SPC. 00-ZA-E-09101: Incidental Scenario Identification

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ENGINEERING SUPPORT FOR GREENSTREAM
OFFSHORE PIPELINE SYSTEM Rev.
Sh. 1 of 22 C1
Agreement No. GS-OP/004/05/AM
INCIDENTAL SCENARIO IDENTIFICATION
C1 Client Comments Included LCO ADF CMO 18/03/10

B1 Issue for Client Comments LCO ADF CMO 22/02/10
A1 Issue for Internal Review LCO ADF
Description Prepared Checked Approved Date
Data file:09101_C1.doc
This document is the property of Saipem who will safeguard its rights according to the civil and penal provisions of the law.
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ENGINEERING SUPPORT FOR GREENSTREAM Rev.
OFFSHORE PIPELINE SYSTEM Sh. 2 of 22 C1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1 INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE 3

1.1 Introduction 3
1.2 Scope of the document 5
2 CONCLUSION 5
3 DEFINITIONS, ABBREVIATIONS AND REFERENCES 8

3.1 Definitions 8
3.2 Abbreviations 8
3.3 References 9
4 INCIDENTAL SCENARIOS IDENTIFICATION 10

4.1 Potential Causes of Incident / Damage 10
4.2 Damage Types 11
4.2.1 Dry Buckle or Dent 11
4.2.2 Pin Hole 11
4.2.3 Catastrophic Rupture 11
4.2.4 Line Blockage 11
4.3 Damage classes 12
5 P/L FEATURES 13
5.1 Operating Condition 13
5.2 Internal Features 15
5.3 External Features 15
5.3.1 P/L routing vs external interfaces 15
5.3.2 External Protection 18
6 MOST LIKELY INCIDENTAL SCENARIO: IDENTIFICATION

PROCESS 19
7 LIST OF IDENTIFIED INCIDENTAL SCENARIO 21
Data file: 09101_c1.doc

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1 INTRODUCTION and SCOPE
1.1 Introduction
The GreenStream System conveys dry and sweet natural gas from coastal facilities in
Libya to Italy, via an offshore pipeline (OPL), with associated initial gas compressor
station (MGCS) and a receiving terminal (SRT).
The overview of the pipeline route between Libya and Sicily and the bathymetric profile
of the line are reported in the below figures:
Fig. 1-1: Overview of the Pipeline Route between Sicily and Libya [Ref. 8]

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Libya Italy
-200
Water Depth [m]
-400
-600
-800
-1000
-1200
0 100 200 300 400 500
Chainage [km]
Fig. 1-2: Green Stream Pipeline Bathymetric Profile

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1.2 Scope of the document
The scope of this study is the definition of the type of failure/incidental scenarios
potentially occurring during the operating life of the export system within the Green
Stream project.
Identification of all likely causes of realistic incidental scenario that could potentially
occur during operational activities;
Identification of every conceivable realistic incidental scenario that could potentially
occur during operational activities;
In particular, this document is focused on the classification of main incidental scenarios

that have consequences on the main off-shore pipeline system operating parameters.
The study is limited to the Offshore Part of the Green Stream Pipeline System (GSOP),
the gas pipeline system joining Libya to Italy. Battery Limits are, therefore:
Upstream battery limit: downstream weld at ESD valve, Libya side.

Downstream battery limit: upstream weld at ESD valve, Italy side.
2 CONCLUSION
Considering the different damage types and the probably to occur in some defined
positions, the following list of incidental scenario is identified and reported along the
pipeline route:
A) Buckle or Dent
Type Buckle or Dent

KP 0 to KP 285
Position
KP 490 to KP 516
Size Dent depth >0.05 Pipe OD
Buckle Arrestors Distance
Extention
(i.e. 126 joint) (*)
(*) [Ref. 11]

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B) Pin Hole _Gas Leakage
Type Pin Hole_Gas Leakage

KP 0 to KP 285
Position
Hole () To be defined as
Size
minimum detectable
Extention Local
C) Pin Hole _Water Inlet
Type Pin Hole_Water Inlet
Position KP 390 to KP 410

Size
minimum detectable
Extention Local
D) Rupture
Type Rupture
KP 0 to KP 285
Position
KP 490 to KP 516
Size () = Pipe ID
Extention To be defined
E) Line Blockage
Type Line Blockage

All position are equally
Position
probable
Size () = Pipe ID
Extention Local

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Lybia Sicily
0
-200
Water Dept [m]
-400
Buckle or Dent Buckle or Dent

-600
Pin Hole_Gas Leakage Pin Hole_Water Inlet
-800
Rupture
-1000
Internal Blockage
-1200
0 100,000 200,000 300,000 400,000 500,000
P/L Length [m]
Fig. 2-1: Damage Location vs Pipeline route
It is notice that, both Rupture and Internal Blockage Incidental Scenario have not
location defined; because these could occur with the same probability in any position
along the route.
In particular the Rupture Scenario could be caused by Human Activity, in two defined
critical sections (i.e. line continuous in figure), and by Geohazard (no more critical
section defined along the route, i.e. dotted line).

