13. Silverio vs.

Republic

FACTS: Silverio having undergone a sex reassignment surgery, sought to have his first name
changed from Rommel to Mely, and his sex from male to female. Trial court granted his petition.
CA, however, upon appeal filed by the Republic of the Philippines thru OSG, reversed the trial
court decision, holding that there is no law allowing the change of entries of either name or sex
in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.

ISSUE: Whether or not Rommels first name and sex be changed on the ground of sex
reassignment.

HELD: No. There is no law authorizes the change of entry as of sex and first name through the
intervention of sex reassignment surgery. Article 376 of the Civil Code as amended by RA 9048
(Clerical Error Law), together with Article 412 of the same Code, change of name or sex in the
birth certificate is allowed by the courts so long as clerical or typographical errors are involved.

Changes sought by Silverio will have serious legal and public policy consequences. To grant this
petition filed by Silverio will greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the
union of a man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female
postoperative transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women
such as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women, certain felonies under the
Revised Penal Code and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of
the Rules of Court, among others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to women
which could be substantially affected if petitioners petition were to be granted.

14. Republic vs. Cagandahan

FACTS: This is a petition for correction of entries in Birth Certificate of her name from Jennifer C.
Cagandahan to Jeff Cagandahan and her gender from female to male. It is appearing that
Cagandahan is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a rare medical condition
where afflicted persons possess both male and female characteristics. Cagandahan grew up
with secondary male characteristics. To further her petition, Cagandahan presented in court the
medical certificate evidencing that she is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which
certificate is issued by Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the
Philippines- Philippine General Hospital, who, in addition, explained that Cagandahan
genetically is female but because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not
develop normally, thus has organs of both male and female.

ISSUE: W/N Cagandahans sex as appearing in her birth certificate be changed.

HELD: Yes. Where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his
gender classification would be what the individual, having reached the age of majority, with
good reason thinks of his/her sex. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the
gender classification at birth inconclusiveit is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like
respondent, is fixed.

In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent concerning a
matter so innately private as ones sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or
not to undergo medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH. The Court will not
consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to become
or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to take
medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society commonly currently knows this gender
of the human species. Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him
belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong
the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual
development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an incompetent
and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm other
members of society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as
valid and justified the respondents position and his personal judgment of being a male. Same;
Same; Names; There is merit in the change of

15. Republic vs. Albios 707 SCRA 584 (2013)

Mendoza, J.
FACTS: On October 22, 2004, Fringer (American) and Albios were married before Judge Calo of
MeTC. On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of her
marriage with Fringer on the ground that they never really had any intention of entering into a
married state or complying with any of their essential marital obligations. She contracted Fringer
to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship; that in consideration
thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went
their separate ways; that Fringer returned to the United States and never again communicated
with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him the $2,000.00 because he never processed her
petition for citizenship.She described their marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null and
void ab initio.

ISSUE: Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in
consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?

HELD: No, the marriage is not void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent.

1. Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of marriage.Under said
Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a
solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and
deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor
rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code,
such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence. Consent must also be conscious or
intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and
both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act. Their understanding should not be
affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.

Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was
real consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their
consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial
and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so.
That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring
American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and
deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid
marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was
a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since
it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.

2. The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to
establish a conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no
real intention to establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely
entered into in accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides that the nature,
consequences, and incidents of marriage are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A
marriage may, thus, only be declared void or voidable under the grounds provided by law.
There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the
Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as
all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or
voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid.

3. Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under Article 45 (3)
of the Family Code. Only the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the same Code may
constitute fraud, namely, (1) non- disclosure of a previous conviction involving moral turpitude;
(2) concealment by the wife of a pregnancy by another man; (3) concealment of a sexually
transmitted disease; and (4) concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality.
Entering into a marriage for the sole purpose of evading immigration laws does not qualify under
any of the listed circumstances. Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the ground of fraud may only
be brought by the injured or innocent party. In the present case, there is no injured party
because Albios and Fringer both conspired to enter into the sham marriage.

4. No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. It must, therefore, be safeguarded
from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the impression
that marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily
nullified when no longer needed.
Allowing her marriage with Fringer to be declared void would only further trivialize this inviolable
institution. The Court cannot declare such a marriage void in the event the parties fail to qualify
for immigration benefits, after they have availed of its benefits, or simply have no further use for
it. These unscrupulous individuals cannot be allowed to use the courts as instruments in their
fraudulent schemes. Albios already misused a judicial institution to enter into a marriage of
convenience; she should not be allowed to again abuse it to get herself out of an inconvenient
situation.

Notes:

Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA) Modification

It requires the couple to instead demonstrate that the marriage was not "entered into for the
purpose of evading the immigration laws of the United States." (shifted from determining the
intention to establish a life together, to determining the intention of evading immigration laws)

This standard is used purely for immigration purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule on
the legal validity or existence of a marriage.

Marriage in Jest

It is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a joke, with no real intention of
entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear understanding that the parties would
not be bound.

16. Ronulo vs. People 728 SCRA 675 (2014)

Brion, J.

FACTS: Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry each other on March 29,
2003 at the Sta. Rosa Catholic Parish Church of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. However, on the day
of the wedding, the supposed officiating priest, Fr. Mario Ragaza, refused to solemnize the
marriage upon learning that the couple failed to secure a marriage license. As recourse, they
proceeded to the Independent Church of Filipino Christians, also known as the Aglipayan
Church. They requested the petitioner, an Aglipayan priest, to perform a ceremony to which the
latter agreed despite having been informed by the couple that they had no marriage
certificate. Later, information for violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, was filed
against the petitioner before the MTC for allegedly performing an illegal marriage ceremony.The
petitioner, while admitting that he conducted a ceremony, denied that his act of blessing the
couple was tantamount to a solemnization of the marriage as contemplated by law. For the
prosecution, Florida Umadac, the mother of Joey, testified that she heard the couple declare
during the ceremony that they take each other as husband and wife.

ISSUE:(1)Whether the alleged "blessing" by the petitioner is tantamount to the performance of an

"illegal marriage ceremony" which is punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.

