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Journal of Business Ethics (2005) 62: 277297 Springer 2005

DOI 10.1007/s10551-005-0849-1

Whistleblowing in Organizations:
An Examination of Correlates of
Whistleblowing Intentions, Jessica R. Mesmer-Magnus
Actions, and Retaliation Chockalingam Viswesvaran

ABSTRACT. Whistleblowing on organizational wrongdoing characteristics and whistleblowing intent


wrongdoing is becoming increasingly prevalent. What than with actual whistleblowing. Retaliation might best
aspects of the person, the context, and the transgression be predicted using contextual variables. Implications for
relate to whistleblowing intentions and to actual whis- research and practice are discussed.
tleblowing on corporate wrongdoing? Which aspects
relate to retaliation against whistleblowers? Can we draw KEY WORDS: retaliation, retaliatory acts, organiza-
conclusions about the whistleblowing process by assess- tional wrongdoing, organizational justice, whistleblow-
ing whistleblowing intentions? Meta-analytic examina- ing, whistleblower characteristics, whistleblowing
tion of 193 correlations obtained from 26 samples intentions
(N = 18,781) reveals differences in the correlates of
whistleblowing intentions and actions. Stronger rela-
tionships were found between personal, contextual, and Incidents of organizational wrongdoing are
increasingly making headlines (e.g., fraud, corrup-
tion, and other unethical acts in organizations like
Chockalingam Viswesvaran (Ph.D. University of Iowa) is a Enron, WorldCom, Anderson, and Tyco). While
Professor of Psychology at Florida International University. once thought to be rare, broad coverage of recent
His research interests include business ethics, personnel selec- corporate wrongdoing has led to a widely-held belief
tion, and human resource management. He has published in that scandal may be uncovered in virtually every
Journal of Applied Psychology, Organizational
business or organization (Anand et al., 2004). With
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, and
greater frequency, reports of wrongdoing are made
Psychological Bulletin. He has served on 5 editorial boards
and as an Associate Editor of the International Journal of by members close to the inner workings of the
Selection and Assessment. He is an elected fellow of the organization (e.g., by employees, board members or
Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology as well internal auditors), rather than by external auditing
as Divisions 5 (Measurement) and 14 (Industrial-Organi- agencies. These individuals, often referred to as
zational Psychology) of the American Psychological whistle-blowers, risk retaliation both by their orga-
Association. nization (e.g., via job loss, demotion, decreased
Jessica Mesmer-Magnus (Ph.D. 2005, Florida International quality of working conditions) and by the public
University) is an Assistant Professor of Management with the (e.g., character assassinations, accusations of being
Cameron School of Business at the University of North merely sour grapes, spies, or squealers) in their
Carolina at Wilmington. Her research interests include work/ efforts to expose perceived immoral or illegal acts
family conflict/balance, organizational training program de-
(Jubb, 1999; Near and Miceli, 1985).
sign, whistleblowing/counterproductive behavior, and business
In this manuscript, we examine potential pre-
ethics. She has published in the Journal of Vocational
Behavior, Journal of Business Ethics and Journal of dictors and correlates of whistleblowing behavior
Labor Research. She is certified as a Senior Professional in and of retaliation against whistleblowers. Specifi-
Human Resources and has worked as a Human Resources cally, we employ meta-analytic methodology to
Manager for a US-based national consulting firm. examine the personal and contextual correlates of
278 Jessica R. Mesmer-Magnus and Chockalingam Viswesvaran

whistleblowing intentions and behaviors, as well as Whistleblowing research


the correlates of retaliation against whistleblowers
in an effort to improve our understanding of the Reviews of whistleblowing research have identified
whistleblowing process. Our main purpose in two relatively robust foci of examination, in which
conducting this study is to guide future research in researchers have sought to identify the conditions
efforts to better predict and understand whistle- under which whistleblowing intentions are formed
blowing and retaliation, and to inform practice as and action taken, and retaliation occurs (Ellis and
to the aspects of the work environment that may Arieli, 1999; Miceli and Near, 2002). Studies of the
foster the potential for effective whistleblowing. In antecedents, correlates, and consequences of the
the following review, we will (1) provide an decision to blow the whistle on corporate wrongdo-
overview of the whistleblowing construct, (2) re- ing, as well as those focused on modeling its process,
view potential correlates of whistleblowing and of have typically drawn conceptual distinctions between
retaliation against whistleblowers, and (3) draw a those variables related to the whistleblower (i.e.,
distinction between an employees intent to blow whistleblower characteristics), the context in which
the whistle and actually blowing it. We hope to the whistleblowing occurs (i.e., contextual variables),
inform research as to the feasibility of drawing and aspects of the wrongdoing and wrong-doer (e.g.,
conclusions about whistleblowing from data based King. 1997; Miceli et al., 1991a; Miceli and Near,
on intentions rather than actual behaviors. 1985, 1988; Miceli et al., 1991b). Research exploring
the role of these variables in the whistleblowing pro-
cess is typically approached in one of two ways: (1)
Whistleblowing defined conducting surveys of actual whistleblowers, or (2)
using scenarios, interviews, or survey-based methods
Whistleblowing is the disclosure by organization to ascertain when an observer of organizational
members (former or current) of illegal, immoral, or wrongdoing will be likely to blow the whistle or will
illegitimate practices under the control of their report the intention to make a claim. Specifically,
employers, to persons or organizations that may be while some authors have been successful in gaining
able to effect action. (Near and Miceli, 1985, p. 4). access to actual whistleblowers, others have resorted
While whistleblowers typically have both internal to drawing conclusions about the whistleblowing
and external reporting channels available to report process using reports of whistleblowing intentions. In
organizational transgressions, research suggests that the first case, actual whistleblowers have observed a
nearly all whistleblowers initially attempt to report transgression, made the decision to report it, and then
wrongdoing via internal channels before utilizing (or actually followed through in making a claim. Likely
in lieu of) external channels (Miceli and Near, 1992, or intended whistleblowers, on the other hand,
2002). Even though whistleblowing via internal have been given information about a wrongdoing
channels is less threatening to an organization (as (whether real or fictitious) and have reported either
compared with external reporting which threatens how likely they would be to blow the whistle or
public scrutiny or legal intervention; Miceli et al., whether they intended blow the whistle at some fu-
1991a), whistleblowing within an organization is not ture time. The obvious difference between these ap-
often welcomed. Rather, whistleblower reports of proaches is that intended whistleblowers have not
wrongdoing are frequently buried or ignored (Miceli actually followed through with blowing the whistle.
et al., 1991b). In this scenario, the whistleblower is Researchers have justified using data gained from
unsuccessful in stopping organizational wrongdoing, intended rather than actual whistleblowers by (1)
and worse, is placed in a position to experience citing the difficulty of carrying out investigations
negative consequences to their action. Burying or into unethical conduct in actual organizations (e.g.,
ignoring reports and retaliation against whistle- Chiu, 2003), (2) suggesting that actual whistle-
blowers are more likely when whistleblowing is blowers censor the information they provide to
perceived by top management to represent a investigators due to the perception that data gath-
questioning of or challenge to the organizations ered in actual organizations precludes their confi-
authority structure (e.g., Miceli and Near, 2002). dentiality or anonymity (e.g., Sims and Keenan,
Whistleblowing and Retaliation 279

