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Grassroots and Rebellion: A Study on the Future

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Article in Civil Wars December 2012

DOI: 10.1080/13698249.2012.740202

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Grassroots and Rebellion: A Study on the Future of

the Moro Struggle in Mindanao, Philippines

Alpaslan zerdem & Sukanya Podder

To cite this article: Alpaslan zerdem & Sukanya Podder (2012) Grassroots and Rebellion: A
Study on the Future of the Moro Struggle in Mindanao, Philippines, Civil Wars, 14:4, 521-545, DOI:
10.1080/13698249.2012.740202

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 Grassroots and Rebellion: A Study
on the Future of the Moro Struggle in
Mindanao, Philippines

A L P A S L A N O Z E R D E M A N D S U K A N Y A P O D D E R

An important aspect in the resolution of civil conflict pertains to the political

transition of rebel groups, dissipation of their command structures and
reintegration of former combatants. In this paper, we draw on empirical data
collected in select communities of Lanao, Cotabato and Maguindanao provinces
of Mindanao, Philippines during June 2010 to explore future trends in civilian
support for the main separatist rebel outfit in Mindanao the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF). We test variance in the existence of recruitment pools
among the two main Muslim ethnic groups the Maranao and the
Maguindanao. Our findings suggest that recruitment into MILF is not simply
about religion or ideology, this is a simplification of its underlying support base.
Several factors such as geographic location, especially proximity to Armed
Forces of the Philippines camps, and conflict-related impacts of displacement,
together with disparity in governance delivery levels, have resulted in divergence
in levels of support for the Bangsamoro struggle between the two main ethnic
groups. These variables will have an impact on the future existence of the MILF
as a rebel movement.

INTRODUCTION

Community-combatant relations in civil conflict is today evolving as an important

area of research; it draws on the trends in rebel group behaviour towards civilian
communities that is well documented in recent research on insurgent and political
violence.1 Rebel group community interaction is a principal and agent relationship
that can be mutually reinforcing, predatory, and protective or even symbiotic.2
Rebels rely on civilians to provide them sanctuary, provisions, information and other
resources.3 Yet, for a positive support relationship, rebel groups need to transcend
from being roving bandits to stationary providers of social services, prominently
governance, justice, law enforcement and security.4
Key trends in current research highlight the nature of rebellion as being the
primary determinant of rebel behaviour. Opportunistic rebellions permit indiscipline
in their ranks to maintain membership and retain recruits. Predation is closely tied
with limited access and heightened competition for resources and recruitment
pools.5 Insurgent violence offers a strategic tool for controlling local population and
Civil Wars, Vol. 14, No. 4 (December 2012), pp. 521545
ISSN 1369-8249 print/ISSN 1743-968X online
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2012.740202 q 2012 Taylor & Francis
522 CIVIL WARS

resources critical for group sustenance. Another strand of research investigates

presence or lack of group competition and active rivalry as the defining variable of
rebel behaviour.6 Civilians are at the centre of competing incentives from the rebel
and government forces for loyalty, support and local resources. Selective incentives
in the arena of public services, wages or security by either side may make affiliation
fluid and contingent on who offers better benefits. Legal power wielded by the state
may compensate for weak capacity by adding the leverage of imprisonment, and
reprisal by the military.7
Targeted violence on civilians may seek to offset or undermine the governments
primary role of protection, making it imperative to rely on stronger rebels for
security in areas controlled by them. Credible security guarantees from rebels can
incentivise civilian support for them.8 Changes in rebel civilian relations are
relative to rebel capability and dynamic of insurgent-government contest. Hence,
sympathy for and collaboration with rebels is contingent on the latters ability to
protect in the long term.9 Conversely, indiscriminate violence may render civilians
indifferent in their support to either side or simply lead them to evacuate.10
Organisational weakness can translate into violence directed towards civilians since
governance provision and related benefits are less likely to be offered making it
difficult to secure loyalty through peaceful means.11 Strong rebel groups often
present a mix of selective incentives and selective repression to entice support.
Counterinsurgency strategies by the government that is premised on indiscriminate
regime violence can also undermine local support and result in turning rebels into
preferred security providers.
Today, rebel group and civilian interaction during conflict is of theoretical
interest, also because of a growing interrogation into the dynamics of rebel group
transition. How rebel groups transform in the post-conflict period can be related to
their relationship with civilians and their pool of civilian support in war time. Roots
of legitimacy, civilian support base and structures of governance, comprising
prototypical state functions, germinate during conflict itself. These may prove to be
enduring and can consolidate into legitimate political power when rebellions
successfully transform into elected government.
An important issue here is rebel governance. Effectiveness of rebel governance
is embedded in an evolution of territorial control and relies on political legitimacy
and support from the local population. In establishing hegemony or control,
sustainability of rebel governance relies on consent as opposed to coercion.12 Trends
in pre-conflict relations between state and society, together with ethnic composition
and ideological motivation of rebel groups, impinge on design and conduct of rebel-
led civil administration. Rebel groups need to transform into stationary bandits,
hence the emphasis is on sustainability of rebel governance through civilian consent
rather than coercive subjugation or conformity. This stationary bandit thesis views
rebel behaviour towards civilian communities and governance provisions as
precursors to a new state apparatus.13
Despite current focus on these related themes, the communitys role in conflict
continues to be an understudied element in civil war research. This paper seeks to
FUTURE OF THE MORO STRUGGLE IN MINDANAO, PHILIPPINES 523

address this gap by exploring strong versus waning support in the context of
long-duration civil conflicts using the case of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
(MILF) in Mindanao, Philippines. Focus of the analysis will be to understand how
conflict dynamics have shifted over time, and what that means for the role of
communities in the recruitment of combatants into the MILF. To undertake such
an exploration, the next section will first present an overview of the Mindanao
conflict. Having presented the field research methodology and general findings
from the questionnaire survey that was conducted with 229 households in
Mindanao in June 2010, the paper will then present its analysis in the following
section. Finally, the conclusions will focus around the question of future trends in
civilian support for the MILF and whether the group is nearing its demise in light
of a crumbling power base.

B ACK GR O U ND T O THE M I NDANAO C ONF L I C T

The history and root cause of the Mindanao conflict, together with the evolution of
the Moro resistance, have been well documented in recent literature on the subject.14
The important themes pertain to successive colonial policies of exclusion, land
dispossession, resettlement and organisation of indigenous ethnic groups under an
overarching Islamic identity. Revivalist responses among the 13 Islamised ethno-
linguistic groups or the Bangsamoro15 people transformed in time from the Muslim
Independence Movement to the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF).16
Factionalism and splits in this movement matched by a progressive dilution of
objectives from separation to autonomy on part of the MNLF resulted in the
formation of the more radical group the MILF, which continued to demand
independence.17 Peace negotiations and a policy of accommodation on part of the
central government over time resulted in the creation of the Autonomous Region of
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) that is planned to include 15 provinces and their
component cities. It seeks to offer a democratic palliative for Muslim aspirations
under the Tripoli Agreement (1976) (see Figure 1).
The 1996 Jakarta Peace Agreement launched a demobilisation and reintegration
process for the MNLF, yet the MILF continues with the broader separatist vision of a
Muslim homeland (Bangsamoro).18 The three provinces of Maguindanao, Lanao del
Norte and North Cotabato that were selected to examine civilian support for the
MILF provide important inroads into understanding the complexity of conflict in
Mindanao.19
Maguindanao has been the main operating base of the MILF. It figures as one of
the 10 poorest provinces of the Philippines, and has low educational attainment with
only 42 per cent of its population having completed elementary education.20 Lanao
del Sur and Lanao del Norte were created from the united province of Lanao in 1959,
with Marawi city and Iligan city as designated capitals. Under the Marcos
administration, Lanao del Sur was incorporated into Region XII along with five other
provinces following successful negotiations with the MNLF and later became part of
the ARMM following referendum in 1997. Lanao del Sur borders Maguindanao and
524 CIVIL WARS

