RULE 63
Spureme Court held that the same section of the provision
Case No. 1: REYES vs ORTIZ (Dizon)
Facts:
The instant cases are consolidated Petitions 1 for
Declaratory Relief, Certiorari, and Prohibition, which
involved parcels of land in Tala Estate situated between
Caloocan and Quezon City encompassing an area of
7,007.9515 hectares.
In GR No. 137794, respondents Segundo Bautista and
spouses Perl sought the ouster from the contested lots of
Erlinda Reyes, spouses Matienzo, and Sergio Abejero. Upon
the filing of the first case on December 11, 1996 against
spouses Matienzo and Biyaya Corporation with Samahan
ng Maliliit na Magkakapitbahay (SAMAKABA), of which
petitioners are members, as intervenor, RTC issued a WPI
on May 28, 1997 freezing all ejectment cases pending in
the MeTCs in QC and Caloocan. The second and third
cases on ejectment filed on June 25 and July 8 were
commenced by spouses Perl against Reyes and Abejero,
respectively. The last two cases were consolidated. Reyes,
in her answer, moved for the suspension of the
proceedings and/or for the dismissal of these cases citing
the WPI issued by RTC. The MeTC, however, did not
entertain such motion and required Reyes to submit
position paper. On April 16, 1999, RTC rendered a decision
ordering Erlinda to vacate. On March 25, 2999, petitioners
Reyes and Matienzo filed directly with this Court the
instant petition denominated as "Declaratory Relief,
Certiorari, and Prohibition," mainly assailing the denial of
their respective motions for suspension. Petitioners
Matienzo and Reyes asked that the proceedings in the
Ejectment cases and the Recovery case be declared null
and void for violating the Injunction order of the Quezon
City RTC
As to GR No. 149664, complaints were filed against
petitioners after Injunction order was issued on May 28,
1997. On July 28, 2006, however, petitioner filed a Motion
to Withdraw and/or Dismiss Instant Petition following the
issuance of the decision of Annulment/ Reversion case
rendering said case moot and academic.
Case for Petitioners: Petitioners specifically alleged that the MeTCs
refusal to suspend the Ejectment cases despite the Injunction order
is tantamount or amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction. As to
the Caloocan City RTC, its desistance to heed the Injunction is
unjustified and contrary to well-settled jurisprudence.
Case for Respondents: Respondent Segundo Bautista contends that
petitioners resorted to a wrong remedy. He argues that the action
for declaratory relief can only prosper if the statute, deed, or
contract has not been violated. Hence, where the law or contract has
already been breached prior to the filing of the declaratory relief,
courts can no longer assume jurisdiction since this action is not
geared towards the settling of issues arising from breach or violation
of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, and
contract, but rather it is intended to secure an authoritative
statement for guidance in their enforcement or compliance of the
same.
Issue: Whether or not Declaratory Relief is the proper remedy.
Ruling: NO.
Citing Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, the
can be dissected into two parts. The first paragraph
concerns declaratory relief, which has been defined as a
special civil action by any person interested under a deed,
will, contract or other written instrument or whose rights
are affected by a statute, ordinance, executive order or
regulation to determine any question of construction or
validity arising under the instrument, executive order or
regulation, or statute and for a declaration of his rights and
duties thereunder. The second paragraph pertains to (1)
an action for the reformation of an instrument; (2) an
action to quiet title; and (3) an action to consolidate
ownership in a sale with a right to repurchase.
The first paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 63 enumerates the
subject matter to be inquired upon in a declaratory relief
namely, deed, will, contract or other written instrument, a
statute, executive order or regulation, or any government
regulation. This Court, in Lerum v. Cruz, 44 declared that the
subject matters to be tested in a petition for declaratory
relief are exclusive, viz:
Under this rule, only a person who is interested "under a
deed, will, contract or other written instrument, and
whose rights are affected by a statute or ordinance, may
bring an action to determine any question of construction
or validity arising under the instrument or statute and for a
declaration of his rights or duties thereunder." This means
that the subject matter must refer to a deed, will, contract
or other written instrument, or to a statute or ordinance,
to warrant declaratory relief. Any other matter not
mentioned therein is deemed excluded. This is under the
principle of expressio unius est exclussio alterius. (Emphasis
supplied.)
In a recent case, the Supreme Courtm citing Tanda vs
Aldaya, ruled that a court decision cannot be interpreted
as included within the purview of the words "other written
instrument," as contended by appellant, for the simple
reason that the Rules of Court already provide for the ways
by which an ambiguous or doubtful decision may be
corrected or clarified without need of resorting to the
expedient prescribed by Rule 66 [now Rule 64].
The proper remedy that petitioner Erlinda Reyes could
have utilized from the denial of her motion to suspend
proceedings in the Caloocan City MeTC was to file a
motion for reconsideration and, if it is denied, to file a
petition for certiorari before the RTC pursuant to Rule 65
of the Rules of Court. On the other hand, petitioner
Matienzo should have filed a special civil action on
certiorari also under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals
from the denial of her motion by the Caloocan City RTC.
Case No. 2: CJH DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs BIR, BOC, AND
DISTRICT OF COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS BALTAZAR
Facts:
President Ramos issued Proclamation No. 420 creating a
Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in a portion of Camp John Hay
in Baguio City. Section 3 of the said Proclamation provides
for the incentives granted to the newly created SEZ.
Among these incentives are the exemption from the
payment of taxes, both local and national, for businesses
located inside the SEZ, and the operation of the SEZ as a
special customs territory providing for tax and duty free
importations of raw materials, capital and equipment.
 Subsequently, Section 3 of the Proclamation was declared
unconstitutional and thereby declared null and void (GR
No. 119775). While the motion for reconsideration was
pending, the Office of the City Treasurer of Baguio sent a
demand letter with an updated statements of real property
taxes due on real estate properties declared under the
names of the Bases Conversion and Development
Authority and Camp John Hay Development Corporation
totaling P101,935,634.17 inclusive of penalties, as of
January 10, 2004. Five months thereafter, BOC followed
suit and demanded CJH of its payment of P71,983,753.00
representing its taxes due from 1998 to 2004. Petitioner
filed a petition for declaratory relief.
Case for petitioner: CJH questioned the retroactive application by
the BOC of the decision of this Court in G.R. No. 119775. It claimed
that the assessment was null and void because it violated the non-
retroactive principle under the Tariff and Customs Code.
Case for respondent (through the OSG): The Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) filed a motion to dismiss claiming that the remedy of
declaratory relief is inapplicable because an assessment is not a
proper subject of such petition. It further alleged that there are
administrative remedies which were available to CJH.
The RTC rendered its assailed order holding that the
decision in G.R. No. 119775 applies retroactively because
the tax exemption granted by Proclamation No. 420 is null
and void from the beginning. The RTC also ruled that the
petition for declaratory relief is not the appropriate
remedy. A judgment of the court cannot be the proper
subject of a petition for declaratory relief; the enumeration
in Rule 64 is exclusive.
Issue: Whether or not the remedy of declaratory remedy is proper
in this case.
Ruling: NO.
The requisites for a petition for declaratory relief to
prosper are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2)
the controversy must be between persons whose interests
are adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must
have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue
involved must be ripe for judicial determination.
As to CJHs allegation that CA No. 55 has already been
repealed by the Rules of Court; thus, the remedy of
declaratory relief against the assessment made by the BOC
is proper, the SC however directed the petitioner to the
case of National Dental Supply Co. v. Meer, where it held
that:
From the opinion of the former Chief Justice
Moran may be deduced that the failure to
incorporate the above proviso [CA No. 55] in
section 1, rule 66, [now Rule 64] is not due to an
intention to repeal it but rather to the desire to
leave its application to the sound discretion of
the court, which is the sole arbiter to determine
whether a case is meritorious or not. And even if
it be desired to incorporate it in rule 66, it is
doubted if it could be done under the rule-
making power of the Supreme Court considering
that the nature of said proviso is substantive and
not adjective, its purpose being to lay down a
policy as to the right of a taxpayer to contest the
collection of taxes on the part of a revenue
officer or of the Government. Xxx In other words,
it is our considered opinion that the proviso
contained in Commonwealth Act No. 55 is still in
full force and effect and bars the plaintiff from
filing the present action.
As a substantive law that has not been repealed by
another statute, CA No. 55 is still in effect and holds sway.
Precisely, it has removed from the courts jurisdiction over
petitions for declaratory relief involving tax assessments.
The Court cannot repeal, modify or alter an act of the
Legislature.
Moreover, the proper subject matter of a declaratory relief
is a deed, will, contract, or other written instrument, or the
construction or validity of statute or ordinance. CJH hinges
its petition on the demand letter or assessment sent to it
by the BOC. However, it is really not the demand letter
which is the subject matter of the petition. Ultimately, this
Court is asked to determine whether the decision of the
Court en banc in G.R. No. 119775 has a retroactive effect.
This approach cannot be countenanced. Again, the Court
cited Tanda vs Aldaya, which provides that: A court
decision cannot be interpreted as included within the
purview of the words "other written instrument," as
contended by appellant, for the simple reason that the
Rules of Court already provide for the ways by which an
ambiguous or doubtful decision may be corrected or
clarified without need of resorting to the expedient
prescribed by Rule 66 [now Rule 64].
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 200670, July 06, 2015
CLARK INVESTORS AND LOCATORS ASSOCIATION,
INC., Petitioner, v. SECRETARY OF FINANCE AND COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.
THE CASE:
This is a petition for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to
annul and set aside Revenue Regulations No. 2-2012 (RR 2-2012)
issued by the Department of Finance (DOF) on February 17, 2012
upon recommendation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR).
Petitioner Clark Investors and Locators Association, Inc. claims that
RR 2-2012, which imposes Value Added Tax (VAT) and excise tax on
the importation of petroleum and petroleum products from abroad
into the Freeport or Economic Zones, is void and contrary to
Republic Act (RA) No. 7227, otherwise known as the Bases
Conversion and Development Act of 1992, as amended by RA No.
9400.
FACTS:
On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted RA No. 7227 which mandated
the accelerated conversion of the Clark and Subic military
reservations into special economic zones. Based on Section 12 (c)
above, in lieu of national and local taxes, all businesses and
enterprises operating within the Subic Special Economic Zone shall
pay a preferential gross income tax rate of five percent (5%). In
addition, Section 12 (b) also provides that such businesses and
enterprises shall be exempt from the payment of all taxes and duties
on the importation of raw materials, capital, and equipment into the
Subic Special Economic Zone. Meanwhile, on March 20, 2007,
Congress enacted RA No. 9400 which extended the aforementioned
tax and fiscal incentives under RA No. 7227 to the Clark Freeport
Zone. By way of amendment, thus, the businesses and enterprises
within the Clark Freeport Zone are similarly exempt from the
payment of all taxes and duties on the importation of raw materials,
capital and equipment. On February 17, 2012, the DOF, upon
recommendation of the BIR, issued RR 2-2012 which imposed VAT
and excise tax on the importation of petroleum and petroleum
products from abroad and into the Freeport or Economic Zones.
