JMM PROMOTIONS & MANAGEMENT, INC. vs.
In addition, the petitioner claims it has placed in escrow the sum of P200,000 with
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ULPIANO L. DE LOS SANTOS
G.R. No. 109835 November 22, 1993
CRUZ, J.:
The sole issue submitted in this case is the validity of the order of respondent National
Labor Relations Commission dated October 30, 1992, dismissing the petitioner's
appeal from a decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration on
the ground of failure to post the required appeal bond.1
The respondent cited the second paragraph of Article 223 of the Labor Code as
amended, providing that:
In the case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer
may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a
reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in an amount
equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from.
and Rule VI, Section 6 of the new Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, as amended,
reading as follows:
Sec. 6. Bond In case the decision of a Labor Arbiter involves a monetary award,
an appeal by the employer shall be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or
surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the
Commission or the Supreme Court in an amount equivalent to the monetary award.
The petitioner contends that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in
applying these rules to decisions rendered by the POEA. It insists that the appeal
bond is not necessary in the case of licensed recruiters for overseas employment
because they are already required under Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules
not only to pay a license fee of P30,000 but also to post a cash bond of P100,000
and a surety bond of P50,000, thus:
Upon approval of the application, the applicant shall pay a license fee of P30,000.
It shall also post a cash bond of P100,000 and surety bond of P50,000 from a bonding
company acceptable to the Administration and duly accredited by the Insurance
Commission. The bonds shall answer for all valid and legal claims arising from
violations of the conditions for the grant and use of the license, and/or accreditation
and contracts of employment. The bonds shall likewise guarantee compliance with
the provisions of the Code and its implementing rules and regulations relating to
recruitment and placement, the Rules of the Administration and relevant issuances
of the Department and all liabilities which the Administration may impose. The surety
bonds shall include the condition that the notice to the principal is notice to the
surety and that any judgment against the principal in connection with matters falling
under POEA's jurisdiction shall be binding and conclusive on the surety. The surety
bonds shall be co-terminus with the validity period of license. (Emphasis supplied)
the Philippine National Bank in compliance with Section 17, Rule II, Book II of the
same Rule, "to primarily answer for valid and legal claims of recruited workers as a
result of recruitment violations or money claims."
Required to comment, the Solicitor General sustains the appeal bond requirement
but suggest that the rules cited by the NLRC are applicable only to decisions of the
Labor Arbiters and not of the POEA. Appeals from decisions of the POEA, he says,
are governed by the following provisions of Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules:
Sec. 5. Requisites for Perfection of Appeal. The appeal shall be filed within the
reglementary period as provided in Section 1 of this Rule; shall be under oath with
proof of payment of the required appeal fee and the posting of a cash or surety
bond as provided in Section 6 of this Rule; shall be accompanied by a memorandum
of appeal which shall state the grounds relied upon and the arguments in support
thereof; the relief prayed for; and a statement of the date when the appellant
received the appealed decision and/or award and proof of service on the other
party of such appeal.
A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisites aforestated
shall not stop the running of the period for perfecting an appeal.
Sec. 6. Bond. In case the decision of the Administration involves a monetary award,
an appeal by the employer shall be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or
surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the
Commission in an amount equivalent to the monetary award. (Emphasis supplied)
The question is, having posted the total bond of P150,000 and placed in escrow the
amount of P200,000 as required by the POEA Rules, was the petitioner still required
to post an appeal bond to perfect its appeal from a decision of the POEA to the
NLRC?
It was.
The POEA Rules are clear. A reading thereof readily shows that in addition to the
cash and surety bonds and the escrow money, an appeal bond in an amount
equivalent to the monetary award is required to perfect an appeal from a decision
of the POEA. Obviously, the appeal bond is intended to further insure the payment
of the monetary award in favor of the employee if it is eventually affirmed on appeal
to the NLRC.
It is true that the cash and surety bonds and the money placed in escrow are
supposed to guarantee the payment of all valid and legal claims against the
employer, but these claims are not limited to monetary awards to employees whose
contracts of employment have been violated. The POEA can go against these
bonds also for violations by the recruiter of the conditions of its license, the provisions
of the Labor Code and its implementing rules, E.O. 247 (reorganizing POEA) and the
POEA Rules, as well as the settlement of other liabilities the recruiter may incur.
As for the escrow agreement, it was presumably intended to provide for a standing
fund, as it were, to be used only as a last resort and not to be reduced with the
enforcement against it of every claim of recruited workers that may be adjudged
against the employer. This amount may not even be enough to cover such claims
and, even if it could initially, may eventually be exhausted after satisfying other
subsequent claims.
As it happens, the decision sought to be appealed grants a monetary award of
about P170,000 to the dismissed employee, the herein private respondent. The
standby guarantees required by the POEA Rules would be depleted if this award
were to be enforced not against the appeal bond but against the bonds and the
escrow money, making them inadequate for the satisfaction of the other obligations
the recruiter may incur.
Indeed, it is possible for the monetary award in favor of the employee to exceed the
amount of P350,000, which is the sum of the bonds and escrow money required of
the recruiter.
It is true that these standby guarantees are not imposed on local employers, as the
petitioner observes, but there is a simple explanation for this distinction. Overseas
recruiters are subject to more stringent requirement because of the special risks to
which our workers abroad are subjected by their foreign employers, against whom
there is usually no direct or effective recourse. The overseas recruiter is solidarily liable
with a foreign employer. The bonds and the escrow money are intended to insure
more care on the part of the local agent in its choice of the foreign principal to
whom our overseas workers are to be sent.
It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute (or a set of rules as
in this case), care should be taken that every part thereof be given effect, on the
theory that it was enacted as an integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of
conflicting provisions. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat. 2 Under the petitioner's
interpretation, the appeal bond required by Section 6 of the aforementioned POEA
Rule should be disregarded because of the earlier bonds and escrow money it has
posted. The petitioner would in effect nullify Section 6 as a superfluity but we do not
see any such redundancy; on the contrary, we find that Section 6 complements
Section 4 and Section 17. The rule is that a construction that would render a provision
inoperative should be avoided; instead, apparently inconsistent provisions should
be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and harmonious whole.
Accordingly, we hold that in addition to the monetary obligations of the overseas
recruiter prescribed in Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules and the escrow
agreement under Section 17 of the same Rule, it is necessary to post the appeal
bond required under Section 6, Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules, as a condition for
perfecting an appeal from a decision of the POEA.
Every intendment of the law must be interpreted in favor of the working class,
conformably to the mandate of the Constitution. By sustaining rather than annulling
the appeal bond as a further protection to the claimant employee, this Court affirms
once again its commitment to the interest of labor.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so
ordered.
RADIOLA-TOSHIBA PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON.
LEONARDO I. CRUZ
G.R. No. 75222 July 18, 1991
BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari of the March 31, 1986 Decision of the then Intermediate
Appellate Court * in A.C-G.R. SP No. 04160 entitled "Radiola-Toshiba Philippines, Inc.
vs. Hon. Leonardo I. Cruz, et al." denying the petition for certiorari and mandamus;
and its Resolution of July 1, 1986 denying the motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts of this case, as found by the then Intermediate Appellate
Court, are as follows:
On July 2, 1980, three creditors filed a petition for the involuntary insolvency of Carlos
Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan, the private respondents herein, the case
docketed as Special Proceeding No. 1548 of the then Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) of Pampanga and Angeles City.
On July 9, 1980, the respondent court issued an order taking cognizance of the said
petition and stating inter alia that:
. . . the Court forbids the payment of any debts, and the delivery of any property
owing and belonging to said respondents-debtors from other persons, or, to any
other persons for the use and benefit of the same respondents-debtors and/or the
transfer of any property by and for the said respondents-debtors to another, upon
petitioners' putting up a bond by way of certified and reputable sureties. (Annex 1,
Comment).
Counsel for the petitioners-creditors informed respondent sheriff Angeles City of the
aforesaid order (Annex 2, Ibid) and on March 26, 1981, also communicated with
counsel for the petitioner herein regarding same order, apprising the latter that "the
personal and real property which have been levied upon and/or attached should
be preserved till the final determination of the petition aforementioned." (Annex 3,
Ibid).
On April 12, 1983, petitioners-creditors filed second urgent motion for issuance of
insolvency order and resolution of the case, alleging among other things, that in
November, 1982, they filed an urgent motion to issue insolvency order; on December
2, 1982, they presented a motion to prohibit the city sheriff of Angeles City from
disposing the personal and real properties of the insolvent debtors, Carlos
Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan; on January 18, 1983, they (sic) appealed in
the Bulletin Today issue of even date a news item to the effect that Radiola-Toshiba
Phil. Inc. has already shut down its factory, sometime in March 1983, through their
representative, they caused to be investigated the real properties in the names of
Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan and they were surprised to find out that
some of the aforesaid properties were already transferred to Radiola-Toshiba Phil.
Inc.; and that in view of such development, it is their submission that without an
insolvency order and a resolution of the case which was ripe for resolution as early
as March 3, 1982, the rights and interest of petitioners-creditors would be injured and
jeopardized. (Annex "C").
On April 15, 1983, petitioner filed an opposition to the said motion vis-a-vis the prayer
that the insolvency order (which has not been rendered yet by the court) be
annotated on the transfer certificates of title already issued in its name (Annex "D").
On April 22, 1983, judgment was rendered declaring the insolvency of respondents-
debtors Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan.
On April 28, 1983, petitioner filed a supplemental opposition to the same second
urgent motion and motion to direct respondent sheriff to issue a final certificate of
sale for the properties covered by TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430 in its favor (Annex "E").
