The

Sidney
Axinn Logic of
Hope:
EXTBNSIONS OF KAHrS VlBW OF REUGlON
 THE LOGIC OF HOPE:
Extensions of Kant's View of Religion
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Volumr: 15

Roben Ginsbera
Eucullvt Editor

AFlM:iatc Editors

John M. Abbuno
Vqini.I B1act
Rem B. Edwwds
........ -
Alan Milchmln
Michael H. Mitiu
Richard T. Hull M"" Mou
Robe."" Kevdson
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Samuel M. Nata1e
Alan ROIetIberJ
Ruth M. Lucier Dlniel SWn_"
 THE LOGIC OF HOPE:
Extensions of Kant's View of Religion

Sidney Axinn

Ammrdam - Atwu., GA 199<4

This book contains mattrialll'pfillted rrom Rfttt(M Wi,Aillw Ulrtlll (Ij
R _ AI",", by Immanuel Kant, lnInsialed by Tbeodore M. Oree ... aDd
Ho)'l H. HIKkon , by pennission of Open Court PUblishiRJ Company, La
Sallt . lUinoil . Copyriabt 19~ by The Opm Collrtl'llblishin. Company.

.....,.
C..... e. des .... by Cb ... Kok boled on a pbOlol"ph -1984 by Robert
O insberJ, or SlatlUlf)' by (ju.stav VilC'laDd io IlK Fro.... r Park, Oslo,

ISBN: 96-S I B~:J-7 (CIP)

-Editioll!l Rodopi B.V., Amsterdam Atllnta . GA I ~
Printed ill 1M NttheflaDds
Lei US 001 make rub c:onjenurn aboul the grulesl thinp.

Heraclitus, fragmenl 48.

If you do 001 hope. you will 001 find !hal ",bleb is DOt
hoped for; &ince il is difficull 10 discover and impossible In
.twn.
Heradltus, fragment 7.
 cmrrENTS

Fo reword 1

Preface J

Pan 1: KANTS ANALYSIS OF REUGION 7

ONE. lnuoduction ... .. ....... ... . . .. ...... .. .... 9

I. H istory and a TOlith of Gossip 9

2. Oullinc of This Book 11
3. Summary 0( Kant', Book on Religion 15
A. HulIWI Nature 15
B. Ethical Theory 16
C The Religion of Reason 17
D. The RelatioD Between Historical Religions
and Rational Religion 19
E. FetishWn 20

'TWO. Kam', ConCCpiual Tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 23

I. The Nature and LimiU of Knowledge 23

A. The Pragmatic Foundatioo of Koowledgt: 24
B. POISible Experience as a Necessi ty for
~d~ U
C. Spa.oc and Tune 26
D. Phenomena and Noumena UI
E. The Antinomies 31
F. Conclusions 33
2. Kant's ElhicaJ Theory 34
3. Kant's Philosophy of H islo!), 48
1HREE. IUfigion Wuhilllh~ Limits 0{ &men AIo.v . . . . .. 67

I Puf~re 10 the FiBI Edjtion 61

2. Part One: CcmeerniDfi the lndwellin& of the Evil
Principle with me Good; Ort 0J1 the R adieal Evi]
in H uman Nablrl':

PART n APM !CAnONS OF REASON ]39

FOIIR. AmbiVlllcDCC: The Na]urc of ]be Individual ..... . ]4]

]. liappille5ll ]41
2 And VC]: The Amb ivalence of] M J ndiyj d u~] ]42
J. Ambjya]CDCC Yl. Fanaticism 10
4. 1lJe Requircme nlS of Logic 145
S. The Forma! Propertie5 of a CUbe of Opposition 147
S ] ModCls of AmbjyatCDCf; 148
5.2 varieties of Ambivalcnce IS4
53 Some RCSU]t!, of This Modcl IS6
6. The Mo nist Tradition ]51
7. H istorjp ] Re]ations 158
8. A D ualist Mode] of H uman Nunrc 1M
9. Ambival~DCf; and H ODe$ry 163
FIVE. The logic of igllOnnce ..................... 165

I. Definitions, Assumptions 167

2. Axioms 169
3. Assumptions Summariud 171
4 Theorem. In
S. Responsible Ignorance 173
6. FOIJetting 177
7. A Few Fnmple$ 178
&. Concluding Comments 179

SIX. The Logic of Hope: Definitions of Three Types

of Hope ................................. 183

I. Introduction: Kinds of Hope 183

2. The Presuppoiition of Ignorance, Considered
Pragmati<:a!ly 185

SEVEN. The Logic of Hope: Continued .. ... . ........ 201

I. Schema and Image 20 1

2. Kant on POSlliblr Hopes 205
3. S:ond-Order Hope 207
4. Hope and tbe Solution of tbe Antinomie$ 209
4.1 The Epicurus Analogy 210
4.2 The Second.()rder Hope Antinomy 213
S. Pragmatic Synthesis 214
6. SUlDmary and D istinction Between Reasonable
and Unrra.sonabk Hopes 218
 7. Unreasonable Hopes

PART III: CONSEQUENCES OF KANTS

Y1EWPOlNT n,-
EIGHT. Kant's Use of Reasonable Hope .... .. ... ... . . 227

E. 1be Retribution Antinomy 237

F. Active and Passive Moral Subjects 2J8
a Conclusion 242
2. Hope: for Mysterious Assistance in Moral Effort 242

NINE. Mystery Versus Undecidability .......... 247

reNo1be Moral Antinomy ..... . ...... .. . . 263

I. A Moral Antinomy 263

A Ob-.,vatjon< po tbe 1Msfs 263
B. ot,mvaUom on . be A n!j!bcsi, 264
264

,
 3. Nine QuestiOIl$ about Morality and Kant'li
AnSW1'fS 267
4. Cond",jQRI m
ELEVEN. The Religious Ouestion: The PhiI050Phy of
Religion as the PhilO5OPhy of History .. . . 275

NOles 293
 FOREWORD

Sidney Axinn has written. profound and intense study of funda-

mental mancl'$ touching upon our humanity. He expounds and
e~ the Kantian question, "What may we hope?" 111e ~[ora
lion is subtle and systematic; me results arc an exciting aposiliDn
of the ~ry meaniq of hope.
Axirm Ilpelli !he book with an utended ueg6is of Kant's
fWi&inn. Willlill the Umiu of Ret1IOtI AIoM, a fascinating "WOrk. that
weaves togetber major themes of Kaotian philosophy, but which
has n01 received iu full due. Arinn worn out and works aver
every worthwhile distinction in thaI volume, connecting i\ wilen
appropriate with the corpus 0( Kant's works. This full clarification
of the Kantian cJas.sic gives Minn the: terms .ud consideratioilS for
pursuill8 hope 10 its lUI biding places in !he human bean.
Sophisticated analytic techniques, includina symbolic logic. are put
to use on the ((lDo:eptUal matrix. the logical alternatives, the
propositional structure of hope. Much rums upon the traditional
Square of ~itiOD (redone as a Olbe) and tbe rceenl distinc-
tiOD benoreen us.! and mmtion .
a'
Mnn arrives an astonishing oot(:Omc in his Kantian journey;
hope, whicb generally is thought to be. religiOtl5 maller, beoomes
invested by the rational beings thai we are in the lI'llmformation
of world society inlo Kingdom of Ends of individuals and a
peaceful Leape of Nations. Here Ax;n n, a1011j with Kant, ties
together phiJosophy of hislOry and international politia with eOlia.
human nature, aod the powers of reasoo. This bopefuJ romrihu-
tion 10 Kantian itudies. and 10 human siudies. is Axinnology al its
b.".
Roben Ginsberg
Executive Editor
 PREFACE
For what can a human being hope? For what can a healthy and
therefore ambivalent hulIWI beiq hope? What can such a penon
DOt merely mcnuon hoping for, bul rationally hope for? lbal is
the religious question, Icrording to Kam. We find his al15WCr in
the book, Rdigion Within the Limiu of IWuon AlaM, his only full-
length treatment of the subject. Pan I of this study is a commen-
tary on Kant's book. Part n develops thc logic of three of Kant'S
basic ideas: ambivalence, ignorance, and hope. Pan m organizes
all of Ihe5c: malletS in tCrtll$ of Kant', pbilosophy of history.
The first two chapters of ParI I are introductory. auuming a
reader who can use. brief survey of Kant'S ronccptu.altools. The
third chapler is. detailed analysis of each scction of Kant's book..
After going lbrougb Kant', work on religion, we find .everal
problems lbat need more development. First. the problem of
ambivalence. Kant's tbeory of human nature. Seoond, the exact
analysis of ignorance. An e5SeOtiai concern of Kant's work on
religion is mapping out the area of reality thai human beings can
hope \0 know and thc area thai they cannot hope to know.
Therefore, the nature of ignoranoe is otta!. And it is of panicu-
tar lignifieance in a work on religion because of the assumption
!hat we can hope for 5Oml:thi"l only if we all: ignorant of ....!!ether
or not it will occur.
The third and basic problem that we are pressed to deal with
at the 1:00 of Kanfs work is Ihe logical analysis o f bope. Kant has
argued thai if we act in a fashion that is oot unworthy of bope for
Rlpem&wral assistance we then have the ri&ht to weh hope.
There are complicated problelll5 10 be considered in the analysis
of the limilS of rational hope, in addition to the prewpposition of
ignorance just mentioned.
Pan II uses just a h it o f modem symbolic losie to extend these
three of !CaDI'S basic ideas: ambivalence, ignorance, and hope.
Each of them plays a pan in Kant's position on the philosophy of
history and ethiC$, as well as religion. Each needs more develop.
ment than Kant has p rovided. In separate dlaptcrs these topia
, PREFACE

are exterv1ed in fashion that IiWU with Kant's sugeestions but

then goes on to reach condusions beyond his. Without some
attention to the logic of ignoranc:e, of ambivllctlCe. and of hope
the power of KanI'S analym of religion can euily be mis.5ed.
Part 1lI develops the consequence.5 of combinina the UlcMiOf\li
of ambivalence, ignorance, and hope with Kanl's viewpoint ill the
philOliOphy of hi511H)' and religion. Kant's own conception of the
li mit of reasonable hope is ooll5idcn:d in one chapler. This is
followed by his analysis of the distinction berween wbat is
myilcrious and what is unknowable. "'The Moral Antinomy,'
Chapler X. provides a counterbalance 10 the usual individualistic
and formal intctprctatioll5 of his ethical theory. Certain aspec:u
of Kanl's philowphy of history and of human !I.IIUTC are cmpha-
ilicd in alln05l every ckapler. Finally, KanI'S conception of lhe
rcligi0U5 question is the subject of the last chapter, his view lbal
the philosophy of felipo!! is essentially the pbilOiOphy of history.
Paro of a few CluiplC'lI have appeared in early formulationl.
'The material of Chapter V is taken from "'The Logic of the
Ignorance Relatioos," Amt>YQII Pllilowp/!icuJ Quarterly, 13:2
(1976). 135-143, dom: jointly with David M. Axinn. I thank him
as well as the editor of the journal for pe rmission to use IOII\e of
it here. We we~ f~e to use symbolic losie in the journal pape r,
but I have translated the ~ lcyant ideas into English for prcsent
PUrpose$. Some of Otapte r IV appeared as "On the LoPe of
Consent," .Atehiva lOT PhiJosoplry of Law and SociDI Plliloscphy
(ARSP), Deibeft Neue Folge, NR. 12. pp. 19-32. Some of Otapter
IX appeared as "Kant's Distinction De~en Mystery and Unknow-
ability," Alam du 4. Inumationtlkn Kmu~, Mainz. 197".
Tell IU, Wallcr de Gruyter, Berlin, 197", pp. 899-905. Pan of
Olapter X may be foond as "Kant and tbe Moral AntillOlll)',"
Pllxudill8l 0{ 1M Ottawa Intmwtional Kmu Ccl!lerota, 1914,
University of Ottawa. Ottawa, 1976.
1 1!tank eacb editor for permission to use these materials. The
point of their indusion i.5 that in tbe framework of Kant's analysis
of religion the othctwise random piece:! become essential paru. of
a unified viewpoint
 ,
Once ~n I am grateful 10 Nadia L. Kravehel\ko of Temple
University's College of Am and Sciences for her real cJpeniH and
good will in doing technical work on the manusaipt.
Research lime for this project was provided by several slUdy
leaves from Temple URivc:nil)'. for ",hid) I am happy 10 thank the
commiuecs and particularly Dean Carolyn Adams of the College
of Am and Scienoes.
ProfCSlOl' Robe" Ginsllelll proved 10 be . n ideal editor, forcing
me to reconsider and rewrite mauen boll! substalltivc: and stylistie.
There is one UDiqllc ad:nowLedgmenl that I owe. The material
in the chapler on ignorance pvc me more pleulITc than the rest
because of the colIabontioll with my OO-llIllIor and son. David M.
A1in.n. Par~l5 and children have often been impressed by each
olber's igooranc:e. As .ClIdemia, we found ourselves seneralizillJ
on the mallcr of igoorance; as Ioa'cians, we looked for precisiolL
The reader IIIlIY judse what we round, but can only imagine our
fun in tbe findina. The problem goes beyond family dynami~ of
CQUf$e, since Kant's notion of the scope and varieties of ignorance
is central 10 his view of rational hope. It takes some knowtedge
to formulaic, hope; it abo lakes some ignorance, betaU5e one
doe.s nol hope for what is certain 10 happen.

Vineyard Haven, Mau.

November 1993
 Part I

KANTS ANALYSIS OF RELIGION

 One

IN I RODUCnON

I. HIIfot)' aad I Tolldl or Gossip

What can I k:Dow1 What YIouId I do1 What can I hope rOf'?
Immanuel Kant took thcR! three questions 10 characterize the field
of philosophy.' His wellknown answen 10 the r1t5\ two may be
found in the Oitique of ~ Rauon and lbe Crilique of PmcticoI
&asoII. respectively. Kant'. book on the third question, &fi&ioII
Within 1M J..imju of Jkusott 14"-, is IIardJy known in many
quarten. It appeared in 1793. when Kant was sixty-nine yean old.
Why has major ."."rk by major modem philosopher received
rueh seanl tl'CatmcO\ in the Ii!erarure? Perhaps the title of the
book served 10 repel the two main cateprics of readen. The
sc:icntific collllnUnity oould quickly pul it aside beause it s1.ned
wi th the word "religion," and at least pan mlhe: religious rommu-
nity c:ouid iJ.l1Ore the work on the assumption thai Yi:ry Iitde
religion could be located within the limits of reason alone. An
acellern. Engiish tmWaoon by Theodore M. Or_ and HO)'I H.
Hudson appeared in 1934. but was 011\ of print for about twenty
years precedins ill reiMue in 1960. Another reason ror bypassina
the book may be the fac1 that Kant did trUI one or two major
reJigiOllS questions io bi5 earlier works. His classic aoaJyses of the
"proofs" of !be emtence of God are found in the CritiqIu of Pun
Iwlft'''I, and moa of the commentaton on Kant, when they Ialk
about his rcli&iOllS poiilion, have ronfined themselves to this book.
But Kant was far (rom ipent .t the age of smy.nine. His impor
tant essay, "Perpetu.al Peace," appeared two year5 bter, and he
continued his univenity ieClUTe5 up to 1796. Several major works
appeared after be retired from lecturing. pattiwlarly the Meta-
phyjic of Moro/s, The Conflict of the FacuJtiu, and Amhropology
from Q l'IugnUltic VitllpOint.
 lNTRODUcnON

When textbook IlCOOIInts do mentiOfl Kant's work on rel~on,

it is usually for the sake of the story about its censonhip. Under
Kina Frederick William II, a narrowly onhodwt administration
took ovtr the Prussian Slate', Depanment of C11urch and Schools.
Books dealing with religion had to be pa55ed by a nsor. The
imprimatur was 10 be allowed only for writing that followed the
doctrine of the Lutheran and Reformed OIlIfCbes.. Kant duly
submiued the fint pan of his book. "On Radical Evil: and it was
accepted and appeared in April, 1792, in the ~ MONlU'
1Chrift. The remainder of Kant's manUS(ript was refused by the
Berlin College of Censors. Kant was able. temporarily, to avoid
the Berlin iWUP by getting permi";o" to publish from a univenity
(either Jena or K/lnipbera: the referell$ differ). A :;ccond
edition or the hook appeared the foLlowina year, and then the
authorities acted. Wollner, Minister of Ecdesiastical Affairs.
obtained an order from the King in which Kant was accused of
' Wstortilll and dearadi.n& many of the chief and fundamental
docui.oes of bo1y Saipture and of O lristianity.' Kant was ordered
10 desist, and all of tbe theoJogjc:al and pbilosophical faculty of the
Univenity of KtlnipbefJ were abo required to sian statements in
which they acreed not 10 lecture 00 Kant', hook. R&giotI W"uhill
the LiMiu of Ibm,," A~.
What ~d Kant do, faced with a royal order forbidding him
to publisb 01'" teach b.is own po$ition on reliJion? We have aleller
from Kant 10 Moses Mendelssohn, dated 8 April 1766, in which
Kant had already developed his po$ition on this kind of queslion.
"Altbouah J am ab50lulcly convinced of many things Ihat I shall
never have the courage 10 ny, I lhal l neve r say anythilll I do not
believe." 1lti.i leiter predicted bis bduovior. Kant did IIOt chanae
or rel\Ollnce a word of b.is published material on religion, but he
agreed to obey the Kina and 10 neither publish nor lpeU publicly
on religion. Mer the death of Frederick William 11, Kant
announced that he felt free again 10 upreu himself on religion
since he had qreed to silctICC only as a subject of tlult King.
Kant', bebavior in this matter suggests comparison with three
other mleUcctual bc:TO$: Soerates. Bruno, and Calileo. (Giordano
 I~

Bruoo of Nola, an Italian philosopher or the Rell.lis$ance, was

burned aliY(! in Rome in 1600 for Tdu5ing to recant "heresies"
concerning the relative rotation of the sun and the earth.) Galileo
won release from prison by ranting; Kant did not recant bUI
agreed 10 Itop presenting hl$ views on religion. Socrates and Bruno
refused to recant or 10 Slop Iheir public presentations. and were
executed (Bruno was burned at the stake). The ronl~ and
penalties were different, bul a simiJa:r question of moral courage
was involved in each case. Kant seems 10 have been somewhere
between the opponunism of Galileo ud the strict formal ism or
penonal integrity of Socrates and Bruno.
For the sake of comparison, DOtC thai Bruno was not an
absolu tely perfect moral hero. There was an episode in which he
apparently plagiarized a book by Manilio Ficino; and once al
trial in Venice: he did recant hl$ views. We need not dwell on
these tales because heroic 1d5 can be celebrated without demand-
ing lbat the actors be angel$, but also without dcnyins Ihal there
were uoberoic ICIS in their lives. For present purposu, following
all these histories would take us 100 far afield and well into the
area of lossip.

1. O .Uh.e or 'I1lb Book

Tbc purpose of Part I of this Ulldy is an analysis of Kanl's

position in his major book on religion. TI!erefore. Chapler III, the
bulk of Part l, is confined 10 this book, with an fJOOIIsional
refe rence beyond it 10 Kant', o!ber work.. I wiD ignore all of Ille
rich bi5lorical qutiOll$ wch a$ !be stale of theology al lhe lime,
biographical details beyond what I have already mentioned, the
religion of KanI'S parents, bis own early religious instruction, etc.
I enjoy Bossip as much as the nul penon, but the danger of
substituling anecdote fOT analysis warns me away. Before launeh-
ing into the detailed commentary on Kanl's text, Chapter II
provides a brief w "'ey of his theory of ItnowledBe. his ethical
theory, and his philosophy of history. The distinctive features of
12 INTRODUcnON

Kant's work on each of these are oombined in his analysis of

religion.
1lIe major pie of Pan l, the third cllapter. is section-by-
section commenlllf)' on Kant's book, /kligion Wu/Wr f~ Umiu of
R~ AIoM. AI the rondusion of mit. study, we will hi",,,
~ered just how his elhicaltheory, wilh lIS absolute conception
of right and WTOIlg. if, oombioed wilh Kant's theory of hillaI)'.
Each pan of Kant's book is followed by. Gcneral ObKmnion in
whid! he disawed traditional religious mallen that lie ouwde of
his own $lrid LimilS of. reJi&ioo of pure reason. These four arc;
Works of Orate. Mindes., Mysteries, and Means of Grace. One
distinctive thing about Kant's ueallnent is lhe WlIy thai he
ooll$iden eacb of lbelle without weakening any _nlial pan of the
scientific: analysis of knowledge, o.r any of the fol"' of the
eale&orical imperative. While $dence and morality are absolute
in their own real!!!$, there au limits 10 Wile realms.

Pan U giva funher dcw:iopaICnl to three central ideas upoll

...hid! Kant has based the entire enterprise. The fint of these is
the notion of the asenliui umbivuk1lCe of the individual. The
problem for interpretation is 10 undenland how an individual <:all
be ambivalent, can intend to ream oppos.itcs. and still maintain
some degree of rationality. Olaptcr IV develops the logic of the
situ.tion, starting with Kant's view of individuals who have
;ncol1Si$tcnl natures. and gots on 10 oolliiider Klmc of the psycho-
lop oonscquenoes.
The second of Kant's i<lcas thaI receives an extension in Pan
II is the nolion of ignonura. Epislemology has usua!]y assumed
lhal the crileri. for knowledge will be wfficienl to locale the areas
of iporancc. thai iporanee is whatcver is nol known. Thil is not
satisfaetmy (Of' several rCllSOII$! (I) We may need 10 distinguisb
berwccn what is 111M presenlly known and what cannot be known
(between ignorance and abl'lClm1CC) ; (2) We may need to distin-
guish. within the mcntionables, between what can and what canlllM
be koown 10 be lrue or false; and (3) We may also need 10
distinauisb between whal can be menlioned and can playa role in
calculations, bUI cannot be OODStruaed, and whal (1lI be so
OODSltuaed. Kant's conceptiODS of God, freedom. and irnmonality
require exactly ruch distinctions be",,n kinds of ignorance.
Therefore, Chapter V deve lops three kinds of ignoranec: relation!..
and. provides an instrumenl for extending Kanl's analysis.
The third of the basic COnceplS in Kant'S position is the maner
of the logic of.. What (1lI and wbat cannot be I'lItionaily
take n as a legitilDllte object of hope? A variety of problems arise,
and Kant gave only , bare beginning 10 the subject. Can OIIC
hope for, oonll'lldiaioll, for example, a square-(ircle? If one
hopes for a, and if a is equivalenl 10 b, docs one hope for b (the
opadly problem)? If one hope presupposes something else, is thaI
other mailer included in the hope? am one hope fOl" something
that cannol be named, lhal CIInnot be understood?
An additional clUSler of problems concerns the rdatioll5
between hope and fear. Can one hope for something wilhoul al
the same time fcaring that the desired situation may not 0CC\Ir?
ls every hope correlative with some fear? Chapter VI develops
the logic of the relation in which one hopes for $Ometbing. and
provides, necessary ClIlension of Kant's eentral idea.
The Ihree problems of Pan II are intimatcly relaled 10 each
otber. In order 10 construct, hope, one musl have a balance of
knowled&e and i&norance. There mUSI be 'I least some knowledge
of wbat !he desired objective would be, and there must be some
ignorance about whether or not the objective will be reached.
Hope presupposes partial ignonnoe; one does 001 hope for a
cenainly or an lmpouibilily. The further question remains: what
hope can there be 01" an individual woo is ambivalent aboor
~1inI? A response 10 this is offered in terms of the dislinction
between an individu&l's intentions aI a panicular moment, and the
history of thaI individual. 'The chapter on ambiYlllence also
pre5enl$ I classification of objcctive5 in terms of the classical
square of opposition (contradictory, contraJy. subcontrary. and
subaltern pairs of gnm). arwl extends this 10 a cube nf psychologi
 II'n'RODUCT10N
"
cal opposites. The three concepts of this put of lhe book are
nc:ceMaty to construct an answer to the question o f what a healthy
a nd therefore IltIlbivalenl human can rationally hope for.
Several eonseque nc;e$ Df Kant's position of religion a rc
oonsidered in Pan Ill. The Io&ic of the triple. ambivalence-
ignorance-hope, is used In develop KanI'S oonception of reasonable
hope and fealUres of his distilK'lion between whal is IIl)'$lcrious
and what is u nknowable. He inmts 1'11'1 sepaT1llion between a cue
in which we know wb.at UJouJd be done but not why il should, and
the: case in which we know why something is needed but 110\ what
it might consist of. R eligious mysteries and scientific unkoowabil-
ilia both involve ignorance, but the varieties of ioorance must be
lo&ica1ty distinguished for claril)'.
Chapler X develops the religious consequences of the moral
antinomy, the is&ue between taking morality to be c:omplclely
withi n the individual and taking ;1 10 be feature of external
reality. Kant', view involves. combination of the individual's
rclI5O!I and human history.
FmaUy, the roncludin& chapter preK OIS Kant', analysis of
religion in terms of his understanding of history. A hope is a
ronstnlction about the future and mUSI presuppose a theOI)' of
bislol)'. The ethical Idnadom of enlk. in which 00 one is used
merely as a means and eaeb is treated as an end, is ronnec:ted
with the religious phraseology of a Kin&dom of God on Earth.
His philosophy of history is the rramewor~ that oonne.:ts Kant's
relipous ideas of tbe ethical rommonwealth, the nature of mystel)'
and ignoranee, the require ment of moral worthiness, and the logic
of hope. This eblpler summarizes hls view of the SlaM of God
and of political goals. and ronsidcrs Kant's response 10 the
questions: Whit is humlnkind? What is the hope for moral
prosress? What would a re liJious age be? What meanin& does
human hlslOI)' have (or the individual? What is the poiot of
ronception of . God who <:an be mentioned but oot used? What
is s.ac:red? Why InI5I reason?
 is

J. Su~m.ry of Kaal's Book on Rdi&lon

Since most of Put J will be COIllIlH:OI&l}' on Kant's book on

!.he 5ubjc.ct, the reao:kr may find it \J5efuJ to have a brief summary
of the bask )JO$itions in surface reading of the WOI"k. Exact
details, arguments., and citations will come in Olapler III Kant
holds thaI rcligioJl$ are to be classified as either ( I) efrons 10 win
the favor of God, or (2) moral religions, religions of good life-
conduct. He has interest in, but only limited respect for, the
rdigions in the first category, the efrons to win pcrwnal objc"ives.
He annwnces immediately. in the preface 10 the finl edition. that
morality iuelf is independent of religion. The principles of
momity, the complete ba$is (or moral decisions, require no
religion al all. But although morality doesn't nd relipon, !tleads
to religion. In his ethical theory be has already shown thai the
only moral incentive is found in respect for the moral law. This
IIl()ra\ law he lake:! 10 be derived from rC3$(ln, from O\IT rational
nature. This view of the independence of morality from religion
is perfectly classical. For example we find it in Plato's dialOfUc
EulhypJrro . One unique feature of Kant'l position is that he
follows this with the idea that while morality does IlOt need
religion as a premise, it may have religion as a ronscquence.
In the COUl'5e of his boot Kant does these five things:
(1) presents \IS with a theory of buman !l.llture, (2) develops his
ethkal theory, (3) offers the roncept of "a Pure Reli&ion of
ReaMln, (4) cxplaim the relationship between historical religions
and the religion of reason, and (5) explains &I1d criticizes fetishism,
anthropomorphism, clericalism, and a variety of superstitioll5
oonncaed with historical religions. Some intmduaory oommenlS
on each of these five may be helpful

A. H uman Nature

It i$ a oommoDplace of the textbooks in the history of philoso-

phy to note that Kant was a du&lisl. Pbto', metllod of didJ(ltomy
could hardly be taken more seriously. From dichotomy, Ka.m
16 INTRODUcnON

1OOYe5 to a dialectical ,wdy of antinomies. Kant's an.l~ of

human nature is I. case in point.
As we Ioball see in his philosoplly of history, I. sharp separation
must be made between humanity roIkcivtly and humanity
dimib~ly. Humanity a;JUec:tivety has history thai one may
vicw optimistically. As I. group. it has an objective that may be
formulated consistently; I. perfectly rational world. But people
taken individually have radically different propcnies. Considered
one 11 a time, Kant finds us euenliaUy ambivalent, Given anyone
of our ob;enives. we also have some intention for the opposite of
that objective. An individual wilh ineumisleRI goals has often
been called p.nhological, irrational, or lick. For Kant, il is
usouiaJ for II hNbhy hlUl1an 00t!g ,hol he or w have u.consistem
iIflellliolu. A rc:volutionary rom:cpl of hulJUUI health! n.c
inconsistent goals of panicular importance for moralil)' and for
religion are sel by the conflict between the IIlOOlI principle in U$,
and the selfISh principle.
In the fi~t pan of Kant', siudy of religion, he explains what he
calls "the radical evil in human nature." His ui\lment is thaI the
principle of selfWtncu is properly an innate 01' radical evil, and
this principle rontinuaUy wars with the other innate principle in
human nature, the moral principle. The source of evil is not to be
fou oo in the sellSlJOUIi illdinations. Considered by themsclve5.
lhese are a perfectly legitimate pan of human beings.. It is DOl
eveD selfish behavior that Kant points 10 as the 5CIU1"ce of evil.
Instead. it is the principle 01 selfishness. This principle is called
radical evil bec:ause he takes il 10 be a rlXed p,an of the nature of
every individual human beiD8- Tbe anumption is thai bealthy
individuals must be umbivakm about the elloice between the D1OI'aI
and the selfish principles. This view of human nature is developed
in more derail in Otapter IV, "The Logic of Ambival ence.'

B. Ethical 1lIeory

In the second pan of hi5 study, Kant analyzes what he cal l~ Ihe
ronflict between the moral principle and the selrlSh principle in
 17

human nature. For tbe lasl rational being in the IIo'Orld. there
would be no moral problems. Morality consists in the choice of
principles with which 10 deal with other ra tional being.'i; therefore,
morality a)1I500 in opposing ODe', ~rsoDal selrlhDel; and
following. instead, the categorical imperati~. The concept of
univerul reason, and i1$ impel1lUve, provide the only basis for
respectable action. In lhis book Kant goes beyond his previ0U5
work in tibia 10 gi\~ U$ some details of tbe personality that
morality should !Lave, 115 wel l as the dislillCtions betwun indina-
tion, motive, desire, propell5ily. instinct, and plWion.

C The Religion of Reason

In addition 10 moral obj~ives. are there any religious objec-

tives? The ccmraJ c:onpu in Kant's view of rel igion are hope
and won/WIess. Kant hold$ that a person's religious objective is
just and only 10 make Ihal perwn worthy of assi:nance in becoming
moral. Therefore, he defines religion all the performance of .11
human duties (moral duties) as if they were divine commands..
One of the basic aswrnptions bere is Ihis: If an act can be
performed by an evil penon as well as a 800d one, it pouesses no
moral worth. On this basis he exclude!. a11n(l$1 all the macllinery
and trappings of organized religion u beillJ behavior patterns tllat
can be performed equally weD by a good or an evil irwlividual, and
therefore completely irrelevant as far u pleasina God.
A primal)' qUHtion for Kant is this: "511.11 we start our )'Stem
witll faith in what God iIas done on our bella If, or witll wllat we
are to do 10 beanne: worthy of God's u.sistana:?" (And he adds.,
"whatever this may be: ) TIle answer fOT Kant is dearly the laller-
-wortlliness, not faitll. 'There is no vicarious atonement for an
individual's immorality. Moral debts can never be di!.chataed by
another penon. There is no moral marut-place to parallel the
functions of an economic marketplace.
11lc:re are no special duties to God, for Kant. Reliaion is to be
500gb! witllin us, using rational concepts. not outside of us in facts.
This 6dudes aU of the machinery of divine worship, which lie
18 Ir-rrROOUcnON

calls ". liupemitious belief," and Kriptural learning. which is 001

required for morality. 'The principles of morality are revealed w
all of iii, learned or not, in an immediate but inscrutable WIly. "To
demand tbat more than this be ~aled to us is presumptuous.'
'The holiest of beinp in Ihis world is the human being. Basic is
the followin~ "principle requiring no proof; whatever over and
above &ood Hfe-rondud man fancies Ibl he ean do 10 beeome
well pleasi ng to God is a mere religious illusion and pseudo-
service 10 God,"
A good part of Ihis has oollSisted in complaints against claims
of nwty figllfcs in the history' of religion. On the positive side.
what doeli Kant's pure rational faith consist 011 We are told that
it wu Christianity's first intention 10 introduce" pure religious
faith rather than an historical or ecclesiastical faith. ~ilc mili,
he claims that the morally best period in the history of humanity
and of any church is the prcse m period.. H is viewpoi nt is ex
plairoed in terms of the notion of humanity's becoming more and
more rational, hence more and more morallhtOllgh the C(Jurw of
history. By the COm't'pl of th~ OIristian faith as a purely rational
faith. Kant means !he following. which he insists can be freely
assented 10 by everyone:
A. Each of us can convince OUBelve5 through our own rea$On
of the evil which lies in human hearts and from which roo one is
fre~.
B. Each nf U$ can convince ourselvcs of the impossibility of
ever bolding ourselves 10 be morally juslified befor~ a God
through our own life conduct. and. I I the lame lime, of Ihe
necessity for hope of $\lch a jllStificalion valid in God', eyes.
C. Each of lIS can convince OUBelvcs of the futility of SUbsl;\1,It-
ing eh\lrchly observances and pious compulilOl)' services for a
righlWIIsne5S which is lacking and, over and against Ihis, of the
inescapable obligalion 10 become a new penon.
A complele rational reli&ion m\lst be somelhinll Ihal can be
presented to all human beinp comprehensibly and convincingly 10
Iheir own reason.
 19

D. The Relation Between Historical Rdigior"15

and Rational Religion

The purpose of reading Scripture, and all scriptural e~egesis, is

to make people belle!. Should we expound morality aoxording to
the Bible or the Bible accordi ng 10 moralily? The fint, for
Augustine: the second for KanL He insists thai ' revealed" doctrine
must be eherished and cultivated as merely a meam. but a
precious means of makillJ this doctrine wmprehensible to all.
Since Kant holds thaI there is only one reliJion bu t many faiths,
he bas no 'Ptrial confidence in any existing faith as it stand$.. The
Christian faith is talccn to be apable of interpretation in a strictly
rational and moral way if the historical clements arc o;omplclcly
ignored. Tbe bare concepts of reason make up die OUlslian
religion; "ram" make up tbe Christian faitb and chu rch.. Kant
~ nlions le mpcramcmal trailS of various historical beliefs:
(1) Judai:;m is called misanthropic because of il$ objection to
intermingling with olher people. (2) ' Mol\ammcdanism' ;5
criticized for bavins arrogant pride, because of its Soal of IlUbjugal-
ina other people. (l) The H indu f.ilh is ailed pusillanimous
(timid \ 0 the point of cowvdiee) because the Hindu's temper is 50
far from the Mohammedan. (4) The Ouistian faith is criticized
for developina"a davish <:ast of mind" or a misconceived humility.
Kant's basic complaint against 1ll()I;\ of these historical reliaiollS
is that tbey substitute the doctrine ofGodline5S for the doctrine of
vinue. By "Godl iness" Kanl means either fear of God or love of
God. He explains that the fi~t is the altitude of a !iI.lbject, the
second the duty of a son. Both involve tbe concept of a super-
~rful being and, therefCN'e, what Kant calls the danger of
anthropomorphism. 1be doctrine of Godlineu "cannot of itself
constitute the final aual of moral endeavor, il can merely serve as
a means of strengthenin, tha t which &DeS to make a bener man."
To 51a" wilh the conc:t:pt of Godliness is to run the danae r of
dewO)'ina one's courage and of tcansformina Godlinc5S into "a
fawning. davish subjection to a dCipotically collUlUlndin& mJ&ht."
Both Godliness. and vinue are partS of Kant', picture. but the
20 INTRODUcnON

order in which .... e unite these is a matter of the greatest impor-

lance. If reverence for God is put finl and vinue subordinated,
",his objed of revercBCe becomes an kIoI."
The general relationship between historical religiollli and !be
religion of reason i$ Ihis: The historical fai th can be seen as "tbe
symbolic presentation and !be meaIl$ or promotion of pure
religious faith: He insislS thai it must !lave as I basic principle of
an e~lesia$lk:al (aith thai al $Orne future lime;1 shoold be able 10
dispense completely with SllIlutory anidu in favor of "the reHgion
of aood life conduct as the real life end." Alilhe sects deserve tile
same respect as far as they are efforts by "poor man.1s 10 render
perceptible 10 the lelUe5 tbe Kingdom of God on earth.' All of
these iiCClS de5ervc "the lalTlC blame wben they lake the form of
the representation of lhis idea in a vwble cliurch 10 be the Ihing
itself."

E. FeIWlW'n

Kant uses the word "retishWn" to refcr to "the illusion that one
can Jl'O'KSii the an of bringing about a supernatural effect by a
wholly natwal mclUlS." As an cxilRlple of ~ be suggests that it
is fetishism to suppose Ihal one "works on God and \lSe$ him as
means; to bring ablxll a fesuh in lhe world fOf which hi~ own
powen ' " would not .vail, He adds Ihal this involves an
absurdity in ilS very conception.
Kant separates the nages of Ihe history of religious faith inlo
(I) idol wonhip, baKd on one's fear, (2) tempLe service, the public
Legaliud form of idol worship, (3) dlurcb wonhip. a rombination
of moral and legal organization based on an bistorical faith, and
(4) pure religious faith, All through Kanl's book, partiallarly in
Part 4 on clericalism, he explains what he takes to be the examples
and dangcn of fctishism, "Ocricalism' means "fetish wonhip,'
Therc iii a difference in manner but rIOt in principle "between a
shaman of the Tunguses and a European prelate ruling over
chu rch and state alike,' This also holds "betwecn the wholly
sensuous Wogulitc who, in lhe morning. places the paw of a bear
ilin upon his bead with the short prayer, 'Strike me not dead!' and
the sublimated Puritan and Independent in Connecticut.' They
both take worship to mmist in arbitrvy observarn:cs with no
moral bellCfiL "'The intention of aU of them is to manage to thei r
own advantase the invisible power which presides ove r the destiny
of man; they differ merely in their mnceptions of how to
undertake this fU L" All churdlly observances are effons to "as it
were, conjure up divine as5istan<:e by m.agic." They fail because
"between 50lely pbysicalll""'ns and morally efficacious cause.. there
is no cause wbatsoevu accordina 10 any law of which reuon can
oonceive." In more s~tforward (asbion, Kant is holdins here
that 110 merely pbysical activity can aompmh a moral effea.
TIierefore, with this attitude toward churchly obI.ervances, Kant
bimself never voLuntarily went to church as an adult. Appare ntly
the involuntaty visits were made when he bad to take part in an
official univen.ity exercise.
As examples of fetish-faith, we are Jiven the five STeat
oomma!\ds in the Mobarnmedan belief: washing. prayins. fastins.
alms siving, and pilgrimage 10 Mea:a. Kant gives no special
criticism of Mohammedani$m distinct from the other typeli of faith.
Kant ar&ues in iCnel'lll that there are three types of illusory faith:
(I) faith in miracles, (2) faith in mysteries, and (J) fai th in means
of STace. Althoush he does respect wbat he cal15 the spirit of
prayer, wbich does not lICed to be clothed in words and formulas,
prayins itself is a. supentitious illusion-a fetish-making-if it is
thought of <lI a mMru of 81iiC1.
Devotional uercises of all sorts are calLed "pious pLaythinp."
He finds no essential differeDtt in the worthle$SllC$S of the
mechanical W')'Ii that have been deviKd 10 presume 10 serve God.
He mentions re&Ular church attendance, pilgrimages 10 the
sanctuaries, formulu of prayer, and tbe use of a Tibetan praye r
wheel. Kant diSCU$SCs a psychological phenomenon in which it is
OOsef\led that people seem to feel themselves somewhat ennobled
and more enlightened if their denomination has fewer statutory
requirements than another denomination. This is the ease because
the church with the fewer statutory requirements is that much
 INTRODUCTION

cklRr to a pure moral religion. Prtsllmably Kant ...-as familiar

with so-called liberal sectS.
Kant defines fanaticism as either the belief thai we can
separate the effectS of pee from those of nature o r the belief
that we can produce the effeas of grace in some way. We may
rationally believe that there may be works of grace. but 10 claim
knowledge Of "to wish to observe such heavenly influences in
ourselves is a kind of madness."
Kant gives special emphasis 10 four religious problems by
diso'ssi", them in very Qlr:nded sectiOIlS at the end of each of the
four pans of his book. The mailers especially singled out are:
works of grace. miracles, mysteries. and means of grace. 'Tbcse
four areas are not properly pans of a religion within the limits of
reason alone. W'bcn presented as maners of knowledge rather
than hope. tltey arc errors that he takes historical religions to have
fallen inlO. The principle for avoiding these errors is tltis: ' It is
not essential, and hence no1 flCC"Slilry. for everyone 10 know what
God does or has done for his salvation; but it is essential to know
what man himself mUlt do in order 10 bcIlle ......:ItJhy of this
assistance."
I will close tltis summaJ}' with one of Kant's challenges. "Who,
indeed, is DOW tbe unbeliever? ls it he who lrU51S, without
knowing bow that for which he hopes will come 10 pass; o r he who
absolutely insists on knowillJ the ~ in which mao is released
from eviJ., and if he cannot know this., gives up all hope of this
releaser
Wbile tltis summary has Jiven the leader some notion of the
ideas that are important 10 Kant's view of religion, it has not
presented an integrated position. For that we $hall Study the
elements more carefuUy, and then combine them with the 10gicaJ
development of ambivalence, ignolllDCC. and hope. In preparation,
the next chapter offers introductiollS to Kant's theory of knowl-
edge, his ethical theory, and his philosophy of history. Readers
arc invited to lkip the sections that they arc familiar with in
Chapter Two.
 Two

KANT'S CONCEP I'UAL TOOLS

Kalil', rcJiiious position presupposes almost evcrythina mal he

previOU$ly wrote. Particularly, iI require5 familiarity with his
tbeoty of knowledge. c.bje.l lbeory, and philosophy of history. This
dtaplcr offers an inU'Oduetion 10 eaeb of tbcse three basic 5Ubjeas.
but merely a seltive elementary trutment. 'Those who need no
introduction 10 these IIUltlCI'$ are cncoungcd to Rip ahead.

", . . Tbe hul}' appeal to the supernatural is .. couch upon

whld! the Inlellect slothfully reclines, uK! Kant near the end of
his I~ Di.ssowticm. 011 first readlll& Kant KCms to give us
e1car<ulloughmindcd rejca;on or any supernatural appeal. On
the otbcr hand, we IDlY IIOlite that it is the "Iwty appeal' tilal is
castigated: and we wonder immediately if some son of considered
appeal caD be kept, re$JlU.bly. from Kant's position. To gel II
this matter properly we shall look a1 parts of the theory of
knowIed&e and see precisely what an lhe limits of knowledge and,
separately, the limiu of thought. One may think of things thaI one
canDOI know, and Kant is very particular about the line between
such think;". and wbat may be properly taken as knowledge.
In addilioa to the obriotu questions about knowledge and
tbought, tbere is the maner of what we lIllIy and may not /lope /Ot".
A$ we ~ find, the mbjCCl of religion requires that we have
precise notions of what we ca.n mink, wbat we can know, whal we
are iJDO"llI of, tmd wIuJt ...... ("#II tmd CII7IIJOI' ~ hope f. In the
Critique of Pwt ~. Kanl developed his powerful anaI)'Si$ of
the nalure of knowtedge. For the PUrpolC:S of mis introduction I
will ignore many of me $ubtletie5 and byways involved in the book
and restrict ~If to a fairly thl.n ovtline or just a few matters.
 KANl"S CONCEP'IUAL TOOLS

Kanl afIlIes Ihll !he lerm "knowledge" refen jusl and only 10 1M
resuhs of experimental analysis. Thai is, we need both direct
sense data and some analytic (logical) categories into which the
data fit. 1be claims of the absolute empiricist and the ab50IUle
ratiooalist Imitiom are bolh rejected.

A The Pragmatic Fouodation of Knowledge

Mere observation&, wbat Kant called "accidental obHrvations,"

Jive no rational result. Knowledge does nol come by putting on
a laboratory coal and wandering around the nalural world "in the
character of a pupil woo listens 10 everything thai the teacher
cllooses 10 Ioay." Instead, our reason must act as "an appointed
judge woo c:ompel5 the witnesses to answe r questions which he has
himself formullled.'" Obviously. few Kant, knowledge is DOl a
matler of pusive1y receiving copies of what is outside the obHrver.
Instead. it requiTe$ the activity of imposiog the observer's own
dauHjcations on some outside sense intuitions.
If reason gains knowledge by a combination of iu own princi-
ples and "the experiment whid! it har ~." is there any
objectivity, any knowledge thai is nol merely personal bias? Yes,
indeed. Even Ph)'li"" Ioa)'l Kant, owes its wa:ess "entirely 10 the
happy t!Jou&ht, thai while reason muSt seek in nalure, not
fictitiously ascribe 10 it ... it must adopt as its guide in so seeking,
lhut which it har iudf puI into ntllUt'e." Strange, al fint beannS:
in order to get objective knowledge of fact and 10 learn the laws
of nature, we must put something or our own mind into our view
of nature. And this is sUpp!lsc,d to produce objective knowledge.
not personal bias!
Kant explains his strategy this way. "Hitherto il has been
assumed that all OIlt knowledge must conform to objects." A fair
way of describing tbe common-sense vie.... of the knowledge
problem: objects emt, and we either do or don't !mow their
propenies. But common scnse lias an embarra$$ing IliSIOry, placed
or
alongside sdence. u:t', consider the po5Iiibility that instead our
knowledge tonforming to objects, "that objectS must tonfonn to
our knowledge."
Lest the reader panic, or laUJh, Kant notes that Copernicus
tried a 5imilar strategy, with great success Having made no
progre:\5 in ~lainina; astronomical movements on the ordinary
llaumption that the spectator was at rest and the ita" in motion.
he tried the converse ... perhaps the spectator was in motion and
the stan at rest. Common sens.e preferred to understand the
spectator at rest . .. but common sens.e ba5 lost to the converse
assumption. 1lIe Strategy of Copernicus, the Copernican revolu-
tion (to take "revolution" in a double sense), gave Kant the
confidence to uy his revolution in the relation hetween the knower
and the known.
What rerults from Kant'S reformulation of the old common-
sense problem? Fil"lt. let's he clearer about just whal Kant',
fonnulation involves.. The human faaJiIy of unde"tanding "has
rules whieh I must presuppose as being in me prior 10 objects
beina; given to me." Then we gel a comple:c a:oUnt of those
"rules" thai are laken to be "in me." By calling them. "in me: he
means lhat they are not learned from sensations of lhe outside
world ("intuitions,' in his vocabulary), but that we mUlit w;ume
Ihal !bey are innate equipment of the individual woo has a
cognitive experience. The maliC" outside the human mind (or
uoderstaodina;) must fit into tbese internal rule3, or the human
would have 110 way of having an experience, of knowina; thai
somethina; had been observed.
If there were no internal receiving apparatus, nothing ....wld be
received. Pe rhaps ' received" is a misluding word, be<:ausc Kant
lias il tllat the human knower doQ not merely "reeeive" what is
out there, but pla)'l' an aetive part in impo$ing his or her own
framework on the intuitions from outside the mind. For an
analogy, an FM reeeiver hean nothing of the world of AM signals:
an AM receiver hean nothing of lhe world of FM signals-the
receiver imp05C5 its own inlernal filler (design) on anything hitting
its input. and so it is aware of only what can be located by virtue
of its internal filter.
 KANrS CONCEP11JAL TOOLS

This Ibcory of knowledge is 10 be considered prasmatic hec:aUK

of the arguments just presented: knowledge requires lbat the
knower impose hill or her own classific:atioru; on pertinent sense
dala. What dassific:ations are to he chosen? That depends on the
purposes of the persoll seeking knowledge. That person may
consider objeas from more than one point of view. For eumplc,
as objeas of lbe ~ or as objects of thought alone.

B. POSSIble Experience as a Nec:eliSity for Knowledge

On Kant's basis, empiricism is riaht when it claims thai sense

data are IIC'('H UY for knowledge, but is wrona if it claims that
sense data are sufficient for knowledge. On the other hand, he
held that rationalism is right wben it argues lbat knowIedae
prewpposes some clarity of one's innate ideas, but is wrona if it
claims that renection on ooncepts alone is sufficient fot any
~ of the world.

C. Space and Time

In the font section of [he book Kant analyzes the position of

'Pace and of time in the knowledge pr<XeliS. Space and time, the
I(I(US of the objeas of kDowIedge accordina 10 empiricism, are
themselves not rul entitiH. Space and time are not empirical
ooncepts derived from external e.tperience; they are the forms that
all phenomena of the external senses muS! have. Although one
never directly obse"'es ~ce itself or time ilSel, no object can be
observed unlCIiS the obse",ations of it can be put into a space and
time form (framework). Kant'l conclusion is that 5pace and time
are innate, human forms; nothilli can be observed by a human
being unless the sensations of it til these forms. Might there he
a non-human beillll from whose viewpoint the malerial world
would have a different look? Kant'l response is that ~ havc
absolutely no basis for answering, thai is, for lufowi"8 the answer
10 this question lince all oor knowledge is possible only on the
bud of the kind of direct sense data thlE we can fit into oor
 27

innate forms. "It is, therefore. $Olely from the human slal1dpoint
thai we can speak of space. Ulcnded thinp. etc. If we depan
from lhc subjective condition under which alone we can have outer
inluilion, namely, liability to be affected by obju.lhc representa-
tion of space .tands for nomlng wbatsoever. This predicate can be
applied to things only in so far as they appear to us. that is, only
10 objects of 5ellSibility,"' Our knowledge depends upon the
appearance or pheoomena to lIS. II i5 pos.s.ible 10 have knowledge
of $Omethina only if there is p'P;ble upcricm:e of tlUII thing.
No pllJ.Sibk apuima. no possible~.
How about the question of .hinp by tbermelves, whether
perceived by III or not. or perceived by other thinking beings?
Kant responds, We cannot judge whether lhe intuiuCMI$ of other
Ibjnkin!! beings arc IiUbjcct to tbe 5amC CODditions which determine
our intuition (our awareness of sense data], and whKh for us arc
generally binding." H knowledge is wbjcct 10 tbis subjective
limilalion, can there be .b50lutc knowledge? Kant argues apinst
the skeptical view provided we specify ollie limitation that thinp
are taken as object! of our ilel\$\lOUS intuition." Is there a real
world on the ba$is of such a limitation? "We maintain the
empiric:al reality of space. so far as ~ry powblc eJllcmal
~rience is concerned, but at the Yme time its transcendental
id<:a1ity: that is to lay, we maintain that space is DOthing. if we
leave OUt of consideration the CMditioru of Q pouible eq;tritna,
and aocept it as sollltthing on which things by themselves are in
any way d<:pendent So, we never iee 'Pace itself, but anything
we do lee is understood to be in space.
TIle situation is similar for time. Like space, time is also a
subjective condition of human 5eJISation. If space and time are
"nothing btu the form of our own internal intuition,"" and objeCtli
an: always somewbere in space and lime, then the knowable
universe is a synthesis-. combination of sense data from oulSid<:
of us and our internal categories or forms for knowledge. These
internal categories an: a priori, that is, in us and available before
~rience can take place.
28 KANrS CONCEP11JAL TOOLS

An upMQIU, an awareness of u~tioll$ from outside of us,

requites that we be able to impo5e oor internal forms of space and
lime on any such external scns.atioll5. That's whal an uperiCDCe
is: an awucne5S of some U1cmal sensation fitting in lo some
(internal) classification. Wilhout the ability 10 "fj[" 5ens.alion inlo
some classification, we would not be awart of the sensation ...
would not 'experience" iL Without the possibility of such experi-
enee. we o:an know nothing. "11 remainr. completely unknown 10 us
whll obju may be by themselves and .part rom the receptivity
of our senses. We know nothing but our manner of perceiving
tbc:m, lb.1 manner being pecUliar 10 1.IS and nol necessarily shared
in by every being tbough.. no doubt, by every human being. This
is willi alone concerns U$..J!
We are left willi the followina position. Knowledge is the
I)'lIlhesis of two streams: ( I ) ilClmlOUS intuitions. CXIcmal
stimulation received through our senseI. and (2) forms of the
undcrsWldiIl8 (for instance, space and lime, and other" priori
patterns). "Neither of these qualities or famlties is preferable to
the other. Without sensibility objects would 00\ be given to us,
wilhout understanding they would not be thought by us. TboughlS
withoot contents are ~mpty. inwitions without concepts are blind .
. . . Th~ und~rstandill& cannot K~. th~ Knse5 cannot think. By
their union onJy can knowledg~ be produced""

D. Phenomena and Noumena

Clearly enough. for Kant knowledge requires both thooahl and

sense data. Suppose thought is employed independently. Tbe
unikrsWlding alone can actively produ~ arguments. The
materials of logic and mathematics are examples of this. Although
Kant lias already warned us that this source of analysis cannot
r~pre.sent things as they are by themselve$ apat! from their
consideration as phenomena. ....e would like to know what staws
the operation of !be understanding alone might h.ave.
We are pr~sented with the terms 'phenome na" and "ooumena"
as aid!. 10 making this maner clear. 'The pileoome nal world is the
 29

world of possible !.elISe experience. The ooomenal world is 10

mean It possible world-logically possible because not incoll$lstent-
but a world thai could provide us with no sense data with which
10 have an experience. 'The notion of !he phenomenal ~'orld i$
obvious enough; the phruc:, "noumenal world," i$ puuJinJ.
Does tbe coining of this term 'noun1ell.l" mean that Kan l hold$
thai we can in some way .brow world of objects that we cannot
experience? No: he provides no basis for knowledge beyond the
phenomenal world. No pouible experience, no knowledge.
However, ow C/M IQ/k abet" things lhut we CIIfIItOt.t-. Gho!its.
,obIim. anaels, and Sanla Oaw; are perfectly aettptable noull$;
they may be the subjects of se,"cnce5 and the objects of ooll$ider-
able disawion. However, if by their very definitions we c;anllOl
experience them, we cannot know of them. II by their definitions
sucb entities are (1) consislent enough. yet (2) by those Arne
definitions are not pouible experiences fo r UI . we now hive It
dassifIeation term for them. Such entities may be said 10 be in
the DOUJnenai world.
Is there such I world, are there actually web entities as reuan
may C(losislcntly describe but thai allow us no scm.e data' We
can never know Ihal any $uch emt, lince we shall never liave the
neeeu2'Y sense data .. yet without that sense data we also an
never know that $1,I(h entitie$ do DOt e:mL At this point the
reader may well anticipate something of how Kant will deal with
the DOtioo of God."
We now have three divisions:
( I) the phe llOmenal world. oonta.ining objecu that are po$Sihle
experiences.
(2) the noomenal world, the dau of Ioaically oonsistent
concepts that by their definitions cannot be poMible experiences.
(3) an impossible world. oonsisting of concepts that are 001
logica1Jy oonsistent, but that may be given names.
In lIl is third division we have a clauification for those emities
that are conceptually impoMible. weh :1$ ilquate-cirdes. roullll
triangles., inhumanhumans, et(. Even entities wllose definitions
30 KANrS CONCEP'JUAL TOOLS

make them (OllCeJ)Iually impossible may be named. Not only

named, tbey may be lovingly discued for ce nlUrin.
E.acb division must be dCiHl ibed with ClIft in order to avoid
logical p<UlIdoxes as wen as flat nonsense. Al lhough there Ill'C
paradoxes in the wr of entities in divisions (2) and (3), modem
logic has devices that permit us to nrDltion. or safely name, Rich
things. The modem distinction be_n UK and mwion is crucial
to _ ral ~lopmenlS in tbe 1000c of ignonncc and of hope, in
Part II,"
As \0118 as we are clear and hollC~1 about their dauifieation as
IlOIImenal, we may talk and think about ICI'IlI$ such as God,
freedom and immonality. A.J. 100& as such subjects, by their
definitions. .... nnot be a maner of possible upericnce. we arc free
10 say whatever we wish about their exi5tenc:e. lbeTC is only the
..tiona] requireme nt thaI tbeiT concepts be self<onsistent. Tbell,
we can neither know thaI they do exist. nor be forced 10 conclude
thaI Ibey do 1101 emt. No possible experience, no possible
knowledge. But, we want 10 talk and think and hope and ,ina of
some Ihinp without knowina their exact credentials. Kant makes
il easy to do so ... provided we are bonest about what is and is
not knowable. , bout whit is and is I'IOt ))05&ble eq>erienc:e.
Kanl takes spedal pains 10 ridi(Qle tho$e who think that !hey
have k1wto~ of God, freedom, or iJnmonality. Bul, if we can
neither 1tJIow that such mallel'$ eml, nor know that they doft'l, i5
lhe choice merely a persorW aesthetic matter? We are 1101 left 10
complelely independent personal dtoice: Kanl's moral theory has
both fixed and pragmatic requireme nts in these areas. TIle
development of his morallheo!)' is Ihe busiocu of Part II of Ihis
chap":r, and lhe relations 10 noumenal entities must wait for Iale r
5eCtio1l$ of this study. But one sia.nificanl question remains in the
theo!), of knowledge: Are there limits to the tru51 in reason whe n
;1 deals with noumenal is5ues?
 31

E. The Antinomies

One of the most important pans and the mao;\ dramatic section
of Kant', fim Critiq ue deals with four antinomies. These are pairs
of opposed arpuncDIS. Each ugumem seCItl$ 10 be quile nicely
proved true . ucept for the cmbatra5Slllcnt that the opposed
a1JUIIleDI is also just as well proved true!
The fint pair give us proofs thaI, for one, the world is finite in
time and space ... and paired with this, proof that the world is
infinite in time and ~ Nothina tricky about the proou. They
~cb seem perfe<:tly reasonable. The semnd pair. the second
antinomy. presents. thesis that there are ultimate simple pam
(atolll$) in the world and ~rytbing is made of them. But, the
antithesis to this is abo presented in a ne.1 proof. namely that
tbere are 1\0 simple atoms bul that evcrythina is inflllitcly divWblc.
The third antinomy ronsi5ts of thcsi5 asserting thai in addition
to c:aw.ality, we must abo assume freedom in nlltUJ'C. And, me
antithesis to Ibis holds thaI there is no freedom; CYCrything in the
world obeys caw.al laws of nature. The fourth antinomy oonsists
of the thesis that there is lOme beina in the world tbal is absolute-
ly necemry . .. and the antitbcsi$, of to\Ir$e, hold$ that this is
false, th.1 there is 110 necessary beina in (K outside the world.
What can we IWIke 0( these antinomies, these dear Slrona
deductive proofs that ecru;n auumptions are true ... with tile
apparent Iogkal scandal that tile opposite assumptions sum to
have just as strolll! and irrefutable proofs of their views? A
number of significant comments and rooousions are dra"''lI by
Kant, but for our purposes we shaD limit ounelves 10 just one or
twO poinu..
Fi~1, it should be obvious that none of the antinomies deals
with matten of possible nperience. We don't expericllce the
finite or the infinite natllre of 'Pac:e and time or the ullimate
nature of maller, we don't nperience either freedom itself or the
lack of it, a IIClL "I)' beina or the absence of such a nec:enary
entity. Therefore. we should 001 be surprised by the conclusion
"that reuon, in ill 'PC'ClIlalive empLoyment, can never .. .
32 KANrS CONCEPTIJAL TOOLS

transcend the field of poWhle experic oce ... outside wllich there
is for us nothing but empty space."" Reason alone, reason without
sense data, amnot choose between equally reasonable arguments.
Kanl distinguishes between what he calls "constitutive pri nd-
pies.," that spedfy the absolute nature of something. and "regulative
principles" that give U$ IISCful rules (hypothetical rules) for canyins
011\ an inquiry in the observable world. The dislillClion her-en
( I) the observable world and (2) a concept of an absolute world
behind our ob5crvations i5 crudal. ConstiwtWc principles do !lOt
apply 10 the observable world. If _ apply constitutive prinl:iples
\0 the observable$, we must make erron. These few remarks on
the relations between constitutive and !"eiulalive principles are
intended only to direct an especially curious reader to the Joq
development of these principles to be found in the Fin;t Oitique.
Although they are crucial to Ihe study of the anlinomics we shall
nOl continue the mattcr here.
n.e antin(mlies hold many kinds of fascination. A suious
anal)'$is of them 'OiOIIJd have to present the arguments in detail,
and then (X)lISider a variety of imlcs thaI arise with the group as
....-ell as with each separately. Such an analysis would have to do
a precise job of illustrating the difference heNo-een constitutive and
regulative principles, and !ihow where in the proofs they were
properly or improperly used. However, for our purpoles in
preparing to nudy Kant'li work on re ligion we shall lnvc the
problem of the antinomies with just three modest conclusions (but
return to the malter In later chapten).
(t) One conclu$ion that Kant draW$ from the ammomies is this:
on the b.tii$ of reason alone ....-e would be unable to chmre
between the lWQ ~des of each antinomy. b the world finite or
infinite, completely determined by causal laW!; or partly free,
containing anything necessary, anything not merely contingent?
Rea50ll alone would leave us in "continuous vacillation." However,
when we are 'wmmoned to action," we find ourselves chOO5ing
"principles exdusively in accordance with practical inlere$ts...
That is, ,../uft .... call t <heide raJionully, .... mil)' be oble to tkcil:k
projJItItJlieo/1y .
 J3

(2) Another (XlllClusion, prepared earlier, is tbat "We know

DOtbill& but nature, since it alone can present objects \0 us and
instruct us in regard 10 !heir laws.... Speculative reason cannot
produce knowledge beyond "the field of possible upcrieoce.""
(3) A further eonelusion is that. certain kind o f question must
be (OO5idered empty. What sort of inquiries are they Ihal lead
Kant to ~ that "!be ~ itself is nrun,-f'" A question as
10 the constitution of RHT\ething which cannot be thought through
any determinate predicate-inasmuch as it is comp letely outside the
sphe re of lbo!ie objects which ean be Jiven to us-is entirely null
and void.... When ' questions refer 10 an oo)cct which can be
found nowhere save in our thoughts . 50 long as we obstinately
penis! in assuming that there is an actu.al object corresponding 10
the idea, the problem, &I thus viewed. allows of no solution. ....

F. Conclusions

This inlrociudion to the theory of knowledge is intended to

leave the reader wi lh the following propositions. in addition 10 the
above Ihree results of considering tile antinomies:
I. Kant takes scicoce 10 be tbe only technique fOf" acquiring
knowledge. But, 1toow\edge wms out to be unable to wpply !hoe
basis for all decisiollS.
2. The scientific acquisition of knowledge requires that the
human mind impo$Ci its forms of thinking on the 5e1l5e intuitinll5
thaI il receiYe$. SensaOOIl5 alone Jive DO information.
3. The e.ti$teoce of knowledge presuppces the ui$tence of Q
priori categories of thooght.
4. Knowledge reren only 10 the phenomenal world : there is no
basis for knowledge of anything beyond the world of appearances.
5. Aoy entity thu llllIIY be meotiooed must fall into one of lhree
divisioll5. Either
(a) the phenomenal worLd. tM world of possib le experience,
(b) the noumenal world, a world that i$ logically possible
but nonexpe rimental, o r
 KAl'ITS CONCEPTUAL TOOLS

(() an unlhinbble world. (OmJlO$ed of entitie$ that are

Iogicall, inconsistent.
It ~ imponant 10 liter developments to recall that we ma,
conee.ive of $Orne1biol thlt canoot be known., for example
noumenal entities (ghosts. loolins, San~ Claus): and we may
mention thinas that cannot be col\C%ived, the so-called unthinkable
entities. (If there ~ an additiOllil! QltelOl)' of unmentiollable
entities, we n~d not take special care 10 avoid their mention I).
Kanl hold5 it hnp056ible 10 have knowledge of God. but one may
reasonably mentioo lbe term, "God." Sil\C% there is a IoaicaJly
(Onsistent definition, the tenn can be employed in the whole range
of ooumenal diSCUS!iioM, and serve for theoretical purposes. The
term "free-wiIl" has the IaJIIC status: it cannot be located in space
and time, and $0 is DOl. knowable. However, as a consistent
notion, it is theoretically serviceable and can be employed in
noumenal (Ontext5. But lines must be dnwn between what can be
mmtionftI, what can be I~, and whal can be knoM.'tI. To deny
this WOIlld be 10 lie about mal1en of the areatCSI i.n1ponance.
In addition 10 !be distinctions between mention, reference.
belief, and knowledge, a later chapter in this "lilly will add an
analysis of "'hN CIUI WId CIUIIKIt be ~ p . Hope and moral
wonhinc55 arc the IWO cenU'al religious (OnccplS. The analysis of
hope requires $Orne: precision about the logic of ianorance. the
lubjen of Chapter Five.

An. outline, with (Omments and texl rderences, should help the
reader keep the argument in mind. I must strW thaI lhis section
presents Kant', analysis of the prindpk of morality. but not his
tlpplicuJUM of the princ:iple to the hislory of humanity. This section
will, therefore, have a merely formal or artificial tone; the nut
section will apply the resu1ts 10 human hislory.
(a) MoroJity u a mtlIt~ of ilUmtion not of ~
Kant responds dearly to the famous problem of th.e choice
between locating morality in lbe iluM1ion of an individual in
performing an act, or in the com"quylCD of mch an intention. the
act and its results. "Nothina in the world, or even outside of the
world. can possibly be reprded as good witbout limitation ellC%pt
a good will: The choice b. intentionalism. "'The good will seems
10 COfIStitute the indispensable condition even of wonhincss 10 be
bappy" (393). Kant simply insists that a rational. impanial
observer can feel no pleasure al the sight of worldly sumesc that
is not based on a good will; but be quickly adds that by a good
will be means "not a mere wish but the 5lImmoninil of aU the
means in our powt:r" (394). The point is made and repeated thai
the value of a good will does not consiJ,t in its efficiency in
reaching an objective. or the objective itself, but il bas value
merely on account of its own nature. "It is good of itself" (394).
Here, then. is an ab50lutely r""ed point for the analy$is of ethical
theory. Any system of values must have at least one inherent
value. H all values are instrumentaJ. one races an infinite regress
in the process of choosing. For Kant, the location of ab50lute
value, that wbich hilS value for itself alone, is clear and repeated,
It is just. certain kind of will or intention that is the only inherent
value.
Kant argues thai something is strange in the idea of "the
ab50lute wonh of the will alone: (394) reprdJe5S of any roose
queBOe of that will, But strange or DOt, this is taken 10 be the
view of rommon sense, the mw that says that morality is 10 be
judged on the basis of an individual's intention.

(b) ~ moral gtXJl U II _,'OIIIll...,.vl, nor ~ dluJppy...arld.

Assume as an axiom that every organ found in a naruTaI being
is efficiently adopted to some purpc Ie, Then, if the happineS5 of
human beinp were the real end of nature:. it must have been an
enormous mistake to give us reason. Ccnainly, instinn alone is
more likely to make us happy then any guidance dictated by
reason. As it stands, our choice of objectives is made by ill5tinct,
36 KANTS CONCEPTIJAL TOOLS

but OIIr choice of means to reach the~ objtives is the art:a of

reason. Kant insists that nature would have entrusted both the
choice of means and of ends to instinct alone if the objective were
to make: human beings happy. This is 1101 argued in much detail.
but he docs mention the appare oUy obYiou.s c:ase in which we find
Ihal "the more a cultivated rCUIID deliberately devotes iue]f 10 the
enjoyment of life and happiness, lbe more the man falls shon of
true oonlcntmenl" (395). Apparently the IOOTe rational an
individual beromes, the less likely the JUessful pursuit of life's
enjoyment. Kant calls this "fact" and adds lIlal in many people
there arises, "if only they arc candid enough to admit it, certain
degree of misology, hatred of reason" (395). Pa rticu larly those
who are most upericnd in using reason arc apl 10 ' envy rather
than d espie the c:ommon run of men who are better llIided by
mere natural instina and who do IIOt permit their reason much
influence 0f1 !heir conduct" (J96).
In I' leasl one obvious area there is clear-cut support for
Kanl's view. In a well-known sludy of male suual hehaviol' we
find evidence for the oonclu~n lhal in the arca of 5CnIal
pleasures, Kant i5 perfectly righ t. For this Cl:arnple, let us make
IWO erode yet ddensible assumptions. Fir$t, ilial the higher the
educational level tbe more like ly the use of reason over instinct.
Second, !hal !be STealer !be number of lexua! ellperlences, tbe
STeatcr the amount of happiness. Kinsey er u/.. found thaI the
highest total (sexual) ouilets are found among those who go into
High Sc:hooI but never beyond, Combining Ihis with otber conelu-
siOllS i.n !be Kinsey sludy brings us some basis for Kan,'s view that
those who are lIIost "raliorcal" are _pt lO en.,. tbe ordinary person's
pursui t of happinea I( one's goal i.n life were ntalimum 5Ual
activity, a college education WOIJJd be a bad choice.
tn order '0 save ourselves from the view that nature has made
an enormous mistake i.n &iving us reason. Kant coneludes that
human realiOn is properly intended for a much different objective
ilian producing individual happi ness. What is the objeCliYe that we
may call !be function of reason? Kant answefl, "Reason's proper
fUllCIion muS! be to produce II will good in-it-self and not good
 Km/l's ConuptUDl Tools 37

merely as a means" (396), TIle function of reoon is to produec:

morality!

(e) MOMl wUlU rw[Uiru all iIItOlliotl to QCt purely 0Ul of fnpr for
rM moroIlaw. Any Sl!t'IIia to p6JOIUll i1Ic/iJrmiOil ~0\'eJ tM bwis
fOl' morol wonh.
We certainly need more detail about this notion of a will which
i$ to be called good-in-ilSel!. Kant offers the ronc:cpt of duty. For
an action 10 bave any moral worth. it must be the consequence of
a principle or muim based on duty ~ and be completely fr~
from personal inclination.
Suppose Ihal one of us, al the seashore. sees an enremely
beautiful person drowning. We bave both a duty to II)' to help
and. let it be auumed, Itrong personal inclinatiollS in the same
direction. If we then risk our life in an effon to save this
spectacular person. v.'C can claim 00 j)tcial moral credil because
it was an act from personal indinatiollS as well il$ a sense of duty.
However, &Upposc we see a powerful enemy of oors in danger of
drOWflinJ. If we ignore oor own preference and perform the
action of giving help purely from a sense of duty wilbool any
personal inclination al all, then and only then docs the action have
moral worth. (Tbis casc Wil$ stronger than neassal)'. since oor
irn:linations may have been merely indifferent, not opposed to
duty.)
This is a severely rigOro.B basis for morality. If morality
requires behavior based merely on duty. and duty lhal is chosen
withoul any attention 10 personal inclination, one wonders if there
have ever been moral people. Kant's answer is usually tn wggcst
Ihat each individual consul t thai person's own moral hislOI)' since
that is the only one the individual is in a position 10 uamine. Can
we reject Q thfinition. of moral ity if il turns out that Done of uS arc
moral on that basis? Cenainly not, iftbe definition is compelling-
ly &upponed. We don', reject the definition of geometrical figures,
foc example, perfect cirdes, squares., triangles., and just because
they arc not readily found on tbe 5Urfaa of the eanh. Likewise.
we have no feUDn 10 reject Kant's definition of morality merely
38 KANTS CONCEP11JAL TOO LS

beca~ it may tum out tha I actual human beinp are never qu ile
moral.
This notion of moral value S\rt sses three propositioll$.. The (un
is that only those actions done purely from dul)' can have moral
worth. The SOnd proposition iii thaI the moral wonh of an aet
~pends 00 the principle or maxim by which it is determined.
And. the thin:J is a definition of the ronccpl of duty. "Duty is tbe
necessil)' of an action uecuted from respect for law" (400). We
can have no respec:t for any il1(iination. aC((lrding 10 Kant. We
can approve or disapprOlle of indinatioll5, love or bale them, bu t
!lOt respt them. However, the concept of law itself can be an
object of respeel and merefore becomes a command (400). If an
act of duly is conceived of as an act done in romple\e indifference
to PCl'$OnaJ inclination and [0 any coll$equence of the act. "" hat
then can we find as a basis for determini ng the DalUTe of duly
itself? Kant holds \bat only an ab$olule law could determine the
nature of duly and meet these resuietions. TIlerefore, "the pre-
eminent good can consist only in the eon.:eplion of the law ilSe!!
(which can be prese nt only in a rational being)" (401). '"The only
object of re~ct is the Jaw, and indeed only the law which we
impose on ounc:Jves and yet recogniu as necCMaI)' in itselr (note
401). Note well the "and yet.' This indicatcs that the combination
is unexpected or surprising. Kam wists that "All respect for a
person is only respect fOf the law (of righteou!i1\U\, etc.) of which
lhe penon providcs an example" (401).

(dJ We find ..ithin oundva twO ul/imcue principles: ~IfWInQ.f wid

morol duty.
Kanl has located morality in lhe concept of a seLf-imposed law.
a law which we find Ihal we mwt impose on our selves. "All 10()-
called moral intcre51 consists solely in respect for the law" (40 1).
And this Jaw, we are laid, "is already present in the penon" who
aeu morally. However, Ihis moral principle is not lhe only
principle Ihal Kant finds in the nature of the human individual.
There is also the principle of egoism, of purw ing penonal
happineu. "Man feels in himself. powerful OO\Inlerpoise agaill'll
 J9

all rommands of duty ... this counterpoise is his nds and

ind inatioll$, the complete satisfaction of whieh he sult15 up under
the name of happine5$" (.w5). A$ Kant pictures it, reason and
selftshoeu fight with each other for control over a human being.
"From this a IMIlurai dialectic ~ ." (40S).

(t) The COfIj/ict ~ the IWO Ww/c priN:iples is 1M fIOmIaJ

hum/UI SiJumiOll: rM morol principle ougJu /0 dominm~ but
Mlfi.JhnesJ must ai.rt for IhiJ to hllppm.
This idea of an intemal "C:OUDlerpobe: or "natural dialec:Uc," is
a crucial part of Kant's theory of human nature. Briefly, Kant
holds thai ~ is ambiwllmllJboollM comntIIItd.r of duty and
wvs
rlUl of HlfohMss. This is not a pathological $itLl.lion thai can
be rC$Olved by intelligence, or by any therapy. 1\ is the constant
IUUUrc: of normal human beinp. It is abo nccc!Dr)l for hUmanily'i
progrcu, as .... e lhall find in his view of history. 1bcrefore, while
mnsidering just wbal Kanl tates morality 10 involve. we must beat
in mi nd thai the priDciple of morality is just one of the two
constantly compelill8 motives within human nature.
T o find the selfISh principle within us is 001 surprising: we are
quile aware of our prejudice in favor of ourselves. However. to
find a competing law, lhe moral law, wilbin us is a fanwlic shock.
The command of morality, of duty, is by no means 10 be joi ned in
bappy compromise witb peT$Onal bappines.s: ;1 is in flat compeli-
tion. '"The majesly of duly bu ootbillJ to do wilh the enjoyment
of life: it bu ilS own law... ..... The concept of duly brings us to
the strange situation in which we find wilhin ourselves "I. law
be fore which all inclinalions au dumb ~ I~I 11u:,. >W elly
work against iI.- The ordinary human situation, lhen, is one in
which the individual bolh docs and docs oot want 10 be selfL&h.
Pul aoother way. the individual botb docs alld don oot wan! 10 be
moral. l.ogical fSpc<"IS of Ihis ambivalence are developed in
Chapler IV.
 KANrS CONCEPlUAL TOOLS

(f) .AI l'llIional bftng can 1IrM! 1M idea of {_.

We have not yet considered the detail~ of the manl law ilKlf,
and for this we return to features of the cona:ption of law.

E~ ill ~ woob . : "0dide let 1nI. 0uIy I. ,......., bei"" Iw

1M upoocily oI..:1iAf; __ eli", ICtlbe """pl;'" 01 ....... i.e."""""""
let priMipica. TIIis .. ~ Is will. Slace reuooo Is rcq~ired "" lbe
de i. ,;.,. oI.f rm.. .......
MIl is -Iriat cloc I.... ptaclal ' " ' , .
(~t2)

In this pauage. remi!ilicent of Pascal. al though oot quite the same

idea, Kant bolds that the difference between a rational be ing and
other beings. is not any ability to breal:: the laws of nature; it is the
ability to understand them. "The cooception of la..... is the key.
laws that cannot be avoided. plII'QIl elIprcued that pan in his
POISh.J. #347, "if the uai~CrK werc 10 crush him, man would still
be more noble tIwi that wh ich killed him. becallK he knows tbat
he diC5 and the advantage which the univerK has over him; the
univerK knows nothing of this. All our dignity consislS, tben. in
tbought,"
Not any random tbou&ht. of COIlIW. but the thought or concept
of law, Kant pr ETI es for something more than Pascal did here.
Kant bolds that reason can (A) understand law. as Pascal pointed
oot. (B) deri~e aroom tbal would be consequences of cenain laws.
and (C) will or intend jU5t those actions.
Next we tum \0 11 morc detailed classification of the principles
of reason.

(&) Dlx;ision.mtIJci"8 ~ ""'" and otIQo <HI cut glRkDl command.

All comnumds or impe ratives may be divided ineo the hypothet
icaJ and the categorical. A hypothetical command orders one to
choose 11 particular action as a means of achieving something else.
This 'something else" is presented only hypothetically. For
example. the commands of the medical doctor are hypothetical; if
you W1lIlt to extend your life span. you mUSI cal a balaJl(C(j diet.
The engineer. mathematician. pby5.icist. chemist. etc.. present their
bJowledge as hYPOlheticai imperatives.. 11 we h;lve cen;,tin
 4\

objecti\e5 in engineerins. mathematics, physics, or chemistry. Ih~n

we are liven cenain pieces of advice. Hypothetical impcralivclI are
statements of the form: If you seek objective A, ' hen you ought
to II5e means 8. The foree behind this ~I comes from tbe
a5$umption that Jiven an objective, one wishe5 the most efficient
mtaJl$ \1'1 reach il If you don't want the most efficient means,
then you don't rmlJy want the objective. (Or you want more than
one objective.) Howevt:r, if you do 11(11 wUh objective A. the
hypothetical imperative with A as antecedent has no foree.
A categorical imperative is an order in which)'Oll are presented
wi th an action that must be chosen, regardless of any eonflicting
objective. As examples, consider the orders of ( I ) a uaffic officer,
Pull uvcr: (2) a military officer, "Advance upon the enemy: (3)
a theologian, "Seek ye the kingdom nf beaven: In each of these
alles we are, ~licalty speaking. presented wilh categorical
commands. Without any "ih: "andI.," or "bulS,: we are directed
In a specific action. Suppose this command is challenged by
asking for the objective that it serves. If the police officer said,
"Pullover. if you wanl tn avoid furtbe r violation of the traffic
ordinanees. the o rder would have beeD reduced (rom a categorical
to tnl:re hypothetical eommand. H we do DOt wish to avoid such
legal complexity. we are under no p ressure 10 take the .dviee.
H the miliwy offiee r said, 'Advance u pon the enemy. if you wi5h
to avoid a coonmartial, we agaio have \0 mal: decision about
the hypothetical objective of avoiding. court-martial. Thirdly. if
the theologian ~nds upon his Of her command by saying. "Seek
ye the kirwJom of iteavc:n, if ye wish to obey God.' we are no
longer siven an absolu te eomtruItId but instead. matter of choice
has bun raised.
The natural QUe5tions arise: (I) are categorical imper.tives
oecess"y fo r decision-making, or is. rid!. collection of hypotheti-
cal imperatives enough? (2) On what basis may categorical
impe ratives be chosen? How can we cboose between conflicting
categorical imperatives? ~ shalt not kill; and "'Thou shalt
kill," are. grammatically s~akjng. equally good Cltegoricals. An
 KANrS CONCEPTIJAL TOOLS

IU\wcr to the fint question may be found if we COll$ider the ffJI/at:y

of the pafal roadmop.
Su~ thai one bas a perf1 road-map; that is, one mows
the mosl effiejelll mute for ruchini any objective. and. in
addition, one's own location is clearly established. Knowled(IC of
the ITIOiI efflcienl route to an objective is hypothetieal knowled(le.
If one wishes to (10 10 A, then cboose mule X: if one wishes 10
(10 10 B. then choose mule y , etc. A rationallldion requires both
Ibis kind of hypothetical infonm.tion (or command) and. beyond
tbis, a specifIC deslination.
Comp~te hypothetical infOl'Dlation abou t bow to ruch any
objective is DOt sufficient for a dedsion. There must, in addition,
be at least one piece of eale(lOrieaI Information, or a ea.le(lOrieal
command such as, "Go to A, B, C. _. ' or Z" A perfect road-map,
alone, doesn't supply this Clu(IOrical informalion and hence is not
sufficient for a decision. Popular road_maps of the day often have
a ~l reaanauJar !xu; in a comer headed. "Interesting Places 10
Visit." Not the leasl of the map's advantaiCfo, lhis prOYides us with
some Rl B(lCstion of a ea.teiorical command (particularly if the
places of interesl are numbered), By lhe fallacy of me perfect
roadmap. I mean the f.n.ey of assumini Ihat hypothetieal
imperatives alone are a suffICient basis for makina a decision, A
destination, or a c:ate(lOrical imperative, is a necess"y requirement
The dangers of ambi8uily are equally present if we face more
than one tale(lOric:al This becomes the hierarchy problem,
rankin, objectives in ocder of preference. Then the lower (IoaIs
are 10 be choien only if the hl&her ones have been reached ...
m'kin8 the lower (lOlls hypothetica ls To make a rational decision
we seem to require one, but only nne categorical. (While this is
tbe ~ rational demand. the Chapten on the UlpC of
ArnbMllence and the Logie of Hope will oot leave matlen the.re.)