On March 8, 2012, petitioner, which represents the businesses and
enterprises within the Clark Freeport Zone, filed the instant petition
alleging that respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion in
issuing RR 2-2012.
Petitioner:
It argues that by imposing the VAT and excise tax on the importation
of petroleum and petroleum products from abroad and into the
Freeport or Economic Zones, RR 2-2012 unilaterally revoked the tax
exemption granted by RA No. 7227 and RA No. 9400 to the
businesses and enterprises operating within the Subic Special
Economic Zone and Clark Freeport Zone.
Respondent:
Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
contend that the petition must be denied outright because the
special civil action for certiorari cannot be used to assail RR 2-2012
which was issued by the respondents in the exercise of their quasi-
legislative or rule-making powers. According to the OSG, certiorari
can only be used against a public officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial powers. In addition, the OSG invokes the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts and claims that a petition for certiorari cannot be
filed directly to this Court absent highly exceptional reasons which
the petitioner failed to adduce. Finally, the OSG opposes the
argument of petitioner that RR 2-2012 unilaterally revoked the tax
exemption granted by RA No. 7227 and RA No. 9400 to the
businesses and enterprises operating within the Subic Special
Economic Zone and Clark Freeport Zone by referring to the tax
refund under Section 3 of RR 2-2012. It points out that Section 3
allows the businesses and enterprises operating within the Subic
Special Economic Zone and Clark Freeport Zone to claim for a tax
refund upon submission of competent proof that they used the
imported fuel exclusively within the Subic Special Economic Zone
and Clark Freeport Zone. Thus, the OSG claimed that RR 2-2012 is
consistent with RA No. 7227 and RA No. 9400. We deny the petition
for being an improper remedy. Firstly, respondents did not act in any
judicial or quasi-judicial capacity. A petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, is a special civil
action that may be invoked only against a tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Secretary of Finance acted with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing RR 2- 2012 that imposes VAT and excise tax on
the importation of petroleum and petroleum product from abroad
and into Freeport or Economic Zones as it claimed to have
unilaterally revoked tax exemption granted by R.A. No. 7277 and R.A.
No. 9400.
RULING:
Secondly, while this case is styled as a petition for certiorari, there is,
however, no denying the fact that, in essence, it seeks the
declaration by this Court of the unconstitutionality and illegality of
the questioned rule, thus partaking the nature, in reality, of one for
declaratory relief over which this Court has only appellate, not
original, jurisdiction.
Accordingly, this petition must fail because this Court does not have
original jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief even if only
questions of law are involved. The special civil action of declaratory
relief falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Courts. The Rules of Court is explicit that such action shall be
brought before the appropriate Regional Trial Court. Section 1, Rule
63 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested under a
deed, will, contract or other written instrument, whose rights are
affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or
any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation
thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to
determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a
declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 211356, September 29, 2014
CRISOSTOMO B. AQUINO, Petitioner, v. MUNICIPALITY OF MALAY,
AKLAN, REPRESENTED BY HON. MAYOR JOHN P. YAP,
SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MALAY, AKLAN, REPRESENTED BY HON.
EZEL FLORES, DANTE PASUGUIRON, ROWEN AGUIRRE, WILBEC
GELITO, JUPITER GALLENERO, OFFICE OF THE MUNICIPAL
ENGINEER, OFFICE OF THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER, BORACAY PNP
CHIEF, BORACAY FOUNDATION, INC., REPRESENTED BY NENETTE
GRAF, MUNICIPAL AUXILIARY POLICE, AND JOHN AND JANE
DOES, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO JR., J.:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari challenging the
Decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 120042 dated August 13, 2013 and February 3, 2014,
respectively. The assailed rulings denied Crisostomo Aquinos
Petition for Certiorari for not being the proper remedy to question
the issuance and implementation of Executive Order No. 10, Series
of 2011 (EO 10), ordering the demolition of his hotel establishment.
FACTS:

Petitioner is the president and chief executive officer of Boracay
Island West Cove Management Philippines, Inc. (Boracay West Cove).
On January 7, 2010, the company applied for a zoning compliance
with the municipal government of Malay, Aklan. While the company
was already operating a resort in the area, the application sought the
issuance of a building permit covering the construction of a three-
storey hotel over a parcel of land measuring 998 sqm. located in Sitio
Diniwid, Barangay Balagab, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan, which is
covered by a Forest Land Use Agreement for Tourism Purposes
(FLAgT) issued by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) in favor of Boracay West Cove.
Through a Decision on Zoning dated January 20, 2010, the Municipal
Zoning Administrator denied petitioners application on the ground
that the proposed construction site was within the no build zone
demarcated in Municipal Ordinance 2000-131 (Ordinance). As
provided in the Ordinance:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SECTION 3. No building or structure of any kind whether temporary
or permanent shall be allowed to be set up, erected or constructed
on the beaches around the Island of Boracay and in its offshore
waters. During the conduct of special activities or special events, the
Sangguniang Bayan may, through a Resolution, authorize the Office
of the Mayor to issue Special Permits for construction of temporary
structures on the beach for the duration of the special activity as
embodied in the Resolution.
In due time, petitioner appealed the denial action to the Office of
the Mayor on February 1, 2010. On May 13, 2010, petitioner
followed up his appeal through a letter but no action was ever taken
by the respondent mayor. On April 5, 2011, however, a Notice of
Assessment was sent to petitioner asking for the settlement of
Boracay West Coves unpaid taxes and other liabilities under pain of
a recommendation for closure in view of its continuous commercial
operation since 2009 sans the necessary zoning clearance, building
permit, and business and mayors permit. In reply, petitioner
expressed willingness to settle the companys obligations, but the
municipal treasurer refused to accept the tendered payment.
Meanwhile, petitioner continued with the construction, expansion,
and operation of the resort hotel.
Subsequently, on March 28, 2011, a Cease and Desist Order was
issued by the municipal government, enjoining the expansion of the
resort, and on June 7, 2011, the Office of the Mayor of Malay, Aklan
issued the assailed EO 10, ordering the closure and demolition of
Boracay West Coves hotel.
EO 10 was partially implemented on June 10, 2011. Thereafter, two
more instances followed wherein respondents demolished the
improvements introduced by Boracay West Cove, the most recent of
which was made in February 2014.
Petitioner:
Alleging that the order was issued and executed with grave abuse of
discretion, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for
injunctive relief with the CA. He argued that judicial proceedings
should first be conducted before the respondent mayor could order
the demolition of the companys establishment; that Boracay West
Cove was granted a FLAgT by the DENR, which bestowed the
company the right to construct permanent improvements on the
area in question; that since the area is a forestland, it is the DENR
and not the municipality of Malay, or any other local government
unit for that matterthat has primary jurisdiction over the area, and
that the Regional Executive Director of DENR-Region 6 had officially
issued an opinion regarding the legal issues involved in the present
case; that the Ordinance admits of exceptions; and lastly, that it is
the mayor who should be blamed for not issuing the necessary
clearances in the companys favor.
Respondent:
In rebuttal, respondents contended that the FLAgT does not excuse
the company from complying with the Ordinance and Presidential
Decree No. 1096 (PD 1096), otherwise known as the National
Building Code of the Philippines. Respondents also argued that the
demolition needed no court order because the municipal mayor has
the express power under the Local Government Code (LGC) to order
the removal of illegally constructed buildings.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals:
In its assailed Decision dated August 13, 2013, the CA dismissed the
petition solely on procedural ground, i.e., the special writ
of certiorari can only be directed against a tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions and since the issuance
of EO 10 was done in the exercise of executive functions, and not of
judicial or quasi-judicial functions, certiorari will not lie. Instead, the
proper remedy for the petitioner, according to the CA, is to file a
petition for declaratory relief with the Regional Trial Court.
Petitioner sought reconsideration but this was denied by the CA on
February 3, 2014 through the challenged Resolution. Hence, the
instant petition raising arguments on both procedure and substance.
ISSUE:
A. WHETHER OR NOT DECLARATORY RELIEF IS STILL AVAILABLE TO
PETITIONER.
THE COURTS RULING:
We deny the petition.
Certiorari, not declaratory relief, is the proper remedy.
a. Declaratory relief no longer viable
Resolving first the procedural aspect of the case, We find merit in
petitioners contention that the special writ of certiorari , and not
declaratory relief, is the proper remedy for assailing EO 10. As
provided under Sec. 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SECTION 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested under a
deed, will, contract or other written instrument, whose rights are
affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance or any
other governmental regulation may, before breach or
violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial
Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising,
and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder. x x x
An action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no
actual breach of the instruments involved or of the rights arising
thereunder. Since the purpose of an action for declaratory relief is to
secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the
parties under a statute, deed, or contract for their guidance in the
enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith, and not to settle
issues arising from an alleged breach thereof, it may be entertained
before the breach or violation of the statute, deed or contract to
which it refers. A petition for declaratory relief gives a practical
remedy for ending controversies that have not reached the state
where another relief is immediately available; and supplies the need
for a form of action that will set controversies at rest before they
lead to a repudiation of obligations, an invasion of rights, and a
commission of wrongs.lawlawlibr
In the case at bar, the petition for declaratory relief became
unavailable by EO 10s enforcement and implementation. The
closure and demolition of the hotel rendered futile any possible
guidelines that may be issued by the trial court for carrying out the
directives in the challenged EO 10. Indubitably, the CA erred when it
ruled that declaratory relief is the proper remedy given such a
situation.
PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR VS. CA
G.R. No. 175064; September 18, 2009
600 SCRA 569
CHICO-NAZARIO
FACTS:
The property subject of the instant case is a parcel of land,
known as Plaza Rizal, situated within the territory of the City of
Naga. Plaza Rizal is located in front of the old provincial capitol
building, where the Provincial Government of Camarines Sur used to
have its seat, at the time when the then Municipality of Naga was
still the provincial capital. Republic Act No. 305 took effect and, by
virtue thereof, the Municipality of Naga was converted into the City
of Naga. Subsequently, RA No. 1336 was approved, transferring the
site of the provincial capitol of Camarines Sur from the City of Naga
to the barrio of Palestina, Municipality of Pili. The Municipality of Pili
was also named as the new provincial capital.
