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INTRODUCTION
The branch of public law that fixes the organization of the government
and determines competence of authorities who execute the law and indicates
to individual remedies for the violations of his rights.
I. Concept
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compensation commissions, x x x and the like. x x x The term 'agency'
includes any department, independent establishment, commission,
administration, authority, board or bureau x x x ."
Issue: WON administrative agency has only such powers as expressly granted
to it by law and those that are necessarily implied in the exercise thereof?
RULING: The SC ruled in the negative. Administrative agency has only such
powers as are expressly granted to it by law and those that are necessarily
implied in the exercise thereof?
In this case, administrative agency is judicially defined as government body
charged with the administering and implementing particular legislation
examples are workers compensation commissions and the like. The term
agency includes any department, independent establishment, commission,
administration, authority or bureau.
Ruling: Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and
control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and
the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the Policy of the
legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the
organic law of its existence
Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control
over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the
promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the
legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the
organic law of its existence "we can readily see that membership in the
Provincial or City Committee on Justice would not involve any regulation or
control over the conduct and affairs of individuals. Neither will the Committee
on Justice promulgate rules and regulations nor exercise any quasi-legislative
functions. Its work is purely advisory. A member of the judiciary joining any
study group which concentrates on the administration of justice as long as the
group merely deliberates on problems involving the speedy disposition of
cases particularly those involving the poor and needy litigants-or detainees,
pools the expertise and experiences of the members, and limits itself to
recommendations which may be adopted or rejected by those who have the
power to legislate or administer the particular function involved in their
implementation.
Facts: In this Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer
for a Temporary Restraining Order, petitioners Salvador C. Fernandez and
Anicia M. de Lima assail the validity of Resolution No. 94-3710 of the Civil
Service Commission and the authority of the Commission to issue the same.
Petitioner Fernandez was serving as Director of the Office of Personnel
Inspection and Audit while petitioner de Lima was serving as Director of the
Office of the Personnel Relations, both at the Central Office of the Civil Service
Commission in Quezon City, Metropolitan Manila. While petitioners were so
serving, Resolution No. 94-3710 signed by public respondents Patricia A. Sto.
Tomas and Ramon Ereneta, Jr., Chairman and Commissioner, respectively, of
the Commission, was issued .
Issues:
(1)Whether or not the Civil Service Commission had legal authority to issue
Resolution No. 94-3710 to the extent it merged the OCSS [Office of Career
Systems and Standards], the OPIA [Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit]
and the OPR [Office of Personnel Relations], to form the RDO [Research and
Development Office]; and
Ruling: Public office is frequently used to refer to the right, authority and
duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period either fixed
by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is
invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of government, to be
exercised by that individual for the benefit of the public (radlapsbip)
N.B. We (SC) note, firstly, that appointments to the staff of the Commission
are not appointments to a specified public office but rather appointments to
particular positions or ranks. Thus a person may be appointed to the position
of Director III or Director IV; or to the position of Attorney IV or Attorney V;
or to the position of Records Officer I or Records Officer II; and so forth. In
the instant case, petitioners were each appointed to the position of Director
IV, without specification of any particular office or station. The same is true
with respect to the other persons holding the same position or rank of Director
IV of the Commission.
Ruling: As recently stressed by the Court, "in this era of clogged court
dockets, the need for specialized administrative boards or commissions with
the special knowledge, experience and capability to hear and determine
promptly disputes on technical matters or essentially factual matters, subject
to judicial review in case of grave abuse of discretion, has become well-nigh
indispensable.
Reyes vs Caneba
4. Definition of Administration
Facts: Dorr is the owner of newspaper manila freedom charge with the crime
of libel together with Eduard OBrian.
The defendants were tried and found guilty of the offense charged in the
complaint, and each was sentenced to six months imprisonment at hard labor
and a fine of $1,000, United States currency. From this judgment the
defendants have appealed to this court.
During the course of the proceedings a motion was made by the defendants
asking that they be granted a trial by jury, as provided for in Article 111,
section 2, of the Constitution of the United States, and under the sixth
amendment to the Constitution, which motion was denied by the court, and
an exception was also taken to this ruling.
1. That while the Philippine Islands constitute territory which has been
acquired by and belongs to the United States, there is a difference between
such territory and the territories which are a part-of the United States with
reference to the Constitution of the United States.
2. That the Constitution was not extended here by the terms of the treaty
of Paris, under which the Philippine Islands were acquired from Spain. By the
treaty the status of the ceded territory was to be determined by Congress.
3. That the mere act of cession of the Philippines to the United States did
not extend the Constitution here, except such parts as fall within the general
principles of fundamental limitations in favor of personal rights formulated in
the Constitution and its amendments, and which exist rather by inference and
the general spirit of the Constitution, and except those express provisions of
the Constitution which prohibit Congress from passing laws in their
contravention under any circumstances; that the provisions contained in the
Constitution relating to jury trials do not fall within either of these exceptions,
and, consequently, the right to trial by jury has not been extended here by
the mere act of the cession of the territory.
4. That Congress has passed no law extending here the provision of the
Constitution relating to jury trials, nor were any laws in existence in the
Philippine Islands, at the date of their cession, for trials by jury, and
consequently there is no law in the Philippine Islands entitling the defendants
in this case to such trial; that the Court of First Instance committed no error
in overruling their application for a trial by jury
The court reach the conclusion that the Philippine Commission is a body
expressly recognized and sanctioned by act of Congress, having the power to
pass laws, and has the power to pass the libel law under which the defendants
where convicted.
II. Creation, reorganization, and abolition of administrative
agencies
Issue: WON the CSC had the power to abolish the career executive service
board.
Ruling: No. "Except for such offices as are created by the Constitution, the
creation of public offices is primarily a legislative function, In so far as the
legislative power in this respect is not restricted by constitutional provisions,
it is supreme, and the legislature may decide for itself what offices are
suitable, necessary, or convenient. When in the exigencies of government it
is necessary to create and define duties, the legislative department has the
discretion to determine whether additional offices shall be created, or whether
these duties shall be attached to and become ex-officio duties of existing
offices. An office created by the legislature is wholly within the power of that
body, and it may prescribe the mode of filling the office and the powers and
duties of the incumbent, and, if it sees fit, abolish the office."
Issue: Whether or not the total destruction of the bridge abolished the
position of toll collector.
Held: The SC ruled in the negative. All offices created by statute are more or
less temporary, transitory or precarious in that they are subject to the power
of the legislature to abolish them. But this is not saying that the rights of the
incumbents of such positions may be impaired while the offices exist, except
for cause.
Issue: WON the enactment into law of BP 129 was done in good faith.
Ruling: Yes, it was done in good faith and is valid. This conclusion flows from
the fundamental proposition that the legislature may abolish courts inferior to
the Supreme Court and therefore may reorganize them territorially or
otherwise thereby necessitating new appointments and commissions. Section
2, Article VIII of the Constitution vests in the National Assembly the power to
define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts, subject
to certain limitations in the cage of the Supreme Court.
Facts: President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued P.D. No. 1341 converting the Phil
College of Commerce into a Polytechnic University, defining its objectives,
organizational structure and functions, and expanding its curricular offerings.
Issue: Whether or not P.D. 1341 did not abolish but only changed, the former
PCC into what is now the PUP.
Held: No, what took place was a change in academic status of the educational
institution not in its corporate life.
Neither the addition of a new course offerings nor changes in its existing
structure and organization bring about the abolition of an educational
institution and the creation of a new one only an express declaration to that
effect by the lawmaking authority will.
Stand transferred simply means that lands transferred to the PCC were to
be understood as transferred to the PCC were to be understood as transferred
to the PUP as the new name of the institution.
But these are hardly indicia of an intent to abolish an existing institution and
to create a new one. New course offerings can be added to the curriculum of
a school without affecting its legal existence. Nor will changes in its existing
structure and organization bring about its abolition and the creation of a new
one. Only an express declaration to that effect by the lawmaking authority
will.
1. Reorganization, defined
National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration vs CSC 221
SCRA 145
Executive Order No. 649 was enacted to improve the services and better
systematize the operation of the Land Registration Commission. A
reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy
or to make bureaucracy more efficient. To this end, the requirement of Bar
membership to qualify for key positions in the NALTDRA was imposed to meet
the changing circumstances and new development of the times. Private
respondent Garcia who formerly held the position of Deputy Register of Deeds
II did not have such qualification. It is thus clear that she cannot hold any key
position in the NILTDRA. The additional qualification was not intended to
remove her from office. Rather, it was a criterion imposed concomitant with a
valid reorganization measure.
The issue is basically one of power: whether or not, in the exercise of the
powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses
from returning to the Philippines.
Whether or not the President has the power under the Constitution, to bar the
Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. Then, we shall determine,
pursuant to the express power of the Court under the Constitution in Article
VIII, Section 1, whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she
determined that the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious
threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return.
The case for petitioners is founded on the assertion that the Tight of the
marcoses to return to the Philippines is guaranteed under the following
provisions of the Bill of Rights, to wit:
Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the
people. The Government may call upon the people to defend the State and, in
the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided
by law, to render personal, military, or civil service.
The parties are in agreement that the underlying issue is one of the scopes of
presidential power and its limits.
Executive power
As stated above, the Constitution provides that "the executive power shall be
vested in the President of the Philippines." (Art. VII, Sec. 1]. However, it does
not define what is meant by "executive power" although in the same article it
touches on the exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of
control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to
execute the laws, the appointing power, the powers under the commander-in
chief clause, the power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, the
power to grant-amnesty with the concurrence of Congress, the power to
contract or guarantee foreign loans, the power to enter into treaties or
international agreements, the power to submit the budget to Congress, and
the power to address Congress [Art. VII, Secs. 14-23].
On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution
imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President, it
maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of
"executive power." Corollary, the powers of the President cannot be said to be
limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other
words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so
enumerated.
It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is
neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive.
The Power Involved
The Constitution declares among the guiding principles that "[t]he prime duty
of the Government is to serve and protect the people" and that "[t]he
maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property,
and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by
all the people of the blessings of democracy." [Art. H, Secs. 4 and 5.]
Admittedly, service and protection of the people, the maintenance of peace
and order, the protection of life, liberty and property, and the promotion of
the general welfare are essentially ideals to guide governmental action. But
such does not mean that they are empty words. Thus, in the exercise of
presidential functions, in drawing a plan of government, and in directing
implementing action for these plans, or from another point of view, in making
any decision as President of the Republic, the President has to consider these
principles, among other things, and adhere to them.
Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the
Marcoses to return to the Philippines, the President is, under the Constitution,
constrained to consider these basic principles in arriving at a decision. More
than that, having sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution, the President
has the obligation under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their
welfare and advance the national interest. It must be borne in mind that the
To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the
common good against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power
involved is the President's residual power to protect the general welfare of the
people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people.
Ruling: As stated above, the Constitution provides that "[t]he executive power
shall be vested in the President of the Philippines." (Art. VII, Sec. 1]. However,
it does not define what is meant by "executive power" although in the same
article it touches on the exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the
power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the
power to execute the laws, the appointing power, the powers under the
commander-in-chief clause, the power to grant reprieves, commutations and
pardons, the power to grant-amnesty with the concurrence of Congress, the
power to contract or guarantee foreign loans, the power to enter into treaties
or international agreements, the power to submit the budget to Congress, and
the power to address Congress [Art. VII, Secs. 14-23]. (more than the sum
of the powers enumerated)
Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
Carpio vs Executive Secretary 206 SCRA 290
Issue
Whether or not the control over the PNP is vested soley to the
Department Secretary of the DILG.
Ruling
The Presidential Power of control was held to mean the power of the
President to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer
had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of
the former with that of the latter. This Presidential power of control over the
executive branch of government extends over all executive officers from
Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk and has been held by us. Thus, and in
short, the Presidents power of control is directly exercised by him over the
members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus
and other offices under their respective jurisdictions in the executive
department.
The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to
interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the
officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national
government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by
the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned.
With respect to the latter, the fundamental law permits him to wield no more
authority than that of checking whether said local governments or the officers
thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the
President cannot interfere with local governments, so long as the same or its
officers act within the scope of their authority. He may not enact an ordinance
which the municipal council has failed or refused to pass, even if it had thereby
violated a duty imposed thereto by law, although he may see to it that the
corresponding provincial officials take appropriate disciplinary action therefor.
Neither may he veto, set aside or annul an ordinance passed by said council
within the scope of its jurisdiction, no matter how patently unwise it may be.
He may not even suspend an elective official of a regular municipality or take
any disciplinary action against him, except on appeal from a decision of the
corresponding provincial board.
Facts: The President of the Philippines issued Executive Orders restricting the
banning of trawl fishing from San Miguel Bay. However, a group of other trawl
operators questioned the said executive orders alleging the same as null and
void.
Issue: WON the executive orders in question are null and void.
Facts: It appears that on several occasions prior to 1968, various land titles
(Torrens titles) covering lands situated within the Province of Rizal were
amended on the basis of supposed corrective resurveys, by increasing the
respective areas covered by said titles. The corresponding certifications of the
verifications of these resurveys were issued by the Land Registration Office,
headed then by petitioner Noblejas, and subsequently approved by the court,
in instances where the subdivision plans were complex, the action of the office
being sufficient where the subdivision plans were simple. Allegedly, however,
it turned out that the increases in said various amendments were far in excess
of the respective corresponding real areas of the lands involve, so much so
that even vast portions of lands and waters of the public domain not capable
of appropriation by any private person or entity have been included within the
expanded titles.
Ruling: The power of control . . . . implies the right of the President (and
naturally of his alter ego) to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may
be vested by law in the officers of the national government, as well as to act
in lieu of such officers. The provisions of the existing law to the contrary
notwithstanding, whenever a specific power, authority, duty, function, or
activity is entrusted to a chief of bureau, office, division or service, the same
shall be understood as also conferred upon the proper Department Head who
shall have authority to act directly in pursuance thereof, or to review, modify
or revoke any decision or action of said chief of bureau, office, division or
service. Accordingly, the law confers upon the Secretary only 'general
supervision and control' may not be construed as limiting or in any way
diminishing the pervasiveness of the Secretary's power of control which is
constitutionally based, since he acts also as alter ego of the President. Acts of
the (alter ego) secretary is presumed to be that of the president.
E. Power of supervision
Facts: The petitioner is the duly elected and qualified mayor of the
municipality of Mainit, province of Surigao. On 27 February 1954 Consolacion
Vda. de Mosende filed a sworn complaint with the Presidential Complaints and
Action Committee accusing him of (1) rape committed on her daughter
Caridad Mosende; and (2) concubinage for cohabiting with her daughter in a
place other than the conjugal dwelling. On 6 March the Assistant Executive
Secretary indorsed the complaint to the respondent provincial governor for
immediate investigation, appropriate action and report. On 10 April the
petitioner appeared before the provincial governor in obedience to his
summons and was served with a copy of the complaint filed by the provincial
governor with the provincial board. On the same day, the provincial, governor
issued Administrative Order No. 8 suspending the petitioner from office.
Thereafter, the Provincial Board proceeded to hear the charges preferred
against the petitioner over his objection.
Issue: Whether or not the department head as agent has the direct control
and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction
Ruling: The department head as agent of the President has direct control and
supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction as provided for
in section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code, but he does not have the
same control of local governments as that exercised by him over bureaus and,
offices under his jurisdiction. Likewise, his authority to order the investigation
of any act or conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or office under
his department is confined to bureaus or offices under his jurisdiction and does
not extend to local governments over which the President exercises only
general supervision as may be provided by law (section 10, paragraph 1,
Article VII of the Constitution). If the provisions of section 79(c) of the Revised
Administrative Code are to be construed as conferring upon the corresponding
department head direct control, direction, and supervision over all local
governments and that for that reason he may order the investigation of an
official of a local government for malfeasance in office, such interpretation
would be contrary to the provisions of paragraph 1, section 10, article VII, of
the Constitution. In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the
power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their
duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such
action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform these duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify
or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance
of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
The power to oversee that the officials concerned performs their duty and if
they later fail or neglect to fulfill them, to take such action or steps as
prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.
Rodriguez vs Montinola 94 Phil 973
Issue: Whether or not the said resolution requires the approval of the
Secretary of Finance.
Ruling: The court granted the petition. While the Secretary of Finance has the
power to revise their budget, local governments should be given a large
degree of freedom in determining for themselves the propriety and wisdom of
the expenses that they make provided that the expenses contemplated are
within their financial capacity. The supervisory authority of the President over
local governments is limited by the phrase as provided by law and where
there is no law in accordance with which said authority is to be exercised, it
must be exercised in accord with general principles of law. The Secretary of
Finance is an official of the central government, not of provincial governments,
which are distinct and separate. The power of general supervision granted to
the President over local governments, in the absence of any express provision
of law, may not generally be interpreted to mean that hem or his alter ego the
Secretary of Finance, may direct the form and manner in which local officials
shall perform or comply with their duties. Further, the court ruled that the act
of the provincial board in suppressing the positions of three special counsel
not being contrary to law, nor an act of maladministration, nor an act of abuse,
the same may not be disapproved by the Secretary of Finance acting as a
representative of he President by virtue of the latters power of general
supervision over local governments.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution but it was denied
by respondent Secretary.
