work.
Aside from her economic role, Jane had to be reproductively successful. Ongaro
did not pay the brideprice for her before she had demonstrated such success (by
bearing him two sons). She then had seven years without childbirths, followed by
years when she gave birth to seven more children.
In the 1970s Ongaro married a new wife-- and the marriage again entered
into a polygynic state. The new co-wife lived in town where she took care of a bar
that Ongaro owned there. The marriage here was again that of separate
households. The friction that emerged on Janes side was based on economic
uncertainty-- she was afraid that Ongaro might give half of his land to the co-wife.
Yet the life-course of Jane eliminated such danger-- in 1974 her eldest son
married and became employed. As the mother of an adult son who was both
married and employed, Jane felt secure about her economic dominance in
Ongaros family. Despite of tensions with Ongaro, she considered her home life
very satisfactory, since she was economically safe and enjoyed rewarding
relations with her children.
The co-wife in town failed to bring children to Ongaro, and he divorced
her. He then married another woman-- for whom he purchased land near town--
with whom he had two children. This purchase was an addition to the whole
family resources, and did not constitute a threat to Jane. Again, the polygynic
marriage here was of separate households type.

In this example, we can see how a polygynic marriage can move between
the shared household and separate households conditions. The role of the co-
wives in these two is different, their economic concerns as well. Sexual functions
did not enter into the decisions about marriage, or frictions in the marriage--
sexuality was important for procreation (e.g., barrenness of a co-wife was
sufficient for divorce), but did not constitute a basis for friction. In contrast,
potential danger to Janes own property (within the marriage) was viewed as a
serious challenge.
Aside from economic and child-bearing functions, polygyny is to guarantee
the continuity of the once established household. Since the major threat for a
household has historically been that of the death of the wives (in childbirth, or
from any health complication), polygyny functions as a social buffer against
dramatic upsets in the organization of the household. The Sebei (in Kenya)
saying-- A man but with one wife is a friend to the bachelor (Goldschmidt, 1976,
p. 231)is indicative of such adaptational function of polygyny. If a man has no
second co-wife who could immediately compensate for the functions of the
household care should the first co-wife become incapacitated, he would have to
import a female relative from some other part of his kinship network. This new
import might not enter the caregivers role as simply as an existing co-wife.
Valsiner 175

Spouses ages in polygynic marriages. Polygynic marriages are not just of

multiple wivesbut also of multiple ages. As a rule, polygynic marriage begins
as a monogamic one, and after some time may become extended to polygyny.
Hence, structurally, the cases of underdeveloped polygyny are not separable
from monogamy. This has led some analysts to point out that in societies where
polygyny is practiced, it does not dominate in terms of demographic majority.
This is understandable, since expansion from the monogamic to polygynic phase
of marriage is a difficult and expensive step.
Since marriages are usually economic exchange events (between clans),
the man who wants to add a second wife to his marriage needs to be affluent
enough to pay the brideprice for the second time. This is possible if the
accumulation of wealth (largely through the work of the first wife) makes such
expansion possible. Naturally, there is some time period (ranging from 4 to 10 or
more years) between the first and subsequent marriages. As a rule, the husband
is already older than the first wife at their marriage, adding every new wife is
likely to increase such age difference. The husband-wife peer relation thus
becomes supplemented by father-daughter and mother-daughter role relations
(see Example 4.4. below). The junior co-wife can be taken into a polygynic
marriage as a kind of daughter for the existing wifewhile being a young wife for
the husband.
The psychological mechanisms that make polygynic relations possible include (a)
maintenance of equality of the persons in their social roles through a
differentiated structure of inequality; (b) ritualistic emphasis on unity, and de-
emphasis on personal possessiveness; (c) joint goals in subsistence.

Maintenance of equality through inequality. This claim at first glance seems

internally contradictory, as it unites two opposites (equality and inequality) which
are usually viewed as mutually exclusive. Yet there exist no social group that
involves equal participants in all possible senses. Rather, even when equality of
members is claimed to be the case, the realities of existence of the group
demonstrate inequalities. Thus, the presentation of a group (to outsiders, and to
group members themselves) may emphasize the meaning of equality that sets
the psychological basis for acceptance of inequalities in the ongoing life of the
group.
In the polygynic marriage system, the use of the meaning of equality is
symbolically presented by the social norm that the husband must treat all co-
wives equally. This norm is particularly set into practice in the ritualistic functions
within the life of the polygynic marriage group. The husband-- when making gifts
to his wives-- must give each of them a gift equal in value. Deviations (by the
husband) from that norm are carefully monitored (by the co-wives, first of all),
and may lead to friction within the group. Yet, at the same time, the co-wives are
-- already in their social roles-- not equal at all. They function in accordance with
a prescribed dominance by seniority; they are of very different ages, physical
capabilities, they are in different stages of their reproductive careers. Some have
more children (which is a value marker for women) than others. If any of them is
Valsiner 176

barren, this may be a basis for serious social stigmatization (within the group)
and may lead to loss of the marital status for the woman (divorce).
The reality of the relations between co-wives in a polygynic setting is filled
with inequalities from the very moment of the womens entrance into their social
roles. Yet semiotically these inequalities are organized through the social norm of
equality (through constructing an ingroup through we-feeling), which leads to
the acceptance of intra-group differentiation. The example from the Oneida
community (see description belowExample 4.7.) indicates this well-- the
community members presented themselves to others and one another as parts
of a we-feeling group, yet that semiotic unity was dependent upon John Noyes
central personal role within the we-group. Once his role crumbled (as he aged),
the we-community dissipated.

Private and public visibility: from eating by way of sexuality to marriage.

All basic physiological functions of human beings are semiotically encoded
beginning from their general talkability/tellability (see chapter 2) and ending with
the ways in which the given biological functions are talked about. Thus, among
Asante market women,

Cooking for a man seems to take the place that living with a man
occupies in contemporary United States society, as a trial or quasi-
marital relationship. For some relationships it will turn out to be a
stage of courtship, formalized eventually through lineage, church,
or legal rituals Couples in a relationship including daily cooking
accept some degree of public recognition of the relationship and
also recognize mutual responsibilities similar to marital roles,
although less binding
The sexual connotation of cooking is so strong that Asantes use
it as a euphemism as well as a symbol for sex. As in many
languages, Asante Twi uses the same verb (di) for eating and sex,
a verb which has other meanings of possession, taking, inheriting,
etc. It must be duplicated (didi) to unambiguously mean eating
(Clark, 1994, pp. 344-345)

The Asante meaning system is not uniquesimilar linkages of sexuality and

eating are present in other languages, and it may be most appropriate to look at
the phenomena of sexuality as derivations from general meanings of feeding (cf.
Sambia male semen-eating practicesHerdt, 1980).
However, the symbolic function of food as a signpresenting the sexual
actbecomes extended to marital and extra-marital relations 66 if some duration.

66
All of these relations co-exist in collective culture (as well as may be present within personal cultures.
Since the times of Ancient Greece, the European societies have had to acceptoften by acts of social
repression and stigmatization of marital relationships boundaryDemosthenes (384 B.C.322 B.C.)
saying that in Athena we have hetaerai for the sake of pleasure, concubines (pallakai) for meeting our
bodily needs day-to-day; but wives for having legitimate children and to be trustworthy custodians of our
household (Demosthenes, 2003, p. 191). Actually these words come from a dispute over the obeservation
Valsiner 177

Thus, the question of who cooks food for whom becomes the marker of such
relationships. In the case of the Asantewhose marital relation has been
preferably duolocal (husbands live in separate household units from wives), the
wives cook for the husbands and carry the food to the latters place of residence.
Couples in a relationship that includes some cooking for the other on a daily
basis build their intimacy of relationship (in which the sexual component is an
important part after the feeding care of the other). Affective dramas are played
out through cooking. On the positive side,

Wives express their satisfaction with a warm relationship by extra

care in cooking, just as husbands enjoy giving beloved wives extra
gifts. One trader 67 described with gusto how a wife chooses her
finest bowl, puts a beautiful fufu in it and arranges the fish to look
big and plump. Then she bathes carefully, rubs herself with cream
and puts on her good cloth to take the dinner to her husband.
(Clark, 1989, p. 327)

Thus, at dinnertime local Asante towns and villages have a publicly visible
movement of women carrying large covered dishes to the houses of their
preferred partnershusbands among them. On the other handdeterioration of
personal relations also becomes expressed in cooking. A woman who starts to
cook carelesslyor refuse to cook at allfor a man is in the process of ending
her relationship with him.
The intricacies of marital relations are being outlined in chapter 4. Here we
can treat the Asante market womens example of for whom am I cooking? as an
extension of a dual field-like meaning. The primary activity of eating (versus non-
eating) leads to the preparation of food as a skill to be mastered by girls over
childhood (cooking <> non-cooking), which by sexual maturity transfers into
{cooking for=sex with <> not cooking for anybody}, and finally into {cooking
for=married with him<> non-married=not cooking for him}. Aside from the
personal-cultural, subjectively hidden side of this meaning transition, there is
collective-cultural externalization facet in this transition. The acts of eating,
cooking, and carrying food from one household to another are publicly visible
while sexual acts are hidden from direct public access.

Joint goals in subsistence. If the polygynic marriage is of the shared home

compound kind, it is the coordination of everyday subsistence (farming, feeding
children, etc.) tasks that unifies the group. The mechanism of creating group
unity through shared tasks is a classic fact in social psychology (e.g., see the
Robbers Cave experiment (Sherif et al, 1961). Joint actions by co-wives, on
daily basis, particularly under conditions of economic uncertainties (e.g., loss of

of the citizenship purity negotiatiations, and are considered to be authored by Apollodorus (Demosthenes
father-in-lawibid, p. 151)
67
Asante traders are predominantly women. The whole West African region is economically dominated
by womens work, inclusive that of market trading. As was shown in Chapter 2, matriliny has been
historically present in what is presently Ghana.
Valsiner 178

crop due to draught, etc.) and the need of maintaining the household, create the
activity basis for the psychological well-being of the group. This joint activity
basis can be enhanced by the history of co-wives relationship (as in the case of
sororal polygyny).
The usual (Western) problem of sexual jealousy is largely out of place in
the case of non-monogamic marriage forms. Sexuality is a normal part of lives of
all participants, male and female. Yet its meaning in terms of partners
preferences may lead to jealousies on multiple groundsthose of self-esteem,
inferiority feelings, control within the marriage, and economic features of the
arrangement (see Example 4.4.). Like any close relations, that of co-wives (or
co-husbands in the polyandric case) is a culturally guided setting for cooperation,
within which exemplars of the opposite (non-cooperation) may emerge on any
basis.

Example 4.4. Polygynic marriage in Lebanon: a contrast of urban and rural

cases. The contrast between urban and rural conditions for polygynic marriage
tells us a story about the tension of unity and disunity of the minimal communities
that are created through such marriages.
The urban case is that of Wadad and Lama (Hamadeh, 1999, pp. 144-
147) who are married to Mounir, a university professor. Wadad married Mounir at
her age 25, and at the time of the interview was in her late 40s, having given birth
to 3 children. Lama was 15 years younger than Wadad. As a university student
in Mounirs courses had developed a love relationship with him, which led to a
marriage, of which Wadad was informed after the fact. To than news she reacted

as though the walls of her house were closing in on her. She fell
to the floor and for three days refused to eat. (She must have been
exaggerating.) When her husband attempted to reason with her,
she drove him out of the house with her hysterical shouting. Later,
she thought that if she allowed her grief to overwhelm her, she
would die, and that would please the couple whose happiness was
built on her ruin. She thought that her death would hurt only her
children. From then on, she decided to do whatever she could to
hurt Mounir and Lama while fighting to keep Mounir as father for
her children. Thus, when he proposed to divide his time equally
between the two households, she accepted. She even accepted
resuming sexual relations with him although I hated him like the
devil. But I wanted to do anything that would spite her, Wadad
said. (Hamadeh, 1999, p. 146)

The arrangement of two separate households came to a halt during the

Lebanese civil war when Lamas house was damaged and she and her daughter
ended up moving into Wahads house. The rivalry between the co-wives
continued on small episodes of everyday life. It was there where the war caught
her 5-year old daughter who was irreversibly debilitated by a shrapnel flying into
Valsiner 179

their living room. Lama was transformed after the accident, becoming a devout
Muslim . As Wadad commented,

She quit her coquettish ways, started praying five times a day, and
tried to be civil to me and to my children. But sometimes I feel that it
was better the other way. When she visits me with my husband, I
feel awkward and humiliated. When somebody refers to her as
Mrs. Mounir, I feel that she is erasing my very existence.
(Hamadeh, 1999, p. 147)

Lamas own story indicates that she married Mounir on the basis of the
love relationship, expecting him to divorce his first wife. That did not happen, and
she felt her love to Be smothered. Her daughters accident changed Lama,

Seeing her with me only in body, without being able to reach her
spirit, caused me to lose all attachment to life. I became certain that
God was punishing me for having wronged Wadad and her
children. I tried to evoke Gods forgiveness by becoming a good
Muslim. I also tried to compensate Wadad by going to her house
and doing her housework. But she understood this to be a
comment on her cleanliness. (ibid, p. 147,emphases added)

The new ways of beingrecognized by Wadaddid not eliminate the

friction, but transformed it. An act of help (cleaning the others house) became
interpreted as a sign of un-cleanness of the latter. On Lamas side, her new
religious self did not stop her from criticizing Wadad for ways of acting
unbecoming to a mother and an elderly woman. The newly acquired religiosity
was a powerful basis for new scenarios of interpersonal critiques, while Lama
made symbolic moves to act positively towards Wadads family. The rivalry was
transformed into a new state, but not overcome.

The rural Lebanese case comes from the background of nomadic

Bedouins (Hamadeh, 1999, p. 148-151). Um Hussein (first wife, interviewed at
age 35married at 19) and Amira (17 at marriagethird daughter from a family
of 6 boys and 8 girls) were co-wives in a three-tent home compound. That home
compound also included their husbands separated sister, and three living
daughters of Um Hussein. The household moved in the steppes of the Syrian
desert and summer times in the Bekaa Valley. Um Husseins only son had died
in an accident at age 5. Yet even before, her husband expressed his desire to
take another wife in order that the daughters will have more than one brother to
protect them when their father is no longer there for them (Hamadeh, 1999, p.
149). A few months after the sons accidental death, Um Hussein proposed that
she herself find the second wife for her husbandand proceeded to get Amira
(under the conditions set by Amiras family that one of the daughters of Um
Hussein be given as wife to one of Amiras brothers).
Valsiner 180

Amira when asked

why she had agreed to marry Abu Hussein, she answered, Because they liked
me and chose me from among my sisters, I also liked them. Because the choice
referred to was made by Um Hussein and not by her husband, it was not clear
whom the girl liked and whom she accepted. When I pressed her about why she
had consented to marry a man old enough to be her father, she repeated that he
was respectable and she felt that Um Hussein (Um Hussein again!) could make
her a better person. She also said that she liked the company of Um Husseins
daughters. (Hamadeh, 1999, p. 150, added emphasis)

Marriage here becomes presented as a course of continuing education. It

was the head principals (husbands) respectability and the main teachers (the
first wife) knowledge that mattered. Note also the use by the researcher of the
age stereotype (consented to marry a man old enough to be her father).
Um Husseins own look at the addition to the marriage was that of
ambivalence with socially respectful faade, where she granted her own
centrality by taking the initiative in making the arrangements. This led her to
gaining respect in the local community, and fortified her position in her own
marriage. A year later, the marriage had undergone a transformation that
indicates the role of marital bonds in inter-clan relations. As Hamadeh reports,

When I revisited them in the summer of 1993, I found some change in the
attitude of Um Hussein toward Amira. I was told that during the winter Abu
Hussein had divorced Amira and that he had taken her back only after much
pleading from Um Hussein. The older co-wife explained, Respectable people
like us do not take other peoples daughters, impregnate them, and send them
back to their folks." When I asked Abu Hussein about the reason for the divorce, I
was told that Amiras mother had caused it by urging her daughter to demand
that he divorce his first wife. This made Abu Hussein so angry that he divorced
Amira instead. He added, I respect all the family, but Um Hussein has in my
esteem a special position, before everyone else, because she sacrificed for the
sake of the family and because she is the mother of my daughters and bears the
name of my late son. (Hamadeh, 1999, p. 150-151, added emphases)

The families feud about resources shows its roleand defeatin this
example. The symbolic fortification of her role in the marriage by Um Hussein
(sacrificed for the sake of the family; she is the mother of my daughters)
wrought by her organizational role in making and maintaining this polygynic
marriage (including the decision to bring Amira back, on the grounds of
respectability)all these features demonstrate how a marriage of any formis
a symbolic construction. Of course it frames the everyday lives of the family
membersspecifying who does what, sleeps where, and together with whom,
has sexual relations and their nature (procreation or pleasure). Here the notion of
respect is used by both Um Hussein and Abu Hussein as a promoter sign to
settle suddenly complicated marital relations.
Valsiner 181

Example 4.5. Polygyny in the history of the U.S.. Polygyny is not a privilege,
nor is it specific to one or another area (or religion) in the World. Under special
socio-historical conditions, Christianity-dominated social units have re-structured
the strict limits set upon the transformation of the marriage forms (i.e., the
general picture of Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.3.limits on transformation).
The United States is a country of very specific history-- on a relatively
large territory, different religious and political groups who escaped from Europe,
could establish a relatively well-balanced system of co-existence. The
denominational nature of religion in the United States, together with religious
freedom, has allowed different small religious groups to establish their particular
forms of communal living. Such forms at times have explicitly transcended the
privileged nature of monogamy, in favor of polygynandry or polygyny. Notably,
such transcendence has been related with efforts to build new forms of society,
usually on the grounds of strong religious orientation.
The history of adoption of the polygynic marriage form by the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons) on the basis of an interpretation of
the Christian history is informative in two ways. First, it demonstrates how a new-
- previously completely alien-- form of social organization of everyday life can be
put into practice if completely (redundantly) set up by a social institution.
Secondly, the history of Mormon polygyny entails a story of socio-political power
struggle between the Mormon-dominated State of Utah, and U.S. Federal
Government, in the second half of the 19th Century (see also Chapter 2
Example 2.2.above). That fight brings out the questions of freedom of belief,
construction of images of social stigmatization, and socialization of children
under conditions of constant dangers.
The mundane nature of Mormon polygyny continues in its contemporary
practices, which have survived and re-gained prominence -- at least in that side
of social life arrangements that adheres to the religious calling in a most devoted
way. The cultural-psychological intricacies of contemporary Mormon polygyny
are studied in detail by Irwin Altman and Joseph Ginat (Altman & Ginat, 1996).
While documenting a whole range of ways in which modern polygynous
marriages in the Mormon lands function-- including successes and failures-- the
pattern of coordination of dyadic and communal arrangements of everyday lives
of the marriages becomes evident. The dyadic (husband-wife) psychological
relations can be extended to include super-ordinate (social group) structure, in
which all co-wives and the husband establish their roles in the midst of making
sure that all everyday life arrangements (work, child-care, education, religious
activities) are guaranteed.
The success in the establishment of the social group framework depends
upon the establishment of relations between co-wives, aided (or hindered) by
their particular living arrangements. In the contemporary Mormon case, these
arrangements are more complex than in the cases of African polygyny (e.g., the
contrast between "shared home compound" and "separate homes for each co-
wife"). The fitting of multi-wife and many-children polygynic Mormon families into
regular U.S. architectural practice of planning one-(monogamic)-family housing
has been a creative effort. Furthermore, the collective memories of previous
Valsiner 182

religious persecution have not disappeared, and the possibility of their re-
surfacing is a factor that is to be considered. On the other side, the internalization
of the religious value of communal marriage-- in parallel with practical solutions
such living affords (sharing of housing, co-wives helping one another with issues
of child-care) maintain polygyny as a viable form of marriage in those areas of
the United States where a collective-cultural religious framework provides
background support for it.
Altman and Ginat demonstrate how the set of everyday objects and
activities mediates the social relations in-- and psychological construction of-- the
persons' roles in polygynic marriages. The core of such marriage is
complementay nature of the husband's patriarch-role (head of the family), and of
the roles of the individual co-wives in their role as women-mothers. The latter role
of women entails home-centered control over space, cultural marking of the
space, and organization of activities (cooking, child-care, laundry). The co-wives
jointly control communal space, and individually their own personal territories.
The smoothness of the co-wife relations depends upon their individual control
over their personal space, and objects within these spaces. The space/object
domain is both the arena for establishing and maintaining co-wives' relations, as
well as an indicator of their state. Thus,

Sally, Harvey's first wife, said that the way she, Harvey, and Molly
managed and decorated their homes mirrored the graduate
deterioration of the marriage and their relationships. When Molly
first joined the family she and Sally shared everything. They wore
each other's clothes and cooperated in decorating the home. They
discussed cooperatively how to furnish the living room, where to put
furniture, what to hang on the walls, how to arrange objects. But
over time things began to deteriorate, Sally claimed, because Molly
became selfish and Harvey began to prefer Molly. In successive
moves, Sally always kept her very personal things-- books, desk,
cedar chest, photographs, silverware. But she shopped caring
about other things in the home, to some extent because Harvey
began giving Sally's furniture to Molly without discussing it with
her Sally finally divorced Harvey for many reasons, but his
violation of her attachment to places and things mirrored other
problems in the family. (Altman & Ginat, 1996, p. 234, emphases
added)

The closeness between persons is built (and indicated) by their

unconditional sharing of personal objects (and activities). Wearing each other's
clothing would indicate an effort at interpersonal closeness. The effort carries
within it ambivalence-- as the previous state of the relation was not that of
closeness. If the closeness is not established through the effort, the division of
the objects (into personal versus communal) can indicate change in the
relationship. Thus, the polygynic marriage form (of shared households) sets the
stage for potential establishment of close inter-co-wife ties through the sharing of
Valsiner 183

joint, similarly goal-oriented tasks. Whether this actually happens depends upon
the specific persons involved, and the dynamics of their actual establishment of
their relations. That latter process is not determinable by any social set-up of
conditions-- the relations may work out to be good, but also to become negative.
Precisely this uncertainty is taken into account by the redundant compensatory
mechanism-- each of the co-wives establish their own personalized object
environment (room, etc.) which serves for each of them as her own place. It may
be shared with the visiting (common) husband, but not with other co-wives
(except if the relations are indeed of the kind that makes such sharing possible).
The co-wives have their individual places, and on the basis of those can
establish close relations with one another.
The making of the home place for the husband is a very different matter in
contemporary Mormon households. Given the history of stigmatization (which
resulted in the need to hide the polygynic lifestyle from public), and distribution of
the homes of the husband's wives, the strict visiting schedule (which is described
by anthropologists looking at polygyny in Africa) has been both impractical and
undesirable. It has given rise to a flexible scheduling of the husband's movement
patters between households. At times the husband himself (in his patriarch's role)
decides where he goes for the given night; at other times this scheduling is
completely in the collective hands of the co-wives; or is determined by particular
needs of the given household. In any case, it is the husband who may lack one's
personal territory in any of the homes 68.
The Mormon polygynic system empowers women. In each household, the
particular co-wife has full control over the organization of the home. This of
course is the case in monogamic marriages as wellyet the huisbands regular
absences in the polygynic case create the diminished possibilities for immediate
household tasks participation, which results in lesser control over the household.
The principle here is mundanethe one who acts in the competent ways in an
area X is in control of area X, othersby way of lesser competencecan assert
their control only by some power assertion 69.
The husbands limited competence is linked also to simple organizational
issues of everyday life. Since the husband regularly visits all of the homes, his
own pertinent personal objects (clothing) are distributed between the homes (as
an object-based marker of the husband's psychological presence in each, and in
an equitable way). For example,

Howard distributes his clothing among the homes of his four

wives, Constance, Valerie, Barbara, and Rose, all of whom live in
separate dwellings. He keeps some of his clothing in his own

68
In addition, the husband's role entails social overstimulation-- in his rotation between different
households (each filled by a multitude of his own children), he has no possibility to be alone. However,
being alone is a basic need for human mature personality. Contemporary Mormon husbands adjust their
lives by creating privacy in their workplace, or even-- in some extreme cases-- by spending some nights
alone in motels (Altman & Ginat, 1996, p. 258)
69
As is usual in socio-political systems, the agents who gain power by force are incompetent in the
running of the social system (unless they quickly learn its systemic nature). Many military dictators fail by
succeeding gaining political power that leads to their own demise.
Valsiner 184

drawer in a bureau in each wife's bedroom. They, too, have

adopted a system that emphasizes his communal relationship to
homes and wives.
They also told of the amusing confusion that arises in managing
Howard's clothing. He sometimes ends up having to wear bizarre
combinations of colors because he does not know where things
are, sometimes all of his socks end up in one wife's home, or he is
missing a key piece of clothing for a particular outfit, and so on.
With great amusement, the wives said Howard bangs into walls and
furniture in the middle of the night, not sure where he is, and is
always looking in the wrong drawer for his clothing. (Altman &
Ginat, 1996, pp. 266-267)

The amusing telling of the story of their shared husband's confusions

fortifies the indication that each of the co-wives is in control over their respective
home grounds. They collectively appreciate the husband in the role of the head
of the family, and (each personally) have their particular emotional relationship
with him (which is dyadic-- irrespective whether the relations between co-wives
are positive, ambivalent, or negative). They are symbolically united with the
husband after death (see Figure 4.2.).

Figure 4.2. Tombstone of Soren Christoffersen and his three wives in Manti
cemetery, Utah (from Deynes, 2001)
Valsiner 185

The full control over the home ground as the core role for the wives is
encoded into the Mormon religious teaching, which separates the home as the
unquestionable dominance domain for the women from the public domain as
(equally unquestionable) domain of dominance of the men. This distinction is
similar to gender role distinctions between public and private (family) domains in
many other societies, especially those in which polygyny is a socially privileged
form of marriage. In respect to all of these societies, it is not possible to make
simple statements about one or the other gender being "dominant". The
dominance is clearly specific to the particular kind of place (home versus work),
and the polygynic marriage form guides women to be necessarily dominant in the
home domains.
Valsiner 186

In general, the experiences of children in polygynic marriages vary greatly-- as

the particular forms of these marriages are variable. Kilbride & Kilbride (1990)
have provided an elaborate account about the impressions of Ugandan children
who have grown up under polygynic marriage conditions. As is expected,
personal experiences cover the whole range of psychological conditions, from
reporting high levels of group cohesion and cooperation, to cases of jealousy and
stigmatization of children (by other children, and by co-wives).

Example 4.6. Cooperation and competition in polygynic households. First,

Marjorie (a daughter of a wealthy Ugandan agricultural official, who has twenty
five children from four wives) narrated her memories of childhood:

I remember seeing my father bringing a new wife. When she

came my mother was taken by my father to my home district where
my father built a shamba, and she stayed there while the new wife
was staying with my father in the place where he was working. The
place where my mother was now staying was near the school
where my sisters were boarding, so they could come home during
the weekends. They could come to see my mother.
When I passed to Class 6, I went to study where my father was
working. By then he had two more wives. All these women had
children. We were all going to school together, staying in the same
house. We were doing everything as sisters. I like my stepmothers;
they were good. I never know who my father loves best, whether
my mother or the others. But I knew he gave respect to my
mother, being the first wife. This was according to the traditional
way. The wives gave respect according to how one comes, first
come, second come, and so on. These women gave so much
respect to my mother. Myself and the stepsisters, we dont say,
who is your mother? We are all like sisters and brothers.
My fathers wives had many gardens. They could plant six acres
of cotton for the wives. There was no famine in my family. It was a
large family. I used to go to the garden with my stepmother. I could
tell them a lot of stories, and they laughed so much. I went back to
my mothers house for holidays where I stayed with my two sisters.
My mother was so strict with me! It was my future. She had to teach
me cooking, responsibilities like doing dishes, all as womans
duties. My favorite relative was my mothers elder sister. She gave
us a lot to eat so we liked her so much. She had only one son, but
mother had ten of us. (Kilbride & Kilbride, 1990, pp. 206-207,
emphases added)

This personal story includes a number of points that demonstrate how a

polygynic marriage could work as a social system. The success of the childhood
family environment depended upon the fathers treatment of the co-wives
Valsiner 187

equitably-- both in the sense of respecting each of them, and respecting their
seniority rank. The co-wives can be traced here to set up a unifying social
context for all of the co-sibs (e.g., children would not ask the question of who is
whose mother, as such question is rendered unimportant by the harmonious
relationships in the family group).
Different co-wives obviously differed in how they treated the children in
different practical tasks. Marjorie here was not particularly complimentary about
her own mother (mentioning that the mother never liked us so much-- Kilbride &
Kilbride, 1990, p. 207). Of course, it need not be forgotten that the mother had 10
children, which necessarily means shortening of attention to each single one.
The flexible environment of the household of the other co-wives was thus a
contrastive (or reconstructive) for these needs of Marjorie that were not fully
granted by her own mother. The role of female relatives (Marjories mothers
elder sister) is important here. It is coordinated with the role of the father, and set
the stage for non-problematic growth of the child, leading to this positive
retrospect.
In contrast, Robert tells us a different story of his experiences. His father
was also married with four wiveslocated in separate home compounds-- his
mother being the second in rank. Robert reported asking questions about his
real mother-- and being stigmatized and mistreated by the children of the other
co-wives at school. He was negatively treated by the fourth co-wife (while living
on her home grounds, to attend school from there). Among his memories of
childhood, the question of organization of eating on the shared home compound
is of relevance:

Some of the things that I have experienced basically on the side of

eating are that when eating we do not assemble at one particular
place, each mommy with her children. This results in jealousy
because the wives cook different types of food. And also one may
be eating only one type of food, such as Ugali, without changing.
So it results in admiring the food of the other mommies. (Kilbride &
Kilbride, 1990, p. 209)

The specific social-psychological organization of food-related activities is

of central importance for regulating social relations (see chapter 8). The
possibility for open comparisons of foods made by other co-wives created the
basis for inter-child competitiveness on the basis of inter-mother comparisons.
Summarizing his growing-up experiences, Robert remarked:

The advantages which I have experienced under polygyny are

that with work like planting, cooperation works, and when one of the
family is sick, contributions occur in great number. Biblically, that is
a time for showing love, peace, and unity as the commandment
says to love your neighbor. Another advantage is that barrenness
cannot occur. African tribes, particularly the Bunyala, believe that
immortality is recaptured in ones issue (offspring). They believe
Valsiner 188

that the more wives one gets, the more children he expects, and
the more chances of purportedly capturing immortality. If robbers
have appeared at the compound, the polygamous family can react
seriously to defend whatever is to happen. Also, no money is
wasted employing some people to defend the home. And some
believe that polygyny is a sign of wealth.
Some of the disadvantages that I have experienced in a
polygynous family are so many. When my mother is given
something by father such as money for buying new clothes that is
the time when rough words come from the first, third, and fourth
wives that their children also need clothes or whatever she has
gotten. Who to educate becomes also a problem because of
financial difficulties in obtaining school fees. Feeding the family
becomes impossible, hence stealing other peoples properties
results sometimes... Jealousy generates among such a family. For
instance, maybe one of the sons of the second or third wife is
employed somewhere. The rest of the wives complain that what he
gets is only to feed his really mother... (Kilbride & Kilbride, 1990,
pp. 208-209, emphases added)

The psychological mechanisms of problematic functioning of Roberts

home context are obvious here. Once jealousy has appeared in the relations
(through promoted competitiveness), it can become the basis for constant
evaluation of what happens with economic provisions-- whether these come to
the mothers from their husband, or from their sons.
This example verifies once more that the crucial issue around which the
polygynic family can go astray is the handling of economic resources, rather than
issues of sexuality. Surely it is easier to maintain the polygynic household under
conditions of affluence (Marjories case) than when the whole family is under
economic strain (Roberts case).

The polyandrous marriage

In contrast to polygyny, polyandry is a rare form of marriage in terms of its

presence around the World. It has been documented in mostly in the Himalayan
mountain regions and in different parts of the Indian subcontinent. Like all other
marriage forms it has been described in our contemporary times, its existence is
closely tied to the economic conditions of the life in a given society.

The economic basis of polyandry. Polyandry sets up cultural limits on the

reproductive proliferation of the men, through limiting their child-bearing
capacities to the role of the joint wife. This is necessary under strict economic
demand conditions. For instance, Himalayan polyandry exists largely on the
basis of the economic need for not partitioning the land between sons from
generation to generation, as that would hinder agricultural productivity. Polyandry
in the Himalayas is further supported by the combination of economic activities--
Valsiner 189

working the fields (which requires male labor) and going on trading trips (also
male activity) facilitates the economic well-being of the polyandrous household.
Economic concerns can be related with collective-cultural norms. If (like
was the case in the history of Southern India) there was the norm that a
household must always include a male member while (at the same time) males
were recruited into military campaigns for different times (and uncertainties of
survival), then most clearly polyandrous arrangements are functional to maintain
normal life conditions for the families. Yet when the conditions change, the
marriage form can transform. Yet the marriage form is not an outcome, but a
means to social ends, and it protects itself against its downfall. As Ayappan
remarked (in 1937):

Whenever modern European culture has penetrated and modified

indigenous culture, polyandry is giving way to monandry, but on
the other hand, in rural areas remote from foreign influences,
polyandrous families are still numerous and are surprisingly free
from jealousy and discord. The suppression, therefore, of sexual
jealosy between the brothers who are the common husbands of a
single wife is a function of their culture. The chief cultural forces
that lead to the suppression of the emotion in the men are (1) the
ritual of marriage... by which they are made joint husbands; (2) the
economic motive to prevent the disintegration of the family
property by limiting the number of heirs; (3) the influence of
parents who, during the earlier years of marital partnership,
supervise and regulate the sexual life of the co-husbands by
assigning each of them a particular night to be with the wife; and
(4) public opinion which applauds successful polyandry. Under
conditions of culture change all these forces have weakened and
in every family in which economic and other ties have been
modified, bickerings are heard that have their root in sexual
jealousy, growing individualism and rebellion against the authority
of elders in sexual matters. (Aiyappan, 1937, No. 130)

Social organization. Polyandry exists in different forms. First, there is the form
of fraternal polyandry-- a set of brothers marrying the same woman (the
Aiyappan quote above refers to this form). Here the marriage to the woman
entails literally the younger co-husbands growing into the marriage with the
same wife at the time of the marriage of the oldest of the brothers (at
adolescence). So, for instance, if the oldest brother (of 4) is 17 at the time of the
marriage (and perhaps the bride 15), then the other brothers could be 13, 10,
and 7 at the time of their joint marriage (assuming 3-year birth interval between
brothers). If the oldest brother may have become psycho-sexually ready to
marry, then his younger brothers are still developing through their middle
childhood and adolescence. This creates continuity from childhood relationships
between brothers and their joint marriage. This continuity supports the creation of
the collective husband status of the set of brothers. The co-husbands (brothers)
Valsiner 190

function in a united way as a well-integrated social group-- persons become parts

of the whole collective husband.
Early marriage of brothers as a collective husband can also lead to later
marital problems (see Levine, 1988, for description). The coming into age of the
younger brothers at times leads to demands to add other wives to the marriage
(thus turning it into polygynandry) or requiring separate wives for themselves
(turning polyandry into monogamysee Figure 4.1.). Like in the case of sororal
polygyny, the arrangement of fraternal polyandry is primarily built on the history
of sibling relationships. The joint family context leads to the dominance of
brothers relations who marry a woman as a social unitso, de facto, they
involve themselves in a monogamic relation between the collective husband and
a his wife. In case of the dissipation of the collective husband various other
marriage forms can result from it.
Examples of non-fraternal polyandry are therefore more important to
understand the cultural construction of this plural marriage form. The question of
male sexual jealousies has been haunting Western researchers who have failed
to understand the ordinary role sexuality plays in human family lives (beyond the
act of reproduction). In the case of Keralas Nayar polyandry (see description of
the history of Nayar tharavad in Chapter 2), the relation between Nayar or
Nambudiri husbands and their sambadham wife was regulated through simple
mutuality rules:

The husband would visit the wife at night, and be accommodated in

a suitable room provided for the purpose. If he ceased to like her,
divorce was simple; he discontinued his visits. Conversely, if she
did not like him, she refused to open the door to him, or even more
emphatically, threw a mat and pillow out for him. The husbands
financial involvement was minimal; he presented a cloth and an
upper cloth, at the time of marriage and during Onam, Vishu,
Tiruvatira, and a certain quantity of toilet oil every month. He
acknowledged the paternity of the issues by discharging the
expenses incurred for the delivery. (Menon, 2002, p. 802)

Polyandry as it occurs in the form of matriarchal polyandry (as the Kerala

example specifies) is either matrilocal (i.e., different husbands come to share the
wifes household, either simultaneously or in successionas in the Nayar case),
or patrilocal (a husband and wife couple, inhabiting the husbands home territory,
invites another husband to join them in marriage). The reasons for adding a new
husband to an existing marriage vary, but usually relate to the infertility or
economic needs.
An example of such transition comes from the description of Tibetan
polyandry by Prince Peter (1963, p. 370) who has been one of the most notable
Western researchers interested in polyandry. Ishe Palkid (a woman) was married
to Rigzin at her age of 21, and almost immediately gave birth to a stillborn child.
Efforts to become pregnant again during the following five years failed. Rigzin
was alone cultivating the fields, and needed further help. He suggested to her to
Valsiner 191

invite another man (Paldan) to join them in marriage, and she agreed. Paldan
joined the household and shared the agricultural work, yet Ishe Palkid did not
become pregnant during the following seven years. The need for a heir was high,
so the polyandrous group decided to adopt a boy from another family.

Psychological organization. The crucial point in polyandrous relationships is

the reverse of that of polygyny. In polyandry, the wife has to treat all co-husbands
(who also vary by age, and seniority) equally. The issue of specific paternity of
children is de-emphasized at the level of public presentation, even if it may be
recognized in private. In any case, the having of a child by the whole marriage
group is valued positively, de-focussing from the question of concrete paternity.
For most couples, the problem of sexual equity is handled by having the
wife spend an entire night with one husband at a time and with all husbands in a
more or less equal measure. Because men often are away on trading trips, a
strict rotation is not feasible, and the scheduling tends to be flexible. A general
rule is that a husband who has been away has the first rights to spend the night
with the wife. Otherwise the goal is rough balance, and when all things are equal,
the senior brother, the brother who took the principal role in bringing about the
marriage, or the brother currently closest to the wife may take precedence
(Levine, 1988, p. 164). Jealousy is a rare phenomenon-- everything in the
everyday relationships is done so as to not let it emerge, or -- if it does emerge--
to re-direct it:

Jealousy and sexual rivalry between brothers are the exception.

The problem more commonly is one of greater and lesser
compatability between specific husbands and the wife. A wife may
prefer one of the husbands and let her preference be known.
Relationships change over time, so the neglected husband can
hope for the future-- while complaining that women are fickle; and
preferences are tolerated so long as no one is excluded. Most
women initially like the eldest husband more, for the two often are
close in age; and it is the eldest with whom most establish the first
sexual relationship. In later years a woman is apt to turn to younger
husbands with whom she may have a more equal relationship,
whose upbringing she may have supervised, and who likely are
seen as more sexually attractive. Temporarily neglected husbands
are more free to pursue extramarital affairs, while women attempt
to control the actions of their favorites (Levine, 1988, p. 165, added
emphases)

The phenomenon of supervising the growth of the husband is intricate in

itself. Polyandry (in its fraternal form) provides the condition for the wife to have
secure company of multi-aged small group of husbands. The youngest of the co-
husbands may indeed assume a role of both a young husband and an adopted
male child (i.e., whose childhood and adolescent growth was supervised by the
wife). Such double role can fortify the psychological stability of the marriage on
Valsiner 192

the side of the wife-- in case the older co-husbands do not create problems on
the grounds of their being treated unequally (compare this also with
UmHassan<>Amira relations in the Lebanese polygynic marriage, above).

The conjoint (polygynandrous) marriage

This marriage form is rarest of all of the four forms. It entails marriage of
more than one husband with more than one wife. The crucial distinction of this
form from co-habitation of monogamic marriages within the same household is
the absence of symbolic ownership of a particular partner (which is the case in
monogamic marriages).

Distribution, economic basis, and social organization. . Polygynandry is

found usually in societies which practice polyandry. It cant be found in strictly
polygynous societies. Its economic basis is similar to that of polyandry.
Polygynandry is in effect a combination of polygyny and polyandry. Social
roles of the partners thus entail unity (of the marriage group) and differentiation
(between different aged co-wives and co-husbands). Hence polygynandry occurs
often in parallel with polyandry, and easily moves between different marriage
forms. Thus, in the case of Jaunsar-Bawar (in Uttar Pradesh--practicing all forms
of plural marriages, and studied consistently), under the conditions of hill
economy,

Several brothers must work together, and the wife or wives, share
the responsibilities of running the house, with a group of husbands.
Most wives prefer to have co-wives, to help them and sometimes a
clever woman is found who is fond of one the husbands, and
pleads for a co-wife, to release herself from the obligation of
sharing the bed with other brothers. The new wife acts as a safety
valve for domestic tension. Theoretically, the wife is the monopoly
of the eldest brother, normally she caters to the sexual need of all
the brothers, but she can time her intimacy, and show preference to
any of the husbands, meeting the protests of the aggrieved
husbands, by excuses and even demanding a co-wife. Sexual
relations need not necessarily be confined within the household
group, and under the prevailing conditions of hill economy and the
double standard of morality that the society recognizes, sex is not
an overpowering factor in the life of the people, neither is inhibition
considered a virtue. Food and personal decoration cause more
anxiety. (Majumdar. 1954/55, p. 92)

It is important to emphasize here (as well as in other plural marriage form)

that the role of sexuality in marriage can be culturally constructed in different
ways. In the plural marriage forms, it is not highlighted as the basis for marriage.
The basis is elsewhere-- for example in economic relations between family clans
Valsiner 193

(exemplified by bride price). Sexuality is undoubtedly important-- but not the

central issue in marriage. It leads to more important aspects of persons cultural
movement through life-courses (such as having children, and grandchildren). In a
day-to-day life context, other issues-- who cooks for whom? what? who gives
whom presents?-- are by far more important. This may be combined with
intolerance for the extra-marital sexual affairs of the spouses-- yet sexuality here
is a cultural object for social treatment.
Same principles for curbing potential jealousies (eliminating them before
they emerge) apply here as those apply in polygynic and polyandrous marriages.
The participants need to construct for themselves a superordinate unifying
meaning-- religious or secular (e.g., based on "rights", "respect", "progress",
"humanity" etc.)-- of general kind. It becomes translated -- by persons-- into their
everyday life practices by guiding them away from emotional reactions to specific
forms of the sexual, procreation-oriented, and resources distribution practices.