On February 3, 1984, acting upon petitioner's motion claiming that ownership of
certain real properties of the insolvents had passed to it by virtue of foreclosure
proceedings conducted in Civil Case No. 35946 of the former Court of First Instance
of Rizal, Branch II, Pasig, Metro Manila, which properties were not redeemed within
the period of redemption, respondent court issued an order disposing, thus:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby, confirms the election of Mr. Emilio C. Patino, as
assignee of all the registered claimants in this case, and, in consequence thereof,
the said assignee is hereby directed to post a bond in the amount of P30,000.00 and
to take his oath thereafter so as to be able to perform his duties and discharge his
functions, as such.
The Court, likewise, sets the meeting of all the creditors with the attendance, of
course, of the assignee, on March 9, 1984, at 8:30., as by that time the proposals,
which the respective representatives of the parties-claimants desire to clear with
their principals, shall have already been reported.
The assignee shall see to it that the properties of the insolvents which are now in the
actual or constructive custody and management of the receiver previously
appointed by the Court on petitioners' and claimants' proposals be placed under
this actual or constructive custody and management, such as he is able to do so,
as the Court hereby dissolves the receivership previously authorized, it having
become a superfluity. (Annex "F").
On May 18, 1984, the Regional Trial Court, Branch CLII, Pasig, Metro Manila, in Civil
Case No. 35946, issued an order directing respondent Sheriff of Angeles City, or
whoever is acting in his behalf, to issue within seven (7) days from notice thereof a
final deed of sale over the two (2) parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates
of Titles Nos. 18905 and 40430 in favor of petitioner. (Annex "G").
In said Civil Case No. 35946, a case for collection of sum of money covering the
proceeds of television sets and other appliances, the then Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch II, Pasig, Metro Manila, issued a writ of preliminary attachment on
February 15, 1980 upon application of the petitioner, as plaintiff, which put up a
bond of P350,000.00. On March 4, 1980, 3:00 P.M., levy on attachment was done in
favor of petitioner on the real properties registered in the names of spouses Carlos
Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan under TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430 of the Registry
of Deeds of Angeles City, per Entry No. 7216 on said titles. (Annex "A" and "B").
On December 10, 1980, a decision was rendered in favor of petitioner, ordering
private respondents and their co-defendant Peoples Appliance Center, Inc. to pay
petitioner, jointly and severally, the sum of P721,825.91 plus interest thereon of 14%
per annum from October 12, 1979 until fully paid; P20,000.00, for and attorney's fees;
and the costs of suit (Annex "5", Comment). After the said decision in the
aforementioned Civil Case No. 35946 became final and executory, a writ of
execution for the satisfaction thereof issued on March 18, 1981; and on May 4, 1981,
respondent sheriff of Angeles City sold at auction sale the attached properties
covered by TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430, to petitioner as the highest bidder, and the
certificate of sale was accordingly issued in its favor.
On September 21, 1982, the court ordered the consolidation of ownership of
petitioner over said properties; but respondent sheriff of Angeles City refused to issue
a final certificate of sale in favor of petitioner.
On May 30, 1984, petitioners-creditors interposed their opposition, stating among
other things, that subject motion is improper and premature because it treats of
matters foreign to the insolvency proceedings; and premature, for the reason that
the properties covered by TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430-Angeles City were brought to
the jurisdiction of the insolvency court for the determination of the assets of the
insolvents available for distribution to the approved credits/liabilities of the insolvents.
Petitioners-creditors theorized that the insolvency court is devoid of jurisdiction to
grant the motion referring to matters involved in a case pending before a
coordinate court in another jurisdiction (Annex "l").
Prior thereto or on July 13, 1984, to be precise, respondent court came out with its
assailed extended order with the following decretal portion:
WHEREFORE, and also for the reason stated in the aforequoted order issued in
pursuance of a similar motion of the movant, the Court denies, as it is hereby denied
the motion of Radiola-Toshiba, dated May 28, 1984 and directs the latter to
participate in the supposed meeting of all the creditors/claimants presided by the
duly elected assignee. (Annex "J").
On September 8, 1984, herein petitioner Radiola-Toshiba Philippines, Inc. (RTPI, for
short) filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with respondent Intermediate
Appellate Court.
The then Intermediate Appellate Court, in a Decision promulgated on March 31,
1986, denied petitioner's aforesaid petition. On April 19, 1986, petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied in a Resolution dated July 1,
1986.
Hence, the instant petition. Herein petitioner raised two issues
1. WHETHER OR NOT CERTIORARI IS A REMEDY DESIGNATED FOR THE CORRECTION OF
ERRORS OF JURISDICTION ONLY; and
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE REFUSAL OF THE COURTS TO ENFORCE THE LIEN OF PETITIONER
ARISING FROM A LEVY OF ATTACHMENT NOT MADE WITHIN ONE MONTH NEXT
PRECEDING THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE INSOLVENCY PROCEEDING IS GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
The main issue in this case is whether or not the levy on attachment in favor of the
petitioner is dissolved by the insolvency proceedings against respondent spouses
commenced four months after said attachment.
On this issue, Section 32 of the Insolvency Law (Act No. 1956, as amended), provides:
Sec. 32 As soon as an assignee is elected or appointed and qualified, the clerk of
the court shall, by an instrument under his hand and seal of the court, assign and
convey to the assignee all the real and personal property, estate, and effects of the
debtor with all his deeds, books, and papers relating thereto, and such assignment
shall relate back to the commencement of the proceedings in insolvency, and shall
relate back to the acts upon the adjudication was founded, and by operation of
law shall vest the title to all such property, estate, and effects in the assignee,
although the same is then attached on mesne process, as the property of the
debtor. Such assignment shall operate to vest in the assignee all of the estate of the
insolvent debtor not exempt by law from execution. It shall dissolve any attachment
levied within one month next preceding the commencement of the insolvency
proceedings and vacate and set aside any judgment entered in any action
commenced within thirty days immediately prior to the commencement of
insolvency proceedings and shall set aside any judgment entered by default or
consent of the debtor within thirty days immediately prior to the commencement of
the insolvency proceedings. (Emphasis supplied)
Relative thereto, the findings of the then Intermediate Appellate Court are
undisputed that the levy on attachment against the subject properties of the
Gatmaytans, issued by the then Court of First Instance of Pasig in Civil Case No.
35946, was on March 4, 1980 while the insolvency proceeding in the then Court of
First Instance of Angeles City, Special Proceeding No. 1548, was commenced only
on July 2, 1980, or more than four (4) months after the issuance of the said
attachment. Under the circumstances, petitioner contends that its lien on the
subject properties overrode the insolvency proceeding and was not dissolved
thereby.
Private respondents, on the other hand, relying on Section 79 of the said law, which
reads:
Sec. 79. When an attachment has been made and is not dissolved before the
commencement of proceedings in insolvency, or is dissolved by an undertaking
given by the defendant, if the claim upon which the attachment suit was
commenced is proved against the estate of the debtor, the plaintiff may prove the
legal costs and disbursements of the suit, and of the keeping of the property, and
the amount thereof shall be a preferred debt.
and the fact that petitioner and its counsel have full knowledge of the proceedings
in the insolvent case, argue that the subsequent Certificate of Sale on August 3,
1981, issued in favor of petitioner over the subject properties, was issued in bad faith,
in violation of the law and is not equitable for the creditors of the insolvent debtors;
and pursuant to the above quoted Section 79, petitioner should not be entitled to
the transfer of the subject properties in its name.
Petitioner's contention is impressed with merit. The provision of the above-quoted
Section 32, of the Insolvency Law is very clear that attachments dissolved are
those levied within one (1) month next preceding the commencement of the
insolvency proceedings and judgments vacated and set aside are judgments
entered in any action, including judgment entered by default or consent of the
debtor, where the action was filed within thirty (30) days immediately prior to the
commencement of the insolvency proceedings. In short, there is a cut off period
one (1) month in attachment cases and thirty (30) days in judgments entered in
actions commenced prior to the insolvency proceedings. Section 79, on the other
hand, relied upon by private respondents, provides for the right of the plaintiff if the
attachment is not dissolved before the commencement of proceedings in
insolvency, or is dissolved by an undertaking given by the defendant, if the claim
upon which the attachment suit was commenced is proved against the estate of
the debtor. Therefore, there is no conflict between the two provisions.
But even granting that such conflict exists, it may be stated that in construing a
statute, courts should adopt a construction that will give effect to every part of a
statute, if at all possible. This rule is expressed in the maxim, ut maqis valeat quam
pereat or that construction is to be sought which gives effect to the whole of the
statute its every word. Hence, where a statute is susceptible of more than one
interpretation, the court should adopt such reasonable and beneficial construction
as will render the provision thereof operative and effective and harmonious with
each other (Javellana vs. Tayo, 6 SCRA 1042 [1962]; Statutory Construction by Ruben
E. Agpalo, p. 182).
Neither can the sheriff's sale in execution of the judgment in favor of the petitioner
be considered as a fraudulent transfer or preference by the insolvent debtors, which
constitute a violation of Sec. 70 of the Insolvency Law. In the case of Velayo vs. Shell
Co. of the Philippines (100 Phil. 187, [1956]), this Court ruled that Sections 32 and 70
contemplate only acts and transactions occurring within 30 days prior to the
commencement of the proceedings in insolvency and, consequently, all other acts
outside of the 30-day period cannot possibly be considered as coming within the
orbit of their operation.
Finally, petitioner correctly argued that the properties in question were never placed
under the jurisdiction of respondent insolvency court so as to be made available for
the payment of claim filed against the Gatmaytans in the insolvency proceedings.