FIGURE 1
MAP OF MINDANAO REGIONS AND ARMM

North Cotabato to its south and lies at the centre of Islamic political and judicial
decision-making in Mindanao. Political decisions such as the Taritib and the Ijma
govern legal institutions, public order and regulate sociocultural life of the people in
the ARMM.21
In the 1970s, Lanao del Sur and Lanao del Norte were the political turfs of two
strong clans and dynasties the Dimaporo clan in Lanao del Sur and the Quibranza
clan in Lanao del Norte. Through years of violent feuds, the two clans agreed to
settle their differences through intermarriage. Local politics dominated by these
powerful clans adds a distinct layer to the conflict, with candidates offering to
protect Christians against MILF attacks, or aligning with either the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police as well as the MILF to
serve their own political interests.
Successive migration and resettlement has changed the configuration of the
Lanao provinces and today nearly 60 per cent of Lanao del Norte is Christian, while
nearly 100 per cent of Lanao del Sur remains Maranao. Moro territorial claims over
six municipalities of Lanao del Norte and some barangays of Iligan City also
informed the 2008 clashes with attacks on municipalities of Kauswagan and
Kolambugan and the Iligan City bombings in August 2008 as reflective of the public
FUTURE OF THE MORO STRUGGLE IN MINDANAO, PHILIPPINES 525

debate on the Ancestral Domain question,22 particularly the rejection of the MILF
territorial claims and expansion of the present ARMM.
The Lanao provinces are among the most heavily militarised provinces of the
country. In Lanao del Norte, the AFP has deployed four infantry battalions (IBs)23
from the 4th and 1st infantry divisions (IDs), namely 8th IB and 10th IB of the 4th ID
and 32nd IB and 35th IB of the 1st ID. These units are reinforced by the 42nd Special
Army Mobile Company and all are poised against the 102nd Base Command of the
MILF under Commander Abdullah Makapaar alias Kumander Bravo.24 In Lanao del
Sur, the AFP has four IBs, namely 33rd IB of the 1st ID (based in Marawi City), 5th
IB of the 1st ID (based in Malabang), 65th IB of the 9th ID (based in Balindong) and
69th IB of the 9th ID (based in Marawi City). These are poised against the 103rd and
116th base commands of the MILF. The 103rd base command is under Commander
Aleem Pangalian and operates in the Lanao del Sur Lanao del Norte boundary,
while the 116th Command operates in the coastal areas connecting Zamboanga del
Sur and Maguindanao. Deployment of these battalions by the Philippine Army seems
to have an impact on the community recruitment nexus. The AFP units are advised
by American soldiers based in Lanao by virtue of the Visiting Forces Agreement (pre
9/11) and subsequently as a consequence of military and intelligence cooperation
under the counter-terrorism campaign of Operation Enduring Freedom.25
The MILFs military capability has waned in recent years, due to defection and
split in its ranks. Conservative estimates have suggested its military unit, the
Bangsamoro Islamic Army (BIAF), to consist of 8,000 11,000 men.26 Previously, it
was organised in camp structures that became pockets of autonomous existence
outside of government control and duplicated as self-sustainable communities.27
These were destroyed in 2000 under the Joseph Estrada administrations all out
war policy. The MILF political structure is headed by a central committee that
presides over all important policy decisions. There is an Executive Council that
governs administration, and prior to its destruction in 2000 Camp Abu Bakar was
home to the general headquarters and National Guard Divisions of the MILF. These
have now been reorganised and streamlined into compact units spread across MILF
strongholds in North Cotabato, Maguindanao and Lanao del Norte.
Pre-empting on quasi-state governance functions, the MILF runs Islamic courts
for dispute settlement based on Sharia law, and has appointed a Barangay28 Chairman
in each municipality in consultation with municipal structures and contingent on the
Central Committees approval. The Islamic Salvation Force (ISF) provides military
oversight to activities at the barangay level for enforcement and defence-related
matters. Every barangay has an ISF platoon that conducts community policing and
ensures contiguity with broader principles of Islamic administration.29 The MILF has
attempted to create such grass-roots structures to embed its presence in governance at
the different levels of barangay, municipality and district administrative units. The
MILF has pursued a deliberate political strategy of institutionalising task-oriented,
community-friendly political committee setups to perform a range of socio-
economic, cultural and political functions to replicate the model of a microstate. The
MILF administrative structure has named these units Political Committee setups.30
526 CIVIL WARS

This has resulted in the creation of a parallel system of governance that works in the
background and shadows the presence of elected officials with its own set of
functionaries.
Given the grass-roots character of this group, the AFP traditionally has found it
difficult to gather information on movement and loci of MILF members, due to the
close camaraderie, support and protective attitude of community members towards
the group. The Army in response has created civil defences militias at the barangay
level called Citizen Armed Force Geographical Units (CAFGUs) since 1987.31
These replaced the Integrated Civilian Home Defence Force structures prevalent
under the Marcos regime and function in the nature of a citizens armed force under
the control of the AFP. Each CAFGU member is assigned to a particular AFP
commander and attached to a manoeuvre battalion in that geographic area. In 2006,
there were 52,748 active CAFGU auxiliaries.32 They are well remunerated with a
subsistence pay of 900 pesos, roughly 25 30 USD per month (2010 figures), in
addition to other allowances.33 There are also civilian voluntary organisations
(CVOs) or Barangay Tanod (village watch) that are sanctioned and organised by the
national state authorities. These are responsible for village community policing in
the areas of crime prevention, monitoring and coordination with the local Peace and
Order Council office. They mainly engage in intelligence and information gathering,
neighbourhood watch and with medical, traffic or emergency assistance. Some CVO
units are armed and function in coordination with AFP commanders.34 Private
armies maintained by local business elites and politicians complicate the matrix of
armed auxiliary groups in Mindanao further. Despite competition between the main
rebel groups and the government forces, at a local level, there appears to be a high
level of camaraderie between communities and rebel group members. Loyalties are
strongly aligned along MNLF/MILF areas of control, especially areas close to their
active or latent camps. However, with growing AFP presence in the form of
battalion units, CAFGU and CVO personnel, an interesting balancing act among
competing security providers at the community level is noticeable.
Apart from creating a grass-roots presence, the MILF has also engaged with the
international community to secure legitimacy and recognition for its struggle.
Diplomatically, it has sought active third-party involvement in talks to create pressure
on the government for implementing agreed points of action as part of the ongoing
peace negotiations.35 Stalled talks resumed in August 2008; however, attacks by
MILF commanders Bravo and Umra Kato against Christian villages in the aftermath
of the Supreme Courts rejection of the memorandum of agreement on Ancestral
Domain spurred a strong military response. In August 2009, the government
unilaterally announced suspension of military attacks, which was reciprocated by the
MILF. The ancestral domain question remains a tricky issue in any future peace pact,
since it proposes to secure a territory of self-governance. There are minority tribal
communities such as the Subanen ethnic groups of the Zamboanga peninsula and the
Kolibugan community who wish to opt out of this future Moro homeland as defined by
the MILF peace panel negotiators.36 With a change in leadership and advent of
President Aquino to power in July 2010, greater international involvement has been
FUTURE OF THE MORO STRUGGLE IN MINDANAO, PHILIPPINES 527

introduced. An international contact group that includes four third-party governments

