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Appendix 1; The Basic Narrative Structure ot'Security': a semiotic note in the tradition of A.J. Greimas.
Summary:
This paper challenges two basic elements of 'security' as we usually talk of it. 1)
Security is normally seen as a 'reality' prior to language; it is seen as being 'out there'
- irrespective of the conception is 'objective' or 'subjective', that is, measured in threat,,
or fear. Basically the word 'security' refers to something which we think of as
'security' and which would be there whether it was labelled security or not, talked
about or not. 2) The more security, the better. In contrast the present paper argues
1) The word 'security' is the act, the utterance is the primary reality. 2) The most
radical, transformational and still realist <political> perspective Is oneof minimizing
'security'. And then it is claimed that the new understanding put forward is the
traditional one.
Security is basically linked to the regimes, the power holders - they have among their
instruments the speech act 'security' which has the effect of raising a specific
challenge to a principled level implying that all means will - If necessary- be used to
block the development in case. No rules will bind the state In this case, since the
threat is defined as existential. A challenge to sovereignty. This 'use' of security can
not be countered by any 'alternative' measure for 'reasonable' or 'legitimate' use of
the word; 'security' is what the regime defines It to be; all other specifications are
basically non-sensical. They do define It. This is not new. But In nuclear Europe
the speech act will always be efficient since violent overthrow Is not possible the way it
was In earlier times where elites tried to use the Instrument but often failed. The
present structure has therefore an inbullt status quo-gurantee it Is a multi-veto
system. Therefore, change can only take the form of negotiated limitations on the
use of the 'speech act security'.
On this basis we reach a surprising, new 'formula' for improved conditions: less
security and more politics.
As the basic project was to open new perspectives, new views and newways, in
European security, the conclusion Is: In the part of the world where I live, it Is
significant to say 'security Is a speech act'. -
Plan for re-structuring of the parer "Security, the Speech Act"
Tasks:
* In the theoretical part, the concepts of sovereignty and
legitimacy have to be adressed.
(1) An early attempt to deal with the change -on the basis of
the present . speech act approach is found in the paper presented
at the BISA-conference December 19,89 ("The .Changing Character of
Continuity"). . 1
Structure:
(Part 3 is the theoretical core chapter; 2 introduces the new
perspective through a case (dtente as change through
stabilization - especially in relation to the repressive regimes
in Eastern Europe); Part 4 extends the analysis to the other
cases: a! the Western way, b/ the break down of the (Eastern
element of the) European s curity order, Cl security in post-wall
Europe.
1. Introduction
2. A 1980s Security Concept: Non-Military Aspects of -European
Security
2.1. Human Rights and Security in European Politics
2.2. 'Security' from a positive to a -negative meaning
2.3. A possibility for change
2
Security, the Speech Act
How to analyse the politics of a word
1. Introduction
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-3---
This was the argument behind the earlier argument
(non-interference). Now itd.s stated directly - and in its
basic form unspecified regarding the sources of challenge
(domestic or foreign). Thus we ha philosophically and
historically in a way moved back a step - but that Was
probably the way to advance: to get to the basic issue.
What is then security? We often associate military questions,
but these are just the form that 'security problems' for
empirical reasons have mainly taken. This does not tell us
much about the meaning of security. <4>
-4-
I -----------
- - -
-5--
fjship). <6> By saying 'security' a state-representative moves
the particular case into a specific area; claiming a special
J right to use the means necessary to block this development,
but paying the price of some loss of prestige by needing to
use this special resort. "National security was
threatened."
Security is of course more than a word. It is necessary to
have the means to block the devlopment deemed threatening:
-6-
East-West interaction. <8>
At the core is a project of mutual stabilization and
reassurance; "stabilizing the status quo in order to overcome
the status quo" - as some great statesmen of the West said in
the sixties.
Cc, I.. - . . . .
...... ..
..: .
w /
/ 9. The 'common paper'. as . well as. important parts of the
/ reaction and debate can be found in I3rinkel & Rodejohann
C
. t 1 / // () f( .
. -7.-
debate and competition.<9> Naturally it caused critical
reactions in the Federal Republic - but surprisingly often
criticism against the expression of recognition of realities
which the liberal-conservative government ws clearly
recognizing all the time, without spelling it out. For
instance: that the rule of non-interference generally covers
all attempts at getting rid of the other system. And i.a.
the parties have to see each other as capable of peace - in
order to act on the condition of a protracted co-existence.
