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GR No.
Date: By: DORIA
Topic: Remedies from judgment (same court, same case)
Spouses Regino Cleofas and Lucia de la Cruz filed suit against St. Peter Memorial Park, Inc. (St. Peter), Araceli Wijangco del Rosario, National Investment
and Development Corporation (NIDC), Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank (Banco Filipino), the Register of Deeds of Rizal, the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City and the Sheriff of Quezon City. In their amended complaint, the spouses prayed:
That they be declared the rightful owners of Lot No. 719 of the Piedad Estate,
That the Torrens Title to said lot be reconstituted, the title thereto of their deceased predecessor, Antonio Cleofas, having been burned in a fire
in 1933;
That the certificates of title over said lot in the name of the Memorial Park, and that in the name of Wijangco del Rosario, and all the certificates
of title from which these certificates were derived be declared null and void;
That the mortgages over said, lot constituted in favor of Banco Filipino and the NIDC be declared null and void;
That the Memorial Park be ordered to pay plaintiffs damages. May 2, 1973 After trial, lower court decision in favor of the plaintiffs and against
the defendants. June 23, 1973 The Memorial Park and Banco Filipino filed their joint motion for reconsideration of the decision. June 30, 1973
They filed a joint motion for new trial.
July 9, 1973 - The Memorial Park filed a supplement to the motion for reconsideration with prayer for new trial. Plaintiffs opposed the motion for
reconsideration and/or new trial.
January 10, 1974 - The plaintiffs moved for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction and restoration of receivership.
February 5, 1974 - The trial court denied new trial. (From this decision, it appears that the parties do not dispute that the lot of Piedad Estate (PE for
brevity) forms part of the land covered by Original Certificate Title No. 614 in the name of the Government of the PH Islands.)

March 20, 1909 Director of Lands, as administrator of PE, executed a contract in favor of Antonio Cleofas
July 1929 - Entry made showing the award and final sale to A. Cleofas by the government (however, the page15 of OCT 614 where this is found is torn and
only parts of the details appears) - Basis of the decision: respondent judge - Also this newly discovered evidence prompted the filing of motion for new
1933 - Antonio Cleofas, their predecessor his title burned in a fire. Private respondent (PR) did not take any step to reconstruct said title until the real
estate boom in Quezon City.
1945 - Evidence of PR: Antonio took possession of the lot and occupied the same until his death
But when they filed a petition for reconstruction in the CFI QC, they discovered that the lot was already in the name of Narciso and Martin
predecessors of the Memorial Park. However, to support PRs allegation, they presented a mother title of the PE. (contained many sheets because
the estate was large)
On the other hand: Memorial Park and Banco Filipino evidence:
July 15, 1921 - A. Cleofas executed a Deed of Assignment of Sales of Lot 719 in favor of Martin deed approved on July 22, 1921
May 2, 1932 - Bureau of Lands issued a Deed of Conveyance of Lot 719 in favor of Martin and Narciso upon payment of full price deed issued to both on
June 17, 1932. Then declared the lot in their name for taxation.
May 1, 1937 - They sold the lot to Nazario Roque. Upon his death to heirs.
1967 - St. Peter Memorial Park purchased Lot 719 for value and in good faith from the heirs.

Newly Discovered Evidence: St. Peter solved the issue of the missing details of the torn evidence. The entry on that page found by respondent judge refers to a
different lot. These are newly discovered evidence within the meaning of par. (b), Sec. 1, Rule 137 of the ROC and/or evidence not presented due to mistake or
excusable negligence within the purview of par. (a) supra.

February 21, 1974 Banco Filipino and the Memorial Park filed their notice of appeal from the decision of May 2, 1973, and filed their cash bond. Within
the reglementary period they filed their joint record on appeal.
February 28, 1974 - The Memorial Park filed before the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction (L-38280)
against the trial judge and the plaintiff spouses, seeking annulment of the court's order denying new trial, on the ground that the same was issued in grave
abuse of discretion.
March 7, 1974 Court issued a restraining order: (respondent judge) restrained from enforcing decision of May 2, 1973 and Feb. 5, 1974.
July 8, 1974 Court dismissed the appeal filed by both the Memorial Park and Banco Filipino.

1.) Whether the respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the Memorial Park and Banco Filipino in its order of Jul 8, 1974? YES
2.) Whether respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion when it denied in its order a motion for new trial of the Memorial Park? YES
Petition granted. The grounds cited by petitioners for the allowance of the writ of certiorari, justify the giving of due course to the petitions in these two cases, for
ordinary appeal will not be adequate. Respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion for new trial, having disregarded in a capricious
and arbitrary manner, the newly discovered evidence.

It must be noted that the petitioner in L-38280 is only St. Peter Memorial Park. Banco Filipino is not a party in that first proceeding before this Court. Thus, whatever
may be the effect of the filing of a petition for certiorari, on the pending appeal, cannot affect the appeal of Banco Filipino. And the respondent Judge clearly
committed a clear error and a grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the appeal of Banco Filipino due to the filing by the Memorial Park of its petition in L-
38280. Moreover, as will now be explained, the dismissal of the appeal violated the restraining order issued by this Court.

The general rule is that the extraordinary writ of certiorari is not proper when ordinary appeal is available. However, we have granted the writ in cases where it is
shown that appeal would be inadequate, slow, and insufficient and will not promptly relieve petitioner from the injurious effects of the order complained of. The
grounds cited by petitioners for the allowance of the writ of certiorari, justify the giving of due course to the petitions in these two cases, for ordinary appeal will not
be adequate. As many memorial lot buyers are affected, and the very integrity of the Torrens system is at stake, public interest is involved.
This rule for the granting of a motion for new trial, as all other rules of procedure, should be liberally construed to assist the parties in obtaining a just and speedy
determination of their rights. Court litigations are primarily for the search of truth, and a liberal interpretation of the rules by which both parties are given the fullest
opportunity to adduce proofs is the best way to find out such truth. The dispensation of justice and vindication of legitimate grievances should not be barred by

The evidence sought to be presented in a new trial by petitioner became pertinent and important only after trial, when judgment was rendered by respondent Judge
that private respondents have a valid and subsisting title to Lot 719 on the basis of sheet 15 of OCT 614 which on its face does not mention Lot 719. Based on the
incomplete data, petitioner conducted a new search and discovered the evidence it now seeks to present in a new trial, indubitably showing that sheet 15 refers to
a title to Lot 640, and not to Lot 719 in the name of petitioner (St. peter). If admitted in a new trial, these newly discovered evidence will probably alter the judgment
of the trial court.