Phil.
B. Purpose of doctrine
A. General rule
Ruling: One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the power
conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that
department to any other body or authority. Where the sovereign power of the
State has located the authority, there it must remain; and by the constitutional
agency alone the laws must be made until the constitution itself is changed.
The petitioner, in his contention, empowers the Secretary of Public Works with
the recommendation of the Director of Public works to legislate rules and laws
relative to the regulation of traffic in the country. Further, the petitioner
contended that such act is invalid delegation of legislative power.
The respondent public official asserted that such promulgation of rules is in
connection with the powers vested to them by the said law.
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the said act is not an invalid delegation
of power. The authority therein conferred upon them and under which they
promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine
what public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid
down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to promote safe transit
upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national
roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President
of the Philippines" and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic
"whenever the condition of the road or the traffic thereon makes such action
necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest." The delegated
power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be,
but merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the
application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations
on the use of national roads and to determine when and how long a national
road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the
traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an
administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the National
Assembly, It must depend on the discretion of some other government official
to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion
exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such
discretion is the making of the law.
Ruling: Petition granted and held the memoranda No. 92-009 invalid.
Legislature delegated to the defunct Public Service Commission the power of
fixing the rates of public services. Respondent LTFRB, the existing regulatory
body today, is likewise vested with the same under Executive Order No. 202
dated June 19, 1987. Section 5(c) of the said executive order authorizes LTFRB
"to determine, prescribe, approve and periodically review and adjust
reasonable fares, rates and other related charges, relative to the operation of
public land transportation services provided by motorized vehicles."
The authority given by the LTFRB to the provincial bus operators to set a fare
range over and above the authorized existing fare is illegal and invalid as it is
tantamount to art undue delegation of legislative authority. Potestas delegata
non delegari potest. What has been delegated cannot be delegated.
Given the complexity of the nature of the function of rate fixing and its
farreaching effects on millions of commuters, government must not relinquish
this important function in favor of those who would benefit and profit from the
industry.
Facts: This is an original action in the Supreme Court for Mandamus with
preliminary injunction. Petitioners herein, who have pending interference and
cancellation proceedings, questions the validity of Rule 168 of the Revised
Rules of Practice before the Philippine Patent Office in Trademark Cases as
amended which authorized the Director of Patents to designate any ranking
official of said office to hear inter partes proceedings. Moreover, the rule also
provided that judgment on the merits shall be personally and directly prepared
by the Director and signed by him. Petitioners contend that the amendment
made by the Director on the Rule vesting hearing officers authority to hear
their cases was illegal and void because under the law, it is the Director who
should personally hear the cases of petitioners.
Issue: Whether or not the Director has the power to delegate his functions.
Ruling: It has been held that the power conferred upon an administrative
agency to which the administration of a statute is entrusted to issue such
regulations and orders as may be deemed necessary or proper in order to
carry out its purpose and provisions may be an adequate source of authority
to delegate a particular function, unless by express provisions of the Act or by
implication it has been withheld. There is no provision under the general law
and RA 165 and 166 which prohibits such authority insofar as the designation
of hearing examiners is concerned. The nature of the power and authority
entrusted to the Director suggests that the aforementioned laws should be
construed so as to give aforesaid official the administrative flexibility
necessary for the prompt and expeditious discharge of his duties in the
administration of said laws. Judgment and discretion will still be exercised by
him since that the parties will still be able to adduce evidence. Due process of
law nor the requirements of fair hearing require the actual taking of testimony
before the same officer who will make the decision.
Issues: Whether or not the BOT had the power to legalize illegal taxicab
operators under PD 101 even after the lapse of six (6) months.
Ruling: There was nothing in said law to suggest the expiration of such powers
granted to the BOT, six (6) months after its promulgation. It is a settled
principle of law that in determining whether a board or commission has a
certain power, the authority given should be liberally construed in the light of
the purposes for which it was created, and that which is incidentally necessary
to a full implementation of the legislative intent should be upheld as being
germane to the law.
Issues: Whether or not the secretary had the power to order an investigation
and order the removal of the encroachment made on the river.
Section 16 (i) of Republic Act 2260 leaves no doubt that the removal,
suspension or separation effected by said City Council or City Mayor, can be
passed upon or reviewed by the Commissioner of Civil Service. Nonetheless,
the Commissioner's "final authority to pass upon the removal, separation and
suspension" of classified service employees presupposes, rather than negates,
the power vested in another official to originally or initially decide the removal,
separation or suspension which the Commissioner is thereunder empowered
to pass upon.
Ruling: LLDA has a special charter that gives it the responsibility to protect
the inhabitants of the laguna lake region from the deleterious effect of
pollutants emanating from the discharge of wastes from the surrounding area.
It has the power and authority to issue a cease and desist order under RA
4850 and its amendatory laws. Moreover, the power to make, alter, or modify
orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution is also impliedly bestowed
upon LLDA by EO 927.
Facts: Petitioner was the project manager of NPC who filed a letter of
explanation and appeal from the notice of disallowance issued by the COA.
The case stemmed from the hiring of a private lawyer, Atty. Satorre, who was
compensated by virtue of a contract entered by the NPC and the former. The
COA held several persons liable for payment of the amount due to said lawyer
which included herein petitioner. Petitioner contends the nature of services
that was contracted with the lawyer. Respondent contends that there was a
memorandum prohibiting the hiring of private lawyers without following the
necessary procedures required by the COA.
Issue: Was the issuance of the COA circular valid and applicable in this case?
Ruling: What can be gleaned from a reading of the circular is that government
agencies and instrumentalities are restricted in their hiring of private lawyers
to render legal services or handle their cases. No public funds will be disbursed
for the payment to private lawyers unless prior to the hiring of said lawyer,
there is a written conformity and acquiescence from the Solicitor General or
the Government Corporate Counsel. It bears repeating that the purpose of the
circular is to curtail the unauthorized and unnecessary disbursement of public
funds to private lawyers for services rendered to the government. This is in
line with the Commission on Audits constitutional mandate to promulgate
accounting and auditing rules and regulations including those for the
prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant
or unconscionable expenditures or uses of government funds and properties.
Facts: The petition seeks to nullify the Order of the Ombudsman directing the
preventive suspension of petitioners for violations of graft and corruption.
Facts: The petitioner filed the present case to annul the order issued by the
respondent Judge and prevent the same in conducting further hearing thereof.
AMA Computer College situated in Davao city operated as an Educational
Institution without the required authorization that must be secured first before
the DECS. As a consequence thereof, the DECS issued an order for the closure
of the said school with the aid of the military as per agreement of the two
governmental agencies. The private respondent filed a case before the RTC
Davao to enjoin DECS from implementing the said closure pending the
approval of the request to operate of the said school. The said request was
denied by the DECS for not complying the requirements prescribed by the
Department. The said case was dismissed, undaunted the private respondent
appeal before the CA which later affirmed the decision of the lower court. The
private respondent then filed a petition before the RTC of Makati with the same
cause of action now using the organization of the parents of their students.
The said court presided by the respondent Judge issued the preliminary
injunction sought by the private respondent. Hence, this petition. The private
respondent contended that the same should be permitted to operate because
DECS is only performing a ministerial power over the circumstance. The DECS
on the other hand contended that it exercises a discretionary power in
pursuant to the provisions of law with respect to educational institutions.
Ruling: The SC ruled that the public petitioner exercised discretionary power
with respect to the issuance of permit to operate as an educational institution.
The Court further distinguished ministerial and discretionary powers. A
purely ministerial act or duty to a discretional act, is one which an
officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed
manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without
regard to or the exercise of his own judgment, upon the propriety of the
act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer, and gives him the
right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is
ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise
of official discretion nor judgment.
Facts: Petitioners filed an action for the recovery of a parcel of land. RTC ruled
in favor the petitioner. Issued execution of judgment for private respondent.
Petitioner filed relief from judgment. Judge denied petition for relief from
judgment. Petitioner filed mandamus.
Issues: Whether or not granting of the petition for relief from judgment is
ministerial?
Facts: This case sought to set aside and annul the writ of mandamus issued
by Judge Savellano, ordering petitioner Meralco Securities Corporation to pay
and petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue to collect from the former
the amount of 51M by way of alleged deficiency corporate income tax, plus
interests and surcharges due thereon and to pay private respondents 25% of
the total amount collectible as informers reward.
Ruling : Thus, after the Commissioner who is specifically charged by law with
the task of enforcing and implementing the tax laws and the collection of taxes
has after a mature and thorough study rendered his decision or ruling that no
tax is due or collectible, and his decision is sustained by the Secretary, now
Minister of Finance (whose act is that of the President unless reprobated),
such decision or ruling is a valid exercise of discretion in the performance of
official duty and cannot be controlled much less reversed by mandamus. A
contrary view, whereby any stranger or informer would be allowed to usurp
and control the official functions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
would create disorder and confusion, if not chaos and total disruption of the
operations of the government.
Facts: Petitioner was applying for a position for guidance counselor in a school
(navy based) which was denied even though she was qualified. Filed a case
against the military officials concerned because of discrimination. The military
invoked the non-suability of the state.
Ruling: The principle of non-suability does not apply because the petitioner is
questioning the personal judgment or discretion of the officials not their office
by virtue of their official capacity.
2. Estoppel inapplicable
3. Presumption of regularity
Facts: The President issued PD 232 creating the Philippine Coconut Authority
and established a coconut stabilization fund. The members were originally 11
but reduced to 7. Thereafter, respondent chairman of the coconut authority
initiated a special coconut end-user companies which included the petitioner.
The chairman directed to collect short levies and overpriced subsidies to apply
the same to settlement of short levies should they fail to pay. COA agreed to
release the subsidy provided they post a bond equal to the amount of the
disputed claim. Petitioner contended that it is unacceptable that the COA
Chairman and Auditor had no jurisdiction. They caused the withholding of the
subsidy case endorsed to the court.
Issue: WON respondent COA chairman may disregard the PCA rules and
decision had became moot.
Ruling: The legal presumption is that official duty has been duly performed;
and it is 'particularly strong as regards administrative agencies x x vested with
powers said to be quasi-judicial in nature, in connection with the enforcement
of laws affecting particular fields of activity, the proper regulation and/or
promotion of which requires a technical or special training, 'aside from a good
knowledge and grasp of the overall conditions, relevant to said fields,
containing in the nation. The consequent policy and practice underlying our
Administrative Law is that courts of justice should respect the findings of fact
of said administrative agencies, unless there is absolutely no evidence in
support thereof or such evidence is clearly, manifestly and patently
insubstantial.
Court declared that CHR has no jurisdiction on adjudicatory power over certain
specific type of cases like alleged human rights violation involving civil or
political rights.
The most that may be conceded to the CHR in the way of adjudication power
is that it may investigate,.eg,. Receive evidence and make findings of facts as
regard claimed human rights violation involving civil and political rights.
Facts: MWSS launched the Angat Water Supply Optimization Project in order
to provide about 1.3 million liters of water daily to about 3.8 million people in
the Metropolitan area. The project was financed by funds loaned by the
Overseas Economic Coop Fund of Japan to the National Government.
MWSS caused the publication or an invitation for pre-qualification and bids.
The major factors considered in the evaluation were the applicants financial
condition, technical qualification and experience to undertake the project.
Private Respondent Phil. Large Diameter Pressure Pipes Manufacturers
Association sent letters offering suggestions on the technical specifications.
PLDPPMA, through its President filed with the office of the Ombudsman a
letter-complaint protesting the public bidding conducted by the MWSS to favor
suppliers of fiberglass pipes and urging the Ombudsman to conduct an
investigation there on.
Ombudsman, in its fact-finding investigation pursuant to power, functions and
duties of the office under Sec. 15 of R.A 6670 MWSS was diverted to set aside
the recommendation of MWSS to award contract.
Petitioner filed a special civil, action in the SC and cited that respondent
Ombudsman acted beyond the jurisdiction notwithstanding that Section 20 of
the Ombudsman Act, which enumerated the administrative act, or omission
that may not be the subject of investigation clearly among the cases exempts
the same by his office.
Ruling: No, the particular aspect in question is the investigatory power and
public assistance duties that can be found in the first and second part of
Sec.13, Art. XI of the Constitution. While the broad authority of the
Ombudsman to investigate any act or omission which xxx appears illegal,
unjust, improper or inefficient may be yielded, it is difficult to equally concede
however, that the constitution and the Ombudsman Act have intended to
confer upon it veto or provisory power over an exercise of judgment or
discretion is lawfully vested.
While the authority of the ombudsman to investigate any act or omission of
any public officer or employee, other than those specifically excepted under
the Constitution and Republic Acts No. 6770, which appears illegal, unjust,
improper, or inefficient, is broad, the Constitution and the Ombudsman Act
did not intend to confer upon the Ombudsman veto or revisory power over an
exercise of judgment or discretion is lawfully vested. Thus, on the question of
whether to accept or reject a bid and award contract vested by law in a
government agency, which involves the exercise of discretion, the
Ombudsman has exceeded his power by reviewing the award and granting it
to another bidder.
Issue: Whether or not the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case.
Ruling: The Court ruled in positive manner. As protector of the people, the
office of the Ombudsman has the power, function and duty to act promptly on
complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials and to
investigate any act or omission of any public officials when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. Ombudsman is
also empowered to direct the officer concerned, in this case the Special
Prosecutor, to take appropriate action against a public official and to
recommend his prosecution. Further, the court ruled that the law does not
required that the act or omission be related to or be connected with or arise
from the performance of official duty.
Ruling : From the procedures earlier abstracted, after the filing of the
extradition petition and during the judicial determination of the propriety of
extradition, the rights of notice and hearing are clearly granted to the
prospective extradite. However, prior thereto, the law is silent as to these
rights. Reference to the U.S. extradition procedures also manifests this
silence.
Ruiz vs Drilon 209 SCRA 695
Facts: GR No. 103570 refers to a petition for review on the decision of the
court of appeals consolidated with GR No. 101666 for certiorari and prohibition
to review the decision of the executive secretary.
Petitioner herein was the president of Central Luzon State University who was
dismissed by the President of the Philippines from his position after
investigation of a committee on several charges against him. Petitioner
undertook to ask for a reconsideration on the same which respondent Drilon,
as executive secretary denied. Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for
prohibition with a prayer for TRO which granted the latter prayer. After eight
days, petitioner filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for TRO. The CA dismissed the petition on the ground
that the petition was not meritorious and a case of forum shopping. The SC
dispensed with the comment of the Solicitor General for the public respondents
it being that the pleadings and papers already filed were already adequate for
them to act on said petition.
Issue: Whether or not the public respondents acted with grave abuse of
discretion or any act without or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering the
assailed administrative orders. / Was the petitioner entitled to be informed of
the findings of an investigative committee created to inquire into charges
against him?
Ruling: Petitioner is not entitled to be informed of the findings and
recommendations of any investigating committee created to inquire into
charges filed against him. He is entitled only to an administrative decision that
is based on substantial evidence made of record and a reasonable opportunity
to meet the charges made against him and the evidence presented against
him during the hearings of the investigating committees.
Facts: Ma. Luisa Moral instituted an action for mandamus and injunction
before the regular courts against Secretary Gloria, who was later replaced by
Secretary Pefianco, praying that she be furnished a copy of the DECS
Investigation Committee Report and that the DECS Secretary be enjoined from
enforcing the order of dismissal until she received a copy of the said report.
Moral was ordered dismissed from the government service. Respondent did
not appeal the judgement .
Secretary Gloria moved to dismiss the mandamus case for lack of cause of
action but the trial court denied his motion, thus elevated the case to the Court
of Appeals on certiorari which sustained the trial court.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition
for Certiorari for failure of petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration of the
order denying the motion to dismiss.
Facts: Petitioner filed a case before the SC seeking to annul the order of the
respondent judge in civil case manalastas vs. bagatsing et, al. which order
that preliminary injunction restraining respondent from further issuing
subpoena in connection with the fact finding investigation against petitioner.
Pursuant to his special powers and duties under Section 64 of the Revised
Administrative Code, 1 the President of the Philippines created the Presidential
Agency on Reforms and Government Operations (PARGO) under Executive
Order No. 4 of January 7, 1966.
Issue: Whether the Agency, acting thru its officials, enjoys the authority to
issue subpoenas in its conduct of fact-finding investigations.
Power of the president to order, when in his opinion the good of the
public service so requires, an investigation of any action or the conduct
of any person in the Government service, and in connection therewith
to designate the official, committee, or person by whom such
investigation shall be conducted.
Issue: Who has the power to discipline the petitioner or does the president
have the power to order an investigation against herein petitioner?
Ruling: The position of Assistant Commissioner of the BIR is part of the Career
Executive Service under the law which is appointed by the president. As a
presidential appointee who belongs to career service of the Civil Service, he
comes under the direct disciplining authority of the president in line with the
principle that the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint
conferred by the Constitution. The memorandum issued by the president
which created a committee to investigate the administrative charge against
petitioner was pursuant to the power of removal by the president. However,
the power of removal is not absolute since the petitioner herein is a career
service officer who has in his favor the security of tenure who may only be
removed through a cause enumerated by law.
