G.R. No.

78742 [July 14, 1989]

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, et al., petitioners,
vs. HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent.

FACTS: The association of the Small Landowners of the Philippines invokes the right of retention granted
by PD 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding 7 hectares as long as they are cultivating on
intend to cultivate the same. Their respected lands do not exceed the statutory limits but are occupied
by tenants who re actually cultivating such lands.
Because PD No. 316 provides that no tenant-farmer in agricultural land primarily devoted to rice and
corn shall be ejected or removed from his farm holding until such time as the respective rights of the
tenant-farmers and the land owners shall have been determined, they petitioned the court for a writ of
mandamus to compel the DAR Secretary to issue the IRR, as they could not eject their tenants and so
are unable to enjoy their right of retention.
ISSUE
Whether or not the assailed statutes are valid exercises of police power.
Whether or not the content and manner of just compensation provided for the CARP is violative of the
Constitution.
Whether or not the CARP and EO 228 contravene a well accepted principle of eminent domain by
divesting the land owner of his property even before actual payment to him in full of just compensation
HELD
Yes. The subject and purpose of agrarian reform have been laid down by the Constitution itself, which
satisfies the first requirement of the lawful subject. However, objection is raised to the manner fixing
the just compensation, which it is claimed is judicial prerogatives. However, there is no arbitrariness in
the provision as the determination of just compensation by DAR is only preliminary unless accepted by
all parties concerned. Otherwise, the courts will still have the right to review with finality the said
determination.
No. Although the traditional medium for payment of just compensation is money and no other, what is
being dealt with here is not the traditional exercise of the power and eminent domain. This is a
revolutionary kind of expropriation, which involves not mere millions of pesos. The initially intended
amount of P50B may not be enough, and is in fact not even fully available at the time. The invalidation
of the said section resulted in the nullification of the entire program.
No. EO 228 categorically stated that all qualified farmer-beneficiaries were deemed full owners of the
land they acquired under PP 27, after proof of full payment of just compensation. The CARP Law, for its
part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on the receipt
by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit of DAR of the compensation in cash or
LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner.
______________________________________________________
G.R. No. 70736, March 16, 1987
Bonifacio Hilario and Eduarda Buencamino Hilario
vs Hon. IAC and Salvador Baltazar

Facts:
January 1981, Salvador Baltazar filed a verified complaint with Courts of Agrarian Relation-Bulacan
alleging that since January 1955 he had been continuous possession as a share tenant of a parcel of land
in Bulacan which was previously owned by Socorro Vda. de Balagtas. Thereafter, the spouses Hilario
began to threaten him to desist from entering and cultivating the land.
Baltazar claims that he became sa tenant of Socorro by virtue of a kasunduan executed in 1979. After
the death of Socorro, he allegedly gave the share pertaining to the daughter of Socorro Corazon
Pengzon. It was only in December 1980 that Baltazar knew that portion of the land was already owned
by the Hilarios.
The Hilarios, aver that they acquired the land from the PNB after it had been foreclosed. CAR ruled that
the land in question is not an agricultural land but a plain "bakuran". Hence, Baltazar is not a tenant.
CA however remanded the case to the lower court for further proceesings on the ground that the
findings of CAR were not supported by substantial evidence. In compliance, CAR admitted additional
evidence.
Again, CAR declared Baltazar as non-tenant. Baltazar appealed with IAC, IAC set aside the decision of the
CAR and entitling Baltazar security of tenure on the land. Spouse Hilario then petition for review.

Issue: Whether Baltazar is a tenant.

Ruling:
The evidence presented is more than sufficient to justify the conclusion that Baltazar is not a tenant of
the landholding. (a) The kasunduan refers to 2-hectare land, while the landholding is only 4000 sqm. (b)
When Socorro died, no new contract was executed. (c) Corazon did not receive any rental or share from
the produce of the land.