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3 DEFINITIONS, ABBREVIATIONS AND REFERENCES
3.1 Definitions
Company: Green Stream Pipeline Company B.V. (GSPC);

Engineer: Saipem Energy Services S.p.A
Green Stream Pipeline System including Mellitah Compressor Station
System: and the an offshore pipeline;
Offshore Pipeline: the Green Stream pipeline sections located
between the upstream and the downstream
Battery Limits;
Battery Limits: Upstream battery limit: internal and external
surface of the pipeline, downstream weld at ESD
valve, Lybia side;
Downstream battery limit: internal and external
surface of the pipeline, upstream weld at ESD
valve, Sicily side;
3.2 Abbreviations
BSCMD Billions of Standard Cubic Meters per Day

BA Buckle arrestor
CWC Concrete Weight Coating
DCS Distributed Control System
DP Dew Point
ESD Emergency Shut Down
EPRP Emergency Prevention and Response Plan
GSOP Green Stream Offshore Pipeline
GT Total Mass rate
LDS Leak Detection System
MB Mass Balance
MGCS Mellitha Gas Compressor Station
MMSCMD Million Standard Cubic Meters per Day
OPL Offshore Pipeline
OS Offshore Survey
Pint Internal Pressure
Pext External Pressure
P/L Pipeline
QA Quality Assurance
QC Quality Control
ROV Remote Operated Vehicle
RTM Real Time Model
RTU Remote Terminal Unit
SCADA Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition
SRT Sicily Receiving Terminal
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STMC/h Standard Cubic Meters per hour

Tmin Temperature at minimum operating condition
UCS Unit Control System
WD Water Depth
3.3 References
Ref. 1 Doc. No SPC.00-ZA-E-08311_Offshore Pipeline Operating Manual

Ref. 2 Doc. No 400246-REL-E400-T088-00_Conceptual study Sircos 2 Dry Damage
scenarios OMISSIS_1
Ref. 3 Doc. No 400246-REL-E400-T088-00_Conceptual study Sircos 2 Wet Damage
scenarios OMISSIS_1
Ref. 4 DNV-OS-F101 (2007), Submarine Pipeline System
Ref. 5 Doc. No. SPC.00-ZA-E-85202_ Assessment of Causes Requiring Long Repair
System Provision
Ref. 6 Doc. No. 02-LF-E-09001, Green Stream Pipeline Basic Data (All data in ED50
Co-ordinates), Rev.C1 (2006)
Ref. 7 Field Measurements of Pressure, Temperature and Flow Rate at MGCS and
SRT (January 2009 April 2009)
Ref. 8 Doc. No SPC. 01-ZA-E-85051, Ship Traffic Characterization
Ref. 9 Doc. No SPC. 01-ZA-E-85220, Frequency of External Interference
Ref. 10 Doc. No SPC. 01-LF-E-71511 Bathymorphological and Geotechnical Route
characterisation and Design Parameters.
Ref. 11 Doc. No SPC.01-LF-E- 70003 Buckle Arrestors Sizing

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4 INCIDENTAL SCENARIOS IDENTIFICATION
4.1 Potential Causes of Incident / Damage
In this paragraph, all the possible hazardous causes that may happen during the
operational life of the pipelines have been identified.
Subsea pipeline damage can occur as a result of a number of causes and contributory
factors. The most common of these are listed below:
Physical damage caused by human activities, typically ship traffic/ frequency &
fishing activities. Based on statistical occurrences, the following hazardous
scenarios show a not negligible likelihood:
dropped object
anchor dragging;
vessel/container grounding;
sinking ships
Physical damage caused by Geohazards [Ref. 10]:

Steep slopes
Slumps and creeps
Faults
Earthquake
Material Corrosion:
Internal corrosion arising from:
unforeseen/unplanned changes in production composition;
metallurgical defect in the pipe wall or weld;
erosion by unexpected product or pigs during operation.
External corrosion, scaling, pitting caused by:
damage by crustaceans and/or sea water;
missing or damaged cathodic protection;
missing or damaged anti-corrosion coating or concrete.
Operational Pigging: Pig stuck in line due to excessive debris build-up or pig
break-down during run.
Hydrate Formation

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4.2 Damage Types
In this paragraph, the possible damage types that may happen during the operational
life of the pipelines have been identified.
Different damage type could be found for pipeline system.
4.2.1 Dry Buckle or Dent
A dry buckle is defined as a local geometrical deformation of the pipeline wall or

extended between two buckle arrestors. The deformation of pipe cross section could
be piggable or not-piggable.
This could be possibly caused by dropped objects or anchor dragging.
4.2.2 Pin Hole
This damage type is defined as a local and limited hole on the pipeline wall. Depending
on location and operating transport conditions, this leak could generate a gas outlet to
the environment or water ingress.
Outward leakage is expected considering a scenario of internal pressure higher
than external hydrostatic pressure and reduced hole dimension. This could be
possibly caused by local corrosion phenomena. An underwater release of high-
pressure gas will produce high velocity gas jets close to the leak position.
Inward Sea Water is expected when the pressure of the gas in the pipeline is
lower than the external pressure. This could be possibly caused by local
corrosion phenomena. The main consequence of this event is the presence of
water in the gas stream, which will alter the gas composition and dew point, with
consequent serious process problems. In case of sea water inlet into pipeline,
hydrates, as they form, principally stick and deposit onto the pipe wall. Then
hydrates continue to build up in the system and very little water exits at pipeline
outlet. Depending on the initial position of the water ingress in the pipeline, the
water inlet and the consequent hydrate formation could be identified after a
significant number of hours from the initial event.
4.2.3 Catastrophic Rupture
This kind of damage is defined as an extended rupture on pipe wall.

Depending on location and operating transport conditions, a P/L rupture could generate
an initial gas blow-out followed by a sea water ingress or direct sea water ingress.
The damage could not have a defined localization due to the possible not defined
propagation of seawater inlet along line.
This could be caused by earthquake, geological instability, dragging of a large anchor.
4.2.4 Line Blockage
An obstruction could be typically generated by pig stuck in line or by hydrate formation.

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Pig stuck in line is defined as a local restriction of pipe cross section and could
be caused by break-down of launched pig in the line, undetected line section
restriction, solids accumulated in the line [Ref. 2].
Hydrate formation could be an outcome of water ingress in line.
The following table is an attempt to make a correlation between possible causes and
damages:
Causes
Human Acivity Geohazard Corrosion Pig Stuck Hydrate Formation
Buckle or Dent X X
Damage Type
Pin-Hole Leak X X
Rupture X X
Blockage X X
Tab. 4-1: Cause & Damage Matrix
4.3 Damage classes
The different damage types could be divided for entity of impact on the normal
operating conditions for the following classification:
Minor damage (Buckle and Dents): Damage requiring repair but not originating
hydrocarbon release (i.e. not damaging the pipelines integrity). These damages
may be repaired during programmed shut-down and do not require immediate
intervention nor cause loss of production (however It might be necessary to
operate for some time at a reduced flow rate). Examples of this damage category
are dents restricting internal passage area (ovalization larger than 5 % of pipeline
diameter) and pipeline displacements with cross sectional deformations [Ref. 4-
Section 5- E503].
Moderate damage (Pin Hole with Inward Sea Water or Outward Fluid):
Damage originating inlet of sea water or hydrocarbon release from holes in the
pipe wall.
Major damage (Catastrophic Rupture ): Damage leading to Full Bore Ruptures
or Large Ruptures, and implying the release of a significant fraction of the flow
rate (or the entire flowrate) or a flooding of the line and will require immediate
shut down and immediate intervention.

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5 P/L FEATURES
In order to predict the most likely incidental scenarios, it is important to analyse also the
pipeline configuration in term of its vulnerability / consequences due to damage upset
conditions:
5.1 Operating Condition
Variations on operating parameters due to any pipeline rupture are expected to be

different depending on the initial steady state conditions at which the system is
operating.
For this reason, different operating conditions have been considered in order to
estimate the pipeline behaviour at different export work load.
Based on the field data relevant to January 2009 April 2009, it is noted that the flow
rate is quite constant; instead the pressure at receiving shows some variation [Ref. 7].
In particular, an average flow rate value (i.e. 8BSCMY) and three receiving pressure
value have been considered representative of normal operating condition of the line.
Following table reports the operating conditions that are selected from available daily
report data.
MGCS SRT
Gas Rate Pin Tin Gas Rate Pout Tout
Case
[KStm3/h] [barg] [C] [MSCMD] [barg] [C]
Min 1014.6 134 60 24.35 80 10.7
Mean 1014.6 147 60 24.35 100 10.9
Max 1014.6 154 60 24.35 110 11
Tab. 5-1: Selected Operating Cases

