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PSYCHOLOGY I
SE^^KNT I Volume 1

NEWSLETTER January 1970

"...the psychological Investigative event constitutes the interbehavior of the.investigator

with, & behavior segment or psychological event...Just as the event Investigated is condition"
ed by the interbehavioral history of the organism.and object, so the investigator is influ-
enced by his antecedent intellectual background*" -- J, R* Rantor
A Toast
The soul may be & mere pretense,
the mind makes very little sfense
So let us value CS.Kthe appeal rlr

Of that which v&Ataste and feel.

Piet Rein (Crooks. MIT Press, 1966)

NEWS AND NOTES

It is a primary hope that the inauguration of Rollo Handy is correcting galley proofs'for
this Newsletter will help to promote an inte- his new The_ Measurement o|_ Value. He argues
rest in the development and dissemination of "for construing valuation as a field process
objective approaches to psychology and will involving both the organism and the environ"
facilitate efforts toward that end, especial^ ment, and agains<t views that attempt to
ly in cotraaunication and coordination. You account for valuing transactions in terras of
are invited and urged to send in any perti- the person isolated from an environmental
nent information, questions, requests, etc. setting or that postulate a supernatural'or
as indicated in the prospectus * nonnatural locus for values" (personal'com-
munication)'. Examination copies of Prontoss
The design of the Newsletter is an adaptation new Panorama of Psychology can be obtained
of one in Ranter's "Toward a Scientific Ana- from Brooks/Cole, 10 Davis Drive, Belaiontj
lysis of Motivation," Psychological Record, Calif. 94002. (This book has met with over-
1942, 5, 225-275. The accompanying quota- whelming enthusiasm by my students-=ed.)
tion is from the same source. The indication Lundin's Personality; 'A Behavioral
of media was omitted and the arrow off center Macmillan, 1969, is an interbehavioral
in the vertical segments and "field" is no- operant approach.
where to be found. If you can bear with
these inaccuracies until the supply of face Stan Ratner reports that Michigan State Uni-
sheets is used up, we can make the correc- versity has a graduate program in compara-
'tions or use an entirely new design that any- tive psychology with heavy emphasis in inter-
one is willing to provide. behavior of organism as illustrated 'in"Denny
***** & Ratner*s Cpiaparative Psychology, rev, ed.

Crude Date Investigative Contact Scientific Construction

State University of New fork at Plattsburgh has a two-year school psychology program
(M.S.) with emphasis n scientist first and practitioner second with exposure to inter-
behavioral and operant approaches; M.A in experimental and 'personality-clinical pt~
bably fall 1970. Also faculty petting in experimental and in personality.
The second annual meeting of The International Society for the History of the'Behavioral
and Social Sciences (ISHOBSS) will'be held at the University of'Akron, home o the
psychology archives. Information oa the meeting is available from Dr'John A, Popple**
stone9 Department of Psychology, University f Akron, Akron9 Ohio 44304 and on memBef-
ship frm Barbara Rosss Psychology Department. 003, University f Massachusetts-Boston,
100 Arlington Street,, Boston,, Mass,'02116. Several persons Interested"in"'interbehavioral
psychology are associated with the organization* It would be a good opportunity for
of us in the East and Midwest to meet. Date; May 8-10, 1970.
the inclusions in" the 'next issue will be a criticism"'of the 'establishment of the
Newsletter and an argument that a distinction between interbehaviorism and behaviorisms
is mythical~->an account "of the awards given by the Division of Clinical Psychology of
the American psychological Association in 1968 to two interbeh'avioral psychologists s
Jerry Carter "and "Julian Rotter--the" telegram sent to Dr. Kantor by the participants of
the conference (below) and his reply .
REPORT

The Summer 'Community of Scholars

June 16-21, I960
The Emerging Role of Inter behavioral Psychology

Psychologists working in teaching , research, and applied settings will meet toge-
ther for a week of seminars and lectures related to their interest in interbehavioral
approaches that underlie their diverse specialities. The seminars are for the purpose
of exchanging ideas around 'some topic of special interest to the discussion leader of
the day. The leader may open with a short, tentative paper or a talk (15 to 20 minutes)
on an area of research in which he is currently involved* The lectures and semlra&rs are
pea to all interested parsons.
Noel W. Smith, Coordinator , , . ... . -
State University College of Arts and Sciences Sponsored with support from
Miner Ceater
Pittsburgh, New fork '
Interbehavioral psychology was formulated fifty years ago by J,R, Kantor who is
still continuing its development. He has often been decades ahead of his colleagues
in stseh topics as motivations instincts, intelligence , language behavior , physiologi-
eal psychology, perception,, covert or implicit behavior , numerous logical problems of
psychology, and even what constitutes psychology, Interbehavioral psychology has been
a rather subtle but definite influence and within the past decade has shown signs of
rapidly increasing importance as evidenced by the number of books and papers related to
r utilizing this approach and the rise in citations; the compatibility- with operant
conditioners is especially ...significant.
The basic assumption of "Interbehavioral psychology is that the datum of psychology
is the organism' interacting 'or' interbehaving with a stimulus object via media of con
tact in some particular setting or context. These factors together make up the inter"
/behavioral field,.....Psychological activity 'then is not locallza'Ble "in" nor reducible to
any single organ nor. even the entire organism bat is constituted by the entire field
of events . -There Is here neither "empty organism" not physiological' reductionism,
Nor is there any postulation of special, powers such, as "mind" or " ''will*'' or .animistic
brain powers that reside ins Me the organism nor assumptions .of vector's" or forces out-
side the organism that control it. Neither is there any borrowing of analogies from
 -3-

of complex but concrete interactions

such as light and s<

Each of the participants in the program will- present his WE specialized area of
psychology within the orientation interbehavioral psyehlgy ..
participants! Samuel Campbells, fexas Technological University; Paul Fuller.
Siegler Co, Grand Rapids, Mich,I Louise Keats Program Director, Fort Ouster State Home,
Augusta, Mich*; Neil Kent, Western Michigan University; Wayne Laaar, Institute of
Behavior, Rutgers University; Paul Mountj0y Western Michigan University!"Neel
State University f New York "at .Plattsburgh* Formal papers s Wayne 'La"zar~-A comparison
the theoretical positions of JR,'Kntbr aid T*C*"Schhelrla; Louise Kent~A
ilysis of language and its'"'implications' for "Sirst language acquisition;
Animal' behavior"technologies the'history of psychology; Paul Fuller-
relationship between, interbehavioral psychology and system engineering.
Some Thoughts"on the "Summer Community of Scholars,"1969
State Waiversity of... lew,, fork/Miner Foundation
- Paul Fuller
The outstanding impression I came away with is that Miner' Institute"provides an
setting for coaferences of this type* "Quiet"and'"fustic 'surrounding's' provide/'a
of distractions* Facilities 'are"adeq'uate"b'u't"not lavish-conducive to thoughts
,ons scholarship,, and stimulating discussion*
Tbere was also the overall "impressiaB which confirme'3 a contention I ' have" made ' for
yer (vweptY years: Interbehavtoral psycholugy provides the systems frame wot fe in which
psyehrtiog j i>t;s can effectively work in every conceivable type of behavioral field. At
the conference were people studying all "types of human snd animal behavior problems,
including astronauts, ants, and falcons. There were those involved in verbal behavior,,
special cases of language development, all phases of clinical psychology , executive
selection tod development man/machine systems, selection and training of outstanding

fieally new problems,, new data, new combinations*

ia
asd systems engineering, systems management, sad system analysis in the 1950's and"
i e Some of this develepment, was influenced by Kantr students such as Burt Wlias

It is my opinien that recent developments in mathematicss optimal" control theory,

omjmter technology and system science should new"be fed back' to systematic psychology*
these techniques will further"mensuration in a'more detailed field analysis and expe-
f interbehavioral field events.
 THE SIGNIFICANCE OP THE STIMULUS FUNCTION

P. E, Lichtenetein
Denison University
In 1920 the behavioristic revolution was sttll very much in the air.
Kantor was one of several psychologists who at that time saw much that was
promising in behaviorism* Yet Kantor already had found Watson's formula-
tion of stimulus-response psychology inadequate in certain respects. At
times Watson used the term stimulus crudely to refer simply to the object
responded to. At other times in an attempt at a more scientific formulation
the behaviorists fell back upon the earlier mentalistic account of the
stimulus as a physical energy impinging a receptor organ* Kantor did not
find either usage capable of yielding &n adequate account of complex beha-
vior,, He therefore began to work out a functional conception of the stimulus
correlated with a response function*
Stimulus functions and response functions are seen as distinct from
biological, stimuli and responses and as being evolved in the course of
what Kantor now refers to as the interbehavioral history* Stimulus func~
tions are elaborated on the side of the objects or events responded to and
response functions on the side of the organism* Stimulus functions are
clearly connected with stimulus objects but the two must not be confused.
Similarly response functions are not simply biological reactions or move-
ments even though without such biological participation there can be no
psychological event. Response functions, like stimulus functions, are
field components evolved through contacts of the organism with stimulus
objects,
Kantor (1933) made an impressive defense of stimulus-response psycho-
logy in reaction to challenges to the S-R conception by such writers as
Wood-worth, Thurstone, and Kluver. Kantor saw no reason to abandon the S-R
concept but rather an opportunity to modify it along interbehavioral lines.
This paper was described by Griffith (1943) as the clearest defense of S-R
psychology and Skinner (1938) commented that Kantor had shown the impossi-
bility of defining "a functional stimulus without reference to a functional
response, and vices ver_sa_," Even so Kantor*s approach had less impact upon
psychology than ought to have been the case. It is interesting to conjec-
ture as to why this was so and an examination of some of the possible rea-
sons should be profitable.
The traditional physiological stimulus had the characteristics of be-
ing manipulable and measurable in physical terms. The stimulus could
therefore be readily employed as an independent variable in scientific
investigation* Stimuli (light rays) impinge upon sensitive receptor cells
(rods and cones) in such a manner as to initiate neural impulses which are
carried along the optic nerve to the visual cortex. As a result of brain
action there may occur sensations or perceptions (mental activities?) and
eventually an effector response. This sequence assumes the operation of
causality of a traditional "billiard ball" type* The stimulus operates in
a pre-psychological manner and j-Ue slenificanee of the stimulus (in a psycho-
logical sense) is to be understood by reference to the mental reaction which
creates its significance (meatsli'sm) or in the response without* reference
to a mental, vent (behaviorism). Kantor broke with tradition when he made
the stimulus an essential part of the psychological event rather than a
i:o.eding cause. Because Kantor's approach involved a conception of c.nvwt*,^ ;
in psychology at variance with that generally acopfco<'i and wJde.lv *-Bljt, it
has not had the ready acceptance that its merits should have warranted,1
The Interbehavioral field and more particularly the stimulus function have been
poorly understood and their revolnt-lonary Imp!-teatlone too ot<su ignored or
certainly not fully appreciated.
A good discussion of causation may be found in Lerner (1965), See especially
the articles by Hagel, Mayr, and Parsons,
 The stimulus function is, of course, a scientific construct derived
from the behavior of an organism observed to bes or assumed to bes in con-
tact with some object or event. In a sense it is improper to discuss the
stimulus function apart from its correlated response function since it is
the interaction of these two factors which constitutes the central focus of
an interbehavioral or psychological event. When we discuss the stimulus
function in isolation we must regard it as simply an analytical abstraction*
In a recent formulation Kantor (3.959) described the psychological event by
the following formula: PE * C (ks s, rf, his sts tad) where k symbolizes
the uniqueness of interbehavioral fields and C that the field consists of
the entire system of factors in interaction* Sf refers to the stimulus
functions rf the response function, hi the historical interbehavior process
in which are generated the stimulus function and response functions &t
setting factors and md media of contact such as light or air*
Kantor's interbehavioral event by bringing physical, biological,
cultural, and historical factors into system represents a field approach
to psychology quite different from traditional causal conceptions. The
psychological event is seen to consist of a constellation of interacting
factors rather than as a mental or biological dependent variable caused
by antecedent: physical events, Kantor, by making the stimulus itself a
part of the psychological event J?|"jwi_des_ an Slter_gat_iw_ to both reduct_i-
li MJi5!ii,!-J;:Sl 2GSL JE^HES!S.52l_o^, This is a difficult point for many
to grasp for reasons we have discussed, Physicalists tend to see the
stimulus function as a non-naturalistic factor while phenomenologists
prefer to interpret it in terms of internal mechanisms such as the isomorph-
ism of Gestalt psychology. The inability to appreciate Kantor's view as an
alternative to reductionistic behaviorism and phenomenology is clearly
revealed in a recent article by Thornton (1969) which discusses Kantor's
interpretation of Socrates,
Many psychologists make practical use of data from the life history
but Kantor appears to be the first to bring history into the. theoretical
structure in a significant way. He is able to do this because he is not
beholden to a physicalistic theory of causation. The writer (1950) has
discussed at length the reductionistic problem and the bias against
geneticism in psychology,
The experimental psychologist may properly ask what happens under an
interbehavioral point of view to the elaborate procedures which have been
developed for systematically varying the physical stimulus (independent
variable) and observing accurately the effect upon the subject's response
(dependent variable) as has been done perhaps most clearly in the typical
psychophysical experiment. Kantor'a (1.959) answer is clear. Procedures
under which the stimulus object is regarded as an independent variable are
"only operationally justified," "R - f (S) is,..a pragmatic device." The
same holds true even when additional factors such as the condition of the
organism are taken into account, Under controlled conditions certain
regularities may be found in behavior. Absolute and differential thresholds
may be established, effects of reinforcement schedules determined and the
like. In such instances the experimental procedure and the observed regu-
larity may be taken as special cases falling within a wider interbehavioral
frame of reference. Nothing in such situations should be taken as a basis
for misreading the general nature of psychological stimulation. Uniform*
ities in response to physical properties of stimuli under rigid conditions
of control do not negate the intetbehsvioral concept of the stimulus as
function,, Outside the experimental situation behavior is generally found
to be considerably more variable and responsive to a. greater variety of
conditions. Consequently under such conditions the physical definition of
the stimulus tends to be less useful* 2

It is sometimes said that the stimulus function has only postdictive

but not predictive value How, for example, can one predict from a variable
which is not independently observable? The clue to an answer lies in the
interbehavioral history. When this (i.e. a set of previously elaborated
sf - r correlations) is reasonably well understood one can predict quite
well what the stimulus-response function for an individual will be $,n a
given situation. Even small children are able to predict fairly accurately
the effects of their own verbal behavior on their parents.
Stimulus objects are important and the study of their physical, biolo-
gical, and cultural properties often sheds light upon their role in psycho-
logical events. Stimulus functions are not synonymous with these properties
which may be regarded as independent of particular psychological inter-
actions , The view which makes stimulus objects into objects known or crea-
tions of the mind stems from the causal theory which is set aside by an
interbehavioral construction,
It has been suggested that the stimulus function is a scientific con-
struct which has revolutionary implications,, It permits the development
of a psychology which neither reduces psychological activities to the bio-
logical responses of organisms nor holds them to be functions of an immater-
ial mind. Furthermore, it allows us to gain considerable understanding of
complex behaviors as they develop through an intricate and detailed inter-
behavioral history. When we cling to the physical or physiological defini-
tion of stimulus we may feel constrained to restrict investigation to those
behaviors for which such constructs appear most appropriate.

2. For an interesting discussion of some of the same points see Campbell

(1969) ,

1* Campbell, D.T. A Phenomenology of the Other One: Corrigible, Hypothe-

tical, and Critical, In T, Mischel, Hutnan_Action New York, Academic
press, .1969, pp. 41-69.
2, Griffith, C e R. Principles^ of ^Systematic .Pfxc.hologx* Urbana: Univ. of
Illinois Press, 1943........................"~~..................
3. Kant or , JR, In defense of Stimulus-Response Psychology, Psxchj^JRev,
1.933, 40, 324-336
^ _ .' Interbehavi.aral Psy_chology_ Granville, Ohio: The Principle
Press", 1959."" ~~". . . . . ".............~~...........
5. Lerner, I), (ed) , Cajue_anjd_EJEfect_, New York: The Free Press, 1965.
6. Liechtenstein, P.E. Psycho logy as a Genetic Science.
1950, 42 , 313-332,
7. Thornton, H. Socrates and the History of Psychology, JN
1969, 5, 326-339.
8. Skinner, B.F. ThjBelMiyi.OT_pJjOr^ajnist^. New York: Appleton-Century,
1938.
 PRECEDING

_-_. . ~~
=rI

PSYCHOLOGY 1
Number 2
NEWSLETTER
The activity of" the sensible 'object and that' of the percipient sense is
and'the same activity,'and yet the distinctIon between their being
remains* Take as illustration actual actual'hearing; a
may have hearing and yet not be hearing, and' that'which has"a sound is
always sounding 'But that vhich caa'feear is actively
and that which""can sound is sounding, then the actual hearing and the
actual sound are merged in (these call respectively hear-
keaing and sounding). -- Aristotle: Pe
That pfiysics of light is so frequently applied to color is indica-
tive only of' an inseverable relationship of data and not of their
identity.. JoR. Kantor: "Goethe's Place in Modern Science"

Instead of starting popular as "][ _see_ a_ "tree_",

let us attempt an event orientation in which seeing does sot arise
from the confrontation of an organism and' a tree. la fact,
and tree are onl/ *.. mn^torage points r^r s c'carreuce, situat
interaction or *ri">i-%ct * ^ th*r "r-'P'fp
frame-work th1?- c,*--- "--*,> f-j>-Ji " - - - ! ' --"'the organism
r
and within a t "'- *. .^T^he^si >~ ban the instant.
N.H. Pronfo.

THE AGORA
The Newsletter to achieved to the
modest success in terras of number of sub- was mailed out response was the
scribers; 74 including 24 students following objection? "With regard to
to the Archives of American Psychology* We the PSYCHOLOGY NEWS-
mrrm.s I think the is right
buttons of sisterisls r questions that might to ''iaterbeha-vioral psychology8
provoke some replies. One student asked with ordinary everyday behaviorism as
for "a concise article of runo ~the-sri.il show-
the basis for interbehavioral psychology, ing increasing symptoms of 'inter-
showing its importance, the advantages behavioral' (ioeos naturalistic) think-
disadvantages of such a viewpoint ing. Is it then appropriate to perpet-
it could mean to the future of psychology" the 'distinctness1 myth? Will
which could be for explanation to an in^group newsletter tend to rein
force distinctions (often pseudo or
be an "straw maaish" in nature,, or at least
and if too long for the Newsletter it would caused by language differences) rather
be highly for the
ledge, etc.? la as much &s
Crude Data Investigative Contact Scientific Construction
founded the PSYCHOLOGICAL KEGOEDS would not'this "be an appropriate place to exchange'tid-
bits of IHTElBEli^VIdi&L Insights, news',"etc.? By "so doitigs' nbn-initiates'"'might happen t
read of an3 become.interested' la interb'ehaviorisu It would that- your newsletter
could'be 'included as a'supplement to, or' even a '""feature'' "of THE "PSYCHOLOGICAL "RECORD."
As editor, "I will leave a response to the first part 'to anyone who wishes to do so, but I
think''a comment on the 'latter .proposal Is appropriates It'seems doubtful'whether the'
informal'exc'Kange of information, in. a newsletter "would'be the'likely fodder for a profe-
ssional" Journal,' I see the' function^ as quite'different. However, if" the'RECORD should
it"'first resumed publication in" the '50'*sthe Newsletter would be unnecessary"arid could
very well cease, "But & is a'decision

A"job"opening for a social psychologist for which an laterbehavieral rieatatiea might be

appropriate is available at 'the University of Tennessee. Write to William S. Verplanck,
Hea'3, Uepartmeat'of Psychology, Kn3willes Tennessee 37916* Whether you apply r not'be
(, p. 6a.

Harry Mahan has a few remaining'copies of Ms" text; THE INTERACTIONAL 'PSYCHOLOGY'OF J'.R.
KANTdRY AN IHTROBUGTION which'he will send gratis to anyone' who writes for a" copy. Address?
Department of Psychology'j'palomar College,'San'Marco, California 92069. He has also just
published "a new'text in"question'and answer forms A"PRIMER OF lOTESACTlOjEt PSYCHOLOGY.
tt sells"for $1,5 'A wrkb@k will be available in May, He has the'material on
Jnd re'por8 that'adopt ions will either or workbook will be high-
ly suitable for by teaching'assistants. He also suggests that Pronko's PANORAMA F
PSYCHOLOGY would be a useful adjunct text. We'can'look forward to 'hearing more ab'out his
pioneering efforts la the "first college course outside of the language field to be com"
pletely programmed and on cassettes available to students."

for all f voltxme 1

provides delig'
University, KalamaEo0s Michigan 49001

May 9 at the'Second Annual Meeting of The Cheiron Society

for the History of the Behavioral Social Sciences. I;
Dr. Kaator write'immediately
Mc'PherSon, .
Ohd 44304.

(See first issue for description of conference awl Paul Fuller's aeeemiat,
 Chazy, New fork, at Miner"institute
under the" joint auspices o the Miner Foundation, Fadulty'of Social Sciences'of
State 'University" College'of Art's and 'Science at g'h, NY.'S we 'are"discus'sing 'the

In addition to the stimulating"intellectual discussions centered on 'inierbehavioral

point up the interpersonal eori~
'gists. These emphasize the warm
Please kindest regards,,

Tii:et...conferenee on interbehavioral psychology seems to have been, quite successful*

was a great pleasure to be able to discuss topics n the basis of'a'common orients"
ind a common'understanding of principles* It was the interbehaviorsl principles
themselves f the discussion,, but the utilization, f principles
:
.n, such fields as linguisticss physiological psycfeolsgy, aad operant conditioning

As for fruitfulness' of the meetings, it was agreed

we
lifting 1 will be editing news*
letter and t get it underway by fall.

appealing and 1 hope that they will all work out t y@ur satisfaction and t that of
if conditions allow I would very saach like t e in and help farther the
work the group* Please keep me informed aew developments.

tiful gesture and I was very

I

'gists at Miner Institute at Chazy, Hew TTork3

@ discuss J. Ro

we
the teaching f interbehavioral fsychology9 During the affeernooass
 Recreation, I' think, "was &n .'.important ingredient, of our'conference.'*', let only did
we "enjoy various sports' "and "sight -seeing. trips--l"let Paul" Fulled "me at'tennis',
for exataple'"but. the"atmosphere of our discuss ions was light".and,Vat times, "jocular "as
we'll as' serious. Probably becua'se "of the informality that this inspired,"and,'not" in"
the least, because the meeting turned but to'be like'tiomecomirig for'Indiana "University
scences about'"old times'* were there for the listening. Hot being of the era
until'then having'never seen or talked with Ktotor, 1 got a good, deal from these flash-
backs, I think it is important to know Ranter the man as well "as Rantor the scholar
because then we would be likely to read "truth4* likely to read

In the formal discussion, several points emerged: (1) We were ignorant about what
and a psychological event at early stages in behavioral development or in some specific
species, as well as some rather broad topics,, eseteric to moat psychologists, such a-ss
logic. '(2) None of us really knew about the influence Rantor has had evea thoughtwe
could Kaatorlaas who were interested in various specialties,, What, for
example9 was his specific contribution to the present state of affairs in physiological
or comparative psychology most of whose workers mow'subscribe to'non-dualistic tenets
fie expressed almost 'fifty years ago* Also, (3)' t put it simplys what more can
psyehelegists leara fro Kantor who, to be pragmatic, been "right" about so much?
In retrospect these kinds' of questions probably prompted us to have mere Summer
- good deal of enthusiasm about studying Ranter's works, criticizing thesis and demonstrat-
ing the extent o their influence. I think that this newsletter is objective proof of

but it doesn't know much. Experience is the, only thing that brings'knowledge, and
ar' nue&rth, the more experience you are sure to get,11 - Frank
State University College of Arts and Science , PIattsburgh, New York t
Noel W. Smith, Editor P-RECEOIfS

v,
Faculty of Social Sciences
I
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MTERBEHAVIORAL SOCCE-'EDING !'

SEGMENT
PSYCHOLOGY Volume 1
Number 3
NEWSLETTER May, 1970

Regarding the stimulus-response event as essentially a single behavioral

happening with the stimulus and the response as mutually necessary functional
features analyzed out for logical convenience, Organismic or Interactional
Psychology emphasizes the interactional relationship between these two varia-
bles. The psychological stimulus is considered an action or function perform-
ed by a stimulus object corresponding to the action or function of the whole
responding organism. A given interaction of these two variables is held to
be dependent on the former interactions of the two, so that regardless of the
physical properties of the stimulus object it takes on a particular stimulus-
function which evokes a characteristic response to the object. The response
is not conceived as a fixed or static configuration of bodily activity but as
the functional adjustment of the whole organism to the stimulus-function.
This view eschews descriptions of psychological stimulus-response exclusively
in terms of physical properties and corresponding anatomical or physiological
processes^ holding that though such descriptions may be satisfactory for
physiology and physics they are inadequate in any fundamental psychological
sense* The main objection to this concept is that it is confined to a purely
descriptive and analytic level in its approach to psychological problems,
Howevers what it lacks in ready explanations appears to be due more to the
limitations of our present knowledge than to any inherent defect. Moreover,
it has the recommendation of avoiding over-simplified, teleological, menta-
listic, and other scientifically fallacious implications, and of recogniz-
ing a psychology with its own unique, field without relying on wholesale
borrowings from its sister sciences.

--Jerry Carter: "On Experimental Study of Psycho-

logical Stimulus-Response."
1938.

Crude Data investigative Contact Scientific Construction

 THE AGORA

Two articles of considerable interest have appeared in the JOURNAL OF THE

EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF BEHAVIOR. In 1969, pages 329-347 was W.N. Schoenfeld's
"J.R. Kant or's ObJ[et:ive_J^^^ A
Retrospective Appreciation." This is a magnificent tribute to Dr. Kantor and
invites reading or re-reading of these two works. In 1970, pages 101108^appear-
ed J.R. Kantor's "An Analysis of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior (TEAB)"
which was his invited address to Division 25 at APA, September 3, 1.969. There
were approximately 300 in attendance and they gave a standing ovation at the
conclusion of the paper. This is perhaps one of the finest papers he has
written and is directly relevant to current psychological research in general
and operant research in particular.
*****

T.-X. Barber has published a book that summarizes his extensive program of
research to date in. de-spooking hypnosis: HYPNOSIS: A SCIENTIFIC APPROACH, Van
Nostrand, 1969, $2.95 in paper. He has succeeded in producing all of the pheno-
mena of hypnosis without the so-called trance state and o f f e r s a naturalistic
account. Along similar lines is C.E.M. Hansel's ESP: A SCIENTIFIC EVALUATION,
S c r i b n e r ' s j 1966, which provides an on-the-spot investigation of many of the
alleged ESP events including those at Duke and provides plausible explanations.

*****

There have been a few requests for lists of names of people and their areas
of interest for purposes of corresponding and exchanging information. If readers
will jot down this information and send it in (a postcard will do), a list will
be compiled and published. Other requests call for a list of readings along the
lines of interbehavioral psychology, especially for students. A future issue of
the Newsletter will contain such a list. In the meantime,, a perusal of issues
of THE PSYCHOLOGICAL RECORD will turn up a host of relevant items. The articles
appearing just before the book review section during the last couple of years by
"Observer" are especially noteworthy as are most of those under "Perspectives in
Psychology."
*****

The Cheiron Society (International Society for the History of Behavioral

Sciences) meeting included quite a number of interbehaviorists. Dr. Kantor was
to receive an honorary doctorate from the. University of Akron but received a
postponement due. to the. closing of the university subsequent to the nearby Kent
State tragedy. The Society presented him with a certificate. Attending in the
honor guard were Sam Campbell, Jerry Carter, Arthur Kahn, Parker Lichtenstein,
Marion McPherson, Paul Mountjoy, Stanley Ratner, Noel Smith, Robert Topper, Irv
Wolf.
*****

In this issue are reports (abridged) of the awards to Jerry Carter, the
first Ph.D. student of Dr. Kantor, and Julian Rotter, also a former Kantor
student, presented by George Albee from Division 12, Also included are two
contributions by students. Ronald Heyduk is at the University of Michigan
and Jacqueline Farrington at the State. University College at Plattsburgh, New
York.
 AWARDS AND CITATIONS - by GEORGE ALBEE

Distinguished Contributions to the Science and Profession of Clinical Psychology

Jerry W. Carter, Jr.

Jerry W. Carter Jr. is a familiar and beloved figure in clinical psychology; indeed,
in all areas of psychology.

Dr. Carter, despite his obvious youth, is one of the old-timers in the clinical
field in years of service. He completed his graduate training at Indiana University
in 1938, and so preceded the enormous influx of people into clinical psychology that
followed World War II.

In 1948 he began his career in the United States Public Health Service in the
Commissioned Officer Corps. During these years his travels took him up and down the
land where he visited every department and center and participated in every significant
conference which involved planning the ro.le of,psychologists in community service.

In 1962 he was appointed Acting Chief and Training Specialist in Community Mental
Health in the Manpower and Training Branch of NIMH, and in 1965 he became Chief and
Training Specialist in Community Mental Health in the Inservice Training Section of
the Manpower and Training Branch of the NIMH. Two years ago he was appointed Special
Assistant for Personnel in State Mental Health Programs at NIMH.

These formidable sounding titles do not convey the human warmth, and mature wisdom
and insight, that Jerry Carter has brought to Bethesda and to Chevy Chase. His wise
counsel and his sensitivity to the important issues in public health mental health have
been felt throughout the country and the world. He has been a leader of the Conference
of Psychological Directors and Consultants in Federal, State, Territorial Mental Health
Programs,, He has been actively engaged in nurturing a number of significant conferences
where the contributions of psychology to the mental health field have been examined in
detail. He currently has a monograph in press entitled "Research Contributions from
Psychology to Community Mental Health." He has written extensively on broad programs
for improving the care of the retarded, on the role of cottage personnel in residential
care facilities, and on mental health in the schools. In 1.956, long before the current
preoccupation with community mental health, he wrote a chapter on the training needs of
psychologists in community mental health programs.

During his early years Dr. Carter made important contributions to case study, to
the field of psychodiagnosis and to the development of the functioning of the psycho-
logist in psychological service centers.

Division 12 is by no means the first to honor Dr. Carter. He received the National
Defense Service Medal in 1964, and the United States Public Health Service Commendation
Medal in 1966.

This award expresses our appreciation for your long, devoted, significant and
continuing service to clinical psychology, to American psychology, and to psychology
throughout the world.
 Julian B. Rotter

Professor Julian B. Rotter is professor of psychology and director of the clinical

psychology training program at the University of Connecticut where he has been a member
of the faculty since 1963.

He completed his Ph.D. at Indiana University in 1941 after service as a personnel

consultant in the United States Army and as an Aviation Psychologist in the Army. In
1946 he went to Ohio State University where he moved through the ranks from, assistant
professor to professor.

It is impossible for me to summarize briefly the enormously productive research

contributions which Professor Rotter has made to clinical psychology and the stimulat-
ing concepts he has added to the field. 'I am sure that everyone in this audience has
read with interest and profit his articles and chapters on psychological testing
assessment, or has used the Rotter Incomplete Sentences Test, or has been influenced
by his writings on social learning theory and clinical psychology. His books on clini-
cal psychology have been required reading for .graduate students for at least the past
fourteen years. I must, add that Dr. Rotter was one of the first clinical psychologists
to criticize the "illness model" and his eloquent writing on the defects of this model
anticipated by more than a decade the recent debate on this topic. His recent Psycho-
logical Monograph dealing with internal versus external control of reinforcement, in
the judgment of many in the field, is one of the most significant contributions to
heuristic theory of the past 20 years. Certainly it has stimulated tremendous interest
and research activity., and especially dissertation research, since its appearance. Dr.
Rotter's work and his writing have always captured the enthusiasm of students; many
of his students have gone on to leadership positions in the field.

This award signifies our appreciation for the distinguished contribution you are
making and will continue to make to our field.

THE CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST

A STUDENT'S VIEW OF THE INTERBEHAVIORAL CONFERENCE

Jacqueline Farrington

As an adult student returning to the world of "academeia" who attended the Summer
Community of Scholars' Conference on Interbehaviora 1 Psychology, my commentary is some-
what different than that of the attending scholars who have thus far reported to the
News letter .

For me, the conference provided a further impetus toward my own goal of inter-
relating knowledges and experiences in several fields. Informal and formal present-
-ations of those attending the conference assured me that the science of psychology
both should and could realistically encompass the innumerable major and minor strands
of human concern which pervade man's cultures, I recognize the broad idealism of
such a statement. However, when one considers the "specialties" within the field of
psychology which were represented by individuals who applied the interbehaviora 1
approach in experimental, historical, clinical, philosophical, industrial and linguistic
fields as well as in teacher-student situations, the simple fact that such an approach
is viable in areas which are often in practice treated as distinct, disciplines, becomes
a significant and meaningful event for the observing and participating student.

It is for such reasons that the student chooses to investigate further the writ-
ings of Dr. Kantor, and to continue to pursue a goal which is both an ideal and a
pragmatic path of discovery through observation. The interbehaviora 1 approach offers
a coherent and honest system which many students, were they given ample opportunity to
explore its principles and quite natural consequences, would comfortably and to advan-
tage utilize throughout lifetimes of study, vocations and avocations. Employing such
an approach, the long assumed dichotomy between arts and sciences disappears as readily
as does that of "mind and body". Concerns about "self" integration, curricular inte-
gration,, the generation gap, community integration and even world integration can be
turned from wordy actionless theory to constructive action as the human organisms his
individual and collective enterprises, experiences, relationships and concerns are
understood as continuing events within a broader field of organism interacting within
the total environment.

Last summer's conference was an exciting and broadening experience for me, I
sincerely hope that students, both undergraduate and graduate, will be enabled to
participate in the conference during this coming summer.
j't"sWf!'V

CRACKS IN THE "BILLIARD BALL" ORGANISM

Ronald G. Hayduk'

A prevailing pessimism is often noted among interactional psychologists with

respect to the possibility of interbehavioral models of the organism serving as the
basis for general experimental research. Indeed, this pessimism is understandable.
Mahan (1970) notes in his Primer of Interactional Psychology that the psychological
laboratories are among "the last bulwarks to hold out in defense of the physiological
and dualistic traditions as explanations of behavior,"2 and contrasts this to the more
receptive and progressive attitudes among personality (Lewin), developmental (Piaget),
and social psychological (Mead) systematists

Fortunately, the outlook for the future of interactional models with "hard line"
researchers may not be so bleak. There is substantial evidence that a saccadic move-
ment in the direction of conceptualizing the psychological event as an interactive,
non-Localized process is occurring in experimental psychological circles. This shift
toward more naturalistic models has been catalyzed by the growing number of investi-
gators who are dissatisfied with the limited subset of psychological events which
have heretofore been subject to analysis,, There is increasing interest in modeling
the natural stream of behavior, and it has become apparent that new methodologies and
metatheories are required for this endeavor.

The exceptionally enlightening distinction between "behavior tesserae" and

"behavior units" drawn by Barker (1964) is relevant to the problems encountered by
these pioneering psychological researchers. On the one hand are the "fragments of
behavior that are created or selected by the investigator in accordance with his
scientific aims."3 These "tesserae" (pieces used in mosaic) have been the interest

My apologies to P.E. Lichtenstein, "The Significance of the Stimulus Function,"

January 1970.
o
Harry C. Mahan, A__Pjogiej:_j3fIn^^ (San Marcos, California, 1970),
p. 83.
o
Roger G. Barker, "The stream of activity as an empirical problem." In R.G. Barker
and H.Fo Wright, Thje_S^r^amof_]Behavj.or j (New York, 1963), p . L .
of a majority of experimenters, probably because, they fit neatly into a classical
methodology where manipulation of an independent variable (stimulus) is supposed to
produce some effect upon a dependent variable (response). Likewise, they are parsi-
moniously conceptualized within the framework of a "reactive organism" theory where
stimuli are the necessary causes of event initiation and termination,

Less popular with researchers are "behavior units , " defined by Barker as "the
inherent segments of the stream of behavior ."4 These psychological events, not
dependent upon the investigator for their duration or quality, demand new taxonomical
systems, experimental methodologies, and the sort of metatheoretical underpinnings
which can only be provided by in-terbehavioral models of the organism, models not
restricted by simplistic notions of causality, action, or reaction.

Barker's distinction aids in isolating the logical basis for the predominence
of "billiard ball" models in experimental psychology, but it has been the task of
others to evolve the methodologies and constructs required to appropriately study
the stream of activity in an interactional reference system. Progress is being made
on two fronts at the University of Michigan. Research in the laboratories of E.L.
Walker concerns the complexity interaction patterns of organisms in free-access
environments o Experimental techniques are being refined within the framework of a
compelling theory of motivation and choice sequences (see Walker, 1964). Simultane-
ously, J.W. Atkinson and J.D. Birch are formulating a highly ambitious "theory of
action" on the premise that the determinants of the fjlow of activity and not activity
er sja are the appropriate interests of experimental psychology. The kernel concept
of their behavioral system, the "persisting tendency," may be an example of a truly
interactional construct with heuristic value. Unique research into the determinants
of simple activity shifts is in progress.

Despite such, evidence for optimism, champions of the interbehavioral approach

can hardly afford to presume that naturalistic attitudes will prevail . Progress
reports from other laboratories at other universities are needed, and interbehavioral
psychologists are especially capable of detecting such progress. Also, the struggle
begun by Kantor (1923) against "mentalistic" attitudes toward the nervous system must
be intensified . The notion that stimulus-initiated neural events explain psycho-
logical events has not promoted an understanding of psychological phenomena any more
than chemical theory has helped to explain the rolling of a ball, but such a reduction
istic. view continues to be a powerful ally of stimulus-bound theories. If major progress
toward more naturalistic models as the basis for research is to be made, the assumptional
bases of dualistic interpretations of the nervous system must be undermined. The role
of the interbehavioral. psychologist is therefore clearly delineated if he wishes to
widen the cracks in the "billiard ball." organism.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Atkinson,, J 0 W. and Birch, J.D., 3l_^ZSSBis__-Ai2Il9 ^n print, 1969.

Barker, R.G. The stream of behavior as an empirical problem. In R.G. Barker and
H.F. Wright, ^_^^am_^_^ha_vir_3 New York, Appleton, 1963.

Kantor, J.R. The. organismic versus the mentalistic attitude toward the nervous system.
Psychological Bulletin, 1923, _20, 684-692.

Lic'htenstein., P.E. The significance of the stimulus function. -InterJbehajn.oi^l_News--

letter, 1970, vol. 1, No. 1.
 Mahan, H.C. Appendix: Foundations of interactional psychology. In H.C. Mahan, A__Pr_in^r_
San Marcos, California: Project Socrates Press, 1970.

Walker, E.L. Psychological complexity as a basis for a theory of motivation and choice.
In D. Levine (ed), Nebjcajskj^Jiy^ 1964. Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 1964.

Psychological constructs, like constructs in any other science,

are methods created by the scientist to describe and explain. If we
speak of _frji^trjjti.on^tlerancei or rat^__of__le_arning_, it is not nece-
ssary-^ fact it is fallacioustor think of some entity that exists
within the person like so much nickel in a steel alloy. When we
stop thinking this way, we do not seek to localize our constructs
in a part of the body or behavioral and physiological constructs in
set proportions or ratios. An understanding that the constructs
are instruments of the scientist, not entities, allows us to deal
freely with a logical, and useful set of wholly psychological and
scientific constructs.
--Julian Rotter: ScjiaJL Learning^ nd_ Cj.inica_l
p. 43.

Interbehaviora! Psychology Newsletter

Noel VV, Smith, Editor
State University College <Sf Afts &
Faculty of Social Sciences
Pittsburgh, New York

EDWARD K FCRRIS
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Noel W. Smith, Editor ' ^L__^___J
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WTERBEHAVIORAL SUCCEEDING Volume 1
Number 4
PSYCHOLOGY !
August 1970

NEWSLETTER
Salviati: I shall say that that which makes the earth
move Is a virtue like that by which Mars and Jupiter are
moved, . . .
Simpllclus: The cause of this is most manifest, arid
everyone knows that It is gravity.
Salviati: You are out, SImpllcius; you should say that
everyone knows that It is alle_d gravity,, and I do not ques-
tion about the name but about the essence (essenza) of the
thing. Of this you know not a tittle more than you know the
essence of the mover of the stars In gyration, unless It be
the name that has been put to the former and made familiar
and domestic by the many experiences that we have of It
every hour of the day,,
--Galileo
There Is no word in modern philosophy repeated more
often than this one (force), none which is defined so In-
exactly. Its obscurity makes it so handy, that one finds
its usage is not restricted to bodies with which we are
familiar; an entire school of philosophy today attributes
to beings which have never been, seen a force which does
not manifest Itself In any phenomenon.
--'Maupertius

NSP did not regard the Second Inter-
behavioral Conference favorably
enough to grant any funds. This
plus the fact that very few people
could break away from other commit-
ments and responsibilities forced a
cancellation. We hope to carry on
the planned projects by correspon-
dence o
Harry Mahan replies to the criticism
of the Newsletter that appeared in
issue # 2: "it Is not the purpose of
any of us,, I am sure,, to perpetuate
Crude Data
THE AGORA
any distinction^ but rather.to elimi-
nate It. The distinction is there
already,, and though behaviorism should
be merging into Interbehavloral psycho-
logy. It is not doing so. I fear that
the author of the quotation, must be
just a little bit naive Distinct-
ness is certainly no myth, and there
is nothing "straw manish" about it
whatsoever. One has only to take a
cursory glance at some of the most
recent elementary textbooks to'see
that this is true,,"
investigative Contact - Scientific Construction
In the May 1970 Aine_^a2i_^s1v_ch^2i2Si^t Bevan makes a couple of
comments that intimate a recognition of factors that have long
been advocated by interbehaviorists: "I reviewed data demon-
strating the influence of context on such things as sensory and
perceptual judgment, expectancy and response latency,, effective
reinforcement magnitude,, and free recall. I might also have
included reference to affect and motivation and to social judg-
ment ... .Nowhere is the handicap of the classical physical model
clearer than in our failure, until recently, to recognize the
significance of the fact that the psychological experiment It-
self is a case of interactive behavior" (p ,,443)-, In. the July
issue Lachenmeyer states: "As Nagel arid Kaplan point out. the
reality of human.behavior is the interaction between a multi-
plicity of variables,, The most theoretically meaningful ques-
tions in the social sciences will probably deal with these
interactions." (p.,622).
*****
T.X. Barber has published a new-book to be out this month: LSD,
MARIJUANA., YOGA, AND HYPNOSIS, Aldine Publishing Company,, 529 S.
Wabash Avenue,, Chicago,, 111, 60605= He writes "The book Is
harmonious with the interbehavioral viewpoint," It looks as If
he has successfully despooked another traditionally spooky topic.
Here Is an excerpt from the flyer:"The book differs from previous
work on these subjects in that It treats "psychedelics," yoga,
and hypnosis as continuous with other known psychological pheno-
mena and as part of social psychology,, Moreover, it questions the
substance of beliefswidespread even among psychologists--that
"psychedelics,," yoga,, and hypnosis can bring out unused mental
or physical capacities, can heighten awareness or give rise to
enhanced creativity,, or can produce an altered state of conscious-
ness, a suspension of conventional reality-orientation, changes
in "body-image," or changes In perception. These long-held
assumptions are critically analyzed In the light of available
empirical data and accepted only if they are clearly supported
by this data. Complete bibliographies of literature on each
subject are included at the conclusion, of each chapter. The
results of these studies are twofold. First, they show that
few of the alleged dangers or enhanced psychological effects of
LSD and marijuana exist when, carefully studied in the light of
empirical data, arid the feats and other phenomena associated with
so-called yoga and hypnotism can be explained by other factors.
Second, the studies illustrate the method of analysis that can
most effectively be employed when studying other similar psycho-
logical phenomena.
#####
!
Some reviews of Kantor s THE-SCIENTIFIC EVOLUTION OF PSYCHOLOGY,
Vol.2 are beginning to appear. In S_ciejic_e_, May 1970 Richard
Lowry presents a very confused analysis,, He spends much space on
the metaphysical status of a toothache,, assets that Kantor would
consider it a theoretical construction, then declares that it
does not have spatial dimensions like a chair. He makes the
common erroneous assumption that Kantor Is to be identified with
John Watson. Finally, he contends that "transpati, al'; and
"fictitious" are not synonymous. In the April 1970 Journal of
 : 3:

Kenneth Gibson offers a

review that indicates a good grasp of what Kant or is saying. .'He
has some reservations about some of his assumptions 'but is quite
fair in the overall appraisal, Robert We y ant has a review of
both volumes in the July 1970 issue of
He believes that the work follows the usual path of history of
psychology texts rather than, that of the stated intent of .the
author. He considers a major weakness to lie in his rebuke of
mentalism as a statement of fact rather than a hypothesise He finds
the work meticulously scholarly, evidencing a great breadth of
knowledge, and distinctive in. relying on primary sources
*****
Harry Mahan will have a no ties in the to
the following effect: Available to graduate students arid psycho-
1'ogy majors only: two 1970 publications, "A Primer of Inter-
actional Psychology"' 'list $1, 95) and H A Primer of Interactional
Psychology/ Part II,, Socratic Workbook" (list $1.75) for $2.00
plus 24^ postage plus sales tax: to California addressees o Project
Socrates: Department of Psychology,, Palomar College, San Marcos
Calif. 92069. Offer expires December 31, 1970,, This offer
for allL readers o:
*****
has grown a 'bit. It is
*****
So far only two indications have-been received of areas of
interest for purposes of correspondence and exchange of informa-
tion. Jot it on. a postcard and send to Newsletter so that we
c an c o rap lie a list.
*****
For features in this issue >f the .Newsletter we are printing the
statement-to Dr Kant or on the conferring of the Doctor of L
degree to him by The University of Akron and an excerpt from a new
book by Rollo Handy: THE MEASUREMENT OF VALUE, Warren H,
expected date summer 1970

DOCTOR OF LETTERS
Presented June l4, 1970

The author of numerous books, arid, the founder of the widely respect-
ed journal, The Psychological Record,, JACOB ROBERT KANTOR, Professor
Emeritus of Indiana University,., has been active for five decades.
Structuralist psychologists,, in ascen.den.ce when he began his work,
saw the advent of Watsonian Behaviorism and soon thereafter the
emergence of Gestalt psychology. Both, without and within the
academy questions were repeatedly asked, "What is psychology about
and " How
Winds of doctrine blew heavily from all directions. Professor Kantor
withstood these gales and maintained a victorious immunity to the
mandates of tradition, ever seeking to match- the label "scientific"
to the fact of scientific psychology . His endeavors have promoted
man's directorship of man,

Hence, it is fitting to honor this Nestor among psychologists

JACOB ROBERT KANTOR

a personage of impressive academic accomplishments 'whose seminal ideas

may well yield the -richest harvests in the years ahead.

Discussions of the most fruitful way to approach the subject

matter of scientific inquiry have generated an extensive literature;
many of those Issues were mentioned in Chapter I. The topic of con-
cern in the present'section Is related to a host of Issues discussed
under such headings as "atomism-vs. holism," "reductlonlsm," "reality
of societal laws, "methodological Individualism," etc. Of Immediate
concern are questions relating to the unit of analysis chosen for
inquiry (especially in the behavioral sciences,) and on the structure
and dynamics of that unit. The view taken here is closely related to
the _tr^ns_a^_lonaJ1ism of John Dewey and Arthur P. Bentley, to Norman
Cameron's biosocial approach, and to J.R. Kantor! s Interactlonism, 1.2
For present purposes, using the Dewey-Bentley terminology seems
desirable,
Dewey a n d Bentley differentiate sharply between _ _
ant
j ^ ^ra^nsactioifi, Their preliminary account follows:

" S elf _-_ a_c ti on : where things are viewed as acting under
their own powers.

I_n ;tejr^ja.cj:i_on : where thing is balanced against thing

in casual interconnection.,

12. John Dewey and Arthur P. Bentley., Kj2icmguja,nji_J^

Beacon Press, 19^93 paperback ed.s 19600 Norman Cameron,, _
lj2SLJ2JLJ^!:^ Boston,
HoughTon~l4iffTin3 ig^rr"^ > B1 o o mi rig -
ton,, Principia Press, Vol. I, 19^-5,s Vol. II s 1950 Although Dewey
and Bentley differentiate sharply between a transactlonal and an
interactional approach,, there is a strong family resemblance between
Kantorrs illte_racti.on. and their j^,Hladiono The complex, of Issues
discussed in this -section is discussed In much more detail In my
^h 3
 :
where systems of description and naming
are employed to deal with aspects and phases of action,,
without final, attribution to 'elements5 or other
presumptively detachable or independent 'entitles,1
'essences^ 1 or 'realities^1 arid without Isolation of
presumptively.detachable 'relations1 from such detach- *
able 'elementso! "13

They argue that a self-actional. approach dominated early physics,

and is illustrated by the belief that rain, is caused by Jupiter Plu-
vius. 'Substance,,' 'essence^,1 !actor3' ' creator,! etc,s are terms
often made heavy use of In self-actional approaches. Galileo's
inquiries marked the overthrow of that approach in physics In the
behavioral science areas., those who put primary emphasis on. motives,
intentions and purposes often use a self-actional framework. Inter-
actionism tended to dominate in scientific Inquiry until recently5 arid
is typified by Newtonian mechanics. Many such interactional framework
still work efficiently in that warranted assertions emerge. On. the
other hand., in many areas of Inquiry the use of that framework produces
problems that are primarily methodogenlc (i.e., artifacts of the method)
as is illustrated by epistemological systems which generate problems
as to how mind and matter,, assumed to exist in separate ontologlcal
realmsj, can interact.14- .

In many situations transactionalism seems a more appropriate

framework for inquiry. Take the case of a man hunting a rabbit:

"No one would be able successfully to speak of the huntejr

and the hunteji as Isolated with respect to hunting. Yet
it is just as absurd to set up hunting as an event in
isolation from the-spatio-temporal connections of all the
components."

Dewey and Bentley go on. to compare a billiard game with a loan:

"if we confine ourselves to the problem of the balls on.

the billiard table, they can profitably be presented
and studied interactlorially But a cultural account
of the game in its full spread of social growth and
human adaptations is already transactional. And if one
player loses money to another we cannot even find words
in which to organize a fully interactional account by
assembling together primarily separate items. Borrower
cannot borrow without lender to lend,, nor lender lend
without borrower to borrow, -the loan being a transaction
that is Identifiable only in the wider transaction of
the full legal-commercial system In which It Is present
as occurrence."15.

13- Dewey and Bentley., ,2_i_ci-jfc p.lo80

14. rb_id.., pp. 108-112. I have borrowed the term ' methodogenlc!
from Marvin Farber, Basic Issues oj[_PMJmoj)hv_; New York,
Harper & Row_, 1968"s pp7B3~Tf7~~ ~
15. Dewey and Bentley_, o]D_.__c_it;_. .> P133
 In the Investigation of many processes,, the inquirer himself in
common process with what is being inquired into For present purpos-
es., then, 'transaction1 designates the full ongoing process In a.
field In which the inquirer may be in reciprocal relation with many
aspects and phases of that -field. No mysticism should be attached to
'field1; it names the cluster of connected things and events found in
mutual (reciprocal) relation. In many situations5 a methodological
emphasis on presumed self-actors,, or on presumed separates interact-
ing, does not.seem as fruitful in facilitating prediction as does an
emphasis on the transactional system as a whole.

The holistic emphasis on a field or system in which the aspects

and phases are In common process Is sometimes associated with a "tender-
minded" or "hard-science" approach of more atomistic emphases The
view chosen here combines a hard-science.,, skeptical3 tough-minded out-
look with a holistic frame of reference,, because such an approach seems
the most fruitful for inquiry.. For example, I see nothing at all mystic-
al or tender-minded about viewing loans.,, borrowers, arid lenders as
aspects of a common transactional framework. Indeed,, leaving out the
"system" in which the behavior occurs is surely to make unnecessary
problems and difficulties. Separating the borrower from, the
transaction does not make inquiry more scientific;-It tends "
some Important relations.

As applied to measurement., a transactional framework leads one to

emphasize what often Is Ignored by philosophers: the methodological and
other problems of the data-collector or person who is trying to measure
something. Viewed transactlonally, many aspects or phases of" the whole
transaction have their importance,, including not only questions about
the formal structure of the.scale used arid related problems, but the
problems of calibrating the Instruments used, controlling the observa-
tion of the results., etc. This issue will be discussed further in the
context of fundamental vs. derived measurement; for the present I will
only point out that having a scale characterized by an impressively
neat and tidy set of formal properties -may be of no use at all to an.
investigator if the conditions encountered make it impossible, for him
to exercise adequate control over the observations necessary for the use
of that scale.
 State University College of Arts and Science, Plattsburgh, New York j
Noel W . Smith, Editor F I E L D ! PRECEDING
1
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WTEMBEHAVIORAL S U C C EEDING r J
Volume 1
SE(3MEHT Number 5
PSYCHOLOGY ! November 1970
NEWSLETTER
Therefore everything In existence is, fundamentally, made out of two
things. There are bodies and there Is the void in which these bodies have
their places and through which they move in different directions., For
sensation which is common to everybody declares that body exists. And un-
less we hold fast to this original belief in sensation,, we shall find that
in matters beyond the reach of sensation we shall have no principle to which
we can refer and by means of which we can arrive at rational conclusions.
Next, if there were no such thing as space (which is what we mean by "the
void ) there would be nowhere in which the bodies could be situated and it
would be quite impossible for them to move about in different directions,.. ,
There is nothing else--nothing which you could say was distinct both from
body and from void and could be pronounced to be a third substance. For
everything that Is to exist must be something In Itself; if it is capable
0
touching and being touched,, however light and small the touch may be, it
...L.11, provided that it does exist,, Increase the quantity of body to some
extent,, whether great or small,, and be an addition to the sum of things.
If on the other hand it Is tangible and unable to prevent any object in
motion from passing through It at any point, then unquestionably It must be
what we call the empty void. Then again,, whatever Is to exist in Itself
will either do something., or else must remain passive itself while other
things act upon it, or else must be of the sort in which things can exist
and actions can take place. But nothing can act or be acted upon without
body and nothing can afford space except the void and the empty. Therefore5
apart from the void and bodies it is impossible for there to exist in the
sum of things any residual third substance. Such a substance could never
at any time come within the reach of our senses, nor could any man lay hold
of it by any process of reasoning.
Lucretius (First Century B.C.)
(Rex Warner, Translator).
How may the union of the corporeal with-the incorporeal be conceived?..
..How will that which Is corporeal seize upon that which is incorporeal, so
to hold It conjoined with Itself, or how will the Incorporeal grasp the
corporeal, so as reciprocally to keep it bound to itself....? I ask you
how you think that you, If you are 'incorporeal and unextended, are capable
of experiencing the sensation of pain?...The general difficulty always
remains, how the corporeal can have anything in common with the incorporeal,
or what relationship may be established between the one and the other.
Pierre Gassendi (Letter to
Descartes quoted in OBJECTIONS
"*': AND REPLIES IN THE PHILOSOPHICAL
WORK OF DESCARTES, Vol. 2, E.S.
Haldane G . R . T . Ross, T r . )
Crude Data Investigative Contact Scientific Construction
 So far as I can gather from his own words, this is the opinion of that
distinguished, man (Descartes), and I. could scarcely have believed it possible
for one so great to have put it forward if it had been less subtle. I can
hardly wonder enough that a philosopher who firmly resolved to make no deduct-
ion except from self-evident principles, and to affirm nothing but what he
clearly and distinctly perceived,, and who blamed, all the schoolmen because
they desired to explain obscure matters by occult qualities, should except a
hypothesis more occult than'''any occult quality. What does he understand, I
ask, by the union of. the-mind and body? What clear and distinct conception
has he thought intimately connected, with a certain small1 portion of matter?
I wish that he had explained this union by its proximate cause. 'But he con-
ceived the mind to be so distinct from the body* that he,, was able to-, as sign
no single cause of this union, rior of the mind itself^ 'but was' obligeqt to
have recourse to the cause of the whole universe, that is to say, to God,,
Baruch Spinoza: ETHICS
(W.H, White, Tr.)

In the race of the various phenomena with which this book is concerned,
the selection is determined iri past by the ancient distinction between mind
arid matter. Mind is mysterious, being, as the French philosopher Rene
Descartes said, "unextended substance,' Yet how can mind be in the body
and still occupy no space there? It seems reasonable to suppose that so
impalpable an essence could act in strange ways. For Instance, if the mirid
or the soul--the two used not to be distinguishedcan be here and yet take
up no room, may not the mind or its effects be both here, there, and every-
where, like light or, as now, the radio waves?
E.G. Boring in the Introduction
to C.E.M. Hansel: ESP: A SCIENTIFIC
EVALUATION.

Now, matter obeys the principles of conservation of mass plus energy,

momenta and electrical charges Any influence upon matter implies the
variation of at least one of these quantities, 'If one material system
acts upon another, the changes of mass, momenta, energy and electric
charges of the second are compensated by equal and contrary changes in the
first. If mind is supposed to act upon matter, it would have to possess
mass, energy, momenta or electric charges. But according to the usual
psychological definition, it does not possess them. Therefore an action
of mind upon matter is possible,, It would mean the breaking of the laws
of physics,
E. Gaviola: The impossibility of
interaction between mind and matter1
Philosophy of Science, April 1936

What room has modern science Tor the dichotomy of man or of any other
natural object? There is no mind, and indeed, no body considered as an
adjunct of mind. As an organism the scientific worker is an observable
object In Interrelation with other thing's. His existence, his operations,
are as public and as stable as anything else in nature
J.R. Kantor: THE LOGIC OF MODERN
SCIENCE,
 THE AGORA

With this issue we come to the end of 1970. The number of subscribers
now totals 1^5 The NwsjLe_tJ:_er_ will definitely continue for another year,,
and hopefully indefinitely into the future. Subscription forms for 1971 are
included with this issue.
*******
f
A brief comment on the quotations: Gassendi, Spinoza, Gaviola, and
Boring offer incisive comments on the problems of dualism,, but fall victim
to it in their own writings. Gaviola1s paper is an object lesson on how
the clearest statement of the problem is not sufficient to obviate it when
the troublesome concept is not completely replaced by an event based
orientation.
*******
Cheiron International Society for the History of the Behavioral and
Social Sciences will meet April 29-May 2, 1971 in New York City. Several
interbehaviorallsts usually attend (see Numbers 2 and 3) For information
write Dr. Barbara Ross, University of Massachusetts, 100 Arlington Street,
Boston, Mass. 02116.
*******
At the 1970 APA meeting Jerry Carter received from The Division of
Community Service a Distinguished Service Award for a "lifetime of signi-
ficant contributions to community mental health and community psychology"
and from The Division of Psychologists in Public Service the Hildreth
Memorial Award, In the May Number we reported an award to him by The
Division of Clinical Psychology.
*******
The continuing tenacity of the brain dogma is illustrated by some
current material. ^|l^Xi2Z_-2^Z^ July 20, 1970 reports that Charles
Burkland, a neurosurgeon at the Omaha VA Hospital, found that nine of
twelve patients having hemispherectomles were able immediately after the
operation to perform movements with the side of the body supposedly con-
trolled by the excised hemisphere. But rather than abandon the old dogma
he proposes that such movements must originate in the lower brain rather
than the cortex. At the editor's institution a circular describing a new
graduate seminar in biology called The Neural Basis of Behavior reads:
'Many biologists have become convinced that we are on the verge of a
revolution in the understanding of neurophysiology as it relates to behavior,,
In this seminar students will examine the conceptual' basis for the coming
revolution by reading arid critically discussing some of the classic papers
in neurophysiology. Later in the semester each student will present a
report on the status of a currently hot topic of research. Some of the
topics to be'studied: perception,, learning and memory,, electrical stimulation
of the brain.;, attention, sleep, pharmacological effects on behavior." In
the sjho_logi_c_al Review, November 1970, Bindra takes Sperry to task for
the dualism in the latter's paper of 1969 "A modified concept of conscious-
ness." Unfortunately, Bindra gets as entangled in mentalistic constructs
and neurological surrogates as Sperry. Sperry rebuts by disclaiming epi-
phenomenalism, double aspect^ inner aspect of cerebral process, parallelism,
and other traditional mentalistic approaches; but the basic dualistic entities
and processes and their neural bases remain unchanged in that his theory
elies these disclaimers. At this rate the imminent revolution is still
^n infinity away.
* * * * * **
The spooks are now heavily funded. .August 31 Behavior Today reports
that Howard Shevrin received a grant of $157^900 from NIMH to study ttie__
unconscious o I_t_ is measured by fluctuations in electrical activity of the
brain during visual discrimination tasks.
 In the Jourmilj::!^^ July 1969 <,
5 5 326-3395 Thornton published a critical review of the chapter on Socrates
in Volume 1 of Kantor's THE SCIENTIFIC EVOLUTION OF PSYCHOLOGY. Mountjoy
and Smith have written a reply that will appear in 1971 > probably April or
July 5 along with Thornton's rebuttal if he chooses to provide one. Russell
arid Winograd have replied in S_cieric_e_3 September 1970 to Lowry's review of
Volume 2 (see August Ne2JS_le_ttrJ7~~~A point in common with the reply of
Mountjoy and Smith is a correction of the assumption that interbehaviorism
'is identical with Watsonian behaviorism.
* * * # # * *
Feature articles in this number consist of a reaction to the excerpt
from Handy's new book presented in the last number and a list of selected
readings in interbehavioral psychology as requested earlier. These repre-
sent a few of several possible areas. Several features are already lined
up for issues next year including a critique on intellectual "deficiency"
by Marion White MePherson and a defense of the interbehavioral position by
Jacqueline Farrington.

INTERACTION: TRANSACTION: WHICH?

In the excerpt from the new book of Professor Rollo Handy in the last
number of" the Newslejbte^, the author avers that while Dewey and Bentley*
differentiate sharply between, transactional and interactional interpretations
of events there is a strong family resemblance between Kantor's Interaction
and their Transaction,, Thus Professor Handy joins other writers who have
denied the claims of transactionists to have invented a different and
superior principle of explicating events

Are these claims only rhetorical autism? That appears to be the case,
Still where there is so much clamor a look-in may be appropriate. Accord-
ingly, we Inquire briefly why there is such bombastic and strident emphasis
upon the term "transaction" instead of "interaction". If there is a problem
here it certainly must be examined upon two levelsa superficial semantic
one arid a deeper philosophic one, e suspect that this modern homo-homo!
issue, masks a great divergence between scientific interactions and meta-
physical transactions,,
Semantics first. As Professor Handy and other writers suggest, when
concrete situations are described there is no compulsion to prefer one term
to another. Words are seldom used descriptively, mainly they are metaphor-
ical. Those who are attuned to the commercial aspects of our culture--
merchants5 brokers5 fathers and sons of bankersalert to loans, borrowers,
and lenders favor the term "transaction". But those interested in analyzing
and describing events and not merely applying names cannot accept favored
terms as identical with confronted things and events. Transaction or Inter-
action? De gustibus,o,o.
Turning next to the deeper philosophical considerations we discover
that extremely different postulates underly the different usages. The
transactionists draw their intellectual sustenance from the bottomless well
of Hegelian objective idealism., in which actor and thing acted upon,, the
knower arid the known,, are interfused in one gigantic spiritual cosmochaos.
For them nature is only knowledge of nature, and in all situations naming is
identical with the named.
^Knowing and the Known, Boston, Beacon Press,, 1949,
 To cozen themselves and their readers the metaphysical transactlonists
loudly proclaim that the names or the events^ hunter^, hunted,, and the hunt
j_ng do not exist in isolation but in a system. What need to blast the man
of straw who disagrees? Though Johnny may not know how to- read,, he does
know that "borrower cannot borrow without a lender to lend,, nor lender lend
without borrower to borrow,," He knows, too,, that no transaction creates
the interactors who by their actions engender the transaction. Moreover,,
he is quite aware that the borrower is riot the lender but usually the victim
of an exaction interaction. If ever the roles are reversed it is not
because the actors were identical to begin with but rather because two
separate and distinct people enter into an economic game in its various
phases. No great acumen is required to see that there is no connection
between any concrete transaction and any metaphysical transactionism,, and
no acumen is needed to conclude that the writings aimed at making such
connections are gossamer spun to support the vast concrete universal.

Since it appears probable that of the Dewey--Bentley couple it is the

latter who is mainly responsible for the great emphasis upon the power of
words and their identity with knowledge and with things it is instructive
to exemplify his mentallstic dialectic that is the basis of transactionism.
u
e return to a status of the world in the mind^ yet mind in the world.
e solve it by symblotaxis. The world is in the mind socially taken as
action (symbiotaxis). The symbiotaxium constructs the world-knowledge--i.e. ,
it 'is1 that world The world (knowledge) includes mind (mind as psycho-
logical technique)."*

In complete contrast to such transactionism the interactional view-

point stands firmly upon a scientific philosophy. That is to say,, all
premises are exclusively derived from descriptive and analytic confront-
ations with actual events. Specifically in psychology the term "inter-
action" is employed as a synonym for the interbehavior of organisms with
other organismss or things and conditions with which they come into contactL> ,
The interbehavloral scientist is completely justified In investigating the
components of Interacting fields since they also Interact with many other
different things in other behavioral fields. Moreover,, he may study how
he himself fits into the different behavior fields and how he influences
the various entire fields. The only "metaphysics" of the interbehavloral"]
scientist consists of the demand that he rid himself of all assumptions I
derived from, autistic constructionss Instead of from interbehavloral j
observations

A, MItsorg

^Inquiry into Inquiries., Boston., Beacon Press,, 195^-? p.25

 SUGGESTED 'READINGS IN INTEKBEHAVIORAL PSYCHOLOGY

Gene_ral_
Bentley, A. P. BEHAVIOR, KNOWLEDGE, PACT. Prlncipla, 1935, Ch.12: "The
apprehensional space -segment : Kantor" .
Bucklew, Jo Complex 'behavioral units of the reactional biography ^_cho_-
LogLca^Jtecoixa, 1956 , 6, 44-77, '
Herman, D.T, What is the stimulus? Ps_^chlogia2-__Rord>5 1957., 7 , 70-72.
Herman, D.T, & Kenyon, G.T. A contribution toward interbehavioral analysis.
., 1956, 6, 33-38.
Kantor, J . R , How do we acquire our basic reactions?
1921, 28S 328-356,
Karitor, J . R . The nervous system, psychological fact or fiction?
1922, 19, 38-49.
Karitor, J.R. A SURVEY OF THE SCIENCE OF PSYCHOLOGY. Principia^ 1933

Kantor, J.R, Preface to interbehavioral psychology. Z2il2i2^i^

1942, 5, 173-193.
Kantor3 J.R. INTERBEHAVIORAL PSYCHOLOGY., Principia, 1959.
Kantor, JR. An analysis of the experimental analysis- of behavior (TEAB).
1970, 13, 101-108,
Lichtenstein, P.E, Psychology as a genetic science.
, 1950, 42, 313-332.
Lichtenstein, P.E. Psychological Systems: Their Nature and Function.
17-, 321-340.
Mahan, H.C. THE INTERACTIONAL PSYCHOLOGY J.R, KANTOR: AN INTRODUCTION.
San Marcos, Calif.: Project Socrates Press, Palomar College, 1968.
Mahan, H.C. .A PRIMER OF INTERACTIONAL PSYCHOLOGY. San Marcos, Calif.:
Project Socrates Press, Palomar College, 1970.

Noris, 0,0. A preamble to an organismic theory of knowledge. PhilS2Ehy.

H_2ience3 193^, 1, 46-478,
Pronko, N.H. TEXTBOOK OF .ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY. Williams & Wilkins, 1963.,
(esp. p. 25-27 on field).
Pronko, N.H. PANORAMA OF PSYCHOLOGY. Brooks/Cole, 1969. :

Pronko, N.H. & Bowles, J.W. EMPIRICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY, Routledge

& Kegan Paul, 1952.
Ruch, M, Review of PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY, Vol. I.
1926, 23, 248-249.
Stephenson, . Postulates of behaviorism. Philosophy of Science , 1953,
203 110-120.
Swartz, P. -On the validity of the experimental approach to behavior,
^ 1957, 7, 119-122.

Biones, I.T, An experimental comparison of two forms of linguistic learn-

ing. Pxchlogj:aj^^ 1937, 1, 205-214.
Brackman, J.P. /An interbehavloral analysis of sensory preconditioning
1956, 6} 24-26.
Carter, J.W. An experimental study of the stimulus function. Psychological
Record, 1937, 1, 35-48,
Carter , J.W. An experimental study of psychological stimulus-response.
ZS2rcholoical_Record., 1938, 2, 35-91.
Foley, J.P. The effect of context upon perceptual differentiation. Ajrchlve_s_
of^_Ps_y_cholog^5 1935, Nr. l84, 67 pp.
Herman, D.T, Linguistic behaviors: I. Some differentiations in hearer
response to verbal stimulation. Journal of General Psychology, 1951j> 445
199-213.
Herman, D<,T.<, Linguistic behaviors: II. The development of hearer inter-
action with holophrastic language stimuli. Journaj^oJI^ene^aj^Ps^ychology,
1951, 44, 273^291,
Lichtenstein, P.E, Studies of anxiety: II. The effects of lobotomy on a
feeding inhibition In dogs. ^^~]Q^^
P_sy_choloy_., 1950., 43., 419-427.
Mount joy,, P.T, Differential behavior in monozygotic twins, P^y_cliolOic_al_
_, 1957, 7, 65-69,
Pronko , N 0 H<, An exploratory Investigation of language by means of
oscillographic arid reaction time techniques. ^oiliSfLLj^jLJi^^
1945, 355 433-458.
Ratner, S.Ca; Gawronski, J.J.j & Rice, F.E. The variable of concurrent
actions In language of children: effect of delayed speech feedback.
Psychological Re corda 1964, l4, 47-56.
Ratner, S.C. & Rice, F,E The effect of the listener on the speaking
interaction. ^s^_cY}l^ic^lfJiec.oT^9 1963, 13, 265-268.
Wolf, I, S<, Stimulus variables in aphasia: I. Setting conditions. Journal
1958, 44, 203-22IL
//olf, I.S. Stimulus variables in aphasia: II. Stimulus objects. Journal
of the Scientific Laboratorie_s,Derii^ 1958, 44, 2l8~22cT7~~~~
Kantor, J.R. Suggestions toward a scientific interpretation of perception.
1920 , 27, 191-216.
Herman, D.T.; Lawless., R.H.; & Marshall, R.W. Variables in the effect of
language on the reproduction of visually perceived forms.
Motor__Skills_, 1957, 7, 171-186.
Lichtenstein, P.E, Perception arid the psychological metasystem.
logical Record, 1959* 9, 37-44.
Pronko, N.H. Some reflections on perception. Z^Z]l22^i^i_jM2Z^,.9 1961.,
11, 311-314.
Pronko, N.H.; Ebert, R.; & Greenberg, G. A critical review of theories of
perception. In A. A. Kidd & J.L. Rivoire (Eds). PERCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT IN
CHILDREN, International Universities,, 1966.

Brackman, J.F. Some comments on the definition of emotion.

Record, 1957, 7> 93-95
Howard, D,T. A functional theory of emotions. In E.L. Reymert (Ed),
PEELINGS AND EMOTIONS: THE WITTENBERG SYMPOSIUM. Clark University , 1928.
Kantor,, J.R. An attempt toward a naturalistic description of emotions (I)
(II). Pl^ch^log^aaj^ej^ 1921, 28, 19-42^ 120-140.
Kantor,, J.R. The psychology of feeling or affective reactions.
y_,) 1923, 3^5
Kantor, J.R. Peelings and emotions as scientific events. Psy_clioloic_al_
Re cord3 1966, 16, 377-404.

Language^
Kantor, J.R. Can psychology contribute to the study of linguistics?
Morust, 19285 38, 630-648,
Kantor, J.R. Language as behavior and as symbolism. Joumal_^f^^
1929, 26, 150-159.
Kantor, J.R,, AN OBJECTIVE PSYCHOLOGY OF GRAMMAR. Indiana University, 19360
Pronko, N.H. Language and psychological linguistics: a review.
1946, 43, 189-239.
Ratner, S.C0 Toward a description of language behavior: I. The speaking
action. ZZ^l2l5^_^II^.5 1957> 7, 61-64.
 Noel W. Smith, Editor Preceding

Faculty of Social Sciences

Setting Factors

Stimulus Object
Stimulus ["
Function j

Media L

MTERBEHAVIORAL Volume 2
Number 1
PSYCHOLOGY January 1971

NEl^LETTER
State University College of Arts and Science, Plattsburgh, New York

_____________Ji_ZZ^ly: a point of view that defines

psychology as the study of evolved events in which at
least one of the interacting or Interbehaving factors is
an organism. The event consists in the interbehavior of
an organism with other organismss things3 and relations,
which are structurally and exlsteritially independent of
the Interbehaving organism- (That is^ neither stimulus
objects nor their properties are cr_e_at_e_d_ in the inter-
behavioral acti but the characteristics of any particular
psychological ev_ent are derived from previous Inter-
behaviors ) The configurations or adjustments that con-
stitute events called psychological are evolved ~- i,e.<,
they are dependent upon or conditioned by previous inter-
behaviors .

-English & English: A COMPREHENSIVE

DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL AND
PSYCHOANALYTIC TERMS (Longmans Green/

The demand for Kantor's LOGIC OF
MODERN SCIENCE and Volume I of THE
SCIENTIFIC EVOLUTION OF PSYCHOLOGY
has been so great that these are now
being reprinted,
Fred recent LEARNING RE-
INFORCEMENT THEORY , rev ed..5 appear-
ed along with some other new books in
a brochure entitled,, paradoxically^
: "Mind Expanders from Random House-
Knopf !t Other ope rant news: Univer-
sity of Veracruz in Mexico held a
"First Symposium on Behavior Modifi-
* Crude Data
THE AGORA
cation: Perspectives in Training
the Non-Professionals in Applied
Behavior Analysis" Jan,, 25-2.63
1971 It honored B.F. Skinner
Other speakers were Daniel 0'Leary5
Robert ahler5 Harold Cohens Sidney
Bijou,, Teodore Ayllon.3 and Charles
Ferster, Paul MountJoy is now on &
semester sabbatical leave working
on a history of operant condition-
ing as animal technology- This was
inspired by Vol. 1 of THE SCIENTIFIC
EVOLUTION OF PSYCHOLOGY,,,
******
Investigative Contact Scientific Construction
 A new publication of note is by T. R. Sarbin and J. C. Mancuso:
"Failure of a moral enterprise: attitudes of the public toward mental
Illness",, ]S22J!^LJ2JLJ22B^ > 1970, 353
159-173. The authors find that the public has not shown signs of
change in connection with the educational campaign to de-stigmatize
"mental Illness" while it is generally tolerant of concrete deviant
behavior. Apparently the public Is better grounded In events than,
the professionals: "The man in the street, particularly the occupant
of a low SES [socloeconomlc status] , has told us that his urihapplness
originates in identifiable problems. The mental health professional
insists on disordered minds as the cause of the slum dweller's conduct;
the public has not been willing to apply the myth of the professionals."
"The .mental Illness concept embodies a series of logical absurdities
which forestall, efforts to subsume certain classes of deviant behavior
under the category of mental Illness"
******
Some comments, occurred about the list of "Suggested Readings in. Inter-
behavioral Psychology" that appeared In, the last Issue to the effect
that there were important omissions The list was meant to be select-
ive rather than exhaustive but perhaps some useful additions--none of
which fit the categories given unless It would be "general"--would
include Lundlri's AN OBJECTIVE PSYCHOLOGY OF MUSIC, 1953, 196?;
Swartz's "Stimulus evolution in problem solving behavior: an inter-
behavioralM analysis", ^Psy^cjn^^g^aJ^J^^orpl, 1955 55 425-432; and
Carter's .A case of reactional dissociation (hysterical paralysis)", '
^!^LC^^ 1937.9 7js ,219-224. Carter's paper
is an application, of technical Inte rbehavloral analysis and planning
of therapeutic procedure that is still fresh and of vital .importance
In today's clinical settings as well as having theoretical importance.
******
If anyone wishes to place a notice about faculty openings, graduating
students looking for jobs or degree programs,, new or old degree pro-
grams of special interest,, or is seeking new horizons himself the
Nej^sJ^tt^r is available for such information.
~ ~" ******
The special features this Issue Include a short lampoon written by-
Hal Bauer when he was an undergraduate at SUNY at Plattsburgh and
attending a philosophy class in existentialism. He Is now In Tanzania,
East Africa, doing field studies on chimpanzees with Jane Goodall as
part of his graduate studies. The other item is a list of mentalistic
phrases with a corresponding list of attempted objective replacements.
It will be observed that the objective ones are often, rather awkward
or at least do not come tripping to the tongue,, an Indication of
the grip that our duallstic culture holds on us and which is abetted
In part by the same language habits it produces. Since the mentalese
is not objective there may be some disagreement about what objective
events the phrases do allude to if any. It makes a useful exercise;
for students to listen for arid colleqt these and attempt to write
objective equivalents
_******_
Anyone who might wish to obtain a 5x7 color'print of Dr. Kantor with
honor guard at The University of Akron may send a check for $1025
payable to Noel Smith. Orders" will be sent March 15
-; ;
****** ;
 THE KINGDOM OF BOO!
Harold Bauer

Once upon a time there was a kingdom called Boo! In the kingdom
were many experts on Boo-ology and they talked constantly in a language
of Booi One of these Boo-ologists taught at the University of Bool,
called Booi State. Dr. Theos was his name and he was well briefed on
Booisml , and by using it's neologisms fluently he made a strong
impression on many of his students They all wanted to study Boo-ology
so they could also impress people with the language of Boo! and
'understand1 Boolst thoughts One of his studentss Erutan^ an anti-
Booist,, asked why was Boo-ology necessary and on what observable events
was Boo-ology based. All through his course In Booism! he tried to
explain to Dr. Theos that he thought it was all unnecessary,, but the
problem was that the teacher could not understand anything in non-
Booist terms . So goes the Kingdom of Boo!

SOME; DE-DUALIZING OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE

Mejitales_e_
don't mind don't object
keep in mind r em.em.be r
all in your mind imagine it
with, you in spirit think of you
bless my soulI I'm pleasantly surprised
mind over matter reactions diverted to substitute
stimulus
have a mental picture imagine
has a mind of his own is independent
inner peace calmness
against my will. contrary to my preference
has all his faculties f unc t lorilng normally
out of sight., out of mind out of sight, forgotten
mindless without duly considering
mindful attending
mental giant highly Intelligent person
that's the spirit t h a t ' s the appropriate enthusiasm
spirits high elated
f e eble -minde dn.e s s developmental retardation
nervous anxious
ne r vy bold
nerve racking stressful
back of your mind readiness to recall
change your mind change your decision
make up"your mind decide
spirit is strong but body is weak passively desiring but insufficient!;
energtlc
blow your mind (30 senior psychology majors could
not agree on a meaning )
mind's eye visually imagined
out of your mind Irrational
come to your senses b e have r at I onally
have spirit enthusiasm,
give up the ghost die
bring to mind stimulate to recall
speak your mind s p e ak f r ankly
have in mind Intend or thinking about
 Mentales ectlvese
spirit of law intention of law * :
spirit of times orientation of times
spiritless listless
make mental note observe for later recollection
use your head think
gave a piece of my mind scolded
soul stirring experience intense affective reaction
weighs on the mind continually troubled reaction,
it's the spirit that counts attitude is important
a mindless act irresponsible act
conscious of attending to
picking your mind or_ brain questioning for specialized Information
a guts issue an affective issue
know the inner man know the individual's reactions intimately
brainstorm succession of unevaluated schemes
what ' s on your mind what are you thinking about
mentally alert readiness to respond
mind a blank. unable to recall or to react constructively
me n t al exercise th.lnki.rig exercise
a meeting of minds agreement
a closed mind refusal to consider something different
have rocks in your head be illogical ' .
mental block unable to recall certain things
cool head logical
psyched up excited
get it off your mind dispose of it so that it no longer stlmuf ':<
more brains that brawn. intelligent but limited muscular strength
put your minds together work jointly on a problem
level headed use 'Intelligent or rational approach
lost my mind acted i r r at1onal ly
keen mind Intelligent
slipped my mind forgot
lose your head a c. t i r r at 1 o nal ly
racked my brain tried to recall
don't know my own mind uncertain of my own reactions
the brains to go far the ability to succeed
let your heart lead the way- make your decisions affectively
fixed in. mind well established reaction
dampen spirits reduce enthusiasm
call to mind recall an event
put out of mind discontinue reacting to something
my mind is clear nothing is interfering with my thinking
have a mind to disposed to
one track mind preoccupation with single object
bear in mind remember
off the top of my head Impromptu
use your will power proceed resolutely
int e rnal s at 1 s f a c 1 1 on affe ctIvely s at is fying
internalize develop habitual response
mental arithmetic implicit arithmetic or covert arithmetic
raise your ego develop more positive reactions to your
own reactions ' ''
I have an idea I have developed a plan
soul music music constituting substitute stimulus
for social, conditions
Noel W. Smith, Editor
Faculty of Social Sciences

Stimulus Object
Stimulus
Function
i

Segment

PSYCHOLOGY Volume 2
Number 2

NEWSLETTER April 1971

State University College of Arts and Science, Plattsburgh, New York

Prom my earliest professional concern with psychology I have been

a reprobative witness of the spiral development of the discipline
from pure mentalism couched in language that perpetuates auyayehis*
tic mode of thinking. What was plain consciousnesss self,, mind.,
or ego has recently become cognitive behavior.

Je R. Kantor: THE AIM AND PROGRESS OP

PSYCHOLOGY AND OTHER SCIENCES, 197!
(from the. Preface)

Since the notions of soul and consciousness undoubtedly were

derived from an interest .in one's own person and its destiny5
they became developed into the doctrine of absolute uniqueness
and individuality. In modern, tim.es this doctrine has taken'.the
form that one can only have knowledge of his own mind. The
existence of minds in others and the nature of what goes on in
those minds can only be matters of indirect inference. The famous
and perennial argument that only the possessor of the aching tooth
could have direct experience or knowledge of the toothache is
simply the product of the evolution of psychic doctrine Those
who accept the doctrine have always become influenced by the
dogma of mind to- overlook the fact that all events are unique
What A is digesting is not being digested by B, The fall of A
is not the fall of B. Nor does the fact that neither A nor B~~
can ee_ what the other is digesting nor observe the fall of the
other,, unless both happen to be in a favorable situation, Indi-
cate that psychic stuff or principle is involved. Again, the
subtlety of events lends no basis to their mentalization unless
background institutions demand this. Privacy no more helps to
establish transcendental mind than any of the other factors we
have considered
J. Ro Kantor: THE SCIENTIFIC EVOLUTION
OF PSYCHOLOGY, vo!0 1, 1963, Pp.291-292
Crude Data Investigative Contact Scientific Construction
 THJHJHJH THE AGORA
The Principia Press of Granville, Ohio, announces the early publication of
a new book of over 600 pages by Dr. J, R, Kant or to be entitled THE AIM AND'
PROGRESS OF PSYCHOLOGY AND OTHER SCIENCES. The volume will consist of 36
papers classified into eleven sections each covering Important issues with-
in the general scientific or specialized psychological domain. In the case
of each of the articles which has appeared in an American or foreign journal
during an interval of almost half a century the aim has been to indicate
the direction psychology and the other sciences should move in order to
reach a genuinely naturalistic status .
A recent book by Arthur L. Blumenthal : LANGUAGE AND PSYCHOLOGY: HISTORICAL
ASPECTS OP PSYCHOLINGUISTICS, Wiley, 1970 (paperback) contains a major
portion of Kantor!s<, "Can Psychology contribute to the study of linguis-
tics?", Monls_t_,) 1928. Blumenthal notes that few except Roback, Karitor,
Esper, and Carroll have cited the early work in psycholinguistics He holds
that Kant or established a behaviorism more radical than Watson or Meyers ,
expunged both mind and physiological explanation, confined psychology to
"input -out put relations," held to a descriptive approach to language and
rejected "any underlying mechanisms or explanations" along with Bloomfield,
always maintained a greater interest in language than any other aspect of
behavior, and showed unusual acquaintance with philological literature of
Europe which possibly accounts for his remaining isolated from "the main-
stream of American psychology" although an intense supporter of behaviorism,
He considers AN OBJECTIVE PSYCHOLOGY OF GRAMMAR to be 'mlstltled because it
contains little of grammar and to be preoccupied with criticisms but to
effectively and distinctively show the American objections to the Wundtian
approacha denial of language as symbol or as outward expression of Inward-
cognition . While Blumenthal ' s treatment has a few misinterpretations It Is
an unusually satisfactory account on the whole and bears reading,

All five back Issues of the Newslet_te_r_ of 1970 are still available. Price:
$2,00 for the five or 50^ ea'cli~~T^|~~thos~e prices for students). Number five
might be of special Interest to new subscribers, for it contains a selected
list of readings in five areas of Interbehavioral psychology,

"A reply to Thornton's 'Socrates and the History of Psychology'" by Mount joy
and Smith mentioned in the Newsletter, vol.1, No. 5 a appeared in Tlie__
of_t_he_Jl^^ April/ 1971 . Offprints may be
obtained from either author, Thornton did not offer a rebuttal.

Correction: The January 1971 number should have given the

Iteort_s_ Instead of the ^X2il2i2Si^i_Ji2^^: ^or Swartz's "Stimulus evolu
tion in problem solving behavior: an Interbehavioral analysis

There will be a Summer Institute on the History of Psychology June 22 to

July 31 j 1971 at Lehlgh University directed by Josef Brozek and' supported
by NSF,, In 1969 it was held at the University of New Hampshire, A present
ation on interbehaviorlsm was made by Sam Campbell, Wayne Lazar, and Noel
Smith arid was tape recorded,

The feature article In this 'Issue is "A Case of Reactional Dissociation

(Hysterical Paralysis)" by Jerry Carter described In the last number as
a technical employment of Interbehavioral principles The "summary of
history" portion is by Jacqueline Farrlngton,
 A CASE OF REACTIONAL DISSOCIATION
(HYSTERICAL PARALYSIS)*
Jerry W. Carter^ Jr.

"To a surprising extent current psychiatric thought appears to mis-

conceive and over-simplify its data and then compensate for this short-
coming by unctuously elaborating its description and procedure. Remedial
to this, it is submitted that Kantor's Organismic Concept in Mental Patho-
logy-'- and the Meyer school in psychiatry^ afford a purely behavioral
approach of more substantial service than the pseudo-realities of mental-
istic dialectics by placing emphasis on inquiry into the individual's
developmental history. Abnormal behavior studied from such an objective
standpoint makes possible descriptive terms derived from actually observed
behavior conditions rather than from medical or psychological traditions.::
"The writer considers the case of reactional dissociation (hysterical
paralysis) presented here to be so ideally commonplace as to make up for
its spectacular deficiencies. It Is possibly of more than usual interest
for this reason particularized as follows: first,, the pertinent develop-
mental history of the patient's pathology is complete and distinct; second,
the Initial ease and suddenness with which this history was brought out Is
noteworthy; and finally, the patient's response to planned treatment was
ideal."
Summary of History:
Kate, a 13-year old female with a medical history of excellent health,,
was admitted to the hospital presenting the following symptoms: (1) partial
paralysis of the left leg, (2) extreme nervousness, (3) marked loss of
apetite. Symptoms had occurred intermittently over a period of nine months,
Increasing in severity. Medical examination had suggested possible diagno-
ses of (1) hysterical paralysis, (2) post-poliomyletis, (3) post-polio-
encephalitis.
Inasmuch as no emotional conflict prior to the onset of difficulties
was related during the initial psychological Interview,, Kate was requested
to recount all of her experiences up to the time of the Initial seizure,,
Over a period of several interviews,, the patient related having learned of
problems between the parents, Including extra-marital relationships on both

*Copyrlght5 the American Orthopsychiatric Association,, Inc. Reproduced by

permission from American Journal of Orthopsychiatry., 1937^ 7> 219-224,,
Originally publication of the Indiana University Psychological Clinics}
Ser. II, Number 12.
Kant or} J.R., Princip_les of Psychology, A. Knopf, New York, 1926, vol. ii,
p. 452 ff. '
p
Kanner, Leo, Child Psychiatry, Thomas, Springfield, 111.,, 1935 =
sides. Considerable disagreement , hostile behavior and discussion of divorf
between the parents., as well as an attempted shooting of the father by a
third man, a friend of the mother's paramour, had been witnessed by Kate.
During this time, an older sister had threatened suicide . The parient relat-
ed these events with considerable agitation and emotionality.

Although the parents had evidently been successful In returning the home
to normal conditions , the patient had continued to react to this period of
extreme stress by refusal to accept her parents' behavior. She had expe-
rienced feelings of "oppressive melancholy," engaged In compulsive behaviors
and become fearful and withdrawn in situations of social Intercourse both at
home and at school. The initial Incident of paralysis had occurred while in
school,, where she was an excellent student.

"A diagnosis of hysteria of the reactional dissociation type was made

on the basis of the above findings ,. ,l!

"It was considered essential that the patient return, figuratively

speaking, to the situation of the parental triangle and learn to meet it
with complete acceptance. This, it was believed, would eliminate the basis
of her hysteria and redirect her reactional biography towards a more normal
behavior picture. To this end a frequent and thorough review of the domestic
scene In question was prescribed, along with physical and occupational therapy
for the duration of hospltalization. " (Carter, 1937) .
Kate was Instructed to think frequently about what had occurred and to
do so as objectively as possible. During each visit to the clinic, she was
requested to describe the previous domestic strife in more detail, the
purpose of doing so being made 'clear to her. After a period of three visits
in two weeks time, all symptoms had disappeared and the patient was dis-
charged with Instructions to continue thinking about the events In question,
telling them either to a confidante or aloud to herself.
Follow-up visits of one month and -four months later demonstrated that
behavior had returned to normal. During the final visit, Kate was able to
recount the experiences with composure , She reported that she had done as
Instructed and that while it was still unpleasant, it no longer disturbed her,

"in the following discussion of the Fox case we will attempt to

Illustrate the efficacy of the organismic viewpoint when applied to abnormal
behavior of biographic origin. 3 It will be noted that the only limitations
Imposed by this logical technique are our powers of observation and breadth
of empirical experience .

^Abnormal behavior of biographic origin, e.g., Dementia Praecox, Mania,

Melancholy, Hysteria, etc., as distinguished from abnormal behavior of
organic origin, e.g., Paresis, Arterio-sclerosis, etc.
 !1
A refined objective description of our patient's behavior pathology
must first take into account the complexity of her developmental history,,
for5 therein lies the whole story of her difficulty. An adequate knowledge
of the developmental history leads to an understanding of the behavior
equipment which the patient used in interacting with various persons,,
objects and situations. More specif ically^ her abnormal behavior may be
described as a maladjustment between her behavior equipment and the situa-
tional surroundings . Prior to the violent domestic disturbances we find
the patient's behavior equipment developed well within a normal adjustment
range for a girl of ten years , as evidenced in that period by her excellent
health^ school progress and general societal adjustment :
into her developing reactional biography there Intruded a
parental triangle situation which was wholly foreign to and at violence
with anything previously experienced. From this point on this individual
was precipitated into an environment in which the various objectss persons
and situations did not constitute a homogeneous unity. The result was that
in the two years following she built up additional behavior equipment that
did not hang together very well." Then5 under the stress of a specific fear
of social intercourse (the recess period) a part of her reactional equip-
ment se joined., a specific reaction system (her left leg) became non-
functional. Hence our descriptive terrn^ reactional dissociation . 4
"Our plan of treatment for the patient was of course in accordance
with the above general and diagnostic observations. Since it was deter-
mined that the patient had built up behavior equipment maladjusted to her
later normal surroundings3 and had^ as a result of this5 later suffered a
loss of part of this equipments our problem was more fundamental than
merely restoring the lost reaction system. The real task was to replace
the undesirable part of the patient's behavior equipment with equipment
directed towards more satisfactory adjustment in the future. It is appa-
rent that a mere laying of the symptoms would have offered only temporary
relief to the patient.
"With this end in view, the patient was required to re-experience the
Incidents basic to her abnormal behavior equipment under conditions more
favorable to building up a hygienic basis for personality adjustment. As
already indicated,, this was done in a figurative manner by having the,
patient relate the disturbing incidents in detail,, and5 by guiding the
subsequent development of the new additions to her behavior equipment.
Due to the limited number of interviews} this procedure was ree'nfoced by
furnishing the patient a logical technique with which she could continue
treatment by herself over a long period of time with occasional help from
the writer."

.,.one of the special characteristics of this type of abnormality is

that the so-called lost equipment may be readily reinstated^ and become
functional again." Kant or3 J.R., op. cit.,, p. 495
Readers of the Newsletter might wish to subscribe to:

THE1, PSYCHOLOGICAL RECORD

Regularly there are articles of interest to inter-

behavioral psychologists,, (Inexpensive reprints of some
of these,, eog,,, by Kant or5 Kellogg,, Homme,, Bljou5
Liechtenstein,, are also available for classroom use.) A
continuing feature in each, issue is a short provocative
paper by OBSERVER written from the interbehavloral point-
of-view. The RECORD is a low cost journal with each,
volume containing approximately 600 pages

Institutions 10.00 THE, PSYCHOLOGICAL

Individuals 6.00 Denison Univers1ty
Students 4.00 Granvllle5 Ohio 43023
 Noel W. Smith, Editor
Faculty of Social Sciences

WTERBEHAVIORAL Volume 2
PSYCHOLOGY Number 3
August 1971
NEWSLETTER
State University College of Arts and Science, Plattsburgh, New York

"it was a saying of Demetrius Fhalereus, that 'Meii, having often

abandoned what was visible for the sake of what was uncertain,
have not got what they expected.'"
Athenaeus, "The Deipnosophists"
VI, 23 (ca. 200)

THE AGORA
In the January issue we noted an
article by S art in and Mancuso on
the problems with the mental ill-
ness notion. In The Progressive,,
June 197!,. ap p e arF~~nT~TsyclTiatrTs t
Looks at the Uses of Abnormality"
by Seymour Halle ck, Professor of
Psychiatry at the University of
Wisconsin. This article nicely
complements and reinforces the
Sarbin and Mancuso thesis .
Galloping mentalism: An article
appeared in University Review,
Future
of the Mind." The author is John
McHale, labeled as sociologist,
artist, designer, director of the
Center for Integrative Studies at
the School of Advanced Technology,
University Center at Binghamton.
In one passage he states "in
discussing the mind, I find it
helpful to think back to my
Crude Data
earlier formative experience as an
artiste In art, in creative work,
the mind often seems to work best
when you are least conscious of it.
The mind does much of its work
without your cognizant knowledge
of its operation. In a sense, the
thinker doesn't sit down and think
about something, he puts something
into his mind and the mind goes on
and thinks about it for him, This
is typical of the entire present-
ation. But this beautiful flow of
pure animistic mentalism uncorrupt-
ed by actual events becomes tainted
as he proceeds, for eventually the
events start getting in the way of
his verbal constructs. In another
passage: "You can't literally change
your mind because your mind remains
the entity in your skull. You
change certain habits or patterns
of thinking, and the influence of
those patterns of thinking are pro-
bably much less evident in action
ve Contact, Scientific Construction
than in the unconscious." Here he has allowed "action" to creep in. In-
evitably he gets to .brain as mind but decides that mind is more than that-
-it is "the effects of the whole body process." Mind seems to switch from
effector to affected.
*****
Under a $120,000 grant from Office of Economic Opportunity a research team
has produced "A Theory of Cognitive Functioning and Stratification: What
the Brain Does., Who Makes It Do It, and Why." They conjecture that a left
dominant hemisphere provides functions of verbal abilities and conceptual
and prepositional thought and is characteristic of the white culture while
a right dominant hemisphere is strong in associative and perceptual abili-
ties and apposltional thought. These latter functions are characteristic
of blacks,, women,, youth and other subdominant members of our culture be-
cause of their lack of training in prepositional thought. While the beha-
vioral characteristics are event-oriented and descriptive , whether or not
veridical (are there not vast differences within each of these groups?),
the brain ascription is of the same genesis as McHale's approach: medieval
theology.
*****
The feature article is the body of a letter from Ronald G. Heyduk, Univer-
sity of Michigan. It serves as an excellent critique of the foregoing
news-item. _ *:: ::-:>^-:: _

Readers of the Newslejtte^j might be Interested in the following four

passages relevant to the relationship between the nervous system and psy-
chology, spanning 1769-1970. I find them to be very revealing of the
extent to which an unrecognized and unacceptable assumption can "dog"
scientific enterprise., blinding scientists to the futility e>f their seem-
ingly objective pursuits The first two quotes are found in Kantor's
Problems of Fhysiologj.^j-_P^ycholog^ (19^-7).? while the latter two quotes
I came across recently,
Bonnet (1769):
The philosopher does not investigate how. the movement of a nerve
causes an idea to arise in the soul. He simply admits the fact
and readily renounces the attempt of discovering the cause. He
knows that it springs from the mystery of the union of two sub-
stances , and that this mystery is for him. inscrutable.
Ranson (1933) :
I shall leave out of account entirely the most difficult part:
how when these propogated disturbances reach the brain they give
rise to conscious sensation which appears to be something of an
entirely different order than a neural activity. I cannot under-
stand how such a thing as a sensation of warmth makes its appear-
ance as a result of as a concomitant of the activity of certain
nerve cells in my brain. I can only admit the fact and leave to
the future, perhaps the far distant future , the problem presented
by the relation of brain and mind.
John (1967):
Rejection of these speculations (i.e.,, about the "neural corre-
lates" of memory) on the basis that we know of no mechanisms at
present which could accomplish the sensing of its own state by
an aggregate would display an immoderate respect for our present
level of knowledge. We are ignorant of how the mind arises from
the brain. The answer to that riddle is the most challenging
unsolved problem for science.
Dember and Jenkins (1970):
...we have tried to give an account of how a pattern of electro-
magnetic radiation strikes the photosensitive retinal cells} and
is transformed into a pattern of electrical activity that is
eventually "displayed" in a specialized "visual area" of the
cerebral cortex. The question that naturally arises at this
point is: How does the electrical display in the visual cortex
get further transformed into the events that we call visual
experience? That is, while the neurophysiological and neuro-
anatomical bases of visual- experience can now be described in
impressive detail....a the problem of the relation between these
physical events and those we categorize as "mental," "experiential,"
or "phenomenal" remains to plague us.
It seems inconceivable that after a full 200 years of frustration,,
psychologists interested in biological influences upon psychological
events would still fail to recognize the "blind alley" of reductionism.
Dutifully they pursue a "scientific solution" to the mind-body problem.,
expecting momentarily to find the key to crossing some imagined
"physiological-psychological boundary" between the electrochemical
activity of neurons and the organismic interactions which are psycho-
logical events. It should be apparent by now, even if it were not be-
fore y that neither covert nor overt psychological events can 'be con-
ceptualized as "arising from" biological events. Yet,, in the absence
of a recognized alternative, the reductionistic model (and the "self-
actional" metatheory supporting it is self-perpetuating. It will con-
tinue to be so until a model 'based on interactional, principles is brought
forth with sufficient predictive power and research implications to
capture the fancy of the most skeptical experimentalist. Perhaps then,
.finally, psychologists will give up the notion that psychological events
"emerge from the depths" in favor of the notion that they are perfectly
naturalistic occurrences? receptive to the influences of events from
many other disciplines, but servant to none. The mind-body problem will
disappear as quickly as these interbehavioral views are accepted.

Rosenblith, .A, & Vidale, Eda B., "A Quantitative View of Neuroelectric
Events in Relation to Sensory Communication," in S. Koch (ed),
vol. 4, McGraw-Hill, 1962.
On the other hand, evidence pointing to the not-so-specific
organization of the nervous system has accumulated: Lashley's
experiments on mass action, experience with the re-education of
brain-injured patients, as well as the outcome of many ablation
experiments --all emphasized the futility of looking for a local -
izable structure in the nervous system whose normal functioning
is indispensable to alii discriminations within a specific sense
modality. In a given modality, deficits in sensory performance
that are attributable to neural dysfunction are rarely of the
all-or-none type; they tend to be task-specific rather than modality-
Specific o (p .344) .
'Readers of the Hewsletter might wish to subscribe to:

THE

Regularly there are articles of interest to inter-

behavioral psychologists0 (Inexpensive reprints of
of these, ea g0, by Kahtor, Kellogg, Hmnie8 Bijou?
Liehtenstein*--are also available for classroom use.) A
continuing feature in each issue is a short provocative
paper by OBSERVER written from the interbehavioral point
of view9 The RECORD is a low cost journal with
volume containing approximately 600 pages,
Institutions |10.00 THE
Individuals I 6000 Denison University
Students I A. 00 Granville, Obio 43023
 1
1
F ! t L D Preceding
Noel W. Smith, Editor
Faculty of Social Sciences Segment
L
f
!
__^._- _ _ .~.
Setting Factors j
Organism

!!
Response
Function

&
v]
4-t
c
j tovesUgafor
1 1
Stimu'tis Object
t
SI muijs
1 j
Function

!1 i
i . __
i 1
Media i_
~ t- j
Succeeding

"SBgiiipf ^ 1
INTERBEHAVIORA L Volume 2
Number 3
PSYCHOLOGY October 1971

NEWSLETTER
State University College of Arts and Science, Plattsburgh, New York

Certain psychologists maintain .that structurally determined or "unlearned"

behavior falls outside of the scope of psychology. This is the position
taken by Kantor ({SURVEY OF THE SCIENCE OF PSYCHOLOGY] Chp. IV), for
example, who holds that biological functioning follows directly from the
structural properties of the organism and the physical characteristics
of the stimulus, whereas psychological functioning depends upon the
individual's previous interactions with stimuli.

Physiological and biological conditions may thus be regarded as

"participating factors" in psychological reactions, rather than as
underlying determinants of any behavior function.

Ann Anastasi & John P. Foley: DIFFERENTIAL

PSYCHOLOGY, 2nd ed., Macmillan, 1949

AGORA

T.X. Barber has produced another de- Harding, Massachusetts 02042.

spo.oking , of. hypnotism. His "Suggested ***************
(.'Hypnotic') Behavior: The Trance Dr. Kantor's new THE AIM AND PROGRESS OF
Paradigm, v.ers.us...an Alternative Paradigm", PSYCHOLOGY AND OTHER SCIENCES is now
MedfLeld Foundation Report #103 provides available from Principia Press, Inc.,
a review of research and an analysis that Granville, Ohio, 43023 for $12.00. It is a
puts the whole matter on a naturalistic weighty book of over 600 pages and contains
footing... One of the logical problems of a selection of papers that span a half-
the traditional approach is that it does century. Many of them have been difficult to
not define hypnotic trance independently obtain. Even the earliest of them are quite
of what it is supposed to explain. Barber fresh and pertinent today and demonstrate
brings the whole matter to a status that how little we have advanced during that
is direct, uncluttered with constructs, period. We have often merely developed new
intelligible, and consistent with matter- and fashionable terms for old disreputable
of-fact well known characteristics of concepts that leave us in the same quagmire.
psychological interactions. Copies of The table of contents from the book is given
the report can be obtained by writing, overleaf.
Research Department, Medfield Foundation,
"Crude Data ; ,,.,.?- ,,-, - ; , - , Se i ent i f i c- Con s t ruW 6h
 CONTENTS
SECTION ONE: Theories and Data of Psychology
1. The Aim and Progress of Psychology
2. The Nature of Psychology as a Natural
Science
3. Preface to Interbehavioral Psychology
4. In Defense of Stimulus-Response Psychology
5. Current Trends in Psychological Theory
SECTION TWO: Personality Traits, Potential
Behavior, and Covert Performances
6. Intelligence and Mental Tests
7. Character and Personality: Their Nature
and Interrelations
8. An Objective Interpretation of Meanings
SECTION THREE: Operations and Interpretations
In Psychology and Other Sciences
9. Man and Machine in Science
10. Can the Psychophysical Experiment
Reconcile Introspectionists and
Objectivists?
11. The Operational Principle in the Physical
and Psychological Sciences
12. Interbehavioral Psychology and Scientific
Operations
SECTION FOUR: Psychological Evolution and
Interbehavioral History
13. How Do We Acquire our Basic Reactions?
14. The Evolution of Mind
15. Evolution and the Science of Psychology
SECTION FIVE: The Nervous System in Psycho-
logical Behavior, and in Theory
16. The Nervous System: Psychological Fact
or Fiction?
17. The Organismic vs. the Mentalistic
Attitude Toward the Nervous System
SECTION SIX: Psychological Linguistics
18. Can Psychology Contribute to the Study
of Linguistics?
19. Language as Behavior and as Symbolism
20. The R&le of Language in Logic and
Science
SECTION SEVEN: Problems of Social
Psychology
21. The Institutional Foundation of a
Scientific Social Psychology
22. An Essay Toward an Institutional
Conception of Social Psychology
23. Concerning Some Faulty Conceptions
of Social Psychology
24. What Are the Data and Problems of
Social Psychology?
25. The Current Situation in Social
Psychology
SECTION EIGHT: Deviations of Behavior
and Personality
26. Conscious Behavior and the
Abnormal
27. Human Personality and Its Pathology
SECTION NINE: Problems of Motivation
28. Toward a Scientific Analysis of
Motivation '
SECTION TEN: Behaviorism as Science and
as Psychology
29. Behaviorism: Whose Image?
30. Behaviorism in the History of
Psychology
SECTION ELEVEN: The Relation of
Psychology to Other Scientific
Disciplines
31. Anthropology, Race, Psychology,
and Culture
32. Concerning Physical Analogies in
Psychology
33. Interbehavioral Psychology and the
Social Sciences
34. Interbehaviorism, Social Psychology,
and Sociology
35. History of Science as Scientific
Method
36. Scientific Psychology and Specious
Philosophy
 Defictency In Patients and Professionals

Marion White McPherson

University of Akron

Diagnosing patients as mentally defective involves a series of illogical

practices. First there are those, practitioners in psychology, psychiatry,
and social work who defect from their disciplines by failing to make a
search for experiental precursors in preference to ascribing the etiological
factors to biopathology. Ignoring the reactional biography not only
creates spurious agreement about both origin and outcome but is paradoxical
in as much as the responsibility is assigned to events outside the domain
of the promoters.

This inflated consensus is maintained even though, the indicted agent

has two incompatible qualities: potency and impotency. The causes, either
neurological or genetic, are interpreted as sufficiently powerful to make
mental deficiency as irreversible, condition, but at the same time they are
powerless in that they involve a deficit. The condition has been referred
to by a variety of terms,, .but common to, .them is a concept o,f ,dea,rth
Amentia, hvjxrphrenia, j3LLgphrenia, _febl_e_minded, mental ^ficienc^, and
behavioral deficits^

The parologism is nurtured for many reasons and conspipuous among them
is the (mis)identifying of scores on an "intelligence test" with the
presumed reason for the score, "intelligence",, For example, an IQ of 100
is misconstrued as evidence of an average amount of "native endowment".
In the case of less than average IQ's the cause gains efficacy as patient
default increases. Thus, an IQ of 25 is the result of a charge that is
more devitalized than is an IQ of 50,

Irrationality is compounded by the fact that the basis of the score

is the number of correct responses. In the case of grossly inept patients
these decrease with IQ - morbidity is judged by reference to what the subject
does not do!

The assessing of pathology by means of tests standardized on normals

and scored in terms of accuracy promotes a concept of patient under-
reactivity. Data obtained by means of instruments that facilitate the
demonstration of pathology do not support an identification of a lack of
effective behavior with a lack of behavior (McPherson 1964). Mentally
defective patients may be very active, even though they may be more
responsive to themselves than to externality and may indulge largely in
such self-centered activities as body rocking, mouthing, smelling, or toying
with objects. There is apt to be a dom.inan.ce of contact over distance
receptors. Such reactivity allows, theoretically if not currently
realistically, a matrix for the shaping of serviceable behavior.

These artifacts of illogical theory and diagnostic practices can be

permeated, and one arena in which to start this exercise is the plethora
of confusing and confused studies on learning and mental deficiency. More
than 100 studies have appeared in the last decade. Some of the research
on mental defectives demonstrates that they do learn and that although
mastery is often erratic, these patients do acquire, on, .occasion at a rate
and to an. altitude equal to, or in some cases superior to,..that achieved
by Ss who attain normal IQs (McPherson 1948, 1958). Such results may be
filed in. the curio cabinet, considered to be the offspring of inadequate
design or measurement, or serve as stimulants for the elaboration of
neurological and genetic myths.

The. dismissal, of research results is fostered by the common failure

to acknowledge the limited correlation between learning and IQ throughout,
the IQ range. Mental defectives are pervasively referred to as "slow
learners" and considered to be exceptions to the attentuated relationship
in the average and superior segments of the spectrum.

Performance in a learning experiment is, of course, a derivative of the

reactional biography. A relatively sound speculation in; the case of mental
defectives is a history of negative reinforcement for nat having acquired.
This may incorporate an anticipation of punishment, an alertness to pressures
to acquire, as well as an aversion to the process. The patients may prefer
not to have their self absorption interfered with, but in order to avoid
punishment may be sensitized to what is to be demanded. They may be both
egocentric and vigilant about external events. Such a dilemna provides a
framework on which to organize the laboratory data.

The egocentricity implies that learning is more probable when the

material to be acquired is clearly perceptible. This speculation is
supported by empirical data, e.g., Blue (1963) reported that more visual and
auditory items were paired when the interval separating them was brief and
the volume of the latter was high. The self-centeredness also suggests that
contact, as opposed to distance;, receptors facilitate mastery. This con-
tention Is promoted by an investigation by O'Connor & Hermlein (1960)
in which patients with IQ"s 30-50 were found to be more efficient in tactual
than in visual recognition of Greek letters.

The aversion to mastery indicates that acquisition is favored when

the j5s do not recognize the situation as a learning enterprise, that is,
when experimental procedures vary from prior learning contexts. An
illustration of this is seen, in the work of Harrison, ,et a.l. (1966). They
compared, scores on motor tasks when the Instructions were sung and When
spoken and found mental defectives to be more accurate under the former
condition. Most classical conditioning studies of mental defectives report
adequate conditioning. Do the patients see these as medical rather than
educational procedures?

The alertness to pressure suggests an awareness that would facilitate

incidental learning. The results obtained by Goldstein & Kass (1961)
support this contention. The Investigators compared mentally retarded
& "gifted" children of the same MA. on an incidental learning task and
found homogeneous scores between samples on an easy. Identification task
but on more difficult ones the. patients gave both more, responses and more
Inaccurate ones. Furthermore, forecasts of punishment may foster compliance,
for a time at least. Belmont & Ellis (1968) noted that patients were not
distracted, from learning two choice problems early in practice.

These examples do not deal with the relative dominance of egocentricity

or the alertness. For example, why did Belmont & Ellis' Ss react late in
 -5-

practice to extraneous elements? Did the aversion :.to mastery overcome the
aversion to punishment? Why did Goldstein & Kass1 Ss become more reactive
to difficult tasks? Did these obscure the clarity of the material and
indicate that patients when deprived of cues of accuracy intensify their
efforts to avoid punishment? Or had they also become satiated with the
aversive task and merely camoflagued their abandoning of it? Whatever
the answer(s), the topic is behavior - the subject matter of psychology.

References

Belmont, J.M. & Ellis, N.R. Effects of extraneous stlHiula.tion upon

discrimination learning, in normals and retardates. Amer ican
1968, 72, 525-532.

Blue, C.M. Performance of normal and ..retarded..., .s.ub.j:e,c:ts. on a paired-

associate task. American Journal of Mental Deficiency, 1963, 68_,
228-234.

Goldstein, H. & Kass, C. Incidental, learning of. ..gd;uc,able mental retarded

and gifted children. American .Jurna_L_ af_ Mental Deficiency , 1961, _6_6_
245-249.

Harrison, W. , Lecrone, H. , Temerlin, M.K, & Trousdale, W.W. The effect

of music and exercise up.o.n the .self-help skills, of non-verbal retardates,
American Journal, of. Mental DejEicienc^, 1966, _7_2, 279-282.

McPherson, M.W. A survey of experimental studies of learning in individuals

who achieve subnormal ratings on standardized psychometric measures.
Amer_lcan ,Journa_l o_f_ Mental Deficiency, 1948, 2_, 232-254.

McPherson, M.W. Learning and mental deficiency. American Journal _o_

Mental Deficiency, 1958, 62_, 870-877.

McPherson, M.W. Diagnostic problems in children. Progress Report No. 4,

July, 1964, Grant No. M 3568, National Institute of Mental Health.

O'Connor, N., & Hermelin, B. Learning and recognition in imbeciles.

Proceedings CK jthe_ London Conference _o_n jthe_ Scigritiji.c Study of_ Mental_
Deficiency. 1960, 1, 83-88.
 C
In .a aeries of studies....... .-.control subjects were., asked to..imagine, that . ....
the.....r.i.gh-t ,,arm.,..wa.a_..laec,,ci!ning.....heavy. .and., then were given ..rep.ea.ted....s.ugges.ti.ons .. .
that .it. .was .becoming,,, jie&vy . ..("Imagine .that your,, right., arm ..Is ...feeling heavier.
and heavier ... It ' s becoming heavier and heavier ...") Similarly, each
control subject was asked to imagine that his left arm was becoming light,
his clasped hands were stuck together, he was very thirsty, his throat
was rigid and he couldn't say his name, and he was stuck in the chair and
couldn't get up. ...more than one-fourth of these control subjects who
were asked to imagine the suggested effects passed each of the test-
suggestions both objectively and subjectively, that is, they experienced
arm heaviness, arm lightness, hand lock, thirst 'hallucination1, verbal
inhibition, and body immobility.

...if a subject carries out a goal-directed fantasy when given a suggestion--that

is, if he imagines a situation which, if it actually transpired, would result
in the suggested effect--, he tends to feel that his response to the
suggestion is involuntary (e.g., "My arm rose by itself").

T.X-. .Barber: Suggested ('Hypnotic') Behavior: .

The Trance Paradigm Vers.us an Alternative Paradigm
 Noel W. Smith, Editor preceding
Faculty of Social Sciences Segment

Setting Factors

Investigator
Stimulus Object
Stimulus
Function

MTERBEHAVIORAL ^
PSYCHOLOGY Volume 2

NEWSLETTER Number 5
December 1971

State University College of Arts and Science, Plattsburgh, New York

Field: In psychology, field is used to emphasize the complex totality

of interdependent influences within which an organism functions, the constel-
lation of interdependent factors that account for.a psychological event. See
field theory.

Field ^heory_: ....the properties of related phenomena are derived from, or .

dependent on, the tdtal field of which they are at that time a part. The
theory substitutes events for things having fixed properties, and s-ees events
as totalities in which parts of the event are what they are, qualitatively
and quantitatively, only in terms of the rest of the event. ...a field theory
may hold.,, that the organism and its surrounds form a unified interacting
totality and can only arbitrarily be considered separately.

--English & English: A COMPREHENSIVE

DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL AND
PSYCHOANALYTIC TERMS (Longmans, Green)

^-EIHJHIEL 2J~2_ THE ELTPTB 5J5_n

In this last issue of the Newsletter for 1971
we finish with 176 subscribers. At the end
of 1970 we had 145. The number dropped off
at the first of the year due to non-renewals
and late renewals, but has continued building
to the present. In all probability it will
again drop at the outset of 1972. We have
subscribers from Mexico, Canada, South Africa,
,New.,2'ealand, England, .and Tanzania. We are
fighting .inflation by keeping,our rates the
e. as they were when we started two years
ago.
***
Correction: the last issue was numbered 3
but should have been 4. With the present issue
we again have a quinterly. Would it be better
to have fewer issues that have more pages?.
***
A translation is in preparation of a 25 page
analysis of interbehaviorism in LE BEHAVIOR-
ISME ORIGINS ET DEVELOPPEMENT DE LA PSYCHOLOGIE
DE REACTION EN AMEftlQUE by Andr/Tilquin,
Paris: Libraire Philosophique, I960., The book
is available from Blackwell's (Broad Street,
Oxford, England 0X1 3BQ) for about $4.00. When
the translation is complete we will publish it
in the Newsletter if permission can be obtained.
There is another section in the book on Che

Crude Data Investigative Contact Scientific Construction

operationism of Tolman, Kantor, and Stevens.
***
In the August: issue (#3) of this year we reported a heavily funded research project that :
conjectures that each brain hemisphere contains different psychological properties and
that one side dominates with thewhite race and the other with blacks and other subdominant
groups. The dominating hemisphere gives rise to corresponding psychological characteristics,
The November 22 Behavior Today reports that Jerry Levy of the Biochemistry Department of
Oregon. State University claims that, the left hemisphere is analytic and verbal while the
right: is synthetic and spatial. At a meeting in San Diego where that was reported, others
took issue and advanced their own conjectures; but no one questioned the basic assumptions
with all of the attendant contradictions.
***
The feature ariticle is by a graduate student. An item appeared by her as an undergraduate
in issue #3 in 1970. The present article bears directly on the first page design of the
Newsletter.

"Im lo achshav, matai" . If Not Now, Then When?"

In Defense of the Interbehavioral Position,
Jacqueline Farrington
One cannot help but admire and commend the prolific and valuable contributions of those
investigating and practicing psychologists who have left behind the mentalistic concepts of
psychic energies and processes which are but circularly and deductively postulated construe t/
which defy empirical research. However, the seeming oversimplification of the investigatiori
and handling of the psychological event which mirrors the physiological model of reflex con-
ditioning is difficult to accept as representing the complexities of human as well as infra-
human behaviors. That such a venture was a necessary step in the evolution of the science of
psychology is understandable when one views the historical evidence of animistic and super-
natural belief systems which have pervaded mankind for centuries. Yet, in. a time when the
universe becomes rapidly smaller and the earth more crowded and tumultous, one wonders if the
somewhat narrow and isolated practices of some behavioral scientists are perhaps as unrealis-
tic as the oversimplification of an "act of faith".

Consideration of the behavioral and interbehavioral positions in terms of data collec-

tion, experimental and clinical observation and reporting of events points to the meaningful
and important question of interaction of factors and variables within behavioral events' and
the fields comprising those events.

The behavioral investigator operates upon the assumption that, R = f(S) or that R3sS.
Such a formulation appears logical as a. description of certain specific events, particularly
respondent, conditioning. The response of eating may well be a function of learning the maze,
particularly if the animal is hungry. Such behavior might better be diagrammed as PD (physio-
logical drive)^-B(learned behavior) 5*R(response). In terms of some human learning, in-
cluding the acquisition of skills, the model R^fc^>S may fit the event, although not. the situ-
ation.

As well as accommodating respondent procedures, the model fits also operant procedures,
but with essential differences. Consider whether the response of blinking the eye can be
considered as a function of a tone paired with an airpuff, or even the airpuff alone. In I
such an event, the formulation of J.R. Kantor (1970), S<^>R expanded to PE = c (k, rf, sf,
hi, st, md) appears to describe the actual event more incisively and completely. In such
instances and in innumerable others of more complexity, the inclusion of the media of contacts
and the behavioral history of the organism are as necessary concomitants of
description as are the recording of stimulus and response function. Even more
appropriate and objective would be such a formulation in clinical procedures
in terms of data collection, specification of treatment procedures, and re-
porting of outcomes.

Beyond these considerations is that of the interaction of the observer who,

whether in the role of experimenter or clinician, must, of necessity be. considered
and included in objective reporting of the events being studied. In fact, one
wonders if the observer's data collection is not a function of the psychological
event, to eliminate this interaction process is to encourage the distortion of
investigative events.

Differentiation between the psychological event, and the psychological

situation is required for adequate analysis of behavioral events. The function
of both the stimulus object (i.e., person or thing) and response observed within
a particular behavior segment, or event arises from the interactional history of
the organism and may well be governed by innumerable setting factors within
present and past situations or fields. The situation that the electric burner
is hot does not presuppose that the burner will generate either noxious or
appetitive stimulus or response functions. In interpersonal situations which
are more complex than object-organism situations, consideration;;1 must be given
to expectancies developed throughout the interactional histories of both or-
ganisms; that is, preceding, immediate and post-event segments must, be under-
stood by some reliable means before the events observed can be accurately an-
alyzed. The writer is reminded of a situation in which a young child drank a
DDT liquid solution. Upon discovering this, the mother hurried to give, the
child ipecac. While most, adults associate ipecac and vomiting behavior, the
child had no such expectancy and loudly proclaimed: "More candy, Mommy."

The task of utilizing the interbehav'ioral model which is both inductive

and yet deductive in at least the. commuta'tive sense, is not a simple one; in
fact, it is most difficult, particularly in the clinical situation which is
often fraught with subjectivity of verbal report, and semantic difficulties.
Yet such an approach is appropriate and tenable, particularly if the science
of psychology which includes clinical practice, is to become the discovery
and the reporting of "the characteristics of confronted things and events."
(Kantor, 1970)

Of major import are the manipulative techniques and tactics aiding such
discovery arid the philosophical underpinnings of manipulation. Briefly, the
philosophy is one of objective search for all variables which abandons mental-
istic concepts and concentrates upon investigation of the interactions within
a total field of events represented by the aforementioned formula. Manipulative
tactics include the consideration of the functioning of the whole organism as
a component of the field and as such, cannot be misleading in the use of iso-
lated independent and dependent variables which are in actuality correlative
and interdependent.

Multidimensional events, multiplicity of factors and interactional con-

text dre appropriate to an interbehavioral position and to be desired more
than isolated and unique cause-effect relationships. Such an approach removes
the stress of emphasis upon the view that nonhuman experimentation may provide
the laws for all psychological behavior including the human. Rather, emphasis
may be expanded to attempt to contend with the interrelationships of factors
in the origin and occurrence of psychological, events including those of imagin-
ing, perceiving, feeling, thinking, intercommunication, etc.
 As Kantor has so succinctly stated: ". . . experimentation upon complex
human behavior involves tremendous difficulties, . . . . . but there is no
merit or profit in avoiding the hardships of urgent, necessities,'1 And as the
ancient Hebrew Hillel is said to have uttered, "1m l,o achshav, mataijf'11 . . .
If not now 3 when?

.Reference
Kantor, J.R. An analysis of the experimental analysis of behavior (TEAR),
Journal of the Experimental AnalysisofBehavior, 197Q, 13, 101-108,

What is found experimentally is that certain vast regions of the. central

core of the neuraxis are neither sensory nor motor in character, but may
be in mutual interdependence with both sensory and motor systems. More-
over, patterns of convergence and divergence within these central regions
are not, altogether fixed in character but may change with time. Using
waking animals with implanted electrodes, observers have found that some, of
these relatively plastic systems can be, altered in. accordance with deliber-
ate environmental manipulations. (p. 67-68)

It has long been recongized that, when a. part, of the. central nervous system
is cut away, the distortion of capacities resulting from ablation is less
an expression of wha_t _the_ missing .!: jjj| than it, is an expression of
what. j:he a;indj2r of _th_e nj=ll[vous_ JStm can d_ in _the_ absence cxf .that p_at<
Something qualitatively different may be provided by certain small changes
in highly complex transactional mechanisms0 This is apparently true of the
nervous system of man. (p0 681

Robert B Livingston: How man looks at: his own brain: an adventure shared
by psychology and neurophysiology,, In S Koch (Ed,,),, jPgycho1.pgy:
a study of behavior, Vol. 4. McGraw-Hill, . 1962.
 1

Noel W. Smith, Editor F I E L D Preceding

Faculty of Social Sciences Segment

1
1
J 1
Seu % Factors |
(*tm,m

:|
Response
Function
- 1 1

A 1'
I*|
Invfi$iiater <? j > j |
\j/

J J

I
Stimulus Object
1 1
Stimulus
Function 1
1
1
_ __
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, , ,. i |
1

~ 1- J
Succeeding
Winter
seamem
L Number 1
PSYCHOLOGY Volume 3

NEWSLETTER
State University College of Arts and Science, Plattsburgh, New York

To perfect Behaviorism there is also required, as the name Interbehaviorism

indicates, the rejection of the view which regards psychological events as
acts of or ganisms asymmetrically impelled by external stimuli or internally
determined by various hidden powers. The central hypothesis of Interbehav-
iorism is that psychological events consist of symmetric fields in which the
acts of or'"ganisms and the acts of stimulus objects are the simultaneously
occurring poles.,
--Jo R. Kantor: THE SCIENTIFIC EVOLUTION
OF PSYCHOLOGY, Vol. II, p. 377

Indeed, in some respects Aristotle's functional and contextual behaviorism

seems to be superior to our own biological and mechanistic behaviorism,
because it views human experience, not as the interaction between a "merely*!
biological organism and a wholly illogical world, but as a co-operation
between an intelligent biological organism and an intelligible world.

--John Randall: ARISTOTLE, p. 106

THE AGORA ITLfTL

With this issue the Newsletter will change LIGENCE: GENETIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL IN-
from a quinterly to a quarterly. Hopefully, FLUENCES, Grume & Stratton, 1971) con-
each quarterly will be a little fuller than tains the full gamut of positions. Arti-
the quinterlies; but that depends on how cles by Bijou and by Hunt are of special
much material we receive. interest to those uncommitted to an organ-
*** ism containing fixed entities or powers.
The Jensen attempt: to substantiate the no- Results were recently released from a five
tion of native intelligence seems to have year study at the Milwaukee Infant Educa-
the advantage along with the major dis- tion Center using children intellectually
advantage of giving ammunition to the. ra- stimulated from infancy as compared, with
cistsof stirring up some renewed criti- a control group. Differences in I.Q.
cal examinations of this old dogma. A scores between the group run on the order
new book edited by Robert Cancro (INTEL- of 50. Numerous other studies in the past
that were less systematically controlled.

Crude Data investigative Contact Scientific Construction

showed 5 to 20 points difference., and occasionally more. An excellent
analysis of the intelligence controversy occurs in the Psychological
Record, 1970, 20, 123-130 by Observer: "Innate Intelligence: Another
Genetic Avatar". Another noteworthy approach is by John P. Frank &
Gretchen Kagan in the February 1972 ]Prgres_s_ive_ : "The False Standards
of I.Q, Tests". It is a striking fact that occasionally we find (see
Newgj.etter Vol. 2, Nr . 1) non-psychologists bringing a more objective
view to bear than that of most psychologists perhaps because so many
of the latter are still wedded to the doctrines of inherited capacities,
failing to recognize the distinction between constructs and events,
while non-psychologists are not professionally indoctrinated and thereby
free to take a more straight- forward uncluttered 'view. . Frank & Kagan
point out the culture-bound characteristics of I.Q. tests and the effects
in specific situations. This should be glaringly obvious to all psychol-
ogists but gets pushed aside in the efforts to substantiate the old dogma.
The authors are remiss only in giving scant attention to the importance
of intellectual stimulation as a part of that cultural development of the
individual that we construct as intelligence. The article concludes with
a. quotation from Gunnar Myrdal that we can do no better than to .re-quote:
"When we approach those problems on the hypothesis that differences in
behavior are to be explained largely in terms of social and cultural fac-
tors, we are on scientifically safe ground. If we should, however, ap-
proach them on the hypothesis that they are to be explained primarily
in terms of heredity, we do not have any scientific basis for our assump-

The. Principia Press, Inc. which publishes the books of J. R. Kantor

announces its removal from Granville, Ohio to 5743 South Kimbark Ave ,
Chicago, 111. 60637
***

On February 11 the editor presented an invited colloquim address to the

Psychology Department at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro
entitled "Interbehaviorism: Roots and Branches." Most of the members
of the department already hall some acquaintance with the works of Kantor
and were quite receptive and interested. Graduate students also expressed
interest including requests for copies of the address,

***

Our feature article is a book review of Skinner's BEYOND FREEDOM AND

DIGNITY by John Sullivan that will also appear in Tgghes_Cpllege Record.
We will follow it in the next issue with an interb ehavioral article by
N. H 0 Pronko on that same controversy: determinism and free will.
 SKINNER'S RAZOR*

John Sullivan

New York University

B F. Skinner's Beyond Freedom and Dignity (Knopf., 1971) is clearly

an important book, but how important is difficult, to assess at this time.
Many books which have been historically influential have not, been acclaimed
when first published and many so acclaimed have not stood the test of later
historical judgment. Some historians suggest that the significance of an
event for the most: part does not depend upon events which precede or accom-
pany it. What follows is more important. For instance, Freud's J^nterp_r_e-
_ _
(1900) would have been an interesting contribution to the
explanation of dreams, but not much more. Because of the subsequent devel
opment of psychoanalysis and the drift of Western culture it has become one
of the basic books of our time. By contrast, James Mill's
(1829) marked both the culmination and the end
of the movement of simple association psychology, John Stuart Mill's doc-
trine of emergent properties, called h_em._sm , and the influence of Darwin
sim resulted in a basic reorientation of British psychology. Though the
historical importance of Bey^md^JFreedom and Dignity is impossible to deter-
mine today, I shall attempt to evaluate its contemporary significance.

Skinner's fundamental method in this book is to define in a behavior-

istic language a number of terms common in the humanistic literature. Mean-
ings and references of the humanistic terms are transposed from social con-
texts into paradigms used in the experimental study of learning. The intel-
lectual feat is to make these translations in. such a way that no meaning of
the humanistic terms are unaccounted for and the new definitions have a
practical use. Since he does not explicitly restrict his claims, it. is
assumed that Skinner has done both. An obvious advantage of his procedure
is that is he is able to make successful coordinations of terms from. the.
humanistic literature to his experimental paradigms, and he knows the rele-
vant: variables in these paradigms, then he is in a position to make signifi-
cant: analyses of social situations. Social contexts may thus be analyzed
in different ways than have been done in the humanistic literature. Skin-
ner's analyses lead, so the claim goes, to J^ey_orid freedom and dignity to a
social world based upon positive reinforcement that could lead to the devel-
opment: of man beyond the capability of our present social arrangements.

Such Utopian dreams are symptoms of the discontents of our social world.
These dreams have been called the "opium of the intellectuals.1' Dreams of
the conditions for social justice invariably have a solution in terms of the
particular thinker's favored paradigms. For Plato the solution was in the
recognition of the natural hierarchy of classes and the harmony of the func-
tions of each class. Christian tradition found the solution to living in
this world to be composed of fortitude and love in this world, and faith
in the Utopian character of the next world. For Marx the solution was found
in the abolition of class exploitation by a rearrangement of economic and
political power. For Freud the Utopian dream is viewed as a regressive wish
for the good mother who satisfies every need without making demands. Reality,
however, requires a. measure of stoicism and an attempt to extend conscious
control when conditions are propitious. For Skinner the dream is the design
of social controls without the use of aversive stimuli.

*Presented to the Graduate Student Psychology Colloquim at the New School,,

Jan. 1972.
 -4-

Evaluation of Beyond Freedom and Dignity entails at least three com-

ponents: (1) an analysis of Skinner's specific reductive procedures, (2)
an analysis of the general empirical tradition, and (3) a review of alter-
native analyses. One who attacks, defends, or merely assesses the book is
taking a stand on the experimental analysis of behavior, empricism, and
the generality of the experimental analysis of behavior .

I.

A network of interesting arguments is presented in Beyond Freedom and

DignjLty. They will be constructed here in a form slightly different from
Skinner's presentation in order to heighten their dialectical quality and
to stress their related character. The comments are my own.

The Technology Dialectic

Anta.goni_s^t : Man is an autonomous agent; thus prediction and control

of his behavior are impossible. Skinnerian Reply: All behavior is deter-
mined, that -"is, under some control. A technology of control of behavior
has developed as we have learned to manipulate environments which rein-
force behavior.

The Value s Dialectic

An_tagoni^t : The gap between what is and what ought to be is un-

bridgeable. This is the gap between science and ethics, a distinction
between description and prescription. There can be no scientifically
based, so-called naturalistic ethics,
Rejxjv: An ultimate value for humans is survival. What is good is what
contributes to long-term survival. To.-askif something is good is only to
ask if it: contributes positively to the fulfillment of human development.
Comment: This is the Darwinian metaphysic of the Skinnerian system. It
might better be stated as a hypothetical statement: If survival is our
ultimate value, then whatever contributes to survival is good.

The__Autonpm.ous Man_j3 ia 1 e c t, ic^

Ant agon is t : Man's behavior is controlled by his wishes, perceptions,

and ideas. Rep ly : To explain a person's actions by his ideas is simply
to push the problem of explanation back to the conditions which determine
the development of his ideas. Comment : A variation on this argument is
to hold that behavior is determined by a person's habits, motivational
states, individual differences like intelligence, and the environmental
stimuli. It might then be objected that it is not the stimuli
that are important but: how the stimuli are perceived. But this is to
require all over again that habits, motivational states, and individual
differences explain the perception of stimuli,

Di.al.ectic

Some people deserve credit for their strength of character

and dignity. Reply : We tend to explain behavior in which the causes are
inconspicuous as due to the properties of the agent or his will. But all
behavior is under controls such that the person should be given neither
blame or credit for his dignity.

Th e Fr e e d om D i a 1.6 c tj. c.

Antagonist : Freedom is an unrestricted good, is the condition for the

development of the person to the fullest, and is incompatible with control
in any form. Reply: Behavior is always under control of some form or
 -5-

another. The literature of freedom has arisen from a rejection of aversive

social controls. This literature is Largely concerned with avoidance or
escape from aversive controls. But this formulation distorts the problem.
The values of ppsitive social controls are denied in the wish to escape
from aversive controls. Since behavior is always under environmental con-
trol, the problem is to shift controls from aversive to positive stimuli.

The_Reinforcenient Dia 1 ectJLC

Antagonist: Reinforcement theory which is at the base of your psychology

cannot explain the behavior of people who are free, particularly their crea-
tive behavior. Reinforcement by its nature only increases the probability
of what has already occurred. Rejjljr: Creative behavior is under the control
of normative systems, like language is under the control of syntactic rules
which are learned. Such rules applied over and over again with different,
contents may generate infinitely varied sentences. Rule-mediated behavior
is ultimately under the control of reinforcing environments. Scientific
laws generally are learned by reinforcement principles and are maintained
by social and physical reinforcements.

The Empiricism Dialectic

Antagonist: Out of pure reason it is possible to construct concepts

that have an explanatory function in the physical world. Mathematical
concepts are standard examples. Re ply: All knowledge comes from experience.
In. order to have meaning theoretical terms must be reducible to terms of
direct experience. Comment: Skinner's work is in the tradition of radical
empiricism. His reduction of the terms "freedom" and "dignity" is compar-
able in method to Hume's reduction of "cause" and "self" to elements of
his psychology of impressions and ideas related by laws of association
(ATreatiseonHumanNature (1739). Skinner's reduction is also similar
in form to Mach's reduction to his psychology of the terms of Newtonian
science (Die JMechanik in ihrer... Entwicke lung his t or is^ch-hr i t iscti darge s tel, 11,
Leipzig, 1,883) and William James' reduction of "consciousness" ("Does
Consciousness Exist." 1904).
II.
Much that irritates about Skinner may be traced to the bland assertive-
ness of his style. This assertiveness is also of an extreme position that
leads to paradoxical conclusions that are counter-intuitive and against
ordinary language usage.

A cluster of notions has been traditionally associated with empiricism.