(2) Whether the solemnization by the petitioner of this marriage ceremony was illegal.

HELD:(1)What the petitioner conducted was a marriage ceremony, as the minimum

requirements set by law were complied with.

Article 6 of the Family Code provides that "[n]o prescribed form or religious rite for the
solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall be necessary, however, for the contracting
parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not
less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife."As to the
first requirement, the petitioner admitted that the parties appeared before him and this fact was
testified to by witnesses. On the second requirement, the Court find that, the prosecution has
proven, through the testimony of Florida that the contracting parties personally declared that
they take each other as husband and wife.

(2) Yes.

Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who shall
perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony. The elements of this crime are as follows:
(1) authority of the solemnizing officer; and (2) his performance of an illegal marriage ceremony.
In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he has authority to solemnize a marriage.

Under Article 3(3) of the Family Code, one of the essential requisites of marriage is the presence
of a valid marriage certificate. In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he knew that
the couple had no marriage license, yet he conducted the "blessing" of their
relationship.Undoubtedly, the petitioner conducted the marriage ceremony despite knowledge
that the essential and formal requirements of marriage set by law were lacking. The marriage
ceremony, therefore, was illegal.

23. Fujiki vs. Marinay 700 SCRA 69 (2013)

CARPIO, J.

FACTS: Fujiki is a Japanese national who married respondent Marinay the Philippines on 23
January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioners parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his
wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other. In 2008, Marinay
met another Japanese, Maekara. Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and
Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to
Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara
and started to contact Fujiki. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family
court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the
ground of bigamy. On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)."

ISSUES: (1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.

(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on
the ground of bigamy.

HELD: (1) The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign
country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic, this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does
not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy."

To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment would
mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions, including the form and
contents of the petition, the service of summons, the investigation of the public prosecutor, the
setting of pre-trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the trial court.56 This is absurd because it will
litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to
limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues." In Mijares v. Raada, this Court explained that "[i]f
every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced
back on his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously concluded
litigation."

However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign
judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is consistent
with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws. Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that
"[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the rule of
lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for effectivity in
the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its citizen, over
whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of
such citizen.

(2) Yes. Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court
judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy
because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he
has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between
Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family
Court. Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage
to question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary,
when Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage
may be filed solely by the husband or the wife"it refers to the husband or the wife of the
subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from
the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife
under the law. The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the
personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a)
of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

24. San Luis vs. San Luis 514 SCRA 294 (2007)

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

FACTS: The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo).
During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages.His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit
on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda,
Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.Five years later, on May
1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias.However, on
October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce before Family
Court (Hawaii, USA), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child
Custody on December 14, 1973.On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San
Luis. He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their
marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992. Petitioners alleged that the respondent has
legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration on the ground that
respondents marriage to Felicisimo was void and bigamous because it was performed during
the subsistence of the latters marriage to Merry Lee. They argue that paragraph 2, Article 26
cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair vested rights and ratify the void
bigamous marriage.As such, respondent cannot be considered the surviving wife of Felicisimo.

ISSUE: Whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under
the Civil Code, considering that Felicidads marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20,
1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988.

HELD: Yes. The Court need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code, particularly
Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing them to rule in the
affirmative.

In the case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., the Court held that the purpose and effect of a decree of
divorce from the bond of matrimony by a competent jurisdiction are to change the existing
status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The
marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a
wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of
a penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still
absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage.

Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, the Court stated that where a Filipino is divorced by his
naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn applies. Although decided on December 22,
1998, the divorce in the said case was obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions were still
in effect.

The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited recognition of divorce in
the Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as severing marital ties
between parties in a mixed marriage and capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a
necessary consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce obtained abroad by the alien
spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that "if the foreigner obtains
a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law."

NOTES:

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van
Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein
that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and
consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.
If respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage, the applicable
provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the
Civil Code by expressly regulating the property relations of couples living together as husband
and wife but are incapacitated to marry. In Saguid v. Court of Appeals, we held that even if the
cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article
148 governs. The Court described the property regime under this provision as follows:

The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not
legally capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and
wife, applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective
contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of
money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and
corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.

x xxx

In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-
ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous
relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the
property is essential. x xx

25. Tupal vs. Rojo 717 SCRA 236 (2014)

LEONEN, J.

FACTS: Tupal filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) a complaint against Judge
Rojo for violating the Code of Judicial Conduct and for gross ignorance of the law. Judge Rojo
allegedly solemnized marriages without the required marriage license. He instead notarized
affidavits of cohabitation and issued them to the contracting parties. He notarized these
affidavits on the day of the parties marriage. These "package marriages" are allegedly
common in Bacolod City. For notarizing affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage he
solemnized, Judge Rojo allegedly violated Circular No. 1-90 dated February 26, 1990. Circular
No. 1-90 allows municipal trial court judges to act as notaries public ex officio and notarize
documents only if connected with their official functions and duties. Rex argues that affidavits of
cohabitation are not connected with a judges official functions and duties as solemnizing
officer. Thus, Judge Rojo cannot notarize ex officio affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose
marriage he solemnized. Judge Rojo did not deny notarizing the affidavits of cohabitation. He
argued that notarizing affidavits of cohabitation was connected with his official functions and
duties as a judge. OCA found that Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90.

ISSUE: Whether or not a person who notarized the affidavits of cohabitation may solemnize the
parties marriage.

