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Chapter Eight

PROCEDURE AND JURISDICTION


TOPICS PER SYLLABUS
A. Labor Arbiter
1. Jurisdiction
a) versus Regional Director
2. Reinstatement pending appeal
3. Requirements to perfect appeal to NLRC

A.
LABOR ARBITER
1. THE LABOR ARBITER.
The Labor Arbiter is an official in the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) who hears and decides cases falling under his original and exclusive jurisdiction as provided by law.
2. VARIOUS POWERS OF THE LABOR ARBITERS.
Besides their adjudicatory power to hear and decide cases over which they have jurisdiction, the Labor
Arbiters have (1) contempt power;1 and (2) power to conduct ocular inspection.2
Previously, they are also possessed of injunctive power. 3 This grant of injunctive power, however, was
deleted in recent NLRC Rules.4 The Labor Arbiter thus has no more injunctive power.5 Only the Commission
(NLRC) has that power.6

1.
JURISDICTION

1. NATURE OF JURISDICTION OF LABOR ARBITERS, ORIGINAL AND EXCLUSIVE.


The jurisdiction conferred by Article 217 upon the Labor Arbiters is both original and exclusive, meaning,
no other officers or tribunals can take cognizance of, or hear and decide, any of the cases therein enumerated.
2. EXCEPTIONS TO THE ORIGINAL AND EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF LABOR ARBITERS.
The following are the exceptions:
1. When the DOLE Secretary or the President exercises his power under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code
to assume jurisdiction over national interest cases and decide them himself.
2. When the NLRC exercises its power of compulsory arbitration over similar national interest cases that
are certified to it by the DOLE Secretary pursuant to the exercise by the latter of his certification power
under the same Article 263(g) .
3. When cases arise from the interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining agreements and
from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies which shall be disposed of by the
Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration, as may be
provided in said agreements.7
4. When the parties agree to submit the case to voluntary arbitration before a Voluntary Arbitrator or panel
of Voluntary Arbitrators who, under Articles 261 and 262 of the Labor Code, are also possessed of
original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases mutually submitted to them by the parties
for arbitration and adjudication.
The Labor Arbiters do not have jurisdiction over the cases mentioned above which are taken cognizance of
by said other labor officials or tribunals under specific provisions of the Labor Code.
3. LAWS CONFERRING JURISDICTION ON LABOR ARBITERS.
The following provisions of laws grant original and exclusive jurisdiction to the Labor Arbiters:
1. Article 217 of the Labor Code;8
2. Article 124 of the Labor Code;9
3. Article 128(b) of the Labor Code;10
4. Article 227 of the Labor Code;
5. Article 262-A of the Labor Code;11 and
6. Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042,12 as amended by R.A. No. 10022.13
4. RUNDOWN OF ALL CASES FALLING UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF THE LABOR ARBITERS.
More particularly, Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the
following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:
1. Under Article 217 of the Labor Code:
(a) Unfair labor practice cases;
(b) Termination disputes;
(c) If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file involving wages,
rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment;
(d) Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from employer-employee
relations;
(e) Cases arising from any violation of Article 279 [264] of the Labor Code, as amended, including
questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts;
(f) Except claims for employees compensation, social security, Philhealth (Medicare) and maternity
benefits, all other claims arising from employer-employee relations, including those of persons in
domestic or household service, involving an amount exceeding Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) ,
whether or not accompanied with a claim for reinstatement.
2. Under Article 124 of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. No. 6727:
Disputes involving legislated wage increases and wage distortion in unorganized establishments not
voluntarily settled by the parties pursuant to R.A. No. 6727. 14
3. Under Article 128(b) of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7730:
Contested cases under the exception clause in Article 128(b) of the Labor Code.
4. Under Article 227 of the Labor Code:
Enforcement of compromise agreements when there is non-compliance by any of the parties thereto,
pursuant to Article 227 of the Labor Code.
5. Under Article 262-A of the Labor Code:
Issuance of writ of execution to enforce decisions of Voluntary Arbitrators or panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators, in case of their absence or incapacity, for any reason. 15
6. Under Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042, as amended by R.A. No. 10022:
Money claims arising out of employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract,
involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment, including claims death and disability benefits and
for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages as provided by R.A. No. 8042, as amended. 16
7. Other cases as may be provided by law. 17
All the foregoing shall be discussed hereunder seriatim.
I.
JURISDICTION OVER UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE CASES
1. VARIOUS ARTICLES OF THE LABOR CODE ON ULP.
Under the Labor Code, there are only five (5) provisions related to unfair labor practices, viz:
(1) Article 247 which describes the concept of unfair labor practice acts and prescribes the procedure for
their prosecution;
(2) Article 248 which enumerates the unfair labor practices that may be committed by employers;
(3) Article 249 which enumerates the unfair labor practices that may be committed by labor organizations;
(4) Article 261 which considers violations of the CBA as no longer unfair labor practices unless the same
are gross in character which means flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic
provisions thereof.
(5) Article 263(c) which refers to union-busting involving the dismissal from employment of union officers
duly elected in accordance with the union constitution and by-laws, where the existence of the union is
threatened thereby.
2. SOME PRINCIPLES ON JURISDICTION OVER ULPs.
The Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over all ULPs whether committed by the employers 18 or the labor
organizations.19
The law gives utmost priority in the resolution of unfair labor practice cases.20
The Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction only over the civil aspect of ULP, the criminal aspect being lodged with the
regular courts.21
II.
JURISDICTION OVER ILLEGAL DISMISSAL CASES
1. LABOR OFFICIALS WHO MAY TAKE COGNIZANCE OF TERMINATION DISPUTES.
An examination of the Labor Code shows that the following officials have the power to take cognizance of
termination disputes in the exercise of their respective original and exclusive jurisdictions:
1. Labor Arbiters;22
2. Voluntary Arbitrators or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators; 23
3. The DOLE Secretary, in the exercise of his assumption power in national interest cases;24 or
4. The NLRC, in national interest cases certified to it for compulsory arbitration by the DOLE Secretary. 25

2. SOME PRINCIPLES ON JURISDICTION OVER TERMINATION CASES.


The validity of the exercise of jurisdiction by Labor Arbiters over illegal dismissal cases is not
dependent on the kind or nature of the ground cited in support of the dismissal; hence, whether the
dismissal is for just cause or authorized cause, it is of no consequence. 26
In case of conflict of jurisdiction between Labor Arbiter and the Voluntary Arbitrator over
termination cases, the formers jurisdiction shall prevail for the following reasons:
(1) Termination of employment is not a grievable issue that must be submitted to the grievance
machinery or voluntary arbitration for adjudication. 27 The jurisdiction thereover remains within the
original and exclusive ambit of the Labor Arbiter and not of the Voluntary Arbitrator. 28
(2) Even if the CBA provides that termination disputes are grievable, the same is merely discretionary on
the part of the parties thereto.29
(3) Once there is actual termination, jurisdiction is conferred upon Labor Arbiters by operation of law. 30
(4) Interpretation of CBA and enforcement of company personnel policies are merely corollary to an
illegal dismissal case.31
(5) Article 217 is deemed written into the CBA being an intrinsic part thereof. 32
(6) Article 277(b) grants the right to the dismissed employee to contest his termination with the Labor
Arbiter.
(7) Estoppel confers jurisdiction on Labor Arbiters. 33
(8) The phrase all other labor disputes in Article 262 does not automatically confer jurisdiction on
Voluntary Arbitrators.34
(9) The State policy of promoting voluntary arbitration does not foreclose filing of termination case with
Labor Arbiter.35
(10) Failure of the employer to activate grievance machinery confers jurisdiction on Labor Arbiters. 36
In other words, the Voluntary Arbitrator will only have jurisdiction over illegal dismissal cases when
there is express agreement of the parties to the CBA, i.e. , the employer and the bargaining agent, to
submit the termination case to voluntary arbitration. Absent the mutual express agreement of the parties,
Voluntary Arbitrator cannot acquire jurisdiction over termination cases. 37 This was the holding of the
Supreme Court in the cases of Negros Metal Corp. v. Lamayo,38 Landtex Industries v. CA,39 Atlas
Farms, Inc. v. NLRC,40 and San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC.41 In all these cases, the Supreme Court
has categorically declared that termination cases fall under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
Labor Arbiters and not of Voluntary Arbitrators. 42
The express agreement must be stated in the CBA or there must be enough evidence on record
unmistakably showing that the parties have agreed to resort to voluntary arbitration.43
III.
JURISDICTION OVER MONEY CLAIMS CASES
1. CLASSIFICATION OF MONEY CLAIMS.
Money claims falling within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters may be classified
as follows:
1. Any money claim, regardless of amount, accompanied with a claim for reinstatement; or
2. Any money claim, regardless of whether accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, exceeding the
amount of five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) per claimant.
The money claim in No. 1 above presupposes that it proceeds from a termination case, it being
accompanied with a claim for reinstatement. Hence, it falls within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter since it is
principally a termination dispute.
The money claim in No. 2 above does not necessarily arise from or involve a termination case but because
the amount exceeds P5,000.00, it falls within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. If the amount does not exceed
P5,000.00, it is, under Article 129, the Regional Director of the Department of Labor and Employment or his duly
authorized hearing officers who have jurisdiction to take cognizance thereof. 44
2. DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE JURISDICTION OF VOLUNTARY ARBITRATORS AND LABOR
ARBITERS OVER CASES FOR MONEY CLAIMS.
The original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters under Article 217(c) , over cases for money
claims is limited only to those arising from statutes or contracts other than a CBA. The Voluntary Arbitrators or
panel of Voluntary Arbitrators will thus have original and exclusive jurisdiction over money claims arising from
the interpretation or implementation of the CBA and, those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of
company personnel policies, under Article 261.
San Jose v. NLRC,45 ruled that it was correct for the NLRC to hold that the Labor Arbiter has no
jurisdiction to hear and decide the employees money claims (underpayment of retirement benefits) , as the
controversy between the parties involved an issue arising from the interpretation or implementation of a provision
of the CBA. The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators has original and exclusive jurisdiction over
this controversy under Article 261 of the Labor Code, and not the Labor Arbiter.
Citing San Jose on the distinction between the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and the Voluntary
Arbitrators, the Supreme Court, in Del Monte Philippines, Inc. v. Saldivar,46 ruled that the Labor Arbiter in the
instant case could not properly pass judgment on the money claim cited as cross-claim by petitioner against the
union (Association Labor Union [ALU]) since it is a money claim arising from the CBA, hence, the Voluntary
Arbitrator has jurisdiction to resolve the same.
3. SOME PRINCIPLES ON JURISDICTION OVER MONEY CLAIMS.
Money claims must arise out of employer-employee relationship.47 If not, jurisdiction is with the regular
courts.48
Award of statutory benefits even if not prayed for is valid.49
The money claims lodged by an employee are not to be properly offset by his unpaid subscription of stocks. 50
Claim for notarial fees by a lawyer employed by a company is within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.51

(a)
VERSUS REGIONAL DIRECTOR
1. LABOR ARBITERS HAVE NO JURISDICTION OVER SMALL MONEY CLAIMS LODGED UNDER
ARTICLE 129.
Under Article 129 of the Labor Code, DOLE Regional Directors or the duly authorized hearing officers, are
empowered, in a summary proceeding, to hear and decide claims for recovery of wages and other monetary claims
and benefits, including legal interest, provided the following requisites concur:
1. The claim must arise from employer-employee relationship;
2. The claimant does not seek reinstatement; and
3. The aggregate money claim of each employee does not exceed P5,000.00.52
The first requisite is indispensable as labor authorities may only take cognizance of cases arising from
employer-employee relationship or when the cause of action has a reasonable causal connection to such relationship
under the reasonable causal connection rule.
The second requisite means that the remedy of reinstatement should not accompany the monetary claim
because if this is the case, the principal cause of action would be for illegal dismissal and not for monetary claim.
Necessarily, an action for illegal dismissal falls within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter as provided under Article
217 of the Labor Code. Needlessly, in an illegal dismissal case, the amount of any monetary claim asserted therein -
whether below or in excess the threshold amount of P5,000.00 - is immaterial.
The third requisite simply refers to the determination of whether the total amount being claimed is at least
P5,000.00 or below, in which case, the jurisdiction is lodged with the DOLE Regional Director. If it exceeds
P5,000.00, there is no doubt that the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction thereover.
To recapitulate, absent any of the requisites mentioned above will divest the DOLE Regional Directors of
their authority to hear and decide said money claims. Consequently, the jurisdiction over the same is vested upon the
Labor Arbiters.53
In Oreshoot Mining Company v. Arellano,54 the DOLE Regional Director Office No. IV issued an order
in three (3) separate but consolidated cases, directing the reinstatement of private respondents and the payment to
them of backwages and certain other benefits. The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner is correct as regards its
claim of lack of competence on the part of the Regional Director over the cases. The Regional Director has no
jurisdiction to try and decide claims of workers arising from their illegal dismissal from employment and for their
reinstatement and recovery of monetary and other benefits. It is the Labor Arbiter who has jurisdiction over said
issues. Consequently, the questioned order was nullified and the case was referred to the Labor Arbiter for proper
adjudication.
2. JURISDICTION OVER CONTESTED CASES UNDER THE EXCEPTION CLAUSE IN ARTICLE
128(b) OF THE LABOR CODE INVOLVING THE DOLE SECRETARYS VISITORIAL AND
ENFORCEMENT POWERS (INSPECTION OF ESTABLISHMENTS) .
a. Requisites.
For the valid exercise by the DOLE Secretary or any of his duly authorized representatives (DOLE Regional
Directors) of the visitorial and enforcement powers provided under Article 128(b) , the following requisites should
concur:
(1) The employer-employee relationship should still exist;
(2) The findings in question were made in the course of inspection by labor inspectors;55 and
(3) The employees have not yet initiated any claim or complaint with the DOLE Regional Director under
Article 129, or the Labor Arbiter under Article 224 [217].
b. Relation of paragraph (b) of article 128 to the jurisdiction of labor arbiters.
Paragraph (b) of Article 128 is a very controversial provision which must be discussed in connection with
the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters. The provision itself expressly acknowledges the conflict of jurisdiction. Thus,
the opening sentence of the first paragraph of Article 128(b) , after its amendment by R.A. No. 7730 [June 2, 1994],
pertinently states:
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of Articles 129 and 217 of this Code to the contrary,
and in cases where the relationship of employer-employee still exists, the Secretary of Labor and
Employment or his duly authorized representatives shall have the power to issue compliance
orders to give effect to the labor standards provisions of this Code and other labor legislation based
on the findings of labor employment and enforcement officers or industrial safety engineers made
in the course of inspection. The Secretary or his duly authorized representatives shall issue writs of
execution to the appropriate authority for the enforcement of their orders, exceptin cases where the
employer contests the findings of the labor employment and enforcement officer and raises issues
supported by documentary proofs which were not considered in the course of inspection. 56