It might be a structural problem in Western societies -where
elections are primarily won on domestic issues- that no
sensible political party will spell out these constructive
self-limitations and risk the label of moral traitor; a label
which inevitably spills over into domestic politics. Thus
all prefer to up-hold illusions and thereby miss security
political chances.
-8-
value of the process - the space.<lO> This does, however,
not change the principles of the present argument.) What
they wanted to gain was the legalization of organizations
like Solidarnosc and the opposition party linked to
Solidarnosc - the 'civic committee'. What they aim at is to
recreate a 'civil society'. And the West should probably be
more aware of this collective level than the specific
'rights'. To create a 'civil society' is simply to re-open a
public realm - recreate politics. To allow the formation and
interplay of autonomous organizations. Even if the interplay
is still not 'fair'. (Solidarnosc was willing to let the
Ruling Party have 65% of the seats - on the condition that
the rest were open for a completely free process.) Just like
the help-to-selfhelp principle in 3rd World aid, the need for
the East is political changes that open up possibilities for
politics in these societies. From there the other changes
can be conquered by the people there. This is a more
promising dynamic than improved possibilities for
emmigrat ion.
-9-
retracting an ideological framework that contain the
possibility of supporting (in a given situation) a political
'revolution' on the other side. Not to speai about the value
of economic help.
All this can be translated into a completely different
political language: all this relates to the problem how to
handle the interaction of two processes: all-EuropeaniZatiOfl
and Western-europeanization. Whether we intend it or not, the
- now again dynamic - process of Western European integration
will necessarily have destabilizing and magnetic effects in
and on Eastern Europe. On the other hand, processes of
all-Europeanization have always been seen as latently
dangerous for the West as they could entail a certain Soviet
dominance of an all-European security system - dtente and
'Common European home' These two processes might be
mutually reassuring - creating a 'balance of imbalances'. Or
they might mutually reinforce a process of destabilization.
At least one should be aware that they might for some period
seem purely positive - but accumulate fears in liinitied but
important groups - 'security: elites' inWest and Eas And
one day this will cause a :draiatic back-lash.
Abit schematically one could cla&m that hig.4litic,s is a
problem to the West (the disarmamentdi:plomic victories of
Gorbachev) and low politics is a proem to the East
(societal and economic developments) (fFurthering 'human
rights' in Europe will in the last instance depend on
policies calming the fears on both sides - and thereby create
a dynamic process where all these contraditory changes can
un-fold.
- 10 -
- ____
t I '--:----- -
-. ----. -li.-_ -
dtente. In stead they find it necessary to pursue a policy
of stabilization. In order to make this morally tolerable the
picture of the East is tendentially coloured more rosy The
dynamics of reform is supposed to come from the top - the
reforrnThhige elites - and it is therefore logical to
stabilize their situation.<13>
The second policy repeats the mistake of the de-stabilization
policy. Both assume that policy and morality should be
brought into close and early correspondance. This we could
appropriately call the Fallacy of the Prophet: <14> the
prophet believes it possible to realise transcendental
standards in the temporal structure ; the prophet is moved by
the goal of a political order able to be judged according to
absolute standards.
This obviusl applies to the first group - direct moralism.
In the second case (the stabilizers) the realisation of
limits to possible change leads them to give up ideals. It
is felt impossible to live with the tension between ideals
and reality. Thus both share the premise that the political
order should be judged according to absolute standards.
-12-
of 'walking out' of the cold war system it is necessary to be
extremely careflll. As argued above the status quo is always
an available option - and the veto-holders are many.
' In all otherPperiods a major transformation like the one we
are beginnning to imagine would entail the transformatory
mechanism of war - or at least revolutions. In the nuclear
age this is excluded in a region like Europe. "Europe (...)
is the frontier where any retreat implies a gain for the
challenger. To yield on indirect or outlying fields of
confrontation is one thing; to retreat from one vested with
geographical, psychological, political, and economic
symbolism is quite another" (David 1989: 104 f). Thus, drastic
losses are not possible; means of repression will, if
necessary, be supplied to curb domestic upheavals. Change
through direct force from outside is impossible, due to the
nuclear shadow. Indirect (i.e. non-military) pressure from
outside will have to be translated through domestic action to
yeild political results. And we are back with the domestic
impossibility.