G.R. No. 176942, August 28, 2008

Nicorp Management and Development Corp. vs Leonida de Leon
FACTS: These consolidated petitions assail the Decision of the CA finding respondent De Leon as a bona
fide tenant of the subject property. Respondent filed a complaint praying that petitioners Lim and/or
NICORP Management and Devt Corp.be ordered to respect her tenancy rights over a parcel of land in
Cavite registered to the De Leon sisters, who were likewise impleaded as parties-defendants in the suit.
Respondent alleged that she was the actual tiller and cultivator of the land with full knowledge of the
owners, who were her sisters-in-law. Petitioner denied that respondent was a tenant of the subject
property and alleged that respondent is no longer physically capable of tilling the land. Respondent
submitted evidences to prove that she was made a tenant of the land as well as the agricultural
activities of respondent and her family. However, a Decision was rendered dismissing the complaint for
failure of resp.to prove by substantial evidence all the requisites of an agricultural tenancy relationship.
On appeal, the CA reversed the findings of DARAB stating that there was sufficient evidence to prove the
elements of an agricultural tenancy relationship. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was
denied. Hence, this petition from petitioners Lim and NICORP.
ISSUE: WON occupancy and continued possession of the land makes one a de jure tenant.
HELD: NO. The respondent being allowed to cultivate the property without opposition, does not mean
that the De Leon sisters impliedly recognized the existence of a leasehold relation with respondent. The
principal factor in determining whether a tenancy relationship exists is intent. Tenancy is not a purely
factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land but is a legal relationship.
Thus, the intent of the parties, the understanding when the farmer is installed, and their written
agreements, provided these are complied with and are not contrary to law, are more important. There is
a tenancy relationship if the ff.essential elements concur: 1) the parties are the landowner and the
tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; 3) there is
consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about
agricultural production; 5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee;
and 6) the harvest is shared between landowner and tenant or agricultural lessee.

G.R. No. 108941, July 6, 2000

Reynaldo Bejasa and Erlinda Bejasa vs CA, Isabel Candelaria and Jamie Dinglasan

Facts:
This case involves two parcels of land located in Oriental Mindoro owned by Isabel Candelaria. October
1974, Candelaria entered into a 3-year lease agreement with Pio Malabanan wherein Malabanan agreed
to clear, clean and cultivate the land, to purchase calamansi, and other seedlings, to attend and care for
whatever plants thereon exist, to make the necessary harvest of fruits.
Malabanan, later hired the Bejasas to plant on the land and to clear it. On May 1977, Candelaria gave
Malabanan a 6-year usufruct over the land. 1983, Malabanan died. Candelaria constituted Jaime
Dinglasan as her attorney-in-fact, having powers of administration over the land.
October 1984, Candelaria entered into a new lease contract with Victoria Dinglasan, Jaime's wife with a
1-year term. On December 1984, Bejasas agreed to pay Victoria rent in consideration of an "pakyaw na
bunga" agreement, with a term of 1 year. After the 1 year period, Victoria demanded for Bejasas to
vacate, but Bejasas continued to stay and did not give any consideration for its use, be in rent or share.
Candelarian again entered with a 3-year lease agreement with Dinglasans, and made Jaime her
attorney-in-fact again. Jaime then filed a complaint before Commission on the Settlement of Land
Problems (COSLAP) seeking for ejectment of Bejasas. COSLAP dismissed the complaint. Jaime then filed
it with RTC for recovery of possession; the case was referred to DAR. DAR certified that ht e case was
not proper for trial before the civil courts. Trial court dismissed the complaint of Jaime including the
leasehold claim of Bejasas. Bejasas then filed a complaint for confirmation of leasehold and recovery of
damages against Candelaria and Jaime.
RTC favored the Bejasas. On appeal, CA reversed the decision saying that (1) there was no tenant
relationship, (2) Bejasas are mere overseers and not as permanent tenants, (3) the pakyaw contract
have expired, (4) sharing of profits was not proven, (5) the element of personal cultivation was not
proven.
Issue: Whether there is tenancy in favor of Bejasas.
Ruling: There is no tenancy relationship. There was no proof of shared harvests. Between Candelaria (as
owner) and the Bejasas, there is no relationship. Candelaria never gave her consent. As to the authority
of Dinglasans, they had authority to bind the owner in a tenancy agreement, but there is no proof of
such presented.