Sometime in 1997, City of Naga filed a complaint for
Declaratory Relief and/ Quieting of Title against Camarines Sur. City
of Naga alleged that CamSur possessed and claimed ownership of
Plaza Rizal by virtue of a Tax declaration over said property in the
name of the province. As a result, Camarines Sur had long exercised
administrative control and management of Plaza Rizal, to the
exclusion of the City of Naga. The situation had created a conflict of
interest between the parties herein and had generated animosities
among their respective officials. City of Naga seeks a declaration that
the administrative control and management of Plaza Rizal should be
vested in it given that the said property is within its territorial
jurisdiction invoking Sec. 2, Art. I of R.A. 305 or the Charter of Naga
City.
CamSur filed an answer with Motion to Dismiss alleging
that the complaint lacked factual and legal basis. It further alleged
that the remedy of Declaratory Relief was inappropriate because
there was no justiciable controversy since ownership of said subject
belongs to CamSur and it has been under its control and supervision
since time immemorial. Also, the remedy of quieting of title was
inappropriate since Naga City had no equitable title to Plaza Rizal
that needed protection. Motion to dismiss was denied because the
legal issues required evidentiary matters that can only be settled in a
full-blown trial.
RTC rendered a decision in favor of City of Naga. Court
saidx x x Since [Section 2, Article I] of [Republic Act No.] 305 defines
the territory of [the City of] Naga and Plaza Rizal is within its
territorial jurisdiction, ergo, it is the City [of Naga] who has the
right of administrative control and management of Plaza Rizal.
Camarines Sur filed with the Court vis--vis a petition for
review on Certiorari after having denied its MR. RTC referred the
case to the Court of Appeals. SIDE ISSUE: Court of Appeals mistook
the petition for review on Certiorari (Rule 45) as a petition for
Certiorari (Rule 65)and the CA denied the petition by saying that
Certiorari cannot be resorted to as a substitute for a lost remedy of
appeal and that the case would still fail because there was no grave
abuse of discretion. (You may choose to ignore this, OMG CA!)
CamSur now then filed the instant petition for
Certiorai(Rule 65) arguing that the Court of Appeals went beyond its
authority and gravely abused its discretion when it treated and
resolved the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court as a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, which must
allege grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC, and which
cannot be made a substitute for a lost appeal. Camarines Sur insists
that what it filed was a Petition under Rule 45, which raised all
reversible errors committed by the RTC and presented all questions
of laws.
In the same petition CamSur pleads for this Court to decide
on the questions of law raised in the dismissed petition. CamSur
alleges that the filing of the Complaint for Declaratory Relief and/or
Quieting of Title was improper as it was hinged on a pretended
controversy. Essentially, the complaint of the City of Naga did not
show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on one side,
and a denial thereof, on the other.
ISSUE: WON the petition for Declaratory relief is proper.
HELD:
YES, the City of Naga properly resorted to the filing of an
action for declaratory relief. Declaratory relief is defined as an action
by any person interested in a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, executive order or resolution, to determine any question
of construction or validity arising from the instrument, executive
order or regulation, or statute; and for a declaration of his rights and
duties thereunder. The only issue that may be raised in such a
petition is the question of construction or validity of provisions in an
instrument or statute. In the instant case, the controversy concerns
the construction of the provisions of Republic Act No. 305 or the
Charter of the City of Naga. Specifically, the City of Naga seeks an
interpretation of Section 2, Article I of its Charter, as well as a
declaration of the rights of the parties to this case. The requisites of
an action for declaratory relief are:
(1) there must be a justiciable controversy between
persons whose interests are adverse;
(2) the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the
controversy; and
(3) the issue is ripe for judicial determination
The instant case falls under the requisites: First, the interests of the
City of Naga and Camarines Sur in this case are adverse. The
assertion by the City of Naga of a superior right to the administrative
control and management of Plaza Rizal, because said property of the
public domain is within its territorial jurisdiction, is clearly
antagonistic to and inconsistent with the insistence of Camarines Sur.
Second, City of Naga asserted as a result of CamSurs ownership,
former could not introduce improvements on Plaza Rizal; its
constituents were denied adequate use of said property, since
Camarines Sur required that the latters permission must first be
sought for the use of the same; and it was still Camarines Sur that
was able to continuously use Plaza Rizal for its own programs and
projects. Therefore, City of Naga undoubtedly has a legal interest in
the controversy because Plaza Rizal is within its jurisdiction. Lastly,
the issue is ripe for determination in view of the conflicting interest
of the parties to which litigation is inevitable and no adequate
relief is available in any other form or proceeding.
EUFEMIAALMEDA and ROMELALMEDA, petitioners,
vs.
BATHALA MARKETING INDUSTRIES, INC., respondent.
G.R. No. 150806 January 28, 2008
NACHURA
Facts: In May 1997, respondent Bathala Marketing Industries, Inc.
(lessee) entered into a contract of lease with petitioners (lessors).
Provisions of the contract of lease include:
6th - Lessee shall pay an increased rent if there is any new tax
imposed on the property
7th - In case of supervening extraordinary inflation or devaluation of
the PHP, the value of PHP at the time of the establishment of the
obligation shall be the basis of payment
Petitioners later demanded payment of VAT and 73%
adjustedrentals pursuant to the foregoing provisions.
Respondent refusedand filed an action for declaratory relief.
Petitioners filed an action for ejectment.
Issue: Whether or not declaratory relief is proper.
Held: YES. Petitioners insist that respondent was already in breach of
the contract when the petition was filed, thus, respondent is barred
from filing an action for declaratory relief. However, after petitioners
demanded payment of adjusted rentals and in the months that
followed, respondent complied with the terms and conditions set
forth in their contract of lease by paying the rentalsstipulated
therein. Respondent religiously fulfilled its obligations to petitioners
even during the pendency of the present suit. There is no showing
that respondent committed an act constituting a breach of the
subject contract of lease. Thus, respondent is not barred from
instituting before the trial court the petition for declaratory relief.
Petitioners further claim that the instant petition is not proper
because a separate action for rescission, ejectment and damages
had been commenced before another court; thus, the construction
of the subject contractual provisions should be ventilated in the
same forum.
As a rule, the petition for declaratory relief should be dismissed in
view of the pendency of a separate action for unlawful detainer. In
this case, however, the trial court had not yet resolved the
rescission/ejectment case during the pendency of the declaratory
relief petition. In fact, the trial court, where the rescission case was
on appeal, initiated the suspension of the proceedings pending the
resolution of the action for declaratory relief.
Baguio Citizens Actions vs City Council of Baguio
GR No. L-27247 April 20, 1983
Doctrine:
All persons shall be made parti es who have or claim any
interest which would be affected by the declaration; and no
declaration shall prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the
action. Therefore, the non- joinder of persons who have claim
or interest which would be affected by the declarati on is not
a jurisdicti onaldefect.
Facts:
This is a petition for declaratory relief originally filed in the CFI of
Baguio, Branch II involving the validity of Ordinance 386 passed by
the City Council of Baguio City. Said ordinance considered all
squatters of public land who are duly registered as such at the
ti me of the promulgati on of the ordinance as bona fi de
occupants of their respective lots.- Petitioners filed a petition for
declaratory relief, praying for a judgment declaring the Ordinance as
invalid and illegal ab initio.
Respondents-appellees, the City Council and the City Mayor, filed
motions to dismiss the petition which were denied.- Nevertheless,
CFI, later on, rendered a decision dismissing the petition on three
grounds: (1) that another court, the CFI of Baguio, Branch I, had
declared the Ordinance valid in a criminal case filed against the
squatters for illegal constructi on, and the Branch II of the
same court cannot, in a declaratory proceeding, review
and determine the validity of said judgment pursuant to the
policy of judicial respect and stability; (2) those who come
within the protection of the ordinance have not been made parties
to the suit in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 64 and it has been
held that the non-joinder of such parties is a jurisdictional defect;
and (3) the court is clothed with discretion to refuse to make any
declaration where the declaration is not necessary and proper at the
time under all circumstances.
Issues/Held: WON non-joinder of persons who have or claim any
interest which would be affected by the declaration is a jurisdictional
defect?
Ratio: No, it is not a jurisdictional defect. The non-inclusion of the
squatters mentioned in the Ordinance in question as party
defendants in this case cannot defeat the jurisdiction of the CFI of
Baguio. Section 2 of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court which merely
states that "All persons shall be made parties who have or claim any
interest which would be affected by the declaration; and no
declaration shall, except or otherwise provided in these rules,
prejudice the rights of persons not parties to
thea cti o n. " T hi s s e c ti on co nte m pl ate s a s i t uati on w he re
t he re are o th e r pe rs o ns w ho wo ul d b e aff e c te d by th e d
eclaration, but were not impleaded as necessary parties, in which
case the declaration shall not prejudice them. If at all, the case may
be dismissed not on the ground of lack of jurisdiction but for the
reason stated in Section 5 of the same Rule stating that "the Court
may refuse to exercise the power to declare rights and to construe
instruments in any case where a decision would not terminate the
uncertainty or controversy which gave rise to the action, or any case
where the declaration or construction is not necessary and proper at
the time under all circumstances."The reason for the law
requiring the joinder of all necessary parti es is that failure
to do so would deprive the declarati on of the fi nal and
pacifying functi on the acti on for declaratory relief
is calculated to subserve, as they would not be bound by the
declaration and may raise the identical issue. In the case at bar,
although it is true that any declarati on by the court would
affect the squatters, the latter are not necessary parti es
because the questi on involved is the power of the Municipal
Council to enact the Ordinances in questi on. Whether or not
they are impleaded, any determination of the controversy would be
binding upon the squatters. The declaration here is not a mere
exercise in futi lity because a declarati on on the nullity of the
ordinance, would give the squatters no right which they are
entitled to protect. The party most interested to sustain and defend
the legality of the Ordinance is the body that passed it, the City
Council, and together with the City Mayor, is already a party in these
proceedings.
Commissioner of Customs v. Cloribel
G.R. No. L-21036 June 30, 1977
Barredo, J.
Facts:There was pending before respondent court a special civil
action for declaratory relief entitled Macario M. Ofilada vs.
Reparations Commission, Jose Cochingyan and Susana Cochingyan,
wherein Ofilada, as the Second Receiver of the World War II
Veterans Enterprises, Inc. (Warvets) in another civil case, likewise
pending in another Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
sought a judicial declaration as to whether, under the allocation
granted to said Warvets to purchase reparations goods, the
conversion into pesos of the dollar prices of said goods should be at
the rate of two pesos to one dollar or at the prevailing market rate at
the time for payment, which would be much higher.Spouses
Cochingyan filed a third-party complaint for mandamus against
petitioner. Respondent judge ruled in their favor and ordered
petitioners to deliver the goods subject to the third-paty complaint
of Cochingyan.