HELD: Based on law and the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the
Judiciary, the person who notarizes the contracting parties affidavit of cohabitation cannot be
the judge who will solemnize the parties marriage. As a solemnizing officer, the judges only duty
involving the affidavit of cohabitation is to examine whether the parties have indeed lived
together for at least five years without legal impediment to marry. The Guidelines does not state
that the judge can notarize the parties affidavit of cohabitation. Thus, affidavits of cohabitation
are documents not connected with the judges official function and duty to solemnize
marriages. Notarizing affidavits of cohabitation is inconsistent with the duty to examine the
parties requirements for marriage. If the solemnizing officer notarized the affidavit of
cohabitation, he cannot objectively examine and review the affidavits statements before
performing the marriage ceremony. Should there be any irregularity or false statements in the
affidavit of cohabitation he notarized, he cannot be expected to admit that he solemnized the
marriage despite the irregularity or false allegation. Thus, judges cannot notarize the affidavits of
cohabitation of the parties whose marriage they will solemnize. Affidavits of cohabitation are
documents not connected with their official function and duty to solemnize marriages. Judge
Rojo admitted that he notarized affidavits of cohabitation of parties "on the same day [he
solemnized their marriages]." He notarized documents not connected with his official function
and duty to solemnize marriages. Thus, Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90.

26. Republic vs. Dayot 550 SCRA 435 (2008)

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

FACTS: On 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa were married at the Pasay City Hall. The marriage
was solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza. In lieu of a marriage license, Jose and Felisa executed
a sworn affidavit, attesting that both of them had attained the age of maturity, and that being
unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. On 7 July 1993,
Jose filed a Complaint 4 for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with the RTC,
Bian, Laguna, Branch 25. He contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no
marriage ceremony was celebrated between the parties; that he did not execute the sworn
affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at least five years; and that
his consent to the marriage was secured through fraud.

ISSUE: Whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties have in truth
fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the marriage void ab initio
for lack of a marriage license.

HELD: Yes.

Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential requisites of marriage as a contract: ART. 53.
No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with: (1) Legal capacity
of the contracting parties; (2) Their consent, freely given; (3) Authority of the person performing
the marriage; and (4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.

Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title III,
comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the
point of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in remote places, (2) consular marriages, (3)
ratification of marital cohabitation, (4) religious ratification of a civil marriage, (5) Mohammedan
or pagan marriages, and (6) mixed marriages.

ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained
the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts
in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest or
minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to
ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal
impediment to the marriage.

Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the
indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of statutory
construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly but reasonably construed. They
extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of
the general provisions rather than the exception. Where a general rule is established by statute
with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former or add to the latter by implication. For the
exception in Article 76 to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that the man and the woman must
have attained the age of majority, and that, being unmarried, they have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years.

It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time
they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. Jose and Felisa started living
together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage. Felisa
introduced Jose to her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or March 1986
and it was only in June 1986 when Jose commenced to live in her house. Therefore, the falsity of
the affidavit dated 24 November 1986, executed by Jose and Felisa to exempt them from the
requirement of a marriage license, is beyond question.

NOTES:

An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. No other conclusion can be reached except
that it is void ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn a void marriage does not prescribe, and
may be raised any time.

The reason for the law on ratification of marital cohabitation, whereby no marriage license is
required, is that the publicity attending the marriage license may discourage such persons who
have lived in a state of cohabitation from legalizing their status.
Common-Law Cohabitation Period To settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule
that the five-year common-law cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five- year period
computed back from the date of celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union
had it not been for the absence of a marriage. It covers the years immediately preceding the
day of the marriage, characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at any
time within the five yearsand continuity that is unbroken.

27. De Castro vs. Assidao-De Castro 545 SCRA 162 (2008)

TINGA, J.:

FACTS: Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get
married, thus they applied for a marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig
City in September 1994. They had their first sexual relation sometime in October 1994, and had
regularly engaged in sex thereafter. When the couple went back to the Office of the Civil
Registrar, the marriage license had already expired. Thus, in order to push through with the plan,
in lieu of a marriage license, they executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they
had been living together as husband and wife for at least five years. The couple got married on
the same date, with Judge Bernabe, presiding judge of the MTC Pasig City, administering the
civil rites. Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back to their
respective homes and did not live together as husband and wife.

On 13 November 1995, respondent gave birth to a child named Reinna and since then, the
respondent has been the one supporting her out of her income.

On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for support against petitioner before the RTC Pasig
City. In her complaint, respondent alleged that she is married to petitioner and that the latter
has reneged on his responsibility/obligation to financially support her as his wife and Reinna as
his child.

Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent, claiming that their marriage is void ab initio
since the marriage was facilitated by a fake affidavit; and that he was merely prevailed upon
by respondent to sign the marriage contract to save her from embarrassment and possible
administrative prosecution due to her pregnant state; and that he was not able to get parental
advice from his parents before he got married. He also averred that they never lived together as
husband and wife and that he has never seen nor acknowledged the child.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court had the jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage
between petitioner.

HELD: Yes. The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked.

In Nial v. Bayadog:

xxx the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without
prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of
declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause on the
basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void in Article 40 of the Family Code
connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.

NOTES:

Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the
marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the
marriage voidable.

Failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders the marriage void ab initio.

The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of
marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman
who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous
and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The aim of this provision is to
avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the
scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every
applicants name for a marriage license. In the instant case, there was no scandalous
cohabitation to protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at all.

28. Santiago vs. People G.R. No. 200233. July 15, 2015.

SERENO, CJ.:

FACTS: Santos, who had been married to Estela Galang since 2 June 1974, asked petitioner to
marry him. Petitioner, who was a 43-year-old widow then, married Santos on 29 July 1997 despite
the advice of her brother-in-law and parents-in-law that if she wanted to remarry, she should
choose someone who was without responsibility. Petitioner asserted her affirmative defense
that she could not be included as an accused in the crime of bigamy, because she had been
under the belief that Santos was still single when they got married. She also averred that for there
to be a conviction for bigamy, his second marriage to her should be proven valid by the
prosecution; but in this case, she argued that their marriage was void due to the lack of a
marriage license. However, it is indicated in the Marriage Certificate that her marriage was
celebrated without a need for a marriage license in accordance with Article 34 of the Family
Code, which is an admission that she cohabited with Santos long before the celebration of their
marriage.

ISSUE: Whether or not the valid second marriage must be proven by the prosecution beyond
reasonable doubt before the Petitioner can be held convicted of Bigamy.

HELD: No.