For new trial, Rule 37, Sec. 1 (b), the requisites for the grant of new trial based on are:
1. That such evidence has been discovered after the trial;
2. That even with the exercise of reasonable diligence, it could not have been discovered and produced at that trial; and
3. That such evidence is of such a nature as to alter the result of the case if admitted. NOTES


GR No. 143929
Date: FEBRUARY 28, 2003 By: AMER.
1. Respondent is a owner of a 1000sqm residential lot in Sampaloc, Manila. Beside said lot is a lot owned by Petitioners with an area of 114sqm.
2. Building and other improvements on the land of respondents were destroyed by fire.
3. Petitioners built a kitchen and in the process encroached a portion of respondents lot
4. Respondent resurveyed her land by a geodetic engineer and she was able to confirm petitioner had encroached her property by 19sqms.
5. Respondent made several demands to vacate portion of her that petitioners are illegally occupying but petioner did not comply to such demand.
6. Respondent filed with the RTC of Manila a complaint against petitioners, praying that the court determine the rightful owner of the area in dispute.
7. Trial court ordered a resurvey of the lots. Respondent appointed Engr. Honorio Santamaria as servoyer of her lot and petitioner chose Engr. Rosario
8. Santamaria reported that petitioners had encroached upon respondents lot by an area of 19sqm. On the other hand, Mercados report did not cointain a
similar finding.
9. Trial Court was able to establish common boundary of the parties lots but it could not conclusively determine whether the disputed area belonged to
respondent or petitioner.
10. Trial court issued an order calling for another resurvey and directed the director of the bureau of lands to appoint competent geodetic engineer to
undertake the resurvey.
11. Engr. Elpidio de Lara resurveyed the properties pursuant to the order of the trial court. Thereafter, He submitted a survey report with a verification plan,
stating that petitioners had encroached upon 17 sq. m. of respondents lot.
12. RTC rendered decision holding that petitioners had encroached on respondents lot by an area of 17 sqm.
13. Petitioner filed with trial court a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. They claimed that the TCT covering respondents lot
referred to another lot owned by Sps. Tupaz. RTC denied the motion for lack of merit.
14. CA affirmed in toto the decision of trial court and ruled Court of Appeals ruled that
The evidence presented before it supported the factual findings of the RTC. It, likewise, held that the trial court did not err in denying the motion
for new trial, since petitioners had not satisfactorily shown that they exercised reasonable diligence in producing or locating a copy of TCT No.
180189 in the name of Nolasco and Editha Tupaz before or during trial but had nonetheless failed to secure it.
Whether CA erred in affirming the decision of TRC in denying the motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence ---------- NO. NO.
1. The Court sustains the findings of the appellate court that petitioners motion for new trial was correctly denied by the trial court.
2. We have previously ruled that a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence shall be granted when the concurrence of
the following requisites is established:
(a) The evidence is discovered after trial;
(b) The evidence could not have been discovered and produced during trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; and
(c) The evidence is material and not merely corroborative, cumulative or impeaching and is of such weight that if admitted, would probably
change the judgment.
3. In order that a particular piece of evidence may be regarded as newly discovered for purposes of granting a new trial, it is essential to show
that the offering party exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate such evidence before or during trial but had nonetheless failed to
secure it.
4. The evidence offered by petitioners, TCT No. 180189 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Manila not to respondent, but to Spouses Nolasco
E. Tupaz and Editha L. Tupaz, does not satisfy the aforementioned requisites.
5. The Court notes that although petitioners found out about the existence of said TCT only after trial, they could have easily discovered the
same before or during the trial of the case had they bothered to check the TCT of respondents lot to ascertain whether or not it overlapped
with their own lot.
6. In any case, TCT No. 180189 is hardly material to their case, considering that respondents TCT is of a different number: TCT No. 180199. Hence, it
is not difficult to see why the two certificates of title refer to different parcels of land and owners. Such piece of evidence would certainly not have
affected, much less, altered the outcome of the case.
G.R. No. 112795.
June 27, 1994 Topic: Remedies
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court to reverse and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals.
PR Ernesto Banez filed a complaint for a sum of money against petitioner Capuz at the RTC of Kalookan.
On Sept 5 summons was served to Capuz
Set 25 Petitioner failed to file an answer. PR Banez filed an EX PARTE motion to declare Capuz in default.
Oct 23 the court granted the motion and authorized the Banez to present evidence ex parte. 5 days after Banez presented his evidence ex parte.
Nov 6 the court rendered decision in favor of Banez ordering Capuz to pay principle amount principal damages, interest and attorneys fees.
th rd th
Nov 13 the petitioner Capuz received the copy of the Oct 23 decision dated Nov 6 .
Nov 23 petitioner filed a verified motion to lift the order of default and to set aside the decision. He stated that upon receiving the summon on Sept
5 , he went immediately to Banez and showed his receipt (evidence of payment of the obligation) and in the same conversation, Banez assured him not to
worry and that he will advise his lawyer to withdraw the complaint.
Dec 7 trial court denied the motion stating that the filing of the motion to lift order of default did not stop the running of the period of appeal, for his only
right at the moment is to receive notice of further proceedings regardless of whether the order of default is set aside or not. What he could have done instead
was to appeal the Decision before the expiration of the period to appeal. Since he failed to make a timely appeal, the decision became final.
Petitioner filed MR but was also denied.
Petitioner then filed petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA, but was dismissed for lack of merit. It held that (1) that petitioner's motion to lift
the order of default and set aside the judgment was improper because there was already a judgment by default rendered when it was filed; (2) that having
discovered the order of default after the rendition of the judgment, the remedy of petitioner was either to appeal the decision or file a motion for new trial
under Rule 37; and (3) that the said motion could not be considered as a motion for new trial under Rule 37 because it was not accompanied by an affidavit
of merit.
Thus this petition for review under Rule 45 filed with the SC
#1: WON the petitioner has availed of the proper remedy?
#2: WON the motion to lift the order of default and to set aside the decision could be treated as a motion for new trial under Rule 37?
#1: YES, Petitioner properly availed of the remedy provided for in Section 1, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Respondent court also erred when it held that petitioner should have appealed from the decision, instead of filing the motion to lift the order of default,
because he still had two days left within which to appeal when he filed the said motion. Paragraph 3 of Section 2, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court,
provides that: "a party who has been declared in default may likewise appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the
law, even if no petition for relief to set aside the order of default has been presented by him in accordance with Rule 38."
Petitioner properly availed of the remedy provided for in Section 1, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court because the appeal under Section 2, Rule 41 was
not, under the circumstances, a "plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." In an appeal under Section 2, Rule 41, the party in default
can only question the decision in the light of the evidence on record. In other words, he cannot adduce his own evidence, like the receipt to prove payment
by petitioner herein of his obligation to private respondent.

