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constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
SUMMARY
November 30, 2017
2017COA149
sell for the price offered, the developer created the metropolitan
agreement and that the propertys eventual use for a public purpose
vacates the order on the landowners bill of costs, and remands the
Petitioner-Appellee,
v.
Respondent-Appellant.
Division II
Opinion by JUDGE HARRIS
Dailey and Plank*, JJ. concur
Ann A. Terry, Denver, Colorado, for Amicus Curiae Special District Association
of Colorado
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, 5(3), and 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2017.
1 Appellant, Woodcrest Homes, Inc., owned a .65-acre parcel of
acquired the parcels to the north and south of Parcel C, with a plan
parcels. Under its agreement with the Town, the Developer could
Woodcrests land.
of Parcel C.
1
improvements such as roads and sewers, will be located on Parcel
C.
showing that, under the Developers plan, once approved, the taking
purpose.
sort of alter ego of the Developer, to ensure that the Developer met
obligations are satisfied and the development plan can proceed, the
amounts to a classic case of the tail wagging the dog the District
2
I. Background
13.07.040(a)(2).
3
The final plat prepared by Woodcrests engineering firm was never
firm had retained all the development plans so the Developer was
A and B. Under the terms of the Agreement, the Town would not
annex Parcels A and B, nor would it approve any plats for Carousel
provision:
4
2. Consolidation of Ownership of the
Property and the Strip Parcel. The Town
has no obligation to approve (including
the setting of any public hearings) any
plats for the Property until all of the
following conditions are satisfied:
(Formatting omitted.)
5
12 The Developer did not make another offer. Instead, two weeks
and Woodcrest assumed that it was the Town that might move to
condemn Parcel C.
representative testified that the Town did not even want to talk
the Town preferred that the two property owners, meaning the
6
15 On September 2, 2014, the Town held a public hearing on the
only with the addition of Parcel C would the Developers sketch and
2035 Master Plan. The Town approved the plan on the condition
Agreement.
16 During the fall of 2014, the Developer also created the District,
7
17 At the time the District was created, the Agreement still
until [the Developer] or its assign, [was] the owner of the . . . Strip
Parcel.
the Town of Parker (the Project). Due to the immediate need for
this Project, the notice continued, the District must obtain [Parcel
8
the property within and served by the District, it is necessary for
At the time of the resolution, the District had no residents, the only
Development . . . .
1 The record does not appear to include evidence of the date that
Developer acquired parcels A and B. However, Woodcrest
represented in its briefing that the Developer closed on the sale of
the parcels between September 12 and 15, 2014, and the District
did not dispute that representation.
9
21 An immediate possession hearing was scheduled for March 19,
2015. The Developers final plat had not yet been approved, but the
22 So, three days before the hearing, on March 16, 2015, the
thereby satisfy its obligation under the Agreement, clearing the way
10
primarily private, not public. Woodcrest urged the district court to
Developer.
public purpose but instead was initiated in bad faith, for the
Agreement.
11
purpose, and pays the owner just compensation for the property
after giving the owner due process of law. Colo. Const. art. II, 15.
lies dormant in the state until the General Assembly speaks. Town
of Parker v. Colo. Div. of Parks & Outdoor Recreation, 860 P.2d 584,
also Thompson v. Consol. Gas Utils. Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 80 (1937)
12
There is no precise definition of public purpose; it must be
Kobobel, 176 P.3d 860, 863 (Colo. App. 2007). The relevant inquiry
Co., 757 P.2d 181, 183 (Colo. App. 1988), affd, 789 P.2d 1088
(Colo. 1990).
170, 174 (Colo. App. 2002). Thus, on review, the courts role is to
13
that the taking of private property is for a public use.
38-1-101(2)(b).
436 (Colo. App. 1989) (quoting Thornton Dev. Auth. v. Upah, 640 F.
Absent a showing of bad faith, we will assume that the entity has
Colo. 338, 342, 430 P.2d 617, 619 (1967). But if, for example, the
14
condemning entitys determination that condemnation of a
courts findings of fact for clear error and its legal conclusions de
novo. Glenelk Assn v. Lewis, 260 P.3d 1117, 1120 (Colo. 2011).
134 P.3d 544, 549 (Colo. App. 2006). And, even under the clearly
record, with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
App. 2003).
15
the statue prohibiting a taking for transfer to a private entity for
A. Public Purpose
the public or, more accurately, the future residents of the proposed
taking itself was for a public purpose. See Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Am. Natl Prop. & Cas. Co., 2015 COA 135, 30 ([T]he Colorado
public purpose.).
16
to the issue of public purpose, id. And here, it is not just that the
Mutual Insurance Co. In that case, the state forest service initiated
Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2. The insurers of the property argued that
the fire, at its inception, was for a public purpose. Id. at 29, 31.
initial act of setting the fire served a public purpose, the resulting
damage (or taking) was a step removed from the original public
17
purpose, and the initial public purpose could not support the later
that the Developer could seek approval of its final plat in the first
place. Only then was approval of the subdivision even possible, and
Shaklee, 784 P.2d 314, 317 n.3 (Colo. 1989) (Although obtaining a
permit is not required before the entity can condemn property, the
public use for Parcel C does not transfer to and supply the public
purpose for th[e] [Districts] taking. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 32.
at 436.
18
B. Necessity and Bad Faith
failed to show (or even allege) any bad faith on the part of the
District. We disagree.
as the District has pointed out, that in the early stages, special
19
under a conflict of interest in pursuing condemnation of Parcel C.
B, and C.
The Developer knew that it could not obtain approval for its
Parcel C.
20
condemnation proceedings, the Developer not the District
Developer.
either.
21
C when it had no authority to do so, and then created the District
words, the Developer spoke for the District and the District acted
the property. Id. The family entity offered to buy property from a
the district argued that once it was established that relocating the
22
ditch would yield a public benefit, the trial court was precluded
23
public purpose, when its actual purpose [is] to bestow a private
benefit. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 478 (2005).
24
Projects, 37 Colo. Law. 39 (Mar. 2008); see also Ch. 349, sec. 1,
49 In Kelo, the Supreme Court held that the City of New London
even though there was no showing by the city that the property was
code, required the Developer to acquire at its own cost all of the
25
condemn Parcel C. Nor, consistent with section 38-1-101(1)(b),
Town. So, instead, the District, acting as a mere conduit for the
purposes. Such action violates the principle that the law may not
achieve directly. Salle v. Howe, 793 P.2d 628, 631 (Colo. App.
1990).
26
requirements, we must reverse the district courts judgment of
possession.
award costs and attorney fees upon a finding that petitioner is not
V. Conclusion
27