(II) A rruiotJDI mind must intmd a OOftSUttrU ~ I f/COI/SUtMq

is~lOit.
If me positioo above is cogen\, decision procedure for
rational being require5 one and only one cllIegorieal impel.live.
 "
Fonunately, laYS Kant, there is one altegorical impe rative, and he
calls il the imperative of mor~ty. Kant QOmidcrs two questions
in connection wilb this. FiBI, What is the moral imperative?
And, 5econd. How is it pouiblc? From tile very concept of a
categorical imperative, we can discover the only proposition .... hich
CI.lI stand as weh a categorical. We can think of the meaning of
a hypothetical imperative without knowing a $pific antcoedent.
H owever, if we think of the meaning of a categorical impe rative
we immediately discover thaI il contains only the universality of
Jaw as such, to which the principle of any action should conform.
Then comes the lriumphanl conclusion. "'There is Ihcrcfore only
one categorical imperative. " Is: Act only according 10 thaI
maxim by which you can at the urnc time will thaI it sIlould
berome :I. universal law" (421).
Thi$ is. rather quick maneuver {or such an important mallcr.
"We imnJediatcly o;li$eoYer : be tells U$, This coold stand :I. bit
of expansion. Let'S construct !he path of discovery mentioned.
From the standpoint of Q f'CllioNll mitrd. there is one coman!
presupposition to any pos,sible absolute command . . . /IIUI 1M
commund be pouib~. So much Is tautological, but significant
tautology. Now, in order to be pouible, in the sense of a possible
construction for a rational mind, an im.perative must corrunand a
5ituation lbat (all be tbougbt o r constructed consistently, 1be
demand for consistency means that one could intend that the
entire univeIK follow that command. To say thb b 10 say that
one could will that the command (or maxim) become a universal
la.....
Presumably, we (all mentioo a self-CODtradictory command. but
cannot think such a command.. In this sense. to think is 10
construct a mental entity to ....hich ceRain words refer, rather than
merely me ntion thoK wor<b.
How (all we lell the differeDCe between mentioning $Ome words
and actually constructina some entity described by those words?
There is at least a negative test: only. consistent entity could
poiIIibly be constructed (given the ordinary IWUmption about losic
and mental health). Therefore, consistency is the general universal
 KANl"S CONCEPTIJAL TOOlS

nnrumum requirement fOl' a. thinkable uniYelW. The absolute

command for. rational mind is: Be oo05;$Ienl, intend only a
consisuent universe. While. rational mind can assert things thai
are in(:oD$isleol., it cannot undentand or <XIDltru<:t such things. As
ezample consider the figure ealJed, ", square-tircle." We may
easily $a)' web words., and include them in weU-forrn.ed panunati
c:al 5eDlences, However, we eantJO( imagine an entity tha, is a
$(fIIue-Orde.
The lasl poin11cads to .. difficult qUC$tion. Can we be in error
about what we CM or tannOI consistently imagine? Kant docs I'lOl
take up the nalter, and it has DOl dominaled the subsequcll1
Literature. ContemporaJ)' work in the phi\o$Ophy of mind is not
decisive on mit. My view is. laken from tile fallibility position of
ClIaries S. Peirce. We arc capable 0( error in anything. includilll
in whal~r seems quite deaf and distinct a1 some momenL We
may 10 for years telling ourselves thai we have constructed a
lhouJht. only to discover that we have mentioned it 10 ourselves
btu 00{ o;:omtructed ;1. Even worse, we may never make Ihal
dilcoYery aDd learn our enor. Sin<:e Kant docs nol deve lop this
maner, rn drop it at this stage.
The command, Be mnsi..5tent, is the buis for morality, accord-
ina: to Kant. It is !he euential idea of fairnes5 to all, one I.w
holding (or everyone. Therefore, it is 00 DOYel interpretation of
moTaliry, but the ordilwy ~rson'l notion of the euential point in
moral intention. The mll1lllalld docs not mme from. supernat-
ural Mina bul is lo<:ated in the nature and meaning of reason
itself. We human Mings are part ratiooal .nd pan selfish; that
pat! of us that is r.tional is the pan thai can intend only
mll5isteDl and the refore moral UnivelW. The ot~r pan of us can
have quite different intentioll5. But, to the merdy ration.1 pan of
human being, the only thing immoral is inconsistency. So, Kanl
holds., all of the commands of duty can be derived from DOe
imperative as principle. The im~rative: Inlend a consistent
univelW.
 "
(/) A fflIiottaI bdn& pes iadf ~ Cl')mmtlld: II!lmd Q ~
IUIiwrx. 17tU. t~ MOlal COItIInWJd.
The eatepical impc~tive is tephnsed in _ral ways; for
eumpJe, An as tbougb the maxim of your action 1WC:tc by your
will II) bcromoe a universal law of nature: Kant &ives _tal
cumplu of uslllJ tbis p rinciple 10 determine !he moralily of
pyen action. In one _ have the case of penon who find$
hilD$elf or henelf foreed by need to borrow mooey thaI cannot be
repaid. May such. person promise to pay while knowin& it will
not be done?

u.. _ t , 01 w. ..... M hi be. 'o!k , '" _ . I belicYc _,...,If

10
be "" ....cI at WHy. I will bc:w . ow _ , ... po ;, : La , ..., it.
010- a~ I t - I .... -=- ..... ""'-." ", ... '
of d-boe or
01 _ _ bad"~ ..,. ~ .... be _ ; "lh WIo W. w' hi"""
~ bioi rIIoe qw.... ;. A "
.... of odf ..... ~. '
, . ,.
p ",
. ... .,-
_
,_OIl
II;. ...... He ; " , 1M prete--
low .... """ ,... tIroo q ,';..e: H0-
ea ' , .. _ ,
, .
_ _
. . . .- . . . . -

TIle p"xedure for mati'l& IT1Of"aI decilions .bout a particular

act requires that two questions be answt.red: <I) What is the
ltWIim or principle from which thil act would foUow? (2) If
everyone in lhe world _ce compelled to follow Ihis ma.-llim (as a
ullivel'Kllaw) would;1 be consistent with itself or would il he llelf-
defe.tfna? Only. ~tenl maxim is eoncci... ble, .nd therefore
useable, for this tbouiht-upcrimellt. In his example. JC.nl holds
thallhe maxim commanding fabe promi:Jes would be ;ncon!iislenl
with itSelf becaU$oe no one would believe what was promised, if
fabe promlla were .. u~n.allaw; therefore, ~ch promises could
not 51lc(mfuUy occur. If"al: were "eompelled" to uLl lia. our
audiences would know thi5 and we could not 5uoc:ecd in lyinr: to
them. So tbe prindple of Iyinr: does not r:ive u.s a eonstructable
univene.
We bave reached the eollClU$ion thai the moral eommand is
KlrimpcllCd. but univel'$lll and inescapable ror aU rational bei np.
That the a.ssenion of the command is Inescapable does 001 mean
" !<ANTS CONCEPT1JAL TOOLS

that il ill obeyed. 'That it is self-imposed, .lso does nol mean thaI
il is aJwa~ obeyed. Theile aspects of Kant's vicw should nol diven
Wi from the significa nt point thaI the principle is both universal
and yel we impose it on ounelvC5.
H the moral command were \0 originate from outside tbe
individual, moral obedicm:e might be the obedience of a slave or
the fearful rHponse of mere IlUbject of some king. If the
eoll'lmaJ1d originates within the individual. relativistic: morality
miJht easily be the TeRllt. Kant lvoiib both of these familiar
pitfalls by deriving the principle of moralily from the naJUre of
reason, as we have IUn. Then, rational beings find thaI the
Tluional part of their nature, of lheir own nature. commands them
\0 obey the rational demand: Intend a consistent univelVl The
wnunand is seH.imposed, and yel ;1 is me universal command of
reason thaI balds for all such beinp.. Therefore, the moral
amunand is individual. is wbjectivc, is mallcr of obedience 10
onc patt of one's own nature ; yet it is !he universal common
demand thaI 1IlU$\ always hold belWCe n rational beings. The
romcnl of tbe moral principle eomes from the nature of reason,
not from human nature (ueeP\ in pan). Human beinp. of course,
are a combination of reason and selfl5hneu. The refore, the lack
of hiswrical eumplu of people who were perfectly moral is 00
argumcm against this formulation of 1M Principk of morality.

(j) More than Oftl! pru.!ihk Ullivtnt mel)' be OOfISisltlll- The

ctlft gorial/ imptt'oJio>t gMs 1M boundaria of morolity, wilhill whK:h
i1Idi~idud st)'fm mel)' differ.
The IUteriai in this section on ethics has developed Kant'l view
of 1M mtalli1l& of moral ity, the line be~en what is and what is
oot to count as moral. However, 10 10 10 far with Kant il only to
have a definition of morality. The question arises: For a liven
problem, is there more than one response mat may be d10sen
within the bounds of the categorical imperative? Are there
alternative ways of satisfying the definition of monlity?
The answer 10 our question is, yes. There may well be
different ways of behavior that count equally IS moral. Al l JOOd
 47

Kantillll$ need not do precUely the 5IllJ\e thing under the 5aIlle
cirevmstance5. They can't violate the rational demand thaI the
principles under which they act be principle5 thaI an be uni~rsaJ
tted. Whatever tile)' do lhey must treat all human beings lI$
ultimate ends, as penons 001 as mere thinp. H~r. tile
boundaries within which morality is satisfied may vary from wide
10 11&fl'OW, depending on Ihe problem-situation. And, within these
boundaries, very differenl sty1cs" may be chosen.
While the cates0ricaJ imperative IimilS the range of itylc~ that
can be acocpled as moral, it doesn't tell us which uyle to choose
on particular occasion. It does demand thaI the style of
Te5pOllSe lbal is chosen be ODe whose principle or maxim be
univcrsaJizabJe. All fair interpretations musl be consistent. It
must be a principle that wouJd nol be contradicted if it were a law
for the univeT$e. 'The style of killing those with whom we djsagree
is DOt universaJizable: \llrule A can kill B and remain alive, B
can't also do the same thing. A's principle could nol be. law for
the universe.
A Ivge number of ql,lC$tions are DOl moral iuues.. Which shoe
to put on fll'$t, ",hellier 10 daoc:e a Viennese waltz., whether to join
a particular non-di5criminatory d ub or church are manen that
raise no 5pCner of inconsistency. If the whole world took one Of"
the other alkrnative, the principle under which we acted would
face DO l(llical embarTa$lIleIlt.
Likewise, there are questions to which none of the responses
are acceptable under the Catetlorical Imperative. Shall I kill my
captive by rut Of" slow tonure? Neither ,tyle satisfies Kant's
definition of moral hehavior.
The COD(lusion to be noted is lb. t the categorical imperative.
the command 10 act only under principles thaI may he coiWstently
univenal ized, gives atkfiniOOn of morality. Within the parameten
of thaI definition, llIO!e than one style may he moral ... and more
than one, immoral. Thi5 wiD give readen a depndable due to
Kant'S anirude toward the different religious institutiOll5.
Key matten remain of the meaning. the force, and the source
of monl distinctions. Kant ~ insisted that I~ mN11in.8 of
 KANIS CONCEPTIJAL TOOLS

morality comeli from the meaning of reason. and 1M fon::e of

morality mmes from the fact that it is Klfimposed: that we
impose it on ourselves. The ~ is the reuon that is in us. IlOl
in any external entity,
Kant holds tliat his position is the orditwy undentanding of
morality. WhIle he USCI technical tenns, it requires no new and
brilliant discovery 10 explai n moral ity. It is the common idea that
a moral act is one that foll~ principles that an be followed by
anyone in I limilat situation. Kant has stressed the role of law, of
respect. and of duty in the mailer.
This brief introduction 10 Kant's eth ical theory has hardly
touched on sevent..l crucial mallen.. However, it sets the stage for
timbe r developmeots in bi$ work on re ligion. The mtljcr fWw is
lhal iJ lias ~ only 1M iNIMdwJ tU the subJtct of m orol
(;aIqoriu, and Itus ~ 1M moJIn" oftIfOUP cr coIJtjw morality.
Therefore, the moral antinomy of primary significa,, for religion
has not been wggutcd. For lhis we lihall wail until the lut
chapten of this book. In the nezl section on lhe philO5Ophy of
hislory we shall see how Kant undentands tbe moral history of
something that is not JUSt an individual human being. namely, the
TnOTlI.I history of Iwmonity.

J. Kul '. Phllcnopb, or "Istort'

This 5edion contains an uuemely brief outline of a rather

dramatic philosophy of history," We find Kant', position in its
lTIO$t direct form in bi$ shon but valuable euay, ' Idea for a
Universal History from Cosmopoli\.ln Point of View.' This
conception of bistory is also presented and u5ed in other parts of
his work-the C~ of JudgmelU, PtrptlUill Peua, AlUhrop%IJI,
etc.-but not in Ihe detail that we find here. Even in this essay,
things are put in compressed slyle. After a brief introduction, the
euay consists of nine "theses" with a paragraph or 10 of comment
on each.
The inlroduction argues that even though human individuals
Kern 10 have freedom of wilL and 10 behave in 'complex and
 .,
chaotic" ways, we may find somelhin& d ifferent if we change our
viewpoint. Instead of taking the human individual as our subject.
lei LIS consider "the human race as a whole." This new subject.
humanily or the human nace. shows ". sleady and progreuivc
though slow evolution" (17). This should not surpme us. Many
lhinp seem 10 be unpredictable u individual evenlS, bul exhibit
regular pallcrru; whe n cKamined in largt groups. As examples
Kanl mentions thaI individual marriages. births. and deaths 5Urn
\0 be unpredictable, yet the annual tables in major countries
"prove" that they follow regular la-.n, considered collectively. He
also mentions thaI the weather sums \0 be unpredictable day-by-
day, but over the 00IIn.e of the year is regular enough to maintain
the growth of plants and the flow of riveTl. 1'bereforc, Ihe project
of looking for a pallem in the history of the human race w u
,,11ok is quile legitimate, Jo&ically.
'The PlIllero Ihal we look for, or that we impose on the data,
may be purpoiivc on tbe wbole, ahhough the individuals involved
may be unaware of an)' IoUch pUrpoK. They might "Work tOW'J.rd
funhering il. eve n if the)' would set lill ie store by it evcn if they
did know it" (17). Despite the folly, vanity, and malice of
iooividuals, there might be an overall rational purpose that a
history of humanity exhibits. Now to his theses, or hypothese1.

R RST TIi ESIS

'All naturoI CDpucili~ of Q crcutun an dcuilled 10 evolve

complac/y 10 IJ~,'" naturaJ cnd." ( 18)

We muM aRlune IOmclhins like this in o rder 10 havc a

conception of a lawful rather than an .imlc!lS course of IlIure."
Kant adds thai the form and structurc of animals ronfillllli this.
Orpns or arrangements that do IlOt uhievc their pIIrpoKS " .. ould
be contradictions in a tcleological theory of nature. So, let us
assume that everything has a purpose, and then try 10 find ... hat
that PUrpo5C is.
 KANT'S CONCEPTUAL TOOL'>

SECOND TIlES IS

"I" mUll (as t/~ ~ raJionai ~ on fiVliI) I/UJIf! "aJUraI

cll{JQCilies wllich are diret;I"<1lo l/~ ILU of hif nasD/I are to M fullY
~oped only iIIlh~ mee, lIot ill the illdMduaL" (IS)

The illllOCCnr soundin&: Fint Thesi$. laken sc:rioolly, forces us

10 /J1OYC our al1ell1ion away from the individualloward humanity.
Since lbere are no limits 10 Ihe application of reason., and reason
does not work instinctively, bUI reQuirt'S 'Iri~ practice. .nd
instruction in order gradually 10 progress from one level of insighl
10 another: individual human beinp do nol live Ion&: enough to
learn the fuU use of reason. However, we find naNre settin,
lillon JXriod for Individual lives, bul producin, a l.eries of senera-
tions in which each passes its own accomplishments on to iUi
ulcccssor. The only Wily to make the capability of reasoninll
cons~[ent wilh lbe Fint Thesis i. [0 assume lhat ralionality is to
be fully developed only in the race, not the individual. We arc
tberefore forced 10 a dualism in human history: both the individu
al JXl"SOn and the human race must be studied, and lhey have
Quite different historical patterns.

TIlIRD TIlES IS

"NoJure hat willtd I/roJ man llwu.1d, by Irirrutlf, produce every-

thing Ihat goa Myond lire mechanical Ot"dmng of his animal
ailiUlOt, and that he lIrculd ptlftau of no ()/Iu:r l,appiflaS or
petfeaicn tlrllll tlrat ... Melr Ire hirruelf, inde~ndent/y of instinct, lUll
cnatw by I,is ""." rrtul>rr." (19)
When we puttosether the a55umption that Nature doe. notlling
in vain. and lhe notion Ihal Nature hu given us reason and free
will. we ha"e whal Kant calls "a clear indication of her purlKlse"
(19). No insti nct. no -ready-made knowledge" iii available for a
lIuman !:teing's goab.. Any success in moving toward one's delires
mUSI be due entirely to th:l.t indMdual's own efforts. Kanllis!S the
 Kant', ConaplUOJ Tool.J 51

goa.Is: securing "food. sheher, safely, and defense, , . all amuse-

ment whkh can make life pleasant, insiiht and intelligence, finally
even goodneSll of hean-all tOO should be wholly his own work"
(19), If a human being ever does progres5\oward happines5, '."
he alone should have the credit and should have only himself 10
thank , . , exactly as if she (Natute] aimed more at his rational
self-e~leem than al his _U-being" (20),
No god$ would deserve lhe credit; it would be complelely due
to 1M wort of human beings, tbemselve5. The goal is not well_
being, but wortllinus of it. This is the same goal that is preMed
tbroughout Kam's writing. As pul here, ", , , il seems not to have
amcerned Nature that he should live _ll but only that he should
work himself upward 50 as to make himself, through his own
actions, worthy of life and of well-being" (20). This is as strong an
appreciation of iNJMduaJisnI as any anarchist could want, but it is
JUSt a pan of Kam', position. The other pan is his view of pJpIe
collectively: lu.unanldnd.
We then find a paragraph in which Kant mentions the "strange'
pattern in whleh "earlier generations appear to earry tbrouih their
toilsome labor only for the sake of the later , . , only the latest of
the generations would have the good fortune to inhabit the
building on whleh a klDg Hne of their ancestors had (unintentional-
ly) labore:d without being permitted to PM\Ilke of the fortune they
had prepued" (20), This strange pal1em ", , , is neC""ary if one
assumes that a species of animal$ should have reason. and, as a
daM of rational beings toch of whom diltt w/,ile rile spteJ it
immortal, should develop their apacities to perfection" (20). The
species has its own history: individuals die, but " T mQ)' Iwpe /IUll
lilt: species is ""manal, 'The notion of immortality has a basic p;art
in our thought, and ;t ;s not embarnwed by observable fact
because it is not taken to be a property of individuals. NOI we but
our spcdes is to be the immortal entity.
52 KANT'S CONCEPTUAL TOOLS

FOURTIi THESIS

"1M means emplD')wi by Nalun! to bring abocu the d~I(J~nl

of /Iff I/~ cupaciJia of mOl is rhN WIIogonism in JOCiety, !O far 4.t
thU iJ, in the md, I/~ Cau.u! of Q la...ful onkr among men: (20)

In this Thesis Kalll goes far beyond ttle romantic views of

human nawre and the mechanism of hislory. In his comment on
this 11Iesis be first derIDeS "&ntagOnism." This is 10 mean "tIUl
lUISOCial JOCidJiliry of m ..lI, i.e., their propel1$ity \0 tiller into
society. bound loae1iler with 11 mutual oppoiition which connanlly
threatens 10 break up Ihe society" (20) (empllasis mine). 'The
"social" pare of this is familiar enough; since Aristotle we have had
the comforting notion dUll a human being is a social animal. and
Deeds and Iovn other hl,lmaD bcillgli. SelfIShness has been not iced
and received rommcm by earlier .Ulhol'5, hut usually 10 complain
and criticize it in enspenlled IOne$. Hobbes and Adam Smith are
uceplions \0 Ihis altitude. Kant follows Hobbes and Smith lief";
1101 only are human beings selftsh. hut this very selfishness is a
requirement fOf" humanity', progreu. I am reminded of Adam
Smi th's phrueology in his Weabh of NUlWru, ", . , it is as if man
is . . . led by an invi$ible hand to promote an end whieh was no
pan of his intention. Nor is it always the "'orse for the society
that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own intereit he
frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when
he really intends to promote il. I have never known mueh good
done by those who affected 10 ~ for the public good."
The idea that ~Ifi$hness, the unsocial characteristic, is a _ .
SilTy means for progreu is not just a lingle casual remark, It is
repeated and developed. "Without those inthemselves unamiable
characteristics of unsociability from whence opposition springs-
characteristics each man mu.st find in his own !.elfish pretensiOO$-
an wlenl5 would remain hidden. unborn in an Arcadian shepherd's
life ... . Men, goodn;:uured as Ihe sheep they herd, v.wld hardly
reach a higher W(lrlh than thoei r beasl5 .. : (21).
 53

He continues, Jbanks be 10 Nature, then, for the incompat

ibility. for heartless rompetitivc vanity, for the insatiable desire 10
possess aDd 10 rule! Without them, aU the excellent natural
copacities of humanity would forever sleep, undeveloped. Man
wishes concord; but Nature knows belter what is good for the raoe ;
me wills divmd" (21). So much for peace, Jove, and warm
fellowship. It lakes "heartless competitive vanity" 10 drive us to
serious CJlcnions of our powers.
The point of thi$ The$is is 10 iosisl that ( 1) individual$ are both
social and ull5Ocial, and each of these two properties is a fixed
innate pan of the healthy human being; and (2) boIh of t'-e
properties are required for bllmanity's progress, 1M NJ.JI'j ~1fiJh
wpI is qbwllll,!1y asmtiaJ. EffortS to eradicate selfishness would
be quile unnarura!, quile WTOIlI- Not only an: human beings
ambiYaient about morality; human progFe5Ii requires that they be
ambivalent about it. We s.hall tum to the mattcr of person.aJ
ambivalence in IIIOfC detail in Chapter Four.

FlF IH TIIESIS

~ f'Wllut probknI for 1M Iuumut rpce, to llu soIuliotI 0/

whkh Nunue dm>es """" if the uchk'.'cnwu of a ~ CMc
wcidy which admUtist~ Ww IU'IOIII mOl." (22)

Up to this point. Kant has held that Nature has a rational goal
for humanity. and that individual human beings may well be
unaware of or indifferent to that loal. But, we have oot yel been
given any notion of what Ihis rational end is. Now, in this Thesis
and the a,lmmeOI on it. we have hi5 answer. The goal is
petfeclly jusl cMe sodely. A "weiely wi!b tbt arCatelil rrc:cdom
... wnsistcnt with the freedom of others" (22).
Hnmanily'5 c:apabililies cannol be achieved by the individual
living in isolalion from fenows human bein&5. Such individuals,
Kant lays, are like isolated IfCQ !bat put 001 branchel a' random
and "grow stunled. crooked, and twisted" (22). In a forest, eacb
tree needs the others for competition, 'since each ill seekina 10
 KANTS CONCEPTUAL TOOLS

lake the air and wnlight (rom ot.ben must strive upward. and
thereby ead! ruliU's a beautiful straight stature . . : (22). We
need othen to fight with, not to love.
Kant stresses the MCeSSily of ~ in producing historical
progcss. The romantic desire for peace and human companion-
ship would be a calamiry if it succeeded too lOOT\. Not the
sociable, but the UNOdable tc:ndende5 of our nature are required
for progress. "All culture, art which adorns mankind, and t.be
finest lOCial order are fruits of unsodableues.s. whid! forces itself
to discipline itself , . : (22),
This achievement, I just wdery. must be lcoomplished by
bumanity itself, "Like aU its olber destined pis: Therefore, no
supernatural 'FD(:)' c:an ordu 01" lead us; it must all be our work.
This is wbat "Nature demaMs .. : (22).

SlXTlf reFSIS

"'ThU prob/mt jj the most dijfiaUl and 1M IlI.SI /0 be soMd by

n/01tkiJf.d: (23)

Why iii t.be political problem so difficult? Here is t.be argu-

menL FinL a human beiq is a combination of "K1rtsh animal"
and "reasonable bein,," Secood, t.bis combirur.tion is eaential: the
rational pan CIMOt eliminate t.be selfisb pan, as we found in the
Fifth Thesis. Third. to live among olhen of its kind. "Man iii an
. nim 1 which require5 a master." While each of us rationally
wishes a law to limit everyone's freedom, "his selfISh impulses
tempt him, where possible, to exempt himself." 11Ierefore.
individuals require a IJII5ter to force them to obey. Founh, the
only pouibJe muter must, also, be a buman being. Fifth. "the
mastc:r, himself, is an animal, and nuds a muter." 1berefore,
"the highest master ~ld be just in himself, and )'Ct a man:
That iii why the "complete solution is impossible" for the political
taSk. Honest, and )'Ct a bllflWl being! A con tradiction.
H a sin&Je penon t:aIlIKM be trusted to be u~msh. perhaps a
lP'oup of several elecled persons can utidy the requirement. No,
 "
SlI)'$ KalIl., ", for each ofthem will always abuse his freedom if
be hQ no one above him 10 Cllcrci5e force in accord with the laws'
(23). Thi$ (oDUDellI applies 10 people !akcn individually. 'each
will .bu5e. . . : But, it may 1101 be the case for group of
~DOns, considered all a group. A dlecks-and-baIanee5 mechanism
might IUnit the individuals' ability to "abuse:
Can no one be educated to place rationality aver selfisb
regard? What of the Platonic idea of philOMlphcr-kings7 Kant
will have no IUeb confidence in any elite: ~I kings should
philosophize or philosopbel$ beo:>me kings is DOt 10 be upeaed.
Nor is it to be wished. since I~ J'OfYrsiOtl of powtr iMvitubly
/XIII'FUfJU the untrammeled judgments of reason.'" A remark that
Lord Anon wu 10 repeal about one hundred years laler.
Human nature, our R1fish .Dd yet ambivalent altitude 10000rd
morality. IWgested the metaphor of C'OOked wood. "from such
crooked wood as man is made of, no.hj". perfectly 5lraigbl can be
buill" (23). 'The IOlutioo to the poJitieal probJem, the last problem
thai humanity will solve, has three requirements.. Ooe, ' "correa
conception of. possible constitution"; two, "cat ~ricnce pined
in many paths of life; .and three, "far beyond these... good will
rudy 10 accept such coll5lirution. This Thesis cncb with lIle
am:uneOI tbal the5e three Ibings arc bard 10 find. "and if lbcy arc
ever 10 be found loaetber. il will be very Ille and after II'W!y vain
allempu" (23). The ju5t Slale is an ideal that we may approach
yet may DOl rcacb. This is an opeD question for hope.
In a si&ni6cant footnole bcre, Kanl repclllS his Second 'J'beW,
sayin,; that '"The role of man is very artificial." Perhaps on otbcr
plancu.. "caeh individual can perfealy atlain his destiny in his own
life. Amana II$, il is differeD!; 0tIJy the raa can hope /0 flIIain it"
(my emphasis).
Not juR lhe individual, bill the human lj)Ceies, now beeoma
the moral actor. As """ lhaII see. the eonsequences of lhis point
of view arc enormous..
 KANT"S CONCEPTUAL TOOLS

SEVENTH rnESIS

"The proh/t:m of atabIiJhina D paJeu rn'l(: wnsntwion u

MpnuJmI upon 1M proh/ml of D ltlwfuJ mmwl rdation DIIflNI8
stales and CQllllDt ~ ~ wllhouJ a JOIWion of 1M Lmer pmbltm.

' '' TIle mecbanism5 that drove individual people to restrict their
own freedom in the prooea of CTellitillB a commonwealth are here
applied to states themselves. Kant finds thai states have in their
natures "the same unsociability" thai individuals have. TIlerefore,
"each of them l1\li51 expect from another precisely the evil which
opprlWed the individuals and forced them to ente r ioto a lawful
cMe stale' (24). Earlier be had beld laloo individual could be
trusled to treal otbers jllStly: here no Slate can be trusted with
complete freedom. TIle IOlutinn is clear enoup 10 reason: r/un
_ I be l1li w~ w"wr of NlIioIu: &11 reason does not
determine the aetioos of states. Sornethin& else will.
Nature uses "the friction among men, the inevitable an~
n.i.!;m," as the means of forcing stales to form an intemationailegIJ
arrangemenl for 5eltlill8 disputes.. Earlier, lhe Fourth Thesis held
that the individual', 5eIfJSltoc:ss, vanity, greed, and competitiveness
were nature', means of establishing lawful lIl'TIlIgemenlS. Here
Kan. bollb thai war ill the mechanism by which Nature can
produce the desimlt resulL
SIf'OII8 ernpbasls is liven the power of warfare to produce
inlemational law: "., . throop the taDng and never-endill8
aa:umulation of armament, tbroup the want wbieh any state, even
in pelcetime, mllSl !lUffer inlernally, Nature forces Ihem 10 make
a. fust ilUldcquale and tentative auempts .. : (~), So far thi5
can sound smootb and manageable, oot Kant doesn't expect that
il will be. Instead, it will take "devastations, revolutions, and even
complete exhaustion,' before the greal stales arrive at the stage
that reason could have preseoted to them "with far less s.ad
experience. At .h~ stage they ' step from the lawless condition of
UYagQ; inlo league of nations:
 If war is the mechanism for this moral goa~ is war morally
desirable? Kant's view is that individual acts of war are usually
immoral. but looked al in the large, the condition after a war can
wmetimes be more desirable, morally, than Ihe condition before
iL II
J ust wha l is the moral advantqe of a leaJUe of nations? "even
the Y!1aIIest nate (:OUld expect security and justice, not from its
owo power and by irs own decrees, but only from this grealleague
of nations . . . from a united power actina according 10 deci5ions
reached under the laws or their uniled wilr (24).
Several things are 10 be noted about this lut quolation. First,
Slates are taken to he entities that have a will or intention, and
second, Slaies are entities 10 whom juslice or injustice may be
done. In lel1ll5 of t.he well-known nominalistreallsl contrOVersy,
is Kant a realisl aboul the c.islence of enlities like Slales?
Heretofore, the only entities thai mighl be taken 10 have a "wilr
and to be reeipienl$ of justine or injustice have been individuak
An ab5tract enlity like a nation would seem a peculiar and unlikely
cntity foc- such predkation. It appean unlikely 10 a nominalist, for
whom abstract cntities arc mcrely names and do not uist as rcal
cntities. A brief digression on this matter may be helpful.
For an object 10 be known. it must be at least a pouib1e
thought. A pouiblc object or thought. Kant divides possible
objccu. inlo tbose that can be mcntioned consistcntly but oot
constructed in thought, and those that can be so menlioned and
alw CQII ~ lhoug/tl. In order 10 think an object, therc must be
matcrial, "... since without malerial nothing whaUOCYcr can be
thought" (A232/B284). The "malerial" must come from experi-
encc. A pouib1e object of though t must be made out of pam that
are poi5iblc objecu. of expericnce. Howevcr, a possiblc objcct and
an actual object are not identical. An actual objcct is cxpericnced;
rather, it I'M be experienced. A possible object is oonstructcd in
thc mind, but conslructed out of parts that are actually experi-
cnced. To rcpeat this conclusion, a pouible object of thought is
an arrangement constructed OUI of actually cEpcricnced pat1$.
 KANrS CONCEPllJAl TOOLS
"
From this pouu of view. OUT languaae iii welL-stocked with
worth that can be mentioned consistently, but cannot be taken to
be pos5ible objects of tboupl. Words thai Kanl dauifit'S as
noumenal, "God," "Freedom," and "Immortality; arc aamples."
For Kant'li comments on the relation between the possible and the
actual. see the Finl Critique analysis. starting" A23O.
How does this rauil about possible objects of thought affect
Kant'li coll5idertltion or slales? 'The parts of. Slate are objects of
pos51l1lc experience; therefore, the Slate is proper objea of
lhoop!. It can be both mentioned and used \0 refer 10 OUlllen
of eJF:pericnce. We might define 11 StalC so thai it is mere ly an
abstract c nlil)' thai does not refer to any experience. However.
lherc is also perfectly experimental way of defining a SlatC, and
50 Kant bas legitimate phenomenal entity 10 analyze. (For
example, the IOU-Ie can be taken 10 be the cnlil)' thai has as parts
the kgislaturc, the stalC police. lbe couru. prisons. lU collector,
highway department. board of heallb, etc.)
Let us return 10 Kalll'l Slllcmcm aoo..n the position of lmall
$la1C$ in a "great league of nations.' We found him holding Ihal
staleS are entities that have will that they are moral acton and
moral objects, and that they can live and receive justice 01'
injustice. TIle romplt:re history of morality i$ the history of both
individual and aroup morality.
This distinetion between individual and collective morality
pennil5 Kanl 10 make a lignilicant dicholomy. Individllals may
llUlke DO ptllgreu in their own moialiry, bu.t their group. their
SUte, may O!X!Isionally make real progreu in its morality. We
shall f<:rum to this matter in the summary of this notion of history.
The term "intention' is applied to three diffef<:nt subjeCts: (1)
individual people. (2) collections of people. for instance, States.
and (3) Nature. n.e fint two are usually oot IIOt alwlYS distill-
pished by Kant. Bill he is qllile insistent about separating the
fiBt two from the intentions of what he caLIs "Nlture." 'All wan
are accordingly 50 many allc mpts (1Wt in fhf' WOlfion. of m ..... but
Ut lite Wf'IIliOll of Naturf') to establish new relations among StaleS
and through tile destruction or at least the dismemberment of 111
 so

of them to create new political bodies .... (25) (my emphasis).

TIle history 0( warfare, both internal and external 10 states, mi&hl
finally result in state which, "like a civic commonwealth, caD
maintain iuelfaulomatically," because it has "the best JI(lUible civic
constitution and common agreement .. .' (25).
What are the po5Sible bases for such a desirable result? Kant
wondel'$, and offers three. Perhaps. ( I) it miahl arrive by cham:e,
bul be adds thai web fortunate accident could hardly ever OCQIT.
Perh.aps., (2) this ideal soaJ may never be reac hed, bul instead our
nalUral discord may annjhilate "civilization and all mllUrai progress
throop barbarous devastation . . ." (25). This 'is the rate we may
well have 10 ruffer under the rule of blind chance ... if there is
00 !leCfCI wise guidance in Nature." Or, (3) tile hope thlt be
offers: "are we not rather to suppose thaI Nature here follows
lawful rourK in gradually liftina OUI' race from the lower levels of
anilTlll1ity to the highest level of humanity ." (25).
The three alternatives above are reduced 10 one question: "Is
it reasonable 10 UiUDJe a purposiveness in all the pans of nature
and 10 deny it 10 the wboler (25). Prcwmably, Kant expects us
to agree thai it is not reasonable to assume reasonableness in the
partS bul 1)(11 in the whole. However, we cannot poOO(! thai the
whole has certain property just because the partS of that whole
have t he property. That would constiMe committing the Fallacy
of Composition." Kant doesn't araue for such. deduction of the
property of the whole from the parts; it is left as a rhetorical
question.
His point in this Thesis, lest we lose it, is that "the barbaric
freedom of established litates" must be replaced by "a cosmopolitan
condition to 5CCIIre the external afcty of each stale' (26). This
will not be achieved by sweetness of character or recognition of
the moral imperative. It will be achieved simply to secure the
$aCety of eacb itale. The prescnt freedom is called barbaric
because:, ibrough wasting II~ ~ of the commOllwerUlhs in
orrnumelllS /0 ~ used aguiJUr C'QCIi Oflier, through dcvutation
brought on by war, and even more by the nettSS.ity of holding
60 KANT'S CONCEPTIJAL TOOLS

themselves in COIl5WU readiness for war, they [lI"ueign Iilate$J

stunt the full development of human nature" (26).
Kant takes me oppmhion of slates to be "in irsclf healthy," and
points out thaI peace between StalCS "is 1\01 unaetcndcd by the
danger thaI !he vitality of mankind may (aI] asleep... ." But, the
risk of "barbaric freedom" in international relations is that
humaniry "nrlJht be altogether dwrO)":d."
He concluded this section witb distinction betwun rultwte
(the benefiu of atl and science). cM/iulliotI (soeial JOIees and
decorum). and mQITlJiry. "&crythiog good WI if; not based on a
morally load disposition, however, is nothing but pn:lcnse and
glitterin& misery" (26). Moralil)' requires thai the human species
work ilS way out of "the chaotic conditions of its international
rcations" (26).

ElGHllf ntEStS

"'T'htt lWlory of numIdnd <:all ~ s"' iIf Iht /Q1ge, the

QS

mlli:aJiorf of NUlIU'e's secrd p/aII to bring /Mil Q pefoaly oorutituted

$lDlC (U the 0lI/)' COIId/llote u. whicII flit cupacil/Q of IJIOIIkUuJ eM
~ fully d~/o~ rl1!d Also bri1!g /orfh thal armuU refmion IIMOtI8
stDles which u pof~1y udequmc to IIW Old: (27)

In the effort \0 reach !his goal of Nature, the ph ilosophic

fkvelopmen\ of the idea of it "can help, thoug.h only from afar, to
bring tbe millennium to pll55.. This reminds us 0( the view
developed years laler by William James in "1be Will to Believe."
James held thaI there are CII5CS, social situations., in which having
an idea that iODlCthil\& will OCCIIr can help produce the future
event. Kam has insisted. earlier in this eWlY, that individuals need
not know the ~gn of Nature; it ....iII .... OI'"k out without their
understanding, We are now told that a history of the human
speciu, properly understood. can help to bring about the desired
goal. This is the classical problem of goal-oricntcd interpretations
of history.
 61

If things are moving toward . goal. the activity of the individual

an easily be taken 10 be $Uperfiuoos. What i$ the role of the
individual in .I determininie theory of history (for example,
MaJXism)? Kant doesn't gi~ individuals the power \0 make or
bruit the rcsult. bul holds thll they CWI help the good QlUSC. H e
lalcr insists thaI Ihey ought 10 act as if the whole project rested on
their cHom. How ean they help? In .II leasl OIlC way, by writing
and Ihinking OUI Inchistory of the human race.
Beyond the mere Utopian Idea, does Nature reveal anything of
a p,ath to the goal of world government? Kant wondel'$, and his
an.woer is., "She reveals something. but very tittle" (27). A modC$1
claim for an issue so uIJcnL What is available as evide~ is 10
be found in the history of humanity.
Two oonuneou about hunan rtalUtc in this section arc
connected with Ihe historical entetprUe. Kant hold5 that "human
nature is so constituted thai we CIlIlllOI be indifferent \0 tile most
remote epocb our race may rome to, if ooly we may expect it with
certainty" (27). Apparently, we do lake oul'Klvcs \0 be a part of
humaniry, and to have IiOme concern for its future: this concerns
a period long after our own death. but we are still not indifferent
The remark that we need to "expect it with certainty" il a Ilip; he
later i~t:I that we may hope for this goal even if it is not a
cenainty.
Kant adds that our intelligent action can help Ilasten the
desirable future time, and tbis iocruses our interut. What
evidence is there fOf" this interesting L!.5umption of concern bey<lnd
our lifespan? Kant turns to wbat he finds contained in the ootion
of "enlightenment." '"This enl ightenment. and wilh il a certain
commitmenl of heart which the enlightened man Qlnnol fai l 10
make 10 Ihe good he dearly und<:ntarulS , , : (28). In a way, this
trades on Socrates's ootion Iha!, for a rational penon, 10 know lhe
good is 10 desire i1. (If we may equale "ratinnal" with "enlight-
ened.") Whatever the basis., Kanl holds that we ca re aboul Ihe
future of bumanity. and Ihal the history of humanity can show OIIr
progress toward a moral ly established imernational government.
62 KANIS CONCEPTUAL TOOLS

A5 well as the obvious dangen of war, Kant mentions what he

calls a new in~ntion, "an evc r-growing war debt lhat eaMO! be
met" (28). Several years laler, the C:l5aY, "Perperual Peace:
expanded on this idea. He took the credit system \0 be an ", ..
ingenious invention of a commercial people [England) in this
century . : bul to be "dangerous because il is w;u O'CMUfe
which uceeds me treasures of all olher states; it cannot be
exhausted except by default of lUes (which is ine_iable), though
it can be long delayed by the stimulus 10 mule .... (345). There-
fore, be considered the feasibility of forbidding the credi t system,
as a preliminary artielc in the efron 10 reach perpetual peace.
However, this is minor aside in his view of human history.
E5sentially we find the vicw repelillcd, in Hobbe&.ian ICnm, thaI
the nata will be 'dri~n by their own danger" 10 prepafC the way
for II distant international lOYemmenl for which there is no
precedent in world history. '7'hi.J gives hope fowJly that .. ." the
hullUlll race will be able 10 develop its o;apabilitiCli within a
univen.aJ world 1I00000mmeni (28), (emphasis mine).

NINTH TlI ESIS

"A PhiloJophical.AlI~mpt to wotk out a unr--sallaiJtory oo.:oniin,g

to 0 notum1 p/aII directed to acIIUving th~ civic unkNc of th~ IwmtJn
'flU must ~ rqmrkd as ponibk and, iIItktd. as contribUlUtg to tllU
md of NtllUre." (29)

Oil lhe face of iI, a hislory of humanity Ihal lI$$umcs what will
be lhe pinero of lhe future is 50 biased thai il can only be called
a romance. Kant does 001 wish "to displace lhe work of practicing
empirical historians with this Idea of world history ... based on
an a priori principle .. ." (30). His intere$l is in looking for an
organization pattern for "what would otherwise be a planle.u
conglomeration of human actions" (29).
What pattern can one find? "a regular progress in the constitu-
lion of states on our oonlinent .. ." (29). "The bistOf)' of civic
coMtitutions and their laws shows a pattern of "the good they
 OJ

contained" serving over long periods of time, and the evil destroy.
ing nations. Such a hislory of world Jegalsys\ems can serve three
purposes; ( 1) 'clarifying tM: confused play of things human: (2)
proph~8 huer political changes, and (3) ' giving a ronwling
view of the funu'c' (30). Kant is optimi5tic about humaniry'l

mon>l ,...,=
fu ture, although not at all optimistic about individuals making

A dramatic cballenge a1 the end. Our deM:endanu. will have

just one liignificant question about earlier history: ' What have the
I'Wious naJictu wtd ~1IU COIfJribulrd /0 the gouJ of world
citizenship, und ..hat ha>'e /hq daM /0 damuge iJ?" (my emphasis).
Science and an are interesting &litter, but the basic mailer is the
progress toward a moral world.. A moral world requires world
citizemhip in a single governme nt for the human race.

F ollowing the $tylc of Kant'l eMaY, we may outline his view of

history in the following way. (Thi$ is presented as an OOlline of
assertions that, in almost every case, have been discussed above.)
(1) IIIdividuals tur monal; 1M spV< is immonaJ.
(2) 17K prosieM of the JPW if the subject of hiftOf'j. Many
histories can be composed and justified by empirical evidence. The
point here is thai the morally most siJ,Rificanl of these bimlfin is
the history of the species.
(3) 11w: history of /M spies is a lIistory of inaMsiftg rationality.
The property of rationalily is here applied to the species, and not
to the individuals alive at a given moment. For example, contem-
porary 5OCietie$ aehieve many objcroves IOOre efficiently than
earlier 50cieties did. Health case, minimum itandards of living.
abolition of slavery, univerul literacy, and equal rights fOf" women,
arc rational objectives that stand as exampln. However, this does
DOt mean that the individual!. alive at the present are more
rational than those of previous ase!.. As a corollary of thi ..
(3.1) 11w: history of /he spies is a history of incnasing momlity.
The history of political divisions, from family sroup. to many
.. KANTS CONCEP1lJAL TOOLS

fl.lllJ.1ics, \0 vrn dty, and nation is a history of increasing the

area over which the same set of laws pr~l. To do this is to
increase the $cope of morality.
(Jol) 1M hiJtory 0{ 1M spit< iJ Q hiJtory of 1M ~ 0{
fru:dcm. Since freedom, for Kant. is", .. propeny of all ra tional
beings,' the &rowth or rationality means the growth of frudoUL
(4) The pi of 1M spiQ 11 a mcroJ~. This does nol
mean thaI the species is conscious of sueh a goal from the start.
It means that the 5pedes behaves aI if it had such a goal. Kant
ilpClls OUI this goal in the conception of the kingdom of ends, the
nolion of political justice, and perpetual peace (foul\(! in woru
DIller than this =y on hislOry). That the world is moving toward
this goal does not mean that it will be attained.
(5) II is the MlIIJ'e 0{ hunum iIuJividulll.s to FJUT.fU'. cmurodiClory
obj~. The "unsociallOciality" iii an example of Ihis, and Kant
develop!i lIIe importance of both sides of this pair of objectives.
The various plans (of other authors) for reaching "utopia" (or
individuals on tanh mUSI all dul with the effects of this proposi
tion.
(5. 1) lNiivjdualr WIIIIOI be ruliortul. This follows from (5) and
Kant'S conception of degrees of ratiolllllity. Individuals cannot be
rational on the whole, with re&pect to all their objectivel..
HOII.ever, we can IIope that the spedes becomes increasingly
rational.
(6) Individuob, tJioIIe, cUlVlOl be morul. 1lIc problem of
morality exists only ill. a social ~luatioll..
(7) 1"he SOUf(:e of re5pea for UuJiyiduoJ.s lies Ulilleir membership
in IwntQIIUy. The basis for the respect thai eacb individual must
have for every other individual, and for himself or herself, is the
humanity in the individual. In a 5(DSe, individuals participate in
the history of their species. "The species does make progress, and
individuals may gain (or claim) \Ihal might be called "re&pe<:t by
association" (an obverse of guilt by IWOCliuion, and 110 bener
founded).
(7.1) The soura: of conlelltmellt for indi";d!wls lies in Ih~iT
mrmlxrship ill ilumanity. However, to ~y that this is a ncceuary
 "
$OUTte of contentment is rIl)I to $a)' that it is sufficient. Individuals
an: I>Ot merely social They are a combination of humallily,
pmotUJJiJy, and perhap5 divillity." Therefore. the only possible
$OUrcc of contentment llUy still DOl be eooup 10 prod\lce it. One
is 001 merely human; one is also particu lar, unique person with
contradictory objectiva that seem \0 forbid resolution.
In sum, on thi5 view of bislOry. one may be ptSSimiJIic about
individual moral progress. bul optimUtic .bout humanity's own
f\lI\lTe.
 Three

REUGION WITIUN TIlE UMITS OF

REASON ALONE'

l. Prtl'Ke 10 lhe Firsl Edllion

The finl !lenience of the ,,",facc maku the point thaI moral
dedsioDS must be made withoul any consideration of ends or
incentives other than tbe moralla.... iuet!. The moral person rllU51
perform dutiC5 withoul concern for the idea of a superior being
waiChing. Therefore. morality does DOl need religion as , premise.
We expect this mueh on the hasis of Kanl'i previous work in
elbia. However, he has several surprises in itore for UL Morality
by itself has no need of rcliiio.o, but morality will be shown In
lead 10 reLigioo!
Kanl &oes 10 grelll pains 10 insist that he can never tamper wilh
the indepeodeocc of morality from aoy consideration of goal$ or
obje<:tivei. Afler several repetitions of this point. be takes a
dramatie new Ium. "An end does arise OIIt of morality" (p. 4).
Several matten prepare us for this consideration. Fint, he has
mentioned thaI withoul an obje<:tive DO determlnatioo of the will
can take place in ,human. Second. it is eoll$ide red reasonable
for us 10 ask, What is \0 rC5ull from this moral behavior of OlIn?
Third, reason cannot be iodiffereolto the problem of barmonizill3
OIIr activities wilh the end or re~uhs or moral i!)', if any.
LeI us retwn 10 the question, "Suppose ....e do behave our-
selves. and do SO purely 0111 of respect for Ihe moral l,w, what is
10 resWlT In TC5ponse, we fonnulate the idea ofa highest good
in the world. This idea has several properties thai must be
spedfied. The highesl good has two elements: (I) happiness., the
objeetive we do have; and (2) morality, the objective ....'C ought to
!lave. 1bese f',I,'O elemenll must be rombined in a special way for
68 RElUGION WITHIN ... REASON ALONE

Kant to call this the highest good: happiness must be propor-

tioned to obedience to duty, that is., happiness must be propor-
tioned to moral wonbi~ Kanl adm tbat t bis idea is far from
empty. We bave a nalunll need 10 conceive of a s.ingle consistent
objective for all our actions, and he adds that the absence of Ihis
would be 'a bindrance 10 moral decisiou' (p. 5). The serious
question arises, "What guarantee iii there tbat vinue will be
proponionally rewarded?" At tbis point, Kant simply responds,
"We must postulate a bi&her, moral, most holy. aod omnipotent
beilll which alone can unite the IWO elemenl$ of this highest good"
(pp. 4-5). We win hear muth more of this aflUmen!.
A rational beillJ am scarcely avoid raisinglhe queslion of the
kind of world Ihal he or she would creale, in which thaI creator
would be willing 10 be a member. Suppose an additional restric-
tion on lhis world: the lIUIle moral law must hold for everyone,
including the pef$On who is creating tllis world . .. creating il at
iul;t in thou.ghl. Now, after presenting us with this fanciful and
yet obvious problem, Kant gives us six predictions: (1) such a
pef$On would have to choos.e exactly the same thinll that is
determiued by the moral idea of the highest &ood: (2) thai penon
would also wiD thaI such a world should by aU means rome into
existence; (3) thai pef$On wou ld not waiver about (2), even tbouj.b
realizing that he or she, personally, might fail morally, and
therefore lose in his or ber own happinCS5; (4) he or she would
have tbe judgment of the degree of happiness rendered with
complete impartiality, as tbou&h it were rendered by someone else;
(5) and yet, the individual would have the judgment about
personal happine50S also roindde ...ilh his or her own judgment of
that happiness; (6) therefore. Kant c:onduder., humans must
imagine some resull$ in a universe in which they fol lowed their
duty.
Kant fonows this with his summary suuement, "Morality thus
leads ineluctably to religion, through which it exlenm itself to the:
idea of a powerful moral la.....giver, outside of mankind ..." (pp.
S~). JUSI what is the nature of this moral la..... giver. _ are not
told here. We must wait unti! much further aionl in the book
 Rdigiolr ~itlli" the Limiu of fleo...., AIOII~ 6~

before Kam returns to this question.. Going back oyer Kant'.

hypothetical example of a penon who wonders what SOrt of a
world he or lIle would create if it had to be a moral world, we are
uruek by several things..
Conclusion (2) above is particularly significanL Kant's
demolition of the ontological argument over the existeDCe of God
is considered & classic piece of reasoning. Yet we cannot avoid rc+
thinking it when Kant 1II)'5, ""The moral law demands that the
highest good possible throu&h our agency should be realized"
(p.S). 1bere is a considerable difference between (\) and (2)
above. Morality is IIOt u.tWied with the mere idea of tile highest
good; it is "ill bener that such a " "Orld "should by all means come
into existence." TIle victor over SI. Anselm's proof for tbe
existence of God oomes dose to adopting the logic of his oppo-
nent!
Despite the point just mentioned, the differences between
Anselm's proof and Ihe moves Ihal Kant makes here are signifi-
eanL Kant doe5 nol &ive uS a "proof" Ihal a moral world WSIIi; he
merely hold5 thaI a rational bema must will, must 11Ope, that such
a world can be brought about. Kant docs DOt coo11ate desire with
actuality. This (2) above is merely an example of a praamatie lest
of seriousness: To pursue an objective is also to pursue an
c(fidcm means for that objective. To hold Ihal one wanu an
obje~ and yet not show any oollCt!m about an efficient means
10 Ih.1 objective, is 10 daydream idly.
Kanl foilOWli tbis with the first of Ihe many long and si&nificant
footnOtes that we find all throu&h his book on rtligion. Apparent-
ly he was so anxious to avoid any delay [n publishing that he
added a 101 of si&nificant malerial in lhe form of eXlended
footnotes, rather tban laking the lime to ilK'Ol"pOrale this malerial
inlO the tex!.
1be passage in question is devoled to an anal)'5is of a ralher
dramatic proposition.. One of the most striking. original, and
influential parIS of the Cril~ of Purr R~a.wn was the assertion
and aoal)'$is of tbe argument thaI held that the laws of arithmetic
are synlhelic a priori prOpclilions. On the face of tile malter,
70 REUGION wrnflN .. . REASON ALONE

synthetic statements (stateme nts whose w bject and predicate are

oot deducible from each other) must come from e.;perience. from
outside the individu1oll. If such statements are d priori, they must
he analytic and nol synthetic.
Now, Kant wants us to consider the proposition, '"There is a
God, henee there is hi&bcst good in the world." He asserts tbat
if this proposition is to arise 'from morality alone" it mmt he a
synthetic u poiOfi. We are direned to both pam of the proposi-
tion, and 10 its stalUS. We tan't derive tbe prOpc:!$ition analytically
from moral ity becaU5C morality contains only the formal laW5
determining the concept of duty. Kam agrees that the "bare idea
of a monl law givt'r for all men is indeed idemicalto the general
moral conet'pt of duty," and this much probably could be cal led
analytic. Bul, shades of Anselm, " "C then read that the assertion
of God'i e.ristence carries us far bc:yond the bare pouibility of
such a thing. We bave a typical Kantian question: "How is such
a proposition " priori pouibleT" Kant continues very modestly
"ith tbe remarlr. that be will show us what he helieves to be the
key to this problem but can only indicate the maile r and oot really
devt'lop it here.
His "key" SlatU rather familiarly. Individuals have dual
objective" a subjective and an objective I:oal. The subjective goal
of rational worldly beings is their 0\0"11 happineSl, and the objective
end is the rational goal of respect for the moral law. He makes
the point. in a parenthetical exprwion, Ihat individuals in fact
have a ual\lte dependent upon s.ensuous objectives; sincc this is a
mailer of t~ IIdtIU(i' of tbe5C individual$. il would be absurd to say
Ihal they ' ought" to have such a nature.
Presumably, there's 00 poiD! in saying W I healthy human
beings ought to have two ean and one mouth; they do. Ii ~"OUld
be just as absurd to say Ihal they ougbl oot to have 501t1e property
lhat they anually do have, by nature. So, propositions concerning
facts about the happine5ii of sensuous beings mmt be empirical
and synthetie. Now, he lakes it 10 he a syntbetic practical
proposition giV1:n by pure reason Ihal "everyone ought 10 make the
higheslJood poi5ible in the world a final end: By "final end" he
 ~Iigion Wirhin r/", Limiu of Rf!Q.JOn Alane 71

0'\CalI$ an cnd whieh "c mbra~5 the unavoidable and at the lame
time is a suffici~nt rondition of all other ~nds" Kant points out
that this syntbcril:: a priori "proposition," Make the high~st good
poMibl~ in the world your own final ~nd. r~fers to a oonsequ~nee
that is DOt oontained in the moral laws and so c::annot be lak~n OUI
or tb~m anaIyti.;ally.
Why have any concern with ro~uen<:C when Kant has
alr~ady established that morality should properly show no ooncern
for ronsequ~nce1 Kant amwers his own question by making two
points. First. that "it is one of the ine5(:3~I~ limitations of man"
that for all our actions we must oollCeive of an end. And seoond,
that we suk something that ..... e an I~. while the moral law
alone mer~Jy arouses our respect. 1bereIor~, he puts things
togelher in this ronclusion: If moral behavior is to be ronsider~d
"the cause . . . of the highest good," tben sioce "human capacity
does not 5IIffiee for bringing about happiness proponiol1llte to
wortl1illCSl to be happy. an omnipotent moral being must be
postulated as ruler of the world, IInd~r whose care tllis balance
occurs. That i$, morality lead!. inevitahly to religion" (p. 7).
However traditional the phraseology of lhis rondusion, it can
be given a far from onhodox interpretation. Notiee thai Ka.nf's
oonelllSion 51aru wilh a oondi\ional, "if: H e eondudes Ihal II
moral being "mUSI be poslulated: Th is ronclusion is a hypotheli-
cal statemenl, and even within this framework we have almost no
detail of the nature of this omnipotent moral being. We shall find
reasons for thinking that in Kant's position a eenaln ooneeption of
humanity is almost synoll)'Il'lOllS with God. BUI I must acknowl-
edge thai this p. n ieu Jar note is altached 10 a sent~1lCe in whkh we
find thai Kant has referred 10 the idea of a powerful moral law-
giver "outside of mankind." It Ulould a\$(l be mentioned Ihal afler
raising the mailer of the human search for something that c:an be
~ and nol merely respected, Kanl drops the maner oomplclely
al this stage.
The remainder of this preface u. devoted 10 an analysis of
all\SOrsbip. Afler mentioning the majesty tllat we find in religion,
Kant abruptly adds, "But anything. even the IIlO!it subli me,
n REUGION WmUN ... REASON ALONE

dwindles under the hands of men when they rum the idea of il 10
Iheir own use" (p. 7). H is commenl on censorship begins plainly
enough. Moralily docs require obedience 10 Ihe authorities. He
adds. optimislkally, thai "all injunctiOIl$ or duly can be drawn into
religion." However, he goes on to explain that he hu the
obligation to respect not merely a lingle stale repation, bul all
of the regulations taken together. ( I shall relurn to this point
shortly.)
On his own analysis there should be a theologian who .ppl"OYeS
boob for the welfare of the sou l and also one who approves
boob for Ihe welfare of the scicnces (p. 7). The rclatioll$
betwccn the5c two must be such that therc shal l be "no distur-
bance in the field of thc sciences." Unless the sciCnce!i arc
properly protected from outside inlcrfcrcrw:e we are threatened
with the rcsulls thai d_Ioped in the timc of Galilco, when
theologians wanted 10 bumblc the pride of the sciences and almost
arrested the endcavors of human rcason. Kant makes the poiDl
that there is reaDy no danger .III all 10 Bibliat! lheology when the
philosophers borrow 50mtthing from the Biblc. TIle only pouible
IIli$chicf might OIXUr if thc philosophers try to import solllCthing
into Biblical theology. These comments on Biblical theology
concilldc with "A religion which ruhly declares war on reason will
nol be able to bold out in the long TlIO apin:n it" (p. 9).
LeI III relurn 10 the idea that Kam has employed 10 escape
from the absolute power of the censor. He agrees that it is an
injundion of duty to "Obey the authoritiesl" This Kerns as
absolute as grammar can make it. HiJ, response, however, takes
1.11 on crafty road. We must do more than simply do what _
arc lold: "obedience ... c:an be evinced not through a!lcntion
merely 10 bw in the form of single stale regulation and blind-
DCSli with respect 10 every other, hull)lt/y ll~, combillrd rcsp'
for IlII rPgUlatiOtU ltlkm 1~11f!t" (p. 7, cmphasis mine). 'The world
of law consists of more than one rcgubtion. A proper allitude of
obedience to law mllSI DOl restrict itself to jllsi one OUI of the K I
of laws that may bear on tbe maile r. Where there are two
regulations, ~ may use the serond"to limil Ihc USUrpatiOOli of the
finl .. .. (p. 8).
The idea that one must obey Jaws collectively, IlOtjust distribu-
tively (one-alatime), is of coD$iderable imponance and must nOi
be forgollen in imerpretina Kant', moral, ieaal, and political
view5.' Even where there i.5 just one buic principle, it may THUlt
in several applications or regulations, and lhese are not 10 be
obeyed on a merely disln"buti...-e basis 1be regulations (I) may he
consistent. (2) they may lie 011 a hlcrarchy. with one superseding
the othen., (I( (3) they nay present an antinomy. In the inteTW'
ins cze, the antinomy. lhere nay not be a solution that is
IIltisfaaory fivrn rhe SUfdpoinI of the itIdivitJuDh iIwol_M. As we
have seen, Kant'S lhenry nf history places individuals in just lhis
siNatinn. We shall de...-elop this further in the chapter on the
moral antinomy.
This prerate ends on a rather friendly conciliatory oote. Kant
agrees lhat Biblical theology and a purely philosophical theory or
reliJion (such u he presents in Ihis book) arc really rather
different Ihinp. For either to be thoroughly understood lhey m WI!
1101 be mixed However, he does SUlIJC5t wt after a course in
Biblicaltbeology a candidate might perhaps take .separate course
of lectures on pbilosophical theory or reliJioD and use book
such as his, or, he adds modestly, beller ooe of the same kind,
if il can be fouod.
The preface to the second edition adds DOthins of greal
theorC1ical interesL Kant inviles thoIIe who are worried about the
relalions berween revelation and the pure re1iaion of reason 10
think of these two as concentric circles.. Since revelation can
include the pure religion of reuon, bul a purely rational position
(lIMOt include what is historieal, revel.tion is the wider of the two
circles. Is a circle lhal wide needed? He relUn!5 to lhis maner
in the wt cbapter.
74 REUGI ON wm11N ... REASON ALON E

1. Pan OM: Concernla, tbe lad_lUa, of th~ EU

Prindpl~ witb the Good; Or, 011 the IUdkal Erll
III Human NIIII~

Kant opens this part by r~r~rring us to the optimistpe~imist

controversy. Is the history of civilization II history or a fan from
the happiness of the goldeo ag~ to th~ evil days or th~ pr~sent?
Or, is lhis history, instead, a (N.llem about which on~ may be
optimistic, a pattern of steady progress from a painful beginning
10 th~ happier times of the day? In g~neral terms, Kant JUggests
that the r~1igious views have taken the pessimilic side that v."e
have fallen into evil recently. Some prominent philosophers. and
recently those interest~d in ~ducation, have taken the optimistic
view that we are improving. PTeMimably Le ibniz would be amDII&
the prominent philosophers Kant h3$ in mind. And for the educa
tors, apparently it takes an optimist even to attempt to leach.
Kant soon makes the question IOOfe precise. Has morality
been increasing 01" decreasing through the O;OUJ1.e of human
history? This question leads immediately to an analysis of, firsl,
the nature of IOOrality, and thcn the nature of buman beings.
Kant explains tbat evil is not a property of actions tbemselvC$,
but is located in the principles or mnims by which actions lITe
chosen. A maxim is defined as "a rule made by the will. . .." On
what basis can we call someone evil? We obse~ actions not
maxims. Hov."cver, we can infer from several actiollS the presence
of a common undcrlyinJ principle or maxim. Suppose _ have
found a person, perhaps your$clf, whose actions are the results of
a rule made by that person's own free will, and not by an external
object determining the win or by a fU:ed natural impulse. 'The
nature or this rule is the targe t of a moral judgment, either good
or evil. If we were compelled 10 choose this maxim by anythi ng
fU:ed, either in our natute or outside of ~ there would then be
no responsibility and therefore 00 baMS for moral judgment. 8 111,
can we ask what determined a person to maLte just this cboice of
maxim? T o this Kant ansv."CR as foLlov.,,; The ultimate ground
or
for the choice maxims is Jocated In the individual, the individual
 Rtligion Wlillill tM UmitJ of RMlOtI AioM 75

alone has this respo1l5ibility, and al$O too ubimatt growrd is

ilucrutubk to UJ. Both parts of this answer are developed.
When he says thll the ultimate ground for ehoo$ill& maxims is
innate, Kant me'ns that 'man himself is it5 author: and we muu
neve r blame narure or credit nature for our own use of our
freedom. The inserutability of the grounds of $ODlCOne's free
choice of mora1 maxims is explained in this way. We want to
explain the ba$i$ upon which a rational beil13 hlUi dIosen a
principle. Now this choice must itself be made on the basis of
some principle Ihal has been chosen from among alternatives by
a free rational being. To be rational is to act on principle.
However, this choice itself is in the same predicament lIS the
original choice;;t mll$t also have. as iu. basis, $Ome principle. We
are faced by III infinite regress from mazim to me13-maxim, to
me13- meta-maxim lUi Kant's point would be put by contemporary
logicians. Since some maxim for action is apparently clIo5cn. and
since the basis fOf" this choice would apparently require an infinite
regreu, we are forced to Kant's eoodll$ioo that the ul timate basis
for the choice of the moral maxim cannot be understood and is
inscrutable.
The question would be meanin&1ess if individuals were neither
good nor evil. or if they were panly one and panly the other.
Therefore, Kant I\ltnS to an analysis of the is$ue between
' rigonsu' and 'atitudiltal"iaM.' His point can be put this way.
From the standpoint of the logic of statements, only three po!I5ible
positions exist on any subject. We can call them dogmatism,
skepticism, and eclecticism. The dogmatist holds that at least
$Orne statement is true. The ueptic holds that no statement is
true, and the eclectic useru that every statement is true. Now,
while a dogmatic position. as suggested above. holds thaI al least
$Orne statement is true, the dogmatist mayor may not go on 10 say
thaI be or she alone knows the true statements. Looking at these
three alternative position5, one must apee thaI to In)' anything
ckarly OM mu.st be a dogmalisf. A brief eumination of the other
IWO alternatives may be in order.
76 REUGION WITHIN ... REASON AWNE

The skeptie bu always had to face the Epimenides Paradox.

What of the !tUth of skeptidsm, of the statement that "no
statemeot is truer The skeptic does want to UKrt Ihe trulh of
Ih is. and yet, to do 50 the skeptic must OOIIntenance the fact t hat
there is al Icast one truc statement. If we have found one such
&em. we lhould examine it to see if any properties exist that can
be found elsewhere, and above all we must wonder how we were
t;\!cr so fonunate as 10 discover this unique prize.
The eclectic faces analosous problems. If every statement is
true, then the eclectic must admit thaI the denial of eclectici~ is
aI50 !tUe. And now we sec the real objection 10 both eclecticism
and skepticism: They deny a difference betwccn true stalements
and false stattmcnlS. To deny this distiDction is to give up any
rational basis for preferring one position 10 another. If no basis.
exists for preferring one position 10 another, all is ambiguity,
nothing dear can be said. Therefore, 10 say anythill& clearly, to
separate one's own position from the al ternatives, is 10 lIMUIIle
that II least some state ment is !tUe. Returning to Kant's fonnula-
tion, for his tenn rigorisl i luggest 'ab$olutw ' or ' dogmatist"; for
his term fuliIuditwrilHl I $!Iuest "Telalivi$t.' He brealts
latirudinarians into indifferentists and syncretists. I have called
these skeptics and edectiCL Kant says that the lenn rigotist ' is
intcnded to carry reproach, but ... actually praise$..' We can DOW
say the ume thing about the tenn "dogmatism.' Only dogmatists
can be dear enough for anyone to agree or to disqrcc wilh them.
The next question 10 arise is the mailer of whether a person
can be morally good in some ways and at the ume lime motalJy
evil in olhers. Kanl denies this. Either olle'. maxim is univen.al
or il is particular. The fint is moral, the sc:rond is DOL To be
both univcrul and panicuJar in the same seru.e would be a
contradiction (p. 20).
Kant next rums to the ancient Greek questions: Musl vinue
be learned? Is there more than one virtue? He proposes 10
anp'c r from two KpaTllte viewpoints: The finl question is
equivalent 10 "is man by nature indifferent as rcgards virtue and
vice'!"' From the standpoint of pure reason, Kant answen in the
 Rditfton Within the Limiu of &IJSOII Alofte T7

negative. We human belli&' do IKM learn the nature of vinue

(rom anything external 10 ou r own reason. The only vinue is
moralitY. However, by empirical5tandatds, judging human beinp
lIS they appear in experience. thC5C qUC:Slioll5 can be amwc:red
affirmatively. Human beings uppuIT 10 \cam vinuc. and they can
appearvinuous in some r"peru but not OIheB. We are promised
more detail in what follows.
Kant concludes this early section with the idea that the
qucstion of being sood or evil by nature docs not really apply 10
individuals but to "lIIe entire ra(:e" (p. 21). Otherwise, "one man
COIIld be coRSidered lIS good, by nature, another as evil" (p. 21).
h will tum OUI that individua\$ are, quite likely, all in the same
moral predicament.
AJong the way, Kanl has raised a question aboul the personali
ty or the temperament of vinue. ls a vinuous per5(lO COIII"a&eous
and joyous, or fear-ridden and dejected? The fear-ridden or
loIavisb frame of mind "can never occur without a hidden hatred of
the law" [the moral Jawl. The self jnflicted lorment of a repenlanl
~r Kant takcs 10 be "1IOlhing but inward regret al having
infringed upon the rules of prudence: He argues that only a
happy bean, only a ~ frame: of mind, is the mark of genuine-
ness in the virtuous di-position (p. 19).
Kant would apparently find lillIe moral value in publi~
confessions, in the literary genre naned by SL Augustine, in which
the repentant sinner tells U5 bow bad he used to be and how &nod
he now is. If, hard to reread the repentant sinners without being
reminded of Kant's rellUlrk that they arc in "a very ambiguoU5
state of mind: lIS they recall the good old bad days (p. 19).
Nut, Kant offers us the heading "Concerning the Origilllll Pre-
disposition to Good in Human Nature: This is an analysis of
tbosc e\cments in the fixed ro.taeter and natUfC of human beinp
that have immediate reference 10 the facull)' of desire and will.
Tbcsc are divided into: (1) The predisposition 10 wtimaJiry in a
membe r of the speci~ taken as a living beiD&- (2) The predispo-
sition 10 hwruvWy in someone. taken as. rational being. (3) The
predisposition to pmotIaliry in an individual, taken a.o; an accou nt-
18 REUGJON wrrnlN ... REASON ALONE

able being.. We are a Hille surprised to diSOO\ler that aCI\Jntabili

ty does DOt follow from rationality alone. Kant explains that
rationality alone provides DO incentives. Reason can decide
whether a maxim can be universalized, an decide on the consis
tency of a set of objtctivell, and can decide on the effimney of
various means for obtaining objective ... but it cannot specify
absolutely imperative moral laws as incentives. Well, then, if not
from reason, where do we get OIIr moral imperative? Kant says,
Were it not Jiven us from within, we sbould never by any
ratiocination brilli il into exislence .. ." (p. 21).
AI the conclusion of the Critique of PrvcticaJ ~, he had
given us one of the most poetic punges in modem philOiOphy.
'Two thinp fill the mind with ever DeW and increasing admiration
and awe, the oftener and more steadily we reflect on them: The
starry heavens above me and the moral law within me." 1be
moral law "begins at my invisible self, my perwnality."
1be pTedispos,tion to animality is put under the Jenera!
heading of physical and mechanical selflove that demands no
reason. This operates. (a) for self-preservation, (h) for the
propag:nion of the specie5 by the sexual impulse, and (c) for
community with other people, tbe social impulse.
'The predisposition 10 humanity goes beyond the ategory of
self-love, which is physical. and introduces comparison with other
human beiop. for which reason is required. "We jIIdge ounoelves
happy 01' unhappy only by m"king (Xlmparison with oUlers" (p. 22).
Kant m"ke< a comment thai sounds like. summary of Shaftcs<
buty's ethKlll theory. "Out of this selflcwe springs the inclination
to acquire worth in the opinion of the othel'$,"'
Animality and bll m"nity. although they are predispositiom
toward good. both occa'ionally provide vices of aU kinds.
Animality nay develop into the so-called beastly vices of gluttony,
drunkenness. and lasciviouslIC5. The predisposition to humanity
can develop into the vices o( jealousy and rivalry. and into the vice
of "seact and open animosity agaimt all whom we look upon as
oot belonpg to us (p. 22).
 &figicll Wil/litlihe Umiu of &ason Alotle 79

The third predisposition, personality, is the capacity for "respect

for tile moral law as in hsel f a sufficient incentive of tile will." A
Iel;s tecbnical tcrm (but 1101 a Kantian term) would liimply be
moral feeling. Kant adlb thaI cootrary to the predispositions 10
animality and humanity, thil; third predisposition provide$ no base
al all for any vice. Along the way lie finds that personality itself
is "the idea of humanity considered quite intellectually" (p. 23).
Despite tile poss.ibility of vice, arising from the fin;t two. Kanl
insists that all three of these predi$positions are natural in our
species, original in \IIi, and do not conlr.ldict the moral law.
Although one can develop vices from the fin;t two, human beiogs
sbould never tty 10 ' c.rtirpate' any of them. Were any of these
three missing. we would not be complcte human beings.
II mUSI be remembered that these three predispos.itiollS ....ere
introduced as predispositions 10 good in human nature. From
animality arises tile sexual impulse, the hasis for propagating the
species, for caring for the offspring. and for the social impulse.
community with ocllen;. From humanity arises. the de$ire for
equality.
Kan['s next topic is Ihe ' Propensity" to evil in human nature.
We must pay attention to a range of lerms thai he introduces. A
propell5ity can be dislinguished from a predisposilion be<:a\lSe
propensity can be either innate or ac:quired. His uample is the
remark that Ioavage peoples !lave propensity for intoxicants, bul
no craving until lhey are sampled. He takes inclin.tion (craving)
10 prellllppose ac:quaintanoc with the object of desire and the term
'instinct" to be 'a fel l want 10 do or to enjoy something of which
one has as yet no conception-such as the constructive impulse in
animal", or the saua! impullie. The term pa55ion is an incli natioo
that ududes mastery over ooc', Kif, and the term emotion has to
do with the feeling of pleasure and pain' (p. 24).
Kant presents us with three degrees of a capacity for evil. Fin;1
is the frailty of human nature seen in tile weakness in observing
adopted maxims The second is called impurity, and Ihis is the
prope nsity of mixing moral with other molives. The third is called
wickedness.. the propensity to Adopt evil maxims. In connection
80 REUGION WTrnIN ... REASON ALONE

.... ilb the second. impurity, )(anI repeats hili familiar idea tha t the
moral law alone should be the single all-sufficient itKentive fOf"
moral behavior. Then Kanl add5lbat people usually, and perhaps
every time, add additional incentives to the single incentive of
doing what duty demands. Th is remark carries tile /mplicuJion Ihal
I~ m<l)' not be any mtxal indMdual.J. From Kant's view, morality
would bind us qui te as weU whether or nO! a liinsle moral
individual ever ensled.
In rommeots on the thi rd category, wickedness or corruption,
Kant adds, "thiJ. propensity to evil is here ascribed to men in
general, even to the best of them .. .' (p. 24). Kam uses Ibis
cateSDTY whenever the incentive for action is anything Dlher than
the moral law itself: Not merely self-love in its benisn fonru, but
even "a kindly instinct such III sympathy" are examples of subven-
ing morality itself to something else. He remarks, "it is merely
accidental that Ibese causes coincide with the law, where they
wvld equally _II incite its violation." The &DOd works that result
rrom IIOmelbing like sodlll sympathy are no cx..use for the
individual who has put IIOffiCthina el!le in Ibe place of resped. for
law itself.
Our sense appetiw. are clearly relieved of any possible burden
of moral guill. Kant argues tbat every propensity is either physical
or moral "A propensity 10 evil can inhere only in the moral
capacity of Ibe will" Therefore, Ihe physical propensities,
JlUuoded in MiDSUOUS impulses, are outside of the moral battle-
iffiWKI. Kant has located the three sources of immorality in the
free choice of the adoption of ou r maxims, and not "i n what
touches sensibility" (p. 27).
Kant's next problem is to develop the notion Ibat althoup the
individual pe~ is evil by nature, this evil cannot be inferred
from the "concept of his species" becaUMi then ;1 would be
necesnry. H owever, Kant must account (Of" the universality of this
evil that we find in people throop elq)Crience. In his phraseology,
evil is not a natv.ral predispoi-itioo, but it is a natural propensity
(pp. 27-28). Since the individual is responsible for her or his own
 Rdigion Wallin 1M Umlu of &ason A/ont 81

immoral ity, .....e can funher call it a radical innate evil in human
nature, ye t nonetheleu brooght upon us by ourselves" (p. 28).
Next. Kanl direc:u our .nention 10 the empirieal eumples of
human corroplion. lbose philosophen (such as ROWICau) who
tal.ked romantically about the natural goodl1CM of the human being
in the 5()o-ca1led state of natu re, are dispatched wilh eumpln of
the unprovoked auelry of natives in New Zealand, in the Naviga-
tor blands. and in repom of travclen (Kanl mentions Captain
Samuel Heame) conurning the auelry of American Indians.
Then Kant dares us to offer civilized people as a oounter-e.u.mple.
Here, in dvilized $OCiety, we find: "Secret falsiry even in the
dosest friendship: "a propensity to hate him to wborn Doe is
indebted" (a point that Hobbes had developed), evidence to
wpport La Rochdoucauld in his remark that "in the midonuoes
of our best friends there is 50mething whkb i, IMlt altogether
displeasilll to us' (Maxim No. 583). and our international
situation. We find civilized nations stand toward each other "i n a
state of continuous readiness for war" (p. 29). This phrase is
almost identical to 1bomiU Hobbe$', description of the nature of
cold v.-ar. At this point in Ihe seo:ond edition Kant adds a (OCIIlMlle
Ihal rea.pitulales the leading ideas of his pllilosophy of history.
He disawes 'a cenain machine-like movement of nature 'tl"'-ard
ends which are nature', own rather than those of the nations:
Each state 'slTive5 to attai n a world monarchy... ." ' Yet thb
monster, after it has just swallowed up all ilS neighbors., finally
diMolve5 of itself and through rebellion and disunion breaks up
into many smaller States" (p. 29).
Kam's own political proposal is toward the construction of "a
league of natiom--a republic of federated free natioQi." but he is
forced to agree that it scell1ll impo5llible to imagine human being:!!..
whose nature remains as it is, who mighl live in a state of
perpetual peace. For his own proposals on tile maner of interna-
tional relalion.\, iCC his essay, "Perpetual Pea::
One of the points that he repealS i$ the mailer of the location
of evil. "Man's !iCIISUOLlS nature and tbe natural indinalioos arising
therefrom," are illl\Oeeol. Since these arc rlXed pam of our
82 REUGION WITHIN ... REASON ALONE

nature, we havt: no freedom to either have or nol ha,-e .e1l$\l0llS

objectives, and therefore we ate OOt alXOUDuble for them, In fad.
Kant adds that they can afford the occasion for vinue (p. 30). He
also givt:s II clean bill of moral health to reason i!KIf, Can reason
he malignant? Can reason ilSelf destrD7 its own authority? Here
Kantatgues that II free being must he considered the cause of its
own behavior and It would be a contradiction to think of this
being operalin. wilhout any \aw$ or caLI5CS.. A malignant reason
WO\I ld be an il'lCOnsislem cause and would leavt: U$ with the self-
contradiction of a beiDg whose operation is and is not based on
la"''5.
Kant oomiders the possibility of one's reason selling up opposi-
lion 10 law, as an incenlivt:. He qui<:kly deddes that such an
individual would be a devil, not a human heinS- Kant', brief
entertainilli of this idea and qui<:k dispatch of it are reminisc:cm
of Oe5c:aMes's similar treatment of the idea of II malicious demon.
In the DiJcowu M M~hod. De_Mel forces hi~lf 10 raise the
idea of whether we can troSI even dlOse of our conceptions Ihal
seem ITIOIiI dear and distillct.. Suppose that a malicious demon
had givt:n us just Rich ideas for the yke of fooling us. n.e
prospect is unendurable for Descants; with such a premise
nothilli could be trusted lIS a basis for rational decisiom..
Returning 10 Kant, after he formulates the nature of a devil, he
lells us briefly Ihal this designation is not applicable 10 the human
being (p. 30),
If lhe source of immorality cannot be found in a human being's
""nsuou. nature Or in ralional nature, where is the culprit? "Man
(evt:n the best) i. evil only in lhat he reverses the moral order of
the incentives when he adopts lhem into his muim" (p. 31). Kant
insists Ih~t e,-en the mosl wicked pelSOn docs not "repudiate the
moral law in the manner of I rebel re nouncing obedience to it."
To be I human being one must have the categorical imperative
internally. However, one natu rally finds both the moral maxim
WId the wbjeClive principle of IoClf-IOYe avaflable. n.e serious
distinction he~een a good penon and one who is not is lhe
question of ...",ric/, incDuiw is ...lKNdi"tlud /0 the 0111.". n.e
 Rdigion Wuhin 1M Limils of RetnOfI AI~ 83

propensily 10 do this, tn reverse the ethical order of the ince ntivel.

is the free natural propensity of evil.
Kant makes the imponant point that this evil is caUed radical
be<ause ;1 corrupts the around of all nwr.ims, and it is a natural
propensity ",'~If! by human ~rs since extirpation could
our only through good maxilllS, ,. ," H e insists, "Yet at tile
same time it must be possible to O'VCrcome iI, since il is found in
man, a being wllose arooll5 are free" (p. 32).
Here we: have the moral predicament. Moral evil is "ineltir
pable by human powers: yet,,, the wne time it must be possible
to overcome it (p, 32), T o ~ something, thaI obstade mUSI
exiSL Does Kant have a amtradictory position here? No; it might
even be the case that a person alone cannot DYercome an obstacle,
but it remains possible thai some other agen<:)' does help over-
corne iL From this point on in Kant'li book the reader lenses the
ae<:Uracy of his title and the scope that he has for the term
"religion." Before this point one felt that tile book lihould properly
lIave been called "MoroJiry Within tile Li mits of Reason Alone."
Kant is particularly devasl.llting wllcn he diiCU5.SC1i tile IiO-called
"peace of col\5,dence" of many wbo$e behavioT happellS to have
conformed to Ille requirements of moral action. UnlCM the
principle of their action was purely ethical, their innate guilt is just
as rca l as those: whose conduct has actual evil conscqucn~.
"'They mc rely clude evil consequencc:i by good fortune, They may
eV(:n picture th<:mselves as meritorious., feeling themselves guilty
of no IlUch offcnses as th<:y IeC Others burdened "";Ih: nor do they
ever inqui re wllelller good luck should IIOt lIave the credit, or
whether by reason of tile cast of mind whicll they could di~r
if they only WOlJld, in their inlTlO!lt nature, they would not have
practiced similar vices., had IIOt inability, temperament, training.
and circumstances of time and place whicll serve to tempI one, ..
kepI them oot of tile way oftllose vices. This dishonesty. by which
we lIumbug oorselves, , , . exlends ootwardly also to falsehood and
deception of otllen" (p. 33), Kanl lakes this false peace of mind
to be worthlCM and to be one of the elements wll icll constitule lIIe
"foul taint in our race" (p, 34),
 REUGION WlTIilN ... REASON ALONE