-
-13-
international relations. The list of philosophers is not
meant to be exhaustive. The idea is just to point out some
elements of our thinking that might be related to some
organizing principles for the international system and
therefore necessarily present - in various ways - in the
different discourses on security.
- 14 -
on various 'peace plans', etc. We have the works of
internatiohal law that appear to be markedly different from
i.a. the power tradition of the German historians. Still -
even aiong the more idealist writers - there -have been
certain shared assumptions since - at least - the last
quarter of the seventeenth century (Holzgrefe 1989)<17>,
reflecting a specific structuration of political space.
So the following is not a 'genealogy' of security. It offers
the philosophical basis for something I hereby invent in the
name of 'the classical concept'. The history of philosophy
is naturally constructed in a backwards direction with the
'conclusion' as starting point. This presentation slides
into a more systematic (representative) presentation of the
security concept in I.R.-theory.
As already shown in part - II,. the prolect in the present
conceptualization is to link 'security' solidly to the
self-defense by states (read: regimes) against threats from
the outside as well as the inside: basically we are dealing
with threats against the social order. Or rather with the
'right' of the rulers to state that a certain development is
a challenge to the social order. - We will discuss this
briefly in relation to challenges that are:
A: domestic
B: international
Aristotle: Even he, who has development of individual virtue
as the aim for the state, accepts a bottom line. Not only
does he specualte about the merits of different political
systems - not least in terms of stability - he also
considered it natural that the political power (the state)
uses the means available to counter all attempts at
overthrowing the social order. "----HVOR F. ER DET
CITAT?---" After all, this should not surprise us thinking of
Aristotle's well-known .distaste of revolutions -. or maybe
:i 5
more correctly of 'civil strife' (cf Lintott 1982: 245). Nore
basically the state is seen as prior to the individual. (In
fact a true human being can only exist in a state - "he who
is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he
is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god:
he is no part of a state" (Politics, 1:2, 1253a:28-29 - see
also 1:2, 1253a:l-7). Aristotle certainly favors non-violent
means for the handling of challenges to the established order
(basically: respect for the law; wise design of the
constitution <cf himself!>; control over the economic balance
of society; diplomatic handling of the relations to those who
are not sharing power). ut he also deals with necessary
ostracising of the individuals concerned. And generally -
due to the 'civilizing' role of the state - it is taken for
granted that 'civil strife' (stasis) should in the final
instance be coinbatted by all means necessary, when deemed
necessary, by the state
-16-
S -..-- .- -
20. Cf. Walker 1987a; Ashley 1987, 1988, 1989; Wver 1989d.
-17- -
(domestic/international) <20> The state/regime establishes
itself as the thin line creating in this very process the
distinction.. And it is under pressure from -'both sides' -
that is: threatened by processes and aspirations that are
originally very like.
This mode of thinking is linked to the various material
processes leading to a gradual concentration of political
power (Elias 1978 <1939>: --; Herz 1959: 43-48). The
'civilizing process' led to a situation where the states had
out-manoevred the units above and beneath: Pope and local
knights. Resulting in a territorially based .states-system.
The most famous sentence on this is probably Max Weber's on
the monopoly on violence.
At present the interest is mainly to find a shared
bottomline, and there is therefore reason to pick the 'hard
challenges' - those philosophers who would be generally
assumed to take a different stand. For instance Immanuel
Kant. It is well-known that he takes a rather puzzling
position on the question of domestic stability versus revolt,
aild thereby clearly supports our present argument along the
A-line. But on the B-issue he is generally seen 'as a
supporter of moral obligations as leading principles for
international politics. And so he is. But this is on the -
to him self-evident? - basis of a balance of power (Kant
1979 <1796>: 57) and a natural inclination to defend national
independence (not freely accept the courts of other states
(ibid: 61). And Kant stresses that "one could not demand of a
state that it should change a constitution - not even a
despotic one - that contains larger strength of resistance
against outside enemies, as long as the state thereby would
expose itself to the risk of being immediately swallowed by
other states. Thus, it must be it allowed to postpone to a
more favorable time the implementation of its intention (its
moral duty to move towards better conditions for peace
including 'republican' constitutions, ow)" (ibid 63 - my
preliminary translation)
And also Kant believes that it was the necessity of
organizing as a power towards the external world - to be
armed against another people - that made it necessary to
organize internally as a state (Kant 1979 <1796>: 55). Hereby
we have entered the second (B) part of the qtiestions.
international challenges to the state.