G.R. No. L-62626, July 18, 1984

Spouses Cayetano and Patricia Tiongson, etc.
vs CA and Teodoro Macaya
Ponente: Gutierrez

Facts:
1946, Severino Manotok donated and transferred to his 8 children and 2 grandchildren a 34 hectare
land in Quezon City. Severino Manotok was appointed judicial guardian of his minor children. There was
no tenant occupying the property at the time of the donation.
Later, Teodoro Macaya accompanied Vicente Herrera, the overseer of the property, went to the
Manotok and pleaded that he be allowed to live in the property to prevent theft and to guard the
property. Manotok allowed Macaya but imposed the condition that any time the owners needed to take
the property, Macaya and his family must vacate, and that he could raise animals and plant according to
his needs, and that the owners have no responsibility to Macaya and he will use only 3 hectares. These
conditions were not put in writing.
In 1950, the property owners organized themselves as a corporation and transferred the 34 hectare land
a capital contribution to the capital stock of the corporation. Later, when the owners demanded for
payment of taxes, Macaya agreed to help pay the taxes by remitting 10 cavans of palay every year as his
contribution. Later, owners requested Macaya to increase his contribution to 20 cavans, Macaya agreed.
Later, Macaya pleaded that he will contribute 10 cavans only, the owners said the "he might as well not
deliver anymore". Macaya did not deliver palays from then on.
1974, the owners executed a Unilateral Deed of Conveyance of the property to Patricia Tiongson, etc.
Macaya was informed that the land is needed for house construction of the owners and was asked to
vacate, Macaya pleaded that he may be allowed to harvest first before vacating. However, after harvest,
Macaya did not vacate and even expand his cultivation to 6 hectares without the consent of the owners.

Issue: Whether there is tenancy relationship between the parties.

Ruling: Real estate taxes of the property declare the land as residential. The physical view of the
property also shows that the land was a rolling forestal land without any flat portion except the one
tilled by Macaya.
As to the sharing, the decision of the petitioners not to ask for anymore contributions from Macaya
reveals that there was no tenancy relationship ever agreed upon by the parties. Neither can such
relationship be implied from the facts as there was no agreed system of sharing the produce of the
property. Moreover, from 1946 to 1956 at which time, Macaya was also planting rice, there was no
payment whatsoever. At the most and during the limited period when it was in force, the arrangement
was a civil lease where the lessee for a fixed price leases the property while the lessor has no
responsibility whatsoever for the problems of production and enters into no agreement as to the
sharing of the costs of fertilizers, irrigation, seedlings, and other items.
As to consent, the lot was taxed as residential land in a metropolitan area. There was clearly no
intention on the part of the owners to devote the property for agricultural production but only for
residential purposes. Thus, together with the third requisite, the fourth requisite which is the purpose
was also not present.
There was no agreement as to any system of sharing the produce of the land. The petitioners did not get
anything from the harvest and private respondent Macaya was using and cultivating the land free from
any charge or expense.

G.R. No. 36213, June 29, 1989

Felix Gonzales and Carmen Gonzales vs CA, deceased spouses Andres Agcaoile and Leonora Agcaoile,
substituted by Lucia Sison

Facts:
October 1988, Lucia Sison filed a motion to be substituted in lieu of Andres and Leonora as she inherited
the unsold lots of the deceased spouses. The court granted her motion.
Spouses are owners of parcels of land in Bulacan At the time of the purchased of the spouses, Maximo
Cruz was th tenant who was planting palay thereon. Maximo continued as tenant until he died and was
succeeded by his son Fidel Cruz. After 4 years as tennat, Fidel was succeeded by Pascual Gonzales, father
of Felix Gonzales. In 1954, Pascual ceased to be a tenant because the land was proposed to be
converted into residential subdivision.
Since 1956, spouses offered to pay rental and acted as agents for the sale of the subdivision lots. While
they are renting, the spouses requsted that they may be allowed to plant palay on the lots that have not
yet been sold. No specific agreement was concluded with regards of harvest, but spouses delivered part
of the yield to Federico Mateo, defendants overseer.
When spouses defaulted in paying the rentals, the owner demanded for payment of rental or to vacate.
Spouses then filed to elect the leasehold system and pray for a reliquidation of past harvest embracing
the agricultural years. Before summons were served, owners initiated an action against the spouses for
recovery of possession. CFI-Bulacan, favored Gonzales, the owner.
CA upheld the decision of the court saying that the property ceased to be an agricultural or farmland,
having been converted as residential subdivision.