Hence, the denial by respondent insolvency court to give due course to the
attachment and execution of Civil Case No. 35946 of the CFI of Rizal constitutes a
freezing of the disposition of subject properties by the former which were not within
its jurisdiction; undeniably, a grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of
jurisdiction, correctable by certiorari.
WHEREFORE, the March 31, 1986 decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court
is hereby Reversed and SET ASIDE. The attachment and execution sale in Civil Case
No. 35946 of the former CFI of Rizal are given due course and petitioner's ownership
of subject properties covered by TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430 is ordered consolidated.
SO ORDERED.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO ABISTADO, substituted by MARGARITA, MARISSA,
MARIBEL, ARNOLD and MARY ANN, all surnamed ABISTO
G.R. No. 102858 July 28, 1997
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Is newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land registration
case mandatory or directory?
Statement of the Case
The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural and that the failure to
cause such publication did not deprive the trial court of its authority to grant the
application. But the Solicitor General disagreed and thus filed this petition to set
aside the Decision1 promulgated on July 3, 1991 and the subsequent Resolution2
promulgated on November 19, 1991 by Respondent Court of Appeals 3 in CA-G.R.
CV No. 23719. The dispositive portion of the challenged Decision reads:4
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of dismissal appealed from is
hereby set aside, and a new one entered confirming the registration and title of
applicant, Teodoro Abistado, Filipino, a resident of Barangay 7, Poblacion
Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, now deceased and substituted by Margarita,
Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado, represented by their
aunt, Miss Josefa Abistado, Filipinos, residents of Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental
Mindoro, to the parcel of land covered under MSI (IV-A-8) 315-D located in
Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro.
The oppositions filed by the Republic of the Philippines and private oppositor are
hereby dismissed for want of evidence.
Upon the finality of this decision and payment of the corresponding taxes due on
this land, let an order for the issuance of a decree be issued.
The Facts
On December 8, 1986, Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for
original registration of his title over 648 square meters of land under Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 1529.5 The application was docketed as Land Registration Case
(LRC) No. 86 and assigned to Branch 44 of the Regional Trial Court of Mamburao,
Occidental Mindoro.6 However, during the pendency of his petition, applicant died.
Hence, his heirs Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed
Abistado represented by their aunt Josefa Abistado, who was appointed their
guardian ad litem, were substituted as applicants.
The land registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989 dismissed the petition
"for want of jurisdiction." However, it found that the applicants through their
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and peaceful
possession of the subject land since 1938.
In dismissing the petition, the trial court reasoned:7
. . . However, the Court noted that applicants failed to comply with the provisions of
Section 23 (1) of PD 1529, requiring the Applicants to publish the notice of Initial
Hearing (Exh. "E") in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. Exhibit "E"
was only published in the Official Gazette (Exhibits "F" and "G"). Consequently, the
Court is of the well considered view that it has not legally acquired jurisdiction over
the instant application for want of compliance with the mandatory provision
requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general
circulation.
The trial court also cited Ministry of Justice Opinion No. 48, Series of 1982, which in its
pertinent portion provides:8
It bears emphasis that the publication requirement under Section 23 [of PD 1529] has
a two-fold purpose; the first, which is mentioned in the provision of the aforequoted
provision refers to publication in the Official Gazette, and is jurisdictional; while the
second, which is mentioned in the opening clause of the same paragraph, refers to
publication not only in the Official Gazette but also in a newspaper of general
circulation, and is procedural. Neither one nor the other is dispensable. As to the first,
publication in the Official Gazette is indispensably necessary because without it, the
court would be powerless to assume jurisdiction over a particular land registration
case. As to the second, publication of the notice of initial hearing also in a
newspaper of general circulation is indispensably necessary as a requirement of
procedural due process; otherwise, any decision that the court may promulgate in
the case would be legally infirm.
Unsatisfied, private respondents appealed to Respondent Court of Appeals which,
as earlier explained, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the
registration of the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado.
The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in the challenged CA
Resolution dared November 19, 1991.
The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated this
recourse to us. This Court notes that the petitioner's counsel anchored his petition on
Rule 65. This is an error. His remedy should be based on Rule 45 because he is
appealing a final disposition of the Court of Appeals. Hence, we shall treat his
petition as one for review under Rule 45, and not for certiorari under Rule 65.9
The Issue
Petitioner alleges that Respondent Court of Appeals committed "grave abuse of
discretion"10 in holding
. . . that publication of the petition for registration of title in LRC Case No. 86 need
not be published in a newspaper of general circulation, and in not dismissing LRC
Case No. 86 for want of such publication.
Petitioner points out that under Section 23 of PD 1529, the notice of initial hearing
shall be "published both in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general
circulation." According to petitioner, publication in the Official Gazette is "necessary
to confer jurisdiction upon the trial court, and . . . in . . . a newspaper of general
circulation to comply with the notice requirement of due process."11
Private respondents, on the other hand, contend that failure to comply with the
requirement of publication in a newspaper of general circulation is a mere
"procedural defect." They add that publication in the Official Gazette is sufficient to
confer jurisdiction.12
In reversing the decision of the trial court, Respondent Court of Appeals ruled:13
. . . although the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette and in a
newspaper of general circulation is couched in mandatory terms, it cannot be
gainsaid that the law also mandates with equal force that publication in the Official
Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court.
Further, Respondent Court found that the oppositors were afforded the opportunity
"to explain matters fully and present their side." Thus, it justified its disposition in this
wise:14
. . . We do not see how the lack of compliance with the required procedure
prejudiced them in any way. Moreover, the other requirements of: publication in the
Official Gazette, personal notice by mailing, and posting at the site and other
conspicuous places, were complied with and these are sufficient to notify any party
who is minded to make any objection of the application for registration.
The Court's Ruling
We find for petitioner.
Newspaper Publication Mandatory
The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 requiring publication
of the notice of initial hearing reads as follows:
Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. The court shall, within five days
from filing of the application, issue an order setting the date and hour of the initial
hearing which shall not be earlier than forty-five days nor later than ninety days from
the date of the order.
The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application for land
registration by means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting.
1. By publication.
Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the
Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be
published once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however, that the publication in the Official
Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Said notice shall be
addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in the land involved including
the adjoining owners so far as known, and "to all whom it may concern." Said notice
shall also require all persons concerned to appear in court at a certain date and
time to show cause why the prayer of said application shall not be granted.
Admittedly, the above provision provides in clear and categorical terms that
publication in the Official Gazette suffices to confer jurisdiction upon the land
registration court. However, the question boils down to whether, absent any
publication in a newspaper of general circulation, the land registration court can
validly confirm and register the title of private respondents.
We answer this query in the negative. This answer is impelled by the demands of
statutory construction and the due process rationale behind the publication
requirement.
The law used the term "shall" in prescribing the work to be done by the Commissioner
of Land Registration upon the latter's receipt of the court order setting the time for
initial hearing. The said word denotes an imperative and thus indicates the
mandatory character of a statute.15 While concededly such literal mandate is not
an absolute rule in statutory construction, as its import ultimately depends upon its
context in the entire provision, we hold that in the present case the term must be
understood in its normal mandatory meaning. In Republic vs. Marasigan,16 the Court
through Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. held that Section 23 of PD 1529 requires
notice of the initial hearing by means of (1) publication, (2) mailing and (3) posting,
all of which must be complied with. "If the intention of the law were otherwise, said
section would not have stressed in detail the requirements of mailing of notices to
all persons named in the petition who, per Section 15 of the Decree, include owners
of adjoining properties, and occupants of the land." Indeed, if mailing of notices is
essential, then by parity of reasoning, publication in a newspaper of general
circulation is likewise imperative since the law included such requirement in its
detailed provision.
It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in rem. 17 Being in
rem, such proceeding requires constructive seizure of the land as against all persons,
including the state, who have rights to or interests in the property. An in rem
proceeding is validated essentially through publication. This being so, the process
must strictly be complied with. Otherwise, persons who may be interested or whose
rights may be adversely affected would be barred from contesting an application
which they had no knowledge of. As has been ruled, a party as an owner seeking
the inscription of realty in the land registration court must prove by satisfactory and
conclusive evidence not only his ownership thereof but the identity of the same, for
he is in the same situation as one who institutes an action for recovery of realty.18 He
must prove his title against the whole world. This task, which rests upon the applicant,
can best be achieved when all persons concerned nay, "the whole world" who
have rights to or interests in the subject property are notified and effectively invited
to come to court and show cause why the application should not be granted. The
elementary norms of due process require that before the claimed property is taken
from concerned parties and registered in the name of the applicant, said parties
must be given notice and opportunity to oppose.
It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation should be
deemed mandatory when the law already requires notice by publication in the
Official Gazette as well as by mailing and posting, all of which have already been
complied with in the case at hand. The reason is due process and the reality that
the Official Gazette is not as widely read and circulated as newspapers and is
oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the notices published therein may not
reach the interested parties on time, if at all. Additionally, such parties may not be
owners of neighboring properties, and may in fact not own any other real estate. In
sum, the all-encompassing in rem nature of land registration cases, the
consequences of default orders issued against the whole world and the objective
of disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as possible demand a mandatory
construction of the requirements for publication, mailing and posting.