Facts: Petitioner filed a case before the SC seeking to annul the order of the
respondent judge in civil case manalastas vs. bagatsing et, al. which order
that preliminary injunction restraining respondent from further issuing
subpoena in connection with the fact finding investigation against petitioner.
Pursuant to his special powers and duties under Section 64 of the Revised
Administrative Code, 1 the President of the Philippines created the Presidential
Agency on Reforms and Government Operations (PARGO) under Executive
Order No. 4 of January 7, 1966.
Facts: Esrelito Romolona was the post master at the postal office service in
Infanta, Quezon, District Supervisor of the DECS inquired from the Civil
Service Commission as to the status of the Civil Service eligibility of Mrs.
Remolona who got a rating of 81.25% of as per report of rating issued by the
National Board for Teachers. After an investigation, Remolonas name is not
in the list of passing and failing examinees. Remolona admitted that he was
responsible in acquiring the alleged fake eligibility, that his wife has no
knowledge and that he did it because he wanted them to be together.
A formal charge was filed against petitioner Remolona, Nery C. Remolona and
Atty. Hadji Sdupadin for possession of fake eligibility, falsification and
dishonesty. CSS found Estelito Remolona and Nery remolona guilty but Nery
Remolona was absolved from legibility. On appeal, CA dismissed the petition
and therefore a review by the SC.
Issue: Whether or not the CSC can dismiss the petitioner despite of the fact
that the offense committed was not done in the performance of his official
duty.
Facts: The case at bar involves the validity of a 1967 regulation, penalizing
electro fishing in fresh water.
Ruling: The fishery laws did not expressly prohibit electro fishing. The
lawmaking body cannot delegate to administrative official the power to declare
what act constitute a criminal offense. Electro fishing is now punishable by
virtue of PD 704. Thus, an administrative regulation must be in harmony with
law; it must not amend an act of the legislature. In a prosecution for violation
of an administrative order it must clearly appear that the order falls within the
scope of the authority conferred by law.
- The president has the power to issue rules and regulations (executive
orders, proclamations, etc.)
Section 28. 2 - The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix
within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it
may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage
dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national
development program of the Government.
Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, Book III, Title I, Chapter 2, 1987 Admin. Code
Chapter 2
ORDINANCE POWER
Facts: The President of the Philippines issued Executive Orders restricting and
banning trawl fishing from San Miguel Bay. However, a group of other trawl
operators questioned the said executive orders alleging that the same is null
and void.
Issue: Whether or not the issuance of the executive order was valid.
Ruling: Before the issuance of the eo, a resolution by the municipality allowed
thrall fishing. Such law is not deemed complete unless it lays down a standard
or pattern sufficiently fixed or determinate, or, at least, determinable without
requiring another legislation, to guide the administrative body concerned in
the performance of its duty to implement or enforce said policy.
EO issued by the secretary was valid since that it was part of the agencies
functions.
Ruling: The only power conferred to the Collector of Internal Revenue was
that a proper standard of the quality of tobacco should be fixed and defined
and that all of these who produce tobacco of the same standard would have
equal rights and opportunities. Such delegated power the rules and regulations
promulgated should be confined to and limited by the power conferred by the
legislative act.
Held: Yes, E.O 226 grants the right of appeal from decisions of BOI. It simply
deals with procedural aspects with court has the power to regulate by virtue
of its cons rule-making power. Circular 1-91 repealed or suspended EO 226 in
so far as the manner of appeal. Appeals from decisions of BOI, which statutes
allowed to be filed with SC, are brought to CA.
3. Delegation to LGUs
Section 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own
sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees and charges subject to such
guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with the
basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue
exclusively to the local governments.
(b) The veto shall be communicated by the local chief executive concerned
to the Sanggunian within fifteen (15) days in the case of a province, and ten
(10) days in the case of a city or a municipality; otherwise, the ordinance shall
be deemed approved as if he had signed it.
SECTION 55. Veto Power of the Local Chief Executive. - (a) The local
chief executive may veto any ordinance of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
Sangguniang Panlungsod, or Sangguniang bayan on the ground that it is ultra
vires or prejudicial to the public welfare, stating his reasons therefor in writing.
(b) The local chief executive, except the Punong Barangay, shall have the
power to veto any particular item or items of an appropriations ordinance, an
ordinance or resolution adopting a local development plan and public
investment program, or an ordinance directing the payment of money or
creating liability. In such a case, the veto shall not affect the item or items
which are not objected to. The vetoed item or items shall not take effect unless
the Sanggunian overrides the veto in the manner herein provided; otherwise,
the item or items in the appropriations ordinance of the previous year
corresponding to those vetoed, if any, shall be deemed reenacted.
(c) The local chief executive may veto an ordinance or resolution only once.
The Sanggunian may override the veto of the local chief executive concerned
by two-thirds (2/3) vote of all its members, thereby making the ordinance
effective even without the approval of the local chief executive concerned.
SECTION 56. Review of Component City and Municipal Ordinances or
Resolutions by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. - (a) Within three (3)
days after approval, the secretary to the Sanggunian Panlungsod or
Sangguniang bayan shall forward to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for review,
copies of approved ordinances and the resolutions approving the local
development plans and public investment programs formulated by the local
development councils.
(b) Within thirty (30) days after receipt of copies of such ordinances and
resolutions, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan shall examine the documents or
transmit them to the provincial attorney, or if there be none, to the provincial
prosecutor for prompt examination. The provincial attorney or provincial
prosecutor shall, within a period of ten (10) days from receipt of the
documents, inform the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in writing of his comments
or recommendations, which may be considered by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan in making its decision.
Ruling: The court ruled that RA No. 8180 is declared unconstitutional and
ED.
No. 372 void.The rational of the Court annulling RA No. 8180 is not because
it disagrees with deregulation as an economic policy but because as cobbled
by Congress in its present form, the law violates the Constitution.
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid
delegation of legislative power, viz: the completeness test and the sufficient
standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms
and conditions when it leaves the legislative such that when it reaches the
delegate the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. Under the sufficient
standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to
map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation
from running not. Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of
legislative authority to the delegates who is not allowed to step into the shoes
of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.
Facts: Davao pilot association filed a petition against the Eastern shipping
lines for sum of money and attorneys fee claiming that herein respondent
rendered pilotage service to petitioner, the lower court ruled in favor of the
respondent; herein petition for certiorari assailing the decision of the CA.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the legislative powers granted to the Public Service
Commission by Sec.1 of the Commonwealth Act No. 454 constitute a complete
and total abdication of the Legislatures functions and thus unconstitutional
and void.
(2) Whether or not Public Service Commission has exceeded its
authority.
Held:
(1) No, Commonwealth Act no. 454 is constitutional. Section 8 of Art.
XIII of the Constitution provides that no franchise, certificate or any other
form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be for a longer
period than fifty years and when it was ordained. While in Sec. 15 of
Commonwealth Act No. 146 as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 454 that
the Public Service Commission may prescribe as a condition for the issuance
of a certificate. That it shall be valid only for a period of time it has been
declared that the period shall not be longer than 50 years. Therefore, all that
has been delegated to the commission is the admin function\, including the
use of discretion, to carry out the will of the National Assembly having in view,
in addition, the promotion of public interests in a proper and suitable
manner.
With the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the
subjects of governmental regulation and the increased difficulty of
administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency towards the
delegation of greater powers by the legislative and towards the approval of
the practice by the courts.
(2) No, this right of the state to regulate public utilities is founded
upon the police power, applicable not only to those public utilities coming into
existence after its passage, but likewise to those already established and in
operation.
The petitioner, in his contention, empowers the Secretary of Public Works with
the recommendation of the Director of Public works to legislate rules and laws
relative to the regulation of traffic in the country. Further, the petitioner
contended that such act is an invalid delegation of legislative power.
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the said act is not an invalid delegation
of power. The authority therein conferred upon them and under which they
promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine
what public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid
down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to promote safe transit
upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national
roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President
of the Philippines" and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic
"whenever the condition of the road or the traffic thereon makes such action
necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest." The delegated
power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be,
but merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the
application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations
on the use of national roads and to determine when and how long a national
road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the
traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an
administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the National
Assembly, It must depend on the discretion of some other government official
to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion
exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such
discretion is the making of the law.
C. Limitations on the rule-making power
Held: Petitions are granted. The issuance by the NTC of Memorandum Circular
No. 13-6-2000 and its Memorandum dated October 6, 2000 was pursuant to
its quasi-legislative or rule-making power. As such, petitioners were justified
in invoking the judicial power of the Regional Trial Court to assail the
constitutionality and validity of the said issuances. What is assailed is the
validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative
agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts
have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. The determination of whether a
specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes
the law or the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.
Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to
declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential
decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the
regional trial courts.25 This is within the scope of judicial power, which includes
the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity
of the acts of the political departments.26 Judicial power includes the duty of
the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Ruling: the court ruled that RA No. 8180 is declared unconstitutional and
ED. No. 372 void.The rational of the Court annulling RA No. 8180 is not
because it disagrees with deregulation as an economic policy but because as
cobbled by Congress in its present form, the law violates the Constitution. The
right call therefore should be for Congress to write a new oil deregulation law
that conforms to the Constitution and not for this Court to shirk its duty of
striking down a law that offends the Constitution. Striking down RA. No. 8180
may cost losses in quantifiable terms to the oil oligopolists. But the loss in
tolerating the tampering of our Constitution is not quantifiable in pesos and
centavos. More worthy of protection than the supra-normal profits of private
corporations is the sanctity of the fundamental principles of the Constitution.
When confronted by a law violating the Constitution, the Court has no option
but to strike it down dead. Lest it is missed, the Constitution is a covenant
that grants and guarantees both the political and economic rights of the
people. The Constitution mandates this Court to be the guardian not only of
the people's political rights but their economic rights as well. The protection
of the economic rights of the poor and the powerless is of greater importance
to them for they are concerned more with the exoteric of living and less with
the esoteric of liberty. Hence, for as long as the Constitution reigns supreme
so long will this Court be vigilant in upholding the economic rights of our
people especially from the onslaught of the powerful. Our defense of the
people's economic rights may appear heartless because it cannot be half-
hearted.
1. Completeness test the law must be complete in all its items
and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it
reaches the delegate, the only thing they will have to do is
enforce it (Eastern
Shipping vs. POEA)
What cannot be delegated are those which are purely legislative in
nature. He cannot determine what the law shall be.
Facts: Davao pilot association filed a petition against the Eastern shipping
lines for sum of money and attorneys fee claiming that herein respondent
rendered pilotage service to petitioner, the lower court ruled in favor of the
respondent; herein petition for certiorari assailing the decision of the CA. The
factual antecedents of the controversy are simple. Petitioner insists on paying
pilotage fees prescribed under PPA circulars. Because EO 1088 sets a higher
rate, petitioner now assails its constitutionality.
Issue: Whether the People of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General
and Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a proper party in present case.
Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall
be expressed in the title. The title is not required to be an index of the content
of the bill. It is a sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement if
the title expresses the general subject and all provisions of the statute are
pertinent to that subject. The Reorganization of the remaining administrative
regions is pertinent to the general subject of R.A 6734, which is the
establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.
Facts: Petitioner was manager of the national abaca and Fibers Corporation.
Its board of directors granted quarter allowances to petitioner. Submitted to
the control of the government enterprise council created in EO 93 in pursuance
to RA 51 for approval, the resolution was disapproved on recommendation by
auditor general. 1. That quarter allowance constituted additional
compensation prohibited by NAFCO charter. 2. Financial condition of NAFCO.
Reconsideration was denied, hence, this petition for review by certiorari/
Issue: that EO 93 is invalid as based on the law that is unconstitutional being
an undue delegation of legislative power to executive.
Ruling: the rule that so long as the legislative lays down policy and a
standard is established by the statute there is no undue delegation. RA 51 is
authorizes the president to make reforms and changes in the government
controlled corporation for the purpose of promoting simplicity, economy and
efficiency in their operations. This lays down a standard and policy. pursuant
to this authority, the president promulgate EO 93 creating government
enterprises council with power to pass upon the program of activities and
yearly budget of member corporations. Petition is dismissed.
Issue: Whether or not the E.O nos issued constitutes undue delegation of
legislative power.
Facts: The petitioner is questioning the validity of the Executive order issued
by the President of the Philippines prohibiting the interprovincial movement of
carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos not complying with the
requirements of Executive Order No. 626 particularly with respect to age.
Obviously, the petitioner was affected to the said order with the contention
that the said order is an invalid delegation of power and unduly oppressive to
the industry. The Solicitor General contended that the said law is a proper
delegation of legislative power to the President of the Republic.
Issue: Whether or not the said executive order is a valid delegation of power.
Ruling: The court ruled in that the said order is an invalid delegation of power.
The court further ruled that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of
the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is
not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly
oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property
confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately
condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities
of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear
encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of
separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative
powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion
in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, the
court declared Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.
Facts: For his part, A.V. Emmanuel said he confiscated Trieste's driver's
license pursuant to a memorandum dated February 27, 1991, from the District
Commander of the Western Traffic District of the Philippine National Police,
authorizing such sanction under certain conditions. Director General Cesar P.
Nazareno of the Philippine National Police assured the Court in his own
Comment that his office had never authorized the removal of the license plates
of illegally parked vehicles and that he had in fact directed full compliance with
the above-mentioned decision in a memorandum.
Held: (1) declaring Ordinance No. 11, NULL and VOID; and (2) enjoining all
law enforcement authorities in Metropolitan Manila from removing the license
plates of motor vehicles (except when authorized under LOI 43) and
confiscating driver's licenses for traffic violations within the said area.
An ordinance to be valid:
Must not be in contravention of the constitution
Must not be oppressive
Must not be discriminatory
Must not regulate or prohibit trade
Must not be against a statute F. Rule and rule-making, defined
Section 2.2 Book VII, Admin Code of 1987
Issue: Whether or not the acts done by the COA in the case at bar are valid.
Ruling: COA is not authorized to substitute its own judgment for any
applicable law or administrative regulation with the wisdom or propriety of
which it does not agree at least not before such law or regulation was set aside
by authorized agency of government as unconstitutional or illegal and void.
law;
Facts: Assailed in this petition for certiorari and prohibition is that part of the
decision of the Director of Mines, affirmed by the Minister of Natural
Resources, which declared that petitioners have abandoned and lost their
rights over their mining claim.
This case originated from a protest case for alleged overlapping or
encroachment between two mining claims.
Petitioners filed with the Bureau of Mines a letter complain against private
respondents for alleged overlapping and encroachment of the "Ullmann" claim
over the "Ped" claim.
The Director of Mines rendered a decision declaring that there was no conflict
between the "Ped and "Ullmann and dismissed the petition.
Since the protest case was filed after Pres. Decree No. 463 (Mineral Resources
Development Decree of 1974) took effect on May 17, 1974, the provisions of
the law were made applicable to petitioners. Pres. Decree No. 463 mandates
compliance with certain requirements in order for subsisting mining claims,
such as the "Ped" claim, to avail of the benefits granted under the Decree.
Otherwise, mining rights to the claim will be lost.
Issue: (1) whether or not public respondents have jurisdiction to pass upon
the validity of the "Ped" claim in a protest case of overlapping of mining claims;
and (2) should public respondents have such jurisdiction, whether or not they
committed grave abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction in declaring
petitioners to have abandoned their mining claim.
Facts: The Collector of Internal Revenue notified petitioner that its income as
an educational institution was taxable. Later on UST submitted a
memorandum before the Sec. of Finance disputing the decision of the latter
as regard the taxability of the formers income from tuition fees.
The case was elevated before the Board of Tax Appeals in accordance with the
rules romulgated by said Board under E.O. No. 401-A, whereby the petitioner
questioned the jurisdiction of respondent to take cognizance of the petition for
review.
Issue: Whether or not E.O. No. 401-A is tainted with invalidity for the reason
that it deprives the CFIs of their jurisdiction to take cognizance of cases
involving recovery of taxes.
Held: E.O. No. 401-A does not merely create the BTA, which, as an
instrumentality of the Dept of Finance may properly come within the purview
of R.A. No. 422, but goes as far as depriving the CFIs of their jurisdiction to
act on internal evenue cases, a matter which is foreign to it and which comes
within the exclusive province of Congress. This the Chief Executive cannot do,
nor can that power be delegated by Congress alone has the power to define,
prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various department.
Facts: Before us are consolidated petitions seeking the review and reversal of
the decision1 of the respondent Court of Appeals2 declaring the National
Telecommunications Commission (hereafter, NTC) to be a collegial body under
Executive Order No. 546 3 and ordering the NTC to heretofore sit and act en
bane, i.e., with the concurrence of at least two commissioners, for a valid
dispensation of its quasi-judicial functions.