Having sellied the question of the kw:alion of evil to his

s.atisfactioll, Kanl tums to lhe mailer of the origin of it. Two
possibilities exisl: an origin in reason, or an origin in time. A
free aet has a rational basis and therefore "to seek the temporal
origin of free aCl$ as such (as though they were natural efferu) is
thus a contradiction" (p. 35).
A1 lhough he is shonly to make explicit use of Ihe scriptural
acoou nl of the origin of evil, Kanl find5 it ne ....uy to first Ioay
lhal of all the explanations of the spread of moral evil, "the most
inept is thai which de5Cribes it as descending to us as an inheri-
tance from our first parenl5" (p. 3S). His point is that if we gOi it
as an inheritance we would have no rCiponsibility for it ourselves.
Every evil aelion lhould be looked at as though the individual
"had faUen into it directly from a State of innol1Ce." Regardl~
of the early or recent moral hislory of an individual, "it is now still
his duty to he ller hil1l5elf. To do 10 mUSI be within his power:
Therefore, we ""vCr search for tbe temporal origin of a deed, but
look only fOf" the principle or muim from wh ich it comes, its
rational OrigiIL
Next Kant rums to a mmpMison bet_en his accou nl of the
origin of evil and the scriptural account. He avees Ihal whal he
writes is nol intended 10 be scriprural exegesis. However,"it is
possible to explain how an hislorical account is 10 be pul 10 a
moral use without deciding whether this is the intention of lhe
author, or merely our own interpretation .. ." (p. 39). His account
agree.s in &Cneral terms with the manner in which the problem is
presented in the scriptu res. "'1"be moral law became known 10
mankind, as it must 10 any beiol nol pure but templed by desires.
in the form of a prohibition" (Genesis II, 16-17). Kanl in terprets
Genesis III, 6, as humanity'li search for other incentives beyond
morality. Genesis 111, S, is an eumple of inward deceit, Ihal is,
a lendency to deceive one's self in the imerpretation of the moral
law. 'Accordingly. the Bible (the Christian pof\ion of it) denomi
nales the author of evil (who is within us, as the liar from the
beginning .. ." (oole, p. 37). This makCill clear to Kanl IlIat ....-e
daily act in the same way and "in Adam all have si nned."
However, Kant imists on one radical difference betwee n our
situation and that of Adam For us., "there is presupposed an
innate propensity 10 tranSgression, wbereas in tbe fin;t man, [rom
the point of view of time, there is presupposed DO sueb propensity
but rather innocence; hence transgression DO bis pan is called a
fall into sin; but with us sin i5 represented as resulting from an
already innate wickednes.s in our nature.'
But Kant insists that we eanoot locate the seat of evil in tbe
first man, and we must DOl look fnr a point in time at which to
specify Ibe origin of a moral character. He does agree that if we
want In uplain I10t the formal but the empirical existence of
wmethina. for example. of moral cbaracter. we find ourselves
drawn to a temporal framework, and be ad~ "Pe rbaps il is for
this reason that Scripture. in confnrmity with tlti5 weakness of
ours, has thus pietured the temporal origin of evil' (p. 38).
So. the origin of our propensity 10 evil remains inscrutable to
us. AI the end of the commen!5 on G<=I'IC~ Kant holds that the
Biblical narrative upre55t5 the inconceivability in this fashion.
1be nurative locates evil oot in human beings, 'but in a !>pirit of
an originally loftier destiny: How evil COt into !bat spirit is lefl
beyond uplanation for us, but it is made dear tbat, "mi n is
represented as having fallen into evil only through seduction, and
hence as beinl 001 basically corrupt .. ." (p. 39). In the lasl line
of Part I Kant eoncludes, "For man, therefore, wbn despile a
conupled hean ~t possesses a good will, there remains hope of
a return to the good from whicb he has 5tra~d" (p. 39).
At the end of Pan I. Kant has a lenpage ~l'ICraI Observation
on the rubject of Works of Grace. Here he develops the concep-
tion of the rnle thaI Grice pllYS in his religion. Much nf his
position can be summed up in the foUowin& outline:
1. If we ought to do 5Omething. it mU5t he the case that It lies
within our pov,.er. Duty demands nothing that we cannot
do.
2. The demands of duty have two aspects: (a) a rtV'Dlutinn in
the penon', "cast of mind,' choice of principle, and (b) a
gradual reform in thai ptBOn's sensuous nature-the degree
86 REUGJON WJ11HN ... REASON ALONE

of vinue in perwtlill behavior. Q is equivalent 10 a kind of

rebinh, becomina a new pel'5(ln.
J. Allbaugh it is pm'ible for a person to behave morally, it
mighl IIOt be possible to do so without some ' supernatural
cooperatioo" (p. 40).
4 . To receive supernatural cooperation. a penon mU51 firsl be
_hy of Ihis.. 11ris wonhinCS5 depends on the free choice
of the individual alone.
S. If a pmon Is _hy of USislanCe, thai individual can Jwpe
thaI wbal is 1101 within his or her own power will be
supplied by cooperation from another sou rce.
6. This cooperation, this work of Grace, is incomprehensible
to us. This mW;1 be so beaiuse, on the one band. to use
the idea we must understand what it is that we do to
achieve il; and on the other hand, it is the meaning of a
work of pee that we doo', do it, tN.t il is IlOl OUT deed
but the deed of another.
Eacb of tbese points is apanded in detail, and a number of
additional ideas are introduced along the way. The argument thaI
leads Kant from worthiness to the hope of Grace is an argumenl
thaI goes beyond the limits of reason alone. However, Kanl offers
the prqmatic argumenl that reason can use somethina withou l
understanding it.
He is quile eoncemed to se~le (tI) dogmatic faith which
pre te Dds 10 knowledge and (b) reflective faith which makes
fIbsolutely 110 d...uo to koowl~. Kant illSists tpin and "lin
thai nothins of the supematunll. can be understood either
theocetically or practically. But, if supernalural cooperatioo is
incomprebeIl5ible. il is b.r from useless 10 hUJnanity. AlIOwr
polot that be repetts emphfltically is that it is IIOt necessary for us
to know the nature of this rooperation. "It is 1101 e~ntifll and
hence not netessary for e-.eryone 10 know what God does or has
done for his salvation, bul it is essential to know what man himself
must do in order to betome worthy of this aWst.a.nte" (p. 47). He
adds that il is obvious that different people fit different times must
form di fferent tonceptions of tbis supern.aturfll cooperation, "and
 Rdigion Mthin 1M Umiu of Rea.wn AtoM 87

that with entire ~ncerity" (p. 47). However. Kant divideli religion
into (1) the endeavors to win favor-mete worship-and (2) moral
religions-religions of good life conduct. Those in the first
category depend on the pleasanl thought thai they eM be made
eternally happy without the need to become morally bener.
FollCflving this Kant .dds. "Of all the public: religions which have
ever eaisted, the Olristian alone is moral" (p. 47). This leaves a
lo!: of territory available 10 private reliJions.
Worthiness requires morality. and we are kd to the question
of the emtence of moral heros, if any. Kant discusses moral
education of children, and inDsts that even children can dcteCllhe
smallest trace of sclrlSb motives mixed with proper ooes.. He.ods
that we should ocvcr teach childfen 10 admire vinuous fictions
becansc the children might fall victim to the thoughtthflt vinuous
actioo was somelbing extraorciliwy instead of the Dmple duty of
all people. No bero-wonhip for Kanl. No Doe has a restrictcd
monopoly 00 the UodefSl&Ddioa: of morality. NOI only children bul
even people "of Jl"ealest limitations" are capahle of beina im-
pressed by "respect for an aaion conformiDJ 10 duty" (p. 44).
In the disol ion of the problem of reconcilina freedom of the
55

will with detenninism, Kant inuoduces the rather oovel concept of

pre-determinism. Pre-dctcnnioism isuplained as the poiition that
bold$ thai voluntary actions have their detcrminin& grounds in
antecedent time. What bas already happened is no longer wi thin
our power, yet, if it is taken as an element in a voluntary action,
it must be within Ihe power of the subject aI the moment,
Uofonuoalely, after leading us to tbinlr; that ..... e were going to be
treated to an explanation, we notice that Kant has prefaced the
word "predetenninism" with the remark that we wish 10 understaoo
it, but we IICveT shall In OIapter IX. "MYSIery- YS. Undecidability,"
we $ball lind morc 51tisfactory analysis of the limits of our
uoderstandina of this and related concepts. We can IIS5IlDJe that
the individual has free_ill without understandins every aspect
of the origin and nature of this notion.
88 REU GION WJ11iI N ... REASON ALONE

J. Part Two: CoIl'l1llQ tM CollftiCl of the Good with

the Evil Prlftdple ror Sove~lpty o~r Mall

In the introduction to this part, Kant compares Iris position to

the ethical theory and contributions of the Stoia. 'They are
perfectly natural grDIIP foc Kant to ronsider bause they .Iso hold
an intention morality. 1'bey a1so took the moraJ question to be
matter of the kind of intention of the individual rather than
property of the ~e ol the act. Consequence, wbat
happell$ to one, body, property, reputation, or office, Is deter-
mined by the laws of the external world. Whetber you are 10 be
emperor or slave depends on the ouUide W(lr!d and not on
)'OlITR1f. However, YOUT preferences, Ihe Stoics thought, are
entirely your ebooiillll. So they took virlue to consist in the kind
of ehoice someone made within tbe area under personal ronITo\,
tbat U, Ihe individual's own intentions.
While agreeing with this much oltbe Stoic position, Kant says
Ih .. t they misuoderuood lhe enemy of virlue. They tbougbt the
rontest WII$ berwcen re~ and tbe natural indinatioos.. K IU\I
imisl$ that "natural inclinations, coll5idered in themselves, are
good, that b, DOt a matter of reproaeb" (p. SI). He a Ils it useless
as well 11$ harmful and blameworthy to try to eliminate them.
H uman happillC50S requires that they oper..te in harmony ralher
than dashing with each otller. If the Stoics misundentood tbe
moral struggle as a struggle with one's inclinations, what really is
the moral struggle? As Kant has already held, genuine evi.l
coll5isl$ in the fact thai one does DOt will or wi$h 10 ...~th$tand
one's inclinations when they tempt uaDSgreWons. Not the Inclina-
tions themselves, but the choice of principle that gives them full
KUJte. Evi~ just as good, is to be found in principle.
Kant ilIumates his point by mentioning that Cbri$tilU\ ethics
has represented moral coodnes.s as differing from moral evil not
in lhe way thai heaven differs from earth, but as heaven from hell.
He adds thai this is philosophically correCl in meaning (p. 5)). In
wpPOrl of this he quotes Ephesians VI. 12. "We wrestle not
agaill$t flesh and blood, but against principalhiel\ and powers. .. ."
 Rtli,gion WilIWt I~ Urn/u of Reason AtoM 89

11Ie next section anaIyus the 5O-<:alled legal daim of lhe sood
principle 10 50Vtreignty OYer humanity. Kanl looks for a personifi.
cation of the idea of the good principle. His philmophy of history
and ethical theory have already prepared us for his answer. TIle
personified idea of the sood principle is lhe monJ perfertion of
humanity. The only end of creation, and the object of a divine
deaee, is the oomplele moral perfection of humanity. By
humanity he mtall$ rational ean.hJy existence in gcneraL 1be only
world pleasing to God is a moral world. 1be ideal of moral
perfertion is not only our universal duty as human beings, hut also
"can give WI power" (p. 54). Kant conlinues, rather oddly, "we are
nol the autbol'$ of this idea." The ideal of humanity'l moral
perlertion is somebow found in us. presented to WI by reason, bul
in a way that would be more appropriateJy put by Jaying that this
idea has come down to us. Apin Kant holds that we cannot
comprehend how human naNte itself could have produced iL We
can best undCl'$tand the idea of. moral disposition by "picturing
il as encompaned by obsuu:les. and yet in lite race of the fiercest
onslaugbl$, victorious (p. 55). We represent this 10 ourselves. he
boltb, in the idea of a person who is willillJ not only to behavc as
a perfect.ly moral human being. bul to risk the grealest of induce-
menu and any affiietion 10 do 10, including "the 10051 ignominioUll
death rot the sood of the world and eYen for his enemies" (p. 55).
Again. Biblical symbol is interpreted in a strictly moral fashinn.
J USI bow much objective reality can we give 10 this personified
idea of lhe good ptiftCiple? Kanl holds that lbe idea of a penon
moraUy _II pleasing 10 God is available 10 WI without any actual
empirical examples. This idea is already present in our reasoning.
For an individual 10 be J1.Ilded by Imitating an actual person rather
than the ide. of morality itself. would be a confession of the
individual's "moral unbelief" (p. 56). This would show a lack of
faith in vlnue itself. If, iru;lead of virtue, a person is impressed by
a claim tn havc perfonncd miracla, then thai penon is abandon
ing the essential idea of moral wonh.
Kant speculate$ that if an atwa! indiYid ... al appeared on earth
who had descended from heaven, 'l,Ipema\urally beaO!!en, thaI
90 REUGION WTIHIN ... REASON ALONE

person would in no way benefit us morally. The cmtence of the

idea of moral behavior in the human souL 'is iuclf wfficiently
incomprehensible without our adding 10 iu supernatural oripn' (p.
57). Kanl adds thaI if there were such a holy person 00 earth, 10
usc thai pel'$On a5 lID example 10 us would hirKIer rather than
assisl frail human nat\lle in its pur$Uil ol moral ity. We could
simply Jay that this supernalural cumple behave5 morally because
II has a wiD that is 1101 templed by evil. Kanl agrees WI il is a
limitation of b1!me" reason thaI we can give no moral worth 10
anything witbovt representing it in human guise. "Therefore, he
lhlnks that it is perfectly acceptahle 10 think of a perfea being in
human guise a5 an analogy. However, he warns, if we think that
we can take our analogy and ronsidcr il as lID extension of our
knowledge, we have rommiltcd the ronsidcrable errOl" of anthropo-
morphism. Kanl adds that anthropomorphism has ITK)5I injurious
consequenCC5 10 the moral point of view in religion (note, p. 58).
To arJUe by analoay is always to argue fallaciously. Reprdlcs.s of
how m.any propctlics two obju have in common, we have no
warTlIDl for boldin& Ihey must share some additional property. In
the lasl two pans of the book, Kam returns again to the dangeB
of anthropomorphism.
Tn the IlCXI IiCction Kanl ronsiders the metter of deathbed
~n.ions 10 moral ity, and the poeral problem created by the
fact that morality requires an eOOley progress and human life is
finite.
A SOrt of moral happillC$S would be obtained if we were sure
that our disposition had reall)' changed for the better. How can
thi.s disposition be judged'! T o trusl our feelings about such a
matter is rather perilOU$, Kant bold$.. 'Mao is nCller more easily
deceived than in what ptOlI101es his good opinion of himsclr
(p. 62). The only basis for judging the reali(y of. new disposition
is the Dllure of the action thai follows from il. This is the only
basis thaI human beings have; a supersensible heing might be able
to know directly our inner disposition. Although ~nt makes clear
Ihal left 10 our "feelings' we deceive olU'selves caslly, he roncludcs
 fWi&ion Willlill tl~ Umits 0/ &aJon AIoM 91

that "a man cannol buy his own reason." Fcelings and the rational
powers. it will he recallcd, are qui te diffcrent mailers.
Now, take the question, "What at Iifc', close may a man
promise himself, o r wbat he has 10 fear, on the ha$is of his way of
lifc: Kanl Jhinb that the aR$WCr 10 thi$ requires. judgment
based on the wholc of a person's life, and not a mcre seament of
il. Ccnainly DOt the very last sesment of il .lone. This question
must he addrcned 10 lhe judge within a person, and I severe
verdiel will be pronou ...... d on herself or himself, because, Kant
thinks., one canool bnbe ooc', own loaical powers. If person
thinks !bal he or 5hc is 10 rome before an outside judge, the
e:o:c:uses are immediately under preparation. There are limill 10
the degree 10 whieb we can fool OUT own reason.
The remark thai "all'. . .~ ll thai ends we Ir annoys Kanl
considerably if it is applied to moral history. Kant holds that
inunoral .ctions cannot be wiped out by any subsequent moral
crediL Moral debts cannot he handled like double-entry book-
keeping.. There is no IrlllWlli$sible liability: No one else can pay
off our motal deblS, "the IOOSI penonal of all deb\$." In ronncc-
lion with this matter, he considers the question of whether lbe
punishments of hell are finite or infinite. This is called "childish,'
and a dtildish qution is liken 10 he one for which even an
answer would leave us 00 wiser. For this qUC5tion, as for all
Teligi0U5 qUC5tiom, Kant considen what affe it might have on an
individual'. morality.
Turning to tbe malter of the duration of hell let's ronsider the
al ternatives from Kan!'s viewpoint. If the punishments are finile
they mipl DOt operate in a seri0U5 eoough fashion: if infinite lhey
would either terminate hope: or raise the hope of romplete
immunity. Ratber Ihan b.ave any dogma on the question, Kant
prefet5 10 have an individual personally frame I concept of the
future state that miahl be dC$Crved on the basis of his or her
moral condition up 10 the prC$Cnt moment.
He generalizes here that if we limit our judgmenl to regulative
principlC5 tbat apply to morailife instead of aiming a.t ronstitutive
92 REUGION WITHIN ... REASON ALONE

principles for the knowl~dp of Mlpersel\!iibl~ objccU, we will be

mucb bell~r off (p. 65).
Does Ih~ auill of all human beinp mean Ihal DOlhing bin
~ndless punishmenl is befor~ us? Kanl at]UeS thaI it Ih~r~ is a
genuine moral revolution wilhin the individual, if he or she really
beromes a !leW penon, w~ sliIl have !he qu~slion of wh~n
infliction of punishmeol I'kes place. Even if this new penon is
free of pill, the old OO~, the penon b~ or she used to be, stiD
deserves punishment Kant holds thai punishrnenl lakes place
neither before DOT after the change of heart, hul 'We mll5l think
of it as carried out dLiring the change of heart itsclr (p. 67).
Surely a uniqu~ conception of divine punishment Mor~ a nominll
than an adual 5Olution 10 the problem of the punishment of Ihe
old person.
Kanl is rather u.ncharil.lble aboul the psychology of those who.
" the end of Life, have a d~rgyoun summoned. II wu already
mad~ cIcar thaI !he ckrgyman can in no way remove guill for past
lT~ons. If Ih~ clergyman is supposed 10 o;omfo" moral
anguish, the r~proacbes of consci~nce, h~ finds rath~r awkward
advice in Kan!. OIIr aUlhor holds, AI such a time conscience
should be tllher stirred up and sharpened in order that lhe dying
man may not nealea 10 do whal good he liIill may" (p. n). II is
immoral "10 -.dminisiU a 50" of opium to the consci~nce" (p. 72):
MI&Il~stive of the phrase thaI Manr was 10 Ust 10 describe religion
(opium of the ma .....s).
In the las! seclioo of Pan II Ka'nl relates Ihe Bible 10 !he
conffiCI betwccn the sood principle and lhe evil principle. He
repr~sents the sood and the evil principle as persons outside of
the individual. and as penons who pit their strengths against each
other. Kant desl:ribes the moral sirnalion "in the Jewish theocracy"
al the time when a penon appeared among lhem proclaiming
himself "as indeed truly human with resped 10 his I~achin.gs and
~Jllmpl~, y~t also as an eJl\l'Cl)' (rom Huycn who. Ihrough an
original innocence, was not invoJy~d in the bargain wilh the evil
principle" (p. 74). Kam traces the familiar IilOry of J esus and
concludes that "the moral oulcome of th~ combat as r~gards the
 ~ W"uhin 1M Umiu uf RmW"l AJo.te 93

hero of this "orr up to lbe time of his deatb. is really not lbe
OOIIQIIerill& of the evil principle-for iu kinadom still endures, . . .
but tlle breaking of iu power to hold those who had so long been
iu subjects .. ." (p. TI).
Kant calls the ac:aJllnt of the eUYO)' (rom Heaven a vivid mode
of representation whose spirit and rational meaning are valid and
binding for the whole world, once il is divesled of iu mystical veil.
"Its meaning is this; Thai lbere exists absohncly 110 g}vllion for
man apan from the sincerw adoption of genuinely moral
principles into his dUposition; that what works agaillSt this
adoplion is 001 so much the sensuous narurc, which so often
receives the blame. as it is a ocrtain seifin<:urred perversity .. .
which lbe human race has brought upon itself . . ." (p. 78). Kanl
c:oncludes this section with another insistence thai the only muk
of the presence of goodoCS$ in an individual is the well-ordered
oonduct of personal life. He summarizes the ~on as an attempt
10 discover, in scripture, Illeul one sense which harmonizes "'with
Ihe most holy leaehings of reason" (p. 78).
The General Observation at the end of Pan II is the place in
wbich Kant deals dirca1y with the problem of miracles. ""There "Ie
fmd two general objections 10 any prelended know/~ of
miracles. One objection is moral and the other scientific. His
moral objc<:tion is Ibis: The belief in miracles is superfluous from
the standpoint ola moral religion. He defmes a moral religion as
one that oonsists not in dogmas and righlS, but in the heart's
dispositiOll 10 fvIfill all human dUlies as if they were divine
oommands. Since morality adnowledges as completely authorita
tive the commands of duty, "Commands primordially engraved in
the heart of man through rea5On,' we have Do need for any
accreditation through miracles. Kant quoles John IV, 43, "Eltocpt
)'t! see signs in wonders, ye will IIOt believe." From the moral
viC\\-poinl il is useless 10 debale the narnllivCl or inlerpretatioru
of miracles, since the moral religion, "the true religion," can
maintain itself on rational grounds. Kam agrees Ihal "the penon
of the teacher of lhe one and only religion, valid for all worlds,
ntJy indeed be l mYSlef)': His appearance on eanh and H is
 REUGIQN WJTHlN ... REASON ALONE

evenlfuJ life and His wflering may all be IIOthing but miracles .. .'
(p. 79). However, in U$ing lhese historical acoounts we must never
"make it a tenet of religion Ihat the knowin&, believing. and
professing of them. are Ihemse lvcs means whereby we can render
ourselves _11 pleasing to God" (p. SO).
Kant points out the incoll5istellC)' of those who believe in
ancient mirades but nol in recent ones, in UDall mirades but not
large ones, in miracles described in church bl.ll nol miracles
described in !be civil court 'The word "mirade" is underslood to
refer to an event in Ihe world whose operating laws of its c:aU$e1i
are and mUIiI remain absolutely unknown to ~ To know lhatthis
is !be case we would bave to know flT5t that an event is deter-
mined by a law and IieOOnd that we CIIJ1IKM know the law that
determines !be event. Both of the5e pam require an imprCMive
amount of knowledge.
Concerning tbe traditional idea W t at times and ciraunstaneeS
God allows naNre to d<:vlatc (rom il5 own laws, ~nt is patti(\!-
larly sarcastic. H is point is that if _ make this assumption, we
give up any hope of having even the slightest conception of
natural law determining any event. Reason would be crippled in
C'Yery way. This would mean tbat tbe most 5eCUte knowledge we
have of natural laws would be no belle. than the wildest fan<:)'.
Essentially, Kant is saying this; Myuery,]CS; miracle, IkI.
A special diseussion is devoted to so-c:alled lheistic miracles..
Tbc5e are events in which something is repre5Cnled as commanded
by God although it contradicts morality or natural Idencc. Kant
insi515 in the "rongest way that if a IiO-Called command of God
"flatly contradicts morality. it cannot. 6cspile all appcarallCC$., be
of God.' As an eumple, he gives the case in which a father mi&ht
be ordered to kill his son who, so far as he knows, is perfectly
innocent. Abraham was absolutely wrong 10 prefer the apparent
command of God to the commands of morality. Kant's criticism
of Abraham is not made lightly or casually. It appears on p. 82
and again in the final pan of this book, on p. I7S. An apparenl
command from God may always tum OUI to be erTone~ We
have 00 buis lor /cJw,.v., what is a direct or even an indirect
 &/igi0ll W"Jlhill I/~ Umil$ of RtflSOII Alotle 95

"""'lle from God. For Kam il is simply impossible to imagine

Ihlt God could rommand an immom lei, and so. 10 repeal. a
command thai molnldiCl$ morality cannol be I genuine command
from God. The highesl allerion for any of lIS mllSl aMa)'$ be OIIr
own reason.
Wbal is for Judaism I profOllnd eumple of obedience to God-
Abraham's response 10 the command 10 slaughler his son-is for
Kanl an enmple of the immorality of reLigiOt.l5 fanalicism.
Kanl follows his (:Ommen! aboul Abraham with the remark, "In
the affairs of Ufe, it is impossible for us 10 count on mirades or 10
tale lhem inlo consideration al all in OIIr use of reason (and
reason mUSI be used in every incidenl of Life)" (p. 82).
Kanl makes eLear lhal although be can find no use at all for
miracles in either moral or scientific reasoning, he Goes not dell)'
!heir possibili ty or reality. He considers in some detail Ihe
argumenl of those who poinl OIIt thl! scienti!ts arc. after all,
ignorant of a great deal We do I'lOl know the "'''SC of Iravity, of
magnetic force. etc. In his theory of knowledge. Kanl had already
argued that knowledge of causal relationships requires a eombina
lion of Q priori categories and SCIISC data. and does not include
knowledge of thingsin-lbemsclve5. But the scriOt.l5 question for
Kanl is !he qucstion of what use somethinl can be for morality.
Here he finds the apparent colUislency of the scientific picture of
the world of yeat relWUraDCe 10 a mind lookin, for ra tionality;
the very threal of miracles he finds 10 he just the opposile.
Kanl points OUllhal so-c:alled natural wonders arc exhilarating
to the spiril. whereas ' the ~irit is dejected by a ... miracle'
(p. 83). His explanation is that a natural wonder awakellS the
hope of discovering new I.W$ of DIlUre. while the mirlcle .rouses
the fear that reason shall be discovered 10 be inadequate. If
reason is inadequate. our moral incentives might be II Dtnl.'ilWOrthy.
llIc ignorance of the scienti!t Kantlvkcs 10 be honesl modesty.
llIc assertion of miracle would lead 10 what he calls "a be
witched world.' The real horror in such a bewitched world is Ihat
we could no longer !niSI reason and therefore no longer know
96 REUGION WITItIN ... REASON ALONE

whether. without our being aware of it, our moral incentives

remain consistent.
Kant is careful to keep open the possibility of miracla and
concerned only to deny IlK: possibility olluwwkdge of miracles.
No one can claim to comprehend "whether or Dot the di rect
influence of tbe creator is req\lired for ... \lie delicate beallty of
color in the plant kingdom ... or the inner perfection or mecha-
nism in the animal kingdom" (my order, p. 84). "To vent\lI'C
beyond tile limit" of reason is ruhness and immodesty, "although
tbm e who suppon mirades frequently pretend 10 eEbibit a humble
and selfrellO\lncing way of thoogbt" (p. 84).

... Patt TIlree: The Victory ot the Good o~er lhe E\11
Principle. a nd the Foul1dlnl of a Klncdom or God 011 Eanb

In \lIis pan of his book Kant explains 1m process by which

humllllli arc to combat evil. At Ihis point the distinction between
the concept of humanity and the concept of the human individual
becomes crucial. lbe individual alone, for example, the lasl
person on earth. cartn!M be immoraL Where the re is only one
individual in the universe. the principle that person follows is abo
the principle that is univef1.ally foUawed by everyone, consistently.
Therefore. the individual can easily convince herself or himse lf
that \lie temptations to bebave immorally don't come from
personal nature bul "bccaus.c: of mankind to whom he is related
and bound" (p. 85). Lust, greed, etc. arise only in the company of
Others.. It', not that one of these individuals is more immonl than
the otber, "il wffices that they are at hand, thtthey a re men, for
them mutually to corrupt each Otber's predisposiwns and malre
one another evil" (p. 8S).
Human society is the ijOUrcc of evil. human society alK\ is the
potential means for the maintenance o f morality. From Kant's
viewpoint the spread of the "5OVe re ignty of the good principle" can
QCalr only in a $OCiety, in an ethical $OCiely. He then develop!i the
notion of an ethical commonwealth. whose purpose would be to
spread I~ws of virtue in all their srope "upon the enti re human
 race" (p. 86). In .orne detail Kant presents this idea of an ethical
commonwealth and its relation to the political commonwealth.
Part m from this point on is divided into, first, a philO$Ophical
acrount of the victory of !he good principle in the founding of a
kin8dom of God on earth, and second, a historical acrount of the
same victory.
In the philO$Opb.ical acoount, we find Kant's interpretation of
seven key notiOIl$. I will foHow Kanl's numbering. and will
sununame the argument at the end of his seventh assertion.

I. Concemins the Ethical State of Nature.

A political state is a relationship !hat holds be~en people
who are bound by laW$ of coercion. An ethical nate, or an
ethical<ivil state. is a relationship between people who are united
under non-ooercive laws, laW$ of virtue alone. By a state of nature
one means, following llJomas H obbes's language, a situation in
which individuals depend upon themselves for their security. If
there is no powerful public autbority, we have a state of nature.
Hobbes had explained thai be fore a covemment exists human
beinp are in this stale of nature. Under such oooditiODS of eaeh
pefSOD al war with every other, life is "0.a5ty. brutisll, and short."
'Iberefore. people agreed to give up some personal powers on
condition that everyone else do so; !hes.e powers are !hen &lven to
an individual who beromes king. Because that person has more
power than any other combilllltion of individuals, the king's orders
become law. Hobbes argued that for individual iiCCUrity a rational
person Iibould WlInllO leave the stale of IllIture and join a political
community.
For his purposeJ here, Kanl ae:ptl the brOild outline of
H obbes's position. He makes the distinction hetwun a political
stale of nature and an ethical state of Illliure: Individua1s who
have left !he political state of nature and joined a commonwealth
may still be in an ethical state of nature. He adds that individuals
are entitled 10 remain in an ethical state of nature hecaUIiC il
would be sel-oonlTlldiClory for a political S)'$lem to compel its
omens 10 join an ethical community. An ethical commu nity
98 REUGION WITHIN ... REASON ALONE

presupposes the freedom of its citizem, and one can'! compel

people 10 freely do the right thing. The ethical arena i$ the area
of human inte ntion, human disposition. and Kant adds that "the
human judge cannot penetrate into the dcpltu of every man'
(p. 87). We are warned that lepslatures mmt control their wish
for sovereignty OYer ethics. An effort to 'utablish through force
a polity directed 10 ethical ends' would achieve ju5t the opposite
of an ~ thical result (p. 87).
WhiI~ an ethical oommonweahh cannot be imposed by force,
i! can eml simultaDeOlJsly within a political commonweal th.
Immediately one wonders aboot the relationships between this
ethical stale and the political Slate. Kant says that those woo
freely join this ~thical lilate arc 1101 bound to accept any orden
from the political powe r about Ihe ethical romtitution, but he
thinb that !bey may 'agree to limitations., mainly to the condition
thai this constitution shall contain nothing which contradicts the
duty of its Immben as citizens of the litate." This relationship is
unfortunately nol quite as dear as it seemL
On the face of it, the poliTical system can give no positive
orden 10 the ethical community, but il can give negative orders,
limitations.. Kant mentions., as an example of a limitation, that
nothing should oppose the duty of citizenship. He foU0'W5 this
comment with the rather litrange remark that ......hen the ethical
pledge is of the genuine $Ol1, !be political limitations need cause
no amiety" (p. 88). How is anxiety relieved for a citizen who is
drafted by the state fnr war yet whose ethical commonwealth
forbids war? KanT'1i alTitude Toward WIIf. Toward the qUClition of
whether a member of an ethical commonwealth can go to war, is
a ailical maller, but I will IIOt deal with it in this book. (I have
treated pans of the que5tion in other places.")
The ethical and political commonwealltu have already been
separated on the basis of whether their laws are free nr coercive.
To this Kant adds that they are alliO distinguished because the
concept of an ethical commonwealth extends to the entire human
raoe, and the political commonwealth is ordinarily short of that
ideal.
II. Human beings ought to leave their ethical Slate of nature in
order to become members of an ethical community.
'The ethical state of nature is a situation in which the good
principle found in each of us is in open conflia with the principle
of evil found in us and also in everyone else. In thili situation, as
Kant has already pointed out. human beings mutually corrupt each
other beca ..se they lack a principle which unites them. Therefore,
individuals ought 10 try to leave this ethical $late of nature as soon
as poMible. Kant now has the job of explaining jU$t ..... hat kind of
an ithIll people must have before themselves ;u an allernative.
1be duty of leaving the ethical state of nature is rather
UIlIISII&I duty. "We have a duty ..... hich is sui gctmU, 1101 of men
toward men, OOt of lhe human rave toward itselr (p. 89). "This is
a ~ficant argument. "The hiJ.best "moral good Cl,nno( be
achieved merely by the uertions of lhe single individual toward
his own moral perfection, but requires rather a union of Rich
individuals into a whole toward !be wnc goal . : (p. 89). This
represents a rather dramatic break with wme kinds of individual
ism ... of moral individualism. The highest good is a wcial good.
The buman species is seen as pursuing an essentially wcial
goal. To be absorbed in one's individual moral perfection is to
miss !be idea of !be highest moral good. This idea, the conception
of a univen.al republic based on laws of virtue, "is an idea
completely distinguished from all moral laws (which concern what
we know to lie in our own power), since il involves working
toward,. whole reprding which we do oot know whether, IS ruth,
it lies in OIIr ~r or I1Ot" (p. 89). Therefore, Kant insists tilal
this duty is distinauisbed fmm all others in several wa)'1. AI he
has aIrcady said, it Is the duty of !be hunun species toward itself.
II is also a duty 10 work toward wmcthing which we know we
OUpl 10 work toward bol for whose SIICCCS5 we rnU$t rely on
powers outside of OIIr OWl!. Tbereforc, Iwpc pIuys 0 sipifo:olll-ok.
( I develop !be analysis of hope: in rub5cquenl chapters.)
Even lhoop we personally behave in. perftly moral fashion,
!be community in which we live might well be far from the ideal
of a proper elhieai eommunity. It takes more than the power of
100 REUGION WJ1liJN . . . REASON ALONE

individuals.. "Sepat'l.te individuals, inwfficient in themselves. are

united for a comtnOI\ end. ~t adds that we can already fOi U
,
thai this duly wiU requiTe the prC5UppoIition of the idea of I
hipr monal bein&- Up 10 this staae In his IflUmenl Kant has
derived the Idea of the iOdal goal from the idel of reuon itself:
the oorw:eplion of I siDJIe mnsistent Jet of prinQpleI detenninina
the behlvior of al l rational beinp In their choice of moral
prinQple.

III. "IlIe oonocpt of In ethical mmmonwealth Is the concept of

I people of Cod under ethical laws.
Any m~alth is a body of individuals subjen to lOme
mmmotI Iqislation. In a dWinc:tive1y ethical commonwealth, the
laWi must be ~ 10 promote the monaliry of actions.
Monlily is -thina inner and hence cannoc be sub.jen 10
OI'dinary public law. A poUtic:al conunonweaIth mlUt and does
have _ dear and obvious. 1OUra: of law. What pI~ the
j)lIral1e1 role in an ethical rommonwealth? Must there be MIclJ a
parallel role? TIle fallac:y of analogy tKMrs over the q\le$tion, yet
Kant PI on without mll5iderin& the problem. If this were all he
had 10 "yon the mnc:ept of God, his 'flUment for the role of
God would he 51mply a ~ of the f,llac:y of analOi)'. This Is the
fallacy of hoIdlna; that if two tbinp have lOme properties in
oommon, they mUlt have others..
Kanft IlI5wer 10 the question about the parallel role is thai
tomC()t'j(: must be 5pified as the publie lawJiver for III ethicat

c:ommoowealth. "And yet, ethical IaWli ea.nnot be t ..... 1JItt of as

emanatina; Grit,intIJIy merely from the will of the superior beina"
(p. 90). 1bcse laws an tbought of as duties thai bind all rational
beinp bcc:IUIe their own reason commands them. At the same
time these are also \0 be tbouaht of III the commands of III
cthicallaw-pver. Since. iii Kanl poinl$ OUI repeatedly, the ethkal
ana Is the: ana of intentions. this Beinl must be "one who knows
the hean" and 10 can know the intention, the db pos!clon, of each
individual. Then Kant oondudes. "But thl, ilthe concept of God
as moral ru ler of the WOlJd" (p. 91). This leads Kant 10 the
 Religion Wlllrin fh~ LiMils 0/ RealOI1 AION 101

conclusion that an ethical commonwealth is a commonwealth of

people under laws of vinue. and that means under divine com-
mands as a people of God (p. 91).
Since tile laws of this people of God must concern the morality
and not merely the legality of aeu. we are to see this as an
institution "whose laws are purely inward."
Kam makes clear, in an expanded footnote, that moral duties
are also to be thou",t of as divine commands. However, the
converse is not the case. He does not recognize divine commands
10 be duties if they oppose "a plain duty: perhaps an ordinary civil
law that is not b)' itself immoral, "Since the DOtion that it is
actually a divine command can never, b)' any empirical toke n, be
accredited adequately enough 10 allow an otherwise e~ilablished
duty to be negleaed on its account" (p. 91). The crucial concept
is the notion of, "and yet." Ethical laws must be thought of as
coming from our own rational nature, and yet, at the same time,
as being divine commands.

IV. The idea of a people of God can be realized only in the

form of a church.
'"The sublime. yet never wholly auainable, idea of an eth ical
commonwealth dwindles markedly unde r men's hands" (p. 91).
Altbou&h the idea is sublime, when it becoma a human ilal itution
it IiCrva the conditions of human nature. Kam likens human
nature 10 crooked wood., and I$ks, "How indeed can one expect
something perfectly straight to be framed OUt of such crooked
wood?" (p. 92). Such pessimism ruggau that it's impossible for
buman beings to establish a lIlOJ'aI people of God. However, Kant
insists that "Man must proceed as though evel)'lhing depended
upon him." Only such responsible behavior can be a basis for
I~ that higher wisdom will IS5ist humanity.
Kant defines the te rm "church" as an ethical commonwealth
uoder divine moral legislation. Since such a church is DOt an
object of pos!Iible experience, it is called "!be church invisible."
H e uses the term "visible church' 10 refer to the acrual efToN that
people make to unify in a Whole thai may harmonize with the
102 REUGION wrJ1il N ... REASON ALONE

ideal of the invWole c:burch. He lakes the concept of a moral

kinadom of God on earth, the invisible chu:h, to have the
following four properties: (1) Universality. There must be no
sectarian divisioll5; the fundamental intention must be capable of
I~ding to a genenl unification in a Yngle cburch. (2) A purely
moral nature. The only motivating forces must be moral, purified
of "the stupidity of superstition and the madness of fanaticism"
(p. 93). (3) Freedom., both internally and eJltemally. The
relatioru;hips between the members of a clIurch as well as the
relatioru;hip of the church 10 the politinJ system., must be the kind
of relations found in a republic. This means that no hiervchical
lIlTangements will do. It also means thilt no "illuminalism, which
is a kind of democracy throogh special inspiraliol15," will do. This
would be a situation in whieh the decisions are made by the
private feelings or inspirations of individuals according to their
whim. (4) The unchangeableness of il$ constitution. The true
church must operale under '"primordial laws once for all laid down,
as it were, OUI of a book of laWl, for guidance." Kant adds Ihal
incidental regulations concerning adminimation can change
according to time and circumstanCes, and arbitrary 5yJllOOls have
no eMCntiai place.
What has Kant really specified as the fonn of hi5 eth ical
commonwealth? There is llOlhing resembling an eJlplicit political
comtitutioo.. The relationship between tbe citizens of thi$ ethical
commonwealth, the members of the true church, is not that of
king and subjects, 11m" democratic citizens undu a law imposed by
the majority. What is the relationship between members of this
clIurch, and between the churcll and the seadar city'? This
relationship is closest of all to thilt nf a housel"lold or family under
a common. though invisible, moral fatber. In wcll a family may
be a "holy KIll, knowing the father's will. and yet standing in blood
relal ion with all members of the housel"lold, [wOO[ takes HiJ, place
in making H is will beller known to them; these accordi ngly bonor
the father in bim and 10 enter with one another inlO a voluntary,
universal, and enduring union of hearts" (p. 93). Recall, Kant hu
said thl! the Biblical fanilly could ~ the best analO(lY to the
relationship in an ethical common_alth.

V, The constitution of every church originates aJw-J.YS in some

hislOricaJ (revealed) faith which _ can call ea:le$iutia.l faith,
and this is best foonded on a Holy Seriplure,
Kant makes a sharp distinction belWee n a pure religious faith.
and a historical faith grounded solely on fan. Thc fint can
establish . universal d!urd!. whereas the historical faith ean only
affect tho5e woo know ilS facts. Why ~ any!lerious attention to
historical faiths? Kant holds that "a peculiar weakness of human
naturc' requires more than a purely rational basi$ to establish a
church. This weakness Icads peoplc to put their confidence in the
observable world, and in many ways this is perfectly understand-
able. After all, knowledge is restricted 10 the observable world.
The moral world is not observable in the ume way, and 50 people
are DOl easily convinced "that 'teadfasl diligence in morally good
life conduct is all that God requires of man. to be subjects in His
kingdom and _ll p1easin& to Him" (p. 94), It is easy to think of
lhe obligation to God as a !lervice that must be offered. "It does
not enter their heads that when they fulfill tllei r dutiCli 10 men
(llKmselves and othen) they arc. by thc!Ie "ery 1Icts, performing
God', command$ ," (p. 94). "and that it is absolutely impossible
10 serve God more direffiy in any other way, . ' ."
Instead of a concept of a purcly moral religion, Kant explaiJl!
how the concept of a religion of divine worship can arise. His
uplanation is strongly rcminiscent of SpiD02a'S explanation in thc
Appendix 10 Book I of his Ethics. Human beings bow 10 our
requests wilen they are given special praise and honor. When 'fte
behave submissively toward them. Human be ings project Ihis
pattern into tile nature of divinity and develop tbe notion of a
tramaction wilh God on the samc basis. Even the most rational
person finds flattery a "bewitc:hing engine: as Bernard De
Mandeville pu t it! Therefore, flattery in worship is assumed 10 be
the proper way to !ieI'Ve God.
104 REUGION WITHIN . .. REASON ALONE

In one form the religious question is the question, "How does

God wish to be hoooredr On Kant's interpretation, "tM corrupt
of the ~iJy mdly ari.su sckly from COIISCiousnns of monlllaw.f ..."
(p. 95, my emphasis). Therefore, "each individual can know of
himself throu&h his own reasoo the will of God which lies at the
basis of his reliJioo" (p. 95).
Kant's concept of a divi ne will determined by pure moral laws
alone, "allows us to think of only one religion which is purely
moral, as it did of only one God: This is contrasted with a
historieal religion whose statutory laws can be known only by a
revelation. 1be religious question, "How does God wish 10 be
boooredr ooght 10 be answered In a universally valid way, (or
each penon. lbat is, by universally moral behavior. We mU!it
also ralse the question about our obligation as citiuns of a divine
state on eanh, of a church. Now the question becomes: How
does God wish to be honored in a chuteh?
The answer to this new quc"ion Ulkcl us outside of reason
alone, and appean 10 require an ccdesiastical faith. A churdl
requires a publ ic covenant. and therefore an ecclesiastical form.
Should God or lhould humans found the church? Kant holds that
we must lS$umc that the divine will is that we oune1ves should
con$\antly try to $<:1 up a ralional commonweallh of this sort.
While we try to improve lhe form of Ihis chureh we mUll do this
in a way tnal is not presumplUOUIi. It would be arrogant to
assume that we already bad a perfect form for tile chureb and save
ourselves the effort of improving. The touchstone must always be
harmony with the commands of univenal moral ily.
Again, Kant mU!it cotUidcr those forces that lead 10 worship.
Some quarten bold that tbe Highest Being can be given venera
tion diTCCliy, rather than indirectly by obedience to that Being's
moral laws. lbe mearu for Ihis arc said to be ceremonies,
confessioru of fai th in revealed laws, and observances of ordi.
nances that delermine lhe form of a chureh. Kant sums the$<: up
by bolding. "all the$<: ob$crvanoes arc al bottom morally indiffereDl
actions; ..." (p. 97). However, Kant agrees that in hu manity's
cltort to approach an ethical commonlAleahh, eede~llIlical faith is
 Rdip>n W"nhin th Limits of Rmson AIM<! lOS

a narural preceding step. From !his vicwpoinl, one must consider

the problem of the continuation or the institution of a $larutory
CIC5iudcal faith, and thU"can hardly be provided for adequately
lhroug,b tradition, but only throu&h Scripture which . . . must itself
be an objcc! of esteem .. ." (p. 97). "A holy book arouses the
greatest respect even among those (indeed. tnO$t of all among
those) who do DOt read it . . ." (p. 98). Kant makes the assertion
lhal " history proves thaI il bas never been possible to deslroy
a faith grounded in scripture .. ." (p. 98). He then concludes that
we are ClI.lremcly fortunate when we find wch a book to contain
"along with iu stanues, or laW5 of failh. the purest moral doctrine
of religion in iQ complctCJlC$$ ... a doctrine which can he brought
into perfccr. barmoll)' with such statutes as 5Crvc as vehicles for ilS
introduction' (p. 98). The key remart here involves the mailer of
how 5Ucb a boot may be brought into barmony with the pure
moral doctrines of religion. And Kant', nen $Cction is on the
interpretation of wch a boot.
Before movinJ 10 the subject of interpretation, Kant returns to
consider some additional aspcetS of revealed religion.
The position developed so far allows for only one true religion,
and Kant would like us 10 restrict the word "reliJion" to the one
and only panem of moral dispositions (hidden within each
individual) that deserves the term. He, therefore, ooids that it
would be more fitting 10 usc the word "faith' instead of religion in
actual practice. lllc differences betwn the Jewish,
'Mohammedan: Chmtian (Catholic, Lutheran, etc.), positions are
taken to he matten of faith, and people woo hold tbo5c pos.itiOIlli
should be called people of that faith ratber than that religion.
Kant is usually rcspcctful and apprcQativc of the ordinary penon.
He directs contempt more frequenLly at the learned than the
limple. However, in this disawion of the distinction between
religion and faith he allows hiJmclf to be more sa:a.'itic than
anywhere else in his wort thai I know. "One dOC$ too areat honor
10 mosl people by uying of lhcm: the)' profess !his or that
religion. For the)' know none and desire none . . . statUIOf)'
utJesiastieaJ failll is all 11111 lIIey understand by the word. The
106 REUGION wmJIN ... REASON ALONE

so-called religious wars, which have 50 often wen the world Ind
bespattered it with blood, have never been anything but wn.nglcs
of ea:.1esiluical faitb ..." (p. 99).
The words "Catholic" and "Proteslllnt" are inuoduced in
connection witb the claims a churd! may make; tbat its ecdeslasd-
cal faith is universally binding. He IDCntioll$ that a Catholic
church makes Ibis claim &lid that I cburch thai protesl5 against
5UclI a claim is called ProtcsWtL He add$, parenthetkally, thaI
the Protestant church "often times would gladly advance similar
claims itself if it oould" (p. 100). This is followed by the Rlgges-
tion that mill)' examples aist of protestant Catholics, and of
arch-catbolic Protestants. He addi that the protestant Calhol.ic is
often. pel"$Oll whose easl of mind lelUb to self-apansion, and tbe
arch-catbolk Protestant stands in sharp conlraSt with arrum-
scribed cast of mind.

YJ. Ecclesiastical Faith has pure religious faith as its highest

interpreter.
Once Kant has deeided that "historical etdC5iastical faitb" can
be helpful vehicle in spruding interest in religious progrC$S, he
has to COll!iider the problem of interpretation, His principle is that
the interpretation must always agree "witb tbe uniYenal pTilctical
rules of reJigion of pure rusoo.." It may be that the only
interprel.ltion of a scripturaltUl tltat Sltisfies our 100m require-
ments may "appear forced ... it may often really be forced; and
yet if the leu can possibly suppa" il, it must be prcfelTed to
literal interpretation which either oontairu notbing II.U helpful to
morality Of else actually works COUnter to moral incentive"
(p. l01). As an eumplc, Kant takes tbe problem of finding a
ooosistent interprellltinn of rwo pMua,grs. Finl, Psalm 59, 11-1 6,
the prayer for revenge; and second, Mattbew V, 21 or 44, wbere
we find, "Love your enemies, ble5S them that rune you . .. ." Kant
suggests tbat we consider the possibility that the enemies refelTed
10 in the Ps.aIm arc invisible enemies and not enemies in the Oesh,
tbe invisible enemies being evil inclinations which must be
crushed. This is. rather forced interpretatiOll, bul if this kind of
 RdigiOll Witlli1lll~ Umils of R(QS{NI AtoM 107

interprel8tion an'l be carried out, Kant suggesu that he would

... ther have it that "this passage is not to be understood in a moral
sense al aJJ' (p, 101),
Kant raises the general question ofwhether morality should be
eJlpounded accordill& to the Bible, or whether the Bible should be
pOUnded according to morality. He takes the first al ternative to
be hopeless as well as immoral, and offers his own book as an
enmple of the serond.
H ow can Kant avoid the eharJe of dishonesty for his forced
interpretation? H is response is thai he would not iruist that his
meanina is exactly what Will inlended by the H oly Books., but
would simply leave this question ope n and mereJy present the
pos!Iibility that the boob may be understood in this way. 'For the
final PUrp<J5C, even of reading these holy scriptures, or of investi
gatillJ their conlent, is 10 make men better" (p. 102). 1bc
principle 10 be used in all scriptural eJlegesis is the moral improve
ment of human beings. U a bistorical de tail is morally neu tral,
Kant takes lUI cnremely casual attitude toward it and sayi, "We
an do with it what we like" (p. 102). We cannot lie about it, for
instanee, claim that an interpretation is 5Ometbin& el$c.
Rational religion may have iu role as lUI interpreter of scrip-
turts COIItested by three other groups. The scriptural scholv has
an importanl and dignified role in Kant's system. Such authority
is needed. But such a ICholar's work is put in a position that is
lI igbtly subordinated 10 an inlerpretation based on reason itself.
H owever, Kant supporu the value of ICholarship and of Biblical
scholarship completely free from hindrance by the secular arm.
H e does not wanl le&is\ators to conc:cm lhemselves with the
quarrels of scriptural scholarship based on the eJI.lct analysis of
ancien! llnguagcs and on historical credibility.
However, we are warned . ga inst a volunteer interpreter of
scriptures: '"llIc man who needs neither reason nor seholarship,
bul merely an inner feeling, 10 recogniu the true meaning of
Scripture . . ." cannot be truSted a t aU (p. 104). Neither knowl-
edge of ~w nor of faet an be derived from feeling. The difficulty
is thai "{edina is privale 10 every individual" and "il teaches us
108 REUGION WfTHIN ... R EASON ALONE

absolutely DOthing. but is merely the way in which the subject is

affected as regards pleasure or displeasure .. ." (p. lOS).
The only autbentic expositor is the pure re ligion of reuon.
Scriptural $Cbolarship is merely doctrinal, and Kant enc:oorqes
Ihese scbolan to 5Ubmit !beir interpretation to public examination
and earn the community's confidence in this way.

VII. The aradual transition 01 ecclesiastical fai th 10 the exclusive

sovereignty of pure rcJigi0U5 failh is Ihe comin, of the
Kingdom of God.
When a churdl embraces the principle ofusin, its ecclesiastical
faitb 115 a vehicle for continually approachina pure re ligious faill\,
Kant holds that we can call this institution the true church, or the
church militant. Why must ecclesiastical faith be abandoned?
"Ecclesiastieal faith fancies il possible 10 become well plell5inllO
God throu&h actlOI15 (01" wo~ip) which, thou&h irksome, yet
r ' c" in themselves no moral worth and hence are ... merely
IKIS which an evil man can also perform" (p. 106). A nIOra] God
can bardly be impressed by an act wbich can be performed just as
~U by an evil person as by a good one.
The COTlCepl of a llvins faith rums out to have two elements;
finl, faith in an alOnemenl, reparation fOl" debt; second, faith that
we can become we.U-pleasin. to God through a .ood course of life
in !be furure. 1lIese IWO elemenes develop into what Kant calls a
rellllfuble antinomy. Kant insuts that a reasonable person knows
thai no "sis'a nce in the malICr of atonemenl is available from
anyone else. lbat person knows thai fint his or her own way or
life must be improved before there can be even the slig.htCSI hope
of hipr moral pin. However, knowing that an individual is
corrupt by IUltute, and knowing thai the individual knows this, how
can we really expect such a person 10 IIIiIke himse.lf or berself into
a new human being we ll-pleasill& to God? Apparently, "faith in
a meril not his own .. must precede every effort 10 good worb."
H ere is !be antinomy: Do good works prect:de faith in divine
alonement. or does faith in divine atonement precede good works?
Kant holds that theoretically lhis antinomy cannot be rewlved.
 RtligiotI Within I/~ Limits of R~ AIoM 109

But he transforms it into I practical pragmatic question mal can

be resolved. "Where shall we lIart, i.e~ with a faith in what God
has done on our behalt, or with what we are 10 do to become
wonlty of God', asmtance (whatever this rtUIIy be)?" (p. lOS). Th is
question can be answered: We must nan with wbat we 1ft to do
10 become worthy, and our source of elhics tdls us Ihis. Kant
takes it that lIle history of religion shows thi$ conflict bet",.een two
principles of faith to have existed througb lIle ages. The priesl$
on one side and the moralists on the other. Both sides hive
offered CIpiations, and be adds that !be priem have l15UaJly
complained more than the moralisu.
Kant has given us a view in which "in the end religion wiD
&radually be freed (rom .D empirical determining groonds and
from allltalUteS which rest on history ..." (p. 112). Kant e1q)Ccts
thai "lIle humiliating distinction between laity and clergy disap-
pears, and equality arises from lI"IIe freedom .... (p. 112). This
change from the visible to !be Invisihle church is supposed to be
developed through ,",dually advancing reform. Revolu tioI1$ might
hasten this progess, M agees. but "they rest in tM hands of
providence and cannot be ushered in according to plan without
damage to freedom" (p. Ill).
Kant thinks thai an analogy 0CC\l1'$ between the history of
political states and church history. Every single pol itical state
strives to overcome every olber stale, but CIIentuaily il reacbe5 I
certain size and breaks up of its own accord. In a simi lar way,
individual churches pretend to become lIle church univeruJ. but
iI$ 500n as lIlcy ~end themselves and Stan to rule. !.hey break up
again into mall sccu. Kant IMn 5pCCUlates lIlal we might U5ume
a design of providence 10 checlr. the ~ and morally harmful
fusion of religioI1$. It would be harmful if it comes before human
bein&:, have become morally improved. The two devices that Kant
speculates may be operating here are the difference of tonguCi,
and lite difference of religio11$. In bis own terms. this second
difference should be called the difference of faiths.
110 REU GION WTrnIN . . . REASON ALONE

We DOW tum to what Kant calls the hi!torical aecount of the

grlIdual e!iLlbli!hment of sovereignty of the good principle on
earth.
What i! called the history of religion can be 5eelI as the
constant conflict between the faith of divine worship and the moral
faith of religion. Rather than. broad historical record of the
different dogmas that hlive been developed, Kant propme5 to
consider j\l$t that portion of church hislOf)' in which the clear
be&inninas of the universal church may be foood.. He has already
eqJlained that Chri5tianity has the s.eeds for the development of
thi! universal faith. He m\l$t now commit himself to some
relationship between the Jewish faith and Christianity.
We are fIrst Jiven !.be hroad auertion that "the Jewish fai!.b
stands in no essential connection Whatever. i.e~ in no unity of
c:ooa:pts, with this ecclesiastical failh whose history we wish to
consider .. ." (p. 116). Despite the faa that the Jewish faith
immcdialely preceded the Chri5tiao church and provided the
physical oocasioo for its e.slablishment, Kant fiDd$ no essential
c:ooa:pt shared by both. He aTJIIe5 that J udaism is really not a
rcliJion aI III, but . purely political il15urution. He offers three
arguments in IlIppon of too char&e that J udaism is oot reliJious,
deipite the "aristocracy of priests Of leaders, who hua!;t of instruc-
tiom imparted direetly by God."
Hi! charges are these: Firs!, all of the commands "are of the
kind which. political organi1lltion can insist upon and lay down
as coercive laws, since: they relale merely to enema! aas." Kant
does acrce that "the Ten Commandments are, to the eye of
reason, valid as ethical commands. even had thCJ not been Jiven
publicly . . ." (p. 116 ). His arpment here is thai the Ten Com-
mandmcnb are directed to noq but OIlIer observance, and they
make no requiremenu at all upoo the moral disposition. Second,
Kant char&es thaI the rewards or punishments of (Oll(:Cm are
limited to those "which can be allotted to all men in this world"
(p. 111). He takes it that Judaism in iu pure form lack5 a belief
in a future life and holds that lhis alone tak~ it 0111 of the
category of religion since "no tel iaiOn an be (Onccived of which
 Rdidon Within 1M Limiu of RftUOIf A/OM 111

involves 00 belief in a future life" (p, 117), Kant also adds that
r.be rewards and p"oisbrnenU were DOl distributed ethically $inee
tbey were 10 reach the posteril)' of the individual who 1001; pan in
lbe deeds or mbdeeds.
Kant's third point is based on the idea of a chosen people. A
religion must include lIIe entile human race, and lIIe c:oncepl of
a special people chosen exclusively by God is a IIOtion Ihal
'lhowed enmil)' roward all other peoples and which therefore
C\IOked the enmil)' of alr (p. 117). Kant is careful 10 say lhal
individual Jews may well frame $Orne sort of religious failh and
combine it with Ibe legislation of Judaism.
After tbese comments on !he status of J udaism. Kant tums 10
!he origin of Cbristianil)' as the beainnins of seneral church
history.
"Thus Cbrislianil)' IU'05C suddenly. though IIOt uppreplled f01',
from Judaism' (p, 118). He traces the Oltistian narrative from
Ibe poim at which the leacher of the goopel announced hilnKlf 10
be an am ...... 'OOr (rom heaven, throop the example of his own
person of I genuinely good course of life, to his unmerited death.
Olri.u's life is Ulken to be ' the archetype of a humanil)' alone
pleasi", to God." He was able 10 say that "he ,"'QUId stilt be wilh
his disciples cvcn 10 the end of the world' (Matthew XXVIII. 20)
and by this Quist meant that the power of the memories of his
teacIJin&. his eumple, and his real merit, would be with his
disciples forcvcr.
Kant sepatlte:s the Ouittlan narrative lnlo the public record of
Olrisl', life, which ends with his death, and 'the more secret
recon1s, added as a sequel, of his re5llrreetion and ascension,
which took place before !he eyes only of his inlimales . . ,"
(p, 119). The fint, tbe publk record, can serve universally as an
example of a worthy life, an enmple 10 be imitated Aboul the
seael records of the resurrection, Kanl says thaI this "cannol be
used in the interest of religion within the limiu of reason alone,'
Kant holds lhal the only way 10 UIke these reamls 10 be of moral
use is 10 do great violence to their historical value. This is
mentioned in passing. his more serious objectiOn is to what he
112 REUGION WIlliIN .. . REASON ALONE

caUs the concept of "the materialism of penonality" (p. 119). Kant

lakes Ibis to be a concept that holds that a pcnonality ean exist
only if it remaiN always in the same body. To this he opposes the
hypllhesis of the spirituality of rational beings. the hypothesis that
holds that the body ean remain de.d wlule the same penon
continues 10 live. The conception of humanity a.s spiri t ~n1takes
to be "more congenial to reason' for two rea5Ol15: (1) The
impouihility of making comprehensible a matter which thinks, and
(2) the material.ist requirement that body be dragged along
through elernity.
Kant then turns to the requirement Ih.1 hisloricaJ faith hll$
for a learned puhlie. Historical faith that ba$e$ i!$elf upon books
needs for iU security. continuous tradition of scholanhip. He
discusses the maner of the gap in scnotarship in the very first
Christian ~neration. This question arises panicuiarly because
Kant is COD5idering what effect !he teaching of Christianity had
upon the morality of its .dherenu : the question of whether the
very first believers were tbell15e]ves moral, 'or j~t people of
common run' (p. ]2 1). Kant makes the point that from the nap
at whieb Ouistendom dcvelopc:d iu tradi tion of scho\ar$hip, we
know 50Illething of tbe effed of the faitb on iu public. and he
adds lIIat it "has served in 00 way tn recommend it on !he score
of the magnifieelll dfed which ean jU$t1y be upeeted of. mom
religion' (p. 121). Kant takes particular delight in remindina; us of
the disunce from morality .t which believers have been found
through the histOl)'. He notices tbat '&reat masses of people were
rendered use ]eu to the world" by the a;lorification of tbe holiness
of eehbacy, and tbe ueenes of Ill)'$tical fanaticism in the lives of
henniu and monks. We are reminded that ' !he dreadful voiee of
onbodoxy" appeared and divided the Christian world into embit
tered parties. Kant doesn't fail 10 note how ' the spiritual head
ruled over and disciplined kings like children by means of a magic
wand of his threatened excommunication' (p. 121), and how the:
spiritual bead u ci ted tbe em""'" and other wars. He swns up
these and other atrocities with the remark from Locrc:tius: "Such
evil deeds could religion prompt!" He notes that none of these
 Migion W"ulu"n rile Umiu of &a.sotI Alone 1 \3

faeu nor the truth of the remark of Lucretius obscures the fact
thai the fint intention of Christianity was to introduce a pu.re
religioU$ fai th, and this imention was diuupted and delayed by the
evil propcnsitiC5 of hu man nalLITe. But the history in no way
makes Kant lose his optimism about the Suoccss that Christianity
is expected to have in foundina a universal world religion.
Has the history of the church been a faU from a perfectly
moral beginning. or a progress in il\CTCasing morality? For Kant
the question is crucial, and his answer is dearly the second. He
imists that the prescnt period is the best in "the enlire known
history of the church" (p. 122). His optimism about the prescnt is
based on the increasini deiTCC to which reason has freed itself
from the weight of dogmatic faith.
Kant takes it that reason is beginning to make clear the
followilll tW'O principles.. Firtt, rile priJK:ipk of refJ.SOIIUbk modeJty
in pronouncements abou t revelation. This means the ~ibility is
recognized tl\.;lt a scriptLITe containing 50 much that is actually
moral may be regarded as a genuinely divine rcvc:lllion. It is also
taken to be possible, al least possihle, that a suocessful union of
people into ODC true rel igion can only be brou&ht about wit h a
holy book and a foundation of an ecclesiastical faith. "Hence, the
most intelligent and reasonable thing to do is from now on to usc
the book already at hand as the basis for ecclesiastical instruction
and not lessen its value through use less or mischievous attach, yet
meanwhile 001 forcin& belief in it as a requisile to y.lvation upon
any man" (p. 123). 'The second principle is this: Sioce the ~(Jed
narrative is used only for "the vivid presentation of in true object
(virtue striving toward holiness)." Kant insists that this nt:lmIti'I>r
mwt alway! M umgIu tmd ~ ill rhe im~ of morolily.
It must be regularly ln$isted upon and repeated "that true
religion is 10 consist not in the knowing or considering of whal
God docs or has done for our salvation, bu t in what we must do
10 become worthy of il" (p. 123). Kant adds here, and whenever
an nee"ion arises, that what we must do to become worthy an
only be something that possesses in itself dear and absolute moral
worth, and lherefore Ihis is WffiCthing aboo l whlch ",e aD be
114 REUGION WITHIN ... REASON ALONE

certain "without any seripturai learning wruuever" (po 123). Kant

insists that political rulers must neve r hi nder these two principles
of reason from becoming pIlblic:. The principles are modeJ.ry and
moraliry.
A propell$iry !O sink !O a pusive belief is wpp<lsetl to be
especially a danger with the common person, according to Kant.
In discussing the allractioll$ for this so-called passive belief, we
find Kant loalling one of ilS causes in "the principle of seeurily."
Seeuriry here comes about in the following ~y. When I am born
and brought up in a religious faith, the ins\nlelion in thit. has not
been chosen by me nor been subject to my own thinking. bu t to
that of my instrunol"$ and teachers. Therefore, the de fects of this
religious jXl!iition are not chargeable to me, but to my teachers.
Kant expands on this point and U$C$ it to explain ou r distaste
when someone publicly changes religion. First, we don't approve
giving up the seaJrity mentioned a~. A second ground. and a
dper one, is this; Everyone feels internally an enol1l1OU.5
uncenainty about which of the many historical faiths il the proper
one, while one knows thatlhe moral faith is everywhere the same.
Under 1he5e circumstances, "it seems highly unnecessary to create
a stir about the mailer" (p. 123). To publicly change religious
faith is a1l1lOit to be have as if one cedesiaslical faith had a serious
advantage over another weh faith.
In this historical aeoount, the Kingdom of Heaven comes doser
and closer. 11Ie approach it. delayed at times here and there, but
it it. never completely stopped. The prophC$)' in Ihe Apoxatypse.
and the aeoou nl of the end of the world, are to be interpreted as
symbolic rc:presentations that may be UKd to enliven hope and
cou rage. On this interpretation we cannot literally conceive the
perfect ideal of a moral world containing human beings, but Kant
holds that we can anticipate it. By the term "anticipate" he means
"prepare for in conti nual progreu and apprax.imation toward the
highest good possible on earth . . . and in Ih is there it. nothing
mystical but everything moves quile naturally in a moral fashion
. .." (p. 126). To hasten this end we sllould "lahor industriously
by way of continuously selling lree the pure religion from its
 Rdition lVuhin I/~ Limits of R=sotl Alooe 115

present shell, which u )'<:t cannot be spared," By "its present

sheU: be means the eedesiutical or historical fai th which "stands
in need of a ~d book as a leadina; string fnr men" (p, 126),
Try to prepare "to oonsider OUTHlves always u cho!ien citiulI5 of
a divine ethieal state" (p. 126). The goal is the Kingdom of God
in a visible form.
At the end of tbis section Kant returns to make funber
oomments about the history of the Jews. He is impres.sed by the
long history through which the Jews have eontinued to mainta in
themse lves, even though $C8ttered through tbe world. Does this
unusua lly long history of a people seem 50 unlikely that it should
be called the result of a divine purpose? Kant docs OOt think this
oonclU$ion is necessarily forced. He SlJssests that tbe fact tbattbe
Jews had a written religion-s.acred boob--can acoou nt for the
result. Their boob kept their identity and kept them from fusing
together with people possessing 110 such books hilt only rites.
Kant even suggests that the J ews themselves might not have
mai ntained tbeir w:red boob hilt that they may have received
assistance from tbe Christian and later "Mohammedan" religions.
because these positions presupposed tbe Jewish faith and the
J ewish sacred boob. Kant a$IImes that in their wanderings tbe
skilt in reading and the des.ire to posse55 the sacred books may
have heen l05t from time to lime. He suggests that the J ews may
well have spread to lands with no Christian or "Mohammedan"
traditioll5 and have disappeared. This is presemed merely 3$ a
speculation that the Jews themselves might not deserve the credit
for preserving their sacred lituature. Kant suggests a counter
example to hi.s own theory. He mentions a community of J ews
that exists in China and whose attachment to scriptures would owe
nothing to any ootside religioos tradition.
Kalil condudes tbat the pre!iCrvation of the Jewisb people and
of their religion, under circumstances thai seem so unlikely, is not
a basis for "edifying remarks" (p. 127). He adds that one could
interpret this either III proof of a special decision of God to save
this people for 11 glorious fu ture, or one could !iCe in all of their
\1oublts an example of "punitive justice vi~iled upon it because it
116 REU GION WIll-UN ... REASON ALONE

stiffne<:!"edly sought to create. political and I10t a moral COrK:ept

of the MeMiah" (p. 128). Kant', comments here about the Jews
must be pu t together wi th hU othe r comments to evaluate them as
a VOOP.'
The long General Observation at the end of Part 111 is devoted
10 Kant's analysis of the ooncept nf a religious mystery. He can't
avoid the subject of l!I)'$lery becausc, he points out. the inner
nature of every kind of religious faith leads one to a myslery. In
this sense a mystery can be defined as "somelhing /zajy which may
be ktwt."lf by each single individual but cannot be made ktwt.n
publicly. thai is, shared univenally" (p. 129). To be calLed holy it
must be moral and an object of reason; yet, if it is something
l!I)'$terious, we cannot poss.ibly have a t heoretically adequate
analysis of it that can be made known publicly.
At a number of critical points, Kant has referred 10 maIleR
Ihat are i05Cl'Ulable to us. (01apter Nine deals wilh this in more
careful lemu.) He TIO'W takes special care 10 distirI&Ui.h beN.een
lhose matteR that are 10 be called ifficrutablt, and those maileR
Ihal are to be cal led myste ries. .A mystery if tire category lor
~t/Zif18 rlUlt wt caI/ kIww bw ",'hieh "''C CIUIIICH communiaue
publM;ly. The grounds, the h<uis, of morality is taken to be
iJlS(l'Utahle by him, but il is a milner whose cause remains
unknown to us although il certainly can be communicated publicly
(p. 129). For another eumple, freedom is something whose basis
is insc1'Wob/t to us. because, aI/llough wt can rommunicUle our
1cno...tlge 0/ il, "'II! auulDt unlktJlwui fhe cause 0/ it. We lcnow
t hai all mailer in the world is wbject to universalgravilalion, bu l
we doo'\ know just whal is the cause of thi~ However, "'e do
have a law that can be made public governing the behavior of
objeClS in gravitational field$. Therefore. gravity also is not a
mystery.
What is an example of a mystery? We find a considerable
number of so-called genuine religious mysteries presemed 10 us in
this section. Kaot has already insisted that human duty cannOI be
a mystery, however inscrutable its b:Ise. Kant contrasts the status
of human morality with the question or what God alone can do.
 klig/l:Nt Wilhilt 1M L.imiU of R _ AIoM 111

We have a senuine holy mYSlery of religion when we know M'hy

somelhioi is 10 oa:ur but we don'l mow wIulI il is thai oa:un..
The queslion of what God alone can do 10 assisl UI in beina moraJ
is just lU(:b a mailer. We can amwer the .we)' question; Bec:ause
we need assisllOCf;. We canDOI answer W whOI queslion; lUll
whal can God do 10 assist us? Kanl adds. "11 may weD be
upedieol for us merely 10 know and understand that there is IUd!
a mystery, nol 10 comprehend il" (p. 130).
This suB&dtion that it may be belief for U5 not to understand
the nature of God rugests the e.nendcd argument in Kant's
Critique of ProclicaJ Rt4IDiI, in whid! he oonsidered wbat would be
the ease if, iostead of beini limited 10 a hope Of" an assumption
thaI God aislS, we knew that God edsted. "God and eternity in
their awful majesty would sland uooeasin&ly before our era .. .
most actiom oonformina to the Law would be done from fear, few
would be done from hope, oone from duty. The moal wonh of
aruODl, 00 wbid! alone the worth of me person and even of the
world depends in tbe eyea of rupreme wisdom would not eu~t al
all" (p. 141). Knowkdge oCGod's eilitenee is both unavailable and
undesirable. Kant wiD return to some pam of this afiliment in
the fuW section of the book.
The idea of God as the moral lovcrnor of the world is
presented 10 us by our moral reasoning. Morality explains to U5
wby we need rum a be inl; it can never uplain 10 us what God is,
and therefore tbe idu of wm a being is a holy myslery. Howev-
er, Kant insists that the belief that sum a God eDIts does not
oontain a mystery. This belief expresses the relationship of a
moral God to the human rue, and Kant takes it that this presenlll
itsclf"spontlneously to buman reason everywhere and is merefore
to be met with in the religion of most eivili%ed people" (p. 131).
As he expands it, the belief that conforms 10 this is belief in God,
(I) as the omnipotent creator ofbeaven and earth, that is, morally.
as holy legisl'tor. (2) as preserver of the human raee. illl benevo-
lent ruler and moral guardian. (3) as administrator of his own holy
laws. as righteous judie (p. 131). Kant then poinlll 0111 that a
greal many andeRI peoples a1w developed Ihe idea of a Ihrceparl
118 REUG10N Wl11UN REASON ALONE

bam for the gOY(lmmcnt (or the world. He mentions the three
divine persons in the religion of Zoroaster, the three persons in
the reli.ion of the Hindus, II religion in EiYPt that bad eSentiaJIy
thru supreme Gods, the Gotm, etc. Kant insists tbatth.is three..
pan anal)'5is of the supreme beina must be cleansed of "harmful
anthropomorphism" (p. 132). He prefers an inte rpretation in
which God will5 10 be served under three specifically differenl
moral aspeCts. Kant'S emphasis, as a/wayl, is on moral ralher than
physical aspeCts.
Kanl IICXI tunts 10 an anaJys.iJ. of three basic mysleries.. Each
of these is revealed 10 us through our reilSOn, grows OUI of II
moral context, bul "taken theologically ... ulIll5amds all our
concepts, is II myslery . . ." (p. 133).
I . The myslery of the divine call This is the call 10 human
beinp 10 become citizens of an elhical ltale. The ethical ltate
requires that we see ourselves as beiDiS crealed 10 a free ~ of
our powen. This, lIIYS Kant, is incomprehensible 10 rciISOn. To
be crealed is nol 10 be free: 10 be free, is 10 be free of the
limitations of creation. '"Ibe caJllo this end is morally quile clellr,
wbile for spu1ation the possibilil)' of wcb II calling il an
impencttable mystety" (p. 134).
2. The mystery of IItonemenl The moral value of an individ
ual's behavior musl come from him or her alone if il is 10 be
called thaI person's moralil)'. Bul human beings life corrupt, and
for moral llatWacUnn 10 lllke place witbout some vicarious
atonement 5eefD$ almost irnpouible. From the standpoint of
reason, vicarious IItonemenl is "an unfathomable myslety" (p, 134).
3, The mystery of election. That one person should receive
grace, and another not, cannot be uplained in terms of. rational
theory of justice, but must be comidered an .bsolute mystery.
Aboul cac:b of these my5leriCl, the call, the atonement, .nd
election. Kant says this: They touch the moral lifel!istory of every
penon. and yet we do not and cannot undcnUlnd them. However,
we do OOt need 10 understand them because the rules for oor
beh.vior are adequately revealed 10 us through a reason thaI is
comprehensible 10 cvcry penon.
 II is prelUmplUOUlIO demand WI more be revealed 10 us than
is revealed by our reuon, OUT bean, and Ollf COnscieDCe (p. 135).
What is made clear 10 us from lhese sourccs is the foUO'Ning: Tbe
moral law c:al.L$ a hUlJW1 being 10 wboniinale selfi5hnes.s, respeer
for this law gives bope WI one may latisfy Ihe moral demand,
and finally we know thai we musl constantly check ourselves, ' 11$
though summoned 10 account before a judge" (p. \35). Kanl adds
thai even if a revelalion were 10 ocx:ur beyolKl these matters which
reason makes dear, il cou.Id J"I(M be considered a universal need
for human beinp (p. 136).
If knowledge of these mysteries cannOl be obtained by reason.
can another source, our feel ings, provide il for us? Kanl repeated-
ly says. WI 'feelings are IIOt knowledge' (p. 129). Laler he ballk
thaI 'it is u nthinklhle thai God could allow Ibis knowledge In
come 10 us through inspiration whenever we, on our pan, wish
earnestly for iL' He argues this because of the structure of our
understanding-and ill abilil)' 10 function only by presupposin,
ratiooal catesories..
Up to this poinl the basic: calegories have been duly and
respect, bul 1101 love. Kant's interpretation of "God is love' is
developed in term5 of love of Ibe moral law. "The hipeil soaJ of
moral perCection of finile creatures ... a soaI 10 which man can
never complelely altain ... is love of Ibe law" (p. 136). After a
brief commenl on the relation belWeeo love of God and fear of
God, Kant turns 10 an analysis of the logic: of judgmenL He had
held WI both the love and the fear of God are combined in the
ronoeption of the Holy Gho$L
Kant takes moral judilllCntto be divided into two kinds of acts:
( I) a choice between two persoos. each striving for. priu. and
(2) a senlence on one and the same peT50n who is accused of a
crime. Tbe first kind of decision is a judgmenl in which lbe
categories are meril and laclt of meriL One individual gains lhe
prize, merit, and the olher simply receives nothing. In the
judilllCnl upon the matter of guilt of an individual, Ibe categories
become guilt or absellCC of au ilL Between individuals the verdier
is worthy or unwonby: within an individual the verdict is sin or
120 REUGION WIllIlN ... REASON ALONE

freedom from sin. Kant uses tbese distinctions between lORds of

jud&ment to &ave the consistenl;)' of apparently contradictory
pauges 50ch u "'The Son will corne agai n to judge the quid:: and
the dead," II TImothy IV, 1, and "God sent nOl his Son into the
world to rondemn the world ...: John III, 17. Why eve about
the inamsistclK')' of saiptural p",sages if saiptures themselves are
only a vehicle for moral instructioo1 For those iCriptuTal ques-
tions that concern the nature of God and other mysteries, Kant
spurns. "amious IiOlicitude: H oweve r, where the question concerns
the Jrind of moral judgment that an individual personally is subject
to, he feels thaI the precise detennination of these concepts is of
PnlcticaJ Importance (p. 137).
lbe point has frequemly been made in the history of ethical
theory that lllOI'a1 commands are lUually phrased as negatives,
Kant holds that his key concept of worthiness "al,,'lIYS has a merely
negative meaoing" (p. 137). lbe idea is not developed fun her at
this stage, but the relationship between morality and wonhineu is
made as close as possible.
For all of Kant's analysis of scriptural passages, and his
attention to the need for consistent interpreutions of them, he is
.t....lIys wary about the dangers of literal scriptural faith, A bate
literal faith in it buns rather than improves the truly religious
disposition" (p. 138).

5. Part Four: Cnncemhlg.5erYke I nd PRudG.Servia Ualln-

lbe Sovudpuy or lbe Good Prtftdple; Or,
Cnneem lnc ReUcloll li nd OerlcllUl m

It has already been argued that a special kind of duty binds

human beings.. the duty to unite in an ethical rommon.... ealth. The
accidental agreement of morally good individua1s is not enough.
Unless ", special business be made of their union with one
another," the meat important btuiness of all would be left 10 mere
chance. It takes a commornr.'ealth under moral laws, .nd this is
called, visible church. Kant repealS that this church iii to operate
on principles that ",ill lead it to steadily approximate pu re rational
 ~/igiotl IVahill ~ LimilJ of RWJM Alone 121

faith, and it will be "able in time to dispense with the churchly

faith" (p. 140). He bas already explained that it Med not actually
dispense with tbh, but it must be $0 atfw.nc;ed morally thai il is
capable of dispcming with it. He then defines pscuo:\o-$crvice as
behavior that frustrates the objectives of whoever is being served.
The wbject of the last pan of this book bcromcs lhe relatiomhip
between religion and clcricali5m.

We nan with Kant'. well-known definition of religion:

"Religion is (subjectively rcgarded) the recognition of all duties as
divine commands." This definition is supposed to avoid several
common errors. First, lhe definitiOil does nol rcquire that we
make asscniom about God, even about thc question of God's
existcnce. Morality needs only thc idea of God, and no certiflCa-
lion of the reality of this idea. Second, this definilion avoids the
mistake of tbinking of religion as a collection of special duties 10
God. Kant insists "there arc no special duties to God in the
u.uvelW.l religion, for God tan rea:ive nothing from IIS." "The only
duties recognized arc the civil duties of humanity-of per$On to
person. Kant interprets thc statement "We oughl to obey God
rather than DlCn" (Acts V, 29), 10 mean that when buman laws
connie! with duties that reason promote," we must obey reason,
which is the proper God. Kant insists thaI this quotation must
IICVCr mean thai the statutory commands given OUI by a ebul"(:b
must be obeyed in place of civil laws, and he adds, "wch prin-
ciple might easily become the war cry oftcn hcard of hypocritical
and ambitious ,"Jeri", in revolt apiml their civil superion"
(p. 142). He takes it that civil authorities issue commands Ihal
musl be taken 10 be duty, but whethcr something is in fact a
command of Gnd is alway5 higbly uncenain.
After defining religion, Kant distinguishes between a natural
and a revealed religion. In a natural rel igion I must know that
something is my duty before I ean accept it as a divine order; in
a revealed rdilion. I must fillt know that IOmethina ii a divine
122 R EUG ION WITHIN , , , REASON ALONE

order and then J ClIl discover thaI il is duty. c.n. religion be

bolh? On this Inaner Kanl holds lhal no reUpon ClIl be natural
"and al the same time revealed when il is so constituted lhal men
could wid ou,/Il lo " - dirroNN it of themselves merely throu&b
lhe U5C of Ihelr reasom" (p. 143). II may be tbe c:a5C th.t humanity
would IIOt ~ come upon religiom as early. or in as great
numbers. withoul revel.tion, but such religion may be one lhat
could. by iISC If, be caJled naturaL Kant holds that the Christian
religion can be looked .1 both as natural religion and as
learned rclipol1, lnd he gives us two len&thY sections in wbich
these separate presentaliOIl$ are considered,

Kant begins by Qyin" "l..et us IWppoie that there wu a

teacher , , ," who offered to the world a purely moral and
uniV(:naIly undent'nd ' ble reupon. Kam maintains lh. 1 Ibis
teacber mUSI be ciV(:n reverence oot as the fOlinck r of the relipon,
but as the fOlinder of lhe fi151 true chu rch. The religion, he adds.
is engraV(:d in all bumao hcaru. Why mUSI a church be founded
if we find these principles engraved in our heans? Kanl has
al ready illliislcd thaI we also find in our heans the evil principle
and that the effort to ronstantly combat the evil principle requires
feJlOW$hip witb olhcl5. The proecu of organizing this fellowship
wilh others. this union inlo a universal and visible church,
"presupposes a realm of fact and nor merely the pure concept of
reason" (p. 146), 'The great preache r of conficknce in pure reason
iasists here that a visible churcb is necessa,)" and for this there
must be Statutes, ordinances, and the elements of arbilrarineM. As
may be expected, Kant is concerned that there be no civil
requirements of religious oaths OIX\Ir in connection with any
church.
Kant's examination of the logic of requirina: oaths is rather
forcefuL If we do DOt trust someone 10 tell the truth in a solemn
statelDCnt, bow can we havc any confidence in Ihat pC:l'$On's
honesty simply because the individual calls down upon himself or
 RrJi&ion Within 1M LimiJs of ReA.JOII AioM 123

herself me punishments "which in any event, with such I lie, he

cannot escape" (p, 147)1 The technique of confirming the truth
of something by requiring an oath is taken to be an absurd
presumption. "the attempt to m.ke .ctual. as though with ma&ical
words, whit is really not in our power: Kant al50 nw:otiOtl5 his
concern that Ihe great importance connected wim teUing the truth
under oath "almost 5alIClions the common lie" (p. 147). We have
no more reason for UU$ling the testimony of a wiUlCS$ who has
sworn on a Bible 10 tell me truth than we have confidence in the
teslimony of that willlCSS wilhoul me Biblieal oalh.
Kant takes Christ 10 hold I pOOtion found in Mlllhcw V,
20-48; Not the OIIter observance, but the pure moral disposition
of the heir! alone, can make I person Wf:1I pleasing 10 God.
Hatred of one's enemies must be wrncd 10 charity, and these pure
di5po5itiollS of the heir! must be manifested in worki (Matthew
VlI, 16). Kant takes all or the Jpedal duties to be combined into
one ~ rule-"Perform your duties for no motive olher man
unconditional esteem for duty iUCIf, i.e~ love God.bove .n else.'
And KCOndiy, in panicultv rule-\oYe everyone 115 yourself, mat
is, treat each penon Wf:11 frnm the motive of good wiIlrather than
Kif advantage. Kant himself hll5 held that "me boliest of beings
in this world" is the buman being (p. 147). But holiness al50
applies to precepts such as these two, the universal and the
pankular, thai he has JUSt speciflCd.
Kant takes it thaI the first teacher made clear thll good worki
must be performed, that moral goodnC$5 i$ not something that can
be passively awaited. lbese workille to be pcrfu""ed publicly
and cheerfully and without any interest in reward. He thinks the
proper altitude toward reward is exprc!oSCd in Matthew XXV,
35-40, wilcre ilclp to the needy given spontaneously is model for
those .... ho are to be thoscn for tbe Kingdom of God. What of the
passages in ....hith Orisl speaks of the rewards in the world 10
come? Kant says that these Ire not 10 be Ken 115 illCCnti~ to
action. bul as I rcprcsclllation of divine benevolence, and mont
approval, "wheo reasoo reviews bumao destiny in ilS entirety"
(p. ISO).
124 REUGION WTl1UN ... REASON ALONE

This section concludes with tne statement that the Christian

religion "is a romplete religion which can be presented to all men
comprehensively and convincingly to their own reason ..."
(p. ISO). This is the Christian religion looked at as a natural
religion, and free of any external certification through schol.nhip
or miracles.