Above operating cases are selected in agreement with the following criteria:
Gas Rate selected is an average value of production relevant to period 2009 (it
has to be noted that in the daily report the data are recorded each hour).
Minimum, medium and maximum receiving pressures are selected in order to
cover a production range representative of the whole pipeline system.
Following Graph reports pressure profiles for each case, reported above, compared
with external pressure (due to seawater column along pipeline bathymetry).
The comparison between internal pressures (gas flowing pressure) with external
pressure (due to seawater) of the pipeline is reported to assess possible gas leakage
or water ingress inside the pipeline due to any rupture.

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Bathymetry Hydrostatic Pressure
Pout=81 bara Pout=111 bara
Pout=101 bara 1.60E+02
0
1.40E+02
-200
1.20E+02
Pressure [bara]
Elevation [m]
-400
1.00E+02
8.00E+01
-600
6.00E+01
-800
4.00E+01
-1000
2.00E+01
-1200 0.00E+00
0 100 200 300 400 500
P/L length [km]
Fig. 5-1: Internal Pressure Profile vs External Pressure
Considering the above reported pressure profile for each operating conditions, it is
possible to note that the two possible zones along the pipelines route could be
considered representative of different rupture outward, and in particular:
Zone of Shallow Water: where pressure inside the pipelines is always larger
that external pressure (near Libyan Coast).
Zone of Deep Water: where pressure inside the pipelines could be smaller than
external pressure (near Sicily Coast). In particular, considering the case of
minimum receiving pressure, two significant point should be identified:
-At KP 393 where Pin<Pext;
-At KP 470 where Pin~Pext;

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5.2 Internal Features
The internal cause of damage is represented by corrosion due to the transported

medium composition.
The monitoring and recording of gas composition at the pipeline inlet, should be
consider a parameter to avoid corrosion phenomena.
Moreover the transported gas is dry and free of sour components in order to minimize
the possibility of internal corrosion.
However the condensation of some water, occurring along the pipeline, should be
considered as an even remote possibility, although gas dehydration units are at
Mellitah Gas Treatment Plants.
5.3 External Features
5.3.1 P/L routing vs external interfaces
Along the pipeline route could be highlighted zones more likely affect by human
damage.
In order to analyze these points are to be considered the interaction between whole P/L
route [see Fig. 1-2] and ship traffic / frequency.
Ship Traffic:
The following map shows each kilometre section of pipeline colour-coded by annual
crossings, based on the following ranges:
Colour Annual Crossing % of Pipeline
Dark Blue From 0 to 0.5 19%
Light Blue From 0.5 to 5 23%
Green From 5 to 15 19%
Yellow From 15 to 50 18%
Red >50 21%
Note: Annual Crossing is Annual number of crossings of KP section of pipeline by vessels on the route
identified.
Tab. 5-2: Colour-Coded by Annual Vessel Crossings [Ref. 8]

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Fig. 5-2: Pipe KPs Colour-Coded by Annual Vessel Crossings [Ref. 8]
The annual crossing of ships is considered divided as follow:
- From the Libya coat since to 285 km, the annual ship crossing is just 4%
(1/24th).
- From KP=490 to 509 km is estimated as the busiest zone with 50% of total
crossing.
Anchoring Operation
The maximum water depth for anchoring area operations is assumed to be around
300m [Ref. 9].
Moreover it is notice that an anchoring area for vessels over 5000GT is located close to
Gela landfall (i.e. From KP 511.07 to KP 512.8) [Ref. 6]

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Interaction / impact frequency
Even if dropped object from commercial vessel, anchor dragging and trawl gears
should be likely for both Libyan and Italian landfall, it is notice that the higher frequency
of impacts is found in the section from KP 498 to KP 509 [see tab below].
FromTo Depth range Impacts/km-y

[km] [m]
KP494.8KP505.1 -50-300 12364
KP408.4KP449.5 -250-700 150
KP289KP379.4 -485-700 254
KP85KP289 -100-485 74
KP28KP208 -95-289 24
Tab. 5-3: Trawl gear impact results [Ref. 9]
Based on the above reported ship traffic and frequency of interaction with pipeline, the
most threatened area is found to be:
- Near Sicily Coast: from KP 498 to KP 510.
This estimation is referred to only vessel crossing frequency. The aim is give some
indication about the pipeline sections where the interaction with external features
should be more likely.