Held: We hereby declare that the NTC is a collegial body requiring a majority
vote out of the three members of the commission in order to validly decide a
case or any incident therein. Corollarily, the vote alone of the chairman of the
commission, as in this case, the vote of Commissioner Kintanar, absent the
required concurring vote coming from the rest of the membership of the
commission to at least arrive at a majority decision, is not sufficient to legally
render an NTC order, resolution or decision. Simply put, Commissioner
Kintanar is not the National Telecommunications Commission. He alone does
not speak for and in behalf of the NTC. The NTC acts through a three-man
body, and the three members of the commission each has one vote to cast in
every deliberation concerning a case or any incident therein that is subject to
the jurisdiction of the NTC.
Facts: Deputy Sheriff Basco was found guilty by the city court of manila of
serious misconduct and dismissed from service with forfeiture of all retirement
benefits with prejudice to reinstatement to any position in the national or local
government, its agencies and instrumentalities or GOCC.
Basco run as a councilor in 1988 election won and assume office. In the 1992
election he run again and this time his victory not without unchallenged.
A quo warranto was filed against him but was dismissed. At second time
petitioner Grego a registered voted file a petition with comelec for
disqualification and suspension of his proclamation. Basco was proclaimed and
assume office; petitioner filed an urgent motion seeking to annul a hasty and
illegal proclamation.
Issue: Does Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160 apply retroactively to
those removed from office before it took effect on January 1, 1992?
Ruling: There is no provision in the statute which would clearly indicate that
the same operates retroactively. It, therefore, follows that [Section] 40 (b) of
the Local Government Code is not applicable to the present case. Basco was
NOT subject to any disqualification at all under Section 40 (b) of the Local
Government Code which, as we said earlier, applies only to those removed
from office on or after January 1, 1992.
Facts: Issue of the validity of the Amendments to the Rules and Regulations
Implementing Republic Act No. 7742, which require the existence of a plan
providing for both provident/retirement and housing benefits for exemption
from the Pag~IBIG Fund coverage under Presidential Decree No. 1752, as
amended.
Held: The amendments are null and void insofar as they require that an
employer should have both a provident/ retirement plan and a housing plan
superior to the benefits offered by the Fund in order to qualify for waiver or
suspension of the Fund coverage.
3. Requirement of reasonableness
Facts: PRC issued resolution no. 105 that no examine shall attend any review
class, briefing, conference, or the like conducted by or shall receive any
handouts, review material or any tip from school or any review center during
the three days immediately preceding every examination day including the
examination day.
H. Interpretative legislation
Ruling: The court ruled that where the court of last resort has not previously
interpreted the stature, the rule is that the courts will give considerations to
construction by administrative or executive departments of the state. The
construction of the office charged with implementing and enforcing the
provisions of a statute should be given controlling weight.
Facts: Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in
issuing and promulgating ex parte the assailed resolution without complying
with the provisions of Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 28, Section 1 of Rule 10,
Sections 1 to 6 of Rule 14, Sections 1 to 4 of Rule 17 and Section 9 of Rule
18, all of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
Held: On the basis of all the foregoing considerations, it is resolved that the
payment of the filing of fee for purposes of an election protest and
counterprotest is not jurisdictional and, hence, non-compliance therewith at
the outset will not operate to deprive the Court of jurisdiction conferred upon
it by law and acquired pursuant to the Rules. Accordingly, the Motion to
Dismiss the instant petition is hereby denied.
ISSUE: WON the commission erred in ruling that it has no authority under
SSC to condone the penalty prescribed by law for late premiums.
Ratio: An administrative body has the power to interpret its own rules and
such interpretation becomes part of the rule itself. Unless shown to be
erroneous, unreasonable or arbitrary, such interpretation is entitled to
recognition and respect from the courts, as no one is better qualified to
interpret the intent of the regulation than the authority that issued it. Thus,
its interpretation that the rule it issued is not retroactive, not being
unreasonable, should be followed.
Facts: Dependant Panlilio was charged and convicted of the CFI of Province
of Pampaga of a violation of the law relating to the quarantining of animals
suffering from dangerous diseases known as rinderpest. The conviction was
grounded on illegal and voluntary act of herein accused by way of permitting
and ordering the carabaos on issue to be taken from the corral while the
quarantines against the same was still enforce. On other hand, that herein
defendant interposed a defense that the acts complained of did not constitute
a crime.
Issue: WON the acts complaint of in the case at bar did not constitute a crime.
Ruling: the court ruled in the negative. The acts complaint in the case at bar
do not fall within any of the provisions of the Act No. 1760. However, the said
finding does not prevent the court from finding the accused guilty of a violation
of an article of the revised penal code.
K. Rate-fixing power
Facts: Philippine Satellite Corporation filed a petition seeking to annul and set
aside an order issued by respondent Commissioner Jose Luis Alcuaz of the
NTC, which directs the provisional reduction of the rates which may be charged
by petitioner for certain specified lines of its services by 15% with the
reservation to make further reduction later, for being violative of the
constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative power and a
denial or procedural, as well as substantial due process of law. The said
provisional reduction is allegedly under the contemplation of E.O. 546,
providing for the creation of NTC and granting its rate-fixing powers; and E.O.
196 , placing petitioner under the jurisdiction of respondent NTC.
Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the challenged order, particularly on the
issue of rates provided therein, being violative of due process clause is void
and should be nullified. Thus, temporary rate-fixing order is not exempt from
the procedural requirement of notice and hearing. Moreover the temporary
rate-fixing becomes final legislative act as to the period during which it has to
remain in force pending the final determination of the case.
Issue: Whether publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non
requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for
their own effectivity dates
Held: Petitions are granted. The issuance by the NTC of Memorandum Circular
No. 13-6-2000 and its Memorandum dated October 6, 2000 was pursuant to
its quasi-legislative or rule-making power. As such, petitioners were justified
in invoking the judicial power of the Regional Trial Court to assail the
constitutionality and validity of the said issuances. What is assailed is the
validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative
agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts
have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. The determination of whether a
specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes
the law or the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.
Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to
declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential
decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the
regional trial courts. This is within the scope of judicial power, which includes
the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity
of the acts of the political departments. Judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Facts: The appellant was a grade 6 pupil in a certain public elementary school.
As the school year was then about to end, the "Committee On the Rating Of
Students For Honor" was constituted by the teachers concerned at said school
for the purpose of selecting the "honor students" of its graduating class. With
the school Principal, as chairman, and the members of the committee
deliberated and finally adjudged Socorro Medina, Patricia Ligat and Teodoro
C. Santiago, Jr. as first, second and third honors, respectively. The school's
graduation exercises were thereafter set for May 21, 1965; but three days
before that date, the "third placer" Teodoro Santiago, Jr., represented by his
mother, and with his father as counsel, sought the invalidation of the "ranking
of honor students" thus made, by instituting the above-mentioned civil case
in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, committee members along with the
District Supervisor and the Academic Supervisor of the place.
The precise line of demarkation between what are judicial and what are
administrative or ministerial functions is often difficult to determine. The
exercise of judicial functions may involve the performance of legislative or
administrative dudes, and the performance of administrative or ministerial
duties, may, in a measure, involve the exercise of judicial functions. It may
be said generally that the exercise of judicial functions is to determine what
the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in
controversy; and whenever an officer is clothed with that authority, and
undertakes to determine those questions, he acts judicially.
Despite the pendency of the controversy before the ordinary civil courts, OIC
persisted in asserting jurisdiction over it by rendering a decision stating it has
jurisdiction to pass upon the alleged contractual right of petitioner to declare
Yap's contract terminated. The OIC negated the existence of such right
because the stipulation is an "unfair and onerous trade practice." Respondent
OIC also allowed respondent Yap reasonable time from receipt of the decision
within which to pay his judgment debt to petitioner as adjudged in a Civil Case.
Petitioner Shell moved for a reconsideration but respondent OIC denied it.
Issue: WON Respondent OIC has jurisdiction to hear and decide contractual
disputes between a gasoline dealer and an oil company.
Facts: Some 800 public school teachers, among them members of the Manila
Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned
Teachers (ACT) undertook what they described as amass concerted actions"
to "dramatize and highlight' their plight resulting from the alleged failure of
the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been
brought to the latter's attention. According to them they had decided to
undertake said "mass concerted actions" after the protest rally staged at the
DECS premises on September 14, 1990 without disrupting classes as a last
call for the government to negotiate the granting of demands had elicited no
response from the Secretary of Education. Through their representatives, the
teachers participating in the mass actions were served with an order of the
Secretary of Education to return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal, and a
memorandum directing the DECS officials concerned to initiate dismissal
proceedings against those who did not comply and to hire their replacements.
"For failure to heed the return-to-work order, the CHR complainants (private
respondents) were administratively charged on the basis of the principal's
report and given five (5) days to answer the charges. They were also
preventively suspended for ninety (90) days 'pursuant to Section 41 of P.D.
807' and temporarily replaced. An investigation committee was consequently
formed to hear the charges in accordance with P.D. 807."
Held: The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such
power; and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court
or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the
functions of the latter.
As should at once be observed, only the first of the enumerated powers and
functions bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment. The
Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to
investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political
rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any
person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it
may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in
accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any investigation
conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution
to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other
evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may also
request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the
performance of its functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in extending
such remedy as may be required by its findings.
But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as
courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to
adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these
terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings.
"x x 'It may be said generally that the exercise of judicial functions is to
determine what the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect
to a matter in controversy; and whenever an officer is clothed with that
authority, and undertakes to determine those questions, he acts judicially.'x
x."
Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the
power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits"
( adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC
Issue: WON the company has violated the Collective Bargaining Agreement
provision and the Memorandum of Agreement dated April 1994, on promotion.
Held: It will thus be noted that the Jurisdiction conferred by law on a voluntary
arbitrator or a panel of such arbitrators is quite limited compared to the
original jurisdiction of the labor arbiter and the appellate jurisdiction of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for that matter.4 The state of
our present law relating to voluntary arbitration provides that "(t)he award or
decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator x x x shall be final and executory after ten
(10) calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the
parties,"5 while the "(d)ecision, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final
and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties
within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or
orders."6 Hence, while there is an express mode of appeal from the decision
of a labor arbiter, Republic Act No. 6715 is silent with respect to an appeal
from the decision of a voluntary arbitrator.
Administrative Function are those which involve the regulation and control
over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the
promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the
legislature as such are devoled upon the admin agency by the organic law of
existence.
Issue: WON the PADS is a quasi-judicial body issue search warrants under
the 1973 Constitution?
Held: Considering that the PCGG, like the courts, is vested with the authority
to grant provisional remedies of (1) sequestration, (2) freezing assets, and
(3) provisional takeover, it is indispensable that, as in the case of attachment
and receivership, there exists a prima facie factual foundation, at least, for the
sequestration order, freeze order or takeover order, an adequate and fair
opportunity to contest it and endeavor to cause its negation or nullification.
Both are assured under the foregoing executive orders and the rules and
regulations promulgated by the PCGG.
It is in such instances that We say one cannot be "a prosecutor and judge at
the same time." Having gathered the evidence and filed the complaint as a
law enforcer, he cannot be expected to handle with impartiality the preliminary
investigation of his own complaint, this time as a public prosecutor.
The Court holds that a just and fair administration of justice can be promoted
if the PCGG would be prohibited from conducting the preliminary investigation
of the complaints subject of this petition and the petition for intervention and
that the records of the same should be forwarded to the Ombudsman, who as
an independent constitutional officer has primary jurisdiction over cases of this
nature, to conduct such preliminary investigation and take appropriate action.
Facts: Two parties, Crispulo Sideco on the one hand, and Leocadio Sarenas
and Rufino Sarenas on the other hand, claim the exclusive right to the use of
the waters flowing through the estero for irrigation purposes. The claim of
Sideco goes back to 1885 when the predecessor in interest of his father
constructed a dam in these waters; the use of the dam was afterwards
interrupted by outside causes such as imprisonment and war, but again
reasserted in 1911, 1915, and 1916. Exactly what the two Sarenas' contention
is, is not quite clear on the facts before us. However, it appears that they
made application to the Director of Public Works, only to meet with the
opposition of Sideco, and that the Director of Public Works, with the approval
of the Secretary of Commerce and Communications, granted the two Sarenas
the right, in preference to all other persons, to use the waters of the estero
Bangad. Sideco then took the proceedings to the Court of First Instance of
Nueva Ecija. After trial, judgment was entered, dismissing the complaint and
the appeal of Sideco and confirming the decision of the administrative
authorities, with the costs against the plaintiff.
The further appeal of Sideco to this court, while conceding the correctness of
the findings of the trial court, squarely challenges its judgment.
Issue: WON
Ocampo vs US 234 US 91
"No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like
conducted by, or shall receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from
any school, college or university, or any review center or the like or any
reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of the aforementioned
or similar institutions during the three days immediately preceding every
examination day including the examination day. Any examinee violating this
instruction shall be subject to the sanctions. Petitioners, all reviewees
preparing to take the licensure examinations in accountancy filed in their own
behalf and in behalf of all others similarly situated like them, with the RTC a
complaint for injunction with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction against respondent PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the
above-mentioned resolution and to declare the same unconstitutional.
Issue: WON the trial court have jurisdiction over the case.
Ratio: P.D. No. 957, promulgated July 12, 1976 and otherwise known as "The
Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree," provides that the
National Housing Authority shall have exclusive authority to regulate the real
estate trade and business.
P.D. No. 1344, which was promulgated April 2, 1978, and empowered the
National Housing Authority to issue writs of execution in the enforcement of
its decisions under P.D. No. 957, specified the quasi-judicial jurisdiction of
the agency as follows:
Facts: The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) dismissed six (6)
employees as being "notoriously undesirable," they having allegedly been
found to be connected with irregularities in the canvass of supplies and
materials. Five of these six dismissed employees appealed to the Merit
Systems Board. The Board found the dismissals to be illegal because affected
without formal charges having been filed or an opportunity given to the
employees to answer, and ordered the remand of the cases to the GSIS for
appropriate disciplinary proceedings. The GSIS appealed to the Civil Service
Commission. By Resolution, the Commission ruled that the dismissal of all five
was indeed illegal. GSIS appealed to the SC and affirmed the decision of the
CSC with a modification that it eliminated the payment of back salaries until
the outcome of the investigation and reinstatement of only 3 employees since
the other two had died. The heirs of the deceased sought execution of the
order from the CSC which was granted. GSIS opposed and came to the SC on
certiorari contending that the CSC does not have any power to execute its
resolution or judgment.
Issue: WON the CSC had powers to execute its resolution or judgment.
Ratio: The Civil Service Commission, like the Commission on Elections and
the Commission on Audit, is a constitutional commission invested by the
Constitution and relevant laws not only with authority to administer the civil
service, but also with quasi-judicial powers. It has the authority to hear and
decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it or brought to
it on appeal.
The Civil Service Commission promulgated Resolution No. 89-779 adopting,
approving and putting into effect simplified rules of procedure on
administrative disciplinary and protest cases, pursuant to the authority
granted by the constitutional and statutory provisions. The provisions are
analogous and entirely consistent with the duty or responsibility reposed in
the Chairman by PD 807, subject to policies and resolutions adopted by the
Commission. In light of all the foregoing constitutional and statutory
provisions, it would appear absurd to deny to the Civil Service Commission
the power or authority to enforce or order execution of its decisions,
resolutions or orders which, it should be stressed, it has been exercising
through the years. It would seem quite obvious that the authority to decide
cases is inutile unless accompanied by the authority to see that what has been
decided is carried out. Hence, the grant to a tribunal or agency of adjudicatory
power, or the authority to hear and adjudge cases, should normally and
logically be deemed to include the grant of authority to enforce or execute the
judgments it thus renders, unless the law otherwise provides.
Death, however, has already sealed that outcome, foreclosing the initiation of
disciplinary administrative proceedings, or the continuation of any then
pending, against the deceased employees. Whatever may be said of the
binding force of the Resolution of July 4, 1988 so far as, to all intents and
purposes, it makes exoneration in the administrative proceedings a condition
precedent to payment of back salaries, it cannot exact an impossible
performance or decree a useless exercise.
Angara vs. Electoral Commission 63 Phil 139
Facts: This is an original action instituted in this court by the petitioner, Jose
A. Angara, for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the
Electoral Commission, one of the respondents, from taking further cognizance
of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua, another respondent, against the election
of said petitioner as member of the National Assembly for the first assembly
district of the Province of Tayabas. Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the
Electoral Commission.
Issue : Has the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against the
election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation
of such election by resolution of the National Assembly?
In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized administrative
boards or commissions with the special knowledge, experience and capability
to hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters or essentially
factual matters, subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse of discretion,
has become well nigh indispensable . . .
Moreover, however cleverly the complaint may be worded, the ultimate relief
sought by PTFI is to compel the Bureau of Customs to seize and forfeit the
match importations of AJIC. Since the determination to seize or not to seize is
discretionary upon the Bureau of Customs, the same cannot be subject of
mandamus. But this does not preclude recourse to the courts by way of the
extraordinary relief of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court if the
Bureau of Customs should gravely abuse the exercise of its jurisdiction.
Otherwise stated, the court cannot compel an agency to do a particular act or
to enjoin such act which is with its prerogative; except when in the excrcise
of its authority it clearly abuses or exceeds its jurisdiction. In the case at
bench, we have no occasion to rule on the issue of grave abuse of discretion
as excess of jurisdiction as it is not before us.