Issue:Whether the third-party complaint can be granted in
declaratory relief actions
Held:No. When the origin of the case is for declaratory relief, a third-
party complaint is inconceivable. In this case, the relief cannot be
granted because in declaratory relief action, the court is merely
interpreting the terms of the contract.
G.R. No. L-29673
THE VISAYAN PACKING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE
REPARATIONS COMMISSION and THE COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents.
Nov. 12, 1987
J. Narvasa
SUMMARY:
REPACOM sold to VISPAC several properties on installment basis.
VISPAC filed a case alleging ambiguity on the terms of payment.
REPACOM filed a separate case for collection on the 1st installment.
The SC said REPACOM should have filed an answer to the 1st case
but still found VISPAC liable to pay the 1st installment.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: Petition for certiorari on a decision
of CA. (RULE 65) (INFERRED only by having CA as respondent
because the case did not say anything).
FACTS:
Through a Contract of Conditional Purchase and Sale of
Reparation Goods, Reparations Commission (REPACOM) sold a
cannery plant, a tin manufacturing plant, and 3 fishing boats to
Visayan Packing Corp. (VISPAC) for P1,135,712.47 in 10 equal yearly
installments with interest.
Prior to the due date of the 1st installment, RECPACOM sent
VISPAC a written reminder. In response, VISPAC filed a special civil
action for declaratory relief in CFI Manila (1st case) alleging an
ambiguity on the precise time the obligation to pay the first
installment.
For VISPACs failure to pay despite several demands for the 1st
installment (P135,712.47), REPACOM filed an ordinary civil action for
collection (2nd case).
VISPAC moved to dismiss the 2nd case on the ground of pendency
of the declaratory relief actions.
Oct. 9, 1962: In the 1st case, CFI dismissed the complaint, holding
that the issues raised would be necessarily threshed out in the
collection suit.The SC affirmed the CFI, holding the clarity of terms of
the contract.
March 27, 1963: In the 2nd case, CFI denied the motion to dismiss
and ordered VISPAC to pay the 1st installment.
VISPAC appealed to the CA stating that the TC erred in not holding
the collection suit (2nd case) was barred by the pendency of the
declaratory relief cases (1st case). CA affirmed CFI
Issue: WON the CA erred in not dismissing the 2nd case because of
the pendency of the 1st case
Ruling:
YES,
A compulsory counterclaim cannot be made the subject of a
separate action but should be asserted in the same suit involving the
same transaction or occurrence giving rise to it.
Section 4, Rule 9 (1985 ROC) states that a counterclaim not set up
shall be barred if it arises out of or is necessarily connected with the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing
party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence
of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.
However, Sec. 3, Rule 9 (1985 ROC) provide that when a pleader fails LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
to set up a counterclaim through oversight, inadvertence, or
excusable negligence, or when justice requires, he may, by leave of Facts:
court, set up the counterclaim or crossclaim by amendment before
The instant cases are consolidated Petitions for Declaratory Relief,
judgment.
Certiorari, and Prohibition. The parcels of land which are the subject
Where the counterclaim is made the subject of a separate suit, it matter of these cases are part of the Tala Estate, situated between
may be abated upon a plea of another action pendant or litis the boundaries of Caloocan City and Quezon City.
pendentia, and/or dismissed on the ground of res adjudicata. There
-(1st case) December 11, 1996Respondent Segundo Bautista,
is nothing in the nature of a special civil action for declaratory relief
registered owner of a parcel of land, filed a complaint for Recovery
that proscribes the filing of a counterclaim based on the same
of Possession and/or Ownership of Real Property (Recovery case)
transaction, deed or contract subject of the complaint.
with the RTC of Caloocan against the occupants, spouses Rene and
A special civil action is not essentially different from all ordinary Rosemarie Matienzo.
civil action, which is generally governed by Rules 1 to 56 of the Rules
December 27, 1996- A separate but related action was initiated by
of Court, except that the former deals with a special subject matter
the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands
which makes necessary some special regulation. The Identity
before the Quezon City RTC, Branch 85. The complaint was for the
between their fundamental nature is such that the same rules
Annulment of Title/Reversion (Annulment/Reversion case) against
governing ordinary civil suits may and do apply to special civil actions
Biyaya Corporation and the Register of Deeds of the Cities of Pasig,
if not inconsistent with or if they may serve to supplement the
Caloocan, and Quezon, the City of Manila, and the Administrator of
provisions of the peculiar rules governing special civil actions. The
the Land Registration Authority involving the Tala Estate.
separate action for collection should have been dismissed and set up
as a compulsory counterclaim in the declaratory relief suits, by way
The (Annulment/Reversion case) sought to declare null and void the
of an amended answer.
transfer certificates of title issued in the name of Biyaya Corporation,
and all derivative titles emanating therefrom, and to revert the land
BUT it appears VISPAC initiated the 1st case merely to obstruct and
as part of the patrimonial property of the State, and awarded to the
delay the payment of the installments. Under the circumstances, and
actual occupants. One of the intervenors therein is Samahan ng
taking account of the not inconsiderable length of time that the case
Maliliit na Magkakapitbahay (SAMAKABA) of which petitioners
at bar has been pending, it would be to do violence to substantial
Erlinda Reyes and Rosemarie Matienzo are members.
justice to pronounce the proceedings fatally defective for breach of
the rule on compulsory counterclaims. Form cannot prevail over
- Quezon City RTC (in Annulment/Reversion case )issued a
substance.
Preliminary Injunction freezing all ejectment cases involving the Tala
Estate pending in the MeTCs of Quezon City and Caloocan City.
G.R. No. 149664
-Believing that the Injunction issued can be beneficial to them in the
ERLINDA REYES and ROSEMARIE MATIENZO, Petitioners, - versus -
Recovery case, spouses Matienzo filed a motion to suspend the
HON. JUDGE BELEN B. ORTIZ, Presiding, Branch 49, Metropolitan
proceedings of the Recovery case but denied.
Trial Court, Caloocan City; SPOUSES BERNARD and FLORENCIA
PERL, represented by Attorney-in-Fact BENJAMIN MUCIO; HON.
-(2nd case) June 25, 1997- spouses Bernard and Florencia Perl filed
JUDGE VICTORIA ISABEL A. PAREDES, Presiding, Branch 124,
an ejectment complaint against Erlinda Reyes before the Caloocan
Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City and SEGUNDO BAUTISTA,
City MeTC.
Respondents.
-(3rd case) July 8, 1997- spouses Perl filed an ejectment action
x-----------------------x
against Sergio Abejero with Caloocan City MeTC. The cases were
consolidated.
SPS. ALBERTO EMBORES and LOURDES EMBORES, SPS. ROBERTO
AND EVELYN PALAD, DENNIS HENOSA and CORAZON LAURENTE,
- Erlinda Reyes moved for the suspension of the proceedings and/or
Petitioners, - versus - HON. RAYMUNDO G. VALLEGA, Presiding
for the dismissal of these cases citing the Injunction issued in the
Judge, Branch 52, Metropolitan Trial Court, Caloocan City; HON.
RTC of Quezon. The motion was not entertained. Eventually, the
ELEANOR R. KWONG, Presiding Judge, Branch 51, Metropolitan
court issued a Decision ordering Erlinda to vacate the contested
Trial Court, Caloocan City; HON. JUDGE BELEN B. ORTIZ, Presiding
property.
Judge, Branch 49, Metropolitan Trial Court, Caloocan City;
VICTORIA C. SALIRE-ALBIS, represented by her attorney-in-fact MR. - Petitioners Rosemarie Matienzo and Erlinda Reyes, joined on March
MENELIO C. SALIRE; MA. FE R. ROCO, ALFREDO TAN, MANUELITO 25, 1999 in filing directly with the Supreme Court the instant petition
ESTRELLA; and HON. JUDGE ANTONIO FINEZA, Presiding Judge, denominated as Declaratory Relief, Certiorari, and Prohibition,
Branch 131, Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City, Respondents. mainly assailing the denial of their respective motions for
suspension.
August 11, 2010
-Petitioners asked that the proceedings in the Ejectment cases and G.R. No. 193978 February 28, 2012
the Recovery case be declared null and void for violating the
Injunction order of the Quezon City RTC. That the refusal to suspend BRION, J.
the Ejectment cases is tantamount or amounting to lack of or excess
Facts
of jurisdiction.
Pres. Aquino made public in his first State of the Nation Address the
Respondent Segundo Bautista contends that petitioners resorted to
alleged excessive allowances, bonuses and other benefits of Officers
a wrong remedy. He argues that the action for declaratory relief can
and Members of the Board of Directors of the Manila Waterworks
only prosper if the statute, deed, or contract has not been violated.
and Sewerage System a government owned and controlled
Since the Injunction order of the Quezon City RTC had already been
corporation (GOCC) which has been unable to meet its standing
violated before the filing of this instant petition, resort to Rule 63 of
obligations. Subsequently, the Senate conducted an inquiry in aid of
the Rules of Court would not lie.
legislation on the reported excessive salaries, allowances, and other
Issue: benefits of GOCCs and government financial institutions (GFIs).
Based on its findings, officials and governing boards of various
WON Declaratory Relief is a proper remedy GOCCs and GFIs have been granting themselves unwarranted
allowances, bonuses, incentives, stock options, and other benefits as
Ruling: well as other irregular and abusive practices. Consequently, the
Senate issued Senate Resolution No. 17 urging the President to order
NO.
the immediate suspension of the unusually large and apparently
excessive allowances, bonuses, incentives and other perks of
The first paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 63 enumerates the subject
members of the governing boards of GOCCs and GFIs. Heeding the
matter to be inquired upon in a declaratory relief namely, deed, will,
call of Congress, Pres. Aquino, on September 8, 2010, issued EO 7,
contract or other written instrument, a statute, executive order or
entitled Directing the Rationalization of the Compensation and
regulation, or any government regulation. Any other matter not
Position Classification System in the GOCCs and GFIs, and for Other
mentioned therein is deemed excluded. This is under the principle of
Purposes. EO 7 provided for the guiding principles and framework to
expressio unius est exclussio alterius.
establish a fixed compensation and position classification system for
In a recent ruling of this Court, it was emphasized that a petition for GOCCs and GFIs.
declaratory relief cannot properly have a court decision as its subject
EO 7 was published and precluded the Board of Directors, Trustees
matter for the simple reason that the Rules of Court already provide
and/or Officers of GOCCs from granting and releasing bonuses and
for the ways by which an ambiguous or doubtful decision may be
allowances to members of the board of directors, and from
corrected or clarified without need of resorting to the expedient
increasing salary rates of and granting new or additional benefits and
prescribed by Rule 66 [now Rule 64].
allowances to their employees.