In the case of People vs. De Lara, the Court found that when Domingo de Lara married his
second wife, Josefa Rosales, on 18 August 1951, the local Civil Registrar had yet to issue their
marriage license on 19 August 1951. Thus, since the marriage was celebrated one day before
the issuance of the marriage license, the Court acquitted him of bigamy. de Lara did not cause
the falsification of public documents in order to contract a second marriage. In contrast,
petitioner and Santos fraudulently secured a Certificate of Marriage, and petitioner later used
this blatantly illicit act as basis for seeking her exculpation. Therefore, unlike our treatment of the
accused in De Lara, this Court cannot regard petitioner herein as innocent of the crime.

No less than the present Constitution provides that marriage, as an inviolable social institution,
is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. It must be safeguarded from
the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. In keeping therefore with this fundamental
policy, the Court affirms the conviction of petitioner for bigamy.

29. Enrico vs. Heirs of Sps. Eulogio B. Medinaceli and Trinidad Catli-Medinaceli 534 SCRA 418
(2007)

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

FACTS: Eulogio and Trinidad were married on 14 June 1962, in Lal-lo, Cagayan. They begot
seven children, herein respondents. On 1 May 2004, Trinidad died. On 26 August 2004, Eulogio
married petitioner before the Municipal Mayor of Lallo, Cagayan. Six months later, or on 10
February 2005, Eulogio passed away.

On 17 March 2005, respondents, heirs of Spouses Eulogio and Trinidad filed with the RTC, an
action for declaration of nullity of marriage of Eulogio and petitioner Enrico. Respondents
averred that the same was entered into without the requisite marriage license. They argued that
Article 34 of the Family Code, which exempts a man and a woman who have been living
together for at least five years without any legal impediment from securing a marriage license,
was not applicable to petitioner and Eulogio because they could not have lived together under
the circumstances required by said provision. Respondents raised the additional ground of lack
of marriage ceremony due to Eulogios serious illness which made its performance impossible.
Petitioner maintained that she and Eulogio lived together as husband and wife under one roof
for 21 years openly and publicly; hence, they were exempted from the requirement of a
marriage license. From their union were born Elvin and Marco, on 28 October 1988 and 30
October 1991, respectively. She further contended that the marriage ceremony was performed
in the Municipal Hall of Lal-lo, Cagayan, and solemnized by the Municipal Mayor. As an
affirmative defense, she sought the dismissal of the action on the ground that it is only the
contracting parties while living who can file an action for declaration of nullity of marriage.
ISSUE: Whether the case law as embodied in Nial, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, as specified in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC of
the Supreme Court applies to the case at bar.

HELD: Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages, as specified in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC of the Supreme Court is applicable.

While it is true that Nial in no uncertain terms allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for the
declaration of nullity of their fathers marriage to therein respondent after the death of their
father, the Court cannot, however, apply its ruling for the reason that the impugned marriage
therein was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The Court in Nial recognized
that the applicable law to determine the validity of the two marriages involved therein is the
Civil Code, which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. The marriage sought to
be declared void was entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code. As can be gleaned
from the facts, petitioners marriage to Eulogio was celebrated in 2004.

The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10- SC is explicit in its scope, to wit:

Section 1. Scope.This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines. The
Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.

The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11- 10-SC leaves no room for doubtthe coverage
extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which
took effect on 3 August 1988; The marriage of petitioner to Eulogio was celebrated on 26 August
2004, and it squarely falls within the ambit of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC

The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders explicates on Section 2(a) in
the following manner, viz.: 1. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for
annulment of voidable marriages and declaration of absolute nullity of void marriagessuch
petitions cannot be filed by the compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State
[Section 2; Section 3, paragraph a]. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal
right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death
of their predecessor, and hence can only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses
upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
spouse filed in the regular courts.

30. Carlos vs. Sandoval 574 SCRA 116 (2008)

Reyes, R.T., J.

FACTS: Teofilo and Felicidad got married in 1962. Thirty years after marriage, Teofilo died
intestate leaving his wife and son Teofilo Carlos ll. In 1995, Teofilos brother Juan filed a petition
for declaration of absolute nullity of Teofilo and Felicidad's marriage in view of the absence of
the required marriage license. He likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the
natural nor the adoptive father of respondent Teofilo Carlos II.

ISSUE: Whether a marriage may be declared void ab initio through a judgment on the pleadings
or a summary judgment and without the benefit of a trial.

HELD: No. With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, known as Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the question on the application
of summary judgments or even judgment on the pleadings in cases of nullity or annulment of
marriage has been stamped with clarity. The significant principle laid down by the said Rule,
which took effect on March 15, 2003 is found in Section 17, viz.:

SEC. 17. Trial. (1) The presiding judge shall personally conduct the trial of the case. No delegation
of evidence to a commissioner shall be allowed except as to matters involving property relations
of the spouses.

(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of marriage must be proved. No
judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of judgment shall be allowed.
(Underscoring supplied)
In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, the Court held that save for annulment of marriage or
declaration of its nullity or for legal separation, summary judgment is applicable to all kinds of
actions.

By issuing said summary judgment, the trial court has divested the State of its lawful right and
duty to intervene in the case. Both the Civil Code and the Family Code ordain that the court
should order the prosecuting attorney to appear and intervene for the State. It is at this stage
when the public prosecutor sees to it that there is no suppression of evidence. Concomitantly,
even if there is no suppression of evidence, the public prosecutor has to make sure that the
evidence to be presented or laid down before the court is not fabricated.

Truly, only the active participation of the public prosecutor or the Solicitor General will ensure
that the interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for declaration of
nullity of marriages by preventing the fabrication or suppression of evidence.

31. Ablaza vs. Republic 628 SCRA 27 (2010)

BERSAMIN, J.:

FACTS: On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in RTC Cataingan, Masbate a petition for the
declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26, 1949 between
his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato.

The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been
celebrated without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9, 1950.
He insisted that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue
entitled him to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death,
thereby making him a real party in interest; and that any person, himself included, could impugn
the validity of the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death
of Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void ab initio.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner is a real party-in-interest in the action to seek the declaration of
nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother solemnized under the regime of the old Civil
Code.