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5.3.2 External Protection
Concrete Weight Coating
Due to overweighting for on bottom stability and protection requirements for fishing
device, some of the offshore pipeline sections are concrete coated.
As reported in the Tab. 5-4, the concrete is not present in two deepest points of the
route.
In the area involved in by fishing activity / ship traffic and where the pipeline is not
concrete coated, the anticorrosion coating more likely could suffer damages from
impacts with dropped objects.
In the area involved in by fishing activity / ship traffic, the pipeline sections coated with
concrete could be considered more protected from impacts with dropped objects.
LGTS CONCRETE THICKNESS AS BUILT DATA

Kilometric Progressive Concrete Coating
Section Line Pipe Wall
(KP) from Libya
Length Thickness
(km) Thickness Density Material Thickness
from to (m) (mm) (mm) (kg/m3) (mm)
0 0.6 600 30.2 100 3040 PU 2.5
0.6 2.14 1540 26.1 100 3040 PU 2.5
2.14 2.771 631 26.1 100 3040 PU 2.5
2.771 4.495 1724 26.1 100 3040 PU 2.5
4.495 12 7505 26.1 90 3040 PU 2.5
12 15.23 3230 26.1 100 3040 PU 2.5
15.23 21.58 6350 26.1 90 3040 PU 2.5
21.58 25.88 4300 26.1 100 3040 PU 2.5
25.88 27.42 1540 26.1 90 3040 PU 2.5
27.42 40.13 12710 26.1 50 3040 PU 2.5
40.13 260 219780 26.1 40 2400 PU 2.5
260 412.75 152750 30.2 - - PE 6
412.75 435.75 23000 30.2 40 2400 PU 2.5
435.75 494 58250 30.2 - - PE 6
494 505.23 11230 30.2 40 2400 PU 2.5
505.23 508.35 3120 30.2 70 3040 PU 2.5
508.35 513.467 5117 30.2 70 3040 PU 2.5
513.467 515.11 1643 30.2 100 3040 PU 2.5
515.11 515.764 654 30.2 100 3040 PU 2.5
Tab. 5-4: LGTS Concrete Thickness Along the Pipeline Route As Built Data
[Ref. 6]
Burial Configuration
The pipeline sections buried could be considered more protected from impacts with
dropped objects or dragged anchor.
In particular the pipeline sections buried are [Ref. 6]:
- Near Libya Coast: From KP 0 to KP 10;

- Near Sicily Coast: From KP 507 to KP 516:

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6 MOST LIKELY INCIDENTAL SCENARIO: IDENTIFICATION PROCESS
Most likely incidental scenario, as basis for this study, are defined as the combinations
of type of damage, location and resulting consequences that have more probably to
occur based on the actual GSOP configuration and routing.
Taking into consideration all the characteristic parameters, different regions are
indicated on P/L route as follow in Fig. 6-1:
Operating Condition:
- From KP 100 to 250 (Max Different Pressure from Pin and Pext; always
Pin>Pest);
- From KP 390 to 410 (Max Water Dept & Pin < Pext);
- From KP 450 to 490 (High Water Dept & Pin ~ Pext).
External Features:
- From KP 260 to KP 412.75 (No Concrete Coated Section);
- From KP 435 to KP 495 (No Concrete Coated Section);
- From KP 490 to KP 509 (More ship crossings for year);
- From KP 0 to KP 285 (Anchoring Area_near Libyan Coast);
- From KP 490 to KP 516 (Anchoring Area_near Sicilian Coast);
- From KP 0 to KP 516 (No Specific Critical Section Identified for Geohazad);
Internal Features:
- From KP 0 to KP 516 (No Specific Critical Section Identified for Corrosion);
- From KP 0 to KP 516 (No Specific Critical Section Identified for Hydrate
Formation);
- From KP 0 to KP 516 (No Specific Critical Section Identified for Pig Stuck);

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200
Lybia Sicily
0
-200
Water Dept [m]
-400
Buckle or Dent Buckle or Dent

-600
Pin Hole_Gas Leakage Pin Hole_Water Inlet
-800
Rupture
-1000
Internal Blockage
-1200
0 100,000 200,000 300,000 400,000 500,000
P/L Length [m]
Fig. 6-1: Damage Location vs Pipeline route
It is notice that, both Rupture and Internal Blockage Incidental Scenario have not
location defined; because these could occur with the same probability in any position
along the route.
In particular the Rupture Scenario could be caused by Human Activity, in two defined
critical sections (i.e. line continuous in figure), and by Geohazard (no more critical
section defined along the route, i.e. dotted line).