1998), (3) illuminating the difficulty of locating relating to aspects of the whistleblower, context, and
actual whistleblowers for questioning, or (4) citing wrongdoing potentially predictive of whistleblowing
the inherently flawed nature of such data (e.g., self- intention/action). A qualitative review of the whis-
reports of past events). While we believe these tleblowing process yields relatively consistent findings
concerns to be valid, we also believe that conclu- resulting from each approach. However, a cursory
sions drawn based on testimonies of actual whis- examination of their results suggests stronger rela-
tleblowers will be different than those from likely tionships may exist between key variables and whis-
whistleblowers. The real question, however, is how tleblowing intentions than whistleblowing actions.
different will these conclusions be. Specifically, are Given that whistleblowing behavior may be heavily
the correlates of actual whistleblowing similar en- governed by subjective norms and external supports, it
ough to those of likely/intended whistleblowing to stands to reason that the relationship between inten-
warrant firm conclusions about the whistleblowing tion and action may be even lower for whistleblowing
process? Or, given the nature of whistleblowing as a than other actions. Using a meta-analytic approach, we
behavior (rather than an attitude or intention), is examine correlates of whistleblowing intent and actual
the distance" between whistleblowing intent and whistleblowing separately so as to lend a greater
actual whistleblowing (e.g., deciding to blow the understanding of their common relation to predictors
whistle, accessing the internal or external channel, and correlates. We hope to identify the relationship
making a claim of wrongdoing, supplying the between whistleblowing intent and whistleblowing
necessary evidence) so great as to void direct action, so that research may be better informed as to the
comparison? Research on the intentionbehavior applicability of data regarding whistleblowing inten-
relationship suggests only a weak relationship tions to conclusions about whistleblowing actions.
between the intention to act and the actual per-
formance of a behavior (Miller and Grush, 1988).
In fact, measures of behavioral intentions have ac- Whistleblower characteristics
counted for, at most, 10% of the variance in overt
behaviors (e.g., Mitchell, 1974). Further, the A variety of personal characteristics related to the
intentionbehavior relationship is thought to be decision to engage in whistleblowing have been
even weaker for some behaviors (i.e., those examined: whistleblower demographics (i.e., age,
behaviors that may be governed more heavily by sex, level of education, level of job held, etc.),
subjective norms and external support, like whis- personality variables (i.e., locus of control), morality
tleblowing; e.g., Miller and Grush, 1988; Mitchell, (i.e., ethical judgment), and other characteristics
1974). According to Bagozzis (1992) Volitional (i.e., job performance, organizational commitment,
Model of Goal Directed Behaviors, behavioral role responsibility, approval of whistleblowing; e.g.,
intention and overt action are separated" by Brief and Motowidlo, 1986; Near and Miceli, 1996).
extensive psychological, motivational, and imple- While results seem to differ slightly across studies,
mentation processes (i.e., planning, monitoring whistleblowers (as compared with inactive observ-
activities, guidance and control, psychological ers) tend to have good job performance, to be more
commitment, effort). This suggests there may be highly educated, to hold higher-level or supervisory
multiple phases involved in moving from an positions, to score higher on tests of moral reasoning,
awareness of an illegitimate practice, to the decision and to value whistleblowing in the face of unethical
to blow the whistle, to actually making a claim. behavior (e.g., Brabeck, 1984; Miceli and Near,
1984; Near and Miceli, 1996; Sims and Keenan,
1998). Also, it appears that whistleblowers are more
Correlates of whistleblowing likely (than inactive observers) to report a role-
related responsibility or obligation to blow the whistle
Below we review research resulting from both reports (e.g., Near and Miceli, 1996). Age and organizational
of whistleblowing intent and whistleblowing action. tenure as predictors of whistleblowing have yielded
Researchers have examined the same sets of variables mixed results (e.g., Near and Miceli, 1996; Sims and
in studies of intended and actual whistleblowers (i.e., Keenan, 1998).
280 Jessica R. Mesmer-Magnus and Chockalingam Viswesvaran

Empirical findings regarding the personal corre- vein, individuals demonstrating higher organizational
lates of whistleblowing intentions and actions are commitment are more invested in staying with the
typically interpreted through the lens of organization, therefore are more likely to blow the
socialpsychological theories of behavior (cf. Casal whistle rather than exit the organization (particularly
and Zalkind, 1995; Ellis and Arieli, 1999; Miceli and when the prospect of continued wrongdoing is
Near, 1994; 2002; Near and Miceli, 1995). For uncomfortable or unacceptable). Thus, theoretical
example, Hollanders (1958) idiosyncrasy model explanations based on available idiosyncrasy credits,
suggests that those individuals who are considered to power relations, voice-exit choices, and control
be the best contributors to group and organizational theory are congruent with empirical findings that
objectives (i.e., have high job performance) will be older, high performing, more committed and more
given greater leeway to deviate from group or experienced employees are more likely to report
organizational norms. Specifically, employees with wrongdoing in and by organizations.
good job performance will be more likely to have
accumulated idiosyncrasy credits (interpersonal
bonuses) within the organization, thus providing Contextual variables
some latitude to report wrongdoing without suffer-
ing retaliation, and more importantly, to effect the Compared with the personal characteristics of
desired change (e.g., Miceli et al., 1991a). Similarly, whistleblowers, contextual variables seem to explain
Pheffer and Salanciks (1978) Resource Dependence more variance in an individuals decision to blow the
Theory posits that when one party possesses resources whistle (e.g., Miceli et al., 1991b; Miceli and Near,
upon which another is dependent, that party will be 1984; Near and Miceli, 1996). Such contextual
more powerful. Within the whistleblowing context, variables may include supervisor and coworker
an individual with more experience, tenure, and support, organizational climate, threat of retaliation,
better job performance is more valuable to an orga- and size of organization. Research suggests that
nization, thus giving them some leverage to report perceptions of supervisor or top management sup-
misdeeds (e.g., Miceli and Near, 2002). Perceived port are instrumental in the decision to blow the
leverage may increase whistleblowing potential and whistle, and in the determination of which reporting
action. Theories of power relationships (e.g., French channel will be employed (i.e., internal vs. external
and Raven, 1959) suggest that individuals gain (and to the organization; e.g., Keenan, 2000; Sims and
exercise) various bases of power by possessing valued Keenan, 1998). For instance, predictions from Social
and not easily replaceable characteristics (e.g., desired Exchange Theory (Thibaut and Kelley, 1959) would
or unique skills, good job performance, tenure or suggest that when there is a high level of supervisor
position status, credibility). Thus, whistleblowers and co-worker support, norms of reciprocity will
with better job performance and tenure are more develop that channel an individual to use internal
likely to be successful in persuading organizational means to effect behavior change (before making the
actors to stop the undesirable acts, also increasing the charges public).
potential they will report (or intend to report) a Other contextual variables are also worth pursu-
transgression (e.g., Miceli and Near, 1994). ing. For example, whistleblowing seems to be
Organizational employees have three options to greater in organizations that value whistleblowing
address an unsatisfactory situation faced within an and in those in which the whistleblower perceives a
organization: (1) to exit the organization, (2) voice high congruence between personal and organiza-
discontent (i.e., blow the whistle), or (3) remain tional values (Berry, 2004; Near and Miceli, 1996).
silent. Employees with greater tenure are more in- This is in accordance with Enzs (1988) theory of
vested in the organization and may prefer voice to value congruence. Similarly, potential whistleblow-
exit. This is also congruent with predictions from ers who perceive a threat of retaliation (by the
theories of power in organizations, where employees organization, immediate supervisors, or co-workers)
with greater tenure may have greater power to effect are much less likely to blow the whistle than those
change, and therefore may prefer voice to exit or who do not perceive a retaliatory climate (Keenan,
silence (e.g., French and Raven, 1959). In a similar 1995; King, 1999; Near and Miceli, 1996).
Whistleblowing and Retaliation 281

Characteristics of wrong-doing blower (Near and Miceli, 1986). It is assumed that a


whistleblowers experiences (perceived or actual,
Evidence suggests that characteristics of the wrong- reward or retaliation) following a whistleblowing
doing (i.e., perceived severity of the wrongdoing, event will have strong effects on others willingness
evidence of wrongdoing) and/or characteristics of and likelihood to blow the whistle in the future
the wrong-doer (i.e., likeability of or closeness to the (Casal and Zalkind, 1995; Miceli and Near, 1992).
wrongdoer) may have significant implications in the Logically, organizational response to whistleblower
decision to blow the whistle. Wrongdoing type and action depends in part upon whether management
perceived severity has been found to be moderately agrees with the merit of the claim and with the
positively related to whistleblowing (Miceli and whistleblowers obligation to take action (Parmer-
Near, 1985; Near and Miceli, 1996). There is also a lee et al., 1982). Under circumstances where an
tradition of research in whistleblowing that addresses organization is dependent upon the continuation of
whether the wrongdoing is sufficiently costly to the wrongdoing or when they are not dependent
warrant pursuit. Thus, it has been suggested that upon the whistleblower (e.g., Resource Depen-
potential whistleblowers look for materiality (as dence Theory; Pheffer and Salancik, 1978), the
auditors do) before embarking on any actions. organization is more likely to retaliate against the
Similarly, organization members seem to be more whistleblower and continue the wrongdoing (Near
likely to blow the whistle on organization wrong- and Miceli, 1986).
doing when they have convincing evidence of the Retaliation may take many forms, ranging from
wrongdoing, and when the transgression personally attempted coercion of the whistleblower to with-
affects them (Miceli and Near, 1985). The latter draw accusations of wrongdoing to the outright
finding parallels the research on the bystander exclusion of the whistleblower from the organiza-
effect in explaining prosocial behavior: due to a tion (e.g., Parmerlee et al., 1982). Other retaliatory
diffusion of responsibility, individuals are less likely acts may include organizational steps taken to
to help when several others are present (Latane and undermine the complaint process, isolation of the
Darley, 1970). On the other hand, to the extent whistleblower, character defamation, imposition of
strong norms of reciprocity develop and social sup- hardship or disgrace upon the whistleblower,
port is high between organizational members, exclusion from meetings, elimination of perquisites,
wrongdoing that harms the organization and/or and other forms of discrimination or harassment
co-workers is more likely to be reported (especially (e.g., Parmerlee et al., 1982). Retaliatory acts may be
using internal channels). Interestingly, in organiza- motivated by the organizations desire to (1) silence
tions that depend upon the continuation of the the whistleblower completely, (2) prevent a full
wrongdoing, whistleblowers are more likely to select public knowledge of the complaint, (3) discredit the
external reporting channels rather than attempt to whistleblower, and/or (4) discourage other potential
make an internal claim (Miceli and Near, 1985). whistleblowers from taking action (Miceli and Near,
This relationship appears to be especially strong 1994; Parmerlee et al., 1982).
when the whistleblower is fearful of retaliation by Retaliation is not always initiated by organiza-
the organization, supervisors, or coworkers (Miceli tional top management. Rather, isolated acts of
and Near, 1985). retaliation may be initiated by the whistleblowers
supervisor or coworkers with or without (formal or
informal) sanctioning by top management. Super-
visors may be motivated to retaliate against whis-
Retaliation against whistleblowers tleblowers for a variety of reasons, but they
frequently do so out of fear that a whistleblowing
Once an organization member has blown the whistle claim signals their inability to maintain order and
on an organizational wrongdoing, management may compliance within their departments, or the fear that
make two types of decisions: (1) whether to disre- valid complaints will result in the restriction or
gard the claim or take appropriate action, and (2) cessation of their own operations or influence
whether to reward or retaliate against the whistle- (ODay, 1972; Parmerlee et al., 1982).
282 Jessica R. Mesmer-Magnus and Chockalingam Viswesvaran