(UK, Turkey, Japan and Saudi Arabia) and four international non-governmental
organisations (Asia Foundation, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Conciliation
Resources and Muhammadiyah) is now in place. Following a brief lull, parties
returned to talks in early 2011. Meetings were held in February and later in June; the
February negotiations saw the MILF panel handing in a revised comprehensive draft
package (updating on the January 2010 draft) that articulated an asymmetrical state or
a Moro sub-state solution. The underlying objective is to secure expanded autonomy
rather than separation.37

FIELD RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND GENERAL SURVEY FINDINGS

In June 2010, a household survey was administered to grasp nuances of the MILF and
community interaction better. The survey was written in English and later translated
into Maranao and Maguindanao dialects. It comprised 13 sections, it started by
coding general demographic information, followed by entries on specifics of an
individual household, with respect to age, gender, marital status and educational
attainment of household members, followed by a section on socio-economic profile,
income, assets, food security, health access, water, sanitation, education, political
mobilisation and involvement in communal organisations. Recruitment dynamics
were coded under sections on role of family and community in recruitment and youth
involvement in MILF. Issues of MNLF reintegration, socio-economic disparity,
inter-tribal rivalry and the future of the Bangsamoro struggle were also explored.
Our field research partners were Mindanao Tulong Bakwet (MTB) Inc. in
Maguindanao and North Cotabato, and Birth-Dev Inc. in Lanao del Norte. Both
agencies provided support in the recruitment of university graduates/researchers to
administer the survey. Selection of the communities combined conflict-affectedness
variables with representativeness of the Maranao and Maguindanao communities vis-
a-vis population distribution in selected provinces. A total of 229 household surveys
were enumerated. Each survey interview took 45 minutes 1 hour and was
administered by a research team debriefed on ethics and methods. Before
administering the survey, we trained the local researchers and undertook a brief
pilot in the Kauswagan area. At the end of each day, surveys were reviewed, team
meetings were held, reports circulated and the team members shared their reflections
on the process so that discrepancies could be noted.
Table 1 provides a list of barangays (villages) in which the household survey
was administered.
Out of 229 household surveys, 148 (65 per cent) questionnaires were completed
in Lanao del Norte, 49 of them (21 per cent) in North Cotabato and 32 of them (14
per cent) in Maguindanao. In terms of the municipality of residence, majority of our
household sample was from Munai, followed by Pikit and Iligan city38 (see Figure 2).
With respect to tribal affiliation in the survey sample, 65 per cent of respondents
belonged to the Maranao group while 35 per cent belonged to the Maguindanao
ethnic group.
528 CIVIL WARS

TABLE 1
RESEARCH SITES

Lanao del Norte Maguindanao North Cotabato

Mahayahay Buayan Nalapan

Upper Hinaplanon Cabaro Magaslung Batulawan
Tambacan Kintangu Dalingaoen
Cadulawan Dapiawan
Panggao Simuay
Tambo Muti
Dilabayan Bagan
Indukan Tanuel
Poona Piagapo Taviran
Munai

The research process involved challenges of limited time, long distance travel to
remote communities and physical/road access issues, especially in Lanao del Sur
that was initially part of our sampling plan. This issue of inaccessibility was
balanced by interviewing elite leaders and residents displaced from Lanao del Sur
who were resident in Iligan or in Maguindanao areas where we could freely
administer the survey. As the subject matter researched is highly sensitive, a number
of biases in the responses received were considered by the research methodology.
We are aware of these potential biases and they have been addressed in our analysis
to the greatest extent possible. To mitigate biases during data collection, other

FIGURE 2
MUNICIPALITY OF RESIDENCE FOR HOUSEHOLD SURVEY SAMPLE

60
Count

40
30.13%
69

20.52% 19.65%
47 45
20
13.97%
32
9.61%
22
4.37%
10 1.75%
4
0
Illigan city Munai Kauswagan Datu saudi Guindulungan Pikit Cotabato city

Respondent's municipality
FUTURE OF THE MORO STRUGGLE IN MINDANAO, PHILIPPINES 529

participatory research methods were employed as a means of triangulation if and

when needed. Selection of local researchers from organisations with a long history
of working with local communities was another way of dealing with the potential
challenge of biased responses. A range of qualitative methods including elite
interviews, key informant interviews39 and community-based timeline exercises
with leaders, women and youth helped incorporate elements of rapid rural appraisal
techniques. These contributed to a deeper understanding of community-level
perceptions, which is reflected in our analysis. Two main limitations with results
remain. Random selection of houses for administering the survey has contributed to
a partially representative sample of total population in the barangays selected.
Another source of limitation is translation bias, due to a problem of double
translation in some instances from Maranao to Tagalog.
The household survey exercise in these communities produced mixed results.
While in some barangays, we met civilian families who openly admitted to being
proud members of MILF, in other cases there was fear, hesitance and even refusal to
take part in the exercise. Support for the MILF movement is premised on a strong
ideological basis for support. In our earlier study centred on a small caseload of
Maranao child soldiers part of the rebel group in Lanao del Norte, we found a strong
religious basis for support and explored the critical role of family in recruitment.40
However, is religion the only motivation for participation? We sought to test the
robustness of this relationship further by broadening our caseload and focusing on
the families and communities to understand what explains the decision to enlist and
the rationale for participation, especially what accounts for variant participation in
the MILF movement from among the two main ethnic groups the Maranao and
Maguindanao. First of all, we questioned the respondents support according to
different provinces, as shown in Figure 3.
Figure 4 shows a breakdown of family members who had joined the MILF
movement over the last 20 years in the households we surveyed.
Furthermore, we probed support according to different types of family and
community members joining the MILF, as shown in Figure 5.
Overall, looking at inter-group variance, it was evident that despite a smaller
representation from the Maguindanao tribe among our respondents, they displayed
greater propensity towards having a relative in the MILF. As Figure 5 delineates,
greater number of households among the Maranao tribe reported not having any
family member in the MILF. In our bivariate analysis, we found that there is strong
relation between family support for the decision to join disaggregated by province
and municipality. Among the three provinces, Maguindanao exhibited 93.8 per cent
support (see Figure 6).
Disaggregation by province on youth joining the MILF as part of intra-factional
conflict (2008 2009) produced mixed responses. Among the three provinces of
Maguindanao, Lanao del Norte and North Cotabato, Maguindanao households
testified to have witnessed a greater proportion of willing young recruits as part of
fresh appeals for recruitment, followed closely by North Cotabato. In Lanao del
Norte, there was a higher incidence of youth willingness in some pockets, such as
530 CIVIL WARS

FIGURE 3
SUPPORT FOR DECISION TO JOIN MILF ACCORDING T O PROVINCES

100
Province with most
conflct
Maguindanao
North cotabato
80 Lanao del Norte
Lanao del Sur
Count (%)

60

40

20

0
No Yes
Support for decision

FIGURE 4
FAMILY MEMBE R JOINING MILF (1990 2010)

150

100
Count (%)

127
55.46%

50
66
28.82%

29
12.66% 3 4
1.31% 1.75%
0
None Father Mother Son Daughter Relative
FUTURE OF THE MORO STRUGGLE IN MINDANAO, PHILIPPINES 531

FIGURE 5
T RENDS ON SUPPORT FOR DECISION TO JOIN BY TRIBE

100
Respondent's tribe
Maranoao
80 Maguindanao
Count (%)

60

40

20

0
None Father Son Daughter Relative
Family member joining MILF

FIGURE 6
SUPPORT FOR THE DECISION OF JOINING MILF ACCORDING TO CASE STUDY PROVINCE S

100
Province of residence
Maguindanao
Lanao del norte
80 North cotabato
Count (%)

60

40

20

0
No Yes
Support for decision
532 CIVIL WARS

Cadulawan, and less fresh recruitment in Panggao and Poona Piagapo, which have
been important support bases for the MILF historically.41