Issue: Whether an agricultural tenancy relationship can be created over land embraced in an approved
residential subdivision.

Ruling: There is no merit. An agricultural leasehold cannot be established on land which has ceased to
be devoted to cultivation or farming because of its conversion into a residential subdivision.
Petitioners may not invoke Section 36(l) of Republic Act No. 3844 which provides that "when the lessor-
owner fails to substantially carry out the conversion of his agricultural land into a subdivision within one
year after the dispossession of the lessee, the lessee shall be entitled to reinstatement and damages,"
for the petitioners were not agricultural lessees or tenants of the land before its conversion into a
residential subdivision in 1955. Not having been dispossessed by the conversion of the land into a
residential subdivision, they may not claim a right to reinstatement.
Furthermore, their admission that: (1) they leased from the respondents a lot (No. 1285-M) in the
subdivision on which they built their house; (2) that as commission agents for the respondents, they
were able to sell a subdivision lot to Clemente Bernabe, and received a P 300-commission on the sale;
and (3) that "a number of other lots were sold by respondents to different buyers," (p. 51, Rollo) refutes
the petitioners' contention that the development of the subdivision was a mere "scheme" to dispossess
the previous tenant.
On the other hand, the petitioners' tactic of entering the subdivision as lessee of a homelot and
thereafter cultivating some unsold lots ostensibly for temporary use as a home garden, but covertly for
the purpose of later claiming the land as "tenanted" farm lots, recalls the fable of the camel that sought
shelter inside its master's tent during a storm, and once inside, kicked its master out of the tent. Here,
the private respondents' tolerance of the petitioners' supposedly temporary use of some vacant lots in
the subdivision was seized by the latter as a weapon to deprive the respondents of their land.
________________________________________________________________________________
G.R. No. 78214, December 5, 1988
Yolanda Caballes
vs Dept. Agrarian Reform, Hon. Heherson Alvarez and Bienvenido Abajon
Ponente: Sarmiento

Facts:
The landholding subject of the controversy is consists of 60 sqm was acquired by spouses Arturo and
Yolanda Caballes by virute of a Deed of Sale executed by Andrea Alicaba Millenes, this land is situated in
Lawaan Talisay, Cebu. Before the sale of the property to Caballes, Bienvenido Abajon constructed his
house on a protion of the land, paying monthly rental to Andrea Millenes. Abjon was likewise allowed to
plant thereon, and they have agreed that the produce thereon would be shred by them 50-50.
When the property was sold, Caballes told Abajon that they will put up a poultry on the land and they
intended to build it close to Abajon's house and they pursuaded Abajon to transfer his dwelling to the
opposite portion of the land. Abajon offered to pay renta; to the new owners, but they refuse and later
demanded for Abajon to vacate. Abajon refused to leave.
DAR concluded that Abajon was a tenant of the former owner, Andrea.

Issue: Whether Abajon is a tenant under the new owners.

Ruling:
Abajon is not a tenant for it only occupied a miniscule portion of the land which cannot be interpreted
as economic-family size farm under the definition of RA 3844.

The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are:

1. The parties are the landowner and the tenant;

2. The subject is agricultural land;
3. There is consent;
4. The purpose is agricultural production;
5. There is personal cultivation; and
6. There is sharing of harvests.