Admittedly, there was failure to comply with the explicit publication requirement of
the law. Private respondents did not proffer any excuse; even if they had, it would
not have mattered because the statute itself allows no excuses. Ineludibly, this Court
has no authority to dispense with such mandatory requirement. The law is
unambiguous and its rationale clear. Time and again, this Court has declared that
where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for
interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there is room only for application.19 There
is no alternative. Thus, the application for land registration filed by private
respondents must be dismissed without prejudice to reapplication in the future, after
all the legal requisites shall have been duly complied with.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application of private respondent for land registration
is DISMISSED without prejudice. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
 OLIVIA S. PASCUAL and HERMES S. PASCUAL vs. Geranaia Pascual-Dubert;
ESPERANZA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, MANUEL C. PASCUAL, JOSE C. PASCUAL, SUSANA
C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, ERLINDA C. PASCUAL, WENCESLAO C. PASCUAL, JR., (d) Acknowledged natural children of Eligio Pascual, brother of the full blood of the
INTESTATE ESTATE OF ELEUTERIO T. PASCUAL, AVELINO PASCUAL, ISOCELES PASCUAL, deceased, to wit:
LEIDA PASCUAL-MARTINES, VIRGINIA PASCUAL-NER, NONA PASCUAL-FERNANDO,
OCTAVIO PASCUAL, GERANAIA PASCUAL-DUBERT, and THE HONORABLE PRESIDING Olivia S. Pascual
JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA of Br. 162, RTC, Pasig, Metro Manila Hermes S. Pascual
G.R. No. 84240 March 25, 1992
(e) Intestate of Eleuterio T. Pascual, a brother of the half blood of the deceased and
PARAS, J.: represented by the following:

Dominga M. Pascual
This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse and set aside: (a) the Mamerta P. Fugoso
decision of the Court of Appeals 1 dated April 29, 1988 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 14010 Abraham S. Sarmiento, III
entitled "Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual v. Esperanza C. Pascual-Bautista, Regina Sarmiento-Macaibay
Manuel C. Pascual, Jose Pascual, Susana C. Pascual-Bautista, Erlinda C. Pascual, Eleuterio P. Sarmiento
Wenceslao C. Pascual, Jr., et al." which dismissed the petition and in effect affirmed Domiga P. San Diego
the decision of the trial court and (b) the resolution dated July 14, 1988 denying Nelia P. Marquez
petitioners' motion for reconsideration. Silvestre M. Pascual
Eleuterio M. Pascual(Rollo, pp. 46-47)
The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:
Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, the surviving spouse of the late Don Andres Pascual,
Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed Pascual are the acknowledged filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 162 (CFI of Rizal, Br. XXIII), a Special
natural children of the late Eligio Pascual, the latter being the full blood brother of Proceeding, Case No. 7554, for administration of the intestate estate of her late
the decedent Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, petition, p. 17). husband (Rollo, p. 47).

Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973 without any issue, legitimate, On December 18, 1973, Adela soldevilla de Pascual filed a Supplemental Petition to
acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious children and was survived by the the Petition for letters of Administration, where she expressly stated that Olivia
following: Pascual and Hermes Pascual, are among the heirs of Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, pp.
99-101).
(a) Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, surviving spouses;
On February 27, 1974, again Adela Soldevilla de Pascual executed an affidavit, to
(b) Children of Wenceslao Pascual, Sr., a brother of the full blood of the deceased, the effect that of her own knowledge, Eligio Pascual is the younger full blood brother
to wit: of her late husband Don Andres Pascual, to belie the statement made by the
oppositors, that they were are not among the known heirs of the deceased Don
Esperanza C. Pascual-Bautista Andres Pascual (Rollo, p. 102).
Manuel C. Pascual
Jose C. Pascual On October 16, 1985, all the above-mentioned heirs entered into a COMPROMISE
Susana C. Pascual-Bautista AGREEMENT, over the vehement objections of the herein petitioners Olivia S. Pascual
Erlinda C. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual, although paragraph V of such compromise agreement
Wenceslao C. Pascual, Jr. provides, to wit:

(c) Children of Pedro-Bautista, brother of the half blood of the deceased, to wit: This Compromise Agreement shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the
above-entitled proceedings until the final determination thereof by the court, or by
Avelino Pascual another compromise agreement, as regards the claims of Olivia Pascual and
Isoceles Pascual Hermes Pascual as legal heirs of the deceased, Don Andres Pascual. (Rollo, p. 108)
Loida Pascual-Martinez
Virginia Pascual-Ner
Nona Pascual-Fernando The said Compromise Agreement had been entered into despite the
Octavio Pascual Manifestation/Motion of the petitioners Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual,
manifesting their hereditary rights in the intestate estate of Don Andres Pascual, their
uncle (Rollo, pp. 111-112).
On September 30, 1987, petitioners filed their Motion to Reiterate Hereditary Rights
(Rollo, pp. 113-114) and the Memorandum in Support of Motion to reiterate
Hereditary Rights (Rollo, pp. 116-130).
On December 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court, presided over by Judge Manuel S.
Padolina issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court resolves as it is hereby resolved to Deny
this motion reiterating the hereditary rights of Olivia and Hermes Pascual (Rollo, p.
136).
On January 13, 1988, petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration (Rollo, pp. 515-
526). and such motion was denied.
Petitioner appealed their case to the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. No.
14010 (Rollo, p. 15.).
On Aril 29, 1988, the respondent Court of Appeals rendered its decision the decision
the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against the petitioners. SO ORDERED.
(Rollo, p. 38)
Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration of said decision and on July 14, 1988,
the Court of Appeals issued its resolution denying the motion for reconsideration
(Rollo, p. 42).
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
After all the requirements had been filed, the case was given due course.
The main issue to be resolved in the case at bar is whether or not Article 992 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude recognized natural
children from the inheritance of the deceased.
Petitioners contend that they do not fall squarely within the purview of Article 992 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude recognized and of
the doctrine laid down in Diaz v. IAC (150 SCRA 645 [1987]) because being
acknowledged natural children, their illegitimacy is not due to the subsistence of a
prior marriage when such children were under conception (Rollo, p. 418).
Otherwise stated they say the term "illegitimate" children as provided in Article 992
must be strictly construed to refer only to spurious children (Rollo, p. 419).
On the other hand, private respondents maintain that herein petitioners are within
the prohibition of Article 992 of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in Diaz v.
IAC is applicable to them.
The petition is devoid of merit.
Pertinent thereto, Article 992 of the civil Code, provides:
An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children
and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the
same manner from the illegitimate child.
The issue in the case at bar, had already been laid to rest in Diaz v. IAC, supra, where
this Court ruled that:
Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits
absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the
legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They
may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes
of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and illegitimate family there is
presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate
child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn
hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the
former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in
the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish
broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further
grounds of resentment.
Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children.
Applying the above doctrine to the case at bar, respondent IAC did not err in
holding that petitioners herein cannot represent their father Eligio Pascual in the
succession of the latter to the intestate estate of the decedent Andres Pascual, full
blood brother of their father.
In their memorandum, petitioners insisted that Article 992 in the light of Articles 902
and 989 of the Civil Code allows them (Olivia and Hermes) to represent Eligio
Pascual in the intestate estate of Don Andres Pascual.
On motion for reconsideration of the decision in Diaz v. IAC, this Court further
elucidated the successional rights of illegitimate children, which squarely answers
the questions raised by the petitioner on this point.
The Court held:
Article 902, 989, and 990 clearly speaks of successional rights of illegitimate children,
which rights are transmitted to their descendants upon their death. The descendants
(of these illegitimate children) who may inherit by virtue of the right of representation
may be legitimate or illegitimate. In whatever manner, one should not overlook the
fact that the persons to be represented are themselves illegitimate. The three
named provisions are very clear on this matter. The right of representation is not
available to illegitimate descendants of legitimate children in the inheritance of a
legitimate grandparent. It may be argued, as done by petitioners, that the
illegitimate descendant of a legitimate child is entitled to represent by virtue of the
provisions of Article 982, which provides that "the grandchildren and other
descendants shall inherit by right of representation." Such a conclusion is erroneous.
It would allow intestate succession by an illegitimate child to the legitimate parent
of his father or mother, a situation which would set at naught the provisions of Article
992. Article 982 is inapplicable to the instant case because Article 992 prohibits
absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the
legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother. It may not be amiss to state
Article 982 is the general rule and Article 992 the exception.
The rules laid down in Article 982 that "grandchildren and other descendants shall
inherit by right of representation" and in Article 902 that the rights of illegitimate
children . . . are transmitted upon their death to their descendants, whether
legitimate or illegitimate are subject to the limitation prescribed by Article 992 to the
end that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother. (Amicus Curiae's Opinion by former
Justice Minister Ricardo C. Puno, p. 12). Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 182
SCRA 427; pp. 431-432; [1990]).
Verily, the interpretation of the law desired by the petitioner may be more humane
but it is also an elementary rule in statutory construction that when the words and
phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be
determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean
exactly what is says. (Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 758-759 [1988]). The courts may
not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words
(Aparri v. CA, 127 SCRA 233 [1984]). When the law is clear, it is not susceptible of
interpretation. It must be applied regardless of who may be affected, even if the
law may be harsh or onerous. (Nepomuceno, et al. v. FC, 110 Phil. 42). And even
granting that exceptions may be conceded, the same as a general rule, should be
strictly but reasonably construed; they extend only so far as their language fairly
warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather
than the exception. Thus, where a general rule is established by statute, the court
will not curtail the former nor add to the latter by implication (Samson v. C.A., 145
SCRA 654 [1986]).
Clearly the term "illegitimate" refers to both natural and spurious.
Finally under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are generally
placed under one category, which undoubtedly settles the issue as to whether or
not acknowledged natural children should be treated differently, in the negative.
It may be said that the law may be harsh but that is the law (DURA LEX SED LEX).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the assailed
decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated April 29, 1988 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG
G.R. No. L-22301 August 30, 1967
FERNANDO, J.:
The sole question in this appeal from a judgment of conviction by the lower court is
whether or not the appointment to and holding of the position of a secret agent to
the provincial governor would constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for
the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. We hold that it does not.