c. Jurisdictional conflict.
A survey of the cases involving Article 128(b) shows that the following jurisdictional issues have been
raised:
(1) Whether the DOLE Secretary or the Regional Directors have jurisdiction when the total amount of
monetary claims exceeds P5,000.00 per claimant;
(2) Whether the Labor Arbiters have jurisdiction over the contested cases mentioned in the exception
clause in Article 128(b) ; and
(3) Whether the factual findings of the DOLE Secretary or the Regional Directors are binding on Labor
Arbiters and the NLRC under the doctrine of res judicata.
On No. 1 above:
The DOLE Secretary or the Regional Directors have jurisdiction regardless of whether the amount exceeds
P5,000.00 or not.
In Ex-Bataan Veterans Security Agency, Inc. v. The Secretary of Labor Laguesma, 57 it was held that
the Regional Director validly assumed jurisdiction over the money claims of private respondents even if the claims
exceeded P5,000 because such jurisdiction was exercised in accordance with Article 128(b) of the Labor Code and
the case does not fall under the exception clause.
The en banc Resolution in the 2012 case of Peoples Broadcasting Service (Bombo Radyo Phils. , Inc. )
v. The Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment, 58 clarified that the expanded jurisdiction of
the DOLE Secretary or Regional Directors is not affected whether the case is the result of regular inspection
under Article 128(b) or it originates from a complaint under either Article 129 or Article 217.
On No. 2 above:
The Labor Arbiters have jurisdiction over contested cases under the exception clause in Article 128(b) .
which states: xxx. The Secretary or his duly authorized representatives shall issue writs of execution to the
appropriate authority for the enforcement of their orders, except in cases where the employer contests the findings
of the labor employment and enforcement officer and raises issues supported by documentary proofs which were not
considered in the course of inspection.59
In interpreting the afore-quoted provision of the exception clause, three (3) elements must concur to divest
the Regional Directors or their representatives of jurisdiction thereunder, to wit:
(a) That the employer contests the findings of the labor regulations officer and raises issues thereon;
(b) That in order to resolve such issues, there is a need to examine evidentiary matters; and
(c) That such matters are not verifiable in the normal course of inspection. 60
Resultantly, if the said elements are present and therefore the labor standards case is covered by said
exception clause, then the Regional Director will have to endorse the case to the appropriate Labor Arbiters of the
Arbitration Branch of the NLRC as held in said case of Ex-Bataan Veterans. 61
The 2009 case of Meteoro v. Creative Creatures, Inc.,62 best illustrates the application of the exception
clause. Here, it was held that the Court of Appeals aptly applied the exception clause because at the earliest
opportunity, respondent company registered its objection to the findings of the labor inspector on the ground that
there was no employer-employee relationship between petitioners and respondent company. The labor inspector, in
fact, noted in his report that respondent alleged that petitioners were contractual workers and/or independent and
talent workers without control or supervision and also supplied with tools and apparatus pertaining to their job. In
its position paper, respondent again insisted that petitioners were not its employees. It then questioned the Regional
Directors jurisdiction to entertain the matter before it, primarily because of the absence of an employer-employee
relationship. Finally, it raised the same arguments before the Secretary of Labor and the appellate court. It is,
therefore, clear that respondent contested and continues to contest the findings and conclusions of the labor
inspector. To resolve the issue raised by respondent, that is, the existence of an employer-employee relationship,
there is a need to examine evidentiary matters.
On No. 3 above:
The factual findings of the DOLE Secretary or the Regional Directors made in the exercise of their visitorial
and enforcement powers under Article 128 are binding on Labor Arbiters and the NLRC under the doctrine of res
judicata as held in the 2012 case of Norkis Trading Corporation v. Buenavista. 63
IV.
JURISDICTION OVER CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES
1. LABOR ARBITERS HAVE JURISDICTION OVER CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES.
It is now a well-settled rule, according to Primero v. Intermediate Appellate Court,64 that claims for
damages as well as attorneys fees in labor cases are cognizable by the Labor Arbiters, to the exclusion of all other
courts. Rulings to the contrary are deemed abandoned or modified accordingly. No matter how designated, for as
long as the action primarily involves an employer-employee relationship, the labor court has jurisdiction over any
damage claims.65
2. CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES OF OVERSEAS FILIPINO WORKERS (OFWs) .
Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages that may be lodged by overseas Filipino
workers are cognizable by the Labor Arbiters.66
V.
JURISDICTION OVER LEGALITY OF STRIKES AND LOCKOUTS
1. JURISDICTION OVER LEGALITY OF STRIKES AND LOCKOUTS NOT AFFECTING NATIONAL
INTEREST.
In general, the Labor Arbiter has the power to determine questions involving the legality or illegality of a
strike or lockout upon the filing of a proper complaint and after due proceedings. 67
The employer, in case of a strike, or the union, in case of a lockout, may file the proper petition with the
Labor Arbiter to seek a declaration of the illegality thereof. It shall be the duty of the Labor Arbiter concerned to act
on the case immediately and dispose of the same, subject only to the requirements of due process. 68
2. JURISDICTION OVER STRIKES AND LOCKOUTS AFFECTING INDUSTRIES INDISPENSABLE
TO THE NATIONAL INTEREST.
The jurisdiction over labor disputes affecting industries indispensable to the national interest is lodged with
either the DOLE Secretary, in case he assumes jurisdiction thereover, or with the NLRC, in case the DOLE
Secretary certifies it thereto.
Under either situation, all cases between the same parties shall be considered subsumed to, or absorbed by,
the assumed or certified case, as the case may be, and shall be decided accordingly by the DOLE Secretary 69 or by
the appropriate Division of the Commission.70 The exception to this rule is when the assumption or certification
order specifies otherwise.
Consequent to this, the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure71 prescribe that:
When the Secretary of Labor and Employment has assumed jurisdiction over a strike or
lockout or certified the same to the Commission, the parties to such dispute shall immediately
inform the Secretary or the Commission, as the case may be, of all cases directly related to the
dispute between them pending before any Regional Arbitration Branch, and the Labor Arbiters
handling the same of such assumption or certification. The Labor Arbiter concerned shall forward
within two (2) days from notice the entire records of the case to the Commission or to the Secretary
of Labor, as the case may be, for proper disposition.
Thus, the parties to an assumed or certified case, under pain of contempt, shall inform their counsels and
the DOLE Secretary or the NLRC Division concerned, of all cases pending with the Regional Arbitration Branches
and the Voluntary Arbitrators relative or incident to the assumed or certified case. 72
Further, in cases certified to the NLRC which involve business entities with several workplaces located in
different regions, the NLRC Division having territorial jurisdiction over the principal office of the company shall
acquire jurisdiction to decide such labor dispute; unless the certification order provides otherwise. 73
3. JURISDICTION OVER CRIMINAL CASES ARISING FROM STRIKES OR LOCKOUTS.
The Labor Arbiter cannot adjudicate issues involving any crimes committed, whether related to a strike or
lockout or not. Prosecution of crimes or felonies falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts of justice.
V-A.
JURISDICTIONAL INTERPLAY IN STRIKE OR LOCKOUT CASES
1. NECESSITY TO DESCRIBE INTERPLAY OF JURISDICTION.
At the outset, there is a need to discuss and explain the jurisdictional issues involved in strike or lockout
situations because of their seeming complexity. As distinguished from other labor cases, a labor dispute involving a
strike or lockout is unique as it involves an interplay of jurisdiction of several labor officials or tribunals. Confusion
usually arises as to when the said labor officials or tribunals can properly take cognizance of strike-related or
lockout-related issues.
2. A STRIKE OR LOCKOUT IS CROSS-JURISDICTIONAL IN NATURE.
Based on the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code, there is really no overlap or conflict in the exercise of
jurisdiction of each one of them. Below is an outline of the interplay in jurisdiction among said officials and
tribunals.
1. Filing of a notice of strike or lockout with NCMB. - A union which intends to stage a strike or an
employer which desires to mount a lockout should file a notice of strike or notice of lockout, as the case may be,
with the NCMB and not with any other office. It must be noted, however, that the NCMB, per Tabigue v.
International Copra Export Corporation,74 is not a quasi-judicial body; hence, the Conciliators-Mediators of the
NCMB do not have any decision-making power. They cannot issue decisions to resolve the issues raised in the
notice of strike or lockout. Their role is confined solely to the conciliation and mediation of the said issues, although
they can suggest to the parties that they submit their dispute to voluntary arbitration through the Voluntary
Arbitrators accredited by the NCMB.
2. Filing of a complaint to declare the illegality of the strike or lockout with the Labor Arbiter or
Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrator. - In case a party wants to have the strike or lockout
declared illegal, a complaint should be filed either with the Labor Arbiter under Article 217(a) (5) of the Labor Code
or, upon mutual agreement of the parties, with the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators under
Article 262 of the same Code. The issue of illegality of the strike or lockout cannot be resolved by the Conciliators-
Mediators of the NCMB as earlier pointed out and discussed.
3. Filing of an injunction petition with the Commission (NLRC). - In case illegal acts violative of
Article 264 are committed in the course of the strike or lockout, a party may file a petition for injunction directly
with the Commission (NLRC) under Article 218(e) of the Labor Code for purposes of securing a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and injunction. The Labor Arbiters or Voluntary Arbitrators are not possessed of any
injunctive power under the Labor Code. In other words, the aggrieved party, despite the pendency of the case for the
declaration of the illegality of the strike or lockout with the Labor Arbiter or Voluntary Arbitrator, as the case may
be, may directly go to the Commission to secure the injunctive relief.
4. Assumption of jurisdiction by the DOLE Secretary. Under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, the
DOLE Secretary has the power to assume jurisdiction over labor disputes which, in his opinion, may cause or likely
to cause a strike or lockout in industries indispensable to the national interest (so-called national interest cases) .
Once he makes the assumption, he shall decide all the issues related to the labor dispute himself, to the exclusion of
all other labor authorities.
5. Certification of the labor dispute to the NLRC. - Under the same provision of Article 263(g) of the
Labor Code, the DOLE Secretary has the option of not assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute in national
interest cases. Instead, he may certify it to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration, in which case, it will be the NLRC
which shall hear and decide all the issues subject of the certification order.
In case at the time of the said assumption or certification, there is a pending case before the Labor Arbiter
or Voluntary Arbitrator on the issue of illegality of the strike or lockout, the same shall be deemed subsumed in the
assumed or certified case. Resultantly, it is no longer the Labor Arbiter or the Voluntary Arbitrator who should
decide the said case but the DOLE Secretary, in the case of assumed cases, or the NLRC, in the case of certified
cases.
6. Assumption of jurisdiction over a national interest case by the President. - The President of the
Philippines is not precluded from intervening in a national interest case by exercising himself the powers of his alter
ego, the DOLE Secretary, granted under Article 263(g) by assuming jurisdiction over the same for purposes of
settling or terminating it.
7. Submission of a national interest case to voluntary arbitration. - Despite the pendency of the
assumed or certified national interest case, the parties are allowed to submit any issues raised therein to voluntary
arbitration at any stage of the proceeding, by virtue of Article 263(h) which provides that (b)efore or at any stage
of the compulsory arbitration process, the parties may opt to submit their dispute to voluntary arbitration.
The foregoing interplay explains why Article 263(i) makes specific reference to the President of the
Philippines, the Secretary of Labor and Employment, the Commission (NLRC) or the Voluntary Arbitrator in
connection with the law on strike, lockout and picketing embodied in Article 263. The only labor official not so
mentioned therein but who has a significant role to play in the interaction of labor officials and tribunals in strike or
lockout cases, is the Labor Arbiter. This is understandable in the light of the separate express grant of jurisdiction to
the Labor Arbiters under Article 217(a) (5) as above discussed.
VI.
JURISDICTION OVER CASES INVOLVING
LEGISLATED WAGE INCREASES AND WAGE DISTORTION
1. CASES IN ORGANIZED ESTABLISHMENTS.
In establishments where there are existing collective bargaining agreements or recognized bargaining
unions, R.A. No. 6727,75 vests upon the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, the jurisdiction to
hear and decide wage distortion cases, after the grievance procedure in the CBA failed to settle the same.76
2. CASES IN UNORGANIZED ESTABLISHMENTS.
In establishments where there are no certified collective bargaining unions or existing collective
bargaining agreements, the Labor Arbiters have jurisdiction to hear and decide wage distortion cases after the
parties and the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) failed to correct the distortion. 77
3. DISPUTES OVER LEGISLATED WAGE INCREASES AND WAGE DISTORTION MADE SUBJECT
OF NOTICE OF STRIKE OR LOCKOUT.
Wage distortion is not a proper ground to be invoked in support of a strike or lockout. Disputes arising
from wage distortion resulting from wage orders issued by the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board
(RTWPB) which are alleged in the notice of strike or notice of lockout, should be referred to the Labor Arbiter if not
settled within ten (10) calendar days of conciliation by the NCMB. 78
VII.
JURISDICTION OVER ENFORCEMENT OR ANNULMENT
OF COMPROMISE AGREEMENTS
1. LEGAL BASIS.
Article 227 clearly embodies the following provisions on compromise agreements:
Article 227. Compromise Agreements. - Any compromise settlement, including those
involving labor standard laws, voluntarily agreed upon by the parties with the assistance of the
Bureau or the regional office of the Department of Labor, shall be final and binding upon the
parties. The National Labor Relations Commission or any court shall not assume jurisdiction
over issues involved therein except in case of non-compliance thereof or if there is prima
facie evidence that the settlement was obtained through fraud, misrepresentation, or
coercion. 79
Clear from the foregoing provision that, although the compromise agreement may have been entered into by
the parties before the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) or the DOLE Regional Office, it is the Labor Arbiter who
has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the following issues related thereto, to the exclusion of the BLR and the
DOLE Regional Directors:
(1) To enforce the compromise agreement in case of non-compliance therewith by any of the parties thereto;
or
(2) To nullify it if there is prima facie evidence that the settlement was obtained through fraud,
misrepresentation, or coercion.
2. PROVISION IN THE NLRC RULES.
A similar provision is found in the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure,80 where the jurisdiction of the Labor
Arbiters is recognized over the enforcement of compromise agreements when there is non-compliance by any of the
parties thereto pursuant to Article 227 of the Labor Code.
3. LABOR ARBITERS JURISDICTION OVER COMPROMISE AGREEMENTS EXECUTED BEFORE
THE NCMB.
Although Article 227 refers only to compromise agreements entered into before the BLR and DOLE
Regional Directors, the same rule vesting jurisdiction to Labor Arbiters also applies to any compromise settlement,
including those involving labor standard laws, voluntarily agreed upon by the parties with the assistance of the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) and its regional branches. Thus, as provided in the Rules to
Implement the Labor Code,81 the NLRC or any court shall not assume jurisdiction over issues involved therein
except in case of non-compliance thereof or if there is prima facie evidence that the settlement was obtained through
fraud, misrepresentation, or coercion.
Upon motion of any interested party, the Labor Arbiter in the region where the agreement was reached
may issue a writ of execution requiring a Sheriff of the Commission or the courts to enforce the terms of the
agreement.82
VIII.
JURISDICTION OVER EXECUTION AND ENFORCEMENT
OF DECISIONS OF VOLUNTARY ARBITRATORS
1. DECISIONS OF VOLUNTARY ARBITRATORS.
Article 262-A of the Labor Code prescribes the procedures that Voluntary Arbitrators or panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators should follow in adjudicating cases filed before them. Once a decision has been rendered in a case and
subsequently becomes final and executory, it may be enforced through the writ of execution issued by the same
Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators who rendered it, addressed to and requiring certain public
officers83 to execute the final decision, order or award.
2. LABOR ARBITERS MAY ISSUE THE WRIT OF EXECUTION.
In situations, however, where the Voluntary Arbitrator or the panel of Voluntary Arbitrators who rendered
the decision is absent or incapacitated for any reason, Article 262-A84 grants jurisdiction to any Labor Arbiter in the
region where the winning party resides, to take cognizance of a motion for the issuance of the writ of execution filed
by such party and accordingly issue such writ addressed to and requiring the public officers mentioned above to
execute the final decision, order or award of the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators.
IX.
JURISDICTION OVER CASES OF OVERSEAS FILIPINO WORKERS (OFWs)
1. LABOR ARBITERS HAVE JURISDICTION OVER ALL MONEY CLAIMS OF OFWs.
R.A. No. 8042,85 conferred original and exclusive jurisdiction upon Labor Arbiters, to hear and decide all
claims arising from employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers
for overseas deployment, including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.
R.A. No. 8042, specifically Section 10 thereof, was undisturbed by the latest amendatory law, R.A. No.
10022.86
2. VOLUNTARY ARBITRATORS HAVE JURISDICTION OVER MONEY CLAIMS IF THERE EXISTS
A CBA.
If there is a CBA between the foreign employer and the bargaining union of the OFWs, the
jurisdiction over monetary claims of OFWs belongs to the Voluntary Arbitrator and not to the Labor
Arbiter.
In at least two (2) recent 2012 decisions of the Supreme Court, the jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters over
monetary claims of OFWs was distinguished from that of the Voluntary Arbitrators or panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators, to wit:
(1) Ace Navigation Co. , Inc. v. Fernandez,87 involving the disability claim of respondent; and
(2) Estate of Dulay v. Aboitiz Jebsen Maritime, Inc. and General Charterers Inc. , 88 involving claim
for death benefits of petitioner.
In summary, it was ruled in these cases that in case there is a CBA between the employer and the
bargaining union to which the complaining OFW belongs, the original and exclusive jurisdiction over his monetary
claims belongs to the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators and not to the Labor Arbiters.
3. OFW-RELATED CASES OVER WHICH THE POEA, AND NOT THE LABOR ARBITERS, HAS
JURISDICTION.
The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) has original and exclusive jurisdiction to
hear and decide:
(a) All cases which are administrative in character, involving or arising out of violation of rules and
regulations relating to licensing and registration of recruitment and employment agencies or entities,
including refund of fees collected from workers and violation of the conditions for the issuance of
license to recruit workers.89
(b) Disciplinary action cases and other special cases which are administrative in character, involving
employers, principals, contracting partners and Filipino migrant workers. 90
No. 1 above covers recruitment violations or violations of conditions of license; while No. 2 above involves
(a) disciplinary action cases against foreign principals or employers, and (a) disciplinary action cases against land-
based OFWs and seafarers.
X.
OTHER ISSUES OVER WHICH LABOR ARBITERS HAVE JURISDICTION
1. JURISDICTION OVER CERTAIN ISSUES AS PROVIDED IN JURISPRUDENCE.
In accordance with well-entrenched jurisprudence, the issues, claims or cases of the following fall under the
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters:
(a) Employees in government-owned and/or controlled corporations;
(b) Alien parties;
(c) Priests and ministers;
(d) Domestic workers or kasambahay;
(e) Employees of cooperatives;
(f) Counter-claims of employers against employees.
All the foregoing are discussed below seriatim.
X-A.
JURISDICTION OVER CASES INVOLVING EMPLOYEES
OF GOVERNMENT-OWNED AND/OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS
1. PREVAILING RULE.
The hiring and firing of employees of government owned and/or controlled corporations without original
charters are covered by the Labor Code while those with original charters are basically governed by the Civil
Service Law, rules and regulations.91
X-B.
JURISDICTION OVER DISPUTES INVOLVING ALIEN PARTIES
1. CHOICE OF LAW BY PARTIES.
A basic policy of contract is to protect the expectations of the parties. 92 Such party expectations are
protected by giving effect to the parties own choice of the applicable law. 93 The choice of law must, however, bear
some relationship to the parties or their transaction.94 A manning agency, for instance, cannot be faulted for
complying with the applicable foreign law. By so complying, it has discharged its monetary obligation to the
employee.95
2. WHEN PHILIPPINE LAW PREVAILS.
Pakistan International Airlines Corporation v. Ople, 96 is in point. In this case, two contracts of
employment were executed in Manila between Pakistan International Airlines Corporation and two Filipino flight
attendants. Paragraph 10 of the contracts embodies the stipulation, among others, that the terms thereof shall be
construed and governed by the laws of Pakistan and only the courts of Karachi, Pakistan shall have jurisdiction to
consider any matter arising out of or under the agreement. Prior to the expiration of the contracts, the services of the
two Filipino flight attendants were terminated. They jointly filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. One of the issues
raised is which law should apply and which court has jurisdiction over the dispute.
The Supreme Court, in holding that the Philippine law should apply and that the Philippine court has
jurisdiction, declared that petitioner PIA cannot take refuge in paragraph 10 of its employment agreement which,
firstly, specifies the law of Pakistan as the applicable law of the agreement and, secondly, lays the venue for
settlement of any dispute arising out of or in connection with the agreement only [in] courts of Karachi, Pakistan.
The first clause of paragraph 10 cannot be invoked to prevent the application of Philippine labor laws and
regulations to the subject matter of this case, i.e. , the employer-employee relationship between petitioner PIA and
private respondents. The relationship is much affected with public interest and that the otherwise applicable
Philippine laws and regulations cannot be rendered illusory by the parties agreeing upon some other law to govern
their relationship. Neither may petitioner invoke the second clause of paragraph 10, specifying the Karachi courts as
the sole venue for the settlement of disputes between the contracting parties. Even a cursory scrutiny of the relevant
circumstances of this case will show the multiple and substantive contacts between law and Philippine courts, on the
one hand, and the relationship between the parties, upon the other. The contract was not only executed in the
Philippines, it was also performed here, at least partially. Private respondents are Philippine citizens and residents,
while petitioner, although a foreign corporation, is licensed to do business (and is actually doing business in the
Philippines) and hence, is a resident in the Philippines. Lastly, private respondents were based in the Philippines in
between their assigned flights to the Middle East and Europe. All the above contracts point to the Philippine courts
and administrative agencies as the proper forum for the resolution of the contractual disputes between the parties.
Under these circumstances, paragraph 10 of the employment agreement cannot be given effect so as to oust
Philippine agencies and courts of the jurisdiction vested upon them by Philippine law. Finally, and in any event, the
petitioner PIA did not undertake to plead and prove the contents of Pakistan law on the matter. It must therefore be
presumed that the applicable provisions of the law of Pakistan are the same as the applicable provisions of
Philippine law.
X-C.
JURISDICTION OVER LABOR CASES INVOLVING PRIESTS AND MINISTERS
1. WHEN LABOR ARBITERS HAVE JURISDICTION.
The fact that a case involves as parties thereto the church and its religious minister does not ipso facto give
the case a religious significance. If what is involved is a labor case, say illegal dismissal, the relationship of the
church, as employer, and the priest or minister, as employee is a purely secular matter not related to the practice of
faith, worship or doctrines of the church. Hence, Labor Arbiters may validly exercise jurisdiction over said labor
case.
Austria v. Hon. NLRC and Cebu City Central Philippines Union Mission Corporation of the Seventh
Day Adventist. 97 - The minister here was not excommunicated or expelled from the membership of the church but
was terminated from employment based on the just causes provided in Article 282 of the Labor Code. Indeed, the
matter of terminating an employee which is purely secular in nature is different from the ecclesiastical act98 of
expelling a member from the religious congregation. As such, the State, through the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC,
has the right to take cognizance of the case to determine whether the church, as employer, rightfully exercised its
management prerogative to dismiss the religious minister as its employee.
2. ECCLESIASTICAL AFFAIR, MEANING.
An ecclesiastical affair is one that concerns doctrine, creed, or form of worship of the church, or the
adoption and enforcement within a religious association of needful laws and regulations for the government of its
membership, and the power of excluding from such association those deemed unworthy of membership. 99 Based on
this definition, an ecclesiastical affair involves the relationship between the church and its members and relates to
matters of faith, religious doctrines, worship and governance of the congregation. To be concrete, examples of these
so-called ecclesiastical affairs to which the State cannot meddle, are proceedings for excommunication, ordination
of religious ministers, administration of sacraments and other activities with attached religious significance. 100
X-D.
JURISDICTION OVER CASES OF
DOMESTIC WORKERS OR KASAMBAHAY
1. WHEN LABOR ARBITERS HAVE JURISDICTION.
The Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction if the amount of the claim exceeds P5,000.00; otherwise, the jurisdiction
is vested with the DOLE Regional Director under Article 129 of the Labor Code.
Incidentally, it is no longer legally correct to use the term domestic servant or househelper in
reference to a person who performs domestic work. Under R.A. No. 10361,101 domestic servant or househelper
should now be referred to as domestic worker or kasambahay. 102
X-E.
JURISDICTION OVER CASES OF
EMPLOYEES OF COOPERATIVES
1. WHEN LABOR ARBITERS HAVE JURISDICTION.
The Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction only over monetary claims and illegal dismissal cases involving
employees of cooperatives but not the claims or termination of membership of members thereof. Cooperatives
organized under R.A. No. 6938,103 are composed of members; hence, issues on the termination of their
membership with the cooperative do not fall within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters.
Perpetual Help Credit Cooperative, Inc. v. Faburada. 104 - Petitioner in this case contends that the Labor
Arbiter has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint of private respondents who are not members but
employees of the cooperative. The Supreme Court ruled that there is no evidence that private respondents are
members of petitioner cooperative and even if they are, the dispute is about payment of wages, overtime pay, rest
day and termination of employment. Under Article 217 of the Labor Code, these disputes are within the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters.105
In the 2010 case of San Miguel Corp. v. Semillano,106 petitioner asserts that the present case is outside the
jurisdiction of the labor tribunals because respondent Vicente Semillano is a member of the Alilgilan Multi-Purpose
Coop (AMPCO) , not an employee of petitioner SMC. Petitioner is of the position that the instant dispute is intra-
cooperative in nature falling within the jurisdiction of the Arbitration Committee of the Cooperative Development
Authority. AMPCO was contracted by petitioner to supply it with workers to perform the task of segregating bottles,
removing dirt therefrom, filing them in designated places, loading and unloading the bottles to and from the delivery
trucks, and to perform other tasks as may be ordered by SMCs officers. Semillano, together with the other
respondents, filed the complaint for regularization with petitioner SMC, contending that AMPCO was a mere labor-
only contractor. The High Court declared in this case that AMPCO was a labor-only contractor and consequently
pronounced that all the respondents, including Semillano, were regular employees of petitioner. On this issue of
jurisdiction, the High Court held that the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction because precisely, Semillano has joined the
others in filing this complaint because it is his position that petitioner SMC is his true employer and liable for all his
claims under the Labor Code.
X-F.
JURISDICTION OVER COUNTER-CLAIMS OF EMPLOYERS
1. EMPLOYERS MAY ASSERT COUNTER-CLAIMS AGAINST EMPLOYEES FILED BY THE LATTER
BEFORE THE LABOR ARBITERS.
Almost all labor cases decided by labor courts involve claims asserted by the workers. The question that
may be propounded is whether the employers can assert counter-claims against their employees before the Labor
Arbiters. The Supreme Court answered this poser in the affirmative.
Baez v. Hon. Valdevilla. 107 - The jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the NLRC is comprehensive enough
to include claims for all forms of damages arising from the employer-employee relations. By this clause, Article
217 should apply with equal force to the claim of an employer for actual damages against its dismissed employee,
where the basis for the claim arises from or is necessarily connected with the fact of termination, and should be
entered as a counter-claim in the illegal dismissal case. This is in accord with paragraph 6 of Article 217(a) , which
covers all other claims, arising from employer-employee relations. 108
But such counter-claim, being a factual issue, must be asserted before the Labor Arbiter; otherwise, it can
no longer be passed upon by a reviewing court.109
XI.
ISSUES AND CASES OVER WHICH
LABOR ARBITERS HAVE NO JURISDICTION
1. LABOR ARBITERS HAVE NO JURISDICTION OVER CERTAIN ISSUES AND CASES.
The following issues or cases do not fall under the jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters:
(a) Claims for damages arising from breach of a non-compete clause and other post-employment
prohibitions;
(b) Claims for payment of cash advances, car, appliance and other loans of employees;
(c) Dismissal of corporate officers and their monetary claims;
(d) Issues involving suspension of payment of debts (rehabilitation receivership) ;
(e) Cases involving entities immune from suit;
(f) Cases falling under the doctrine of forum non conveniens;
(g) Quasi-delict or tort cases;
(h) Criminal and civil liabilities arising from violations of certain provisions of the Labor Code;
(i) Constitutionality of CBA provisions.
All the foregoing issues or cases are discussed below seriatim.
XI-A.
CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES ARISING FROM BREACH OF NON-COMPETE CLAUSE AND OTHER
POST-EMPLOYMENT PROHIBITIONS
1. JURISDICTION IS LODGED WITH THE REGULAR COURTS.
In case of violation of the non-compete clause and similar post-employment bans or prohibitions, the
employer can assert his claim for damages against the erring employee with the regular courts and not with the
labor courts.110
XI-B.
EMPLOYERS CLAIMS FOR CASH ADVANCES, CAR, APPLIANCE
AND OTHER PERSONAL LOANS OF EMPLOYEES
1. LABOR ARBITERS HAVE NO JURISDICTION.
With respect to resolving issues involving loans availed of by employees from their employers, it has been
the consistent ruling of the Supreme Court that the Labor Arbiters have no jurisdiction thereover but the regular
courts.
Where the claim to the principal relief sought is to be resolved not by reference to the Labor Code or
other labor relations statute or a collective bargaining agreement but by the general civil law, the jurisdiction over
the dispute belongs to the regular courts of justice and not to the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. In such situations,
resolutions of the dispute requires expertise, not in labor management relations nor in wage structures and other
terms and conditions of employment, but rather in the application of the general civil law. Clearly, such claims fall
outside the area of competence or expertise ordinarily ascribed to Labor Arbiters and the NLRC and the rationale for
granting jurisdiction over such claims to these agencies disappears. 111
The following loans may be cited:
a. Cash loans/advances are in the nature of simple collection of a sum of money brought by the employer,
as creditor, against the employee, as debtor. The fact that they were employer and employee at the time
of the transaction does not negate the civil jurisdiction of the trial court. The case does not involve
adjudication of a labor dispute but recovery of a sum of money based on our civil laws on obligation
and contract.112
b. Car loans such as those granted to sales or medical representatives by reason of the nature of their
work. The employers demand for payment of the employees amortizations on their car loans, or, in the
alternative, the return of the cars to the company, is not a labor, but a civil, dispute. It involves debtor-
creditor relations, rather than employee-employer relations.113
c. Appliance loans concern the enforcement of a loan agreement involving debtor-creditor relations
founded on contract and do not in any way concern employee relations. As such it should be
enforced through a separate civil action in the regular courts and not before the Labor Arbiter. 114
d. Loans from retirement fund also involve the same principle as above; hence, collection therefor may
only be made through the regular courts and not through the Labor Arbiter or any labor tribunal. 115
XI-C.
DISMISSAL OF DIRECTORS AND CORPORATE OFFICERS
1. LABOR ARBITERS HAVE NO JURISDICTION.
The dismissal of a director or corporate officer is an intra-corporate dispute cognizable by the Regional
Trial Court116 and not by the Labor Arbiter.
2. MATLING DOCTRINE.
Under this doctrine,117 the following rules should be observed:
(1) The dismissal of regular employees falls under the jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters; while that of
corporate officers falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.
(2) The term corporate officers refers only to those expressly mentioned in the Corporation Code and
By-Laws; all other officers not so mentioned therein are deemed employees.
(3) Corporate officers are elected or appointed by the directors or stockholders, and those who are given
that character either by the Corporation Code or by the corporations by-laws. 118
(4) The Corporation Code119 specifically mentions only the following corporate officers, to wit:
president, secretary and treasurer and such other officers as may be provided for in the by-laws.
(5) The Board of Directors can no longer create corporate offices because the power of the Board of
Directors to create a corporate office cannot be delegated. Therefore, the term corporate
officers should only refer to the above and to no other. A different interpretation can easily leave the
way open for the Board of Directors to circumvent the constitutionally guaranteed security of tenure of
the employee by the expedient inclusion in the By-Laws of an enabling clause on the creation of just
any corporate officer position.
(6) Distinction between a corporate officer and an employee. - An office is created by the charter of
the corporation and the corporate officer is elected by the directors or stockholders. On the other
hand, an employee occupies no office and generally is employed not by the action of the directors or
stockholders but by the managing officer of the corporation who also determines the compensation to
be paid to such employee.
(7) Because of the Matling doctrine, the rulings in Tabang120 and Nacpil,121 are no longer controlling
because they are too sweeping and do not accord with reason, justice, and fair play.
(8) The status of an employee as director and stockholder does not automatically convert his
dismissal into an intra-corporate dispute.
(9) Two (2) elements to determine whether a dispute is intra-corporate or not.
(a) The status or relationship of the parties; and
(b) The nature of the question that is the subject of their controversy. (Nature of controversy test) .
In the absence of any one of these factors, the RTC will not have jurisdiction.
(10) The criteria do not depend on the services performed but on the manner of creation of the office.
In Matling, respondent Corros was supposedly at once an employee, a stockholder, and a Director of
Matling. The circumstances surrounding his appointment to office must be fully considered to
determine whether the dismissal constituted an intra-corporate controversy or a labor termination
dispute. It must also be considered whether his status as Director and stockholder had any relation at
all to his appointment and subsequent dismissal as Vice President for Finance and Administration.
Obviously enough, the respondent was not appointed as Vice President for Finance and Administration
because of his being a stockholder or Director of Matling. He had started working for Matling on
September 8, 1966, and had been employed continuously for 33 years until his termination on April
17, 2000. His first work as a bookkeeper and his climb in 1987 to his last position as Vice President for
Finance and Administration had been gradual but steady. 122 Even though he might have become a
stockholder of Matling in 1992, his promotion to the position of Vice President for Finance and
Administration in 1987 was by virtue of the length of quality service he had rendered as an employee
of Matling. His subsequent acquisition of the status of Director/stockholder had no relation to his
promotion. Besides, his status of Director/stockholder was unaffected by his dismissal from
employment as Vice President for Finance and Administration. 123
3. SIGNIFICANT CASES DECIDED BASED ON THE MATLING DOCTRINE.
a. Cosare v. Broadcom Asia, Inc. ,124
In this 2014 case, the Supreme Court ruled that the Labor Arbiter, not the regular courts, has original
jurisdiction over the illegal dismissal case filed by petitioner Cosare who was an incorporator125 of respondent
Broadcom and was holding the position of Assistant Vice President for Sales (AVP for Sales) and Head of the
Technical Coordination at the time of his termination. The following justifications were cited in support of this
ruling:
(1) The mere fact that a person was a stockholder and an officer of the company at the time the subject
controversy developed does not necessarily make the case an intra-corporate dispute.
(2) A person, although an officer of the company, is not necessarily a corporate officer thereof.
(3) General Information Sheet (GIS) submitted to SEC neither governs nor establishes the nature of office.
(4) The Nature of the Controversy Test: The mere fact that a person was a stockholder at the time of the
filing of the illegal dismissal case does not make the action an intra-corporate dispute.
b. Other cases:
(1) Barba v. Liceo de Cagayan University (2012) ;126
(2) Marc II Marketing, Inc. and Lucila V. Joson v. Alfredo M. Joson (2011) ;127
(3) Real v. Sangu Philippines, Inc. (2011) . 128