The position was given a classic statement by Locke, who held that all know-
ledge comes from experience. This doctrine was aimed polemically at the
Platonic doctrine of innate ideas (first stated in the dialogue Meno). The
main thrust of Skinner's polemic is against abstract notions, with the
accompaning doctrine that all behavior is controlled (ultimately) by rein-
forcements. Skinner is concerned with behaviors, not ideas. Classical
empiricism concerned with knowledge and mind has been shorn of its mental-
istic trappings and given a new formulation in terms of experimental anal-
ysis of behavior. Skinner's version is that knowledge comes from rein-forcements
and further that ultimately the control pf behavior is to be found in reinforce-
ments and not in ideas or knowledge.
Skinner is thus giving us a modern experimental psychologist's version
of Ockham's Razor: don't multiply entities beyond reinforcements. Ockham's
(don't multiply entities beyond necessity) thrust was against the existence
of platonic universals and a preference for Aristotelian particulars. There
may be physical objects, white in color. These objects may be said to have
the property of whiteness. Since many different objects may have the pro-
perty of being white, whiteness is designated a universal. The problem is
to consider whether "whiteness" has an existence apart from the objects which
have it as a property. Nominalists like Ockham held that the only things
that existed were particulars; they were against the multiplying of entities
like Platonic universals. Freedom is also a universal of the Platonic type;
the. question is whether it is reducible to simple situations. Since it is
not a variable in an experimental situation, the problem is to translate
the term into behavioristic vocabulary. In performing this reduction, note
that Skinner refers to the behaviors of people and not the property of an
individual.

"Man's struggle for freedom is...due...to certain behavioral processes...

the chief effect of which is the avoidance or escape from so-called "aver-
sive" features of the environment." (p.42). "The literature of freedom...
has been forced to brand all control, as wrong and to misrepresent many of
the. advantages to be gained from a social environment. It is unprepared
for the next step, which is not to free men from control but to analyze
and change the kinds of control to which they are exposed." (p. 42-43).
These two quotations, patched together as they are from Skinner's text,
do not, I believe, distort it. The core of his argument is contained
here. Briefly, in terms of the dimensions mentioned above, the literature
of freedom arises in conditions of strong aversive control, but, that we
are able to use controls non-aversively toward goals which have ultimately
good outcomes.

"We recognize a. person's dignity or worth when we give him credit, for
what he has done. The amount we. give is inversely proportional to the con-
spicuousness of the causes of his behavior. If we do not know why a person
acts as he does, we attribute his behavior to him." (p. 58).

III.

My evaluation of Skinner's proposals is based upon a fundamental agree-

ment and a fundamental disagreement. The agreement is probably a professional
distortion, sort of a special knothole view on the world, that psychology
is the propaedeutic social science. This is the thesis that, most of what
is interesting in the social sciences can be given an explanation in psycho-
logical terms. The disagreement is on the question of how fat a reduction
can be made of any social phenomena. The question "how far a. .reduction?"
is connected with the question, "to what psychology will the reduction of
humanistic terms be most productive?"

It is reasonable to hold that even freedom implies the direction of

a person's behavior by his own set of values, ideas, etc. Thus the notion
of. freedom implies control. The argument is not about control or no control
but the loci of control. That there can be differences in the ratios of
external versus internal control of a person's behavior is difficult to
dispute. It is: important in evaluating actions to assess them as wise or
foolish, intelligent or not intelligent, compelled or relatively free.
These actions are to be judged in terms of criteria relative to the pursuit,
of goals, ends, values, etc. The region where it is important to preserve
the notions of freedom and dignity is precisely in the opportunity to have
behavior under the control of one's own values, etc. and not someone elses 1 .
No doubt, one's politics, religion, views on education, on love, life, etc,
are determined by one's background, ultimately by reinforcement from one's
own physical and social environments. To be controlled by someone else's
background values, etc. is to be unfree. The argument is not for ultimate
freedom but for freedom to control one's own behavior and environments in
terms of one's own states. The area in which terms like freedom and dignity
occur is not. in ultimate explanations but in immediate ones. This is a
thesis of levels of explanation and causal chains.

My fundamental disagreement is to which of the various psychologies

the terms of humanistic literature will be reduced. At this stage of our
understanding of psychological processes one cannot rule out competing
psychologies. Reduction of terms like "freedom" and "dignity" to a psychol-
ogy that does not admit of inner states of organisms inevitably ends by
dissolving these concepts. If one assumes the existence of mediating states
or cognitive processes, the chance of the survival of some of the ordinary
language meanings of these constructs is increased.

Skinner's Bey_gnd Freedom and Dignity is of great value for it sharply

illuminates the controlling features of our environments. As a result of
this book we ought to be increasingly sensitive to being controlled and
the opportunity to exercise counter control in our environments. How this
works in the miniature can be illustrated by the fact that copyrights of
Skinner's previous books were owned by the publishers. He, however, owns
the copyright to BeyondFreedomand Dignity. He probably would interpret
this behavior as rule-mediated which is reinforcing. I hold that this is
an advance in Skinner's freedom and probably a considerable contribution
to his worth.

"A man sees a forest, a coastline, or a prairie in a time frame-

work of the past, present and future; progress and decay; pro-
jects and prospects. His experiences is affected by duration--
the amount of time he spends in the setting; J^emp_o_-- a lake looks
different when he is driving past at 70 miles an hour from when
he is walking alongside it; sequence--certain paths provide
contrasts and surprises while others prepare him for what is
coming next; chronicity--several brief visits will produce an
experience different from one based on a long visit; and
familiarity--as a visitor, he and an old-time resident share
space but their experiences will be different."

--Robert Sommer
Natural History,
Aug/Sept. 1971
Noel W. Smith, Editor
Faculty of Social Sciences

oidg Fsc&rs

tawretlgtw I <' |"> 1

Medi*

PSYCHOLOGY

NEWSLETTER
State University College of Arts and Science, Plattsburgh, New York

It i clear that chance is an Incidental caus In theme

for the of something which involve c Intelligent reflection,
then, "arid chance are ''.in '.the sphere, for

the Indefinite ani to bg

in a way nothing oeeus's by chance^
they are well grounded Things < in a ways ecus' by chances, foy

The spontaneous on, the other hand

manyf.inariiraate objectgtt "We say,, ,exai the', horse .eame' sport
becausef though his coming saved come fosr the sake of
the tripod fall"*of when it fell it stood

it is deaf that events which

taay come to pass for the sake of (2) do not COM to pass
s
by the frera chance' if thy
the objects of deliberate Intention C e

Crude Data investigative Contact Scientific Construction

 THE AGORA

In January 1971 we described an article by Sarbin and Mancuso on some problems

with the concept of "mental illness". Jim Mancuso now writes that "Sarbin and
I are writing a piece on the failure of the diesease model in 'schizophrenia5
and are arguing that the failure is the result of applying mechanism at points
where a mechanistic paradigm is inappropriate,, We recommend that the approp-
riate paradigm would be a contextualist paradigm, which would regard the judge
and the subject's response to the judge as being as important to the 'diagnosis'
as is any condition in the past of the subject. Thus, the quotations you have
on the first page [Winter 1972]--from Kantor and Randall--could not have been
more appropriate to what we are doing..,"
***

In the fall of 1972 the editor will teach a senior seminar in interbehavibral
psychology* Are there other courses currently offered somewhere that are de-
voted exclusively to this approach?
***

Charles Maddox is looking for a new position in college teaching and counseling
or community psychological services. Prefers West coast. Box 202, Monterey
Park,.':Callf. 91754
***

Paul Mountjoy is working on a review of Kantor' s recent AIM AND PROGRESS OF

PSYCHOLOGY AMD OTHER SCIENCES which will appear in the Journal of the Scientific
Laboratories of Denison University,
***

Steven Brown of the Political Science Department of Kent State sent an offprint
authored by himself and Thomas Ungs entitled "Representativeness and the study
of political behaviors an application of Q technique to reactions to the Kent
State Incident" and published in Social Science Quarterly, Dec, 1970, It was
influenced by the position advanced by Egon Brunswik and later elaborated by
Kenneth Hammond that the stimulus population should receive the same represent-
ative sampling as does the respondents, (Although he is referring to a some-
what different research arrangement we might note that in vol. 2 of SCIENTIFIC
EVOLUTION OF PSYCHOLOGY Kantor writes "The interbehaviorist rejects the con-
ventional organocentric formula R = f(S) and urges,that, since the events con-
sist of a great complex of equally important factors of which the acts of the
organism are only some, the investigative procedure of varying one or a few
factors at a time applies equally well to responses, stimuli., media, and set-
ting factors" (p. 380),,) The approach attempts to overcome the shortcomings
of the Fisher-type systematic design. Also of influence on the paper was
William Stevenson who wrote in THE STUDY OF BEHAVIORS Q-TECHNIQUE AND ITS
METHODOLOGY that "Kantor's principles lie behind the main thesis of the chapters,
in a grass-roots matter,"
*-*

The feature article is bj Henry Pronko of Wichita State University, He is a

long-time interbehaviorist and is now working on the second edition of his
exellent P4NOMMA OF PSYCHOLOGY, e are also including in this issue a state-
ment requesting information for inclusion in an Inventory of Drug~Abu.se Research
Instruments,
 NOTES FOR A FRESHMANt
ON THE
N e H 0 Pronko

To assert that every notion stems from a certain frame of discourse appears
.jto be a self-evident truth too obvious to require mention. Yet the history of
science is replete with common-sense truisms that have bedeviled and confounded
intellectual progress, I believe that the concept of "free-will versus deter-
minism" is such a concept. Certainly, an extensive literature has generated
much heat but little light on a topic which, in its usual formf demand a "lady-
or-the-tiger" type of choice,, The conventional "either-or" straight jacket
states that either there is free will or there isn8tj--behavior is either strictly
determined or it isn'to Take your choice,. You can't have both.

It is my contention that the traditional question of""free will versus

determinism" derives only from the traditional psychic orientation prevalent in
our '.culture down through the ages. According to this views man's thinking^
feelingj, desiring,, tasting, seeing^ and creating transpire inside the body in
a psychic theater with a "pseudo-location" somewhere within the brain. Such a
formulation iss essentially9 a onevariable theory according to which only grudg-
ing acknowledgement is ascribed to "external stimuli" Heavy stress is given
to the drama as it unfolds within "autonomous man" (Skinner), The mind within
the body is a kind of _deus ex machina which carries the bulk of the theoretical
burden in explaining psychological happenings, For example, the female rat
simply triggers a !'sex drive" within the male rat and it is the internal drive
which _realJj gets the credit for propelling(or driving) the male toward the
female,, Similarly, according to the conventional view9 it is the child's "I0Qo*%
an entity residing somewhere in the child's head, that, either facilitates or
prevents his answers on. an intelligence test. The "I.Q,," is the prime movers
the power behind the throne,

According to Handy's (1964) acceptance of the DeweyBentley definition of

self-action, self-action is found "where things viewed as acting under
their own powers" (p, 55) In extension of their definition,, I should also
mention such terms as "motives'% "intention'% "capacity'% "talent", "thoughts",
"sensations" and "feelings" and "instincts" as still other reification,, An
older faculty psychology has its "Will." However9 whether old or contemporary,
all of the above agents that initiate, influence^ or cause particular psycho-
logical responses have one thing in common,"they are self-actional,

By contrast, the interbehavioral approach views psychological happenings

as events. Certainly, the organism and stimulus object hold a nuclear posi-
tion in the event, as do the participating anatomical and psysiological factors
of the organism but the media of contact and setting factors and prior in-
terrelated events are also necessary conditions Since all factors play a
role, it is not possible to glorify one factor above another and assign it
a special role. As William James somewhere puts it with a prophetic insight,
when (in customary phraseology) "a person is reading a book," it can also be
stated that Ma book is being read by a. person." The second statement shows
the need for developing a language, that will keep all the participating vari-
ables of an event in neutral, perspective. None has a special or causal signi-
ficance in the total situation under behavioral observation),.,because .;each'.'.,and"
every one is essential. Let the reader look at a photo of a galaxy rotating
once around its axis every.210 million years in order to experience the futility
of ascribing causality to any of the component bodies of the astronomical
system No prime mover or power behind the throne can be detected. It appears
to be a field event.
 An Interbehavioral orientation, then, would view psychological occur -
ences as events in which the role of all the component factors would be
assessed. Their relationship and the interrelationship of the flow of events
is the focus of such an orientation. There is no glorification of the
organism over the stimulus object. Consequently, there is no place for a
prime mover. In other words, in an interbehavioral approach, the question
of free will never comes up any more than it does in explaining the rota-
tion,, The free will-determinism controversy is an artefact of a self-action-
al procedure. If and where, in the distant future, such procedures should
be superceded by a field or interbehavioral type of theory 3 then the question:
"does man have a free will or is behavior strictly determined?" will be a
philosophical and linguistic fo&sil. It can only be nurtured by a self-acf;
tional approach in which it is embedded. The question never arises in field
theory.

REFERENCES

1. Fromm, Erich. The Heart of Man9 New York: Harper & Row, 1964.
2. Handy, Rollo, Methodology _of thg Beh ayj. or a^l S^ienc_es Springfield,
111.: Charles C. Thomas, Publisher, 1964
3. Skinner, B. F. Beyond Fjr^edom and Mjgmjty,, New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1971.

Brief BibliographyFree will versus Determinism2

1. Townsend , John C , _Intr_oductj.on to_ 2EiSHtSi SSJillSfis McGraw-Hill

1953, p. 17 Principle of Determinism.
20 Rapppprt, Anatol, Operational Philosophy , Harper, 1954, Ch. 7,
Is there a choice? pp. 83-92,
3. Skinner, B. F., Walden: .Two, Macmillan, 1948. pp. 213-216
4. Rogers, Carl R. Freedom and Commitment in The_ Humanist, 1964, pp. 24,
37-40,
5. Immergluck, Ludwig, Determinism- Freedom in Contemporary Psychology,
1964, 19, 207-281,
Grunbaum, Adolf, Causality and the Science of Human Behavior, American
Sc_ienti_st5 1952, pp. 665-676. Also reprinted in R. S. Daniel's Con-
H GjmeraJL Psychology, in Part IX0 Also in Fuge and
Brodbeck, Reading_s_ _in _the Philosophy of Science, pp 766-777,
7. Ayer, A, J., Chance, S^cienjtijic Amerl-can^ 1965, 213, 44-54,
8. Beckwith, Burnham PI, Religion, Philosophy, and Science:_____An Introduction
_to Logical Posit ivism , Philosophical Library, 1957, pp. 208-213,
9. Frank, Philipp, Mojlejrn_J:k;ju2nj^^ Braziller, 1955,
Ch 8, Sec. 3, Complementarity as an argument for Vitalism and Free Will,
pp. 165-169.
10. Russell, Bertrand, Our knowledge of the__external_ world, W.W. Norton,
1929, pp, 247-56. Also in Feigl and Brodbeck, Readings in the
pp, 402-407.

In his laudable attempt to displace "autonomous man" Skinner (Beyond Freedom

and Dignity;) seems to attribute the same autonomy to the environment when he
asserts that "environmental contingencies now take over functions once att-
ributed to autonomous man" (p. 215). If it is invalid to attribute autonomy
to the organism, is it any more valid to attribute it to the environment? Why
the reaction formation? To make the environment too powerful is equivalent
to ascribing too much power to the organism as when it is said to "emit be-
havior,"
The above bibliography was contributed by my colleague, Grant Kenyou,
in whose seminar I participated when "Free Will vs. Determinism" was discussed.
-2-
Cause and causal relations...may simply be regarded as the interrelations of
field componentso Certainly, causation can be formulated as correlation. At:
first, correlations were primarily interested in organizing two-factor systems.
Later, the development of partial and multiple correlation techniques amplified
the original view. The above paradox is easily resolved by indica.ting that
cause is, after all, only a type of correlation, (p0 156)

According to our hypothesis that causal processes and relations constitute

factos in event fields, causal elements consist of objects, their combinations
and relations in particular systems. All things existing as parts or features
of a certain pattern of happenings may be said to 9/tici2ate_ as factors in
that particular causal field. In some causal events there are few factors, in
others many. In case there are many we find great variations in the proportion
of those factors that appear more prominent than the remainder. Again, in some
events there may be no outstanding factors at all. Whether there are many or
few, the factors may be either sequential, or coordinate in time. Causal situ-
ations must further be differentiated on. the basis of the relative availability
of the factors for observation and: experimental manipulation. In some instances
the factors can -only be hypothetically named and enumerated. (p. 158)

--J. R. Kantor: PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGIC, VOL 2

As far as science is concerned, its object is not to discover the ultimate na-
ture of reality, but rather to explore empirical relations and derive useful
generalizations from them. The question of what sort of causation is involved
in explanation is an unnecessary impediment, a, philosophical encumbrance, to
the conduct of science. It is futile for the scientist to be concerned with
whether an event occurred because some other event compelled it to occur;
much more to the point is that an event occurs and its occurrence can be cor-
related with certain sets of" conditions. (p. 7)

--Robert C, Bolles: THEORY OF MOTIVATION

 Boston City Hospital Psychiatry Service
(at) Mattapan Chronic Disease Hospital
249 River Street

Mattapan, Massachusetts 02126

U.SoA.

An Inventory of Drug-Abuse Research Instruments (similar to the Research Refer-

ence Files in Alcoholism maintained by Ralph Connor, Eastern Washington State
College, Cheney, Washington) has been formed by the undersigned. Those using
such instruments are invited to submit a copy of them, as well as pertinent
bibliographies and citations of relevant references (articles, reports, and
books), for notice in the Inventory. The Inventory serves as an archival
source for the collection, storage, duplication, and issuance of pertinent
research instruments and related material (e.g., bibliographies) to aid in
drug-abuse research and in the development of more such instruments. A copy
of the Inventory will be sent to those who do submit such material,, Others
will_be_sent a copy of the Inventory upon their request'. Requests for instru-
ments contained in the Inventory will be promptly filled The Inventory is now
more than six months old, and includes some fifty items in the areas of: atti-
tudes, access and extent, measurementof subjective effects of drugs, differen-
tiation of abusers, education and knowledge, and; program-related evaluation.

Organizations and individuals submitting material to the Inventory will later

find that referring all future instrument requests received by them, to the
Inventory will save them much time, waste, and expense -- as has been the exper-
ience of those utilizing the Research Reference Files. In the same way, they
should also help to keep the Inventory up-dated with references, "spin-offs",
etc. Second- and subsequent- generation instruments should be promptly filed
with the Inventory. Such refinements are of particular value to those in the
field, I

Since the Inventory exists solely as a service to aid individuals and agencies
undertaking research in the area of drug abuse, it is very important that the
Inventory's existence and policy be as widely known as possible in order that
interested individuals and agencies can avail, themselves of the service that
the Inventory offers. We would, therefore, especially request those individuals
and agencies responsible for communication media in the field (newsletters,
bulletins, agency publications) if they would be kind enough to insert notices
in their publications, of the existence and operation of the Inventory so that
others may learn of it. Individuals and agencies may wish to put a copy of
this notice on their bulletin boards. Of course, we would be grateful if this
announcement would be passed on in as many ways as possible, and that we be
notified of others to inform of this archive.

Comments and suggestions will be gratefully received.

Copies of reprints of this notice in journals, bulletins, etc. will also be

welcomed

Ernest W. Ferneau, Jr.

Clinical Psychologist
Custodian
 i
Noel W. Smith, Editor F I E L D !

Faculty of Social Sciences

,'T*-]
Segment
ii
f
i ^,rf^ _ ^ _ ^. ^H^.
~
'$) factors ; 1
Or^n,?^ , ;

: : Function

;X. ;' -;''| 1

Factors
hyssiigaio? 3 *^in" j J ! VI /|\
V f
Stlfiialut ObiCCt
Stimulus 1
Function

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~ ' " t [ " K
Succeeding

MTERBEHAVIORA L SesMW- -

PSYCHOLOGY Volume 3
Number 3

NEWSLETTER Summer 1972

State University College of Arts and Science, Plattsburgh, New York

In this 'interactional' approach, Kantor makes use of the language of

stimulus and response. He distinguishes his technique, from that of others
by using the double-pointed arrow to connect "S" with "R". This is no mere
formality, but the positive characteristic of .his whole attack. "S" and "R"
are alike activity, one as much as the other. Stimulus never enters his
system in the form of a sharp isolation or -abstraction of some, form of physi-
cal energy. Response never occurs as a biological product or by-product
caused or excited by a train of physical energy. ...If the, organism shows
activity--function--in 'perceiving' the object, the object in its turn shows
activity, or function, to just the same extent in 'being perceived1....

The 'things', namely, organism and object, enter this construction as

'existing' in the same preliminary common-sense, way in which they enter into
any natural science. What psychology studies is their 'interaction'--not:
their physical interaction, and not their physiological interaction,, but.
positively and definitely their psychological interaction; it is exactly here
that the differentiation of the psychological from the physical and the physio-
logical can be secured. The psychological interaction requires both organism
and object, and it requires both of these in action such that, without their
mutual participation/ the expressly psychological would not appear,

A. F. Bentley: BEHAVIOR, KNOWLEDGE, FACT

THE
In answer to the query in the last issue of
whether any other current courses are devoted
soley to interbehaviorism Henry Pronko replies
that such is the case for his introductory
pp"".hology course involving two sections of
5i freshmen. His list of topics might be of
interest to readers: (1) misunderstandings
about psychology: "The Universe"; (2) science,,
scientific method, and delimitation of our
field; (3) psychological events, their pro-
perties; (4) the behavior segment; (5) stimu-
lus function and medium of contact, inter-
actional setting; (6) the nervous system in
relationship to psychology; (7) heredity in

Crude Data 1 Bvestigat i ve 'Contact 'Scientific Construction

relation to psychology and comments on race and psychology; (8) instincts,
imprinting, tropisms, pheromones, etc.; (9) reactional biography; (10) founda-
tion stage of reactional biography; (11) classical conditioning; (12) operant
conditioning; (13) basic stage of reactional biography; (14) societal stage of
reactional biography.

***

Steven Brown writes that a volume entitled SCIENCE, PSYCHOLOGY AND COMMUNICATION:
ESSAYS HONORING WILLIAM STEPHENSON was presented at ceremonies on May 4 at the
University of Missouri. All royalties go to a William Stephenson Prize for
outstanding dissertations in psychology and communication at Missouri. The
table of contents lists a bibliography of Stephenson's works. Publisher is
Teachers College Press, "Young might be interested in knowing that a journal
emphasizing Q methodology may soon be in the offing. Stephenson formally retires
in August and may then be able to devote more time to .this: it has been under
consideration for several months. Stephenson's more recent interests in the
foundations of communication theory are evidenced in the winter issue of P_sv_ch-
ipj|i_l. Record. He and I are collaborating on an edited book of original essays
on
.Inten.sj.ye Aria.ljs_i_s in the Social ^c_ience_ in which the importance of the single
case--as opposed to the survey approach--will be given emphasis/1 The Winter
issue 1972 contains the article "Application of Communication Theory: I. The
Substructure of science" and Spring issue "Applications of Communication Theory:
II. Interpretations of Keats' 'Ode on a Grecian Urn'". This series shows the
means by which subjective behavior can be measured objectively. His article in
the October 1968 Recor_d perhaps expresses the point: "Consciousness outSubjec-
tivity In". The spooks of consciousness are abjured while the concrete activity
of subjective behavior is emphasized as an important matter of scientific inves-
tigation. In "Postulates of Behaviorism", Philosophy of Science, 1953, 20, 110-
120, the following points may be singled out as of interest to interbehaviorists:
(1) Hunter, Skinner, and Kantor "did not reject verbal report on proto-postula-
tory grounds, but merely provisionally" until "reliable operations became avail-
able; (2) "Kantor's efforts" and "John Dewey's notions about experience" leave
doubt about the objectivity of starting with "immediate experience"; (3) the
positions of Mace, Farrell, and Ryle concerning "rnentalistic fictions of psycho-
logists" have been "long sustained by Kantor"; (4) the systematic approach to
the study of behavior" should begin with simple segments of behavior as held by
Kantor and Skinner and emphasize interactions as indicated by Skinner, A.F. Bent-
ley, Cantril, and others; (5) Kantor "grasped the need for a monistic space, the
same for all empirical propositions"; (6) Kantor*s interactionism includes self-
observation as well as observation by others and the historical connections of
these behavior segments all being concrete behavior--but excluding "psychisms"
such as experience and phenomenal or private worlds which are not; (7) "What
seems important is concrete behavior, including the concrete subject,..as
Kantor has been saying almost alone, for many years."

itjric

The following paper by Jim Herrick consists of two chapters from his master's
thesis. The thesis consists of 16 chapters and 118 pages and was completed in
1971 in anthropology. He obtained his B.A. at Plattsburgh. The paper by A.
Mitsorg is his second in the Newsletter. The first appeared in the fifth number
Of volume 1, 1970S
 THE COLLECTIVE MIND CONSTRUCT AND ITS INFLUENCE UPON CULTURE--PERSONALITY
RESEARCH: AN APPLICATION OF THE INTERBEHAVIORAL MODEL

James W. Herrick*

XIII. An Interbehavioral Approach to the Relationship Between Post-

Childhood Development and the Processes of Culture

As Kantor (1924) points out, it is extremely difficult to draw a line between

the "Basic" stage and "Societal" stage of development., There can be no exact or
correct way of doing this, since the use of stages is merely a way of trying to show
that particular types of behavioral reactions are more characteristics of certain
ages or phases in the development, of the individual than are others. One must .
therefore realize that any discussion of classes of conditioning stimuli (physical,
personal, and social) during the "Basic" stage differ from the conditioning stimuli
of the "Societal" (adolescence-adulthood) stage only in availability; i.e., an
adult or adolescent is subject to a greater range of physical, personal, and social
stimuli than a child. With this in mind, we may consider these three classes of
conditioning stimuli, concentrating on social, stimuli since we are. concerned with
similarities in cultural behavior.

Kantor (1924: 167) places under the heading of social and cultural stimuli,
"social situations...and social objects or institutions." Social situations
include such things as famines, epidemics, etc., and social institutions consist
of "any thing or conditions which operate as a common stimulus to a definite group
or series of individuals" (1924: 167). There are, according to Kantor (1924: 167),
two types of cultural stimuli: "those comprising the common reactions of members
of a group, such as the institutions we call manners and customs, or the products
themselves of social behavior, as buildings, roads, distinct wearing apparel, etc."
All of these stimuli are presented to the child in the "Basic" (primarily familial)
stage, and he is "brought to conform to the practices and ideals of the group in
which he lives by the authority of the group"--the group in this case being the
family (1924: 168).

We shall now consider what is termed the '^Societal and Cultural" levels of
personality development.

At the social and cultural stages of development the individual

acquires all sorts of equipment which are reactions to the social
institutions with which the child next, comes into contact. These
institutions are the. objects, situations, and conditions serving
as common stimuli to groups of individuals as well as customs,
manners, and other ways of acting of people (Kantor 1924: 82)0

As the child advances to adolescence and adulthood, interactions with social

stimuli increase. Since each culture or sub-culture or society or even community
will have either its own unique institutional stimuli, we begin to see similarities
in their behaviors--not because each of them has something inside of them which
guides their behavior (a personality or, when considered as a group, a group per-
sonality), but rather because they are interacting with the same cultural or
institutional stimuli.

Although cultural responses are not concerned essentially with the

preservation of the individual, we find that much of our cultural behavior
constitutes the functioning of the organism, in a very fundamental and
elementary manner. For it is such action that comprises a very large part
of the distinctly human activities This means to say that although

*State University of New York at Albany

 cultural reactions are arbitrary and artificial they do constitute
the intimate adaptations of persons to most, of the specific con-
ditions and objects of their surroundings. Not only do such activ-
ities comprise the more elaborate responses that correspond to
historical institutional stimuli; such as religious, aesthetic and
mythological things, but they also have to do with the intimate
details of personal and private life. For instance, our cultural
behavior involves methods and manners of eating, of sexual activity,
methods of breathing, bodily carriage, etc. In such adaptations to
cultural stimuli our anatomical and physiological equipment consti-
tute the same means and instruments of adjustments as in every type
of response. Cultural conduct is therefore a very fundamental
feature of the person's total behavior equipment. As such these
reactions have a large and central place in the person's behavior
life (Kantor, 1924: 201). '

If we adhere to the interbehavioral approach and consider interactions with

institutional stimuli as that which accounts for similarities in cultural behavior,
then we are not faced with any great dilemma when we discover that not everyone
conforms to our postulates of homogeneity. We must simply realize that in more
complex societies, there may be one particular institution with which certain
people interact more than others (e.g., old people and religious institutions),
while in less complex cultures (where, for example, a religious institution may
play an important role in the lives of everyone--young and old) we may easily
observe a higher degree of homogeneity in behavior. Of course, the functions
of various cultural institutions may be interdependent (as they often are) and
we could therefore select out of the interactions with these interdependent
institutions certain behaviors which seem to be dominant in all institutional
interactions (e.g., older males assume leadership roles). In this case, we could
rely upon an abstraction such as a "theme" (as proposed by Opler 1946a who,
incidentally, cites Kantor?s notion of institutions as stimuli as influencing
him in his [Opler 1946a3 1946b^] theory). One should realize, however, that
"themes" must (as Opler's approach indicates) be dervied from overt behavior
(he calls them "expressions'**). One cannot postulate a theme and then go in
search of support for it.

One final quotation from Kantor (1924: 203, 204) should conclude our
argument for the interbehavioral approach to the study of culturally-similar
patterns of behavior. It deals further with the notion of instititions serving
as stimuli for cultural behavior.

The stimuli for cultural reactions differ from those of our

ordinary individual responses in that the objects or conditions
constituting the bases for cultural stimulation, are in a sense
officially or authoritatively, though not deliberately, determined
by the activities of the group. In other words, the functional
character of the objects is determined not by the manner in which
the individual left alone responds to these objects but by the
fact that these objects already have some kind of stimulational
function. They already have called out standard reactions in
other members of the group. The individual at present is merely
building up similar reactions to the same stimuli and therefore
his reactions are like the reactions of the other individuals.
This means that he Is merely attaching the same reactions to in-
stitutional stimuli in the identical way that his predecessors
have done.
 XIV. Recapitulation II.

If we accept Spiro's (1951) notion that personality and culture are two ways
of looking at the same process, and if we reject traditional conceptions of culture
influencing the psyche or mind which then manifests itself in overt behavior; and,
if we further reject the unsupported contention that early childhood experiences
are most important in developing the "personality structure" of an individual, then
we are left with the ideas that: (1) the relationship between culture and person-
ality is one of interaction (with neither "causing" the other, since an inter-
action assumes a two-way process); (2) the process of personality development is
an interactive process which may not be ascribed to any one. particular stage of
development; and (3) after we have observed an individual or group of individuals
interacting with the various stimuli in their environments (objects, personal,
institutional)5 we must not reify this behavior (e.g., aggression), place it
within the organism, and then use it as a "determiner" (a personality structure)
of behavior. When considering group personalities specifically , we are dealing
primarily with Institutional stimuli ("any thing or condition which operates as
a common stimulus to a definite group or series of individuals" [Kantor 192,4: 167J) .
Of course, a thing or a person could also serve as a common, stimulus (e.g., hospital
or policeman).

Certain problemsarise when, after observing groups or cultural behavioral

interactions with institutional stimuli3 we attach a name to this behavior (even
if we do not place it within the organism, but merely describe such and such
behavior as, for example, "aggressive"). These problems, of course, relate to
questions of cultural relativism--what is considered aggressive in one culture
may not, be considered so in the culture under investigation or to other cultures.
This problem was discussed in Section II.

It: is therefore suggested that some sort of stand be taken when the inter-
actions of the people of Culture X with their institutional stimuli, are considered,
That iss are the people of Culture X "aggressive" according to our standards, to
their standards, or to whose standards? Or perhaps, we might do away with such
labels altogether and confine ourselves to descriptions of interbehaviors--thus
avoiding the projection of our standards of "aggressive," "witty," "paranoid,"
"sly," "guilt-ridden," etc., etc.:; while at the same time being in possession
of more exacting accounts of why the people of Culture X behave as they do
(i.e., their behavioral patterns are, in, some cases, highly homogeneous because
they are interacting with such and such an institutional, stimulus or stimuli) .
We must not shy away from exacting descriptions of human behavior (which may
eventually be converted into event-bound theories or laws)"...on the ground that
such problems require higher powers than science commands" (Kantor 1962: 326, 327).

A final word on the subject of labeling observed interbehaviors is given by

Kantor (1924: 167, 168) in the following quotation.

Let us not slight the fact that each name for social behavior,
such as awe or shame, must, if it is to mean anything at all, stand
for some concrete and specific action which of necessity is ab-
solutely different for each person and also culturally-defined],
and also varied within the different periods of the individual's
life. An act of charity, mercy, faith, hope, shame, or resent-
ment, is a specific, factual behavior situation and we must by no
means overlook the fact that, because for descriptive purposes we
apply a conventional term to such reactions, there is anything but
a conventional similarity in such behavior situations,, ...Social
 conduct, we repeat again, consists of behavior segments developed
through contact with actual institutions or common stimuli; and
the nature of the behavior is a direct derivation of the stimulating
circumstances in which the person acquires it.

If the above propositions-are held, then it remains to make use of

Harris" (1968) argument that we provide a "material" base for the investigation
of cultural phenomenainstitutions and the concomitant institutional inter-
behaviors being a large part of what constitutes these cultural phenomena. A
knowledge of the foundation conditions upon which various institutions arose and
the subsequent evolution of these institutions is crucial to the understanding
of why things and events are the way they are today. It is hoped that this
point, has been made in the tracing of one area of that vast institution called
"science"-~namely, that dealing with anthropology's culture and personality
approach.

In effect, this thesis could be considered as an attempt to attach a group

label to those scientists called anthropologists. The label would read "Dualis-
tic," while Harris' label would read "Idealists," It is hoped that support has
been given for these labels on other than a priori grounds. It must be remembered,
however, that science is but one institution and that one could also deal with
religious, familial, economic, etc., etc. institutions, all of which may be seen
to be the product of divergences from pristine cultural-ecological conditions.
What cannot be emphasized enough is the idea that group labels must be derived
from the institutional interactions carried out by the people of a particular
culture, and that these institutions are not to be assumed to exist on a. priori
grounds.

References

Harris, M. The rise of anthropolpgical '.theory. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell,

.1968.

Kant or, J. R. Principles of psychology, vol. 1. Bloomington, Ind.: Principia,

1924.

Kantor, J, R. The logic of modern science. Chicago: Principia, 1962.

Opler, M. E. Themes as dynamic forces in culture. American Journal of

y_> 1946a: "'51: 198-206.

Opler, M. E. An application of the theory of themes in culture. Journal of

The Washington Academy of Sciences, 1946b: 36: (5)4

Spiro, M. E. Culture and personality. ; j^c Matry_ , 1951: 14: 19-46.

 _ 7_

Nevertheless, the Earth is Flat

A Review of a Review

Fundamentalists who persistently maintain that the earth is flat bear

witness to -the great power of infallible intuition to outweigh the claims
of meticulous observation. That unfailing power Is the essence of funda-
mentalism, a trait which is manifested on every intellectual level. Psy-
chologists no more than other professionals escape the contagion of funda-
mentalism. The burden of their faith is the existence of mind. Overtly
and covertly they paraphrase the New York editor; "Yes, Virginia, there
jLs_ a mind", though in the succession of generations the same entity is
dominated by different nouns.

Clear as day are the mechanisms that fortify faith. At bottom is

ignorance concerning the nature of'things believed, and next is the vigor
of established cultural institutions when encapsulated in an amber of words.
Names support the conviction in the existence of nothings.

All the above is effectively illustrated in a recent book review by

Professor Neisser-'- who comments upon three books on Mental Imagery. He
waxes approvingly of the change of fashion in psychology which makes possi-
ble a renewed commerce with mental processes despite the demise of intro-
spective psychology. He says, "In the last, ten years...,the behavioristic
taboos have been broken and the mind seems worth studying after all." (p.628).

As is only to be expected Professor Neisser follows closely in the

footsteps of the early detractors of behaviorism and reiterates that "what
contemporary. ... .psychologists mean by "the mind'1', however, is very different
from what their predecessors meant. The definition is no longer in terms of
conscious, introspectively given phenomena. Instead it is in terms of a
flow of information in the organism. Theoretical terms like 'storage',
'retrieval', 'receding', and ' selection9.....refer to hypothetical stages
of activity or processing" (P. 628).

Note the glaring contradictions If behavioristic taboos have been

broken, what are the referents of the terms 'storage', 'retrieval1, 'recod-
ings', and "selection"? Can they be. other than the conscious, introspectively
given Noumena? So where is the shift in the meaning of mind? Can the
juggling with synonyms transform the transcendental into something else?
Can nonbehavioral imagery be anything else, than supernatural processes dis-
guised by other names? The camouflage fails to conceal. The reviewer
states that one of the three books is organized entirely in the classical
mode, another includes papers from both sides of the fmental-behavioralj
watershed, while the third is written from the perspective of association-
ism. The reviewer even points out that in one of the three books, images
"have become the psychological correlate of linguistic deep structure" (p. 630)

What else can one conclude but that the stream of psychological thinking
is heavily polluted by transcendental fallout? Though the labors of a
Hercules may not suffice to clear it, one is tempted to point out (1) that
to ignore the fact that imagery has only been rejected by reflexological
behaviorism, is really a sign of being influenced by supernaturalism, (2)
that though behaviorism is simply antimentalism in every form, it need not
be Pavlovian reflexology, and (3) that antibehaviorism despite verbal cam-
ouflage holds to "mind" as the age-old mystical conscious known only through
introspective intuitions It is only the prevalence of scientific work
and achievements of the other disciplines that influences psychologists
to presume that mind can be nonbehavioral and at the same time nonsuper-
natural.
 A striking feature of the clinging to the flat-earth type of funda-
mentalism in psychology is the misinterpretation of the behavioral move-
ment. Instead of regarding it as an admirable attempt to comply with
scientific demands to deal only with the actual behavior of organisms,
it is looked upon as a fad in psychology to avoid the recognition of
mentalistic imagery, thinking, and other noumena. Those who unwittingly
accept the dogmas of the Church Fathers concerning the existence of two
worlds, two essences-minds and bodies, as well as other mentalistic dual-
isms decry Behaviorism despite the fact that their observations and exper-
iments never concern anything but the cognitive and affective interactions
of organisms with concrete objects through the mediation of direct or
substitute stimulation. By disregarding this fact they find it easy
to delude themselves that by a curtain of words they can conceal their
adherence to the fundamentalistic belief in the existence of the super-
natural.

A. Mitsorg

"...'science' is...a procedure of observation and postulation, with all

observation recognizing that it takes place under postulation, and with all
postulation recognizing that it arises out of observation."
A. F. Bentleys "Kennetic Inquiry",
Science, 1950, CXII, 775-783.
 Noel W. Smith, Editor
Faculty of Social Sciences

WTERBEHAVIORAL Volume 4-
PSYCHOLOGY Number 4-
Pall 1972
NEWSLETTER
State University College of Arts and Science, Pittsburgh, New York

NATURE AND Mil: SELECTED ESSAYS OF FEEDERICK J. E. WOODBRIDGE

Thus the sense organs appear to be constructed and differentiated in relation
to specific differences in the stimuli which may affect them, while the
nervous system appears to be constructed and unified in relation to co-
ordinated activity by the organism. While the sense organs put the organism
in diversified interaction with its surroundings, the nervous system prevents
this diversification from resulting in disintegrated and isolated reactions,
it is thus apparent that the nervous system secures to: the organism individu-
ality and unity of life in spite of very great diversity of stimuli and envir-
onment. We have in these considerations, I believe, the means of stating
the relational view of consciousness in biological terms. An organism so
situated that it should be in differentiated interaction with the specific
differences in the world about it, but which should none the less, react in a
unified and co-ordinated manner no matter how it might be stimulated, might well
be defined as a conscious organism. Its consciousness would be a relational
term integrating and unifying its differentiated interaction with its sur-
roundings. Furthermore, its consciousness would naturally be marked by many
of the characteristics usually attributed to consciousness. It would for
instance, be what we call individual and personal, and, being unified, it would
present features often ascribed to a self'or mind.

--"Consciousness, the Sense Organs, and the Nervous System", 1909

Oooconsciousness is not a term, but a relation.

.....our life...manifestly appears to be an interaction between organism and
environment, and not an interaction between consciousness and objects...

"Consciousness and Object", 1912

Crude Data Investigative Contact Scientific Construction

 2.

On J-une 7,8, and 9 the Cheiron Society for the History of the Social and
Behavioral Sciences will hold its Fifth Annual Meeting at Plattsburgh. There
will be a symposium on "Contextual Interactionists". Hollo Handy from State ..
University of New York at Buffalo (now on leave at Behavioral Research Council,
Great Barrington, Massachusetts) will speak on Arthur Bently and John Dewey,
Paul Fuller at Western Michigan on J. R. Kantor, David Miller at University
of Texas on George Herbert Mead, and Clarence State Professor Emeritus at
University of Massachusetts on Aristotle. There are a couple of other pos-
sibilities for the meeting that are of special interest to interbehaviorists.
If they are realized they will be reported in later issues of the Newsletter.
It looks like an exciting meeting and hopefully many interbehaviorists will
attend. The meetings will be held at Valoour Conference Center on Lake
Champ lain, ' an idyllic setting. Those who wish to submit papers should send
them to .ifhis editor by January 31, 1973. We hope that a number of inter-
behaviorists and other interested persons will do so and add to the merriment
(with or without papers). Inexpensive lodging will be available. We will
provide information on that later. Papers will be considered which deal with
aspects of the history of any of the behavioral and social sciences, with
relevant historical or social science methodology, or with the philosophy
of history as applied to the study of the history of the behavioral and social
sciences. The emphasis of the meetings- will be interdisciplinary.
ft**.*

In the November 1972 Cojnte^goiwzJPS^SfeSiSSZ Norman Guttman reviews Kantor's

AIM AND PROGRESS OF PSYCHOLOGY AND OTHER SCIENCES. It is the lead article
and is headlined "Interbehaviorisms Naturalism Radicalized". Guttman does
not seem to like naturalism and takes Kantor to task for it. He also has
Kantor as a devotee of William James and "under the impress of Freud".
(Wolman in CONTEMPORARY THEORIES AND SYSTEMS OF PSYCHOLOGY had him indepted
to Adolf Meyer). Guttman finds Kantor's systematization weak while Roback in
1952 (A HISTORY OF AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGY) wrote that "Kantor, who, for all his
explorations into logic, language, and allied fields, the boundaries of which
he delimits expertly may be charged with an over dose of systematization. "
Replies to Guttman in the form of letters to the editor might be appropriate,
These are printed under "On the Other Hand".

A new book by Robert Lundin has just been published by D, C, Heath and Co. 5
THEORIES AND SYSTEMS OF PSYCHOLOGY. It presents a prominent account of
interbehaviorism and even mentions the Newsletter. The book runs about 3^0
pages and would appear to be about right for a one semester course. It has
the additional merit of providing a good historical background five chapters
before Wundt. Lundin has previously published AN OBJECTIVE PSYCHOLOGY OF
MUSIC (two editions), PERSONALITY (two editions), and PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHO-
PATHOLOGY, All have an interbehavioral orientation.
We are publishing the first original research in the Newsletter with Jacqueline
Parrington's work0 It was conducted as a class project and a continuation
of her interests in construct usage and its influence as expressed in a paper
she published in the Psgchglogical Record. Bequests for offprints for that
publication have exhausted her supply. She is in the second year -of her
M.Ao program in clinical psychology, plans to spend a year working after com-
pletion, then look for a doctoral program. Hopefully, her journal publication
and her works in this Newsletter may help her in gaining admittance to a
satisfactory program. The second article is a whimsical piece by the editor,

In cutting down from five to four issues we have tried to provide as much
material as in the five and can now count pages and find that 1972 pages are
about one-third more than 1971 , Prices will remain the same as we go into our
fourth year of the Newsletter,, The feature articles coming in 1973 include
a comparison by a senior psychology major of a systems approach of D.L. Clark
and the field approach of J.R., Kantor and a lengthy article of exceptional
quality by a graduate student at the University of Denver,,
S-R

"RITE WORDS ...... BUT ARE THEY RIGHT?"

Jacqueline Farrington
Bollard and Miller (1950) have suggested that effective communist ion
and effective psychotherapy consist of verbal labeling and symbolic linguistic
manipulation of adult problem solving situations. Such labeling and manipula-
tive behavior is frequently observed in the use of constructs which are reified
into possessing existence and which often connote direction or force within
the human organism,, Additionally, such directors or forces are viewed as un-
derlying and causative factors of both implicit and explicit behaviors
McLuhan (1967) has suggested that humans engaged in social interaction
learn to use "the rite words in rote order. " This study was undertaken as a
pilot study of a series of studies by the author (Farrington, 1972) which
attempt to discover the ways in which "rite" words may be used in both des-
cription and explanation within a group setting concerned with problem .solving.
Previous studies (Ellis, 1967; Do Hard and Miller, 1950? Jourard, 1958)
have suggested that such constructs carry an assumed and implicit meaning
which is seldom defined or agreed upon by group participants.
Subigcjbss
Ss consisted of 25 members of an education subgroup of a Drug Awareness
Workshop, Summer, 1972, at State University of New York at Plattsburgh, Age
range of Ss was 17-68 years (median age = 36 years, X = 35 years). Twelve
Ss were public school classroom teachers; 4 Ss were nurse-teachers j 3 S_s were
employed by community drug programs | 4- Ss were students; 1 5 was a medical
technician in the US Air Force,
Ss were requested during the second grouo session to write a brief
definition of 10 constructs identified by 0 as high in frequency of use
during the first group session. The ten constructs were; (l) anxiety, (2)
ego* (3) mind, (4-) problem, (5) self-image, (6) identity, (7) paranoia,
(8) psychological, (9) physiological, (10) self-esteem.
 During three 90-minu.te group sessions, the observer recorded the fre-
quency and context of constructs.,, Three conditions were observed; Condition
.A: discussion grouts,in dialogue with three high school student participants
centering.on students' perceptions of drug usage among peers; Condition B
discussion of adult attitudes toward the high school graduate who is classified
as a "drifter'8j Condition ; discussion led by educational consultant of
teaching techniques for school health education programs.
As is shown in Table 1, a wide diversity of meaning was found in written
definitionso A total of 120 definitions were given for the 10 constructs. The
words "ego", "anxiety5," and "psychological" received the greatest number of
definitions in that order The least number of definitions were given to
"physiological," "problem.," and "self-esteem" in ascending order.
Ss frequently gave more than one definition perword and occasionally
gave overlapping definitions,, For example, "self-image" was defined as
"identity" and vice versa0 One construct was also often defined by another
construct or part of another construct; e.g.,,. "ego" by "self," ^identity" by
"self," "paranoia" by "character disorder," "mind" by "intelligence," Addition-
ally, a construct was defined partially by itself; e.g. "self-esteem" by
."self-feelings", "self-pride",and "self-judgement."
The construct "self" demonstrated higher frequency than any other construct
as a definer of several other constructs, (frequency = 17)
Figure one demonstrates that behavioral use of constructs during the
three sessions showed extreme variability,, The construct "self-image" was
verbalized most frequently over the total sessions, followed by the construct
"problem",,
Of interest in considering such frequencies are the group setting
factors toder setting Condition A the most frequent constructs (in order
of frequency) were "self-image", "problem", and "paranoia;" under Con-
dition Bf "self-image'j" "problem", and "self-esteem;" under Condition C
"self-image,"."anxiety" and %ind0"
In Table 2 is given the verbal context in which the 6 most frequent
constructs were utilized* In all but one case ("the problem drinker"), the
construct is described rather than descriptive and is viewed as being
acted upon rather than acting,, That is, constructs, both in conversational
and in written verbal context, have been reified to assume existence as
concrete objects or events.
DISCUSSION
In a previous and better controlled setting of B Ss, the author'
(Fa'rrington, 1972) suggested that the utilization of constructs in group
discussion appeared to have the characteristic of an "anticipatory pre-
eurrent reaction" (Kantor, 1924., p0 39) which prepared participants for the
final act of avoiding discussion of particular o.vents0 It is unfortunate
that in the limited number of group sessions available, a single observer
in-a large group of 25 subjects cannot validate further the earlier findings.
It is suggested, however, that the "problem", whether an underlying cause or
an effect or factor contributing to behavior, was never specifically de-
fined. In fact, the "problem" was not defined as q group of factors,
though such was suggested occassionally. Rather, the information which emerged
from group discussion suggested that setting factors (societal, economic and
political) as well as innumerable specific stimuli with varying functions
had not yet been specifically identified,,
The construct "self/' so frequently utilized in both written definition
and verbal communication, was never operationally defined. Such is not
surprising, for the definition of self is far from succinct or singular in
any psychological dictionary Even holding constant the function of reference,
 able 1.. DEP1NITI01S OF TEN FREQUENTLY UTILIZED WORDS IN GROUP DISCUSSIONS
anxiety ego self-image Identity
concept
need self** to others what I am
unrest self-esteem seen in mirror way viewed
nervousness knowing framework of ego self
worry** improving learned, tried, familiar
fear*** feelings** accepted self picture
uncoHsfortableness ** personality** outward anpearanc** sense of self
feeling of stress** determines behavior self picture** uniqueness
apprehension worth sense of self role**
concern mind opinion of self goals
madness conscious identity** philosophy
unhaopiness me evaluation of self what I think
frustration self-image what want to be self-image
motions dreams personal thing
uneasyness sense of self
tension things
insecurity process
psychic director
inner strength
psychological physiological mind paranoia

deal with mind physical** intelligence*** character disorder

mind effects vital organs non-physieal part feeling persecuted**
relates to mind** body processes*** thought processes irrational fear
relates to psyche inborn tendency where unconscious distrust
mental orientation body, not brain stored critical
brain body and mind memory suspicious feeling**
emotional effect subconscious ill feeling
feeling unconscious fear**
thinking reasoning seared
learned behavior judgement hostility
mind processes** personality discouragement
consciousness discipline feeling threatened
unconscious where I think insecurity
problem solving
mind directing
problem self-esteem

interfering factors stressful belief of self self-pride

situation*** circumstances ego-strength self-judgement
needs solving feelings of worth** functional relation-
obstacle hurdle self-feeling ship between iden-
idea favorable opinion tity and self

***given more than ten times

**given more than five times
 4.5

35

- 30'

25-

20

10-

I i i f JL\_1_ J__L
1 2 3 2 3 1 2 : 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
anxiety ego self- identity psycho- physio- mind problem self-
esteem logical logical image
I O N S

Figure1 Frequencies of Constructs observed in group discussions

Table 20 Yerbal context of most frequently used constructs.
. mind
damaging to a kid's self- image overtones in our roinds
high self concept the unconscious part of your mind
low self concept mind-expanding drugs
an evaluation of tK- 5\->if secure in your mind
self-image is what ?> < > " > in the back of the mind
thinks of himself a critical roind
activities used to develop
self-image
decisions are related to
one's self image
drug abuse o .depends upon
your self ~concept
2) 5) anxietj
abuse is symptomatic of a create anxiety
problem low anxiety
underlying nature of the high anxiety
problem emotional anxiety
an underlying problem
security ill having a problem
the drug problem
the Droblen drinker
problem is a thing that concerns
run into a problem
psychological problem
3) oaranoia
"^ * &&wt3afmm&a&t&msaxxz*X3
&wt3afmm&a&tmsxz3 .

eople get paranoid high self-esteem

f
eelings of"' paranoia low self-esteem
doing drug* gives paranoia teach self-esteem
to be paranoid provide self-esteem
self-esteem growth

Brown and Oilman (1966) have found that there remain differences in expression
which exist at a level of difficulty which demands time-and-painstaking effort,,
These authors have suggested that the repertoires of verbal responses of
individuals alter under varying conditions, appear to be descriptive of their
own reactions and have significantly different effects upon others What
may be reasonably inferred is that the construct "self" probably refers to
reaction patterns established by the individual using the word, these then
being imposed upon other individuals" observed behavior.
The purpose of a Drug Awareness Workshop is assigned to be that of placing
individuals in a setting in which they may discuss and attempt to find
adequate means of understanding and altering behavior patterns of drug usage
deemed undesireable and/or harmful to effective and satisfactory personal
and group functioning. As has been demonstrated, words acquire innumerable
functions or meanings., A relevant question posed by Lewis Carroll (1936)
then arises; "whether you can make words mean so many different things."
Phrased somewhat more bluntly, the question Is? what events or actual
happenings have we actually been talking about?
Such a question is not posed as either challenge nor Idle hair-
splitting, but rather with serious concern^, It has been oft said that
"psychologists don't know what they are talking about." The author sug-
gests that the disciples of psychology must take both credit arid blame for
the promulgation of reification of constructs and the implications of such
a practice. Psychology has aided the splitting of the human organism
into two parts000a questionably sound view of a whole organism which inter-
acts with and within an environment If indeed our constructs have no re-
ferent in crude datas that is, in actual behavior which is observable, it
would seem more than expedient to dispense withtheir use.
Rather than continue a practice which cannot facilitate the alteration
of behavior and may facilitate avoidance of such efforts, we would do well
to attempt to adequately describe and classify behavioral events. Only
then can we discover the conditions which may facilitate and encourage
alteration of behavior,, Such admits of our ignorance and simultaneously
suggests that systematic analyses of connected series of events could lead
to more favorable results than we presently see in most social institutions,,
It the meantime, we are spinning circular discussions with labels and con-
structs which have far too many referents and varied meanings and functions
to enable us to communicate with clarity or to adequately seek new directions,,
Our 'rite11 words have seemingly become a rite in themselves as we perpetuate
the circle, or as a young poet said at age seventeen! (published in'Verdi
Valley Review" in 1969, Verdi Valley School, Arizona),
"words learn themselves after a long time, after all
their cramped misunderstood falterings finally lead them
to some point (not in time) where they find space around
themselves and breathe full, ah0
which is not to 'say that they are suddenly free, as freedom is
generally misunderstood, but that they are free to be
created rather than merely found in the dark,,
which is very like other art and living, not only writing,,
which is where most of us haooen to be. right now.w
Perhaps the time has come to say; we are as much victims of our rites as are
our young friends,and our old friends0 <>whose rites are, after all, only
different,, That's all we know0 <,right now0

References

Caroll; Lewis, ThejCojK2iM-^feJEfe5J^iJ!^irJ2i- New lorks Modern Library, 1936-

Bollard, JY and Millers N 0 PjjB^n^.ity-_aj|d_PsjzghjQth^r^a^, New loyfes McGraw Hill, 1950*
Ellis,y A, *""'"""r?^^"'^'"rf?tr:''^^^
Reason and Emotion in Psychotherapy.y New forks Lyle u
tj Stuart0
Farrington, J e K 0 Utilization of Psychological constructs in a group therapy setting
1972, 22, 291-312.
Oilman, A 0 and Brown, R 0 ThgJif^MIl^ll^ilSS^SSSSfJlMiiilS* ^nn Arbor? U Mich. Press
1966, pp0 87-122
Jourard, PC New lorks Basic Books, 1958.
Kantor,'j 0 Ro Pjliiile_oX_llI^ho]^^s Vol.I, Principia Press, 1924.
McLuhanj M 0 E21_.34SfeSaJk2,^lli1ilEi, ^e Yorks Random House, 1967.
 AI INTERBEHAVIORIST AT
Noel W, Smith
State University of New York at Plattsburgh

For many years we have been indoctrinated in the belief that we mast
convince children of the reality of Santa Glaus0 Never does a December
slip by without our local newspaper reminding us that "Yess Virginia, there
is a Santa Glaus" We are told in this chestnut that Santa Glaus is
necessary for "child-like faith" and for poetry, and romance, and joy.
And what we cannot is not nroof something doesn't exist; witness
fairies Further, "there is a veil cohering the unseen world" which can
never be removed except by fantasy,,
With, this belief which is so strongly entrenched and highly cherished,
do we even dare to question it or poke at it a little or try to lift a
corner of that veil with our fingers rather than our fantasy? Could we
possibly be so bold and undisciplined as to suggest some doubt about the
value of the entire concept and its mystique? We must, for there is
imich that we have learned in psychological investigation of children that
demands our scrutiny of this tradition,
First of all we must recognize that our attempts to convince children
that a fantasy is not a fantasy but a truth is the deliberate fostering
of a lie,, Yet the parent who so lies to the child would likely punish the
child for such a Iie0 We must be a truthful to children in all matters as
we expect them to be, for they follow examples of our behavior, not our
admonishmentso This is not to deny the value of imagination, but we must
distinguish between encouraging imagination and deliberately passing off
imaginative objects as trutho
Santa Glaus is commonly employed as a device to control children?
"You better not shoutj you better not pout, you better not cry0."
The song tells the child that he must not behave as a child if he ex-
pects to receive the potential gifts that have been dangled before him,,
He must give up his wicked ways and conform to an adult pattern of
being "good0M It is no wonder that some children seream with fright when
they encounter this bizarre creature in a department store. Others
merely assert to him that they have been "good" even though they have
necessarily and inevitably all shouted, pouted, and cried,
When the child finally discovers that the whole matter is a
monumental hoax perpetrated upon him in his innocence, thereis dis-
illusionment and confusion and. finally disapnointment and embarrass-
mento Up to this time his parents and other adults had been the repository
of total truth for him but now the story all falls -away as a deliberate
fabrication and his parents are found wanting,, Not only can the gift
receiving never be the same again but neither can his parents,, In
some cases he will be too embarrassed to admit to his parents either for
his sake or theirs, that he knows the truth, and so he goes along with the
hoax on himselfo This is similar to the situation in which the child
learns that his parents' story about the origin of babies is a lie but
never mentions it in order to embarrass no one including himself.
As adults we often view in retrospect our own belief in Santa Glaus
as pleasurableo But if we sort through our nostalgic memories of eager
anticipation we may find that we are confusing sentimentality with
enjoyment or we are desiring to continue believing what our parents told
us was true; we cling to the childhood belief rather than face the disillusion-
ment and we bolster this belief by vicariously living it with our children
on whom we have, in turn, perpetrated the lie. It is this kind of bond that
 10.

can account for the strong feeling of attachment we have for this hoax.
In a class of child psychology that I taught to college freshmen,
I raised some of these same objections to Santa. The outcry of protest
was loud and intense. Upon sorting through the students' various argu-
ments I found that they centered around these three assertions; (l) if
children are not taught that Santa is real they will tell other children
and that will cause problemsj (2) Santa Glaus is no different from any
other fantasy and children should be encouraged in the use of fantasy;
further^ children cannot be taught to distinguish between truth and
fantasy; (3) believing in Santa is fun and no child should be deprived
of this fun.
I asked the class how many thought it wise to tell children that
storks brought babies. Not a single student raised a hand. I then in-
formed then that their arguments for Santa would apply in precisely
the same way as that of storks and babies0 To be consistent they would,
have to accept both or relinquish both. But let us look at the argu-
ments one at a time
The first argument recognizes the inevitability that children will
pass on information no matter what it is they are told, whether truth,
fabrication, or folklore,, It was sxich information that caused Virginia
to write her letter to seek clarification. It seems hardly justified to
lie to a child in order to prevent his passing truthful information to
another child0 If a child can be informed by another child of truth as
opposed to fantasy it contradicts the argument that he eanst distinguish
between them. That leads us directly to the second argument0 Children
are constantly confronted with such ready-made fantasies such as personal-
ized animals| trains that have faces, feelings, and desires; and television
cartoon characters that fly through the air.3 Yet in their actual encounter
with these things they maintain constant awareness that dogs don't wear
hats or talk; that trains, cars, and other inanimate objects must be
made to function by humans; and that no one flies unassisted. I had tried
on several occasions to see if my twins at the age of four would believe
that a neighborhood squirrel was either the same as their favorite story-
book squirrel or at least behaved similarly,, They clearly informed me that
squirrels don't really do such things as the storybook describes and that
I should know better,,
In addition to their ready-made fantasies there is no dearth of
fantasies children themselves construct whether they be centered around
their creations in a sandpile, activities of dolls, or just sitting in
a chair pretending to be driving a car and producing some noise to
heighten the effect,, Yet the child constantly exhibits his ability to
distinguish between these and real objects,, What child would not leave
his fantasied car to sit on his father's lap behind the steering wheel of
a real, car?
These kinds of fantasies are desirable and healthy but they are of
a different kind from those proffered as truth by parents where the child
has no opportunity to test them against reality. In addition to Santa
Glaus and storks bringing babies there is the Easter bunny that lays eggs
and shovels, the fairy that replaces the tooth under the pillow with a
coin, the star that is a dead relative, the supernatural agents that
provide a constant surveillance of the child's behavior, and other veils of
an unseen world that we construct It is in the Santa Glaus Lie that we go
to the most elaborate extremes to lend credulity to the hoax. Both S. I.
Hayakaw and Brock Ghisholm have observed the problems in these distortions
of reality and have shown how imagination as a valuable tool of exploration
 11,

may be actually crippled-.by not having reliable information for comparison

until there I an emotional realization or a traumatic revelation. .When
imaginative behavior encounters inconsistent tests of reality It cannot
realize its potential as a tool of innovation and progress in adult life.
For there have been no reliable guidelines, nothing to trust. It seems
likely, then, that what is necessary for poetry and romance and joy is
not "child-like faith" but rather the freedom to engage fully in fantasy
while surrounded by a concrete world arid factual and true information
or factual and true to the best of our ability to provide it; at the very
least we should not Impede any child from discovering it. Any veil is
one that we have placed between our children and the truth. It consists of
lies and ignorance. Lies we can Immediately dispense with. Ignorance we
can overcomeo
As for the third argument, if we look at the childss reactions objectively
rather than nostalgically we are likely to find more eventual pain and
damage than fun,, His fun and pleasure can probably be more genuine and
freer of conflict if he is not the victim of a hoax however well meaning
it :Biay be intended
' -What are the real functions of Santa Glaus? There are twos (l)
a symbol for Virginia and others of "love and generosity and devotions"
(2) a commercial gimmick to increase sales The first one is probably
too abstract for small children, and we might suspect that it is also
a convenient alibi for justifying the lie. The second is a very concrete one
that children can understands Santa helps stores sell toysa Let us look
at some considerations that bring us to these two functions.
So far we have dealt largely with the negative issues. Let us add
one more-that leads us toward the first function. If Santa is really sup-
posed to be a symbol for our interpersonal relations as in (l), he
subverts that intent The gift giving that should be one of intimacy and
devotion between parent and child is handed over to a biaarre impersonal
creature who sneaks in during the night,, Certainly the excitement of finding
gleaming new toys is there but does this really represent the way oarents and
children feel about each other? Have they expressed any intimacy and devotion
to each other? Would not the whole matter of gift giving be more meaning-
ful and more directed toward warm personal relations if we gave our gifts
directly from each other to each other parents, children, grandparents,
sisters, brothers, friends with all of the meaning of fond personal
selection and cordial presentation?
What then do w tell our children about the many creatures in red
that they see in tip stores in December, 1 tell mine that these Santas
are men In costumes just like the clown at the circus. They are in the
stores to laugh and make us happy and to help us to select gifts for each
other. This is concrete and they understand it and accept it readily. It
is the utilization of the second function. As for the descent down the
chimney we tell them how this was derived from the Norse belief that the
goddess Hersa descended through the smoke and flames of a fire of fir
boughs and through her magic slippers gave gifts to obedient children.
This tale we compare with fairy tales and personified animals as "pretending"
and not real0 The fact of such a derivation is not quite so concrete and
clear but neither is it clear to them, how an automobile or a television
works or how paint sticks to the wall or trees turn color in the fall, or how
glass transmits light; but we keep helping them, with new information and
improving methods of explanation. Never are they told a deliberate lie
about anything. In the meantime they are free to pretend they are flying
 12,

through the air on a sleigh or coming down chimneys and to have all the fun
with the tale that it can provide, but they are quite clear about what is
fantasy and what is not0

"While It is clear that a person does acctiaulate and remember ways of behaving
and normally does behave in a way that is consistent with his present circum-
stances , there is no clear evidence in logic or in data that these behaviors
are really internal physical units that get storeds processed, searched for,
selected, and invoked by some set of internal storage or processing devices
That argument only leads to regressive questions about the mechanisms underlying
the mechanisms. It is not an aeeident that the description of symbolic
processes (the functions f some alleged symbolic device) is given in behavioral
termSj, such as storing, .sorting^ and selection,, That in itself i@ a strong
clue that, rather than being functions of a device at all, they are functions f
a person, i e0, part and parcel of or9 better^ parameters of his behavior
(p. 13)
Lyle E0 Bourne, B0 R0 Bkstrand, &
R9 L8 Dominowskis THE PSYCHOLOGY OP
Prentiee~Hallj 1971,
 Noel W. Smith, Editor
Faculty of Social Sciences
Setting Factors
INTERBEHAVIORAL
PSYCHOLOGY
NEWSLETTER
State University College of Arts and Science, Plattsburgh, New York
For insight into what human nature is, the Greeks, with Plato first of all,
are unsurpassed. They make our best modern psychologists often look very
crudee
J, H. Randalls
Harry Mahan continues to make progress with
his Project Socrates* Some months ago he
wrote? "It is arousing nothing less than a
phenomenal Interest among the community
colleges of California. I sent out a mailing
the first of the year Inviting visits to
our campus and I have been swamped with
visitors ever since. I made a new set of
study tapes just prior to the beginning of
the present semester and they contain con-
siderable tutoring material In addition to
the content of the two manuals This makes
the taped course virtually completely
self-contained^ which is what I have been
aiming at* The economy aspect is a vehicle
which will put our type of psychology into
hundreds of introductory psychology class-
rooms and will convert thousands of people
to our way of thinking. The accomplishments
of Project Soerat are turning out to be
everything which I had hoped they might be,
I anticipate at least a oouple of pilot
programs on other campuses next fall with
nore the second semester getting the snow
ball under way. So far I am not approaching
institutions outside of the community
Crude Data
Preceding
Segment
Organism
Response
Function j
IM
Stimulus Objecl
I Sti mlus
| Fu clion
Media |'
Succeeding
'Segment
Volume 4
Number 1
Winter 1973
PLATO% THE DRAMATIST OF THE LIFE OF REASON
THE AGOHA
colleges of California1 as the y are all I can
handle at this time I want to b in very
close contact with any installations at other
campuses at first During the present year
I have had a couple of other people ttaehing
th course in addition to mystlf and am
pleased with the results. It is a very easy
assignment and works out ideally with th
teacher having a couple of other courses which
are his and in which he can project his own
personality in his relations with his stud^
ents.,,. Project Socrates i financed entirely
through th sal of study manuals and easa-
ett@ which w @11 to students through th
college bookstore,!( Inquiries can be addrtsse
i Dr. Mahan at Palomar College, San Marooi,
California 92069.
Corrections th laat issue should feav b@n
Number 4* Volua 3~not Volume 4,. Stteh rrora
cause problems with our library subscribers.
Th feature artlol is by Robert Martin? a
doctoral student In psychology with a 0peeial-
ization in higher dueation. The first two
parts (I & II; wssre abstracted in
Edjsgj|M,ojr| and are available from Educational
Investigative ]
 Toward Conceptualization of Learning Processes in the College Classroom Ills
Operant Psychology and Rotter's Social Learning Theory as a Basis for Research
Robert F. Martin
University of Denver

Abstract
In this paper the basic processes of learning in the college classroom are
conceptualized according to two approaches to learning, operant psychology and
Rotter's social learning theory. These orientations are viewed as coimlemen-
tary in characterizing college learning* The theory and relevant research of
the operant orientation are reviewed and criticized.. Specifically, it is sug-
gested that operant theory, in its application to such complex human concerns
as the college classroom is limited in two waysj (a) it is difficult to deter-
mine the relevant contingencies of behaviors and reinforcers for individual
Students, and (b) it is difficult to determine what in fact is a reinforcement
for a given student. It is suggested that Rotter's approach may hold notential
in meeting these problems, A program of research is suggested to test the utility
of such a combined model for the college classroom,
In previous papers, this author (Martin, 1971,1972). has reviewed the literature generally
focused on the application of the techniques of operant learning to the college classroom,
These applications have been roughly dichotomized as programmed textbooks and related techni-
ques and an overall approach to the classroom, known as contingency management. Although the
previous papers have been somewhat critical of this research -literature in terms of both the
research designs and the limitations of the theoretical framework, the focus of this paper
is on the apparent limitations of the. operant approach in its application to a highly comp? :
human situation.
In order to focus on limitations of operant theory, a single research effort has been
selected. The study reported by Johnston and Pennypacker (lf>7l) was selected because it
to utilize the bulk of the onerant techniques and to answer criticism of research
design mentioned above. It also perhaps is more familiar to the general reader than is
most of the literature in this area.
After reviewing the general principles of operant theory and the particulars of operant
technology in the college classroom, the Johnston and Pennypacker article is used as a
vehicle to indicate how in fact the operant techniques have been employed. It is argued,
subsequently, that the failings noted in the Johnston and Pennypacker effort (and in similar
attempts) are attributable to the weaknesses of the operant approach, as it has been applied
to the college classroom. The limitations of operant technology are then further elaborated
alternatives based on Rotter's social learning theory (SLT) are suggested. Finally,
suggestions for testing the appropriateness and utility of the contributions of SLT to the
use of operant techniques as a model for learning in the college classroom are made*
The Operant Model
A survey of the Indexes for ^gyjiiolojglcaj. Abjtractg, through 1958 yields no references
by title to applications of techniques derived from the operant "camp" of behaviorlst.lc
psychology to the college classroom. The.general lack of research on teaching was noted by
Beck and Shaw (i960), who have observed;
The study of the psychology of teaching is apt to involve disap-
pointment. The great number of studies in human learning generate the
expectation of a speedy introduction to important principles of practical .(
training^ Nevertheless, it is apparent that, although a great deal is
known about the many variables and conditions that affect learning,,
little is known about applying these to promote efficient training,
(p. 543)
 3.
Beck and Shaw's statement requires some modification because of th work in the deead
since it was made. During this period, there has been much effort in attempting to extend
the laethodology and principles of operant conditioning from animal laboratories to "real,
human" problems. This endeavor has been primarily within the "Skinnerian school" and is
manifested in education by "programmed instruction" and "teaching machines." The earliest
effort in this area was made by Skinner and his colleagues (Skinner, 1958j Holland &
Skinner, 1961), but was intimated by Skinner as early as 1948 in his novel. WaJ-deji Tj2<.
In spite of the rapid growth in this area since Beck and Shaw's (i960) statement,
remains much reason for such "disanpointment," As Lloyd and Knutzen (1969S p. 125)
point out, the us of programmed materials has been widespread, but has gone little beyond
the us of programmed textbooks (ef,, Lumsdaine, 1964} Gagne, 1965), Several volumes
dealt with programmed instruction (c, fe.g., Lumsdaine & Glaser, I960; Glaser, 1%5|
Galvin, 1969), yet applications to the college classroom of operant techniques have been
limited almost exclusively to programmed textbooks. This limited use suggests a need to
specify the foundations and mechanisms in the application of the operant technology to
the college classroom, so that these techniques may be more readily and widely apnlied.
BsfflSsMsss.
The general procedures employed in the conditioning of operant behavior, that is the
behavior, that is the behavior by which the organism modifies or manipulates his environ-
ment, have been set forth by many authors, but roost extensively by the major proponent
of this approach, Be F. Skinner (cf., e.g., Skinner, 1953j Skinner, 1963). In this
section, the general procedures anplied in operant conditioning are presented: also,
procedures which are similar and aimed specifically at education and' programmed insinua-
tion are discussed*
Generally, five steps are delineated in the process of conditioning an operant be-
havior; (a) the final desired outcome is specified: (b) the pre-conditioning level of this
nporant is measured? (c) the appropriate reinforeers, discriminative stimuli, and
fjoatingencies of reinforcement are specified; (d) a suitable "learning snace" is ettabliihedf
mill (e) the desired behavior is "shaped up" and brought under the control of the pre-
viously specified discriminative stimuli and contingencies of reinforcement. The order of
steps 10 not'necessarily fixed. For instance, step (b) above may be better plaetd
(c) and (d) in specific situations; steps (c) and (d) might also be reversed where
appropriate. In addition, the final behavior is assessed to determine to what extent the
"desired outcome" was accomplished,
In specifying the "final desired outcome," the experimenter must define what behavior
or specific operant is to be the end-product of this conditioning. In defining the operant,
the measures by which the success of the conditioning is determined are also snecified. As
an example, in a typical conditioning study, an experimenter may have decided to establish
a C5olor discrimination in a pigeon. In such a task, the pigeon is to exhibit an operant
of pecking a key of only one color and not another. In defining the final outcome, the
experimenter also specifies the criteria, of !SffiiS That is to say, the measures where-
by the operant is said to be conditioned pr not are stipulated. In the present example,
the experimenter may be satisfied that conditioning has taken "lace if the nigeon pecks
the white key only 90$ as often as the red key is pecked in a 60-minute session,
In determining the "pre-conditioning level" of the operant, the exnerlmenter is
interested in the probability 01% 'operationally, the frequency, of the response In the
organism's existing repertoire of behavior. In so doing, the "base rate" for this particular
operant of the specific organism in the given situation is defined, against whieh the final
outcome of conditioning can be compared. In th example of conditioning a pigeon t
discriminate between a red and a whit k@y, this step is carried out by observing th
frequency of the pigeon's key-peaking behavior prior to any exnerlmental waninulatione,
la addition to determining the base rate of the perant in question, in this step th
experimenter takes note of behaviors which could be components of a more comnlex operant
or a "chain" of responses which the experimenter might wish to mtabllsh in the behavior
ropertoire of the organism and for which the base rate Is virtually gero. In the example
of the pigeon color-discriminating, if the desired ooerant were a circle turned in the , .
clockwise direction before necking the red key, the experimenter would note in the bass
rate determination those behaviors which were emitted frequently and could be components
of the turning behavior, such as tilting the head in the clockwise direction,
The third step noted above is most comnlex and deals with "motivational" variables of
learning, as well as the physical limits of the organism. In specifying the appropriate
reinforcers, the experimenter must be aware of or control the physiological state of the
organism. Motivation for learning, necessarily observed as the performance of an operant,
is typically operationalized by depriving the organism of some necessity of life such as food
or water, but not to such an extent as to impair the organism. Yet choosing, as a reinforce-
ment of the food~deprlved pigeon in the previous examnle, a pellet of dried meat would be
inappropriate, In addition to reinforcement delivered appropriately to meet deprivation,
other types of reinforcers may be useful. Secondary reinforcers, when they can be observed
or extablished for the organism, may be more appropriate in certain conditioning situations,
(This is apparent in considering the complex behavior of students controlled by grades OT
"being right"; a point considered in greater detail below.) In the examnle of the color-
discriminating, clockwise-turfing pigeon, many circles may be turned just to be able to peck
the red key, which becomes red only after n circles are turned by the pigeon.
In specifying the discriminative stimuli, under the control of which the experimenter
wishes to bring the operant, again the physiological limits of the organism must be re-
cognized* To require the pigeon in the, by now well-used, example to discriminate between
two shades of red, closely spaced on the sneetrum, would be nearly an impossible task to
learn. In addition, the discriminative stimulus may vary in its appropriateness to the task,,
(This point can be better exemplified in considering educational uses of operant techniques
discussed below,,)
The specification of the contingencies of reinforcement includes two nrimary considera-
tions s (a) the interval between operant termination and the presentation of reinforcement!
termed "delay of reinforcement" and (b) the number of onerants required prior to rein-
forcement or "schedules of reinforcement". In this regard, the physical limits must be1
consideredi a delay of reinforcement of five minutes is likely to have little effect on
the color-discrimination operant of the pigeon, yet a grade of 129/150 may have powerful
effects for a student several weeks after the behavior haa been emitted,, Likewise, expecting
a pigeon to emit ten circle-turnings for the first reinforcement is unreasonable. Both
the delay and schedules of reinforcement have been extensively researched in the laboratory
(of*, Ferster & Skinner, 1957), and hence, the experimenter in the laboratory dafi.fefidiiy
find guide lines for this step. This procedure when apnlled in the educational or thera-
peutic setting has been termed "contingency management," by some authors and Is discussed
below. Guide lines for the classroom, however, appear not to be so readily available.
In establishing a "suitable learning space," the experimenter attempts to control as
many as possible of the variables which may impinge on the organism and interfere with
conditioning. In addition, the environment most conducive to learning is sought. This
includes making the methods of response and reinforcement convenient to the organism. In
the example of the discrimination pigeon, this is generally accomnlished by utilisation of
an operant conditioning apparatus, the so called, "Skinner Box."
Finally, the experimenter shapes up the specified operant by reinforcing successive
approximations of the behavior. In addition, the behavior is brought under the control of
the specified discriminative (eliciting) stimulus and contingency of reinforcement. Shaping
is accomplished through the utilization of small increments in moving from more simple
to more complex behavior, in that the organism is first reinforced for gross approximations
of the desired operant and then only for finer and finer approximations. Resnonses which were
initially sufficient for reinforcement are subsequently not reinforced. By requiring one
simple behavior to follow another, prior to reinforcement, comnlex behavior patterns (the
whole of which may be termed an operant) are extablished, through chaining. In bringing
behavior under the control of specific stimuli or sets of stimuli and in establishing schedules
of intermittent reinforcement, the organism is reinforced only under certain conditions and
only after a certain number of operants have been emitted. More operationally, the response
probability for the specified operant comes to approach 1,0 under certain states, and 0.0
under others. Measures like rates of responding are Influenced by the schedule of inter-
mittent reinforcement, that is, the number of operanta required before reinforcement.
 5*
iS
Several authors have delineated approaches'to applying, in the educational situation,
operant techniques similar to those discussed in the preceeding section. Reviews by
Barlow (1962) and Gagne (1965) represent and summarize such work.
Barlow has maintained much of the language of "Skinner's 'operant1 psychology," yet
taken it from the laboratory setting,, as is exemplified in the preceeding section, and
placed the emphasis on the classroom. Barlow states,
The task of the teacher is to (l) determine the current discrimina-
tive repertoire and effective reinforcers for the potential students; (2)
carefully specify the desired terminal behavior and conditions under which
this behavior is appropriatej (3) evoke and reinforce typical current
behavior that is relevant in order to "dipper" or "magazine" train the student;
(4) carefully sequence SDs (discriminative stimuli) and reinforcement In
order to shape the behavior of the student until the desired behavior is
emitted in the presence of SDs typical of the natural practical environment
in which the behavior is appropriate; (5) complete the sequence in such
a manner that the new behavior will be intrinsically reinforced and main-
taiaed after the sequence is completed (p. <403)
It should be noted -that, in addition to some differences in the order of the steps
outlined in the description of the operant procedures presented initially above and Barlow'0
there are some differences in emphasis, if not content* It should be helpful to indicate
just how Barlow's scheme relates to the more general one outlined previously. Barlow's
.first point corresponds roughly to the third point in the general scheme outlined above,
that 1,5 specifying the appropriate reinforcers, SDs, and contingencies. In addition,
this step of Barlow's scheme implies the determination of base rates which is the second
point in the general operant procedure* Barlow's second step also implies (c) of the
general scheme, as well as the specification of the desired final outcome, (a) of the
general scheme. The "general conditions under which this behavior is appropriate" can b@
taken us the relevant discriminative stimuli and contingencies of reinforcement* Barlow's
ihi rd and fourth points may be seen to correspond with the fifth noint of the general
procedure, shaping and establishing contingencies. The fifth noint of Barlow's scheme is
implied in (e) of the outline of the general procedure! "intrinsically reinforced and
unnfntnined" may be taken to correspond to "brought under the control of the previously
Bpecified discriminative stl-nuli and contingencies of reinforcements" Barlow's scheme
apparently does not specifically consider step (d) of the general procedures for operant
conditioning, the establishment of a suitable learning space. It is, however, implicit
in Barlow's whole description and most clearly implied in (e)a
Gagne (1965) has emphasized the importance of specifying the outcomes of c-mditioning
ttad the conditions for the behavior to be emitted (Barlow's second step^. In addition, to
the necessity of this step apparent in the statement of the operant approach in the
[.laboratory, that is step (a) of the general scheme, he has indicated some other and perhaps
wore practical considerations. To Gagnes the specification of terminal behavior desired by
the teacher is essential so that the "instructional designer" may know the nature of what
.la to be learned. That is to say, the "instructional designer" roust know the nature of the
terminal behavior so that he can correctly design the terminal stages of his nrogram. This
depends on the specification by the user of a program, the teacher, of "what the learner
is expected to be able to do" having gone through instruction. It is only with such a
criterion that the success of the program can be measured. Clearly, this terminal behavior
must be specified as an overt performance in order to provide a suitable criterion. In
addition to determining the terminal sequences of the program, Gagne points out that the
specification of outcomes in overt behavior allows the orogrammer to make inferences about
behavior modifications to be made through the program (pp. 23-24-)
Gagne notes two more reasons for specifying the desired outcomes of conditioning in
lonns of overt behavior. One such specification allows the evaluation of the effective-
ness of the program in comparisons of the effectiveness between -ire-grams. This is BO
Ixsnaua the specification of overt terminal behaviors medts the requirements of reliability
me! measurement, Finally, Gagne suggests that the most important function >\f specifying
of conditioning is the provision of a basis for the shaping of behavior (of.,
 6,
steps (c) and (e) oC the generaJ scheme), Distinctions among the class of behavior to
be established may serve ns a basis for modifying nievious oattermi of behnvior. Dif-
ferent claries of behavior require the application of different conditions for learning
(p. ?M For example, 1hc Icarninp oP a clars of behaviors such eu othlon] behavior
can be expected to lake place under different conditions (o p., different contingencies
aud rdnforcerr) than the Irnrninp, of a class of behaviors ouch as bmskot mMkinf, in
Gagne"r p3ie,coc)ingr treatment 'iiner" and "edue i t iona.i donipnor" ore d]ot1nf,ui shed. (ften,
however, a t !r the fare that in the d hoc uao of o>*ier<mt technique a J n tho r|-i;".roon
theno wo "toehn iolnar" (iff, I ho 'same. Never Iholosfr, i t should bo oim>hwi1'/od tluit the
spool f Jent Jon of clearly dciJned c net-product-) of the conditioning >'i aim; esaonllal,
Uagno emphasises one more lole for the speoifjcntion oT outcomes or Hefinlnf of ob-
jectives11! this has to do with the role of reinforcement jn applying operarit techniques
to human behavior. The .match:!ng of behavior to specified outcomes or "being correct"
appears to be a powerful reinforcer of human behavior (Gagne, 1965, p.26.). However,
Gagne adds that "reinforcement" has not been practically defined, beyond the conceptual
definition that a set of conditions coincident or closely subsequent to a behavior which
appears to increa.se the probability of that behavior is termed reinforcement. Reinforce-
ment is then taken to mean in programmed instruction the learner's matching of his own
response production to a response which is indicated as correct (p. 27}.
For the most part, to this point, the elaboration of Barlow's scheme has been
limited to his second point and to the additions to it suggested by Gagne. Skinner (1965)
has written an article which suggests some further clarification of Barlow's outline and
provides some additional translation from the statement of operant procedure in the
laboratory to. the Replication of these procedures in the classroom. Skinner offers the
following elaborations
An important contribution of operant research has been the so-
called "programming" of knowledge and 8kills~tho construction of care-
fully arranged sequences of contingencies leading to the terminal per-
formances 'which are the object of education. The teacher begins with
whatever behavior the student brings to the instructional situation; by
selective reinforcement he that'behavior-so that a given terminal
performance is more and more closely apnrpxiroated. Even with lower organ-
isms quite complex behaviors can be "shaped" in this w<y with surprising
speed; the human, organism is presumably far more sensitive (pps 6-7).
The notion, contingency, implies both reinforcement schedules and sequences of dis-
criminative stimuli; behavior is brought under the control of both. As Barlow suggests,
"Weaning" from the program is essential also, so that the behavior is maintained by the
appropriate schedules and reinforcers and discriminative stimuli in the "real world".
Reflecting the emphasis on specification of overt behaviors as the terminal outcones of
conditioning made by both Barlow and Gagne, Skinner (1965) also emphasizes the equally
straightforward, overt function of the program or instructor; "The task of the teacher is
to bring about changes in the student's behavior. His methods are equally consnicuous;
He makes changes in the environment. A teaching method is simply a way of arranging an
environment which expedites learning" (p. 13). This is the implication of the third and
fourth point in the discussion of operant techniques in the laboratory, that is the e*tabllsh
ment of a suitable "learning space." In addition to manipulation of contingencies of
reinforcement and discriminative stimuli, an environment "conducive to learning" Is neoded.
Skinner also suggests a dichotomy of the role which operant procedures' play in the
educational setting: producing new behavior or controls and maintaining behavior strength,
As he views this role of "programming," the arranging of contingencies of reinforcement by
the teacher to establish new forms of response, such as a handwriting and verbal and non-
verbal behaviors as in sports, arts and crafts, is fairly straightforward. However,
the manipulation of contingencies to bring existing behaviors under new stimulus controls,
such as with intellectual and ethical self-control has not been so widely attempted,
but requires the application of the same principles (1965, p. 13), This discxis.sion
corresponds roughly to Barlow's fourth point, but also incorporates part of Barlow's
final point.
 . 7,
The sceond half of Skinner's dichotomy of the role of operant procedures in education
completes the fifth step of Barlow's scheme and reflects the "motivational" aspects in the
preceding treatment of laboratory operant techniques. Skinner has' emphasised the role of
schedules of reinforcement in suggesting that "a second kind of programming" results in
the maintenance of the strength or probability of a student's behavior. The form of the
response and stimulus control are not altered but the likelihood of resnonse is increased,
The introduction of new reinforeers or increasing the effectiveness of old ones can
strengthen behavior, as in Skinner's example of providing a student better reasons for
getting an education. He adds that another possibility is suggested by the experimental
analysis of behavior : available reinforeers may be scheduled more effectively. Ap-
propriate terminal schedules will yield a "motivated" student, or one who is "interested,"
"perservering, " "curious," and "Indus trious"| but less stringent schedules are required
first, in order to maintain the desired behavior at every stage. Skinner stresses that,
"The programming of schedules or reinforcement is a promising alternative to the avers ive
control which, in spite of repeated reforms , still prevails in educational practice"
(1965, pp. 13-U).
At this point, the juxtaposition of the laboratory techniques of operant conditioning
with the description of these techniques in the classroom is completed. With the theoretical
foundations of operant conditioning in educat on having been delineated, it is now in
order to consider an example of the application of operant techniques in the college
cid.ssrooinB

lSfeaiaiie ill
In this section of the paper, the effort to use operant principles and techniques, or
contingency management, in 'the college classroom reported by Johnston and Pennynacker (1971)
is used as an example. The principles of operant conditioning, as outlined above, are
Elaborated and exemplified using the Johnston and Pennypacker study,
The general scheme developed by Barlow (1962) and delineated above is used as the
criterion against which the example is compared. The criterion is one of comnleteness and,
although the Johnston-penneypaeker naper is criticised below, their caveat is well-noted?
The studies discussed here are a part of a long-term research pro-
gram which seeks definition and analysis of relevant variables affecting stu-
dent performance in undergraduate college courses and the development of
feasible methods of most efficiently and reliably producing optimal student
performance in a manner that is preferred by both student and teacher to
other methods of instruction. It should be noted that the efforts to be
reported here are only the beginning of such a program and have thus been
confined to certain facets of the entire program (p, 220).
Before considering the specific operant irinciples, the general procedures and character-
istics of the course are noted,, The course was an advanced course, focusing on principles
of behavior. The majority of the students were junior and senior psychology majors, but
other students ranged from sophomore to graduate levels and majors renresented all the col-
leges. of the University. Enrollment was from 60 to 70 students each quarter and class- '
work consisted of reading a textbook, lectures three days a week, and an lied labora-
tory sections usually on the remaining two days.
In Johnston and Pennypacker's operational! zation of onerant principles, students ner-
forraed verbally in answering questions for each study unit to criterion. Reinforcement
(i.e., being correct) was administered immediately by a more advanced student "manager,"
who aiso displayed the student's cumulative record. The course grade was determined by th
final correct and incorrect resnonse rates. Replications with variations such as silent
written performance and in various course content areas were also reported by Johnston
and Pennypacker . The specific points of their approach are n >w comnared with the schemata
developed by Barolw (1962), which has been nresented above.
The first step of Barlow's scheme, the determination of the discriminative renertdires
of students and the reinforeers effective in controlling their behavior, is apparently
not measured but only assumed,, In this anproaeh rather tban the deterrninat on of such
variables for each student, the following type of assumptions are mades
 It has been suggested that instructions presumably substitute for
drive arid that knowledge of results presumably substitutes for reinforcement
In the ease of the human subject. Generally speaking, it appears that know-
ledge of results comes ordinarily to act as a secondary reinforcer; and, as is
true of secondary reinforeers at the infrahuman level, it is also true with
human subjects that knowledge of results come simultaneously to attain cue
or SD properties (Notterman, 1970, pps 194-195).
This approach is evident in the Johnston-pennypacker program (pp6 221-2; 23$). Prom the
standpoint of assessing individual .students prior to teaching, these assumptions appear
to be a major difficulty of the operant approach. This criticism is elaborated and
alternative approaches are suggested in later .sections of this paper*
Although the evaluation of "entering behavior'% as the information required in the
previous paragraph is sometimes referred to (cf., e.g.* Taber, Glaser,& Schaefer, 1965
p0 147) is not evident in Johnston and Penny-packer's program, the specification of the
desired terminal behavior, the second step of Barlow's scheme is evident,
FT]
^, s# he written and oral course-relevant verbal behavior
- of the
student was the primary response of interest in these experiments, al-
though other behaviors (such as attendance) were also considered (Johnston
& Pennypacker, 1971, p. 220).
In addition to this description, the particular response criteria were carefully specified
(pp. 222-3, 232-7; 238). Criteria for performances on the weekly quizes were stated in
terms of both correct and incorrect response rates so that "a quality and quantity of ver-
bal behavior with resoect to the subject matter that would be comnarable to the verbal
behavior that characterizes an 'expert1 in the area" would be produced. These criteria
equivalent to 90$ correct and 10$ incorrect. The cumulative performance criteria,
over quizes, were also stated. This was done to raise the probability of consistent
quiz taking behavior.
Barlow's third step, the evocation and reinforcement of behavior, currently in a stud@nt!
repertoire and useful in shaping, is not readily apparent in the Johnston-Pennypacker nlW
gram. This operation is related to the assessment of entering behavior and is subject to
the criticism noted above in that regard. The use of instructions arid the description of
the course provided to students (p. 223-A) appears to be an attempt to evoke the anpronriate
behaviors from the cJUiss,. The measurement of success of this manipulation for indj^WjifJ.
students is subject to the previous criticism. In addition, Johnston and Pennypacker's
attempt to balance "student-paced" with "instructor-paced" demands (p. 223) nay be an
Implicit recognition of the differences in the success of this attempt to shane existing
behaviors,
The first part of Barlow's step (4.), the sequencing of SDs and reinforcements is evident
on the level both of individual quizes and from unit to unit. The student is nrovided
cues and reinforcement from the display.of his behavior, cumulated by the manager after
each performance. In addition, an adequate performance on each unit is required nrior
to moving to the next (p. 222; 237-8). The second part of Barlow's fourth step, that is bring
ing the behavior under the control of the SDs in the individual's "natural, practical"
ecology, is apparently not considered by Johnston and Pennypacker,,
Likewise, Barlow's fifth step does not appear to have been taken into consideration
in the work reviewed,, The intrinsic reinforcement and maintenance of the newly acquired
operant is essentially the notion that the skills acquired in the particular course will
b maintained in strength in other courses and outside the classroom,, Skinner has auggenttd
that this process may also be a function of the scheduling of reinforcement (cf,* p, 13
As wan noted in the introductory remarks, the intent of the author is n <t to oriticlis
the research effort reported by Johnston and Pennypacker (1971), 'On-the contrary, their
approach has been viewed as comprehensive in its use of operant techniques. It is argued
that failings, if there are any, of such programs are not the fault of researchers, educate ,
or programers who are as careful as Johnston and Pennypacker evidently are, but are intrinsic
to the use of the operant orientation.
 9,
The utility for higher education of the operant approach has been summarized by
Martin (1971, pp, 24-34.)} if the goals stated for it can in fact be accomplished. As
Johnston and Pennypacker (1971) see it, the goals of the use of operant techniques is
the individual! zation of instruction in higher education (op. 2-41-2), They summarise
this goal and the attendant operations with the following?
The ideal guiding these efforts developing teaching nrocedures
which would allow each student to serve as his own control for the academic
purpose of evaluating the effects of individual procedural changes and for
the research purpose of evaluating independent variable manipulations was in
great part attained. The individual cumulative records served as a higtPy
sensitive representation of current individual activity. Such attempts will
accrue even greater success if material difficulty and other similar variables
can be held relatively constant to allow stable reflections in individual student
performance of manipulations of variables of primary interest. There would
seem to be considerable advantages to such a research tactic (Sidman, I960;
p. 243)*
Although this author has been critical of the operant approach on various grounds
(Martin, 1972, pp. 39-44-), it is exactly the limitations of the operant approach in
meeting such goals, which are now of focus. Although Johnston and Pennypacker (1971 )
report high levels of achievement, with over 90$ of the class receiving A's (p, 226),
and high student satisfaction (p. 224), some important considerations remain from the
standpoint of individualizing instruction.
First, there is apparently some variability in the number of students reaching
criteria in programs of apparently equal comprehensiveness (cf , , e.g., Malott and Svlnicki?
1969 j p. 550; Ferster, 1968, p. 523). In addition, the research literature may be
selectively distorted by falling to include studies reporting lower success rates. In
the author's own experience, the A~achievement is closer to 65$. Although this may be a
ftmction of less precise use of the techniques or of higher criteria for behavior, it Is
argued below that this variability is a function of the inability to assess individual
variation prior to the course of instruction with operant methods.
Secondly, the reportedly high student satisfaction may be an artifact of high drot>~
out rates from the class. Johnston and Pennypacker do not report relevant data, but
Ferster (1968, p. 523) has reported a dronout rate near 12% of the initial enrollment.
In the author's classes a rate from 4^-60$ has been evident and similar to that noted in the
personal experience of others (Todd, Anderson, Hodson, & Gregerson, 1972). Such variability
be a function of program differences or characteristics of student populations.
Again, it is argued in the next section, however, that the dropout rate is in part a function
of the inability of the operant an^roach to assess the individual prior to the _ course of
Instruction,

Having considered the application of the principles of operant conditioning to college

learning as delineated in the previous section, one may conclude that there are serious
limitations to this orientation. For instance, if a college instructor wishes to manipulate
the appropriate contingencies of reinforcement in the classroom, he needs to know what
constitutes reinforcement for a given student; such knowledge requires information about
Ms individual history of reinforcement. This is the assessment required by the first
step of Barlow's approach described above. The failure of the onerant approach to nro-
vide a means for such an evaluation for coirralex human behavior, on an individual basis,
is the major criticism of this approach to this writer. It amears that events such as
being correct, receiving praise from the instructor, and receiving a high grade are not
reinforcing events and effective for all students. Likewise, discriminative stimuli, those
stimuli to which some behaviors are emitted and others withheld, are assumed to be the same
for individual students. Such stimuli as an open book, a study table, or a teaching machine
; may or may not exist as SDs in individual student repertoires. Whether these reinforcers
and SDs exist for every student in a given class and in equal strength is an emnirica'J
 10.
question, the potential evaluation of which is elaborated in the concluding section of
the paper .
Secondly, to apply the principles of operant conditioning, it is essential to estab-
lish the "base line" of behavior, or more technically, the probability of occurrence of
the behavior; that is to assess the student's entering behavior. The same assessment
is required for classes of behavior in the repertoire of the student. This corresponds
roughly to the third step of Barlow's scheme, as noted previously. The onerant approach
appears not to suggest methods for determining what is the current repertoire, including
the relevant contingencies, for an individual in complex, human situations. In the lab-
oratory or for simple behavior (including humans in some institutional situations, eg*>
profound retardation), one need only to observe the organism to determine the base rat
of the desired operant and any behaviors exist- nt in the organism's repertoire which
might be useful in later shaping.
To summarize, it has been argued that in the case of complex human behaVlor, occuring
in a very complicated ecology, the operant approach does not provide the tools for the
assessment of individual behavior, antecedarit to the goal of individualizing instruction.
Such limitations, it may be suggested, present serious difficulties for the prnctiCBl use
of the principles of operant conditioning in the college classroom. The assessment of
each student, even if it were possible using operant techniques, would require large
expenditures of personnel time, money, and equipment. In the present educational system,
it would appear unlikely that such assessment' is foreseeable. After reviewing social
learning theory (SLT) in the next section, specific suggestions taken from SLT for in-
creasing the utility of the operant model in individual! si ug the instruction in the college
classroom are discussed.
The Social Learning Ihodel
Variables like "history of reinforcement" and individual reinforcement contingencies,
as well .as response hierarchies, can be considered ns 3yin{ in the domrJn of the "per-
sonality" sub-area of psychology (JesEDer, Graves, Hanaon, & Jessor, 196ft, pp. &5-P9).
Rotter's (1954, 1955, I960, 1966) social learning theory (SLT) perhnor-s ixrovidoo a bnais
for meeting the limitations of applications of operont principles to the college cla,3B-
'rooro, in that the primary concepts of SLT are intended to ovnlnnte uh;il constitutes rein-
forcement for the individual, .SLT is directed as the coimlo* o" -H-rrnonal ity level, rnther
than derived -from principles developed in ninmle rviiyint.ion:-!. 'In tin:; ;ipction or the
paper, then, the basic formulations of Rotter's theory ;u*o *verRntfi<i nnd r.ng viitiona for
application of this conceptual framework to the college clnr.sroom ore dlccunru-id,

Rotter, at the Nebraska Symposium on motivation (1955), addressed the problem

learning theorists generally do not treat the issues raised above, that is, the measure-
ment of what constitutes reinforcement or what contingencies are ooer?>ting for the indivi-
dual',, It is argued that knowing the external environment is not suf"icient for prediction
of individual behavior; the "psychological situation" must also be considered. Itotter states
that, "any attempt to predict precisely or specifically what the human organism will do,
requires a knowledge of the cues present, internal or external, and the acquired meaning
or learned values that these cues have a^or the organism" (lr55, n. 245).
Rotter goes on (1955, pp. 245-254) to review theoretical positions which have treated
the "psychological climate" and concludes that thin consideration is never more than irn~
plicit. In this regard, Brunswik's approach is noted as an exception. In other specific
research areas the "psychological situation" has been considered somewhat more exnHcltly,
The role of anxiety In student performance (lr<55j, pp. 25'1~2'J2) and the rolo of experi~
nienter, examiner, or teacher bias (1955 pps 249} 251-25?; cf . , Nosonthal, 3966, J5-efreot)
are noted by Rotter as such research areas. He, however, concludes that the consideration
of the "psychological situation" generally has been lir lied to personality theorists and
social psychologists | the importance of the psychological situation in learning theory is
stressed by Rotter?
 There are two basic aspects to the prediction of learned behavior. On
deals with the individual's past experience, from which we must abstract con*
stmota or. variables of different levels of generality for different nurpoaaa
and we attribute these to the individual or consider that he carries these around
with him* The other is the nresent, meaningful environment,, nayohologlcal alt-
, ' nation-or Lewin (1951) has called the "life space," this latter
variable the psychologist roust also abstract constructs at different levels
of generality for different purposes in to nrediot behavior (1955, p* 249).
Although Rotter *-s explanation is in terms of "behavior prediction^" the
orations hold for "behavior control*"
fi
Rotter has sneoified the role of the psychological situation in the nredietion of
human behavior with the formal statement offunctional relationships. However,
considering theseg some basic definitions
In
are treated*
the discussion above of this general orientation*
it was noted that knowing both internal and external cues 10 considered essential in
to predict behavior. The definition of these variables has implications beyond .the
conmonrsense meaning;
By internal cues I mean that the individual is rennonding to stimuli
conditionsj arising in the body,, with learned associative meanings , such
EB to a parched throat, or a pain In the region of the atonach. By external
cues I refer to any asnect of the individual's environment, outside of the
body,'to which he is responding at. any given time,, and which for him has
acquired meanings as a result of previous experience,, A cue then is a psycho-
"': logical stimulus (Rotter, 1955, p* 251). ,'
It would appear that in this use "cue" is a somewhat broader conoeot than the 'atimulua" of
oparant theory (although^ c.f., and Staats, 1963).
The definition of the other basic eoneapts of SLT are most efficiently treated aa
appear in the statement of the functional relationships of the theory, SLT first was
comprehensively in the context of clinical psychology (Rotters 1954);
Social learning theory has been characteriatd in the following wayi
The fundamental concepts in tetter's learning theory arc the
following! (1) (E), which refers to the subjective probability
held by an individual that a spaeifie behavior will lead to the
of certain events or reinforcements! (2) fginffiSOTgnt yjluj, (RV), which
refers to the degree of preference for the events or reinforcements which
are contingently related to behavior; (3) (BP), which
refers to the likelihood of occurrence of'a bthavior^ or the relative strength
of the tendency to respond in a certoin wny; and (4) the EISb2^ffi4Si
Jfcfj2B (S), which refers to the immediate context of action described In s
psychologically relevant terms, that is, in terms reflecting the actor s
potential perception or interpretation of his confronting situation,
Thes basic terms generate tbe following dascriotive formula, which
constitutes the foundation for nredictJon or explanation at the.nersonality
leveli BP = f(E and KV). The formula reads: The potentiality of any be-
havior occurring in a Riven situation is nowe function (probably multiplica-
tive) of (l) the expection that it will, in that situation, lead to a narti-
oular goal and (2) the value of that goal in that situation* Note that the
"S" term is implicit in that each of the other terms in the fomul a is
variable or dependent u on the specific 'iroportiaa perceived in the p*yoho-
logloal situation Action, or acttal behavior, then, always involves a nro-
of selection or choice, from a repertoire of lhaviors, of that behavior
with the highest potential for 3( .-.(Tmg to gratification in a given context
(Jssort jjfe al., 1968, pp. 85-ft6).
fh four of this general expres^:ion require elaboration and lead to other
functional relationships.
 What lessor et aj,. have termed "expecti.it Ion" was In Rotter's original -
formulation "expectancy" (E). "Expectancy may be defined au the probability held by the.
individual that a particular reinforcement will occur as M function of n .-neeinc behavior
on his part in a specific situation or situations" (Rotter, l"r>4, p. \W; 1V55, p. ?''>)(
Additionally, it ia pointed out that expectancy is theorized to bo Independent of the
reinforcement's value or irnnortunce to the individual. The conct of rxnoctnncy ia Im-
portant also in moving from prediction of nneclflc events to- nretlict.lon or explanation
of classes of behavior^ as is elaborated below.
yjLLBS Originally this concent was defined "edenlly," lib: I ted to ex-
ternal reinforcemenTTTRottor, 1954? p. 107). In subsequent presentations of the theory
this qualification was dropped and reinforcement value (RV) defined "as the degree of
preference for any reinforcements are equal" (Rotter, 15^, p. 255). It is clear that
the referent of this concept is the individual and not experin enter-dcf 1 ned events in 'the
ecology, the nature of the reinvorcement concent ia operant theory,
T
Sfell he third concent of SLT and the one which provides the bns.is for
the prediction of behavior is behavior potential (BP). This is defined "fir, the potential! t
of any behavior's occurring in any given situation or situations as calculated in relation
to any single reinforcement or set of reinforcements" (Rotter^ 1954,, p. 15; cf , , 19S50 p.
2SS)S It is noted that ultimately the evaluation of the potentiality for the occurrence
of any specified behavior may be based on its actual occurrence in .a ft.ivem situation whtre
alternative behaviors are nossible. BP thus is a relative measure, being described on3y
as weaker or stronger than other potential behaviors present in that situation. This
relativity would hold also if the potential for the earn behavior were determined in seven
different situations (Rotter, 1954, p. 1^5). That is .to say that the obtained HP's would
be ordered relative to each other One
for each different situation,
concept ia implicit in all the functional relationships
presented below, the importance of which has been stressed by /Rotter. "Perhaps one of
the greatest weaknesses of current psychological theorizing and practice has '>een ita fail"
ure to deal analytically with the situations or contexts in which humans behave" (Rotter
1954> pp* 110-111), The psychological situation (S) functions to provide euea by which
the individual may determine which reinforcements he may expect to follow which behaviors
(Hotter, 1955,. p* 256). More specifically,
We mean by a psychological situation or any part of it to which
the individual is responding. Like lewin (1951 ) and Kantor (1924), we
define a situation as that which is experienced b the subject with the
meanings the subject gives to it. The situation must also be descrlbnble
in objective terms for scientific purpose B, W do not lot the matter rerst
with the statement that for each person the situation may have different
meanings, aince it ia necessary to describe in some communicable way what
it is that has different meanings for various persons (Rotter, I f 54 p. in).
The three variables defined above are viewed <>s functionally related in the context of
Hence, they provide a bus Is for predicting human behavior at the moat nimie Ivn3 und,
with reformulation, at thf complex levol, classes of behavior.
^ bejjgvioj:. ' At the most .dn^le level (i.e., a single behavior), expectancy
and reinforcement value are combined, in the context of the psycholopicnl situation,
to yield behavior potential, Formally, this relationship is stated:
B.P. = (E & ReV8 ).
x, s 1 f R& x, Rft, s1 a^ s1
Verbally, thls^ relationshin Is: the no'ential for the occurrence of n /^Ivrn btshav'nr
in a apeoific situation (l) In relation to a given reinforcement () In a function (nrobfibl
multiplicative) of the value of that reinforcement in that situation and of the ex nee ~
taney for the occurrence of the reinforcement a following the p?ivn behavior in that
!
specific situation (Rotter, 3955, p. 255; 195^7 P 3(F$ 1' 60, p. 302),
 13.
This initial formulation is of limited usefulness, however, in the prediction of
behavior because it takes Into account on"y n snecified reinforcement and nn other pos-
sibilities,, In order to predict the potential of all the possible behaviors ocetWTilnp;
in situation 1, a Bet of BP's must be obtained, each limited to a snecified reinforce-
ment,, This logic generates the following formulation: B.P.x, 3 1, H(a-n)=f(Ex S1 jRa-n'^'^'a-
which can be described verbally as the potential of the occurrence of a given behavior
(x) in a specified situation (l), considering all the potential reinfordements relevant
to the individual, is a function of the expectation that these reinforcements (a to n)
w:Ill occur in the given situation and the values of these reinforcements (Rotter, 1954 j
p.. 109).
In order to predict behavior at a more general level in a variety or group of sit-
uations, the formula for behavior potential is generalized:
n.p. =f (E & R.V. s
(ac-n) S(1_n) R<a-n) (x-n) S(1-n)R(a_n) (a-n) (l-n).
This is described by Rotter;
The potentiality of the functionally related Behaviors x to n to occur
Jn the specified Situations 1 to n in relation to the potential Reinforce-
ments a to n is a function of the expectancies of these behaviors leading
to 1ho.se reinforcements in these situations and the values of these rein-
forcements in these situations (Rotter, 1950, p. 302; cf., 1954. pp 109-110).
'ihlr formuJa is simnlified in the follow-in^; expression: NP=f(FM & NV) (Rotter, I960, p 3n3).
's'blH introduces three simplifying and more general variables than used In the preceding
foriiiuls Need potential (NP), freedom of movement (FM), and need value (NV) are de~
fi nod in the following description of this functional relationship: "The potentiality
of occurrence of a set of behaviors thnt lead to the satisfaction of some need (need
potential) 3s a function of the expectancies that these behaviors will leod to these
ro in for cements (freedom of movement) and the strength or value of these reinforcements
(utjod value)" (Rotter, 1954, p. 110). Rotter has emphasized that the psychological sit-
nation is implicit in this formula (i960, p9 303).
Rotter has further elaborated the theory and further specified the concents of SLT
(J9'54) In addition, he has indicated how SLT can be brought to bear in particular applied
.m-,w (clinical, 1954j personality testing, I960). However, since these do not appear
to bear directly in this effort to conceptualize college learning, only one additional
concept is considered,_
later development of SLT and in Rotter's research, the
concept of internal versus external control of reinforcement (I-JE) has received emphasis,
This concept has been most fully developed and a relevant nrogrsm of research reported in
a monograph (1966). I-E is in a sense n further generalization of the predictive function
of the theory as cr.ri be seen In definition nrovided by Jessor et fijL, (396?). I-E is
the "generalized orientation or expectation that the outcomes of one's behavior are
SESJl wJlisdi 2S6, [2. (internal control )_as, 2Egosed to bej_ng djt^nrdned^ bj; outside
sjjoh a 22iSZ]ii tners.,_jor imrnej^onal random forcg such a 2u2JS> siji. H fcSS
ternal cTjntrolT"" (italics in the original, p, 304).
Having completed the description of social learning theory, it is at this point ap-
propriate to note some of the apparent limitations to its intended use, vis a vis operant
techniques in the college classroom. The orientation of SLT has been highly theoretical
in the preceeding description; this is of necessity in that it has not been applied to the
processes of learning in the college classroom or to behavior and ecologies of similar
complexity. In addition, the appropriate measures a-ipear not to have been fully formulated,
There is, however, sufficient evidence on both counts to suggest the hueristic value of the
concepts of SLT in the present c< ntext; a suggested research program is developed in the -
concluding section of the paper,
With the basic conceptualizations of Rotter's SLT and the relevant limitations in
hand, a consideration of its potential role in research on college learning processes can
 u.
be undertaken. In what follows some suggestions as to the potential use of SLT in char-
acterizing and researching learning in the college classroom are described.

The potential contribution of SLT to research on conceptualization of college class-

room learning processes is in its specification of individual differences inherent in the
concept of psychological situations. The most effecient application of any reinforcement
paradigm to such complex human learning would appear to require elaboration as to how the
variables of stimuli and reinforcements affect individuals differently. This cnn be
elaborated in considering the potential role of each of the variables of SLT in concep-
tualizing the learning processes of the college classroom.
The concept of reward, value provid.es perhaps different potential information for pre-
dicting human behavior than the experimentally controlled reinforcement. Recalling that
RV is the extent to which an individual prefers reinforcements contingent on his behavior,
it can be suggested that experimenter- (teacher-) defined reinforcements will differ in
their effect dm controlling students' behavior. As an example, some students will "work"
best for grades, others fez? praise, and still others for freetime, For the teacher to
manipulate only grades, for instance, (i.e., to "contract" for the amount of work to be
completed by the student) would appear a less efficient way to handle a class, of students,
The RV concept of course broadens to need value in considering classes of functionally
related reinforcements (goals).
It would appear that determining the RV or NV for an individual student perhaps pro-
vides the same functional information as is essential in specifying or controlling the
history of reinforcement of the individual student as is n-ited above (p. 25). The dif-
ference between these two approaches would appear to be in the method of measurement (or
manipulation) by the teacher.
As with RV and history of reinforcement, a parallel between expectation and the
contingencies of reinforcement can be drawn, E, the individual's subjectively held pro-
bability that a particular behavior will be followed by the occurrence of a specified event
or class of events (reinforcements), can be viewed as the individual's apprnisnl of the
contingencies of reinforcement in his ecology. Whether such contingencies are chance-
controlled or they are personally controlled indicates the role of the I-K variable of
SLT. The E variable is generalized to sets of behaviors and goals as the merm expectancy
or freedom of movement.
An example of a classroom situation may help clarify the relationship suggested be-
tween E and contingency of reinforcement. The I-E concept is -also suggested in this
example. If a student perceives that the grade he will receive for a research renort is a
function of how well he approximates writing a paper acceptable for publication, it can be
predicted that ha will respond differently than if he perceives that his grade is determined
only by the instructor's whim. It is suggested that this is so, irrelevant o th_e ac_tual_
c^ontingenci.eg, of reinforcement. To specify this point; it is being suggested here that for
mature human subjects~Thopefully students) in complex situations of learning, the individual1
expectations of reinforcement will be a better predictor of behavior than the actual con-
tingencies of reinforcement. This is an empirical question and through learning it can be
suggested that expectations and contingencies of reinforcement may, in general , become
very similar, if not identical,
The probability of the occurrence of a. given behavior, that is the relative response
tendency (BP) strength, appears conceptually similar to the notion of response' hierarchy
(cf. , Staats and Staats, 1963, pp. 101-107). The concept of response hierarchy is an exten-
sion of basic operant principles. It, can be taken to suggest that for classes of function-
ally related behaviors, one behavior has a greater likelihood of occurrence in a given
situation than another behavior in the same class. This parallel is more explicit in
considering that the relativity of the strength of the tendency to respond In a cert win
way is with other behaviors. When BP is broadened as need potential, the probability of
occurrence of a set 'of functionally similar behaviors, the two concepts would appear to '
be identical. The determination of response hierarchies or of NP would appear to yield the
same information, at least conceptually.
 15.

A summary comment is in order for this section: In this treatment of Rotter's social
learning theory, the approach has differed somewhat from the previous approach.to onerant
conditioning. In the operant conditioning section,, relevant research was reviewed; none
wss available for applying SLT to the classroom. However, to the author, these two theories
do not appear to be antagonistic. On the contrary, they appear to be complementary, as
has been stressed above. SLT would appear to have potential contribution to reinforcement
paradigms in general, and, in particular, for conceptualizing learning processes in the
college classroom, if in no other way than notationa]. However, a broader contribution
bns boon suggested above.
Summary and Conclusions
Based on the thrust of the existing literature, the paradigm initialJy followed
in this paper to characterize learning in the college classroom Is that of onervmt condi-
tioning. The intent in this paper is tr. increase the effectiveness of learning in the col-
lege classroom through the more efficient use of operant techniques. Some apparent dif-
ficulties, impairing the efficiency of the application of this paradigm in a complex
situation, have been alluded to above. In addition, it has been suggested that social
learning theory may hold some potential solutions for these problems in specifying a?ein-
foreers and contingencies. In this concluding section these matters are more concisely
formulated and the nature of research relevant to these issues is indicated.
The two major difficulties in applying the operant approach in the college classroom
would appear to be in assessing, prerequisite to controlling, the contingencies of be-
havior and reinforcement and in manipulating the relevant reinforcers (steps 3 and 5 in
the general operant procedure outlined above). In complex human behavior, it is dif-
ficult (i.e., e.g., "unethical") to control the organism's history of reinforcement, or
even the most recent history, such as depriving a rat of water. In addition, recording
nuch history would ap ear to present insurmountable (at present) problems when the time
period is around 20 years. The difficulty in manipulating relevant reinforcers is similar
In the preceeding one for complex, human behavior: in order to manipulate the reinforeere,
one must determine what constitutes a relevant reinforcer. The E knows the relevant
reinforcer of the bar press operant, if the rat has been food deprived for 36 hours, and
thus can manipulate this reinforcer. Can a teacher, however, be so confident that the
promise of an "A" -grade is the relevant reinforcer for the operant of writing a research
paper, if the student has been "A" -deprived for two semesters?
As noted previously, the experimenter or teacher manipulation of relevant reinforcers
is dependent upon their specification. In the rat (or in simple behavior) the relevant
reinforcers are operationally "defined" when the exnerircenter deprives the organism, a
situation unlikely to be duplicated in complex, human behavior. Two basic concepts of
social learning theory may provide a basis for assessing the relevant reinforcers for
individual students in complex learning situations. Expectancy is the individual's
(subjective) probability that a given reinforcement will occur as a function of his
emitting aparticular behavior in a particular situation. This concept also provides a
basis for assessing what are the individual's perceptions of the contingencies of
reinforcement. Reward value, on the other hand is the concept which provides the bssls
for determining the relative strength of reinforcers for the individual. Thus, it may
be an indication of what reinforcer should be manipulated by the teacher in order to con-
trol the student's behavior.
Two ideas have been raised here which should be further stressed. The notion IB
implicit that what the student reports as the contingencies of reinforcement (his expectancy)
may be more useful in the control of behavior (learning) than the "actual" or toncher-
rle/flnod and -manipulated contingencies. Such an orientation is consonant with tho p-
pjrtuli of social learning theory. However, operant theory might b token to suggest the
contrary orientation to the .question of the Individual's awareness of the contingencies
updating In his learning (cf., e.g., Greenspoon, 1955), that reinforcers may operate
ooUIde of awareness. Research is required to rosolve this apparent difference in the two
l.hoorit'S, although recent research (Page, 1972) favors an "awareness" interpretation.
The question is whether or not the individual's perception of the contingencies of
 16. ,.

behaviors and reinforcements, or at least his report of these is relevant to the effective-
ness of learning. In fact, if student-reported and teacher-defined contingencies differ at
all is an empirical question* The second notion is that what events a student nerceives
as reinforcing may not correspond in "value" (i.e.j, their effectiveness for the control of
behavior) to the teacher-defined and --manipulated events* In fact, the student may not
perceive as. reinforcing at all what the teacher manipulates. The question is again which
set of events or reported perceptions leads to better control, if they are different at
all.
Specification of 2J!ich SHSM2M, Suggested Methods
In. specifying what ao^ears to be the critical research questions, the orientation
taken below is to focus on the apparent deficits in the operant paradigm and to suggest
how the concepts and methods of SLT may be utilized in providing the information necessary
for effective aoplication of operant techniques in the college classroom. The most im-
portant question for college teaching raised above would appear to be that of the nercention
of reinforcers in the teaching process* That is to say, do students perceive the same
events as reinforcing as do teachers in the teachers' effort to control the classroom
and academic behavior of college students?
At the outset it should again be noted that, in the terms of Rotter's theory, this
question involves the assessment of student's psychological situation. In the methods
typically used in SLT? a questionnaire for the expected outcomes or consequences of a set
of behaviors is developed. Adams and Ulehla (1969) have used a method for assessing
social learning variables in the framework of the theory of signal detectability (TSD).
This measurement model can be combined with an orientation toward social nercention
(such as Gibsonfst 1966 and Brunswik's 1955), which focuses on the individual's sufejectiv
perceptual parallels to the events of the ecology. Through Brunswik's notion of represen~
tative design, the complexity and real nature of the ecology is stressed. That is to say
that stimulus situations are used as they exist in the natural ecology, rather than as
they are delimited and simplified typically in the laboratory.
The TSD approach to the measurement of social perception yields unitless, ratio~
scaled measures from rating scale data, similar to Thurstone's (1927) approach. In the
intended application of this approach to social perception measurement, "stimulus sources"
may be read as the events in the ecology of students and teachers which are "considered
to be reinforeers" in the college classroom (Ulehla. and Martin, 1971). The method of
development of expected consequences questionnaires is suggested by several authors (cf . ,
e.g., Jessor, e_t al, 1968).
A second major question is implied in the proceeding paragraphs. This question too,
involves differing perceptions of the ecology but is centered around the problem of
specifying the contingencies of reinforcement and behavior, or expectancies in social
learning terms. That is to say, are the contingencies perceived by the teacher the same as
those perceived by the students? As an examole, does the student perceive his grade to
be contingent upon the "knowledge of the literature" demonstrated in his writing of a panr
or contingent upon the teacher's whim? For the teacher, is the grade given contingent upon
the "knowledge" demonstrated or on the "clarity or expression," the "style," the "form,"
for some combination of these or upon something else? Clearly, the control, of paper writing
behavior is in part a function of such. perceptions of the relevant contingencies, perhaps
aore so than the "actual" contingencies. This latter is again an empirical question, but
is not the curremt focus. A Methodological apnroach similar to that outlined for the
first basic question would apoear productive. That is to say, a questionnaire focusing
on the expected consequences of various academic activities, the contingencies of rein-
forcements on the student behavior, wouad be used. Items again would be developed ac-
cording to the principles of the ecological, functional amroach to perceptual measurement.
Sampling academic behaviors and their expected consequences from the ecology or what students
and teachers perceive of the ecology is required,
These two basic questions suggest supplemental research questions. Having discovered
to what extent teachers' and students9 perception of the reinforcers relevant to the c]asn~
room and academic behavior of college students differ, for example the next question might
 17.

bo to discover which events in the ecology of the college classroom are most useful in
controlling the target behavior. In social learning terms, the question is which events
of potential us e, have the greater reward value for students, within practical and ethical
limits. Another supplemental question witv a closer anchor in the ecology of the co23@R
classroom is to determine if the reinforeers and contingencies actually manipulated by
the teacher are the same ones the teacher perceives himself to be manipulating. These ar
only two of many possible questions which would be of exnerimental potential. The elabora-
tion of these questions and the appropriate experimental methods should be determined by
the answers to the more basic questions raised above.
Having raised the two basic research questions for assessing the utility of social
learning concepts in refining the application of operant procedures to the classroom,
several other questions of research interest may be generated, some of which have been
noted. The basic issue remains; Can the concepts of social learning theory be utilized
in complementing the basic operant paradigm for use by college teachers in controlling
the academic behavior of their students? Research directed at answerimg these basic
questions should clarify the utility of social learning concepts and methods in the effort
to improve the effectiveness of teaching in the col'lege classroom through the use of the
operarit paradigm. This goal is in harmony with those working to apply operant principles
to the college classroom. The goal is clear; Johnston and Pennypacker (1.971, p. 243)
observe:
The key to the success of any applications to other academic situations
is in the adherence to techniques that will give to all concerned precise
and continuous feedback on the individual effects of any or all procedures,
Only by having evidence as to what is happening and to what variables these
effects are related can reasonable development progress. The lack of such
evidence would seem to promote capricious variations more related to the
personal whiua of the teacher than to the lawful relationships between the
academic environment and student performance.

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Ulehla, Z. J. & Martin, R* F0 Operating characteristic analysis of attribute ratings.

^ 1971, 3_, 291-293
 Noel W. Smith, Editor F i E L D Preceding

Faculty of Social Sciences 1 Segment

1

Setting Factors
i i
Organism
i
Response
i Function
i

! 1
1
Investigator <4 -|
i
IX
Stimulus Object
Stimulus
Function
i
i
Media 1

L
- hJ
Succeeding
Volume -4
WTERBEHAVIORA L Segment
Number 2
PSYCHOLOGY Spring 1973

NEWSLETTER
State University College of Arts and Science, Plattsburgh, New York

The fact that part of the Interactional event takes place in the physiology
of the reacting agent does not place the total event there any more than the
tides, which are part of the gravitational interaction between the earth and
the moon, place the total event of gravity upon the earth, A person's feel-
ings are not located within him, but in his relationship with the stimulating
agent. Love is a relationship, hate is a relationship, and so is every other
feeling. A stimulating agent and a situation, as well as a reacting agent,
are involved in every one0
Harry Mahan: A PRIMER OF INTERACTIONAL PSYCHOLOGY

...: .
~ ,
._
-
...
. ~_-, .,( r~~. ~J-.. j*wj".. p~~.~, ,
...
.
. __v-,,..-. .rf

f tEJ ciJ dJ dl CrE THE AGORA fBJ IJ dLTHJ

As reported in the Fall 1972 Newsletter the gram. Those who are not on the Cheiron mail
Cheiron Society for the History of the Behav- ing list, but are interested in attending,
ioral and Social Sciences will meet in should contact the editor for a program and
Plattsburg June 7-9. Of special importance lodging information.
to interbehaviorists is a symposium on "Con-
textual Interactionists" that will consist The editor was invited to Lynchburg College
of Hollo Handy on John Dewey and Arthur where he presented an address on March 28 on
Bentley? Paul Puller on J. R. Kantor and B. "The Social and Psychological Development of
F. Skinner, David Miller on George Herbert Ancient Egypt with Some Preliminary Remarks on
Mead, and Clarence Shute on Aristotle. We Primitive Beliefs . " The attempt was to show
can now add that the discussant will be the naturalism of belief systems as they existec
Parker Lichtenstein,, There are hopeful in the ancient world before the supernatural-
plans of publishing the symposium. In add- ism of the Qrae co -Roman period came on the
ition, Drs Kantor will be present to give seen, the presentation was illustrated with
an invited address entitled "Segregation in slides. His address at the University of
Science: An Historico-Cultural Analysis." North Carolina at Greensboro in February 1972
He will be introduced by Henry Pronko. The on "Interbehaviorism: Roots and Brances" will
program also includes, of course, papers be published in the Spring issue of The Psy-
covering a great variety of other topics. chological Record, -^t offers a basic expositios
It promises to be quite an interesting pro- of the interbehavioral system and relates some
current developments that seem to be evolving a
similar approach.
Crude Data Investigative Contact Scientific Construction
 "iC""

The second edition of SYSTEMS AND THEORIES OF PSYCHOLOGY by Melvin

Marx and William Hillix, McGraw-Hill, 1973S continues to have a short
section on Interbehaviorism that is worth readnng. It concludes on
an optimistic note for the approach.
***

Steven Brown & Richard Taylor, Department of Political Science at

Kent State,, will publish in June 1973 Social Science quarterly "Frames
of Reference and the Observation of Behavior" that may be of interest
to interbehaviorists. For example: "By taking the object, instru-
ment, and observer in context, the interactions themselves can become
objects of study within the total field and observer's extractions of
different meanings become the most immediate events which present them
selves for analysis and explanation," Questions will arise, however,
where a partition between observer and observed is discussed. The in-
terbehaviorist stresses interaction of observer and observed so that
there is no partition, but rather continuity or interdependence,
***

A new work that commands our attention is by Theordore Sarbin and Will
iam Coes HYPNOSIS? THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF INFLUENCE COMMUNICATION,
Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1972, Sarbin writes: "This book is in
the tradition of contextualism and interbehaviorism. It challenges
the utility of such concepts as specialstates of consciousness, mental
states, and trance. The book is a culmination of almost 40 years of
research and study by the senior author, an early proponent of J. 8.,
Knator." We plan to have a review of the book in a later issue.
***

Dr. Kantor made colloquia appearances at Queens College on December 7

and at the University of Chicago on February 22. He indicated that a
scientific psychology required a special type of logical or systematic
foundation--one that would exclude postulates from traditional philos-
ophy.

Robert Martin, whose lengthy paper we published in the last issue, will
be completing his Ph.D. this summer at the University of Denver. He
would appreciate any job leads.
***

The feature article in this Issue is by Chris Fowler, a senior psychol-

ogy major at Plattsburgh. In forthcoming articles Paul Mount joy replies
to Robert Martin's article and J s R^ Kantor examines the famous statement
by John Watson: "Give me a dozen healthy infants. ......"
 , 3

A Comparison of the Field-System Approaches

of
D, L. Clarke and J. R, Kantor
by
Christopher M. Fowler

D L. Clarke, in Analytical Archeology (1968), has recently shown the value

of utilizing general systems theory (Ashby, 1954; Wiener, 1948) as a tool for the
analysis of interrelationships between culture and environment. Clarke outlines,
explains, and interprets for the reader the properties of qualities of a system.
It is these properties and his explanations and interpretations with which we shall
concern ourselves.
Inasmuch as "jLntera^ct^ons^ between living organisms and their environments
are the subject matter of ecological studies (Vayda, 1968, p. xi)," it is clear,
at least to those individuals intimately involved in ecological approaches (Bark-
er9 1969; Sells, 1969) that the most valuable approach to the analysis of human
behavior and the solution of human behavior problems must be an jJltejraj^imM,^ one.
Further, it is apparent that a fruitful framework to deal with interactions, es-
pecially those between an organism and its environment, should be
ary_ (Hall, 1966; Kantor, 1925; Sommer, 1969). To this end we shall develop a com-
parison of some of the larger components or important basic constructions between
Kantor 's interbehavioral psychology and Clarke's general system model for complex
(as opposed to simple) systems.

For Clarke, a system is "any intercommunicating network of attributes or en~

tities forming a complex whole (1968; p. 4)." That is, we have here a whole unit
of two or more integrated and interacting components. Thus, Clarke's "system" is
analogous to Kantor 's behavior segment and/or interbehavioral setting. Where
Clarke speaks of attributes or entities, Kantor uses stimulus objects and react-
ing organisms. Where Clarke talks about an intercommunicating network, Kantor
states that "all the specific acts and motions operate mutually and in concert.
The field is entirely symmetrical and reciprocal (1966, p. 383)." The nature of
interactions for both positions is similar: movement is constant; change is con-
tinuous; interactions are on-going. While Clarke refers to a complex whole, Kan-
tor refers to the behavior segment or unit psychological event.

contj-nui^, as Clarke sees it, is that "characteristic capacity for

change or transformation which is most often demonstrated as a process of
uus_ cha_nje_ . . . (p. 45)." Analogously, Smith (1972) in reference to oneof Kan-
tor's basic postulates, speaks of a "universe of interactions." Change generally
(yet not always) takes place in small, successive or incremental transformations.
That is, what brings about change in a system (generally speaking) is the effect
of an accumulation of small changes in many variables. For Kantor, change is a
function of the dynamic interrelationships or interbehaviors of many organisms
with events, objects, or other organisms, i.e., many variables. System continuity
further implies continuous movement of a system along a trajectory or path (i.e.,
a series of successive changes in the value of the essential or critical variables
of the system and, consequently, in the system itself) through time and space.
Similarly, the nature of interbehavioral fields, of course, as well as behavior
segments is "evolutional" (Kantor, 1966) . The nature of change in a system, as
 Clarke understands it, is. determined by the initial state of the system (when com-
ponents, e.g., organisms of the system begin intercommunicating interacting)
equivalent to Kantor's preceding behavior segment; the terminal state of the sys-
tem equivalent to the succeeding behavior segment (Kantor uses the behavior seg-
ment as "an abstraction designed tofixate a definite spatio-temporal event (1938);"
(see Smith's motion-picture-frame analogy, 1972); field conditions (a term which Kan-
tor also uses) or setting factors, and the trajectory of the system through time
and space equivalent to the evolution of interbehavioral fields. Just as no two
systems can ever be identical nor can one system ever again be like it was at some
time in the past, Kantor tells us that.". . . behavior segments like all events
are unique and unrepeatable (1938)."

Concerning the system's property of feedbaclc (in complex systems, hardly a

mechanistic quality) Clarke says "it is more frequently the case that the attri-
bute or entity values are coupled or connected in such a manner that a change or
transformation in either one may produce a corresponding transformation in the
value of the other. In such a case a connecting line and arrow must be shown in
directions (p. 46)." This is analogous to the most fundamental behavioral
unit of Kantor's system: the relationship of the stimulus and the response, that
is, the S**R relationship indicating, of course, that the stimulus and response
are interdependent, mutual, and reciprocal factors (Smith, 1972). Both Clarke and
Kantor are very aware of the need to represent complex multifactor interactions ac-
curately and objectively.

Regulation and control is "another inherent capacity of certain kinds of com-

plex system . . . to act 'as if capable of self-control by self regulation (p. 53),
That is, complex systems have the capacity to regulate disturbances or variables
impinging upon the system. In a similar sense, " . . . the setting factors of in-
terbehavioral fields operate to give pattern and distinction to the specific be-
havior segments in which they are components. They also serve to facilitate the
occurrence of the particular response~stimulus coordinations or to inhibit their
performance. . . the setting factors regulate the probability of the actual oc-
currence of a particular behavioral field (Kantor, 1966; p. 387)." Neither Kan-
tor nor Clarke, however, is assuming an invariant, causative process here.

Next, Clarke speaks of limits, sjgecj^fjjcalj^, limits on component variability.

That is, there are factors (internal and external) that limit the range of values
that variables or components of a system can assume. This is not an unfamiliar
notion to Kantor. We have already discussed the limiting or regulatory nature of
setting factors (field conditions). Further, there are limits to the number of
functions attributable to both stimulus objects and responses. That is, Kantor
does not assume that either the stimulus or the response has an unj-J-tnited^, or jLn-
jrinlt:e_ number of functions. In fact, the number of functions a stimulus object
or response can assume is a function of stimulus evolution and reactional biography
respectively (Kantor, 1966). That is, the type and number of functions that stim-
ulus objects and responses acquire depends on their respective on-going interac-
tions. However, neither Clarke nor Kantor is imposing some form of preordained
immutability on the events with which they are dealing.

Finally, Clarke discusses ^^2tation_ and d_irec_tivie Oej^tion.- Adaptation

occurs when a change in one system (any intercommunicating network of attributes
or entities forming a complex whole) brings about & change in another system. Kan-
tor would see this as the interaction of one behavior segment or interbehavioral
field with others. However, in most situations only certain attributes in either
system need change. Kantor notes the similarity of certain behavior segments and
interbehavioral fields with others, yet recognizes that the particular or relevant
events occurring in either are not identical. Two behavior segments or interbe-
havioral fields may be similar, but the stimulus objects and response function to
be investigated in them need not be the same. Clarke refers to such relevant or
critical factors as "essential variables." Closely associated with the notion of
adaptation is that of directive correlation.

"In every system changing or adapting with time there is a certain limited
set of attributes or entities whose past and present variation is essentially rel-
evant to some future condition of the system . . . (Clarke, p. 58)." This set of
attributes or entities is said to be diec_tl.y_ rlted_ with some future condi-
tion of the system. Moreover, "the range of permissable variation in the set of
past and present states in order to attain a future condition may be taken as a
measure of the degree of directive correlation (p. 58)." In other words, the fu-
ture condition of a system depends on present and past conditions of the system
as it moves through time and space. This is essentially what Kantor means when
he says that "interbehavioral fields are evolutional (1966, p. 383)." That is,
the behavior segment under analysis in the present is influenced by the preceding
behavior segment with its interbehavioral history, and both the present and pre-
ceding behavior segments (with their interbehavioral histories) will influence
the succeeding segment. It must be well understood, however, that neither Clarke
nor Kantor is assuming simple causal relationships. Instead, they choose to
speak of c_or_re_l^tj.ori because both are concerned not with some simple A causes B^
paradigm, but with the interrelationship of factors, the matrix of dynamic inter-
relationships, and the contributions of various factors as they provide varying
amounts of influence (Smith, 1972).

Nearly half a century ago Kantor recognized the need for interdisciplinary
approaches:

"Of all the instances in the domain of science in which particular ad-
joining disciplines can (and should) come to the cooperative assistance
of each other, no better can be cited than that which signalizes the
relation between anthropology and psychology. For here we have two
sciences converging in some of their studies upon different aspects of
the same set of phenomena, namely, human behavior. The domain of cul-
tural anthropology not only borders very closely upon, but actually
overlaps human psychology. Assuredly, if any two borderline sciences
can help each other we should find them doing so in the case mentioned
(1925, p. 267)."

Concurrently, we submit that aJJL. sciences (especially those concerned with

human social problems) should become aware of the need for interdisciplinary ac-
tion and should focus their energies in that direction. It is hoped that the com-
parison presented here shows the manner in which a field-systems approach may be ap-
propriate across disciplines as a means of obtaining a scientific analysis of the
events. Such an approach seems to be the goal toward which all sciences are moving
and may be appropriate for the analysis of all events.
 References

Ashby, W. R. liduc>y.on__^o__^bernt2. London: Chapman and Hall, 1965.

Barker, R. G. Wanted: An eco-behavioral science. In E. P. Wtllems and H. L.

Raush, (Eds.) 3 MSj-ESSJ^yi!^ ^ew York:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969, pp. 31-43.

Clarke, D. L. Anl^tacal_archeo_log^. London: Methuen, 1968,

Hall, E. T. TheJiiMeji_J,wverision. Englewood Cliffs, N.-J. : Prentice-Hall, 1969.

Kantor, J. R. Anthropology, race, psychology and culture.

1925, 27, 267-283.

Kantors J. R. The nature of psychology as a natural science.

1938, 4, 1-61.

Kantor, J. R. Feelings and emotions as scientific events.