The accused in this case was indicted for the above offense in an information dated
August 14, 1962 reading as follows: "The undersized accuses MARIO MAPA Y
MAPULONG of a violation of Section 878 in connection with Section 2692 of the
Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and as
further amended by Republic Act No. 4, committed as follows: That on or about the
13th day of August, 1962, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then
and there wilfully and unlawfully have in his possession and under his custody and
control one home-made revolver (Paltik), Cal. 22, without serial number, with six (6)
rounds of ammunition, without first having secured the necessary license or permit
therefor from the corresponding authorities. Contrary to law."
When the case was called for hearing on September 3, 1963, the lower court at the
outset asked the counsel for the accused: "May counsel stipulate that the accused
was found in possession of the gun involved in this case, that he has neither a permit
or license to possess the same and that we can submit the same on a question of
law whether or not an agent of the governor can hold a firearm without a permit
issued by the Philippine Constabulary." After counsel sought from the fiscal an
assurance that he would not question the authenticity of his exhibits, the
understanding being that only a question of law would be submitted for decision,
he explicitly specified such question to be "whether or not a secret agent is not
required to get a license for his firearm."
Upon the lower court stating that the fiscal should examine the document so that
he could pass on their authenticity, the fiscal asked the following question: "Does the
accused admit that this pistol cal. 22 revolver with six rounds of ammunition
mentioned in the information was found in his possession on August 13, 1962, in the
City of Manila without first having secured the necessary license or permit thereof
from the corresponding authority?" The accused, now the appellant, answered
categorically: "Yes, Your Honor." Upon which, the lower court made a statement:
"The accused admits, Yes, and his counsel Atty. Cabigao also affirms that the
accused admits."
Forthwith, the fiscal announced that he was "willing to submit the same for decision."
Counsel for the accused on his part presented four (4) exhibits consisting of his
appointment "as secret agent of the Hon. Feliciano Leviste," then Governor of
Batangas, dated June 2, 1962;1 another document likewise issued by Gov. Leviste
also addressed to the accused directing him to proceed to Manila, Pasay and
Quezon City on a confidential mission;2 the oath of office of the accused as such
secret agent,3 a certificate dated March 11, 1963, to the effect that the accused "is
a secret agent" of Gov. Leviste.4 Counsel for the accused then stated that with the
presentation of the above exhibits he was "willing to submit the case on the question
of whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and qualified as such of the
provincial governor is exempt from the requirement of having a license of firearm."
The exhibits were admitted and the parties were given time to file their respective
memoranda.1wph1.t
Thereafter on November 27, 1963, the lower court rendered a decision convicting
the accused "of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of from one year and one day to two years and to pay the
costs. The firearm and ammunition confiscated from him are forfeited in favor of the
Government."
The only question being one of law, the appeal was taken to this Court. The decision
must be affirmed.
The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful
for any person to . . . possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition
therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the
manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition."5 The next section provides
that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers,
sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine
Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police,
provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal
treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not
covered "when such firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants
for use in the performance of their official duties."6
The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he
is not exempt. Our task is equally clear. The first and fundamental duty of courts is to
apply the law. "Construction and interpretation come only after it has been
demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them." 7 The
conviction of the accused must stand. It cannot be set aside.
Accused however would rely on People v. Macarandang,8 where a secret agent
was acquitted on appeal on the assumption that the appointment "of the accused
as a secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and
detection of crimes, sufficiently put him within the category of a "peace officer"
equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by section
879." Such reliance is misplaced. It is not within the power of this Court to set aside
the clear and explicit mandate of a statutory provision. To the extent therefore that
this decision conflicts with what was held in People v. Macarandang, it no longer
speaks with authority.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.
SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S. GARCIA
G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995
KAPUNAN, J.:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a
confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a
"hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and
personality," contrary to morals, good customs and public policy."1
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and
sought moral damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in the
amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at
the trial court's discretion. The transcript on which the civil case was based was
culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.2 The
transcript reads as follows:
Plaintiff Soccoro D. Ramirez (Chuchi) Good Afternoon M'am.
Defendant Ester S. Garcia (ESG) Ano ba ang nangyari sa 'yo, nakalimot ka na
kung paano ka napunta rito, porke member ka na, magsumbong ka kung ano ang
gagawin ko sa 'yo.
CHUCHI Kasi, naka duty ako noon.
ESG Tapos iniwan no. (Sic)
CHUCHI Hindi m'am, pero ilan beses na nila akong binalikan, sabing ganoon
ESG Ito and (sic) masasabi ko sa 'yo, ayaw kung (sic) mag explain ka, kasi
hanggang 10:00 p.m., kinabukasan hindi ka na pumasok. Ngayon ako ang babalik
sa 'yo, nag-aaply ka sa States, nag-aaply ka sa review mo, kung kakailanganin ang
certification mo, kalimutan mo na kasi hindi ka sa akin makakahingi.
CHUCHI Hindi M'am. Kasi ang ano ko talaga noon i-cocontinue ko up to 10:00
p.m.
ESG Bastos ka, nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka pumasok dito sa hotel.
Magsumbong ka sa Union kung gusto mo. Nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka
nakapasok dito "Do you think that on your own makakapasok ka kung hindi ako.
Panunumbyoyan na kita (Sinusumbatan na kita).
CHUCHI Itutuloy ko na M'am sana ang duty ko.
ESG Kaso ilang beses na akong binabalikan doon ng mga no (sic) ko.
ESG Nakalimutan mo na ba kung paano ka pumasok sa hotel, kung on your own
merit alam ko naman kung gaano ka "ka bobo" mo. Marami ang nag-aaply alam
kong hindi ka papasa.
CHUCHI Kumuha kami ng exam noon.
ESG Oo, pero hindi ka papasa.
CHUCHI Eh, bakit ako ang nakuha ni Dr. Tamayo
ESG Kukunin ka kasi ako.
CHUCHI Eh, di sana
ESG Huwag mong ipagmalaki na may utak ka kasi wala kang utak. Akala mo ba
makukuha ka dito kung hindi ako.
CHUCHI Mag-eexplain ako.
ESG Huwag na, hindi ako mag-papa-explain sa 'yo, makaalala ka kung paano
ka puma-rito. "Putang-ina" sasabi-sabihin mo kamag-anak ng nanay at tatay mo
ang mga magulang ko.
ESG Wala na akong pakialam, dahil nandito ka sa loob, nasa labas ka puwede
ka ng hindi pumasok, okey yan nasaloob ka umalis ka doon.
CHUCHI Kasi M'am, binbalikan ako ng mga taga Union.
ESG Nandiyan na rin ako, pero huwag mong kalimutan na hindi ka makakapasok
kung hindi ako. Kung hindi mo kinikilala yan okey lang sa akin, dahil tapos ka na.
CHUCHI Ina-ano ko m'am na utang na loob.
ESG Huwag na lang, hindi mo utang na loob, kasi kung baga sa no,
nilapastangan mo ako.
CHUCHI Paano kita nilapastanganan?
ESG Mabuti pa lumabas ka na. Hindi na ako makikipagusap sa 'yo. Lumabas ka
na. Magsumbong ka.3
As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of
secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal
case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200,
entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations
of private communication, and other purposes." An information charging petitioner
of violation of the said Act, dated October 6, 1988 is quoted herewith:
INFORMATION
The Undersigned Assistant City Fiscal Accusses Socorro D. Ramirez of Violation of
Republic Act No. 4200, committed as follows:
That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1988, in Pasay City Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this honorable court, the above-named
accused, Socorro D. Ramirez not being authorized by Ester S. Garcia to record the
latter's conversation with said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with the use of a tape recorder secretly record the said conversation
and thereafter communicate in writing the contents of the said recording to other
person.
Contrary to law.
Pasay City, Metro Manila, September 16, 1988.
MARIANO M. CUNETA
Asst. City Fiscal
Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the
Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense,
particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. In an order May 3, 1989, the trial court granted
the Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner that 1) the facts charged do not
constitute an offense under R.A. 4200; and that 2) the violation punished by R.A. 4200
refers to a the taping of a communication by a person other than a participant to
the communication.4
From the trial court's Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review on
Certiorari with this Court, which forthwith referred the case to the Court of Appeals
in a Resolution (by the First Division) of June 19, 1989.
On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision
declaring the trial court's order of May 3, 1989 null and void, and holding that:
[T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under Section 1 of R.A.
4200. In thus quashing the information based on the ground that the facts alleged
do not constitute an offense, the respondent judge acted in grave abuse of
discretion correctible by certiorari.5
Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
which respondent Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution6 dated June 19, 1990.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal issue" 7 that the applicable
provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private
conversation by one of the parties to the conversation. She contends that the
provision merely refers to the unauthorized taping of a private conversation by a
party other than those involved in the communication.8 In relation to this, petitioner
avers that the substance or content of the conversation must be alleged in the
Information, otherwise the facts charged would not constitute a violation of R.A.
4200.9 Finally, petitioner agues that R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a "private
communication," not a "private conversation" and that consequently, her act of
secretly taping her conversation with private respondent was not illegal under the
said act. 10
We disagree.
First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where
the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according
to its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal
interpretation would be either impossible 11 or absurb or would lead to an injustice.
12
Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and
Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes," provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to
any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using
any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a
dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or
however otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person,
not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record
such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as
to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other
than or different from those involved in the private communication. The statute's
intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored
by the use of the qualifier "any". Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals
correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy to a communication who records his
private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify
as a violator" 13 under this provision of R.A. 4200.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent
court's conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated
to make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or
communications taken either by the parties themselves or by third persons. Thus:
Senator Taada: That qualified only "overhear".