In tbis section the Christian religion is clearly separated from

the Christian faith. Kant lint reviews what ne meat\$ by religion
based on the bare concepts of reason. "Everyone can convince
himself, through his own reason, of tne evil wllich lies in human
beans and from wllich 00 one is free; of tbe impossibility nf ever
hoJding himself to be jU$tilied before Ood through his own life
conduct. and. at the same time, of the necessity for such a
justification valid in his eyes; of lite futility 0( wbstilUtill8 churchly
observances and piOU$ compulsory servic:es for the right_SlleSS
which is lacking. and over and against this of the inac:apable
obligation to become a new man" (p. 151). Now, as a learned
faith, Chrislian faith relies upon history, and 00 the $O-CIIled
revealed doctrines. 'The revealed doctrines need inlerpretation,
and the!ioe imerpreten mw.l be developed and supported. Kanl
bas already made the point that these interpreters mU$t IruSI their
works to public discretion and to buman reasonill8 as the final
adjudicating principle. However, KalIl poinlS OU I thai even when
church officials "do 001 appear in hierarchical splendor as spiri tual
officen clolhed with external power ... eveD when indeed they
prOIe!;1 verbally apinsl all this ... tbey yet actually wish 10 feel
Ihemselves regarded as the only chosen interpreten of H Dly
Scripture . . ." (p. 153). Kant lake!; the ooru.c:quences of this 10 be
a transformation 'rom service: of church into a domination of
church memben.
Is a Christian actuaUy a Jew wllte Messiah has corne? Kanl
denies this, and yet mentions that Ihis would be the result of a
Uleral venion of Christianity. 1 the entire Holy Book of the Jews
 ReligiOll Wi/hin lilt' Lillfits of /WlsotIA/onf' 125

is 10 be accepted faithfully, then the answer 10 this question might

perhaps be affinnative. Kant mentions an u pment Ihal Ihe
Jewish philosopher. M~ Me lldelW)hn, had presented. Mende ls
sohn rejected the request that he conven 10 Christianity because,
he 5aid, "if !be Jewish faith is the SlID-structure of Christianity. 10
ask that it be abandoned is equivalent to demolishing the ground
nonr of a house in order 10 live on the second nory: Ka nl
answeB that Meooelssohn's view has been ingeniously developed,
and he takes the real intention to be this: There is no poim in
exchan&illl one faith for another which also comains the yoke of
outer obse/Vallccs. Throw off Ihis yoke, and whe n nolhing is left
but pure moral religion, the proposal will be wonh taking uDder
advisement (p. 154).
For Kant. to know the Old Tcstament in translations is fIOl
enough. but we must always have scholars who arc familiu ";Ib
the Hebrew language. "II mUSI be regarded as not merely a
conccrn of historical Kholarship in general. but one upon which
hanp the lal'vation of mankind, Ihal there should be men
sufficiently familiu with Hebrew to assure the Ulle reHaion for the
world" (p. ISS). It seems quite unKantian to hold that human
salvation requires scholars familiar with Hebrew, or any paniculat
language. Consider, however, thai SIIch scholan assure us that Ihe
lllllJU3&e will be undcBtood as a human crcalion, a human
production in need of imcrpretalion, and nol the lileral words of
GO<
De5pite his respect and C()IICCrn for wria en tradition, Kanl
add!., Christianity posses.ses the greal advantage over J udaism of
being represented as coming from the mouth of the fiBt leacher
nOI as a statutory but as a moral religion, and thus cntering inlo
the closest relation with reason. . . : Kant poinu OU I lhat the fint
o.rislian oommunilies were clOKly a"ached 10 the hi~tory of
Judaism. but he says, "this was managed wisely in view of the
si tualion at the time, and perhaps with reference 10 thai siluation
alone .. . ." H",,'ever, he ls always ronttrned 10 separate essenlial
ankles of faith from merely ellternal and political articles.. These
connections, "cannot be avoided so long as I'oe seek re ligion
126 REUG ION WITH IN ... REASON ALONE

wilhoul and nol wilhin us" (p. 155).

By the term "'p5cudo-~rvice" Kant means the pretended

honorillj of God through activity that aCUlaily works (lOOnIer to
God's gool$. The term "religious iIIusioo" means. liUlation in
which one holds Ihal a uatutol)' faith is CiSCnliai 10 a servke of
Cod generally, that is, a sialul0l)' faith restricted to one people,
and which cannol include Ihe universal world religion.

1. Concerning the Universal Subjective Ground of the Religious

Illusion.
Allhough Kant criticizes most versinns of anlhropomorphism,
because we creale God for ourselves in a fuhion in which we
believe Ihal we shall be able 10 win Cod 10 our advantase, he
makes an imponanl point Ihal may easi ly be overlooked here.
Kant explains that, although it do6 sound "dangerous. il is in no
way reprehensible 10 lolly that every man creales a Cod fOl'"
himself' (p. 157). Kant's poinl is Ihal each penon must make.
God for thaI person, according to moral concepts; that is, each ol
us mUSI aeate the idea of such a God. 1lIcn, when God is
described or made known to us in some way, and even if such a
being appean before us, each nf us mUSI first compare "this
representation wilh his ideal in order to judge whether he is
emitJed to regard II and to honor it as a divinity. Hence there can.
be no religion springing from revelation alone" (p. 157). There
mu.o;t always be an assumption of a ~pl4I" a .Jt<Jndarr1 by ..1,ic/I
10 iu4J,'I! any possible description or representalion of a God.
"Without this all reverence for God WOIIld be idolatry" (p. 157).
Since reason is assumed 10 be the same in aU healthy humans, the
God thai reason fashions, the mDTal God, must al....ys have lbe
same CiSCnlial properties.
1lIc principle upon which people uwal1y operate when they
think of their relationship to God is this: If ... e behave in a
manner well pleuing to God, u long as our behavior is nol
 ReJWon Within I/~ Umiu of Rwson A/OM 127

actually immoral, we are showing our willingneu 10 serve God,

and, in fact, we are serving God. The hislory of the subject shows
115 u.crifices that were thought to perform this function, feslivals,
penilences, CIIliligations, pilgrimages. and tite like. '"The more
useleM such self-ca.sligations are, and the less they are designed for
the general moral improo;ernenl of lhe man, the holie r they !.eern
10 be; jusl because lhey are of 00 U!.e ",hal5Oever in the world,
and yel COIiI gainful effort, they Kern to be directed IoOlely 10 lhe
alleSlation of devolion 10 God" (page 157). All these mailers,
Kanl holds, are cases in which we Ihink we can gel moral value
OUI of IoOmething thaI itself has no moral value.

2. The Moral Principle of Religion Opposed 10 the Religious

lUusiolL
This section slam wilh a proposition thaI is taken 10 be a
principle requiring no proof. Whatever over and above good life
conduct man fancies Ihal he can do 10 become well pleasing 10
God is mere re1igi~ iIlU$ion and p$eudo-service 10 God" (p. 158).
This prirKiple !.ell Ihe lone for the section 10 follow. Kanl fml
makes clear Ihal his principle refers 10 wbat a person faocies he
or she alone can do. II by no means denies thaI there may be a
mystery through which God can do IoOmething in this area. Before
he gelS down 10 e.umples of his principle, Kant poinl!i OUI that
reason "does not leave us wholly without COMOlation wilh respect
10 our lack of ri~te0U5ne55 Y1Ilid before God" (p. 159). As he has
frequently said, if IoOmeone has done as much as lies in Ihat
person's power 10 satisfy moral obHgalio!1$, aod has al least lried
to continually approach complete harmony with the moral law,
such a person "may hope lhal what is 1101 in his power will be
supplied by lhe supreme wisdom in IoOme way or other" (po 159).
Reason allows us 10 believe that there may be IlOpe for such
assislance while strictly dc:nyiOi us the slighlesl Iheorelical grasp
of whl this assistance mighl be. In romparinglhis position with
that of those churches which pretend 10 specify exactly wIIal
manner God U!.eS 10 supply the needed grace 10 human ity, Kanl
raises this qUeltion, "Who, indeed, is now the unbeliever? Is it he
12J1 REUGiON wrnllN ... REASON A WNE

who trusts without knowing how that for whidJ he hope5 win come
10 pass: or he who absolutely insi5ts upon knowing the way in
which man is releasffl from evil. and if he cannol know Ihis. gives
up all hope of thili release?" (pp. 15\1-1(0).
AI \lIis stage we have only a common-sense meaning for this
most significant nolion. hope. 1lte logic of hope is obviously a
hiWc mailer for religion. in Kant's and in anyone's position. We
wll turn 10 \lie development of \lie Logic: of hope in later
chapten.
OI1(C an individual violates the principle wi\ll whic:h Kant
stalled this section.. \lie principle of not presuming to serve God
by means that are lhemselves not purely moral, no real differel1(C
octIIrs among the various ways of serving God. 1lJe5e mechanical
ways, says Kant, are all alike in wonh. or rather ...onhlC$SJIess (p.
160). Kant lists somethilli of the variety of mechanicalteehruques
thai have been dlo$en. "Whether the devotee betake5 himself to
church, undenakes a pilgrimilge 10 the sam:tuaries in Loreto,
brings formulas of prilyer In heaven wilh his lips., or by means of
a prayer wheel like lhe Tibetan, whatever is $ublitituted fnr moral
service, is equal and equally ~leS1: These are all called "pious
play things:
Kant interests hims.elf in poinling OUt the psychological
phenomenon, as he calls iI, whereby fnlloo,o,'ers of a denominiltion
with fewer statutory requirements feel liOmewhat ennobled and
more enlightened by virtue of this fact (p. 16 1). Kant IUggests
that lhey may look down wilh contempt from their fancied heIghts
of purity, "upon their brothen in churchly illusion: PreS41mably.
Ouaken, U nitarians, Reformed Jews, and others, are examples of
Ihis phenomenon. His explanation is thill because of the slight
difference in belief. these groups find thermelves a little nearer
10 pure moral religion" (p. 161).
Fanaticism is defined as the feeling that we can distinguish the
effects of grace from those of nalure. or that "'e can produce tbe
effecu of grace within ourselves. 'To wish to observe 5Ueh
heavenly influences in ourselves is it kind of madness" (p. 162).
It is a s.uperstitious illusion 10 ..i,h 10 become " 'ell pleasing 10
 ~ligion. Wi/hill 1M LimiJs of &ason A IOIU: 129

God thtougb actioll$ which anyone can perform wilhout even

needing 10 be a sood man ... for example, Ihrough ronfonnity 10
churchly observance and discipUnc. etc." (p. 162). This is the basis
for Kant's rejeetioo of !l105t of the paraphernalia of organized
rcligiom: If an act can be perfonned jusl as ...e ll by an evil as a
good perwn. the act has 00 moral value. And if tbe act hu 00
moral value, it has no religious value.
AIs an cumpJe of a fana tical religious illusion, Kant mentiom
\he fceli/li of the immediatc presence of Ihe Supreme Being, and
distinguishes this from other Ceelinss induding the moral f~ling.
One diffieully hele is that this f~J i ng would constitutc an activity
for which therc is no sensory provision in human nature. A
fanatical religious illusion is cal led "the moral death of reason, for
without reason, after all. 00 reUgion is possible, since like all
morality in general it must be established upon basic principles"
(p. 163).

3. Concerning Oericalism as a Government in the Pseudo-Service

of the Good Principle.
Because the word "clericalism" may easily be misundentood,
Kant uplains that in his comparison of the different sects he has
00 wisb to treat any one of them with contempt as contrasted with
the othen.. ' All deserve the same respect so rar as their fornu are
the atlemplll of poor monals to render perceptible to the senses
the Kingdom of God on earth, but also the same blame when they
take Ihe form of the representation of this idea in a visible church
10 be the thing itself (p. 163).
Kant poinlll to the difference in manner but not in principle
"between !be Shaman of the Tungll!C$ and a European prelate
ruling over church and state alike" (p. 164). NOI me rely the
leaden but also tbe fol1owen of the faith are again different in
manner but not in principle; for uample, "!be wholly sensuous
Wogulitc who in the morning places the paw of a bear skin upon
bis head, with the shon prayer, 'strike me oot dead,' and the
sublimated Puritan and Independent in Connecticut" (p. 164).
Both of these parties make the mistake of taking something that
130 REUQION WITHIN ... REASON ALONE

in itse lf can never make a penon better and letting it sand for
worship of God.
Kant Usel the ~vrd "fetishiYn" to iland for the iUusion that one
can bring about a supe rnatural effc.:t. throop merely natural
means.. This definition does not apply to an efton to make
oneself wonhy of supernau.mll assistance thrOllgh moral activily.
But if Ihe meam to be used arc tbose that can be put into practice
"by the most wicked man quite as well as by the ben: then we
haye fetishism. As examples of this, Kant often formulas of
invocation, churchly observances, and the general term "clerical-
ism." Wherever saNtOI)' comJIIIUK!s., rules of faith, and obser-
yances form the c.'iSCIIce of a cburch, Kant bolds the chu rch to be
10 the Jrip of fetish-wonhip. Oericalism Indicates the de&ree to
which a church is dominated by fetjsh-~"O!"Ship. Where fetishiYn
is the: major propeny, we are yery close to paganUm.
Kant holds thai the evil of a fetish-faith cannot be mitigated by
a democratic structure for the church. Whether the: structure is
monarchical, aristocratic, or democratic, if creedal ilatu tes are
takeo to be c.'iSCntial we have the rule of the cIeri)'. Kant
continues that a clergy in this po$itioo will orten think it carl
dispell5e wilh reuon and even finally wilh scriptural learning.
When a cieri)' takc.s ilsclf to haye the aUlhorily 10 guard and
interpret lhe will of an invisible lcgislator, when it has the power,
it need nol convince hut merely command. All of this can follow
from a fetish state.
To emphasize bow absurd and \IlUleCCs.sary it is 10 require I
literal faith in any narratiye, Kanl claims that the concept of God
as a moral legislator "can be elicited in its compleleBc.sS from
anyone without his ever haying been instructed in it" (p. 170).
This suggests it learning experiment like Plato'li in the MCllo.
We arc nexl led to romider the doctrine of godlineu. The
quc.stion is whether the doctrine of godlinCliS or the doctrine of
vinue, or both, should colI$titute the main rontent of religious
teaching. Both fear of God and love of God arc aken 10 be the
relationship' comprising godlinCM.. The concept of a upersensihle
being with attributes beyond the moral relation always carries with
il llle danger of anlllropomorphism. There i$ mnply 110 SOllrce of
knowledge of such a being. Since lIIe doctrine of virtue can sland
by iue lf, wbereu the doctrine of godlincu, of a moral God,
cannot stand by iuelf. Kant thinks that the doctrine of godliness
can merely seNe as a means of strellglhening \he virtuom
disposition. The religious OOl1CCpl needs \0 be ralional~d inlO
being by mcan5 of arguments. In distinction, the: doctrine of virtue
"derives from the soul of man. He is already in full pas ... uion of
it, undeveloped no doubt" (p. 171). This concepl of virtue can
awaken us \0 a capacity whim otherwise we would never surmi ....
"A capacity of becomins able 10 muter Ihe Featest obstacies
within ourselves. in the dignity of bumanity which man mUSt
respect in his own person and hUlllaD de5tiny, toward whicb be
strives ... in all this there i$ something which so uallS lbe soul
and so leads it 10 the very Deity who is worthy of adoration only
bemuse of bi$ bolioeu as legislator for virtue ..." (p. 171).
As Kant has it, the ooncepl of virtue is ennobling. bul the
ooncept of a world ruler who commands is demcaninJ, since Ihis
"would incur the danger of dubing man's courage which goes 10
CIlOStiClile the essence of virtuc" (p. 172). The diffcrcnce betwecn
a fawning. slavish, subjcction, and "the courage 10 stand on onc's
own fect," 5CCDU clear and uDavoidallle 10 Kant. "When rcvtrcncc
for God is put finl ... wilh virtuc subordinalcd, this object of
reve rcnce beOOIIlC$ an idol .. ." (p. 173).
Kant points 011 1 thai we attribute tcmperamental traits to
different people based on dtaractcristics of tbcir rcligious belicfs.
The separatism of Judai$m suggestcd the charge of misanthropy.
"Mohammedanism" is cbaracterized by arroganl pride hccau!iC of
ilS altitude toward the subjugation of many peoples. And !he
Hindu failh he takes to give its followers the maracler of pusilla
nimity. Now he comes 10 the qUclion oftbe character uait of thc
Christian faith. Thinking about tbo5c who cmpbaskc picty and
take a passive altitudc toward a godliness wh ich is \0 be awaitcd
from a powcr abovc, Kant claims that thi$ sigoalius a slavish cast
of mind. He calls this selfabnegation I misronecived humility.
"Such men never place Iny relianc:e in themselves, but look about
132 REUGION wrnI lN ... REASON ALONE

them in perpetual arWety, for supernatural assistance "

(p. 173).

4. Conceminll the Guide of Conscience in Mailers of Faith.

Kant defines ronsciena: as "the moral faculty of judgment,
passing upon itselr (p. 114). Under this definition ronscience
docs not pass judgment upon actions; instead. it is rcuon judging
itse lf, to see if it has really undenaken tbe romplele appraisal of
ilS actiOIa. Therefore, he roncludes, "the undel'$laDdiog. DOt
roDScieoce, judges whether an action is really right or wrong"
(p. 114). Frequently, " 'hen we ask if a per10n has searched his or
her roDScience, we might bener ask if tbat per10n bas seardlcd his
or ber understanding. Conscience judges principle; the under-
, laDding judlles action.
Kant introduces a basic moral principle that "requires no proof,
that OM ocq;ht 10 haumi nothing thal may ~ ..1I:ItIg." (From the
slaDdpoinr of tbe modern theo')' of error we note thai Kant Is
rerommendiog a ceruin moral style in this mailer.') H e takes this
requirement to be a postulate of consciencc. This is compared
witb tbe principle that Kant finds unfonunately widespread: "II is
c.r;pedien t to believe 100 much rather than tOO little, on the ground
tbat what we do O'VCT and above what we owe will at least do no
barm and might eveD help" (p. 176). Kant takes this to be a D
illusion, ..... bicb makes dishonesty in religious confessions a ba$ic
principle." He is oulrlliled at the hypocrisy. the disbonC$ty, the
violation of conscience involved in such a principle. He takes the
lIenuine maxim eompalible with religion 10 be just the reverse.
Kanl proposes a tC5t quC$uon for every one who considers the
mailer of dogmas regarded as divine revelations. Do you really
trust yourself 10 aMen the truth of tbe$.e dogmas in the sight of
the One who knows Ihe heart and .II Ihe risk of losing all that is
valuable and holy \0 you? Kant himself prefen the good will
which says, "Lord. I believe; help lhou my unbelie r (Mark IX. 24).
(As did AuJUStine, who giVC5 us the same quotation in his Conles-
Jioru.)
Suppose someone aru;\l{C1'$ Kant'!, que!.lion with the reply. "Ycs,
 RtligiOit Within the Limits oj Rearon Alene 133

let me be damned if what' &lay is nOI l1Ue.' He responds thaI if

anyone could make lUeh a dreadful declaration, "' should advise
the conduct toward him suggested by the Penian proverb about
the hadji: If a man hu been in Mecca once as a pilgrim. ll\OVe
out of the house in which he is living; if he has been there twice.
leave the street on which he is [0 be found; but if he has beeo
there three limes. foruke ttl<: city or even the land which he
inhabits" (p. 178).
The role that Kant has given 10 conscience requires sincerity.
He admits "that candor (in speaking the ",hole truth which one
knows) is not 10 be found in human nalure. But we demand
sincnity. {that all thai OIte sayJ' be said wilh truthfulness . . .r
(po 178). This recalls his own behavior when ordered 10 Slop
publie lecturing and wrilin& on reliJjOll (mentioned in Cbapter
One of Ihis book).

Means of Grace

The Gene~l Observation anached to the final seclion deals

with the subject of Means of Grace. Two points are made dear
al ttl<: outset. Fint, the coneepl of supernalural assistance is a
bare idea and nothing more. We can never have any experience
thai can Jjve us knowledge of its reality, or of ttl<: laW5 atXOrding
10 which il mighl occur. Yet, on the otber hand, the impossibility
of sud! assislance. "cannot really be proyed" (p. 179). In connec-
tion with the second poin!, Kant remilllls us Ihal freedom itsel f,
although it has nothing supernatural in i1$ conceplion, is jU$! as
incomprehens.ible to Uli as is a supernalural factor or entity. (Here
Kant equates the unknowable witb the mysterious, a distinction on
which be had earlier insisted.)
Given the two assenions above. what can be done with the
idea of grace? In the language of contemporary logic, Kant holds
Ihat we can men(iOit but not use this idea. An idea is used, or
rather the name of an idea is used. wilen it designates something
other than itself. A name is mentioned when it appears in a
stllttrlct but do.!:s not rder to anything beyond ilself. Perhaps I
134 REUGION wrntIN ... REASON ALONE

have been tOO stringent In interpreting Kant on this maner. He

does allow one slight we of the term "Grace; the assumption that
whatever it is, it may possibly affect us in wa)'$ that our nature
cannol, provided we have made the maximum use of our powen.
In ~ry kind of public belief, Kanl fInds thaI people have
devised practices for themselves as means of grace. For example,
the fIve great commands in "Mohammedanism": washing. praying.
fasting. alms giving. and pilgrimage to Mecca. Kant's interest Is
always in classifying these thing!! as dther virtuOUS in themselves,
and so a senuine means of grace, or merely ClIamples of fetishism.
Kant had alteady mentioned that the phrase, "means of grace; is
internally self<Q)nuadictory, lince grace is presumably something
fOT which no deaf means is available to us.
In Ihe "Mohammedan" list of commands, Kant menliulU that
aIms-giving alone, if il took place from a really moral motive,
.... ould be the only one that could be looked upon as a human
duty. However, lesl the charity indusll')' rest 100 cheerfully, Kant
adds that, on the ronlrary. alms-giving does nol deserve to be thus
distinguished from tile rest because, under this faith, alll1$-giving
can well go hand-in-hand ~ith the extonion from othen of wllal,
as a ucrifice, is offered to God in the penon of the poor." As
always., Whil mancl'$ morally iii the intcntion. After these
preliminaries, Kant directs himself to tile rOUT apparent means of
grace that Christianity hu usually taken to have serious meaning:
(1) Prayer, (2) Cburch-Going. (3) Baptism, and (4) Communion_
I. Prayer. With prayer, as with each of these OIlier possible
means of ,race, Kant separates the genuine spirit of the maner
from that upect which is merely a felish. Where prayer is thoullht
of as 'an inner formal SCM" of God and hence III a means of
grace, it is a superstitious illusion (a fetish makinl)" (pp. 182-183).
In this kind of praycr we have 110 more than "a stated wi$h
directed to a beinl "'ho needs no such information' about the
inner disposition of the wishcr. Such a praycr acannplishel
nothing and discharges no moral obligations.. However, tnc 'spi rit
of prayer' consists in "a heartfelt wish to be well pleasing 10 God
in our cvery act and ab$tcntion, or in Oilier word$, the disposition
 Rdigion WUllin If~ Limits of Reason A/OM 135

. . . 10 act as thoop our actions were being executed in this

service of God .. ." (p. 1&3). Kam warns apinst any explicit
effort to clothe Ihis wish in words and formulas. He separates the
spirit of pr.l.yer from Ihe Illusion in this way. In the s.piril of
prayer, "man KeU bill ro IO'Otk upon hu.-/ffor the quickening of
his di$pOSition by means of the idea of God"; while in the fetish
variety, the human being tries ro ~ upon God. In the genuine
sense, a prayer can be offered with perfect sincerity because "the
mao praying does DOt presume to be able to affirm tbat lhe
existence of God is wholly cenain." Recall that in this cue lhe
individual el>5entiaUy wants 10 work upon himself or herself. In
the iCCOod variety, "115 an addreM, he supposes this supreme being
10 be present in penon." Kaot adds, dryly, complete sincerity
cannot be found in the latter, verbal, prayer.
To illustrate the point about the !;incerity in vermu prayer, Kant
challenges us to imagine a pious and wellmeaning man. "Who
someooe else takes unawares. I will not say in praying aloud, bul
merely in behavior iodicative of prayer. Everyone will ... expect
a man thus surprised to raU inlo confusion or embamwment 115
though in a situation whereof he should be ashamed" (p. 183).
Why should web a penon be ashamed? Presumably became
someone caUghl talking aloud to him is llIspeeted of a slight attack
of madness., for behaving while alone in a way that we would
ClIpec:t only if someone else were with Ihal person.
Kanl insists that the tcacher of Ihe gospel has expresscd the
spirit of prayer "mosl admirably in a formula whicb bas al once
rendered dispensable not only all this bill also Ihe prayer itself as
a verbal utterance" (p. 183). We must 00\ request something that
God in divine wisdom might refuse us., but only a wish "10 become
a man well pleasing to God." How abom the wish for the means
of sustaininll. our existence-for bread? The prayer for da ily bread
is a prayer for an animal n.eed nllher than a distinc:tly human wish.
Kant holds that the distinc:tly human wish would be for bread for
anolher day. BUI his objection involves the Idea Ihal lhe petition
for daily bread is addr~d 10 someone else. "It is funher not
only a preposterOUS but also a presumptuOUS illusion to try to
136 REUGION wrn-tIN ... REASON ALONE

divine whether Ihrough the persistent importunity of one', requcsL

God cannot be divened (to our present advantage) from the plan
of his wisdom. Hence, we cannot hold that any prayer which is
for a oonmoral object is lure to be heard .. : (p. 184). Kant
generaJiz... that any prayer for III object that is possible only
through supernatural influence, for something whose OC'aIrTence
wouJd DOt trouble us to make our own efforts, is outside of the
area in which we can pray. "I t follows that a gih of miracles ...
taken literally, is not to be thought or (p. 184).
What of the mere paMive contemplation of the profound
wisdom of the divine creator? To this Kant responds that such
contemplation would simply "U'lIIIIipon the mind into that thinking
mood ealled adoration, annihilating men. as it were. in their own
eyes" (p. 1&5).
Kant does bold that set fonns of prayer fot children are of
moral use. Children still stand in need of the leller. and 10 in
their earliest yean they must be given the proper language In
which to speak inwardly and make the allempt to allune the mind
to the idea of God. But it muSI be made dear that the words
being U&td are oot an aid to the imagination. The actual urvice
of God "never consislll io mere feelings" (I'. 186).
1. Cbun:b-Goln" This is aUo presented [n Iwt) separale waY'.
If formalitics are required thai might lead to idolatry. or "sensuous
representations of God: then the panem is contrary to the
command of rell5On. Here. interestingly enough. Kant takes a
command of reason 10 be, Ibou $hal t 001 make unto thee any
graven illlll3e... : He makes the reference to Exodus xx. 4.
without any comment ... all about the effect that this hu had on
the ceremon.ial paltelll5 of Judaism. Kant's main point under Ihis
heading is that churchgoing is a duty for the group. when it is
thought of as a ceremonial public service of God. ' Public prayer
is indeed no means of grace; yet it is moral ceremony ...
embracing aU the moral concerm of men" (p. 1&5). He COIltrasu
puhlic prayers with privale prayen and finds that the mor:al benefit
is found in the public pattern. The public ceremony repreltnting
the ,HUOn of all people in a common desire for the Kingdom of
 RdigiOl* Wuhin '/~ Limill of RtlISlNl A/OM 137

God, "cannot be: accomplished more appropriately than by

speaking to the head of the Kingdom just as thoop he were
sped.ally present in tbat vel)' place" (p, 185), Public: prayer can
"raise the feelings to the point or moral eultalion , , , and possess
a more rational basis than does private prayer for clothi", the
moral wish, ....hich constitutes the spirit of prayer, in a formal
mode of address," Kant adds quickly tbat this is done ",of,IlOW
piaurins Ihc Supreme Being as present, yel he bas also said in lbe
remark just quoted above, lhal this may be done, "as lhoop he
were present."
3. s.pU. ., "Ibis a ims at something holy (the development of
a man inlo a cilizen in a divine state) but the Ict performed by
othen is not in itself holy or productive of holiness." llIerefoce,
Kanl takes an initiation ceremony 10 be highly significant for an
individual .... ho "is in a pCIIition, hinuelf, to confess his faith,' or
"upon the wimcw>e who pledge themselves 10 take care of his
eduClilion," yet il is no means of grace by it5elf, The aSPJmption
thai il can ....ash away si ns Kant calls "an allllOil more Ihan
heathenish supentition" (p. 187),
... Co_aalo.. Here apin Kant holds that ....e have I
significant ceremony, provided that we do nol assert "that God bas
attached special f'V(ln to the celebration of this solemnity: '"IlIc
formality of I common partaking of the same table. contains
witbin itself something great, expanding the narrow, selfish. and
unsociable cast of mind among men, "-'pecially in matten of
religion, loward lhe idea of a cosmopolitan moral community. It
is I good means of enlivening a community to tbe moral dispo$i-
tion of brotherly love which it represents" (pp, 187-88). There
could hardly be a wanner endonement, yet he WIIns thai to think
of it as more than a mere churchly act .... ould be: "a religious
illusion ....hicb can do cooght hut work counter to the spirit of
religion,"
Kant concludes these comments aoo...t the so-eaJled means of
grace \\l tb a dcfinitiOll of dericalism in general It is the domin-
ion of the dergy over people's beans, by arrogating to themsclves
tbe prestige Ittached to exclusive possession of means of grace
138 REUGION WITHIN ... REASON ALONE

(p. 188). or the three divine moral altrib\lIes, Iloline5$, mercy. and
justice. "man habitually turns directly to the second in o rder tl'lus
10 avoid the forbiddilli condition of conforming to the require
menu. of the fil'$t" (p. 188). "Man busies himself with every
conceivable formality designed to indicate l'Iow gready he respU
the divine commands, in ordc r thai it may not be nessary for
him to obey thcm." Kant concludes with Matthew VII. 2 1, where
the human heing crics "L)rd, Lord: 50 as noI to l'Iavc 10 "do the
will of his H eavenly Father."
The Christian concept of Ihe chosen.. those wllo "in Iheir own
opinion are extrMlrdinarily favored: is a concepl that Kant treau.
with contempt. If we can know people by their fruits, be con
cludes that thU$ far .... e do DOl see that the chosen ones surpass in
the very leut "the naUJrally bol\C$l man who (In be relied upon
in lIOCial intercourse, in busincu, or in trouble; on Ihe coniraJ)'.
taken as whole, Ihe chosen ones can s.carcely .bide comparison
with him, which PTm'eS thai the righl COUT$C Is not 10 go from
grace 10 vinue. but rather to progress from virtue 10 pardoning
grace." No religiOU$ mystic sland$ above "men of native honesty
who . .. take religion unto themselves not as a 5ubstitute for but
as a funheran.ce of the vinuous d~tion. which $I\0I0.'$ itself
through actiollli in a good COUT$C of life" (p. 189).
1be reader who has completed this comme ntary chapter and
desires a brief in!erpretation Is advised to tum to Chaple r E1eveo
of this book, "1'he R eligiOU$ Question."
 Part II

APPLICATIONS OF REASON
 Four

AMBIVALENCE: THE NATURE OF

THE INDIVIDUAL

This chapter, true 10 its subject, tends 10 II"IOYe toward IWO pis.
One is the effort 10 generaliu on Kant's notion of the subli me
and make some features of WI into the euential pallem of
human OlIIUTe. The other is the development of a formal model
for dassilyiog twenty~igbt differeot types of ambivalence. The
coonection between these IwO goals is lIle view WI serious
attention to Kant's tbeory of human ambivalence requ ires a
logically acceptable set of models for ambivalence. The formal or
logical material on ambivalence is preceded by ~eraJ sections
presenting Kant's views on human happiness, the idea of ambiVll-
knee, the n.ature of ranalicbm, and the monist and dualist
traditions. The form.al material on ambivalence is followed by a
section on the history of the relations between Kanl's and olber
views of hwnan nature, and a 1ICCti0n on the sourcn and
implications of Kant's dua.listie model Finally, comments are
given 0 0 the connections between ambivalence and hoocsty.

I, HapploeJil

We have already seen that Kant's dualism applie5 to individuals,

and we have already considered his rejection of individual
happiocu lIS a foundation (or morality. These IwO elements will
continue to be basic lIS we orpnize his conception of individual
human nature.
Kant'. ethical theory aa~e several arguments for the rejection of
happine5S as a basis for morality.' Morality apart, the very idea
of bappine5S has a strange complication. 10 addition to the more
famil iar points. Kant holds that "the concept of happiness is 50
1<2 TIlE LOGIC OF AMBIVALENCE

indefinite thaI, although each person wishes \0 altain it, he can

never ... Siale what it is he really wishes and willi.'" After Ihis
p"sag.: follows .. formal explanation of this problem of tile
inability 10 prodU(e ". definite concept" of happiness. Kant
concludes that the task of determining the imperative or principle
which would produce "the happiness of a rational being is
completely unsolvable," Here be i5 considering the Cl<islCnce of
an impenllive for happille5S rather than the nature of happiness;
DO rational imperative is to be found because, "happiness is an
ideal no! of reason but of ima&inatioll, dependin; only on
empirical grounds ., ,"" Apart from the mattc r of web an
imperative, why is the eoncept of happineu "50 indefinite,' to use
his term? Because we arc always ambivalent. This limitation on
happiness isromJalivc with the ron<:cp! ohmbivalence developed
in this chapter. If onc is ambivalent about all &oak. neither
Tcacbill3 nor avoiding any goal will produce bappiness..

1. ...... d Vee : The AJIIbl ... lence or lIN! I.dhidual

The phrase. "and yel: is used rcauJarly at critical points in

Kant's work on elhics aDd religion! Und dot;h and dcch w.gIdch
are liberal ly sprinkled ill almost every seeUon. Far from a stylistic
rlXity, the phrase, ' and yel.' indicated Kant's view that opp17 d e

principles exist wilhin the human individual. What are these

principles? We have already seen them: reason and sensuous-
neM, the categorical imperative and personal veed, ete. Consider
the .....y matten are put in several key pau.ages. Humanity,
' despite a corrupted heart yet possesses a good will" (R.digion,
p. 39). uter on, "Our reuon commands us potently. yrI without
maJrins either promises or w eall .... (RdigiOfl, p. ).
Kant holds that the only .....y that a person can frame a concept
of a moral dispoJition is by "picturing il ai encompassed by
ob!iotacles. and reI. in the face of the fierceSI onslaughts, victorious
. ." (RdlgKm, p. S5). In another basic passage, "The idea of the
hipest good . .. cannot be realized by man himse lf ... yet he
 ~ J..cric of Ambivalence 143

disroveT5 within himstlf the duty to work (or this end" (Religion.
p. 130).
"And yel" OCCUT5 al doum of crilical points; il is required by
the thought The thoupt in queslion is the conceplion of an
ambivalent individual. 'The problem of this chapter is to develop
a notion o( ambivalence that makes both logical and psy<:hological
sense. Kant has KI fonh some of the require ments of Ibili
conception, bul despite its importance (or bi5 whole posilion, he
has left eoonnous pps in his theory of human nature. We will
have to develop his d ues. To have one goal and yet have an
opposite goal al the IiI1RIC lime does leave us wilh quite a (ew
questionable mailers.
Among the i55ues rai'ed by !he erron to have a logically
consistent theory of ambivalence are these. ( I ) T o intend to reach
a goal may require having an image or a model of that goal.
What is the image for an ambivalent goal? (2) If a model turns
OUI to be self..conlradiClOry. that indicales JOme error about lhe
intention. 3) If an intended goal is not possible. it apptU'Mtly can't
be actual-thai is, the intention did IlOl occur, even if the subject
thoupt it did. What did oemr? Each of these malleT5 is subjed
10 debate; a OOgeDl lhemy of ambivalence mUSI clarify its stand on
all of them. What follows addresses these and other problems in
a fashion that is consislent with the requirements of KaDt's
position and the relevant fragments 10 be found in hi5 work.
'I'hi5 chapter worb OUI a position that gives full scope to the
psychological fact of ambivalence. Experimental work lies ahead
on the nature of ambivaJeocc. But let us try to use what may be
assumed to be the flct of ambivalence withoul sacrificin& any of
the demandli of logic. Firs!, whit is the fact? Second, why respect
logic?

1. Ambh-aieace .... FI.. l tklsm

To Slart, I will Slate things. dogmatically, and argue laler. Here

is the fact with which we shall be concerned: jnJiWfrwlr ate
ure1lfiDllyambNaJent. Comider the ass.enion that individuals have
\ .. TIlE LOGIC OF AMBIVAlENCE

opposed intentions 115 rued pan of their naturel, that they are
cSenlia1Jy, rather than accidentally, ambivalent. For WIY of /11dr
objraies, they hatIe at fras/ JOnIC UutrW ill lUI oppo=l objtaive.
Freud has made us familiar with life and death instiru:ts and with
childhood ambivalence toward parents. But these are often
presenled by others either as pilthoJogicaJ or as stages in growth.
Instead, suppose that we take ambivalence to be the ordinary
or healthy stale of affairs.. Immediately "'Ie are Infronted by wbat
is called the "doublc-bind" theory. This rcfcl'$ 10 kind of
ambivalence in whieh .n individual is given lncoosislCni me<uges.
such as: "I love )'OIl.' and, "I doo', lave you"; ' I hope YOli reach I
oenain goal." and "I hope you don't reach that iloa!." The double-
bind IheolY' has c:Dlliidcred an imponanl idea. gone off in a
limited direction with it, and p!:rImadcd orne thcrapisu that
ambivalence ought 10 be cured. I'm going 10 usumc 50ftIClhina
diffe rent.
SolIN: kind. of ambivalence may well be alrable, but cenalnly
1101 every kind. This requires I .....y of classllyins kind$ of
ambivalences, and this chapler provides II leasl one way. Since
lOme psychialrist5 try 10 undersland ambivalence. not elimirnlle il.
a way 10 classify ambivalence is Mcenaf)'.
Whenever an individual bas DM objecti~, lbal penon has at
least lOme ioteteSl in another objective that is opposed 10 iL
Take this to be the healthy stale of affilirs. If an individual has
merely a toosistent set of Boals. has no ambivalence, let us call
that person f(mQ1icDJ. SeIf-impo$Cd binds are normal, not patho-
JogicaL We an still distilllLlish heal thy and unhealtby ambiva-
lences. More on this bel(J\/l. But we may assume that Q faNZtic is
someone who has merely, sin&Je objecti~, or a tonsistent sct of
objectivn. Such a penon thinks that his or her single objective is
il. is sufficieoL This penon is DOl e~o slightly interested in an
alternative to tnal aoat. For such an individual only one heaven
exists, and nothing is wonh a deviation or a pause in &Ctting there.
b tim an ordinary or an unusual aMumplioo7 A tontemporary
reference may help. In his book on tonflict resolution, Kenneth
Bouldina made a Umilar point
 'I'M Logic of Ambtvaklt

no. rnH;"'. oSevotce, wit"' ..ly .......,liued,""' .. a ~ barpi '".

pooiI"'" boao ..... 0I1lie ior ...... obIc Nt"", 01 tkir ......aIit_ ... llIey
...W'. ~ ccuccd, boaollK I...,. will die I"ItI!er ll!aa ~ up lloeir fa411 """
pnoct.icc. Before lloe hUlk. ordUwy reo,o"H< "'... &Ie "'!pIcM: ,bey
tan be. """"'" """ lhc r..." tanllOl. II a t...p;a ir. wlOd, ~ "''''' be. . .
the. f....ri<:'. ......... kw "" ",be, .emu &Ie poo&ibIo.. WbcI!. w...ic: Itib
diff....,.. f..... k. 01 course, "" bupia tan be .,rvd II aU.'

11Iey strike each other. Bouldin, takes a fanatic to be someone

who has an ' irrevocable" commitment. In OUT teons, such an
individual would have no ambivalence, no interest in the opposite
of her or his commitment. For BouIding. ordinary, reasonable
men" do not have any irrevocable commitment. and 1 assume Ihis
means tbat ordinal)' people do ha"e some possible interest in the
opposite of their goals.. They am consider a compromise because.
afler aU, they are oot perfealy consistent about their loals; they
do have some opposed interest, some ambivalence concemillJ
even their mos. strongly held objectives.
Havin, found wppon in someone else. a rontemponll), wriler
who takes the ordinal)' penon 10 be ambivalent, "'e shall 10 on 10
coru.ider a second mailer. If ambivalence is not yel an established
fact, it is at least a reasonable hypolhesis.

4. The Requ irements or Logie

Let liS now make the assumption that human heini\.' are
~liaJJy ambivalent-not accidentally, not as a stage in growth.
not just when victimittd by a pathological family. eiC. 001 by their
own nalUres. 11Ie problem now is 10 prodllce a theory of ambiva-
lence !lUll does 1101 make our ordinary ambivalenl person look
irnltional when compared 10 the fanal ic.
Suppose an individu al has two 10als. Ind they are inconsistent.
It is the fallacy of ignarotio t~neJoj to ask which thaI person would
prefer if both goals could not he had. (Thi~ it. the f"llacy of
Ignorance of the Point at luue. It OCCUTJ wilen lhe response 10 a
question is not pertinent to Ike i55Ue at stake.) It is ignorance of
the pain! at iSliue because 5uch a person wants boIlI. even if Ihey
 m E LOG IC OF AM BIV AU'..NCE
'"
are il\OOlIliislenl A logical obstacle appean to the mere thought
(or picture) of reaching contradictory slales of affairs. Would you
like 10 draw a square-drde? One can say 50, but logic doesn't Jet
Wi take the ambition seriously. If wmething is logically impo5.ii
ble, can il be psycholOj;icaUy poMible? Our problem can be
solved by acknowledging that while contradictory natcme nts
cannot be true al Ihe ia/TlC time. they lTIiIy hold a' different times.
It is impouible 10 picture the colliradiclion of being in this
room.nd 1'101 being in this room at the $;Imc time. However, one
can picture such events svifJ/ly: one can constlllC! an il'lUlgc of
oneself here. and afterwards outside. then again in. then 001, in,
out, etc. Such images can be quickly f1ruohcd in an individual's
thought. Memben of a oolltradictory pair can each be pres<=nl al
slightly differenllimes.. The difference between the Ja/llC time and
times thaI differ by extremely small fractions of a seeond seems
psyehologieaUy trivial, Itowevt:r logically significam.
Suppose three conditions to hold: (a) an individual vaciUates
between losicaHy contradictory po!)iitions, (b) the interval between
the alternativt:s is quile short. and (c) Ihal person is a ..... re of the
rapid vacillation between the po$ition!;. An individual ""ith these
three conditions is then aware of himself or herself as holding
contradictOry po!)iitions at uuntial/y the ~me time. With rapid
enough vacillation between tbem, one produces the psychological
effect of holding contradictory po!)iitions. wilhou! any breach of
logic.
Ambivalence inVQl'lCli ~cillaling bet""een a1ternative5 tllat are
in one or anotller 50rt of k>gieal opposition. We ""ill consider the
kinds of oppo!)iition in til<: nell! section. If sevcraltimes differ only
by minule fractions of a 5eC()nd. [or ll1yehological purposu Ihey
are simultalK'OlJs. If an imerval is so short that it iii not significant
to hisect it and n()\ice ""hich alternative came in the fil'$t and
""hieh in the second half. then those alternatives arc effectively
simultaneous. When the individual is not aware of ""hich of the
IWO alternatives occurred fir-a and ""hieh second. they are simulta-
nwus, few Iilal penon.
 Th~ Logic of Ambil'llknu \ <7

.5, The Fol'IILI..I Propen ies or a Cube or Opposition

T o be ronvincing, our notion of arnbivalelll:e must have a

ronsistent {onnal interpretation, 'Ibis section ronsm.u:ts jusl wch
an iDt~rpretalion. Our conslruction foll0W5 lhe pa ttern of
Aristotle', well-known Square of Op~tion. but we shall enlarge
it inlo a cube.

Deftnltlnns of Some Varieties of Opposition

A "square of opposition" provides a way nf classifying and

showing some of the structure of four different ways thai $Iate-
menlS may be opposed 10 olher statements.
A pair of stalements may be
(a) ronlnldictoriu: that is, they can not both be true or bolh be
false. If ei the r one is true, the other mmt be false. EnmpJe;
"Today is Monday: and "Today is I'WlI Monday:
A pair of statements are
(b) WIIlrwy when they cannot both be true, but theyelUl both
be faJsc. EJtample: "Today is Monday: and "Today is Tuesday."
A pair that are
(e) subeomroty, have a different property; they can both be
true, but Clnnot both be false. Example: "Some days are sunny:
and "Some days are IIOt sunny:
A pair are !laid to be
(d) subalItnU when they can both be true, and also they can
both be false. EJtample: "Every day is sunny,' and "Some days are
sunny:
A fifth pattern should be IIOted, "'hen ililemenu I re
(e) ~nt in truth-value. They I re held equ ivalen t in this
IiCIlSe when they are either both true or both false. Statements
may be equivalent in deserving the label "true" or "false" and yet
have different referen(C5. Example: "Wll$hinglOn was Preside nt
of the USA," and ")Cant was not P resident of the USA," Both
true, but somewhat different meaniTl{:$-
148 TIlE LOG IC OF AMBIVALENCE

5. 1 Moods of Amblnltatt

For ambivalenc:e to be displayed "''CO must have at least one

individual lubject. onc goal. and one pattern of opposition. One
goal will JiYC UI just the simplu\ ca.5e.. The individual, A, either
(I) accepts, or (2) reject$, or (3) neither accepts nor rejects an
objective, B. To simplify still further, we will assume (uwal!y) that
the third CiI5C does 1101 occur, aDd our subject either accepu or
rejcru the objective, B.
We now consider four po$itions thaI a subject, A, may take on
the matter of rejecting 5OnlCthing, B. Likewise. oollSider four
positlo11$ that A may take in the mancr of accepting B. Diagram
3 displays these eight positions on acceptil18 and rejecting as the
eight comers of a cube.

Diagram 1
Square or P~hok>pcal Opposition roT ~ion

I 2

A always rcjecu B A never rejecu B

COl'ITRARIES
s s
U U
B B
A A
L L
T T

R

R
N N
SUBCONTRARIES
A iOmelimu rejectS B A sometimes
does nol reject B

J
 ..9

At the top left point of the 'Quare is a ~ ~

statement, and a' the top ri&J!t comer a ~ "'V;~, with the
umc subject and predicate. At the \ower left corner is pa1ficuIor
affUrruuive, and at the lower ri&hl romer a particuItlr nqatm, with
the same subjects and predicates as !he twO 1.II1iverwi 5Ulements.
It will then be dj~red that the two diagona.ls. lines 13, and 2-
4. connect pairs of Slatcmeol$ that arc contradictory.
The back face of the eube-comcn 5, 6, 7, and S-Offcn four
positioos involvina the aca:plin& of B.

Diagram 2
Squre of Psycbolo&leaJ Oppolltion lOr Acpnace

, ,
A always accepts B ... A n~r accepts B
CONTI<ARlES
s ,--------, S
U U

A

A
L L
T T
E E
R R
N N
SUBCONTRARIES
A sometimes accepts B A sometimes does
1101 accept B

8 7

Tbe sq\lare$ in Dlagranu I and 2 ea.n. be placed on opposite

races of cube, as in Diagram 3. We can then interpret this as
a CtN of PJyclwlogiroJ. Opparition. Each line connects two
150 niE LOG IC OF AMBIVALENCE

comers, and so each tine preenl5 one kind of ambivalence:

ambivalenc'e ronsis'in& in v.emllion between tile positions It each
end of the line. eaeh romer.

Diagram 3
C'llbe of Pl)'dloIo&lW Opposhkm

;'----:
,, '
,,,
,
,, . ----



--- ,

." - - - -

TIle position at each corner is as follows:

I - A always rejects B. (I) R(a,B.I)

2 - A never rejects B. (I) R(a.El.t)
3 - A sometimes docs not reject B. (El) R(a.El.t)
4 - A sometimes rejeru B. (El) R(a,8,t)
5 - A aJwa)'5 aa:epts B. (I) A(a, B.I)
6 - A never aecepts B. (I) A(a,El.t)
7 _ A sometimes does not ac:eepl B. (Et) A(a,El.I)
8 - A sometimes Ic:eePI5 B. (EI) A(a,B.I)
 17~ Logic of Ambivalclce lSI

1lIe line between 1 and 2 represents the osciJ[ation between

always rejtinK B and never rejectill& B. An individual whose
ambiYaJence consists ohacillating between Sometimes rejecting B.
and Sometima 00{ rejectin& B, would bave bis or her pallern
illustrated by the line between 4 and 3.
The ~be has twelve edges, each consislill& of a line that
presents one patlern of ambivaJence. There are six faces on the
~be, and each (ace can have a pair of diagonals connecting its
cornen. These diagonal Iina are not drawn on the cube in
Diagram 3, bUI may easily be specified. as [3,2-4,27, 3-6, elc.
Since there are We faces. there are twelve face diagonals. 10
addition, there are four interior diagonals (nol drawn on the ~be
of Diagram 3), 17.2-8, 3-5, and 4-6. We therefore have a total
of 28 lines COfIMCtMg opposiJe oorn6J of tbc cube. EDCh of these
lines can ~ taken to rqJIf:SDd a ~arU:ty of am~ benVl!'" the
opposite posirioru QJ W DId of the fitIe.
The 28 typeS [aJ[ into rlYe logical varielies: contradiClOfy,
contrary, sub<ontrary, 5llbaltern, or equiYmnL
By m'kioK ceNin U5lImpliollli we sball be able 10 di$eoYer the
logical relationships between thc twenty-eiabt kinds of ambiva-
lence. If the reader suspects that the lS5umptions 10 be found in
the nut 5Cdion dictalc the conclusions. I can only agree. In any
deductive presentation the IWUmptioll5 mun force the conclusions.
Cou[d other IS5wnptions have been made? Of course. But
hollC5ty is satisfied wben the panicular IWUmpliollS emplll)'cd are
d early staled, and whenlhcir alternatives are alleut considered.
Some nf tbese are obviOU$; otbers perbaps DOL

AHwnptlonl

Take "rejecu" and "is repelled ~ to be synonymous. and

likewise. "accepts" and "is attracted by:
(I) We will deal only with a two-valued universe in which one
is either repelled or attracted; nothing else can ocrur. When an
individual, a. is repelled by something. B. at a time. t, tbat is
152 1HE LOGIC OF AMBIVAlENCE

equivalenl 10 nol bein& attrac!ed by B, .1.1 !hal time. Symbolically,

R ( ..8,1) is equivalenl 10 -A (a.B,I).
(2) 1be statemenl r.hat 5Omeone is always repelied by B is
equivalenl 10 the statemenl r.hal il is false 10 say r.hat sometimes
thai penon is nol repelled by B. Following the lI5UaI symbols and
rules for quantification, (I) R (a,8,I) is equivalent 10 -(EI) -R(a,8,I).
Another a;lfnmon rule in logic: lells us r.hat
(3) If 5Ollleone is sometimes repelled by B, lhis is equivaJenlto
bolding that it is false thaI our penon is never repelled by B.
(Et) R(a.B,I) is equivalenllO (1) -R (a,.B,I).
(4) By wbstiluoon of ( I) in (2), the risht band side of (I) for
the equivalenl material on Ibe rishl band side of (2), and the law
of double negation, we gel the auertion lbal '0 is always repelled
by B," is equivalent 10 ' Q is never attracted by B: (I) R(a, B,t) is
equivalenl 10 {EI) A(a,B.t).
It will be convenient 10 have three more equivaleoc:esstated in
this form.
(5)'Q is always attracted by B: is equivaleOl to 'Q is nevt:r
repelled by 8." (I) A(a,B,t) is equivalent to -(EI) R (a, B,t).
(6) ' Q somelimes is repelled by B: is equivalent to'Q sometimes
is not attracted by B." (EI) R(a,B,t) is equivalenl to (EI)-
A( ..8,I).
(7) 'Sometimes D is not repelled by B; is equivalent to
"sometimes 0 is attrac:ted by B: (EI) -R(a, B.t) is equivalent 10
( Et) A(a.8,I).
These assumptioO$ and consequences allow us 10 wnven any of
the ' standard formulations" ot attraction and repulsion into an
equivalent formulation. By these devices we quickly discover the
propcnies of the twenty-ei&ht lines involved in the cube.

Propenles ot Ihe ~nl1-El"'l Unes of Opposition In the Cllbe

Each venical face of the C\lbc: consists of a full traditional
square of opposition, with contraries a5 the lop line, wbamtraries
as r.he bonom line, subalterns as sides, and contradictories for
diagonal\. 'The top face of the C\lbe, 1-5-6-2, is compo5otd of
contrary lines. The hIlttam face, 4-3-7-8, is composed of subcon-
 The Logic
The Logic of
of Alnbivalence
Ambivalence 153
153

traries. The
traries. The diagonals
diagonals on on the
the top
top face
face (1-6,
(1-6, and
and 2-5)
2-5) and
and onon the
the
bottom face
bottom face (4-7
(4-7 and
and 3-8)
3-8) tum
turn out
out toto connect
connect equivalent
equivalent positions.
positions.
Equivalent statements
Equivalent statements must
must be be either
either both
both true
true or
or both
both false.
false.
To adopt
To adopt oneone isis equivalent
equivalent in in truth-value
truth-value to to adopting
adopting thethe other.
other.
To be
To be equivalent
equivalent in in truth-value
truth-value need
need notnot be
be the
the same
same asas equiva-
equiva-
lent in
lent in reference.
reference. The The interior
interior diagonals
diagonals (1-7,
(1-7, 2-8,
2-8, 3-5,
3-5, and
and 4-6)
4-6)
each connect
each connect aa subaltern
subaltern pair.
pair. Notice
Notice thatthat the
the front
front face
face is is
couched in
couched in terms
terms ofof "reject,"
"reject," the
the rear
rear face
face in
in terms
terms ofof "accept,"
"accept," and
and
the connecting faces
the connecting faces contain
contain both
both "reject"
"reject" and
and "accept."
"accept."

12 edges:
12 edges:
1-2 contraries
1-2 contraries 5-8 subalterns
5-8 subalterns
4-3 sub
4-3 subcontraries
contraries 6-7 subalterns
6-7 subalterns
1-4 subalterns
1-4 subalterns 1-5 contraries
1-5 contraries
2-3 subalterns
2-3 subalterns 2-6 contraries
2-6 contraries
5-6 contraries
5-6 contraries 4-8 subcontraries
4-8 subcontraries
8-7 subcontraries
8-7 subcontraries 3-7 subcontraries
3-7 subcontraries
12 face
12 face diagonals:
diagonals:
1-3 contradictories
1-3 contradictories 2-7
2-7 contradictories
contradictories
2-4 contradictories
2-4 contradictories 3-6
3-6 contradictories
contradictories
5-7 contradictories
5-7 contradictories 4-7
4-7 equivalent
6-8 contradictories
6-8 contradictories 3-8
3-8 equivalent
1-6 equivalent
1-6 equivalent 4-5 contradictories
2-5 equivalent
2-5 equivalent 1-8
1-8 contradictories
contradictories
44 interior diagonals:
interior diagonals:
1-7 subalterns
1-7 subalterns
2-8 subalterns
2-8 subalterns
3-5 subalterns
3-5 subalterns
4-6 subalterns
4-6 subalterns
SUMMARY:
SUMMARY:
contradictories
contradictories == 88
contraries
contraries == 44
subcontraries
subcontraries =4
=4
subalterns
subal terns =8
=8
equivalences
equivalences ^ 44
28
28
IS' 11iE LOGIC OF AMBIVALENCE

If the from face (12~) is kept fmd and the rear face (5-6-7-
8) rotated. three additional cubes et.J\ be produced. However,
these new cubes make no conlnootion to our purpose of chwify-
ing the patterns of oppo$ition. 'The!WTle lines of opposition
remain. a1tbough edges beoome diagonals, elc.
Now we need an interpretation of the5e patterns of opposition.

Amb~ CUll be Ulldemood as w.;illating bm._ poMOtU til

I~ elfds uf any of 'he litru of t~~. TIle twenty-eight lines, or
varieties of ambivalence have turned OUI \0 consist of eight
contBdiaorics, four contraries., four subromraries., eight 5UballC1ll$,
and four cqllivalcncics. Each of these varieties bll$ its Jo&ical
structure and set of alternatives available to the ambivalent
individual

1be individual who OKiU.teI betweell contradictory positions

faces the most 5C\'CfC kind of "bind," For eumplc, a vacillation
be~cn A always accepts B" and A sometimes does not accept

B." These a1ternativC$ cannot both occur, simult.allcousJy; and they

cannot both be .voided. simultaneously. One and only one must
obtain. Formally. OM a1Id CIIJy OM of the scntences describing
them can be true. However, til difft!riru lima a person ean act as
if rust one and then the other sentence were true . But, since they
are mntndictories, at any specified time just one of the two
sentences must be true.

(bJ Ambiv<lhna &twem Conlr'ariD

ContrariH present an entirely different !let of alternatives. In

thi5 case while om: cannot obtain both simultallCOUsly, thq COlI
botll ~ atIOided. In an ambivalence between "A always accepts S-
and "A never accepts B, a pc'rson might behave as if one of the
 The Logic
The Logic of
of Ambivalence
Ambivalence 155
155

two were
two were true,
true, then alternate and
then alternate and take
take the other to
the other to be
be true, and
true, and
for still aa third
for still third response,
response, behave
behave as
as if
if neither
neither one
one were
were the case.
the case.
This third response
This third is not
response is possible in
not possible the case
in the case of
of ambivalence
ambivalence
between contradictories.
between contradictories. (While
(While not
not logically
logically possible,
possible, it
it might be
might be
psychologically possible
psychologically that one
possible that one mistakes
mistakes aa pair of contradictories
pair of contradictories
for contraries.)
for contraries.)

(c) Ambivalence
(c) Ambivalence Between
Between Subcontraries

One whose
One ambivalence consists
whose ambivalence consists in
in vacillating
vacillating between subcon-
between subcon-
traries has three
traries has alternatives. In
three alternatives. In such
such aa case,
case, one
one may
may behave
behave as as
if either
if either one
one or or the other were
the other were to to be the case,
be the and thirdly
case, and thirdly as
as if
if
both were
both were to to occur.
occur. Consider
Consider ambivalence
ambivalence between
between "sometimes
"sometimes
rejecting B"
rejecting and "sometimes
Btl and "sometimes not not rejecting
rejecting B." Subcontraries
B." Sub can
contraries can
both occur
both occur together,
together^ but
but atat least
least one
one of
of the
the two
two must
must occur:
occur: they
they
cannot both
cannot both be denied. The
be denied. The pattern
pattern ofof vacillation
vacillation here might
here might
consist in
consist in alternating
alternating between
between the the choice
choice ofof which
which one
one to falsify or
to falsify or
forgo, or
forgo, or it
it might
might depend
depend on on not
not realizing
realizing that both may
that both occur.
may occur.

(d) Ambivalence
(d) Ambivalence Between Subalterns
Between Subalterns

This pattern of ambivalence logically permits two ways of of

avoiding oscillation.
avoiding oscillation. The
The alternatives
alternatives may
may both
both be
be had,
had, or they
or they
may both
may both bebe avoided.
avoided. In In addition,
addition, subalterns
subalterns are
are related so that
related so that
one is
one is aa universal
universal and
and the other aa particular,
the other particular, for
for instance,
instance, "A"A
always accepts
always accepts B," and "A
B," and "A sometimes
sometimes accepts
accepts B,"
B." If
If the universal
the universal
statement is
statement is true,
true, the
the particular
particular oneone must
must be,
be, but
but the particular
the particular
may hold
may hold while
while the
the universal
universal is is false.
false. ToTo summarize,
summarize, subalterns
subalterns
allow three
allow three patterns, (1) they
patterns, (1) they may
may both be false,
both be false, (2)
(2) they
they may both
may both
be true,
be true, and
and (3)
(3) the
t~e universal
universal member
member may may bebe false
false and
and the
the
particular member may
particular member may still
still be true.
be true.

(e) Ambivalence
(e) Ambivalence Between Equivalences
Between Equivalences

Even when the descriptions of two positions

poSItIons are actually
equivalent logically, that equivalence may
'equivalent may not be recognized.
,,. TIiE LOG IC OF AMBIVALENCE

Consider (with our IWO-Yalued assumpUOIll) 'A alwa)'li rejects 8,"

and ' A never accepts B: II may take a number of complicated
logical transformations and ~bstitulions 10 cstablish the equiva-
lence. Or, emotional connections with one formulation may make
i\ difficult to see the loJical relalion. Finally, vacillation may
O<:eUt be~cn preferred formulations or descriptions of the same
situation. But formally, if a pair of pn$itions are logically equiva-
lent, either they may both be accepted or both rejected. They
suffer or enjoy the same fale.

5.3 So_ Re ...llts of This Modtl

What can now be uid ,bout tbe rationality of !he ambivalent

individual? First, thai JUeh a penon has more than onc imerCSI
in the world, which dislin&uishcs such. penon from Ih05e we
have called fanatic. II is nol obviou~y beneT or more rational in
every ca!O!: 10 seek f~T &oals. Second, patterns of ambivalence
can be classified in a wide variety of ways, as our tweDty-eighl
lines 00 a simple cube indicates. Among these p.IICms of
ambivalence, some can be maintained easily and some not. Some
can be maintained by slowly osciJlating bcrwecn alternatives, and
others by rapid oscillation. Some may he "IIeallhy," and others
oot. llIese matters would take us 100 Car from our objectives in
this study of Kant', views. We have at least established a way of
understanding a dualist model of human nature, alllsiructed
without violeoce to the demands of logic. Sucb a model can lhow
IIOt ollly diffe reDt logical varieties of ambivalence, as this chapter
illustrates. but also degrees of ambivalence.
Within each of these tweDIy-eight kinds of ambivalence may
easily exist unequal interest in the particular opposites. A more
clinically U$eful model might have to include a way of measurin&
tlte degree of interest in each of the poles of the particular "tine"
of ambivalence. Sucb developments will be ignored in tlte
remainder of this chapter. We shall fUm 10 some other theories
of human nature that have beeD pro~d in tlte bistory of such
......
;
 The Logic
The Logic of
of Ambivalence
Ambivalence 157
157

6. The
6. The Monist
Monist Tradition
Tradition

Theories of
Theories of conflict
conflict have
have been
been presented
presented regularly
regularly in
in the
the history
history
of thought.
of thought. Before
Before Plato,
Plato, Heraclitus
Heraclitus held
held that
that everything
everything takes
takes
place by
place by strife.
strife. The
The problem
problem isis to
to discriminate
discriminate between
between healthy
healthy
and unhealthy
and unhealthy strife.
strife. For
For this
this we
we need
need analyses
analyses of
of the
the notions
notions of
of
health and of
health and of human
human strife.
strife. Heraclitus
Heraclitus gave
gave us
us an
an early
early statement
statement
of ambivalence.
of ambivalence.

Though reason
Though reason is
is common,
common, most
most people
people live
live as
as though they
though they had
had anan
understanding peculiar
understanding pecuHar to to themselves.
themselves. With
With what
what they most
they most constantly
constantly
associate, with
associate, with this
this they
they are
are at
at variance.
variance.88

The history
The history of of thought
thought sincesince Heraclitus
Herachtus has has often
often taken
taken this
this to
to bebe
an error
an error oror aa weakness.
weakness. If If you
you areare at
at variance
variance with with what
what you you also
also
take to
take to be
be most
most dear,
dear, you
you are are supposed
supposed to to be
be in in trouble.
trouble. Let's Let's
call the
call the position
position thatthat holds
holds that that one
one should
should be consistent the
be consistent the
monist assumption.
monist assumption. For For the the monist,
monist, thethe proper,
proper, best, or healthy
best, or healthy
pattern
pattern is is where
where all all of
of thethe goals
goals that
that an an individual
individual has has are
are aa
consistent
consistent set.set. I'm
I'm assuming
assuming that that monism
monism (or (or rationalism,
rationalism, as as it has
it has
sometimes
sometimes been been called)
called) is is Heraclitus'
Heraclitus' view.
view. For For him,
him, you
you ought
ought to to
have
have only
only aa consistent
consistent set set ofof objectives;
objectives; if if you
you have
have an inconsistent
an inconsistent
set,
set, things
things areare bad.
bad. If If you
you wantwant toto associate
associate with with someone
someone or or
something,
something, you you should
should be be in in agreement
agreement with with it,it, not
not at variance.
at variance.
Presumably,
Presumably, when when Heraclitus
Heraclitus says says that
that most
most people
people live live inin this
this
strange
strange way,
way, he he suggests
suggests thatthat he he doesn't
doesn't andand that
that they
they shouldn't.
shouldn't.
What
What are the examples that he gives? Consider what or who
are the examples that he gives? Consider what or who itit isis
with which people most constantly associate
with which people most constantly associate (his phrase). Their (his phrase). Their
parents,
parents, when
when young;
young; family,
family, friends,
friends, jobs,
jobs, later
later on;
on; and
and thethe "most
"most
constant"
constant" associate
associate you you have
have is is yourself.
yourself. So, So, Heraclitus
Heraclitus assumed
assumed
that
that what we are calling essential ambivalence is bad. The object
what we are calling essential ambivalence is bad. The object
of philosophy, or medicine, is to get
of philosophy, or medicine, is to get rid of that. rid of that.
This
This monist
monist tradition
tradition was was also
also accepted
accepted by by seventeenth-century
seventeenth-century
rationalists.
rationalists. Spinoza's
Spinoza's Ethics
Ethics isis thethe classical
classical presentation
presentation of of aa
monism
monism so so complete
complete that that itit insisted,
insisted, "No"No oneone can can hate
hate God"
God"
(Proposition
(Proposition XVIII,XVIII, Part
Part V). V). As As aa corollary
corollary to to this
this proposition.
proposition,
158 lHE LOGIC OF AMBIVALENCE

SpillOD aIso argued. "Love loward$ God cannot be: changed into
batred."
'The monist (or rationalist) tradition thaI Heraclitus represents
has had lona and impressive grip on the history of thought. II
has become familiar as "common scnse." 1l1C only trouble is that
it is a theory of machines rather than human beings. Only
machines or IIIMe wfferill8 serious disturbances are moniSt about
their goalL This chapter is an eflon 10 preserve rationalism
(ronsisumcy) in tM deJCriplion of human beinp, but 001 in the
namre of the human beings described.
The ambivalence in hul\Wl nature has been obYious !O many
fipres in the history of thought. Ho",ever, it was frequently taken
to be ", disease of the mind" as St. Augustine put il in Book VOl
of his CoIffe ssUuU;

no. ..iood
.... m.er\, Ibc -lad, ito ....... d , 10 will, Mod yet it dotb __
WIoc:_ ,kiI _ _ p' ".,,1 _ '0 _ c..t1' ... It .. ,hord_ _
............... patly 10 will, partly 1o ail, bull dioeooe 01 tbe ..ilod. . ..
AMllXrerote ate tIoen ,_ ..;)Is . . ~ _ I wIoo willed, I wIoo ;"d, I,
I ")II<.If. I wit"', willed CIIIIteIJ, "'" llilltd Ulinly. Tkn:f"", _ I ..
otrifc witII "JKIf. ..0 ,oM ulUIde. "" ..ysdf.'

Return for. momelll to the lWumplion that health requires I

consistent set of goals. We may put this in tel1Il$ of the Socratic
Ra/ioIulJisI Assumption; If an individual knew what WI$ good for
him or her, it would be preferred !o anything else. Greek
rationalism seems 10 have beld tbat human beings are eilSCntially
monist, consistent; therefore, all problems arc problems of
luIowledge. If you really knew what WI$ best for you, if you knew
youneif thoroughly, and knew the environment thoroughly, then
there would be no funher problems. All problems are problems
of oIHainiItg knowledge. That is, the gooll an individual hl$ (r~
Good) are not in conflict. We have called this monism. If you
don't take monism to be compelling. you then have the problem
of dedding which kinds nf dualism are the healthy ones. Whieh
 '"
kind$ of ambivalence must you never II)' to cure or wipe out, and
which kind of ambivalence oug}!! you to try 10 eliminate? Should
a variety of ambivalence be encouraged in some situation?
This chapler assumes that, under at leasl one interpretation.
Socrates is wrong. A single consistent set of objectives is nOI
DOIUW for humans. You might object thai Socrates was not
offerill8 the namai, but the idMi for humQII ~havior. Call
Socrates' assumption, "naive optimism: This optimism has lasted
a long lime, yel il has alternated with various kinds of dualism.
Greal names can be dropped on each side. The problem of
stating the exact po$ition thai Socrates held is rather complicated.
so I iiball select iUustratiom father than claim historical complete-
~

In Xenopbon'l McmomliiJia of SocroteJ. we fInd "tho$e who

could di$(ern tbo$e thinp (thai were honorable and good) would
never prefer anything else to them ...-- People who "never
prefer anything elsc' apparently have no ambivalence about the
maUer. This leaves us with the question of whether people exist
who actually do discern those things, although the rontut
suggests that Socrate5 think$ they do. In anotber passage. after
defining Envy as "a certain UDeasiness , , , at the good lUCceSS of
their frielMk," Socrales is reported to have said, Ihis feeling
0, , ,

[of Envy[ COIJld never arise in the breast of a seru;ible man, hut
that the foolish were COlltantly affected with it" " PrellUmably,
only the foolish are amhivalent about their friends! We are led to
believe some sensihle people exist, !hose who satisfy the ideal of
complete oomisteocy about their concern for Iheir friends'
successes, Exactly the same maner, consistency loward the
success of one's friends, was used by Kanl 10 illumatc his
oppruition to the monist conception of human nature, Earlier we
found thaI Kanl quotes with agreement La Rochefoucauld',
Maxim No. 583,

I. tk ",WOOl " our best

'" ~! + Iloo.., .. _tIoifts _ ir. _
dOV'W, dj'rk",j", 10 .... "
160
160 THE LOGIC
THE LOGIC OF
OF AMBIVALENCE
AMBIVALENCE

To the
To the response
response of of Socrates
Socrates that
that this
this feeling
feeling would
would not
not arise
arise "...,.
in the
in the breast
breast of of aa sensible
sensible man,"
man," Kant
Kant would
would hold
hold that
that human
human
beings are
beings are not
not purely
purely sensible
sensible oror rational
rational creatures.
creatures. We We shall
shall
return to
return to Kant's
Kant's position
position shortly.
shortly.
Suppose the
Suppose the monist
monist isis wrong:
wrong: ambivalence
ambivalence is is not
not accidental--
accidental-
due to
due to ignorance
ignorance of of what
what isis really
really good--but
goodbut essential.
essential. Then,
Then,
knowledge won't
knowledge won't solve
solve everything
everything because
because the
the problem
problem is is not
not
merely aa lack
merely lack of
of knowledge
knowledge but but the
the nature
nature of
of the
the human
human subject,
subject,
the fixed
the fbced nature
nature ofof that
that subject.
subject. The
The next
next issue
issue to
to consider
consider isis the
the
matter of
matter of what
what is
is fixed
fixed about
about the
the nature
nature ofof humanity,
humanity, and
and what
what isis
not fixed.
not fixed.

8, A
8. A Dualist
Dualist Model
Model of
of Human
Human Nature
Nature

This model
This model allows
allows usus to
to accept
accept the the Aristotelian
Aristotelian conception
conception of of
human beings
human beings as as rational
rational animals,
animals, with with the
the full
full consequences
consequences of of
the ambivalence
the ambivalence between between rational
rational and and animal.
animal. However,
However, the the
comforting ancient
comforting ancient Greek
Greek notion
notion thatthat the rational part
the rational somehow
part somehow
should persuade
should persuade or or overcome
overcome the the animal
animal part
part isis not
not aa significant
significant
feature of
feature of the
the individual.
individual. Instead,
Instead, KantKant transfers
transfers thethe success
success of of
rationality
rationality to to the
the collective
collective entity,
entity, humanity.
humanity. Rationality
Rationality is taken
is taken
to
to be
be an
an ideal
ideal that
that humanity
humanity progresses
progresses toward,
toward, butbut does
does not reach
not reach
in
in aa finite time.
finite time.
Does
Does Kant
Kant really
really hold
hold such
such aa dualist
dualist model
model as as this
this chapter
chapter on on
Ambivalence
Ambivalence presents?
presents? We We havehave already
already seen
seen some
some of of the
the "and
"and
yet"
yet" passages
passages in in which
which he he presents
presents aa variety
variety of of central
central positions.
positions.
We
We shall
shall now
now consider
consider aa few
few places
places in in which
which ambivalence
ambivalence is is more
more
clearly asserted.
clearly asserted.
Any
Any acceptable
acceptable theorytheory ofof human
human nature
nature must
must have
have some
some equally
equally
acceptable
acceptable theorytheory of of art,
art, otherwise
otherwise something
something crucial
crucial isis omitted.
omitted.
When
When we we look
look at at Kant's
Kant's analysis
analysis of of art,
art, his
his conception
conception of of the
the
sublime
sublime is is striking.
striking. TheThe special
special factor
factor isis the
the role
role that
that oscillation
oscillation
plays
plays inin it.
it. HeHe distinguishes
distinguishes the the idea
idea ofof the
the sublime
sublime fromfrom the
the idea
idea
of
of beauty
beauty (and(and several
several other
other related
related matters).
matters). The The experience
experience of of
the
the sublime
sublime is is taken
taken toto occur
occur in in aa patten
patten inin which
which individuals
individuals areare
both
both attracted
attracted and and terrified
terrified by by some
some phenomenon
phenomenon or or some
some
 1M Logic 0/ Ambivolma 161

conception. Seeina an enormOU$ narural feature like a great

canyon might prodU" such an experience: an osaUI-tion may
0CQIl between wantirJ& to lean over to see more of it, and fear
and dread of falling Kant praeDb this oscillation (Of vibration,
in some uanslations) u the basic property of tbe experience,

!be .iIMI io _ _ rely er , . , 1 by !lie ",lj-a bOIl io e>o:. beia&

'"
ell : ,.Y". _10 ....... . . . . .,
,r!pt.1h& , ..;.tanim .. the ...bIiaotdoa
~ , " ... ' e ... ~ .. tt<j' , ' "..tUd: ...... j T r ... 10 I:t
. .' , 1 " SM;'" Ft-zp;~ (Nil''' o{J"Io>wIIIC o{J.1. ... n._1
_phzs"z)

Later, we seek for a ground ", , , for the sublime merely in

ouT$dvt$ and in our altitude of tboopt , , ," (C 0/ J., #23 ),
Then, ", , . the redinS of the sublime brin&1l with it as ill; CMraC-
temtic (eature a II'ICIWn5mt of the mind bound up witll the judgins
of the object , , ," (C of 1., 114). So far we are told thai the mind
is alternately attracted and repelled, and tIlat tIlis movement is
cbaracteristic. Kanl adtls, ", , ,the $ublime is that, tbe mere ability
to tbink whicb MIOW5 a faculty of the mind surpassin& every
standard of Knse" (C of J" #2S), Since the ntltEdon:U for judginS
everythiIIJ iocludinll "sense" are the IlIWIi of logic, Kant is claiming
some ability DOl 10 deny logic, but to pin the feelinl of surpasMns

" Ali an eumple of that feeling, be mentions the unavoidability

of Ibinkins", , . tile infinite (in the judgment of common reason)
as mtirtly pm (accordina 10 i\$ lotality)" (C of1" #26), He $OOIl
adds thai this. is accompli$hed, ", ' , not, of course, in a theoretical
point of view and on behalf of the ropitive faculty, bUI as an
tension of tile mind wbicb feels ibeJf able from another
(practical) point of view to lID beyond the limi b of KlI5ibility"
(C. of I., #26), 'Ibis is a malter of feeling, DOt knowledge, ~e
feeliIIJ of tile sublime is , , ' a feeling of pain, , , , 'There is al the
same time a pleasure Ibm excited , , .. (C of J" #27), I leavc o ut
Kant'S supponing argumenb and c.umplcs becaU5C il is the
framework of tbe idea rather than the application in an to which
I want to al l attention bere,
162 THE lOGIC OF AMBIVALENCE

Ibe mind fecit itself moved in the reprcentalion of lhe

sublime . This IDOYcmenl may (especially in ilS beginnings) be
compared to a Vibration, i.e., 10 a quickly alternating .'traction
toward, and repu.lsion from. the SilDIC object' (Co{J., 127). What
this chapter here has done is 10 gen.eralize on Kan,', analysis of
the sublime and make his "vibration . .. quickly alternating
'!lnroaD toward, and repulsion (rom. the same object . . ." into
the ordirwy fixed nature of the buman individual.
The dualist or oonflict model of the individual human is euctly
what Kant Jives U$ in critical passases in his ethia, history. and
religion. In the ethical theory we find, 'Man (eels in himself a
powerful counterpoise against an commands of dul)' . . . .' ' From
this a natural dialectic arises.. . . .o" In the CriJ~ of PrrxtiaJJ
&wcc we arc presented with 'man. as belonging to two worlds.
.. : .. In the ana1yW of history we find lhal, "it is no! his (Man's]
Darurc 10 rest and be oontented with the poswuion and enjoyment
of an)thina whatewcr:" "Further, the inroniislclK')' of his own
fIDJtUUJ dUpruitions drives him ;nlo self-devised torments .. .-
(Kant's cmpha5is., C of I. , '83). Iu the mechanism at the hean
of Kant', "Idea for a Uniwenal Hist ory on a Cosmopolit.an PIa.n,"
we have "the ull50cial liOciability of man," in the Founb 1llesis,
pr~lllcd in Olaplcr II of this book.
For Kant, the ambivalence of the individual is 1'101 pathological.
Some kinds of ambMilellCC are morc productive of waal advan
tages than othen, lOme kinds result in paralysis of the individual,
CII;. However, as a therapist, Kant would not try 10 produce a
consistcnt or monist orientation in his patients. Iu claimed earlier
in this chapter, for Kant, ' . . . fanaticism is annparable to
monomonio . ." (C of J., #29, Bernard trans., p. 116).
The dualist pDlition did nol disappear after Kant, although it
did not dominate. It is wellknown thaI Scbopenhauer was
suollJly inlIuenced by many aspects of Kant', ~neral position,
a1thouJh he objects 10 the ethical theory. BUI on lhe malter of
ambivalence. Schopenbauer was one of the most consi..slCnt
followers. Iu be put it, "At times iI $CelllS as though we both
wanted and did not wanl the same thing. and felt al once &lad and
 163

10")' about it. In such eases there Ire really fWO differellt
motives al work in us. .. ." Apin,"In my head tbere is
permanent oppositioo-party; and whenever I take any step or rome
10 any decision-though J may have &iYcn the maucr mature
consideration-il aftc......vds attacks what I have oone... :"
U ambivalence within the individual is not to be cadialcd,
what hope is there for individual happiness. or even progreM
toward happine$s? What CIlIl hope mean, if ambivalence is
essential rather than acc:idcnt.al? We shall detour into several
other mancrs before we rerum to Ihis, in Chapler Sill: on lhe logic
0'_
9. Amblnlem:e .nd HOlesl,

Kant holds thaI honesty rcqllircs thaI people mUSI "not be

coerced tbroup any threat .. ," (~IigUJn. p. 171). If we accept
this definition, ambivalence presenlS direct challenge 10 such
hODe5Iy. Given ooe objective, bones!), iUUIS to requi re Ihal 00
conflicting objective have the i:UllC status. To be ambivalent is to
have a constant threat lbal one of the goals may be subvcned by
lIIe other. Honesty would require thaI the individual nol be
ambivalent: that DO threat arise of losillJ one of the individual'li
goals in completed .edon. But, if this is the ease. either 00
bonest human beings exist. or Kant is quile wrong about the
essential ambivalence of humans He held that we do oot know
that bonC:Sl people exist. But the problem is stiD more serious
than thU, Is it possible for a human being 10 be bonest?
If honesry requires monilm in one's go.ls, then ansets or devils
can be honest. but oot human beinl$- On Kant'S lelling. human
beinss are always OIciUatinS between respect for the moral ll .... in
them and feat of losing their selfish goals Should h uman beings
try to be monist? Should they ~ to be monisl? We shall
return 10 this question in the last chapter,
Honesry mll5t consist in Idmillilll ambivalence, Idmiuing tha t
every objective mll5t face 50Il'10 competition from an opposite
objective, In its literal sense, "s.inoeril)'" does not a pply to healthy
164 TIlE LOG IC OF AMBIVALENCE

b1lman beings. tbough it may apply 10 fanatics. Buildings may be

dedicated to a consistent goal, but not bealthy human beings.
 Five

THE LOGIC OF IGNORANCE'

A hallmark of Kant's position on religion is to insist on a definite

line between the areu of illnonance and knowledge. We simply
cannot know noumc:n~l entitiu. His sha~t criticism il di rected
at tOOse who prete nd to have knowledge where they have only
ignorance. Or, something thaI we shall call abnorance. 'Therefore,
we mw;t pve a careful analym of the logical structUre of igno-
rance. The anal)'$is of the marks of knowLedge has been a fIXed
part of philosophy in the West since the pre-Soc:ratics. The
analysis of ignorance, ho...-ever. hu been slighted. Perhaps Ihis
was due to an assumption that if lhe basis for knowledge was
understood, ignorance would be obvious.
This ehapter presents a 5emanlie conception of three IOtU of
ignorance relations, WId l~ dmillCriOl1 betwten igIIDronet WId
aIJnonJnu. The object is 10 develop. gene ral conslruction for
analyring some of the logical features of ignorance. 'The logie of
ignorance relations is as relevant 10 every subject as is the logic of
knowLedge relations. Cbapler Vllt and olhers in Part III ,,~1L
apply !be te5Ults of Ihis llIIiI1ysis of ignorance 10 Kam's relipous
conceplS.
YIM! may well ask, Why Iij>eciaL anention to ignorance when
kllD"'Ledge has already been analyud? bn't ignoran simply the
absence of knowledge? Seve ral rea500S exist for a special Study
of the strUcture of ignorance. Fin!, C35e$ exist in which there is
no knowledge. and also no 'porance because there is IlOlhing 10
know or nothing of which to be ignonanl. So, the lack of knowl
edge is nol alwa)'$ equivalent to the presence of ignorance.
Second, significant differences exist between various kinds of
ignorance. We shal l conside r particularly the ignorance dilPlayed
by,
166 TIlE LOGIC OF IGNORANCE

These relationships each require independent analysis to be

properly undentood. Various connections eris.t between these
three kinds of ignorance, and that maner will also be deah with
in detail.
Even a strong theory of knowledge will not Jive a basis for
all$wering some simple questions about ignorance relations.
Examples:
( I) If sentences A and B are equivalent; if one is ignorant of
A. is one ignorant of B1 Put differently, in tellll$ of tbe
logical rather !han the psycholo&ica1 relations involved in
these matters, does ignorance of A imply i&nonance of a
Io&ieally equivalent B?
(2) If sentence A implies sentence B, doeJ, ignorance of A
imply ignorance of B1 Docs ignorance of B imply Igno-
rance of A?
TIIese examples Oon', distinguish varieties of ignorunce, but they
se~ 10 show that a careful treatment of the lo&ical relations
between ignorance pauerns is needed.
This is a semantic conception of ignorance, and, like Tarski'$
classic paper on truth,' we shall make spe<:ial use of the distinction
between use and mention. Briefly, "use" means the reference of
term or semen.:e; "mc:nti{)II" means the name of the term Of
sentence-the !ellers between the qUOUItion marks.
To introduce the definiti{)II used here, one might think of it 11$
I" sdwoIfCOCh<:r's lIOfiOlf 0{ ig!totwIu. For.n individual to be
ignorant. it must be the CiUC that some sentence is true, and our
individual is not capable of a.ueninll it when fairly examined. A
fair examiner must judge whether a ruponse is adequate or not.
IgrwrtJItU ClUI be diJritrguisherl from almoro:mc: II. case of
ignorance: OCCUTli when something is accurately a.uertable;
aboorance occurs in the absence ofSOffiCthing tru thfully as5enable.
If we can't $ay what our weight is, we are illnoralll of the matter.
 111~ Lot;ic of I",orona 167

If we can't say what oolor winSS we human beings have, we V~

abooran!. H aving no wings, we can have no true atlS'A'Cr to the
question about !heir oolor.
Alone poim analytic philosophy devot~d effort to th~ study of
VlICUOW questions. such as the color of the wings on an individual
who has none, and the truthvalue of a sentence about ' he
baldneu of the pr~sent (oon-e.mtent) King of France. 'The term,
"aboorance" I~IS us proce~d mor~ Ioimply, and more intuitively,
altbough intuitions do not all go alike.