Issue #2: YES, The grounds alleged by petitioner in his motion are the same as the grounds for a motion for new trial under Rule 37.
The only reason why respondent court did not consider the motion of petitioner as a motion for new trial was because the said motion did not
include an affidavit of merit. The allegations contained in an affidavit of merit required to be attached to a motion to lift an order of default or for
a new trial need not be embodied in a separate document but may be incorporated in the petition itself.
The grounds are (1) that petitioner's failure to file his answer was due to fraud, mistake, accident or excusable negligence; and (2) that he was a
meritorious defense. Petitioner explained that upon receiving the summons, he immediately saw private respondent and confronted him with the
receipt evidencing his payment. Thereupon, private respondent assured him that he would instruct his lawyer to withdraw the complaint. The prior
payment of the loan sought to be collected by private respondent is a good defense to the complaint to collect the same loan again.
The affidavit of merit may either be drawn up as a separate document and appended to the motion for new trial or the facts which should otherwise be set
out in said separate document may, with equal effect, be alleged in the verified motion itself.
Issue #1: Petitioner properly availed of the remedy provided for in Section 1, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court as compared to the appeal under Section 2, Rule
41, because on the latter, he wont be able to provide evidence such as the receipt for payment because the remedy under this section is confined in the evidence already
presented and since the trial was ex parte, his evidence was not presented.

Issue #2: When a motion to lift an order of default contains the reasons for the failure to answer as well as the facts constituting the prospective defense of
the defendant and it is sworn to by said defendant, neither a formal verification nor a separate affidavit of merit is necessary.
GR No. L-21163 / L-25495
Date: May 17, 1972 By: ZAF
Topic: Remedies from judgments (same court, same case) - Newly discovered evidence: must be material and not discoverable during trial
On June 18, 1937, the late Pascual Libudan filed a petition for the registration of a 188,725-square-meter land. Jose Palma Gil claiming
that he purchased the entire land from one Mangob (Samal), opposed the petition.
Three months after he filed his amended opposition in the registration case, Jose Palma Gil sought in Civil Case No. 204 before the Justice
of the Peace Court of Samal, the ejectment of Libudan from the 15-hectare area claimed by the former in the registration case. Judgment
was rendered by the Justice of the Peace Court ordering Libudan (and his agents) to vacate the premises, restore the possession to Jose
Palma Gil and pay him P320 for the value of the products taken therefrom plus P100 as damages for the illegal occupation.
Nine months thereafter, or on September 7, 1940, the Davao Land Registration Court rendered judgment confirming the title of Jose Palma
Gil over the 15-hectare portion of the land, and awarding the remainder thereof or the 31,040-square-meter portion to Libudan.
Libudan appealed to the Court of Appeals. During the pendency of the appeal, the Sheriff of Davao, to satisfy the alias writ of execution
issued in Civil Case No. 204 (the judgment having already become final) levied upon the 31,040-square-meter portion previously
adjudicated to Libudan by the Registration Court, and on December 27, 1940, sold it at public auction to Jose Palma Gil. Failure of Libudan
to redeem the property within the one year statutory period resulted in the execution of the final deed of sale, followed by the delivery of
the possession of the property to Jose Palma Gil.
Meanwhile during the Second World War, the records of the land registration case pending with the Court of Appeals were destroyed, and,
as said Court failed to reconstitute them, the case was remanded to the lower court for new trial on October 21, 1951.
The Davao Court of First Instance dismissed the case on the procedural technicality: that the action should have been instituted against the
judicial administrator of the estate of the deceased Libudan. But on appeal, the Court of Appeals, reversed, after finding that "... the land
ordered registered and title issued in the name of the late Pascual Libudan in Registration Case No. 281, G.L.R.O. Record No. 51986 ... is
the same as that described in the complaint as well as in the certificate of sale issued in Civil Case No. 204."
Not satisfied with this decision, Palinkud Samal appealed to the Supreme Court, but we sustained the Court of Appeals. Two years before
the aforequoted decision of the Supreme Court was promulgated, or on May 29, 1954, the Davao Registration Court, after holding a new
trial in G.L.R.O. 281, adjudicated to Pascual Libudan's heirs, the entire parcel of land applied for (18.8725 heactares).
The Registration Court rejected the claim of oppositor Jose Palma Gil that the property claimed by him is part of the land he bought from
Mongob. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its decision promulgated on May 6, 1961, or five years after the Supreme Court
confirmed Jose Palma Gil's ownership over the 31,040-square-meter portion of the land in controversy.
Seven months after the affirmance by the Appellate Court of the judgment in the registration case, the substituted applicants filed two
motions in the court below: one, for issuance of a registration decree; and, two, for a writ of execution. But before the Court could act on
those motions, the heirs of Jose Palma Gil filed a "Petition to Review Judgment and/or Substitution", dated January 5, 1962, and later
amended on February 27, 1962.
Pascual Libudan's heirs, on March 3, 1962, moved to dismiss the petition for review and/or substitution.
After a pre-trial conference, the trial court decided first to resolve the oppositor's Petition for Review and/or Substitution before ruling on
the applicants' motions for issuance of registration decree and for writ of possession.

(1) Whether the facts alleged in oppositors' petition for review constitute fraud within the context of Sec. 38, Act 496 to warrant the reopening and
review of the Registration Court's final judgment which incidentally bears the imprimatur of affirmance by the Appellate Court. - YES
(2) Whether the court a quo erred in granting without formal presentation of evidence but solely on the pleadings, the alternative petition of the
oppositors for substitution under Sec. 29, Act 496 with respect to the 31,040-square-meter portion of the land previously adjudicated to applicants. -

Ruling: The court affirmed the appealed order.

I. The court resort to the law. As provided in the pertinent portion of Section 38 of Act 496. The basic elements for the allowance of the reopening or
review of a decree, therefore, are: (1) that the petitioner has real or dominical right; (2) that he has been deprived thereof; (3) through fraud; (4) that
the petition is filed within one year from the issuance of the decree; and (5) that the property has not as yet been transferred to an innocent purchaser.

The purpose of the law in giving aggrieved parties, deprived of land or any interest therein, through fraud in the registration proceedings, the
opportunity to review the decree is to insure fair and honest dealing in the registration of land. But the action to annul a judgment, upon the ground
of fraud, would be unavailing unless the fraud be extrinsic or collateral and the facts upon which it is based have not been controverted or resolved
in the case where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered. Extrinsic or collateral fraud, as distinguished from intrinsic fraud, connotes any
fraudulent scheme executed by a prevailing litigant "outside the trial of a case against the defeated party, or his agents, attorneys or witnesses, whereby
said defeated party is prevented from presenting fully and fairly his side of the case." But intrinsic fraud takes the form of "acts of a party in a litigation
during the trial, such as the use of forged instruments or perjured testimony, which did not affect the presentation of the case, but did prevent a fair
and just determination of the case."

Thus, relief is granted to a party deprived of his interest in land where the fraud consists in a deliberate misrepresentation that the lots are not contested
when in fact they are; or in applying for and obtaining adjudication and registration in the name of a co-owner of land which he knows had not been
alloted to him in the partition; or in intentionally concealing facts, and conniving with the land inspector to include in the survey plan the bed of a
navigable stream; or in willfully misrepresenting that there are no other claims; or in deliberately failing to notify the party entitled to notice; or in
inducing him not to oppose an application; or in misrepresenting about the identity of the lot to the true owner by the applicant causing the former to
withdraw his opposition. In all these examples the over-riding consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party
from having his day in court or from presenting his case. The fraud, therefore, is one that affects and goes into the jurisdiction of the court. The reason
for the rule is to put an end to litigations.