HELD: YES.

Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the limitation that a petition
for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife.
Such limitation demarcates a line to distinguish between marriages covered by the Family Code
and those solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code. Specifically, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
extends only to marriages covered by the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988,
but, being a procedural rule that is prospective in application, is confined only to proceedings
commenced after March 15, 2003.

Based on Carlos v. Sandoval,the following actions for declaration of absolute nullity of a

marriage are excepted from the limitation, to wit:

1. Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity date of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and

2. Those filed vis--vis marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code and, those
celebrated under the regime of the Family Code prior to March 15, 2003.

Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted on December
26, 1949, the applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as
having the right to initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner.

It is clarified, however, that the absence of a provision in the old and new Civil Codes cannot be
construed as giving a license to just any person to bring an action to declare the absolute nullity
of a marriage. According to Carlos v. Sandoval, the plaintiff must still be the party who stands to
be benefited by the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit, for it is basic in procedural
law that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest.
Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest, or an interest in issue to be
affected by the decree or judgment of the case. One having no material interest to protect
cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action.

Here, the petitioner alleged himself to be the late Cresencianos brother and surviving heir.
Assuming that the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then he has a material interest in
the estate of Cresenciano that will be adversely affected by any judgment in the suit.

32. Bolos vs. Bolos 634 SCRA 429 (2010)

MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS: On July 10, 2003, petitioner Cynthia Bolos filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of
her marriage to respondent Danilo Bolos under Art. 36 of the Family Code.

On January 16, 2007, judgment was rendered by the RTC- Pasig City, declaring the marriage
between petitioner respondent celebrated on February 14, 1980 as null and void ab initio on the
ground of psychological incapacity on the part of both petitioner and respondent under Article
36 of the Family Code with all the legal consequences provided by law.

Respondent then filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul the
orders of the RTC on January 16, 2007.

On December 10, 2008, the CA in an original action for certiorari under rule 65 entitled Danilo T.
Bolos v. Hon. Lorifel Lacap Pahimna and Cynthia S. Bolos reversed the January 16, 2007 decision
of the RTC- Pasig City.

The appellate court in its decision stated that the requirement of a motion for reconsideration as
a prerequisite to appeal under A.M. 02-11-10-SC (Rule On Declaration Of Absolute Nullity Of
Void Mariages And Annulment Of Voidable Marriages) is not applicable in this case since the
marriage of Cynthia and Danilo was solemnized before the Family Code took effect.

Moreover, the appellate court relied on its ruling in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinacelli stating that
coverage of A.M. 02-11-10-SC extends only to those marriages entered into during the
effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.

Petitioner then filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking
a review of the December 10, 2008 decision of the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: Whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC entitled "Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages," is applicable to the case at bench.

HELD: No. In Section 1 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court promulgated on March 15, 2003,
it reads that:

Section 1. Scope This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.

The categorical language being used clearly states that the coverage of this Rule extends only
to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which became
effective on August 3, 1988. The Court therefore cannot apply merit to the petitioners
interpretation stating that petitions is being categorized in the phrase under the Family Code
when the Rule took effectivity.

Furthermore, the Court clarified that a cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law
is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation,
only application. It must therefore be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation in what is known as plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the
maxim, index animi sermo, or speech is the index of intention. Additionally, there is also the
maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a status there should be no
departure.
33. Juliano- Llave vs. Republic 646 SCRA 753 (2011)

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS: The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958,
solemnized under civil and Muslim rites.

Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice initially under the
Islamic laws and tradition and under a civil ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang,
Lanao del Sur. In their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamanos civil status was indicated as divorced.

Private respondents Zorayda and her son Adib filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for
the declaration of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous.

It was further alleged that since Zorayda and deceased were married when the NCC was
already in effect, the subsequent marriage to Estrellita is void ab initio since divorce is not
allowed under the NCC. Moreover, the deceased did not and could not have divorced
Complainant Zorayda by invoking the provision of P.D. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws, for the simple reason that the marriage of the deceased with
Complainant Zorayda was never deemed, legally and factually, to have been one contracted
under Muslim law.

ISSUE: (1) Whether or not the marriage of Estrellita and Tamano was bigamous.

(2) Whether Zorayda and Adib have the legal standing to have Estrellitas marriage declared
void ab initio.

HELD: (1) Yes. The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958,
solemnized under civil and Muslim rites. The only law in force governing marriage relationships
between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of
which only one marriage can exist at any given time. Under the marriage provisions of the Civil
Code, divorce is not recognized except during the effectivity of Republic Act No. 394which was
not availed of during its effectivity.

As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamanos prior marriage to Zorayda has been severed by
way of divorce under PD 1083, the law that codified Muslim personal laws. However, PD 1083
cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law applies to "marriage
and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and
the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the
Philippines." But we already ruled in G.R. No. 126603 that "Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide
for a situation where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites."

Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on February 4, 1977, and this law cannot
retroactively override the Civil Code which already bestowed certain rights on the marriage of
Sen. Tamano and Zorayda.

(2) Yes. Zorayda and Adib, as the injured parties, have the legal personalities to file the
declaration of nullity of marriage. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which limits to only the husband or the
wife the filing of a petition for nullity is prospective in application and does not shut out the prior
spouse from filing suit if the ground is a bigamous subsequent marriage.

In explaining why under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC only the spouses may file the petition to the
exclusion of compulsory or intestate heirs, we said:

The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders explicates on Section 2(a) in
the following manner, viz:

1. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for annulment of voidable marriages
and declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petitions cannot be filed by the
compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. [Section 2; Section 3, paragraph a]

Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC precludes the son from impugning the subsequent
marriage.1wphi1 But in the case at bar, both Zorayda and Adib have legal personalities to file
an action for nullity. Albeit the Supreme Court Resolution governs marriages celebrated under
the Family Code, such is prospective in application and does not apply to cases already
commenced before March 15, 2003.