1966, 16, 377-404.

Sells, S. B. Ecology and the science of psychology. In E. P. Willems and H. L.

Raush,, (Eds.), NaJ^uraJHj;^^ New York:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969, pp. 15-30.

Smith, N. W. Interbehavioral psychology: roots and branches. P^ZhJLoi.al_

Record_, 1973 (in press) .

Sommer, R. PJlSl_^SS.* Englewood Cliffs, N. J. : Prentice-Hall, 1969.

Vayda, A. P. (Ed.)3 E_nvlrjDnmjjn^^ Garden City, N.Y.:

Natural History Press, 1969.

Wiener, N. 6ybe?netic.s. Cambridge,, Mass.: Technology Press, 1948.

 Noel W. Smith, Editor Preceding

Faculty of Socia! Sciences

Selling Factors

Stimulus Object
Stimulus
Funclion

Succeeding

INTERBEHAVIORAL Segment

Volume 4
PSYCHOLOGY Number 3
Summer 1973
NEWSLETTER
State University College of Arts and Science, Pittsburgh, New York

As the title implies, this is a presentation of the neuroses and psychoses

from a consistently biosocial point of view. It follows a prediction made
five years ago that psychopathology--or behavior pathology as I propose to
call itwill shift progressively in emphasis from speculations about a
psyche in a somatic container to the study of the operations of human organ-
isms in a social field.

This is essentially the biosocial point of view. It differs radically

from the contemporary psychosomatic approach to the behavior disorders by
breaking completely with the tradition of mind-body dualism. There is no
need to begin by accepting the ancient end gratuitous assumption that an
invisible and intangible psyche lurks within the soma, or is coextensive
with it. We begin instead with what we find, a biological organism oper-
ating in and by means of a social environment. We thus create no artific-
ial need to solve meaningless conundrums as, How does the soma affect the
psyche? How does the psyche influence the soma? And ho'- is the non-psy-
chic reality ever contacted and tested by an insubstantial psyche? These
questions are not inherent i,n the problems which our patients present.
They are the offspring of psychosomatic dualism and we can discard them with
their parent.
Norman Cameron: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF BEHAVIOR DISORDERS, 194-7
(from the Preface)

AGORA

The symposium on "Contextual interactionists"
as reported in prospect in the preceding issue
of the Newsletter will be published in the Psy-
chological Record, Summer, 1973. It will in-
clude a brief introduction to the topic, a few
es of vita on each participant, and selected
questions and answers between audience and par-
ticipants as well as the five papers. The par-
ticipants' voices had to periodically compete
Crude Data
with low flying aircraft from the nearby
Strategic Air Command Air Base that hap-
pened to be on alert that day, but they
were indomitable in the end.
* **
The new ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PSYCHOLOGY in
three volumes published in 1972 by Herder
& Herder shows no advancement over the
usual animism in its treatment of the role
Investigative Contact Scientific Construction
 -2-

of biological organs in psychological activities. It states under the entry "Cen-

tral nervous system" that "All afferent sensory nerve paths receiving information
from the sense organs regarding the state of the environment end in the CNS, where,
in terms of reflexes, reactions, behavior patterns and volitions, this information
is processed and conveyed once more by means of efficient motor nerve fibers to
the motor effectors, and hence to the environment." The section on "Brain" main-
tains that "the totality of neuronal activity In our brain represents our individ-
ual world," The view that the cerebral cortex is "the highest central unit on
whose activity the control of all more complex behavioral processes and the occur-
rence of psychic (mental) processes depend" is now revised so that the reticular
formation "controls the activity of the cerebral cortex and hence all experience
and_ behavior" (emphasis added--ed.). The entry "Brain pathology" provides a slight
inkling that the brain might be considered a participating organ, but that is soon
overwhelmed by the usual cultural beliefs about its controlling, directing, init-
iating, and interpreting functions. Similarly, under "Sense organs" we find that
these organs communicate information. The encyclopedists would have the organism
populated with a panoply of little homunculi who screen incoming "signals" and then
tell the master homunculus in the skull about them. He (she?) then provides the
final interpretations and decisions for all the little homunculi who then act ac-
cordingly. Nowhere is there the slightest indication of alternative approaches or
the merest recognition that science must start with actual events rather than cul-
tural presuppositions. The entries in the Encyclopedia that are definitions or
simple descriptions are, with a few exceptions, quite standard and differ little
from what can be found in an elementary text. Examples of entries that are signif-
icant include Lundin's "Music, psychology of" and Brozek's informative account of
"Soviet psychology." On the whole, the COMPREHENSIVE DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
TERMS by English & English published in 1958 with its critical analyses is far more
useful than this $75 triad.

* **

Ronald Heyduk has compiled for teaching purposes thirteen pages of material from
the Newsletter from the three years 1970-72. Copies can be obtained by writing
him at the Department of Psychology, Appleton Hall, Amherst College, Amherst,
Massachusetts, 01002. He contributed "Cracks in the 'Billiard Ball' Organism" to
the Newsletter in 1970 (Nr. 3) and some apt quotations and critique in 1971 (Nr. 3)
when he was a graduate student at the University of Michigan.

The Newsletter is singularly honored to have in this issue an original contribution

by J. R. Kantor whose inspiration is the Newsletter's bedrock. His contributions
loomed large in the Cheiron symposium on "Contextual Interactionists" and in David
Miller's guest address "Can Social Scientists Be Humane?" His own guest paper
"Segregation in Science: A Historico-Cultural Analysis" aroused considerable inter-
est as shown by the numerous questions that were asked; and his extensive ad lib com-
mentary throughout his paper was a delight to all.
 -3-

A PROPOS WATSON'S HYPERBOLA

In the continuing dialogue between nativtstic and empiristic psychologists con-

cerning the genetics of behavior, the classical statement of Watson turns up occa-
sionally. Even empirically inclined psychologists appear to regard Watson's claim
to produce desirable or undesirable types of personality, given his conditions of op-
eration9 as an unmitigated hyperbola. But what is the alternative? It is alleged
that to reject the extreme developmental hypothesis is to entertain an ungrounded be-
lief in occult determiners. Surely Watson's declaration and its validity deserves
careful examination. Despite its familiarity it may be worth quoting here for pur-
poses of ready reference

1 should like to go one step further now and say, "Give me a dozen
healthy infants, well-formed and my own specified world to bring them up
in and I'll guarantee to take any one at random and train, him to become
any type of specialist I might select,--doctor, lawyer, artist, merchant-
chief, and yess even beggarman and thief, regardless of his talents, pen-
chants, tendencies, abilities, vocations, and race of his ancestors." I
am going beyond my facts and I admit it, but so have the advocates of the
contrary and they have been doing it for many thousands of years. Please
note that when this experiment is made, I am to be allowed to specify the
way the children are to be brought up and the type of vorld they have to
live in.

It is not surprising in view of the circumstances under which Watson formulated

his argument that it comprises some opacities and even some paradoxes. For example,
fellow behairiorists have pointed out that Watson himself admitted that he was going
beyond his facts, and that he affirmed that some behavior is inherited. It may be
contended, however, that Watson's basic hypothesis is thoroughly sound and that an
analysis of the issues involved can illuminate the problem of behavioral genetics
as well as genetics in general and the process of biological reproduction.

In what way did Watson go beyond the facts? Surely, he as an individual had
not performed the experiments but is there any doubt that such an experiment would
succeed? How else bat by means of the variables of personal and social development
are personalities with all their traits evolved? Is it not through the conditions
of parental and familial circumstances, economic and ethnic conditions, and cultur-
al institutions that doctors, lawyers, merchants, artists, beggars, thieves, mur-
derers, and governors are produced? No events available to scientists are more re-
vealing that the modes of cultivating the many occupational, professional, and poli-
tical personalities of complex societies. As we have intimated above, the objection
to the evolutional theory concerning the origin of various traits and capacities may
be prompted by lingering notions that occult powers determine the characteristics of
persons and their later performances.

As to the paradoxes, in Watson's statement, it cannot be denied that he slipped

in asserting his disregard of talents, penchants, tendencies, and abilities. For
there is no evidence that such traits are not evolved in the interbehavior of grow-
ing organisms in their encounters with things and events. It is not special plead-
ing in defense of Watson's hypothesis to suggest that what counts are the observed
events and not the rhetoric used to argue for them. We turn now to some relevant
issues.
 -4-

The Problem of Behavioral Inheritance

Geneticists in unending recurrence insist that no anatomical character is (

transmitted to offspring. What passes from parents to offspring are patterns of
genes which in interaction with environing factors result in certain structure-func-
tion traits. Gene patterning in interaction with environing conditions constitute
the mechanisms whereby offspring conserve the species similarities of successive gen-
erations of organisms.

Such being the case with anatomical structures and physiological functions, how
much less are behaviors transmitted? Surely we need here some critical analysis of
what is happening. And this is easily done by observing an organism as it begins
its life as a zygote and later as a neonate and as a developing personality.

The entire process clearly goes on upon several stages. In each we find defi-
nite interactions with copresent things and events. For the foetus these conditions
of development are located in the narrow confines of the uterus where the total sit-
uation does not allow for more than anatomical and physiological development. On
the whole it is proper to say that whatever psychological action is performed con-
sists primarily of the operation of cellular systems.

The development of the neonate is facilitated by the enlarged range of con-

frentable things and conditions. At the point of birth the foundation is laid for
a tremendous repertoire of action and action traits. The individual becomes the
speaker of a particular ethnic and dialectic language, a sectarian believer, a
unique type of craftsman or vocationist, a cultural male or female, a conformer
or unorthodox performer, a conventional moralist or transgressor.

In every case, whether the development is straight or oblique, smooth or rough,

difficult or relatively easy, rapid or slow, there is always development in com-
plex interbehavior with objects, persons, conditions, circumstances, aids and hin-
derances, all within the range of biological normality or abnormality of organisms
and their surroundings.

Does any unbiased observation of the actual development of organisms allow for
any alternative interpretation? The answer is, of course, no. Yet an alternate
one is proposed based not on observation, but on cultural indoctrination. It is
derived from the acceptance of historical transcendentalism, from the traditional
belief in occult powers and forces that are the creations of verbalistic imagina-
tion. In substance, such non-developmental constructions are blood brothers to
Orenda, Wakanda, and Mana of primitive peoples.

The Tabula Rasa Argument

Writers who unwittingly deny or are skeptical about the universal and inevit-
ably complete development of behavior and personality drag into the discussion the
red herring of the tabula rasa. They hark back to the seventeenth century debate
between those who affirmed that the soul was loaded with faculties and those who
held that the souls of individuals were only raw materials that had to be complete-
ly developed. However sympathetic we may be with those who believe they are espous-
ing the principle of nihil ex nihilo, we cannot but criticize them for dragging in
a metaphysical problem into biological and psychological situations. In both bio-
logical and psychological situations we perforce meet with transition conditions (
 mr m

in which new things and actions are evolved. Surely at one stage in their devel-
opment organisms start at a psychological zero point. But this is not to say any-
thing about a metaphysical nothing. We are concerned with a growing organism,
which, if it interacts effectively with its surrounds, will develop psychological
behavior and psychological traits.

By the same token the organism has passed through a biological zero point
when it was only a prezygotic ovum and sperm. The evolutional process involves a
before and after, and the observer can see how it is that scientific potentialities
are actualities on a preexistent level. The evolutional process in biology and psy-
chology comprises discontinuities as well as continuities.

Psychological and Biological Relations

To stress observations rather than conjectural dialogue with little or no con-

nection with events is t o be able to solve many of the problems concerning the in-
timate relations of psychological and biological events. We consider the proximal
and divergent connections under the conditions of emergence and participation.

Emegene_, Psychological and biological events are continuous in the sense

that it is organisms and their behavior that are the locus of both. For most of
the prenatal life of even complex^ organisms behavior is purely biological, they
are only physiological functions of cellular structures. A definite, though par-
tial, differentiation begins in late gestation and in greater and greater ampli-
tude in post-natal development. The neonate enters a new world, so to speak, and
develops adjustments to the great variety and constantly changing things and
events with which it becomes surrounded.

Psychological events may truly be said to emerge from biological matrices, but
this fact in no wise obliterates the differences between psychological and biologi-
cal behavior. Evolutionally both may be variant performances of the same organisms.
The variation in development of the two types of events may be regarded as stemming
from either forward or backward reference points. Biological interactions are in-
fluenced by the continuity of individuals with the members of the species from
which they spring through the agency of their cellular organization. Psychologi-
cal interactions are cumulative adjustments developed under current conditions
with potential competence for acting in future similar exigencies.

Undoubtedly, an appreciation of the similarities and dissimilarities in the

two types of situations is important for the analysis of heredity problems.

Participation. Heredity problems, too, are illuminated by the inevitable par-

ticipation of biological factors in all psychological activities. Since all psy-
chological events are at the same time biological events, it is overlooked that
the two types can differ markedly. The greatest similarity is found in simple re-
flex behavior. But even here we must distinguish between biological reflexes of
tissue preparations and the conditioned reflexes of intact organisms.

Only concrete events are considered, and not philosophical speculations.

2
Plants and simple animals, of course, remain so during their entire life
cycles.
 The most striking difference between the participation of organisms in psy-
chological interactions are to be observed while comparing a conditioned reflex
with the complexities of a thinking or reasoning performance. In the latter it
is obviously an organism that interacts, but the interaction has been derived in
a cultural development and is not just the functioning of tissues or organs. Given
a particular anatomical part, say., a hand or foot, it can perform in enormously
different ways; the hand can hold somethings clap, play an instrument, transcribe
records, and so on. Similarly, the foot can support, kick something, walk, and in
rare cases draw and paint. Participation in all sorts of interbehavior is possible.
Comparable or variant anatomical traits--size, race, sex-can participate equally
well in crude or precise actions. Coexistence and participation when properly in-
terpreted are exact indications of how biology and psychology are interrelated.

Participatory Graduation

When we compare the participation of biological components in comparatively

simple reflexes and in the formulation of a mathematical law, we must be struck
with ranges of participation. Always a biological organism is the performer, but
the degree of cellular functioning must be considered in the ratio of anatomico-
phys iological contribution to the processes and adjustmental results as compared
with the cultural factors. Minus the cells and tissues and organism there is no
psychological behavior, but the evolution of a biologically competent organism--
upright walking and elaborately neuralized--must be followed by the invention of
a cultural environment and the accumulation of its products or it will remain a
metabolizing, maturizing, and reproducing animal.

Behavior and Behavior

Problems of innateness in biology and psychology are invariably beclouded by

the use of common names for the description of different types of events. Certain-
ly this is the case when the term "behavior" is used to mask the differences in
biological and psychological events. Here is the source of considerable misin-
terpretation. It may be helpful, therefore, to clarify some prominent terms in
the discussion of natvism and empiricism.

Bjahavior. Essentially biological behavior consists of the opera-

tion or functioning of cells as living entities or factors in various structures
or organizations as tissues, organs, and organisms, in ecological interaction with
energizing conditions as in reflex action, or with objects as evolved animals or
plants. Basically, biological behavior is localized in the phylogenetic, struc-
tural, reproductive, and mutational conditions of a line of cellular organizations.

Psychological Behavior. The identifying mark of psychological performances is

that they constitute adjustmental interactions with Immediately occurring events,
or adjustments based upon a number of encounters with other organisms or environing
objects and conditions ordinarily grouped as a class called stimuli. The emphasis
is upon individual developmental or historical contacts of organisms rather than
upon their evolution as members of species or cellular organizations. The cellu-
lar structures, that is, the organic or species traits of the interacting organ-
ism, may be central or peripheral in the behavior.

ZZlil2iSi iSSSJiMiSSJLi. This term is predominately linguistic and has no

correspondence with confrontable events. It is illicitly employed to refer to some
non-existent, non-developed power or force to act in a certain way. Nativists as-
 -7-

sume that organisms are endowed with inherent characteristics such as intelligence,
morality, genius, creativity, affectivity, artistry, and so on,

DejveJ.otnenjt. Of the many kinds of behavior development we have only

to distinguish two types , the biological and the psychological. On the biological
level development begins with conception, the fertilization of an ovum, then the dif-
ferentiation and growth of zygote, and the gradual succession of foetus, embryo, and
a neonate organism. At each stage the developmental process involves contacts with
things and conditions which may directly affect organisms in their future responses
to similar situations.

The development of psychological behavior begins in the late prenatal stages of

biological development. Psychological acts and traits arise from single or serial
contacts' with stimulus objects under specific circumstances. After stimulus and
response fields are developed they may recur periodically when the original situa-
tion or some phases of them reappear. Psychological development by contrast with
biological development differs in the rapidity of the process and the increasingly
enlarged scope available for confrontations with organisms and other objects and
conditions .

L^arnln^. Properly employed, this term refers to a specialization and modifi-

cation of behavioral development mediated by contrivances of various sorts. Among
the many different kinds of contrivance that can be arranged are included rewardings
punishing, encouraging, cajoling, isolating, grouping, and general control of the
learning situation. The various contrivances may be singly employed or in concert.

Summary and Conclusion

Upon close examination Watson's hyperbola turns out to be no such thing. On

the contrary, what seems to Watson himself and others as overstepping the bounds of
observable data actually fall short of this process. Watson does not go far enough
when he asserts that his training procedures operate in disregard of talents, pen-
chants, tendencies, and abilities. These terms all refer to traits that are devel-
oped in their entirety during the individual's psychological development and are sub-
ject to control during the development of the social traits and behavior of persons
as doctors, lawyers, merchants, and so on.

It must be admitted that Watson reveals here his transition from a belief in
innate traits and tendencies toward the new emphasis upon biological evolution and
psychological development each from a zero point emergence from an -earlier embryo-
logical stage, but this is no impeachment of his new anti-innateness attitude.

It is sometimes implied that Watson could not give up a belief in the inherit-
ance of behavior because he shared the layman's belief that respiration, digestion,
elimination, growth, and random activity are inherited. This allegation merely
stimulated the study of the differences between the concrete reproduction processes
in species continuity and the putative similarity of such processes to the transfer
of property. When Watson says he is going beyond his facts, he is merely paying
tribute to the great complexity of developmental circumstances and the paucity of
economic, legal, and social control over the complex operations.

J. R. Kantor
 Noei W. Smith, Editor Preceding

Faculty of Social Sciences Segment

Seising Factors
Organism
Response
Function

IM
Stimulus Object
Stimulus
Function

h-'

WTERBEHAVIORAL
Volume 4
PSYCHOLOGY Number 4

NEWSLETTER Fall 1973

State University College of Arts and Science, Plattsburgh, New York

SBSSS SSH
KS^2SiS?S^^SSaS!!SSSS-SSSIS '* ' 'ft ' i t ^^^ ^^ * \*> i t -a f ) o I I

Every event in the realm of the terresfnal---tne realm of things which are
generated and perish---is to be understood in its relation to other events,
some immediate,, others in varying degrees of remoteness. ...[Aristotle]
contributes to what today we call interbahavioral psychology.

Clarence Shute

THE AGORA

The above quotation appears in The Psych- Lynchburg, Virginia as Distinguished

ological Record, Summer 1973 in one of the Visiting Scholar. He will deliver two
five papers on "Contextual Interaction!sts: addresses and consult with students and
A Symposium." staff. A weekly discussion group is also
*** part of the program. Donna Cone who made
Harry Mahan has the following mimeographed the arragemerits has sabbatical leave to
articles and cassettes. He will send the study with him during this time. Present
mimeographed articles gratis and the reports are that students, psychology
cassettes for $1 each. (1) Dewey's 1896 staffs and Dr. Kantor are all greatly
Reflex Arc paper (mimeo and cassette), enjoying the experience.
(2) Excerpts from Dewey & Bentley's ***
"Knowing and the Known" (mimeo and cass- Dr. Kantor has been invited to be the
ette) , (3) Part of Kantor's paper "In Honorary Chairman at the first Mexican
defense of Stimulus-response psychology" Congress on Behavior Analysis. It will
(mimeo). He also has copies of "The meet April 8-10, 1974 at Xalapa, Vera-
Interactional Psychology of J.R. Kantor" cruz,. Mexico. His address will be "How
available in quantity^ gratis., and is Interbehavioral Psychology Related
"Interactional Psychology" (two volumes) to the Experimental Analysis of Behavior?"
for $1 each. Write Dr. Harry Mahan, Palo- ***
mar College,, San Marcos* California,,92069. The feature articles in this issue consists
*** of a response by Paul Mountjoy to the
Dr. Kantor has undertaken a sojourn of 6 article by Robert Martin in the Winter 1973
or 7 weeks at Lynchburg College in issue and a reply by Martin to Mountjoy.

Crude Data Investigative Contact Scientific Construction

 A ROSE BY ANY OTHER NAME
Paul T. Mountjoy
Western Michigan University

A response to Martin's (1973) discussion of the applicability of operant

analysis to the "complex11 behavior of the human college student in the class-
room is likely to appear to be an unnecessarily vigorous exercise in one-up-
manship. A somewhat elaborate disclaimer is s therefore, desirable. Martin has
paid his dues, done his homework, in the sense of having read those appli-
cations of operant analysis to classroom instruction which are most readily
available in the psychological literature. The purpose of this response ( which I
hesitate to dignify with the title cribbed from the Bard) is to call the attention
of this '.-pacific reading audience to recent developments in educational technology.
I am fortunate to be a colleague of a number of innovative and creative teachers,
and I merely report upon the exciting developments with which I am privileged
to be associated at Western Michigan University.
All human Intellectual activities are based upon assumptions , and Kantor
(1959) has stressed the of gymnological as opposed to cryptological
systems. In the interests of a gymnological approach I list the following assumptions.
(1) There are definite continuities between the behavior of human and non-human
organisms. A corollary is that the behavioral generalities derived from the study
of non-human organisms in an operant test chamber do have relevance to the under-
standing of" the behavior of human organisms in their everyday environment. (2) Eve-
nts are the ultimate criteria-not constructs. A corollary is that behaviorism is
scientific psychology (Kantor* 1963) and any particular scientist will use whatever
vocabulary he or she is comfortable with. At this point I' must remind my audience
that Skinner in 1938 ( p. 35) acknowledged his debt, to Kantor in a manner which he
has not since duplicated,, and that Kantor (1970) has indicated the potential of
experimental analysis for carrying out Kantor1 s own program.1 The rather convoluted
point of all this is that Interbehaviorism and Operant Analysis are quite compatibles
and that Skinner and Kantor respect each other as scientists, and also continue to
regard themselves as friends. (3) Human behavior may appear complex, as contrasted
to non-human behavior , but in actuality the continuities between human and non-human
behaviors are most compelling ( see number one above). The contrast between "complex"
human behavior and " simple" non-human behavior is assumed to be as specious as the
falsely elaborated contrast between the complexity of behavioral events and the
simplicity of physical events to which Kantor (1953) long ago drew attention. (4)
The learning events which occur in a college classroom may be analyzed within any
number of competing behavioral frameworks. However, the thinly veiled mental ism
of Rotter's ( 1954,1955,1960,1966) social learning theory confers no special advan-
tage upon analysis. The renaming of reinforcement history (or interbehavioral
history) as " expectancy" merely directs the interest of the psychologist away from
the actual historical ( and causal) events and towards inferred internal states of
the organism. The scientific disadvantages of this procedure have been documented
by Kantor for over 50 years.

During Dr. Kantor' s illness at the time of the 1968 Amen.cam Psychological Convention
at San Francisco I was asked to read the Invited Address "Scientific Psychology and
Specious Philosophy". B.F. Skinner arrived early, and despite my explanation that I
was substituting for Dr. Kantors remained to hear the paper read.
 Perhaps this is the point at which I should launch into a description of my
own evolution as a teacher since there are undoubtedly parallels in the evolution
of many other college teachers. In the beginning I was convinced that I would be an
excellent teacher because I was highly motivated to be a successful teacher. Gradu-
ally disillusionment set in, as has happened to so many others (Skinner 1948, 1968).
There are obviously many alternative adjustments which one may select when teaching
fails to provide requisite satisfactions. One such alternative is analogous to the
varied behavior exhibited by non-human organisms placed upon extinction. I am fort-
unate in that during the time I was emitting trial and error teaching behavior I
was able to observe and model upon the behavior of three innovative and successful
teachers who remain my colleagues. These individuals are Fred Keller, Dick Mallet,
and Jack Michael. All three are firmly convinced that suitable arrangements.of the
educational environment will result in higher levels of educational achievement for
all students, but the actual arrangements which they advocate vary. For the purpose
of this essay I shall emphasize the dimension upon which they exhibit most variability.
Dick Mallot utilizes " pop culture" and multi-media presentations. Jack Michael relies
heavily upon remedial lectures at which difficult points are explicated. Fred Keller
is best known for the development of Personalized Systems of Instruction (PSI), which
are student self-paced. Within these variations all three remain committed to an
operant analysis of behavior. However, none of the three is committed to a formal
operant analysis of teaching in the sense implied by Martin (1973). Instead, they
approach teaching as a technological problem in which one manipulates variables
in an attempt to achieve a practical goal of approximating 100% mastery of subject
matter rather than attempting to demonstrate functional relationships between
independent and dependent variables. In other words, we deal here with applied
psychology rather than with science in the narrow sense of hypothesis testing. Thus
any college teacher may utilize "operant" teaching technology and may at the same
time give that teehnologywhatever label is most pleasing to him.
For the remainder of this report I shall concentrate upon PSI for a number
of reasons. Among these are: PSI is used by many non-psychologists. PSI is reported
upon in a large number of publications. PSI is a flexible approach which allows
variations to suit the personal life style of the instructor. Fred Keller, the
innovator of PSI, is a charming and urbane gentleman who has devoted his life to the
improvement of college teaching; most of us can greatly improve our own instructional
proficiency by applying the principles of PSI. A new campus of the University of
Texas at Odessa is being founded upon the PSI approach. As presently planned, every
course in every department shall be taught by the "Keller Plan" (PSI) on that campus.
The following principles characterize PSI9 but obviously details have been
omitted:
1. Within limits the student is in a "free operant" or"self-paced" environment.
That is, the student schedules himself for examinations upon units when he is
prepared to take those examinations.
2. Responses which the student is expected to perform are specified in remarkable
detail by the distribution of "objectives". That is, students are instructed
toread certain pages in a book and to be prepared to perform specific response?
For example, the "objective" may instruct the student to differentiate
 between operant and respondent conditioning, or to describe systematic
desensitization, or whatever is germane to the subjet matter of the
particular course under consideration.
3. Complete mastery of each and every unit is required prior to progression
on to the next unit. Some instructors set lower levels of mastery as
satisfactory for their purposes.
4. Mastery is demonstrated by a combined written-oral examination. N.B. , the
oral portion is designed to accomplish several ends, among them the
explanation of any unsatisfactory written answer and a social interaction
between student and instructor.
5. Failure to demonstrate mastery of a unit is not taken as indicative of
failure or stupidity, but as indicative of a need for further preparation,.
That is, remedial examinations are available as necessary.
6. Students are involved in the teaching process as proctors9 etc.
7. Final examination determines the grade in the course.
Frequentlys individuals respond to descriptions of the PSI with "mickey mouse"
or even more pejorative exclamations. It seems likely that PSI is not the answer
for every teacherlet alone for every student. Nevertheless, the flexibility
available does appear to allow instructors and students alike to find their own path
to paradise or to perdition. For examples does the instructor enjoy lecturing? Excellent.
He should schedule lectures. If the instructor prefers to write out his materials
and distribute them to the class, he may do so. Or, the instructor may both lecture
and distribute his own written materials.
Members of this reading audience who are desirous of learning more about PSI
should write: Dr. John H. Hess, Junior
PSI Clearinghouse
Eastern Mennonite College
Harrisonburq, Virginia 22801
Enclosure of $1.00 will be reinforced by receipt of "PSI ( Keller Plan) Biblio-
graphy". This lists 150 published and unpublished papers on the use of behavior
theory in college instruction.
The fSJ_Jiwsjliris available gratis ( except for lack issues which must be
purchased) from: Dr. J.6. Sherman, Editor
Department of Psychology
Georgetown University
Washington, D.C. 20007
2
I am indebted to Fred Keller for many conversations, and for allowing me to peruse
eertiari unpublished materials. I remain, however, responsible for all errors in the
description of PSI herein presented.
 Two manuals (which will be found to be most useful in describing pitfalls
to be avoided) may be purchased from:
College Bookstore
200 University Street
Salt Lake Citys Utah 84112
Born, David G. IjnLMM!^ Mi^^
(1970) $6" 25. ' .
Born, David G. Prortor. Manual (1970) $2.25
Individuals who wish to explore PSI on a smaller budget will find Lewis and
Wolf's (1973) description of the application of PSI principles to Introductory
Chemistry to be most illuminating.
The present author has found PSI principles to be applicable to courses whose
enrollment is limited to advanced undergraduates and to graduate students as well
as to lower level courses in which PSI is usually implemented. In the case of the
history of psychology ( where I have taught by both conventional and PSI methods)
the advantage of the newer methodology is clear. The textbook has not changed, but
weekly quizzes ( with remediation) and written objectives have resulted in
virtually all students receiving a grade of A. In my opinion the students know more
about the history of psychology than they did when they were tested by the
conventional hourly examinations and also wrote term papers. In all honesty I must
admit that the majority of term papers were of such poor quality as to serve as ex-
tremely potent punishing stimuli and to drive me to seek a better teaching technology.
In conclusion I wish to reiterate that the events themselves are the fundamental
criterion. No matter whether one prefers the terminology of PSI or some other
terminology is irrelevent. The ethics of the situation are clear: The instructor
must teach the best course he is able to teach to all students at all times. The
conventional control group of experimental psychology is esentially unavailable
both for ethical reasons and because of the practical considerations regarding the
impossibility of meeting conventional design critera in higher educational situations.
I urge my readers to try out the modern teaching technology I have so briefly
described. With luck your department too may be criticized by your administration
for giving the grade of A to 69%^ of those undergraduates enrolled in your department!
References
Kantor, J.R. 1953. The _LoJc .of Modern Science. BloomingtonV Indiana: Principia Press.
Kantor, J.R. 1959. Ijite^behavioral Psychj3loy. Bloomington, Indiana: Principia Press.
Kantors J.R. 1963. Behaviorism: Whose image? s^hol_p^j_ca]_ Record., 13, 499-512.
Kantor, J.R. 1970. An analysis of the experimental analysis of behavior (TEAS)
Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 13,101-108.
3
.Undergraduate Grades 1966 to 1972 at Western Michigan University. Office of
Institutional Research, March 1973.
Lewis 9 O.K. and Wolf, W. A. 1973. Implementation of self-paced learning ( Keller method)
in a first year course. jJpjurn_a]_ erf ^Jin]Jal Idjuart1_on_., 50 , 51-56.

Martin, R.F. 1973. Toward conceptualization of learning processes in the college

classroom III: Operant psychology and Rotter's social learning theory as a
basis for research. JQ]Jtej^bjli_a^j_oj^Q_ sj|^]i]j^ ^ewsjjtter, 4 (1), 2-19.

Rotter, J.B. 1954. .Socuf[ MlX!ling_jM. ^llnJ^M. fiy!}lP-9y' Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall.

Rotter, J.B. 1955. The role of the psychological situation in determining the
direction of human behavior. In M. R. Jones (Ed.) JJhe Njb_ra_sj<a_ I^JJP^IUJILJJI
MpJJj\/aJJkm_, Lincolon: University of Nebraska Press. Pp. 245-269.
Rotter, J.B. 1960. Some implications of a social learning theory for the prediction
of goal directed behavior from testing procedures. s^hj)J_pjjjMl___rjejn^wJ 67 ,
301-316.

Rotter, J.B. 1966 Generalized 'expectancies for internal versus external control of
reinforcement. P^ch]_PJliI I^Q^SIMbA' 80, ( 1, Who.Te No. 609).
Skinner, B.F. 1938. The_ Beha,yj_or of Orgair[sms_. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.

Skinner, B.F. 1948. Walden H.. New York: Macmillan.

Skinner 9 B.F. 1968. JJie ,Ijh]loloy_ f IeahJH9.' New York: Appleton-Century-Oofts.

 But There Are Roses and There Are Roses
Robert F. Martin
University of Denver

Through the Kindness of Dr. Smith I was able to read'Dr.Mountjoy's reply to

my paper which appeared in this journal ( Martins 1973). I found the reply to be
helpful because it summarized an''obscure literature on teaching. I am.familiar with
this literature, and, in fact, have a paper listed in Dr. Mess's Bibliography, I also*
found DP. Mountjoy's report insightful for the development of a new teacher, which
I am. I, too, do not wish to engage in " one-up-manship," but there are three sub-
stantive points which I wish to draw.
Even with thehighly innovative instructors practicing PSI or other classroom
applications of operant technology, two bits of data aopear in nearly every report:
course withdrawals occur and at the rate above " regular "courses'9 and students still
fail to meet criteria of mastery. Why were there only 69% Aggrades in Dr. Mountjoy's
classes? These observations suggest to me that history of reinforcement and current
contingencies vary so greatly between students that some effort must be made to
assess these " where it's at" for the individual student.
This need for current assessment leads, I argue, to a non-historic approach
such as Rotter's (1955) social learning theory (SLT). " Expectancy," I still argue,
yields potentially more for the instructor's classroom use than generally manipulated
reinforcers, such as grades. People behave as if certain contingencies are operating
amd these may not be the same as teacher-controlled contingencies. The literature
to support this position is difficult to characterize, but consider the " non-learners'
in research like Levine's (1971) work.
Finally, Mountjoy's implication that the complexity of college classroom
behavior is readily subject to operant technology is contradicted by his statement
that, " The conventional control group of experimental psychology is essentially
unavailable both for ethical resons and because of the practical considerations
regarding the impossibility of meeting conventional design criteria in higher
educational situations." A point I made in my paper.
I have argued the complementarity of operant psychology and Rotter's SLT
and would extend this to Kantor's ( 1970) approach. I am also in basic agreement with
PSI and other operant applications to higher education. As an aspiring college teacher,
I amy be so naive as to believe that this approach may be improved by borrowing from
work such as Rotter's. The conceptual compatibility of these disparate developments
of psychology has been demonstrated, I hope, in my paper.
 References

Kantor s J. R, ) Aruanalysis of the experimental analysis of behavior (TEAB).

.of. J-lli L iEll!!!MtaI JiDJlllsj^ f Miajin^T , 1970, 13, 101-108.
Levine 9 M. Hypothesis theory and nonlearning despite ideal S-~R reinforcement
contingencies. s^chiojpjj^l__jevj^w9 1971, 78 9 130-140.

Martin, R.F. Toward conceptualization of learning processes in the college classroom

III: Operant psychology and Rotter's social learning theory as a basis for research.
5 4 S 2-19..

Rotter, J. B. The role of the psychological situation in determining the direction

of human behavior. In. M. R. Jones ( Ed.), JJhe Nebas_ka ^yjip^slum cm Jiojtrvatijon,
1955. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1955. Pp. 245-269.
 Noel W. Smith, Editor Preceding

Facility of Social Sciences

Selling factors

IM
Stimulus Object
S'lTW
on

Volume 5
MTERBEHAVIORAL Number 1
PSYCHOLOGY Winter 1974

NEWSLETTER
State University College of Arts and Science, Pittsburgh, New York

.... If you start with the assumption that whatever the world is made of
must be inherently inert, you then have to go ahead and guess that it
changes only as force is applied to it. Here you are, saddled with two
distinct constructs; objects, and the force that makes them move. As
long as you are a materialistand nearly everybody is in spite of what
he says there is not much you can do except think in terms of primary
objects, such as the atoms of Democritus, being pushed around by secon-
dary forces. Apply this basic thinking to physiology, and you have the
notion.* a body being actuated by energy; apply it to psychology, and you
come up with the notion of a person either being propelled by motives
in spite of himself, or stuck tight in his fundament. . . Suppose we be-
gan by assuming that the fundamental thing about life is that it goes on.
It isn't that something makes it go on; the going on is. the thing itself..
It isn't that motives mak.e man come alert and do things; his alertness is
an aspect of his very being. Talking about activating motives is simply
redundant taIky-talk, for once you've got a human being on your hands, you
already have alertness and movement, and sometimes a lot more of it than
you know what to make of. There is another habit of thinking that Western
Man more or less fell into fortuitously. As long as he was assuming that
human beings are propelled by motives, it seemed reasonable to imagine al-
so that the motives give direction to the movement; if they push, they
must push in some direction. Now if we could only find out what is push-
ing, we could predict where everybody is going, as well as how soon he
would get there. So for two thousand years we have been looking for the
thing that is doing the pushing, and often trying to define it by the di-
rections it pushes. We haven't found it yet; naturally, we haven t found
it, but during the centuries we have built up a tremendous lexicon of push
and pull terms. Even our language has fallen heir to the design of our
quest, and we have committed ourselves to a grammar of motives that con-
trols our speech and channels our thinking about human behavior. Now we
can scarcely say anything about what a person had done, or is about to do,
without: using a language form that implies that he has been pushed into
it. We are even inclined to think that way about our own behavior, and
when we do, it usually means we are in trouble.

--George Kelley in Nebraska Syjnjgosium on Mcvtrvation, 1962.

<Chjdet>ata ,;.-/ - ^, , Investigative Contact Scientific Construction
 THE AGORA

The quotation from George Kelley is one of those admirable statements where
the author's own works do not follow his best precepts.

Two recent articles have appeared that suggest the importance of considering
the field or context in psychological situations. James R. Averill writes in the
Psjhoj.ogica 1 Bulletin, 19 73 , 80, 286-303 under the title "Personal Control Over
Aversive Stimuli and Its Relation to Stress" that conditions of stress and the ex-
tent to which the individual can control it "depend upon such factors as the na-
ture of the response and the context in which it is embedded and not jist upon its
effectiveness in preventing or mitigating the impact of a potentially harmful
stimulus." They also depend "upon the meaning of the control response for the in-
dividual; and what lends a response meaning is largely the context in which it is
embedded." Donald N. Bersoff in "Silk Purses Into Sows' Ears: The Decline of Psy-
chological Testing and a Suggestion for its Redemption," Amer_ic_a_n
1973, 28, 892-899, recommends that the usual artificial test arrangement be re-
placed by "psychosituation assessment" where "the aim is to 'contextualize1 be-
havior and discover what Fischer called the whe n /when - not_s of specific behavior.
In the classroom, both the child's behavior and that of the teacher are carefully
assessed before any changes in the instructional environments are made. The
child and his teacher 'co-constitute* this instructional environment, interacting
to evoke behavior in the other. Any assessment procedure that isolates the tar-
get person from the significant others who participate in his behavior can be
considered, at the very least, incomplete, and, at the most, unethical."

In a chapter on "Hypnotism and Surgical Pain" by J. F. Chaves & T. X. Bar-

ber in a new book by Barber, Spanos, and Chaves ('HYPNOSIS,' DIRECTED IMAGINING
AND HUMAN CAPABILITIES, N.Y. : Pergamon Press, in press, chapter 8) the authors
stress that surgical pain is primarily limited to outer tissues and that with a
local skin anesthetic along with low anxiety, positive expectations of minimal
pain, a>nd active imagining of insensitivity, surgical pain can be tolerated by
some individuals. These conditions are those used in hypnotic surgery and are
essentially the conditions of acupuncture surgery as well. The same authors
consider acupuncture surgery in more detail in Medfield Foundation Report #128:
"Acupuncture Analgesia: A Six~Factor Theory." These factors are "(a) the pa-
tients who are accepted for surgery with acupuncture strongly believe in its ef-
ficiency and are not fearful or anxious; (b) with few exceptions, narcotic anal-
gesics, local anesthetics, and sedatives were also used, singly or in combina-
tion, during surgery with acupuncture; . . . (c) the pain normally associated with
many surgical procedures is less than is generally assumed. .. (d) the patients are
typically exposed to special preparation and indoctrination for several days prior
to surgery, (e) the acupuncture needles distract the patients from the pain of
surgery, and (f) suggestions for pain relief are present in the acupuncture sit-
uation." They describe the Chinese Yin-Yang meridian theory and observe that
some Chinese surgeons disregard the traditional meridian locations and put the
needles anywhere. They find the neural gate theory equally unsatisfactory. This
theory fails because ( 1) the gate is a hypothetical entity having no observable
referent, (2) some of the acupuncture locations such as ear or head could not
close the spinal gate and would require postulation of still additional gates,
(3' It cannot account for failures, (4) it cannot account for the necessity of be-
lief la the efficacy of the needles, (5) it cannot account for the requirement of
localized anesthetics. By contrast, Ronald Melzack ("How Acupuncture Can Block
Pain," Impjacj; f ScJ.ence_ cm Soc_ietjs 1.973, 65-75) argues the traditionalist ap-
proach. He supports the gate theory as well as hypothesizing neural arrangements
that might give support to the Yin-Yang theory. He rejects hypnosis by assuming
the traditional trance notion and other discredited concepts about it. Ironical-
ly, he describes the importance of low anxiety and the probable role of suggestion
in a manner that approaches the account givenby Chaves and Barber. The view that
hypnosis is a mysterious and paranormal state rather than "DIRECTED IMAGINING" is
a tenacious one.

Among Bob Lundin's several books that incorporate an interbehavioral approach

is the new second edition of PERSONALITY: A BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS, Macmillan Co.,
1974.

The author of the feature article in this issue is a graduate student at

State University of New York at Plattsburgh. In the next issue we will also car-
ry an article on motivation by a graduate student.
 B. F. Skinner on Motivation: a Critique

Cynthia J. LaShier

B. F. Skinner never really said what he thought "drive" was. In 1938 he al-
lotted "drive" a whole chapter of heavy reading in experimental procedures and
charts, typical of The Behavior, o_f_ Orgaru.sms_. In 1953 the chapter heading "Drive"
did not appear. Rather, it had become "Deprivation and Satiation^" which was
much more appropriate to Skinner's operational approach in both The Behavior. f_
Organisms. (1938) and .ScjLencje and_ Hujnan jSehjrvlor (1953) . The earlier work is val-
uable as experimental report and as a basic statement of Skinner's position, the
latter as a readable digest of Skinnerfs system. In 1938 Skinner's concern was
statement and method; in 1953 it was interrelationship.

I3rive in 1938

Skinner's main purpose in 1938 was to demonstrate the usefulness of the re-
sponse as the "proper study of organism-kind" as the behaviorist saw it. From
the vantage point of the response-observer. Skinner began his discourse on the na-
ture of drive with the following inferential statement:

"The problem of drive arises because much of the behavior of an organism

shows an apparent variability, A rat does not always respond to food
placed before it, and a factor called its 'hunger* is invoked by way of
explanation. The rat is said to eat only when it is hungry. It is be-
cause eating is not inevitable that we are led to hypothesize an inter-
nal state to which we may assign the variability... As in any case of
variability in reflex strength, tha problem here is to find the variable
or variables of which the strength is a function and to express the re-
lationship in a set of laws." (1938, pp. 341-342.)

The inference is that response variability indicates the existence of some

cause of it. The use of the word "cause" was anathema to Skinner, but the best
he could do with "drive" at that time was to hypothesize an equivalent to an in-
tervening variable, which he preferred to call an "internal state." Although the
behaviorist strenuously objects (and Skinner not the least of them) to interven-
ing, immeasurable unobservables, Skinner did not seem at all uncomfortable with
"drive." The proof of its existence is, as he said, reflected in response var-
iability. In any case, "internal state" is a vague term for a behaviorist to be
using. His ultimate purpose was to include it, thereby legitimizing it, in a
set of behavioral laws.

Step one toward legitimization was the use of operational definition. Drive
level was a function of deprivation, expressed in number of hours. The drives
Skinner investigated were hunger and thirst; his subjects were rats. But he did
not call his studies investigations into "hunger drives" or "thirst drives" be-
cause he refused to speak of kinds of classifications of drives. All-important
were the effects of deprivations on the organisms*s response patterns; naming
the "drives" was not only irrelevant, but meaningless.

Skinner's "reflex strength" was close kin to Hull's "habit strength" in that
it was a result of conditioning, i.e., it is the learned component of performance.
The other component, also parallel to Hull's, was drive. In his two chapters on
drive in The Behavior. o_f Orga_nisms_, Skinner presents experimental evidence to sup-
port his multiplicative theory of performance, and comes to just about the same
conclusion as Hull. What he did was to observe the effect of different levels of
drive (deprivation hours) on instrumental learning, or operant behavior. The rat,
depending on how "hungry" (with apologies to Dr. Skinner) he was, was to press the
lever or perform some other task in order to receive a reward, or reinforcement.
The reinforcer was what, in ordinary operant conditioning, more or less assured that
learning would take place. Learning was measured in "reflex strength," assuming the
reinforcer really did increase the probabilityc a given response. To measure re-
flex strength or "learning," Skinner used the ingenious method of resistance to ex-
tinction. The more responses to "complete" extinction, the more the reflex strength.

It was probably Skinner's definition of "positive reinforcer" that helped lead

him to a rapid conclusion on the nature of drive. If the reader recalls, a "positive"
reinforcer is anything following a response which increases the probability of that
response's recurrence the next time the same or similar stimulus conditions are pres-
ent. If a positive reinforcer is really reinforcing, then it follows that a food-
deprived rat should show no significantly different level of reflex strength from
any other non-deprived rat, IF drive has no effect. It was no surprise to anyone
that Skinner found that, indeed, drive did have a tremendous effect on performance.
However, he also found that number of responses to extinction did not significantly
differ from deprived to non-deprived groups. He concluded, logically enough, that
drive had no effect on learning. Hull came to the same conclusions.

Drive j.n 1953,

By 1953 Skinner's attempt to pinpoint the nature of drive yielded both more pre-
cise and more vague phraseology. As was noted earlier, "drive" had now become "de-
privation and satiation," indicating his distaste for an all-inclusive concept. Of
"drive," he said, "The term is simply a convenient way of referring to the effects
of deprivation and satiation and of other operations which alter the probability of
behavior in more or less the same way." (1953, p. 144).

Further, drive was no longer a "state." It was "... a verbal device with which
we account for a sjtatei of strength, a nd it cannot answer experimental questions"
(1953, p. 144) femphasis mine]. It was now something (but not an entity) which helped
account for a "state," that state being learning. One gets the impression that Skin-
ner at this point had abandoned hopes of compromising drive and reinforcement and had
decided to concentrate wholly on reinforcement as essential to both learning and per-
formance. He seems to cling to drive as one answer to the response variability prob-
lem and, more specifically, as an answer to the behavior of individuals and their re-
sponses at any given time. In fact, he seems to have come around to the point Hull
did when Hull came upon his "oscillation" idea. It is an explanatory concept of the
last-ditch-effort type which is used in a mild state of conceptual desperation. In
any case. Skinner's frustration with the concept is obvious. He says, "No concept
can eliminate an actual diversity of data" (1953, p. 144), and he admits (see above)
that "it cannot answer experimental questions."

No, drive was neither physiological nor psychic state, nor was it a stimulus.
Nor could it be simply a state of strength. No, he said, "The prossibility remains
that the strength of the behavior is due to other kinds of variables not in thefield
of motivation." (1953, p.146). Drive is not the only source of behavioral variabil-
ity.

Having failed to solve the problem, Skinner resorts again to deprivation-as-

drive, which is inferred from "unexplained changes in probability." Unfortunately,
that which is inferred from these changes is also used to account for them. Such a
flaw in reasoning is an error of circularity and was not detected by Skinner, who
went on to address the question of categorization of drives in the following manner:
"Our question thus becomes: How many kinds of behavior vary in strength independent-
ly of each other?" (1953, p. 149)

Though lacking the formality of Clark Hull, Skinner approached the interaction
of learning and drive in a Hullian way--by using the reinforcing properties ofstimuli
which are drive-related. He would never have dared to call it drive-reduction or even
drive-stimulus reduction and avoided at all costs the mention of "goal." Other than
these omissions of what Skinner believed to be meaningless terminology, his theory is
very near Hull's and not so far from Tolman's. An example given in the text proceeds
as follows:

"The behavior of going to a restaurant is composed of a sequence of

responses, early members of which (for example, going along a certain
street) are reinforced by the appearance of discriminative stimuli which
cnntrol later responses (the appearance of the restaurant, which we then
enter) . The whole sequence is ultimately reinforced by food, and the
probability varies with food deprivation. We increase the chances that
sxneone will go to a restaurant, or even walk along a particular street,
by making him hungry." (1953, p. 150).

Skinner's emphasis here is on the probability of a given response, which leaves

us no alternative but to classify him under "Pure Behaviorists. " The influence of
Hull, however, is noticeable in Skinner's new inclusion of behavior-reinforcing
stimuli. And, though the implication of goal-direction is plain, in deference to
the "pure behaviorist" we shall not belabor the point. He concludes, as in 1938,
that "Behavior which has been strengthened by a conditioned reinforcer varies with
the deprivation appropriate to the primary reinforcer." (1953, p. 150)

Skinner launches into a discussion of "generalized reinforcers :" attention, ap-

proval, affection, and domination. He says these cannot be drives because they do
not show results of the appropriate operations of deprivation and satiation. Here
again we see the difference between the behaviorist and most motivation theorists.
Whereas the latter would describe attention and approval in terms of needs and secon-
dary drives attained by reinforcement, Skinner maintains that they themselves are re-
inforcers .

s Negative Rei_nforcemejit, and Punishment

Emotion: 1953

Skinner attacks the problem of "emotion" in much the same way as he did drive--
by looking for variables of which emotions are functions.

"We define an emotioninsofar as we wish to do so-*as a par-

ticular state of strength or weakness in one or more responses induced
by any one of a class of operations." (1953, p. 166)

"The behavior observed during an emotion is not to be con-

fused with the emotion as a hypothetical 'state'." (1953, p. 168)

As with drive, the proper subject matter inthe study of emotion is (1) the behav
ior and (2) the manipulable conditions for it. Also, as with drive, its "state" is
neither physiological nor psychic, nor is it a cause.
 The relationship of emotion to drive is cousin-like. Behaviorally, an "extreme
deprivation probably acts as an emotional operation." (1953, p. 165)

Working with everyday words like "anger" and "sadness," Skinner discards them as
colloquial at best, but fails himself in his attempt to discover any really reliable
scientific definition of them. In this author's opinion, the fact that he worked with
them at all indicates that this is not the purely behavioristic Skinner of 1938.

Negative Rejjlforcement_; Avoida_ne

The confusion of negative reinforcement with punishment is well-documented. In

Skinner's negative reinforcement, withdrawal of the aversive stimulus increases the
probability of that response's recurrence under the same conditions.

Until 1953 Skinner managed to avoid any notion of drive-reduction. Even then,
he would have managed to avoid it altogether, were it not for his chapter on avoid-
ance learning. The following quotation suggests that, even enlisting the aid of con-
ditioned negative reinforcement, he just couldn't get around it any other way.

"in avoidance the conditioned and unconditioned aversive stimuli

are separated by an appreciable interval of time... A rapidly approaching
object rec_edes. painful contact. The sputter of the fuse rec_ed_es_ the ex-
plosion of the firecracker... When stimuli occur in this order, the first
stimulus becomes a conditioned negative reinforcer, and henceforth any ac-
tion which reduces it is strengthened through operant conditioning." (1953,
p. 176)

The key to the diminution of the conditioned stimulus is the diminution of

"anxiety," another concept Skinner has trouble putting his finger on. It is "... a
violent emotional reaction which is characteristic of all stimuli leading to avoid-
ance behavior." (1953, p. 178) Anxiety is an aversive emotion from which the or-
ganism attempts to escape and is, therefore, a necessary component of avoidance be-
havior. Without anxiety, the organism would probably not learn an avoidance prob-
lem.

The point to be stressed here is Skinner's involvement with immeasurable, unob-

servable concepts inferrable only by their effects on behavior. None of these is op-
erationally defined for any reliably accurate detection, nor are any characterized in
enough detail to differentiate among them. Skinner is an inductive theorist, but he
seems to be engaging in sloppy practice. Common to these aforementioned concepts is
their dependence on the "controlling environment" for stimulus cues by which the be-
haviors (the concepts) are supposedly characterized.

PujiLshment_

Punishment is described as "withdrawing a positive reinforcer or presenting a

negative." (1953, p. 185) The possible effects of punishment are three: (1) it
elicits responses incompatible with the punished behavior and suppresses it, (2) it
supplies its own aversive stimuli on later occasions, and thus interferes with the
punished behavioral act, and (3) most importantly, "If a given response is followed
by an aversive stimulus... any behavior which reduces this conditioned aversive stim-
ulation will be reinforced." (1953S p. 188, 189)

Note again the use of stimulus reduction as reinforcement. No mention is made

of drive; only of aversive stimuli. There is no goal stimulus involved, but there
are hints of persisting stimulus traces.
 It is often mentioned that Skinner's position on punishment is similar to Thorn-
dike's in that punishment temporarily suppresses the response but does not permanent-
ly weaken it. This position has before and since received much experimental support.

Drive in 1966
In his Preface to the seventh printing of The Behavior^ of_ Pjrgjmisms_ in 1966 Skin-
ner acknowledged that his interpretation of "drive" as a third variable (first and
second are stimulus and response) was in error. Comparing his own usage of the con-
cept as a means of reference to environmental variables with Tolman's usage of it as
a full-fledged intervening, cognition-filled variable, Skinner criticized both Tol-
man's and Hull's preoccupation with internal states (see p. xi).

His "drive" of 1938, the reader will recall, consisted of carefully calculated
deprivation and satiation. By 1953, "drive" was an amorphous concept that often was
related to and included emotion, anxiety, and punishment. Consequently, the status
of "drive" as an operationally defined variable had become rather cloudy. Skinner
had, though, for many years stuck to his conclusion that some third variable must
necessarily be inferred whenever behavior (i.e., response) varied under externally
constant conditions. Now in 1966 Skinner admitted, of the concept "drive" that
"J. R. Kantor eventually convinced me of its dangers" (p. x). All mediating con-
cepts of S-R theories, he was to argue, suffer from such dangers, one of the most
lethal of which is that they can "serve no other function than to account for fail-
ure to relate the objective terminal events in a meaningful way" (p. xii). One might
state the problem more directly: mediating concepts are simply not operationally de-
finable either (1) in terms of stimulus and/or response or (2) in their own right.

At this juncture Skinner disassociated his Behavior of_ Oranlsins_ from the S-R
tradition, ostensibly because he believed stimulus, response, and reinforcer were
quite sufficient to "account for attending, remembering, learning, forgetting, gen-
eralizing, abstracting, and many other so-called cognitive processes" (p. xii). He
considers S + R + reinforcer inclusive of all relevant^ input and output, so that
"there is no need to appeal to an inner apparatus, whether mental, physiological,
or conceptual" (p. xii). Deprivation and satiation are relegated to a sort of peas-
antlike relationship of fealty to the "reinforcer" element of the basic triad.

Less ostensibly, but far more basically, Skinner pounds home what one is bound
to read between the lines of his Preface of 1966: "...Nor are mediating concepts
observable." For Skinner, input and output ought to be real data. Obviously, what
is unobservable cannot be real data.

What we see here is a full circular evolution of an interpretation of "drive," a

return to the old spawning ground. It was asif the old operational definition of 1938
had taken a swing at its perpetrator "to bring him back to his senses."

Perhaps the greatest difference between Skinner's attitude toward operationally

defined "drive" in 1938 and that in 1966 was that in 1938 Skinner intended to use sit-
uation-specific operational definitions of drive (i.e., degree of satiation arid hours
of deprivation) as a means to an end, that end being a scientific grasp of the real
roots of drive-in-general and a common meaning of the term, which might still permit
classification of types of drives. By 1966 Skinner had realized that there was to
be no common real root nor a drive-in-general and that his original approach in its
simplest form had been a correct one. The true sceintist was to define variables
concretely, specifically, and operationally. This is theon.ly_ way for the behaviorist
to approach accuracy in prediction, measurement, and experimental control. Once
again, Skinner had become the purist.
 Skinner's position on reinforcements his methods, his operational definitions
have become litany to the contemporary behaviorist. Operational definitions provide
their own inherent methodology and are self-perpetuating. Their usefulness lies in
their purpose: meaningful observations and measurements. Skinner's system in 1938
was based on observation and measurement and his chapters on drive are methodologi-
cal and observational reports. Drive in 1938 was operationally defined as a func-
tion of deprivation. By 1953 Skinner seems to have beencaught up in the quest of
his contemporaries for the ultimate word on drive, emotion, avoidance, and punish-
ment. He was best prepared to handle drive, but his method and means of attack on
the other three problems (with the possible exception of punishment) were non-behavior-
istic, Thevariables of which such concepts were supposedly functions were vaguely
defined and observable only by inference and induction. Perhaps the "Behaviorist's
behaviorist" felt obligated to make a stab at these concepts, for the sake of Behav-
iorism, in answer to chiding from less "scientific" thinkers. If so, the challenge
was, in this author's humble opinion, poorly met.

The other, more plausible interpretation of Skinner's approach to motivational

theory is that he intended merely to represent the pervasiveness of the role of rein-
forcement and that ideas expressed in his motivation chapters are a means to that end.
Correspondingly, they were not to be taken as "'My Ultimate Word on Motivation1 by
B. F. Skinner." The Preface to the 1966 printing of The Behavior of_ Organisms seems
to confirm this. It is a reaffirmation of the original Skinnerian purpose: observa-
bility and predictability in the simplest, most elemental form possible. With that
reaffirmation and an alleged mending of his ways, Skinner abandoned further pursuit
of "drive" altogether, and returned to a behavioristic purism of observable, measur-
able, controllable stimulus, response and reinforcer.

Mediating variables are presumed by some to haw suffered, great losses in his wake.
*'Rescue"operations are in effect, however, under the supervision of those parties.

References

Skinner, B. F. The Beha_vio_r of_ Oj^gajilsms.: An Experimenta 1 Analysj.^. New York:

Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1938.

Skinner, B. F. The Behayi^or ojf Or_g_ajndsms_: A_n Experimental A_nj|J,_yjSJLs_, 7th printing.
New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1966. (Orig. 1938)

Skinner, B. F. S_cjjenc_e and Human Behavj.gir. New York: Macmillan, 1953.

 10

Itfc widely held that a stimulus event, for example, a toucher vocalization or
some combination, is often treated as if it carries the same meaning regardless of
context. We maintain that this is not necessarily true, and that it is necessary to
study the contextual or situational setting as well as behavioral events themselves.
Thuss a stimulus event may change its meaning for both infant and caregiver, depend-
ing on the situation. A simple example may suffice. The infant cries--in one case it
has just been fed, in the other it is feeding time. The caregiver, through context-
ual cues, realizes that in the former case the infant is in need of a burp, while in
the latter the infant is hungry. The behavior of the infant is the same, but the
meaning of the behavior is quite different. Interestingly, comparable examples of a
caregiver's behavior are not as easily found. For example, a caregiver may pick up
an infant because she thinks the infant wants to be held, whereas another time the
caregiver picks up the infant because she wants to hold it. At issue then is the
meaning of behavior. One way this can be explored is to observe given behaviors in
given contextual situations. Parenthetically, it might be mentioned that context
may be very important for a developing organism. The infant may utilize behavior-
context situations to learn meaning.

^-Michael Lewis & Leonard A. Rosenblum: THE EFFECT OF THE INFANT ON ITS CAREGIVER,
Wiley, 1974, p. xxii.
 Noel W. Smith, Editor F I E L D Preceding

Faculty of Socia! Sciences Segment

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Organism
Response i
Function j
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investigator 1 ^j^ f

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Stimulus
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Vo lume 5
PSYCHOLOGY Number i
Spring 1974

NEWSLETTER
State University College of Arts and Science, Plattsburgh, New York

The nub of the problem, I believe, lies in the following observation:

Psychologists and nonpsychologists invent and use motivational terms in the
same situations for the same purposes or reasons. They apply movational
terms to describe and ejcpj-^in the conduct of animals --human or otherwise.
Certain aspects or properties of behavior are called motivational in contrast
to others which are grouped and labeled by other words. The psychologist
(and the nonpsychologists too) tries to formulate the uniform and essen-
tial characteristics or properties of motivational phenomena. He attempts
to discover their mode of operation and their causal history and consequen-
ces. He especially tries to relate motivational phenomena and what he knows
of them to nonmotivational phenomena so that he can reach his objective of
explaining and predicting the conduct of organisms. In order to do this
properly he should be able to distinguish between motivational and nonmoti-
vational phenomena explicitly. So far, he has not been able to do this.

R. A. Littman in liebjrask
Symposium on Motivation, J[9J:>8_

The Agora

The following back issues of the dentiality of Social Science Re-

Newsletter are still available and search Sources and Data." This
will be sent gratis upon request: study developed as a result of
Vol. 1, Nr. 1, 2, 3, 4; Vol. 2, Nr. the imprisonment of Prof. Pop-
4; Vol. 3, Nr. 2, 4; Vol. 4, Nr. 2. kins ofHarvard for his refusal
to answer questions regarding
the publication of the Pentagon
papers. He had obtained infor-
The Newsletter has received a re- mation from confidential sources
quest to publish "Request for in- during his research on Vietnam and
formation: A Study of the Confi- refused to answer on the grounds

Data investigative Contact Scientific Construction

 2~

of the First Amendent and the failure of the government to show that his infor-
mation was relevant and necessary to the government investigation. To quote
from John Carroll's "Confidentiality of Social Science Research Courses and
Data: The Popkins Case," Political Science, 1973,6(3): "In the past scholars
believed that they were able to assure sources of anonymity because the release
of any information gained was deemed to be solely within the scholar's discre-
tion. Recently, however, with increasing number,, prosecutors, congressional
committees and grand juries have become interested in the sources of scholarly
research. As in the instant case these bodies have asserted the right to in-
quire completely into a scholar's sources of information. Notes have been sub-
poenaed and scholars questioned as to their research. As a result, scholars
carrying out their research are no longer secure in the belief that research
material provided them in confidence will be free from pressure of court-ordered
d i s c l o s u r e at a future point and as such are impaired in the collection of re-
search data. The problem has been aggravated by the widespread publicity given
to the instant case. Until limits of public inquiry are authoritatively settled
by this Court, scholars cannot be certain of what protection, if any, they can
assure their sources, and sources cannot predict the possible repercussions of
cooperation in furnishing information. The resulting uncertainty impinges up-
on normal scholarly inquiry and inhibits research into many social and behav-
ioral problems most in need of immediate research and enlightenment...Amici
support the position that before requiring a scholar to testify or furnish
documents, a court should balance the interest of the inquiring agency again-
st the First Amendment rights of the scholar." While psychologists are not
often involved in gathering data of a political nature, they often do solicit
information of a personal nature where the respondent is assured of anonymity.
Popkins has received support from a wide variety of professional organizations.
The Carroll article is recommended for a detailed account of the case and its
implications for research.

kickirfc

The feature article is by Steven Johnson and was written when he was working on
a Master of Arts in experimental psychology. He has now completed the degree
and is looking for a Ph.D. program.
 The Springs of Action: A Fountain of Youth?

Steven L. Johnson

The approaches to the area of psychology called motivation are as diverse

as are the behaviors psychologists choose to study. Motivation has run the gamut
from learned drives to instinct to setting conditions to physiological needs and
has come out as a tattered, but still lively topic in psychology. Littman (1958)
proposes motivation as the category under which are subsumed the actives of psy-
chology. By this Littman means anything which does something to some other thing.
The definition of "actives" contrasts with "passives" in that passives are those
things which have something done to them. He, and Madsen (1968, p. 46) also, sug-
gest that motivation is categorized by those things and events which activate, di-
rect, and make persistent the behavior of an organism. Undoubtedly these 'Hefini-
tionsslof motivation include disparate topics in psychology and are not specific
enough or limited enough to easily distinguish motivated and non-motivated behav-
ior. However, more specific types of motivators (drives, incentives, physiological
needs, etc.) lack the generality to encompass the whole of what is meant by motiva-
tion. : .

Perhaps the problem of defining motivation is capsulized in the principle of

Gestalt Psychology--the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. Perhaps, on the
other hand, motivation is a vapid area which has no real parts to be summed. The
latter statement seems to paraphrase Littman's (1958) conclusions about motivation.
He explicitly states that there is "...no hope for a master schema that will encom-
pass all motivational phenomena."

What is the goal of motivational psychology? Surely, it must be the same as

the goal of all psychology (and generally all science) to explain and predict be-
havior. This is essentially answering the question: how does behavior occur? It
is a description of the events which cause another event to occur. Once a complete
system of the interrelations of types of events which invariably precede or are pre-
ceded by other events can be constructed one is able to account, for any action which
occurs and to predict the subsequent events. The goal of science is then leached.

To ask for the reason for an action one either wants the mechanism of action
(how something works) or what initiates the action, (why it works). At low levels of
understanding the answer to why (what initiates) is often meaningless since to name
an initiator is of little aid in comprehending an activity unless the events which
are being started are understood. To say a man engages in friendly behavior due to
some force (need, drive, instinct) means little unless one understands the particu-
lar relationship of the events prior to a display of friendliness and the actions
during the display. If the interrelations are understood, speaking of the "force"
which initiates the behavior (the set of prior and current conditions) has meaning
as a summary of a set of generally correlated behaviors. It a s s u m e s the begin-
ning of an episode (activation) and t h a t the episode will continue in a certain
manner (direction) until the force is removed (persistence).

Motivation theorists are often attempting to use a descriptive term (a moti-

vating force) to describe the initiating conditions of a certain class of behaviors.
The question of the usefulness of the concept of motivation becomes relative to
the degree of understanding of the behaviors which are being initiated. To say
 -4-

that a person eats due to hunger motivation simply means that hunger (deprivation
of food for a period of time) is correlated with eating. Nothing more is added to
an understanding of eating behavior than is added to an understanding of electric-
ical incandescence by the correlation of a switch position and a light bulb light-
ing.

The diversity of activities, behaviors and experimental methodologies sub-

sumed under the term motivation may well be due to an attempt of psychologists to
study both the "how" (the isolation of objective correlates of behavior) and the
"why" (the classification of groups of major correlates of behavior) questions con-
cerning the behavior of organisms simultaneously. It seems that many of the the-
ories of motivation discussed in psychology are concerned with trying to locate
the springs of action of behavior before the behaviors themselves are understood.
That is, psychologists tend at times to postulate motivating forces rather than
understanding the behaviors themselves.

He hedonistic theory of P. T. Young (1959) is a motivation theory which pos-

tulates principles of action which ultimately jjjojjld^ allow one to explain almost
any series of behaviors. Young's theory assumes the existence of affective pro-
cesses of positive and negative sign. Organisms try to maximize positive and min-
imize negative affects. This is, in Young's system, the guiding force or princi-
ple at the core of all behavior.

Young has presented empirical evidence for his hedonic theory through the
use of preference tests for various concentrations of sugar solutions (Young and
Shuford, 1954). It was found that well-fed and watered rats would run faster for
higher concentrations of sugar solution than for weaker solutions. If the ani- '
mals were presented with another concentration of sugar solution after training
with one concentration, their running speed, varied dir ectly with the change in
concentration. Because the animals were not in obvious need of nutrient or liq-
uid. Young discounts drive reduction or need reduction as the mechanism of this
change in performance. Rather, he believes the simplest accounting of the rats1
behavior is that contact with the sugar solution aroused a positive affective
process in the animals. This seems to account for the correlation of concentra-
tion of sugar solution and running speed.

Young s trengthens his case for hedonic process by reference to the work of
Olds (1955) on the effect of stimulation of areas of the brain and bar pressing
in rats. Si these studies rats were able, by pressing a bar, to deliver a pulse
of electric current to a certain area of their brains. The rate of bar pressing
varied with the area of stimulation. Stimulation of some areas produced in-
creased bar pressing, while other areas produced a reduction in the rate to zero.
Although Olds accounts for this relationship between an operant response and elec-
trical brain stimulation by reference to the reinforcing properties of the stimu-
lation, Young believes the stimulation produces a positive (negative) affective
process which sustains (inhibits) the patterns of behavior which are instrumental
in arousing the affective process.

What difference can there be between reinforcing and arousing affective pro-
cesses in this situation? The objective situation is the same, but two different
terms are being used as explanation. The difference seems to be the amount of
surplus meaning carried by the two concepts. Young opts for affective processes
which are physiological in nature and have behavioral correlates: "Whether or not
 -5-

Dr. Olds has placed his finger upon the physiological basis of affectivity remains
to be seen. Apart from this, however, some physiological basis must be assumed to
account for the facts. Affective processes exist objectively within the tissues
of organisms" (Young, 1959). Olds, on the other hand, prefers tosay the electrical
stimuation is reinforcing. That electrical brain stimulation in certain areas of
the brain will increase the probability of an instrumental response occurring. This
statement does not imply that activity in a certain region of the brain is the na-
ture of reinforcement, but only that induced activity in a certain area acts as a
reinforcing stimulus. It seems the motivation theorist Young is more willing to
physiologize than the physiological psychologist Olds. Young's tendency to reduce
psychological functioning to biological process is an attempt to find out "how"
hedonic processes work whenall that is known is that an event (positive affect,
reinforcing stimulus, satisfying state of affairs), when paired with a behavior,
tends to increase the probability of the behavior occurring again. To postulate
as Young has done is like postulatingflatthe turning of a light switch in a certain
position causes vaporous excitations to be activated in the body of a light bulb
causing the bulb to become incandescent. The statement is mechanically incorrect,
but it does express the correlation of switch position and incandescence. So, an-
alogously, Young's hedonic process may express the correlation of certain events
and behaviors, but it may do so at the expense of adding misleading surplus mean-
ing to an analysis of the total situation. It: would s,eem more appropriate to state
the correlation directly, so that the relative importance of the various components
of the situation might be more clearly seen, without a fog of hypothetical motiva-
tors .

David McClelland also proposes a modern form of hedonism as the force behind
human behavior. His theory is based on the definition of a motive as "a strong
affective association, characterized by an anticipatory goal reaction and based
on past association of certain cues with pleasure.or pain" (McClelland, 1955,
p. 226). What McClelland seems to be saying is that every motive is a product of
the associations of present cues and the probability of a change in affective
state. When an organism is in a certain affective state, and the stimulus cues in
his environment indicate that an imminent change in affective state will occur,
the organism will thei instrument behavior to either maintain the affective state,
if it is pleasureable, or change the affective state, if It. is painful. (It is
interesting to rote that, in his definition, McClelland has strung together four
concepts inferred from behavior. Thus, the definition, of motivation,, itself an
intervening variable, is based on four other intervening variables, all of which
are presumably based on the same objective response, of the organism as an indica-
tion of their operation.)

McClelland states; "The presence of a motive may be inferred either (a) in-
directly based on knowledge of past cue-affective arousal associations or (b) di-
rectly based on imaginal goal states. Our inferences under condition (a) may be
based on our direct knowledge of the particular individual we are studying (as
when we infer that the rat has acquired a hunger motive based on the associations
during habituation of being handled by the experimenter and being fed) or by the
extrapolation from the experience of other individuals (as when we infer that this
individual has a high ri Achievement in other members of his group)." And, "...
the simplest measure we can obtain of the strength of the achievement motive in a
human individual is to observe the frequency with which he thinks about achievement
as measured through Imaginative productions" (McClelland, 1953, p. 232). Undoubt-
edly, these activities measure some reatlonship(s) between individuals and their en-
vironment, but the question was to whether it is motives which can be inferred is
 -6-

dubious. Given a certain type response to several TAT cards (an instance of Mc
Clelland's simplest and most pure measure of motivation) and certain behaviors of
an individual )for example, his behavior t^nds towards competitive activities with
an. obvious standard of excellence) which are correlated with that certain type of
imaginal response, one would assume, from McClelland!s definitions, that the in-
dividual ha_s_ a high _n Achievement. According to definition this would be a valid
inference. But, might it not be just as valid, if not more exact, to say that the
individual's response to selected TAT cards reflects the general class of behaviors
in which he participates. McClelland assumes the imaginal response to the TAT
cards reflects certain affective states which are integral to the maintenance of
his behavior. It could be equally possible that a certain type of persistent be-
havior could result in TAT responses of a particular sort, without any particular
affective state directly correlated with the behavior.

Research has been completed which correlates child rearing practices and the
TAT responses from which n Achievement is inferred (McClelland, 1955). McClelland
has concluded that this correlation indicates that the child rearing models develop
n. Achievement motive in the children which leads them to respond in a certain way
on the TAT, and to tend to engage in a particular set of occupational activities
(business). It is entirely possible that these child rearing practices produce in-
dividuals who tend to engage in a particular class of behaviors which in turn tend
to produce a certain type of TAT response. Thus, the TAT response may be reflect-
ing the types of behavior in which a person will engage. But, what information is
gained from the assumption that the child rearing practices lead to the development
of a motive scheme which in turn produces a type of behavior pattern and a certain
TAT response? More efficiency could be obtained, it seems to me, if the observable
primary correlations were probed to find what other factors (or the specific factor"
which) influence behavior in addition to the child rearing practices noted by Me- l
Clelland. By postulating a motive which directs and activates behavior, rather than
assuming an active organism whose behavior is directed by past experience, a search
for the hypothetical entity of motives is begun which would seem to reduce the ef-
fectiveness of searching for the critical events, and combinations of events which
influence behavior. To say that a "rat has acquired a hunger motive based on the
associations during habituation of being handled by the experimenter and being fed"
(McClelland, 1955, p. 232) seems to be a complex and overly suggestive way of saying
that a rat tends to run faster to food, or eat faster if a certain stereotypical
behavior occurs just prior to feeding than if the events just prior to feeding are
not correlated with the receipt of food.

In summary, it might be said that although the review of these two hedonistic
theories is brief, the criticisms of Young and McClelland are general to most of
the statements which they make regarding their respective theories of motivation.
The essential nature of their propositions, I think, is expressed. Both of these
individuals have contributed significantly to the body of fact in psychology. How-
ever, the headings under which they classify their research and the inferences they
draw seem to be outside the bounds of a truly behavioral science. Their reliance
on hedonism as a source of action does not seem to be necessary to the advancement
of psychology. In fact, it may hinder the advancement of the science in that, by
postulating hedonistic motives, subsequent researchers may begin to reify the con-
cept of motivation and the search for the entity of motives may begin. As I stated
earlier, the hypothesis of a motive roe_ss_ may be useful jLf the use of a motiva-
tional term capsulizes some more microscopic analysis of behavior. As the research
of McClelland and Young stands, at this point, the use of motivational concepts do (
not infer anything more about behavior than does an objective statement of the be-
haviors which occur.
 Littman (1958) concisely states this conclusion: "So, the final moral is that
psychologists should do as they have been doing-~determine what the properties are
of the things they want to study and ascertain what their laws of interaction are.
That they also feel constrained to call what they study "motivational" should not
be construed as saying very much, if anything, else about it."

References

Littman, R. A. Motives, history and causes. In M. R. Jones (Ed.), Nebraska Sym-

jn._jira^ University of Nebraska Press, 1958.

McClelland, D. C. .Th^_acjd.eyenient_Ti mo tiye. . Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1953.

McClelland, D. C. S-tudj.es_jyLJig-tiya_tj.on. . Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955.

Madsen, K. B. Theories of motivation: a comparative study of modern theories of

mojtivatlon, 4th ed . Kent Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1968.

Olds, J. Physiological mechanisms of reward. In M. R. Jones (ed.), Nebraska sym-

:m_ji|0^ 1955. University of Nebraska Press, 1955.

Young, P. T. The role of affective processes in learning and motivation. Psycho-

logical Review. 1959, 66, 104-125.

Young, P. T. & E. H. Shuford. Intensity, duration and repetition of hedonic pro-

cesses as related to acquisition of motives. Journal of Comparative and Phy-
47
> 298-305.

"<,,<,we do not find in the literature any clear-cut distinction of a motivated

from a nonmotivated event."
J 9 R Kantors Toward & scientific analysis
of motivation. EsychoJ^gicjal^jiecordf 1942,
5, 225-275,
 REQUEST FOR INFORMATION:
A STUDY OF THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH SOURCES AND DATA

The Russell Sage Foundation is funding a study of events and problems

concerning the confidentiality of social science research sources and
data. The study will analyze such issues as the confidentiality of sur-
vey research data, and the obligation of a scholar to reveal his or her
research sources to other scholars,

The study is sponsored by the American Sociological Association, the

American Political Science Association, the American Anthropological
Association9 the American Psychological Association, and the American
Historical Association. (The Association of American Law Schools, the
Association of American Geographers, the American Economic Association,
and the American Statistical Association are considering sponsorship).

The study will begin in February, 1974, and end in December, 1975,

Individuals and organizations are invited to send to the director of the

study a statement of (1) any events of which they have knowledge that
have raised questions concerning the confidentiality of social science
research sources and data, and (2) any problems they have encountered
that have involved questions concerning the confidentiality of social
science research sources and data. The statement should specify the
time and the place and the individuals and the organizations and the
circumstances involved in the events and problems. Information provided
in response to this request will be treated as confidential unless the
individual providing the information consents to its release,,

The statements will be used by the director and project board to select
events and problems for further analysis.

Statements should be sent to the principal investigator,

James D. Carroll, Director

Public Administration Programs
200 Maxwell Hall
Syracuse University
Syracuse, New York 13210
Telephone: 315 423-2687

February 11, 1974

 Noel W. Smith, Editor F I E L D

Faculty of Social Sciences

Succeeding

Volume 5
Number 3
PSYCHOLOGY Summer 1974

NEWSLETTER
State University College of Arts and Science, Plattsburgh, New York

..when the fingers are crosseds the one object [placed between them] is felt
fy'the touch] as two; but yet we deny that it is two; for sight is more author-
itative than touch,, Yet, if touch stood alone, we should actually have pro-
nounced the one object to be two. The ground of such false judgements is that
any appearances whatever present themselves, not only when its object stimula-
tes a sense, but also when the sense by itself alone is stimulated, provided
only it be stimulated in the same manner as it is by the object. For example,
to persons sailing past, the land seems to move when it is really the eye that
is being moved by something else [the moving ship]. From this it is manifest
that the stimulatory movements based upon sensory impressions, whether the lat-
ter are derived from external objects or from causes within the body, present
themselves not only when persons are awake, but also than, when this affection
which is called sleep has come upon them, with even greater impressiveness.
Aristotle: "On Dreams"

JZJHJHJWEJH. THE AGORA

The long teaching career of Dr. Kantor
has its continuance yet today 15 years
after his retirement. In June Donna
Cone spent a period .of time with him
working on papers and gaining a more
extensive understanding of interbehav-
iorism. The enduring influence of Dr.
Kantor is indicated by the second gen-
eration of students who find great in-
spiration and remarkable freshness in
his work. Examples can be seen in the
publication of Jim Herrick ("Kantor's an-
ticipation of current approaches in an-
thropology") and of Wayne Lazar ("A com-
parison of some theoretical proposals of
J. R. Kantor and T. C. Schnierla") both
in the Spring issue of the Psvchological
Record.
##*
Jim has obtained a position at Mohawk Val-
ley Community College in Utica, New York,
while completing his dissertation for a
doctorate in anthropology at the State Un-
iversity in Albany. Wayne is in need of
a job in September and would appreciate
any leads.

Crude Data Investigative Contact Scientific Construction

Harry Mahan seems to be an inexhaustible source of inexpensive innovative teach-
ing materials of interest to interbehaviorists0 For a course in neuropsychology
he has ten tape study cassettes that include his own unpublished case materialsj
an illustrated study guide, and a textbookall for $10. He also has shortcut
procedures for the electronic calculator that he will send gratis. Write him at
the Department of Psychologyf Palomar Gollege? San Marcosf California 92060,,

The editor returned from 30 days in Greece and found greeting him in his mailbox
the summer issue of the Psychological Record with his article "The ancient back-
ground to Greek Psychology and some implications for today," Off prints are be-
ing distributed with this Newsletter* While in Athens he visited the namesake
of this column wherein are the ruins of the Stoa of Zeus where Socrates was tried
and the Stoa Poikile or Painted Stoa where Zeno began Stoicism and where other
philosophers as well liked to gather for discussions * The Painted Stoa had a
southern, exposure that made it especially attractive in the winter months. It
was in the Agora and in the vicinity of the Temple of Zeus on the other side of
Acropolis that Socrates conducted many of his discourses* A house that he
visited has also been identified. The several legendary locations said to be
his place of imprisonment during which the famous dialogue portrayed in the
Phaedo occurs vary from a cave on the side of the Acropolis to some cavities on
the nearby Hill of the Muses , They all seem to be apocryphal. The location of
Plato's Academy and Aristotle's Lyceum seem to be unknown to modern Athenians}
but research subsequent to returning indicates that they are buried under modern
city streets and buildings west of the Kerameikos (potter's quarters and entrance
to the ancient city). A number of color slides taken on the trip of Minoant My-
ceans and various stages up to Classical remains will be used in the fall to il
lustrate a bit of the first portion of a course in the history of psychology.
Outstanding in this respect are the various measures used in the Parthenon to off-
set perceptual illustions. These are incredible from the point of view of both
psychology and engineering.

Readers may be interested in the article by Endel Tulving? "Cue-Dependent For-

getting" in the January-February 1974 MSSLSJffi; iiii.' Through use of differ-
ent terminology he emphasizes the nature and function of stimulus objects in for-
getting as opposed to strictly internal determiners and even hints at a concept
of substitute stimulation. A book that may elude the notice of psychologists in-
terested in learning and intelligence is THE CULTURAL CONTEXT OF LEARNING AND THINK-
INGJ AN EXPLORATION IN CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY by Michael Colet John Gays Joseph
Glickf and Donald Sharp published by Basic Books in 19 6l. The authors' view
"denies the existence of a general deficitf denies the existence of a social pa-
thology (in the sense intended by psychologists and educators) and relies on ob-
servational and linguistic evidence to claim that the poor ^rforinance, of minor-
ity groups on psychological tests is the result of various situational factors"
(p 223)e They conclude that "cultural differences in cognition reside more in
the situations to which particular cognitive processes are applied than in the
existence of a process in one cultural group and its absence in another" (p233)

A number of reprints are available from the Psychological Record at nominal cost.
Because they may be of interest to readers either for personal use or class adop
tion, the current list is being reproduced in this issue. Write The Psychologi-
cal Record,, Denison University? Granvilles Ohio 43023,* The feature article is
 3
one given by David Miller at the 1973 Cheiron Society meeting. He is Professor
of Philosophy at the University of Texas and gave the paper on George Herbert
Maad at the symposium on "Contextual Interactionists,," The paper on Mead is
available among the reprints listed* In the present paperf the term "nrlnd" is
used centrally* It is a difficult term to use without construing it as an en-
tity or allowing it to revert to a role in historical dualism. The reader may wish
to see how it fares in this work*

Offered @ $100 each. Ten or more (assorted) @ k? discount. No handling charge

if prepaid.,
AVAILABLE REPRINTS
Contextual Interactionistss A symposium. (A group of 5 papers authored by Clar-
ence Shute, David Miller, Rollo Handy, Paul Fuller, Parker Lichtenstein)
Bijou, Sidney W e : 1. Theory & Research in Mental (Developmental) Retardation
2. Methodology for Experimental Studies of Young Children in
natural settings.
Chunf Ki Taek & Sarbin, T. R.: Methodological Artifacts in Subception Research

Ferster, C 9 B e s An Experimental Analysis of Clinical Phenomena.

Feister, C. B 8 ? & S. Culbertson, A Psychology Learning Center.
Greenspoon, Joel & Simkin, L. : A Measurement Approach to Psychotherapy .
Guertin, W* H. et al: Research with the Wechsler Intelligence Scales for
Adults? 1965-1970,
Homme, Lloyd et al: What Behavioral Engineering Is
Kantor, J e R* 1. Behaviorism in the Histdry of Psychology
2* Feelings & Emotions as Scientific Events
3 Newton's Influence on the Development of Psychology
k* Scientific Psychology & Specious Philosophy
5. Segregation in Science: A Historico-Cultural Analysis
6. System Structure & Scientific Psychology
Kellogg, W. N e s Chimpanzees in Experimental Homes.
Kuo? Zing-Yang & Yut-hang, Lam? Chinese Religious Behavior & the Deification
of Mao Tse-tung.
Lichtenstein, P a E 8 2 1. Pschological Systems: Their Nature & Function
2 A Behvioral Approach to "Phoenomenological Data"
3. Genius as Productive Neurosis
Morris, Charles & KLmbrell, G. McA.s Performance & Attitudinal Effects of the
Keller Method in an Introductory Psychology Course
Ratner, Stanley C 6 s Comparative Psychology: Some Distinctions from Animal Be-
havior,,
Rice f Charles E e : Perceptual Enhancement in the Early BlincU
Schoefeld, W. N. , Note on a bit of Psychological Nonsenses Race Differences in
Intelligence
Smith, Noel ,,? Interbehavioral Psychology? Roots and Branches
Stephensonf Williams Applications of Communication Theory? (3 separate papers)
1. Substructure of Science
2. Interpretations of Keats' - -
3. Intelligence & Multivalued Choice
Weiners Harold? Human Behavioral Persistence

S -R
 CAM SOCIAL SCIENTISTS BE HIMANE?
David L. Miller
University of Texas, Atistin

In connection with,this subject I want to refer at least obliquely to the

philosophy of George Herbert Mead. But first let me point out that in the Wes-
tern world, especially from the time of the Renaissance to the present, much
progress has been made toward recognizing and openly acknowledging the value of
the individualf the person. This theory is exhibited in especially our political
theory and in scientific method, or in democracies and in the experimental sci-
ences. Often we speak of such things as civil liberties, individual rights, free-
domf self-actualization, self-determination, ingenuity, new hypotheses, creativ-
ity, and individualism* All of these are based on the implicit or explicit as
sumption that a new baby has been born in the West, that at last the individual,
the person, subject or self, has been severed from the umbilical cord of the tribe
and from restraining static customs or stagnant institutions.
In fact, that baby, prized so dearly, is the basis for modern science and
for what we call self-actualization or self-development. And I am suggesting
that paradoxically several of our so-called social scientists have emptied the
baby with the bath water.
To be more explicit, I am pointing out what everyone knows| namely, that
some social scientists, including especially some psychologists, anthropolo-
gists, and sociologists, in their zeal for being scientific and objective, have
adopted categories and conceptual explanatory terms that belong properly to phy-
sics, chemistry or biology exclusively, but these concepts by themselves are in-
adequate in explaining the subject matter of the humanities. But rather than un-
derstand and admit this inadequacy, many would rather deny that social scien-
tists have a subject matter of their own* , That subject matter is human beings
with individual minds and selves, something, I believe, that is irreducibly and
qualitatively different from the objects of physics, say.
Here your first reaction may be that I am suggesting that this new baby,
this new self that emerged first in the West, is a sort of supernatural, mythi-
cal or mystical entity, and that we should try to understand it from a mediaeval,
pre-Renaissance point of view, or that we cannot treat it scientifically. Not
at all. It both belongs to the natural order and it is humane. My complaint,
rather, is that some of us have assumed, probably unwittingly, that if anything
is natural, it is the same kind of thing that is treated by the physical scien-
tists, and, of course, such a treatment empties the baby with the bath.
Can we be scientific and also humane in the sense that we can offer a sci-
entific understanding of a kind of process in nature? I mean the symbolic pro-
cess, nind, or the self. My answer is yes. And despite my lamenting, I am most
encouraged to find that some know what this involves and are working strenuously
toward that end.
I have studied several of the important works of the honorable Professor
Kantorf and I quote most approvingly only a few of the relevant passages by him,,
 -6-

In I^ertehavlor^l Ps^clral^^ Professor Kantor sayss

"Psychological events are adjustments of organisms to environing things"
p. 86, '

Alsos " , , [A]ny factor dissected out for research purposes must always be
handled with direct reference to the entire unit from which it was taken" Ibid*
19.
Againf "We must place ourselves on an interbehavioral foundation" Ibid 25 *
Once more, "...mind is not a substance or quality,, but action - - the ways
in which an individual adapts himself to the things and conditions in his milieu
now psychological action is interaction" (The Evolution of Mind," P^22teM&Si
Rgvlews 1935, vol. 52, 455-465.)
Finally, "The specifically psychological activities are intimately connec-
ted with what, for want of a better term, we call social phenomena - - those es-
sentially human features of an organism' s surroundings" Ibid.,, f p* 464
Nor should we forget the laudable work done by Professor Noel Smith, I
quote from his work only one passage relevant to the purpose at hand* He writes s
"Interbehaviorism starts with events, and holds that all events occur in a field
of other events, never in isolation." (interbehavioral Psychology, Roots and
1
Branches/ a paper, 1972, p. 3 [Psychological Record, 1973, 23, 153-16? --.ed.])
Professor Kantor and his students are committed to the thesis that there
are minds, selves, persons, but they exist only- in connection with biological
organisms and environment* They agree also that although minds operate in a
field, and that mind involves action and interaction, still we cannot assimilate
the individual mind, the self, or the person to those social and environmental
conditions in which it operates.
This is quite a contrast to B. F. Skinner's view. He sayss "I am a radi-
cal behaviorist in the sense that I find no place for the formulation of any-
thing which is mental" (Behaviorism and Phgnomen^.g^;f ed by T. W. Mann. Uni-
versity o f Chicago ~
In his writings, Noel Smith has illuminated a point that seems almost ob-
vious, but its implications are profoundand very extensive* He shows that one
cannot define or even conceive clearly of the meaning of "response" apart from
stimulus, organism and environment. He is not claiming that a response as re~
sponse ij> a stimulus or a part of the biological organism |>er _se or a part of
the environment of the organism* Rather, he is saying that a response is a
phase of an act of adjustment, a phase that must be explained in terms of other
phases and conditions, but it cannot be assimilated to them. This view is at
the very basis of what has been called inter actionism, organicism, or, in gen~
eral, process philosophy*
Skinner is not an organicist. He is an atomist in the sense that he believes
that the phases of behavior are in reality parts that can exist in isolation. No
wonder he cannot get these analytic, atomic? parts together into an organic whole
Ho miatokoo abstractions for concrete reality. Hume saw clearly that if one starts
with atomic, analytic parts as real, no connection, necessary or otherwise, can
be found between them* But even Skinner has never touched a habit, he has never (
smelt one, nor has he ever seen one.
 Now if we should go to the opposite extreme from Skinner we would find an
almost perfect exemplification of it in the attitude of Robert M. Hutchins of
1930, then president of the University of Chicago. Partially under the influ-
ence of J. Mortimer Adlers Hutchins believed that the sciences could not offer
an understanding of man, of the self, of the person He recommended that we re-
turn to a pre-seientific Mediaeval approach for that understandingf and apparent
ly he thought of the self as some kind of mythical entity* One of Mr. Hutchins'
most unfortunate limitations consisted in his inability to see that under his very
eyes and within his own university there was a manf George Herbert Mead, who was
offering a naturalistic account of the self, an account that took into considera-
tion the scientific method and all of the latest findings of biology? neurology,
psychology, anthropologyf and the physical sciences.
All I want to say here is that Mead conceived of mind and the self as a pro-
cess, but a process that is a phase of a more inclusive processf which is the so-
cial process of adjustment*
The organism has experiences before it has awareness. Awareness grows out
of experience and awareness is essential to the existence of both minds and sel-
ves.
Mind is a case in which one can respond to stimuli in their absence orf it
is a case in which one can by use of language gesturesf indicate to himself and
to another both the character of the stimulus and the form of the response made
to it in its absence. That is, the minded organism canf on the basis of prior
experiencef anticipate or predict, and consequently, it can select in advance,
or in the absence of stimuli, the kind of stimulus to which it will later re-
spond,,
Mind emerges out of a social process; it is in nature, and nature is not
in mind.
If we are to evade Cartesian dualism (which precludes a functional relation-
ship between mind and body) or if we are to evade parallelism, which is a species
of dualism, without resorting to mysticism, then we must conceive of mind as a na-
tural emergent, as a phase of the social process.
Mind must be conceived of as a culmination of that evolutionary process
which is found throughout the universe.
Our problem is to explain precisely how mind arises out of an earlier pro-
cess in which there was no mind and how, consequently, mind is a phase of, or
interrelated with, other natural phases including other men? biological organ-
isms, and an environment. When this is done, then we will be on the road to giv-
ing a scientific account of the nature of individualism, freedom, blame and re-
sponsibility. We will be in a position to justify or offer reasons why it is
possible for each of us to enter into the process of changing our social insti-
tutions and in taking the initiative in determining our own future both at the
personal and social level* This is the task of the social scientists* If they
succeed, they will have cleansed that baby that was born in the West so that it
canf under the influence of science, be nurtured to adulthood* They can do so
only if they accept organicism, interbehaviorism and process philosophy as a foun-
dation Through this approach they can be both scientific and humane and they
will not empty the baby with the bath*
 Noel W. Smith, Editor F 1 E L D Preceding