II. This brings us to the issue of substitution. Applicants would find fault in the trial court's finding that the 31,040-square-meter lot purchased by
Jose Palma Gil in the sheriff's sale on December 27, 1940, forms part of the 18.8725-hectare land applied for by, and adjudicated to the heirs of
Pascual Libudan by final judgment of the court in the registration proceedings, when no formal hearing and presentation of witnesses or submission
of evidence was conducted in connection with the petition for review and/or for substitution, and the factual finding based solely on the pleadings. It
is applicants' posture, that the trial court's reliance on the annexes to the petition for review and/or for substitution as basis of its factual findings is a
reversible error, such annexes not having been formally offered in evidence in accordance with Section 72, Rule 123 (now Rule 132, Sec. 35).

One cannot, of course, quarrel over the need for a formal offer of evidence, the purpose of which is to inform the court about what is expected to be
proved and "to preserve exceptions to the conclusion of the offered evidence." Moreover, the judge has to build his factual findings and his judgment
only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. Hence, documents that form no part of the proofs before the court will not be
considered in disposing of issues before it.

But that does not dispose of the question. For it should be noted that a pre-trial was held, and as a result thereof the trial court issued an order on
July 28, 1962, granting the parties 20 days to file their respective memoranda, "after which the petition will be considered submitted for
resolution." the applicants concede that "the findings of fact of the Court as contained" in its order are not based "merely on the allegations of the
appellants' petition for review of judgment but on the set of facts brought out during the pre-trial." Moreover, the applicants in their motion to
dismiss did not deny the oppositors' allegations on the identity of the land or of the fact that the land (the registration and issuance of title of which
was decreed in favor of Pascual Libudan by the Davao Registration Court in G.L.R.O. No.51986) was subsequently sold at a Sheriff's sale on
December 27, 1940 to Jose Palma Gil, and his title thereon confirmed by this Court. As a matter of fact, in their motion for reconsideration, dated
October 18, 1962, applicants admitted that "the 31,040 square meters, subject-matter of Civil Case 458, is part of the land applied for in the
present registration proceedings ..." Admission by parties in the pleading do not require proof and cannot be contradicted.
Section 38 of Act 496, reads: Sec. 38. ... Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected
thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or decree; subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of
any state or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the competent Court of First Instance a petition for review within
one year after entry of the decree provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest. ..."
Case Name: VICENTE DELOS SANTOS, et al, petitioner v. FRED ELIZALDE, and Joan Elizalde, Jesus Delos Santos, Rosita Delos Santos et al, respondent
GR No. 141810 & 141812
Date: February 2, 2007 By: ANJ
Topic: Remedies from Judgments (same court, same case)
On December 15, 1986, petitioners filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title, Damages and Attorneys Fees before the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan involving 4
adjoing lots.
On May 8, 1991, An amended complaint was thereafter filed
Petitioners claimed the lots as their inheritance from the late Mariano delos Santos, their common ascendant. They also alleged that the late Mariano delos
Santos was the original owner of the lots.
o Respondent Spouses Fred and Joan Elizalde (first set of intervenors), claimed that they purchased the lots on June 18, 1974 from heirs of Leonardo
delos Santos (owner of the said land)
o Respondent Gloria Martin, Domingo Casimero, et al. (second intervenors) claimed ownership as heirs of Tomasa Prado, who alleged to own
the said lots.
o Respondents Rosita delos Santos-Flores and Jesus delos Santos, (third set of intervenors) and two of the legitimate children of the late Leonardo
delos Santos, claimed 2/3 of the lots as their rightful inheritance.
Trial court issued the April 29, 1996 Decision dismissing the complaint filed by plaintiffs, Declaring Jesus delos Santos and Rosita delos Santos Flores as
the lawful owners of 2/3s protion of the land in question, declaring defendant Fred Elizalde as the rightful owner of one-third of the land in question.
Petitioners and respondent Fred Elizalde filed their separate Notices of Appeal dated June 6, 1996 and May 16, 1996, respectively. The cases were docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 48475 for respondent Elizalde and CA-G.R. CV No. 54136 for petitioners. CA issued the June 2, 1998 Notice to File Brief, requiring
petitioners and respondent Elizalde to file their briefs within forty-five (45) days from receipts of said notice.
On July 1998, Petitioners filed by registered mail a July 27, 1998 Motion for Extension of Time to File Brief for Plaintiffs Appellants.
Respondents Fred Elizalde et al filed an October 6, 1998 Joint Manifestation and Motion, whereby respondent Elizalde abandoned his appeal by virtue of
an amicable settlement between the parties through the May 27, 1997 Agreement. (They agreed to swap and re-adjust the areas adjudged by the trial court
in their favor). Also, moved that his appeal be considered as withdrawn and that he be excused from filing an appellants brief.)
In sum, petitioners had total of extension of 180 days from July 27, 1998, when they filed a motion for extension before the CA for the first time.
Respondents opposed the foregoing motions for extension moved for dismissal of the appeal (for petitioners failure to file appellants brief)
On April 8, 1999, petitioners, through their former counsel Atty. Napoleon M. Victoriano, filed an Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw Appeal. Said motion sought
the withdrawal of the appeal because Petitioners and Respondents Delos Santos entered into an ammicable settlement whereby the Petitioners would be paid
the amount of 4M, in consideration of them leaving the disputed lots.

On May 11, 1999, CA issued assailed decision dismissing CA-G.R No. 54136 and SP No. 48475 and considering them withdrawn. For failure to file their respective
appellants briefs and in accordance with the prayer in the Joint Manifestation and Motion, and in the Ex Parte Motion to Withdrawal Appeal the appeal should be
considered dismissed, and considered as withdrawn.

Entry of Appearance was filed on June 17, 1999 by Atty. Cesar T. Verano (allegedly in representation of the Petitioners)
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Decision with Prayer for Reinstatement of Appeal, they did not have any knowledge of the promulgation
of the assailed Decision of the CA; they never entered into any amicable settlement with respondents Delos Santos, Their signatures were forged and they
did not authorize their former counsel, Atty. Victoriano to withdraw their appeal.
On July 16, 1999, respondents Delos Santos filed an Opposition for Reconsideration
Petitioners filed a Reply (To Opposition) that Atty. Victoriano did not furnish them a copy of the Decision of the CA.

On January 31, 2000, CA issued the assailed Resolution Motion for Reconsideration with prayer for the Reinstatement of Appeal filed by new counsel of
plaintiffs-appellants, is DENIED admission for being late by nine days. Plaintiffs-appellants counsel, Atty. Napoleon Victoriano, received copy of the Courts
Decision dated May 11, 1998 on May 24, 1999. Appellants had only until June 8, 1999 to file their Motion for Reconsideration.
Whether or not CA erred in dismissing the appeal, considering it withdrawn as prayed for by counsel, Atty. Victoriano and for not considering the fact that said
counsel was clearly at fault and/ or grossly negligent in the performance of his duties to his clients. NO.