XI-D.
SUSPENSION OF PAYMENT OF DEBTS
(REHABILITATION RECEIVERSHIP)
1. JURISDICTION LODGED WITH RTC.
It is no longer the SEC which has jurisdiction over this case. It is now the Regional Trial Court which has
jurisdiction.129
2. EFFECTS OF SUSPENSION OF PAYMENT OF DEBTS (REHABILITATION RECEIVERSHIP) OR
LIQUIDATION ON JURISDICTION OF LABOR ARBITERS.
The jurisdiction conferred by law upon Labor Arbiters and the NLRC would not be lost simply because the
assets of a former employer have been placed under receivership or liquidation. This jurisdiction carries with it
the concomitant power to execute their decisions. 130
The pendency of the rehabilitation proceedings does not affect the Courts jurisdiction to resolve the case, but
merely suspends the execution of its decision.131
The suspension of all actions covers all claims against the corporation which is undergoing rehabilitation
receivership, whether for damages founded on a breach of contract of carriage, labor cases, collection suits or
any other claims of a pecuniary nature. No exception in favor of labor claims is mentioned in the law. 132
Likewise, the suspension of all actions for claims against a corporation embraces all phases of the suit, be it
before the trial court or any tribunal or before the Supreme Court. No other action may be taken, including the
rendition of judgment during the state of suspension. Once the process of rehabilitation, however, is completed,
the Court should proceed to complete the proceedings on the suspended actions. 133
Even execution of decisions that are already final and executory may be stayed if the corporation has been
placed under rehabilitation receivership.134
Execution of final decisions during the period of rehabilitation and suspension is null and void. 135
Duration of automatic stay has no limit. The suspension shall last up to the termination of the rehabilitation
proceedings.136
Remedy is to lodge the labor claims with the Rehabilitation Receiver.137
XI-E.
LABOR CASES INVOLVING ENTITIES IMMUNE FROM SUIT
1. IMMUNE ENTITIES CANNOT BE SUED FOR LABOR LAW VIOLATIONS.
In this jurisdiction, the generally accepted principles of international law are recognized and adopted as part
of the law of the land.138 Immunity of a State and international organizations from suit is one of these universally
recognized principles. It is on this basis that Labor Arbiters or other labor tribunals have no jurisdiction over
immune entities.139
2. ILLUSTRATIVE CASES.
There are quite a number of cases that may be cited but the following would be the most ideal examples:
In Department of Foreign Affairs v. NLRC,140 involving an illegal dismissal case filed against the Asian
Development Bank (ADB) , it was ruled that said entity enjoys immunity from legal process of every form and
therefore the suit against it cannot prosper. And this immunity extends to its officers who also enjoy immunity in
respect of all acts performed by them in their official capacity. The Charter and the Headquarters Agreement
granting these immunities and privileges to the ADB are treaty covenants and commitments voluntarily assumed by
the Philippine government which must be respected.
In Lasco v. United Nations Revolving Fund for Natural Resources Exploration [UNRFNRE], 141
involving an illegal dismissal case filed against the respondent which is a specialized agency of the United Nations,
the said immunity rule was asserted and reiterated by the Supreme Court. In dismissing the case, the High Court said
that being a member of the United Nations and a party to the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the
Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, the Philippine government adheres to the doctrine of immunity granted
to the United Nations and its specialized agencies. Both treaties have the force and effect of law. 142
The same doctrine was earlier applied in Jusmag Philippines v. NLRC,143 a case involving illegal
dismissal of a Filipino employee of the Joint United States Military Assistance Group to the Republic of the
Philippines (JUSMAG-Philippines) . In upholding the Labor Arbiters dismissal of the case, the High Court
enunciated that since the employment contract was entered into by JUSMAG in the discharge of its governmental
functions, JUSMAG being an entity performing a governmental function on behalf of the United States Government
pursuant to the Military Assistance Agreement dated March 21, 1947, the illegal dismissal suit is one against the
latter, albeit it was not impleaded in the complaint. Considering that the United States has not waived or consented
to the suit, the complaint against JUSMAG cannot prosper. JUSMAG is beyond the jurisdiction of Philippine courts.
In Larkins v. NLRC,144 involving the dismissal of workers who worked in the maintenance of dormitories
at the former US Clark Air Base in Pampanga, the Supreme Court, in dismissing the case, invoked, among other
reasons, lack of jurisdiction in the light of the fact that their suit was against the United States Government which,
by right of sovereign power, operated and maintained the dormitories at Clark Air Base for members of the U.S. Air
Force.
3. EXCEPTION TO THE RULE.
There is an exception to the immunity rule as exemplified by the case of United States v. Hon. Rodrigo,145
where it was held that when the function of the foreign entity otherwise immune from suit partakes of the nature of a
proprietary activity, such as the restaurant services offered at John Hay Air Station undertaken by the United States
Government as a commercial activity for profit and not in its governmental capacity, the case for illegal dismissal
filed by a Filipino cook working therein is well within the jurisdiction of Philippine courts. The reason is that by
entering into the employment contract with the cook in the discharge of its proprietary functions, it impliedly
divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit.
4. ESTOPPEL DOES NOT CONFER JURISDICTION OVER AN IMMUNE ENTITY.
An entity immune from suit cannot be estopped from claiming such diplomatic immunity since estoppel
does not operate to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over a cause of action. 146
XI-F.
DOCTRINE OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS
1. REQUISITES.
This doctrine is an international law principle which has been applied to labor cases. The following are the
requisites for its applicability:
(1) That the Philippine court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort;
(2) That the Philippine court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and
(3) That the Philippine court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision. 147
2. APPLICATION TO LABOR CASES.
a. Case where doctrine was rejected.
Petitioners invocation of this principle was rejected in Pacific Consultants International Asia, Inc. v.
Schonfeld. 148 Petitioners insistence was based on the fact that respondent is a Canadian citizen and was a
repatriate. In so rejecting petitioners contention, the Supreme Court cited the following reasons that do not warrant
the application of the said principle: (1) the Labor Code does not include forum non conveniens as a ground for the
dismissal of the complaint;149 and(2) the propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle requires a factual
determination; hence, it is properly considered as a defense.
b. Case where doctrine was applied.
This doctrine was applied in the case of The Manila Hotel Corp. and Manila Hotel International Limited v.
NLRC,150 where private respondent Marcelo Santos was an overseas worker employed as a printer in a printing
press in the Sultanate of Oman when he was directly hired by the Palace Hotel, Beijing, Peoples Republic of China
to work in its print shop. This hotel was being managed by the Manila Hotel International Ltd. , a foreign entity
registered under the laws of Hong Kong. Later, he was terminated due to retrenchment occasioned by business
reverses brought about by the political upheaval in China (referring to the Tiananmen Square incident) which
severely affected the hotels operations.
In holding that the NLRC was a seriously inconvenient forum, the Supreme Court noted that the main
aspects of the case transpired in two foreign jurisdictions and the case involves purely foreign elements. The only
link that the Philippines has with the case is that the private respondent employee (Marcelo Santos) is a Filipino
citizen. The Palace Hotel and MHICL are foreign corporations. Consequently, not all cases involving Filipino
citizens can be tried here. Respondent employee was hired directly by the Beijing Palace Hotel, a foreign employer,
through correspondence sent to him while he was working at the Sultanate of Oman. He was hired without the
intervention of the POEA or any authorized recruitment agency of the government. Hence, the NLRC is an
inconvenient forum given that all the incidents of the case - from the time of recruitment, to employment to
dismissal - occurred outside the Philippines. The inconvenience is compounded by the fact that the proper
defendants, the Palace Hotel and MHICL, are not nationals of the Philippines. Neither are they doing business in
the Philippines. Likewise, the main witnesses, Mr. Shmidt (General Manager of the Palace Hotel) and Mr. Henk
(Palace Hotels Manager) are non-residents of the Philippines.
Neither can an intelligent decision be made as to the law governing the employment contract as such was
perfected in foreign soil. This calls to fore the application of the principle of lex loci contractus (the law of the place
where the contract was made) . It must be noted that the employment contract was not perfected in the Philippines.
Private respondent employee signified his acceptance thereof by writing a letter while he was in the Sultanate of
Oman. This letter was sent to the Palace Hotel in the Peoples Republic of China. Neither can the NLRC determine
the facts surrounding the alleged illegal dismissal as all acts complained of took place in Beijing, Peoples Republic
of China. The NLRC was not in a position to determine whether the Tiananmen Square incident truly adversely
affected the operations of the Palace Hotel as to justify respondent employees retrenchment.
Even assuming that a proper decision could be reached by the NLRC, such would not have any binding
effect against the employer, the Palace Hotel, which is a corporation incorporated under the laws of China and was
not even served with summons. Jurisdiction over its person was not acquired. This is not to say that Philippine
courts and agencies have no power to solve controversies involving foreign employers. Neither could it be said that
the Supreme Court does not have power over an employment contract executed in a foreign country. If the
respondent employee were an overseas contract worker, a Philippine forum, specifically the POEA, not the
NLRC, would protect him. He is not an overseas contract worker, a fact which he admits with conviction. 151
XI-G.
QUASI-DELICT OR TORT CASES
1. LABOR ARBITERS HAVE NO JURISDICTION OVER QUASI-DELICT OR TORT CASES.
Damages arising from quasi-delict or tort are often confused with damages that may be claimed under
labor laws and labor agreements. Consequently, quasi-delict or tort damages are asserted, though erroneously, in
labor cases filed with the Labor Arbiters. As earlier emphasized, however, Labor Arbiters and the NLRC have no
power or authority to grant reliefs in claims that do not arise from employer-employee relationship such as those
emanating from quasi-delict or tort cases per Article 2176 of the Civil Code that have no reasonable causal
connection to any of the claims provided in the Labor Code, other labor statutes, or collective bargaining
agreements.
2. THE TOLOSA CASE.
The best example to cite on this point is the case of Evelyn Tolosa v. NLRC.152 Because of the death of her
husband, Captain Virgilio Tolosa, a complaint for damages was lodged with the Labor Arbiter by the surviving wife
but the Supreme Court ruled that the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over the case because it was established that
the same was in the nature of an action based on quasi-delict or tort, it being evident that the issue presented therein
involved the alleged gross negligence of Captain Tolosas shipmates, Pedro Garate and Mario Asis, with whom
Captain Tolosa had no employer-employee relationship. Hence, this case does not involve the adjudication of a
labor dispute, but the recovery of damages based on quasi-delict. Notably, the jurisdiction of labor tribunals is
limited to disputes arising from employer-employee relations.
XI-H.
CRIMINAL AND CIVIL ACTIONS ARISING FROM VIOLATIONS
OF THE PENAL PROVISIONS OF THE LABOR CODE
1. REGULAR COURTS HAVE JURISDICTION.
The Labor Code has expressly conferred jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases arising from violations of
the Labor Code with the regular courts. The relevant provisions are as follows:
1. Article 241 which provides that criminal and civil liabilities arising from violations of rights and
conditions of union membership provided for thereunder shall continue to be under the jurisdiction of
ordinary courts.
2. Article 247 - while the jurisdiction to hear and decide the administrative and civil aspects of unfair labor
practices is lodged with the Labor Arbiters, the jurisdiction over the criminal aspect thereof is vested in
the regular courts.
3. Article 272 - Although Article 272153 does not mention expressly that the jurisdiction over the criminal
violation of its provision is vested in the regular court, it, however, mentions the word court in
paragraph [a] thereof, obviously referring to the regular court. Further, in the Rules to Implement the
Labor Code, as amended,154 it is provided that the regular courts shall have jurisdiction over any
criminal action under Article 272 of the Labor Code, as amended, but subject to the required clearance
from the DOLE on cases arising out of or related to a labor dispute pursuant to the Ministry of Justice 155
Circular No. 15, Series of 1982, and Circular No. 9, Series of 1986.156
4. Article 288 - It is provided therein that any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, any
criminal offense punished in the Labor Code shall be under the concurrent jurisdiction of the Municipal
or City Courts and the Courts of First Instance (now RTC). 157