Senator Padilla: So that when it is intercepted or recorded, the element of secrecy
would not appear to be material. Now, suppose, Your Honor, the recording is not
made by all the parties but by some parties and involved not criminal cases that
would be mentioned under section 3 but would cover, for example civil cases or
special proceedings whereby a recording is made not necessarily by all the parties
but perhaps by some in an effort to show the intent of the parties because the
actuation of the parties prior, simultaneous even subsequent to the contract or the
act may be indicative of their intention. Suppose there is such a recording, would
you say, Your Honor, that the intention is to cover it within the purview of this bill or
outside?
Senator Taada: That is covered by the purview of this bill, Your Honor.
Senator Padilla: Even if the record should be used not in the prosecution of offense
but as evidence to be used in Civil Cases or special proceedings?
Senator Taada: That is right. This is a complete ban on tape recorded conversations
taken without the authorization of all the parties.
Senator Padilla: Now, would that be reasonable, your Honor?
Senator Taada: I believe it is reasonable because it is not sporting to record the
observation of one without his knowing it and then using it against him. It is not fair,
it is not sportsmanlike. If the purpose; Your honor, is to record the intention of the
parties. I believe that all the parties should know that the observations are being
recorded.
Senator Padilla: This might reduce the utility of recorders.
Senator Taada: Well no. For example, I was to say that in meetings of the board of
directors where a tape recording is taken, there is no objection to this if all the parties
know. It is but fair that the people whose remarks and observations are being made
should know that the observations are being recorded.
Senator Padilla: Now, I can understand.
Senator Taada: That is why when we take statements of persons, we say: "Please
be informed that whatever you say here may be used against you." That is fairness
and that is what we demand. Now, in spite of that warning, he makes damaging
statements against his own interest, well, he cannot complain any more. But if you
are going to take a recording of the observations and remarks of a person without
him knowing that it is being taped or recorded, without him knowing that what is
being recorded may be used against him, I think it is unfair.
(Congression Record, Vol. III, No. 31, p. 584, March 12, 1964)
Senator Diokno: Do you understand, Mr. Senator, that under Section 1 of the bill as
now worded, if a party secretly records a public speech, he would be penalized
under Section 1? Because the speech is public, but the recording is done secretly.
Senator Taada: Well, that particular aspect is not contemplated by the bill. It is the pleasures and satisfactions of life are to be found in the unaudited, and free
communication between one person and another person not between a exchange of communication between individuals free from every unjustifiable
speaker and a public. intrusion by whatever means.17

(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, p. 626, March 12, 1964)
The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the
above-quoted deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore plainly
supports the view held by the respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize
even those privy to the private communications. Where the law makes no
distinctions, one does not distinguish.
Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute.
The substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What
R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording
private communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere
allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication
by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1
of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the
respondent court: "Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be
regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its communication
to a third person should be professed." 14
In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 18 a case which dealt with the issue of
telephone wiretapping, we held that the use of a telephone extension for the
purpose of overhearing a private conversation without authorization did not violate
R.A. 4200 because a telephone extension devise was neither among those
"device(s) or arrangement(s)" enumerated therein, 19 following the principle that
"penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused."20 The instant case
turns on a different note, because the applicable facts and circumstances pointing
to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no ambiguity, and the statute itself explicitly
mentions the unauthorized "recording" of private communications with the use of
tape-recorders as among the acts punishable.
WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at bench is clear and
unambiguous and leaves us with no discretion, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.
The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1

of R.A. 4200 does not include "private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning
of the word "communication" to a point of absurdity. The word communicate comes
from the latin word communicare, meaning "to share or to impart." In its ordinary
signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification,
communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, 15 or
signifies the "process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals
through a common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)" 16 These
definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive
communications of "meanings or thoughts" which are likely to include the
emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and
private respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office. Any doubts about the
legislative body's meaning of the phrase "private communication" are, furthermore,
put to rest by the fact that the terms "conversation" and "communication" were
interchangeably used by Senator Taada in his Explanatory Note to the bill quoted
below:

It has been said that innocent people have nothing to fear from their conversations
being overheard. But this statement ignores the usual nature of conversations as well
the undeniable fact that most, if not all, civilized people have some aspects of their
lives they do not wish to expose. Free conversations are often characterized by
exaggerations, obscenity, agreeable falsehoods, and the expression of anti-social
desires of views not intended to be taken seriously. The right to the privacy of
communication, among others, has expressly been assured by our Constitution.
Needless to state here, the framers of our Constitution must have recognized the
nature of conversations between individuals and the significance of man's spiritual
nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They must have known that part of the
 FELICITO BASBACIO vs. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
FRANKLIN DRILON in his capacity as Secretary of Justice
G.R. No. 109445 November 7, 1994
MENDOZA, J.:
This case presents for determination the scope of the State's liability under Rep. Act
No. 7309, which among other things provides compensation for persons who are
unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned but on appeal are acquitted and
ordered released.
Petitioner Felicito Basbacio and his son-in-law, Wilfredo Balderrama, were convicted
of frustrated murder and of two counts of frustrated murder for the killing of Federico
Boyon and the wounding of the latter's wife Florida and his son Tirso, at Palo,
Calanuga, Rapu-Rapu, Albay, on the night of June 26, 1988. The motive for the killing
was apparently a land dispute between the Boyons and petitioner. Petitioner and
his son-in-law were sentenced to imprisonment and ordered immediately detained
after their bonds had been cancelled.
Petitioner and his son-in-law appealed. Only petitioner's appeal proceeded to
judgment, however, as the appeal of the other accused was dismissed for failure to
file his brief.
On June 22, 1992 the Court of Appeals rendered a decision acquitting petitioner on
the ground that the prosecution failed to prove conspiracy between him and his
son-in-law. He had been pointed to by a daughter of Federico Boyon as the
companion of Balderrama when the latter barged into their hut and without
warning started shooting, but the appellate court ruled that because petitioner did
nothing more, petitioner's presence at the scene of the crime was insufficient to
show conspiracy.
Based on his acquittal, petitioner filed a claim under Rep. Act No. 7309, sec. 3(a),
which provides for the payment of compensation to "any person who was unjustly
accused, convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a judgment
of acquittal."1 The claim was filed with the Board of Claims of the Department of
Justice, but the claim was denied on the ground that while petitioner's presence at
the scene of the killing was not sufficient to find him guilty beyond reasonable doubt,
yet, considering that there was bad blood between him and the deceased as a
result of a land dispute and the fact that the convicted murderer is his son-in-law,
there was basis for finding that he was "probably guilty."
On appeal, respondent Secretary of Justice affirmed the Board's ruling. Said the
Secretary of Justice in his resolution dated March 11, 1993:
It is believed therefore that the phrase "any person . . . unjustly accused, convicted
and imprisoned" in Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7309 refers to an individual who was
wrongly accused and imprisoned for a crime he did not commit, thereby making
him "a victim of unjust imprisonment." In the instant case, however,
Claimant/Appellant cannot be deemed such a victim since a reading of the
decision of his acquittal shows that his exculpation is not based on his innocence,
but upon, in effect, a finding of reasonable doubt.
Petitioner brought this petition for review on certiorari. Neither Rule 45 nor Rep. Act
No. 7309, however, provides for review by certiorari of the decisions of the Secretary
of Justice. Nonetheless, in view of the importance of the question tendered, the
Court resolved to treat the petition as a special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65.
Petitioner questions the basis of the respondent's ruling that to be able to recover
under sec. 3(a) of the law the claimant must on appeal be found to be innocent of
the crimes of which he was convicted in the trial court. Through counsel he contends
that the language of sec. 3(a) is clear and does not call for interpretation. The "mere
fact that the claimant was imprisoned for a crime which he was subsequently
acquitted of is already unjust in itself," he contends. To deny his claim because he
was not declared innocent would be to say that his imprisonment for two years while
his appeal was pending was justified. Petitioner argues that there is only one
requirement for conviction in criminal cases and that is proof beyond reasonable
doubt. If the prosecution fails to present such proof, the presumption that the
accused is innocent stands and, therefore, there is no reason for requiring that he
be declared innocent of the crime before he can recover compensation for his
imprisonment.
Petitioner's contention has no merit. It would require that every time an accused is
acquitted on appeal he must be given compensation on the theory that he was
"unjustly convicted" by the trial court. Such a reading of sec. 3(a) is contrary to
petitioner's professed canon of construction that when the language of the statute
is clear it should be given its natural meaning. It leaves out of the provision in question
the qualifying word "unjustly" so that the provision would simply read: "The following
may file claims for compensation before the Board: (a) any person who was
accused, convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a judgment
of acquittal."
But sec. 3(a) requires that the claimant be "unjustly accused, convicted [and]
imprisoned." The fact that his conviction is reversed and the accused is acquitted is
not itself proof that the previous conviction was "unjust." An accused may be
acquitted for a number of reasons and his conviction by the trial court may, for any
of these reasons, be set aside. For example, he may be acquitted not because he
is innocent of the crime charged but because of reasonable doubt, in which case
he may be found civilly liable to the complainant, because while the evidence
against him does not satisfy the quantum of proof required for conviction, it may
nonetheless be sufficient to sustain a civil action for damages.2 In one case the
accused, an alien, was acquitted of statutory rape with homicide because of doubt
as to the ages of the offended parties who consented to have sex with him.
Nonetheless the accused was ordered to pay moral and exemplary damages and
ordered deported.3 In such a case to pay the accused compensation for having
been "unjustly convicted" by the trial court would be utterly inconsistent with his
liability to the complainant. Yet to follow petitioner's theory such an accused would
be entitled to compensation under sec. 3(a).