P US H A ND P U L L F A C T O R S F OR JO I N IN G M I L F

Cumulative responses from our sample suggest three main reasons for youth
participation in the MILF. The survey indicated that poverty (54 per cent) rather than
religion (31 per cent) ranked as the main reason for participation in the MILF. This
was followed by bravery (12 per cent); other factors included mixed responses
citing revenge, rido42 and the excitement surrounding the notion of being a future
commander as motivational variables. However, it has to be emphasised that
recruitment in rebel ranks in Mindanao is unlike most contexts in Africa. While
poverty, displacement, homelessness and familial separation are generic push
factors for recruitment across conflict contexts, in Mindanao, there are certain outlier
variables that figure prominently in encouraging participation. Having a family
member in the MILF was the main push factor for voluntary recruitment. Although
coercion was not cited as relevant to the recruitment process, there is an abiding
element of fear among civilian respondents. Fear of AFP among civilians has an
impact on recruitment dynamics.
Pre-recruitment characteristics of political and ideological sympathies reinforce
Islamist narratives of exclusion, cultural markers of commitment and sacrifice
drawing on faith-based motivations of participation. Culturally being a soldier
appeared to be traditionally coveted, and joining the Bangsamoro struggle a much
respected decision, which was sanctioned by family and community support.
However, these factors are not universal and revisionist trends in support were evident
across the three provinces where the survey was administered. Maximum and evenly
distributed support was evident in Maguindanao, where socio-economic status was
also better compared to Lanao del Norte and North Cotabato provinces. In some
instances, respondents admitted that a family member had volunteered to avenge the
death of a close family member or to defend their community. Coercion was absent
and ideological, cultural and sociological issues of low education, lack of
opportunities and poverty appeared to be more robust reasons for joining in support
of the Bangsamoro political objectives.
In some respects, Moro society has traditionally created a cultural norm by
expecting youth to join the struggle for their homeland. Families and communities, in
this context, serve as key agents who support youth participation in the movement,
creating an indirect push factor. Muslim families are also more conservative and have
historically avoided secular education, opting to send children for training in MILF
ranks, where they receive instruction in military drills on how to fight, how to survive
without food, madrassah education and regular Koran classes. There are religious
seminars to ensure that prayer and religion are imbibed as protection,43 and training in
self-defence, skills that are critical for survival in this environment. Hence, youths
learning trajectory is often responsible for willing enrolment in the MILF. Yet, their
FUTURE OF THE MORO STRUGGLE IN MINDANAO, PHILIPPINES 533

education is often abrupt or truncated, since this form of learning is different from
regular schooling.
Among family members joining the MILF and in light of the households
support for this decision in the past, most respondents cited some form of support
for the MILF. Some admitted to having a relative as part of the group, this response
was followed closely by that of having their father in the MILF or MNLF. Few
cited current participation by their own children. This lack of transparency and
hesitation towards sharing information is closely linked with overarching suspicion
regarding MILF-related research or enquiries. As Muslim families become more
exposed to developments in the outside world, fear of secular schooling is
decreasing; this can help explain an incipient shift in the participation rationale for
youth in MILF ranks.
Some youth today choose not to join, as one respondent suggested, We have
experience of conflict, young people have experience of conflict we can refuse to be
part, we simply evacuate, and yet be supporters.44 In other words, there was little
association between level of education and support for the decision to join the MILF.
Similarly, there was greater support from respondents in active employment,
undermining the common assumption of low education and unemployment being
triggers for rebel recruitment. Majority of our respondents reported completing
secular primary education (71.18 per cent) although in most cases this was
complemented by madrassah education during weekends. As can be seen in Figure 7,
the survey also questioned the significance of type of education in influencing
community support for joining the MILF.

FIGURE 7
TYPE OF EDUCATION AND COMMUNITY SUPPORT FOR JOINING MILF.

100
Type of education
Religious
80 Secular
Other
Count (%)

60

40

20

0
No Yes
Support for decision
534 CIVIL WARS

FIGURE 8
DIFFERE NT HOUSEHOLD GOODS OWNED BY HOUSEHOLDS

120

100
Frequency (%)

80

125
60

40

50
20
20 17 16
1
0
No asset Radio Tv Refrigerator Mobile Multiple
phone assets
Household asset

Drawing on our field observation, we felt that the Maguindanaon families had
better socio-economic status, and chose to support the MILF monetarily rather than
sending in their children to fight. We probed the issue further by coding household
assets (see Figure 8). In this exercise, greater number of Maranao households
(30/50) reported a complete lack of basic household assets compared to their
Maguindanaon counterparts.
Finally, there are some key inter-faith issues that we explored through the survey.
Inter-group cooperation was the predominant trend in Muslim Christian relations,
especially in North Cotabato and Lanao del Norte. Preliminary correlations suggest
that respondents who felt that Christians were good neighbours also exhibited strong
faith that a negotiated peace can be secured for the Moro struggle. In Lanao del Norte,
maximum respondents felt that Christians were good neighbours (Figure 9).45

ANALYSIS: MILF A ND CHANGING DYNAMICS OF C ONFLICT

Near MILF camps, the population is closely related to MILF commanders, and the
area is controlled by them, with inhabitants constituting immediate and extended
family. As distance from the camps increases, area control is mixed with presence of
MNLF commanders in pockets, while other barangays are having a strong CAFGU
presence due to AFP influence. In the total respondent sample, non-disaggregated by
province, 56.77 per cent respondents admitted to having an MILF commander from
their village, while 43.23 per cent reported no such affiliational link. MILF
commanders enjoy respect and control cadres locally, enhancing their influence and
standing in the communities.
Tribal affiliation as a variable influencing loyalty of communities is restricted to
elite-level competition within the organisation, and does not impact on community
FUTURE OF THE MORO STRUGGLE IN MINDANAO, PHILIPPINES 535

FIGURE 9
FEELINGS TOWARDS CHRISTIANS IN THE COMMUNIT IES

250

200
Count (%)

150

218
95.20%
100

50

10 1
4.37% 0.44%
0
Good/ Occupy Have Should Other
neighbourly our land better jobs go back

Feeling about Christians

support/behaviour for participation into the MILF ranks. The Moro struggle attracts
overarching support from all Muslim groups in responding to the call of Islam, issues
of organisational or tribal loyalty are often viewed as secondary. This view undermines
the nuances of community support. Many pious Muslims in the Southern Philippines
remain loyal to their subgroups in the first instance. Similarly, a considerable number of
Muslim communities do not feel compelled to take up arms against the state. These
nuances help undermine stereotypes about community support for the MILF.
Today it is personalities within the groups who are fighting for prominence,
especially with a new crop of radical commanders such as Bravo and Umra Kato
leaving the fold; weakness in the MILF is a result of intra-organisational power
struggle rather than inter-tribal rivalry between Maranao and Maguindanao
communities at a grass-roots level. At the same time, there is war weariness in the
voices of residents in Lanao del Norte in particular. Field observations indicate
important differences between Maguindanao and Lanao del Norte. In the former
community, residents are proud, fearless, and less hesitant in admitting participation,
and support for the MILF. In Lanao del Norte, reverse variables of fear, secrecy,
hesitance and denial are operative.
Local researchers administering the survey reported greater level of transparency
in admitting support and participation in the MILF movement among residents of
Munai, Tambo Dilabayan, Panggao and Cadulawan. They recorded least support and
disenchantment with the movement in Mahayahay, Upper Hilapanon and Tambacan.
In our analysis, the main reason for waning support seems to be poverty and economic
difficulty. Given that the MILF does not pay salary to its recruits, respondents
admitted that they had to pay their own expenses during camp training, which made
536 CIVIL WARS