Correlates of retaliation against targets for retaliation. Finally, evidence suggests that
whistleblowers whistleblowers whose values regarding right and wrong
are not congruent with those of the organization, are
Predictors or correlates of retaliation against whis- more likely to be retaliated against (Miceli and Near,
tleblowers fall into one of four broad categories: (1) 1994), presumably because organization top man-
characteristics of the whistleblower, (2) actions taken agement does not deem the wrongdoing to be as
by the whistleblower in reporting organizational severe as is perceived by the whistleblower, thus casting
wrongdoing, (3) situational or environmental vari- doubt on the merit of the whistleblowers complaint.
ables related to the organization, and (4) character-
istics of the wrongdoing or wrongdoer.
Actions taken by the whistleblower
Characteristics of the whistleblower
Some researchers have examined whether specific
Characteristics of the whistleblower examined in actions taken by a whistleblower influence the de-
relation to retaliation include whistleblower age, gree to which they are retaliated against (e.g.,
education level, job level, role responsibility, and whether the whistleblower used an internal or
value congruence with the organization. While external channel to report wrongdoing, whether the
demographic characteristics of whistleblowers are whistleblower attempted to remain anonymous
thought to be less predictive of retaliation than are during the whistleblowing process, how successful
contextual variables (Miceli and Near, 2002), research the whistleblower was in ultimately curbing the
suggests that individuals who blow the whistle be- organizational wrongdoing, and even whether
cause it is their job to do so (e.g., audit or role others in the organization ignored wrongdoing).
responsibility) are less likely to be retaliated against Indeed, research suggests that when whistleblowers
and are more likely to be successful in stopping the report wrongdoing via external channels, they are
transgression (e.g., Casal and Zalkind, 1995; Miceli more likely to receive retaliation, and such retalia-
and Near, 2002). Further, Parmerlee and colleagues tion is likely to be more severe than when internal
(1982) found preliminary evidence that older channels are utilized (Near and Miceli, 1986).
whistleblowers are more likely to be retaliated against Starting with Weber (1947) and Barnard (1938),
than are younger whistleblowers. Interestingly, their organizations have relied on the concept of legiti-
results also suggest that whistleblowers that are valuable mate authority. Thus, the use of external channels
to their organization (e.g., due to age, experience, is more likely to elicit retaliatory behaviors, as it
education, job level) are more likely to be retaliated violates the power and authority structure present
against as compared to less valuable whistleblowers. within the organization. Similarly, whistleblowers
Perhaps, for older individuals and those at higher job who unsuccessfully attempted to remain anonymous
levels and with more experience, greater organiza- during the whistleblowing process were more likely
tional loyalty is expected. When such individuals to be retaliated against (Miceli and Near, 1994).
blow the whistle, other organizational members may Inconsistent results have been reported regarding
feel a greater sense of betrayal, thus paving the way the effectiveness of the whistleblower in curbing
for more retaliatory behaviors. This is especially true wrongdoing and experience of retaliation. Specifi-
when external channels are employed to report vio- cally, Miceli and Near (2002) report that effective
lations. Norms of reciprocity and notions of perceived whistleblowers are less likely to experience retaliation
justice violations (however misguided) appear to unless the supervisor or top management simul-
predict retaliation. Theories of power also suggest that taneously curbed the wrongdoing and retaliated
whistleblowers at higher job levels, who are expected simply for blowing the whistle. This suggests that
to enforce the power structure, upon violating this even when the transgression is agreed to be harmful
mandate are more likely to suffer retaliation. On the and is subsequently stopped, some organizations are
other hand, individuals at lower levels of the organiza- particularly sensitive to violations of the authority
tional structure may have lesser power, thus being easy structure via whistleblowing. This seems to be
Whistleblowing and Retaliation 283

especially likely when whistleblowers have utilized actual behavior. Our second purpose in conducting
external channels. the present study was to examine likely antecedents
and correlates of retaliation against whistleblowers,
and to determine the relative importance of each
Contextual variables variable in predicting retaliation. To address these
questions, meta-analytic cumulation of the extant
Context variables examined in relation to retaliation literature was employed to summarize and integrate
include top management, supervisor, and coworker findings from individual studies.
support, as well as organizational climate for whis-
tleblowing. While lack of support from supervisors
and top management is likely predictive of retalia- Method
tion against whistleblowers, coworker support does
not appear to be related to perceived or experienced Database
retaliation (Near and Miceli, 1986). This finding is
likely due to the low occurrence of retaliation ini- One hundred and ninety-three correlations from 26
tiated by coworkers (e.g., Miceli and Near, 1994). samples reported in 21 articles (total N = 18,781)
However, this finding may be indicative of organi- examining whistleblowing (including intent to blow
zational norms for treatment of whistleblowers. the whistle, likelihood of blowing the whistle, and
Specifically, in organizations where whistleblowing actual whistleblowing, both via internal and external
is not sanctioned, coworkers are likely less willing to channels) and retaliation against whistleblowers were
offer support or protection from retaliation to a included in this meta-analysis. To ensure a com-
whistleblower. prehensive search, these studies were located using
the following strategies: (1) conducting a comput-
erized search of the PsycInfo (1887 to present) and
Characteristics of the wrongdoing ABI Inform (1971 to present) databases, using
appropriate keywords and phrases (e.g., whistleblow-
Lastly, in addition to the other predictors of retali- ing, blowing the whistle, organizational wrongdoing,
ation, researchers have examined aspects of the retaliation, dissent, counterproductive behavior, corruption),
wrongdoing that may influence retaliation (e.g., (2) conducting a manual search of references cited in
frequency, severity, and evidence of wrongdoing). studies included in this meta-analysis and cited in this
Logic suggests that when wrongdoing in an orga- manuscript, (3) snowballing references cited in
nization is widespread or when the organization is recently published reviews of the whistleblowing
dependent upon the continuation of wrongdoing, literature (e.g., Gundlach et al., 2003; Miceli et al.,
the organizations top management would be more 1991b; Near and Miceli, 1995, 1996), and (4)
likely to lash out at individuals who blow the whistle soliciting relevant, but as yet unpublished, research
(Casal and Zalkind, 1995). However, Near and from authors at the 2004 and 2005 meetings of the
Miceli (1986) found that a whistleblowers report of Society of Industrial Organizational Psychology.
(a) multiple incidents of wrongdoing, (b) multiple These methods yielded an initial 67 journal
individuals involved in the wrongdoing, or (c) articles, dissertations, and theses with the potential to
multiple sources of evidence, appear unrelated to provide usable data. An attempt was made to obtain
retaliation. This could be explained in terms of the all studies identified. When a manuscript was not
effort needed to retaliate against a whistleblower available via interlibrary loan, a request for a copy
with strong evidence of wrongdoing, particularly was sent directly to the studys primary author.
when the wrongdoing is widespread and impacts Studies were included only if they reported a cor-
multiple individuals (Parmerlee et al., 1982). relation (or an effect size which could be converted
In sum, our first purpose in conducting this re- to a correlation using appropriate conversion for-
search was to investigate the antecedents and cor- mulas) between one of the several predictors and
relates of whistleblowing, and to determine whether whistleblowing (intent/likelihood or behavior) or
these were different for whistleblowing intent versus instances of retaliation. Studies that examined
284 Jessica R. Mesmer-Magnus and Chockalingam Viswesvaran