1. Denn lllons, AHumptions

'The individuals w~ shall be concerned with ar~ those ~ntili~s

capable of ~king a statemeot in IoOme languag~, witbout r~gard
to whether or not th~y happen 10 be human beings. 'The act of
making a statement may (:(Insist of uttering a sentence. or of any
other form of oommunication; poinling. writing. cin:ling. I)'ping.
elc. We 85Sume the cxisten~ of IoOtne examiner, pos$ibly but not
IlC'cessarily the same as the subject. The ignonmee relations we
will develop are a means for the c.uminer 10 specify the utem of
!he subjec:t's iiflOlance.
We shall take i,noranee to be ignorance of a sentence or set of
sentences; ignorance of things. propositions., or SUltemen\5 can be
expressed by wel1-cbos.en sentences about them. The ulleranee of
a sentence is called a itatement, bul ullnfailure may still leave
us with an objec:t of the ianorance !'Clation; a sentence need not
be utte!'Cd, as Quine has argued.' In order to specify the truth of
a statement asserting ignorance (or exhibiting it), we mUSI also
specify th.e time al which it is ullered. For this notion of ino-
ranee to emt there must exist !he sentence of which our subjec:t
is ignoran!.
Three special cases are of interest, as indicated above: (I)
ignorance of the fact that s.ometbing is a sentence in some
language, (2) ignorance of the truth-value of a sentence. and (3)
ignorance of !he meaning of a senlence. Each of these relation-
shipti will bt exprtued as ignorarlce of the set of sentences
168 TIiE LOGIC OF IGNORANCE

expressing these facts.. No objection \0 a one-member set.

Knowledge will be taken \0 be the case wilen a 5.Ubjed is neither
ignorant nor ahnoranl.

DdinltiOIl I.
Q is IONORANT OF THE FACT THAT s IS A SENTENCE-

in the case thai tI is unable to as.sen that s is such,

This pte5uppoles "fair eMimmI!T who can decide whether s is a
sentence. and whether II is unable \0 assert that it il. This is
called ignoronce of mention. It will be cited lIS "Ignorance (of M)."

iHnalcioli l .
/l is IGNORANT OF 11'IE TR1.J11{VALUE OF I-in the case
wat II is unable to rorrcctly cxp~ the fact that s is lrue or that
it is false.
This also presupposes a fair eominer woo can decide the trutb
or (;Wily of s, and of ,,'s expr~on of the maner. This ignorance
will be ciled as "Ignorance (of TV)."

J)eftnllkin J.
a is IGNORANT OF mE MEAN ING (use or reference) OF
SENTENCE, .1.1 time I-in the case that Q Is unable 10 lIMCn
scntcnc'e S al lime t, given that s is true and its &ssenion is
appropriate.
Again, this presupposes the nolion of a fair B{lI1Iiner who ean
decide whether s is true (is the amwer to the questioo pow:d) and
whether a is or is not able to assert J appropriately_ This is
igrwtwlu of uu. to be cited as "Ignorance (of Rcf)."

Dennll ion of.

a is ABNORANT OF J at I-i n lhe case lhat " is unable 10
tiSen J , but J does not exist in his (or any) language. To eSlablish
abnorancc requires a fair examiner whme knowledge if, so
complete thaI sucb euminer can decide thai there CJtiSls no J Ihal
is the true answer to the relevant question. Cite a5 "Abooranc:e."
 The Logic
Logic of Ambivalence
of Ignorance 169

One
One may distinguish
distinguish varieties of
of abnorance,
abnorance, but
but we shall not
not have
need
need for such sophistication
sophistication until Chapter
Chapter IX.

DeHnition
Definition 5.
a KNOWS 5--justs--just in case a is not ignorant of of s, and s is true.
We avoid the possibility of of abnorance
abnorance by the specification that that s
is true.
is true.
What
What restrictions are on substitutions
substitutions for a in the definitions
above? Of Of what sort of of entity may we say that it is ignorant
ignorant in
one or another
another of of these ways? We need no edict on the matter.
An individual has been been taken, above, as a source of of assertions.
Such an individual may be a composite entity, a computer, a non-
human
human animal, a human being, etc.
The sentence, s, is to be a declarative. However, as long as it
is a sentence in a recognized language (ordinarily, the subject's
language), it may declare anything, for example, a truth-value, as
in Definition 2, or declare that an ignorance relation holds in a
situation, etc.
situation, etc.
Iteration is available, and significant. One may be ignorant
Iteration ignorant of
of
the
the fact
fact that one is
that one is ignorant
ignorant ofof aa certain
certain fact.
fact. Or,
Or, one
one may
may not be
not be
ignorant
ignorant of of one's
one's ignorance
ignorance onon some
some matter.
matter. WeWe can
can be ignorant
be ignorant
of our
of our or
or someone
someone else's
else's ignorance.
ignorance. SomeSome of of this
this will
will be devel-
be devel-
oped in
oped in aa later
later section.
section. Defining
Defining ignorance
ignorance semantically
semantically allows
allows us
us
to express
to express the
the cases
cases inin which
which an
an individual
individual is
is ignorant
ignorant ofof anything
anything
from one
from one sentence,
sentence, to several, to
to several, to aa whole
whole language.
language.

2. Axioms
2. Axioms

The distinction between the examiner's and the subject's

language must
language must always
always be
be kept
kept in
in mind,
mind, although
although the
the two
two may
may
overlap (e.g.,
overlap (e.g., when
when an
an individual
individual makes
makes statements
statements about
about hishis own
own
ignorance).
ignorance The ignorance
). The ignorance relations
relations are
are contained
contained inin the
the exam-
exam-
iner's language,
iner's language, andand are
are used
used toto make
make statements
statements about
about the the
subject's ignorance
subject's ignorance ofof sentences
sentences inin his
his language.
language. (The
(The examiner
examiner
must have
must have made
made anan assumption
assumption specifying
specifying the
the language
language in in which
which
the subject
the subject isis speaking.)
speaking.) For
For simplification,
simplification, wewe shall
shall assume
assume aa
170
170 THE LOGIC
THE LOGIC OF
OF IGNORANCE
AMBIVALENCE

two-valued universe
two-valued universe of
of discourse
discourse for
for both
both languages
languages (examiner'S
(examiner's
and sUbject's).
and subject's).
The following
The following axioms
axioms present
present the
the minimal
minimal properties
properties of
of the
the
ignorance relation;
ignorance relation; further
further assumptions
assumptions will
will be
be made
made in
in the
the next
next
section.
section.

Axiom I.I. If
Axiom If an
an individual
individual cannot
cannot even
even mention
mention aa sentence,
sentence, then
then
that individual
that individual cannot
cannot assert
assert its
its truth-value
truth-value or
or its
its reference.
reference.

Axiom II.
Axiom II. One
One who
who isis unable
unable to to assert
assert the truth-value
the truth-value of
of aa
sentence can
sentence can not
not correctly
correctly use
use itit to
to make
make aa reference. (Except
reference. (Except by
by
accident.)
accident.)

Axiom III.
Axiom III. If If someone
someone can can be
be called
called ignorant
ignorant of of something,
something, that
that
thing must
thing must exist.
exist. (Otherwise,
(Otherwise, recall
recall that
that we
we have
have the the concept
concept of of
abnorance for
abnorance for inability
inability toto answer
answer questions
questions about
about things
things that
that don't
don't
exist.)
exist.)
Accepting Axioms
Accepting Axioms II and and IIII makes
makes the
the properties
properties of of the
the three
three
ignorance relations
ignorance relations fall fall into
into aa partial Aristotelian square
partial Aristotelian square of of
opposition.
opposition.
Consider the
Consider following four
the following four sentences:
sentences:
1. aa is
1. is ignorance
ignorance of of the
the mention
mention ofof 5,
s.
2.
2. it
it is
is false
false to to say
say that
that aa is
is ignorance
ignorance of of the
the reference
reference of s.
of s.
3.
3. it
it is
is false
false toto say
say that
that aa is
is ignorance
ignorance of of the
the mention
mention of of s.
4.
4. aa is
is ignorant
ignorant of of the
the truth-value
truth-value of of s.
Follow
Follow the the usualusual definitions
definitions of of contrary,
contrary, contradictory,
contradictory, sub- sub-
contrary, and
contrary, and subaltern
subaltern (mentioned
(mentioned in in Chapter
Chapter Four).
Four). Then,
Then, 11 and
and
22 make
make aa contrary
contrary pair.pair. 33 and
and 44 are
are sub-contraries.
sub-contraries. ## 11 and and #4#4
are
are subalterns,
subalterns, as as are
are 22 and
and 3.3. The
The reason
reason for
for calling
calling the
the square
square
"partial"
"partial" isis that
that while
while 11 and
and 33 are
are contradictories,
contradictories, 22 and and 44 are
are not
not
although
although theythey would
would be be in
in aa complete
complete Aristotelian
Aristotelian Square.
Square. Other
Other
arrangements
arrangements of of opposition
opposition can can bebe offered.
offered. Replacing
Replacing the the lower
lower
left
left entry
entry by by "5Its is
is ignorant
ignorant of of the
the reference
reference of of s"
sIt gives
gives aa complete
complete
square,
square, butbut doesn't
doesn't contain
contain each
each kind
kind of
of ignorance.
ignorance.
 171

I 2

3. AslumpUo .., S.mmlriud

We have already introduced definitions and some axiOIll5. A

summary of the as5Umptions 10 this poilu may be helpful.
1. ifI1W'w/U is established by tbe inabiUly !O COlTenly give a
certain senlence or set of sentences..
2 Know1ed&e of iporance is relative 10 tile aomiMr. Sell-
examination may occur.
3. Fol1owi1lj the usual convention, a sentence wilhout quotation
marks is II$tJ 10 refer 10 5Omethill8 other man ilSell. and
senle1l<:e within quotation marks rden \0 itself.
... 'Ibere is just one language in the euminer's universe of
diV'OlJrse, and it's twO-valuc4. ('Ibis simpliflCl the presenlalion,
although. richer se t of alternatives can be offered.)
S. Any individual can be the subjea in an igooraJl(% relation if
thaI individual is an cotil)' WI ean eommuruca\e lIIe usemon of
sentence, i.e~ make a statement. We 5halI also assume a
responsible 19ooramUl, as defined below.
6. Tbe subject's anguagc is the set of all the sentences that
individWli can:wen. The examiner's language includes names for
the sentences in the subject's Janguase-
172 1liE LOGIC OF IGNORANCE

7. A WI/eel twmicn of a sentence is one which latisfies the

cnmioer. Ullering may be one form of mentioniDJ: others are
poi nting. writing. drding. ele.
S. The igooruce relation is conrai ned in the examiner's
Janau. ThaI is, the examinu is the one who can say thai tbe
5Ilbjecc is or is nol iporanl of some matter. II is called a relation
because our definition of ignorance employs a two-place predicate
connecting I subject and the ability to produce. certain 5eIllence.
A IWO-plaoe predicate is. relation. In tbe cue of the igDOratN:e
relation, a fair cumine r decides whether the subject has or has
not produc:ed an acceptable answer 10 the pertinent question.

The definitions and assumptions above lead to a number of

theorems, some obvious and trivial, some of significance for the
analysis of ignorance and of hope.
Sinc:e we UJ\ITDe two-YaIucd luau_ge, for any true statement
J. and any individual, a.

Theorem (1) Eimer a is ignorant of the re ference of J, or it is

fabe to say thai a is igooranl of tbe rderenee of s.
The knowledge relation has been defined as the denial of
ignorance (definition S). 10

Theorem (2) If Q knows '. then s is true and it is [atH 10 say thaI
a is ignorant of the refer~nce of J .
The knDwIedge relation has the same domains and amditiollS
on lIS variables as the ignorance relations.
Axiom I Jives us

Tbeor~ro (3) If" is ignorant of the me nlion of I. then 0 is

ignorant of the reference of I .
By the "w of transpOrtation, Theorem (3) gives us a theorem
Ihal rules 0111 Wtrpt'l'lwbk trull!,
 nu Lcgic of Igru:wtUla 173

Theorem (4) If it is false: mat s is ignorant of me reference or s,

then it is fahe to uy that a is ignorant of the mention of s.
1lJ.at is.. if one knows a truth (is oot ignorant of it). one must be
able to "y iL
Ali well IS Theorem (3), if one is ignorant of the mention of a
sentence. one Clnoot know its truth ....alue..

5. itetpolldble lpon.nee

We can no 10DiCr pwtponc. consideration of a problem noted

earlier in mis chapter. Whac is sometimes called tbe matter of
'opaque contexts' is Involved IS well in studies of epistemic logic.
Is one ignorant of the logical consequences of his ignorance? This
requi res us 10 specify the nacure of rational, responsible, or
defensible ignorance.
Suppo$C that
(A) S' is equivalent in uuth..value to t,
(B) If s' is true. men" is true.
~d
(C) 0 is ignorant of the trulbvalue of S'.
Doc5 0 '5 ignorance of the uutbvalue of J' carry with it the
u.suranoc that the individual is ignoranl of the truth valuu of t
and of 11 That pcl'$On may oot know (A) and (8). In either
case, we musl make some a.ssumplion about the rational abilil)'
and k.nowlcdJc of the ignoraol individual. The assumption we
choose 10 make depends on the use 10 which we will pol the
rcsultina IogiCIII machinery. For the Be neral illU5Ul1tive ptlrp!lses
of this chapter, we will make the special-casc l55umption that we
IIlU5t distinguish between what is available 10 the subjcet whose
ignorance is beil18 spified and whal is available to the construc-
tors of the system of I155ertiOJl5 about that individual. The
COJl5truetDC5 of the system, we outside observers, arc taken to have
all the macbinery oflogie and the truths of science at our dispoYl.
The system that we construet is presentation that we make to
each olber, oot discourse by lbe subject. In the case above, if
(C) is true. and even it (A) and (8) are talltologies. we uill may
'" TIlE LOG IC O F IG NORANCE

wonde r whether our rubjcct, a, knowJ, (A) and ( B) and know$ the
force of the mbstitutions suggested by them.
Before choosing an assumption about the logical abilities of
subject, let us note the de(i$ions made by iOIIIe of the early
writen on epistemic logic. In his presentation of the matter, D.
Paul Snyder I15ed the pbrue "responsible kDOWing' for lhe case in
which 'one is responsible for me logical conscquenees 0(",11" one
knows," and all truths of logic are supposed 10 he known.J We
shall adopt $imilar notion of tUpOIlJib~ ~ in which one
is taken In be responsible for the logical conscqucnc;e$ of his igno-
rance. Where the subject is 1101 ignorant of a oonKquen.ce, that
can be separately staled.
Thi$ notion of Te$ponsible ignorance is like the "alternative
interpretation" thaI J aakko Hintikk. aJosiden but rejeas.' For
our nolio n of ignorance (in all of iu varie ties). we may .ttribute
to Q o r deny" whalcvt: r lagially follows from the ipunc:c of lUI
I. What does follow (rom the ignorance of. sentence? A formal
answer requires a careful statement of the rules for the logic 10 be
used, the macltintry for the introduction and eliminatio n of
seottnees. and other thinp For ou r purposes 111 simply adopt
Quine's MOlMmoticaJ Logic' for the logic of the examiner's
language. Let US define a re6pOnsible ignoramus (a subjeCl) U
someone whose ignorance is consislenl with the results of Quine',
MUlhorUllicuJ Logic or an equivalent S)'5tem of roles,

Deft_lUO.. "

case; If"
a is a reponsible ignoramus if and only if the followiog is the
is true and t is a logical consequence of s', then if Q is
ignorant of" then Q is ignorant of J',
For special pu.rpo!eI we might l55IJme an ignoramus with
di fferent Iogieal powers and maroril)'. Our responsible ignoramus
is responsible for quite a Jarge deln~e of logical power. in many
appJicaliol1!l of this analysis of ignorance one might want 10
considerably weaken the \og.ical ability. In the case of our
Definition 6, "Ie have a subjcCl that is not capable of knowing
COlltlldidiolUc tit denying tautologiel. And, our SUbject i5
 The Logic
The Logic of
of Ignorance
Ambivalence 175
175

responsible for
responsible for ignorance
ignorance of of anyany statement
statement that that isis logically
logically
equivalent to
equivalent to an an already
already established
established matter matter of of his
his or
or her
her igno-
igno-
rance.
rance.
An individual
An individual with with thethe logical
logical nature
nature assumed
assumed above above cannot
cannot
know that
know that contradictions
contradictions are are both
both true,
true, or
or both
both false.
false. Are
Are such
such an an
individual's possible
individual's possible patterns
patterns of of ignorance
ignorance equallyequally restricted?
restricted?
Theorem TT (1)
Theorem (1) states
states that
that aa subject
subject either
either isis oror isis not
not ignorant
ignorant of of
the reference
the reference of of sentence
sentence s.5. We We cancan addadd some
some sub-theorems,
sub-theorems,
TT (1.1)
(1.1) Either
Either aa isis or or isis not
not ignorant
ignorant of of the
the mention
mention of of s,
5,
and
and
TT (1.2)
(1.2) EitherEither aa isis or or isis not
not ignorant
ignorant of of the
the truth-value
truth-value of of s. 5.
But, can
But, can aa subject
subject be be ignorant
ignorant of of both
both parts
parts of of aa contradictory
contradictory
pair? The
pair? The answeranswer to to this
this question
question affects
affects some some versions
versions of of
skepticism, and
skepticism, and of of agnosticism.
agnosticism. Consider, Consider,
(D) aa is
(D) is ignorant
ignorant of of the
the mention
mention of of s, and
and aa is is ignorant
ignorant of of the
the
mention of
mention of ss isis false.
false.
(E) aa is
(E) is ignorant
ignorant of of the
the truth
truth value
value of 5, and
of s, and ignorant
ignorant of of the
the
truth value
truth value of ot ss isis false.
false,
(F) aa is
(F) is ignorant
ignorant of of thethe reference
reference of of 5, s, and
and also
also of of the the
reference
reference of of ss is false,
is false.
(D)
(D) isis possible,
possible, since since aa rational
rational ignoramus
ignoramus knows knows thatthat any any
statement
statement can can be be denied:
denied: if if one
one were
were unable
unable to to mention
mention V one
"s" one
would
would be be unable
unable to to mention
mention "j "s is
is false."
false." From
From either either side
side of of the
the
conjunction
conjunction we we can can infer
infer the the other,
other, giving,
giving,
T
T (1.3)
(1.3) aa is is ignorant
ignorant of of thethe mention
mention of of 5s if if and
and only
only if if aa isis
ignorant
ignorant of of the
the mention
mention of of 5s y false,
is false.
(E)
(E) asserts
asserts ignorance
ignorance of of aa certain
certain opposition.
opposition. Again, Again, aa rational
rational
ignoramus
ignoramus knows knows that that aa denial
denial sign sign inin front
front of of aa statement
statement
reverses
reverses its truth-value. So if one knew the truth-value of
its truth-value. So if one knew the truth-value of either
either
"stl or
or Its is
is false,''
false," one one would
would know know the the other.
other. To To be be ignorant
ignorant of of
either
either oneone isis to to be
be ignorant
ignorant of of the
the other,
other, giving
giving
TT (1.4)
(1.4) ItIt is is equivalent
equivalent to to saysay that
that aa isis ignorant
ignorant of of the
the truth-
truth-
value
value of of Js and
and to to say
say that
that aa isis ignorant
ignorant of of the
the truth-value
truth-value of of 5s isis
false.
false.-
. (F)
(F) seems
seems deviant.
deviant. Where Where 5s isis aa sentence
sentence asserting
asserting thatthat factfact
that
that President
President Lincoln Lincoln was was assassinated,
assassinated, (F) (F) asserts
asserts that
that aa isis
 176
176 THE LOGIC
THE LOGIC OF
OF IGNORANCE
AMBIVALENCE

ignorant of
ignorant of the
the factfact that
that he
he waswas assassinated
assassinated and and ignorant
ignorant of of the
the
fact that
fact that hehe was
was not not assassinated.
assassinated. This This would
would be be entirely
entirely tootoo much
much
ignorance for
ignorance for aa rational
rational ignoramus.
ignoramus. One One and and onlyonly oneone side
side ofof the
the
conjunction can
conjunction can occur,
occur, as as we we understand
understand the the terms
terms involved.
involved.
Ordinary usage
Ordinary usage isis not not perturbed
perturbed by by the
the fact
fact that
that eveneven oneone who
who waswas
assassinated must
assassinated must have have had
had many many unassassinated
unassassinated moments. moments. If If
someone, say
someone, say President
President Washington,
Washington, was was notnot assassinated,
assassinated, there there
can be
can be abnorance
abnorance but but not
not ignorance
ignorance of of his
his assassination.
assassination. So, So,
differing from
differing from (D) (D) and and (E),
(E), in in (F)
(F) both
both sides
sides of of the
the conjunction
conjunction
cannot be
cannot be true.
true. Here Here we we have have another
another distinction
distinction betweenbetween
ignorance of
ignorance of reference
reference and and the the other
other two two kindskinds of of ignorance.
ignorance.
There can
There can bebe ignorance
ignorance of of facts;
facts; in in addition
addition to to TT (1) (1) we
we can
can have
have
TT (6)
(6) If If aa isis ignorant
ignorant of of the
the truth-value
truth-value of of s, thenthen either
either aa is is
ignorant of the reference of 5 or is ignorant of the reference of ^
ignorant of the reference of s or is ignorant of the reference of s
is false with the examiner knowing that one side of the alternation
is false with the examiner knowing that one side of the alternation
is false.
is false.
Axiom III
Axiom III seems
seems to to permit
permit an an alarming
alarming result.
result. ThisThis axiom
axiom gives
gives
the expected
the expected
T (7)
T (7) If If aa is
is ignorant
ignorant of of the
the reference
reference of of s,5, then
then s is true. But,
is true. But,
by
by thethe law
law of of transportation,
transportation, applied applied too too loosely,
loosely, we we might
might get get
(G)
(G) If If 5s is
is false,
false, then
then aa isis not
not ignorant
ignorant of of its its truth
truth (that
(that is,is, aa
knows
knows that that itit is
is true!).
true!).
However,
However, the the apparent
apparent paradox
paradox of of (G)
(G) is is simply
simply the the result
result of of an
an
error
error in in applying
applying the the law
law ofof transportation
transportation to to aa part
part rather
rather thanthan
the
the whole
whole of of the the antecedent
antecedent in in TT (7).'
(7).8 Careful
Careful attention
attention to to
applying
applying the the lawlaw involved
involved letslets us us obtain
obtain
TT (7.1)
(7.1) If s is false, then it is false to
If 5 is false, then it is false to say
say that
that aa is is ignorant
ignorant of of
the reference
the reference of s. of s.
Perfectly
Perfectly acceptable,
acceptable, while while (G) (G) waswas not.
not. We We must must distinguish
distinguish
between
between
(H)
(H) ItIt isis false
false to to say
say that
that aa isis ignorant
ignorant of of j,s,
and
and
(I)
(I) aa isis not
not ignorant
ignorant of of5.s.
What
What difference
difference isis there there between
between (H) (H) andand (I)?
(I)? (H) (H) isis clear,
clear, butbut
(I)
(J) IS is ambiguous
ambiguous about about thethe position
position of of its
its negation,
negation, as as wewe have
have
seen
seen above.above. Some Some applications
applications of of statement
statement logic logic require
require
 In

IiCI1Ipulous attention if we are to avoid paradoxes; 11 point Ihal

many readers have known for years.
AI this uage a comment sllould be: made to those readers ...110
have had some training in symbolic Josie and also have natural
bent toward i&norance. Such persons mll5t wonder hOI"' the
ignorance relations behave when the laws of distribution, iteration,
quantification. elc. arc applied. Questions aim aris.e about
comparisons and COntraslS with other branches of modal logic
(lI5IIumina that this is one sucb branch). I suggest thaI the paper
by S. Axinn and D. Mion, "NOles on the Logic of Ihc Ignorance
Rclalioll5,' be ooll5UlIed; and I cnrouragc any llUeb readers to
continue 10 develop the suhject themselves. The logic of igno-
rance has been neglected and m:CWl 10 be worked on by many
people. This chapter is limited 10 just a few of the ronsequcnce5
that arc of significance in the analysis of hope, and in tile
development of Kam's ideas about religion.

6. Forteuinc

In cpistcmk logic the question of forgetting has raised prob-

lems. For H inlikka, "only statements made on one and the same
occasion are considered here." For Snyder, "forgelling is ROt
allowed .... We may accept1WO axioms that hold that if something
is known then it is known for some specific interval thereafter: and
if an individual is ignorant of something. thai individual was
ignoranl of it for some inleJVai preceding a specified time. Let
the time elements "( and 'x" be reprCKnted by real numben.

AJdom IV. ]( u knows J at time I, lhen a knows J al time t plus x.

AxIom V. If II is ignorant of s al time t, then a is ignoranl of I at

time t minus.l:.
These IWO are called the elephant ariOllU, since elephants are
laken to saiUfy them for large values of x.
178 THE LOGIC OF IGNORANCE

7. A. F_ Fnmples

Can one know that he or s.be i.5 ignorant of the mention of a

sentence? Visitors to foreign countries are oeeasionally in the
predicament of knowins thaI there is some senlcoce in the forei&n
language on a particular wbjed, but they do nol have the ability
to mention iUch a senlcnoe. An observer who is sufficiently
knowledgeable can express the situation Ill(Irc specifically. For the
Rlbject concerned, a, it would be true mal
(J) There exists some sentence r in a language giving direc-
tions for reaching tbe airport, and a knows that a is ignorant of
the mention of x.
Can one know Ihal he or she is ignorant of a fact? From the
uamplc above, we can know lilal we are i,oorant of the mention
of. sentence auening a ract and of tbe truth-value of a sentence
:userting a fact. But, \0 know thaI we are ignorant of a fact, we
cannot auert a delloCriplion of the ract btu must instead aMen Ihal
there is some sentence reponina a ract in a amain area or on a
certain topic. A very poor chemisl mig.hl be the subject. a, in the
following situation:
(K) Q know5 both tha t there i~ wmc: x that is a scntence about
the composition of the .... ater molecule, and that he, a, is ignorant
of the mention of x,
Socratic ignoran~e t<lrI lake many forms, ineIuding bUI hardly
limited 10 (J) and (K).
To assert that an adequate statement on some maner doc$ 001
exist (that a problem cannot be sol~ed), one may hold thai na one
knows Ihe pertinent scnle/ICC and no Olle is ignorant of the
sentel\CC. This ITICllII5 110 such sentence exists.. A better way of
expressing it would be by the abnarance relalion, defined ea rlier.
Abnorancc holds .... hen a is un.able to assert I becausc I does not
exist in his language. For example, let s' be the correct formula
for the area of a square-cirde. 1lIcn we can have
T (8) For any time, I, and for any person, Q; Q is abnorant of s'
al f.
 ".
!be examiners can be in urnr and take something to be
aboonnce ....hen they are merely projectina their ia;norance. And
they may mode!itly aMIImt ignorance wben it is maner of
.""""""'.
Di5tinguishing between kinds of ignorance can help in t'Onsidcr-
ing-dearly stati ng-the wellknown logical paradOJl:cl. lei "u" be
.. so-a.lled undecidable !lenience (e.g... "This sentence is false").
Then, ignorance of the mention of 'u' can occur, bu t 1101 igno-
ranee of il$ truth-value (since it has none). 1bere can be ipo-
ranee of JUSt what llappens to different assignments of trIlth-vatuc.

s. Condudln& Comments

To clarify the applications of the nolion of semantic ignorance,

ronsidcr some behavioral e:Jtamplc5. We rcwrn 10 O\lf poor
chemist, Jones.
(A) Jones is ignorant of the {act thai waler oontains omen.
What (A) describes is the (:tiC in which Joneli cannol produce the
senlence, "water contains. oxygen," wben aned to me nlion all the
things chemically contained in waler. 1be fair euminer may grant
him her some degree of responsible ignorance and accept dose
Of
equivalents. If Jones canool assert "waler contains oxygen." or a
fair equivalent, under whal we lake !O be relevanl examination
oooditioos, be or sbe is apparently ignoranl of lhe sentellCC. Also,
if asked a quite differenl question and be Of she asscru, "wa ter
contains oxygen." then JonC5 is DOl ignorant of every aspect of the
senlc:.ncc. Jones can mention it, although he 01" she may IIOt know
ilS truthvalue or ilS reference. likewise, if our wbject can sing
a song conlaining the scnlencc, he or she has the ability to
mention it, and so is not completely ignorant of it. If our J anel
can physically producc, locate, or communicate tile SCnlcncc. this
is IIOt a ease of ignorance of ilS menlion. We must distinguish Ihis
from the case in which one mighl produce some SCnlcncc IXII DOl
know that one hu made a 5talemenl, as a c:hild si nging a SOilS (Ie
a bit of doggerel in a language foreign to it might take the wmds
180 TI-l E LOG IC O F IGNORANCE

\0 be merely soulllls rather than clements or sententts of a

language.
Suppese that Jones does have a demonstrated knowledge of the
word5 "water: "conlains," and ' oxygcn," and enough grammar to
ha~ made them inlO a welL-formed sentence. but never has done
so. Can we hold such a person ignorant of the mention of the
sentence? The issue is whether or not our subject deals wilh the
words as a sentence: if under /uiruuminillUm condiTiOllS he or she
fails to produce the words as a sentence. we lake Ihis eumillCC 10
be ignorant of the mention, lrulh-valuc. or reference of it. If we
design fair examination rendi tions, we can decide thai Jones is or
is nOI ignorant. Can we be charged wilh restricting oun.elves \0
the examined l ona., ratber than to the "real" J OllC5, 10 J ones
"himself or berseLf?" Only by Iho5.c who can point out way of
tnea:;;uring the ignorance of thai otber cntil)'.
One might be able 10 mention a sentence. and know its truth
value. but not know what situation is dCKribed I))' if. By carrying
oot the steps of.l proof in mathematics, or I))' suMtitution and re-
arrangement of symbols in a branch of ~ence. one might believe
thaI a senlence is \.rue bol 1'101 know to what i( referred. 1lIe
history of ~ence has such eumples.
The relatioll5hip between knowledge. ignorance. and abnoran
is not always obvious. There may be addil;oru; 10 one's knowl-
edge: also there may be additions 10 one or another kind of
ignoralKe. Forgetting me:ans replacing knowledge by ignorance.
The increase of knowledge may di~lose problems of which one
was ignorant. Thc::re may be a move from ignorance of the
exUlellce of a seDleDee to ignorance of its truth-value or its
reference.
Whether ignorance is always bad is a moot point. There can be
situations in which insignificant information can mike one
inefficient (overloading with noii<: is different from overloading
witlt trivia). 1l!e time: and effort needed to obtain some knowl-
edge may not be as de.!;irable on the whole as remaining in
ignorance on the mauer. In his fl1lroduaion /0 Legit, Kant
distinguished between four kinds of ignorance: what we ( I )
 of Ignorance
The Logic of Ambivalence 181
181

cannot know,
cannot know, (2) (2) dare
dare notnot know,
know, (3) (3) need
need notnot know,
know, and and (4)
(4) ought
ought
not know.
not know. The The first
first and
and third
third of of these
these areare obvious:
obvious: we we cannot
cannot
know the
know the truth
truth of of noumenal
noumenai matters,matters, and and wewe need
need not not know
know all all
kinds of
kinds of trivial
trivial things.
things. On On the the fourth,
fourth, Kant Kant hashas an an argument,
argument, in in
the Critique
the Critique of of Practical
Practical Reason,
Reason, that that morality
morality requires
requires ignorance
ignorance
of the
of the truth-value
truth-value of of the
the sentence,
sentence, "God "God exists."
exists." In In our
our terms,
terms,
ELant might
Kant might not not specify
specify that
that morality
morality requiresrequires ignorance:
ignorance: either either
that or
that or abnorance,
abnorance, whatever whatever the the case
case may may be.be.
What of
What of Kant's
Kant's second
second kind kind of of ignorance,
ignorance, thingsthings that
that wewe dare
dare
not know?
not know? After After all,all, Kant
Kant himself
himself started started hishis essay,
essay, "What
"What is is
Enlightenment," with
Enlightenment," with approval
approval of of thethe well-known
well-known slogan,slogan, Sapere
Sapere
aude. Dare
aude, Dare to to know!
know! In In The
The Metaphysical
Metaphysical Principles
Principles of of Virtue,
Virtue, we
we
find Kant
find Kant saying,
saying, "Only"Only descent
descent into into the the hell
hell of
of self-knowledge
self-knowledge
prepares the
prepares the wayway forfor godliness.
godliness."" This
tlll
This notion
notion of of self-knowledge
self-knowledge
is quite
is quite different
different from from the optimism of
the optimism of the
the Greek
Greek "Know
"Know thyself."
thyself."
But Kant
But Kant takes
takes human
human beings
beings to to be
be essentially
essentially inconsistent
inconsistent in in their
their
objectives. It
objectives. It is
is part
part ofof the "hell of
the "hell of self-knowledge"
self-knowledge" to discover
to discover
one's insincerity,
one's insincerity, and and therefore
therefore the unsolvability of
the unsolvability of some
some prob-
prob-
lems. To
lems. To trytry to know yourself
to know yourself is is to to dodo aa daring
daring thing, indeed. It
thing, indeed. It
is far
is far from
from obvious
obvious that that if if you
you knew knew yourself
yourself you you would
would lovelove
yourself;
yourself; it it might instead result
might instead result in in the
the hell
hell of self-hate. For
of self-hate. For
Socrates, the
Socrates, the unexamined
unexamined life life isis not
not worthworth living
living (the
(the Apology),
Apology), but but
life
life might
might better
better be be lived
lived than
than over/y-examined.
overly-examined. At At what
what point
point isis
the dare of
the dare of self-knowledge
self-knowledge dangerous dangerous rather rather than
than healthy?
healthy? That That
must
must be be left
left toto the
the progress
progress of of psychiatry.
psychiatry. But But farfar from obvious
from obvious
is
is that
that if some ignorance
if some ignorance is is bad,
bad, all all ignorance
ignorance is is bad. Socrates
bad. Socrates
himself
himself took took his only superiority
his only superiority over over hishis fellow
fellow Athenians
Athenians to to
consist
consist in in his
his awareness
awareness of ignorance.
of ignorance.
Now
Now that that we we have
have definitions
definitions of of ignorance
ignorance of of mention,
mention, of truth-
of truth-
value,
value, of of reference,
reference, and and of of the
the conception
conception of of abnorance,
abnorance, we are
we are
almost
almost prepared
prepared to to deal
deal with
with Kant's
Kant's position
position on on religion.
religion. We have
We have
the
the machinery
machinery with with which
which to to distinguish
distinguish the the mention,
mention, the truth-
the truth-
value,
value, and
and the the reference
reference of of sentences
sentences dealing dealing with
with God,
God, the Soul,
the Soul,
.and
and Immortality.
Immortality. But But first
first we
we needneed to to analyze
analyze the the logic
logic of hope,
of hope,
which
which requires
requires that that wewe connect
connect varieties
varieties of of hope
hope with
with the varieties
the varieties
of
of ignorance
ignorance that that they presuppose.
they presuppose.
 Six

THE LOGIC OF HOPE:

DEFINITIONS OF THREE TYPES
OF HOPE

1. Innochlctlon: Kind. or Hope

The verb "to hope" (hoIfM) plays a central pan in Kant'S analysis
of a 'moral religion.' As a typical PWlie goes. " , . it is a basie
principle that each must do as mueh a.s lies in his power to
become a beller man. and that only [tberoJ ' , , can be hope m.t
wbat is DOt within his power will be supplied through cooperation
.... from 50tne other SOIIrce.' The religiOll$ question for Kant is
the famou.s third qUe5tiOD of the ~ 0/ ~ RM.ron (AIIO:.'i),
"What can I hoper Limits, IogicallimilS, exist to what ean be the
object of oope, and to the qualifications for the subject who does
the hoping.
In this d1apter I analyze 50nte fonnal propenies of the relation
of bopina. and in the next chapter I apply the results to positioll5
that Kant took. Kant ha.s distinguished between what we may
"reuonably hope: and a siruatioo in which we "can entertain no
reasonable hope' (&fitjon, p. 62). The problem of the relation
between reason and hope requires logical coiWderation before we
ean realize the force (and limits) of Kant's work.
In the Preface to the Fint Edition of the cm~ 0/ ~
RMSM Kanl wrote. 'the chief question [about knowledge] is
always simply this: what and bow much can the understanding
and rcason know apart (rom all experience? not: bow is the
faculty of thought itself poMible" (Axvii). We might paraphrase
here and say, "the chIef question about religion is: 'What can the
undcnUlnding and reason hoptl/D' apart from all ~rienc:e1' not:
What can the faatlty of thought nuntiDII as if it were a wish?'
184 THE LOGIC OF HOPE

When we reach the section on Kan!'. theory of pouible hope. our

rderenees will come from the Cririqru of Purt. &tuon more than
anywhe re e~ in his work.
Since one of my objectives is 10 develop the logic of hope weU
beyond the ~. at which Kant left it, I have no hesi tation in
cmployina the lools of symbolic loPe thai are available loday.
When basic choices are to be PlIIdc, I will ordinarily make them
on I Kannan basis. 'The term, "hope' will be taken to be a three
place relation. An . nt, a, at a time, I, hopes for II situation
described by p. SymbolicalJy, H (a,p,I). The time. I, is the lime I'
whieh the .gell! is said to eDtertain the hope. not lhe time al
which the situation, p , 15 to occur. The time of p is understood as
a pan of p .
lbe main iaues involved are those concerning the range of the
first variable, a, and those involved in the ranp of lhe second
variable, p . To consider me naMe of the individual and the
cirmmstances under which that penon can have II hope. is to deal
with the first of these, o. To ooll5ide r the propenies that a
situation may nave if h is 10 serve as all objea of hope. is to
analyze me $ODd, the maltcl'$ thai can stand in the p1aee of p.
We will study cuh of these in tum.
I classify siq.le hopes. (1)~. in lerms o f meaD$
and ends, and (2) _icuJly. in terms of mention, usc. and trulh-
...:Jue. Then, (3). bolll eqlCriemiai and uanscendenlal oompowld
hopes are studied. The TClatiOIl5 betwee n hope and fear are
displayed 00 a square of oppositiOIl. Reilled notioJ15 will arise, 10
be consickred in tbe next dlaptCJ', well as Ihe pouib1e. sdlema
and image. sccond-order hope. and properties of the antinomies.
Wc must make a COnstanl effon to gain Ihe advamages of
distinguishin& between use and mention. Please see T able 1.
 ~ Lcgic oOf HoOpe IS'
TABLE 1
KlNDS OF HOPE

I. Medtodok>&lc.' ctauUkatiolt
(I) hope fo r success oOf means
(2) hope (Of d iscovery of mea ns
(3) hope for communication of JOOI
2 Semantic CI..,Ukatknl
( I ) Type L h~ to mmIion (dusify or analyze)
(2) Type n. hope toO bsow tnI1h-~
(3) Type ill Iwpe to kIww",erMa
3. Colllpo8od Hopes
r.xpnimtiDJ
(I) Dialectical hope: that there ~ a prqnuu ic synlhesis
~tweell opJIO$Itd po$itions that are po$5Jble experiences.
(2) Second-order hope: a hope concerning a hope.
tTruISCMderuaJ
(3) Antinomie hope: tha t reason ean give decisive
solu tioll5 10 the antinomies (conflicu ~~ell positions thaI are
nol po5Slble experiences).
(") Second-ord er hope: that il is possible that something
nol u nderstandable is possible.

2. The Pmiopposlilo ll of lporllace.

Couldt!red Pnamllllclllly

Within a p ragmatic oOrientatioOlI, an individ ual may know the goal

being soua,llt. oOr DUly know the best means by which to ~lIch it,
or may have various combinations of knowledge and ignorance
about means and end$. I flnl consider a preliminary introduction
10 lhe malter, and lhen replace it with II more salisfactory and
detailed formulation. In Table 2. K u .... ds for knowledge and G
for ignorance (the firsl consonant of these words). llIe lISSum!'"
tioOn is that one doe$ noOt hope fo r something known toO oeeuT, or
known to be irnpouiblc: ignorance, IlOllmowledge is presupposed
for hope.
186 nIE LOGIC OF HOPE

TABLE 2

,mol

1. K K (hope is WperllUOllS)
2. K G (hope for efficieDt D\eaIll;)
3. G K (hope for desirable goal)
. G o (hope is oon-uislcllI)

Table 2 shows four possible combinations of knowledge and

ignorance with respeo:t to means and goals. For hope 10 exist there
must be a combination of knowledge and ignorance. The subject.
Q, bas to know either the goal 01' the means. Coll5ider case I in
Table 2. If one knows both means and goal perfectly, there if. no
atea for hope. As in the eump\c of Spinoza's conception of God,
if an individual bas perfect knowledge of everytbina. can predi~1
evcl)1hing with ceru.inty, there is no meaning 10 the notion of a
hope. Spioou:s God is hopelcs.s.. However, if our subject docs
n01 know thaI he or me wan ts a particular goal (perhaps because
it miglll prevent reaching another goal that is cared about). then
sud! an individual doc. nol have perfect knowledgt of the goal
mal is sought. CT, if a penon is leD than <:eMain that the
available means will be perfectly suoceuful, tbill person again has
an uca for some ignorance, and therefore some hope.
Consider case 4, in Table 2. If a is ignorant of both a panicu
lIlT goal and a suooescf'JJ means of reaching it, Q can hardly
prollOUllCe a hope 01 either reachina thai goo or of a particularly
&ODd means to it. To simply hope for an unspecified "somethin&"
i5 DOt yet 10 hope. H the "sometlling' can be given $Orne negative
detail, $Orne (Xlntrast with an alternative. then we have moved to
case 2 or J. Case 2 i5 the more familiar pattern in which the
subject knows his OT her goal but does not have complete
knowledge of a successful ~ans. Case J looks strange at fint:
what would be a situation in which the subjeet knows the means
that will be 115ed, but does oot know the end that it will bring?
 'nle Wgic of Hope ' <7

For an uample of this, imagine a penon who has been in a

shipwre<-Ii: and is alone in a life.boat wilh no means of \ocatina !he
position Of calling for assistance. Our boater has no inclination to
leave the Iife-boat; !he meaN to be used are ltnown, that is,
remaining in the boat if po.ible. However, the individual is
iprant of where the boat will drift. but knows that some
de$tilLltiOIl5 are muc:b better than others, and hopes fot a
de$irable goal. The desirable &oals might include reaching a
comfortable island or meeting a resale ship.
Table 2 and the comments 00 it are equivocaJ on one important
matter. Is it lmowledge of a desired goal, or lu10wledge of the
loa.! that will be reached that is referred to in the column muli:ed
"goalr These may be separated, as in Table 3. 1he questions, A
thro\Ip D, are to be coll5idered serially in alphabetic order; A is
to be directed to the most knowledgeable oosevu of the robject.
while the other questioll5 are to be answered by 1M subjtcl of the
hope relation.
Table 3 is 10 be read, horiwntally, u follows; as an eumple
consider line J.-an oh5er.er has _ e red "yes' 10 question A, the
wbjc:n docs desire a goaJ. . the subjen _ e n "yes' to B, the
,oa! can be mentioned, ... but ' no' 10 C, no available means is
known. ... siven the iln5Wer 10 question C, question D is an
empty question (indicated by ')(").

TABLE 3

A B C D
Is there a Is there a Is an available Is the meall5
delired de$ired goa.! means 10 the adopted knc7.m
goo1' that can be goaIltnown? to brin,

I. ,..
,.. ,..
mentioned?

,.. 'u
,..
Sl'cce"?
,~

2
3. ,.. ,~ NO
NO

,. '""" NO
, , ,
 188
188 THE LOGIC
THE LOGIC OF
OF HOPE
HOPE

Wherever in
Wherever in Table
Table 33 the the answer
answer isis "N "NO"
Olt isis an
an area
area in in which
which to to
hope for
hope for aa basis
basis for for changing
changing to to the
the affirmative.
affirmative. (We (We can can hopehope
for ignorance
for ignorance of of aa matter
matter where where knowledge
knowledge isis painful,
painful, but but thisthis isis
actually aa means
actually means to to thethe goal
goal of of lowering
lowering pain.)
pain.) On On lineline 2, 2, aa goal
goal .
can be
can be mentioned,
mentioned, and and aa means
means of of some
some probability
probability isis known, known, but but
the means
the means isis not not known
known to to have
have aa probability
probability of of 11 (on(on the the usual
usual
o0 toto 11 scale)
scale) that that itit will will bring
bring the the desired
desired goal.
goal. To To know know that that
something will
something will occur
occur we we need
need aa basis
basis for
for certainty,
certainty, for for assigning
assigning aa
probability of
probability of 11 to to the
the event's
event's occurrence.
occurrence. Therefore,
Therefore, the the issue
issue isis
in doubt,
in doubt, as as Spinoza
Spinoza put put itit in
in his
his definitions
definitions of of hope
hope and and of of fear.2
fear.^
When an
When an issue
issue is is inin doubt,
doubt, following
following Spinoza,
Spinoza, hope hope is is the
the namename
for the
for the element
element of of Joy Joy in in expectation
expectation of of oneone of of the the possible
possible
results; fear
results; fear isis the the name name for for thethe element
element of of sorrow
sorrow from from the the
expectation of
expectation of thethe other
other possible
possible result.
result. Since
Since the the issue
issue is is known
known
to be
to be inin doubt,
doubt, one one alternates
alternates between
between considering
considering the the pleasurable
pleasurable
and the
and the painful
painful result. result. To To concentrate
concentrate on on thethe pleasurable
pleasurable
alternative is
alternative is to to be be hopeful;
hopeful; to to bebe engaged
engaged with with the the painful
painful
alternative is
alternative is to
to be be mainly
mainly fearful.
fearful.
On line
On line 33 the
the area area for for hope
hope ((and fear) concerns
and fear) concerns the ignorance
the ignorance
of
of aa means
means with with aa probability
probability greatergreater thanthan zero.
zero. The The situation
situation on on
line
line 44 isis rather
rather different
different from from the the two
two above
above it.it. For
For this individual
this individual
there
there is is no
no goal
goal that that can can be be mentioned.
mentioned. Does Does this this provide
provide any any
target
target for for hope?
hope? Only Only if if the
the individual
individual desires
desires to to know
know aa goal. goal.
To
To havehave no no goal goal is is to to bebe hopeless,
hopeless, the the situation
situation on on lineline 5. 5.
However,
However, this this is is aa different
different context
context for for the
the absence
absence of of hope
hope from from
the
the context
context of of line
line 1. 1. On On 1, 1, hope
hope is is Superfluous
superfluous since since therethere is is no
no
alternation
alternation betweenbetween thinking thinking of of each
each of of several
several possible
possible outcomes:
outcomes:
the
the outcome
outcome is is known.
known. On On line
line 55 hope
hope does
does not not occur
occur since since no no
goal
goal isis desired.
desired.
The
The question
question arises: arises: Can Can aa human
human being being live
live without
without hope, hope, in in
the
the sense
sense of of line
line 5, 5, without
without aa desired
desired goal?
goal? The The closest
closest examples
examples
seem
seem to to bebe the the so-called
so-called "vegetable
"vegetable cases"cases" thatthat are are sometimes
sometimes
found
found in in institutions
institutions for for the
the mentally
mentally deficient.
deficient. ItIt isis not not clear
clear at at
what stage they lose the status of being
what stage they lose the status of being human: we say that they human: we say that they
don't
don't act act like
like human
human beings. beings. Apparently,
Apparently, in in this
this wewe agreeagree with with
Viktor
Viktor Frankl,
Frankl, "It flIt isis aa peculiarity
peculiarity of ofmanman that
that hehe cancan only only livelive byby
 1M Logic of H~ 189

\ookillfl (10 this Frankl added, 'sub specW

to the
acfcmnGtU futlU'e :
There are W1!:U-known effortS in the literature to distinguish
between c:onscious and IlDOOnscious hopei. For a corucious hope,
the subject answers "yes" to question B: for an unconscious hope
the observer answers "yes" 10 question A, and the subject answers
"no" 10 question B. This is the situation on line 4 of Table 2. The
subject has a goal but CIlMOI mention it, and therefore ClInnot
rommunkalc il 10 the subject or anyone clse. Howeve r, the
subjcct mayor may not behave as if a means 10 reach the goal,
question C. were known..
In the case of an uncomclous hope. the observer takes the
subject to have a goal that the subject can not mention: the
bu rden is on the ob5crver to uplain Ihe basis for that answer to
question A. In addition to having a goal, there needs to be a
basis for holding that the subject behaves as if he or she knew thaI
the goal would bring pleasure, and that the available means bave
a probability between 0 and I for sueccu. What we have here is
the observer who s~ab, as il were. for the subject: the observer
knows the goaJ and cxpreues the bope of succcg for the liubject.
It may rum OUI that we are presented with the hope of Ihe
observer and not really of the subject. There iii always Ibe
possibility, particularly in the line 4 siruation, that the observer iii
...ronB about tbe subject's Boa! and concern with SI.HXCSS in
reaching it. llIere is an obvious risk in reporonB a Boa] that the
subject has not been able to mcmion.
To summarize lhill $ection. an example of hope has to be in the
form of either case 2, case 3, or case 4 of Table 3. An individual
who hopes for something has some combination of knowledge and
of ignorance, and the area of tha t ~non'l hope lies in the area
of bis or her ignorance. This framework allows for "uncoru;dous
hope: In addition to the hope for a satilifadory mcam and the
hope for a satisfactory BOO (or sub-goal) we will find ourselves
romidering the problem of a resolution of an antinomy. Howc"cr,
Ihili third mailer is ordinarily formulated as a problem in the area
190 mE LOGIC OF HOPE

of either choo5ing means or goals. We have not yel considered

the required propenies of the object of hope.

3. Hope, Fur, and the Sqaare of Opposition

The conception of hope includes the knowledge thai the subject

is ignoran\ of the l'e$ult. ibete is some probability that the
individual will pin and some probability thai Ihis individual will
DOl gain hi$ or ber dWre. The opposition between hope and fear
can be exhibited on a classical square of opposition.

TABLE 4
Square of Opposition for Hope and Fear

" always hopes for p . u never fcan "'" p.

Q always fcan 'lOt p. Q nevt:r hopes for p .

I ,

Sometimes (l hopes for p. Sometimes Q does

Sometimes II fcan ,,0( P. not hope for p.
Sometimes" does
not fear not p.
 191

The Square in T able" b based on the following &mImplions:

(A) 1. II bopes for p if and only if II fear1 l!Cl-p (fears the
absence of pl.
(A) 2. if II bopes for p then Q does not fear p .
(A) 3. either Q hopes (Of" P or Q fan p or Q is neutral toward
p.
With respect W a55Umplion CA) 3, if one of the three alterna-
tives is uue, the other two are !O be false. Thai is, when a wbject
hopes for 101De1hina. then neither fear nor neutrality obtains. So
mud! for lbe meanjos of hope: one may vacillate be~en hope
and fear, as \he chapter on Iltnbivalence held.
II may also be also be added thaI
CA) 4. if /J is neutrallowardp, Q is.15o is neutral toward not-p.
A variety of iS5Ue5 arise, for example, the opacity problem. If
Q hopes for p, and p is equivaicm 10 q. does II hope for q?

Precisely similar questions arose in deaHna with the ignoraIlCe

relations.
In the Square in Table 4, the upper left comer, 1. contains the
sentenoes Q always bopes for p. and Q always fears not p, which
are equivalent. Moving clodwise around the Square, 2 reads Q
never fear5 not p. and Q never bopes for p (equivalent sentences).
AI 3 we find sometimes Q docs nol hope for p , and sometimes Q
does not feu nol P. again equivaJent. At 4. sometimes a hopes
for P. and !iOIIletimes a fears not p.
'The arranaement in Table 4 is a traditional $lIuue of opposition
because the diaaonalJi OO/UIect oontr.l.dictories., the upper horizonal
OOnnet\$ contraries., the lower horiwn\al connectS subcontrary
sentences, and the verticals connect wbahems. This iii simply a
pattern (nr IUTIIngin& the assumptions thai we have made abo\ll
the relations be~en hope. feu, and neuualiry.
Attention should be drawn to U5lImption AI. the assertion that
10 hope for p is to fear Io5ingp. One occasionally finds opposition
to this correlative relation be~en hope and fear. This response
is apparently based on the notion that to be full of hope is a
perfectly respectable condition, but to be full of fear is a lowly.
cr:aven (unm.mly1 in gender terms). psychologically weak situation.
192 11fE LOGIC OF HOPE

There is said to be $Omething "positive" about havil13 a hope. and

$Omething "oepti\lc" .bout havin& a fear. What can be olTered to
clIplain this oommon response?
Two things lIIlIIy be SUW5ICd. Fir5t, by calling attention 10 the
d istinction between IwlIlIIY and unJl~hy !ma, one may peT5uade
critic that all fears should not be eliminated from matu re
development. There must be heal thy and unhcahhy hopes as well,
wbere there are such divisions between fears. Second, it may be
remarked that in ......y the term "hope' has been the poncuion
of the idealist and the religious Iraditions. While Ihe word "hope"
is easily extracted from the context of "religious hope." it has
received ilS ilrOog habitual and literary uses in that a1Olal.
Where the regular and cen luries.()ld tiSOdations with "hope" are
in rcligiOU$ hUlguage, it takes careful conscious cW,," to
construct. purely Joaical (or even a materialist) defi nition of
hope. One of my goals in this chapter. beyond the Kamian
a pplications, is 10 contribute to rccoll5ideralion of the logical
aspeas. $0 lhal "'hope" can have a wider extension than the well-
Jmoo.<.ll idealist .nd rtliJious usel. As an eumplc of the obstacles
enc:oo ntered, the familiar notions of hope seem to presuppose
platonist oollCCption of poiSibility; to changc to a nominalist view
of possiblc individual canics with it se rious changcs in what can
be takcn for objects of hope.

To serve as a basis for hope, the i&Jiorance involved h.as 10 be

knoIo.-ll ignorance. Thc subject must be ignorant ofsomcthing, and
be awarc of that ignorance enough to be ablc to make a statement
asserti ng it. Three different kinds of ignorance wst, semantically,
as the previous ~hapter prescmed the matter, and thc5c three
provide a basis for the chusifiC<llion of threc Iype$ of hope. A
brief description of the thrcc kinds of semantic iilnorancc will be
repealed here, althouilh more detail was offered in Chaplcr V.
The three kinds of ignorance arc: (I ) ignorance of mcnliotl, of
the ability to producc a particular sentence, (2) ignorance of"",10.
 193

wUlM, of the trUth or falsity of a particular sentence, and (3)

ignorance of .qav/Cc. of the situ.Oon designated by the peninenl
scntence. We have already noticed the role played by ignorance
in the act of bopin&- Since there IIfC three kinds of semanue
ignofllO(:C, we may expect thai they each involve a different kind
of hope. First we need to be: explicit about the definition of our
subject.

4.1 Reqalrelllcllu tor. Ddlnltlo. of Hope

In general. the relation of hoping has thi$ structure:
(1) the subject can rncntioD de$eription of a cenain situation,
(2) the IUbject desires thaI situation, and
(3) the subject does IlOl know whether me siwalion will or will
1'101 come about, and is aware of his or her ip!Orance.
Fonnally: when 0 hopes for p, then a can mention "p.. desires
p, and knows thai he or she is ignorant of the trUthyalue of p.
Some authors lake a variant position. holding thai the subject
is IlOl merely ignorant of the uuth-Yaluc of P. but takes the
probability of the situation, p, to be somewhere between 0 and 1.
What cha ....... does a's hope have is amwered by probability
figure; the fear that it will 001 sua::eed is then I minus the
probability of the hope. The description of the desired situation,
.p: is a variable for any of the groop of acceptable equivalenl
senteocu. The opacity problem generated by this is still to be
considered.
So far we have just a bare ootJine of the definition; funher
details are needed. The desired situation, p, can be presented in
terms of two schema, comparing the pruent and !he desired
environment of !he subject. Or, we can consider the mailer in
tentll of just one incomplete schema; in this fnllnework, the
subject constructs a schema of the situation that is desired. but it
is not all, or exactly what, this subject desires. It is ioromplete in
al least one significanl feature. like a treasure map witb a
missing piece, noc can make an adequate image of 50me but not
all of what is desi red. What is desired is 1M! a certain image be
". THE LOG IC OF HOPE

true. aetua1ly come about. Therefore, the subject needs an image

of the situation de.sited. and an additional feature il to be
involved; namely, thai we imqe 001 be known 10 be true. This
is one incomplete future, that the image, al the hope stage. is not
known 10 be true. The subject is ignorant of me truth-value of the
ItIIlcnce deseribing it. DWted, yet.: but will it happen?
However, the truth-1'Ubu! of the senlence describing the de5ired
situation i5 an Iemal fact about the senle nce. II is about, but
oot a property 1M" inlernal feature oJ. the senlence itself. 1lIe
senlence is just as clear or DOl clear, complete or not, as
description of. situ.tion, whether it is true or false. We do care
10 distingu ish between an accunlle description of IOITIelhinB that
occurs and an equally accurate description of iOme thing Ihal ~
001 occur. The logic of names and descriptions allows \IS to
describe entities independently of the question of tbeir exUlence,'
It aJso allows \IS to embed I description of somethinj: in a
!lemence thai may be false or true. By. technique in which the
subsWltive (XltIieOI is built inlo the predicate, and pronoun
variables are quantified. we can construct desaiptions lhal are
pred ... and can be used for many purpo ses wilhout presupposina
a decision on the existence of the entity described.
'The point just made is no IIIrprise to iCantians fresh from
reading the CriJique of ~~. "In the men t,;OIIUpt of a
thin& DO mark of iu existence is to be found .... Again, in a)nsider.
ing the relations between a hundred real lbalers and a hundred
po$Sible thalers. Kant poiou out that "the object, as it .c:tualJy
exist$, is 1101 analytically a)ollined 10 my a)JlCept, but is added 10
my a)rn:epl... ... TIle meaning of . SlIlement is indepeodent of
iu trutlJ..vaIue.
Only after a description is available can we have a basis for
deciding whether it de$Cribes a =tely. The theory of descrip.
tions and reference has many serious problems, but for our
purpo5e!i we will assume thl! a theory of descriptions is available
along the lines suggcsted by Kant and conti nued by Quine' and
many others IDOre recently. The basie form involved is:
 The Logic
The Logic of
of Hope
Hope 195
195

The one
The one and
and only
only object
object X
X such
such that
that X
X has
has the
the property
property P.
P.

Whether there
Whether there isis oror isis not
not such
such aa unique
unique entity
entity does
does not
not affect
affect the
the
detail or
detail or clarity
clarity of of thethe description.
description. QuineQuine remarked
remarked that that this
this
technique "...
technique . . supplies
supplies aa strict
strict technical
technical meaning
meaning for for Kant's
Kant's vague
vague
declaration that
declaration that 'exists'
'exists' is is not
not aa predicate."
predicate."^ B

When improvements
When improvements are are developed
developed for for descriptions,
descriptions, they
they may
may
be expected
be expected to to have
have at at least
least the
the power
power of of the
the early
early formulations.
formulations.
Therefore, II will
Therefore, will continue
continue to to take
take itit that
that when
when an an individual
individual hopes
hopes
for something,
for something, that that individual
individual constructs
constructs aa map map containing
containing aa
description of
description of his
his or or her
her goal.
goal. The
The description
description may may have
have aa wide
wide
range of
range of incompleteness;
incompleteness; questions questions about
about thethe existence
existence of of the
the goal
goal
described, or
described, or the
the truth-value
truth-value of of aa sentence
sentence containing
containing the the descrip-
descrip-
tion, are
tion, are quite
quite independent
independent of of the
the detail
detail andand clarity
clarity of of the
the
description.
description.
One more
One more detour
detour before
before we we take
take upup an
an expanded
expanded version
version of of the
the
definition of
definition of hope.
hope. Another Another incomplete
incomplete featurefeature that
that gives the
gives the
subject anxiety
subject anxiety is is the
the relation between the
relation between the present
present schema
schema and the
and the
desired schema. What
desired schema. connects and
What connects and relates
relates these
these two schema?
two schema?
If the
If the subject
subject knows exactly what
knows exactly will be
what will be the
the relation
relation between
between the the
two,
two, the
the individual
individual has has enough
enough knowledge
knowledge and and needs
needs no hope.
no hope.
What
What such
such aa person
person is is ignorant
ignorant of of is
is whether
whether there
there will
will be
be aa path
path
to
to the
the desired
desired image.
image. Is Is there
there aa schema
schema connecting
connecting the the two, the
two, the
present
present andand the
the desired
desired future-this
future~-this person's
person's desired
desired future?
future?

5,
5.. The
The Definition
Definition of
of Hope
Hope

To
To desire
desire something
something is is to
to desire
desire aa means
means toto obtain
obtain it.it. To
To hope
hope
for
for something
something is is to
to be
be uncertain
uncertain about
about the
the question
question of of success
success in
in
reaching
reaching one's
one's goal,
goal, that
that is,
is, to
to be
be ignorant
ignorant of of the
the schema
schema that
that
connects
connects the
the present
present with
with the
the future.
future. InIn view
view of
of the
the considerations
considerations
above,
above, wewe can
can expand
expand thethe three
three properties
properties ofof the
the hope
hope relation
relation to
to
the
the following
following five:
five: (the
(the term
term "schema"
"schema" is is used
used as as aa map
map going
going
from the
'from the present
present to to the
the desired
desired future).
future).
(a)
(a) The
The subject
subject can
can mention
mention an an image
image oror construct
construct aa schema
schema of
of
the
the object
object ofof hope.
hope.
'96 1lffi LOG IC OF HOPE

(b) TIle subject i$ ~ o/a' least some part of the schema.

or image.
(el The subject know.r thai he or she is ignorant of some pan of
the schema or image.
(d) TIle subject ths~ (wants, prefcl'1) 10 complete the schema
or image.
(e) But the subject does 001 lmow whether the desire will be
satisfied (as earlier, tbe iisue is in doubt). The subject knolOlJ thaI
he or lobe is i&norwU of the result.
Understandably, the ability to consllUCt a leMma for some
objective carries with it the ability to mention the S(hema Ihat
includes the objective.
Now " it arc in position 10 compile the three semantically
different patterm. Cue I below is Ihe hope 10 find an adequate
anal)'liis of, or d3$Si1icatioo of, $Omething. For example, 10 have
reference and a hope to find either the or a name for it. Cue
2 is the hope to discover whether iIOme 5111telTlem is Or fal$e.
true
For example, if one bas a hypothesis and hopes to confirm or deny
it. Case 3 Is the hope 10 djl(:oycr the object (or an object) to
,,'hieh some statement (or name) refen. For example, if one has
an unknown name and bope$ (or a reference. Each of these: three
cases provides. different Iype of hope.
Type I bope is ilIusualcd by the sentence,
(I) Jones hopes to be able to say the French equivalent
of, "Which way to tile airponr
In litis case each of the five required conditiOI15 is present.
(a) Jones can construct a schema in which the English sentence
of concern is equivalent in meaning to some French sentence.
(b) J ones' Schema has a miMing pan: JOI16 can fill in the
English pan of the schema, but not the Frencb.
(e) Jones is ignorant of pan of the iiChema, and knows of that
ignorance. Our traveler can tum the schema into an imaae of
himself or herself "king a French penon for tbe required
infonnation, but knows that mat image has a niliIiing pan. ("The
French penon'5 answer, in French, English, or pantomime.)
(d) Jones desires to complete the schema (or image).
 197

(e) Jones does not knowwbether the miu;ng pan of the IChcma
can be produced within an acceptable time-limit
While slaooill8 00 the sidewalk nervously thumMng Ihroogh II
FrclK'hEngli5h dictionary, and satisfying each of the above
re<;juircmeot$, J ones may properly Tepo" (to an EnlJ,lishllpeliking
companion) the hope 10 be able 10 lay the French equivalent of,
"Which way to the airpon?" Our subject has II schema for II
refercn<:e and hopes 10 produce II sentence Ihal mcnliom; or
names the reference. Tbe first variety. Type I hope, exist!; only
wben an individual thinkf, that $Ome linguistic enlily. for example,
II sentence, can be uttered, bul does 001 know enough 10 be able
to produce it.
A funher discrimination Ihal may be made here. Knowledge i:;;
II mailer of the degree of probability that one would assign.
Therefore, J ones, in 1, above. may be quite ruin thaI French
oontailll such II senlcoce, or may be moderately or jusl barely
confident that the French language is rich cnough to do that.
Suppcse Ihal our sub~ct knows lhal the language as ordinarily
used by the natives of some remole u ndeveloped" eowltry does
not already contain a cenain familiar iCntence; our slIbject may
still give some probabiliry (pealer than zero) 10 the pro~ct of
inventing a s.entence that will serve the purpose. However,
suppose !hal the natives in the area are reslricted 10 language
in whieb Jones knows Ihal it is impossible 10 produce 5Uch a
senlence. In lhal case our J ones misbt hope to leach them a new
language that is known 10 be rieb ellOlJgh to do lhe job. But if
restricted 10 their !oCmanlical1y incapable language, lhere will be
no hope of producing an adequate Ul\erance.
Type II bope exists in Ihe situation in whieb an individual hopes
10 disooyer whether a pankular Slllemcm it. true or false .
Consider the s.entence,
(2) 1lIe airpon is five miles 50Ulh of the center of lhe
dry.
Suppose that someone has menlioned !oCntenc:e (2) to J ones, and
Jones stam acting as if it is true. To hope that il is true is to
IIopo! that !IOmeo~ may have knowledge of irs tnuhvaIue and that
 THE LOGIC OF HO PE

value will rum OUI 10 be lrue. To hope 10 have knowledge of 115

Inuh-value, Type II hope. IfI\IOlves each of lhe five requirements.,
a) to e), above. Pu ttilli these requiremen15 together, we have:
If Jones hopes to know the truth,value of To the n Jones can
mention the sentence s, knows persorutl ignonnce of ;15 truth-
value, desires 10 know it and thinks the chances are fl . To know
tha.t one is. ignoranl is 10 _me that Ihere is an aruwer.
In whal situation would such a Type II hope be hopele"?
Suppose that IOmeont has mentioned sentence (2) to Jones. bul
Jones does 001 understand anything about the sentence, perhaps
not even that it Is a well Cormed sentence in any laRgUage. In Ihat
cue, il would be bopeless to expect Jones to discover tha.1 the
sentence is either true or false. We observers of the lituation can
say Ihal. while in this condilion, Jones has no hope of learning
Ihat a perune nt piece of information has just been reponed. Since
Jones does IIOt recognize Ihat a sentence has been heard. our
Rlbject has no schema in which '''14 ~",eflu may tum ou t to be
lrue or (Woe. As Kant has put il. "... without male rial IloOthing
wha1SOever can be thought" (A232). So, the observe rs can say,
correctly, that J ones has no hope of discovering the truthvalue of
senteoce (2) while not yet reoognwllIthat it is a sentence.
A pos.sibility is that just as the rnltive in the situation above
pronounces sentence (2), Jones has a day-dream. In this. reverie
J ones thinks that it would be nice if someone such as that native
explained the way \0 &0 10 the airport. Docs Jones the o hope to
learn the truthvalue of the sentence? No, bause our traveler
still does not recognize that the nat;\'e's utterance is linguistic. a
sentence, and does play the TOle in the 5t:hema that is. delired. So,
we may say that Jones has a hope to be capable of determ ini ng as
lrue some sentence relevant to the problem. but nol Ihal Jones
hopes 10 learn the truth of just Ihat sentence, (2).
Type III hope OCCIIrs in a si lualioo in which one is ignoranl of
the reference of a sentence, and hopes 10 discover whatever Ihe
sentence designates. Suppose J ones finds the following sentence
on the door of his or her holel room, somewhere in Fr,mce, and
takes il to be of po$Sible importance. ye t cannot understand it:
 nit Logic of Hope 199

(3) Le prix de tte chambre, nunW'fO dix-buit, e.u fid

.. quaue-vingt franca pour Ie jour.
If Jones hopes to understand it, theo lhe followina holds: Jones
can poinl 10 it and assumes Ihal il has a reference, wat1U 10 know
what it refers to, koOl\"$ penooal igooraoee of tbe refe rerK:e, and
knows that there mayor may nol be suor;e55 in geltill8 the answer.
When a bilingual companinn appear5, Jones can properly 5:1Y, "'
hope you cao. translale those words for me: they mighl he
intercstina or importanl."
Suppose another ()(C&Sion on .... hich his or her room-male is
asked to translale a sentence, with the same hope thai it can he
done beeaU5e it may be imponaoL But iD!ilead of a sentence on
the door, there appear merely a few random letters of the
alphabet. "The room-rnate may properly respond, "No hope nf
undentanding that, it is 1101 anythinl in French or any other
language, as far as I know: A Type III hope can eWt only when
the subject is aware of IoOIIIe sentence and hopes to find its
refere nce. No IoC:nlence, DO Type ill hope. This hope is based on
an assumption of fact, that a cenain strinl of marb is a IoC:ntence.
If Ihat assumption is in error, me subject assumes whal we call a
fint-order hope, but it turns out to he a IoC:roll(\-order hope. A
more satidactory explanation requires the results of the neJt two
1oC:dions.. Jones may reply to the room-male, "II may be a IoC:ntenc:e
in rode. Please lest that assumption and I shall hope thai you
succeed in deciphering it (Type I hope), and then in undentanding
its meanill& (Type III hope)." (Jones is a difficult room-male;
illiterate bul persistent!)
For another example of Type ID hope, hope of Jeamina the
reference of something. cort$ider the followinl c;ase:
(") Jones h.u rome into possession of a Treasure Map,
and hopes to find the treasure al the place marked X.
Joncs satisfies each of the five requiremenl1: (a) has a pattern or
$oChema of the objective, including IoOIIIe nolion of whal "Irel.Sllre"
might refer 10, (b) does not know whether Ihere will be an actual
phr.;ical entity that is a treasure. 10 salisfy that mosl eISCntial pan
of tilt idw:ma, (c) is aware of prescnt ignortnce of the mD&t
200 TIlE LOGIC OF HOPE

imercsting part of the 5Chcma, (d) does wanl to find the treuure,
and, (e) assumes thaI the probability of M1~U ranges somewhe re
between 0 and I. Therefore, JOntl bope!; 10 find the reference of
X in a cenain semence. Ibal is. '7lIc: treasure is al X: This is a
Type III hope. Our hunter also has a Type U hope. thai his oc
ber favorite senlence, "The treasure is al X: is true.
Suppose thaI in tbe siluation in (ot) above, all is the same e:a:eept
thatlhe map has unfonunatcly been panly d~troyed, and the pan
thai may have amtaioed the area showing the exact ioulion of
the trea$lJtC doe.s not exist (or is not available to Jones). Now
J ones has even mort: 10 hope for: the hope 10 complete the
schema. figure 0\1\ where the Ilcasure is supposed \0 be, a Type

-.
I IKlpe: al50 the hope that it will be there upon arrival, a Type III

Type III hopes seem to eml in two different liiluatiOJl$, when

the hoper seeks /0 know 1M ,tfon;lICC of a sentence, and wbc:n the
individual seeks to find (po<yss) rlu! ouUy referred \0. For the
purpos.es ollhis semantic conception of hope. the second of these,
for cnmpie, Jones hope$ 10 pos5Cs thc Ireasure, is taken 10 be

-.
cquivalcnl 10 JODeS'S hope thai "II" minc" is truc. A Type II

So far we havc introduced a definilion of hope and distin-

guished three variCtiC5 dcpendent on the kind of ignorance
involvcd. A number of problems remain 10 be dealt with:
definina sccond-ordcr hope, comidering the limits on possible
hope, applyi", these mallen to hope of IoOlving the antinomies,
ilDd the distinction betwecn rcasonable and unreasonable hope.
To clarify Kant', work on rel.igion, we need to have each of these
in hand.
 Seven

THE LOGIC OF HOPE:

CONTINUED

We now expand thc subject beyond the definitioll$ of lhe previous

chaplet. What ~y RtvC as p , as a ~ption 0( the desired
situation? AI fint onc may comider a range of possible dc5CJip-
tions: ( I) a thre~ensiona1 color picture, (2) a black and white
twcHIimensionai picture (rom one viewpoint, (3) a physical model
to scale. (4) a ~p to scale, (5) a formal schematic, and, (6)
linguistic entities. To cvaluate the claims 0( each of t hese
candidalC$ requires a wcll-llcvelopcd theory of the na ture of
images in die mind.
The hi5torics of philosophy and of psycholoi)' 5ltow a &nod deal
of attention to this question. While die Il5t fifteen yean of work
on thc philO$Opby of mind and cognitive psyehology have been
interesting. dceisivc results arc still lackinJ. Therefore, I will
proceed willi one of the most modest of the range of alternatives.
When "rongcr theories of description and of thc nature ofmcntal
images are available, they ~y aUow improvements in the
fonnulation of hope. Our modest assumption is that when an
individual thinks of IOmCthini such 15 a physical object, there
Deed OOt be a pictorial image in mind; the individual ncelb only
to have I tcchniquc for menlionins features of the objcct. For
this purpose, a bare map or schematic is cnough.
We do need 50me notion of the nccnsary requirements of a
proper map. A helpful uudy (now dusical) of the related
properties of maps and im'ics is readily at bl.nd. Kevin LyndI'l
1M 1" , . of 1M City.' Without COl'ICCrning ourselvcs widl the
concept of image tllat l..ynclt uses, we can take his analysis of the
202 TIiE LOGIC OF HOPE: CONTINUED

elements of an imqe as our set of requirements for the elements

of a map. Following him, a map has ( I) paW, (2) boundaries, (3)
nodes, (4) diitricu. and (5) landmarks.. We also WlInt the
psychologieal properties of these elements so we will add the
following (e.tures to bii lise (1 ) a pcuh may he understood as a
_ to reach a goaL (2) /kJftkn are the limiu of fM ttality 10
be considered, whal 1000cians eall Ihe universe of discourse.
Sorden cont.ain what we take 10 exist, in an are.. (3) Noda are
intersections of palhs. 1hey give us the im~ion of MImIl
meQIU. and. therefore. pal1ems for achieving several goals. (4)
Districtl are arus of special Jignificaru:e. worth idenlifyin" (5)
Landmarks are objecu of value, either in themselves Of as Iocaton
10 give sealrity about our position.
Suppose that someone nopes 10 obtain a partiallar book at the
library this afternoon. For this hope 10 take place, we need 10
have a ITUIJ' of lhe area from our present Iocalion to the library.
A map of the library is also needed, cont.aining the palhs one ~
lake aDd nodes for changing from one path to anothe r. tbe
boundariel of the building. the aJU. or lCCIion of the building in
which books of that sort are kept, and the landmarks. sucb as lhe
Librarians desk. tbe doorway, the card catalog or library computer,
perbaps the duplicating equipmenL 'The book itself may also be
mapped: il bas (1) boutIdaries. (2) paths and alternative paths
tbat may be l.aken to iu contents such as skipping pagel or just
reading chapler headings., (3) oodes bet'A'Cen chapters, (4) districtS
such as !be first half, and perhap5 (5) landmarks such as Olapter
VII, the Preface.
To desire something is 10 have a map of it, although il may be
an incomplete map. To hope require.s desire. 10 desire require.
thought, and 10 tbi nk requires a map and the eocTCY 10 move
around il that constitutes various jouT1lC)'. I assume that it is
something like tbis sense of map tbat Arislotle meant by "imaae"
when he said, "when lhe mind iii actively aware nf anything il is
ne"'''arily aware of it along with an image. . ..oJ. We need 10
know encdy what an image is before we can look for counler-
CJWIlples. For the PUrpo5C$ of this chapler we can lake a
 203

strin&cnt notion of image. take it to be map a5 defIned above.

and look about for possible bopc:i that resist translation into maps.
We have coll5idered !leveral propenie$ of the JUbjeCl in the
hope relation: the person's desire for the object, ntirturc of
knowledge or and ignorance of the derails of the scbema, and the
cbances for 5U......... We have specified Ihal tbe individual is to
construCt:l schema that include5 the objea of hope. bul we have
not gone inlo the propenies of an adequate schema, nor into !he
relation between a schema and an image. AmaRi the questions
still to be analyzed is the malter of the COII$i$ICncy of the schema
that is required, 1M question of ~ fOl' Ille impossibk.
In the electronics field a common relationship holds between a
schematic diagram and a piece of equipment. for example. a radio
receiver. The schematic diagram is DOl a picture of the physical
radio; it is an .mtraet Of form.al way of representing electrical
features of the radio. The diagram docs 001 symbolize cvcry-
feature of tbe physical radio. It might 1101 dIaw the size, the
weight, the color, the price. the minimum signal that may be
reived. the maximum volume that may be produced. It does
CldIibit ccnain electrical features of thc equipment. presented in
the way a map presents features of its Rlbject.
We do oot set an electrical sl'lod: from tOIIchinS the schematie
in the wrong plate. but we tan predict ~ U5ing the schematic
whcre a sbock would be felt in the radio. In lin&uistic terms., a
schematic is a way of mt'lllimlin& features of the radio without
using &II image or model that physically corresponds to the radio.
1be relation between schema and object is Q limilrd Uomo,plli.sm:
for some points in the object tbere are points in the Kherna, and
for SOIllC relations between those points in the object there are
relations between the corresponding points in the schema.
1be comments above on the relatioD between Kherna and
object should DOt be considered stranSe. In these terms., language
is a schema for the objects in the world as well as objects not in
the world. The word, "Philadelphia: is nOi an imase of the city
that it names, bul il does $tNt in schematic COntcns to give us an
object of thought. For example, ' Philadelphia lies on the Dela
 204
204 THE LOGIC
THE LOGIC OF
OF HOPE:
HOPE: CONTINUED
CONTINUED

ware River,
ware River," gives
It gives usus aa symbolic
symbolic schemaschema that that presents
presents features
features of of
aa situation.
situation. AA suitablesuitable map map may may alsoalso do do this.
this. Neither
Neither the the
sentence nor
sentence nor the
the map
map havehave all all of
of the
the features
features that that we
we seesee from
from an an
airplane over
airplane over the
the city,
city, or
or on on aa detailed
detailed scalescale model
model of of the
the city.
city.
However, the
However, the assertion
assertion of of aa hope
hope to to go
go toto Philadelphia
Philadelphia requires requires
merely aa schematic
merely schematic in in mind
mind that that enables
enables the the person
person to to construct
construct
some feature
some feature of of the
the city,
city, enough
enough to to connect
coimect itit with with that
that person's
person's
present location.
present location. EveryEvery imageimage may may be be reduced
reduced to to some
some schematic
schematic
construction: aa schematic
construction: schematic need need not not presuppose
presuppose that that oneone can can
construct an
construct an image
image based
based on on it.it.
A native
A native Philadelphian
Philadelphian familiarfamiliar withwith the the waterfront
waterfront of of the
the city
city
may have
may have somesome image
image in in mind
mind whenwhen saying,
saying, "Philadelphia
"Philadelphia lies lies onon
the Delaware
the Delaware River."River." However,
However, aa foreigner
foreigner who who has has never
never visited
visited
the city
the city oror seen
seen aa picture
picture or or model
model of of it
it may
may still
still understand
understand the the
sentence in
sentence in terms
terms of of aa schema
schema in in which
which there
there is is one
one line
line symboliz-
symboliz-
ing the
ing the river
river andand an an area
area alongside
alongside the the line
line symbolizing
symbolizing the the
location of
location of the
the city.
city. The
The foreigner
foreigner may may alsoalso be told that
be told that the
the river
river
flows from
flows from northnorth to to south
south and and thatthat the
the city
city isis onon the
the west side.
west side.
This
This maymay be be put
put into
into the schema with
the schema with suitable
suitable symbols, without
symbols, without
the
the person
person picturing
picturing the the river,
river, the
the streets
streets andand buildings
buildings of of the
the city,
city,
waterfront,
waterfront, etc. etc. TheThe question
question arises,arises, Does
Does the the native
native havehave an an
image
image in in mind
mind or or merely
merely aa more more detailed
detailed schema?
schema? To To answer
answer thisthis
question
question adequately
adequately one one would
would needneed aa moremore powerful conception
powerful conception
of
of the
the nature
nature of of image
image than than anyany II have
have found.
found. For For thethe purposes
purposes
of
of the
the analysis
analysis of of hope,
hope, we we need
need to to assume
assume some some schema
schema that that
locates
locates features
features of of the
the object
object of of hope.
hope. Whether
Whether or or notnot images
images
exist
exist is
is irrelevant
irrelevant for for this
this purpose
purpose (and (and perhaps
perhaps any any other
other as as long
long
as
as detailed
detailed schematics
schematics can can be be constructed).
constructed).
At
At this
this stage
stage we we may may consider
consider the the matter
matter of of possible
possible and and
impossible
impossible hopes.hopes. A A hope
hope requires
requires aa schema
schema connecting
connecting subjects
subjects
with
with their
their objectives.
objectives. While While itit can can have
have manymany blankblank sections,
sections, itit
provides
provides the the basis
basis for
for the
the subject
subject to to answer
answer the the question,
question, "What
"What do do
you
you hope
hope for?"
for?" A A response
response can can be be made
made with with aa description
description of of the
the
goal,
goal, atat least
least inin schematic
schematic form. form. But,But, the
the schema
schema has has to to be
be self-
self-
consistent,
consistent, or or we
we will
will not
not know
know whatwhat we we desire.
desire. IfIf moremore than than oneone
schema
schema can can be be made
made of of the
the objective,
objective, and and ififthey
they are are inconsistent.
inconsistent,
 1h Logic of HOfN: Continued

we must choose in orde r togive a sat isfactory answt!r, at ally one

time, even to our5elves. Suppose tbis schema diffen from oun
(we outside observen of the world)? May we hope for something
in tenm or a schema that contradicts the reigning scientific
schema for the matter involved? People do hope in terms of their
awn schema, as long as it is self-consistent there is a dear buis
for tbe expreuion of hope.
Suppose wmeone presents. schema that is discovered to be
inconsistent? What about the stage before the schema was
discovered 10 be raully? One of tbe risb of cognitive thought is
!.bat one's symbol$ may have 00 reference: the other risk is 100
many referenccs. It is quite ealiy to me ntion a schema thaI cannot
possibly be used to designate anythill&- For ClIample, "a square-
circle." Even wide social avrncnt on a 'Chema does not
cuaranlCC that it is the fII05t effident construction for specifying
a certain soal. H owever, even when we do nol have a proof of
the consistency and completeness of a schema. il may be usable in
tbe parts that are DOt iDCOnsistenL
A furlher question arises, Are I.bcre restrictions on the
clements of a 5Chema to be used as a buis for hoper What is
I.bc restriction on possible hope, if any?