Faculty of Social Sciences Sugrnont

1
Sottmj; Factors
1

1
Organism
1
i
Rebpnnsn
Function
1
1
1
I 1
! 0&
1
1*1 i
invpstigatoi c
1 1
4
1

SUmuU ^ Object 1 o
! a
I
S'trv.U-

Fviict or
i
i
Media |
!
L
- fcJ
Succeeding

MTERBEHAVIORA L Sejperu
Yolyme 5
Number 4-
PSYCHOLOGY Fall 197A

NEWSLETTER
State University College of Arts and Science, Plattsburgh, New York

...the psychological investigative vent constitutes the interbehavior of

the investigator with a behavior segment or psychological event......Just as
the investigator is conditioned by the interbehavipral history of the org-
anism and object, so the investigator is influenced by his antecedent intel-
lectual background,
J. R. Kantor
A Toast
The soul may be a mere pretense,
the mind makes very little sense
So let us value the appeal
Of that which we can taste and feel.
Pie't Hein (Grooks)

~~~T^
With this final issue of the Newsletter for The Newsletter started out with about 40
197A we complete five years of publication. subscribers, at one time hit H5 then
As a commemoration we are reprinting the settled down to about 100. The number
quotation and quatrain from the first issue, of institutional subscribers, especially
the former being the basis for the design. libaries, has been gradually increasing.
We improved the design in the second year
and mad minor improvements in the fourth. The Newsletter represents one of the projects
Beginning in the third year we changed from recommended at the Summer Conference of
a quinterly to a quarterly. Articles or Interbehavioral Psychology held at Miner
other features hav been included regular- Institute, June 16-21, 1969. Another
ly and perhaps we should rename the pub- recommendation, that of some collaborative
lication, inasmuch as it has been some- book publishing, is now receiving some
what more than a news medium. A tentative attention. Efforts are underway to develop
possibility is "Quarterly" to replace a book of original papers on selected
Newsletter". Suggestions would be welcome. topics, tentatively entitled INTERBEHAVIORAL

Crude Data Investigative Contact Scientific Construction

APPROACHES TO RECURRING PROBLEMS IN PSYCHOLOGY and to offer some proposed
solutions. If anyone who has not been contacted feels he or she would like
to offer a paper or to explore the possibilities, please contact this editor.
There are several areas in which we have no writers and others that could
use additional development.

In 1933, J. R. Kantor published his basic textbook SURVEY OP THE SCIENCE OF

PSYCHOLOGY. This has been an excellent source of his concepts in a very
readable form covering a broad array of topics. It has now been revised
and brought up to date and will appear in 1975 under the title THE SCIENCE
OF PSYCHOLOGY! AN INTERBEHAVIORAL SURVEY.

In this issue , we are providing a Bibliographic Index for the five years
of the' Newsletter. It includes feature articles , works referred to In th
news8 and quotations ,-, Several offprints or "reprints" have been distributed
with the Newsletters. Most of these have not been mentioned in the text
itself and so have not been listed. The following back issues of the
Newsletter are still available and will b sent gratis upon request: Vol. 1,
Nr. 1, 2, 3, 4; Vol. 2, Nr. 4j Vol. 3, Nre 2, 4| Vol. 4S Nr. 2.

***

The editor is grateful to those who have subscribed to the Newsletter and
those who have submitted news, articles , and quotations over the past
five yearst for these have made the advent of the publication and its
continuation possible* We continue to be anti-inflationary by keeping the
prices the same as those of five years ago. Accompanying this issue is a
resubscription form and attached to the back a subscription form, the
former, of course, for current subscribers. The latter might be used to
induce a friend to try us out or even to subsidize him for a year's trial.
If you have occasion to refer students or others to articles in the News-
letter, you might wish to request your library to order a subscription.
 BIBLIOGRAPHIC INDEX1

F = feat-ore
N = "from news section"
Q = quotation

1) Albee, George? 1970, 1(3), Ps Awards and Citations

2) Anastasij Ann and John Poleyi 1971, 2(4), g' DIFFERENTIAL PSYCHOLOGY
3) Aristotle^ 1970, 1(2), g*. DE ANIMA
1972, 3(2), gi THE PHYSICS
1974* 5(3), gt ON DREAMS
4) Athenaeus, 1971, 2(3)* gt THE DEIPNOSOPHISTS
5} Averill, James R. 1974., 5(1), N: Personal Control over Adverse Stimuli and Its
Relation to Stress
6) Barber, T. X.; 1970, 1(3), N: HYPNOSISs A SCIENTIFIC APPROACH
1970, 1(4), N: LSD, KARIJUANA, YOGA, AHD.HYPNOSIS
1971, 2(4), N: Suggested ('Hypnotic') Behavior: The Trance
Paradigm versus an Alternative Paradigm
1974, 5(1), Ns Acupuncture Analgesia: A Six-Factor Theory
(see Chaves, note 25)
7) Bauer, Harold5 1971, 2(1), F: The Kingdom of Boo!
8} Baum, Frank; 1970, 1(2), g: THE WIZARD OF OZ
9) Bentley, A. F.; 1972, 3(3), : BEHAVIOR, KNOWLEDGE, FACT
1972, 3(3), fi: Kennetic Inquiry
10) Bersoffs Donald N.; 1974., 5(1), N: Silk Purses into Sow's Ears? The Decline
of Psychological Testing and a Suggestion for its Redemption
11) Bevan, William; 1970, 1U), N: Psychology, The University and The Real
World Around Us
12) Bindra, Dalbir; 1970, 1(5), N: The Problem of Subjective Experiences Puzzle-
ment on Reading R. W. Sperry's "A Modification Concept of Consciousness"
13) Blumenthal, Arthur L.; 1971, 2(2), N; LANGUAGE AND PSYCHOLOGY: HISTORICAL
ASPECTS OF PSYCHOLINGUISTICS

1 Sequencet,of entries; author, date of Newsletter, volume, designation (see

key above), title. N.B.: Oct. 1971, vol. 2, rir. A was mlsnumbered as 3; Fall
1972^ vol. 3S nr. 4 was misnumbered ss vol. 4; Spring 1974, vol. 5, nr. 2 was
misnumber'ed as 1.
14) Bolles, Robert C.; 1972, 3(2), g*. THEORY OF MOTIVATION
15) Boring, E. G.;.1970, 1(5), ^ from the "Inroduction" in ESPs A SCIENTIFIC
EVALUATION by C.E.M. Hansel
16) Bourne, Lyle E,, B8R. Ekstrand and R.L. Dominowski; 1972, 3(4), fi: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF THINKING
17) Brenner, Donald J. (ed.); 1972, 3(3), Ss SCIENCE, PSYCHOLOGY, AND COMMUNICATIONS:
ESSAYS HONORING WILLIAM STEPHEKSON, (see Erovm, note 18)
18) Brown, Stephen, (ed,); 1972, 3(3), Ns INTENSIVE ANALYSIS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES,
(see Stephenson, note 99)
& Donald Brenner (ed); 1972, 3(3), fi: SCIENCE, PSYCHOLOGY AND COMMUNICATIONS:
ESSAYS HONORING WILLIAM STEPHENSON
& Richard Taylor; 1973? 4(2), N; Frames of Reference and the Observation
of Behavior
& Thomas tings; 1972, 3(2), Ns Representativeness and the study of
political behaviors an application of the Q technique
to reactions to the Kent State Incident
19) Cameron, Norman; 1973, 4(3), <*: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF BEHAVIORAL DISORDERS
20) Campbell, Sam; 1970, 1(2), Nj (telegram to J. B. Kantor)
21) Cancro, Robert(ed.); 1972, 3(1), Ns INTELLIGENCES GENETIC AND EWIRQNMENTAL
INFLUENCES

22) Carroll, James D.; 1974, 5(2), request

23) Carroll, John'; 1974, 5(2), Ns Confidentiality of Social Science Research
Sources and Data; The Popkins Case
24) Carter, Jerry; 1970, 1(3), ,: An Experimental Study of Psychological
Stimulus-Response
1971, 2(1), N: A Case of Reactional Dissociation (Hysterical
Paralysis)
1971, 2(2), P: A Case of Reactional Dissociation (Hysterical
Paralysis)
25) Chaves, J. H., T. X, Barber, & Spanoesj 1974, 5(1), Ns Acupuncture Analgesia?
A Six-Factor Theory
1974, 5(1), N: HYPNOSIS, DIRECT
IMAGINING AND HWAM CAPABILITIES

26) Coe, William; 1973, 4(2), N; HYPNOSIS: THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF INFLUENCE
COMMUNICATION, (see Sarbin, note 89)
27) Cole, Michael, John Gay, Joseph Click, & Donald Sharp; 1974, 5(3), Ns THE
CULTURAL CONTEXT OF LEARNING AND THINKING: AN EXPLORATION IN CURRENT
ANTHROPOLOGY
2g) Denny & Ratnerj- 1970, 1(1), N: COMPARATIVE PSYCHOLOGY
29 ) Devey, Joteif 1973S 4(4), N; The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology
& Arther Bentley; 1973, 4l4)? N: KNOWING AND THE KNOWN
30) Dominowski, R. .L.; 1972, 3(4)* . THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THINKING, (see Bourne,
note 16)

31) EkstrandU B. R.; 1972* 3(4), fi: THE PSYCHOLOGY OP'THINKING,, (see Bourne* note 16)
32) ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PSYCHOLOGY; 1973, 4(3), N
33) English & English; 1971, 2(1), Nj A COMPREHENSIVE-DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
AND PSYCHOANALYTIC TERMS
1971, 2(5), s A COMPREHENSIVE DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
AND PSYCHOANALYTIC TERMS
. 1973* 4(3), N: A COMPREHENSIVE DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
AND PSYCHOANALYTIC TERMS
34) Farrington, Jacqueline? 1970S 1(3), Fs A Student's View of the Interbehavioral
Conference
1971, 2(5), t "Irn lo ach shav, matai".....If Not Now,
Then When?
1972, 3(4), j Rite Words../..But Are They Right?
35) FernsaUj, Ernest W.; 1972, 3(2), notice

36) Foley, John P.j 1971, 2(4), gi DIFFERENTIAL PSYCHOLOGY, (see Anastasl, note 2)
37) Fowler* Christopher M; 1973, 4(2), F; A Comparison of the Field-System '
Approaches of D. L. Clark and J s I,5 Kantor

38) Frank, John P. & Gretehen Kagan; 1972? 3(1), Ns The False Standards of I.Q.

39) Fuller, Paul; 1970, 1(1), Fr Some Thoughts on the Summer Gonranity of Scholars,
1969 *~ '
1970, 1(2), N: (telegram to J 9 R. Kantor)

40) Galileo; 1970, 1(4), g

41) Gassendi, 1970, l(5),-ai letter to Descartes, quoted in OBJECTIONS
AND IN THE PHILOSOPHICAL OF

42) Gaviola, E*; 1970, 1(5), E! The Impossibility of interaction between mind
and matter

43) Gay, John; 1974, 5(3),'N:- THE CULTURAL CONTEXT OP LEARNING AND THINKING:
. AN II (see Cole, note 27)

44) Gibson^ Kwmeih; 1970, 1U), fs (took review)

45) Glick, Joseph; 1974, 5(3), N; THE CULTURAL OF LEARNING AM) THINKING:
AN EXPLORATION IN ANTHROPOLOGY,-(see Cole, note 27)
46) Guttman, Normanj 1972, 3(4), Ns. Interbehaviorism:'Naturalism Radicalized'

47) Handy, Hollo; 1970, 1(1), Is THE Of VALUE

1970, 1(4), ?; THE MEASUREMENT OF VALUE
 -6-

48) Hansel, C, E, M. ; 1970, 1(3), N: ESPs A SCIENTIFIC EVALUATION

49) Hein, Pietj 1970, 1(1), : CROOKS

1974, 5(4), gi GROOKS
50) Herriek, James . ; 1972, 3(3), s The Collective Mind and Its Influence Upon
Culture Personality Research! An Application of the
Interbehavioral Model
1974, '5 (3), N: Kantor's anticipation of current approaches
in anthropology
51) Heyduk, Ronald G.j 1970, 1(3), Ps Cracks in the 'Billiard Ball1 Organism
1971, 2(3), ES (a letter)
52) Hilliat, William; 1973, 4(3), N: SYSTH-1S AND THEORIES OF PSYCHOLOGY, (see
Marx, note 73)
53) Johnson, Stephen L.j 1974, 5(2), Fs The Springs of Action: Th Fountain of
Youth "~
54) Kaganf Gretehen, 1972, 3(1), Ns The False Standards of I.Q. Teats, (see
Prank, note 37)
55) Kantor, J. R. ; 1970, 1(1), fit Toward a soientifio analysis of motivation
1970, 1(2), : Goethe's Place in Modem Science
1970, 1(2), Ns reply to letter, (see Smith, note 94)
1970, 1(2), fs THE SCIENTIFIC EVOLUTION OF PSYCHOLOGY, vols. I & TI
1970, 1(3), It An Analysis of the Experimental Analysis of
1970, 1(4), Ms THE SCIENTIFIC EVOLUTION OF PSYCHOLOGY, vol. I
1970* 1(5), Is THE LOGIC OP MODERN SCIENCE
. 1971, 2(1), N: THE LOGIC OF MODEBN SCIENCE
1971, 2(1), Ii THE SCIEITIFIC EVOLUTION OP PSYCHOLOGY, -vol. I
1971, 2(2), gs THE AIM AND OF PSYCHOLOGY AND OTHER
1971, 2(2), Ms Can Psychology contribute to the study of
linguistics?
1971, 2(2), gs THE SCIENTIFIC EVOLUTION OF PSYCHOLOGY, vol. I
1971, 2(4), Hi THE AIM AND PROGRESS OF PSYCHOLOGY AND OTHER SCIENCES
1972, 3(1), s THE EVOLUTION OF PSYCHOLOGY, vole II
1972j, 3(2), Ns THE AIM AHD PROGRESS OF PSYCHOLOGY AND
1972, 3(2), i* PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGIC, vol. II
1972, 3(2), Is TI'<E SCIENTIFIC EVOLUTION OP PSYCHOLOGY, vol. II
1972, 3(4), Is THE AIK AND PROGRESS OF PSYCHOLOGY AND OTHER SCIENCES
1973, 4(3), t i Propos Watson's Hyperbola
1973, 4(4), S* How ia Interbehavioral Psychology Related to
the Experimental Analysis of Behavior?
1973, 4(4 ), Nt In defense of stimulus-response psychology
1974, 5 UK I SURVEY OF THE SCIENCE OF PSYCHOLOGY
1974, 5(4), Ms THE OP PSYCHOLOGY? AN INTERBBHAVIOML
.APPROACH
1974, 5(4),' s Toward & scientific analyaia of motivation
56) Keller, Frd| 1971, 2(1), Ns LRiRWNGi RBIKFORCMEST THEORY, 'rev. '-ed. ;
 7

57) Kelly, George? 197-4, 5(1), fis in Marshall Jones (ed.), NEBRASKA SYMPOSIUM
ON MOTIVATION, 1962 . .
58) Kent, Louise; 1970, 1(2), Ns (telegram to J. R. Kantor)
59) Kent, Neil} 1970,, 1(2), Nt (telegram to J. R9 Kantor)
60) Laehenmyer, Charles We; 1970, 1(4), Ns ExperimentationA Misunderstood
Methodology in Psychology and Social-Psychology Research
61) LaShier, Cynthia J.; 1974 5(1), F: B. P8 Skinner'on Motivations A Critique
62) Lasar, Waynef 1970, 1(2), F$ Account of Conference at Miner Center, Chaay, N.Ye
1970, 1(2), N; (telegram to J. R. Kantor)
1974., 5(3), N: A comparison of some theoretical proposals of
J.R. Kantor and T.C. Schnierla
63) Lewis, Michael & Leonard A* Rosenblumj 1974, 5(1), s THE EFFECT OF THE
INFANT ON ITS CAREGIVER
64) Liehtensteln, P. E.j 1970, 1(1), F: The Significance of the Stimulus Function
65) Littnian, R, A.| 1974, 5(2), g: in Marshall Jones (ed.), NEBRASKA SYMPOSIUM
ON MOTIVATION, 1958
66) Livingston, Robert B.j 1971, 2(5), Ss How aan looks at his own brain: an
adventure shared by psychology and neurophyaiology
67) Lowery, Richardj 1970, 1(4), N$ The Straight and Narrow Path in Psychology,
(book review)
68) Lucretiusf 1970, 1(5), : ON THE OP THE
69) Lundin, Robert? 1970, 1(1), N; PERSONALITY: A BEHAVIORAL APPROACH
1971, 2(1), I; AN OBJECTIVE PSYCHOLOGY OF MUSIC
1972, 3(4), NJ AN OBJECTIVE PSYCHOLOGY OF MUSIC
1972, 3(4), Is PERSONALITY ,
1972, 3,(4), NJ PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOPATHOLOGY
1972, 3(4), N: THEORIES AND .SYSTEMS OF PSYCHOLOGY
1974, 5(1),'Nt PERSONALITY: A BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS
70) Mahan, Harry; 1970, 1(2), N: THE INTERACTIONAI PSYCHOLOGY OF J.R. KiNTORj
AN INTRODUCTION
1970, 1(2), Ni A PRIMER OF INTERACTIONAL PSYCHOLOGY
1973, 4(1), 5* A PRIMER OF INTERACTIONAL PSYCHOLOGY
1973, 4U), N; THE INTERACTIONAL PSYCHOLOGY OF J.R. KANTOR
1973? 4(4)* N: INTERACTIONAL PSYCHOLOGY
1974, 4(4), N: THE INTERACTIONAL PSYCHOLOGY OF J.R. KANTOR
71) Mancuso, J a C.| 1971, 2(1), N: Failure of a moral enterprize: attudes of
the public toward mental Illness, (see Sarbin, not 90)
72) Martin, Robert F.; 1973, 4(1), Ft Toward Conceptualization of the Learning
Processes in the College Classroom Ills Operant
Psychology and Better's Social Learning Theory
as a Basis for Research
 1973, 4(4)t Fs But There Are and There ire Hoses
73) Marx* Melin & William-Hillix; 1973, 4(2), NJ SYSTEMS .AND THBORI1SS OF PSYCHOLOGY
74) Maupertiusj 1970, 1(4), a
75) McHale? John; 1971, 2(3), N: The Future of the Mind
76) McPherson, Marlon White; 1971, 2(4), F: Deficiency in Patients and Professionals
77) Melzak, Ronald; 1974, 5(1), Ns How Acupuncture Can Block Pain
78) Miller, David; 1974, .5(3), F: Can Social Scientists Be Humane?
79) Mitsorgs A.; 1970, 1(5), Fs Interactions Transactions Which?
1972, 3(3), Pi Nevertheless, The Earth is Flat
80) Mountjoy, Paul; 1970S 1(2), N: (telegram to J. R. Kantor)
1973, 4(4), Ft A Hose By Any Other
& Noel Smith; 1971, 2(2), N: A reply to Thornton's 'Socrates and the
History of Psychology1
81) Observer, 1972} 3(1), Ns Innate Intelligences Another Genetic Avatar
82) Pronto, Heneryj 1970, M(1), Ns PANORAMA OF PSYCHOIOGY
1970, 1(2), N; PANORAMA OF PSYCHOLOGY
1970, 1(2), : Some Reflections of Perception
1972, 3(2), F: Notes for a Freshman on the Free Will Versus
, Determination Controversy
83) Randall, John; 1972, 3(1), a* ARISTOTLE
1973, 4(1), a* PLATO? THE DRBMATIST OF THE LIFE OF REASON
84) Ratner; 1970, 1(1), Ns COMPARATIVE PSYCHOLOGY, (see Denny, note 28)
85) Rotoaek; 1972, 3(4), N: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGY
86) Rosenbliths W. A. and Eda B6 Vidalep 1971, 2(3), &'. A Quantitative view of
Keuroelectrie Events in Relation to Sensory Communication
87) Roeenblum, Leonard A. j 1974, 5(1), g'. THE EFFECT OF THE INFANT ON ITS CAREGIVER
(see Lewis, note 62)
88) Rotter, Julian; 1970, 1(3), a* SOCIAL LEARNING AND CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY
89) Russell, I. Steele & Eugene Winograd; 1970, 1(5), N: Mental Events in Psychology
90) Sarbin, 'Theodore & William Coe; 1973, 4(2), Ns HYPNOSIS: THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
OF INFLUENCE COMMUNICATION.
& J..C. Mancusbs 1971, 2(1), Ns Failure of a moral enterprise;
attudes of the public toward mental illness
91) Schoenfeld, W N 0 ; 1970, 1(3), Si J.R. Kantor's OBJECTIVE PSYCHOLOGY OF GRAMMER
and PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGICs A Retrospect Appreciation
92) Sharp, Davidj 1974* 5(3), Nt THE CULTURAL CONTEXT OF LEARNING AND THINKING;
AN EXPLORATION IN CURRENT -ANTHROPOLOGY, (see Cole, note 27)
93) Shute, Clarences 1973, 4(4)* Sl! Aristotle's Interactionism and ita Transformation
by some 20 Century Writers. In N.W. Smith '(ed.) "Contextual Interact-
ionistss A Symposium"
94) Skinner, B.F.: 1972, 3(1j, : BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNITY
95) Smith, Noel . ; 1970, 1(1), F: The Emerging Role of Interbehavioral Psychology
1970, 1(2), N: letter concerning Conference at Miner Center
1970, 1(2), Is (telegram to J.R9 Ranter)
1971, 2(2), N: A reply to Thornton's 'Socrates and the
History of Psychology,f(see Mountjoy, note 80)
1972, 3(1), N: Interbehaviorism: Roots and Branches
1972, 3(4), F: An Interbehaviorist Looks at Santa Clause
1973s 4(2), N: Interbehavioral Psychologyj Roots and Branches
1973, 4(2'), NJ Social and Psychological Development of Ancient
Egypt with some Preliminary Remarks on Primitive Beliefs
(ed) 1974* 5(4), Ns INTERBEHAVIORAL APPROACHES TO RECURRING PROBLEMS
IN PSYCHOLOGY
96) Sommer, Robert; 1972, 3(1), *'' Natural History
97) Spanoes| 1974$ 5(1), Ns Acupuncture Analgesias A Six-Factor Theory, (see
Chav.es, note 25)
1974, 5(1), NJ HYPNOSIS, DIRECT IMAGINING AND HUMAN CAPABILITIES,
(see Chaves, note 25)
98) Spinoza, Baruch| 1970, 1(5), 2? ETHICS
99) Stevenson, William; 1972, 3(2), Ns THE STUDY OF BEHAVIOR; Q-TECHNIQUE AND
ITS METHODOLOGY
1972, 3(3), fir Applications of Communication Theory? I.
The Substructure of Science
1972, 3(3), Ns Applications of Communication Theory; II.
Interpretations of Keat's "Ode on a Grecian Urn"
1972, 3(3), N: Consciousness OutSubjectivity In
1972, 3(3), I; Postulates of Behaviorism
& Stephen Brown (eds); 1972, 3(3), N: INTENSIVE ANALYSIS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
100) Suggested Readings in Interbehavioral Psychology! 1970, 1(5), F
101) Sullivan, John; 1972, 3(1), F; Skinner's Razor ' . ' .
102) Swartzf 1971, 2(1), Ns Stimulus evolution in problem solving behavior? an
interbehavior analysis
1971, 2(2), Ms Stimulus evolution in problem solving behavior; an
interbehavioral analysis
103) Taylor, Richard; 1973* 4(2), I; Frames of Reference and the Observation of
Behavior, (see Brown, note 18}
104,) A Theory of Cognitive Functioning and Stratifications What the Brain Does,
Mho It Do It, and Why, 1971, 2(3), N
 -10-

105) Thornton; 1970, 1(5), S* Socrates and the History of Psychology

106) Tilquin, Andre? 197}, 2(5), Nj LE BEHAVIORISMS ORIGINE ET DEVELOPPEMENT DE
LA PSYCHOLOGIE DE REACTION EN ANTIQUE '.' .
107) Tulving, Endelj 1974, 5(3), N: Cue-Dependent Forgetting
108) Ungs, Thomas; 1972, 3(2), Ks Representativeness and the study of political
behaviors an application of the Q-technique to the Kent State incident,
(see Brown, note 18)
109) University of Akron ; 1970, 1(4), F: Doctor, of Letters, Presented June 4, 1970,
to Js R, Kantor by the University of Akron
110) Vidale, Eda B. ; 1971, 2(3), g% A Quantitive View of Neuroelectric Events in
Relation to Sensory Communication, (see Rosenblith, note 86)
111)' Weyant, Robertj 1970, 1(4), Ns History Painted with a Biased Brush, (review)
112) Winograd, Eugene; 1970, 1(5), N: Mental Events in Psychology, (see Russell,
note 89) ""
113) olman| 1972, 3(4), Ns CONTEMPORARY THEORIES AND SYSTEMS OP PSYCHOLOGY
114) Woodbridge, Fredrick 3, E. ; 1972, 3(4), % SELECTED ESSAYS OF J.E. WOODBRIDGE
 I
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Winter 1975 j I 1
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Interbefiavtoral NOEL W. SMITH, EDITOR

DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY

quarterly STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCE
PLATTSBURGH, NEW YORK

Intei-behavioral psychology* a system of psychology which emphasizes the inter-

action between the organism and the environment. ^h& subject matter of psy-
chology is the &vnt (perceiving, learning, discriminating, etc.), which is
studied in terms of the history of its relations to stimuli and to other events.
J. P. Chaplins DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOLOGY
Psychology, interbehavlorals The definition of psychology as the study of
evolved interaction between organism and the environment. The unit of study
is the event consisting of the interbehavior of the organism with other or-
ganisms and objects which are existentially and structurally separate* Con-
figurations constituting events are determined by previous interbehaviors.
B. B. olman; DICTIONARY OP BEHAVIOR SCIENCES

In addition to the above definition Wolman
has other entries on Interbehavioral psych-
ology including one under its older name of
"organismic psychology". Unfortunately,
Wolman's work is given to errors. Under the
entry "vitalism" he gives Kantor as well as
MeDougall as influenced by it and in his
CONTEMPORARY THEORIES AND SYSTEMS IN PSYCH-i
OM3GY he attributes the origin of Kantor's
work to Adolf Meyer, associates him closely
with Goldstein and Lewin, and avers that he
accepts
%
the notion that "mental functions
-6 accompanied by physiological ones". In
^viewing the DICTIONARY in Contemporary
H&Slog$r, 1974* 19, 660-661, Josef Brozek
notes otter errors and shortcomings.
Crude Data
AGORA
After five years as the Interbehavioral Psy-
chology Newsletter we begin our sixth year
as the Interbehavioral Quarterly. We will
continue much as before with news and inter-
behavioral papers, but the possibility of an
improved format is being explored for some-
time in the future,
#**
In this issue Paul Mountjoy attempts to clar-
ify his position vis-a-vis Robert Martin in
the Fall 1973, 4- U) Newsletter. Lila Good-
son compares Watson and Kantor on concepts
of emotion. She wrote the paper as an under-
graduate at Lynchburg College and is now in
graduate studies at University of New Orleans,
Investigative Contact Scientific Construction
 -2-

A Rose is a Rose is a. Rose

PaiO. T.Mount joy
Western Michigan University

It was a pleasure to discover substantive areas of agreement between

Martin (1973) and myself (1973) during our recent interchange. However,
one area of disagreement remains unsolved! and in my effort to write con-
cisely I became so terse as to lose intelligibility. It is hoped this brief
note will help to clarify these issues.
Martin askss "Why were there only 69% A-grades in Dr. Mountjoy's
classes?" In my undergraduate classes over 90$ of the students earn the
grade of A. I referred in footnote 3 to an official university report which
criticized the Department of Psychology for giving the grade of A to 69% of
the undergraduates who completed courses in our department. Let us assume
for simplicity that grades represent interbehaviors between students and in-
structors. All behavioral events are fieldsf i*e.f determined by the inter-
action of numerous factors,
One factor which determines grades is the behavior of the instructor.
Some instructors in this department distribute grades according to the bell-
shaped normal probability curve (e.g.,10% A, etc.). Another factor which
determines grades is the behavior which the student performs. By the time
they enter psychology courses, some students have learned that grades can be
attained by behaviors other than mastering course content. A carefully de-
signed course contains limited hold contingencies such that by the end of
the second or third week a student may have lost sufficient points to pre-
clude earning an A. Bern's Manuals (see Mount joy, 1973) explicate these con-
tingencies. Thus, students who enter a course with well-developed "confi-
dence man" behaviors will end up with less than an A, at least in their first
psychology course.
My view regarding the renaming of the historical component in behaviors
as expectancy remains unchanged. Others may wish to state that the possession
of highly developed "confidence man" behaviors indicate that the individual
expects to be reinforced for these behaviors. That is their privilege, but
I feel that it violates proper scientific procedures. It seems to be much
more in line with the rules of science to remain as close to the data as pos-
sible. For example, the student who has lost sufficient points to preclude
earning an A during the first few weeks may very well exhibit 100% mastery
during the remainder of the course. Such a case would be illustrative of
the development of a new and different historical factor, a response func-
tion of mastery replacing the response function of being a confidence man.
It would be instructive to examine the changing behavior of students as they
progress through a series of well-designed courses.
A brief comment on the differences between laboratory research (hypo-
thesis testing) and classroom technology (problem solving) appears to be in
order. The classroom teacher who attempts to apply psychological principles
to his own teaching has, because of his problem solving orientation (How should
a course be designed to produce mastery of course content?) left the arena of
 -3-

hypothesis testing. Now non-scientific factors become important variables.

From a scientific standpoint the question of what factors are responsible for
students failing courses is every bit as important as the question of what
factors are responsible for students earning an A. Yetf because of cultural
considerations we concentrate on the factors which are responsible for stu-
dents earning an A, and are unable to meet conventional design criteria. The
fact is that operant technology is not synonomous with psychological science.
Operant technology is the practical application of a type of scientific psy-
chology, dn a problem solving manner. The fact that a technological applica-
tion does not meet the standards of a laboratory science is irrelevant to the
issue of whether the behavior of college students in the classroom is readily
subject to operant technology. The empirical finding is that operant technol-
ogy does change the behavior of college students. The present state of the
art is such that there is still a greal deal of room for improvement. In the
not too distant future there will be more improvement.
I hope that Martin and I shall both be able to contribute to the improve-
ment of classroom instruction.

References
Martin, R. F. But there are roses and there are roses,. Int^e^e^aviGral Py_-
Newsletter f 1973 i 4? 6-7.
Mount joy, P T, A rose by any other name. Interbehayipra.! Psjjchologx; News-
letter, 1973 4 1-5.
 Emotions vse Emotional Behaviors
Comparing Watson and Kantor
Li la Goodsori

When the wordf or a derivative of the word, emotion is verbalized, var-

ious thoughts or ideas are probably experienced depending on the organism's
history of responding to these terms as well as the setting factors. The
definitions and explanations of emotions as given by J, B, Watson and J. R.
Kantor are to be compared and contrasted.
For Watson, human action is divided into two parts: the acquired modes
of responses and the hereditary modes of responses. Emotions along with in-
stincts are paired together in the latter group. He reports that the human
undergoes a process of organization whereby the hereditary and acquired reac-
tion modes separate to a certain extent, but never completely.
An emotion for Watson is "a hereditary pattern reaction" involving pro-
found changes of the bodily mechanism as a whole, but particularly of the vis-
ceral and glandular systems. In referring to pattern-reaction he gives the
example of a sooty-tern feigning death in reaction to a human intruder, but
running away and giving an instinctive cry when the chance for escape arises,
Watson differentiates emotions and instincts with respect to the adjustments
of the organism. If the adjustments are internal and confined to the sub-
ject's body, emotdstnoccurs; if the organism as a whole makes adjustments to
external objects , instinct has occurred. This is clearly an example of or-
ganocentric ideology in which sbimuli are assumed to elicit reactions from
within the organism.
Watson's almost exclusive lase of children as subjects was a deliberate
move because he felt that not enough work had been done in this area. He
grouped emotional reactions into the categories of fear, rage, and love, at
the same time warning students not to find anythingin these words that was
not statable in terms of situation and response. He named four principal
situations as producing fear; loss of support, loud sounds, an abrupt in-
terruption as sleep is overtaking the organism, and pulling a blanket out
from under the subject who is falling asleep. The observed reactions are
catching the breath, the grasping reflex, closing of theqjre lids, puckering
the lips, then crying. The common belief that children are instinctively
afraid of the dark was shown not to be true according to his evidence. In-
cidentally, Watson stipulates without reference or experimental support that
children reared in the South exhibit fear of the dark far more than others.
Rage is said to occur as a result of "hampering of the infant's movements."
The exhibited behaviors are crying, screaming, slashing movements with the
arms and hands, drawing up and down with the feet and legs, and flushing of
the face as a result of breath-holding. Love involves smiling, cooing, gurg-
ling, etc. as a result of stroking or manipulation of the erogenous zones
by tickling, shaking, patting, or gentle rocking. The Freudian emphasis in
relation to this emotion is minimal.
Different kinds of infrahuman organisms were exposed to the infants in
order to see if generalized emotional reactions could be obtained. Relatively
little fear was observed in the infants even after contact with such organ-
isms as rabbits, pigeonsf catsf dogs, white ratsf as well as observation of
a fire in a nearby bucket.
In the attempt to detect emotional responsesf Watson considered the im-
plicit portions to be more important than the explicit portions. He listed
two methods of detections l) gee t2E,t where "significant" words are random-
ly interjected with neutral words? and 2) contdnmus, t^ge where a subject is
given a key word from an emotional situation and told to freely relate to it.
This method is used to detect blockage as related to dreams which Watson con-
sidered to be good indicators of one's personality, stressesf strains, and
general emotional life.
Watson's famous conditioned emotional reaction study with little Albert
was an example of the eliciting properties which can be taken on by the habit
influences to "call out" emotional responses. The phenomenon of transferred
conditioned emotional reactions was exhibited when Albert made fear responses
to objects similar in texture to the white rat. A control procedure was used
in which the infant was given blocks to interact with between stimulus presen-
tations.
In dealing with emotional outlets, Watson describes diffusion which is
equivalent to the concept of displacement. He viewed it as a threat to so-
cietyf but rationalized the occurrences as resulting in relaxation. Atti-
tudes are considered to be a consolidation of emotions, instincts, and habits.
Examples such as "tenderness," "shyness," "shame/1 "jealousy/' "hate," "em-
barrassment," "suspicion," "anxiety," etc. are said to represent combinations
of the three reaction modes.
Physiological factors are considered to be strong components in the ex-
pression of emotions. Secretions from duct glands are reduced with contrac-
tion nf smooth muscles occurring in reaction to emotionally exciting stimuli.
The effect on the- ductless glands is increased production of adrenalin re-
sulting in glycosuria. This conditionis caused by excess sugar passing into
the urine* In addition, the pulse accelerates and dilation of the pupils
occurs. The post emotional state may leave the organism either poorly ad-
justed or better adjusted, depending on the sHuational factors.
Watson summarizes his discussion of emotion by saying that emotions
must be recognized as part of human life rather than being discarded or over-
looked. He suggests that further investigation into the control and manipu-
lation of human behavior in relation to emotions should reveal more knowledge
about the area. The faults as well as good points of Watson's theory will
be openly discussed after a challenging alternative system is presented.
Emotional behavior for Kantor "consists essentially of interruptive
forms of action stimulated by rapidly changing circumstances and in all cases
involves various slight or intense general organic and visceral processes."
He considers emotional conduct to be a momentary condition of "no response"
with this cessation of activity differentiating emotional behavior from af-
fective or feeling behavior. Bringing in the aspects of Kantor's field
theory, one might say that the emotional conduct is a failure to adjust
based on past reactions and the environment. By breaking emotional behavior
 -6-

segments, specific characteristics can be examined such as the absence of

the consummatory or final responses which are blocked by the occurring be-
havior. Unless these consummatory responses occur In the proper sequence,
the behavior pattern will be disorderly. It is this lack of order which
characterizes the emotional conduct amprovides the only observable parsi-
monious method of detection, Kantor supports this view with various obser-
vations? the failure of psychologists to classify emotional acts, the inabil-
ity of the observer to detect which tyjae of emotion the person under investi-
gation is experiencing, the blunder of replacing emotions with reflexes
which are not equivalent in detection of emotional behavior* and in credit-
ing infrahuman organisms with human qualities in relation to emotions.
In order to more thoroughly investigate the various types and degrees
of emotional conductt Kantor systematically anlyzed the emotional behavior
into four segments. These separate sequences ares Pre-Emotional Behavior
Segements, Emotional Behavior Segements Proper, First-Proximate Post-Emo-
tional Behavior Segements, and Second-Proximate Post Emotional Behavior Seg-
ments. The Pre-Emotional Behavior Segment consists of whatever situation
sets the occasion for the emotional segment. It, therefore, involves the set-
ting factors and movements of the subject and stimulus object preparing to
interact. The Emotional Behavior Segment Proper is characterized by the ab-
sence of the final reaction system and the presence of visceral and general
organic functioning which operates in the absence of the consummatory re-
sponse. The emotional act involves a disintergration process of the response
pattern along with inhibition and suppression of any overt adjustments to the
situation. An emotion is, therefore, a negative form of behavior even though
it may precede an adjustment. The biological functions are also taken into
account including such factors as disturbances of digestive secretions and
respiration, contraction of blood vessels, acceleration or retardation of
the heart beat, and induction of various secretions. The First Proximate
Post-Emotional Behavior Segment is considered to be directly conditioned by
the surrounding stimulating circumstances of the moment. The type of re-
sponse is dependent upon the stimulating situation which initiated the emo-
tional act* Hth primary emotion, the acts are most likely to be large, overt
responses which involve the skeletal muscles as in the case of running or
jumping. The secondary or social emotional situation involves a gradual
transitional from a confused state back to equilibrium. The Second Proxi-
mate Post-Emotional Behavior Segment sometimes carries over to a subsequent
behavior segment. It's considered a very transitional stage bridging the
gap between isolated sequences of behavior.
Kantor feels it is necessary to distinguish emotional behavior from
non-emotional feeling behavior which have been mistakenly paired together
in the past. Feelings do not meet the criterion of the presence or ab-
sence of an organized response system and are, therefore, not classified as
emotional behavior. He especially wishes to separate emotions from passions
which operate continuously in some form constituting an autonomous system.
Unlike Watson, Kantor places love and hate under the category of passions
which can be brought about by substitute stimuli as well as by stimulating
objects such as other organisms. Sentiments are also distinguished from emo-
tions, being "prescriptive and limiting types of activity developed under
the influence of social approval." Sentiments are considered to be directed
responses resulting in some complex social behavior examples of which are
modesty, cleanliness, and charitableness. Sentiments have a broader range
of exciting stimuli, while passions are more closely linked with the surround-
ing environment,
Kantor finds the utilitarian theory of emotions to be an invalid one.
He deals with this on the organic levelf finding no utilitarian value in bio-
logical functions* The participation of an parts of the organism in bring-
ing about responses is what matters. In classifying emotional behaviorsf Kan-
tor feels that there is only one type of emotional act. By finding the spe-
cific circumstances under which an organism responds, more information can be
obtained about the process of human reaction. He singles out the errors of
giving excess meaning to a name which is similar to a symbol. Because all
reactions depend on the characteristics of the individual and the surround-
ing conditionss an investigation of the conditions is considered necessary.
The distinction between emotions and expressions is made on the assump-
tion that there is no room in Kantorfs analysis for the "expression of an emo-
tion," He claims that the doctrine of emotional expression is based onthe di~-
chotomy that divides emotions into an inner state of emotions themselves and
an outer expression of them. In dealing with emotions in infants and infra-
human organisms he considers the social experience of adult humans to be an
important factor in emotional behavior. The continuity theory begun by Dar-
win is as much in error as the doctrines initiated by the non-continuity
theorists. Kantor resolves the two opposing views with his field approach
which concentrates on the circumstances which are appropriate for responses
to be made by each organism.
While both Watson and Kantor were writingin the same decade, one can
see from the two view points given, that Watson still clumg to the tradi-
tional theories of psychology. Even though Watson was considered a radical,
Kantor was the true revolutionary, the difference being in the size of the
audiences. While introducing Behaviorism as a new school with emphasis on
the environmental effects on behavior, Watson did not shed such archaic
ideas as the nature-nurture conflict. Watson's organocentric ideology was
also fully apparent, as was his reductionistic attitude towards isolated or-
gans of the body.
Kantor brings in a field approach to deal with the problems left by
Watson and others. With his emphasis on the environment containing setting
factors and media of contact, as well as the stimulating object which exgitej?
rather than elicits, responses in the organism based on the past history, any
aspect of behavior can be dealt with objectively.

References
Kantorf J. R. Prijwrglgsi-_of_Pgy^feg^g5r, Granville, Ohio! The Principa Press,
1926.
Watson, J B 'S^l^Q^S^SlSB^S^^SI^^^L^^^^^^iS^^e Philadelphia
and London; J* B Lippincott, 1919.
*Volume 6
(Number 2 Preceding

Spring 1975

SUituiius Object
SSitrtjius
FURChttI

r
Succeeding

Interbefiavloral NOEL W. SMITH, EDITOR

DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY

quarterly STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCE
PLATTSBURGH, NEW YORK

e can analyze a given instance of behavior in its relation to the current setting and
to antecedent events in the history of the species and of the individual.
B. F. Skinner; "The steep and thorny way to a
science of behavior", American
1975f 30, 42-49.
The response of the animal to a stimulating object is not determined by the object
alonef but by the nature of the environmental context; under two different environ-
mental contexts, two "mutually exclusive" behavior patterns may be developed.
Z.-T. Kuo? THE DYNAMICS OF BEHAVIOR DEVELOPMENT?
AN EPIGENETIC VIEW, Random House, 196?,
p. 169.
The results of these experiments prove one important point; when a bird is brought
up in an environmental context in which he does not have to fly, he may not acquire
a behavior pattern of flighteven though flight is not inhibited or restricted-
while other patterns.are being developed and fixated. This failure to form an
actual flight pattern is not due to a lack of appropriate stimuli for the "instinct
of flight" at its "critical period," nor to a lack of exercise or of strength in the
neuromuscular system for flight, for many could fly when frightened by the chasing
dog. The important fact to, be borne in mind is that the combined factors of devel-
opmental history and environmental context alone are often sufficient to reduce the
range of behavioral potentials, a reduction that does not necessarily involve ana-
"-omico-physio logical factors; it is a reduction of plasticity in the formation of
.ew patterns without any need for reference to mythical pre-determined neural organ-
ization.
Kuo, ibid., p. 174-175
Crude Data Investigative Contact Scientific Construction
 AGORA

Some new and recent works that may be of interest to readers include Barber, Spanos,
and Chavess HYPNOSIS, IMAGINATION, AND HUMAN POTENTIAL, Pergamon Pressf 1975. The
de-spooking work of these authors for hypnosis and acupuncture has been previously
reported in this publication. R*G Heyduk published "Rated preference of musical
compositions as it relates to complexity and exposure frequency" in
1975 17? 84-91, which examines the influence of situational or
setting conditions and individual differences* Rollo Handy and E.G. Harwood attempt
to clarify the Dewey-Bentley concepts in reviewing John Spiegel's TRANSACTIONS;
THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL, FAMILY, AND SOCIETY. The review is entitled
"Transactional procedures misunderstood" and appears in
1975? 34? 103-112, In an article entitled "Eye contact
as a setting event for infant learning"s -
1974 17? 250-263 , Kathleen Bloom notes the important but neglected role of setting
events in S-R relationships and undertakes an experimental study that examines them
specifically. Among the social learning theorists the setting or context is receiving
increased attention as a factor in accounting for changes in responses when successive
stimuli are the same. Several studies by J,L. Gewirtz are of this nature. It is
encouraging that he has dropped the drive abstraction and replaced it with the
events of set ting j e.g., "Some contextual determinants of stimulus potency" in
R9Da Parke (ed.) RECENT TRENDS IN SOCIAL LEARNING THEORY, Academic Press? 1972.
The recognition of the distinction between stimulus object and stimulus function
would also be useful in these studies.
y y y
TV*A A'

Editorial Trillas? a publishing firm in Mexico City, and the Principia Press of
Chicago have contracted for a Spanish translation of Kantor: 1NTERBEHAVIORAL
PSYCHOLOGY. A revision by Kantor and Smith of Kantor' s A SURVEY OF THE SCIENCE
OF PSYCHOLOGY is now in the final proof-print stage under the new title: THE
SCIENCE OF PSYCHOLOGY : AN INTERBEHAVIORAL SURVEY* We will provide further
information in the next issue.
We are pleased to announce that Ronald Heyduk of Kenyon College and Donna Cone
of Lynchburg Training School & Hospital, Lynchburgf Virginia will be joining the
Quarterly as associate editors. We hope that with their assistance and the continued
contributions of our readers we will be able to improve the medium,,

Introductory psychology books are one of the best indicators of current orientations,
directions, and emphases in psychology. A sampling of the current crop of which
there is a plethora is not encouraging for those who wish to see the discipline
established on events. Those that seem to stray somewhat less from an event-based
approach than others are Whittaker: INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOLOGYf Saunders Co., and
Morgan & King, same title, McGraw-Hill. Ken Dallett's IT'S ALL IN YOUR MIND? UNDER-
STANDING PSYCHOLOGY, National Press, 1973, offers much of the usual doctrine and then
surprisingly describes the absurdity of much of it, often with the same assumptions,
however, that produced the initial difficulty. For example, "Our language describes
external actions well, but cannot describe the inner workings of man without popu-
lating him with littler men who hide inside, do our thinking, and pull our strings"
(p. 5l) In most of the texts, the two areas that seem to give rise to the most
doctrinaire assumptions are perception and brain function and neither Whittaker nor
Morgan and King escape them. There is growing emphasis in the textbooks on "cognition",
"information processing", and popular topics such as "expansion of consciousness"
which all continue to confuse constructs with events. To indicate the orientation
of a few of these works a page of quotations entitled "Shades of Medieval Theology"
is provided. If readers have run across others that coiald.be singled out either
'positively or negatively we would offer the information in this column. Statements
,/hat would make useful quotes either from introductory texts or others that could
be used under "Shades" would be gratefully received*

A COMMENTARY

An article in the ^2^2SSli 2iiiiiB? 1974i &1 1026-1028? by a Swedish psychologistf

Bo Ekehammers entitled "Interactionism in personality from a historical perspective"
gives prominent place to Kantor's contributions. However, the author seems to confuse
the interaction of inter-behaviorism with the notion of mental or phenomenal inter-
actionism. He sees much commonality with Koffka, Lewins Murry? Sullivan, Mischelf and
Angyal: their "central idea" "is essentially the same."
It seems to be very difficult to convey the vital difference between the interbehavioral
event-based approach and the traditional const rue t-based approach. Our thinking is
so conditioned by Western dualism that totally disparate alternatives are seen as
modifications or new developments within the same old metaphysics. For example,
Ekehammer attributes to Kantor the importance of distinguishing "between the physical
and psychological world." How can it be made clear that interbehaviorism holds
the entire world including human interactions to be physical, that a psychological
^vent is the interaction of organism and object , not something occuring inside the
_ndividual that is different from or additional to the interaction? How can it be
made clear that interbehavior comprises a field of object -organism interactions
(interbehaviors) in a setting or context and not a phenomenal field ("psychological
world") inside the organism interacting with the physical world? And how can it be
made clear that interbehaviorism holds to these interacting field event^ and does
not impose ^conBtructs,?
It is misleading to speak of a "psychological world" or a "psychological environment ."
Such reference to verbal construction denotes working from an organism-centered and
construct-based approach. It implies that there is meaning or knowledge or awareness
that is additional to or different from the interactionf that these are inputs to
the interactions rather than being constituted by them* The interbehaviorist insists
that meaning is the interactional eventf an interaction of a physical organism with
a physical object in a physical setting* There is no psychological world or
psychological environment that is somehow different from a physical. world or physical
environment. Psychological events are distinguished from other classes of ejjrents, by
the level of organizations and characteristics of those events? not by being non-
physical* The term "psychological world" implies the existence of such non-events
as phenomenal field or mind in addition to physical organism and physical object .
As we quoted Lucretius in the November 1970 Newsletter (Vol. 1, Nr. 5): "Therefore
everything in existence is, fundament ally? made out of two things. There are bodies
and there is the void in which these bodies have their places and through which they
move in different directions., .nothing can act or be acted upon without body and
nothing can afford space except the void and the empty. Therefore, apart from the
void and bodies it is impossible for there to exist in the sum of things any residual
third substance. Such a. substance eould never at any time come within the reach of
our senses, nor could any man lay hold of it by any process of reasoning." It is
such a "third substance" that pheno'meno legists assume and which must be distinguished
from the events that interbehaviorists adhere toa Assuredly interbehaviorism 'can
make a contribution to personality theoryf but only when it is understood that the
interbehaviorist * s interaction consists of confrentable events and that of the
phenomenologist? s of verbal constructions that involve a confusion of such constructions
with ongoing events.
SHADES OF MEUEEVAL THEOLOGY
Jerome Kagan & Ernest Havemann: 2nd ed.f Harcourt? Brace?
Javanovich, 1972.
Psychology is the science that systematically studies and attempts to explain
observable behavior and its relationship to the unseen mental processes that
go on inside the organism and to the external events in the environment, (p. 9)

Roger Brown & Richard J. Hernstein: Lf Little, Brown, 1975.

Mental Processesthe bridge between stimulus and responseare obscure because
they occur out of sight, (p. 438)
We can experience external stimuli only as they are transformed by our senses
and perception, (p. 438)
The first stages of response to a physical stimulus are triggered automatically
by activation of a sense organ. Then attention rehearses and analyzes some
aspects of the icon [after-effect of stimulus removed] and not othersf supple-
menting them with information stored in memory, (p. 438-439)
W e Lambert Gardiner: Brooks/Cole, 1970.
The psychologist is concerned with the internal processes of the organism and
with the function of the organism, (p. 4)
The system studied by the psychologist is unique in that it can be viewed from
the inside as well as from the outside. The manifestation of the processes within
the organism as viewed from the outside is behavior anci as viewed from the inside
is esgDejrijenee. (p. 4)
Experience must ultimately be based on the various forms of physical energy that
impinge on our receptors. Physical energy is transformed into nerve impulses and
then into sensations. Although some psychologists have attempted to explain all
experience in terms of sensation, others have argued that it is necessary to go
bevond_sensation. (p. 5)
Psychology is the science that studies the nervous system. This system is unique
among all the systems studied by scientists in that it may be studied from the
inside as well as from the outside. The manifestation of the functioning of the
nervous system as seen from the outside is behavior; the manifestation of the
nervous system as seen from t he inside is experience, (p. 127)

-4-
Richard Lazarus : The_M.ddle_of_Man; ^_J^Od^^on_to_P^chl^? Prentice-
Hall, 1974.
There is no way for man to know what the environment is really like out-
side of what he mentally constructs of this environment by his sense
organs and perceptual activity. Perception is "true" only in the sense
that the knowledge obtained serves us well in our interactions with the
environment . .....*....*......................................*.......
In shortf our perception of the external world is a schematic affairs
based on what has been required for species survival during evolutionary
history, rather than a direct mirroring of all that actually exists.
Our perceptual experience is so compelling, subjectivelyf that it is
difficult to divest ourselves of the literal view that perception is
the discovery of how the environment truly is and to adopt a relativistic
view that we detect some of the qualities of objects and events but
probably cannot know all of reality* (p. 58~6o)
Anthony Davids & Trygg Engen: IntrjOjduc;borX-ZgMlo^f Random Ho usef 1975.
Chapter 7 deals with sensations. All approaches and theories of psychology
have considered them the gateways to the mindf the channels of information
through which humans acquire the knowledge and the content of1 their con-
sciousness. (p. 143)
For all our unique thoughts, hopes, and behaviors, without exception,
can be traced to activity in the brain, (p. 145)
Ernest R. Hilgard, Richard C. Atkinson, & Rita L. Atkinson: Introduction^tg
Psjhc>loj2r, 6th ed., Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1975.
Neural impulses from your eye are related to your brain where various
features of the stimulus are analyzed and compared with information
about past events stored in your memory, (p. 32)
Our perception of events depends on how our sense organs detect
stimuli and our brain interprets information coming from the senses, (p. 32)
To understand behavior we need to know something of how the sensory
mechanisms are constructed and how they mediate the sensations of
light, sound, touch, taste, and the like. But perception goes beyond
the discrimination of single stimuli; the human organism must be able
to interpret and react to patterns of stimuli. He must be able to
extract information from the changing array of stimulation provided
by the environment.

CRM Books: ^22^^SI^l2^LL^^3i^^I2^^^2,t 2nd ed., 1972.

The visual informationthe lights and the musical notes are the
injDutj whatever transformations occurred between them is the rcc_essi.ng. (p. 153)
Robert E8 Silverman: PsjYhoJ.g, 2nd ed., Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1974.
Once the brain interprets a stimulus event, it relays a message through
the nervous system to the muscles and the glands; this message dictates
to the body how to respond to the stimulus, (p. 62)
 Bouquets of Roses: A Final Reply to Mount joy
Robert F. Martin
Jamestown College

I have been struck by the honest sincerity and open friendliness of the
recent series of exchanges between Martin (l973t at bj and Mountjoy (1973?
1975). It is apparent that we are in agreement in our goal to improve the
technology of higher education (teaching) and even that an operant-psychology-
derived technology is productive in that effort. An important area of dis-
agreement remainsy however.
Mountjoy (l975 p.3) points accurately to the distinction between the
technology and science of college teaching,, a distinction previously drawn
by Martin (1974). Mountjoy states; "The empirical finding is that operant
technology does change the behavior of college students* The present state
of the art is such that there is still a-great deal of room for improvement."
Agreed! This is where the discussion started, with one approach of the
science of psychology, presented by Martin (l973t a).
It is precisely because the learning (behavior) of college students
is an interbehavior between students and environmental variables, including
instructors, that the science (and, ultimately, the technology) of college
teaching must take into account the individual*s contribution to the event.
It is this transaction that operant psychology does not concern itself
withf rather concentrating on the environmental conditions. In an effort
to improve the technology of college teaching, Martin has described a
research program (l971 1972, 1973, a, b, 1974, 1975) which focuses on
the transactional context and the individual's perception of the event,
Mountjoy and, I are in total agreement in our hope to make a contri-
bution to the improvement of classroom instruction* The application of
operant technology to college teaching may be viewed as an interbehavioral
transaction with scientific psychology, each contributes to and defj.n^s the
other, as London (1972) has pointed out in another context. Both Mountjoy
and Martin serve heuristic purposes in this transaction (event), I look
forward to meeting Dr. Mountjoy in person to exchange ideas, after the
long-running and congenial discussion through Dr. Smith' s S^&Zi6^^'

References
London, P. The end of ideology in behavior modification. American
Psephologist, 1972, 27, 913-920.
Martin, R.F. Toward a conceptualization of learning processes in the college
classroom I: A review of operant research. Rjssjsarch in Education, 1971,
6, 31 Educational Resources Information Center number Ed04o044.
Martin, ReF, Toward conceptualization of learning processes in the college
classroom II: Considerations from operant and social learning theory.
Research in Education, 1972, 7, 65<
Martin, R.F, Toward conceptualization of learning processes in the college
classroom Ills Operant psychology and Rotter's social learning theory
as a basis for research* Interbehavlorj.1. Psv^cJiDj-Ogjr Nejreljitter, 1973,
4 (1), 2-19. (a)
Martinf R*F, Bub there are rosesf and there are roses.* Intgrbehfivloral
4 (4) f 6-7. (b)
Martin? R e F Toward a learning theory of college teaching; Student and
teacher perceptions of contingencies and reinforcers in the classroom
(Doctoral dissertation, University of Denver, 1974)
? 1974f 35, 74-1?? 0?88
Martinf R.F. The theory of signal detectability and Implications from
functional theories of perception for its application to social
perception. The Jojrnal Jll!hi0Jf 1975f 89? 53-63.
Motmt joy, P.T. A rose by any other name. Intertehjig-Oral
Newsletters 1973? 4f 1-5.'
Mount joy? PT e A rose is a rose is a rose. Interbeh^yj.oral
1975* 6 (l), 2-3.

-7.
 A Critique of Kohlberg' s Theory of Moral Development
from the Viewpoint of Interbehavioral Psychology
Sidney L.
L@high University
and
Donna M, Gone
Lynchburg Training School Hospital

Developmental psychologists typically concern themselves with progress-

ive changes in the behavior of organisms,, Working primarily with humansf
these investigators attempt to single out behaviors in which the changes
observed can be systematically and reliably related to the passage of time.
Among1 the "age-developmental" actions that have been studied are grasping,
walking, speaking, and many other skills>,usually displayed by humans
during their first few years of life. The majority of developmental psy-
chologists are concerned with the growth of humans from birth to adoles-
cence, simply because that period encompasses rapid and noticeable changes
in many different kinds of behavior; and because widespread public inter-
eat in child education makes it useful for politicians to channel public
funds into child development research.

So long as developraentalists observe and describe changes in the

behavior of their subjects and try to show that such changes are correl-
ated with the age of the organism, they may be respected as psychologists
and scientists. Unfortunately,, some have been unable to resist the tempt-
ation to seek recognition by imposing elaborate mentalistic theories upon
their data, instead of presenting their findings in the context of inter-
behavioral events. Even more unfortunate is the fact that they have achieved
recognition. This is probably as much the shortcoming of the people these
workers seek to impress (their peers and the money-controllers) as of the
developmentalists themselves! for mentalism is extremely pervasive in our
society, and even otherwise well-educated men have been unable to free them-
selves of this barrier to progress in science. The result has been a coll-
ection of developmental theories which have scientifically indefensible non-
entities as their central referent,
An example is Lawrence Kohlberg's theory of moral development* It is
this theory, as described by Kohlberg in Hoffman & Hoffman (1966, pp. 383-
431) that provides the subject of the present paper. Selected aspects of
Kolhberg' s orientation, theory, and conclusions will be outlined, with cri-
tical comments interspread throughout. The critical perspective will be
that of scientific naturalism, as exemplified by the interbehavioral ap-
proach to psychology (see Kantorf 1963* 19&9) I* seems appropriate, there-
fore, to devote several paragraphs to a brief description of the principles
which form the nucleus of the interbehavioral system of scientific psychology*

Kantor's Psychology

Interbehavioral psychology was founded by JeR. Kantor, a philosopher

-8-
of science and historian of psychology* Kantor recognized that the widely
accepted S-R formula of behaviorism could not adequately represent a psy-
chological event, simply because it implies that the stimulus affects, and/
or effects, the response while the response has no effect on the stimulus*
But responses do have effects on the associated stimuli! stimuli and res-
ponse j1njtract. Thus the name terbehavloral oholo v&s used to iden-
tify this new approach, and BS was adopted to symbolize the only legitimate
basic datum of psychology! an event consisting of an interaction between
a stimulus function and a response function* The term "function" is append-
ed to the two key words to emphasize the fact that the effect of a given
stimulus or response need not remain constant across or within situations.
Thus the "function" in a given interbehavioral situation is just as impor-
tant as the response and/or stimulus.

Another core concept of interbehavioral psychology is that of an

inter-behavioral field. No psychological event occurs in a vacuum. Each
is surrounded by an interbehavioral field consisting of getting factors
(including the variables usually manipulated in experimental settings as
"dependent variables", such as age, sex, and deprivation) s the j.ntgr-
behavioral history of tjie organism (including both phylogenetic and onto-
genetic history), and the medium of ontat between the stimulus function
and the response function (sdrTlight, or direct physical contact, for
example).

A third basic idea of Kantor' s system is that of the gcj-gntist-"

observer, who is himself operating in a larger interbehavioral field. In
this larger field, the scientist-observer constitutes the response func-
tion and the inter-behavioral field-event he is observing can be regarded
as the stimulus function. Again, the same kinds of setting factors men-
tioned above are present with respect to this larger interbehavioral field.

An important point is that the scientist-observer always interacts

with the field-event itself; never with constructs or other abstractions
imposed on the original event. When an observer turns to the study of
such abstractions, he can no longer be called a scientist, nor can his
activity be called scientific. Instead, he becomes a rationalistic phil-
osopher, often engaging in the invention of ever more abstract construc-
tions which are inevitably offered as (or taken to be) explanatory prin-
ciples. Unfortunately, the original event is very likely to be completely
forgotten in the process of building models from these abstractions. The
end product is often an elaborate edifice which, though purporting to ex-
plain the original event, succeeds only in demonstrating the model-building
skill of the inventor. In the words of Kantor, "This amounts to a shift
in the problem of investigation. Instead of asking what the original events
are like and how they may be subsumed under precise laws, attention is
directed to the behavior of the experimenter. Even if such a shift results
in the collection of precise and predictable results, it still bespeaks a
weak understanding of the task of research " (1969s P 381). As for ex-
planatory value, the resulting abstractions are worthless hypostatizations
which attempt to explain events by simply re-naming them a procedure that
often fails to satisfy even small children,

Interbehavioral psychology insists on studying events " e without

entangling itself with purely traditional constructions " (Kantorf 19699
p. "576) . The scientific psychologist allows neither hia choice of a re-
search problem nor his interpretation of events to be warped by the myth-
opeic transcendentalism that has dominated Western thought since the inven-
tion of spiritual man by the Church Fathers He resists the efforts of
others to impose the traditional autistic construction "soul" or any of its
many derivatives and surrogates (such as "mind", "will", "character" and
"inner capacities") on his findings,, Instead, the scientist seeks natur-
ajj-jgtic explanations of his data; and the constructs he employs as descrip-
tive aids are always tied directly to the original events or to summations
of them.

Kohlberg' s Orientation

Now that the elements of Interbehavioral Psychology have been pre-

sented a.a the basis for the critical remarks to follow, the discussion of
Kohlberg1 s theory can be undertaken,,

Kohlberg' s description of hia efforts begins with a look at the

past and current approaches to the study of children' s morality* He says
that an interest in morality itself has recently reappeared after a period
of absorption in concern for social adjustments* Here, Kohlberg suggests
that he regards morality to be different from social adjustment. He makes
this very plain when he states;

This increased interest in moral development seems to be

partly the result of recent history, which has sharpened
awareness of the distinction between internal moral devel-
opment and outward socialization and social adjustment.
The barbarities of the Nazi and Stalinist systems and the
hollow lives apparent in our own affluent society have made
it painfully obvious that adjustment to the group is no sub-
stitute for moral maturity. (p. 383) .
To the naturalistic scientist , the phrase "internal moral develop-
ment" raises an immediate and basic question! How can a scientist con-
front internal moral development? The obvious answer is that he cannot.
Internal moral development cannot be an observable event or series of events,
so it must be a construct. As a construct , there is only one way it can
be defensible from the viewpoint of the natural scientists it must be
derived directly from interbehavioral events, and defined very strictly
in terms of such natural events* It must be asked whether Kohlbergfs
idea of internal moral development meets this simple criterion,, In several

-10-
statements Kohlberg reveals that he regards internal moral development
as anything but a derivation from natural events* For example,, he asserts
that "Morality has generally been defined as 2Si5f as a set of cul-
tural rules of social action which have been jlntegmlized by the individual.
Moral development has been conceived as the increase in such iniM2.alizati.on
of basic cultural rules " (p. 384? emphasis added)* More to the pointt
Kohlberg says that the focus of recent (his own) work and that of Piaget has
been upon the judgemental side of moral developments "...the internaliza~
tion of a standard implied a csajaajxLty. to judgements in terms of that
standard " (p 384) In these two quotes there is no reference to any
natural event; no hint that such terms as "internalization of rules" and
"capacity to make judgements" have any references in the world of observ-
able events. These items are apparently offered as common sense entities
which everyone knows exist, but which no one can define* It appears, then,,
that Kohlberg departs from natural science at the outset of his investiga-
tion, by choosing a mentalistic non-entity as the central focus of his re-
search. The fact that he regards morality as something apart from naturally
occuring events is underscored heavily when he says that much moral research
has not been specifically addressed to a "distinctive set of questions basic
to researchers, and educated men alike", but rather "has viewed morality as
a type of social behavior learned like any other social behavior " (p 385)
It could not be plainer that Kohlberg believes he is dealing with a trans-
spatial entity, which, like the soul, has the miraculous ability to influence
environmental events while remaining perfectly isolated from them* His sel-
ection of a research problem has been profoundly affected by traditional
Western spiritism.

Kohlberg' s View _of_JMoral_Cha.racter

After outlining his opinions regarding the meaning of morality,

Kohlberg devotes several pages to a consideration of moral character and
moral conduct. He begins by offering several definitions of "character"
which have been used by psychologists at one time or another! from the
vacuous evasion "sum total of a set of virtues", to the more precise "ad-
hering to cultural norms of action where such adherence involves effort,
self-control, or sacrifice." He then says that "Psychologists have agreed
with common opinion that moral character traits should be assessed from
actions, rather than from judgements or feelings " (p. 386). Ciiting the
work of Rau (1965) and Hartshorne & May (1928-1930), he admits that experi-
mental evidence gives no basis for the notion of stable character traits
such as"honesty". For example, these experiments demonstrated that sltua-
tional factors (setting factors) were more important than supposed "honesty"
in predicting cheating behavior* But Kohlberg is not satisfied. He cites
Burton's (1963) factor analysis of the Hartshorne & May data which "...
indicated a snail general factor in the various experimental tests of class-
room cheating " (p. 38?) Kohlberg takes this as evidence for a stable
"personality factor" which is "more general than a specific attitude toward
honesty or fear of getting caught " (p 367). As if this were not a suffic-
iently Olympian leap of faith, he goes on to assert that "These findings sug-
gest a core of truth to common senae notions of general good character,, and

-11-
provide some justification for adding up measures of various aspects of
moral conduct into a total assessment of moral character " (p. 387)

Here we have seen an example of how the mystical transcendentalism

of the Patristics continues to enthrall twentieth-century thinkings In the
face of hard data to the contrary, Kohlberg still managed to rescue the
cherished notion of a supernaturally-existing "character" which is just
another name for the construction dreamed up by Hellenistic thinkers as
Man's answer for alls the soul*

Having saved "moral character" from death due to the demonstration

of its non-existence, Kohlberg is then able to go on to a discussion by sosie
different ways of defining it,, He begins by considering the notion of charac-
ter as "superego strength", another name for "strength of conscience*" He
says this conception fares badly because "Conformity to a moral rule has not
been found to bear much relationship to the strength of stated belief in that
rule " (p. 388) He does not let this pass unqualified, however^ In a
footnote he states "The relationships between moral judgments and moral con-
duct are more complex than these negative findings suggest, and will be dis-
cussed in detail later" (pe 388)* The promised detail consists of a rather
artful argument in which Kohlberg attempts to convince his readers that while
moral judgments and moral conduct are very different, it is still possible
to infer a common developmental process for them. He saysi "The fact that
when the chips are down children do not do what they say does not mean that
development of judgment and developjnent of conduct go along on two indepen-
dent tracks, however. Verbal judgments may not be trustworthy reports of
conduct but they may still reflect the same basic developmental process "
(p, 408). This statement occurs right after Kohlberg has stated that moral
judgment does not show until early adolescence while moral conduct appears
to develop earlyi that moral judgment seems to exhibit general and stable
individual differences while conduct is situation-specific! and that moral
judgment develops in the same direction across cultures while moral conduct
develops in line with social groups* In spite of careful re-readingf it is
impossible to escape the conclusion that Kohlberg has seriously contradicted
himself with respect to a fundamental.hypothesis of his theory* In one state-
ment he points out three major differences between the development of moral
judgment and that of moral conduct; and in the next he blithely says they
reflect the same basic developmental process. This behavior indicates that
it is highly unlikely that an^ event could have led Kohlberg to abandon his
exceptionally strong insistence on the existence of a transcendent moral
character.

Following his dismissal of the "superego" view of character, Kohlberg

looks at the interpretation of moral character as "good habits". This view,
he says, is typified by the parental faith that exposure to Sunday school,
Boy Scoutse and other character-education situations will build character.
He cites 'several studies which fail to support such an idea* He goes on to
say that there are contradictory findings with respect to the effect of

-12-
of punishment and reward on resistance to temptation* True to his spiritual-
istic philosophy, he concludes by asserting that "e,direct training and phys-
ical types of punishment may be effective in producing short-run situational
conformity but do not directly produce general internalized habits of moral
character carried into later lifes carried outside the home, or carried into
permissive situations,," (p 589) Once again Kohlberg proclaims the existence
of a mystical entity, which transcends situational factors. The argument seems
to bei "If it can be affected by environmental variations, it can't be the real
thing." This is the same iraperviousness to scientific investigation that was
given to the soul of Man (and to the essence of God) by the Church Fathers in
the first and second centuries after Christ. As Kantor (1963? p. 228) put it,
"...the greatest and most authentic realities are those that cannot be grasped,
pictured, or understood. It is such realities that are of interest to Chris-
tianity in its philosophic aspects. And it was interest in these realities
that engendered the Christian scorn for evidence and reasoning based upon obser-
vation," Kohlberg stands as an example of a present-day victim of this anti-
scientific philosophy which has either stifled, misdirected, or controverted
naturalistic investigation in every field of scientific inquiry for nearly nin-
tfe&n centuries.

Having demonstrated once again the primacy of faith ovettlatas Kohlberg

turns to the merits of viewing character as "ego strength". This, he says,
roughly corresponds to what is commonly termed "strength of will", and is pre-
sumed to include the ability to assess long-range outcomes of actions and to
delay immediate gratification in favour of greater future reward. Also included
is the ability to put oneself in the place of another, Kohlberg says that
"In psychoanalytic theory, these factors of will, foresight, and empathy are
included with other aspects of decision-making and emotional control in the
concept of "ego-strength." (p. 390),

Kohlberg then cites some studies which he views as supporting the ego-
strength interpretation of moral character. The first is a factor analysis
of character ratings among adults done by Webb (1915) which yielded a "will-
factor". Next, he points out that Hartshome and May'(1950), founfl persistence
and nondistractibility on achievement tests to be correlated with the moral
traits ofhonasty and service. He says these early findings are supported by
more recent factor-analytic investigations and by a study by Peck and Havi-
ghurst (i960) in which ego-strength ratings given by psychologist to 35 small
city adolescents "...correlated well (r = .69) with total moral character
scores (honesty, responsibility, loyalty, courage, friendliness) as rated by
community informants (schoolmates, teachers, and other adults) " (p 390).
Kohlberg admits the obviousj that it is "...quite possible that these correl-
ations were inflated by halo effects, since the raters had some knowledge of
the moral character ratings " (p. 390). In spite of the admission, he insists
on the validity of the ego-strength idea by adding, "Nevertheless, the correl-
ations with any other 'good1 aspects of personality " (p. 390). This estab-
lished, he lists five different types of ego-strength variables, and describes
correlational studies which relate each of them to some aspect of moral behav-

-13-
ior. As might be expected, the five classes of variables are all as amorphous
as ego-strength itself Consider the list; Intelligence, capacity to antic-
ipate future events, capacity to maintain focused attention, capacity to control
unsocialized fantasies, and satisfaction with self and environment* All five
types of ego-strength variables refer to some inner capacity or state of the
individual Though such constructs may be interpreted as having been derived
from natural events, the following quote leaves no doubt that Kohlberg follows
the mainstream of spiritistic philosophy by forgetting (or ignoring) the events
while giving the constructs an existence independent of them;

The above findings (those outlined above by the present

authors), in the aggregate, provide some support for the
interpretation of moral character as ego, rather than super-
ego, strength. This interpretation implies that the major
consistencies in moral conduct represent decision-making
capacities rather than .fixed behavior traits. It is thus
consistent with the findings on situational variation, which
suggestedthat moral conduct was the product of a situational
decision,, (pp. 391-392).

Kohlberg has not only reified the construct "decision-making capacities", he

has put it in actual control of the very behavior from which it was originally
inferred.

At this point in Kohlberg1 s chapter, it is clear that he subscribes

to the ego-strength view of moral character. Kohlberg is then ready to discuss
attempts to fix the age at which moral character is formed. He concludes that
although experimental investigations have indicated that moral behavior as
measured by stealing and cheating are not age-related, and although adult's
ratings of moral character-traits of children also fail to vary regularly
with age, these negative findings could result from the fact that "...morally
conforming conduct poorly represents underlying moral attitudes or 'moral con-
trol1" (pp 59?-393) Yet again, Kohlberg has implied that events are
nothing compared to mystical constructs.

The Developmental Theory of Moral

. Judgement

It is from this philosophic orientation, steeped in the transcend-

entalism of Plotinus and St. Augustine, that Kohlberg approaches his inves-
tigation of morality. At the outset, he declares his intention to ignore
events in favour of constructs: "While moral behavior has not lent itself
to age-developmental analysis, the study of moral judgement has readily
suggested basic stages of development " (p. 394). This is underscored by
another statement made by Kohlberg in the same paragraph, in which he says
that moral knowledge scores (presumably based on the behavior of saying the
rules) "... seem primarily to indicate intelligence, cultural background, and
desire to make a good impression, rather than basic moral development " (p. 394)

-14-
It could not be plainer that Kohlberg regards events as superficial and unim-
portant compared to spiritistic constructions such as "basic moral development".
Yet he is forced to rely on events (verbal iriterbehavior) as the fundamental
data of his investigations. As an example of this kind of data, Kohlberg offers
the reply of ten-year-old Danny, who was asked whether he ould tell his father
about a transgression of his brother. Danny's reply was ambivalent, pointing
out that if he didn't, he might be spanked by his father; but if he did, he
could get beaten up by his brother. Kohlberg lays his "other-wordly" orienta-
tion bare when he declares? "Obviouslyf whether Danny decides it is right to
maintain authority or right to maintain peer 'loyalty' is of little interest
compared to the fact that his decision will be based on his anticipation of
who can hit harder " (p, 394). It is apparent that Kohlberg has exactly re-
versed the priorities of interest. Danny's behavior in an actual conflict sit-
uation (the ultimate outcome of any decision he makes) is what must be dealt
with, not "internal processes" inferred from his verbalizations,

Kohlberg's Goal and Method

Kohlberg indicates that his research has as its immediate goal the
understanding of responses to hypothetical moral conflict stories-which are
characteristic of an age group. Such research, according to him, involved
analysis of the underlying thought structures found at differentages in order
to discover general developmental directions. Both the goal itself and the
type of analysis employed raise serious questions.

Regarding the goal, what is meant by "understanding"? Kohlberg

implies that "understanding" goes hand in hand with the ability to isolate
contributing factors. Thus "understanding" implies "ability to manipulate".
Perhaps Kohlberg would object strongly to so utilitarian a view of the
term "understanding", but it must be admitted that such a view removes the
undesirable vagueness inherent in the term. It may now be inferred that
Kohlberg proposes to discover variables that influence children' s statements
concerning hypothetical moral conflict situations. This is an entirely comm-
endable proposal, consistent with naturalistic investigation. Unfortunately,
it will later become clear that Kohlberg completely loses sight of the simplic-
ity and boundedness of the original behavioral field-events he observed, and
somehow convinced himself he was dealing with such transcendental non-entities
as morality, conscience, a.nd universal human values.

His intention to analyze underlying thought structures simply reflects

his spiritistic approach. Even though he has no choice but to study verbal
behavior, he says he is examining "thought structures". Again, a rejection
of events in favour of constructs is apparent. For Kohlberg, the construct
has become the basic stuff of research possible because constructs may be
divorced from theevents they were originally intended to summarize or illuminate,
and can be linguistically tailored to fit theoretical orientations much more
readily than data. (Perhaps this is the basis for the expression "hard data"
-- data is "hard" in the sense that it cannot be stretched or compressed by
linguistic machinations as can fluid constructs).

-15-
Kohlberg'a Categorization of Moral Judgement

Kohlberg defines six general types of moral orientation, each of which

"could be defined in terms of its specific stance on 32 aspects of morality"
(p. 400).

The three "stages of morality" and the six orientations subsumed under
them stand out as an example of imposing' constructs on events,, In the ordinary
practice of science, it is perfectly legitimate to derive constructs from events
so long as the events retain their primacy and the constructs remain merely sum-
marizing agents. In the present case, the events are verbal responses of boys
to hypothetical conflict situations imposed under specific conditions by specific
persons. It is highly unlikely that such grand and complex constructs as "naive
instrumental hedonism" and "morality of individual principles of conscience" can
be shown to have been deriygd from such circumscribed events. Instead, mythopeic
constructions founded in the folklore of the sociocultural matrix were imposed
on the events, so that the boundedness of the original interbehavioral event-field
is forgotten in favour of the nearly limitless scope of the spiritistic constructs.

To show how each orientations might be defined in terms of its "specific

stance on 32 aspects of morality", Kohlberg offers an example of the definition
of the six orientations in terms of aspect 10, "Motivation for Rule Obedience
or Mpral Action."s

Orientation Is Obey rules to avoid punishment.

Orientation ?:.' Conform to obtain rewards, have favours
returned, and so on.
Orientation 5s Conform to avoid disapproval, dislike by others.
Orientation 4: Conform to avoid censure by legitimate author-
ities and resultant guilt.
Orientation 5s Conform to maintain respect of impartial spec-
tator judging in terms of community welfare.
Orientation 6: Conform to avoid self-condemnation.
(p. 400)

It will be noticed that each "definition" can be derived linguistically

from each orientation, in complete absence of any contact with events. As such,
they do not constitute definitions at all, but are merely re-statements, expan-
sions, or reconstructions of the constructs.

Kohlberg then presents a figure which shows how the percentage of re-
sponses reflecting each of the six orientations changes as age changes (p, 403).
On the whole, the figure shows that the greater percentage (more than 70%)
of the responses of seven-year-olds were classified as reflecting Orientation 1,
while practically none reflected Orientation 6, and only slightly more reflected
Orientation 4 For boys of age 10, Orientation-1 responses were only about
3?% of thetotal, while Orientation-4 responses accounted for more than 15%
Orientation-6 responses were still essentially non-existent for these boys*

-16-
In the 15-year-old group, Orientation-4 responses accounted for about 32%,
while Orientation-1 commanded only about 12%. Some Orient at ion-6 responses ap-
peared in thisgroup, comprising about, 4% of the total. Among boys of age, 16,
the last age shown, Orientation-4 responses were still the moat prevalent,
taking around M% of the total, with Orientation-1 taking only about 11% and
Orientation-^ about 5% One should be careful not to forget that these data
do not represent successive observations of the same boys at four age levels.
Rather, the data at each age level is obtained from a different group of boys*

Kohlberg asks how "level of maturity of moral judgement" (as disting-

uished from "intellectual maturity") might be defined. His answer is; "...a
more mature judgement is a more moral judgement . This does not mean that a
child who utters mature judgements is a more moral person, as judged by the
standards of his community,, It means that his judgements more closely corres-
pond to genuine moral judgements as these have been defined by philosophers. "
(p. 405). According to Kohlberg, most philosophers agree that moral judgements
are those which concern the "good" and the "right" of actions. Kohlberg himself
takes this definitions a step further by suggesting that many pronouncements
about the "good" and "right" are not moral judgements; rather, they are esthetic^
prudential, or technological evaluations. In contrast to such statements, he
says, "...moral judgements tend to be universal, inclusive, consistent, and to
be grounded on objective, impersonal, or ideal grounds " (p. 405) He cites
his own work (Kohlberg, 1958) in support of that statement.

The usefulness of Kohlberg 1 s definition of a moral judgement as dis-

tinct from esthetic or other judgements lies in the fact that a statement may
be labelled a genuine moral judgement without regard to whether the examiner
agrees with the judgement.

Developmental Trends in Moral Judgement

Kohlberg says that the trend of development in Western culture is to-

ward a greater frequency of genuine more judgements, &e further states that
"...such an interpretation of the direction of moral judgement implies that the
development is in many ways the same, regardless of the child's nation (in
western culture), social class, peer group, or sex While such a belief flies
in the face of prevalent notions of unlimited cultural relativism, it is somewhat
supported by empirical evidence " (p. 406). The evidence is inferred from
studies of various groups by Piaget (specific studies notcited) and Kohlberg
(1964). Kohlberg adds that "The statement that the same stages of judgement
were found means that children's answers could be categorized the same with-
out overlooking obviously new kinds of responses, that individual children
were consistent in stage regardless of group membership, and that the age order
of the stages was the same in all social groups " (p. 406).

Here, Kohlberg is to be commended for remaining close to the original

interbehavioral events he observed (the children's answers) and his own inter-
behavior with them (catergorization into stages). Nevertheless, it is doubt-
ful that his discovery of age-related differences in the count of verbalizations

-17-
that he considers to fall into certain self-created categories "flies in the
face of prevalent notions of unlimited cultural relativism," regardless of
whether or not such -differences are observed across many cultural groxips.
Few people are likely to dispute that age-related differences in the count of
moral statements which "tend to be universal, inclusive, consistent, and to be
grounded on objective, impersonal or ideal grounds" (pe 405) will be found
across cultures. But the most parsimonious explanation of these differences
is that a child must jlearn to verbalize about hypothetical constructs such as
"universal ideals" ; further,, a child must jLearn to verbalize in a manner that
will be described by others as "inclusive, consistent, objective, and imperson-
al." There is no reason to believe that such learning would not be age-related
in any and all cultures.

jBocial Influences on the Development of Moral Judgement

Kohlberg continues to take issue with the idea that social groups deter-
mine moral development by asserting that his findings indicate participation
in various social groups merely stimulates the "development, of basic moral
values", rather than causing "conflicting developmental trends in morality "
(p. 407). As he puts it,

The child lives in a total social world in which

perceptions of the law, of the peer group, and of
parental teachings all influence one another. While
various people and groups make conflicting
damands upon the child, they do not seem to present
the child with basically con Licting or different
general moral values. In the course of "normal"
development, the conflicts between the demands of
groups and individuals constitute the material for
the discrimination and development of such general
moral values."
(p. 407)

The problem here is that Kohlberg has yet again deluded himself into
believing he is examining the unexaminable. His reference to "conflicting
immediate demands" made by various groxrps seems to be a reference to a con-
crete interbehavioral event. But in spite of his own admission that different
groups make conflicting demands on the behavior of the child, he maintains
that these different groups share the same basic set of "general moral values."
This can be seen as a denial that general moral values influence the behavior
of the group. If such values had any effect, the behavior of the different
groups with respect to these values would be the same .(because they share the
same "general moral values"), and no group would make conflicting demands on
the behavior of its members. Apparently, Kohlberg has again contradicted
himself while trying to make a crucial point. It seems very inconsistent with
ordinary logic to assert that different groups will demand different kinds
of moral behavior if their definitions of moral behavior are the same. Con-
versely, the fact that they do demand different kinds of moral behavior nec-
essarily implies that their definitions of moral behavior differ.

-18-
 The difficulty here probably stems from the fact that Kohlberg has
simply ignored actual events (behavior labelled as "moral" and the act of
defining and labelling such behavior) in order to discuss impressive-
sounding mystical nonentities like "general moral values". One of the most
useful properties of such transcendent constructions is their complete immunity
to scientific and logical practice. With this immunity,, they can be endowed
with whatever attribute seems convenient. In the present case, one finds
that "general moral values" do not affect the behavior of groups (because they
behave differently even though they ostensibly share the same values); nor
are the ".general moral values" of a group member affected by the behavior of
the group. Yet the behavior of the groups "constitute,5 the material for the
discrimination and development of such general moral values" of the member
(p. 4-07). So it can be seen that "general moral values" are shaped by the
behavior of groups while remaining unaffected by that behavior* In addition,
"general moral values" are the same across the groups that provide material
for their discrimination and development* Such contradictory attributes cannot
be denied, because they describe a linguistic invention, a name without a
referent in the naturalistic world. It is the privilege of the inventor of
such constructs to endow them with any attributes he wishes} without regard to
the logical restrictions associated with mundane events. These non-entities
transcend all such restrictions , and their users take full advantage of this
property to make their arguments unassailable. Whether known to their users
or not, these constructs can always be exposed as thinly-veiled linguistic
substitutes for the soul. These autistic constructions continue the purpose
of the soul: they give the human his godlike attributes, separating him once
and for all from non-human creatures.

Satisfied that he has made his point with respect to the development
of moral judgement, Kohlberg turns next to the development of "guilt" and
"other reactions to transgression". He considers these to be important aspects
or morality, but not central components. The story is much the same| the basic
data (responses of children to hypothetical situations) are largely ignored,
while menfcalistic constructs like "capacity for internal guilt" assume central
importance. Thus story-completion responses of children are seen as indicating
either "moral anxiety", "true guilt", or something in between the internal
moral reaction of self-criticism and the externally focused anxiety represented
by a preoccupation with punishment" (p. 4-11).
After discussing the effects of punishment on the development of guilt
reactions, Kohlberg concludes that "successful study of the role of early
punishment and genetically primitive forms of guilt in later conscience devel-
opment may require extensive longitudinal study" (p. 413). It is doubtful
that the most extensive longitudinal development will do more than clarify
the effects of early punishment on later behaviors. The development of conscience
will remain a matter for dualistic philosophers and tieologians to discuss.
There is no way for natural events, no matter how carefully and extensively
observed, to yield information concerning supernatural inventions.

-19-
 Kohlberg turns next to a. discussion of the theory that guilt is depen-
dent on the child's identification with, or taking the role of, the wronged
or punishing other. In general, his interpretation of these theories is that
"...positive and affectional relations to others are in general conducive to
role-taking and acceptance of social standards " (p. 414). He also states that
such a relationship need not be with a parents "...a child should more readily
accept the values of an adult who is liked or accepted..." (p. 414) He then
says, "The greater acceptance of moral standards by warmly treated children does
not appear to lead to greater moral control in terms of these standards, how-
ever." (p. 414).

The problem with Kohlberg's interpretation of the "identification" the-

ories of guilt acqtiisition is that it centers on the child's acceptance of the
"moral standards" of the adult, which according to Kohlberg, is not reflected
by "moral control". One is led to the inference that "acceptance" is gauged
by verbal interactions with the child, while "control" is measured by situa-
tional behavior and ratings. Seen this way, the assertion that "acceptance"
does not, lead to "control"-is very similar to the earlier statement that "...
when the chips are down, children do not do what they say..." (p. 408).
It is not surprising to find Kohlberg emphasizing what they say ("acceptance
of moral standards")over what they do("moral control").

Summary and Conclusions

The present paper has offered a critical review of Lawrence Kohlberg's

theory of the development, of moral judgement as he described it in Hoffman A
Hoffman (1964). Criticisms were presented from the viewpoint of interbehav~
ioral psychology (Kantor; 19^3 19&9) ^ne central concepts of interbehavioral
psychology were outlined, including the interbehavioral field-event, the
scientist-observer, the primacy of events over constructs, and the rejection
of dualistic assumptions. Following the sketch of Kantor's psychology, Kohlberg1s
orientation to the study of morality wa0 examined and found to be grossly spir-
itistic. Next, Kohlberg's developmental theory of moral judgement was analyzed
on the basis of his own description of it. Included in this analysis were an
example of his basic data and a brief look at his methodology. Then attention
was given to his categorization of moral judgement, and the notion of develop-
mental trends in moral judgement. Finally Kohlberg's views concerning the devel-
opment ofguilt were briefly mentioned.

At every point in the analysis, Kohlberg's work was seen to be thoroughly

inundated with dualistic assumptions. Such assumptions were apparent from the
outset, when Kohlberg implied that, "internal moral development" must be under-
stood, rather than "outward social adjustment". This spiritistic orientation
removes his work from the realm of scientific psychology and relegates it to
idealistic philosophy. In the words of Kantor (1969* PP. 376-377)

-20-
 While scientists in their investigations can hardly escape
contacts with events, they can be so influenced by historical
traditions as to select data andproblems prejudicially and to
employ methods that tend to distort the knowledge gained by
the research. The worst consequence, obviously, is the emer-
gence of the belief that what one is studying is something
entirely different from the original events which suggested
the problem to be investigated in the first place,

In addition to continually giving mystical constructs primacy over

natural events, Kohlberg was found to have seriously contradicted himself
with respect to the major points of his theory. The most serious contradiction
occurred when he asserted that the development of moral judgement and the devel-
opment of moral conduct are the same, after previously listing three dimensions
along which they show different developmental patterns* Other contradictions
appeared when he argued that moral judgement ia unlearned, yet arises from efforts
of the child to "make sense" of his environment,, One further contradiction
occurred when he stated that different groups make conflicting moral demands on
a child, but that these groups share the same moral values*

In each instance, it was pointed out that the contradictions arose as

a consequence of Kohlberg' s insistence on dealing with ethereal constructions
rather than with the field-events he actually observed. When dealing with ling-
uistic constructs that name spiritistic non-entities, such contradictions can
be termed "paradoxes" (as if calling them paradoxes added anything to knowledge),
But .in the world of natural events, contradictions are a warning that something
is wrong. In Kohlberg1 3 case, the thingthat is wrong is his attempt to force
events to correspond to prefabricated autistic construction.

Though his enthrallment by traditional Christian doctirnes prevented

him from seeing his data in its naturalistic field, his data stand out as a
valuable contribution to psychology. His records of the verbal responses to
hypothetical moral dilemmas of many children of different ages living in var-
ioTis societies can be used to clarify the factors influencing such interbehav-
ior and to illuminate the relation between these verbalizations and the acts of
children.

References

Burton, R . V , The generality of honesty reconsidered, Psvcholgl_cal

Jteview, 196?, 70, 481-500.

Hartshorne, H. and May, M. A. Stiuyjgg^jji^^jy^^ s

Vol. I, StudJ_esJ.n__Dcei_t; Vol. II, Studies in Self-Control;
Vol. Ill, Studies in the Organization of Character^ jjew yorks
MacMillan, 1928-1930,

-21-
H o f f m a n , L.W. , and Hoffman, M.L., (eda.) Revj.ew_j>f_J]hijLd_J)evelogmgnt
f Vol. ?. Hartford, Conn.; RuaselL Sage Foundation, 1966.

Karitor, J . H . ZtiLJi2JJ!ILLLlllJELJ^ Vol.. J . Chicago?

The I ' r i n o i p i a l'r<8n, 19&9*

Kohlherg, L. The development, of modes of moral thinking and choice in

the years ten to sixteen. Unp\iblished doctoral dissertation,
University of Chicago, 195^.,

Koh-lberg, L. The development of children's orientation toward a moral

order: T.I. Social experience, social, conduct, and the develop-
ment of moral thought, Vj1ta.Huniana!, 1964^(in press at time of
citation in Hoffman & Hoffman) ~.

Peck, R.P., & Havighurst, R . J . ^2^S^S^122^L^I^^^l^L^^S}^S^[lie

New Yorks Wiley, I960.

Ran, L. Conscience and identification. In R . R . Sears, L. Rau, & R. Alpert,

Identification and_^jLj.dj~rearing Stanford, Gal.: Stanford
University Press.

Webb, B. Character and. intelligence. Bri_tish_jlol!^

J^nographSup^plement, 1915? 1

-22-
 folume 6
Number 3
Summer 1975

Herbefiavforcil
NOEL W. SMITH, EDITOR
DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY
STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCE PLATTSBURGH, NEW YORK

It is a commonplace that psychology as one of the sciences is the study of

sueh activities as seeing^ hearing! learning, remembering, thinking, desir-
ing, reasoning, and so on* It is also common knowledge that whenever an
organism performs psychological activity, it is interacting with something
under specific conditions. Normally one does not see or hear unless one sees
some object or hears a sound,, One does not plan unless one plans some action,
some work, some project or some vacation. These things and conditions with
which one interacts are conventionally called stimuli. Such stimuli are
said to elicit or incite the organism's behavior. It is more accurate, how-
ever, to think of stimuli as coordinate actions which occur in a single com-
plex event. Because all psychological events consists of just such inter-
actions of organisms and stimlus objects we may therefore describe psychology
as the study of the interbehavior of organisms with things and events. Since
the interbehavior of organisms and objects consists of specific reciprocal
actions called function we may describe psychology as the investigation of
the interbehavior of responses and stimlus functions,
J. R. Kantor & N. W. Smiths THE SCIENCE
OF'PSYCHOLOGY: AN'INTERBEHAVIORAL SURVEY,
Principia Press, Chicago, 1975* p. 3.

The precise nature of human nature has over the ages been the target of
thinkers. As a symbolic reference to an early date we may refer to the
delineation by Theophrastus (370-287 B. C.) of various human traits. From
the standpoint of interbehavioral psychology, the invalidity of all such
attempts is owing to the organocentrism of locating essential qualities
solely in the organism* Scholars sought for causes in responding organisms
without regard to the events in which they participate. According to inter-
behavioral psychology, human nature is interbehavior and interbehavior is
always a complex event that can only be described as ways organisms adjust
themselves to things, whether organic or inorganic. It follows then that
the capacities of organims and their performances are evolved during their
contacts with stimulus objects in the various stages of their interbehav..
ioral histories,....Human nature is experience and circumstance* The char-
acter of a person is a function of his interbehavioral history and the im-
mediate circumstances that surround him It is these two factors that in-
fluence his character as an idealist, pragmatist, man of honor, thief, ex-
pert j dunce, compiler, protestant, thinker, practitioner, and so on through-
out all the categories of mankind.
Ibid., -492-493
DONNA M. CONE, ASSOCIATE EDITOR RONALD G. HEYDUK, ASSOCIATE EDITOR
LYNCHBURG TRAINING SCHOOL AND HOSPITAL KENYON COLLEGE

Crude Data investigative Contact Scientific Construction

 2

THE AGORA

The revision of A SURVEY OF THE SCIENCE OF PSYCHOLOGY published in 1933

and now revised under the title THE SCIENCE OF PSYCHOLOGY: AN INTERBEHAV-
IORAL SURVEY is now available. A separate announcement is being included
with this issue of the Ooaarterly.

William Stephenson whose views have many points in common with inter-
behaviorism has published "Methodology of the Single Case Studies", Journal.
1975, 5S 3-16. THE SCIENCE AND POLITICS OF
I,Q. by Leon J.' Kamin, published by Wiley, can be added to the .list of
those beginning to question the absoluteness of intelligence, David Layzer
provides a worthwhile review of the book in Scientifi^J^^rica^if July 1975.
Layzer himself has an article on the subject in ScJ.ence? 1974., 183 , 1259-
1266, Stephenson considers the Layzer work in his article.
***
Beginning with this issue the Quarterly is enhanced by the services of
two new associate editors ; Donna Cone and Ronald Heyduk. Any commentaries
or contributed materials may 'be addressed to any of the three editors.
Even with additional assistance this periodical must continue to rely on
its readers for contributions. If a book or article strikes you as news-
worthy positively or negatively or you wish to comment on anything on the
current scene or see something quotable please let the editors know,. If
a student writes a paper that might be suitable it could f;nd its place
beside those of other students that have appeared in these pages.

The Midwestern Association of Behavior Analysts has asked us to make the

following announcement*,

The Midwestern Association of Behavior Analysis announces its Second Annual

Convention to be held at the Blackstone Hotel in Chicago, May 1-4- , 1976.
FiABA is an interdisciplinary group of professionals, paraprofessionals, and
students who are interested in the experimental and/or applied analysis of
behavior. The purpose of the convention is to provide a forum for the
presentation of papers, symposia, and workships concerning all aspects of
behavior analysis. Included in the program will be invited addresses, con-
versation hours, slide shows, and films. The First Annual MBA Convention
was successful in bringing together over 1200 persons interested in behav-
ior analysis. Attendance for the Second Annual Convention is estimated to
be approximately 2000. Those persons interested in making a presentation
or attending the 1976 convention should write for information to: MABA,
Department of Psychology, Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, Michigan
49008.

The paper by Jacqueline Farrington Kelley is the fourth to appear in the

Newsletter/Quarterly. The earlier ones were 1970, 1(3), 1971, 2(5), 1972,
3U).
 COMMENT; Operatlonism vs. Operational Definitions

Modern psychologists seem to be always on the defensive when dealing with

members of the more traditional sciences. Somewhere near the beginning of the
course, students of introductory psychology are given a detailed list of the rea-
sons why psychology is a science. If one of the fledlings possesses the temerity
to ask how psychology can measure mental events, the typical answer is "We can
measure anything as long as we define it operationally".

Since 1928, when the physiciist P.W. Bridgman first discussed operationism,
scientists as a group and psychologists in particular have felt obligated to oper-
ationally define their terms. The difficulty of doing this has largely been for-
gotten although it was clearly recognized by S.S. Stevens in Chapter I of what has
surely emerged as the King James version of the modern experimental psychologists'
Bible, Handbook of Experimental Psychology. On page 3 of this 1951 work, Stevens
makes the following observation:

"It is generally accepted that semantical rules should be in the nature of

operational definitions but the problem of contriving definitions that meet the
operational test of meaning is, as Bridgman showed in 1928, a serious, difficult
business. It is easy enough to say "Let jc represent the ratio of responsibility
to liberalism', but it is hard to know what, if anything, we are talking about."

Certainly one of the most famous, and most ridiculous, misuses of operational
definitions is: "Intelligence is whatever intelligence tests measure". The sole
value of that statement is to remind the psychometrician of the limits he places
on himself by the particular test he chooses.

The problems of misuse of operational definitions in psychology can be largely

avoided if the psychologist derives the operationally defined terms at the proper
time in the sequence of events comprising an experiment. Step 1 in the planning
of a psychological experiment is crucial. The behavior which constitutes the
subject of study must be p sychologically meaningful, as determined by observation
of the organisms involved. The study then must be designed to further elucidate
natural events known to be of interest and importance and must not be designed to
demonstrate the existence of some traditional concept which non-scientists have
used to fill the gaps in their explanations of behavior. The writings of such
early intelligence testers as Sir Francis Galton reveal that the latter was their
purpose. Intelligence tests were to be used to confirm the inferiority of women
and savages, indeed, all who were not of the noble class. While somewhat less
chauvinistic in intent, the early intelligence tests of Ebbinghous, Binet, Terman,
Wechsler and others were designed to provide a "scientific" means of classifying
individuals. Too often these instruments have been used to confirm the traditional
biases of special interest groups.

What then is the proper way of defining intelligence? First, it must be ask-
ed if intelligent behavior is a type of behavior one notes when observing people
interacting with certain stimulus objects in certain settings. If there is some-
thing there, such as adeptness at dealing with a variety of formal problems or
quicktiess at learning new tasks, then controlled situations must be set up to study
these phenomena. After extensive study, it may be possible to derive tests which
will identify individuals who will respond in a predicatable way in a given setting.
Operational definitions are to be used in setting up the conditions for study and
in specifying the exact role to be played by the observer or experimenter. This
constitutes good technique and guarantees that undesired fluctuations from setting
to setting are kept to a minimum.

When operationism is used by the psychologist as a part of his definition of

the experimental or observational set-up and of his role in it, it is being used
properly. Operationism is also being used properly when it serves to remind the
scientist of just how far he can validly generalize his results. Operationism is
being improperly used when it makes it possible for the scientist to create events
which exist only as verbalizations of individuals working in the dualistic tradition
of our culture.

Operationism is also a poor servaftt of the scientist when it leads him to

doubt the reality of the world around him. In a recent article published in the
Mexican Journal of Behavior Analysis (1965, 1, 31-38), J.R. Kantor discusses how
Bridgman himself practiced "the worst kind of metaphysics" (p.36). Kantor details
Bridgman's move to a nihilism in which he concludes in his 1936 work, The Nature of
Physica.1 The_ory_: "What we mean by physical reality is to a large extent a matter
of convention and convenience" (p.120). The same can be said for what psycholo-
gists have meant by intelligence.

As stated earlier, the key to the proper usage of operationism lies in the
scientist's manner of planning and executing an experiment or observation. Op-
erational (i.e., measurable) definitions of the participants and their roles must
be made in order to realize good technique. But this technical skill must not be
allowed to shake the scientists' basic assumption that the world, including him-
self, is a conglomerate of natural events subject to study by the most mundane
methods.

Donna M e Cone

That existence is, the single case in operation should9 of course? be the
primary concern of psychology and psychiatry.
William Stephenson:
"Methodology of Single Case Studies"
 INTERBEHAVIORAL PSYCHOLOGY: A PROPOSAL
FOR A CLEAR DIRECTION

As one whose inclinations never allow for issues relating to the

history and systems of the discipline to be ignored for long, the psy-
chologist with an interbehaviora1 orientation is compelled occasionally
to reflect upon current trends in the conceptualization of behavior and
its determinants, and especially upon the status of the interbehaviora1
perspective with respect to the psychological Zeitgeist. Following my
recent acceptance of an associate editorship of the Quarterly, I took
some time to collect my thoughts on these matters, much as I did five
years earlier as I neared the end of my graduate studies. In great
contrast to the optimism about the future of interbehaviorism in scien-
tific psychology that I expressed then in the recently initiated News-
letter (Volume 1, Number 3, May 1970), my more recent conclusion is a
less hopeful one, and only partly, I suspect, as a.result of my loss
of graduate school innocence!

It appears to me now that any inroads the interbehaviora1 perspec-

tive may have made in recent years are more than balanced by movements
toward a more widespread acceptance of mentalistic descriptions and
explanations of psychological events. In fact, a survey of current psy-
chological media led me to conclude that mentalism, in its disguise as
brain reductionist^ has a wider appeal now than a few years ago as a
result of the proliferation of new introductory texts and popular psy-
chology magazines that capitalize upon the dramatic appeal of recent
discoveries in physiological psychology. The common characteristic of
these publications is that the brain is firmly entrenched as a surrogate
for the mind, endowed with the same supernatural abilities to independent-
ly determine, initiate, and even perform acts of the whole organism.
Furthermore, given the existing reductionistic bias, new discoveries of
intraorganismic influences upon interbehavior are interpreted as addition-
al "proof" that the brain is the locus of behavior determination, and
thus the initial assumptions effectively direct their own strengthening
in a never-end process.

As much as the interbehaviora1 psychologist might wish to observe

and report the rampant mentalism of modern psychology with the objectivity
of a scientist, it is difficult to avoid discouragement over the fact
that after a full half-century of spiritualistic preconceptions muddling
the research and conclusions of empirical psychologists, we are no closer
to eliminating them than we were when behaviorists first offered their
hopeful but finally inadequate antidote. If, then, psychologists have
failed and continue to fail so miserably at basing the science of behavior
on naturalistic principles, in what direction should interbehaviorists
channel their energies and special competence in an effort to influence
the course of events within our discipline?

Obviously, the task of influencing the psychological Zeitgeist is

a formidable one, but perhaps not hopeless if we make our goals as inter-
behavioral psychologists clearer than we have made them previously. I
do not presume to have a unique, insight into what those goals might best
be, but from my perspective at a small teaching-oriented liberal arts
institution, I would suggest that a more systematic consideration of the
relationship between interbehavioral notions and. teaching would be well
worth the effort required.

My experiences with presenting interbehavioral conceptions in several

introductory psychology classes and in a philosophy of psychology course,
as well as my experiences as a student, have convinced me that inter-
behavioral psychology can be a valuable teaching tool. The. interactional
way of describing psychological events offers a dramatic contrast to the
predominant orientations of modern psychology (e.g., behavioristic,
physiological, cognitive) and thus provides students with a better under-
standing of the notion of a psychological system while freeing them from
standard patterns of thinking about psychological issues associated with
the more popular systems. Perhaps most impressively, I have noted that
an appreciation of interbehavioral psychology leads to an appreciation of
scientific psychology as an empirical but philosophical endeavor; that
is, in understanding the interbehavioral approach it becomes clear that
psychologists are pursuing answers to the same important questions about
man that have always stimulated the interest of philosophers, but are
doing so using the powerful tools of empirical science. Most psychological
systems either entangle the student in such a web of constructs and pre-
suppositions that the data of behavior are lost, or else stress the em-
pirical while denying or not clarifying underlying assumptions and ignoring
the meaningful questions concerning behavior that might be answered by the
data. In contrast, the interbehaviorist never loses sight of the impor-
tant issues concerning man's complex interbehavior in natural environments,
but prizes above all else the objective approach to their resolution.

In light of the fact that the interbehavioral approach to psychology

may have its greatest and most positive impact in the classroom, I
propose that in succeeding issues the Quarterly provide a forum for inter-
action among its readers about the teaching of interbehavioral psychology
or teaching psychology from an interbehavioral perspective. I urge every
reader actively involved or interested in teaching to contribute something
in the coming months, whether it be suggestions about teaching aids, a
reading list for the student of interbehaviorism (or the instructor), a
report of positive or negative teaching experiences, a discussion of a
psychological issue or issues that lend themselves to an interbehavioral
treatment, or an interbehavioral analysis of teaching* The Quarterly will
attempt to evolve a suitable presentation format in response to the nature
of the contributions made, with the hope of better serving its intended
purpose as a coordinator and communicator of ideas about objective approaches
to psychology (Volume 1, Number 1, January 1970).

In our efforts to be more systematic about the teaching of inter-

behaviorism, we should be encouraged by the fact that interbehavioral
psychology had its origins in classrooms at Indiana University, just
as most of us developed our enthusiasm for the approach in that setting.
If it is not within our capabilities to influence the psychological Zeitgeist
more directly and immediately, we should at least dp our best to insure
that our understanding of and excitement about interbehaviorism will be
communicated to those in our classes as effectively as possible. Perhaps
we can make no more important contribution to the advancement of an
objective, naturalistic psychology.

Ronald G. Heyduk
Book Review

Elliott S. Valenstein; BRAIN CONTROL: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF BRAIN

STIMULATION AND PSYCHOSURGERY. New York: Wiley, 1973

In this book Valenstein provides a critique of the notion of man as

a machine controlled by his brain that appears in much of the popular lit-
erature and even some of the professional. While Valenstein does not aban-
don the brain doctrine he goes far toward giving it a more proper role as
one factor among many.
In reviewing the studies on electrical stimulation of "pleasure centers"
he notes that the animal engages in operant responding to obtain more stim-
ulation not just when a single point or center is stimulated but from exten-
sive areas of the brain. When humans are stimulated their reports about what
they feel are rather vague. Sometimes for both males and females sexual
stimulation is reported thus suggesting biological rather than psychological
implications In stimulations that attempt to obtain muscle flexion the
result is single muscle contraction or mere twitches, rarely an entire limb.
In Delgado's work in which a remote control signal to a brain electrode
changed a charging bull into a docile bull the feat was accomplished by stim-
ulation of motor responses that caused the bull to turn to one side. Other
studies indicate that such stimulation disrupts brain functioning generally
so that confusion ensues. These two factors Valenstein sees as responsible
rather than "behavioral inhibition" contended by Delgado whose "propensity
for dramatic9 albeit ambiguous demonstrations has been a constant source for
those whose purposes are served by exaggerting the omnipotence of stimulation"
(p. 99). "He also takes him to task for his declarations about the inhibitions
of aggression from stimulating the caudate nucleus: "Delgado's argument that
there may be a number of specific loci in the caudate nucleus cannot be dis-
missed out of handj but he has presented evidence from controlled behavioral-
studies that his electrodes have tapped into separate centers from the inhib-
ition of aggression, appetites and other motivational states. Instead he
seems to capitalize on every individual effect his electrodes happen to pro-
duce and presents little, if any,, experimental evidence that his impression
of the underlying cause is correct" (p, 103). He further observes in Delgado's
work that there are no consistent responses with different animals from "a
given electrode" and no "specific behavior in response to stimulation" (p. 88).
The results are quite variable. "Electrodes that seem to be in the same brain
locus in different animals often evoke different behavior , and electrodes
located at very different brain sites may evoke the same behavior in a given
animal" (p. 89}. Valenstein adds that in humans personality factors are also
variables.
In further considering the human side of brain stimulation Valenstein
becomes almost interbehaviorals "The evidence is not completely cone?, usivej
but it strongly suggests that the contents of the experiences evoked by stim-
ulation are greatly determined by the personal reactions of the patients-
reactions which are influenced by their past history and the present setting"
(p. 106).
 He reviews Penfield's studies where electrical stimulation of the
cortex during surgery was supposed, to have evoked memories. He finds that
the memories were "very abbreviated and sketchy fragments. The more com-
plete reports by the patients were very few in number -and, because they
were obtained in a surgical setting , the evidence that the patients were
actually reliving a past experience could not be verified" (p0 110 ). Fedio
& Van Buren who made similar studies did not obtain the kinds of reports
given by Penrod, Further , Penfield himself noted that the same point
restimulated after a short time will result in different responses. The
responses also depend' on the situation: "responses are influenced by the
setting. Responses depend upon who is present, what has just happened , and
whether it is a hospital (or laboratory) as contrasted to a life' (or a field)
situation" (p.

Valenstein argues that animal studies of aggression and brain stim-

ulation to produce it are hardly applicable to man. Animals kill for food,
and this is more properly predation that aggression, the two being not
highly correlated. The killing is usually between species rather than within
species whereas warfare is within species and is usually based on complex
economic and political factors rather than person to person confrontation.
When brain areas that elicit aggressive behavior in animals are destroyed the
aggression is not eliminated. The author brings out again and again this lack
of specificity and the complex interplay of other factors. "If drug-related
crimes are excluded , most of the present upsurge in violence can be related
to a rejection of previously accepted values and social roles and to the
existence of large groups of people who feel that they have no vested inter-
est in the stability of the society in which they live. It may not be easy
to find or to implement the changes that are necessary, but there is a great
danger in accepting the delusion that biological solutions are available for
these social problems" (p. 353).
The book offers a discussion on chemical stimulation, psychosurgery,
and ethical and social considerations of brain alteration. All of these
are given against a background of the historical factors that led up to each
type of brain expe rimentation. Detailed accounts of the experiments are
often given as well as extensive quotations from original sources. This is
a book that reads easily. It is an important critique that can be valuable
f or ' the layman, student , and professional brain researcher or neuro- surgeon.
It is often directly supportive of interbehavioral contentions.

ooo
 Some Advantages of Interbehavlorism

Jacqueline Farrington

Interbehavioral psychology as conceived by J.R. Kantor appears to

"get it all together" as the popular soft drink advertisement says. For the
first time since the decline of Greek classicism, there is within Kantor* s
psychological system the possibility of studying the human as well as nonhuman
organism as a complete, unified and observable reality within the context of
observable situations or fields of events.

It is the event itself which is of prime importance in the consideration

of the interactive organizing and functioning ofany organism,, rather than the
etiology, the course or structure of events which is the realm of the physical
sciences. Kantor' s system appears to be process-oriented rather than object
bound. As such, it remains naturalistic, positing no special or separate
entities such as mind, soul, tendency^ entity,, or essence which can be studied
or observed apart from a physical organism. Events are specific in terms of
the psychological situation, implying specific stimulus and response functions
which match, and in terms of an observable field of events which includes pre-
ceding events '(interbehavioral history), media of contact and environmental
(including cultural) setting factors. The as sumption is made that the total
field can be observed . That which is not observed in the field and which seems
not capable of observation may require skills, technologies or knowledges
either not available or not being utilized,

Just as the event is observed asthe interactive functioning between

stimuli which perform both the functions of stimulating and responding, so the
observer is, in the very process of observing, interacting with the event under
observation. The observing then is not separable from the went, and is induc-
tive in manner rather than deductive. Thisapproach eliminates the artificial-
ities of postualted. independent and/or dependent variables which can be objec-
tively manipulated, by an outside observer and considered as cause-effect varia-
bles providing construct-like explanation for real happenings. Rather, factors
are assumed to be in an associative relationship; that is t one factor if isolated
from its present relationship would not be capable of the same description either
in isolation or in a different relationship,

While the observation of events (and the reporting?) is inductive, the

bridging of gaps between sets of observed events is deductive, and hypothetic-
ally links one set to another. Such bridging does not imply a closed circular
system, but rather the utilization of tentative orientation (attitude) toward
unknown or partially known occurrences,, Deduction here is built upon defined
concepts observed within the field, the symbolic structure being derived from
interbehavioral operations or acts. As such, deduction is both an abstracting
and hypothesizing process rather than an absolute to be employed in inductive
approaches to further event segments to be studied...
 -10-

Utilizing the interbehavioral approach and understanding the assumptions

underlying the approach enables the psychologist to more effectively contend
with the miltiplicity and the interrelationships of factors in the occurrences
of such psychological events as imagining, perceiving^ feeling, thinking, inter-
communication, desiring, etc* Within the system of Kantor, such events need
not be relegated to metaphysical entities of consciousness and unconsciousness,,
innate qualities of good and evil or physical connect ionism and reflex action
theories. Rather, events may be studied as functions of an organism whose
biological structure at any given spatio-temporal moment may or may not be a
factor in the psychological functioning which is observed within the context
of cultural , social and physical interactive environments.

What differences may then be noted in the practical application of the

interbehavioral approach? Perhaps most important, the position proposes a
distinguishing between the actions of interbehavior, the products resulting from
these actions, and the things and events being observed (Kantor, 1958> P 186),
Here the knower and that known are not parties to a mystical union of entities
called ' experience, ' but rather, experience is the result of interaction with
things and events in everyday living. Within the reporting of events, the
observer, experimenter or clinician is free to identify and define "circum-
stances surrounding things and events before and after manipulation and des-
cription" (ibid). The observer is never separable from his surroundings.

Particularly valuable in clinical and experimental practices, this

freedom of identification and description eliminates the traditional, obstructing
assumption that characteristics of things and events "thingevent" (Appendix,
ibid) are placed in them by the various constructs mind, emotion^ unconscious,
etc. Inferential hypotheses may then be closely tied to actual inter-behavioral
events which are more readily observable than are intellectual constructs of
hidden quality, quantity, and meaning. And similarly, events need not be projected
upon a specific organ or system of organs such as the brain, nervous system or
glandular systems, thus ignoring the contextual field,

In the observation and application of learning, the relevance of which

today occupies the forefront in educational, social .and political arenas, the
interbehavioral approach emphasizes the coordination of stimulus and response
functioning as the core of the learning event. Additionally, setting factors
and conditions, of learning which are specific to the -learning event do not,
become abstract principles. This enables the problems of individual differences
and unpracticed learning to become suitable ventures for observation and for
scientific rather than metaphysical study. Learning may profitably be considered
as interbehavior which leads to new behavior segments, or event fields. Process
rather than an abstract principle of adjustment and adaptation is stressed, per-
mitting realistic description of the relational aspects of events. Prediction
and deduction then may remain close to actual events rather than to fictional
constructions.

Reference

J. R. Kan tor; Isiri^SZi2E^_Z2ll2l2'' Prlncipia, 1968.

 Number
1975

HerbehaviorQl
NOEL W. SMITH, EDITOR
DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY
STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCE GH
...when a person is afraid, he is afraid all over, '
feels afraid, but his heart, his stomach, and his muscles react in
characteristic ways. All of the changes that occur constitute the
pattern of fear* Fear does not cause the heart to beat faster, the
stomach to stop digesting, and the muscles to become tense. They are
all components of a single unified pattern. Fear does not cause con-
stipation; gastrointestinal immobility is rather an integral part of
the pattern of fear.
There is an appealing but oversimplified view of the individual
which conceives of each organ as performing its own special function
in the corporate whole, much as the separate iinstruments comprising
an orchestra make their individual contribution in the performance of
a symphony. According to this viewj the heart is a pump, the lungs
are bellows, the stomach and intestines are organs of digestion and
elimination, the hand is a tool for grasping and manipulating objects,
the eyes are organs of sight, and the brain is the seat of mental
activity.
This is a false conception. No disembodied brain can think, no
disembodied lungs can breathe. They can only function as constituents
of the total organismic system. The process of breathing is influenced
by the biochemistry of the blood and by electro-chemical impulses in the
nervous system. Blood chemistry and neural impulses, in turn, are affec-
ted by a number of organic conditions including secretions of the endo-
crine glands, processes in the sense organs, and metabolism. The person
is able to breathe not merely because he has lungs, but because the lungs
function as part of the total organic system.
This can be easily verified by observing the changes in the brea-
thing pattern as the state of the whole organism changes. The waking
person breathes in a manner quite different from that of the sleeping
person. The frightened person does not breathe in the same way as does
the joyful person. When one engages in strenuous activity, his breathing
is faster and deeper than it is when he is relaxed and resting. Any
emotional disturbance affects the rate and amplitude of breathing. This
is one of the measures used in the "lie-detector" test.
Calvin S. Hall: PSYCHOLOGY
Howard Allen, I960.

DONNA W. CONE, ASSOCIATE EDITOR RONALD G. HEYDUK, ASSOCIATE EDITOR

LYNCHBURG TRAINING SCHOOL AND HOSPITAL ICENYON COLLEGE

Crude Data investigative Contact Scientific Construction

 -2-

THE AGORA

The Archives of the History of American Psychology makes two announce-

ments %
(1) This year marks the tenth anniversary of the founding of the Archives
of the History of American Psychology. During that time more than 500
separate collections have been accessed. Present holdings include 1200
linear feet of documents as well as 600 pieces of pioneer laboratory and
teaching equipment. The finding aids include an inventory of each deposit
as well as a reference file noting the location of materials relevant to
psychologists represented in any deposit. The current roster includes
approximately 30,000 individuals. There have been at least 223 guests
who have traveled to Akron to visit the Archives and the last two years
has been one of dramatic increase in the on site use of the resources.
The post-; to pre-doctoral ratio of scholars is 2:1. There is diversity
in the professional identification. For example, in a sample of 27, 15
were psychologists, 10 historians, one a philosopher, and one an educator.
(2) A stipend of up to $500 will be awarded. This is considered as aid
to a scholar wishing to utilize the primary resrouces of the Archives.
The stipend is intended to defray travel and research expenses and the
recipient is expected to reside in Akron while using the materials of the
Archives. Candidates should submit a prospectus of the work planned, a
vita, and two letters of recommendation. It is particularly important
that there be evidence that the Archives is the most suitable place for
the work to be undertaken. Preference will be give to advanced graduate
students and younger post doctoral scholars. Applications should be
completed by March 1st. The award will be announced not later than April
15th and will be in effect until December 31, 1976. Applications should
be sent to the chairman of the University of Akron awards committee; Mr.
John V. Miller, Jr., Director of Archival Services, University of Akron,
Akron, Ohio U325.

Work continues on the joint enterprise INTEBBEHAVIOPJtL APPROACHES TO

RECURRING PROBLEMS IN PSYCHOLOGY though progress is very slow. Seven
manuscripts are now complete. It appears that another two or three will
be the maximum. That will provide a more limited sample of areas for
interbehavioral approaches than originally envisioned but a slimmer vol-
ume may have its own kind of advantages.

The editor has been offered a Visiting Fellowship to Hull College in Hull,
England for 1976-77. In order to work publication of the Quarterly
around that schedule it will be published as a single volume for the cal-
endar years of 1976 and 1977, two issues in each year. Subscription price
will remain the same for the volume.

Lila Goodson, author of the feature articles wrote it as a senior at Lynch-

burg College. The "R.evisitations" by Vieki Thompson we hope to run as a
feature series.
 Emotions Versus Emotional Behaviors A Comparison
of J. Be Watson and J e Re Kantor
Lila Goodson
When the word, or -& derivative of the words emotion is verbal--
ised, various thoughts or ideas are probably experienced depending
on the organism's history of responding to these terms as well as
the setting factors. The definitions and explanations of emotions
as given by J.B. Watson and J.R, Kantor, are to be compared and con-
trasted,,
For Watson, human action is divided into two parts; the acquired
modes of responses and the hereditary modes of responses. Emotions
along with instincts are paired together in the latter group. He re-
ports that the human undergoes a process of organisation whereby the
hereditary and acquired reaction modes separate to a certain extent,
but never completely*
An emotion for Watson is, "an hereditary pattern reaction" involv-
ing profound changes of the bodily mechanism as a whole, but particularly
of the visceral and glandular systerns, In referring to pattern-reaction
he gives the example of a sooty-tern feinting death in reaction to a
human intruder, but running away and giving an instinctive cry when the
chance for escape arises, Watson differentiates emotions and instincts
with respect to the adjustments of the organism. If the adjustments are
internal and confined to the subject's body, emotion occurs; if the
organism as a whole makes adjustments to external objects, instinct has
occurred. This is clearly an example of organocentric ideology in which
stimuli are assumed to elicit reactions from within the organism,
Watson's almost exclusive use of children as subjects was a deliber-
ate mov because he felt that not enough work had been done in this area.
He grouped emotional reactions into the categories of fears rage, and love,
at the same time warning students not to find anything in these words that
was not statable in terms of situation and response. He names four prin-
ciple situations as producing fears loss of support^ loud sounds, an abrupt
interruption as sleep is overtaking the organism, and pulling a blanket out
from under the subject who is falling asleep* The observed reactions are
catching the breath, the grasping reflex, closing of the eyelids, puckering
the lips, then crying. The common belief that children are instinctively
afraid of the dark was shown not to be true according to his evidence.
Incidentally 3 Watson stipulates without reference or experimental support
that children reared in the South exhibit fear of the dark more than others,
Rage is said to occur as a result of "hampering of the infant's move~
meats," The exhibited behaviors are crying, screaming, slashing movements
with the arms and hands, drawing up and down with the feet and legs, and
flushing of the face as a result of breath holding. Love involves smiling
cooing, gurgling, etc. as a result of stroking or manipulation of the
erogenous zones such as tickling, shaking, patting, or gentle rocking. The
Freudian emphasis in relation to this emotion is minimal.
Different kinds of infrahuman organisms were exposed to th infants
to se if generalized emotional reactions could be obtained* Relative-
ly little fear was observed in the infants even after contact with such
organisms as rabbits, pigeons, cats, dogs, white rats, as well as observa-
tion of a fire in a nearby bucket,,
 In the attempt to detect emotional responses, Watson considered
the implicit portions to be more important than the explicit portions.
H listed two methods of detection! 1) .free tjge, where "significant"
words are randomly interj ected with neutral words, and conttogias. tyjj
where a subject is given a key word from an emotional situation and
told to freely relate to it. This method is used to detect blockage
as related to dreams which atson considered to be good indicators of
one's personality, stresses, strains and general emotional life.
Watson's famous conditioned emotional reaction study with little
Albert was an example of the eliciting properties which can be taken on
by the habit influences to "call out" emotional responses. The pheno-
menon of transferred, conditioned emotional reactions was exhibited when
Albert made fear responses to objects similar in texture to the white rat
A eontrol procedure was used in which the infant was given blocks to inter-
act with between stimulus presentations,,
In dealing with emotional outlets j, Watson describes diffusion "which
is equivalent to the concept of displacement,, H viewed it as a threat
to society, but rationalized the occurrences as resulting in relaxation*
Attitudes are considered to be a consolidation of emotions, instincts and
habits* Examples such as, "tenderness% "shyness", ^shame^ "jealousy",
"hate", "embarrassment", "suspicion", "anxiety", etc. are said to repre-
sent combinations of the three reaction modes
Physiological factors are considered to be strong components in the
expression of emotions, secretions from duct glands are reduced with
contraction of smooth muscles occurring in reaction rto emotionally ex-
citing stimuli. The effect on the ductless glands is increased production
of adrenalin resulting in glycosuriaK This condition is caused by excess
sugar passing into the urine. In addition, the puls accelerates and dil-
ation of the pupils occurs, The post emotional state may leave the organ-
ism either poorly adjusted r better adjusted, depending on the situa-
tional factors*
Watson summarises his discussion of emotion by saying that emotions
must be recognized as part of human life rather than being discarded
or overlooked,, He suggests that further investigation into the control
and manipulation of human behavior in relation to emotions should re-
veal more knowledge about the area The faults as well as good points
of Watson'!s theory will be openly discussed after a challenging alter-
native system is presented*
Emotional behavior for Kantor "consists essentially of interruptive
forms of action stimulated by rapidly changing circumstances and in all
cases involves various slight or intense general organic and visceral
processes," He considers enotional conduct to be a momentary condition
of "no response" withthis cassation of activity differentiating emo-
tional behavior from affective or feeling behavior. Bringing in the
aspects of Kantor's field theoryt one might say that the emotional con-
duct is a failure to adjust based on past reactions and the environments
By breaking emotional behavior into segments, specific characteristics
can be examined such as the absense of the consumma:tory or final responses
which are blocked by the occurring behavior* Unless these consummatary
responses occur in the proper sequence j, the behavior pattern will be dis-
orderly . It is this lack of order which characterizes the emotional con-
duct and provides the only observable parsimonious method of detection.
Kantor supports this view with various observations! the failure of
psychologists to classify emotional acts, the inability of the observer
to detect \hloh J2e of emotion the person under investigation is experien-
cing i the blunder of replacing emotions with reflexes which are not
equivalent in detection of emotional behavior, and in crediting infra~
human organisms with qualities in relation to emotions.
In order to more thoroughly investigate the Yarious types and degrees
of emotional conduct j, Kantor systematically analyzed the emotional beha-
vior into four segments,, Tfaes separate sequences are; Pre-ensotioHi-1
Behavior Segments, Emotional Behavior Segments Proper, First-Proximate
Post-Emotional Behavior Segments, and Second-Proximate Post Emotional
Segments,, .The Pre-Emotional Segment consists of whatever situation sets
the occasion for the emotional segment,, It therefore involves the setting
factors and movements of the subject and stimulus object preparing to
interact. The Emotional Behavior Segment Proper is characterized by the
absense of the final reaction system and the presence of visceral and
general organic functioning which operates in the absence of the eon-
suimnatory response. The emotional act involves a disintegration process
of the response pattern along with inhibition and suppression of any
overt adjustments to the situation An emotion is therefore a negative
form of behavior even though it may precede an adjustment,, The biological
functions also taken into account including such factors as distur- '
bances of digestive secretions and respiration, contraction of blood
vessels, acceleration or retardation of the heart beats and induction of
various secretions. The first Proximate Post-Emotional Behavior Segmant
is considered to be directly conditioned by the surrounding stimulating
circumstances of the moment* The type of response is dependent upon the
stimulating situation which initiated the emotional act. With primary
emotion^ the acts are most likely to be large overt responses which in-
volve the skeletal muscles as in the case of running or jumping. The
secondary or social emotional situation involves a gradual transition
from a confused state back to equilibrium. The Second Proximate Post-
Emotional Behavior Segment sometimes carries over 'to a subsequent
behavior segment,, It's considered a very transitional stage bridging
the gap between isolated sequences of behavior.
Kantor feels it necessary to distinguish emotional behavior from
non-emotional feeling behavior which have been mistakenly paired to-
gether in the past6 Feelings do not meet the criterion of the presence
or absence of an organized response system and are therefore not clas-
sified as emotional behavior,, He especially ishes to separate emotions
froB passions which operate continuously is form constituting an
autonomous system. Unlike Watson, Kantor places love and hate under the
category of passions which can b brought about by substitute stimuli
as well as by stimulating objects such as other organisms Sentiments are
also distinguished from emotions, being ''prescriptive and limiting types
of activity developed under the inflmence of social approval". Sentiw
ments are considered to be directed responses resulting in some complex
social behavior examples of which are modesty,, cleanliness, and charitable-
ness. Sentiments a broader of exciting stimuli while passions
are more closely linked with the surrounding environment^,
Kantor finds the utilitarian theory of emotions to be an invalid one,
He deals with this on the organic level, finding no utilitarian, value in
biological functions* The participation of all of.the organism in
bringing about responses is what matters. In classifying emotional be-
haviors 3, Kantor feels that there is only one type of emotional act. By
finding the specific circumstances under which an organism responds, more
information can be obtained about the process of human reaction. He singles
out the errors of giving excess meaning to a name which is similar to a
symbol,, Because all reactions depend on the characteristic of the indi-
vidual and the surrounding conditions, an investigation of th conditions
is considered necessary*
The distinction between emotions and expressions is made on the
asstanption that there is no room In Kantor "*s analysis for th "expression
of emotion"* He claims that the doctrine of emotional expression is based
on the dichotomy that divides emotions into an inner state of emotions
themselves and an outer expression of them* In dealing vith emotions in
infants and infrahuman organisms he considers the social experience of
adult humans to be an important factor in emotional behavior. The con~
tinuity theory begun by Darwin is as much in error as the doctrines in-
itiated by the non-continuity theorists, Kantor resolves the two opposing
views with his field approach which concentrates on the eire-urnstances
which are appropriate for responses to be made by each organism,
While both Watson and Kantor were writing in the same decade, one can
see from the two view points given, that Watson still clung to the trad-
itional theories of psychology* Even though Watson was considered a radi~
calj Kantor was the true revolutionary, the difference being in the size
of audiences., While introducing Behaviorism as a new school with em-
phasis on the environmental effects on behavior, Watson did not shed such
archaic ideas as the nature-nurture conflict. Watson's organocentric
ideology was also fully apparent j, as was his reductionistic attitude to-
wards isolated organs of the body*
Kantor brings in^a field approach to deal with the problems left by
Watson and others. With his emphasis on the environment containing set-
ting factors and media of contact, as well as the stimulating object which
excites ratfeer than elicits responses in the organism based on the past
history, any aspect of behavior can be dealt with objectively.

References

Kantor, J. R. PrjB^iEle^^of^P&xcholasZs Granville, Ohio 5 The Principia

Press, 1926
Watson^ J e Be PjsjjcJMJojxJ^
Philadelphia and London? J* Be Lippincott^ 1919.
 ?.

Revisitations of J. R. Kan tor's _-

Part I
Vicki Thompson

Although written in 1924., Kantor's Principles, explores many areas of

behavior only recently being studied by other psychologists and some of them
not yet touched upon. Two chapters of his work that involve topics rarely
dealt with yet comprising large portions of human day-to-day activities,
namely, "Implicit Action as Responses to Absent Stimuli Objects" and "Wishing,
Desiring, and Kindred Forms of Responses" are recounted. The complete object-
ivity with which he deals with these interbehaviors, many of them subtle and
treated in the past as "mental" or internal and private, arid his success in
showing the way to an analysis can be a source of continuing inspiration.
EEiS2llS. will never age,,

Mediate reactions comprise a large number of human responses. For

example, an individual may respond to an object indirectly, as in speaking
about something or someone standing before him. Sometimes when completing a
response, changes occur within the organism itself. This type of mediate
reaction occurs in feeling behavior. Implicit responses, a third type of mediate
reaction, result when an organis^ responds to an absent object through a sub-
stitute stimulus object.
Kantor distinguishes between perceptual or semi-implicit action and full-
fledged implicit responses,, In perceptual action the stimulus object is in partial
or complete contact with the reacting individual. However, in a full-fledged
implicit response an entirely different object must serve as the stimulus.
Implicit responses play a significant role in everyday human behavior,
The language response which can substitute for an overt reaction is the most
common form of implicit activity,, The importance of the implicit response is
again evident when considering thinking and remembering activity. For example,
when planning a party the arrangements are considered implicitly before any
overt actions are carried out* Implicit behavior allows us to make use of our
past actions in present situations .to profit from our experiences. It also
makes possible complex responses which depend upon the delay of the final
reaction as in all thought and voluntary conduct. The detachment of meaning
functions developed by perceptual contact with objects is a final indication
of the importance of implicit reactions.
Implicit reaction systems are all in some sense representative or symbol-
izing activities. They derive directly or indirectly from overt actions and thus
contain the same component factors as any overt response system. Although the
original stimulus is not present a substitute stimulus results in a reaction
which may be quite similar to the original response. For example, in recalling
the death of a friend one may experience his throat tightening and actually shed
tears . Although implicit reactions may be only partial or diminished forms of
responses they are often lacking in vividness,
 Most often implicit responses are precurrent or anticipatory reaction
systems,, The following illustration indicates their precurrent character. One
reads the return address on a letter and it reminds him of a friend The
implicit response of remembering the absent friend mediates between the stimulus
and the final adjustment of the behavior segment, namely, writing to the person.
Implicit reactions not only allow us to respond to objects and persons we are
not in direct contact with but also allow us to adjust to surrounding conditions.
An individual may rehearse similar circumstances, comparing the results of each
before deciding how to handle the present situation,,

Although occurring less frequently, implicit reactions do operate as final

adjustments of a behavior segment. Such activity is commonly referred to as day-
dreaming. When hallucinating an individual responds not on the basis of surr-
ounding conditions but upon implicit reactions which may have been derived from
completely different circumstances.

Kantor distinguishes between two classes of implicit reaction. A repre-

sentative implicit reaction is similar to a response performed in the presence
of a stimulus object and now occurring without the stimulational arousal of that
object,, ' One example of such behavior is the imagery responses performed by an
individual^ The second class of implicit responses is the substitutive reaction.
These responses do not resemble the original reactions to the objects for which
they substitute. They may be totally symbolic. Illustrative of substitutive
responses are denominated concepts or thoughts. Lying between the fully rep-
resentative and substitutive reactions are the language responses, a most eff-
icient form of detached reaction.
Probing further Kantor discusses seven different forms of implicit typess

(1) Repetitive implicit responses In this instance the original res~

ponse is essentially repeated but without the presence of the original stimulus
object^ An example of this would be the acting out of some past event.

(2) Incipient implicit responses These are simply partial performances

of some original action. For example, almost everyone has experienced the sit-
uation of nearly being able to pronounce a name but not quite able to hit upon
it correctly. The inability to do so because of the absence of an adequate
stimulus is quite clearly a different matter than stuttering due to interference
with the verbal response,,

(3) Vestigial implicit responses -~ In this case substitute stimuli objects

elicit a response which contains parts of actions left over from the original
reaction. We may distinguish between two different forms of vestigial implicit
action, (a) Image responses are reaction systems left over from original per-
ceptual responses to things* Images are sometimes so vivid that one may seem
to see or hear things even though the original stimuli are no longer present,
(b) Vestigial movement responses are derived from original non-perceptual res-
ponses. A good example is that one may blush or shudder when thinking of a
previously experienced unpleasant activity.

(4) Organizational implicit action Some implicit acts have no resem-

blance to the original contacts with stimuli but are connected to such original
actions in an essential and important manner. Implicit behavior of this sort
is conceptual activity. Concepts are reaction systems which operate when we
must make use of our past experiences in a rapid and effective manner. Our
ability to develop concepts depends upon verbal aids which allow us to build
up meaning functions such as concepts are* A concept is a standardized and
definite implicit response which substitutes for and sums up the person's
experiences in a form useful for present purposes.
(5) Combinative implicit responses The detaching character of implicit
responses makes it possible to combine previous activities into new forms of
behavior as in the development of an aspiration or ideal of some sort.
(6) Fanciful implicit responses This refers to daydreaming or engaging
in the sheer functioning of implicit activity without any intimate contact with
objects.
(7) Referential implicit actions Some implicit activities substitute
for behaviors which cannot occur or which the individual does not wish to do or
dare to do for some reason. These are apparent to an observer and thus may be
used to induce someone else to perform the work. The most obvious form of ref-
erential implicit action is verbal activity.
Since the original stimulus is not present it is difficult to know just
what sort of implicit reaction a person is performing,, Each individual responds
differently in his implicit behavior and since implicit responses occur in the
absence of the original stimuli they can be indefinitely varied and modified.
Thus, the study of implicit behavior depends upon our knowledge of the person's
previous conditions of stimulation and his mode of response to those stimuli.
Another type of mediate activity is the desire response. Here again there
is a detachment of the individual from the adjustment stimulus. Desire responses
are peculiar to a specific individual making them a more personal activity. Cer-
tain objects can be desire stimuli for people only under given conditions.
In examining desire reaction systems we discover several essential char-
acteristics. Since an individual may wish for a. particular object with certain
qualities, cognitive or discriminative factors must play a prominent role. Ob-
jects do not become desire stimuli by forcing themselves upon the person. Rather,
they are actualized into desire stimuli by the individual as a result of previous
experience with such objects* Here we see the importance of the attention factor.
Sortie desire reaction systems involve various affective factors. Others involve
the operation of neural mechanisms as in cravings and appetitive forms of desire
responses.
Desire reaction systems may be of a precurrent or anticipatory nature. In
such behavior segments they precede and perhaps determine what the following
reaction system will be. They may be present to an effective response in which
case the individual who desires something wishes to touch, manipulate, possess,
or perform some other effective response, or they may be precurrent to informa-
tional reactions in which case the final response is some type of informational
activity. On the other hand, the desiring reaction system may serve as the final
or consummately activity in the behavior segment. Such is the case when a person
desires an object even though he can in no way secure it.
 -10-

Desires are the foundations for behaviors such as striving to reach some
goal or end and attempting to modify one's self or one's surrounding, conditions.
Our beliefs and values are largely affected by our desires for particular objects
and interactions. Undoubtedly desire behavior segments assume a large role in
everyday behavior.

Although some desire response may be gradually acquired over a period of

time others may be accidental occurrences. An individual may come in contact
with an object and momentarily desire it while in its presence. Developed de-
sires may be referred to as desire attitudes.

Conditions influencing desiring reactions may be divided into two classes,

reactional or personality types and stimulational types. Reactional conditions
of desire refer, to such things as an individual's behavior equipment, his
knowledge, attitudes, etc. One's capacity to obtain the thing he desires may
also affect the desire response or even determine whether there will be a desire
response* Interests and character traits developed through past experiences
naturally influence these reactions. Other significant reactional conditions
include institutional factors such as custom, law, and public opinion, and
conditioning circumstances in an individual's cultural development and surr-
oundings.
The second type of condition influencing desire reactions, stimulational
conditions, refers to the stimuli surroundings. Desire for a particular thing
necessarily depends upon the presence of such an object in our surroundings or
in past contact with this or a similar type of object.

Any object or condition that may serve as a psychological stimulus may

serve as desiderata stimuli for desiring behavior. Kantor distinguishes between
goal and goalless desire stimuli. Both elicit desire reactions that lead to
specific satisfactions, but only desire stimuli necessitate a complex of behav-
ior to bring this satisfaction about.

The degree of intensity of a desiring rection depends upon the nature of

the reacting individual and the particular situation involved. Characteristics
of an object or situation or circumstances surrounding the object may affect the
intensity of the reaction. For example, one may desire an object because of its
importance for carrying out a specific task.

The satisfaction of desire responses depends upon the individual's know-

ledge of his desires and the objects stimulating them. Some may be easily and
effectively satisfied while others may be impossible to satisfy. In many cases
only apparent gratification is obtained as when one settles for an inferior pro-
duct or a copy instead of the original.

It is necessary at this point to distinguish between desiring activity and

purposive conduct. While the desiring behavior situation is quite definitely
limited in time, purposive behavior is practically indefinite in its duration.
Also desiring reactions consist of simple or complex behavior situations whereas
purposive conduct involves a broader scope of activity.

A major difference between desiring and purposive action is the importance

of the stimulus factors. In desiring activity reactionistic emphasis is placed
 -11-

upon the response rather than the stimulus condition. Whereas the character-
istics of things have a hold upon the individual in purposing conduct, in
desiring activity things exert an influence only because the individual is
interested in them or desires them.

Desiring reactions differ from purposive behavior in yet another way.

They are much more localized than purposive conduct, more.personal and intimate.
Purposive reactions always require additional activity in order to be accom-
plished themselves whereas desiring reactions may or may not require other act-
ivities to be completed. Finally, it must be pointed out that every complicated
desriring reaction is convertible into a purposing response*

Thus far we have considered desiring conduct as a general type of psy-

chological activity, Kantor further analyses desiring behavior and classifies
it into several different types as listed below.

(1) Craving activities are desires for the performance of action. The
stimuli for such responses involve conditions of the organism such as hunger and
thirst.

(2) Appetites resemble craving activities but the stress is on the nature
of the stimulus objects rather than the performance of action. Thus the appe-
tite is always a specific desire and not a general craving.

(3) Organic functioning is absent in universal desires. These are more

concerned with an individual's ability to obtain comforts and conveniences.
Although based upon the person's biological organization, universal desires
are greatly influenced by cultural features. Included among them are the wishes
and wants concerning shelter, health, and well-being.

(4-) Idiosyncratic desires are peculiar to an individual on the basis of

his past interactional history and his unique present circumstances.

(5) Institutions within each .--culture determine that man shall desire cer-
tain objects and conditions. Among the cultural desires are desires to attain
certain positions, to be respectable, etc.

(6) As desiring behavior wishing is characterized by an inability to sat-

isfy the desire. For example, one may wish he had not performed some behavior
which he regrets.
(7) Yearning responses are desires of a very intimate and personal sort.
The satisfaction of these desires may be very drawn out and problematical.
Yearning responses are passive and hopeless activities such as an individual
yearning for the personal affection of another person.

(8) Although very similar to yearning; the stimuli conditions for longing
responses are not such definite objects and conditions. They are aroused by
various lacks and needs. An example is longing for love, happiness, etc.

(9) Wanting is essentially a desire of occasions. Objects become desid-

erata for a particular moment bedause of some use or need for them.
 -12-

In concluding his chapter on desiring behavior Kantor considers two com-

monly held misconceptions. First, the term desire is often used to signify
forces or powers within the individual which cause him to reach out for certain
objects or conditions. Secondly, the powers which supposedly condition desire
responses are attributed to a particular biological organ or organ function.
Kantor, however, establishes desiring behavior not as any type of mystical force
but as a definite psychological activity to be objectively studied and understood.
r leebehavioral
NOEL W. SMSTH, EDITOR
quQfterlL
Volume 7
Number 1
DEPARTMENT. OF PSYCHOLOGY 1976-1977
STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCE PLATTSBURGH, NEW YORK

Reinforcement is a law which itself is lawfully related to a number

of setting factors which multiply the number of experimental treat-
ments affecting a particular experimental outcome. Not the least of
these setting factors is deprivation or, if you will, time between
access to scheduled reinforcement. Kantor (1963) has called atten-
tion to just these kinds of issues in his arguments that interbehav-
iorism is the only means whereby one can effectively deal with the
scientific investigation of setting and field variables, as opposed
to keeping them constant and thus unclarified. Much of the effects
of setting conditions may be consumed under past history, thus bring-
ing to the forefront such issues as multiple paradigming effects on
behavior. Evidence of the import of this for conditioning comes
from data generated concepts such as "conditioned helplessness"(Maier,
Seligman, & Solomon, 1969), "internal-external locus of control" pers-
onality-learning labels (Rotter, 1966), and certain forms of pavlovian
conditioned inhibition and facilitation (Ray, 1973). Compared to con-
ditioning, what we know about setting factors is almost nothing.
Setting conditions, situational factors, species differences, and
specificity of response measures will all most likely be found to have
much more profound influences on conditioning than current research
would lead one to suspect. Thus a translation from current research
models to more ecological models not only seems feasible, but necessary.
Roger D. Rays "Conditions Conditioning Conditioning",
Paper Presented at the Southeastern
Psychological Association Meeting, New
Orleans, Louisiana, April 6-8, 1973

DONNA M. CONE, ASSOCIATE EDITOR RONALD G. HEYDUK, ASSOCIATE EDITOR

LYNCHBURG TRAINING SCHOOL AND HOSPITAL KENYON COLLEGE

Crude Data Investigative Contact Scientific Construction