Petitioners attribute the dismissal of their appeal and their failure to file a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period to their former counsels negligence,
Atty. Victoriano. Thus, petitioners seek the liberal application of the rules, citing Ginete v. Court of Appeals, wherein the counsel of record did not file an appellants
brief within the prescribed period and continued with the case for fear of reprisal from respondents who were judges. In said case, the SC ruled that the negligence of
the clients counsel does not bind them. The departure from the rule was explained, thus: The lawyers negligence without any participatory negligence on the part of
petitioners is a sufficient reason to set aside the resolutions of the Court of Appeals.
Aside from matters of life, liberty, honor or property which would warrant the suspension of the rules of the most mandatory character and an examination and review
by the appellate court of the lower courts findings of fact, the other elements that should be considered are the following: (1) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances, (2) the merits of the case, (3) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (4) a lack of
any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, (5) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. However, the Ginete case is not a
precedent to the case at bar because in said case, the party had no participatory negligence, while in the case at bar, petitioners were negligent in not monitoring
the developments in their case. Petitioners acts are considered inexcusable negligence in line with the SCs ruling in Bernardo v. Court of Appeals (Special Sixth
Division), where they explicated the vital participation of the parties in the effective handling of the case by their lawyers, thus: Worth mentioning is the fact that
petitioner was likewise not entirely blameless in his alleged deprivation of his day in court. "Litigants, represented by counsel, should not expect that all they need to
do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of their case. They should give the necessary assistance to their counsel for what is at stake is their interest in the case."

Concurrently, petitioners did not even know that Atty. Victoriano failed to file an appellants brief on their behalf during the more than one hundred eighty (180)-day
extension that he sought from the CA, aside from their failure to learn of the Decision of the appellate court. Ordinary prudence would dictate that petitioners must give
utmost importance to the case considering that it involves their residences, presumably their most valued material possession, and considering further that they had
already lost at the trial court. Petitioners failure to apprise themselves of the status of the case from the time that Atty. Victoriano received a copy of the notice to file
brief on June 15, 1998 up to June 2, 1999, when petitioners allegedly obtained a copy of the assailed Decision from the CA, is unjustified. Petitioners cannot be shielded
from the repercussions of their counsels and their own negligence. Petitioners themselves are as much to blame in losing their appeal. Petition denied.
The general rule is that motions for extension of time to file an appellants brief shall not be granted except for a good cause. No such justification is present in this
case. Petitioners failure to apprise themselves of the status of their case during its pendency before the CA is inexcusable. Moreover, their former counsels failure or
neglect to file the required appellants brief shall bind them.

Emilio Tuason v. Court of Appeals and Maria Victoria Tuason

GR No. 116607
Date: April 10, 1996 By: Jelica
Topic: Relief from Judgments: not available for lost remedy
Maria Victoria Lopez Tuason filed with the RTC of Makati a petition for annulment or declaration of nullity of her marriage
to Emilio Tuason.
After the issues were joined, trial commenced.
2 days before the scheduled reception of Emilios evidence, one of his counsel moved for a postponement on the ground that
the principal counsel was out of the country. The court granted the motion.
On the rescheduled hearing, the petitioner failed to appear.
On oral motion of Maria Victoria, the court declared Emilio to have waived his right to present evidence and deemed the case
submitted for decision on the basis of the evidence presented.
RTC rendered judgment declaring the nullity of Maria Victorias marriage to Emilio and awarding custody of the children to
Maria Victoria. No appeal was taken from the decision.
Maria Victoria filed a Motion for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Adjudication to Plaintiff of the Conjugal
Properties. Emilio opposed the motion.
Emilio, through new counsel, filed with the RTC a petition for relief from judgment of the RTC decision, which the RTC
Emilio appealed before the CA but the CA dismissed the appeal.
Is a petition for relief from judgment warranted under the circumstances of the case? NO
Under Rule 38, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, a final and executory judgment or order of the RTC may be set aside on the
ground of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. In addition, the petitioner must assert facts showing that he has a good,
substantial and meritorious defense or cause of action. If the petition is granted, the court shall proceed to hear and determine the case
as if a timely motion for new trial had been granted therein.
In the case at bar, the decision annulling Emilios marriage to Maria Victoria had already become final and executory when Emilio
failed to appeal during the reglementary period. Emilio however claims that the RTCs decision was null and void for violation of his
right to due process. He contends he was denied due process when, after failing to appear on 2 scheduled hearings, the RTC deemed
him to have waived his right to present evidence and rendered judgment on the basis of the evidence of Maria Victoria. Emilio justifies
his absence at the hearings on the ground that he was then confined for medical and/or rehabilitation reasons. In his affidavit of merit
before the RTC, he attached a certification by Lt. Col. Plaridel Vidal, Director of the Narcotics Command, Drug Rehabilitation Center,
that Emilio was admitted for treatment of drug dependency. The records, however, show that Emilios former counsel did not inform
the RTC of this confinement. And when the court rendered its decision, the same counsel was out of the country for which reason the
decision became final and executory as no appeal was taken therefrom.
The failure of Emilios counsel to notify him on time of the adverse judgment to enable him to appeal therefrom is negligence which
is not excusable. Notice sent to counsel of record is binding upon the client and the neglect or failure of counsel to inform him of an
adverse judgment resulting in the loss of his right to appeal is not a ground for setting aside a judgment valid and regular on its face.
Similarly inexcusable was the failure of his former counsel to inform the trial court of petitioners confinement and medical treatment
as the reason for his nonappearance at the scheduled hearings. Petitioner has not given any reason why his former counsel, intentionally
or unintentionally, did not inform the court of this fact. This led the trial court to order the case deemed submitted for decision on the
basis of the evidence presented by the private respondent alone. To compound the negligence of petitioners counsel, the order of the
trial court was never assailed via a motion for reconsideration.
Clearly, petitioner cannot now claim that he was deprived of due process. He may have lost his right to present evidence but he was
not denied his day in court. As the records show, petitioner, through counsel, actively participated in the proceedings below. He filed
his answer to the petition, cross-examined private respondents witnesses and even submitted his opposition to private respondents
motion for dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains.
Petition is DENIED.
A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy; it is allowed only in exceptional cases where there is no other available or
adequate remedy. When a party has another remedy available to him, which may be either a motion for new trial or appeal from an
adverse decision of the trial court, and he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing such
motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail himself of this petition. Indeed, relief will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance
from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence; otherwise the petition for relief
can be used to revive the right to appeal which had been lost thru inexcusable negligence. Notes
129.) Case Name: SPOUSES BENIGNO QUE & ERLINDA QUE, and ADELA URIAN vs. CA, HON. F. A. RUIZ, JR., Presiding
Judge, RTC Br. 24, Cabugao, Ilocos Sur, and ISABEL COSTALES
GR No. 150739
Date: August 18, 2005
Lorenzo Cario (Lorenzo), who died in 1960, originally owned a parcel of land subject to this case.
Thereafter, respondent Costales has been occupying as owner of a parcel of land after Lorenzos death. She declared the
property in her name for taxation purposes.
Costales claimed that she is Lorenzos granddaughter and as such, she inherited the subject lot form him
Costales filed a complaint against petitioners Urian (Lorenzos grandneice) and Sps. Que with the RTC for Annulment of
Quitclaim, Ownership, Possession and Damages
Under the Deed of Quitclaim, Costales renounced all her rights, interests, participation, title and possession over the subject
lot to Sps. Que while in the Acknowledgment, Arrieta confirmed receiving P30,000 from Urian. However, she alleged that
she did not sign the documents.
When Costales filed her Complaint, Sps. Que had taken possession of the lot. They also declared the land in their name for
tax purposes.
However, after receiving the summons, Atty. Ranot (petitioners counsel) failed to file an answer.
RTC declared petitioners in default and granted Costales motion to present evidence ex parte
RTC ruled in favor of Costales as the absolute owner of the subject land.
Sept 15, 2000 Urian received a copy of the RTCs decision
Oct 10, 2000 a new counsel, Atty. Bateria, sought reconsideration or new trial which was denied
Dec 18, 2000 - Petitioners represented by Atty. Cachapero, filed with the RTC a petition for Relief from Judgment under
Rule 38 of the ROC. They claimed that their failure to file an Answer and to seek reconsideration or new trial on time was
due to the excusable negligence of their previous counsels. They also invoked mistake and fraud as they were allegedly
under the impression that Atty. Ranot had prepared and filed the necessary pleading or that the necessary pleading to vacate
the judgment and secure new trial was prepared and filed. However, this was denied.
CA: affirmed the decision of the RTC. Held that petitioners filed their petition for relief from judgment beyond the 60-day
period under Section 3, Rule 38. CA also noted that the Rules allow a petition for relief from judgment only when there is no
other available remedy and not when litigants, like petitioners, lose a remedy by negligence.
WON CA erred in ruling that petitioners are not entitled to relief from judgment. NO
Under Section 1, Rule 38, the court may grant relief from judgment only when a judgment or final order is entered, or any other
proceeding is taken against a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence x x x.