-18-
War is not, therefore, a relation of man to iiian but
a relation of state to state, in which individuals
are enemies only by accident, not as men or even as
citizens, but as soldiers, not as members of the
homeland, but as its defenders.
From here there is obviously an easy link to the particular
logic of war according to Clausewitz: War has its inner logic
and this follows from its basic character of being the
unrestrained situation where each chooses maximum effeciency
in relation to a clear and polarly defined aim, victory. It
is the situation where a state is up for a test of will --
testing whether it is still a sovereign unit. The ability to
fend off a challenge is the criterion for establishing
oneself as a sovereign unit - forcing the others to recognize
one's sovereignty and thereby gaining identity. Aron <21> It
is in fact not the particular means (military) that defines
the situation as one of war - it is the structure of the
'game'. Logically seen it is coincidence that military means
have traditionally been the ultimo ratio. The basic logic of
Clausewitz's argument follows from the situation pf an
ultimate test: what is then logically to be done ('throw
-19-
I
- 22 -
reserve 'security' as positive whereas 'power' can be
legitimate or not, depending on the historical situation.
The striving for security can also lead to more or less lucky
effects due to the structure or the level of aspiration (the
security dilemma simpliciter) but the motive as such is by
definition legitimate and positive.
As we shall see in the next section, some radical critics -
notably in peace research - have denounced 'security' and
deemed it a part of the problem. Still this operation hinges
partly on an idea of true security. And it wants to put
'peace' or 'justice' in the place of 'national securitry'.
But partly, in noticing the close link between 'national
security' (as an empirically existing referent) and
particular interests, this radical position shares crucial
elements with the present analysis. The conclusions drawn
have until now been radically different.
Arnold Wolf ers has written probably the most famous article
on the concept of security ("National Security as an aTflbigous
symbol" from 1952; reprinted in Wlfers 1962: 147-165). As
pointed out by Buzan (1983: 4) the article largely had the
effect to kill of theoretical interest in the concept of
security whereas the purpose more likely was the opposite.
The first part of the article summarises the general
assumptions about what security is 'about':
ttWe know roughly what people have in mind if they
complain that their government is neglecting
national security or demanding excessive sacrifices
for the sake of enhancing it. Usually those who
raise the cry for a policy oriented exclusively
toward this interest are afraid their country
underestimates the external dangers facing it or is
being diverted into idealistic channels. unmindful
of thes dangers. moreover, the symbol ('national
security', OW) suggests protection through power
(...). For these reasons it would be an
excaggeration to claim that the symbol of national
security is. nothing but a stimulus to semantic
confusion, though. closer analysis; will show that If
used without spcification it leaves room for zre
confusion than sound.. political counsel or
scientific usage can afford." . (1962: 149)
- 23 -
basic orientation of 'security' is towards protection of
values previously acquired and in this sense the term has a
basically conservtive twist (bc. cit; Krell 1981).
The probably most famous passage from Wolfers' article - and
one of the best established definitions of security goes like
this:
security in an objective sense, measures the
absence of threats to acquired values, in a
subjective sense, the absence of fear that such
values will be attacked.
<27>
-24-
security proper there would be an optimum of forces and
(theoretically) the issue would not be very complicated -, if
it was not for the other motives.