Example 4.7. Complex mariage in the U.S.: The Oneida Community. The
creation of the Oneida Community was the life-work of John Humphrey Noyes
who grew up in Vermont, graduated from Dartmouth College at age 19 (in 1830),
and became converted into the free church of Perfectionism. At the time, the
social world of the U.S. North-East was filled with emergence of various kinds of
free churches which opposed the orthodoxies of the established denominations.
Perfectionism rejected the Calvinist doctrine of the depravity of human beings
and their inability to do good except through Gods intervention. Instead,
perfectionism was close to the Wesleyan doctrine that accepted the possibility
that human beings could attain a state of perfect love between oneself and God.
Noyess version of perfectionism was quite explicit (and extreme)-- as a 23-year
old seminarian he declared that not only can a man be perfect, but that he
himself actually was. For such clarity about himself, he was dismissed from Yale
Divinity School. Yet he became to collect followers to his ideology, including his
wife Harriet Holton (whom he married in 1838, emphasizing in his proposal that
marriage should not monopolize or enslave each others heart, and expressing
his wish that his wife would love all men and women-- Carden, 1971, p. 9). He
conceptualized the abolition of monogamous marriage as an ideal heavenly
condition. Moving back to Vermont, Noyes established (by 1846) his first
polygynandrous marriage-based community, involving four monogamous
couples. All that establishment was construed as Gods will for the participating
persons to feel together not only in their religion, but also in their sexual relations.
Noyess experiment was explicitly autocratic-- he was the dominant
organizer of the marriage system, and (as he was perfect, by self-admission),
was chosen for that role. His theocratic governance of the first experiment
(which was put under stress by the local community accusing the Noyes
household of adultery and immorality) carried over to the construction of the
Oneida Community. Noyes selected his followers, and autocratically set up the
social rules within the community.
The Oneida Community of Noyes lasted for thirty years-- from 1849 (when
Noyes became its leader) to the end of 1870s (when it broke down through an
Valsiner 194

internal rift). In its high time, it was economically self-supporting. In its

religiousness, it was an example of very strictly internalized religious beliefs
which did not need many external rituals for support. There were no regular
religious meetings or prayers, Christmas was scarcely recognized (but Noyess
conversion date-- February, 20th-- was celebrated). Yet in evening meetings of
the community, both work tasks and social relationship issues were discussed.
Maximum care by Noyes was given to eradication of exclusive dyadic relations
that tended to emerge from the sharing of co-spouses.
At Oneida, due to the communal nature of life, having wives (or
husbands) was ideologically reproachable-- as no human being should possess
another in a perfect Christian community. Hence the move from either
monogamy or polygynandry to polygyny or polyandry was strictly blocked. Given
Noyes orientation, monogamy could (in case of joining the community) only be
transformed into polygynandry (which was the case for him, his wife, and other
followers), while the reverse movement was blocked. Individuals could join the
community by-passing monogamy, but could not -- at least within the community-
- move further into a monogamous relation.
Based on this organization of marriage, Noyes established a social
organization that generated support for the form itself. The tyrannican nature of
monogamy was overcome by way of a number of tools. First, the involvement of
all community members in the economically productive activities (and active
participation in decision making) created a moment of sharing. Secondly, the
meaning of sexual relations was changed-- in accordance with perfectionism--
from being sinful to being the way to attain perfection. The feelings of shame
were targets of Noyes preaching:

To be ashamed of the sexual organs, is to be ashamed of Gods

workmanship... of the most perfect instruments of love and unity...
of the agencies which gave us existence-... is to be ashamed of the
image of the glory of God-- the physical symbol of life dwelling in
life, which is the mystery of the gospel (cited via Carden, 1971, p.
56)

If this message were to be taken literally, one could have imagined the
Oneida Community to be a nudist colony. Nothing was further from reality-- in
fact all who visited the community noticed their members perfect moral
demenour. The message was really not for organization of public life, but input
for internalization by individuals. That internalization succeeded--- by way of
intertwining of the religious devotion and personal pleasure. In a diary of one of
the female members of the community, the following description (which was
published by the Community as an example for appropriate ways of feeling)
entails clear fusion of the God and the particular partner:

[The Lord] stirs up my heart from time to time to an appreciation

of his mercies, which is as enlivening and satisfying as the
reception of new mercies.
Valsiner 195

In view of his goodness to me and of his desire that I should let

him fill me with himself, I yield and offer myself, to be penetrated by
his spirit, and desire that love and gratitude may inspire my heart so
that I shall sympathize with his pleasure in the thing, before my
personal pleasure begins; knowing that it will increase my capability
for happiness. (Mary Cragins Journal, Carden, 1971, pp. 56-57)

The propagation of the personal pleasure of sexual relations as indicator

of pleasing the God was not unique in the Oneida Community as a religious
group. Other religious movements in other parts of the World (such as devotional
bhakti sects in Southern India (Hardy, 1983; Ramajunan, 1983) have
reconstructed the pleasurable nature of sexual intercourse in ways that connect it
with religious servitude.
In Noyess context, however, it led to two practical problems. First, the
birth rate of the Oneida complex family needed to be curtailed. In tribute to
Noyes economic realism, Oneida Community was always oriented towards
economic self-sufficiency, and sudden upsurge of reproductive success could
have been detrimental. This problem was solved by social suggestion to male
members of the Community to practice continence. Noyes instructed his
followers to concentrate on the sexual expression of love (as it was that of its
most natural and beautiful form) in the form of mutual enjoyment of the process
of intercourse, without male ejaculation. Here we can observe an effort to make
the male partner responsible for the birth control by way of regulating his sexual
behavior. Judging by the actual childbirths in the Oneida Community, this
method of birth control worked sufficiently well.
The second problem entailed the regulation of choices of love partners
that members could select, in ways that would enhance the religious ideology,
rather than undermine it. Here Noyes developed the rule of ascending scale of
perfectionism as characteristic measurement system for community members.
By that rule, the community members must select sexual partners who are above
them on the scale of perfectionism (with Noyes himself, of course, occupying the
highest position in this perfectionism scale). By inventing such scale, Noyes
created a system where any selection of a sexual partner was directly linked with
evaluation of ones own (and desired partners) perfectionism. Sexual relations in
this way were both results and vehicles for local upward mobility-- where the
criterion was persons internalization and externalization of community values.
The core of decisions about selection of partners was based on Noyes ideology,
followed by similar link of the actual act of sexual intercourse. Noyess social
experiment had completely appropriated human sexuality for the build-up and
maintenance of his religious community, while reversing the notion of repression
of sexuality by turning it into a centrally recognized positive human need.
The Oneida Community had its own life course -- one which overlapped
by its theocratic leader, John Noyes. As Noyes himself grew older, there was no
person fitting to take over his pivotal role. Furthermore, the generation of young
members of the community differed from their parents. Their parents had entered
the communal lifestyle based on their religious conviction (and among the ones
Valsiner 196

who claimed such conviction, Noyes carefully selected the most appropriate
group members). In contrast, children born within the community were members
of the community by virtue of kinship ties, not through conviction. Furthermore,
the community emphasized childrens education, and critical orientation (in
general, not in respect to the perfectionist belief system). About a third of children
who grew up in Oneida Community got some education outside of the
community.
John Humphrey Noyes stayed as the leader of the Oneida Community
until 1877, after which he created a committee (with his son Theodore as its
head) to lead the community. Noyes son was himself a non-follower of
perfectionism, and reluctant to lead the community. Internal dissent within the
community grew-- but this dissent was first and foremost about power roles
within the community (with Noyes departure from leadership, no heir to his
throne was strong enough to take over). The complex marriage form started to
break down as a result of the political infighting, resulting (by 1880) in a tendency
to begin to establish monogamic relations (and issue monogamic marriage
licenses). In 1881, Oneida Community was transformed into a joint stock
company. Another of the many efforts of creating a communal living arrangement
that would be harmonious had ended 70.

What happened in Oneida? A closer analysis of the Oneida Community reveals

its intricate internal structure. It was a community that set up polygynandry as its
core marriage form. Yet within the polygynandrous system, one could see
moments of theogamy (if one considers the ideological linkage of plural marriage
relations to belong to all participants being bonded with the God through their
plural relations). Theogamy here is monogamous (as only one God, rather than
plurality of deities, is worshipped). Furthermore, Noyes ascending scale of
perfectionism created a shade of polygyny (of Noyes as the perfect husband
being the partner for many community women-- and for the women growing up in
the community their very first partner 71). From the viewpoint of female
community members (who could decide whom to select as their partners) the
system included a shade of polyandry. While it is a definitional given for
polygynandry that it includes moments from every other marriage form, Noyes
managed to create a social system through his particular structuring of that form
that fitted the socio-economic needs of the community (of his creation).

70
There were many efforts in the U.S. society of the 19th century to build small communes that would
follow teachings of different forms of social equality, some secular, others deeply religious. The U.S. has
been a continuous testing ground for experiments in creating small-scale socially harmonious communities-
- all of which have failed after shorter or longer times.
71
until 1870s, when Noyes grew old, it was consensually accepted that he would be the first to initiate girls
in the community who were coming of age, into adulthood.
Valsiner 197

The monogamous marriage

In the history of biological species, monogamy has been rare in the animal
world (see Kleiman, 1984). As was observed above, its presence in humans is a
result of cultural restrictions upon transitions in the system of marriage forms.
Yet, in the context of modern industrialized world, it has become a normative and
sufficiently well-functioning marriage form. It fits the needs of limiting the
inheritance of property (across generation) and constitutes a mutual relationship
based on the notion of property ownership (exemplified by language: my wife,
my husband). Monogamy has been canonized in these societies that have
taken up different forms of Christianity as their religious belief system (i.e., from
the 3rd and 4th Century A.D. onwards).
Since most of the science of psychology has emerged in occidental
societies that share the Judeo-Christian religious history, let us look at the
restrictions that the religious system of Christianity-- since its raise to relevance
in the 4th Century A.D.-- has set upon the general scheme. This strictly restricted
scheme is presented in Figure 4.3.
As is the case with most moral norms, its boundaries are over-determined
by meaning. All basic meanings are tied to affective realmsat what the
socialization efforts aim. Only with the personal construction of a hyper-
generalized affective field sign (Valsiner, 2005, and chapter 8 here) will the
particular domain of interobjectivity become redundantly guarded through
personal-cultural corresponding canalizers. Thus, the message of marital
fidelity surrounds the young children growing up in a myriad of waysand is to
be accepted unquestioningly and affectively. Human socialization consists of
canalization of human affect through simple mechanisms of obedience to
authority (Milgram, 1974)assertions that something must be done simply
because it must be done, or something else cant be done because it is not
allowed. Such acts of asserted power are particularly powerful because of their
absence of argumentationthe power asserter re-instates ones control of the
given setting, rather than bargains for it.
As can be seen from Figure 4.3., social systems that have been built on
the basis of Christianity have strictly restricted any transformation of marriage out
of the prescribed monogamic form. Adding husbands (or wives) to an existing
monogamic marriage is strictly blocked, and all other three marriage forms are
made to be not only illegal but also immoral. This redundant control-- blocking
transformation and stigmatizing the other possible forms-- guarantees that all
marriage related issues are immediately viewed as necessarily those of
monogamy.
Valsiner 198

Figure 4.3. Constraining marriage forms to serial monogamy

MONOGAMY

MONOGAMY

Take away all bo MONOGAMY bo Take away all but 1

but 1 wife un un husband
da da
ry ry
MONOGAMY

boundary
Add 1 or
Add 1 more
or hus-
more band
wife

POLY- POLY-
ANDRY
GYNY
Take
away all
but 1 Take
hus away
band all
but 1
Add 1 or more wife
Add 1 or more wife
husband
POLYGYNANDRY

Women: to marry a man or a god? Once upon a time that was the question.
Christianity created a two-trajectory social role expectations for women-- either
marry, or remain chaste and dedicate oneself to religious service. As a
developing religious cult in Roman Empire (where it moved into a majority
position by around 350 A.D.), it emphasized body-related symbolic marking of
the religious commitment. Thus, sexuality became appropriated as a basis for
religious commitment (remaining chaste for religion, or faithful to husband).
Christianity was viewed as particularly successful among women (Stark, 1996,
Valsiner 199

pp. 99-100). Similarly, it is the women who have been designated the role of
socio-moral guardianship of the monogamic marriage. Last (but not least), the
monogamic practice divides the resources (husband candidates) in ways that
give the given husband-bearer full role in the marital system. This fullness of the
role may be constrained by external rules upon womens conduct. A Fulani (in
Mali) perspective (from a standpoint of polygyny) upon European monogamy is
revealing in this sense. When the researcher-- Paul Riesman-- explained that in
Europe bigamy is outlawed,

...the women would say with a dreamy and envious air, What a
good law you have! Every woman, if she does not yet have a co-
wife, lives under the constant threat of the arrival of one, and it is a
threat against which she can offer no legal resistance. Thus the
man may attenuate his wifes hold not only over her own children
and her cattle but also over himself, the husband, in sharing himself
between two, three, or four wives... A wife may ask for a divorce in
such a case, but since the husbands action is not considered to be
wrong, the wife must return the husband [all the valuables] which
he had brought about the marriage... since it is the husband who
keeps the children in any case of separation, to ask for a divorce
would be, for the wife, to abandon her children (Riesman, 1977, p.
92)

Again, we can see the centrality of control over resources (including here issue of
ownership of children at divorce), above other concerns. Probably the Fulani
fascination with European monogamy would look different if the husband in
monogamy were to keep the children.
In the spirit of missionary efforts, political dominance gained by European
countries at times of colonial expansion (16th to 20th centuries) resulted in
superimposing upon other societies the monogamy-privileging marriage forms.
Other forms of marriage of the natives were to be transformed to strict
monogamy. Such colonial efforts resulted in superficial masking of the accepted
marriage forms by superficial acceptance of monogamy 72.

Social organization. The social roles of the wife and the husband are defined in
monogamy by strict prescriptions and boundary maintenance against move to
any other form of marriage. Over the last 17 centuries, the organization of
monogamic marriages has moved from social role basis to that of internalization
of exclusive interpersonal relations (in terms of use of the meaning of love as
the basis for establishment and maintenance of the relation). This historical
development has been linked with the development of capitalist economic
system out of its feudal predecessors. It has differentially proliferated through
different strata of Western societies, especially among its middle range (e.g.,
72
For example, British enforcement of monogamy in (what is now) Ghana led to superficial declaration
(by polgynously married persons) of the first (senior) co-wife as the monogamic spouse, while retaining
other co-wives as if these were mistresses in the sense of the colonialist powers.
Valsiner 200

European aristocracy in the 20th century, like in previous ones, cannot build
marital relations on the basis of love, but have to consider the social history of
the potential marriage partners).

Psychological organization. In contrast to other marriage forms (which

function to eradicate feelings of jealousy), monogamy is largely built upon the
personal-cultural construction of jealousies (see chapter 7 on hyper-geheralized
affective field signs). Often jealousy is equated with the organizing concept of
love. Love is a basically ill-defined concept, which nevertheless governs the
feelings of human beings in their personal cultures in very powerful ways. As love
may be linked with the notion of belonging (of one marital partner to the other),
the linkage to monogamic relation as "mutual ownership" of the other is easily
made. The basis for building such affective limits on the borders of monogamy is
the symbolic ownership of the other (by the husband of the wife, and by the wife
of the husband). Such ownership is cultivated through the collective-cultural myth
systems of a society (e.g, a belief that if the spouse is not jealous, the spouse
does not really love the partner). In dyadic marital relations, testing of the
fullness of the "ownership" of the other can occur constantly from the beginning
(as well as from times before) the marriage. For example, the bride or wife may
indulge in genetic dramatisms of jealousy over the husband's real or imaginary
female friends, thus both testing the "love tie" of the relationship and trying to
channel the husband's interests (see Brusco, 1995, pp. 115-116 for a description
of marital relations in Colombian marriages). The needs of the traditionally
economically more insecure partners-- the women -- are guaranteed by their
implicit power control over the marital tie through the inevitable embeddedness of
the husband in the wife-controlled negotiations of the family with needs of
everyday life. Further restrictions upon monogamy can be seen in different
conditions of possible ending of a monogamous relation. These range from the
absolute impossibility of legal divorce, to the case (practiced in contemporary
societies) of allowing divorces at relatively relaxed conditions. The former
extreme ruled out change of marriage partners (i.e., the only possibility of new
marriage partnership was re-marriage after a spouse had died); the latter
transformed the monogamic marriage form into a case of serial monogamy.

Serial monogamy.

Serial monogamy can be seen as a version of polygyny without polygyny-- that

is, a way of marrying many partners without plurality of these partners at the
same time (Clignet, 1970). It is monogamic because at any time only one
husband and one wife are involved in it. Yet its development into full polygyny is
arrested by legal and moral boundaries. As such, it constitutes a solution to
human life-course organization which entails multiple partners without allowing
such multiplicity to occur at the same time.
Serial monogamy can be found in the sequence where partners separate,
and re-marry. The crucial-- and critical-- condition is the abandonment of the
previous spouse in favour of a new one. This condition differentiates serial
Valsiner 201

monogamy from either polygyny or polyandry. In the case of both polyandry and
polygyny, new spouses are added to the marriage, without the abandonment of
the previous ones. Psychologically, this difference is of opposite nature of
cultural construction. In one case, the reasons for abandonment have to be
constructed in the personal-cultural domain. Serial monogamy is necessarily
linked with conflicts of denigration of the previous marital partner for any
collective-culturally appropriate reason (be it witchcraft accusation or he does
not love me any more). Furthermore, the form of serial monogamy creates
multiple households for children born in different phases of the serial monogamic
relations of particular parents.

Summary: Minimal communities in action

The question of marriage forms is central for cultural-psychological

understanding of the contexts in which the bi-directional cultural transfer over
generations takes place. Each of the basic forms of marriage creates a different
meaning for the notion of family. Each of the forms of marriage (and family) are
cultural means for organization of human lives.
None of the forms has higher inherent value than any other, despite the
fact that participants in each find way to give privilege to their own preference.
That is done either by accentuating their existing conditions in contrast (and
opposition) to others' ways. Thus, statements of horror by monogamists about
the possibility of life in plural unions-- or similar horror of polygynists at the idea
of living under the impoverished conditions of monogamy-- are semiotic ways to
create boundaries between the "ingroup" and "outgroup". As was shown above-
chapters 2 and 3this value-based distinction ("WE are right, THEY are
wrong")creates conflicts far beyond the boundaries of family groups. Similarly,
by creating wild imaginations about the other ways of living (e.g., fascination by
bored monogamists with the assumed pleasures of polygynic or polyandrous
marriages), that boundary becomes maintained ("WE are insufficient, THEY
really are better"). Such personal externalized valuations are parts of the
personal cultures of their authors, rather than definitive statements about the
psychological, social, or economic conditions of the described marriage forms.
Each of the marriage forms constitutes the temporal structure for marriage.
Each of them requires different ways of handling the social role relationships
between the participants. The flexibility of the cultural-psychological system of
creating meanings helps here. In cases where jealousies are imminent dangers
for the functioning of a marriage form, specific set of cultural means is used so as
the emergence of jealousies is either made impossible, or at least highly
improbable. The very same personal feeling (jealousy) can be collective-
culturally promoted to maintain the boundaries of another marriage form
(monogamy). In both cases-- of attenuation and amplification-- of jealousies as
psychological, internalized boundary control mechanisms-- we can see the
personal-cultural system as functioning in service of the given life space
organization.
Valsiner 202

Aside from the personal-cultural constructions of human life course within

the matrix of marriage forms, these forms play also an important role in cultural
mediating of persons relations with social groups in which they are parts. The
cultural forms of marriage and family guarantee sufficient maintenance of the
whole texture of social life. It is therefore not surprising that the issues of family
and marriage are recurrent targets for different social institutions in their power
relations and goal-oriented actions within a society. As our example of the
Mormon re-organization of married lives, as well as that of the Oneida
Community indicated, it was the religious institutions which made use of re-
formulation of marriage forms (and their collective cultural valuation) to bond
persons in these marriages further to their specific goals. This does not differ
from the use of chastity demands in Christian or Muslim dominated social worlds.
The married life is the playground for extra-marital institutional interestsyet
these are sufficiently buffered by the creation of minimal community atmospheres
within the functioning social unitsthe families.
Valsiner 203

Chapter 5. Cultural Wholes on the Move: Maintenance and

Crossing of Boundaries in the Semiotic Universes

In every social stratum that area of

conduct which is functionally of most
vital importance to its members us the
most carefully and intensively molded.
Elias, 1982, p. 305

We have seen in the previous chapters how human beings are cultural
beings through the creation and use of signs. The use of signs allows us to both
make distinctions and overcome themby creating fields of meaning that extend
over space and time. That personal-cultural side of the human psyche is guided
by the meanings encoded into the persons life environments by different social
institutions that are in need for participation by persons in their goals-directed
activities. The whole cultural set-up of our environments is suggesting one or
another kind of actingusing the combinations of various signs, starting from
iconic and indexical ones (see chapter 1). Human environments are socially
suggestive environments.
Within these environments, social-institutional guidance takes the form of
setting up dramatized activity settingspublic situations within which human
beings participate to greater or lesser extents and experience the social
suggestions for socially expected feeling, thinking, and acting. At times such
public dramas entail the loss of life by some of the participantsas in public
executions, duels, and hunting trips. Such loss of life is presented through the
particular meanings attached to the role performances 73 of the participants.

Example 5.1. The functions of public punishments. In the course of history,

people labeled as criminals have been punished-- from their execution to
whipping-- in public places all through the European history. In New England,
from the 17th Century onwards, public punishments were turned into deeply
theatrical events:

In many ways the whole drama resembled a sort of moral

theater. Sedate at first, punishments, in particular executions, took
on a carnival atmosphere from the 1670s onward. Advertised well
in advance, they attracted large crowds: drums played, the
participants marched in procession, and ministers gave long

73
A good example of such role performance orientation is the care for prisoners left waiting execution for
not to die before they are killedthe result (the prisoner dead) is the same, but in the case of non-scripted
death (e.g., suicide) it lacks the socially set theatrical performance in the role of the ones to be
legitimately killed.
Valsiner 204

sermons replete with details and graphic language. The criminals

about to be punished for "black-mouthed oaths," "filthy
drunkennesses," "vilest debauchery," and so forth were asked to
play their part. Confessions provided the penultimate excitement
before the final act took place.
Executions often became the most talked-about event of the
year and drew immense crowds For James Morgan's execution
in 1686, crowds began to gather in Boston a week ahead of the
event. Some came at least fifty miles. On the Sunday before the
hanging, two distinguished ministers preached sermons on the
crime; and on the Thursday of the execution, Increase Mather
preached a sermon to a crowd of five thousand, the largest
theretofore gathered in New England. Vendors sold written
broadsides, which, like theater programs, summarized the details of
Morgan's crimes. (Daniels, 1995, p., 101)

The theatrical nature of public punishments involved coordination of

mutually related social roles. Similar functions can be found in other rituals--
military parades, weddings, court cases, college graduation ceremonies.
Many theatrical ritualized acts entail the use of socially created life events
of individualscriminals, celebrities, etc.for the sake of the guidance of others.
These others are taken out of their ordinary home environments to some public
setting, kept within the field, and provided with dramatic (and traumatic)
experiences for the sake of the guidance of their internalization system (see
chapter 7). The public settings are set up by a structure of social roles assigned
to particular people (the criminal, the executioner, the vendors of popcorn and
theatre programs, TV cameramen focusing on the events, anchorperson for the
local TV channel, and police to keep public order). All these persons are actors in
the public theatrical setting, where the rest of the spectators are liminal co-
players. They are spectatorswatching the event from outsideand yet, at the
same time, they are insidersas part of the event. The liminality of social group
and crowd membership is set up by public events where necessarily the
differentiation of the center stage and quasi-spectatorship 74 is present.

74
I use this awkward term to emphasize the inclusive separation of the stage and audience in any
theatrical performance. Contrary to the usual opposition (based on the model of exclusive separation) that
the actors on stage are unlinked with the audience, here we see various forms of peripheral participation
in the theatre playor public ritualfrom different positions. Of course our contemporary mass media are
a technological device that allows such forms of participation to become central at the maximum distance
from the location of the event. Hence the movement of images from far-away areas of wars, famines,
royal weddings, etc. right into the comforts of our living rooms, and the dominance of the peripheralized
participation in private of events in public. The visible social crowds (viewed on TV screens) meet the real
minimal communities at the loci of message reception.
Valsiner 205

Meanings and Movements

To create social guidance dramas, people move aroundand force others

to do the same. Such movement begins from the beginning the first move
away can be found in the childs exit from the womb at birthwith no real
chance of return. All through the life the person creates novelty and encounters
that altered state of ones surroundings.
The latter reality of irreversibility of development has of course given rise
to various psychological theories that posit the basic desire to return to the locus
of origin. The alternative ideologythat of positing incurable tendencies for
explorationexists in parallel. Different types of movements away from the home
ground are shown in Figure 5.1.
The typology of various forms of movement entails a look backwards
reconstruction of the cultural history by way of re-telling and re-constructing ones
collective myth stories, narratives of the past historical events, and ones own life
stories. In parallel, the movement towards the future entails temporary
movements into the geographically near other placesschools, bars, markets,
zoos, brothels, tanning studies, theatres, cafes, restaurants, cinemas, art
exhibits, concerts, and more generallypublic places of the local village, town, or
megapolis. Such movements are temporarydaily, weekly, or at irregular
timesand are based on the home place, and are places of negotiation of the
personal and collective cultures. The act of moving out of the ordinary home
routine is itself an act of minimal adventure. It entails the psychological creation
of the meaning triplet HOME--|THRESHOLD|--non-HOME, followed by setting up
ones action goals beyond the border of the threshold. We create such
thresholds both in the architectural space. Our houses, stores, churches,
temples, etcall have thresholds that the person who steps in, or out, needs to
trespass. Furthermore, we create semiotic markers of the border crossing
actionsin the form of locks and keys, passwords, visas, etc. Special social
roles for people overseeing the borders are created-- doormen at bars, security
guards, etc.
Our intra-psychological (personal-cultural) worlds are similarly layered. We
also create these thresholds in the depths of our internalized worlds of feelings
and meaningsthe semiotic space. Widely known and revered meanings such
as incest, holiness, and ownership are meaning thresholdspromoter signs
that regulate our intentions in our action by inhibiting the latter. Otherslike
trash, enemy, helpare to trigger us into appropriate action in crossing the
thresholds. While creating the boundariesboth internally and externallywe
set up the stage for our crossing them.
Valsiner 206

Figure 5.1. A typology of possible culturally organized movement trajectories

CULTURAL
IDENTITY:

PILGRIMAGE
CRUSADE
MISSION

Cultural ECONOMIC
reconstruction ACTIVITIES:
of past events: life THE
history myth PRE- TRADE
school
SENT bars,
EXPLORATION
PLACE market G t b it
AT
WAR
THIS
CONQUE

LOCALITY
ALTERATIO
N:

marrying
o t

PAST | PRESENT | near

far FUTURE

The temporary movement outside of home is socially regulated both by

objective set-up of environment (geographic locations, accessibility to outside,
etc) as well as symbolically. The latter entails regulation of meanings of access to
different gender or age categories to different public locationsall together, or
with a chaperone, or under conditions of hijab (El-Guindi, 1999; Shirazi, 2001).
Some of the movements are made mandatorycompulsory formal schooling
requires daily movement through the environment between home and school
territories. Specific transport vehiclessymbolically markedmay be
institutionally made available for such regular trips (see Figure 5.2.).
Valsiner 207

Figure 5.2. A cultural tool for boundary transition: a school bus in the U.S.

The U.S. yellow school bus in Figure 5.2. is more than just a car (which
has special privileges in traffic, in relation to other cars). It is a symbol of
transition between the two separated life-worldsthose of the home (and its
extensionsthe community), and the place for formal education (school). It is a
specifically marked boundary devicea way to cross the symbolic (aside from
geographic) distance between the two. In a similar vein, the day-and-night cycle
creates a basis for such cultural migration between home and non-home. In a
Maasai homestead,

During the day, when the cattle are out and the gates are open, the
boundary between the cultural domain of the homestead and the
natural domain of the bush is removed. The homestead is invaded
by nature, it becomes natural space. Women occupy the centre of
the homestead, men and cattle stay outside. Conversely, during the
night, when men and cattle are inside the homestead along with the
women, and the gates are closed, the boundary between culture
and nature is reaffirmed. (Arnhem, 1991, p. 65)

The opening and closing of doors and gatesbe those of ones bedroom,
or bathroom, or house, or of the gates of a (mediaeval) city, or of the political
borders of countries-- are all cultural acts of regulating the possibilities of
movement of the cultural agents. The whole invention of cultural tools to
guarantee the selective permeability of these boundariesinvention of keys,
visas, passwords, etc.indicates the need to regulate the dynamics of
interchange between this side and the other in a spatio-temporal living
arrangement.
Likewise, introduction of daily trips between home and school have
impacts on the ways the participants in these regular symbolic movement
patterns are dressed. The adoption of school uniforms would entail
institutionalization of not merely the homogeneity of schoolchildrens being at
school, but also of their movement in and out of school. Likewise, the introduction
Valsiner 208

of regular school trips could lead to modification of the whole communitys dress
codes 75. By introducing a new form of activity, the movement patterns of access
to (and from) that activity setting can lead to transformation of the whole social
order.

Cultural psychology of being on the move. Temporary movement of children out

of their natal householdsto those of their relatives, or to boarding schools and
(later) colleges entails the tension between moving away from the familiar (and
resisting itHeimweh in Ernst Boeschs termssee below), and moving
towards the not-yet-familiar but somehow desired (Fernweh, a la Boesch;
adventuresee Simmel, 1959a).
Moving around is a spatio-temporal enterprise. It occurs with its posited
goals, and on landscapes that are culturally pre-structured. In most general
sense-- peoples movement is meaningfully purposeful. They go from place A to
place B for some reasonyet the place out there is beyond their horizon, both
perceptually and culturally. While doing that, they put their own previously
established personal-cultural and collective-cultural systems under new tensions
for adaptation. Even the conqueror has to adjust to the realities of the lives of the
conqueredas the history of colonial conquests amply demonstrate (Steinmetz,
2003). Likewise, a religious pilgrim expects to find new meaningsand cures for
illsin new places one has decided to visit. In that expectation, the pilgrim not
only endures the hardship of the pilgrimage but also accepts the social role
allotted to him/her at the destination.

Trajectories of social movement

Human beings are on the move. They go from their home compounds to
places of relevant life cycle ritualstemples, churches, birthing huts, schools,
military barracks or cemeteries, theatres, cinemas, restaurants or parksto
places other than their regular home environments. They may go to crusades,
wars, or football gamesas well as to bring images of those to ones home.
As was described in Figure 5.1., the making of longer-term future states
entails a variety of movements. First, the human history is mostly that of
conquests of resourcesthrough wars, colonial annexations, intermarriages,
property purchases and trade. Many social moves entail a combination of various
kindsa religious missionary effort may be linked with a trade journey, or war
expedition is linked with the efforts to convert the captured natives into the faith
of the conquerors. A version of this unity is slave trade (Kopytoff, 1982)
expeditions and trade of human beings to be transported to economic production

75
Describing changes in the public life in Fez, Morocco, in the 1950s, Fatima Mernissi recollects:

When the nationalists first started sending their daughters to school, they also started letting them
wear the djellaba [male clothing- a closely fitted robe with trimmed sleeves and slits on the side to
allow walking] because it was much more practical than the haik [traditional womens veil].
Going back and forth to school four times a day was not like going to visit a saints tomb once a
year. So the daughters started wearing the mens djellba, and soon thereafter, their mothers
followed suit. (Mernissi, 1994, p. 119)
Valsiner 209

place under compulsion. Generations of such exposure led to religious

conversion and were at times re-directed into re-immigration to places of origin
with new missionary and economic interests (Falola & Childs,
2004;Johnson,1999; Sanneh, 1999; Weiner, 1998). The establishment of ex-
slave colonies in West Africa was a social experiment of the population
movement started by the trans-Atlantic slave trade.
Likewise, a religious pilgrimage combined with military conquest amounts
to a crusade. Many of the first sea faring explorations of the worldfrom Vasco
da Gama to James Cook were to set the stage for conquest by force,
combined by different forms of direct or indirect administrative rule-- followed by
missionary efforts by the new rulers.

Cultural psychology of pilgrimage

There exists a deeply historical tradition all over the World and in its
various religionsthat of special journeys to specifically rich and powerful
symbolic places. The tradition of pilgrimage is an act of personal-cultural
devotion within a social framework that is set up by the constraint system of the
collective culture (Delaney, 1990)expectation that a believer in X undertakes a
weekly, monthly, yearly, or once in a lifetimea journey to that another place of
special collectively shared meaning for the believers 76. The history of inventing
the rituals of pilgrimages is linked with the sedentary lifestyle and agricultural
subsistence activities. It is absent in nomadic lifestyleshence it constitutes an
activity of temporary change of the {LIVING HERE > LIVING non-HERE} duality
(see chapter 3), where from the sub-dominant field {Living non-HERE} emerges
the notion of {JOURNEY TO THERE} which begins to act as the promoter sign
for the person undertaking the pilgrimage. As Victor Turner has pointed out,

A pilgrimage center, from the standpoint of the believing actor, also

represents a threshold, a place and moment in and out of time,
and such an actoras the evidence of many pilgrims of many
religions attestshopes to have there direct experience of the
sacred, invisible, or supernatural order, either in the material aspect
of miraculous healing or in the material aspect of inward
transformation of spirit or personality. (Turner, 1973, p. 214)

The pilgrim undertakes physical hardship that is meaningful for the

personal-cultural construction of the journey away from the regular place and
ways of living. Thus, the three-week barefoot journey of raj jat (Royal Pilgrimage)
of 164 miles in Northern India, passing elevations of over 4000 meters gets
successfully completed on rare years when the conditions are favourable (Sax,
1990). Yet its construction as a luring challenge for the test of devotional piety is

76
Contemporary activity of tourism can be viewed as a secularized historical outgrowth from the social
practices of pilgrimage. The functions of tourism for the tourists are centered upon ones own self through
the act of travel elsewhere (see Gillespie, 2007)
Valsiner 210

an idea for which many people prepare themselves. Already such preparation
can have an intra-psychological function of a pilgrimagein ones mind.
Once the pilgrim actually gets started on the road to the pilgrimage goal
place,

the route becomes increasingly sacralized as he progresses: at

first it is his subjective mood of penitence that is important while the
many long miles are mainly secular, everyday miles; then the
sacred symbols begin to invest the route; while in the final stages,
the route itself becomes a sacred, sometimes mythical journey until
almost every landmark and ultimately every step is a condensed,
multivocal symbol capable of arousing much affect and desire.
(Turner, 1973, p. 214, added emphases)

The historical invention of pilgrimage is thus an act of sign construction

through ones own effortfirst in the form of indexical sign (the pilgrims own step
by step movement on the pilgrimage trail). It is this full impact of the actual
journey on its meaning, followed by symbolic generalization from the efforts over
time into a hyper-generalized symbol of transformed self that is the result of
pilgrimage (see further chapter 1 on sign complexes). The trail of pilgrimage can

Figure 5.3. Pilgrims and tourists waiting in line to see the image of the
saint in the Cathedral of Santiago de Compostela, Spain (authors photo,
2004)
Valsiner 211

be long or short, entail the use of modern airplanes or traditional horse or camel
power, or just walkingyet the full immersion in the meaningful totality of the
other place. This is supported by social relations and social crowd phenomena--
the pilgrim moves into a temporary community of similar actorswho collectively
transform the place of the pilgrimage, and carry back home the symbolic images
of the special place which for the un-initiated can look very mundane. There are
very many occasions for people waiting in line (see Figure 5.3.).
Equally important is the set of specific activities the pilgrims become
engaged in once they arrive at the goal of their pilgrimage. This may entail
touching the sculpted image of the deity (e.g., people in line in Figure 5.3. are on
their way to embrace the sculpture of St. Johns from behind in the cathedral of
Santiago de Compostela), or bathing in a holy place (e.g., when a pilgrim dives
into the sacred waters of the Ganga, he feels the thrill of plunging into the waters
of all rivers of IndiaEck, 1982, p. 168). Richly overgeneralized symbols grow
out of the indexical sign of letting the water of a river flow over ones body, and
the iconic sign of observing all other bathers doing the same. It is supported by
the myth stories of the origins and special symbolic meanings of rivers, sacred
mountains, and forests (e.g., Feldhaus, 1995an analysis of the symbolic
meanings of rivers in India).

Crusades: unity of war and pilgrimage

However, the ways of being human are not only those of peaceful
pilgrimages. History of humankind is filled with warsand many of those are
fought under the auspices of religious systems of conviction. The preponderance
of the latter creates a situation where a religious journeya pilgrimage
becomes simultaneously a war path.
In year 1095 A.D., the Pope Urban II proclaimed the holy war against the
infidels. While making this proclamation in Clermont, he made it clear that the
conquering of the Holy Land of Jerusalem was to be an armed pilgrimage
(Savage, 1977, p. 36). The crusades that occupied the religious minds of the
Europeans over the following four centuries followed suit. This included
examples of religious fervent of adolescents who in year 1212 A.D. moved
through European countryside in a deep belief that proliferated large crowds of
youngsters that they have the mission to liberate the Holy Land. This episode
of collective unity of action 77 has been mentioned as a curious part of the Fourth
Crusadethe so-called Childrens Crusade (Pallenberg, 1983).

77
Historical records of that event of childrens leaving home to liberate the Holy Land are scanty. The
notion of childrens crusade covered the crowd activities of youngsters who left their homes to follow the
particular young boys of religious callinga young boy Nicholas in Rheinland and Stephanus (Etienne in
French) from Cloyes (Vendome)who led their accumulating crowds of followers through the Alps to
Rome, and to Marseille, respectively. The roots for such crowd phenomena are built on the meaning-
seeking nature of adolescent psychology, guided by the ideology of the ever-present religious belief
system. At the core of the childrens actions was the long-held medieval belief in holy povertythat the
Valsiner 212

The introduction of crusades as a form of war with a religious flavor led to

the establishment of new cultural codes of warfare. Like all aspects of human life,
destruction is as much culturally organized as is any feature of cultural
development. The notion of the just war was known since the times of Cicero in
Ancient Rome (Cowdrey, 2003). The crusades appropriated that notion by way of
saturating the meaning of war with symbolic meaningfor the Christian warrior,
being in the holy war could be an act of imitation of the Christ in his victory upon
the cross. Winning (by way of killing the opponents) as well as being killed
oneself became positively valued, meaningful acts. The ideologies of joining war
efforts for the sake of a generalized field-like promoter sign (defending
homeland, liberating the others for the sake of democracy, controlling the
World etc.) have been used widely in human history, and are re-invented
whenever needed.

Figure 5.4. An image of the enemy in Christian/Muslim conflict in Spain, 8th

century A.D. (from Hunt, 2005, p. 14)

The general cultural-psychological principles were present in the turn to

war (chapter 2). In order for making killing legitimate, the enemy was de-
humanized (see Figure 5.4.Charlemagnes fight with Arabsdressed as
devilsin Spain in the 8th century A.D.). The crusades were a kind of war where
the constructive momentliberation of what the crusaders considered their
holy land (and of course what has been of the same status by their
opponents)existed as an integral part of destruction.

poor of Christ could achieve things by their pious righteousness that church prelates and secular lords could
not (Madden, 1999, p. 138).
Valsiner 213

The impacts of movement

Movement leads to transformation of the environment and of ones own

self. The minimal act of movement is that of taking a stepwhat is just one step
for a person may be a huge step for his or her personal culture:

One step after the other, and each, potentially, carries a meaning. I
may not notice it, yet I walk differently in a cheerful mood, in
sorrow, or in deep thoughts. Might we say that my mood somehow
commands my style of walking? Of course, but the opposite is no
less true: My walking commands my mood. Look at it more closely:
each step, whether I am consciously aware of it or not, sends me a
messagefeedback in the more sober terminology of science: it
tells me that I walk easily or with effort, lightly or laboriously. This
contains both, the basic information that I am able to move, and the
more circumstantial one about the actual quality of my moving. This
feedback immediately translates itself into a mood, a feeling of
ease or strain, and it extends and generalizes: it makes me
confident or doubting about reaching my aim, not only the present
one I am going to, but also others, possible ones. (Boesch, 2006, p.
75)

Movement is goals-orientedand goals can be multiple. Persons move in order

to put themselves into another environment for sake of devotion, social roles
(e.g. at marriage, or or both-- spouses move to the others, or a newly
established, household), profit (nomadic tribes moving with cattle to feed it in new
pastures, or traders moving in a caravan), or to capture new resources. The
movement of the world explorersfrom Vasco da Gama and Columbus to our
contemporary oil drillers is an act of getting to know the unknown with a goal of
material gains. In contrast, the movement of mountain climbers towards the top
of Mount Everest is for self-accomplishment purposes no goldmines await the
climbers on the top. Crowds of military move around territories to capture those
(and resources linked with those) and eradicate the owners of these resources;
while the latter move as refugees having lost the resources. Human cultural
movement is not for the sake of movement itself, but is organized by the basic
unity of construction and destruction.

The CONSTRUCTION<> DESTRUCTION dialectics

Human beings constructwhile destructing. The building of any architectural

novel structure entails the destruction of the natural environmentboth in terms
of the place for the structure, and in terms of the materials for the structure.
Valsiner 214

Wars are a cultural inventionan act of movement with destructive purposes.

Wars have been fought by the same national powers in different locations
differently. All wars are administrative symbolic acts of destructive touring (see
Gillespie, 2007) which involve atrocities. The latter may be limited to the direct
enemy (soldiers in uniforms), or cover the wide ground of all representatives of
the enemy, whether directly involved in combat or not.

From war to genocide. The closeness of phenomena of genocide to this

widening of the meaning of war is an indicator of the perverse persevering of the
destructive side of the human condition (Kiernan, 2003). All colonial powers
committed acts of atrocities against the conquered peoples as part of the
administrative standard operating procedures. Genocidesfinal solutions in
eradicating the other-- are destruction utopias (Hull, 2003, p. 143)that recur in
human history filled with creation of a variety of utopias.
All human activity can be characterized as a constant dialectical tension
between the opposing poles of the unified duality CONSTRUCTION <>
DESCTRUCTION. Each of the opposites prepares the ground for the otherour
utilization of our environment (i.e., its modification, that entails the destruction of
some of its previous state of affairs) is a vehicle for our construction of something
new. Likewise, that something new can be the invention of weapons of individual
destruction the human species is notable for its construction of destruction
devicesfrom stone choppers and axes to nuclear bombsand their use.
Georg Simmels (1906, see also chapter 2) on the mutuality of peace and war
plays itself out most dramatically in the human construction of destructive acts
(and the destructionconstructivelyof those acts).

The transformation of dual meaning field. When the pilgrimage is an act of

personal construction of the self through the special journey to a honored divine
location and subservience to the local social (and sacred) orders, then a war is of
opposite kind. Human warring orientation is built on the emergence of
{CONSTRUCTION <> non-CONSTRUCTION} meaning duality. Out of the sub-
dominant {non-CONSTRUCTION} fieldwhere many other options could grow
as well (e.g., ignoring, utilizing, etc.it is the {DESTRUCTION <> non-
DESTRUCTION} new meaning field that acts as the promoter sign for human
beings. Under its constraints, people who had been carefully constructing their
environmentsbuilding towns, roads, bridges, cultivating crops and livestock
turn to the opposite course of action. They start to destroy objects created by
fellow human beings-- as well as torture, imprison, and kill the other human
beings designated as enemies, infidels, or in any other ways belonging to a
category of sub-humans (see chapters 2 and 3). The whole meaning of the
landscape changes for persons who come to the war zonewhere the same
object could have been carefully used for constructive or ordinary life purposes, it
becomes a participating tool in the act of destruction (Lewin, 1917)yet in the
back of the primacy of the destructive acts remains the meaning field on non-
destruction. It takes the form of saving some of the objects on the warpath from
being destroyed (e.g. some buildings, monuments, sacred places; or civilians of
Valsiner 215

the enemy kind). As a resultas Georg Simmel has emphasizedduring the

war a preparation for peace is going on.

Movement together with symbols

Not all pilgrimages are to the objectssome entail human movement with
the objects. An image of a deity may be taken around in the village and its
environs. These are examples of minimal pilgrimagesof a day or of a part of
the day (e.g., chariot journeys of Hindu temple deitiesSax, 1990; Catholic
rituals of carrying images of saints through the communities; Merina carrying of
the remnants of the ancestors around in the community as important process of
identity for the livingBloch, 1968). All these events are occasions of a symbolic
walkthe persons accompany the symbolic figures 78.