XI-I.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LABOR CONTRACT STIPULATIONS
1. THE HALAGUEA DOCTRINE.
In Halaguea v. Philippine Airlines, Inc.,158 it was pronounced that it is not the Labor Arbiter but the
regular court which has jurisdiction to rule on the constitutionality of labor contracts such as a CBA. Petitioners
were female flight attendants of respondent Philippine Airlines (PAL) and are members of the Flight Attendants and
Stewards Association of the Philippines (FASAP) , the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the flight
attendants, flight stewards and pursers of respondent. The July 11, 2001 CBA between PAL and FASAP provides
that the compulsory retirement for female flight attendants is fifty-five (55) and sixty (60) for their male counterpart.
Claiming that said CBA provision is discriminatory against them, petitioners filed against respondent a
Special Civil Action for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City.
In ruling that the RTC has jurisdiction, the Supreme Court cited the following reasons:
(1) The case is an ordinary civil action, hence, beyond the jurisdiction of labor tribunals.
(2) The said issue cannot be resolved solely by applying the Labor Code. Rather, it requires the
application of the Constitution, labor statutes, law on contracts and the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) . The power to apply and interpret the
constitution and CEDAW is within the jurisdiction of trial courts, a court of general jurisdiction.
(3) Not every controversy or money claim by an employee against the employer or vice-versa is within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. Actions between employees and employer where the
employer-employee relationship is merely incidental and the cause of action proceeds from a different
source of obligation are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular courts. Here, the employer-
employee relationship between the parties is merely incidental and the cause of action ultimately arose
from different sources of obligation, i.e. , the Constitution and CEDAW.