The proper remedy that petitioner Erlinda Reyes could have utilized
JelbertGalicto claims that as a PhilHealth employee, he is affected by
from the denial of her motion to suspend proceedings in the
the implementation of EO 7, which was issued with grave abuse of
Caloocan City MeTC was to file a motion for reconsideration and, if it
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, as it is null and
is denied, to file a petition for certiorari before the RTC pursuant to
void for lack of legal basis. He asserts that EO7 is unconstitutional for
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. On the other hand, petitioner
having been issued beyond the powers of the President. It is
Matienzo should have filed a special civil action on certiorari also
contended, however, that the President exercises control over the
under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals from the denial of her
governing boards of the GOCCs and GFIs; thus, he can fix their
motion by the Caloocan City RTC.The necessity of filing the petition
compensation packages in order to control the grant of excessive
to the RTC in the case of Erlinda Reyes and to the Court of Appeals in
salaries, allowances, incentives, etc.
the case of Matienzo is dictated by the principle of the hierarchy of
courts.
Hence, he filed this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with
Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary
Bereft of merit too is petitioners argument that the Caloocan City
Restraining Order, seeking to nullify and enjoin the implementation
MeTC cannot disregard the injunction order of the Quezon City RTC
of EO7.
hearing the Annulment/Reversion case. The established rule is that a
pending civil action for ownership such as annulment of title shall
The respondents pointed out the following procedural defects as
not ipso facto suspend an ejectment proceeding. The Court
grounds for the petition's dismissal: (1) the petitioner lacks locus
explained that the rationale for this is that in an ejectment case, the
standi; and (2) certiorari is not applicable to this case.
issue is possession, while in an annulment case the issue is
ownership. In fact, an ejectment case can be tried apart from an Meanwhile, on June 6, 2011, Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.)
annulment case. No. 10149, otherwise known as the GOCC Governance Act of 2011.
Section 11 of RA 10149 expressly authorizes the President to fix the
JELBERT B. GALICTO, PETITIONER, VS. H.E. PRESIDENT BENIGNO
compensation framework of GOCCs and GFIs.
SIMEON C. AQUINO III
Issue
Whether certiorari is the proper remedy.
Ruling
No. Under the Rules of Court, petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition
are availed of to question judicial, quasi-judicial and mandatory
acts. Since the issuance of an EO is not judicial, quasi-judicial or a
mandatory act, a petition for certiorari and prohibition is an
incorrect remedy; instead a petition for declaratory relief under Rule
63 of the Rules of Court, filed with the RTC, is the proper recourse to
assail the validity of EO 7.
Section 1. Who may file petition.
Any person interested under a deed, will, contract
or other written instrument, whose rights are affected by a statute,
executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental
regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in
the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of
construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or
duties, thereunder.
THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, PETITIONER, VS. AYALA
LAND INCORPORATED, ROBINSONS LAND
CORPORATION, SHANGRI-LA PLAZA CORPORATION AND
SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC.
G.R. No. 177056 September 18, 2009
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Facts
The Senate Committee on Trade and Commerce and on Justice and
Human Rights conducted a joint hearing on the issue of collection of
parking fees by several malls within Metro Manila, owned
particularly Ayala Land, Robinsons Land, Shangri-La, and SM Prime
Holdings.
After the hearings, it published Joint Committee Report No. 225
which declared that the collection of parking fees by the malls is
illegal as it violates the National Building Code. It recommended
among others, that the Office of the Solicitor General should
institute the necessary action to enjoin the collection of parking fees
as well as enforce the penal provision of the National Building Code.
SM Prime received information thereafter that the DPWH, and the
local building officials of different cities within Metro Manila intend
to file thru the OSG an action to enjoin respondent SM Prime and
similar establishments from collecting parking fees, and to impose
upon said establishments penal sanctions under Presidential Decree
No. 1096, otherwise known as the National Building Code of the
Philippines (National Building Code), and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR). Thus, SM Prime filed a petition for declaratory
relief and injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order to
declare Rule XIX of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the
National Building Code as ultra vires; and to declare it as entitled to
collection of parking fees, and also to declare the IRR of the National
Building Code as ineffective.
The next day, the OSG also filed its own petition for declaratory
relief, to enjoin the companies from collecting parking fees. The
cases were consolidated into the sala of Judge Marella. After trial,
the RTC ruled in favour of the companies. It declared OSG as a
proper party to file the petition for declaratory relief; that the cases
all meet the requirements of a petition for declaratory relief; and,
that the companies are entitled to collect parking fees. While the
National Building Code provided for buildings to have parking
spaces, it did not say whether the same should be free or paid. To
compel the companies to provide free parking spaces would be
tantamount to deprivation of property without due process of law.
The OSG appealed the case to the Court of Appeals which also
denied it, hence this case before the Supreme Court.
Issue
Whether declaratory relief is proper.
Ruling
The RTC resolved the first two issues affirmatively. It ruled that the
OSG can initiate Civil Case No. 00-1210 under Presidential Decree
No. 478 and the Administrative Code of 1987. It also found that all
the requisites for an action for declaratory relief were present, to
wit:
The requisites for an action for declaratory relief are: (a)
there is a justiciable controversy; (b) the controversy is
between persons whose interests are adverse; (c) the party
seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy;
and (d) the issue involved is ripe for judicial determination.
SM, the petitioner in Civil Case No. 001-1208
[sic] is a mall operator who stands to be affected
directly by the position taken by the government
officials sued namely the Secretary of Public
Highways and the Building Officials of the local
government units where it operates shopping
malls. The OSG on the other hand acts on a
matter of public interest and has taken a position
adverse to that of the mall owners whom it sued.
The construction of new and bigger malls has
been announced, a matter which the Court can
take judicial notice and the unsettled issue of
whether mall operators should provide parking
facilities, free of charge needs to be resolved.
G.R. No. 176579 June 28, 2011
WILSON P. GAMBOA, Petitioner, - versus - FINANCE SECRETARY
MARGARITO B. TEVES, FINANCE UNDERSECRETARY JOHN P.
SEVILLA, AND COMMISSIONER RICARDO ABCEDE OF THE
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) IN
THEIR CAPACITIES AS CHAIR AND MEMBERS, RESPECTIVELY, OF THE
PRIVATIZATION COUNCIL, CHAIRMAN ANTHONI SALIM OF FIRST
PACIFIC CO., LTD. IN HIS CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF METRO PACIFIC
ASSET HOLDINGS INC., CHAIRMAN MANUEL V. PANGILINAN OF
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY (PLDT) IN HIS
CAPACITY AS MANAGING DIRECTOR OF FIRST PACIFIC CO., LTD., However, since the threshold and purely legal issue on the definition
PRESIDENT NAPOLEON L. NAZARENO OF PHILIPPINE LONG of the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution has
DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, CHAIR FE BARIN OF THE far-reaching implications to the national economy, the Court treats
SECURITIES EXCHANGE COMMISSION, and PRESIDENT FRANCIS LIM the petition for declaratory relief as one for mandamus.
OF THE PHILIPPINE STOCK EXCHANGE, Respondents.
In Salvacion v. Central Bank of the Philippines, the Court treated the
PABLITO V. SANIDAD and ARNO V. SANIDAD, Petitioners-in- petition for declaratory relief as one for mandamus considering the
Intervention. grave injustice that would result in the interpretation of a banking
law.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
In Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of Labor, the Court
Facts similarly brushed aside the procedural infirmity of the petition for
declaratory relief and treated the same as one for mandamus. In
The issue started when petitioner Gamboa questioned the indirect
Alliance, the issue was whether the government unlawfully excluded
sale of shares involving almost 12 million shares of the Philippine
petitioners, who were government employees, from the enjoyment
Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) owned by PTIC to First
of rights to which they were entitled under the law. Specifically, the
Pacific. Thus, First Pacifics common shareholdings in PLDT increased
question was: Are the branches, agencies, subdivisions, and
from 30.7 percent to 37 percent, thereby increasing the total
instrumentalities of the Government, including government owned
common shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT to about 81.47%. The
or controlled corporations included among the four employers under
petitioner contends that it violates the Constitutional provision on
Presidential Decree No. 851 which are required to pay their
filipinazation of public utility, stated in Section 11, Article XII of the
employees x xx a thirteenth (13th) month pay x xx ? The
1987 Philippine Constitution, which limits foreign ownership of the
Constitutional principle involved therein affected all government
capital of a public utility to not more than 40%. Then, in 2011, the
employees, clearly justifying a relaxation of the technical rules of
court ruled the case in favor of the petitioner, hence this new case,
procedure, and certainly requiring the interpretation of the assailed
resolving the motion for reconsideration for the 2011 decision filed
presidential decree.
by the respondents.
In short, it is well-settled that this Court may treat a petition for
On 28 February 2007, petitioner filed the instant petition for
declaratory relief as one for mandamus if the issue involved has
prohibition, injunction, declaratory relief, and declaration of nullity
far-reaching implications. As this Court held in Salvacion:
of sale of the 111,415 PTIC shares. Petitioner claims, among others,
that the sale of the 111,415 PTIC shares would result in an increase The Court has no original and exclusive jurisdiction over a petition
in First Pacifics common shareholdings in PLDT from 30.7 percent to for declaratory relief. However, exceptions to this rule have been
37 percent, and this, combined with Japanese NTT DoCoMos recognized. Thus, where the petition has far-reaching implications
common shareholdings in PLDT, would result to a total foreign and raises questions that should be resolved, it may be treated as
common shareholdings in PLDT of 51.56 percent which is over the 40 one for mandamus.
percent constitutional limit
In the present case, petitioner seeks primarily the interpretation of
Issue the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution. He
prays that this Court declare that the term capital refers to common
Whether or not the petition for declaratory relief may be granted.
shares only, and that such shares constitute the sole basis in
determining foreign equity in a public utility. Petitioner further asks
Ruling
this Court to declare any ruling inconsistent with such interpretation
Yes. Petition for declaratory relief treated as petition for unconstitutional.
mandamus At the outset, petitioner is faced with a procedural
There is no dispute that petitioner is a stockholder of PLDT. As such,
barrier. Among the remedies petitioner seeks, only the petition for
he has the right to question the subject sale, which he claims to
prohibition is within the original jurisdiction of this court, which
violate the nationality requirement prescribed in Section 11, Article
however is not exclusive but is concurrent with the Regional Trial
XII of the Constitution. If the sale indeed violates the Constitution,
Court and the Court of Appeals. The actions for declaratory relief,
then there is a possibility that PLDTs franchise could be revoked, a
injunction, and annulment of sale are not embraced within the
dire consequence directly affecting petitioners interest as a
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. On this ground alone, the
stockholder.
petition could have been dismissed outright.