things difficult. Another issue cited was difficulty of access to the fighters. Repeated
AFP attacks as aerial bombardment on camps and communities adjacent to them,
have also resulted in large-scale displacement. Today MILF fighters are based in
remotely located forest areas of Tanclao, Gorain and Butig forests.46
Despite these factors, civilians remain sympathetic to the cause in selective
pockets. In Maguindanao, community members in Muti, for instance, admitted that at
times MILF commanders request boys from the village to go to the camp for training
or labour support functions, and most boys are sent voluntarily, since these
commanders may be relatives. In case of appeal for donations, residents also give
willingly and without coercion. One youth we interviewed in Muti had served as a
messenger for the MILF. He expressed interest in sending his boys for MILF training
once they had completed schooling and 18 years old. They will be supporters of
MILF we are the same bloodline . . . eventually they will support.47 However, there
was divergence of views on the content of this giving and the willingness of
support. The rich give money, while the poor give their lives.48 Community residents
in Maguindanao admitted to giving zakat and especially among the wealthier
Muslim families. A barangay official in Cadulawan admitted, the people will give
support in secret food, money and even our sons. Now children are being sent to
school, good if Mujahideen will be educated.49 In Lanao del Norte, poverty in the
rural communities was higher, and disenchantment with the future of the movement
greater. In urban pockets such as Iligan city, a greater interest in secular education
among youth has resulted in less willingness to join rebel ranks; youth wanted a better
future for themselves and felt rebel life was hard.
This variance in the provincial support trends reflects a deeper anathema that
of the MILF losing ground, and direction, gradually cornered by the governments
military machine. Other issues pertain to divergent socio-economic well-being
levels between provinces. A proximity to AFP base camps, distance from MILF
positions and competing political sympathies of provincial governors were also
important variables.50 The difficulties created by the presence of AFP and CAFGU
were elaborated by an inactive member of the BIAF in Cadulawan, which is five
barangays away from Camp Munai. He elaborated that,
all people here are MILF supporters, nobody is active fighter with MILF
mainly because times are difficult . . . if the men leave the house there are no
funds to support the family. All Muslims are MILF, those in the forest are
active, we are their friends and relatives in Cadulawan, however they are not
visiting us often because of AFP presence. The AFP through CAFGU is
getting information about MILF in these communities. . .51
Among internally displaced people (IDPs) from Tangclao who had evacuated to
Pantawan, the village schoolmaster shared how loss of territory to the AFP has
reduced MILFs influence in the communities:
all Muslims support MILF, however military presence makes it difficult for
MILF to live amongst us. The MILF was here in Pantawan before, there were
FUTURE OF THE MORO STRUGGLE IN MINDANAO, PHILIPPINES 537

families of MILF before, they grew in number, but in 2008 government took
over Tangclao in a game of shifting dynamics. . .52
On the issue of donations to support the MILF, a school principal we interviewed in
Poona Piagapo suggested that while youth of his generation went to the camp
willingly, younger children today are not really interested.
presently no more support from people for MILF, no MILF donations, MILF
gets support from rich families and people from abroad, the Organization of
the Islamic Conference (OIC) in particular . . . the popular support in Lanao del
Norte is especially weak.53
On the whole, the voices from Lanao Norte were reverberating with disappointment,
civilians who had been displaced and impoverished by repeated crossfires between
the AFP and MILF felt they had nothing to support the MILF with. They felt both
unable and seemed unwilling to participate or send their children for training with
the MILF in the future. Most are overwhelmed by their daily fight for livelihood and
suffer from a lack of basic social welfare. Our life is difficult, other families (rich)
can support MILF. . . they get money from external sources, not us, we always have
to evacuate. . . .54 They were openly unhappy with their lot, especially with the need
to evacuate every time there were AFP MILF clashes in the area. In Panggao, a
Bravo strong hold at one time, and hometown for his brother James Bond, there were
similar revelations. Residents exhibited a distinctive war weariness and
disappointment especially with the leadership in the MILF. In a focus group
discussion at the barangay meeting hall, residents of this all-Maranao settlement
voiced their concerns. They admitted that today their support for the MILF is less
because we are tired of evacuation, for last ten years, only we in Lanao del Norte
have to leave and become homeless, Lanao del Sur does not have this problem. . ..55
In our interaction with residents of Cablacan, where several of Commander
Bravos relatives live, and where he reportedly took refuge in 2008, residents
admitted to facing challenges after the recent clashes (2008). As one resident whose
father and brother are in the MILF shared earlier the people were free in their
livelihood choices, now we live in fear. . . we may be caught in the crossfire..56 This
area is particularly sensitive because Barangay Tangclao is close to an MILF camp.
The residents of Nunungan, Pantawan and Cablacan reported suffering grenade
attacks and aerial bombardment during the military offensive on the MILF camp in
2008. Yet, the support for MILF is greater than that for the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and government presence in the area is still weak.
Similarly, in Dapiawan, residents cited a major problem with IDPs who put
additional pressure on already poor amenities in the village. Each time there are
clashes, Dapiawan becomes host to IDPs who flee from areas under attack, or to
escape the crossfire.57 This variable of conflict impact also influenced civilian views
on future support for the MILF.
538 CIVIL WARS

A C RU MB LI NG P O WER BA SE ?

Inter-ethnic competition in the MILF is elite based and disconnected from the
organisations efforts to garner a mass support base outlined above. Under the initial
leadership of Hashim Salamat, the MILF had made ideology and identity issues flexible,
tailoring both territorial and group objectives to meet exigency and advocating
incorporation of non-Muslim indigenous Lumad population as part of its Bangsamoro
homeland ideal.58 According to analysts of the region, following Chief Salamat
Hashims demise in 2003, inter-ethnic factionalism was a prominent feature of power
succession in the MILF. The two main Moro groups the Maranao and Maguindanao
vied for influence, with the eventual triumph of the Maguindanaon clique59 with support
from the Yakan, Kalagan and Tausug ethnic groups and also on account of stronger
MILF-cadre loyalties towards Al Haj Murads disposal.60 For example, compared to
initial support for a family member joining the MILF (approximately 80 per cent)
among Maranao families, future support dipped to 60 per cent while among
Maguindanao families remained consistent at 45 per cent (see Figure 10).
However, there is an element of contiguity in membership, since both organisations
draw from the same recruitment pool. We explored ethnic group affiliation as a variable
influencing loyalty of communities. Our results suggest that there is no such indicator of
inter-ethnic competition, which impact on community support/behaviour for
participation in the MILF. Inter-ethnic group rivalry for political leadership was
more evident at the elite level and between competing clans. The Maranao and
Maguindanaon communities did not view support for the Moro cause through a
competitive support lens. The Moro struggle receives overarching support from all
ethnic groups who respond to the call of Islam and transcends issues of organisational or
tribal loyalty. For instance, remnant pockets of MNLF control suggest that local
strongholds remain mired in structures of community leadership and loyalty. The
MNLFGRP peace accord has had important implications for the future trajectory of
the Bangsamoro or separate homeland project. MNLFs coalescence with the demand
for autonomy rather than statehood has triggered the rise of more extremist voices
within the movement to represent the call for independence under the separatist agenda
of the MILF. However, it was interesting to explore how reintegration of the former
MNLF has operated in the communities. We coded reintegration benefits for former
MNLF, noting variance in terms of tribe and province (Figure 11).
This helped gauge whether receipt of reintegration benefits impacted on support
for the Moro movement. Our results on reintegration assistance for the MNLF were
as follows. Lanao del Norte recorded highest recipients and non-recipient of
reintegration support for former MNLF cadres. Among the municipalities, Datu
Saudi and Kauswagan exhibited good reintegration support for former MNLF, and
alluded to the presence of more former MNLF cadres in these communities. There is
existence of remnant MNLF structures in these areas. In terms of the peace dividend,
experience with ARMM and the way it has been a major disappointment for the
local population due to its problems with corruption, nepotism and other issues of
FUTURE OF THE MORO STRUGGLE IN MINDANAO, PHILIPPINES 539