 2

THE AGORA

Regarding the quotation from Ray, we also published statements from Skinner
and from Kuo on setting factors in the Number 2 issue of 1975. Observations
and studies by others are quoted in Smith , Psj^h^l^acj-l^ecord, 1973, pages
164 and 165. Direct research on this topic is beginning to develop as in the
work of Kathleen Bloom in the Jojurri.aljDf_^^ 1974t
17, 250-263 and W. H. Redd, same journal, 1974, 17, 61-78. J. L. Gewirtz has
several studies in which he initially equates drive and setting but gradually
abandons drive in his later work as it becomes obvious to him that it implies
a special internal force which setting does not while the latter accounts for
variation in response to a given stimulus His papers . appear in MINNESOTA
SYMPOSIUM ON CHILD PSYCHOLOGY, Vol. 1, 1967; HANDBOOK OF SOCIALIZATION THEORY
AND RESEARCH, 1969; Deye lopmen,ta3L_ Psychologyt 1969, 1, 2-13; RECENT TRENDS IN
SOCIAL LEARNING, 1972. Barker1 s ecological psychology is also largely a study
of setting factors. Gibson's interest in the ambient array in perception is
still another indication of a growing recognition, at least in some quarters
of psychology, of the multiplicity of factors that constitute a psychological
event. Perhaps the mechanistic S-KR. will one day give. way to a field approach,
However, there is the disquieting fact that as the mechanistic approach is seen
wantingthat the organism is not passively shaped by environmental forces
other quarters of psychology rush in with consciousness,: will power, genetic
determiners, and other intangibles conjured up from the metaphysical past.
Those who recognize alternatives to mechanism or mentalisia are all too few,
but there does seem to be enough growth in that direction that such an alternative
might eventually become visible 'enough to gain some larger consideration by
entering into the mainstream of debate. Then psychologists can at least make
an informed choice.
*#

We regret the duplication of the Goodson article in Number 4 of 1975. It was

inadvertently interchanged with another article that we intended to run. Some
of the articles in Number 3 must have been of special interest. We have received
so many requests for extra copies that additional copies will have to be printed.
The editor of HjfflaB_Dejrelojement requested a revision of the Sanders and Cone
article in Number 2 for publication in that journal.

On April 9, 1976 Dr. Kantor was the guest of honor at a dinner party given by
the Department of Psychology at Western Michigan University. Other guests
included the following graduates of Indiana University :. Frederick P. Gault,
David 0. Lyon, Louise R. Kent, Richard W. ^alott, Marjorie P. Mount joy, and Paul
T. Mount joy. A central topic of conversation was the golden days at Indiana
University. After the dinner Dr. Kantor presided at a conversation hour. Over
75 students and faculty made up the standing room only audience. Because of Dr.
Kantor!s hearing loss he requested that questions be submitted in writing. He
responded to them with his customary analytic acumen and lively wit. Those who
were fortunate enought to attend this conversation hour were in agreement that
his visit was an intellectual high point in the academic year.
About two and one-half years ago we began a project (reported in 197-4, Nr. 4
and 1975 , Nr. -4) of putting together a book make up of original papers to be
tentatirely entitled INTERBEHAVIOML APPROACHES TO RECURRING PROBLEMS IN
PSYCHOLOGY: ATTEMPTED SOLUTIONS. The Prospectus read.; the book "will under-
take the comparison of traditional approaches to a variety of topics with the
interbehavioral approach and attempt to show how the latter can more effect-
ively treat the problems that have been recurring for decades or even cen-
turiesperhaps even resolve them so that they need not. be recurring* These
recurring problems often grow out of theories and research that (l) offer
interpretation of data in terms of constructs inherited from the past (e.g.,
drivest mental states, instincts ), (2) are directed toward solving issues of
which the basic assumptions have not been clarified or even carefully examined
(e.g., heredity versus learning), and (3) are misdirected (e.sr., the search
for engrams) because of those same unsatisfactory and unexamined assumptions .
The papers will indicate the advantages of an approach which insists that
psychology must start with events, not traditional constructs, and must interpret
its observations in terms of thos e same events events assisting of interactions
of factors in a field involving organisms and objects developing historically in
a setting or context. Research and theory can then proceed to expand knowledge
rather than repeatedly tripping over ensconced tradition." We now have eight
completed manuscripts and hope to receive two or three more. Here are the
papers we now haves
Marion McPherson & John Popplestone; Is "Intelligence" Intelligent?
Donna Cone; An Objective Analysis of Species-Typical and Other Behaviors
Donna Cone? The Historical Development of Scientific Psychology
Hollo Handy: Methods of Inquiry
Ronald Kidd & Luiz Natalicio: An Interbehavioral Approach to Operant Analysis
Paul Mountjoy: A History of Psychological Technology
Henry Pronkos The Current Status of Physiological Psychology
Noel Smith? Perception: Inner Representation of the Outer World or Organism-
Object Interaction?

In this issue we are beginning a two-part series involving a translation of a

treatment of interbehaviorism by Andre' Tilquin. It is as literal a translation
as is consistent with accuracy and good English. The next issue will begin with
section III on "'Interbehaviorism'" and conclude the account. It will also con-
tain the references. Also in this issue we have Donna Cone's editorial notes.
 Le Behaviorisme Origins et Developpement de la
Psychologie de Reaction en Ameriqtw?
(The Origin of Behaviorism and Development of Psychology of Reaction in America)
Andre Tilquin
Paris? Librairie Philosophique? 1942
Translated by Nanette Weissinger and Lucien Leduc
In Consultation with Noel We Smith
Book II, Part II
Chapter I.
Behaviorism and Biology: The Organic Psychology of Kantor
I. The Organic Point of View

The "organic psychology of Kantor stands in opposition to physiological

behaviorism quite as much as to traditional psychology, and for the same reasons.
Eacfaj, instead of taking acts themselves as objects for studyall acts, just as
they occur, and at their face valuedraws an inadmissable distinction between
them and substitutes artificial, occult, inobservable entities for them,, The
mental states of traditional psychology have none of the properties of the
observable phenomena studied by natural sciences* Assuming that mental states
exist, they could be known only by their manifestations. From this one has some-
times been led to think of them as internal hidden forces which motivate organ-
isms to do what they do (4, v,I, p. xiii-xiv)* As for the object (of study] of
physiological behaviorism, it is equally artificial and inobservable. Although
it is concerned with paired stimulus-response, the stimulus is defined physi-
cally, the response is considered as a system of muscular contractions, and the
link between these two components of behavior is ensured by a neural process.
Thus the real content of animal and human behavior is neglected for the study of
abstractions, occult entites and hypothetical phenomena-... The stimuli to which
vre respond are not physical or chemical agents, stripped of every quality, but
"objects1* things, animals, people, institutions possessing concrete properties
which are the origin of and the reason for our responses (p, xv). Similarly,
our responses are not, by any means, simple muscular contractions. They are
acts, each having a special character expressed by the terms used to refer to
it, such as walking, swimming, riding, reading, getting married, etc.... As
for the nervous system, the mission of which would be to ensure the appro-
priate relationship between stimulus and response, to it are attributed powers
just as occult and inobservable as psychic powers. All that traditional psychology
attributed to psychic states interpolated between stimulus and response, physio-
logical behaviorism attributes to the nervous system. The processes which occur
in the nervous system are -without any doubt, factors in behaviorbut not the
only factors. To consider them to the exclusion of all others is to take the
part for the whole (p, xv, 30).
The Watsonian attribution of psychological functions to the whole organism,
rather than to the nervous system, leaves the position basically unchanged, for
the organism is no more than an abstraction. It cannot, either from the biologi-
cal or from the psychological point of view, be separated from its surroundings.
To tie behavior either to one part of the body, or to the body as a whole is still,
then, to consider only a part of a reality which must be considered in its entirety*
 Behaviorism has been the victim of the prestige of the earliest established
sciences* %e general view of chemistry and physics as the model of science has
resulted in the assumption that only those phenomena which have been reduced to
their ultimate unitsdifferent from observed and observable acts, but susceptible
to mathematical measurement.can be objects of scientific study. This analysis
and quantification are acceptable in physics because details of phenomena are con-
sidered unimportant. In psychology it is altogether otherwise. How is it possible
to -understand a case of loss of memory without attempting to know what the person
had previously learned, the conditions of ^Learning] acquisition, and the circum-
stances of forgetting? It can even be said that if the physicist is concerned only
with motion and energy, then he is abandoning to the psychologist the qualitative
content of his experience* If psychology refuses this gift, then science is
deprived of all that human experience contributes (4., p. 2-3).
V must neither exaggerate the role of mathematics in sciences nor take
mathematics for "a machine for making facts" (p. 2). Mathematics serves only as an
auxiliary to express relationships between facts in a very precise manner. However,
mathematics is not applicable in all domains. "When the object of study is complex,
mathematics can participate only in the form of statistical organization of the
results of observation. TO put it to any other use would involve the substitution of
artificial, empty schemes for observable acts. If the goal is to obtain uniform-
ities, then the formation of schemas and concepts, together with the reduction to
units, is obviously indispensable; neither abstraction nor analysis is condemnable
in itself (p. 2). But, indeed, to substitute schemas for acts from which they
neither arise nor follow, to reduce acts to units from which they cannot be composed,
would be to mistake the nature of scientific thought (3, p. 67). Now this is just
what one does when on claims to describe human behavior by utilizing concepts of
physical stimulus, of muscular and glandular reaction, of physiological processes in
the nervous system, or of the organism as a whole. Such a description and such a
reduction have nothing to do with the concrete events which they are supposed to
represent. The Concepts utilized do not spring from the acts such as they are given .
in the experience of the observer. And if one attempts to capitalize on them, it
is impossible to find again the acts which they assertedly symbolize. Similarly,
physiological elements used to explain behavior do not provide an analysis of
behaviors themselves, just as they are given in experience; and it is impossible to
reconstruct the behaviors by composing them. Therefore, of what interest can they
possibly be as a scientific instrument? (4, p. 2-3; 3, p. 5).
Will it be said that these ways of proceeding permit prediction, the goal of
all science; Certainly if the word "prediction" is given the meaning it has in
physics, of certain prediction of an event which is in some way required to occur,
then such a prediction is possible in psychology only on condition that the behavior
be reduced to empty abstractions. But of what value can such a prediction be? All
that the psychologist can make are uncertain anticipations, analogous to those of
the meteorologist, which require a detailed knowledge of the reactional history of
an individual and of the precise circumstances with which the individual is con-
fronted (3, p. 9). That is to say that one must consider the behavior itself,
describe it as it occurs with the greatest possiblemmber of details, and refrain
from seeking elsewhere than in the behavior itself for the categories and units to
to use to describe and explain it (4, p. 2-3).

Quote from original English Whenever a quotation from Kantor occurs that
was originally in English, the original statement is used rather than a retranslation
from the French. Quotations that were originally in French are translated.con.
 Kantor, one sees, maintains science in general and psychology in particular
on a purely descriptive level. Acts, nothing but acts and not artificialities,
but all acts without discrimination, seem to be his motto and the conception he
develops of science* If he admits an explanation, it is on condition that the
explanation operate., not as a function of general laws, but as a function of the
particular behaviors. Explanation is then only the history of the behavior being
considered, which is the procedure of description,,
Physiological behaviorism was .-justified in breaking with traditional
psychology and in rejecting mental states; but in conceptualizing behavior physio-
logically, it was led to deny observable characteristics of it. If consciousness
does not exist,, conscious behaviors do Consciousness is not a substantial reality
tied in any manner whatever to the nervous system or to the whole organism; it is
an aspect of certain behaviors, an aspect which is neglected in a purely physio-
logical conception of human activities (6, p a 75). Under the pretext that intro-
spection is not the only method permitting direct observation of psychological acts,
behaviorism has been excessive in deciding to renounce all factors of behavior
which relate to this method. The only legitimate conclusion to draw from the
inadequacies of introspection is the necessity of improving and perfecting it.
Renouncing it and holding that conscious behaviormemory, thought, emotion, language,
for examplecan be studied only by an objective method, leads to supposing that this
behavior is purely physiological (3, p. 7). And again, acts are given only a biased
and incomplete description, and human experience is emptied of its human content.
The consideration of psychology as a natural science can not have this paradoxical
consequence of the rejection from the field of observation of events which really
take place there, however subtle or hidden they be. "The point of view that consists
of considering psychological phenomena as phenomena of nature does not exclude the
most refined desires, anymore than strong emotion, profound pain, the most compli-
cated activities of discovery, or the profound speculations to which certain indiv-
iduals are so attached" (6, p. 81).
This desire to not neglect any act in no way implies a return to the doctrine
of states of consciousness. Kantor does not accept the dilemma with which psychol-
ogists thiak they are faced: to accept an objective point of view, and consequently
reduct human behavior to simple muscle twitching; or to consider human behavior
in its concrete and original aspect, but then to have recourse to states of con-
sciousness,, This dilemma implies dualism, which he rejects for the same reasons
which led him to condemn traditional psychology and physiological behaviorism.
Dualism does not express a fact (6, p. 85). Observation of animal and human activ-
ities reveals behaviors which certainly have more or less different characteristics,
but it does not reveal mental states as opposed to activities in the nervous system
or muscles contractions. Observation, however, does reveal organisms that are real
and concrete, rather than double artificial beings made up of mind and body
expressed as body, "Mind" and "body" are metaphysical, entities which represent
nothing that is real (4-, p, xiv, 30). "Although men ostensibly sought to justify
the entire dualistic problem by physiological or neurological facts, it was never
founded on real observations. It represents purely and simply only a traditional
interpretation supported by cultural attitudes" (6, p. 80). It is a historical
accident originating from this, that psychology "instead of developing in the
direction initiated by Greek rationalism, has undergone the influence of mystic
imagination from the Orient. The only positive basis that it could ever have had
is reduced to the fact that every act of psychological being is at the same time
:
the behavior of a biological organism, that is to say the function of certain
structures" (6, p. 80).
 It seems probable that, with James, Kantor admits only one sort of stuff,
the world qualified by pure or immediate experience^ and that this experience,
for him as for the phenomenolgists, contains "things" as well as "thoughts".
Kantor!s concept of experience is confused both with introspection as redefined
by the gestaltists and with naive observation, the point of departure of all science.
However, there are abstract sciences, such as physics, physiology, and traditional
psychology, which transcend the given with their explanatory schemas, their
"constructions", electrons, neural processes, and psychic states; and there are
concrete sciences which limit themselves to describing the given. It is in the
second group of sciences that Kantor places psychology. It is the study of
observable interactions between the organism and its milieu. The milieu,3 in a
neo-realistic manner, is made up of concrete objects possessing qualities, just
as naive observation reveals them, and not artificial entities invented by the
physicist and the chemist. The organism, which can not be separated from its
environment, is not only the organism such as the biologist^ the physiologist and
the mentalist create, but is a concrete, real, living, acting organism which stands
in opposition to the twin dichotomy mind-body and organism-milieu, -^t is in order
to make this new unity salient, this uniquely truly given unity, that Kantor calls
psychology as he understands it organic psychology or, better, organismic_jBsy_cho.logy,
and that he gives it interactions, interbehavior between the organism and its milieu,
as the object [of study].

II: Characteristics of Psychological Activities

The expression "organismic psychology" is perhaps an unsatisfactory choice

because it seems to join with biology a psychology which wishes to be autonomous.
However Kantor admits that a sane biological conception of behavior would lead to
organic psychology U, ve 1, p. 78). And he is certain that he conceptualizes the
psychological problem in the spirt of, if not in the same manner of, biology. This
science does not reduce itself to anatomy, but it studies also the functions of the
organism. But how can one treat of these functions if one does not take account of
the milieu in which the organism lives and without which the organism cannot live?
Life implies without doubt an internal harmony, but it requires also an adaptation
to external conditions, ^he respiratory apparatus, for example, and the function
of respiration have neither the same structure nor the. same workings depending upon
whether the milieu in which the organism is plunged is gaseous or liquid. The organ
and the function are adapted to normal conditions of the milieu and they tend to
adapt themselves to variations of these conditions. How the psychological activ-

Kantor speaks of interactions between an organism and a stimulus object that

occur in a setting, Tilquin sometimes uses milieu to apparently include both
stimulus and setting although in a context in which Kantor would refer specifically
to a stimulus object. To render mlieu as stilffiiSS.or iilSyisM~SSZ213MiM_-
here would more accurately reflect Kantor's position but somewhat misconstrue
Tilquin1s interpretation. At other times milieu seems to refer to stimulus objects
or to surroundings and at still others to what Kantor calls the field. Field
comprises the interrelated and interdependent activities of an organism,
stimulus object, setting, and media of contact. To be accurate to Tilquin,
inilieu, a word also used in English, is retained in all these instances but with
notes to a term more appropriate to Kantor, In this instance "stimulating sur-
roundings" might be more appropriate.con.
3 .
stimulus
ities of organisms for Kantor have precisely this for their functions to adjust
the individual to external conditions which naturally are quite different froin
biological conditions., In the degree to which he accents the adaptive character
of psychological activities, Kantor is influenced by a biological approach as are
Watson and Weiss. But he goes much farther than they in his faithfulness to the
spirit of this science. He holds that the organism, either from its biological
or psychological viewpoint is inseparable from its milieu. To distinguish the
organism on one-hand, and the milieu on the other, can be a useful distinction.
Indeed it is an abstraction,, the consequence of which is the substitution of a
new dualism for the old: a completed organism and a so-to-speak inalterable mil-
ieu are set up in opposition to each other like two unrelated realities. One
neglects thms the fundamental fact, as much of biology as of psychology, which
is the inseparability of the organism from its milieu, and the continual inter-
actions with which each fashions the other. It is to put in relief this dynamic
organism-milieu unity that Kantor has chosen to designate his psychology by the
expression organic psychology.
K
In treating adaptive interactions between the organism and its milieu
psychology tends to be confounded with biology (6, p. 79). How is it disting-
uished from biology? To say that organic psychology is the study of activities
or "psychological organisms" (6, p. 75) can only be a tautology as long as what
it is that differentiates a psychological from a biological organism is not pre-
cisely defined. Sometimes Kantor seems to see in this distinction only the dis-
tion of functions and structures. The biological organism would in some way be
the organism at rest, considered in its potentially active state5 the psychological
organism would be the organism in action. Psychology would occupy itself "prim-
arily with reactions or behavior, and the independencefvis-a-vis biology) of psych-
ology as a science depends in part upon keeping the reactions distinct from the
biological organism that performs them. Briefly, psychological organisms, as
differentiated from biological organism, may be considered as a sum of reactions
plus their various integrations" (4-, p. 3).
There evidently is a distinctive characteristic there which implies an
admissible reduction of biology to anatomy. If one were to admit it, psychology
would be confused if not with physiology in the strict sense, at least with a
physiology carried to the point of understanding the extra-organic causes and
effects of functions. Now Kantor is vigorously opposed to physiological behav-
iorism, and thus to this confusion. On the other hand psychology is not the
only science which treats of activity. All the sciences, -Kantor recognizes
(4.5 p 8 3-5), treat behavior, that is to say actions executed by an inert or
living body following actions undergone by it; and one may speak of physical
behavior, biological behavior, and psychological behavior.
Thence the problem comes back to knowing what differences there are between
these three types of behavior and particularly between the last two. It is
inertia which characterizes the first, irritability the property of the second,
and spontaneity that defines the third. In the domain of raw matter, reaction
which is not a response in the proper sense of the word because it is not adaptive-
depends entirely for its existence and its quantity on the action undergone. There

^stimulating surroundings
5
stimulus object
is an equality between action and reaction, and the laws of physical behavior on
which certain prediction is founded are expressible mathematically. Even though
the state of an inanimate body is practically invariable such that its movements
depend entirely on exterior conditions, living beings in contrast are entirely
different. They are constantly changing. The substances of which they are made
are continuously being renewed. There is at every instant a reconstruction of
unstable substances which are at every instant destroyed. In addition, the org-
anism is a reservoir of energy accumulated by metabolism. From these continual
variations in the state of the organism and from this accumulation of energy
there results a. certain independence of reaction with regard to the action under-
gone and a disproportion in energy between the stimulus and response. However
every organism executes, in answer to external conditions more or less complex
responses which are tied in a constant manner, if not to these conditions, at
least to anatomical physiological organizations. The role of the stimulus is
solely to set in motion the anatomical physiological mechanisms. Such are the
tropisms. Depending exclusively on the structure of the organism, they are con~
etant modes of adaptation to -.determined stimuli and are the object of precise
prediction. As a. result of the disproportion between the action and the reaction,
these behaviors cannot be expressed in a mathematical equation. With higher org-
anisms and with man the reactions are more highly adaptive and more indepen-
dent still of external conditions. They appear to be unpredictable. More accur-
ately, they depend less on actions presently "being undergone than on past inter-
actions,, historical and biographical relations between the individual and the
milieu. In brief, in the domain of physics reactions depend on actions presently
being undergone, in. the domain of biology on the structure of the organism, in
the domain of psychology on the experience of the individualthat is to say, on
his personal and historical contacts with the milieu, (4., v. I, p. 3-5? 6, p. 76-
77).

This general characteristic of psychological activities can be described

more precisely by underlining a certain number of traits that they possess through
which are manifested their spontaneity, their relative independence with regard to
immediate exterior stimuli,, and their adaptive nature. Psychological reactions
are variable, varied, differential, modifiable, organized, and susceptible of being
postponed or inhibited.

Psychological reactions are highly adaptive. First of all, they relate to

the situation which provokes them. They are directed, aimed, dependent on it.
Above all, reactional activity which manifests itself on the occasion of and with
regard to a situation, continues and persists up to a. well defined conclusion, that
is to say, up to the point where one of the following four events occurs. Either
the organism modifies its relation with respect to the situation, or it modifies
the situation, or the situation disappears by itself, or the exhausted organism
coases to react Most of the time persistence in reacting does not express itself
by repetition of the same responses the organism on the contrary, varies its react-
ions by executing successive different reactions. This diversification of reactions,
which depends on the details of the situation, contributes to a growing efficiency
on the part of the organism in its adjustment to this situation. In more complex
cases the behavior ought to be described as pursuit of a goal by a deliberate var-

stimulating surroundings
7stimulus object
 -10-

iation of means. Under the name of diversification of reactions we see Kantor

describe in fact two characteristics! the first, which does not seem to him the
most important, will be for Tolman the essential descriptive trait: it is the
intentional characteristic of behavior which is, in higher activities, pursuit
of a goal and ordering of means to that goal; and in lower activities, persistence
of reactional activity tip to the supression of stimulation. The second charac-
teristic which Kantor holds to be fundamental, since it is with it that he resumes
his description, seems to be a consequence of the first; if an outcome is to be
obtained^ and if a first reaction does not obtain it, the organism is lead to
change and to vary his response.
Psychological behavior is then adaptive in a first sense because responses
are directed toward the situation and became they have the function of making
the action of the organism cease* But they are adaptive in a second sense. They
are always differential, that is, different for different objects, or for diff-
erent properties and positions of the some objects (4,' v. I; 6, p. 77), If the
necessity of diversification of responses is explained by the intentional char-
acteristic of behavior, the possibility of this diversification, Kantor notes,
depends on the capacity for discrimination. It is in directing its responses
toward different properties or phases of a situation that the organism is lead.
to vary its responses; and this diversification depends on the discriminations
of which it is capable and on the discriminatory behaviors which it possesses.
If it possesses them it has acquired them. Without a doubt there are innate
discriminatory behaviors: different properties set in motion different behaviors
without apprenticeship, but most behaviors are the result of experience of previous
contacts of the organism with the milieu.
Psychological behavior manifests again its adaptive characteristic by its
plasticity. It is modified as a function of the earlier experience of the indiv-
idual. It depends both from the point of view of the stimulus and from the point
of view of the response on the earlier contact of the organism with the objects
which have composed its milieu. The same response is attached to different ob-
jects , or else the first response is transformed and is modified. These are the
phenomena of conditioning and of habituation; they presuppose a unification of
behaviors that are at first isolated; contraction or fusion of stimuli, which from
that moment on will act as a totality; and an integration of reactions which coor-
dinate themselves to form a single act.
Another characteristic made conspicuous by Kantor comes from the capacity
which psychological organisms possess of discriminating or postponing their res-
ponses and even of inhibiting them completely. In the first case the objects
which stimulate the organism don't produce their effects immediately; certain of
them only produce their effects long after the cessation of the stimulation, either
because their response is blocked by a detail of the situation as in the experience
of deferred reactions, or because the situation is not complete and does not offer
a point of application to the reaction. Whatever the cause of the delay, the delay
between the stimulation and the response is filled in by secondary reactions excited
by the stimulus,.such as the orientation of the body, attitudes, etc. which con-
stitute the reaction itself, but only the incipient phases. The principle reaction
is then provisionally inhibited. It can be definitively inhibited. In the case of
total inhibition we are dealing with a preferred reaction and not a real lack of
reaction. Two reactional systems are simultaneously excited by different aspects
 -11-

of the same complex situation. Whether one of the two aspects is prepotent, or
the organism is momentarily more sensitive to it its associated reactional system
is actualized and this actualization makes the realization of the other system im-
possible-.
Such are the general charaeeristics of psychological activities according to
Kantor. They permit one to distinguish between psychological behavior and biol-
ogical behavior, but at the price of such a narrow definition of biological behav-
ior that no reality corresponds any longer to this notion. Biological behavior
would be the function of anatomico-physiological organization and would depend
exclusively on present stimuli. By contrast, psychological behavior would be less
the function of structure and of immediate stimuli than of earlier behavior arid
previous personal contacts of the organism with its milieuin a words of the
experience of this organism.
To accept this point of view is to take sides in favor of Loeb against
Jennings. It assumes belief in the existence of tropisms, forced inevitable reac-
tions, entirely conditioned by the structure of the organism, by the physico-chem-
ical composition of its tissues, and by the lines of the field of force on which
the living organism would be held. To speak truly, .Loefe himself has shown that the
sign, the threshold of the beginning or of the reversal of a tropism, are affected
by the variations of external or internal conditions: growth, modification of tissues
by the influence of nourishment, of dehydration, of hydration, of the presence of
certain chemical substances in the changing milieu, of the temperature, etc. But
in opposing tropisms to acts due to "associative memory" Loeb has denied the depen-
dence of tropisms with regard to earlier experience. Now it is a fact that a tro-
pism is modifiable to a certain extent, that even the lowest animal is capable of
overcoming its trerpisms, of forming habits (conditionings), of learning,, And with-
out admitting with Buytendijk that tropism is abnormal, one must recognize that
reflexes and pure stereotyped tropisms play only a very limited role in the behavior
of a living being. "It is evident", wrote Jennings (2, p. 178), "that the anatomical
structure of the organism and the different physical or chemical action of the stim-
ulating agents are not sufficient to account for the reactions. The varying physio-
logical states of the animal are equally important factors.,..
,. The present physio-
logical state of an organism depends on its past history.... n9
Between biological and psychological behavior there is no clear line of de-
marcation. The same characteristics, in different degrees, are found in the two
sorts of behavior. It is consequently impossible to place clear limits on a psy-
chology of behavior without forming narrow and poor ideas of the biological. Kantor
has succeeded in distinguishing his psychology from physiological behaviorism, but
he fails to separate it from biology. And it is not surprising since his conception
of psychology is inspired by biology.

8
stimulating surroundings
9Quotation taken from original English.
 -12-

Notes From a Comparative Animal Behaviorist In Exile

OR
What Observations of Retarded Human Adult Behaviors Can Teach the
Student of General Animal Behavior

In recent years comparative psychologists have been careful to specify

that man.ss behavior is part of their subject matter. Yet few studies have
appeared in which human behavior is viewed comparatively,,

Since December of 1974 1 have served as the chief administrative officer

of a 350-resident living unit within the largest institution for the mentally
retarded in North America. As I left behind nine years of colleg teaching and
fifteen years of research with non-human animals to interact solely with humans,
a friend and fellow interbehaviorist advised ma to make the most of this oppor-
tunity to study the human animal. In reflecting on seventeen months of informal
day-to-day observations, I find that my thinking about at least four topics
within, the general area of animal behavior has been clarified*

The subjects of my observations ar@ multihandicapped adults of both

sexes, most of whom are classified as either severely or profoundly retarded.
Since they have been institutionalized for most of their lives (i. e., for
periods of from 10 to 65 years), I hve been interacting with thra in their
"natural" environment.
The first aad most general lesson I have learned relates to the inter-
relationships between biological and psychological interbehaviors. The contri-
bution of biological. intrbahaviors to adult human activities has been generally
played down in favor of an emphasis on psychological interbehaviors, specially
learning. IE retarded,, mjltxttandieapped adults, however^ the importance of
properly functioning biological'systems is clearly apparent, For sample,
swallowing is ordinarily: viewed as a chain of biological events, which, by
definition, is unlearned. When swallowing is inefficient constant drooling
o saliva occurs and the person is unlikely to ingest food effectively or to
make thos vocalizations which are the primitive forms of human speech. Through
a laborious s@ri@g of steps involving a number of stimulating conditions (e. g.,
ic is applied to the area just outside the lips; a cold metal object is pressed
on the back of the tongue), efficient swallowing can be conditioned in the
profoundly retarded, multihandicapped adult, luckily for the behavior modifying
agent, the ice and fluidsoused to stimulate swallowing are sufficiently rein-
forcing, together with praise sad hugs, to maintain the new interbehaviors. Tne
individual can then proceed through a series of training steps'to sucking,
blowings ^istling, and sometimes, forming recognisable vocalizations.
Secondly, the vital role f precursory psychological interbehaviors
has been brought into ocus. toother psychologist and.I'found that the Foxx-
toilet training program which works so well with normal toddlers and
with pradolscent retarded children was not Imndiately effective with retarded
males over 18 years of age* They had simply Acquired too many competing
 -13-

responses In the presence of a full bladder or colon. To solve this problem,

a preliminary program was written specifying procedures for conditioning the
resident to go to the bathroom, lower his pants and sit on the commode* Here
the reinforcing liquids aid the conditioning process by filling the bladder.

Another example of the importance o "normal" pt@ertdry psychological

interbehaviors was experienced by my husband, Dr. Al Cone, when he worked with
severely retarded proAdolescant males at Lynchburg Training School & Hospital
(LTSfffi) in 1970, One youngster had quickly acquired a series of self-help
skillshe used the bathroots properly; he fed himself adequately; he dressed
himself neatly. The flaw in the conditioning program became apparent as Dr.
Gone proudly escorted his immaculate subject across the institution grounds to
meet his parents in the visitor's waiting room. As they approached a curb,
the resident suddenly stopped. M@ stared at the 4-ineh rise* He stepped
back and then lunged forward, raising his foot 12 inches into the air. While
this overreactton served to propel the subject safely over the obstacle, it
al-'so led to a new program in which residents received M fk M's for subtly nego-
tiating a staircase*
The third area for which I have acquired more appreciation is the im-
portance of the setting in which learning occurs. The myrnalization of institu-
tionalized retarded individuals is often, seen in terms of promoting proper
discriminations (e, g., teaching them not to attempt to hug strangers). The
converse, promoting proper generalizations, is equally important. The best
example of this ubiquitous lesson comes from my husband's experience.with the
young boys. One such boy with a typical history o helplessness became ill
and was taken from the living unit where he had recently learned to feed him-
self to the hospital. At supper-time of the first day, the nurse called the
aide on duty at the living unit to say: "You told me T.i'my could feed himself
but he just sits there staring at his tray,," By the tine the aide could walk
across the parking lot to the hospital, Timmy had solved the problem himself.
When the aid and the nurse entered Tiramy's hospital room, he was carefully
ingesting small raouthfuls of his supper and periodically wiping his lips with
a hand towel which he had taken from a rod near the sink attd draped'across
his lap. The hospital had thoughtlessly failed to provide a dinner napkin and
Timmy would not eat until he had located an adequate substitute.
The fourth lesson the residents of LTS&H have taught me is that certain
behaviors regarded as relatively easy to learn because they develop in all nor-
mal children are very difficult to condition in adults. Toileting and rudimen-
tary interactions with others, such as tossing a ball, are prime examples. Con-
versely, certain behaviors regarded as indicative of high levels of phylogenetic
development are apparently very easy to -acquire^. Imitation of seemingly com-
plex social interbehavior9 LS a clear example. It is a rare newcomer to the
professional staff of an institution for the mentally retarded who does not
quickly sense that these "pathetic" residents are conditioning hitnl

Donna M. Cone, Lynchburg Training

School and Hospital
rterbeficiviorcil
NOEL W. SMITH, EDITOR
quorterli
ISSl 4.0 .
Volume 7
Number 2
Hi&iie

1976-77
DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY
STATE UNIVERSITY OF YORK COLLEGE OF ARTS AND PLATTSBURGH, NEW YORK

INTERCOMPORT1MENT
(Amer0 interbehavior)
Action reciproque et simultanee de 1'organisme sur le milieu et du milieu
sur 1'organisme. Cette double correlation est toujour fonction des mont-
ages anterieurs du comportement de la biographie reactionelle (Kantor).

VOGABULAIRE DE LA PSYCHOLOGIE, erne ed.

Henri Pieron, editor. Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France, 1973

THE AGORA

In. Volume 2, Number 1 of 1972 we reported a
study by Sarbin & Mancuso on the profession-
al myth of "mental illness" and the more
appropriate public attitude, but the latter
being adversely swayed by the "mental ill- .
ness1" construct. A new experimental study
by Yaffe & Mancuso finds a similar result as
reflected in the title "The Effects of Ther-
apist Behavior on People's Mental Illness
Judgments". For a preprint write James C.
Mancuso , Dept. of Psycho logy , SUNY, Albany,
New York 12222.
**
Mexico seems to have a continuing interest
in interbehaviorism. Dr. Kantor delivered
two public lectures to large audiences at
the University of Mexico and several addit-
ional lectures to other centers of the Univ-
ersity around Mexico City.
This will be the last issue of the Quarterly
for 1976. As previously reported , the vol-
ume will be extended over a two-year period.
The editor will be in England from Sept. 7
until mid or late summer 1977. The last two
issues of the volume will be published in
the latter part of 1977. Those who might
wish to correspond are invited to do so at
Kingston-Upon-Hull College of Education,
Cottingham Road, Hull HB6 7RT, United King-
dom.
###
James Herrick, a portion of whose M. A.
thesis was published in these pages in Vol-
ume 2, Number 3 of 1972, a Ph.D. candidate
in anthropology from SUNY at Albany, author
of "Kantor's Anticipation of Current Approa-
ches' in Anthropology" (reported 1974, Nr. 3),
has had a fiction paper accepted for publi-
cation in an anthology of futuristic cultur-
al fictions edited by Magoroh Maruyuma and
Arthur Harkins. The story is entitled "How
John ^ennol Saved the World". It was also
selected for presentation at the 1975 Amer-
ican Anthropological Association's annual
meeting's Symposium on Future Cultures: Im-
aginable Alternatives for Terrestrial and
Extraterrestrial Communities. *t is a re-
freshing departure from the usual mentalis-
tic and mystical science fiction. The ab-
stract prepared for the meeting is presen-
ted here. Another story he wrote, "Penum-

DONNA M. CONE, ASSOCIATE EDITOR RONALD G. HEYDUK, ASSOCIATE EDITOR

LYNCHBURG TRAINING SCHOOL AND HOSPITAL KENYON COLLEGE

Crude Data Investigative Contact Scientific Construction

 2

bra" was on of the winners of the AAA competition again this year and
is projected for publication in a paperback anthology. The second and
final installment of the translation rom Tilquin is printed in this
issue. Tilquin presents a number of problems or questions concerning
interbehavidrism. The editors would like to urge readers to offer res
ponses to them that would be printed in forthcoming issues. The quota-
tions on page 14 are relevant to Tilquin's critique.

How John Nennoi Saved the World

(Abstract)
This fictitious story attempts to show how one individual comes to realize that West-
ern people are being victimized by their "thing-based" language. It is discovered that
this "thingness" quality of Western thought has prevented a recognition of and an apprec-
iation for the interactional, processional nature of nature with the result being a stat-
ic, hierarchically arranged, tripartite (natural, man-made, and supernatural), cause-effect
conception of the universe. This biased perception of events in the universe is thought
to be responsbile for the failure of the modern-day "scientific-medical" establishment to
find a "cause" and a cure for that disease labeled "cancer". The notion that cancer may
not be a disease (in the traditional sense) at all, but rather, may be the result of the
human organism rapidly and uncontrollable adjusting biologically to new materials in its
environment is explored.
Also treated is the idea that medical practices in all cultures serve the sick indiv-
idual on more or less of a "placebo" basis owing to the fact that biologically Homo Sapiens
has evolved as an efficient, disease-resistant organism. H is further suggested that the
belief that someone or something will enhance recovery is more important than the actual
treatment-with the removal of treatment leading to an auto-suggestively worsened condition
for the patient. This erroneous belief in having control over "disease" (a thing) has re-
sulted in Western medical researchers searching in vain for a causative agent for a disease
(cancer), which, in actuality, is merely evolution (an event).
Once Hennol understands what is being said, he is strongly moved and attempts to make
Westerners realize through his music the trappings of their conception of the universe. He
extends what he has gained regarding Westerners' biologically self-destructive, static con-
ception of the universe to all constructions which are really events, but which have come
to be treated as things in themselves -(e.g., love, honor, integrity, justice, aggression,
etc.). He succeeds.
The following anthropological themes are presented in this story: (l) the superorganic
nature of culture; (2) the role of the individual in cultural change; (3) the role of acci-
dent in culture change; (4) operant learning principles in the development of cultural be-
haviorsespecially as they relate to medical behaviors; (5) language as a guide to social
and cultural reality; and (6) the contemporary and future biological evolution of man.
 Le Behaviorism Origins et Developpement de la
Psychologie de Reaction en Ame^rique
Andre Tilquin
(Conclusion of Translation)
"Intei-behavior11

Kantor is opposed like the Gestalt psychologists to a conception of behav-

ior which would make it depend strictly on anatomical physiological organization,
of a fixed connection between a receptor and an effector so that the nature of
the response would be the function not of the nature, of the meaning, of the
importances of the interest, of the value, of the stimulus, but of the nervous
mechanism that was aroused. An electric bulb lights up because the installation
of wiring is made in such a way that every press of the button permits current
to pass through the wire hooked up to the lamp. The lamp is illuminated each
time that one turns the button, and it is illuminated only when one turns the
button* The movement can be executed by the tenant of an apartment or by a
burglar thanks to an intentional pressure of a finger or to a mistake of an
accidental bump. The lamp lights in every case without being concerned about
the concrete living being which carries the stimulus or about the context in
which the stimulus is initiated. Similarly, the same stimulus , turning the but-
ton, according to the effector which is found at the other end of the wire, will
put in action a motor9 an electric iron, a tea kettle, or an oven, radio, etc.
In other words if such a response is set in motion by the stimulus, this corr-
espondence arises from an extrinsic relation between a stimulus and a response
represented by the sensory-neural-muscular structure concerned.
That, fcr Kantor, is the model of biological behavior. Psychological be-
havior is quite otherwise. Whereas gestalt theory explains the union of stim-
ulus and response by a reciprocal conformity, a myserious affinity, an unintell-
igible "direct dynamic determinism, " Kantor seeks the cause of this correlation
in the earlier experience of the organism, in its reactional history which has
conferred on the objects of the milieu the power to excite the reactions which
they presently start up. Current responses depend on functions of stimulations
taken on by objects of the milieu in the course of interactions which have been
earlier exercised between the organism and the milieu.

Psychology is, in fact, for Kantor the study of adaptive interactions of

the organism and its milieu, the study of interbehavior. The milieu1^ gicts
on the organism stimulates it. The organism acts on the milieu^ responds to
it. Actions and reactions are woven together and condition each other. The
word "interaction" or "interbehavior" expresses precisely this reciprocal and
simultaneous action of the organism on the milieul3 and the milieul^ on the
organism. If the milieu-^ excites our responses, our responses in their turn
not only are directed to the milieu but even modify it. "When he is contem-
plating this action of responses on the mi lieu, 1? Kantor is not thinking strictly
of human endeavor which creates objects and consequently new stimuli. He takes
this recurrent action in its most general significance t by the simple act of
responding to an object we modify it, not strictly in itself, but always in its
psychological function which is to put a behavior into gear,

object
 The stimulant value of an object depends, in fact, on the series of ante-
cedent responses made with respect to it. The execution of a response at a
given moment evidently implies that a well defined object5, capable of stimulating
it., exists in the environment, but it still implies that this response has behind
it all .the experience which the individual has formerly had with regard to the
present stimulus object (6, p. 8l). When a cat learns to get out of a cage, the
correct response which he finally makes, depends on earlier reactions without
which the correct reaction would not be attached to the situation. The phen-
omenon of conditioning shows us how objects, neutral with regard to a certain
reaction, can acquire the power of putting it in gear. In any case, it is thanks
to "contacts" that the organism has had previously with the situation that this
situation has acquired its present motivating power. But these contacts do not
limit themselves to shifting reactions, to making them pass from one object to
another from a total situation to one of its elements or vice versa. They have
a formative function; they give rise to responses, they modify them, they trans-
form them, mold them, dissociate them, organize them. Would our habits exist,
would they be what they are if the objects to which they relate had not existed
in our surroundings, if we had not had all the contacts which we have had with
them? The development and the assembling of responses, i. e. the formation of
the response as well as its attachment to a certain stimulus, depends then on
the reactional history of a given individual, of his reactional biography. The
difference in environments in which they have lived and consequently the diff-
erences in their reactional biographies explain the differences in behavior
between different individuals better than an originality of genetic constitution.
If the form of the response depends on the sort of object with which the organism
is in contact, that is to say, on the nature of the present and past contacts,
that perfection of the response, the ease with which it is accomplished is a
function of the number of these contacts. The accent is then put by Kan tor on
the environment, on the objects, or rather on the functions of stimulation which
they assume according to the reactional history of the subject* It is the reac-
tional history of his interactions with his milieu which explain the capacity of
stimulation of a particular object, the form of the response put in gear, its
immediacy, its perfection and the differences of behavior between different
individuals. This conception had some affinity with that of Lewin, who also
located the source of actions not in the organism under the form of impulsions,
but placed them outside in the surrounding environment in the form of vectors
which correspond to the stimulating functions which Kantor assumes for the
objects. And these vectors of Lewin, like the stimulating functions of Kantor
result from an interaction which is exercised between the organism and its
surroxmding.
Since the present existence of a behavior has as a condition the earlier
interactions between certain objects and the reacting organism, psychological
phenomena are not in any way predestined (6, p. 82). They depend in their
existence on a multitude of real circumstances which have led to their formation
of which the oldest go back to the very beginning of the life of the organism.
Then the development of behavior continues according to the particular circum-
stances of the time and place in which they are produced. One can consequently
consider the reactional biography taken in its totality as a series of levels,
one above the other.
"Let us take the example of an architect who is making plans for a building.
His present abilities and the work which he is doing now are dependent on sit-
uations that are somewhat similar to the ones that have preceded them and in
 -5-

which he had to design similar plans for buildings comparable to those which
occupy him today. Here is a level which itself depends on a lower level which
has immediately precededed it, that is the period of apprenticeship during
which the architect was working only on partial plans. This level in its turn
depends on the period during which he was studying his trade at the school of
architecture and. this period itself had for a base the stage where the archi-
tect as a child was learning to make elementary drawings and to appreciate
diverse objects? (6, p. 82-83).
The development of a .behavior depends then on the series of interactions
which have preceded its on wcontacts" which the organism has had with his
milieu,-*- of his reactional biography* The formative action is incumbent on
the conditions of stimulation* Kantor insists on the causality of-objects or
situations. "Because in recent times the causes or conditions of psychological
action have been transferred from the mind, which produced an effect on the body5,
to some phase of the body, it seems difficult for the idea to gain currency that
such causes or conditions lie only in the stimulation circumstances. Decidedly
it is the latter that bring about the development of reaction systems and their
later operation" U-, v. I, p. 73). "...the development of the individual and his
activities depends upon the coordinate development of his contacts with objects
and situations. The cause or influence of development is then the series of
stimulating situations with which the person is in contact..." (Ibid., p. 77).
To attribute then all formative action to situations, is to reduce the role
of the organism to the extreme. In actual fact, biological factors have little
importance for Kantor. Organic characteristics exercise above all, a negative
influence; they are incapable of producing by themselves well defined behaviors,
but they can render some behaviors impossible. On them are uniquely based the
possibility or the impossibility of the behavior. Thus, an athletic musculature
does not at all force him who possesses It to become an athlete. On the other hand,
it is impossible for a lame man to run a race or for a one armed man to do gym-
nastics on apparatus or to engage in boxing. It is true that such physical
deficiencies can become stimuli and push the individual to construct systems of
behavior which mask them by compensating for them. Again,, it is necessary to
know this, that the form of the compensation is determined not by the nature of
the handicap, but by the conditions of the milieu in which the individual lives
(Ibid.,p. 81).
1 more positive influence is exercised on behavior by certain physiological
phenomena, particularly by internal secretions, but these phenomena, most of the
time have no formative value at all. They do not determine any special behavior.
They determine only the speed and the vigor of all behaviors. However* the
action of these physiological phenomena goes farther. Concurrently with external
stimuli they have an influence on the development of an operation of systems of
reaction under the name of needs, desires, and so on. But'this positive action
is reduced by Kantor as by Levin to a simple modification of the stimulation
values of the ^valence", of external objects. As fr heredity, whatever be the
manner in which one conceptualizes it, it is clear by the above that its part is
altogether restricted* Outside of the minimal contributions indicated above,
which concern the possibilityf the impossibility, the speed and the vigor of
behaviors, heredity manifests itself by several reflexes and above all by random
movements which are put in gear by all sorts of very light stimuli, in which are

18stimulating surroundings
 -6-

the gross, primitive material with which complex behaviors of the adult are
constructed under the incitement and the control of objects in the environment.
This conception which has some close connections with that of Lewin is not
in opposition to the behaviorism of Watson or even to that of Kuo. They have
the same recognition of the enormous role of habit, the same affirmation of the
weak role of heredity, the same underestimation of the importance of organic
maturation and of these psychological states which constitute the needs and the
tendencies which Tolman will consider as motivating forces, the instigators of
behavior. Consequently they have the same accent placed on the action of external
conditions. Only what has been called the simplistic approach of the Watsonian
explanation is here masked by vague words about interaction and above all about
contact. Contact does not necessarily imply an activity of the organism; it can
be passive* In these cases the objects would be the causes of development of
behavior, if such a development was possible. In fact, an object would not be
able to produce anything more or different on the second contact than what it
produced on the occasion of the first. One does not see how existing reactions
would be able to be modified, how new reactions would be able to become estab-
lished. At the very most a transfer of reactions would be produced, put in
motion by an object, to another object which was not putting them in motion
before. Watson stays consistent with himself in making conditioning play a
capital role in his psychology. But Kantor has seen and affirms that not every
acquisition leads to a conditioning. Consequently passive contact between
organism and object would not be able to suffice. The organism responds, which
is a long way from passivity, and by its response it tends to adapt itself. If
the behavior is adaptive, the initiative for adaptation can belong only to the
organism. It is not the object which from outside adjusts the organism to that
object, it is the organism which adapts itself to the object. Kantor has pointed
out justly that it is not the possession of an athletic musculature which leads
its beneficiary to become an athlete, but similarly, it is not the presence of an
object in the environment which by itself produces the assembling of a behavior
which relates to it. There is, it seems, a contradiction in considering objects
as the causes of behavior while affirming the adaptive character of responses.
t is true that Kantor speaks of interactions between organism and milieu,19
attributing thus the initiative of adaptation not to the object alone nor to the
organism alone, but to the dynamic relation which ties them together. But then
how does one reconcile this conception with numerous assertions which present
without ambiguity, objects as the causes not only of the operational responses,
but even of the assembling of responses? The fact is that Kantgr locates in and
pjojj3gt_s_ into the, pjresent obje_ct the result of earlier in teractions which are
exercised between this object and the organism and which it would be more natural
to localize in the organism under the form of a modification of physiological
states of behavior, in the sense of Jennings (see Section II, p. 115. But would
this not be then to abandon the concrete point of view, to come back to the point
of view of physiological behaviorism? To avoid this renunciation, Kantor is
obliged to realize in the object, where it< certainly is not, the earlier exper-
ience of the organism. ,
Kantor continually insists upon the idea that the stimulus is not a thing,
a state. It is a "function" assumed by a thing. And he sees in this transfor-
mation of an object into a stimulus the definition itself of physiological process

^stimulus object
 .7-

(4, v. I, p. 4-8). An object does not inevitably have stimulation capacities

from the first contact of the organism with it which it will have later: it
acquires some and it loses some also* Thus a little cube of wood loses for
the child the property which it was having for the baby, i.e. of being suck-
able. Classical psychology certainly does not misconstrue the fact that the
universe of an adult is not that of a child , that the repertoire of acts of
the former is infinitely richer than that of the latter., But classical psy-
chology tends to reduce the phenomenon of development , the becoming aware of
qualities, to an actualization of behavior that potentially exists from the
beginning whereas development is the phenomenon of acquisition and enrichment.
The universe of the child would contain that of the adult both in its sensory
aspect and in its motor aspect, as the engraved plate contains the photographic
image. Experience would be a simple progressive revealer. This thesis, espec-
ially as with regard to the world as it is perceived and which is only an
interpretation, would not be able to satisfy a psychologist who is above all
concerned about facts. The fact is that every object acquires new properties
progressively as we respond to it. It is the motivating experience which we
have of it; it is our reactions with regard to it which enrich it with new
properties or which impoverish it, sometimes in taking away properties which
it had formerly possessed. The cube becomes something to push, to take, some-
thing to throw, and ceases to be something to stick. "Whereas classical psy-
chology holds that experience reveals to us pre-existing properties of objects,
Kantor affirms or holds that experience confers on objects new properties.
This thesis is very behavioristie and Kantor only insists on a conviction
which is, if not expressed, at least shared by all the b@havlorists. In posing
the fundamental stimulus-response formula, the behaviorist appears to do to the
stimulus the same thing as to the response. Much more, the stimulus and response,
being reciprocal terms, appear co-extensive. The response supposes a stimulus
which puts it in motion and to which it responds and the stimulus can only be
such when it causes a response. In fact, all or nearly all in a behavioristie
universe is constituted by responses, >r as soon as one seeks to qualify the
stimulus, to describe it, to say of what it consists, what is its nature, one
responds to it. It is then definable only as a bundle of capacities for stim-
ulation; it can have only a functional significance.
However, isn't it necessary to give sttpport to these capacities and func-
tions? If the stimulus is "this", which puts a response in gear, isn't it
necessary to pose something which assumes this function of stimulation? This
philosophical problem has not escaped the philosophical mind of Weiss, who in
being well acquainted with .the subject, has constructed this something with the
responses of the physicists. He has made of it a configuration of electrons
and protons denuded of every quality which our responses confer to it. This
turning towards physics, is no more permit ^.ed to a behaviorism which wishes to
be concrete and autonomous than the previous turning toward physiology. Kantor
is thus obliged to accept the conception 0? common sense. What assumes the
functions of stimulation, he says, are ob;i?cts such as they present themselves
to the common sense: trees, rivers, people * laws, rules, morals, institutions;
not only objects taken in their totality, but also the natural qualities of
which they are made: colors, odors, forms, sizes (4., v. I, p. 48; v. II, p. 29).
The realism of Kantor is not the learned pseudorealism of Weiss, but a true
realism, the naive realism of the man in the street and it is not surprising on
the part of the psychologist who claims to take facts at their face value. This
silence on the difficulties of such a position has without doubt the same origin.
Kantor j, preoccupied above all with observing and with describing, is not concerned
at all about metaphysical implications of his descriptions.
Does not the distinction,, the neat dichotomy made by Kantor between the ob-
ject and its functions of stimulation, lead to attributing to the object the
properties which form the nature of it and which nave no behavioristic status,
being independent of the functions of stimulation? To conceive these properties
as primitive functions of stimulation that the objects would possess before having
any contact of the organism with them would not resolve the difficulty. They
place themselves only with the responses which they put in gear and they can be
nothing more or different from this inciting action. How would one know them
independently of the provoked responses, since to know in a coherent behaviorism
can only be to respond? These difficulties are not unique to the system of Kantor.
They are met with in all behaviorislm which wishes to be concrete and autonomous,
without external support. Psychologically the object can only be a system of
reactions, a bundle of stimulating capacities, a possibility of reactions; and
Kantor says very justly, the psychological phenomena consists largely in the trans-
formation of objects into stimuli (4-, p. 48). But for this very reason it is im-
possible for psychology to define the object as it is. Psychology can only borrow
from another science, physics for example, for its definition of the object,
It is impossible for Kantor to tell us what the "natural" objects are in
themselves, independently of the stimulus functions they possess or take on. He
cannot identify the "natural" qualities that would characterize them without con-
sidering our reactions to those objects. "Organic psychology does not accept the
idea according to which a stimulus provokes in the 'mind' a sensation of quality.
For organic psychology such a mind and such qualities do not exist. Sensations of
quality are really properties of things...." But this realism contradicts itself
immediately, for Kantor continues: "...there are properties of things which incite
a person to distinguish betweem them, to act differently towards them, to like
them, to say that they are different, etc..." (A, v.,I, p. 93| 6, p. 78).20 Thus
these qualities which are proposed at first, as forming the nature of the object
are in fact only functions of stimulation possessed by objects of which one can
say absolutely nothing.
The danger of adopting vis-a-vis the exterior world, the attitude of common
sense, is that one resolves without posing them, and perhaps without knowing it a
a certain number of problems which are possibly only pseudo-problems. But it is nec-
essary to examine them if only to dissipate them. Some phenomena that classical
psychology holds for constructions or interpretations are here posed as immediate
givens and as raw facts. Thus the qualities that are said to be sensible are,
for Kantor, in the object,not in the subject* It is probably that with neo~realism
Kantor recognizes also in things the spat3al~temporal relations and logical
relations. He postulates that the objects exist in their unity and distinction.
The object which is a construction for classical psychology,and which is the result
of an organization of sensory field into figure and ground for the gestaltists, for

20
The first quotation does not occur in the place cited. Therefore the pres-
entation here is a translation rather than a substitution of the original English.
The second quotation is written in French and is consequently also a translation.
Kantor is posed as the immediate given. The problems of unity, exteriority of
the nature of the object, are resolved thanks to the decision to ignore them.
It is the same with the problem of localization. Kantor distinguishes the
stimulus object from what he calls "the medium of stimulation". When we respond
to a visual stimulus, what stimulates us is not the succession of light waves
which emanate from the object but the object itself* The train of waves are
only an intermediary, a medium, thank? to which a functional contact is estab-
lished between the object and the reacting organism. In a general way every
object, whatever be.the receptor concerned, and whatever be its distance or near-
ness with regard to this reeeptorjhas its medium of .stimulation. Thus a thorn
could stimulate a reaction of pain only by the intermediary of being in touch
with our tissues; a savory object can stimulate us only by the intermediary of
a chemical process, etc. (5, p. 5A-55). The reason for this distinction is
evidently that our. responses are always addressed to the object, never in normal
conditions to the medium which is otherwise ignored by most people. But if
the reaction belongs to (or refers to) the object, is it immediately directed
to it? Does it reach it immediately and right there where it is? Maybe all
these problems have been poorly posed by classical psychology. To adopt the
common sense solution is more to ignore them than to solve them.
The behaviorism of Kantor insofar as it is an autonomous psychology is nec-
essarily led to this realism of the concrete object. Since it has been decided
to ignore the other sciences, since one is concerned about "acts" rather than
"abstractionsf% one cannot conceive the object as a substrate made of vibrations
t which the functions of stimulation would be latched on as so many properties
of the object. One is forced to recognize,if not all the qualities,at least cer-
tain numbers of them. There are qualities which define the object, and which are
the object; and there are qualities which are functions exercized by the preceding
qualities and which correspond to the capacities of stimulation of the object and
which are the properties of the object.
One of the most grave limitations of behaviorism is the impossibility attrib-
uted to it of taking account of the quality as it is. Doesn't it seem tied to a
consciousness, to a mind? If one eliminates this consciousness or this mind in
order to consider only a reacting organism by its contractions or secretions to
these physical stimuli, doesn't it show at the same time every quality? One sees
how Kantor triumphs over this difficulty. Leaning on common sense, in the name of
direct concrete observation he places, if not all the qualities, at least certain
of them in the things; he makes of them the stuff of things. One can reproach him
since it is a matter of psychological cjLence,, and not of metaphysics. One can
reproach him with preferring intuitions to the information of physics and of
physiology, of preferring ingenious intuitions of common sense and of experience

21
[Author's footnote:] This Kantorian distinction between the object and the
medium corresponds to the distintion of Holt, between the object and the stimulus.
22
[Author's footnote3 Is this distinction made by Kantor? One can doubt
before the assertions that follow which are in bad accord with the notion of stim-
ulating functions acquired in consequence of earlier experience: perception is an
"interaction between the total organism or person and objects existing with all of
their qualities, whether or not these qualities can all be reacted to or not" (A,
v e 1, pe 293. "None of these qualities of the object or the object as a whole
depends upon our reaction to them" (Ibid.). The Kantorian idea that stimulus and
response are developed in a concommitant manner (already exposed by Bode) (l, p. 59)
hardly agrees with the preceding assertions.
 -10-

called immediate, direct, or pure. Above all, can one not accuse him of getting
along without consciousness all the more easily because he at first reified a
part of the content of consciousness?
lYs The "Segment of Behavior"
Kantor does not content himself vith reifying in stimuli the content of
conscious experience that relates to objects; he also reifies in the responses
the other portion of this content whicb relates to the subject. If one runs
through his psychology, it is impossible to avoid the impression that his behav-
iorism merits the reproach addressed to behaviorism in general, of being a simple
word game that is to say, of running the good old traditional psychology in th ,
stimulus-response mold. One finds again in. the two volumes of his
all the chapters of classical psychology: sensation, perception, attention* assoc-
iation, affection, emotion, desire, imagination, memory, intelligence, knowledge,
reasoning, Volition, and so on. However, antor puts himself or believes he puts
himself in order with the behavioristic credo by following these designations
with the words s behavior, conduct, activities, responses. Attention becomes atten-
tion behavior, volition becomes voluntary conduct, emotion becomes emotional act-
ivities, and he treats not of pleasure and pain nor desires but feeling reactions
and desiring responses; this is exactly as functionalism believed that it broke
with structural psychology, by limiting itself to adding the magic word process
to the heads f chapters Psychology of consciousness distinguishes three aspects
in psychological life; cognitive, affective, and conative aspects. Kantor retains
this distinction but the aspects of psychological life become "phases" of the
response. Mould organic psychology, then, not be a mere translation of the whole
content of classical psychology into behavioristic language?
The task of psychology is not to explain behavior, more or Jess systematized,
but to give a faithful description of concrete behaviors. The general notions of
stimulus and response are evidently insufficient to express all the nuances and
all the details of real behaviors. It is necessary to specify them, but the spec-
ifications ought to arise from specific observation of acts. It is from there
that Kantor makes numerous distinctions among stimuli and responses according to
their functions; distinction of stimulus object arid its stimulating functions, of
the stimulus and of the medium of stimulation, of the stimulus and of its situation
or context, of primary stimuli (unconditioned) and secondary (conditioned), direct
and substituted, adequate (total) and partial, dominant and auxiliary, exogenous
and endogenous, apparent and inapparent. Similarly, he makes the distinction
between primary and derived reactions, informational, performative and affective,
explicit and implicit, apparent and inapparent.
But to take behavior .apart into simuli and responses would be to misunder-
stand the intimacy which unites the organism and its milieu. The fundamental
descriptive element cannot be the duality stimulus -response; it can be only their
union, their unity, what Kantor calls the segment of behavior. Therefore , the
psychological life, which for Kantor as 'for Vatson, is a stream of action, Is decom-
posable not into stimuli and response but into elementary acts, into segments of
behavior in which each constitute a definite adaptation. Examples would be the act
of pulling back the hand from a burning fire or the act of throwing one's self out-
side the trajectory of a missile. Every action is without doubt "bi-polar": it
presents two phases of which one is the stimulus and the other is a response, but
 n-

these phases are inseparable and the segment of behavior constitutes ultimate
descriptive element of' organic psychology (4, p. 36-37)
Actually/ in the study in which Kantor formulates the segment of behavior
he is mostly concerned with the response. And we should not be surprised about
thats since the stimulus, as it is, being a function* can be defined only by the
reactions produced, A segment of behavior contains at least an elementary reac-
tion or reaction system as in the examples above, but it can contain several of
them, as in behaviors manifested during experiments on reaction time. In this
case, the response contains the following elementary reactions; (l) waiting for
the expected stimulus, (2) perception by sight or hearing stimulus, and (3) act-
ivating the "registering apparatus"; and these three reactions which constitute
as many adaptations are temporally organized. One .sees in fact a subordination
of the first reaction systems to the last. There are at first "preeurrent" reac-
tions, reactions of attention and waiting, and perceptive reaction, then a final
reaction or "consummatory" reaction; this subordination is the one that we notice
touching off the registering apparatus. The expressions "precurrent" reactions
and final or "consummatory" reactions do not need, according to Kantor, to-be
explained* "In every behavior segment," he says, "we can fairly well determine
what reaction system finishes and rounds up the act or characterizes it as an
adaptation... ...it is the final reaction system which gives the name to the
entire behavior segment" (4, v. 1, p. 38). The term fjjial^reaction can be used
for every action which ends a segment. When the final.action is an explicit
reaction executed with the muscles, Kantor reserves for it the name of consum-
matory action. As to the precurrent reaction, be there one or many, it can be
limited to preceding the final reaction but generally it acts to determine it.
Moreover,this determination presents degrees and varied forms.
Certain precurrent reactions relate to past contacts that the person has had
with stimulating aspects of the situation or refer to a phase of this situation
which is not presently playing the role of stimulus. Their function is "to
appreciate the nature" of the stimulus, to function in identifying it and recog-
nizing it ("meaning reaction"). Sometimes this appreciation is without effect on
the final response as the consciousness which we have of a blow in the crural
reflex. Sometimes in fact, it can be absent without this absence jeopardizing the
response, such as in acts that are called subconscious Sometimes, finally, this
appreciation is a determining factor of the final response which would not be pro-
duced without it. In this case the precurrent response is not limited to preceding
the final reaction but it conditions it by preparing it, by putting the person in
the state of executing it, and even sometimes by beginning it. In the example of
reaction time these include the reactions of perception, of recognition, of atten-
tion. Other examples are attitudes or movements which are merely sketched or out-
lined, reactions which are little bits or pieces of the final reaction, touching
it off at the occurrence of the signal. Still others are auxiliary reactions
which deal with the means where execution is required for the execution of the
final reaction (going to the study and opening the Bookcase to take out a book)
or which apply to instruments of which the manipulation is necessary for the oper-
ation of the final action (putting the gun to the shoulder and holding it to draw
a bead). In these cases the function of the precurrent reaction is to render
possible, to prepare the final reaction of which the form is determined above all
by the stimulus. But sometimes it is the precurrent reaction and not the situa-
tion which directly conditions the form of the final reaction; the person can acc-
omplish in a muscular way the final readtion only after having anticipated it and
only after having executed it implicitly in advance, and having foreseen the
 -12-

the results. Such Is the case with Intelligent and voluntary acts and with act-
ivities in which the person can be said to pursue a goal. The precurrent res-
ponse is not here simply preparatory; it is anticipatory (4, v 1, p. 39-4-7).

Ys Critical Examination
Thus after having reified along with neo- realism in the world of stimuli,
all that part of the subjective experience which relates to objects, Kantor pro-
vides in the responses the remaining portion of this experience , that which con-
cerns the subject. The division of the segment of behavior into precurrent or
preparatory reactions and into final or consummatory reactions may well come from
Sherrington; it has no objective foundation. Objectivity there is only one succ-
ession, a purely temporal order of reactional systems . To establish between them
relations of subordination , to call the first systems precurrent or preparatory or
auxiliary, and the last final or consummatory is to mask under the words which one
believes neutral the subjective relation of means to an end* To speak of apprec-
iation, of choice, of preference, of intention , etc. is manifestly to use cate-
gories which concern states of soul, to characterize the responses , that is to say
movements. One understands then how Kantor "while denying interior life does not
deprive psychology of human experience" (6, p. 75). Rather he exteriorizes inter-
ior life by projecting it into stimuli and responses-, and he makes stimuli and
responses that are objective phenomena undergo a "subjectivation".
This manner of preceding can have a metaphysical interest but it implies a
complete reversal of the movement of scientific thought,. If science has progressed
toward its state of true science only by "desubjectivizing" its objects, to load
the stimulus-response pair with the remains of interior life is then to make of
psychology a metaphysics of behavior, and not a science,
It has been said that science eliminates all that the universe contains of
quality, of signification, of value and retains of it only a skeleton of spatial-
temporal relations leaving thus to psychology the care of assuming what it had
despised (4, vo. 1, p. 2). But this confounds psychology with metaphysics, with
metascience* Psychology aspires only to be a science like the others. So it is
not concerned with leftovers of science, if in reality there are leftovers. In
admitting that sciences, of nature despise certain aspects of the universe, it is
certainly not the job of another s_cience_ to occupy itself with it. A concrete
behaviorism, that is to say a science of behavior that interests itself in qual-
ities, meanings, values of stimuli and responses is a contradiction in terms.

References
1. Bode, Boyd H. The method of introspection. JiiSSl^lL^iiSS2PfeZ? 1913, 10,
85-91.
2. Jennings, H. S. Behavior of Lower Organisms 1906.

3. Kantor, J. R. At attempt toward a naturalistic description of emotions (I),

(II). ^sycMQEics.lJsvi&w, 1921, 28, 19-42, 120-140.

4. Kantor, J. R. PrincJ.E3B_oJllsjsJolo.g2; , Vol. 1, 1924, Vol. II, 1926, Knopf.

5. Kantor, J, R. AnJ>utlJjie__c^^ Follett, 1929.
6. Kantor, J. R. La psycho logie orsranique.
1929, 1, 75-88.
rtefbefiavloral quarterly
NOEL W. SMITH, Volume 7
DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY Number 3
1976-1977
STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCE PLATTSBURGH, NEW YORK

The start of the present wave of
genetic determinism, which claims
that differences in intelligence, sex
differences in behaviour, even
"
14
social poise ", " conformity " and
political radicalism ", are largely
genetic, may be dated from the
writings in the late 1960s of Arthur
Jensen in the United States and
Hans Eysenck in Britain. Its pro-
ponents have laid heavy claims to
scientificity by their reliance upon
complex statistical procedures and
the algebra of the heritability
equation. The discrediting of the
Burt results is but one example of
the inadequacy of the data on which
the hereditarian position is based.
But the fundamental issue is not
the validity of this or that empirical
survey; it is a theoretical one. All
claims of the " heritability of
intelligence" depend on two prior
theoretical assumptions: that the
IQ test measures an absolute
quantity, " intelligence " ; and that
the algebra derived by biometricians
for the study of the genetic
and environmental components
of differences in perfomance if)
very tightly controlled plant and
animal breeding programmes Is
applicable to the distribution of a
behavioural character across a wide
range of complex human environ-
ments. Both these theoretical
assumptions are fallacious; the 10
test is a social construct, as much
. a measure of the built-in assump-
tions of the testers, as of the innate
ability of those being tested; the
famed heritability estimate which
emerges from the biometry is a
.figure without theoretical meaning
or practical significance. The entire
exercise is best summed up in the
computer people's phrase " GIGO-r-
" Garbage InGarbage Out".
Exceptand this is a point which
those of us, biologists and psycho-
logists, who haye discussed these
questions extensively over the past
eight years with students, ethnic
minority groups and trade unionists,
have been anxious to point out
that this type of hereditarianism
Professor Steven Rose, Biology Dept.The
Open University, United Kingdom. Letter
to "The Times", Nov. 9, 1976.
has deep social and political under-
tones and is reflective of important
ideological issues. Its purpose is
to provide a biological rationale for
the status quo: IQ is
along class and race lines ; atber
types of desirable behavioural
characteristics are unequiuly dis-
tributed between the saxes (the
only reason why IQ isn't as that
test items which show sexual differ-
ences in scores are deleted from the
test !). The hereditarian position
would have us believe thftt' xtjte
working class, the Blacks, <th Irish,
are genetically stupider lehan the
middle class, the Wliit&s, the
English ; that women halve: series
for being secretaries and stten for
being executivesand therefore
that the explanation and justifica-
tion of a class bound, racially and
sexually divided society, lies not in
social institutions and structures
(which we can change) but in our
genes (which, we cannot).

THE AGOR&

While the editor was spending the academic ucation Act provided that at age eleven all
year in Britain the storm over Cyril Burt children would be* divided in their further
developed. The disclosure that he had fals- educational pursuits by an examination which
ified data to support a hereditarian view would send them to a grammar school, tech-
of intelligence provoked a spate of letters nical school, or secondary modern school.
to The Times. The line of influence of Ey- Grammar school was a preparation for higher
senck as a student of Burt and Jensen a stu- education while the other two were usually
dent of Eysenck was among the information terminal, ^he division was assumed to be
that emerged from it. The issue is no mere based on inherited intelligence. About two
academic exercise<, The British educational years ago the system was replaced by "comp-
system was largely based on the hereditarian rehensive schools" which are similar to Am-
view until recently and that view was heavi- erican schools,
ly influenced by the "research" of Burt who *
served as a government adviser. He was Several papers have been recently published
knighted in 1946 for his work. The 1944 Ed- in the
DONNA M. CONE, ASSOCIATE EDITOR RONALD G. HEYDUK, ASSOCIATE EDITOR
LYNCHBURG TRAINING SCHOOL AND HOSPITAL KENYON COLLEGE

Crude Data Investigative Contact Scientific Construction

 -2-

which will be of interest to readers. Of these three are fairly closely

related; (l) P. Te Mouritjoy,, "Science in Psychology; J. R8 Kantor's Field
Theory", 1976? 2, 3-21; (2) J, R Kantor, "The Origin and Evolution of Inter-
behavioral Psychology", 1976, 2S 120-136; (3) N. W. Smith, "The Works of J, R.
Kantor; Pioneer in Scientific Psychology", 1976, 2, 137-148.
?;-#
In Number 1 of this volume we commented on the developing interest in setting
factors as part of the psychological field. Sid Bijou's new book also makes
extensive use of the concept-. CHILD DEVELOPMENT; THE BASIC STAGE OF EARLY
CHILDHOODs Prentice-Hall, 1976. It also utilizes concepts of stimulus functions
and interactional history. James VI. McKearney, Senior Scientist at the Worcester
Foundation for Experimental Biology, has been giving considerable emphasis to
multiple factors in his research,, In "Punished Behavior: Increases in Responding
after d-Amphatemine'% PsjchoEhSS2laia9 1975, 411 23-26, he reports the
effects of "eo-existing behaviors" and "environmental context" with respect to
drugs. In "Drug Effects and the Environmental Control of Behavior",
j 1976, 27 (3), he explores some of the varied factors that
influence the effects of drugs as reinforcers. In a paper to be published in
PERSPECTIVES IN BIOLOGY AND MEDICINE, "Asking Questions about Behavior", he
develops a position about causation, biological factors in behavior, settings,
and functional meanings of objects that is entirely interbehavioral. For
example,' "Knowing the physiological concomitants of a behavior could be very
useful information and yet not be an explanation. Since behavior is a complex
product of many interacting f actors , it is erroneous to attribute primary
causal status to any one of these acting in isolation". Still another paper,
"Interrelations among Prior Experience and Current Conditions in the Determination
of Behavior and the Effects of Drugs" to be published in Volume 3 of ADVANCES IN
BEHAVIORAL PHARMACOLOGY, Academic Press, states "although there has been a trad-
itional recognition of the importance of prior experience and of situational or
contextual, factors in the determination of behavior, these factors have not been
much emphasized in the experimental analysis of behavior and analysis of the
behavioral effects of drugs". For offprints and preprints write the author at
the Foundation, 222 Maple Ave, Shrewsbury^ Massachusetts 0154-5. The interest
in setting factors has also appeared in Germany; M i Setting factors* (Kantor,
1959) sind ebenfalls unmittelbare Umstfl.nde, unter denen sich ein Individuum
verhfllt, und erleichtern oder unterdrftcken bestimmte Reaktamen. Ein setting
factor kann z. B, die Anwesenheit einer anderen Person sein, aber auch der
Zustand, in dem sich die Vp befindet^ z. B. ihr Alter oder ihre gesundheitliche
verfassung". Source; Monika Rennert, "Der Einfluss der Versuchssituatlon bei
Imitationsexperimenten", Archly fttr,J?s_ycholQgle ., 1975* 127, 70-77. Also in num-
ber 1 Roger Ray was quoted on the subject of the role of setting and situational
factors in conditioning. He predicted that future research would demonstrate
the "profound" influences of such factors and. force a shift to "more ecological
models" of conditioning. Readers should know that in the years sinee that 1973
statement, Ray (with several associates) has been active in fulfilling his own
prophecy, i seris of papers entitled "A Systems Approach to Behavior" report
an impressive variety of experimental and field studies of animal and human
behavior (including but not limited to conditioning) establishing relationships
between subtle and often ignored setting factors and a variety of behavior par-
ameters. In addition to drawing attention to the importance of such setting
factors, Ray is consistent with the interbehavioral field orientation in his
philsophical and methodological commitment to the notion of a continuous
behavioral flow. Two of the papers in the series have already appeared in the
Ps]rcholoical_fecoTdl (1975, 25, 459-478; 1976, 26, 147-180) and a third (which
includes a particularly delightful study of the behavior of a killer whale at
a sea amusement park) will appear in the jRecord shortly. All three papers dem-
onstrate that interbehaviorism is far more than a stimulating exercise in phil-
osophical psychology! it has revolutionary potential for empirical psychology
as well, drawing the behavioral scientist toward relatively unexplored determ-
inants as well as novel measures of behavior. Along these same lines another
paper of interest is the lead article in the July 1977 AmerJ.cOT._P&ychologit
entitled "Toward an Experimental Ecology of Human Development" by Urie Bron-
fenbrenner. The interactional flavor of this manifesto for "broader perspect-
ives in theory, method, and substance" of research on human development is
demonstrated by Bronfebrenner's proposed definition for his new "ecology of
human development":

The ecology of human development is the scientific study of

the progressive, mutual accommodation, throughout the life span,
between a growing human organism and the changing immediate envir-
onments in which it lives, as this process is affected by relations
obtaining within and between these immediate settings, as well as
the larger social contexts, both formal and informal,, in which the
settings are embedded.

In numbers 1 and 2 of this volume we published a translation of Tilquin's account

of interbehaviorism. In this number we publish a translation of Foulquie" & Delle-
dalle's account. In the case of Tilquin he offers an overview that has only
occasional misunderstandings. But he ends with conclusions that are totally in-
consistent with what he reports about it. He is unable to recognize that one
need not assume an "interior life" as opposed, to an exterior one, tiat there is
no evidence that nature has divided humans or other organism into "inner" and
"outer". He also fails to recognize that one may regard all events as part of
the physical universe, that none are "leftovers" or objects of "despise", that
all are subject to scientific investigation, and that his includes "qualities,
meanings, and values" constituted by organism-object interactions. Assertions
about "desubjectivising" or "exteriorizing" are based on dualistic assumptions
invented by medieval theologians, Foulquie & Deledalle agree with Tilquin's
conclusions but give them a slightly different twist. By some rather obscure
logic they arrive at a "subjective world". For these authors to analyze a
naturalistic approach to psychology with fair accuracy and then return to meta-
physics that do not follow from it indicates the tenacious grip that this cul-
tural doctrine has even on diligent scholars. Without metaphysical assumptions
the doubts and criticisms fall away and psychology can be a true natural science
dealing with the observed events of valuing, developing meanings, etc.a part
of human activity, these activities in turn being as much a part of the domain
of the physical universe as are falling rocks. A similar confusion was analysed
in some detail in "A Commentary", Volume 6, Number 2.

Paul Puller once mentioned that there is a Russian book that has an account of
interbehaviorism but that he had lost the reference. If anyone knows of it
please send us the particulars. Perhaps we could locate a copy, find a translator,
and present it in these pages.
 4-

After eight years and seven volumes of the Newsletter/Quarterly the editor
would like to turn the job over to a successor. If anyone is interested in this
enterprise please contact him.

In the final number of Volume 7 we will include information about Dr. Ranter's
new book on language behavior.

The following essay, a revision and expansion of a portion of an under-

graduate sophomore's examination in a History and Systems of Psychology course
at Kenyon College, grapples with the relationship between behavioristic and
interbehavioristic perspectives. This relationship is, of course, intriguing
in its . complexity : as befits close siblings, the behaviorist and the inter-
behaviorist are at once the most f a i t h f u l of allies (in their efforts to establish
a naturalistic psychology) and the most irreconcilable of opponents (in their
analyses of the psychological event and the interrelations of its parts). The
essay also draws humanism into the comparison of psychological perspectives,
and in the process aptly raises questions about whether the "humanistic
revolution" is truly as revolutionary as promoted.
 -5-

Interbehaviorism, Behaviorism, and Humanism:

A Comparative Analysis of Three Psychological Systems
*
Steven A. ZLeiser and Ronald G. Heyduk
Kenyon College

This essay is a brief attempt to contrast and compare three psychological

systems of the twentieth century: behaviorism, interbehaviorism, and humanism.
This will be done by examining first the similarities and differences between
behaviorism and interbehaviorism, and then discussing the similarities and
differences between interbehaviorism and humanism.

Interbehaviorism and Behaviorism: Similarities and Differences

Both behaviorism and interbehaviorism reject mind-body dualism. Both

systems strive to create a psychology that is monistic, that takes as its subject,
matter only natural, observable acts of the organism. Behaviorists and inter-
behaviorists believe that the "mind" does not exist; that it is just a cultural
imposition upon psychology. Psychologists of both schools want to study what
really exists, what is natural and observable, not some artificial, intangible
construct. Another similarity between the two systems is that each is opposed to
physiological reductionism as a solution to mind-body dualism. Each believes
that psychological events can never be fully explained in neurological terms;
such an effort is not only futile, but misdirected because in spite of his monistic
intentions the physiological reductionist maintains a dualism, simply substituting
for "mind" a new term, "brain", with the same spiritual properties. The brain
perceives, thinks, learns, and directs behavior exactly as the mind did. Thus
the organism is still not unified: "lower" aspects of the organism are sub-
ordinated to the omnipotent "mind-brain51.

A basic difference between behaviorism and interbehaviorism is the way in

which each tries to rid psychology of "mind" and thereby create a monistic
psychology. The behaviorist's solution is to focus on overt behavior and deny
or ignore "mental functions" such as perceiving, thinking, and remembering.
In the process, however, says the interbehaviorist, dualism is maintained, because
by ignoring "mental" events, one is tacitly admitting to their non-natural
status. In contrast, the interbehaviorist, rather than regarding the acts of
perceiving, thinking and remembering as unobservable functions of an ethereal
"mind", views them as natural functions of a whole organism, no different in
kind than "overt" behavioral accomplishments in that they represent an inter-
action between an organism and an environment. This leads to the second essential
difference between behaviorism and interbehaviorism. The behaviorist treats
the psychological event as an action-reaction, a sequential process beginning
with a "cause" (a "stimulus" or environmental situation influencing an organism)
and ending with an "effect" (the response of the organism to that situation),
while the interbehaviorist believes behavior is the result of a complex inter-
action between organism and environment, with no single, localized cause.

* The former author contributed organization, style, and most of the content of the
essay; the latter author exerted his prerogative as the former's teacher by
suggesting several modifications, mainly editorial in nature.
 -6-

The most fundamental difference between the two schools (the difference
from which the other differences derive) concerns the definition of the two
components of a psychological event, "stimulus" and "response." The behaviorist
defines a stimulus as an environmental object (or the flow of energy it produces),
and a response as a movement or a secretion. The stimulus occxirs first, in the
environment, and elicits a response from the organism. Stimulus and response
are separate and distinct, and the environment is said to control the organism.
The interbehaviorist, when viewing the psychological event, concentrates not
on physical stimuli and responses, but on stimulus functions and response functions.
What matters is not the physical stimulus but its function ("meaning") for the
stimulated organism. A clinched fist and a glaring look, though different
physical stimuli, may have the same stimulus function. Similarly, what matters
is not the muscle activity comprising a response, but its function ("intent").
A glance at one's watch and a yawn during a lecture can have the same response
function. The interbehaviorist notes that while physical stimulus and response
occur as isolable units in a cause-effect sequence, stimulus and response
functions are not so isolable: they can be understood only in terms of their
relationship. One cannot determine a behavior's "intent" (response function)
without knowing the behaving organism's interpretation of the current environ-
ment (stimulus function); conversely, an organism's interpretation of the
environment (stimulus function) is only defined or revealed by the organism's
action in that environment (response function).

Interbehaviorism and Humanism: Similarities and Differences

Interbehaviorism and humanism are similar in that both systems are reactions
against what are viewed as oversimplifying characteristics of behaviorism.
Humanists and interbehaviorists agree that man is a complex and active organism
that should not be treated as an object controlled by the environment or by his
physiology. The similarity between the two systems ends there, however.
Humanists, in rejecting the behavioristic conception that man's behavior is
determined by the environment, assert in polar opposition that man determines
his own behavior. A fundamental belief of the humanist is in the free will of
man, in man's ability to control his own behavior, and in man's inherent goodness.
Interbehaviorists do not argue that man is basically good or evil, nor do they
believe in simplistic control of behavior, either by the environment or by man's
'Will". Interbehaviorists believe that causes of behavior can be determined,
but that "first causes" or "prime movers" do not exist. Instead of simple
cause-effect determinism, interbehaviorism posits an interaction between the
organism and the environment, with each dependent upon but neither controlling
the other. Humanism and behaviorism espouse opposing theories of behavior control,
while interbehaviorism is in the center, believing neither in strict environmental
nor organismic control but rather in an interaction of behavior determinants.
Humanism, in attempting to make a complete break with behaviorism, reintroduces
the mind and dualism, and strives to make psychology unnatural and unscientific
once again. Interbehaviorism also rejects the simplistic elements of behaviorism,
but interbehaviorist still believe in a scientific, naturalistic, and monistic
psychology.
References

Matson, Floyd W. Humanistic theory: ehe Third Revolution in psychology. The

Humanist, March/April 1971.

Murphy, Gardner, & Kovach, Joseph K. HjjLtJd,aJLJntrj^^

Third Edition. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972.

Watson, John B. Psychology as the behaviorist views it. Psychological Review,

1913, 20, 158-177.
 -7-

LA PS1CHOLOGIE
Paul Foulquie*
with the collaboration of
Gerald Deledalle
Parisj Presses Universitaires de France, 1951

Le Behaviorisms Organismique de Kantor*

The behaviorist Jacob Kantor (bom in 1388), professor at Indiana University,

leans heavily on the modern behaviorists but also seems to have been influenced
by the psychology of form: arid because of the importance that he attributes to
environment he is reminiscent of the concept of the psychology of man represented
by certain contemporary phenomenalegists.
He calls his concept organismic psychology which we will translate as "Psy-
cho logie organismique" although in one of his articles that he published in 1929
for the short-lived RgyjM_AJ^ZM3SiS_^2SI!k^.''" this was translated as "organic
psychology". That review states "Organic psychology is the study of the activities
of psychological organisms. It has no relation to traditional psychology which is
concerned with psychic or mental states". It does not call upon introspection
and considers states of consciousness to be a fiction. We consider that the object
of psychology is concrete reactions of an organism to its surrounding stimuli (Ibid.),
"The data of organic psychology are soley the concrete interactions of psych-
ological organisms and of objects acting upon them as stimuli. The concern then
is with a type of interaction absolutely analogous to the interaction of objects
as they are studied by the natural sciences" (Ibid.). For Kantor, the terms
"spirit" and "body" are only metaphysical abstractions which do not represent
anything real (3PrjilS. ^> P- 30). Holding to that reality which is perceptible
to the senses, the psychology he limits himself to analyzing and describing is
"the intervention of an organism which responds to an object which stimulates it"
(Ibid., p. 182).^
But Kantor is very careful to point out that psycho logy, as he conceives it,
is distinguished not only from the properly biological sciences but also from
classical behaviorism represented by Watson. Although for him, psychism is no
more than organic reactions, organic psychology should not be confused with biology
or with physiology. Indeed, while these natural sciences only study organisms,
psychology concentrates its attention on the interaction of the organism with the
stimuli which stem from the environment in which the organism lives. Rooted in

*This translation was corrected and improved by Lucien Ledue* ill footnotes
are by the editor.
1
"L'etat actual du behaviorisme'% 1929, 2, 136-137.
2
This statement does not occur on the page indicated.
 -8-

biology, psychology has a special object and one can consider it as an ecological
(or bionomic) science (Ibid., p. 20). Moreover, psychological reactions differ
essentially from physical or biological reactions; they vary with the circumstances;
they integate themselves into complex behaviors; they can be put off or even in-
hibited (Ibid., p. 5-9).
In additiony in psychology it is essential to observe one's own behavior be-
cause a large number of facts cannot be known in any other way. Let us imagine,
for example, a person leaving his house, taking a few steps on the street, then
returning home, only to emerge again with a book under his arm. Anyone observing
this will understand that the person had forgotten the book and then had suddenly
remembered it (p. 8-9). But how did he remember it? Only that person can answer
the question by observing his own behavior. This type of information which sing-
ularly resembles introspection is unknown to biology.
Lastly, besides physical or biological there are psychological stimuli that
the biologist is not concerned with; among the former one must include geographic,
climatic, and ecological conditions.
Although he stated in his Principles of Psychology that this book somewhat
shares the view of authors who "sail together under the pennant of behaviorism"
(I, p. 72)3 he dOes not want to be confused with those for whom psychology is
only the study of organisms considered as a whole. "Organic psychology is the
science of a specific form of interaction among real personsor animalsand the
objects and situations which constitute their natural and social milieu" (Revue,
1929). For Kantor as for Watson the primary object of psychology is reactions
or behavior. But organismic psychology considers behaviors as separate from the
biological organisms that produce them and it integrates them in increasingly
complex structures whose development is described in the Principles. Also in
rejection of the mentalist attitude and introspective method, Kantor claims to
avoid the mechanisms by which all is reduced to reflexes. His work even begins
with this declaration; "The domain of psychology comprises the phenomena which
we call conscisousness or psychological reactions" (p. l). He further specifies;
"By psychological reaction we mean the responses which psychological organisms,
such as human individuals and higher types of animals perform when they adjust
themselves to the various stimulating objects surrounding them" (p. l). He deems
it impossible to explain these psychological reactions by analyzing the organic
activity ending in the reflex-arc, the basic unit of psychism. "Psychology can-
not take as its unit anything less full of content than the actual response of a
person to a stimulus object" (p. 2). Every response is the response of a person-
ality (p. 36). "Personality constitutes one of the essential psychological
data" (p. 7,4). In fact, Kantor admits only of an empirical personality. It
amounts to systems of reactions or to behavioral equipment acquired by the
individual in the course of his past experience; it seems that there is something
that transcends the purely organic.
Be that as it may, it is interesting to note his insistence in affirming
the effect of an individual's past in his present conduct; "One of the best
established of all psychological principles is that the activities of an indiv-
idual depend upon his reactional biography or behavior history" (p. 159). Whereas

quotations from the Principles are here presented from the original
English rather than being retranslated.
on the one hand biological behavior is rigorously determined by the present
disposition of the organism and on the other by environment, psychological behav-
ior depends even more on the past contacts of the organism with the surroxmdings
and subsequently is seen to be highly personal.
Further, Kantor1s points are not in agreement with the rigourous methods
that experimental psychologists claimed to acquire from physics. Introspection
is rejected and one must be content with exterior observation which appears in
two principle forms: (1) field observationwhat one would call naive or popular
observation and which consists of the study of psychological organisms as they
are found in spontaneous or free activity; (2) laboratory Research or experi-
mentation. Mow it is interesting to note that it is to the first that Kantor
gives more importance, just as do the traditional psychologists. Field obser-
vation he says is irreplaceable such fiat psychology is essentially a field science
and supplies us with first notions of thought, feeling, wanting, etc; it is only
by this that we have an understanding of complex facts that laboratory analysis
would distort. Psychology is none the less a science; for it is a critical
attitude which makes for a scientific attitude^ and thanks to it these ^.wo modes
of observation are separated only very tenuously (p. 15).
Of even more interest is the Kantorian concept of stimulus. The stimulus
does not identify with a physical phenomenon that is identical for all. What is
identical for all is the object. For example, a white ball has natural proper-
ties which act in a similar fashion on the retinas of the eyes which perceive
it| but this is only a small part of the stimulatory properties of things. The
stimulus is created rather than given in natural objects. Indeed, transformations
occur which add to the latter powers what they did not originally possess. In
other words, where classical behaviorism supposes that experience nodifies the
organism, but not the environment which acts upon it, Kantor teaches that the
environment is also modified and that the objects are enriched by new stimuli.
For a child, for example, a red ball viewed from a distance, is characterized
only by its round form and colorj but when it is placed in his hands and he
senses its freshness, when he caresses it with his fingers, when he feels its
smoothness send its hardness and weight, the original stimulus will be singularly
enriched. Thus, to the mysterious object in itself is progressively substituted
the object for us which is reminiscent of the world of phemenologists. The study
of the interactions which result in both the adaptation of the behavior of organ-
isms and the constitution of a new world becomes for Kantor the object of psych-
ology.
Association one would guess plays a major role in what one may call
"psychologization" of the material world. But Kantor does not fall into assoe-
iational psychology that prevailed in the 19th century, which concerned assoc-
iation of ideas. For it, everything occurs within the subject; it is pure
mentalism. For Kantor, on the contrary, it is not ideas or states of conscious-
ness which are associated but more or less complex stimuli and responses,, "Pre-
cisely as in the case of an earlier psychological period, associated processes
today may be looked upon as fundamental and universal mechanisms for all psych-

authors use quotation marks for this clause but have actually summarized
"is it not this critical attitude in observing and interpreting phenomena in what-
ever way it may be employed^ which constitutes science?" They have also rendered
"attitude" as esprit, "spirit" or "mind". "Attitude".is the same word in French
from which it was borrowed.
 -10-

ological phenomena. But unlike the earlier period in which association was
considered as having to do only with mental states, we must today consider it as
referring to the organization of actual stimuli-response situations" (p. 343).
Kantor made substitutions to Watsonian behaviorism which he called inter-
behaviorism and for the psychology of reactions he substituted the psychology of
interaction. On the one hand the beings that he calls "psychological organisms"
do not merely react to the actions of stimuli; their reactions are responses in
the sense of human relationships; they consist of new attitudes in which the
individual faces a situation, and which little by little gives him the "psych-
ological equipment"; and tiat equipment is more or less independent of the organ-
ism and of the surroundings. On the other hand the stimuli arriving from the
surroundings don't remain indifferent to the responses which are made to them;
their powers of stimulation can either increase or decrease, There are therefore
more than two terms having bearings a being capable of reactions and objects
capable of provoking reactions. Beyond these assumptions that one may consider
as the structure of psychic activity, there arises in the life course of the
individuals complex superstructures which result from the interaction of the
two terms in relation. The object of psychology is the study of these super-
structures.
For Kantor, psychological analysis could not go beyond the stimulus-response
pair, which he calls a "segment of behavior" and which constitutesra determinate
adaptation. The primary forms of behavior are reflex and instinct-'to which ex-
perience imposes "basic behavior" which constitutes the framework of personality.
Finally, with social behavior appears psychological behavior. Under the name of
psychological behavior Kantor goes on to analyze, with a profusion of divisions
and subdivisions unknown to classical psychology, the varying psychic functions,
emphasizing their characteristics of behavior or reactions attentive reactions,
implicit actions as responses to absent stimuli (thought), affective reactions,
cognitive responses, volitional conduct, etc, (p. 307).
Thus the images (or rather the imaginal responses) consist of vestiges of
perceptual reaction systems. To this observation the author adds this profound
remark: in great measure, to imagine means to verbally analyze the manner in which
we react to absent objects (p. 307).
He rejects the realist concept that intelligence is a special power; it is
only "the particular way the individual adapts himself to his surroundings,". (p
128) and this "particular way" consists in predicting and varying the reaction
systems. However, for Kantor these predictions and these attempts at varied
reactions are the business of implicit behavior and not of thought; classical
psychology says the same thing.
The description that Kantor gives us of the free act or rather of idiosyn-
cratic activity singularly recalls the Bergsonian theory of freedoms there ares
he says, contingential reactions whieir'depend not on the organism but on the
"psychological equipment*. In these-situations the individual derives his response
from his personality, from his "reactional biography" (p. 195).

This is misleading. See "Principles., I, P. 155-158. Kantor was one of the

earliest critics of the instinct doctrine.
 Kantor rejects any hypothesis that goes beyond immediate data, and it is
in the name of scientific positivism that he rejects Watsonian materialism as
well as classic spiritualism. Claiming to limit himself to what is immediately
verifiable he considers psychology as a descriptive science and he does not seek
any explanation of observed facts,,
In fact he reconstitutes the contents of consciousness and interior life on
a new plans which are so vilified by objective psychology. In their place he
speaks of psychological behavior and psychological environment, all the factors
of interbehavior. As M. Tilquin accurately said "One understands then how Kantor
'while denying interior* life does not deprive psychology of human experience*,
Rather he exteriorizes interior life by projecting itinto stimuli and responses,
and he makes stimuli and responses fiat are objective phenomena -undergo a
!
subjactivation" (p. 354).
For the author we have just quoted a return to subjectivity constitutes a
fundamental error for he says "Psychology only aspires to be a science like the
others" (p, 355). One can, on the contrary, believe that in becoming a science
like the others,, it no longer attains its goal; because of this we have indirect
constitution of & subjective world.

r "(T o >
A proper understanding of psychological events will only come when
researchers change their conception of them. For one of the most
eloquent of the group of cognitive theorists, Neisser (1967), the
task is to "trace the fate of tie input" (p. 4.), what happens to the
stimulus once it has entered the body. Such an approach clearly
views psychology as what happens inside, and so it is essential to
fill the organism with psychological functions. Behaviour is not
seen as being a function of the stimulus context but as a function
of organism!, c processes, which are recognised as being hypothetical
constructs (p. 4-} Behaviour is merely a manifestation of these
underlying processes. Cognition is no longer something which a
person does but is something performed by cognitive structures,
which have no existential reality,, How can it possibly be justi-
fied that one can explain a phenomenon by referring to something
which does not exist? Only by recognizing that psychology is the
study of the interaction of an organism and an. environment will any
progress be made in the understanding of its events. The environ-
ment does not somehow enter the organism and be processed; it merely
comes into contact with the environment. And it is the study of the
various types of relationships with which psychology is concerned.
In brief, psychology is not the study of what occurs between stim-
ulus and response in the CNS (Conceptual Nervous System); it is
the study of the interaction between the two factors. Stimulus and
response now play a central rather than a peripheral role in the
eventthey are the event,, Reference to the CNS does not account
for the event, it merely provides us with a more detailed descrip-
tion of the response phase, Viewed in isolation from the stimulus
 -12-

contextj the responding of an organism is a purely biological event-

psychological events are not located in biological structures
and it only attains psychological status when it is linked with the
stimulus context.
Edward Blewett
Letter, June H, 1976
terbeftavlorol
NOEL W. SMITH, EDITOR
quorterli
folume 7
Nussber 4-
DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY 1976-77
STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORIC COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCE PLATTSBURGH, YORK

Language in not an i^g_trumgnt of communication between speaker and hearers it

Is their c^wffiiati2S"-''feheir transactionas speaker and hearer,,
A corollary of the constant code of the linguists is that the forms of language
ar not altered by the meanings of the speakers, and the forms themselves do not
properly "mean" anything,, But it can be shown that forms and meanings continually
affect one another. In my opinion, these linguists do not understand how language,
has meaning. Meaning is the end-in-view of speaking and .hearing; It is not some-
thing extrinsic to speech* Meaning is not thoughts or purposes in the heads of
speakers, and It is not-, as Bloomfield said, the relation of events prior to their
speaking and consequent to their speaking. Meaning is what needs to be said in
coping with the actual situation of the speaker and hearer, so far as it can be
done by saying. Meaning is not conveyed by speech or EOjhjtedjto. by speech; it is
speaker and hearer making sense to one another in a situation, (p. 34.)
Again and again I find myself dissenting from the main line of the scientific
linguists of the past fifty yearsthe anthropologists, the posltivists, and the
structuralists.,.. It seems to ae that in abstracting language from speaking and
hearing in actual situations, they make three fundamental,, ted connected mistakess
(l) they exaggerate constancy and supra-individuality as against the variability
and interpersonal!ty of natural language; the wlanguage8 that they discuss, with
its contstant forms and self-contained rules, is sometimes an artifact of their
method of investigation., (2) They say that the forms of language can rarelyf If
ever, be explained by meanings in experience and practical use,, and the forms
themselves do not have meaning,, (3) They have a disposition to treat language
and communication as a calculus of forms and processing of information that could
dispense with human speakers and hearers altogether, (p. 86-87)
e cannot use words to cope unless we believe in their meaning and assert it, and
this belief depends on utterance, grammar, history, the existence of speakers and
hearers. Conversely, we cannot finally describe a language, its pronunciation,
grammar, and meaning of words, unless we take into accountjfcs uses in spakinge.e
(p. 85)

Paul Goodmans SPEAKING AND LANGUAGES

DEFENSE OF POETRY, Random House, 1971

DONNA M. CONE, ASSOCIATE EDITOR RONALD G. HEYDUK, ASSOCIATE EDITOR

LYNCHBURG TRAINING SCHOOL AND HOSPITAL KENYON COLLEGE

Crude Data investigative Contact Scientific Construction

 -2-

THE AGORA

A new book by Js R Kantor, ' PSYCHOLOGICAL LINGUISTICS, comes at a time when this
topic has become of interest to psychology and has also produced some major contro-
versies. His OBJECTIVE PSYCHOLOGY OF GRAMMAR published in 1936 was decades ahead of
the field as were several of the areas with which he dealt and thus received little
attentions There is no way yet of knowing whether this latest work will fair any
better but at least the chances seem better. Perhaps one of the most outstanding
features of the book is the way in which the author has shown the integral nature f
language interbehaviora ; with all other interbehaviors Numerous diagrams of various
types of language situations help to clarify them* This book, as we would expect
from its author, is completely congistent with a naturalistic field approach to
psychological behavior. As an alternative to the tired old assumptions about lang-
uage round which many of the debates continue to circlet this work is refreshing. It
never departs from an observational base? its constructs are always descriptions of
actual events. The book-" is a culmination of writings on psycho linguistics that
began in 1922 that have consistently satisfied the insightful criticisms and criteria
of the quoted passages from Paul Goodman. fh@@ works have been ignored far too long.
This book deserves wide attention.

Steven Brown has started a publication entitled Operaa t Sub^gcMvitnL

ojLogy Newsletter .. It is actually closer to a jpurnal style of publication than of
a newsletter. Volume 1, Number 1. 1977 is dated October 1977. Readers might wish to
refer to 1972, 3(2) and 1972, 3(3; of these pages for information about Brown's work
and that of William Stephenson, There is a close kinship with interbehaviorism.
Subscriptions to Operant. . . SuMejgtivi ty_ are, per year, t5 for individuals, $7 outside
US and Canada, $7 for libraries and institutions. Address? Steven R. Brown, Editor,
Political Science Department, Kent State University, Kent,
Ohio

The Archives of the History of American Psychology announces its. annual Research
Fellowship, A stipend of $500 will be awarded. This is considered as aid to a
scholar wishing to utilize the primary resources of the Archives of the History of
American Psychology. The stipend is intended to defray travel and research expenses
and the recipient is expected to reside in Akron while using the materials of the
Archives. Candidates should submit a prospectus of the work planned, a vita, and
two letters of recommendation. It is particularly important that there be evidence
that the Archives is the most suitable place for the work to be undertaken. Preference
will be given to advanced graduate students and younger post doctoral scholars.
Applications should be completed by March first. The award will be announced not
later than April 15th and will be in effect until December 31, 1978. Applications
should be sent to the chairman of the University of Akron awards committees Mr. John
V. Miller, Jr., Director of Archival Services, University of Akron, Akron, Ohio

A recent book of interest: N, J. Block & Gerald Dworkim THE IQ CONTROVERSY: CRITICAL
READINGS, New Yorks Parthenon Books, 1976. The book presents papers giving various
arguments as well as extended debates with rebuttals and counter-rebuttals. The final
chapter by the editors is called "IQ, Heritability, Inequality" and is an excellent
 -3-

analysis of the various assumptions f their relation to empirical data, and their
logical consequences. The social implications are also discussed. Block and
Dworkin find major errors in the works of Jensen and Herrnstein whose works are
among those offered in the volume. An article by Mary Jo Bane & Christopher Jeneks,
"Five Myths About Your IQ" maintains a few myths itself but on the whole offers a
very readable account of major myths that educators, social reformers, students $ the
public, and researchers as well would do well to examine.
*
We have received three comments on information that appeared in the preceding issue.
One is from William Stephenson concerning Cyril Burt:

I was Cyril Burt's assistant and colleague during the early years of his prof-
essorship at University College, London (during the years 1928-37), and although
Burt's early work on the intelligence-heredity problem preeeeded my appointments,
I remain one of the last of those in psychology who knew him well as a colleague
during those years, in relation to heredity and related aspects of his work. I
have so far not made public my views on the fratiduleney with which Burt has been
charged-the matter is sad and more complex than headlines and brief abstractions
affordbut I would ask for compassion until the story is fully told.
An example of the necessity for this has reference to your Quarterly's note on
Burt in Volume 7, No. 3, 1976-7: it is true that Burt's work was used to support
those who framed the Education Act of 1944 in Britain, which in effect saved
K.any Public Schools (i.e. private schools in England) from near bankruptcy, and
which creamed off some fifteen percent of eleven-year-olds in England for Grammar
Schools, leaving the rest to ill-supported elementary schools, Burt himself,
however, did not support this drastic and unwarranted division^ and I myself
wrote strongly against the assumptions and provisions of the Act in my Testing
Sghoolchildren (Longman Green, 1948), recommending the American system of high
schools, which is now (1976) being adopted in Britain.
This example, of an all-too-easy assumption of personal accountability, in no
way changes the matter of Erofes,sional blame, Burt!s rigid acceptance of psyoh-
ometty based on the assumption of the objectivity of iadJ,vj.dUAl__dJ.fj|[ej^ncej-, was
a serious mistake, not to be expected of a scholar so well versed in the meta-
physics and logic of modern science* But Burt was not along in this, since
almost all psychometrists then, and still now, suffer the same lapsus int_elli--
gentiae. At the same time, as some readers of this note may guess, I was warning
Burt of his mistaketo no avail, of course. In passing, however, I hop that
psychologists will not color Burt all black, with fraud as the pencil, forgetful
of his prolific, creative contributions to educational psychology in the early
decades of this century. And incidentally, Hurt's knighthood was in recognition
of the contributions made by psychologists to the war effort, rather than to
Burt alone.
A second comment is from Ken Pearee who teaches in a private (what we call ^public")
school in England:
Thera has a complaint recently is Britain that the Open University is
"infested1* with Marxists* In reading Professor Steven Rose's comments n the
desire of the guardians of the status quo to believe in the established tripartite
system, it is easy to understand why complaints arises even in the late 20th
century the voice of dissent is interpreted by some as being evidence of dissolute
 tendencies In society,, Of course* these who dislike reading the evidence of
Burt's falsification of ^research*1 data are those wh would seek to perpetuate
the order established by that data, and it is my unfortunate duty to pint out
that we still have schools operating under the old "tripartite" systeffl? as
grammar,, technical,, r secondary schools!! Indeed? I am now working in a schl
of the latter type and am constantly enraged by the comments f some other
members of the staff who still talk as if the 11+ IQ tests were infallible, (In
that part of Lincolnshire In which I teach the IQ test is still used to determine
which typ of school is "appropriateB for the children of that area!) 1 MQ filled
with hope for the future when I read extracts from world sources in your publica-
tion^ at least some of the people will eventually perceive the issue 'to be wider
than they presently consider it to be*
Th third comment is from Jim McKearney regarding the note by Zeiser and Heydukt
In all fairness. I think it should be noted that the brand f "beaaviorlsffl" they
discuss is tfatsonian in character (or at most what Skinner ferns called "method-
ological behaviorism" ) . Skinner takes great pains t stress that Kcv@rtw events
eannat b excluded from analysis ; indeed , this forms part f the basis for his
separation f methodological from radical behaviorism* Similarly,* he cannot b
identified with the position that behavior is an "action-reaction91 process in
which environmental stimuli elicit specific responses,, Further^ h has consis-
tently emphasized the functional importance of the stisrulus and response as
opposed to their physical or topographical nature,, I agree with your statement
that behavlorists and interbehaviorists are allied 5 on the other hand* it would
be unfortunate if an oversimplification of behaviorism, or its exclusive Ident-
ification with the naive variety of Watson and Hull, were to create or perpetuate;
a spurious conflict between the two, Hothing in Skinner's radical behavlorisai is
in conflict with the emphasis of interbehaviorism. Instead^ the interbefaavioral
approach is more comprehensive, and calls attention to more of the important
determinants of behavior than Skinner ejsglicitlz emphasizes .
##*
In the preceding isswthe editor announced that he was seeking, a new editor to take
over the 22lZ> He was fortunate in persuading Ronald Ge Beyduk to assume these
duties beginning in 1978* A message from the editor-elect informs us that the
_ _ .
will become S_^SilfefeffiiSEisi. beginning in its ninth
year and eighth volume , It will originate from the Department of Psychology, Kenyoa
College, Gambler , Ohio and thus will share the same home as the
Associate editors will include the present editor and founder, Noel W Smith; Donna
Cone who will continue ; and Paul f. Mount joy who will b newly joining but who has
made contri butions from time to time throughout the past* Attendant upon these
administrative change will be several other changes . including the new title, new
m
journal-style" format* and probably a new "face sheet" design. Such changes will
be more cosmetic than substantial? The_Jrtextehavl.oristi will continue to provide a
forttm for the exchange of information and ideas concerning the development of objective
psychology. As before, the endeavor will be to scrutinize modern empirical and
theoretical psychology , separating events from what is cultural imposition, and
offering alternatives when necessary in an effort to encourage a naturalistic psych-
ology* that of a field of interbehaviors. Your continued support and contributions
are requested in order that %e_Injrbehaviorlst can attempt to provide a contimdag
intellectual stimulus ,
As a feature article we present another translation from Andre Tilquinfs LE
BEHAVIORISMS. The style of writing in this section of the book was partic-
ularly difficult to work with* It uses extremely lengthy sentences with series
of appositional clauses and numerous indefinite pronouns whose referents are
often difficult to determine. The translation attempts to break up some of the
sentences into shorter ones? smooth out others , and write in some of the ref-
erents for the pronouns. The reader will still find much of the writing prob-
lematical but to do more with the translation would require entirely recomposing
it. is for substances the interbehaviorist will find much to disagree with,
The editor felt that the selection was worth presenting in these pages because
of the fact that it does address interbehavioral concepts however poorlys it
seems important to understand what is being perceived and inispereeived about
interbehaviorism and to be apprised of counter-arguments. As this selection
is one of a limited number of coJfflnentaries on Kantor's works (it also includes
other writers, especially Tolman) we are making it available to our readers.
The topic is operationism. For the reader who may wish to consult interbehav-
ioral writings on operationisra the following list is offered:
Cone, D,M. Comments Operationism vs. operational definition. Interbjhavi^
1975 , 6(3), 3-4.
.,. JU._.. The .operational .principle in the physical and psychological . .
sciences , ^icholsgicai^gcord., 1938, 2, 1-32.

Moore, J. On the principle of operatlonisw in a science of psychology.

1975 , 3 20-138.
 Le Behaviorism Origins et Developpement de la
Psychologie de Reaction en Amerique
(The Origin of Behaviorism and Development of Psychology of Reaction in America)
Andre Tilquin
Pariss Librairie Philosophique, 1942
Translated by Lucien Ledue and Venice Sake11

Behaviorism and Operationalism

If a truly epistemological dualism is implied somewhere it is in the concept

of Kaxrbor, in that of Tolmanj, and in that of Bridgman himself, Kantor may well
consider sensible qualities as objectives, as properties of objects that are
independent of the actions and reactions of the subject, and as a psychologist
study the interbahavior of organisms with such concrete objects,, But then,
either the knowledge is interbehavior, an operation, in which case the sensible
qualities can be defined only by those operations, or else the sensible qualities
are independent of operations. In the latter case one must admit, along with
a knowledge that is interaction and that ends up in constructions, another
knowledge concerning the sensible qualities which it is very difficult to
characterize in Kantor's system. But at least on can say that it provides us
with givensj, crude data. This is what is commonly known as immediate experience.
To call the contemplation of these qualities an operation constitutes an obvious
abuse of the word. There would be an operation if there were a discriminative
response. But if the known quality is other than a discriminative response, or
must necessarily admit,, along with a knowledge by way of operations of constructs,
a direct knowledge of data.
The same epistemological dxialism is implied in most of.the psychological
operationalisms which we ha.ve cited; the object or event possesses properties
that are immediately given, but its scientific definition is Bade not in terms
of its properties but in terms of the operations executed upon it. One then
admits, to use Kantor's terminology, an operand or a discriminand provided with
sensible qualities, which may be.viewed as a point of application of the oper-
ations or of the discriminative responses; but this does not interest science!
the only things that have scientific dignity are the operations.
This thesis is explicitly proposed or exposed by TolBane In examining his
operationalistic behaviorism^ we have shown that the psychological concepts that
he utilizes and that he gives as constructions, Inventionsf fictions, were prob-
ably no more fabricated than they had been in the first presentation of his
system,, inferred from behavior,, It seemed to us that they (concepts) were drawn
from that part of his direct experience which is called the field of his con-
sciousness,,
In fact Tolman repeats that direct experience does not enter into our science,
neither in psychology nor in physics, other than as the determinants of behavior,
which as intermediate variables of causal equation could not be and are not
 of this direct experience (8, p, 4-61 j 9j pe 359; 10, p* 90)8
But if this experience is not part of science, perhaps it is the source for it,
the point of departure, and if the concepts do not express it, or signify it,
perhaps they come forth frosa it? Direct experience in the form called intro-
spection, could deliver for us psjohological concepts which would then undergo
a scientific purification* They would be then deprived of all connotations, of
all reference to an intuitive essence apprehended by a single subject, in order
to be defined and tested by experiences ausceptibls of being reproduced by an
Infinite niaber of independent investigators (10, p, 89). In brief, although
coming from an introspective source, they would be emptied of their original
material (raw feel, quale) and defined functionally and operationally by the
experiences from which they receive a scientific status and verification.
This interpretation, in so far as it does not forcibly imply a spirit-body
dualism,, is in accord with the ideas of Tolasn concerning the character of the
initial given that immediate experience possesses, but only in that, measure.
For if imnediate experience, which "contains as much objectivity as subjectivity,
which is neither my private world nor yours" is, according to Tolmanf the only
tangible reality given to us and the final matrix, rich and qualified which gives
birth to the sciences, trhese sciences, howeverf in spite of this image, do not
emerge, from immediate experience and do not retaiA anything of its nature.
Immediate experience is not relived in the sciences, no more so in psychology
than it is in physics, in spite of the contrary belief (9, p. 359-360). Between
science and immediate experience there is a hiatus, a solution of continuity.
Tolman insists that the true dichotomy (Ibid., ps 363), .is not between physical
existences and mental existences,, but between the reality captured in immediate
experience and science. For the ontological spirit-body dualism is substituted
the epistemological dualism, immediate experience-science (see also 3j p 128-129).
For science is a construction which is realized, certainly, beginning with and in
reference to immediate experience, but which borrows no material from it (9, p.
363). Immediate experience is not the mine out of which science comes, but the
ground, the base upon which it is built. Or in other words science is not a
reduplication of immediate experience, a photograph that would reproduce it in
whole or in part, but rather a topographical map, a plan that permits us to
direct ourselves toward it. "Physics does not present to us another reality
that is hidden behind that of immediate experience. Psychology does not study
the reality of immediate experience in a manner more direct than, physics does.
Physics is a system of logical constructions, a system of rules and equations,
that help us to find our way through successive moments of immediate experience
.psychology.. .is nothing but another similar system of logical constructions,
another similar system of rules and equations, which, added to those of physics,
will give us an additional aid to pass from one moment of experience to the next11
(9, pe 359),
Immediate experience, be it the starting point of psychology or ofphysios,
offers us properties, not psychological states. These properties are either
IM^BsadSiit properties or properties, that is to say, a either
properties that are inherent in the Qbfeets and independent of the relations of
these objects with the organissaf or properties which depend on these relations
(9, p. 360-361). But^ perspective or independent, these qualities are equally
given in immediate experiences both are equally real and must be placed on the
same level. Real dualism is not between "perspectives" and "independents", but
between them and the scientific constructions by which w explained them (9, p.
363), Th psychological explanation, to limit ourselves to it, consists IB
 -8-

intention, expectation, etc. and in formulating laws which determine the func-
tioning of these psychological processes. For psychological phenomena! the mental
states of early psychology j, are not given in and through immediate experience|
they are not known nor are they knowable directly. Immediate experience, or if
your wishj consciousness or introspection cannot reveal the existence of psychol-
ogical phenomena for the reason that they are constructions made from perspectives
and independents, the only things given by immediate experience* The psychological
processes, assumed by the scientist in order to explain behavior are thus not
elements or parts of immediate experience. They are intellectual constructs
created in order to explain the coincidence of a determined stimulus and a deter-
mined response (9* p. 363-364-5. If one thinks that the concepts utilized by Tolsnan
to explain behavior^ and which he now claims are constructed by the scientist, are
exactly in their expression if not in their content* those of introspective psy-
chology, on may doubt that introspection is as powerless as he says to reveal
psychological states and that introspection does not intervene in his behavior. At
least one cannot contest the exactness of his distinction between science and
immediate experience.
Whatever Kantor may say, Bridgman himself adults that along with conceptual
knowledge which is of an operational nature there is a sensible knowledge. It is
then the task of the physicist as best he can to formulate this sensible knowledge
in terms of operations even though sensible knowledge is not itself of an oper-
ational nature. It is "experience" that gives to the physicist the initial know-
ledge of phenomenaf of "physical situations1*, as Bridgman says, and consequences
of results of operations and it is also experience which gives him knowledge of
fundamental operations with which he constructs his definitions of phenomena. For
when one defines a concept "one regresses until one is in the presence of operations
that one must accept as unanalysable and apprehendable only in an intuitive^ manner
ky Efsrsonal experience" (2). There is alsoj according to Bridgman a very precise
distinction between experiences that are operations and constitute the matter of
physical concepts, and experience which is composed of sensible intuitions. Taken
in the second sense, the word experience probably has in the sentenc above the
same meaning which it had for James when he writes that it is the summum gnus to
which everything must belong or must have belonged in order that we may talk about
it.

The twin brother f operationalism, logical positivism, also believed in its

beginnings, in this dichotomy and even presented it as fundamental (1. p. 286),
Scientific knowledge, r knowledge in its correct meaning (irJkgjmtsJL)f ceOTrtunl-
cable, a priori, purelyIbrmal and relational, Is opposed to immediate experience
er
ErJLebnis., incommunicable apprehension and deprived f a qualitative content.
Like the preceding doctrines, but contrary to Kantor who insists n insensible
transitions by which one goes frm dafia to cjnstructs,f logical positivism affirms
a most distinct dis<soB%intSity between the concepts of science and the glvens of
experience. Sensible glvens remain outside of science j, which emerge by a kind of
extraction from immediate experience. Law does not spring forth from facts as was
believed in the epistemology of John Stuart Mill any more than the concept comes
forth abstractly from sensible givens as was believed In the psychology of Hamilton,
More energetically than the preceding doctrinest logical positivism even argues
that science is constructed according to the sensible givensj because Jbr logical
positivism science is wMS^Z^^B^^L^MlA-^^^2^.' What role then does iirmed-
iate experience play? It is immediate experience that permits the giving of an
nrplrial content to the formal enunciations of science, and consequently to verify
them by means of conventions of classifications [conventions decisoires] or "Zuord-
nuRg8d@fi!fiitionn" (Reichenbach) which establish a dominunication between the world
of science and the world of immediate experience * Thus are obtained enuncia-
tions of "empirical science" which express formal structure but not the dntent
of experience (Ibid., p. 286). The latter is not and cannot be expressed! it
ean only be indicated , shown. The content of experience , in so far as it is
lived, given, remains exterior to science.
That at least was the initial conviction of the Vienna circle. But logical
positivism in becoming 2bJ2iJl3j! U) soon realized,, that by virtue of the rules
established by it, the assertion that immediate experience would be ineoramnieable
apprehension and deprived of a qualitative content constitutes an "enunciation
which has ao meaning" for it is not verifiable,, How could we in fact demonstrate,
that is to say, snake public and communicate that vhich is private and ineosatiurs-
icable? Experience whieh is called immediate an be nothing if it is not the
apprehension of diseriminable and expressible relations* Let us observe what
those who invoke it do when we ask them 'to justify its existence, "Almost
invariably they Indicate a situation that implies a discrimination such a !_
Elementary discriminations-- that is then the meaning of the
-and discriminative reactions are evidently publie and commode able ,!! To
affirm that there is only one reality but two ways of knowing it is again to
formulate an enunciation that ean hav no aeaning . For how can one verify that
reality is unique if our knowledge is double? For a coherent positivism there
ean be only one type of knowledge and all speculation on the existemee and the
mature of a reality, distinct from knowledge that we have of it, is a pseudo-
problem (7, p. 238-239).
Likewise, a eoheremt operational! am only ae@ept am operational definition
of immediate experia Su0h precisely is the extension given by Stevens to
Bridgmam's doctrine,, H^SliSSS,"'6OK whi*h physical scieute Is founded, is only
a term whieh implietly at least denotes the of the discriminative reactions
executed by human beings s for to experience is for science to react discrlminately"
(6, p. 52l)e Of all the operations by which one can describe a concept, the
simplest is certainly the operation of denoting, that is to say, of indicating,
of shoving , the corresponding object (5, p. 324;. But . denotation implies discrim-
ination as a necessary condition,, In order to indicate an object one evidently
msst be able to distinguish it from other objects" and let us add that the object
indicated is indicated in so fax as it is distinguished and not experienced.
Discrimination or execution of differential responses is then the fundamental
operation of all science (5, p. 324).
If pitsteKologioal dualism Is not acceptable for a logical positivism (logical
above all with Itself) nor for a decided operationslissn, it is even less admls~
ible in a behaviorism, especially if this behaviorism quite uselessly lends alleg-
iance to the preceding doctrines* 111 pisteraology implies, no doubt, a certain
psychology; but the logician has perhaps the right to neglect the psychological
implication of his doctrine, whereas the psychologist cannot afford the luxury
of admitting a psychology of knowledge which rains psychological knowledge. The
behaviorism of Tolman and Kantor in accepting epistemological dualism contradicts
itself or in any case limits itself singularly. The behavioristie method can no
longer be the only method of psychology if to a knowledge which is reactional
and operational, one make roomfer an intuitive knowledge. One may reduce, &n

*The original reference number given here is 590f p. 289, The referenee
list goes only to 455. ~ed.
 -10-

Tolman had done, this place to the extreme by affirming that sensible knowledge
always remains outside of sciences sensible knowledge is its point of departure,
even If it does not virtually contain sciences even if science is built against
immediate experience. Sensible knowledge is also the end for science, for it is
by function of this experience that scientific assertions have meaning and are
tested. Science , as all knowledge , Including immediate experience or empirical
Intuition, is a product of psychological activity,, To affirm that all psych-
ological activity is behavior and to admit at the same time a knowledge which is
not behavior j, is definitely to contradict oneself. That Is the inevitable des-
tiny of all behaviorism that believes itself to be autonomous , Refusing to lend
support to the established sciences, to define a stimulus as a function of
physics, he is necessarily led to regard this stimulus as a sensible given, and
he who calls himself autonomous and believes himself to be independent of all
metaphysics, is forced to rely on common sense , this being the worst of all meta-
physics which does not know itself. To explain the adaptation of the response
to the stimulus, certainly it is necessary that the stimulus be soj^tMng and that
that are independent of the reactions and anterior to
them. If one refuses to view it as a certain type of spatio-temporal order, for
example as a vibration of a certain frequency, length of wave, amplitude, there
is no other resource than the power of Inherent guaHtiesu foundation of the
adaptive character of the responses. But then behaviorism denies itself or
limits itself j for the knowledge of these qualities which precedes and establishes
reactions, can not be a reactions it [knowledge ?f escapes a strictly behavioristie
psychology. To be coherent behaviorism must then affirm that what common sense
calls sensible qualities are discriminative responses to physically defined
stimuli. This is, as we have seen, the thesis of the strict behaviorism of Weiss.
One must then go from logical positivism to physicalism, from the dperation-
allsm of Bridgman to that of Stevens, from the behaviorism of Tolman and of
Kan tor to that of Weiss There are not two types of knowledge, a conceptual
knowledge and a sensible knowledge bearing on data, qualities. Nor are there
two languages in which those two knowledges would be expressed. All knowledge is
always, from beginning to end construction, operation, reactions for all knowledge
begins and ends by discriminations. One can certainly call the elementary discrim-
inations facts and the more complex ones concepts; it Is a question of convention.
But then one runs the risk of transforming -unconsciously a simple difference of
degree into a difference of nature.
Immediate ejcperlence which is the point of departure and about which Tolman,
Kantor, and Bridgman speak, is then only the sum of their elementary discriminative
responses, the ensemble of their propositions-facts jconstats]. Scientific knowledge
is, to be sur, something else, but it is not of a different nature. "With the
aid of propositions-facts [constatsj we formulate laws which. .. (are ) indications
that permit us to arrive at predictions, which in their turn may be controlled
by propositions-facts jconstatsj. .."' Thus there is always comparisons between
enunciations and enunciations and not, as even the Vienna circle believed, between
enunciations and a realltj or things (4-, p. 298-299). This physicalistic descrip-
tion becomes this in behavioristic languages to certain of cur discriminative
responses we respond by a recording of verbal reactions, some by verbal response
of generalization, and to others by one or several verbal responses v which
constitute substitutes of eventual discriminative responses. The execution of
these discriminative responses will constitute the verification of the prediction
(11, p. 209, 221). Thus scientific knowledge from the behavioristic point of
 -11-

view is d eveloped from a series of biosocial symbolic responses, "linguistic",

and it is always a relation between responses and other responses and not
between responses and reality. The symbolic character of the enunciations
and responses may lead one to speak of science as a construction, but the
"givens" to which one opposes science are already themselves constructions,

References

1. Blumberg, A. E. Feigl, H. Logical positivism; A new movement in European

philosophy. jLtJMi' 1931, 28, 281-296.
2. Bridgman, P. W. A physicist's second reaction to Mengenlehre.
ica, 193-4, 2, 101-117.
3. De Leguna, G. A. Dualism in animal psychology. J. Phil.. 1918, 15, 617-627.
4. Neurath, G. Physikalistnus. Scientia, 1931, 297-303 (trad, frang., p. 117-122).
5 Stevens, S. S. The operational basis of psychology. Amgri. J. Psychol. .
1935, 67, 323-330.
6. Stevens, S. S. The operational definition of psychological concepts. Psjrch.
Rev., 1935, 62, 517-527.
7. Stevens, S. S. Psychology and the science of science, IL,JE!ull. , 1939,
37, 221-263.
8. Tolman, E. C. & Horowitz, J. A reply to Mr. Koffka. Pavchs-Jail' f 1933, 30,
-459-465.
9. Tolnaan, E, C. Psychology Yersus immediate experience. PMis_Sci. , 1935, 2,
356-380.
10. Tolman, E. C. Operational behaviorism and current trends in psychology.
Proceedings of the 25th Anniv. Celeb. Inaug. Grad. Studies Univ. South.
Calif., 1936, 89-103.
11. Weiss, A. P. AJjih^cj?eJ>ia^ 2nd. ed. rev., 1925.
 -12-

Knowing all there is to know about the physiological or chemical effects

of drugs will not explain why people may take them habitually. Addiction
is a behavioral process and may lose its meaning on other levels- of analysis.
Seen in this way, exhaustive knowledge of the molecular pharmacology of
alcohol or heroin may be no more valuable in understanding how these drugs
can preempt and control so much behavior than knowledge of the physical
properties of electricity, of the physiology of pain, or of the metabolic
effects of food ingestion can illuminate how these processes control behav-
ior. There can be no basis of ''addiction" that resides sole y in the struc-
ture or function of the nervous system simply because the phenomenon does
not exist there. By analogy, no individual group member can generally be
said to be the basis of a "mass hysteria" or any other distinctly group
process j the group phenomenon could not exist without individuals, just as
there could be no behavior withou a nervous system, but it cannot be fully
understood in terms of them either. To again borrow a term from systems
theory, complex behavior has "emergent" qualities that preclude its total
understanding on the basis of the separate structures or parts that make
it up.
James McKearney; "Asking Questions About Behavior"
.f 1977, 21,
109-119.

The most frequent pattern for papers in the field of physiological psychology
is the presentation of a physiological concept which is then defined oper-
ationally, the presentation of a psychological concept which is then defined
operationally and the assertion that the two concepts are related on the basis
of a significant experimental correlation between the two operational proced~
ures. This of course is an entirely unwarranted procedure, since it omits
the necessary stage of discussing the proposed logical relation between the
two superordinate constructsj it fails to provide a related line of descent
from each concept to the subordinates (the alleged operational definitions)
and consequently any finding of correlation between the two operational
definitions is without logical significance, however great its statistical
significance.

D. Bannisters "The Myth of Physiological Psych-

ology", Bulletin of the BrttishJPayohological
Society^ 1968, 21, 229-231.
 A QUARTERLY NEWSLETTER OF
INTERBEHAVIORAL PSYCHOLOGY
PUBLISHED AT KENYON COLLEGE
GAMBIER, OHIO
Volume 8, Number 1 Spring 1978

There are moments when we Interrupt our own scientific

operations and begin to wonder whether, without our
knowledge, there are not strange remnants of the past
also In our own thinking which calmly determine Its
course as much as do our most aavanced principles.
M. Kohler, 1958. The nature of the
organism. 61fford Lectures. Se-
cond series, Lecture 2.
 THE INTERBEHAVIORIST
fdltor:
Ronald 6. Heyduk, Kenyon College
Associate Editors:
Donna H. Cone, Assistant Director, Division of Retardation, Rho<$
island
Paul T. Mountjoy, Western Michigan University
Noel M. Smith, State University of New York, Pittsburgh
The Agora
The_ Interbehaviorlst begins Its eighth volume (and ninth year of
publlcatfonTwTth a new name and a "face-lift," but with no weakening
In Us resolve to scrutinize modern psychology In order to discover
those "strange remnants of the past also In our own thinking which
calmly determine Its course" of which Wolfgang Ko'hler speaks In the
cover quotation. The new editor has enjoyed reading the many comrwnti
from subscribers whose names have long been familiar to him but who
now are known more personally. Especially appreciated have been the
words of encouragement and best wishes, received, I am Impressed by
the warmth and unity of the unique "community" of scholars subscribing
to the newsletter.
Notes from that community:
Our past editor, Noel Smith, Indicates that back volumes of the
Newsletter/Quarterly are available at $2 per volume for 1-7.
TFougFiTTT may not nave the original face sheets, all will have the
original content.
Paul Mountjoy wishes to announce his sabbatical leave from Western
Michigan University for the 1978-79 academic year. Me hopes to ac-
complish two things: one Is to teach (at a place as yet unspecified)
Kantor's Interbehavloral system to students who don't know about
his contributions. The other Is to work on a book which will trace
the history of Psychological Technology. More Information on his
proposed activities and accomplishments will be forthcoming.
Robert Lundln sends word that the second edition of his Theories and
Systems textbook (editor's note: a very fine one) will appearlrTJ"an-
uary7T979.
William Verplanck offers the following encouraging observation:
Through more than half a century, the thinking of Robert Kantor has
remained In the avant-garde, far ahead of the times. Now, 1t seems,
the last quarter of this century Is proving catch-up time, with
many psychologists, of diverse backgrounds, asserting, In one voca-
bulary or another, viewpoints close to those of Interbehavlorlsm.
Professor Verplanck concludes with a hope that "The 1 n t e r beh a v 1 o rjs t
will be able to work well and effectively In developing"TntercTiamje
among these groups."
Professor Verplanck's concluding comment about the development of Inter-
change provides an apt Introduction to the next news item. In the last
issue, mention was made of a new publication entitled Operant Subjectiv-
ity: The 0 Hethododglogy Newsletter, which has a close kinship with
Interbehav1orTsm in 1ts or1enta ti on. The editor, Steven R. Brown, a po-
litical scientist at Kent State University, responded by Including the
following passage in the April, 1978 issue of his publication:
The most recent issue of Inter-behavioral Quarterly (Vol. 7, No. 4),
which seeks to promote the Views of J. R. Kantor, notes the appear-
ance of Operant Subjectivity, and further notes that Stephenson's
work is In "close kinship with interbehaviorism." (The same issue
of the Quarterly also contains a*brief communique from Stephenson
concerning his relationship to the late Sir Cyril Burt and the lat-
ter's role in educational theory and reform.) Stephenson's The Study
of Behavior is generously sprinkled with references to Kantor, who
was Instrumental in establishing the Psychological Record In which
many of Stephenson's papers have appeared since I960. In many respects,
the Ini terbehavioral Qua r terly. ably edited since its Inception by
Noel W. Smith, provided the Inspiration for Operant Subjectivity.
"Underground" publications such as these are often more stimulating
than the cost-effective but otherwise Ineffectual periodicals that
grace dusty library shelves (and which some sage once referred to as
"solar energy in captivity").
In the spirit of Verplanck's suggestion, it is hoped that Interchange be-
tween readers of the two publications can be realized by means of common
subscriptions.
Steven Brown also informs our readership of the establishment of the Inter-
national Society of Political Psychology. An excerpt from its news re-
lease of February 24, 1978 follows:
Outstanding scholars throughout the world with an Interest in po-
litical psychology are now inviting those involved in similar concerns
to join them In the newly founded International Society of Political
Psychology. ISPP was formed this fall by leaders in psychiatry, gov-
ernment, anthropology, psychology, sociology and political science.
Its purpose is to improve communication among scholars with different
scientific, geographic and political viewpoints. The founders thus
hope to increase the quality and breadth of work done, as well as the
quality of working conditions,, by firming the ties among those who be-
long to this "Invisible university" of Interest.
The first meeting of the Society will be held on September 2-4 in New York,
and the first issue of its official journal is scheduled to appear 1n the
fall. Address inquiries to Jeanne N. Knutson, Executive Secretary Pro-
Tern, ISPP, 10837 Via Verona, Los Angeles, CA 90024.
* * *
The 10th annual meeting of the Chelron Society For the History of the
Behavioral and Social Sciences will be held at Welles ley College, Wellesley,
Massachusetts, June 2,3, and 4, 1978. Information on local arrangements may
be obtained from: Or. Lorenz J. Finison, Department of Psychology, Welles-
ley College, Wellesley, Massachusetts 02181. For Information on Chelron
membership write: Dr. Elizabeth S. Goodman, Department of Psychology, State
University College. Fredonla. New York 14063.
 In this Issue, the editor offers his analysis of an excerpt from
Aristotle's de Anlma concerning the soul, and argues that purely gram-
matical considerations should'not be allowed to obscure the naturalism
of Aristotle's view and Us similarity to the Interbehavlorlst's concep-
tion. Also In this first Issue of 1978, a paper by Jacqueline (Farrlng-
ton) K1nn1e, a past contributor, Is presented. It argues for a re-eval-
uation, from an organlsmlc perspective, of the subject matter and con-
structs of the psychology of motivation.
* * * viewed as the same part of speech as "body" (I.e., as a noun; as "subject
ARISTOTLE'S CONCEPTION OF THE SOUL
A GRAMMATICAL SOLUTION TO A HETAPHYSICAL PROBLEM
Ronald 6. Heyduk
...the soul will not be body; for the body is not something pre-
dicated of a subject, but exists rather as subject and matter.
The soul must, then, be...the first actuality of a natural body
which has life potentially...corresponding to the principle of a
thing...we should not ask whether the soul and body are one, any
more than whether the wax and the Impression are one, or In gen-
eral whether the matter of each thing and that of which It Is the
matter are one.
Aristotle: de Anlma. Book II, Chapter 1,
412*16, 22; &4. Translation
by D. W. Hamlyn. Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1968
Historical Background to the Excerpt
The relationship between "soul" and body (and thus the nature of
what we now label "consciousness") was a subject of lively debate 1n
fourth century B.C. Athens, much as Is the "mind - body problem" In 20th
century Western philosophy and psychology. In Aristotle's time, two
views of the soul had been well articulated: the soul could be conceived
of In the same material terms as the body (e.g., Oemocrltus1 atomistic
monism), or else It could be viewed as an Immaterial, supernatural entity
(Plato's dualism). As Aristotle was able to discern, the apparent po-
larity of the two views 1s Illusory. In each case, "soul" 1s conceptu-
alized In structural terms: "It" Is a "thing," although 1n one view
that thing Is of the natural, material world and In the other view It is
Immaterial and supernatural.
Analysis of the Excerpt
"...the soul will not be body;"
This short portion of the larger excerpt from Aristotle's deAnJhw
would seem to support a common Interpretation that Aristotle's view of
soul and Its relation to body 1s duallstic, much more In the spirit of
Plato his teacher than of those philosophers such as Democrltus who
wished to naturalize the soul and thereby present a picture of a unit lea
organism. Indeed, Aristotle's statement argues clearly for a distinction
between soul and body, but a continued reading of the excerpt reveals
that It Is not at all the Platonic distinction that 1s being made, in
fact, Aristotle probably found Plato's solution to the mind - body prohirn.
as unacceptable as Democrltus' arbitrary materialistic reduction of soul,
since Plato separated thought and other functions of soul from a natural
world to which Aristotle believed they belonged.
"...for the body Is not something predicated of a subject, but exists
rather as subject and matter."
Aristotle concluded that a satisfactory alternative to the materialis-
tic and Platonic Interpretations of soul rested upon the making of a gram-
matical distinction between the words "soul" and "body." If "soul" Is
and matter"), then one must conceive of soul either as a fundamentally dif-
ferent sort of "thing" than body (thus artificially bifurcating a whole
organism), or else as the same sort of thing or substance as body (thus de-
basing thought, memory, and other attributes of the soul). Aristotle gain-
ed the freedom needed to reject both positions by arguing that the word
"soul" could best be thought of as a verb, not a noun: It was, after all,
a label given to a set of activities of an organism. Soul, then, Is "some-
thing predicated of a subject," unlike the body, which "exists as subject
and matter."
"...The soul must, then, be the first actuality of a natural body
which has life potentially...corresponding to the principle of a
thing."
Once such a grammatical distinction between "soul" and "body" 1s made,