constructs different from those of interest (e.g., whistleblower works near or closely with the
perceptions of or reactions to unethical behaviors/ wrong-doer). These correlates were coded with re-
incidences other than those of actual or intended spect to whether the data was collected from in-
whistleblowing) or those that reported only anec- tended or likely whistleblowers or from actual
dotal data, regression coefficients, or other effect whistleblowers. Further, the data were coded with
sizes not representative of a clean relationship respect to whether the whistleblower used (or in-
between whistleblowing intent/action and a relevant tended to use) an internal or external reporting
correlate, were not code-able. When authors channel. If the reporting channel was not specified
reported separate correlations for different subgroups or was mixed, this was coded separately. While we
(e.g., males and females), samples, administrations (as had hoped to be able to examine correlations be-
in a longitudinal study), or measures of the same tween whistleblowing correlates and whistleblowing
construct, those correlations were examined sepa- intentions and behaviors by the type of reporting
rately. The studies included in this meta-analysis are channel employed (intended), there was an insuffi-
listed in the references prefixed with an asterisk. The cient number of studies available to facilitate this
studies included in this meta-analysis, for the most specificity. We chose instead to examine the rela-
part, utilized largely male samples of working adults tionships of whistleblowing correlates with either
(average ages between mid-1920s and late-1940s) intentions or actions, regardless of reporting channel.
who have (or could have) witnessed and reported (or In reference to correlates of retaliation against
considered reporting) organizational wrongdoing whistleblowers, the variables coded included those
(i.e., internal auditors, military and government related to the (1) characteristics of a whistleblower
employees, accountants). Experimental, scenario- (e.g., like age, education, job level, role responsi-
based, and survey-based designs were utilized. bility to blow the whistle, perceived alternative job
opportunities, and degree to which the whistle-
blower perceived value congruence with the orga-
Coding procedure nization), (2) actions taken by the whistleblower
in reporting an organizational wrongdoing (e.g.,
The first author made an initial independent effort to utilizing an external channel, attempting to remain
code the 21 articles selected for inclusion in this anonymous during the whistleblowing process, and
study. A random subset of these articles was coded success in stopping the wrongdoing), (3) contextual
by the second author in an effort to determine coder variables (e.g., supervisor and co-worker support),
reliability. Inter-coder agreement was very high, and (4) characteristics of the transgression (e.g.,
likely due to the objective nature of the data coded. frequency of wrongdoing in the organization, the
In reference to whistleblowing intentions and severity of the transgression, and the amount of
actions, the variables coded included those related evidence about the wrongdoing possessed by the
to (1) the characteristics of a whistleblower (e.g., whistleblower).
demographics, like age, sex, education, tenure, and
job level, and other characteristics, like ethical
judgment, job satisfaction, job performance, role Analysis
responsibility to blow the whistle, and approval of
whistleblowing), (2) the context in which whistle- The meta-analytic methods outlined by Hunter and
blowing takes place (e.g., organizational climate for Schmidt (2004) were employed to analyze this data.
whistleblowing, fear or threat of retaliation against The three outcomes investigated are (1) intent to
whistleblowers, organizational size, and supervisor blow the whistle, (2) whistle-blowing behavior, and
and co-worker support), and (3) the characteristics of (3) retaliation experienced. Each set of bivariate
the wrongdoing or the wrong-doer (e.g., the seri- correlations (between a predictor and outcome)
ousness of the wrongdoing, the amount of evidence were analyzed separately. The sample-size weighted
of the wrongdoing possessed by the whistleblower, mean observed correlation and the sample-size
whether the whistleblower was effective in stopping weighted standard deviation of the observed corre-
the wrongdoing, and the degree to which the lations were computed. These two estimated
Whistleblowing and Retaliation 285

parameters provide a distribution of the observed and a relevant correlate were available. However,
effect sizes. Unfortunately, insufficient information given that one of the purposes of this study was to
was available to correct for unreliability in the compare conclusions drawn from reports of whis-
measures. This concern is mitigated to some extent tleblowing intentions with those drawn from reports
by the objective nature of some of the predictors of whistleblowing actions, in cases where fewer than
included (e.g., gender, tenure). To the extent sta- three studies were available examining a compari-
tistical artifacts like unreliability and range restriction son relationship of interest (i.e., a sufficient number
in the measures affect the results, our reported of studies were available to meta-analyze the rela-
findings underestimate the true magnitude of the tionship between a correlate and either whistle-
correlations and overestimate the true variability blowing intention or whistleblowing action, and less
across studies. Note, however, that our analyses are than three were available for the other relevant meta-
conservative in that true correlations will actually be analysis), we report the results of the other relation-
higher and we are more likely to consider potential ship for purposes of description and comparison.
moderators (even when their effects are weak).
The sampling error variance associated with the
mean observed correlation was computed (Hunter Results
and Schmidt, 2004) and subtracted from the
observed variance. The resulting residual variance The results of the meta-analysis of correlations
was used to compute the confidence intervals between whistleblower characteristics and whistle-
around the observed mean. The percent of observed blowing intentions (Intent WB) and actions (Actual
variance attributable to sampling error was also WB) are presented in Table I. Results indicate that
computed. Usually, if 60% or more of the observed older employees are more likely to intend to blow the
variance is attributable to sampling error, one can whistle than are younger employees (r = 0.19).
assume that variance across studies due to uncor- Unfortunately, no studies examining age and actual
rected artifacts like unreliability and range restriction whistleblowing were located, so we cannot be sure
in the measures correlated can explain the remaining whether this relationship translates to actual whistle-
variability. Such a finding suggests that the rela- blowers. Sex and tenure appear to be related to actual
tionship generalizes or transports across contexts. whistleblowing (r = 0.13 and 0.10, respectively), but
Thus, our analyses could be construed to be a bare- not to whistleblowing intent. Specifically, females
bones meta-analysis (Hunter and Schmidt, 2004). and more tenured employees appear to be slightly
We report for each meta-analysis, the number of more likely to actually blow the whistle. Job level
correlations included (k), the total sample size across appears to have a similar relationship with whistle-
all estimates (N), the sample-size weighted mean blowing intentions (r = 0.10) as with actual whistle-
observed correlation (r), the sample-size weighted blowing. These results support the contention that
standard deviation (SDr), the sampling error standard older employees with greater tenure and at higher
deviation, the residual standard deviation (resSD), levels are more likely to have the commitment and
the percent of observed variance attributable to power to employ voice rather than exit mechanisms.
sampling error, and the 95% confidence interval More interesting than the demographic charac-
around the sample-size weighted mean observed teristics of whistleblowers were the results related
correlation. For studies with a mean observed cor- to other whistleblower characteristics and intent or
relation of greater than 0.05, we conducted a file actual whistleblowing. Specifically, ethical judgment,
drawer analysis (Hunter and Schmidt, 2004), and while moderately related to the intent to blow the
provide a file drawer k, which represents the whistle (r = 0.45), is not related to actual whistle-
number of missing studies averaging null results blowing (r = )0.08). Similarly, while role responsi-
required to reduce our reported sample-size weighted bility, approval of whistleblowing, and perceptions
mean observed correlation to 0.05. that blowing the whistle would be in ones best
For the most part, we conducted meta-analyses interests, appear to be predictive of the intent to
only when a minimum of three studies reporting a blow the whistle (r = 0.15, 0.44, and 0.31, respec-
relationship between whistleblowing intent/action tively), they do not appear to be related to actual
286 Jessica R. Mesmer-Magnus and Chockalingam Viswesvaran

TABLE I
Correlations between Whistleblower Characteristics and Whistleblowing Intentions and Actions