G.R. No. 167391 June 8, 2011
While direct resort to this Court may be justified in a petition for
prohibition, the Court shall nevertheless refrain from discussing the
PHIL-VILLE DEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING CORPORATION,
grounds in support of the petition for prohibition since on 28
Petitioner, - versus - MAXIMO BONIFACIO, CEFERINO R. BONIFACIO,
February 2007, the questioned sale was consummated when MPAH
APOLONIO B. TAN, BENITA B. CAINA, CRISPINA B. PASCUAL,
paid IPC P25,217,556,000 and the government delivered the
ROSALIA B. DE GRACIA, TERESITA S. DORONIA, CHRISTINA GOCO
certificates for the 111,415 PTIC shares.
AND ARSENIO C. BONIFACIO, in their capacity as the surviving heirs
of the late ELEUTERIA RIVERA VDA. DE BONIFACIO, Respondents.
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Facts
Phil-Ville Development and Housing Corporation is the owner of
three parcels of land located in Caloocan City. Prior to their
subdivision, the lots were collectively designated as Lot 1-G
registered in the name of Phil-Ville under TCT No. T-148220. Said
parcels of land form part of Lot 23-A of the Maysilo Estate originally
covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994 registered on
May 3, 1917 in the name of Isabel Gil de Sola as the judicial
administratrix of the estate of Gonzalo Tuason and thirty-one (31)
others. Phil-Ville acquired the lots by purchase from N. Dela Merced
and Sons, Inc. on July 24, 1984.
Earlier, on September 27, 1961, a group composed of Eleuteria
Rivera, Bartolome P. Rivera, Josefa R. Aquino, Gregorio R. Aquino,
Pelagia R. Angeles, Modesta R. Angeles, Venancio R. Angeles, Felipe
R. Angeles Fidela R. Angeles and Rosauro R. Aquino, claiming to be
the heirs of Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, a co-owner to the extent
of 1-189/1000% of the properties covered by OCT Nos. 982, 983,
984, 985 and 994 of the Hacienda Maysilo, filed a petition with the
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal in Land Registration Case No.
4557. They prayed for the substitution of their names on OCT No.
994 in place of Maria de la Concepcion Vidal. Said petition was
granted by the CFI in an Order dated May 25, 1962.
Judge Discaya directed the segregation of portions of Lots 23, 28-A-1
and 28-A-2 and ordered the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City to
issue to Eleuteria Rivera new certificates of title over them. Three
days later, the Register of Deeds of Caloocan, Yolanda O. Alfonso,
issued to Eleuteria Rivera TCT No. C-314537 covering a portion of Lot
23 with an area of 14,391.54 square meters. On December 12, 1996,
the trial court issued another Order directing the acting Branch Clerk
to issue a Certificate of Finality of the Order dated September 9,
1996.
Meanwhile, a writ of possession was issued in EleuteriaRiveras favor
on December 26, 1996. Accordingly, Sheriff Cesar L. Cruz served a
Notice to Vacate dated January 2, 1997 upon Phil-Ville, requiring it to
vacate Lots 23-A and 28. Bonifacio Shopping Center, Inc., which
occupied Lot 28-A-2, was also served a copy of the notice. Aggrieved,
Bonifacio Shopping Center, Inc. filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 43009, before the Court of
Appeals. In a Decision dated February 19, 1997, the appellate court
set aside and declared as void the Order and Writ of Possession
dated December 26, 1996 and the Notice to Vacate dated January 2,
1997. The appellate court explained that a party who has not been
impleaded in a case cannot be bound by a writ of possession issued
in connection therewith.
On June 5, 1997, petitioner filed a complaint for quieting of title and
damages against the surviving heirs of Eleuteria Rivera Vda.
deBonifacio and the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City. Ultimately,
petitioner submits that a cloud exists over its titles because TCT No.
C-314537 in the name of Eleuteria Rivera purports to cover the same
parcels of land covered by petitioners TCT Nos. 270921, 270922 and
270923. It points out that what appears to be a valid and effective
TCT No. C-314537 is, in truth, invalid because it covers Lot 23 which
is not among those described in the OCT No. 994 on file with the
Register of Deeds of Rizal and registered on May 3, 1917. Petitioner
notes that the OCT No. 994 allegedly registered on April 19, 1917
and from which TCT No. C-314537 was derived, is not found in the
records of the Register of Deeds. In other words, the action seeks
the removal of a cloud from Phil-Villes title and/or the confirmation
of its ownership over the disputed properties as the successor-in-
interest of N. Dela Merced and Sons, Inc.
Issue
Whether or not declaratory relief is proper.
Ruling
Yes. Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any
cloud upon, doubt, or uncertainty affecting title to real property.
Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest in
real property by reason of any instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance, or proceeding that is apparently valid or effective, but
is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or
unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be
brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title. In such action,
the competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of
the complainant and the other claimants, not only to place things in
their proper places, and make the claimant, who has no rights to said
immovable, respect and not disturb the one so entitled, but also for
the benefit of both, so that whoever has the right will see every
cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he can thereafter
fearlessly introduce any desired improvements, as well as use, and
even abuse the property.
In order that an action for quieting of title may prosper, two
requisites must concur: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or
equitable title or interest in the real property subject of the action;
and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be
casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or
inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal
efficacy.
As regards the first requisite, we find that petitioner was able to
establish its title over the real properties subject of this action.
Petitioner submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale by which
it acquired the subject property from N. Dela Merced and Sons, Inc.,
as well as copies of OCT No. 994 dated May 3, 1917 and all the
derivative titles leading to the issuance of TCT Nos. 270921, 270922
and 270923 in petitioners name.
Petitioner likewise presented the Proyecto de particion de la
Hacienda de Maysilo[43] to prove that Lot 23-A, of which petitioners
Lots 1-G-1, 1-G-2 and 1-G-3 form part, is among the 34 lots covered
by OCT No. 994 registered on May 3, 1917. It produced tax receipts
accompanied by a Certification[44] dated September 15, 1997 issued
by the City Treasurer of Caloocan stating that Phil-Ville has been
religiously paying realty taxes on the lots. Its documentary evidence
also includes a Plan[45] prepared by the Chief of the Geodetic
Surveys Division showing that Lot 23-A of the Maysilo Estate is
remotely situated from Lot 23 portion of the Maysilo Estate.
Petitioner ties these pieces of evidence to the finding in the DOJ
Committee Report[46] dated August 28, 1997 and Senate Committee
Report No. 1031 dated May 25, 1998 that, indeed, there is only one
OCT No. 994, that is, the one registered on May 3, 1917.
The second requisite in an action for quieting of title requires that
the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting
cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative
despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. Article
476 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any
interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective
but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or
unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be
brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast
upon title to real property or any interest therein.
Thus, the cloud on title consists of: (1) any instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding; (2) which is apparently valid or
effective; (3) but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable,
or unenforceable; and (4) may be prejudicial to the title sought to be
quieted. The fourth element is not present in the case at bar.
While it is true that TCT No. C-314537 in the name of Eleuteria
Rivera is an instrument that appeared to be valid but was
subsequently shown to be invalid, it does not cover the same parcels
of land that are described in petitioners titles. Foremost, Riveras title
embraces a land measuring 14,391.54 square meters while
petitioners lands has an aggregate area of only 8,694 square meters.
On the one hand, it may be argued that petitioners land could be
subsumed within Riveras 14,391.54-square meter property. Yet, a
comparison of the technical descriptions of the parties titles negates
an overlapping of their boundaries.
Significantly, an action to quiet title is characterized as a proceeding
quasi in rem. In an action quasi in rem, an individual is named a
defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his
interests to the obligation or loan burdening the property. Actions
quasi in rem deal with the status, ownership or liability of a
particular property but which are intended to operate on these
questions only as between the particular parties to the proceedings
and not to ascertain or cut off the rights or interests of all possible
claimants. The judgment therein is binding only upon the parties
who joined in the action.
This brings petitioners action within the purview of Rule 63 of the
Rules of Court on Declaratory Relief. Section 1 of Rule 63 provides:
SECTION 1. Who may file petition.-Any person interested under a
deed, will, contract or other written instrument, whose rights are
affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance or any
other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation
thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to
determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a
declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real
property or remove clouds therefrom, or to consolidate ownership
under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought under this Rule.
(Emphasis supplied).
An action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no
actual breach of the instruments involved or of the rights arising
thereunder. Since the purpose of an action for declaratory relief is to
secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the
parties under a statute, deed, or contract for their guidance in the
enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith, and not to settle
issues arising from an alleged breach thereof, it may be entertained
before the breach or violation of the statute, deed or contract to
which it refers. A petition for declaratory relief gives a practical
remedy for ending controversies that have not reached the state
where another relief is immediately available; and supplies the need
for a form of action that will set controversies at rest before they
lead to a repudiation of obligations, an invasion of rights, and a
commission of wrongs.
In the present case, petitioner filed a complaint for quieting of title
after it was served a notice to vacate but before it could be
dispossessed of the subject properties. Notably, the Court of
Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 43034, had earlier set aside the Order
which granted partial partition in favor of Eleuteria Rivera and the
Writ of Possession issued pursuant thereto. And although petitioners
complaint is captioned as Quieting of Title and Damages, all that
petitioner prayed for, is for the court to uphold the validity of its
titles as against that of respondents. This is consistent with the
nature of the relief in an action for declaratory relief where the
judgment in the case can be carried into effect without requiring the
parties to pay damages or to perform any act.
Thus, while petitioner was not able to demonstrate that respondents
TCT No. C-314537 in the name of Eleuteria Rivera constitutes a cloud
over its title, it has nevertheless successfully established its
ownership over the subject properties and the validity of its titles
which entitles it to declaratory relief.
G.R. No. 169466 May 9, 2007
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, represented by
SECRETARY ROMULO L. NERI, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE,
represented by POLICE DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO L. LOMIBAO,
NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION, represented by CHAIRMAN
ANGELO T. REYES, AND CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, represented
by CHAIRPERSON KARINA C. DAVID, Petitioners,
vs.
MANILAS FINEST RETIREES ASSOCIATION, INC., represented by
P/COL. FELICISIMO G. LAZARO (RET.), AND ALL THE OTHER INP
RETIREES, Respondents.