John Herz is one of the first IR-theorists to put security at
the centre (leading him to the 'discovery' of the security
dilemma - simultaneously with Herbert Butterfield). In
important books and articles (like 1957, 1959, 1964, 1969,
1981) the concept is left not only un-defined but without any
reflection on its origins, connotations or content. The
original article on the security dilemma (1950) contains the
following: In a "social constellation (...) where a plurality
of otherwise interconnected groups constitute ultimate units
of political life" arises "what may beclied the 'security
dilemma' of men, or groups, or their leaders. Groups or
individuals living in such a constellation must be, and
usually are, concerned about their security from being
attacked, subjected, dominated, or annihilated by other
groups and individuals. Striving to attain security from
such attack, they are driven to acquire more and more power
in order to escape the impact of the power of others. This,
in.turn, renders the others more insecure and compels them to
prepare for the worst" (l950:157).'Herz is mainly interested
in the social structure or 'constellation'; the content of
'security' is indicated indirectly by reference to attack,
domination and annihilation as that which is feared - and
countered by accumulation of power
- 25 -
(loc.cit.)..) <28> Insecurity sterns from a combination of
threats and vulnerabilities (Cf Wolfers, Kissinger and
others). Threats become threats to security by being "swift"
and marked by "a sense of outrage at unfair play" (ibid: 75).
Thus, the ideal type of security (policy) is a state 's
(pursuit of) freedom from external threat and interference.
- 26 -
between)
The place from where the security discourse is spoken has
become invisible.<30>
This first sub-section of chapter 3 is rounded of with a
brief indication of the main tendencies in scientific
writings on 'security' in the post-war period; i.e. the way
'security' shows on the surface as an 'analytical' term.
From this we will soon proceed to the attempts at
transcending the 'traditional' meaning into some type of
'alternative security concept'. Before this: the ways it has
been employed. In less conceptually oriented writings the
concept of security appears basically in four forms:
1) from a national perspective (i.a. 'British Security in the
1990s') and then it is often identical with considerations on
national.defence, 'strategic studies'.
CurIously the the second major heap of references to
something called 'security' is to be found at the opposite
extreme:
2) international security - close tthe peace genre.
Third, and theoretically probably most important:
3) writings on the 'security dilemma'. It is possible to
distinguish two traditions of realism (cf Herz 1951, 1959:
231-143; Wolfers 1957 <1951 & 1952>; especially pp. -----
Jervis 1976): One is the 'classical realism' based at least
partly on anthropological arguments about tle (evil) human
nature leading to a eternal power drive etc. The other views
security as a dynamic in it's own right - it has even been
proposed as the priviliged 'middle ground' (Buzan 1984)
because it avoids any reference to the evil nature of man but
on the other hand points to continuing probierns.<31> >
- 27 -
When it can be generally assumed that all states are status
quo powers, a focus on inherent vicious circles in a closed
universe of 'security' - generated by short-sighted policies
- will naturally lead to the kind of security thinking today
known as common security. (For pre-Palme versions, see ia.
Bohr 1950; Wolfers 1962 <1952>: 158-165; Herz 1959; Jervis
1976: --).<32>
Finally, and logically following from this:
____----
- 28 - -
When it can be generally assumed that all states are status
quo powers, a focus on inherent vicious circles in a closed
universe of 'security' - generated by short-sighted policies
- will naturally lead to the kind of security thinking today
known as common security. (For pre-Palme versions, see i.a.
Bohr 1950; Wolfers 1962 <1952>: 158-165; Herz 1959; Jervis
1976: --).<32>
- 28 -
between state and society."<33>
- 29 -
4
- 30 -
p -- --- - - --
_1
-0-
( -
-31-
- I - - - -
-0-
2) on Buzan:
- 32 -
We can not as researchers define abstractly the 'true
security' of state x. But the concept of security can not be
traced solely by talking 'around' it. It is not enough to
map by walking back and forth across the territory. There is
something unifying - otherwise there would be no discourse.
The unifying moment is probably a certain basic modality.
And, indeed, it is in Buzan's book. It slips out between the
lines. (More on this in a moment.)
By this manoevre Buzan pretends to obtain an openness which
is false. It results in a duality of perspectives: on the
one hand, there is a focus on national security (put in a
broad context) on the other hand Buzan presents as an
essential idea that security is - and should be - located at
3 levels (individual, state and international). This is
mirrored in the titel/sub-title contrast: People, States and
Fear: The National Security Problem in International
Relations. For analytical purposes I prefer the sub-title
(though, of course, the title is stylisticly attractive, and
the combination compelling).