In their petition for relief from judgment in the trial court, petitioners contended that judgment was entered against them through
mistake or fraud because they were allegedly under the impression that Atty. Ranot had prepared and filed the necessary pleading.
This is not the fraud or mistake contemplated under Section 1.

As used in that provision, mistake refers to mistake of fact, not of law, which relates to the case. Fraud, on the other hand, must
be extrinsic or collateral, that is, the kind which prevented the aggrieved party from having a trial or presenting his case to the court.
Clearly, petitioners mistaken assumption that Atty. Ranot had attended to his professional duties is neither mistake nor fraud. Further,
the negligence, as contemplated in the Rules must be excusable and generally imputable to the party because if it is imputable to the
counsel, it is binding on the client. To follow a contrary rule and allow a party to disown his counsels conduct would render
proceedings indefinite, tentative, and subject to reopening by the mere deception of replacing counsel. What the aggrieved litigant
should do is seek administrative sanctions against the erring counsel and not ask for the reversal of the courts ruling.

As an equitable remedy, a petition for relief from judgment is available only as a last recourse, when the petitioner has no other remedy.
This is not true here because petitioners had at their disposal other remedies which they in fact availed of, although belatedly or
defectively, such as when they filed their motion for reconsideration or new trial in the trial court. As the CA held: Petition for Relief
from Judgment is not a general utility tool in the procedural workshop. The relief granted under Rule 38 of the ROC is of equitable
character and is allowed only when there is no other available or adequate remedy. It is not regarded with favor. The judgment rendered
will not be disturbed where the complainant has or by exercising proper diligence would have had an adequate remedy at law. If the
complainant lost a remedy at law from an adverse judgment by his x x x negligence, such inequitable conduct precludes him from
relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. x x x
Case Name: Monzon vs Spouses Relova
GR No. 171287
Date: September 17, 2008
Topic: Relief from judgment: not available for lost remedy
October 18, 2000 Spouses RELOVA and Spouses PEREZ (respondents) filed against Atty. LUNA, Clerk of Court of RTC Tagaytay and MONZON
(herein petitioner) an initiatory pleading captioned as Petition for Injunction
Respondents alleged that on December 28, 1998, Monzon executed a promissory note in favor of the spouses PEREZ for P600K, with interest of 5% per
month, payable on or before December 28, 1999. This was secured by a 300-sq.m. lot in Tagaytay City, a portion of Psu-232001.
December 31, 1998 MONZON executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the said parcel of land in favor of Spouses PEREZ.
March 29, 1999 MONZON executed another promissory note, this time in favor of spouses RELOVA for P200K, with interest of 5% per month, payable
on or before December 31, 1999. This was secured by a 200-sq.m. lot in Tagaytay City, another portion of Psu-232001.
December 27, 1999 MONZON executed a Deed of Conditional Sale over said parcel of land in favor of the spouses RELOVA.
October 23, 1999 Coastal Lending Corporation extrajudicially foreclosed the entire 9,967-sq.m. property covered by Psu-232001, including the portions
mortgaged and subsequently sold to respondents.
MONZON was indebted to the Coastal Lending Corporation in the total amount of P3.4M. The winning bidder in the extrajudicial foreclosure, Addio
Properties Inc., paid P5M, thus leaving a P1.6M residue.
According to respondents, this residue amount, which is in the custody of Atty. Luna as Branch Clerk of Court, should be turned over to them pursuant to
Section 4, Rule 68 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
MONZON in her Answer, claimed that the Petition for Injunction should be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. He also claimed that
respondents could no longer ask for the enforcement of 2 PNs because she had already performed her obligation to them by dacion en pago as evidenced
by the Deed of Conditional Sale and Deed of Absolute Sale and claimed that petitioners could still claim the portions sold to them if they would only file
the proper civil cases. As regards the fund in custody of Atty. Luna, respondents cannot acquire the same without a writ of preliminary attachment or a writ
of garnishment in accordance with the provisions of Rule 57 and Section 9(c), Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
December 5, 2001 RTC, citing absence of petitioner and her counsel on said hearing date despite due notice, granted an oral Motion by the respondents
by issuing an Order allowing the ex parte presentation of evidence by respondents.
RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents. Decision also mentioned that the Order allowing the ex parte presentation of evidence by respondents
was due to the continuous and incessant absences of petitioner and counsel.
Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision dismissing the appeal. Monzon showed tepid interest in having the case resolved with dispatch. She, thus,
cannot now complain that she was denied due process when she was given ample opportunity to defend and assert her interests in the case. The Court of
Appeals reminded Monzon that the essence of due process is reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit evidence in support of ones defense. What the
law proscribes is lack of opportunity to be heard. Monzons Motion for Reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated 7 March 2006.