an alternate metaphysical position becomes apparent: soul constitutes the
set of functions of body, those accomplishments that distinguish a living
body from one that Is not. The brilliance of Aristotle's resolution dawns:
simply by means of a grammatical reanalysls, Aristotle was able to reject
the undesirable aspects of Platonic and materialistic conceptions while main-
taining the best aspects of these views. Soul Is, as Plato claimed, Inn
material, and thus clearly distinguishable from and exalted In relation to
the mere matter of which all living things are made. But soul Is not an
Immaterial entity: It Is "function," not "structure." Thus, unlike Plato's
view and like Oemocrltus', soul Is perfectly natural, and clearly Insepa-
rable from (Indeed, that which gives Hfe to, ''the first actuality of") a
living body. As Aristotle summarized:
"We should not ask whether the wax and the Impression are one, or
In general whether the matter of each thing and that of which It
is the matter are one."
Reconciliation of Arlstotlean and Interbehavtoral Conception of Mind and
Body
The frequent appearance of the word "soul" In translations of Aris-
totle's writing, and particularly statements such as "...the soul will not
be body," have justifiably led some to conclude that Aristotle's view on
the mind - body problem has little In common with the aggressively antl-
mentallstlc, monistic position of the (nterbehavlorlst. However, It would
seem that linguistic problems aside, the two views are not easily distin-
guishable. Both Aristotle and the 1nterbehav1or1st believe that one should
not. In speaking of thoughts, feelings, memories, etc., consider them as
Items contained within or comprising an entity localized In the natural
(or supernatural) world. Aristotle and Interbehavlortsts agree, then,
that there Is no such "thing" as "soul," "mind," or "consciousness," but
only activities of an organism In the natural world. The Interbehavlorlst,
however, thereupon eliminates terms such as "mind" and "consciousness" from
his vocabulary, since their status as nouns in normal usage tends to en-
courage conceiving of what they stand for as entitles. In contrast, "soul"
remained an Important word in Aristotle's vocabulary, and hence a source
of confusion to readers, though It may be that the biases of Aristotle's
translators are responsible for the word's persistent noun-like appearances
in his writing. In the end. the Interbehavlorist is taking a position
quite similar (or identical) to Aristotle In rejecting the notion of mind
or consciousness as a "thing" in the head (or anywhere else), without in
any sense rejecting or debasing those acts of the organism that tradition-
ally have been thought of as aspects or functions of "mind,"
* * *
THE INTERBEHAVIORAL APPROACH AND MOTIVATION
Jacqueline (Farrington) Klnnle
More than a half-century has passed since J. R. Kantor defined mo-
tivation as direct or indirect purposive behavior (Kantor, 1924). A
third-century ago Kantor stated: "The psychology of motivation Is in a
chaotic state," and proposed that motivation might be defined as condition-
al actions "influencing other actions and conducing to their performance
as preferential activities " (Kantor, 1942). Yet perusal of the psy-
chological literature demonstrates little advancement toward Kantor's anal-
ysis, in spite of considerable support for his commentary upon the state of
motivation studies. The uniqueness of the Interbehavioral approach as
proposed by Kantor appears to be largely Ignored by social scientists inter-
ested In the "why" of behaviors of individuals and groups. While multiple
factors are frequently enumerated in analyses, the Imposition of cultural
constructs upon actual events is still the norm. An understanding of the
contribution of Kantor to the analysis of events could lead to fewer Im-
positions upon, and greater understanding of, the chosen and preferred
activities of the human animal, and the "whys" of their choice and prefer-
ence.
An Overview of the Interbehavioral System
Kantor's approach guards against cultural traditions which have for
centuries placed psychology apart from other sciences. Essential to the
Interbehavioral approach is the notion that theory must be derived specif-
ically from the actual interbehavlor of organisms with objects and events
within particular situations. The event itself is of prime Importance.
Lest such a statement appear trivial. It Is well to recall that psycho-
logical events are all too frequently and unfortunately confused with bio-
logical events and/or religious and philosophic constructions.
Inevitably linked with biological organisms, psychological events are
different from biological occurrences. While psychological events neces-
sarily evolve from previous biological evolutions, they develop within the
total life span of the organism. It is the province of the psychologist to
provide a descriptive model of the Initiation and evolution of the organism's
adjustments to things and events both up to and beyond the point of bio-
logical maturation.
In describing psychological events, Kantor posits no special entitles
such as soul, mind, tendency, nor Indeed separate entitles of any type.
Such entitles can be neither directly observed nor manipulated, and thus
have no place In a naturalistic description. Equally to be avoided is the
separation of the total organism into parts which operate Individually. In
order to avoid such non-scientific methodology, the Interbehavioral ap-
proach would have psychologists observe two simple rules (Observer, 1969):
1. "...the rule of specificity: no thing or event Is something
else, so each must be described as a field of its own specific
factors.
2. "...the rule of natural limits; no confrontable event can be
described as transcending the limits of observation and ex-
perimental manipulation."
Natural Investigation which observes these procedural rules permits anal-
ysis of such events as recalling without the Imposition of unreal con-
structs. Rather than conceiving of the organism as storing in a "mind"
or "memory bank" Information which may be pulled out for utilization at
a later time, the act of recalling may be viewed as the Interactions of
the organism with a substitute stimulus which facilitates a new Inter-
action with an event, object or situation.
The behavioral life of any organism Is a continuum of events Into
which the investigator breaks In order to observe and record particular
unique behavior segments within the total field of available events.
"Psychological phenomena must be likened to a flowing stream rather than
to barbs set side by side on a wire" (Kantor, 1933). Each behavior seg-
ment delineates one of the simplest units of an interactional event and
consists of a single stimulus and its correlated response. While one
may separate behavior segments by identifying the stimulus, neither stim-
ulus nor response can occur independent of the other; that Is, stimulus
and response are reciprocal.
Within each unique behavior segment, the stimulus function is that
action which is performed by the object with which the organism Interacts.
It is apparent that a stimulus object may develop multiple functions. The
response is that action which the organism executes with respect to the
Stimulus object. Such are the beginnings of behavioral analysis. How-
ever, further analysis points to a complex set of units of action, "reac-
tion systems" (Kantor, 1933), which constitute the response. While a
single reaction system may make up the response, It is more probable that
the response contains a "response pattern" (Kantor, 1933). Within the
latter are a minimum of three reaction systems: attending, perceiving and
performing of a final action unit. Response patterns consist of sequences
of activities such as Intra-organismic changes, movements, verbalizations,
etc., organized In various ways. Every new combination of reaction systems
makes up a different response pattern.
Kantor makes an Important distinction between the stimulus object and
Its functions, unlike what is often done by those psychologists who are
physiologically inclined. Unless a stimulus object has acquired a specific
function or group of functions to which the organism reacts, that object
Is not considered to be within a psychological situation or interaction.
For example, until a child has come into contact with a dog, that dog has no
stimulus function as "to pet," "to talk to," or "to fear." Stimulus func-
tions originate under varying conditions producing three types of functions:
universal, individual and cultural. Universal stimulus functions are based
upon the natural qualities or characteristics of things and upon the bio-
logical structures of the reacting organism and are generally established
at the first contact between stimulus object and organism. An example Is
the "smoothness" characterizing the Interaction with a river-bed stone. In-
dividual stimulus functions do not depend upon the qualities of the object,
but rather upon the previous experiences of reacting organism with the ob-
ject. For example: the smooth texture of the river-bed stone may be liked.
Through such previous experiences, referred to as the Interbehavioral his-
tory or the rcactlonal biography (Kantor, 1924), individual differences
such as liking, disliking, loving, knowing, understanding, etc. are account-
ed for. The major characteristic of cultural stimulus functions are that
 they are Identical or similar for a particular group of persons, and
they generally develop through Institutional processes.
Because events cannot take place 1n Isolation but rather occur In
contexts In which particular and definite conditions may be observed,
those conditions which provide the means for stimulation of the organism
are a necessary concomitant of description. Without such a medium of
contact as light, one cannot react to visual shapes or to color. Similar-
ly, 1f an organism could live In a vacuum, It could not under such condi-
tions react to sound vibrations. A medium of contact such as light Is
not to be confused with a stimulus; rather, It 1s one factor among many
within the psychological behavior segment.
The environmental surrounding or "setting" Is another Important as-
pect of the psychological event: consider the differences In reactions
of a falcon tethered to a post and the same falcon free of the post.
Setting conditions are then an essential consideration in determining
which of many possible correlated stimulus and response functions will
operate at a given moment In time and space.
Perhaps of primary Importance in the acquisition of stimulus and re-
sponse functions is their historical evolution. The previous experience
of the organism Is the distinguishing characteristic between biological
and psychological events. Such evolutions of functioning may be analysed
either In terms of immediate or progressive types of action. First en-
counters between stimulus object and reacting organism are classified as
Immediate experiences, while social responses such as verbal usage of
particular words or symbols are classified as progressive experiences.
Psychological fields, then, are continually evolving fields.
"Most Important, the field consists of confrontable real events. It
is a field concerned with activity" (Kantor, 1924). Further, "It Is ad-
visable to look upon the field as the entire system of things and condi-
tions operating In any event taken In its available totality" (Kantor,
1969). Only by observing and describing the entire system of factors
available can the behavioral scientist obtain adequate description and
explanation of events. As will be noted later in discussing motivation
behavior and events, the total field description Is of great Import 1n
complex investigations.
The psychological field is qualitatively different from the physical
fields of physics and biology. The biological field generally localizes
causative factors within the organism, utilizing Internal principles of
description such as neural functioning. Kantor believes that It is un-
fortunate that this model is so frequently followed by psychologists who
neglect the essential data of psychological events. The study of the
structure of the organism Is the business of biology; such is not the
order of business in psychology. Nor Is the study of physical bodies and
their movements, which Is the undertaking of physics. In physics, ob-
jects are said to be characterized by a state of Inertia. Though observa-
tion dictates that living organisms cannot be considered Inert objects,
psychology has long adopted and utilized such a model, positing drives,
needs, forces and energies which set the inert organism Into motion and
direct behavior.
Although an attempt has been made to utilize a field approach In
phenomenology, there are differences between Kantor's naturalistic ap-
proach to a concrete field of events and the Internal and subjective fields
of the proponents of phenomenology (cf. Bentley, 1935). Lewln (1935) con-
sidered that "objects which...form the goal of the process are to be re-
garded primarily as objects from which a force, a steering process, goes
out." Relying heavily upon the physics model of forces, he attempted to
represent these forces which determined behavior In diagrams of the "life
space." As the psychological environment of the organism from moment to
moment rather than the objective world, life-space represented the major
construct In Lewln's system. Objective stimuli played no role In be-
havior, but rather the Individual's perception of the stimulus object de-
termined action. Such a field was then not necessarily an actuality, but
might be based solely upon hypothetical and subjective data. In this re-
spect, Lewln's phenomenal field differs from Kantor's objective field.
An Interbehavioral Critique of the Psychology of Motivation
Perhaps there 1s no area of psychological investigation which better
exemplifies the confusion of construct and event than that of motivation.
Kantor (1942) surveyed the literature and pointed to the fact that most
writers In the field do not adequately discriminate between events which
are motivated and those which are not. Kantor succinctly pinpoints the
source of the problem: "One of the primary bases for the unsatisfactory
situation in the motivation field is that students...do not begin...by
Isolating unique behavior segments. Instead they start with the general
Interpretive assumption that actions require initiating or guiding forces
or conditions." Such are the bases for not only drive and need concepts,
but also for the instinct-rooted doctrines of motivation that have In re-
cent decades begun to reappear in the literature (cf. Maslow, 1963; 1967;
Rogers and Stevens, 1967).
It Is likely that a linguistic problem underlies the failure of moti-
vation psychologists to develop a naturalistic view. Kantor argues that
man's "linguistic action and linguistic products exert their influence
upon the discrimination, selection and patinatlon of objects and events and
...upon the style and efficacy of recording them" (Kantor, 1942). Few
items frequently used in the psychological literature have as many meanings
and implications as the word "motivation" (cf. English and English, 1958),
and it 1s unfortunate that, In sum, the term connotes an Inert organism.
In fact, the behavioral scientist interested In motivation phenomena needs
not to ask "why", but rather, "under what conditions" does a particular
preferred activity occur. Kantor suggests that "motivation Interbehavior
presupposes a situation or field,In which the component action functions
have more than a momentary existence," and "to motivate an Individual...Is
to place him in a particular field...in which he will more probably than
not do some preferred action." It is at this point that the reader of
"Toward a scientific analysis of motivation" may wish that Dr. Kantor had
been more explicit. Instead, he leaves us to sort through his various
other writings In an attempt to conduct our investigations in a more ob-
jective manner.
What specific differences may be noted In the Interbehavioral approach
to psychological events which may aid attempts to Investigate motivation
fields and events? Perhaps most significant is the enabling of the Investi-
gator to contend more comfortably with Interrelationships of factors In the
occurrence of psychological events. Using the Interbehavioral approach also
relieves the behavioral scientist of such cumbersome constructions as the
"self," "mind," and consciousness and unconsciousness. When an investigator
Is Interacting with events rather than constructions, he 1s freer to Identify
and to define "circumstances surrounding things and events before and after
manipulation and description" (Kantor, 1959). Such unencumbered Investi-
gation Is not easily attainable, but perhaps such an admission Is necessary
in the beginning of a search for more meaningful and objective Investigation
Into hunwn motivation.
References
flontloy, A. Behavior, Knowledge, Fact. Bloomlngton: Prlnclpla, 1935, pp. 97-
99. "
10
English, H.B. and English, A.C. Comprehensive Dictionary of Psychological
and Psychoanalytic Terms. Mew York:Longmans-Green, 1958.
Kantor, J.R. Principles of Psychology. Vol. I. Bloomfngton: Principle,
1924, p. 12*:
Kantor, J.R. A Survey of the Science of Psychology. Bloomlngton: Prlnclpla,
1933.
Kantor, J.R. Toward a scientific analysis of motivation. Psychological Re-
cord. 1942S 8, 225-275.
Kantor, J.R. Interbehavloral Psychology. Bloomlngton: Prlnclpls, 1959.
Kantor, J.R. The Scientific Evolution of Psychology. Vol. II. Granvllle,
Ohio: Prlnclpla, 1969.
Lewln, K. A Dynamic Theory of Personality, trans. Zener and Adams. New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1935.
Maslow, A. The need to know and the fear of knowing. Journal of General
Psychology. 1963, 68, 111-125.
Maslow, A. A theory of metamotlvatlon: the biological rooting of the value-
life. Journal of Humanistic Psychology. 1967, !_, 93-127.
Observer, The conditioned reflex and scientific psychology. Psychological
Record, 1969, 19_, 143-146.
Rogers, C. and Stevens, et al. Person to Person; The Problem of Being Human.
Lafayette, Calif.: Real People Press, 19677"^
Skinner, B.F. Science and Human Behavior. New fork: MacMlllan, 1953.
 A QUARTERLY NEWSLETTER OF
INTERBEHAVIORAL PSYCHOLOGY
PUBLISHED AT KENYON COLLEGE
GAMBIER, OHIO
Volume 8, Number 2 Sunnier 1978

The "control mechanism" view of culture begins with the

assumption that human thought Is basically both social
and publicthat Its natural habitat Is the house yard,
the marketplace, and the town square. Thinking consists
not of "happenings In the head" (though happenings there
and elsewhere are necessary for It to occur) but of a
traffic In what have been called, by G.II.Mead and others,
significant symbols---words for the most part but also
gestures, drawings, musical sounds, mechanical devices
like clocks, or natural objects like Jewelsanything,
In fact, that Is disengaged from Its mere actuality
and used to Impose meaning upon experience.
C. Geertr, 1966. The Impart of the concept
of culture on the concept of man. In J.
Plutt (Ed.), N_ew Views of the Nature of_Man.
 THE INTERBEHAVIORIST
Editor:
Ronald G. lleyduk, Kenyon College
Associate Editors:
Donna M. Cone, Assistant Director, Division of Retardation, Rhode
Island
Paul T Mountjoy, Western Michigan University
Noel H. Smith. State University of New York, Pittsburgh
The Agora
The conceptualization of "thinking" revealed In this Issue's cover quote
contrasts sharply In Its naturalism with the view of "hearing" expressed
In the following excerpt from a pamphlet entitled "How do you hear?", pre-
pared by Warner/Chllcott Pharmaceuticals as a child patient aid:
In the cochlea, the vibrations are changed Into nerve signals
which go to the hearing center of the brain. And the brain
says "Oh, I know that sound, It's a barking dog." Or, "That
sound Is a train whistle." And, that's how we hear!
In this case, a laudlble attempt to provide a simple answer to a child's
question "How do we hear?" fills because the brain Is7 transformed from a
participant bodily organ Into an entity endowed with the capabilities for
activity of whole organisms. Rather than answering the question posed, the
purported explanation raises new, more puzzling, and Insoluble questions:
Who or what 1s the object In the hearing center that hears the barking dog
and the train whistle? And by what process does that object hear? Such
mystical treatments of perceiving and thinking far outnumber naturalistic
analyses of the sort exemplified on the cover page, and as long as this Is
the case, children's efforts to learn about perceiving and thinking will mon
often leave them farther from than closer to the understanding of those even'
A colleague at Kenyon College with no previous exposure to Interbehavlorlsm
read the Spring 1978 Issue of The Interbehavlorlst and subsequently responda
by commenting that the publication seemed very "specialized" and questioning
whether the label "underground publication" Is an accurate one. Following 1
the editor's reply, written after some hard thinking about who Interbehavlor
are and what The Interbehavlorlst Is trying to do:
I appreciated your note concerning The Interbehavlorlst and am very
happy that you took the time to read It. "Tfiope thIFyour confusion
with some of It Is neither an Index of overspeclallzatlon nor of a
lack of clarity of expression. While the publication Is clearly
specialized In some senses, I believe that It has more to say to the
general psychological community (and to a larger academic community,
In fact) than most specialized publications I read. As for the term
"underground publication," that was a label affixed to The Intejr-
behavlorlst by an editor of a kindred publication, Steven Wown of tl
Kent State University political science department; his letter
Is excerpted 1n the Issue you read. I must confess that I am
both compelled and repulsed by the application of the term to
our publication. "Underground" has an air of adventure and
Intrigue associated with It, and 1n that sense I like to think
of us as doing something "underground." Also, It Is fair to
say that some premises of Interbehavlorlsm (particularly the
Idea that physiological reductlonlsm has no place In psychology)
border on heresy In the larger psychological community. How-
ever, to the extent that the label "underground" imples that
those with Interbehavlorlst leanings are a wild-eyed group of
misfits brandishing a similarly misfit and anti-Intellectual
doctrine, the label Is far off the mark. Interbehavlorlsm 1s
rooted firmly In the soil of Aristotelian naturalism, and draws
Its sustenance from Ideas that are respected both without and
within the psychological community (though not so much within
the more scientific psychological community). As for Inter-
behavlorlsts, they are, for the most part, a not-so-wlId-eyed
but enthusiastic group of philosophically-oriented research
psychologists committed to the belief that empirical psychology
would derive many benefits from the adoption of an Interactional
mode of doing Its business.
Your responses to the editor's characterization of our enterprise, whether In
the form of emendations or elaborations, would be welcome.
In the Summer 1978 Issue of The Psychological Record, the following open letter
appeared, reprinted here with the edltoPs permission:
To reach the age of 90 Is In Itself notable. To be professionally
productive for more than 60 of the 99 years since the benchmark
founding of Wundt's laboratory Is especially remarkable. Two
facets of (Cantor's contributions characterize his work. First,
with historical perspective he has Inveighed against the pervasive
and continuing spiritistic Influence upon the sciences, particu-
larly psychology. He has been Insistent that In all scientific
behavior the scientist needs to differentiate between construct
and event and, rejecting prevailing animistic thinking, to derive
the former from the observation of the latter. In his long list of
papers and books he also originated and elaborated the Interbehav-
loral viewpoint, a naturalistic approach offering a framework for
studying and understanding the whole spectrum of psychological
events. He avoided both dualism and the newer neurologlzlng while
emphasizing the role of cultural conditions In the development of
human behavior. He went beyond other critics among the behavlorlsts
who seemed to concentrate on what he labeled "learnology" and who
thus, with something like benign neglect, left certain areas mini-
mally treated. Claiming to fill this void, many current writers
seem openly to embrace mental Ism or not to comprehend that their
efforts mirror the persisting and perhaps burgeoning mysticism.
In addition to his writing, Kantor also has had Impact In the
scientific world through The Principle Press which he still heads,
founding of this journal, The Psychojogllca 1 Record, and teaching
his many students. Dr. KaiTlor, we marTc your~day This August (8), con-
gratulate and thank you, and wish you many happy returns!
Irvfn S. Wolf
In the same Issue of The Psychological Record are two additional items of
interest to those whoTollow the distinguished career of Dr. Kantor: an about Investigatory bias that Barber wishes to overcome derives from an
article entitled "Cognition as events and as psychic constructions" based unsatisfactory model of the researcher's relationship to the psychological
on a lecture he delivered at Wichita State University on April 13, 1978; events being studied, one wherein the researcher Is viewed as set apart from
and an unusually detailed review of his Psychological Linguistics book by the events being observed. In contrast, the Interbehavioral conception is
David Herman. that the researcher is an inextricable part of the sequence of investigatory
field events constituting the planning, Implementation, and data manipulation
of an experiment (see cover design). Thus, adoption by psychological Investi-
gators of an Interbehavioral view would serve as the best antidote to the sort
Two other items relating to Dr. Kantor: of inattentiveness to bias that concerns Barber in his book.
The third volume of Krawiec's series of autobiographical sketches (The
Psychologists) contains a reference to Kantor in an unlikely place: the
Joint autobiography of J. B. and E. Louisa Rhine. They note that while This Issue features contributions from Noel W. Smith and Edward Blewitt. Our
they were graduate students in biology at the University of Chicago In the former editor's contribution is a chart that shows the chapter correspondences
1920s, Louisa Rhine took a course under Dr. Kantor and they were both im- between two texts that survey the domain of psychology from an Interbehavioral
pressed by behaviorism and more generally by attempts to develop "an all- perspective: Kantor and Smith's, The science of psychology: an interbehavlpral
inclusive mechanistic philosophy of life" (p. 185) devoid of any super- | survey and Pronko's Panorama of psychology.Smith writes that "the two texts
natural elements. It Is easy to see how Kantor's developing system would I harmonize very well and some readers may want to try using them together."
have impressed the Rhines in this regard; we might speculate that, in - Blewitt is a Ph.D. candidate at University College, Cardiff, Wales, U.K. who
addition, interbehaviorlsm's message that a psychologist must be open to describes himself as "carrying out research into the descriptive analysis of
events unencumbered by presuppositions and constructs was recalled by them behaviour-environment relationships with developmentally retarded persons."
in their subsequent pioneering work In parapsychology, when they bravely In this Issue appears the first Installment of a paper he wrote while an under-
and steadfastly pursued objectivity In a "taboo" area. graduate at the University of Wales at Bangor.
Cedrlc A. Larson provides the following comments about his acquaintance
with Dr. Kantor:
I am working on the biography of the late Dr. John B. Watson
, (1878-1958) and this is the centennial year of his birth. I
have been on this project for a number of years, but am now
devoting most of my time to It. Several years ago (I think it
was in the year 1961), and I have the Interview In my files, I
had an interview with Dr. Kantor about John B. Watson when he
was teaching a summer school course in a college near Washington.
He was most cooperative and gave me a long Interview. Me had
once taken a summer school course under Watson early in the cen-
tury at the University of Chicago, I have five or six of his
books, and he has sent me many reprints of his articles. I
recognized him immediately at the 1977 A.P.A. convention In
San Francisco at the Hilton Hotel, and talked briefly with him.
His nephew had brought him there, and although he was close to
90, his conversation and his mind were alert, I wrote him later
In Chicago and he sent me more reprints. He Is a remarkable man.

Since Rosenthal's pioneering experimental work 1n the early 1960's, much atten-
tion has been given to the problem of bias in psychological research. Recently,
T. X. Barber (1976), In his book Pitfalls in Human Research, has criticized much
of this earlier research on grounds thaT It takes a to6~slmp11st1c and narrow
view of the problem of bias in empirical investigations. He argues that the re-
searcher is intertwined with the events being observed at all stages of the In-
vestigatory process; thus, Instead of focussing attention solely upon "experi-
menter effects" (biases introduced while the experimental procedure 1s being
carried out), the investigator must be equally attentive to potential trouble
spots earlier (the initial conceptualization and designing of the study) and
later (data recording and analysis) In the Investigatory sequence. Those fa-
miliar with the Interbehavioral approach may recognize that the naive attitude
 The Necessity of Social Control:
A Critical Review of B. F. Skinner's Science and Human Behavior
SCIENCE OF PSYCHOLOGY PANORAMA OF PSYCHOLOGY Edward Blewltt
University College, Cardiff
Basic Factors
If one looks at Skinner's publishing history It will be seen that his first
Science and psychology , 1 book, The Behavior of Organisms (1938), 1s one of empirical research, while
History of psychology 2 his secbndTTfclden Two (1948), Is a Utopian novel. This contrast gives us
Units of psychological acts 3 a good Indication oFThe aspects of psychology that have Interested Skinner,
Psychological and biological and which he finds Important. Skinner's Interests lie not only in carrying
history 4 out psychological research but also In applying the principles formulated
Psychological history vs. in the laboratory to the problems of modern society. Indeed, as the years
Inherited behavior 5 have passed the social implications of psychological research -- developing
Development 6-8 a technology of behaviour change -- have occupied an Increasingly Important
Personality and Pathology 9, 23- part of Skinner's published works. It Is mainly through the social appli-
cations that the "experimental analysts of behavior" (Skinner's not partic-
Analysls of Psychological Acts ularly descriptive term for his approach) came to the public's attention, at
least in the United States. Unfortunately, Skinner's work 1s still largely
Attending 10 unknown to the lay public in the U.K., a sad Indictment of British psychology,
Perceiving 11 which seems reluctant to emerge from academic isolationism and enter the arena
Covert or-Implicit behaviors 12-- of social reality.
Feelings 14 12 It is in Science and human behavior (1953) that the synthesis of laboratory
Emotions 15 research aruTits social Implications Is best represented. I will deal with
Remembering and forgetting 16 only two 'aspects of this synthesis: (1) the application of a scientific
Learning (17-- approach to human behaviour; that is, the problem of determinism In human
18- behavior; (2) the application of the findings of a scientific psychology to
Thinking, problem-solving, the problem of social control.
reasoning 19
Language behavior 20 THE POSSIBILITY OF A SCIENCE OF HUMAN BEHAVIOUR
Imagining 21
Social psychology 24 --8 One of the most Influential explanations of human behaviour is that each
Intelligence 10 individual is totally free to decide whether to follow the ways of God or
the ways of Satan. The modern assault on the concept of free will came as
a consequence of the application of the methodology of the natural sciences
Psychology and Other Sciences to behavioural phenomena. The extension of scientific methods has not been
without its critics: the resultant conflict Is an example of the more gen-
Assumptions 25 eral conflict existing between Aristotelian and Galilean modes of thought
Mathematics and statistics 26 (see Lewin, 1931).
Physics 27
Chemistry 28 The Aristotelian mode* tends to be anthropomorphic and Inexact, abounding
Biology 29- 1n normative concepts taken from ethics. For example, the "hlg est" forms
Anthropology 30 of motions occur only in heavenly movements, such as the stars, whereas the
Psychology and society 31- earthly world is endowed with motion of Inferior types. When Galilean and
post-Galilean physics disposed of the distinction between heavenly and earthly,
and thereby extended the domain of natural law, It was not due only to the ex-
clusion of value concepts but also to a different Interpretation of classi-
fication. For Aristotelian physics the membership of an object to a given
class was of critical Importance because the class defined the essential
nature of, and determined the likely behaviour of, the object. For the
Aristotelian the environment played a part only 1n so far as It may give
rise to disturbances or modifications of the motion which follows from the

It Is Important to distinguish the AHstotellanism of Aristotle from

the Arlstotelianism of the Christian Interpretation of Aristotle. In the
following we speak of the latter, not the former.
 8
nature of the object Itself. For Galilean physics, on the other hand,
the motion of an object depends on the relation of the object to the
environment. This does not mean that the nature of the object becomes
Insignificant, only that the contextual situation assumes as much Im-
portance In determining the motion as the nature of the object. It Is
only by examining the concrete whole, which comprises the object, the
environment, and the mode of Interaction, that an event can be understood.
Aristotelian classes were defined as the sum total of those characteristics
a group of objects has In common. This definition largely determined the
Aristotelian concept of lawfulness and chance. For the Aristotelian those
things were lawful which occur without exception. Also, those were lawful
which occur frequently. Excluded from the class of the conceptually In-
telligible, then, were those things occurring Infrequently or only once.
The source of this conception may be that for Aristotelian physics not all
physical processes possessed the lawful character ascribed to them by post-
Galilean physics. In post-Galilean physics, with the elimination of the
distinction between lawful and chance events, the necessity also disappeared
for proving that the process under consideration was lawful. Instead, the
question to be asked became what are the particular lawful relationships
between the various factors which make up the event. For Aristotelian
physics, on the other hand, It was necessary to have a criterion to decide
whether or not a given event was lawful. Because the regularity with
which similar events occurred in nature was used as such a criterion, the
domain of Aristotelian science was limited to those events that were cer-
tified by repetition, and thus Aristotelian science was limited In its
ability to understand complex, chaotic, and unintelligible phenomena of
nature. The Aristotelian conviction that it Is Impossible to wholly com-
prehend the individual case encouraged. In addition, a certain laxity In
inquiry: a satisfaction with setting forth mere regularities, requiring
validity "in general" or "on the average" only. The complexity of nature
makes it unreasonable to require complete, exceptionless validity. The
Aristotelian ascribed to the proverb that "the exception proves the rule":
exceptions are not counter-arguments so long as their frequency is not too
great. For post-Galilean physics, however, exceptions are not taken lightly
and are valid disproofs, even though they are rare (cf. Popper's falslfi-
abillty criterion of science In his The Logic of Scientific Discovery,
1959). In summary, the Aristotelian concept of science was static, re-
sulting In little scientific advancement. By way of contrast, there is
no limit to the range of application of Galilean science and this led to
a rapid development and accumulation of scientific knowledge.
The application of the Galilean concept of science to events other than
psychological ones is today met with little resistance. This is far from
being the situation when it is applied to the field of human activity.
The proposal that human behaviour is determined to the same degree as non-
human activity is still strongly opposed: the belief that the Individual
has a free will, and that human behaviour is therefore capricious, main-
tains Its hold, both within and without the scientific community. In the
battle against the free will concept, Skinner has been a particularly out-
spoken leader, viewing it as a relic of the prescientific mode of thought,
as a concept concealing and perpetuating ignorance of the variables of which
behaviour Is a function. The position that determinism occupies in Skinner's
approach to the explanation of human behaviour is shown when he writes in
Science and human behavior:
Science is more than the mere description of events as they
occur. It is an attempt to discover order, to show that
certain events stand In lawful relations to other events . . . .
But order Is not only a possible end product; it is a working
assumption which must be adopted at the very start. We can-
not apply the methods of science to a subject matter which Is
assumed to move about capriciously. Science not only describes,
it predicts. It deals not only with the past but with the fu-
ture. Nor is prediction the last word: to the extent that
relevant conditions can be altered, or otherwise controlled,
the future can be controlled. If we are to use the methods
of science in the field of human affairs, we must assume that
behavior Is lawful and determined. We must expect to dis-
cover that what a man does is the result of specifiable con-
ditions and that once these conditions have been discovered,
we can anticipate and to some extent determine his actions.
(Skinner, 1953, p. 6)
If human behaviour does not exhibit cause-effect sequences, then the scient-
ific method is essentially Irrelevant to the explanation of the nature of
man, and scientific psychology and the other social sciences are permanently
barred from achieving the status they desire. To deny determinism In regard
to human behaviour is to assert that significant lessons cannot be drawn from
the past and that man's future Is capricious and elusive. In contrast, the
assumption that causal laws are discoverable In human behaviour leads to
enormous possibilities in the social control of man's social environment;
rules for managing social behaviour can be based on causal laws which tell
us that If such and such is done it is likely that the outcome will be this
and this.
Some Objections to Determinism
(0 The Melsenberg Principle of Indeterminacy
The Helsenberg Principle of Indeterminacy states that there are circumstances
under which it is not possible to simultaneously determine the velocity and
position of subatomic particles. The reason for this Is that any system used
to observe the particle Interacts with the particle. More specifically, there
Is an exchange of energy between the observing system and the object. Hence,
the very act of observation alters the behaviour of the particle. This ex-
perimental fact Is supposed to provide scientific evidence of the reality of
free will, of the undetermined nature of behavioural events. The Helsenberg
Principle, however, does not necessarily lead to this conclusion. That cer-
tain events appear to be unpredictable does not entail that these events are
free or capricious. In the field of human behaviour, there may be acts to
which the principle of Indeterminacy applies, but it does not follow that hu-
man behaviour is free. It is only that it is "beyond the range of a pre-
dictive or controlling science" (Skinner, 1953. p. 17). It may be argued
that the principle of indeterminacy is a testimonial only to experimental im-
perfection. Uncertainty is, at the present stage of development, inherent
in the methods of observation and measurement, and not in nature itself.
That certain events are unpredictable now does not mean that this will always
be the case. A future technology may be capable of creating a means of ob-
servation that can eliminate the energy interchange between the object and
the system of observation. That such an event will eventually occur is pre-
dicted by "Clarke's Law":
When a distinguished but elderly scientist states that some-
thing is possible, he is almost invariably right. When he
states that something is impossible, he Is very probably
wrong.
10
(End of first Installment)
REFERENCES
Lewln, K, The conflict between Aristotelian and Galilean modes of thought.
Journal of General Psychology, 1941, , 141-162.
Popper, K. R. The logic of scientific discovery. London: llutchlnson,
1959,
Skinner, B. F. The behavior of organisms. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts,
1938.
Skinner, B. F. Maiden II. New York: Hacmlllan, 1948.
Skinner, B. F. Science and human behavior. New York: Macmlllan,, 1953.
12
REFERENCES THE
Azrln, N. and llolz, II. Punishment. In W. llonlg (Ed.), Operant Behavior.
New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1966.
I
Black, R. Some averslve responses to a would-be relnforcer. In II. Wheeler
(Ed.), Beyond the Punitive Society. New York: Wlldwood Mouse, 1974.
Engels, f. Antl-DuhHng. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1976. Originally n
pubHsh~e<nFT8l8.
Hume, D. A Treatise of Human Nature. London: Fontana, 1972. Originally
t
published! n 1739,
Harx, K. Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy.
andlfTshlrt. Originally publTIHeTlinBBg.
London: Lawrence
e M

Marx, K. Theses on Feuerbach. In L. Collettl (Ed.), Marx: Early Writings.

Ha'rmondsworth: Penguin Books/New Left Review, 1975TOriginally pub-
lished 1n 1888.
Marx, K. and tngels, F. The German Ideology. London: Lawrence and Ulshart, 1965.
r
Perelman, R. Behaviorism's enlightened despotism. In II. Wheeler (Ed.), Beyond
the_Jliin_1t1ye_SocJet^. New York: Hlldwood House, 1974.
Pyle, G. Thp Qon_cep_t_jo_fJ11nd. London: Penguin Books, 1949.
Roe, A. Man's forgotten weapon, AmeHcan Psychologist, 1959, 14., 261-266.
Skinner, R. F. Halctenjhro. (lew York: Macmlllan, 1948.
Skinner, 11. F. Science and Human Behavior. New York: Macmlllan, 1953.
Skinner, li. F. Freedom and the control of men (1955). Reprinted 1n Cumulative
Record.
Skinner, B. F. Some Issues concerning the control of human behavior (1955).
Reprinted In Cumulative Record.
Skinner, B. F. Han (19d4). Reprinted 1n Cumulative Record.
Skinner, B, F, Utopia as an experimental culture (1969). Reprinted 1n Cumulative
Record.
Skinner, B. F. Beyond Freedom and Dignity. London: Jonathan Capo, 1971.
Skinner, I). F. Cumulative Accord. 3rd ed. Mew York: Appleton-Century-Crof ts,
1972.
Ulrlch, R. Behavior control and public concern. sy_ch_qlp_gjLcaJ_Jecojrd, 1967,
17, 229-234.
Ulrlch, R. and flountjoy, P. (Fds.) The Experimental Analysis of Social Behavior.
Mow York: Applnton-Century-CroTts, "1972.
A QUARTERLY NEWSLETTER OF
INTERBEHAVIORAL PSYCHOLOGY
PUBLISHED AT KENYON COLLEGE
GAMBIER, OHIO
Volume n. Number 3 Fall l')78
Any given action - say, yawning, Illustrating, painting,
or mailing a letter - may bo variously performed, that Is,
performed with different specific movements Involving
different causal processes. On the other hand, similar
events and processes may condition guile different actions:
for oxanplr, the movements of the fingers, hand, and ami,
and presumably of the nervous system, In dealing a card
and In postlno letter, are virtually the same, although
the actions am unlike. This suggests that the analysis
of actions reveals a different structure and system of
relations from the analysis of bodily events.
,1. ,). Compton, 1972. Science and God's
action In nature. In I. r,. Harbour (Fd.),
Larth might be fair, p. 17-8.

Editor:
Ronald fi. lleyduk, Kenyon College
Associate F.dltors:
Donna M, Cone, Assistant Director, Division of Retardation, Rhode
Island
Paul T. 'Mountjoy, Uestern Michigan University
Noel H. Smith, State University of New York, Plattsburgh
The Agora
In this Issue's cover quote, Compton provides excellent examples In support
of a distinction between what the interbehaviorist calls "response" and
"response function." Furthermore, In suggesting that the analysis of the
two classes of events "reveals a different structure and system of relations,"
Compton 1s agreeing with the 1nterbehav1or1st that bodily movements and
organlsmlc "acts" must be understood In terms of entirely different fields
of determinants. Ironically, Compton (a philosopher-theologian) proceeds from
the distinction to make a not very naturalistic but intriguing point. He
argues that just as there Is an "I," a behaving individual wno is needed in
the field representation of psychological events but who clearly does not
Intrude upon (and Is In fact irrelevant to) the sequence of bodily movements
underlying functional responses, so too Is there a "God" who Is needed as the
"agent" of all natural events, but who need not (and should not) be conceived
of as Intervening in the sequence of happenings constituting the course of
natural history. A reading of his paper is recommended, and an interbehavlorlst
crit.lque would be appreciated.
* * *
Another quote with a stronn interbehavioral flavor comes from a very different
source:
More encompassing features of the total environmental context and
of the organism's behavioral history appear to coalesce in deter-
mlning the effects that drugs and other environmental events will
have on behavior. The effects of behaviorally relevant events
hove typically been examined under conditions that minimize or
preclude the influence of such factors. Ongoing behavior can be
exquisitely susceptible to influences that may be quite remote, but
the degree and extent to which these factors may modify drug effects
has not been studied extensively. The effects of drugs on behaviors
that appear to lie quite similar can be radically different depending
nn the behavioral history, on characteristics of the maintaining
event, and on behaviors occurring under different environmental
conditions. It is significant that the influence on these factors
cnn omnrge when a drug Is administered.
James A, flarrett. Effects of d-Amphetamine on respondini
simultaneously maintained and punished by presentation
of electric shock, Psychopharfflacoloeiy, 1977, M, 119-
171.
Noel Smith provides us with the news that Kantor's Interbehavioral Psychology
(1959) has recently been published in Spanish translation Try FdTFoFlilTirlTlas
of Mexico. Magdalena Varela was the translator.
This issue contains the second Installment of Edward Blewitt's detailed analysis
of Skinner's Science and Human Behavior (1953), described by (Hewitt as the book
in which Skinner most clearly lynfiiesTzes his laboratory research and its social
implications. Preceding this Is a short paper by,Dennis Oelprato that should
be of particular interest to those who teach interbehavioral psychology. '
AN IHTERBEIIAV(ORALLY ORIENTED UNDERGRADUATE COURSE IN
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LEARNING
Dennis J. Oelprato
Eastern Michigan University
The present writer was led to the Interbehavioral approach especially out of
disenchantment with the truncated views of learning and behavior offered by
traditional "animal learning" psychology on the one hand and human mentalIstlc
approaches to learning on the other. Gradually, my undergraduate learning
course changed to the point where I feel that It is legitimate to consider it
an Interbehaviorally oriented approach to the psychology of learning. An
outline of the course is presented to provide a stimulus for feedback from
other interbehavlorlsts and to perhaps offer a useful suggestion or two to
other Interbehaviorally oriented instructors.
Goals. As a consequence of a course In learning, students should bo able
to effectively interact with empirical principles of behavioral change.
This means they should be able to use these principles in their everyday
observations of events in the world and to recognize the applications of
learning principles to the modification of the behavior of organisms. In
addition, because students' interactions with learning principles cannot be
separated from the broader context (interbehavloral field) In which they occur,
a major task of the course is to present a context for learning general psy-
chology that 1s conducive to a naturalistic approach to the subject matter.
Texts. N. H. Pronko's Panorama of Psychology (2nd ed.) is used to demonstrate
. theT>readth and advantages oT a leaTning-Tlevelopmental perspective on behavior.
' L. K. Miller's Eyerjday_Jlehav_1pr Analj^sjj^ is used to provide the student with
ample opportunity to Interact wTtFToperant procedures. The other two major
classes of empirical learning procedures (Pavlovian and modeling) are pre-
sented by the instructor (Pronko also covers both of these and Miller covers
modeling to some degree). iat
Outline. The course syllabus contains the following quotation from J. R.
KanForrs PH_ncin!e5, of _Psycholmjy (192<1, Vol. 1):
In recent years the fact has been strenuously
forced upon us that many of the most serious
maladjustments of the organism can be and Indeed
 must be explained not in terms of physiological
but of social conditions.
To the psycholopist who neglects the humanistic
or social side of persons may be laid the charge
of the extremely faulty notions current in psy-
chology concerning the motives and conditions of
human actions, (p. 20)
This'provides the starting point for discussion of the general orientation
of the course. Presentations of the first topic in the course outline then
begins.
I. Physiological vs. Cultural, Social,, Humanistic or Learning Perspectives:
Reduction Ism, brain dogma et al. are covered and the Interbehavloral
alternative is presented.
II. Basic and Applied Learning:
The role of learning principles In contemporary applied psychology
(behavioral therapy, applied behavioral analysis) 1s emphasized.
I feel this is important to counteract many students' preconceived
notions that learning psychology Is concerned only with salivating
dogs, rats in mazes, and nonsense syllables.
III. Province of Learning 1n Psychology:
Three views regarding learning are covered. First, there is the
environmentalist view that all learning is a matter of SR and that
this model applies to all behavior. Second, there is the currently
popular view that "learning" is inextricably Intertwined with "innate"
(inherited) behavior. Work such as that of the Rrelands and the Garcia
effect (taste aversion learning) 1s cited here. Finally, the view
that learning is a subarea of developmental psychology (Kantor, Kuo,
Schnierla, Lehrman, Pronko) is presented. The role of organism-
environment interactions in behavioral development (change) is stressed.
IV. Major Competing Views of Behavior:
This section of the course further Introduces the student to the inter-
actional perspective by comparing and contrasting several Influential
approaches to behavior: (a) Intrapsychic trait approaches (b) S>R
view (c) mediational or cognitive learning views (signs of Interactionism
are Indicated here) (d) molar or radical behaviorism (Skinner's contri-
bution to the rejection of S>R psychology is surprising to many stu-
dents) and (e) Interbehavloral (organlsmlc or authentic interactional)
approach.
V. Basic Learning (Behavioral Change) Principles: I.
This section and the following one cover the specific empirical and
procedural aspects of learning principles. Topographical vs. functional
analyses (antecedent-behavior consequences) are presented; operant,
respondent, and modeling procedures are defined; arid basic learning
procedures (positive reinforcement, escape training, extinction, etc.)
are presented.
VI. Basic Learning Principles: II. . v
Aversive control procedures (e.g., active avoidance, emotional learning)
as well as thoir relationship to the development of behavioral therapy
(Hatson and Hayner; llnlpe) are covered here.
VII. Great Awareness Controversy:
This short section enables me to provide further background regarding
the use of learning principles in the analysis and treatment of
human behavior because this controversy, In large part, began at
Indiana University when learning principles were applied to "unlguely
human behavior" (verbal behavior). Fuller's comments (Psychological
Record, 1973, 23, 318-24) regarding the role of Professors Fa'ntor" ~
ana Skinner 1n~this are noted. Of course the controversy regarding
the role of awareness In behavioral change provides an excellent
opportunity for me to practice my skills at presenting Interbehavloral
views, since this entire Issue is seen as a pseudo-issue from the
fnterbehaviora! perspective.
VIII. The Cognitive Learning Approach:
Ry this time we have covered many matters related to "cognitive
reversionism." In this section, the basic rationale for it Is pre-
sented and demonstrations of how cognitions "cause" behavior are given.
The Interbehavloral alternative to internal cognitions Is presented
and Integrated with learning principles (e.g., stimulus control and
positive reinforcement of Implicit behavior).
IX. Intelligence Behavior:
Learning-developmental alternatives to "intelligence" are presented
and recent research is used to buttress the alternative.
The Necessity of Social Control:
A Critical Review of R. F. Skinner's Scjence_ and Human Behavior
(Part II) ""
Edward Blewltt
University College, Cardiff
(Fd. note: In Part I, Blewitt discussed Skinner's important role as a 20th
century leader 1n the "battle against the freewill concept" and against the
"Aristotelian mode" of thinking. Part II concludes his consideration of
Skinner's contributions to the scientific conception of human behavior, and
moves on to discuss Skinner's other major set of contributions as a spokes-
person for social control)
(continued)
(2) Jl^^ni1rLlsj!L.1j!5?JjS_fa_t_aljsni and passivity
Some critics of the determinist thesis reject it because they Relieve that
there exists a conflict between the determinist position and the possibility
of deliberate or planned human action. That a belief in determinism should
not encourage fatal isn was argued by Marx in his Theses on__Fpu_ojl>_ach written
in the spring of lfM5:
II
The material doctrine th.it men are the product of circumstances
and upbringing, and that, therefore, changed men are the products
of other circumstances and changed upbringing, forgets that It is
men that change circumstances, and that the educator himself needs
 educating. Hence this doctrine necessarily arrives at dividing
society into two parts, of which one Is superior to the other.
The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human
activity can be understood only as revolutionising practice.
XI
The philosophers have only Interpreted the world 1n various
ways; the point, however. Is to change It.
In these notes, of which Engels wrote In February 1883 (l.udwig Feuerbach and
the fjid of Classical German Philosophy) "...the first document Tti wWcTTi 3
deposited" the brill lant germ of the new world outlook," we find a philosophy
which lies at the centre of Marx's work. The Theses 1 proclaim the need for
thought to become 'practical' and 'change the worTdT and they reject the
contemplative attitude in general, and German Idealism in particular. For
Marx, the Internal logic of the historical process culminates in making man
sovereign over his circumstances. The social revolution Is the agent of
this transformation. Theory and practice can be unified, on the condition
that the former guide the latter. For Marx, man appropriates the world
actively not passively, through practice (especially through labour). As
men change the world they come to know It better, and this increase 1n
knowledge enhances their ability to change It. Man creates himself through
his action upon the world. The philosophy of practice denies both the
assumption that man is autonomous and can decide Independently at any time
(I.e., idealism), and the opposite, that man only appears to decide while
in fact circumstances rule men's lives and do not admit any genuine decision.
Marx saw man as a being who is necessarily capable of deliberately changing
the world and yet 1s at the same time created by it (for a more detailed
discussion, see Marx and Engels, The German Ideology).
Skinner also accepts determinism while recognising that men act upon, and
change, the world 1n which they live, and In the process of changing the
world change themselves. In Skinner's functional psychology the class of
relationship between organism and environment that has been most studied
is that established In operant behavior. In Science and Human Behavior
(p. fiS) he writes":
The term operant emphasizes the fact that the behavior
operates upon the environment to generate consequences.
It Is the consequences of an action, the effect of the behaviour of the
organism on the environment, which for Skinner Is the most Important factor
In determining the behaviour of organisms. In Skinner's concept of oporant
behaviour there Is a continual Interaction between the organism and the
environment: a class of responses produces a change in the environment
which acts upon the organism to alter Its future probability of responding,
and so on until the organism dies. Unlike the early attempts at establishlm
a behavlourlstlc science of psychology by Pavlov and Watson, Skinner's hehav-
lourlstlc approach does not consider the organism as simply a passive receptor
of stimuli. In his (Jeyond Freedom and__DJ_njiJ_ty_ (1071) for example he writes
with reference to this narTy tradTtlon:
When Pavlov showed how new reflexes could be built up
through condltloninn, a full-fledged stimulus-response
psychology was born, In which all behavior VMS reo.irdod
as reactions to stimuli. One writer put 1t this way: 'lie
are prodded or lashed through life.' The stimulus-response
model was never very convincing, however, and dfd not solve
the basic problem, because something like an Inner man had
to be invented to convert a stimulus into a response. It
is now clear that we must take Into account what the environ-
ment does to an organism not only before but after it responds.
Behavior is shaped and maintained by Its consequences. Once
this fact is recognized, we can formulate the interaction
between organism and environment in a much more comprehensive
way (p. 17-8).
Skinner, with his concept of operant behaviour, has transcended the dichotomy
of passive or active organism, and has arrived at a conceptualization which
recognizes the reciprocity of the relationship. Rather than spending his time
' In philosophical discussion of the dilemma of whether the organism is active
or passive, Skinner examines the activity of organisms In specific environm-
ental situations. From this direct contact with the subject matter of psy-
chology he has provided us with an account of the organism-environment relation-
ship that recognises the effect of the environment on the organism as well as
the effect of the organism on the environment.
In summary, both Marx and Skinner consider that man is not only a product of
his circumstances but also the producer of them, and that man changes himself
In the process of changing his surroundings. Man cannot change himself with-
out changing his environment and cannot change the environment without
changing himself. Similarly Marx and Skinner have transcended the problem
of whether man or society should be changed and recognized that it is necessary
to change society to change men and that it is necessary to change men to
change society. The processes2 of changing man and society cannot be separated,
they are inherently related. i n Skinner's words:
If man has no freedom of choice, If he can initiate no action
which alters the causal stream of behavior, then he may seem
to have no control over his own destiny. The scientific view
of man according to Krutch is a "dead end." The fact is,
however, that men control both their genetic and environmental
histories, and In that sense they do, Indeed, control them-
selves. .. .Men controT themselves by controlling the world In
which they live ("Man", 19M, in Cumulative Record, 1972, p. 01).
He are all controlled by the world in which we live, and part
of that world has been and will be constructed by mrr. The question
Is this: Are we to be controlled by accident, by tyrants, or by
ourselves In effective cultural design? ("Freedom arid the Control
of Hen", l%5,1n Cumulative jtecord, 1972, p. 11).
Hopefully, what has boon written shows that a Marxian perspective Is
compatible with Skinner's psychology. Ironically, Skinner-Ian behaviourism Is
mom nonprally regarded as being a fascist Ideoloqy, as bolng the supporter of
in elitist, conservative social system. For the present writer, behaviouristic
psychology could contribute a great deal more In the construction of a large-
scale socialist society.
8 so his suggestions should carry no more or loss weight than our own "oughts".
A final argument against the statement that determinism Implies passivity
and fatalism may be noted. Physical laws In no v/ay force bodies to behave
In a certain way, but merely describe how under certain conditions they do
behave. Similarly, psychological laws do not force us to do anything. They
merely state what, as a matter of fact, we do under certain conditions (see
Pvle, 1949, Th_e_ Concept of Hind). That Is, an object does not behave because
of a law; for example, a stone does not fall because of gravity. The Taw~
merely describes what occurs. Phenomena do not behave because of laws 1n the
same way that a man building a model plane behaves In a certain way because
of the Instructions. A natural law does not determine an event In the way
that the Instructions are one of the factors determining the behaviour of .
the model builder,
(3) Determinism. Is not proven
Probably the most common argument In favour of the free-will viewpoint Is
the negative one that the determlnlst belief In causal processes has not
been applied to the whole range of human behaviour, and, hence, has not been
proven. It Is not denied by such critics of determinism that causal processes
have been found to apply to some kinds of human behaviour. However, they
question whether previous successes provide sufficient reason for believing
that a wider range of human actions will be explicable In causal terms.
Such arguments are not compelling. It Is primarily on the basis of the past
success of an approach or orientation that one should put faith In Its future
application. One 1s not proceeding logically If one dismisses the possibility
of the future success of an approach simply on the grounds that It has not as
yet confronted the events In question.
THE POSSIBILITY OP THE CONTROL OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR
It Is through Its technological Implications for social control that operant
psychology has come to the public notice. Skinner's own applications to the
social sphere, both 1n his books, Maiden^ Two and Beyond Freedom and JVicjnlty,
and In various articles (e.g., Freedom and the ControTl)TTlen",~l9^; Som issues
Concerning the Control of Human Behavior, 1956) have caused a great deal of
controversy. A great deal of the reaction to Skinner's suggestions about the
applications of operant behavior findings to social behaviour has been aggres-
sively uncomplimentary. For example, Orvllle .Prescot, 1n the (jew York Times,r
commented on Wald_en_Two as "Alluring In a sinister way, and appaTTlng too.'
On the basis bflifs more recent book, Beyqnd__Freedom_ajid DU|n1ty, Skinner's
Utopian vision of a society based on aTieTiavloUiFal technology has been variously
called a "behavioral scientist's enlightened despotism "(Perelman, Behaviorism's
Enlightened Despotism), and the book Itself a ' "melange of amateurish meta-
physics, self-advertising 'technology', and Illiberal social policy (which)
adds up to a document that is a disservice to scientists, technologists, and
to all who are seriously trying to Improve the human condition "(Black, Some
Aversive Responses to a Mould-Be Relnforcer).
Skinner's commitment to deliberate cultural design is sometimes said to be
deficient because it Is value-ladon. This is viewed as a flaw because In
philosophy there is a distinction between descriptive and normative proposi-
tions; that Is, It is accepted that the "ought" cannot lie derived from the
"Is". Thus 1t is argued. Skinner cannot assert that his proscriptions for
social change ("ought") arc grounded In scientific discovery ("Is"), and if
The most well-known analysis of this problem was undertaken by Iliimo In his
A Treatise of Human tiature (1739). In this work Hume implied that 'ought'
sentences are not" logically deducible from 'is' sentences:
I cannot forbear adding to those reasonings an observation,
which may, perhaps, be found of some Importance. In every
system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have
always remarked, that the author proceeds for somo time In
the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of
a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when
of a sudden, I am surprised to find, that Instead of the
usual copulations of propositions, Is, and 1s not, I mot
with no proposition that 1s not connected with an ought, or
an ought not. This change 1s Imperceptible; but Is, however,
of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not,
expresses some new relation or affirmation, It Is necessary
that 1t should be observed and explained; and at the same
time that a reason be given, for what seems to be altogether
Inconceivable, how this new relation can he a deduction from
others, which are entirely different from It. Hut as authors
do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to
recommend It to the readers; and am persuaded, that this
small attention would subvert all the vulgar systems of
morality, and let us see, that this distinction of vice and
virtue Is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor
Is perceived by reason.
While Hume's argument 1s Impressive, the author Is unconvinced that It should
carry any weight as a criticism of Skinner. The criticism of cultural design
on the grounds that It contains a value judgement, and is therefore based on
"moral" rather than "scientific" grounds. Implies that valuos are somehow
Immune to a scientific analysis. To the contrary,, what a person believes
"ought" to be done Is a datum for the science of behavior. What a person fels
about a fact Is no doubt different from the fact, but the former is a fact also.
By posing the problem of intentional cultural design, It follows that one must
ask "Who 1s to have control?" It Is In the controversy over an answer to this
puzzling question that a great deal of anger and name-calling has occurred.
It has been assumed by many critics of the application of operant techniques
to social problems that control will be In the hands of a small group of behav-
ioural engineers, who will Impose what they regard as the correct solutions on
a passive and ignorant mass. Such a concept of society Is In the same tradition
ns Plato's Ropubljc, Orwell's and Huxley's liravo Jlow Horld.
'Orwell's novel together with his Animal Farm wore Intended as critiques
of cotununlsm in Stalinist Russin. Russia liasi" never""been, oven before Lenin's
death In 19?4, a communist nation, as conceived by Marx and fngels , nor a tran-
sitional society, which is a myth anyway. The Communist nations - the Soviet
I'nlon, the Fast European Republics, China, Cuba, etc. - differ from those nations
nf HIP "Free I'orld" the U.K., U.S.A., fiermany, Canada, etc, - in two main
">vs:(l) the degree of political freedom; (?) the extent to which the state is
Involved |n the running of the economy. Instead of relying on what supporters
of the various nations say, wo should examine actual situations. Marx warned
ii", to search below the stated situation to the real one: 'Must as our opinion
"f an Individual is not based on what he thinks of himself, so wo can not judge
1
pi-rind of transformation l>y its own consciousness; on tho contrary, this con-n
v t'Hr.ru",', i Mist rather be explained from the contradictions of material life...
<"", Piv>)
10
The apparent reason that cultural design Is associated with this type of
society Is that social control tends to be conceived of only 1n terms of
explicit control using averslve stimulus contingencies (see Ulrlch, 1967).
The association of control with averslve stimuli Is made very clear In the
film "A Clockwork Orange", when the "hero" of the film Is treated for his
abnormal behaviour. This obvious attack on the methods of behaviour therapy
1s Ill-aimed however. Operant research has shown that the use of averslve
techniques alone Is a very poor method of control (see Azrln and llolz, Punish-
ment, 1n Honlg (ed.), Op_erant Research: Areas of Research and ApplIcatlon,
19fi6, p. 380-147). AversTve control not only leads to socfaT aggression,
aimed both at the Individual who Is delivering the punishing stimulus and
also at those present when punishment 1s presented (operant and elicited
aggression respectively), but also to escape or avoidance of the punishment
situation. Indeed, It could be argued that the most severe critics of
averslve control have been those who work within the operant framework.
Skinner In particular Is very much against the use of averslve techniques
of control In social affairs because of their behavioural effects. In
Ha 1 den Two, for example, there are no references to the use of averslve
controT, and 1n Beyond Freedom and PI gn 1 ty. Skinner clearly allies himself
with those who write^The UteraTure of freedom and dignity" on the Issue
of freedom from averslve control.
In contrast, the use of positive reinforcement 1s not generally regarded as
a form of control because Its use does not lead to escape or avoidance of
the stimuli, and so the Individual Is not aware of the control. However,
Skinner makes It clear that positive reinforcement contingencies do exert
control, and that such control Is ubiquitous: people are under the positive
control of social, familial, religious, political, economic, and educational
agencies. In a society based on positive reinforcement control, whether that
control 1s capricious or planned, the most serious danger 1s a lack of awareness
of the control. Roe (1959) points out that awareness Is a major factor In
defense against undeslred control:
Awareness of our own needs and attitudes 1s our most effective
Instrument for maintaining our own Integrity and control over
our reactions.
Those Interested In the possibilities of behavioural engineering also advocate
an awareness of specific behavioural principles. The more that Is known about
behavioural control, the greater the potential for counter-control.
While agreeing that awareness 1s an Important factor 1n counter-control, It
would not be of any value unless It was linked up to methods of counter-control.
It Is of little use to an Individual to know that he Is being manipulated If
there 1s no way he can counter 1t. In Skinner's view, however, behavioural
control involves nn inherent reciprocity, as long as the Individual Initiating
the control can be made receptive to the responses of the control lee:
In analyzing any social episode from this point of view a
complete account must be given of the behaviors of both
parties as they contribute to the origin and maintenance
of the behavior of the other....In noticing how the master
controls the slave or the employer the worker, we coiwonly
overlook reciprocal effects and, by considering action In
one direction only, are led to regard control as exploitation,
or at least the gaining of a one-sided advantages but the con-
trol is actually mutual. The slave controls the master as
completely as the master the slave. In the sense that the
11
techniques of punishment employed by the master have
been selected by the slave's behavior In submitting to
them (Skinner, The Design of Cultures, 1961, in Cumulative
Record, 1972, p. 15). "
One of the features of an alarmist picture of behaviour control 1s the separ-
ation of the controller and the controlled. It 1s this false dichotomy between
the controller and the controlled that lies at the heart of the controversy over
the question "Mho Is to control?" In discussions ovnr planned societies It is
always assumed that there must be a separate group that controls the masses.
With a recognition of the reciprocity 1n behavioural control, a solution offers
Itself: the unification of the controller and the controlled. There Is nothing
in Skinner's conception of behavior that argues against the possibility of the
whole of society being Involved In Its own control, that is, In the democrat)-
satlon of social life. On the contrary, Skinner seems to favour this as a means
of preventing the establishment of a totalitarian regime. In 'Utopia as an
Experimental Culture' (C^njynrjenl^f_Jle1j^qr^enie_nt, 19f>9, p. 13) Skinner wrl tes:
Democracy Is an effort to solve the problem (of control) by
letting the people design the contingencies under which they
are to live or -- to put 1t another way -- by Insisting that
the designer himself live under the contingencies he designs.
It Is unlikely that the designers will use averslve techniques if they will be
affected by them, or use positive techniques which lead to exploitation if the
designers are to be exploited.
As knowledge of the factors that control behaviour becomes available to greater
numbers of people, the design of an Individual's environment by himself, rather
than by an external agency, becomes more feasible. This does not mean that the
ultimate controlling role of the external environment 1s denied. Personal freedom
In the sense of "free will" does not exist, but the behavioural scientist offers,
In place of the belief 1n freedom that Is really ignorance of the factors that
control behavior, the potential for a new, more meaningful freedom:
From a scientific point of view, the best approximation of
personal freedom can be achieved through understanding one's
own nature as a human being and learning to exploit it. In-
crease In knowledge and dissemination of the principles of
behavior should actually Increase personal freedom (tllrlch
and Mountjoy (eds.), The Jxperljejital^AjiaJysIs of Social
Behavior, 1972, p. 179]. "
there are striking parallels between the behaviourist's conception of freedom
nd the conception derived from the social theory of Harx and Cngels. They
believed that it is only through awareness of what social variables control us that
w Ciin intentionally control them for the benefit of society. Control does not
"Hcsn.irlly lead to the nenntion of freedom; on tho contrary, it can Increase the
rnmin of human freedom. He cnn only agroe with Engnls whon lie writes in Antl-
iHitirlmj (1H70):
Freedom does not consist in the realm of Independence of natural
1 sw;, hut In tho knowledge of these laws, and in the possibility
tMs nivos of systematically making them work towards definite
emk ., .. Trredoi'i therefore consists In control over ourselves and
nvor external nature which is founded on knowledge of natural
')"<"'<, sHy; and is therefore necessarily a product of historical
I'-volnpnent.
12
REFERENCES

Azrln, fl. and llolz, U. Punishment. In W. llonig (Ed.), Operant Behavior.

Mew York: Appleton-Century-Crofts , 1966.

Black, R. Some averslve responses to a would-be relnforcer. In II. Mheeler

(Ed.), Deypnd the Punitive Society. Mew York: Mlldwood House, 1974.

Engels, F. Ant1-Duhr1ng. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1976. Originally

publishecTin 1B78.

Hume, D. A Treatise of Human Mature. London: Fontana, 1972. Originally

pubTTsheTin77T9.

llarx, K. Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy. London: Lawrence

and WTslTart. OrlglnaTTy publTslieir In 1859.

Marx, K., Theses on Feuerbach, In L. Collettl (Ed.), Harx: Early Writings.

llarmondsworth: Penguin Hooks/New Left Review, 15757 Originally pub"-
lished In 1888.

Marx, K. and Engels, F. The German Ideology. London: Lawrence and Wlshart, 1965.

Perelman, R. Behaviorism's enlightened despotism. In II. Wheeler (Ed.), Beyond

flew York:
Wlldwood House, 1974.

Pyle, G. The_frm_cepj:_of Jjlmi. London: Penguin Books, 1949.

Roe, A. Man's forgotten weapon, American Psychologist. 1959, 14, 261-266,
Skinner, B. F. Hal den Two. Mew York: Hacralllan, 1948.
Skinner, B. F. Science and Human Behavior. New York: Hacmlllan, 1953.
Skinner, B. F. Freedom and the control of men (1955). Reprinted 1n Cumulative
Record .
Skinner, R. F. Some Issues concerning the control of human behavior (1955).
Reprinted In Cumulative Record.
Skinner, R. F. Man (19fi4). Reprinted In Cumulative Record.
Skinner, B, F. Utopia as an experimental culture (1969). Reprinted In Cumulative
Record.
Skinner, B. F. B_ey_on(J[ Jjeedj)m_aiid[])1jnU^. London: Jonathan Cape, 1971.

Skinner, B. F. Cumulative Record. 3rd ed. Mew York: Appleton-Century-Crofts,

1972.

lllrich, R. Behavior control and public concern. PsycliolU)q1caJMiecprd, 19fi7,

17_, 229-234.

Ulrich, R, and Mount joy, P. (Eds.) The Experimental Analysis of ^Social B_eh_av1ojr.
Mew .York: Appleton-Century-CroTts v 19~7Y.
THE
I
n f I f 1 0

t
e ;M

r
b
a
A QUARTERLY NEWSLETTER OF
INTERBEHAVIORAL PSYCHOLOGY
PUBLISHED AT KENYON COLLEGE
GAMBIER, OHIO

Volume 8, Number 4 Winter 1978-79

First, both of these traditional conceptions of motivation

(_ Habit x Drive and Expectancy x Value Theories^ lead us to
consider behavior in terms of discrete behavioral episodes
that can be conceived In terms of S--0-R, that Is, stimulus
situation -organ1sm~>react1on to stimulus situation. Second,
both are sjjmul us -bound theories of motivation. They en-
courage us to tfiTnT of the Immediate stimulus situation to
which the organism Is exposed as the cause of the tendencies
to act In certain ways . . . . as contrasted with the tradi-
tional Image of separate episodes, . . . . behavior, now
concejved as js contjnuous streaii, characterized by^ change
Troi" one 'activity to another even 1n_a constant environment,
Is TnOuencedHBy characteristics 1TF partfFulitt7 persons . . .
and characteristics of the Immediate environment.
.
J. W. Atkinson and 0. Birch, 1978.
ed.).
Van Nostrand. p. 17, 26.
 2.
THE INTERBEHAVIORIST
Editor:
Ronald G. Heyduk, Kenyon College
Associate Editors:
Donna M. Cone, Department of Mental Health, Retardation, and
Hospitals, State of Rhode Island
Paul T. Mountjoy, Western Michigan University
Noel M. Smith, State University of New York, Pittsburgh
The Agora
This Issue's cover quote Is Intended to engender Interest In a truly revolutionary
new text on motivation, Atkinson and Birch's Introduction to Motivation (2nd
Edition). As can be seen In the excerpt from the Introductory chapter, Atkinson
and Birch replace several traditional premises about the nature of behavior and
the organism-environment relationship with new premises having a distinctly Inter-
behavioral flavor, and the remainder of their book Is a highly specific elab-
oration of the dramatic (and potentially testable) Implications of the new prem-
ises for the conceptual analysis of human motivation. The book Is a daring
revision of Atkinson's classic Introductory text (1964), and while the revised
edition 1s probably less appropriate than the original (and than other texts on
motivation) for the undergraduate of average ability. Its scholarllness and
clarity make It an excellent choice for an advanced undergraduate seminar or
for a graduate course concerning theories of motivation. Although Kantorlan
Interbehaviorlsm 1s not referenced, the book Is a testimonial to the enormous
potential impact of interbehavloral assumptions upon scientific psychology,
and I give it my highest recommendation.
As Indicated in the credits, Associate Editor Donna Cone has begun a new Job
within the Department of Mental Health, Retardation and Hospitals, State of
Rhode Island. Her new title 1s that of Assistant Director for Program Stan-
dards, Planning, and Evaluation. She writes that "It's a much less strife-
ridden assignment, much more in keeping with my background, and much more fun.
The Interbehaviorist will continue under the same editorship (and associate
ecirtm:shlpT~foT"VoTunie 9, 1979. Enclosed with this last Issue of Volume 8 is
a subscription form: please return It promptly, as the first Issue of the new
volume is scheduled to appear 1n early April. The (regretted) Increase in
subscription rate is in deference to inflation.
This Issue's feature is a paper by Edward K. Morris, University of Kansas. HI*
Interest Is in articulating with greater specificity the relationships between
the psychologies of Kantor and Skinner In order to "promote a useful Interchange
between Interbehavlorists and behaviorlsts.
SOHE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE PSYCHOLOGIES OF KANTOR AMI) SKINNER
Edward K. Morris
University of Kansas
J. R. Kantor and B. F. Skinner approach psychology with similar natural
science assumptions, yet their perspectives rarely are related to one
another in a constructive manner. In this paper, some relationships
between the approaches are discussed In an attempt to promote a useful
Interchange. First, the Interbehavloral field and the three-term con-
tingency are described according to their points of correspondence;
special attention is given to the concepts of stimulus and response
function. Second, points of disagreement on the issue of complexity
in human Interactions and on the concept of causality are outlined,
and resolutions suggested. It Is concluded that the two psychologies
can be related constructively.
Much Is to be admired 1n the works of J. R. Kantor and B. F. Skinner and In
their proposals for a natural science of psychology (e.g., Kantor, 1921, 1925,
1938, 1959, 1971; Skinner, 1938, 1953, 1966, 1969, 1974). The proponents of
one approach, however, sometimes fail to view constructively or understand
completely the aims and methods of the other. This paper will note briefly
some points of correspondence between the two approaches and suggest some
other points upon which there is potential agreement. Some of these relation-
ships have been described elsewhere (e.g., Bijou 4 Baer, 1978; Fuller, 1973),
but a more explicit delineation Is needed In order to promote further inter-
change, and eventually a more encompassing and practical analysis of behavior
than that which emerges from either approach alone. This paper will also de-
scribe, and suggest resolutions for, the apparent points of disagreement between
Kantor and Skinner on the issue of complexity In human interactions and on the
Issue of causality. The present analysis Is Incomplete, but perhaps it will
stimulate further efforts to merge the two views.
POINTS OF CORRESPONDENCE
In this section, Kantor's conceptual unit, the Interbehavloral field, will be
described and its elements discussed in order: the organism, the stimulus,
setting factors, media, and the reactional biography. An analysis of Skinner's
conceptual unit, the three-term contingency,11 will be
h Integrated with Kantor's
as we proceed.
1 am indebted to Sidney H. Bijou, Parker E. Lichenstein, and Irvin S. Wolf
for contributing so much to my thinking through the years; they are not, of
course, responsible for any of this paper's shortcomings. Also, I would like
to thank my students Jane Atwater, Bob Sharkey, and Greg Wagner -- and the
editor of this newsletter for their perspicacious comments on earlier versions
of the manuscript. Reprint requests should be sent to the author. Department
of Human Development, Haworth Hall, Lawrence, Kansas 66045.
Bijou and fiaer (1978) add Kantor's concept of setting factor to Skinner's
three-term contingency, thus yielding a conceptual unit called a four-term con-
tingency.

4.
The organism. Kantor suggests that the organism may be described on three
dlTferentTevels: first by Its organlsmlc equipment; second, by Us response
forms; and third, by Its response functions. The organlsmlc equipment refers
to the biological entity that defines the organism. It Is synonymous with
what Skinner would call the response equipment of the organism. Kantor goes
on to describe the organlsmlc equipment in terms of the phylogenetlc and onto-
genetic contributions made to 1t; that Is, In terms of what has been Imparted
to It by evolution and maturation. In general, he has attended more closely
to biological variables than has Skinner (see Kantor, 1947). Skinner never
Intended to dismiss biological factors from his system (Skinner, 1974, 1975),
but most behavlorlsts have focused so Intensely on the environment In their
analysis of behavior that they have courted misinterpretation on this Issue.
The second level on which the organism may be described Is In terms of Its
response forms_. Response forms are the neuromuscular patterns of behavior,
descrlEIcTEy"their physical topography or structure. All psychological activ-
ity has a form or topography that may be described (or potentially described)
by physical measurements. An analogous term for response form In Skinner's
system would be response Instance. A formal or structural analysis of behavior
covers the broad range of all possible Interactions, from relatively discrete
units (Instances), such as a bar press or a spoken sentence, to more lengthy
and complex sequences, such as a description of the course of development.
Kantor and Skinner agree that response forms or Instances are of obvious Impor-
tance In the analysis of behavior, but both would argue that formal analyses
must not be confused with functional analyses. While formal (or structural)
and functional analyses of behavior are not Incompatible, and while both may
be necessary for a full understanding of behavior (Catania, 1973; Rlchelle,
1976), and for proper remediation of behavior (Wetherby S Morris 1979), Kantor
and Skinner would state that a formal or structural analysis does not on its
own promote an understanding of psychological functioning.
The third level of analysis is that of response function, In which behavior Is
described in terms of Its "meaning" within an interactional field. When we
describe what an Individual Is doing psychologically, we are describing the
individual's response functions. Response functions are the "whys" of or reasons
for behavior. When we say that'a child 1s crying (response form) in order to
obtain food, we are describing the function of that behavior.
In the analysis of response functions, two sets of Interrelationships should be
noted. First, response functions cannot be defined without taking into account
all the other elements of the Interbehavloral field; response functions are de-
fined by their relationship to the other elements, especially stimulus functions,
and not on the basis of response forms removed from the context of the other
functioning elements. Second, a multiplicity of form-function relationships
may be described. One response form may have different response functions for
different Individuals or for the same Individual at different times (i.e., in
different Interbehavloral fields). For Instance, In the example presented
previously, a child's cry (response form) may occur because he or she is hungry,
tired, or seeking attention (response functions). Also, one response function
can be served by a wide variety of response forms. Children may seek teacher
attention (response function) by acting up in class or by working studiously
(response forms) depending on the other variables 1n the Interbehavloral field.
5.
Skinner has proposed a concept for the analysis of behavior that is similar to
Kantor's, but Instead of speaking of response functions. Skinner speaks of
response classes (Skinner, 1935). A response class 1s defined by a set of
response Instances that are held together by their specific functional relation-
ship to stimulus contingencies. Instances of behavior come 1n a near infinite
variety; no two are likely to be identical. But when a group of Instances is
functionally related to a particular set of contingencies (I.e., when they
serve the same function), then that group Is called a response class. A re-
sponse class Is maintained by a relationship or contingency between the re-
sponse Instances and the stimulus conditions that control the defining and
non-defining properties of that class of behavior. For example, a child's
single request for assistance Is a response instance, but requesting assistance
comes in many different forms which, as a group, define a response class.
While valuable conceptually, Kantor's concept of response function and Skinner's
concept of response class pose a problem for sorting out the almost Infinite
number of substantive, content-related functions or classes that may exist in the
world. Skinner has another approach to response functions and classes, however,
that allows one to organize them so that they may be dealt with in a more prac-
tical manner. He has organized behavior Into two functional categories: responses
that function as respondents and responses that function as operants (Skinner,
1953). Some responses function as respondents in that they are controlled by
antecedent eliciting stimuli; other responses function as operants in that they
are controlled by consequent reinforcing stimuli and accompanying discriminative
conditions. Respondents and operants, then, are defined in relation to their
respective controlling conditions, and may be thought of as two broad categories
of response functions.
The stimulus. Corresponding to the three levels of analysis for the organism
are three similar levels of analysis for the stimulus with which the organism
interacts, the first level of which 1s what Kantor labels the stimulus object.
The stimulus object, like the response equipment, Is analyzed TiTTerms oT boTh
its phylogenetic history (I.e., the ways in which It came to exist) and its onto-
genetlc history (I.e., what has become of the object since It was created). In
general, behavior scientists have paid little attention to this level of analysis.
Skinner has no comparable term and does not address the concept directly.
' The second level of analysis is that of stimulus form; this refers to the physical
description of the stimulus according to~lts topography or structure. All stimuli
have forms that may be described (or potentially described) by physical measure-
ment. An analgous term for stimulus form in Skinner's system might be stimulus
Instance, A formal or structural analysis of stimuli covers the broad range f
aTToDlects in our world, from relatively discrete units (Instances) such as
food pellets and the word "good", to more complex categories such as a landscape
and the complex behavior of other organisms. As with response forms, both Kantor
and Skinner would agree that stimulus forms or Instances obviously are Important
in the analysis of the world around us, but both would also argue that formal
analyses of stimuli cannot provide a sufficient basis for understanding how they
function. Kantor and Skinner would hold that a formal or structural analysis of
a stimulus does not promote much understanding of Its function, In spite of the
assertions of some psychologists that behaviorists have failed to appreciate the
form-function distinction (e.g., Randura, 1977; Bowers, 1973).
The third level of analysis 1s that of stimulus function^. Not only may stimuli
be described by their physical propertied, but they also may be described in terms
6.
of their functions or "meanings" within an Interactional field (see Llchtensteln,
1970). When we describe how a stimulus affects an organism's interaction with
It, we are describing the stimulus's function. If we say that a stick with a
flat blade attached to one end (stimulus form) is being used as a toy shovel in
a sandbox, then we are describing a stimulus function for that object.
As in the case of response functions, two sets of relationships should be noted.
First, a stimulus function cannot be defined without taking into account the
other elements of the Interbehavioral field; stimulus functions are defined by
their relationship to the other elements, especially response functions, and not
on the basis of their forms alone, removed from the context of the other function-
Ing elements. Second, a multiplicity of form-function relationships may be de-
scribed. One stimulus form may have different functions for different indi-
viduals or for the same Individual at different times (i.e., in different Inter-
behavioral fields). For Instance, in the example presented previously, the stick
with the flat blade on the end (stimulus form) may be used by a child as a shovel
for digging, as a weapon for attacking those who Intrude into the sandbox area,
or as a spoon for a mudpie luncheon (stimulus functions). Also, one stimulus
function can be served by a wide variety of stimulus forms. Digging implements
(stimulus function) may come In many different forms, such as shovels, pieces
of bark, or flat stones.
Skinner has a concept similar to Kantor's stimulus function that of stimulus
class (Skinner, 1935). A stimulus class is defined by a set of stiimjlusTn-
stances that are held together by their specific functional relationship to
behavior. Instances of stimuli come in a near infinite variety, but when a
group of Instances is functionally related to a particular set of responses
(i.e., when they serve the same function), then that group is called a stimulus
class. A stimulus class Is maintained by a relationship or contingency between
the stimulus instances and the responses that control the defining and non-
defining properties of that class of stimuli. For example, a particular toy
shovel is an Instance of a class of shoveling Implements, but other stimuli that
similarly move sand about a sandbox will serve the same function. All these in-
stances constitute a stimulus class of sand-moving instruments. That class of
Implements will be maintained by the relationship of its instances to the be-
havior of shoveling.
Kantor's concept of stimulus function and Skinner's of stimulus class represent
valuable conceptual approaches to the analysis of the relationship of environ-
ment to behavior. However, these concepts, like those of response function and
response class, pose some problems because of the nearly infinite number of sub-
stantive, content-related functions or classes that may exist among objects In
our world. Again, Skinner proposes a practical organizing scheme. We may define
functions or classes of stimuli in terms of their effects on behavior, that is,
in terms of their eliciting, discriminative, and reinforcing functions (Skinner,
1953). Many stimuli may serve any or a combination of these functions, and al-
most any stimulus function can have numerous associated forms/ These three
categories of stimuli are defined functionally by the two categories of response
functions with which they Interact -- respondents in the case of eliciting stimuli
and operants In the case of discriminative and reinforcing stimuli.
~?These two relationships hold within the limits of the organismic equip-
ment; see Sellqman and llaqar (1972) and Shettleworth (1972).
7.
The media. Kantor's concept of the medium of stimulation refers to the means
by which contact is made between the organism a~nd~stTiSuTus. The medium is not a
property of an object itself, but is a stimulus condition under which inter-
actions occur (or are "enabled": Kantor, 1970). For example, a child may con-
tact a cookie through the visual medium of a dark cupboard, or may turn on a
light in the hallway to enable him or her to see better what kind of cookie It
is, and perhaps to enable different kinds of Interactions with 1t, such as
keeping it or selecting another. Unfortunately, turning on the light in the
hallway also enables a parent to observe the forbidden act. Changes In the
medium can affect the Interaction of an organism with a stimulus object, even
though the organism and the object remain formally the same. Skinner's system
has no analogous conceptual element. The media would probably be analyzed In
terms of supplementary stimulus control within an Interaction.
Setting factors. Setting factors or events are the contextual conditions that
surround the organism-environment interactions and that Influence the func-
tional properties of the stimulus and response forms. Setting factors are not
the stimuli with which an organism interacts directly, but are the contexts of
those interactions. These factors may be Internal organismic conditions (e.g.,
fatigue and illness), external environmental conditions (e.g., classrooms and
play yards), or the interaction of the external and internal conditions (e.g.,
emotional states). The important feature of setting events Is that they have a
strong Influence over the functional properties of the Interacting stimuli and
responses. For example, tickling a child who is alert, active, and awake may
evoke laughter, but stimulating the child in the same way when he or she is
tired or ill may evoke crying. Or, roughhouslng between children will lead
to very different consequences depending on whether the children are In the
classroom or in the play yard.
Psychologists with a Skinnerlan perspective have not readily adopted the con-
cept of setting factors, though their system does not discount the effects
of such variables. The closest Skinner comes to an Independent setting event
concept is probably when he describes the habituation operations that affect
respondent interactions and the satiation-deprivation operations that affect
operant interactions. As for setting events related more obviously to the
general environmental context, the preference of many Sklnnerlans Is to speak
in terms of stimuli that function as supplementary eliciting, discriminative
(especially conditional), and reinforcing events, and not of a special class
or category of stimuli.
The reactional biography. The react ional biography or Interbehavioral history
's the organism's history of past TnteractTmisT This history Is critical In
that it imparts to the stimulus and response forms their functions. Stimuli
and responses acquire their functions as the result of their Interbehavioral
histories. Similar Skinnerlan terminology would be conditioning or reinforce-
ment history, though the latter would be too narrow in that It eliminates con-
sideration of respondent interactions. Through an organism's conditioning
history, stimuli acquire eliciting, discriminative, and reinforcing functions
with respect to respondent and operant behavior. Or, alternatively, stimulus
and response classes become mutually defined.
5_omments_. Kantor's Interbehavioral postulates allow for a complete
an oec velmaTysIs of organism-environment interactions. Many experimenta
and applied behavior analysts could profit from an understanding of Kantor.
8.
For some, however, Kantor's system Is unwieldy because In the application of
his concepts -- especially the stimulus and response functions -- there 1s no
Intermediate step between the broad classes he differentiates and specific
examples from everyday Hfe. Skinner's experimental analysis of behavior,
however, provides an Intermediate level of analysis for stimulus and response
functions that 1s a useful adjunct to Kantor's approach. Skinner's response
function categories of operants and respondents and his stimulus function
categories of eliciting, discriminative, and reinforcing stimuli allow a slicing
of the interbehavloral pie Into specific, content-free units of Investigation
which have proved extremely valuable in both basic and applied behavior analysis.
Once analyzed In basic behavioral research, operants and respondents, and elic-
iting, discriminative, and reinforcing stimuli can be Interrelated with the sub-
stantive activities of everyday life. Or, 1n applied behavioral research, one
can analyze everyday behavioral and environmental events In terms of respondent
and operant behavior, and in terms of eliciting, discriminative, and reinforcing
functions, respectively. Skinnerlans, however, are wont to be narrow on occasion
(Bijou, 1979). Sensitivity on their part to Kantor's broader perspective might
prove an excellent remedy. In sum, a wedding of the two approaches has much to
offer proponents of either system.
POINTS OF DISPARITY
Two points of disagreement between Kantor's and Skinner's perspectives deserve
Vedal attention. One 1s an unnecessary conflict over the Issue of complexity.
The second pertains to causality and the different ways 1n which 1t may be
approached.
Complexity. Kantor (1970; see also Farrlngton, 1971) has criticized Skinnerlans
forTaTTTng to analyze the complexity of human behavior. He has said that they
devote too much effort to the analysis of simple comdltlonlng phenomena and too
little effort to the analysis of such Interactions as perceiving, remembering,
and thinking. But the behavior analyst would object. Complexity may be con-
ceived of In two legitimate but different ways that should not be confused.3
One type of complexity 1s related to basic behavioral principles or processes
and a second to the outcomes of those processes as they operate In everyday
organ ism-environment interactions.
Despite assertions to the contrary, the basic behavioral principles are not
simple. Volumes upon volumes of journals and texts attest to their complexity
and to the behavior scientist's difficulty In understanding them. Skinnerians,
for the most part, concentrate their work and energy In this area. Behavioral
content Is also complex. Given the myriad biological and environmental con-
ditions In which stimulus and response functions develop, Interbehavloral Inter-
actions take on a tremendous number of substantive, content-related form-
function relationships. These relationships are complex and they need to be
studied. This is the type of complexity on which Kantor focuses. An analogy
might be drawn to the work of the research physicist and the meteorologist.
Both are dealing with complexity, but in two different ways -- one 1n terms of
the basic principles or processes of physics and the other in terms of the real
world outcomes of those processes. For psychologists, Important work remains
to be accomplished 1n both areas, but the two should not be confused with one
another. Indeed, exploration of the complexity of behavioral processes and
behavioral outcomes must proceed hand in hand 1f a truly effective psychological
system 1s to be developed.
I am Indebted to David Rider for his discussions with mo on this point.
Causality. The second issue requires more attention than can be provided here,
but ft will be touched on briefly. The issue is that of causality. In Kantor's
organlsmlc model, there Is no temporal separation of cause and effect; a stimulus
function and response function Interact dynamically In a field as part of a
unitary event (Smith, 1973). An organismic, field system does not allow for a
"billiard ball" conception of causality (Llchtenstein, 1970). Skinner, however,
does speak in terms of temporally ordered functional relationships between
antecedent and consequent events. This mechanistic cause-and-effect model serves
a useful stipulatlve rule or pragmatic device for the conduct of science.'' The
mechanistic approach may have Its limitations as we gain a more sophisticated
perspective on behavior, but psychology probably has not yet proceeded far enough
to require a more sophisticated conception of causality. Billiard ball models
will remain sufficient -- even If they are Incomplete -- for some time. Cer-
tainly, the Newtonian mechanistic model of physics sufficed for many years before
Einstein revolutionized our perspectives; and even today the Newtonian model re-
mains adequate for most of what physicists do.
Organlsmlc and mechanistic models or world views (Pepper, 1912) have received
much attention In developmental psychology of late (e.g., Lerner, 1976; Overton,
* Reese, 1973; Reese 8 Overton, 1970). Unfortunately, the organismic model has
become aligned solely with mentalIstlc, cognitive assumptions about behavioral
development (Fuller, 1973), and Is clearly favored in these comparisons; the
mechanistic model has become aligned with behavorisms of various sorts, and
is dismissed as misguided, or grossly limited at best. It is important to point
out, however, that a mechanistic model may be either cognitive (e.g., Information
processing and computer analogies) or behavioral (Skinner) and that an organlsmlc
model also may be cognitive (e.g., Piaget) or behavioral (e.g., Kantor). Present
world view analyses fall to appreciate this point. An organlsmlc model need not
come with mentalistlc baggage (Kantor, 1923). Who would want that on a honey-
moon? An organlsmlc model can ascribe to natural science assumptions and yet
be behavioral.
Mental ism aside, analyses of the different world views are In general agree-
ment that the basic metatheoretical assumption's of the mechanistic and organ-
lsmlc approaches are incompatible 1n fundamental ways, never to be reconciled
by any eclecticism (Pepper, 1942). But there Is one way in which the two
world views may be combined. One may adopt organismic assumptions, yet do
everyday science following mechanistic reasoning. We may use the science of
physics as an example: everyday physics may be accomplished with mechanistic
assumptions, despite the conceptual advantages of relativity theory. Perhaps
the relationship between Skinner and Kantor can be viewed in the same way:
everyday psychology can be accomplished with mechanistic reasoning even though
Kantor's organismic approach might be the better model. Kantor's and Skinner's
psychologies are not Incompatible; rather, they provide different degrees of
analytic completeness.
Much is to be said for the wedding of Kantorlan and SklnneHan psychologies,
even though -- as is the case in many weddings -- neither set of parents will
be totally satisfied. Certainly, points of disagreement remain (Llchtenstein,
1973). Rut if the proponents of each perspective will look moro closely at
"Skinner's behaviorism may or may not be mechanistic depending on one's
definition of mechanistic. For example, operant Interactions do not display
mechanical causn-and-effp.ct relationships in the same sense that S-R respon-
dent Interactions do. See Rlngen (1976) for further elaboration on this point.

10.
what is good in the other, the resulting union may bear children who are un-
usually effective as behavior scientists.
REFERENCES
Bandura,, A. Social learning theory. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall,
1977,
Bijou, S, M. Some clarifications on the meaning of a behavior analysis of child
development, psychological Record, 1979, 29, 3-13.
Bijou, S. W. S Baer, D. M. Behavior analysis of child development. Englewood
Cliffs, H. J.: Prent1ce-Hall.T978;
Bowers, K. S. Situationism 1n psychology; An analysis and critique. Psycho-
logical Review. 1973, B0f 307-336.
Catania, A. C. The psychologies of structure, function, and development.
Ame r1 can Psycho1og1st, 1973, 28, 434-443.
Farrington, J. "Im lo achshav, matai ." . ." If not now, then when? In defense
of the Interbehavioral position. Interbehavioral Psychology Newsletter,
1971, 2 (5), 2-4.
Fuller, P. R, Professors Kantor and Skinner - The "Grand Alliance" of the
40's. Psychological Record. 1973, 23, 318-324.
Kantor, J. R. The organismlc and inentalistic attitude toward the nervous
system. Psychological Bulletin, 1923, 20, 684-692.
Kantor, J, R. P r i n c1p1e s o f P sycho1ogy. Vol. I. Chicago: Principia Press,
1924.
Kantor, J,, R, Principles of Psychology. Vol. II. Granville, Ohio: Principia
Press, T526~T~~
Kantor, J, R. The nature of psychology as a natural science, ftcta Psychplpgla.
1938, 4, 1-61.
Kantor, J. R. Problems of physiological psychology. Bloomington: Principia
Press, WiT,
Kantor, J, R. 1nterbehavioral psychplogy. Granville, Ohio: Principia Press,
1959. _ "
Kantor, J. R. An analysis of the experimental analysis of behavior (TEAB).
Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 1970, 13, 101-108.
Kantorv J. R.. The aim and progress of psychology and other sciences,- Chicago,
111.: FrlnTTpTTFritsTTSTl. "
11.
Lerner, R. M. Concepts and theories of human _deyel^n]ent,. Reading, Mass.:
~
Lichtenstein, P. E. The significance of the stimulus function. Interbehav-
ioral Psychology Newsletter. 1970, !_ (1), 4-6.
Lichtenstein, P. E. Oiscussion: "Contextual Interactionists." Psychplogjcal
Record, 1973, 23, 325-333.
Overton, W. F. & Reese, H. W. Models of development: Methodological implica-
tions. In J. R. Nesselroade X H. W. Reese (Eds.), LVfe-sjgan develjyi-
mental psychology: Methodological Issues. New Yort: "AcademTFTress,
--^- - -
Pepper, S. C. World hypotheses. Berkeley, Ca.: University of California
Press, 1942.
Reese, H. M. & Overton, M. F. Models of development and theories of develop-
ment. In L. R. Goulet J P. B. Baltes (Eds.), Ufe-span developmental
psychology: Research and theory.' New York: AcadenrfifTress, 19"70~.
Richelle, H. Formal analysis and functional analysis of verbal behavior:
Notes on the debate between Chomsky and Skinner. BeJiavlprjwn. 1976,
4, 209-221.
Ringen, J. 0. Explanation, teleology, and operant behaviorism: A study of
the experimental analysis of purposive behavior. Philosophy of Science,
1976, 43, 222-253.
Seligman, M. E. P. S Hagar, J. L. Biological boundaries of learning. New York:
Meredith, 1972.
Shettleworth, S. J, Constraints on learning. In D. S. Lehnnan, R. A. (Undo,
& E. Shaw (Eds.), Advances in the Study of behavior (Vol. 4). New York:
Academic Press, ^
Skinner, B. F. The generic nature of the concepts of stimulus and response.
Journal of Genetic Psychology. 1935. 12_, 40-65.
Skinner, B. F. The behavior of organisms. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts,
1938. ~~
Skinner, B. F. lcj^nce_AnAJiy.nJ.a-'lAclla-yJP_r_- New York:
Basic Rooks, 1953.
Skinner, B. F. What Is the experimental analysis of behavior? Journal_j)f_ the
. 213-218.
Skinner, B. F. Contingencies of reinforcement. New York: Appleton-Century-
Crofts, I9i">5. ' ""
Dinner, n. F. About_j><Lhay1oHsm. New York: Alfrwl A. Knopf, 1974.
M* Inner, I!, r. The steep and thorny way to a science of behavior. American
P s.ycjio log 1st, 1975, 3_0, 42-49.
THE
I
n
t
e
r
b
e
h A QUARTERLY NEWSLETTER OF
INTERBEHAVIORAL PSYCHOLOGY
a
v Volume 9, Number 1
PUBLISHED AT KENYON COLLEGE
GAMBIER, OHIO

Spring 1979
Within this framework, then, behavior viewed psychologically Is

o Interactional or relational 1n nature; Its specification or Iden-

tification at the referential level requires xthe specification of
a particular context and a set of relationships thereto. Our

r
definition of psychology, therefore, excludes the study of organ-
Isms or physical environments per se, and behavior may not be
referred to either alone . . . . Some objection may be raised to
the relational or transdermal character of the definition 1n that
there Is provided no palpable locus for a psychologically defined
behavior. Those who raise such a query seem to be operating with-
in what Woodger picturesquely describes as a "finger and thumb"
philosophy of metaphysics, I.e., the notion that a thing Is real

s or exists only If It can In principle be picked up between the

finger and thumb. Interactions or relations, though not simple
physical objects, are nevertheless real and concrete and can be

t
precisely specified by the conditions and course of their occurrence.

R. Jessor, 1958. The problem of reductlonlsm In

psychology. 5^chlogjca] Jteyjew, 1958, 65, p. 173.
 THE INTERBEHAVIOIUST

Editor:
Ronald G. Heyduk, Kenyon College
Associate Editors:
Donna M, Cone, Department of Mental Health, Retardation, and
Hospitals, State of Rhode Island
Paul T. Hountjoy, Western Michigan University
Noel M. Smith, State University of Hew York, Pittsburgh
The Agora
Kith this issue, The Interbehaviorlst begins its ninth volume. As
before, our goal in this publication year will be to provide a forum
for the promotion of a naturalistic psychology unencumbered by the
"spooks" of its past, yet appropriately appreciative of the organism's
awesome complexity. Motes, news, reactions, and articles for the three
further Issues of Volume 9 (to appear in late summer, fall, and winter)
will be happily received. The editor would enjoy the luxury of having
a backlog of quality contributions.
Robert Lundln sends word that the second edition of his Theories and
Systems of Psychology (D.C. Heath) is "hot off the pressT"In his
undergraduate History and Systems course, the editor has found that
the nine-page section on interbehaviorism is particularly effective
when assigned in conjunction with primary source material during a
three-session consideration of Interbehaviorism.
of Physiological Psychology (1947) for a review of the cultural
tradition that endowed the orain with magical properties and notes
that the basic assumptions of researchers such as Kamlya are con-
temporary versions of Cartesian mind-body dualism."
Two June meetings may be of Interest to readers:
The llth annual meeting of the Cheiron Society for the History of
the Behavioral and Social Sciences will be held this year at the
Archives of the History of American Psychology, University of
Akron, Akron, Ohio, on June 8-10. Information on registration
and reservations may be obtained from John Popples tone, director
of the Archives.
The Association for Behavior Analysis (ABA) will have its con-
vention at the Hyatt-Regency Hotel, Dearborn, Michigan, on June
15-19. Of particular note 1s that there will be a Special Interest
Group Meeting for interbehavlorists co-chaired by Paul Mountjoy
and Linda Parrott. Further information may be obtained from Linda
Parrott, 5-82B H. South St., Kalamazoo, MI 49007.
Few behavioral phenomena have been as lost in a sea of mentalistic
verbiage as those associated with the "state" of "hypnosis". This
Issue's feature article presents two early attempts to describe and
explain hypnosis naturalistically and parsimoniously.

Some publications of possible Interest to those who are interbehaviorally

Inclined:
Peter Holmes recommends Duncan, S. ft Fiske, D. W., "Dynamic patterning
in conversation" (American Scientist. 1979, 67, 90-98) for Its systems
analysis of conversational behavior. Their work reminds him of Roger
Ray's systems approach (The Psychological Record, Volumes 25, 26, and
27).
Dennis Delprato recommends two publications to interbehaviorlsts.
One is Biology as a Social Weapon (The Ann Arbor Science for the
People Collective, Burgess Publishing Co., 1977), an interactional1y-
oHented reaction to biological determinism. The other is an article
by John M. Grossberg, about which Delprato writes: "Grossberg (Journal
of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 1972, 1, 245-251)
addresses brain wave"feedback research from an interbehavloral per-
spective and once again demonstrates the infusion of spiritism Into
"scientific" laboratories . . . . Grossberg cites Kantor's Problems
 JAMES AND KANTOR ON HYPNOSIS:
TWO EARLY NATURALISTIC PERSPECTIVES
Deborah Barfield*
Prior to Barber's attempts to demystify the events constituting "hypnosis"
(e.g., Barber, 1973), roost analyses of hypnosis had been steeped in the
dualism that Kantor has so often decried (e.g., Kantor, 1959). That 1s,
'they referred to mysterious processes of the mind of the subject and
hypnotist and sometimes even vaguely to the occult (e.g., Pal, 1946).
Notable exceptions to this generalization about early views of hypnosis
are the views of William James (1890) and J. R. Kantor (1926). This
paper examines their two different attempts to "de-spook" the phenomena
of hypnosis.
/
JAMES ON HYPNOSIS
James, writing as he did in the pre-behavioristlc era of mentalism, might
be expected to have presented mystical Ideas about hypnosis. However,
this was not the case. In fact, Kantor, the quintessential naturalist,
could easily have based his writings on hypnosis upon James' account.
James, at his best, was quite as naturalistic as Kantor.
James offered three theories of hypnosis. The first was animal magnetism
theory, which suggested that there was " . . . a direct passage of force
from the operator to the subject, whereby the latter becomes the former's
puppet."! The second theory discussed was neurosis theory, which states
that hypnosis is a "pathological condition into which certain predisposed
patients fall and in which special physical agents have the power of pro-
voking special symptoms quite apart from the subjects mentally expecting
the effect."2 Charcot felt this was an atypical form of hypnotism which
he called le grand hypnotisms. James discarded both of these theories
* Editor's note -- The author of this paper is a former student
of one of the Associate Editors. The student's whereabouts are currently
unknown. In light of this unusual circumstance, the Editor has taken the
liberty of revising the paper more substantially than would be done in the
normal process of copy editing. In particular, a number of transitional
statements have been added, as well as several references, and the paper
has been reorganized. The Editor believes that the revisions do not
materially modify the thesis of the original author.
James, William, Principles of Psychology (Vol. II). New York:
Henry Holt and CompanyT 1890, p. 5967
Z Ibid., p. 599.
Ibid.
due to their mystical references. Neither appeared to him to account
for the role that expectancy plays in hypnosis. If the patient expects
to be hypnotized, he usually is. For the best results, then the operator
must be very competent and authoritative. He must also be good at inter-
preting the physiognomy of the subject so as to give the right commands
at the right time. The role of expectancy plays an Important part through-
out the entire hypnotic trance. As James stated, "Anything will awaken
a patient who expects to be awakened by that thing."-'
These phenomena of hypnosis led James to accept and expound upon a third
theory, the theory of suggestion, in which hypnotism was described as
" . . . yielding assent to outward suggestion, of affirming what we
strongly conceive and of acting in accordance with what we are made to
expect."* James* Interpretation of the trance was strikingly naturalistic,
making reference to what would now be called "operant conditioning" and
"modeling" processes: "The first patients accidentally did certain things
which their doctors thought typical and caused to be repeated. The 5
subsequent subjects caught on and followed the established tradition."
James also invoked what might now be called the "placebo effect" when he
said: "Even that sleepy and inert condition, the advent of which seems
to be the prime condition of farther symptoms being developed, is said
to be merely due to the fact that the mind expects It to come."" James
removed more of the mysterious associations traditionally surrounding
hypnotism by analogizing the trance to sleep or half-sleep: " . . . and
one might most naturally describe the usual relation of operator and
subject by saying that the former keeps the latter suspended between
waking and sleeping by talking to him enough to keep his slumber from
growing profound, and yet not In such a way as to wake him up."' To
so succinctly and parsimoniously ascribe the trance to a natural process
was indeed a contrast to traditional dualism and mysticism.
James' discussion of several of the symptoms of the trance also reflected
a naturalistic orientation: 1) Amnesia. He stated that the amnesia
connected with hypnosis is similar to the one experienced by the sleeper
who is abruptly awakened from dreams. Because the amnesia associated with
an abrupt awakening can be overcome by external promptings, James believed
that the same would be true for hypnosis, and he provided evidence that
Mbid., p. 58.
'Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
when prompted, the subject can remember parts of hts trance. James
stated that "One cause of the forgetfulness seems to be the disconnection
of the trance performance with the system of waking Ideas."8 2) Suggest-
ibility. James noted (much as Barber and others were to do much later;
that a hypnotized Individual would not follow every command of the oper-
ator. He pointed out that "1f the thing suggested be too Intimately
repugnant, the subject may strenuously resist and get nervously excited
In consequence even to the point of having an hysterical attack."'
3) Post-hypnotic suggestions. The operator may suggest a behavior to
occur In the future, after the trance is over. Again, James cited the
role of expectancy to explain this phenomenon; the subject expects to
act a certain way; therefore, he does.
Although James' belief 1n the use of the term "mind" in his discussion
of hypnosis reflects his Indebtedness to spiritualism and dualism, a
naturalist must admire him for his acknowledgement of the role of the
entire body during the hypnotic trance and the interaction between the
subject and operator.
KANTOR ON HYPNOSIS
Kantor's general description and Interpretation of hypnosis (1926) was
very similar to James1. As did James, Kantor began by analogizing the
trance to sleeping, although he was more Interested than James in the
distinctions between the two: "During hypnosis, however, in contra-
distinction to the sleeping condition, the person is not dissociated
from his stimuli but uniquely and unusually in contact with them."10
He further noted that the subject Is so much in contact with certain
stimuli that he Is out of contact with others. Thus, whereas James
might have led one to believe that the hypnotized subject was completely
out of touch with his environment, Kantor gave an explicit account of the
stimulus conditions surrounding the trance.
Kantor defined hypnosis as an " . . . action performed by an individual
as a result of transferring himself to a particular behavior environ-
ment, "11 thereby stressing (in characteristic KantoHan fashion) the
role of "setting factors" In the psychological event. A naturalistic
emphasis upon the stimulus environment surrounding the hypnotized subject
likewise permeated Kantor's descriptions of the phenomena of hypnosis.
For example, on the topic of anaesthesia, he stated that "So closely
B
Ib1d.. p. 602.
9 lb1d.. p. 395.
lbid.. p. 605.
lKantor, J. R., Principles of Psychology (Vol. II). New York:
Knopf, 1926, p. 392.
11 393
Ml-- P- -
associated may the person be with the stimuli centering in the operator
that the everyday objects surrounding the patient do not perform their
ordinary stimulational functions."12 of hyperanaesthesla, Kantor said
" . . . the Individual merely performs responses in his equipment on the
basis of substitute stimulation."13 These substitute stimuli are the
suggestions of the operator. This is also the basis for hallucinations
and delusions: the subject Is responding to substitute stimuli provided
by the operator.
Kantor's wholistic approach to the organism was clearly revealed In his
description of the hypnotized individual. For example, Kantor wrote of
the involvement In the trance of the whole body when he discussed the
phenomenon of performing actions while hypnotized that are not performed
under ordinary circumstances. He stated that " . . . persons are deprived
of their Inhibiting functions and thus are capable of doing various acti-
vities which they usually prevent themselves from executing."" He
added, however, as James did, that a hypnotized person will not perform
an action that he ordinarily couldn't or wouldn't execute. Kantor also
treated the topic of post-hypnotic suggestion, stating that an " . . .
Individual attachment to a stimulus situation Involves the performance
of an action at a time removed from the original contact with the oper-
ator."15 Thus, Kantor clearly wiped out any mystery concerning the post-
hypnotic suggestion. The key to Its understanding was to recognize the
substitute stimulus responsible for intlatlng the action of the subject.
Kantor summed up the post-hypnotic action as being " . . . not different
from ordinary memorial conduct and as such involves no different problem."'
A COMPARISON OF THE TWO VIEWS
Upon close Inspection, Kantor's explanations for the symptoms of hypnosis
were extremely similar to James' theory of suggestion. Although James
was somewhat more organocentric than Kantor, both James and Kantor spoke
plainly of the stimuli provided by the operator affecting the subject.
Likewise, both descriptions of hypnosis noted the effect of the trance on
the entire body. Also, both Kantor and James removed the mystery sur-
rounding post-hypnotic suggestion. Even though James' "expectancy" explan-
ation Implicated the unconscious mind, he agreed with Kantor that no
bid., p. 394.
I4
" P- 599.
16
lb1d.
paranormal processes need be Invoked: the suggestion of the operator
stays with the subject and Initiates the later action simply because
of the subject's expectancy that It will.
In summary, there appear to be many similarities between Kantor's
and James' treatment of hypnosis. Given that James was writing in
the pre-behaviorlstic era of psychology, his theory was remarkably free
of mentallsm. He was still a victim of the long dualistic tradition, as
evidenced by his continual references to the mind with all of Its spiri-
tistic components. Present in his theory of hypnosis, however, was
the entire organism, not just organ Unite components, and he also stressed
the Importance of the interaction between the subject and the operator
(or stimulating object in Kantor's terms). Kantor, of course, had
the more naturalistic description of hypnosis. He eliminated all mystical
and dualistic elements in stating that the subject is so much in contact
with the'operator that he loses contact with other stimulating objects
1n the environment. Kantor's concept of substitute stimuli, though
similar to James' concept of suggestibility, was more parsimonious, thus
more effectively "de-spooklhg" the hypnotic trance. One might wonder,
however, how closely James would approach the naturalism of Kantor if
he were theorizing today.

REFERENCES

Barber, T. X. Experimental hypnosis. In B. Holman (Ed.), Handbook

of General Psychology. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1973.
James
> M- Principles of psychology (Vol. II). New York: Henry Holt
and Company, 1890.
Kantor, J. R. Principles of psychology (Vol. II). New York: Knopf,

Kantor, J. R. Interbehavioral psychology. Granville, Ohio: Prlncipia

Press, 1959.
THE
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1 A QUARTERLY NEWSLETTER OF
' INTERBEHAVIORAL PSYCHOLOGY
u
PUBLISHED AT HARTWICK COLLEGE
VfS
ONEONTA, NEW YORK

J!L Volume 9, Number 2 Siiiiniirr 197

H[S The behavior of the Individual in the environment in which he

^pr lives is not nolng to be analyzed by instruments that get

r
J
H
inside that ornanism. It's on the outside that the bnhtivior
takes place. Chanties occur inside, and the omniscient physio-
lonlst may eventually tell us what they are. At the moment he
can't tell us very much. I said In 1930 that

don't.
knew of no
phvsioloqical fact that threw any 11 *(ht on behavior, and still

s
1). F. Skinner, 1977. Excerpt from Interview v/1 th
David Cohen, Psycho o<]ir. tr> on 1'sycfiolony '
Tapl inner I'tihl fshinr Company.

t
 THE IHTERBEHAVIORIST analysis movement, methods of teaching Interbehavlorism to students, and
contributions of the Interbehavloral orientation to the conduct of research.

Editor: Interested Individuals are requested to communicate their willingness to

Ronald G. lleyduk, Kenyon College participate and the topic which they would be willing to present to either
Paul or Linda at the Department of Psychology, Vies tern Michigan University,
Associate Editors: Kalamazoo, HI 49008. It Is urged that responses be mailed as soon as
Donna H. Cone, Department of Mental Health, Retardation, and possible because of the expected deadline of November, 1979 for final I -
Hospitals, State of Rhode Island zatlon of the program.
Paul T. llountjoy, llestern Michigan University
Hoel II. Smith, State University of Hew York, Pittsburgh
The editor, Ronald lleyduk, wishes to announce his interest In finding a
new position for the academic year 1980-81 (or possibly sooner). I have
The Agora a strong background (Ph.D., University of Michigan) and strong teaching
credentials In general experimental psychology (especially research methods,
Before his untimely death In July 1977, Klaus Rlegel was one of the most human motivation, and visual perception), with publications and papers in
strikingly original developmental psychologists, historians of psychology, the areas of preference for complexity and visual Illusions of size. In
and conitientators on the discipline. In his last book, Psychology, Mon addition, I have great Interest and developing expertise in the history,
Amour: A Countertext (published posthumously by Houghtbn-Wff nn, 1978), systems, and philosophical Issues of psychology. I would like to find a
lie" ' paTTTTirTeTTrTbtTte to a kindred revolutionary, J, R. (Cantor: teaching position (Associate or advanced Assistant Professorship) or a com-
bined administrative-teaching position at a school placing Its highest
Our experts believe that the minds of geneticists work like a snap- value upon quality teaching. However, I might also be Interested in and
shot camera: Zap - and there you have the display of the 48 chromo- qualified for a research or administrative position outside of an academic
somes of the fruit fly, thinly sliced for the microscope and nicely environment. Please write or call me at 614-427-2244, Extension 2374.
ordered, as they ought to be according to the textbooks. Fortu-
nately, the minds of geneticists are 1n as much a state of flux or
transformation as they believe the genetic organization to be. The
snapshot Is but an artificial fixation that crudely represents a Two contributions are Included in this Issue. The first Is a report of an
momentary state of the genetic structures (In vitro) within the Interview of J. R. Kantor by Cedrlc Larson, currently writing a biography
changing organism (In vivo). of John B. Watson. The Interview Is revealing of the styles and psychologies
of both Watson and Kantor. The second contribution 1s introduced following
Present-day psychologists, however, have closed their minds to the Larson article.
the problem of Inner changes. As Descartes fell on God, they
fall on the genetic structure as If It were a rest room - clean,
restricted, unchanging, and thus safe. But such places do not
exist In the sciences; they are bound to become dirty. They are
already dirty. A few far-sighted psychologists, for example Jacob
Kantor, have for many decades recognized the problem of Interactive
changes, but their voices have been drowned by the loudspeakers (and
not the radicals) of modern psychology.
In (Cantor's most recent published work (Observer, Comments and queries:
What future for psychology?, Psychological Record, Spring 1979) there 1s
a brief mention of the potent1aT~p1tfaTTs In describing the role of genetic
factors In psychological events. A more substantial discussion of genes
and the Interbehavloral field may be found In Kantor's Interhehavloral
(Principle Press, 1959).

At the June 1979 convention of the Association for Behavior Analysis, l'*ul
Hountjoy and Linda Parrot co-chaired an Interbehavloral Interest Group
meeting. Those present agreed that Inclusion of symposia devoted to Inter-
behavioral approaches to psychology on the 1980 program was feasible, lop'n
suggested Included: causality, specific Issues In the history of psvclioin<iv.
the Interbehavloral description of "covert" events, ways In which an Inter-
behavloral orientation could contribute to and strengthen HIP applied |.ei..i.mr
 AH INTERVIEW WITH J.R. KAMTOR ABOUT JOHN I). WATSON
Cedrlc A, Larson
University College, Rutgers - The State
University of Hew Jersey, Newark
Division (Retired)
A number of years ago, when I started out collecting data and Information
on the life of John B. Watson for a biography, many colleagues suggested
that I should try to Interview as many psychologists as possible who might
have known Watson In his active years. Several people suggested the name
of Dr. J. R. Kantor, the founder of Interbehavlorlsm, and an early worker
In the broad field of Behaviorism. The first step was a letter addressed
to him at Indiana University In Bloomlngton on August 13, 1963. This
letter was forwarded to his home In Chicago and he responded on August 18th.
In this letter he said: "It Is a coincidence that your letter came while I
was preparing a short article on Behaviorism which I hope to have appear In
October."1
Ills letter went on to say: "Yes, I knew Dr. Watson quite well. Naturally,
he should have a large place In any book on the Behavlorlstic movement.
In the brief paper I am preparing I Indicate the Important Influence that
Loeb exercised on the development of Behaviorism ... I am to be visiting
Professor at the University of Maryland this coming year. I shall be glad
to discuss with you the topic of your book If we can arrange a time and
place mutually convenient to us both."
The winter of 1963-64 was quite a severe one, but after exchanging further
letters and telephone calls, a date for an Interview was set up for
February 29, 1964, at the Psychology Department of the University of Maryland,
College Park, Maryland. As I recall It, this was on Saturday, and a bright,
clear, late winter day with mild temperatures.
At the time, Dr. Kantor was 76 years old. He was a short, rather tMn .
Individual, with a warm, pleasant manner. He Impressed me as a man of con-
siderable energy, and he spoke clearly and concisely, never having the least
difficulty in putting his Ideas across. The Interview took place 1n a class-
room: he sat at his desk, and I sat 1n a chair taking notes. He frequently
got up from his chair to draw diagrams on the board to help explain an Idea.
!t might be noted here that John B. Watson formulated his ideas on Behavior-
Ism while at the University of Chicago (graduate student, 1900-1903; instructor
and assistant professor, 1904-1908). Or, Kantor received his baccalaureate
degree from the University of Chicago In 1914, and his Ph.D. In 1917, so
he must have learned much about Watson from psychologists who remained at
Chicago after Watson had left In 1908.
The following are some of the highlights of the Interview, taken down In
shorthand at the time, and transcribed upon returning to my home. He re-
called Watson as follows:
"I was In a class of Dr. Watson's one summer at the University of
Chicago. It must have been In the sunnier of 1914 or 1915. This
'This article was: J. R. Kantor, "Behaviorism: Whose Image?" The
Psychological_Record. Vol. 13, No. 4 (October, 1963), 499-512.
was a return visit, and of course I was then only a student, so
I did not have a lot of personal contacts with him. I only knew
him as a professor.
"Watson was a brilliant man in every way. His lectures were
brilliant ones. He always went to the Faculty Exchange before
class, picked up his mail, and then came to class. Before
lecturing he took off his gloves, and glanced over his letters
, before he began his class. He was a very sportily dressed man.
He had spats and a cane and gloves all the time."
Kantor's next remark on Watson's needs a bit of preliminary explanation.
After Watson resigned from Johns Hopkins, and started working for the J.
Walter Thompson Company 1n New York City in 1920, he taught nights at the
New School for Social Research, the Cooper Union, and conducted some
seminar-type classes at Columbia. Watson's name first appeared In the New
School catalog for 1922-23. He taught there also In 1923-24, and In summer
terms. Ills final year at the New School appears to have been 1925-26.
(This teaching was of course all at night).
Watson had a habit of Inviting guest lecturers to talk to his crowded classes
at the Hew School. Most of them were eminent psychologists of their day.
One of these was William McDougall, who lectured some time in the school
year 1922-23. He was then at Harvard University and at the height of his
career. McDougall published his lecture to Watson's class in The Psycho-
logical Review for July 1923.
In the spring of 1926 Watson had a number of prominent psychologists talk
to his classes at the New School. Among them were Robert H. Yerkes, Edwin
G. Boring, Raymond Dodge (of Yale), and George A. Dorsey, the Columbia
University anthropologist,2
The foregoing explanation about Watson's night school courses at the New
School In the 1920s was to give a brief background to Kantor's next remarks
about Hatson: "I met him also in New York later, I cannot tell you just
when. I lectured for him in the New School. After I made my presentation,
Watson said to his students that he thought I was more mechanical than he was."
As a point of Information, the stipend or honorarium for these visiting
psychologists was $50 plus travel expenses for the lecture.. That was In the
1920s, a sum that would be equivalent today to four or five times as much.
Tuition at the Hew School In those days was about $20 per course, and Watson's
classes were crowded.
The Interview now turned to the more theoretical side, with some words of
"good fatherly advice" -- as he put It. Kantor said: "Don't be too facile
1n saying one person was Influenced by another. You have to be very careful
about Influences. It Is true no doubt that Watson was influenced somewhat
by Jennings and Loeb, but Jennings and Loeb were at sword points." Kantor
suggested that a biography of Watson and the origin of behaviorism might
be patterned after llossner's The Life of David Hume (University of Texas
Press, 1954).
Cedrlc A, Larson, "John B. Watson and the Hew School for Social Research,"
paper presented at the 42nd annual convention of The New York Stato Psych-
ological Association, Saratoga Springs, N.Y., May 12, 1979. 18 pages.
(Unpublished manuscript).
 HP went on: Originally I thought that I would call my point of view organ-
Ismlc psychology. But there was a man by the name of Wheeler (Raymond tl.
Wheeler, 1892-1961) who used the name organlsmlc (although In a different
sense) so I dropped 1t.
"In a general way, a synonym for Behaviorism Is antl-mentallsm. Even in
their essay on "The Rise and Fall of Behaviorism," Harrell and Harrison3
have to say It had a great Influence. Even Boring likes to say that con-
sciousness Is something neural. Watson wanted to get away from structuralism
and functlonallsm, the two big viewpoints In this country In the early part
of the century. Watson first discussed reactions In terms of efferent con-
duction to the muscles and glands. That Is why Watsonlan psychology was
sometimes referred to as 'muscle twitch.' Since the description of a
psychological event 1s In terms of muscles, glands and nerves, afferent
and efferent conduction, one place to another, you call this molecular
behaviorism. This Is what Watson was.
"But he was also a molar behavlorlst In part. Watson said we should not
overemphasize the nervous system or muscles or glands. Han also had Ideas.
Things are complicated and 1f man has molecular behavior, he also has molar
behavior. An example of a molar behavlorlst Is Tolman. Every purposive
behavlorlst would be a molar behavlorlst, but not every molar behavlorlst
would be a purposive behavlorlst.
"In the molecular and molar point of view In talking about the mind, they
have to make all kinds of peculiar statements. That Is, they have to do
what lashley criticized In Watson. He said, Watson Is a methodological
behavlorlst. He adopts the method of not dealing with consciousness, but
he does not settle the question of consciousness. Lashley's1 way of settling
this was to throw It out and say: 'There Is no such thing. My point Is
that none of that really settles the problem for psychology. You do not
have an aritl-mentallsm -- you do not tiave a description of behavior of any
organism which is clear-cut and objective and completely without 'spooks.'
This prepares the way for interbehavlorlsm.
"Interbehavloral psychology starts all over again. We are not anti-
mentalistic but non-mentallstlc. Interbehavloral psychology has the Idea
that we should do what the Greeks did. Aristotle wrote the first treatise we
we have 1n psychology. He said that what we call psychology Is part of
biology. You study organisms and their actions. Biology is a part of
physics. What you do Is to observe an organism performing actions. We call
our starting point the basic datum - a field.
"So we begin with pristine events. This puts psychology on the same level
with biology and physics. You study the earth worm and see what It does
under certain conditions and get some kind of law. We don't say S arouses
R, but are factors of two actions In the field. Media of contact must be
taken into account. What mentallsts and behaviorlsts call stimuli (light
rays, etc.) are only media of contact (other examples, auditory waves,
electromagnetic waves). So interbehavloristlc psychology starts off with
d Harrell and Ross Harrison, "The Rise and Fall of Behaviorism,"
in The Journal of General Psychology, Vol. 18 (1938) 367-421. This notable
article lias 426 FeTeTences at tfitTend. Seven of these are to articles and
books by Kantor (Hos. 169-175). History has shown that this article pre-
dicting the demise of behaviorism was wide of the mark. Behaviorism,
today, Is alive and well.
a field, builds up constructs (descriptions, hypotheses, laws, etc.)
Those are all built up observations of the field ("field" here has nothing
to do with Kurt Lewin's formulation).
"Interbehavloral psychology has two important principles. First, you
build your propositions on the basis of observations. Second, imposing
constructions descriptions and hypotheses and laws not derived from
events or from the investigation of events -- are to be avoided."
The foregoing paragraphs contain the highlights of the interview which
lasted a two good hours. I was especially impressed with the clarity
of thought and speech. He later sent me a copy of his article: "Behavior-
ism: Whose Image?" His opening remarks in this essay (see footnote 1) are
worth repeating: "The twentieth century development of psychological
Behaviorism Is without doubt one of the most significant events in the whole
of modern science. Certainly no other event In the History of Psychology
appears so stirring and revolutionary . . . . Behaviorism has been de-
clared to be a type of Interpretation or theory, while it has also been
elevated to the dignity of a philosophy, a philosophy of science venturing
far beyond the boundaries of the particular dieclpline, which 1s psychology."
It Is the thesis of this truly fascinating article that "Behaviorism is the
core of science, the enterprise of investigating the behavior of things
and events under specific controlled conditions. It is further proposed
that Interbehavloral psychology as the study of total behavioral fields,
of which organlsmlc actions constitute one component, best fulfills the
requirements of the behavlorlstlc enterprise In this specialized area."
As a postscript to the foregoing, I last met Or. Kantor personally at the
85th annual convention of the A.P.A. in San Francisco In 1977. I recog-
nized him in the lobby of a hotel one afternoon and went over and spoke
with him. I found him still alert and friendly. He promised to send me
some further reprints of later articles which he had written. 1 received
them later in the fall, including two published in 1973 and 1975, and also
one In the Mexican Journal of_Behavior Analysis in 1976, which also contained
Hoel W. Smith's fascinating 'article! The Works of J. R. Kan tor: Pioneer
In Scientific Psychology."
One paragraph of Kantor's 1976 article caught my>eye especially: "By a
curious coincidence, 1, like J. 0. Watson at an earlier date, entered
the University of Chicago with Philosophic interests, though of a very
different type. Watson proposed to study conventional philosophy with
John Dewey, whereas I wished to further my knowledge and understanding of
the nature of things and events Including human beings, with which we are
inevitably surrounded. I early became highly sensitive to the differences .
between pristine events and the constructions built for their description."
One can only agree with tloel W. Smith, who mentions the "prodigious scholar-
ship" encompassed by the works of Kantor, In 102 articles and books, and
a long list of book reviews, and articles published in six languages 1m-
sidos English: hnre Indeed Is a scientific psychologist whose work needs
to be better known and appreciated. Kantor was 91 years old Aug. 8
1979, but his life shows age need be no limitation to productivity.
q
J. R. Kantor, "The Origin and Evolution of Inlet-behavioral Psychology,
Mexican Journal of Ufih^vior_AnaJyjLJj, Vf)1- 7> "- ? (<1u1.Vlw). 120-136.
(Qiiote'Trom p. !?I)
One of the most attractive aspects of Interbehaviorism Is that it provides
a refreshing perspective upon (and perhaps even a resolution for) some
of the most persistent and troublesome underlying issues In psychology,
such as freedom versus determinism, the mind-body problem, and the active
versus passive organism. In the following short essay by David Cohen, an
undergraduate senior at Kenyon College, another enduring issue in psychology
is discussed, and once again the perspective offered by interbehaviorism
emerges as a valuable one.
ANALYSIS VERSUS WIIOLISM REVISITED
David Cohen
Kenyon College
The fundamental issues of psychology are not so easily separable as a brief
synopsis of them makes it appear. A certain perspective on the mind-body
problem, for example, may imply a corresponding position regarding free
will versus determinism. The specific Issue that this essay will address
is whether consciousness and behavior are more fruitfully viewed analytically
or wholistically. This question Is related to the conflict between re-
ductionists and non-reductionists, and also to the issue of whether psych-
ological processes can best be understood as simple or complex phenomena.
The essence of the conflict between analytic and whollstic approaches can
be seen in the first paragraph. In questioning the value and practicality
of viewing the fundamental issues of psychology as a set of clearly dis-
tinguishable questions,! am arguing in favor of wholism and against analysis:
it is only by considering, the issues In relation to each other that we can
get a true picture of them.
In the pre-scientific years of psychology, philosophers of mind engaged
each other in a healthy dialectic regarding the question of analysis vs.
wholism. V/e can find a clear Instance of this conflict in one famous
family. James M i l l , In the mainstream of British assoclatlonlsm, believed
that any idea is only the sum of other simpler ideas. In contrast, his son
John Stuart Hill held that complex concepts were more than the sum of com-
ponent ideas.
With the advent of the experimental psychology of consciousness In 19th
century Germany, analysis gained a clear (though temporary) advantage,
probably because little fresh objective understanding of consciousness
could be gained without analysis. However, the analytlc-wholistic conflict
was revived with Hi 111am James1 criticism of the methods of Mil helm Uundt
in the 1890's. -Uundt believed that by using trained introspection, one
could arrive at the elemental structure of consciousness. Consciousness
is made up of particular mental experiences which are in turn made up of
ideas and feelings. Ideas are composed of sensations which have both
This essay is a revision of an answer submitted by the author to a question
on a take-home examination in the History and Systems of Psychology at Kenyon
College. I wish to acknowledge the help of the course instructor and editor
f The 1 n terbelia v 1 orist, Ronald G. lleyduk, In the re-writing of the essay.
intensity and quality, etc. James had a number of objections to this
method of describing mental processes. One argument was that Hundt was
not being analytic -- he was postulating the existence of the elements
and then showing how they could be synthesized into the whole. More
pertinent to this discussion Is James' assertion that certain phenomenon
cannot be analyzed. The stream of consciousness is transitory and cannot
be stopped for analysis; the introspection itself may destroy the state.
Furthermore, those elements that can be Isolated may not exist in normal
consciousness (the "psychologists fallacy").
More recent times have seen a continuation of the debate between those
favoring analytic and wholistic approaches. The conflict between behaviorism
(especially Watsonian behaviorism) and Gestalt psychology is an important
20th century example. Watson was extremely analytic, viewing complex
behaviors as concatenations of "stimulus" and "response" units. In con-
trast, the Gestalt psychology of l/ertheimer, Kohler, and Koffka was the
ultimate in wholism, arguing that an elementlzing of psychological pheno-
mena overlooks the Importance of the relationships between elements,
whether the subject of analysis is consciousness or behavior.
An intriguing synthesis of analysis and wholisro is achieved by J. R.
Kantor's interbehaviorism, which has something in common with both
Gestalt psychology and Watsonian behaviorism, l/hile adopting many of thn
terms and anti-mentalIstic bias of analytic behaviorism, intcrbehnviorism
holds that an organism's actions cannot be described in terms of simple
stimulus-response, cause-effect sequences. Stimuli and responses cannot
be separated, nor Is a linear, "billiard-ball" view of causality appropriate.
Every psychological event must be considered within the context of the multi-
dimensional field In which it occurs, encompassing preceding, succeeding,
and surrounding events.
From a historical perspective It seems that a combination of analytic and
whollstic approaches is optimal for psychology's development. The analytic
approach of the assodationists enriched and advanced our conception of
consciousness; but the criticisms of Reid's wholistic Scottish school
provided a valuable tempering influence. Similarly, the debate between
20th century analysts and wholists is crucial to the character of modern
psychology. The case 1s convincing that we can never gain a full under-
standing of phenomena from analysis alone -- the whole is^ equal to more
than the sum of its parts. Yet analysis has proven to be a practical and
productive way to advance our knowledge of complex psychological events.
Recently there has been some doubt cast on the accuracy of traditional
views that lltmdt's psychology was clemcntaristic. Tor example, see:
Dlumnnthal, A. L. The founding father we never knew. Contemjiorarv
!'sjLchpj!y.> 1979. 21, 7, 547-550.
10
REFERENCES

James, II. Psychology: A Briefer Course. New York: Holt, 1898.

Lundln, R. H. Theories and systems of psychology. Lexington, Mass.:
Heath, 1972/"
Hurphy, G. and Kovacli, J. K. Historical Introduction to modern psychology,
(lew York: llarcourt Brace Jovahovich, 1972.
THE
I
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r
A QUARTERLY NEWSLETTER OF
INTERBEHAVIORAL PSYCHOLOGY
PUBLISHED AT KENYON COLLEGE
GAMBIER, OHIO

Volume 9, Number 3 Fall 1979

For there 1s no self-evidence to the proposition that the mental
1s the unobservable. In a perfectly valid sense, I can be said
to observe another man's anger, sadness, his eagerness to please,
his sense of his own dignity, uncertainty, love for a nirl or
whatever. I can find out these tilings about another sometimes
by just observing him In the coninnn sense of that term, some-
times by listening to what he says. But, in this latter case,
I am not learning of some dubious and uncheckable "Introspection"
on his part. For vihat people say about themselves is never In
principle and rarely in practice uncheckable.
C. Taylor, 1964. The_ Exfi.]ana_y_on^gf^ Behjryjor,
Routledge and Kegan-T'au!, ~p. 61-2. "
 THE INTERDEHAVIORIST
Editor:
Ronald G. Heyduk, Kenyon College
Associate Editors:
Donna M. Cone, Department of Mental Health, Retardation, and
Hospitals, State of Rhode fsland
Paul T. Mountjoy, Western Michigan University
Noel W. Smith, State University of New York. Pittsburgh
The Agora
The June 8, 1979 Issue of Science Included a book review by R.C.Bolles
of both volumes of Skinner's autobiography. The review contained
reference to Skinner's association with Kantor at Indiana University:
Most scholars delight In a meeting of minds, but not Skinner.
The historically inclined reader Is going to be distressed that
Skinner Is so reluctant to acknowledge the existence of kindred
souls. Indeed, he goes to some pains to prove the Insularity of
his work and his Ideas there Is Skinner's colleague at Indiana,
J.R.(Cantor, who Is treated cordially enough but very briefly.
Are we really supposed to believe that Skinner learned nothing
or gained nothing from this man who shared so many of his views
about a purely behavioral behaviorism?
Regarding Skinner's apparent belief In the insularity of his work, the
editor has a postscript. A Kenyon colleague and I are conducting a
survey of "eminent psychologists" (defined by their appearance on the
Endler et aj "Host-Cited" list, American Psychologist. December 1978)
in order to "determine what books and articles haveinfluenced their
work. Whereas most of the respondents have submitted rather long
lists, Skinner mentioned only two books--Watson's Behaviorism and
Bertrand Russell's Philosophyand he went on to say that even these
books did not have much effect upon his life as a psychologist.
Henry Pronko has Informed me that Psychology from the Standpointof
an Interbehavior1st will appear In"the fall of 1980, \n time for
achTpTTon the following spring. Host graciously, he has promised a
complimentary copy of the book to all subscribers to The Interfaeha-
viorist. This is an incentive to renew your subscription: a form
for Volume 10 will be Included with the final Issue of Volume 9,
which will appear in March.
At the top of the next page is an abstract of Hoel Smith's 94-page
annotated bibliography of citations to Kantor's works. Copies of
the bibliography are available to those who want them.
Uitafciblifl that excluded self-citations were collected to the works
of J.R. Kantor for the 60 year period of 1918-1976 from books and
Journal articles. The 526 citations are presented alphabetically
by author along with annotations to the characteristics of the
citations. The works referred to in each citation are keyed to
Kantor's bibliography. The citations are as complete as a nine-
year search could make possibleprobably about 95% for journals
and perhaps B0J, for books. The annotations provide information
about reactions to interbehaviorism and to its supporters and
detractors and supply a data base for analyses. A brief description
' of the interbehavioral field.system and. of the procedure precedes
the list.
Noel Smith also responded to the editor's statement In the Spring 1979
Issue that Interbehaviorism Is "appreciative of the organism's awesome
complexity":
The reference to "the organism's awesome complexity" is slightly
misleading from an interbehavioral framework, for it is not the
organism itself that is the focus but quite explicitly the total
field of which the organism Is but one part. The interaction of
organism with stimulus objects having stimulus functions occurring
in a setting and as part of a developing history of interactions
together constitute the psychological event. The repudiation of
mere responses to stiniuli--organocentrisni-~is a cornerstone of
interbehaviorism. The biological complexity of the organism is
an inseparable part of the interaction but so is the complexity
of past interactions including the development of stimulus functions
of stimulus objects and corresponding response functions of the
organism together with setting factors and, In the case of direct
contact with stimulus objects, media of contact.
Dennis Delprato provided the following overviews of two papers that
are supportive of an Interbehavioral psychology:

1.
Cantor'c position on the role biological factors play in behavior is
nicely supported by a tudy of DodriH, HacFsrUne, and Boyd (Journal of
_Consulting and Clinical Psychology. 1974, 42, 231-255). A* result of
thair research, the author* rejected tha common hypothesis that Intra-
ut*rin infection of tha rubella virus (German measles) Is associated
with deficit* in intelligence behavior a* result of physical effect*
on the internal intellectual apparatus. (Cantor, of course, hold* that
biological conditions are participating factors in behavior that, when
"abnormal," are related to behavioral difficulties to the extent that
they preclude tha individual from "being the kind of a biological organism
that can come into contact with stimulus objects and acquire reactions toward
then'.' (Pronko, 1973, p. 204). Dodrlll et *1. conclude as follows:
"...this study haa shown that children with a history of intrautarlne
rubella infection who have the important sensory modality of vision
remaining are not retarded, but rather have average Intelligence.
Physical symptoms seam Important primarily as they close off important
sources of Information to the developing child. The suggestion, then,
is that the clinical picture commonly seen as one of retardation is not
produced by the physical damage of ths rubella virus per se, but rather
by the secondary effects of such damage that limit psychological
development and expression. If this is true, then we may repudiate
tha notion that rubella results in Inevitable mental retardation...."
(P. 254)
II,
Fischer, in a paper entitled "Contextual Approach to Assessment," (Com-
munity Mental Health Journal, 1973, , 38-46) discusses "an altarnattve
to reductive psychodynamic assessment" that contains several Interbehavioral
features. For example, she points out that what has been referred to as
"paychopathological" is not in the person, but between the person and his
milieu; thus, assessment cannot consist of an attempt to identify some
pathological state within the person. Fischer offers a model of assessment
that "is based on the principle that behavior occurs within specific
contexts (Interbehavioral fields, setting eventsj ." Techniques of assessment
include firsthand observation of the individual's Interactions with events, includ-
ing consideration of the person's Interactions with his or her society's
institutions. Fischer considers that she comes from a phenomenological
perspective; her paper is another example of why interbehaviorlits are
perhaps not well advised to summarily reject all of what files under the
phenomenological banner.
Dennis Delprato also provided abstracts of three Int'erbehavlorally-
orlented papers he has written, all of which are scheduled to appear
within the next year:
Delprato, D.J. The reactlonal biography concept: early contribution
to a perspective for the psychology of aging. Human Development,
1n press.
This paper reviews J. R. K a n t o r ' s reactlonal biography conrnpt In the con-
text of published literature in the psychology of aging. The reactlonal
biography concept is based on an organIsmlc perspective which emphasizes
the holistic nature of psychological behavior and the role of organism-
environment interactions in poychologlcal development, and It depicts a
relationship between the biological and psychological life curves of the
Individual. K a n t o r ' s perspective Is seen to be compntlble w i t h recent
views end empirical findings In the psychology of aging such SB the re-
sults of Investigations of the relationship between different component*
of Intelligence and age, the diminishing emphasis on biologically bated
age models, increasing recognition of organism-environment Interactions,
and behavioral plasticity In old age.
Delprato, D.J. Hereditary determinants of fears and phobias: a critical
review. Behavior Therapy, in press.
Although behavioral therapy was founded on the assumption that problematic
behaviors are learned during the life history of the Individual, there Is
currently a strong tendency to minimise or to rule out altogether the
"learning-conditioning" analysis of fears and phobias In favor of an
emphasis on hereditary factors. This paper examined several research
findings that have been presented as consistent with the assumption that
fears and phobias are more dependent upon Inherited predispositions than
upon organisms' Individual learning histories. Research areas covered In-
cluded allegations of failures to replicate Uatson and Rayner's (1920)
Influential fear conditioning study, taste aversion learning phenomena,
huaun conditioning experiments with phobic and nonphobic preaverslv*
ftlmull, research on the topography of avoidance responses, and the "hawk-
loose" effect with birds. The main conclusion was that, although the
learning-conditioning approach la Inadequate, no body of research con-
clusively supports the evolutionary hypothesis. It was suggested |hat
attempts to fit the ontogeny of fear Into the traditional "Innate versus
learned" framework have hampered Identification of developmental factors
underlying fear behavior that go beyond concepts of heredity nnd learning.
Delprato, O.J. The interbehavioral alternative to brain dogma. Psycho-
logical Record, in press.
Hiysiologieal reduationimn as exhibited in aJ_U>giitli>n." that the
brain causes behavior (brain-dojjma) ia viewed from the intorbehuvloral. per-
spective. Explicit and subtle forms of brain-dogma are Identified in con-
temporary versions of nwntalisn, cognltivism, and behaviorism. The inter-
behavioral approach provides on alternative to brain-dogma in the fora
of a holistic view of behavior which recopniEes that neural processes
j cannot be separated from behavior (dualicm) but instead Are integral,
j participating factors In all psychological behavior. An ertiphauls on organism
environment interactions and the Interbehavioral field conception ruleo
out classical mechanical, cause-effect, deterministic versions of causation
which underlie brain-dogma. A variety of other viewpolntii that nre com-
patible with the Interhehavlorol approach are briefly reviewed.
It is the adequacy of the response which 1n imnedlate
experience determines the reality of the stimulation.
Things are not real as seen or heard or sroelled; they
are real as actually or potentially experienced through
contact....The response is functionally the reality of
the stimulation, the end of the act the reality of its
beginning. The stimulation implies the response.
G. II. Head, approximately 1910. "The Process
of Hind in Nature." In A. Strauss (Ed.),
George Herbert Mead on Social Psychology.
U. of Chicago PressTT9l>T, p. 92O7"
THE
I
n
t
e
r
b
e
h A QUARTERLY NEWSLETTER OF
INTERBEHAVIORAL PSYCHOLOGY
a
v
PUBLISHED AT KENYON COLLEGE
GAMBIER, OHIO

Volume 9, Number 4 Winter 1979-80

o
r Too often, the appeal by psychologists to biological
science has been nothing more than a symbolic clinging
to the skirts of a make-believe biology.

L. J. Kamln, 1979. Excerpt from

s
Eastern Psychological Association
Presidential Address.
 THE INTERBEHAVIORIST
Please note on the enclosed subscription form that, effective Inmediately,
Editor: The interbehavlorist has moved to Hartwick College 1n Oneonta, New York,
Ronald G. lleyduk, Kenyan College where its editor will be an Associate Professor of Psychology.
Associate Editors:
Donna H. Cone, Department of Mental Health, Retardation, and
Hospitals, State of Rhode Island The feature article for this Issue was contributed by M. H, and B. R.
Paul T. MountJoy, Western Michigan University MacRoberts, who wrote In their cover letter:
Noel U. Smith, State University of New York, Pittsburgh
As you will see, the paper deals with ethology and interbe-
haviorlsm. Our efforts to persuade our ethological colleagues
to listen to, much less publish, work that has an Interbehavioral
slant has met with almost universal failure (however, see
The Agora reference 22 In the article) ... if this article is acceptable
Dennis Delprato of Eastern Michigan University supplied a copy of a doctoral - for The Interbehavigrist. it can be sent as reprints to ethologlsts.
Of course, psychologists could gain by looking at sister fields also.
program announcement from which the following Is excerpted:
Psychology In the School Community (a component of Transactional-Ecological
Psychology, George Peabody College for Teachers, Vanderbllt University): *
Vanderbllt University offers a program leading to the Ph.D. degree In
psychology with specialized training 1n transactional-ecologlcal psychology
(TEP). Psychology in the School Community is the school component of the
TEP program, which provides a new and unified approach to doctoral training
in those areas traditionally called clinical, community, counseling, and
school psychology .... The TEP program is accredited by the American
Psychological Association as a "combined professional-scientific psychology
program . . ..The school component is accredited by the National Council
for Accreditation of Teacher Education .... Emphasis in the program
is on the training of psychologists who will be able to conduct research
and work at various system levels: individual, small group, and organi-
zation . . . Transactionalism Is very broadly thought to be a system of
inquiry that considers behavior a dynamic process involving the "environed
organism" and the constantly changing properties of natural settings . . . .
For Information, write the Admissions Liaison Department of Psychology
and Human Development, Box 512, George Peabody College for Teachers,
Vanderbllt University, Nashville, Tennessee 37203.
A copy of the program announcement may be obtained from the editor or from
Dennis Delprato.

We end our ninth volume with significantly more subscribers than we had at
the close of the last volume, a reversal of the trend in recent years. With
this sign of the health of interbehaviorism as encouragement, I look forward
to Volume 10, for which a subscription form is included with this issue. The
first issue of Volume 10 will contain a most provocative Interbehaviorally-
orlented critique by Paul Mountjoy of Daniel Robinson's An Intellectual
History of Psychology.
 Interbehavlorlsm and animal communication theory In the literature on communication are legion.

M, H. MacRoberts and B. R. MacRoberts Between the seventeenth and twentieth century, one major addition was
made to this model. Because almost the entire semlotlc event 1s In-brain
Interbehavlorlsm has, of course, received a poor hearing from psy-
and thus unobservable, dissatisfaction developed, beginning with C. S. Pelrce,
chologists, but among ethologlsts Interbehavlorlsm 1s virtually unknown.
which resulted In what today is called the action theory of meaning.
The purpose of this paper Is to show briefly and simply that an inter-
James expressed It this way. "The current of life which runs In at our eyes,
behavioral approach Is applicable to the study of animal behavior. We use
o
or ears is meant to run out at our hands, feet, or lips." Thus, the meaning
the study of animal communication (zoosemiotics) as an exemplar.
of words (ideas) is to be found in their behavioral manifestations, for
In order to understand zoosemlotlcs, one first needs to know something
example, if a person announces, "It is time to go," and he and everyone
about semiotics.^ Semiotics Is concerned with the process of the transfer
else leaves, there is a connection between the Idea and action, whereby the
'of Ideas from one to another by means of language. As Sebeok'' puts It,
action Indicates the meaning of the utterance. The action theory, then, Is
semlotldans "face the twin task of constructing a model for the addresser
an attempt to materialize In-braln events as observable activity.
to specify how a message Is encoded and transformed Into a signal carried by
The action theory of meaning usually Is pitted against the referential
a variety of channels to the addressee; and of constructing a model for
theory. Philosophically, the referential theory Is realistic, for example,