Issue: WON the RTC had jurisdiction over the recovery of reservation fee.
Held: Under Presidential Decree No. 1344, the NHA has exclusive jurisdiction
to hear and decide claims involving refund and other claims filed by a
subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, etc.
There is no such qualification in said provision of law that makes a distinction
between a perfected sale and one that has yet to be perfected. The word
"buyer" in the law should be understood to be anyone who purchases anything
for money. Under the circumstances of this case, one who offers to buy is as
much a buyer as one who buys by virtue of a perfected contract of sale. Said
powers have since been transferred to the HLRB.
Ruling : Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the
power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits"
(adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775,
as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a
claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers
in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil
or political rights had been transgressed. More particularly, the Commission
has no power to "resolve on the merits" the question of (a) whether or not the
mass concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute a strike and are
prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying
on and taking part in those actions, and the failure of the teachers to
discontinue those actions and return to their classes despite the order to this
effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules
and regulations warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are
justified by the grievances complained of by them; and (c) what where the
particular acts done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any,
may properly be imposed for said acts or omissions.
These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original jurisdiction of
the Secretary of Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary powers
granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.
Ruling: Respondent should have known or ought to know that under Section
1, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, a subpoena "is a process directed to a person
requiring him to attend and to testify at the hearing or the trial of an action,
or at any investigation conducted under the laws of the Philippines, or for
taking of his deposition." Although the subpoena he caused to be issued
purports to be in a form for criminal cases pending in his court, it was not, in
fact, issued in connection with a criminal case or for any other pending case
in his court nor for any investigation he was competent to conduct pursuant
to law or by direction of this Court. It was designated for a specific purpose,
viz., and administrative conference. That purpose was, in no way connected
with or related to some of his administrative duties because he knew from the
beginning that it was for a confrontation with the complainant as solicited by
Generosa. Sandagan for the latter to get a share in the death benefits of
Edgardo Sandagan which was received by the complainant. Generosa had not
filed any action in respondent's court for her claim; neither is there any case
in respondent's court concerning such death benefits. What Generosa wanted
was for respondent to act as mediator or conciliator to arrive at a possible
compromise with the complainant, which was, obviously, non-official and
absolutely a private matter. Not being then directly or remotely related to his
official functions and duties, accommodating the request and using his official
functions and office in connection therewith was, by any yardstick, improper.
Issue: WON the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum is proper in a case for
unfair competition.
Ratio: A case for unfair competition is actually a case for injunction and
damages. As a general rule, on obtaining an injunction for infringement of a
trademark, complainant is entitled to an accounting and recovery of
defendant's profits on the goods sold under that mark, as incident to, and a
part of, his property right, and this rule applies in cases of unfair competition.
In such case, the infringer or unfair trader is required in equity to account for
and yield up his gains on a principle analogous to that which charges as trustee
with the profits acquired by the wrongful use of the property of the cestui que
trust, and defendant's profits are regarded as an equitable measure of the
compensation plaintiff should receive for the past harm suffered by him.
In the instant case in determining whether the books subject to the subpoena
duces tecum are relevant and reasonable in relation to the complaint of private
respondent for unfair competition.
Facts: Masangcay was the provincial treasurer of Aklan who was charged with
several others for CONTEMPT by the COMELEC when it opened 3 boxes without
the presence of the persons and/or parties indicated in its Resolution. After
appearing and showing cause why they should not be punished for contempt,
the COMELEC sentenced Masangcay for imprisonment and imposing a fine.
Masangcay filed a petition for review with the SC.
Issue: WON the COMELEC may punish Masangcay for contempt for his acts.
Ruling : The Commission on Elections has not only the duty to enforce and
administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections, but also the power to
try, hear and decide any controversy that may be submitted to it in connection
with the elections. In this sense, we said, the Commission, although it cannot
be classified as a court of justice within the meaning of the Constitution
(Section 30, Article VIII), for it is merely an administrative body, may however
exercise quasi-judicial functions insofar as controversies that by express
provision of law come under its jurisdiction.
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence is
essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the
enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of courts, and, consequently,
in the, administration of justice.
The exercise of this power has always been regarded as a necessary incident
and attribute of courts. Its exercise by administrative bodies has been
invariably limited to making effective the power to elicit testimony. And the
exercise of that power by an administrative body in furtherance of its
administrative function has been held invalid.
Ruling: Rule 64 applies only to inferior and superior courts and does not
comprehend contempt committed against administrative officials or bodies,
unless said contempt is [clearly considered and expressly defined as contempt
of court, as is done in paragraph 2 of Sec. 580 of the revised administrative
code. The refusal to comply with order of tenancy law, enforcement division
is neither contempt nor a penalized offense.
The employers denied the charge. They claimed that the complainant was
dismissed from the service because of her misconduct and serious disrespect
to the management and her co employees so much so that several criminal
charges were filed against her with the city fiscal of Manila who, after
investigation, filed the corresponding informations against her and the same
are now pending trial in court.
The Court of industrial relation ruled in favor of Nina Micaller.
Issue: WON the Court of Industrial Relations has jurisdiction to impose the
penalties prescribed in section 25 of Republic Act No. 875.
Ruling: In conclusion, our considered opinion is that the power to impose the
penalties provided for in section 25 of Republic Act No. 875 is lodged in
ordinary courts, and not in the Court of Industrial Relations, notwithstanding
the definition of the word "Court" contained in section 2 (a) of said Act. Hence,
the decision of the industrial court in so far as it imposes a fine of P100 upon
petitioners is illegal and should be nullified.
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
I. Jurisdiction
A. Definition
People vs Mariano 71 SCRA 600
Facts: The Accused was convicted of the crime of abused of chastity. He filed
an appealed contending that he married the victim therefore his criminal
liability should be extinguished. The Attorney-General entered an opposition
to said petition wherein, after discussing the scope of article 448 of the Penal
Code and Act No. 1773 of the Philippine Legislature amending said article, he
concluded that the marriage of the accused with the offended party cannot
extinguish his liability as perpetrator of the crime of abuse against chastity.
Issue: The question is a purely legal one and sifts down to whether or not
section 2 of Act No. 1773 includes the crime of abuse against chastity among
those cases in which criminal liability is extinguished by the marriage of the
accused with the offended party.
Ruling: The intention of our Legislature in enacting said Act No. 1773 was
that the marriage of the accused or convict with the offended party should
extinguish the criminal liability in the cases of seduction, abduction and rape
and those involving offenses included in said crimes, such as frustrated or
attempted seduction, abduction or rape. This is clear and logical. If the liability
for a crime is extinguished in the graver cases, it must be extinguished, and
for a stronger reason, in the lesser crimes. Now then, if the crime of abuse
against chastity is not denominated rape, it is only for the lack of the intention
to lie, both crimes being identical in every other respect, though of different
degrees of gravity. We therefore conclude that the crime of abuse against
chastity is included in the crime of rape mentioned in section 2 of Act No. 1773
and, consequently, the marriage of the accused with the offended party in the
present case has extinguished his criminal liability.
C. Extent of jurisdiction of administrative agencies
performing quasi-judicial acts
D.
Chin vs LBP 201 SCRA 190
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution but it was denied
by respondent Secretary. In the petition for certiorari before Us, petitioner
seeks the reversal of the resolutions of respondent for being null and void.
Facts: That in the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A.
Angara won. The provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as
member-elect of the National Assembly for the said district, for having
received the most number of votes, the petitioner took his oath of office.
Respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of
Protest" against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and
praying, among other things, that said respondent be declared elected
member of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or that the
election of said position be nullified.
Issue: WON the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against the
election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation
of such election by resolution of the National Assembly?
Ruling: The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained
originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral
Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National
Assembly. And this is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as
an express prohibition in the Constitution. If we concede the power claimed
in behalf of the National Assembly that said body may regulate the
proceedings of the Electoral Commission and cut off the power of the
commission to lay down the period within which protests should be filed, the
grant of power to the commission would be ineffective.
The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the
power regulative in character to limit the time within which protests intrusted
to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that where
a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power
necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also
included. The incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the
proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must
be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral
Commission.
Held: The labor arbiters and the NLRC must not, at the expense of due
process, be the first to arbitrarily disregard specific provisions of the Rules
which are precisely intended to assist the parties in obtaining the just,
expeditious and inexpensive settlement of labor disputes. The decision of the
National Labor Relations Commission, Fifth Division, is annulled and set aside
and the case is remanded to the Regional Arbitration Branch, Iligan City for
further proceedings.
Facts: Petitioner Police Commission seeks the setting aside of the decision of
the defunct Court of First Instance (respondent court) of Rizal, Branch VI,
which declared null and void its decision in Administrative Case No. 48
dismissing private respondent Simplicio C. Ibea and instead ordered then
Municipal Mayor Braulio Sto. Domingo of San Juan, Rizal to reinstate said
respondent to his former position as policeman of the same municipality with
back salaries from the date of his suspension up to the date of his actual
reinstatement.
Petitioner contends that the lower court erred in holding that respondent
Simplicio C. Ibea was deprived of due process of law because the Police
Commission decided Administrative Case No. 48 even without stenographic
notes taken of the proceedings of the case.
Facts: The petition before this Court relates to the exercise by the SEC of its
powers in a case involving a stockbroker (CUALOPING) and a stock transfer
agency (FIDELITY).
The Commission has brought the case to this Court in the instant petition for
review on certiorari, contending that the appellate court erred in setting aside
the decision of the SEC which had (a) ordered the replacement of the
certificates of stock of Philex and (b) imposed fines on both FIDELITY and
CUALOPING.
Held: The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") has both regulatory
and adjudicative functions. Under its regulatory responsibilities, the SEC may
pass upon applications for, or may suspend or revoke (after due notice and
hearing), certificates of registration of corporations, partnerships and
associations (excluding cooperatives, homeowners' associations, and labor
unions); compel legal and regulatory compliances; conduct inspections; and
impose fines or other penalties for violations of the Revised Securities Act, as
well as implementing rules and directives of the SEC, such as may be
warranted.
The SEC decision which orders the two stock transfer agencies to "jointly
replace the subject shares and for FIDELITY to cause the transfer thereof in
the names of the buyers" clearly calls for an exercise of SEC's adjudicative
jurisdiction. The stockholders who have been deprived of their certificates of
stock or the persons to whom the forged certificates have ultimately been
transferred by the supposed indorsee thereof are yet to initiate, if minded, an
appropriate adversarial action. A justiciable controversy such as can occasion
an exercise of SEC's exclusive jurisdiction would require an assertion of a right
by a proper party against another who, in turn, contests it. The proper parties
that can bring the controversy and can cause an exercise by the SEC of its
original and exclusive jurisdiction would be all or any of those who are
adversely affected by the transfer of the pilfered certificates of stock. Any
peremptory judgment by the SEC, without such proceedings having initiated,
would be precipitat.
The question on the legal propriety of the imposition by the SEC of a P50,000
fine on each of FIDELITY and CUALOPING, is an entirely different matter. This
time, it is the regulatory power of the SEC which is involved. When, on appeal
to the Court of Appeals, the latter set aside the fines imposed by they the SEC,
the latter, in its instant petition, can no longer be deemed just a nominal party
but a real party in interest sufficient to pursuant appeals to this Court.
Section 2.5 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
Santiago, Jr. vs Bautista 32 SCRA 188
Villanueva vs Adre 172 SCRA 876
Chemphil Export & Import Corp. vs CA 251 SCRA 257
First Phil. Intl Bank vs CA 252 SCRA 259
R. Transport Corp. vs Laguesma 227 SCRA 826
Galongco vs CA 283 SCRA 493
E. Institution of proceedings; acquisition of jurisdiction
Section 5, Rule 7 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
Santos vs NLRC 254 SCRA 675
Matanguihand vs Tengo, 272 SCRA 704
F. Pre-trial conference; default
Section 10 Book VII 1987 Admin. Code
Auyong vs CTA 59 SCRA 110
G. Hearing
Secretary of Justice vs Lantion 322 SCRA 160
Section 11.1 Book VII 1987 Admin. Code
Medenilla vs CSC 194 SCRA 278
Simpao vs CSC 191 SCRA 396
Alejandro vs CA 191 SCRA 700
H. Evidence
Section 12.3 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
State Prosecutor vs Muro 236 SCRA 505
1. Proof beyond reasonable doubt
People vs Bacalzo 195 SCRA 557
2. Clear and convincing evidence
Blacks Law Dictionary 5th ed. P. 227
3. Preponderance of evidence
New Testament Church of God vs CA 246 SCRA 266
4. Substantial evidence
Velasquez vs Nery 211 SCRA 28
Malonzo ns COMELEC 269 SCRA 380
I. Decision
Section 2.8, 14 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
Marcelino vs Cruz 121 SCRA 51
Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC 248 SCRA 300
1. Form of decision
Mangca vs COMELEC 112 SCRA 273
Malinao vs Reyes 255 SCRA 616
Sections 2.13 and 2.12 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
2. Publication of decisions
Section 16.1.2 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
3. Finality, promulgation and notice of decision
Section 15 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
Robert Dollar Company vs Tuvera 123 SCRA 354
Lindo vs COMELEC 194 SCRA 25
Jamil vs COMELEC 283 SCRA 349
Section 14 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
Zoleta vs Drilon 166 SCRA 548
4. Collegiate decision, requirement to be valid
Mison vs COA 187 SCRA 445
Aquino-Sarmiento vs Morato 203 SCRA 515
5. Finality of decisions
Section 15 Chapter III Book VII Admin Code of 1987
Administrative Order No. 18 Section 7
Uy vs COA 328 SCRA 607
Camarines Norte Electric Cooperative vs Torres 286 SCRA 666
6. Application of the doctrine of res judicata
Republic vs Neri 213 SCRA 812
Brillantes v Castro 99 Phil 497
Ipekdjian Merchandising vs CTA, L-15430, 30 Sept. 1963
Teodoro vs Carague 206 SCRA 429
Facts: Petitioner Santiago was charged with violation of Arts. Of War 96 and
97. He was arraigned though without summons and subpoena afforded to him.
From the proven facts and the admission likewise of the respondents, the court
martial which tried his case was not properly convened. There was no special
order published by the headquarters Philippine Constabulary creating or
directing the General Court Martial composed of the respondents to arraign
and try however was already an existing court trying another case.
Issue: WON failure to comply with law on conveying a valid court martial
amount to denial of due process
Facts: President Marcos issued PD No. 1069 "Prescribing the Procedure for
the
Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country". The
Decree is founded on: the doctrine of incorporation under the Constitution;
the mutual concern for the suppression of crime both in the state where it was
committed and the state where the criminal may have escaped; the
extradition treaty with the Republic of Indonesia and the intention of the
Philippines to enter into similar treaties with other interested countries; and
the need for rules to guide the executive department and the courts in the
proper implementation of said treaties. The Department of Justice received
from the Department of Foreign Affairs U. S. Note Verbale No. 0522 containing
a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the United
States. private respondent, through counsel, wrote a letter dated July 1, 1999
addressed to petitioner requesting copies of the official extradition request
from the U. S. Government, as well as all documents and papers submitted
therewith; and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after
he shall have received copies of the requested papers. Petitioner refused
because it is not included in the procedure of the RP-US Treaty.
Issue: WON private respondent's entitlement to notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of
the Philippine Government under the RP-Extradition Treaty? Assuming the
answer is in the affirmative, is there really a conflict between the treaty and
the due process clause in the Constitution?
Facts: Plaintiff Albert sued University Publishing Company, Inc. for breach of
contract. Albert died before the case proceeded to trial, and Justo R. Albert,
his estate's administrator, was substituted. Finally, defendant's liability was
determined by this Court in L-15275. Plaintiff was to recover P15,000.00 with
legal interest from judicial demand.
From the inception of the suit below up to the time the judgment in
L15275 was to be executed, the corporate existence of University Publishing
Company, Inc. appears to have been taken for granted, and was not then put
in issue. However, when the Court of First Instance of Manila issued on July
22, 1961 an order of execution against University Publishing Company, Inc.,
a new problem cropped up. By virtue of this writ, plaintiff's counsel and the
Sheriff of the City of Manila went to see Jose M. Aruego who signed the
contract with plaintiff on behalf and as President of University Publishing
Company, Inc. They then discovered that no such entity exists. A verification
made at the Securities and Exchange Commission confirmed this fact. On July
31, 1961, said Commission issued a certification "that the records of this
Commission do not show the registration of UNIVERSITY PUBLISHING CO.,
INC., either as a corporation or partnership."2 This triggered a verified petition
in the court below on August 10, 1961 for the issuance of a writ of execution
ordering the Sheriff of Manila to cause the satisfaction of the judgment against
the assets and properties of Jose M. Aruego as the real defendant in the case.
All along, Jose M. Aruego and his law firm were counsel for the University
Publishing Company, Inc. Instead of informing the lower court that it had in
its possession copies of its certificate of registration, its article of incorporation,
its by-laws and all other papers material to its disputed corporate existence,
University Publishing Company, Inc. chose to remain silent. On August 11,
1961, University Publishing Company, Inc., by counsel Aruego, Mamaril and
Associates (the law firm of Jose M. Aruego aforesaid) merely countered
plaintiff's petition for execution as against Aruego with an unsworn
manifestation in court that "said Jose M. Aruego is not a party to this case,"
and, therefore, plaintiff's petition should be denied.