Meta-analysis k N r SDr SESD resSD %SEV 95%CI File drawer k

Whistleblower Action
demographics
Age Intent WB 3 1279 0.19 0.1902 0.0457 0.1847 5.77 )0.17/0.55 9
Actual WB
Sex Intent WB 2 1131 )0.05 0.0866 0.0414 0.0760 22.93 )0.20/0.09
Actual WB 4 1707 0.13 0.0368 0.0460 0 100 0.13/0.13 7
Education Intent WB 3 1667 0.02 0.0867 0.0418 0.0759 23.32 )0.13/0.17
Actual WB 6 7851 0.02 0.0619 0.0275 0.0555 19.76 )0.09/0.12
Tenure Intent WB 3 1563 0.02 0.0651 0.0436 0.0483 44.93 )0.07/0.12
Actual WB 2 1383 0.10 0.0100 0.0376 0 100 0.10/0.10 2
Job level Intent WB 4 1938 0.10 0.1164 0.0439 0.1078 14.22 )0.11/0.31 4
Actual WB 8 9200 0.08 0.0320 0.0293 0.0130 83.56 0.05/0.10 5
Other characteristics Action
Ethical judgment Intent WB 4 1147 0.45 0.0707 0.0472 0.0527 44.49 0.35/0.56 32
Actual WB 2 320 )0.08 0.1669 0.0695 0.1518 17.32 )0.38/0.22 2
Job satisfaction Intent WB 2 838 )0.01 0.0503 0.0487 0.0128 93.58 )0.03/0.02
Actual WB 2 1164 0.19 0.0300 0.0399 0 100 0.19/0.19 6
Organizational Intent WB 8 2170 0.03 0.0637 0.0603 0.0202 89.89 )0.01/0.07
commitment Actual WB
Job performance Intent WB 2 1315 0.05 0 0.0389 0 0.05/0.05
Actual WB 2 1401 0.11 0.0156 0.0373 0 100 0.11/0.11 3
Role responsibility Intent WB 4 1494 0.15 0.1556 0.0474 0.1482 9.28 )0.14/0.44 8
Actual WB 6 7762 0.06 0.1048 0.0274 0.1011 6.85 )0.14/0.26 2
Approve of Intent WB 6 2143 0.44 0.1406 0.0394 0.1349 7.86 0.18/0.71 47
whistleblowing Actual WB 2 5514 0.06 0.0200 0.0190 0.0064 89.92 0.05/0.07 1

Notes: k = number of studies included in the meta-analysis; N = total number of participants across studies included in the
meta-analysis; r = sample-size weighted mean observed correlation; SDr = tandard deviation of sample-size weighted
mean observed correlation; SESD = standard error of the standard deviation; resSD = residual standard deviation;
%SEV = percent variance due to sampling error; 95% CI = 95% confidence interval formed around the sample-size
weighted mean observed correlation (the number before the slash indicates the lower bound and the number after the
slash indicates the upper bound); File drawer k indicates the number of missing studies averaging null results required to
reduce the mean observed correlation to 0.05. Intent WB indicates participants indicated they intended or were likely to
blow the whistle on a wrongdoing; Actual WB indicates participants actually blew the whistle on a wrongdoing.

whistleblowing behavior (r = 0.06, 0.06, and 0.04). the whistleblowing channel used. Specifically, the
Conversely, while job satisfaction and job perfor- data included in our analysis suggest a small, but
mance relate to actual whistleblowing (r = 0.19 and positive correlation may exist between role respon-
0.11, respectively), they are unrelated to whistle- sibility and the use of an internal reporting channel,
blowing intentions (r = )0.01 and 0.05, respec- while no (or a negative) relationship may exist with
tively). Finally, organizational commitment does not the use of an external channel.
appear to be related to either whistleblowing inten- The results of the meta-analytic examination of
tions or actual whistleblowing. It should be noted, correlations between contextual aspects of the
that while our analysis suggests that role responsibility whistleblowing situation and whistleblowing inten-
is unrelated to actual whistleblowing behavior, it is tions (Intent WB) and actions (Actual WB) are
possible that this relationship may be moderated by presented in Table II. Organizational climate for
Whistleblowing and Retaliation 287

TABLE II
Correlations between contextual variables and whistleblowing intentions and actions

Meta-analysis k N r SDr SESD resSD %SEV 95%CI File drawer k

Contextual variables Action


Organizational climate Intent WB 8 2947 0.28 0.1738 0.0457 0.1677 6.92 )0.05/0.61 37
for whistleblowing Actual WB 5 6960 0.10 0.0375 0.0263 0.0266 49.45 0.05/0.15 5
Threat of retaliation Intent WB 7 2849 )0.27 0.1292 0.0459 0.1208 12.61 )0.51/-0.03 31
Actual WB 8 11974 0.04 0.0907 0.0251 0.0872 7.65 )0.13/0.21
Supervisor support Intent WB 4 1443 0.28 0.0530 0.0484 0.0216 83.41 0.23/0.32 19
Actual WB 2 789 )0.12 0.0088 0.0495 0 100 )0.12/)0.12 3
Organizational size Intent WB 1 725 )0.10 1
Actual WB 5 5803 0.09 0.0783 0.0286 0.0729 13.34 )0.05/0.23 4

See Note to Table I.

TABLE III
Correlations between characteristics of the wrongdoing/wrongdoer and whistleblowing intentions and actions

Meta-analysis k N r SDr SESD resSD %SEV 95% CI File drawer k

Wrongdoing/wrongdoer Action
Seriousness of Intent WB 7 3207 0.16 0.2642 0.0413 0.2609 2.44 )0.35/0.67 16
wrongdoing Actual WB 6 6460 0.13 0.0348 0.0299 0.0180 73.41 0.10/0.17 10
Evidence of Intent WB 1 636 )0.06 1
wrongdoing Actual WB 3 4759 0.06 0.0079 0.0250 0 100 0.06/0.06 1
Closeness to Intent WB 4 965 0.45 0.1768 0.0527 0.1687 8.88 0.12/0.78 32
wrongdoer Actual WB
Effective in stopping Intent WB
wrongdoing Actual WB 3 1714 )0.07 0.0741 0.0410 0.0617 30.65 )0.19/0.05 2

See Note to Table I.


whistleblowing is more strongly related to whistle- (Intent WB) and actions (Actual WB) are presented
blowing intentions than actual whistleblowing, but in Table III. We found similar small relationships
the direction of the relationship is consistent between seriousness of the wrongdoing and whis-
(r = 0.28 and 0.10, respectively). Of greater interest tleblowing intentions and actions (r = 0.16 and 0.13,
is that threat of retaliation is negatively related to the respectively). Importantly, the observed correlations
intent to blow the whistle, but appears to be unre- used to compute the relationship between severity of
lated to actual whistleblowing behaviors (r = )0.27 the transgression and whistleblowing intent varied
and 0.04, respectively). Also intriguing is the finding widely in magnitude, potentially signaling the pres-
that supervisor support is positively related to ence of a moderator. Of interest is the moderate
whistleblowing intent (r = 0.28), but negatively effect size found for the relationship between
related to actual whistleblowing (r = )0.12), sug- closeness to the wrong-doer and intent to blow the
gesting that supervisor support may facilitate ones whistle (r = 0.45); this finding suggests that the
decision to blow the whistle, but work to inhibit closer the potential whistle-blower is to the wrong-
behaviors required to actually blow it. doer (whether interpersonally or with respect to
The results of the meta-analysis of correlations organizational structure), the greater their intention
between characteristics of the wrongdoing and of to blow the whistle on the transgression. Unfortu-
the wrong-doer and whistleblowing intentions nately, similar data was not available for actual
288 Jessica R. Mesmer-Magnus and Chockalingam Viswesvaran

whistleblowing, so we do not know if this rela- Not surprisingly, whistleblowers who utilize an
tionship will generalize. Also noteworthy is the small external reporting channel are more likely to be
negative correlation found between actual whistle- retaliated against (r = 0.17). However, those whis-
blowing and the whistleblowers success in stopping tleblowers who are effective in stopping the trans-
the wrongdoing (r = )0.07). This finding suggests gression are less likely to experience retaliation for
that whistleblowers are not frequently successful in blowing the whistle (r = )0.20), as are those who
their efforts to curb organizational wrongdoing. It is produce convincing evidence (r = )0.25), and those
worth noting, however, that all correlations included who enjoy support from their supervisor (r = )0.39).
in this computation reflect the success of whistle- More intriguing, however, was our finding that
blowers who utilized an external reporting channel. blowing the whistle on serious transgressions or
Lastly, displayed in Table IV are the results of the those that frequently occur in the organization, are
meta-analysis of correlates of retaliation against more likely to be met with retaliation, than are
whistleblowers. Information is arranged according to infrequent or less severe wrongdoings (r = 0.30 and
the four types of correlates examined (1) character- 0.13, respectively).
istics of the whistleblower, (2) actions taken by the
whistleblower, (3) contextual variables, and (4) Discussion
characteristics of the wrongdoing. Education, job
level, and the role-prescribed responsibility to blow Our purpose in conducting this research was to
the whistle appear to be relatively unrelated to examine the antecedents and correlates of whistle-
retaliation against whistleblowers (r = 0.04, )0.07, blowing and retaliation against whistleblowers so
and )0.07, respectively). While small relationships, it that we might better understand their role as pre-
is important to note that the correlation between dictors and within the whistleblowing process. A
retaliation and role responsibility is in the desired secondary goal was to evaluate the feasibility of
direction. Also, while based on only one study each, drawing conclusions about whistleblowing utilizing
it appears that older whistleblowers are more likely data gathered on whistleblowing intentions rather
to be retaliated against, as are those with greater than whistleblowing actions. Overall, our results
perceived value congruence with the organization. suggest that the predictors of the intent to blow the
This second finding may indicate a misperception as whistle are not the same as those of actual whistle-
to the organizations values regarding whistleblow- blowing. Further, many of the variables typically
ing and/or wrongdoing. measured in studies of whistleblowing are stronger
TABLE IV
Correlations of retaliation against a whistleblower