The truth is that the presumption of innocence has never been intended as evidence
of innocence of the accused but only to shift the burden of proof that he is guilty to
the prosecution. If "accusation is not synonymous with guilt," 4 so is the presumption
of innocence not a proof thereof. It is one thing to say that the accused is presumed
to be innocent in order to place on the prosecution the burden of proving beyond
reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty. It is quite another thing to say that he is
innocent and if he is convicted that he has been "unjustly convicted." As this Court
held in a case:
Though we are acquitting the appellant for the crime of rape with homicide, we
emphasize that we are not ruling that he is innocent or blameless. It is only the
constitutional presumption of innocence and the failure of the prosecution to build
an airtight case for conviction which saved him, not that the facts of unlawful
conduct do not exist.5
To say then that an accused has been "unjustly convicted" has to do with the
manner of his conviction rather than with his innocence. An accused may on
appeal be acquitted because he did not commit the crime, but that does
not necessarily mean that he is entitled to compensation for having been the victim
of an "unjust conviction." If his conviction was due to an error in the appreciation of
the evidence the conviction while erroneous is not unjust. That is why it is not, on the
other hand, correct to say as does respondent, that under the law liability for
compensation depends entirely on the innocence of the accused.
The phrase "unjustly convicted" has the same meaning as "knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment" in art. 204 of the Revised Penal Code. What this Court held in In re
Rafael C. Climaco 6 applies:
In order that a judge may be held liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment,
it must be shown beyond doubt that the judgment is unjust as it is contrary to law or
is not supported by the evidence, and the same was made with conscious and
deliberate intent to do an injustice . . . .
To hold a judge liable for the rendition of manifestly unjust judgment by reason of
inexcusable negligence or ignorance, it must be shown, according to Groizard, that
although he has acted without malice, he failed to observe in the performance of
his duty, that diligence, prudence and care which the law is entitled to exact in the
rendering of any public service. Negligence and ignorance are inexcusable if they
imply a manifest injustice which cannot be explained by a reasonable
interpretation. Inexcusable mistake only exists in the legal concept when it implies a
manifest injustice, that is to say, such injustice which cannot be explained by a
reasonable interpretation, even though there is a misunderstanding or error of the
law applied, yet in the contrary it results, logically and reasonably, and in a very
clear and indisputable manner, in the notorious violation of the legal precept.
Indeed, sec. 3(a) does not refer solely to an unjust conviction as a result of which the
accused is unjustly imprisoned, but, in addition, to an unjust accusation. The
accused must have been "unjustly accused, in consequence of which he is unjustly
convicted and then imprisoned. It is important to note this because if from its
inception the prosecution of the accused has been wrongful, his conviction by the
court is, in all probability, also wrongful. Conversely, if the prosecution is not malicious
any conviction even though based on less than the required quantum of proof in
criminal cases may be erroneous but not necessarily unjust.
The reason is that under Rule 112, sec. 4, the question for the prosecutor in filing a
case in court is not whether the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt but only
whether "there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed
and the accused is probably guilty thereof." Hence, an accusation which is based
on "probable guilt" is not an unjust accusation and a conviction based on such
degree of proof is not necessarily an unjust judgment but only an erroneous one. The
remedy for such error is appeal.
In the case at bar there is absolutely no evidence to show that petitioner's conviction
by the trial court was wrongful or that it was the product of malice or gross ignorance
or gross negligence. To the contrary, the court had reason to believe that petitioner
and his co-accused were in league, because petitioner is the father-in-law of
Wilfredo Balderrama and it was petitioner who bore the victim a grudge because
of a land dispute. Not only that. Petitioner and his coaccused arrived together in the
hut of the victims and forced their way into it.
The Court of Appeals ruled there was no conspiracy only because there was no
proof that he did or say anything on the occasion. Said the appellate court.
Both eyewitness testimonies fail to show the appellant Felicito Basbacio to have
committed any act at all. Both fail to show Felicito Basbacio as having said anything
at all. Both fail to show Felicito Basbacio as having committed anything in
furtherance of a conspiracy to commit the crimes charged against the defendants.
It seems to be a frail and flimsy basis on which to conclude that conspiracy existed
between actual killer Wilfredo Balderrama and Felicito Basbacio to commit murder
and two frustrated murders on that night of June 26, 1988. It may be asked: where
was the coming together of the two defendants to an agreement to commit the
crimes of murder and frustrated murder on two counts? Where was Basbacio's
contribution to the commission of the said crimes? Basbacio was as the record
shows nothing but part of the dark shadows of that night. . . .
One may take issue with this ruling because precisely conspiracy may be shown by
concert of action and other circumstances. Why was petitioner with his son-in-law?
Why did they apparently flee together? And what about the fact that there was
bad blood between petitioner and the victim Federico Boyon? These questions may
no longer be passed upon in view of the acquittal of petitioner but they are relevant
in evaluating his claim that he had been unjustly accused, convicted and
imprisoned before he was released because of his acquittal on appeal. We hold
that in view of these circumstances respondent Secretary of Justice and the Board
of Claims did not commit a grave abuse of its discretion in disallowing petitioner's
claim for compensation under Rep. Act No. 7309.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
 GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORPORATION vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and IMELDA SALAZAR
G.R. No. 82511 March 3, 1992
ROMERO, J.:
For private respondent Imelda L. Salazar, it would seem that her close association
with Delfin Saldivar would mean the loss of her job. In May 1982, private
respondent was employed by Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation
(GMCR) as general systems analyst. Also employed by petitioner as manager for
technical operations' support was Delfin Saldivar with whom private respondent
was allegedly very close.
Sometime in 1984, petitioner GMCR, prompted by reports that company
equipment and spare parts worth thousands of dollars under the custody of
Saldivar were missing, caused the investigation of the latter's activities. The report
dated September 25, 1984 prepared by the company's internal auditor, Mr.
Agustin Maramara, indicated that Saldivar had entered into a partnership styled
Concave Commercial and Industrial Company with Richard A. Yambao, owner
and manager of Elecon Engineering Services (Elecon), a supplier of petitioner
often recommended by Saldivar. The report also disclosed that Saldivar had taken
petitioner's missing Fedders airconditioning unit for his own personal use without
authorization and also connived with Yambao to defraud petitioner of its property.
The airconditioner was recovered only after petitioner GMCR filed an action for
replevin against Saldivar.1
It likewise appeared in the course of Maramara's investigation that Imelda Salazar
violated company reglations by involving herself in transactions conflicting with the
company's interests. Evidence showed that she signed as a witness to the articles
of partnership between Yambao and Saldivar. It also appeared that she had full
knowledge of the loss and whereabouts of the Fedders airconditioner but failed to
inform her employer.
Consequently, in a letter dated October 8, 1984, petitioner company placed
private respondent Salazar under preventive suspension for one (1) month,
effective October 9, 1984, thus giving her thirty (30) days within which to, explain
her side. But instead of submitting an explanations three (3) days later or on
October 12, 1984 private respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for illegal
suspension, which she subsequently amended to include illegal dismissal, vacation
and sick leave benefits, 13th month pay and damages, after petitioner notified her
in writing that effective November 8, 1984, she was considered dismissed "in view of
(her) inability to refute and disprove these findings. 2
After due hearing, the Labor Arbiter in a decision dated July 16, 1985, ordered
petitioner company to reinstate private respondent to her former or equivalent
position and to pay her full backwages and other benefits she would have
received were it not for the illegal dismissal. Petitioner was also ordered to pay
private respondent moral damages of P50,000.00. 3
On appeal, public respondent National Labor Relations, Commission in the
questioned resolution dated December 29, 1987 affirmed the aforesaid decision
with respect to the reinstatement of private respondent but limited the backwages
to a period of two (2) years and deleted the award for moral damages. 4
Hence, this petition assailing the Labor Tribunal for having committed grave abuse
of discretion in holding that the suspension and subsequent dismissal of private
respondent were illegal and in ordering her reinstatement with two (2) years'
backwages.
On the matter of preventive suspension, we find for petitioner GMCR.
The inestigative findings of Mr. Maramara, which pointed to Delfin Saldivar's acts in
conflict with his position as technical operations manager, necessitated immediate
and decisive action on any employee closely, associated with Saldivar. The
suspension of Salazar was further impelled by th.e discovery of the missing Fedders
airconditioning unit inside the apartment private respondent shared with Saldivar.
Under such circumstances, preventive suspension was the proper remedial
recourse available to the company pending Salazar's investigation. By itself,
preventive suspension does, not signify that the company has adjudged the
employee guilty of the charges she was asked to answer and explain. Such
disciplinary measure is resorted to for the protection of the company's property
pending investigation any alleged malfeasance or misfeasance committed by the
employee.5
Thus, it is not correct to conclude that petitioner GMCR had violated Salazar's right
to due process when she was promptly suspended. If at all, the fault, lay with
private respondent when she ignored petitioner's memorandum of October 8,
1984 "giving her ample opportunity to present (her) side to the Management."
Instead, she went directly to the Labor Department and filed her complaint for
illegal suspension without giving her employer a chance to evaluate her side of the
controversy.
But while we agree with the propriety of Salazar's preventive suspension, we hold
that her eventual separation from employment was not for cause.
What is the remedy in law to rectify an unlawful dismissal so as to "make whole" the
victim who has not merely lost her job which, under settled Jurisprudence, is a
property right of which a person is not to be deprived without due process, but
also the compensation that should have accrued to her during the period when
she was unemployed?