1. The right to a hearing which includes the right to present ones case
and submit evidence
2. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented
3. The decision must have something to support itself
4. The evidence must be substantial
5. The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the
hearing
6. The tribunal or body of any judges must act on its own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy
7. The board or body should in all controversial questions, render its
decision in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the
various issues involves and reason for the decision rendered
8. The officer or tribunal conducting the investigation must be vested
with competent jurisdiction
A violation of any of the cardinal requirements of due process in
administrative proceedings renders any judgment or order
issued therein null and void and can be attacked in any
appropriate proceeding
Facts: The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand, prays
for the vacation of the judgment rendered by the majority of this Court and
the remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial Relations for a new trial.
The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for
reconsideration of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations and to the
motion for new trial of the respondent National Labor Uuion, Inc.
Facts: The petitioner herein, successor in-interest in the case of the former
DECS Secretary against the public school teachers who were illegally
dismissed for staging a mass action and failure to heed to the return-to-work
order, filed a petition for the judgment of the trial court holding that said public
school teachers were denied of due process in the proceedings. It was held
that the proceedings contravened RA 4670 which required that administrative
charges against a teacher shall be heard initially by a committee composed of
the corresponding school superintendent of the Division or a duly authorized
representative who at least have the rank of a supervisor, where the teachers
belong, as chairman, a representative of the local or, in its absence, any
existing provincial or national teachers organization and supervisor of the
Division, the last 2 to be designated by the Director of Public Schools.
Petitioner argued that DECS complied with RA 4670 because all the
teachers who were members of the various committee are members of either
the QC Teachers Federation or the QC Elementary teachers Federation and are
deemed representatives of teachers organization.
Held: The Court held that there was indeed a denial of due process. Mere
membership of said teachers in their respective organizations does not ipso
facto make them authorized representatives of the organizations. Under the
law, the teachers organization possess the right to indicate its choice of
representatives. Such right cannot be usurped by the Secretary of Education
or the Director of Public Schools or their underlings. The teachers appointed
by the DECS as members of its investigating committee was ever designated
or authorized by a teachers organization as its representatives in said
committee.
Hence the failure to comply with the requirement vested no jurisdiction
to the committee to hear the case. Respondent teachers were denied of due
process.
Facts: PAL's proposal to introduce new Mercury night flights had been referred
to a hearing examiner for economic justification, PAL submitted a so-called
consolidated schedule of flights that included the same Mercury night flights
and this was allowed by Board Resolution No. 139(68). The Board's action was
impelled by the authorizations of certain flight schedules previously allowed
but were incorporated were about to expire; thus, the consolidated schedule
had to be approved temporarily if the operations of the flights referred to were
not to be suspended. In short, the temporary permit was issued to prevent
the stoppage or cessation of services in the affected areas.
Held: YES. It was precisely prescribed that "all schedules under the DTS-35
for which no previous approval has been granted by the Board, are hereby
referred to a hearing examiner for reception of evidence on its economic
justification."
It has been correctly said that administrative proceedings are not exempt from
the operation of certain basic and fundamental procedural principles, such as
the due process requirements in investigations and trials (Asprec vs. Itchon.
16 SCRA 921). And this administrative due process is recognized to include
(a) the right to notice*, be it actual or constructive, of the institution of the
proceedings that may affect a person s legal rights; (b) reasonable opportunity
to appear and defend his rights*, introduce witnesses and relevant evidence
in his favor: (c) a tribunal so constituted* as to give him reasonable assurance
of honesty and impartiality, and one of competent jurisdiction. and (d) a
finding or decision by that tribunal supported by substantial evidence*
presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the records or disclosed to
the parties affected
In administrative cases, the general rule is that prior notice and hearing are
necessary only where the law so requires. The inquiry should therefore be into
the enabling statute which clothes an administrative agency or officer with
certain duties and responsibilities in the discharge of which some persons may
adversely affected.
Facts: The Court of Industrial Relations authorized lay off of workers solely
on the basis of an ocular inspection.
Issue: WON the Court of Industrial Relations authorize the layoff of workers
on the basis of an ocular inspections without receiving full evidence to
determine the cause or motive of such a lay off
Held: No. The required process has not been followed. The court of quo merely
acted on the strength of the ocular inspection it conducted in the premises of
the respondent company was incurring financial losses. The allegations cannot
be established by a mere inspection of the place of labor specially when
conducted at the request of the interested.
Sometime in 1982, the Board granted export quota allocations for 1983 to the
petitioner. These export quotas have been granted annually to the Petitioner
since 1976. They are automatically renewed every year provided the grantee
has utilized its quotas during the previous years.
On March 2, 1983, the petitioner received a letter from the Board informing it
that its 1983 export quota allocations were revoked effective February 1983.
Furthermore, its major stockholders and officers were also distinguished from
engaging in business activities involving garment and textile exports.
Privileges that had long been enjoyed transforms and becomes in the
character of ones property.
Go vs NAPOLCOM 271 SCRA 447
Facts: This special civil action of certiorari to set aside the decision of the
NAPOLCOM: The fact that the Jai alai bookies were operating in the house
being occupied by herein respondent-appellant, the apprehension of his wife
and brother in two (2) successive raids effected by law enforcement authority
and his intercession for the dismissal of the case filed in consequence thereof,
are tangible proofs that he was, indeed, an accessory - if not a principal - in
said gambling operation.
Petitioner maintains that he was not served written charges and
informed of the nature of such charges; that no hearing had actually been held
by the summary dismissal board: and that at any rate he was not heard.
Held: YES. We conclude that petitioner was denied the due process of law and
that not even the fact that the charge against him is serious and evidence of
his guilt is - in the opinion of his superiors - strong can compensate for the
procedural shortcut evident in the record of this case. It is precisely in cases
such as this that the utmost care be exercised lest in the drive to clean up the
ranks of the police those who are innocent are denied justice or, through
blunder, those who are guilty are allowed to escape punishment.
The petitioners appealed from that order to the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources. While the appeal was pending. Director Gozon was
appointed Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Instead of inhibiting
himself, he decided the appeal, as if he was adjudicating the case for the first
time. Thus, Secretary Gozon exercised appellate jurisdiction over a case which
he had decided as Director of Mines. He acted as reviewing authority in the
appeal from his own decision. Or, to use another analogy, he acted as trial
judge and appellate judge in the same case.
In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turn
out to be a farce, the reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer
whose decision is under review; otherwise, there could be no different view or
there would be no real review of the case. The decision of the reviewing officer
would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view since being
human, he would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case.
In administrative cases, the general rule is that prior notice and hearing are
necessary only where the law so requires. The inquiry should therefore be into
the enabling statute which clothes an administrative agency or officer with
certain duties and responsibilities in the discharge of which some persons may
adversely affected.
Essential elements of due
process:
a. An impartial tribunal
b. Due notice and opportunity to be heard be given
c. The procedure at the hearing be consistent with the essentials of a fair
trial
d. The proceedings may be conducted in such a way that there will be
opportunity for the court to determine whether the applicable rules of
law and procedure
e. That the decision or ruling be supported by substantial evidence
Facts: Anita Villa was granted a building permit issued by the City Engineer
to contrcust a funeral parlor. Following adverse judgment to the court in his
suit to enjoin the construction of the funeral parlor, Veneracion, instead of
appealing the judgment, lodged a complaint with the HSCR on substantially
the same ground litigated in the action relative parlors distance from
hospitals whether public or private. Villa received a telegram from the HSRC
through Commissioner Dizon requesting transmittal of proof of location
clearance granted by this Office. Villa sent a reply telegram reading:
Locational Clearance based on certification of City Planning and Development
Coordinator and Human Settlement Officer, copies mail. Subsequently, Villa
received from Dizon an Order to Present Proof of Locational Clearance. Since
she had already sent the required locational clearance, Villa made no
response. Then Villa received a show cause Order, requiring her to show
cause why a fine should not be imposed on her or a cease-and desist order
issued against her for her failure to show proof of locational clearance. In spite
of her communication that she had already mailed all required documents, she
received an Order imposing on her a fine of P10,000 and requiring her to cease
operations, and later, a writ of execution in implementation of the order. A
motion for reconsideration to which she attached copies of the Commission
Proper was also denied on account of the finality of the Order. An appeal to
the office of the Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs, and so was the motion
for reconsideration.
Noteworthy are the following: neither Veneracion nor the Commision,
ever made known the complaint of Veneracion to Villa until much later, after
the Commission has rendered several adverse rulings against her; the orders
of the Commission made no reference whatever to the documents Villa had
already sent by registered mail; and the resolutions of the Presidential
Assistant Lazaro likewise omitted to refer to the telegrams and documents
sent by Veneracion
Issue: WON Villa was denied due process against which the defense of failure
of Villa to take timely appeal will not avail.
Facts: PLDTCO entered into an agreement with the American Telephone and
Telegraph Company, wherein both companies agreed to establish telephone
services between the Philippines and the United States. As it lacked the
necessary equipment and facilities, PLDTCO on the same date entered into
another agreement with RCA whereby the latter constituted itself a carrier of
PLDTCO's telephone messages to and from the United States. The term of the
agreement was for five years and "shall thereafter continue in force until
terminated by either party giving the other 24 calendar months previous
notice in writing."
RCA filed a petition for prohibition) with the Court of First Instance of
Manila to prevent the Secretary of Public Works and Communications and the
Radio Control Board from proceeding further on PLDTCO's pending application.
The complaint alleged that the approval by the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications of the construction permit in favor of PLDTCO without
previous hearing and opportunity to plaintiff RCA to present evidence in
support of its opposition was without due process of law.
Issue: Whether or not RCA was denied of hearing and opportunity present
case.
That he and others wilfully and unlawfully enter into a purchase contract with
REYNALDO ESPARAGUERRA, a private citizen, for the purchase of certain office
supplies, namely: one hundred (100) reams of Onion Skin size 11" x 17" at a
unit prim of Five Hundred Fifty pesos (P550.00) or a total price of Fifty-Five
Thousand Pesos (P55,000.00), which contract was manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the government as the prevailing unit price for said item
was only Fifty-Five Pews (P55.00) or a total price of Five Thousand Five
Hundred Pews (P5,500.00), thereby causing undue injury to the government
in the total amount of Forty-NineThousand Five Hundred Pesos (P49,500.00)
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Petitioner was arraigned on January 5, 1993, whereupon he entered a plea of
"not guilty."
On January 25, 1993, Special Prosecution Officer III Wilfredo Orencia moved
for petitioner's suspension, citing see. 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 which
provides in part:
Held: Yes, It is now settled that sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 makes it
mandatory for the Sandiganbayan to suspend any public officer against whom
a valid information charging violation of that law, Book II, Title 7 of the Revised
Penal Code, or any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds
or property is filed.5 The court trying a case has neither discretion nor duty to
determine whether preventive suspension is required to prevent the accused
from using his office to intimidate witnesses or frustrate his prosecution or
continue committing malfeasance in office. The presumption is that unIess the
accused is suspended he may frustrate his prosecution or commit further acts
of malfeasance or do both, in the same way that upon a finding that there is
probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof, the law requires the judge to issue a
warrant fur the arrest of the accused. The law does not require the court to
determine whether the accused is likely to escape or evade the jurisdiction of
the court.
Facts: Monetary Board (MB) issued Resolution No. 596 ordering the closure
of Triumph Savings Bank (TSB), forbidding it from doing business in the
Philippines, placing it under receivership, and appointing Ramon V. Tiaoqui as
receiver. TSB filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
against Central Bank and Ramon V. Tiaoqui to annul MB Resolution No. 596,
with prayer for injunction, challenging in the process the constitutionality of
Sec. 29 of R.A. 269, otherwise known as 'The Central Bank Act," as amended,
insofar as it authorizes the Central Bank to take over a banking institution
even if it is not charged with violation of any few or regulation, much less
found guilty thereof.
The trial court granted the relief sought and denied the application of
TSB for injunction. Thereafter, Triumph Savings under the receivership of the
officials of the Central Bank was done without prior hearing, that is, without
first hearing the side of the bank. They further admit that said resolution can
be the subject of judicial review and may be set aside should it be found that
the same was issued with arbitrariness and in bad faith.
Issue: Whether or not summary closure was "arbitrary and in bad faith" and
a denial of "due process.
Ruling: No, Sec. 29 does not contemplate prior notice and hearing before a
bank may be directed to stop operations and placed under receivership. When
par. 4 (now par. 5, as amended by E.O. 289) provides for the filing of a case
within ten (10) days after the receiver takes charge of the assets of the bank,
it is unmistakable that the assailed actions should precede the filing of the
case. Plainly, the legislature could not have intended to authorize "no prior
notice and hearing" in the closure of the bank and at the same time allow a
suit to annul it on the basis of absence thereof.
In the early case of Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc. v Arca [1965],17
It was held that a hearing is nowhere required in Sec. 29 nor does the
constitutional requirement of due process demand that the correctness of the.
Monetary Board' s resolution to stop operation and proceed to liquidation be
first adjudged before making the resolution effective, It is enough that a
subsequent judicial review be provided.
Facts: The Philippine Ports Authority (Port of Zamboanga) issued to Tan Gin
San, surviving spouse of Gregoria Francisco, a permit to occupy the lot where
the building stands for a period of one (1) year, to expire on 31 December
1989. The permittee was using the Quonset (hut) for the storage of copra.
Ruling: No, Petitioner was in lawful possession of the lot and quonset building
by virtue of a permit from the Philippine Ports Authority (Port of Zamboanga)
when demolition was effected. It was not squatting on public land. Its property
was not of trifling value. It was entitled to an impartial hearing before a
tribunal authorized to decide whether the quonset building did constitute a
nuisance in law. There was no compelling necessity for precipitate action. It
follows then that respondent public officials of the Municipality of Isabela,
Basilan, transcended their authority in abating summarily petitioner's quonset
building. They had deprived petitioner of its property without due process of
law. The fact that petitioner filed a suit for prohibition and was subsequently
heard thereon will not cure the defect, as opined by the Court of Appeals, the
demolition having been a fait accompli prior to hearing and the authority to
demolish without a judicial order being a prejudicial issue.
Ruling:
1. Yes, the office of the Ombudsman has the power to "investigate and
prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission
of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient." 14 This
power has been held to include the investigation and prosecution of any
crime committed by a public official regardless of whether the acts or
omissions complained of are related to, or connected with, or arise from,
the performance of his official duty 15 It is enough that the act or
omission was committed by a public official. Hence, the crime of rape,
when committed by a public official like a municipal mayor, is within the
power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute.
2. No, Prior notice and hearing is a not required, such suspension not being
a penalty but only a preliminary step in an administrative investigation.
As held in Nera v. Garcia:
3. Where the twin rights have previously been offered but the right to
exercise them had not been claimed.
Where the law is silent on prior notice and hearing as a
requirement before an agency action, which refers to the whole
or part of every agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief or its
equivalent or denial thereof, can be done, compliance with the
requirement of prior notice and hearing depends upon the nature
of the power to be exercised or the end to be achieved.
Facts: Respondent Jacinto Hernandez lodged with the Board of Examiners for
Surveyors administrative complaint2 for unprofessional conduct against
petitioner Cleto Asprec. He requested Asprec to undertake survey on his lot in
Port Junction, Ragay, Camarines Sur. That no survey was conducted and that
it was a mere copy of one Damian Alham. that Asprec was guilty of deceit and
thus violated the Code of Ethics for surveyors. The Board's unanimous decision
of October 27, 1959 revoked, and required surrender of, Asprec's certificate
of registration as a private land surveyor. A complaint was but was absent in
the hearing.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner was denied his right to present his case.
Ruling: No, petitioner has had more than ample opportunity to defend himself
before the Board. As he and counsel did not appear at the last and stipulated
d ate of bearing, he cannot look to the law or to a judicial tribunal to whipsaw
the Board into giving him a new one. He cannot raise his voice in protest
against the act of the Board in proceeding in his and his counsel's absence.
And this because without cause or reason, without any excuse at all, counsel
and client have chosen to shy away from the trial. Presence of a party at a
trial, petitioner concedes, is not always of the essence of due process. Really,
all that the law requires to satisfy adherence to this constitutional precept is
that the parties be given notice of the trial, an opportunity to be heard.
Petitioner had notice of the trial of May 11th. More than this, that date of trial
(May 11) had been previously agreed upon by the parties and their counsel.
Petitioner cannot now charge that he received less-than-a-fair-treatment. He
has forfeited his right to be heard in his defense.6
Petitioner insists that the proceeding before the Board are quasi-
criminal in nature. From this he proceeds to draw the conclusion that no
valid trial could proceed even if he absented himself therefrom. We do not
see eye to eye with this view. It is best answered by a reference to the
opinion of the court below, thus the rule applies even to quasi-criminal or
criminal proceedings. So, where the respondent in a petition for contempt
failed to appear on the date set f or the hearing, of which he was previously
notified, it was held that he was not deprived of his day in court when the
judge ordered him arrested unless he pa y the support he was adjudged to
give, he having been given an opportunity to be heard
Facts: Republic Act No. 316, granted petitioner Vigan Electric Light Company,
Inc., a franchise to construct, maintain and operate an electric light heat
and/or power plant for the purpose of generating and distributing light, heat
and/or power, for sale within the limits of several Municipalities of the province
of Ilocos Sur.