Whether or not respondents are entitled to relief?
Section 4, Rule 68 of the Rules of Court, which is the basis of respondents alleged cause of action
entitling them to the residue of the amount paid in the foreclosure sale, provides as follows:
SEC. 4. Disposition of proceeds of sale.The amount realized from the foreclosure sale of the mortgaged property shall, after deducting the costs of the sale, be
paid to the person foreclosing the mortgage, and when there shall be any balance or residue, after paying off the mortgage debt due, the same shall be paid to
junior encumbrancers in the order of their priority, to be ascertained by the court, or if there be no such encumbrancers or there be a balance or residue after
payment to them, then to the mortgagor or his duly authorized agent, or to the person entitled to it.

However, Rule 68 governs the judicial foreclosure of mortgages. Extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages,
which was what transpired in the case at bar, is governed by Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No.
4118, Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7353, Section 18 of Republic Act No. 7906, and Section 47 of Republic Act No. 8791. A.M. No. 99-10-05-0, issued on 14
December 1999, provides for the procedure to be observed in the conduct of an extrajudicial foreclosure sale.

Unlike Rule 68, which governs judicial foreclosure sales, neither Act No. 3135 as amended, nor A.M. No. 99-10-05-0 grants to junior encumbrancers the right to
receive the balance of the purchase price. The only right given to second mortgagees in said issuances is the right to redeem the foreclosed property pursuant to
Section 6 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, which provides:
Sec. 6. Redemption.In all cases in which an extrajudicial sale is made under the special power hereinbefore referred to, the debtor, his successors in interest or
any judicial creditor or judgment creditor of said debtor, or any person having a lien on the property subsequent to the mortgage or deed of trust under which the
property is sold, may redeem the same at any time within the term of one year from and after the date of the sale; and such redemption shall be governed by the
provisions of sections four hundred and sixty-four to four hundred and sixty-six, inclusive, of the Code of Civil Procedure, in so far as these are not inconsistent with
this Act.

Even if, for the sake of argument, Rule 68 is to be applied to extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages, such
right can only be given to second mortgagees who are made parties to the (judicial) foreclosure. While a second mortgagee is a proper and in a sense even a
necessary party to a proceeding to foreclose a first mortgage on real property, he is not an indispensable party, because a valid decree may be made, as between
the mortgagor and the first mortgagee, without regard to the second mortgage; but the consequence of a failure to make the second mortgagee a party to the
proceeding is that the lien of the second mortgagee on the equity of redemption is not affected by the decree of foreclosure

Court ruled that respondents do not have a cause of action against Atty. Ana Liza Luna for the delivery of the subject amounts on the basis of Section 4, Rule 68 of
the Rules of Court, for the reason that the foregoing Rule does not apply to extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages. However, while the case should indeed be
dismissed insofar as Atty. Luna is concerned, the same is not necessarily true with respect to Monzon. Other than respondents prayer that the amount due to
respondents be delivered by Atty. Luna to them, they also pray for a judgment declaring Monzon liable for such amounts. Said prayer, as argued by Monzon herself,
may constitute a cause of action for collection of sum of money against Monzon.

The rule is now settled that a mortgage creditor may elect to waive his security and bring, instead, an
ordinary action to recover the indebtedness with the right to execute a judgment thereon on all the properties of the debtor including the subject matter of the
mortgage, subject to the qualification that if he fails in the remedy elected by him, he cannot pursue further the remedy he has waived. However, due to the fact
that construing respondents Petition for Injunction to be one for a collection of sum of money would entail a waiver by the respondents of the mortgage executed
over the subject properties, we should proceed with caution before making such construction. We, therefore, resolve that upon the remand of this case to the trial
court, respondents should be ordered to manifest whether the Petition for Injunction should be treated as a complaint for the collection of a sum of money.

If respondents answer in the affirmative, then the case shall proceed with the presentation of the evidence for the defense. If Monzon would be successful in
proving her defense of dacion en pago, there would, in effect, be a double sale of the mortgaged properties: the same properties were sold to both respondents
and to herein intervenor Addio Properties, Inc. If, pursuant to the rules on double sales, respondents are entitled to the properties, their remedy is to file the
proper action to recover possession. If, pursuant to said rules, Addio Properties, Inc. is entitled to the properties, respondents remedy is to file an action for
damages against Monzon. If respondents answer in the negative, the case shall be dismissed, without prejudice to the exercise of respondents rights as mortgage
creditors. If respondents mortgage contract was executed before the execution of the mortgage contract with Addio Properties, Inc., respondents would be the
first mortgagors. Pursuant to Article 2126 of the Civil Code, they would be entitled to foreclose the property as against any subsequent possessor thereof. If
respondents mortgage con tract was executed after the execution of the mortgage contract with Addio Properties, Inc., respondents would be the second
mortgagors. As such, they are entitled to a right of redemption pursuant to Section 6 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118.

Case Name: Dare Adventure Farm Corporation v CA

GR No. 161122
Date: September 24, 2012 By: BRIES
Topic: Annulment of Judgment
Dare Adventure Farm acquired a parcel of land with an area of 65,100 sqm through a Deed of Absolute sale from the Goc-
Later on Dare discovered a 1990 Joint Affidavit executed by the Goc-ongs wherein they declared their ownership over the
property and that they were mortgaging it to the Ngs as security for their obligation worth P648,000.00 and subject to a
provision that allows for automatic transfer of ownership to the Ngs if there is default.
The goc-ongs defaulted and the Ngs instituted a complaint for recovery of money or in the alternative for the foreclosure of
mortgage in the RTC. Agripina Goc-ong was declared in default for her failure to file an answer hence the Ngs were
declared owners of the lot.
In 2001, Dare instituted an action for annulment of the October 16, 1997 decision of the RTC but the CA dismissed the
petition for annulment of judgment because Dare failed to allege or show why the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of its own.
Dare moved for motion for reconsideration but CA dismissed the petition. Hence Dare appealed to the SC to review the decision of
the CA
1. WoN CA erred in ruling that Dare failed to explain why it did not avail of the other remedies enumerated in section 1 of Rule 47.

2. WoN CA erred in ruling that petitioner could have assailed the deed of sale and questioned the foreclosure proceedings or sought
the quieting of title to the subject property. NO.

1) A petition for annulment of judgment is exceptional in nature and it is a remedy in equity. It can only be availed of when other
remedies are wanting and only if the judgment, final order, or final resolution rendered was rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction
or through extrinsic fraud.

Because of the extraordinary nature of the remedy of annulment of judgment, the court has instituted safeguards which must be met
before the petition can prosper. Namely:
1. Lack of jurisdiction or;
2. Extrinsic fraud; and
3. Section 1 of rule 47 which requires petitioner to show that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or
other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.