the addressee to specify the ways In which [animals and humans] utilize
"house" refers to the object with windows and a roof across the street. This
their knowledge of their code to recognize the messages they receive." .
theory 1s g-lven short-shrift by semiotlcians on the grounds that 1) while It
An Interbehavlorlst may note that underlying Sebeok's description of the
works well with nouns, it falls entirely with syncategorical words such as
semlotlclan's task Is a commitment to an "In-braln to In-braln" model of com-
"and," "if," or "the" and 2) it fails to take Into account the supposed
munication, a model with a long tradition going back to the Patrlstlcs but
complexities of "perception" and "cognition"; that is, because the referential
becoming solidified In Its modern form in the seventeenth century. Today the
theory is not easily subsumed by the dominant In-braln to in-brain model, the
in-braln to In-braln model Is dominant among semiotlcians. llayakawa expresses
theory goes by the way.
it so clearly that the essential point cannot be missed: "Now, human beings
With this brief summary of semiotics, we turn to zoosemlotlcs, the study
have agreed, In the course of centuries of mutual dependency, to let the various
of animal communication. Fundamental in the dualistic tradition of the West
noises that they can produce . . . systematically stand for specified happenings
1s the dichotomy between humans and other animals. Humans have "minds" of one
In their nervous systems. For example, we who speak English have been so
type, animals have minds of another type. The difference has been devilishly
trained that, when our nervous systems register the presence of a certain
hard to pin down, but there is basic agreement that humans have conceptual
kind of animal, we may make the following noise: 'There Is a cat.1 Anyone
thought, which animals lack,** whereas both men and animals have "emotions,"
hearing us expects to find that, by looking in the same direction, he will
that is, hunger, fear, sexual Impulses, and so forth. Whatever the assumed
experience a similar event In his nervous system . . . ." Similar statements

differences, however, both human and animal behavior Is characteristically
conceptualized as emanating from an organism Impinged upon by stimuli that
are Immediately transformed Into light or sound waves and then Into neural
action. This conceptualization Is as evident in zoosemiotics as It Is In
semiotics.
According to W. J. Smith.9 a zoosemiotlc event is " . . . characterized
by three essential features: a communicator, a signal, and a referent. The
comnunlcator's role Is to transmit a signal, encoding therein a message which
is In some way descriptive of some aspect(s) of the state of the central
nervous system (CNS) of that individual. The message may refer among other
things to a generalized anxiety, an emotional state such as aggression or
fear, an activity being performed or probably about to be performed by the
communicator, etc. The code used in forming the signal must be held in
common by both communicator and recipient. To the recipient, the signal comes
10
as one of many simultaneous inputs to the CHS." S. T. Smith further
develops the concept of message, "The message is the information about the
displaying individual that the recipient of the display would know in the
theoretical event In which he received only the display, unaccompanied by in-
formation from contextual sources. Messages Indicate which behavior, of the
coimiun lea tor's entire repertoire, he is performing or Is likely to perform
In these terms, then, displays of animals are considered to be state-
ments about emotions or tendencies, following from which the function of a
display Is, as W. J. Smith suggests, " . . . to make the behavior of the
communicator more predictable to the recipient by making available some
information about the Internal state of the communicator." W. J. Smith'^
provides an illustration: "A small bird seeing an approaching hawk . . .
may utter a vocal display Indicating a high probability that it (the
7
communicator) Is, or soon will be, engaged In an attempt to escape. Other
small birds, upon hearing his vocalizations, may seek cover immediately."
Consequently, according to zoosemiotlc theory, the message of a display
is Identified "by examining in detail the use of the display and abstracting
those features of the communicator's behavior that are common to all of the
situations tin which the display is used] . The word "all" is Important
here. It pinpoints the sought-after unitary commonality or referent of the
display.
The search for a general set of messages has led to the conclusion that
although a particular species may have many different displays, the messages
encoded are not nearly so numerous or so diverse as the displays them-
selves.^ In fact, W. J. Smith!** concludes that "all birds and mammals, and
perhaps other vertebrates, may encode as messages selections from the same
small set of referent classes." This conclusion, naturally, is readied
because at the time of displaying, animals do only a limited number of things
--- they may flee, approach, stay, locomote, and so forth. Because the
display is said to encode the tendency behind these actions, it follows that
there will only be a few messages, I.e., there are only so many emotions, as
1t were.
For the comnunlcatee's part, the model begins with the signal (display),
which is received and decoded. The signal, which 1s supposed to correlate
with a disposition or tendency of the communicator that Is reflected in the
communicator's concurrent or subsequent acts (manifestations of in-braln
events), thereby conveys information about what 1s on the communicator's mind.
When the communlcatee knows what Is on the communicator's mind, he responds.
The meaning of the display, that is, what the communlcatee makes of it, is
simply equated with the communicatee's response to it. The communlea tee's
response, like the comnunlcator's, is also considered to reflect In-braln
events.
8

In this view, under no circumstances Is the display considered to refer

mind. Kantor's radically novel approach to human language Is allowed by his
to the "external" world. In fact, external stimuli, although sometimes
wholesale rejection of traditional assumptions, beginning with the traditional
referred to as "Initiators" or "ellcltors", are given no serious attention as
model of perception and ending with brain or mind dogma.
possible referents and are really not a part of the behavior event.
Let us now briefly return to the referential theory, which semiotlcians
Without further explication of current conceptions of communication by
and zoosemlotlclans have so cavalierly discarded. As pointed out earlier,
zoosemlotlclans, and without criticizing this approach except to say that
the theory has been rejected on two grounds. First, syncategorical words have
It Is totally mentallstlc and therefore suffers from the same problems that
no "existential" referents. Secondly, referential theory Is based on realistic
plague all mentalIstlc approaches confusion of media of contact for
assumptions (there is a world outside organisms with which they make contact).
stimuli, reduction of complex event fields to 1n-bra1n events, limitation
Regarding the first criticism, in point of fact, no one speaks syncategor-
of observation to only a small fraction of what Is supposedly happening,
ically. Semioticians have simply confused formal grammar and "word-things"
and so on we will briefly Indicate the way that we believe animal
with actual speech. Regarding, the second criticism, as Kantor has shown,
communication events should be Interpreted.
the "received" views of perception, neurophysiology, and cognition are
Kantor*' characterizes language as being blstlmulatlonal and referential.
specious and represent little more than attempts to make "scientific" tra-
Basically, the speaker responds to two things simultaneously, the thing spoken
ditional assumptions originating in post-Hellenic philosophy. These responses
of and the person spoken to. The speaker's response adjusts the hearer to the
to criticism of the referential theory place the shoe on the other foot and
thing spoken of. "There is the cat!" is a response made to the lost cat for
make it necessary for semloticlans to justify their reliance on traditional
which both have been searching. The statement adjusts the hearer to the cat.
assumptions.
It Is a small step to transfer this blstlmulatlonal-referential model
In a paper of this length , it is impossible to do more than scratch
to animal communication, for example, many animals have what are called
the surface of this complex subject. Our purpose, however, has not been to
"alarm calls." Basically, these are given by social species in response to
cover semlotic- aoosemiotic theory completely but to Indicate to interbehavior-
approaching predators. Hearers of these calls respond by hiding, fleeing
1sts the feasibility of moving further afield in their endeavors to place
or becoming inactive and attentive. Here we have a perfect example of
behavior studies on a sound footing. As ethologtsts, we have found Kantor's
b1stimulational-referential behavior. The communicator, in a complex social
work directly applicable to the study of aninal behavior. *9 In fact,
and environmental field, responds to predators by calling and this adjusts
Kantor's20 The Scientific Evolution of might easily be a treatise
social companions to the presence of predators. In such a description,
on the assumptlonal bases of ethology. Ills studies of physiology are
there is no talk of light waves, in-brain events, transference of Information,
equally applicable, and so on. Of the behavioral sciences, psychology Is
information theory, motivational states, emotions, the communicator's ten-
probably the most advanced. It has had its behavlorist revolution and the
dencies or next acts, or the commurticatee knowing what Is on the coninunicator's
seeds have been sown for the Interbehaviorist revolution. Ethology has yet
to have any revolution but remains largely In the grips of Mental ism.

10
References and notes
1. The authors wish to thank L. C. Shaffer for Introducing us to Inter-
behaviorism,
2. Me rely heavily on the work of W. J. Smith because his 1s perhaps the
best recent articulation of zoosemiotics. However, any one of a number
of recent works provide the essentials of this approach. See J. P.
Mailman, Optical Signals, University of Indiana Press, Bloomington,
1977, and T. A. Sebeok (Ed.), How Animals Communicate, Indiana University
Press, Bloomington, 1977.
3. Modern classics are C. Morris, Signs, Language and Behavior, Brazlller,
H. ., 1946, and C. Cherry, On Human Communication. M.I.T. Press, 1966.
4. T. A. Sebeok, "Animal Communication." Science. 147, 1965, 1006-1014,
p. 1013.
5. S. I. llayakawa, Language in Thought and Action. Harcourt, Brace, N. V.,
1949, p. 27.
6. M. P. Alston, Philosophy of Language, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs,
N. J., 1964.
7. W, James, quoted in E. C. Moore, American Pragmatism: Peirce, James.
a
M Dewejr, Columbia University Press, N. V., 1961, p. 142.
8. M. Adler, The Difference of_ Mar^ aM the Difference It Makes, Holt,
Rinehart, Winston, N. Y., 1967.
9. W. J. Smith, "Message, meaning and context in ethology," American
NaturaJL|s, 99, 1965, 405-409.
10. S. T. Smith, "Communication and other behavior In Parus carolinensis,"
Publication of the Huttall Ornithological Club, 11, 1972, p. 2.
11. M. J. Smith, "Messages of vertebrate conmunication," Science, Vol.
165, 1969, 145-150, p. 145.
11
12. W. J. Smith, "Animal communication," In W. E. Preede (ED.). JJHJ Nev
Encyclopedia Britannlca, Hacropedia, 4, Benton, Chicago, 1974, 1010-
1019, p. 1011.
13. S. T. Smith, 0. cit., p. 2.
14. M. J. Smith, The Behavior of Communicating, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, 1977.
15. W. J. Smith, 0. cU., 1969, p. 145.
16. See S. T. Smith, op_. cit.. W. J. Smith, op. cit., 1977, but also J. P.
Mailman, "A review of The Behavior of Comnunieating," Auk, 95, 1978,
771-774.
17. J. R. Kantor, An Objective Psychology of Grammar, Principia, Chicago,
1936. and J. R. Kantor, 0. cit.. 1977.
18. J. R. Kantor, Problems of Physiological Psychology, Principia, Chicago,
1947, and J. R. Kantor, The Scientific Evolution, of Psychology. Vol. 1
and II, Principia, Chicago, 1963 and 1969.
19. M. MacRoberts and B. R. HacRoberts, "Referent In animal communication,"
Bird Behaviour. In press.
20. J. R. Kantor, op_. cH., 1963, 1969.
21. J. R. Kantor, 0. cit.. 1947.
 Piece* rig '

Selling Faciws
Organise
Eespcnse
Rjnclloi

Imssdgatw

SHrulus oyl
SllElllui
fLSlCliCql

A QUARTERLY NEWSLETTER OF
INTERBEHAVIORAL PSYCHOLOGY
PUBLISHED AT HARTWICK COLLEGE
ONEONTA, NEW YORK

Volume 10, Number 1

As the whole of conduct of life consists of things
done, which do other things in their turn just so
our behaviour and its fruits are essentially one and
continuous and persistent and unquenchable,. - ,-ind
so, among our innumerable acts, are not senseless
separations. '!'

t- is character but the determination of incident?

It is "n incident for a woman to stand up with her
hand resting on a table and look nt you In a certain
way. . -At the same time it is an '^>",Sion nC far_
acter. If you say you don't nno -it. , ., tnis i s nx
actly what the artist. . .undertakes tn show you.12)
 THE INTERBEHAVIORIST
Editor:
Ronald G. Heyduk, Hartwick College
Associate Editors:
Donna M. Cone, Department of Mental Health, Retardation,
and Hospitals, State of Rhode Island
Paul T. Mountjoy, Western Michigan University
Noel W. Smith, State University of New York, Plattsburgh
, The Agora
We begin our tenth volume amidst a flurry of interbehaviorally-
oriented papers presented at major national conventions. For.
example, Edward Morris of the University of Kansas sent a list
of eight papers of interest to interbehaviorists that were read
at this year's meeting, of the Association for Behavior Analysis
(only two such papers were read at the previous two meetings).
The list is.given below for those who may wish to send for re-
prints:
Delprato, D. Interbehavioral psychology as a pallia-
tive to the excesses of cognitionism.
Morris, E.K. The evolution of interbehavioral psy-
chology and radical behaviorism.
Morris, E.K. Traits and situations: A behavior anal-
ysis.
Mountjoy, P.T. The interrelationship between inter-
behavioral psychology and radical behaviorism.
Parrott, L.J. Science and scientific philosophy.
Parrott, L.J. Radical- and interbehavioral perspec-
tives on knowing.
Parrott, L.J. Beyond radical behaviorism: The inter--
behavioral alternative.
Verplanck, W.S. Talk: You can't get there from here.
* * *
Next week the 'forurn for interbehaviorism will be at the An-
nual Convention of the American Psychological Association in
Montreal, where Edward Morris has organized and will chair an
interbehavioral symposium on Friday, September 5 at 1:00 p.m.
in the Terrace Room of the Sheraton Ht. Royal:
Interbehavioral and Radical Behavioral Psychologies:
Is Behaviorism Reductionistic?
Paper 1. Edward K. Morris, Department of Human
Development, University of Kansas, Law-
rence, Kansas 66045.
Historical and Philosophical Evolu-
tion of Interbehaviorism and Radi-
cal Behaviorism.
Paper 2, Paul T. Mountjoy, Department of Psy-
chology, Western Michigan University,
Kalamazoo, Michigan 49008.
Conceptual Relationships between
Interbehaviorism and Radical Behav-
iorism.
Paper 3. Dennis J. Delprato and Peter A, Holmes,
Department of Psychology, Eastern
Michigan University, Ypsilanti, Mich-
igan 48197.
Interbehaviorism: A Non-Reduction-
istic Alternative to the Heredity-
Environment Question,
Discussant: William S. Verplanck, Department of
Psychology, University of Tennessee,
Knoxville, Tennessee 37919.
Also regarding the upcoming convention, Dennis Delprato wrote:
"Interbehaviorists will be most encouraged if they attend a
paper that will be presented at the upcoming APA convention by
Thomas Z. Cassel, Ph.D., Plymouth Center for Human Development,
Horthville, MI 48167. The paper is entitled 'The Trajectory
of Coupled Organisms: Reductionism vs. Systems of Constraint. '
[Thursday 9/4, 2:00 p.m., Sheraton Mt. Royal, Quebec Room] The
following views of Dr. Cassel show the congruity between his
outlook and interbehaviorism:
'A notion central to the new currents in biology is that
of coupled systems. Across all levels of biological or-
ganization emphasis is placed upon the manner in which a
system is coupled to its surround. For example, it is
both incorrect and misleading to state that DMA contains
directive information. Outside of an appropriate aqueous
medium, DMA macromolecules exhibit a denatured secondary
sterochemical form. When placed in an appropriate aque-
ous medium, hydrophobic and hydrophilic couplings with the
medium further twist the macromolecule into its active
tertiary form. The medium and the coupling of DNA to it
supplies essential configurational information.'
Dr. Cassel notes that the major paradigms for behavioral
research are reductionistic in that they 'restrict their
analysis to selected components of the overall behavioral
 field, and seek to provide explanations by reduction to the
isolated activities of these components. For example, be-
haviorism argues for a theoretical reductionism limited to
isolated "behavioral" events emitted by an uncoupled entity.
In addition, neither the morphological structure of the or-
ganism, nor the structure of its surround are given serious
consideration. In a similar manner cognitive psychology
argues for a theoretical reductionism to a subsystem of the
organism (a cognitive system). As Flavell (197.1) ingenuously
notes, complex behavior is to be understood as "just a mat-
ter of the head doing its characteristic ' thing' ...(p. 273). "
This view represents nothing more than an infelicitous
revival of sixteenth century reductionistic mentalism.'
"Dr. Caasel indicates that Kantor's writings did not influence
his own because he did not find Kantor. After reading some of
Kantor, he notes, 'clearly I must read more.1 Dr. Cassel goes
on, 'At the present, the only problem that I have is with the
conceptual separation of the biological and the psychological,
particularly the" responsive-manipulative dichotomy. If we are
dealing with complex performances across all levels, is this
really a fruitful distinction?' "
Interbehaviorists planning to attend the upcoming A.P.A. Con-
vention are encouraged to contact Associate Editor Noel W. Smith
at his home or office by August 31, so that plans for a social
gathering can be made. As an alternative, use the message board
at A.P.A. to contact either Smith orHeyduk, and we shall inform
you via return note of any plans that have materialized.
This issue's feature article is a book review by Paul T. Mount-
joy of Daniel Robinson's An Intellectual History of Psychology.
As The Interbehaviorist would seem to b e a p r o p e r publication
outlet for interbefiaviorally-oriented book reviews, readers are
encouraged to submit titles to the editor, who will request them
from publishers.
A Review of Daniel N. Robinson's
An Intellectual History jjf Psychology
Paul T. Mountjoy
Western Michigan University
Why add another to the plethora of texts concerning the history
of psychology? Robinson's answer would be that the others fail
to properly interpret that history. Make no mistake on this
point: the interpretation presented is quite different from that
found in the works which it is designed to replace. Is An In-
tellectual History destined to become a dominant influence in
our field? My prediction (and my hope) is that it is not; yet
the book is an expression of a significant movement in the Euro-
American culture of which we historians are a subcultural group,
and consequently Robinson may impact significantly.
fin Intellectual History of Psychology is divided into three major
parts entitled Philosophical Psychology, From Philosophy to Psy-
chology, and Scientific Psychology. Part One covers the period
from the Ionian philosophers through the sixteenth century; Part
Two includes the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; Part Three
discusses the nineteenth and-twentieth centuries. Excluding the
brief introductory chapter approximately 40% of the text is de-
voted to the earliest developments and about 30% is contained in
each of the second and third parts. This distribution is com-
mendable in that early, seminal developments are discussed in suf-
ficient depth.
In what manner does Robinson depart from the usual scholarly in-
terpretations of psychological history? The most significant
deviations are his (1) insistence that psychology is not (and
never can be) a science, and (2) emphasis upon the necessity of
considering religious issues in understanding human behavior.
Clearly he has performed a service by questioning conventional
(and usually unquestioned) assumptions regarding the history of
psychology as he developed these two interpretations. Anyone
will profit from a careful reading of this literate and stimu-
lating book, especially when disagreement concerning interpre-
tation arises as it most certainly will. I repeatedly found my-
self carrying on animated arguments with the author as I perused
the text; that is, it stimulated me to become critical in turn,
an important function for any work to perform.
Readers also will find many of Robinson's statements about the
discipline of history to be compelling. For example:
History is not simply a subject to be learned. It is a
method by which we can attempt to explain ourselves and
our world. Historical scholarship, properly conceived, is
not an actuarial exercise leading to correct datings. It
is misused when wielded in such a way as to populate a Hall
of Fame (p. viii).
Given that Robinson raises stimulating questions, is undeniably
literate, discusses early developments in sufficient depth, and
correctly interprets the nature of the discipline of history,
what aspects of the book lead to my overall negative reaction?
In part, my reaction is a result of my belief that Robinson's
scholarship could have been more careful and complete; but my
major misgiving is that I believe that Robinson has made grievous
errors in his interpretation of the nature and procedures of sci-
ence .
Regarding Robinson's scholarship, as I read I drew up a list of
20 errors of fact and 23 errors of interpretation. Considera-
tions of space and time constrain me to present three examples
rather than an exhaustive list.
The statement is made that Frederick II". .. experimented with fal-
cons, proving their ability to locate prey by smell by blind-
folding them.,.." {p. 160). The citation for this bit of non-
sense is Haskins1 Studies in theHistgry _gf_ Medieval Science
(which is an excellent secondary source for Frederick II) . For
a moment I thought that Haskins had erred, but no on p. 263, and
again on p. 322 Haskins stated clearly that the Emperor sealed
the eyes of vultures to determine whether they detected cadavers
by sight or smell. The Emperor may well have been the greatest
falconer of all times, and he knew full well from his widespread
experience that the active avoidance of falcons by their live
prey precluded any discovery by smell. Only vultures, which feed
upon decaying cadavers, could possibly locate their food by
smell but, in fact, in his De Artg -Venan'di cum:Avibus Frederick
reports his conclusion that even vultures find theTr carrion
food by vision and not by smell.
Page 185 contains this statement: "He [Leonardo] virtually dis-
covered the geometric principles of perspective...-" Actually
it has long been known that in about 1425 the Florentine Brunei-
leschi painted according to the principles of linear perspective.
Leonardo was not born until some 25 years after that event.
Page 293 reproduces an illustration from Descartes' L ' Homme . In
1969 Pastore and Klibbe pointed out in the pages of The Journal
of the History of the Behavioral Sciences that the diagram was
not Descartes ' and that it is actually mlsTeading about Descartes'
interpretation of vision.
This last example of Robinson's error-filled scholarship leads
to an observation that may be of some significance. Robinson does
not cite either The Journal ' of the 'History of- the Behavioral
Sciences or Isis^ and for that matter, the sole citation of Bor-
ring's A History of Experimental Psychology is to a description
of Breuer and Freud1 s concept of catharsis, which can hardly be
regarded as definitive since the publication of Ellenberg's The
Discovery of the Unconscious. Thus, Robinson's factual and in-
terpretative foundation is weakened by his failure to exploit
modern scholarship.
There are some specific cases of scholarly errors of omission
worth noting. For example, Robinson's treatment of Fechner is
limited to a half page (p. 330) which in spite of its brevity is
essentially accurate. However, there is no mention of the moti-
vation which guided Fechner 's work in psychophysics despite the
fact that Fechner himself is one of the best possible examples
of Robinson's central thesis that scientists are pushed about by
social forces rather than guided by their investigations . Fech-
ner is treated as a scientist among scientists' but this is ser-
iously misleading. Fechner adapted the scientific metaphor which
Robinson inveighs against in order to support his theological
notions. As Wundt expressed it:
Das ganze Interesse Fechners gehort eben nicht der
chologie als solcher an, sondern diese ist fur ihn nur ein
Bestandtheil der Natur und Religionsphilosophie. (Gus-
tave Theodor Fechner: Rede zur Feir seines hundertjahri-
gen Geburtstages, p. 84) .
Robinson also repeatedly reports (triumphantly) that behaviorism
has only one law, the law of effect (p. 234, 241, 263-4, 404-5)
and that is not really a law. Robinson should stop reading
Skinner (his major example of behaviorism) and start reading The
Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior. Operanfc con-
ditioning has progressed far beyond Skinner's notions. To be sure,
the operant conditioners give Skinner a testimonial banquet each
year but they then go ahead and 'do their own work. As an exam-
ple of new behavioral laws I offer the matching lav;, first pro-
posed in 1961 by Herrnstein. Perhaps it should be called a
matching assumption, as it is usually properly perceived by oper-
ant conditioners to be a tentative proposal, one which will be
rejected when it no longer predicts observations. Nevertheless,
the so-called matching law does predict successfully that when
organisms are placed on two concurrent variable interval sched-
ules the ratio of response rates on those -two schedules will
equal the ratio of the reinforcement rates of the two schedules.
In a sense the behavioral matching law resembles Ohm's Law (and
the history of both is somewhat complex) since both generate fam-
ilies of theoretical curves that may be compared to empirical
results. This sort of proposition is worthy of analysis by the
historian of psychology.
As a"final example of problems in scholarship, Sir Charles Bell
is presented as the discoverer of the sensory and motor functions
of the dorsal and ventral spinal roots and as a founder of phys-
iological psychology, but no mention is made of Sir Charles' co-
authorship of the Bridgewater^ Treatises, an eight volume set de-
voted to the demonstration of the "Power, Wisdom and Goodness
of God, as manifested in the Creation." In this case, Robinson's
omission is particularly unfortunate,for pointing out Sir Charles'
association with the Bridgewater Treatises would have shown the
oversimplicity of Robinson' s presentation of the history of psy-
chology as a battle between representatives of "good" Christian-
ity and those of "evil" science.
Much more serious than Robinson's frequent lapses in scholarship
are his misunderstandings of'the terminology, methods, and pur-
pose of the scientific enterprise that is the major villain of
his text. As an example of terminology confusion, Robinson states:
It is an undeniable law of physics that the mass and den-
sity of the human body are such, and that the viscosity of
the earth's atmosphere is such, that no one will ever be
able to escape the pull of gravity by beating his arms up
and down (p. 410, italics added).
Robinson's confusion of a theorem with a lav? is a disservice to
students of science. The laws of physics are mathematical expres-
sions which summarize empirical observations. For example. Ohm's
Law is in the form V=IR, where V is voltage, I is current, and
R is resistance. Knowledge of two variables allows prediction
of the other. More specifically: a conductor obeys Ohm 1 s Law if
the relationship V=IR is true for all voltages (i.e., resistance
is independent of both voltage and current). Note the qualifying
and limiting assumption: a far cry from flapping one's arms up
and down.
A second gap in Robinson's understanding of science concerns
hypothesis testing. The logical problems involved in accepting
the null hypothesis are elementary enough to be included in

undergraduate curricula in psychology. Yet, on page. 352 Robin-
son states: "The contemporary physicist does not devote his ener-
gies to the search for phlogiston because he has established that
there is no such thing." This mistatement is not simply a momen-
tary lapse since the same basic error reoccurs on page 357: "Mo
experimental finding has made it clear that we lack a moral sense
or a link with God or a love of beauty. I hesitate to state the
obvious, and yet I must. Statements that deny the existence of
an entity cannot be experimentally tested. It may be that some
individual scientists have spoken carelessly (as I myself in the
give and take of an argument) , but the mill:hyp;othesi;s jcannot be
proven. That is, the existence of phlogiston,ortKe~souT7^or
gods, cannot be disproven. Thus, when on page 279 Robinson states
that "Science, after all, has not discovered that there is no
God," he is stating the obvious, and is in no way providing sup-
port for the validity of theological concepts.
In the end, Robinson's attacks against science in the name of
free will demonstrate a fundamental misunderstanding of the pro-
cess whereby scientific propositions may be confirmed or discon-
tinued. Science is, of course, concerned with the development
of propositions that cannot be adequately evaluated except by
the criterion of science itself. That criterion is the events
which the propositions purport to describe. I submit that this
criterion is involed by all human intellectual enterprises, but
the scientist is set apart from other scholars by an exceptional
faithfulness to the use of events as the ultimate criterion of
the validity of his constructs. In fact, in no other field of
scholarship has there been developed such a complex set of rules
and procedures to insure that a description of events is accurate
rather than misleading. A quotation best illustrates this point.
Insofern sich die Satze der mathematik auf die Wirklich-
keit beziehen sind sie nicht sicher, und insofern sie
sicher sind, beziehen sie sichnichtauf die Wirklichkeit.
(Einstein, Geometrie und Erfahrung, p. 3f.)
The point is that common sense is not a guide to the validity of
scientific constructs. The notions of the man in the street
that he has freedom of the will, as interesting and instructive
as they may be, are of no greater value to science than the as-
sertation of my garbage man the other day when we were having a
philosophical discussion that "you gotta believe in something."
The arbitrer of scientific validity is not the theologian nor the
man in the street. Neither is the scientist the arbitrer of the
validity of theological constructsthough he may sometimes act
as if he were.
The free will versus determinism debate is a subtle trap into
which Robinson blunders, thus following the lead of many of his
contemporaries. That hoary debate has no place in a discussion
of the nature of science since both free will and determinism are
primarily theological doctrines. The debate in its modern form
may be summarized by the St. Augustine-Pelagius controversy (in
which Augustine held that grace was sufficient for. salvation
free will being only an aid to gracewhile Pelagius maintained
that free will was necessary for salvation, and grace was only
an aid to free will); and the Calvin-Arminius controversy (in
which Calvin argued that salvation was an absolute act of Jeho-
vah's willdeterminismand Arminius proposed that salvation
was a matter of grace). This brief summary should remind us all
that both those who attack science in the name of religion be-
cause science is deterministic, and those who defend a doctrine
of determinism in science are inheritors of a long tradition in
Judeo-Christian culture. We should also remind ourselves that sim-
ilar controversies have occurred in other religions as well.
Robinson did not invent the error of regarding determinism as a
scientific assumption. He follows many scientists, among whom
we must number Skinner. Historically speaking, what is the or-
igen of the error? I suggest that scientists as a group have un-
critically carried theological doctrines into science. I fur-
ther propose that an historical analysis of the nature of the
concept of causality itself would repay the effort expended. The
simplistic nineteenth century conceptualization of a single cause
and a single effect was dealt a death blow by the discovery of
radio-activity and the development of quantum mechanics. How-
ever, the expansion of field concepts of causality from physics
into biology and the behavioral sciences appears to me to have
been an extraordinarily slow process. I, for one, would welcome
a description of the cultural factors which have impeded the de-
velopment of field theory especially in the behavioral sciences.
That analysis would be significant to the historian of the be-
havioral sciences.
Of course, attacks such as Robinson's upon science in the name
of religion are not new in history. Andrew White in his A His-
tory of the Warfare of Science with Theology documented the con-
flict and argued that such warfarePwas futile. This last quar-
ter of the twentieth century is the locus of kaleidoscopic at-
tacks by various sects upon science. These include the legis-
lation of equal time for "creation" theories in public school
science courses.
The history of science contains many conservative figures who
attempted to proclaim the limits of scientific method. Frequent-
ly their proclaimations were motivated by an interest in preserv-
ing the authority of the church and preventing the spread of athe-
ism. Yet there would seem to be little to fear: with the pos-
sible exception of Soviet Russia, and more recently hhe People's
Republic of China, governments have continued to align themselves
with conventional religious power structures and the great ma-
jority of all cultural populations have practiced some religious
rites more or less regularly. Robinson is specifically concerned
that behaviorism will have deleterious effects on religious be-
haviors. It appears to me that he has little to worry about.
At the present time the majority of the population of the United
States is religious, and a significant proportion is responsive
to the most bizarre types of mysticism. For example, a recent
book proclaiming that it explains how to harness the mystical pow-
er contained in the great pyramid is reported to have sold over
300,000 copies in English and to be in the process of translation
into seven other languages. With an astrology column in almost
every daily newspaper in these United States the historian need
not seek far for evidence of a significant anti-scientific move-
ment in our culture. In my opinion, it is unfortunate that An
Intellectual History fits so neatly into that significant cultural
10

trend.

Robinson is misguided in his interpretations so often that I

have been stimulated to compose several essays pointing out his
errors. In my view that is the principle benefit of the book;
it led me to examine and justify my own convictions. In this
sense the book serves a very useful purposein contrast to the
dreary parade of chronologies which have recently attempted to
masguerade as histories of psychology. Read the book. I hope
it will stimulate you to examine your own assumptions as it did
me to examine mine.
 Setting Factors

investigator

Stlrului object
Stimulus
FUTitUttl

r=:

A QUARTERLY NEWSLETTER OF
INTERBEHAVIORAL PSYCHOLOGY
PUBLISHED AT HARTWICK COLLEGE
ONEONTA, NEW YORK

Volume 10, Number 2 Pal

To localize a problem in n porsnn and then oven Iur-

ther in the brain of a person , is ;i snienhj Tic mis-
take. Behavior does not arise rxclusively or inn i n 1 y
in a single individual, but rn dhor i n the In rqor so-
cial system of which he is n p.irl..

Psychology takes the con cup tit MI of l-hf ind i vi dun I ;is
its central focus . . . the snc i n I rnn i fxl i s Laki.Mi ns
relevant and perhaps i nf 1 no n I; in I on I; In- i.nd iuidua I .
But, reciprocal feedback IT; 1 <i I" i OTIS hips .'imonq tlu.: ]ii-
ological, psychologies 1 , and r;ncj n 1 .ispncLs oF nx.i s-
toncc a re not taken SIT 10115; I y -
 THE INTERBEHAVIORIST
Editor:
Ronald G. Heyduk, Hartwick College
Associate Editors:
Donna M. Cone, Department of Mental Health, Retardation,
and Hospitals, State of Rhode Island
Dennis J. Delprato, Eastern Michigan University
Edward K. Morris, University of Kansas
Paul T. Mount joy, Vies tern Michigan University
Noel W. Smith, State University of New York, Plattsburgh
The Agora
Some personal reflections on the September American Psycho-
logical Association Convention in Montreal:
This year's convention renewed my excitement about inter-
behaviorism and renewed my hopes that our discipline may.
yet cast away its reductionistic and self-actional meta-
physic. My renewal was partly a result of attending the
interbehavioral symposium chaired by Edward Morris. The
three papers were well-conceived and well-received, William
Verplanck's commentary was outstanding, and the aftermath
provided a rare opportunity for an informal gathering of
interbehavioriststoo brief to be satisfying, but much
better than none at all. For me, however, a number of oth-
er meetings attended at the convention, were the most im-
portant sources of renewal of my enthusiasm and hope for an
interbehavioral psychology. For example, a recurring theme
at the convention (nicely articulated at the "Future History
of Psychology" Symposium sponsored by Division 1) was the
widening rift between humanistic psychologists convinced
that the last century of scientific psychology has been a
grand mistake', and "hard-headed" psychologists convinced
that the greatest threat to psychology is the growing tide
of anti-objectivism exemplified by the humanistic revolu-
tion. Clearly the interbehaviorist is in an excellent pos-
ition to see the merits of both views and to offer a solu-
tion to the rift. Psychology may indeed have taken a wrong
turn a century ago when it embraced the elementarism, mech-
anism, and reductionism of the 19th century physical sci-
ences, but the antidote is not to turn away from science,
but rather to chart a different scientific course, adopt-
ing an interactional perspective that achieves the goals of
objectivism and naturalism and yet would likely be more pal-
atable to the humanist than the current dominant perspect-
Although interbehaviorism may offer a synthesis that would
heal the growing schism between humanists and mainstream
scientific psychologists, I believe that there is little
hope that interbehaviorism will be perceived as holful un-
less interbehaviorists adopt a positive tone in their writ-
ings. While we must, of course, clarify points of disagree-
ment with the traditional perspectives, we must emphasizing
common goals and potential solutions to commonly recognized
problems. For example, vie need to point out to humanists
that interbehaviorism is not just another scientific "bad
guy", that we agree with their point that the last century
of psychology has not been satisfactory, and that an inter-
behavioral psychology would attain many of their desired
goals. Similarly, we need to demonstrate to mainstream
scientific psychologists other than our behaviorists cous-
ins that interbehaviorism offers not just metatheory and
criticism, but also some very specific prescriptions for
how to run the everyday business of psychology more effec-
tively.
Other sessions at the Convention offered encouragement that
the ranks of psychologists who are singing the praises of
interactional psychology (although they may know little of
interbehaviorism) are growing. A good example was the "De-
fining a New Psychology" paper session, and especially
Thomas Cassell's paper on "The Trajectory of Coupled Organ-
isms", a compelling, example-filled indictment of reduc-
tionism, organocentrism, and the separation of the observer
and the observed. Another example was the address given
by John W. Atkinson, recipient of the 1979 Distinguished
Scientific Contribution Award. Atkinson made it clear that
the contributions to the fields of personality and motiva-
tion for which he received the award were a result of break-
ing the conceptual and methodological shackles of two gen-
erally accepted "bifurcations of nature" that interbehav-
iorists recognize to be arbitrary: the separation of sit-
utational from personal determinants of behavior; and the
separation of one behavior segment from preceding and suc-
ceeding ones.
So it appears that interbehaviorists are "out there," even
though they don't know they're interbehaviorists! This
suggests another communication goal: not only should we
try to communicate more effectively with those who are not
our direct intellectual kin, but also we should do a bet-
ter job of reaching those who are our kin but know little
of Kantorian interbehaviorism and do not receive this news-
letter. To that end, one of my goals this year is to tap
new sources of potential subscribers by placing material
concerning the newsletter in several journals which fre-
quently publish articles reflecting a commitment to inter-
actional premises. Also, Edward Morris recommends that
readers of The Interbehayic-rist send out subscription forms
(available upon request) with the reprints they distribute,
and reprints to authors cited in papers appearing in this
publication.
On the other hand, I am not recommending that our aim ought
to be to "convert" those with similar ideas to interfaehav-
iorism. I suggest that such a parochial goal would be na-
ive and counterproductive. Perhaps it is obvious to read-
 ers, but if the psychology we desire is to come about, it
will almost certainly not come about under the banners of
"interbehaviorism," or any other provincial banner for that
matter. It is highly unlikely that the size and structure
of modern psychology will allow our small group of inter-
behaviorists to lead a revolution analogous to the behav-
ioristic revolution spearheaded by John B. Watson. It is
more realistic to expect a gradual evolution (perhaps al-
ready in progress) toward a less self-actional, reduction-
istic, elementaristic psychology. This evolution will be
the result of the work of psychologists like Cassell and
Atkinson who speak different languages, but who in their
own work have discovered the advantages of an" interactional
psychology. As interbehaviorists, our goal ought to be to
make sure we are ah integral part of the evolution by be-
ing productive psychologists who can interact with and
give support to others with different labels but similar
convictions.
The Editor
Your written .reactions to my comments will be most appreci-
ated.
H. H. Pronko's Psychology From the Standpoint of An Inter-
behaviorist (Brooks-Cole) was published this fall. It is
written for the intoductory psychology student with the aim
of "providing my readers with a strategic perspective for
working out their eventual orientation." In my view, its
rejection of the incoherent eclecticism characteristic of
most introductory texts is a major strength. I urge you to
consider it carefully for possible adoption. Peter Holmes
(Department of Psychology, Eastern Michigan University,
Ypsilanti, MI, 48197) is constructing 150-175 multiple choice
items to go along with the text. He would be happy to send
a copy (along with point biserial correlations and percent
correct data) to anyone interested.
Dennis J. Delprato of Eastern Michigan University and Edward
K. Morris of the University of Kansas have agreed to serve
as Associate Editors of The Intejrbehaviorist. In the last
two years, they have been consistent contributors and have
made many helpful suggestions, and we look forward to their
continuing support. The editor also wishes to quash .the ru-
mor that we now have more editors than subscribers.
Edward Blewitt, a past contributor to The Interbehaviorist,
has nov; completed his doctoral studies at University College,
Cardiff, Wales. He is looking for an opportunity to conduct
collaborative research in the experimental analysis of de-
velopmental retardation in naturalistic settings. He is al-
so interested in investigating the implications of interbe-
haviorism and radical behaviorism for problems in philosophy
and politics. His address is: 51 Pen-Y-Lan Road, Roath,
Cardiff CF25H2, U.K.
Noel Smith alerts readers to a segment under "Research Mews"
in the December 12, 1980 issue of Science (Volume 210) enti-
tled "Is Your Brain Really Necessary?"
The three-page report by Roger Lewin summarizes the work and
conclusions of John Lorber, a British neurologist who claims
that a substantial proportion of hydrocephalic patients with
severly reduced brain tissue show no intellectual or other
functional impairment. Among other examples, Lorber recounts
the case of a university honors student in mathematics with
an IQ of 126 who has "virtually no brain." It is suggested
that Lorber's findings are not as unusual as one might assume,
but that such findings are generally given short shrift be-
cause they are inconsistent with our dominant assumptions
about the role of the brain in behavior.
Noel Smith also reports that "the volume of original inter-
behavioral papers that we were trying to publish through
'Paths In Psychology' was returned with the statement, 'He
tried to interest a number of publishers in publishing your
book, but none of them felt that there was a sufficient mar-
ket for them to make a profit.' I have returned the papers
to the authors with the recommendation that they seek inde-
pendent publication." A bibliography from the proposed vol-
ume will appear in a future issue of The Interbehaviorist.
Of interest to interbehaviorists is an article appearing in
the Fall 1980 issue of The Psychological Record (Volume 30,
Number 4) by John R. Knapp and Dennis J. Delprato entitled
"Will power, behavior therapy, and the public." Dennis Del-
prato has provided an abstract:
465 respondents completed a questionnaire that was present-
ed as a "survey to determine the extent to which individ-
uals perceive will power (or inner strength) as necessary
for individuals to successfully overcome various problems."
24 problem behaviors of a variety of types were included
on the questionnaire and the respondent rated the import-
ance of will power for overcoming each problem on a 7-point
scale.
Will power was rated as more necessary for overcoming cer-
tain problems (e.g., alcoholism, smoking) than for over-
coming others (e.g., inability to swim, poor mathematical
ability). Of special interest were the findings that ra-
ted agreement of the necessity of will power was unrelated
to years of education, whether or not the respondent ever
 attended a college, particular college attended, and number Mr. John V. Miller, Jr.
of psychology classes completed. The authors state, "... Director of Archival Services
the absence of a relationship between adherence to will University of Akron
power and a variety of variables pertaining to respondents'
Akron, Ohio 4-1325
formal education indicates that scientific psychology has
had little impact concerning this particular traditional,
culturally transmitted explanatory concept. This finding
supports the assertions of Kantor (1963, 1969, 1971) and
Skinner (1971, 1974) that the views of scientific psychol-
ogy are often subsidiary to those that individuals glean
from their broader culture. It is perhaps most discourag-
ing that, for the present sample, adherence to will power
was not related to the number of psychology classes complet-
ed even though a variety of different colleges and univer-
sities were represented. This result leads one to wonder
what students are learning in psychology classes if they
complete such classes still holding to will power "theory"
when tested outside of the classroom setting. It appears
that behavioral psychology has far to go toward overcoming
traditionally held assumptions regarding human behavior.

Also appearing in the Fall 1980 issue of the Record are three
other articles with an interbehavioral orientationT "Theo-
retical Psychology; Where Is It Headed?" by Parker E. Lich-
tenstein; "On Behaviorism and Private Events" by Jay Moore;
and "Exploratory Behavior in Infants and Animals" by Sidney
W. Bijou.

Research Fellowship
History of Psychology Foundation

The Research Fellowship, funded by the History of Psychology

Foundation and awarded by the University of Akron, is inten-
ded to promote research in the history of psychology through
the granting of stipends of up to $750 to aid scholars wish-
ing to utilize the primary resources of the Archives of the
History of American Psychology, Bierce Library, University
of Akron. The stipend is intended to defray travel and liv-
ing expenses and the recipient is expected to reside in Akron
while using the materials of the Archives.

Candidates should submit a prospectus of the work planned, a

vita, and two letters of recommendation. It is particularly
important that there be evidence that the Archives is the
most suitable place for the work to be undertaken. Preference
will be given to advanced graduate students and younger post
doctoral scholars.
Applications should"be completed by March 1, 1981. The award
will be announced not later than April 15th. Applications
should be sent to the chairman of the University of Akron
awards committee:
I

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A QUARTERLY NEWSLETTER OF
INTERBEHAVIORAL PSYCHOLOGY
PUBLISHED AT HARTWICK COLLEGE
ONEONTA, NEW YORK
Volume 10, Number 3 Winter 1981

our conception...does not take into consideration

the customary hypothesis that...performances are
the expression of certain physio-chemical pro-
cesses. Certainly, in a complete theory of the
organism, we must also take these processes into
account. However, according to our view, they
play no_ greater part than the other phenomena^,
but are only coordinated -with them.

Kurt Goldstein, 1939. The organism.

New York: American BooR Company, p, 121.
 THE INTERBEHAVIORIST
Editor:
Ronald G. Heyduk, Hartwick College
Associate Editors;
Donna H. Cone, Department of Mental Health, Retardation,,
and Hospitals, State of Rhode Island
Dennis J, Delprato, Eastern Michigan University
Edward K, Morris, University of Kansas
Paul T. Mountjoy, Western Michigan University
Noel W. Smith, State University of New York, Plattsburgh
The Agora
For the second consecutive year, the meeting of the Associa-
tion for Behavior Analysis has provided a forum for Interbe-
havioral psychology. Following is the program for an
invited symposium at this year's meeting:
The Relevance of Interbehavioral Psychology
for Behavioral Research
Edward K. Morris, Chair
Paper 1. Edward K. Morris, Stephen T. Higgins, and Warren
K. Bickel (Department of Human Development, Uni-
versity of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas 66045; 913-
864-4840), "The Influence of Kantor's Interbehav-
ioral Psychology on Behavior Analysis."
Paper 2. James W. HcKearney (The Worcester Foundation for
Experimental Biology, Shrewsbury, Mass. 01545;
617-842-8921, Ext. 322), "OrganIsm-Environment
Relations in the Analysis of Behavior."
Paper 3. Sidney W. Bijou (Department of Special Education,
University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona 85721;
602-626-3214), "Child Development and Interbehav-
ioral Psychology,"
Paper 4. Donna M. Cone (Department of Mental Health,
- Retardation, <and Hospitals, 600 New London Ave.f
Cranston, R.I.! 02920; 401-464-1000), "Behavioral
Applications: Complexity of the >True State 'of
Affairs." - passivity of this editorial that caught my attention^ It
Discussant; Paul T. Mountjoy (Department of Psycho-
logy, Western Michigan University, Kala-
mazoo, Michigan 49008; 616-383-6246)
Edward Morris provided some comments on the paper that he
co-authored:
My paper with Higgins and Bickel is based, in part, on a
giant questionnaire survey (shades of G.S. Hall) to all
present and past editors of JEflB, JABA, and Behaviorism.
It asks about their acquaintance with interbehavioral
psychology and their estimates of it on several dimen-
sions... The return rate has been good, and some of the
answers interesting, ranging from the laudatory to the
very critical.
A copy of the questionnaire that Morris et al used may be
obtained from the editor.
In the last issue of The Interbehaviorist the editor made
some predictions and recommendations about the future of
interbehavioral psychology. One response that was received
wag especially thoughtful, eloquent, and challenging. It
appears below.
A Challenge to the Interbehaviorists
Michael H. MacRoberts
740 Columbia
Shreveport, LA 71104
Dr. Heyduk has asked for comments on his editorial in
The Interbehaviprist (Vol. 10,No. 2) . Here are mine.
Since I began studying Kantor's writings some five years
ago, I have been struck by the fact that interbehaviorism
is almost unknown within psychology and completely un-
known outside it. N, Smith's annotated list of citations
to Kantor's work is enough to convince anyone of this. The
question I have asked myself is s why is interbehaviorism
unknown? I suspect that the answer is that most psycholo-
gists have never come into contact with it and that most
of those who have, have rejected it because it seemingly
"empties" the organism, and as Kantor has shown, an "empty"
organism is of no Interest to most psychologists.
There now exists a second generation of interbehavioristsi
This handful of scholars obviously considers Kantor's work
revolutionary and important, but they seem to be neither
prolific nor especially concerned with spearheading a revo-
lution. Let me underline this point by referring to the
closing paragraph of Dr. Heyduk's editorial, the message of
which seems clear. Instead of pro.selytizing, interbehav-
lorists appear to be willing to let psychology slowly and
falterlngly evolve toward their own position. It is the
is as if interbehaviorism had its Darwin but lacked its
Huxley.
But let me expand my comment. The motive power behind
scientific evolution Is the constant pressure put on
current theory by individuals who have discovered new
facts or who have reevaluated the status of current theory.
Without this pressure, science would not evolve; it would
drift-or worse, stagnate and degenerate. Passivity is ab-
normal or contrary to normal science where, in all ages,
men with novel ideas have fought to get these ideas before
their colleagues. If interbehaviorists feel that they have
a contribution to make then they have the obligation as
scientists to challenge psychology and to change it either
by deflecting its course or by speeding it up.
My suggestion therefore is that an active, not a passive,
program be initiated. I suggest that what the second
generation leaders of interbehaviorism ought to do is
essentially what the American Realists did in 1910, Find-
ing themselves in philosophical disagreement with the
reigning paradigm, Holt, Marvin/ Montagu, Perry, Pitkin,
and Spaulding co-authored "A Program and First Platform of
Six Realists" and a year later The New Real-ists. No one
could miss the challenge of these two polemics.
I would propose that five or more interbehaviorists begin
by co-authoring a paper entitled something like "The Inter-
behaviorist Manifesto" and publish it in a major psychology
journal. The reason for co-authoring is tactical. By
doing so, it should be clear that interbehaviorism is a
movement with a well-defined and agreed-upon platform, not
the aberration of an eccentric singleton. While the con-
tent of the article would have to be negotiated among the
authors, I would suggest that it focus on three main
things: the conceptual nervous system (mentalism), physio-
logical reductionism, and self-action. The remainder of
the interbehavioral system follows once the traditional
CNS is discarded. The interactional, adjustmental, and
developmental aspects of interbehaviorism should be empha-
sized as should the advantages of interbehaviorism over
other systems. I would suggest a polemical style and I
would include a selected bibliography.
I would further suggest that the principal author be an
interbehaviorist who is in the main stream of things and
that he produce the first draft, which he would then send
to those colleagues who have agreed to be co-authors.
These individuals would then carefully comment on the
paper and return it to the principal author. He would
then rewrite and send his co-authors this revised draft
for further comment. The senior author would then be
responsible for the final draft and submitting it. Indi-
vidual differences of opinion should not be allowed to
overshadow the group effort..
Once this is accomplished (or while it is being done)' I
would suggest that the same group begin writing a booh
entitled something provocative like Interbphayigrism!
The New Psychology. The purpose of the book woul<I fee to
follow up in greater detail the points made in the article.
Each contributor would write a chapter or two, again in
polemical style,' with the intention of putting the current
state of psychology into historical perspective. Each
chapter would explain the interbehavioral system and its
advantages over rival systems. ..This-book would contain
chapters on history of psychology, the CNS, perception,
language, drive, self-action, and so on. Some of the chap-
ters that were intended for the N. Smith edited Paths in
Psychology are of the type I have in mind.
The aim of these exercises of course is to bring interbe-
haviorism to the attention of other psychologists. Any
negative reaction would be followed by counterattack. But,
and here is where the interbehaviorist has the advantage:
any attackers will be obliged by the rules of thorough
scholarship to familiarize themselves with the interbeha-
vioral literature. This is the real aim, for I believe
that no one can become familiar with interbehaviorism
without some benefit to his own thinking, and no one who is
already on the path to rejecting self-action, reductionism,
and mentalism can fail to see the import of Kantor's work.
Consequently, while psychology may be evolving toward an
interbehaviorist position, I see no reason why interbehav-
iorists should take only a supporting role in this evolu-
tion when they are already intellectual principals. I see
no reason not to "convert" those with similar ideas nor why
a revolution can not and should not come about under the
banner of "interbehaviorism".
HacRoberts made a few additional comments in a letter en-
closed with his reaction that I believe are worth sharing:
Of course, being an outsider to psychology, I can't really
tell what its status actually is, but from my peripheral
position, I can see nothing approximating Kantor's posi-
tion (taken as a whole). I can see bits and pieces of it
or something resembling it in psychology, ethology, anthro-
pology, and philosophy, e.g., here we have a philosopher
making "interbehaviorist" noises about perception, and
there an anthropologist who has discovered that "culture"
is related to the environment, but what I don't find is a
complete program: just bits and pieces. (I can even find
bits and pieces in Abelard, St. Thomas, Ockham and others
as well). My sidelines view oft psychology and the place
of interbehaviorism in it may have led me to a distorted
view but then again, maybe it has not. This is for you
as insider to decide.
A Reply to MacRoberts' Challenge to
the Interbehaviorists
Ronald G. Heyduk
Hartwick College
In MacRoberts1 response to my editorial, he suggests that
we disagree about the proper role for infcerbehaviorists
in the promotion of interbehavioral assumptions in psycho-
logy. I believe that while there are points of disagree-
ment between us, they are somewhat different (and less

severe) than he suggests. MacRoberts characterizes my
position as "passive", whereas he suggests that interbehav-
iorists must take a more active part in encouraging an
interbehavioral psychology. I have no quarrel with his
suggestion! in fact, I in-tended my editorial to be a call
for activity, not passivity. It is with regard to the kind
of actions that interbehaviorists should be engaging in
that there is a disagreement - but even then our disagree-
ment is only partial.
MacRoberts argues compellingly that scientists whose views
clash with the dominant paradigm in their field have a duty
to challenge that paradigm, and that an aggressive* polemical
posture is needed to mount a serious challenge. His position
is sound. Like any scientists who disagree with the main-
stream of their discipline, interbehaviorists must be will-
ing to argue fervently with those psychologists who give aid
and comfort to our intellectual arch-enemies mentalism,
reductionism, and self-actionalism. Certainly this news-
letter has been a forum for such polemics, and it will con-
tinue to be (e.g., see N. Smith's response to Florence
Denmark's A.P.A, Presidential Address in the next issue).
MacRoberts1 proposals for a polemical "Interbehaviorist Mani-
festo" in a major journal and a follow-up book are also
attractive* and I did not intend by my editorial to dis-
courage such activity* In summary, I agree with HacRoberts
that it is desirable (and our duty as scientists) to engage
in confrontation politics with those whose views are in
conflict with our own.
It is in regard to how to relate to our intellectual kin--
psychologists like Atkinson, Cassellj Schafer (see paper by
Delprato in the next issue), and others who may not know of
interbehaviorism but whose work reflects some of its premises-
that MacRoberts and I may disagree. HacRoberts takes issue
with my statement that our goal ought not to be to "convert"
those with similar ideas to interbehaviorism. If in suggest-
ing that conversion ought to be our goal he is recommending
that we deal with our potential allies in the same fashion as
our enemies, then I respectfully disagree. An aggressive,
polemical style is not, I believe, the most productive mode of
interaction with those who share at least some common assump-
tions with us. In my view, interbehaviorists have been too
inclined to build barriers and too little inclined to build
bridges between themselves and their intellectual neighbors,
and an intellectual isolationism has resulted. By promoting
mutual understanding through emphasizing points of agree-
ment with those- who, in HacRoberts1 words, are "already on
the path to rejecting self-action, reductionism, and menta-
lism", we may in fact "convert" them to Kantorian interbehav-
iorism, for the virtues of Kantor's systematic approach
should be evident. But we must be prepared to learn as well
as teach and that means we must be receptive to intellectual
alliances involving some modifications of our own positions.
So, then, let us continue and even escalate our attacks
against mainstream psychology, let us write our "interbehav-
iorist Manifesto"-and if an interbehavioral revolution takes
7
place, so much the better for psychology. But if, as
seems likely, an evolution and not a revolution is the
means whereby psychology sheds its mentalism, reductionism
and self-actionalism, let us be a part of that evolution,
even if we must lose our identity as interbehaviorists in
the process.
Noel Smith has provided a copy of the bibliography originally
intended for the volume of original interbehavioral papers
that did not find a publisher. It will appear in The
Interbehaviorist in segments in this and forthcoming issues:
A Selected and Classified Bibliography of Interbehavioral
Works
1. POSTULATES OF THE SYSTEM AND POSTULATION
1.1 Kantor, J.R. Interbehavioral psychology! A sample
of scientific system construction^Bloomington,
Ind.t Principia Press, 1959.
1.2 Kantor, J.R. & Smith, N.W. Chp. 25: Psychology as
systematic science. The science of psychology!
An Interbehavioral Survey. Cfiicagb": PrincipTa
Press, 1975.
1.3 Lichtenstein, P .E. Psychological systems! Their
nature and function. Psychological Record, 1967,
1 7 , 321-340. : :
1.4 Stephenson, W. Postulates of behaviorism. Philoso-
phy of Science, 1953, 20, 110-120.
2. THE SYSTEM AND ITS UTILIZATION
2.1 Bijou, S.W. Development in the preschool years: A
functional analysis. Ameri ca n Psychplogjls_t,
1975, 30, 829-837.
2.2 Bucklew, J. Complex behavioral units of the reac-
tional biography. Psychologica 1 Record,' 1956,
6_, 44-47.
2.3 Carter, J.W. A case of reactional dissociation.
American Journal of ^Jrthopsychiatry, 1937, 7_,
219-224.
2.4 Delprato, D.J. The reactional biography concept!
Early contributions to a perspective for the
psychology of aging. Human Development, 1980,
23, 314-322.
2.5 Herman, D.T. What is the stimulus? Psychologi. cal
Record, 1957, 7, 70-72.

2.6 Herman, D.T, & Kenyon, G.T. A contribution toward
interbehavioral analysis: I. Some general
concepts. Psychological Record, 1956, (>, 33-36.
2.7 Kantor, J.R. Chp. 1: The domain, method, and develop-
ment of psychology; Chp. 2; The primary data of
psychology; Chp. 14: The nature of volitional
conduct . Principles of Psychology, Vol . 1 .
New York: Knopf, 1924.
2.8 Lichtenstein, P.E. Psychology as a genetic science.
Journal of General Psychology, 1950, 4j> 313-332.
2.9 Lichtenstein, P.E. The significance of the stimulus
function . Interbehavioral Psychology newsletter,
1970, 1 (1).
2.10 Lundin, R.W. An objective psychology of music, rev.
ed . Ronald, 1967.
2.11 MacUoberts, H.H. 6 MacRobeirts, B.R. Interbehaviorism
and animal communication theory. The Interbehay-
iorist, 1979-80, , 4-11.
2.12 i-lountjoy, P.T. Science in psychology: J.R. Kantor's
field theory. Mexican Journal of Behavior Analysis,
1976, 2., 3-21.
2.13 Observer. Psychology in the service of mankind.
Psychological Record, 1979, 29, 419-422.
2.14 Pronko, N.H. Textbook of abnormal psychology Williams
S Wilkins, 1963T ' 3.5
2.15 Ratner, S.C* Three questions about experimental
extinction. Psychological Record, 1956, , 9-10.
2.16 Ratner, S.C. The search for learning and memory mecha-
nisms. In W.C. Corning & S.C. Ratner (Eds.),
Chemistry of learning; Invertebrate research.
Plenum Press, 1967.
2.17 Ray, R.D, Physiological experiments as interbehavioral
systems: A case study from the Soviet Union.
Psychological Record, 1977, 2_, 279-306.
2.18 Ray, R.D. fi Drown, D.A. A systems approach to behavior
Psychological Record, 1975, 25_, 459-478.
2.19 Sanders, S.L. & Cone, D.H. A critique of Kohlberg's
theory of moral development from the viewpoint of
interbehavioral psychology. Interbehavioral
Quarterly, 1975, 6_{2), 8-23.
2.20 Smith, N.W. Iitterbehavioral psychology: Roots and
Branches. Psychological- Re'c'ord, 1973, 23, 153-167
2.21 Smith, N.W. Interbehavioral Psychology. International
J
Encyclopedia of Psychiatry, Psychology, Psychoana-
sycl
lysis, and Neurology,Vol. 6, 125-126, Van
Moatrand Reinhold, 1977 .
2.22 Smith, N.W. fi Shaw, N.E. An analysis of commonplace
behaviors: Volitional acts. Ppycholg_gical
Record, 1979, 29^ 179-186.
2.23 Stephenson, W.S. The stiudy of behavior; Q-technigue
and its methodology.' University oiT Chicago, 1953.
2.24 Zimmerman, D.W. Quantum theory and interbehavioral
psychology. Psychological Record, 1979, 29,
473-485.
EVALUATION OF THE SYSTEM
3.1 Bentley, A.F, Chp. 12: The apprehensional space-seg-
ment: Kantor; Behavior, Knowledge , Fact .
Bloomington , IncTT: Principle Press7 1935 .
3 .2 Blumenthal, A.L, Language and psychology! Historical
aspects of psycholinguistics. New York:^Biley ,
3.3 Carter, J.W. An experimental study of the stimulus-
function. Psychological Record , 1937, 1, 35-48.
3.4 Carter, J.W. An experimental study of psychological
stimulus-response. Psychological Record, 1938,
2_, 35-91.
Dewey, J. 5 A.F. Bentley, Chp. 8: Logic in an age of"
science; Knowing and the known. Boston: Beacon
Press, 1941T
3.6 Farrington, J. Utilization of psychological constructs
by group therapy participants. Psychological
Record, 1972, 22, 387-394.
3.7 Farrington, J. Some advantages of interbehaviorism.
Interbehavioral Quarterly, 1975, 6.O), 9-10.
3.8 Gewlrtz, J.L. Deprivation and satiation of social
stimuli as determinants of their reinforcing
efficacy. In J.P. Hill (J5d.), Minnesota sympo-
sium on child psychology, Vol . T~. University
of Minnesota "Presa~7" 1967.
3.9 Herman, D.T. & Engstrand, R. Order effect in problem
solving. Psychological Reports, 1957, 3_, 623-626.
3.10 Herrick, J.W. Kantor's anticipation of current
approaches in- anthropology. Psychological Record,
1974, 24, 253-257.
10 ,
3.11 Heydukr R,G. Cracks in the '."billiard ball" organism.
Interbehavioral Newsletter, .1970, H3).
3.12 Lazar, J.W. A comparison of some theoretical propo-
sals of J.R. Kantor and T.C. Sohneirla. Psycho-
logical Record, 1974, 2^, 177-190.
3.13 Lazzeroni, V. II Compartimento Organismico di E.
(sic) Kantor; Le grigine della Psicplpgia Contem
oranea. Florence 7 Italy: Editrlcer~0niversitaria
f 1976-77, 7/1,2), 4-11, 3^12^
3.14 Lundin, R.W. Chp, 13: Later behaviorism; Theories
and systems of .psychology,* Lexington, Mass, i
Heath, 1972.
3.15 Marx, H. & Hillix, 17. A. Chp. Hi Varieties of field
theory. Systems and theories :in psychology.
New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973.
3.16 Mount joy j P.T. Science in psychology: J.R. Kantor's
Field Theory, Mexican Journal of Behavior
Analysis , 19767~^, 3-21.
3.17 Mountjoy, P.T. & Smith, N.W. A reply to Thornton's
"Socrates and the history of psychology."
Journal of the History of^the Behavioral Sciences,
197.1, T_, 183-186. ~
3.18 Neu, D.H, A critical review of the literature on
"absolute pitch". Psychological Bulletin, 1942,
4_4, 249-266. .
3.19 Poyer, G. Review of "Association as a fundamental
process of objective psychology," Psychological
Review , 1921, 28, 482-483, In L'Annee Psychologic,
1922, 23_, 482-T83.
3.20 Pronko, N.H. Language and psychological linguistics:
A review. Psychological Bulletin, 1946, 43^
189-239.
3.21 Pronko, H.H.; Ebert, R. ; S Greenberg, G. A critical
review of theories perception. In A.L. Kidd s
J.L. Rivoire (Eds* ) , Perceptua^ development in
children. New York: International Universities,
1966.
3.22 Robinson, E.s, Review of Principles of Psychology ,
Vol. 1, International ' JournaT" of Ethics, 1924-25,
3J>, 429-432";
3.23 Ruch, G.M. Review of Principles of Psychology, Vol. 1.
Journal of Philosophy, 1926, 23, 248-2457
3.24 Smith, N.W. (Chm. & Orgz.). Contextual inter-
actiohists: A symposium. Psychological Record,
1973, 23, 281-334.
3.25 Smith, N.W, The works of J.R. Kantori Pioneer in
scientific psychology. Hex i c an Journ a l o f Behav-
ior Analysis, 1976, 2, 1 3 7 - 1 4 8 ~ , ~ ~ ~ ~~
3.26 Tilquin, B.A. Book 2, Ph. 2, Chp. 1: Behaviorisme et
biology: La psychologic organique de Kantor; Le
behaviproisms origine__gt developpement de lapsy-
chplpgie de r'ea_ction~en Aineriquie. ParTsT
Librairie Phllosophique, 1950. Trans, by N.
Weissinger 6 L. Leduc, Interbehavioral Quarterly,
3.27 Wolf, I.S. Stimulus variables in aphasia: I. Setting
conditions. Journal of the Scientific Laboratories
Denison University, 1958, '44, 203-218.
3.28 Wolf, I.S. Stimulus variables in aphasia: II. Stimu-
lus objects. Denison University, 1958, 44, 218-228
3.29 Woodworth, R.S. Chp. 7: Hormic and holistic psycho-
logies ; Contemporary schools of psychology, rev
ed. Hew York:Ronald Press, 1948.
THE ROLE OF THE NERVOUS SYSTEM
4.1 Delprato, D.J. The iiiterbehavioral alternative to
brain-dogma. Psychological Record, 1979, 29,
409-418.
4.2 Kantor, J.R. The nervous system: Psychological fact
or fiction? Journal of- Philosophy, 1922, 19,
38-49.
4.3 Kantor, J.R. The organismic versus the mentalistic .
attitude toward the nervous system. P syc hologica1
Bulletin, 1923, 20^ 684-692.
4.4 Kantor, J.R. Problems of physiological psychology.
Bloomington, Ind.: Principle Press, 1947.
4.5 Observer. On the reduction of psychology to physics.
Psychological' Record, 1969, 1, 515-518,
4.6 Observer. The basis fallacy in psychology. Psycholo-
gical Record, 1969, 19_, 645-648.
4.7 Observer. Disunity in science; Inconcinnity in
psychology. Psychglggi^Gal Record, 1971, 21,,
565-569.
4.8 H.C. Warren. Psychology and the central nervous sys-
tem. Psychological Review, 1921, 2, 249-269.
4.9 H.C. Warren. Neurology: Mystical and magical.
Psychological Bulletin, 1923, 2, 438-44.
4.10 Warren, H.C. Reply to Dr. Kantor. P sy chologica1
Bulletin, 1923, 20, 633-694.
 Preceding

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A QUARTERLY NEWSLETTER OF
INTERBEHAVIORAL PSYCHOLOGY
PUBLISHED AT HARTWICK COLLEGE
ONEONTA, NEW YORK

Volume 10, Number 4 Spring 1981

As the interbehavioral approach attempts to show,

biological factors are always involved in or-
ganismic activities, but they (a) are not separate
from behavior, (b) are not antecedent of behavior,
(c) do not cause behavior, (d) do not manufacture
psychological events, and (e) are not the under-
lying bases of behavior.

Dennis Delprato, 1979. The interbehav-

ioral alternative to brain-dogma.
Psychological Record, Volume 29, p

THE INTERBEHAVIORIST
Editor:
Ronald G. Heyduk, Hartwick College
Associate Editors:
Donna H. Cone, Department of Mental Health, Retardation,
and Hospitals, State of Rhode Island
Dennis J. Delprato, Eastern Michigan University
Edward K. Morris, University of Kansas
Paul T* Mountjoy, Western Michigan University
Noel W. Smith, State University of New York, Plattsburgh
The Agora
In Volume 31 , Number 1 (Winter 1981) of The Psychological
Record , an article appeared by D. A. Boswell entitled "Meta-
phor arid Observation in Science", It Is highly critical of
Kantorian interhehavlorism's claim that "mind" and "con-
sciousness" are useless and dangerous metaphors, I urge
readers who missed it to find the issue or request a reprint
from D. A. Boswell, Department of Psychology, Western Univer
sity, Middletovm, CT. 06457. The editor is currently draft
ing a reply, hopefully for publication in the Record. I
would be most interested in the reactions of otTher ^readers ,
and would be happy to include them in the next issue of The
Inter behavior is ti
With this issue, we conclude the tenth volume of our quarter-
ly newsletter of interbehavioral psychology. Enclosed is a
subscription form for Volume 11, the first issue of which
will appear at the end of the summer. I would be happy to .
publish your reactions not only to the Boswell article men-
tioned above, but also to MacRoberts' provocative comments
(and my reply) in Volume 10, Number 3.
* * *
Dennis Delprato prefaces the following contribution with:
Readers of The Interbehaviqrist may find... of interest...
(Roy) ShafeF's attempt to radically revise Freudian Meta-
psychology. I think that his work is consistent with your
(the editor's) comments in the most recent issue (Volume 10,
Number 2) concerning 'your reflections on the APA conven-
tion.
Some Notes on Roy Schafer's Revolutionary
Alternative to Freudian Metapsychology
Dennis J. Delprato
Eastern Michigan University
Picture a psychoanalysis without force, energy, cathexis,
function, structure, self, motive, drive, an unconscious,
an id, an ego, a superego, libidinal energy, mental places,
emotion entities, causes; a psychoanalysis in which the indi-
vidual does not "have" feelings or impulses or dispositions
or habits or symptoms or sublimation; a psychoanalysis that
does not speak of psychological depth, impulses that under-
lie actions, discharge or depletion of pent-up or displaced
energy or cathexis. According to this psychoanalysis, we
do not speak of "a" wish as an active or propulsive entity
or force; nor do we say that anyone "has" a wish; we do not
speak of "a" motive, "the" motive, "having" or "lacking" a
motive, strong motivation, or motivational hierarchies.
When speaking of the historical factors that are considered
relevant to a psychological event, this psychoanalysis does
not designate them the "causes" of the agent's action.
This psychoanalysis tells us it is wrong to say that a per-
son seems to be saying one thing and is "really" saying
another. This psychoanalysis leads us to maintain "it is
not necessary to assume that an action, in the sense of
whatever is carried out behaviorally, spoken, or thought,
must have been prepared by. some immediately preceding
mental activity that sets the stage for that action"
(Schafer, 1976,-p. 225). In the framework of this psycho-
analysis, "we may say that peggle_just dp what they dj? and
,..we need not qualify this s t at ement~ with suggest Tons of
prior reflective activity" (Schafer, 1976, p. 233).
And picture thiss "We need not assume that each action
must be triggered by something. We view actions histori-
cally ;. that is, as following one another in a sequence that
is intelligible in a number of related ways; the sequence
is more than a chaotic chronicle whose only organizing
principle is the passage of time. In this respect psycho-
analysis is an historical appr6ach to lives...But histori-
cal background is not to be confused with the ideas of
preparatory phases of thought and causal motives that some-
how precede, underlie, trigger, and guide action."
(Schafer, 1976, p. 232).
Since emotion is not an entity, it is wrong to speak of
"the expression of emotion." One does not put feelings or
emotions into words, for "to say that one is putting a
feeling into words is to imply, what is no longer admissible,
both that there is an independently existing emotion-entity
and that this entity remains unchanged by being verbalized;
that is to say, it is to imply that an emotion is what it
is apart from the action by which we bring it into the
world, such as naming, choosing words, gesturing, and
observing one's actions." (Schafer, 1976, p. 301),
What of the concept experience? Experience is viewed as a
construction of the TndTvTduaT.
"What the analyaand reports infcrospectively as experience
may be interpreted as one of his or her ways of saying some-
thing about what has been encountered in the world or in the
body or what one has thought up. But, strictly speaking,
that report in itself cannot be taken to show that any-
thing is really the case in the sense that there is some
final, unanalyzable, undescribable account of reality being
reached through inspection of experiential reports...The
inner world of experience is a kind of telling, not a kind
of place." (Schafer, 1978, p. 197).
Furthermore, "one cannot make a good case for retaining
the idea that there exists some kind of subjective expe-
rience (as of emotion) which 'a3_ experience remains privi-
leged...Once all...features have been specified, the notion
of a purely private, experiential remainder becomes super-
fluous..."(Schafer, 1976, p. 308).
The above summarizes some of what psychoanalysis discards,
in the view of Roy Schafer, the first Sigmund Freud Memo-
rial Visiting Professor at University College London (1975-
76). According to Schafer, the viability of clinical psy-
choanalysis, an interpretative discipline whose concern it
is to construct life histories of human beings, requires
radical revision of Freud's nineteenth-century natural
science languagehis metapsychology. He contends that
psychoanalysts speak in the language rejected above because
of their acceptance of the mechanistic, cause-effect,
reductionistic world view available to Freud. Schafer's
rejection of metapsychology and his alternativeaction lan-
guagehave been influenced by writing such as that of Ryle
(1949) and Wittgenstein (1934-35, 1945-49). Those psycho-
logists seeking to move psychology away from the dualistic
perspective that is so deeply rooted in our culture should
find Schafer"s writing extremely useful. It is the present
writer's view that Schafer's alternative is compatible with
the philosophical positions of several other revolutionary
(contemporary) alternatives to traditional psychology.
Some of the labels that have been applied to those alter-
natives include: interbehaviorism (Kantor), radical behav-
iorism (Skinner), radical phenomenology (Herleau-Ponty) -,
behavioral epigenesis (Kuo), and dialectical psychology
(Riegel). I further contend that Schafer's psychoanalysis
of action (his alternative to Freud's metapsychology) will
make important contributions toward the eventual acceptance
of a truly scientific psychology. Readers can use the
above summary of what Schafer negates in psychoanalysis to
partially evaluate this claim; his positive contributions
should be of further assistance in this regard. I will
mention some of these.
The central concept in Schafer's alternative is actioni
"We shall regard all psychological processes, events, pheno-
mena or behavior as some kind of activity, henceforth, to
be called action, and shall designate each action by an act-
ive verb stating its nature and by an adverb, when applicable,
stating the mode of this action."
This rule entails that, so far as it is possible to do so
sensibly,^we shall not Use nouns and adjectives to refer to
psychological processes, events, etc. In this, we should
avoid substantive designations of actions as well as adjec-
tival or traitlike designations of modes of action."
"We must understand the word action to include all private
psychological activity that can be made public through
gesture and speech, such as dreams and the unspoken thoughts
of everyday^life, as well as all initially public activity,
such as ordinary speech and motoric behaviors that has some
goal-directed or symbolic properties." (Schafer, 1975,p.44).
Thus, thoughts, wishes, cognition, anxiety, perceptions
are actions thinking, wishing, perhaps expeoting, acting
anxiously, petceiving, respectively. Thoughts, e.g., are
not processes of one kind that initiate action, rather
thinking is an organismic activity that may or may not be
systematically related to certain other activity, including
thinking activity, at particular times. Like the other
contemporary perspectives mentioned above, action"psychoana-
lysis does not restrict our analysis to the individual's
overt behavior as did naive behaviorism; therefore, it is
not behavioristic in the original meaning of behaviorism.
Part of the key to not restricting analysis to overt
behavior is the reliance on observations from the indivi-
dual and consideration of the situation (context); note
how this is in agreement with the other revolutionary
perspectives, especially interbehaviorism, radical behav-
iorism, and radical phenomenology.
It is not infrequent for an analyst working in the frame-
work of interbehaviorism or radical behaviorism to describe
historical and contemporary organism-environment interactions
contributing to an event, then be informed that such an I
account is interesting but, unfortunately, that it is
"mere description" not an explanation. Action psychoanaly-
sis aims at thorough description. Schafer (1976) dis-
cusses how Freud's mechanistic perspective, which holds
that legitimate scientific explanation requires causal
forces, led him to consider his1 account of depression in
terms of action as a mere description. Schafer suggests
that depression is a matter of how individuals interact
with aspects of their life circumstances.
Does conflict refer to internal conflicting impulses,
drives, or cognitions? Schafer suggests that conflict is
a matter of an individual acting in a conflicted manner or
conflictually, e.g., going to the theatre may be about as
attractive as studying.
For some years behavioral therapists have been confused
by the frequent failures to find correlations between what
are often considered to be different "measures of anxiety,"
e.g., heart rate and motor avoidance behavior. The notion
that such measures would correlate assumes that heart rate
and avoidance behavior are reflections or manifestations of
a state of anxiety that is logically distinct from and
antecedent to actions. Once anxiety is recognized as a

term descriptive of activity, not a motive or drive, such
findings are not surprising.
The interactional or transactional nature of Schafer's
alternative is very clear in the suggestion that "we can-
not absolutely separate the definition of a situation and
the definition of a reaction to it, for the two are corre-
lative" (1976, p. 231).
Radical behaviorists, especially, will be glad to hear that
thinking and speaking are rule-following performances.
Finally, self-control is to follow a course of action*
"Self-control is a way of acting * however dramatized the
subjective narrative of this way of acting may be" (1978,
p. 102). Since self-control is not an internal process
separate from acting, to lose self-control or to fail to
exercise self-control is to act differently from when self-
control is exercised.
References
Schafer, R. Psychoanalysis without psychodynamics.
Int. J, Psycho-Anal., 1975, 56, 41-55.
Schafer, R. A new action language for psychoanalysis^
New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, i9vb*
Schafer, R. Language and insight. New Haven: Yale Univ.
Press, 1978.~
* * A
The feature article of the December 1980 issue of the African
Psychologist was the Presidential Address by Florence L. Den-
mark, delivered at the 1980 APA Convention in Montreal, En-
titled "Psyche: From Rocking the Cradle to Rocking the Boat,"
in contains some statements about the origins of the term
"psyche" that are historically inaccurate and perpetuate the
belief that psychology's origins are steeped in dualism. Here
is Noel Smith's reply to Denmark's paper:
Corrections on Use of "Psyche"
Noel W. Smith
State University of New York, Plattsburgh
In Denmark's .(I960) recent article on "Psyche" in the Ameri-
can Psychologist she begins with historical accounts of that
term tnaF"are" Incorrect. She states:
,..psyche is derived from the Greek, in which it origi-
nally signified the soul, the spirit, and the source
of all vitality (p. 1057).
The earliest written source for the use of p_g_yche is in
Homer. He uses it to refer to the last gaspof~Ereath (e.g..
Odyssey, Chp. 5, 1. 468) much as we use expire, meaning
to.breathe Out and to die; in the course of succeeding
centuries -it came to have an affective meaning and was
finally used in a systematic way by Aristotle (Smith,1974).
In De Anima 412a, 28-29, Aristotle defines psyche (trans-
la tecT~as~Trs"oul") as "the first grade of actuality of a
natural body having life potentially in it." That is, it
is the actualization of the organism's fundamental poten-
tiality of actions. Aristotle provides the analogy that
"psyche" is to "soma" as cutting is to the axj it is what
the organism does, it is the life-function of the organism
and is similar to what we would call "behavior" but more
encompassing, for it includes nutritive and locomotive
acts. It also involves such covert behaviors as perceiv-
ing, thinking, dreaming, imagining, knowing, and others.
These are all life-functions of the organism. This is
decidedly not a mind-body dualism nor a putting together
of mind and body, for there is no such distinction to start
with. Aristotle's analysis of psychological events is one
of a thoroughgoing organism-environment relationship and
continuity. It is the potential of the organism to see,
think, or recollect together with the "potential of the
object to be seen, thought about, or recollected. The
joint actualization of these potentials constitutes the
acts of seeing, thinking, or recollecting (Kantor, 1963 j
Randall, I960? Shute, 1941/1964; Smith, 1971, 1974). The
psychological event then is not inside the organism^ or in
a mind acting upon or directing the body, but in the inter-
action of the organism and its environment. This is in
direct contradiction to Denmark's next sentence:
Psychology, which began as the study of the mind de-
tached from physical nature, has come to recognize the
interrelationship between the intangible and the
. material aspects of human life {p. 1057).
This distinction between natural and supernatural, physi-
cal and nonphysical, material and immaterial, soul and
body, and in modern form behavior and cognition or behav-
ior and consciousness developed in the chaotic and inse-
cure times of the Graecb-Roman period, not in the Homeric
or Hellenic periods (Case, 1946; Kantor, 1963; Murray,
1955; Rostovtseff, 1957). Following the Graeco-Roman
developments it became a part of the theology and the
cultural heritage of the West and eventually entered into
psychology as the psycho-physical dualism that Denmark
attributes to the Greeks and to the original meaning of
"psyche".
Perhaps we could take a clue from the Classical Greeks and
rather than struggle with "an attempt to integrate" mind
and body, as Denmark indicates we are doing, we could ques-
tion the assumption about such a distinction. Perhaps also
in the mode of the Greeks we could fruitfully examine con-
crete organism-object interactions rather than putative
metaphysical relationships of mind and body. This would
provide ud with an alternative to traditional arguments
stemming from Graeco-Roman mysticism about whether we are
shaped by an external world or directed by an internal
onet whether there is a double world, an objective one
outside and a subjective one inside; and whether mind
can be integrated with body. These puzzles are artifacts
of historical invention, not data...and not a mode of
Greek thinking.

References
Case, S.J. The origins of Christian supernaturalism^
Chicago": University" of Chicago Press, F94(T
Denmark, F.L. Psyche: From rocking the cradle" to rock-
ing the boat. American Fsychologigt, 1980, 35,
1057-1065.
Kantor, J.R. The scientific e_yolution_o psychology,
Vol 1. Chicago:Principle Press, 1963.
Murray, G. Five stages ofGreek religion. Hew York:
Doubleday, Doran, T955.
Randall, J. Aristotle. New York: Columbia Univer-
sity Press, 1960.

Rostovtseff, M.I. The social_and economic history of

the Roman^mpire" (2nd rev. ed.), 2 vols. Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1957.
Shiite, C. The jisycho logy of Aristotle; An Analysis^ of
the living being.New York:Russell 6 RusselY,
1964 (Originally published, 1941).
Smith, N.W. Aristotle's dynamic approach to sensing and
some current implications, journal of the History
of the Behavioral Sciences, 1971, 7_.375-377.
Smith, N.W. The ancient background to Greek psychology
and some implications for today. Psychological
Record, 1974, 24, 309-324.
A OF
PSYCHOLOGY
AT HARTWICK COLLEGi
ONEONTA, NEWYOFU

Volume 11, Number 1 Winter 198

It is astonishing what havoc is wrought in psychol-

ogy by admitting at the outset apparently innocent
suppositions, that nevertheless contain a flaw. The
bad consequences develop themselves later on, and
are irremediable being woven through the whole tex-
ture of the work.

William James, 1890. The principles of

E^yLll -LJ1Y (Vol. 1). New York: Holt,
p. 224'.
 THE INTERBEHAVIORIST
Editor:
Ronald G. Heyduk, Hartwick College
Associate Editors:
Donna M. Cone, Department of Mental Health, Retardation,
and Hospitals, State of Rhode Island
Dennis J. Delprato, Eastern Michigan University
Edward K. Morris, University of Kansas
Paul T. Mountjoy. Western Michigan University
Noel W. Smith, State University of New York, Plattsburgh
The Agora
Dennis Delprato contributed the following comment and sugges-
ted reading:
If anyone was naive enough to assume that psychology had
crossed the barrier of spiritism, a paper referred to by
Grossberg (Comments about cognitive therapy and behavior
therapy, Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental
Psychiatry'pl9lI7~T7~T5:::3TFwIlTTring them badTTcTearth.
A. E. Bergin has published an article that could have come
directly out of the Dark Ages in the Journal of Consulting
a
I3^_5iilL4ai_5YlloiP-2Y. (Psychotherapy~an3~ReligIous Values,
1980, 48, 95-105). The author calls to task those views of
psychologists that "manifest a relative indifference to God,
the relationship of human beings to God, and the possibil-
ity that spiritual factors influence behavior" (p. 98).
Grossberg points out how cognitivism continues to foster
spiritistic verbal behavior on the part of psychologists as
seen in Bergin"s statement that 8
"The emergence of studies of consciousness and cognition,
which grew out of disillusionment with mechanistic behav-
iorism and the growth of humanistic psychology, has set
the stage for a new examination of the possibility that
presently unobservable realitiesnamely, spiritual forces
--are at work in human behavior." (p. 96)
Delprato also recommends an article by Stephen Wilcox and
Stuart Katz (The ecological approach to development: an alter-
native to cognitivism, Journa 1 of Exgeri.menta 1 Child_Psy_chp_l-
ogy_, 1981, 3J2, 247-263). The authors' criticisms of the cog-
nitive approach and their recommended alternative should be
appreciated by interbehaviorists.
The following note from Science^, Volume 213, 31 July 1981, is
reproduced without comments
When Einstein died, on 18 April 1955, his body was cremated
but his brain, according to his specific direction, wan re-
moved to be used for research. It thereupon began a journey
which, like the Flying Dutchman's, seems to have no clear
end in sight.
The sage's cerebral remains disappeared for some years u n t i l
Steven Levy, then a reporter with the New Jersey Monthly,
set out to find what had become of them. He finally located
the brain, or most of what was left of it, reposing in n
Mason jar packed in a cardboard box marked COSTA CIDER, in
an office in Wichita, Kansas (Science, 25 August 1978, p.
696) .
The office belonged to Thomas S. Harvey, who had been en-
trusted with the brain as the pathologist at the Princeton
Hospital where Einstein died. Harvey had had most of the
brain sectioned and distributed to various specialists for
study. He had not published any of the findings, as of Aug-
ust 1978, .but hoped to do so in "perhaps a year."
Three years rolled by, the world has been presented with a
work of science fiction, Einstein's Brain, by Mark Olshaker,
but not with any scientific tretTse on the neuroanatomy of
the mind that shaped the foundations of modern physics. It
seemed not unduly premature to inquire when the report would
be ready.
Harvey has since moved from VJichita to the town of Weston,
Missouri. He has not yet written up his study of the brain.
He has no firm date for doing so. Asked what his article
is likely to conclude, Harvey says he has "No concrete plans.
I have my ideas about it but they have not solidified." The
results from the specialists who studied sections of the
brain show that everything is "perfectly within normal lim-
its except for the changes due to age."
Harvey possesses "small fragments" of the brain but declines
to say exactly where they are now stored. Einstein's estate,
he says, has no interest in them.
In Volume 10, Number 3, Michael MacRoberts offered "A Chal-
lenge to the Interbehaviorists," to which the editor briefly
replied in the same issue. Our disagreement centered on the
issue of whether the energies of interbehaviorists would be
better spent on "converting" our intellectual allies to the
interbehavioral position, or on "building bridges" with them,
even at the risk of losing our identity as interbehaviorists.
MacRoberts' reply to my reaction follows:
I enjoyed your reply and really have little to add. I think
it's fair and to the point. Our only difference is in the
question of evolution versus revolution. I'm a revolution-
ist, you, an evolutionist, or better put, you would welcome
a revolution but believe that things are going to change

more slowly. If this is what happens, let us work in such
a way as to make it a rapid evolution: after all, a revolu-
tion is only a rapid evolution. As to building bridges, I
don't think we disagree. I certainly don't advocate treat-
ing allies as enemies but my only question is, if we
build bridges, who is it that is supposed to cross them?
Steven R. Brown, a political scientist who is a subscriber and
occasional contributor, drew attention to his recently pub-
lished book, which he suggests may be of "peripheral interest
...especially the introductory and concluding chapters on op-
erant subjectivity"!
Brown, Steven R. Political subjectivity; applications_of
Q methodology in polTticaT~scTenceT
JienceT New" H a v e r u Y a l e Un
Uni-
varsity Press, 1980.
Robert W. Lundin of the University of the South, whose produc-
tive career an an interbehavioral psychologist is familiar to
most of us, has recently been named to a prestigious chair,
the William R. Kenan Professor of Psychology. The criteria
were scholarship, research, and teaching ability. Congratula-
tions S
Research Fellowship
History of Psychology Foundation
The Research E'ellowship funded by the History of Psychology
Foundation, a private foundation affiliated with the Univer-
sity of Akron, promotes research in the history of psychology
through the granting of stipends of up to $750 to aid scholars
wishing to utilize the primary resources of the Archives of
the History of American Psychology, Bierce Library, University
of Akron. The stipend is intended to he^p defray travel and
Jiving expenses and the recipient is expected to reside in
Akron while using materials in the Archives,
Candidates should submit a prospectus of the work planned, a
vita, and two letters of recommendation. It is particularly
important that there is evidence that the Archives is the most
suitable place for the research to be undertaken by the candi-
date. Advanced graduate students and recent doctorates are
encouraged to apply.
Applications should be completed by March 1, 1982, The award
will be announced not later than April 15th, Applications
should be sent to the chairman of the University of Akron
awards committee:
Mr. John V. Miller, Jr.
Director of Archival Services
University of Akron
Akron, Ohio 44325
Our feature article was contributed by "Commentator," an anon-
ymous advocate of interbehaviorism. It looks at the "phenome-
non" of Kantorian interbehaviorism from the somewhat detached
but useful perspective of a science historian.
Priority and Interbehaviorism
The common occurrence of multiple independent discoveries in
science has been the subject of special interest to historians
and sociologists of science for two main reasons. First, mul-
tiples provide evidence that discoveries are context-depen-
dent; that is, they occur when the time is right. If Darwin
and Wallace had not independently hit on the idea of evolution
by natural selection, someone else soon would have. Second,
multiples often lead to priority disputes, which underlines
strongly the importance of personal recognition in science.
Darwin's agonies over being forestalled is evidence of this.
The literature on multiple discoveries is quite extensive
(see, for example, Ben-David S Sullivan, 1975; Gaston, 1973,
1978; Hagstrom, 1974? Merton, 1973).
The failure of scientists to recognize priority can be extreme-
ly irritating. Sorokin (1956) discusses this in his essay,
"Amnesia and New Colurobuses," in which he gives many examples
of the "disease," as he calls it, wherein rediscoverers claim
to be first, and asks why this occurs so frequently. He sug-
gests two possibilities; it is due either to ignorance of
previous work or it is due to the rediscoverer attempting to
gain priority by knowingly ignoring previous work. While the
latter_occurs with some regularity, Sorokin believes that "the
bulk ^pf cases/7 are probably due to ignorance."
Observer (1981) finds Kantor involved in a "priority dispute"
in which it is evident that a rediscoverer or set of redis-
coverers is clearly ignorant of previous work (see also Lich-
tenstein, 1980; Smith, 1980). In brief, sixty years ago Kantor
began developing his "integrated field" ("ecological") approach
and has been propounding it ever since (for a bibliography of
Kantor's writings see Smith, 1976). But Kantor is not totally
alone. Independently and over the same period, philosophers
have been attempting to break from the thraldom of classical
empiricism and to establish a realism, of which an attempt at
a naturalistic theory of perception forms a central part (Browr
1977s Hanson, 1958; Moore, 1922; Sellars, 1916; Woodbridge,
1965). Additionally, and again apparently independently, dur-
ing the last two decades, psychologists have been moving rap-
idly toward a field perspective (see references in Observer,
1981). Certainly, the field or ecological perspective has
been in the wind, with a series of discoverers or a discover-
er and a series of rediscoverers. But the central figures
seem to be largely unaware of each other.
What is of Interest to us in this and other cases is why re-
discoverers should be unaware of previous work. Kantor's sit-
uation, I think, provides a classic example of one type of
case. Briefly, it would appear that Kantor is neglected by
current researchers because he failed to receive attention
from his contemporaries. And he failed to receive attention
because he was (and is) ahead of his time. Because few scien-
tists read anything that is more than a few years old (they
apparently assume that anything of value from "ancient" times
wij.1 have been assimilated in succeeding periods), Kantor's
work has been effectively lost from the mainstream of psych-
ology! or if it has been influential, it has been so without
association with his name or school. For example, Observer
points specifically to a 1920 paper and a 1933 book for Kan-
tor's claim to priority regarding "ecological perception."
But these two works, like all of Kantor's writings, have re-
ceived almost no attention (see Smith, Note 1). Up to 1976,
the 1920 paper has received only eight citations, of which
five were in the early twenties, and the 1933 book has been
cited only 54 times with citations peaking in the fifties.
The vast majority of citations to this latter work are not to
perception. Further, if we consider Kantor's entire produc-
tion, up to 1976 (omitting self-citation) he has been cited in
626 works, an astonishingly low figure considering his high
productivity (Smith, 1976; Note 1).
In this regard it is interesting that the three rediscoverers
of particulate inheritance not only searched the literature
but found Mendel's long-forgotten papers, and the only reason
they were able to do so was that Mendel's papers were cited in
Focke's 1881 Die Pflanzen^Mischlinge and in Bailey's 1892 art-
icle, "Cross bre^dTn^~alid~lTybrTdsT1^ Kantor's work seems to
have received less citation attention even than Mendel's, or
put another way, Kantor's work has been lost in the literature
deluge while Mendel's was not.
Other factors undoubtedly have contributed to the continued
neglect of Kantor's work. One is that he is not always the
clearest writer (Stevens & Stove, 1947), often leaving the
reader dangling at the punch line. Another is that Kantor
has not spelled out his system in a simple manner. He should
have been in philosophy, not science, where the reading and
writing customs are entirely different. One almost needs to
begin with Kantor's earliest works and proceed to the present for
his system to become evident. Contrast this with Skinner's
About BehayjLojrisjn, which can be read by specialist and layman
iTTk"e~wTth~ complete comprehension. But behaviorism has been
around for a long time, its terminology does not deviate sub-
stantially from common usage? and its ideas are not radically
new, even when first put forward. The terminology of inter-
behaviorism, on the other hand, is as novel as its perspective,
and interbehaviorism appears "negative" because it trammels
on sacred cultural and scientific beliefs, and this has not
sat well with many psychologists. Little wonder, then, that
Kantor finds himself in the unenviable position that Observer
depicts.
What twenty or fifty years will bring is impossible to tell.
Will Kantor emerge as a name to be reckoned with on a par with
Skinner and Watson, will such luminaries ultimately be consid-
ered "mere schoolboys" to old Kantor, will psychologists sim-
ply rediscover piecemeal what Kantor has pioneered but not rec
ognize his originality, or will psychology devolve into person
alism and then into transcendentalism and the cycle repeat it-
self? It is all well and good for the handful of those who
understand what Kantor has done to say in the pages of one
quarterly publication with a relatively small circulation:
"Wait a minute, Kantor said that in 1920." But will this send
rediscoverers scurrying to the library where they will spend
the next few years mastering the interbehavioral Canon? I
doubt it. In my experience, even if they see Smith's review
or Lichtenstein's paper or Observer's comments, at best they
will, in future work, mention Kantor in a group citation with
the one-liner: "Similar ideas have been developed by others
(see Adams...Kantor... Zilch)." What reader of scientific lit-
erature is stimulated to explore the writings of those men-
tioned in group citations?
Whatever the fate of interbehaviorism, it will provide an in-
teresting study for historians of science. While obviously
no one is completely ahead of his time, some are enough ahead
to cause themselves trouble, and Kantor is clearly a case in
point. So far, he has been virtually ignored. If he is re-
discovered in toto and not piecemeal, then the historian will
be concerned wrth~understanding that set of factors which pre-
vented his emergence and then rediscovery. If, on the other
hand, he is only reinvented piecemeal, the historians have
another set of problems. What, for example, is the ultimate
fate of a person's work if his contemporaries and immediate
successors do not understand and/or cite him? This, of course
involves a consideration of how scientists utilize scientific
literature. Do they carefully comb the literature and abstr-
acting services or do they pick up the latest "review" and
consult its bibliography under the impression that the author
has "pulled together" everything of value? Do scientists reg-
ularly study the work of the "ancients" or do they learn about
the "ancients" from introductory textbooks, undergraduate cour
sea, and traditional histories? DeVries, Correns, and Tscher-
mak made a concerted effort to be thorough in their literature
surveys, but has this practice changed in the last century?
The fate of interbehaviorism is in the balance, but with a
little help from his friends, perhaps Kantor's work can be-
come, as it should, something more than a group citation in
psychology or an example of "the man ahead of his time" in
the history of science.
COMMENTATOR
 Note Woodbridge, F. J. E. Nature and mind: Selected essays of
Frederick J. E. Wogdbridge. New York: Russell & Russell
1. Smith, N. W. Annotated citations to and bibliography of the 1965.
interbehavioral psychology of J. R. Kantor. Unpublished
manuscript, 1976.
References A Selected and Classified Bibliography of Interbehavioral
Works (continued from Volume 10, Number 3)
Ben-David, J. & Sullivan, T. A. Sociology of science, Annual
Review of Sociology, 1975, I, 203-222. 5. CAUSALITY

Brown, H. I. Perception, theory and commitment. Chicagoi 5.1 Kantor, J. R, Chp. 9: Interbehavioral logic and
Precedent, 1977. causation; Psychology and^logi c, Vol. 2. Bloom-
ington, IndT:PrTncipTaTress, 1950.
Gaston, J. Originality and competition in science. Chicago?
University of"cHIcago^nFe^sJ 1971T 5.2 Pronko, N. H. Notes for a freshman: On the free
will versus determinism controversy. Interbehav-
Gaston, J. The reward systeminBritish.and American._ science. 1972, 3(2), 3-4.
New York! WileyT~T9W.
PERCEIVING
Hagstrom, W. 0. Competition in science. American Sociolpgi-
cal Review, 1974, 3_9, 1-18. 6.1 Kantor, J. R. Chp. 9: The nature of sensing and pe:
ceiving: Principles of psyghology. Vol. 1. Hew
Hanson, N. R. Patterns^of discovery. Cambridge: University York: Knopf, 1924.
Press, 1958.
6.2 Lichtenstein, P. E. Perception and the psychologi-
Lictenstein, P. E. Theoretical psychology! where is it cal metasystem. Psychological Record, 1959, 9_,
headed? The Psychological Record, 1980, 30, 447-458. 37-44.
Merton, R. K. The sociology ofscience. Chicago; University 6.3 Lichtenstein, P. E. A behavioral approach to "phen-
of Chicago Press, 1973. omenological data." Psychological Re cord, 1971,
21, 1-16.
Moore, G. E. PhJJ.S^p2y.c_al_^tudl1es_. London: Routledge 6
Kegan Paul, 1922. 6.4 Observer. The role of chemistry in the domain of
psychology. Pgy_choj.ggical Record, 1974, 2J_, 267-
Observer. Priority and the pace of scientific progress. The 270.
Psychological Record, 1981, 3_lt 285-292.
6.5 Pronko, N. H. Some reflections on perception. sy_-
Seliars, R. W. Critic^jreald-sm. New York: Rand McNally, chological Record, 1961, 11, 311-314.
1916.
6.6 Pronko, Ebert, S Greenberg. A critical review of
Smith, N. W. The works of J. R. Kantor: Pioneer in scientific theories perception. In A. L. Kidd & J. L. Rivoin
psychology. Mexican Journal of Behavior Analysis, 1976, (Eds.), Perceptual development in children. New
2, 137-148. York: International Universities, 1966.
Smith, N. W. Book review of Gibson, J.J., The_ec_olog_ical_a- EMOTION AND AFFECT
proach to visual perception. The\_Psy c h q 1 pgi ca 1 Re c o r d,
1980, _3, 587-588. 7.1 Brachman, J. F. Some comments on the definition of
emotion. Psychological Record, 1957, 7_, 93-95.
Sorokin, P. A. Fads_and foibles in modern soci.olggy_and_re-
la_ted__science_s_. ChTcagos Henry Regnery Company, 1956. 7.2 Brady, J. V. Toward a behavioral biology of emotion
In L. Levi (ed.) Emotions; Their parameters and
Stevens, S. S. & Stove, G. Psychological writing, easy and measurements. New York: Raven Press, 1975.
hard. MericaaJPsy^hologist, 1947, 2, 230-245.
10

7.3 Howard, D. T. A functional theory of the emotions.
In E. L. Reymert (Ed.), Feelings and emotions!
The Wittenburg symposium. Clark University Press,
1928.
7.4 Kantor, J. R. Feelings and emotions as scientific
events. Psycho logical Record , 1966, 16^ 377-404.
LANGUAGE BEHAVIOR
8.1 Briones, I. T. An experimental comparison of two
forms of liguistic learning. Psychological Record,
1937, 1, 205-214.
8.2 Herman, D. T. Linguistic behavior: I. Some differ-
entiations in hearer responses to verbal stimulation.
Journal of General Pjiychologvy 1951, 4, 199-213.
8.13 Ratner, S. C. Toward a description of language be-
havior: I. The speaking action. Psychological
Record, 1957, T_, 61-64.
8.14 Ratner, S. C.; Gawronski, J. J.; & Rice, F. R. The
variable of concurrent actions in language of
children: Effect of delayed speech feedback. Psy-
chological_Record, 1964, 14_, 47-56.
8.15 Ratner, S. C. & Rice, F. E. The effect of the lis-
tener on the speaking interaction. ESichloji,caJ_
Record, 1963, 13, 265-268.
8.16 Rice, F. E. S Ratner, S. C. Toward a description
of language behavior: II. The listening action.
Psychological Record, 1967, \1_, 493-502.

8.3 Herman, D. T. Linguistic behaviors: II. The devel- 8.17 Rosenberg, S. s Cohen, B. D. Referential processes
of speakers and listeners. Psychological Review,
opment of hearer interaction with holophrastic
language stimuli. Journal of General Psychology, 1966, 73, 208-231.
1951, 4J_, 273-291.
8.4 Kantor, J. R. Can psychology contribute to the study
of linguistics? Monisj;, 1928, 3j8, 630-648. For information concerning subscriptions to The Interbehav-
1grist, please write to:
8.5 Kantor, J. R. Language as behavior and as symbolism. Ronald G. Heyduk, Editor
Journal of Philosophy , 1929, 2_6, 150-159. The Interbehavigrist
8.6 Kantor, J. R. Psy_chcJ.gJ.a2L_JJ:n.gjji1sjy^C. Chicago: Department of Psychology
Hartwick College
Principle Press, 1977, Oneonta, NY 13820
8.7 Lewis, M. & Freedle, R. Mother-infant dyads The
cradle of meaning. In P. Pliner, L. Krames, 6 Special rates for students are available.
T. Alloway (Eds.), Communicatign and affect t____jjang-
uage and thought. New Yorki Academic Press, 1973.

8.8 MacRoberts, M. H. 6 MacRoberts, B. R. Toward a min-

imal definition of animal communication. sy_55Jl
1980, 3JO, 387-396.
8,9 Observer. Wanted! A better direction for linguistic
psychology. Psychological Record, 1971, 2^, 269-
272.
8.10 Observer. Words, words, words. Psychological, Re cord,
1971, 21, 269-272.
8.11 Pronko, N. H. An exploratory Investigation of lang-
uage by means of oscillographic and reaction time
techniques, journal of _ Experimental _ jfeycholog^ ,
1945, 35. , 433-458.
8.12 Pronko, N. H. Language and psychological linguistics:
A review. Psychological Bulletj.n, 1946, 43, 189-
239.
 r if t o

Setting Factors

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Stimulus Object
Stimulus
Function

Ir^
ji
Succeeding

Segment

A OF

PUBLISHED AT HARTWICK COLLEGE

ONEONTA, NEW YORK
Vol uinci 11, Number 2

H i l l (.1 ( l i f f a r n n t npiM'om.'h can | v > t d k c n Id Mi" IM< - . 1 mi i ' -iw n '

oJ; behavior t h a n is c u s t o m n r y | . i H l ; i y . That: i s t.o .-.'',0
thinking of tho behnvior stieat'i as nwtlc up of " reRp-'T.sor,
w h i c h fU'o ( U n j u n c t l v o t iinrvpoi n l o v o n t n i t i v ( > ! \ ' n u i - i p i ' i - i -
f t p i l Hum I |'ti I f i t i i t r t , mid t u I ' n n i ' o l vo ( I i n i l i m w i t h i r i i - i
IMtL'tl l.H H t K i l l . H t t'UHl ( t i l t d l f'S i !\ " I t * M | ) ( t | | f t i < H | i i , : i l l . " i M
a moveniniit 1 ti space of pa ft or - ' i L l . of f i n o r q a i i i s w . V ' h j I n
it has customarily been recoi:d"d as a di.scrutf ovonL-
t h i n g , it may perhaps be bettfv described p o p i t i o n a l !
by c o n t i n u o v i s f i e l d - f u n c t i o n s . . . Spati al- ana tomicn 1 iclc
h.vl been involved in discussion-: of roaponsc " t o p o o r a p i
^loprossing the levor wit! a forr-paw was said to bo on
topography, while b i t i n g it wa:; a not h o r ) , but it a i s
r o m a i n o d l a r g e l y p i c t o r i a l . Tl>o e l a b o r a t i o n of a :;ri;
spatial or f i e l d measure has y> I to be succr;ssf n i l v
accomplished.
W . N . S i - h o G n f o l d , 1 9 7 2 ,P m b l r
of m"<lei:n bc>liavior t l i ^ o r v .
CDndllJ.o)wLJRcloj{, V o l . 1,
 THE INTERBEIIAVIORIST
Editor:
Ronald G. Ileyduk, Hartwick College
Associate Editors:
Donna N. Cone, Department of Mental Health, Retardation,
and Hospitals, State of Rhode Island
Dennis J. Delprato, Eastern Michigan University
Edward K. Morris, University of Kansas
Paul T. Mountjoy, Western Michigan University
Noel W. Smith, State University of New York, Plattsburgh
The Agora
Another example of the frustrating lack of awareness of Kantor1
contributions to psychology is a statement by J. Michael in
"Flight from behavior analysis" (The Behavior Ana_lv_st, 1980, 3_,
1-22). Michael asserts that no text on the~history~of psycho-
logy adequately approaches the topic from a behavioral per-
spective. Surely those who have discovered Kantor's Th_e Sci-
IrDiijL'-.E Evolj.iti.on P.^ Psychologyf Volumes 1 and 2 (Principle
Press, 1963; 19G9) know otherwise. More than just a daring
and scholarly history of psychology, Kantor's text is also a
working example of his naturalistic approach to understanding
civents (in this case, the development of psychology); as well
as a defense of interbehaviorism on the grounds that it rep-
resents a natural and inevitable return to the Greek natura-
lism that characterized the very beginnings of Western psy-
chology .
In recent books, two leaders of mainstream reductionistic,
atomistic psychology testify to their "conversions" to ideas
that are at the core of interbehaviorism. Seymour Sarason's
Zll2l29Y, Misdirected (McGraw-Hill, 198.1) concludes that
psychology's dTIappointing record in regard to productively
influencing the events it seeks to understand is due to its
failure to appreciate that the psychologist-observer is a
part and product of those events--a notion not unfamiliar
to Kantorians (e.g., see the paper in this issue). William
Uttal's A Txononiy_ <^f Visual PO_es_s_es (Erlbaum, 1981)
represents an even more startling reversal of form on the
part of the author. Uttal, for over a decade an eloquent
and productive apologist for physiological reductionism,
suggests now that such an approach to understanding the
visual system may have its shortcomings. As Charles Rice
summarizes in his review of Uttal's book (Psychological
Record^ 1982, 32, 300):
The book is...about the philosophical metamorphosis
of the author from confirmed physiological reduction-
ist to physiological agnostic. It is about epistorno-
logy and it suggests a view of pr ychology not likely to
be popular in the contemporary nu' instream of scientific
psychology. Uttal reaches his pc sition by inductive
reasoning after exhaustive study of vast archives of
visual science. The book there ft re is not a sterile
compendium of labels and classifi cation but a narrative
combat between the author and pr< hlems raised by con-
temporary science's tendencies t< look toward molecular
and atomic organization for explt> nations.
Such testimonies to the value of wl'olism and non-reduction-
ism, coming as they do from those vho have had apparent
previous success with more dominant assumptions, are espe-
cially encouraging signs that psychology may yet come of age,
as Kantor has anticipated.
SUBSCRIPTIONS TO VOLUME 11 OF THF" INTERBEIIAVIORIST
U.S. and Canada
Regular and institutional subsciptions $4.00
Student subscriptions $2.50
Other countries
All subscriptions $6.00
Please make checks payable to The )nterbehaviorist and mail:
Ronald G. Ileyduk
Editor
The Interbehayic'rist
Department of Pt-ychology
Hartwick College
Oneonta, NY 13820
T'ie following paper, written by the author when she was an un-
dergraduate student,reminds us thai Kantor's interbehaviorism
is as much a statement about the scientific enterprise as it
is a statement about the events thot are its subject matter.
The paper also isolates the class c-f human activity which,
perhaps, has been most victimized by psychologists' contin-
uing investment in mentalisrn and reductionism.
 Toward an Interbehavioral Science of "Memory"
Alice J.R. Gordon
The University of Tennessee
Knoxville
Science consists of the past and current interbehaviors
of persons with things and events whose traits (struc-
tures, relations, actions) they are interested in know-
ing and controlling, plus the products of such activities
(investigations)in the form of descriptions, theories,
and laws (Kantor, 1933).
Science is an anthropocentic activity. It involves the seek-
ing of information by humans about the relationships between
humans and their surroundings. The subject matter of science
consists of the actions, relations, and structures with which
humans come in contact. The discovery of how these relations,
structures, and actions can be predicted is the goal of sci-
entific investigation, and the final statements are the des-
cription, theory, and law.
The unique aspect of Kantor's description of science is that
it views science itself as an interbehavioral phenomenon. It
stresses that the actions, relations, and structures studied
by the scientist affect and are affected by the behavior of
the.scientist, even as the scientist attempts to understand
them. Kantor's interbehavioral perspective on science also
helps us to see that the descriptions, theories, and laws
that are the products of scientific endeavor are not immune
to the presuppositions which are part of the field surroun-
ding scientific interbehaviors.' According to Kantor, psy-
chologists have been guilty in their search for scientific
understanding of inappropriately imitating outdated para-
digms, thereby coloring the products of their investigations.
The sort of science they have mimicked has been referred to
as "Newtonian"(Kvale, 1976). This approach essentially iso-
lates components of events independent of surrounding factors.
Preferable to Kantor is the interrelational approach exem-
plified by relativity theory in physics, where an interaction
is relative to its frame.
Kantor also believes that psychologists have allowed unwarren-
ted spiritistic assumptions to infiltrate their science. Re-
membering is one class of interbehavioral phenomena that has
especially suffered from having been cast into a mentalistic
light over the more than hundred years of its scientific
investigation. It has been treated as though it were one of
a number of "functions of the mind" (e.g., Handler and Hand-
ler, 1964). It has also been viewed atomistically and mecha-
nistically. Alternatively, remembering can be investigated
from an interrelational perspective. In an interbehavioral
context remembering is a set of relat ons to be investigated,
rather than a mentalistic construct, The investigation of
remembering behavior shows that it ca >i be viewed as a set of
interactions between an individual an 1 the environment of the
individual. The common feature of al I remembering activities
is that they involve environmental st Imuli no longer present.
This can be illustrated by looking at the diverse behaviors
called "remembering" in relation to a single stimulus, an
equation. There is remembering the e'{nation, memorizing the
equation, "thinking" you know the equ ition, incorrectly re-
membering the equation, and recalling that you "used to know"
the equation.
Remembering interbehavior also involves the interaction of
persons with current things and events. WllJiam James (1890)
describes how recalling an explorer's text in a terrible
depression caused him to regard it as n terrible tale of
privation; recalling the text in a good mood caused him to
interpret the text as a tale of the indomitable spirit of
humankind. Here we have the present affecting recollection
of the past. Thus, complete descriptions of remembering
interbehaviors should include the circumstances of the ori-
ginal contact ^learning), the intervening events, and the
circumstances surrounding the remembering event itself.
Remembering interbehaviors also must bo understood in tarms
of relations between events. The most famous of these re-
lations are those described by "contiguity" and "consequence".
In order to generate laws there first must be observation of
those regularities of behavior to be generalized. This means
that the first step in investigation is description! the
theory, which is in essence extapolatod from the data, comes
later. This is the inductive method by which science first
begins to understand any phenomenon, but psychologists of
"memory" have gotten the order of events reversed. The study
of memory has been founded on mentalistic presuppositions,
rather than observation and subsequent extrapolation. How-
ever, it could be grounded in the interbehavior of persons
with things, past and present. There is presently a concentra
tion on the elaboration of models (e.g., Miller, 1956; Smith,
1966; Norman, 1969) rather than on th5 description of the
relations, structures, and actions which constitute remem-
bering. Taking seriously the interbehavioral approach would
result in a systematic and scientific study of an important
class of human behaviors.
REFERENCES
James, W. The principles of psychology, Volumes 1 and 2.
New York: Henry Holt, 1890.
Kantor, J.R. A survey_ o_f the sc_ience of_ P^^ Bloom-
ington, Indiana: PrincTpia Press, 1933.
 A SELECTED AND CLASSIFIED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF INTERtlKIIAVIORAL
WORKS (continued f r o m Volume 11, number 1)
Kvale, S. The psychology of learning as ideology and
technology. Behaviorism, 1976, 4J1), 97-116. 9. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

Handler, J.M. and Handler, G, jWj}kinq:Frornassociation 9.1 Herman, D. T. A study in the cultural!zatlon of response.
to_Gestalt. New York, KileyTT964. ~~ ~~ ' Psychological Record, 1956, 6_, 12-16.

Norman, D.A. Memory and attention. New York: Wiley, 1969. 9.2 Kantor, .J. R. What are the data and problems of social psychology?
Journal of Philosophy, 1923, 20, 449-457.
Miller, G.A. Human memory and the storage of information.
IRE-grana.___ Inform. Theory IT2, 1956. 9.3 Kantor, J. R. An Outline of Social Psychology. Chicago: Follett,
1929. '
Smith, B. Memory. New York: Humanities Press, 1966.
9.4 Observer. What social, what psychology, in social psychology?
Psychqlogi ca1 Re cord, 1970, 2, 403-407.
9.5 Pronko, N. H. 6 Bowles, J. W. Chp. 6: Social behavior; Empirical
foundations_of psycho1ogy. London: Rout ledge 8 Kcgan P a u l ,
1952.
10. LEARNING
10.1 Kantor, J. P.. Chp. 26: Learning conduct: A technic of behavior
acquisition; Principles ofjpsyclio 1 ogy, V o l . 2. New York:
Knopf, 1924.

10.2 Pronko, N. H. F, Bowles, J. 'J). Chp. ir>: Learning; Enjiirical

foundations of psychology. London: Rout ledge F, Kegan P a u l ,
1952.
10.3 Observer. The era of learning and its aftermath in American
psychology. Psychological^ Record, 196!!, _18, 475-477.
11. IMPLICIT INTERACTIOHS
11.1 Kantor, J. R. An objective interpretation of meanings. Ame_rican_
Journal of Psychology, 1921, _32_, 231-248.
11.2 Kantor, J. R. Chp. 10: Implicit action as responses to absent
stimuli objects; Principles of_ psychp_loy_. V o l . 1, 1924.
Clip. 17: WishingT desiring, and kindred forms of responses;
Chp. 18: Imagination reactions us creative conduct; Clip. 21:
Thinking and problem solving; Chp. 22: Peasoning responses
as inferential activities; Chp, 28: nchavior of the organism
during sleep, hypnosis, and while dreaming; P_inc_ip_le_s__of
', Vol. 2. Hew York: Knopf, 1926.

11.3 Pronko, N. H. f, Bowles, J. W. Dip. 11: I m p l i c i t or "thinking"

behaviors; E nip i r i c a 1 f punj at i on s of p s y clip 1 o py_. London:
Rout ledge 6 Kegan Paul, 1952.
12. INTERBHIIAVIOR AND HEREDITY
12.1 Bijou, S. W. Theory and research in mental (developmental)
retardation. Psych o logical .Record, 1963, _U, 95-110.
12.2 Bowles, J. W. ft Pronko, M. !!. A new scheme for the inheritance of
intelligence. Psychological Record, 1960, _H), 55-57.
 12.3 Delprato, I.). J. Hereditary determinants of fears and phobias:
A critical review. Behavior jriierapy . In press.
12.4 Kantor, J. R. Intelligence and mental tests. Jcmrnal of
Philosophy, 1920. _17, 260-268.
12. S Mountjoy, P. T. Differential behavior in monozyp,otic twins.
Psychological Record, 1957, 7_, 65-69.
12.6 Observer. Innate intelligence: Another penotic avitar.
Psychological Record, 1970, 20, 123-130.
12.7 Pronko, N. II. "Heredity" and "environment" in biolopy and
psychology Psychological Record, 1957, T_, 45-54.
J2.8 Smith, N. VI. Twin studies and heredity, jUiman Development^
1976, 19, 65-68.
13. PERSONALITY
}3.1 Kantor, J. R. Clip. 3: The psychological individual or
personality; r|ncjj]ls__pjjgsj^cjip_lov_, Vol. 1. New York:
Knopf, 1924.
13.2 f'ahan, II. C. Clip. 3: Personality;
of J . R . Kantor; An...introductioir
Socrates Press, 1968. " ~*
13.3 Observer. On retaining the person in personality.
Record, 1974, 24, 569-572.
14, PSYCHOLOGY AS SCIENCE
14.1 Cone, D. H. Comment: Opcrationism vs. operational definition.
lntcrbehaviorai_Quartorly > 1975, 6(3), 3-4.
14.2 Kantor, J. R. In defense of stimulus-response psychology.
, 1933, 40, 324-336.
14.3 Kwitor, J. U. Man and machine in science.
1935, J52_, 673-684.
14.4 Kantor, J. R. Concerning physical analogies in psychology.
Journal of Psychology , 1936, _48, 153-1G4.
14.5 Kantor, J. R. The operational principle in the physical and
psychological sciences. s}^clioJ^J.aJ_Jtecord, 1938, 2_, 1-32.
14.6 Kantor, J. P.. Current trends in psychological theory.
BuHeUn, 1941, ZB, 29-65.
14.7 Knntor, J. R. Man and machine in science. J"niiiL
1935, 3J, 673-684.
14.8 Kantor, J. R. System structure and scientific psychology.
, 1973, 23_, 451-458.
14.9 K a n t o r , J. R. (fan and pachincs in psychology: Cybernetics nn<i
artificial intellipence. Psycliolnpical Record, 197R, ?_R^,
575-583. ~~ " ~ ~
14.10 Kantor, J. R. Psycholofjy : Science or nonscicnce? Psycholoqicnl
Record, 1979, 29_, iS5-lf3.
14.11 Lambley, P, Psycholoo' and epistcmology: Ope rat ion ism r e v i s i t e d .
j'sycliolonical Record, 1970, 20, 229-234.
14,12 Lundin, R. W, Aesthetic experience or response? A psychological
viewpoint. Psychological Rec,or<J, 1956, 6_, 28-32.
14.13 Hoore, J. On the principle of opcrotionism in a science of
psychology. Behaviorism, 1975, o>, 120-138.
14.14 Observer. Descriptive relevance of psychological language.
1968
' i- HI- 113.
14.15 Observer. Certitude and reality in psychology.
Record, 1969, 19_, 345-347.
14.16 Observer. Belief and faith in science.
1970, _20, 545-552.
14.17 Observer. Toward an improved l i n g u i s t i c model for science.
, 1971, 2, 429-434.
14.18 Observer. Concerning cognitive revrrsionism in psychology.
1977, 2_, 351-354.
14.19 Observer. Concerning iaxiis in psychology and other sciences:
Can there be laws in psychology, psycho logical Re cord, 1D77
_3S 627-632.
14.20 Observer, The recycling of cognition in psychology.
Record, 1978, 28, 157-160.
14.21 Observer. Theological psydiolopy vs. s c i e n t i f i c psychology.
Psychglo!7-ica|r_P.ecQrd, 1980, 30, 131-133.
14,22 Swartz. A note on the coinputinR innrhlne nnalopy in psychology.
Arwri 1958, S_, 53-56.
14.23 Wynne, L. Behavior analysis and behavior synthesis.
Record, 1971, 2\_, 171-179.
15. WHAT KIND OF RESEARCH?
15.1 Swartz, P. On the validity of the experimental approach to
behavior. Ps^chological_Recor(l, 1957, ]_, 119-122.
15.2 Swnrtz, P. Psychology and the h i s t o r i c a l sense. Psychological
Ue_cord, 1958, _8, 17-20.
15.3 Swartz, P. The criteria of validity in observational a n a l y s i s .
Psych o log! ca_l_ Record , 1958, 8, 77-85.
 10

15.<t Swartz, P. Literature as art and a$ knowledge.

Record. 195!), 9_, 7-10.

15.5 Verplanck, W. S. An "overstatement" on psychological research:

Mint is a dissertation? Psychological Record, 1971,
2\_, 471-480. ~"

>. MOTIVATION

10.1 Kantor, J.P.. Toward a scientific analysis of motivation.

Psycholoiucal Record, 1942, S_, 225-275.

16.2 Kinnic, J. F. The interbehavioral approadi and motivation. The

|ntertehnviorisl 1978, (1), 6-10.
1. BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS

17.1 Puller, P. R. Professors Kantor and Skinner--the "grand

alliance" of the 40's. In H. W. Smith (Chm. fi Orgz.),
Contextual interactionists: A symposium. szcho_logial^
Record, 1973, 231, 281-334.

17.2 Kantor, J. R. An analysis of the experimental analysis of

behavior (TBAB). Journal of th^Experinyntal Analysis
ofJJehavior, 1970, _13, 101-108.

17.3 Lichtenstoin, P. E. Discussion: "Contextual interactionism."

In H. VJ. Smith (Chm. ft Orgz.), Contextual interactionists:
A symposium. sy_ch^lgical_^cOTd, 1973, 3, 281-334.

17.4 Morris, E. K. Some relationships between the psychologies of

Kantor and Skinner. The Interbehaviorist, 1978, (4),
3-12.

17.5 Mountjoy (see 2.12).

 1
F I E L D 1 Preceding

**..
r 1
business. The program is organized according to the li-
1
censing requirements in the state of Michigan. Students Selling Factors
1
Organism
should find the emphasis on assessment, treatment and prac- 1
ticum/internship experience acceptable as credentials in function
many other states as well. There is no foreign language

Preceding Even!
I
or thesis requirement for graduation.
Investigator ( >
_/ ) st

54
The behavioral services program is designed to train prac- Stimulus Object
1
titioners to provide psychological services based on estab- a
Stimulus
function
lished principles of human behavior. The overall goal of
the BSP is for graduates to base the delivery of services
in clinical and other applied settings on the science of Media
_ _ -, ,__ .-
1
behavior. Graduates receive a master of science degree in
psychology. L- -h J
Succeeding

Segment
1
1

OF
PSYCHOLOGY
PUBLISHED AT HARTWICK COLLEGE
ONEONTA, NEW YORK
Volume 11, Number 3 Spring 1983

That perceptions are in terms of their meanings, which in

turn are based on and constituted by a history of inter-
actions, is an alternative to the received view of brain
representation, inference and interpretation...Perceptions
may or may not correspond to measurements of the perceived
object and this is because it is a joint action of organ-
ism and object, not something mysteriously interpreted or
inferred inside an organism...The properties of objects and
events can be examined and so can perceivings of them.
They need not, usually do not, and would not be expected
to correspond one to one; and perceiving is no less real
or concrete for it.
Noel W. Smith. Book review of
R.L. Gregory, Hind in Science; A
History of Explanationg^Tn Psy--~
chology and PhysTcsT^ EYi
cal Record, 1983, 33, 139-140.
 THE INTERBEHAVIORIST
Editor:
Ronald G. Heyduk, Hartwick College
Associate Editors:
Donna N. Cone, Department of Mental Health, Retardation,
and Hospitals, State of. Rhode Island
Dennis J. Delprato, Eastern Michigan University
Edward K. Morris, Univeristy of Kansas
Paul T, Mountjoy, Western Michigan University
Noel W. Smith, State University of New York, Plattsburgh
The Agora
W. W. Henton and I. H. Iversen's Classical Conditioning_and
2PJirjHLLJ?pjnaJJ;ion^ Yorks
Spnnger-Verlag, 1978) receives high honors for its impres-
sive applications of field behaviorism to "various permuta-
tions and combinations of classical and operant conditioning
schedules" (p. 19). This scholarly treatise is based on a
10-year research program covering a wide range of problems
x i n "learning and conditioning." h guiding principle of the
authors' procedural and postulational activities is the
"long held insistence by Kantor that a behavior occurs in a
field of other behaviors, never in isolation" (p. 217). The
distinctly interbehavioral nature of the volume is detected
in the comment of J. V. Brady in the Foreword: "Unfettered
by slavish conventions involving 'dependent' and 'independent'
variable assumptions, this dedicated molecular analysis fo-
cuses upon specific sets of events and interactions as multi-
ple determinants of behavior" (p. vi). The authors, espec-
ially Dr. Henton, have subsequently published additional re-
search on interbehavioral relationships in conditioning pre-
parations (e.g., Psv^lo2ical_Record, 1981--several papers)..
Their innovative work shouTd~be~of great value for those
concerned with basic principles of learning or with the im-
plications of interbehaviorism for laboratory research.
J. M. Johnston and H. S. Pennypacker ' s Strategies and Tac
^ __ Human Behavioral
tics^of ~ ~ Research ~ ^
ErlbaunT As1socTa~tes7~1980) deserves the scrutiny of those
concerned with an authentically naturalistic introduction to
research methodology. The most direct influence on the au-
thors was Sidman' Tactics of Scientific Research (I960);
however, they cover a broader array oFTssues than addressed
^-n Tactics. TO begin with, Johnston and Pennypacker base
their text on the observation that science and scientific
methodology are not reified entities; instead they can only
refer to actions of scientists (scientific interbehavior) .
Furthermore, scientific interbehavior cannot be separated
from the cultural context in which it occurs. It is of
interest that the authors make a point that was first made
by Kantor in 1938, yi^., naive operatlonalism has contrib-
uted to reification~oT ancient constructs. Clearly, to
question the dogma of operationalism is to eschew the no-
tion of "science" that many of us were taught by the neo-
behaviorists (and is still maintained by mainstream exper-
imental psychology). True, the authors have a little way
to go to contact a completely naturalistic approach to
their subject matter (e.g., "An independent variable is one
that exists independently of the phenomenon to be examined;
its presence in no way depends on the dependent variable").
However, they are so otherwise interactional that this
statement strikes? the careful student as inconsistent with
their view. Perhaps they will be assisted in their attempts
to interactionally handle the independent-dependent vari-
able distinction in future editions by examination of in-
terbehavioral work, including Honig (Ps^cho_l_._Record, 1959,
9, 121-130) and Henton and Iver.sen (above).
At several times, The Inter behavior is t has made reference
to the compatibility of T. X. Barber's approach to hypnotic
phenomena with interbehaviorism (e.g., Volume 9, Number 1).
While Dr. Barber's writing in this area is indeed refresh-
ing (against the background of downright mysticism that is
still found in the area) , I submit that he has a way to go
if he is to present an authentic naturalistic account of
hypnotic phenomena. Barber's position is one of cognitive-
behaviorism. It is basically the same approach that many
contemporary behavior therapists (such as Bandura) proffer.
This is clearly seen in the following from Barber et al's
MYJ222i?iJLL_ISla2iBs^^ (Pergamon
Press, 1974): "From the cognitive-behavioral viewpoint,
__
at^ ^^
ward the te sF~aIuaTIon~777n (p7~T7~TtaTTcTin~l>rTgTnaTT7
r~hTve~a^Hres^eirTrr~detail this sort of verbal behavior in
Smith et al., Reju3sj3SmejTj;_ji_P^^
ioral Alternative . Simply put, Barber does not take _ a
ITeTd~~appaoch7~does not take into account the evolutional
nature of all psychological behavior, has not taken an in-
tegrated-field view of the causation question, is dualistic,
and has been enthralled by cognitionism. Given Dr. Barber's
impressive history of scholarly, behavior, we can be optim-
istic regarding further steps he will take in the direction
of naturalism vis a vis the hypnosis problem. However,
this writer will not present Barber's views (at least as
represented in H y_ i o s i S l m a [ i n a t i
itiejs) as naturalistic.
Noel W. Smith
Following are summaries of two interbehavioral papers that
will be presented at the Spring meeting of the Association
for Behavioral Analysis.
Interacting Behavior Patterns arid Behavioral Decrements:
Historical and Contemporary Developments
Dennis J. Delprato
Behavior theorists have invoked a wide variety of theoret-
ical devices to account for behavioral decrements; some of
the most prominent of these include the weakening of S-R
bonds, internal inhibition, reactive inhibition, motivational
conflict, motivational decrements, generalization decrement,
emotionality, disconfirmed expectations, counter sign-ges-
talt expectation, unlearning, retrieval failure, response
interference, and response competition. Given that tradition-
al behavior theory deprecates behavior in favor of hypothet-
ical intraorganismic states and processes, it is not sur-
prising that the majority of attempts to formulate general
principles of decremental phenomena involves reference to
nonbehavioral entitites as presumptive underlying explana-
tory concepts. In contrast with traditional views, descrip-
tive functional analyses conducted within a field behavioral
framework have led to an approach to behavioral decrements
that emphasizes response patterning and behavioral interde-
pendencies (interbehavioral relationships). This paper will
consider noteworthy historical, theoretical, and empirical
developments of relevance to interacting behavioral patterns.
Numerous historical developments antedate the present app-
roach. The evolution of field behaviorism, exemplified by
interbehaviorism and radical behaviorism, was important par-
ticularly because of the recognition that the isolated re-
sponse is a scientific abstraction. The point here Is that
a response occurs in a field or stream of other behaviors,
not in isolation. This basic feature of behavior was lost
(or ignored) for many years in the experimental analysis of
behavior (and in experimental psychology, in general) inso-
far as single responses served as the focus of analysis.
However, in his 1938 book which stimulated so many to anal-
yze single, isolated responses, Skinner explicitly recog-
nized the ultimate necessity for analysis of interacting re-
sponses. Subsequently, operant researchers began system-
atic investigation of concurrent operants within the concur-
rent schedule preparation, one fundamental model for study
of interacting response patterns.
While the vast majority of Western respondent research (and.
Pavlov's itself) typically involved measurement of single
responses, some early investigators reported concurrent
(e.g., Zener) and sequential (e.g., Kupalov) response depen-
dencies in respondent conditioning.
Inhibition has been a prominent concept in discussions of
behavioral decrements, although writers frequently have
failed to distinguish between events and constructs and
consequently attempted to account for diminutions in res-
ponding (events) in terms of hypothetical intraorganismic
inhibitory processes rather than interacting reaction pat-
terns. Field behaviorism, on the.other hand, views inhib-
ition as always a matter of preferential reaction and nev-
er one of non-action. Numerous theorists, including Sov-
iet psychophysiologists and Konorski who continued invest-
igating inhibitory phenomena during the period when West-
ern researchers eschewed such work, have concluded that
incompatible reactions are at the basis of inhibitory ef-
fects.
American learning theorists occasionally used the notion
of competing responses to account for decrements in res-
ponding. Philosophical and methodological deficiencies
contributed to rejections of this approach. However,
several contemporary developments -attest to the fundament-
al soundness of the competing response view. Prominent
among these developments are multiple response methodology
in which various responses are simultaneously observed,
concurrent response-concurrent schedule analysis, and se-
quential response analyses. Traditional arguments against
interfaring responses have been largely overcome by such
methodological tactics.
Some the the research areas and laboratory phenomena in
which support for the interacting response pattern analy-
sis is found include positive and'negative conditioned
suppression, concurrent schedules, extinction of appeti-
tively maintained instrumental behavior, inhibition of
avoidance and fear behavior, schedule-induced behavior,
and forgetting.
Interacting Response Patterns! Contributions to Constuc-
tional Clinical Behavioral Intervention
Thomas Fluent and Dennis J. Delprato
Sumrnary
Goldiamond (1974) distinguished between two classes of
clinical interventions. On the one hand, eliminative ap-
proaches focus on the elimination of problem behaviors,
and they do not-explicitly specify and make programmatic
arrangements for the development of socially acceptable
behaviors. Eliminative behavioral interventions are char-
acterized by procedures such as extinction, punishment,
time out, DRO, covert sensitization, flooding, and implo-
sion. On the other hand, constructional approaches focus
on the development of behavioral repertoires or their re-
instatement or transfer to new situations and, thus, ex-
plicitly include arrangements for socially acceptable al-
ternatives to problematic referent behavior. Some proced-
ures that are used in constructional behavioral interven-
tions include positive reinforcement, differential rein-
forcement of alternative behavior, modeling, token systems,
and behavioral rehearsal. Constructional interventions
are preferable to eliminative ones on the basis of several
considerations such as ethical and legal guidelines, social
acceptability, basic principles of behavior, and empirical
evidence. Furthermore, Delprato (1981) pointed out that
constructionalism is consistent with the philosophical
foundations of clinical behavioral analysis. However, un-
systematic observations as well as three different inde-
pendent surveys of published clinical interventions indi-
cate that a substantial number of contemporary behavioral
interventions are noj; constuctional. Undoubtedly, numerous
factors contribute to this evident lack of constructional-
ism. The present paper proposes one possibility (the sing-
le-response model) and addresses an alternative (interact-
ing response patterns).
Behavioral research (e.g., respondent and operant condi-
tioning) that provides the foundation for clinical analy-
sis has been based on the analysis of the single response.
Even when researchers have measured multiple responses,
the individual responses have been separately analyzed.
We argue that the single-response model has contributed to
implementation of eliminative clinical interventions, since
both the single-response model and eliminative interven-
tions do not involve systematic analysis of alternative
responses. In other words, the absence of a generally ac-
knowleged multiple-response (or interacting response pat-
tern) model of behavioral analysis has impeded more wide-
spread clinical constructionalism. For example, from the
viewpoint of the single-response model, the constructional
approach requires the clinician to engage in an apparently
illogical attempt to alter one behavior (the identified
problem behavior) by focusing on some othe_r behavior (al-
ternative behavior). It is now the case, however, that
basic researchers and clinicians have contributed to the
development of a framework based on interacting behavior
patterns that promises to greatly advance constructionalism
by providing a model that includes a role for systematic
relationships among multiple responses.
The point of departure for interacting response patterns
analysis is field behaviorism and descriptive functional
analysis which demonstrate that a response occurs in a
field of stream of other behaviors not in isolation. Fur-
thermore, behavior is conditionally organized or struc-
tured in terms of concurrent and sequential response inter-
actions (interbehavioral relationships). Two frequently
occuring interbehavioral relationships of great signifi-
cance for the clinician are complementary inhibition and
sequential interactions (Henton, 1981). In tiie former, a
concurrent or simultaneously available response reciproc-
ally inhibits a target response (e.g., relaxing disrupts
certain autonotnic responding associated with reports of
"anxiety"; manipulating toys interferes with head-banging).
In the latter, the changeover between temporally successive
responses is interdependent' such that (a) Response t influ-
ences the following Response t \ 1 or (b) Response t + 1
affects the (future) probability of Response t. Clinical
examples of t-to-t + 1 sequential dependencies are verbal
attack responses may reliably precede physical attack or
failure episodes in the individual's work setting may pre-
cede child abuse at home.
The conditional organization of'behavior shows that respon-
ses other than the identified target behavior can be sys-
tematically related to occurrenpe or nonoccurrence of prob-
lematic responses. Thus, in constructing responses (con-
structional interventions) the clinician is altering the
organization of behavior by indirect therapeutic change;
nojt targeting the identified problem behavior and applying
contingent aversive stimulation, e.g., is perfectly con-
sistent with an interacting response pattern analysis.
Dennis Delprato write;of a new graduate program offered at
Eastern Michigan University!
Peter Holmes and I developed a masters-level program in
behavioral services that is designed to prepare graduates
to provide clinical services._ The program was prepared
with explicit consideration of licensing requirements
in our state in view. Thus, our graduates will qualify
for the same positions as do ^graduates from traditional
clinical programs. Since Michigan's licensing require-
ments are basically similar to those of other states,
graduates should be on an equal footing with any masters-
level clinician. While not -Indicated on the enclosed
materials, it goes without saying that the program has
interbehaviorism as its foundations.
Following are excerpts from material about the program:
BEHAVIORAL SERVICES PROGRAM
Department of- Psychology
Eastern Michigan University
Ypsilanti, MI 48197
Peter A. Holmes, Ph.D. Dennis 3. Delprato, Ph.D.
Program Director Program Coordinator
The psychology department at Eastern Michigan University
lias developed a new 4S hour master's degree program in
Behavioral Services to be offered beginning Fall, 1983.
The program was dev&ioped in response to needs in mental
health, community placement, psychological clinics and
business. The program is organized according to the li-
censing requirements in the state of Michigan. Students
should find the emphasis on assessment, treatment and prac-
ticum/internship experience acceptable as credentials in
many other states as well. There is no foreign language
or thesis requirement for graduation.
The behavioral services program is designed to train prac-
titioners to provide psychological servicesbased on estab-
lished, principles of human behavior. The overall goal of
the BSP is for graduates to base the delivery of services
in clinical and other applied settings on the science of
behavior. Graduates receive a master of science degree in
psychology.
 THE
INTERBEHAVIORIST
A Quarterly Newsletter of Interbehavioral Psychology
Published at the University of Kansas
Volume 12 Winter 1983-1984 Number 2

EDITOR TABLE OF CONTENTS

Edward K. Morris
Notes from the Field 2
Department of Human Development
University of Kansas The Agora 3

ASSOCIATE EDITORS The Principia Press 4

Donna M. Cone Interbehaviorism at ABA 5

Department of Mental Health Subscriptions 6
State of Rhode Island
Journal Notes 7
Dennis J. Delprato
Book Review 8
Department of Psychology
Eastern Michigan University Linda J. Parrott on J. R. Kantor's
(1983) Tragedy and the Event
Ronald G. Heyduk Continuum.
Department of Psychology
Hartuick College Research Note 9
Douglas H. Ruben on "Setting,
Paul T. Mountjoy History, and Aging."
Department of Psychology
Western Michigan University QUOTATION
Linda J. Parrott In conclusion, I want to stress one
Department of Psychology important implication of the field
West Virginia University advance in psychology, namely, the
cooperative interrelations of psychology
Douglas H. Ruben
with the other sciences...From the
Department of Psychology standpoint of the reacting organism,
Western Michigan University cooperation with the biologist in his
Noel W. Smith various branches is called for.
Department of Psychology Certainly, the psychologist must keep
State University of New York alert to the latest findings of the
at Plattsburgh physiologist concerning the organic
processes participating in the complex
EDITORIAL ASSISTANTS psychological response. Needless to add,
this cooperation will be different from
Jane B. Atwater
the traditional game of tossing to each
Lisa M. Johnson other the ball of imaginary brain powers.
Steven E. Larsen
James T. Todd - J. R. Kantor
 THE INTERBEHAVIORIST
A Quarterly Newsletter of
Interbehavioral Psychology
Edward K, Morris, Editor
Department of Human Development
212B Haworth Hall
University of Kansas
Lawrence, Kansas 66045
(913) 864-4840
The Interbehaviorist is a quarterly
publication of news, discussion, and
articles pertaining to interbehavioral
psychology a natural science of
psychology from a contextualistic,
integrated-field perspective. The
Interbehavioris t serves as a newsletter
committed to professional communication
that falls between informal letters and
colloquia, and formal archival publication.
As such, the newsletter supplements
contemporary journals in the behavioral
sciences dedicated to basic and applied
research and to the history and philosophy
of the behavioral sciences. The
newsletter actively encourages reader
submission of articles, book reviews,
commentaries on publications of interest,
observations on current practices and
trends in the behavioral sciences,
convention and conference notes,
bibliographies (annotated or not), and
news of interest about the professional
activities of interbehaviorists
Contributions should be submitted to the
editor in triplicate and should conform
to the style described in the publication
manual of the American Psychological
Association (3rd ed., 1983). Submitted
articles will undergo a regular review
process through the members of the
editorial board. For other submissions,
the editor reserves the right to make
minor editorial and stylistic changes.
The support of the faculty and staff of
the Department of Human Development at
the University of Kansas is gratefully
acknowledged.
FROM THE 'P IELD
Our first note in this issue is the
unofficial, official announcement of a new
book by PROFESSOR J. R. KANTOR, entitled
Selected Papers (1984). It is listed in
the Princlpia Press section of The Agora.
In a related bit of unofficial news,
which is on the distaff side, the
warehouse holding much of Principia
Press's stock burned down. Professor
Kantor*s books, however, remain available,
though some will have to be re-printed in
order to maintain availability in the
future. Apparently, as Steve Larsen
quipped, Professor Kantor!s books have
been a hot item lately.
In another note, LOUISE KENT-UDOLF has
completed her second book Shop Talk;
A Preyocational Language Program for
Retarded Students. It is dedicated to
Jacob Robert Kantor. Dr. Kent-Udolf is a
special education consultant to the public
schools at the Region II Service Center in
Corpus Christi, Texas.
'Finally, we would like to make note of
an article published by LINDA J. PARROTT
(West Virginia University) in the last
issue of The Psychological Record (1983,
Vol. 33, No. 4) "Defining Social
Behavior: An Exercise in Scientific System
Building." That issue of The Record was
devoted to the experimental analysis of
human operant behavior, and was edited by
William F. Buskist (Auburn University).
The quotation on the front cover of this
issue comes from Kantor, J. R. (1946).
The aim and progress of psychology.
AjtSiiSSB Scientist, 3_4, 251-263. The
article is also reprinted in Kantor, J. R.
(1971). The Aim and Progress of
Psychology and Other Sciences. Chicago:
Principlia Press (see p. 18 of text).
 THE
As promised -- a second issue of The
Interbehaviorist before the new year. As
plans now stand, we expect to publish
issues of Volume 12 in March (Spring),
June (Summer), and September (Fall).
Volume 13 will begin with the 1985 Winter
issue. That volume and all subsequent
ones will have four issues each.
Many of you wrote us notes of support in
regards to the form and substance of the
last issue. Thank you. More important,
though, some of you had excellent
suggestions for improving the newsletter
(e.g., layout and content). Although we
would like to make some of these suggested
changes, we regret that we cannot do so at
the present time because of our financial
situation; these changes will have to wait
until the next volume.
As mentioned, our financial situation is
not a strong one; however, we are, as they
say, viable. Our finances, though, will
keep us from publishing more than twelve
pages per issue throughout the rest of the
present volume, and may cause us to cut
back to eight pages on occasion. In
addition, we will have to raise
subscription rates for the next volume in
order to cover costs. We thought it
prudent, first, however, to strengthen the
distribution and substance of the
newsletter before asking subscribers to
pay increased rates. Noel Smith (SUNY-
Plattsburg) kindly sent us his extra back
issues of the newsletter. Having these
will help reduce our reproduction costs
for back issues for a while.
We would like to thank those of you who
have renewed your subscriptions to the
newsletter. If you have not yet renewed,
but intend to, please do so at your
earliest convenience -- renewals are
lagging a bit. We would also like to
welcome those who are new subscribers and
to thank those who have assisted us in
securing new subscriptions. The number of
new subscriptions is quite gratifying, >
especially those from students. The small
advertising campaign launched by Doug
Ruben seems to have had some effect,
especially with the members of the
Association for Behavior Analysis (ABA).
A number of you also submitted gift
subscriptions for colleagues, which is an
excellent idea. We would, of course, be
pleased to send a trial issue to anyone.
At our own instigation, we did send out
AGORA
about 100 gratis copies to colleagues
throughout the social and behavioral
sciences. In addition, we are attempting
to arrange for interbehavioral psychology
to have some presence at the May, 1984,
ABA meetings in Nashville, Tennessee. We
expect there to be some interbehavioral
papers or symposia, a meeting for those
interested in interbehavioral psychology,
and some interbehavioral hosts at the
social hours. We will let you know about
the specifics of these matters as soon as
they are available to us.
Before getting on to th?e business of the
newsletter, we do have one issue we would
like to raise. Despite all the very
strong and positive promotion that has
been done on behalf of The
Interbehaviorist over the past several
months, we do not think that the
newsletter will be able to sustain the
readership we are acquiring, and would
like to acquire, if it focuses too
narrowly on mere news and notes about a
small group of interbehaviorists. The
informality of the newsletter and the
function it serves in keeping us informed
about interbehavioral psychology, and
about each other's work, are
characteristics we do not want to lose.
However, we should move beyond this if
interbehavioral psychology is to influence
the behavioral and social sciences in ways
comensurate with a natural science
perspective.
In this regard, the newsletter can
promote and strengthen the role of
interbehavioral psychology by serving as a
resource and an outlet for scholarly work.
Although the number of pages we can
publish this year is limited, we would
like to devote a greater percentage of
them to substantive papers and book
reviews than we did in our first issue.
We realize that writing articles for a
newsletter may not seem a practical way to
achieve academic success, but it is not a
bad first step, especially for students.
Moreover, the newsletter can serve as a
useful outlet for convention papers that
might not otherwise be published and for
briefer versions or shorter parts of
longer manuscripts', chapters, and grant
proposals. In addition, book reviews are
especially welcome. They are important
educational resources for our readers.
All of this is not to suggest a change
in editorial policy or in the general
nature of the .newsletter. Rather, we
would like to make a move towards
strengthening the newsletter so that it
has the broadest possible appeal and
usefulness for the readership. Thus, in
addition to submitting news and notes,
please also consider submitting some short
but substantive manuscripts and book
reviews.
More space could be devoted to such
articles, of course, if the editor would
editorialize less, so let us move on. In
this issue, we feature some information
about the Principia Press, we provide a
list of presentations given by
interbehaviorists at the recent ABA
meetings, and we provide a list of the new
and renewed subscribers to this volume of
the newsletter. We are also pleased to
have a book review by Linda J. Parrott
(West Virginia University) of Kantor's
(1983) Tragedy and the Event Continuum and
a brief research report by Douglas H.
Ruben (Western Michigan University).
Finally, we are carrying an advertisement
for The Psychological Record (The Record)
inside the back page. Again, if you do
not already subscribe to The Record, we
recommend it as an excellent general-
purpose journal that adheres to
perspectives consistent with
interbehavioral psychology.
The Principia Press
Because The Interbehaviorist has quite a
few new subscribers (see subscription
lists at the end of the newsletter), a
word or two about Principia Press and the
availability of Professor Kantor's books
seems to be in o*der. The Principia Press
(5743 Kimbark Ave. / Chicago, IL 60637)
has a booklet available that describes the
current texts in stock. The inside cover
of the booklet contains a description of
the company and its publishing practices.
This description reads as follows:
The Principia Press was organized as a
company of scholars for the purpose of
publishing meritorious works of learning.
From its inception, the Press has operated
on a nonprofit basis. Income from the
sale of books is used to subsidize new
books.
Originally, the Principia Press was
founded to serve primarily the needs of
faculty members of Indiana University.
But soon it became enlarged to serve as a
national medium of publication and was
incorporated in 1932. During the
following decades, the list of
publications grew to include a number of
books in various fields by authors from
other institutions and states. However,
in 1954, the company was divided and the
corporation dissolved. Most of the titles
were distributed under other company
names, while a new private venture under
the name Principia Press became a
specialized outlet for books of permanent
worth in psychology, philosophy, and
education.
Throughout the career of the Principia
Press, it has been operated as a
cooperative enterprise with the unique
feature that orders for books are usually
processed and shipped the day they are
received. The Principia Press maintains a
policy of keeping prices as low as
economic conditions allow. Changes are
made only in response to changing
production costs.
The booklet describing the Press and its
offerings is available from the address
provided above. The books described and
outlined are primarily Professor Kantor's.
Although space limitations do not allow us
to provide these descriptions in this
newsletter, the titles of the books and
their prices are listed below. Checks or
money orders should be made out to the
Principia Press. The currently available
books and their prices are as follows:
1. Kantor, J. R. (1984). Selected
Writings. $20.00.
2. Kantor, J. R. (1983). Tragedy and
the Event Continuum. $15.00.
3. Kantor, J. R. (1982). Cultural
Psychology. $15.00. (Replaces An
Outline of Social Psychology, Kantor,
1929).
4. Kantor, J. R. (1981). Interbehavioral
Philosophy. $27.50.
5. Kantor, J. R. (1977). Psychological
Linguistics. $15.00.
6. Kantor, J. R. and Smith, N. W.
(1975). The Science of Psychology:
 An Interbehavioral Survey. $14.00.
(Replaces A Survey of the Science of
Psychology, Kantor, 1933).
7. Kantor, J. R. (1971). The Aim and
Progress of Psychology and Other
Sciences: A Selection of Papers by
J. R. Kantor. $15.00.
8. Kantor, J. R. (1963, 1969). The
Scientific Evolution of Psychology,
Vols. I and II. $35.00/set.
9. Kantor, J. R. (1959). Interbehavioral
Psychology: A Sample of Scientific
Theory Construction. $10.00.
10. Kantor, J. R. (1953). The Logic of
Modern Science. $10.00.
11. Kantor, J. R. (1945, 1950).
Psychology and Logic, Vols. I and II.
$25.00/set.
12. Kantor, J. R. (1947).- Problems in
Physiological Psychology. $20.00.
13. Kantor, J. R. (1936). An Objective
Psychology of Grammar. $10.00.
14. Kantor, J. R. (1924, 1926).
Principles of Psychology, Vols. I
and II. $30.00/set.
Interbehavioral Psychology at ABA
As mentioned in the last issue of the
newsletter, the annual ABA meetings have
for the past five years provided excellent
opportunities for interbehavioral
psychologists to present papers on
interbehavioral psychology and related
matters. The names of interbehaviorists
(and interested parties) who have
presented papers at these meetings, and
the titles of their presentations, are
listed below alphabetically and by year.
1979
Edward K. Morris
Some Relationships between Kantor
and Skinner
Paul T. Mountjoy
Assumptive Base of Radical Behaviorism
Paul T. Mountjoy & Linda J. Parrott, Chairs
Open Meeting for Interbehaviorists
in the Association for Behavior Analysis
Linda J. Parrott
Modifying the Behavior of an Audience
Linda J. Parrott
Verbal Behavior and Women's Liberation
William S. Verplanck
Danger: Theory Construction Ahead
1980
Sidney W. Bijou
Circumstances for Bringing Behavior
Analysis to Child Behavior and
Development
Dennis J. Delprato
Interbehavioral Psychology as a
Palliative to the Exfcesses of
Cognitivism
Peter A. Holmes and Dennis J. Delprato
Behavior Modification by any 'Other
Name Is Not Necessarily a Rose
Peter A. Holmes, Chair
Radical Behaviorism and Interbehavioral
Psychology. Invited symposium with
with papers by-Delprato, Morris, and
Mountjoy. v
Edward K. Morris
The Evolution of Interbehavioral
Psychology and Radical Behaviorism
Edward.K. Morris
Traits and Situations: A Behavior
Analysis
Paul T. Mountjoy
Individual Organism Research and Group
Design in the History of Psychology
Paul T. Mountjoy
The Interrelationship Between
Interbehavioral Psychology and Radical
Behaviorism
Linda J. Parrott "
Beyond Radical Behaviorism: The
Interbehavioral Alternative
Linda J. Parrott
Radical and Interbehavioral
Perspectives on Knowing
Linda J. Parrott
Science and Scientific Philosophy
1981
Sidney W. Bijou
Child Development and Interbehavioral
Psychology
Donna M. Cone
Behavioral Applications: Complexity
of the True State of Affairs
Jackson Marr
Behaviorism and Modern Physics:
Parallels and Antiparallels
James T. McKearney
Organism-Environment Relations in the
Analysis of Behavior
Jay Moore
On Mentalism, Methodological Behaviorism,
and Radical Behaviorism
Jay Moore
On Molar and Molecular Analyses of
Behavior
Edward K. Morris, Stephen T. Higgins
and Warren K. Bickel
The Influence of Kantor's Interbehavioral
Psychology on Behavior Analysis
Edward K. Morris, Chair
The Relevance of Interbehavioral *"
Psychology for Behavioral Research.
Invited symposium with papers by Bijou,
Cone, McKearney, and Morris, Higgins,
and Bickel
Paul T. Mountjoy
Some Continnua of Verbal Behavior
Linda J. Parrott
Interbehaviorism: Analysis of Implicit
Interbehaviors
Linda J.* Parrott
On the Difference Between Social and
Verbal Behaviors
1982
Sidney W. Bijou
Three Stage Analysis of the Beginning
of Language Behavior
Jackson Marr
Conceptual Approaches and Issues [in
EAB]
Jay Moore
Molar and Molecular Contributions to
Avoidance
Jay Moore
On Behaviorism, Knowledge, and
Explanation
Edward K. Morris, Stephen T. Higgins,
and Warren K. Bickel
Cogniphia and Cogniphobia in the
Behavioral Sciences
Paul T. Mountjoy#
Private Events*Revisited: There Ain't
No Such Thing < Regular, F = Foreign, and I = Institution.
Paul T. Mountjoy and Alan Lewandowski
A Dancing Horse, A Learned Pig, and
Muscle Twitches
Paul T. Mountjoy, Douglas H. Ruben,
and Terry Bradford
Recent Technological Advancement in
Treatment of Enuresis: Theory and
Commercial Devices
Douglas H. Ruben
Methodological and Philosphical
Adaptation in,Assertiveness Training
Programs Designed for the Blind
Linda J. Parrott
Rule-Governed Behavior: An Implicit
Analysis of Reference
Linda J. Parrott and -Don F. Hake
Uses and Abuses of History
William N. Schoenfeld
Avoidance Revisited
Robert Wahler and James J. Fox
Setting Events in Applied Behavior
Analysis
1983
Sidney W. Bijou and John Umbreit
Initial Language Development: The
Fourth Stage
Dennis J. Delprato
Interacting Behavior Patterns and
Behavioral Decrements
Steven E. Larsen and Edward K. Morris
On the Usefulness of the Setting Event
Concept in Behavior Analysis
Sam M. Leigland
Three Empirical Stages in the Functional
Analysis of Verbal Behavior
Jack Marr
Behaviorism and Mathematical Thinking:
Some Issues of Scientific Verbal
Behavior
Jay Moore
Causal Issues in the Analysis of Privacy
Linda J. Parrott
A Conceptual Analysis of Social Behavior
Linda J. Parrott
Second Thoughts on Skinner's Verbal
Behavior
Subscriptions
Listed below are the names of new
subscribers and those who have renewed
subscriptions to The Interbehaviorist for
1983-1984 (Vol. 12). The letters in
parentheses following each name refer to
subscription categories: S = Student, R
Those subscribers whose names are followed
by an asterisk are those interested in
exchanging reprints of interbehavioral
publications and related material with
other subscribers. A mailing list is
available from the editor. If you have
paid for your subscription and your name
is missing from the list, or if your
subscription category is inaccurate, or if
you would like an asterisk to designate
your interest in reprint exchange, please
let us know.
New Subscriptions
Athabasca Univesity Library (I)
Jane B. Atwater (S)*
Donald M. Baer (R)
David Barns (S)
Ramon Bayes (RF)
Warren K. Bickel (R)
Donald A. Bloomquist (S)-v
Bill Bryson-Brockmann (S)
Louis Burgio (R)
David Chlubna.(S)
Lynne Anne Daurelle (S)
Robert Epstein (R)
James J. Fox (R)
Roderick K, Fox (S)
Albert F. Haas (R)
Robert P. Hawkins (R)
Catherine Hunker (S)
Matthew L. Isreal (R)
Lisa M. Johnson (S)*
William Kaiser (S)
Kimberly C. Kirby (S)
Jennifer Lamarre (S)
Steven E. Larsen (S)*
Janet R. LeFrancois(S)
Maria A. Matos (RF)
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Renewed Subscriptions