FIGURE 10
GRASS-ROOTS SUPPORT FOR T HE MILF

(a)
100
Respondent's tribe
Maranao
Maguindanao
80
Count (%)

60

40

20

0
No Yes
Support for decision

(b)
100
Respondent's tribe
Maranao
Maguindanao
80
Count (%)

60

40

20

0
No Yes
Whether still support decision

bad governance were widely recognised among intellectuals, but at a local level,
respondents did not voice.
At an organisational level, there have been efforts to harmonise the differences in
their political positions by signing periodic Memorandum of Understandings
(MoUs) and working mechanisms (1999), and later in 2001 and 2010 at Kuala
Lumpur and recently at Dushanbe.61 The difference in position between autonomy
versus separation or independence, which has been a key divergence in the political
rhetoric of the two armed groups, at the same time there is the issue of mode of future
governance in Mindanao within this autonomous entity. While the MNLF stands for
540 CIVIL WARS

FIGURE 11
MNLF REINTEGRATION BENEFITS ACCORDING TO MUNICIPALITIES

50 Respondent's
municipality
lligan City
Munai
40 Kauswagan
Datu Saudi
Guindulungan
Pikit
Count (%)

30 Cotabato City

20

10

0
No Yes
Reintegration assistance

secular administration, the MILF stands for full and rigorous implementation of the
Sharia, although Muslim personal law is already implemented by the GRP.
Relationship between the MILF and MNLF has also changed over time. The
1980s were marked by stiff competition and armed clashes between the two sides,
they fought for area control in the period following MILFs formation in 1985.62 At
the community level, families and their siblings came to be divided by MNLF
MILF ridos.63 Insiders from the group suggested that despite the official
demobilisation of the MNLF in 1996, in select pockets, MNLF camps and remnant
structures are still armed, their military structures in place and ready for enemy
attack.64 Despite the growing ground presence of the GRP, and attempt to play each
group against another, there is some level of organisational solidarity between
MNLF and MILF. Personalities within these groups, especially local commanders,
engage in occasional contests for influence and competition over local resources
rather than any significant inter-group rivalry at grass-roots level.
For instance, during our community visits, we realised that in Maguindanao
communities, the MNLF had little influence. By contrast, in Lanao del Norte and
North Cotabato, they were dominant and entrenched in decision-making roles. One
informant suggested that if in a particular area the MILF decides to carry out active
military operations and the local MNLF commander considers the same
unnecessary, there is likely to be an armed confrontation or some form of
negotiation between low-level commanders. Active rivalry between the MILF and
MNLF was reported in North Cotabato in the boundary of Datu-uddin, and in
Talayan. This local MILF MNLF competition was cited as a deliberate divide and
FUTURE OF THE MORO STRUGGLE IN MINDANAO, PHILIPPINES 541

rule policy instigated by the AFP. This appears to be valid in light of recent
displacement of families in the Carmen area of North Cotabato following clashes
between MNLF Commander Theo and MILF Commander Karim (110th Base
Command) in March 2012.65
In our interaction with leaders from the two groups, there was a clear indication
of top-level cooperation.66 On the MNLF side, representatives suggested that the
organisation supports a solidarity compact with the MILF, although there is no
paper agreement. In 2010, during the OIC meeting in Russia, Professor Misuari and
Haji Murad were reported to have carried on discussions along these lines.67 The
Mayor of Cotabato and former MNLF Chairman reiterated that We used to be one
organisation, and we share the same aspirations, the Moro problem is one individual
problem of one individual people, we live in same territory, we may be divided but
we will work towards the point of being one.68
Significantly, as an organisation, the MILF today is facing important internal
cleavages and in-group competition. Following Commander Bravos demotion to
legal aide status by the MILF Superior Court in 2010, Umra Kato, the other break
away commander, has forged a new puritanical Islamist outfit called the
Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters. Formed early in 2011, it draws primarily
on the manpower of the 105th Base Command to which he formerly belonged. These
developments together with the reported demise of the MILF Chairman Murad in
February have weakened the main organisation considerably. Murad had been
losing control over the three main Base commands the 105th, 103rd and 102nd
since 2008, and today the BIAF remains a weak shadow of its former capacity.
Efforts to replace the pro-MILF Malaysian facilitator Datuk Othman bin Abd Razak
have also destabilised the trust and comity necessary for fruitful negotiations. The
MILF is concerned about the opposition meted out to its goal of establishing a
Bangsamoro Juridical Entity that will redefine the ARMM in terms of the MILFs
Islamist vision.69 Following talks in April, the two-day meeting in June was cut short
and rescheduled to commence in August. The government is yet to respond to the
revised comprehensive compact submitted by the MILF. These signal a lack of true
commitment towards a comprehensive solution on both sides.70

C ON CL U S I O N S

In our preliminary conclusions from this research, the main finding is the influence
of geographic location on support for MILF. Provinces that had greater Philippines
Army presence, and support from the government, as well as mixed populations
(Christian settlements) were less supportive of the MILF compared to the more
remote and socio-economically backward areas. Between the different provinces
where field research was conducted, in Maguindanao, the communities are more
proud, fearless and less hesitant about acknowledging participation in MILF,
compared to Lanao del Norte, which embodied more displacement, with hesitance,
fear and war weariness prominent among its populace. Another observation pertains
to the greater presence of mixed populations and AFP camps in Lanao del Norte,
542 CIVIL WARS

which could be the underlying reason for discouraging respondents from revealing
their support and participation in the MILF. Field results indicate a dwindling
support base and drop in the number of willing recruits in Lanao del Norte in
particular. Greater conflict affectedness and the repeated evacuation, displacement
and destruction experienced by residents in Lanao del Norte communities have
created a bitterness towards the MILF GRP clashes. This variance in conflict
impact has influenced the local populations support for the MILF over the years.
Poor governance delivery and related socio-political failures and incapacity by the
Government of Philippines have historically acted as a primary underlying variable
for support and hope with the Moro cause. However, the variables for civilian
support seem to be overridden by realities of a dwindling MILF power base. Other
reasons for declining support lie in the fact that there are few economic incentives
for participation. The cost of training youth in the camp is often borne by the
families themselves. This creates additional burden in impoverished households and
results in resistance and disinterest in sending children to the camp for training in
future. There is less support for separation, and the goal of Bangsamoro is
internalised by the populace as unrealistic and unattainable in most pockets. Finally,
there is an overarching positive feeling towards a peacefully negotiated settlement
as the way forward. This trend could be a significant indication of the possible
dissolution and disbandment of the group and a resolution either through successful
peace negotiations or a possible military defeat similar to the fortunes of the Tamil
Tigers in Sri Lanka; nonetheless, which track will unfold remains unclear at present.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The field research for this study was funded by the British Academy. We would like to thank our field
research partners and Mr E. L. Quitoriano for providing insights into the local conflict dynamics.