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7 LIST OF IDENTIFIED INCIDENTAL SCENARIO
Considering the different damage types and the probably to occur in defined positions,
the following list of incidental scenario is identified:
A) Buckle or Dent
Type Buckle or Dent

KP 0 to KP 285
Position
KP 490 to KP 516
Size Dent depth >0.05 Pipe OD
Buckle Arrestors Distance
Extention
(i.e. 126 joint) (*)
(*) [Ref. 11]
B) Pin Hole _Gas Leakage
Type Pin Hole_Gas Leakage

KP 0 to KP 285
Position
Size
minimum detectable
Extention Local
C) Pin Hole _Water Inlet
Type Pin Hole_Water Inlet
Position KP 390 to KP 410

Size
minimum detectable
Extention Local

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D) Rupture
Type Rupture
KP 0 to KP 285
Position
KP 490 to KP 516
Size () = Pipe ID
Extention To be defined
E) Line Blockage
Type Line Blockage

All position are equally
Position
probable
Size () = Pipe ID
Extention Local


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Agreement No. GS-OP/004/05/AM

INCIDENTAL SCENARIO IDENTIFICATION

C1 Client Comments Included LCO ADF CMO 18/03/10

Agreement No. GS-OP/004/05/AM

1 INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE 3

3 DEFINITIONS, ABBREVIATIONS AND REFERENCES 8

4 INCIDENTAL SCENARIOS IDENTIFICATION 10

6 MOST LIKELY INCIDENTAL SCENARIO: IDENTIFICATION

7 LIST OF IDENTIFIED INCIDENTAL SCENARIO 21

Data file: 09101_c1.doc

Agreement No. GS-OP/004/05/AM

1 INTRODUCTION and SCOPE

Data file: 09101_c1.doc

Agreement No. GS-OP/004/05/AM

Fig. 1-2: Green Stream Pipeline Bathymetric Profile

Data file: 09101_c1.doc

Agreement No. GS-OP/004/05/AM

1.2 Scope of the document

In particular, this document is focused on the classification of main incidental scenarios

Upstream battery limit: downstream weld at ESD valve, Libya side.

Type Buckle or Dent

Data file: 09101_c1.doc

Agreement No. GS-OP/004/05/AM

B) Pin Hole _Gas Leakage

Type Pin Hole_Gas Leakage

C) Pin Hole _Water Inlet

Type Pin Hole_Water Inlet

Position KP 390 to KP 410

Type Line Blockage

Data file: 09101_c1.doc

Agreement No. GS-OP/004/05/AM

Buckle or Dent Buckle or Dent

Pin Hole_Gas Leakage Pin Hole_Water Inlet

Fig. 2-1: Damage Location vs Pipeline route

Data file: 09101_c1.doc

Agreement No. GS-OP/004/05/AM

3 DEFINITIONS, ABBREVIATIONS AND REFERENCES

Company: Green Stream Pipeline Company B.V. (GSPC);

BSCMD Billions of Standard Cubic Meters per Day

Agreement No. GS-OP/004/05/AM

STMC/h Standard Cubic Meters per hour

Ref. 1 Doc. No SPC.00-ZA-E-08311_Offshore Pipeline Operating Manual

Data file: 09101_c1.doc

Agreement No. GS-OP/004/05/AM

4 INCIDENTAL SCENARIOS IDENTIFICATION

4.1 Potential Causes of Incident / Damage

Physical damage caused by Geohazards [Ref. 10]:

Data file: 09101_c1.doc

Agreement No. GS-OP/004/05/AM

4.2 Damage Types

4.2.1 Dry Buckle or Dent

A dry buckle is defined as a local geometrical deformation of the pipeline wall or

4.2.2 Pin Hole

4.2.3 Catastrophic Rupture

This kind of damage is defined as an extended rupture on pipe wall.

4.2.4 Line Blockage

An obstruction could be typically generated by pig stuck in line or by hydrate formation.

Data file: 09101_c1.doc

Agreement No. GS-OP/004/05/AM

Tab. 4-1: Cause & Damage Matrix

4.3 Damage classes