GARCIA, J.:
FACTS:
With the issuance of PD 765 in 1975, the Integrated National Police
(INP) was constituted and to be composed of the Phil. Constabulary
(PC), as the nucleus, and the integrated police forces as components
thereof. PD 1184 was then issued in 1977 to professionalize the INP
and promote career development. Then, in 1990, RA 6975 (PNP Law)
was enacted. Under Sec. 23 of this law, the PNP would initially
consist of the members of the INP, created under PD 765, as well as
the officers and enlisted personnel of the PC. About 8 years later, RA
8551 (PNP Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998) was enacted,
amending the PNP Law and reengineered the retirement scheme in
the police organization. Under this new law, PNP personnel stood to
collect more retirement benefits that what the INP members of
equivalent rank, who had retired under the INP Law. Thus, all INP
retirees, lead by the Manilas Finest Retirees Assoc., filed a petition
for declaratory relief with the RTC of Manila, impleading DBM, PNP,
NAPOLCOM, CSC and GSIS as respondents. Said petition alleged that
INP retirees, although equally situated with the PNP retirees with
regard to retirement benefits prior to the enactment of the PNP Law,
were unconscionably and arbitrarily excluded from the higher and
adjusted benefits accorded to the PNP retirees.
The RTC rules in favor of the INP retirees. It held that the PNP Law, as
amended, did not abolish the INP but merely provided for the
absorption of its police functions by the PNP. Thus, INP retirees are
entitled to the same benefits as the PNP retirees. In the same
decision, the RTC ordered the proper adjustments of the INP
retirees benefits and its immediate implementation. Said decision
was appealed by the DBM, etc. to the CA. However, the CA affirmed
the RTC decision.
ISSUE: W/N the trial court erred in ordering the immediate
adjustments of the INP retirees benefits when the basic petition
filed before it was one for declaratory relief.
HELD/RATIO: NO. RTC and CA decisions are affirmed.
Although herein petitioners DBM, etc. had a valid point, it must be
remembered that the execution of judgments in a petition for
declaratory relief is not necessarily indefensible. In PDIC v. CA, the SC
categorically ruled:
Now, there is nothing in the nature of a special civil action for
declaratory relief that proscribes the filing of a counterclaim based
on the same transaction, deed or contract subject of the complaint.
A special civil action is after all not essentially different from an
ordinary civil action, which is generally governed by Rules 1 to 56 of
the Rules of Court, except that the former deals with a special
subject matter which makes necessary some special regulation. But
the identity between their fundamental nature is such that the same
rules governing ordinary civil suits may and do apply to special civil
actions if not inconsistent with or if they may serve to supplement
the provisions of the peculiar rules governing special civil actions.
Also, in Matalin Coconut Co., Inc. v. Municipal Council of Malabang,
Lanao del Sur, the SC ruled:
x x x Under Sec. 6 of Rule 64, the action for declaratory relief may be
converted into an ordinary action and the parties allowed to file such
pleadings as may be necessary or proper, if before the final
termination of the case "a breach or violation of an ordinance,
should take place." In the present case, no breach or violation of the
ordinance occurred. The petitioner decided to pay "under protest"
the fees imposed by the ordinance. Such payment did not affect the
case; the declaratory relief action was still proper because the
applicability of the ordinance to future transactions still remained to
be resolved, although the matter could also be threshed out in an
ordinary suit for the recovery of taxes paid . In its petition for
declaratory relief, petitioner-appellee alleged that by reason of the
enforcement of the municipal ordinance by respondents it was
forced to pay under protest the fees imposed pursuant to the said
ordinance, and accordingly, one of the reliefs prayed for by the
petitioner was that the respondents be ordered to refund all the
amounts it paid to respondent Municipal Treasurer during the
pendency of the case. The inclusion of said allegation and prayer in
the petition was not objected to by the respondents in their answer.
During the trial, evidence of the payments made by the petitioner
was introduced. Respondents were thus fully aware of the
petitioner's claim for refund and of what would happen if the
ordinance were to be declared invalid by the court.
The SC sees no reason for treating this case differently from PDIC and
Matalin. This disposition becomes all the more appropriate
considering that the retirees, as petitioners in the RTC, pleaded for
the immediate adjustment of their retirement benefits to which the
herein petitioners, as respondents in the same court, did not object
to. Being aware of said prayer, the petitioners then already knew the
logical consequence if, as it turned out, a declaratory judgment is
rendered in the retirees favor. At bottom then, the trial courts
judgment forestalled multiplicity of suits which, needless to stress,
would only entail a long and arduous process. Considering their
obvious advanced years, the respondents can hardly afford another
protracted proceedings.
[G.R. No. 159357. April 28, 2004]
Brother MARIANO MIKE Z. VELARDE, petitioner,
vs.
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY, respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Case
The Petition prayed for the resolution of the question "whether or
not the act of a religious leader like any of herein respondents, in
endorsing the candidacy of a candidate for elective office or in urging
or requiring the members of his flock to vote for a specified
candidate, is violative of the letter or spirit of the constitutional
provisions x x x."
FACTS
On January 28, 2003, SJS filed a Petition for Declaratory
Relief ("SJS Petition") before the RTC-Manila against Velarde and his
aforesaid co-respondents.
SJS, a registered political party, sought the interpretation of
several constitutional provisions, specifically on the separation of
church and state; and a declaratory judgment on the
constitutionality of the acts of religious leaders endorsing a
candidate for an elective office, or urging or requiring the members
of their flock to vote for a specified candidate.
Bro. Eddie Villanueva, Executive Minister Erao Manalo
and Bro. Mike Velarde, His Eminence Jaime Cardinal L. Sin, and Bro.
Eli Soriano, all sought the dismissal of the Petition on the common
grounds that it does not state a cause of action and that there is no
justiciable controversy.
The Court denied the Motions to Dismiss, and the Motions
for Reconsideration filed by Bro. Mike Velarde, Bro. Eddie Villanueva
and Executive Minister Erao Manalo, which raised no new
arguments other than those already considered in the motions to
dismiss.
The trial court proceeded to a lengthy discussion of the
issue raised in the Petition the separation of church and state
even tracing, to some extent, the historical background of the
principle. Through its discourse, the court a quo opined at some
point that the "[e]ndorsement of specific candidates in an election to
any public office is a clear violation of the separation clause."
However, the trial court failed to include a dispositive
portion in its assailed Decision. Thus, Velarde and Soriano filed
separate Motions for Reconsideration which, as mentioned earlier,
were denied by the lower court. Hence, this Petition for Review.
The Issues
Whether or not the Petition for Declaratory Relief raise a
justiciable controversy;
Whether or not herein respondent has legal interest in
filing the Petition for declaratory relief.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition of Brother Mike Velarde is meritorious.
Requisites of Petitions for Declaratory Relief
(Section 1 of Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, which deals with
petitions for declaratory relief)
An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested
under a deed, a will, a contract or other written instrument, and
whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a
regulation or an ordinance. The purpose of the remedy is to
interpret or to determine the validity of the written instrument and
to seek a judicial declaration of the parties rights or duties
thereunder. The essential requisites of the action are as follows: (1)
there is a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy is between
persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking the relief
has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue is ripe for
judicial determination.
Justiciable Controversy
A justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that
is appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not one that is
conjectural or merely anticipatory. The SJS Petition for Declaratory
Relief fell short of this test. It miserably failed to allege an existing
controversy or dispute between the petitioner and the named
respondents therein. Further, the Petition did not sufficiently state
what specific legal right of the petitioner was violated by the
respondents therein; and what particular act or acts of the latter
were in breach of its rights, the law or the Constitution.
An initiatory complaint or petition filed with the trial court should
contain "a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts
on which the party pleading relies for his claim x x x." Yet, the SJS
Petition stated no ultimate facts.
Indeed, SJS merely speculated or anticipated without factual
moorings that, as religious leaders, the petitioner and his co-
respondents below had endorsed or threatened to endorse a
candidate or candidates for elective offices; and that such actual or
threatened endorsement "will enable [them] to elect men to public
office who [would] in turn be forever beholden to their leaders,
enabling them to control the government"[;] 21 and "pos[ing] a clear
and present danger of serious erosion of the peoples faith in the
electoral process[;] and reinforc[ing] their belief that religious
leaders determine the ultimate result of elections," which would
then be violative of the separation clause.
Such premise is highly speculative and merely theoretical, to say the
least. Clearly, it does not suffice to constitute a justiciable
controversy. The Petition does not even allege any indication or
manifest intent on the part of any of the respondents below to
champion an electoral candidate, or to urge their so-called flock to
vote for, or not to vote for, a particular candidate. It is a time-
honored rule that sheer speculation does not give rise to an
actionable right.
Cause of Action
A cause of action is an act or an omission of one party in violation
of the legal right or rights of another, causing injury to the latter.
The failure of a complaint to state a cause of action is a ground for its
outright dismissal. However, in special civil actions for declaratory
relief, the concept of a cause of action under ordinary civil actions
does not strictly apply. The reason for this exception is that an action
for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual
breach of the instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder.
Nevertheless, a breach or violation should be impending, imminent
or at least threatened.
A perusal of the Petition filed by SJS before the RTC discloses no
explicit allegation that the former had any legal right in its favor that
it sought to protect. We can only infer the interest, supposedly in its
favor, from its bare allegation that it "has thousands of members
who are citizens-taxpayers-registered voters and who are keenly
interested in a judicial clarification of the constitutionality of the
partisan participation of religious leaders in Philippine politics and in
the process to insure adherence to the Constitution by everyone x x
x."
Such general averment does not, however, suffice to constitute a
legal right or interest. Not only is the presumed interest not personal
in character; it is likewise too vague, highly speculative and
uncertain. The Rules require that the interest must be material to
the issue and affected by the questioned act or instrument, as
distinguished from simple curiosity or incidental interest in the
question raised.
The Court finds in the Petition for Declaratory Relief no single
allegation of fact upon which SJS could base a right of relief from the
named respondents. In any event, even granting that it sufficiently
asserted a legal right it sought to protect, there was nevertheless no
certainty that such right would be invaded by the said respondents.
Not even the alleged proximity of the elections to the time the
Petition was filed below (January 28, 2003) would have provided the
certainty that it had a legal right that would be jeopardized or
violated by any of those respondents.
Legal Standing
Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and
substantial interest in the case, such that the party has sustained or
will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged act. Interest
means a material interest in issue that is affected by the questioned
act or instrument, as distinguished from a mere incidental interest in
the question involved.
Parties bringing suits challenging the constitutionality of a law, an act
or a statute must show "not only that the law [or act] is invalid, but
also that [they have] sustained or [are] in immediate or imminent
danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
enforcement, and not merely that [they] suffer thereby in some
indefinite way." They must demonstrate that they have been, or are
about to be, denied some right or privilege to which they are
lawfully entitled, or that they are about to be subjected to some
burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.