2.
REINSTATEMENT PENDING APPEAL

1. PIONEER TEXTURIZING DOCTRINE: REINSTATEMENT ASPECT OF LABOR ARBITERS


DECISION, IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY EVEN PENDING APPEAL; NO WRIT OF EXECUTION
REQUIRED.
According to the Pioneer Texturizing doctrine,159 an order of reinstatement issued by the Labor Arbiter
under Article 223160 of the Labor Code is self-executory or immediately executory even pending appeal. 161 This
means that the perfection of an appeal shall stay the execution of the decision of the Labor Arbiter except execution
of the reinstatement pending appeal.162
As a consequence of Pioneer Texturizing, the rulings in earlier cases163 that the reinstatement aspect of the
Labor Arbiters decision needs a writ of execution as it is not self-executory, are deemed abandoned.164
2. REINSTATEMENT PENDING APPEAL, APPLICABLE ONLY TO THE ORDER ISSUED BY THE
LABOR ARBITER; WRIT OF EXECUTION REQUIRED WHEN REINSTATEMENT IS ORDERED BY
NLRC ON APPEAL, OR SUBSEQUENTLY BY THE COURT OF APPEALS OR SUPREME COURT,
AS THE CASE MAY BE.
By way of distinction, the rule on reinstatement pending appeal applies only to the order of reinstatement
issued by the Labor Arbiter and to no other. This means that if the reinstatement order is issued by the NLRC on
appeal, or by the Court of Appeals165 or by the Supreme Court,166 there is a need to secure a writ of execution from
the Labor Arbiter of origin to enforce the reinstatement of the employee whose dismissal is declared illegal. 167
3. TWO (2) OPTIONS OF EMPLOYER.
To implement the reinstatement aspect of a Labor Arbiters decision, there are only two (2) options
available to the employer, to wit:
1. Actual reinstatement. - The employee should be reinstated to his position which he occupies prior to his
illegal dismissal under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, if
no longer available, to a substantially-equivalent position; or
2. Payroll reinstatement. The employee should be reinstated in the payroll of the company without
requiring him to report back to his work.168
4. DUTY OF EMPLOYER TO NOTIFY EMPLOYEE ORDERED REINSTATED.
It is required169 that in case the decision of the Labor Arbiter includes an order of reinstatement, it should
contain:
(a) A statement that the reinstatement aspect is immediately executory; and
(b) A directive for the employer to submit a report of compliance within ten (10) calendar days from
receipt of the said decision.170
Disobedience of this directive clearly denotes a refusal to reinstate. The employee need not file a motion
for the issuance of the writ of execution since the Labor Arbiter is mandated thereafterto motu proprio issue the
writ. With the new rules in place, there is hardly any difficulty in determining the employers intransigence in
immediately complying with the order.171
5. LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER FOR DISOBEYING LABOR ARBITERS REINSTATEMENT ORDER.
Under any of the two (2) circumstances described above, the Labor Arbiter shall immediately issue a writ
of execution, even pending appeal, directing the employer to immediately reinstate the dismissed employee either
physically or in the payroll.172
As a consequence of such disobedience, the employer has the following liabilities, 173 to wit:
1. He shall be liable to pay the accrued salaries of the reinstated employee as a consequence of such non-
reinstatement in the amount specified in the decision; and
2. He may be cited for contempt, in accordance with the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure,174 for his refusal
to comply with the writ of execution ordering the reinstatement. 175 This remedy, however, is available
only after the Sheriff shall have served the writ of execution upon the employer or any other person
required by law to obey the same.176
On No. 1 above, the employer should pay the accrued salaries in case of disobedience because the
employee should not be left without any remedy in case the employer unreasonably delays or refuses reinstatement.
The unjustified refusal of the employer to reinstate an illegally dismissed employee entitles the employee to the
payment of his salaries.177 The entitlement of the dismissed employee to his salaries occasioned by the unjustified
refusal of the employer to reinstate him becomes effective from the time the employer failed to reinstate him despite
the issuance of a writ of execution.178
On No. 2 above, the remedy available to the employee whose reinstatement ordered by the Labor Arbiter
was not implemented by the employer is to file for contempt against the latter and certainly not the institution of a
separate action in the regular court or with the Labor Arbiter. Such recourse will violate the well-settled principle of
res judicata. It would give rise to multiplicity of actions which the law abhors and exerts every effort to eschew. 179
6. INSTANCES WHEN WRIT OF EXECUTION OF LABOR ARBITERS REINSTATEMENT ORDER STILL REQUIRED.
Under the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure,180 there are two (2) instances when a writ of execution should
still be issued immediately by the Labor Arbiter to implement his order of reinstatement, even pending appeal, viz:
(1) When the employer disobeys the prescribed directive181 to submit a report of compliance within ten (10)
calendar days from receipt of the decision; or
(2) When the employer refuses to reinstate the dismissed employee.
The Labor Arbiter shall motu proprio issue a corresponding writ to satisfy the reinstatement wages as they
accrue until actual reinstatement or reversal of the order of reinstatement.182
7. SOME PRINCIPLES ON REINSTATEMENT PENDING APPEAL.
Employer has no way of staying execution of immediate reinstatement. He cannot post bond to prevent its
execution.183
Reinstatement pending appeal applies to all kinds of illegal dismissal cases, regardless of the grounds
thereof.184
Reinstatement pending appeal does not apply when the dismissal is legal but reinstatement is ordered for
some reasons like equity and compassionate justice.185
The failure of employee ordered reinstated pending appeal to report back to work as directed by the employer
does not give the employer the right to remove him, especially when there is a reasonable explanation for his
failure.186
When former position is already filled up, the employee ordered reinstated pending appeal should be
reinstated to a substantially equivalent position.187
Reinstatement to a position lower in rank is not proper. 188
In case of two successive dismissals, the order of reinstatement pending appeal under Article 223 issued in the
first case shall apply only to the first case and should not affect the second dismissal. According to Sevilla v.
NLRC,189 the Labor Arbiter was correct in denying the third motion for reinstatement filed by the petitioner
because what she should have filed was a new complaint based on the second dismissal. The second dismissal
gave rise to a new cause of action. Inasmuch as no new complaint was filed, the Labor Arbiter could not have
ruled on the legality of the second dismissal.
Reinstatement pending appeal is not affected by the reinstated employees employment elsewhere. 190
Effect of grant of achievement award during reinstatement pending appeal.
In the 2014 case of Garza v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. ,191 it was pronounced that the act of
respondent CCBPI in giving an award of a Certificate of Achievement to petitioner for his exemplary sales
performance during his reinstatement ordered by the Labor Arbiter,192 while respondents appeal with the
NLRC was still pending, constitutes recognition of petitioners abilities and accomplishments. It indicates that
he is a responsible, trustworthy and hardworking employee of CCBPI. It constitutes adequate proof weighing
in his favor.
The issuance of temporary restraining order (TRO) by the Court of Appeals or by the Supreme Court, as
the case may be, merely suspends the implementation and enforcement of the reinstatement order but it does
not have the effect of nullifying the right of the employee to his reinstatement and to be paid his reinstatement
wages.193

3.
REQUIREMENTS TO PERFECT APPEAL TO NLRC
I.
APPEAL IN GENERAL
1. APPEAL, MEANING AND NATURE.
The term appealrefers to the elevation by an aggrieved party to an agency vested with appellate authority
of any decision, resolution or order disposing the principal issues of a case rendered by an agency vested with
original jurisdiction, undertaken by filing a memorandum of appeal. 194
2. SOME PRINCIPLES ON APPEAL.
Appeals under Article 223 apply only to appeals from the Labor Arbiters decisions, awards or orders to the
Commission (NLRC) .
There is no appeal from the decisions, orders or awards of the NLRC. Clearly, therefore, Article 223 of the
Labor Code is not the proper basis for elevating the case to the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme Court. 195
The proper remedy from the decisions, awards or orders of the NLRC to the Court of Appeals is a Rule 65
petition for certiorari and from the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court, a Rule 45 petition for review on
certiorari.
Appeal from the NLRC to the DOLE Secretary and to the President had long been abolished. 196
Appeal is not a constitutional right but a mere statutory privilege. Hence, parties who seek to avail of it must
comply with the statutes or rules allowing it.197
A motion for reconsideration is unavailing as a remedy against a decision of the Labor Arbiter. The Labor
Arbiter should treat the said motion as an appeal to the NLRC.198
A Petition for Relief should be treated as appeal.199
Affirmative relief is not available to a party who failed to appeal. A party who does not appeal from a
decision of a court cannot obtain affirmative relief other than the ones granted in the appealed decision. 200
3. GROUNDS FOR APPEAL TO THE COMMISSION (NLRC) .
The appeal to the NLRC may be entertained only on any of the following grounds:
a. If there is a prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion on the part of the Labor Arbiter;
b. If the decision, order or award was secured through fraud or coercion, including graft and corruption;
c. If made purely on questions of law; and/or
d. If serious errors in the findings of fact are raised which, if not corrected, would cause grave or
irreparable damage or injury to the appellant.201
NLRC has certiorari power.
The first ground above regarding prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion on the part of the Labor
Arbiter is actually an exercise of certiorari power by the NLRC. The case of Triad Security & Allied Services, Inc.
v. Ortega, 202 expressly recognized this certiorari power of the NLRC. 203 Clearly, according to the 2012 case of
Auza, Jr. v. MOL Philippines, Inc.,204 the NLRC is possessed of the power to rectify any abuse of discretion
committed by the Labor Arbiter.
II.
PERFECTION OF APPEAL
1. EFFECT OF PERFECTION OF APPEAL ON EXECUTION.
To reiterate, the perfection of an appeal shall stay the execution of the decision of the Labor Arbiter except
execution for reinstatement pending appeal.205
2. PERFECTION OF APPEAL, MANDATORY AND JURISDICTIONAL.
The perfection of appeal within the period and in the manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional and non-
compliance with the legal requirements is fatal and has the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory,
hence, unappealable.206
3. REQUISITES.
The requisites for perfection of appeal to the NLRC are as follows:
(1) Observance of the reglementary period;
(2) Payment of appeal and legal research fee;
(3) Filing of a Memorandum of Appeal;
(4) Proof of service to the other party; and
(5) Posting of cash, property or surety bond, in case of monetary awards.
The foregoing are discussed below.
III.
REGLEMENTARY PERIOD
1. TWO (2) KINDS OF REGLEMENTARY PERIOD.
The reglementary period depends on where the appeal comes from, viz:
1. Ten (10) calendar days in the case of appeals from decisions of the Labor Arbiters under Article 223
of the Labor Code; and
2. Five (5) calendar days in the case of appeals from decisions of the DOLE Regional Director under
Article 129 of the Labor Code.207
Calendar days and not working days.
The shortened period of ten (10) days fixed by Article 223 contemplates calendar days and not working
days.208 The same holds true in the case of the 5-day reglementary period under Article 129 of the Labor Code.
Consequently, Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays are included in reckoning and computing the reglementary
period. 209
2. EXCEPTIONS TO THE 10-CALENDAR DAY OR 5-CALENDAR DAY REGLEMENTARY PERIOD
RULE.
Certain procedural lapses may be disregarded where there is an acceptable reason to excuse tardiness in the
taking of the appeal.210 It is always within the power of the court to suspend its own rules or to except a particular
case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require it. 211 Thus, procedural rules may be waived,
dispensed with or relaxed in the interest of substantial justice. The Court may deign to veer away from the general
rule if, on its face, the appeal appears to be absolutely meritorious. 212
The following are the specific instances where the rules on the reckoning of the reglementary period have
not been strictly observed:
1) 10 day (or 5 day) falling on a Saturday,213 Sunday or holiday,214 in which case, the appeal may be filed
th th

in the next working day.


2) Reliance on erroneous notice of decision215 as when the notice expressly states working days and not
calendar days.
3) Appeal from decisions of Labor Arbiters in direct contempt cases five (5) calendar days.216
4) Filing of petition for extraordinary remedies from orders or resolutions of Labor Arbiters or on third
party claims ten (10) calendar days.217
5) When NLRC exercises its power tocorrect, amend, or waive any error, defect or irregularity whether
in substance or formin the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, as provided under Article 218(c) of the
Labor Code,218 in which case, the late filing of the appeal is excused.
6) When technical rules are disregarded under Article 221.219
7) When there are some compelling reasons that justify the allowance of the appeal despite its late filing
such as when it is granted in the interest of substantial justice. 220
3. SOME PRINCIPLES ON REGLEMENTARY PERIOD.
The reglementary period is mandatory and not a mere technicality.221
The failure to appeal within the reglementary period renders the judgment appealed from final and
executory by operation of law.222 Consequently, the prevailing party is entitled, as a matter of right, to a writ of
execution and the issuance thereof becomes a ministerial duty which may be compelled through the remedy of
mandamus.223
The date of receipt of decisions, resolutions or orders by the parties is of no moment. For purposes of appeal,
the reglementary period shall be counted from receipt of such decisions, resolutions, or orders by the counsel
or representative of record. 224
Miscomputation of the reglementary period will not forestall the finality of the judgment. It is in the interest of
everyone that the date when judgments become final and executory should remain fixed and ascertainable. 225
Date of mailing by registered mail of the appeal memorandum is the date of its filing.226
Motion for extension of time to perfect an appeal is not allowed.227 This kind of motion is a prohibited
pleading.228
Motion for extension of time to file the memorandum of appeal is not allowed.229
Motion for extension of time to file appeal bond is not allowed.230
IV.
APPEAL FEE AND LEGAL RESEARCH FEE
1. PAYMENT OF APPEAL FEE AND LEGAL RESEARCH FEE, MANDATORY AND
JURISDICTIONAL.
The payment by the appellant of the prevailing appeal fee and legal research fee is both mandatory and
jurisdictional.231 An appeal is perfected only when there is proof of payment of the appeal fee. 232 It is by no means a
mere technicality.233 If not paid, the running of the reglementary period for perfecting an appeal will not be tolled.234
2. EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE ON PAYMENT OF APPELLATE COURT DOCKET FEES.
The following are the recognized exceptions to the strict observance of the rule on appeal fee: (1) most
persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to
comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a
reasonable time from the time of the default; (4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits
of the case; (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of
the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party will
not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without the appellant's fault;
(10) peculiar, legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and
fair play; (12) importance of the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge, guided by all
the attendant circumstances.
Thus, there should be an effort, on the part of the party invoking liberality, to advance a reasonable or
meritorious explanation for his failure to comply with the rules. 235 Consequently, in instances where the appeal fee
was paid belatedly, it was held that the broader interest of justice and the desired objective of deciding the case on
the merits demand that the appeal be given due course.236
V.
MEMORANDUM OF APPEAL
1. REQUISITES.
The requisites for a valid Memorandum of Appeal are as follows:
1. The Memorandum of Appeal should be verified by the appellant himself in accordance with the Rules of
Court, as amended;237
2. It should be presented in three (3) legibly typewritten or printed copies;
3. It shall state the grounds relied upon and the arguments in support thereof, including the relief prayed
for;
4. It shall contain a statement of the date the appellant received the appealed decision, award or order; and
5. It shall be accompanied by:
(i) proof of payment of the required appeal fee and legal research fee;
(ii) posting of a cash or surety bond (in case of monetary awards) ; and
(iii) proof of service upon the other party.238
2. REQUIREMENTS NOT JURISDICTIONAL.
The aforesaid requirements that should be complied with in a Memorandum of Appeal are merely a
rundown of the contents of the required appeal memorandum to be submitted by the appellant. They are not
jurisdictional requirements.239 But it must be emphasized that per Navarro v. NLRC,240 the perfection of an appeal
includes the filing, within the prescribed period, of the Memorandum of Appeal containing, among others, the
assignment of error/s, arguments in support thereof, the relief sought and, in appropriate cases, posting of the appeal
bond.
3. SOME PRINCIPLES ON MEMORANDUM OF APPEAL.
Mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisites aforestated shall not stop the running of the
period for perfecting an appeal.241
Memorandum of appeal is not similar to motion for reconsideration. 242
Lack of verification in a memorandum of appeal is not a fatal defect. It may easily be corrected by requiring an
oath.243
Supplemental appeal need not be verified.244 Neither the laws nor the rules require the verification of the
supplemental appeal.245 Furthermore, verification is a formal, not a jurisdictional, requirement. It is mainly
intended as an assurance that the matters alleged in the pleading are true and correct and not of mere
speculation.246
An appeal will be dismissed if signed only by an unauthorized representative.247
Only complainants who signed the memorandum of appeal are deemed to have appealed the Labor Arbiters
decision. The prevailing doctrine in labor cases is that a party who has not appealed cannot obtain from the
appellate court any affirmative relief other than those granted, if any, in the decision of the lower tribunal. 248
Certificate of non-forum shopping is no longer provided in the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure. It is only
required in the initiatory complaint or petition filed with the Labor Arbiter. 249
VI.
PROOF OF SERVICE TO ADVERSE PARTY
1. FAILURE TO SERVE COPY TO ADVERSE PARTY, NOT FATAL.
While it is required that in all cases, the appellant shall furnish a copy of the Memorandum of Appeal to
the other party (appellee) ,250 non-compliance therewith, however, will not be an obstacle to the perfection of the
appeal; nor will it amount to a jurisdictional defect on the NLRCs taking cognizance thereof.251
It has long been settled that mere failure to serve a copy of a Memorandum of Appeal upon the opposing
party does not bar the NLRC from entertaining an appeal. 252 It may even be dispensed with since in appeals in labor
cases, non-service of a copy of appeal memorandum to the adverse party is not a jurisdictional defect which calls for
the dismissal of the appeal.253
VII.
POSTING OF BOND
1. WHEN POSTING OF BOND REQUIRED.
Only in case the decision of the Labor Arbiter or the DOLE Regional Director (under Article 129 of the
Labor Code) involves a monetary award , that an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting
of a bond, which shall either be in the form of (1) cash deposit, (2) surety bond or (3) property bond,254 equivalent
in amount to the monetary award, exclusive of damages and attorneys fees.255 In other words, only monetary
awards (such as unpaid wages, backwages, separation pay, 13 month pay, etc. ) are required to be covered by the
th

bond. Moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees are excluded.
2. POSTING OF BOND, MANDATORY AND JURISDICTIONAL.
The provision of Article 223 requiring the posting of a bond is self-executory and does not need any rule to
implement it. The reason for this rule is that the filing of a supersedeas bond for the perfection of an appeal is both
mandatory and jurisdictional.256
3. SOME PRINCIPLES ON POSTING OF BOND.
The cash or surety bond required for the perfection of appeal should be posted within the reglementary
period.257 If a party failed to perfect his appeal by the non-payment of the appeal bond within the 10-calendar
day period provided by law, the decision of the Labor Arbiter becomes final and executory upon the expiration
of the said period.258
In case the employer failed to post a bond to perfect its appeal, the remedy of the employee is to file a motion
to dismiss the appeal and not a petition for mandamus for the issuance of a writ of execution.259
Surety bond must be issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission (NLRC) or
the Supreme Court.260
The bond shall be valid and effective from the date of deposit or posting, until the case is finally decided,
resolved or terminated, or the award satisfied.261
Posting of a bank guarantee or bank certification is not sufficient compliance with the bond
requirement. It is not equivalent to nor can be considered compliance with the cash, surety or property bond. 262
Cooperatives are not exempted from posting bond. 263
Government is exempt from posting of bond; government-owned and/or controlled corporations, however,
are not exempt therefrom.264
Bond is not required for the NLRC to entertain a motion for reconsideration. 265 An appeal bond is
required only for the perfection of an appeal of a Labor Arbiters decision involving a monetary award. 266
Bond is not required to file a Rule 65 petition for certiorari.267
4. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR NON-POSTING OF BOND.
No monetary award, no bond required. The rule is clear that when the judgment of the Labor Arbiter does
not involve any monetary award, no appeal bond is necessary. 268
There is no duty to post a bond if the monetary award is not specified in the decisions. The Labor
Arbiters decision or order should state the amount awarded. If the amount of the monetary award is not
contained or fixed in the judgment, the appeal bond is not required to be posted.269
In case of conflict between the body and the fallo of the decision, the latter should prevail. 270

5. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR ALLOWANCE OF APPEAL DESPITE DELAY IN POSTING OF BOND.