Together with moving around, human beings transport various objects

from other places to their home placepurchased, looted, or stolen goodsand
transfer some objects from home into publicly available and exchangeable
onesgifts and commodities, as well as discarded objects after use (waste or
garbage).

Crossing borders: within personal cultures, and between

In all of these movements, the actors cross bordersset by themselves,

or by others, for them. The borders range from public and political (border
crossing, with visas or without, of national borders) to those of personal
environments (entering another persons home as an invited guest, or as a
burglar), and to the innermost spheres of the psyche. In the latter, collective-
cultural regulation of boundaries of closeness sets up both the internal feelings
towards others (being acquaintances, friends, lovers) as well as serves as
basis for expectations for inter-personal interaction.
Comparison between persons from different collective-cultural
backgrounds illustrate the contrasts of intra-psychological borders by the
contrasts in the communication domain. People from different backgrounds
become acquainted with, fall in love with, marry, and establish multi-cultural
familiesall of which requires the coordination of the personal-cultural structures
of self borders between the persons involved. Or, likewise, a navigator (and
laterconqueror) cannot understand the behavior of the natives who may show
a friendly face before a fatal attack.
Kurt Lewins life course took him to the United States in 1933 after
Hitlers takeover in Germany. As an immigrant and as a psychologist, he could
not fail to notice the contrasts in interpersonal relationship-making as a process
of boundary crossings (Figure 5.5.)

78
It may be interesting to consider our contemporary practices of walking for health as outgrowths from
the movement around with significant symbolic figures. In this case the one who walks and the significant
symbol are the samethe mystique of health in the walking body.
Valsiner 216

Figure 5.5. Structure of closeness boundaries between Germany and the United
States in the 1930s, as viewed by Kurt Lewin (Lewin, 1936, p. 283)

In the diagram drawn by Lewin after two years in the United States, the
resistance against communication from outside is represented by heavier lines
(versus lighter ones) within the concentric layers of closeness that designate the
person. Layer 5 is the utmost subjective, deeply intra-personal layer. In the U-
Type (United States) that layer is protected by very strong resistance boundary
for outsiders penetration, while the other layers (14) can be crossed in the
interpersonal domain with relative ease. In contrast, the G-Type (Germany)
allows only the outermost layer (1) to be easily accessible. The major boundary
here is between layers 1 and 2, with minor resistances at later boundaries.
A number of contrastive predictions emerge from Lewins scheme. In a
traditional cross-cultural perspective, he claimed

The American is much less likely to respond with anger, or at least

with open anger, to the hundred small misfortunes of everyday
life The American reacts generally to such accidents more from
the point of action (he considers what has to be done to remedy the
situation), the German more from a moral point of view (he
considers whose fault it was).. Furthermore, such incidents are less
likely to touch central regions of the person. In other words, the
range of events which correspond to the peripheral, non-private
regions, seems to be comparatively greater for the American As
the private field includes more layers of the G-type, he is likely to
act more emotionally. (Lewin, 1936, p. 285)

Lewins depiction is structural hereyet all living is dynamic. Each person

creates ones own personal-cultural structure of ones selfs boundaries, and
rules (set up by signs) for entry into varied layers of ones self for different
carriers of social roles in ones immediate environment. This pertains in parallel
to the domains of actions by others, and to personal acceptance of tellability (see
chapter 2) information sharing in being told something about the self. The
particular othermother, father, sister, brother, friend, lover, housemaid, slave,
Valsiner 217

milkman, hooker, policeman, journalist, priest, medicine specialist, psychologist,

etc.is provided differential accesses into the persons subjective self 79.
Likewise, the move of the person into the self-domains of different social others
involves bringing ones personal-cultural boundary structure of the self into those
set up by these other persons within their social roles. The latter may demand
from their carrier direct intervention into others personal-cultural domains
policemen, nurses, spies, detectives, etc. are constantly involved in such
endeavours.

Example 5.3. Semiotic crossing of personal culture boundaries in

gynecological examination. While all medicine is definable as a social act of
such boundary crossings, the specific branch of medicineobstetrics and
gynecologythat deals with female reproductive processes is at the extreme of
such boundary crossing. Therefore it constitutes a good example of how such
inevitable boundary crossings are set up.
First and foremost, the history of medical care of women has been
operating under the gender-knowledge base power conditions. Reproduction and
all aspects of the bodily function related with that have been womens world to
which males have penetrated only historically very recently (after 17th century in
Europe). The confluence of medical expert roles with those of common life
gender presuppositions continue to our present day where even official
acceptance of male gynecologists in that role is viewed with suspicion and met
by social control. For example, a female nurse may accompany the male doctor
in the process of gynecological examination. The situation becomes semiotically
re-defined the given context of encounter of a male (doctor) and woman
(patient) part of the social definition of life outside of something labeled medical
setting (such as a party, sexual assault, psychological experiment, etc), but it is
in such setting where it is prescribed that no one is embarrassed and where it is
inappropriate to even thinknot to speak of talking 80in sexual terms. In the
interpersonal communication within that setting, speech registers clearly guide
the ways of expression. This is guided by the promoter sign of medical care that
legitimizes various kinds of actions which otherwise would be socially impossible.
It legitimizes the entrance into the personal cultural domain by counter-acting the
operations of the usual promoter sign (personal dignity) that usually governs the
boundaries of privacy:

The medical definition grants the staff the right to carry out their
task. If not for the medical definition the staffs routine activities
could be defined as unconscionable assaults on the dignity of
individuals. The topics of talk, particularly inquiries about bodily
functioning, sexual experience, and death of relatives might be
taken as offenses against propriety. As for exposure and
manipulation of the patients body, it would be shocking and

79
This is an extension of the coverage of I-positions within the Dialogical Self frameworksee chapter
3.
80
This social prescription is an internalized version of Semiotic Demand Settingsee chapter 2
Valsiner 218

degrading invasion of privacy were the patient not defined as a

technical object. The infliction of pain would be mere cruelty. The
medical definition justifies the request that a presumably competent
adult give up most of his autonomy to persons often subordinate in
age, sex, or social class. The patient needs the medical definition to
minimize the threat to his dignity; the staff need it in order to
inveigle the patient into cooperating. (Emerson, 1970, added
emphases).

The emphasized parts in this quote are promoter signs that are used in
organizing the medical encounter. Their structure that generates the meaning of
medical setting might be characterized as a chain of meaning growth processes
(Figure 5.5.).

Figure 5.5. Semiotic construction of a setting

ALLOWnon-

SOMEBO ASSAUL
DY does T CAR
SOMETHI CRUE DIGNIF
NG to L E
IED
ANOTHE NON-
RS ASSAUL
BODY T NON- NON-
CRUE CARE NON-
L DIGNIFIE
D
Some eventfor instance, another human being reaching out a hand to
touch 81 body part X of the person- becomes the object of instant meaning
construction that grows towards either letting the act to proceed (or not). A further
consideration is the perceived social rolepossibly marked by a recognized
uniform 82of the initiating agent.

Social regulation of boundaries: censorship

Censorship, in its objective social functions, exists in any social unit.

Parents censor childrens conductas well as their own expression in front of
children. Neighbors censor one anothers conductby half-silences, sarcastic

81
Consider filling in the role of X by various body parts: genitals, hair, knee, nose, hand, etc.
82
Compare two possible images of medical doctors: one in a medical coat (uniform), cleanly shaved, the
other in jeans, and unshavedin the context of gynecological examination.
Valsiner 219

comments, or reporting ones activities to local authorities. Censorship carries a

role in creating and maintaining social and interpersonal distinctions. In terms of
Pierre Bourdieu,

Cultural products owe their most specific properties to the social

conditions of their production and more precisely to the position of
the producer in the field of production, which dictates, albeit
through divergent mediatory processes, not only the expressive
drive, and the form and force of the censorship which affects it, but
also the competence which enables this drive to be satisfied within
the framework of these constraints. The dialectical relation which
is established between the expressive drive and the structural
censorship of the field prevents us from distinguishing in the opus
operatum the form from the content, what is being said from the
manner of saying it or even the manner of hearing it. By imposing
form, the censorship exercised by the structure of the field
determines its discursive form. (Bourdieu, 1991, pp.71-72, added
emphases)

The prescriptions of how to express oneself (and prohibitions against how

not to) are on the basis for creating the fields of feeling, thinking, and
communicating (see chapter 7). Parents censor each other, their children.
Children censor the expressions of other children, and sometimes of parents.
Teachers censor the expressions of students, but not school principals. Social
norms for political correctness lead to self-censorship in peoples minds and
interaction. Governments censor political discourse, etc.

Rhetorical guiding of human movement

Human beings create themselves by unity of acting, feeling, and thinking.

This unity is organized by putting oneself (and others) into scripted dramatic
everyday life situations, which require the assuming of corresponding roles. The
enactment of these roles creates the dramas that guide personal development of
all of its participants. The dramas are built on stories that circulate among the
actors. Their enactment creates the basis for their reconstruction from generation
to generation.
Myth stories that circulate in the social world create the rhetoric framing for
role-enactment dramas. Human development is thoroughly embedded within
these framings-- through both internalization of the meanings in these stories,
and role enactment guided by the stories, the robustness of human cultural
development is guaranteed.

Example 5.4. Visiting the village of ones parents. Pilgrimages are not
necessarily framed by a religious narrative. Personal-cultural construction of
ones roots can lead to similar movement for the search of the past of ones
Valsiner 220

family, childhood home, etc. Such nostalgic journeys (see chapter 7 for coverage
of feelings) are personally important mini-pilgrimages. By definition of the
uniqueness of personal life history the pilgrimage sites here are not visited by
hordes of seekers, nor is there likely to be a crusade to liberate ones own place
of birth from the infidels who are now dwelling therepaying their rent or
keeping their by now owned place from decay.
The history of labor force movement in contemporary Europe has
generated a new hybrid social groupTurkish Gastarbeiter in Germany (as well
as in other European Union countriesDelaney, 1990) 83. The young of the
immigrant Turksthe second generation-- constitute a new cultural hybrid based
on both Turkish and German collective-cultural input. The family contexts
maintain the narratives of the home land that one could visit briefly (summer
holidaysizin) or even repatriate to, eventually. The summer holiday trips are
idealized as visits to the home villages and networks of relatives. If these trips
are made by car, it entails long drive from Germany to Turkey via the Balkans.
The transit phase in the going to summer holiday is of particular interest:

The marked difference can be discerned once the Turks leave

German-speaking lands behind them and expressed in terms of a
burden having been liftedin their words nihayet, Alemanyadan
kurtulduk! (at last, were rid of, freed from, Germany!). Sometimes
Gavuristan is substituted for Almanya, Germany becoming the
land of the infidels. (Mandel, 1990, p. 158)

The making of the psychological distance through the movement away in

geographical distance here indicates the ambivalence of the construction of the
meaning of ones self (see Gillespie, 2007, on the construction of the selves by
tourists to Ladakh).
However, moving away from one place entails moving towards another.
The Turkish-German travelers on their home-going pilgrimages are faced with a
new set of ambivalences when they arrive:

Once the initial excitement of homecoming begins to wane, the

iznili returnees find that the privileged treatment which they have
receivedas esteemed, long-lost relativesevolves into
something quite different: they have become, willy-nilly,
AlamancarGerman-ish, or German-like. Implicitly derogatory in its
markedness, in its explicit differentiation from a non-emigrant Turk,
the label bears witness to a combination of difference, lack of
acceptance, and rejection. It is a distancing mechanism, expressing
the ambivalence contained in the same outstretched arms which
greet the returning vacationers, and accept the prestigious gifts, but

83
The pattern of families moving to other countriesor parts of the families moving for work in locations
other than their native place, is the trend in all of our contemporary World. For example, migration from
Kerala to the Middle East has brought with it transformation in the social hierarchy of castes in Kerala, as
well as new symbolic markers of that in ways of dressing (Kurien, 2002, p. 101-102)
Valsiner 221

which also keep them at a socially safe distance. (Mandel, 1990,

pp. 158-159)

The boundaries of the home place are regulated by persons who inhabit
it. The travelling iznili visitor is returning homebut the home is actually
another place inhabited by other people who create meanings of the iznili in ways
that partially close the psychological doors of the home". Of course, the iznili
themselves may be involved is their self-presentation that feeds into the making
of their other status by the home people. Thus, the latter can get no idea from
the symbolic self-presentations by the iznili (e.g., driving to Turkey in a new car
every summer, giving expensive gifts) of the efforts back in Germany to
assemble the economic resources to be able to put on this show of European
affluence. Sothe iznili drive long distance to be home in order not to be there
(but to be in a double non-homemaking the symbolic distance of the Turkish
home as well as from the German home). This double non-home state leads
to the search for a home within non-home. The iznili,

Feeling misunderstood and less than appreciated by their

compatriots in Turkey, they seek others like themselves. On quite a
few occasions in Turkey, I saw individuals and families travel
considerable distances to visit friends whom they had made in
Germany. With each other they were able to relax, tell jokes in
German, and compare experiences. They could relate to one
another without the constraints of material and social expectations
and obligations demanded by an uncomfortable hierarchy. (Mandel,
1990, p. 160)

Yet that uncomfortable hierarchy of the home in Turkey is partly co-

constructed by the iznili themselves, presenting their rich relative side to the
people in their home village. By assuming such social roles of higher status
themselvesby symbolic acts fitting the persons in such statusthey create the
distance co-constructed by the local audiencewhich is also marked by the iznili
unease with local conduct rules 84. Thus the iznili home-going tactics begin at
times to take on German-like holiday-making forms: they may travel to tourists
resorts in Turkey (but not to home villages) where they findin a place at
distance from the Gavuristanall the services usual in Alemanya. The
surrounding is uniting both homeswithout the embedding in the social role
hierarchies of the home village.

This example illustrates the ambivalence in the act of being in a liminal

status between groups (chapter 2). The movement towards the center here
entails travel at long geographical distancesand creation of symbolic
psychological distances. In a similar vein, we can look at the symbolic distancing

84
For instance, young Turkish-German girls find it awkward to be chaperoned by male relatives in public
placesand the local people find it awkward if these girls go around without such chaperones. Social
norms of body coverage would also differ for the iznili and the home people.
Valsiner 222

(and un-distancing) of life events through myth stories and their corresponding
public signs. The use of children in warfare is usually presented in public
discourse of the European and North American worldscurrently in state of
peace-- as a deplorable practice of the corrupt governments and guerilla groups
in the Third Worldand then we may find that very same practice positively
honored when it happened in the context of a just war (see Figure 5.6.). Instead
of being viewed as unjustly exploited, the child soldiers who died in the uprising
are presented as national heroes.

Figure 5.6. Creation of a myth story about a child soldier (in commemoration
of the Warsaw uprising, 1944)

Human cultural environment is polymorphously meaningful. The very

same general meaninga valuewould be brought into the persons
developmental field simultaneously in different forms, and are carried by different
members of the social network. Thus, for example, respect for authority figures
Valsiner 223

(a desired objective for any social institution) may be encoded explicitly ("you
must honor your parents") carried by different persons in the child's environment
(parents themselves, aunts and uncles, teachers) as well as implicitly (other
persons showing ritualized respect for the child's parents). It can be extended to
political leaders ("you should honor [specific leader] as your father") or religious
figures (treat [religious figure] as if the father). These messages can come from
priests, journalists, political campaigners, television and radio messages. They
can be paralleled by active explicit counter-messages (e.g., by the actual father
of the child who is an atheist and/or political opponent to the present
government). In a similar vein, the same basic message can be encoded into
silences, and in ritualistic prescribed actions. For example, children are raising
from their seats in classroom when the teacher arrives, waving flags and portraits
of the country's leader passing by in a motorcade, or singing songs glorifying the
religious or political leader in a kindergarten. Symbolic objects can be used in lieu
of such authority figures (see chapter 7).
Such redundant canalization of human development is the only
reasonable adaptation to the uncertainties involved in open systems. Since open
systems are not controllable, their functioning can only be regulated by way of
entering constraints into as many locations of the systems transactions with the
environment as possible. The ideal of such control efforts-- which in practice
can't be realized-- is full control of the field within which the person is located. If
the outer boundaries of the field are firmly controlled, the specific actions of the
person within those boundaries can be left to one's own devices. Any option of
conduct that the person devises is acceptable, except one-- leaving the field.
This is guaranteed by saturating the field with narratives that maintain the
boundaries of Semiotic Demand Settings (see chapter 2, Figure 2.7).
The narrative environment of developing persons is filled with a myriad of
storiessome directed towards the person directly, others meant to be
overheard when told by others to others. Likewise, there are stories meant not to
be told to otherssecret narratives of symbolically important issues for the given
social institution, or group (e.g., womens secret knowledge not to be known by
men, and mens secret know-how which could be spoilt if women were to know
it).

Ernst Boeschs symbolic action theory.

Ernst E. Boeschs Symbolic Action Theory is the most established (since

1960s) and most sophisticated theoretical systems of such substantive kind
(Boesch, 1983, 1991, 2000, 2002a, 2002b, 2005, 2006). Boesch's theoretical
thinking is elegant, as it is perfected in his analyses of the history and cultural
construction of skilled action. Boesch views the individuals' "action field" to be
organized by cultural meanings, which suggest the range of potential uses of
objects by humans, as well as their symbolic value. The action field entails both
objective and subjective domains, as well as polyvalence of goals. As an
illustration, Boesch refers to an Alpine skier moving skillfully down a slope:
Valsiner 224

We might say that his goal of sliding down the slope has two
aspects: the one is the objective motion in space, the other are all
the subjective sensations related to it, the feeling of harmonious
interplay of muscles, the sensation of speed, the impression of
mastery. The skier might enjoy both "objective-instrumental"
aspect of the action, i.e. mastering his skis, as well as the
"subjective-functional" one, i.e., the proprioceptive experience
related to it.; at any rate, both are always simultaneously present:
the action, by necessity, is "polyvalent" (Boesch, 1989, p. 42)

The developed introspective feeling at different levels (e.g., "bare" sensory

experience not analyzable in a semiotic code, explicit reflection in speech, or
generic discussion through language) guarantees the polyvalence of any human
action.
Culture regulates action both in terms of limits on the physical execution of
actionssocial rules-- and by personal meanings. It opens some possibilities for
acting, thinking and feeling, while simultaneously closing others. Furthermore,
cultural rules have a hierarchy of organization:

The quality of a specific rule, such as prohibition to steal, derives

from two sources. The first is the occurrence of specific events,
such as jealousy, greed, and resulting thefts. The second source
for a specific rule are general rules, such as... the right to private
property. The rules of greeting derive from general rules of
politeness, and those again from the ones of respect, social
mutuality and social hierarchy. (Boesch, 1989, p. 45)

General cultural rules are partly coded in a variety of forms in the social
environment-- none of the environmental objects or social practices singularly
represents a particular general rule, yet many of those allude to it in some partial
form. Myths are constantly created in a society, while persons' private general
idea frameworks (which are ill-defined, yet omnipresent-- "fantasms" in Boesch's
terminologyBoesch, 1991) are the personal counterparts of the general rule
systems in the self. The person is constantly in the process of structuring (and re-
structuring) of one's fantasms.

Cultural tools for action. Boesch emphasizes the embeddedness of any

ontogenesis of action in its cultural-historical confines. Action tools have cultural
historythe violin, piano, or the organ-- are all results of musicians
experimentation with how to create pure sounds and melodies. The history of
music provides a complex example of uniting the cultural history with personal
self-motivation of the music-maker to try the making of new musical melodies--
at the tension of experiencing beauty and being anxious to lose it (Boesch, 1993,
p. 79). Painters' decisions to create extraordinary paintingssuch as Picasso's
Guernica (Boesch, 1991, pp. 279-294)operate for the human psyche as being
at the boundary of the, or constant everyday modifications of our mundane
Valsiner 225

actions, which we legitimate by boredom or adventure, indicate this locus of

synthesis.
The personal field of a structure of valences is guided by the cultural field,
yet it is the tension in the personal field that can lead to innovation in the cultural
one. The emergence of sacrifice, prayer, magic, and carnival are ways of human
beings coping with the uncertainties of the possible lurking chaos of the future
(Boesch, 2000, 2002a). All these social actions are embedded within
meaningscirculated between persons in the form of myth stories. Aside from
myth stories well known from their preservation by folklorists, human beings
constantly create new mythssuch as the myth of dangers (exemplified in our
contemporary panic societyBeck, 1992), and counter-myths:

The myth of lurking chaos seems, in modern Western Europe, to

be displaced by a different myththat of feasibility. Dangers can be
avoided, problems researched and solved, the harmful can be
fought, obstacles removed. Even the catastrophes threatening the
climate and the environment that many are warning about, the
nuclear threat or the atomic time bomb, all these are only
temporary indispositions that we will eventually master. But,
although usually below the surface, the myth of lurking chaos
remains and can be activated. The Hong Kong chicken flu, the
Ebola or AIDS virus at first set off scenarios of catastrophe
revealing the latent virulence of the myth, even though the belief in
the science soon concealed it. The myth of feasibility, or mastery,
of course, strongly enhances our action confidence and thus
efficiently counteracts fears of calamity. (Boesch, 2002a, pp. 127-
128)

The theoretical construction of opposition of myths in function (myth of

lurking chaos <> counter-myth of feasibility) allows for explanation of the
dynamic dialogical processes of the self (see chapter 3) and transformations in
social orders (see chapter 2-- persons<>community<>society relations). At
the level of personal culture, the tension between desire to move towards the
unknown (Fernwehroad to far) and its oppositedesire to move towards the
known, and secure home (Heimwehhome road Boesch, 1997, pp. 79-109)
create the ambivalence that modulates persons feeling, acting, and thinking
(see further in chapter 2 on the liminality of human cultural being).

Myths and fantasms

Myths, fairy tales, and in our modern societies, wide popular

consumption movies and trash literatureare all semiotic complexes which are
guiding the internalization and externalization of basic values in the course of
development. The social suggestions encoded in such holistic semiotic
complexes are expected to work through the person's active relating to the
Valsiner 226

complex, and establishment of intra-psychological counterpart models within

one's personal sense systems. The myth can be viewed as a

...collectively accepted means of explanation, justification, and

exhortation, which might be expressed in the form of myth-stories,
but also mythemes... isolated themes relating to the underlying
myth... a myth-story specifies ...pattern of imaginary situations,
while a mytheme corresponds to specific themes related to the
myth or the myth story (Boesch, 1991, p. 124)

What must be addressed is the question of the connection between

myths, individuals, and society. Myth-stories are narrated texts that tell the story
about a past event. Yet one of the functions of telling the story is to direct the
recipient's personal reconstruction of that story in a form that would position the
recipient in a desired relation to the societal world. It is meant to create a
personal relation with a religious, national, or other identity source in the process
of movement from the present to the future.
Myth-stories are usually simple stories about events, yet some of the
events are of the kind that transcend the everyday life practices. For example,
there is often a quick and unusual transformations of characters in the myth-- a
person becomes an animal, or vice versa. This contrast might be important by
itself-- fairy tales and myths create some domains of actively promoted
imagination, while bypassing other possible domains of thought. Rapid and
varied changes in the image content are exaggerated in fairy tales, whereas
simultaneous combination of ideas belongs to the domain of ignored possibilities.
A fairy tale or a myth-story avoids all thinking that is in any way complicated, and
replaces complications by exaggerations of temporal transformations of
unexplained nature.

Example 5.4. Regulating rape in a myth story. Consider the following

Yanomam (Amazonian Indian) myth story on the topic of rape:

One day the brothers Tohor and Kanikav from the Surra tribe
went fishing. After catching a lot of fish, especially piranhas, with
their bows and arrows they suddenly heard a voice telling them not
to kill any more piranhas. Tohor obeyed, but Kanikaw just
laughed and kept shooting at the piranhas with his arrows.
As he was busy doing this a pretty young girl, Kayarom , came
to fetch water. The sight of her aroused Kanikaw sexually so
strongly that he wanted to have intercourse with her at once. When
he tried to grab her she ran off, jumped into the water, and stayed
submerged for a long time.
Finally she came to the surface again. But when she swam to
shore and climbed up, Kanikaw seized her, threw her to the
ground, and raped her. Tohor wanted to defend her against his
brother, but it was already too late. However, at the very moment
Valsiner 227

howls of pain were heard from Kanikaw He felt as if his penis

were trapped in a mouth with sharp teeth, and it burned like fire.
Trying to pull it out he failed, for the penis had been bitten off inside
the vagina. From the girls vagina thick stream of blood poured,
together with a piranha which still held the severed penis between
its sharp teeth. The girl picked up the piranha and threw it into the
water. It turned bright red at once, attracting innumerable other
piranhas, which quickly ate the penis. While Tohor took care of his
badly wounded brother, the girl disappeared without a trace.
(Wilbert & Simoneau, 1990, pp. 395-396)

In this myth, the favourite theme of psychoanalysis (castration anxiety) is

played out in an ecological context. The tension between fishermans catch and
the desire to catch more fish is linked with a suggestion to stop. The appearance
of the girl leads to sexual tension in one of the brothers, while the other is
mentioned to attempt to keep the first one from his actions. The result of the
rapeplayed out through the theme of vagina dentata created by the fish
(piranha-an aggressive fish-- is a frequent theme in South American Indian
stories, cf. Wagley, 1977, p. 179) which were hunted leads to a number of
suggestionsnot overdo the fish hunting (or sexuality), beware of women, and
consider advice of your close persons. These suggestions are all embedded in
the myth story text in an intertwined bundle. The piranhas fight back on their
hunters by joining forces with other hunted agent (girl) and succeeding despite
the brothers efforts to keep Kanikaw out of danger.

Personal-cultural counterparts of myths: fantasms. According to Boesch,

myths have the personal counterpart in the role of fantasms. A fantasm

...concerns the nature of the anticipated ego-world relationship of

the individual... The personal contents the individual gives to a term
like "happiness" would constitute a fantasm, as would subjective
meaning given to the term "self-realization" or "order" (Boesch,
1991, p. 124)

Myths thus constitute complex social inputs for the establishment and
functioning of fantasms. Yet the latter are not direct images of the former, but
their personal transformations. Myths belong to the realm of collective culture,
while fantasms are in the personal culture. Fantasms are similar to social
representationsmeaning complexes that guide human subjectivity in its
multiple functions. Personal values and beliefs are internalized reconstructions
of ideas promoted through myths and other collectively distributed
communicative messages.

Externalizing fantasms. As persons are involved in the re-telling of myth

stories, they make their contribution to the variation of the story from one version
to another. The constructive nature of human story telling from memory has been
Valsiner 228

analyzed by Frederick Bartlett (1932). The person re-telling the myth story
externalizes ones internalized (=re-constructed) notion, and provides further
novelty for the others who listen. Myths-stories retold on the basis of personal
fantasms become new storiesvariability between different versions of such
stories is enhanced. It is only through folklorists efforts at finding the canonical
version of a given story that the myths seem to be organized in a standard way.
By the re-telling the story, the person is put into a situation where specific
features of the story are repeated for oneselfwhile telling the story for others.
Thus, the activity of story-telling is a way to enhance the internalization of
particular values inherent in the myth story. Thus, consider a myth story of the
Shanti Nagar (in India) concerning the history of the pain at childbirth:

It was first believed that all women were created out of water. Then
God created a small child and put him at a well. Nobody paid any
attention to him, but just passed by. So God said that he wouldnt
create anybody without pain. Now when men and women get
together, children are born with pain. In this way, too, the child is
born of ones own blood, and people are more interested in the
child and pay attention to him. When a child is born, the midwife
places it on the earth because it is the earth that has the burden of
supporting the child, and God is all powerful. (Freed & Freed, 1980,
p. 356)

A woman telling such story to otherson multiple occasionsis guiding

herself towards the acceptance and even positive evaluationof the childbirth
pain. Of course she probably has heard others telling a story like that to her in
her girlhood. Thus, by beginning to re-tell the story, the woman keeps up her
internalized version of the story. Parents who are telling stories (or reading
books) to children are simultaneously guiding their own personal system of
fantasms.

Basic duality: Myths and counter-myths

Myths may be seen as a means to explore an ephemeral reality--in which

plausible and concrete human experiences occur, yet the plot of the story may be
outside of the realm of everyday world. The imagery is worked out on materials
that are projected into the past, and captures the attention of the persons telling
and listening to these stories by unrealistic images of the personages, and their
transformations. Yet behind the exotic events of the myth unfolding can be
mundane values of everyday life, promoted to the listeners in exaggerated form.
The purpose of construction of myths is

...to provide a logical model capable of overcoming a contradiction

(an impossible achievement if... the contradiction is real), a
theoretically infinite number of states will be generated, each one
slightly different from the others. Thus, myth grows spiral-wise until
Valsiner 229

the intellectual impulse which has produced it is exhausted. Its

growth is a continuous process, whereas its structure remains
discontinuous. If this is the case, we should assume that it closely
corresponds, in the realm of spoken word, to a crystal in the realm
of physical matter... Myth is an intermediary entity between a
statistical aggregate of molecules and the molecular structure itself.
(Lvi-Strauss, 1963, p. 229, added emphasis)

The myth is thus quasi-differentiated (but not fully integrated) text that
due to its loose endsallows something for everybody, while promoting
specific generalized values. The functionality of the story is in the repeated
insertion of semiotic material that "gives man...the illusion that he can understand
the universe and that he does understand the universe" (Lvi-Strauss, 1978, p.
17). This is made possible through the bundle-kind nature of the message:

The true constituent units of a myth are not the isolated relations
but bundles of such relations, and it is only as bundles that these
relations can be put to use and combined so as to produce a
meaning. Relations pertaining to the same bundle may appear
diachronically at remote intervals, but when we have succeeded in
grouping them together we have recognized our myth according to
a time referent of a new nature. (Lvi-Strauss, 1963, pp. 211-212)

The constructive act of human imagination is built on the "as-if" kind of

thinking and feeling. Narratives evoke scenarios of different kind-- which in
principle could happen with real or imaginary personages in real or unreal
situations. Such construction charts out the field of possibilities for acting,
thinking, and feelingoften on material far removed from the everyday context.
Such removal allows for a "free play" of scenarios for conduct, as the everyday
realities do not enter their immediate corrective force upon those.

Variability in myth construction. Myth stories are a heterogeneous set.

Different persons create their personal meanings on the basis of their individual
constructions This "dialogical tension" can occur both between persons and
within a person. Thus, Hamlet's dialogue within himself (about the crucial issues
of being and non-being) were linked with the complex object of the human skull
that the actor skillfully holds in his hand. For another person-- a phrenologist for
instance-- there would be no existential dialogue while holding the skull. Instead,
the skull is a diagnostic device for mental faculties.
The reality of the binary oppositions entailed within messages can be
viewed on the example of the complex of tobacco in South-American Indian
mythology, analyzed by Levi-Strauss (see Figure 5.7.). Despite the public
discourse in North America and Europe in recent decade, attempting to prove the
horrors of tobacco to lay populace, the meaning of tobacco in the history of South
America has been that of a tension between FOOD (wholesome) and NON-
Valsiner 230

FOOD. The latter field includes, among other substances, a sub-class of

poisonous objects.
This basic distinction is behind all human relating to any object that we
can swallowfrom different kinds of liquids and minerals to the question of
freshness of the objects designated as food in supermarkets. With organic
decay, many foods become non-foods (and may have lethal effects at intake).
All medically approved drugs can be both curing and killing (depending upon
dosage, and usually unknown side-effects). Thus, the WHOLESOME <>
POISONOUS tension exists at the human encounter with potentially edible
substances in any society. It can lead to reversal of dominance relationsa
given substance becomes transformed from being WHOLESOME to being
POISONOUS (e.g., a chemical is first considered as a curing drugbut then,
after revealing its lethal side-effects, becomes considered as a poison), or vice
versa.

Figure 5.7. The role of tobacco in South American indigenous mythologies

(after Lvi-Strauss)

TOBACC

WHOLESOME POISONOUS

WEAK and STRONG

and
BAD GOOD

Thus, our contemporary health education campaigns against smoking

would look odd to Tapirap Indians, for whom tobacco was a sacred plant
necessary for curing illnesses:

Each night, after a long days work, or while traveling or hunting,

Tapirape men blew smoke over their legs, arms, and backs, and
sometimes men could be seen fumigating their tired wives or
companions. They accompanied the fumigation of their bodies with
massage, rubbing their arms and legs toward the extremities.
Tiredness and soreness were considered extraneous substances
acquired during the day through exercise and it was believed that
they could be fumigated and massaged from the body. (Wagley,
1977, p. 192)
Valsiner 231

Tobacco played a wholesome medical role in Indian medicine, as well as

life in general. Its multiple uses included (aside smoking) snuffing, chewing,
licking, drinking, and enemas (Wilbert, 1987, p. 125-131). It was not just inhaling
the smoke, but also exhaling it upon specific persons (or body parts) was crucial
for restoration of bodily powers. For that, the desirable state of the opposition
WEAKSTRONG is the latter dominating over the formerstrong tobacco is
healthy.
As we can see, the human meaning-making system is simultaneously
operating with multiple binary oppositions, which operate as bipolar anchor points
to create the tension underlying human thinking, feeling, and acting. These
multiple bipolar oppositions make dialogical psychological processes possible in
the persons subjective world.

The heterogeneity of the mythscape.

Similarly to the notion of landscape, one can think of the different

narratives surrounding the developing person as a multifaceted surfacea
mythscape. The mythscape of a given social unitcommunity, country, or
geographical region (e.g. European or Asian and person-- is always
inherently ambiguous. Different myths can suggest the mutually opposite values
within the same society. This is not surprising, given the unity of opposites within
the myth story (as described above). Simply in some myth stories, the meaning-
value A is highlighted as socially suggested, while in another set of myth stories
its opposite (non-A) becomes socially suggested. In a society where these two
kinds co-exist, dialogical nature of social discourse is likely to be observable.
The second kind of stories-- "counter-myths" (Ramanujan, 1991)serves
an important function in keeping the societys pool of possible meanings. The
public discourse including such myths and counter-myths is filled with dialogical
tensions. If in standard myths a particular set of meanings (e.g., honesty, etc.) is
emphasized and wins after a battle with the opponents, then there may exist
different counter-myths in the given mythscape which promote the opposite
meaning (e.g., cheating) being victorious in the mythical battles.

Official and non-official history narratives. Myth and counter-myth are

roughly equivalent to the opposition of different kinds of histories of countries
official and unofficialthat operate along the lines of dialogism (Wertsch, 1998).
The official history of a given country is an equivalent for a myth, its opposite
unofficial historyfunctions as counter-myth. In case of political changes in the
country the two myths can change their places (the unofficial history is the basis
for constructing a new official history, while the losing previous version
becomes a counter-myth).
History narratives are createdand censoredin accordance with the
goal orientations of social institutions. The colonizers usually create myth stories
of the glory of discovery of the lands of the colonizedwhile the latter are ready
to tell the story of being conquered, rather than discovered (e.g., the
Valsiner 232

perspectives upon Columbus discovery of Americafrom Spanish or Mexican

perspectivesCarretero et al, 2002). The fate of smaller ethnic and linguistic
communities within the historic artifact of political borders (e.g., Basques and
Catalans between Spain and France; or the partition of India and Pakistan in
1947) are critical. The tensions generated by borders leads to the creation of a
large variety of history stories that operate as myths in the regulation of current
inter-communities relations, and modifying the borders. The establishment of
European Union sets up a different social demand for myth stories to enter into a
dialogue with those of Catalan, French, or Spanish identities (Llobera, 2004).

Dialogical processes in myth stories

How does a myth-story work when the listener creates its morale and
makes it work for ones personal culture? We have shown (Gupta & Valsiner,
2000) that dialogical processes are operating both within a myth (as reflected in
different tensions implied in a given myth-story, with its foreground/background
distinctions), as well as between different myths. In the latter case, a "main
myth" may have its opposite "counter-myth" within the same society. Thus, if in
the "main myth" a particular characteristic (e.g., women being subservient to
men) might be consistently promoted, then its "counter-myth" may entail the
promotion of the opposite idea (men subservient to women). When both myth
and counter-myth occur in the narrative field of a society, persons can internalize
the opposition between those in unique novel ways.
The psychological relevance of the stories in the cases of both myth-
stories and horror films may be in the experiencing of the underlying binary
tensions, rather than in the manifest content of the story (which may be easily
forgotten, disbelieved, etc.,) while the story's tension as a story is maintained
through the binary contrasts. The contrast is created between the communicative
message and the recipients intra-psychological system. It is a contrast of
tension. The message is a holistic complex precisely as such complex
guarantees redundancy in the creation of expected tensions. Different
individualswho relate to the message in their own termshighlight different
parts of the semiotic complex and relate to it.

The person can carry a particular monological meaning (i.e., one in which
the inherent opposite is suppressed: A and {suppressed non-A}which looks
monological). The message (in a myth story, a movie, or a message from a
moralist) can emphasize its opposite (non-A) in the act of communication. The
person now enters into a tension between internal A and external non-A (which is
{B<>non-B}). The tension can be observable in the actions the person
undertakes in relation to the message. The tension can lead to escalationwhich
either leads to the synthesis of a new meaning (i.e., new opposition{C<>non-
C}), or reverts back to the continuing tension.
Valsiner 233

Figure 5.8. Tension between the meaning maker and the message in
creation

ESCALATION
OF MESSAGE IN
PERSON THE THE
creates TENSION IN SURROUNDING
Meaning A CONTEXT:
(contra
{B <> B}

NEW SYNTHETIC
MEANING IN THE
NO MAKING?
YE

NEW OPPOSITION IN THE MAKING {C <>

Example 5.5. Movement through reality and unreality in myths. Myth-stories

can include complex turns between reality and imagination, setting those up as
mutually complementary social regulators. Consider the following Tamil story:

A housewife knew a story. She also knew a song. But she kept
them to herself, never told anyone the story nor sang the song.
Imprisoned within her, the story and the song wanted release,
wanted to run away. One day, when she was sleeping with her
mouth open, the story escaped, fell out of her, took the shape of a
pair of shoes and sat outside the house. The song also escaped,
took the shape of something like a mans coat and hung on a peg.
The womans husband came home, looked at the coat and
shoes, and asked her, "Who is visiting?
No one, she said.
But whose coat and shoes are these?
I dont know, she replied. He wasnt satisfied with her answer.
He was suspicious. Their conversation was unpleasant. The
unpleasantness led to a quarrel. The husband flew into a rage,
picked up his blanket, and went to the Monkey Gods temple to
sleep.
Valsiner 234

The woman did not understand what was happening. She lay
down alone that night. She asked the same question over and
over Whose coat and shoes are these? Baffled and unhappy,
she put out the lamp and went to sleep.
All the flames of the town, once they were put out, used to
come to the Monkey Gods temple and spend the night there,
gossiping. On this night, all the lamps of all the houses were
represented thereall except one, which came late. The others
asked the latecomer, Why are you so late tonight?
At our house, the couple quarreled late into the night, said the
flame.
Why did they quarrel?
When the husband wasnt home, a pair of shoes came into the
veranda, and a coat somehow got on to a peg. The husband
asked her whose they were. The wife said she didnt know. So
they quarreled.
Where did the coat and shoes come from?
The lady of the house knows a story and a song. She never
tells the story, and has never sung the song to anyone. The story
and the song got suffocated inside; so they got out and have
turned into a coat and a pair of shoes. They took revenge. The
woman doesnt even know.
The husband, lying under his blanket in the temple, heard the
lamps explanation. His suspicions were cleared. When he went
home it was dawn. He asked his wife about her story and her
song. But she had forgotten both of them. What story, what
song? She said. (Linganna, 1972quoted via Ramanujan, 1991,
pp. 44-45)

The story gives us mutually intertwining oppositional tensions. The

hidden song and story grow in tension to escaperemaining hidden (now from
the woman) in the form suggesting infidelity to the husband. While the husband
finds the resolution of the tension (through overhearing gossip), the wife has lost
the song and the story already, and is ignorant of the whole happening.

Example 5.6. Mythical guidance for family role powers The basic topics on
which myth stories are set up to provide their guiding suggestions are those of
basic social and psychological values-adherence to social role expectations,
avoidance of dangers, relevance of social group cohesion, and so on. The
developing person is provided redundant exposure to structured ways of social
beingthrough observing others real ways of being, and through hearing the
myth-stories that activate ones imagination about such roles. The latter are
playgrounds for narratively given transgressions that are possiblebut evaluated
culturally. Thus, myth-stories may carry the function of creating both imaginary
play-out of possibilities for actions (which have not occurred, and which may be
Valsiner 235

undesired), and for semiotic ways to block these possible actions from becoming
actualized.
Consider the following story (from the Samoa Mende group in Burkina
Faso):

One day, a man, who already had a first wife, decided to marry
again. However, she ran away immediately. Some time later, he
once more decided to take a second wife. While the first and
second wives were spinning cotton together, the first said to the
second, I am very happy that you have come to join us, but I must
warn you about our husbands peculiarities. What might that be?
asked the second wife. He has two penises, the first wife
answered. Consequently, she continued, when he comes to make
love to you, be sure to grab hold of one of them, for if both enter at
the same time, it is very painful. The second wife listened to what
the first wife told her. When, that night, the husband came to make
love to the second wife, the latter grabbed hold of his penis. The
man jumped back in surprise. He approached her again, the same
thing happened. This went on until dawn, at which time the second
wife ran away to return to her home. Upon arriving, she learned that
her mother had just died. Soon after, her husband arrived looking
for her. Seeing him, she decided to take a bath. As she is bathing,
her husband comes up to her with a knife in his hand saying Now
we will get to the bottom of this affair. If you do not explain
everything to me, it is not only your mother who will be buried today,
but you as well, and in the same tomb. The second wife was afraid
and recounted everything that the first wife had told her. When the
husband heard this he said, I understand, for the first wife had told
him that the second wife was a penis snatcher, the reason for which
he jumped away whenever she grabbed his penis. Come and wash
my back, he then says to his second wife. She begins to do so.
Suddenly the husband interrupts his bath and leads his second wife
indoors where they make love satisfactorily. The next day, the
husband dances at his mother-in-laws funeral and the couple
returns to the husbands home. There they find the first wife waiting.
My husband, she says, I am so glad you are back so soon, I
missed you so much. How can that be? answers the man. I
have, as you well know, he continues, two penises, one in each of
my wives backsides. When I left I took one with me, but the other
one remained here with you. And that is the only one you will have
from now on. (Houseman, 1988, pp. 665-666)

The role of the first co-wife in a plural marriage is here the target of the
moralistic guidance. The difference of narrative domains of men and women
(which is overcome only under extreme conditionsthreat) sets a stage where
Valsiner 236

womens intrigues can succeed. Yet they can also failand the failure has grave
consequences.

Mythological transitions of A non-A kind

Myth stories frequently include transformations of the identity of the

charactershuman beings become animals, or plants, and are subseqyently
turned again into human beings. Such ideational transformation of images is
deeply rooted in the perceptual and ideational processes of human minds. Their
reflection in collective-cultural texts is a form of guidance of the ways in which the
minds operate.
In the flexible world of transformations within myth stories we can trace the
growth of meanings of the {A<>non-A} kind (see chapter 3). In Kali myth stories
(Kinsley, 1996) we can observe the transitions between destructive (Kali) and
non-destructive versions of the major goddess (Durga, Parvati). The goddess
undergoes transformation between the non-destructive and destructive forms,
involving her husband (Siva) in these movements:

In the Linga Purana Parvati is requested by Siva to slay the demon

Daruka, who has been granted the boon that he can be killed only
by a woman. Parvati is then described as entering Sivas body and
remaking herself from the poison in his throat. She reemerges as
Kali, of terrible appearance, and with the help of beings who include
pisakas, flesh-eating spirits, she begins to attack Daruka and his
hosts. However, owing to her frenzy the universe itself is
threatened with destruction and is saved only by Sivas
intervention. (Kinsley, 1996, pp. 78-79, emphases added).