Zorayda and Adib filed the case for declaration of nullity of Estrellitas marriage in November
1994. While the Family Code is silent with respect to the proper party who can file a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage prior to A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, it has been held that in a void
marriage, in which no marriage has taken place and cannot be the source of rights, any
interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which may
be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage. Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does
not apply, Adib, as one of the children of the deceased who has property rights as an heir, is
likewise considered to be the real party in interest in the suit he and his mother had filed since
both of them stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit.

34. Fujiki vs. Marinay 700 SCRA 69 (2013)

(Same No. 23)

35. Abbas vs. Abbas 689 SCRA 646 (2013)

VELASCO, JR., J.:

FACTS: This is a case filed by Syed Azhar Abbas, petitioner, for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage with Gloria Goo-Abbas on the ground of absence of marriage license, as provided for
in Article 4 of the Family Code.

Syed and Gloria were married in Taiwan on August 9, 1992. When they arrived in the Philippines
on December 1992, a ceremony was conducted between them solemnized by Rev. Mario Dauz
and witnessed by Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez and Mary Ann Ceriola. Present also is Felicitas Goo,
mother-in-law of Syed. During the ceremony, he and Gloria signed a document. Syed claim that
he did not know the nature of the ceremony until Gloria told him that it was a marriage.

In the marriage contract of Syed and Gloria, it is stated that Marriage License No 9969967, issued
at Carmona, Cavite was proven by the MCR being issued to other couple.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Syed and Gloria is valid.

HELD: No. As the marriage of Syed and Gloria was solemnized on January 9, 1993, the Family
Code is the applicable law, particularly Articles 3, 4 and 35 (3).

Article 3 provides the formal requisites of marriage. Article 4 provides the effects of the absence
of the essential and formal requisites. And Article 35, Paragraph 3 provides that those marriages
which are solemnized without a license are void from the beginning in exception to those
covered by the preceding chapter.

Gloria failed to present actual marriage license or copy relied on the marriage contract and
testimonies to prove the existence of the said license.

Thus, the marriage of Syed and Gloria is void ab initio.

36. Vitangcol vs. People 780 SCRA 598 (2016)

LEONEN, J.

FACTS: On 1994, Alice Eduardo married petitioner. After some time, Eduardo discovered that
petitioner was married to a Gina Gaerlan on July 1987, before the Family Code became
effective. She then filed for bigamy.

The RTC held in favor of Eduardo and the CA affirmed that decision. In his motion for
reconsideration, petitioner argues that there is no bigamy as there was no proof of existence of
an essential requisite of marriage in the first marriage which was the marriage license.

ISSUE: Whether the essential requisites of marriage was present in the first marriage.

HELD: YES.

The SC held that petitioner was indeed guilty of bigamy. The SC stated that petitioner was still
legally married to Gina when he married Alice.
Article 53 of the Civil Code enumerates the requisites of marriage, the absence of any of which
renders the marriage void from the beginning:

No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:

1. Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

2. Their consent, freely given;

3. Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

4. A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.

The fourth requisitethe marriage licenseis issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality
where either contracting party habitually resides. The marriage license represents the states
involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general
public is interested.

In the case of Castro, to prove that a marriage was solemnized without a marriage license, the
law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage
contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no
such marriage license was issued to the parties.

Petitioner presents a Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar but the SC held that the
Certification does not prove that petitioners first marriage was solemnized without a marriage
license. It does not categorically state that Marriage License No. 8683519 does not exist.

The circumstances in Castro and in this case are different. Castro involved a civil case for
declaration of nullity of marriage that does not involve the possible loss of liberty. The
certification in Castro was unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion, there being no
prosecution for bigamy involved. On the other hand, the present case involves a criminal
prosecution for bigamy. This is a circumstance of suspicion, the Certification having been issued
to Norberto for him to evade conviction for bigamy.

A different view would undermine the stability of our legal order insofar as marriages are
concerned. Marriage licenses may be conveniently lost due to negligence or consideration. The
motivation to do this becomes greatest when the benefit is to evade prosecution.

This case is likewise different from Nicdao Cario v. Yee Cario. In Cario, the marriage contract
between Santiago Cario and his first wife, Susan Nicdao, bore no marriage license number. In
addition, the local civil registrar certified that it has no record of any marriage license issued to
Santiago Cario and Susan Nicdao. This court declared Santiago Cario's first marriage void for
having been solemnized without a marriage license.

In this case, there is a marriage contract indicating the presence of a marriage license number
freely and voluntarily signed and attested to by the parties to the marriage as well as by their
solemnizing officer. The first marriage was celebrated on July 17, 1987. The second marriage was
entered into on December 4, 1994. Within a span of seven (7) years, four (4) months, and 17
(seventeen) days, petitioner did not procure a judicial declaration of the nullity of his first
marriage. Even while the bigamy case was pending, no decision declaring the first marriage as
spurious was presented. In other words, petitioner's belief that there was no marriage license is
rendered untrue by his own actuations.

37. Kho vs. Republic 791 SCRA 604 (2016)

PERALTA, J.

FACTS:

ISSUE:

HELD:

38. Ngo Teh vs. Yu Teh 579 SCRA 193 (2009)

Nachura, J.

FACTS: The parties whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6) months. They met in January
1996, eloped in March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. After almost
four years, or on January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
Quezon City for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latters
psychological incapacity. The psychologist who provided expert testimony found both parties
psychologically incapacitated. Petitioners behavioral pattern falls under the classification of
dependent personality disorder, and the respondents, that of the narcissistic and antisocial
personality disorder.

The trial court, on July 30, 2001, rendered its decision declaring the marriage of the parties null
and void on the ground that both parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations. On review, the appellate court reversed and set aside the trials
court ruling. It ruled that petitioner failed to prove the psychological incapacity of respondent,
for the clinical psychologist did not personally examine respondent, and relied only on the
information provided by petitioner. Further, the psychological incapacity was not shown to be
attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. In sum, the evidence adduced fell
short of the requirements stated in the Molina case needed for the declaration of nullity of the
marriage under Art. 36 of the Family Code. Dissatisfied, petitioner filed before the SC the instant
petition for review on certiorari. He posited that the trial court declared the marriage void, not
only because of respondents psychological incapacity, but rather due to both parties
psychological incapacity. He also pointed out that there is no requirement for the psychologist
to personally examine respondent.

