PRESBITERO V.

FERNANDEZ
G.R. NO. L-19527. MARCH 30, 1963

FACTS:
ESPERIDION Presbitero failed to furnish Nava the value of theproperties under
litigation. Presbitero was ordered by the lower court topay Nava to settle his debts.
Nava's counsel still tried to settle this case with Presbitero, out of court. But to no avail.
Thereafter, the sheriff levied upon and garnished the sugar quotas allotted to the
plantation and adhered to the Ma-ao Mill District and registered in the name of
Presbitero as the original plantation owner. The sheriff was not able to present for
registration thereof to the Registry of Deeds. The court then ordered Presbitero to
segregate the portion of Lot 608 pertaining to Nava from the mass of properties
belonging to the defendant within a period to expire on August 1960. Bottomline,
Presbitero did not meet his obligations, and the auction sale was scheduled. Presbitero
died after.
RICARDO Presbitero, the estate administrator, then petitioned that the sheriff
desist in holding the auction sale on the ground that the levy on the sugar quotas was
invalid because the notice thereof was not registered with the Registry of Deeds.

ISSUE:
W/N the sugar quotas are real (immovable) or personal properties.

HELD:
They are real properties. a) The Sugar Limitation Law xxx attaching to the land
xxx (p 631); b) RA 1825xxx to be an improvement attaching to the land xxx (p 631)c) EO
# 873 "plantation" xxx to which is attached an allotment of centrifugal sugar. 3) Under
the express provisions of law, the sugar quota allocations are accessories to the land,
and cannot have independent existence away from a plantation. 4) Since the levy is
invalid for non-compliance with law, xxx the levy amount to no levy at all.
GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES, INC. VS CA
G.R. NO. 76217. SEP. 14, 1989

FACTS:
Spouses Jose are residents of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA are owners of the land
situated in sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal (the land being disputed in the case at
bar.) The spouses Jose executed a special power of attorney authorizing petitioner German
Management Services to develop their property. They have already acquired the proper permits
to do so but they discovered that the land was occupied by the respondent with 20 other
farmers (members of the Concerned of Farmers Association.) These farmers have occupied the
land for the last twelve to fifteen years prior to the issuance of the permits and they already
have their crops all over the property. In short, they are in actual possession of the land.
Petitioners tried to forcibly drive the farmers away and; demolish and bulldoze their
crops and property. The respondents filed in CFI because they were deprived of their property
without due process of law by trespassing, demolishing and bulldozing their crops and
property situated in the land. CFI and RTC denied it but CA reversed the decision. Petitioners
tried to appeal the decision in CA but were denied thus this appeal
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondents are entitled to file a forcible entry case against
petitioner?
HELD:
YES, they are entitled to file a forcible entry case! Since private respondents were in
actual possession of the property at the time they were forcibly ejected by petitioner, private
respondents have a right to commence an action for forcible entry regardless of the legality or
illegality of possession.
Private respondents, as actual possessors, can commence a forcible entry case against
petitioner because ownership is not in issue. Forcible entry is merely a quieting process and
never determines the actual title to an estate. Title is not involved, only actual possession. It is
undisputed that private respondents were in possession of the property and not the petitioners
nor the spouses Jose. Although the petitioners have a valid claim over ownership this does not
in any way justify their act of forcible entry. It must be stated that regardless of the actual
condition of the title to the property the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned
out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can
recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his
possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain
on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. The doctrine of self-help, which the petitioners were using
to justify their actions, are not applicable in the case because it can only be exercised at the time
of actual or threatened dispossession which is absent in the case at bar (in fact they are the ones
who are threatening to remove the respondents with the use of force.) Article 536 basically tells
us that the owner or a person who has a better right over the land must resort to judicial means
to recover the property from another person who possesses the land.
When possession has already been lost, the owner must resort to judicial process for the
recovery of property. As clearly stated in Article 536 - In no case may possession be acquired
through force or intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects thereto. He who
believes that he has an action or right to deprive another of the holding of a thing must invoke
the aid of the competent court, if holder should refuse to deliver the thing.
SANTOS VS. BERNABE
G.R. NO. L-31163. NOV. 6, 1929

FACTS:
Santos deposited 778 cavans and 38 kilos of palay in the warehouse of Bernabe.
At the same time, Tiongson also deposited 1,026 cavans and 9 kilos of palay. The share
of Tiongson and Santos were mixed together and cannot be separated.
Later on and for some unknown reason, Tiongson files a case against Bernabe to
recover the 1,026 cavans and 9 kilos of palay deposited in Bernabes warehouse. So
Tiongson files for a petition for a writ of attachment and the Court granted it. Bernabes
properties were attached, including only 924 cavans of rice and 31 kilos of palay.
These were sold at a public auction and the proceeds were delivered to Tiongson.
Santos tried to intervene in the attachment of the palay but then the sheriff had
already proceeded with the attachment, so Santos files a complaint. He says that
Tiongson cannot claim the 924 cavans of palay; he says that by asking for the
attachment of the properties, Tiongson is claiming that the cavans of rice all belonged to
Bernabe and not to him.

ISSUE:
W/N Tiongson can claim the 924 cavans of rice as his own.