Meta-analysis k N r SDr SESD resSD %SEV 95%CI File drawer k

Whistleblower characteristics
Education 5 2405 0.04 0.0329 0.0452 0 100 0.04/0.04
Job level 6 2624 )0.07 0.0606 0.0471 0.0381 60.41 )0.14/0.01 3
Role responsibility 4 2314 )0.07 0.0730 0.0408 0.0605 31.27 )0.18/0.05 2
Whistleblower actions
Used external channel 4 2337 0.17 0.0871 0.0391 0.0778 20.12 0.02/0.33 10
Success in stopping wrongdoing 5 2410 )0.20 0.0782 0.0425 0.0656 29.63 )0.33/)0.07 15
Contextual variables
Supervisor support 3 923 )0.39 0.0027 0.0482 0 100 )0.39/)0.39 21
Co-worker support 3 1194 0.03 0.0155 0.0501 0 100 0.03/0.03
Characteristics of the wrongdoing
Frequency of wrongdoing 2 855 0.30 0.0788 0.0448 0.0648 32.30 0.18/0.43 10
Seriousness of wrongdoing 6 3046 0.13 0.0503 0.0431 0.0259 73.58 0.08/0.19 10

See Note to Table I.


Whistleblowing and Retaliation 289

correlates of whistleblowing intent than of whistle- organization (Keenan, 2000). Consistent with con-
blowing action. trol theory and theories of power, organizational
members with greater tenure and of higher job levels
usually have stronger power bases (as compared with
Correlates of whistleblowing their younger and newer counterparts), and there-
fore may be more confident in their abilities to exact
We organized the presentation of the results of our change within the organization via whistleblowing.
meta-analyses of whistleblowing (intent and action) In other words, these individuals may be more
according to characteristics of the whistleblower, certain that the risks they take in blowing the whistle
work context, wrongdoing and wrongdoer, as we will not be in vain. Lastly, employees higher in the
felt that such variables would provide unique organizational hierarchy and those that have been
information regarding the whistleblowing process with the organization for longer are likely to have a
(Gundlach et al., 2003; Miceli and Near, 1988; Near greater understanding of, appreciation for, and
and Miceli, 1995, 1996). Further, we anticipated commitment to the espoused values of the organi-
differences in both the direction and strength of zation, and thus a greater desire to protect this cul-
these relationships according to these dimensions ture (e.g., Berry, 2004; Schein, 1996).
(e.g., Dozier and Miceli, 1985; Miceli et al., 1991b; We were surprised to find that ethical judgment,
Near and Miceli, 1995). We expected that demo- approval of whistleblowing, and a perception that
graphics and other characteristics of the whistle- blowing the whistle is in ones best interests were
blower would have stronger correlations with the related to whistleblowing intent but not to actual
intent to blow the whistle, while contextual variables whistleblowing. One would have thought that
and aspects of the transgression would have stronger morality or ethicality, in particular, would be pre-
implications for actual whistleblowing. dictive of whistleblowing (e.g., Brabeck, 1984; Brief
and Motowildo, 1986; Miceli et al., 1991b). Cer-
Whistleblower characteristics tainly, we anticipated that workers would be more
With regard to demographic characteristics, our likely to blow the whistle when they perceive that it
results suggest that whistleblowing intent might best is in their best interests to do so (e.g., Miceli and
be predicted from whistleblower age and the level of Near, 1985). Perhaps, however, the influence of
the job held by the intended whistleblower. Simi- contextual factors on the decision to blow the
larly, actual whistleblowing is likely to be predicted whistle (e.g., fear of retaliation, perceived costs
by job level and organizational tenure but also the versus benefits, severity of the transgression, per-
sex of the whistleblower (e.g., Miceli et al., 1991b). ceived support from supervisors and coworkers, etc.)
While we found no studies which examined age of are so great as to preclude whistleblowing on the
whistleblower with actual whistleblowing, one basis of personal need or desire. Or, perhaps, the
would think that older employees are more likely to commitment to the organization is so great that the
hold positions at higher levels within the organiza- desire to meet the needs of the greater workgroup is
tional hierarchy and also have greater tenure (this is stronger than that of meeting individual needs.
particularly true for tenure-based promotion systems While this potential is appealing, we were disheart-
commonly found in government organizations). ened to find no correlation between organizational
Therefore, we would expect that older employees commitment and whistleblowing intent (e.g.,
are also more likely to follow through with blowing Somers and Casal, 1994). We expected to find that
the whistle. Also likely is that older workers are greater organizational commitment would yield a
more secure in their value systems than are younger desire to exercise voice rather than either silence or
workers, and therefore are more willing to defend exit strategies. It should be noted, however, that we
these values throughout the lengthy whistleblowing were unable to locate any studies that reported a
process and in the face of retaliation (Chiu, 2003). correlation between actual whistleblowing and
Likewise, more senior and higher-level employees organizational commitment. As such, we cannot be
are more likely to have access organizational mem- sure that there is not a relationship between this
bers with the ability to exact change within the variable and the decision to blow the whistle.
290 Jessica R. Mesmer-Magnus and Chockalingam Viswesvaran

Of particular interest is that job satisfaction and job whistle, but utilize non-traditional channels in doing
performance were positively related to whistle- so. While in many cases this would still qualify as
blowing action but not to whistleblowing intent. whistleblowing, use of such reporting channels makes
This finding makes sense in light of various propo- the tracking and identification of these whistle-
sitions of resource dependence and power theories blowers more difficult. Alternatively, certain internal
(e.g., Miceli et al., 1991b). Specifically, while ones auditors may be chosen from a select inner circle
job performance may not enter into the decision to within the organization and possess the ultimate goal
blow the whistle on an organizational wrongdoing, of preventing damage to the organizations public
when one considers the likelihood that one might be image rather than stopping wrongdoing. In this case,
able to effect change by blowing the whistle and/or these individuals may opt to ignore certain trans-
when one considers the likelihood one will suffer gressions they know to be unethical, or in some other
retaliation by organizational members, it becomes non-traditional way deal with the transgression so as
likely that the intended whistleblower will consider to minimize public knowledge and scrutiny. Our data
their relative value to and power within the organi- does not preclude the potential that this relationship
zation prior to taking action (e.g., Miceli and Near, (between role responsibility and whistleblowing) is
1994). Specifically, resource dependence theory moderated by the whistleblowing channel utilized
suggests that individuals with better job performance (internal versus external). Regardless, our data suggest
are more valuable to the organization, suggesting the that having a role-related responsibility to blow the
organization officials would be more likely to want to whistle may not be sufficient to ensure whistle-
correct the transgression than risk losing the whis- blowing action. Other factors may be of greater
tleblower (e.g., Miceli et al., 1991b). Similarly, importance, or may play a moderating role, in the
power theory would predict that high performing whistleblowing decision-making process. This is a
whistleblowers would be in a better position to exact matter for future research.
change through voice mechanisms (cf. French and
Raven, 1959). Also, in the making the decision to Contextual aspects of whistleblowing
engage in whistleblowing, an employee with better An examination of the meta-analyses of contextual
job performance might be more comfortable in variables and whistleblowing reveal somewhat sur-
expressing a dissenting opinion than their fellow prising findings for organizational climate, fear of
employees who may possess fewer idiosyncrasy retaliation, and supervisor support. As expected,
credits (due to less satisfactory job performance; e.g., organizational climate for whistleblowing is posi-
Hollander, 1958). Future research should examine tively related to whistleblowing intent (Berry, 2004),
the potential for job performance to predict retalia- however, the relationship is considerably weaker for
tion against whistleblowers. It would seem likely that whistleblowing action. This may be a function of the
individuals with higher job performance would have distance between whistleblowing intent and
accumulated more idiosyncrasy credits and would action (e.g., Bagozzi, 1992). Alternatively, this may
also be less likely to suffer retaliation. signal the presence of other contextual or individual
Curiously, we found that role responsibility to variables that may moderate this relationship and
blow the whistle is predictive of intent to blow the may account for the reduction in explained variance.
whistle but not of actual whistleblowing. This finding For example, supervisor support, if low, may serve
is unexpected, as one would expect that the organi- to de-motivate an employee to blow the whistle
zation creates and staffs internal watchdog positions even when this individual is part of an organization
to facilitate whistleblowing on unsanctioned practices that (with regard to organizational wrongdoing)
(e.g., Miceli et al., 1991b; Near and Miceli, 1996). values employee dissent (Dozier and Miceli, 1985;
Furthermore, in certain occupations and industries, Miceli and Near, 1985). Also of interest, is that
all employees are expected to voice concerns of ille- threat or fear of retaliation appears to greatly reduce
gitimate or unsanctioned activities (e.g., government the likelihood that an observer of wrongdoing will
employees, military, and employees of many gov- intend to blow the whistle, but does not impact
ernment contractors). However, it may be that these actual whistleblowing. Therefore, it appears that
individuals actually follow through with blowing the once the intention to whistle-blow is formed, fear of
Whistleblowing and Retaliation 291