NOTES

1. C. Clapham, (ed.), African Guerrillas (Oxford: James Curry 1998); P. Collier, Rebellion as a Quasi-
Criminal Activity, Journal of Conflict Resolution 44/6 (2000) pp.83953; P. Collier and A. Hoeffler,
Greed and Grievance in Civil War, World Bank Research Paper 2355, World Bank, Washington, DC
(2001); M. Duffield, Post-Modern Conflict: Warlords, Postadjustment States and Private Protection,
Civil Wars 1/1 (1998) pp.65102; M. Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of
Development and Security (London: Zed Books 2001); J. Fearon and D. Laitin, Ethnicity, Insurgency,
and Civil War, American Political Science Review 97/1 (2003) pp.7590; P.N. Gleditsch and B. Lacina
Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New Dataset of Battle Deaths, European Journal of
Population 21/23 (2005) pp.14566; M. Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global
Era (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 1999); S.N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War
(Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press 2006); S.N. Kalyvas, Wanton and Senseless? The Logic
of Massacres in Algeria, Rationality and Society 11/3 (1999) pp.24385; D. Keen, The Economic
Functions of Violence in Civil Wars (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press 1998); T. Mkandawire, The
Terrible Toll of Post-Colonial Insurgent Movements in Africa: Towards an Explanation of the Violence
Against the Peasantry, Journal of Modern African Studies 40/2 (2002) pp.181215; W. Reno, Warlord
Politics and African States (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 1998); J.M. Weinstein, Inside Rebellion: The
Politics of Insurgent Violence (New York: Cambridge University Press 2006).
2. W. Reno, Patronage Politics and the Behaviour of Armed Groups, Civil Wars 9/4 (2006) pp.32442.
3. T.D. Mason, Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, and the Rational Peasant, Public Choice 86/12
(1996) pp.6383; J. Migdal, Peasants, Politics, and Revolutions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press 1974).
FUTURE OF THE MORO STRUGGLE IN MINDANAO, PHILIPPINES 543

4. C. Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and the European State, AD 9901990 (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell
1990); Z. Mampilly, Stationary Bandits: Understanding Rebel Governance, PhD Thesis, University
of California, Los Angeles (2007).
5. Weinstein (note 1).
6. C.M. Metelits, The Consequences of Rivalry: Explaining Insurgent Violence Using Fuzzy Sets,
Political Research Quarterly 62 (2009) pp.67384.
7. Ibid.
8. Kalyvas (note 1) p.167.
9. Metelits (note 6).
10. W.H. Moore, Rational Rebels: Overcoming the Free-Rider Problem, Political Research Quarterly
48/2 (1995) pp.41734.
11. R.M. Wood, Rebel Capability and Strategic Violence Against Civilians, Journal of Peace Research
47 (2010) pp.60114.
12. Mampilly (note 4).
13. Ibid. Tilly (note 4); M. Mann, The Sources of Social Power: A History of Power from the Beginning to
A.D. 1760, vol. 1 (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press 1986); M. Olson, Dictatorship,
Democracy and Development, American Political Science Review 87/3 (1993) pp.567 76.
14. S.K. Tan, Internationalization of the Bangsamoro Struggle (Quezon City: Centre for Integrative and
Development Struggle, University of Philippines, 1995); J.A. Kamlian, Bangsamoro Society and
Culture: A Book of Readings on Peace and Development in Southern Philippines (Iligan City: Iligan
Center for Peace Education and Research/MSU-IIT Press 1995); P.N. Abinales, Making Mindanao:
Cotabato and Davao in the Formation of the Philippine NationState (Manila: Ateneo De Manila UP
2000). J. Carino and E. Christian (eds) Indigenous Peoples and Local Government: Experiences from
Malaysia and the Philippines (Manila: IWGIA 2005); A.S. Tuminez, Ancestral Domain in
Comparative Perspective, USIP Special Report 151, United States Institute of Peace, Washington,
DC (Sept. 2008); A. Ozerdem and S. Podder How Voluntary? The Role of Community in Youth
Participation in Muslim Mindanao in A. Ozerdem and S. Podder (eds) Child Soldiers: From
Recruitment to Reintegration (London: Palgrave Macmillan 2011) pp.12240.
15. Bangsamoro means Muslim homeland.
16. E.L. Quitoriano and F.M. Theofelize, Their War, Our Struggle: Stories of Children in Central
Mindanao (Quezon City: Save the Children UK 2004).
17. For an historical background and detailed discussion on emergence of the Bangsamoro identity and
split within the MNLF, see M. Caballero-Anthony, Revisiting the Bangsamoro Struggle: Contested
Identities and Elusive Peace, Asian Security 3/2 (2007) pp.14161; R.G. Buendia, The Politics of
Ethnicity and Moro Secessionism in the Philippines, Working Paper No. 146 (Nov. 2007), online at
,http://wwwarc.murdoch.edu.au/publications/wp/wp146.pdf., accessed 17 Feb. 2012, p.9; E.
Gutierrez, A. Ahmad, F.L. Gonzales, E.R. Mercado Jr., OMI, J. Rocamora, M. Danguilan-Vitug and
A. Guialal, Rebels, Warlords and Ulama: A reader on Muslim Separatism and the War in Southern
Philippines (Quezon City: Institute for Popular Democracy 2000).
18. For an in-depth discussion on the peace process, see P.N. Abinales, Making Mindanao: Cotabato and
Davao in the Formation of the Philippine Nation-State (Manila: Ateneo De Manila University Press
2000) pp.18788; S.M. Santos, Delays in the Peace Negotiations between the Philippine Government
and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front: Causes and Prescriptions, East West Centre Washington
Working Papers 3 (Jan. 2005), online at ,www.eastwestcenter.org/fileadmin/stored/pdfs/
EWCWwp003.pdf., accessed 19 May 2011.
19. Lanao del Sur was part of the initial sampling and research design; however, the household survey
could not be conducted in the planned communities due to problems of access and security fears on
part of research assistants in light of renewed local violence and reported kidnappings in the capital
Marawi city in July 2010.
20. A.Z.V. Camacho, M.P. Puzon, and Y.P. Ortiga, Children and Youth in Organised Armed Violence in
the Philippines: Contextualisation, Personal Histories and Policy Options, Psychosocial Trauma and
Human Rights Program, Center for Integrative and Development Studies, University of the
Philippines (2005), online at ,http://www.coav.org.br/publique/media/Report%20Filipinas.pdf.,
accessed 15 May 2011.
21. Quitoriano and Theofelize (note 16); The local dynamics of the conflict presented here draws on
interviews with local researchers who choose to remain anonymous and an unpublished risk
assessment report on the Lanao provinces (2009) prepared by Mr E.L. Quitoriano of Risk Asia
Consulting for the Voluntary Services Overseas (VSO) Mindanao office.
544 CIVIL WARS