Petitioner herein instituted the present action for certiorari to annul said order
of May 17, 1962, upon the ground that, latter had not furnished the former a
"copy of the alleged letter-petition of Congressman Crisologo and others.
Respondent then expressed the view that there was no necessity of serving
copy of said letter to petitioner, because respondent was merely holding
informal conferences to ascertain whether petitioner would consent to the
reduction of its rates. That petitioner had not even been served a copy of the
auditor's report upon which the order complained of is based, that such order
had been issued without notice and hearing; and that, accordingly, petitioner
had been denied due process.
Ruling: The hold that the determination of the issue involved in the order
complained of partakes of the nature of a quasi-judicial function and that,
having been issued without previous notice and hearing, said order is clearly
violative of the due process clause, and, hence, null and void.
The rule that the filling of a MR of the decision /ruling against a party cures
the defect in the lack of prior notice and hearing as to preclude the party from
claiming denial of due process assumes that the other requirements of due
process have been complied with. However such opportunity is nothing and
he is still denied due process, where the decision against him has nothing to
support itself, one of the cardinal requirements of due process being that the
decision or ruling of an administrative body must be supported by substantial
evidence.
This instant petition for certiorari and mandamus praying for the reversal of
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Committee, the October
22, 1992, Memorandum of then Justice Secretary Drilon, A.O. No. 52 issued
by President Ramos, and the orders of Secretary Quisumbingit prays for the
"payment of retirement benefits and other benefits accorded to deceased
Arsenio Lumiqued by law, payable to his heirs; and the backwages from the
period he was dismissed from service up to the time of his death on May 19,
1994.
ISSUE: WON the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by
counsel during an administrative inquiry?
RULING: While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at
times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that under existing
laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by
counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondent's
capacity to represent himself and no duty rests in such a body to furnish the
person being investigated with counsel,28 In an administrative proceeding
such as the one that transpired below, a respondent (such as Lumiqued)
has the option of engaging the services of counsel or not.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction requires that a plaintiff should first seek
relief in an administrative proceeding before he seeks a remedy in court,
even though the matter is properly presented to the court, which is within its
jurisdiction. The court will not determine a controversy:
Held: Petitions are granted. The issuance by the NTC of Memorandum Circular
No. 13-6-2000 and its Memorandum dated October 6, 2000 was pursuant to
its quasi-legislative or rule-making power. As such, petitioners were justified
in invoking the judicial power of the Regional Trial Court to assail the
constitutionality and validity of the said issuances. What is assailed is the
validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative
agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts
have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. The determination of whether a
specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes
the law or the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.
Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to
declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential
decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the
regional trial courts.25 This is within the scope of judicial power, which includes
the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity
of the acts of the political departments.26 Judicial power includes the duty of
the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
B. Distinguished from the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies
C. Effect of doctrine
Villaflor filed with the Bureau of Lands, he protested the Sales Application of
Nasipit Lumber, claiming that the company has not paid him P5,000.00 as
provided in the Deed of Relinquishment of Rights.
The Director of Lands found that the payment of the amount of P5,000.00 in
the Deed xxx and the consideration in the Agreement to Sell were duly proven,
and ordered the dismissal of Villaflor's protest and gave due course to the
Sales Application of Nasipit Lumber.
ISSUE: WON the director of land has primary jurisdiction over the case?
Facts: Celestino Villalon filed a complaint for collection of back rentals and
damages before the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City against petitioners
Lope Machete and 11 others. The complaint alleged that the parties entered
into a leasehold agreement with respect to Villanons landholdings at Poblacion
Norte, Carmen, Bohol, under which Machete et al. were to pay private
respondent a certain amount or percentage of their harvests. However,
despite repeated demands and with no valid reason, Machete et al. Failed to
pay their respective rentals. Private respondent thus prayed that petitioners
be ordered to pay him back rentals and damages.
The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, and later denied the motion for
reconsideration. On appeal, the petitioners maintain that the alleged cause of
action of private respondent arose from an agrarian relation and that
respondent appellate court failed to consider that the agreement involved is
an agricultural leasehold contract, hence, the dispute is agrarian in nature.
The laws governing its execution and the rights and obligations of the parries
thereto are necessarily R.A. 3844, R.A. 66577 and other pertinent agrarian
laws. Considering that the application, implementation, enforcement or
interpretation of said laws are matters which have been vested in the DAR,
this case is outside the jurisdiction of the trial court. The CA found the petition
to be impressed with merit. E.O. 2298 vested the DAR with quasi-judicial
powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters as well as
exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving implementation of
agrarian reform except those failing under the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources in accordance with law, hence, this case.
In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized administrative
boards or commissions with the special knowledge, experience and capability
to hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters or essentially
factual matters, subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse of discretion,
has become well-nigh indispensable . . .
Moreover, however cleverly the complaint may be worded, the ultimate relief
sought by PTFI is to compel the Bureau of Customs to seize and forfeit the
match importations of AJIC. Since the determination to seize or not to seize is
discretionary upon the Bureau of Customs, the same cannot be subject of
mandamus. But this does not preclude recourse to the courts by way of the
extraordinary relief of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court if the
Bureau of Customs should gravely abuse the exercise of its jurisdiction.
Otherwise stated, the court cannot compel an agency to do a particular act or
to enjoin such act which is with its prerogative; except when in the exercise
of its authority it clearly abuses or exceeds its jurisdiction. In the case at
bench, we have no occasion to rule on the issue of grave abuse of discretion
as excess of jurisdiction as it is not before us.
Facts: Philippine Veterans Bank owned four parcels of land in Tagum, Davao,
which are covered by Transfer Certificates. The lands were taken by the
Department of Agrarian Reform for distribution to landless farmers pursuant
to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657). Dissatisfied with
the valuation of the land made by respondents Land Bank of the Philippines
and the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB),
petitioner filed a petition for a determination of the just compensation for its
property. The petition was filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2,
Tagum, Davao, which dismissed the petition on the ground that it was filed
beyond the 15-day reglementary period for filing appeals from the orders of
the DARAB. Since this case was filed only on January 26, 1994, the fifteen-
day period provided for under Section 51 of Republic Act 6657 which is the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law within which to appeal, already lapsed.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision was affirmed. It was held that:
Jurisdiction over land valuation cases is lodged in the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board, as is plainly provided under Rule II of the DARAB
Revised Rules of Procedure. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but
its motion was likewise denied. Hence, this petition for review.
Petitioner argues that DAR adjudicators have no jurisdiction to determine the
just compensation for the taking of lands under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program, because such jurisdiction is vested in Regional Trial Courts
designated as Special Agrarian Courts and, therefore, a petition for the fixing
of just compensation can be filed beyond the 15-day period of appeal provided
from the decision of the DAR adjudicator.On the other hand, respondents
argue that actions for the fixing of just compensation must be filed in the
appropriate courts within 15 days from receipt of the decision of the DAR
adjudicator, otherwise such decision becomes final and executory, pursuant
to 51 of R.A. No. 6657.
Ruling: Petitioner's contention has no merit. R.A. No. 6657 provides: The DAR
is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all
matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) . . . .The Special
Agrarian Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions
for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution
of all criminal offenses under this Act. The Rules of Court shall apply to all
proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts, unless modified by this Act.
The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under their
special jurisdiction within thirty (30) days from submission of the case for
decision.
Where the administrative agency has no jurisdiction, the doctrine does not
apply. It does not apply in any of the exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies.
Lagua vs Cusi 160 SCRA 260
Facts: This petition for mandamus originated from a complaint for damages
which was instituted by the petitioners against the private respondents for
closing a logging road without authority.
From the facts, petitioners were hauling logs to be loaded on a vessel. Private
respondent EastCoast ordered the closure of the road, a national highway,
through their security force, to prevent passage of the trucks hauling the logs
for the Japanese vessel. Private respondent claim that they were the only
authorized timber licensee to use the road. Petitioners filed a case before the
trial court, which was dismissed on lack of jurisdiction, the court a quo holding
that the issue is within the realm of the Bureau of Forestry which should have
heard the case before filing t case in court.
Held: The petitioners maintain that since their action is for damages, the
regular courts have jurisdiction over the same. According to them, the
respondent court had no basis for holding that the Bureau of Forestry
Development must first determine that the closure of a logging road is illegal
before an action for damages can be instituted.
P.D. No. 705 upon which the respondent court based its order does not vast
any power in the Bureau of Forest Development to determine whether or not
the closure of a logging road is legal or illegal and to make such determination
a pre-requisite before an action for damages may be maintained. Moreover,
the complaint instituted by the petitioners is clearly for damages based on the
alleged illegal closure of the logging road. Whether or not such closure was
illegal is a matter to be established on the part of the petitioners and a matter
to be disproved by the private respondents. This should appropriately be
threshed out in a judicial proceeding. It is beyond the power and authority of
the Bureau of Forest Development to determine the unlawful closure of a
passage way, much less award or deny the payment of damages based on
such closure. Not every activity inside a forest area is subject to the
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest Development.
V. Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
As a general rule, recourse through court action cannot prosper until all the
remedies have been exhausted at the administrative level.
Petitioners however, claim that they were denied due process, obviously to
show that their case falls within one of the exceptions to the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Such contention is however untenable, because in the first place, they were
made to avail in the same administrative agency, the opportunity or right to
oppose, which in fact they did, when they filed a motion for reconsideration
and later when the motion was denied, they appealed to the Secretary of
Education and Culture.
Facts: Jose L. Gonzales, a senior teacher civil service eligible, was appointed
Principal of the Lambunao High School established in the municipality of
Lambunao, Iloilo. Lambunao High School was later converted into a Regional
Vocational High School under the name of Iloilo Vocational High School.
Gonzales then received a letter from the Secretary of Education appointing
him as Head of the Related Subjects Department of the Bureau of Public
School. He also received a copy of a letter of the Director of Public Schools
addressed to respondent Alfredo Pineda, at the time Principal of the Samar
Trade School, appointing him as Principal of the Iloilo Vocational School. When
Pineda came to assume the office of Principal of the latter school, Gonzales
refused to yield the same to him, and sent a written protest against Pineda's
appointment as well as against his own appointment as Head of the Related
Subjects Department, addressed to the Superintendent of the Iloilo School of
Arts and Trades, who forwarded it without undue delay to the Director of Public
Schools by a second indorsement. Without waiting for any action on his
protest-in fact even before said protest could be forwarded and submitted to
the Director of Public Schools-Gonzales, filed the present petition for
prohibition with preliminary injunction in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo to
restrain the Secretary of Education and the Director of Public Schools from
giving effect to the appointment of Alfredo Pineda as Principal of the Iloilo
Vocational School, and to recover damages. After due trial, the lower court
rendered the appealed judgment. Appellants claimed that the lower court
erred in not holding that the present action was instituted prematurely.
Ruling: The facts of this case disclose that appellee initiated appropriate
administrative procedures to obtain relief from the orders that he considered
prejudicial to his rights by means of his first, addressed to the Superintendent
of the Iloilo School of Arts and Trades. This protest was forwarded by the latter
to the Director of Public Schools, but even before this date appellee instituted
the present action. It is, therefore, clear that he did not give his superior
officers any opportunity to reconsider the questioned orders before seeking
judicial intervention. The rule of exhaustion of appropriate remedies before
resorting to the courts to seek relief appears to be of stronger application to
the present case where, according to the record, appellant Pineda and the
superior officers of appellee did not appear to have exerted any undue
pressure upon him to compel him to yield and give up the position in question.
The decision appealed from is reserved, with the result that the present action
is dismissed.
Carale vs Abarintos 269 SCRA 132
The petition was granted and that respondent court {RTC} was ordered to
dismiss the case filed by Pontejos.
Facts: This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Basilan
City dismissing a petition for mandamus to compel Limbaga, the engineer of
that city, to authorize de los Santos to construct a residential house on the
land described in the petition. It is alleged the respondent without any lawful
cause refused to grant said permit; and that in view of this refusal, petitioner
suffered damages.
In his answer, the respondent, represented by the City Fiscal of Basilan, denied
the allegations of the petition and interposed the following affirmative
defenses: that after a fire which occurred in Lamitan that raged down a major
portion of the market site therein, the city government approved the purchase
of an additional area to enlarge the said site and that, incidentally, the lot
claimed by the petitioner was included in the area; that by virtue thereof,
expropriation proceedings had been instituted thereon, hence, the denial of
the permit applied for by petitioner. The city fiscal moved to dismiss the
petition on the following grounds: that mandamus will not lie since the
issuance of the permit applied for was a discretionary and not a ministerial
duty on the part of the city engineer to which the trial court agreed.
Issue: WON the case will prosper and WON there is compliance with the
DEAR.
Ruling: Mandamus cannot prosper in this case for the simple reason that, as
the record shows, the land in question is already the subject matter of
expropriation proceeding instituted by Basilan City pursuant to a resolution
approved by the City Council, which proceeding is now pending in the Court
of First Instance of Basilan. Moreover, herein petitioner has failed to exhaust
the administrative remedies available to him. Petitioner should have first
brought the matter to the Director of Public Works who, under the law,
exercise supervision and control over city engineers of chartered cities (see
Commonwealth Act No. 424), and if he was not satisfied with the Director's
decision he should have appealed to the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications.
C. When applied
Issue: WON the petitioner has cause of action in the herein case before the
court.
Ruling: Special civil actions of certiorari and mandamus against the Import
Control Commission do not lie if the petitioner has a plain and adequate
remedy by an appeal to the President. Certiorari or mandamus against
administrative officers should not be entertained if superior administrative
officers can grant relief. Thus, the petition is denied.
On July 31, 1987, the herein private respondents filed a petition with the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources for the cancellation of the
TLA, on the ground of serious violations of its conditions and the provisions of
forestry laws and regulations.
The same charges were subsequently made, also by the herein private
respondents, in a complaint for injunction with damages against the petitioner,
which was docketed as Civil Case No. 2732 in the Regional Trial Court of
Pagadian City.
The petitioner moved to dismiss this case on three grounds, to wit: 1) the
court had no jurisdiction over the complaint; 2) the plaintiffs had not yet
exhausted administrative remedies; and 3) the injunction sought was
expressly prohibited by Section I of PD 605.
Judge Alfonso G. Abad denied the motion to dismiss on December 11, 1987,1
and the motion for reconsideration on February 15,1988.2 The petitioner then
elevated the matter to the respondent Court of Appeals, which sustained the
trial court in a decision dated July 4, 1988,3 and in its resolution of September
27 , 1988, denying the motion for reconsideration.
Issue: Whether or not the lower court correctly applied the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Ruling: The lower court erred in misapplying the doctrine. One of the reasons
for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of powers, which enjoins upon
the Judiciary a becoming policy of noninterference with matters coming
primarily (albeit not exclusively) within the competence of the other
departments. The theory is that the administrative authorities are in a better
position to resolve questions addressed to their particular expertise and that
errors committed by subordinates in their resolution may be rectified by their
superiors if given a chance to do so. The argument that the questions raised
in the petition are purely legal is also not acceptable. The private respondents
have charged, both in the administrative case before the DENR and in the civil
case before the Regional Trial Court of Pagethan City, that the petitioner has
violated the terms and conditions of the TLA and the provisions of forestry
laws and regulations.21 The charge involves factual issues calling for the
presentation of supporting evidence. Such evidence is best evaluated first by
the administrative authorities, employing their specialized knowledge of the
agreement and the rules allegedly violated, before the courts may step in to
exercise their powers of review. Here is no question that Civil Case No. 2732
comes within the jurisdiction of the respondent court. Nevertheless, as the
wrong alleged in the complaint was supposedly committed as a result of the
unlawful logging activities of the petitioner, it will be necessary first to
determine whether or not the TLA and the forestry laws and regulations had
indeed been violated. To repeat for emphasis, determination of this question
is the primary responsibility of the Forest Management Bureau of the DENR.
The application of the expertise of the administrative agency in the resolution
of the issue raised is a condition precedent for the eventual examination, if
still necessary, of the same question by a court of justice.
Facts: The controversy on hand had its incipiency on May 19, 1989 when the
truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman while on its way to Bulacan
from San Jose, Baggao, Cagayan, was seized by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR, for brevity) personnel in Aritao,
Nueva Vizcaya because the driver could not produce the required documents
for the forest products found concealed in the truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan,
the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) in Aritao,
Cagayan, issued on May 23, 1989 an order of confiscation of the truck and
gave the owner thereof fifteen, (15) days within which to submit an
explanation why the truck should not be forfeited. Private respondents,
however, failed to submit the required explanation. On June 22, 1989, 1
Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan of DENR sustained petitioner
Layugan's action of confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck
invoking Section 68-A of Presidential Decree No.of temporary restraining order
of petitioners was granted by this court. Invoking the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies, petitioners aver that the trial court could not
legally entertain the suit for replevin because the buck was under
administrative seizure proceedings pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as
amended by E.O. 277. Private respondents, on the other hand, would seek to
avoid the operation of this principle asserting that the instant case falls within
the exception of the doctrine upon the justification that (1) due process was
violated because they were not given the chance to be heard, and (2) the
seizure and forfeiture was unlawful on the grounds: (a) that the Secretary of
DENR and his representatives have no authority to confiscate and forfeit
conveyances utilized in transporting illegal forest products, and (b) that the
truck as admitted by petitioners was not used in the commission of the crime.