HELD:
No, both Tiongson and Santos must divide the cavans and palay proportionately.
The cavans belonging to Santos, having been mixed with those belonging to
Tiongson, the following rule prescribed is Article 381 of the Civil Code: If, by will of
one of their owners, two things of identical or dissimilar nature are mixed, or if the
mixture occurs accidentally, if in the latter case, the things cannot be separated without
injury, each owner shall acquire a right in the mixture proportionate to the part
belonging to him, according to the value of the things mixed or comingled.
The number of kilos in a cavan not having been determined, the Court took the
proportion only of the 924 cavans of palay which were attached andsold, therby giving
Santos, who deposited 778 cavans, 398.49 and Tiongson, who deposited 1,026 cavans,
525.51, or the value thereof at the rate of 3Php per cavan.
REPUBLIC VS. HEIRS OF DIGNOS-SORONO
G.R. NO. 171571. MARCH 24, 2008

FACTS:
2 were adjudicated by the then Court of First Instance of Cebu in favor of the
following in four equal shares:

a) Francisca Dignos, married to Blas Sorono share in the two lots;

b) Tito Dignos share in the two lots;

c) predecessors-in-interest of the respondents share in the two lots;

and

d) predecessors-in-interest of the respondents share in the two lots

It appears that the two lots were not partitioned by the adjudicatees. It appears
further that the heirs of Tito Dignos, who was awarded share in the two lots, sold the
entire two lots to the then Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) via a public
instrument entitled Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale without the knowledge of
respondents whose predecessors-in-interest were the adjudicatees of the rest of the
portion of the two lots.
In 1996, CAAs successor-in-interest, the Mactan Cebu International Airport
Authority (MCIAA), erected a security fence one of the lot and relocated a number of
families, who had built their dwellings within the airport perimeter, to a portion of said
lot to enhance airport security.
MCIAA later caused the issuance in its name of a Tax Declarations of the 2 lots.
Respondents soon asked the agents of MCIAA to cease giving third persons permission
to occupy the lots but the same was ignored.
Respondents thereupon filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title, Legal Redemption with
Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against MCIAA before the RTC of Lapu-
lapu City. Respondents further alleged that neither they nor their predecessors-in-
interests sold, alienated or disposed of their shares in the lots of which they have been
in continuous peaceful possession. Respondents furthermore alleged that neither
petitioner nor its predecessor-in-interest had given them any written notice of its
acquisition of the share of Tito Dignos.
The Republic, represented by the MCIAA in its Answer with Counterclaim,
maintained that from the time the lots were sold to its predecessor-in-interest CAA, it
has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession thereof; through
acquisitive prescription, it had acquired valid title to the lots since it was a purchaser in
good faith and for value; and assuming arguendo that it did not have just title, it had,
by possession for over 30 years, acquired ownership thereof by extraordinary
prescription. At all events, petitioner contended that respondents action was barred by
estoppel and laches.
The trial court found for respondents. the CA affirmed the trial courts decision.
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari

ISSUE:
1. WON the sale of the entire 2 lots by the heirs of Tito binding to the respondents
2. WON estoppel and laches should work against respondents

HELD:
The petition is denied.
1. NO. Article 493 of the Civil Code provides:
Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and
even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involved. But the effect of the alienation of the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners,
shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership.
Apropos is the following pertinent portion of this Courts decision in Bailon-
Casilao v. CA:
As early as 1923, this Court has ruled that even if a co-owner sells the whole
property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-
owners who did not consent to thesale.This is because under the aforementioned codal
provision, the sale or other disposition affects only his undivided share and the
transferee gets only what would correspond to his grantor in the partition of the thing
owned in common.
From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to sell his
undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the consent of
the other co-owners is NOT null and void. However, only the rights of the co-owner-
seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.
Petitioners predecessor-in-interest CAA thus acquired only the rights pertaining
to the sellers-heirs of Tito Dignos, which is only undivided share of the two lots.

2. NO. Registered lands cannot be the subject of acquisitive prescription. Petitioners

insistence that it acquired the property through acquisitive prescription, if not ordinary,
then extraordinary, does not lie. It bears emphasis at this juncture that in the
Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale forged by CAA and Tito Dignos heirs the following
material portions thereof validate the claim of respondents that the two lots were
registered: x x x x
That since the OCT of Title of the above-mentioned property/ies has/have been
lost and/or destroyed and the VENDEE hereby binds itself to reconstitute said title/s
at its own expense and that the HEIRS-VENDORS, their heirs, successors and assigns
bind themselves to help in the reconstitution of title so that the said lot/s may be
registered in the name of the VENDEE in accordance with law x x x x

NOTES:
As for petitioners argument that the redemption price should be of the
prevailing market value, not of the actual purchase price, since, so it claims, (1) the
respondents received just compensation for the property at the time it was purchased
by the Government; and, (2) the property, due to improvements introduced by
petitioner in its vicinity, is now worth several hundreds of millions of pesos, the law is
not on its side.
Thus, Article 1088 of the Civil Code provides:
Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the
partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by
reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one
month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor. The Court
may take judicial notice of the increase in value of the lots.
As mentioned earlier, however, the heirs of Tito Dignos did not notify
respondents about the sale. At any rate, since the Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale
stipulates, thus:
That the HEIRS-VENDORS, their heirs, assigns and successors, undertake and
agree to warrant and defend the possession and ownership of the property/ies herein
sold against any and all just claims of all persons whomsoever and should the VENDEE
be disturbed in its possession, to prosecute and defend the same in the Courts of Justice.
Petitioner is not without any remedy. This decision is, therefore, without
prejudice to petitioners right to seek redress against the vendors-heirs of Tito Dignos
and their successors-in-interest.