22. In October 2008, the Supreme Court declared the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral
Domain Aspect (MOA-AD) of the GRPMILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 as contrary to
law and the Constitution and in excess of the legal authority; further see T. Williams, The MoA-AD
Debacle An Analysis of Individuals Voices, Provincial Propaganda and National Disinterest,
Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 29/1(2010) pp.12144.
23. An infantry battalion consists of four companies. The structure is similar to the US Army each unit
consists of four subunits. The battalion would have three front line companies and one Headquarter
Company as reserve and on camp duty.
24. Kumander Bravo and Commander Pangalian (including Kumander Umbra Kato in Cotabato) are in
the US Government list of wanted terrorists. An MILF Base Command is a mix of MILF regulars and
local militias. The community near this base command normally endorses authority of the
Commander leading the camp. The commander may make autonomous decisions regarding military
targets and troop mobilisation for horizontal conflicts such as clan conflicts over land. The MILF
central command allows this relative autonomy of the base commanders to maintain a loose military
alliance system in place of vertical imposition of its authority.
25. Other American military advisers are also based in Tacurong City (Sultan Kudarat) and Jolo (Sulu).
26. Z. Abuza, The Moro Islamic Liberation Front at 20: State of the Revolution, Studies in Conflict and
Terrorism 28/6 (2005) pp.45379.
27. Tuminez (note 14) p.83.
28. Barangay means village in Tagalog.
29. The BIAF is made up of two parallel armies: (1) the regular infantry and (2) the special unit called
Internal Security Force (ISF). The ISF is considered an elite unit responsible for intelligence gathering
and adherence to the Koran. Every municipality under the control of the MILF has one ISF company,
while every barangay has one platoon. At present, the BIAF is divided into nine Base Commands,
which in turn comprise Unit Brigades. Each base command has various numbers of unit brigades
comprising from 1,200 to over 3,000 fighters. There is no fixed standard for what constitutes a unit
brigade. A unit brigade may roughly include 50100 fighters, each unit brigade in turn comprises
several platoons, hence these are smaller outfits of 10 15 fighters each (see Abuza, note 26).
30. S.L. Taya, The Political Strategies of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for Self-Determination in
the Philippines, Intellectual Discourse 15/1 (2007) pp.5984.
31. The CAFGUs were established pursuant to Executive Order 264 dated 25 Jul 1987. See, J.S.H. Kraft,
The Foibles of an Armed Citizenry: Armed Auxiliaries of the State and Private Armed Groups in the
Philippines (Overview) in D. Rodriguez (ed.) Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human
Security Efforts in the Philippines (Quezon City: South-South Network for Non-State Armed Group
Engagement 2010) pp.185215.
32. Area commanders of the AFP screen possible candidates in consultation with local executives, civic
and business leaders who constitute the Peace and Order Council in that cluster of barangays.
33. Kraft (note 31). Input from E.L. Quitoriano, Consultant, Quezon City, Philippines.
34. Kraft (note 31), pp.19697.
35. S.M. Santos, Delays in the Peace Negotiations between the Philippine Government and the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front: Causes and Prescriptions, East West Centre Washington Working Papers 3
(Jan. 2005), online at ,www.eastwestcenter.org/fileadmin/stored/pdfs/EWCWwp003.pdf.,
accessed 19 May 2011.
36. R.D. Rosauro, Bangsamoro Sub-state not averse to Subanen Ancestral Domain Claims (11 May 2011)
online at ,http://malindangheraldonline.blogspot.com/2011/05/bangsamoro-sub-state-not-adverse-
to.html., accessed 19 Jun. 2011.
37. Ibid.
38. At the same time, geographic distribution in the sample is limited and does not represent entire
household population in Lanao del Norte, Cotabato and Maguindanao provinces. Lanao del Sur was
part of our initial sample but had to be eliminated at the time of research implementation due to local
violence reports in Piagapo and Butig, which were initially part of the survey sampling design.
39. Some of the notable experts and insider voices on the peace process that we could access included Mr
Giame Alim, Kadtuntaya Foundation, Chairperson Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society,
Professor Abhoud Linga, Research Director of the Institute for Bangsamoro Studies (IBS), Chairman
of the MILF Political Affairs Committee, Mr Ghazali Jafar, Head of the United Youth for Peace and
Development in Mindanao, Mr Rahib Kudpo and Ms Nuraida Abu, the womens wing head of the
United Youth of Philippines.
 FUTURE OF THE MORO STRUGGLE IN MINDANAO, PHILIPPINES 545

40. A. Ozerdem, S. Podder, and E. L. Quitoriano, Identity, Ideology and Child Soldiering: Community
and Youth Participation in Civil Conflict: A Study on the MILF, Mindanao, Philippines, Civil Wars
12/3 (Sept. 2010) pp.30425.
41. This conclusion is based on our qualitative research in the communities.
42. Rido means blood feud. In Mindanao, these clan feuds tend to define relations between the various
Islamic and non-Islamic tribes. They perpetuate a cycle of vengeance and retaliation with frequent
civilian killings, political rivalry, land disputes and crimes such as theft, non-payments of debts and
elopement. This source of conflict perpetuation and escalation is disruptive for civilians since with the
initiation of a rido conflict, the members of the kin group or the community are often immobilised, on
account of them being potential targets for retaliation (see, Ozerdem et al. (note 40), p.311.
43. Interview with Aisa Bangsabai, trained as MILF to help the wounded. She was not active in 2008, but
was active earlier in 2000. She lives near Dilabayan, where her husband is an MILF commander,
Panggao, 21 Jun. 2010.
44. Barangay Captain Fatima Itada, Panggao, Lanao del Norte, 21 Jun. 2010.
45. We use the blank categories occupy our land and should go back to incorporate the multiple-
choice options included in the survey.
46. Interview with Aisa Bangsabai, Panggao, 21 Jun. 2010.
47. Civilian Interview 2, Muti, Maguindanao, 23 Jun. 2010.
48. Civilian Interview 1, Cadulawan, 22 Jun. 2010.
49. Interview with Mansawi Arbi, Barangay Treasurer, Cadulawan, 22 Jun. 2010.
50. In our interview with the school principal in Tambo, Lanao del Norte, she noted that the provincial
Governor Dimaporo was pro-establishment, while the Governor of Maguindanao Datu Ismael Toto
Mangudadatu was pro-MILF.
51. Civilian Interview 2, Cadulawan, 22 Jun. 2010.
52. Interview with schoolmaster, Pantawan, Lanao del Norte, 23 Jun. 2010.
53. Interview with resident male 46-year-old Imam (Principal of Arabic School appointed him as a
teacher), Poonga Piagapo, Lanao del Norte, 24 Jun. 2010.
54. Civilian Interview 5, Panggao, 21 Jun. 2010.
55. Ibid.
56. Civilian Interview 8, Cablacan, 26 Jun. 2010.
57. Civilian Interview 2, Dapiawan, 27 Jun. 2010.
58. Abuza (note 26).
59. The Maguindanaon presence is dominant in the MILFs Central Committee and the Jihad Executive
Council, i.e. the main decision-making units of the group.
60. S.L. Taya, The Political Strategies of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for Self-Determination in the
Philippines, Intellectual Discourse 15/1 (2007) pp.5984.
61. In 2010, Nur Misuari and Murad admitted that efforts at an incipient unification process are ongoing,
and there may be a possibility of achieving the same in future, with acknowledgement of an initial
understanding to work together.
62. Interview with Japal J. Guani, Jr, Mayor of Cotabato and MNLF Chairman, 10 Jun 2011.
63. Ibid.
64. Mr Butch Gilson, Former MNLF Commander.
65. Online at ,http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?articleId 791242&publicationSubCategory
Id 200..
66. Mr Butch Gilson, Former MNLF Commander, Camp Darapanan, near Simuay, which is adjacent to
MILF camps.
67. Interview with the Mayor of Cotabato, MNLF Chairman, 10 Jun. 2011.
68. Ibid.
69. Under the MoA signed with the MILF, the government has pledged to recognise the Bangsamoro
people as distinct from the rest of the national communities. It seeks to grant the Bangsamoro people
their own distinct territory and their own government, and to concede international recognition to the
Bangsamoro people. Towards this end, 712 barangays in five provinces will be added to the territory
covered by ARMM as homeland for the Muslims, to be called the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity. It will
become one of the states in a federal government being envisioned in a revised Constitution. See J.S.
Alvarez, Philippine Territory at the Negotiating Table The Price Tag for Peace? (n.d.) online at
,http://ustlawreview.com/pdf/vol.LIII/Bangsamoro_Juridical_Entity.pdf., accessed 11 Feb. 2012).
70. Rosauro (note 36).

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