- 33 -
concept (cf 3.1.). But this is my- claim not Buzan' s. No, not
only mine. Buzan has a chapter on threats divided into
sectors (military, political, economic, ecological). And it
is clear that the military is the- starting point whereas the
others have somehow started to challenge it. How? in the
chapter on military threats some words are revealing: The
military threats have been primary because they evolved
"swiftly" and with "a sense of outrage at unfair play" (Buzan
1983: 75) This used to be an option mainly related to the
military sphere. When the sante can be done through economic
or political means overturning the political order these will
be security problems, too. Isn't this the basic definition
of security that it relates to developments that can undercut
the politial order and thereby "alter the premises for all
other questions" (Jahn et al 1987: 9)?
- _34 -
of international security is a very open question. Does it
mean the maximum security for the iuaximuin number of states?
Then it is basically defined at the national level and then
aggregated. Or is it the global security for human beings -
then it is defined at the individual level - and then
aggregated. Is it the stability of the international
system/order? Probably not since this would often be a
rather negative thing and not similar to what is usually seen
as a positive aim: international security. Is it then,
fourthly, the security against international war? For some
reason this is often the analytical solution preferred but it
seems unacceptable due to the fact that security is generally
seen as more than security against war (i.a. freedom); and
this can not be left out at the international level just
because there is no harmony between the different national
goals.<39> Leaving aside all the problems of weighing if
there is war between Ghana and Togo but increased security in
Europe, we have what seems to be an insolvable problem about
the unit of reference.
- 35 -
The meaning of 'security' is basically 'national security'
and related to a specific problematique (the stability of the
political order). If one tries to move the concept of
security to the other spheres (individual/international) this
will in reality amount to speaking about something else -it
is not the 'same security'. Therefore, the only meaningful
way to speak about 'security' is to relate to the classical
meaning (national security) and broaden the understanding of
relevant dynamics: not only state-to-state, but also the
quality of international politics and sub-state dynamics.
The concept of security is posited :at the level of 'state'.
At the other levels developments can not be summed up in a
similar way. We have various interactions at all three
levels. But the issue of 'security' has to be read through
the lense of 'national security'.
- 36 -
'Security' signifies a situation marked by the presence of a
security problem and some measure against it. In-security is
the situation with a security problem but no measure against
it. The both share the security probleiuatique. There are
obviously situations other than these; characterised by
'a-security' or 'non-non-security'. The semiotics of this is
a large issue in itself. Suffice it for now to say that we
should not necessarily let ourselves be limited to the
universe of security <---> in-security. (See also appendix.)
-37-
The aim of 'post-structuralist realism' is to develop a
theory that can be political. It does not want to find a new
place to stand outside realism. InCstead it tries to be at
the limit of the tradition. Working with the classical
meanings in a way which is faithful - but too faithful. The
method will be to work with the realist concepts in order to
mark them so that they are not able anymore to function in
the harmonious self-assured standard-discourse of realism.
This is not achieved through a change from outside, but from
the inside. (The name 'PSR' achieves this by its double
meaning: it is a post-structuralist reading of realism. But
it is also 'post' in particular to the structural realism of
Waltz - the main object for the deconstructivist criticism.
In this way - and generally by laboring faithfully on the
classical concepts it it in a way inside realism and in a way
outside. It is not clear whether I am a realist or not.) 3"
38
9 /
/ 1:
-
s''34A _/c I L
It
- 39 -
run the risk of seemingly just opening up unlimited
possibilites for theoretical activities (without effect and
any rules). The latter seems to be troubled by the
difficulty of finding any necessity. And furthermore this
'relativism' will always be reproached with the critique of
undercutting itself: how can one be absolutely sure about
relativism, etc.
The writings of Derrida seems to handle this dilemma by
treating the existing philosophical (metaphysical) tradition
as tightly integrated, forcing our thinking into fixed
patterns. Working with this tradition thereby demands a high
degree of discipline. The inertness of the tradition might
offer something relatively solid to hold on to. 'Anything
goes' is. avoided at the same time as (illusionary)
foundations are also dispensed with.
.-
0 -
- 40 -
stream of events (Waver, eternally forthcoming).
We also tend to underestimate here the '-sign'function of
'security' (or the exchange of 'signals') (cf Schelling 1960;
Jervis 1976; Baudriliard 1983; NoCanles 1984; Derrida 1984c;
Tunander 1989; Waver l989d: 102-105; Luke 1989). In contrast
to this communications perspective we are here more
investigating the 'limit' to communication; i.e. the cases
when it is deemed necessary to seek self-reliant action.