Art. 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides:
Security of Tenure. In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not
terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized
by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full
backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary
equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to
the time of his actual reinstatement. 6 (Emphasis supplied)
Corollary thereto are the following provisions of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the Labor Code:
Sec. 2. Security of Tenure. In cases of regular employments, the employer shall
not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause as provided in
the Labor Code or when authorized by existing laws.
Sec. 3. Reinstatement. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall by
entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to backwages."7
(Emphasis supplied)
Before proceeding any furthers, it needs must be recalled that the present
Constitution has gone further than the 1973 Charter in guaranteeing vital social
and economic rights to marginalized groups of society, including labor. Given the
pro-poor orientation of several articulate Commissioners of the Constitutional
Commission of 1986, it was not surprising that a whole new Article emerged on
Social Justice and Human Rights designed, among other things, to "protect and
enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic
and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing
wealth and political power for the common good." 8 Proof of the priority accorded
to labor is that it leads the other areas of concern in the Article on Social Justice,
viz., Labor ranks ahead of such topics as Agrarian and Natural Resources Reform,
Urban Land Roform and Housing, Health, Women, Role and Rights of Poople's
Organizations and Human Rights.9
The opening paragraphs on Labor states
The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment
opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining
and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in
accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane
conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and
decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits is may be provided
by law.10 (Emphasis supplied)
Compare this with the sole.provision on Labor in the 1973 Constitution under the
Article an Declaration of Principles and State Policies that provides:
Sec. 9. The state shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment and
equality in employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or
creed, and regulate the relations between workers and employers. The State shall
ensure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective baegaining, security of
tenure, and just and humane conditions of work. The State may provide for
compulsory arbitration. 11
To be sure, both Charters recognize "security of tenure" as one of the rights of labor
which the State is mandated to protect. But there is no gainsaying the fact that the
intent of the framers of the present Constitution was to give primacy to the rights of
labor and afford the sector "full protection," at least greater protection than
heretofore accorded them, regardless of the geographical location of the workers
and whether they are organized or not.
It was then CONCOM Commissioner, now Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., who
substantially contributed to the present formulation of the protection to labor
provision and proposed that the same be incorporated in the Article on Social
Justice and not just in the Article on Declaration of Principles and State Policies "in
the light of the special importance that we are giving now to social justice and the
necessity of emphasizing the scope and role of social justice in national
development." 12
If we have taken pains to delve into the background of the labor provisions in our
Constitution and the Labor Code, it is but to stress that the right of an employee
not to be dismissed from his job except for a just or authorized cause provided by
law has assumed greater importance under the 1987 Constitution with the singular
prominence labor enjoys under the article on Social Justice. And this transcendent
policy has been translated into law in the Labor Code. Under its terms, where a
case of unlawful or unauthorized dismissal has been proved by the aggrieved
employee, or on the other hand, the employer whose duty it is to prove the
lawfulness or justness of his act of dismissal has failed to do so, then the remedies
provided in Article 279 should find, application. Consonant with this liberalized
stance vis-a-vis labor, the legislature even went further by enacting Republic Act
No. 6715 which took effect on March 2, 1989 that amended said Article to remove
any possible ambiguity that jurisprudence may have generated which watered
down the constitutional intent to grant to labor "full protection." 13
To go back to the instant case, there being no evidence to show an authorized,
much less a legal, cause for the dismissal of private respondent, she had every
right, not only to be entitled to reinstatement, but ay well, to full backwages." 14
The intendment of the law in prescribing the twin remedies of reinstatement and
payment of backwages is, in the former, to restore the dismissed employee to her
status before she lost her job, for the dictionary meaning of the word "reinstate" is
"to restore to a state, conditione positions etc. from which one had been
removed"15 and in the latter, to give her back the income lost during the period of
unemployment. Both remedies, looking to the past, would perforce make her
"whole."
Sadly, the avowed intent of the law has at times been thwarted when
reinstatement has not been forthcoming and the hapless dismissed employee finds
himself on the outside looking in.
Over time, the following reasons have been advanced by the Court for denying
reinstatement under the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto; that
reinstatement can no longer be effected in view of the long passage of time (22
years of litigation) or because of the realities of the situation; 16 or that it would be
"inimical to the employer's interest; " 17 or that reinstatement may no longer be
feasible; 18 or, that it will not serve the best interests of the parties involved; 19 or that
the company would be prejudiced by the workers' continued employment; 20 or
that it will not serve any prudent purpose as when supervening facts have
transpired which make execution on that score unjust or inequitable 21 or, to an
increasing extent, due to the resultant atmosphere of "antipathy and antagonism"
or "strained relations" or "irretrievable estrangement" between the employer and
the employee. 22
In lieu of reinstatement, the Court has variously ordered the payment of
backwages and separation pay 23 or solely separation pay. 24
In the case at bar, the law is on the side of private respondent. In the first place the
wording of the Labor Code is clear and unambiguous: "An employee who is
unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement. . . . and to his full
backwages. . . ." 25 Under the principlesof statutory construction, if a statute is
clears plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation. This plain-meaning rule or verba legis
derived from the maxim index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention)
rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by, the legislature in a
statute correctly express its intent or will and preclude the court from construing it
differently. 26 The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words,
to:have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such
words as are found in the statute.27 Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the
words of a statute there should be no departure. Neither does the provision admit
of any qualification. If in the wisdom of the Court, there may be a ground or
grounds for non-application of the above-cited provision, this should be by way of
exception, such as when the reinstatement may be inadmissible due to ensuing
strained relations between the employer and the employee.
In such cases, it should be proved that the employee concerned occupies a
position where he enjoys the trust and confidence of his employer; and that it is
likely that if reinstated, an atmosphere of antipathy and antagonism may be
generated as to adversely affect the efficiency and productivity of the employee
concerned.
A few examples, will suffice to illustrate the Court's application of the above
principles: where the employee is a Vice-President for Marketing and as such,
enjoys the full trust and confidence of top management; 28 or is the Officer-In-
Charge of the extension office of the bank where he works; 29 or is an organizer of
a union who was in a position to sabotage the union's efforts to organize the
workers in commercial and industrial establishments; 30 or is a warehouseman of a
non-profit organization whose primary purpose is to facilitate and maximize
voluntary gifts. by foreign individuals and organizations to the Philippines; 31 or is a
manager of its Energy Equipment Sales. 32
Obviously, the principle of "strained relations" cannot be applied indiscriminately.
Otherwisey reinstatement can never be possible simply because some hostility is
invariably engendered between the parties as a result of litigation. That is human
nature. 33
Besides, no strained relations should arise from a valid and legal act of asserting
one's right; otherwise an employee who shall assert his right could be easily
separated from the service, by merely paying his separation pay on the pretext
that his relationship with his employer had already become strained. 34
Here, it has not been proved that the position of private respondent as systems
analyst is one that may be characterized as a position of trust and confidence
such that if reinstated, it may well lead to strained relations between employer and
employee. Hence, this does not constitute an exception to the general rule
mandating reinstatement for an employee who has been unlawfully dismissed.
On the other hand, has she betrayed any confidence reposed in her by engaging
in transactions that may have created conflict of interest situations? Petitioner
GMCR points out that as a matter of company policy, it prohibits its employees
from involving themselves with any company that has business dealings with
GMCR. Consequently, when private respondent Salazar signed as a witness to the
partnership papers of Concave (a supplier of Ultra which in turn is also a supplier of
GMCR), she was deemed to have placed. herself in an untenable position as far
as petitioner was concerned.
However, on close scrutiny, we agree with public respondent that such a
circumstance did not create a conflict of interests situation. As a systems analyst,
Salazar was very far removed from operations involving the procurement of
supplies. Salazar's duties revolved around the development of systems and analysis
of designs on a continuing basis. In other words, Salazar did not occupy a position
of trust relative to the approval and purchase of supplies and company assets.
In the instant case, petitioner has predicated its dismissal of Salazar on loss of
confidence. As we have held countless times, while loss of confidence or breach
of trust is a valid ground for terminations it must rest an some basis which must be
convincingly established. 35 An employee who not be dismissed on mere
presumptions and suppositions. Petitioner's allegation that since Salazar and
Saldivar lived together in the same apartment, it "presumed reasonably that
complainant's sympathy would be with Saldivar" and its averment that Saldivar's
investigation although unverified, was probably true, do not pass this Court's test. 36
While we should not condone the acts of disloyalty of an employee, neither should
we dismiss him on the basis of suspicion derived from speculative inferences.
To rely on the Maramara report as a basis for Salazar's dismissal would be most
inequitous because the bulk of the findings centered principally oh her friend's
alleged thievery and anomalous transactions as technical operations' support
manager. Said report merely insinuated that in view of Salazar's special relationship
with Saldivar, Salazar might have had direct knowledge of Saldivar's questionable
activities. Direct evidence implicating private respondent is wanting from the
records.

It is also worth emphasizing that the Maramara report came out after Saldivar had
already resigned from GMCR on May 31, 1984. Since Saldivar did not have the
opportunity to refute management's findings, the report remained obviously one-
sided. Since the main evidence obtained by petitioner dealt principally on the
alleged culpability of Saldivar, without his having had a chance to voice his side in
view of his prior resignation, stringent examination should have been carried out to
ascertain whether or not there existed independent legal grounds to hold Salatar
answerable as well and, thereby, justify her dismissal. Finding none, from the
records, we find her to have been unlawfully dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution of public respondent National Labor Relations

Commission dated December 29, 1987 is hereby AFFIRMED. Petitioner GMCR is
ordered to REINSTATE private respondent Imelda Salazar and to pay her
backwages equivalent to her salary for a period of two (2) years only.

This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.