Ruling: This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a
party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that
he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded
him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be
resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity
to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy
should be exhausted first before court's judicial power can be sought. The
premature invocation of court's intervention is fatal to one's cause of action.
Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel the case is susceptible
of dismissal for lack of cause of action. This doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies was not without its practical and legal reasons, for
one thing, availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and
provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. It is no less true to state
that the courts of justice for reasons of comity and convenience will shy away
from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed
and complied with so as to give the administrative agency concerned every
opportunity to correct its error and to dispose of the case. However, we are
not amiss to reiterate that the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies as tested by a battery of cases is not an ironclad rule. This doctrine
is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and
uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. Thus, while
the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious problems
caused by unbriddled exploitation of these resources, the judiciary will stand
clear. A long line of cases establish the basic rule that the courts will not
interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of
government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under
the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies." To sustain the
claim of private respondents would in effect bring the instant controversy
beyond the pale of the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies and
fall within the ambit of excepted cases heretofore stated.
Three days after, the Monetary Board adopted Resolution No. 995, dated July
23, 1959, approving the appointment of herein respondent Mario Marcos to
the position involved in place of petitioner R. Marino Corpus. The lower court
was of the opinion that petitioner-appellant should have exhausted all
administrative remedies available to him, such as an appeal to the
Commissioner of Civil Service, under Republic Act 2260, or the President of
the Philippines who under the Constitution and the law is the head of all the
executive departments of the government including its agencies and
instrumentalities. This is the main issue disputed in this appeal.
Ruling: True, the appellant did not elevate his case for review either by the
President or the Civil Service Commission. However, it is our opinion that a
resort to these administrative appeals is voluntary or permissive, taking into
account the facts obtaining in this case. (1) There is no law requiring an appeal
to the President in a case like the one at bar. The fact that the President had,
in two instances cited in the orders appealed from, acted on appeals from
decisions of the Monetary Board of the Central Bank, should not be regarded
as precedents, but at most may be viewed as acts of condescension on the
part of the Chief Executive. (2) While there are provisions in the Civil Service
Law regarding appeals to the Commissioner of Civil Service and the Civil
Service Board of Appeals, We believe the petitioner is not bound to observe
them, considering his status and the Charter of the Central Bank. In Castillo
vs,. Bayona, et al., 106 Phil., 1121, We said that Section 14, Republic Act 265,
creating the Central Bank of the Philippines, particularly paragraph (c) thereof,
"is sufficiently broad to vest the Monetary Board with the power of
investigation and removal of its officials, except the Governor thereof. In other
words, the Civil Service Law is the general legal provision for the investigation,
suspension or removal of civil service employees, whereas Section 14 is a
special provision of law which must govern the investigation, suspension or
removal of employees of the Central Bank-, though they may be subject to
the Civil Service Law and Regulations in other respects."
Held: Petitions are granted. The issuance by the NTC of Memorandum Circular
No. 13-6-2000 and its Memorandum dated October 6, 2000 was pursuant to
its quasi-legislative or rule-making power. As such, petitioners were justified
in invoking the judicial power of the Regional Trial Court to assail the
constitutionality and validity of the said issuances. What is assailed is the
validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative
agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts
have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. The determination of whether a
specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes
the law or the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.
Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to
declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential
decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the
regional trial courts.25 This is within the scope of judicial power, which includes
the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity
of the acts of the political departments.26 Judicial power includes the duty of
the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Marinduque Iron Mines v. Sec. of Public Works
8 SCRA 179
Facts: It appears from the allegations of the petition that the petitioner was
denounced before the Port and Harbor Board, Manila for making certain
constructions near the mouth of Calat-an Creek in Sipalay, Negros Occidental;
that on September 11, 1958, petitioner was served with copy of the charges
filed against it by two investigators of respondent Secretary of Public Works
and Communications who conducted an investigation of said charges; that on
the basis of this investigation, respondent Secretary rendered a decision dated
January 16, 1959 ordering the petitioner herein to remove the causeway
illegally constructed at the mouth of the Calat-an River and restore the bed of
said river to its original condition within thirty days from receipt of copy of the
decision, otherwise, the removal shall be effected by the government at the
expense of herein petitioner. Without appealing the decision of the respondent
Secretary to the President, herein petitioner has filed with this Court the
present petition for certiorari seeking that the decision of respondent be
annulled."
Facts: On April 29, 1958, Pedro B. Patanao commenced Special Civil Case No.
48 with the Court of First Instance of Agusan, against Valeriano, C. Bueno and
one Juanito Merin, for injunction and damages. In his amended petition,
Patanao alleged that on March 10, 1958 the respondents therein disturbed
him in his, possession of his timber concession by illegally entering the same
and cutting and hauling logs therein; that when he went to the area to stop
said respondents and their laborers, truckers and loggers from cutting and
hauling logs "he was met with riot guns, pistols and other firearms"; and that
defendants were able to cut no less than one million board feet of exportable
logs worth not less than $64,000.00 and would be able to cut and haul even
a bigger amount in the space of one month as they had allegedly concentrated
all their logging machineries and equipment with the apparent intention of
illegally denuding the forest area covered by his license. Patanao thus urged
the court below to issue a writ of preliminary injunction so as to enjoin the
respondents, their agents, laborers and lawyers, from entering the area and
cutting and hauling logs therein pending trial and, after trial, to make the
injunction final and permanent, and to condemn said respondents liable in an
amount of not less than P175,000. 00 as actual and moral damages, attorney's
fees and costs.
Facts: In his complaint before the NLRC, herein private respondent Rodito
Nasayao claimed that sometime in May 1974, he was appointed plant manager
of the petitioner corporation, with an alleged compensation of P3,000.00, a
month, or 25% of the monthly net income of the company, whichever is
greater, and when the company failed to pay his salary for the months of May,
June, and July 1974, Rodito Nasayao filed a complaint with the National Labor
Relations Commission, Branch IV, for the recovery of said unpaid salaries. The
case was docketed therein as NLRC Case No. LR6151. Answering, the herein
petitioners denied that Rodito Nasayao was employed in the company as plant
manager with a fixed monthly salary of P3,000.00. They claimed that the
undertaking agreed upon by the parties was a joint venture, a sort of
partnership, wherein Rodito Nasayao was to keep the machinery in good
working condition and, in return, he would get the contracts from endusers
for the installation of marble products, in which the company would not
interfere. In addition, private respondent Nasayao was to receive an amount
equivalent to 25% of the net profits that the petitioner corporation would
realize, should there be any. Petitioners alleged that since there had been no
profits during said period, private respondent was not entitled to any amount.
The case was submitted for voluntary arbitration and the parties selected the
herein respondent Jose T. Collado as voluntary arbitrator. In the course of the
proceedings, however, the herein petitioners challenged the arbitrator's
capacity to try and decide the case fairly and judiciously and asked him to
desist from farther hearing the case. But, the respondent arbitrator refused.
In due time, or on 29 December 1975, he rendered judgment in favor of the
complainant, ordering the herein petitioners to pay Rodito Nasayao the
amount of P9,000.00, within 10 days from notice. Upon receipt of the decision,
the herein petitioners appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission
on grounds that the labor arbiter gravely abused his discretion in persisting to
hear and decide the case notwithstanding petitioners' request for him to desist
therefrom: and that the appealed decision is not supported by evidence. On
18 March 1976, Rodito Nasayao filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the
ground that the decision of the voluntary arbitrator is final, appealable, and
immediately executory;3 and, on 23 March 1976, he filed a motion for the
issuance of a writ of execution. Acting on the motions, the respondent
Commission, in a resolution dated 7 May 1976, dismissed the appeal on the
ground that the decision appealed from is final, unappealable and immediately
executory, and ordered the herein petitioners to comply with the decision of
the voluntary arbitrator within 10 days from receipt of the resolution.5 The
petitioners are before the Court in the present recourse. As prayed for, the
Court issued a temporary restraining order, restraining herein respondents
from enforcing and/or carrying out the questioned decision and resolution.
Issue: Whether or not the contention of the private respondent that the
petitioner failed to follow the doctrine of exhaustion of admin remedies is
tenable.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners in the first case failed to follow the
doctrine of exhaustion of admin remedies.
Ruling: As to failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the rule is well-
settled that this requirement does not apply where the respondent is a
department secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of the President, bear the
implied approval of the latter, unless actually disapproved by him.69 This
doctrine of qualified political agency ensures speedy access to the courts when
most needed. There was no need then to appeal the decision to the office
of the President; recourse to the courts could be had immediately.
Moreover, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies also yields to
other exceptions, such as when the question involved is purely legal, as in the
instant case, or where the questioned act is patently illegal, arbitrary or
oppressive. Such is the claim of petitioners which, as hereinafter shown, is
correct.
Facts: Ramon Tapales was duly appointed Director of the Conservatory Music
in UP as recommended by the President of the University of the Philippines
after compliance of the required qualifications under the Charter of the same.
Consequently, the Board of Regents of the said University issued a resolution
fixing the terms of the office of the Dean and Directors thereof allegedly in
pursuant to same charter. Thereafter, the University President issued a
memorandum reminding the Deans and Directors whose terms are about to
expire that unless they are recommended by the same for reappointment,
their assumption to their respective office is deemed terminated. Tapales was
injured by the said resolution and memorandum as such filed before the court
a question on the validity of the said resolution and memorandum. The
respondent on the other hand alleged that the petitioner failed to exhaust the
required administrative remedies available.
Facts: Quintos is the legitimate owner of a racehorse which was duly and
officially registered with NSF and for which he is issued a certificate of
registration, thereby entitling it to participate in horse races and sweepstakes
draws in legally authorized racing clubs or tracks. In line with the SOP and
usual racing practices for horse owners, Quintos applied for inclusion of his
horse in a particular race 3 days before the date of the race which application
was duly approved by Phil Racing Club, Inc. On the very day when Quintos
race-horse was scheduled to participate in race no. 15, the PRC announced
thru the PA system before the start of race no. 13 that his horse was being
excluded from taking part in race no. 15. It was then alleged that the
cancellation of the certificate of registration of his horse was arbitrary and
oppressive, due process being denied him in the absence of a formal
investigation or inquiry prior thereto. The trial court dismissed the complaint
primarily on the ground of lack of EAR that the admin remedy of Quintos
was to ask the Board of Trustees of NSF to reconsider its resolution cancelling
the certificate of registration, and in case of denial of appeal to the Games and
Amusement Board or to the Office of the President. The CA certified the case
to the SC since it found that a purely legal question was involved, to wit: WON
the trial court correctly dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies.
Ruling: None. Quintos prematurely instituted a suit for damages. The reason
for this short-circuiting of administrative processes is not explained by
Quintos. His gives no reason for his failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Indeed, there is none. The order of dismissal, therefore, certainly cannot be
considered as being in derogation of the due process guarantee. The judicial
forum sought by Quintos was in effect an unwarranted disregard of the
concept of primary jurisdiction. In the traditional language of administrative
law, the stage of ripeness for judicial review had not been reached. Quintos
ignored factors not predetermined by formula but by seasoned balancing for
and against the assumption of jurisdiction. All that had been said so far would
seem to indicate that under such a test, the lower courts insistence of the
fundamental requirement of exhausting administrative remedies is more than
justified.
The said registered owner was Sergio Serfino, who was married in January
1933 to the petitioner. In 1939, he filed an application for a homestead patent,
describing himself as "married to Francisca Soto," but in 1953, when the
original certificate over the homestead was issued, it was in favor of "Sergio
Serfino, widower." Serfino died in 1965, and soon thereafter the petitioner
filed a motion with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental praying
that his description as a "widower" be changed to "married to Francisca Soto."
Two daughters of the couple opposed the motion. While conceding that their
parents were married in 1933, the oppositors nonetheless pointed out that
their mother had abandoned them in 1942 to live with another man. Later,
they said, she had adulterous relations with still a second man by whom she
begot eleven children. According to these oppositors, it was their father
himself who had described himself as a widower in 1953 because he had not
heard from the petitioner since 1942.
Their purpose, obviously, was to prevent the land from being considered
conjugal and therefore equally owned by the spouses.
The trial court originally granted the motion and ordered the change prayed
for, but later it reconsidered its decision and held itself without jurisdiction to
act on the matter. Its reason was that there was no observance of the doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Facts: Sunga, et al. filed before the NLRC a complaint against ACD Computer
Services and Cabel for illegal dismissal and non-payment of certain benefits.
The labor arbiter rendered a decision sustaining the petitioners' position. The
labor arbiter, then, upon motion of the petitioners, issued a writ of execution
to enforce said decision. The following day, the sheriff served a notice of
garnishment to the Commercial Bank of Manila after which the total amount
of P15,031.85 was garnished. This amount has already been turned over to
the petitioners.
A levy on execution was made upon the properties found in the respondents'
office premises. ACD Group Inc., an American firm based in California, U.S.A.,
through its Chairman, Dulay filed a third-party claim in the NLRC case on the
ground that it is the real owner of the computers levied upon and scheduled
for auction. This third-party claim was denied.
ACD Computer Services and Cabel filed before the NLRC a petition for relief
from judgment in NLRC-NCR Case No. 6-2423-86 with prayer for the issuance
of writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order. The NLRC then
issued the questioned resolutions incidental to Injunction Case. The petitioners
filed before the NLRC a motion to dismiss and/or answer to the petition on the
ground that a petition for relief is not a remedy granted under the Labor Code
and NLRC Rules.
Without waiting for the NLRC's resolution on their motion to dismiss, the
petitioners filed the present petition. This petition seeks to annul the three
NLRC resolutions, to prohibit the NLRC from taking further proceedings in
Injunction Case and to direct the NLRC to dismiss said injunction case and to
order the full execution of the decision.
The Solicitor General recommends that the petition be dismissed for being
premature, applying the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. He
further stressed the jurisdiction of the NLRC and its exercise of sound
discretion.
Ruling: The Court gave due course to this petition on a finding, among others,
that the instant case falls under the exceptions to the general rule. The
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not an inflexible rule. In
fact, it yields to many accepted exceptions. As we have noted in a number of
cases, exhaustion is not necessary where inter alia there is estoppel on the
part of the party invoking the doctrine; where the challenged administrative
act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; where there is
unreasonable delay or official action that will irretrievably prejudice the
complainant: where the amount involved is relatively small so as to make the
rule impractical and oppressive; where the question involved is purely legal
and will ultimately have to be decided anyway by the courts of justice. At least
two of these exceptions are present in the instant case on exhaustion of
administrative remedies. There had been no action on the challenge to the
petition for relief from judgment for almost a year. This is considerably long
considering that the labor arbiter's decision had already become final and in
fact has been partially executed. The main case had been filed as early as
June 20, 1986.
Moreover, this case involving the propriety of a remedy and the suspension
of an execution would only be further delayed if we remand it to the NLRC,
only to have any decision raised again before this Court.
Facts: Petitioner Sabello, was the Elementary School Principal of Talisay and
also the Assistant Principal of the Talisay Barangay High School of the Division
of Gingoog City. The barangay high school was in deficit at that time due to
the fact that the students could hardly pay for their monthly tuition few. Since
at that time also, the President of the Philippines who was earnestly
campaigning was giving aid in the amount of P2,000.00 for each barrio, the
barrio council through proper resolutions alloted the amount of P840.00 to
cover up for the salaries of the high school teachers, with the honest thought
in mind that the barrio high school was a barrio project and as such therefore,
was entitled to its share of the RICD fund in question. The only part that the
herein petitioner played was his being authorized by the said barrio council to
withdraw the above amount and which was subsequently deposited in the City
Treasurer's Office in the name of the Talisay Barrio High School. That was a
grave error on the part of the herein petitioner as it involves the very
intricacies in the disbursement of government funds and of its technicalities.
Thus, the herein petitioner, together with the barrio captain, were charged of
the violation of Republic Act 3019, and both were convicted to suffer a
sentence of one year and disqualification to hold public office. The herein
petitioner appealed his case to the Court of Appeals, Manila. The Court of
Appeals modified the decision by eliminating the subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency in the payment of one-half of the amount being involved.
The herein petitioner, being financially battered, could no longer hire a lawyer
to proceed to the highest court of the land.
Finally, Sabello was granted an ABSOLUTE PARDON by the President of the
Republic of the Philippines, restoring him to full civil and political rights. With
this instrument on hand, the herein petitioner applied for reinstatement to the
government service, only to be reinstated to the wrong position of a mere
classroom teacher and not to his former position as Elementary School
Principal I.