2. KlInt on PoulNe Hopei

The relation ber.vcen the paiSible and the actual has been a
mailer of regular interest in the history of philosophy. The
common-sense a.uumption is that more paiSible entities exist than
actual entities, more JlO55ible world$!.ban actu.a1 worlds.. However,
Kant roues a valuable distinction between what one may "profess
to think" as possible and what is objectively possible (Cril~ of
Pure RmsotI, A 223). Kant (nt defines the prusibk as, '"That
.... hicb agrees witb !.be formal conditions of experience. that is. with
the conditiOll$ of intuition and of concepts." (In the First Critique.
section on the Postulates of EmpiricaiThougbt, AlIS.)
So. ' pomible' is to be used in !.be context of possible u~na!
b there a seme of possible concePt tIlal is merely logical but nol
206 m E LOGIC OF HO PE: CONTINUED

a pouible experience? Kant responds, "I t is, irKIeed, a ~

logical corKIition that. concept of the pouible must not contain
any contradiction; but this is not by any lnCa"s sufficient 10
detennine the objecti~ reality of the concept, that is, the pouibili-
ty of such an object as is thought through the concept" (A220).
Logical consistency is necessary but not sufficient. What has to be
added for sufficiency? CotlSUllClubility ill spuu und timt. Only
those things are pouible that "agree with the formal corKIitions of
experience": this is Kant's "po$lulate of possibili~ (A2IS), And,
the formal conditions of experience require that an object of
experience be constructed within the requiremcnl5 of space and
time. 'Therefore. Q possible object of hcpe CUII1IOl rkfy I/~ m'/I-'irt-
mMl~ of Q p-I)SSI'ble u;poil!1lce, To hope for an object is 10 imagine
an experience of it.
Gi~n the conclusion that Kant presenl5 to us above, there are
serious. rtr1ctioos on the elemenu of a seIJena thaI can be U$(!d
as a basis for hope.. 'The object nf hope is to be not merely
logically consistent; it is aI50 to be conslrUctable in space and
time. IUId be a possible object of uperience. In addition to such
legiti mate objecu of possible hope. Kant rnentiol\l; something else.
'There are", . . arbitrary combinations of thoughts, which. al though
indeed (ru (rom oonuadiction, can make DO claim to objective
reality. and none. therefore. as to the pouibility of lUI object such
as we here profess to think" (A223), What mighl be enmples of
such "arbitrary combinations of thoughtsr
Kant offers: (I) "A su.b!;tance which would be permanently
present in space, but withoot filling it .. ." (2) "a special ultimate
me ntal power of intuitively anticiplltin& the future. , ." (3)"a
power of starKIiT\i in community nf thought with other men,
however distant they may be . , ." (A223). 'The feature thaI eadl
of these thru have in common is that they "are concepu the
possibili ty of which is altogether aroundless, as they cannot be
based on uperience and its known laws." In terms of the modem
distinction between use and m~, Kant is makin& a distinction
between concepu that mil)' be nwuiOllM bw lUX wed to rqer to
ptJSJibl~ tlwughu, and concepts thai may be mentioned UIId IhUl
abo m.:Iy ~ u.W /0 d~fgrIUl~ pruJibl~ 111lJf4:I1IS.
This parallels the distinction between phenomena and noumcna.
In our cue we have th~ distinction between (1) concepts that may
only be mentioned, and (2) concepts Ihat may be mentioned and
al$o ItsCd. Ph~nom~na are possible experiences, noumena are not.
Similarly, coR$tructable COIICCPU arc possibl~ hopes. unconstruct-
able concepts are nol poMible hopes. I am assuming in this
discussion thai if something is nol :II possible object, il is nol a
possible object of hope. Therefore, we may _ruion whal we lake
10 be the object of a hope, and be in error because il is not a
possible object of hope. (likewise. we may mention whal is taken
to be an object of the undenlaOding and be in error, if it is a
noumenal enlity.)

3. Second-Order Hope

AI this siage in the liludy .. reader wilh a vague memory of the

distinction between noumena and phenomena may raise :I
question. 'Doesn't Kanl offer us. al lta$t the possibility of
IIOtImcnaJ objerur The answer is No. he does not. Consider
how he puts the maner: "the concept of a noumenon is problem-
atic, lhal is, .. we can neither SIIy that il is possible nor Ihat il
is impossible .. .' (A287). Why such a sirange predicament?
Kant adds, 'for 'A'C are acquainted with no kind of intuition but
our own sensible !tind and no !tind of concepts but the calegories,
and neither of lhese is appropriate 10 a oonsensible object. We
cannot. therefore, positively extend the sphere of the objecu of
OUT thought beyond the conditioR$ of OUT IICR$ibility, and as.wDlC
besides appearances objects of pure thought. that is, noumena,
~nce such objectS have no &S5ignable positive meanina" (A287).
He continues, ""The concept of a tIOUmenon is, therefore, nol the
concept of an object, bul is a problem unavoidably bound up with
the limitation of our liCosibiJity-the problem ... as 10 whether
there may not be objects entirely disengaged from any such kind
of intuition.
 mE LOG IC OF HOPE: CONTINUED

It IiUntS that if \hi$ is COlI$idered a problem, either answer is

possIble. Kant repliu, '"Ibis is a question which ClUl only be
all$_red in an indeterminate manner, by U)'ina that .. ... place
remains ope:n for other and different objects; and consequently
that these laner must not be absolutely denied, though-liince _
are without a determinate concept o( them . .. neither can they
be U!ierted as objects (or our undentandin&" (A288). 1l!e same
point is made again. near the end of the section on "Concepts of
ReOection": "a concept ..;tbout an object (ou mtiOtlis), like:
ooumena, ""hich canDOt be reckoned among the possibilitiu,
although they must DOt (or that rcawn be declared to be also
impossible ... whicb though entenained in thought without sel(-
contradiction are ~t a\$o in our thinking unsupponed by any
eumple from uperience, and are therefore not to be counted as
possible" (;.291). Oearly, ooumenal entiliQ can be mentioned
without inroll$istency, but they cannot be possible objects of
tbought. 1l!eir status is quite different from entities whose
conceptS are self-contradictory, and therefore impossible,
Noumena cannot be declared possible or declared impossible.
Can it be possible that they are possible? Kilnl has said (above)
that this am only be answered in an indeterminate manner.
Can we hope that noumena are possible? We cannot under
stand what this would mean. but since ..~ may tell oundva things
that ...,. do IlOf wuk:nland, we may tefl _/lies thal ...,. IuNe .such
a hope -.fIhOUl under:Jrandirrg ....-hat we "ope for. In this case, we
may know ..-hy we hope:. but DOt whal we hope:, a distinction that
parallels the distinction Kant makes belWeen ~tery and unknow-
ability (see my OutpUT Nine, "On Mystery vs. Unkoowability").
We may call this Q ~onJer Iwpe (or rrlCta-hope), Q /rope thut
;1 is pouibk IhuJ wmethirrg nc( IUfdtmundubk is possible.
It is tautological to say that llUeh a second order hope is not
undeT$tandable. To the tautologieal we may add the otMous:
thilliS not understandahle may sometimes be useful. OM may
drive an automobile without understanding the nature of its
ellgine.' The serious que~tion for Kant is this: Does a second-
order hope have any mom use or moral danger? We will
 The Logic
The Logic of
of Hope:
Hope: Continued
Continued 209

postpone considering
postpone considering this
this question
question until
until after
after taking
taking up
up the
the matter
matter
of hope
of hope in
in connection
connection with
with antinomies.
antinomies.

4. Hope
4. Hope and
and the
the Solution
Solution of
of the
the Antinomies
Antinomies

What place
What place isis there
there for
for hope
hope of
of solution
solution for
for those
those puzzles
puzzles in
in
which reason
which reason itself
itself seems
seems toto have
have no
no basis
basis for
for choice?
choice? The
The four
four
antinomies that
antinomies that Kant
Kant offers
offers in
in the
the Cdtique
Critique of
of Pure
Pure Reason
Reason (A426
(A426
to A453)
to A453) are
are urgent
urgent examples
examples ofof our
our question.
question. The
The antinomies,
antinomies,
as Kant
as Kant presents
presents them
them onon opposite
opposite pages,
pages, or
or sides
sides of
of the
the same
same
page, are:
page, are:

Thesis
Thesis Antithesis
Antithesis

1. The
1. The world
world has
has aa beginning
beginning 1. The
1. The world
world has
has no
no begin-
begin-
in time,
in time, and
and is
is also
also limited
limited as
as ning, and no
ning, and no limits
limits in space;
in space;
regards space.
regards space. it is
it is infinite
infinite as
as regards both
regards both
time and
time and space.
space.

2. Every
2. composite substance
Every composite substance 2.
2. No
No composite
composite thing
thing in the
in the
in the
in the world
world is
is made
made upup of
of world
world is
is made
made up
up of simple
of simple
simple
simple parts,
parts, and nothing
and nothing parts,
parts, and
and there nowhere
there nowhere
anywhere
anywhere exists
exists save the
save the exists
exists in
in the
the world anything
world anything
simple
simple oror what
what is composed
is composed simple.
simple.
of
of the simple.
the simple.

3.
3. Causality
Causality in accordance
in accordance 3.
3. There
There is is nono freedom;
freedom;
with
with laws
laws ofof nature
nature isis not the
not the everything
everything in
in the
the world takes
world takes
only
only causality
causality from
from which
which thethe place
place solely
solely in accordance
in accordance
appearances
appearances of of the
the world
world cancan with
with laws
laws of nature.
of nature.
one
one and
and all
all be
be derived.
derived. To To
explain
explain these
these appearances
appearances it it
is
is necessary
necessary to to assume
assume thatthat
there
there is
is- also
also another
another causal-
causal-
ity,
ity, that
that of
of freedom.
freedom.
210 11iE LOGIC OF HOPE: CONllNUEO

4. lbere belollgs to the 4. An absolutely ncceuary

world, either as iU pat! or as being nowhere exislS ill lhe
ilS cause. a beill& thai is world, nor docs il exisl out-
absolulely IIUSUI)'. side the world as ilS cause.

lbere is no need 10 repeal )(am', lUIIIlysis of all of the fealUres

of these posilions and Iheir relations to each other. For our
purposes it will be enough recall that we cannot solve the problem
of deciding belWecn the thesA and the antithesis in each casc.
Unsolvable bcausc each position, thesis and IU1tilhesis. "is nol
only in llSelf free from contradiction, bul fillds conditions of ilS
neceuity in the very n.alUre of reason-only thai, unfOrlUnalely, the
aucrtion of the oppo$ile has.. on ilS side, grounds that are juSt as
valid and ncceuary" (8449).
How do such problems arise? Kam answe", "If in employing
the principles of understanding we do I10t merely apply our reil5Ol1
10 objects of experience, but venture 10 extend these principles
beyond the limilS of experience, there arise pMUdo-roIiona1
doctrioes which can ru:il""" /~ fix wlllradiciion. in upcieflce nOl"
fear "fu/ution. by if' (8449) (my emphasis).
Here we have a problem that Kam says is lNyond hope 01" fear.
Notice that it is beyond hope or fear of uperiMce. Can there be
a hope or a fear thai is I10t a hope for experience or a fellf of
experience' lbe sccond pat! of this question, involving fear, WlU
studied in a clauic passage by Epicurus..

4.1 The Epicun" AnalolY

Sllould we fear something which, when i1 happens. will not be

an occasion for paill, and so for fear? Aocording to EpicuCU$, "he
,"'lIIi a silly mall who said that he feared death. not because it
would grieve him when ;t was prescllt, but because it did grieve
him while ;t was future. For it is very absurd thai thai which does
not distress a man when il is presefll. should afflict him when only
e.<pCcted."
 77~ Lcgic of Hope: COtIlimmJ 211

On the same ba$i$, we may argue that it is absurd to hope for

an experience of happine from somethin&whith. should it ocrur.
would not be an experience of happiness. As Kanl menlioM, "all
hoping is directed to happin~" (CPR. A80S). Call ,hue be
huppbtess "'i,11CUl an apt,j~~? Not in any smJ~ of Ih~ lern 11101
..~ can imugiIte. TIle consequence of this Is that we may find
ourselves facinS problems, tbe rHOlution of Ihe anlinomie$, which
are beyond hope or fear. Undecidable questioni and proofs of
their undWdabiliry exist. Bu t utisfaction requires. proof. And
consll'Ucting a proof requires experience. (Even knowledge of a
matbematical proof requi res experienee..)'
There are objeaions 10 Epicurus. Epicurus bas arsued that if
the fear of (leatb is taten lite rally. it is absurd; bowever. if "fear
of deatb" means fear of a short rather than a 1011& interval before
death. then pre5ent fear of the future event is reouonable. But this
would translate the feared result into a shon experience rather
tban a long experience; we still are deaHng with the expectation
of one or another experience. If tile fear of death is fear of a
painful last illness., we again have an experience as tile object of
the fear. TIle lengtb of one's life and tbe pain before one's death
are proper and understandable manea of hope and fear. BUL
hope and fear tbat are not hope and fear of some experience are
emp'Y ideas..
Consider one PlOte possible oounter-example 10 the broadened
EpiaJrus position: tbe view Ibat there is no basis for a present
hope or fear .bout.n experience unless it would be an experience
of bappiness or unhappiness when it OIlrred. Suppose you buy
a life ill5Uranee policy witb family members as the beneficiaries of
a large sum of money in case of accidental dealh. In buying the
policy. you hope that the insurance company will make the family
wealtby in the event of your accidental death. Docs it make sense
10 say Ibat in buying the policy, you bope fo r something that will
1101 be an object of your experience? Yu. but it is an object of
uperience rlK tbe family. if the insurao company makes the
payme nt.
212 TIlE LOGIC OF HOPE: CONTINUED

Kanfs im;istcnce thilt all hoping is for happine~ does not seem
to apply to the MJbjeet who docs the hoping in thi5 example. ( I)
The subject dots hope for bappi~ althoogh it is IIOt peBanal
happineu but the happiness of othen. (2) The probability of
bappineu for tbe othen is a basis for peBanal happincS5 ;n the
present and in the intefVill from the purchase of the insurance
until death. (3) 1be insured, apparently, wouLd be happy If able
to experience the reeeipi of the wealth by the family. So, the
purchaser hopes for a situation Q.J if there to experience it. We
avoid various subjunctive enUlnglements by noting that the subject
m
buys the polio:y assuming thai tile company ..... pay, and the
family, if they know about the situation, do lhe hoping.. 1be
beneficiaries hope that the company will be IoOlvent when the time
for paymenl arrives and will carry 001 the contnlC!. BUI a sense
remains in which the pefloOll who purchased tbe polio:y for other
beneficiaries does hope that what has been purchased will be
carried OU I as agreed. This peBan's hope is chaT1lcterlzcd by the
Q.J if col1$truction: but, thi5 "as if pattern of hope is a variety of

Iraru;.ceooenlal second order hope. The individual hopes for a

situation which, if it were an experience, woo ld be an experience
of happine~, But we cannot produce an image of ourselves both
dead and also not dead and able to have the expe rience of a HviRi
person. So, the buyer of such insurance hopes (or IoOmcthing thaI
can be !laid but canoot be understood, referentially, in firslperwn
,,-The eITon 10 produce an image is IoOmetimes prodigious. You
can com;truct an image of yourself $landing behind a veil, w.llching
through a hole in the veil as your family receives the wealth from
the imuTilllCC company: an "as it' ((Instruction wilh a serious naw.
The question of rClISOllilblc second-order hopes will arise again in
connection with Kant's use of the conception.
Rcturning 10 the antinomies, we IIOle bow Kant advises us 10
proceed. First, remind ourselves of tbe c~nlial role of pou.iblc
experience.
 213

PM' l " , H,~, ic ..... is:hal whidI ... oIc.e p.c rulity 10 ..... ......,""' ..
ill ............ ..-epe io ..... idu. wilIoouIlnlllo. :haI iI, witboooI ..IOI"'"
10 "1i~j rn. 11M: p" vU aoopirial a.cept iI:bud_tlle M'M"d b7
...mdt we ....... jI1dp:.' ,he,"
icIo.o io ........ ~.-I ~_Qly. or
whelbet iI finck iu obje<I '" the .....1<1.. (M89) (III' ... pIIasis)

For "Ihough.-entity" we may 5ubstitllte ~"'ionable entily: TI!e11,

if somelhina is mentionable bul not usable. by ou r concept$, can
we hope that il become usable? NOI by us., limited as we are 10
our concepts. Can we ~ thaI there may be entities that have
different Q priori cateBories of uDdcrstanding and experience, and
WI what is only mentionable for us is usable for them? We can
SCl)' this, 001 it may be argued that we cannot understand what we
are saying. The i$sue may be pul in terms of another antinomy.

""'.
We may reuoll.llbly hope thai wbat is 1101 understandable for
human rcason is understandable by some other entity in the
world.
AnllItitlll
II is DOl reuonablc 10 hope that what is DOt understandable
by human beings is still undcl1'undable by non-humans..

Suppose we aecept the Thesis, above. What advantage would

human beillfl have if only some outside entity undenlood the
solulion to a problem? II would nill remain a problem (or that
person. SUppo5C the Thesis is rephrased in lerms of furore
ulMlt ntandillJ by human beinp. But, if human beings of the
fulure undentand Ihe 5Olulion to a problem, that slill docs 001
provide us with a wlulion. Suppose the 'Thesis is rephrased 50
that we ounclv hope 10 undentand in the future something that
is DOW completely beyond the meaning of our categories. ls this
a reasonable hope? Again, we can say it, but we do nol /lOW
know what we are u.ying. But a lt5!i desperate alternative can be
oonsidered.
2\0' lliE LOG IC OF HOPE; CONTINUED

What does Kant do with the problem of the solution to the

antinomies in the Fint Cri tique? He suggests what _ may call
a pragmatic response 10 predicaments of thaI type. If a question
cannot be answered. attack the question and replace it by,. beller
qucstion. Fint. he looks carefully a\ the "conditions" of the
antinomy under diKussJon. By a <:(Illodition i$ meam a common
assumption made by both \he$il and antithesis. "If twO opposed
judgments presuppose an inadmissible condition, then in spi te of
their opposition. ... both fall to the ground .. ." (ASOJ).
The first step, then. is to analyze the alternatives 10 $Ce if we
CIUI locate their rommon USlImptiom. Since tbey arc rellpOlISCS
10 the same: question, they must have SOIT>C common assumptions.
1bc 5CCOnd step consists in diding whether the common
assumption (or tiSWnptioos) is acceptable. If nol, _ arc not
<:(Impelled to .ocept either thesis or antithc5il. But suppose the
assumption is acceptable, having no property thai can be rejected?
Our nut move may be to employ the dualist', famous _apon;
Consider the alternatives from different viewpoints. Kant docs
this with the fooM antioomy, in AS6O, wrung with, "Both of the
<:(Inflicting propo5itions may be 1tUC, if taken in different <:(I1llICC-
tions." If we take the thesis and IntlthesJ.s to be answers to
different quc5lio"," we will somctimes gain the advantages of each
without logical confusion. SUppo5C this technique is also unsatis-
faClOry for OUT problem. There is yet another move available, the
search for what we may call a praamatic synthesis.

SUJlP( Ie Ihat we are unable to c~ cither of a pai r of

opp<lsed posi tions, and we arc also unablc to reject either of the
two. A pragmatic re!>pOlI$C suiiests using Kant's strateI)' in a
different way.
Step I, Connulate the qucstiOll (question A) to which the thesis
and antitbc$i$ are UIISWttJ". Call tha.e answen position A and
position -A.
 The Logic
The Logic of
of Hope:
Hope: Continued
Continued 215
215

Step 2,
Step 2, formulate
formulate the the problem
problem (problem
(problem A) A) for
for which
which question
question
AA isis pertinent.
pertinent. Now:
Now:
Step 3,
Step 3, wewe try
try to
to generalize
generalize on on problem
problem A, A, raise
raise aa broader
broader
problem such
problem such that
that ifif we
we solved
solved this
this newnew problem
problem we we would
would no no
longer be
longer be concerned
concerned with with problem
problem A. A. We We require
require aa formulation
formulation
of some
of some problem
problem BB thatthat lends
lends itself
itself to
to aa pertinent
pertinent question
question that
that we
we
can answer
can answer satisfactorily.
satisfactorily. There
There is is more
more than
than one
one way
way ofof con-
con-
structing problem
structing problem BB so so as
as to
to have
have its
its solution
solution remove
remove thethe need
need for
for
solving problem
solving problem A. A. Because
Because therethere isis no
no unique
unique decision
decision procedure
procedure
for stating
for stating problem
problem B, B, dialecticians
dialecticians cannot
cannot compel
compel agreement
agreement fromfrom
each other on
each other on the
the matter
matter of of the
the most
most efficient
efficient "new
"new synthesis,"
synthesis," or
or
the most
the most fruitful
fruitful generalization.
generalization. The The schema
schema forfor this
this procedure
procedure is is
presented in
presented in Table
Table 5.5.

TABLE 5
PRAGMATIC SYNTHESIS
PRAGMATIC SYNTHESIS

step 11
step Question A
Question A position
position A
A <-> position-A
< - > position-A

(thesis) (antithesis)
( antithesis)

step
step 22 Problem
Problem A
A ......Question
Question A
A position
position A
A <-> position-A
< - > position-A

step
step 33 Problem
Problem B
B......Question
Question B
B position
position B
B <->
< - > position -B
position-B

step
step 44 Problem
Problem C
C ......Question
Question C
C position
position C
C <->
< - > position -C
position-C

To
To illustrate
illustrate aa pragmatic
pragmatic synthesis,
synthesis, consider
consider the
the following.
following. Suppose
Suppose
we
we come
come upon
upon twotwo people
people who
who are
are arguing
arguing about
about thethe answer
answer toto thethe
. question.
question, Where
Where isis Montgomery
Montgomery Street?
Street? Perhaps
Perhaps oneone says
says that
that itit isis
 216 TIlE LOGIC OF HOPE: CONTINUED

to the !>OM while the other holds that it lies south. As. pragmalic
peacemakers.. we ask why the disputants "''ant to know the location
01 Monlgomery Strut. Suppcl5e they answer, To visit Temple
University. Now, if we can provide directioll$ 10 tIIat destination.
even thou&h we don't know the location of Montgomery Street, we
h.ave resolved the problem of the antinomy between going north and
KMlIh. We might be able to point to the tallest building of the
University and yet not know anything about Moolgomery Strut.
The synthe5i5 (8), "Temple University lin thai way; might be
neither north IlOl' south of the speakers position. However, il
symhe,~ the original conflict. not by conlaining within itself bolh
positions (A) and (A). but by providing Ihe advantages of a
sucressful decision procedure that solves the proble m that was the
goal of each con~tanl. It may nol be addrcued 10 the precise
question that separated ilJ\SWer (A) and (A). bul il solves a problem
lhal makes the original problem. (A). no longer re levanl to me
concerns 0( the individuals involved.
At any llep, if we find ourselves ulisficd with aoxcpting. position
(A or .A, B or .8, and so on), then we need no funher slepi. We
have solved the problem of finding a satisfactory posilion. If,
however, we are 00( satisfied with the choice between positions al
any "CP.we are 10 generaliu on me problem al lhal 5tep in the
effOTt to formulate a problem that allows us 10 I.OXCpl a position that
satisfies or removes the original problem.
We have ooticcd Kant', point that "if two opposed judgment5
presuppose: an inadmiuible condition" (ASOJ), they lose their force.
In the pragmatic search for a synthesis, if il IUrns out that two
opposed posilioll!l have a commoo assumplioo that Slops any further
inquiry, lhat IISSUmption needs 10 be replaced by something more
efficient for the problem at hand. Kant iIlustr.l.les this pattern by an
example from Zeno of Ele.. eallcd "a subtle dialectician" rather than
the mischievous Sophist tllal Plato reprimanded (A502).
Zeno maintained, as Kant presents it. "Ihal God (probably
conoeived by blm as simply the world) is neither fmite nor infinile.
neither in motion nor at rest. neither similar nor dissimilar 10 any
othtr thi",&" (ASOl). 1.5 Kant uplaiN Zcno's position. it turns on
 711~ Logic of Hope: ConlinuM 217

finding that each side in the antinomy presupposes a common

assumption. 1lIe two positions: that (A), the universe is similar, Ol"
that (A) it is DOl similar, to any other thing. each presuppose: that
some OIlw thill& "With wruch it could be compared.: When we
realize thaI the opposition between the two Yiew$ depends on
making thi$ U$umption. and that we need 001, indeed. cannot, make
it, then the antinomy 00 longer troubles us. Presumably we tum to
other more urgent propenies of God or lbe universe.
Is lhere hope for resolvins antinomies between apparently
contradictory positions? We have two technique&. Firsl, we may
find the C(lmIDOn assumptions that they make and di$rover Ihal .... e
can avoid tbem. Second, .... e may take the pTalDalic rou le of
generalbing on the problem thaI gave rise to the antithetical view5.
When mUSt ....e face hatd choice and pick one of lhe alternative
answers, and .... hen may we hope 10 avoid either allernative by an
attack on the question? This problem involves more than the mere
1000c of the situation. Surely .... e may hope (or results that we &houJd
nof hope for. However urgent. moral issue, .... e may somctim<:s
entenain a logically pouible hope of .voiding" dlOicc. But this is
the moral problem of good and bad hopes. and oot tbe logical
problem of the range of possible: hope.
1lIe point of this s.ection is to aplain the pragmatic advice that
when a question does ~ permit us to choose an effidcnt answer,
\herc may be reasonable hope of finding II limO' qumion. Thcre
is a limit 10 the optimistic tone of the lasl se:ntence. Therc is a
reasonable hope of .voiding cboice between contradictions if they
follow the Khematic form of Kant's antinomies. Now, the feature
that enables us 10 avoid etcrnal vacillation between thesis and
lllItilhel.is in Kant'li antinomicli iii the fact that they involve employ
m<:nt of the categories of the understanding on som<:thill& that is DOl
a po$foible experieoce. We may therefore successfully attack the
question 10 which thesis and antithesis are oppo5td .nswers.
Do we have hope of $IIch a stratcgy with all C(lntradictories? Only
with lhose in .... hich .... e can find a critical fla .... in the question tllat
gave rise: to them. Kant hIlS shown that "'c may sometimes succeed,
but it is a merely ment ioned hope until we can 5how the possibility
 218
218 T H E LOGIC
THE LOGIC OF
OF HOPE:
HOPE: CONTINUED
CONTINUED

of aa refutable
of refutable assumption
assumption in in the
the question.
question. YetYet aa mentionable
mentionable hope
hope
isis still
still one
one variety
variety ofof aa hope.
hope.
Second-order hopes
Second~order hopes are
are cases
cases where
where wewe can
can mention
mention aa hope
hope but
but
not construct an
not construct an object
object of
of that
that hope.
hope. They
They areare mentionable
mentionable but but not
not
understandable. There
understandable. There isis little
little limit
limit on
on our
our ability
ability to
to simply
simply assert
assert
that we
that we have
have aa hope,
hope, whether
whether or or not
not it
it is
is reasonable
reasonable or or construct-
construct-
able. However,
able. However, logiclogic and
and taste
taste will
will become
become parameters.
parameters.
It has
It has been
been argued
argued (for
(for example,
example, by by John
John Dewey)
Dewey) that
that the
the history
history
of science
of science isis aa history
history of
of better
better andand better
better questions
questions asas well
well as
as better
better
and better
and better answers.
answers. Science
Science does
does not
not always
always work
work doggedly
doggedly until
until aa
question is
question is answered.
answered. Dewey's
Dewey's remark
remark is is well-based:
well-based:

. . . the
... the conviction
conviction persists--though
persists-though history
history shows
shows itit to
to be
be aa hallucination--that
hallucination-that
all the
all the questions
questions that
that the
the human
human mindmind hashas asked
asked areare questions
questions that
that can
can be
be
answered in
answered in terms
terms of
of the
the alternatives
alternatives that
that the
the questions
questions themselves
themselves present.
present.
But in
But in fact
fact intellectual
intellectual progress
progress usually
usually occurs
occurs through
through sheer
sheer abandonment
abandonment of of
questions together
questions together with
with both
both of
of the
the alternatives
alternatives they
they assume--an
assume--an abandonment
abandonment
that results
that results from
from their
their decreasing
decreasing vitality
vitality and
and aa change
change of of urgent interest. We
urgent interest. We
do not
do not solve
solve them:
them: we we get
get over
over them.
them. Old Old questions
questions areare solved by
solved by
disappearing, evaporating,
disappearing, evaporating, while
while new
new questions
questions corresponding
corresponding to to the changed
the changed
attitude of
attitude of endeavor
endeavor andand preference
preference take
take their
their place.^
place. 6

6.
6. Summaiy
Summary and
and Distinction
Distinction Between
Between
Reasonable
Reasonable and
and Unreasonable
Unreasonable Hopes
Hopes

We
We may may collect
collect the
the varieties
varieties of
of hope
hope and
and specify
specify the
the line between
line between
what
what is is and
and what
what isis not
not hopeless.
hopeless. The
The. general
general definition
definition employed
employed
has
has five
five conditions
conditions for for the
the relation
relation between
between an an individual
individual andand thethe
object
object of of that
that person's
person's hope:
hope: (a)
(a) We
We must
must be
be able
able to
to mention
mention (i.e.,
(i.e.,
construct)
construct) aa schema
schema of of the
the object,
object. (b)(b) We
We must
must bebe ignorant
ignorant of of at
at
least
least some
some part
part of
of the
the schema
schema or or image,
image. (c)
( c) We
We areare to
to know
know thatthat
we
we are
are ignorant
ignorant ofof some
some part
part of
of the
the schema
schema or or image,
image. (d) (d) WeWe areare
to desire to complete the schema or image, (e) We
to desire to complete the schema or image. (e) We must know that must know that
we
we are
are ignorant
ignorant ofof the
the result,
result, the
the success
success or
or failure,
failure, of
of the
the desire.
desir~.
While
While thisthis definition
definition is
is involved
involved inin eveiy
every example
example of of hope,
hope, itit lets
lets us
us
distinguish between methodological, semantic, and
distinguish between methodological, semantic, and compound kinds compound kinds
of
of hope.
hope.
 219

Please a)QSult Table I, "'Kinds of Hope: in our previous chapler,

page ISS, i n roMe<1ion with the following outline.
1M _~ kinds of ~ are: (1) hope for the success of
a known means, (2) hope for the discovery of an efficient means,
and (3) hope for the ability 10 communicate an adequate description
of a goal.
1M Mmmuic wuijkmiOlt gave us: (I) !he Type: L the hope for
the ability to mention (cl~ or analyze) something, (2) Type 11,
the hope to know the trutb-Yalue of. senlence. and (3) the Type 111,
the hope 10 know the rdereoce of a lingui5tic e ntity.
,of wmpowuJ hope is a case in wbicb the subject deab ~ulta
oeously with more than one hope. While Ihc hope for .. solution is
unitary, the object of the hope may i!Kif be hope or nuy involve
more than ODe hope. We oonsidered three kinds of compound
hopes: (1) the ~~. the hope thaI it is possible that
IIOmething that is IlOl und: '$,lVIlfubk is still possible, (2) the hope for
a 5Ohnion 10 antinomies between positions that presupprlC impoui-
bk upoimcu, (3) the hope for a solution 10 the choice between
dialectical opposi tes lIIat bold between pouibk apoitnCt!l. Of this
group of compound hopes. lbe fin! two are transcendental while the
third is experiential.
llIis is not an exhaustive classification of the possible compound
hopes.. Given any two hopes., ODC can alwa)'$ join them .nd produce
a compound hope for their mutual solution. Also. aiven any hope.
caU it A, one can hope that A have particular features. Such
features might be that A is never realized. that A is quickly
realized, thai A remain a secret from the world. and Ihal A be
adopted universally. We can dU.tinguish between the object of hope
A. and the relation of hoplnJ.. 'Then, in the cases jusl listed, some
are flrst-order compounds that take the same object of hope; othen
are second-order because they are hopes thai take hopes at part of
their obj(dS. Second-order bope5 may be either transcendental or
experiential. See Table 1, "Kinds of Hope."
 220
220 THE LOGIC
THE LOGIC OF
OF HOPE:
HOPE: CONTINUED
CONTINUED

7.7. Unreasonable
Unreasonable Hopes
Hopes

Now that
Now that we we havehave completed
completed our our survey
survey of of the
the kinds
kinds ofof hope,
hope, we we
can specify
can specifysome some of of the
the unreasonable
unreasonable varieties. varieties. The The methodological
methodological
classification in
classification in Table
Table 33 in in our our previous
previous chapterchapter suggests
suggests the the
possibility of
possibility of empty
empty hopeshopes in in several
several categories.
categories. On On level
level 2,2, in
in Table
Table
3, 3, the
the hope
hope for for success
success of of aa particular
particular means means presupposes
presupposes that that anan
available means
available means isis known.
known. If If itit isis not,
not, the
the hope
hope forfor success
success isis empty,
empty,
atat least
least atat that
that stage.
stage. Likewise,
Likewise, on on level
level 33 thethe hope
hope forfor anan efficient
efficient
means can
means can be be reasonable
reasonable only only if if the
the answer
answer to to question
question B B is is
affirmative. Similarly,
affirmative. Similarly, on on level
level 44 the the hope
hope for for communication
communication of of aa
goal requires
goal requires that that there
there be be aa goal, goal, that
that there
there be be an an affirmative
affirmative
answer to
answer to question
question A. A. Is Is an
an empty
empty hope hope unreasonable?
unreasonable? While While it it is
is
not the
not the same
same as as aa hope
hope for for aa flat flat contradiction,
contradiction, it it is
is internally
internally
inconsistent; it
inconsistent; it ignores
ignores its its own
own presuppositions.
presuppositions.
The Semantic
The Semantic Classification
Classification also also permits
permits the the mention
mention of of varieties
varieties
of hope
of hope thatthat areare internally
internally inconsistent.
inconsistent. A A Type
Type II hope
hope requires
requires that that
the subject
the subject be be able
able to to construct
construct aa schema schema as as aa reference
reference for for the
the
desire to
desire do something,
to do something, that that is, is, to to name
name something.
something. If If one
one has has nono
such
such schema,
schema, one one hashas nono such
such hope. hope. There There can can bebe nono Type
Type II hope
II hope
unless
unless therethere is is the
the ability
ability to to mention
mention aa sentencesentence whose truth-value
whose truth-value
is
is desired.
desired. To To saysay that
that aa subject
subject hopes hopes to to know
know the the truth,
truth, butbut not
not
the truth about some sentence or sentences,
the truth about some sentence or sentences, is to report an empty is to report an empty
Type
Type II II hope.
hope. Thirdly,
Thirdly, therethere cannotcannot be be aa Type
Type III III hope
hope without
without aa
sentence
sentence whose whose reference
reference is is desired.
desired. Each Each of of these
these three
three aberrations
aberrations
of
of semantic hopes is equivalent to hoping for the answer to
semantic hopes is equivalent to hoping for the answer to aa
question but having no notion of what is the question.
question but having no notion of what is the question.
Presumably,
Presumably, reason reason forbids
forbids the the inconsistency
inconsistency of of treating
treating an an empty
empty
hope
hope as as ifif itit were
were not not empty,
empty, as as ifif each
each of of its
its requirements
requirements were were
satisfied. The point here is not that
satisfied. The point here is not that an incomplete or empty hopean incomplete or empty hope
isis to
to be
be called
called unreasonable,
unreasonable, but but that
that itit isis unreasonable
unreasonable (inconsis-
(inconsis-
tent)
tent) to to take
take an an incomplete
incomplete hope hope to to be
be complete.
complete. (The (The term term
"unreasonable"
"unreasonable is used to mean that reason cannot support such aa
ll is used to mean that reason cannot support such
position:
position: itit contradicts
contradicts itself.)
itself.)
The
The incomplete
incomplete hopes hopesjust just considered
considered are are rather
rather obvious
obvious casescases of of
error.
error. AA more more serious
serious because
because more more easily
easilyoverlooked
overlooked error error consists
consists
 221

in tUina as an obJt of hope 50mething thai vioIatel Kant',

"po5tulate of poWbility." TbiJ postulate bokb; thai for an object to
be poaible II muu be tbe ob;ed. 01 pouible experience. As
phrased aboYe. in lectlon 4.1 we QlUIOt hope for an object \lnl_
ane can imqinc an uperiencc of Ihl! objca. 1bercf.m=, an
ullJ"Ca$On.lble hope takes for lIS object somcthil'll Wt doc5 not
atidy lbe eonc1itiooi 01. p"".jbk experience..
To hope for ~tu.tioD that _Id violate tbe laws 01. logic is
ccnainly 10 hope Cor somethina: WI caMOt be an etpetien.ee.
HC/WC'IC:r. m ..dsu/ICy II noc enoup 10 ",vant I itgitilNle hope.
A Type 111 hope, hope for. rcfere~ for conoepl thai may be
c:or.i<U'fI!ly mentioned bul Ih.al is not. by its own definition, a
pouibIe experience for \II., II hope thai viola!e$ Kant's ptJ6IUIote of
posIibilily. Apin, the reason that Kant insis15 on hb postulate of
PG",ibility is th.l, ", .. without materi,1 nothina whatsOe~r an be
thQuabt" (Al.l2). A hope requires I Ihou&hl of ill object, .nd il
'au' "material" in order 10 produce. thollj)'II, accocdinl 10 Kant.
"So lona; lIS inrvition is \ackina. we do IlOl know whether throv&h the
calcaorlcl we are thinkin& I n objca, and whether indd there can
anywhere be an objealUlled to them" (8288).
The (()mpound hopei offer compound opport;Jnilic5 to phrase
untc;uonable hope. The experientIal candidatel can he unreason-
able on (be bui! of factual error in their assumptions, or internal
inconsistency in their comtruction. With the utn$ttndental hopes
we have a mou IIoerious bsue than the obvious matlel'$ of factual or
Logical fwndation. EYen If web hope_ do paM formal 5mlliny on
these VOUnds.. we have the question o f their pt'Ob!ematie status..
They are problernatk be<:ause they ISiUme Kherna that are OOt

.........
posfJbIe experiel\Cle$. An Impoo&nt alterJll.'lve remains to be

On first consideration, there teelllli to be a cllitinction between our

symboh and the objecU ~ entities that they I}'I1lbolize. In the c:aK
of mathematical entitie .. we use symbolJ to refer to numbers,
equalities.. reJationshipl. that are quite distinct from the symbols
themsetve5. What iJ known u platonism in mathematics iI; often
I2ken for a \htofy of the olMOUl. However. there is :llJ()(her
 222 TIm LOGIC OF HOPE: CONTINUED

alternative to the auumption that there are numben and mathemati-

cal truths that enst as propositi01l5 in some world of ideas.. We may
lake the position that the mathematical ')'mbols IlIemselvc:, arc the
subjects of mathematia.. Then. mathematieall,ws ate references to
the experiential possibilities of operations carried oot on symbols.
Mathematics CU1 then be uooentood as an cq)erimcnuU science.
One consequence of this position is Ihe emphasis on ')'mbols
themKlves as objects of ~rie1l. We do, after all, see them:
they either do or don', yield 10 certain manipulations and sUMSes
Whelher they do or don't allow a particular wbslitution pauem is
a matter of trial and ~rvation.. "They can do the job of 5)'1DboLiz-
In& something else, but they are also objects of ~rieDCe in their
own right. When a colleague claims to have, proof of a previously
questionable theorem, we: alik to see it. If the proof exists, we may
hope to find it. This hope is an ordinary first-order hope, because
it is a desi re for an ~rience in the U5Ual sense of experience.
To ~y that a mathematical proof is ap>e.r.>~ in leTlll$ of symbols,
but the proof iJJdf cannot be observed. i5 undent.andable. However,
it is undeT5li1ndable exactly ill one may unduslilnd any distinction
between phenomena and noumena. All reference to t"t!aJily it~1f,
apan (rom what is a possible experience. is reference to noumena.
The hope to prove a mathematical theorem Is a hope to produce
symbols that arc objects in the world of experience. The colleague
who claims to have a proof but cannot exhibit it is either shy or sly.
The point of this digression into the matter of mathematical entities
and proofs is to present the notion that ')'mbots themselves are
perftly common obje<n of possible experience. Nm only common,
they are sometimes liven the hooorifie status of an.
Returning to the problematic starus of transcendental hopes, we:
may distinguish between those whose schema are intended 10 refer
10 goals mat are rIOt mentionable. and those whose schema are
imended to refer 10 symbols. Where the reference is 10 ')'mbols, 10
mentionables, we have experiential goals.
SuPlMl!e Ihal we have a hope Ihal ~melhing, for which we do nO!
now have adequate symbols, may be satisfactorily symboliud in the
future. Is Ihl$ a firsl or second-o~r hope? That depends on the
 The Logic
The Logic of
of Hope:
Hope: Continued
Continued 223
223

schema. If
schema. If we
we hope
hope that
that wewe may
may have
have more
more satisfactory
satisfactory hopes
hopes in in the
the
future, this
future, this is
is aa second-order
second-order hope. hope. And,And, ifif by
by "the
"the hope"
hope" we we meanmean
some reality
some reality notnot capable
capable of of being
being anan object
object ofof experience,
experience, we we havehave
aa transcendental
transcendental object. object. On On thethe other
other hand,
hand, if if by
by "the
"the hope"
hope" we we
mean something
mean something that that may
may be be an an object
object ofof experience--such
experience-such as as aa
symbol or
symbol or some
some linguistic
linguistic behavior--we
behaviorwe have have aa possible
possible object.
object. Such Such
aa symbolic
symbolic or or linguistic
linguistic object
object maymay bebe mentioned
mentioned but but not
not used:
used: that that
is the
is the limitation
limitation on on transcendental
transcendental symbols.
symbols.
Transcendental hopes
Transcendental hopes may may bebe mentioned
mentioned but but not
not used
used toto refer
refer toto
possible objects other
possible objects other than
than symbols.
symbols. The The important
important thingthing isis that
that they
they
may be
may be mentioned.
mentioned. The The risk
risk of
of the
the unreasonable
unreasonable hopes hopes is is that
that there
there
is the
is the danger
danger thatthat they
they may
may be be treated
treated as as if
if they
they could
could bebe used.
used. Is Is
there any
there any point
point in in mentioning
mentioning them them if if they
they cannot
cannot be be used?
used? Indeed
Indeed
there is.
there is.
As far as Antinomic hope is concerned, Kant has shown that there
is sometimes
is sometimes aa reasonable
reasonable hope hope of of solution.
solution. But But this involves
this involves
attacking the
attacking the question
question rather
rather than
than taking
taking it it at face value.
at face value. It It is
is
unreasonable to
unreasonable to adopt
adopt oneone side
side ofof an
an antinomy
antinomy without considering
without considering
the claims
the claims of of the
the other
other side,
side, when
when neither
neither isis decidable
decidable by possible
by possible
experience.
expenence.
To summarize
To summarize this this section,
section, it it is
is unreasonable
unreasonable to to act
act as as if an
if an
incomplete
incomplete hope hope were were inin fact
fact complete.
complete. Also, Also, itit is
is unreasonable
unreasonable to to
act as
act as if
if aa merely
merely mentionable
mentionable object object of of hope
hope were
were also thinkable,
also thinkable,
if it
if it does
does not satisfy the
not satisfy conditions of
the conditions of experience.
experience. Both Both factual
factual and and
logical assumptions are
logical assumptions are involved
involved in in hope,
hope, and
and oneone cancan be
be in error
in error
about either
about either of of them.
them. Such Such errors
errors can
can produce
produce unreasonable
unreasonable hopes. hopes.
The transcendental
The transcendental hopes hopes become
become unreasonable
unreasonable if if they
they are treated
are treated
as
as if if they
they applied
applied to to possible
possible experiences
experiences beyond
beyond experiences
experiences with with
symbols.
symbols. They They may may be be mentioned
mentioned reasonably,
reasonably, but but not
not used.
used.
Now
Now we we are
are in in position
position to to analyze
analyze Kant's
Kant's views
views on on the
the scope
scope and and
limits
limits of of various
various religious hopes.
religious hopes.
 Part III
Part III

CONSEQUENCES OF
CONSEQUENCES OF
KANT'S VIEWPOINT
KANT'S VIEWPOINT
 Eight

KANTS USE OF
REASONABLE HOPE

Now we will see how consistent Kanl hi=l( was when he cam<: to
employ the idea of hope. This is a rair question 10 15k of Kant,
5ince he has informed us that, 'consistency is the highest obligation
of a philmopher. .."' He did finish thaI sentence wilh, "and ~I the
most rarely found: 1be problem thaI seems 10 be solved inconsis-
tently by Kant is the analysis of hope. How can hope be limited 10
possible experience, and also be transcendent?
It is tempting to introduce lhis wilh the remark that Kam pl aced
in tbe preface \0 his Critique 0{ PrrKlical RCUSM, "Now is explained
1M migma of the critical philosoph)'. whicb lies in the ract thaI we
must rcl'IOUII<:C the: objective reality of the supencnsih\c usc of the
categories in speculation and yet can attribute this reality to them in
respect 10 the objects of pure practical reasoo" (my emphasis).'
How does be solve "the enigmar A proper answer would take us
far afield at this stage, but a brief rcspoll5C may be wonhwhilc.
"The inc:ollSistenq vanishes because the usc which is DOW made of
these oonapts is different from that required by speculative reason."
One usc is in order 10 refer 10 the phenomenal world, the Olher use
is in order 10 oonslruCl a oonsislenl and morally useful s.chema.
Formally, one is use, and lhe olher is mmtiDrl. Wilhoot lhis
distinction. KanI'S syslem islosl. He regularly explains thaI one r;an
"think a supersensible being withoul II the same time meaning
thereby 10 cognize il theoretically.. ..'" To lhink requires meouon
(al leasl 10 oneself), 10 know (or "cogniu ") requires use in referring
10 phenomena. Now look at eumples. Section 1 will deal with
retribution and Seaion 2 with myslerious lI!ISistance io moral effon.
 REASONABLE HOPE

I. Hope tor Ret:rihulion

Let us start wilh the section of tile Cril~ of ~ Rearon l in

which Kant anaJyu.s the three W1uu quHtiol\!.. This is in "The
Canon of Pure Reason," Section 2, tilled, "The Ideal of the Highest
Good, as a Dc:tenruning Ground of the Ultimate End or Pure
Reason" (A804-AS19).
I. What can 1 know?
2. What ought I 10 do?
3. What may I hope?
Oddly, Kant tells the reader Ihat the fint question is merely
speculative and the second question is purely practical. However, he
takes !he third question to be practical, theoretical, and speculative.
He fint rephrases Ihe third question to give it a condition, "If I do
what I ought to do, what may I then hope?" This ronditional
question about hope be proceeds 10 analyu. An honest reader is
bound to wonder aboutthc alternative, "If 1 do nol do w~t I ought
to do, or do precisely what I ought not; what may I hope?"
Naturally we are interested in both Kant's question and ours.
FiTS! we ate informed, as earlier mentioned, ll1at ", . . all hoping
is directed to happiDeM.., .." ThIUl Kant sugsests a basic parallel in
the logic behind each of tbe three questiolll.
I. In the theory of knowledge. we conclude that if something
happens then something exists.
2. In moral theory, we conclude ll1al if 50IIIething OOghllO happen
then it is pouible for il to happen.
3, In !he theory of nope, we ronclude Ihat if SOme<:lnc is worthy
of happiness then that person may hope to rec:cive happincss.
Kant prefers 10 phrase his question in a negative form, "If I
behave 50 as not to be unworthy of happiness. may I hope 10 be
happy?" Before responding 10 this several intervening steps au
required.
For any hope, in general,
4. If it i$ rational to hope for IoOmtthing, then that thing (or
situation) is pouible.
 Reasonable Hopi!

Kant'li qu~tion has a moral condition, and we need snme prelimi-

naries to reach it_ We fint apply the moral ronditionat, 2. above, to
the matter of having wonhines.s to be happy actually followed by a
proponional degree of happineu.
4A.. U relltionship (in which 'NOr\hineu. il; proportiomtl to
happines.s) OCIgJll to occur. then it am oecur (that is. it i~
possible).
S. If it i~ possible that a relationship will occur, then I nUl)' hopt!
Ihal it does OfXUr.
TIle/\, we reath a moral ronditional:
6. If I relationship between wonbineu and happiness <Jll&ill to
OfXUr, then I may Iwpe that it does occur.
~ntence 6 is I ronsequenl of 4A and 5, taken.as premises. 6 il; the
panicuJar oonc:ern of Kant, and of the present chaple r. We return
to it after a brief detour. We may wonder It this ~tage, Can there
be a oondu~ion that iii morally stronger than 61 Perhaps,
7. If Klmething oughl to occur, then I IIllJtlld hope for il.
Thi~ 7 presents an odd problem. Hope has dt!5ire as one of its
essential clements. Can it be held that an individual should have
some desire tha t the penon ~ not have? TIlere are a variety of
viCW5 in the literature on this. One oontributor, J . P. Day, holds thl!
-generally speaking. our oo~ de5ircs Ire not under our control .
. ..'" In this IIOphisticatcd anid e, Day speaks of cases in which one
mly bold that In individual should lUX have a particular desire for
50mething evil, and perhaps could have prevented himself or berself
from beOOtning the KIn of penon who Oocs have thai desire. "This
is ROt yet a full-blown Irgument for the view that there are desi res
that one ought to have. CtInsidering (7), there may be events Wt
ought to occur. but for whose occurrence my hope is vacuous.
Either they "'"ill occur or they will oot, and my hoping may be quite
irrelevant For another dass of events, my hope may be a decisive
pan of the production of the event. William J ames has explored this
al ternative in his well-known e!.Sa)', "The Will to Believe: al though
to be precise one wou ld have to relate belief, will, desire, a Rd hope.
I eanool leave the consideration of (7). eveR in this brief way.
witlloot rnentioniRg an tum pIe thai Kant mes in the Condusion of
2JO REASONABLE HO PE

his work on J U$tice. After a discussion of tbe prospects for perpetu-

al peace he says. ' We must. howeve r, act a! though perpetual pe ace
were a reality. which pe rhaps it is nol, by working for in establish
me nt ... ~ D if the realization of Ih~ goal of abolishing war were
always 10 remai n just a pious wish ... we h.,'c a duty 10 do 110. :'
Here Kant iD$isu on I position thai has the form of (7). There is
a hope. a "piou.5 wish: in which "''e do nol !\ave &rcal ronIiiknce,
but we have ", duty" 10 hope for il
A SliD more stringent result is to be ronsi~rcd, be fore we rt:lum
10 (6).
8. Ir somelhin& oupt to occur, then I mu.u n"C"<wriJy hope {OF il.
Il (~) were the case, moral exhorul!iGn would be UrulCees.saty; we
would have the hopes that we ought 10 have. Perhaps exhortation
would nol be completely UMCUSiaty. since we might have ambiva
lent hopes. those that we should have and a few that we shouldn't.
But there would be no ~ed 10 inspire us to have the nJh! or the
good objectS of hope. There fore, the significant qucstiolUi t(locem
(6) and (7).
H aw can Kant argue for (6) without destroying his Jl'05ilion
concerning lhe basis 01 morality? Happiness is 1101 sUppoKd 10 play
a role in delerminina morality, accordi", 10 !.he Groundwork of II~
Mf!laphysjCJ of M onili. The Groundworlc was published in 1785, and
the Cri~ of~ RI!<UOII, while it a~ared in 1781, had ils Krond
edition in 1787 with no change at all in the section on Hope that we
are dealing with. H(l'A.ever, this section w:u written before Kant's
dassie fonnulation of his position 00 the StalUS of the principle of
morality. We. do find some notions thaI look ra!.her slranae for Ihe
aUlhor of the Groundwork, panicularly the comment thaI moral laws
(plural here) 'connect a priori suitable conseque~ wilh their rules.,
and thus carry with them promi5e.5 and \hTe.a1$." Yel, "'"e are
looking at this scction not for Kant', final analysis of morality but for
his approach to the nature and usc of the hope-relation. And we
will ha~ 10 make. SOnIC changes in this before we leave. the. maner.
 231

A. Happine5.i Proponional 10 WorthilK:u

I return to his defense of (6). He has explained thai from the

standpoint of reason, happiness is not approved as a good except
when it is connected wilb wortbinCM 10 be happy_ Sud! worthineu
comes only from moral oondLICI. Now we have the question, Will
happineu be proportioned 10 morality? Kanl's respoll$e is this: In
a purely raliollili world. with rational bcinp themselves the authon
of everyone', well-being, il "can be con.;:eived as ncc:e5Sary .. : Ihal
happiness be proportioned 10 worthine!.S: Not only pouiblc. but
ne~essaryl This is held 10 be the IIer's,?!} result in a purely
rational world containing entities Ihal are ralional alone, and have
00 olber desires.. In the observable world, Kant makes no lIIeb
claim. Returning 10 tbe formal assumption of a purely rational
world. we see wbere Kant is \eadin&: "Morality, taken by iuelf. and
..itb it, tbe mere "'Mhi/'lal 10 be happy. is also far from being the
complete good. To make the good complete, he who bchll\'cs in
such a manner IIli DOl 10 be I.lnv.'On hy of happillHS mWl ~ tIbIl! 10
~ 111m hI! wiJJ panicipau in 11Oppinas" (my emphasis, ASI3).
Kant asks us to consider what distribution of happine:ss would be
made by a rational being "free {rom all private purposes, , ." (ASI3).
From the Slillldpoint of rell$On there is "00 limitation on happiness
uve mat which ariloCs from our own immoral conduct" (A814),
Therefore, a rational being would have ", , , happiness, , , in euct
proportion wilh .,' mol"ollity .. ." (A81 4). Presumably, it would be
II bener world if happiness were 50 proportioned than if it were DOL
T don't find that Kant argues (or Ihis 50 much as he repeats
several times 111:11 such II '.'orld would be lhe ralional preference,
Why? It is consistent wilh our prefereocc, but ill Ihal preference
rational or merely sentimenl:!" That it is possible to have h.appiness
proportioned on other grounds is established by the actual world,
We can imagine: II world in wbich the proportion is inverse. and yet
that would be a consistent world. From the standpoinl of an
(ambivalent) individual who desires both moral behavior and
happiness, it "'Quld be consistent .....illl rhl! individual'l dUlli goo1s if
happiness were proponioned to wonbineu. However. when Kant
232
232 REASONABLE HOPE
REASONABLE HOPE

asks us
asks us to
to think
think of
of the
the problem
problem from
from thethe view
view of,
of, "the
"the reason
reason that
that is
is
free from
free from all
all private
private purposes
purposes ...
. . ,If we
we need
need not
not pay
pay attention
attention to
to
ambivalent desire.
ambivalent desire. We
We are
are to
to consider
consider merely
merely consistency
consistency with
with the
the
commands of
commands of morality.
morality.

B. Ontological
B. Ontological Proof
Proof of
of the
the Rational
Rational Proportion
Proportion

Ironic that
Ironic that the
the victor
victor over
over thethe ontological
ontological proof
proof of of the
the existence
existence
of God
of God^ should
lO
should himself
himself take
take aa similar
similar path
path when
when choosing
choosing between
between
candidates for
candidates for the
the most
most rational
rational of of all
all possible
possible worlds.
worlds. Kant Kant doesn't
doesn't
raise the
raise the question
question in in precisely
precisely thisthis way,
way, butbut he he suggests
suggests it it in
in the the
mind of
mind of his
his reader.
reader. Let Let usus construct
construct it. it.
Imagine aa perfectly
Imagine perfectly rational
rational world.
world. If If the
the beings
beings in in that
that world
world did did
not receive
not receive happiness
happiness in in proportion
proportion to to worthiness,
worthiness, one one could
could
immediately imagine
immediately imagine aa more more perfect
perfect rational
rational world
world in in which
which the the
inhabitants did
inhabitants did receive
receive happiness
happiness proportional
proportional to to worthiness.
worthiness.
Therefore, in
Therefore, in the
the most
most perfect
perfect (most
(most complete)
complete) rational
rational world,
world, the the
magic proportion
magic proportion wouldwould take
take place.
place.
Kant quickly distinguishes
Kant quickly distinguishes between
between this this world,
world, which
which is is n . . an
an
intelligible world
intelligible world only,
only, ...
. . " and
and thethe "sensible
"sensible world"
world" in in which
which therethere
is "no
is "no promise that any
promise that any such
such systematic
systematic unityunity ofof ends
ends cancan arise
arise from
from
the nature
the nature of of things"
things" (A814).
(A814). However,
However, he he insists
insists that
that under
under the the
commands of
commands of morality
morality we we are
are obliged
obliged to to place
place ourselves
ourselves in in such
such an an
intelligible
intelligible world.
world. If If we
we were
were obliged,
obliged, then
then that
that isis the
the should
should of (7).
of (7).
That
That would
would also
also be
be the
the basis
basis for
for the
the "must"
"must" in in his
his key
key sentence,
sentence, "To "To
make
make thethe good
good complete,
complete, he he who
who behaves
behaves in in such
such aa manner
manner as as notnot
to
to be
be unworthy
unworthy of of happiness
happiness must must be be able
able toto hope
hope that that hehe willwill
participate
participate in in happiness" (A813).
happiness" (A813).

C.
C. Limitations
Limitations on
on Rational Hope
Rational Hope

On
On the
the basis
basis of
of Kant's
Kant's own
own position,
position, there
there are
are several
several flaws
flaws in
in the
the
argument
argument above.
above. First,
First, the
the rational
rational beings
beings in
in that
that rational
rational world
world
provide
provide usus with
with no
no basis
basis for
for understanding
understanding thethe notion
notion of of happiness.
happiness.
What
What isis happiness
happiness for
for aa rational
rational being?
being? WeWe might
might respond
respond to to Kant
Kant
on
on the
the model
model that
that he
he used
used toto comment
comment on on Plato:
Plato: ".... . itit is
is therefore
therefore
 233

quile rational to mainllln, as Plato does, IMI in a perfect SUle no

punishme nts wha~r would be required" (AlI7). Similarly, in a
perfeetly rational world, no rewards are requ ired; the question of
happinea Illperfluous 10 purdy rational belnp. Sceond. even if
we are coneemed witb bolh morality and happineu in ~na:
rational world; we mi&ht muimi!e nm if we separated lheir
recipients.. Thlrd. we mldl! dlJtinpmh between collective and
diwibutiYe propertict. as Kanl does in 1m analysis 0( history:
rationalily and morality mi,l" then IUrn OUI to be properties of
coIlectiYe entilia nuber than individ"ll. TMn, one mi&hl h_
ha$is for (6) and (7). Yet il would DOt be. buis for the indMdual',
hope for hit or ber own COIII()IWI(e bet'fteD wonhineu and
happi-. but for the hope for. eonsonanc:e be~en IWO P"operues
or lOtial croup. And. fOllrth, the ~ of happine55 or rather
retnootion in "the mmp\ele &ood" (ASU) b; rar from dear. A nf
exo.Irsioo inlo the matter may be of use..
If we are eonsldering purely n lional belnp. it Is nOI at all dear
what is meant by happine .. beyond tbe achievement of consistency.
U we are dealina 'lll'ith human beinp., es,sentlally ambivalent beings.
C'OTIlbination of rational and animal, one may have. DOlion of
retributive just!ee, However, the IIlOYC from retributive justice for
human beings in the world 01 Clperien.ce to retriblllive justice for
I1It;ol\l,l beinp In rltion. 1 world [5 .n utl1loTC1inary jump. II
IUItIS equivaJent 10 the jump that Kanl so often WImli apiTlSt:
usin& tategone. d experience 10 .pply ouuide of experience. H
morality rc:quire5 that we COfWl'l/CI 11I000.J world. we havoe 10
know _raJ p.rllmeten before we can earry ou t that task.. What
are the IllfUreI of the memben of WI world? What II 10 be \be
history of thai world? If we CIQ only mention but not comtruc:t
imaps olli1e memben, we Qllnot have dear conception of \heir
hopei. Hwe eat! mention but no! construet. Kbe:ma for the history
of RId! world. we, apin. (III have no conoeption of hope for
I.ll)'\hiIIa within lila! world. A world without. bistory ",ems empty,
and nrk rrI work! IUms 10 haV'C DO histOl)'. 1lIerefore. we CIQ
make Kbe:ma of definitiom and names. but nol .ll:I imlJe of
 1I!l11qo 01 (II) ul Iu~amw
~ ~lId;J 01 pw '::I)fIO[ U) ;~syw II DIU] [IIIJ 01 Am S! 11 ;J;H
.~,

-lddl!1(lln ~;;)aJ Plnoq' ;tIO 'w.ItJlddellun )o ,(quo.ooI S! ;vo JI 'II

ft p;lflS;J ;q.<rw (01)
'oS '~!ddt!\jUll;w-et ;111 s~p()Jd A[qmms;.Id ~!IJU! 1~ ~
;Ifl ; ....11 o~ -W;Ujdduqllll JO AquOM :IUD S~IIW ;HU!J3 ' 11wwOO o~
'u(KJ;d 1111(1
uo P;P!UIJ! ;q PlOOIIs ~ ;ures ;ql ';w!J3 I SlJ1lIW03 ;00 JI '01
'OS ';IUJ.O' P;[110 ;q AI!'W
.'P!tJU! no.{ l'lfl U"'; p;.u;5;plln. uy ,,: ' - 'lu;Wll51und JO nJlf;p
put PUP. ;1(1 "1Pe ;U!WJ;I;p UI!:) (f1/IO!(l'1 mfJ lI1l!1nq!-mJ JO Mr]
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;UO;HUO'S uo P!UUI no); 111111 '1"; ~;s;pun.we '''r!ulPJoo;,y -1;1fl0
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318YNOSV3~
3dOH
'"
 Reasonable Hope
Reasonable Hope 235
235

12. If
12. If one
one isis unworthy
unworthy (of (of happiness)
happiness) one one should
should receive
receive unhappi-
unhappi-
ness.
ness.
Now, by
Now, by the
the law
law of of transposition,
transposition, this this isis equivalent
equivalent to to
13. If
13. If one
one should
should not not receive
receive unhappiness,
unhappiness, one one is is not
not unworthy.
unworthy.
Do we
Do we havehave aa warrant
warrant for for removing
removing the the double
double negatives
negatives on on each
each
side of
side of the
the connective
connective in in (13)?
(13)? OnlyOnly in in aa strictly
strictly two-valued
two-valued universe
universe
for happiness
for happiness and and worthiness.
worthiness. If If there
there werewere no no third
third alternative
alternative
between happiness
between happiness and and unhappiness,
unhappiness, and and between
between worthiness
worthiness and and
unworthiness, we
unworthiness, we would
would havehave
14. If
14. If one
one should
should be be happy,
happy, then then oneone is is worthy.
worthy.
However, even
However, even (14)(14) does
does not not give
give us us
15. If
15. If one
one is is worthy,
worthy, one one should
should be be happy.
happy.
To derive
To derive (15)(15) from
from (10)
(10) requires
requires aa two-valued
two-valued universeuniverse for for should
should
and two
and two errors
errors in in logic.
logic. Neither
Neither is is recommended.
recommended. Between Between "should"should
be happy,"
be happy," and and "should
"should not not be be happy,"
happy," lies lies the
the alternative
alternative of of aa
situation in
situation in which
which neither
neither moral
moral imperative
imperative applies.
applies. The The moves
moves from from
11 to
11 to 12,
12, and
and from
from (14)
(14) to to (15)
(15) cannot
cannot be be made
made by logic alone.
by logic alone.
While (10)
While (10) oror (11)
(11) does
does not not allow
allow us us to to derive
derive (15),
(15), itit gives
gives us us an
an
analogy that
analogy that has some force.
has some force. Now Now it it is
is time
time to to locate
locate that
that force.
force. It It
is the
is the force
force of of aa pair
pair of of tautologies!
tautologies! The The antecedent
antecedent in (11), the
in (11), the
notion of
notion of being worthy of
being worthy of unhappiness,
unhappiness, contains contains the the consequent
consequent of of
(11) within
(11) within it. it. As As II understand
understand it, it, the
the should
should of of the
the consequent
consequent is is
contained in
contained in the
the worthy
worthy of of the antecedent. Likewise
the antecedent. Likewise in in (15),
(15), thethe
worthy
worthy conception
conception of of the antecedent contains
the antecedent contains the the notion
notion of of should
should of of
the
the consequent
consequent of of that sentence,
that sentence.
16. Things
16. Things that that are
are worthy
worthy and and therefore
therefore shouldshould happen
happen are things
are things
that
that should happen.
should happen.
In
In the
the course
course of of his
his analysis
analysis Kant Kant seemsseems to to recognize
recognize that that he he is
is
arguing
arguing for for aa tautology,
tautology, because
because he he changes
changes from from worthy
worthy of happi-
of happi-
ness
ness toto not
not unworthy
unworthy of of happiness.
happiness. But, But, this
this still
still leaves
leaves us us with
with thethe
third
third alternative
alternative pointed
pointed out above.
out above.
There
There is is another
another serious
serious problem
problem to to bebe looked
looked at at in
in this matter.
this matter.
The
The case
case for for retribution
retribution in in the
the book
book on on Justice
Justice is is argued
argued in in terms
terms of of
the
the relative
relative treatment
treatment of of the
the criminal,
criminal, treatment
treatment relative
relative to to others
others
of
of different
different class,
class, or or to
to those
those who who havehave beenbeen harmed.
harmed. Our OUf state
state ofof
unhappiness
unhappiness depends depends on on comparison
comparison with with the the condition
condition of of others
others in in
236 REASONABLE HOPE
REASONABLE HOPE

our social universe. Now, in the case of the hope for happiness in
a perfectly rational world, there is no obvious basis for comparison comparison
between the
between the individuals
individuals to to determine
determine the the degree
degree of happiness.
of happiness.
Given two
Given two rational
rational beings,
beings, on on what
what basis basis may may they compare
they compare
themselves with
themselves with eacheach other
other to to determine
determine their their relative state of
relative state of
happiness? If
happiness? If such
such comparisons
comparisons cannot cannot be be made,
made, we we have
have no no
conception of
conception of their
their relative
relative happiness.
happiness.
Another difficulty may be raised in terms of of the way Kant gives
us the problem.
us the problem. What What principle
principle wouldwould we we useuse if if we
we put ourselves,
put ourselves,
"in the place
"in the place ofof aa being
being that
that had
had to to distribute
distribute all all happiness
happiness to others"
to others"
(A813). To
(A813). To answer
answer thisthis we
we have
have to to know whether aa finite
know whether finite or
or infinite
infinite
amount of
amount of happiness
happiness is is to
to bebe distributed.
distributed. If If there
there is is aa shortage
shortage of of
the commodity,
the commodity, we we would
would be be impressed
impressed by by the "worthiness" of
the "worthiness" of the
the
consumers. If
consumers. If no
no shortage,
shortage, or or ifif no one's happiness were
no one'shappiness were affected
affected by by
the happiness
the happiness of of anyone
anyone else,
else, whywhy not simply maximize
not simply everyone's
maximize everyone's
happiness? Why
happiness? Why punish anyone in
punish anyone in aa rational
rational world?
world? After all, Kant
After all, Kant
has said,
has said, "That
"That aa general
general amnesty
amnesty shouldshould be be included
included in in aa peace
peace
treaty is
treaty is already
already implied
implied in in thethe concept
concept of of the
the latter."^ However,
latter."u However,
death is
death is not
not aa peace
peace treaty.
treaty.
On the
On the matter
matter of of punishment,
punishment, Kant's Kant's sustained
sustained argument
argument is that
is that
"The law concerning punishment
"Tbe punishment is a categorical imperative .. . . :113
and is
and is not
not to
to bebe handled
handled in in terms
terms of of utility
utility to
to the
the individual
individual or or the
the
community. This
community. ,;
This means that the
means that the relation
relation between
between worthiness
worthiness and and
punishment is
punishment is understood
understood to to bebe specified
specified by by thethe nature
nature of of those
those
maxims or
maxims or principles
principles that
that could
could be be thought
thought of of asas operating universal-
operating universal-
ly. If
ly. If crimes
crimes werewere not not punished,
punished, the the resulting
resulting inconsistency
inconsistency in in
behavior would
behavior would failfail the
the test
test ofof universality.
universality. Even Even if if we
we accepted
accepted thisthis
line of
line of reasoning,
reasoning, wouldwould it it require
require thatthat aa rational
rational world distribute
world distribute
worthiness and
.worthiness and happiness
happiness as as itit distributes
distributes worthiness
worthiness and and punishment
punishment
(unhappiness)??
(unhappiness)
Can aa rational
Can rational mindmind distribute
distribute happiness
happiness on on aa consistent basis
consistent basis
without taking
without taking worthiness
worthiness intointo account?
account? Certainly.
Certainly. One distribution
One distribution
might be
might proportional to
be proportional to weight,
weight, another
another might might be inversely
be inversely
proportional to
proportional to weight.
weight. Or, Or, considering
considering worthiness,
worthiness, aa consistent
consistent (if (if
perverse) mind
perverse) mind might
might distribute
distribute happiness
happiness inversely
inversely proportional
proportional to to
worthiness. Each
worthiness. Each of of these
these patterns
patterns wouldwould be be capable
capable of being
of being
 231

carried OUI oorWstently. Suppose tbe rational mind Ihal makH tbe
disuibution must iuel( be included amona the individuals who are
50 treated. A purely rational mind. caring only for consistency,
might still make the distribution inversely as the wonhinca of the
individuals. Rc5pCct for the moral law is independent of any such
eonsequence5 as the ultimate distribution of happiness.
The a~ 50 far has centered on Kant's claim thaI the
connection between wonhineu and lhe proponion or happillCU was
M:CUSity for a ralional world. Howe~r, Kant may have oycrnalcd
the need of a necelSar)' connection for a ralional world. Even if the
desired proponion is nol a neceuary properly of a rational distribu
tion, il is apoDib~ property. It is po5Sible in the sense Ihal it is not
self-contradictory. and in the 50eMe thaI we can construct a detailed
scheme for the distribution based on devce of worthiness. Doe5
this pouibility requi re a God, "50Jc, alJ-perfeet, and rational
primordial being" (AS! 4) to guarantee the ]1055ibilily? Not II all.
since we require not me necessity, but merdy the p<K<ibilily of the
ideal diInDtJlion of happiness. If it is possible, then it is a legiti-
mate hope: it would not be a proper objen of hope if ;1 were

If our reconsuuction (!iOftening1) of Kant's position is acceptable,

we have reached a significant rewlt. The aMUmption of God's
existence is DOt a requirement for rational hope in the unr.erse.
Yel, if the rational hope is to sWKI on ils own., it still has to ~tWy
the consequent of (4). Thc:re must be the assumption that what is
hoped for is possible. However, tbe bare assumption 01 I/~
passib;1ily of a rational scbema in the universe makes a rather
minimal notion of "God."

E. The Retribution Antinomy

The discussion above has centered Illriely on the antecedent in

(4A) and (6). the assertion mat happineu should be proportional to
wonhineu. We may pul the matter in the form of an antinomy.
238 REASONABLE HOPE

m E RETRIS urION AI'\'T1NOM\,

Thesis Arllilht sll

Won hiness 10 be happy There iii no purely rational

should, flltiona.lly, result in a basis 10 have wonhineu to be
proportional degree of happi- happy re5IIil in a proponional
~. degree of happiness.

Kant holds that the Thesis is obvio\lJ,1y the rational choice, thaI '.:e
"cannot judge Otbenr.1!.e" (AS]J). Suppose that we arc equally
attracted by the Antithesis. Following the pragmatic recommenda-
tion of the previQuli chapter, we uc 10 ask about the status of the
question to which these opposed pmitiOIlS are answen.
Wbat is the question? It is: From the standpoint of rcason alone,
is !here basis for preferring a proportional relation between
wonhineu 10 be happy and happiness? This very question bas
implicit lISSumplion$ thai need not be accepted. RCa50n alone is a
concern for oonsistency, bul reason does not choo5.e the rules 10 be
put into the consistent SCL Where more than onc collection of rules
makes a collSistent set, reason has no decision principle. 'The
categorical imperative does DOt make a claim for or agaill$t the
Thelis here. We are dealing with the respoMe$ to a question about
the preference of reason alone. If reuon h:u no prefere nce, we may
apparently choose whateve r position we wish without fcar of rational
contradiction. If no e;cperience can e",, ' confirm or rcfute us, and
no rational :t1JlIment is decis)"" on either side, we are free to adopt
whichever alternatilfe we prefer 00 independent grounds.

F. Active and Passilfe Moral SubjeCtS

Kant's position can be summarized by an lIfiUment that staru with

the tautology,
( I ) If one is \O'onhy of happine!i$. then one ought to obtain
happiness.
 Reasonable Hope
Reasonable Hope 239
239

Since the
Since the concept
concept worthy
worthy contains
contains ought,
ought, (1)(1) is
is beyond
beyond objection.
objection.
Then,
Then,
(2) If
(2) If one
one ought
ought to to obtain
obtain happiness,
happiness, then then one
one can
can obtain
obtain it.
it.
(3) If
(3) If one
one can
can obtain
obtain happiness,
happiness, then then oneone can
can hope
hope to to obtain
obtain it. it.
Therefore, from
Therefore, from (1),
(1), (2),
(2), and
and (3),
(3), it
it follows
follows that
that
(4) If
(4) If one
one isis worthy
worthy of of happiness,
happiness, thenthen oneone can
can hope
hope to to obtain
obtain it. it.
In the
In the argument
argument above,
above, (1)(1) is
is aa tautology,
tautology, and and (3)
(3) seems
seems perfectly
perfectly
reasonable in
reasonable in terms
terms of of the
the definition
definition of of hope
hope that
that wewe have
have beenbeen
assuming.
assumIng.
Now, (2)
Now, (2) raises
raises aa different
different sort
sort ofof problem.
problem. On On thethe face
face of
of it,
it, (2)
(2)
is merely
is merely aa restatement
restatement of of Kant's
Kant's familiar
familiar thesis
thesis that
that ought
ought implies
implies
can. However,
can. However, an an equivocation
equivocation in in (2)
(2) goes
goes beyond
beyond the the familiar
familiar
thesis. The
thesis. The proposition,
proposition, thatthat ought
ought implies
implies can,
can, is
is given
given toto us
us in
in the
the
form in
form in which
which thethe same
same individual
individual who who has has the
the moral
moral obligation
obligation is is
the individual
the individual who
who can can perform
perform the the action.
action. The The oneone who
who ought
ought is is
the one who
the one who can.
can. After
After one
one of
of his
his examples,
examples, Kant Kant tells
tells us that the
us that the
individual involved
individual involved "judges,
"judges, therefore,
therefore, that that hehe can
can do do something
something
because he
because he knows
knows that that he
he ought,
ought, andand he he recognizes
recognizes thatthat he is free.
he is free.
1.14
,,14

In the
In the ordinary
ordinary example,
example, KantKant has
has argued
argued that
that the
the same individual
same individual
who is
who obligated to
is obligated to do
do something
something is is the
the one
one who
who cancan do
do it. Now,
it. Now,
returning
returning to (2), the
to (2), antecedent makes
the antecedent makes an an individual
individual the proper
the proper
recipient
recipient ofof happiness.
happiness. If If happiness
happiness ought
ought toto be
be given
given to someone,
to someone,
the obligation
the obHgation to to give
give itit does
does not
not rest
rest on
on that
that individual.
individual. WhereWhere
does
does itit rest?
rest? Let Let usus construct
construct aa response.
response. First,
First, (2)
(2) is
is far
far from
from
obvious
obvious as as itit stands.
stands. TheThe individual
individual inin the
the consequent
consequent is is not the
not the
moral
moral actor
actor in in the
the antecedent.
antecedent, Who Who is is the
the moral
moral actor?
actor? As As (2)
(2) is
is
phrased,
phrased, we we do do not
not know
know whether
whether thethe moral
moral actor
actor is
is to
to bebe anan
individual,
individual; the the universe
universe as as aa whole,
whole, or
or something
something between
between these
these two.
two.
The
The situation
situation does does require
require aa distinction
distinction between
between moral
moral actor
actor andand
object.
object.
(2A)
(2A) lIfi xx ought
ought to to give
give something
something to to 6,
b, thenx
then x can
can give
give that
that to b.
to b.
(2B)
(2B) If If bb ought
ought to to receive
receive something
something from
from x,
x, then
then bb can
can receive
receive itit
from
from X. x.
(2C)
(2C) If If bb ought
ought to to receive
receive something
something from
from x,
x, then
then bb will
will receive
receive itit
from
from X. x.
,<0 REASONABLE HOPE

Before .....e consider the proper subslilUlioo for x in these three

oondilionatl, we have \0 deal wilh their force. (lA) is a lraightfor-
ward mbstiflilion in Kant ', formula !hal ought implies can.
However, it merely leaves us with the conclusion thaI if IoOmc emity.
x, has an obligation, then this entity has the p!:lMibility of 5(1 actin&,.
If there is 110 such emity as ~ then (2A) is vacuous.
But (28) gives us a different situalion. Perhaps we have $Orne
rcilSOll for holding thaI b ought to receive something; this doe$ not
by itself carry with it the implication thaI b can be the recipient.
Suppose that a bas an obliplion 10 send a mes",c 10 h, and does
so. In this cue, the mo",] actor is a , and this actor may carry OUI
the action even if b does not receive the message. Suppose that b
dies during a 's action. Then, a carried CM the obligation. sent the
message, but b, being dead, did 1101 have the possibility of receiving
it. The obligation falls on the actor, 001 the recipient. 11 is the
actor who mU51 have the possibility,""bo can do what the obligatioo
aIls [or. However, the &II''C.... o[ even the best intentioned action
is quite another maller, and oot to be deduced from the nature of
obligation. So. the antecedent io (28) is an alternative formulation
of. 'x OII&11t to give liOmething to b: an obligation of z but oot a
basis for implying the CCIIUequent in (28). If (28) does not hold up.
as we have seen, (2C) has mucll leu of a claim for 5UppoM.
Has the eounter-e.u.mple of the message destroyed the force of
(2B)? Separate the assumption that can be made by the actor, z.
and the knowledge of an outside observer. A1tbaugh an observer
lIllIIy mow that the intended recipient of the meaage ba.s died, and
50 the observer may find that !be obliptkln [0 send the OIC'!l5age no
longe r holds from his or her basis of information, it is quile
otherwise with z. For z. the obligation does bold only if it is
pos:o;ible: we may !lay that z thought that he or she was obliged. but
really no longer was so. As long a5 there is an obligation, there has
to be the po$5ibility of c:anying 011\ that obligation. But the
obligation is matter of intent and not of consequence. for Kant.
Therefore, z must act on the basis of the intention that morality
requires, tnu the .JI'crn\ lire ~ences, depmd Off lire IflWJ of
tulIUtt! IIOt morality.
 So: .t may nope: to carry ou t a moral obligation, and it must be
possible for.t, or else we have Ioit the meaning of obligation, but the
obligation consists in acting consistently with II certain intention. If
one ought to do something. perhaps to send a message to b. then it
must be po$Sible to send weh a meMllge: bu t b is not obliged to be
alive and well enough to read weh a message. To accept this result
is to deny (2C). Are we also forced to deny (2 B)? That depcnd5 on
the sense of "ean,' on the meaning of possibility, involved in (2B).
We may take (2B) to be equivalent to
(20) If b ought to recei.'C someth ing from x. then it D possible for
b to receive it from x.
In out eb.:lpter on the Logic of Hope, we found that Kant refused to
vant the S!.;ltUS of possibility to mere definitional coru;istency.
Following the tradition, he distinguishe5 between formal Dr logical
poiSibilil)', and "rear possibilil)'. For the second. "real poloSibilil)'."
one bas to be able to imagi ne or construCt a map of an experience.
Where "po5sibJe' mea ns "possible experience." (2D) becomes
(2E) If b ought to receive something from.t, tben it is a possible
experience for b 10 receive it.
We have reduced the problem to twO questions. First, what arc
tbe pa.ramc:len of the x in (2E)? Second, is receiving the gift a
possible experience? In the conte~t of Kant's use. thex is sometimes
(a) II rational unive~ (ASIl). (b) a universe that contains "Ihe
supreme good" (A814), (c) a moral R uler of the world." These arc
hardly synonyms. However, in each ease it ;s nol lhe knowledge of
the entity.t, but !be I'Iopc thaI such an entil)' exists, that is Ihe
conclusion of Kant's analysis.. Such an entity as may be wbstiluled
for x in (2E) is Ihe object of second-order 1'Iopc. Ute the object of
a ny seoond-order hope, il may be mentioned bul nol U$Cd 10 refer.
If reason neithe r requires nor forbids its mention. the choice may be
made freely. pmuided t/~ limitatioru 0/ men mention an carrfully
=-"'.
The second question following (2E) iii the mailer of the ability to
receive the gifl of happiness, the oonsequent of the sentence. If the
lUbject, b. is a possible individual who may have expe:rie~ then
we can map or oonstruct a situation in ..... hich that person receives
 REASONABLE HOPE

the experience of particular gift. If the subject i$ DOt a pos5ible

individual in Kant', ntd nther than merely logical sense, the
question is empty. A "soul" defined merely IS a logic:al entity would
IlOl qualify for such an experience. Apparently, we can understand
happine.u only in tbe context of living beings. who have desires in
the real sense. So, wbere "happiness is the ytisfaction of all our
desires" (A806/ B834), the hope of happine.s.s i$ the hope for a
pos5ible experience.