The destructive goddess emerges from her non-desctructive, peaceful

ordinary formwith the necessary key role being played by Sivaand enters
into an escalatory cycle of destructiononly to be reversed again by Siva. The
guaranteed husband/wife complementarity roles are encoded in the story, with
mutual transitions of control over the events.
How is such myth story understood by ordinary people? The work of
Usha Menon and Richard Shweder (Menon & Shweder, 1994) on the
interpentration of the Kali myth in the context of Orissa in India provides an
elaborate illustration of the cultural canalization of feelings.

Example 5.7. Interpreting the Kali myth. Menon and Shweder (1994)
described as the myth of Kali interpenetrates the feelings of the Oryiaat inter-
individually varied levels of understanding of the myth. Those inter-individually
varied versions of making sense of the Kali myth indicate different internalization
patterns. The role of the particular emotion (linked with the protruded tongue
see belowFigure 5.9.) is central for such internalization.
Valsiner 237

Figure 5.9. Kali stepping on Siva

The crucial cultural marker of the Kali myth is the visual image
distributed as postcards in Orissaof the Kali with her tongue protruded, while
being about to step on Siva (her husband). That image of tongue protrusion
linked with biting ones tongue is representing the feeling of lajya
approximately translated as shame, embarrassment, modesty, or shyness. The
component of shame is central herethe act of stepping upon ones own
husband is considered to instantly evoke such shame.
The Kali myth in its elaborated form has been given in the following
version:

Mahisasura [a demon] became so powerful that he tortured

everyone on nearth and heaven He had obtained a boon from the
gods according to which no male could kill him. All the gods then
went to Narayana and they pondered on ways to destroy
Mahisasura each contributed the strength and energy of his
consciousnesshis binduand from that Durga was created. But
when Durga was told that she had to kill Mahisasura, she said that
she needed weapons to do so and all the gods gave her their
weapons. Armed thus, Durga went into battle. She fought bravely,
but she found it impossible to kill the demon. .. he was too strong
and clever. You see, the gods had forgotten to tell her that the boon
Valsiner 238

Mahisasura had obtained from Brahma was that he would only die
at the hands of a naked woman. Durga finally became desparate
and she appealed to Mangala to suggest some way to kill
Mahisasura. Mangala told her that the only way was to take off her
clothes, that the demon would only lose strength when confronted
with a naked woman. So Durga did as she was advised to, she
stripped, and within seconds of seeing her, Mahisasuras strength
waned and he died under her heavy sword. After killing him, a
terrible rage entered into Durgas mind, as she asked herself, What
kinds of gods are these that they do not have the honesty to tell me
the truth before sending me into battle? She decided that such a
world with such gods did not deserve to survive, so she took on the
form of Kali and went on a mad rampage, devouring every living
creature that came her way. Now, the gods were in a terrible
quandary. They had given her all their weapons. They were
helpless without any weapons, while she had a weapon in each of
her 10 arms. How could Kali be checked and who would check her
in her mad dance of desctruction? Again the gods gathered and
Narayana decided that only Mahadev (Siva) could check Kali, and
so he advised the gods to appeal to him. Now, Siva is an ascetic, a
yogi who has no interest in what happens in this world; but when all
the gods begged him to intervene, he agreed to do his best. He
went and lay on her path. Kali, absorbed in her dance of
destruction, was unaware that Siva lay in her path, so she stepped
on him all unknowing... When she put her foot on Siva's chest, she
bit her tongue saying "Oh! My husband! (Menon & Shweder, 1994,
pp. 246-247)

Here the power of counterattack (killing the demon) becomes power for revenge
(for being tricked into action), which could only be stopped through evoking
culturally inhibiting emotion (lajya). The power of evoking such inhibitive effect is
given by marital tiehusband (and no one else) can stop the killing spree
through evoking the feeling. The structure of meaningful events within this myth
can be viewed as fortifying the conjugal power relations (husband > wife), yet
with simultaneous emphasis of female power (of destruction, in this case).
Yet different recipients can construct vastly different personal-cultural
understanding of the same myth. Menon & Shweder (1994) demonstrated a wide
spread of different understandings of the myth, all based on the prevalence for
one (lajya) or another (anger) core emotion viewed as being present in Kalis
case. Anger is seen as antidote of lajya, and thus indicates the unity of
opposites.
One strategy for dealing with inherent tensions in the myth story is to emphasize
one of the opposites while denying the other. Thus, an informant- emphasizing
the Tantric interpretation of the story-- insisted:
Valsiner 239

Q: How would you describe Kalis expression here [on the postcard with protruded
tongue]?
A: She is the image of the fury.
Q: You mean shes angry? She is in a rage?
A: Yes,.. yes. You must understand that this is how she appears to her devotee. He has
to have the strength of mind to withstand her fierceness. She is not mild or tender,
but cruel and demanding and frightening.
Q: Do you think that she has put out her tongue in anger?
A: Yes, she has put out her tongue in anger. Kali is always angry, she is always creating
and, at the same time, destroying life. Here you see her standing with her foot
placed squarely on Sivas chest. When the time comes for the universe to be
destroyed entirely, no one will be spared, not even the godswhether Vishnu or
Sivaeveryone will be destroyed.
Q: Some people say that she is feeling deeply ashamed at having stepped on her
husband and that is why she has bitten her tongue. You dont agree?
A: People have different views. People believe whatever makes them feel comfortable
and if they like to think that Kali is ashamed, then let them. What I have told you is
what the special devotees of Kali believe. They believe that Mother is supreme.
Even Brahma, Visnu, and Siva are her servants.
Q: Have you seen this expression, that is, Kalis here, in daily life?
A: No, if one was to see this expression on an ordinary human beings face, he would
have to be mad, to have lost all his senses. Kali, in fact, is mad with rage, but her
rage has nothing that is remotely human about it, it is a divine rage that only a
human being who has completely lost his mind can duplicate.
Q: Can you tell me why Siva is lying on the ground?
A: Kali has thrown him down on the ground and she puts her foot on him to make clear
that she is supreme.
Q: So you dont think that hes lying on the ground to subdue Kali?
A: No, thats beyond Sivas capacity. If Kali becomes calm, it is because she wishes to,
not because she is persuaded to be so. Even to her most faithful devotee, Kalis
actions sometimes dont make sense, but life itself often doesnt make sense, so
what can one say? (Menon & Shweder, 1994, pp. 272-273)

This (Tantric) version of understanding Kalis role provides us with an interesting

elaboration of the notion of hierarchical integration. While the canonic version of
the myth (centered on lajya) makes use of the form of intransitive hierarchy
(Valsiner, 1998b, p. 217; Poddiakov & Valsiner, in press), then the Tantric
version is built on the premises of transitive hierarchy:
Valsiner 240

Kali Kali

Siva Gods

Gods Siva

The canonical version The Tantric version

If in the intransitive hierarchy we can see the establishment of a power

circle (A is more powerful than B, B more powerful than C, and C more powerful
than A: Kali>Gods>Siva>Kali), then in the transitive hierarchy there exists clear
linear subordination (Kali > Gods > Siva). These two versions of the hierarchy
are made possible in the Oriya context by combining or un-combining two criteria
-- power and purity 85. The intransitive hierarchy is the result of application of two
criteria -- that of power (in which Kali > Gods > Siva in a transitive way), and that
of purity (as in the state of impurity, Kali < Siva). Thus, the combination of the two
criteria creates the intransitivity of the hierarchy. The Tantric version of the
hierarchy makes use of only one of the criteria (power), and the hierarchy
becomes transitive.
Transitivity provides for linear hierarchies. The notion of social control
within an institution is established through superimposing linear hierarchies upon
human relations, and attempting to fix those over time. In contrast, phenomena
open to development occur in intransitive feedback loops that under some
conditions lead to the breaking of the relationship cycle (lajya in Kali leads her to
shift from rage to embarrassment)

Conclusions: Textured dramas

All human life takes place in the middle of various forms of stories told,
rituals constructed, and values exchangedby trade, conquest, appropriation, or
other forms of social transfer. Parents may read books to the children, priests
may read sermons to the parents, politicians may manage to utter one-liners on
TV, interspersed with advertising for computers, beer, and travel opportunities.
TV channels fight for the attention of the viewers to tell them stories about how to
live right and buy all the things they do not need. Priests only tell stories about
the former. Dieticians tell mothers how to feed their babies, or how to eat
properly themselves. Teachers tell stories about the world outside of the
immediate reach of the children. Policemen tell stories about immediate

85
I am grateful to Usha Menon to pointing this aspect of hierarchy construction out to
me (Personal communication, November, 1, 1999)
Valsiner 241

conductby their actions, words, or even mere presence as complex signs in the
public environments.
All in all, human beings- young or oldare surrounded by a great variety
of goals-directed efforts to tell stories. They do it themselves, and are listeners to
others stories. The developing personand that is a person from beginning to
the end of ones life course-- is faced with an excessively explained and
meaningfully overdetermined environment. All that myriad of meanings pretends
to operate as if it were rational. Human rationality is perhaps one of the major
myth stories invented by human beings in their desperation about their own
facing of the never-ending uncertainties of the future. In chapter 6 we will cover
the principles of human construction of this irrational rationality.
Valsiner 242

Chapter 6. Thinking as a cultural process

All human thinking is culturally organized. It takes place through mediating

devices signs, general heuristics, etc.and makes use of value-embedded
beliefs and superstitions for guiding the mental processes. The social
surroundings for human thinking are purposefully suggestive-- guiding the person
towards some ways of feeling and thinking, and away from others. Myths and
counter-myths, fairy tales, supported by different social representations all set up
the social texture for human thinking.
However-- human beings think as individuals. The primacy of personal
subjective worlds in the thinking is clear and unambiguous. Human thought
processes are usually hidden from others, thinking is a private sand hidden affair.
Yet the ways in which persons think, and the psychological tools they use in it
are results of cultural construction. Thinking processes are historically based on
the social relations with others and with the environment. In their established
form, these processes are internalized and unique to the persons who do the
thinking. It is in the human thinking that the social and the personal are united
within a cultural (semiotic) process of making sense of one's world, and of
oneself.

An excursion into history of psychology of thinking. The study of thinking in

psychology got its impetus from the experimental introspective studies of Karl
Bhler, Otto Selz, Robert Ogden, Oswald Klpe and Narziss Ach in the
beginning of the 20th Century. The intellectual traditions of the "Wrzburg
School" in psychology of the beginning of this Century have largely been
forgotten-- largely due to the stigmatization of the introspective methodology that
characterized the experimental work of Bhler and others.
The introspective study of thinking by "the Wrzburgers" was followed by the
work of Karl Duncker and Max Wertheimer on processes of productive problem
solving (Simon, 1999). Most of contemporary cognitive psychology originates in
the work of Wertheimer and Duncker, and thus it can be claimed that the
"Wrzburg school" has been the forerunner of all cognitive science. Yet that is
not the end of the story we can find out from the history of cognitive science.
Psychology has re-written its history in a pars pro toto mannertracing its
recent roots to the experimental psychology of Wilhelm Wundt and his laboratory
(opened in Leipzig in 1879). Wundts own focus on cultural psychology
(Vlkerpsychologie) has usually been de-emphasized (quite incorrectly) as the
ruminations of an experimentalist in his old age. A more important parallel
tendency for the history of cognitive science is the contribution of the Austrian
Valsiner 243

philosopher Franz Brentano. It is from the work of Brentano that different

trajectories in further development in psychology and philosophy have acquired
the focus on the inherent potentials for further change in psychological
phenomena. A phenomenon like thought entails both an abstraction from the
experience the person has up to now, and a potential for further thinking.
Edmund Husserls phenomenological philosophy built on the notion of inherent
intentionality grows out from the Brentano line of thinking. Likewise, the work of
Alexius Meinong on presentation (vorstellungsee Haller, 1996; also chapter 3),
and the language philosophy of Anton Marty (Mulligan, 1990), as well as the
Polish school of logic of Kasimir Twardowski grew out of the Brentano tradition.
It can be argued that the recent history of psychology as science builds upon two
trajectoriesthose of Wundts experimental tradition and Brentanos
philosophical orientation. Sometimes these trajectories have merged, at other
times (and countries)kept anxiously separate by psychologists fearful of the
implications of subjective philosophy for their science.
An example of the merging of the two trajectories in the history of the
study on human reasoning is Fritz Heider. Heider migrated between different
Continental European schools of thinking about thinking-- Alexius Meinong's in
Graz, Karl Bhler's in Vienna, and Heinz Werner's in Hamburg. After his
emigration to the United States, Heider established himself in Kansas, where he
created his fundamental synthetic work on human reasoning processes-- The
psychology of interpersonal relations (Heider, 1958). The study of social
attributions grows out of that classic contribution. Yet its main focus was
differentto understand how language structures the activities of the human
mind. All of the directions of thought that emanated from the legacy of Franz
Brentano shared the focus on language as the mediator in human thinking
processes. They also built their theories on the premise that logic is the formal
basis for human mentality.

Three logical processes in human reasoning

Logic was the "gold standard" of human intellectual enterprise at the turn
of the 20th Century, and continued in that role until the time after World War II.
Logic had the halo of providing human beings with rules for "correct thinking"--
yet there could not be any single set of such rules. As a result, the present
century faced a variety of claims for such normative role, while no clear definition
of logic exists. After considering a multitude of existing views on logic, Boris
Bogoslovsky managed to create one:

Logic is a complex of relative and limited (as contrasted with

absolute and universal) generalizations on interrelationships of
statements helpful for the most efficient, productive, and excellent
use of the statements. (Bogoslovsky, 1928, p. 42)
Valsiner 244

Figure 6.1. Inductive, deductive, and abductive reasoning processes

The criteria for "efficient", "productive", and "excellent" uses can of course
be only socially constructed. Hence any logical system-- formalized as it may be-
- is surrounded by the culturally set conditions of use of the strict logical forms in
a particular setting.
Valsiner 245

Human reasoning is a process of mental construction made available

through human semiotic capabilities. In this respect, all rules of logic are
necessarily semiotic phenomena, and thuscultural-historical constructions.
There are three basic forms of reasoning within the realm of logical inference
(see Figure 6.1.).
First, there is the deductive process (which involves the construction of
specific novel ideas on the basis of general believed premises and conventional
derivation rules). It is best known through examples of syllogistic reasoning
tasks, in which the reasoner arrives at the conclusions through moving from
general premises towards concrete situations. This is often referred to as rule-
based reasoning. The scheme of deductive reasoning (Figure 6.1. B.)
constitutes a basically closed scheme of moving from general stated rule to
interpretational activity of category formation. That activity is the only open
moment in the schemea moment that is not pre-determined by the fixed rule. If
a particular specimen is found to belong to the class (X), the deduction that it is Y
follows immediately (e,g, in case of a, b, c, d). If the specimen is not detected to
belong to the specified category, it escapes the deductive conclusion otherwise
pre-given by the rule.
Second, there is the inductive process --which entails generalization of
ideas based on specific lived-through experiences of the person. In psychologys
research methodology this process is exemplified by efforts to arrive at
generalized knowledge through accumulation of data. This process can be found
in modern cognitive psychology under the labels of "instance-based" reasoning.
The process of inductive generalization operates with observations of the specific
phenomenacollection of specimens of a class that can be observed. The set of
actually observable specimens is smaller than the set of all of the members of
the class. It is known since Aristotle that the ideal case of inductive inference
depends upon full enumeration of the set of specimens. Obviously, that ideal is
not reachable in practice. In most cases, the full set of specimens in a class is
either indeterminate, or impossible to get access to.
Third, there is the process that synthesizes the two the abductive
process. It involves a structure of a reasoning process where the deductive and
inductive sides mutually interpenetrate, and give birth to novel ideas (Santaella,
2005). The novelty construction in reasoning takes place both in the realm of
symbolic content, (i.e. reasoning rules are not "empty" processes), and in the
domain of symbolic constraints (i.e., following certain rules or guidelines, which
guide the form of reasoning). The scheme of abductive reasoning (Figure. 6.1.C.)
is based on the bi-directional relation between the general (rule) and a concrete
case. Their mutual mismatch contradictionleads to a generalizing leap that
reconstructs the general rule in a new version. That new rule then enters into
relation with another concrete case, and becomes again reconstructed.
Valsiner 246

Social power of deduction

The development of cognitive (mental) functions has two facets-- that of

knowledge creation (epistemological function) and that of mediating specific
functions of social control.

Example 6.1. Insertion of deductive reasoning patterns through schooling.

The main finding from comparisons of formally schooled and not-schooled
persons in the realm of solving reasoning tasks is the mastery of automatization
of the reliance to the form of the task and assuming the deductive reasoning
scheme at an instant. (Luria, 1976). For example, the following syllogism is given
to a person:

MAJOR PREMISS: In the Far North, where there is snow, all bears are
white.
MINOR PREMISS: Novaya Zemlya is in the Far North and there is
always snow there.
QUESTION: What color are the bears there?

The benefit of formal education makes it possible to recognize this task

immediately as a deductive reasoning task that has to be solved by simple
application of rules. By following the ruleif ALL X are P and A IS X, it follows
that A is P. Yet the unschooled subjects found it impossible to accept the
scheme trained in school. In Lurias expedition to Central Asia in the early 1930s,
a 37-year old illiterate Abdulrakhim from a remote Kashgar village responded to
the presentation by assuming a strictly inductive orientation towards the task:

Abdulrakhim: There are different sorts of bears.

[the syllogism is repeated]
Abdulrakhim: I dont know; I have seen a black bear, I have never seen
any others Each locality has its own animals; if its white,
theyll be white; if it is yellow, they will be yellow.
Experimenter: But what kinds of bears are there in Novaya Zemlya?
Abdulrakhim: We always speak only of what we see; we dont talk about
what we havent seen.
Experimenter: But what do my words imply? [the syllogism is repeated]
Abdulrakhim: Well, its like this: our tsar isnt like yours, and yours isnt
like ours. Your words can be answered by someone who
was there, and if a person wasnt there he cant say anything
on the basis of your words.
Experimenter: But on the basis of my wordsIn the North, where there is
always snow, the bears are white, can you gather what kind
of bears there are in Novaya Zemlya?
Abdulrakhim: If a man was sixty or eighty and had seen a white bear and
had told about it, he could be believed, but Ive never seen
one and hence I cant say. Thats my last word. Those who
Valsiner 247

saw can tell, and those who didnt see cant say anything.
(Luria, 1976, pp. 108-109)

The issue of refusal to assume a deductive reasoning scheme here

indicates the major domain where the effects of formal schooling can be
foundin the getting of the schooled subjects to automatically recognize and
assume a particular position in relation to a given task.

Social control through deductive reasoning

Strictly speaking this "formal schooling effect" is not an effect of schooling

per se, but of the internalization of the social position of assuming the
correctness of the suggested position. The schooled person who immediately
recognizes the task as a syllogism and uses the deductive line of reasoning to
solve it necessarily accepts the assertion of the person who gives the task
without questioning whether deductive logic is applicable to the given content
material. Consider, for instance, a syllogistic task which could have been set in
the context of mediaeval Europe (or Europes North American colonies)

MAJOR PREMISS: All witches should be burnt at stake

MINOR PREMISS: Tituba 86 is a witch
CONCLUSION: ???

In this example we can observe the insertion of a social value-based action

command as content into a deductive reasoning scheme. A social power source
who sets up the deductive scheme can expect to have high source credibility (in
terms of communication). When the scheme is automatically accepted (e.g.,
"this is a syllogistic task" which "is given as such by a trustable source") it can
lead to social action desired by the power source. It is due to this social power
function that formal schooling has high renom for social institutions. Every
social power that captures another ethnic group or subgroup in a colonial or
missionary effort is likely to introduce a schooling context where psychological
tools that are beneficial for social control efforts are promoted to the young
developing persons.

Example 6.2. Application of the deductive reasoning process in

extermination. Deductive reasoning is widely applied in acts of social violence
as its rationale. Here we look at the psychological system of a mass murderer
an extermination camp commander Stangl who (at his early thirties during World
War II) was the chief of police of an euthenasia clinic and then the commander of
a concentration camps in Sobibor and Treblinka (Welzer, 2004). What surprises

86
For full coverage of how concrete persons were set up to belong to this scheme as
filling in the minor premise, see The tryal of Tituba Indian: Transcripts of the Salem
Witchcraft trials of 1692. Salem, Ma.: The New England and Virginia Company, n.d.
Valsiner 248

the readers of his account about his deeds-- explicated in an interview 25 years
lateris the absence of moral qualms within Stangls self-expression about his
leadership role in the massive killing of the prisoners. Instead, Stangl dwells upon
different accusations against him as inadequate from the viewpoint of his moral
integrity. What bothered him was little things which he specifically had done, anf
not his role of what he was:

Stangl had scarcely any or no problems at all with his work, which in his view he
was obliged to carry out, and this was particularly the case when he could regard
himself as a ggod guy, just, objective, free of partiality, and sometimes helpful
and friendly above and beyond the call of duty. It will have been the maintenance
of this self-image of the exterminator camp commander which ensured that
Stangl, despite his actual function, which consisted in leading mases of people to
their deaths, was nevertheless not tortured by any moral qualms. On the one
hand, a task which fits into a universe of causes to be justified one way or the
other; on the other, an individual, from case to case distanced from his role, who
is ready at all times to fulfil his duties as required, but who at the same time also
wants to remain a human being. (Welzer, 2004, pp. 26-27, added emphases)

Stangls case is not extraordinaryresearch in social psychology (Milgram,

1974, 1992) shows that such distancing of oneself from the social role of
obedient reaction is universal. The difference is merely in the extent and kind of
destructiveness that such role-distancing mechanism is set up to guarantee.

Social role distancing and acceptance of deductive reasoning patterns. As

Welzer very perceptively points outmass murder could not have been carried
out with amoral perpetrators (ibid., p. 30). The mechanisms that make personal
participation in acts of mass destruction possible are precisely the promotion of
the higher moral calling (with the denigration of some designated outgroup)
and, based on such internalized sign fielduncritical acceptance of suggested
major premises of syllogistic reasoning tasks. As is known from multiple
genocides, even the fortification of the group differences by uniform is not
necessarythe atrocities are easily committed against close neighbors.
Deductive reasoning processes can be cognitive bases for social destruction.

The value of inductive knowledge construction

The example of Abdulrakhim (Example 6.1.) indicates the social
resistance value of the personal insistence upon relying only upon one's
immediately available and personally accumulated knowledge. The person is in
full control over what one knows, and nothing follows -- from an inductive
standpoint-- from the words that some suspicious outsider (such as the
researcher) is suggesting in the syllogistic reasoning task. The framing of a
thinking task in either an inductively- or deductively-solvable problem is a result
of social relationships.
Valsiner 249

Not only unschooled and illiterate peasants insist upon the primacy of the
inductive reasoning schemes-- so do scientists. Experimenters in any area of
science would distrust data that have not carefully obtained by inductive ways.
Deductive reasoning would not allow the empirical reality to provide the
researchers with needed correction for their general thinking. Without such
corrections science cannot proceed.
Of course, the full process of human understanding of the world entails both inductive and
deductive components. How can they be united?

Unity of induction and deduction. Inductive and deductive reasoning

processes cannot be separated from each other, but function together. Efforts to
use "purely" inductive processes will necessarily remain inconsequential, as
George Miller has pointed out:

The impossibility of proving a general statement on the basis of

a finite number of positive instances had long been
recognized... That is to say, the "inductive leap" from a finite set
of examples to a universal generalization can land almost
anywhere. It should not have been surprising, therefore, when
cognitive scientists realized that different people can draw very
different conclusions after observing the same set of instances--
that the consequences of experience are as much constructed
by as imposed on the learner. (Miller, 1990, p. 11, emphasis
added)

Example 6.3. includes an example that represents exactly such an

indeterminate nature of a "purely" inductive "leap":

Example 6.3. Parents and children. Consider a case where the inductive
reasoning processes of both parents in this invented dialogue dominates over the
deductive ones:

PARENT 1: You know, last week John played with a vase,

let it fall on the floor, and it broke into pieces.

PARENT 2: I know, what you mean-- Mary has done that

many times with our coffee mugs-- thank goodness those do
not break-- those children are such innocent playful
creatures.

PARENT 1: Well,... you know... it is not so simple. The other

day John took a paper napkin from the dinner table and
brought it to the burning candle, proceeding to make a small
fire on his plate... We had to put out the fire!
Valsiner 250

PARENT 2: How explorative! Mary has not done anything

like that... but she explores her world, indeed, very actively.
Children are adventurous, and come up with new and
surprising actions.

PARENT 1: Adventurous... hmm... yeah-- just yesterday we

caught John in the bathroom-- he was about to throw our
Minnie-- our dear little family cat-- into the toilet! Those
children can be cruel to animals, and they are such little
devils who come up with nasty ideas. Parents must always
control them.

In reality, no "purely" inductive generalization exists-- if we see

generalization based on induction, it resorts to the use of some (usually implicit)
general meanings (or cultural models). We have underlined the moments in
Example 6.3. where such general notions are brought into the dialogue. As can
be seen, the deductive line of reasoning enters into the ongoing dialogue in the
form of implied general statements about children. Aside from describing specific
actions by children, parents revert to narrating upon what children in general "are
like", or what they "can" do (or be). Parents chatting about their particular
children (John and Mary) and comparing specific instances of their conduct move
to import a general meaning (or belief) into the discourse. Once it is imported, it
can become to guide further discourse in accordance with the whole complex
implied by the general meaning or belief (e.g., general belief that "children are
innocent" can guide further interpretations by parents, differently from a belief
that assumes that "children are little devils").
All generalizations of the described (i.e., inductively-based but generically
framed) kind go beyond the given particulars-- and are constructed exactly for
that purpose. Parental reasoning is oriented towards future encounters with
children's novel conduct, hence present-time generalizations are functional for
preparation of the adults for the (highly unpredictable) future. Such
generalizations are not "correct" in any sense-- since in the case of dynamic
constructive processes which take place in irreversible time, criteria for
"correctness" (or "falseness") of any generalization are in principle
indeterminable. Any novelty that emerges in development is in a way wrong or
incorrect in relation to its predecessors. Once it becomes established as the
next developmental state it becomes correct in that role.

Generalization and indeterminacy.

The indeterminacy of generalization leads culture construction in several

ways. First, there is a resulting variability of reception, understanding, and
application of cultural knowledge. Secondly, there may come to exist conflicting
meanings within the same corpus of knowledge. A good example are conflicting
opinions expressed by proverbs within the same language, such as "A spanking
comes straight from heaven" vs. "A good houselord doesn't beat his animals"
Valsiner 251

(implicitly - "let alone his children"; but also possibly - "this doesn't apply to
children).
Sayings like those have come to existence as shared expressions of
experience. They do not necessarily reflect upon uniformly shared meanings,
and may have gained sustained circulation thanks to the nature of reality, which
is not always singularly patterned. They also rely on the inclusion of value-
positions into the reasoning process, which is clearly illustrated in both the above
expressions. The value-positions are included arbitrarily and feed into the
deductive support of the reasoning process at times when such statements are
generated.
Furthermore, in every situation where such pearls of wisdom are
pronounced as a confirmatory seal on reality, they are made applicable to the
concrete situation by an "inductive leap", which is aided by the offering of
patterns toward which the leap may be made. A third result of the indeterminacy
of generalization in culture-construction is that the implicit categorization of reality
which is established is not necessarily clear. This speaks to the assumption that
culture is comprised of something like schemas or patterns which are handed
down in "tidy packages" (successfully or unsuccessfully). In fact, the packaging
is nothing like tidy, although the labels might appear to be so.
What could a deductively-driven process in parental reasoning look like?.
Example 6.4. can be viewed as continuation of Example 6.4., only now both
parents complement each other's narrative by supporting the deriving of concrete
conclusions from previously constructed major premises.

Example 6.4. Deductively driven reasoning processes in a dialogue

PARENT 1: There is so much cruelty in children. I see John

often chasing our cat, and worry what could be done to
make him behave gently towards Minnie.

PARENT 2: Of, don't worry-- he is just a little boy, and little

boys are adventurous, they like new experiences. If I were
you, I would not worry, boys need to capture the world, and
chasing animals and experimenting with objects is their
natural way, and a need for all males. But what should I do
with Mary-- she is my dear little girl, but she becomes
interested in boyish ways of playing with toys. I try to buy her
nice dolls, but she gets into rough play with trucks... is that
what being in day-care is producing?

Again, we have underlined the general statements (about "cruelty" being a

characteristic of children, hence applicable to John; etc.). In this example, the
"figure <--> ground" relationship of the two processes is reversed-- the deductive
process is in the foreground (and leads the talk about specifics in the parental
discourse), while the inductive process remains implicitly in the background-- yet
interfering with the foreground.
Valsiner 252

Unity of reasoning through abduction

The overlap, or intermingling of the processes, is a place where the
construction of new forms of reasoning takes place in the abductive scheme..
However, a more important point brought to us by both of our examples, is the
illustration of the proactivity of real-life reasoning. The purpose of the if... then
statement is not to ascertain a universally true law but to plan and monitor one's
action. The syllogistic form - a logically correct one, too - is a necessary tool in
the organization of our everyday thinking, but the deductive inference is never its
pure result, nor a result in itself. It cannot be a pure result, because with the
moment of its emergence it becomes contextualized, and gains meaning from
the particular context in the given situation (situation in the mind, so to speak).
Although it is a product of syllogism, it is also meaningfully divorced form it by the
meaning it has gained from the context into which it has emerged (Magarios de
Morentin, 2005).
Furthermore-- it is not a result in itself, because it feeds into a future-
oriented process of regulation of conduct. The re-contextualized result is not
simply produced to stand out without use-- it is produced for and immediately
picked up by other ongoing thought processes. Everyday reasoning, therefore, is
driven by purpose, and although it involves forms of both syllogistic deduction
and inductive inclusion, it takes place within the frame of an irreversible real-time
contextualized process. In that process the two "types" of reasoning are not just
intermingled but continuously interact in indeterministic ways, potentially creating
new forms.

Abductive reasoning in practice.

The reasoning process proceeds in irreversible time in its microgenesis,

hence it is its constant immediate future orientation that makes it possible for
moves between inductive and deductive orientations to take place. In case of
both inductive and deductive orientations, novelty can be created within the given
micro-constructive process. It takes the form of either construction (or
importation) of an encoded general meaning (if the person operates in the
deductive orientation), or reconstruction of some personal experience of the past
in the present (if in the inductive mode). In the ongoing flow of reasoning, the two
orientations flexibly switch between each other, and become coordinated in ways
that allow for novel sense to be generated. It involves hypothesis generation,
followed by subsequent testing.

Peirce (1955, p. 151) provided a general formula for abductive process:

Valsiner 253

The surprising fact (C) is observed

If A were true, C would be a matter of course

Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true

The leap in reasoning here entails the positing of A as an explanation of

C. There is no reason embedded in the fact (C) that leads the thinker to make
that leap. The leap may be based upon some previous knowledge or inclination
state (and thus would qualify as a deductive moment in the abductive scheme),
but that origin is not visible in the immediate abductive process. Novelty
emerges in the abductive process, by the active leap in reasoning that the
thinker undertakes.
There can be two basic forms in this leaprecombinatorial and synthetic.
The general process of reasoning in the recombinatorial form entails the
unfolding of a train of reasoning that is constructed on the basis of closed sets of
general beliefs (or meanings) {A, B, C, D}, specific events {a, b, c, d}, and of
relationships between the two sets {conjunction, implication}. By way of
previously established constraints, for instance, implications "if a & b ==> A"; "if
A ==> c", and "if c & d ==> D" have been established. Hence the reasoning process
can proceed along familiar path, as in Example 6.6:

Example 6.6. A recombinatorial form of reasoning

Event Implication Explanation

-----------------------------------------------------------------
a toddler looks at the cat
b the child pulls cat's tail
a & b ==> A the child is cruel
A ==> c child may hit the cat
c child does hit the cat
d cat screams at attacks child
c & d ==> D children learn lessons from life
b again pulls the tail
b continues
b & b ==> C if that cat allows tail being
pulled, the cats must be
masochistic
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

This artificial example shows how parent's reasoning can lead to a new
recombinatorial form by lifting a previously (experientially) established constraint
on the kinds of implications expected in this situation. However, the sets of
beliefs, events, and relationships were not modified; their relationship merely
came to include a recombined version (b & b ==> C).
Valsiner 254

The synthetic form entails the emergence of qualitatively new

mental/affective phenomena in the process of coordination of the inductive and
deductive processes. To follow along the lines of the formalistic example-- here
any one (or more) of the sets (of beliefs, events, connectors) are suddenly made
open, and re-organized. Novel forms can emerge in any of those. The
coordination process here loses its simple "computable" nature, and moves into
the realm of emerging novelty of Gestalt kind. This may entail periods in the
course of mental functioning at which the relationships between the deductive
and inductive processes for a time enter into a state of confusion (or-- a state that
from the perspective of an external viewer look like "confusion"), from which
totally new solutions (innovations) emerge.

Given these three forms of thought, it becomes clear that human

reasoning always proceeds at some intermediate level of abstractness/
concreteness, with possibilities both for further generalization and context-bound
specification constantly available. Every element in the reasoning process
depends on prior knowledge and, this knowledge being often self-contradicting
and not employed in a consistent manner, the outcome of the process is
therefore not deducible from what we might in principle know about the
momentary knowledge-base of the thinker (since that knowledge base exists in a
heterogeneous and hierarchically organized form).

Overcoming uncertainties: probability as logic

Charles Sanders Peirce indicated the unity of probabilistic thinking and

logic:

The theory of probabilities is simply the science of logic

quantitatively treated. There are two conceivable certainties with
reference to any hypothesis, the certainty of its truth and the
certainty of its falsity. The numbers one and zero are appropriated,
in this calculus, to marking these extremes of knowledge; while
fractions having values intermediate between them indicate, as we
may vaguely say, the degrees in which the evidence leans towards
one or the other. (Peirce, 1955, p. 157)

When human thinking is faced with uncertainty, the thinker attempts to

overcome it. Of course any effort of overcoming it is a psychological
constructionof a semiotic reflection of uncertainty in terms of signs that seem to
entail certainty. Consider the following statements:

(1) I do not know if it may rain tomorrowmaybe it will, maybe it

will not
(2) There is a 50% chance of rain tomorrow
Valsiner 255

From the perspective of reality (=weather tomorrow), both of these

statements are equally indeterminate. Yet (1) reflects the full indeterminacy of the
situation (in verbal form), while (2) allows for projection of other comparison
conditions (e.g., 50% chance is higher than 30% chance) into the field of
reasoning. The latter is an example of semiotic reconstruction of the uncertainty
field with the help of signsquantified probability valueswhich create an
illusion of certainty where there is actually none (i.e., even if the claim that 50%
chance is higher than 30% chance, its relevance for the reality of rain tomorrow
is only illusory).

Do we toss a coin to live?

The standard starting point of making sense of probability is the ordinary

act of betting-- tossing a coin. It is usually on the basis of such coin-tossing that
the meaning of probability is set forth.
A coin is a thin round piece of metal which-- when thrown up and let to
land on a hard surface-- lands either on one ("heads") or the other ("tails") side.
Assuming the hardness of the landing surface, there are only 2 possible options
for the landing 87. Thus, by accepted probability calculus, each of the sides
("heads" and "tails") has the same chance (0.5 or 1 in 2) to occur.
Note the basic attribution trick in this statement-- in the coin, both sides
are an inseparable part of the same coin. Yet the attribution is made to each of
the parts as if those could be separated. In reality, neither "heads" nor "tails"
sides of the coin "have" the chance (separately from each other) to land on its
side. It is the coin that-- when tossed-- lands, not one (or the other) side of the
coin. Thus, the coin (as a whole) lands either on one, or another side-- but the
sides do not land in any state without the coin as the whole.

Three meanings of probability From the same event of tossing a coin,

one can proceed to outline the three kinds of probabilities that Western thought
has operated with in the past three centuries.
First, there is the propensity notion of probability. This probability is based
on the set of structural possibilities inherent in the structure of the object and its
situation. Thus, the coin-- at least a thin one, thrown on hard surface-- entails two
possible landing options. The probability described above-- (p "heads" = p
"tails"=0.5) is an example of propensity notion of probability. The thinker only
needs to know the structure of the coin (and its tossing environment) so as to
estimate the probabilities. The estimation can change, if the structure of the
object changes. Imagine that a coin is made to "grow" in its thickness and reach
the same diameter in the third dimension that it has in the other two. The

87
Under conditions of different surface-- soft and embracing-- the coin may also land and
stay on its edge. This example proves that the probability of the coin's landing depends
upon the environment within which the coin-tossing occurs.
Valsiner 256

propensity kind of probability is immediately changing from a 1/2 to 1/2 split to a

1/3 ("heads") to 1/3 ("tails") to 1/3 ("on edge") estimate. Note that propensity as
the basis of probability estimate is independent of any previous experience with
tossing coins, and can be fully deductively calculated prior to the first tossing of
the coin.
Secondly, probabilities can be frequentist. The frequentist probability
estimation entails full dependence upon the past history-- summatively
accumulated over time-- of the experienced events. Thus, one needs a large
number of coin tossings for estimation of the frequentist probability of the "heads"
or "tails". In the case of a coin, it is likely that the summarized frequencies of
"heads" and "tails" over time coincide with propensity based probability
estimates. After all;-- the coin remaining 2-sided-- a very large number of
tossings should distribute approximately similarly to what the equal opitions are.
Thirdly, there exists the notion of subjective probability. The subjective
probability is a subjectively quantified degree of belief about the outcome of an
event. Under conditions where all the information about the properties f the
event are known (a coin is a good example), the subjective probability may
concur with the propensity version of the probability estimation. Thus, if I know
the structure of the coin and its landing surface, I can believe that the chances of
"heads" and "tails" on any tossing are equal (0.5), and if I were to try it out on a
large number of occasions, my belief may indeed be proven by empirical
evidence. Yet not always are the features of the system known (no or limited
access to the propensity conditions), nor is the history of the object known (no
frequentistic information). Under such circumstances, the degree of belief can
provide the thinker with complicated projective possibilities.

Mixing of probability notions in psychological research.

There is a basic issue at stake in psychology's methodology-- the applicability

of different notions of probabilistic thinking in its theoretical discourse. In the current
practice, there exists constant confusion between the three notions, Of the three
models of probability-- frequentistic, subjective, and propensity-- only the first two
are amply utilized by psychologists. It is especially the case with the first--
frequentistic probability notion is used widely (as it allows for the use of inductively
accumulated knowledge of frequencies of events), and often translated into the
probability notion. Yet such translation need not be applicable-- especially when the
researcher moves from a populational data base (for frequentistic probability
estimation) into a degree of belief (subjective probability) concerning an individual
case (ODoherty, 2006).
An example of such translation was criticized by Allport in the context of
prediction of personality:

A fatal non sequitur occurs in the reasoning that if 80 per cent of the
delinquents who come from broken homes are recidivists, then this
delinquent from a broken home has an 80 per cent chance of
Valsiner 257

becoming a recidivist. The truth of the matter seems to be that this

delinquent has either 100 per cent certainty of becoming a repeater or
100 per cent certainty of going straight. (Allport, 1942, p. 156)

The strict logic of Allport's argument can be followed if we look at his

arguments from a strictly defined developmental perspective-- of irreversibility of
time in the lives of organisms. "Becoming a delinquent" is not an event similar to
tossing coins. It is a process of becoming-- taking place within a complex system
(such as a particular adolescent). The repetition of the "delinquent act" by a
particular adolescent is worked out between the developing person and his/her
environment. Hence the history of similar previous cases (e.g., a sample of
adolescents who have been found delinquent) has no bearing upon this
particular young person.
Allport's point is important-- habitual transfer of frequentistic probability
notions from populations to individuals creates an illusion of knowledge, and
stops actual inquiry. A probability estimate carried over to an individual has no
explanatory value. In the case of set of multi-linear possible life-course
trajectories, the knowledge of any N previous cases cannot provide the
researchers with adequate information about the actual construction of the N+1st
case. The actual construction of the person's life experience takes place in
irreversible time and concrete life contexts as those emerge during that time
period. Each possible next step in this course is predictively equifinal from the
vantage point of the present (e.g., a person who has committed a delinquent act
either does it again-- i.e. has "100 % certainty" for that-- or does not).

Cognitive heuristics as cultural mediation complexes

Contemporary cognitive psychology has oftentimes demonstrated its

normative bias-- the thinking by ordinary persons has been evaluated from the
standpoint of norms of one or another kind of formal logic, rather than studied for
the discovery of its own inherent logic. Thus, "errors" of thinking-- viewed from
the standpoint of either classical two-valent logic, or statistical rules of inference--
have been documented and paraded in front of the ever-new cohorts of
psychology students. Those students may listen to the stories with awe, and
proceed to make the very same "errors" in their own reasoning. Thus, it is the
research on reasoning that needs to adjust its scope-- not the reality of human
mental processes that have served us well since we managed to kill our first
predator.

Example 6.6. Heuristics in thinking. Consider, for example, the following

scenario that has been the basis for subjective probability estimation task

Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken and very bright. She majored in
philosophy. As a student she was deeply concerned with issues of
discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear
demonstrations. (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983, p. 297)
Valsiner 258

In a forced choice selection-- ranking-- of interpretations (from a list of 8

options), three have made their way into the data base of modern cognitive
psychology. The interpreters of the scenario compared judgments that were
assumed to be unrepresentative of Linda ("Linda is a bank teller"), another that
was considered to be representative of her ("Linda is active in the feminist
movement"), and their unified version (conjunction: "Linda is a bank teller who is
active in the feminist movement"). The originators of the "heuristics and biases"
research in cognitive psychology-- Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman-- have
made this judgment task pivotal for demonstration that ordinary (as well as
"sophisticated"-- those who have taken statistics courses at Stanford) persons all
commit the so-called "conjunction fallacy". That "fallacy" consists of systematic
believing that the conjunction of the two ("Linda is a bank teller who is active in
the feminist movement") is more probable than either of its components taken
separately). If the persons-- ordinary or sophisticated-- had utilized the laws of
probability calculus, the conjunction of the two parts should have been viewed as
less probable than its components. As Tversky and Kahneman demonstrated
that use of probability calculations was not the case-- respondents used some
other, non-logical and non-probabilistic -- ways of deciding about the present
status of Linda.
The prominence of the "conjunction fallacy" in human reasoning indicates
that applicability of probabilistic reasoning in everyday life reasoning is itself a
decision (which is not made by persons probabilistically or logically). Calculation
is a lengthy process, and is not simply applicable under conditions of limited
information and time pressure on the decision maker (see Gigerenzer's claim for
alternatives-- "fast and frugal heuristics", below). Probability-- in each of its three
meanings-- is applicable to real-life reasoning only in narrowly circumscribed
conditions. That narrow applicability applies to psychological decisions.

The cognitive "heuristics and biases" tradition in cognitive psychology has

emerged from the discovery that ordinary human beings do not follow the canons
of frequentistic probability thinking-- the base rates of the events thought about.
Tversky and Kahneman labeled such base-rate dismissing moves in thinking
"heuristics", and used a set of such heuristics to explain human reasoning. Thus,
for example, the representativeness heuristic entails

an assessment of the degree of correspondence between a

sample and a population, an instance and a category, an act and
an actor or, more generally, between an outcome and a model.
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1983, p. 295, added emphasis)

The notion of degree of correspondence is a subjective phenomenon that is

completely delegated to the intra-psychological subjective realm. Tversky and
Kahnemanwhether consciously or nothave brought modern cognitive
Valsiner 259

science back to the study of introspection. Yet they assume that human
reasoning might, in its subjectivity, be probabilistic.
The mixing of different perspectives described above (populational
frequencies with psychological salience of an instance, or model) is evident in the
case of the representativeness heuristic. "Heuristic" is a blanket term for a
cognitive complex that a person uses to solve a problem under the present
conditions.