2) CAs dismissal was also upheld because the SC said that not being a party impleaded to the case between the Goc-ongs and the
Ngs, petitioner did not need to resort to annulment of judgment if the judgment did not prejudice it. Being a non-party, Section 1 of
rule 47 does not extend to Dares favor.

The SC also agreed with the CAs suggestion that the petitioners proper recourse was either an action for quieting of title or an action
for reconveyance of the property.
G.R. No. 166819
June 16, 2010 Topic: Annulment of Judgment
On January 23, 2002, the spouses Dolores and Oscar Arcenas filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas City, an Action for Declaratory Relief
against respondent Queen City Development Bank for the declaration of their rights as lessors under the contract of lease.
RTC dismissed the action for declaratory relief and set the hearing on respondent bank's counterclaim for damages.
Spouses Arcenas filed with RTC of Roxas City, another case against respondent bank, this time for breach of the same contract of lease, docketed as Civil
Case No. V-072-07-2002 (the case subject of this petition), Respondent bank then filed its Answer with Affirmative Defenses.
The Spouses Arcenas subsequently filed their Pre-Trial Brief with the proposed amicable settlement. During the scheduled pre-trial conference, respondent
bank's counsel manifested its interest in the proposal but wanted to know the exact amount for settlement; thus, the pre-trial was reset.
The Spouses Arcenas filed, in Civil Case No.V-006-01-2002, a written Proposed Settlement in the amount of P1,297,514.00. Respondent bank was asked
to comment on the proposed settlement.
During the September 9, 2003 pre-trial conference in Civil Case No. V-072-07-2002, respondent bank's counsel manifested that the parties were in the
process of settling the case amicably.
In the hearing of Civil Case No. 006-01-2002, the RTC ordered the resetting of the case in view of the manifestation of both counsels that settlement was
still possible.
However, during the October 17, 2003 hearing of the same case, the RTC noted that, from the contents of both proposals for settlement, there was no meeting
of the minds between the parties; thus, the RTC ordered the parties to prepare one compromise agreement duly signed and submitted for the court's approval,
which shall be made as basis for the judgment in both civil cases.
On November 11, 2003 the date set for the continuation of the pre-trial conference in Civil Case No. V-072-07-2002 only respondent bank's counsel was
present. On November 10, 2003, the counsel for the Spouses Arcenas filed a Motion for Postponement of the pre-trial conference because of conflict of
Respondent bank's counsel objected to such postponement, as he was not furnished a copy of the motion and the filing of such motion violated the three-day
notice rule on motions; thus, he moved that the Spouses Arcenas be declared non-suited. On the same day, November 11, 2003, the RTC issued an Order
declaring the Spouses Arcenas non-suited and set the presentation of respondent bank's evidence on its counterclaim on January 8, 2004. The Order was
received by the secretary of the Spouses' counsel on November 17, 2003.
On the January 8, 2004 scheduled hearing, despite due notice, the Spouses Arcenas and their counsel failed to appear; thus, respondent bank presented
evidence on its counterclaim, rested its case and submitted the same for decision. On the same day, the RTC issued an Order12 submitting the case for
decision. The Order was received by the Spouses Arcenas on January 14, 2004.
In an Order14 dated March 9, 2004, the RTC denied the Manifestation and Motion to reconsider the order of non-suit and allowed respondent bank to present
evidence on its counterclaim on March 25, 2004. The RTC found (1) that assuming there was an agreement between the counsels regarding a compromise
affecting the civil cases, such an out of court agreement was not an excuse for the counsel of the Spouses Arcenas not to move for the lifting of the order of
default; (2) that counsel should not presume that his motion for postponement would be granted, specially since the scheduled proceeding was a pre-trial
conference which was mandatory; (3) that a motion should abide by the three-day notice rule; and (4) that the January 8, 2004 Order submitting the case for
decision had long become final and the Manifestation and Motion was filed beyond the reglementary period for filing a motion for reconsideration.
On March 29, 2004, the Spouses Arcenas, as petitioners, filed with the CA a Petition for annulment of order under Rule 47 seeking to annul the November
11, 2003 Order of non-suit issued by the RTC of Roxas City, Branch 15 in Civil Case No. V-072-07-2002 on the ground of extrinsic fraud.
On May 18, 2004, the CA dismissed the petition on the ground that petitioners, the Spouses Arcenas, failed to avail of the appropriate remedies without
sufficient justification before resorting to the petition for annulment of order. The CA ruled that assuming that petitioners were able to substantiate their
allegations of fraud, they could have filed a petition for relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court and prayed that the assailed Order be set aside, but they
did not. Thus, they cannot benefit from their inaction.
In the meantime, on August 18, 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision on the merits in Civil Case Nos. V-006-01-2002 and V-072-07-2002, wherein the
contract of lease subject of the two cases was declared rescinded, and the Spouses Arcenas were ordered to pay respondent bank actual damages, attorney's
fees and litigation expenses. On September 8, 2004, the Spouses Arcenas filed their Notice of Appeal.
On July 19, 2004, Oscar Arcenas died. Thus, only petitioner Dolores filed the instant petition for review.
Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition for annulment of order filed by petitioners on the ground that they failed to take other appropriate remedies in
assailing the questioned final order, since their inaction was not due to fault or negligence imputable to them.
Section 1, Rule 47 provides that it does not allow a direct recourse to a petition for annulment of judgment if other appropriate remedies are available, such
as a petition for new trial, appeal or a petition for relief. If petitioner fails to avail of these remedies without sufficient justification, she cannot resort to the
action for annulment of judgment under Rule 47, for otherwise, she would benefit from her inaction or negligence.
The Spouses Arcenas were declared non-suited for failure to appear at the pre-trial conference of Civil Case No. 072-07-2002 on November 11, 2003, and
respondent bank was allowed to present evidence on its counterclaim on January 8, 2004. Such Order was received by the secretary of petitioner's counsel
on November 17, 2003. Petitioner did not move to set aside the RTC's order of non-suit. While petitioner's counsel claimed that he only learned of such
Order of non-suit on December 4, 2003, yet no motion to lift the order of non-suit was filed. Notably, from December 4, 2003 to the scheduled hearing on
January 8, 2004, petitioner did not take any remedial action to lift the order of non-suit when she had the opportunity to do so. In fact, petitioner and her
counsel did not also appear on the scheduled January 8, 2004 hearing wherein respondent bank presented evidence on its counterclaim and submitted the
case for decision.
Moreover, since petitioner claimed that there was extrinsic fraud committed by respondent bank's counsel, she could have filed a petition for relief under
Rule 38 within the period provided for by the Rules of Court, but she did not. Section 2, Rule 47 clearly states that extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground
for annulment of order if it was availed of, or could have been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief. Thus, extrinsic fraud is effectively
barred if it could have been raised as a ground in an available remedial measure.
Petitioner tries to justify her failure to avail of the appropriate remedies on a promise of settlement. However, such promise was not an excuse for petitioner's
counsel not to lift the order of non-suit and to file a petition for relief.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Resolutions dated May 18, 2004 and January 20, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83357 are