The rules on posting of bond have been liberally construed and relaxed considering the substantial merits of the
case and the existence of exceptional circumstances justifying the same, such as: 271
(1) Fundamental consideration of substantial justice;
(2) Prevention of miscarriage of justice or of unjust enrichment; and
(3) Existence of special circumstances in the case combined with its legal merits as well as the amount and
the issue involved.272
Relevant cases.
The 2011 case of Semblante and Pilar v. CA, Gallera de Mandaue, 273 where the respondents failure to
post the required appeal bond within the 10-calendar day reglementary period was excused because the High Court
found it compelling to rule on the issue of whether the petitioners, who worked as masiador and sentenciador in the
cockpit of respondents, were employees of the latter. It thus declared that they were not employees but independent
contractors since their relationship with respondents failed to pass muster the four-fold test of employment.
The 2010 case of Intertranz Container Lines, Inc. v. Bautista,274 where relaxation of the rule was made
because it is clear from the records that the petitioners never intended to evade the posting of an appeal
bond. They exerted earnest efforts to abide by the law and the rules on appeal with a notice of appeal, appeal
memorandum, and an appeal bond for P531,000.00. They also moved to reduce the appeal bond. The petitioners
might or might not have been aware that the accreditation of the bonding company expired on July 31, 2005 but
when the bond was posted on July 11, 2005, the bonding companys accreditation and the bond it issued were still
valid. Although the petitioners failed to file a replacement bond within ten (10) days from receipt of the NLRC
order requiring them to do so, again, it cannot be said that they intended to ignore the order.
In Your Bus Line v. NLRC,275 where the Labor Arbiters decision failed to state the exact total amount
due which would be the basis of the computation of the bond, the failure of the petitioner to post the bond was
excused because it was misled by the notice of the decision which did not mention that a bond must be filed. The
lawyer for petitioner relied on such notice and considering this circumstance as an excusable mistake, the Supreme
Court allowed petitioner to file the bond and appeal from the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
In Erectors, Inc. v. NLRC,276 where the Labor Arbiter erroneously included moral and exemplary
damages in the computation of the appeal bond.
VII-A.
RULE ON REDUCTION OF APPEAL BOND
1. THE AMOUNT OF APPEAL BOND MAY BE REDUCED.
The general rule is that the appeal bond that should be posted should be equivalent to the monetary
award of the Labor Arbiter.277 Its reduction is neither provided for in the Labor Code nor in its implementing rules.
In practice, however, the NLRC has allowed the reduction of the bond upon showing of meritorious grounds. And
the validity of this practice has been given judicial imprimatur in the case of Star Angel Handicraft v. NLRC. 278
2. REQUISITES.
Under the latest 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, a motion to reduce bond may be allowed provided the
following conditions are complied with:
(1) The motion should be filed within the reglementary period;
(2) The motion to reduce bond should be based on meritorious grounds; and
(3) The motion should be accompanied by a partial bond, the amount of which should be reasonable in
relation to the monetary awards.279
a. Guidelines to determine when case is meritorious.
The 2013 case of Maynilad Water Supervisors Association v. Maynilad Water Services, Inc. , 280
enunciates the following guidelines to determine existence of meritorious cases which include instances in which:
(1) There was substantial compliance with the Rules;281
(2) Surrounding facts and circumstances constitute meritorious grounds to reduce the bond;
(3) A liberal interpretation of the requirement of an appeal bond would serve the desired objective of
resolving controversies on the merits; or
(4) The appellants, at the very least, exhibited their willingness and/or good faith by posting a partial bond
during the reglementary period.282
3. SOME PRINCIPLES ON REDUCTION OF BOND.
Bond may be reduced when decision failed to specify the exact amount of monetary award from which the
amount of the appeal bond is to be based.283
Conversely, the reduction of the bond will not be warranted not only when no meritorious ground is shown to
justify the same but when the appellant absolutely failed to comply with the requirement of posting a bond,
even if partial; or when circumstances show the employers unwillingness to ensure the satisfaction of its
workers valid claims.284
Monetary award running into millions is not justification to reduce bond. 285
Financial difficulties or financial incapacity is not sufficient grounds to reduce bond. What appellant has
to pay is a moderate and reasonable sum for the premium for such bond. 286
The full amount of the monetary award should still be posted within the reglementary period even if the
appellant has filed a motion to reduce bond.287
Alternative remedy is to pay partial appeal bond while motion to reduce bond is pending with the NLRC.
Examples:

(1) Rosewood Processing, Inc. v. NLRC. 288 - The petitioner was declared to have substantially complied
with the rules by posting a partial surety bond of P50,000.00 while its motion to reduce the appeal bond in
the amount of P789,154.39 was pending before the NLRC.

(2) Following Rosewood, the filing by petitioners of a motion to reduce appeal bond to P100,000, enclosing a
bond in that amount, from the total monetary award of P3,132,335.57 was given imprimatur in the 2010
case of Pasig Cylinder Mfg. , Corp. v. Rollo. 289

The partial bond must be posted during the reglementary period. The late filing of the bond divests the NLRC
of its jurisdiction to entertain the appeal since the decision of the Labor Arbiter has already become final and
executory with the lapse of the reglementary period.290
Partial bond posted must not be inadequate. In Sapitan v. JB Line Bicol Express, Inc. ,291 the partial bond of
P200,000 was found to be inadequate for the liability in the sum of P9,097,624.00.

------------oOo------------

Endnotes:

1 Article 218(d) , as amended by R.A. No. 6715, March 21, 1989; Section 1, Rule IX, 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure;
Section 1, Rule XXIII, Book V, Rules to Implement the Labor Code, as amended by Department Order No. 40-03,
Series of 2003, [Feb. 17, 2003].

2 Article 219 of the Labor Code.

3 Under the 1990 New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, Labor Arbiters are expressly granted the power to issue
injunction in ordinary cases. (See Section 1, Rule XI thereof) .

4 The said provision in the 1990 NLRC Rules is no longer found in its 2002, 2005 and 2011 versions. It is opined that
this deletion is correct since Article 218 of the Labor Code grants injunctive power only to the Commission which
obviously refers to the NLRCs various divisions and not to the Labor Arbiters. The reception of evidence in
injunction proceedings may, however, be delegated to the Labor Arbiters who shall conduct such hearings in such
places as he/she may determine to be accessible to the parties and their witnesses, and shall thereafter submit
his/her report and recommendation to the Commission within fifteen (15) days from such delegation. (See Article
218(e) , Labor Code and Section 4, Rule X, 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure) .

5 As confirmed in Lahm III v. Mayor, A.C. No. 7430, Feb. 15, 2012.
6 Under Article 218(e) , Labor Code.

7 See paragraph [c], Article 217, Labor Code; Section 1, Rule V, 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure.

8 As amended by R.A. No. 6715 [March 21, 1989].

9 As amended by R.A. No. 6727 [June 9, 1989], involving wage distortion cases in unorganized establishments.

10 As amended by R.A. No. 7730 [June 2, 1994], involving contested cases under the exception clause therein.

11 As incorporated by Section 26, R.A. No. 6715 [March 21, 1989].

12 Otherwise known as The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995.

13 March 8, 2010.

14 The Wage Rationalization Act.

15 The last paragraph of Article 262-A of the Labor Code entitled Procedures provides: Upon motion of any
interested party, the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators or the Labor Arbiter in the region where
the movant resides, in case of the absence or incapacity of the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators, for any reason, may issue a writ of execution requiring either the sheriff of the Commission or regular
courts or any public official whom the parties may designate in the submission agreement to execute the final
decision, order or award.

16 Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042, as amended by R.A. No. 10022.

17 See Section 1, Rule V, 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure.

18 Under Article 248, Ibid.

19 Under Article 249, Ibid.

20 Article 247, Labor Code, as amended by Section 19, Republic Act No. 6715.

21 Article 247, Ibid.

22 Under paragraph [a] (2) of Article 217.

23 Under Articles 261 and 262.

24 Under paragraph [g] of Article 263, he may take cognizance of termination disputes that are included or subsumed
in the case/s over which he has assumed jurisdiction.

25 Id. ; Such certified cases may include or subsume the issue of termination of employment the legality of which the
NLRC may validly decide upon.

26 C. Alcantara & Sons, Inc. v. CA, G.R. Nos. 155109, 155135 & 179220, Sept. 29, 2010.

27 Navarro III v. Damasco, G.R. No. 101875, July 14, 1995.

28 Maneja v. NLRC, G.R. No. 124013, June 5, 1998, 290 SCRA 603.
29 San San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 108001, March 15, 1996.

30 Atlas Farms, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 142244, Nov. 18, 2002.

31 Maneja v. NLRC, supra.

32 Landtex Industries v. CA, G.R. No. 150278, Aug. 9, 2007; San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC, supra

33 Landtex Industries v. CA, supra.

34 Vivero v. CA, G.R. No. 138938, Oct. 24, 2000, 344 SCRA 268, 281.

35 Navarro III v. Damasco, supra.

36 Atlas Farms, Inc. v. NLRC, supra.

37 Maneja v. NLRC, supra; Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 95940, July 24, 1996.

38 G.R. No. 186557, Aug. 25, 2010.

39 G.R. No. 150278, Aug. 9, 2007.

40 G.R. No. 142244, Nov. 18, 2002.

41 G.R. No. 108001, March 15, 1996, 255 SCRA 133.

42 University of the Immaculate Conception v. NLRC and Teodora Axalan, G.R. No. 181146, Jan. 26, 2011.

43 Id.

44 Article 129, Labor Code; Briad Agro Development Corporation v. de la Serna, G.R. No. 82805, Nov. 9, 1989, 179
SCRA 269; Brokenshire Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Minister of Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 74621, Feb. 7,
1990, 182 SCRA 5; Star Security and Detective Agency v. Secretary of Labor, G.R. No. 82607, July 12, 1990, 187
SCRA 358.

45 San Jose v. NLRC, G.R. No. 121227, Aug. 17, 1998.

46 G.R. No. 158620, Oct. 11, 2006.

47 San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC, 161 SCRA 719.

48 Lapanday Agricultural Development Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. 112139, Jan. 31, 2000.

49 Osias Academy v. DOLE, G.R. Nos. 83257-58, Dec. 21, 1990, 192 SCRA 612.

50 Apodaca v. NLRC, G.R. No. 80039, April 18, 1989, 172 SCRA 442.

51 Air Material Wing Savings and Loan Association, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 111870, June 30, 1994.

52 M. Ramirez Industries v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 89894, Jan. 3, 1997, 266 SCRA 111, 128;
Ubay Arrastre and Stevedoring Services, Inc. v. Trajano, G.R. No. 106813, Nov. 25, 1993, 228 SCRA 189.
53 Article 217(a) ,(6) , Labor Code; South Motorists Enterprises v. Tosoc, G.R. No. 87449, Jan. 23, 1990, 181 SCRA
386.

54 G.R. Nos. L-75746-48, Dec. 14, 1987, 156 SCRA 498.

55 Referring to the labor employment and enforcement officers or industrial safety engineers who are tasked to
inspect the establishments under Article 128 of the Labor Code. .

56 Emphasis supplied.

57 G.R. No. 152396, Nov. 20, 2007.

58 G.R. No. 179652, March 6, 2012. This Resolution modified its earlier May 8, 2009 decision found in 587 SCRA
724, 738.

59 Underscoring supplied.

60 The Supreme Court, in the 2007 case of Ex-Bataan Veterans Security Agency, Inc. v. The Secretary of Labor
Laguesma, G.R. No. 152396, Nov. 20, 2007, reiterated the said three (3) elements to divest the Regional Director
or his representatives of jurisdiction under the exception clause cited in the earlier cases of SSK Parts Corporation
v. Camas, G.R. Nos. 85934-36, Jan. 30, 1990, 181 SCRA 675, 678, and Batong Buhay Gold Mines, Inc. v. Sec.
Dela Serna, G.R. No. 86963, Aug. 6, 1999, 370 Phil. 872. See also Bayhaven, Inc. v. Abuan, G.R. No. 160859,
July 30, 2008 and Meteoro v. Creative Creatures, Inc. , G.R. No. 171275, July 13, 2009; Section 1 [b], Rule III of
the Rules on the Disposition of Labor Standards Cases in the Regional Offices [September 16, 1987].

61 G.R. No. 152396, Nov. 20, 2007.

62 G.R. No. 171275, July 13, 2009.

63 G.R. No. 182018, Oct. 10, 2012.

64 G.R. No. L-72644, Dec. 14, 1987, 156 SCRA 435.

65 Dai-ichi Electronics Manufacturing Corp. V. Villarama, Jr. , G.R. No. 112940, Nov. 21, 1994, 238 SCRA 267, 271
[1994]; San Miguel Corporation v. Etcuban, G.R. No. 127639, Dec. 3, 1999; Rodriguez, Jr. v. Aguilar, Sr. , G.R. No.
159482. Aug. 30, 2005.

66 Section 10, Republic Act No. 8042; Section 58, Rules and Regulations Implementing the Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995.

67 No. 22, NCMB Primer on Strike, Picketing and Lockout, 2nd Edition, December 1995.

68 No. 26, Guidelines Governing Labor Relations.

69 In assumed cases.

70 In certified cases. ; See Article 263(g) , Labor Code; See also Section 3[b], Rule VIII, 2011 NLRC Rules of
Procedure.

71 See 2 paragraph of Section 4 of Rule IV thereof.


nd
72 Section 3[b], Rule VIII, 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure. This rule should likewise apply by analogy to assumed
cases.

73 Section 3[c], Rule VIII, 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure.

74 G.R. No. 183335, Dec. 23, 2009; See also Hotel Employees Union-NFL v. Waterfront Insular Hotel Davao, G.R.
Nos. 174040-41, Sept. 22, 2010.

75 Otherwise known as the Wage Rationalization Act.

76 Article 124, Labor Code, as amended by Section 3, Republic Act No. 6727; Section 7, Chapter II, Implementing
Rules of Republic Act No. 6727; Section 1, Rule VII, Rules of Procedure on Minimum Wage Fixing issued by the
National Wages and Productivity Commission on 04 June 1990.

77 Id.

78 Section 6 [c], Rule V, NCMB Manual of Procedures for Conciliation and Preventive Mediation Cases.

79 Emphasis supplied.

80 See Section 1(h) of Rule V thereof.

81 Section 4, Rule XXII, Book V, Rules to Implement the Labor Code, as amended by Department Order No. 40-03,
Series of 2003, [February 17, 2003].

82 Id.

83 Such as (1) the Sheriff of the Commission (NLRC) ; (2) a duly deputized officer; (3) a Special Sheriff; (4) the Sheriff
of the regular courts; or (5) any public official whom the parties may designate in the submission agreement to
execute the final decision, order or award.
84 The last paragraph of Article 262-A of the Labor Code entitled Procedures provides: Upon motion of any
interested party, the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators or the Labor Arbiter in the region where
the movant resides, in case of the absence or incapacity of the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators, for any reason, may issue a writ of execution requiring either the sheriff of the Commission or regular
courts or any public official whom the parties may designate in the submission agreement to execute the final
decision, order or award.

85 Entitled An Act to Institute the Policies of Overseas Employment and Establish a Higher Standard of Protection
and Promotion of the Welfare of Migrant Workers, Their Families and Overseas Filipinos in Distress, and for Other
Purposes. See Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042, Otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos
Act of 1995 (Approved on June 7, 1995) ,

86 See Section 7 of R.A. No. 10022 (Approved on March 8, 2010) .

87 G.R. No. 197309, Oct. 10, 2012.

88 G.R. No. 172642, June 13, 2012.


89 Section 1, Rule I, Part VI, 2002 POEA Rules for Land-Based Overseas Workers; Section 1, Rule II, Part V, 2003
POEA Rules for Seafarers; Section 28, Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 dated Feb. 29, 1996.