The availability heuristic. Tversky and Kahneman formulated a whole set of

heuristics which they labeled in terms of assumed intra-psychological
introspective processes. Thus, that of availability is another shortcut around the
need to become involved in probability calculations:

A person is said to employ the availability heuristic whenever he

estimates frequency or probability by the ease with which instances
or associations could be brought to mind. To assess availability it is
not necessary to perform the actual operations of retrieval or
construction. It suffices to assess the ease with which these
operations could be performed, much as the difficulty of a puzzle or
mathematical problem can be assessed without considering
specific solutions. (Tversky & Kahneman, 1982, p. 164, added
emphases)

Again, the frequency of events is assumed to be parallel to subjective probability.

The notion of ease is a characteristic of the human mental system that is based
on the basic processes of associations.

The simulation heuristic. This construct was the last ultimate step in the
heuristics and biases research program to return to the study of processes of
introspection. Whereas in the case of representativeness and availability
heuristics the processes behind the invented labels remained unemphasized,
then in the case of the simulation heuristic there is a clear effort to bring those
processes out to the arena of investigation. The starting point for the simulation
heuristic

is a common introspection. There appear to be many situations

in which questions about events are answered by an operation that
resembles the running of a simulation model we construe the
output of simulation as an assessment of the ease with which the
model could produce different outcomes, given its initial conditions
and operating parameters. mental simulation yields a measure of
the propensity of ones model of the situation to generate various
outcomes. (Kahneman & Tversky, 1992, p. 201)
Valsiner 260

Simulation of events occurring within assumed (constructed) scenarios is

the process of problem-solving. The heuristics and biases program has re-
invented the mental problem solving processes (under the name of simulation)
that were effectively studied in introspection experiments of the Wrzburg
School as well as by its corollary researchersOtto Selz and Karl Duncker
(Simon, 1999). The critical (re)invention is the return to the need to study the
processes of decision making as those are taking place in the real timerather
than make inferences about those processes from their outcomes. The study of
such processes qua processes entails the need to consider time limits that exist
in various problem-solving tasks.

How can human thinking proceed at its regular speed?

Most of the phenomena captured by the "cognitive heuristics" are based

on laboratory tasks (such as the ones described above). The actual decision
making in real life takes place as the person detects a problem, and in
accordance with the time demands of the solution. There is often a time
pressure upon the decision making.
The need to act under uncertainty (of the future) and time pressure (of the
given problem definition) leads to the need for sturdy mechanisms of human
reflection. Such cognitive mechanisms have been labeled by Gerd Gigerenzer
fast and frugal heuristics (FFH). These are essentially psychological tools for
overlooking some parts of existing information for the sake of efficiency of the
decision. Thus,

Fast and frugal heuristics employ a minimum of time, knowledge,

and computation to make adaptive choices in real environments.
They can be used to solve problems of sequential search through
objects or options, as in satisficing. They can also be used to make
choices between simultaneously available objects, where the
search for information (in the form of cues, features, consequences,
etc.) about the possible options must be limited, rather than the
search for the options themselves. Fast and frugal heuristics limit
their search of objects or information using easily computable
stopping rules, and they may make their choices with easily
computable decision rules. (Gigerenzer, Todd, & ABC, 1999, p. 14)

In contrast to Tversky and Kahneman assumption of cognitive forming of

the solutions (via heuristics), Gigerenzer advocates a model of thinking that
operates upon regulation of the search process for answers. The mental system-
- facing with an ill-defined problem (e.g., "Which city has bigger population,
Munich or Antananarive?")-- utilizes the approximate information based on
familiarity of the names, and stops the decision process before it enters into long
calculations. Most of human reasoning is based on ignorance-- yet it works
sufficiently well in our life environments.
Valsiner 261

From FFH to semiotic mediation

Human reflected-upon world is inherently ambiguous-- despite its present

seemingly clear state, this can change at any moment. It is here where
Gigerenzer's "fast and frugal heuristics" share grounds with semiotic mediation
The latter reflects the conditionality of the states of the world. Thus, cultural
heroes, mothers, tricksters are employed in myth stories and discourse in
general to reflect the possible (conditional) changes of their conduct from one
extreme to another. In this respect, semiotically mediated world is a "personally
cautious world"-- different possible scenarios for what might happen with a
person under different conditions. The decisions about how to solve different
kinds of problemsranging from trivial decisions to those on which human lives
may depend (as in medicine) would lead to the use of one or another kind of
heuristic process.

Strategic uses of reasoning

Semiotic mediation reflects the desired (i.e., goals-oriented) reflection

upon the world. This may make it possible to ignore the ambiguity of the
conditional world, and represent the world in terms of unipolarity of a desired
sign. Here is where ideologies narrow down human complexity of reflection-- with
clear purpose. "Dialogue" in the case of ideological crusade is not a desired form
of interaction, if it is claimed to be of value it is a framework of superimposition of
the ideologist's missionary claim to gain control over "the other". Political
"dialogues", as well as advertisements in mass media that manifestly use the
notion of "dialogue" are aimed at disambiguating "the other's" field of conduct.
The process is simple-- a domain of human actions that previously had not been
highlighted, becomes now singled out as an "area of concern". The concern then
becomes reflected upon in ambiguous terms (guiding the persons towards
constructing their personal worries about this), Finally it becomes disambiguated
again, but now through making the disambiguating agent to be in control of
relieving the worries. A domain X becomes made into a "problem", and the
solutions to that "problem" become available as "services" by an exclusive set of
"professionals" who are "well-trained" to solve precisely these "problems." The
professional services of child psychology and education specialists need not
differ much from advice that grandmothers could give, yet its value is produced
by the professional construction of the "problem" and its "cure."

Freedom for making "the right" choice

The disambiguating strategies surely rely upon semiotically constructed

values that would make the external control of the issue acceptable. In many
societies of our time, the generalized complex of "freedom of choice" is utilized in
this process. Some years ago, when U.S. telephone companies were "de-
monopolized" (and many new companies could compete for the same
customers), TV commercials of the text like "now you have the CHOICE for your
Valsiner 262

provider of telephone services... we hope you to make the RIGHT choice" began
to appear. The new ambiguous situation for the clients-- who had not had to
bother about the "right" to "make choices" about telephone companies prior to
that time-- was immediately made into a domain of discursive activity, by goal-
oriented agents who controlled fully their version of provision of the given
knowhow. The "right do decide" (between telephone companies) was culturally
created within an existing set of possibilities, each of which (if chosen) would
gain full control over the given relation with the client who had decided in their
favour. The ambiguity of deciding (among options not revealed in full to the
prospective "clients") was generated socially, and immediately this set the stage
for various goal-oriented efforts of disambiguating the situation. The latter
operates with signs that exclude their opposites-- thus creating certainty and
eliminating doubts.
The crucial test of the advertising efforts would be to look for any signs of
doubt about the advertised product itself, communicated in the advertisement
text. This is particularly interesting in the case of products that are necessarily
inherently ambiguous-- all medical "drugs" carry inherent ambiguity with them
(not different from any other substance usable in human existence, tobacco and
alcohol included). Medicines can both cure and kill, which of the two scenarios
works in a given case is in principle indeterminate.
Thus, particular "side effects" of a medical drug for a particular person
cannot be predicted, and long-term "safety" of a drug is not testable in principle
(e.g., which pharmaceutical company would wait for 20 years to test the lack of
long-term negative effects of a drug that needs to capture the market now?).
These are inevitable, inherent ambiguities of human life in the "modern world",
which are ideologically turned into semiotic unambiguity (.e.g., "drug X is SAFE").
Thalidomide was "safe" as a drug administered to pregnant women until cases of
congenital bodily malformation were discovered-- in low frequencies, compared
to the wide use of the drug. Yet it was sufficient to lead to banning of the drug.
Asbestos in the architectural environment was once viewed as "safe"-- and in our
present time examples of quick abandonment of asbestos-infested buildings can
be reported.

Conclusions: abduction as process of innovation

Human thinking is simultaneously intra-mental and inter-mental process.

In its basic flow it belongs to the intra-mental domain. Yet most of its objects are
in the domains outside of the human individual psyche. Furthermore, the forms
for thinking are actively suggested by other people-- through different forms of
communication. Communication is not a flowery, utopian process of "sharing" or
"communion" of kindred souls. Instead it carries in it all of the human goals
orientations, tactical action plans, and -- most importantly-- ever-open
possibilities for modification of the communicative messages.
It is in the context of such openness of communicative messages that the
intra-mental process of thinking constitutes the force that creates relative stability
of the mind in the middle of the myriad of social suggestions. Yet there is always
Valsiner 263

the tension with the frameworks in the social world that attempt to guide the
thinking process. Thinking is guided both internally (through externalization of
the persons understanding of how to frame the here-and-now setting) and
externally -- some external social agent suggesting and demanding how the
person might, should, or just mustthink. Abduction here takes precedence over
induction and deduction. The highly valued freedom of thought is a negotiated
settlement, rather than a philosophical given.
Valsiner 264

Chapter 7. Semiotic fields in action: Affective guiding of the

internalization/externalization process

the airport official who asked cactus-pointed questions

wore no shirt, nor did the porters, so that Lillian decided to
be polite to the smoothest torso and show respect only to
the strongest muscle.
The absence of uniforms restored the dignity and
importance of the body. They all looked untamed and free
in their bare feet, as if they had assumed the duties of
receiving the travelers only temporarily and would soon
return to their hammocks, to swimming and singing. Work
was one of the absurdities of existence. Dont you think so,
Seorita? Said their laughing eyes while they appraised
her from head to toe. They looked at her openly, intently,
as children and animals do, with a physical vision,
measuring only physical attributes, charm, aliveness, and
not titles, possessions, or occupations. Their full, complete
smile was not always answered by foreigners, who blinked
at such warmth of smile as they did at the dazzling sun.
Against the sun they wore dark glasses, but against these
smiles and open naked glances they could only defend
their privacy with a half-smile. (Nin, 1987, pp. 466-467)

This sensual feeling of the encounter between an occasional traveler and

another human beingplaying the role of an official-- leads us to the center of
the role of subjectively emerging affect in the middle of the most mundane
everyday life events. Somehow our subjective worlds register some of the
details of our ambience-- a building we happen to pass by looks beautiful (or
ugly), our boss has either too big (or small) a nose which we evaluate in the
middle of a business meeting, or children make too much noise (or are
suspiciously quiet), the TV or radio is too loud or desirably inaudibly quiet (as a
background for our actions), and so on. We construct meaning for many small,
seemingly inconsequential, events in our lives. Yet it is these inconsequential
events that have enormous consequencewe live through these episodic
subjective constructions. We create ever new ones as we are on the moveand
let them guide our further movement. It is a form of subjective curiosity about the
Fernweh (see Boesch, chapter 5) that is in our nearest next step of encounters
with our environments.
All these episodic constructions involve feelingand possible reflection
upon feeling through the use of signs. These feelings emerge through our
constant process of experiencing within the environments through which we pass
Valsiner 265

as temporary participants in the events that are taking place. Furthermorewe

actively participate in the making of such experiencesby creating dramas,
tragedies, adventures, and social norms.
The central thesis of the semiotic perspective in cultural psychology as put
forth in this book is straightforward-- human psychological life in its sign-mediated
forms is affective in its nature. We make sense of our relations with the world
and of the world itselfthrough our feelings that are themselves culturally
organized through the creation and use of signs. The realm of feelings is central
for the construction of personal cultures. The mentalreflexive (or cognitive)
side is an emergent semiotic tool to organize the affective relating with the world.

Human development: microgenesis, mesogenesis, and ontogenesis

The centrality of affective experiencing is a whole that is created in time--

never to recur in the specific ways it took place, yet illuminating our further
potential encounters. It is regulated sociallythrough social suggestions that are
encoded into signs at different levels of generalization and in three mutually
embedded domains of continuous experiencingmicrogenetic, mesogenetic,
and ontogenetic (see Figure 7.1.)
Human immediate living experience is primarily microgeneticoccurring
as the person faces the ever-new next time moment in the infinite sequence of
irreversible time. In order to create stability of psychological kind, the person
creates semiotic devicesmeaning fieldsthat temporarily stabilize that lurking
chaos (Boesch, 2005) of experiencing ever-new moments. Such semiotic
construction is constant and overabundantthe creativity of human psyche in
generating new meanings while living ones life is hyper-productive. Most of the
semiotic devices created are abandonedsome before their use (intermediate
gestalts of the process of AktualgeneseValsiner & van der Veer, 2000, chapter
7), others after their use and under the conditions of no need for further use. Of
course there are many semiotic devicesmeaningsthat are retained over
ontogenesis, and someover the course of human cultural history 88.
Thus, personal cultures are tools fort creating subjective stability on the
background of inevitable uncertainties of experiencing. They are assisted by the
collective cultural canalization of these experiencesinto culturally structured
activity settings. Such settings operate as a mesogenetic organizational level of
human cultural ways of being (Saada-Robert, 1994). The mesogenetic level
consists of relatively repetitive situated activity frames, or settings. Thus, a
situated activity context such as praying, or going to school, or to a bar, or taking
a shower or bath, are all recurrent frames for human action that canalize the
subjective experiencing by setting up range of possible forms for such
experiencing.

88
Architectural encoding of cultural valuesthrough temples, mosques, churches, military fortifications,
and markets are an example of maintenance of ontogenetic new formations across generations.
Valsiner 266

Figure 7.1. Relations between ontogenesis, mesogenesis, and

microgenesis (Aktualgenese).

ONTOGENETIC MAINTENANCE

MESOGENETIC PROCESS (activity contexts)

MICROGENETIC PROCESS (Aktualgenese)

Finallythe most enduring aspect of human cultural life is the ontogenesis

of the personthe development of the person through the whole life course.
Here some selected experiencessome directly from the microgenetic domain,
othersthrough the recurrent mesogenetic eventsbecome transformed into
relatively stable meaning structures that guide the person within ones life course
(see Valsiner, 1998 on the semiotic look at personality).

Relations between levels of organization of experience. Figure 7.1. indicates

that there is no isomorphismone-to-one correspondencebetween the three
organizational levels of human living. Some microgenetic events-- one time,
unexpected, events in ones life that are not guided by the mesogenetic
collective-cultural framingmay make a major impact for the ontogenetic level.
Thus, the persons surviving a near-accident scenario, or a special feeling of
unity with a particular partner in the act full mutuality (see Example 7.1. below)
may become relevant for the construction of ones ontogenetic life trajectory.
Other one-time deeply affective moments within personal livessuch as the
death of a mother, father, friend, etc.may be collective-culturally assisted by
mesogenetic events that become integrated into the ontogenetic structure of
developing subjectivity. Collective-culturally the microgenetic experience is
Valsiner 267

supported and guided through mesogenetic forms (e.g., collective-cultural funeral

and mourning rituals) to buffer their potential impact for the ontogenetic
organizational level. It is obvious that lack of one-to-one correspondences
between these levels is adaptive for the successful survival of the person within
his or her life course. The encounter (at the microgenetic level) with dramatic
and traumaticlife events is inevitable in the course of living. The people who
live encounter death of others around them, personal losses, changes between
peace- and war-times, and so on. Yet it is important that such highly affective
experiences not hinder their basic progression through their life courses.
In Figure 7.2. a set of some theoretically possible relations between the
levels of life-course organization are presented. Figure 7.2.A. shows theoretically
possible relations between the levels of microgenesis and ontogenesis if there
were no central organizer of the mesogenetic level. Here we can observe three
(out of the many) possibilities that can be recognized as existing social
representations of the developmental transitions in the thinking of social
scientists. Thus, trajectory A entails a belief that the frequency of
microgenetically similar recurrent events accumulates over time linearly to impact
ontogenesis. If that model were true, the concerns of educationalists about the
teaching/learning processes of human beings should be easy to satisfymerely
providing an increase in similar educational experiences should by mere
recurrence guarantee ontogenetic progression. No assumption of action by the
teachers, nor counter-action by the learner, has a place in trajectory A.
Trajectory B provides us with a social representation of how a single but
affectively traumatic life event might decay in its ontogenetic relevance if it
enters into a phase of recurrence of similar events. People become habituated to
similar traumatic events and their impact on ontogeny is reduced. The reverse
is true for trajectory Cwhere recurrence of similar events leads to some gradual
explosion of the transfer from the microgenetic to the ontogenetic domain. This
would substantiate an educational philosophy of providing the learner with
recurrent and wide immediate experiences (e.g., such as surrounding the childs
environment with books, artwork, music, etc) in the expectation that at some
moment of quantitative increase of the exposure there is a qualitative translation
of the experiences into the ontogenetic life-trajectory.
If we introduce the notion of mesogenetic constraining into this
relationship of microgenesis and ontogenesis (Figure 7.2.B.), the monotonicity of
the theoretical relations becomes very different. For instance, the trauma focus
(trajectory B) constrained by X leads to the use of the one-time trauma for its
maintenancewithout the relevance of its recurrence. The one-time event by
its symbolic memoriesbuffers the person against impacts of further similar
events. Thus, the initiation of adolescents into adulthood, or of the military
recruits into military actions, are expected to symbolically buffer their
psychological systems against the impacts of similar events.
Valsiner 268

Figure 7.2. Different theoretically possible forms of relations between

microgenesis, mesogenesis, and ontogenesis

A. Possible forms of microgenetic ontogenetic translation

A
B= trauma focus
O
N M
T A
O I
G N
E T
N E
E N
T A C = learning
I N focus
C C
E

MICROGENETIC

B. How the mesogenetic level organizes the microgenesis ontogenesis

translation

O B= trauma focus
N M
T A
O I
G N
T Y
E
N E
E N
T A C = learning
I N X focus
C Z
C
E

MICROGENETIC

MESOGENETIC
CONSTRAINTS (X, Y, Z)
Valsiner 269

However, more interesting is the mesogenetic constraining of the learning

focus (C) where some intermediate level of microgenetic recurrent events is set
up to be the focus for intense translation to the ontogenetic level. Constraints Z
and Y canalize that transitionyet after that transition has already happened
there is no further relevance for the maintenance of the translated experience.
Once established ontogeneticallyunder mesogenetic guidancefurther
microgenetic experiencing is no longer necessary, even if it actually occurs.
Children may be guided to learn to read and write after some accumulation of
encounters with the printed materials in some educational settings. Once they
master such skillsunder educational guidancefurther encounters need not
translate into any further ontogenetic relevance of such skills. If left uninstructed
at relevant times (by mesogenetic constraining) they may still eventually reach
some level of the skill by mere unconstrained accumulation (trajectory A).
The focus on the mesogenetic level becomes thus crucial for an analysis
of cultural-psychological phenomena (see chapter 8). Particularly important is the
analysis of processes that proceed between the different levels (as indicated in
Figure 7.1. by arrows). Mesogenetic eventsdue to their relative stabilityare
most easily detectable for observation and analysis. Yet in and by themselves
they are not relevantit is their in-between role (linking the never-ending
uniqueness of the microgenetic flow and the relatively conservative progression
of ontogeny) that makes it into a methodological entrance point into the study of
cultural-psychological processes. It is the affective creation of signs operating
between the levels that guarantees both human cultural development of novel
forms of being and the blocking of the myriad of immediate experiences.

Affectfeeling fields and emotion categories

In cultural psychology, the question of primary affect (at its physiological

level) is a precursor for the meaningful construction of feelings and emotions.
The physiological processes of nerve excitation and inhibition constitute the basis
of all feelings and emotions. Yet these phenomena cannot be reduced to these
physiological processes. They entail subjective reflexive characteristics that are
prominent in the person's self-reflection. These characteristics are made
available through semiotic mediation. Yet the nature of affective phenomena sets
the stage for conceptual difficulties for psychologists and linguists to make sense
of them. Consider the following imaginary dialogue between a Linguist (L) and
Psychologist (P) on the role of language in dealing with affect:

P: Sadness and anger are universal human conditions.

L: Sadness and anger are English words, which do not have
equivalents in all other languages. Why should these English
words-- rather than some words from language X, for which
English has no equivalents-- capture correctly some emotional
universals?
Valsiner 270

P: It doesn't matter whether other languages have words for

sadness and anger or not. Let's not deify words! I am talking
about emotions, not about words.
L: Yes, but in talking about these emotions you are using culture-
specific English words, and thus you are introducing an Anglo
perspective on emotions into your discussion.
P: I don't think so. I am sure that people in those other cultures also
experience sadness and anger, even if they don't have words for
them.
L: Maybe they do experience sadness and anger, but their
categorization of emotions is different from that reflected in the
English lexicon. Why should the English taxonomy of emotions
be a better guide to emotional universals than that embodied in
some other language?
P: Let's not exaggerate the importance of language.
(Wierzbicka, 1997, p. 9)

Where verbal language fails. The difficulty of using language to denote

something felt (but not immediately language-encoded) has been a problem for
psychology ever since the disputes about William James' ideas about feelings
(James, 1890, Dewey, 1896). The affective phenomena are dynamically
complex, often defying even elaborate description in terms of ordinary language.
It is my claim in this book that such verbal inaccessibility to affective phenomena
is part of the psychological centrality of affect in human functioning. In other
termsit is the issue of feelings in contrast to categories of emotion (which are
discretely describable in language)that is the core of human condition.
One of the pioneers in the study of affective phenomena, Felix Krueger,
emphasized the distinction of phenomena of feeling:

the experience of a normal individual (and also all social

experience) consists in its main bulk of indistinctly bounded,
diffused, slightly or not at all organized complexes in whose
genesis all organs and functional systems take part. It is significant
and not at all obvious that, at least in adult human beings and
higher animals, the total state of their experience often unfolds into
a multitude of relatively closed part-complexes. But even in the
highest stages of development, this is not always the case, e.g., in
states of the highest, permanent excitement, great fatigue, most
complete self-subservience. Even when we observe experience in
relief, its organization, as a rule, does not correspond at all and
may never correspond exactly to the limitations of objects created
by intellect, or to objective "situations" Never are the
differentiable parts or sides of real experience as isolated from one
another as the parts of physical substance, i.e. its molecules and
atoms. (Krueger, 1928, p. 67)
Valsiner 271

The subjective world of a human being is constantly in the state of a

complex whole of the immediate experience which is dynamically changing.
Henri Bergson (1907) labeled that flowing subjectivity duration (dure). All
semiotic processes that the person brings into one's life are oriented towards
regulating and directing that flow into some selected future direction. Human
beings are acting and feeling towards the future. John Dewey expressed this
sentiment

Anticipation is more primary than recollection; projection than

summoning of the past; the prospective than the retrospective.
Given a world like that in which we live, a world in which environing
changes are partly favorable and partly callously indifferent, and
experience is bound to be prospective in import; for any control
attainable by the living creature depends upon what is done to alter
the state of things Imaginative forecast of the future is the
forerunning quality of behavior rendered available for guidance in
the present. Day-dreaming and castle-building and esthetic
realization of what is not practically achieved are offshoots of this
practical trait, or else practical intelligence is a chastened fantasy.
(Dewey. 1917, p. 13)

We feel forwardbut how can this be conceptualized? Cultural

psychology is interested in basic principles of human affective life as it is
semiotically organizedand thus organizes itself.

Universal semantic primitives and the duality of meaning fields

What different possibilities exist for conceptualizing the complexity of the

affective fields? The differentiated field notion (of above) can be complemented
by general abstract depiction of emotions through the simplest possible linguistic
terms ("semantic primitives"-- Wierzbicka, 1992). These "minimal concepts"
(such as: I, you, someone, something, this, want, don't want, think, say, imagine,
feel , part, world, become) are used to set up structures for different emotions in
different languages.
Anna Wierzbicka has analyzed a key concepts used in different languages
to refer to affective phenomena (Wierzbicka, 1997). As an example of the use of
her depicting the terms, consider the analysis of depressed:

X feels something
Sometimes a person thinks something like that:
I can think: something bad will happen to me
I can't think: something good will happen to me
I can't think: I will do something good
Because of this, this person feels something bad
X feels like this (Wierzbicka, 1992, p. 565)
Valsiner 272

This minimalist example reiterates the assumed mental operations

(distinction of the NO GOOD versus SOMETHING BAD happening to person),
and the incapacity to think of one's activity.
In terms of the theory of duality of meaning (chapter 3), Wierzbickas
semantic primitives can be viewed as dynamic field structures (Figure 7.3.).

Figure 7.3. The duality field of depressed

FEELING something
FEELING NON-something

SOMETHING BAD WILL

HAPPEN TO ME

BLO
Non-BAD =
BAD something good
WILL HAPPEN

Cant think: SOMETHING GOOD

WILL HAPPEN TO ME
Valsiner 273

Semiotics of the domain of feelings.

The subjective world is the world of feelings (German Gefhl, French

sentiment, Hindi rasa, Italian sentimento, Russian chuvstva), on the basis of
which different circumscribed emotions (German Affekt, French motion, Italian
emozione, Russian emotsii) are differentiated through semiotically based
reflexivity. Such reflexivity entails generalization based on recurrent unique
experiences that lead to the establishment of the use of one or another concrete
term (e.g., [fuzzy field of I feel something fear is that what I feel)
The boundaries between different areas of feelings-- as well as those
between feelings and emotions-- have been traditionally unclear in psychology.
Emotions have been usually viewed as categories (in English: happiness,
sadness, surprise, fear, disgust, anger are considered as "basic emotions" and
even acclaimed to be pan-human-- Ekman, Friesen & Ellsworth, 1972). In
contrast, feelings are irreducible to emotions. They are intra-psychological
(accessible to their bearer through introspection, and to others only if expressed
in some action), they pre-suppose an object, and include evaluation as part of
their being. As human experience is constantly directed towards the future-- in
pre-adaptation to the uncertainty of that future-- the evaluation in the feeling is
diffuse, yet directed.
Human affective processes are of the kind of complexity that has been a
problem for straightforward efforts to describe and explain those. Cultural
mediating devicesmeaningsare closely intertwined with that complexity.
They emerge from amidst of that complexity. Human experiencing of every here-
and-now setting is embedded within a field of self-generated affect, which can be
depicted as fields. Furthermore, such fields growbecome wider (and end up all-
encompassing hyper-generalized fieldssomething labeled depression), or
narrow down to the point-like state of specific emotion categories (statement I
am surprised).

Example 7.1. Affective pilgrimages by the self onto the Other. Of course that
cruelty is mutual between genders, and fits the present perspective of
interpersonal closeness as an act of personal pilgrimage. The pilgrims here
undertake a journey into the unknown but idealized intimate worlds of the Other.
The utmost crossing of boundaries of the self and the other happens in selected
moments of unity of the self and the world, as in devotional acts or religious or
sensual moments of ecstasy. For instance, introspective accounts of orgasma
theme of much interest that is usually outside of the public talkability or private
tellability domain-- reveals the structure of oppositesunity and non-unityeven
in the highest moments of affective experience:

A male report: Before orgasm there is a tendency to the manifestation of

contradictory impulses, as for instance to destroy, and at the same time to
embrace; to separate, and at the same time to fuse
Valsiner 274

At the moment of orgasm I felt something like an identification with

space. When studying this primitive explanation more carefully I now see it
very clearly; for instance the following image occurs very frequently: it is
astronomical space with its constellations of stars, each one of which is
my own self, but not as identical beings and in an abstract manner, but as
desperate effort to give a biological value to an abstraction.

A female report: As far as space feelings are concerned, intercourse

presents a paradox: a feeling of expansion into infinity, a blending into the
universe about one, a melting and fusingyet also a feeling of infinite
contraction, of an intense focusing to a minute part of space and even into
a small part of ones physical self as it ordinarily is. There is another
paradox in the identifications loss with ones partner, and yet a realization
that I am myself, unalterable. (Matte Blanco, 1998, p. 441-442)

It may well be the case that access to the concentrated feeling of the
present moment is available rarelyand the post-factum introspections of
orgasm may be one of these rare reports. The meanings of starspresenting the
selfconstitute substantive analog to the notion of Dialogical Self (chapter 3).
Internalized notions of celestial configurations, as well as the unity of fusion and
un-fusion (being together and simultaneously being alone) indicate the basic dual
unity of the opposites (chapter 2).

From personal pilgrimages to personal-cultural appropriation. On the basis

of our coverage of Dialogical Self (chapter 3) and Lewins look at the layers of
bounded self-fields ranging from infinite personal-subjective center to the conduct
in the public universe (chapter 5), we can consider all establishment of
interpersonal relations as an act of subjective pilgrimage into the valued and
charming center of the others personal unknown. That core of personal culture is
the inner infinity as conceptualized by William Stern (1935, p. XXX). The Kerala
author Kamala Daswriter of many recognized short stories in Malayalamhas
commented in one of her short stories:

A woman in love is never satisfied if her lover remembers with only

one part of his body. She wishes to grow like cancer within him, to
fill him with awareness and pain. This is the special cruelty of
love.(Das, 1993, p. 79)

The patterns of family and marriage (chapter 4) provide collective-cultural

frameworks for such acts of personal-cultural colonizing of the Other. It is an
ontogenetic parallel to the Bakhtinian notion of a voice expressing itself through
another voice within the dialogical self. Members of a multi-generational family
create their personal-cultural objectives through feeling with the other
grandparents feel with their children and grandchildren in life activities that are no
longer available to them (or never were). Teenagers feel with their favorite pop-
stars without ever entering into intercourse with them. The reality of personal-
Valsiner 275

cultural worlds entails constant extension of that world to the immediate

environment, including the case of affective Miterleben (German: experiencing
with, or feeling into-- Einfhlung) with others. The Hindi notion of rasa-- an
aesthetic feeling that is created in the process of experiencing art or in the middle
of sensual passion (srngara rasa) in dance and intimacy organizes the persons
future in relating with the world. Rasa is created by the process of becoming
(bhava) that involves active agency of the person.

Affect in boundary crossing

The appeal of crossing boundaries is set up by the boundary of

irreversible timehuman striving for the unknown is an inevitable aspect of
beingcreating noveltywhich in itself is an act of boundary crossing. The
social worlds that the human beings inhabit are set up to canalize that intrinsic
striving for the unknown in the direction of interests of different social power
units. It is not surprising that adolescents, post-adolescents, or children are
recruited as warriors all over human history, and that the striving for unspecified
union with the other becomes a powerful basis for religious conversion.
Personal movement towards the lures of the unknown is guided by the social
expectations web of interested collective power units.
Phenomena of human affectivity are organized at different levels, from
those closest to immediate physiological processes, to hyper-abstracted and
over-generalized higher level total feelings. A hypothetical depiction of these
levels is given in Figure 7.4.
The hierarchy of levels of semiotic mediation of affective processes that is
depicted in Figure 7.4. sets up within the same scheme emotions and feelings of
different generality. Level 0 is the universal-- for all animal kingdom--
physiological anticipation about the immediate next future event in life. Based on
that level, the organisms can develop generalized, non-mediated "feeling tone"
(or anticipatory affective state, kind of undifferentiated awareness of something--
positive, negative, or ambivalent-- that is about to happen). These Level 1
phenomena do not require semiotic mediation-- they are pre-verbal
generalizations. One can grant the reality of dog-lovers' reports about their
favorite pets "feeling with" them at times of the owners' sadness or happiness--
these phenomena (on the dogs' side) can belong to Level 1. Pre-verbal
generalization allows for the organism to maintain previous experiences for
further use, but does not require their encoding through signs.
Semiotically mediated (i.e., cultural) organization of the affective field
begins at the move from Level 0 to Level 1. The person's primary affective field is
already oriented by the person's previous experience. It becomes articulated at
Level 2-- where specific naming of emotions present "in" the experiencing
person, by the person oneself, is taking place. The undifferentiated field of a
particular directional quality (e.g., positive, negative, or ambivalent) becomes
reflected upon through assigning the present state of the field a specifying name
for the emotion felt. So, the person can say "I am sad", "I am disgusted", "I am
happy" or talk about emotions like HAPPINESS, SADNESS, ANGER,
Valsiner 276

SURPRISE, etc. as if those are permanent properties of human affective life.

Valsiner 277

Figure 7.4. Processes of generalization and hyper-generalization in

affective regulation of the flow of experience

I FEEL something overwhelming

Level 4
cannot describe it clearly but it
(hyper-generalized
makes me to feel like
affective semiotic X [access at Level 3]
fieldcreates
subjective Gefhston)

Level 41

Level 3
(generalized cate-
gories of feeling) I feel BAD (or Level 31
GOOD, or
[general label-
rasa]

Level 2 Level 21
(specific emotion
SAD HAPPY
terms)

Level 1
(general immediate
pre-semiotic feeling
subjective experience
New
and its natural
Differentiating feeling based on (constrained)
Gefhston)
physiological arousal feeling

Level 0
PHYSIOLOGICAL
LEVEL
(excitation and
inhibition)
Valsiner 278

Sign mediation creates the psychological distance of the thinker/talker

from the differentiating affective field-- discussing issues of human happiness
does not mean that the discussing person oneself is happy. All the cognitive
activity of persons that concentrates upon the decontextualizing emotions-- in
terms of their specific categories or general prototypes-- takes place at Level 2.
That is the level of maximum articulation of the semiotic encoding of the affective
field (in terms of Werner's and Kaplan's "orthogenetic principle" (Werner &
Kaplan, 1956). Still it does not amount to maximal hierarchical integration. The
latter-- as will be shown later-- can entail the development of a higher level de-
differentiated field.
The mediational processes of Level 2 can become further generalized in
ways that lead to higher-level (in terms of abstraction) de-differentiation of the
affective field. Level 3 in Figure 7.4. depicts a situation where a person-- after
excessive use of emotion categories in one's internal self-dialogue-- arrives at a
new generalized-- yet ill-defined-- self-reflection. Thus, a statement "I feel bad"
can result from generalization higher in abstractness than specification of
emotion categories (sad, disgusted).

The escalation of abstraction of feeling: hypergeneralization. Finally, the

generalization of the sign-mediated field of feelings can reach the highest level of
overgeneralization-- that of a semiotically mediated state which is at the same
time de-differentiated (Level 4). This entails emergence of feeling fields that
overtake the persons psyche in its totalityyet these are not immediate (level
01) diffuse phenomena. The person "just feels" something but cannot put
that feeling into words.
Examples of aesthetic feelings-- catharsis experienced during a theatre
performance, reading deeply moving poems or prose, or in an interpersonal
situation of extreme beauty indicate that human affective field can become
undifferentiated as a result of extensive abstraction of the emotions involved, and
their overgeneralization to the person's general feelings about oneself or about
the world. Theoretically, that process entails internalization and abbreviation .
It becomes important to emphasize that-- contrary to Werner's and
Kaplan's "orthogenetic principle" or Lev Vygotskys emphasis on use of concepts-
- the highest levels of hierarchical integration do not entail increased articulation
of the parts of the affective system, but just to the contrary-- the highest level of
hierarchical integration is that of an hyper-generalized ("nebulous") semiotically
mediated feeling ("higher feeling") subordinating all rational (Level 2) discourse
about emotions to its ever-present (inarticulate) guidance.
The example of the difficulty that psychology has had with the treatment of
some higher-order affective phenomena-- such as values (see Valsiner, Branco,
& Melo Dantas, 1997)-- is indicative of this process. Even as values can be
posited-- and traced-- to be present in human conduct, bringing them out into the
domain of explicit reflection by the carriers of values has been difficult. Values
are basic human affective guidance means that are ontogenetically internalized,
but their externalization can be observed in any aspect of human conduct. Yet as
Valsiner 279

they have reached such hyper-generalized way of being, they are no longer
easily accessible through verbally mediated processes. We can decisively act as
directed by our valuesbut are ill at ease telling others what these values are. If
we succeed, we have performed the Level 43 translation of a hypergeneralized
semiotic field into general verbal statements (e.g., I feel totally dedicated to
science) that may refer to the direction of the values but cannot capture them in
their entirety. Values are not entitiesbut dynamic semiotic fieldswhile
superimposition of language onto such nebulus-but-real fields makes them into
an entity (see chapter 8 on the perils of entification for methodology)

From hyper-generalized feeling fields to the semiotic mediation of affect.

In human life, affective fields of higher kind-- as depicted in Figure 7.4.--

regulate experience in its totality. Affective fields can be hyper-generalized
meanings that have left their original context of emergence and flavour new
experiences. Thus, a person may develop the notion "life is unfair from a series
of life events of being mistreated.
Once hyper-generalized, the field sign of affective tone begins to colour
manysometimes each and everynew experience. The person can look at the
rising (or setting) sun and consider this to carry the flavour of unfairness of life.
A persons depressive feelings can give colouring to each and every encounter
with the world, even if it is impossible for her or him to describe those verbally. A
flow of a general feeling just takes over the intra-personal world of the person,
begins to control ones concrete actions, and debilitate any efforts to counteract
it. A person covered with a flow of depressive feelings cannot do anything to
overcome those; a person overcome by a field of maniacal desires cannot stop
oneself from hyper-action.

Verbal encoding as guided by affective semiotic fields. The feed-forward

from Level 4 organizers to Level 2 (explicit discourse about emotions) entails the
pre-organization of the vocabulary for reflecting the feeling. This pre-
organization entails a range of possibilities ranging from blocking the mentioning
of a given feeling, to exaggeration of the use of a particular general verbal term
beyond a feeling implied. The issue of secrecy within any society (or in personal
culture) creates the basis for de-emphasizing talking about culturally constructed
feelings-- when such feelings relate with the fear of spirits (e.g., George, 1993).
The other extreme in the cultural setup by Level 4 of how to talk about
feelings in terms of emotions (Level 2) can be found in over-expansion of the
semantic field of the sign. Thus, in English it is possible to talk about love in
relation to (obviously) feelings towards someone that a person tries to describe
(to oneself or to others), together with the use of the same term in relation to
mundane objects (ice-cream, broccoli, etc.). As a result, talking about the feeling
of love becomes both socially acceptable (habitual) and distanced from the
actual feeling (of Level 4). If a person, after eloquently telling others how much
she loves broccoli, diet pills, sports cars, Fendi perfume, etc. subsequently talks
about her love for her boyfriend the meaning of the expression "love" is very
Valsiner 280

different than in the case where a person can barely utter the word to the other
person towards whom the feeling is directed. In contrast, for the Dhulo (in
Kenya), the approximate equivalent of English "love"-- hera -- is not a meaning
concentrating on feeling, but rather on social relation 89. For the Dhulo it is
impossible to denote the sentiments of feeling deeply for somebody as "falling in
love". Likewise, the American English "have crush on X" cannot be translated
into other languages.

Example 7.2. The Christmas spirit. The relations between Level 3 and Level
4 in Figure 7.4. are bi-directional. On the one hand, the generalizing semiotically
encoded feeling keeps open the general direction of feeling. On the other hand,
that feeling becomes constructed as a de-differentiated field, and thus "vanishes"
from the direct and crisp linguistic depiction, and becomes a "feeling-at-large".
Consider the following depiction of the "Christmas spirit":

A major festival like Christmas among English-speaking North

Americans is accompanied by a stereotypical set of emotions.
Certainly, we do not all actually feel these emotions: for many,
Christmas is primarily lived, according to self-reports and actions, in
a mode of disgust at overindulgence or in a heightened sense of
loneliness. But this does not mean that Christmas evokes feelings
at random [factors evoking feeling] depend on personal
elements that to a large degree are common to those who share
common experiences and a common exposure to stories, songs,
images, and ritual practices-- all features that reinforce a message
of comfort and joy, homeyness, and familial good cheer. For most
English-speaking North Americans... such evocation of "Christmas
cheer" or "Christmas spirit" extends beyond the words or images
used to provoke it to involve in what we commonly call feelings.
The exact nature of one's feelings will depend on background and
circumstances but include a range of positive and negative
emotions that are themselves reactions to the central stereotypical
emotion of familal and universal love and coziness. (Leavitt, 1996,
p. 527, added emphases)

The "Christmas spirit" is an over-generalized field which-- being labeled as

such (Level 3)-- entails feelings which guide lower levels of dealing with bodily
experiences and categories of emotion. Any encounter by a person with an
environment filled with Christmas paraphernalia (e.g., pervasive Christmas
songs) can lead to primary feelings (Level 1) which become framed by the
89
As is evident from the following examples:
Onyango ohero chiege = Onoyango loves his wife
Oloo gi Aloo oherore = Oloo and Aloo love each other
Atieno ema chuny Onyango ohero = Atieno is the one whose heart Onyango loves
Atieno ema chuny Onyango oyiego = Atieno is the one who the heart of Onyango agrees with
Onyango rembe owinjore gi Atieno= Onyango his blood agrees with Atieno
(Omondi, 1997, pp. 107-108)
Valsiner 281

highest (Level 4) affective field. The person may feel in the bliss of "Christmas
spirit"-- or in the middle of unspeakable alienation (dependent upon the semiotic
organization of the Level 4 field). Both of these extreme ways of structuring the
feelings can be accomplished without direct verbal mediation-- the persons need
not talk about their feelings in the setting, neither to one another, nor within
themselves.

Highest semiotic fields: personal life philosophies

An appropriate example of such abstracted and hyper-generalized field of
regulating affect is the ways in which different religious systems have dealt with
the complex of life phenomena labeled suffering. Suffering is a label potentially
usable at many different levels of generality (e.g. "I suffer from the snoring of my
husband" to "I suffer because of all the injustice in the world"). It is a term that
refers to the person's generalized feeling (Level 4 in Figure 7.4.), and it colors the
ways in which people conduct their daily lives.
Psychology has been a discipline that developed within the European,
Christianity-dominated social context. Hence it has been guided by the prevailing
life philosophies of Christianity as those have transformed all European social life
since the 4th Century AD. In respect to the meaning complex of suffering,
Christianity has acknowledged it, and turned it into a vehicle to attain its social
goals in regulating human lives. Max Scheler has described it in the following
way:

In Christianity, there is mellowing of the soul in totally enduring

suffering either alone or with others. However, an entirely new
source of power emerges that sustains suffering, a power that flows
of a blessedly intuited higher order of things as revealed through
love, insight, and action. The endurance of suffering has a new
meaning-- it is a purification by God's compassionate love, which
has sent suffering as a friend of the soul. Only through these two
thoughts together did Christianity, without reinterpretation,
apparently succeed in integrating the full gravity and misery of
suffering as an essential factor with the order of the world and its
redemption. In spite of its torment, Christianity succeeded in
making suffering a welcome friend of the soul, not an enemy to be
resisted. Suffering is purification, not punishment or correction.
(Scheler, 1992, pp. 110-111)

Cultural construction of SUFFERING as PURIFICATION is a way to

maintain the focus on that complex feeling, and to get it to function for specific
social goals. By maintaining the suffering by the social suggestion that it is
purifying, Christianity guides its followers to accept its teaching through their
regular being within their lives.
An alternative treatment of suffering in human cultural history is its
elimination by persons' active work of psychological distancing of the generalized
Valsiner 282

feeling from the rest of experiences. In terms of the contents of Figure 7.4., that
entails turning the two-sided relation Level 3 Level 4 into a single-direction
relation (Level 4 Level 3). As a result, the over-generalized feeling becomes
unmentionable in terms of verbal encoding (or it becomes "empty"-- see the
Taoist notion of mu-- in Ohnuki-Tierney, 1994). The highest level of semiotic
regulation of the affective fields is that of being "beyond the ordinary" life
experiences-- as oriental ascetics create their highest goals in living. In the
Buddhist world, the suffering is to be eliminated by distancing:

"Elimination of suffering" in Buddhist thought means no more than

to unmask, by means of spontaneously obtained knowledge, the
chimera of objects existing independently of us. This means
locating the void of "nothing"-- in the sense that things no longer
resist us-- at exactly the point where the things previously appeared
in their separate existence with all their prominence, freshness, and
splendor. As seen with complete knowledge, the world and nothing,
nirvana, are strictly parallel correlates. For Buddha, knowledge is
not "participation," "image," "order," or "form," but an emptying of
the contents of the world from our apprehension by severing the
chain of desire that binds us to these contents and makes their
existence possible. Knowledge is thus a stopping of the conflict as
to whether our worlds contents exist or do not exist in our
immediate present; in this respect, knowledge is primarily an
abolishing of all affirmations or denials of existence. (Scheler,1992,
p. 105)

The elimination of suffering through distanced emptiness as knowledge

functionally accomplishes the same social goals that the emphasis on suffering
as purification does for the Christians-- it guides the persons towards acting
(either in suffering-in-the field, or in distancing in-relation-with the field), and
through such acting-- to the acceptance of the given life philosophy. That
philosophy becomes personal-- through internalization/externalization (as
described below).
Individuals need not become followers of the given religion-- in fact they
may be active opponents of the organizer religions-- yet their life philosophies are
framed by the orientation towards suffering within which they develop (see Figure
7.5.)
Valsiner 283

Figure 7.5. How collective-cultural social suggestions are processed by

the personal-cultural hyper-generalization of affective fields.