G. Conclusion

Rational hope$ rail into two varietiu. There are those that may
be merely mentioned, but oot constructed IS thooght, and those that
may be both mentioned and also thought. Both varieties have
practical ronsequeZlCt$. Hopes that may be stated hut are not
possible uperie/ICCs arc It ill mailers of moral interest, but are quite
different from hope$ for poiWble experienca. If this analY$is of
hope Is no! in error, Kant has failed to provide a moral basis for the
postulate of Goo's existence.
What has happened Ulthe statUS of the central assertion Involving
hope, the assertion that one ...110 is not unworthy may hope for a
proportional degree of happiness? We found that this cannot be
understood as a first-order hope (or a possible experience. It can be
asserted as a second-order hope. II can be m~lIlioned /U a I~ thai
IIIe Iwpe of a raJiontd ~ is ,,'C/f./owu;kd. Unfortunately. tbe
term "happiness ha:i no reference in this COntext.

1. Hope lOr Mysterious Alislsca nce In Moral Effon

The discussion in Ih is chapter 10 rar has been concerned with the

hope of happinH$ as a consequence of worthiness 10 be happy. ThaI
is the qu estion pre!lented in the first Critique. In the Rdigiol!, tbe
main problem is formulated in ternu of the hope of ITI)'Steri0u5
assistance in beroming a beller person if one is worthy of SIKh
assistance . 'The objcrt of hope is now somethinil quite different.
Kant fails 10 be pcrsUllliive about a rational world providing
 RmJOtIOble H~
'"
happiness in due proportion 10 worthil\e5li 10 be happy. lewis While
Beck also takes Kanl 10 have failed on this. '1lIe truth of the
mallcr is that the concept of the highest good ... is nol imponaOl
in Kant'S philosophy for any practical consequcl\(C$ it might have .
. . :" But. although lbe form of Ihe queuion is similar, the object
is now quite different. There is one preliminary bul essential hope.
(I) People must be able to Iwpt through their 01<0"" efforts to
become beller human beinp. "
SUppose one makes KnOUS ~ of all personal powen to become
morally beller, but the5C powers are not enough. If the hope in (I)
fails. is there any other? Kant's amwer is
(2) Only when, person hal; done "lIS much as lies in his power to
berome a better man .. . can he hope Ihal whal is not "" ilhin
his power will be supplied through cooperation from above:"
There is a KnOllS presupposition to the: hope in (2 ). How do we
know whether we have done enough to !atisfy the requiremcnt of
doing as much as lies in OIIr power? Perhap5 if we wonder about it.
we have not done enoogh. If " 'e have done all thaI we po5Sibly can
do, why do we need hope offunher assistance? In (1) Kant makes
clellI Ihat people may havc a proper hope: thiU their own drom can
do the job of makillg moral progrea If this is so, then (2) 'NOII ld
Krve 10 undercul the hope in ( I). Kant illSists thaI the machinery
of the "coope ration from above: or Ihe iIlpernaturalassistance is oot
and CUlUlat be a matter of knowledge. We regularly find him
memionillg "God's assistance ( ... hate\er this rn.ay be):" Supernatural
action is unknowoble. Hg.,.cver, on the basis of the qualification in
(2), it can be hoped for withoot being understood.
When s.omething is not understood but is !;till a mailer of hope.
it can only be a 5Ccond-order hope, as our "hapters on the Logic of
Hope havc presenled the mailer. Therefore it is hope that may
be mentioned but no! understood. What is Ihe poinl of such a
hope? What value can it ha"'e without understanding?
11Ie problem of confidence in one's moral disposition strikes Kant
as a mailer of great importance. "If a man lacked all confidence in
his moral dispos.ition, ooce it was acquired, he woutd IoCarcely be
able to persevere steadfastly in iL" How dots one a:ain JUSt the
 REASONABLE HOPE

right amount of ronfideo~, without the dangers of exaggeration,

since. "man is never more easily de~ived than in " 'hat promotC$ his
good opinion of hims.elf."" The solution 10 this problem rons;slI in
"comparing the (OlIne of his lile hitherto with the resolution which
he has adopted ....
Suppose that one gOC$ O\rer the hiuol)' of one's life and finds a
'steady improvement." The individllal "can still only COfIj~ (rom
!.his that Ihe re has been a f1.Uldamental improvement in the essential
inner dispmition. Yet !.he pelloOn has reasonable grounds for hope
as well..... In this ease Ihe individual's hope is for an object of
experience: lUch a pelloOn can hope that the imprO\rement conti nile
"with ever-increasing courage." This is a reasonahle hope: one
hopes that improvement continue to increase, a pattern that has
already been experienced in the individllal's histol)'_ HOI>'Cver. Ihi5
rC<l'J ires IWJ more Ihan the hope in ( I). But Kant continues., "Nay.
more: jf after this life another life awaill him, he may hope: to
continue to fol low this coune still-though to aU appearances under
other conditioru.-in acrordaoce with the vel)' same prlneiple. and to
approacb eve r nearer to, thougb he can never reaeb. the goal of
perfection..... This is also called a reasonable hope. because "DO the
5trength of what he has ob$erved in hims.elf up to the present, he
can look upon his dispmition as radically improved," This i5 a multi-
hypothetical situation: if another life awaill the individual, and if tbe
previous history is a bul, for prediction, lUch a person can have
some confidence in a future pattern. This 5till does nol require Ihe
second...",der hope of (2).
Kant does compare the individllal who has made a moral record
of progl'CS$ with another "who is ever falling hack into evil." Such
an individllal "can entertain 00 reasonable hope that he would
conduct himself better " 'ere he to go on living here on carth, or
even were a future life awaiting him .. _ ..... This pelloOn "w<:Iuld have
to regard the corruption as rooted in his vel)' dispmition_ .... Both
case$, the reasonable hope and the lack of reasonable hope, are
based on the assumption that the future experience will be like the
past. Still no need for more than the hope of ( 1)_ 11Iese twO
individlla!s arc offered as hypothetical examples: that Kant thinks
 Reasonable Hope
Reasonable Hope 245
245

that people
that people existexist whowho do do make
make moral
moral progress
progress isis not not atat all
all obvious.
obvious.
The point
The point that
that KantKant stresses
stresses isis that
that thethe individual
individual who who does
does not not
make all
make all the
the efforts
efforts that that personally
personally can can be be made
made to to be
be aa better
better
person has
person has nono reasonable
reasonable basis basis for
for hope
hope of of outside
outside assistance.
assistance. Why Why
not? Because
not? Because such such aa person
person wouldwould havehave to to hope
hope that that the
the grace
grace thatthat
granted assistance
granted assistance had had no no concern
concern withwith thethe past:
past: that that person
person would
would
hope that
hope that the
the consistency
consistency of of aa retribution
retribution principle
principle might might bebe broken
broken
for his
for his or
or her
her advantage.
advantage.
Suppose we
Suppose we agreed
agreed with with Kant
Kant that that we we cannot
cannot hope hope for for an an
inconsistent universe.
inconsistent universe. Can Can we we hope
hope that
that not
not the
the whole
whole history
history of of the
the
universe, but
universe, but just
just the the future
future be be consistent?
consistent? Can Can we we hope
hope that,that,
despite the
despite the apparent
apparent inconsistency,
inconsistency, some some divine
divine grace grace will
will ignore
ignore
retribution, or
retribution, or replace
replace it it by
by love?
love? (Perhaps
(Perhaps Kant's Kant's God God is is more
more
Hebrew than
Hebrew than Christian.)
Christian.) We We cancan saysay that
that we we havehave suchsuch aa hope.
hope.
But, if
But, if we
we areare limited
limited to to reasonable
reasonable hope, hope, then
then the the schema
schema on on which
which
it is
it is based
based can can have
have only only consistent
consistent material.
material. A A schema
schema for for the
the
universe that
universe that allowed
allowed such such inconsistent
inconsistent principles
principles to to govern
govern wouldwould
not qualify
not qualify as as aa basis
basis for for aa reasonable
reasonable hope. hope.
Kant does
Kant consider the
does consider alternative of
the alternative of aa system
system of self-rewarding
of self-rewarding
morality
morality (in (in A810)
A8I0) but concludes, "It
but concludes, "It can
can be
be counted
counted upon upon only
only if if aa
Supreme
Supreme Reason,
Reason, that that governs
governs according
according to to moral
moral rule, rule, be likewise
be likewise
posited
posited as as underlying
underlying nature nature as as its
its cause."
cause." A A strange sentence,
strange sentence,
indeed,
indeed, forfor Kant.
Kant. First,First, we we dodo not
not require
require aa guarantee
guarantee that that "can
"can be be
counted
counted upon,"
upon," but but onlyonly aa basis
basis for
for hope.
hope. Hope Hope requires
requires aa possible
possible
goal,
goal, notnot something
something that that hashas the
the necessity
necessity of of aa basis
basis that
that cancan be be
counted
counted upon.
upon. If If itit can
can bebe relied
relied on,on, itit need
need notnot be be hoped
hoped for!
for! KantKant
says
says that
that the
the desired
desired distribution
distribution "is "is possible
possible only only in in the
the intelligible
intelligible
world,
world, under
under aa wisewise Author
Author and and Ruler."
Ruler." Is Is itit not
not also
also possible
possible by by
chance?
chance? The The hope
hope for for aa chance
chance distribution
distribution wouldwould satisfy
satisfy the
the moral
moral
requirements
requirements withoutwithout the the need
need forfor aa "posit"
"posit" of of aa wise
wise ruler.
ruler.
In
In the
the Critique
Critique of ofPractical
Practical Reason
Reason we we learn
learn thatthat morality
morality requires
requires
ignorance
ignorance of of the
the existence
existence of of God.
God. Knowledge
Knowledge would would be be calami-
calami-
tous.^^
toUS. On
27
On aa similar
similar basis,
basis, we we need
need no no necessary
necessary postulate
postulate to to assure
assure
the desired distribution;
the'desired distribution; since since moral
moral action
action isis to to be
be independent
independent of of
consequences,
consequences, the the hopehope for for aa chance
chance distribution
distribution isis enough.
enough. This This
 246
246 REASONABLE HOPE
REASONABLE HOPE

hope for
hope for chance
chance isis not
not to
to be
be separated
separated from from thethe fear
fear that
that chance
chance willwill
do no
do no such
such thing.
thing.
The discussion
The discussion in in the
the chapter
chapter has has soso far
far centered
centered on on the
the answer
answer
to the
to the third
third question
question in in the
the form
form thatthat Kant
Kant gavegave itit inin the
the first
first
Critique (and
Critique (and also
also inin the
the introduction
introduction to to his
his book
book on on Logic).
Logic). The The
question, "What
question, "What can can II hope?"
hope?" takes
takes thethe individual,
individual, the the I,/, to
to bebe the
the
subject of
subject of the
the hope
hope relation.
relation. As As wewe have
have seen,
seen, Kant
Kant distinguishes
distinguishes
sharply between
sharply between individuals
individuals andand humanity.
humanity. In In the
the Introduction
Introduction to to his
his
Logic aa fourth
Logic fourth question
question isis added
added to to the
the three
three of of the
the First
First Critique,
Critique,
4) What
4) What isis man?
man?
This is
This is followed
followed by by the
the comment
comment that that all
all four
four questions
questions are are parts
parts ofof
anthropology, "because
anthropology, "because the the first
first three
three questions
questions are are related
related to to the
the
last."^
last." 2S
Apparently we
Apparently we may
may raise
raise the
the question,
question, WhatWhat can can humanity
humanity
hope? In
hope? In terms
terms of of humanity's
humanity's collective
collective hopehope we we shall
shall find
find aa resolu-
resolu-
tion to
tion to the
the antinomy
antinomy of of retribution.
retribution.
Attention should
Attention should move
move from
from thethe individual
individual to to the
the social
social group,
group, in in
the analysis
the analysis of of rational
rational hope.
hope. However,
However, Kant Kant leaves
leaves thethe subject
subject of of
the individual
the individual with with aa challenge,
challenge, "... . , who,
who, indeed,
indeed, is is now
now the the
unbeliever?
unbeliever? Is it he
Is it he who
who trusts,
trusts, without
without knowing
knowing how how that
that for which
for which
he
he hopes
hopes will will come
come to to pass;
pass; oror he
he who
who absolutely
absolutely insists
insists on knowing
on knowing
the
the way
way in in which
which man man isis released
released fromfrom evilevil and,
and, ifif he
he cannot
cannot knowknow
this,
this, gives
gives up up all
all hope
hope ofof this
this release?"^^
release?"29 Hope Hope is is the
the measure
nteasure of of aa
religious
religious person.
person. This This hope
hope concerns
concerns whatwhat is is mysterious
mysterious ratherrather than
than
what
what is is unknowable.
unknowable. The The next
next chapter
chapter develops
develops thisthis distinction.
distinction.
 Nine

MYSTERY VERSUS
UNDECIDABILITY

I. 'The Dip lUl.loD Bet ween Mymry and Unknowablllty

This ehapler anaIyus lhe relalimWlip between Kant's COlIpI of

mystery (GeN!:imniJ) and his COlIpt of unkoo"'abilil)' (unnfor
JChJich, or unbq;rtiflich). EadJ ha$ a major role io bis system.
Fint we need to consider the general type!. of iJllOrance, then the
distinction between IU<! and mmtion, and finally the way Kant
employs the distinclion betweeo mystery and unknowability.
Earlier chapters have developed some of the logic of ignorance
relations: Section 1 of thi5 cbapter wil l deal witb featureli of the
individual'li personal context.

A. Four General Types of Ignorance

It is a commonplace that we may separate what is presently

iUIknoM7I from that which is said to be unkIIawabll!. This
distinguisbes accidenta! ignorance from eMentia! ignorance.
Having made this separation, some authors argue that there is no
essential ignorance, there are no unamll.erable qUe5tions. One
variel)' of positivism hel d that if a question seemed to he unan-
swerable, we were at fault for not sufficiently developing the
meaning of iLl In such cases, what we face "ate no questions at
alL"' For thi5 kind of positivism, then, there is accidental igno-
rance, but nOl essential ignorance. Withou t atguing for or against
the pos.itivist claim, and before giving an interpretation of Kant on
this, let us classify the apparent typeS of ignorance that are
po5iiihle. Perhaps philosophic powt:r may be measured. following
248 MYSTERY VERSUS UN DEODAB ILITY

Socrates' lead, by means of Ihe types of ignorruJcc of which the

philO5Ophcr i!. aware,
There ate fOlir types of ignorance: two are accidental, two arc
essentiaL
T)pe I Ipo ... D: Aceidcnw ignorance of fact. H cre we
cannot answer a question because of the accident of oot having
made cenain observations, or of not being able to make iOJnC
obscr.'ations that arc, in principle, capablc of being made. MorilZ
Schlick's examples of this arc: What did Plato do at eight o'clock
in !he morning of hi~ fifticlh birtbday? H ow much did Homcr
weigh whcn he WTOtc the fint line of the Iliad? and, b there a
piece of silver to be found on the nther side of thc moon, thrcc
incbes long and shaped like a fi~hr
Type 2 lenOnl Dce: Anolher variety of acddenw ignorance,
ignorance of law, For example, if somronc Imcrws Ihc actual
measurements of tile fcatures of mall)' righHrianJlln, but doeli oot
know the Pythagorean Theorem, sud! a person illustrates igno-
rance of law. To be aware of any type of ignorance, onc has to
be able to formulate Ihe pertinent queslion. H owever, il is
apparent that iOmeone may be ignorant either " 1th or without
awarencss of Ibat situation. (See Plalo, lhe early dialogues, for
clusica.l examples.)
T)pe 3 leno ... nce: Essential ignorance of thc purpose of lOme
mailer. Examples are cases where we know ..1wr happc:115, but 'lOt
" 'Iry il does. It is 001 held thai every qucstion of pUrpo$e is I
queslion of Ibis type. Many SIIeb questioll5 are questioll5 of fact,
and ,",'C mayor may OOt avoid Type I ignorance about the mailer.
But, in the special event thai we do know lhal somelhinJl happens,
but/or $D>"IC ~ muon cannot know why, "'C will dusify
tbi!. U Type 3 ignorance.
1)pe 4 IporaRce: &stntiaJ iJlnorance of consequences.
Enmplcs are OlSel where we know why something is \0 occur, but
'lOt ..'hUJ exactly it will be. Many questions of eonscquences are
matte rs of fact or law. and we mayor may not be able to avoid
Type 1 or Type 2 ignorance abol.1I them. Wc reservt: this foorth
 '"
type (or the ease in which, for $OnU! OIJIIUptuaJ n<lIOft, we cannot
answer the question.
We can ~mullaneously display more than one type of ignorance.
We might know oolher law nor fact in some maIler; we might
know neither intemion nor consequent in some case. BUI, 10 be
QwtU'I! of our ignorance, we have: 10 be able 10 ask the relevant

question, and the question presuppose.! features of the situation.

To ask how Plato spenl his fiftieth biobday is to assume that be
lived at leas! thal lnng. To ask a Type 2 question is to presuppose
lhll mere may be fized rclationdlip berween twO or more
variables.. For awareness of Type 3, aswme thalliOmethlllll occurs
in order to raise the question of " 'IIy. The converse holds for
Type 4: here we assume some intention before ...-e can II$k what
will catry 00\ IhU intention.
In sumnuuy, ~a::r or ii"Orance presupposes some kind of
knowledge in order 10 fonnulate the pertinent question, and what
is presuppclcd is knowledt:c of the correlative area. Awareness
of Type 1 liOOrance prcrupptJses some answer \0 the oolTcl.tive
Type 2 matter: a question about fact presuppc scs iOIDC answer
about law. And. the converse: the First Crit~ ruppons this
much. We cannot ask a question about malter of fact without
presupposing IoDme laws, call$lllity, etc. Similarly, to be aware of
igoorance of either Types 3 or 4 requires mat me subject matter
of the omer be presupposed,

B. 00 Use and Mention

We have already DOted that the name of a city can be us.ed and
can be mentioncd. lbc city itself can abo serve in the'IC .... a~ I I
can be us.ed in many ways, for cumplc. by Ihips looking for a
harbor, by tourists looking for ud tcmcnl, by airlinc pilots looking
for a familiar landmark, by lcgislators looking for taxes. Whilc
mention ~ems to OfXIlr usually by employing the name of
IoDmething in a statement, usc can OfXIlr either linguistically, or by
some activity that employs the identity in question. Let us
maintain this familiar and essential distinction betwee.n U!.e and
250 MYS'ffiRY VERSUS UNDEODAB IUfY

mention, but broaden the meaning of the terms. Take mention to

be not mcrely the activity of naming something. but the activity of
oommunicatinglmowledge of il Take using something to be not
merely a linguistic activity. but also nonlinguislic activities
(pragmatic) in which the entity may be employed. Along wilh
these broadened usages, notice thai somelhing may be (I) UKd
and memioned., (2) used but nOI mentioned, (3) not us.ed. but
mentioned, and (04) neither used nor mentioned.
lei us ~tum to the distinctions belween the third and fourth
kinds of iiDOf3J1Ce. In the third type, we know what happens hul
not why it does. This is a situation in ""hieb something can be
mmtioMd, but in at kim otU! g~ it cannot ~!/Md. To be able
10 mention something is to be able 10 oommunicate wilh respect
10 il If we Itnow what OCCUr5, we can mention and so oommuni-
cate Ihis. But, to the U1enl that we do nol know ..-hy it OCCUI"l,
tbe~ is some limitation on our ability 10 employ the cntity in
que.tion. For example, the la'" of gravitation can be both
mentioned and used. However, the purpo.JI! of the law of gravita-
tion can be memioned but not us.ed. To hold this view would be
10 hold thaI the purpose of lbe La", of Gravitation is something
about which we have the Third Type of Ignorance. Or, colloquial-
ly, it would be equivalent to saying that the purpose of Ihis law is
inscrutable 0.- IlJ\lmowable. To defend the view thai this is
unknowable one must show thai the COncepl of this purpose is
theoretically not a subject of possible knowledge.
While the third Und of igno~ gives UI a classification for
unkno""ability, the fourth is different. In the fourth. ,,',e know wiry
something is 10 occur, or is desired, but not ..41at it may be. And
our ignorance is 10 be not ac.:i(\ental, bUI essential. In such a
case, we would have to know something bUI be unahle 10 commu-
nicale ii, " 'e would be able to us.e but not mention the matter.
Are there examples of situations in " 'hich we can do $Omething,
employ something, hul nol oommunicate or undenland it?
Consider a musical genius who can perform bul cannol c1lplain
(oommunicale) how il il done.' For another example, there are
people who can drIve an automobile but cannol uplain what
 Mystery vtnIU Undidability 251

makes it IIIO'VC. In the cue of the IWve driver, there is no

theoretical objection to understandi"" However, ifit is imposs.!ble
for someone to understand the Dature of the automobile engine.
it is for that pef500 a case of the founh type of ignorance, a
mystery. The ordinary term "mystery' captures one important
5e1lSe of this fourth kind of ignorance. To sununariu:: something
is unknowable if it can be mentioned hut not used (the third type).
Something is mysteriou.l if it can be used hut not mentioned (the
fourth type of ignorance).

C. Kant'S Employment of These DistinctiollS

Does Kant use the Third and Fourth Types of Ignorance, and if
so, where? The e:uct langua,ge of the original, mu<:h less of
translatiolll, is not enough to determine the mailer. We are to
take the euct language and interpret it in terms of the use and
mention distinction. I will not give a complete catalogue of Kant's
use and mention of es5enlial ignorance, hut enough to show the
importance of the two types in bis system.
The third type of ignorance can he illL1trated easily from a
variety of source.s. In tbe CriJiqu.e of Pwt ~ we find. 'This
peculiarity of oor undentanding, that it can produce Q priori unity
of apperception solely by means of the categories, and only by
such and so many, is as little capable of further explanation as why
we have jL1t the5e and DO other functions of judgment, or why
space and time are the only fonn.s of our possihle imuition." This.
is an assertion of Type 3 Ignorance; we can explain what but not
why. We cannot know the answer to the question of why space
and time are the only forms of ow- possible imuition.
This is not a casual formulatioo; we find the same thing in mher
places, for eumple. ASS7, BS8S. For another uamp1c of Type 3
Igoorance, we find in ASS6, We may not, therefore, ask why
reUDn has not determined itself differently, hut only why it has 1101
through its causality determined the QjJpeorrutaS differently. But
to this question no answer is possible .... Ocady another case of
unknowability, Type 3 liJIOrnnce.
252 MYSTERY VERSUS UNDECIDABIUTY

1lie First CriliqIu separaleli I1'an5Cendentai use and mention from

empirical use and menlion. A areat many mailers are discllssed
in these tenm. and can ha.lly be understood otherwise:. For
uample. "TIle pure categories. ... have only transcendental
meaning; nevenhel~ they may DOt be employed uansccndentally,
sueb employment being in itself impossible... :' Apparently
these pure calegories may be mentioned but 1101 used; there fore.
they utisfy the requirement for Type III Ignorance, unknowabiHty.
10 tM sense lYe understand the unlrnowability of noumena.
I.n tbe Foundoliotu of/he MeraphyJicr of Mt1t"tili ....e are reminded
thaI ....-c can uplain nothing but ....hat we can reduce to laws
whose object can be given in some possible upc:rience. Bul
freedom is a mere idea. ... Since no example in accordance wil h
any analOS)' can suppan it, it can never be comprehended or even
imagine d." Which type of ignOI"lllKe is this? The same type of
ignorance lutII$ up in answe r to the qUe$tion, "How is a categorical
imperative pouibleT We can specify the Idea of freedom u a
nel;ePary pre~uppo:iition of a <;;Itegorical imperative, "But how thi.
prcsuppo:iition itself is poMible <;;In n~r be discerned by any
human reason. ~ T o explain how pure reason can be practical is
a problem for which "all human reason is wholly iT\("(lmpetent.
. ..""" Whi~h lciod of ignorance i~ this? We get an answer in the
Critique of PmcticaI Rc4fOtl. "For how a law in it5elf can be the
direct determinina around of the will (which is the e~nce of
morality) is an insoluble problem for the human reason. It is
identical with the problem of how a free v.ill is poMible. There
fore, we shall not have to lihow a pricri why the moral law supplies
an incentive but rather ",hat it effects in the mind, $0 rar as it is
an ince ntive:" This is the third type of ignorance, unknowability.
Kant iO$i$ts th.at we do know ",-hal the moral law requires. thi.
all of \U know, but we do not know ....~I)' there sbould be such a
thing. This aspect 01. IllOlIity is unknowable. hut not mysterioos:
be will IIOt leI us get awa.y v.ith thal We find tbe ume thing
earlier in this Cri/iqut! when F reedom wa$ mentioned IU $Omething
unique: "We do not undemand it, but we know it as the cond]
 Mystery versus Undecidability
Mystery versus Undecidability 253
253

tion of
tion of the
the moral
moral law law which
which we we dodo know."^
know."12 The The Third
Third TypeType of of
Ignorance makes
Ignorance makes this this clear.
clear.
Examples of
Examples of unknowability,
unknowability, the the Third
Third Type
Type of of Ignorance, are are
easily found
easily found at at critical
critical points
points in in the
the First
First andand Second
Second Critiques.
Critiques.
Where do
Where do we we findfind KantKant urging
urging the the fourth
fourth type,
type, mystery?
mystery? No No
surprise that
surprise that for for this
this wewe turn
turn to to Religion Within the Limits Limits of of
Reason
Reason Alone.Alone. At At the the end
end ofof each
each of of the
the four
four parts
parts ofof the book,
the book,
as we
as have seen,
we have seen, are are sections
sections called
called General
General Observations.
Observations. In In
these, Kant
these, Kant givesgives his analysis of
his analysis of traditional
traditional religious
religious topics:
topics: 1. 1.
Works of
Works of Grace
Grace (Gnadenwirkungen),
{Gnadenwirkungen), 2. 2. Miracles
Miracles (Wunder),
(Wiinder), 3. 3.
Mysteries (Geheimnisse)
Mysteries (Geheimnisse), , and and 4.
4. Means
Means of of Grace
Grace (Gnadenmittel).
(Gnadenmittel).
Because these
Because these matters
matters are are notnot properly within the
properly within the title
title ofof thethe
book, but
book, but Itborder
"border upon upon it,"it," they
they are
are discussed
discussed in appendages to
in appendages the
to the
main parts
main parts of of the
the work.
work. The The General
General Observation,
Observation, after after Part
Part 3, 3,
is the
is the section
section in in which
which Kant Kant defines
defines mystery.
mystery. In In the
the first sentence
first sentence
we find
we find that
that mystery
mystery is is taken
taken to to bebe something
something holy holy which
which "may "may
indeed be
indeed be known
known by by each
each single
single individual
individual but cannot be
but cannot be mademade
known pUblicly.
known publicly. .. .. . ,,13 This
This is is Type
Type 44 Ignorance,
Ignorance, use use butbut not not
mention. This
mention. This is is followed
followed by, "Being something
by, "Being something holy, holy, itit must
must be be
moral, ...
moral, . . . andand it it must
must be capable of
be capable of being
being known
known from within
from within
adequately for
adequately for practical
practical use, use, and
and yet,
yet, as
as something
something mysterious,
mysterious, not not
for theoretical
for theoretical use, use, since
since inin this
this case
case itit would
would havehave to to be capable
be capable
of being
of being shared
shared with with ... . . . and
and made
made knownknown publicly."^"^
publicly.,,14
II take
take itit that
that Kant's
Kant's ''praktischer
"praktischer Gebrauch"
Gebrauch" may may be be understood
understood
as our
as our term
term "use,"
"use," and and hishis "theoretischer
"theoretischer Gebrauch"
Gebrauch" as as our
our term
term
"mention." Kant
"mention." Kant is is careful
careful to to repeat that the
repeat that the grounds
grounds of morality
of morality
"are inscrutable
"are inscrutable to to us"
us" but
but areare not
not mysteries.
mysteries. The The distinction
distinction is is just
just
the difference
the difference between
between Type Type 32 andand Type
Type 44 Ignorance.
Ignorance. In In his terms,
his terms,
"we can
"we can thus
thus classify
classify [as [as mystery]
mystery] onlyonly that
that which
which we can know
we can know but but
which
which is is incapable
incapable of of being communicated publicly,
being communicated whereas,
publicly, whereas,
though morality
though morality can can indeed
indeed be communicated publicly,
be communicated publicly, its cause
its cause
remains unknown to
remains unknown to US.,,15
us."^^ WeWe maymay have
have aa classification
classification termterm for for
something yet
something yet notnot have
have anything
anything that that fits
fits the
the classification.
classification.
If this-
If this- is
is the
the wayway Kant Kant uses
uses IImystery,'t
"mystery," is is anything mysterious?
anything mysterious?
"There can
."There can be be no no mystery
mystery with with respect
respect to to what
what all all men
men are are in duty
in duty
bound to
bound to know
know (Le., (i.e., what
what is is moral);
moral); onlyonly with
with respect
respect to that
to that
 254
254 MYSTERY VERSUS
MYSTERY VERSUS UNDECIDABILITY
UNDECIDABILITY

which God
which God alone
alone can can dodo and
and the
the performance
performance of of which
which exceeds
exceeds
our capacity,
our capacity, and
and therefore
therefore ourour duty
duty can
can there
there be be aa genuine,
genuine, that
that
is, holy
is, holy mystery
mystery of of religion;
religion; and
and itit may
may well
well be be expedient
expedient forfor usus
merely to
merely to know
know andand understand
understand that
that there
there isis suoh
such aa mystery,
mystery, notnot
to comprehend
to comprehend it.,,16
it."^^
The previous
The previous statement
statement leaves
leaves usus with
with thethe question,
question. IsIs there
there
anything that
anything that "God
"God alone
alone can
can do?"
do?" Here
Here Kant
Kant holds
holds that
that the
the idea
idea
of the
of the highest
highest good
good involves
involves more
more than
than the
the individual
individual human
human being
being
can realize
can realize

(not only
(not only in
in the
the matter
matter of
of [individual
[individual happiness],
happiness], but
but also
also in
in the
the matter
matter ofof the
the
union of
union of men
men necessary
necessary for
for the
the end
end in
in its
its entirety
entirety [the
[the ethical
ethical common-
common-
wealth]); yet
wealth]); yet he
he discovers
discovers within
within himself
himself the
the duty
duty to
to work
work forfor this
this end.
end.
Hence he
Hence he finds
fmds himself
himself impelled
impelled to to believe
believe in
in the
the cooperation
cooperation or or management
management
of aa moral
of moral Ruler
Ruler of
of the
the world,
world, byby means
means of of which
which alone
alone this
this goal
goal can
can bebe
reached. And
reached. And nownow there
there opens
opens up up before
before him
him the
the abyss
abyss of of aa mystery
mystery
regarding what
regarding what God
God may
may do do.....
. . 17

Ignorance, Type
Ignorance, Type 4; 4; we
we cancan morally
morally use, but not
use, but not mention,
mention, God's God's
activity. In
activity. In what
what wayway cancan oneone use
use this
this activity?
activity? Kant
Kant holds that,
holds that,
under
under certaincertain circumstances,
circumstances, one one "... . . may
may hope
hope that
that whatwhat is not
is not
in
in hishis power
power will
will be
be supphed
supplied by by the
the supreme
supreme Wisdom
Wisdom in in some
sonle way
way
or
or other.
other. .. ... ,,18 However,
However, "... . . only
only what
what is is practical
practical is is
comprehensible
comprehensible to to us,
us, ....
. . we,
we, meanwhile,
meanwhile, cannotcannot at at all
all grasp
grasp
theoretically
theoretically what what thisthis relation
relation of of God
God to to aa human
human might might be, be, or
or
apply
apply concepts
concepts to to it.
it. ....
. ,,19 Apparently,
Apparently, we we know
know why why we we need
need aa
supreme
supreme Wisdom, Wisdom, but but not
not ofof what
what itit might
might consist.
consist.
Kant
Kant argues
argues forfor the
the importance
importance of of Type
Type 44 ignorance
ignorance when when he he
explains,
explains, in in the
the Second
Second Critique
Critique (147),
(147), that
that aa conception
conception of of aa
possible
possible God God isis morally
morally better
better than
than aa conception
conception of of an
an actual
actual God.
God.
If,
If, instead
instead of of ignorance,
ignorance, we we knew
knew that that God
God existed,
existed, morality
morality
"would
"would not exist at all." Most actions would be done from fear,
not exist at all." Most actions would be done from fear, aa
few
few fromfrom hope,
hope, "none
"none from
from duty."'"
duty.,,2o Therefore,
Therefore, he he isis impressed
impressed by by
the
the wisdom
wisdom of of what
what isis denied
denied us. us. In In this
this case,
case, ignorance
ignorance Type Type 44
isis better
better than
than knowledge.
knowledge.
ItIt isis hardly
hardly surprising
surprising that that Kant
Kant should
should taketake special
special painspains toto
locate
locate these these different
different types types of of ignorance,
ignorance, unknowability,
unknowability, and and
 Mystoy vema Undecidability
'"
mystery. 'The fint line of the preface to the first edition of tile
First Crilique reads, "Hllman reuon has thi, pealliar fate that in
one !opc:cies of its knowledge it is burde ned by questions which, as
prescribed by the very nalure of reuon ilRl[, il if not able IQ
igtwre, but whi<;h, as tr=nding ~I its powers, il is aoo nol able
10 answer.":' Understanding how kllO'lOoledge is pouible requires
understandi", how ignorance is pouible, and understanding the
types of ignorance.

2, Other Re11&ioU5 CoIl5eq~ncell:

1(1101"1111, Abnonnce, Ind Undecldlbllily

Section 1 ended by <:alling aUenlion 10 the firsl line of the

preface of the Crilique of ~ RmsorI. Whal are these quutions
thai we cannot ig:nore and yet Clnnot answer? Several are
obviOlll.. We hive found, aa:ordlng 10 Kant, thai reason compels
us I(l consider the nature of the cale&orical imperative of morality,
bul we cannal know why such a thing is withi n us. Reuon leads
us 10 the question, What can we hope for? Yel nothing can give
us lpCcifk knovoledge. And reawo applied to the problem of
luwwiedge n;Jes the quulion of the caillre of the thing-inilRlr,
001 we cannot ellpc:ct to have this noomeoal qllestion amy,ered
either. We have the basic questions of the emtence of God, the
future hillol)' of humanity, and the possibility of grace. For each
of these, reason leads us to a quelion lhal we apparently cannot
answe r, beallse we don't have lhe required "powers."
If we cannot know the answers to lhese queslions, are we
ignorant, or are we abnorant? In addition I(l lhese two po5Sibil-
Ities, there is a third calegory. If "'"co cannot know whkh of the
first two is lhe a.!.C, lhe queslion would appear to be undidable.
Undecidability will be introduttd more carefully, after we have
considered several other mallen..
At Ihis siage of our Sludy we have a number of tools available.
Chapter Five provided an analysis o( the logic of the ignorance
relations, three different kinds ofscmant;<; i~ relations. and
the dilinction between ijl:norance and aboorance. In addition to
 256
256 MYSTERY VERSUS
MYSTERY VERSUS UNDECIDABILITY
UNDECIDABILITY

aa theory
theory of of what
what ignorance
ignorance means, means, therethere are are questions
questions aboutabout the the
historyand
history and thethe lbnitations
limitations of of the
the individual
individual candidate
candidate for forignorance,
ignorance,
abnorance, or
abnorance, or knowledge.
knowledge. Responding Responding to to these
these questions,
questions, this this
chapter has
chapter has provided
provided terminology
terminology for for several
several typestypes of of limitation.
hmitation.
The individual
The individual can can bebe ignorant
ignorant either either accidentally
accidentally or or essentially,
essentially,
and can
and can bebe ignorant
ignorant of of means
means or or ofof ends.
ends.
The question
The question arises, arises, AreAre TypesTypes 33 and and 44 "ignorance"
"ignorance" actually
actually
abnorance, in
abnorance, in thethe terminology
terminology of of Chapter
Chapter Five? Five? RecallRecall that that
"abnorance" names
"abnorance" names aa situation
situation in in which
which no no answer
answer exists.
exists. To To saysay
that there
that there isis no no answer
answer isis to to hold
hold that
that the the conditions
conditions for for establish-
establish-
ing ignorance
ing ignorance do do notnot exist.
exist. ThoseThose requirements
requirements were: were: (1) (1) fair
fair
examination conditions,
examination conditions, (2) (2) aa fair
fair examiner,
examiner, and and (3)(3) the
the existence
existence
of an
of an answer
answer to to the
the question.
question. The The third
third condition
condition was was defined
defined in in
terms of
terms of the
the first
first two;
two; the the judgment
judgment of of thethe examiner
examiner determines
determines
whether the
whether the candidate
candidate has has given
given an an adequate
adequate response.response
To say
To say that
that there
there is is nono answer
answer is is toto hold
hold thatthat (1)
(1) there
there is is nono
possible fair
possible fair examination,
examination, (2) (2) there
there is is no
no qualified
qualified examiner,
examiner, or or
else (3)
else (3) that
that every
every candidate
candidate necessarily
necessarily will will fail.
fail. One
One can't fail an
can't fail an
examination unless
examination unless one one has taken it.
has taken it. And And one one can can take
take an an
examination
examination only only if if it
it is
is possible
possible to to do do so.so. Likewise,
Likewise, one one cancan
satisfy
satisfy an an examiner
examiner only only if if there
there is is anan examiner
examiner who who cancan distin-
distin-
guish
guish aa correct
correct from from an an incorrect
incorrect response.
response. If If any
anyone one of of these
these
conditions is conceptually impossible,
conditions is conceptually impossible, we have abnorance. we have abnorance.
However,
However, abnorance
abnorance requires requires that that itit must
must be be impossible
impossible to to imagine
bnagine
the condition satisfied, not merely that
the condition satisfied, not merely that it happens to be factually it happens to be factually
unsatisfied.
unsatisfied.
In
In view
view of of these
these distinctions
distinctions between between ignorance
ignorance and and abnorance,
abnorance,
what
what is is the
the status
status of of the
the questions
questions in in thethe Type
Type 33 and and 44 categories?
categories?
What
What are are called
called TypesTypes of of Ignorance
Ignorance in in this
this chapter
chapter are are classifica-
classifica-
tions
tions of of the
the limitations
limitations of of thethe candidate
candidate or or subject
subject whowho isis either
either
knowledgeable,
knowledgeable, ignorant, ignorant, or or abnorant.
abnorant. In In the
the Type
Type 11 case,case, thethe
candidate
candidate does does not not happen
happen to to have
have the the answer
answer to to some
some question
question
of
of fact,
fact, and
and in in Type
Type 22 does does not not know
know the the proper
proper response
response to to aa
question
question of of law.
law. Reconsider
Reconsider one one of of thethe examples
examples used used in in thethe
explanation
explanation of Type 1 Ignorance: Is there a piece of silver to be
of Type 1-Ignorance: Is there a piece of silver to be
found on the other side of the moon, three
found on the other side of the moon, three inches long and shaped inches long and shaped
like a fish? Since Moria Schlick fonnulared Ihis quntion there
have beeo human beings (asuooauts) who claim to have observed
partS of the other ~de of the moon. H~ver, those visitors made
such hrief visiu to the area that they are not yet qual ified
euminers foc out question. Although there arc no qualified
examiners al prescnt, and there may never be, we can comtrun an
image of a fair examiner who is qualified. The image we con-
struct satiWes the demands of location in space and time.
Therefore, we we the inability to produce a rcspome to the
queslion of Ihe piece of silver 00 the moon 10 be ignorance,
~cau5e we can easily construct an image of a proper euminer
and eumination.
in our construction. the eu.miner has been there, thoroughly
searched, and has a community o//dlow 6tlminen who can abo
emine the conduct of the enmination and the examiner's
decl!;;oo 0 0 the adequacy of the $IIbject's response. If the questioo
arise$ of the qualifications of the enmlner personally, .... e need to
bave recourse to other examiners, and SO a community of examin.
ers is abo presupposed in the malter. This is equivaleot 10 tbe
familiar distinctioo berwuo theories of puhlic and private
knowledge: the questioo of whether there can be knowledge that
is available to just and only one individual. In our ease it is the
issue of whether ignorance can be established if there is just and
only one possible examioer. Without reference to the oonsiderable
litenllure of the malter, or a detout to present alllhe arguments
afresh, I will limply say that 1 assnme the public knowledge view.
From a Kantian PD'ilion, the history of science requires tbe
rcstrinion to public knowledse, and the bistory of knowledge
converges with the history of science. At any rate, the analysis of
the nalure of ig.nonmce can be carried on from either positioo on
this matter. If one assumes private knowledge, one may alw
assume private ignorance. Public koowJedge and public ignorance
require that Ihe object of knowledge as well as the knower's
$IICCMS each he matters that can be communicated. With lhe~
conditions io mind, the question of the piece of silver on the moon
is easily seen to be ignorance: we can construct images of each
2S8 MYSTERY VERSUS UNDEODAB llIfY

requirement. Now we return to the leu OtMOIU matten, Type$ 3

and 4.
The law of gravitation Wil$ giYeo il$ an example of Type 3
ignorance; we know whol it specifie$, but nOl why there is suth a
thinl- lbe ..1ry question is the question of purpo$C. There are
\1>10 forms of this question. (1) Is there .. purpc:!M: for the event
W7 (2) What is the purpose for the event W? The second
question presupposel an a.ffirmative 10 the tint. In one formula
tion, to u k the fint question is equivalent to asking. Am I
ignorant or abnorant of the purpose? To aU the second is to as);,
What is !be purpcsc, of whith I am ignorant? For our interest.$,
the first is the serious problem. If people don't know whether
tbey are i&flOl'lnt or abnorant, are they tbe one: or tlte other?
This depends on whether there is an answer, of toone. And, to
bold that there is requires at leut the construction of an image of
an uaminatioo and examiners.
To remain with the question of tbe purpose of the law of
gravitation, what image might we offer? If there were an
engineermagician wbo had made tbe law of gravitation, ..-ho
might be available for the eumilUltion, and " 'bo bew whether or
DOt there was a purpcse, we toold safely pronounce our subject
isnorant. But some further aspects are Involved; "oI'e Dud an
Unase of this euminer, and also Deed some notion of. oommuru
ty of examinen of (equal) competence. If there is jUJI and only
one sueh examiner, we can't separate knowledse from privlte
fulillJ. (Kant insists that feeling. alone, is 00 source of knowl
edge.)
The requirement that the uamine:r be backedup by Q commwti
ty of t:mmi~ is a crucial pan of the history of science. There
must be a community to carry-on the "oI'orir: of science from one
seneration to the nen. Also there nuds to be a oommunity to
receive and judse the efforts to contribu.te to iiCicntifie prosreu.
Without a scientific community to carry nn communications there
would be 110 way of separating private enthusiasms from publicly
defe nsible contributions. If, at one stage, only one examiner
"knows" the ans,,er. we can imagine thalthi! person teaches othen
and that a community of enminen can develop. We then face
the question, How many enminen are required for an effective
scientific community? This problem is IlIIAlOSous to Kant's
description of the esseotial political problem. Wc each necd a
powerful ruler to keep U$ in check. HO\\'evcr, Kant holds that the
only possible l'1.lIer is a\$O a buman heing and can he trusted to
follow l'1.lIu only .... ben under the governance of a morc powerful
l'1.lIer. There seelllS to he no end 10 this regress, but Kant argues
that a republican balance of poIlIers can KINe the problem.
While no human l'1.lIer can be tr\I$ted, po-.o'er can be exercised by
a community if it is a rommunity of human beings where each is
in fear of the others. Such human communities can make moral
progress. despite tbe private aims of the individual citizens.. The
analogous situation exisll in science. No individual can be trusted
lI!I a source of knowledge: a community is required in order to
make progress in producing knowledge, just ill a community is
requiTed in order to make progress in morality. The point of th is
digression is that the community plays a role in eSTablishing
ItnoIlIledge and ignorance that is much the wne as the role !Cam
gives it in morality. 10 hoth areas, the indMduu/ canDOt be
truSted, but the history of hUtnOJ1ity is a record of progrus. Kant
has no more confidence in scientific geniuses than in moral he~.
The Kantian who emphasized this aspect of the community in the
history of science was Clarlts Peirce (usually refcrred to as the
founder of pragmatism, a derivation from Kant).
Other similarities occur, as ....ell, between Kant's treatment of
knowledge and morality. In both areas the framework of the
problem comes from within the individual; it is an a priori matter
that tbe individual finds within and imp0se5 on whatever is 10 be
known. or judged. Space and time are "priori for knowledge; the
categorical impcrativt! is a priori for morality. But the essential
role of the community is of concern to us here.
If there is. r:cm~pIuaJ muon thai prevents people from kn()\O,ing
.... hetber tbey are ignorant or abooranl, we may aU whether it is
an ullSOtvable problem concerning the object of knowledge or
concerning the capacity of those subjects.
260 MYSTERY VERSUS UN DECIDAB IUTY

To answe r the question of ignorance or abnor;lIlce we have 10

know whelher an amwer aislS but our candidate has nIlt or can't
reach it, or wbelher nil answer mill for any po55ible c:andidate.
If we can imagine (comtruct an image 00 a future scientist
producing evidence for some notion of purpose of tbe law in
question, we have to admit Ihe chance Ihal our candidate has
ignorance ralher than abnoranee. To be compelling requires that
we produce either a proof of .booranee by virtue of tile inconceiv-
ability of the matter, or a proof of ignorance by virtue of the
established existence of the eumining requiremcnu. Lackin,
either of tllese, the iSiUe <:an only be laheled open or undecided.
To know that we are ilflOraot or thai we are abnorant is to know
a great deal.
In formal studies and epistemology, what il; <;:ailed dl!ddabilily
refers to the ability to determine the truth-value of well-formed
sentences. In the area of rounter-epistemology (Chapter Five on
the "Logic of Ignortmee"), decidabllity might refer to the matter of
determining whether we are ignorant or aboorant "'11h 'Upt 10
u pmtiadar quution.. And, as in decidability of truth-value, this
de<:ision problem cannot always he solYi:d. We have well-known
proofs Ihat undecidability is an inherent feature of certain systems,
(or instance, the GOde] theorem concerning the consistency and
complete decidability of arithmetic. Now that we ilave the GlIdel
proof of tbe impossibility of constructing a complete and consistent
basis for arithmetic, we know that we are abnorant of such a hasis.
Before the GOde! proal, we may have assumed that we were
ignount, but we did nIlt have knowledge of our ignorance. For
that we would have needed a proof of tbe existence of an answer
to the question.
1be bistory of the disoovery of abnorance is as much a part of
the progress of s.:ience as is the diSOl.)Very of direct answers to our
questions. After all, there are tWO dear ways of removing the
suspicion of ignorance: by establishing knowledge and by
estahlishing abnorance. (Another way of removing the suspicion
is by establishing igDOrance.) To establish abnorance requirelthat
we have knowledge that no answer is possible. Ltl ui On!;ickr
 261

the variations under whid! this ean and bas occurred. Several
e.... will be of use.
(1) There is a fraction oomposed of natural numbers that ;5 the
square rool of the number two.
(2) Arithmcti<: is provably consiSllcnl and rompJete.
(3) The statement, '"This statement is false," is either true or
r"",.
Each of tbex usertions, has played K1me pan in the history of
science. At limes, each of them was taken 10 be !rue: they are
now known to be falle. A candidate wllO does not know that they
are false, is ignorant of the truth-value involved. However, we
may raise. different question in connection with any one of them.
Cons.ider the stalcmcl'II that is witllin quotation marks in 3. We
do not know the lruth-value of that stalement, and we are not
ignorant of iu trulh-vaIue, because we understand thaI it doc5 001
have a troth-val ue. While ...-e are abnoranl of \he trinh-value of
the statement within quotation marks. we are nOl abnorant of 3.
A similar pallem holds for 1 and 2. We are ulmOf'll//t of a cernu n
question. hUI we are quite /au:w.~abk about the statement
mentioning thaI question. 1bis. knowledge bas cost hard work in
the history of the discipli ne involved, mathematics or logic, and is
properly counted among the high accomplishments of the field.
To prove that something cannot be decided is quite as much
progress in many cases as to prove thaI something else can be
decided. In cenain m.allert, the proof of undecidability hu been
a m.ajor watershed in history. for instance, the GOdcI proof.
GlIde] produced the "crash" of the thirties, the discovery that we
cou ld nol prove that arithmetic could be trusted. that we would
IlCver know that it is rorWstenl and romplete.
11Ie history of the discovery of undecidability in the foundations
of mathematics is ins\J\lctive for ou r undentanding of Kant's
ronception of religion. TIle laws of arithmetic are preSIJppositions
for almost every other science, yet we do not need /0 Jcnow thai
they CIIII he trusted. We make asliumptions about tbem and usc
them regulatively lither Ihan roll5titutiYely. iI$ Kanl might $ay.
What is imponanl for us as working scitntists is the efficiency of
262 MYSTERY VERSUS UND ECIDABIUTY

our hypothcse~ not a theory of the constitutive oature of the

univel'5e from a noumenal perspective, Even mathematics turns
out to be an uperimcntal science," If mathematics can carry On
its activities without abwlute lmowIedge of the consistency and
completeneS$ of i15 foundations. we have a pallem that may give
us confidence in other areu. Even after the disoovery of the
G6de1 theorem. most bridges built by mathematical calculatio!lli
did IIOt collapse,
Kanl's prqmatie position placed its confidence in testing
regulative assumptions <luhe. than se arching for constitutive
reality, Regulative prinriples.IWUmPlioM. have a role 10 play just
and only ....hen we don't or am'l know the "real" constitution of a
sub~ct, As in mathematia. so also in religion: "~'e cannot know
the nature of God or of grace, but knowledge is not required,
Awarenesa; of undecidability, of poii$ible ignorance, is enough of a
basis for hope, as we have already seen in Chapters Seven and
Eighl We might asaiD call allemion 10 Kant's ,hallenge,

... w!oo, iB<ke<I, io _ tile \IlIobclicve. ? I. iI be wIIo lruob., wiUoour k-u.,

.... IloaI (Of whkII be Ioopo. will """" 10 puo; Of be ",be> nbc<Jb<.t)r iaoioI.
"" ~'" II way Yo ..ilid:o .... io n:1<..,..d &.,... oW P4, if be taft"'"
~ 1tW, Ji_ up.ollo.ope d I~" ",I<Met (R~, M' 1$.1(0)

In religion., as in mathematics, it is vacuous to require Ihat we

Uarl with nOUlnenal knowledge.
 Ten

THE MORAL ANTINOMY

This chapter considers (1) a moral antinomy that fa~s any $lXial
or religious theory, (2) Kan t's position on the aminomy, and (3)
his answers 10 several basic questioIu about morality. In Olapter
T wo we disawed bis analysis of the me:anin& of the moral law,
and his ideas on the philosophy of history. We !lOW 'oIiU see how
these maltcn are 10 be combined. The ab$tract formalism of
Kanl's idea of the categorical imperative has 10 be related 10 his
idea of Ihe history of civilization.

L. A Moral Antinomy

Thesis

Morality is radically individu- Mo rality is weia!. The moral

al, completely contained in viewpoint is the viewpoint of
the individ ual. Its scope, wme entity ouUide of and
foundations, ilS gnals are all grca le r Ihan the mere indio
within the individual. vidual.

A. Observatioru on the Thesis

There are bolh advamages and disadvantages 10 the Ihesi!\.. A5

an advantage ;1 satisfies our pre-s)'!iICmalic demand that Ihe
ronscience of the individual 001 be violated by anytbing nlernal.
l! maintains individual dignity. One disadvantage of the thesis is
that ;t doesn'l seem 10 have a de~isi(m criterion. How would we
fi nd the moral resolution of a conflict between individuals? Also,
it seems 10 violate a presystematic notion that morality consists
in more than doing wbllt one wishes to do, that it consists in doing
 TIiE MORAL ANTINOMY

somethiJl& diffirult and oppmed 10 one's seJr.sh goals. Not aU

sacrifice is moral, bu t all morality is sacrifice. acrording to a
oommon underslanding of the noIion.'

B. Ob:servatiom on the Antithesis

This pos.ilion abo has obvious advanlages and disadvantage$. It

seems to offer a decision basis for dispules bet""un individuals.
Whatever advances the moral goals of the collecti"e entity lJ1.;Iy be
taken 10 be the moral course. HOWC\'Cr. il has the apparent du-
advantage of supporting Ihe unwiUing sacrifice ofindividuals 10 the
purpose of some entil)' external \0 tho!<: individuals.

1. KIl nt's Posilion on the Antinomy

What ....,ouJd Kant's posoi tiQll be on thiS antinomy? SOme

commentators., perhaps fo r introdllClory purpose$. take it 10 be the
thesis. However, Kant really gi'o'Cs us Quite aoother alternati"e.
Notice that these two positions are contradictory except in the ca5e
where we impose on ounct.. the: content of the antithesi$. In
that case, tile /orm o/Ille 'lief0 is followed. and the force of
moralil)' tics within the iooi"idual, but/he rontenl of the QJI/itltesiJ
rt!:WIt~. since the moral goal is something beyond the individual
Form and content are oot synonynu. The formal aspeclS of Ka nt'l
tbeory ha"e been the proper subject of a lot of study, and this
leads us confidently to the the$is., i/ we ale asked the formal
QUC!ltions. But, aMWCring QUeJotiom about the content of his
position, reQuireJ. turning to the: work on the phiJosophy or history
and on religion, not merely to the familiar pwages of the
Foundation.! o/t/~ Ml!faphysia 0/ Morals and the Second Critique.
Let uS briefly re<;onsider some of the work on history pre$Cnted
earlier here in a..apter Two, and see what we find that hcat1 on
morality.
The idea of a kingdom of ends is foond in the familiar boob,
but is offered in more detail in the historical work. Human
rational ea.paei ties "arc to be fully developed only in the race, 00\
 265

in the individual."' Morality presupposes rationality. and 50 rhe

moral CQpacitiD Qn! abo /0 ~ fully tkwfopaJ in the humon Jpies,
IlOl in the indMduaJ. This leads \IS 10 the answer 10 one question
raised in OIIf amilhcsi5:: What is the entity, greater than the
individual, whose goal is the moral goal? The answer is, humtvlil)'.
And what is humanity', goal? ", .. a perfectly just civic
COnstilUtion ... is the highest problem Nature assigns \0 the
human race . . ," ... a u~rsaI civic: society which administen
law among men." The concept of a perfectly just society is
considered again in Kam's ~/igicil WU'/WI the Umiu of RLaron
Alone. Here we fmd Kan! deve loping !he idea of an ethical
C()mmonwealth, and arguing thaI ' Man ought 10 leave: his Ethiea1
Stale of Nature in order to become a Member of an Ethical
Commonwealth," One of the distinctive features of such a
commonwealth is thai ;1 Is a goal of humanity rather man of the
individual person,ptr x . AllboU&h individuab have obligations 10
work toward it, "the dulieli of virtue apply to the emire human
race, the concept of an ethical rommonweaJlh is encnded ideally
to the whole of mankind . ...'"

01 Iloo ........ , _ ,.....anI ilKlf. For""F" ' aI , ..;.,..1 be. ;,

Now< lou.: _ luI''' duly..ltich ;, Ali ,.."m.. _ 01 ..... I.....nl IUCII, but

obi ",Mot,..... tbo: ide.o of ..... _ 6 .. for 0DCiaI.,.., '.-01,.. tbo:

pt. Nloo of IIichaI ... 0DCiaI pod. But boca.... 1M -fPaI ....,..
r><M~ H:AWowl", ...1J' 111M" I", "'IIN~_' ta' '" .-.1
~ _ '-"" ~IioIt. /Jut " ; ,. .. NlhtF . ..~;"., .., ...cJ< ~.u .....
Mo\olc - . J IN _ pi. . . .' I"" ..plwGl

K.a.nt then di5tinguW1es between ordinary moral laws and tbe

duty to worl< toward lhi$ "highest moral good." '"Ordinary moral
laws concern wbat we \mow to lie in oor own power... . " our
ability to follow the categorical imperative. "'This lipecial duty
inv'Olves worlcin& toward a whole regarding v;hich we do not know
whether. a$ $!leb, it lief in our power or not." We do not have
the power to oompel\be freely cbo5en intentioll$ of others. Even
though this ethical commonwealth is a matter of hope ratber than
knowledge, individuals have a moral obliption to gtI beyond their
 11iE MORAL ANTINOMY

personal concerns in seeking il: 'man is not enlitled ... 10 be idle

in this business II.Dd to le I Providence rule, as though each eould
apply hilIl5Clf ezelU$ively to IUs 01'."11 private moral afTairs and
relinquish to a higher wisdom all the affairs of the human race (as
regards i!5 moral de.niny). Rather musl mao proceed as though
everything depended upon him...."
One more reference and we can wm up the argument for the
antithesis. In the Cril~ of Judglmm (Section 83, "Of the
Ultimate Purpose of Nature as a Teleological system"), Kant
argucs that only in 'a civil rotnmUllity"" (his emphasis) can thc full
development of humanity take place. He tak the history of
nature to be understandable as an effort 10 win individuals a...... .y
from the ir own "inclinations to cnjoyment,'" and instead to work
for the production nf a rational world. Kant'S view is not
comple tely contained in the tbcsis: the history of civilization is a
bistory of the increasing rationality and lIIcrrmittg motuU'ly of
hwrnlIIily. His emphasis on humanity and on the ideal civil
community mcan that he would certainly have to agree with the
antith6is. as well as the thesis.
Morality is 5OCial: the last person in thc ",orld .....-ould ha\'C no
moral problems. For the last person, everything that individual
inte nds and docs is intendcd and done universally. But, for
someone in that situation, oolhing could he immoral, and there-
fore nothing could be moraL Kant does talk about duties to
oneself, but if humanity were to disappear these duties would be
vaCUO\1$." (Could it be known Ihat one is Ihe lUI person In thc
world?)
We find iUpport for both Ihesis and antithesis in Kant's work..
Cou ld this be consistent? The Ihesis provides the form of moral
judgmen!5 and Ihe antithesis explains tbe contcnt, tbe conse-
quences, of moral history. Each one is incomplete without the
othe r. They am also be viewed as answers to different questioll5.
The thesis responds 10 the question, ~re do moral commands
come from?' The antithesis aoswcrs the question, "W]u,t is the
moral viewpoint from which [0 understand hinory?' "Thc-refore, I
take il that Kant would hold that both the theili and the antithem
 The Moral
The Moral Antinomy
Antinomy 267
267

are true.
are true. It
It is
is this
this synthesis
synthesis that
that underlies
underlies his
his concept
concept of
of auton-
auton-
omy.
omy.

3. Nine
3. Nine Questions
Questions about
about Morality
Morality and
and Kant's
Kant's Answers
Answers

What kind of
What kind of moral
moral system
system results
results from
from asserting
asserting both
both thesis
thesis and
and
antithesis? Let
antithesis? Let us
us consider
consider howhow Kant
Kant might
might answer
answer aa series
series of
of
general questions
general questions that
that arise
arise in
in connection
connection with
with any
any moral
moral position.
position.

1. Does
1. Does morality
morality apply
apply equally
equally to to everyone?
everyone?
Yes. It
Yes. It binds
binds with
with equal
equal force.
force. The The categorical
categorical imperative
imperative has has
the same
the same originorigin andand scope
scope forfor allall rational
rational beings.
beings. Political
Political laws
laws
may be
may be differential,
differential, but but the
the moral
moral law law holds
holds equally
equally for
for all
all human
human
beings, kings
beings, kings or or peasants.
peasants. If If children,
children, the the insane,
insane, oror those
those who
who areare
ill can't
ill can't employ
employ reason,
reason, they
they areare not
not fully
fully rational and so
rational and so are not
are not
fully affected.
fully affected. Otherwise,
Otherwise, no no excuses
excuses can can be be provided
provided by position,
by position,
wealth, ignorance
wealth; ignorance (of (of the
the meaning
meaning of of morality),
morality), education,
education, etc.etc.
2. Can
2. Can everyone
everyone understand
understand what what the the moral
moral law law requires?
requires!
Yes. Kant
Yes. Kant held that we
held that we find
find within
within ourselves
ourselves the ability to
the ability make
to make
moral judgments.
moral judgments. "Do "Do you
you really require that
really require that aa mode
mode of knowl-
of knowl-
edge which
edge which concerns
concerns all all men
men should
should transcend
transcend the common
the common
understanding,
understanding, and and should
should only only be be revealed
revealed to to you
you by philoso-
by philoso-
phers?
phers? ... . . . in
in matters
matters which concern all
which concern all men
men without distinction
without distinction
nature
nature is is not
not guilty
guilty ofof any
any partial
partial distribution
distribution of of her
her gifts,
gifts, and
and in in
regard
regard to to thethe essential
essential ends
ends of of human
human naturenature thethe highest philoso-
highest philoso-
phy cannot advance
phy cannot advance further
further than than is is possible
possible under
under the guidance
the guidance
which
which nature
nature has has bestowed
bestowed even even upon
upon the the most
most ordinary under-
ordinary under-
standing."^'^
standing.,,14 This This passage
passage waswas placed
placed in in the
the concluding paragraph
concluding paragraph
of
of aa section
section in in which
which he he discussed
discussed moral moral belief
belief and
and moral
moral cer-cer-
tainty.
tainty. At At first
first glance
glance this
this isis aa weak
weak argument.
argument. Many Many areas
areas ofof
knowledge
knowledge concern concern all all people
people and and yetyet areare "revealed"
"revealed" to to us
us byby
specialists:
specialists: mathematicians,
mathematicians, medical medical researchers,
researchers, etc. etc. The
The
"common understanding,"
"common understanding," if if this
this means
means common
common intuition,
intuition, is no
is no
match
match for for specialized
specialized experimental
experimental science. science. Kant Kant knows
knows and and
celebrates
celebrates this this regularly.
regularly. But But here here he he isis talking
talking about
about the moral
the moral
goals
goals of
of humanity:
humanity: these these are
are thethe "essential
"essential ends ends ofof human nature,"
human nature,"
 nIE MORAL ANTINOMY

these are the manen that concern all of us "withou t distinction:

Individuals mighl not care about the relationship hetll,een the
interior angles of an equilateral IrianiIe, or aboot tomorrow's
weather, or even aboll! how to extend their lives, bul they must
care about the mol'1l1 imperatives. 111m is eMCntial 10 heinl
human, acrording 10 Kanl. And, he says, very clearly, the commQrtl
Ulldenttlildint is capable of uodenlanding the moral la ....s require
ments.
1. II it poIIibk {Of' ~ fo be moral?
Yes. Kant insists that a person judges "that he can do something
because he kllOW$ that he ouaht. and he recognizes that he is free .
. . : " Ought implies can. Kanl offen some e.u.mples.

s~_ IluII _ o.oys IMo 1..... io inoo.lslible wile, the .sc.ind at;cct and
oppl<tIUIiIy..., prao . A>k ~ -betloer he _III _ COllIn>! .... T"',.
if, .. froat ellhc. ............ '" Ioc c.. \.hill ...",.....1"""', po-. ""'" _0<1
"" M;do ... -'<I be \.-vd ;",.= PMoIy ofr., ....;"..,. Ioio ...... We do
-01 '-t; 10 . - very IooIc .. bar ........"'" ~ be. Bill aok \im ......rhct
10& ,.;_\0 it ....!d be ," ,1. for """ 10 """' ....... U. 1000 oIlif., ... it ....
........;p. lhro.oIe""" tu. w \ lbe _ l>Iddea 4eatII onleM he ....... a 'aK
dep"";';'" ... j...... Iooo.afable ...... ~ tile _ueip w" t 'd 10 dau""
_ pt...ubIo: I"<U:lIL W1Iethet he WMJd Of _ lie peru,. will _
_ ...... 10 My; but IluII it would be I'" 1'%1< fOIl' !lim toe m III a:rtaiaIJ """'it
wilhooot !.cjcotiooo"

Kant takes lhis to show thaI "'C think thaI .... e are free and that it
is at least powble for us to do ....hat we ought to do. "Duty
demands nothing of us .... hich we cannot do:"
4. II it likely thm IlII)'O'IC will be moral?
No. Not for any being ' in the world of seosc:" Instead we
postulate "an endleu progress' " to complete mom fitnea.
Because we have inconsistent intentiolll. both selfIsh and moral,
.... e arc unlikely to act purely OUI of respect for just one of lhese
innate inlenlioM. Kant takes us 10 be nsentially iIlaJtUislenr. as
the earlier chapter on Ambivalence has explained.
 "'9

S. Should ~~ obq rhe morul law'!

~t insists Ihal our selrLshness and mutual antagonism arc
productive. They dri\'c us "from barbarbm \0 rulture. ... Without
Ibrn.e in themselves unamiable characteristics of unsociability ...
characteristics each man must find in his own selfish prelensions-
all talents would remain hidden. unborn in an Arcadian shepherd's
life, wilh all its concord. contentment, and mutual affection. ... '
And then, "Thanks be \0 Nature . .. for the inoompatibllity, for
heartless competitive vanity. for the ill5aliabJe desire 10 posse
and to rule! Without them, all the exceUent natural capacities of
humanity would fOre'o"eT sleep. undeveloped ...ll
If Ihis is the cue, tben morof ptvgfW ~'IJUld ~ stopfNd if ~ all
btJcame momll Not because: it would DO longer be needed, bul
because the machinery for producing it would no longer CDst.
The machinery require5 OW' se lfi5hness. 1be degree of rationality
displayed by Ihe community ""'olild be limited if we settled for the
pres.enl level of sciclKC. For cumple, if the wence of medicine
had oot discmered how to perform an appendeC'lomy. the degree
of rationality of the social group would be less than it now is,
other things being equal. J take it that rationality is a function of
both the ronsislency of pursuit and the power \ 0 reach a set of
objectives.
The fear that moral progress will hah for !he reason that human
beings have all become moral is a fear that is easily relieved:
individuals sbow no sucb dangerow tendencies. (Perhaps we can
separate K.an tianism and Calvinism this way. For Calvinism
people must tty to behave, but are doomed to fail. For Kant, they
ought \0 try, but, fortunately, will fail.)
How would Kant answer this fifth question? Affirmatively.
H uman beinp oupt to try. However, .... e expect that they will
probahly {ail (see 4 just a!love), and from a historical vi e..-point,
that has its advantagc~ !he dignity of a buman being romins in
the mocall1roggle, but succcss would be quite. different malter.
Angels have no dignity.
270 THE MORAL ANTINOMY

6. lJoa QII)'OtU' obrj the moroJ law?

We have first-hand knowledge of only our own intentiOD$.
Knowina; the seope of our selfJShnen, we know lhal ...-e are not
candidates.. Only a $Ilpernatural entity could know the intentions
of other human beings <al the present sla&e of psychology).
Judging (rom their behavior we have no basis fOT decidin&: that
others are acting PUTeIy oot of respect for duty. In the first pan
of the ReligiOll Kant argues for the (Xln~pl of "radical evil in
human natulll." There we found a long lisl of examples, plU$ hi$
quotation of Maxim S83 of La Rochfoua.u1d. How dots K;ml
&lI$Wcr this sixth question? Again, an answer would presuppose
knowledge of inlcnliom., and ....e arc limited 10 knowledge of our
own. He cautions .piMI I. "disbonelity by wh ich "'"e humbu&
oorselve5. . . ..... Thil comes from ",he puce of conscience of 50
many men ... they merely elude evil c:onsequcnces by good
fortune:
7. Hw anyc<1t eIIV bn moron
To know Ihal there bas bun an example we would have !O know
the intentiOll$ of the individual. We don', know Ihe secret inten-
tions of Christ, SocralCIo, Buddha, ConfucilA. Therefore, we do
not know of any hUtorio:al example. But, Kant ;J1ijisu (in the
~Iigion), we do not need a hUtorio:al or empiri(a/ example: oo r
milK! and hean tell us what morality requi res.
8. U1wr polilicuJ ~I1Ces does IhiJ CMct'pliotI of mom/ily /unIe?
1be political problem, the achievement of a moral community,
"a perfectly just dvk constitution," is called "the most difficult and
the lasl to be solved by mankind .... It Is to be wIved by humanity,
not by human beinas distributively. The problem is Ihis. Selfish
animals like us need a master 10 Iimil our abuse of other men.
But the only possible supply of masters comes from the human
race. H uman maslers can't be truSted, "For each of them will
alwa)'li abuse his freedom if he has none above him."'" Is il
possible to educate an cHIC dass of govelTlOl'S? PhilO5Opher
kings? No. "That kings dlOUld philosophiu or philosophers
become kingll is nol to be expec1ed. Nor is il 10 be wished, since
the p"'<e.. ion of power inevitably corrupts the untrammeled
 The Moral
The Moral Antinomy
Antinomy 271
271

judgment of
judgment of reason,,27
reason"^^ (about(about one one hundred
hundred yearsyears before
before the the famous
famous
remark by
remark by Lord
Lord Acton).
Acton). If If the
the relationship
relationship of of king
king andand subject
subject
will not
will not do,
do, what
what will?will? A A republic
republic in in which
which the the government
government has has
the power
the power to to dodo just
just andand onlyonly whatwhat thethe people
people would would do do for for
themselves. A
themselves. A system
system of of checks
checks and and balances
balances is is required
required in in which
which
no one,
no one, and
and no no branch
branch of of government,
government, is is trusted
trusted with with absolute
absolute
power. Kant
power. Kant holds holds that that this
this political
political problem
problem can can be be solved
solved
because, "it
because, "it does
does not not require
require that that wewe know
know howhow to to attain
attain thethe moral
moral
improvement of
improvement of men
men but but only
only thatthat wewe should
should knowknow the the mechanism
mechanism
of nature
of nature in in order
order to to use
use itit on
on men."
men." "The "The problem
problem of of organising
organising
aa state
state .. .. .. can
can be be solved
solved even even for for aa race
race of of devils.
devils. .. ... . "" A A
constitution can
constitution can be be established
established in in such
such aa way
way that
that "although
"although their their
private intentions
private intentions conflict,
conflict, they
they check
check each
each other
other...... . ,,28 IfIf we
we are are
left under
left under any any doubt,
doubt, he he adds,
adds, "A "A good
good constitution
constitution is is not
not to to be be
expected from
expected from morality,
morality, but, but, conversely,
conversely, aa good good moral condition of
moral condition of
the people
the people is is to
to bebe expected
expected only only under
under aa goodgood constitution.
constitution."^^ ,,29
In Perpetual
In Perpetual Peace, Peace, Kant Kant argues
argues that that the
the international
international conse- conse-
quences of
quences of this
this notion
notion of of morality
morality lead lead toto aa League
League of of Nations,
Nations,
and to
and to specific
specific ideasideas aboutabout the the conduct
conduct of of war,
war, etc.
etc.
9. What
9. What position
position does does science
science have have on on this
this conception
conception of of morality?
morality?
The level
The level of of social
social morality
morality depends
depends on on the
the level
level of of science.
science. At At
the end of
the end of the Critique of
the Critique of Practical
Practical Reason
Reason we we find
find an unexpected
an unexpected
idea: "Science ...
idea: "Science . . . is
is the
the narrow
narrow gate gate that
that leads
leads to to the
the doctrine
doctrine of of
wisdom
wisdom ... . . . not
not merely
merely what what one one ought
ought to to dodo butbut what should
what should
serve
serve as as aa guide
guide to to teachers.
teachers .... . . ,,3{) If
If the
the common
common person already
person already
has
has internally
internally the the ability
ability to to recognize
recognize moral moral choices,
choices, whatwhat is is left
left
to
to bebe done
done by by science?
science? The The obvious
obvious answeranswer thatthat Kant
Kant gives
gives in in thethe
same
same paragraph
paragraph is is that
that science
science will will analyze
analyze thisthis moral
moral ability.
ability. In In
addition
addition to to this,
this, something
something else else comes
comes out out of of Kant's
Kant's moralmoral
position.
position.
The
The well-known
well-known formulation
formulation that that "ought
"ought implies
implies can"can" leads
leads us, us, as as
aa consequence
consequence of of the
the law
law ofof transposition,
transposition, to to "if
"if it
it is
is false
false that
that one one
can,
can, then
then it it is
is false
false thatthat one
one ought."
ought." Moral Moral behavior presupposes
behavior presupposes
the
the power
power to to accomplish
accomplish moral moral goals.goals. Kant Kant is is anan intention
intention
moralist.
moralist. But, But, where
where power power to to accomplish
accomplish is is absent,
absent, intentions
intentions are are
empty.
empty.
m mE MORAL ANTINOMY

To be perfectly montl alternatives have to ensl that allow us to

be perfedly ralional. To Ireal c'-cryone as an end ...-e need to
know how to maximize everyone's power. as well as intt oo Ihis
resull Perfect knowledge. the scientific ideal, is approached
gradually through the hislOI')' of science. A5 Kant has it. the late
members of humanity benefit from the scientific work of those
who came earlier. The degree 10 which a nmdom member of a
(Xlmmunity is ueated as an end depends on the leyel of scientifIC
knowledge available iI5 ,,:ell u the narural and political re$Ollr~5
of the community.
If the food supply is not adequate, it can't be distributed on a
perfectly satisfactory buis; if medical knowledge is 1101 adequate,
we may have to choose between uvins one peBOll al the CJpeR5e
of another, etc. A!llhe power of the social group increues, it has
me opportunity and obligation to increase the degree 10 which it
behaves rationally, consistently. wilb respect \0 everyoDe. But
individual people cannot be praised for Ihe moral level 0( the
community; I own no slave" but I perKInally tMoM!l'''e r>O credil for
lhal morally desirable lilualion.
The average life-span of !he random individual has increased in
the lasl two <:e:nturies, bIll r>O one of 1.15 deKrves moral credit for
that desirable progress in human dilnity. (Otber things being
equal, Ihe longer life is tbe more dignified.) I assume: that in a
few yean tbe d ignity of old age will be: improved by luaranteed
annual income: this aJso will be: an improvement in the: morality
of the community. but DOt in the morality of the common perKIn.
From the: standpoint of individual morality. 5ciellCC may be lrivial.
bul with resped to the: morality of the: community. the level of
5cience: is Ii significant presupposition. As the: range of whal we
can do increases, the range of what we ought to do can aoo
increase:.

4. CoaclllsloJiS

In view o f his position on the antinomy and answen 10 these

nine queslioll!, where ~ Kant leave the: common person?
 ~ Moml Antinomy 273

Mon.lly, no one can be trusted more than the ordilllU)' individual.

However, th is is weak p!'aisc. Kant is pessimi.ti~ about indi~idual
moraliry, while he is optimistic about humanity's moral progre"-
Ind ividuah mUSI uy to be moral, they do ul'ldcntand what is at
;55ue, and they can hope to make it; bul, as II mailer of fact, they
will probably not do 50. However, their contentment can come in
part from their participation in humanity's progress toward a
perfectly just legal system.
Kant'S idea of radical evil in all people prevents him from bein,
romantic about any primitive goodness in the ordinary individual
or about any golden age of moraliry before civilization. 11Ie
ordilllU)' penon makes .erious errors; as an uample Kant
mentiOllS tbat the rommon perwn regards the ceremonies of
religion as the wbole of it. Yel, there arc "men of native honesry:
and 00 elite, 00 clerics., et~~ can "surpass in the very least lhe
naturally bonest man, who can be relied upon in 5O(ial intercourse,
io business, or in trouble; 00 the rontraJ)', taken u a whole, the
chosen ooes can scarcely abide romparison with him .........
Howev~r. no 5uch "naturally bonest man" can be trusted with
political power. Thue tvr no mrIllwotS, but none are needed
for moral progress IO'Nard the ethical commonwealth. 11'Iere are
abo no ab$olute moral villains: the distinction between person
and thing is always primary and must be respected, and anyone
can hope 10 become a new person. morally.
On moral malleB, U on everything el!IC, Kant is a dualist.
lberefore, when moral ilSllcs arise, they are to be roI1$idered
from tv..., di$tinct vicv.-points: the individual and humanity. What
is desired by one is nol JIC' .... ssarily desired by tbe other. 1 have
shown bow Kant handlcs this ",ithout rontradiction. While he
doeso't state the moral aotinomy 11$ it is put in the fint KClion of
this ~hapter, he provides all the materials. The moral judgment
mUSI have I/~ form of the thesis. The judgment'S motive and
machinery ha$ 10 lie rompletely within the individual. There is II
ptnOflaJ dury 10 respect the idea of law, the categorical impcnllive.
However, the effective ronlent or the moral judgment expresses
the vieu.'POint or humanity. Kant 'S work on history, religion, and
274 11-IE MORAL ANTINOMY

law gives details of thaI ronteDt. TI!e IWO sid of tbe antinomy
may be taken as answers 10 different questions. TIle the5i5 is the
response to. "What is the $OUrce of moral commandsr Tlie
antithesis is Kant', :uuwer 10. "If we are 10 understand moral
hislOry. wbat purpose must we iI$SIlmc?" Autonomy is nfccnry
but 1'101 sufficient for morality.
What are the religiOO5 ronsequences of the moral antinomy?
TIle antioomy iuelf requires absolutely no re ligiow assumptioll5
because it is. moral problem and, therefore, prcsuppmcs o nly the
properties of reason and of human nalllTe. H owever, we an raise
the religious question, and raise ;1 in two vcl'$.iol1$. From the
individual viewpoint the question is. What can I hope? From the
rol lectivc viewpoint is the paralle~ What can humanity hope for?
The problem of individual hope wu considered in Cbaplcr Eight
aboYe, in Kant', 1101;00 of reasonable hope. O\Ir new question
about colicC'livc hope 5CCms a grammatical error, a misuse of
languasc, when we fint come upon il. AI any ralc, nol Kantian
question. B UI, the argument of Ihis chapter should have penuad-
cd the ruder that moraJiI)' i5 both social and individual, for Kant.
The antithesis in the moral antinomy is quite as Kantian as !he:
theMs.
The q ue5110n of rea.son.able hope ari5el only for an entil)' that is
morally worthy of ou.uide or additional (()Operation. TIlat
que51ion i5 just as reasonahle or unreasonable with Te5pect 10 one
entil)' as ano!he:r, if thaI entil)' can fulfill the requiremenu of the
definitions of hope and wonhiDeY. Can humanil)'. rollective!y,
5alidy the5e requirements? Thili chapter dealt with humanity's
moral ch.aracter, while the I'\e.1t ronsiden some of its hopes., those
embedded in religion.
 Eleven

THE RELIGIOUS QUESTION:

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
AS THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

Several distinctive ideas- are pre5ent in Kant's view of relipon: the

e!hical eommol1\\-ealth, the nature of m)'$tery and i&noranc:e, the
requirement of moral worthintss. and lhe limi15 of hope. The
problem remains of combining the5e four, and connecting them
with the eXlensions that have been dcvcloped in the iotl:ic of
ambivalence, of ignorance, and of hope. This chapter will prnenl
the view !hat Kant's philosophy of history is the framework. that
COnntcts and rel.atC$ them. Some previous emp~ will have to
be repeated Of wmmariud.