The present analysis therefore tries to take the concept of
security in a specific direction which is deemed relevant in
the context of European security. This does not mean that
one can 'define' a concept of security for a particular
purpose (the 'instrumentalist' view of concepts; nor can we
search for the true meaning of the concept, which would be
the position of a strong 'realist'). Textual practice is
limited by the existing material, by the dimensions and
tensions already existing in the tradition of thinking; but
different strategies are available for the textual work.
This one aims at an interference in European Security of the
l990s.
Finally, there might be a need for developping
'counter-discourse' as well. The present approach seems at
first to exclude this possibility by attacking all attempts
to develop 'peoples security' or 'global security'. The
point is however not to deny the role of counter-discourse -
just to point out that it should probably not be done in
terms of security. Then the inner force of 'security' - the
weight of classical thinking - is likely to take its
revenge. 'Visions' coined in any kind of security
terminology will inevitably stabilize the importance of an
insecurity-security dimensions. Alternative programs are
more likely to lead beyond 'traditional security' if they are
expressed in terms of a-security; other aims.
- 41 -
somewhat surprising constellation to have speech act theory
married to- post-structuralism. After all Derrida hos mounted
a major attack on speeh act theory. And the immediate
answers of Searle were rather weak - and the dialogue not
really a dialogue. Some recent contributions have pointed to
the possibilities of a somewhat more fruitful relationship;
and to the points of similarity.
- 42 -
S
- 43 -
attempted to question our traditional concepts of
conuuunication and context. (In -many ways this article is a
brillant summary of some of Derrida's central themes from the
early books (1974, 1978).) Of this article some seven pages
dealt with speech act theory. This motivated a completely
negative response by John R. Searle who saw literally no
value in Derrida's contribution. Actually Searle found that
Derrida had "a distressing penchant for saying things that
are obviously false" (1977: 203). And furthermore his line of
argumentation was generally too un-clear for really allowing
for a debate. Derrida's lengthy reply (1977b/78?) contained
some rather vicious traits (of which some are entertaining).
And the 'dialogue' ended.
it has more recently been pointed out that this should not
make us overlook some elements of affinity.
Post-structuralism and strands of analytical philosophy share
the denial of a purely represential view of language (Frank
1983: 279-286). And in fact Derrida stressed how he felt
committed to some of the essential ideas of Austin (Searle's
'Grand Theory' is, howevex, more problematic than Austin's
original more playfull variant.) Christopher Norris points
out how Paul de Man (who was seen as the leading American
'deconstructivist') puts the constative/performative
distinction "to work in ways undreamed of by J.L.Austin"
(Norris 1988: 43). Manfred Frank (1980; 1983) has carried out
some of the most carefull investigations of the relationship
between Derrida and Anglo-saxon analytical philosophy.
- 44 -
I
- 45 -
(Derrida 1978). <43>
This is not really written for the present purpose but stolen
from another context. Just in order to give an impression of
the kind of arguments I would like to make in the last
section. Or not make? Should this section go along or not?
A few words about the method of 'figuration' analysis have to
be put in (cf Elias and Foucault). Probably as 3.2. And in
3.3. a paragraph on French-German relations have fallen out.
3 1. Concepts of Security as object of 1ysis
- 46 -
3.3. The Current Figuration
- 47 -
though not, pray, at the level of borders. The more general
'revisionism' of East and West, their tendency to 'correct',
adjust, or reject each other's ideologies and social systems,
is more difficult to calibrate in so far as it affects
nation-states. <46> But clearly the level of interaction
that takes place amounts to transnationai politics. And a
core-question for European security is the politically
decided one of where to place the limit as to what is
ordinary interaction (transnational politics) and what is a
security problem. The 'security problem' status can be
asserted by appeal to the category of interference. This the
East generally did until the mid-Eighties when criticism of
human rights was accepted as in principle legitimate. The
pretext now heard invokes a different aspect of security;
lack of human rights is justified in terms of internal
security, and sovereignty is thus at risk from within rather
than from the objections raised from without (interference).
'Vulnerabilities' may be confessed. Order has to be
maintained. In these cases, the East has to mobilize a logic
of security and international politics to combat phenomena
that are seen by the West as natural parts of civil and
civilized interaction. The problems of the East in this
regard are unlikely to be alleviated by the process of
Europeanization and normalization of East West relations.