RECONSTITUTED GENERAL
SOCIALLY SUGGESTED
VALUE (suffering = purification=
GENERAL VALUE (suffering =
ascetism)
THE
EXTRA-
PERSONA
L
SOCIAL
WORLD

CONSTRUCTION OF
AFFECTIVE
FIELDS THE
INTRA-
PERSONA
L

PERSONAL

PERSONAL LIFE EXPERIENCING IN IRREVERSIBLE TIME

Any person encounters in the social world some general suggestion for a
particular direction of how to feel; (e.g., "feeling of suffering is important for
becoming pure"). Such general suggestion is embedded in the person's
surroundings in many different versions. Such encodings include visual signs in
the environments, explicit or implicit comments by other human beings, texts of
literature, films and TV programs, etc. etc. The person cannot ignore the input of
these suggestions, and in one way or another (see chapter 9 on
internalization/externalization) relates to them. As a result, the general suggested
value becomes relevant in the person's own organization of the development.
This leads to two kinds of "side effects" over ontogeny-- the person externalizes
a personally modified model of the value (GENERAL RECONSTRUCTED
Valsiner 284

VALUE) to the social realm, where it becomes as part of the "input" to some
others (e.g., parents' reconstructed values become part of the social suggestion
system for the offspring). The second "side effect" of the process entails the
development and consolidation of one's own personal life philosophy. Human
beings may become contemplative analysts of their life wisdom over their life
courses.

Example 7.3. Semiotic structure of jealousy. Algirdas Greimas (Greimas and

Fontaneille, 1993, chapter 3) analysis of the creation of the feeling of jealousy
through intra-personal semiotic activity would illustrate the personal being-in-the
world (possession of objects) and constructing the hyper-generalized feeling
fields that guide (and at times completely overtake) the conduct of a person. At
the level of immediate relating with the world, a person guided by jealousy is
obsessed with details all linked together through the indeterminate worry of the
loss of an objectusually a personwho is being considered ones ownto a
rival. Here the connection of the feeling field of jealousy to the social meanings
of personal (rather than communal sharing) nature of objects, and the notion of
ownership, come into play. Thus,

The jealous lover is in the first instance a worried person. If we can trust the
definitions of worry, the jealous one is going to know agitation, perpetual lack
of satisfaction, and concern. This absence of repose, this trouble that is an
obstacle to the peaceful enjoyment of the desired object, is in essence based on
an oscillation between euphoria and dysphoria, so that the jealous person is
neither truly euphoric nor truly dysphoric. (Greimas and Fontaneille, 1993, p.
136)

Jealousy is thus a hyper-generalized field of flip-flopping between the A

and non-A states, rather than a field of integration of the opposites. It is a case of
non-integrated ambivalence (Giordano, 1989) where the opposites (valued
positively and negatively) dominate each other temporarily(Figure 7.5.A.)
instead of integrating them through a generalized promoter sign (Figure 7.5.B.).
The latter can happen through a hypergeneralized meaning (e.g., gods will or
fate) or through introduction of iconic or indexical signs (see the function of the
wooden spouses in West AfricaFigure 7. 10. and Example 7.7. below),
In Figure 7.5.C. provides a Greimasian example of the semiotic square of
opposites (TRUST<>non-TRUST) where the latter can take three different forms
PRE-TRUST (= initial positive expectation for the other), DIS-TRUST (suspicion
about the other) and MIS-TRUST (provenor declared provennon-trustability
of the other.
Valsiner 285

Figure 7.5. The psychological and semiotic structures of jealousy

A. A closed cycle of recurrent dominance reversal between positively and

negatively valenced opposites (non-integrated ambivalence)

DISPHORIC STATE:
EUPHORIC STATE:
X is worried about
X declares that s/he
the autonomous
has eternal love for
actions, feelings, and
Y that has no
thoughts of Yand
boundaries or
shows suspicion
conditions
about any feature of
Y i

B. Integration of ambivalent opposites

PROMOTER SIGN-- symbols: trust; fate;

commitment etc

POSITIVE NEGATIVE
VALENCE: VALENCE:

X declares that s/he X does not like the

has eternal love for autonomous actions,
Y that has no feelings and

C. The process of emergence of jealousy (after Greimas and Fontaneille,

1993, p. 142)

TRU MISTR
Signs as

INDICATORS
PRO
Valsiner 286

As Greimas indicated,

The jealous persons trajectory thus includes two fiduciary

transformations, one involving the move from trust to distrust, the
other the move from distrust to mistrust. The first, because of the
conflictual situation that has been in place from the beginning, even
before the crisis of jealousy, is enacted on the slightest pretext. The
slightest fact, the slightest sign can compromise the unstable
equilibrium of exclusive attachment, thus giving preeminence to the
negative side of the internal contradiction. At this stage, the jealous
person is a pure receiver of indexes and signs. Next the
suspension of trust sets of a cognitive quest that is made possible
by a metaknowledge. (Greimas & Fontanille, 1993, p. 141)

The utilization of promoter signs can block the emergence of jealousy in two
waysby circumventing the interpretation of indicators in terms of distrust, or by
blocking the generalization of the proof in the move from distrust to mistrust. In a
similar vein, promoter signs can enable the DISTRUST MISTRUST escalation.
In any case the semiotic structure in Figure 7.5.C. depends on the constriction of
the field of conceptualization of the object of jealousy to the notion of exclusive
possession and intensive attachment to the object. The presence of the rival
claim to the possessed object requires not only the restriction of access to
these possessions (an objective guaranteed symbolically by locks, passwords,
and security guards), but particularly the recognition of the impossibility to control
the goals-oriented and strategic conduct of the possessed object him or herself.
The construction of the MISTRUST in the field of {TRUST<>non-TRUST
MISTRUST} meaning field feeds further into the interpretation of the indicators of
DISTRUST and creates an escalatory loop of affective hyper-generalization.
Such loop can be exited fromthrough the action of elimination of the jealously
guarded highly valuable object (i.e., the Othello strategy), or by way of bringing
into the loop a meta-level promoter sign (e.g. Figure 7.5.B.) that creates affective
distance from the interpretation of the particular conduct signs.

Cultural-historical promotion of affective field construction

As all semiotic tools used in the creation of affective fields are cultural
constructions, it can be said that all personal affective fields are cultural in their
nature. Furthermore, they are historicalthey can be constructed under the
historical conditions of one generation, and transcend it in the next. Human
ontogeny involves constant meaning-making around the issue "what is it how I
feel" in a here-and-now setting, with a comparison to "how should I feel here".
The latter comparison base entails the introduction of socially suggested generic
values which are intertwined with the higher affective field.
Valsiner 287

Example 7.3. A revolutionary function of rape. Undoubtedly there is

wide variability in the ways in which specific events are linked with hyper-
generalized values. What for one age/social activity cohort is construed as
psychotrauma can for others take on the role of dedication to some over-
generalized ideology. An example for such transitions comes from the discussion
of rape in the early times of the Soviet society in Russia, where -- in the context
of war-- enduring of rape by women was viewed (by communist psychiatrists) as
an act of revolutionary heroism, rather than trauma. Furthermore, the way how a
woman dealt with rape was viewed as a diagnostic device. Thus, in the words of
Aaron Zalkind-- one of the hyper-communist psychiatrists in the USSR in the
early 1920s, the description of the following case is of interest:

...F., 26 years, female, from intelligentsia, in RCP [Russian

Communist Party] since 1919. Severe nervous excitability, shivers,
trembles, excited at smallest of noises, strong neuralgic pains that
were considered psychoalgic (i.e., of no organic basis, self-
suggestive) by doctors; constant anguish, gross alienation, strong
heartbeats, disturbed sleep; the critical analytic capability is not
disturbed; energetically takes care of her appearances, despite the
depressed mood.
It turns out that she went with the revolution "for pure
romanticism": heroically, with heightened and bright feelings. Was a
low-level political commander,-- during the events on the front line
had to experience much. While retreating with her unit, was
captured by a group of kazaks [anti-communist cavalry in the Civil
War], and raped. After that-- sharp change: desperation, from which
she could not recover; feeling of emptiness in herself and around,
step-by-step separation from all her surrounding and growth of the
above-mentioned nervous symptoms. The college to which she
entered in order to get distracted also gave her no solution, the
studies did not affect the mind. During our only medical session
with F. she was already excluded from RCP as useless element,
and was about to leave for her home place.
In this case the characteristic fact-- which is beyond F's
coping capability-- is that of rape. The author [Zalkind] has met
minimum ten party comrades who were raped in the process of
bloody struggle with the enemy, and only F., and one other reacted
to that as incurable disaster (by the way, F. did not get either
veneric disease or pregnancy from the rapists). The others, in
general rather sexually normal, possessors of healthy femininity,
comrades related to that in a revolutionary way, recognizing that
bloody struggle entails all kinds of cruel trials and that one has to
be capable of living through all of those; they did not live through
any ideological crises after it. This is the best proof that in case of
correct, strongly social and class-conscious orientation-- mere
sexuality, even the most difficult, does not create psychoneurosis
Valsiner 288

and plays only a secondary role, in service to the relationship with

the social. (Zalkind, 1925, pp. 44-45)

The linking of the suffering (of rape) with the purification through "class
struggle" in the "revolutionary way" is here continuous with the use of suffering in
the service of Christianity (discussed above). The notion of "revolution" is an
example of a totem-- a general idea that permeates the whole sphere of life
activities of a society. The notion of "revolution" is not merely a label, but an
hyper-generalized feeling (Level 4 in Figure 7.4.). Totems permeate human
social lives as they operate via the highest semiotic regulation level.

Rituals as promoters of hyper-generalized feeling fields

Totems can be found in any society or established social group. All
notions of patriotism or group identity are based on ideas that play totemic roles,
often in conjunction with supportive symbolic objects. For instance, the notion of
liberty in the U.S., supported by the national flag-- see Marvin & Ingle, 1999). The
totems -- supported by corresponding environment-encoded symbols and myths-
-create the basis for social rituals. These rituals involve persons' participation--
and through that-- modulation of their affective field system.
Affective fields become re-organized by ritualistic action patterns. These
patterns can be viewed as externalized imagery. Thus, the acts of prayer, or of
abbreviated moments of it in everyday situations (e.g., a person crossing oneself
in an uncertain situation). In human development, different social institutions
religious, educational, medicalpromote the establishment of such action
patterns as affective field regulators.

Social suggestion embedded in coordinated action. In the organization of

childrens group activities, it is the rhythmic and multi-sensory features of activity
that are utilized to canalize the affective field development of the children. Getting
children to sing, dance, and to perform in childrens theatre guides primarily the
development of feelings. Ritualistic repetitions of acts are the dynamic affective
embodiment of the content of activity. For example, rote learning of religious
texts (or learning and reciting poetry) can carry the function of affective field
establishment:

A Muslim should be able to read the Quaran [Koran] even without

being able to understand the words, because the ability to read the
Quaran itself has been to evoke in people a response to the
teachings of Islam which sociologically has been very valuable.
Beyond this most of these people will hardly go, but provided they
learn in their childhood to respond to the music of Arabic
consonants and vowels, and to the rhythms of the Quaran, they will
continue throughout their lives to have an emotional attachment to
it. (Husain & Ashraf, quoted in Wagner, 1983, pp. 185-186, added
emphasis)
Valsiner 289

The focus on future (life-long) emotional attachment to the religious text is

an explicit goal here. It guides the childrenthrough participation in an activity
structure (be it Koran study, or prayer, or fasting, in any religion)towards
internalization of the generalized meaning fields that operate as values regulating
all concrete conduct (Seesemann, 1999, p.51). Modern Arabic alphabet songs
used in Indonesia to get children to master literacy are infused with the affective
ideas of Quranic motivation (Gade, 2004).
The situation is not different in case of political identity-building rituals. The
saying of prayers at regular intervals, or reciting the Pledge of Allegiance in
U.S. schools in the morning, are similar in function to the example of rote
learning. Likewise, joint mass activities such as marching with a band, choir
singing, and listening to music provide similar rhythmic unification of the person
and the activity.

Suggestions for fusion. For different social goals, moments of complete

affective fusion with the immediate setting can be suggested. These can entail
phenomena of trance, or can be built on the notion of over-generalized feelings
that guide action and feeling. Thus, in words of one remarkable woman, her love
relationship to another person has received the following description:

After that he came himself to me, took me entirely in his arms and
pressed me to him; and all my members felt his in full felicity, in
accordance with the desire of my heart and my humanity. So I was
outwardly satisfied and fully transported. Also then, for a short
while, I had the strength to bear this; but soon, after a short time, I
lost that manly beauty outwardly in the sight of his form. I saw him
completely come to naught and so fade and all at once dissolve
that I could no longer distinguish him within me. Then it was to me
as if we were one without difference. (Bynum, 1989, p.168)

This description is given by a 13th Century female mystic Hadewijch. It

indicates the affective fusion of the person with a social other. In this case, the
role played by the latter was Jesus Christ, who probably was quite unaware of
this event ever happening. Poems and letters by Hadewich-- who was an
independent practitioner of devotional Christianity (a Beguine rather than a nun)
were circulated widely in medieval Europe and guided the religious feelings of
many women (Hart, 1980). Uniting of the sensual feelings with devotion to a
deity is a Worldwide phenomenon. Similarly to Hadewijch's feelings, those of the
Hindu temple dancers (devadasi) displayed religious devotion through their
sensuality (Valsiner, 1996, 1998, chapter 9).

Suggestions for distancing. Quite oppositely from the example of medieval

European beguines and Hindu temple dancers, the social world of the 20th
Century United States is imbued with the orientation towards a-hedonistic
relating to one's own body and self (Stearns & Lewis, 1998). In the U.S. middle
Valsiner 290

class social world, it has become accepted that the emotional stance in
interaction with others is mild -- yet positive ("impersonal but friendly"). Intense
emotions are targets for control-- those should be neither seen nor heard (and if
those occur-- these are considered infantile and embarrassing). The focus on
self-control of feelings-- in accordance with social norm following-- is the ideal for
the self (Planalp, 1999).
Guidance of organization of feelings is particularly set up as relevant in
professional contexts where the person-in-social role needs to distance oneself
from the everyday social roles assumed. For example, in the medical profession
different actions in relation to another person's body -- especially in societies
(such as the U.S.) where collective tactile phobia and over-sexualization of
human body has been collectively set up as a norm. Medical students in the
U.S. undergo their professional distancing of their feelings in their training under
general suppression of interpersonal sharing of their experiences. Thus, a
second-year male medical student describes his experience in examining a
woman patient,

When you listen to the heart you have to work around the breast,
and move it to listen to one spot. I tried to do it with minimum
contact, without staring at her tit breast. The different words
(pause) shows I was feeling both things at once. (Smith &
Kleinman, 1989, p. 59)

The medical students are guided towards distancing their feelings from
sexual relation towards purely professional ones, through forcing them to act and
find intra-psychological solutions for the distancing task by themselves 90. Intra-
mentally, they may re-arrange their vocabulary with the help of which they think
during the medical procedure. Thus, thinking of oneself as "palpating the
abdomen" entails distancing, which "feeling the belly" does not. That the
distancing is personally practiced is evident from the following report about
experiences of a first-year female student at a dissection:

When we were dissecting the pelvis, the wrong words kept coming
to mind, and it was uncomfortable. I tried to be sure to use the right
words, penis and testicles (pause) not cock and balls. Even just
thinking. Would have been embarrassing to make that mistake that
day. School language, it made it into a science project. (Smith &
Kleinman, 1989, p. 61, added emphases)

The general genre of "school language" (or "science") is itself a cultural

vehicle for personal distancing. Yet, at the same time in the same (U.S. or other)
society the very same people can be guided towards fusion of their identities with
a social unit. Religious or national symbols-- such as the national flag-- indicate

90
still, as Kleinman and Smith (1989) demonstrate, American medical students are not forced into active
practicing of procedures that constitute psychological sensitivity area for them-- gynecological and rectal
examinations.
Valsiner 291

in parallel the guidance towards sacrificing oneself for the social role (of a
medical doctor, or citizen). The public symbolic object can be taken and turned
into a personal symbolic object, as in a case of a top-level athlete:

Jenny Thompson wraps herself in the American flag every night

when she goes to bed. Her comforter is all stars and stripes and
quilted padding. Her pillow, her lampshade, are both decorated in
red, white, and blue. She tried to hang an oversized flag on the
ceiling of her dorm room at Stanford so she could go to sleep
dreaming the American dream about medal stands and national
anthems. The flag wouldn't stick. It went on the wall, instead
(Marvin & Ingle, 199, p. 221).

In each social context, guidance towards feeling-full unification (with some

social roles, or values) is coordinated with guidance for affective distancing from
some aspects of those roles in specific domains. A U.S. medical student may be
distancing him- or herself from aspects of the bodies of the patients (or cadavers)
while at the same time aligning one's affective field completely with the general
role of the medical doctor. A soldier who kills others distances one's affective
domain from that act through the fusion of oneself with the ideology that not only
legitimizes the killing, but socially prescribes it.
The system of feelings (and their development) that was outlined above
gains further support from cultural anthropologists' work on the meanings of
emotion terms in different languages. Demonstrations of the difficulties of
translation of the semantic nuances of the same basic emotion term from one
language to another is evidence for the local (society- and language-based)
construction of the particular emotion category. Undoubtedly the semantic fields
of the category in different languages has some core overlap (at least for the
"basic emotions", yet it is the margins of the semantic fields that demonstrate the
role of emotion terms as phenomena which are in between the primary and
higher affective fields. The inductively emerged -- labeled-- emotion in one
society need not include some domain of meaning nuances as its counterpart in
another language. Yet in both they function as relevant articulated semiotic
devices, resolving the tension between the primary and higher affective fields.
Valsiner 292

Example 7.4. Getting angry at being helped. Cross-societal comparisons

by anthropologists and descriptions by historians of everyday life provide
evidence of many feeling organization patterns. Consider the following episode
of interactionin a rainy day, a mother is waiting for her son back from school
with an umbrella for him at a bus stop. When the bus arrives the son sees the
mother and gets angrysayingYou shouldnt have come out here with the
umbrella for me. The mother replies, My baby, I am sorry about that.
This episode can be explained in different ways, beginning from the ego-
centered manifest content interpretation of the sons independence of the self.
The maximum depth of this manifest level interpretation is 3 [Level 1 Level 2
(anger) Level 3 (feeling of independence crushed) Level 0/1 (new action)].
Yet in the case of non-manifest interpretationtaking into account the cultural
hyper-generalized semiotic field of Korean Shimcheong provides an alternative
interpretation:

The son must be grateful for the considerate behavior of his

mother. Nonetheless the son hides his real Shimcheong of gratitude by
getting angry with his mother. The mother also conceals her true
Shimcheong of being disappointed by her son just by apologizing to him.
Oftentimes, the strength of Shimcheong in close relationships is reinforced
by expressed emotions that are opposite to the real and hidden emotions.
The parent-child relationship and in particular, the mother-son relationship
is based on in-depth Shimcheong (Choi & Kim, 2001, p. 8).

The particular hyper-generalized feeling (Shimcheong, empathy, etc.) sets

the stage for complex hypergames in close interpersonal relations. Hypergames
are games where the partners do not know the list of strategies of the other
players (as those lists may change), nor their goal orientations (and ther
changes) in the course of the game.
As described above, the seemingly irrational (for a Westerner) positive
feelings expressed at the loss of a close person by people on Bali (Wikan, 1990)
are easily explainable through the use of affective self-organizing mechanisms.
Yet within the manifest behavioral outcomesdomain different societies seem
fundamentally different in their emotional expression.

Promotion of different levels of affective sign fields in different societies

The cultural constraining perspective on human life-course development

(Valsiner & Lawrence, 1997; for a similar developmental take cf. Fischer, Yan &
Stewart, 2003) leads to locating the value of evidence about differences between
social units. The cross-cultural differences as referred to in cross-cultural
psychology in the detection of various versions of how different levels of semiotic
mediation reveal the basic structure of constraining the affective expression
under different circumstances.
Valsiner 293

Figure 7.6. Levels of affective semiotic mediation and their selective social
amplification, attenuation, and blocking by barriers for affect

LEVELS OF SOCIETY A SOCIETY B

GENERALIZATION

LEVEL 4:
UNDER-
HYPER- EMPHASIZED MAXIMALLY
GENERALIZED EMPHASIZED
FEELING FIELD
STRICT BARRIER

LEVEL 3:
MINIMALLY MEDIUM
GENERALIZED EMPHASIZED
AFFECTIVE EMPHASIZED
REFERENCING
PERMEABLE

LEVEL 2:

EMOTION MAXIMALLY MINIMALLY

CATEGORIES EMPHASIZED EMPHASIZED

LEVEL 1: UNDER-
DIFFERENTIATING MEDIUM EMPHASIZED
FEELINGS EMPHASIZED

LEVEL 0: USUALLY NOT CONTROLLABLE SOCIALLY

PHYSIOLOGICAL BUT IN SOME SOCIETIES MAY BECOME
TARGETS FOR SUCH CONTROL EFFORTS

Cross-societies comparisons can provide psychology the basic

structure of the ways in which the generic model of society functions
(chapter 1). Recorded cross-societal contrasts are merely
snapshots of the different ways in which that generic model of
society works.
Valsiner 294

At the level of personal affective self-regulation, all levels (and

their feed-forward connections) can be in operation. Yet the social
suggestions that surround the developing person during ontogeny
may differentially highlight (or diminish) some levels in contrast with
others. Some societies may emphasize the use of the higher levels
of semiotic mediation, while others may de-emphasize it. Figure 7.6.
describes one such (hypothetical) contrast between two societies in
terms of differential highlighting of different levels of semiotic
mediation.
The two societiesA and Bdiffer in the ways in which verbal
accessibility to affective phenomena is emphasized. In Society A, the maximally
highlighted state of affairs is Level 2. People in that society are expected to
focus on the categorical description of their emotions (and similar categorical
recognition of feeling states of others). Generalization beyond Level 2 is
accepted (but not emphasized), and deep intra-psychological affective feeling
through (Level 4) is socially blocked (by strict constraint). Surely it happens
as individual do not follow the social constraining, and transcend it, but in the
given society this would be considered an unmentionable, socially unnecessary,
aberration. In contrast, the capability to classify any feeling into a clearly defined
emotion category (Level 2) is given the highest positive social value. Surely
Society A is one where the rationality of bureaucrats, business executives, and
tax collectors is the ideal for affective grasping of the human life-worlds, and
transcendental meditators, philosophers, poets, artists, and nave youngsters of
the kind of Young Werther (Goethe, 1973) would be considered as barely
tolerable weir-dos.
In contrast, Society B is one where the exploration of the highest levels of
semiotic mediation of affective processes is supported. The naming of
experienced (or recognized) emotion categories (Level 2) is recognized, but not
given a high goal value in the process of socialization. Instead, the persons are
encouraged to contemplate on the general meanings of their lived-through
experiences (Level 3), and to reach the highest levels of affective understanding
of the World (Level 4) that would guide their personal life philosophies. It is here
that the social value of the precious few who reach that levelgurus, yogis,
poets, writers, and philosophersare given the highest social value within the
given society.
Interestingly indeed, the contrast between these two hypothetical societies
seems to overlapat least in general termswith the often used contrast
between Western industrialized (or individualistic) and Eastern societies (or
collectivistic cultures). These contrasts are not ontological, but constitute
different states of the general state of affairs of affect regulation in a universal
model of society as a whole. Not surprisingly the history of both Eastern and
Western societies gives us evidence about changes from one state into the
other. Developing business relations in the Oriental World may bring the people
involved in these areas closer to the emphasis on the rational and verbalized
Valsiner 295

treatment of affect (Level 2). In a similar vein, the relevance of poets in the
cultural history of the Occident remains a fact.
Affective fieldsLevel 4 phenomena-- are constantly a major target for
social canalization efforts. Specific activity contexts are used for the promotion of
generalization of feeling beyond the given here-and-now context. The social
others of the developing person suggest how the present situation canor
shouldrelate to the ways of being in general.
Solving the problem of the development of feelings can take different
forms. The most usual one is descriptive outlining of the ontogenetic changes
as those can be observed at different age levels. Thus, in the second and third
years of life children begin to make reference to their internal psychological
states. At around the same time they begin to describe other persons
experiences. By the fourth year of life there is a differentiation in childrens use of
emotion categories (Stein & Levine, 1989). However, mere description of a
sequence of similarity classes does not explain their development.

Cultural framing of affective development

One needs to uncover the underlying processes by which the social world
surrounding the developing person is gradually directed to feel in ways that are
mutually comprehensible and personally meaningful. In the history of a society
such canalization devices collectively called emotionology(Stearns &
Stearns, 1986) undergo transformations, accentuating the expected ways of
letting the personal-cultural affect regulation system to operate. The social
organization of anger in the history of North America is a good case. Over the
last 300 years, what is now the U.S. society has been embarked on the historical
trajectory of regulating anger. It has led to the segregation of anger expressable
against animals (pre-18th Century) to the unexpressability of anger towards some
animals (emergence of regulations against cruelty to animals), other adults,
andfinallyto children:

Concern about anger in child rearing was surely born out of the
same eighteenth-century emotional transition that produced the
new desire to reduce anger between husband and wife. Explicit
anger advice in the eighteenth century focused more directly on
adults than on children, to be sure. Thus the neologism tantrum
was originally applied to adult behavior and only gradually, during
the nineteenth century, evolved in its present meaning, which
describes a new level of anguish about a certain kind of childish
behavior. (Stearns & Stearns, 1986, p. 50)

While anger had been allowedyet regulatedin the U.S.

over centuries, envy has not (Foster, 1972). Fear in America has
been removed historically from a major social control
mechanism to one of the emotions of no positive function
(Kelly & Kelly, 1998). In the course of history, different political
Valsiner 296

events set up concentrated periods of change in the feeling

canalization in a society. Thus, the terrors of the French Revolution
drastically changed the sentimentalist ethos of most of the 18th
century France, and led into an upsurge of romanticism (Reddy,
2001). Similarly, the Second World War adjusted the promotion of the
ways feelings were handled in American movies (Lyman, 1992). Of
course there were other sides of everyday realitiessuch as
epidemics, childhood accidents, and faminesthat were part and
parcel of childrens affective worlds.
The external situational structures for feeling entailed different demands at
different historical periods, which were encoded into the cultural contexts of the
timespublic rituals, novels, theatre performances, movies, TV shows, etc. The
social demands of major activities guided the development of these structures.
Yet that is not a homogeneous story. Quite the contrarywithin the same society
at the same historical period, one can see attenuation (or suppression) of the
same affect in one situation, and exaggeration of it in another. Among the Toraja
in Indonesia, crying by adults is permitted and expected (lamenting) in
connection with the death and funeral of relatives, but strictly prohibited in other
settings (Wellenkamp, 1992).
Crying is a Level 0 phenomenonemerging at the intersection of
immediate activation fluctuation and meaningful semiotically encoded images.
An example of fluctuations following a significant persona loss illustrates that
well:

My wife of 50 years had died. I cried a lot. There were plenty of

opportunities to engage in silent microanalysis of crying. Friends
would come by the house to offer condolences. I could carry on a
normal flow of conversation except when a visitor would refer to
one or more of my wifes talents and graces. At these moments, my
ability to engage in sequential talk was inhibited. Normally
integrated movements of respiration and vocalization were no
longer in synchrony
Repeatedly, I noticed that the synchrony of speech was
disrupted when the speech partner called upon the image of my
deceased wife. I would begin a sentence with normal control of
volume and content and midway would have difficulty in
coordinating respiratory movements with talk. (Sarbin, 2000, p. 4)

Under similar circumstances of personal loss, different social Semiotic

Demand Settings (see chapter 2, Figure 2.7.) can be set up either to facilitate or
block crying. A middle-age Balinese man described his way of dealing with loss
of his younger brother in an earthquake in similaryet in one way different
terms:
Valsiner 297

When someone dies, it is because God calls him, his karma is

finished. The day of death is written at birth If you cry, the soul
will not be so happy because [it is] still in contact with you. You will
impede its progress to God. Instead you must be happy and pray to
help the soul to go to God. Just like with you, if you are unhappy,
you cannot work so well, cannot concentrate, so also with [the
souls of] the dead [leluhur]. (Wikan, 1990, p. 156)

The concepts of karma (as well as its many equivalents in other religious
systems) operate as Level-4 canalizers of the way in which the person deals with
death. Most generalized terms of ethical kind in any society are of such hyper-
generalized semiotic fields that are worked out over long periods of time in
ontogeny. That entails regular participation in activity settings (Rogoff, 2003),
some of which exercise precisely the relations between different levels of
affective regulationlike pointed move to bring oneself to tears. In Southern
India,
Weeping is an important part of the Tamil bhakti tradition. Only
when a worshipper melts into tears, thus revealing the unbearable
intensity of his desire for union with the god, will the god come to
him. Hence the weeping of devotees singing their hearts out before
idols in temples is not an uncommon sight. (Egnor, 1991, p. 20)

The persons enter into settings (idols in religious places) that are
organized in ways that would enhance their active hyper-generalization of feeling
(of communion with the deity) that would manifest in the weeping, which further
fortifies the hyper-generalized feeling. Repeated even if not too frequent
participation in rituals sets the person up in the direction of arriving at hyper-
generalizationsnot just of the kinds promoted by the given setting.
The process of social canalization of affect may be slow, and consist of a
myriad of mutually disconnected, happenstance, personal life events. Out of
these particular events, the developing person weaves together the texture of
one's psychological world. The bi-directional culture re-construction model
implies the active role the recipients of communicative messages play in re-
constructing cultures. Human psychological development is created by
developing persons through inventing signs of different kinds to make sense of
different settings of subjective uncertainty.

Dynamics of affective fields: coordination of person al and collective cultures

Affective fields are constantly a major target for social canalization efforts.
Specific activity contexts are used for the promotion of generalization of feeling
beyond the given here-and-now context. The social others of the developing
person suggest how the present situation canor shouldrelate to the ways of
being in general.
Valsiner 298

Direct and indirect social suggestions. A particular experience can be

channeled socially in a particular feeling orientation in explicit, implicit, or
environmentally encoded ways. In all of these, the structure of the encounter of
the suggestor and the target person is the same:

Suggestor: Do X (and feel Y)

Expectation for the person: does X and feels Y
where X and Y are sets of similar action/feeling forms

The communication implied here is that of similar direction. The suggestor

gives the direction, and the person is expected to accept and follow the direction-
- not necessarily acting in the specific way (X) that was suggested, and not
necessarily feeling (Y) the same way the suggestor charts it out-- but in ways
similar to those.
An example of the explicit social suggestion is from a mother-child
interaction:

MOTHER: Bring me that beautiful doll from over there.

CHILD: (Brings the doll and gives it to mother)
MOTHER: Isn't it beautiful!
CHILD: (smiles, and looks at mother and doll)

The values added to the action object (doll) as being "beautiful" are
constraints upon how the child is expected to feel while acting. It is not a
requirement for action (the child cannot be forced to feel that the doll is beautiful),
but a suggestion of direction.
An example of implicit suggestion for feeling can be somewhat different:

MOTHER: Look, who is coming!

CHILD (in fussing tone): Dad!
MOTHER: Hmmm, really?
CHILD (changing tone to happy welcome): Hello, dad!

Through minimal communicational means, the mother guides the child into
an appropriate affective tone for the context of greeting the returning father.
Again, it is not assumed that the child will shift from the "fussing mode" into a
feeling of great happiness seeing the father, but such direction is suggested, and
demonstrated in the child's actions.

Social direction of affect through suggestion to the opposite. Social

canalization of the development of affective fields can also take the form of
suggestion for the opposite of the expected. In general, it takes the form of

Suggestor: Do X (and feel Y)

Expected result: the person does non-X
and feels non-Y
Valsiner 299

(where X, non-X, Y, and non-Y

are sets of similar action/feeling forms)

This form is simultaneously an act of promotion and test of the opposite (desired)
feeling (and action) than the one indicated in the manifest contents of the
communicative message.
Jean Briggs (1979, see also Briggs, 1970) observed how an Inuit mother
dealt with a food-sharing issue in case of her 3-year old daughter. Another child--
a 4-year old older daughter-- was outside of the tent, while the mother created a
setting where the 3-year olds establishment of values was both tested and
promoted:

MOTHER (hands a candy to the 3-year-old daughter and says in

exaggeratedly happy-excited-secret-persuasive voice): Eat it
quickly and dont tell your sister, because it is the last one!
THREE-YEAR-OLD (breaks the candy into two pieces, eats one
and takes the other outdoors to her sister)
MOTHER (says to the audience, with a pleased, and perhaps
amused, smile): She never keeps things to herself; she always
shares (Briggs, 1979, p. 396)

In another example, Briggs described a middle-aged aunt talking to a 4-

year old niece who had just returned to the camp after a visit to her mother:

AUNT: What a beautiful new shirt you have (voice of intense,

excited delight)
NIECE (smiles happily).
AUNT (in persuasive tone): Why don't you die so I can have it?
NIECE (looks at aunt with blank face)
AUNT: Don't you want to die?
NIECE (raises eyebrows in affirmative gesture (meaning that she
does not want to die)
AUNT: Don't you want to die? Do die (persuasive voice). Then I can
have the shirt (reaches out towards the shirt with exaggerated
clutching gesture, fingers clawed and tensed)
NIECE (looks at aunt with blank face)
AUNT (changing the subject): Did you see your new baby brother?
NIECE (beams happily and raises eyebrows affirmatively)
AUNT: Do you love him?
NIECE (raises brows, smiling)
AUNT: Did you carry him on your back?
NIECE: (raises brows and smiles happily)
AUNT: Do you love him?
NIECE (raises brows, smiling)
Valsiner 300

AUNT (in exaggeratedly disgusted voice): You love him?! Why

don't you tip him out of your parka and kill him? (confidential,
persuasive voice; jerks her own shoulders forward to demonstrate
the appropriate technique).
NIECE (looks at aunt with blank face)
(Briggs, 1979, p. 394)

The second example is basically an adult's dramatic construction of

suggestions that are beyond the realm of desired actions in the collective-cultural
belief system. The child is participating in this routine in a predominantly non-
verbal way, yet is the target of the dramatized suggestions.
Suggestions for how to feel in acting can also be encoded into the built
environment. The constructors of churches, temples, and other symbolic
architectural creations have set up places which -- by being interpreted as such--
entail implicit suggestions for how to act and feel. Even culturally designated
areas of the natural environment-- such as burial grounds, or places for the
ritualistic activities-- suggest by themselves interpretable directions for acting and
feeling. Thus, on the Karelian (Finnish) village, the cemetery is a holy place:

You may not go there in a scornful or defiant mood, and you may
not do there the least mischief, not even take a twig, nor cut leaves,
nor tear the grass, nor take anything from there with you You
may not go to the cemetery in the afternoon, you must give peace
to the deceased after noontime. When you pass the cemetery, you
must always make the sign of the cross, and ask for forgiveness (a
recording from a Karelian woman in 1915, cited via Jrvinen, 1999,
p. 121, added emphases)

This example shows how explicit instructions for feeling are circulated in
the folklore of the society to be evoked whenever the person encounters the
environmentally encoded place. This certainly depends upon the perceptual
recognition of the given place as cemetery, church, etc. The consensual forms of
architectural construction in a given society provide the environmental encoding
for the suggested higher-level feelings. It tells a story of constant social re-
negotiation of the verbalization thresholds within the collective culture (Figure
7.7.)
Valsiner 301

Figure 7.7. Levels of semiotic regulation and their accessibility to verbal inquiry

Level of VERBALIZATION THRESHOLD (negotiated)

Generali- pro-verb anti-verb
zation

HYPER THE DOMAIN OF

(Level 4) HYPER-
CONSCIOUSNESS
(higher non-verbal)

HIGH
RANGE OF
(Level 3)
VERBALLY
ACCESSIBLE
MEDIUM
PSYCHOLOGICAL
(Level 2)
PHENOMENA
(intra- and inter-personal)

EMER- THE DOMAIN OF

GING SUB-CONSCIOUS
(Level 1) (pre-verbalized)
PHENOMENA

NONE
(Level 0)

LEVEL OF VERBALIZABILITY
Valsiner 302

Social use of affective fields: the ambiguous powers of Mekeo dreaming

Aside from verbalized meanings organizing the affective fields, nonverbal imagery carries the
same function. The person who is overtaken psychologically by an affective field may
experience images emerging within it, which begin to give the field further structure. Under
some circumstances, such imagery may provide a basis for restoration (or emergence) of
semiotic self-regulation mechanisms.
As the affective fields are structured wholes, they function in conjunction
with dramatisms accepted in the cultural belief system. The Mekeo (in the
Central Province of Papua New Guinea-- Stephen, 1982, 1995) use dreaming for
the construction of meanings of life events. Dreams are interpreted as
experiences of the dreamer's soul that wonders around at night. The Mekeo have
two kinds of souls-- the "bodily soul" (imauga) that is believed to stay within the
body all the lifetime, and the "bodiless soul" (lalauga) that is believed to wander
around in the night, enter into relations with different spirits, and guide sleeping
people's dreams (Stephen, 1995, p. 134). The construction of such two souls in
their complementarity makes the human usual activity of the nighttime-- sleeping-
- into a psychological phenomenon of substantial cultural power. It is through the
activities of the "wandering soul" (lalauga) that the negotiations of the daily life
issues of the living are negotiated with the powers of the spirit world.
The Mekeo have constructed a supremely functional dualistic system of
conceptualizing themselves, making the most of the mind/body separation which
is so much dreaded in our contemporary tribe of socio-cultural psychologists. The
separation of imauga and lalauga allows for simultaneous "contact" of the same
person with both the real (everyday) and supernatural (spirits) world. The
reservation of the night-time activities of the lalauga for the important interactions
with the spirit powers turns the activity of dreaming into affectively ambivalent
event. On the one hand, it is through dreaming that the spirit-world can be
consulted as to everyday life decisions. Yet-- as lalauga can also act dangerously
in the nighttime-- its uncontrollable action can bring misfortunes as well. Thus,
the power of dreaming is both honored and feared by the Mekeo.
The uncontrollable side of lalauga can take on a regulatory role in the
organization of the affective fields. Thus, if a Mekeo woman

dreams of a particular lover, then it is said, she will no longer

resist his advances in waking reality. That is to say, once her
dream-self has been won, her bodily self will soon be overcome by
desire. A woman's only defence is to say nothing, for to admit to
dreaming of a particular man would be tantamount to accepting
him. (Stephen, 1995, p. 128, added emphases)

The role of the lalauga here sets up the tone of regulation by the higher
affective field of the immediate feeling (primary feeling) of the woman. The
woman can attempt to hide the potential future relation from others-- but not from
herself ("her bodily self will soon be overcome by desire").
Valsiner 303

The interpretation of the messages from the soul-world of the Mekeo does
not proceed in an automatic fashion. Instead, the dreams can be interpreted in
accordance with a flexible set of possibilities. First, the manifest content of a
dream may either indicate what it is, its opposite, or a displaced generalization.
Thus, a man dreaming about seducing a particular woman may move on to
succeed in that, or in some other valued action (such as hunting down a female
pig). Dreams of seeing dancing relatives may indicate their death. Sharing the
content of dreams with others is itself a dangerous matter-- yet possible under
some circumstances 91.
Since the power of dreaming is of basic cultural relevance for the Mekeo,
they attempt to gain access to it through purposeful action. The magician who
tries to gain access to the soul of a dead relative

performs the following ritual. Before retiring for the night he must
take some relic of the dead relative (usually a finger bone, nail
parings, or hair removed from the corpse before burial and kept for
this purpose) and burn a piece of bark cloth (specially treated with
potent substances) near the relics, while reciting a spell to invoke
the spirit (Stephen, 1982, p. 110).

The person prepares oneself for dreaming through ritualistic actions. Yet other
persons among the Mekeo can dread the potential dangers of the dreaming
powers (as described above). Dreaming-- like any powerful cultural tool-- is
simultaneously potentially useful and potentially dangerous.
The dynamics of the relations between the affective fields allows for
constant modulation of the affective distancing between the person and the
immediate environment. The person can quickly move from immersion in the
primary affective field (minimum distance) to talking about one's emotions, and
further to over-generalized life-philosophical claims (maximum distance), and
from there back to the -- by now meaningfully transformed-- primary field. Such
modulation can occur at high speed-- as our meaning-making in everyday life
contexts needs speedy decisions. This is achieved through the work of the
internalization/externalization process, which constructs the history of the person.

Internalization and externalization

The buffer against excessive complexity of social messages is the
individual's active internalization/externalization system. Human beings are
involved in constant reconstruction of their intra-psychological worlds
through constant exchange of perceptual and semiotic materials with the
environment. The perceptual basis capacity of the human physiological

91
Which may take the form of the researcher-- a foreigner and outsider to the Mekeo society-- acquiring a
special status as a "re-born spirit" of a dead relative -- Michele Stephen discovered herself in that role
(Stephen, 1995, p. 167).
Valsiner 304

bodyis necessary for any build-up of higher psychological (semiotic)

functions.
Internalization is the process of analysis of externally existing semiotic
materials and their synthesis in the novel form in the intra-psychological domain.
The latter is structured by its depth (see the laminal model, below). Internalization
is always a constructive process, turning the external material into an internally
different form. Even in the rare case of direct and unchanged transposition of the
external material into an internal form (i.e., the case of synthesis = mere
takeover), the general principle of constructivity is maintained (in this case, it is
merely a case of zero modifiability of the material)
The parallel and complementary process to internalization is that of
externalization. Externalization is the process of analysis of intra-psychologically
existing (subjective) personal-cultural materials during their transposition from
inside to outside of the person, and the modification of the external environment
as a form of new synthesis of these materials. The results of externalization
immediately enter into the perceptual domain of the person and feed further into
the internalization process (see Figure 7.7.). Like internalization, externalization
is a constructive processthe synthesis produced in the persons actions within
the environment are novel in relation to previous states of the environment, and
different from the intra-psychological materials.
Valsiner 305

Figure 7.8. Internalization and externalization as mutually interdependent

constructive processes

In Figure 7.8., the ongoing relationship between persons psychological

system and the social world is depicted as a cross section of the ongoing
process. The processes of constructive externalization and constructive
internalization are constantly in action. They transpose the semiotic material
(value-based and affectively colored meaning structures, that exist in the
persons intra-psychological fields) into the domain of external action. The latter
produce results that are interpersonally perceivablewhether in speaking
(interaction), moving around in the situation, or material reconstruction of the
environment. The act of externalization feeds forward into the ongoing
internalization process (arrow A), thus contributing to the constructive nature of
the internalization. In a similar vein, the ongoing process of internalization feeds
forward to the externalization process (arrow B). The field structures inside and
outside of the person are constantly changing through this active relating with the
environment (this is not depicted in the cross section in Figure 7.8.)
In terms of psychological reality, the feed-forward loops depicted in Figure
7.8.. entail the inevitable fact that the very first listener of a speaker who is about
to produce an utterance is the speaker oneself , as the speaker gets immediate
feedback while speaking. Likewise, the act of listening to another person feeds
into the planning of ones own next communicative action. Both the
Valsiner 306

internalization and externalization processes are forward-oriented in their focus

on the immediate next moment in time.