I . The Ethical CommonWHllh

The history of humanity, collectively, may be taken as an effort

to produce a perfectly ethical commoowealth. Where pre\~om
writers concern themselves wilh the lalvation of individual~. we
find Kant adding to this objective the additional goal of humanity's
rationality. The connection between rat ionality and morality.
beN.een reason and the kingdom of ends, has already been argued
in Kant's ethical "'Ork.' To take this notion of an elhical common-
....ealth seriously "'e have to comlder the familiar and yet elusive
notion of IwnUVIity. Does humanity have reality; is there such an
entity? (Does humanity have a soul7 to put the iuue in the
language of a distinguished tradition.) Is humanity a proper
subject for value judgmen15 and ethical discriminations? Kant's
altitude on the status of humanity may be found in many place$,
perhaps TI1O!It dramatically in his Introduction. /o~. [n thaI
work he added a fourth question to the famous three questions
276 TIm REUG IOUS QUESTION

",i lb which the introduction this book opened. 'Those three

to
"" crc said 10 cbaracleriu the subject of philosophy:
What <;an I know?
What should I do?
What can I hope fot?
Each of !hellethree questions has., as an cucntial part, "'", The
three arca!' of philosophy defined by these quc$liolU are directed
to the probJelJl$ of the single individual. The fourth question
added by Kanl is,
What is Man?
Here ...c lia"c a new subject. mankind, or humanity 10 phrase it
ITK)re exactly. 1be "I" has heen dropped in favor of Ihis new topic.
The fourth question designates the area of philosophical anthro-
pology. and Kant rema rked thaI the first thr questions properly
fall under this fourth question. Apparently, llie concept of the
individual is correlative with, presu~5, the concept of thc
group. Individual h uman beinp arC members of a n e ntity called
humanity. Humanity har had, Qnd continui!.f to /"nor, ils (>M'' '
llis/cry. Individuals ~nicipale in Ihis hi$tury, some time$ with and
Klmerime without enth\W:wrI or awarene:lS.. Hoy.ever, Kant's
philosophy of hi$tOIy makes it essential to conside r separately the
idea of the individual's behavior and the idea of humanity's status.
Cbapter Ten has put the issue in Kant's _" teons: humanity
is an Q))C rimental entity for him that has as mueh reality as a ny
other object of experience. One observes (finds) it historically,
over time, and OOlIStruCU the restlltant ronceplion, like Ilny othe r
experimental concept. Humanity C',moot be observed in one
,lance, bul neither rould Nonh Ameria until quite recently. 11
canliOl be explained in terms of what human beings do at just one
moment of time; nor can the slope of a curve be explained in
terms of jtut one point on a graph. Humanity can be given it
modest nominalistic definition: the entity that has as pans all
human beinp; past. present. and future. 1lIe parts need not be
present simultaneOUSly to define one entity: the lIO'Ies of a single
piece of music are ordinarily spread fTVer rime. Suppose we grant
 The Religious
The Religious Question
Question 277
277

that humanity
that humanity can can be
be anan experimental
experimental object; object; what
what dodo our
our observa-
observa-
tions and
tions and analysis
analysis tell
tell about
about it? it?
Kant reads
Kant reads the the history
history ofof civilization
civilization as as aa pattern
pattern in in which
which
humanity gradually
humanity gradually becomes
becomes more more rational.
rational. To To bebe rational
rational is is to
to
have the
have the same
same set set of
of consistent
consistent lawslaws govern
govern thethe entire
entire universe
universe of of
discourse. This
discourse. This means
means thatthat as as humanity
humanity becomes
becomes moremore rutionul^
rational,
more parts
more parts of of humanity
humanity are are governed
governed by by the
the same
same set set of
of laws.
laws.
When these
When these laws
laws are
are also
also self-imposed,
self-imposed, we we can
can say
say that
that humanity
humanity
becomes more
becomes more moral.
moraL
From Kant's
From Kant's viewpoint,
viewpoint, the the history
history of of politics
politics and
and thethe history
history of of
reUgion are
religion are converging.
converging. They They converge
converge on on one
one special
special area:
area: the the
problem of
problem of peace.
peace. They They areare never
never to to bebe identical
identical asas long
long asas one,
one,
politics, is
politics, is based
based on on external
external compulsion,
compulsion, and and the
the other,
other, religion,
religion,
on internal compulsion.
on internal compulsion. F For
or thethe one,
one, thethe differences
differences between
between
peoples are
peoples are emphasized;
emphasized; for for thethe other,
other, the the essential
essential moral moral
similarity between
similarity between them them is is stressed.
stressed. For For some
some purposes
purposes it it is
is most
most
efficient to
efficient to consider
consider the the differences,
differences, for for some
some others,
others, thethe similari-
similari-
ties. Therefore,
ties. Therefore, politics
pohtics andand religion
religion have have separate
separate scopes.
scopes. But, But,
whatever our
whatever our political
political circumstances,
circumstances, no one of
no one of us can avoid
us can avoid the the
religious duty
religious duty to to work
work for
for an ethical commonwealth.
an ethical commonwealth.
The duty
The duty to to work
work for for an ethical commonwealth
an ethical commonwealth is is unique
unique on on
several
several counts.
counts. First,
First, such
such aa commonwealth
commonwealth would would be be aa collective
collective
not
not aa distributive
distributive achievement.
achievement. It It gives
gives rise
rise to
to the
the strange status
strange status
of aa collective
of collective duty.
duty. Second,
Second, it it is
is aa matter
matter of of hope
hope rather
rather thanthan
ordinary
ordinary moral moral obligation
obligation for for thethe individual.
individual. Each Each of of. these
these is is
worth
worth textual
textual reference:
reference: together
together they they areare the
the center
center of Kant's
of Kant's
position.
position. We We maymay find
find the
the first
first property
property in in Kant's
Kant's view
view thatthat with
with
the
the Ethical
Ethical Commonwealth
Commonwealth "we "we have
have aa dutyduty which
which is is sui generis,
sui generis,
not
not of of men
men toward
toward men, men, butbut of of the
the human
human racerace toward
toward itself."
itself."
Certainly
Certainly one one of of the
the unique
unique positions
positions in in the
the history
history of philosophy.
of philosophy.
He
He turns
turns to to the
the second
second property:
property:

For
For the
the species
species ofof rational
rational beings
beings isis objectively,
objectively, in
in the
the idea
idea of
of reason,
reason,
destined
destined for
for aa social
social goal,
goal, namely,
namely, the
the promotion
promotion of of the
the highest
highest as
as aa social
social
good.
good. But
But because
because the
the highest
highest moral
moral good
good cannot
cannot hebe achieved
achieved merely
merely byby the
the
.exertions
exertions of
of the
the single
single individual
individual toward
toward his
his own
own moral
moralperfection,
perfection, but
but requires
requires
rather
rather aa union
union ofof such
such individuals
individuals into
into aa whole
whole toward
toward the
the same
same goal
goal ....
. . the
the
278 ruE REUGIOUS QUESTION

idoa 01 IUd. ....... .. ;. .. idea ..,.,plelt11 disI"'*""d ,."'"

all 111"0'.01
II .... (wbido ......... wt..I_~ 10 lie ill ___ pootu); ~ it ~
--kiIIc 1-...1. wboIe nprdiat whldo _ do _ ~ 1>het1let. ulUdo,
it 1ia. .. ow _ .,.. - . Hca<c thio dilly ill d~ It"'" .U OIben
boI~'" kiad .... ill prUw:iplo..' (My .... p"..;,j

NOW" we can $lee some of the need to move to the fourth ques-
tion. H umanity not only has an existence, it hu a duly toward
i/M1f: it 1llU$\ approaeh .n ethical commonwealth. ~ pamcl-
~t in this effort, each of us aJ!IO find ourselves in a unique
liituation.
The ordinary moral obliBation is a case in .... ruch the individual
oupt to do something. and can do iL Oupl implies can. In this
!leW siNation, the goal requires iOmethinllhal is not completely
within tbe power of the individual; it depends on OIIuide circum-
Slancu, other people. II is lhe case Ihal if we oughllO try \0 reach
the ethical rommon,,eallh. ~ eM try to reach it. But Ihis goal
requires more than "lhe e:tenions of the single individual."
Therefore, Kant holds that each of uS I1UI$t act as though every-
thing depended on us, but we roml al$o hope that the outside
universe will eo-operale with us. This hope is a rational req\lire-
ment Wilbout the hope, each of us would either ciw: up in dis-
couragement Of continue in the erroneous (mad) iUSumption that
"'e, individually, could produce the kingdom of ends. Since the
hope dUI1 an ethical rorrunon ....ealth will rome about is sllch a
central one, i\ dC$CTVe$ more 5CUtiny.

2. 'The Ho~ or World Chlu.QSbl p

This hope is ~d on both the moral demand (the categorical

impcratiw:), and tbe empirical history of civili~tion. H istori<:ally.
lhere has been a movement in .... hich Ihe same set of laWl apply
In wider and wider groops of people. Families have rome under
vil lage and city regulatioru; cities have rome under nalional
regulation; .... e may hope that rnllioru will come unde r 'a puhlic
international law." These rcgulaticms !Ia"e to be self-imposed
befOf'C Ihey can begin 10 haw: moral import. However, the
empirical hi5tory does allow us to select dala thai provides an
uperiential schelNl for the moral hope of an ethical common-
wealth. Since success in this requires more than the ability of the
individual, il requires thai the individual make the utmost
uenioDS, and accompany these exenions with the hope that the
projea will sua:eed. Without the hope, the effon is vaaJous . . .
from the rational viewpoint.
This hope for moral proll"e55 is oat merely an intellecrual
coll5truaioo by Wphisticated minds.

.. ~_ ......1IIt is "''' "Milled tloaI _ _ !M'!! be iIIdiIf.rut 10 11000 ""'"

I . . . . . .pocII .... race .. .,. ...... ~ to, it ...1y _ .. .,. C-'J'CCI ir ...;o;~ ca1aiNy.'

Kant usually does not add anythin& as SUOIli as the requirement

that we expect il "with certainty." Perhaps this is fJip, because
the more CODliistent position is !tis view that the idea of

dis..", WOI"Id .,.......... '" .. V- ~ (...ally ,hoot all.,. IIUII)' rd_.u..

rc-.oilll;'-' . . . . .naI .. - opolitical DDOIdit ..... wbido 1'111_ lou II ber
llitilllile purpcoe. will <OIII~ iIIIo beiotc ,be _ b -10 . do> all tIoc or.. 01
"Wieies 01. IX ~_ race ........... Iop.. (My ...ph";')

Human nature cannot be indifferent, for it is so c:onstitu ted that

il mUSI hope for "'the goal of world citizenship. ......
Why do we care about history after our own death, about even
"the mosl remote epoch our race may come 10"? TIlere is
ambivalence on this, but tbe rational pan of the nature of the
individual "is so constituted" thai we each extend our interest along
lines consistent with the interest of the das5 of hunan beinp
despite our penonallimited life-span. We aTe rationally a pan of
humanity, even if selfIShly indifferent. Ralionally we each hope
for lbe gOllI of world citizenship. At thili point Kant introduces a
critical assumption behind the hope for this commonwealth. To
have not merely a political but an ethical common.... ealth, we must

"""
 1liE REUGIOUS QUESTION

... tloe po 'it"';';'" of ''''''W' ideA, nO--'''1, .... 01 it;be. lDOI"aI &i.t
liu"ouP ""'- ~ ."pc "';.,. u.. IQruo 01 "'paI'OI~ i.dMd....
illllIII'"ocieM ill the.....,1va, ...., uorited for ............. tad.'

In view of his insistence that lbe question of lbe exUtenee of a

higher Bein& is undecidahle, what can Kant mean by this ' presup-
position:

J. God u PftsuPpolltion

A p.s.,ge in Kaol'$ WQrk on Justice aplaill5 lbe Joaic of the

matter quite clearly. Despite its length. it deserves repetition and
<:areful study:

u __ "n_ ....,.., LMI cataiJo LhilII cmts, W .... It)' 10 ....,.., llr.M it
doCI .......... U W I'" 'do .. ...,.,. ..ithct (as freqllClUly "'ppea). w
oOoe, ill ..... (Io)patL .jc""1) - . if
,b .Wcai ..... pncti"',,erat. no .... fr_.
1IIe,. io ........._era(,
c:u aoIi: whether lie .... IIl1 iIIIen:sI ....... ptiotc. COIIje<:tur<> rbM one or "'"
A or ..., it ill.
rheorerical poW ofiew, ...
f.,.,. , i' 'Of... order 10 expIaiIIl certaDt pbt _ _ (f<Jr ozampk, for
.. _ _ ~" rile Fb ..c mc_ ro N ...... i..d micbL be the 1"CtrnIT-
..000. 01 !be ph ... rl). Or,'" tloe """" Ioaad, f,_ prac:rical poiM 01
\Oew, ... form "'~;'1"'~ .. order 10 0I1ain """" .ad; IUdo .. e.d IIIIIY be
..... pr ....... ~Iy rcdfdoJ o,l) or 1OtJnII. U it io ...,..ai ead, it ill
.,....!lIar dllC)'l"CqIIira; ... to....". _ .n.. Now it ill .>'ideM (airbe' . b
..,...,. require ... 10 8dopr ... CIId _ our m";m) it oSoa _ teqIIite ...
ro u>j ' a..~ (n\ I Pli''''''' femibiliIJ oltbio .... ill tloe ......... Aoido IOIdo
I .....yaw. ill. purely tIoecrebcal."h!; ....... aDd potAlk"'OIlo ___ wdL,
fOf Ikre caa be ... """p;'" 10 do tloio (10 be ...... H ethinaJ.. WIIat dill)'
reqllir-ea if; !hal ... ac:r ill __ hnr willi tloe Idea ollUdo IJI ead, evea if
Ikre ill ...... oiipI .... rl'YeLieaI poMohiIir)'!bar it if; 10 M"" . _ ~_
ill imP'" I'it.ility CI"!!(l! be.~ eilMr.'

Several upects of this passage need to be ooted:

(1) The atwnment of cenain moral ends ~ requi re that we
form a particu lar ' conjecture,' or hypothesis..
(2) A moral requiremenr thar we adopt an end as our maxim is
nol a requirement that we assume the end is feasihle,
attainable, believable. or knowable.
 The Religious
The Question
Religious Question 281

(3) There can be no obligation to believe something true about

the phenomenal world.
((4)
4) AA requirement
requirement of of duty
duty is is aa matter
matter of of intentions.
intentions. It requires requires
that we
that we actact inin accordance
accordance with with thethe IdeaIdea of of aa certain end,
certain end,
even if
even if there
there is is not
not the
the slightest
slightest theoretical
theoretical probability
probability that that
it is
it is feasible,
feasible, as as long
long as as its
its impossibility
impossibility cannot cannot be demon-
be demon-
strated either.
strated either.
The first of of these points is clear enough. To reach a goal by
intention requires
intention requires some some reasoning,
reasoning, reason reason requires premises;
requires premises;
therefore, aa specific
therefore, specific goalgoal maymay require
require aa particular
particular premise.
premise. The The
second point
second point reminds
reminds us us that
that Kant
Kant takes
takes morality
morality to to bebe aa matter
matter
of intentions
of intentions and and notnot ofof consequences.
consequences. It It also
also insists
insists that, morality
that. morality
does not
does even require
not even require us us toto understand
understand the the consequences,
consequences, much much
less to
less to believe
believe that that they
they will
will be attained. Severe"
be attained. Severe intentionalism,
intentionalism,
indeed.
indeed.
The third point is something that Kant has explained in several
places. The term Itbelief' "belief is used more than one way: it can range
in meaning
in meaning from from aa vague
vague assumption
assumption to to aa wish,
wish, to to aa hope,
hope, and to
and to
aa report
report of of the
the firmest
firmest knowledge.
knowledge. In In this
this section
section I'll I'll use
use it
it to
to
mean an
mean an assertion
assertion of of what
what one one takes
takes to to bebe true,
true, asas anan assertion
assertion of of
knowledge. Simple
knowledge. Simple honesty
honesty requires
requires that that we we never
never pretend
pretend to to
believe something
believe something true true when
when we we don't
don't have
have the the knowledge
knowledge that that it
it
is true.
is true. The The mostmost serious
serious matters
matters (following
(following the the epigraph
epigraph by by
Heraclitus quoted
Heraclitus quoted in in this
this book)
book) should
should be be based
based on on the most
the most
scrupulous attention
scrupulous attention to to honesty.
honesty. Knowledge
Knowledge should should not not be conflated
be conflated
with hope.
with hope. To To believe
believe thatthat aa proposition
proposition is is true
true is,is, in
in the strong
the strong
sense, to
sense, to know
know that that it it is
is true.
true. SinceSince knowledge
knowledge requires requires the the
well-known combination
well-known combination of of sense-data
sense-data and and aa priori categories, it
priori categories, it
makes no
makes no sense
sense to to hold
hold that
that one one ought
ought to to know.
know. PerhapsPerhaps one one
ought to
ought to try
try to to know,
know, but but thatthat is is aa different
different matter.
matter. BeliefsBeliefs
depend on
depend on the
the cognitive
cognitive elements,
elements, and and they
they are are not
not established
established by by
intention: therefore,
intention: therefore, no no belief
belief cancan be be aa matter
matter of of obligation
obligation..
The fourth
.The fourth pointpoint seems
seems outrageous,
outrageous, at at first
first glance.
glance. In In case we
case we
passed over
passed over thethe second
second pointpoint without
without absorbing
absorbing it, it, this statement
this statement
presses the
'presses the notion
notion thatthat wewe have
have no excuse for
no excuse for abandoning
abandoning aa moral moral
requirement even
requirement even ifif there
there is is not
not the
the slightest
slightest theoretical probability
theoretical probability
 282
282 THE RELIGIOUS
THE RELIGIOUS QUESTION
QUESTION

that the
that the end
end will
will occur.
occur. If If there
there werewere no no possibility
possibility of of its
its occur-
occur-
rence we
rence we would
would be be relieved
relieved of of the
the duty.
duty. Therefore
Therefore Kant Kant does does
have at
have at least
least this
this much
much concern
concern with with consequence:
consequence: the the intended
intended
result must
result must be be such
such that that itit isis not
not known
known to to be
be impossible.
impossible. Why Why care care
even this
even this much
much aboutabout consequences?
consequences? Because Because aa rationalrational being being
cannot intend
cannot intend an an inconsistent
inconsistent universe; universe; such such aa being
being cannot
cannot intend
intend
to do
. to do the
the impossible.
impossible. However, However, moral moral obligations
obligations remainremain in in force
force
even when
even when therethere isis no no knowledge
knowledge of of even
even thethe slightest
slightest probability
probability
of success,
of success, just
just 'as
as long
long as as there
there is is no
no proof
proof of of formal
formal impossibility.
impossibility.
Kant used
Kant used thethe above
above quotation
quotation in in connection
connection with with hishis comments
comments
on the
on the moral
moral obligation
obligation to to abolish
abolish war. war. This This is is aa part,
part, andand aa
central part,
central part, ofof the
the question
question that that we we are
are considering,
considering, namely, namely, the the
matter of
matter of working
working for for the the establishment
establishment of of an an ethical
ethical
commonwealth. In
commonwealth. In connection
connection with with this
this we
we found
found KantKant holding
holding
that one
that one needs
needs to to "presuppose"
"presuppose" aa "higher "higher moral
moral Being"
Being" in in order
order to to
unite the
unite the separate
separate individuals.
individuals. The The logical
logical force
force behind
behind the the notion
notion
of presupposition
of presupposition should should be be noted.
noted. Consider
Consider the the following
following
assertions:
assertions:
(5) One
(5) One is is obliged
obliged to to intend
intend Q. Q.
(6) Q
(6) Q cancan bebe intended
intended only only on on condition
condition that that P P is assumed.
is assumed.
(7) To
(7) To be be obliged
obliged to to intend
intend Q Q requires
requires thatthat" one one assume
assume P. P.
If
If (5)
(5) and
and (6)
(6) are
are accepted,
accepted, (7) (7) must
must hold:
hold: P P must
must be be assumed,
assumed, or or
presupposed.
presupposed. So, So, if if Kant
Kant is is correct
correct aboutabout the the requirement
requirement of of aa
higher
higher moral
moral Being,
Being, such such aa beingbeing has has to to be
be presupposed.
presupposed. Would Would
this
this violate
violate (3)(3) above?
above? Not Not as as long
long as as such
such aa Being
Being is is defined
defined so so
as
as toto be
be outside
outside of of the
the phenomenal
phenomenal world. world. The The status
status of of aa formal
formal
presupposition
presupposition or conjecture is quite different from a belief about
or conjecture is quite different from a belief about
something,
something, much much lessless aa belief
belief aboutabout something
something in in the phenomenal
the phenomenal
world.
world. Our OUf next
next step
step willwill bebe to to see
see what
what status
status Kant Kant gives
gives to to such
such
aa higher Being
higher Being or God. or God.
The
The question
question of of suchsuch an an entity
entity arises
arises in in thethe Critique
Critique of of Pure
Pure
Reason,
Reason, in in connection
connection with with an an analogous
analogous matter.
matter. There There itit is is not
not
the
the order
order of of the
the moral
moral world world but but the
the order
order of of the
the phenomenal
phenomenal
world
world that that isis the
the subject.
subject. Near Near the the endend ofof aa section
section called
called "TheliThe
Natural
Natural Dialectic
Dialectic of of Human
Human Reason," Reason," Kant Kant considers
considers whetherwhether
there
there is is
 283

. .. U)tbiq; djst;...r fmao !he world., wbido DDDI.u. tile arowod '" 1.hc ordu
<c "
of Llooe ......Id and ol iu mica witIo '111 ... 001 Low... . . I. Wr. beiq . .
,,""' ...... , 01 the J1UItoI. rea&y, ae m

":y. tic. ... 'I'

His amwt:r. ", . we reply that this question is entirely without

meaning. oM Since this ql,le$tion concerned the reality and neceM;ty
of such substance. Kant's answer is obvious. Reality and
nCMity are properties of COIUfinuNe 0fIily, and we have no
basis for understanding thal However, if a question arises about
a rq;ulatM auun!JNion of Ihe unity of Ibe world, Ihings are quile
different. We do need a regulative principle assuming the
systematic unity of nature, even stronger, the "systematic and
purposive unity. in lcoordaru:e with 1.IIli-.~n.allaws .. .on And tltis
regulative principle may be called divine wisdom. However, Kam
gives a warning .bout the reference of this phrase:

.. it "'\Ill ~ matter of CQalpiot. iDdiffcrCKe to .... ..x. _ pt".tcMo

SlId! ..uy. wIIether ..., ..y 1.Io.at Go<I ialoil .... ~ 11M willed ~ 10 be .... Of!
!hal _....., Us wioely ~ it Ill.... f Of ~ Us jllStilied lIS u. odoptiI>&
!he idea of .... premo i.II.UC<...., .. I ocbeme of the rqulaIiYc pri1>ciple is
peciotJy IIoiop_ 1""'1, ~ . .....ic _ ~ UI1i<y-I...Dry nicIo
............. has required . . . rquIaIie pitocipIr. thai .. lOS! llllderlie ..
....... iprinoo 01 Gal ...... " (My .",pI." ;")

So. we may male. a regulat;'-. anumption, "in order to view the

appearances U $)'$tematically connected. . .." Bl,lt 1I.'e are "DOt
jIlstified in assuming aboYe nature a Being with those qualitiel..u
The distinction between theK two conceptions is crucial. A
hypothe5is, Ye5: a belief a bout reality, no. A third question, the
possibility of hope. is independent of these two. To summarizc in
cootemporary terms, we CQII mmtion built{)( we "God. . We can
mention the term in a regulative hypotheW, but we canDOt use the
tcrm 10 rcfcr to ao object in tbc rcal world.
With these d istincti.o05 in miod, let U$ rct\lm to the mailer of the
status ollbe "presupposition" of. bighe r being in connection with
the ethical commonwealth. In ordcr to have a huis for the hope
of !be ethical commonwcalth. we need wnw: schema that ma];e5
possible the cooperation ohn the members olthe commonwcalth.
 TIiE REUGIOUS QUESTION

To have a bopc requires Waf we have a coD$istent schema &Ii the

image of our bope. Just as in the investigation of natu re, 50 in the
hope of a moral world, there we mu~t presuJlPCse "a unity which
our reason has required as a regulative principle. ....I< Thi5 unily
i5 an essential assumption, othelWise the hope of the ethical
commonweahh is inconsi5tent. However, as Kant put it in the
Fir5t CriJiqut, it i5 a maner of complete indiffcrence whether "'-e
eaII !his unity "God" or "nature." (A position !hat Spinoza had
already developed). 'The point is that the oommonwcalth requires.,
by its meaning. a unity of elements; thiJ writy cUJUlOl be blown but
must TemtW! III a mall6 of hCJ~. This i~ Kant's moral arJUment
for the bope of God, or of the rationality or oonsistency of the
universe. But 1M critical rdtltioruhip iJ 1wpe. n~ kna...faige or
belief

4. God.cetlte~d vs. GoodCentetN JltIiJions

We have 50 far in this chapler developed aspects of thc ootion

that it is a rcligious duly to work for the e thical commonwealth.
This goal is an achievement of humanity, collectively, despite the
individual's ambivalence and essential selfishness.. The case is
even stronger. It is not accomplished despite individual selfishne5&,
but by the mhanisn! of individual iClfuhness. The antagonism of
individuals. their very nastincS&, helps produce 5O(ia1 progress
because it causes society to improve and justify its accommodation
pallern. However, a",'1lTCI\CU of this docs oot justify individual
sclfishllC5l. The individual is still tom bet",e ... n the notion that
one'. penonal acesses wiUIIO{ hano human prngrcu hislOrkal1y,
and tbe IlOtion Ihal penonal eJlCCSSCS Ire WTOI'1g and a mailer of
immorality. Both parts of thi5 are lrue. The individual's immoral
ities will be trivial 10 thc human ~ce in one thous.and years. but
they are still immoralitie$. Even if they tum out to be of .... rvice
10 humanity in one thousand years. they are immoralities. This is
the crucial "and yet" in Kant's position. The SlIme act may be
trivial from olle standpoillt. and yet 5ignificam from allOther. Th is
dilemma i. more apparem than actual, as we shall sec.
 The role of ignorance is import&Dt here. We are not i&norant
of moral demands on us. We are DOt ignorant of !be cateJOrica1
imperative. So, Kant insists, we do know what we, as individuals,
ought to do and ought not do. However, we are ignorant of just
what will be most efficient for the ultimate unity of humanity. To
put this in the alternate phrueo]ogy, we are ignorant of nature's
or God's mechanism. But, we do not need to know reality itself,
in order to know out duties. 'There are no obUgations to God or
the universe, beyond obUgations 10 fenow rational bein~. "The
unity of !be universe is an assumption that we require. but our
assumption, our own regulative principle, doe!. not make moral
demands on us in return. Hence Kant's disdain for what he called
the "God centered'" religions. They confuse constitutive and
regulative principles, use of God with mention of "God.; and II\O$t
seriously, selrlSh and moral objective,- In sum, they confuse be lief
with hope. and rational with irrational hope.

So Religion as a Theol)' or Human Hlilol)'

The question may sliD remain, Does Kant have religious

position, 01'" doH he simply undentand religion as moral exhorta-
tion? I tale it that a reUgiOlis position has two essential postu
Ia,es: (I) there is one highest objective, one supreme or most
si&nificant gna.! or heaven, and (2) all human beings have the same
highest objective." In this sense of the term "religiO\lS," Kant's
position is religiou,- The fint postulate is satisfied by his C(lOCCp-
tion of the ethical C(lmmonwealth. This is the highest objective of
nature, the so-ealled "heaven," in his philosophy of history. The
seoond postulate. the univers:ilist property. is also a pan of Kan t's
view. He takes it that each human being (and each flItional
animal) has the same moral imperative within. Therefore, the
several formulations of the categorical imperative are equally
binding 00 each human being. and the duty to ",uri< for the

.,.
kingdom of ends, the ethical commonwealth, is an equal duty for
 mE REUG IOUS QUESTION

The question still may be rai5ed: What separates Kant's religion

from his morality? No one could illSist more clearly that the only
sacred being is the human being, and the only dutieli are the
moral duties.. Funbermore, the only hasis for hope of '!.alvation
is moral worthine55. Where. then. is the sepat1l.te scope of
religion?
It lies in the framework of hope. Hope pre.suJllXlse!i ignorance.
In order to hope for 5Ometbing, one must be ignorant of whether
it will occur. Morality is not a matter of ignoran~e, for Karll. He
holds that we do know in what morality consists. But the
reasooahle questioo remains: SuppCle I try ali hard as I can to be
moral7 What can I hope? and What can humanity hope? The
responses to these questions are not matlers of morality but
mailers of history. We may o;a]l them mailers of history or
religion; for this pllrpoR they are synonymous. A hope is always
a construction about the future. and 50 it presupposes, or is. a
theory of history.
A s.pecial property of the religious hope for a kingdom of ends
is that it is approachable, continually, a1tOOu&h what would be
meant by reaching it is unclear. To have human beings behave
purely out of respect for the moral law. and yet still be human
beilliSo is mystcriOUli. (In traditional language. this is the demand
that we become "new persons..") Su~h a situation has the proper
clements required by Kant's sense of mystcry. We know ..,IIy the
kingdom of elKls is needed: no one should be used merely as a
means by anyone else. H owever, we have troublc undcrstanding
",hal would be thc details of such a situation. Such a moral hea
Yen is mysterious, yet it still is an object of religious or historical
hop<.

6. ReUgious Proaress
The questions sometimes arise. Is this a rclijous age? Have
otber ages been more religious? Kant doesn't consider exactly
these formulations, but he does deal with a matter that is pre$Up-
posed by them. Book One of &/JgioII Wit/z;" tlte Limits of &tuOrI
AfOlle ilafU wi th the is.sue be~en those who hold that the history
of the world iJ moral dedine, and tho$e who hold Ihal il i,
moral pr~ Kant's answer is that "Tlte human ntce has always
been in progress towards the better .nd will continue to be IiO
hencefonh. .. H owever, "No single member in aU of these
generations of the hUfILUI race, but only the species. fully achieves
ilS destination ... Individuals (on the whole) ate 00 more moral
in one genenttion than in another, hut also 00 less; despite th is,
huma nity be(ll)lIleS more civilized, the human species makes
progress in morality. The present is the IDO$t mow age so far.
The hopes of individuals to be wonhy of mysterioos assistance are
based on their own personal morality, and ~ have 00 reason to
think that there i5 any progress or regress here. Therefore, the
religious litu.tion (rom the itandpoint of the individual does oot
change. However, the hope that the species will continually
improve does regularly get fresh evidence. Kaoltook the pol itieal
history of Europe from the ancient Greeks to his own day to show
' a regular progress in the eoru;tilUtion of states on our continenl."u
So, humanity makes moral progress, and one can confidently hope
that this will eontinue. Of what use is the: hope of humaniry'li
progress to the individual? We have called attention 10 Kant's
idea thaI individu.al$ eannDt be indifferent to the species. 10 that
larger thing of which they are a pan. Bul, while they are
concerned with the hopes of humanity, they are aJso concerned
with their peT$On.al hopes and fean. 1bey are not merely
religious. But the religion thai they do have is the: SCI of !\opes
concerned with the twO postlliates: the hope of progress toward
the ethical commonwealth, &nd, carried with ;1, the metahope that
everyone will have the same hope. To answer the question about
whether this is a more or less religious qe than the past, Kant
might 51y that individuals are 1101 more moral, and so have 00
more religious hope than past ages. hut the class of human beings
is gradually becoming more morally organized and so the religious
objective is being approached mote dosely than in earlier periods.
288 ruE REUGIOUS QUES110N

1. The ReIiJiollli QuestlOIl: Wb. 1 Ca.. Be Said . bool Hope1

We. owe to Erie Frank a useful characterization of the history of

the religious question in the West:" 10 the Greek period the
question was,"What is Ihe _ " " of the OOO$?" What are they
made of? In the Mediev,al period _ had the question of
ailtcnu. ls there a God? From the Medieval period dale the
so-called "proofs" of God'ii aislcnce. The Modem period,
accoTdinglo Frank, takes the question of utilily to be the principle
wue. -Of what use is the be lief in God?" This is. psychological
question roneerning the effect on the believer. Kant's altitude
loward these fonnuiatioll$ of the religious question should be
""""'"-
After tbe fin! Cril~. the Greek and Medieval qucltioD$ eould
no longer be seriously cntcnaioed. We arc eimer ignorant or
aboorant of the ess.ence and existence of God: kllOlOllcdge of
l>Wm<:nal matters is. concepma/ impossibility. The Firs! Crilique
r.akes lipecial paill$ to destroy any pouible proof" ollhe eIi$lcnee
of God. Kint explains the moral argument for the regulative
assumption of rationality, but this is an :wumplion not a proof.
What of the status of the Modern question, the utility of beUef?
Kant's ruponse to that is disgust at the hypocrisy of pretenodilli
belief when there can be no basis for il Such dishonesty, he
hold!;, docs gT!:at mural harm. There can be no moral utility on
such a basis, and no other utility is worth considering. If each of
thcK three questiora iI eliminated, ,,hat is the essential religious
iSMIe? Kant's llrawer is quite clear.
The religious question is., What can I hope? At..-ays a du;olilt,
Kant ha:! two answers. From the standpoint of the individual, one
can hope for happine.u, if one is n<M unworthy of il This is a
second--order hope, however, and while it hu a formal (and
poetic) status., it has no first--order wbstantial status (in any 1Il'-n5e
of MlNtantiar). But Kant presents U$ with his !Iecond answer to
the religious question. From the standpoint 01 humanity, we can
hope fot progress toward a perfectly cthical commonwealth, and
we OUght to ... lind can ... have that hopoe.
 The Religious
Religious Question
Question 289

Does this satisfy the individual? A hope hope for a vaguevague notion
notion of of
happiness, if if one is morally worthy; plus the hope hope that
that the human
species will continue to make progress toward toward a moralmoral andand unified
world government,
government. Kant has located located most most of of the traditional
Christian
Christian religious vocabulary
vocabulary in the noumenal noumenal world. This
vocabulary
vocabulary can be mentioned
mentioned but but not used, not not even
even as the object
of
of aa first-order
first-order hope.
hope. Still,
Still, there
there is
is the
the status
status ofof aa second-order
second-order
hope.
hope. As As aa second-order
second~order hope, hope, wewe have
have mentionability
mentionability and, and,
therefore,
therefore, the the option
option to to make
make poetic
poetic use
use of of the vocabulary.
the vocabulary.
The philosopher, George Santayana, is an example of of an author
who has taken this poetic poetic turn, and has treated
treated religious literature
as poetry, as great and valuable poetry.^ poetry.20 How How mightmight Kant
respond
respond to to Santayana?
Santayana? Kant Kant could
could have
have no no objection, provided
objection, provided
the
the attachments
attachments to to poetic
poetic formulations
formulations nevernever intrude
intrude on on the proper
the proper
and independent
and independent area area of of morality.
morality. Provided
Provided that that the
the poetry
poetry is is
enjoyed but
enjoyed but not
not believed
believed or or trusted
trusted .. .. .. and
and isis never substituted
never substituted
for truth
for that can
truth that can come
come onlyonly from
from science.
science. Kant Kant grants
grants that such
that such
literature
literature cancan help lead to
help lead the purely
to the purely ethical
ethical religion,
religion, if presented
if presented
with care. With
with care. With thesethese reservations,
reservations, thesethese warnings,
warnings, enjoying
enjoying
religious literature as
religious literature as poetry
poetry cancan give
give aa welcome
welcome intermission
intermission in in
the daily
the daily need
need toto dodo business
business with
with reality.
reality. Can Can we we live without
live without
poetry, with
poetry, with science
science alone?
alone? Nietzsche's
Nietzsche's challenge
challenge mocksmocks us, "Show
us, "Show
me the
me the mythless
mythless man!"
man!"
Kant insists that even we ambivalent persons do care about the
categorical imperative and the future of our species; and our
serious and worldly hope is for progress toward a single ethical
government for the world. Hope is the measure of of human beings,
of their
of their dignity
dignity and
and morality.
morality. The The question,
question. Who Who areare you? means.
you? means,
For what do you hope? Recall the challenge at the end of his
outline of the philosophy of history: Our descendants will have
just one significant
just one significant question,
question, "What
"What have
have the the various nations and
various nations and
goverimients contributed
governments contributed to to the
the goal
goal of
of world
world citizenship,
citizenship, andand what
what
have they
have they done
done to to damage
damage it?" it?" InIn another
another form form of of the
the same
same
question; What
question; What are are we,we, ip.dividually,
individually, doing
doing to to contribute
contribute to to the
the
goal of
goal of world
world citizenship,
citizenship, and and what
what are
are we we doing
doing to to damage
damage it? it?
290 1lfE REUGJOUS QUESTlON

.. Aftenhouchc: On Kalil'. Op!imilm

AI the end of his work 50mt final qucstioll$ may arise .bout the
limits. basis, and che suength of Kant'S optimLsm. He is opcimislie
about human beings, collectively. hut pc!oSim\s.li~ ..boo! individuals;
individuals will nol reach all of their goau..
Individllals ean', hope
to saw.fy all of their wants because they wanl inoonsisteoo.
1bey wanl both the selfish and the moral principle. The conap-
lion of rea.~ID. 01 rationality. is central 10 both Kant's oplimim
about humanity and peu imism abom the individual. If the
individual musl try 10 overcome se lfishness in favor of reason. che
hope of SUCttS5 will be small.
Why lu,h ronfidenee in the reality of reason? How does Kant
avoid \he ahe mative of the malicious demon lila! e\'cn rational-
isc like DeseartC$ had to mention? This is the pos.s.ibility th.t the
universe, al bottom, is not Dpel1lting on a con:s.i.stent set of laW$.
The iuue bec ...."C'cn oonsistent and an inCOll5istenl universe is
synonymous. wi th cbe choice between a world produced by
bcnevolenl deity and by a malicious demon. Pre:rumably a
consistent unive rse or a benevolem deity can be trusted; an
inconsistent universe would be like a malicious demon, capable or
deceiving us in anything. even in what seems most certain.
A pauage in Kant considel'$ DucaItes's desperate thought. and
the idea disgusts him.

E ... ~ ill'" ,.., .. ioooo 011 .... p i 01. !ob<'"h;............. re a/vo.. ~ 1<> ~&ia
;.w '"""" wis&, .... otiU =.!d cutoin!y _ be 1- , i i , _IYU b,
""<>Pi... lile ... uino oI...,..ki>ls ' or ~ ..-ilk \lft/'C1c~li", pel'K'o'e'lIOU. Indeed,
........... dilly .<> do ....."" I<) . . . - _ 1M _ I ,.". ...:..\Po ... ".;;w
ddw .., _Id , .. tiu II) 1M """,""" _ ,j"
'" a ... """ _
8/10. tIk:r &Dd .n JOI<C;'" 01 oo. ..... t.a _ "'own
OIl< p<i.odpIeo . . . in
.OF.be ...;ck oII.be oche. ",e ' i" oI'''molr; un<kr lhe .. me m,r'''''' ol
....1In.. (My .... pI..o.)

TI!ere is sell$e of the term "sacred" in which iOmtthing is caned

sacred if it canOOl be questioned. 15 reason acred, for Kant?
Why is it disgusting. in the passage above, 10 wish 10 dispense ,,"ith
 'lk Religious Quesrion
'"
reason? Kant'5 reaction 10 the problem is panly similar to that of
Des.canes, but Ihere are iignifJCant difference between tbem.
For Kant. the tlO$CSI thing 10 a sacred being is "a human being
(the holiest of beings in this world). ... Nothing else has this rank.
in Kant'i view. What rank does reason have? It is the source of
value. It is reason th;il makes each of us an end in OIIrselves, that
raised humanity allogether above community wilh animals.." But
il is reason that compels u.s to consider fellow human beings as
equals. as individuals whose righu oblige us to reurain OIIr
selfishness. 1lIe "restrainu are far morc cssential for thc
ct.tahlWuncnt of a civil society lhan inclinalion and love .....
H umans would be disgustcd with reason if, after all the sacrifices,
all the restrainu thaI il has produced in us, reason itself cannot he
truSted. However, Kanl has almost no dOllht about lhe depend-
ability of our rational awareness of the moral law within us. We
find it within us and find ilto be the clearest and most compelling
aspect of our universe. We are aware of IIOthilli more cogent.
1lIe use of reason in makiOJ us aware of the moral l~w is a
different maner from the application of reason 10 knowledge of
the external world. In the Second Thesis of Ihe "Idea fnr a
Universal. HislO..,. on a Cosmopolitical Plan,' Kant held that "In
man .. . those natural capacities which are directed to the use of
his reason arc to be fully developed only in the rue, 001 in the
individual." The history of science is a collccr.ive not an individual
effon. Each generation "passes iu own enlightenment to iu
lUl'Cessor ..... A dualisl on this as well as each of Ihe other basic
conceptions, Kanl gives "reason" both individual and collective
roles.
Returning 10 nur filial questinn, What is Kant's ani tude toward
the possibility Ihat reason is not trustworthy? Fillt, he insists that
individuah are in no doubt abollt their moral rea~n, about the
moral principle. 1lIere may be problems about the application of
the principle. Then, he has underlined the fact that we have 110
choi~ about the bind lhat Nature has impo5Cd on us. the bind
betweeo reason and selfisbness. HO'ft'ever, 10 wish to dispellSC
m mE REUGIOUS QUESTION

with reason would be literally unnatural, and in that sense,

disgusting.
In the course of Ihis argument Kant betrays a bil of "misology"
as he called it in the Foundations of the Mnaphyljcr of Moroh.
This is Ihe hatred of reason thai may .:orne upon those who
realize that tea!iOn re$lrieu their pursuit of happiness. He didn't
simply say thai it is impossible 10 wish to di$pensc wilh fcason; be
said il would be disgusting.. To ealI something "disgusting." one
has to appreciate the desire and yel deny il ... <kny it wilh
emotional name-calling. Kant'. language Juggestl ambivalence
about the stalUS of rCiLSOlL II suggests that Kant, lib the rest of
us, was ambivalent abou t ~Yhillg. And yet we find oone\ves
able to hope. in the face of aU our ambivalence, that the future
will be desirable, thai humanity will make progress.. AI leasl we
say thaI we hope.
 Notes
Notes

Chapter
Chapter One
One

1.
1. Critique
Cn"tique ofofPure
Pure Reason.
Reason. A805/B833.
A805/B833. See See the
the Bibliography
Bibliography for for the
the exact
exact
edition
edition oror translation
translation used
used for
for Kant's
Kant's works.
works. TheThe numbers
numbers in in the
the notes
notes refer
refer to
to
the
the Berlin
Berlin Akademie
Akademie edition,
edition, the
the standard
standard reference
reference for
for Kant's
Kant's texts.
texts. Almost
Almost allall
of
of the
the modern
modern translations
translations contain
contain these
these reference
reference numbers,
numbers, and and can
can bebe easily
easily
consulted.
consulted. For For translations
translations without
without Berlin
Berlin Akademie
Akademie numbers,
numbers, their
their own
own page
page
numbers will
numbers will be
be given.
given.
2. Kant:
2. Kant: Philosophical
Philosophical Correspondence,
Correspondence, 1759-99.
1759-99. Ed.
Ed. and
and trans.
trans. Amulf
Amulf Zweig
Zweig
(Chicago: The
(Chicago: The University
University of of Chicago
Chicago Press,
Press, 1967),
1967), p.
p. 54.
54.
3. Not
3. Not only
only textbook
textbook authors
authors writing
writing introductions,
introductions, butbut sophisticated
sophisticated scholars
scholars
can hardly
can hardly avoid
avoid calling
calling Kant's
Kant's system
system "radically
liradically dualistic,"
dualistic," as
as Richard
Richard Kroner
Kroner putput
it, in
it, in "The
"The Truth
Truth of of Faith," The Christian
Faith, The
Ii Chn"stian Scholar,
Scholar, 47:1
47:1 (Spring
(Spring 1964),
1964), p.
p. 52.
52.

Chapter Two

1. B xiii. From the Preface to the second edition of of the Critique of

of Pure
Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: SL
Reason, St. Martin's Press, 1929).
Unless noted, all references in this section on Kant's theory of knowledge will
from this Critique. The English translations will be Smith's. References
come from
win follow the standard pattern of indicating the page numbers of the Berlin
will Berlin
edition, using "A" "A" for
for Kant's first edition,
first edition, and "B" for
"B" for his second.
second.
2. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3.
3. Ibid.,
Ibid., my
my emphasis.
emphasis.
4. Ibid.,
4. Ibid., BB xvi.
xvi,
5. Ibid., B xvii.
5. Ibid., B xvii.
6. As Kant
6. As Kant mentions
mentions inin note
note "a"
"a" of ibid.,BBxviii.
of ibid., xviii.
7. A26-27, B42-43.
7. A26-27, B42-43.
8.
8. A27/B43.
A27/B43.
9. A27/B43.
9. p a i i m z .
mid.
10. Ibid.
10.
11. A37/B54.
11. A37/B54.
12.
12. A42/B59.
A42/B59.
13. A51/B75.
13. A51/B75.
14.
14. Familiar
Familiar places
places to
to find
find these
these arguments
arguments in in brief
brief are
are AA742/B770,
742/B770, andand
A753/B781.
A753/B781.
15. This
15.' This isis now
now aa familiar
familiar distinction
distinction usually
usually credited
credited toto Gottlob
Gottlob Frege.
Frege.
16.
16. A702/B730.
A702/B730.
294
294 NOTES
NOTES

17. A475/B503.
17. A475/B503.
18. A470/B498.
18. A470/B498.
19. A702/B730.
19. A702/B730.
20. A479jB57,
20. A479/B57, note note a.a. The
The emphasis
emphasis is is Kant's.
Kant's.
Md.
21. Ibid.
21.
22. A482/B510.
22. A482/B510.
23. All
23. All references
references in in this
this section
section are
are to
to Kanrs
Kant's Foundations
Foundations of of the
the Metaphysics
Metaphysics
of Morals,
of Morals, trans.
trans. Lewis
Lewis W. W. Beck
Beck (New
(New York:
York: Liberal
Liberal Arts
Arts Press,
Press, 1959),
1959), unless
unless
otherwise specified.
otherwise specified. Page Page numbers
numbers are are toto the
the Akademie
Akademie edition
edition asas well
well as
as to
to the
the
translation.
translation.
24. Alfred
24. Alfred C. C. Kinsey,
Kinsey, Wardell
Wardell B. B. Pomeroy,
Pomeroy, and and Clyde
Clyde E. E. Martin,
Martin, Sexual
Sexitai
Behavior in
Behavior in the
the Human
Human Male Male (Philadelphia:
(Philadelphia: Saunders
Saunders and and Co.,
Co., 1948).
1948).
25. Critique
25. Critique of of Practical Reason,
Reason, trans.
trans. Lewis W. W. Beck (New York: York: The Liberal
Liberal
Arts Press,
Arts Press, 1956),
1956), pp.pp. 88-89.
88-89.
26. Ibid.,
26. Ibid., [86].
[86].
27. For
27. For aa more
more detailed
detailed presentation
presentation of of the
the matter
matter ofof style
style in
in this
this area,
area, see
see my
my
"Moral Style,"
"Moral Style," TheThe Journal
Journal of of Value
Value Inquiry,
Inquiry, 24 24 (1990):123-133.
(1990):123-133.
28. Quotations
28. Quotations in this this section
section will
will be
be taken
taken from
from Lewis
Lewis W. W. Beck's
Beck's expert
expert
translation of
translation of the
the "Idea
"Idea for
for aa Universal
Universal History
History from
from aa Cosmopolitan
Cosmopolitan Point Point ofof
View," in
View," in Beck's
Beck's edition
edition ofof Kant
Kant onon History
History (Indianapolis:
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill,
Bobbs-Merrill, 1963).1963).
Page references,
Page references, in in parentheses,
parentheses, are are to
to the
the Akademie
Akademie edition,
edition, asas is standard.
is standard.
29. For
29. For aa more
more complete
complete analysis
analysis ofof his
his philosophy
philosophy of of history see my
history see my A Study
A Study
of Kant's
of Kant's Philosophy
Philosophy of of History (Ann Arbor,
History (Ann Arbor, Mich.:
Mich.: University
University Microfilms, 1955).
Microfilms, 1955).
30. Adam
30. Adam Smith,Smith, An An Inquiry into the
Inquiry into the Nature
Nature and and Causes
Causes of of the Wealth of
the Wealth of
Nations,
Nations, as as reprinted
reprinted in in Social
Social Reformers,
Reformers, ed. ed. Donald
Donald O. O. Wagner
Wagner (New (New York:
York:
Macmillan
Macmillan Co., 1959), p.
Co., 1959), p. 20.
20.
31.
31. "Perpetual
"Perpetual Peace,"
Peace," 369,
369, iain Kant,
Kant, OnOn History,
History, my emphasis.
my emphasis.
32.
32. For
For anan extension
extension of of this,
this, see
see S.
S. Axinn,
Axinn, "Kant
"Kant and
and the
the French Revolution,"
French Revolution,"
Journal
Journal of of the
the History
History of of Ideas,
Ideas, 32:3
32:3 (1971),
(1971), pp. pp. 423-432,
423-432. Also
Also seesee the
the papers
papers by by
Lewis
Lewis W. W. Beck,
Beck, JohnJohn Atwell,
Atwell, and
and Charles
Charles Dyke
Dyke in in the
the same
same issue
issue ofof that
that journal
journal
for
for different
different views
views of of the
the question
question of of Kant's
Kant's viewview of
of revolutions.
revolutions.
33.
33. For more consideration of Kant's nominalism see
For more consideration of Kant's nominalism see S.S. Axinn,
Axinn, "Kant
"Kant andand
Goodman
Goodman on on Possible
Possible Individuals,"
Individuals," TheThe Monist,
Monist, 1:31:3 (July,
(July, 1978):476-482.
1978):476-482.
34.
34. For
For aa discussion
discussion of of the
the significance
significance of of the
the Fallacy
Fallacy ofof Composition,
Composition, see see S.
S.
Axinn,
Axinn, "Kant,
"Kant, Logic,
Logic, andand the
the Concept
Concept of of Mankind,"
Mankind," Ethics,
Ethics, 48:4
48:4 (1958):286-291.
(1958):286-291.
35.
35. In
In Kant's
KanCs Reli^on
Religion Within
Within thethe Limits
Limits of of Reason
Reason Alone,
Alone, trans.
trans. Theodore
Theodore M. M.
Greene
Greene and and Hoyt
Hoyt H. H. Hudson
Hudson (New (New York:
York: Harper
Harper Bros.,
Bros., 1960),
1960), he he insists
insists that
that
aa human
human beingbeing is is "the
"the holiest
holiest ofof beings
beings in in this
this world."
world." Note
Note p.p. 147.
147.
 '95

0<aII" bet,Tr . Shollntw;uy &lid Kaai: wdI bdon: Kaat, SIIaI\:aI:Iu<y dc\dapc<I
all "....hue iIIIttotine m<nIiIy.
4. Sec S. A>i.o, A MDNI M""*'1 (Phold ;'.' ;" T _pIc U~ heu,
19!19j. oad S. AJ:imo, "KalIl. AI>II>oricy, ..... IIoc f'l'e.do ~. /"",...1 c(dv
HiIWy <1/ ,_, 3l:3 (1971):.Q3.;Ill.

V-_.1. Bcrurd De N r i . :.0.'0 detipdul. AlIt bt" 'J WI> IlN 0.;,;.. '" MOI<II
a work tIoa( . . . opparutJy finI prinIcd ill doe k ' , ., ..c..;... 01 . . 1lv
F.tHa ",11K Ika. Tbo ICXI tbat t'Ye IIICd iI. the oelo<:riooo 'tpr;.'td ;" s..juLioo
Road, 1lv a.'rio/ NOIflIUa.
6.. SeeS .......... 'KalIl add 1*,*- : JNUI< ao-un,&>Ww. 59:1 (1'l68):9-ll
7. SO< S. A>:iaD, "1'....,. 01 .... Sia&\o Riok,.' "'ilowplty of Sdttoa, l:U,2
(1%6); aad 'Moral StyIe,' JOfUMJ of V_ I~, N (19\IO):ID-lll.

I. n.: a<a<\e_;,;...,1Ie>; io 10 cicc tlooe ....u-u..... p.". 01 .... F" ..M _

a( IN M ; b 0( NONJity. Sec Ik '.:1...... ethico ill CIoapIet T'Mt.
2. FA,,1ri<w11 cf lIN' MIT :F.Jo>a '" NoN., 41&. As ""'"" the c:iI....
...... ben <de, 10 Iloc 1Icr1ioo Abdeeie ,,10.. T1rot tn",' plinoo;' by t.e.it W,
lied< (New Y.,.k: ,.,.. UbenoI AfU ........ l'lSI).
l. 1I>id, 419.
<~
 NOl<S

S. FOI' ...,.., amalyiio 01 tk _y KMI .... tile pIu'-. ....:1 yd." ud ill
a pplicaliou 10 hio "Olio- d .......6e: iBccresl. _ my "Aaci Yo<: A Xeti ..
~ cl "e,,' " ic lowaI; '1"'770{'1)' MId ..........'OC ' qC4J 1W .. "CJt, 25:1
(l964):lOS- lI6.
_.1Itloon.
6.!'"1IS! 'ottI,,'MI. 1 btr--.c, by C ....., BM....,. ..... Ioio Dooo D.
Jodc_. Jay HMqr, ..... J ..... Wed' ... , .. ..,....... cI.l1ocory ol~
~ x- "'t, 1,. {l9S6'j:2'lI .264.
7".
1, " .... E. !!"''''f. . QMf/kI_ D<t/....: A Ott.... JJwooy (New Yoric
HapeI' T",cloboc.t, 1963), pp. 315-16.
S. Tr~od. ~1Ib 92 oM 9l <>lit.: H.....,liu chapla, ltd. aDd 1nDI.
Mat.. c. N"" Sc' ....... FIQIft .ty a-t 11ti!m.. ~j (N'ew York: Oofta"""

"""'"
9. T . ..... Harold C. OOfdiaer, SJ . no. c-J'.m-.. 0{ Sot A~ (N .....
Yod<: P'ockeI Boob, t-., 1952). pp. 1C-1
10. Cilco! .. Balj,omia R&IId, cd. n. 0llHklll MMIfIltt (Bao!,..: H ...,,,,,,,,
Miftlia. 1931), p. S.
IL~.
12. ~ 1i1th .. IlvUmiarfR_ ... _,u ..... n eodore M,Gree ... ud
H.". H. HIidoooo (New V....: t!at-pe. a.od BIT... .. 19100), P. 29.
U. F~ 0{ W Nd4lfAl i"' 0( Ii.... (<IQ5). P. 21 .
I., ();dqo't of 1'"...*", _ (IS). ltOM. t..cwio W. Bcd< (New YOlk: TIle
Libuol Arlo p ...... 19S6), P. 'lO.
U. ~ 0{ 1.....1d4 83, tr ..... J. H, Be...." (New York: Haf.....
eo..
I"IIbIi.hiIli 11lS1), p. lI!O.
16. "SI" .. J'e"i ... ;,. , 11_ T , B, s.....s.... no, buys of AIIINu
SdKfrO'O""''' (New Vorl: Wdley Boot Co.), PI''''''L

L The _erial iIIlkis ....pltt is W:CII from 01' ~ "" . . . joiDt poper b,
s.i<IwJ AD.... ...:I DrAd AD..a. "Nota "" tile LoP< oil"" lpo<ucc RdMio..:
14""",,_ ~ (110 ..... ..,. 1):2 (AprilI9?I5):I- I,U l10fII pope. ~.
>mlnI<tioa .. tu .... <II oymbolio< loP<. """ disliftpWIa carerlilly betwce.
.non
"",..",iooIo. ........ , ud theor ....... TK pt...", ....."'.. ;, &II to pt ...",
the fnIiu of thot papa wit.IoooIt 'l""botie loP-
1. Alfred Tonki, "l'1oc Scm.Mit O'zr-pt;<. cl Trail; f'IoJboopltJ _
1"1... " ....",rytI lfaNrdo, 4 (Morel; 1I"W):341_3iI\.
J. Abooo:w~ ;, der~ m:- lbe Lot;., ........1 (Sdoolars wi! know tbt ill
..ithct AIICieDt ... MedievallMia did ' "'-oro' -... . Ihvid Am .... ud I odm~
" _ i o o .)
4. WolWd VIII Ornou QIlioK:, Woni _ Objt (O- h M-.: lIan>Ud
U.;.....;,y I'rcu, 1960), P. 194.
 297

S. D. hul SII)det, II""'" LafIc _ III AppIicMotu <New Y",1<: V..

Noouud, IIci"hoId, 1971), p.. 201.
6. Jaalto HiDtikb, KM<-" L< Mil &Iiq (l1.hlu, N.Y" ConoelI U~
I'1'ea, 1962). pp. ]8.39. He _ .......... .,.1Li&h! ...... <OIIne 01 ,...od""
IUo '"K<rp' .... /olio r....... 'O'bat. h e,. IbM" .. nO ........., Ioe ........ '1lM b"
II06aas at def....a.iJi(y and oir!w ;"'pn'iooo ,;.e oomethq q";';. d;lfe.elll.
7. WiUard V.. 0 . - ow.... AI-.. :I"M ~ (e....b,Hr. 101-.:
H unnI UMeniry Pta&, 1951).
&. Su S. """"' oad D. AlIi..oa, ....... I..oP< 01 !he Jporaace R.I......... ' ,.,..
......, clefail.
9, Hi ... jU.. X-'"..". *114 Sditf. P. 211
10.. Saydet. Nodd lAfic, p. \(l6.
IL 7Jwr N,.),!'.,,.,. "fjo1n 0( I'kwt. U'IYIL J _ EDi ..."," (bw> .. 0polia:
BnI.N.MttriII eo..19601), I"I~ p. lOt.

I. IIdiri- Wi_ flu! L.imiu '" Rutt AIoov, ........ n.c od<wt M. G _ .....
HO)'I II. Hudooa CNew York: HOIJIU pel Brolbers, i!lllO), p. 7.
1. 51""""", EJhks, tr..... Williaa H. While., ..... JUICI Gill ...... (New Yo<\ ;
Ho6Ie. l'vbIi<hinl Co" 19'51), p. 111. dc:fiajr ..... 12 ... U
1. V'1bor Fn.nki, NIM~ SUIdo /<II NutliJ1J (New Y",k: WuIIi"ll"" Sq~.,.
I'reu, i963), P. l I j,
11.0. tt.io feat ... of ob.criptK.. I IIudy ,er... _ io W. Y. o.n.c,
N~'ric" ~ (Cambo" .. , 101-..: H........ UaiwrsiIy ......... 1951). OCCIioo.
27, 'Om ' iplioooI ..... N.......
So IWt, 0fI<qwI '" /'w>e~. A22S{Plm
6. lW4. ~/Pt6I1.
7. No ill 0... AI""...".. "hi Ll>P<-.
&. 1'bi4~ po lSI. nu.
...,_01 lppUnI .. _"",jaoo witIo I rl;""H!' ... of '"".-
do""" ope'"'''''

1. kWI Ly.d. 7Jwr 1".... <I{ ~ 0(1' (C. ... bridae, Mas&..: MJ.T. Pr .... 19(0).
2. AriMotlc, Dt ........., 02&, 7.
1. Aa tlQompio. (rom Net- Good..... Ff, FlcfitJ>o. MOd FMI<IUi (Ca .. -
bo Ow ' Muo..: Ib<>ar<1 UllMroi!y Prao, 1m),
4. "L;:Utr I'Tom EpioNnIs Ie) Mcoocel&, 11..... a .."" D. Y(IIUIJ. npriruod
irrr Ikrr.juoi. RMrI, 7Jorr o,,'WM Nomau (0001"", lb.""
Mim", Co. 1937).
po III.
298
298 NOTES
NOTES

5. See,
5. See, S.
S. Axinn,
Axinn, "Mathematics
"Mathematics as as an
an Experimental
Experimental Science,"
Science," Philosophia
Philosophia
Mathematica, 5:1 (1968):1-10. Reprinted in Philosophy and Mathematics,
Mathematica, 5:1 (1968):1-10. Reprinted in Philosophy and Mathematics, ed. ed.
Robert J.J. Baum
Robert Baum (San
(San Francisco:
Francisco: Freeman,
Freeman, Cooper
Cooper and
and Co.,
Co., 1973),
1973), pp.
pp. 283-292.
283-292.
6. John
6. John Dewey,
Dewey, "The
"The Influence
Influence of
of Darwin
Darwin onon Philosophy
Philosophy and
and Other
Other Essays
Essays in
in
Contemporary Thought,"
Contemporary Thought," reprinted
reprinted inin Max
Max H. H. Fisch,
Fisch, ed.,
ed., Classic
Classic American
American
Philosophers (New
Philosophers (New York:
York: Appleton
Appleton Century
Century Crofts,
Crofts, 1951),
1951), p.
p. 344.
344.

Chapter Eight
Chapter Eight

1. Critique
1. Critique of of Practical
Practical Reason,
Reason, trans.
trans. Lewis
Lewis W.W. Beck,
Beck, [24]
[24] (New
(New York:
York: TheThe
Liberal Arts
Liberal Arts Press,
Press, 1956),
1956), p.p. 23.
23.
2. Ibid.,
2. Ibid., [5],
[5], p.
p. 5.
5.
3. Ibid.,
3. Ibid., p.p. 6.
6.
4. Critique
4. Critique of of Judgment,
ludgnient, 91, 91, trans.
trans. J.J. H.
H. Bernard
Bernard (New(New York:
York: Hafner
Hafner
Publishing Co.,
Publishing Co., 1951).
1951).
5. For
5. For thethe large
large number
number of of references
references to to The
The Critique
Critique of
of Pure
Pure Reason
Reason inin this
this
chapter, I'll give only the A and B citations. These will
chapter, I'll give only the A and B citations. These will be to the trans. by be to the trans, by
Norman Kemp
Norman Kemp Smith Smith (New
(New York:
York: St.St. Martin's
Martin's Press,
Press, 1929).
1929).
6. J.
6. J. P.
P. Day,
Day, "Hope,"
"Hope," American Philosophical
Philosophical Quarterly,
Quarterly, 6:2
6:2 (April
(April 1969),
1969), p. 97.
p. 97.
7. TIle
7. The Metaphysical
Metaphysical Elements
Elements of of Justice,
lustice, trans.
trans. John
John Ladd,
Ladd, [355]
[355] (New
(New York:
York:
Bobbs-Merrill, 1965),
Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), p. 128. p. 128.
8. Critique
8. Critique of of Pure
Pure Reason, [A812/B840].
Reasoll, [A812/B840].
9. Ibid.,
9. [A809].
Ibid., [A809].
10. The
10. The famous
famous argument,
argument, "The"The Impossibility
Impossibility of of an
an Ontological
Ontological Proof
Proof of
of the
the
Existence of God," in Critique of Pure Reason,
Existence of God," in Critique of Pure Reason, A592-A602. A592-A602.
11.
11. The
The Metaphysical
Metaphysical Elements
Elements of of Justice,
Justice, p.
p. 101.
101.
12. Ibid., Justice, [349],
12. Ibid., Justice, [349], p. 122.p. 122.
13.
13. Ibid.,
Ibid., [332],
[332], p.p. 100.
100.
14.
14. Critique of Practical Reason,
Critique of Practical Reason, [31],
[31], p.
p. 30.
30.
15. Reli^on, p.
15. Religion, p. 130. 130.
16.
16. Lewis
Lewis W. W. Beck,
Beck, A A Commentary
Commentary on on Kant's
Kant's Critique
Critique ofof Practical Reason
Practical Reason
(Chicago:
(Chicago: University
University of of Chicago
Chicago Press,
Press, 1960),
1960), pp.
pp. 244-254.
244-254. Thomas
Thomas Auxter
Auxter also
also
has a strong paper on this, "The Unimportance of Kant's Highest
has a strong paper on this, "The Unimportance of Kant's Highest Good," JOllmal Good," Journal
of
of the
the History
History of of Philosophy
Philosophy (April
(April 1979):
1979): 121-34.
121-34.
17.
17. Reli^on,
Religion, p. p. 46.
46.
18.
18. Ibid.,
Ibid., p.p. 47.
47.
19.
19. Ibid.,
Ibid., p.p. 108.
108.
20.
20. Ibid,,
Ibid., p.p. 62.
62.
21. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
 299

2S./bid.
76.1'*.
27. ~ F,._ R........ 1'41). II- 1Sl.
a(
2& f_...- '" LorK, 11-. Rabert H,oruo... ...d Wnlr,.", Sch..-an.
(lri",poIio: II<>bb&-MurilI, 1m), po 29.
29. fWiIi<>'I, pp. ~.

I. M ..... SdW<k, -u_... rabIe o.--yioo, r repriooltd ia ",ir-. ; 'ly . . .

1h."n'ot1o c..w.,., Vol. 2, cd.. w.m.... Barren ..... H.o" Aill.. (N"'" York:
R'ndom " - . 1\162).
2. IIM~ II- TI.
l. 1I>i4~ p. 2-4
.. I ""'" Ihio eumplo to CIoarIes Oy"", ....... """ txample .oo..r ......,. 10
c"
Neloooo ('.......In.... 1, FoctitM, ..., F... .. (CUlbtidF, MUL: " ...."ltd
u~ Preo&, 19!il ), P. 38.
5. OiIiqtUI at I'Iw _

.-.
, lBI<I6~ If..... NonII .. K. Scaltk (New y",k: St.
Mutia'. , ..... 1'16$). P. 161 .

1. 1Wd~ [B;II:SJ.
&. Fm"iriuutJfrM N~"""yriua(MattJU, I...... Lewis W. Bccl; (New Y""k:
".. t..ibcnI Am I'1'no, I~). [7211. My .,,~,,;,
9. Il>fd. ["611.
10. /lJid.
11. CNJ."". of ,.., ......0>1 _ , rn~ My CIlIph;'
12. lINd. [4~
~ ~1ittfitM 1t'ilJWo/lv
l..int/a a(~A_, 11..... n, ><k><. M. G_ and
H07f H."IOdaoo (New Vuk: Harper lad. BrotherI, 19110), P. 129,

,,-
14. lbi4.

I" 11>14. _ P. 130.

17. II>i4. P. lJ(l.
LI. 1I>i4~ P. m.
19. 1bId.
20. OiriqW '" 1\ .. ';';0>1 Rt.owIo . 1141).
21. 0iIi'f"I 0( " - _ . A... My o..,pboooio..
2l. See . , "M. d.e ......ia .... &pcr._&! &ic_: I'IoilolDp I;'
millie., ~l (1968):1-10.
M._
300 NOTES

I . "' -..-
A 11m,,' . .. lOud " WiIliaaJ _ _ nOlo.')
_. "' ...J~(N
,. 'r--v COO'

York: HtolI)' HoII, 18\10), Vol. 2,,. 5#1.

1. ' Idea far UoMna! Hiuory &.. rem 1""'"
I'cint of V ...; Kaal,
OR Hiswty, cd.. LewioI W. IIeck (N.... York; Toe IIobboM.rrID eo..
1963).
~, d TIoeaio..
}. lI>iJ., r.ru. ne.i&.
~. IINI~ r.ru. '""'""' _ iu """"11,,,.1..
~Kaat, 1WitJot<. ,. 118.
6. TIHiI.
7.1INI. P. 19.
I. fb<J.
~. fbOd.
1ll. 1I>i4. P. 9l.
II. Kaal, omq.., of J....,......,
tr ..... J. H. Bcraard (N." York: lIal.....
Pub/i,hi.,. Co.. l'HI)' p. :lSl.
11. IINI. P. 282.
U FOIl differeAI -.I ..oK """,pie UlIdy 01 Ku!'I .;e.. 01 dutiello ( . If,
_ .... """t of JoIur, Atwell. _"-I ....... bt4I ... ,.",,, -~\ - ." lot 1GoIlf~ At"""
.---"
~ (Do<drtdoI: M.m..... Nijhol'l', 1986).
14.. Kaal, ~ fI{ '-~, All i .
I$. KaooI, 00ti0Ju< af - . J Ib- '1. !7-. Lcoris W. lIEd (N ... Yeri::

. "".
Lileral AtIJ ' rat, 19S6), p. 1Il

17. " ' ''P, p. 4.

1& OilIqw of ?OIk;M Ra:sooo, P. 126.
I'. 1Wd.
20.,..... r.... U~ HiMor}'." eo.","", ()II Pwnh n.cu..
11. IINI.
n. IW.
II /U, ill . , 'A K.aliao o.rw."", of Dqree ol lbtioOlalily; x..ltl-Sludl... .
8_ 51, Holt I (19)>-60).
u.~.p. n
ll. ' Idea for Uu-.,.! HiM...,.: Si>I. TIIaio.
,. "".
21. 1'U"'''2'~. [l69~
2:IL. 11Iid. [366]..
29. ibid.
lO. ,.,..IkM~, [1631.
ll. R~, P. \110.
 301

I. A_. Iloe -r oipif_ oIOIdia lID< n-.........,. KMtI's

T" ... .,. (M....... Go..: Muca Uoiooenily l'ta&, \!l8l). 0.0.. Aau" "" Nen.
N_

1'1i.- ;v' M &say ... Ka..u.. EWA (New York: CoI\1l11I>i1UMetsi(y....-.

1!I1S). .... JoU At-'I, ENIs..., /'1Mc1pla ill x..n N.". ~ (Duodo", -....
MarU<>.. N.p.,fI. I!l8IS).
2. R....,.,...
P. 89.
1. """~ p. 8lI, a m . , m..,. "Kt pi 5" , ill KalIl .. .....t.
4. 1 .... for UillMn.aI Hiotory; [171 p. n
s. 1bI4. 11.8~ p. n
6.. 1W. 13 1 ~ P. :l6.
7. lWifjoIJ, P. 119.
a. 1M MNlpllyrictll E/a,...... 0{ I,.,riu, " _ JoIuo l.add, (I"ew yan.: ~

. ""-
BobboMuriII CoejWl)'. 1!lti.5), IIII<Iet phe titIc, 'CO"d",;"': p. 117,

10. fI>I4.
11. AHJ9.
u. _ m
nAm
14. INtI.
IS. nil <ODCI<pt 01 re ..V" i" eo tn. Edcu A. Siaccr, J r. "" C""tcUt# n.
Ufo (New York: H eal)' H~ 19'2.1).

..
16..'''' Old 0 ....... Rzbd"""," [89j. ...... Ilobcn E. ...
H"1St<WJ, eli I.-io w. Beck (New York: n.tllohhr-Mcrrill
,
11. "Re,ic,.. 01 H.tde.:
16.1~ 1bOd. po. 5L
ill "'"
a..
191\J), pp. 147
...w.

Ill. "1dea ror a U~ HistOfy; [291. ibOd. p.2o'.

19. Eric f'ruk, 1'triIaItJpItic.t Un t .,dj", _ ~ 1'MII (New Vooi::

ODord U~ rr-.
t~
10. For caaplc ;. hio RMMM ito fWir". 1.be Ibir<i 1fIIIume of GoG.,
~'I &0....... __k. JJwLifc<f _ _ (New York: C\oarbSait-r'.

Soas. 1\IIlS-1906; . eprieted "" CoR;", 1I00I:.. 1962).

21. Nuo;.\A:inoI e "'" oJ 11UIiu. [~L p. t2,

. n R 'i{n, p. 147.
II
",
"Cooj'"......
Bepni.. 01 the ffioIO<]' 01. Mu., , U41." K*Il 0..

lA. 1I>i4. K4I!I. 0. HiJl<Jty, P. 59. A poIM

a..a..w;.,.. -.d1U~.
.e, dcYdoped ill SCm""" "",,,,,-
Jr....,.,.

2S."ldeo !or. UIIie..... H"""," P. U

 BIBLIOGRAPHY

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""'it
Irftrat:

_ &lid [)arieI..uia. "NoIe& OIl the loP< of tIoo 'r" ' "C Re .. 'cu
_ us".
' _ 1"0[\ l :; ', -, 0" 13:1 (Ap-il19?Ii), pp. lJ5.14J.

11-"....., Go '")
1'-.rd I ",..,.,.
.it], 0... !,_.
D. J
of 'Sd!i",., ',' ",'!.Moo_'
Jay H.Jey, Md 10li:0 Wrol:lond
Soil lU, 1:4 (1956), pp. :U1-264.

Bcd, J..eo,W. W. A C. ''''' " ... XMrl~ 0"7" "'I\*"'*'~. 0; i '

U~ ol ' an ........ 1960.

w.
!In:oIdj.., K... E. Ccttf/IcI Mill D<t/tN': A CAwtw"""", New York'
Harper T", woA, 1963.

Day, J. P. "Hop&.' _ _ _ I ~ Qt;rpl<r/), 6:2 (April 1969).

De !>I.. ' .m...

p . ...1. All btquity ...., IN llPiFo of /11.-1 1'frIouo, . " .., .... '
.. 71N Oq'm.r Moo We. cd. lkaj&mia R..t Boot,. H""",'ooo MiftIUo Co.,

"".
D y,........ "Tk InO. ; of o....u. ... NkMc ph) _
r Other E" ). in
0 . ..... j nz .'. ' ill Os M"';_ .... IL:;'wn. 011. Mao H. F"1Odo.
.,=
!

New Vorl.: AP i et.Nry QoItI, 19SL

Eo" _ "LetIe< Fro. E,i _ . . . . M r. . ..... IC .....,. .. 7lw C'Jarri<aI

MOIG1Uu, If. Qulco D. V...... ed. Benj_io R..... Boot.., He' pw M;mm
<>. "".
I'ruk, Eric. ....;!-",';,.. U ,1 lint"", _ R''iab'' 7iwII . New York:
o.rord UaMnicy I'Ta&, 19'5.

f'rukl, Vlktor. N""., Sao'" for N-wr,. New York: WMh;.,. ... Sq...re

- ''''
 BlBUCX;RAPHY

Good." N ....... F.a. FIc1Iao, MIl ForKUl. Cu.bo"'s. M ....: ~

11~","-1~

Heoedil ... ' fl, ,m' sol - . F_ EMtJ tltwit ,""II,,,,;..,, It. aad ....
Milloa C. N. . .. New Yorl: CroI'\a aad Ca. 1917.

KiMcy. AI&ed c., witIt W.-deII II. Pt ,10)', ud CIyok Eo M...... _

,._"'''~N_. J>Ioild'!r'i " s.......su.aadCa.l90C8.

tcro.cr. It"' .. ."".,.".. 01 FaiIk' TM 0IrisMrI Sr~.r ... . 7:1 (Sprio&

11164).

L)'IIdl, K.c-tia. TM J-. <1{ doe 0.,. O.hi" ..... hi-.: M .I.T. Prao, I9IIQ.

Nell, o.an. Am.., ... N ' '''''' JIJo En., ... ~ Edtia. New Y""k:
(Ahmbio 11~"'-' 197:5..

00Iiae, Wdlard V... ()ra.u.. M ....' 51"" UJpt. c-br>ir, M-.: Harvard
11---,. "'"- 19j1.

_. WtlfEl_ 0bjtcI. Om' ..... M-.: H..--d Ufliwasiry I'ra&, 1960.

So" ) Gon, 7JW ~ tJ(,..,. ,. New Yorl: CIw"" Sa il . ..

II, ~
1905-1906; ' .... iMcoI bJ" Cd,. 1Ioob, 1962.

Scl.fid<, Morita. ' U - . . b I t Q ' 'o.r ,t.. wed ioo f'Ir/I:"y'ly .. lIN
T: ....ti"" Cr.,,')', Vol. 2, .... William Barren lad H....,. Aile .... New Yew!:::
It ' _ Hoooze, 1962.

S<~""'''''' AItl:.... 'Sz..tioz _ P ' e : i:o 1lIt Eu.,.. tJ( . . . -

SdOIipn+"", u... T. 8. Sr:: ' h ' I. New Yewt; W:llty Book Co.

SIWtabIary, nw Earl 01. JIJo 11IIJKIr1 ~ .-- .... Nm., x', ro.
.... ;.".t _ 1lIt a . e' N .. 5.... .... Beaj __ Ilaa<I. Il00:_ H"''II.....
MilIIiII Co., 19l7.

Si, 3 " EoIpr A.., Jr. On doe CJ :to*<lU/c, N~ York: H,"'l' Holt, lID
 Bibliography J07

Sdlo, Ad All ffU11ill1 ..... II\< " - _ r:.._ c( II\< W_ c( #5 t . . . . . ,

... ' ..... .. io: Sori ~"WJ, orI. I)op nl d O. W...... New yOft: ",-ma.
eo. "".
s.y.b. D. '"001.. NtHNJ Lqic _ fa A n - .. New yert: v.. Nc:otrud.
'2 . toM, 1971.

S, 'OM Bu h CJIJJc$, II. W"riliul H. Whft, orI. J_ 0 _ _ New V.,..k:

HI' htr I ; i . Co., 19j1.

Tarski, AIfrorI. ""TIoe SnoIlPlioo 0 5; I"'" d. Trani:.: 1'Irri..... ; 'v _ n....",,*

"'*'tk* Ru,.d:, . (Mard: ~), PI'- ].11376,
 ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Sidney Arinn i$ me .,tbor of.lf MoruJ Military, an analysi~ of

mililal'y elbia, and over thirty-five journal articles. He has
published on Kant for many years u well as on applied elhia and
social philosophy. His technique is 10 apply a touch of formal
logic to problcPlS sueb as me anaJysis. of error, ambivalence,
ignorance, hope, law, and moral style.
A Professor of Philosophy II Temple University, Philadelphia.
Arlnn is aJso an Adjunct I'rofes5or in the Psychiatry Depanment
of the Temple Univenity Medical SebooL A.5 well as tcacbing the
range of philosophy coones in the USA. Axinn has lectured widely
in East Asia-in Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan. He has also
taught undcrgmdualts in Tokyo, psyclIi.uy residents in Philadel-
phia, and cadets at West Poinl He is put-president of the
American Society fot V.rue Inquiry and treasurer and BQard
member of The Jowrud of r~ HislOty of Idem. orr the job ...
chess, molOrcycles. and Jailing.

+'ie;';" r:J, 168
Abo . " , Kn'1 ;o~it'j.;';5.- of, 9j-9S
Act", LanI, ~ m
-00" -', ~ ~ 141163
Ariola...., lO2, 7!17 a.l
AlIWII, Job, 294, JOO ~ JOI L1
A .....i.., '!'!.. !1.. U2, l.SII
A ......., TIM N. 2!l& aJ.6. lOl Ll
""""*. O..w M~ !1. 2!16 e.l. LJ
BM..... Go ' -i, 196
8ava. Raben, 198 a...5
Ikd, r--. W~ 141, 294, 29S, l\lII
Ll. a.l6
Betaatd l..!::!.. 2!111 .aA
....."finI, I n "\ I!." 1"-\45, 2III'i
8nuoG, GiordaDco, llll1
8 uddh. 2JO
-~
CluUIiaa ' .... the cbatlCtCt trait
"m
OorisIiaaiIr. 1fI. ~ lO;t ~
I ll, 111. IU. In- I%5, 131. 138
~ i1II ...... loboo. of tloe Lawa,
"'"
.-_1UIicy 01 __ iDerS.. lS'PW
""'-~
INDEX
De ~hrl r ,illt, _ .. 01, 103
oac:..tea, ~ lIlO, 191
ec-y, J ..... 21S. 298 a..fi
cIoubio-biJld, \ ....
...." dol"uotd, 18
dill)' of I K h"",.. ,Ke ._d
iloelf.
277l78
o,u. CUr1u, 294, m L!
n o J!bl!l
doploaal ''';'''', m
EpiounII. 210211
pVe enidt panodoK, 76
r..n.., of COIIIpno;';"', ~ 294 Lli
f.tllIq" of tbe petfca rotId p, i2
f.Mi6< .., clefUlOd, UB-lJO, lU-l"5
few, ud IoQpe, 1811, J<n.J92
'w.!ojs' , defuoed, n 130
Fraak, Eric, 28!, JOt LIi
Fnatl, Vlktor, 18iJ.189, m a.l
Frqe, Gaufriod, 19l
Frelld, S.... uod, I"'. JOt a..2!\
!!!!.
00dcI ptOOl. 2tiO-262
Good. ..... Ndoooo, 1!)7 !Q, 299 "'"
Greeac, Tho"",,"c M ~ 294 L2. m
Haley, J.,., 196
"_ RolIcn. 299. a..28
Haw:6hao, 151-158, l\l6 ...a
HUod ....... 13.
H;"ikko, loall." 114, 197 Il4m
H,H La, n.o.....
& 62, 1n..2I

....
ud fUr , ]M..192
o.y, SEP, m . 298 ILfi. . ..;_it, ttl
 INDEX
'"
.... ' " 1.12. lD
II.. , -..... order ani;. 1. l1J L,.a. ~ 201. ZII7 Ll

. .r.._ .
I .. '

."'zO*'
'"
1 .a, 22J
of, 195-1915
2Of-lQ!I
M.u.. ctydc I!., 194
M~ "
.. 1 ..... ~"'~"""" Mcadrh+a. M_
_.u- __ lJl. I2S
un : I .,'., 18!9
eepl)'. HI 01 0rriItia00 ""' o! ., '1. 289
_ , .. ,"tl" 2I)l..;DS
,,""'" ,..
,
" " La....
" . ... ...
H b , HOjII !!. 2!iW., :510 d . 195 .......... !H,!Iri

--'"
'Uob

-)'IWY.
_ysc..,. ... _h
;" ', III

oIcjje~" 01, 116

W" W
1p)r_ li. !7i.l n
kiodo 01. !M.. 168 NohIoI, Mill.. C. 196 ...,
oI lMl, ~ Nell, o-a. 301 L1
of w.. l!8

-,
l'I'oem<h< fiN ', ' 2119

.
cl il'; ~
0I1lroo poiot If .....

01"
~
" o.
.-
~_
h' j 01.
. ",.r-'" '" Ill-W

i iM U., In-Of ,- ~
;'petoriw" hit... ,.,: loot s.. ~ U2
IIoypoIMciaol, n42. ~ t:z , ...... N .... aI:JQ
....... 1ca1. .4IY2
.",-11;'" H'J(,.\ !I!.
.
JocI:- 0... 0 196
"
... '"
PIal.., U. IlO, 151, :ill.

. .u " ioiu of r.-t'"k'w"

m..m,
-I-"~I '"'-
_
~

"'.'''' w....
J_ we.., !l tN, JIXI L1
S - "3' !l-9l. 111
Sri+",9!, IKIoIII. 1~116, IJI
Pc
".
"E ".
.. ," N
' OJ',

di
8.,:510

KIM< 01 kIpc. _"od<lki 01,

.......io,o:.pc 'o m
KlMcy, AIfttMI ~ :510
krOllU, RicIowd, 29J

lMd. kIoot. '298 L1

u fI , , . , .... !!!.!.!? l'lD o.;.e, W'i8ord. \I .. 0.. ... 1157,
kIF 0/-6 Z, j6:&, &l lli. 1'J+.1?l. 196 So!. m ~~
l!
'"
I ) ' ..
 I""" 313

16. 'J4..&J, :m
-.
, fi ~
"4 "
pocUJ. 289
. -...,ud witIo faid>, 1tl'l.J()'i :z.e.o. ZI6.lL1
n!I~ .j_~, 23Il z..q, AnWf, 193
Roo M'. &1
k ..... 8c:rttucI, '1!TI ....

~ 000:. . . 28\1, JOI ii.lI:I

5-+5 ' . MOO'tr. ~ me 199 a.l
50' .a.~ WoIfl,," 199 a.28

... _ _ -.nIily. mm
""'Dr)' a(, 18Q
",1I'. h "l. 16.:Il!. & . it
....".bn , .... oho .. """-I ed
SIo.oI'I' oI .. ,. T1Ioird EMI 01. 11. m
'h. . J.~ Edpr A. 301 a.Jj

s-..... """- " Po 2!M

s., ' . ...... ~ In. m ILlO
SocnUoo, 1!!. t!. lSMIiO, UII. HI.
'"
So<ntioo . - ....... 1111
!j'; 1.un. U6-lS7. llI!\, lsa. 2M.
' "1 o.l
Soc - - . . I .;u, KMl,

, ... . . ~ noIcd - . I n.
m
1"Ic ... at Gnu, W

_w ..;,. , ., , 6l, lM-Z!IQ, J89

_w F U oC, 6l,Q
 VALUE INQUIRY BOOK SERIES

VIIS

L Noel Ba1u:r, Tk H . _ lei., u .. (,0 .....1 Tllilllr.er.

2. Archie J. a.hm. As"*,,,: TItoe SdcIKC or V.I. n

3. H. P. P. (Hetl1lle) Utter, J ..tl for UIIJUI
SlKld)'.

A Critical Stlld7 In I_
4. H. O. Cal...... )', Coaled for Mea-III, .1141 11.11&1,.:
PIII.....II)' of Lu....ae.
5. Be njlmin S. LlIlTIZOII. It. H. .IIIH CaN fOf' Mon.l
IlIlullroli.
6. JImeS R. WIUO/I, Bdw_ A...::llwib. . .d T ... dllklon:
1"oIt-N'ef'll RtRedlolls 011 IIIe Tali of TIiIlakln,. A
~olwne in H...... &lid Ceud'" Siudles.

7. Robert S. HartmID., .... reedom to Liu: Tile Robert

Hart_II StOf"J. edited by ArtIIur R. IIi.. It. ~otume in
Hart_ , ...Itille It.sioIou Stll""
.. Arc_ J. IHhm, EtllIa: "ne Sdrzee of 0.,11111 '35

9. 00;00", o.vid MiliCI", A. Idiot' .....lk t:tllia; Or. tile

La.... . cll,,. Eillia.

10. Jtl upb P. DeMIKO, It. Cd Itde TII'~ In Eillia.

11. Fran k O. Fornsl, V.lueMelrlu: Till SdenCi of
Peraoaal Ilid prorculonal EtlllCl, A yo lume in
HarlTUn lutltule It.:dolo&J' Stud5H.
12. William Gei bel , ne
Worid'. Greal Tllillkfl"S.
Me._, of LIIe: , .... ,tab of Ille
 '...... r ,..,.'--,..... a..
It",~"
" Pi"'. '
7'
... cI'
,.' 7 1111'
7, . . . . .
,'I . . .,~~. ..
"

tt' or , 7
P' ..... :
till>

....