90 Ibid. ; Id. ; Id.

91 Zamboanga City Water District v. Buat, G.R. No. 104389, May 27, 1994.

92 Reese, Choice of Law in Torts and Contracts, 16 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 1, 21 [1977].

93 Fricke v. Isbrandtsen Co. , Inc. , 151 F. Supp. 465, 467 [1957].

94 Scoles and Hayes, Conflict of Law, 644-647 [1982]; Asia International Builder Corporation v. Mondejar, G.R. No.
105029-32, Dec. 05, 1994.

95 Omanfil International Manpower Development Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 130339, Dec. 22, 1998, 300 SCRA
455.

96 G.R. No. 61594, Sept. 28, 1990.

97 G.R. No. 124382, Aug. 16, 1999.

98 G.R. No. 124382, Aug. 16, 1999.

99 Blacks Law Dictionary, 5 Ed. , [1979], p. 460.


th

100 Id.

101 Otherwise known as Domestic Workers Act or Batas Kasambahay which was approved by President Benigno
S. Aquino III on January 18, 2013.

102 Section 4 [d], Article I, R.A. No. 10361.

103 Otherwise known as The Cooperative Code of the Philippines.

104 G.R. No. 121948, Oct. 8, 2001.

105 P.D. No. 175 [Law Strengthening the Cooperative Movement] was repealed by express provision of Article 127 of
R.A. No. 6938 [The Cooperative Code of the Philippines] which was then the law in force at the time the complaint
in this case was filed with the DOLE.

106 G.R. No. 164257, July 5, 2010.

107 G.R. No. 128024, May 9, 2000, 331 SCRA 584.

108 See also Domondon v. NLRC. G.R. No. 154376, Sept. 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 559.

109 Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement [PRRM] v. Pulgar, G.R. No. 169227, July 5, 2010.

110 Dai-Chi Electronics Manufacturing Corporation v. Hon. Villarama, G.R. No. 112940. Nov. 21, 1994; Portillo v.
Rudolf Lietz, Inc. , G.R. No. 196539, Oct. 10, 2012.
111 San Miguel Corporation vs. NLRC, 161 SCRA 719 (1988) .

112 Georg Grotjahn GMBH & Co. v. Hon. Isnani and Romana R. Lanchinebre, G.R. No. 109272, Aug. 10, 1994, 235
SCRA 216, 221.

113 Nestl Philippines, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 85197, March 18, 1991, 195 SCRA 340; See also Locsin II v. Mekeni
Food Corporation, G.R. No. 192105, Dec. 09, 2013; Manese v. Jollibee Foods Corporation, G.R. No. 170454, Oct.
11, 2012; Jumuad v. Hi-Flyer Food, Inc. , G.R. No. 187887, Sept. 7, 2011.

114 Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corp. , Ltd. Staff Retirement Plan v. Spouses Broqueza, G.R. No. 178610, Nov.
17, 2010.

115 Ibid.

116 Under Section 5 [5.2. ] of R.A. No. 8799 the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) over
all cases enumerated under P.D. No. 902-A, has been transferred to the courts of general jurisdiction or the
appropriate Regional Trial Court (RTC) .

117 Enunciated in the 2010 case of Matling Industrial and Commercial Corp. v. Ricardo R. Coros, G.R. No. 157802,
Oct. 13, 2010. This case is an appeal via petition for review on certiorari. The petitioners challenge the decision of
the CA which sustained the ruling of the NLRC to the effect that the Labor Arbiter had jurisdiction because the
respondent, its Vice President for Finance and Administration, was not a corporate officer of petitioner Matling.

118 P.D. No, 902-A; Barba v. Liceo de Cagayan University, G.R. No. 193857, Nov. 28, 2012; Gomez v. PNOC
Development and Management Corporation (PDMC) , G.R. No. 174044, Nov. 27, 2009, 606 SCRA 187, 194,

119 See Section 25, Batas Pambansa Blg. 69, otherwise known as the Corporation Code of the Philippines.

120 Purificacion G. Tabang v. NLRC, G.R. No. 121143, Jan. 21, 1997, 266 SCRA 462, 468. For a long time, the ruling
in this case has been the controlling doctrine. It was enunciated therein that (a) corporate officers dismissal is
always a corporate act, or an intra-corporate controversy, and the nature is not altered by the reason or wisdom
with which the Board of Directors may have in taking such action. Also, an intra-corporate controversy is one which
arises between a stockholder and the corporation. There is no distinction, qualification, nor any exemption
whatsoever. The provision is broad and covers all kinds of controversies between stockholders and corporations.
In this case, the petitioners dual positions at the time of her dismissal, that of Medical Director and Hospital
Administrator of private respondent Pamana Golden Care Medical Center in Calamba, Laguna, are expressly
provided under the By-Laws.

121 Nacpil v. Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation, G.R. No. 144767, March 21, 2002. In this case, petitioner was
declared a corporate officer despite the fact that the By-Laws of respondent IBC did not mention his position of
Comptroller and Assistant Manager. The reason cited is that even assuming that he was in fact appointed by the
General Manager, such appointment was subsequently approved by the Board of Directors of respondent IBC.
That the position of Comptroller is not expressly mentioned among the officers of IBC in its By-Laws is of no
moment because the IBCs Board of Directors is empowered under Section 25 of the Corporation Code and under
the corporations by-laws to appoint such other officers as it may deem necessary. Consequently, since petitioners
appointment as comptroller required the approval and formal action of respondent IBCs Board of Directors to
become valid, it is clear therefore that petitioner is a corporate officer whose dismissal is in the nature of an intra-
corporate controversy.

122 The following is the sequence of respondent Coross rising from the ranks: 1966 Bookkeeper; 1968Senior
Accountant; 1969 Chief Accountant; 1972Office Supervisor; 1973Assistant Treasurer; 1978Special Assistant
for Finance; 1980Assistant Comptroller; 1983Finance and Administrative Manager; 1985Asst. Vice President
for Finance and Administration; 1987 to April 17, 2000Vice President for Finance and Administration.

123 See also Prudential Bank and Trust Company v. Reyes, G.R. No. 141093, Feb. 20, 2001, 352 SCRA 316, 327.
This case also involves an employee who rose from the ranks until she reached the position of Assistant Vice-
President at the time of her termination.

124 G.R. No. 201298, Feb. 5, 2014.

125 Petitioner Raul C. Cosare, although a salesman employee of private respondent Dante Arevalo, was named an
incorporator of Arevalos Broadcom, having been assigned 100 shares of stock with par value of P1.00 per share.

126 G.R. No. 193857, Nov. 28, 2012.

127 G.R. No. 171993, Dec. 12, 2011, 662 SCRA 35. Petitioner Marc II Marketing, Inc. (petitioner corporation) , is a
corporation primarily engaged in buying, marketing, selling and distributing in retail or wholesale for export or
import household appliances and products and other items. It took over the business operations of Marc Marketing,
Inc. which was made non-operational following its incorporation and registration with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) . Petitioner Lucila V. Joson (Lucila) is the President and majority stockholder of petitioner
corporation. She was also the former President and majority stockholder of the defunct Marc Marketing, Inc.
Respondent Alfredo M. Joson (Alfredo) , on the other hand, was the General Manager, incorporator, director and
stockholder of petitioner corporation.

128 G.R. No. 168757, Jan. 19, 2011, 640 SCRA 67.

129 On December 15, 2000, the Supreme Court, in A.M. No. 00-8-10-SC, adopted the Interim Rules of Procedure on
Corporate Rehabilitation and directed the transfer from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to the
Regional Trial Courts of all petitions for rehabilitation filed by corporations, partnerships, and associations under
P.D. No. 902-A in accordance with the amendatory provisions of R.A. No. 8799, otherwise known as the
Securities Regulation Code.

130 The Manila Banking Corporation, v. NLRC, G.R. No. 107487, Sept. 29, 1997, 279 SCRA 602.

131 De Castro v. Liberty Broadcasting Network, Inc. , G.R. No. 165153, Aug 25, 2010; Negros Navigation Co. , Inc. v.
CA, G.R. No. 163156, Dec. 10, 2008, 573 SCRA 434, 455.

132 Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Heirs of Zamora, G.R. No. 164267, Nov. 23, 2007, citing Philippine Airlines, Inc. v.
Zamora, supra; Rubberworld [Phils. ], Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 126773, April 14, 1999, 305 SCRA 721, 729.

133 Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 123238, July 11, 2005 [Resolution].

134 Alemars Sibal & Sons, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 114761, Jan. 19, 2000.
135 Lingkod Manggagawa sa Rubberworld, Adidas-Anglo v. Rubberworld [Phils. ], Inc. , G.R. No. 153882, Jan. 29,
2007.

136 See Section 11, in relation to Section 27, Rule 4 of the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation; De
Castro v. Liberty Broadcasting Network, Inc. , G.R. No. 165153, Aug 25, 2010; Rubberworld (Phils. ) Inc. v. NLRC,
G.R. No. 126773, April 14, 1999, 365 Phil. 273.

137 Clarion Printing House, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 148372, June 27, 2005.

138 Section 2, Article II, 1987 Constitution.

139 Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center v. Acosta, G.R. Nos. 97468-70, Sept. 2, 1993, 226 SCRA 49.

140 G.R. No. 113191, Sept. 18, 1996, 262 SCRA 39, 43-44.

141 G.R. Nos. 109095-109107, Feb. 23, 1995.

142 See also World Health Organization v. Aquino, G.R. No. L-35131, Nov. 29, 1972, 48 SCRA 242.

143 G.R. No. 108813, Dec. 15, 1994.

144 G.R. No. 92432, Feb. 23, 1995.

145 G.R. No. 79470, Feb. 26, 1990, 182 SCRA 644, 660.

146 Ebro III v. NLRC, G.R. No. 110187, Sept. 4, 1996, 261 SCRA 399.

147 According to Bank of America, NT&SA, Bank of America International, Ltd. v. CA, G.R. No. 120135, March 31,
2003, 448 Phil. 181, 196, and Communication Materials and Design, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 102223, Aug. 22, 1996,
260 SCRA 673, 695.

148 G.R. No. 166920, Feb. 19, 2007.

149 See PHILSEC Investment Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. 103493, June 19, 1997, 274 SCRA 102.

150 G.R. No. 120077, Oct. 13, 2000.

151 Id.

152 G.R. No. 149578, April 10, 2003.

153 Entitled Penalties.

154 As amended, by Department Order No. 40-03, Series of 2003, and further amended by Department Order No. 40-
G-03, Series of 2010 [March 29, 2010],

155 Now Department of Justice.

156 Section 19 [formerly Section 15], Rule XXII, Book V, Rules to Implement the Labor Code, as amended by
Department Order No. 40-G-03, Series of 2010, [March 19, 2010], previously amended by Department Order No.
40-03, Series of 2003, [Feb. 17, 2003].
157 Now Regional Trial Courts.

158 G.R. No. 172013, Oct. 2, 2009.

159 Pioneer Texturizing Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 118651, Oct. 16, 1997, 280 SCRA 806.

160 Article 223 provides in part: In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated
employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, even pending appeal.
The employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his
dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by
the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement provided herein.

161 3rd paragraph of Article 223 of the Labor Code, as amended by Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715, [March 21, 1989].

162 See Section 3 of Rule XI, 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure.

163 Such as the cases of Maranaw Hotel Resort Corporation (Century Park Sheraton Manila) v. NLRC, G.R. No.
110027, November 16, 1994, 238 SCRA 190, as reiterated in Archilles Manufacturing Corporation v. NLRC, G.R.
No. 107225, June 2, 1995, 244 SCRA 750.

164 International Container Terminal Services, Inc. [ICTSI] v. NLRC, supra.

165 By virtue of Rule 65 certiorari petition.

166 By reason of Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari.

167 Mt. Carmel College v. Resuena, G.R. No. 173076, Oct. 10, 2007; See also Panuncillo v. CAP Philippines, Inc. ,
G.R. No. 161305, Feb. 9, 2007.

168 Article 223, Labor Code; Zamboanga City Water District v. Buat, G.R. No. 104389, May 27, 1994, 232 SCRA 587.

169 See Section 19 [Contents of Decisions] of Rule V [Proceedings Before Labor Arbiters] of the 2011 NLRC Rules of
Procedure. It must be noted that this Section 19 was previously numbered Section 18 of the original version of the
2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure. It was renumbered by NLRC En Banc Resolution No. 11-12, Series of 2012
[November 16, 2012], effective January 11, 2013.

170 2 paragraph, Section 19, Rule V thereof, as renumbered by NLRC En Banc Resolution No. 11-12, Series of 2012
nd

[November 16, 2012], effective January 11, 2013.

171 Garcia and Dumago v. Philippine Airlines, Inc. , G.R. No. 164856, Jan. 20, 2009 [En Banc].

172 See 1 paragraph of Section 12 (formerly Section 9) , Rule XI, 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, as renumbered by
st

NLRC En Banc Resolution No. 11-12, Series of 2012 [November 16, 2012], effective January 11, 2013.

173 Ibid.

174 The contempt proceeding shall be in accordance with Rule IX [Contempt] of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure.
See 3 paragraph of Section 12 (formerly Section 9) , Rule XI, 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, as renumbered by
rd

NLRC En Banc Resolution No. 11-12, Series of 2012 [November 16, 2012], effective January 11, 2013.
175 See also Christian Literature Crusade v. NLRC, G.R. No. 79106, April 10, 1989, 171 SCRA 712; Ocampo v. Hon.
Carale, G.R. No. 110687, Dec. 15, 1993; Industrial and Transport Equipment, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 113592, Jan.
15, 1998.

176 See 3 paragraph of Section 12 (formerly Section 9) , Rule XI, 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, as renumbered by
rd

NLRC En Banc Resolution No. 11-12, Series of 2012 [November 16, 2012], effective January 11, 2013.

177 Pioneer Texturizing Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 118651, Oct. 16, 1997, 280 SCRA 806.

178 Roquero v. Philippine Air Lines, Inc. , G.R. No. 152329, April 22, 2003.

179 MAI Philippines, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 73662, June 18, 1987.

180 See Section 12 [Execution of Reinstatement Pending Appeal], Rule XI [Execution Proceedings] of the 2011 NLRC
Rules of Procedure. It must be noted that this Section 12 was previously numbered Section 9 of the original version
of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure. It was renumbered by NLRC En Banc Resolution No. 11-12, Series of 2012
[November 16, 2012], effective January 11, 2013.

181 This directive is provided under the 2 paragraph of Section 19 (formerly Section 18) of Rule V, 2011 NLRC Rules
nd

of Procedure, as renumbered by NLRC En Banc Resolution No. 11-12, Series of 2012 [November 16, 2012],
effective January 11, 2013.

182 See 2 paragraph of Section 12 (formerly Section 9) , Rule XI of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, as
nd

renumbered by NLRC En Banc Resolution No. 11-12, Series of 2012 [November 16, 2012], effective January 11,
2013.

183 Article 223, Labor Code; Pioneer Texturizing Corporation v. NLRC, supra.

184 C. Alcantara & Sons, Inc. v. CA, G.R. Nos. 155109, 155135 & 179220, Sept. 29, 2010.

185 Lansangan v. Amkor Technology Philippines, Inc. , G.R. No. 177026, Jan. 30, 2009.

186 Buenviaje v. CA, G.R. No. 147806, Nov. 12, 2002; See also Pfizer, Inc. v. Velasco, G.R. No. 177467, March 9,
2011.

187 Medina v. Consolidated Broadcasting System (CBS) DZWX, G.R. Nos. 99054-56, May 28, 1993, 222 SCRA
707.

188 Panuncillo v. CAP Philippines, Inc. , G.R. No. 161305, Feb. 9, 2007.

189 G.R. No. 108878, Sept. 20, 1994.

190 Triad Security & Allied Services, Inc. v. Ortega, G.R. No. 160871, Feb. 6, 2006.

191 G.R. No. 180972, Jan. 20, 2014.

192 Issued by the Labor Arbiter pursuant to Article 223 of the Labor Code.

193 Zamboanga City Water District v. Buat. G.R. No. 104389, May 27, 1994.
194 Section 1 [b], Rule I, Book V, Rules to Implement the Labor Code, as amended by Department Order No. 40-03,
Series of 2003, [Feb. 17, 2003].

195 Tomas Claudio Memorial College, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 152568, Feb. 16, 2004; United Field Sea Watchman and
Checkers Agency v. Requillo, G.R. No. 143527, Dec. 6, 2006.