Controversy about theoretical constructions: feasibility of inside

and outside?. The theoretical construction of the notions of internalization and
externalization is built upon the assumption of inclusive separation of the person
and the environment. The person is viewed as relating constantly with the
environment precisely as he/she is separated analytically from the environment.
Such separation allows the researchers to define the directions of the
transposition of cultural materials (from OUTSIDE to INWARDS in case of
internalization, and from INSIDE to OUTWARDS in case of externalization).
These premises have been rejected by an alternative theoretical orientation in
cultural developmental psychology which has emphasized the inseparability of
the person and the social environment and the analytic absence of boundaries
between person and environment, as well as of the inside/outside distinction
(e.g., Matusov, 1998; Rogoff, 1990, 1998). Yet, that direction would lead to
elimination of psychological phenomenaof relative autonomy of human
subjectivity that exists within any situated activity context.
In terms of methodological access to the process- internalization can be
observed only via some form of externalization, and externalization results feed
into further internalization process. Thus the study of internalization/
externalization poses a substantial access problem, which can partly be
overcome by the use of combination of action and introspection tasks.

Internalization/ externalization and psychological distancing

The notion of psychological distancing has been used in psychology at

different times of its history (eg., Bullough, 1912; Sigel, 1970, 1993). It is mostly
viewed as mental distancing. However, in cultural developmental psychology
distancing becomes a result of personal positioning within the field of a situated
activity. Furthermore, constructive internalization and externalization necessarily
leads to some form of psychological distancing. The internalized field develops in
ways that can gradually become different from the external field. Furthermore,
the person is free to move between different situated activity contexts, as well as
modulate ones participation within any context as to the central or peripheral
position in such participation. While being an active participant in an activity
setting, the person may reflect upon the events going on in the given setting in
ways that are not immersed in the actions by which the participation takes place.
Any reflections upon one's action (e.g., any intra-psychological question "what
am I doing here and now?") constitutes a form of psychological distancing that
allows the person to transcend the present setting while remaining its
participating actor. A person is usually a peripheral participant in the myriad of
activity settings, which allows him or her to be buffered against purposeful social
invasions into personal privacy by various distancing mechanisms. Flexible
Valsiner 307

personal distancing is a neutralization tactic for counteracting intervention efforts

from social others.
Distancing can also take more permanent forms. In ontogeny, one can
observe the differentiation of the child's intra-psychological world that is kept
hidden from the efforts of the adults to "peep into" it. All persons (as well as
social institutions) develop different forms of knowledge that are kept
"confidential" or "secret" in various forms-- hence not immediately available to
others in activity contexts. The development of phenomena of secrecy has
relevance for human development (Simmel, 1906), as it serves as the basis from
which social participation can be contemplated. In general-- any case of personal
decision not to disclose one's private thoughts or feelings in an activity setting
indicates the functioning of distancing mechanisms.

Modulation within psychological distancing.

The dynamic side of psychological distancing as a semiotic self-regulation

device entails constant modulation of the person's relation with the given context-
- moving between various forms of im-mediacy and inter-mediacy. The
internalization and externalization processes make it possible to set up intra-
psychological semiotic means that change the whole subjective understanding of
some ongoing action.
Thus, when a mother proceeds feeding her child during a mealtime, then
her construction of the meaning of how much food "is enough" for her child
guides her actions, by constraining them. Yet, at any moment, she can distance
herself from the immediate feeding process by constructing the notion that "the
child actively resists me", and then proceeding either in the direction of
intensification of action ("I must get him to stop resisting") or de-intensifying it ("I
don't want to fight with my child, let him eat as much as he wants"). The intra-
psychological self-regulation by the mother thus can move her -- in the same
setting of a mealtime-- to be even more actively involved in her actions, or
distanced from the given setting. Furthermore, most of the thoughts or feelings
that proceed in the mother's intra-psychological field while performing the routine
actions of feeding, and which unconnected with the action task, indicates the
power of semiotic means in distancing. Human beings are capable of taking their
wandering minds out of the here-and-now situations by intra-psychological
construction.

Creating as-if structures through internalization/ externalization

From very minimal externally given signs, human beings can construct
elaborate intra-psychological scenarios via the internalization process. These
scenarios may stand as possible desired contexts for future action. They entail
abstraction of the specific meanings from the given context.
Continuing with the example of a mother feeding her child (and arriving at
the notion of "the child actively resists me"), the abstraction process can bring out
a generalization about the child's character in general. For example, the mother
Valsiner 308

may arrive at the idea that "my child knows how to stand out for himself" or "my
child has difficult character". Such leaps in inference then become semiotic
organizers of future actions relative to the child, well outside of the given context
(of mealtimes). Furthermore, in the given context these generalizations constitute
cases of as-if structures of meaningful organization of the given setting. Thus, via
abstraction the mother creates for her a meaning structure as if her child "had"
that "difficult character", and may then act in ways different from her primary
(immediate) goal orientation (i.e., get the child fed). The latter changes in the
sphere of actions are products of externalization of the constructed as-if
meaning structure. All abstract concepts that cannot be defined-- yet are applied
constantly to concrete settings-- such as "love", "friendship", "fairness", "justice"
etc. are semiotic vehicles for flavoring the given concrete situation by the
overriding generic meaning. The re-contextualization of these abstracted
meanings constitutes a creation of as-if structure of the situation.
The same phenomenon-- for example, an effort by the mother, in the end
of mealtime, to get "one more spoonful" of food into the child's digestive system
can be viewed extremely differently by outside observers who re-contextualize
their abstracted meanings to the given specific context. Thus, some of these
observers would view that episode as if it reflects the "great love" of the mother
to her child, others-- as a case of mother's "dominance", third-- as "good feeding
tactics", and so on. The as-if nature of any interpretation of a setting is made
possible by the role of the observers who constantly modify their position relative
to the observed phenomenon (the process of attunement, see Rommetveit,
1992). All meaning structures are therefore relative to the objects they attempt to
make sense of, on the one hand, and to the meaning-makers' goal orientations
and positions, on the other. Communication becomes a process of coordinating
these different positions through the semiotic messages. Hence the crucial
feature of communication is that of discrepancy between different positions of the
inter-communicating persons, rather than the "shared" basis for mutual sense-
making.

Structure of the internalization/ externalization process

If we were to follow Kurt Lewin's concentric boundaries depiction for

setting the stage for viewing internalization/externalization processes, we are
creating a laminal model of the intra-psychological world. The internalization
process needs to pass through two layers (laminae) -- I and II in Figure 7.9. .--
before reaching the "inner" sphere (III). The externalization process needs to
proceed correspondingly, in the reverse direction.
In the process, three boundaries-- a, b, and c-- are to be penetrated by
the internalization process. Since the process is constructive, the "inner core" of
the person regulates each of the boundary crossings by specific social (semiotic)
regulating device. First, the boundary-- a --can be selectively open for some
communicative messages from the external social world, while remaining closed
Valsiner 309

for others. The specific "boundary regulator" -- k -- recognizes those messages

that the person is ready to internalize, and ignores or blocks others.
Valsiner 310

Figure 7.9. The laminal model of internalization/externalization

Once a message is brought into layer I, it becomes potentially

internalizable. It is noticed as a message by the intra-psychological system, but
not integrated into it. The latter requires opening of boundary b for the message--
by way of the social regulator l. The latter's action upon the message transforms
it into a new form, as in layer II the message becomes generalized. This
generalization in and by itself is not yet part of the structured intra-psychological
world (layer III), but creates the basis for its potential integration, if it is let through
the boundary c under the action of social regulator m. If that happens, the
generalized and reconstructed message becomes integrated into the structure of
the intra-psychological phenomena (in layer III).
This model of internalization (and externalization) is a sequentially
structured parallel to Piaget's assimilation/ accommodation model. The boundary
Valsiner 311

between "inside" and "outside" is here re-constructed into a sequence of three

boundaries -- a, b, and c --- that need to be passed for external communicative
messages becoming integrated into the internal structure. Layers I and II are a
description of the realm of contact between the person and the external social
world. Directionality in the processes is strictly assumed-- internalization entails
co-constructive (incoming message being acted upon by the social regulators)
passing of boundary a--> layer I --> boundary b --> layer II --> boundary c, in that
order. Externalization entails the opposite order.
The final result of internalization is the process of hierarchical integration--
of the transformed incoming message into the structure of intra-psychological
phenomena. This puts into its place Heinz Werner's focus on differentiation. The
higher affective fields can operate in their semiotically created overgeneralized
form. These higher affective fields can be theoretically located in layer III.

Phenomena in layer I: retention of "brought-in" material. Once some

message has passed boundary a, and has been transported into layer I, it is
maintained in the attention sphere of the intra-psychological system, yet its fate
in layer I may be variable. First, it can be maintained and slowly attenuated.
Alternatively, it can be maintained in its steady state, or even escalated. Yet none
of these developments would guarantee that the message is taken further into
layer II. That transformation depends upon the action of the social regulation
device (l).
Phenomena that can be viewed as located in layer I are most widespread
in our introspective worlds. For example, a tune (or phrase) from a TV
commercial may keep reverberating in my mind for a long time. Any effort to
suppress the silly reverberation may be ineffective, I do not bring that material to
any form of generalization (which would indicate its layer II state), nor do I ever
integrate it in my intra-psychological personal sense structure. After some time,
the tune or phrase "dies out", yet the memory of my suffering from the futile
efforts to suppress it can be re-activated later. Thus, the message was clearly
noticed, maintained, and limited to the outermost layer of the internalization/
externalization system.

Phenomena in layer II: generalization without personal integration. If a

message from layer I is brought to layer II, it is observable by the act of
generalization in the introspective sphere. Yet that generalization remains just
that-- it is not integrated into the personal sense system. It remains an abstract
generalization, without adding to it the person's feeling tone. It amounts to
rational concept formation (a la Vygotsky), which is not linked with the person's
core of intrasubjectivity.
For instance, a concrete story of how my next-door neighbour was
mugged by a gang of youngsters that I have attended to (which was brought into
layer I) keeps being present in my internal sphere after I heard the story, and I let
it turn into layer II by my intra-personal generalization "young people these days
are very inconsiderate and aggressive." I can externalize this generalization in
many different versions-- as a generalization, or as a summary of re-telling my
Valsiner 312

neighbour's story, or as an ironic comment watching some youngsters in the

street (who may be actually hanging out there in a perfectly peaceful manner).
Thus, I have constructed a generalization, yet it is not integrated into my personal
sense system, it is not yet "populated" with my personal feelings, which would be
the case if the generalization were to reach the integration layer (III).
Nevertheless, I may become involved in many rational discussions-- in myself or
with others-- about the downfall of the mores of the youngsters in our time.
Most of ordinary human interactions on issues of politics, business, and
psychology may be of such layer-II type. Discussions of abstract problems that
are sufficiently far from one's own core self may be an activity that seems to
create an image of the person's participation in social issues. Yet that
participation remains at the level of abstract discourse. Thus, discussions of
persons who are located very far from the dangers of some lethal virus (Ebola, or
HIV) can in abstract terms look like efforts of participation in the solution of a
"problem" (=another abstraction), yet it is through that discourse that the issue
involved is not let to become integrated with the personal sense system (layer
III). In contrast, if any of the eager talkers oneself encounters "the problem", it
may become taken into the layer III realm, and the person may find it too difficult
to externalize any (or some) of the personally senseful aspects of the newly
integrated phenomenon.
Likewise, many of psychology's research methods tap into the layer II
phenomena. Consider a standard item from a personality questionnaire, such as

In general, I try to help other people

I like it when I am surrounded by many people
I like to read books on philosophy

If a research participant is expected to respond TRUE or FALSE to such

statements, the method calls for externalization from layer II of the
internalization/externalization process. The statements given are marginal in
their status-- they are public (as these can be uttered easily in any public setting),
yet they are assumed to pertain to the inherent characteristics of the respondent
(whose "personality" is being studied via them)
Relativity of person's participation in external activity contexts (i.e., moving
between central and peripheral roles in a joint action setting) has its counterpart
in the intra-psychological sphere. Here it is organized by way of maintaining
different kinds of internalized materials in different layers, and selectively (and
episodically) letting them to become integrated into the personal sense system.
The person is a relative-- sometimes peripheral, sometimes central-- participant
in one's own life, thanks to the differentiated system of internalization/
externalization.

Phenomena in layer III: another look at Bakhtin's ideas. In layer III, the
personal sense structure transforms the permeating message with the help of
person's subjectivity, and the integrated incoming message acquires a clearly
Valsiner 313

affective flavour. From the perspective of the laminal model, the oft-quoted key
idea of Mikhail Bakhtin may acquire a new role.
The quote from Bakhtin that is often used to emphasize the unity of the
social and the personal in the appropriation process is as follows:

The word of language [slovo iazyka-- in Russian]-- is half alien

[chuzoye-- not belonging to me and unknown-- in Russian] word. It
becomes "one's own" when the speaker inhabits [naselit, in
Russian] it with his intention, with his accent, masters [ovladeet, in
Russian] the word, brings it to bear upon his meaningful and
expressive strivings. Until that moment of appropriation [prisvoenie
in Russian] the word is not existing in neutral and faceless
language (as the speaker does not take the word from a
dictionary!), but [it exists] on the lips of others, in alien contexts, in
service of others' intentions: from here it has to be taken and made
into one's own. (Bakhtin, 1934/35-- published in 1975, p. 106).

The word "exists on the lips of others", it constitutes an externalized

version of the words by these others. As -- for the given person-- the word is
always "half-alien", it is simultaneously also constructed to be one's own, in that
"other half". It is the speaker who "inhabits" it with his "intention", and through
that inhabiting masters or takes control over the word. The double-directedness
of prisvoenie works well within the present laminal model of internalization/
externalization. The person is involved in prisvoenie exactly by way of
internalization/ externalization (see Figure 7.7.) . The "populating of the word"
can be seen as the subjective integration of the incoming message into the
personal sense system in layer III. It is the higher affective fields that would
accomplish that task-- by populating the given word with one's basic personal
feeling of semiotically organized kind.

Complementarity of internalization and externalization

The externalization process proceeds in direct complementarity with the

internalization process. Different layers can enter into a dialogue through that--
some material that is by now "populated with intention" (a la Bakhtin) is taken
from layer III outwards to layer II. If, after talking much about the sad fate of my
neighbour being mugged, and blaming modern-day youngsters for being
aggressive, I myself become mugged by some adolescents, I might integrate the
generic talk of before (layer II) with my lived-through experience, and my talk
about youngsters' aggressivity becomes "populated by my personal sense",
highly affective in its tone. That may become translated into my vehement
general talk about youngsters (layer II), but now there exists a dialogue between
layer II and layer III phenomena in my intra-psychological system.

Example 7.5. A case from Sudan: abortions within abortion-outlawing

contexts. One of the basic changes in human societies that leads to
Valsiner 314

complicated internalization/ externalization processes of persons is the change in

the value of children. In most societies, child-bearing has always been
emphasized with ideological zeal and redundant guidance in the positive
direction. Yet the realities of modern lives in many countries-- military conflicts
that endure over decades, famine, economic downfall-- all undermine the
traditional orientation towards having children as the ideal goal.
The following example of a woman from Southern Sudan (Dinka) who had
undergone abortion indicates the underlying ambivalence:

The only problem with abortion is that it could kill you. If you survive
physically, it kills you inside. A slow and painful death, that you feel
eating away your energy every day. Ever since I have asked myself
if the decision was absolutely necessary. I have got to grips with life
pretty much on the surface, I can laugh and joke around with
everyone, but most people don't know about the fire burning inside
me I always have nightmares about being punished by God so
that I can't have more children when I need/want to. My biggest
nightmare is when bad thoughts come into my head like what if I
lose my older children and then realise that I've been punished and
I can't have any more. I usually feel the spirits coming to me when
I'm walking alone, asking me what am I worth as a woman if I can
take into my own hands something that is supposed to be their
responsibility: to bear or not to bear children I can't stop feeling
this way, because I find my friends with similar experiences talking
about having the same sentiments. (Jok, 1999, p. 208, added
emphases)

The crucial notion of internalized kind is the admission of the internal

dialogue with the spirits about power and responsibility. The role of the spirit
world for persons' internalization/ externalization processes is the creation of a
"social other" who is being a partner in an ongoing dialogue about life-central
issues. In the context of Christian (Catholic) devotionalism, such "social others"
may be images of saints.

Example 7.6. Taking a saint to bed. In the context of American Catholic

devotionalism to St. Jude, the internal dialogues are mediated through the
placement of symbolic objects in personally relevant locations:

Many women told me that they reserved their favorite images of the
saint for their bedrooms; some said they took statues or holy cards
of Jude into bed with them at night so they could touch him while
they talked with him. usually talk to him in the quiet of the
evening," one woman explained, "laying awake at night before
falling asleep." (Orsi, 1996, p. 111)
Valsiner 315

The images of the saint-- St. Jude is considered the saint for hopeless causes--
support the internalization/ externalization processes. The imagery of the "social
other" that the person has constructed can be maintained in the intra-
psychological domain-- or brought out in the form of a symbolic object (e.g.,
cards with depictions of the saint) or iconic replica. The object acts as a semiotic
mediator of the person's self-organization.

Example 7.7. "Spirit spouses" of the Baoule. A phenomenon parallel to the

example from devotional Catholicism is the Baoule (central Ivory Coast) historical
tradition of creating "sprit spouses" for the person. Among the many sculptures
that the Baoule create (and which have become classified under the label of
"African art" for the nave Europeans and Americans), there are sculpted images
of the "spirit husband" or "spirit wife" that are present in the household. These
sculptures are of special significance for the person whose "spirit" is "brought
down" by the sculpture. Others are not supposed to look at those sculptures
(even if these can be glimpsed during visits to the household). The "spirit
spouses" are believed to bring luck in any aspect of life to their main consorts
and the whole household. The "spirit spouses" are located in private areas --
bedrooms of their consorts-- and often covered from visual access by outsiders.
Their location is turned into a shrine (see Figure 7.10.)
The figures-- referred to as "persons of wood"-- are treated functionally as
real spouses. This includes the needs to give them presents-- offerings to their
shrines; as well as they are slept with as required (once a week). The
psychological effects reported by the consorts of the "persons of wood" follow the
lead of the belief of their spiritual powers. For example, a Baole woman claimed:

I have a spirit husband. Mondays I do not sleep with my husband

We consulted [a diviner] and they told me that I had to have blolo
bian [spirit husband] carved. If I didn't, I would never get along with
my husband After they carved it, my husband gave me
something that I gave to my blolo bian. Nevertheless the two are
rivals. My blolo bian has his day when I sleep with him, and that
day I do not sleep with my husband from here [on earth]. After that
day, I come back to sleep with my husband. [Before it was carved],
we quarreled every day. We really quarreled! My spirit husband
made me like that, so I was always fighting with my husband. When
I had it carved, calm returned to the house (Vogel, 1997, p. 248)
Valsiner 316

Figure 7.10. The image (A) and the shrine (B) for the Baoule wooden
husband

A. B.

The use of invented personages to control one's self has been reported in
European cases of psychotherapy (see the invention of "the Thumper" in the
case described by Miltenburg and Singer, 1999). The Baoule accomplish in a
socially systematic manner the externalization of the "social other" into iconic
forms.
The "social other" in case of the Baoule "persons of wood" is of the
opposite gender, thus creating an androgynous semiotic structure of the Baoule
selves. The spirit spouse figures

express an opposite or inverted self. They are other-worldly, the

opposite sex, and often behave antisocially. However imperfect
their human partner, they are physically idealized. They are always
installed on the day before the weekday on which their human
partner was born, and the weekly night that partner must spend
Valsiner 317

with them is the night before his or her day of birth. In some sense
the spirit spouse is an alter ego, a sort of opposite-sex twin of its
human partner Spirit spouses seem to suggest the disorienting
idea (found in other Baoule artworks and in other parts of Africa)
that humans might harbor in themselves elements of the other sex.
The figures both express and remedy this contradiction by
externalizing and isolating the male side of a woman and the
female side of a man (Vogel, 1997, p. 267)

Yet the Baoule externalization of the spirit spouses into iconic symbols go
beyond accentuation of basic human androgyny. The "people of wood" are
spouses in the boundary zone between the this-worldly and other-worldly realms.
As wooden sculptures-- objects-- they belong to the world which is inhabited by
their partners and their real spouses, children, elders, etc. This belonging makes
it necessary to treat them as if they were real. Thus, social rules of privacy are
applied to the wooden spouses similarly to the real ones. Yet, at the same time,
the psychological functions of the "people of wood" are defined by their belonging
to the spiritual realm. This "double citizenship" of the "people of wood" sets them
up as mediators between the two worlds-- and of the self-system of their human
partner.
The phenomena of creating external objects that carry cultural meanings
at the intersection of personal and collective cultures permeate human lives. The
Yoruba marking of the death of one or another of the honored twins by creating
his or her iconic sign out of wood (Chemeche, 2003) is a cultural tool for
maintenance of the symbolic role of the person who has ceased to be present in
the everyday world. The figures (see Figure 7.11) ere ibejiare commissioned
by the parents of the dead child(ren) from a special ritual carver whose making of
the figurines is a sequential ritual act (described by Fakeye, 2003). The whole
process of getting a figurine carved out of special wood (which becomes sacred
as a result) is embedded in a sequence of ritual acts. The carver is being fed by
the person who orders the figurine, a ritual of the selection of wood from which
carving would happen is performed, and the carver has to consecrate the
finished image by ritual washing of the figure, and ritual transfer of the figure to
the parents. A shrine is set up at home where the figurine is treated with daily
activities:

They will be placed lying down at night and standing upright during
the day. The mother may wish to prepare a cloth dress for the ere
ibeji. If one of twins is alive, then the carved figure and the living
child will wear similar garments Every five days a small ceremony
consisting of the presentation of food and the singing of oriki, praise
songs, for ibeji will be performed. (Fakeye, 2003, p. 29)
Valsiner 318

Figure 7. 11. Yoruba ibeji figurine (Chemeche, 2003, p. 187)

Valsiner 319

In the history of the Yoruba, the ibeji figurines are the result of the
historical reversal of the twin infanticide practices of the Yoruba (dated back to
the 18th century). In our present context here, the ibeji figures are exsamples of
hybrid signsuniting iconic and symbolic featuresthat suggest the emergence
and maintenance of a hyper-generalized affective field. The rituals performed
around the figurines are mesogenetic events that guide the ontogenetic
development (of the co-twin, and any other persons in the social environment).
The hybrid nature of the signs simultaneously presents the memory of the real
child (deceased twin) by the iconic side, while presenting the link of connection of
the lives of the living and the deadan act of generalizing psychological
distancing. It is through the use of objectswhich are especially open to the
iconic and symbolic hybridization of signsthat value is generated both in the
personal-cultural and collective-cultural worlds.

Conclusion: Functions of the multi-level affective self-regulation

In chapter 7 we have covered two major domains of cultural psychology
how language is limited (yet important) semiotic regulator of the personal-cultural
domains, and how the multi-layered internalization/externalization process
guarantees relative autonomy of the person in any state of his or her relationship
with the social environment. Similarly, the non-isomorphic relation between
ontogenesis, mesogenesis and microgenesis guarantees relative buffering of
each level against excessive events at the adjacent ones. The person as
subjective agentthe maker of ones own personal world through relating to its
social guidance (canalization)- is enabled through the socially constructed
systems of semiotic mediation.
I claim that it is thanks to the affective semiotic fields which are not open
to direct verbal accesshence also to direct social scrutinyare the mechanism
through which the person is personally unique and socially constituted. There is
no contradiction between these two notions when a dynamic, multi-level model of
relations of person and the social world is being viewed as a way for being
personal and social at the same time. In contrast, in theoretical models of
structural kind where the classical logic excluding the middle term (either A or
not-A) is applied, my statement would be nonsensical. It is precisely by replacing
the law of the excluded middle (used axiomatically by classical logic and
psychology) by the opposite-law of included, or emphasized, in-between
processesthat viable theoretical models of cultural psychology can be built.
What is being built in this book is just only one version of the multitude of
possible theoretical models of this kind.
However, whatever models we may build theoretically, their ultimate
adequacy is tested through their contact with the ever-changing and unique
cultural psychological realities. That makes issues of methodology crucial for any
successful cultural psychology. Chapter 8 will outline how cultural psychology
Valsiner 320

can re-conceptualize psychologys methodologyby way of restoring in it the

unity of the general and the particular, and by including the researcher in the
cycle of cultural-psychological processes themselves.
Valsiner 321

Chapter. 8. Methodology for Cultural Psychology: Systemic,

Qualitative, and Idiographic

in order to apprehend a melody, it is not sufficient to

have in ones consciousness at each stage the impression
of the note that is then sounding. Ratherleaving aside
the initial tonethe impression of at least some of the
preceding tones must also be given in memory. Otherwise
the concluding impression of all melodies having an
identical final note would be the same.
(Ehrenfels, 1988a, p. 84)

The ... quantitative method, brought over into psychology

from the exact sciences, physics and chemistry, must be
discarded; for its ideal consisted in reducing the more
complex to the more simple, the whole into its parts, the
later-evolved to the earlier-existent, thus denying or
eliminating just the factor which constituted or revealed
what was truly genetic. Newer modes of manifestation
cannot be stated in atomic terms without doing violence to
the more synthetic modes which observation reveals.
(Baldwin, 1930, p. 7)

There are two problems with methodology in psychology at large the

habit of treating methodology as if it were limited to any particular kind of method,
and the inability to study complex dynamic processes of human lives. The first of
these problems belongs to the area of social politics in the given area of science.
The second is a genuinely epistemological obstacle that stems from the
emphasis in the social sciences upon quanti-fictional 92 analyses strategies,
rather than on models of creative synthesis and development (Valsiner, 2006c).
Cultural psychological investigation requires a focus on synthesisas semiotic
mediation of human life processes is precisely of the kind of making new forms
for maintaining existing functions.

92
This term indicates the creation of fictions through quantification.
Valsiner 322

Reliance on impossible axioms

When the axiomatic basis of a science becomes worn out by the misfit of
its basic assumptions with the nature of the phenomena under study, a major
overhaul in the methodological domain of that science is in order. Psychology in
the 21st century is in this stateand the peculiar focus of cultural psychology
leads its way.

From independence to non-independence. Traditionally, psychology has built

its methodology on the axiomatic assumptions of independence of the
phenomena from one another, their static ontological status (e.g., X is X), and
reduction of hierarchies of organizational levels into a one. The axiom of
independence entails denial of historical continuityif phenomena A, B, C that
unfold in time, in that order, are considered to be mutually independent, then
their history of transitions ABC will be left out of investigation. Assuming
that phenomena (A,B,C) have static ontologythey exist as representing the
essences of A-ness, B-ness, and C-ness guarantees that the researchers
not focus on the changes within each of the categories of the X-ness
phenomena. Thus, a sequence of variation in form (e.g., A A A) where
the repetition of A comes with slight modifications (yet not enough to re-classify
them from A to a non-A category) remains out of focus for the researchers, who
instead would work on making these variations perceivable as members of the
homogeneous set {A}. This axiomatic operation rules out the consideration of
change and development from the outset (Valsiner & Conolly, 2003).

From uniform to multi-level models of organization. Traditional psychology

has done its best to be blind to the hierarchical order within its phenomena. This
is exemplified by the difficulty of treating the question of part <> whole
relationships. The issue of part <> whole relations has haunted psychologys
methodology ever since its autonomous status was gained as a separate
science 93. This conceptual issue remains unsolved up to the present day, and is
particularly crucial in cultural psychology. As we have observed all through this
book, cultural-psychological processes are primarily those of creating semiotic
control hierarchiesranging from minimal; (sign X conduct Y) to potentially
infinite ({sign X sign X+n} conduct Y) orders of hierarchical kind.
Furthermore, these are transitory hierarchical orders (Poddiakov & Valsiner,
2007) of intransitive kind. They form causal cycles (see below) where the
dominance of each part of the cycle can be dynamically altered, and where the
outcomes are by-products of the self-maintaining cyclical system.

93
I would date that at year 1874the apperance of Franz Brentanos Psychology from the Empitical
Standpoint and Wilhelm Wundts first edition of Foundations of Physiological Psychology. Of course
administratively cultural psychologyunder the name Vlkerpsychologieexisted since 1860 as the such
named professorship was established at the University of Berne in Switzerland.
Valsiner 323

Methodological objectives of cultural psychology

The issue of how to investigate the emergence, maintenance, and demise

of hierarchical order is central for cultural psychology. Traditional psychologys
methodology solves this problemas it does the other two, aboveby axiomatic
ignoring of those issues. Meta-theoretical blind spots are widespread in any
scienceyet their impact on these sciences is that of creating dead-end streets
for empirical investigation that may last for decades. The history of psychology
since the 1870s is filled with such dead-end streets of active empirical (or
pseudo-empirical, see below) investigation traditions.
In this chapter, I will chart out some pathways towards a solution of this
methodological problem that continues to limit the work of cultural psychologists.
The important starting point is to restore the basic understandingwell-known in
European Continental psychologies of early 20th century, that methodology is not
equal to a method, or a class of methods (from which the researcher selects
some). Furthermore, methodology is not an arena for a fight between different
kinds of methodssuch as quantitative and qualitative (Valsiner, 2006c).
Instead, methodology is a process through which scientific knowledge gets
created. However, in all sciencesand particularly in the social sciencesthere
exists the underlying socio-political set of meta-level constraints upon how, what
kind, and for what purposes knowledge is being created. The imperatives of
viewing quantified data as objective, preferring group comparisons to studies of
persons-within-social structures (as was shown in chapter 1), and the rhetoric of
social applicability of the knowledge created are all socially constructed norms
in our contemporary social sciences. Their value for producing general as well
as empirically precise knowledge is in question. Certainly the rhetoric of
narration of the stories that emanate from empirical work in the social sciences
demonstrates such social organization of knowledge construction.

Where democracy fails: in contributions to the literature

Science is not a democratic enterprise, but a cautious, somewhat

masochistic, intellectual search for general knowledge. The ways in which
knowledge has been viewed in psychology has failed to recognize this
complexity of intellectual synthesis, and replaced it with the notion of gradual
accumulation of facts. In contemporary psychology one can often find that
"contribution to the literature"rather than solving a particular problem-- is in
itself an example of a social expectation for researchers.
This perspective on knowledge creation operates based on the social
representation of democracy. It assumes that by majority opinion about issues,
researchers arrive at new breakthroughs. This orientation-- when applied to
scientific writing-- can be labeled "democracy of the literature" (Valsiner, 2000b).
It entails the need to specify the prevailing research orientations, or fashionable
explanations "in the field" through wide referencing, rather than depth of analysis.
Valsiner 324

What is contributing to the literature? Different ways in which researchers

construct knowledge are visible in the ways they write about the phenomena of
their interest, as well as present their conceptual schemes to their colleagues.
The "contribution to the literature" direction is characterized by ample referencing
of other authors who have worked on similar issues, or who are being followed--
yet without elaboration of their specific ideas.
In contrast, the model of knowledge that emphasizes theoretical
breakthroughs-- based on empirical evidence but not limited by it-- would call for
depth in the analysis of the ideas of fellow researchers, at the expense of the
need to acknowledge each and every "player in the field." Rather, a publication
without a single reference to the literature might solve a basic problem in the
fieldand maybe lead to the start-up of a new concentration of the literature.
However, the democratic model of the literature has other perils than mere
wastefulness of the researchers writing capabilities 94it also turns the publicly
available texts towards modeling lack of precision of ideas and reliance on
majority viewpoints.

How imprecision becomes encoded? The prominence of the rhetoric functions

of referencing can be detected by the growing imprecision of intra-text
references. The specific idea of another researcher is not mentioned. Instead,
reference is made to the general work, or research direction, of the selected
author (e.g., We follow the lead of Konnapea (1999) in taking the X perspective
on Y). Here there is no precision of idea linkages between the referenced source
and the referencing author. Instead there is a declaration of allegiance in general
terms. The statement is scientifically empty, but rhetorically explicit.
Since democracy of the literature works on the basis of majority
dominating any minorities,-- as well as the need to demonstrate a wide
constituency-- the reference style in texts often entails concatenating different
pledges of allegiance within (always limited) space of publication. Hence, we may
encounter statements of the following kind:

In our study, we take the perspective X upon Y. That perspective

has been used widely in the literature (Angst, 1998, Bicho, 1997,
Coco, 1995, Doof, 1997, Ebausklik, 1989, Jones, 1992,
Konnapea,1999, Queer, 1995, Rott, 1999, Vabamtleja, in press)

It is clear that the concatenation of manyin this case 10imprecise

references into one sentence of the text is far from any precise linkage with any
specific ideas or research practices of any of the mentioned authors. It only
indicates the referencers claim of connection with some, ill-defined, part of the
literature. It is a rhetoric moment in the messagethe text of an articlerather
than a vehicle for providing substantive information.

94
This is mandated by the contemporary perspective of science administration to evaluate the
productivity or impact of some published article through its citation frequencies. As a result, social
capital for othersor even for oneself, in case of self citations-- is generated through such wastefulnes of
imprecise referencing.
Valsiner 325

Maintaining and making ingroup/outgroup distinctions In contemporary

psychology, rhetoric moments of persuasion of the public are intermingled with
tentative efforts to express ideas. As a result, most of psychologys
communicative messages are complex-like (pseudoconcepts in Vygotskys
sense), rather than conceptual. In the complexes of ideasoften viewed as if
those were scientific conceptsboth the socio-political positions and scientific
knowledge can be seen as mixed between particular labels. Thus, notions of
attachment, genetic determinacy (in psychology, not in genetics), zone of
proximal development (to mention a few) are complexes, rather than scientific
concepts. These complexes may have a potential for becoming conceptsyet
that potential needs to be brought into actuality.
Democracy of the literature thrives on imprecise referencing and rhetoric
group formation (and ingroup/ outgroup distinction). Its excess limits the potential
for innovation in the given discipline. The construction zones of psychological
ideas follow the majority opinions (once these have become established), rather
than precede them.

Cultural developmental psychology as a revolutionary science. The

coverage of issues of cultural developmental psychology in this book has been
anything but "democratic" (in the rhetoric sense). The issues of comparison in
the domain of scientific knowledge that unites culture and human development--
let it be called "cultural developmental psychology"-- are too old (which in terms
of contemporary psychology equals new!) to be simply let be consumed by the
marketplace of the international politics of psychological research. Instead, the
issues involved in cultural developmental psychology require careful re-
organization of the most sacred realm of any science-- that of its methodology.
Borrowing from Thomas Kuhn the distinction between "normal" and
"revolutionary" science, it can be said that the phenomena of cultural
organization of the human psyche, and of its development, are too fundamental
for human life (and death) to be left to the activities of psychology in its "normal
science" methodological orthodoxy. Instead, to cope with the needs to make
sense of cultural variability in persons (as well as between persons from different
societies), psychology needs to re-adjust its methodological repertoire in its
conceptual side. Surely the classical methods of science remain in place, but on
what (and how) they work may be open for "revolutionary" phase in the
development of psychology as science.

Methodology as knowledge construction process

The construction of basic knowledge in the social sciences depends not

upon the sophistication of the analytic techniques in the treatment of the
phenomena, but on the general strategies for where to look, which comparisons
to make, and what to assume about the phenomena before the actual analytic
techniques are put into use. It is an illusion in psychology to think that due to
researchers being similar to the persons they studythe phenomena are
Valsiner 326

immediately accessible to the psychologist. In reality, the inquiry into the minds
and feelings of the person next to oneself may be as inaccessible as the realities
of far-away galaxies are for astrophysicists.
Valsiner 327

Figure 8. 1. The methodology cycle

(after Branco & Valsiner, 1997)

BASIC AXIOMATIC
UNDERSTANDING
OF THE WORLD

P
T H
H E
E INTUITIVE
EXPERIENCING N
O O
R M
I E
E N
S

METHODS

DATA
(transformed
and
abstracted
Valsiner 328

An epistemic cycle

A look at methodology as a process cycle is given in Figure 8.1. The components

in the process are depicted as existing at different levels of generality-- the
axiomatic views of the world (general assumptions) are more general than
theories or intuitive reflections about phenomena; and the latter more general
than the methods that generate data.
In this scheme of scientific epistemology, an explicit and centrally located
emphasis is reserved for the subjectivity of the researcher-- who intuitively
experiences phenomena in connection with his or her axioms, and constructs
theories from one's personal standpoint. Scientists are not rational automata, but
subjective, personally involved human beings who have their subjective
preferences, and positions from which they look at the targets of their research.
In many ways, science is a form of artwhere the aesthetic features of
explanatory ideas, and the deep desires for knowing about something nobody
else have (so far) understood, dominates over the social role of being a wise
source of the knowledge that has already been accumulated. Scientific inquiry is
a form of adventure (Simmel, 1959a) where the pleasure of finding out something
new creates the intrinsic motivation that keeps human beings involved in
practices rather distant from the so-called real life.
The methods and the data are constructed by the researcher on the basis
of the specific structure of the process cycle. Methodology here is equal to the
cyclical process of general knowledge construction, where different parts of the
cycle feed differentially into other parts. The axiomatic look at the phenomena is
based on the experience of the phenomena together with abstracted general
ideas about them. Theories gain input from the axiomatic ideas and serve as a
translation point of those ideas into methodswhich, as those are made to relate
with the phenomena, produce data as a side effect of the methodology
process. The data are selective, theory-and-method based representations of
some selected aspects of the phenomenathat feed forward to the further
construction of theoretical kind.
It would be adequate to depict Figure 8.1. not merely as a cycle, but as a
helixthere is never a full return to the previously generated knowledge, even if
there may be outward resemblance between what is new and what is old. Such
helical development of scientific knowledge allows us to benefit from the history
of ideasdetecting a need at our present time to make sense of a basic issue
(such as development) leads us to look back into the history of our disciplines for
times when similar needs were detected.
Valsiner 329

Figure 8.2. . C. L. Morgans scheme of two inductions: the

integrating role of the subjective (from Morgan, 1894, p. 48)

Objectivity through subjectivity

Objectivity in science emerges on the basis of a deeply subjective process

of generalization. The basic scientific creativity takes place in the subjective
world of the knowledge makerscientist or artist. In terms of C. Lloyd Morgan,
that amounts to subjective induction (see Figure 8.2.) The psychologists
observing of the othersother organisms, other human beings, etcis based on
the subjective synthesis of life experience together with the objective-- perceived
or elicited behavior of the others (c-d relating to a-b in Figure 8.2.). On the
basis of the synthesis emerging from these two processestat takes the form of
an interpretation of the other (a-b) in terms of (c-d)new hypotheses are set
forth for continuing investigation.
The scientistpsychologist-- is constantly operating on the basis of ones
intra-mental understanding ("first induction" or subjective induction) of what it is
that is being studied, how to study it, and what to expect. Here the role of a
philosopher and psychologist convergeboth rely upon their powers of thinking
to make sense of some phenomenon.
However, differently from philosophers-- the scientist moves from such
intra-psychological reflection into an effort to gain knowledge about the object of
investigation through observing the others (through extrospection). The results of
such observation lead to the "second induction or objective induction). The
"second induction" is the process of relying on the empirical evidence that is
constantly emphasized in psychology. Here the scientist resembles a writer,
Valsiner 330

composer or painterall of whom, in their own ways, rely upon the experiences
with the outside world to create a new form of understanding.

Measurement as semiotic process: data are signs.

Measurement is a construction of new sign value from selected aspects of

complex phenomena by linking these selections with measurement standards
(signs). In this respect, all psychological measurement is a form of semiotic
activityconstructing signs of varied kinds for further inquiry into the phenomena
that they represent (as described in chapter 1).
It is obvious that such treatment of measurement as sign construction sets
up the stage for making this process the most central for all scientific
understanding. The adequacy of the constructed signs as representations of the
selected phenomena is the crucial feature of all data-as-signs, and needs to be
under careful scrutiny (see Knorr-Cetina, 1999, for examples of how such
scrutiny happens in different natural sciences). It is sufficient to undertake one
unwarranted step in the transformation of phenomena into signs (data) that the
value of the latter is wiped out in full.

Hypotheses testing: theory-driven versus pseudo-empirical. What follows

from Figure 8.1. is that the propositions to be tested empiricallyotherwise
called hypothesesare set up within the whole of the methodology cycle. An
empirical proof of a hypothesis is productive only if it leads to a new idearather
than confirms an existing one. The latter is expressed in the practices of pseudo-
empiricism in psychology:

...psychological research tends to be pseudoempirical, that is, it

tends to involve empirical studies of relationships which follow
logically from the meanings of the concepts involved. An example
would be studying whether all bachelors are really male and
unmarried. (Smedslund, 1995, p. 196)

Pseudo-empiricism can be countered by careful elucidation of theoretical

assumptions and their linkages with those research questions that can provide
the investigator new knowledge that cannot be derived from the meanings of the
terms in use.
In contrast, deductively generated (that istheories-based) hypotheses
would highlight the role of empirical investigation for science. When a hypothesis
is setwithin any of the four reference frames (intra-individual, inter-individual,
individual-ecological, and individual-socioecologicalValsiner, 2000-a)the
empirical efforts acquire vertically consistent meaning. Hypotheses are used to
Valsiner 331

test particular parts of the theoretical construct for its reality fitrather than
previously stated empirical distinctions 95.

Looking at culturally directed psychological phenomena

We pre-set our research efforts within the framework of wide general

perspectivesframes of reference (Valsiner, 2000c, chapter 5). Frames of
reference are general conceptual positioning devices within the minds of
researchers, who set up their research questions and construct methods in ways
that unify different levels of the methodology cycle. The same phenomenon can
be studied very differently-- from the different perspectives specified by the
different reference frames. Frames of reference narrow down the focus of
empirical research efforts. These frames are like the selection of magnification
levels in a microscopewhile some details become observable better in
selecting a particular frame, others vanish from the view.
The reference frames are necessary and needed blinderstheoretical
general orientation tools that make focusing on our desired object possible, while
eliminating the noise. Four frames can be discerned as in use in psychology
(Valsiner, 2000a, chapter 5) and one of thosethe individual-
socioecologicalis fitting for cultural psychology.

The individual-socioecological reference frame

The individual-socioecological reference frame is an extension of the

individual-ecological one. While the individual-ecological frame focused on the
links between the acting organism and the environment, its socio-ecological
extension includes both the focus on system <---> environment and the role of
others' social regulation of that relationship. The person faces one's
environment, acts upon it, and transforms oneself. However, the environment is
largely pre-prepared by social others-- another person (e.g., parents set up
"appropriate environments" for children), and the person's acting within an
environment is socially guided in explicit and implicit ways by various social
institutions, signs of various kinds present in the environment, etc.
The individual-socioecological reference frame thus includes

(a) an active person,

(b) environment,
(c) person's acting towards the environment.