retaliation for whistleblowing does not serve to on whistleblowing yield two interesting findings.
de-motivate action. It may be that, in their decision First, while the relationships were similar for whis-
to blow the whistle, employees weigh aspects of the tleblowing intent and action, we were surprised by the
situation (like their relative power to exact change, relatively small correlation between severity of the
the severity of the transgression, the likelihood that wrongdoing and whistleblowing. We would have
they will experience retaliation for blowing the thought that a more serious transgression would merit
whistle on this particular transgression, which is also action more so than a less severe transgression (e.g.,
likely to be a function of their relative power within Trevino and Victor, 1992). In fact, severity of the
the organization and their relative balance of idio- wrongdoing explains less than 3% of the variance in
syncrasy credits which will protect them from both whistleblowing intent and action. It may be that
retaliation), and thus only decide to blow the whistle in some cases employees perceive that reports of very
when they perceive their chances of receiving severe organizational wrongdoing are more likely to
retaliation are low (e.g., Miceli and Near, 1994; Sims be met with resistance and retaliation by organiza-
and Keenan, 1998). Also, once the decision is made tional members (e.g., Dozier and Miceli, 1985).
to blow the whistle, they may be so committed to Alternatively, this finding may be indicative of an
taking action that they are no longer able to back overall inconsistency in assessments of the severity of
out. Researchers should explore the possibility that various actions. For example, it may be that individ-
the relationship between fear of retaliation and actual uals with varying value orientations may assess the
whistleblowing is moderated by such processes and same action as more or less severe, or even as more or
contextual variables, as well as by the reporting less wrong. Additionally, this may indicate incon-
channel employed (Miceli and Near, 2002). gruence between the employees values and the
Another unexpected finding was that for supervisor organizations espoused values (e.g., Miceli and Near,
support and whistleblowing intent versus action (e.g., 1994). Researchers might explore the possibility that
Miceli et al., 1991b). Specifically, supervisor support value congruence between the organization and the
seems to increase the likelihood that an observer of whistleblower moderates the relationship between
wrongdoing will intend to blow the whistle, but to transgression severity and whistleblowing.
decrease actual whistleblowing behavior (e.g., Near Finally, we were at first somewhat amazed by the
and Miceli, 1986). This suggests that employees who strong positive correlation between whistleblowing
enjoy the support of their supervisors in some domains intent and relational closeness to the wrong-doer (i.e.,
perceive that this support is likely to extend to a the closer the observer was to the wrong-doer, whe-
whistleblowing situation. As such, they may be more ther interpersonally or with respect to organizational
likely to intend to blow the whistle upon observing a structure, the more likely it was that he or she intended
wrongdoing, knowing their supervisor will likely to blow the whistle; e.g., King, 1997). However, it
back them up. However, given the reverse in the would make sense that one is more likely to observe
direction of this relationship for actual whistleblow- wrongdoing by a person with which one is in close
ing, some other variable or process is likely acting as a proximity. Further, the closer one is to the wrong-
moderator. One possible explanation is that employ- doer, the more likely one has access to sufficient evi-
ees with supportive supervisors may feel a greater dence of wrongdoing. Knowledge of wrongdoing is
responsibility to ensure that their supervisors are not logically the first step in the whistleblowing process. It
adversely affected by a whistleblowing claim. These would be interesting, however, to determine whether
individuals may choose silence to voice in an effort to this relationship holds for actual whistleblowing.
spare the supervisor embarrassment or discipline that Unfortunately, no studies were found that reported
may result from a report of illegitimate, unsanctioned, this correlation.
or immoral acts occurring within their department/
division.
Intending to blow the whistle versus actually blowing it
The role of wrongdoing in whistleblowing
Examination of meta-analytic results for the influence Our discussion of the correlates of whistleblowing
of characteristics of the wrongdoing and wrongdoer intent versus actual whistleblowing points to a likely
292 Jessica R. Mesmer-Magnus and Chockalingam Viswesvaran

difference in the predictors of each. More impor- stopping the wrongdoing), and contextual aspects,
tantly, these differences probably reflect the psy- namely supervisor support. It is interesting that po-
chological distance between behavioral intention sitive correlations surfaced between retaliation and
and overt action (Bagozzi, 1992). Specifically, both the severity and the frequency of the wrong-
whistleblowing intention and action are logically doing. This finding likely reflects a greater threat to
separated by psychological, motivational, and the organizations future performance by whistle-
implementation processes (e.g., planning, monitor- blowers who report information on a severe or
ing, guidance and control, psychological commit- frequent organizational wrongdoing (e.g., Miceli
ment, effort; e.g., Azjen, 1992; Bagozzi, 1992). and Near, 2002). This may be particularly strong in
Therefore, a complete model of the whistleblowing instances where an external reporting channel is
process requires the identification and explication of utilized, as the risk of public scrutiny and legal
the entire process (from observation, to intent, to intervention increases (Miceli et al., 1991b). In
action, and all steps in between). Certainly, most addition, in organizations where wrongdoing is
researchers in this domain are interested in drawing frequent, it is more likely that a cultural norm
conclusions about actual whistleblowing; however, actively operates to continue and support the
few have designed research to allow such enumer- transgressions (e.g., Schein, 1996). In such cases, a
ation of the process. We suspect that this is a whistleblower who reports wrongdoing (regardless
byproduct of the difficulty in gaining longitudinal of the channel employed) is actively violating this
data and data from actual whistleblowers (e.g., Chiu, norm. According to Schein (1996), norm-violators,
2003; Sims and Keenan, 1998). particularly in cases where a norm is widely shared,
Of the studies included in this meta-analysis, only often face severe repercussions. Whistleblowers who
two examined whistleblowing from the perspective already possess fewer idiosyncrasy credits (e.g., due
of both the intended and actual whistleblower; to low job performance, low organizational value,
therefore only two reported a correlation between etc.; Hollander, 1958), upon dissent, are likely to
intending to blow the whistle and actual whistle- face the harshest retaliation.
blowing behavior. The sample-size weighted, mean As expected, whistleblowers who possess con-
observed correlation between whistleblowing intent vincing evidence of wrongdoing and those who are
and actual whistleblowing was only 0.05 (total effective in stopping the transgression are less likely
N = 789, k = 2). While we can not be sure of the to be retaliated against (e.g., Miceli and Near, 2002;
true relationship between intent and action, this is Parmerlee et al., 1982). It is logical that when the
consistent with research in other domains that has whistleblower possesses convincing evidence of the
reported a lower than expected relationship (e.g., transgression, the organization would be well-served
Ajzen, 1992). In sum, generalizing from intent to to halt the practice and not retaliate. Similarly, it
actual whistleblowing may not be a wise strategy. seems likely that in organizations where whistle-
Granted, actual behavior is more difficult to study, blowers are effective in stopping wrongdoing, the
especially in a sensitive area such as this. However, it organization and the whistleblower were in agree-
is still imperative that such studies are conducted and ment that the wrongdoing must be stopped (e.g., the
published. practice violated the espoused values of the organi-
zation), and therefore it would be less likely that the
Correlates of retaliation against whistleblowers whistleblower would experience organizationally-
sanctioned retaliation (Miceli and Near, 1994). It is
We examined four potential types of correlates of important to note that retaliation may occur even
retaliation against whistleblowers. The strongest when not sanctioned by the organizations top
correlates of retaliation against whistleblowers were management (Miceli and Near, 1994; Parmerlee
found for characteristics of the wrongdoing et al., 1982). Future research should examine
(frequency and severity of wrongdoing), whistle- sanctioned and unsanctioned retaliation separately,
blower actions during the whistleblowing process as this would facilitate a more comprehensive
(use of an external reporting channel and success in understanding of the retaliation process.
Whistleblowing and Retaliation 293