All these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the parties. The
absence of one does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or a planter
thereon, a de jure tenant. This is so because unless a person has established his status as a de jure
tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the
Government under existing tenancy laws.
Therefore, the fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationship. Certainly, it is
not unusual for a landowner to accept some of the produce of his land from someone who plants
certain crops thereon. This is a typical and laudable provinciano trait of sharing or patikim, a native way
of expressing gratitude for favor received. This, however, does not automatically make the tiller-sharer a
tenant thereof especially when the area tilled is only 60, or even 500, square meters and located in an
urban area and in. the heart of an industrial or commercial zone at that. Tenancy status arises only if an
occupant of a parcel of land has been given its possession for the primary purpose of agricultural
production. The circumstances of this case indicate that the private respondent's status is more of a
caretaker who was allowed by the owner out of benevolence or compassion to live in the premises and
to have a garden of some sort at its south western side rather than a tenant of the said portion.
Anent the second assignment of error, the petitioner argues that since Abajon, is not an agricultural
tenant, the criminal case for malicious mischief filed against him should be declared as proper for trial so
that proceedings in the lower court can resume.

US v. Hon. Luis R. Reyes- DIGEST

[219 SCRA 192, March 1, 1993]
G.R. No. 79253

FACTS:

Private respondent [Montoya] is an American citizen, employed as an identification (I.D.) checker at the
U.S. Navy Exchange (NEX) at the Joint United States Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG) headquarters in
Quezon City. Petitioner [Bradford] also worked at NEX JUSMAG as an activity manager. There was an
incident on 22 January 1987 whereby Bradford had Montoyas person and belongings searched in front
of many curious onlookers. This caused Montoya to feel aggrieved and to file a suit for damages.

Contentions:
Bradford claimed that she was immune from suit because:
1) (This) action is in effect a suit against the United States of America, a foreign sovereign immune from
suit without its consent for the cause of action pleaded in the complaint; and

2) Defendant, Maxine Bradford, as manager of the US Navy Exchange Branch at JUSMAG, Quezon City, is
immune from suit for act(s) done by her in the performance of her official functions under the Philippines-
United States Military Assistance Agreement of 1947 and Military Bases Agreement of 1947, as amended.

Montoya argued that:

(a) Bradford, in ordering the search upon her person and belongings outside the NEX JUSMAG store in the
presence of onlookers, had committed an improper, unlawful and highly discriminatory act against a
Filipino employee and had exceeded the scope of her authority; (b) having exceeded her authority,
Bradford cannot rely on the sovereign immunity of the public petitioner because her liability is personal;
(c) Philippine courts are vested with jurisdiction over the case because Bradford is a civilian employee who
had committed the challenged act outside the U.S. Military Bases; such act is not one of those exempted
from the jurisdiction of Philippine courts; and (d) Philippine courts can inquire into the factual
circumstances of the case to determine whether or not Bradford had acted within or outside the scope of
her authority.

ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not Bradford acted as an agent of the US government hence entitled to diplomatic
immunity.
2.) Whether or not the case at bar is a suit against the State.
HELD:

1.) NO. First of all, she is not among those granted diplomatic immunity under Art. 16(b) of the 1953
Military Assistance Agreement creating the JUSMAG. Second, even diplomatic agents who enjoy
immunity are liable if they perform acts outside their official functions (Art. 31, Vienna Convention
on Diplomatic Relations).

2.) NO .Doctrine of state immunity is expressed in Art. XVI, Sec. 3 of the 1987 Constitution. This
immunity also applies to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed
by them in discharge of their duties since it will require the state to perform an affirmative act
such as appropriation of amount to pay damages. This will be regarded as a case against the state
even if it has not be formally impleaded. But this is not all encompassing. Its a different matter
where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law &
injurious to rights of plaintiff. State authorizes only legal acts by its officers. Action against officials
by one whose rights have been violated by such acts is not a suit against the State w/in the rule
of immunity of the State from suit. The doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an
instrument for perpetrating an injustice. It will not apply & may not be invoked where the public
official is being sued in his private & personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. This usually arises
where the public official acts w/o authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. A public
official is liable if he acted w/malice & in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or
jurisdiction. (Shauf vs. CA) Also, USA vs. Guinto declared that USA is not conferred with blanket
immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines merely because they have acted as
agents of the US in the discharge of their official functions. In this case, Bradford was sued in her
private/personal capacity for acts done beyond the scope & place of her official function, thus, it
falls w/in the exception to the doctrine of state immunity.