For the East, there is direct, defensive action to be taken
by a nation which forms the object of such criticism; the
question whether and how to label these interactions as
security problems or violations of international law--how to
take them out of the area of transnational politics, which
are supposed to function according to the rules of domestic
politics. Then at the institutional level there is the task
of designing a European security system able to handle these
problems. Narek Grela (1989), points to the dilemmas
involved in setting up a European security system that both
allows the necessary processes of change and at the same time
provides for a degree of stability. The question of how to
deal with this issue constitutes a major issue for Western
Ostpolitik.
- 48 -
Basically this is due to the difference between what Buzan
labels strong and weak states. He distinguishes between
strong and weak powers--the classical question of power to
influence others--and strong and weak states, referring to
the strength of the state as state, its coherence, the degree
of harmony between state and nation, and between its
different components: physical base, institutions and ideas.
In this sense the states in Eastern Europe are much weaker
states. They are thus much more vulnerable at the level of
institutions and ideas--whereas the Western states are so
coherent that they are maiily to be threatened through
physical power. This does not necessarily mean use of
physical power, but the main fear is that in the shadow of
Eastern power the West will be vulnerable to coercive
diplomacy. On further investigation, it becomes clear that
the right wing in the West does in fact doubt the capacity of
Western society to withstand pressure. For the Right in
particular, Western European states have been sapped by
decadence, the welfare state, postmaterial values, etc <47>
High politics
Western
fears
Western Eastern
Europe Ewope
Eastern
fears
Societal level
- 49 -
The context of this model,- is the withdrawal of
the overlay which has for forty years limited interaction
between the blocs, and structured it on the. lines of the
superpower conflict.<48> The overlay is now 'retreating',
and Europe is consequently less stable. One way or another,
the two parts of Europe are tending to drift towards each
other. This necessarily entails more contacts and mutual
influence. It means new options, and maybe perspectives for
transformation of the regional system, but it also means--for
the professionally pessimistic, and all societies have and
have to have a security establishment--a higher level of
fears of breakthrough in the non-military East-West war. So
we start to worry more about breakthroughs. And break
downs At a time when the level of hope in society at large
is rising.
As the fears are assymetrical (figure 1) to understand the
situation is not simply to establish whether it is the one or
the other side that is gaining ground. It is not possible to
say who should feel secure and who insecure. There are fears
on both sides, but different ones. The fears of both sides
may very well be founded. And for those who favour a
continuation of the process of dtente and Europeanization,
the fears of both sides should be taken into account by both
sides because if any of the elite groups threatened feels too
threatened there is a risk of the whole process being
49. Note that the present analysis does not apply t social
groups threatened in their personal area by the prcess--this
is not likely to cause a veto on detente. On the other hand,
we are not talking about the national security debate or
popular opinion either. It is a question of drucial elite
perspectives on 'national security'.
- 50 -
paralysed. <49>
- 51 -
, ,(
especially the recommendation for 'less security, more
politics'. There is a choice in favor of stable change in
the European political situation. There are alternatives to
this: i) continued status quO (which is probably no real
option in the long run) and unregulated break downs or break
up (which is most likely to lead to no changes - or follow
from total insistence on the status quo). The present
analysis tries to present certain logically derived
conditions for a possible regulated change in the European
order that has been so surprisingly stable for 40 years.
What is deduced is not a specific policy. Such a
scientifically justified policy is never possible (cf Wver
l89c). What can be concluded is at the level of the
necessary modalitites which any project has to adapt to -
certain forms any process has to take on due tothe nature of
security, technology and politics.
- 52 -
Appendix 1: The Semiotic Structure of 'Security'; A
Greimasian Note
TETTE
s2
a.
- 53 -
An example could be
life <=--===> death
non-death
>Zi
<=-.---====> non-life
i. ----
Nocrnal relations Non-matrimonial relations
(not fortr1desi) (not prescribed)
(1968a: 93-94)
><
J(ltlllery by the woman ........ . adultery by the man
- 54 -
Security
- 55 -
-V
security threat
t +c - +t /c
/t ?c ?t jc
non-threat in-security
<52>
- 56 -
4 S
OPIINTON ___
* S - --------.---. --.--- - -
(I
(
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