ISSUE: Whether the marriage between the parties is null and void on the ground of Pschological
Incapacity (Article 36 of the Family Code).

HELD: Yes. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.

In dissolving the marital bonds on account of either partys psychological incapacity, the Court
is not demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage,
because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply
with or assume the essential marital obligations, from remaining that sacred bond. Let it be
noted that in Art. 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from
the very beginning.

39. Suazo vs. Suazo 615 SCRA 514 (2010)

BRION, J.

FACTS: Angelito Suazo and Jocelyn Suazo were married when they were 16 years old only.
Without any means to support themselves, they lived with Angelitos parents while Jocelyn took
odd jobs and Angelito refused to work and was most of the time drunk. Petitioner urged him to
find work but this often resulted to violent quarrels. A year after their marriage, Jocelyn left
Angelito. Angelito thereafter found another woman with whom he has since lived. 10 years
later, she filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Art. 36 Psychological
incapacity. Jocelyn testified on the alleged physical beating she received. The expert witness
corroborated parts of Jocelyns testimony. Both her psychological report and testimony
concluded that Angelito was psychologically incapacitated. However, he was not personally
examined by the expert witness. The RTC annulled the marriage on the ground that Angelito is
unfit to comply with his marital obligation, such as immaturity, i.e., lack of an effective sense of
rational judgment and responsibility, otherwise peculiar to infants (like refusal of the husband to
support the family or excessive dependence on parents or peer group approval) and habitual
alcoholism, or the condition by which a person lives for the next drink and the next drinks but
the CA reversed it and held that the respondent may have failed to provide material support to
the family and has resorted to physical abuse, but it is still necessary to show that they were
manifestations of a deeper psychological malaise that was clinically or medically identified. The
theory of the psychologist that the respondent was suffering from an anti-social personality
syndrome at the time of the marriage was not the product of any adequate medical or clinical
investigation. The evidence that she got from the petitioner, anecdotal at best, could equally
show that the behavior of the respondent was due simply to causes like immaturity or
irresponsibility which are not equivalent to psychological incapacity, or the failure or refusal to
work could have been the result of rebelliousness on the part of one who felt that he had been
forced into a loveless marriage.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is basis to nullify Jocelyns marriage with Angelito under Art. 36.

HELD: Jocelyns evidence is insufficient to establish Angelos psychological incapacity. The

psychologist evaluated Bs psychological condition only in an indirect manner she derived all
her conclusions from information coming from Jocelyn whose bias for her cause cannot of
course be doubted. The psychologist, using meager information coming from a directly
interested party, could not have secured a complete personality profile and could not have
conclusively formed an objective opinion or diagnosis of Bs psychological condition. While the
report or evaluation may be conclusive with respect to As psychological condition, this is not
true for Bs. The methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the required depth and
comprehensiveness of examination required to evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from a
psychological disorder. Both the psychologists report and testimony simply provided a general
description of Bs purported anti-social personality disorder, supported by the characterization of
this disorder as chronic, grave and incurable. The psychologist was conspicuously silent,
however, on the bases for her conclusion or the particulars that gave rise to the characterization
she gave. Jurisprudence holds that there must be evidence showing a link, medical or the like,
between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
As testimony regarding the habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while
indicative of psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves, show psychological incapacity.
All these simply indicate difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to perform marital obligations.

40. Garcia- Quiason vs. Belen 702 SCRA 707 (2013)

PEREZ, J.

FACTS: This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Eliseo Quiazon
(Eliseo), filed by herein respondents who are Eliseos common-law wife and daughter. The
petition was opposed by herein petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quaizon (Amelia) to whom Eliseo was
married. Amelia was joined by her children, Jenneth Quiazon (Jenneth) and Maria Jennifer
Quiazon (Jennifer). Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned
the validity of Eliseos marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having been
contracted during the subsistence of the latters marriage with one Filipito Sandico (Filipito).

ISSUE: Whether or not Elise a party in interest to question the validity of marriage between Eliseo
and Lourdes.

HELD: In a void marriage, it was though no marriage has taken place, thus, it cannot be the
source of rights. Any interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally. A void
marriage can be questioned even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage. It must be
pointed out that at the time of the celebration of the marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, the law in
effect was the Civil Code, and not the Family Code, making the ruling in Nial v. Bayadog
applicable four-square to the case at hand. In Nial, the Court, in no uncertain terms, allowed
therein petitioners to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of their fathers marriage to
therein respondent after the death of their father, by contradistinguishing void from voidable
marriages, to wit:

Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but
voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of
either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been
perfectly valid. That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable
marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but
any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.

It was emphasized in Nial that in a void marriage, no marriage has taken place and it cannot
be the source of rights, such that any interested party may attack the marriage directly or
collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to
the marriage.
Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose successional rights would be
prejudiced by her fathers marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence of such marriage
even after the death of her father. The said marriage may be questioned directly by filing an
action attacking the validity thereof, or collaterally by raising it as an issue in a proceeding for
the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse, such as in the case at bar. Ineluctably,
Elise, as a compulsory heir, has a cause of action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the
void marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, and the death of either party to the said marriage does not
extinguish such cause of action.
Tenebro vs. Court of Appeals

1st marriage Petitioner and Villareyes - November 10, 1986

2nd marriage - Petitioner and private complainant Ancajas marriage - April 10, 1990

3rd marriage Petitioner and Villegas - January 25, 1993

Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void,
the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal
liability for bigamy. Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. A plain reading of the law, therefore, would
indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage. There is no cogent reason for distinguishing
between a subsequent marriage that is null and void purely because it is a second or
subsequent marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is null and void on the ground of
psychological incapacity, at least insofar as criminal liability for bigamy is concerned.

Go-Bangayan vs. Bangayan, Jr.