We were not surprised to find that whistleblowers between an entire organization and the whistle-
who employed an external reporting channel were blower. Future research should explore the potential
more likely to suffer retaliation, as the use of an that retaliation is better predicted by examining
external channel is likely to be interpreted as a threat dyadic interactions or relationships (between whis-
to the organizations structure and legitimate tleblower and likely retaliator) than by using a proxy
authority (e.g., Miceli and Near, 2002; Near and that is representative of an organizational-level var-
Miceli, 1986; Weber, 1947). The correlation, iable (i.e., job level, value to organization, etc.; e.g.,
however, was smaller than would be predicted by Casal and Zalkind, 1995).
these theories. This is likely due to the immediate While we did not have access to such data, it
external scrutiny that these organizations would would be interesting to examine the potential for
suffer as a result of the whistleblowers use of an retaliation against intended whistleblowers. For
external reporting channel (Dworkin and Baucus, example, what is the likelihood that these individuals
1998). Any retaliatory acts sanctioned by the share their intentions with others in the organiza-
organization are likely also to be reported through tion, perhaps to assess if, when, or how they should
this external channel, thus further increasing the blow the whistle on organizational wrongdoing
potential for public scrutiny and legal intervention (e.g., via social comparison processes)? Individuals
(Miceli et al., 1991). with whom they share their intentions may be in a
Our finding of a small negative relationship position to retaliate against the intended whistle-
between job level and retaliation is also noteworthy. blower (perhaps to prevent the individual from
Power theories and dependence-control theories taking the charges any further), or to share his or her
would have predicted that individuals of higher job intentions with another organizational member who
level would be in a better position to blow the is in a position to retaliate. As this would have
whistle on organizational wrongdoing (Casal and implications for actual whistleblowing, it seems
Zalkind, 1995; Near and Miceli, 1986). However, important to understand and enumerate this process
organizational members may feel a greater sense of as well as to determine the predictors and correlates
betrayal when a member of higher status in the of retaliation against potential whistleblowers.
organization blows the whistle (e.g., Parmerlee et al.,
1982). Therefore, instead of being better protected
against retaliation, members of higher job level may Practical implications
be at somewhat higher risk. Given the small rela-
tionship we found, however, neither of these Whistleblowing on organizational wrongdoing has
explanations fit the data. If valuable members of the the potential for many positive outcomes for the
organization are more likely to be retaliated against organization (Miceli and Near, 1994; Near and
(due to feelings of betrayal, violation of power Miceli, 1995). Our results have a few implications
structure, etc.), it may be that job level is no longer for the types of actions that should be taken to im-
an appropriate proxy variable for value. Specifically, prove the potential for actual whistleblowing in
organizations are increasingly hiring for top man- organizations. First, consistent with past research
agement and supervisory positions from outside the findings (e.g., Miceli et al., 1991b), our results sug-
organization, rather than promoting from within (as gest that employees of higher tenure and job level
is typical in tenure-based promotion systems). In are more likely to blow the whistle. It may be that
these cases, individuals of high level in the organi- younger employees or those of a lower job level are
zation are not necessarily more valuable, nor do they uncomfortable with reporting wrongdoing (partic-
necessarily possess a relationship with the organiza- ularly by those at a higher level in the organizational
tion as a whole that would induce a feeling of hierarchy). Similarly, these employees may lack
betrayal after whistleblowing. Specifically, a feeling sufficient power or knowledge to blow the whistle
of betrayal implies a break of a psychological con- and effect change (Keenan, 1995). Organizations
tract made in a dyad (i.e., between two individuals, may consider targeting this group of employees for
such as between the whistleblower and the retaliator, specific training focused on (1) what types of activ-
who is perhaps a supervisor or coworker) not ities might be considered unethical/unsanctioned,
294 Jessica R. Mesmer-Magnus and Chockalingam Viswesvaran

(2) how reports of wrongdoing might be made, and led to positive change. This act may improve the
(3) reemphasizing the organizations commitment to likelihood that other potential whistleblowers will be
ethical practices, etc. (e.g., Miceli and Near, 1994). motivated to alert top management of wrongdoing.
Perhaps such training might be delivered during the It would be wise, however, to exercise caution that
organizational orientation process. However, the this practice does not foster unsanctioned retaliatory
organization should be certain that these espoused acts.
ethical values are consistent with those that are
enacted on a daily basis (e.g., Schein, 1996).
Incongruence between espoused and enacted values Limitations and future research directions
may lead to feelings of confusion and even suspicion
within the targeted audience. One limitation of our analyses is the relatively small
Second, we found that ethical judgment is related number of studies included under each meta-analy-
to whistleblowing intent, but not actual whistle- sis. Although the number of studies was few, the
blowing. This suggests that employees may be aware actual sample sizes were often in the thousands
when an observed practice is questionable and suggesting some generalizability of our findings.
should be reported, however, this knowledge is Furthermore, by integrating findings over three
insufficient to instigate actual reporting. While this is decades of research, this study provides a compre-
also a matter for future research, organizational hensive view of the correlates of intended and actual
officials should consider the presence of other vari- whistleblowing as well as lending insight into the
ables within their control that may work against retaliation process. Thus, while there remains a need
whistleblowing (e.g., fear or threat of retaliation, for more individual studies, this meta-analysis was
perception that the costs of whistleblowing out- successful in providing a snapshot of the current state
weigh potential benefits, accurate perception/eval- of the field as well as in providing directions for
uation of the severity of the transgression, value improving future research.
congruence with the organization, perception that A second concern relates to our choice of only
whistleblowing will not lead to change, etc.) Simi- published articles in the meta-analyses. Arguments
larly, our research suggests that whistleblowers may can be made that only significant findings are pub-
not frequently be successful in stopping wrongdoing. lished, and thus by confining ourselves to the pub-
A potential whistleblower may weigh this into his or lished literature we have overestimated the effect
her decision to actually blow the whistle. sizes. This is the classic file-drawer effect (Rosenthal,
Third, our results suggest that role responsibility 1979). To address this potential concern, we con-
to blow the whistle is relatively unrelated to actual ducted file-drawer analyses and found that in many
whistleblowing. Organizations should consider the instances we needed several studies to reverse our
possibility that the individuals in these positions substantive findings.
(wrongly) believe their primary responsibility is to A third limitation concerns the lack of reliability
save face for the organization by, at times, cov- data available in the studies included in this meta-
ering up transgressions, or by dealing with wrong- analysis. All measures are affected by measurement
doing using other non-traditional or unsanctioned error and thus the correlates reported here are
measures. Further, even though these employees underestimates of true relationships. Related to
have been appointed to a watchdog role, they unreliability in the measures, we found that many
may still fear they would betray their organization by studies did not report adequate measures of construct
blowing the whistle; similarly, they may still fear validity for the measures that were employed. Sim-
unsanctioned retaliation for whistleblowing by ilarly, many studies used ad-hoc measures of retali-
coworkers or supervisors. Top management should ation. No evidence was presented why certain
ensure that the internal reporting channels are behaviors are considered to be retaliatory. This
free from leaks and are manned by trustworthy illuminates the need to focus on construct validity
individuals. issues in future. It would also be profitable if stan-
Finally, when possible, organizations may consider dardized measures are used for the main variables in
publicizing when an incident of whistleblowing has future research.
Whistleblowing and Retaliation 295

Another issue concerns the potential for alterna- easily translate into conclusions about whistleblowers.
tive explanations for the differences reported Rather, to advance our understanding of this field, we
between studies examining whistleblowing inten- need to explore and enumerate the processes that
tions and those exploring whistleblowing actions. occur between the time wrongdoing is witnessed and
Specifically, an anonymous reviewer raised the when actual whistleblowing occurs.
important point that since many studies on behav-
ioral intentions utilize scenario-based approaches,
something about this research methodology, other Acknowledgement
than the fact that intentions rather than actions are
studied, may explain the differing results. This is al- We wish to thank the Editor and two anonymous
ways a concern in content domains where substan- reviewers for their valuable comments and sugges-
tially similar research methodologies are consistently tions on an earlier version of this manuscript.
employed (i.e., whistleblowing intentions research
relies heavily upon survey-based and scenario-based
approaches). It is possible that the use of the scenario-
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