196 P.D. No. 1367, approved on May 1, 1978, entitled Further Amending Certain Provisions of Book V of P.D. No.
442, Otherwise Known as the Labor Code of the Philippines, As Amended, eliminated appeals to the President,
but gave the President the power to assume jurisdiction over any case which he considers of national interest.
Moreover, P.D. No. 1391, approved on May 29, 1978, entitled Amending Book V of the Labor Code of the
Philippines to Insure Speedy Labor Justice and Further Stabilize Industrial Peace, further eliminated appeals from
the NLRC to the Secretary of Labor and Employment but the President still continues to exercise his power to
assume jurisdiction over any cases which he considers affecting national interest.

197 Philux, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 151854, Sept. 3, 2008.

198 Millennium Erectors Corporation v. Magallanes, G.R. No. 184362, November 15, 2010; Reyes v. Maxims Tea
House, G.R. No. 140853, Feb. 27, 2003; Cayena v. NLRC, G.R. No. 76137, Feb. 18, 1991.

199 New Pacific Timber & Supply Co. , Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 124224, March 17, 2000.

200 Radiowealth Finance Company v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 138739, July 6, 2000, 335 SCRA 288; See alsoCaedo
v. Kampilan Security and Detective Agency, Inc. , G.R. No. 179326, July 31, 2013; Daabay v. Coca-Cola Bottlers
Phils. , Inc. , G.R. No. 199890, Aug. 19, 2013; Universal Staffing Services, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 177576, July
21, 2008; Solgus Corp. v. Hon. CA, G.R. No. 157488, Feb. 6, 2007; Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils. , Inc. v. Daniel, G.R.
No. 156893, June 21, 2005, 460 SCRA 494, 506.

201 Articles 129 and 223, Labor Code; Section 2, Rule VI, 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure.

202 G.R. No. 160871, Feb. 6, 2006.

203 See also Metro Drug Distribution, Inc. v. Metro Drug Corporation Employees Association-FFW, G.R. No. 142666, Sept.
26, 2005.

204 G.R. No. 175481, Nov. 21, 2012.

205 Section 3, Rule XI, 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure.

206 Opinaldo v. Ravina, G.R. No. 196573, Oct. 16, 2013; Bunagan v. Sentinel Watchman & Protective Agency, Inc. ,
G.R. No. 144376, Sept. 13, 2006, 533 Phil. 283, 290-291; Kathy-O Enterprises v. NLRC, G.R. No. 117610, March
2, 1998, 286 SCRA 729.

207 Section 1, Rule VI, Ibid. ; See also Bristol Myers Squibb [Phils. ], Inc. v. Viloria, G.R. No. 148156, Sept. 27, 2004.

208 RJL Martinez Fishing Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. L-63550-51, Jan. 31, 1984.

209 Judy Philippines, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 111934, April 29, 1998, 289 SCRA 755; 352 Phil. 593; SM Agri and
General Machineries v. NLRC, G.R. No. 74806, Jan. 9, 1989.
210 Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 120506, Oct. 28, 1996, 263 SCRA 638; Chong Guan Trading v. NLRC,
G.R. No. 81471, April 26, 1989, 172 SCRA 831.

211 Chronicle Securities Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 157907, Nov. 25, 2004; Equitable PCI Bank v. Rosita Ku,
G.R. No. 142950, 26 March 2001.

212 Tiger Construction and Development Corporation v. Abay, G.R. No. 164141, Feb. 26, 2010; Iligan Cement Corp. v.
ILIASCOR Employees and Workers Union Southern Philippines Federation of Labor (IEWU-SPFL) , G.R. No.
158956, April 24, 2009, 586 SCRA 449, 461; Ruiz v. Delos Santos, G.R. No. 166386, Jan. 27, 2009, 577 SCRA 29,
48/

213 Judy Philippines, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 111934, April 29, 1998, 289 SCRA 755; 352 Phil. 593.

214 Philippine Geothermal, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 106370, Sept. 8, 1994.

215 Firestone Tire and Rubber Company of the Philippines v. Lariosa, G.R. No. L-70479, Feb. 27, 1987.

216 Article 218(d) , as amended by R.A. No. 6715, March 21, 1989; Section 1, Rule IX, 2011 NLRC Rules of
Procedure.

217 Under the current 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, the decision of the Labor Arbiter on a third party claim is not
appealable but may be elevated to the Commission and resolved in accordance with Rule XII [Extraordinary
Remedies] of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure. (Section 11 [d], Rule XI thereof) . Consequently, such elevation
to the Commission may only be initiated by way of filing of a petition for extraordinary remedy not later than ten (10)
calendar days from receipt of the order or resolution of the Labor Arbiter, furnishing a copy thereof to the adverse
party. ( Section 3, Rule XII, Ibid. ) .

218 New Pacific Timber & Supply Co. , Inc. v. NLRC, G. R. No. 124224, March 17, 2000, 328 SCRA 404.

219 New Pacific Timber & Supply Co. , Inc. v. NLRC, supra; City Fair Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 95711, April 21,
1995, 243 SCRA 572.

220 Surima v. NLRC, G.R. No. 121147, June 26, 1998; Valderrama v. NLRC, G.R. No. 98239, April 25, 1996; Ruga v.
NLRC, G.R. Nos. 72654-61, Jan. 22, 1990, 181 SCRA 266.

221 Calipay v. NLRC, G.R. No. 166411, Aug. 3, 2010, citing Moneytrend Lending Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. 165580,
Feb. 20, 2006, 482 SCRA 705, 714-715; Cuevas v. Bais Steel Corporation, supra.

222 Volkschel Labor Union v. NLRC, Ibid. ; See also Chronicle Securities Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 157907, Nov.
25, 2004; United Field Sea Watchman and Checkers Agency v. Requillo, G.R. No. 143527, Dec. 6, 2006; Andaya
v. NLRC, G.R. No. 157371, July 15, 2005.

223 Building Care Corporation/Leopard Security & Investigation Agency v. Myrna Macaraeg, G.R. No. 198357, Dec.
10, 2012; Henry Clyde Abbott v. NLRC, G.R. No. L-65173, Oct. 27, 1986, 145 SCRA 206.

224 Section 4 [b], Rule III, 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure; Flexo Mfg. Corp. v. NLRC, G.R. No. L-55971, Feb. 28,
1985, 135 SCRA 145; Lynx Industries Contractor, Inc. v. Tala, G.R. No. 164333, Aug. 24, 2007.
225 Volkschel Labor Union v. NLRC, G. R. No. L-39686, June 25, 1980, 98 SCRA 314.

226 Associated Anglo-American Tobacco Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 125602, April 29, 1999, 306 SCRA 380.

227 Section 1, Rule VI, 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure.

228 Bristol Myers Squibb [Phils. ], Inc. v. Viloria, G.R. No. 148156, Sept. 27, 2004.

229 Bunagan v. Sentinel Watchman & Protective Agency, Inc. , G.R. No. 144376, Sept. 13, 2006.

230 Lamzon v. NLRC, G.R. No. 113600, May 28, 1999, 307 SCRA 665; 367 Phil. 169, 177.

231 Saint Louis University, Inc. v. Cobarrubias, G.R. No. 187104, Aug. 3, 2010.

232 Workers of Antique Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 120062, June 8, 2000.

233 Acda v. Minister of Labor, G.R. No. L-51607, Dec. 15, 1982, 119 SCRA 326.

234 Luna v. NLRC, G.R. No. 116404, March 20, 1997, 270 SCRA 227, 231.

235 Saint Louis University, Inc. v. Cobarrubias, G.R. No. 187104, Aug. 3, 2010, citing Lim v. Delos Santos, G.R. No.
172574, July 31, 2009, 594 SCRA 607, 616-617; Villena v. Rupisan, G.R. No. 167620, April 3, 2007, 520 SCRA
346, 358-359.

236 Philamlife Insurance Co. v. Edna Bonto-Perez, G.R. No. 83699, Feb. 21, 1989; C. W. Tan Mfg. v. NLRC, G. R. No.
79596, Feb. 10, 1989.

237 See Section 4, Rule 7 thereof.

238 Section 4 [a], Rule VI, 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure; Bristol Myers Squibb [Phils. ], Inc. v. Viloria, G.R. No.
148156, Sept. 27, 2004.

239 Del Mar Domestic Enterprises v. NLRC, G.R. No. 108731, Dec. 10, 1997.

240 G.R. No. 116464, March 1, 2000.

241 Section 4 [b], Rule VI, 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure; Bristol Myers Squibb [Phils. ], Inc. v. Viloria, G.R. No.
148156, Sept. 27, 2004.

242 Lamsan Trading, Inc. v. Leogardo, G.R. No. 73245, Sept. 30, 1986.

243 Millennium Erectors Corporation v. Magallanes G.R. No. 184362, Nov. 15, 2010; Gaerlan v. NLRC, G.R. No. L-
66526, Sept. 28, 1984, 132 SCRA 402; Del Rosario & Sons Logging Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. L-64204,
May 31, 1985, 136 SCRA 669.

244 Loon v. Power Master, Inc. , G.R. No. 189404, Dec. 11, 2013.

245 Section 3, Rule 1 of the NLRC Rules of Procedure, in relation to Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.
246 Citing Roy Pasos v. Philippine National Construction Corporation, G.R. No. 192394, July 3, 2013; and Millennium
Erectors Corporation v. Magallanes, G.R. No. 184362, Nov. 15, 2010, 634 SCRA 708, 713-714, citing Pacquing v.
Coca-Cola Philippines, Inc. , G.R. No. 157966, Jan. 31, 2008, 543 SCRA 344, 356-357.

247 See No. 4, Administrative Order No. 11-09, Series of 2012 [November 16, 2012], issued by Hon. Gerardo C.
Nograles, NLRC Chairman.

248 Solgus Corp. v. Hon. CA, G.R. No. 157488, Feb. 6, 2007.

249 See Section 1, Rule III thereof.

250 Required under Article 223, Labor Code; Section 4 [a], (5) (iii) , Rule VI, 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure.

251 PNCC v. NLRC, G.R. No. 103670, July 10, 1998, 292 SCRA 266; C. W. Tan Mfg. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 79596, Feb.
10, 1989.

252 Sunrise Manning Agency, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 146703, Nov. 18, 2004; Pagdonsalan v. NLRC, G.R. No. L-
63701, Jan. 31, 1980, 127 SCRA 463.

253 Millennium Erectors Corporation v. Magallanes, G.R. No. 184362, Nov. 15, 2010; Remerco Garments
Manufacturing v. Minister of Labor and Employment,G.R. Nos. L-56176-77, Feb. 28, 1985, 135 SCRA 167.

254 Although Article 223 expressly requires the posting only of a cash or surety bond in order to perfect the appeal,
in UERM-Memorial Medical Center v. NLRC, G.R. No. 110419, March 3, 1997, 269 SCRA 70, the posting of real
property bond in lieu of cash or surety bond was held sufficient protection for the interests of the employees should
they finally prevail.

255 Section 6, Rule VI, 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure; Roos Industrial Construction, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 172409,
Feb. 4, 2008; Borja Estate v. Ballad, G.R. No. 152550, June 8, 2005, 459 SCRA 657; Ong v. CA, G.R. No. 152494, Sept. 22, 2004;
Lamzon v. NLRC, G.R. No. 113600, May 28, 1999, 307 SCRA 665; 367 Phil. 169, 177.

256 Quiambao v. NLRC, G.R. No. 91935, March 4, 1996, 324 Phil. 455; Aquino v. NLRC, G.R. No. 98108, Sept. 3,
1993, 226 SCRA 76.

257 Gaudia v. NLRC, G.R. No. 109371, Nov. 18, 1999; Lamzon v. NLRC, G.R. No. 113600, May 28, 1999, 307 SCRA
665; 367 Phil. 169, 177.

258 Santos v. Velarde, G.R. No. 140753, April 30, 2003; Borja Estate v. Spouses Ballad G.R. No. 152550, June 8,
2005, 459 SCRA 657, 667.

259 Diaz v. Nora, G.R. No. 89324, Oct. 11, 1990.

260 Article 223, Labor Code; Section 6, Rule VI, 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure.

261 Section 6, Rule VI, 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure.

262 Biogenerics Marketing and Research Corp. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 122725, Sept. 8, 1999, 313 SCRA 748.

263 Balagtas Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 159268, Oct. 27, 2006.
264 Banahaw Broadcasting Corporation v. Pacana, G.R. No. 171673, May 30, 2011.

265 Cadalin v. Hon. CA, G.R. No. 168923, Nov. 28, 2008.

266 See Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, Series of 1999, Rule VI, Section 6, in relation to Rule VII, Section 14
[Section 15 in the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure] thereof.

267 Sang-an v. Equator Knights Detective and Security Agency, Inc. , G.R. No. 173189, Feb. 13, 2013.

268 Aba v. NLRC, G.R. No. 122627, July 28, 1999.

269 Orozco v. The Fifth Division of the Honorable Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 155207, April 29, 2005; Taberrah v.
NLRC, G.R. No. 117742, July 29, 1997, 276 SCRA 431; 342 Phil. 394, 402-403; Vergara v. NLRC, G.R. No.
117196, Dec. 5, 1997, 282 SCRA 486.

270 Mendoza, Jr. v. San Miguel Foods, Inc. , G.R. No. 158684, May 16, 2005.

271 Semblante v. CA, Gallera de Mandaue, et al. , G.R. No. 196426, Aug. 15, 2011, citing Orozco v. CA, Fifth Division,
G.R. No. 155207, April 29, 2005, 457 SCRA 700, 706-710; Olacao v. NLRC, G.R. No. 81390, Aug. 29, 1989, 177
SCRA 38, 49; Taberrah v. NLRC, G.R. No. 117742, July 29, 1997, 276 SCRA 431, 342 Phil. 394; Star Angel
Handicraft v. NLRC, G.R. No. 108914, Sept. 20, 1994, 236 SCRA 580, 584.

272 Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 120506, Oct. 28, 1996, 263 SCRA 638, 658; Manaban v. Sarphil
Corporation, G.R. No. 150915, April 11, 2005, 455 SCRA 240, citing Jaro v. CA, G.R. No. 127536, Feb. 19, 2002,
377 SCRA 282; Rosewood Processing, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 116476-84, May 21, 1998, 290 SCRA 408; 352
Phil. 1013.

273 G.R. No. 196426, Aug. 15, 2011.

274 G.R. No. 187693, July 13, 2010.

275 G.R. No. 93381, Sept. 28, 1990, 190 SCRA 160.

276 G.R. No. 93690, Oct. 10, 1991, 202 SCRA 597.

277 Ramirez v. Hon. CA, G.R. No. 182626, Dec. 4, 2009.

278 G.R. No. 108914, Sept. 20, 1994.

279 Section 6, Rule VI, 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure.

280 G.R. No. 198935, Nov. 27, 2013, citing University Plans v. Solano, G. R. No. 170416, June 22, 2011, 652 SCRA
492, 504-505, citing Nicol v. FootjJoy Industrial Corporation, July 27, 2007, 528 SCRA 300, 312-313.

281 Should refer now to the prevailing 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure.

282 See also Cervantes v. PAL Maritime Corporation, G.R. No. 175209, Jan. 16, 2013; University Plans Inc. v. Solano,
G.R. No. 170416, June 22, 2011, 652 SCRA 492; Forever Security & General Services v. Flores, G.R. No. 147961,
Sept. 7, 2007; Ciudad Fernandina v. CA, G.R. No. 166594, July 20, 2006, 495 SCRA 807; Quiambao v. NLRC,
G.R. No. 91935, March 4, 1996, 324 Phil. 455.
283 Maynilad Water Supervisors Association v. Maynilad Water Services, Inc. , supra.

284 Id.

285 Calabash Garments, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 110827, Aug 8, 1996, 260 SCRA 441; 329 Phil. 226, 235.

286 Times Transportation Company, Inc. v. Sotelo, supra citing Biogenerics Marketing and Research Corporation v.
NLRC, G.R. No. 122725, Sept. 8, 1999, 372 Phil. 653, 661; See also Accessories Specialist, Inc. v. Alabanza, G.R.
No. 168985, July 23, 2008.

287 Ramirez v. Hon. CA, G.R. No. 182626, Dec. 4, 2009; Colby Construction and Management Corp. v. NLRC, G.R.
No. 170099, Nov. 28, 2007.

288 G.R. Nos. 116476-84, May 21, 1998, 290 SCRA 408; 352 Phil. 1013.

289 G.R. No. 173631, Sept. 8, 2010.

290 Filipinas [Pre-fabricated Bldg. ] Systems Filsystems, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 153859, Dec. 11, 2003.

291 G.R. No. 163775, Oct. 19, 2007.

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