95
For example, a hypothesis positing finding an inter-genders difference in some empirical measure is of
no theoretical relevance unless there is theoretical basis for such difference telling us a story about
something else that a theory posits in its translation into empirical tasks.
Valsiner 332

(d) the guiding role of the acting by somebody else (be it a person, social
institution, or a symbolic object within the environment), and
(e) the transformation of the person as a result of this socially guided
action by the person oneself.

In the case of the individual-socioecological frame, the researcher needs

to analyze the structure of social suggestions that exists in the particular episode
of encounter between the person and the environment. Some of these
suggestions are encoded into the environment itself, others are produced by the
other persons who are active in the same environment, regulating the person's
conduct in it. The Method of Double Stimulation (MeDoSt, see below) that was
created by Lev Vygotsky in the 1920s (van der Veer & Valsiner, 1991) is an
example of the ways in which the general scheme of individual-sociocultural
reference frame can be put into practice.

Lev Vygotskys contributions as the background to the

individual-socioecological reference frame. There are
three core ideas in Vygotsky's work that are crucial for
developmental and cultural psychology of our present time:

the emphasis on the mediation if the higher psychological functions by

signs (semiotic mediation);
consistently developmental orientation to the study of all psychological
phenomena;
focus on the synthesis of novel psychological forms.

The distinction of lower (involuntary) and higher (voluntary) psychological

functions is of crucial importance for developmental psychology. The central
issue of human intentionality (volition, will) was a universally recognized target for
psychological analysis in the first decades of the 20th Century. Vygotsky added
to the issue the developmental focus-- how do human beings develop from a
state of organization where intentionality clearly does not exist, to a state where it
is the core of human psychological functioning. His solution to the problem was
to see the emergence of semiotic mediation-- self-regulation by meanings-- as
leading to the establishment of intentionality.
Vygotsky's distinction of meaning ("znachenie") and sense ("smysl") was
expressed with an emphasis on the dynamic nature of psychological processes:

A word's sense is the aggregate of all the psychological facts that

arise in our consciousness as a result of the word. Sense is
dynamic, fluid, and complex formation which has several zones that
vary in their stability. Meaning is only one of these zones of the
sense that the word acquires in the context of speech. It is the most
stable, unified, and precise of these zones. In different contexts, a
word's sense changes. In contrast, meaning is a comparatively
Valsiner 333

fixed and stable point, one that remains constant with all the
changes of the word's sense that are associated with its use in
various contexts. Change in the word's sense is a basic factor in
the semantic analysis of speech. The actual meaning of the word is
inconstant. . In one operation, the word emerges with one meaning;
in another, another is acquired... Isolated in the lexicon, the word
has only one meaning. However, this meaning is nothing more than
a potential that can only be realized in living speech, and in living
speech meaning is only a cornerstone in the edifice of sense.
(Vygotsky, 1987, pp. 275-276; emphasis added; original Vygotsky,
1934, p. 305)

Vygotsky viewed the meaning <==> sense relationship in dynamic terms--

both are changing entities, but their change is different in the time frame. The
relatively slower rate of changing the meaning is obtained by inserting the
previous meaning into a novel speech context (realizing the potential of the
meaning by turning it into the "actual meaning"-- the unity of sense and meaning
in the given context). The dynamic, fluid personal sense makes use of potential
meanings encoded in language, and constructs ever-imprecise semiotic devices
(actual meanings) which nevertheless fit the task of reduction of experiential
uncertainty the person faces in the given situation. It can be said that the great
power of human language in guiding human meaning-making is in the vagueness
of the actual meanings that are constructed by persons in uncertain situations.

The Method of Double Stimulation (MeDoSt).

The "method of double stimulation" entails a number of radical ideas in

reconstructing psychology's experimental method. First, it is explicitly
structuralist-- as the subject is viewed as encountering the whole field of the
experimental setting --and not merely the elements of it that are purposefully
varied-- "independent variables". The world of living is not made up of
variablesthat can be independently varied by a researcherbut of dynamic
structures of ecological and cultural niches (Odling-Smee, Laland & Feldman,
2003). These niches are multi-level hierarchical ordersrather than one-level
set of variables manipulable by the researcher and changing independently of
one another. Mixing of the levels of such hierarchical orders into an interplay of
independent and dependent variables introduces representations of
causality into psychological analyses that are fictional (see Anandalakshmy,
1974, p. 81). The MeDoSt overcomes that problem by assuming a person-
centered (rather than variables-centered) position.
Valsiner 334

Figure 8.3. The structure of Vygotskys Method of Double Stimulation

b
STIMULUS-
OBJECTS
(GOALS)
FULL
QUASI-
STRUCT ACTION
PERSO URED TOOL c
N FIELD=
SIMULU a
STUDY
S-
SETTIN
SIGNS
RESEARCHE
R
SUGGESTS

BACKGROUND RESERVE
OF MEANINGS/MEMORIES

Secondly, the subjectthe actor 96 in the research context who is being

studied-- is considered as an active agent who reconstructs that field-- by
introducing into it the goal sub-fields ("stimulus-objects", in Vygotsky's
terminology), and means to reach those goals ("stimulus-means"see Figure
8.3.). This functional differentiation of the experimental structured stimulus field
into two kinds of relevant parts (goals and means), while leaving the rest of the
field to constitute the background, is guided by the experimenter, but cannot be
determined by him or her. The experimenter gives the subject a task embedded
within the field, but the subject can refuse to perform that task, and turn it into
another one. In other terms-- the psychological experiment is only partially
controllable by the experimenter.

The notion of "double stimulation" entails two distinctions-- first, that of

"stimulus-object" (the task and its goals) and "stimulus-means" (means to the end
of reaching the goal). This is the basic Agent (Subject) / Object differentiation that

96
I prefer to bring in the theatrical and activity-focused notion of the actor hereto overcome the fruitless
language game of labeling the person who is being studied either a subject or a research participantall
human beings who are involved in the stage act of research encounterthe one who investigates and the
one who is being investigatedare research participants.
Valsiner 335

is necessary for any problem-solving setting to emerge (Simon, 1999). This

component is shared between Homo sapiens and other primates or even species
further away from humans on the evolutionary ladder (see Sarris, 1931 on dogs
mental capacities).
There is a secondary differentiation of double stimulibetween the two
kinds of means that can be used to organize the subject's conduct in the
experimental field. The action tools are created in the situation, and constitute a
synthesis of new functional uses of previously available objectswithout, or with,
modifications. There exist different qualitative levels of such synthesis, some of
which do not require the presence of the human mind. Thus, the Japanese
monkeys who invented the technique of potato washing (Hirata, Watanabe &
Kawai, 2001) merely re-grouped their available environmental and bodily
resources to invent a completely novel way of solving the problem of access to
food. Vygotsky borrowed the focus on means/ends distinction from Khlers
observations of chimpanzees. Khlers chimpanzees at Tenerife, as well as
many generations of primate problem-solvers in laboratories, zoos, and the wild,
have creatively combined existing resources in new ways (Matsuzawa et al,
2001). A crucial qualitative breakthrough occurs in phylogeny when existing
forms of the action resources are modified by the actor to fit the task, and the
modification know-how retained in the collective memory of the troop of the
species. The making of action tools makes a difference here.

The MeDoSt as a semiotic method. MeDoSt entails the investigation of the

uses of signs-- semiotic means by the actorsigns of varied kinds. Like action
tools, signs can be constructed in the here-and-now setting, for specific task
demands, or imported to the present setting from a previous setting. It is through
these semiotic mediating devices that link the present situation becomes tied in
with the subject's past experiences, and extrapolated to the anticipated futures.
Human subjects, through the use of languagein the act of thinking and
speaking constantly make their own meaning in any situation they experience.
The construction and use of semiotic means includes the context of a
psychological experiment. The subject (participant-to-be-studied 97) makes sense
of the flow of events that is happening to him or her after agreeing to take part in
a study. The signs a human being uses in any study entail three parallel
functionsthey allow the person to give meaning to the act of instrument
construction or selection (a in Figure 8.3.), they provide meaning for the act of
striving towards reaching the goal (b), and they maintain the persistence of the
effort of using the tools to reach the goal (c). Human intrinsic motivation is
semiotically constructedthe meaning of trying, and trying again (persistent

97
The labels used to denote people who participate in psychological research are interesting
case of meaning-making of their own. Having originally been called observers (in the
introspectionist paradigmpeople who observed their inner psychological processes) they
became subjects (e.g., the widely used slang running the subjectsa remnant of the time when
the white rat took the place of the introspecting person), in our time they become research
participants, which denigrates the role of the researchers since they also are participants in the
encounter with persons they want to study.
Valsiner 336

imitation a la Baldwin) is based on the personal culture (Valsiner, 2000a) and

fortified through affectively hyper-generalized semiotic means (Valsiner, 2005a).
This interpretational activity of the subject is not controllable by the
experimenter, and the subjects emerging meanings of the research situation
cannot be eliminated. Human psychological research is necessarily
personological and historical in its nature.
Vygotsky's methodological ingenuity was in his decision to turn that
inevitably uncontrollable moment of human interpretation aroundand make up
virtue of something that would usually be considered a vice (Toomela, 2003).
The meaning-making process in a study context was made into the target of
investigation-- the equivalent of the "dependent variable" in the case of his
method is the microgenetic process by which the subject attempts to reach the
goal, and the corresponding construction of meanings.

Systemic Causality

It is obvious that the MeDoSt experimental scheme is very different from

the view on experimentation where the researchers willful manipulation of the
independent variable leads to the changes in the dependent variablea
scheme fit for the notion of linear causality (A B. A causes B). The
inaplicability of such simplified scheme to everyday cultural-psychological
phenomena has been clearly demonstrated (Anandalakshmy, 1974; Thorngate,
1986, Valsiner, 1997). Instead, the MeDoSt scheme leads us to consider
different forms of systemic causality.
A general scheme of systemic causality is presented in Figure 8.4. The
process of synthesizing two separate substrates (a, b) into a new compound (ab)
is made possible through a catalyst (c) which temporarily binds to the input
substratesfirst to a (arriving at intermediate compound ca), then to b (arriving
at intermediate compound cabbinding a and be into one whole). The catalyst
then releases the newly synthesized compound ab and recreates itself (c).
Without the binding role of the catalyst the synthesis need not be possible-- the
direct, unmediated synthesis {a + b ab} cannot proceed.
Psychological catalyzing can be said to make human lives livable. Since
every action by an organism is potentially dangerous as to its outcome, a fearful
reflexive stance towards what one is doing would be realistic. Yet it is relatively
rare. In most of human activities we are remarkably unreflective about the
potential dangers involved.
This example of catalysis-based synthesis needs to be translated into a
psychological realm. Perhaps the most solid fact in psychology concerning the
introduction of European-style formal schooling in traditional societies has been
the change in the reasoning patterns (see chapter 6). After a few years in school,
persons begin to use deductive reasoning strategies by unquestionably
assuming the scheme for such strategies (syllogistic reasoning schemes) even if
those are filled with contents that is part of their everyday life. If there is a
particular value orientationunconditional acceptance of the authority figures
Valsiner 337

utterancethe syllogistic task to proceed. Once it proceeds, it re-creates the

value orientation itself.
Valsiner 338

Figure 8.4. An example of catalytic process that produces synthesis

A. The basic scheme

AB

CA

B
C-A-B
CA

B. The causal cycle between levels of organization

LEVEL X+1

LEVEL X
Valsiner 339

Multi-level causal systems. Figure 8.4.A. shows the general organizational

scheme of systemic causality, yet it overlooks a crucial feature of such
systemsdifferent parts of the cycle of causality can be located at different
levels of generality, and the causal cycle can work between adjacent levels
(Figure 8.4.B.). This feature of systemic causality introduces into the explanatory
system the notion of hierarchical systems of intransitive kind (Poddiakov &
Valsiner, 2007). The causal cycle that works in-between levels (X and X+1)
leads to the emergence of new form of the higher level. Through such multi-level
catalytic processes of causal kind it becomes possible to explain both
maintenance of the hierarchical orders of cultural-psychological phenomena as
well as emergence of new higherlevels of hierarchical regulation. The central
notion of development of higher psychological functions that permeates
psychology from Wilhelm Wundts Vlkerpsychologie (Diriwchter, 2004) to Lev
Vygotskys and Alexander Lurias cultural-historical psychology (van der Veer &
Valsiner, 1991) requires that formal causal systems in the science of cultural
psychology include the notion of multi-level causal systems.

Downward causality. Together with the emergence of multi-level causal

hierarchies of cyclical kind we can conceptualize the directionality of causality.
While in the case of history of the sciences the main focus has been in discovery
of upward causality (i.e., looking for lower-level causal entities that can be
viewed to explain complex phenomena), then our new look at hierarchical
systemic causality entails the focus on downward causality (Andersen,
Emmeche, Finnemann & Christiansen, 2000). This is particularly appropriate in
case of the semiotic perspective in cultural psychology where the emergence of
higher levels of generalized signs becomes causative in relation to lower levels.
Cultural psychology is built on the basic notion of downward causality.

Systemic transformational causality. There is a general principle observable

herethat conditional temporary causal systems (see Figure 8.5.) Causal
systems can be temporarily assembledhence we can talk of systemic
transformational causality. When the parts of a causal system are prepared
separately, but their synthesis left to the time of need for its full function, we get
the picture not only of systemic causality in operation, but of the contextually
assembled causal system. When not needed, none of its differentiated parts is
effective separately.
Valsiner 340

Figure 8.5. Systemic Transformational Causality

Example 8.1. How systemic temporal causality explains collective-cultural

guidance for violence. Young people may play video games or watch violent
movies-- but no direct outcome of that to their acting violently is empirically
demonstrable. Likewise, people may develop prejudices against some
outgroupbut, again, these prejudices by themselves do not lead to violence
against the group. Guns may be available in a society, together with internalized
social norms against aiming them at fellow human beings and pulling the trigger.
Unless these norms break down in some individual cases the guns remain
unused. At the same timeagain in a separate vein-- hunting is an accepted,
socially legitimate pastime for some of the population, some of the time. Yet
hunting is directed to animals of the kind that are socially accepted as
huntableand not towards ones next-door neighbour. As long as all these
elements co-exist in a society in parallel, there will be no empirically
demonstrable effects of each of those on the potential or actual violent actions
of the people involved in all of them. Thus, playing video games, watching horror
or action movies, going hunting, keeping a gun at home, or gossiping maliciously
about neighbours or publiclyabout some foreigners, at the usual
peacetimecircumstances and viewed separately are not immediately causal for
enabling acts of violence (Capezza & Valsiner, 2007). Yet when brought
Valsiner 341

together under the conditions of friction between social groups, these features
may lead to genocidal events. Then the video-game player, as well as hunters,
and gossipers, may all line up to join an army, rebel force, or an ethnic
cleansing squad, and genocide is in the making. The move from ordinary life to
violence is prepared by most ordinary everyday ways of livingand takes place
in concrete everyday life settings. Yet its microgenesis entails the semiotic set-
up of the arena for violent actions.

What is experiment in the realm of cultural psychology?

The experimental method is crucial for most sciencesyet in each of them it has
its own specific features. The MeDoSt described above sets the stage for re-
conceptualizing that method in its generic form, taking into account the
assumptions coming from the semiotic creativity of human conduct. Figure 8.6.
provides its generic overview.
Putting subjects into a complicated situation is necessary, but not
sufficient for the study of semiotic regulatory processes. The researcher then
needs to find a way to registerto bring out into the openthe subjects on-line
treatment of the dialogue (through recording action hesitance sequences, or
getting verbal self-report). The sequential nature of the evidence is crucial
semiotic regulation can be studied as a microgenetic problem-solving sequence.
The innovative moment here is to link this mental process registration
tradition with experimental manipulation of semiotic kindit is through the
insertion of some meaning change (meaning block in Figure 8.6.) while the
Subject is moving towards a previously set meaningful goal that the access to the
phenomena is created. The persons action plan is expected to be interrupted,
and s/he begins to use newcreated or imported meanings for dealing with the
meaning disturbance. The rupture is created by way of counter-suggestive
signs (see also chapter 1).
All methods in psychology are derivations from the basic human
encounter with the worldin terms of perception and attention. Scientists are
guided in their professional identity development to assume different positions in
relation to the phenomena they studyto look at them from a distance (observe
and contemplate), or study them through direct impact (experiment, interview,
taking the natives perspective by immersion in the cultural worlds of the
others in anthropology).
Some of the methods used in psychology are hybrids of these distant
versus close positioning of the researcherfor instance, a paper-and-pencil
method (test, questionnaire, rating scale) may be brought to the actors to be
studied by the researcher in direct contact. For instance--the researcher
administers ones questionnaires to a group of participants-- yet the method
entails providing distant answers the format of which is pre-set by the method
constructor. The marks the person makes on the piece of paper providedor on
a computer screenrefer to intra-psychologically complex phenomena that lose
their reality after the answer is given.
Valsiner 342

Figure 8.6. The generic structure of the experimental method in cultural

psychology
Valsiner 343

It is possible to re-think such traditionally distant methods and make

them to work towards the explication of the processes that underlie the giving of
answers. Both traditional rating scales (Wagoner & Valsiner, 2005) and
personality inventory items (Diriwchter, Valsiner & Sauck, 2004; Valsiner,
Bibace, and Lapushin, 2005) can work as micro-tasks that fit as elucidating
stimuli for revealing the cultural-psychological processes they trigger.

Modulation of researcher<> phenomena distance.

The crucial issue for methodology is the dynamic modulation of distancing

between the researcher and his or her phenomena. It follows from our focus on
methodology as a cycle that all the versions of encounterranging from the most
distant and abstract contemplation about the phenomena (upper part of Figure
8.1.) to the most hands-on immersion of oneself with the phenomena
(psychologists intuitive relation with the phenomena), including the construction
of theory and method in between.
The contrast between U.S. and Japanese traditions in the study of the
behavior of primates illustrates the different trajectories of negotiating the work
along the lines of the methodology cycle. If it was (and is) the standard practice
in the behavioral sciences as practiced in the U.S. to segregate method and
theory from each other, the starting point of a researchers contact with the
behavioral phenomena is a pre-set behavioral categorization scheme. It is a
protocol into which the observed reality has to be fitted. The protocol may be
amended and updated if some of the categories are questionable (as not
applicable to the fuzzy phenomena), yet the general strategy remains the
samefitting the fluidity of the observed phenomena to strict (classical-logical)
categorization scheme that is checked by similarity of different users habits of
coding (i.e., establishing consensually set standards of inter-observer
agreement). This tactic prioritizes method in relation to the phenomena, and
guarantees the validity of the method by social-institutional symbolic acts 98
(rather than critical links with a theory).
The Japanese tradition in primatologyat least the one built on the
holistic theoretical premises of Kenji Imanishi in Kyotosets the researchers up
in a very different task setting:

A great many students who were embarking on their first field

research were told by the pioneering mentors to simply go and
look and to get an impression of the animals and their lives.
Many wrote everything down. One informant noted that many first-

98
For example, the widespread practice in psychology to trust standardized methods is a symbolic
marking of the validity of the given technique. A method may be standardizedyet fail to capture the
crucial features of the phenomena it is assumed to produce data from (e.g., intelligence tests
standardizedfail to capture the intricacies of the cognitive processes involved in whatever is intelligent
action in humanb lifewhile their symbolic value is generated by their standardized status)
Valsiner 344

generation primatologists felt that writing impressions was

important and that long descriptions often resulted in monographs.
Yet the gaining of impressions about the animals lives was also
seen by informants to be an important and powerful tool to identify
what may be important (to test), one which enabled the observer to
take many factors into account in forming hypotheses, and to
remain free of prevailing opinions and views about animal behavior.
(Asquith, 2000, p. 170)

Here the intuitive relating of the researcher with the phenomena (see right
side of Figure 8.1) is prioritized. The work done is as empirically focused as that
of the U.S. primatologistsyet the method is subdominant to the VIEW-OF-THE-
WORLD <> PHENOMENA relation thatsynthesized by the intuition of the
researcherleads to theory and method construction.

Deriving data. As is emphasized in this book, psychologists data are

constructed signs that represent selected aspects of the phenomena. Data are
quasi-abstractionssigns that abstract some selected features from the complex
flux of the phenomena by way of some general guidelines. Such guidelines may
be institutional (as in the case of reliance on inter-observer agreement and
standardization of methods), or theoretical (e.g., Albert Einsteins demand for
crucial experimentsrather than mere accumulation of datato test his theory of
relativitysee Hentschel, 1992).
In Figure 8.7. a theoretical construction of a measurea data point is
provided. It is a demonstration of how one particular numerical sign (attributed
number at point CP) may equally represent a number of dualities of various
direction vectors and their (quantitative) strength. It indicates how the data
pointa numerical signrepresents qualitative phenomena (oppositional
procesess) which themselves entail both quality (direction) and quantity
(strength).
In Figure 8.7., each of the two sub-fields is delimited by an outer boundary
and filled with two sub-sets of vectors {A,B,C.D.E,...n} and {non-A, non-B, non-
C, non-D, .... non-n}. Each of the pair of oppositely directed vectors (i.e. {A and
non-A}... {n and non-n}) creates an equal phenomena of ambivalence. The only
condition where no ambivalence is present is the CP with no vectors (or 0-
vectors of opposite directionality).
It should be obvious that the application of real numbers to perform
measurements in this field is applicable only to the left side vector field
{A,B,C.D.E,...n}. We can superimpose the number line from Figure 8.7. onto
each of the n vectors on that left-side fieldthus exclusively separating 99 each of
these vectors from their relational counterparts in the right-hand field {non-A,
non-B, non-C, non-D, .... non-n}.

99
Exclusive separation (Valsiner, 1997, pp. 23-24) entails: The phenomena are separated from their
contexts, and the contexts, being irrelevant, are eliminated from any further consideration. Here the
context is the right hand side of the field that guarantees ambivalence.
Valsiner 345

We can subsequently apply any measurement unit onto any of the linear
vectors with the hope that measuring them provides us with a representation of
the underlying properties (the {A,B,C.D.E,...n} set from which the vector
nature is eliminated and only the lengths of the extent to the external border
remains. The resulting measures may allow us to make comparisons within the
left-hand field (e.g. A is two times longer than E), but would be fully
conceptually blind to the limiting conditions that define the lengths (boundary of
the field) as well as to the fact of the different locations within the field (e.g., of
the same A and E). It is only in case of the CP depiction where a point-like
representational strategy might work adequately.

Figure 8.7. The sign called a measure: multiplicity in unity

time

D non-E
B
non-C

A C
P non-A

C
E non-B
non-D

All measurementqualitative and quantitative alikeis a form of

interpretationthrough sign construction. As is seen from Figure 8.7, quality
pertains to the inherent character of the phenomenon. As such, it may be hidden
from the investigator due to access limitations. Consider the example of two
celestial objectsthe sun and the moonwhich are observable by all persons
on the Earth. For the observers, both can be viewed as providing lightthe sun
during the day, the moon at night. That perceived quality may accurately
represent the quality of the sun, but not that of the moon (which provides only
that light that it reflects to the Earth from the Sun). Yet the fact of sunrise and
sunset is a basic and predictable experience for human beings who inhabit the
Earth.
Valsiner 346

The conditional-genetic analysis

The methodological construction in this chapter can be recognized as

being quite oldwhile promising something new for contemporary cultural
psychology. The root of this approach is in Kurt Lewins (1927) general strategy
of conditional-genetic analysis. This kind of analysis operates in terms of
hypothetical conditionsif CONDITION X is present, one can expect event A to
emerge, but not if CONDITION Y is present. This fits the semiotic focus in
cultural psychologydifferent signs created by the person (equivalents of X or Y)
would guide him or her in different action directions. This new use of the
conditional-genetic orientation to methodology is an extension of classical
experimental thought to the realm of open systems where cultural means
signsmediate the persons relations with their environments.
Our return to the Lewinian focus leads to a new look at prediction as a
cornerstone of scientific knowledge construction. The notion of prediction applies
to all of scientific thinking. In its general form, it is a consideration of the realm of
possible outcomes, given some set-up condition (if condition X then we predict
result Y; if result Y does not occur then we cant claim our construction to be
proven). All scientific thinking necessarily operates with some kind of
predictions. We know how a particular system functions when we can expect it to
produce those outcomes that follow from our knowledge of the systembased
on the methodology cycle (Figure 8.1.).
However, the notion of prediction acquires a specific focus in cultural
psychology. As human beings actively construct signsand counter-signs to
socially suggested signswe can expect the empirical evidence to provide us
with a variety of directed outcomes as a result of the conditional-genetic process
(see Figure 8.8.). As was obvious from our coverage in the previous chapters,
the personal-cultural worlds are constantly subjected to the input of
heterogeneousoften contradictory (e,g,. myths and counter-myths) or
ambivalent (do X but do not dare to do X) social suggestions. These
suggestions can be characterized by their directionthese are vectors that may
be convergent, or divergent (e.g., as X and non-X in Figure 8.8.).
The process of personal-cultural synthesis provides a range of different
outcomesaction courses and personal meanings linked with the action
coursesall of which are generally of the same direction within that range. In
contrast, the internal self-constraint that either develops in the course of the
synthesis, or is already present before (in life history) rules out a whole other
range (of possible-- but not observed) action courses. The concrete example in
Figure 8.8. presents a case where the suggested direction X is not followed by
the person, yet its input participates in the synthesis of the range of directions
mostly aligned with that of non-X. If we were to characterize this example in
some qualitative terms, we could perhaps say that the person who provides the
evidence of synthesized outcomes a-b-c-d-e is mildly resistant to both the
opposite social suggestions (X and non-X).
 Valsiner 347

Figure 8.8. Prediction of directions under conditions of personal-cultural

construction of synthesis

SOCIALLY
SOCIALLY SUGGEST
SUGGEST ED
ED

C
O THE
N
S RANGE
T OF
R
A POSSIBLE
PERSONAL-
I BUT NOT
N
CULTURAL T OBSERVE
D
COURSES
OF
a ACTION
EMERGIN
G
FROM
X <> non-X
b OPPOSITI

c
e
d

FULL RANGE OF DIFFERENT ACTION COURSES OF

THE PERSON, UNDER DIFFERENT CIRCUMSTANCES,
AS A RESULT OF THE PERSONAL-CULTURAL

Figure 8.8. provides us with a hint about a methodological issue that was already
introduced in Figure 8.7.the empirically observable aspects of the phenomena
are only an outcome of potentially highly complex causal processes, the
important feature of which may be that part of the range of the possible
phenomena that is absent from the empirically demonstrable range of
phenomena. Thus the personal-cultural constraint in Figure 8.8. rules out
based on the X <> non-X dialogue that leads to the wide range of observables
Valsiner 348

(ae)a whole range of potentially observable phenomena. If this is so, then

the relevant empirical contrasts would be those of what is observed with that
what is not only not observed but cannot be brought into existence even if all
conditions are experimentally set up for that. This orientation would be a far cry
from the habitual group comparisons between the observablesin terms of
Figure 8.8. surely the sub-group of observables {a,b} is located differently from
those of {d,e}but that comparison is completely irrelevant as our crucial focus
is upon the constraint that blocks a different range of possible observables from
actualizing.

Example 8.2. The constraint on stealing. Moral reasoning is the domain where
constraints like generally formulated in Figure 8.8. appear in their full personal
realities. In a detailed case described by Shweder and Much (1987, pp. 235-
244), a number of meanings-based regulations of Babaji- moral reasoning
become evident. Babaji is trying to explain his viewpoint to the Western
interviewer (Rick Shweder). Babaji-- in his 30s-- is a member of a high-status
caste, of primary-school education, and earning his living by car repairing. In the
dialogue about the "Heinz" Dillemma (adjusted to the context as "Ashok
Dilemma")a mans wife is ill, she needs medicine, but the pharmacist refuses
to give it because the man has no money. The critical question in the method
isunder what conditions the respondent would be ready to cross the moral
boundary you should not steal and get the medicine without pay. Babaji jointly
constructed (with Shweder) a dialogue that indicates his alternative construction
of the personal constraint:

Interviewer: Why doesn't Hindu dharma permit stealing?

Babaji: If he steals, it is a sin-- so what virtue is there in saving a
life. Hindu dharma keeps man from sinning.
Interviewer: Why would it be a sin? Isn't there a saying "One must
jump into fire for others"?
Babaji: That is there in our dharma-- sacrifice, but not stealing.
Interviewer: But if he doesn't provide the medicine for his wife, she
will die. Wouldn't it be a sin to let her die?
Babaji: That's why, according to the capacities and powers which
God has given him, he should try to give her shamanistic
instructions and advice. Then she can be cured.
Interviewer: But, that particular medicine is the only way out.
Babaji: There is no reason to necessarily think that that particular
drug will save her life.
Interviewer: Let's suppose she can only be saved by that drug, or
else she will die. Won't he face lots of difficulties if his wife
dies?
Babaji: No.
Interviewer: But his family will break up
Babaji: He can marry other women.
Interviewer: But he has no money. How can he remarry?
Valsiner 349

Babaji: Do you think he should steal? If he steals, he will be sent to

jail. Then what's the use of saving her life to keep the family
together. She has enjoyed the days destined for her. But
stealing is bad. Our sacred scriptures tell that sometimes
stealing is an act of dharma. If by stealing for you I can save
your life, then it is an act of dharma. But one cannot steal for
his wife or his offspring or for himself. If he does that, it is
simply stealing.
Interviewer: If I steal for myself, then it's a sin?
Babaji: Yes.
Interviewer: But in this case I am stealing for my wife, not for me.
Babaji: But your wife is yours.
Interviewer: Doesn't Ashok have a duty or obligation to steal the
drug?
Babaji: He may not get the medicine by stealing. He may sell
himself. He may sell himself to someone for say 500 rupees
for 6 months or 1 year.
Interviewer: Does it make a difference whether or not he loves his
wife?
Babaji: So what if he loves his wife? When the husband dies, the
wife does not die with him or vice versa. We have come into
this world alone and we will leave it alone. Nobody will
accompany us when we leave this world. It may be a son or
it may be a wife. Nobody will go with us.
(from Shweder & Much, 1987, p. 236; emphases added)

If we were to analyze this dialogue from the viewpoint of semiotic

constraining of the efforts to construct joint understanding of the issue (given by
the Heinz/Ashok Dilemma), we can observe the use of meanings of various
generality (ranging from "sin", "duty", "obligation", "love", "dharma" to concrete
"difficulties", "selling oneself" etc.). However, the world views of the two
interlocutors maintain their respective positions. The Interviewer was doing
everything possible to persuade Babaji to accept the occidental framing of the
dilemma (as a tension produced by equivalence of two opposite tendencies-- to
steal for moral cause versus the immorality of stealing). This included effort to
narrow down the realm of possible actions to the question of stealing, which was
rejected by Babaji. For Babaji, the "Heinz/Ashok Dilemma" failed to become a
dilemma which it was supposed to become as a standardized method of
Euro-American psychology of moral reasoning. Rather, the instrumental act of
selling oneself to get the money rendered the situation problem-free for
Babajithus demonstrating the impossibility of creating standardized methods in
cultural psychology.
Valsiner 350

Generality expressed within specificity

The Babaji interview above may be habitually dismissed in the evaluative
talk of social scientists as anecdotalyet if that is so, so is all human life a
grand anecdote of no substance. Situations of self-sacrifice are by definition
singular casesnot repetitions of a generic script.
The axiomatically given uniquenesssingularityof any cultural-
psychological phenomena that in this book I have emphasized to be the case is
paralleled with the need to construct universalhence general and (in their own
nature) non-dynamictheoretical accounts. This singularity and generality come
to their tension point in the practices of creating methodology (Hamel, 1992;
Molenaar, 2004; Molenaar & Valsiner, 2005).
The non-ergodic character of psychological phenomena (Molenaar, 2004)
sets up very clear directions for the construction of methodology. What is
habituallyand impreciselycalled individual differences in psychological
research constitutes two mutually non-isomorphic domains of variabilitythat of
synchronic difference between individuals in a selection (sample, population
inter-individual variability), and that of diachronic difference of each individual
with oneself over time and circumstances (intra-individual variability). It is the
latter that is the focus for psychology, while the former may be of use for the
study of social aggregates (crowds)if these are presented as self-organizing
systems. The discovery of non-ergodicity of psychological phenomena
(Molenaar et al, 2003) rules out the possibility of treating one of those twointer-
individual variability--- as a sign representing the other (intra-individual
variability). The two kinds of variabilities are not isomorphicand that discovery
rules out any applicability of samples (or populations) based empirical findings
in psychology as applicable to single cases (Valsiner, 1986). The revolutionary
implication of this finding is obviousthe overwhelming majority of empirical
investigations have used sample-based data to make inferences to individuals.
Conventions of psychological research that have been established since mid-20th
century have led psychologys methodology into a dead-end street.
The value of single case is precisely in its expressionin its unique
detailsof the processes of generating a pre-adaptation for the expectedbut
not guaranteedcircumstances.

Conclusion: systemic methodology within cultural psychology

We reach the doorstep of a crucial synthesis of ideas in this book. First,

there is the basic locus of culture-- within minds and other social organisms.
Culture is a functional unit in the system of its general organization that
guarantees its existence. To match that localization of the work of culture we
need orientation towards its study that makes it possible to reveal its general
principles. Methodologyseen as an epistemic cycle, a helix of ever-new
knowledge constructionis that matching counterpart.
Valsiner 351

Methodology of cultural psychology is a strategy for understanding the

generality within the ever-unique particulars. As we have emphasized in this
book, the semiotic generativity of human beings is always oriented towards new
construction of cultural toolsmeanings and action patternsto face the ever-
indeterminate future. Adequate methodology to fit this principal openness of the
cultural generative system needs to treat such openness as a generalized
feature of the working of the culture, and discover different ways in which this
general and universal principle is translated into unique contexts of human living.
This general orientation to methodology is idiographic science (Molenaar, 2004;
Molenaar & Valsiner, 2005). Idiographic science generalizes on the basis of
evidence of individual systemic cases, and applies its generalized knowledge to
newand always uniqueindividual cases. It puts into practice the
philosophical idea that the general exists within the particularand vice versa.
Finallythe central issue of methodology of cultural psychology is that of
explaining the functioning of hierarchical dynamic structures. Qualitatively
different parts are mutually regulated across the hierarchy of the system. It
amounts to the synthesis of the historical and the structural perspectives
through the organizing power of semiotic mediation. As Algirdas Greimas has
indicated,

The task of integrating history into the methodology of the social

sciences will take place only when the historical sciences adopt the
concept of structure as one of their fundamental concepts
(Greimas, 1990, p. 101).

Similarly, psychology can become history-inclusive if it stops segregating

complex phenomena into supposedly independent variables and looks for
functioning structures. The functioning of these structures within irreversible time
is the place of emergence of novelties. Cultural psychology adds to this focus on
functioning structures the study of their organizing vehiclessignsthat
guarantee massive explosions as well as constrictions of meaningfulness in
social and personal lives. Methodology of cultural psychology is therefore
systemic, idiographic, and qualitative. Instead of the use of statistics, cultural
psychology needs methodological hybridization with different branches of
qualitative mathematics (Rudolph, 2006a, b, c,; Joyce & Kennison, 2006).
Without such innovation any generality claims of cultural psychology may remain
superficial.
Valsiner 352

General Conclusion: Culture in minds and societies

Symbols are essentially involved in

multiple variability, the variability of the
essentially living, conscious, emotional, and
volitional creatures who employ them not
only to give order to the universe they
inhabit, but creatively to make use of also
disorder, both by overcoming and reducing
it in particular cases and by its means
questioning former axiomatic principles
that have become a letter on the
understanding and manipulation of
contemporary things.
Turner, 1982, p. 23

Signs create the unity of ever new forms of order and disorder that
through their mutualityabductively face the immediate uncertainty of the next
moment of living in the irreversible passage of time. Cultural psychology is the
universal knowledge systemWissenschaftthat reveals the general principles
of semiotic self-regulation of the active organisms within their life-worlds.
The focus on generalityuniversality of our knowing has been a
prominent objective all through this book. It is time for the social sciences to
overcome the stigma brought to it first by the separation (and segregation) of the
so-called hard and soft (oruniversal versus historical) sciences. This
ideologya distinction that has led to discrimination-- was further fortified by the
post-modernist proud counter-claim that all knowledge is local because each
historical particular case is context-bound. Finding the social identity of the social
sciences precisely in the feature that would be considered a scientifically soft
spot was a rhetoric stroke of a genius. However, there is irony in this solution
the claim of local nature of knowledge followed the lead of the empiricist credo
that by the 1950s dominated the social and behavioral sciences. Small empirical
studies in cross-cultural psychology, or ethnography of situated activity settings,
undoubtedly brought into the knowledge base of the social sciences of today a
rich overview of empirical particulars.
However-- no rich description of any phenomena stand on its own without
some generalizing interpretation. If the road to such generalizations in terms of
universal cultural-psychological principles is closedas it was due to the impact
of the post-modernist ideologyinterpretations are generated within other
rhetoric frameworks. Science becomes replaced by socio-political agendasif
not overtly, then covertly (see Amadiume, 1997; Danziger, 1990, 1997; Kuklick,
Valsiner 353

1991). The result of such transition in the history of the social sciences is their
gradual loss of autonomy. Relative as such autonomy always has beenno
science operates in a social vacuum, and the social sciences are particularly
intertwined with their social contextsthe loss of such autonomy leads to the
appropriation of scientific knowledge by political interests of different social
institutions. We find scenarios where knowledge obtained by the social sciences
in a particular locality (local knowledge) becomes generalized by a social
institution that has political interests in using it on a wider scale.
In such applied practices we can observe generalization of local
knowledge to happenonly outside of the domain of its original science, and it
is accomplished by social rules very different from the ideal of science of
constant evaluation of its own presuppositions and methods. The avalanche of
journalisticpopularizingmindset onto the social sciences might be compared
to that of locust attack on the fields of carefully cultivated crops in many parts of
the World. Popularizing select findings from the social sciences within the
proliferating TV-entertainment discourses or through tabloid press leaves the
wide public of consumers of such knowledge increasingly ignorant of the
complex social realities of the other. Perhaps it leads to new kind of colonial
dependenceno longer to the missionary or administrative offices and their ritual
or bureaucratic orders. These old times are replaced by the ever-luring charms of
the television screens where display of war tragedies becomes yet another form
of entertainment for people here-and-now to appreciate their luck of not being
there (and then).
This book is an effort to decisively break with the post-modernist
theoretical framework and to restore the goal of construction of general
knowledge in the social sciences. The newly developed hybrid of psychology,
sociology, anthropology, and historycultural psychologyis a fitting ground for
such restoration efforts. In the substantively inter-disciplinary framework of
cultural psychology the focus on the phenomena is restored in its centrality for
investigation. That would be impossible if the discipline boundaries were
honoredeach discipline would defend those. Thusif one were to look at the
contents of this book from any particular disciplinary (that isideological)
position, the result will be negative. What I have done in this book is certainly
poor psychology (as nowhere can one find the use of the standard scientific
method of statistical inferenceinstead, one finds here substantive claims why
that inference is not fitting for science of psychology). Likewise, it is poor history
(as it does not delve into the richness of archives), and poor anthropology (as it
is not based on a rich descriptive fieldwork of any one cultural context). Note
that all these counter-claims are evaluations based on the ideology of the
inductive model of scientific inquirymoving from the data towards some
interpretation. I have built here a scheme that begins from generalized ideas and
moves downwards (deductively and abductively) towards generalizations through
constant linking of the general schemes and rich cultural realities.
The present book has been rich in theoretical elaborations and
presentation of selected phenomena. The latter were to serve the interests of the
former, rather than the reverse. It is through the tension between theory
Valsiner 354

construction and the phenomena that methodological innovation can come by.
Without such innovation, the different efforts of the late 20th Century to build
cultural psychology would pass without basic breakthroughs-- similarly to their
predecessors about a century before. Yet it would be a pity to have another
miscarriage in this promise of psychology's procreation.

A number of basic themes have been present in this book. First, the old
notion of unitas multiplex (used by William Stern)-- through the comparison of
cases (of persons, or of societies) we look for whatever is universal for all of
these cases. The study of "individual differences" has no value for the revelation
of these differences just to document those. Differences are important as
variations generated by the same general mechanisms. In fact, it is the intra-
systemic (temporal) differences that matter in psychology (Molenaar, 2004)
rather than inter-systemic (inter-individual) ones. The latter may be of use for
making sense of social; unitsgroups, communities, political entitiesas parts
of their particular individual systems. Thus, the historical transitions of countries
between times of war and peace, economic and natural disasters and states of
prosperity require differences between persons who are parts of the social
transformation procesess. The latter remain uniquethere can be no more than
one French Revolution of 1789, or of the Great Depression of the 1930s. The
differential actions of persons in different group and crowd membership roles can
be crucial for the transformation of the given social unit at the given historical
time (see Hunt, 2004 on the male and female symbolic role differences in the
French Revolution). It is under these conditions where functional group
differencesbetween gender groups, age cohorts, and between semiotically
marked social roles (e.g., groups of persons in uniforms-- the military, the police,
the medical nurses and doctors, etc.)actually matter. These differences are
inconsequential when they are discovered outside of a context of social function
of some kind. Thus, a comparison of a sample of persons from a social unit X
with a similar one from Y without functional connection between the two has no
function. Thus, cross-sectional comparisons of samples of persons from Kerala
with those from the Middle East become functional only if a temporary
migrationfor work, trading, or marryingstarts between these (or other)
regions. Such social process of migration results in the transformation of the
social systems through the transformation of individuals (Kurien, 2002).

In cultural psychology, that general mechanism is found in the functioning

of signs (semiotic mediation). Signs operate in the development of individual
psyche's within a given society. They also operate within the developing social
units of human organization. In the structural domain this entails making and re-
making of different social groups, and of the generalized sign to designate
themthe society. In the functional side of human collective living it entails the
establishment of ever new forms of signification sign arenas. This is obvious in
the case of emergence of jargons, professional genres, and silences (rules of
tellability/talkability) in the verbal domain. Yet it is ever-present in the non-verbal
domain of sign constructionthe development of the special communicational
Valsiner 355

domain of cartoons creates a separate domain of sign system for the films with
cartoon characters (Lotman, 2002c). Such differentiated domain has never
existed before in human history and that requires the establishment of new non-
verbal cognitive codes to understand and communicate within that domain
(Puche-Navarro, 2004).
Cultural psychology is developmental in its coreit studies the person of
any age level as a developing system within a developing social context. All
development is a redundantly controlled processit operates through over-
abundance (rather than economy) of the guidance and resources for turning the
here-and-now personal culture into a new form. The meaning-making person
operates in a semiosphere filled with signs of varied complexity, hybridity, and
historical extension. All the meaning-making at the persona-cultural level
happens through the bodily immersion within the social world. Similarly to the
ritual bath in the Ganga, we all daily immerse ourselves in the invisibleyet
functionalocean of signs that surround us in our everyday worlds.
Furthermorewe re-construct our everyday worlds so that these worlds guide us
in the direction of our own desires. The life is indeed a stageand we are actors
on that stagewhile constantly attempting to be spectators. Once we
temporarily succeed in becoming spectators we are overtaken by the desire to
become actors again. This tension of being on the boundary of the stage and the
audience leads us to try to re-design bothwith consequences for our own
development. Cultural psychology is the science of constant re-creation of
ourselvesand of our science. This makes it infinitely fascinatingand
incredibly complicated. But that is precisely the lure of new understanding that
cultural psychology might help us to create.
Valsiner 356

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