First, parties suing as taxpayers must specifically prove
that they have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure
of money raised by taxation. A taxpayers action may be properly
brought only when there is an exercise by Congress of its taxing or
spending power. In the present case, there is no allegation, whether
express or implied, that taxpayers money is being illegally disbursed.
Second, there was no showing in the Petition for Declaratory Relief
that SJS as a political party or its members as registered voters would
be adversely affected by the alleged acts of the respondents below, if
the question at issue was not resolved. There was no allegation that
SJS had suffered or would be deprived of votes due to the acts
imputed to the said respondents. Neither did it allege that any of its
members would be denied the right of suffrage or the privilege to be
voted for a public office they are seeking.
Finally, the allegedly keen interest of its "thousands of members who
are citizens-taxpayers-registered voters" is too general and beyond
the contemplation of the standards set by our jurisprudence. Not
only is the presumed interest impersonal in character; it is likewise
too vague, highly speculative and uncertain to satisfy the
requirement of standing.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review of Brother Mike Velarde is
GRANTED. The SJS Petition for Declaratory Relief is DISMISSED for
failure to state a cause of action.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 161140 January 31, 2007
BAYAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS INC. (Formerly International
Communications Corporation), Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Facts:
A petition for declaratory relief filed before the RTC of Pasig City, by
petitioner Bayan Telecommunications Inc., against respondents NTC.
Petitioner specifically sought the suspension of the requirement,
under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 7925,4 of a public offering of
30% of the aggregate common stocks of telecommunication entities
with regulated types of services within five years from the effectivity
of the Act or the entitys first start of commercial operations,
whichever comes later. Petitioner claimed that it was impossible for
it to make a bona fide public offering at that time because its
financial condition, the Philippine economy, and the stock market
were not conducive for a successful public offering. It also claimed
that impossibility of performance was an implied exception to the
abovecited provision of Rep. Act No. 7925.
SOLGEN and Trial court dismissed the petition for failure to state a
cause of action.
Petitioner then elevated the case to the CA and present appeal is
hereby DISMISSED. It held that the elements of justiciable
controversy and ripeness for judicial determination were absent as
there was no showing that petitioner asked for an exemption from
or deferment of compliance with the requirement of Section 21,
from the NTC, and was refused
Issues:
1. Whether or not there is ambiguity in the provisions of Section 21
of R.A. 7925 that would require the remedy of a declaratory relief?
2. Whether or not there is a justiciable controversy ripe for judicial
determination?
Ruling
We agree that respondents contentions are valid while petitioners
plea lacks merit.
Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court reads:
Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive
order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation
may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the
appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of
construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or
duties, thereunder.
xxxx
For such an action for declaratory relief before a trial court to
prosper, it must be shown that (a) there is a justiciable controversy,
(b) the controversy is between persons whose interests are adverse,
(c) the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy,
and (d) the issue invoked is ripe for judicial determination.10
Respondents contest the presence of the first and last requisites
insofar as petitioners case is concerned.
A justiciable controversy is a definite and concrete dispute touching
on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests, which
may be resolved by a court of law through the application of a law.11
In the case at bar, petitioner fears the risk of possible sanctions.
However, a mere apprehension of an administrative sanction does
not give rise to a justiciable controversy.12 Rep. Act No. 7925 does
not provide for a penalty for noncompliance with Section 21, and as
correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, there are yet no
implementing rules or guidelines to carry into effect the requirement
imposed by the said provision. Whatever sanctions petitioner fears
are merely hypothetical.
An issue is ripe for judicial determination when litigation is
inevitable,13 or when administrative remedies have been
exhausted.14 There is no showing of either in the present case.
Instead, petitioner asserts that this case falls within the exceptions to
the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies, specifically when
there is no administrative review provided by law or when the
questions involved are essentially judicial. To our mind, petitioner
should have first raised its concerns with the NTC, the agency
authorized to implement Rep. Act No. 7925. Only after a categorical
denial of its claim of exemption from or deferment of compliance
with Section 21 can petitioner proceed to court. As it is now, we
agree with the trial and appellate courts that petitioner has no cause
of action.
Instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
G.R. No. 170656 August 15, 2007
THE METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY and
BAYANI FERNANDO as Chairman of the Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority, petitioners,
vs.
VIRON TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., respondent.
x --------------------------------------------- x
G.R. No. 170657 August 15, 2007
HON. ALBERTO G. ROMULO, Executive Secretary, the
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY and BAYANI
FERNANDO as Chairman of the Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority, petitioners,
vs.
MENCORP TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM, INC., respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
FACTS
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued the E.O. on February 10,
2003, "Providing for the Establishment of Greater Manila Mass
Transport System. For this purpose, MMDA is directed to undertake
such infrastructure development work as may be necessary and,
thereafter, manage the project until it may be turned-over to more
appropriate agencies, if found suitable and convenient. Specifically,
MMDA shall have the following functions and responsibilities:
a) Cause the preparation of the Master Plan for the projects,
including the designs and costing;
b) Coordinate the use of the land and/or properties needed for the
project with the respective agencies and/or entities owning them;
c) Supervise and manage the construction of the necessary
structures and facilities;
d) Execute such contracts or agreements as may be necessary, with
the appropriate government agencies, entities, and/or private
persons, in accordance with existing laws and pertinent regulations,
to facilitate the implementation of the project;
e) Accept, manage and disburse such funds as may be necessary for
the construction and/or implementation of the projects, in
accordance with prevailing accounting and audit polices and practice
in government.
f) Enlist the assistance of any national government agency, office or
department, including local government units, government-owned
or controlled corporations, as may be necessary;
g) Assign or hire the necessary personnel for the above purposes;
and
h) Perform such other related functions as may be necessary to
enable it to accomplish the objectives and purposes of this Executive
Order.4 (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)
On February 24, 2003, Viron Transport Co., Inc. (Viron), a domestic
corporation engaged in the business of public transportation with a
provincial bus operation,9 filed a petition for declaratory relief10
before the RTC11 of Manila.
In its petition Viron alleged that the MMDA, through Chairman
Fernando, was "poised to issue a Circular, Memorandum or Order
closing, or tantamount to closing, all provincial bus terminals along
EDSA and in the whole of the Metropolis under the pretext of traffic
regulation."12 This impending move, it stressed, would mean the
closure of its bus terminal in Sampaloc, Manila and two others in
Quezon City.
Alleging that the MMDAs authority does not include the power to
direct provincial bus operators to abandon their existing bus
terminals to thus deprive them of the use of their property, Viron
asked the court to construe the scope, extent and limitation of the
power of the MMDA to regulate traffic under R.A. No. 7924, "An Act
Creating the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, Defining
its Powers and Functions, Providing Funds Therefor and For Other
Purposes."
Viron also asked for a ruling on whether the planned closure of
provincial bus terminals would contravene the Public Service Act and
related laws which mandate public utilities to provide and maintain
their own terminals as a requisite for the privilege of operating as
common carriers.
Mencorp Transportation System, Inc. (Mencorp), another provincial
bus operator, later filed a similar petition for declaratory relief14
against Executive Secretary Alberto G. Romulo and MMDA Chairman
Fernando.
Mencorp asked the court to declare the E.O. unconstitutional and
illegal for transgressing the possessory rights of owners and
operators of public land transportation units over their respective
terminals.
Averring that MMDA Chairman Fernando had begun to implement a
plan to close and eliminate all provincial bus terminals along EDSA
and in the whole of the metropolis and to transfer their operations
to common bus terminals.
The trial court held that the E.O. was a valid exercise of the police
power, However, The trial court the by Order of September 8, 2005,
reversed its Decision, this time holding that the E.O. was "an
unreasonable exercise of police power"; that the authority of the
MMDA under Section (5)(e) of R.A. No. 7924 does not include the
power to order the closure of Virons and Mencorps existing bus
terminals; and that the E.O. is inconsistent with the provisions of the
Public Service Act.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied, Hence, this
petition.
Issues:
W/N requisites of declaratory relief are not present, there being no
justiciable controversy in Civil Case Nos. 03-105850 and 03-106224;
and
Ruling:
In bringing their petitions before the trial court, both respondents
pleaded the existence of the essential requisites for their respective
petitions for declaratory relief,23 and refuted petitioners contention
that a justiciable controversy was lacking.24 There can be no
denying, therefore, that the issue was raised and discussed by the
parties before the trial court.
The following are the essential requisites for a declaratory relief
petition: (a) there must be a justiciable controversy; (b) the
controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse;
(c) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in
the controversy; and (d) the issue invoked must be ripe for judicial
determination.25
The requirement of the presence of a justiciable controversy is
satisfied when an actual controversy or the ripening seeds thereof
exist between the parties, all of whom are sui juris and before the
court, and the declaration sought will help in ending the
controversy.26 A question becomes justiciable when it is translated
into a claim of right which is actually contested.27
In the present cases, respondents resort to court was prompted by
the issuance of the E.O. The 4th Whereas clause of the E.O. sets out
in clear strokes the MMDAs plan to "decongest traffic by eliminating
the bus terminals now located along major Metro Manila
thoroughfares and providing more convenient access to the mass
transport system to the commuting public through the provision of
mass transport terminal facilities x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
It thus appears that the issue has already transcended the
boundaries of what is merely conjectural or anticipatory.lawphil
Under the circumstances, for respondents to wait for the actual
issuance by the MMDA of an order for the closure of respondents
bus terminals would be foolhardy for, by then, the proper action to
bring would no longer be for declaratory relief which, under Section
1, Rule 6330 of the Rules of Court, must be brought before there is a
breach or violation of rights.
As for petitioners contention that the E.O. is a mere administrative
issuance which creates no relation with third persons, it does not
persuade. Suffice it to stress that to ensure the success of the Project
for which the concerned government agencies are directed to
coordinate their activities and resources, the existing bus terminals
owned, operated or leased by third persons like respondents would
have to be eliminated; and respondents would be forced to operate
from the common bus terminals.
It cannot be gainsaid that the E.O. would have an adverse effect on
respondents. The closure of their bus terminals would mean, among
other things, the loss of income from the operation and/or rentals of
stalls thereat. Precisely, respondents claim a deprivation of their
constitutional right to property without due process of law.
Respondents have thus amply demonstrated a "personal and
substantial interest in the case such that [they have] sustained, or
will sustain, direct injury as a result of [the E.O.s] enforcement."31
Consequently, the established rule that the constitutionality of a law
or administrative issuance can be challenged by one who will sustain
a direct injury as a result of its enforcement has been satisfied by
respondents.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is, in light of the foregoing disquisition,
DENIED. E.O. No. 179 is declared NULL and VOID for being ultra vires.
SO ORDERED.