Benjamin and Azucena married on - 10 September 1973 3 Children

Benjamin and Sally pseudo marriage 7 March 1982 Cohabitation 2 children

Sally left 1994, and filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public documents against
Benjamin - simulated marriage contract as evidence.

Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration
of nullity of marriage before the trial court on the ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous
and that it lacked the formal requisites to a valid marriage.

For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for
validity except for the existence of a prior marriage. In this case, there was really no subsequent
marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed a purported marriage contract without a marriage
license. The supposed marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National
Statistics Office. In short, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived
together and represented themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.

Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the properties
acquired by them through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be
owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions.

Social Security System vs. Jarque da. de Bailon

Bailon and Alices marriage - April 25, 1955. More than 15 years later or on October 9, 1970,
Bailon filed before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sorsogon a petition7 to declare Alice
presumptively dead. Close to 13 years after his wife Alice was declared presumptively dead or
on August 8, 1983, Bailon contracted marriage with Teresita Jarque (respondent). Bailon died
January 30, 1998

The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity on August 3,
1988 of the Family Code, the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which
was the law in effect at the time of their celebration.

Under the foregoing provision of the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage contracted during the
lifetime of the first spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled or
dissolved or contracted under any of the three exceptional circumstances:

1. The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive,
2. if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally
considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of
contracting such subsequent marriage,
3. if the absentee is presumed dead according to Articles 39 and 391.
The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void
by a competent court.

Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being voidable,48 it is terminated by final
judgment of annulment in a case instituted by the absent spouse who reappears or by either of
the spouses in the subsequent marriage.

Under the Family Code, no judicial proceeding to annul a subsequent marriage is necessary.
The termination of the subsequent marriage by affidavit provided by Article 42 of the Family
Code does not preclude the filing of an action in court to prove the reappearance of the
absentee and obtain a declaration of dissolution or termination of the subsequent marriage. If
the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the subsequent marriage, either by
affidavit or by court action, such absentees mere reappearance, even if made known to the
spouses in the subsequent marriage, will not terminate such marriage. Since the second
marriage has been contracted because of a presumption that the former spouse is dead, such
presumption continues inspite of the spouses physical reappearance, and by fiction of law, he
or she must still be regarded as legally an absentee until the subsequent marriage is terminated
as provided by law.

If the bigamous marriage had not been void ab initio but only voidable under Article 83,
paragraph 2, of the Civil Code, because the second marriage had been contracted with the first
wife having been an absentee for seven consecutive years, or when she had been generally
believed dead, still the action for annulment became extinguished as soon as one of the three
persons involved had died, as provided in Article 87, paragraph 2, of the Code, requiring that the
action for annulment should be brought during the lifetime of any one of the parties involved.
And furthermore, the liquidation of any conjugal partnership that might have resulted from such
voidable marriage must be carried out in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased
spouse, as expressly provided in Section 2 of the Revised Rule 73, and not in the annulment
proceeding.

Santos vs. Santos

On July 27, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City declared petitioner Celerina J. Santos
(Celerina) presumptively dead after her husband, respondent Ricardo T. Santos (Ricardo), had
filed a petition for declaration of absence or presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage
on June 15, 2007. Ricardo remarried on September 17, 2008.

The proper remedy for a judicial declaration of presumptive death obtained by extrinsic fraud is
an action to annul the judgment. An affidavit of reappearance is not the proper remedy when
the person declared presumptively dead has never been absent.

Article 42 reveals that the termination of the subsequent marriage by reappearance is subject to
several conditions: (1) the nonexistence of a judgment annulling the previous marriage or
declaring it void ab initio; (2) recording in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the
subsequent marriage of the sworn statement of fact and circumstances of reappearance; (3)
due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage of the fact of reappearance; and (4) the
fact of reappearance must either be undisputed or judicially determined.

The subsequent marriage may still subsist despite the absent or presumptively dead spouses
reappearance (1) if the first marriage has already been annulled or has been declared a nullity;
(2) if the sworn statement of the reappearance is not recorded in the civil registry of the
subsequent spouses residence; (3) if there is no notice to the subsequent spouses; or (4) if the
fact of reappearance is disputed in the proper courts of law, and no judgment is yet rendered
confirming, such fact of reappearance.

A subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, even if it was contracted after a court
declaration of presumptive death, lacks the requirement of a well-founded belief56 that the
spouse is already dead. The first marriage will not be considered as validly terminated.
Marriages contracted prior to the valid termination of a subsisting marriage are generally
considered bigamous and void. Only a subsequent marriage contracted in good faith is
protected by law.

Since an undisturbed subsequent marriage under Article 42 of the Family Code is valid until
terminated, the children of such marriage shall be considered legitimate, and the property
relations of the spouse[s] in such marriage will be the same as in valid marriages. If it is
terminated by mere reappearance, the children of the subsequent marriage conceived before
the termination shall still be considered legitimate.62 Moreover, a judgment declaring
presumptive death is a defense against prosecution for bigamy.

For the purpose of not only terminating the subsequent marriage but also of nullifying the effects
of the declaration of presumptive death and the subsequent marriage, mere filing of an affidavit
of reappearance would not suffice. Celerinas choice to file an action for annulment of judgment
will, therefore, lie.

Dio vs. Dio

Whether the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall
only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties properties under Article
147 of the Family Code.

In a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations of the parties during the period
of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. Article 147 of
the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any
impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, such as petitioner
and respondent in the case before the Court.

For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present:

(1) The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
(2) They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
(3) Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void.

It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to
marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and
45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which
are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void
without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.

Article 45 of the Family Code, on the other hand, refers to voidable marriages, meaning,
marriages which are valid until they are set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an
action for annulment. In both instances under Articles 40 and 45, the marriages are governed
either by absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains unless the parties
agree to a complete separation of property in a marriage settlement entered into before the
marriage. Since the property relations of the parties is governed by absolute community of
property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute the
properties before a decree of annulment could be issued. That is not the case for annulment of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage is governed by the ordinary
rules on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, "[p]artition may be made by
agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x." It is not necessary to liquidate
the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage.