Fmea Manual

Client: Sevan Marine Ltd Date: 02.10.
2008 Page:2 of 112

Title: Failure Mode & Effect Analysis - Sevan Driller Rev.: 2 Made: TH
REVISION SHEET
Rev. Reason Page(s)
1 Draft
2 Issued for Comments Whole report
Updated report after comments made by Sevan and
after received updated system drawings
Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-668-001-R01

Client: Sevan Marine Ltd Date: 02.10.2008 Page:3 of 112
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1 INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................6
1.1 Scope of Work ...........................................................................................................6
1.2 Reference Standards...................................................................................................6
1.3 Objective ...................................................................................................................6
1.4 Vessel Particulars.......................................................................................................7
1.5 Definition of DP Class 3 ............................................................................................9
2 SUMMARY................................................................................................................11
3 ABBREVIATION ......................................................................................................13
4 GENERAL LAYOUT................................................................................................15
4.1 General ....................................................................................................................15
4.2 Cable Routing..........................................................................................................18
4.3 Fire and Flooding Protection ....................................................................................20
5 POWER GENERATION ..........................................................................................21
5.1 General ....................................................................................................................21
5.2 Main Engines & Alternators.....................................................................................21
6 POWER DISTRIBUTION ........................................................................................22
6.1 General ....................................................................................................................22
6.2 690V Switchboard ...................................................................................................24
6.3 230V Switchboard ...................................................................................................27
7 POWER, AUTOMATION AND CONTROL...........................................................30
7.1 General ....................................................................................................................30
7.2 Main Engine Control Systems..................................................................................30
7.3 Integrated Alarm & Monitoring System - IAS..........................................................31
7.4 Power Management System .....................................................................................32
7.5 Emergency Shutdown System and Fire & Gas .........................................................36
7.6 Thruster Control System ..........................................................................................38
7.7 Independent Joystick System ...................................................................................41
8 FUEL OIL SYSTEM .................................................................................................42
8.1 General ....................................................................................................................42
8.2 Fuel Oil System Engines..........................................................................................43
8.3 Fuel Oil Quick Closing Valves.................................................................................43
8.4 FO Pipe Run ............................................................................................................44
9 COOLING SYSTEMS...............................................................................................45
9.1 Seawater Cooling System.........................................................................................45
9.2 Seawater Cooling Auxiliary Systems .......................................................................46
9.3 Seawater Pipe Run ...................................................................................................46
9.4 Freshwater Cooling System, Diesel Generator .........................................................47
9.5 Freshwater Cooling System, Thrusters .....................................................................48

9.6 Freshwater Cooling Auxiliary Systems ....................................................................49

9.7 Freshwater Pipe Run ................................................................................................50
10 LUBRICATION SYSTEM........................................................................................51
10.1 Lube Oil System Diesel Generators..........................................................................51
10.2 LO Azimuth Thruster...............................................................................................52
10.3 LO Pipe run .............................................................................................................52
11 COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEM.................................................................................53
11.1 General ....................................................................................................................53
11.2 Starting Air System..................................................................................................53
11.3 Control Air System Main Engines............................................................................54
11.4 Instrument Air System .............................................................................................55
11.5 Rig Air System ........................................................................................................55
11.6 Quick Closing Valves ..............................................................................................56
11.7 Air Pipe Run............................................................................................................56
12 VENTILATION.........................................................................................................58
12.1 General description ..................................................................................................58
12.2 Ventilation...............................................................................................................58
12.3 Chilled Water Cooling System .................................................................................60
12.4 Pipe Run ..................................................................................................................61
13 PROPULSION...........................................................................................................62
13.1 Azimuth Thruster.....................................................................................................62
14 DYNAMIC POSITIONING SYSTEM .....................................................................65
14.1 General ....................................................................................................................65
14.2 Operator Stations .....................................................................................................66
14.3 DP Computers and Network.....................................................................................67
14.4 DP Control Modes and Functions.............................................................................69
14.5 Vessel Sensors .........................................................................................................70
14.6 Position Reference Systems .....................................................................................72
14.7 DP Control System Power Supply............................................................................75
15 FAILURE ANALYSIS ..............................................................................................76
15.1 Configuration and assumptions ................................................................................76
15.2 Failure Analysis Power Generation .......................................................................78
15.3 Failure Analysis Power Distribution......................................................................80
15.4 Failure Analysis Power and Propulsion Control Systems.......................................82
15.5 Failure Analysis Fuel Oil Systems.........................................................................88
15.6 Failure Analysis Cooling Water Systems...............................................................92
15.7 Failure Analysis Lubrication Oil Systems .............................................................97
15.8 Failure Analysis Compressed Air System..............................................................99
15.9 Failure Analysis Ventilation................................................................................101
15.10 Failure Analysis Propulsion ................................................................................103
15.11 Failure Analysis - DP Control System....................................................................105
16 REFERENCES ........................................................................................................111

APPENDIX A DP I/O Spec

APPENDIX B FMEA Proving Trials
APPENDIX C Recommendations

1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Scope of Work
1.1.1 Global Maritime A/S received instructions from Mr. Arne K Nilsen of Sevan
Marine Ltd, to carry out the scope of work identified below.
1.1.2 The scope of work consists of:

Produce a desk top study FMEA report for the DP control system and all
related vessel equipment based on the provided information.
Produce the FMEA Proving Trials
Conduct the FMEA Proving Trials.
Report the trial finding, update and issue a final FMEA report.
1.2 Reference Standards
1.2.1 Global Maritime AS is verifying the systems and design towards the regulation
IMO 1994 Guidelines for Vessels with Dynamic Positioning Systems (IMO
1994 MSC/Circ. 645)for vessel to comply with guidelines for IMO DP class
III (3).
1.2.2 The FMEA is carried out in accordance with industry, IMO and IMCA
guidelines relating to DP Class 3 vessels.
1.2.3 This report will also address the applicable DNV Rules when required.
Applicable DNV are considered to be DNV Rules for Classification for Ships,
Part 6. Chapter 7, Dynamic Positioning Systems (issued January 2008).
1.3 Objective
1.3.1 The objective of the FMEA is to provide a complete, systematic and

documented investigation of the dynamic positioning systems of the vessel.
This means to identify the failures and their effects on the vessels position
keeping performance. Based on the analysis, possible recommendations will be
made to improve the performance or the safety of the vessel.
1.3.2 The FMEA is an independent document containing a system description of the

DP system including thruster systems, machinery systems, electrical systems,
and alarm /control systems.
1.3.3 The essential feature of the DP class 3 philosophies is to identify the worst
single failure that can occur within the total system of the dynamic positioning
of the vessel, without losing station keeping capabilities, fire and flooding in
compartments included.

1.3.4 The vessel is designed to comply with DNV DYNPOS AUTRO notation,
corresponding to IMO DP equipment class 3, i.e. a loss of position is not to
occur in the event of a single fault in any active or static component or
system, fire and flooding in a compartment to be included. Reference is made
to section 1.5 for IMO definition of DP class 3.
1.3.5 The FMEA is limited to specific failure conditions of individual components

and the subsequent effect on the overall position keeping of the vessel. If not
evident, procedures are assumed to ensure that inherent redundancy is
available and used correctly.
1.3.6 It is assumed that the electrical switchboard and distribution system is

designed in accordance with Regulation relating to Maritime Electrical
Installations.
1.4 Vessel Particulars
1.4.1 The vessel is of a new design drilling rigs designed by Sevan Marine. The rig
is of type Sevan 650 Drilling unit. The design of this circular drilling rig is
based on Sevans platform experience with FPSOs and storage tanks.
1.4.2 Vessel Data:
Length (Loa): 85 meters

Length (Lpp): 75 meters
Breadth: 75 meters
Depth (mld): 24.5 meters
Scantling draft, mld 15
Typical operating
55,350 Ton (metric)
displacement
Variable deck load 15,000 Ton (metric)
Accommodation 150 beds
Call Sign TBA
IMO No.: TBA
MMSI No.: TBA
Nationality/ Flag: Bahamas
1.4.3 The vessel will have the DNV DP notation: +X1A1 Mobile Offshore Drilling
& Storage Unit, Drill, DYNPOS AUTRO, Crane, Heldk-S, ICS, LCS-DC.

1.4.4 The vessel is designed for operating under harsh conditions and for working in
ultra deep waters down to 10 000 feet. Typical limitations while drilling is set
to Hs = 20 feet, and Hs = 50 feet in survival conditions. The derrick is of type
single activity derrick.
1.4.5 The vessels switchboard is divided into a 4- four split, each switchboard is
powered by two diesel generators, all of make Rolls Royce Bergen. The
switchboards are named from A to D and design configuration is that bus tie
breakers between switchboard A & B and C& D are normally closed. That
means it will operate as a 2 two split system. There is also opportunity to
operate in a 4-four split configuration, by having all bustie breakers open.
1.4.6 The vessel is equipped with Power Management System (PMS). The PMS will
first of all be mostly for monitoring/ alarm handling; bustie breaker control and
standby start function for the diesel generators. The vessel has start permissive
or blocking for start of heavy consumers when there is a high load on the
switchboard (SWBD).
1.4.7 Main propulsion is by 8-eight azimuth thrusters, all of same make Rolls Royce
Marine. Each has a capacity of 3800kW. The thrusters are configured in four
pairs. All thrusters are electrically driven from respective 11kVswitchboards
via transformers.
1.4.8 The DP system comprises of a Kongsberg Maritime KPOS system, the main
system is a KPOS DP-2 and the backup system is a KPOS DP-1. Three
individually DP UPSs powers the DP system. The DP sensors are three
MRUs, three gyros and three wind sensors. The DP reference systems consist
of two DGPSs, two HiPAPs. In addition a Riser Management System (RMS)
gives the DP system additional information where to position the rig to
optimize time for disconnect in an event of a blackout/ drift off. Riser Position
Reference (RPR) is a software upgrade of the DP system (optional).
1.4.9 The vessel does also have an independent Joystick System of type cJoy of
make Kongsberg Maritime. This joystick is independent of the DP system and
has its own control cabinet, which receives environmental input from a gyro
and a wind sensor.

1.5 Definition of DP Class 3
1.5.1 Quote from IMO MSC Circ. 645 for DP classes
2.2 The equipment classes are defined by their worst case failure modes as
follows:
.2 For equipment class 2, a loss of position is not to occur in the event of

a single fault in any active component or system. Normally static
components will not be considered to fail where adequate protection
from damage is demonstrated, and reliability is to the satisfaction of
the Administration., Single failure criteria include:
.1 Any active component or system (generators, thrusters,

switchboards, remote controlled valves. etc.).
.2 Any normally static component (cables, pipes, manual valves,

etc.) which is not properly documented with respect to
protection and reliability.
.3 For equipment class 3, a single failure includes:
.1 Items listed above for class 2, and any normally static

component is assumed to fail
.2 All components in any one watertight compartment, from fire

or flooding.
.3 All components in any one fire sub-division, from

fire or flooding (for cables see also 3.5.1).
2.3 For equipment classes 2 and 3, a single inadvertent act should be

considered as a single fault if such an act is reasonably probable.
1.5.2 As per class notation (DNV AUTRO) and IMO MSC Circ 645 DP class 3 the
vessel must be designed and commissioned to comply with the following basic
rules:
Automatic and manual position and heading control under specified

maximum environmental conditions, during and following any single fault
including loss of a compartment due to fire or flood.
Two independent computer systems with a separate back-up system must
be installed and separated by A60 class division. The cabling must be
arranged in such a way that loss of one compartment (fire or flood) will still
allow control of the thrusters.
At least three different position references and three sets of sensors (MRU,
wind sensor, gyrocompass) must be provided. Of these, the third reference
system and the third set of sensors must be provided for the back-up system
and also separated by A60 class division.

The generators and the distribution systems must be arranged in different

compartments separated by A60 class division.
The physical separation of generators, thrusters and DP control systems
plays an essential part to classify a vessel as AUTRO. Cable routes and the
location of cable terminations have to be considered with respect to fire and
water damage in each.

2 SUMMARY
2.1.1 Global Maritime AS has performed a desktop Failure Mode and Effects
Analyse (FMEA) the new drilling rig Sevan Driller, of which is based on a
new design by Sevan Marine.
2.1.2 This FMEA has been carried out in order to verify worst single failure within
the DP system, and is based on the provided information from Sevan Marine
and their sub contractors for the new build vessel; reference is made to section
16 in this report for a full list of provided information. The FMEA proving
trials will be conducted first quarter of 2009.
2.1.3 The FMEA includes analysis of relevant failure modes within active
components. Subsystems such as fixed piping, manual valves, tank spaces etc
are not defined as active components. The FMEA is limited to specific failure
conditions of individual components and the subsequent effect on the overall
system as intended in the functional design specification. If not evident,
procedures are assumed to ensure that inherent redundancy is available and
used correctly. Section Error! Reference source not found. in this report
contains the failure analysis in table format. The configuration and mode used
as a basis for this failure analysis is also listed. Other configurations may be
used during DP operations, but thorough assessment with regards to safe
operation (redundancy) is required.
2.1.4 This study has identified the following cases as critical and worst case is
identified to include loss of four thrusters 2-split mode and two thrusters for 4-
split mode.
In a 2-split mode: an Automatic Voltage Regulator (AVR) failure of a

running DG can result in trip of the running DG on the other SWBD on
reverse power, hence partial blackout and loss of 4 thrusters.
Worst electrical failures are short circuit/ loss of 11kV or 690V SWBD,
hence loss of 2 DGs and related thrusters. For the 690V SWBD this
means loss of all aux. systems needed to an engine room to keep the
systems running.
All electrical consumers are powered from respective SWBD; hence a

single failure should not cause loss of more than 2 DG and respective
thrusters.
Worst single failure of the DP control system is loss of an UPS, as this

will cause loss of a controller, operator station, gyro, wind sensor and a
reference system. The vessel will therefore no longer be able to operate
in accordance to DP class 3 criterias.

A fire or flooding in any compartment has not been identified to exceed

worst case failure.
o Engine-, SWBD and thruster rooms are in separate

compartments and for some also apart from each other.
o For the cabling a fire can result in loss of 2 thrusters and one
network (A or B). As each system has dual network the
redundant net work should be available, hence failure does not
exceed worst case failure.
o The main DP system (MCR / main DP equip. room) is placed in

a single compartment; a fire here will result in operator to
change location to backup DP room. This transition should be
smoothly and the vessel should not be able to drift far off
position before the DPO has remained control from backup DP
station.
2.1.5 Worst single mechanical failure within active systems that can occur is a
failure of a FO separator, polluting the FO with dirt and water to service tank;
causing damage of two DGs. Each engine room has a separate FO system.
2.1.6 The rig Sevan Driller can be operating in a 2- or 4- split configuration of the
SWBDs. This desktop FMEA study is based on operating in a 2-split mode
i.e. the bustie breaker between SWBD B & C is open
2.1.7 On the basis of compliance with IMO 1994 MSC/Circ. 645 Guidelines for
Vessels with dynamic positioning system and expected future result of FMEA
proving trials, the vessel is considered fit for the purpose of carrying out DP
operations within the normal operational limits of the vessel provided the A
Recommendations, are closed out and by operating the vessel with open bus
tie.
2.1.8 The vessel should be operated in accordance with the provisions of the Marine
DP Operational Manual.

3 ABBREVIATION
AC Air Condition
AHU Air Handling unit
AUTOPOS Auto Positioning (DP terminology)
Aux. Auxiliary
AT Azimuth Thruster
AVR Automatic Voltage Regulator
Batt. Battery
BU Back Up
BCR Backup Central Room
CTRL Control
CPU Controllable Processor Unit
CO Crude Oil
Comm. Communication
CWH Chilled Water cooling system
DB Distribution Board
DG Diesel Generator
Deg Degrees
DGPS Differential Global Positioning System
DNV Det Norske Veritas
DP Dynamic Positioning
DPO Dynamic Positioning Operator
DPC Dynamic Positioning Computer
ECR Emergency Control Room
EL. Elevation
ER Engine Room
ESD Emergency Shut Down system
Exh Exhaust
F&G Fire & Gas
FC Fan Coil
FMEA Failure Mode and Effect Analysis
FO Fuel Oil
FW Fresh Water
Fwd Forward
GA General Arrangement
GM Global Maritime
GPS Global Positioning System
H2S Hydrogen Sulfide (gas)
HC Hydro Carbon
HiPAP High Precision Acoustic Positioning
HMI Human Machine Interface
HT High Temperature
HTFW High Temperature Fresh Water
HUB center/ link (communication)
HV High Voltage
HVAC Heating Ventilating and Air Conditioning
Hz Hertz (frequency)
IALA International Association of Lighthouse Authorities
IAS Integrated Automation System
IMO International Marine Organisation

IMCA International Marine Contractors Association

I/O In/ Out (signal terminology)
KM Kongsberg Maritime
kW kilo Watt
kVA kilo Volt Ampere
LAN Local Area Network
LO Lube Oil
LT Low Temperature
LTFW Low Temperature Fresh Water
LV Low Voltage
MCR Main Control Room/ Bridge
MDO Marine Diesel Oil
ME Main Engine
Misc. Miscellaneous
MRU Motion Reference Unit,(trademark of Seatex KM)
NDU Network Distribution Unit
NMEA sort of electrical / data comm.
NFU None Follow Up
OIM Offshore Installation Manager
OS Operator Station
PA Public Announcement
PLC Programmable Logic Controller
PMS Power Management System
PS Port or Process Station
PSU Power Supply Unit
QCV Quick Closing Valve
RRM Rolls Royce Marine
RPM Rounds Per Minutes
SB Starboard
SDS Stern Discharge System
SJA Safe Job Analysis
SW Sea Water
SWBD Switch Board
TCC Thruster Control Cabinet
TCV Temperature Control Valve
TBA To Be Announced
THR Thruster #
Tk Tank
TR Thruster Room
UPS Uninterrupted Power Supply
VMS Vessel Management System
VRS Vessel Reference System

4 GENERAL LAYOUT
4.1 General
4.1.1 The Sevan Driller is circular shaped vessel that has the Moonpool in the center
and is built up with the following Decks:
Accommodation deck plan:
G Deck
F Deck (DP backup
equipment room ++)
E deck (Main Ctrl room/
Bridge / DP backup Ctrl
room++)
D Deck
C Deck
B Deck
A Deck
Structure deck plan:

Upper Deck El 36500
Tween Deck El 32500
(Engine/ SWBD rooms/
DP main equipment room)
Lower Deck El 28500
(ECR/ Engine/ SWBD
rooms ++)
Main Deck EL 24500
El. 20500
El 16700
El 13100
El. 9700
El 6500
El 3500 (thruster / pump
rooms)
4.1.2 The rig designed includes four zones for power generation and thrusters.
Whereat, each zone has full integrity with regards to fire and flooding. The
main objective is to maintain 75% thruster and power capacity after a single

failure, fire and flooding included in a 4-split configuration, or 50% capacity in

a 2-split configuration.
4.1.3 Each system is self sustain with regard to aux systems such as SW, FW and
supply fans. A more detail description of each system is described herein in
this report.
4.1.4 Operating in a 2-split configuration i.e. SWBD A & B and C& D are operated
as common. From the illustration below it can be seen that the thruster
configuration will be diagonal. This to maintain a better distribution of the
thruster forces to maintain station keeping capabilities.
4.1.5 The various zones are illustrated below in Figure 4-1:

FWD
Figure 4-2: Main component zone plan, courtesy: Sevan Marine
4.1.6 The following main compartment and equipment comes under each zone

Zone 1 (light green): Engine room 1, Generator 1 & 2, SWBD room A and
thruster 1 & 2.
Zone 1 (green): Engine room 2, Generator 3 & 4, SWBD room B and
thruster 5 & 6.
Zone 3 (light brown): Engine room 3, Generator 5 & 6, SWBD room C and
thruster 3 & 4.
Zone 4 (brown): Engine room 4, Generator 7 & 8, SWBD room D and
thruster 7 & 8.
4.1.7 A principle layout of the DP system and the split there is shown below:
4.1.8 The separation of the main and backup DP system is found to be within
guidelines and regulations based on the provided informations. A more
detailed description of the DP system can be found in section 14.

4.2 Cable Routing
4.2.1 In general all cables (power, DP, IAS etc) that have to be routed from one
compartment to another have to be segregated between the redundant systems.
4.2.2 All bushings where cables are going through shall be packed in accordance to
regulations, to maintain A60 segregation. Where the cabling is crossing into
the other DP zone, the cables are put in A60 insulated cable ducts.
4.2.3 The 3D model above illustrates how the cable routing is laid. Individual deck
layout views can be found in Appendix D. From a top down approach it can be
seen that routing of DP net B (blue) is routed from the MCR/ Bridge and down
in a A-60 trunk (A-60 is indicated in pink around the line). The DP net A
(orange) is routed from DP BU equipment room to DP BU room and down in a
separate trunk. From the illustration it can also be seen that DP net A is routed
at two locations in the center of the vessel around Moonpool while the Net B is
routed on four locations in the outer periphery and down to respective thruster
room (TR#).

4.2.4 The power cables including (HV and LV) are routed in lines that are named
split # to respective thruster room. This ensures that there should not be a
cross. Where applicable there is A-60 isolation around the cabling when
routing from two different zones is met in a common compartment.
4.2.5 EL. 32500: The DP net A is routed out on PS and SB side and back to
respective SWBD rooms. IAS Net B (light blue) and power cable from SWBD
room D to TR4 is routed fwd and then down to deck below.
4.2.6 El. 28500: The DP net B is routed out to the main DP equipment room and
then aft on PS side with connections into SWBD rooms 1 & 2 and SWBD
rooms 3 & 4 from underneath as they are on the deck above. The IAS A cable
routing is routed together with DP net B. From provided information there is
not possible to determine if there is A-60 isolation between the two. IAS Net B
cable is routed on the SB side.
4.2.7 El. 24500: The DP net A is spread out from the trunk to the inner periphery
and down to TR4. The DP net B is routed through with A-60 isolation where
applicable. The IAS net B is routed from the underneath of the SWBD rooms
and up. Power cabling from SWBD 2 crossing over to TR 2. And power cable
from SWBD 1 is routed down to TR 1 with A-60 isolation together with DP
Net B.
4.2.8 EL 20500 and 16700: DP net and power cables are going through this deck.
All cabling have been distributed more or less to respective location for going
down to thruster room. Routing down to TR1 is A-60 isolated.
4.2.9 EL 9700 and 6500: Routing down to respective thruster room. No A-60
isolation of routing to TR1.
4.2.10 EL 3500: At this deck the DP net A is spread out from the inner periphery to
respective thruster room.

4.3 Fire and Flooding Protection
4.3.1 The area-philosophy used for the layout of the passive and active fire systems.
Each bulkhead, forming the border between the areas shall be of A-60 type or
equivalent.
4.3.2 The watertight doors between the different compartments up to EL 24.500 are
all combined Fire (A-60) and Flooding doors. The flooding protection is
configured that the hull in general divided into six or more water tight
compartments per deck level. Within each area, water tight doors to stair
trunks are placed allowing access.
4.3.3 Review of the provided documents has not identified any single failure that
will exceed the worst single failure. However reviews of the ballast system or
collision damage have not been evaluated.
4.3.4 Fire protection is mainly by use of A-60 insulation or double A-0 with distance
between. Important rooms such as SWBD rooms and corridor on EL 28.500
have A 60 insulation in both floor and ceiling in addition to bulkhead.
4.3.5 With reference to drawing GA-105410_N111-619-009 rev it can be identified

that there is no A-60 insulation in floor/ ceiling between EL24.500 and
EL20.500. This results in only A-0 between the DP net A and DP Net B. It is
recommended to have the Net B in an A-60 routing. A recommendations have
been made to be rectified and drawing to be updated.

5 POWER GENERATION
5.1 General
5.1.1 Onboard the vessel there are four engine rooms, engine room 1& 2 and 3& 4
are located next to each other. The mech. workshop and store is placed
between the two pair of engine rooms. Further all engine rooms have A60
insulation on bulkheads and doors. In general terms the engine rooms 1 & 2
will be on port side and 3 & 4 will be aft on elevation deck EL 28.500 (below
upper deck).
5.1.2 The Emergency Control Room (ECR) is located next to SWBD room 2 and
Main Control Room (MCR) is on the Bridge.
5.2 Main Engines & Alternators
5.2.1 All eight diesel engines are of the same type Rolls Royce Bergen
B32:40V12A, 4- stroke V-12 engine with two turbochargers and each has a
capacity of 5535 kW (6920kVA) at 720 rpm. The diesel engine drives an
alternator of type Siemens 1DK4537-8AL05.
5.2.2 All engines are designed for automatic or manual start from the control room
or locally at the engine itself. Emergency stop of an engine can be done
locally, or from control room or the bridge.
5.2.3 Starting of the main engines is performed by using starting air taken from the
starting air system. The engines shutdown solenoids require control air to
operate the fuel rack. The solenoids have to be energised to shutdown the
engine. Reference is made to chapter 11 for starting and control air.
5.2.4 Each main engine is equipped with a direct driven FO pump, LTFW-, HTFW-
and LO pumps. An electrical LO priming pump and a pneumatic priming
pump are fitted for them each. The pneumatic priming pump is for use in a
blackout recovery or start of DGs on a dead board without closing bustie
breakers to restore power first.
5.2.5 Each main engine is equipped with an electric/ hydraulic regulator of make
Woodward. The regulator is controlled by Woodward 723+ electronic control
system. Loadsharing is handled by Woodward 723+, but synchronization is by
PMS.

6 POWER DISTRIBUTION
6.1 General
6.1.1 As for number of engine rooms there are also 4 SWBD rooms. Whereat
SWBD room 1 & 2 are placed side by side on the same level as the engine
rooms (below upper deck) while SWBD room 3 & 4 are located aft of the
vessel on the deck above, almost over respective engine room.
6.1.2 The power distribution switchboards are illustrated in Figure 6-1 below:
Engine Room 1 Engine Room 2 Engine Room 3 Engine Room 4
DG1 DG2 DG3 DG4 DG5 DG6 DG7 DG8
11kV SWBD A 11kV SWBD B 11kV SWBD C 11kV SWBDD
NC NO NC
Transformer
11kVA/ 690V
3500kVA
Thr. 1 Thr. 2 Thr. 5 Thr. 6 Thr. 3 Thr. 4 Thr. 7 Thr. 8
871EN110 871EN210 871EN310 871EN410

690V SWBD A 690V SWBD C
NO NO
UPS Panel A UPS Panel B UPS Panel C UPS Panel D Transformer

690V/ 230V
315kVA
Drilling SWBD A1 Drilling SWBD A2 Drilling SWBD B3 Drilling SWBD B4

230V SWBD A 230V SWBD B 230V SWBD C 230V SWBD D
Figure 6-1: Switchboard Layout
6.1.3 The SWBD manufacture is Siemens. As can be seen from the illustration
above is that the SWBD configuration is complex, but at same time there is a
very logical setup.
6.1.4 There are four 11kV HV SWBDs named from A to D. Each SWBD is
powered by two generators and supplies underlying SWBDs and thrusters.
The SWBD configuration can be 2-split or 4-four split setup. This is achieved
by closing the bustie breakers, between SWBD A & B and C & D. For the
latter all other bustie breakers sustain open. There is minimum one bustie
breaker on each SWBD.

6.1.5 Only three out of the six bustie breakers can be remotely controlled from the
IAS and are equipped with synchronizing equipment. The other three are
manual on/ off breakers. Thus the operator has to be aware of correct sequence
to close these breakers. The bustie breakers are fitted with overload and short
circuit protection.
6.1.6 The distributions named 871EN110 to 871EN410 are the variable speed drive
SWBDs, with consumers such as Mud pumps and Draw work motors, drilling
related equipment. The bustie breakers indicated are normally open.
6.1.7 The vessel is fitted with a PMS and reference is made to section 7.4 in this
report for further information.
6.1.8 As for the diesel generation system, there might be a risk whereby an AVR
failure (or even simple overspeed) of one unit is affecting other units supplying
the same busbar/ SWBD. Operating according to DP Class-3 criteria, the
switchboard is in split configuration and such a failure can only affect half of
the switchboard systems.
6.1.9 Mainly the SWBD configuration will normally be with open bustie breakers
between SWBD B and SWBD C, 2-split mode, running in 4-split configuration
will be in accordance with DP Operation Manual or after Client requirements.
6.1.10 The power capacity is 5536kW for each generator. Total power available
power is 44,288 kW with all generators running.
6.1.11 The thrusters have a capacity of 3800 kW each, and running at full speed will
require 30400 kW. This gives a difference of 13888kW for supplying the
remaining consumers. However it is highly unlikely that full thrust demand
will be required in a drilling operation and in general when on DP. The vessel
should be operated within the criteria set in the DP operation manual as per DP
class 3 philosophies, where no generator/SWBD load on either SWBD should
exceed 50% load. I.e. maximum thruster load will be up to 100% on four
thrusters equal to 15200 kW and the capacity of four running generators are
22144 kW. Remaining power available for the drilling and Accommodation is
(22144 15200) = 6944 kW.
6.1.12 The vessel is to be running with capability analysis running in the DP system
that will in real time calculate for event causing loss of SWBD(s) or
thruster(s). Warning will be to the DPO if the state crosses the critical limit.

6.1.13 In event of a partial blackout situation the Drilling operation has to be stopped,
but prior to that all necessary preparations for shutting down and prepare for
disconnect has to be performed. The Drilling will have priority until its
shutdown then the remaining thrusters will have priority. All preparations for
quick disconnect has then been prepared for, and can be executed if required
(dependent on the situation).
6.1.14 The generator breakers have the following protection devices:

over current/short circuit
reverse power
differential phase
over/under voltage
overload/ unbalanced load
6.1.15 The thruster drive motors will trip for the following:
under voltage
thermal overload
unbalanced and loss of one phase
too long starting time
locked rotor
short circuit
6.1.16 Transformer breakers are protected for:

Over current/ short circuit
Single phase thermal image over current
6.2 690V Switchboard
6.2.1 The main 690V SWBDs are powered from respective 11kV SWBD via
dedicated 11kV/690V (3500/4300kVA) transformers. These transformers are
designed to take the load accumulated by two underlying SWBDs. Further all
aux. systems for respective engine -, thruster room including the thrusters and
generators are powered from these SWBDs.
6.2.2 The 690V Drilling SWBDs (871EN102 to 402) are powered via a breaker from
respective 690V SWBD (871EN101 to 401). There are tie breakers between
the Drilling SWBDs A1 & A2 and between B3 & B4. The consumer of the
drilling switchboard are of none relevance to the station keeping. However, as
for the other SWBDs the selectivity is assumed to be inherent and calculated to
avoid any failure in this system to be transferred to the main SWBDs.

6.2.3 The important consumers of each 690V SWBD are:

690V SWBD A 690V SWBD B
ER 1 SW pumps (1+2) ER 2 SW pumps (1+2)
TR1 aux SW pump 1 TR2 aux SW pump 1
ER1 FO service pump1 ER2 FO service pump1
TR1 FW pumps (1+2) TR1 FW pumps (1+2)
TR1 SW pumps (1+2) TR1 SW pumps (1+2)
ER1 Em FW pump SWBD A ER2 Em FW pump SWBD B
Supply fans ER1 etc. & AC Supply fans ER2 etc. & AC
SWBD cooling coil SWBD cooling coil
LO Priming pump DG 1&2 DP main equip. rm. Em. cooling
LO separator 1 LO separator 1
Starting air compressor 1 Thr.5 LO pump
Instr. Air compressor 1 Thr.5 Hyd. oil pump
Thr.1 LO pump Thr.6 LO pump
Thr.1 Hyd. oil pump Thr.6 Hyd. oil pump
Thr.2 LO pump Thr. 5 FC pre-charger
Thr.2 Hyd. oil pump Thr. 5 FC cooling unit
Thr. 1 FC pre-charger Thr. 6 FC pre-charger
Thr. 1 FC cooling unit Thr. 6 FC cooling unit
Thr. 2 FC pre-charger Thr.5 transformer aux.
Thr. 2 FC cooling unit Thr.6 transformer aux.
Thr.1 transformer aux. Thr.5 draining pump
Thr.2 transformer aux. Thr.6 draining pump
Thr.1 draining pump Generator 3 LO pump (DE/NDE)
Thr.2 draining pump Generator 4 LO pump (DE/NDE)
Generator 1 LO pump (DE/NDE) LO Priming pump DG 3&4
Generator 2 LO pump (DE/NDE) FO separator 2
FO separator 1 DG preheater module DG 3&4
DG preheater module DG 1&2 UPS B1
UPS A1 UPS B2
UPS A2 690V / 230V transformer B
690V / 230V transformer A
Chilled water circ. Pump 1
HVAC Compressor 2
Aux 2 FW pump 1
Aux 1 FW pump 1
690V SWBD C 690V SWBD D

ER 3 SW pumps (1+2) ER 4 SW pumps (1+2)

TR3 aux SW pump 1 TR4 aux SW pump 1
TR3 FW pumps (1+2) ER4 FO service pump2
TR3 SW pumps (1+2) TR4 FW pumps (1+2)
ER3 Em FW pump SWBD C TR4 SW pumps (1+2)
Supply fans ER3 etc. & AC ER4 Em FW pump SWBD D
SWBD cooling coil Supply fans ER4 etc. & AC
DP backup Em. cooling SWBD cooling coil
LO Priming pump DG 5&6 LO separator 4
LO separator 3 Water tight doors
Thr.3 LO pump Starting air compressor 2
Thr.3 Hyd. oil pump Instr. Air compressor 2
Thr.4 LO pump Thr.7 LO pump
Thr.4 Hyd. oil pump Thr.7 Hyd. oil pump
Thr. 3 FC pre-charger Thr.8 LO pump
Thr. 3 FC cooling unit Thr.8 Hyd. oil pump
Thr. 4 FC pre-charger Thr. 7 FC pre-charger
Thr.3 transformer aux. Thr. 8 FC pre-charger
Thr.4 transformer aux. Thr. 8 FC cooling unit
Thr.3 draining pump Thr.7 transformer aux.
Thr.4 draining pump Thr.8 transformer aux.
Generator 5 LO pump (DE/NDE) Thr.7 draining pump
Generator 6 LO pump (DE/NDE) Thr.8 draining pump
FO separator 3 Generator 7 LO pump (DE/NDE)
DG preheater module DG 5&6 Generator 8 LO pump (DE/NDE)
UPS C1 LO Priming pump DG 7&8
UPS C2 FO separator 4
690V / 230V transformer C DG preheater module DG 7&8
UPS D1
UPS D2
690V / 230V transformer D
Chilled water circ. Pump 2
HVAC Compressor 2
Aux 2 FW pump 2
Aux 1 FW pump 2

6.3 230V Switchboard
6.3.1 The 230V SWBDs are derivate from respective 690V SWBD via a 690V/230V
315kVA transformer. There are bustie breakers allowing connected between
SWBD A&B and C&D.
6.3.2 The 230V bustie and transformer breakers are interlocked with the 690V bustie
breakers.
6.3.3 The important consumers of each 230V SWBD are:

230V SWBD A (875EL101) 230V SWBD B (875EL201)
UPS A1 UPS B1
UPS A2 UPS B2
PMS Cab DG1/2 FO purifier 2 ctrl circuit
11kV SWBD A LO purifier 2 ctrl circuit
690V SWBD A PMS Cab DG3/4
230V Distr. panel B 11kV SWBD B
FO purifier 1 ctrl circuit 690V SWBD B
LO purifier 1 ctrl circuit 230V Distr. panel B ctrl circuit
230V panel A ctrl circuit UPS KPOS 2.1
Thruster 1& 2 Aux. systems Thruster 5& 6 Aux. systems
Thruster converter 1+2 Thruster converter 5+6
Thruster controller & I/O cab. Thruster controller & I/O cab.
Remote valve LPU I/O ctrl cab LQ main HVAC ctrl panel
Instrument air drier 1
Gas sampling system
Lighting LP panels
230V SWBD C (875EL301) 230V SWBD D (875EL401)

UPS C1 UPS D1
UPS C2 UPS D2
PMS Cab DG5/6 FO purifier 4 ctrl circuit
11kV SWBD C LO purifier 4 ctrl circuit
690V SWBD C PMS Cab DG7/8
230V Distr. panel C 11kV SWBD D
FO purifier 3 ctrl circuit 690V SWBD D
LO purifier 4 ctrl circuit 230V Distr. panel D
Thruster 3& 4 Aux. systems Thruster 7& 8 Aux. systems
Thruster converter 3+4 Thruster converter 7+8
Thruster controller & I/O cab. Thruster controller & I/O cab.
UPS KPOS 2.2 Remote valve LPU I/O ctrl cab
LQ main HVAC ctrl panel Lighting LP panels
UPS KPOS 1
Instrument air drier 2

6.3.4 There are 4 main 230V UPSs and these are named A to D. Each UPS has 2
power supplies from the respectively 690V SWBD. One supply is for the
charger (1) and the other is for the bypass (2).
6.3.5 The 230V supply listed to the UPSs are for powering UPS control functions
and not charging/ supply to battery/ consumers.
6.3.6 The UPS A and UPS C are in addition to engine controls used for Bridge
navigation and communication systems. While the UPS B and UPS D are for
Automation.
6.3.7 The important consumers of each 230V UPSs are:

230V UPS A (866ER101) 230V UPS C (866ER301)
DG1 ctrl cab (main) DG5 ctrl cab (main)
DG1 ctrl cab (BU) DG5 ctrl cab (BU)
Generator 1 aux j/b Generator 5 aux j/b
PMS cab DG 1/ 2 PMS cab DG 5/ 6
11kV SWBD A 11kV SWBD C
690V SWBD A 690V SWBD C
230V Distr. panel A 230V Distr. panel C
Thr. 1 ACU ctrl cab Thr. 3 ACU ctrl cab
Thr. 1 FC Thr. 3 FC
Thr. 2 FC Thr. 4 FC
Thruster controller & I/O cab.(1) Thruster controller & I/O cab.(3)
Water mist main ctrl panel Distr. panels UP 08, 09 &10
Gas sampling system Watertight doors
Distr. panels UP 01, 02 &03 Navigation (ECDIS, Radar)
Watertight doors Wind
Navigation (ECDIS, Radar, 24V distribution
GMDSS) Printer cabinet
Gyro Bridge console misc.
Magnetic compass 230V fuse box backup
VDR EMS central equip rack
230V UPS B (866ER201) 230V UPS D (866ER401)


PMS cab DG 3/ 4 PMS cab DG 7/ 8
11kV SWBD B 11kV SWBD D
690V SWBD B 690V SWBD D
230V Distr. panel B 230V Distr. panel D
Thr. 5 FC Thr. 7 FC
Thr. 6 FC Thr. 8 FC
Distr. panels UP 04, 05,06 &07 Distr. panels UP 11, 12,13 &14
VMS Node Cabinet(supply 1) VMS Node Cabinet (supply 2)
cC1- cJoy Independent Joystick cC1- cJoy Independent Joystick
IAS I/O field stations 38 to 44 IAS I/O field stations 38 to 44
(supply 1) (supply 2)
IAS I/O field stations 46 to 52 IAS I/O field stations 46 to 52
(supply 1) (supply 2)
IAS Server2/ OS cabinet IAS Server2/ OS cabinet (supply 2)
Electro node cabinet Electro node cabinet (supply 2)
Thruster Node cabinet Thruster Node cabinet (supply 2)
ESD / F&G I/O cabinet ESD / F&G I/O cabinet (supply 2)
ESD / F&G I/O cabinet ESD / F&G I/O cabinet (supply 2)
IAS Server1/ OS cabinet IAS Server1/ OS cabinet (supply 2)
Thruster console Thruster console (supply 2)
ESD/ F&G Matrix ESD/ F&G Matrix (supply 2)
Hard copy printer ESD/ F&G Node cabinet
Alarm event printer (supply 2)
Load computer Fire Central cabinet (supply 2)
ESD/ F&G Node cabinet ESD Node cabinet (supply 2)
Fire Central cabinet ESD/ F&G I/O Cabinet (supply 2)
ESD Node cabinet
ESD/ F&G I/O Cabinet

7 POWER, AUTOMATION AND CONTROL

7.1 General
7.1.1 This section describes the different control, alarm and monitoring systems
which are related to DP operations.
7.1.2 The following systems are described further in this section:

Main Engine Control System
Integrated Alarm & monitoring System, IAS
Power Management System, PMS
Thruster Control System
Emergency Shutdown System and Fire & Gas
Independent Joystick
7.1.3 The DP control system is described in section 14 of this report.
7.2 Main Engine Control Systems
7.2.1 The main engines are controlled by Woodward 723 speed control system
(Governor), and the engine regulator is also of make Woodward. This unit
received the engine speed by two speed pick-ups. Woodward 723+ controls the
load sharing between the DGs. The PMS does control start/ stop and
synchronisation of the DG to the SWBD, when synchronised the Siemens PMS
PLC controls the DGs in compensated DROOP mode i.e. fixed frequency of
60Hz.
7.2.2 Automatic shutdown of a main engine is activated by any of the following

conditions:
Over speed (governor/mechanical)
Low-low LO pressure main engine
Woodward governor (Major failure)
High-high FW temperature
Oil Mist (activation)
7.2.3 The Generator breaker should trip in an event of following:

Over and under voltage protection (generator / bus-bar)
Over and under frequency (generator / bus-bar)
Overload
Unbalanced current
Over excitation
Asymmetric voltage
Reverse power

7.3 Integrated Alarm & Monitoring System - IAS
7.3.1 The IAS system is of make Siemens and consists of the following main
systems:
4 Four servers 19 rack computers with a common display server per
server cabinet.
5 Five operating stations 19 rack computers
Dual redundant network
7.3.2 Each operator station consists of a computer, handling the mimic and human
interface to the various systems, furthered there are keyboard, mouse and a 20
monitor. Four of the operator stations are placed in MCR / Bridge and the fifth
is in the ECR on elevation EL 28.500 next to SWBD room 2.
7.3.3 There are three server/ OS cabinets named 790-IB-001 to 003. The 003 is
interfaced to 002. The server cabinets contains of the following:
790-IB-001 (Net A):
IAS HUB A
Server 1A & 2A
HMI A
IAS OS 1 & 2
790-IB-002 (Net B):

IAS HUB B
Server 1B & 2B
HMI B
OS 3 & 4
IAS OS 5 (ECR)
7.3.4 All data from ESD, F&G, Engine rooms, PMS, and VMS etc are
communicating on dual redundant network to the IAS A & B. Network
switches are used for both IAS and HMI network allowing all serves and OS
stations to see and read both IAS / HMI networks.
7.3.5 For both locations there are an alarm/event printer and a hard copy printer. The
alarm printer is connected up to server OS 1 (MCR) and OS 5 (ECR). The hard
copy printers are directly connected to HMI A & B (Scalance X414) in server/
OS cabinet 790-IB-001/ 002. A load computer is also in the MCR. This
computer is connected up to the remote VMS I/O cabinets for collecting of
data.

7.3.6 Examples of human interface to the IAS are:

Alarm handling & monitoring of generators/ thrusters
Alarm handling & monitoring of utilities as FW, SW, compressed air,
bilge, etc. to mention a few.
ESD and F& G monitoring
Setting of the Power Management System
7.4 Power Management System
7.4.1 The PMS system is of type Siemens PMS 400, and is an integrated part of the
IAS control system. The IAS and PMS functions are performed by the
SIMATIC S7 controller. There is one controller per engine room. As the
generators are divided into 4 groups of 2 generators, each controller controls
respective generator group. For each generator there is also a measuring and
protection unit, protecting the generator.
7.4.2 The IAS PMS consists of the following units:

PMS controllers
11kW SWBD control with one PMS controller per DG pair
Ethernet network between the individual PMS controllers
Profibus from each PMS controller
SWBD control for the 690V incomers and feeders belonging to PMS IAS
part
7.4.3 The dual power supply to the generator protection units are from dedicated
UPS and internal power source from respective generator as backup.
7.4.4 All communications are via remote I/O and Profibus network connections,
between the IAS / PMS and SWBDs.
7.4.5 Circuit breakers with synchronizing ability are the bustie breakers and
generator breakers. All other breakers are of normal open / close type.
7.4.6 The functionality for the SIPROTEC protection units is among others to detect
AVR failures such as over/ under excitation for generators. Real time data from
these units are collected by the controllers and presented for the operator. Data
can be viewed from the IAS or from the Siemens panel.
7.4.7 In situations where the vessel operates with closed bustie configuration the
SIPROTEC units for bustie breakers should detect an increase in frequency
(generator overspeed) or for uneven load, and the bustie breaker should
automatically opens to isolate failure, hence worst case will be loss of a SWBD
and two thrusters.
Note! That the vessel will either operate in 2 or 4 split configuration worst case
should never exceed loss of two SWBDs and four thrusters.

7.4.8 The DGs can be manually, semi automatically and automatically synchronized
to the SWBD. Manual/ local is by operator using the synchroscope on the
SWBD and having DGs in manual mode. Semi automatically is by operator
start of a DG remotely from the IAS and closing of DG breaker with automatic
synchronising and load sharing.
7.4.9 Automatically is by PMS logic control. Automatic start and synchronization of

DG use of the PMS and the remote synchronisation unit, prior to this the DG
has to be in remote control.
7.4.10 The major PMS functions are:

Semi automatic start of DGs and bustie handling, operator controlled
Automatic load dependent start/stop
Standby start of DGs
Restart after Partial/total Blackout handling
Power sharing between DGs (symmetrical / Asymmetrical)
Busbar frequency regulation
Compensated Droop
Load sharing supervision of active power, current and reactive power.
7.4.11 The Woodward speed controller controls solely the engines speed. The engine
load control is according to a droop curve adjusted identically for each engine
(Droop mode). Load sharing by two DGs or more, by isoch. (Fixed frequency)
or droop mode (Load dependent frequency) load shearing.
7.4.12 The differences between these two control modes should be understood as
follows:
In the droop mode, the turbine control system works in concert with the
other on-line governors on the system to share proportionally load
demand changes. This sharing is done based upon the base load rating
of each generator to the overall capacity of the grid.
With the units in the isoch mode, any changes in load demand will try
to reduce system frequency. This attempt to "droop" will be first
"noticed" by the turbine operating with an isochronous governor. This
isoch governor will immediately notice a slight decrease in speed
(frequency) and increase output to increase fuel flow to generate more
power. The isoch machine will "pick up" all of the new load demand.
This happens before the droop governors can react.

7.4.13 There are 4 operation modes of the PMS system. These are as follows:
Emergency mode
DP mode Drilling operation under good weather conditions 2 split
DP mode Drilling operation under bad weather conditions 4 split
Parallel/ Transit mode
7.4.14 The functionality of the PMS controllers is based on a master/slave

philosophy. The master controller in transit mode is the PMS controller 1. For
a 2 split configuration the master controllers are PMS controller 1 & 3. A 4-
split configuration all PMS controllers works independently and are their own
master.
7.4.15 It should be noted that there is an interlock for synchronization of DG breakers

if one DG is synchronizing the other DG is blocked to synchronize until the
breaker is connected. Thus only one DG can be synchronized and connected at
a time. This does apply for all PMS modes. The PMS will lock the last DG
connected to the SWBD to prevent the operator or it-self from stopping the last
DG, hence causing a partial blackout.
7.4.16 When a stop or a shutdown is initiated, the stop solenoid will be energized and
open for air to shut down the engine. Same time a signal is sent to the PMS,
which will disconnect the breaker and start the next standby generator in line.
The following conditions lead to emergency stop:
NDE & DE bearing temp
Cold & Hot air temp
Winding temp
Extreme low LO pressure
Overspeed
Governor major alarm
Emergency stop push button
Shutdown initiated by generator protection unit
Activation of ESD2
ESD automatic shutdown on confirmation of gas in intakes
7.4.17 Engine system failure alarms (delayed shutdown) will initiate a pre-warning
alarm in the PMS and the PMS will automatically initiate start of next standby
DG. When this DG is connected to the SWBD the faulty DG will be
unloaded and disconnected then stopped. The faulty DG will automatically be
set in manual mode, resulting in no longer control by PMS. Failure to start 1st
standby DG on first attempt the PMS will then issue a start signal next/all
standby DGs. Manual override for this function should be possible in critical
situations, allowing the operator to still having it running.

7.4.18 Delayed shutdown is initiated by:

FW alarms
LO alarms
FO alarms
Nozzle alarms
High pressure pipe leakage
High Charge air temp
High Exhaust temp
7.4.19 Blackout restart

Two contactors are fitted; one for detecting a blackout and the other is for
detecting if the busbar is energised. If a blackout is detected the next DG set is
started and switched on with delay when exceeding 85% of nominal voltage.
Simultaneously closing of DG breakers to DGs that have been started to the
voltage free busbar is not possible (blocked by PMS).
After a blackout all essential pumps and systems shall be made available for
auto start as soon as power is restored. The only human interface shall be only
to start thrusters from the MCR/ Bridge.
7.4.20 Blackout prevention

The largest consumers on the vessel are thruster and the drilling pumps. All
these systems use frequency drives and to avoid overloading the DGs a load
reduction system is in place. A limit for maximum load is set in the PMS
system based on available generator capacity. This system will prevent the
generators from overload, and reduce the risk for a total blackout in case of a
power consumption increase by the drilling pumps or thrusters.

7.5 Emergency Shutdown System and Fire & Gas
7.5.1 The ESD system is a subsystem that when activated will stop/ close all systems
i.e. a gas alarm in an engine room wills shut down that particular DG set and
its aux. systems. The DGs are not fitted with rig savers. The ESD sub system
consists of manual activating stations placed around the vessel or can be
activated from the MCR matrix panel. In either case when activated it will
among others perform a quick and safe shutdown of ventilation and electrical
consumers in that area.
7.5.2 The F&G system is for fire and gas detection. Gas and fire detectors are
strategically placed around the vessel. This system does also include manual
fire call points. The fire monitoring system is delivered by Siemens/ Autronica
and is connected up to the IAS for visualisation.
7.5.3 The Fire & Gas system comprises of several I/O cabinets and control cabinets
that are interfaced to the IAS. These cabinets are located as follows:
809-IB-010 Telecom room
809-IB-020 DP BU Equip. room
809-IB-030 DP BU Equip. room
809-IB-040 ESD/ F&G I/O - DP BU Equip. room
809-IB-050 ESD/ F&G I/O - main instrument room
809-IB-060 ESD/ F&G I/O - main instrument room
809-IB-070 ESD/ F&G I/O - ECR
7.5.4 Within the I/O cabinets there are separate modules for ESD and F&G. These
modules are serial linked (ring loop) between the cabinets to the Safety Matrix
unit placed in MCR and down to the control cabinets. The ESD
communication is routed from the Matrix unit directly to ctrl cabinet 812-IB-
001 and from here there is a line to ctrl cabinet 811-IB-001. For the F&G the
signal handling is opposite.
7.5.5 The ESD and F&G station are redundant and one is placed in Telecom room
and the other is in DP BU Equipment room. For them both there is an internal
communication link between the two and they are also interface to the IAS is
through IAS cabinet A and cabinet B. With this loss of a system will still allow
continues monitoring by the other system.
7.5.6 ESD panels with pushbuttons are placed at the following places:
Fwd and aft crane (ESD local isolation of crane)
Drillers cabin (ESD isolation of drilling SWBD only)
Each lifeboat stations + Heli deck (Abandon Vessel Shutdown (AVS))
Main ESD panel in MCR (ESD + AVS)

Global Maritime AS
7.5.8
7.5.7
Title:
Client: Sevan Marine Ltd
Failure Mode & Effect Analysis - Sevan Driller Rev.: 2
those are included for each level:
The ESD logic diagram below shows the three levels of ESD and what systems
engine- SWBD room or drilling SWBD.

From the Safety Matrix panel it is possible to separately activate ESD for an
AVS p.b. AVS p.b. AVS p.b.
ESD Matrix MCR Helideck Lifeboat stations
AVS AVS (Abandon Vessel Shutdown)
MDS MDS
Shutdown of: Manual Drilling Shutdown Manual Drilling Shutdown
Emergency Generator EDS Matrix MCR Drillers cabin Confirmed HC or
Fire pumps Activation of EG Confirmed HC gas Confirmed HC or H2S gas detection in
Essential Safety Systems ESD Matrix MCR detection in ER H2S gas detection in Drillers cabin, Mud
UPS inlet Accom. HVAC inlet ctrl room. etc.
Trip of all 11kV feeders to
ESD 1 p.b. drilling SWBD
Disable automatic shutdown
ESD Matrix MCR function for last remaining Trip drilling UPS Stop DG's in affected ER Close affected ventilation by Close affected ventilation by
DG Shutdown of HVAC Shutdown ER ventilation stopping fans + close damper stopping fans + close damper
ESD1 ESD 1 (Emergency Shutdown)
General Alarm, PA system

ESD Level Indication in Shutdown of El. equipment: Shutdown of all ventilation
MCR, IAS system and Thermal oil boiler systems not necessary to Confirmed fire
Drilling Ctrl system Inert gas generator secure teh rig and maintain Drillfloor,Shaleshacker
position area
Confirmed smoke
detection HVAC
Emergency stop High HC or H2S inlet
Emergency stop Drilling SWBD Gas detection Emergency release of
Main Engines ESD Matrix MCR in non-hazardous Confirmed fire Stern Discharge
ESD Matrix MCR vent. inlet other hazardous system
areas
Date: 02.10.2008 Page:37 of 112

GM Doc. No.: GM-668-001-R01
High HC or H2S gas

Stopping fans and Stopping fans and
Trip of all 11kV feeders to detection in Non- Emergency release of
ESD 2 p.b. Stop of all DG in ER closing dampers for closing dampers for
drilling SWBD Hazardous area SDS
ESD Matrix MCR Shut down ER ventilation affected Ventilation affected Ventilation
system system
ESD2 ESD 2 (Emergency Warning Level)
General Alarm, PA system Shutdown of El. equipment: Shutdown of Ventilation: Shutdown of Cargo operations:
ESD Level Indication in Non-essential consumers All non-essential ventilation Emergency stop, cargo pumps
MCR, IAS system and Floodlights (Non Ex) Emergency stop of SDS valves
Drilling Ctrl system Small power outlets SDS
Welding sockets
Temporary Equipments
Made: TH
7.6 Thruster Control System
7.6.1 The Thruster control system is of make Siemens with interface to the RRM
control cabinet for azimuth control. The following operator stations are
interfaced for thruster control:
Manual lever station
DP control KPOS2
DP control KPOS1
Auto pilot
Independent Joystick cJoy
7.6.2 Each thruster has its own thruster control cabinet (Siemens) and RRM cabinet
for azimuth control. Communication between the thruster control systems and
the thruster units are separate as illustrated below in Figure 7-1 below.
KPOS 2 MCR Bridge control w/ DP cJoy Ind. cJoy Autopilot KPOS1
TC IAS
Thruster 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Figure 7-2: DP and Thruster control Courtesy Siemens.
7.6.3 A mode selector panel is located on the main thruster panel in MCR. From this
the operator can select operation mode of thrusters by pushing the wanted
mode. There are four modes to choose from being DP mode, Joystick mode,
Lever mode and Autopilot mode. A status indication when on DP will show
whether the system is in KPOS2 or KPOS1 control. When in DP mode all
other control systems are inactive and will not affect the station keeping if
operated.

7.6.4 From the provided information there are two thruster joystick operator panels,
both are of type cJoy delivered by Kongsberg Maritime. The one placed in the
back of MCR next to the DP station is the Independent cJoy and the one placed
on the fwd console is the DP cJoy. The latter can be used for operating all
thrusters in joystick mode or in DP mode.
7.6.5 The independent joystick placed in MCR (illustrated in figure 7-3) shows that it
is connected directly to the main thruster panel. However normal practice is to
have the independent joystick to communicate directly to respective thruster
control cabinet in each thruster room. For further description of the
independent joystick reference is made to section 7.7.
7.6.6 By operating the fire backup switch in the DP backup room the operator
deselect all other system so thrusters are solely controlled by the KPOS1
system.
7.6.7 In autopilot mode only 4 thrusters used thruster 3, 4, 5 and 6 as can be seen
from the illustration in Figure 7-4.
7.6.8 The thruster controller (Siemens CPU) within respective thruster compartment
will receive data through separate communication links, the data will include
speed and azimuth set-points. Speed data is sent to the thrusters drive and
steering is sent to the RRM control cabinet for positioning of the thrust angle.
The feedback is sent back to the control system through the same comm. link.
7.6.9 Having a thruster ready for DP there are certain criterias that have to be met,
these are:
Thruster running and ready
No active alarm(s) in converter and RRM control system
Thruster in remote
7.6.10 Thruster emergency stop circuit is an individual hardwired solution from

pushbuttons placed at 3 locations being MCR, Speed drive (frequency
converter) and close to the thruster motor. The system is loop monitored and a
wire break will give an alarm but no activation of emergency stop of that
thruster will be initiated.
7.6.11 The thruster IAS controller (793-IB-001) is a single unit that is wired to each
of the eight thrusters and top a PLC in the main bridge console. This controller
is connected to both IAS networks A & B and to the main bridge console. Loss
of this will only cause loss of instrumental data to/ from the thrusters. The IAS
Thruster controller is dual powered from 230V UPS B (866ER201) and UPS D
(866ER401) via two AC/DC (230V/ 24V) inverters.

7.6.12 The main bridge thruster control panel is dual power from UPSs on the
bridge.
7.6.13 Thruster controllers are powered from respective 230V UPS# and main
distribution panel# as follows:
Thruster 1 controller: UPSA (866ER101) & 230V SWBD A(875EL101)
Thruster 2 controller: UPSA (866ER101) & 230V SWBD A(875EL101)
Thruster 3 controller: UPSC (866ER301) & 230V SWBD C(875EL301)
Thruster 4 controller: UPSC (866ER301) & 230V SWBD C(875EL301)
Thruster 5 controller: UPSB (866ER201) & 230V SWBD B(875EL201)
Thruster 6 controller: UPSB (866ER201) & 230V SWBD B(875EL201)
Thruster 7 controller: UPSD (866ER401) & 230V SWBD D(875EL401)
Thruster 8 controller: UPSD (866ER401) & 230V SWBD D(875EL401)

7.7 Independent Joystick System
7.7.1 The vessel has an Independent Joystick system delivered by Kongsberg

Maritime. This unit is not a part of the vessels DP system but is described
briefly to inform of the independent Joystick system that is fitted onboard the
vessel. This system comprises of a cabinet cC-1, which has its own
communication net, independent of the DP system and of the manual
manoeuvre station. Thruster communication is linked between the cC-1 cabinet
and for respective thruster PCU in the main bridge console.
7.7.2 A switch is installed on the DP desk were the DPO can switch between the DP
controller (DPC-2) and the Joystick controller (cC-1, cJoy). By doing so, the
operation of the independent joystick can be done from a cJoy Operator
Terminal located in MCR. The operator can hold heading of the vessel and
control all thrusters from the joystick.
7.7.3 The cC-1 controller receives data from gyros 3 and wind sensor 1.
7.7.4 The power supply to the control cabinet is fed from 230V MSB D.
7.7.5 This joystick cannot be justified as an independent joystick as the

configuration of signals to the main bridge console rather than directly down
to respective thruster controller.

8 FUEL OIL SYSTEM

8.1 General
8.1.1 All engines runs on Marine Diesel Oil (MDO). The vessel has four FO storage
tanks these are named MDO tk.1 PS, MDO tk.2 PS and named MDO tk.1 SB,
MDO tk.2 SB. There are two FO transfer pumps for PS and SB FO system.
These two pumps are used for transfer of FO from the storage tanks to the FO
tk.1 which is the settling tank (30 m3). Inlet valves to service tanks (tk.2) are
normally closed. All valves and pumps are remotely controlled from the VMS
which is a part of the IAS, whereas the FO feeding system is via the PMS
controllers.
8.1.2 The service tanks (tk.2, capacity 45m3) are alarmed for low level and in
addition settling tanks (tk.1) do also have level alarm high, alerting the
operator of level status. As all DGs are also set to be emergency generators
the low level alarm is placed higher up on the tank as normal, this as the
requirement for an emergency generator is to have at least 18 hours of
continues running of generator after a low level alarm has occurred.
8.1.3 A general illustration of the FO system for each engine room is shown in
Figure 8-1 below.
NO NC
To/from next
NC engine room
FO service FO service
tk 2 tk 1
FO Separator
For EM. FO Separator

DO supply Feed pump
FO Filters
FO Cooler FO Cooler
ME # ME #
Figure 8-1: FO system

8.1.4 From the settling tank (tk.1) the FO is purified through a FO separator of make
PU150 (capacity 3,15m3/hr) and the clean FO is diverted into service tank. An
internal overflow from service tk. 2 to tk. 1 allows continuous purification of
the FO. As illustrated, there is also possible to use a separator for filling up the
service tank in the neighbour engine room.
8.1.5 Not illustrated, is the auxiliary FO system placed in engine room 1 for the
boiler, as this is not important part of the DP system it is no further described.
8.2 Fuel Oil System Engines
8.2.1 As illustrated in Figure 8-1 the engines in each engine room have their own
common FO system. The FO supply is gravity fed from the service tank
through a Quick Closing Valve (QCV), a filter set, with a bypass line, and into
a rail dividing one line to each engine. An isolation valve is placed just in front
of the engine. The engine driven booster pump discharges the FO through a
dual filter set (engine mounted) to the injector pumps. Excessive FO is
diverted back to the engine pumps suction line. Within this return line a FW
heat exchanger is located, providing cooling for the return fuel.
8.2.2 Any FO alarms will also be issued to PMS as a pre-warning, which will then
start up next selectable DG.
8.3 Fuel Oil Quick Closing Valves
8.3.1 To quickly close the outlet valves from various FO tanks etc. there are installed
pneumatic operated QCVs. The control panel is placed outside aft fire control
station. The QCV cabinet is protected against inadvertent operation.
8.3.2 The QCVs are pneumatic operated, meaning that they use air pressure to shut
down the valve(s). Loss of air will not close the valves. Within the QCV
cabinet there is an air reservoir which should have sufficient capacity to close
valves upon loss of main air supply. The handles for opening of air supply are
arranged out from a distributor manifold. Configurations of handles are as
follows, seen from left to right:
1- PS MDO storage tanks
2- Thermal oil expansion tank and heater
3- Engine room 1 MDO service tanks
7- DG LO storage tanks
8- SB MDO storage tanks
8.3.3 Failure analysis of the FO system is listed in section 15.5 in this report.

8.4 FO Pipe Run
8.4.1 The FO system per engine room is totally separate and is common only for the
two diesel generators in respective room. As a backup a FO separator can be
used to fill the service tank in the neighbour engine room (i.e. ER 1/2 and
ER3/4).
8.4.2 The FO storage / transfer system is mainly common for two engine rooms.
Although the transfer pumps can be used to transfer FO from one storage tank
to all others, segregation valves (NC) have to be open prior to this.

9 COOLING SYSTEMS
9.1 Seawater Cooling System
9.1.1 All SW pumps are placed in respective thruster room. As the SW system is
identical for thrusters and generator pairs. Only one setting for the SW system
is illustrated and described below, being engine room 1.
9.1.2 The SW cooling system comprises of a sea chests, a remote operated isolation
valve before the strainer to the common rail manifold, where SW pumps have
their suction from. Two valves are placed before the strainer, one manual and
one that can be remotely operated from IAS and emergency operated from a
hand pump of which is located on elevation EL 24500. The overboard valves
do have an extended spindle to elevation EL 24500. Both shall be placed above
the calculated damaged water line limit.
9.1.3 The SW cooling system is illustrated in Figure 9-1 below.
Overboard line Overboard line
Thr # SW/FW
Cooler
Central
SW/ FW
coolers
DG's
backup to ER # Remote operated Isolation vavle

+ Emergency handpump for operation
Thr # SW
ER # SW
Pump 1/ 2
Pump 1/ 2
Strainer
Sea Chest
Figure 9-1: Seawater Cooling System
9.1.4 The SW system for engine room 1, (generator 1&2 and the stand alone HVAC
unit for the SWBD A) consists of two SW pumps (duty/ standby) providing
cooling for both central coolers and then discharge overboard. The coolers
have configurations set up for back flow of the cooler for maintenance, these
valves are normally closed. The capacity of these two SW pumps is 460m3/hr
@ 4.5 bar (70%). Under normal conditions one pump is running while the
other is on standby. Operating in places where the SW temperature is high,
there is also a possible to have both pumps in running in parallel. There is no
backup SW pump installed, instead there is a crossover line with an isolation
valve (NC) to SW system for engine room 2. A similar configuration is

between SW system engine room 3 & 4 too. The design temperature for the
SW system is 32oC and 35oC air temperature.
9.1.5 The thruster pairs SW system is in principle identical as for the engine rooms.
However, these SW pumps has a capacity of 120m3/hr @ 2.5 bar.
9.1.6 The coolers are fitted with pressure different gauge allowing the operator to
monitor the coolers for clogging, and the pumps are monitored for suction and
discharge pressure.
9.1.7 The electrical power supply is as follows:

Engine rm. 1 SW pump 1 & 2: 690V MSB A
Engine rm. 2 SW pump 1 & 2: 690V MSB B
Engine rm. 3 SW pump 1 & 2: 690V MSB C
Engine rm. 4 SW pump 1 & 2: 690V MSB D
Thruster rm. 1 SW pump 1 & 2: 690V MSB A
Thruster rm. 2 SW pump 1 & 2: 690V MSB B
Thruster rm. 3 SW pump 1 & 2: 690V MSB C
Thruster rm. 4 SW pump 1 & 2: 690V MSB D
9.2 Seawater Cooling Auxiliary Systems
9.2.1 The aux. SW system comprises of two SW pumps, one is placed in each
thruster room 1 and 4. Each pump discharges to a common rail, a segregation
valve is fitted but are normally open (NO). The coolers, four in total are all
placed in the fwd utility room, and there are two coolers for each aux. system
(1 & 2), one cooler for each system is cooled from respective SW pump.
9.2.2 The auxiliary cooling systems are amongst others for cooling of AC units,
Provision, Central Hydraulic Power Unit, emergency Cooling of DP related
rooms and compressors and MUD pumps.
9.3 Seawater Pipe Run
9.3.1 The SW systems per engine room/ thruster room are fully separated. Though
there is a backup possibility for cross connection to neighbour engine room.
Segregation valves are normally closed.
9.3.2 The Aux. SW system is normally operated as a common system, though there
is a segregation valve fitted.

9.4 Freshwater Cooling System, Diesel Generator
9.4.1 The generator FW cooling system is identical for all four generator pairs. The
FW cooling system is illustrated in Figure 9-2 below.
DG 2
DG 1
NO cooling
Ch. air Cyl. block
cooler
DG 2 Gen. cooler
Charge air
cooler
DG 1
LO cooler
FO cooler
FW Circ. pump
Instr. Air FW Cooler

Central Compr. SWBD #
coolers 1 & 2 Cooler
Figure 9-2: Freshwater Cooling System Generators
9.4.2 The FW cooling system consists of an expansion tank (not illustrated), two
SW/FW central coolers, and several heat exchangers. The Cooler is equipped
with Temp gauge (TI) and a pressure gauge (PI) which should give an early
indication if maintenance is needed.
9.4.3 The diesel generator has to cooling coils one is the LTFW system and the other
is the HTFW system. The direct driven LTFW, which has suction from the
outlet line of the cooler circulates the coolant through various coolers for FO,
generator, charge air and LO. A pneumatic operated temperature control valve
(TCV) regulates the flow through the charge air. From the LO cooler the
coolant is diverted in a common return line back to the central coolers.

9.4.4 The direct driven HTFW pump has suction from LTFW return line. The
HTFW pump circulates the HTFW coolant through the HT charge air cooler,
cylinder block and the nozzle oil cooler. A TCV regulates the HTFW coolant
temperature by diverting the flow back to the suction line of the HTFW pump
or discharge to the LTFW return line.
9.4.5 The FW generator is only connected to engine room 1 system and its not
illustrated. This system takes HTFW coolant from the engines HTFW
discharge line, return to LT system. An electrical pump circulates the HTFW
coolant through the FW generator with return back the engines return line of
the HTFW system.
9.4.6 There is no backup LTFW or HTFW cooling pump installed.
9.4.7 The central coolers are also used for the cooling circuit to the respective stand
alone HVAC unit in respective SWBD, one per engine room FW system and
for cooling of instrument air compressor (only applicable for engine room 1 &
4). This cooling circuit is by an electrical driven pump circulating coolant
through the cooler(s) with return back to the central coolers.

SWBD 1 circ. pump : 690V SWBD A
SWBD 2 circ. pump : 690V SWBD B
SWBD 3 circ. pump : 690V SWBD C
SWBD 4 circ. pump : 690V SWBD D
9.5 Freshwater Cooling System, Thrusters
9.5.1 The FW cooling system for thrusters is common for each pair of thrusters and
comprises of a SW/FW cooler, two electrical driven circulation pumps and
several heat exchangers. The Cooler is equipped with Temp gauge (TI) and a
pressure gauge (PI) which should give an early indication if maintenance is
needed.
9.5.2 The FW is circulated by the circulation pumps (duty/ standby); a TCV

(element type) controls the downstream coolant temperature by adjusting the
flow over the SW/FW cooler. The thrusters are cooled in parallel and each heat
exchanger has isolation valve on inlet and outlet. For each thruster the heat
exchangers are:
Thruster motor
Hydraulic oil cooler
LO cooler
Converter
Transformer


Circ. pumps thruster 1&2: 690VSWBD A
Circ. pumps thruster 3&4: 690VSWBD B
Circ. pumps thruster 5&6: 690VSWBD C
Circ. pumps thruster 7&8: 690VSWBD D
9.6 Freshwater Cooling Auxiliary Systems
9.6.1 The FW auxiliary cooling system 1; consists of two FW pump (duty/ standby)
downstream the pumps there are two coolers in parallel a TCV (element type)
and the various heat exchangers as:
Provision store cooling units
AC/ HVAC cooling units 1& 2
Central Hydraulic power unit.
9.6.2 The two SW/ FW coolers are working in parallel and can be isolated from the
system by closing of valves when undergoing maintenance and cleaning
without disrupting the cooling circuit.
9.6.3 One SW pump is located in thruster room 1 and the other in thruster room 4.
The power supply is from SWBD A & D respectively. Design capacity for
these pumps is 100% each, and can be run individually or in parallel.
9.6.4 The FW auxiliary cooling system 2; is primary for cooling of the drilling
systems that requires FW cooling. However this system also serves as backup
cooling for the DP equipment rooms with self contained HVAC units. The
design of this system is of the same principle as for the aux. FW cooling
system 1 with two pumps and SW/FW coolers.
9.6.5 The various heat exchangers which are:

MUD pumps modules (4 in total)
VSD system cooling room A
Emergency Cooling VSD/MCD Room A
VSD system cooling room B
Emergency Cooling VSD/MCD Room B
Draw work cooler
Central Hydraulic Power Unit
HPU for AHC (Compensator)
Air compressors riser tensioner (3 in total)
Local emergency HVAC DP BU equip. room
Local emergency HVAC DP main equip. room
9.6.6 The primary cooling of these two aux. FW cooling systems is by the same SW
cooling system. Else the two FW cooling systems are independent of each
other. Each fitted with a chemical dosing unit and header/ expansion tank.

9.6.7 The SW/FW coolers are for both systems located side by side in the Fwd
Utility room at EL.16700. One cooler of each system is located on each side of
the isolation valve, which is normally left open.
9.6.8 The FW auxiliary cooling system 3; is for resistor cooling and as this is not
relevant for DP, this system is no further described.
9.6.9 Failure analysis of the cooling water system is listed in section 15.6 in this
report.
9.7 Freshwater Pipe Run
9.7.1 FW cooling system to diesel generators is only common for generator in that
particular engine room. This is also the case for each thruster room hosting two
thrusters. No crossover line is fitted to another system for the generator or
thruster FW cooling system.
9.7.2 Both aux. FW cooling systems (1 & 2) have theirs SW/FW coolers and
circulation pumps located in the fwd utility room on EL 16500. A fire/
flooding in this area can in worst case cause loss of both FW cooling systems,
hence loss of the main HVAC system, and back cooling to DP equipment
rooms. Backup cooling for SWBD rooms is handled by respective engine room
FW cooling circuit. GMAS has been informed that this has been discussed
with the Class Society and the solution made has been approved as there is a
low fire risk area.
9.7.3 It should be mentioned that FW aux. system 2 in addition to backup HVAC

cooling to DP equipment rooms it does cool several of Drilling related
systems; a failure of this system can cause lack of cooling to all MUD pumps,
Riser tensioner compressors and both VSD systems among others.

10 LUBRICATION SYSTEM
10.1 Lube Oil System Diesel Generators
10.1.1 The LO system to the engines are totally separate. With exception of the LO
storage tank and the LO slop/ dirty tanks.
10.1.2 Within each engine room there is a LO separator, that can be utilised by the
two generators. Valves are interlocked avoiding taking oil from one generator
and filling up the other. These valves are manual operated and allows only one
generator to be purified at the time.
10.1.3 The ME LO system comprises of a direct driven LO pump, this pump has
suction from the engine sump and discharges the LO through the LO cooler, a
TCV (element type) regulates the LO temperature into the engine by
controlling the flow of oil through the cooler. After the cooler/ TCV the LO is
led through a dual LO filter set and then to the different lubrication points of
the engine and back to the sump. Example of lubrication points among others
are:
Injector pumps
Nozzle oil system
Rocker arms
Turbo charger
Charger air cooler module
10.1.4 The engine uses the same LO for, rocker arms, injector pumps, nozzle system
and the turbo chargers.
10.1.5 The engine does not have a standby LO pump, but an electrical priming pump
is fitted. This pump is used to prime the engine making sure that the engine has
LO pressure prior to start. The priming pump will start up when the engines
stops to lubricate the turbo charger while stopping of the engine.
10.1.6 An emergency priming pump is installed per generator. This pump is

pneumatic operated from the generators control air system. An electrical
solenoid will open for air in a blackout situation occurs i.e. open up for air to
the pneumatic motor driving the pump. This allows priming of the generator
prior for start.

10.1.7 The electrical supplies are configured are:

Priming pump DG 1: 690V MSB A
Priming pump DG 2: 690V MSB A
Priming pump DG 3: 690V MSB B
Priming pump DG 4: 690V MSB B
Priming pump DG 5: 690V MSB C
Priming pump DG 6: 690V MSB C
Priming pump DG 7: 690V MSB D
Priming pump DG 8: 690V MSB D
LO separator 1 w/ pump: 690V MSB A

LO separator 2 w/pump: 690V MSB B
LO separator 3 w/ pump: 690V MSB C
LO separator 4 w/pump: 690V MSB D
10.2 LO Azimuth Thruster
10.2.1 LO is fed to each thrusters from a separate LO storage tank for thrusters by the
use of the LO transfer pump.
10.2.2 For further information about the thrusters LO/Servo system, reference is made
to 13.1 of this report.
10.2.3 Failure analysis of the lube oil system is listed in section 15.7 in this report.
10.3 LO Pipe run
10.3.1 Although the LO system for each engine is independent, they do share the
same LO storage, sludge tanks. The filling lines and dirty oil lines are
common; however there are manual operated valves segregating each system
from each other and these valves are normally closed.

11 COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEM

11.1 General
11.1.1 The compressed air system for starting and instrument air comprises of four
compressors, one emergency air compressor, eight starting air receivers,
valves, pressure reduction valves , air driers and filters.
11.1.2 The next following sections will describe the various compressed air related
systems.
11.2 Starting Air System
11.2.1 The compressed starting air system for engine room 3 and 4 is illustrated in
Figure 11-1 below.
Enginge room 4 Enginge room 3

Start air receiver 1 & 2
Start air receiver 1 & 2
From Emerg.
Starting air
Compressor
Start air
compressor 2
Pressure
reducing
panel ME 8 ME 7 ME 6 ME 5
30>10bars
Non-return
valves
From Ctrl
From Ctrl air line
air line
Instrument/ Ctrl air line Instrument/ Ctrl air line
Figure 11-1: Compressed Air System
11.2.2 The starting air systems comprises of two starting air compressors, one placed
in engine room 1 and the other in engine room 4. There is a common supply
line from these two compressors to the starting air receivers. Two isolation
valves (Normally Closed) are fitted on the line between engine room 2 and 3,
meaning that one compressor supplies staring air to respective two engine
rooms.

11.2.3 Both starting air compressor are of make Sperre HL2, each with a capacity of
123m3/h 30bar. Each compressor is designed to fill 4- four 1000 litres
receivers within an hour.
11.2.4 The compressors and the receivers have relief valves fitted and those from the
receivers are piped clear to deck in order to avoid feeding any fire in the
machinery spaces with air. The compressor will start/stop upon low/high
starting air pressure.
11.2.5 The air receivers have common outlet pipe with isolating valves at each
receiver. The main consumers are as follows:
Main engine pair
Ctrl air module (pressure reduction panel)
11.2.6 In addition to the main starting air system there is an emergency compressor
fitted in engine room 2. This compressor is diesel driven and is of make Sperre
HL2/77-90-15, with a capacity of 34m2/hr 30 bars. Design is to fill one
1000litres receiver within an hour. From this compressor there is a common
outlet to all starting air systems, and there is a manual operated valve (NC) for
each system that has to be opened prior to use.
11.2.7 The electrical supplies to these compressors are configured as follows:

Starting air compressor 1: 690V MSB A
Starting air compressor 2: 690V MSB D
11.3 Control Air System Main Engines
11.3.1 The control air system to the main engines is individual per engine pair. There
is one supply from the starting air system via the pressure reduction panel
illustrated as a box in fig. 10-1. This panel comprises of a solenoid valve, two
filters and reduction valves.
11.3.2 The main engine control air is for the following systems:
Pneumatic LO priming pump (Emergency pump)
TCV charger air cooler

11.4 Instrument Air System
11.4.1 The main instrument air system is configured in a ring-line, two isolation
valves (NO) one is placed on the line between engine room 2 / 3 and the other
is in vicinity of the T-branch to the thruster room 4 ctrl panel. These valves
should be remotely operated to split the system into two separate systems upon
a failure of the system.
11.4.2 Both instrument air compressors are of make Atlas Copco, each has a capacity
of 920 m3/h 9 bar. There is one instrument air compressor in the same engine
room as respective starting air compressor (ER 1 & 4). Downstream the air
compressor is an air drier and a 2m3 air receiver. Outlet is into a common rail
with an isolator valve fitted. The instrument air system can also be used to
assist the rig air system of which consists of three air compressors. These are
no further described.
11.4.3 The main consumers of main instrument/ control air system are as follows:
Main engine control air system
Purifiers/ separators
Fire dampers / HVAC
Remote operated valves
Control panel thruster rooms
Quick Closing Valves (FO valves)
Rig & Drilling related consumers
11.4.4 The electrical supplies are as follows:

Instrument air compressor 1 690V SWBD A
Instrument air compressor 2 690V SWBD D
Air drier 1: 230V SWBD A
Air drier 2: 230V SWBD D
11.5 Rig Air System
11.5.1 The rig air system is based upon three air compressors, reservoir tanks, vavles
etc. and as this system is solely used for working air and other rig related
systems it is no further described in this report. No DP related consumers have
been identified within this system.

11.6 Quick Closing Valves
11.6.1 The Quick Closing Valves (QCV) are pneumatic operated. The QCV cabinet is
placed at the fire control station and comprises of a distribution manifold,
manual operated valves and an air receiver.
11.6.2 The QCV cabinet shall be protected to avoid any mal-operation and the valves
to be configured such that opening of one does not shutdown FO to all engines.
11.6.3 Within the QCV cabinet there are ten valves, of which eight are in use, one
spare and a drain valve. The configuration of the levers is as follows, seen
from left to right:
Lever 1: Drain
Lever 2: MDO storage tanks 1 & 2 PS
Lever 3: Thermal oil expansion tank and heater
Lever 4: MDO service tanks in Engine Room 1
Lever 8: DG LO storage tank 1 & 2
Lever 9: MDO storage tanks 1 & 2 SB
Lever 10:Spare
11.6.4 Failure analysis of the compressed air system is listed in section 15.8 in this
report.
11.7 Air Pipe Run
11.7.1 There are two starting - and two instrument compressors, one of each located
in engine room 1 and the other in engine room 4. The starting air compressors
are dedicated to provide air to respective two engine rooms, crossover valves
are fitted and should be normally closed.
11.7.2 Instrument air compressors provide compressed air into a ring-line distributor
system placed below EL28500 deck. This ring-line system does have two
isolation valves, which are set to be normally open. A single failure here will
increase risk for loss of instrument air. However this will not affect engine
systems as they have backup feed from the starting air system. Non-return
valves are installed that shall omit drain of air in these lines.

11.7.3 Control air to diesel generators are taken from, both the instrument air ring-line
(common system), and via individual reduction panels from respective starting
air systems. Non-return valves are fitted, that means for loss of ring-line air
supply, all systems will be supplied with air from respective starting air
system. At the reduction panel check valves opens for air from starting air
system when pressure drops below 7 bars.
11.7.4 Note! That loss of instrument air to thruster header/ expansion tanks will only
increase the risk of water ingress into the thruster housing, which eventually
will damage the thruster(s). When instrument air is lost the shaft brake opens,
spring loaded. The latter is only relevant if the break is engaged, which it
normally not will be.

12 VENTILATION
12.1 General description
12.1.1 The vessel is equipped with several ventilation systems located over the
various areas. The vessel is divided into different hazardous areas, giving with
it the various rules and regulations applicable with regards to the ventilation
systems in those areas.
12.1.2 For IMO equipment class 2/3, systems not directly being a part of the DP-
system, but which in case of failure, could cause failure of the DP-system
(such as a ventilation system) should also comply with relevant requirements
of the IMO guidelines.
12.2 Ventilation
12.2.1 The following ventilation systems have been looked into and considered
relevant for the power generation systems.
Engine rooms
Thruster rooms
SWBD rooms
Instrument rooms
12.2.2 There are two supply fans per engine room for cooling and combustion air
supply, and there is one supply fan for each thruster room. These fans are
powered from respective SWBD. Due to the size of the engine and thruster
rooms there is a possibility to have the engines running for a limited period.
12.2.3 Fire dampers are in place and are pneumatic controlled i.e. needs air pressure
to stay open. There is also gas detectors fitted on the inlets as these will
automatically close the fire damper and ventilation fan if gas is detected.
12.2.4 Combustion air for the DG is taken directly from the engine room. Each engine
room has two supply fans supplying the engine room with air. The powering to
these systems is divided between the SWBDs. The thruster compartments
have separate supply fans and for the SWBD and Instrument rooms there are
AC units and backup AC units.
12.2.5 The ventilation system for engines, SWBD rooms and thruster rooms are
powered and controlled from the individual PMS. Other ventilation and air
handling systems are controlled by the VMS.
12.2.6 Failure of a supply fan has no affect as there are two fans per engine room. The
thruster allocated within the affected area will not be cooled by the air only,
but also by the FW cooling system as described earlier in this report.

12.2.7 From the provided consumer lists it can be found that related fans and cooling
units are powered from the same distribution/ SWBD as the system it provides
cooling for. The power supply to the various fans and cooling units are as
follows:

Chilled water circ. pump 1 MC trunk PS sup. Fan S-18A
ER 1 supply fan 1 (S-1A) MC trunk PS sup. Fan S-18B
ER 1 supply fan 2 (S-1B) HPR trunk aft S-22A
Starter cab HVAC AC-7 ER 2 supply fan 1 (S-2A)
SWBD A self contained ER 2 supply fan 2 (S-2B)
cooling unit C-6 Thr. room 2 supply fan S-9
Thr. room 1 supply fan S-8 Starter cab HVAC AC-8
PS trunk sup. Fan S-16 A/B SWBD B self contained
cooling unit C7
DP main Equip. room Em.
cooling

Batt. Exh. Fan SWBD A Batt. Exh. Fan SWBD B
690V SWBD C 690V SWBD D

MC trunk SB sup. Fan S-19A Chilled water circ. pump 2
MC trunk SB sup. Fan S-19B ER 4 supply fan 1 (S-4A)
HPR trunk fwd S-23A ER 4 supply fan 2 (S-4B)
ER 3 supply fan 1 (S-3A) Starter cab HVAC AC-6
ER 3 supply fan 2 (S-3B) SWBD D self contained
Thr. room 3 supply fan S-10 cooling unit C-9
Starter cab HVAC AC-5 Thr. room 4 supply fan S-11
SWBD C self contained
cooling unit C8 230V SWBD D
DP BU Equip. room Em. Batt. Exh. Fan SWBD D
cooling
230V SWBD C
Batt. Exh. Fan SWBD C

12.3 Chilled Water Cooling System
12.3.1 The Chilled Water Cooling system (CHW) is designed after DP class 2
redundancies. There are two HVAC compressors, respectively powered from
SWBD A & D. The same applies for the two ice water circulation pumps.
There is one single chilled water buffer tanks and the piping is common.
However there are isolation valves after the T-offs for each Fan Coil / AC
system to segregate it from the main line, upon a failure or service.
12.3.2 The CHW is obtained by the two HVAC compressors which are fully
automatic with temperature monitoring and start/ stop. There is an option to
put in a third compressor.
12.3.3 Each HVAC compressors has a cooling capacity of 60% of the total needed.
The compressors are of make Carrier. The compressors can work individually
(only one running) or both in parallel.
12.3.4 The compressors are cooled from the aux. FW cooling system 1 as described in
section 9.6.1. The design temperature is 6oC on the supply line and 12oC on the
return line from the Air Handlin Units (AHU) and Fan Coils (FC).
12.3.5 Downstream the compressors there are two circulation pumps of make
Allweiler, each with a capacity of 275m3/h. These pumps (duty/ standby)
circulate the ice-water to the various AHU and FC units. The CHW system is
illustrated in Figure 12-1 below:
To FC-4 DP BU Equip. room & FC-3 Telecom room (F-deck)
To FC-2 DP BU Ctrl room & FC-1MCR (E-deck)
To AC Drillers Cabin
To AC-13 Local Instr. room & AC12 MUD etc
AC 5 FC-9 AC 6 FC-10
AC-3/ 3A AC-4/ 4A SWBD SWBD SWBD SWBD
2 x Drill 2 x Drill C. C. D. D.
SWBD A SWBD A
Exp. tank
CHW Compressor
1&2
AC 9 AC 10 AC 7 FC-11 AC 8 FC-12 5 x FC's

ECR SWBD SWBD SWBD SWBD + 1 x AHU
A. A. B. B.
CHW circ. pump 1 & 2
FC-5 / FC-6
AC 1 AC 1B AC 2 AC 14 AC 15 Main DP Eq. room
Acc. Acc. Galley Em Stair Em Stair
case PS case SB
Figure 12-2: Compressed Air System

12.3.6 From the illustration in Figure 12-3 it can be found that this system does
provide cooling to various important rooms, such as SWBD -, DP Equipment
rooms. For redundancy purpose there are stand alone HVAC units in each
SWBD and DP equipment room in addition to the CHW Fan Coiled cooling
system. Of which will kick in if the room temperature rises above a set
temperature and also if the Fan Coil system fails.
12.3.7 The stand-alone HVAC system for SWBD rooms is cooled respective engine
room FW cooling system. Stand-alone cooling (emergency cooling) for the
main and backup DP equipment rooms are cooled from the aux. FW cooling
system 2. There is also a stand-alone unit for the MCR.
12.4 Pipe Run
12.4.1 The ventilation and air ducts are segregated for respective compartment.
12.4.2 The chilled water system is common, and loss of that system will result in loss/
reduced cooling of important compartments. These are not solely cooled by the
CHW system, but also by supply fans and there are emergency cooling
systems i.e. backup AC units are installed too. A further confirmation of
design and layout has to be confirmed at time of trials.
12.4.3 It should be noted that loss of cooling to a technical room such as instrument
room can result in overheating of electrical components, with worst case result
of systems shutting down. Important rooms should all have temperature sensor
alerting the watch keeper of the status and to take corrective actions if
required.

13 PROPULSION
13.1 Azimuth Thruster
13.1.1 The vessel is furnished with eight azimuth thrusters configured in four pairs;
there is one thruster room for each thruster pair. All thrusters are of the same
type Ulstein Aquamaster UUC 355, delivered by Rolls Royce Marine. Each
thruster has a capacity of 3800kW. The propeller is a 4-bladed propeller with a
diameter of 3500mm.
13.1.2 The UUC type thrusters are designed for underwater mounting allowing the
vessel to change thruster at sea without dry-docking the vessel. The thruster
consists of the bottom part, which is the underwater housing. The top part
which is placed inside the thruster rooms and contains among others its
electrical motor and all hydraulic systems needed.
13.1.3 The thrusters are fitted with following:

Electronic cabinet for communication between different systems i.e.
thruster control panels, DP.
Gravity tank, oil reservoir
Starter cabinet for the hydraulic pumps
Starter cabinet for drive motor
Drive motor for revolution of propeller
Frequency Converter for speed control
Thruster unit including propeller
13.1.4 The thrusters are of variable speed type with fixed pitch. Thrusters are
electrical driven from the SWBD via respective transformers. The powering
configurations for the thrusters are as follow:
Thruster Thruster Powered by
room # DG#
1
1, 2 1, 2
(fwd PS)
2
5, 6 3, 4
(aft SB)
3
3, 4 5, 6
(Aft PS)
4
7, 8 7, 8
(fwd SB)
13.1.5 The frequency converter controls the revolution (rpm) of the electric motor, by
regulating the voltage and the frequency to the electric motor driving the
propeller. Frequency converter adjusts the motor speed from 0 1200 rpm.

13.1.6 The Frequency converter has the following protection functions:

Max/ min speed limit
Max power limit
Max torque limit
Short circuit protection of electric motor
Speed ramp
13.1.7 Within the thruster compartment there is LO/ hydraulic auxiliary systems
needed for the thruster, such as lubrication unit, hydraulic steering unit, gravity
- and expansion tanks among others.
13.1.8 The steering hydraulic power pack consists of a reservoir tank, electric driven
pumps(s), propulsion valve, cooler and filter. The pump discharges oil to the
propulsion valve, which divert the oil to the two hydraulic steering motors.
This system is furnished with a FW water cooler, reference is made to section
9.4.8.
13.1.9 The lubrication unit is for lubrication of the thrusters moving parts. The LO
pump has suction from the thruster housing circulating the oil through a filter
and a cooler and then diverting the oil back to the thrusters for lubrication of it.
13.1.10 The thruster has also a gravity tank for oil seal. This tank is pressurised with
air from the instrument air system, via a reducer valve. This to maintain
positive head pressure, this to prevent water ingress through the seals.
13.1.11 The thruster control is by Siemens thruster control system. At the thruster
console there are eight thruster panels one for each thruster. From here the
operator can individually operate thrusters. The consoles include a lever for
speed and direction setting, feedback indicator and push buttons for start/ stop
and alarm indications.
13.1.12 The load signal (rpm) is hardwired directly to thruster converter
13.1.13 The azimuth controller (RRM supply) computes the thruster position and order
given from the external source (DP, joystick) and the feedback it receives from
the thruster. The order signal is monitored and verified against the alarm limits,
same applies for the feedback. If the signal exceeds the limit an alarm will be
given.
13.1.14 The asynchronous thruster motor, frequency converter, hydraulic oil and the
transformers are all water cooled from respective FW cooling system,
reference is made to section 9.4.8 for further description. The frequency
converter is interfaced to the DG overload system.

13.1.15 To have main propulsion available for DP, the hydraulic power pack must be
running, the drive motor to be running, no thruster or converter alarms and the
thruster must be selected ready for DP.
13.1.16 The E-stop is mounted on the thruster panels in the MCR/ Bridge and onto the
HiPAP OS 1 console in the backup DP room. Each E-stop has a directly relay
inside respective thruster drive for trip of thruster. The E-stop are normally
closed (NC) and has loop monitoring. E-stop can also be done locally from the
drive.
13.1.17 Failure analysis of the propulsion system is listed in section 15.9 in this report.

14 DYNAMIC POSITIONING SYSTEM

14.1 General
14.1.1 The Vessel is fitted with a Kongsberg Maritime KPOS-2 and a KPOS-1 DP
system. These are the dual redundant system KPOS-2 and the single DP
control system placed in the DP BU room. This is in order to comply with
DNV AUTRO (IMO DP Class 3).
14.1.2 DP operator stations and computers, communicates with each other on a dual
Network. The DP controllers which are the brain of the DP system are
communicating with each individual Thruster Control Cabinet (TCC, thruster
vendors control system).
14.1.3 The operator can manually switch the thruster controls between the DP /
Manual, Joystick & Autopilot by use of the 4 position selector switch. By
selecting Joystick position all thruster commands are transferred to the cJoy
and the DPO can control the vessel by use of the Joystick.
14.1.4 In Class 2/3 operations at least three position references must be available,
whereby the system can exclude any unsteady reference data and still keep a
good position with some quality degradation. The Consequence Analysis
warning given by Kongsberg does not take this into account and reacts purely
on low power availability or insufficient thrust (thrusters and generators).
14.1.5 The DP consequence analysis software function will be activated automatically

when mode DP class 2/3 is selected. The consequence analysis function within
the SDP software only runs when the vessel is in present position and on
present heading. E.g. if the vessel is in auto track mode, or on the move
towards a set point in AUTOPOS mode, the analysis will not run. There is no
information about this within the SDP system help functions. The operator has
to be aware of this.
14.1.6 There is an DP alert switch Traffic Light for DP status. The operator can
switch the switch to the decided position to alert, among others the drill floor
of the DP status to take necessary precautions / actions. When to active yellow
and red status should be stated in the Well Specific Operation Guidelines
(WSOG).
14.1.7 The backup DP should be standby at all time and prior to take command from
the DP BU ctrl room; the operator has to switch the fire backup switch (placed
in DP BU ctrl room) to cut all communication with thrusters from the MCR.
The owner to implement procedures and DPOs to be familiarized with them.

14.2 Operator Stations
14.2.1 The KPOS consists of three Operator Stations (DP OS#), both main operator
stations are placed in the MCR and the third is in the DP BU ctrl room. Each
OS consists of the following components:
Operator panel with joystick and pushbuttons
A flat screen monitor
OS computer
14.2.2 The OS has minimum hardware; the computer interfaces the operator with the
operating panel and the display. The sensors, references and thrusters are
selected and deselected using a Windows XP configuration. There are quick
buttons on the console for quick operations and operational mode selection.
Configurations of thrusters and reference systems can be enabled through a
window in the software or from push buttons. A joystick is provided on the OS
for manual control of the thrusters and for semi manual yaw, surge and sway
control. Operator can select joystick control of either or of two movements and
the DP controls the other. The KPOS OS computers are of type HP M7600.
14.2.3 The screen of the console is divided into three areas, one small area on top of
the screen and two main areas below. The size of these areas cannot be
changed. Each of the two main areas can display a separate page of
information, which can be selected by the operator.
14.2.4 The top area displays the following:

Status: shows the status of the reference systems active and their
weighting.
Power: bar graph over available/ consumed power on each bus-bar
Heading: coning view shows gyro heading, rotation
Position: vessel position circle including warning and alarm limits
Force: vessels thrust vector, and vector for wind and current
14.2.5 Alarms are displayed when the Alarm view button on the keypad is pushed.
All the alarms are presented on an overlapping window on the screen of the
console where the button is pushed. When an operator has to input information
this is also done using overlapping windows, which always show up at the
same location on the screen. The cursor is positioned directly on the input
window. The pointer can be moved using a trackball and selections are made
using three buttons in front of the trackball.
14.2.6 Colours can be selected from different palettes, (e.g. Daylight, Dusk and
Night). The 'Night' palette has different colours to split information and
commands. All the push buttons on the keypad are black with white text.
Double push buttons are visualized by a white line below the text on the
button. In case a button is pushed an indicator light will lit up.

14.3 DP Computers and Network
14.3.1 Below is a general illustration of how the DP interfaces are:
Figure 14-1: Example DP Interface and network DPC-2 system(courtesy KM)
14.3.2 Connections to the position-reference systems, sensors, thrusters and power

plant are made via conventional signal cables and serial lines.
14.3.3 The controller unit, operator stations and the thruster controllers communicates
via a dual Ethernet network called Net A & B.
14.3.4 There are two independent but linked microprocessors (RCU501) controllers.
The controllers are labelled respectively PS01 and PS11. The controllers which
monitor input data received from a range of sensors using a master/slave
relationship and generate the signals to the thrusters required for position and
heading control. Computers and all interface boards are all located in the DPC-
2 cabinet.

14.3.5 The function of the 230VAC/24VDC Power Supply Units (PSU) within the
DP cabinet is to generate a stable reference voltage for the potentiometers used
for the feedback signals. The controllers and I/O modules are dual supplied
with power from both DP UPSs configuration internally in the cabinet; this
applies for DPC-2 cabinet. Loss of a power supply will result in an alarm in the
DP system, and the LED for the faulty fuse will lit. The DPC-1 cabinet has a
single power supply.
14.3.6 The two controllers (PS1 & PS11) in the DPC-2 operates in parallel each
receiving inputs from sensors, reference systems, thrusters and operator and
each performing the necessary calculations. However, only the on-line
computer (master) controls the thrusters. Switchover between the computers
(master/slave) may be either automatic or manual. It is automatic if failure is
detected in the on-line computer. The controller in DPC-1 is also running in
parallel with the other two. Continuous comparison tests are performed to
check that the three computers read the same inputs and give the same outputs.
If a difference occurs, warnings and alarms are reported from each computer.

14.4 DP Control Modes and Functions
Figure 14-3 Forces and motions courtesy: Kongsberg Maritime
14.4.1 The standard DP control modes are implemented which are standby, manual
(joystick) and auto position. Mixed modes between manual and auto are
automatic control of yaw, surge and sway either separately or combined. When
all three are selected an automatic switch to AUTOPOS mode is made.
Furthermore different control modes can be implemented such as ROV (follow
sub), Auto-track, and Autopilot.
14.4.2 The wind, gyro or VRS sensors used by the DP Control System cannot be
directly selected from the keypad. Instead, a dialogue box on the screen is used
where the preferred sensor has to be selected. Note! If a gyro falls out it has to
be manually enabled/reselected in the dialogue box. This is not the case for the
other sensors.
14.4.3 A standard median test is implemented which will detect a seemingly perfect
position measurement, e.g. dragging transponder or frozen DGPS signal. A
parameter is that at least three position reference systems have to be selected
and accepted by the DP computer. Also a high variance test is used to deselect
those position reference systems which show a high variance pattern over a
prolonged time period. It is required that sufficient position reference systems
are selected and accepted by the DP Control System.
14.4.4 The DP mathematical model is using various historical input data to predict
values/position and compare with actual readings. The computer calculates the
required force and thrusters to be used in order to keep required set-points. To
achieve a good mathematical model the vessel has to be in position for some
time in order to build up the model.
14.4.5 There is a DP alert switch connected to the DP system, traffic light. This
system is to alert among others the Driller and Dive/ ROV operators about the
DP status. In addition to be directly connected up to the DP system it is also
connected to the Vessel Management System (VMS) cabinet.

14.4.6 Integrated into the KPOS 2 system is a Riser Management System (RMS).
This system has its own operator station in the MCR. Data about the riser
angle is received from an inclinometer, with the junction box placed in the
Moonpool area. There is also communication from the Drilling control system
into the RMS module.
14.5 Vessel Sensors
14.5.1 The vessel is fitted with following vessel sensors:

Three VRSs
Three Gyros
Three Wind sensors
Draught sensor
Riser angle monitor
14.5.2 VRS
The vessel is fitted with three VRSs, all of type MRU-5 delivered by
Kongsberg Maritime. The MRU system uses solid state device to measure the
roll and pitch and heave rate. The MRUs should be placed out of harms way
to avoid damage. The MRU signals are interfaced as follows:
MRU5-1: DPC-1, and via a splitter box to DPC-2, HiPAP 1

MRU5-2: DPC-2, HiPAP 2
MRU2-3: DPC-2
14.5.3 Gyro Compass

The vessel is equipped with three Gyros all of same make NAVIGAT X Mk1.
Two gyros are located in the main DP equip. room and the third (gyro 1) is
placed in the DP BU equip. room.
The Gyros are interfaced as follows:
Gyro 1: DPC-1, DPC-2, HiPAP 1, DGPS 2 (DPS 200)

Gyro 2: DPC-2, DGPS 1 (DPS 132)
Gyro 3: DPC-2, HiPAP 2, cC-1 (cJoy Joystick) DGPS 2 (DPS 200)
The gyros have Lat and Long signals from the DGPSs as follows.
Gyro 1: DGPS 2 (DPS 200)

14.5.4 Wind Sensor

All three wind sensors are of the same type Gill and the wind display is of
make Obsermet type OMC 139. The locations are top of derrick and on
forward mast.
The wind data from the Wind sensors are sent to the following systems:
Wind 1: DPC-1 and via serial splitter to DPC-2 and cC-1 (cJoy Joystick)
Wind 2: DPC-2
Wind 3: DPC-2
14.5.5 Draught sensor

As the vessel characteristic is variable with the vessels draught, this sensor
measures the vessel draught and is used to correct the DP system for this.
14.5.6 Riser Angle Sensor

The riser angle sensor data is to visually display the position of the riser
corresponding to the vessels position. This sensor should not be used as a
reference system but only as guidance for riser position.

14.6 Position Reference Systems
14.6.1 The vessel is fitted with following positioning reference systems:

Two DGPSs
Two HiPAPs
Two Tautwires (Interface only)
14.6.2 DGPS
Figure 12-4Example on DGPS configuration Courtesy: Kongsberg Maritime
There are two Differential Global Positioning Systems (DGPS) on board, one
is of make Seatex DPS 132 and the other is of make Seatex DPS 200. The DPS
132 is a combined dual frequency (L1/L2) GPS receiver and the DPS 200 is a
combined 24-channel GPS and GLONAS receiver which improves the satellite
coverage. The DPO should make sure that the DPS 200 is set up to receive
GLONAS also. The DPS 132 is placed on the Bridge/MCR and the DPS 200 is
placed in the DP BU ctrl room. A slave monitor for the DPS 200 with a
keyboard should be placed in vicinity of the main DP desk allowing the DPO
to monitor the DGPS status at all time.
Differential correction signals to the DGPSs are IALA, InMarsat and

Spotbeam. Each DGPS has a separate antenna for IALA, and the differential
correction signal IALA is received from the free net of stations. The
differential correction signals Spotbeam and InMarsat are sent to both DGPSs
via respective serial splitter box. The antennas and cabling should be routed
separately from the mast down.
The most common failure of the DGPS is loss of differential signal because the
satellite link is susceptible to shielding and the quality and stability of receiving
from the official net.

14.6.3 HiPAP 500
Figure 12-4 Courtesy: Kongsberg Simrad

The vessel is furnished with two HiPAP 501 units. One HiPAP unit is placed in
outer sphere of the rig at position 0 degree and the other is placed aft at
position 180 degree. Both HiPAPs are set up for SSBL and LBL. Information
of each deployed transponder which is activated is sent to the DP system to be
processed.
The HiPAP 1 OS is placed in DP BU ctrl. room and the HiPAP 2 OS is placed

next to the main DP desk in MCR. The system is configured for master/ slave
principle whereat both HiPAP OSs can be used to access both transceivers for
configuration.
The HiPAP501 hydro acoustic system is considered to be much more accurate

than previous acoustic systems like HPR. The advantage of the HiPAP 501 is
that there is no mechanical transducer steering but the same tracking area is
covered as for a HPR tracking head. The HiPAP 501 is fitted with a semi
spherical transducer with over 230 elements and electronic controls that
enables narrow beam transmission and focused reception in the direction of the
transponder, thus reducing the noise that would otherwise be received from
other areas of the sphere.
The system calculates a three dimensional subsea position of a transponder

relative to the vessel mounted transducer unit. The directional stability of the
unit is obtained firstly fixing the transponder location by a wide beam and
subsequently by aiming a narrow reception beam towards the transponder. The
system uses a digital beam form, which takes its input from all the transducer
elements.

The system controls the beam dynamically so it is always pointing towards the
target, roll, pitch and yaw is input to the tracking algorithm to direct the beam
in the correct direction thus enabling the correction for these motions to be
effectively applied continuously.
The system calculates a variance for its measurements; determine the known
system accuracy and standard deviation. The HiPAP has a built-in Kalman
filter, which improves the stability and accuracy of the initial narrow beam
guidance but does not interfere with raw fixed data being sent to the DP control
computers.
As the HIPAP is dependent on correct heading and vessel motion data, loss of
either will cause HiPAP to be rejected from the DP. The configurations of
sensors are as follows:
HiPAP 1: Gyro 1, MRU5-1, DGPS 2

HiPAP 2: Gyro 3, MRU5-2, DGPS 1
Any hydro acoustic system is susceptible to disturbances in the water caused

by thrusters. The nearest thruster which could have effect on the transducer
is the main propulsion.
The hoist can be operated from either the bridge panel or locally, when
deployed there is no longer use of it.

14.7 DP Control System Power Supply
14.7.1 The vessel is equipped with three UPS systems for the DP system and its
reference systems. The power supply to the UPSs are configured as follows:
KM UPS 1 (KPOS-2) 230V MSB B
KM UPS 2 (KPOS-2) 230V MSB C
KM UPS 3 (KPOS-1, BU ) 230V MSB D
14.7.2 Each UPS provides 230V AC to the DPC, references and peripherals. The UPS
-distribution is as shown in below:
KM UPS 1 KM UPS 2 KM UPS 3 (BU)

DPC2-PU1 DPC2-PU2 DPC-1
KPOS OS 1 KPOS OS 2 KPOS OS 3
Alarm printer 1 Net Printer Alarm Printer 2
DGPS 1 (DPS 132) History station DGPS 2 (DPS 200)
Gyro 2 HiPAP OS-2 HiPAP OS-1
Wind 2 HiPAP transceiver 2 HiPAP transceiver 1
RMS OS Gyro 3 Gyro 1
Wind 3 Wind 1
In addition, some DP important consumers have power supplies as follows:
VRS 1: From DPC 1

VRS 2: From DPC 2
VRS 3: From DPC-2
Serial Splitter Wind: From DPC 1
Serial Splitter MRU 1: From DPC 1
Serial Splitter DGPS 1: From DPC 2
Serial Splitter DGPS 2: From DPC 1

Client: Sevan Marine Ltd Date: 02.10.2008 Page: 76 of 87
15 FAILURE ANALYSIS
15.1 Configuration and assumptions
15.1.1 This failure analyses show effects while operating in DP Class 3 in a 2-two split configuration, if no other is listed and
following switchboard configuration:
Minimum one DG is running in each engine room
All others are standby
11kV bustie breakers between SWBD B and C are open, the rest are closed
690V/ 230V Bustie breakers are all open
All Thrusters are running
All auxiliary systems are either running or in remote standby
All monitoring, automation working as designed
15.1.2 For power distribution configuration, reference is made to section 6 in this report.
15.1.3 The failure analysis shows effects while operating in DP Class 3 with the auxiliary system set-up as follows:
FO supply to DGs from respective service/day tanks
Valves on FO line between engine rooms are closed
SW system segregated and respective SW pump running, standby pump available.
FW system DGs both coolers are available
FW system Thrusters coolers, pumps etc available and running
LO system all systems available and all segregation valves where applicable are closed
Compressed air system all systems available
15.1.4 All position reference systems and all vessel sensors are assumed to be available during DP Class 3 operations. The
consequence analysis function in the DP system is running.
15.1.5 The wording Loss of DP class 3 means that the vessel, no longer fulfils the requirements in according to IMO guidelines after
a single failure has occurred.
15.1.6 The failure analysis is based on the available documentation listed in section 16 in this report.

15.2 Failure Analysis Power Generation
Function/ Description of failure Effect of failure

comp. Failure mode Failure mech./cause Detection On component in subsystem Effect on DP Comments
of failure operation/position keeping
ME # Mech. failure Fatigue, overload, Alarms, Stop of that particular ME. Reduced power ability
failure on pistons, noise PMS will start standby DG, and
valve, valve gear, temporarily reduce load on
crankshaft, bearing, remaining DG powering the
turbocharger , thrusters
governor failure
Generator / Mech. failure Fatigue, bearing, Alarm, Loss of that particular DG Reduced power ability If an AVR / overspeed
Alternator # Shaft, windings noise PMS will start standby DG, and failure causes reverse trip
Etc. temporarily reduce load on of the other DG in
remaining DG powering the parallel then vessel will
thrusters have a partial blackout.
Electrical failure AVR protection fault, Alarm Can cause instability in voltage, 2-Split PMS blackout recovery
fault on excitation frequency. start of DG# and
Reduced thruster capacity eventually all thrusters
Unstable load/frequency will only Loss of 2 SWBD and 4 can be started and
affect that common SWBD. thrusters. connected to DP again.
Bustie breakers to open to segregate Vessel will hold position
the faulty side with the healthy. with 2 SWBDs and 4
thrusters
Loss of DP class 3
4-Split
Reduced thruster capacity
Loss of 1 SWBD and 2
thrusters.
Vessel will hold position
with 3 SWBDs and 6
thrusters


Circuit Trip of circuit PMS trip Alarm Loss of that particular DG Reduced power ability
breaker breaker Protection trip PMS will start standby DG, and
temporarily reduce load on
remaining DG powering the
thrusters
ME control/ Loss of a power Fuse failure Alarm No affect on running engine None Assume dual supply
governor supply Breaker failure System runs on redundant supply
Control cabinet Short circuit Alarm Stop of that particular DG. Reduced power ability
failure Internal failure PMS will start standby DG, and
Signal failure to Internal error temporarily reduce load on Reduced power ability
governor remaining DG powering the
thrusters
Internal failure Leakage of hydraulic Alarm A failure causing one DG to start Reduced thruster capacity
oil, hunting, oscillating of Hz, V. Bustie Loss of 1 SWBD and 2
breaker to open segregating the two thrusters.
SWBDs.
Vessel will hold position
PMS can start standby DG, but it with 3 SWBDs and 6
will not connect to SWBD thrusters
ME rpm Fail of rpm pick- Mech. failure, sensor Alarm Loss of one out of two None ME has two pickups. To
pick-ups up fault restore a pickup failure
the engine has to be
stopped.

15.3 Failure Analysis Power Distribution

comp. Failure mode Failure mech./cause Detection of On component in subsystem Effect on DP Comments
failure operation/position keeping
11kV SWBD #
11kV Incoming power Trip of DG# breaker Alarm Upon trip of a DG, power is None or 4-split = partial
SWBD # supply Trip of Bustie breaker maintained through the bustie Loss of DP class 2/3 blackout
breaker until PMS starts standby Reduced thruster capacity
DG.
Power maintained from DG
connected or else partial blackout.
Loss of power to respective LV
SWBDs
Powerless Short circuit Alarm Partial blackout, loss of 2 thrusters Loss of DP class 2/3
SWBD Reduced thruster capacity
690V SWBD #
690V Transformer Trip of transformer Alarm Loss of a 690V SWBD and Loss of DP class 2/3 4-split = partial
SWBD # failure breaker respective consumers Reduced thruster capacity blackout
Transformer failure Operator can close LV
bustie breakers for that
If no immediate effect from loss of
None SWBD group
aux. systems
Powerless Short circuit Alarm Loss of a 690V SWBD and Loss of DP class 2/3
SWBD respective consumers Reduced thruster capacity
Loss of power feed to UPS panel
A/B/C/D, which will run on battery


230V SWBD #
230V Transformer Trip of transformer Alarm Loss of a 230V SWBD and None Operator can close LV
SWBD # failure breaker respective consumers bustie breakers for that
Transformer failure Systems run on redundant supply SWBD group
Powerless Short circuit Alarm Loss of a 230V SWBD and Eventually loss of DP Class Eventually UPSs will
SWBD respective consumers 3 run out.
UPS Distr. Panel

UPS # Loss of a charger Charger fault Alarm Loss of that particular charger, None Battery endurance
rectifier Breaker fault consumers runs automatically on minimum 30 minutes
Short circuit battery supply.
Battery failure Battery failure None None. None Good maintenance

routines will detect
Remains on main supply. this.
Loss of UPS # Short circuit. Alarm Loss of consumers fed from that Reduced power capacity 4-split loss of two
particular UPS thrusters and that
This will affect DGs within that SWBD
ER

15.4 Failure Analysis Power and Propulsion Control Systems

Main Engines
Control System
ME Control Loss of either Fuse failure Alarm None, engine runs on redundant None
Cabinet/ power Wire break supply
panel
Loss of control Internal failure Alarm Trip of DG
unit Short circuit Reduced power availability
Woodward Not working Power failure Alarm Trip of affected DG on DP.
723+ PMS starts standby DG PMS does load reduction
AVR Over / under Internal failure Alarm Trip of Generator breaker Reduced thrust
excitation PMS starts standby DG
Shut down Any failure Overspeed Alarm Stop of affected DG Reduced power availability
function of a Causing the Bearings temp PMS starts standby DG on DP.
DG following Governor If the Overspeed is not quick PMS does load reduction
LO pressure enough this can result in
Em stop active unsymmetrical load and bus-tie Reduced thrust
Generator prot. breaker (2-split) should open to
High-high HTFW avoid the other generator to trip on Partial blackout.
temp reverse power before the affected
generator trips.
Pre-warning Any failure Mech. failure Alarm PMS starts standby DG, when on Reduced power availability
function of a Electrical failure board, Faulty DG unloads and on DP.
DG trip of breaker.


IAS/ Integrated Alarm & Monitoring System &
PMS / Power Management System
IAS OS Not functioning Electrical failure Alarm No control / monitoring from that None
Hardware failure IAS OS
Software failure
IAS Server Stopped, not Electrical failure Alarm One server down, communication None
working Hardware failure to OS stations on redundant server.
Software failure
Network Comm. failure Wire break Alarm Lost comm. to one of the HUBs None
system to HUB
Comm. failure Wire break Alarm Lost comm. on one network, all None
HUB to Servers com on redundant network
Comm. failure Wire break Alarm Lost comm. on one network, all None
Servers to HMI com on redundant network
HUB IAS HUB failure Power failure Alarm Lost comm. on one network, all None Loss of HUB interface
com on redundant network between systems and
Servers
VMS DP M Stopped, not Electrical failure Alarm Loss of all monitoring and None Vessel Management
ECR working Hardware failure operation interface to valves, System
Software failure pumps etc.
VMS remote Stopped, not Electrical failure Alarm Loss of monitoring and operation of None
I/O cabinets working Hardware failure particular system connected to that
Software failure I/O
PMS Stopped, not Electrical failure Alarm Loss of PMS control for that engine None With a faulty PMS
Controller working Hardware failure room DG set. controller there can be
Software failure no standby start of DG
DG runs in Droop and can be in same compartment
manually controlled
2 split: fail of master PMS None
controller the standby controller
will take over for related DGs


ESD and
F&G
I/O cabinets Internal failure Network failure Alarm Failure of functions administered None There is one module
PLC failure by the process station. for ESD and one for
Module failure F&G inside each
cabinet
Failure of computer in Alarm Loss of redundancy in process None
process station station. ESD and F&G functions
will still be available, as control
will automatically switch to healthy
computer in the process station
Power supply Fuse failure Alarm Automatic change over to other None
UPS failure power supply
Network Comm. failure Wire break Alarm Communication on redundant None
network is still intact
ESD Panel Activation Inadvertent act of Alarm Activation of shutdown according Loss of DP Class 2/3 All panels shall be
operation human error to group activated protected i.e. at least
double action should be
made prior to activate
ESD or F&G
Gas / Fire Comm. failure Wire break Alarm As the inputs to the system should
Sensor Sensor failure be fault monitored an alarm should
be generated on the IAS.
Operator Not working Power failure Visual Not possible to monitor, from that None
stations Monitor failure operator stations
Thrusters
Control system


Thruster IAS Loss of one Breaker / UPS failure Alarm Continues to run on redundant None Dual power from UPS
controller power supply Inverter failure supply B & UPS D
CPU failure Short circuit Alarm System is not working loss of None
Internal fault thruster indication fwd steering
console
Thrusters works in DP
Fwd MCR Loss of one Breaker / UPS failure Alarm Continues to run on redundant None
thruster power supply Inverter failure supply
console
Not working as Internal short circuit Alarm Manual levers cannot be operated None Dual incoming power
intend Fire No affect when on DP control supply but common
24V distribution
Comm. failure Profibus comm. Alarm Loss of possibility for manual None Operator can observe
failure operation of affected thruster, this by loss of visual
emergency operation is intact. No data for that thruster
affect when on DP control
Analog comm. Wire break Alarm Loss of lever control. No affect as None
failure thrusters are controlled by DP, else
loss of command/ feedback signals
to thruster
Start/ stop Wire break Alarm Not possible to start None
Digital input A running thruster will not stop
module
Mode selector Wire break Alarm No affect but worst case not None
Digital input Short circuit possible to change mode
module
Thruster Loss of one Breaker failure Alarm None. None

Controller power supply short circuit Continues on the other supply


(Siemens) & Loss of Thruster Internal short circuit Alarm Thruster # stop Reduced thruster capacity
RRM controller Fuse failure
Thruster PLC failure
controller
Comm. Azimuth Wire break Alarm Azimuth to zero Reduced thruster capacity
between DP command signal rpm to idle
and TCC failure
Azimuth Wire break Alarm Thruster works as normal None
feedback signal
failure
Rpm command Wire break Alarm Rpm to idle Reduced thruster capacity
signal failure Azimuth works as normal
Rpm feedback Wire break Alarm Thruster works as normal None
signal failure
Comm. Azimuth Wire break Alarm Azimuth to zero Reduced thruster capacity
between TCC command signal rpm to idle
and thruster/ failure
frequency Azimuth Wire break Alarm Thruster not ready, out of DP ctrl Reduced thruster capacity
converter feedback signal
failure
Rpm command Wire break Alarm rpm to idle azimuth works as Reduced thruster capacity
signal failure normal
Rpm feedback Wire break Alarm Thruster works as normal None

signal failure
All Earth fault Earth fault Alarm An earth fault will only give an None .
component alarm, no shut down of system or
thrusters to take place
Independent
Joystick


cJoy Not functioning Power failure Visual No control of vessel by use of None This Joystick is not
Signal failure Joystick routed directly to each
Software failure thruster control but is
Hardware failure connected to each
J/B failure thruster plc in the main
cC-1 Not functioning Internal failure Alarm Depends on cause of failure console. A plc failure
Computer Power failure will cause no function
Cabinet Sensor failure All from loss of joystick control to of joystick.
Signal failure loss of a thruster.
Thruster PLC failure Internal failure Alarm Thruster no communicating with
PLC within Power failure Independent joystick
MCR
Console

15.5 Failure Analysis Fuel Oil Systems

FO supply/
return system
FO service Level alarm high Dirt, out of calibration High level Continuous filling of service tank. None Risk of overflow
tank alarm
Low level alarm Dirt, out of calibration None. Can Can empty one service tank. None Continuous purification
failure monitor of FO from tk. 1 to tk.
locally 2.
Running service tk. 1
empty will also be
alerted by FO separator
alarm.
FO transfer Mech. failure Fatigue, bearing, Alarm Stop of running pump, there are None
pumps causing loss of coupling, damage of two pumps simultaneously failure
pump motor, of both is highly unlikely.
Electrical failure Fuse failure, busbar Alarm

causing loss of failure, protection trip,
pump short circuit.
Start/stop control Not working Alarm No start/ stop of pumps None Operator can manually
of pumps start/ stop FO transfer
pumps.
Remote Valve not Pneumatic, Alarm Operator will receive an alarm in None Operator to manually
operated FO working Electrical IAS if the valve has not reached its operate the valve
valves Mechanical end position within a set time.


FO separator Not working Electrical failure Alarm Purifier not working. As the service None If separator can not be
Mechanical failure tank 2 has a capacity of 45 m3 it fixed, there is a
should be enough time to solve the possibility to use the
problem. separator in the
neighbor compartment
Internal failure Mech. or dirt Alarm Water, dirt into tanks and Worst case loss of 2 engines Should be discovered
consequently damage/stop engines. Reduced power availability by personnel before
Will only affect both engines in worst case causing stop
same compartment. of engines.
FO system Contamination Water, particles and Fuel oil Storage tanks PS are for engine Can reduce thruster capacity If proper procedures
microbiological samples room 1 & 2 and SB for engine room and position depending of on are not in place to
3 & 4. Contamination should be how many engines effected. detect water, particles
restricted to one storage tank. If not and microbiological
filtered by purifier this can affect growth, this is the
respective engines. worst case scenario.
Warning signs
should be apparent
giving crew sufficient
time for corrective
actions.
Quick Failure of QCV Pneumatic failure Loss of air pressure will not close None
Closing valves.
Valves Inadvertent Closing a QCV Alarm Stop of 2 engines Worst case loss of 2 engines The QCVs should be
operation Reduced power availability placed inside a locked
cabinet to prevent
inadvertent operation


FO system DGs
FO system Internal failure in Clogging, leakage Alarm Stop of affected DG. Reduced power availability
DG FO system main wrong adjustments, PMS will start standby DG
engine fatigue
FO Engine Pump failure Fatigue, bearing, Alarm Stop of affected DG. Reduced power availability
driven coupling, damage of PMS will start standby DG
booster pump impeller.
FO filter Unit High diff. Clogged filter Alarm Clogged filter reduced FO flow to a None, Operator can change
(coarse) pressure DG set. or reduced power capacity over to other filter and
Assume enough time to take change out the clogged
corrective actions. If not 2 DG will filter.
stop on same SWBD side. Assume enough time
from alarm given
allowing the operator
to change over filter.
Periodic maintenance
should prevent this.
Lack of routines can
result in loss of ME
due to FO starvation.


FO filters on High diff. Clogged filter Alarm Clogged filter causing reduced FO None, Operator can change
DG pressure flow to injectors. or reduced power capacity over to other filter and
Assume enough time to take change out the clogged
corrective actions. If not 1 DG will filter.
stop. Assume enough time
from alarm given
allowing the operator
to change over filter.
Periodic maintenance
should prevent this.
Lack of routines can
result in loss of ME
due to FO starvation.
FO piping Loss of FO to Rupture of FO piping, Alarm Loss of FO supplies to two DGs, Reduced power availability
DG DGs flexible connections hence loss of two DGs.

15.6 Failure Analysis Cooling Water Systems

comp. Failure mode Failure Detection of On component in subsystem Effect on DP Comments
mech./cause failure operation/position keeping
SW Cooling
System
Sea chest and Filter failure Clogged, dirt Alarm Loss of suction for SW cooling to Reduced power and thruster As there is only one sea
filter/strainer 2DGs and respectively 2 thrusters capacity chest operator has to
isolate the strainer prior
to cleaning, hence no
suction / cooling for
affected systems until
jobs done.
SW system Reduced capacity Marine growth Inspections Can cause reduced capacity and None, as long as proper Chemical treatment of
inside pipes Planned blockage of SW system. action taken water and procedures
maintenance for no weed/ ice
blowing when on DP.
Aeration due to Alarm Aeration pumps sucking air, If blowing is needed to
Chest cleaning reduced cooling be done, DPOs to be
informed + SJA.
SW manifold Aeration Air taken in from Alarm All SW pumps can/ will lose None, as long as proper
sea chest(s) suction for those particular systems action taken
Loss of cooling to DGs and
thrusters related to that particular
thruster room
SW overboard Closing Manual valve If closed lack of cooling to affected None
inlet valve system, these valves are manually
operated,


SW/FW coolers Reduced cooling Clogging Alarm Loss of cooling for effected side, None, as long as proper Operator to open for
capacity Reduced slow increase of temperature for action taken back flush of cooler for
circulation of SW affected system. cleaning.
Failure of cooler Leakage external/ Alarm External leakage will cause water None Periodical maintenance
internal, spill in that compartment. will prevent / reduce
rupture the risk of this type of
Internal leakage can cause draining failure.
of FW into the SW system if that Assume that right
system pressure is higher or the material quality is used
other way around. and insulation between
material types will
reduce this risk.
There are two coolers
in parallel for ER. Plan
is to do the same for
thrusters too.
SW cooling Mechanical Fatigue, bearing, Alarm Stop of running pump start of None
pump failure coupling, damage standby pump.
of motor or
impeller
Electrical failure Fuse failure,
Busbar failure,
Protection trip,
Short circuit.
Main FW Cooling
System
El. driven FW Mechanical Fatigue, bearing, Alarm Stop of running pump, lack of None Chilled water system
cooling pumps failure coupling, damage circulation of coolant through will still be active and
of motor or SWBD cooler and instr. air provide cooling
impeller compressor


Busbar failure, Cooling to important room by the
Protection trip, Fan Coil system
Short circuit.
FO Cooler Lack of cooling Clogged cooler Alarm Increased inlet FO temperature to None Operator to take
Lack of coolant affected DG corrective actions
DG should be stopped and start of a
standby DG by operator
LO Cooler Lack of cooling Clogged cooler Alarm Increased LO temperature to None Operator to take
Lack of coolant affected DG. corrective actions
DG should be stopped and start of a
standby DG by operator
Alternator Lack of cooling Clogged cooler Alarm Overheating of alternator increased None Operator to take
cooler Lack of coolant winding temperature. DG should be corrective actions
stopped and start of a standby DG
by operator
FW exp. tanks Loss of water Leakage in system, Alarm Refill of water until problem found. None, as long as proper Separate expansion
rupture action taken. tanks for each side.
If big leakage loss of affected side Reduced thruster capacity
Loss of DP Class 2/ 3 Operator to take
Loss of a pair of DGs corrective actions
DG internal Loss of DG Internal failure, Alarm Loss of affected DG Reduced power ability
cooling circuits cooling circuit leakage, clogging,
dirt, pump failure PMS starts standby DG.
Direct-driven Mech. failure Fatigue, Alarm, noise Loss of FW circulation to affected Reduced power ability
LTFW pump pinion/gear failure DG
DG PMS starts standby DG.
Direct-driven Mech. failure Fatigue, Alarm, noise Loss of FW circulation to affected Reduced power ability


HTFW pump pinion/gear failure DG
DG PMS starts standby DG.
TCVs MEs TCV lack of Mechanical failure, Alarm TCV fails to full cooling or as set None Operator to take
control function out of calibration, depending on failure mode. necessary actions to
Loss of air pressure correct failure.
It shall not fail to closed position
Manual operation of
the TCV possible.
Loss of power fails

TCV to full cooling
and will seriously
under cool engine.
Thrusters
FW cooling System
El. driven FW Mechanical Fatigue, bearing, Alarm Stop of running pump, auto start of None
cooling pump failure coupling, damage standby pump
of motor or
impeller


Busbar failure,
Protection trip,
Short circuit.
Thruster motor
Cooler
Hydraulic Oil Not for all that the
cooler thruster will stop
LO cooler Lack of cooling Clogged cooler Alarm Stop of thruster due to overheat Reduced thruster capacity immediately, but it will
Lack of coolant eventually if no action
Thruster is taken due to the
Converter increased temperature.
Transformer

15.7 Failure Analysis Lubrication Oil Systems

LO system
DGs
LO direct Failure of pump Fatigue, pinion/gear Alarm Stop of DG auto start of priming Reduced power capacity The LO system for
driven pump failure pump. each engine is
PMS starts standby DG independent
Priming Mech. failure or Fatigue, bearing, Alarm None if DG is running None Good practice is to
pump El. failure coupling, damage of No start of DG if standby, DG will have the pump
motor, short circuit, be start blocked. available at all time
power supply Engineer can also
utilize the pneumatic
LO priming pump prior
to start
LO cooler Leakage Rupture Alarm Due to higher pressure in LO Reduced power capacity
system, LO will get in the FW
system.
Loss of pressure depending on size
of leak. Stop of affected engine.
PMS starts standby DG
TCV TCV valves not Mech. failure, out of Alarm TCV fails as set None TCV of element type
working properly calibration
LO filters Failure of filter Clogging, dirt Alarm Should not affect running of DG. None Regular maintenance
If not corrected stop of affected should avoid this
DG.
LO sump Leakage Rupture or leak in Alarm Low level alarm before low-low None, or
system. pressure and stop of affected DG Stop of DG, hence reduced
power capacity


Thruster servo/
LO systems are analyzed in 13.9

15.8 Failure Analysis Compressed Air System

Staring air
system
Starting air Mech. or electrical Valve failure, fatigue, Alarm Loss of one starting air compressor. None Operator to take
compressor failure bearing failure, loss of Got air in receivers necessary actions to
power supply, correct failure.
protection trip
Starting air Leakage Rupture or leaking Alarm Low pressure alarm causing auto None Operator to take
receivers/ valves start-up of compressor. necessary actions to
valves correct failure.
Can isolate one receiver.
Loss of starting air has no effect on
running machinery.
Starting air No air pressure or Start disk failure Alarm No start of DG None Assumed engines are
to Engines to low Distributor failure running.
If not no start, PMS
will start next DG in
sequence
Pressure Mech. failure Spring failure, Alarm None, safety valves in system will None
reduction diaphragm damage open
valves
Oil mist Loss of Leakage Alarm Loss of air will only give an alarm None Oil mist will only give
detector compressed air Loss of air on the line an alarm upon loss of
air
Instrument/


Control air system

Instrument Mech. or electrical Valve failure, fatigue, Alarm Loss of instrument air compressor None
air failure bearing failure, loss of Automatically supply from the
compressor power supply, starting air system through the
protection trip reduction panel.
Air drier(s) Failure of drier Mech. internal Alarm Loss of affected drier, there are two None
function error, driers in parallel + one drier on
clogged filter outlet from compressor.
El. failure
Can also bypass dryer via valve
Reduction Failure of Failure of reduction Alarm No affect normally the instrument None
panel reduction panel valve air receiver supplies compressed
air, if panel is active there are two
reduction valves the operator can
use to maintain air supply
Instrument Leakage, loss of Rupture or leaking of Alarm Loss of instrument air to two DGs. None. Operator can isolate the
air receiver control air equipment or valves Will only affect one engine room. outlet from the working
to DGs in system Loss of air to emergency LO prime receiver.
pump, TCV charge air cooler will
open to full cooling and no air for
safety shut down of engines
Gravity Loss of air Leakage Alarm Function is to ensure enough None Operator to take
tanks pressure in gravity tanks. necessary actions to
correct failure.
Too low header pressure can result
in SW ingress into thruster housing,
etc.

15.9 Failure Analysis Ventilation

Supply fans/
Ventilation
Engine room Fan not working Mech. failure Alarm Loss of one out of two fans. None
fan Electrical failure
Both fans not Control failure Alarm With both supply fans down the None Assume operator take
working Electrical failure engine(s) running will suck out the necessary action.
air and eventually cause a vacuum If Vacuum occurs this
and/or stop can cause dangerous
situation. This scenario
will be only valid for
one engine room.
Gas detection High level of gas in Alarm Engines in that engine room shuts 2-split Reduced thruster
intake down. Reduced power capacity capacity if this causes a
partial blackout.
4-split Operator can close
Reduced power/ thruster bustie breaker to allow
capacity- two thrusters use of thrusters.
inoperative
Thruster Fan not working Mech. failure Alarm Loss of supply air to affected None
room Electrical failure thruster room.
Thrusters are also FW cooled. No
immediate effect
Fire Dampers Closing Loss of air pressure Alarm Closing of fire damper(s), hence None immediate affect
Activated by alarm auto stop of influenced fans
Fans/ cooling Not working SWBD failure Alarm Upon a SWBD failure fans and None or loss of DP class 3
units cooling units will be lost among
others.
Chilled Water
Cooling System


Cooling Reduced or lack of FW circ. failure Alarm Lack of cooling to a CHW None
circuit to cooling compressor
compressor The other compressor is intact and
starts
Compressor Not working Internal failure Alarm Loss of one compressor None
failure Electrical failure The other compressor is intact and
starts
Circulation Mechanical failure Fatigue, bearing, Alarm Loss of running pump auto start of None
pumps of pump coupling, damage of standby pump
motor, overload
Electrical failure Motor failure
Power failure
Control failure
Fan Coil unit Not working Internal failure Alarm Loss of affected cooling unit. None
Power failure Important rooms have independent
self contained AC units that starts
automatically
Leakage Damage Alarm Each Fan Coil has isolation valves Operator can close
Corrosion from the ring line. isolation valves to stop
Fatigue further leakage
Ring line Leakage Damage Alarm Loss of cooling units. None
failure Corrosion Important rooms have independent
Fatigue self contained AC units that starts
automatically

15.10 Failure Analysis Propulsion

Note that the failure analysis for the control and monitoring system for the propulsion system is found in section 15.4 in this report.

General
E-Stop Open loop Fire Alarm Alarm in IAS for loop failure None
Wire break
Thrusters
Frequency Mech. failure Hardware Alarm Loss of that thruster Reduced thruster capacity
converter El. failure Breaker failure
Short circuit
Protection trip
Cooling failure
El. Motor Loss of power Short circuit, motor Alarm Loss of affected thruster Reduced thruster capacity
failure
Thruster Mech. failure Bearings, blades, Vibration, Stop of thruster depending of extent Reduced thruster capacity
couplings noise of failure
El. Motor Lack of cooling No circulation of Alarm Temp. increase Reduced thruster capacity
Cooling coolant in cooling Can cause trip of thruster
circuit circuit
Steering Mechanical failure Fatigue, bearing, Alarm Loss of steering oil pressure and Reduced thruster capacity Loss of pump not
pump of pump coupling, damage of thruster trips possible to steer
motor, overload thruster in wanted
Electrical failure of Fuse failure direction
pump Short circuit
Busbar failure
Steering Mech. failure Piston, fatigue Alarm Thruster will not rotate or rotates Reduced thruster capacity
motor slower


LO pump Mechanical failure Fatigue, bearing, Alarm Loss of LO pressure and thruster Reduced thruster capacity
of pump coupling, damage of trips to protect it from damage due
motor, overload to lack of lubrication
Electrical failure of Fuse failure
pump Short circuit
Busbar failure
Filters Failure of filter Clogged, dirt Alarm No affect as long as action taken. None Watch keeper to take
Spring loaded by-pass valve. necessary actions to
correct failure.
Oil cooler Failure of cooler Leakage, rupture. Oil Alarm Temp. increase None Watch keeper to take
in FW system. Can cause trip of thruster necessary actions to
correct failure.
Control Failure of steering Leakage, seizure, dirt Can cause variance in azimuth or None Operator should be
valves valve freeze in one direction aware of this and
disable thruster if this
occurs.
Seal system Loss of head Leakage Alarm Risk of seawater ingress into the None, however SW in
incl. Tank pressure or oil thruster housing system will increase risk of
wear and tear

15.11 Failure Analysis - DP Control System

component Failure mode Failure mech./cause Detection of On component in Effect on DP Comments
failure subsystem operation/position keeping
DP
System
DPC-1 Any failure Electrical failure Alarm Loss of backup DP Loss of DP Class 3 All systems running on main
Computer causing loss of Computer failure station DPC-2
this station Controller failure
Etc
DPC-2/ Power failure Short circuit in Alarm Blackout of affected Loss of DP Class 3
Computers cabinet, fuse failure, computer.
PSU failure Auto switchover to other
computer.
Software error Wrong programming, None Cause wrong DP system does not act Self check routines between
model configuration wrong correctly on commands/ computers.
commands. functions selected.
Loss of position may occur.

Loss of DP Class 2/3.
Data Virus Data virus in all None A virus can result in Loss of Station keeping To prevent this Vessel
computer system on crash of both Loss of DP Class 3 operator should make sure to
net computer systems have procedures available to
restrict the use of computers
connected to the network
Loss of I/O board PSU failure Alarm Loss of communication Loss of DP Class 3
Fuse failure, card to component on that I/O
failure, short circuit card
Loss of thrusters Fuse failure, internal Alarm None Loss of DP Class 3 The thrusters are all
I/O Module failure, short circuit communicating on redundant
I/Os ref I/O list.


Abnormal Internal failure in I/O Alarm This scenario can be Loss of DP Class 3 Thruster to be deselected from
behaviour thruster module critical for those I/O DP. Thruster can be used in
control modules that control emergency mode to assist DP
thruster. if needed.
DP Network Net failure Net overload, cable Alarm Loss of affected Loss of DP Class 3
breakage, fuse/ communication network.
breaker failure Signal transfer on
HUB/ node failure redundant network.
Operator
Console
Operator Loss of OS Power failure Alarm Loss of affected OS. Loss of DP Class 3
Console Fuse failure
Short circuit Other OS still available.
Computer failure
DP change Any failure Power failure, short Alarm Power failure, breakage None Change over switch should
over switch circuit, cable of one input cable will have cover to protect it.
breakage not have any affect due
to each thruster unit has
got separate cables.
DP
Sensors
MRU Power or mech. Fuse failure Alarm Loss of affected MRU. Loss of DP Class 3 Loss of MRU signal supplying
failure Short circuit HiPAP will cause HiPAP to
Damage Remain with two other be lost as a DP reference
MRUs. system. HiPAP is dependent
on Vessel motion signals.
Gyro Not working Short circuit Alarm Loss of affected gyro. Loss of DP Class 3 Loss of gyro signal supplying
Fuse failure HiPAP will cause HiPAP to
Mech. failure DP auto select other be lost as a DP reference
gyro(s). system. HiPAP is dependent
on heading signals.


Difference Wrong calibration, Alarm Affected gyro will be de- Loss of DP Class 3
damage selected by DP system
due to gyro difference
check.
Remain with two gyros
Wind Power failure Fuse failure Alarm Loss of affected wind Loss of DP class 3
Supply failure sensor
Short circuit
Remain with two wind
senor.
Mech./internal Damage, shielding Warning Can cause wrong signals Can result in excursion DPO to be aware of this.
failure effect to DP system.
Excess wind speed DP system compensates
due to Helicopter for wrong input.
operations
Draught Not working Damage Alarm Loss of a draught sensor None
Sensor Internal failure shall not affect the DP
Power failure system as there should be
more than one. Total loss
of them all the operator
can manually put in the
vessels draught. The DP
system relay on the
vessels draught for
model calculations.
Riser Angle Not working Damage Alarm This sensor is for None
Sensor Internal failure monitoring of the risers
Power failure position and should not
be used as an reference
system
Position Ref. Vessel is fitted with 2
Systems DGPSs, two HiPAPs


DGPS Power failure Fuse failure Alarm Loss of affected DGPS Loss of DP Class 3
Supply failure as DP ref. system.
Short circuit
GPS Antenna Wire break Alarm
Shielding
GPS antenna damage
DGPS signal Loss of IALA/ Shielding, Warning Loss of IALA signal to None
SBAS Out of range, power indication on both DGPSs
failure DGPS
monitor
Loss of InMarsat Shielding, Warning Loss of InMarsat signal None
Out of range, power indication on to both DGPS,s and
failure, demodulator DGPS Seapaths
and Serial splitter monitor
failure
Loss of Spotbeam Shielding, Warning Loss of Spotbeam signal None
Out of range, power indication on to both DGPSs and both
failure DGPS Seapaths
monitor
Loss of pre-set Too few satellite Alarm Can cause loss of both Loss of DP Class 3 Vessel remains with both
numbers of signals DGPS and Seapaths HiPAPs and Fanbeam
satellite signals enabled in DP. If Seapath is
degraded it will also affect
HiPAP


Degraded Shielding, noise/ Alarm, Can cause invalid DP can use/prefer poor
performance disturbance in Warning position on DGPS. DGPS signal instead of
hardware signal correct signal from the other
network, poor two pos. ref. systems.
satellite constellation,
invalid satellites, As a result, the vessel can
poor atmospheric follow the poor and unstable
conditions DGPS system.
Loss of DP Class 3
HiPAP Computer Power failure Alarm

APC-11 Internal failure
Transceiver MRU signal Alarm Loss of affected HiPAP Loss of DP Class 3
Gyro signal
Power failure
Transducer Mech. damage Alarm
Sensor failure
Transponder Not working Alarm
Battery failure
Noise in water
(propeller wash/
water layers)
Hoist control Power failure Alarm None as long as None Not possible to lift / lower
transducer is deployed transducer
DP Serial
splitter


Serial Power failure Short circuit Alarm Loss of system over Loss of DP Class 3
splitter Fuse/ breaker failure splitter
Internal failure
DP UPS
DP UPSs Power failure Short circuit Alarm Loss of 230V main None Battery endurance should be
230V/ rectifier Fuse/ breaker failure supply cause UPS to min. 30 minutes
failure auto-change to battery
power.
Battery failure Battery failure Alarm None, remains on main None Regular maintenance should
supply. reveal this
Loss of UPS Internal UPS failure, Alarm Loss of consumers on Loss of DP class 3 Reference is made to section
short circuit affected UPS. 14.7 for list of UPS consumers
that will be lost.

16 REFERENCES
Doc/Dwg. No Rev. Title
N111-465-04 2 P&ID Instrument Air Control System
N111-465-01 6 P&ID Starting Air system
N111-465-02 7 P&ID Rig Instrument air system
N111-427-01 0 P&ID Thruster Hydraulic System
N111-461-01 6 P&ID FO transfer system
N111-461-02 6 P&ID FO purification system
N111-461-03 7 P&ID FO service system
N111-463-01-0# 6 P&ID SW cooling system Thruster #
N111-462-02 5 P&ID LO purification system
N111-462-03 5 P&ID LO service system generators
N111-463-02-01 6 P&ID FW cooling system ER01
N111-465-03 1 Quick Closing Valves
N111-463-04 8 Main SW system
N111-463-03-01 5 P&ID FW cooling Aux. system 1
N111-463-03-02 8 P&ID FW cooling Aux. system 2
N111-463-05-0# 5 P&ID FW cooling Thruster rooms
N111-465-02_A 08 Rig Air System
452-570-PID-103525 E HVAC & Chilled water Cooling system
452-100-GA-100396 C Numbering sequence main components
452-790-LA-103514 B Safety Functional Specification ESD, F&G
452-790-BD-101513 C IAS Topology
452-793-BD-101514 D Thruster Control Topology / diagram
452-793-SP-101509 A FMEA Description including IAS
452-103-GA-10050-D D GA lower hull
452-103-GA-12528-D D GA upper hull
452-105-GA-10365 A Watertight integrity plan
GA-105410-N111- 04 DP principle routing diagram
619-009
1037543 D Kongsberg Cable layout KPOS 2
1037544 D Kongsberg Cable layout reference systems
1037546 D Kongsberg Cable layout KPOS 1
1037548 D Kongsberg Cable layout cJoy
452-408-IM-104341 B Kongsberg Cable I/O spec
1067797 A Cable layout RMS
452-106-SD-101703 F Main Single line diagram

452-875-LA-103163 A 230V power consumption list


Client: Sevan Marine Ltd Date: 02.10.2008 Page: A 1
APPENDIX A
DP System I/O Specification list

IO Specification DPC 1 Sevan Driller

Equipment U32 U34 U35 U36 U37 U41 U42
Gyro 1 X
DGPS 1 X
Thruster1 X
DG 1 X
Thruster 2 X
DG 2 X
Thruster 5 X
DG 3 X
Thruster 6 X
DG4 X
Draught (aft, fore, X
PS,SB)
Bustie AB (in) X
Bustie CD (in) X
UPS 3 X
Gyro 1 X
BU Switch DPC 2 X
BU Switch DPC 1 X
Equipment U62 U64 U65 U66 U67 U71 U72

Wind 1 X
DGPS 2 X
Thruster 3 X
DG 5 X
Thruster 4 X
DG 6 X
Thruster 7 X
DG 7 X
Thruster 8 X
DG 8 X
Bustie BC (in) X
MRU 1 X

IO Specification DPC 2 Sevan Driller

Equipment U32 U33 U34 U35 U36 U37 U41 U42 U43
Wind 1 X
Gyro 1 X
DGPS 2 X
Wind 3 X
MRU 1 X
Gyro 2 X
Raiser Angle X
Thruster 1 X
DG 1 X
Thruster 2 X
DG 2 X
Thruster 5 X
DG 3 X
Thruster 6 X
DG 4 X
Bustie AB (in) X
UPS 1 X
BU Switch DPC 1 X
BU Switch DPC 2 X
MRU 3 X
Bustie CD (in) X
Gyro 2 X
Draught (aft, fore, X
PS, SB)
Equipment U62 U64 U65 U66 U67 U71 U72 U73

Wind 2 X
Gyro 3 X
DGPS 1 X
Thruster 3 X
DG 5 X
Thruster 4 X
DG 6 X
Thruster 7 X
DG 7 X
Thruster 8 X
DG 8 X
Bustie BC (in) X
UPS 2 X
Gyro 3 X
MRU 2 X
Drilling X
Prepare to X
disconnect
Disconnect X

Client: Sevan Marine Ltd Date: 02.10.2008 Page: B 1
APPENDIX B
FMEA Proving Trials

Table of Contents FMEA Proving Trials

1 EQUIPMENT SUB-SYSTEM 1 ELECTRICAL........................................................5
1.1 Simulate S/C SWBD A ..............................................................................................5
1.2 Simulate S/C SWBD B ..............................................................................................6
1.3 Simulate S/C SWBD C ..............................................................................................7
1.4 Simulate S/C SWBD D ..............................................................................................8
1.5 Simulate S/C on Ships 230V UPS System..................................................................9
1.6 Main Switchboard 11kV Performance......................................................................10
1.9 Simulate S/C on Ships 110V Ships UPS System (If Applicable) ..............................13
1.10 Performance on high load ........................................................................................14
2 EQUIPMENT SUB-SYSTEM 2 BLACKOUT RECOVERY ..................................15
2.1 Blackout Recovery Test ...........................................................................................15
3 EQUIPMENT SUB-SYSTEM 3 POWER GENERATION .....................................16
3.1 Main Engines Governors..........................................................................................16
3.2 Overspeed/ AVR failure of Diesel Generator ...........................................................17
3.3 Simulate Failure Governors - Woodward ..................................................................18
3.4 Simulate a Failure IAS System.................................................................................19
3.5 Simulate a Failure IAS System cont. ........................................................................20
3.6 Simulate Failure of PMS...........................................................................................21
3.7 Simulate a Failure of PMS cont................................................................................22
3.8 FO System Failures..................................................................................................23
3.9 Simulate SW cooling System Failure .......................................................................24
3.10 Simulate FW System Failures ..................................................................................25
3.11 Lubrication System Failures.....................................................................................26
3.12 Compressed Air System...........................................................................................27
4 EQUIPMENT SUB-SYSTEM 4 THRUSTER..........................................................28
4.1 Azimuth Thruster Hydraulic Servo System ...........................................................28
4.2 Thruster Controllers .................................................................................................29
4.3 Main Bridge Thruster Console .................................................................................30
4.4 Azimuth Thruster - Signal Failures ..........................................................................31
4.5 Azimuth Thruster - Signal Failures (cont.) ...............................................................32
4.6 Thrusters Stop..........................................................................................................33

5 EQUIPMENT SUB-SYSTEM 5 DP CONTROL .....................................................34

5.1 KM UPS 1 Failure ...................................................................................................34
5.2 KM UPS 2 Failure ...................................................................................................35
5.3 KM UPS 3 Failure ...................................................................................................36
5.4 Computer Network failure test .................................................................................37
5.5 Computer failure test................................................................................................38
5.6 Check DP Console OS 1 & OS 2 .............................................................................39
5.7 DPC cabinet.............................................................................................................40
5.8 Computer I/O Modules Failure Test.........................................................................41
5.9 Fail kW signal to DP................................................................................................42
5.10 Manoeuvre Change over ..........................................................................................43
5.11 DP Joystick function test..........................................................................................44
5.12 DP Function test ......................................................................................................45
5.13 Rotation Center........................................................................................................46
5.14 DP Mathematical model...........................................................................................47
5.15 Consequence Analysis .............................................................................................48
6 EQUIPMENT SUB-SYSTEM 6 SENSORS .............................................................49
6.1 VRS Fault Simulation ..............................................................................................49
6.2 Gyro Failure ............................................................................................................50
6.3 Wind Speed / Direction Tests...................................................................................51
7 EQUIPMENT SUB-SYSTEM 7 REFERENCE SYSTEM.......................................52
7.1 DGPS 1 Tests (DPS 132) .........................................................................................52
7.2 DGPS 2 Tests (DPS200) ..........................................................................................53
7.3 HiPAP 1 Tests .........................................................................................................54
7.4 HiPAP 1 Tests .........................................................................................................55
7.5 HiPAP 2 Tests .........................................................................................................56
7.6 HiPAP 2 Tests .........................................................................................................57
8 EQUIPMENT SUB-SYSTEM 8 BACKUP DP CONTROL ....................................58
8.1 Backup DP Computer change over test ....................................................................58
8.2 Backup Computer change over test ..........................................................................59
8.3 Backup Computer ....................................................................................................60
8.4 Backup DP Console .................................................................................................61
8.5 Backup DP Performance ..........................................................................................62
9 EQUIPMENT SUB-SYSTEM 9 A/C UNITS/ VENTILATION ..............................63
9.1 A/C Units/ Ventilation .............................................................................................63
10 EQUIPMENT SUB-SYSTEM 10 CABLING ...........................................................64
10.1 General Cabling.......................................................................................................64
11 EQUIPMENT SUB-SYSTEM 11 PIPING................................................................65
11.1 General Piping .........................................................................................................65
12 EQUIPMENT SUB-SYSTEM 12 FIRE & FLOODING..........................................67
12.1 Simulating fire/ flooding of a compartment..............................................................67

13 EQUIPMENT SUB-SYSTEM 13 ESD/F&G EMERGENCY STOPS ....................68

13.1 Fire & Gas system....................................................................................................68
14 EQUIPMENT SUB-SYSTEM 14 COMMUNICATION..........................................69
14.1 Communication devices ...........................................................................................69

1 EQUIPMENT SUB-SYSTEM 1 ELECTRICAL

1.1 Simulate S/C SWBD A
Method:
- On DP
- All thrusters on line
- All Bustie breakers open
1. Simulate s/c of 230V SWBD A by opening primary breaker

2. Simulate s/c of 690V SWBD A by opening primary breaker
3. Simulate s/c of 11kV SWBD A by trip running DG
Results expected:
1. Alarm No Affect on DP. Important consumers should change over to backup supply
2. Alarm loss of aux. consumers such as pumps etc. needed for DG & thrusters 1&2
3. Partial blackout , Loss of SWBD A no affect on other systems
Results found:
Comments:
Witnessed by: Date:

EQUIPMENT SUB-SYSTEM 1 ELECTRICAL
1.2 Simulate S/C SWBD B

Method:
- On DP
1. Simulate s/c of 230V SWBD B by opening primary breaker

2. Simulate s/c of 690V SWBD B by opening primary breaker
3. Simulate s/c of 11kV SWBD B by trip running DG
Results expected:
2. Alarm loss of aux. consumers such as pumps etc. needed for DG 3&4 & thrusters 5&6
3. Partial blackout , Loss of SWBD B no affect on other systems
Results found:
Comments:
Witnessed by: Date:

1.3 Simulate S/C SWBD C

Method:
- On DP
1. Simulate s/c of 230V SWBD C by opening primary breaker

2. Simulate s/c of 690V SWBD C by opening primary breaker
3. Simulate s/c of 11kV SWBD C by trip running DG
Results expected:
3. Partial blackout , Loss of SWBD C no affect on other systems
Results found:
Comments:
Witnessed by: Date:

1.4 Simulate S/C SWBD D

Method:
- On DP
1. Simulate s/c of 230V SWBD D by opening primary breaker

2. Simulate s/c of 690V SWBD D by opening primary breaker
3. Simulate s/c of 11kV SWBD D by trip running DG
Results expected:
3. Partial blackout , Loss of SWBD D no affect on other systems
Results found:
Comments:
Witnessed by: Date:

1.5 Simulate S/C on Ships 230V UPS System

Method:
- On DP
- Bus tie breaker open
1. Fail main supply to UPS A,

2. Test battery endurance, Restore
3. Simulate s/c of UPS A, Restore
4. Do same test with rectifier of systems UPS B, C & D
Results expected:
For each distribution board:
1. Alarm
2. Battery endurance for minimum 30 min.
3. Alarm, no loss of station keeping.
Results found:
UPS A UPS B UPS C UPS D
1. 1. 1. 1.
2. 2. 2. 2.
3. 3. 3. 3.
Comments:
Witnessed by: Date:

1.6 Main Switchboard 11kV Performance

Method:
- On DP 4 split mode
- Four DGs running
- Four DGs on standby
1. Increase load continuously to maximum.

2. Do the same test with other configuration.
Results expected:
1. Auto start of standby generators.
2. Auto start of standby generators.
Results found:
Comments:
Witnessed by: Date:


Method:
- Four DGs running
1. Increase load continuously to maximum.
Decrease load resulting in unloading of a DG and disconnecting from SWBD, cool down
of engine(s).
2. During cool down sequences, increase load to maximum
Results expected:
1. Auto start standby generator.
2. Generator in cool down auto connects to bus-bar
Results found:
Comments:
Witnessed by: Date:


Method:
- Four DGs running
Increase load on DGs running to 50%, then
1. Trip one running DG
Do the same but this time inhibit start of 1st standby DG
2. Trip one running DG
Results expected:
1. Alarm, Auto start of 1. standby engine insufficient thrust, load reduction on thrusters
2. Alarm, Try to start 1st standby, then PMS initiate start of 2nd standby or all depending
on configuration in PMS. In the meantime insufficient thrust, load reduction on
thrusters
Results found:
Comments:
Witnessed by: Date:

1.9 Simulate S/C on Ships 110V Ships UPS System (If Applicable)
Method:
- On DP
1. Fail main power supply to 110V UPS A

2. Test battery endurance for 30 minutes
3. Simulate s/c of ships 110V UPS A, restore
4. Do same tests for ships 110V UPS B, C & D
Results expected:
For each ships UPS:

1. Alarm, no sleeping fault
2. Minimum battery endurance 30 mins.
3. Trip of 11kV breakers SWBD A
4. As for above
Results found:
Comments:
110V control voltage to SWBD breakers
Witnessed by: Date:

1.10 Performance on high load

Method:
- On DP
- DP Class 2 configuration
- DP Joystick on High Gain
- Fixed Yaw (heading) selected
1. Joystick to full starboard for approximately 3 minutes

2. Joystick quickly over to hard port for approximately 4 minutes
3. Joystick quickly back to hard starboard for approximately 2 minutes
Results expected:
1. The vessel accelerates slowly to maximum athwartship.

2. The starboard movement is stopping, accelerate maximum athwartship to port
3. The port movement is stopping and starts to accelerate to starboard.
Load/ speed reduction if required.
Results found:
Comments:
Witnessed by: Date:

2 EQUIPMENT SUB-SYSTEM 2 BLACKOUT

RECOVERY
2.1 Blackout Recovery Test
Method:
- All thrusters running

- Reduce number of DG to minimum
- Bus-tie breaker closed
1. Trip all running DG

2. Do same test again but this time inhibits start of EG.
Results expected:
1. Blackout, bus-tie breakers opens, PMSs sends start signal to all DGs,
2. Blackout, bus-tie breakers opens, PMSs sends start signal to all DGs,
Results found:
Comments:
Witnessed by: Date:

3 EQUIPMENT SUB-SYSTEM 3 POWER

GENERATION
3.1 Main Engines Governors
Method:
- On DP
For each ME:

1. Fail 230V main supply to ME# control cabinet
2. Fail 230V BU supply to ME# control cabinet
3. Fail load signal to the governor and increase load restore (LON)
Results expected:
1. Alarm, continue to run on BU supply

2. Alarm, continue to run on main supply
3. Alarm Minor Woodward failure,
Results found:
1.
2.
3.
Comments:
Witnessed by: Date:

EQUIPMENT SUB-SYSTEM 3 POWER GENERATION
3.2 Overspeed/ AVR failure of Diesel Generator

Method:
- On DP
- Bustie breaker open
1. Simulate Overspeed of a DG by increasing the RPM manually on engine or from SWBD in

local droop mode
2. Simulate AVR failure of one DG by fail power supply, restore
3. Fail over/ under excitation to a DG, one at the time. Restore
Results expected:
1. Affected DG increases load should trip before the other DG trips on reverse power, worst failure
is half blackout
2. Alarm, DG breaker trips of affected DG.
3. Alarm, DG breaker trips of affected DG
Results found:
1.
2.
3.
Comments:
Witnessed by: Date:

3.3 Simulate Failure Governors - Woodward

Method:
- On DP
- Bustie breaker open
For each engine/ generator:

1. Simulate speed pickup 1 failure
2. Simulate speed pickup 2 failure
3. Simulate failure of Generator circuit breaker input signal
4. Simulate failure of Isochronous/ droop input signal
5. Simulate failure of Generator load feedback signal
6. Simulate failure of Load sharing signal
7. Simulate actuator failure or fail power supply/ plug to actuator.
Results expected:
1. Alarm, no affect on DG or load

2. Alarm, no affect on DG or load
3. Alarm, Loss of load sharing, load will either increase or decrease depending on system
load and load on other DG(s). Loss of IAS control over affected DG
4. Alarm, DG switches into droop mode and continuo to run
5. Alarm, DG continues to run in ISOC
6. Alarm, no load sharing and DG can either increase or decrease load, can trip other DG
on reverse power.
7. Stop of affected DG
Results found:
Comments:
Witnessed by: Date:

3.4 Simulate a Failure IAS System

Method:
- On DP
- Bus tie breaker closed
1. Simulate loss of supply 1 to VMS node cabinet, restore (UPS B)

2. Simulate loss of supply 2 to VMS node cabinet, restore (UPS D)
3. Simulate internal failure of VMS node cabinet, restore
4. Simulate loss of supply 1 to each I/O cabinet (one at the time), restore (UPS B)
5. Simulate loss of supply 2 to each I/O cabinet (one at the time), restore (UPS D)
6. Simulate internal failure of I/O cabinet, restore
Results expected:
1. Alarm, runs on redundant supply

3. Alarm, loss of VMS functions
6. Alarm, loss of comm. to equipment handled by that I/O cabinet.
Results found:
Comments:
Witnessed by: Date:

3.5 Simulate a Failure IAS System cont.

Method:
- On DP
- Bus tie breaker closed
7. Simulate loss of IAS node A + HMI A

8. Simulate loss of IAS node B + HMI B
9. Simulate loss of power to server 1/ OS (supply 1 /then 2)
10. Simulate loss of power to server 2/ OS (supply 1 /then 2)
11. Fail both power supplies to Server1
12. Fail both power supplies to Server2
13. Shut down all systems in main ECR (server 1B, 2B + OS 3, 4 & 5)
14. Shut down all systems in main ECR (server 1A, 2A + OS 1& 2)
Results expected:
7. Alarm, runs on redundant system B

8. Alarm, runs on redundant system A
9. Alarm for either power supply
10. Alarm for either power supply
11. Alarm, runs on redundant server 2
12. Alarm, runs on redundant server 1
13. Alarm, runs on redundant server from backup room
14. Alarm, runs on redundant server from main MCR
Results found:
Comments:
Witnessed by: Date:

3.6 Simulate Failure of PMS

Method:
- On DP
1. Simulate loss of supply 1 to PMS A/ B/ C/ D, restore

2. Simulate loss of supply 2 to PMS A/ B/ C/ D, restore
3. Simulate loss of PMS A
4. Simulate loss of PMS B
5. Simulate loss of PMS C
6. Simulate loss of PMS D
7. Simulate loss of Profibus comm. between Gen. breaker and PMS (Signals via Profibus are:
kW, Hz, Amp, Voltage, breaker status etc.)
8. Fail communication link between PMSs, restore (if applicable)
9. Check mimics for completeness and right inputs
10. Check start block of heavy consumers when try to start.
Results expected:
1. Alarm runs on redundant supply

2. Alarm runs on redundant supply
3. 6. Alarm, lost comm. of respective SWBD A, B, C & D
7. Alarm, no affect on generators
8. Alarm, will start up DG if numbers running is less than set.
9. OK
10. Start block of heavy consumers if defined in PMS
Results found:
Comments:
Witnessed by: Date:

3.7 Simulate a Failure of PMS cont.

Method:
- On DP
11. Simulate failure of Scalence X-208 unit (connected to all PMSs), restore
Results expected:
10. Alarm, no affect on running DGs

11.
Results found:
Comments:
Witnessed by: Date:

3.8 FO System Failures

Method:
- On DP
- All DGs running
1. Open circuit on fuel tank low level sensor settling / service tank ER 1, restore
5. Check FO filter diff. pressure for DGs
6. Confirm configuration of QCVs
Results expected:
1. Alarm
2. Alarm
3. Alarm
4. Alarm
5. Alarm
6. Configuration as per FMEA
Results found:
Comments:
Witnessed by: Date:

3.9 Simulate SW cooling System Failure

Method:
- On DP
- All DGs running
1. Simulate failure of running SW pump to ER 1 (both ways)

2. Simulate failure of running SW pump to Thruster room 1 (both ways)
9. Check that SW crossover valves, if applicable
Results expected:
1. Alarm , start of standby pump

9. Crossover valves are closed and marked
Results found:
Comments:
Witnessed by: Date:

3.10 Simulate FW System Failures

Method:
- On DP
- All DGs running
1. Simulate Low level alarm on Exp./header tank to each ER # system, Restore

2. Simulate Low level alarm on Exp./header tank to each thruster rm. # system, Restore
3. Simulate failure of running LTFW circ. pump to each SWBD # , Restore
4. Simulate failure of running FW circ. pump to each thruster rm. # (both ways), Restore
5. Check that FW crossover valves, if applicable
Results expected:
1. Alarm
2. Alarm
3. Alarm, note time of temperature increase
4. Alarm, start of standby pump
5. Crossover valves are closed and marked
Results found:
Comments:
Witnessed by: Date:

3.11 Lubrication System Failures

Method:
- On DP
- All DGs running
For each engine:

1. Simulate low LO pressure
2. Simulate Low-Low pressure
3. Simulate low-level alarm sump (if possible to test)
4. Simulate loss of LO pump generator # DE
5. Simulate loss of LO pump generator # NDE
Results expected:
1. Alarm, PMS starts standby DG

2. Alarm, affected DG shuts down and PMS starts standby DG
3. Alarm,
4. Alarm,
5. Alarm
Results found:
Comments:
Witnessed by: Date:

3.12 Compressed Air System

Method:
- On DP
- All DGs running
1. Isolate the air to DGs and drain the supply line.

2. Isolate the Instrument/ control air system and drain the system
Results expected:
1. Alarm. No affect on running engine or station keeping

2. Alarm. No affect on running engine or station keeping
Results found:
Comments:
Service/ rig air is a separate system and not considered further.
Witnessed by: Date:

4 EQUIPMENT SUB-SYSTEM 4 THRUSTER

4.1 Azimuth Thruster Hydraulic Servo System
Method:
- On DP
1. Fail running steering pump, restore

2. Fail running LO pump, restore
3. Check start inhibits by Low oil pressure, restore
4. Simulate low-level of LO & steering oil tank, restore
Results expected:
1. Alarm. Prediction error, steering not following order

2. Alarm, thruster trips as no LO circulation
3. Converter will not start, no start of AT
4. Alarm, Gravity tank low level
Results found:
1.
2.
3.
4.
Comments:
Witnessed by: Date:

EQUIPMENT SUB-SYSTEM 4 THRUSTER
4.2 Thruster Controllers

Method:
- On DP
- All thrusters on line.
1. Fail power supply 1 to IAS thruster controller, restore

2. Fail power supply 2 to IAS thruster controller, restore
3. Simulate internal failure by failing both power supplies, restore
4. Fail power supply 1 to Siemens thruster controller#, restore
5. Fail power supply 2 to Siemens thruster controller#, restore
6. Simulate internal failure Siemens thruster controller# by failing both power supplies, restore
7. Repeat test 4 to 6 with RRM thruster cabinet
Results expected:
1. Alarm
2. Alarm
3. Alarm, loss of monitoring from main MCR thrusters console and in IAS
4. Alarm
5. Alarm
6. Alarm, loss of affected thruster
7. Same results as for test 4 to 6 above
Results found:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Comments:
Witnessed by: Date:

4.3 Main Bridge Thruster Console

Method:
- On DP
1. Fail power supply 1 to bridge thruster console, restore

2. Fail power supply 2 to bridge thruster console, restore
3. Simulate internal failure by failing both power supplies, restore
Results expected:
1. Alarm
2. Alarm
3. Alarm, loss of manual lever control, change over switch, test changeover to independent
joystick.
Results found:
1.
2.
3.
4.
Comments:
The Independent C-joy is connected up to the main bridge console with cabling to
respective thrusters control CPU. Total loss of main bridge console will therefore also
cause loss of independent joystick. I.e. the joystick is not independent of the main thruster
control system.
Witnessed by: Date:

4.4 Azimuth Thruster - Signal Failures

Method:
- On DP
1. Fail rpm command signal from DP to TCC , Restore ( )

2. Fail rpm feedback signal from TCC to DP, Restore (
3. Fail rpm command signal from TCC to FC, Restore ( ) )
4. Fail rpm feedback signal from FC to TCC, Restore ( )
5. Fail load feedback signal from FC to DP, Restore ( )
Results expected:
1. Thruster # not ready, rpm to zero

2. Thruster # Input error force, thruster works as normal (uses base value)
3. Thruster # prediction error, rpm to zero
4. Thruster # Prediction error rpm, thruster works as normal
5. Thruster # input error, thruster works as normal
Results found:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Comments:
TCC= Thruster Control Cabinet
Witnessed by: Date:

4.5 Azimuth Thruster - Signal Failures (cont.)

Method:
- On DP
- All thrusters on line,
6. Fail azimuth order signal from DP to TCC, restore )

7. Fail azimuth command signal from TCC to Thruster. Restore ( )
8. Fail azimuth feedback signal from thruster to TCC, Restore ( )
9. Fail azimuth feedback from TCC to DP, restore ( )
Results expected:
6. Thruster # Prediction error force, rpm to idle, azimuth to zero

7. Thruster # Prediction error force, movement of azimuth to affected direction, rpm works
as normal
8. Thruster # not ready , out of DP, rpm to zero
9. Thruster # prediction / input error, thruster works as normal
Results found:
Comments:
Witnessed by: Date:

EQUIPMENT SUB-SYSTEM 4 THRUSTERS
4.6 Thrusters Stop

Method:
- On DP
For each thruster:

1. Activate start/stop on bridge
2. Activate emergency stops
3. Check loop monitoring of E-stop
4. Activate the emergency operation of each thruster
5. Test all wheelhouse controls while in DP
Results expected:
1. Stops
2. Stops
3. Alarm for cable break
4. The thruster deselected from DP, operation by lever locally
5. Not alive
Results found:
Comments:
Witnessed by: Date:

5 EQUIPMENT SUB-SYSTEM 5 DP CONTROL

5.1 KM UPS 1 Failure
Method:
- On DP
- Select all available DP reference systems
1. Simulate mains failure

2. Test battery endurance for 30 min.
3. Simulate fuse failure at fuses in battery box and cabinet (short circuit)
Results expected:
1. UPS alarms local and on DP

2. UPS runs on battery for 30 min.
3. Alarms on DP, connected equipment fails one by one
Results found:
1.
2.
3.
Comments:
UPS 1 consumers: DPC 2-1

DP OS 1
Alarm printer1
DGPS 1 (DPS132)
Gyro 2
Wind 2
Witnessed by: Date:

EQUIPMENT SUB-SYSTEM 5 DP CONTROL

Method:
- On DP

Results expected:

Results found:
1.
2.
3.
Comments:
UPS 2 consumers: DPC 2-2

DP OS 2
Net Printer
History stations
HiPAP OS 2
HiPAP transceiver 2
Gyro 3
Wind 3
Witnessed by: Date:


Method:
- On DP

Results expected:

Results found:
1.
2.
3.
Comments:
UPS 2 consumers: DPC 1

DP OS 3
Alarm printer 2
DGPS 2 (DPS 200)
HiPAP OS 1
HiPAP transceiver 1
Gyro 1
Wind 1
Witnessed by: Date:

5.4 Computer Network failure test

Method:
- On DP
- Select all available reference systems
- All thrusters engaged
1. Fail comm. on Network A , restore

2. Fail comm. on Network B, restore
Results expected:
1. Alarm, No affect on station keeping still comm. via net B

2. Alarm, No affect on station keeping still comm. via net A
Results found:
Comments:
Witnessed by: Date:

5.5 Computer failure test

Method:
- On DP
DPC A On line:
1. Trip power supply to DPC A and Observe position accuracy
DPC B On line
2. Trip power supply to DPC B and Observe position accuracy
DPC C On line
3. Trip power supply to DPC C and Observe position accuracy
Results expected:
1. Alarm, Loss of DPC A, automatic changeover to DPC B

2. Alarm, Loss of DPC B, automatic changeover to DPC-A
3. Alarm, No affect on DPC A or DPC B, lost DPC C (emergency bridge)
Results found:
Comments:
Witnessed by: Date:

5.6 Check DP Console OS 1 & OS 2

Method:
- On DP
1. Fail supply to SDP OS 2 when OS2 in use

2. Fail supply to SDP OS1 when OS1 in use
3. Fail supply to KPOS OS BU
4. Check all pages on screen
5. Change ranges and speed
6. Lamp test
7. Print page
Results expected:
1. Alarm, DPO to take control on OS 1 by pressing take button

2. Alarm, DPO to take control on OS 2 by pressing take button
3. Alarm, loss of backup DP
4. All satisfactory
5. OK
6. OK
7. OK
Results found:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Comments:
Witnessed by: Date:

5.7 DPC cabinet

Method:
- On DP
1. Fail each fuse, by disconnecting one at the time, for each wait 30 second.
2. Insert a defect or remove fuse in fuse panel for those who have LED light.
Results expected:
1. Alarm, loss of respective equipment, no loss of position.

2. The LED lights up.
Results found:
Comments:
Witnessed by: Date:

5.8 Computer I/O Modules Failure Test

Method:
- On DP
1. Fail each I/O module one by one and restore. Check against KM I/O Spec
Results Expected:
1. Alarm. Failure/ Loss of one I/O card should not result in loss of DP.
There is one IO module per thruster, hence only one thruster lost if that module fails
A failure of either I/O should not result in loss of position keeping

Results found:
Comments:
Witnessed by: Date:

5.9 Fail kW signal to DP

Method:
- On DP
For each generator:

1. Fail kW signal to DP
2. Fail running/breaker signal to DP
Results expected:
1. No earlier pitch reduction. Affected generator turns grey (0kW) on the mimic, however
the breaker indicates closed. The maximum kW stays as it includes the faulty DG..
2. The affected generator indicates not online. Affected generator turns grey (0kW) on the
mimic, however the breaker indicates closed. The maximum power limit is set to the
number of healthy generator on the board.
Results found:
Comments:
Witnessed by: Date:

5.10 Manoeuvre Change over

Method:
- In manual mode forward bridge location

- All thrusters engaged.
1. Take command fwd bridge location

2. Take command aft bridge location
3. Take command each wing location
4. Take command on Independent Joystick and test each position
5. Take command on DP
6. Take command on DP Joystick
7. Deselect DP by switch the selection switch to manual.
8. Visual inspection of hardware (DP change over switch). External protection cover, correct
labelling.
Results expected:
1. Command transferred to fwd bridge

2. Command transferred to aft bridge
3. Command transferred to wing location
4. Command transferred to Joystick
5. Command transferred to DP
6. Command transfer to DP Joystick
7. Command transferred to last position
8. Check, passive switch, (if powered; fail power source, if dual, fail both too to simulate
internal failure)
Results found:
Comments:
Witnessed by: Date:

5.11 DP Joystick function test

Method:
- On DP
1. Move vessel by operating joystick, using sway, surge and yaw controls in turn.
2. Move vessel by operating joystick, using diagonal controls in turn use DP high gain fixed
heading (yaw) move vessel on joystick with speed 1 - 2 knots.
3. Test joystick at local. Test environment compensation function.
4. Test joystick increase load on thrusters, simulate worst case failure, restore.
5. Repeat same test with use of bias mode factory settings.
Results expected:
1. Vessel moves to commands.

2. Vessel keeps heading with in 0 3 degrees.
3. DP takes care of environmental forces.
4. Check that the load increase/decrease for remaining thrusters.
5. Same results expected as for 1 4.
Results found:
Comments:
Witnessed by: Date:

5.12 DP Function test

Method:
- On DP
1. Make a 20 meter move with the cursor.

2. When the vessel is half way, press present position.
3. When the vessel has stabilized, press previous set point.
4. Test low, medium and high gain setting functions.
5. Move vessel in auto pos mode with use of cursor, in vessels diagonal directions in turn.
Select DP high gain fixed heading (yaw) move with vessel speed 1 - 2 knots.
6. Repeat same test with use of bias mode factory settings.
Results expected:
1. The vessel moves satisfactory towards the wanted position.

2. The vessel stops at present position, increased thruster activity to stop the vessel from
origin movement.
3. The vessel continues to move towards the previous set point.
4. Normal operation.
5. Vessel keeps heading with in 0 3 degrees.
6. Same results expected as for 1 5.
Results found:
Comments:
Witnessed by: Date:

5.13 Rotation Center

Method:
- On DP
- Select as many reference system as possible

1. Rotate 180 and observe the reference systems offsets on the OS screen
2. Note deviation from present position, change rotation point and check changes of
deviation
3. Change rotation point (not CG) and take command on either aft centre or fwd DP station
Results expected:
1. The reference system should stay within 2-3 metres from zero position.
2. Deviation to zero
3. The rotation point remains as set.
Results found:
1.
2.
3.
Comments:
Witnessed by: Date:

5.14 DP Mathematical model

Method:
- On DP for at least 30 minutes

- Deselect all available reference systems

1. Observe vessel movements using DGPS. Stop after 5to 10 mins.
Results expected:
1. Vessel moved off position slowly
Results found:
Heading Wind m/s @ Current m/s @
Minutes North East

0
1
2
3
4
5
10
Comments:
Witnessed by: Date:

5.15 Consequence Analysis

Method:
- On DP (select class 2)
1. Vessel stabilised on full DP. Stop one thruster. Wait three minutes Restore thrusters.
Results expected:
1. Consequence analysis alarms
2.
Results found:
1.
Comments:
Witnessed by: Date:

6 EQUIPMENT SUB-SYSTEM 6 SENSORS

6.1 VRS Fault Simulation
Method:
- On DP
- Select VRS 1
1. Switch off VRS 1, Restore ( )
- Select VRS 2
- Select VRS 3
For VRSs
4. Simulate failure of VRS roll signal
5. Simulate failure of VRS pitch signal
6. Simulate failure of Heave signal
7. Fail VRS signal to HiPAP
Results expected:
1. Alarm for failure & Automatic change over
4. Alarm, DP deselects faulty VRS
7. Alarm, DP deselects faulty VRS, HiPAP fails too
Results found:
Comments:
Witnessed by: Date:

EQUIPMENT SUB-SYSTEM 6 SENSORS
6.2 Gyro Failure

Method:
- On DP
1. Check Gyro headings
Select Gyro 1
2. Interrupt supply, restore
Select Gyro 2
Select Gyro 3
5. Check settings for Gyro difference alarm and test it

6. If Gyros receive Longitude & Latitude corrections from GPS fail communication
Results expected:
1. Gyro headings agree.

2 4. Alarm for loss of each Gyro
5. Gyro difference alarm is set to 2o , Alarm in DP for difference
6. Alarm, should not affect all gyros simultaneously
Results found:
Comments:
Witnessed by: Date:

EQUIPMENT SUB-SYSTEM 6 SENSORS
6.3 Wind Speed / Direction Tests

Method:
On DP
Select all available reference systems
All thrusters on line
1. Fail I/O card or serial line for wind sensor 1

4. Check shielding
5. Fail power supply to wind sensor
Results expected:
1. Wind sensor mismatch alarm, auto change over if signal to DP is lost.

4. OK, no obstruction or to close to exhaust
5. Alarm
Results found:
1.
2.
3.
4.
Comments:
Witnessed by: Date:

7 EQUIPMENT SUB-SYSTEM 7 REFERENCE

SYSTEM
7.1 DGPS 1 Tests (DPS 132)
Method:
- On DP
1. Fail each differential link signal one at a time (InMarsat, Spotbeam IALA), Restore
2. Fail all diff link signals
3. Fail power supply to DGPS 1 system. Restore
4. Compare performance and take plots
5. Rotate 180o high speed
6. Reduce number of satellites on one by changing horizon limits
Results expected:
1. Only one correction lost. Other diff. corrections still available

2. Alarm DGPS 1 rejected from DP
3. Loss of DGPS 1 , alarm in DP
4. Sufficient performance to the satisfaction of the auditor
5. Stays in DP and no rejection. Set point held.
6. Rejected by DP if less than 4 satellites
Results found:
Comments:
Witnessed by: Date:

EQUIPMENT SUB-SYSTEM 7 REFERENCE SYSTEM
7.2 DGPS 2 Tests (DPS200)

Method:
- On DP
1. Fail each differential link signal one at a time (InMarsat, Spotbeam IALA), Restore
2. Fail all diff link signals
3. Fail power supply to DGPS 2 system. Restore
4. Compare performance and take plots
5. Rotate 180o high speed
6. Reduce number of satellites on one by changing horizon limits
7. Have both DGPS enabled in DP then rotate 360o check blind spots
Results expected:
1. Only one correction lost. Other diff. corrections still available

2. Alarm DGPS 2 rejected from DP
3. Loss of DGPS 2, alarm in DP
4. Sufficient performance to the satisfaction of the auditor
5. Stays in DP and no rejection. Set point held.
6. Rejected by DP if less that 4 satellites
7. No blind spots
Results found:
Comments:
Witnessed by: Date:

7.3 HiPAP 1 Tests

Method:
- On DP
- HiPAP as reference system only
-
1. Test each transponder in turn to DP with HiPAP
2. Lift one transponder used for DP without deselecting

- Select transponder to DP when suspended to test voting
- Make small move
- Stabilise
3. Fail power to HiPAP transceiver unit
Results expected:
1. All transponders work

2. Transponder rejected when moved
Transponder rejected when suspended
3. Alarm, HiPAP rejected on power failure
Results found:
1.
2.
3.
Comments:
Witnessed by: Date:

7.4 HiPAP 1 Tests

Method:
- On DP
-
1. Carry out a standard box move , confirm position with the DGPS in UTM
2. Rotate 180o , confirm position with the DGPS in UTM
3. Continue by rotating another 180o , confirm position with the DGPS in UTM
4. Check interrogation time (change to different intervals)
5. Check test menus and display
Results expected:
1. No loss of position
2. No loss of position, offset OK
4. Different interrogation time, OK
5. All functions normal
Results found:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Comments:
Witnessed by: Date:

7.5 HiPAP 2 Tests

Method:
- On DP
-
1. Test each transponder in turn to DP with HiPAP
2. Lift one transponder used for DP without deselecting

- Select transponder to DP when suspended to test voting
- Make small move
- Stabilise
3. Fail power to HiPAP transceiver unit
Results expected:
1. All transponders work

2. Transponder rejected when moved
Transponder rejected when suspended
3. Alarm, HiPAP rejected on power failure
Results found:
1.
2.
3.
Comments:
Witnessed by: Date:

7.6 HiPAP 2 Tests

Method:
- On DP
-
1. Carry out a standard box move , confirm position with the DGPS in UTM
2. Rotate 180o , confirm position with the DGPS in UTM
3. Continue by rotating another 180o , confirm position with the DGPS in UTM
4. Check interrogation time (change to different intervals)
5. Check test menus and display
Results expected:
1. No loss of position
4. Different interrogation time, OK
5. All functions normal
Results found:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Comments:
Witnessed by: Date:

8 EQUIPMENT SUB-SYSTEM 8 BACKUP DP

CONTROL
8.1 Backup DP Computer change over test
Method:
- On DP
1. On auto DP at Main DP OS, operate switch at backup DP OS.

2. Visual inspect backup switch, cabling, relay, markings.
Results expected:
1. Transition to backup DP control using all thrusters and available reference systems such as
Seapath 2 & HiPAP 2.
2. No loose cabling or relay, marking in place.
Results found:
1.
Comments:
Witnessed by: Date:

EQUIPMENT SUB-SYSTEM 8 BACKUP DP CONTROL
8.2 Backup Computer change over test

Method:
- On DP
1. Simulate failure in main instrument room or fire on main bridge. By closing power to all
systems in the room.
Results expected:
1. Alarm, Backup DP available selected by operator on DP by backup system.
Results found:
Comments:
Witnessed by: Date:

8.3 Backup Computer

Method:
- On DP
- On Backup DP OS
1. Utilise manual and DP control on bridge

2. Fail power supply to thruster controls in instrument room (main and backup)
3. Fail supply to bridge equipment (non backup DP)
Results expected:
1. No loss of controls on backup DP through any failure in main DP area (bridge)

Results found:
Comments:
Witnessed by: Date:

8.4 Backup DP Console

Method:
- On DP
- On Backup DP OS
1. Perform lamp and alarm test

2. Check wind sensor operation
3. Check VRS sensor operation
4. Check DGPS operation
5. Check HiPAP operation
6. For each thruster check feedback, setpoint on pitch/ rpm and azimuth
7. Check mimic for errors between main DP and backup DP OS
Results expected:
1. Operational
2. Operational
3. Operational
4. Operational
5. Operational
6. Within limits
7. No deviation show the same data
Results found:
Comments:
Witnessed by: Date:

8.5 Backup DP Performance

Method:
- On DP
- On Backup DP OS
1. Move vessel to ensure correct operation of available reference

2. Move vessel in low gain, check acceptable positioning
3. Move vessel in high gain, check acceptable positioning
4. Deselect all references and check model control (mathematical model)
5. Check manual station keeping with DP joystick
6. Return to main DP
Results expected:
1. Operational positioning within limits.
2. Satisfactory
3. Satisfactory
4. Position loss acceptable, mathematical model OK
5. Normal operation
6. Normal operation
Results found:
Comments:
Witnessed by: Date:

9 EQUIPMENT SUB-SYSTEM 9 A/C UNITS/

VENTILATION
9.1 A/C Units/ Ventilation
Method:
- On DP
- All references selected
- All thrusters selected
1. Check cabinet fans and room air conditioning units are operational.
2. Power supply to fans and chill units to be split configured.
3. Test Fire dampers
4. Close all WT doors, stop fans by failing a Fan distribution one at the time (to be updated)
Results expected:
1. All operational
2. Power supplies are split configured and same for chill units, a single system does not feed
all.
3. All operational
4. Power generation should not be affected
Results found:
Comments:
Witnessed by: Date

10 EQUIPMENT SUB-SYSTEM 10 CABLING

10.1 General Cabling
Method:
- On DP
1. Asses DP class 3, required cable segregation for control systems and power supplies.
Results expected:
1. Cables segregated according to requirements
Results found:
Comments:
Witnessed by: Date:

11 EQUIPMENT SUB-SYSTEM 11 PIPING

11.1 General Piping
Method:
- On DP
1. Check mechanical segregation against design specification for the systems; FO, LO, Air,
SW/FW cooling.
2. Check marking and labelling for X-over valves
Results expected:
1 Piping segregated according to requirements

2 X-over valves are marked and ease of access
Results found:
Comments:
Witnessed by: Date:


12 EQUIPMENT SUB-SYSTEM 12 FIRE &

FLOODING
12.1 Simulating fire/ flooding of a compartment
Method:
- On DP
1. Simulate failure fire / flooding of a compartment, by shutting down all power to that DP
zone and cabling that goes through with exception if it has A-60 insulation.
Results expected:
1. Alarm, single failure shall not exceed worst case failure.
Results found:
Comments:
This test to be assessed by Auditor after a walkthrough of the vessel.
Witnessed by: Date:

13 EQUIPMENT SUB-SYSTEM 13 ESD/F&G

EMERGENCY STOPS
13.1 Fire & Gas system
Method:
1. Open network loop Net A

2. Open network loop Net B
3. Fail supply 1 to ESD / F&G I/O cabinet
4. Fail supply 1 to ESD / F&G I/O cabinet
5. Simulate loss of I/O cabinet by failing both supplies
6. Simulate loss of ESD/ F&G Matrix
7. Simulate loss of ESD/ F&G node cabinet
8. Fail ESD / F&G computer
Result expected
1. Alarm
2. Alarm
3. Alarm
4. Alarm
5. Alarm, Loss of that I/O cabinet
6. Alarm No affect on station keeping
7. Alarm No affect on station keeping
8. Alarm
Any failure shall not affect Station keeping
Results found:
Comments:
Witnessed by: Date:

14 EQUIPMENT SUB-SYSTEM 14
COMMUNICATION
14.1 Communication devices
Method:
1. Communication equipment between bridge and control stations to be tested.

Test to include raising call in each direction
2. Check ergonomic on DP bridge (visuality, blindfolds)
3. Test DP alert system and fail power supply to the DP alert system, restore
4. Visual inspection of DP alert switch
5. Fail power supply to Clear Com. System, restore (if installed)
Results expected:
1. Clear communication
2. Good ergonomic layout throughout
3. Works OK , dual supplied from UPS 2 and 3 alarm in DP upon a power failure
4. No loose cabling/relay DP alert switch with in reach of DP control station
5. Alarm, no affect Clear Com on UPS
Results found:
1.
2.
3.
Comments:
Witnessed by: Date:

Client: Sevan Marine Ltd Date: 02.10.2008 Page: C 1
APPENDIX C
Recommendations

Client: Sevan Marine Ltd Date: 02.10.2008 Page: C 2
15 RECOMMENDATIONS
15.1 General
15.1.1 Following recommendations are made after review of provided data and
making the desk top study FMEA report.
15.1.2 Recommendations are made in three categories.

A is to comply with Class 3 DP, or to be implemented as soon as practicable.
B is for serious consideration.
C is for longer term consideration or for general improvement.
15.2 Recommendations
15.2.1 It is recommended to carry out the FMEA proving trials listed in Appendix B
to confirm the failure modes written.
15.2.2 The independent joystick is connected to the main bridge console and
respective thruster CPU instead of be directed to the thruster controllers in
respective thruster rooms. Therefore this joystick cannot be seen as a fully
independent joystick but more like a common joystick.
It is recommended to have the cabling from the joystick control cabinet (cC-1)
to be routed directly to respective thruster controller.
15.2.3 The emergency stop pushbuttons are only placed on the main bridge console;
there is none adjacent to main DP or in the backup DP room. It is
recommended to have emergency stop pushbutton placed within reach of
DPOs. To avoid communication failure by verbally tell someone to shut down
a thruster. In respect that the thruster are not of variable pitch type there with
risk of failing to max speed there are scenarios that can influence the station
keeping performance with fixed pitch variable speed thrusters too.
It is recommended to install emergency stop pushbuttons in close vicinity of
the DP desk too.
15.2.4 The single Thruster IAS controller has communication link to all Thruster
controllers and to main Bridge console. According to Siemens a failure of this
will only cause loss of thruster feedback on gauges and monitoring.
a. A single failure here will result in loss of all feedback if in manual
mode no affect in DP mode, still a weak design.
b. What will happen, if there is a short circuit in this unit, spike on the
network modem/ line will that could damage all thruster controllers,
hence loss of all thrusters.
c. Trails to confirm the above

Client: Sevan Marine Ltd Date: 02.10.2008 Page: D 1
APPENDIX C
3D models of DP cable layout
3D view of the cable routing Sevan Driller, based on provided drawing GA-105410-N111-
619-009 rev 04 DP principle routing diagram
The following colour coding is used:
A-60 insulation is shown in pink outer layer of the routing where
The first view is from EL3500 and then it goes up wards through the vessel.

EL3500
EL6500
Split # is power cabling to respective thruster room.

EL9700
EL16700

EL20500
EL24500

EL28500
EL32500
From this elevation the DP nets are run in separate A-60 trunks upward.

This view shows the total view of all cabling DP Network, IAS Network and Power cabling
to thruster rooms (TR).

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Client: Sevan Marine Ltd Date: 02.10.

2008 Page:2 of 112

Rev. Reason Page(s)

Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-668-001-R01

Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-668-001-R01

9.6 Freshwater Cooling Auxiliary Systems ....................................................................49

Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-668-001-R01

APPENDIX A DP I/O Spec

Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-668-001-R01

1.1.2 The scope of work consists of:

1.2 Reference Standards

1.3.1 The objective of the FMEA is to provide a complete, systematic and

1.3.2 The FMEA is an independent document containing a system description of the

Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-668-001-R01

1.3.5 The FMEA is limited to specific failure conditions of individual components

1.3.6 It is assumed that the electrical switchboard and distribution system is

1.4 Vessel Particulars

1.4.2 Vessel Data:

Length (Loa): 85 meters

Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-668-001-R01

Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-668-001-R01

1.5 Definition of DP Class 3

1.5.1 Quote from IMO MSC Circ. 645 for DP classes

.2 For equipment class 2, a loss of position is not to occur in the event of

.1 Any active component or system (generators, thrusters,

.2 Any normally static component (cables, pipes, manual valves,

.3 For equipment class 3, a single failure includes:

.1 Items listed above for class 2, and any normally static

.2 All components in any one watertight compartment, from fire

.3 All components in any one fire sub-division, from

2.3 For equipment classes 2 and 3, a single inadvertent act should be

Automatic and manual position and heading control under specified

Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-668-001-R01

The generators and the distribution systems must be arranged in different

Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-668-001-R01

In a 2-split mode: an Automatic Voltage Regulator (AVR) failure of a

All electrical consumers are powered from respective SWBD; hence a

Worst single failure of the DP control system is loss of an UPS, as this

Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-668-001-R01

A fire or flooding in any compartment has not been identified to exceed

o Engine-, SWBD and thruster rooms are in separate

o The main DP system (MCR / main DP equip. room) is placed in

Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-668-001-R01

Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-668-001-R01

IMCA International Marine Contractors Association

Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-668-001-R01

Structure deck plan:

Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-668-001-R01

failure, fire and flooding included in a 4-split configuration, or 50% capacity in

4.1.5 The various zones are illustrated below in Figure 4-1:

Figure 4-2: Main component zone plan, courtesy: Sevan Marine

Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-668-001-R01

Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-668-001-R01

4.2 Cable Routing

Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-668-001-R01

Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-668-001-R01

4.3 Fire and Flooding Protection

4.3.5 With reference to drawing GA-105410_N111-619-009 rev it can be identified

Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-668-001-R01

5.2 Main Engines & Alternators

Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-668-001-R01

Engine Room 1 Engine Room 2 Engine Room 3 Engine Room 4

DG1 DG2 DG3 DG4 DG5 DG6 DG7 DG8