Steven R. Brown (R)
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M. A. and B. R. MacRoberts (R)
Marion W. McPherson (R)
Edward K. Morris (R)*
Paul T. Mountjoy (R)
N. H. Pronko (R)*
Albert E. Roberts (R)
Douglas H. Ruben (S)
Noel W. Smith (R)
David W. Zimmerman (R)
Journal Noteg
Doug Ruben calls our attention to several
articles of interest to interbehayioral
psychologists. These articles, and his
commentary on thems are ,as follows:
Herrick,, J. W. (1983). In t,er behavioral
perspectives on aging, Internatlong1
Humaji __Deve io_gm_erit, 1 Jo,
95-123. " " ' :'"
This article presents a long and
exhaustive analysis of the implications
of interbehavioral psychology for
geropsychology. Herrick places his
analysis both in relationship to
traditional legacies about aging and to
the matrix of today's society. An
excellent piece of scholarship.
Morawski, J. C. (1982). On thinking about
history as social psychology. Perspnality
and Social PsychologyBulletin, 18, 393-401.
In
The Scientific Evolution of Psychology;
Kantor (1963, 1969) argues for the
critical importance of understanding
history and conceptual errors made in the
past. With this understanding comes an
appreciation for historiography;'"
Morawski calls historiography a practical
method for research. Her plea is that
many problems in social psychology are
reconcilable on a metatheoretical level
by considering the historical data within
a culture as part of a legitimate
discipline. This proposition is agree-
able with interbehavioral psychology.
Those who are skeptical of it are
unaware that social psychology has been
and still is the study of evolutionary
contexts.
These journal notes complete The Agora
for this issue. The remaining material
are the articles by Parrott and by Ruben.
 Book Review;
J. R. Kantor's (1983) Tragedy and
Continuum
Linda J. Parrott
West Virginia University
Kantor begins his analysis of tragedy by
noting how numerous and significant events
of this type are in the realms of both
nature and culture, a circumstance giving
rise to an enormous literature on the
nature and conditions of tragedy.
Traditional expositions and analyses of
these events are found wanting on two
counts, however. First, literary and
philosophical studies of tragedy are
confined to anthropic events, ignoring
catastrophies occurring in the absence of
human intrusion. Secondly, human
tragedies are formulated on psychological
opinion and in accordance with some
variant of metaphysical philosophy,
leaving them void of scientific value. It
is Kantor's objective to correct this
situation, and he does so in a familiar
manner. The events to be examined are
identified and the postulates of a
scientific psychology and philosophy upon
which an adequate interpretation of tragic
events may be articulated are described.
A critical review of historical
interpretations arising from literary,
philosophical, moral, and religious
sources follows. His objective here is to
reach a synthesis "built .upon the
observation of actually occurring events
as well as a consideration of the variant
ways [tragic events] have been
intellectually treated" (p. 1). The
details of this critical study I shall
leave to those inclined to read the book,
so as to leave space for what, to me,
constitutes the most interesting aspect of
this work: Kantor s reformulation of the
concept of tragedy.
Tragedy is defined as the truncation of
event potential (p. 37, 51). It is a
definition requiring further elaboration
and explanation, however, because event
potential is essentially a construction
pertaining to a future state of affairs,
and it is uncharacteristic of Kantor to
regard a construct as a basic datum. To
understand Kantor's definition of tragedy,
then, we must understand the nature of
potentiality and of the kinds of
potentialities subject to tragic ends.
As previously mentioned, the future
condition of some event, in as much as it
hhs not yet obtained, cannot serve as a
stimulus with which an explicit perceptual
response may be coordinated. Reactions to
future conditions may still occur,
however, through the operation of
substitute stimuli. The substitutional
functions of stimuli are derived from
their relations with other stimuli in the
experiences of particular individuals.
Relations among stimuli in the present
case have their sources in two sets of
circumstances. First, all events are
definite processes of change and
development, having their origins in
earlier events. To the extent that trends
or patterns in the direction of event
changes have been observed in their
previous evolutions, their subsequent
evolutions may be expected to follow a
similiar course. That is, the future
conditions of some event may be regarded
as continuous with its past conditions
and, on this basis, previous developments
may substitute for future developments.
Secondly, while all event fields are
unique configurations of factors, the
course of development of one event may be
sufficiently like that of other events of
the same general type to allow the
developments of these other events to
substitute for the future conditions of
the event of interest. In short, one may
react to the future condition or
potentiality of an event, despite its
absence from a current event field,
through the operation of substitute
stimulation arising from the previous
evolutions of that event, as well as from
the entire course of development of
similar events. It is by virtue of
implicit reactions of this sort that the
truncation of event potential has meaning.
A judgement of truncation depends on an
appreciation of the difference between the
terminal condition of an event, as
explicitly perceived, and its
uninterrupted development, as implicitly
imagined.
While it is true that the course of
development of any event may be
interrupted by untoward circumstances, not
all occurrances of this sort are properly
regarded as tragic. Tragic ends are
peculiar to events having potentialities
of particular value, raising the issue of
what "value" means in this context.
Contrary to popular philosophical opinion,
values are not regarded as epiphenomena by
Kantor, nor are they seen as aspects of
anthropic circumstances alone. Values
constitute the quality, necessity, or
fittingness of events and, as such, they
are factors in most situations. For
example, things have value in the sense of
being suitable or required for particular
purposes. Persons, like things, possess
serviceable qualities in specific
situations, known as their abilities and
intelligence. More generally, the value
of any event, or of its potential
condition, is simply one of its
stimulational functions.
When a change in the composition of an
event field occurs, as when the
development of some event is abruptly
curtailed or terminated altogether, the
post-change composition of factors may
lack the properties required for
continuance toward some end anticipated in
the absence of such curtailment. The
curtailed event is thereby one of great
potential in this situation. Its
truncation, therefore, may be regarded as
a tragedy. An example may help to
illustrate this point. Scientific
achievements are features of complex
circumstances involving the conjoint
evolution of many factors. However, not
all of these factors have equal weight in
the eventuation of achievement. The
untimely death of a prominent scientist on
the verge of discovery may serve to delay
scientific advancement for many years,
while the termination of many other
factors, lacking in the property of
fittingness or necessity, may have a
lesser impact. Under these conditions,
only the death of the scientist may be
regarded as tragic. Tragedy is not simply
the curtailment of events or their
termination; it is the truncation of their
potential toward some end, imaginable on
the basis of their previous developments.
Similarly, the destruction* of a forest by
fire is not itself a tragedy. What is
tragic about this event is the truncation
of the potential of the forest to provide
lumber for human use, or a habitat for
other life forms.
Kantor's analysis of tragedy is
essentially an exercise in system
building. All events in the continuum of
natural happenings are subject to
naturalistic interpretations, and tragedy
is no exception. Further, the concept of
tragedy is particularly worthy of this
attempt given the prevalence of tragic
happenings in the event continuum. The
value of Kantor's naturalistic formulation
of tragedy is to be found in its potential
impact on spiritistic interpretations of
this concept arising from nonscientific
sources, including philosphy, literature,
religion, and ethics.

Assessment of Setting Events

and Interbehavioral History for
Dispelling Myths about Aging in
The Residential Elderly

Douglas H. Ruben, M.A.

Center fon Independent Living

and

Western Michigan University

Herrick's (1983) re-appraisal of the illustrates the negative stereotypes that

assumption that behavioral, mental, or underlie geropsychological research. His
cognitive incompetence automatically interbehavioral approach, which uses
accompanies the biological aging process Kantor's overall system and Kantor's
10
analysis of psychological thought,
dispells many of these stereotypes or
"myths."
This present case report illustrates an
application of Herrick's interbehavioral
analysis with five residential elderly
women who strongly believed the
degeneration of their psychological
abilities (e.g., emotion, motivation, and
memory) was due entirely to their advanced
biological age. Through an assessment of
their current setting events, past
interbehavioral history, and immediate
social environment, residents were able to
find suggestive evidence that their
psychological losses were attributable not
to biological change, but to changes in
socio-environmental settings.
Method
Subjects and Setting
Five residential women with varying IQ's
and good vision, 67 years and older,
participated in this study. All women
were widows and had recently moved from
larger houses or apartments to efficiency
or one-bedroom apartments in a seven-floor
building. Their socio'cultural and
economic backgrounds varied greatly from
rural to urban, and from lower- to middle-
class. All the residents voluntarily
participated in weekly group educational
and therapy sessions held by the author on
different topics related to independent
living adjustment.
Assessment Procedure
Seven ability-inability dichotomies were
drawn from Herrick's (1983) category of
stereotypical myths. These dichotomies
are listed in Table 1 below.
Table 1
Category A Category B
(Abilities) (Inabilities)
Emotional Unemotional
Motivated Unmotivated
React Fast React Slow
Learn Fast Learn Slow
Remember Forget
Creative Uncreative
Solve Problems Ignore Problems
Clinical assessment involved four phases.
First, the residents ranked the transition
between each of the dichotomies (i.e.,
from ability to inability) as due to
either "psychological and social" or
"biological." Second, residents were
asked to write down two activities from
their past for each of the seven abilities
listed in Table 1. Third, residents
identified the activities currently
available to them in the apartment
building (opportunities) or in which they
participated (performance) for each of the
abilities. Fourth, the residents and the
author correlated these activities with
the transition from ability to inability
that had developed during their current
residence.
Results
For the first phase of the clinical
assessment, all transitions in ability
were said to be due to biological factors
except for the emotional-unemotional
dichotomy (N=2). The second phase of the
assessment showed that many of.the past
activities in the abilities category
involved group participation, extended
durations of interaction,, and more
response effort (e.g., cooking for
families and shopping). As for the
currently available activities, bingo
games and recreational and occupational
therapy presented the most ability
opportunities, whereas the activities
actually being performed were brief,
effortless, and solitary. Finally, many
of the salient discrepancies between past
and current activities corresponded with
those abilities that residents strongly
argued were biological (viz., memory,
motivation, etc.). Residents did state
that the demands of "social and
competitive" stimulation in current
activities were far less intense and
frequent than in activities during their
youth. Available activities simply lacked
the "time-pressure" and "sense of
accomplishment" that residents felt were
necessary in order for emotion,
motivation, and reaction time to improve
or be restored. The residents, however,
cited examples of performing these past
activities whenever opportunities
currently arose, despite claims that their
biological (e.g., visual-motor) deficits
would discourage them.
Discussion
The assessment of setting events and
interbehavioral history involves the
entire psychological and biological field
of human interaction. Current settings
and past history both play a significant
role in this interbehavioral field, as do
the influence of stimulus events present
at the time of assessement. The elderly
residents in this study realized that
 11

while aging is both a biological and environment interactions could be both

psychological process, loss of particular preventative as well as corrective of
abilities may be due more to environmental deterioration in personal and
change than to biological deterioration. interpersonal functioning.
One solution to the problem of perceived
decreased ability is to increase daily References
activity. Residents could plan a more Herrick, J. W- (1983). Interbehavioral
adaptive activity schedule by including perspectives on aging. International
various important features in each Journal of Aging and Human Development,
activity: (1) time-limitations or 16, 95-123. '
deadlines, (2) achieveable goals, (3)
contingencies for these goals, and (4) Ruben, D. H. (in press). Methodological
peers who compete to achieve these goals adaptativeness in an assertiveness
(see Ruben, in press). Such restructuring training program designed for the blind.
of the current context of behavior- Psychological Reports.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL RECORD

SELECTED RECENT ARTICLES
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Factlitative Effects of Analgesic Suggestions.
John D. Holmes, Ham id Hekmat, and
Barbara S. Mozingo.
Facial and Vocal Individual Recognition in the
Common Chimpanzee. Harold R. Bauer and
M.Michelle Philip.
Symposium Proceedings. On Cognitive and
Behavioral Orientations to the Language of
Behavior Analysis: Why be Concerned Over
the Differences? Jay Moore, Edward A.
Wasserman, Jack Marr, Joseph J. Pear, and
Roger Schnaitter.
The Explanation of Behavior. Robert C. Bolles.
From Bottle-Fed Chimp to Botttenose Dolphin: A
Contemporary Appraisal of Winthrop Kellogg.
Ludy T, Benjamin, Jr., and Darryl Bruce.
Brain, Behavior, and Evolution. Noel W. Smith,
Psychological Retardation and Interbehavioral
Maladjustments. J.R, Kantor
Universal and Personal Helplessness: A Test of
the Reformulated Model. Miriam E. Kramer
and Robert A. Rosellini.
A New Perspective on Alfred Binet: Dramatist of
Le Theatre de I'Horreur. Theta H. Wolf,
Histories of Response Omission and Human
Opera nt Behavior Under a Fixed-Ratio
Schedule of Reinforcement. Harold Weiner.
Self-Reinforcement: Its Reinforcing Capability
and Its Clinical Utility. David Sohn and
Peter A. Lamal.
The Study of Human Operant Behavior, 195&-
1981: A Topical Bibliography. W. F. Buskist
and H.L, Miller, Jr.
Biofeedback: Clinically Valid or Oversold?
Lawrence Simkins.
Sustained Blood Pressure Responding During
Synthetic Work. R.L. Ray and H.H. Emurian.
The Role of Psychology in Multicultural
Education. L.W, Buckalew and
Richard S. Hickey.

The Psychological Record is a general journal of psychology. Since 1937 it has published psychological
theory and research concerned with a broad range of topics in the discipline, Rapid publication of accepted
manuscripts assures thai each issue contains very recent work.

In the belief thai reading The Psychological Record may facilitate the development of students' journal
reading habits, The Psychological Record is continuing a special student subscription rate.

1983 Subscription Rates

Student subscription$10.00
Professional individual$15.00
Library / i n s t i t u t i o n $32.00

Back volumes available

1967 to present

The Psychological Record, Gambier, Ohio 43022

 THE INTERBEHAVIORIST:
A QUARTERLY NEWSLETTER OF INTERBEHAVIORAL PSYCHOLOGY
THE INTERBEHAVIORSST is a quarterly publication in the behavioral sciences. As its title
indicates, THE INTERBEHAVIORIST takes its orientation from the interbehavioral psychology of j.R.
Kantor and others committed to a natural science of behavior from the contexualistic, integrated-field
perspective. THE INTERBEHAVORIST is perhaps best described as a newsletter devoted to filling the
gap between informal means of scientific communication (e.g., colloquia and letters) and formal
publication. As such, it serves as a useful and provoking supplement to contemporary journals such as
Behaviorism, The Behavior Analyst, The Psychological Record, the journal of the Experimental Analysis of
Behavior, the journal of Applied Behavior Analysis, and the journal of the History of the Behavioral
Sciences. The newsletter is designed to encourage reader submission and participation. It publishes brief
articles presented for peer comment and perusal; book reviews; commentaries on other publications of
interest; observations of current practices and trends in basic and applied research, theory, and the
history of the behavioral sciences; and general news of interest. For a sample issue or a one-year
subscription, send the form below to:
Edward K. Morris, Editor THE INTERBEHAVIORIST *
Department of Human Development * University of Kansas "Lawrence, Kansas 66045

THE SNTERBEHAVIORIST
NAME. OFFICE PHONE!

ADDRESS CITY. STATE. ..ZIPCODE.

D Institution subscription: $8.00/year D Student subscription: $2.50/year
D Regular subscription:'$4.00/year D Back volumes, 1-10: $3.00/yolume
(Volume year begins in the Fall)
Make checks payable to THE INTERBEHAV1OR1ST

THE INTERBEHAVIORIST
Edward K. Morris, Editor
Department of Human Development
212B Haworth Hall
University of Kansas
Lawrence, Kansas 66045
 IE
NTERBEHAVIORIST
A Quarterly Newsletter of Interbehavioral Psychology
Published at the University of Kansas
Volume 12 Spring, 1983-1984 Number 3

EDITOR TABLE OF CONTENTS

Edward K. Morris
Department of Human Development Notes From The Field 2
University of Kansas ,'
The Agora 3
ASSOCIATEEDITORS
Commentaries 5
Donna M. Cone
Department of Mental Health Poem. 15
State of Rhode Island
Dennis J. Delprato
Department of Psychology
Eastern Michigan University QUOTATION
Ronald G. Heyduk
Department of Psychology Tragic events are occurrences in
Hartwick College pristine nature and in human
circumstances that are occasionally mild
Paul T. Mountjoy but usually intense, momentous,
Department of Psychology excessive, and frequently pregnant with
Western Michigan University grave consequences. Owing to the
Linda J. Parrott accident that the name of tragic events
Department of Psychology is historically coupled with literary
West Virginia University sources, the continuity of events has
been occluded and therefore unrecognized.
Douglas H. Ruben
Department of Psychology The precise hypothesis adopted in this
Western Michigan University essay is that tragedy comprises
situations in which significant
Noel W. Smith
potentialities that have been developed
Department of Psychology are destroyed or lost in the process of
State University of New York event changes, instead of attaining a
at Plattsbwcgh complete actuality.
EDITORIAL ASSISTANTS
J, R. Kantor (1983, p.
Jane B. Atwater 37). Tragedy and the
Lisa M. Johnson Event Continuum.
Steven E. Larsen Chicago: Principia Press,
James T. Todd
 THE INTERBEHAVIOR1ST
A Quarterly Newsletter of
Interbehavioral Psychology
Edward K. Morris, Editor
Department of Human Development
212B Haworth Hall
University of Kansas
Lawrence, Kansas 66045
(913) 864-4840
The_ _In_terbehaviorist is a quarterly
publication of news, discussion, and
articles pertaining to interbehavioral
psychology a natural science of
psychology from a contextualistic,
integrated-field perspective. The
Interbehaviorist serves as a newsletter
committed to professional communication
that falls between informal letters and
colloquia, and formal archival -publication.
As such, the newsletter supplements
contemporary journals in the behavioral
sciences dedicated to basic and applied
research and to the history and philosophy
of the behavioral sciences. The
newsletter actively encourages reader
submission of articles, book reviews,
commentaries on publications of interest,
observations on current practices and
trends in the behavioral sciences,
convention and conference notes,
bibliographies (annotated or not), and
news of interest about the professional
activities of interbehaviorists.
Contributions should be submitted to the
editor in triplicate and should conform
to the style described in the publication
manual of the American Psychological
Association (3rd ed., 1983). Submitted
articles will undergo a regular review
process through the .members of the
editorial board. For other submissions,
the editor reserves the right to make
minor editorial and stylistic changes.
The support of the faculty and staff of
the Department of Human Development at
the University of Kansas is gratefully
acknowledged.
S9IS_S^LISLZEL2
The material reproduced below was
contributed by Marion White McPherson
(University of Akron). It is the citation
written for the Doctor of Letters Award
given to Professor Kantor on June 14, 1970
by the University of Akron. The content
of the citation seems apropos to this
issue of the newsletter,
j
"The author of numerous books, and the
founder of the widely respected journal,
The Psychological Record, JACOB ROBERT
KANTOR, Professor Emeritus of Indiana
University, has been active for five
decades.
Structural psychologists, in ascendence
when he began his work, saw the advent of
Watsonian Behaviorism and soon thereafter
the emergence of Gestalt psychology. Both
without and within the academy, questions
were repeatedly asked, "What is psychology
about?", "What is its major concern?", and
in all candor "How can psychology
become a science?"
Winds of doctrine blew heavily from all
directions. Professor Kantor withstood
the gales and maintained a victorious
immunity to the .mandates of tradition,
ever seeking to match the label
"scientific" to the fact of scientific
psychology. His endeavors have promoted
man's directorship of man.
Hence, it is fitting to honor this
Nestor among psychologists
JACOB ROBERT KANTOR
a personage of impressive academic
accomplishments whose seminal ideas may
well yield the richest harvests in the
years ahead,"
 THE AGORA
Jacob Robert Kantor (August 18, 1888 to
February 2, 1984) has died. This issue of
The Interbehaviorist is one we hoped we
would never have to publish, but your
responses to our call for commentaries
eased the burden considerably. We know
that you had difficulty in limiting your
comments to one hundred words -- far too
few to express the influence Professor
Kantor has had and will have on our lives
and on the field of psychology. That
limit, though, had to be imposed for
practical reasons. We appreciated your
consideration in this regard. Some
contributors expressed an interest in
writing longer pieces for the newsletter.
We would be pleased to publish more
subtantive articles on Professor Kantor's
contributions, though would like to avoid
a drawn out series of personal memoirs.
We were pleased that so many readers
submitted contributions and appreciated,
also, the many calls and notes from those
of you who felt too new to interbehavioral
psychology to contribute at this time. We
would also like to thank Donna Cone for
submitting the e. e. cummings poem
reproduced at the end of the newsletter,
and Marion White McPherson for sending us
a copy of the citation written for
Professor Kantor's 1970 Doctor of Letters
Award from the University of Akron (see
"Notes from the Field").
Finally, before turning to the submitted
commentaries, we would like to contribute
a few words of our own about Professor
Kantor.
Professor Kantor's death is felt acutely
and deeply. But, what have we lost, what
more might we lose, and what can we do
about that? In one sense, we lost
Professor Kantor, the man. He was real
and material; he occupied space and time
in our world. It seems somehow
incomprehensible that this vital and
physical person can simply have
disappeared -- never, never to return.
Lamenting over this biological event,
however, is too materialistic of us, as
Professor Kantor would have chastized.
What we have lost is more than Professor
Kantor, the man. We have lost a long-
lived and established pattern in our lives
and an interbehavioral event of
extrordinary potential. Our
interbehavioral fields have been
disrupted. We lost the man who educated
us, who corresponded with us, and who
wrote for us and for many others. We can,
of course, try to attach ourselves to
substitutes for these patterns, or to our
libraries of Professor Kantor's books.
But material substitutes cannot
reestablish the patterns of our
interbehavioral fields.
Professor Kantor's interbehavioral
potential, though, need not be lost. That
potential remains with aid of us whose
lives he touched. We interact with our
worlds more wisely for having known
Professor Kantor. In that sense, his
potential remains with us. But for how
long? A greater and worse tragedy than
Professor Kantor's death would be to lose
the potential that was his and that he has
bestowed upon us. Professor Kantor's
potential, however, can be maintained
through us in our continued dedication to
a natural science of psychology. In that
way, he remains with us.
We have chosen not to write an obituary
in the newsletter because that would have
focused on the biological event and our
material loss. Moreover, in looking back
through a formal review of his career, we
might overlook Professor Kantor's
continued potential as an interbehavioral
event, and hence truly lose the man. In
looking forward to establishing a natural
science of psychology, however, we can
find Professor Kantor in our- lives for
ever.
Let us close The Agora with some
forward-looking news affirming the
vitality of interbehavioral psychology.
Harry Mahan (Project Socrates) has been
most kind and generous to us in two ways.
First, he has donated the remaining copies
of The Interactional Psychology of J. R.
Kantor: An Introduction (Mahan, 1968) to
The Interbehaviorist for our resale so
that we can finance the newsletter through
the rest of the present volume. The book
contains a full page photograph of
Professor Kantor which might be of
interest to subscribers. We will describe
the book in more detail in the next issue
of the newsletter. In the meantime,
4
copies are available from us for $5.00
($6.00 foreign) (postpaid). Second,
Professor Mahan has proposed that we
establish a Kantor Memorial Fund for the
future subsidy of the newsletter. We
think this is a most practical suggestion;
there is much we would like to do to
enhance the status and contribution of The
Interbehaviorist to the field of
psychology that we cannot do now for lack
of funds. Professor Mahan has generously
agreed to back up his proposal with a $100
donation to establish the fund (Doug Ruben
had previously made a monetary
contribution to the newsletter that we now
want to acknowledge). We hope that other
subscribers and readers will make similar
contributions as befits their financial
status. These contributions should be
made out to the Kantor Memorial Fund
(Edward K. Morris, Treasurer). There
should be little question about the tax-
exempt status of this fund, but we will
look into establishing an interbehavioral
organization that would assure this,
though this may take a little time. If
other Kantor-related funds are established
elsewhere, we would be most amenable to
combining resources to better effect
changes in the field. We are not very
territorial.
Another note of interbehavioral vitality
comes from the Association for Behavior
Analysis (ABA). The Tenth Annual ABA
convention will be held May 28-31 in
Nashville, Tennessee, at the Opryland
Hotel. Those wishing information about
the convention should write to ABA,
Department of Psychology, Western Michigan
University, Kalamazoo, Michigan (616-383-
1629). In an informal perusal of the
convention program, we noted that about
thirty of the newsletter's subscribers
will be presenting papers at ABA this
year. We will provide a list of
presenters and titles in the next issue of
the newsletter, which should be published
in early July.
Several subscribers have inquired as to
whether any formal gathering of
interbehaviorists would be held at the
convention. Regrettably, a special
meeting form was submitted for that
purpose, but the-meeting could not be
scheduled. The Interbehaviorist, however,
will have an information poster set up
during its co-sponsorship of several
social hours on the evenings of May 28-30
from 9:00-12:00. This would be an
excellent opportunity for us to meet, at
least informally. Moreover, the staff of
1 tie Interbehaviorist CQUJ.U uoe oumc
volunteers at these times to speak with
interested convention attendees, so please
drop by.
In other ABA-related news, Richard S.
Amado (2008 Villard Avenue, St. Paul,
Minnesota 55116; 612-689-2492) has been
preparing materials for establishing an
Interbehavioral Psychology Special
Interest Group (SIG) at ABA. He asked
that those interested in developing the
SIG contact him. This issue should be
discussed before proceeding further. The
upcoming ABA meetings will provide an
excellent opportunity to do this.
Our last annoucement is relevant to our
earlier comments about maintaining the
vitality of interbehavioral psychology.
Principia Press (5743 Kimbark Avenue,
Chicago, Illinois 60637) is pleased to
announce the publication of a collection
of Professor Kantor's writings -- Selected
Writings in Philosophy, Psycho_lggy_,_and
Other Sciences (1929-1983). This text
contains articles written by Professor
Kantor between 1929 and 1983.
Specifically, it reprints three book
chapters, twelve articles from Revista
Mexicana, eleven articles from The
Psychological Record, and one article from
the Journal of The Experimental Analysis
of Behavior. Price: $20.00 (postpaid).
In related news, Principia Press will be
reprinting additional copies of both
volumes of The Scientific Evolution of
Psychology (Kantor, 1963, 1969) and The
Science of Psychology: An Interbehavioral
Survey (Kantor & Smith, 1975). These will
be available by the end of July.
 COMMENTARIES
Reading J. R. Kantor's works introduced
me to interbehavloral philosophy, but it
was not until I met Professor Kantor at
his home in Chicago that I began to
understand how thoroughly the man believed
in interbehaviorism. I left that
encounter believing with complete
certainty he had never waivered in his
commitment to science, or questioned his
own position on scientific psychology,
regardless of the reactions he provoked
from his social community. Professor
Kantor has taught me the lesson I believe
to be the most valuable in my life:
Scientific behavior must be kept within
the interbehavioral continuum and
protected from the influences of
ideological institutions.
Richard S. Amado
The first psychology that I ever learned
was psychophysics; I saw .that there could
be a science of human behavior.
(Previously, I had studied social science,
which convinced me that the term was an
oxymoron.) I turned to the study of
psychology, and found all its parts that
are not psychophysics and not the
experimental analysis of behavior. I was
about to turn back to physics, because
psychophysics seemed nearly complete and
the rest of psychology was social science,
when I was introduced briefly to Skinner's
writings (a deliberate display by that
graduate training program of its intense
liberalism). I stayed to study the
experimental analysis of behavior. Later,
Sid Bijou asked me to read Kantor. At
first, I thought that Kantor's system was
a criticism of the experimental analysis
of behavior. But more reading showed that
it was not -- it was the context for the
experimental analysis of behavior.
Interbehaviorism shows that the principles
of the experimental analysis of behavior
are not the generalities of a science of
behavior, but its special cases. True,
they are its most general special cases,
and for me greatly preferable to the
vastly general noncases of social science.
But even so, they are precisely correct
only in certain contexts, and must be not
abandoned but rather stated differently
for other contexts. Kantor shows us that
we could do that, and that if we did, we
probably would find that the context-
relevant results can be stated generally,
if only they all are built on empirical,
experimentally analyzed observation.
Thank you, Jacob. An earlier Jacob's
children built a nation out of 12 tribes;
your children will unite many tribes into
a paradigm.
Donald M. Baer
Some years ago, the first time I entered
the office of Emilio Ribes at the National
Autonomous University of Mexico
(U.N.A.M.), I was surprised to discover
that it was dominated by a photograph of
an old man who seemed to look down on the
visitor with an affable and ironic
expression (half a Russian anarchist and
half a Frank Capra angel). "Who is it?" I
asked him. "it is Kantor." Although I
never got to know him personally, I soon
learned to appreciate his human qualities
and his writings.
For me, Kantor has not died. He will
never die. As with Russell, Piaget, or
John XXIII, he is timeless. In Spanish
speaking countries he continues to live
through the work of Emilio Ribes,
Francisco Lopez Valadez, Josep Roca, Joan
Riera and many others. The story of
Kantor is a legend, even an old ballad
perhaps -- that of a good man, free and
honest, who was not concerned with honors
and in his life did what he felt ought to
be done. Fortunately for psychologists,
he did it in depth, and well.
Ramon Bayes
I found in n\y association with J. R.
Kantor, which dates back to 1964 at
Indiana University, a warm and lasting
friendship and a constant source of
inspiration. This man's prolific writings
since 1917 have helped me, among other
things, to reconstruct my postulation
orientation, and to formulate a theory of
normal and retarded development. His
recent publications have helped me,
furthermore, to appreciate how affective,
effective, cognitive, and language
interactions can be satisfactorily
analyzed withiri a natural science
framework. Kantor's language analysis has
also served particularly to clarify the
difference between psycholinguistics and
authentic psychological language, and has
encouraged me to launch a research program
on the language behavior of normal and
retarded children.
Sidney W. Bijou
What impressed me at my first,
accidental contact with the work of
Kantor,^whilst still an undergraduate, was
his anti-reductionism and his naturalism.
But, perhaps, more than these two aspects,
was his attempt at constructing a
comprehensive science of human psychology
on a unjtfied theoretical foundation.
Other approaches I encountered were either
partial and unconcerned with
systemization, or hopelessly dualistic.
Kantor's influence has endured and has
been important in my attempts at using
operant concepts to experimentally analyse
naturally occurring human behaviour,
instead of the usual interpretation and
behaviour technology which, unfortunately,
still dominate.
Edward Blewitt
For many years, I wrestled with "the
problems" of traditional psychology, often
accepting rather than questioning its
putative "transcendental verities" --
seeking answers to dualistic questions
which should nev^o: have been asked. It
was Kantor who clarified for me that, by
basing investigations upon metaphysical
presuppositions, science is inevitably led
into a world of blind alleys and
conundrums. For this clarification, I am
deeply grateful. Kantor's thorough-going
treatment of psychology as a natural
science is his legacy and our mandate.
Donald A. Blomquist
In the summer of 1938 Professor Kantor
was Visiting Professor at Ohio State
University. We graduate students found
great challenge and food for thought as he
mercilessly feretted out the "ghosts"
concealed in our views and explanations of
human behavior. I received an extra
dividend because he was there without his
family, so there were many opportunities
for us to have dinner together.
While I was to depart from his shunning
all inferred variables, his insistence on
grounding psychology on down-to-earth
interactional observation and
conceptualization has always remained a
part of my theory, research, and practice
in counseling and psychotherapy. About
ten years ago, at the APA Convention, I
had the satisfaction of testing my ideas
in a long conversation with him. While he
did not give up his preference, he did
admit that there was something to be said
for the use of constructs as long as they
were anchored to interactional (of course,
he would have said interbehavioral)
observations. Incidentally, it may be a
commentary on APA conventions that as we
parted he commented, "I had been thinking
that APA conventions such as this one had
nothing to offer me. But this
conversation gives me new interest in
attending." I was sad because I felt that
psychology was not taking advantage of
this ever-expanding keen mind.
Edward S. Bordin
Some two decades ago, Professor Kantor
spent a year as Visiting Professor at the
University of Maryland in College Park,
Maryland, where I held a part-time
teaching appointment while maintaining my
primary research activities at the Walter
Reed Research Institute in Washington, D.
C. I had long been an avid devotee of
Professor Kantor's writings, and it was a
rare privilege to interact personally with
this remarkable scholar over that rather
extended interval. I was in the "emotion"
research and "theorizing" (you should
excuse the expression!) period of my
scientific and professional career at the
time, and the results of many long and
involved discussions with Professor Kantor
are clearly reflected in my subsequent
attempts to operationalize the concepts
and definitions which we agonized about in
those now-precious interactions. There
can be no question but that whatever
clarity I was able to achieve in coming to
grips with the problems of "feelings and
"emotional behavior" in organizing and
reporting the results of my laboratory
studies in this complex interbehavioral
domain was largely attributable to the
influence of Professor Kantor.
Joseph V. Brady
Robert was an egalitarian, a consummate
naturalist, and a lover of the arts. Once
he took my 5-year-old daughter, whom he
called "my little friend," to see the Kuo
windows my comparative class had made in
developing chick embryos. She credits him
with her desire to be a psychologist. I
met Robert when I was 34 and he was 84.
With him, I attended concerts and toured
museums and zoos. His thinking made sense
of my world in which naive behaviorism
clashed with traditional physiology.
Since he died, the winter has been just a
little colder.
Donna M. Cone
Professor Kantor's writings not only set
high standards of self-critical evaluation
and scholarship for observers of behavior,
but they also, for me, provide a guide to
what is worth noticing in psychology. His
works make available the tools required
for the task described long ago by the
Scottish psychologist Alexander Bain as
"the minute anatomy of human life." And
they are tools which make Bain's metaphor
no longer necessary.
David Cornwell
But a small sampling of the
contributions to my work made by Professor
Kantor is specified in the following:
cultural tradition is insidiously related
to behavioral science; the two-cycles , Fifteen years ago I was asked by
historical analysis of the scientific
evolution of psychology; an integrated-
field approach to human interbehavior is
possible; responses can serve as
legitimate "independent variables;"
behaviorism is simply the science of
psychological behavior; evolutional, field
analyses provide the sort of enlightenment
only sought in reductionistic analyses;
The distinction between events and
constructs; The key to therapeutic change
is the alteration of interbehavioral
fields; and descriptive functional
analyses are the proper alternative to
inferential (or indicator) analyses.
Dennis J. Delprato
I came to J. R. Kantor afire with tales
of the unraveling of complex, novel
behavior in the laboratory. Like most
researchers in the experimental analysis
of behavior (or "praxic'ists," as Fred
Keller might say), I kn'ew ^virtually
nothing of his work. I was astounded to
find that he had already dealt in a
sophisticated manner with .many of the
concepts my data were forcing me slowly
and somewhat painfully to reconstruct. In
November he told me that he had "hidden
his light under a bushel" for more than
half a century, that he now regretted
this, and that he wanted his work to be
better known. The process is well
underway and well deserved. He saw the
start, I'm sure. The light still shines.
Robert Epstein
Professor Kantor's books and articles
revitalized my interest in psychology and
gave me a subject matter that I could
teach with enthusiasm and confidence. He
provided me with a new perspective*on
psychology and gave me a renewed
confidence in my own naturalistic views.
Professor Kantor's gracious friendship
reassured me. Through his writings, he
remains my most inspiring colleague.
William M. Gardner
Professor Helene Kantor, Dr. Kantor's
daughter, to help him with the Principia
Press which published his books. She felt
the Press had become somewhat of a burden.
My being a business man, she thought
perhaps I could be helpful with problems
of bookkeeping, storage, and inventory. A
strong personal relationship developed
between Robert and me, and this farewell
is as a friend and student rather than the
business advisor which he never needed.
When our friendship began, Professor
Kantor was 80 years old, and the phrase he
used more frequently then was "l have work
to do!" About a year ago, when he turned
95, he began to say "My work is done!"
Dr. Kantor arose each morning at 5:30 and
was at his desk ready to work at 6:30.
His work continued the entire day with
only a break perhaps for a brisk walk to
the library or to his daughter's office.
I was 25 years his junior and could hardly
keep up with him as we walked and talked.
Robert taught me interbehavioral
psychology. He was very patient and
considerate until I lapsed into the
unscientific layman's syndrome which he
called "spookology," and then he was
tough and uncompromising. He felt that
the world was filled with unscientific
ideas. If I were to define the mission to
which he was dedicated, I would say that
it was to educate for the purpose of the
understanding that "spookology" was indeed
a negative force in the world.
Robert Kantor, the man and gentleman,
knew good food and enjoyed eating it, as
well as cooking it with his own recipes.
His most favorite was a cold salmon, rice,
and mayonnaise dish which we often shared
at luncheon. Always striving for
perfection, he was critical of taste,
texture, and eye appeal. He was addicted
to good chocolates and always had a supply
of sweets hidden away. When we would go
out to lunch, he would make me aware of
things I had never noticed in my own city.
Robert had started to come to Chicago at
the turn of the century and remembered
many things of past decades. He was
unusually sensitive to nature and the
outdoors. His heart was still in
Bloomington, Indiana, where his home was
on a large tract of land where the colors
and changes of seasons delighted him. In
Chicago, he lived near Lake Michigan where
the different colors and moods of the
water and the cloud formations with the
beautiful sunsets gave him joy and made
his day complete.
He was a behaviorist through and
through, with happy responses to the
sunshine and dour responses on cold and
rainy days. When I asked him one day
recently what he would call himself in
relationship to his work, he surprised me
with the answer "a philosopher." Now, as
his long and rewarding life has ended, we
all will miss our "philosopher."
Albert F. Haas
My degrees all are in philosophy, but
via philosophy of science I became
interested in the specific findings of
psychologists and other behavioral
scientists. As a result, for me a
fascinating aspect of Professor Kantor s
career was his work in many technical
areas other than psychology, including the
field of philosophy. Although I sometimes
disagreed with his views in the latter
area, his ability there was impressive and
his overview of what was defective in
conventional philosophic work seemed to me
both sound and brillant. With some luck,
in the future his work in all the areas to
which he contributed will become more
fully appreciated.
Rollo Handy
As an undergraduate at Western Michigan
University in 1978, I enrolled in a course
taught by Dr. Paul T. Mountjoy on the
history of psychology. The texts used in
this course were Professor Kantor's two
volumes of The Scientific Evolution of
Psychology. This was my first exposure to
the writings of Professor Kantor and
interbehavioral psychology. From that
point, there has been no turning back.
The scholarship and dedication of
Professor Kantor in the development of
interbehavioral psychology has influenced
all of my work since that early course and
it shall continue to influence my work for
the remainder of my academic and
professional careers. To Professor Kantor
and his students, I shall always be
indebted.
Jay D. Hansor
Just before taking the telephone call in
which I heard of Professor Kantor's death,
I had been consulting Scientific Evolution
of Psychology, recalling his comments on
the ideologue, Destutt de Tracy. There is
a certain appropriateness in this, for I
particularly value Kantor's effort to
place interbehaviorism in an historical
context. This contrasts with the relative
naivety on historical and social matters
of some other outstanding modern
psychologists. Robert Watson may have
meant it pejoratively when he called
Kantor's history "an excellent example of
presentism," but it is a compliment. To
me, history illuminates behaviorism, just
as "present" behaviorism illuminates
history.
Sandy Hobbs
Professor J. R. Kantor (rumor at Indiana
University had it that he detested the
title Doctor because so many people
misunderstood the original and proper
meaning) taught me one lesson that I
cherish. That was how to recognize
"spooks," "ghosts," and "spirits." A
spook, ghost, or spirit was an instance of
mentalism, homunculism, or mind-body
dualism in psychological writing or
speech.
I first met spooks, ghosts, and spirits
in Professor Kantor's course in the
history of psychology. I was not
surprised that spooks, ghosts, and spirits
appeared regularly in the writings of
early psychologists and the philosophers
who often presided on the fringes of
psychology's development. I was surprised
that John B. Watson had forrays into
spookology" and that spooks were even to
be found in the writings of the modern
learning theorists. In fact, there was no
obvious trend towards-the objective in
psychological theory and system, perhaps
just a trend to more subtle mentalism.
Spotting spooks became such sport that I
frequently visited with Professor Kantor
in his office to get him to identify the
spooks hidden in some passage. With a
twinkle in his eyes he would wave his
pince-nez and show me where there were
even spooks hidden in the works of
contemporary behaviorists. Sometimes I
would visit him to show a spook I had
found. He consistently approved my
efforts.
Perhaps my promise as a spook hunter,
but more likely my wife's reputation as a
responsible person, prompted Professor
Kantor to invite us to keep his home for
six months while he visited Europe,
Russia, and the Mid-East. To my delight,
his home was richly inhabited by spooks.
They were, of course, in the many books on
psychology I found in his office and the
abundant bookshelves scattered throughout
his house. Some of the spooks were easy ,
to find because he had written, in the
margins of the books, notes like Spook,
"Hidden Mentalism," or "Another word for
mind." I too often ignored my studies for
the French translation exam and our
comprehensive examinations to try to
understand why some passage was marked
"Ghost!!!".
When I got to the books published by
Principia Press, I was duly impressed by
Professor Kantor's evenhandedness. There,
in the margins of the books, he had
written, were occasionally scrawled the
warnings, "Spook!!", 'Ghost!!
B. L. Hopkins
I learned from Kantor concepts that I
had never heard before. I was sceptical
about them but I found substantiation.
From that time, and my reading of his
paper, "Toward a Scientific Analysis of
Motivation," I have looked to his concepts
to guide my work. In the past they have
not been crucial to rny professional
activities. However, they are crucial now
and they will be in the future. Kantor's
work on the Objective Psychology of
Grammar, Psychological Linguistics , ...and
Interbehavioral Philosophy have been
guiding my current and future work on the
analysis of the computer programmers
activities and the.development of training
programs for these people.
Arthur Kahn
Being concise is not one of my
strengths...but it wasn't one of Kantor's
either. I was introduced to Kantor's
writings in 1969 by Noel Smith, a "first
generation Kantorian" who sparked my
interest in history and a naturalistic
field approach to studying behavior. I
first met Kantor in 1971 and had an
unforgettable drive with him through the
Adirondack Mountains of New York. Paul
Mountjoy (another "first generation"
student) took notice in 1977, so I studied
10
behavior analysis at Western Michigan
University. Indirectly, Kantor helped me
get both into and out of graduate school.
Studying Kantor, I developed a much
greater appreciation for historical and
setting factors which will continue to
influence my work with clients and
students. J. R. Kantor also tau'ght me
patience. When others have not
appreciated my analyses or
recommendations, I have often reflected
about Kantor who patiently waited and
toiled for more than half a century to
help the field of psychology mature into a
more natural science. I'll miss J. R.
Kantor, but his impact on us all is
immeasurable and will continue to grow.
Craig W. Knapp
Two years ago, I was introduced to
Kantor's works by an excellent teacher,
Linda Parrott. Since that time, I have
studied Kantor's philosophy and system of
psychology. His views demonstrated to me
the utterly profound effects of
spiritistic verbalizations on interactions
of many sorts. It has also, in large
part, made me critically aware of the
assumptions under which psychologists
operate. For example, through my
dissertation research, I am questioning
the common assumption that contingency-
shaped behavior is more sensitive to
environmental changes than is rule-
governed behavior. Kantor's system of
psychology is more prepared than radical
behaviorism to deal with complex human
behavior. Since my research interests are
with human behavior, I predict that my
future researchi*will be influenced in
content and procedure by his writings. In
closing, I think that Professor Kantor's
interbehavioral perspective currently
holds promise concerning the future
progress of psychology. Therefore, I plan
to continue to use his work in research
and teaching. I look forward to continued
development as I become more acquainted
with his writings.
Jan LeFrancois
My earliest exposure to Professor
Kantor's interbehavioral psychology was
met with considerable resistance on my
part. Only gradually was I able to
question and eventually discard time-worn
assumptions. I found Kantor's Principles
of Psychology very rewarding, but it was
his patience and understanding in fairly
frequent discussions which helped me most.
What did I gain from having known
Professor Kantor? A brief listing is most
inadequate but here it must suffice: a
critical attitude toward traditional
theories not only in psychology but in
other sciences as well; an interest in
psychology as a comprehensive system
closely integrated with biology and
sociology; anti-mentalism, uncompromising
naturalism, and disdain for grand
theorizing and metaphysical speculation;
growing appreciation of the importance of
history for an understanding of
psychological issues; an interest in
developing an interbehavioral philosophy
of science; and a teacher-student
relationship which became a highly
rewarding friendship lasting for more than
forty years.
Parker E. Lichtenstein
I served as Professor Kantor's graduate
assistant for three years while working on
my Ph.D. degree at Indiana University in
the late 1940's. He also served as
chairman of my dissertation committee. I
believe his greatest influence on me
intellectually is reflected in the two
editions of my book, An Objective
Psychology of Music (1954, 1967). This is
written from a rather' strong
interbehavioral point of view. He enabled
me to take an area of psychology, which
had been muddled with mentalism and
subjectivity, and place it on firm
scientific ground. Both editions are
dedicated to him. His advice was wise
when he said, "When you write a book,
write about something you know well. You
do know music." Presumably, I also know
something about psychology. My book,
Principles of Psychopathology, is modeled
after Kantor's approach to the subject as
outlined in a chapter in his Principles.
Likewise, my Personality: A Behavioral
Analysis has marked interbehavioral
overtones.
Robert W. Lundin

Because we are some of the few
interbehaviorists who are not
psychologists, a word on Kantor's value to
other sciences would perhaps by apropos.
Kantor's perspective is not simply another
parochial school of psychology, nor is it
even simply the fruits of scientific
psychology applied to science at large.
It is rather a philosophy of science
disembarassed of traditional metaphysical
encrustations. To evolve a scientific
psychology, Kantor first had to evolve a
philosophy of science. In a sense, it is
the first viable and balanced "common-
sense realism" and as such it is
applicable to any area of scholarship. We
need not elaborate the pragmatic result of
Kantor's work in psychology, but we would
like to emphasize that, because all
science and scientific scholarship must
start from the same naturalistic bedrock,
we can anticipate the same neat separation
of metaphysical chaff from scientific
grain that Kantor achieved in psychology
whenever interbehavioral philosophy is
applied. A sound scientific philosophy is
as important to success in physics as it
is in psychology. Kantor has laid the
groundwork for that philosophy.
Unfortunately, philosophers of science are
ignorant of Kantor's work.
Michael H. MacRoberts
Barbara R. MacRoberts
I consider it a rare privilege to have
been a student of J. R. Kantor and to have
had him as a friend. His concepts have
had a profound influence on my thinking
for over fifty years. An understanding
and appreciation of his interbehavioral
principles will give any young
psychologists intellectual confidence,
self-esteem, and stature which cannot be
achieved in any other way.
Harry 0. Mahan
Dr. Kantor has provided a perspective
that guides and organizes, and does so
with the support of incontestable criteria
for assessing the traffic that is labelled
.11
psychology. The atmosphere of
interbehaviorism is so all-embracing that,
at times, it eludes articulation, but on
numerous occasions specific events bring
it clearly into focus. For example,
arguments about "race" and "intelligence;"
disputes as to whether goals act on
motives or physiological states; learning
that both Kantor and Woodworth are
generalists and eclectic; and even comic
relief on hearing during a convention
paper that DesCartes and Kantor are both
in.teraction.ists! Bless you, Dr. Kantor,
for the systematic charging.
Marion White^McPherson
A few months ago, I was discussing the
process of imitation with a colleague. We
were grappling with conditioned
reinforcement and discriminative stimulus
interpretations of the process, and trying
to dissociate them. The discussion soon
moved to a more general issue, whether our
language was forcing us to fit square pegs
into round holes in connection with our
analyses of behavioral events. My
colleague pointed out to me that since it
was obvious that the imitator was behaving
in an orderly way with respect to the
imitatee, why was it necessary to apply an
idiosyncratic term, or set of terms, to
this event, or to any behavioral event for
that matter? Where was ;the liability in
being the complete operationalist? ,Might
it not obscure the facts of the event to
portray it in idiosyncratic terms? Just
so.
Jay Moore
Professor Kantor provided me with both
guidance for avoidance of specious
philosophy and toward the naturalistic
interpretation of events. I have
encountered no transcendental doctrines
for which his trenchant criticism was
outdated. His foresight applies equally
to previously uninvestigated events.
Every "new" sequence of things and events
is describable and investigatable within
the interbehavioral framework. Our
personal relationship began when, as an
undergraduate, I enrolled in his course on
the history of psychology. At all times
12
he accepted my youthful ignorance and
brashness while he never failed to provide
appropriate guidance tailored to my
deficiencies. Whatever success I have
achieved has been due in large part to his
influence. His perspicacity insures that
appreciation of the importance of an
interbehavioral analysis will continue to
grow.
Paul T. Mountjoy
I consider myself very unfortunate in
that I did not begin to delve into and
appreciate the interbehavioral system
developed by Dr. Kantor until relatively
late in my graduate career. I have come
to see the interbehavioral approach as a
comprehensive method for understanding and
analyzing human behavior. My primary
research interests relate to language
development of normal and autistic and
severely handicapped children. The
interbehavioral approach has an incredible
amount to offer in this area, and the
field has been moving in the direction of
a more comprehensive field-oriented
approach, under the influence of people
such as Sid Bijou, and others. I am very
excited about the prospects for future
research on analysis and intervention in
this area. I regret the fact that Dr.
Kantor will not be able to see all the
fruit of his work, but I'm very proud to
be part of his strong and positive
influence on the field. I never had the
opportunity to personally meet Dr. Kantor,
but I greatly enjoyed my periodic
correspondence with him. He will
obviously be sorely missed.
>f
Robert O'Neill
Early in my association with J. R.
Kantor, he chided me for clinging to an
operant vocabulary and suggested that an
understanding of psychological events was
to be accomplished by "cleaving to my
observations of events," not by confusing
them with traditional ways of talking
about them. In becoming aware of this
distinction, I have come to regard my task
as the analysis of the role and
significance of philosophy in scientific
system building. It is not an easy task.
Neither is it near completion, nor is it
likely ever to be completed because
philosophy and science are constantly
changing, as Kantor has so often pointed
out. Still, it is a life's work and one
for which I feel the kind of excitement
and certainty of purpose that only a great
master can instill in an apprentice set
free.
3
Linda J. Parrott
He was a stimulating, even prvocative,
teacher, with high expectations from his
students. As a man, he was moderate in
all things excluding his scholarly
pursuits in which he indulged himself
unashamedly, much of which trait "rubbed
off" onto his students. Down through the
years and against all odds, he battled
against the anti-naturalistic notions
about human behavior so deeply embedded in
our culture and, sad to say, in our
science. Perhaps above all else, he
stands out as a shining examplar of the
tremendous potential in human development
implicit in his own principle of the
reactional biography.
N. H. Pronko
My relation with J. R. Kantor, both
personally and intellectually, was so
enriching that it is most difficult to
highlight his influence on my work as a
psychologist. As a person, his modesty
and intransigence regarding the need of
cleaning~up psychological theory from
dualistic assumptions was most pervasive
and exemplary for those trying to build a
science of behavior. As a scientist, he
anticipated his time. Kantor will be
justly appreciated when psychologists
become aware that properly formulated
questions are more relevant to scientific
endeavor than data gathering, instrumental
sophistication, and premature
technological applications. He persuaded
me on the need of a theory of human
behavior related to evolutionary concepts
but waived out of reductionism and
dualistic contradictions. I hope that our
work may soon demonstrate his keen
intuition regarding the conceptual
foundations of a scientific psychology.

This would be another way in which we
shall be able to remember him.
Emilio Ribes
The name "Kantor" - was he important? I
knew J. B. Watson supposedly got the ball
rolling and that pioneers like Thorndike,
Hull, Tolman, Pavlov, and Spence put all
the pieces together for Skinner. But what
was missing? My graduate years and
friendship with Paul Mountjoy answered
that question: pychology was only one
whisper in a large voice of natural
science. Natural science caught my
attention and set me spinning with ideas
until I met that person -- Kantor. He was
already in his mid-nineties, but his
letters and personal chats resembled a
youthful gladiator, ambitious for
contests. Kantor taught me two important
lessons about scientific psychology.
First, J. B. Watson played' second fiddle
always. And second, that science means
more than control and prediction. We
can't predict or control anything without
first finding it in a field.
Douglas H. Ruben
Of all my teachers, J. R. Kantor stands
out as the most influential in my
development as a contributor to
psychological theory. He was the first
teacher who convincingly explained the
mythic status of mentalistic concepts that
guided much of psychology in the 1930's.
He was indeed a role model for me when I
entered the lists to expose the unwitting
use of reified metaphors by many
psychologists. My recent work on metaphor
had its roots in a seminar on the
psychology of language that Kantor led in
the summer of 1936 at Ohio State
University. When I was involved in > doubt. Although collaborating with him on
explicating clinical inference in the
1950's, I made heavy use of his two-volume
Psychology and Logic, (1950). My current
work on the narratory principle reflects
in part the deep insights expressed in his
recent foray into belletristic psychology:
Tragedy and the Event Continuum (1983). I
can think of no area of modern psychology
that has not benefitted from the fruitful
pen and gentle wisdom of J. R. Kantor.
13
Theodore R. Sarbin
When I first encountered Professor
Kantor, I was an undergraduate at Indiana
University taking his required course on
the history of psychology. He offered
little documentation on the point of view
he gave to history and, to me, was not
very impressive on his own system which he
presented in a very limited form. It was
after I left Indiana and began graduate
studies that I began comparing his
teaching'with what I was encountering from
other professors and my reading. The more
I compared other views and the more I
checked his points on history, the more
impressed I became. As I continued
through graduate school, it became
increasingly clear to me that psychology
was more of a vast metaphysical exercise
than a science. The superiority of an
integrated field for psychology and, for
that matter, for all of science, was a
viewpoint from which I could never
retreat. It has been the guiding
principle in my teaching, research,
writing, and my entire outlook on nature
and science. The ingenuity and insight
that brought J. R. to this profound
approach in the face of a dualistic and
mechanistically thinking culture leaves me
in perpetual awe. He is an unrecognized
intellectual giant whose contributions
make minor intellects of many others who
have received acclaim, often for concepts
that are erroneous as seen from the
perspective of an integrated field.
On a more personal level, J. R. was a
friendly and kindly man who was always
eager to hear from or visit with his
friends. His letters were warm and
affectionate and his concern great if he
did not receive communication for any
lengthy period. He was always encouraging
about projects in scientific writing and
ready to give assistance on any points of
a writing project was no easy matter, I
enjoyed the close interaction with him and
the acuteness of his thinking when I
assisted him in revising the Survey of the
Science of Psychology. His long life was
one that brought me great intellectual
riches and the personal pleasure and honor
of knowing and working with him -- this
Aristotle of the twentieth century or,
more accurately, a combined Aristotle and
14
Einstein, given the nature of his
interbehavioral field.
It is sad that so few others have known
him or his work, and had the opportunity .
to escape their entrenched mode of
thinking into which Western culture has
directed them. His liberating thinking
could bring enormous benefits .to all
scientific and intellectual endeavors.
That potential is still there in his
writings. It is up to those of us who are
acquainted with it to bring it to those
who are not.
Noel W. Smith
I hope that my text, The Study of
Behavior (1953), did justice to the
influence of Kantor upon that work. His
concept'-of behavioral segment, of
interactional setting, of contact media,
and much more were the beginnings of my
own specific endeavors in psychology. To
Brunswik, Wittgenstein, Schlick, Feifl,
Kaufmann, and others, I paid due
testimony, but to J. R. Kantor I made most
bows. That there were to be no
absolutionist deductive or inductive
methodologies, and that every scientific
decision should best be regarded as
involving its own rules, were lessons I
took from Kantor. His attacks on
mentalist fictions were substantive in my
own development. Looking back, the first
100 pages of The Study of Behavior could
have been dedicated to their primary
source -- J. R. Kantor. I never met him
in person, but I have felt, for fifty
years, that he was holding my hand all the
t ime. ' to the rejection and ridicule of Wegener's
$ hypothesis. What Wegener saw in the maps
William Stephenson
J. R. Kantor was the kindest, sweetest
person I have ever known. He taught me
everything I know that is important. Two
years ago I was invited to Spain to
lecture. I don't know what I expected,
but I didn't expect to be asked
continuously about Kantor. I was and I
loved it. I loved being able to tell them
that I knew him personally and had been
taught by him. They asked about a few
others, too, but only because of a new
book or article. The only one they really
wanted to know about was Kantor. Last
summer (1983), one of the students I met
in Spain came to the U.S. to visit me and
also to study for a few weeks at Purdue.
She wanted to meet Kantor. I called his
daughter to make sure it would be ok for
Carme Basil to visit. She said Kantor
would enjoy it. Carme wrote me later
about what a great afternoon they had
together. What a special memory for her.
You probably know I dedicated my last
book to Kantor. He had seen it and had
written to me about it. Noel Smith had
asked me to send him a chapter for the
festschrift. I truly wanted to, but just
could not put anything together that was
good enough to let go of for such a book.
The point is that the dedication of my own
book was a way of trying to make up for
not being able to write the chapter. I am
so grateful that Kantor had time to see
it.
Louise Kent Udolf
Alfred Wegener (born 1880) died on the
Greenland Ice Cap in 1930, fifteen years
after the publication of the first edition
of his major work, Die Entstehung der
Kontinente und Ozeane. Through the
intervening years, and for another thirty-
odd years, his seminal ideas found few
adherents. Most geologists ignored or
ridiculed his views. Those ideas were
based on Wegener's observation of maps,
and of paleontological and lithological
correlations; they were set forth
unenlightened by the currently received
geological theories. -Those theories led
and rocks could not be.
Now we know that continents do move, and
have moved. Now Wegener's teachings are
basic; geologists are crossing its "t s ,
dotting its "i's", and extending its
implications. So it will be for Robert
Kantor. How long before his
interbehavioral framework will be
understood and utilized, we cannot
foresee. The thicket of theories, the
labyrinth of laboratories, the congelation
of concepts are far denser, twisted, and
firmly frozen among those who term
themselves psychologists.
But Kantor was patient and,
undiscouraged to the end, he continued
 15
brillantly to hack his way through, to lay
the thread, to melt the ice. And so must
we be patient, continuously teaching,
demonstrating, elucidating, extending.
Kantor's unquestionable preeminence
among 20th century psychologists is clear
to us who read this. It will be clear to
all psychologists in a generation or so.

William S. Verplanck

I have always found it difficult to

think about child behavior problems in
anything but a law effect sort of
paradigm. At the.same time I was faced a great
with data that didn't readily fit such a
conceptual model. Kantor's man
interbehavioral perspective provides a is
useful resolution for me. gone.

Robert G. Wahler Tall as t-he truth

was who:and
wore his(mountains
J. R. Kantor influenced my thinking more understand
than any other person, but I was never
able to develop a position that clearly how)life
and unambigiously realized the potential
Kantorian philosophy presented. As 1 like a(now
understood him, he simply denied the field with
of metaphysics. The mind-body problem was one sweet sun
to him a pseudo-problem, a question that
had no answer because it was an improper in it, now with a
or false question. He was neither a
monist nor a subjective idealist because million
both positions assume there is a problem flaming billion kinds
for which they are the answer. For Kantor of nameless
the mind-body problem was simply to be
effaced from one' s .thinking. silence)sky;
Unfortunately, I know of no one of his
followers who has been successful in e. e. cummings
adhering rigidly to the consequences of
his philosophical position. Who do you >V A &
know who has been able to deal
intellectually with the concept of
bistimulation, in spite of its obvious
merit? As human beings we are unable to,
discard our perception of the relative
immutability of what we 'know 'to be
objects with identity and integrity
outside ourselves. We are therefore
unable to conceive easily the fact that
objects are no more or less than we
perceive them to be.

Edward L. Walker
 THE INTERBEHAVIORIST:
A QUARTERLY NEWSLETTER OF INTERBEHAVIORAL PSYCHOLOGY
THE INTERBEHAViORlST is a quarterly publication in the behavioral sciences. As its title
indicates, THE INTERBEHAVIORIST takes its orientation from the interbehavioral psychology of j.R.
Kantor and others committed to a natural science of behavior from the contexualistic, integrated-field
perspective. THE INTERBEHAVORIST is perhaps best described as a newsletter devoted to filling the
gap between informal means of scientific communication (e.g., colloquia and letters) and formal
publication. As such, it serves as a useful and provoking supplement to contemporary journals such as
Behaviorism, The Behavior Analyst, The Psychological Record, the/ourna/ of the Experimental Analysis of
Behavior, the journal of Applied Behavior Analysis, and the journal of the History of the Behavioral
Sciences. The newsletter is designed to encourage reader submission and participation. It publishes brief
articles presented for peer comment and perusal; book reviews; commentaries on other publications of
interest; observations of current practices and trends in basic and applied research, theory, and the
history of the behavioral sciences; and general news of interest. For a sample issue or a one-year
subscription, send the form below to:
Edward K. Morris, Editor THE INTERBEHAVIORIST
Department of Human Development * University of Kansas 'Lawrence, Kansas 66045
JIN-
THE INTERBEHAVIORIST
NAME. OFFICE PHONE L

ADDRESS : CITY, STATE. ZIP CODE.

D Institution subscription: $8.00/year D Student subscription: $2.50/year
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(Volume year begins in the Fall)
Make checks payable to THE INTERBEHAVIORIST

THE INTERBEHAVIORIST
Edward K. Morris, Editor
Department of Human Development
212B Haworth Hall
University of Kansas
Lawrence, Kansas 66045
 INTERBEHAVIORIST
A Quarterly Newsletter of Interbehavioral Psychology
Published at the University of Kansas
Volume 12 Summer, 1983-1984 Number 4

T_ABLE OF CONTENTS
EDITOR
Edward K. Morris Notes from the Meld..................2
Department of Human Development
University of Kansas The Agora.............................3
Remembrances of Professor Kantor.... 3
ASSOCIATE EDITORS
The Principia Press ................. 3
Donna M. Cone
Department of Mental Health. The ABA Convention .................. 4
State of Rhode Island Mahan's In t er a. c t i na 1 P s c h o l o .. . . 5
Dennis J. Delprato Cambridge Center for Behavioral
Department of Psychology Studies............................. 5
Eastern Michigan University
The APA Convention. ................. 5
Ronald G. Heyduk
Department of Psychology Subscriptions....................^ . ... 5
Hartwick College
Paul T. Mountjoy Book and Journal Notes ...... ..... ..... 6
Department of Psychology
Western Michigan University Book Review, .. ............... , ........ 7
L. Kent-Udolf and E. R.
Linda J. Parrott Sherman's (1983) Shop Talk,
Department of Psychology reviewed by Donna .M. Cone
West Virginia University
Douglas H. Ruben Comments.
Department of Psychology .Dennis J. Delprato: Covert Events
Western Michigan University
Noel W. Smith QUOTATIO_N
Department of Psychology
State University of New York There is not "must" in all of natural
at Plattsburgh science; "must" belongs to formal logic.
EDITORIAL ASSISTANTS
J. H. Woodger (1929)
Jane B. Atwater Biologic_al_ Principles:
Lisa M. Johnson A_Critical Study_.
Steven E. Larsen
James T. Todd
 THE INTERBEHAVIORIST
A Quarterly Newsletter of
Interbehavioral Psychology
Edward K. Morris, Editor
Department of Human Development
212B Haworth Hall
University of Kansas
Lawrences Kansas 66045
(913) 864-4840
The In t erbehavio^rist is a quarterly
publication of news, diseussion3 and
articles pertaining to interbehavioral
psychology a natural science of
psychology from a contextualistic,
integrated-field perspective. The
Inj;e_rJ2^haj7io_r_is_^ serves as a newsletter
committed to professional communication
that falls between informal letters and
colloquia, and formal archival publications
As such, the newsletter supplements
contemporary journals in the behavioral
sciences dedicated to basic and applied
research and to the history and philosophy
of the behavioral sciences. The
newsletter actively encourages reader
submission of articles, book reviews,
commentaries on publications of interest,
observations on current practices and
trends in the behavioral sciences,
convention and conference notes,
bibliographies (annotated or not), and
news of interest about the professional
activities of interbehaviorists.
Contributions should be submitted to the
editor in triplicate and should conform
to the style described in the publication
manual of the American. Psychological
Association (3rd ed.s 1983). Submitted
articles will undergo a regular review
process through the members of the
editorial board. For other submissions,
the editor reserves the right to make
minor editorial and stylistic changes.
The support of the faculty and staff of
the Department of Human Development at
the University of Kansas is gratefully
acknowledged.
NOTES FROM THE FIELD
Various members of our field have been
active since this column was last published,
THEODORE R. SAR.BIN (TJC- Santa Cruz) was
quoted for his views on mental illness in
the December, 1983, APA Moriitor. ROBERT W.
LUND IN (University of the South) reviewed
the festschrift for Professor Kantor for
(1984, _29_s 241).
In other publication news, RONALD G.
HEYDUK (Hartwick College) was first author
of a comment in the Amer ican Psyc ho log is t
(1984, .39, 556-559) on influential works
and authors in psychology. RICHARD
PISACRETA (Ferris State College) published
a paper in The P s y c ho log ic a 1 Record_ (1984,
3_4, 269-281) on choice behavior in con-
current schedules of reinforcement. LOUIS
'D. BURGIO (University of Maryland Medical
School) was co-author on an article pub-
lished in the Jour n a 1 of A_p_p_lie_d Behavior
Analysis (1984,1.7, 189-201) ~on~the
effects of family-style dining on insti-
tutional mealtime behaviors. And, LINDA
J. PARROTT (University of West Virginia)
published a paper with Don Hake in The
Behavior Analyst (1983, 6, 121 -132) "on
history as science, to which PAUL T,
MOUNTJOY and DOUGLAS H, RUBEN (Western
Michigan University) wrote a teply In the
following issue (1984, 7, 75-76). Linda,
we should note, is taking a faculty posi-
tion in Psychology at St. Mary's Univer-
sity in Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada.
Finally, we might also mention that
EDWARD K. MORRIS (University of Kansas)
has been elected to serve as the next
editor of The Behavior Analyst . He says
just to call him "Ed." for short.

THE AGORA
Thank you for your positive comments on
the last issue of the newsletter, but any
accolades really belong to you, the
subscribers, who submitted contributions.
Several subscribers also sent their
regrets for not submitting contributions
because they were not yet familiar enough
with interbehavioral psychology. That
should not be cause for any concern. We
are pleased to have new and interested
subscribers, and hope that the newsletter
can facilitate the education of those new
to the field. If you have any suggestions
for how we might better serve that
function, please let us know.
We also want to thank those who have
contributed to the Kantor .Memorial Fund,
which will serve as the basis for the
long-term financial stability of The
Interbehaviorist. The current Fund stand
at $640, reflecting the generous
contributions of Dennis Delprato, Helene
J. Kantor, Harry Mahan, and Doug Ruben.
No contribution is too small.
Notices of Professor Kantor's passing
and obituaries are beginning to appear in
the literature. An announcement appeared
in The Behavior Analyst, and a brief
obituary was pnvlished in the Association
for Behavior Analysis Newsletter. Steven
R. Brown (Kent State), editor of Operant
Subjectivity: The Q Methodology
Newsletter, was kind enough to send us
copies of an issue in which he had
included a brief piece by William
Stephenson on Professor Kantor.
Subscriptions to that newsletter are
available from Professor Brown through the
Department of Political Science, Kent
State University, Kent, Ohio 44242. We
were also sent an obituary published in
the Iztacala Bulletin (Information
Bulletin of Iztacala: Escuela Nacionale
De Estudios Professionales, Epoca 6 Volume
1, N. 103-104, Jan-Feb, 1984). The notice
made special mention of the important
influence Professor Kantor had in Mexico,
not only through his scholarly
publications, but also through his
personal visits to Mexico between 1974 and
1981.
As for future activities, Paul Mountjoy
(Western Michigan University) has been
contacted by Gregory Kimble to write an
3
obituary for the American Psychologist.
James M. Johnston (University of Florida),
editor of The Behavior Analyst, has
invited four articles on Professor Kantor
and interbehavioral psychology for the
Fall issue of the journal. Those articles
will be by Linda Parrott (West Virginia
University) on Professor Kantor!s career
and publications, by Jay Moore '(University
of Wisconsin-Milwaukee) on Kantor's major
conceptual contributions to psychology, by
Ed Morris (University of Kansas) on the
similarities and differences between
interbehavioral psychology and radical
behaviorism, and by Jack Marr (Georgia
Institute of Technology) /m an evaluation
of current trends in the experimental
analysis of behavior in light o:f Professor
Kantor's 1970 critique in, the Journal of
the Experimental Analysis of Behavior.
Finally, Charles E. Rice (Kenyon College),
editor of The Psychological Record, is
preparing a special issue dedicated to
Professor Kantor and interbehavioral
psychology.
The Principia Press announces
publication of Psychological Comments and
Queries by "Observer" -- Essays of J. R.
Kantor selected from The Psychological
Record, 1968-1983 (pp. viii-306). The
inside flyleaf reads as follows:
J. R. Kantor, founder of The
Psychological Record: and its editor
for the first five volumes, returned
to its pages in 1968 as an essayist
under the carefully maintained nom de
plume of "Observer." The Record had
become the principal organ of the
school of Interbehavioral Psychology
which he had established, and its
universe of interests has continued to
expand.
The "Comments and Queries" which
Kantor selected for republication in
the present volume present his
assessment of many trends and problems
in contemporary psychology.
Furthermore, in them his wide-ranging
and integrative thought deals with the
place of psychology in the broad range
of psychological and philosophical
endeavor.
The book contains 55 essays from The
Record and two from The Interbehaviorist.
It will be available on August 15 for $20,
postpaid with check or money order.
Purchase requests should be sent to The
Principia Press, 5743 Kimbark Avenue,
Chicago, IL 60637
As mentioned previously (Vol. 12, No.
2), the annual meeting of the Association
for Behavior Analysis (ABA) continues to
provide excellent opportunities for
interbehavioral psychologists to present
papers and interact with one another.
This year was no different.
First, a poster describing The
Interbehaviorist was set up in the
hospitality rooms. The poster contained
material on the newsletter and the
Principia Press, and listed
interbehavioral presentations at the
convention. The last three issues of the
newsletter and.a tear-away pad of
subscription forms were also attached. We
hope to use versions of the poster again
at future ABA meetings.
Second, 31 of the newsletter's
subscribers were listed as participants at
this year's conference. These were
Atwater, Baer, Bickel, Bijou, Brady,
Bryson-Brockman, Burgio, Buskist,
Delprato, Fox, Gardner, Hawkins, Higgins,
Holmes, Isreal, Johnson, Kelso, Kent-
Udolf, Kirby, Larsen, Moore, Morris,
Mountjoy, Parrott, Ribes-Inesta, Ruben,
Scafasci, Todd, Tomiyasu, and Wahler. In
addition to presentations by the
newsletter's editor and staff, ABA
presentations that were particularly
interbehavioral in nature were the
following:
Sidney W. Bijou: A Theoretical Model
of Early Language Development.
Sidney W, Bijou & John Umbreit: A
Methodology *for Experimental Studies
of Language Behavior.
Bill Bryson-Brockman, Paul R. Dokecki,
& Harold G. Kelso: New and Improved:
Toward a Synthesis of Kantor, Kelly,
and Krasner.
James Fox: Ecological Factors in
Programming Generalization of Social
Interaction Skills in Autistic and
Mentally Retarded Children:
Beginning an Interbehavioral
Analysis.
Linda J. Parrott: Causality in Radical
Behaviorism: A Critique.
Yoshikazu Tomiyasu:. A Four-Item
Analysis of Residential Facilities:
Setting Events in Real Life
Situations.
Roger Ray (Rollins College) was also in
attendance and gadfly to the mechanists
and methodological behaviorists.
Third, an informal meeting of about 20
people was held to discuss matters
interbehavioral at ABA. Rick Amado
(Minnesota) had previously suggested the
possibility of applying to ABA for Special
Interest Group (SIG) status. This move
was strongly endorsed at the meeting;
Linda Parrott (West Virginia University)
will pursue it further with Rick. Another
issue that was brought up was the forming
of an interbehavioral organization, at
least to help support the Principia Press
and the newsletter. Dennis Delprato
(Eastern Michigan University) will begin
looking into this matter with Paul
Mountjoy (Western Michigan University).
Another topic that was brought up was
the need for interbehavioral psychologists
to illustrate more clearly the value of
their perspective for both basic and
applied research. ABA is especially
pragmatic and its members prefer to see
the implications of conceptual issues for
basic and applied research demonstrated
rather than merely asserted. Thus, in
order to strengthen the interbehavioral
position at ABA, and in general, the group
decided to arrange for two symposia next
year -- one on the value of an
interbehavioral perspective for basic
research and one for applied research.
The tentative format is to have
introductory papers outlining the
interbehavioral orientation for the two
respective areas, followed by perhaps
three papers that are empirical in nature.
Each symposium would conclude with
discussants', comments from well-known
behavior analysts who are interbehavioral
in orientation. Roger Ray will chair the
symposium on basic research; Ed Morris
will chair the one on applied research.
Interested subscribers are encouraged to
make offers and suggestions about what
might be included in these symposia.
The meeting adjourned on a positive
note. More formal arrangements will be
made for a meeting at next year's ABA
convention. All subscribers to the
newsletter are encouraged to attend.
 As mentioned in the last issue of the
newsletter (Vol 12, No. 3), Harry Mahan
(Project Socrates) has generously donated
the remaining copies of his text, The
Interactional Psychology of J. R. Kantor:
An Introduction (Mahan, 1968), to us for
resale to finance the remaining two issues
of this volume. The book is available for
$5.00 (U.S. postage paid; $7.50 foreign
postage paid).
The book contains, in order, a full-page
photo portrait of Professor Kantor, a
preface, and chapters on the nature of
psychology, personality, learning
interactions, habit interactions,
affective reactions, implicit reactions,
attention reactions, and perceptual
reactions. The book ends with a
bibliography of J. R. Kantor's works up
through 1963. For a more updated
bibliography, see N. W. Smith (1976), The
Works of J. R. Kantor: Pioneer in
Scientific Psychology, MexicanJournal of
Behavior Analysis, 2, 137-148. Professor
Mahan's dedication of the book reads as
follows:
This introduction to the work of J. R.
Kantor is dedicated to those students
who are just beginning the study of
psychology as it completes its first
century of history as a science and who,
in the unknown world which lies ahead,
will need and be deserving of an
understanding of human interactions far
superior to that which is responsible
for the state of affairs in which man
finds himself today.
Well said. Professor Mahan would be
pleased to receive any comments you might
have on the book or any other matters
pertaining to interbehavioral psychology.
We received a handsome copy of a booklet
describing the Cambridge Center for
Behavioral Studies. The general goals of
the Center were described as follows:
The Center exists to promote
continued excellence in
behavioral research and
scholarship, to provide funding
and opportunities for
professionals in behavioral
psychology and related fields,
and to communicate to the public
various advances in the field.
Among the more specific goals of the
Center is the development and maintenance
of a library and journals in a number of
areas, one of them being
"interbehaviorism." For more information
about the Center, contact Robert Epstein,
Ph.D. (Executive Director, 11 Ware Street,
Cambridge, MA 02138; 617-495-9020). We
wish the best for the Center.
Interbehavioral psychologists, and
interested others, should note the
presentation of a symposium chaired by
Dennis J. Delprato (Eastern Michigan
University) at the upcoming Toronto
meetings of the American*?Psychological
Association sponsored by Divisions 12, 24,
and 25. The title of the symposium is
"Contributions of Interbehavioral and
Ecological Approaches to Clinical
Problems." The papers to be presented are
as follows:
Dennis J. Delprato: Clinical
Implications of Response Patterns.
Edward K. Morris, Jane B. Atwater,
Lisa M. Johnson, Steven E. Larsen,
Lynda K. Powell, and James T. Todd:
Interbehavioral Perspectives on
Crime and Delinquency.
Lynne Anne Daurelle, Ann K. Rogers-
Warren, and James J. Fox:
Ecological and Interbehavioral
Perspectives on Parent Training:
Clinical and Research Implications.
Donna M. Cone: Applications of
Historico-Critical Analysis to Long-
Term, Follow-up Evaluation Research.
Paul T. Mountjoy: Discussant.
The symposium is scheduled for Sunday,
August 26, 10:00-11:50 in the Commonwealth
West room of the Holiday Inn Toronto
Downtown. Dennis suggests that interested
interbehavioral psychologists could meet
immediately afterwards to arrange for
later opportunities to get together.
SUBSCRIPTIONS
Listed below are names of new and
renewed subscribers to this volume since
the previous listing (Vol. 12, No. 2).
Our presence at ABA assisted us in
acquiring some new subscribers, and we are
pleased that the subscription list
continues to grow. If current subscribers
could encourage their institutions and
other individuals to subscribe, that would
be very much appreciated. If you have psychology. For example, the authors
paid for your subscription, but your name reject reductionistic explanations of
has not appeared on either published behavior (p. 5). They describe
subscription list this year, please let us psychological dualism as "the inevitable
know. For those who are interested, a but fatal dysjunction of Western
mailing list is available upon request. scientific thought" (p. 46). They argue
that behavior and environment are not
New Subscriptions separable, but that they are aspects of a
Richard S. Amado continuous, unitary process (p. 273).
Naftali Berrill Mos^t important, they state that much of
William F. Buskist their book "will be an explanation of the
William J. Clemens inadequacy of the claims for causal
Jack R. Crossen chains" (p. 60) and they propose
John L. Falk "dialectical explanations" (p. 11, 265-
Thomas J. Gola 290) as an alternative, both of which are
Michael J. Hemingway indistinguishable from explanations based
University of Illinois upon a field-theoretical perspective. The
Martin Ivancic dialectical view, according to the
Iver Iversen authors, assumes that "the universe is
G. Y. Kenyon unitary but always in change; the
Paul J. S. Knight phenomena we can see at any instant are
Josep Roca parts of processes, processes with
Jesus Rosales-Ruiz histories and futures whose paths are not
Ralph Spiga uniquely determined by their constituent
Wanda Smith units" (p. 11). Unfortunately, while
Jerry Ulman these authors seem to be in full agreement
Michael G. Walraven with the basic premises of
Glen Weber interbehaviorism and radical behaviorism,
Marc Wruble they reject behavioral views by stating
common misconceptions: behaviorism
Renewed Subscriptions adheres to chain-link causality (p. 10),
Harry C. Mahan is totally environmentalistic (p. 78), and
Irvin S. Wolf simultaneously accepts physiological
reductionism (p. 175-176) but rejects the
contribution of the organism to behavior
(p. 175). Behaviorists should be
BOOK AND JOURNAL NOTES disappointed that these authors reject the
very positions that could offer them the
Readers continue to submit book and most support. (James T. Todd, University
journal notes, which we appreciate and of Kansas)
which, we hope, are educational for our
readers. Hinde, R. A. (Ed.) (1984). Primate social
>?' relationships. An integrated approach.
Lewontin, R. C., Rose, S., & Kamin, L. J. Sutherland, MS: Sinauer. $40 HB, $21
(1984). Not in our genes : Biology, PB.
ideology, and human nature. New York:
Pantheon. $21.95HB. Interbehaviorists interested in social
behavior in general, and non-human
Not in Our Genes describes the political behavior in particular, will find value in
and social ills that have resulted from a Robert A. Hinde's (Ed.) Primate Social
view of behavior based upon an uncritical Relationships. Relying on extensive field
acceptance of biological or genetic observations of primate behavior, Hinde
determinism. While the authors of this and his contributors have fashioned
book mostly restate and often overstate research that examines the patterning and
the traditional arguments against genetic development of dyadic social
determinancy, many of the assumptions relationships, and the social contexts in
behind their arguments are entirely which these relationships occur. Hinde's
compatible with important assumptions and approach is most notably interbehavioral
premises of interbehavioral in that emphasis is placed on the direct

form and function of primate social
behavior. Moreover, the concepts used to
describe and explain this behavior are
closely tied to observations. This book
is an important contribution to the study
of primate social interactions and
provides evidence that some ethologists
may be evolving towards an interbehavioral
perspective. (Steven E. Larsen,
University of Kansas)
Veroff, J. (1983). Contextual
determinants of personality.
Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 9, 331-343.
"Contextualism" as echoed by Dewey,
Bentley, and the transactional movement is
not at all what Veroff had in. mind. What
is personality? The cumulative reactional
biography from a sequential field of
events? Not in his interpretation.
Veroff describes personality as
psychodynamically accumulative and
subdivided into historical, cultural,
developmental, organizational, and
interpersonal characteristics. Although
Veroff's thesis is consistent with looking
at events as "interactions," his
"interactionism" is by no means what
Kantor and Lundin have defined as being
personality. Still, the article offers an
interesting departure from psychoanalytic
tradition and a variation on
contextualism. (Douglas H. Ruben, Western
Michigan University)
BOOK REVIEW
Kent-Udolf, L., & Sherman, E. R. (1983).
Shop Talk: A Prevocational Language
Program for Retarded Students.
Champaign, IL: Research Press. Paper,
pp. xi + 223.
Donna M. Cone
Rhode Island Department of Mental Heal,th
This text is dedicated to Jacob Robert
Kantor. One of the many lessons Dr.
Kantor taught me was the definition of
retarded. He did it inductively by
telling me about a young neighbor boy who
could recite the complete timetables of
every major railroad in North America.
This chap had other similar intellectual
skills, but his social behavior was
7
horrendous. In the homes of others, he
would handle everything, open all the
cabinet doors, and pull out all the
drawers. His intellectual skills were
exceptional, yet he was socially retarded. "
I got the point that retardation is a word
used to describe a myriad of behavioral
deficits in a range of settings and that
it must be approached with flexibility and
specificity. Apparently, Dr. Kantor also
told that story to Louise Kent-Udolf.
This text illustrates the interbehavioral
insight into retardation and sets forth
very specific, yet flexible tasks designed
to develop language in a prevocational
setting. ' ^
The text is designed for use with
persons, age 10 and up, with basic self-
help skills and no sever-e behavior
disorders. Independent modules cover the
topics of Social Communication Routines,
Identification Information, Basic Language
Skills, Language-Related Concepts, and
Cognitive Components. Each module
contains rationales, overviews,
objectives, and sample tasks. The modules
emphasize the student's unique identity as
a person; his/her affective impact on
others; self-care, grooming, and dress;
safety, health and leisure; and the
student's ability to work independently
and with reasonable speed.
The program is designed to be taught by
a team made up of a speech-language
therapist, a special education teacher,
and a teacher's aide. A very real
strength of the program is that it is
compatible with an ordinary classroom
situation in terms of the length of the
modules, the recommended frequency of the
lessons, the required preparation time,
and the required record keeping. Basic
procedures for using the progrm are
outlined, data sheets are presented, and a
range of teaching strategies are
explained. Finally, there are
appendencies for resources and informal
social language assessment.
The authors make a genuine contribution
to interbehaviorism by designing and
publishing a practical teaching tool.
This application of the theoretical model
should show the way for others.
The address of Research Press is 2612 N.
Mattis, Champaign, Illinois 68120 (217-
352-3273).
 COMMENTS
Dennis J. Delprato
Eastern Michigan University
Henry Pronko [TI, 1983-84, 12(1), 11]
votes in favor of the motion that the term
"covert" is obsolete. This reader could
not agree more. I fear that I have
frequently misspoken as regards the overt-
covert dichotomy, as in "Covert behavior
obeys the same laws as does overt
behavior" and "We can deal with covert
behavior just as we deal with overt
behavior." Henry did not mention this,
and I would like to hear his opinion on
it, but I have for some time considered
the. overt-covert dichotomy to be just
another version of culturally transmitted
dualism. Henry's suggested rejection of
the dichotomy seems to be especially
appropriate when one considers his point
that overt-covert language is predicated
on the assumption that psychological
events are simply organismic. His note
led me'to think of the discussions of the
public-private distinction by Noel Smith
(1983) and Linda Parrott (1983) in
Reassessment. We need someone to address
at length the position that overt-covert
language is outmoded. Such an effort
might well begin by proceeding from
Henry's note, to the chapters by Smith and
Parrott.
Parrott, L. J. (1983). Systematic
foundations for the concept of "private
events": A critique. In N. W. Smith,
P. T. Mountjoy, & D. H. Ruben (Eds.),
Reassessment in psychology: The
Interbehavioral alternative (pp. 251-
268). Washington, D. C.: University
Press of America.
Smith, N. W. (1983). Sensing is
perceiving: An alternative to the
doctrine of the double world. In N. W.
Smith, P. T. Mountjoy, & D. H. Ruben
(Eds.), Reassessment in psychology: The
interbehavioral alternative (pp. 161-
212). Washington, D. C.: University
Press of America.

THE INTERBEHAVIORIST
Edward K. Morris, Editor
Department of Human Development
212B Haworth Hall
University of Kansas
Lawrence, Kansas 66045
 INTERBEHAVIORIS
A Quarterly Newsletter of Interbehavioral Psychology
Published at. the University of Kansas
Volume 12 Fall, 1983-1984 Number 5

EDITOR
CONTENTS
Edward K. Morris
Department of Human Development Notes from the Field. . 2
University of Kansas The Agora 3
ASSOCIATE EDITORS The Year in Review 3
Donna M. Cone The Mahan Book. 4
Department of Mental Health. Kantor Memorials. 4
State of Rhode Island
Subscriptions 4
Dennis J. Delprato
Department of Psychology The Cambridge Center. . 5
Eastern Michigan University Journal and Book Notes 6
Ronald G. Heyduk Articles 7
Department of Psychology
Hartwick College Dallas W. Stevenson and Michael ,
J. Hemingway on "Abstraction vs.
Paul T. Mountjoy
Confrontation" 7
Department of Psychology
Western Michigan University Noel W. Smith on "Do We Need the
Concept of Mind in Psychology"...... 8
Linda J. Parrott
Department of Psychology Jay Moore on "On Reciprocal
West Virginia University Behavioristic Concerns" 10
Douglas H. Ruben
QUOTATION
Department of Psychology
Western Michigan University Almost 50 years ago, Kantor (1924)
argued eloquently against the use of
Noel W. Smith psychology of metaphysical abstractions,
Department of Psychology which find extreme representations in the
State University of New York "bodyless mind" of the psychics and the
at Plattsburgh mindless body" of the mechanists. His
analysis retains its timeliness.
.EDITORIAL LL ASSISTANTS
- Kanfer and Karoly,
Jane B. Atwater
Behavior Therapy,
Lisa M. Johnson
1972", .3, p. 399.
Steven E. Larsen
James T. Todd
 THE INTEggEHAVIORIST
A Quarterly Newsletter of
Interbehavioral Psychology
Edward K. Morris, Editor
Department of Human Development
212B Haworth Hall
University of Kansas
Lawrence, Kansas 66045
(913) 864-4840
The_ Interbehaviorist is a quarterly
publication of news, discussion, and
articles pertaining to interbehavioral
psychology a natural science of
psychology from a contextualistic,
integratedfield perspective. The
Interbehavioris t serves as a newsletter
committed to professional communication
that falls between informal letters and
colloquia, and formal archival publication.
As such, the newsletter supplements
contemporary journals in the behavioral
sciences dedicated to basic and applied
research and to the history and philosophy
of the behavioral sciences. The
newsletter actively encourages reader
submission of articles, book reviews,
commentaries on publications of interest,
observations on current practices and
trends in the behavioral sciences,
convention and conference notes,
bibliographies (annotated or not), and
news of interest about the professional
activities of interbehaviorists.
Contributions should be submitted to the
editor in triplicate and should conform
to the style described in the publication
manual of the Ameridan Psychological
Association (3rd ed.s 1983). Submitted
articles will undergo a regular review
process through the members of the
editorial board. For other submissions,
the editor reserves the right to make
minor editorial and stylistic changes.
The support of the faculty and staff of
the Department of Human Development at
the University of Kansas is gratefully
acknowledged.
NOTES FROM THE FIELD
Two important awards were given at the
recent APA meetings. First, Sidney W.
Bijou received the Edgar A. Doll Award
from Division 33 (Mental Retardation) and,
on that occasion, gave a paper entitled,
"Challenge Ahead for the Field of
Retardation." Second, Gerald R. Patterson
was presented with APA 1 s Distinguished
Scientific Award for the Application of
Psychology. In addition to papers given
by Sid and Gerry, other newsletter
subscribers were also involved in
presentations: Atwater, Baer, Cone,
Daurelle, Delprato, Epstein, Fox, Higgins,
Mountjoy, Kanfer, Krasner, Larsen, Morris,
Mountjoy, Parrott, Sarbin, and Todd. Good
showing, interbehavioral psychologists!
Among recent publications by subscribers
are: David Cornwell and Sandy Hobbs's
"Behavioral Analysis of Metaphor" (The
Psychological Record, 1984, 34, 325^332);
Sandy Hobbs's set of book reviews entitled
"The Ecological Validity of Research in
Social Psychology" (The International
Journal of Sociology and Social Policy,
1983T~1, 83-87) ;'~and Noel W."SmitbTs
"Illusions and Counter-Illusions or
Aesthetic Effects in Greek Temples"
(Stpria e Critica della Psicologica, 1983,
4, 157-170). Also of note are book
reviews in the summer issue of The_
Psychological Record by Donna M. Cone,
Paul T. Mountjoy, and W. H. Pronko,
We are pleased to announce the success
of our subscribers in their respective
fields. However, while we can keep our
eyes on quite a few journals, we cannot
cover them all. We need to expand our
media of contact (so to speak), and so
would appreciate receiving reprints of (or
citations to) your publications so that we
can note them in this column.

THE AGORA
This issue completes my first volume
(1983-1984, Vol. 12) as editor of The
Interbehaviorist. I was complimented to
be offered this position and have found
the responsibilities exciting,
educational, and gratifying. These
characteristics of my tenure, though, are
the result of the contributions and
support of many people, whom I would like
to thank.
First, I want to thank Rose Roberts, who
processed so many of our words and who
tolerated my compulsive idiosyncracies
with competence and good humor. Among the
others to whom I wish to express
appreciation are Judith M. LeBlanc and
James A. Sherman, Co-chairs of the
Department of Human Development, who made
staff time and other sundry support
available throughout the year; Robert C.
Bearse, Associate Vice-Chancellor for
Research and Graduate Studies, who gave
professional and financial support that
was important for the continued
publication of the newsletter; John G.
Saylor, Director of the Kansas University
Printing Service, who provided friendly,
careful, and pragmatic advice on
publishing, and who oversees the least
expensive (not "cheapest") printing
service in town; the Associate Editors,
who provided personal support and the
products of their prodigious scholarship;
and the Editorial Assistants, who were so
very wise and cheerful in their critiques
and careful reading of the material that
has been published. Lest I seem autistic,
however, let me also thank all the new and
renewed subscribers of the newsletter.
You are the newsletter's reason for being.
The Year in Review
This year has been a good one for The
Interbehaviorist, at least from a non-
financial standpoint. We began the year
with about 65 subscribers, and have ended
with about 140. We are listed in
Blackwells, Faxsons and Swets subscription
services and are pursuing ways to make the
newsletter more widely and easily
available. With the completion of the
volume, we will have published five issues
this year, thereby catching up to our
responsibilities from the previous volume.
The new format has met with positive
comment, though improvements may always be
made. Finally, manuscript submissions
3
have increased slightly in the last
several months. We are pleased with this
growth, but must not stop here.
As suggested above, the financial status
of the newsletter is not what we would
like. Extra one-time expenses accrued for
start-up with a new printer, special
mailings, and the extra issue in this
volume. We also face continuing increases
in printing costs, and are likely to face
a postal increase soon.
At present, we print 200 copies of each
issue, of which about 145 are mailed. If
we had 200 subscribers, the cost of
printing and mailing &> typical 12-page
issue would come to $4.50 a year for an
individual subscriber; for the 140
subscribers, the cost per individual per
year is considerably higher. We were able
to complete this year in large part
through money Ron Heyduk left in the
newsletter's account, through the sale of
back issues of the newsletter and of Harry
Mahan s book, and through generous gifts
from a few individuals.
We have explored several ways to
decrease our costs per subscriber. First,
we could increase the number of
subscribers, which is our ultimate goal.
Moreover, once at 200 subscribers, we can
use bulk mail service, which is
considerably less expensive. We are also
pursuing the development of a non-profit
educational status, which will lessen our
postage expenses even more. Second, we
could find a less expensive printer, but
the University of Kansas Printing Service
already has the lowest rates. Finally, we
could print in a less expensive format.
We think, however, this would detract from
what scholarly appeal we have, and hence
we are reluctant to pursue this avenue.
If you, the subscribers, have additional
suggestions for lowering costs, we would
be pleased to have them.
The alternative to decreasing the costs,
of course, is to increase income. As
mentioned above, we will continue to seek
ways to increase the number of
subscribers. Recently, for instance, we
contacted all past subscribers, some of
whom have resubscribed (see
"Subscriptions" below) or asked for sample
copies. We will also seek to increase
purchases of back issues of the newsletter
and Harry Mahan's book. More directly, we
can increase subscription rates, which we
are afraid we must do. These increases
are, we think, warranted on the basis of
4
inflation and to what we hope you think is
a stylistically improved product. The
overall increase will not itself cover
expenses, but with the addition of more
subscribers and reductions in postage, we
can break even on four 12-page issues a
year. We would like to publish longer
issues, and will use any surplus for that
purpose. The new subscription rates are
as follows:
Regular Subscription $ 6.00
Student Subscription .4.00
Foreign Subscription 8.00
Institution 10.00
Back volume (12) see above
Back volumes (1-11) 4.00 each
Student, per set 15.00
Regular, per set 25.00
Institution, per set 40.00
You will note that student subscriptions
are below cost, but we think this discount
is important in order to encourage as much
student participation as possible, for
students are surely the future of the
field. We hope that you can bear these
increases and continue to support the
newsletter. We think this change is
essential for the future of the newsletter
and important for interbehavioral
psychology in general. By the way, now is
the time to resubscribe -- see insert in
binding. Thank you for your support.
The Mahan Book
As mentioned in previous issues of the
newsletter, Harry Mahan (Project Socrates)
has generously donated the remaining
copies of his text, The Interactional
Psychology of J. R. Kantor: An
Introduction (Mahan, 1968), to us for
resale to finance the remaining two issues
of this volume. ,? The book is available for
$5.00 (U.S. postage paid; $7.50 foreign
postage paid). ' again. To do so, we will continue to need
The book contains, in order, a full-page
photo portrait of Professor Kantor, a
preface, and chapters on the nature of
psychology, personality, learning
interactions, habit interactions,
affective reactions, implicit reactions,
attention reactions, and perceptual
reactions. The book ends with a
bibliography of J. R. Kantor's works up
through 1983. Professor Mahan would be
pleased to receive any comments you might
have on the book or any other matters
pertaining to interbehavioral psychology.
Kantor Memorials
A special memorial paper session was
held in honor of Professor Kantor at the
7th Mexican Meeting of Behavior Analysis
in August. Papers were presented by Linda
Parrott, Ely Rayek, and Emilio Ribes that
covered Kantor T s career, his contributions
to our understanding of behavior, and his
contributions to the theory of psychology
in general. A similar session also took
place at the XXIII International Congress
of Psychology in September, this time with
the participation of Sid Bijou, Linda
Parrott, and.Emilio Ribes.
We want to thank those who have
contributed to the Kantor Memorial Fund,
which serves as the basis for the long-
term financial stability of The
Interbehaviorist. The current Fund stands
at $654, reflecting the generous
contributions of Don Blomquist, Dennis
Delprato, Helene J. Kantor, Harry Mahan,
and Doug Ruben. No contribution is too
small.
Subscriptions
Several subscribers wrote or called to
say they had not received the last issue
(Vol. 12, No. 4) of the newsletter. We
had experienced some problems with postage
on that issue, so if you did not receive
your copy, please write or call. We will
send another copy--posthaste. Also, if
your copies arrive tattered and torn, we
would be pleased to replace them.
As mentioned above, the subscription
list now numbers about 140 individuals,
which is about double what we began with
in mid-1983. We are delighted with these
gains, which could not have been achieved
without the assistance of those who
promoted the newsletter so vigorously.
That assistance has been greatly
appreciated. Our goal for next year is to
double the size of the subscription list
your assistance in encouraging
institutions and individuals to subscribe
(at the new rates). Perhaps you could
consider sending a gift subscription to a
friend.
Listed on the back of this issue are the
names of all subscribers to the current
volume. If you have paid for your
subscription, but your name does not
appear, please let us know. For those who
are interested, a mailing list is
available upon request. Listed below are
the new and renewed subscribers for the
next volume of the newsletter
New Subscribers
Robert Deitchman
E. J. Hovorka
Benjamin F. Gillis
John M. Grossberg
Seymour Rosenberg
Albert Silverstein
E. R. Venator
Renewed or Continuing Subscribers
Donald A. Blomquist
Arthur Kahn
Maria M. A. Matos
Mary Ann Scafasci
Wanda Smith
Yoshikazu E. Tomiyasu
New Programs at the Cambridge Center
The Cambridge Center for Behavioral
Studies was founded in 1981 as an advanced
studies institute and library, along the
lines of the Center for Advanced Study in
the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford.
Distinguished board members include Nathan
H. Azrin, Sidney W. Bijou, Donald M. Baer,
Joseph R. Cautela, I. Bernard Cohen
(Victor S. Thomas Professor of the History
of Science at Harvard University), Hans J.
Eysenck, Donald 0. Hebb, David H. Hubel
(Nobel laureate), Fred S. Keller, Ogden R.
Lindsley, Gardner Lindzey, Jean Mayer
(President of Tufts University), Neal E.
Miller, W. V. Quine (Edgar Pierce
Professor of Philosophy Emeritus at
Harvard University), Janet T, Spence (Past
President of the American Psychological
Association), Roger . Sperry (Nobel
laureate), Joseph Wolpe, and many other
leaders in the academic world. The Center
is an affiliate of the Massachusetts
Psychological Association. For further
information, contact Ms. Janice K. Olson
or Dr. Robert Epstein at the Center, 11
Ware Street, Cambridge, MA 02138, or call
617-495-9020.
The Center has recently announced
several new programs that should interest
many readers. These are described in the
following paragraphs.
Press office. The Center has
established many contacts with the media
for the purpose of informing the public
about advances in behavioral psychology
and related disciplines. Any individual
involved in basic research or applied
disciplines may make use of this new
facility. If you feel that you have
accomplished something noteworthy -- the
successful application of an existing
therapy, the development of a new
technique in therapy, education, or
business, the discovery of a new
phenomenon in research -- send an account
of it to the Press Office, care of the
Center. Your material will be edited and
transfered to the Center's press release
forms and then mailed to contacts in
various branches of the media. For
especially important news, .the mailing
will be followed up by phone calls. Be
sure to include a contact number, so that
someone can call you for further details;
please also specify a release date on the
material.
Internship program. The Center has now
begun an internship program for talented
undergraduates and graduate students.
Qualified students will be selected as
interns for one pr two semesters.
Inquiries can be made by phone or in
writing. Preferably, nominations should
come from a faculty member or practicing
psychologist, but students may also
contact the Center directly. Students may
become involved in many different
activities, depending on their background
and interests. For example, the Center
publishes both an academic journal
(Behaviorism) and a book series (Progress
in Behavioral Studies, co-published with
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates). Students
are responsible for many aspects of these
publications: copy editing, proof reading,
typesetting, printing, distribution, and
so on. There are also opportunities for
students to help organize the Center's
library, to catalog archival materials, to
restore historical items, to conduct
research in an animal behavior laboratory,
and so on. Exceptional students will be
provided with word processing systems for
their places of residence.
Contributions to the Center's
collections. The Center welcomes
contributions of books, journals, archival
material, and items of historical
significance. The Center's current
holdings include a dozen different types
of early teaching machines (including one
of Skinner's original desk machines), an
aircrib, the original Sidman avoidance
box, an early cumulative recorder, and
many other noteworthy items.
Contributions are fully tax deductible,
since the Center holds 501(c)(3) status
with the IRS. For further information,
write to Ms. Laurie J. Averill, Acting
Librarian, at the above address.
Thesis program. The Center will house
and index masters theses and doctoral
dissertations in behavioral psychology and
related disciplines. Individuals who have
completed theses or dissertation are
invited to submit one bound, labeled copy
to Ms. Averill.
JOURNAL AND BOOK NOTES
We encourage readers to submit brief
book and journal notes for this section of
the newsletter.
Cromwell, R. L. (1984). Schizophrenia: A
right and just war. [Review of
Schizphrenia: The epigenetic puzzle.]
Contemporary Psychology, 29, 112-115.
Though not necessarily an inter-
behavioral review of Irving I. Gotteman
and James Shield's text (Cambridge
University Press), Cromwell's last
paragraph contained this interesting
material:
In the same sense that J. R. Kantor
used C. C. Pratt's The Logic of Modern
Psychology (MacMillan, 1948) as a
textbook to illustrate philosophical
shortcomings in Pratt's view of
Watsonian behaviorism, this book would
be useful as a text to'illustrate how
certain assumptions (and a lack of
others) can affect the direction of
research and block out useful areas of
investigation. The book is an accurate
body count of a right and just war that
has failed because of an incomplete
strategy (p. 115). (Edward K. Morris,
University of Kansas)
Hayes, S. C. (1984). But whose
behaviorism is it? [Review of
Behaviorism, science, and human nature].
Contemporary Psychology, :29, 203-206.
In this excellent review of B. Schwartz
and H. Lacy's Behaviorism, Science, and
Human Nature (New York: Norton, 1982),
Steve Hayes acknowledges an important
similarity between radical behaviorism and
interbehaviorism. Hayes describes one of
the philosophical assumptions of radical
behaviorism as: "functionalism in the
development of psychological analyses and
[in] the definition of psychological
terms, including a dynamic, organic,
interbehavioral perspective on the
definition of psychological terms" (p.
205). Hayes' explicit description of the
organismic, interactional nature of
radical behaviorism is important because
this stands in sharp contrast to the
naive, simplistic account of behaviorism
presented in Schwartz and Lacy's book.
All contemporary behaviorisms should work
together against such misrepresentation.
Subsequent issues of Contemporary
Psychology (CP) contain two exchanges of
views between Hayes and Schwartz and Lacy
on the nature of radical behaviorism (see
CP, 1984, 2_9, 676-678, and CP, 1984, 29_,
833-834). (James T. Todd, University of
Kansas)
Manicas, P. T., & Secord, P. F. (1983).
Implications for psychology of the new
philosophy of science. American
Psychologist, 3^, 399-413.
For the most part, the philosophies of
science that have developed since the
beginning of this century have been
characterized by dualism, solipsism, or a
priori logical assumptions concerning the
nature of scientific activity. In the
Logic of Modern Science, though, J. R.
Kantor presented what is perhaps the first
truly scientific approach to the
philosophy of science. Unfortunately,
Kantor's book has been largely ignored by
scientists in general and psychologists in
particular, the latter of whom might
benefit the most from Kantor's
formulations.
The recent publication of Manicas and
Secord's (1983) "implications of the New
Philosophy of Science for Psychology,"
however, is an encouraging sign that some
logicians of science are headed in more
naturalistic directions. Drawing heavily
on the work of Tomulin, the authors
provide a cogent (though difficult to
read) critique of the old philosophies of
science and then set forth the major
tenets of what they consider to be the new
philosophy of science. Although Kantor's
work is not cited, many of the major
tenets of this new philosphy of science
are compatible with interbehavioral views.
For instance, Manicas and Secord reject
solipsism and adopt a position that
integrates both the realist and
fallibilist perspectives. The authors
believe that a world exists independent of
the scientist's experience. Scientific
knowledge is thus "constructed" through
contacts with the world, but can never be
said to be the truth of that world. In
addition, and perhaps more important, the
authors generally reject reductionistic
and mechanistic views of causality, and
embrace more contextualistic, field-
theoretic views. The authors also
demonstrate the wide applicability of
their system by showing its relevance to
almost every major area of psychology.
The authors' views, however, could be
usefully supplemented and strengthened by
an interbehavioral philosophy of science,
especially with respect to two issues.
First, while the authors reject most
aspects of mechanistic views of causality,
they still imbue particular aspects of
field events with "causal powers."
Second, an a priori logic of science still
lingers implicitly in their writing.
Nonetheless, Manicas and Secord have
performed a valuable service to psychology
and other sciences. (Replies to this
article may be found in the American
Psychologist, 39, 917-926.)(Steve Larsen,
University of Kansas)
Zinberg, Norman E. (1984). Drug, set, and
setting: The basis for controlled
int ox i cant use. New Haven: Yale
University Press.
Zinberg explores how drugs (e.g.,
composition and dose), sets (e.g.,
interbehavioral history, organismic
context), and settings (e.g.,
environmental context and media of
contact) interact to produce controlled or
uncontrolled drug use. If readers can
overcome the psychiatric flavor of the
book, they will find portions of Zinberg1s
analysis quite interbehavioral. For
example, Zinberg's contextual views on
drugs can be gleaned from the following
quote: "As for the power of drugs, the
notion that the pharmacological properties
of a drug, irrespective of set and
setting, are the sole determinants of
disturbed or violent behavior dies hard.
There is considerable evidence to the
contrary..." (p. 31). In other words,
drug taking and its effects cannot be
separated from the contexts in which they
occur. In Zinberg's own longitudinal
study reported in the book, subjects were
interviewed extensively about various
contextual factors: family, work, school,
friends, drug history, drug use, etc.
Such research is a step in the right
direction in the search to understand all
the participating factors in drug-behavior
interactions. (Lisa M. Johnson, University
of Kansas)
ARTICLE
A Brief Commentary on
Autistic Abstraction vs. Confrontation
with Things and Events: Reinforcing Power
and Generalization
Dallas W. Stevenson and
Michael J. Hemingway
Wayne State University
Obesity and Risk Factor Clinic
Setbacks in behavioral scientists'
attempts to construct a natural science of
human behavior often occur when we forsake
lucid description of the interaction of
things and events for culturally valued
"explanations" of the phenomena we study.
Take two examples.
First, in their useful introductory
text, Martin and Pear (1978) attempt to
describe a behavioral phenomenon by
stating, "...when backward chaining is
used, the reinforcing power of the
positive reinforcer (presented at the end
of the chain) is transferred down the line
to each [discriminiative stimulus] as it
is added to the chain" (p. 149). In their
attempt to explain, Martin and Pear have
taken a technical language that was
designed to describe a particular
phenomenon observed in nature, and
introduced some unobservable force -- the
power of the reinforcer -- which somehow
mystically moves from stimulus to
stimulus.
Second, consider the topic of
generalization. Stokes and Baer (1977)
have attempted to address the troublesome
issue of generalization in applied
behavior analysis, and they offer several
important .suggestions for the
practitioner. Their use of the term
generalization, however, and its
subsequent use by others, is .problematic.
Practitioners have stated that treatment
failures may be the result of failing to
achieve "generalization" of behavioral
interventions. Use of the term in this
fashion leads to the following position:
In the situation where the scientist can
account for the critical participating
field variables, he or she describes them,
while everything else is attributed to
"generalization."
As Kantor (1981) has long maintained, an
important rule in the construction of a
natural science is that we must take great
care to anchor our descriptions in the
phenomena we study. When we talk about
our descriptions apart from our subject
matter, we are in danger of leaving the
scientific domain and entering into
competition with the brothers Grimm in the
myth-making business. Such attempts at
explanation are substituted for careful
scientific inquiry. Johnston and
Pennypacker (1980) and Kantor (1981) have
warned against the use of terms and the
creation of verbal abstractions that carry
with them explanations not anchored in
observation. If behavioral science is to
progress, behavioral scientists must
monitor their writing and verbal behavior
with respect to this issue.
References
Johnston, J. M., & Pennypacker, H. S.
(1980). Strategies and tactics of human
behavioral research. Hillsdale, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum.
Kantor, J. R. (1981). Interbehavioral
philosophy. Chicago: -Principia Press.
Martin, G. L., & Pear, J. J. (1978).
Behavior modification: What it is and
how to do it. Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice-Hall.
Stokes, T. F., & Baer, D. M. (1977). An
implicit technology of generalization.
Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis,
10, 349-367.
ARTICLE
Do We Need the Concept of Mind
in Psychology?
Noel W. Smith
State University of New York
at Plattsburg
Let us begin our approach to this
question by looking at some terms that are
now related to psychophysical dualism, but
that originally were not.
PSYCHE to Aristotle meant the life
functions of the organism, including
nutritive and reproductive acts,
locomotion, sensing, and thinking.
Psyche, he said, is to the body as cutting
is to the ax. Psyche is what the organism
dtoes -- its most characteristic acts.
Aristotle developed a systematic
psychology around this usage that included
sensing, thinking, remembering, imagining,
and dreaming. He seemed to be at no
disadvantage for not having psychophysical
dualism.
SPIRIT in Latin originally meant, quite
simply, breath, and not any metaphysical
entity.
SOUL in Old English, as used in Beowulf,
referred to life itself or components of
the body, such as blood, that were
associated with life and with life
actions, such as thinking.
MIND goes back to Indo-European origins,
perhaps 4000 years ago or more, to men-,
which meant "to think," "remember," or
"intend." It is possibly related to
"man," meaning "the one who thinks." It
was not an entity or agent or internal
process, but thinking activity.
"Mind" (as gemynd) is first recorded in
English in the year 971 and was used as
the action of thinking about something, as
in the phrase "to have mind of," or to
intend, as in "have a mind to" (Oxford
English Dictionary on Historical
Principles, 1983). It was not until 1125
that mind came to be something distinct
from the body, a practice that was
influenced by Christianity. Mind then
became the seat or agent of perceiving,
thinking, willing, etc. and was contrasted
with matter.
Psychophysical dualism is a relatively
recent creation. It is not an inevitable
or necessary way of thinking. How did it
arise? I can only take the time for a
brief glance at a long and complex
history. It arose as a retreat or a
turning inward and away from a cruel world
that existed through the Hellenistic and
Graeco-Roman times. It began in the
School of Alexandria about 200 B.C. and
was refined and carried to greater levels
of abstraction by the theologians such as
Clement of Alexandria, Origin, Hippolytus,
Gregory of Nyssa, and others and by that
supreme mystic, Plotinus. There were a
few opponents of this way of thinking.
Lucretius (De Rerum Natura), for example,
argued that there could be only matter and
space and no third thing, but his was a
voice in the wilderness during a period of
great social insecurity. The overwhelming
need was not for rationality, but for a
belief in a nonphysical psychological
agent that would survive the destruction
of the body and live in a paradise in the
hereafter. This was vital to oppressed
and insecure people.
Once psychophysical dualism had been
created, no effort was made to resolve it
until the 17th centruy. Descartes
declared, quite illogically, that mind and
body interacted, and he was severely
criticized by other philosophers.
Leibnitz said that mind and body operated
in parallel without any contact with each
other; they were set on this parallel
course by the Creator. Spinoza held that
mind and body were but two aspects of a
single thing -- nonphysical mind when
looked at from the inside and physical
body from the outside. The French
materialists argued that mind was a by-
product of the body, something the body
produces. These and other attempted
solutions all failed because two
contradictory constructs cannot be brought
into interplay or mutual influence.
Unfortunately, no one seemed to recognize
that these arguments completely avoided
any reference to actual events.
The arguments continued into the 20th
century. John Watson pronounced that
there was only a behaving body without a
mind. He lopped off one-half of the
dualism, thereby implicitly acknowledging
it. A favorite current argument is that
brain and mind are one. The brain thinks,
interprets sensations, and processes
information. This homuculean brain has
the same metaphysical status as mind or
soul, and the same insurmountable
problems.
Aristotle did not need psychophysical
dualism for his psychology. Do we need it
for ours? By way of answer I will offer
three brief examples of alternatives to
dualism. First, let us consider the case
of someone who is preparing for a formal
debate. The individual sits quietly
thinking of some arguments that will be
useful in the debate. This interaction
would be unobservable to another observer,
although special instruments might provide
indications that the individual was
thinking about something, a behavior that
some might call mental. As this
individual continues to think about the
argumentsj he becomes slightly more
animated. He mumbles and gestures
slightly. The interaction is now slightly
observable. As he continues further in
this activity, he becomes increasingly
animated until he is speaking out loud and
gesturing fully just as he would in an
actual debate. The interaction has varied
on a continuum from unobseryable to
observable (or covert ot overt), but at
what point has it changed from mental to
physical? Is there any difference in
principle between the interactions at any
point on the continuum? Are these not
just all confrontable interactions that
vary in degree of subtleness or of
observability?
As a second example, let us consider so-
called psychosomatic disorders. The term
"psychosomatic" means that the psyche, not
in Aristotle's sense but in the sense that
the Church Fathers gave it, is acting on
the body, the soma, causing malfunction or
tissue damage. In the case of ulcers, a
mental or psychic disturbance is said to
act destructively on the body. The
alternative approach can be stated very
briefly: A prolonged stress situation
involves a configuration of reactions
including excessive gastric secretion and
resulting ulceration as part of the
interaction.
A final example comes from studies on
perceptual constancies. The usual" account
is that a brain process makes adjustments
to objects viewed at different angles,
distances, and brightnesses and gives a
read-out such that things look the same
regardless of these changes. For example,
we see a table as rectangular regardless
of our viewing angle even though a
rectangle is subtended on the retina only
when we view the table from directly
above. This is said to occur because our
brain somehow processes the parallelograms
or other nonrectangular images that appear
on the retina and reinterprets them as as
a rectangle. We then have an internal
representation of a constantly rectangular
table. Instead of adapting an explanation
by recourse to a metaphysical brain and a
resulting double world (one inside and
another outside), we need simply note that
people respond to things in accordance
with their meanings, and that meanings are
-JO
developed through a history of
interactions with them. A table looks
retangular to me regardless of my viewing
angle, not because of some mysterious
brian process, but because of my history
of contacts with such objects. These
objects look to me in accordance with what
they mean to me, and what they mean to me
consists of my history of interactions
with them.
In conclusion, I suggest that if we
start our inquiry or our investigation
with confrentable events, w_e do not need
metaphysical constructs. We are
susceptible to them because of our
cultural indoctrination which leads us
implicitly to assume such constructs and
then impose them on whatever we observe.
The remedy is to start with events,
develop our constructs from events, and
keep our constructs consistent with the
events. With this direct approach, "mind"
would disappear from psychology and never
be missed. It could then revert to the
theologians and mystics from which it
sprang.
[This paper was presented at the State
University of New York at Plattsburg,
February 23, 1984, in a panel discussion
on the topic "is the Concept of 'Mind' a
Necessary One in Psychology?"]
ARTICLE
On Reciprocal Behavioristic Concerns
Jay Moore
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
I recently spent a few moments
considering whether we are realizing a
genuinely behavioristic psychology as
effectively as we might, given that there
are probably now a greater number of
interbehaviorists and radical behaviorists
active than ever before. I reluctantly
reached the conclusion that we are not. I
would like to take this opportunity to
share my thoughts on this important matter
in the context of an answer to the
following question: What factors seem to
be inhibiting the interaction between
interbehaviorists and radical behaviorists
in pursuit of the common goal of a truly
effective science of behavior?
It seems to me that there are factors on
both sides. Indeed, according to an
integrated-field analysis, how could it be
otherwise? Let me speak frankly to two
matters that in my experience have been of
concern to radical behaviorists about
interbehaviorists. First, radical
behaviorists often express concern about,
the apparent absence of a "research
program" among interbehaviorists, and not
finding what they seek, turn away from
what interbehaviorists actually have to
offer (for further discussion of this
issue, see Verplanck, 1983). For my part,
I do not feel that this sort of concern is
valid, and the loss is the radical
behaviorists1. Any systematic enterprise
in which stimuli are manipulated, and
responses measured, counted, or recorded,
with the aim of describing the constituent
factors of things and their participation
in events, ijs a research program. A
research program does not have to conform
to a particular style, technique, or even
employ an idiosyncratic piece of
apparatus. Kantor would probably argue
that it would be inappropriate for
experimentation to be so constrained.
Moreover, much of interbehavioral
scientific effort is interpretative in
nature, and it is ironic that radical
behaviorists, who place much value in the
interpretative work found in Skinner's
Verbal Behavior, criticize interbehavioral
interpretative work.
There is, however, a second concern that
is perhaps more substantive. It seems to
me that all too frequently,
interbehaviorists end up including Skinner
among the traditional figures whose
approaches they reject, with the result
that interbehaviorists inadvertently end
up endorsing alternative approaches to
doing science, particularly those that
they take as emphasizing the
psychological, constructional processes of
the scientist. Although anyone's approach
to doing science is worthy of inspection,
it seems to me that interbehaviorists then
run the risk of becoming quickly trapped
up by mentalistic formulations of the
behavior of the scientist, a risk that
Skinner has repeatedly tried to bring to
everyone's attention in the context of
criticisms of "the operationism of Boring
and Stevens." Kantor himself warns
against confusing statements about events
with the events themselves; his injunction
focuses upon Berkeleyian constructionism

and attendant attempts to define a
phenomenon that was held to be from a
"subjective" dimension in ostensibly
"objective" ways. For example,
conventional operationism may be unmasked
as a rather explicit endorsement of
dualism, and presumably may be rejected on
that basis (see discussion in Kantor,
1945, p. 145). The point is that
irrespective of any claim of objectivity,
claims that rating scales or observational
technique are somehow valid simply because
they accomodate the "subjective"
constructional processes of the
observer/scientist are simply adding to
the problem of dualism, rather than
relieving it. Recall Kantor (1938): "Why
the term subjective in psychology? We are
passing...back to medieval times of
dividing the universe..." (p. 17). In
brief, interbehaviorists must be somewhat
more selective as to what approaches they
reject and endorse as leading to
legitimate formulations of events. In
particular, they must take care not to
endorse the orientations that are the very
source of the problems standing in the way
of a genuinely behavioristic psychology.
Let me now speak to what seems
justifiably of concern to
interbehaviorists about radical
behaviorists. It seems to me that most
radical behaviorists have a rather
mechanistic view of causation, concerned
with identifying either the billiard ball
effect of a prior stimulus or the
supposedly retroactive effect of
reinforcement. That is, most radical
behaviorists seem to fractionate
behavioral events inappropriately into
neat little parcels, just so that they can
assign causal power to some factor
external to the behaving organism. This
practice, it could be contended, is just
as much in error as trying to assign
causal power to some factor internal to
the behaving organism. In my experience,
radical behaviorists do not seem cognizant
of integrated-field approaches, and
although Skinner himself does not use the
term or principle, his own conceptions
seem entirely consistent with event fields
of integrated factors: "An operant is a
class, of which a response is an instance
or a member...A set of contingencies
defines an operant...The role of stimuli
in defining contingencies is perhaps even
more important...Only by surveying many
instances can we identify properties of
11
stimuli and responses which enter into the
contingencies" (Skinner, 1969, p. 131-
132). Most Skinnerians do not appreciate
Skinner's concepts, let alone the elegance
of Kantor's approach, and a renewed
emphasis on scholarly understanding of
Kantor's position would be most
profitable. Indeed, an integrated-field
perspective, which emphasizes relations
among the specificity of the factors
involved, might go along way toward
preventing such errors as assuming that
"the animal comes to the laboratory as a
virtual tabula rasa, that species
differences are significant, and that all
responses are about equally conditional to
all stimuli" (see (Brelan & Breland,
1961, p. 684). Granted that Skinner
himself does not subscribe to the view
expressed in the quote above, and never
did, there are nevertheless enough who do
subscribe to such a view to cause plenty
of problems.
The foregoing, as Kantor once said, is
only the simplest kind of sketch, with the
omission of many details and citations,
with the inclusion of only the most
abstract contour lines to frame the issue.
Perhaps it will be of interest to some
readers. If only one researcher re-
examines the way he or she does science,
then perhaps some good will have come of
it.
References
Breland, K., & Breland, M. (1961). The
misbehavior of organisms. American
Psychologist, 16, 681-684.
Kantor, J. R. (1938). The operational
principle in the physical and
psychological sciences. The
Psychological Record, 2, 3-32.
Kantor, J. R. (1945). Psychology and
logic. Bloomington: Principia Press.
Skinner, B. F. (1969). Contingencies of
reinforcement: A theoretical analysis.
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Verplanck, W. S. (1983). Preface. In N.
W. Smith, P. T. Mountjoy, & D. H. Ruben,
Reassessment in psychology: The
interbehavioral alternative (pp. xi-
xxv). Washington, B.C.: University
Press.
Reprints of this article may be obtained
from the author, Department of Psychology;
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee,
Milwaukee, WI 53201.
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THE INTERBEHAVIORIST
Edward K. Morris, Editor
Department of Human Development
212B Haworth Hall
University of Kansas
Lawrence, Kansas 66045
 A Quarterly Newsletter of Interbehavioral Psychology
ISSN 8755-612X

Published at the University of Kansas

Volume 13 1985 Number 1
EDITOR TABLE OF CONTENTS

Edward K. Morris Motes from the Field 2

University of Kansas
The Agora 3
ADVISORYBOARD Kantor Memorials. 3
Sidney W. Bijou An Interbehavioral Organization...... 4
University of Arizona
Donna M. Cone Association for Behavior Analysis.... 4
State of Rhode Island
Dennis J. Delprato Subscriptions ... 5
Eastern Michigan University
Sandy Hobbs (Scotland) Journal and Book Motes. 5
Paisley College of Technology
Paul T. Mountjoy Comments 6
Western Michigan University
Linda J. Parrott (Canada) jx-Noel W. Smith: "Covert" Defended.... 6
St. Mary's College
N. H. Pronko Articles 7
Wichita State University
Roger D. Ray N. H. Pronko: "The Matter of
Rollins College Setting Factors: As I See It"..... 7
Emilio Ribes (Mexico)
Escuela Nacional de Estudios Donna M. Cone: "The Usefulness of
Douglas H. Ruben Certain Mentalistic Concepts"...... 7
Western Michigan University
Robert G. Wahler
University of Tennessee QUOTE

The truth is, the science of Nature has

ASSISTANT EDITORS been already too long made only a work
of the brain and the fancy. It is now
Jane B. Atwater high time that that it should return to
Lisa M. Johnson the plainness and soundness of
Steven E. Larsen observations on material and obvious
Susan M. Schneider things.
James T. Todd -- Robert Hooke
 THE INTERBEHAIORIST
A Quarterly Newsletter of
Interbehavioral Psychology
ISSN 8755-612X
Edward K. Morris, Editor
Department of Human Development
212B Haworth Hall
University of Kansas
Lawrence, Kansas 66045, U.S.A.
913-864-3684/4840
Tjie_^_berbehaviorist is a quarterly
publication of news, information,
discussion, journal and book notes, book
reviews, comments, and brief articles
pertaining to interbehavioral psychology
-- a natural science of behavior from a
contextualistic, integrated-field
perspective.
The newsletter publishes professional
communications that fall between informal
correspondence and colloquia, and formal
archival publication. As such, the
newsletter supplements contemporary
journals dedicated to basic and applied
research, and to the history and
philosophy of the behavioral sciences.
The newsletter actively encourages
submission of notes about current
professional activities, news and
observations about interbehavioral
psychology and related perspectives,
comments on journals and books of
interest, more extended book reviews,
and brief articles. All submissions
should be sent in triplicate to the editor
and should conform to the style described
in the publication manual of the American
Psychological Association (3rd edition).
Student Subscriptions...... ..... $4.00
Regular Subscriptions............... 6.00
Foreign Subscriptions............... 8.00
Institutional Subscriptions......... 10.00
Back Volumes 12......... 6.00
Back Volumes 1-11 (each) 4.00
Back Volume Complete Sets........... Write
NOTES FROM THE FIELD
Many subscribers contributed articles in
honor of Professor Kantor to the special
issue of JJ}_^s^ch_ojgI^aJ;_J;ecord and to
the last issue of The[Behavior; Anaj-yst .
These contributions are listed in THE
AGORA In the pages that follow.
In other news, both IVER IVERSEN and
RICHARD PISACRETA were primary authors on
articles in the Jourjial__of_the
Experimental Analysis of Behavior
entitled, respectively, "Operant
Conditioning of Autogrooming in Vervet
Monkeys" (1984, 42, 171-189) and "Transfer
of Matching-to-Figure Samples in the
Pigeon" (1984, 42, 223-237). THEODORE
SARBIN and Karl Scheibe's (1983) Studies
in Social Identity was quite favorably
reviewed in Contemporary Psychology (1984,
29, 955-957). In the same issue, Mancuso
and SARBIN (pp. 992-993) responded to the
unsympathetic review of their book on
schizophrenia. Finally, STEVE LARSEN, ED
MORRIS, LISA JOHNSON, JIM TODD, and John
VonLintel published an article in The
Experimental Analysis of Human Behavior
implications of interbehavioral psychology
in that domain.
DONALD M. BAER and JOHN L. FALK each
contributed papers to the Symposium on
Analysis and Integration of Behavioral
Units in honor of Kenneth MacCorquodale
(Oct. 18-19, 1984). Their papers were
respectively titled, "Frequency as an
Estimate of Probability of Behavioral
Units" and "The Formation and Function of
Ritual Behavior."
RALPH SPIGA chaired a symposium,
entitled "J. R. Kantor 's Interbehavioral
Psychology: Theory and Application," at
the meeting of the Southeastern
Association for Behavior Analysis
(November 15-17, 1984). Papers were
presented by Ralph: "Understanding
Behavior Analysis through
Interbehavlorism"; by BILL BROWN, BILL
BRYSON-BROCKMANN, AND JIM FOX:
"Differentiating Setting Events from
Discriminative Stimuli: An Interbehavioral
Perspective"; and by LYNNE DAURELLE: "An
Interbehavioral Perspective on Parent
Training of Developmentally Delayed
Children."
We would like to thank those of you who
sent us copies of these papers so that we
could note them in this column. We knew
that some day our "reprints" would come.
 THEAGORA
In general news, you will note that the
newsletter has now obtained an
International Standard Serials Number
(ISSN 8755-612X) from the National Serials
Data Program at the Library of Congress.
Having an ISSN number increases the number
of sources in which we are listed, makes
citations to the newsletter easier to
find, and increases the probability that
acquisition librarians will give us
serious consideration.
Readers of BejTay_igris_m saw that we
placed (actually, reciprocated with) an
advertisement in the last issue (1983, ]2,
p. 70). We have yet to receive
Behaviorj^sm's advertisement, but will
publish it when it arrives.
With respect to another "philosophical"
journal, Linda Parrott informs us of the
new Annals of Theoretical Psychology,
edited by Joseph R. Royce and Leendert P.
Mos (Center for Advanced Study in
Theoretical Psychology, University of
Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada T6G
2E9) and published by the Plenum
Publishing Corporation (233 Spring Street,
New York, NY 10013). Volumes 1 (March,
1984) and 2 (November, 1984) have already
been published; Volume 3 is expected in
June. The composition of the editorial
board and contents of the first issues do
not jump out at one as interbehavioral,
but the broad range of topics addressed
touches on all aspects of interbehavioral
philosophy. The "annals" may be worth a
look, and some friendly persuasion.
We received a letter from Gerald R.
Patterson, who commented on Professor
Kantor's contributions to psychology.
Professor Patterson has kindly allowed us
to reprint his comments here:
[When] I was a graduate student at the
University of Minnesota, there was no
one there who was presenting the
interbehavioral perspective. That's
interesting because Minnesota had such
an empirical orientation and [was] very
much committed to S-R learning theories,
including Skinner's point of view. It
was only much later when I actually
engaged in developing what we were
calling here the analysis of structure
that Fred Kanfer said, "You really
should read Kantor." I was shocked to
find that somebody had already developed
this point of view sans data, and
extended it far beyond anything that I
had in mind."
As reported in the last issue, Professor
Patterson was also the recent recipient of
the American Psychological Association's
1984 Distinguished Scientific Award for
the Applications of Psychology. The
inscription on the award reads as follows:
For his tenacious, programmatic and
inventive research on family interaction
processes, especially his naturalistic
studies of coercive interactions
involving aggressive youngsters. A
significant methodological and social
contribution, this work also produced a
carefully devised, meticuously
evaluated, and widely respected parental
training program. His work appears
prominently in all reviews of deviant
family interaction, childhood aggression
and their treatment. He has open-
mindedly [sic] combined social learning
principles and interaction theories in
his coherent model of aversive control,
A stirring speaker, an exemplary leader,
and a creative basic and applied
scientist, he has inspired countless
young scholars.
Hear! Hear!
Kantor Memorials
Sid Bijou sent us news that on October
2, 1984, the Indiana University
Bloomington Faculty Council commemorated
Professor Kantor in a memorial resolution.
The resolution was prepared and signed by
Douglas G. Ellson, James H. Capshew,
Richard N. Berry, Eliot Hearst, and Harry
Yamaguchi; Herman B. Wells and Cornilia
Christiansen assisted. It is available
from the editor of this newsletter.
The commemorative issue of The
Psychological Record has been published
11984, 3l~T4Tn ItTcontains articles by
colleagues and friends of Professor Kantor
who were greatly influenced by his work.
Individual copies of this issue are
available for $8.50 from Charles E. Rice,
Editor, Department of Psychology, Kenyon
College, Gambier, OH 43022. The authors
and the titles of their papers are listed
below.
Marion White McPhqrson and John A.
Popplestone
Selections from Archives of the
History of American Psychology
 Irvin S. Wolf
J. R. Kantor, 1888-1984
Parker E. Liechtenstein
Interbehaviorism in Psychology and
in the Philosophy of Science
Noel W. Smith
Fundamentals of Interbehavioral
Psychology
James E. Upson and Roger D. Ray
An Interbehavioral Systems Model for
Empirical Investigation in Psychology
Sidney W. Bijou
Cross-Sectional and Longitudinal
Analysis of Development: The
Interbehavioral Perspective
Theodore R. Sarbin
Nonvolition in Hypnosis; A Semiotic
Analysis
Paul T. Mountjoy and Douglas H. Ruben
Extinction and Resurgence in
Scientific History: An Interbehavioral
Analysis
Emilio Ribes
The Relation between Interbehaviorism
and the Experimental Analysis of
Behavior: The Search for a Paradigm
William Stephenson
Methodologies for Statements of
Problems: Kantor and Spearman
Conjoined
Douglas H. Ruben
Major Trends in Interbehavioral
Psychology from Articles Published in
The Psychological Record (1937-1983)
In addition to the special issue of The
Psychological Record, James M. Johnston,
editor of The Behavior Analyst; invited
four papers in honor of Professor Kantor
for the Fall, 1984, issue of that journal
(Vol. 7, No. 2). Although these articles
comprise but a portion of the issue, the
issue is available for $5.00 from Ms.
Shery Chamberlain, c/o the Society for the
Advancement of Behavior Analysis,
Department of Psychology, Western Michigan
University, Kalamazoo, MI 49008. The
authors and articles are listed below.
Linda J. Parrott
J. R. Kantor's Contributions to
Psychology and Philosophy: A Guide to
Further Study
Jay Moore
Conceptual Contributions of Kantor's
Interbehavioral Psychology
Jackson Marr
Some Reflections on Kantor's (1970)
"An Analysis of the Experimental
Analysis of Behavior"
Edward K. Morris
Interbehavioral Psychology and Radical
Behaviorism: Some Similarities and
Differences.
We want to thank those who have
contributed so far to the Kantor Memorial
Fund of the newsletter, which serves as
the basis for our long-term financial
stability and special publication events.
The current fund stands at $718,
reflecting the generous contributions of
Richard Amado, Don Blomquist, Dennis
Delprato, William Gardner, Helene J.
Kantor, Louise Kent-Udolf, Harry Mahan,
and Doug Ruben.
An Inter behavioural Organization
Related to the above, Dennis Delprato
and others are looking into the
feasibility of establishing an
interbehavioral organization. ABA serves
the needs of some, but certainly not all
readers of this newsletter. At the
moment, the specific functions of the
organization are not settled -- they may
range from simple filing as an educational
organization, to overseeing the well-being
of various interbehavioral publications,
such as the Principia Press and The
Psychological Record, to that plus the
holding of annual meetings. These matters
warrant serious discussion, the
opportunity for which Dennis has arranged.
An open meeting has been scheduled after
the completion of the regular ABA meetings
in Columbus, Ohio, at the Hyatt-Regency
Hotel (the Champagne Room) on Monday, May
27, at 4:00. If interested, please
attend. A notice of this meeting will
also be published in the ABA_ Newsletter.
The Association for BehaviorAnalysis
As has been mentioned before in past
issues of the newsletter, the annual
meetings of the Association for Behavior
Analysis have been receptive to papers by
interbehavioral psychologists. We expect
this trend to continue, and will provide a
list of interbehavioral papers to be given
at the May meetings in the next issue of
the newsletter.
In the meantime, readers may be
interested to know that Rick Amado
submitted a request to establish a Special
Interest Group (SIG) for Interbehavioral
Psychology within the Association, and
that this was accepted at the October 12-
14 meeting of the Executive Council.
Linda Parrott and Rick have arranged for a
meeting of those interested in the SIG at
the next convention. The meeting is
scheduled for Sunday, May 26, at 1:00 in
the Franklin Room of the Hyatt-Hegency in
Columbus, Ohio. Interested ABA members
should attend so that the SIG can
establish a list of officers and an
agenda.
SubscripWons
As mentioned in previous issues of the
newsletter, we are always interested in
new (and renewed) subscribers. Any
efforts current subscribers can make to
promote new subscriptions, especially from
university,, college, and institutional
libraries, would be greatly appreciated.
Subscription information is listed inside
the front cover of the newsletter. If
you, yourself, have not resubscribed,
please do so as soon as possible. Notices
were enclosed in the last issue and, for
those who have not yet resubscribed, are
enclosed again.
The new subscribers since the last
issue are listed below. We especially
want to thank the Comunidad Los Horcones
for its interest and support. They also
sent us a reprint of an article describing
their activities, entitled "Pilot Walden
Two Experiments: Beginnings of a Planned
Society," which appeared in the
Behaviorists for Social Action Journal,
TW27~37~25^297 and irnJETcTTreferences
are made to the work of other subscribers
to the newsletter -- Don Baer, Sid Bijou,
Gerald Patterson, and Emilio Ribes. The
address of the Comunidad is Carretera a
Tecoripa KM 63, Apartado 372, Hermosillo,
Sonora, Mexico. Me thank them and all
other new subscribers for supporting the
journal. For those interested, a mailing
list is available on request.
New Subscribers for 1985:
Cambridge Center for
Behavioral Studies
Comunidad Los Horcones
Robert Deitchman
Sigrid Glenn
Benjamin F. Gillis
John M. Grossberg
James W. Herrick
Philip N. Hineline
E. J. Hovorka
Lucien Leduc
Lynda K. Powell
Jesus G. Rosales-Nieto
Seymour Rosenberg
Albert Silverstein
Dallas W. Stevenson
E. R. enator
Keith Waldman
Edwin P* Willems
W. Joseph Wyatt
Several recent issues of the newsletter
have been returned to us as undeliverable
at the addresses to which they were
sent. If you know the whereabouts of the
following subscribers, please let us know.
Edward Grant
Lynn D. Larrow
Luiz F. S. Natalicio
Me encourage readers to submit brief
journal and book notes for this section of
the newsletter. When you do so,
please include the full address of the
authors, for we have begun the practice of
sending them a copy of the newsletter.
Costall, A. P. (1984). Are theories of
perception necessary? [A review of The
geological approach to~ visual
~ ~
109-115.
Costall 's excellent paper on J. J.
Gibson's ecological approach is
interbehavioral in many ways in its
critique of cognitive representational
theory; Noel Smith's Festscrift chapter is
commended in this regard. Costall made
one particularly pithy statement worth
repeating; "Quite clearly,
representational theory is (to borrow
James's comment on Wundt's psychology)
like a worm: You cut it up and each
fragment crawls" (p. 111).
Among the specific points Costall raises
that have an interbehavioral ring to them
are (a) that science is not a logical
structure, but human activity; (b) that
Cartesian dualism must be replaced with an
ecological ontology; (c) that the unit of
psychological analysis is the
interdependent relation of organism and
environment; and (d) that the Skinner ian
paradigm seems at times ontologically
physicalistic, and thereby often treats
the environment as an autonomous cause --
this despite the "dialectical status of
the concept of the operant" (p. 112).
Although interbehaviorists may view
Gibson's perspective as a re-invention of
Professor Kantor's field-theoretic views,
Costall's article is well written and
merits attention. (Edward K. Morris,
University of Kansas)
Funk 4 Wagnals Co. (1935). The_New
Internabion_aj1Jfearbook . New York.
The section on "Psychology" for 1934,
which was likely written by Gordon W.
Allport, the yearbook's psychology editor,
includes the following entry 2
"Developments during 1934 show that while
eclecticism is growing, various schools
are still making their individual
differences felt. First and foremost is
the movement referred to generically as
1
totalism' . . . .Totalism may include the
point of view of behaviorism, as is shown
by the purposive behaviorism of E. C.
Tolman...and by a new book by J. R. Kantor
( A Suryey_p_f_ ^he_Science_of_Psy_chglgg^ ,
_ _ - . Viewpoint,
Bloomington, Indiana: Principia Press)"
(p. 596).
Among the other events announced in the
1934 yearbook were (a) that "psychologists
are paying much attention to the so-called
principle of indeterminateness," (b) that
they were continuing "attempts to
determine mathematically the composition
of the mind," and (c) that the American
Psychological Association's committee on
the Ph.D. in psychology "recommends
desirable practices for raising the
standards of the degree" (p. 596). Plus
la change, plus la meme chose. (James T.
Todd, University of Kansas)
COMMENTS
"Covert" Defended
Noel W. Smith
SUNY-Plattsburgh
I take a dissenting view to Pronko's
criticism of the term "covert" (Pronko,
1983-1984) as used in interbehavioral
psychology. The reasons that Pronko lists
as objectionable are to me those that
commend its use. Covert activities are
those that are not readily observable, but
that are nonetheless quite concrete.
Moreover, in contrast to Pronko's
argument, nothing about the term
implies that the activity need be limited
to the organism side of the interaction.
As I have delineated recently, the
activity that is difficult to observe may
be the stimulus only, the response only,
or the entire interaction (Smith, 1983,
PP. 31-33).
"Covert" has the advantage of indicating
one end of a continuum of which the other
end is "overt." When we place activities
on the covert-overt continuum, no
implication need accrue that this
represents a mental-physical dichotomy;
such a distinction would be meaningless.
Psychological events and many other
types as well ~ differ in their degree of
observability while at the same time being
wholly physical. The fact that physicists
and chemists do not use the terms "covert"
and "overt" does not disqualify the terms
for psychology. Those other disciplines
do not have the heavy burden of
metaphysics that psychology labors under;
they take for granted that all events are
equally physical and confrontable,
whatever may be the problems of
observability. Psychology needs to be
explicit about this, and "covert" and
"overt" are useful in this regard.
The term "implicit" has been used in
interbehavioral psychology, but this term
suggests to me that what is implicit is
something not quite real or concrete, for
the event is only implied. This
terminology also offers a continuum
that of implicit to explicit, but I prefer
the more concrete sound of "covert" and
"overt."
If all of these terms are unacceptable,
the only other one I can think of is
"subtle." I have used this occasionally
and find it useful as a supplementary
term, but slightly awkward to work with in
some conttxts and inconvenient in not
being paired with another term that
indicates the other end of the continuum.
Perhaps that is an advantage, for one can
then refer to a single event without the
implication that some dichotomy actually
exists. But how does one express the
other end of the continuum? "Unsubtle" or
"Not at all subtle"?
References
Pronko, N. H. (1983-84). A vote toward
the obsolescence of the term "covert."
Tjie_In^ej^beJTaviorist, 12, 11.
Smith, N. W. (1983). An imperative for
revolutionary alternatives to recurring
problems in psychology. In N. W. Smith,
 P. T. Mount joy, & D. H. Ruben (Eds.),
Reassessment in psychology ; The
~ 7 21-50).
Washington, DC: University Press of
America.
ARTICLE
The Matter of Setting Factors: As I See It
M. H. Pronko
Wichita State University
In addition [to the interbehavioral
history] there is the seating factor
(st); it consists of the immediate
circumstances influencing which
particular sf-rf will occur. (Kantor,
1958, p. 14)
For my purposes, the most relevant and
significant term in Kantor's definition of
setting factors is the word "immediate."
The dictionary defines "immediate" as
"occurring without loss or interval of
time; of or pertaining to the here and
now."
Kantor and Smith (1975, pp. 46-47) offer
an expanded definition of interactional
setting that includes conditions affecting
(a) the stimulus object (e.g.,
simultaneous contrast), (b) the individual
(e.g., illness or fatigue), and (c) "the
environmental effect upon total
psychological interactions" (p. 47) where
the other two factors may be the same (e.g.,
a cemetery at midnight, a picnic, a
funeral, or a hospital). In none of my
search through Kantor's material do I find
any statements that would extend the
definition of setting factors beyond the
boundary of the particular event under
scrutiny.
Some interbehavioral psychologists,
though, have expanded Kantor's concept of
setting factors to include stimulus-
response interactions that influence
subsequent stimulus-response interactions
(e.g., Bijou & Baer, 1961, p. 21; Wahler &
Fox, 1981, p. 329)= As I see it, such an
extension of a clearly-defined term
muddies that clarity. Effects of one
stimulus-response interaction on another
are already covered by the principle,
"Present events are a function of
antecedent events." Restricting the term
setting factor to the specific behavioral
segment under investigation would assure
its unequivocal meaning.
References
Bijou, S. W., & Baer, D. M. (1961).
- - ^ - . ,
ejipj_ical__theor^. Englewood Cliffs, MJ;
Prentice-Hall.
Kantor, J. R. (1958). Interbehavigral
p_sy_cholog_2 . Chicago: Principia Press.
Kantor, J. R., & Smith, M. W. (1975).
_ _ _ _ ,
interbehay ioral survey . Chicago:
Principia Press.
Wahler, R. G., & Fox, J. J. (1981).
Setting events in applied behavior
analysis: Toward a conceptual and
methodological expansion. Journal_o_f
AppliedBehavior Analysis, T4T~327 - 338 .
ARTICLE
The Usefulness of Certain
Mentalistic Concepts
Donna M. Cone
Rhode Island Department of Mental Health
Interbehaviorists, as any good
behaviorists, eschew mentalism, and then
often spend time arguing with colleagues
over what constructs are allowable or not
in a science of behavior. It occurs to me
that in our overzealousness we may
overlook the value of certain "mental"
phenomena and related concepts. Two such
phenomena deserving of closer attention
are (a) stages of development and (b)
ghosts and devils.
Stages of Development
To an interbehaviorist, the concept of
developmental stages is lifted blatantly
from the science of biology and refers to
developmental changes based on the growth
and differentiation of nerves and other
body structures and the maturation of the
hormonal systems. Stages, then, may be
said to represent highly predictable
potentialities. In some cases, though,
the potentialities are related to
biological contributions to behavior,
while in other cases the potentialities
are related to sociocultural
contributions.
Bi2l^giaJ:_cpjntribu_tions. In many
animals, particularly birds and fishes,
8
biological events (e.g., swollen and
colorful appendages) are robust predictors
of subsequent complex interbehavior (e.g.,
mating). Only rarely does the environment
come crashing through to modify that
sequence. Given a "usual" ecological
surrounding, stages of development for
such organisms may be viewed as an index
of the strong contribution biological
events can make to psychological events.
_ _ _ In
primates, however, the supremacy of
biological events is compromised, and
stages of development are less well-
defined and more plastic. In fact, where
humans are concerned, the more potent
contributors to psychological events are
sociocultural, as opposed to biological.
For example, the term "male menopause"
is meant to be analogous to the
developmental stage in human females when
menstruation ceases. The data showing a
compelling biological basis for the
interbehaviors indicating "male
menopause," however, are meager. It seems
more likely that sociocultural factors,
such as the number of years within a
career or marriage, and the current
emphasis on youth, beauty, and health as
desirable characteristics, contribute more
to "male menopause" than do any
physiological changes. In this case,
stages of development predict powerful
sociocultural not biological -- factors
that operate to produce highly predictable
interbehaviors.
THE INTERBEHAVIORIST
Edward K. Morris, Editor
Department of Human Development
212B Haworth Hall
University of Kansas
Lawrence, Kansas 66045
Ghosts and Devils
William James and others have spent many
hours wrestling with the question of
whether or not ghosts exist. The
question, though, was a wrong one. By
definition, ghosts and other non-material
beings do not exist. However, the factors
that contribute to use of such "spooky"
terms are real and confrentable. In that
sense, then, complex social events such as
seances and exorcisms can be quite
instructive to the interbehaviorist
interested in understanding human
behavior.
What we as observers can see and measure
directly of the psychological events we
study make up the bulk of our data for a
science of human behavior. The beliefs of
our human subjects and the subtle effects
these beliefs have on their interbehavior
in various settings are more difficult to
study scientifically. What I am suggestin
is that instead of focusing on the lack of
objective reality for ghostly events
(i.e., the emphasis on disproving the
existence of certain phenomena), we should
examine the interbehaviors of the
participants for the correlated stimulus
factors and interrelated functions that
will thereby "explain" ghosts and devils.
The value of various rituals will be
revealed, and we will come to understand
better how the potentiality of human
behavior is affected by fictions which do
not actually exist in the physical world.
 A Quarterly Newsletter of Interbehavioral Psychology
ISSN 8755-612X

Published at the University of Kansas

Volume 13 1985 Number 2
EDITOR TABLE OF CONTENTS

Edward K. Morris Notes from the Field................... 10

University of Kansas
The Agora.............................. 1 1
ADVISORY BOARD An Interbehavioral Organization...... 11
Sidney W. Bijou Association for Behavior Analysis.... 11
University of Arizona
Donna M. Cone Subscriptions........................ 11
State of Rhode Island
Dennis J. Delprato Journal and Book Notes 12
Eastern Michigan University
Sandy Hobbs (Scotland) Article. 13
Paisley College of Technology
Paul T. Mountjoy Noel W. Smith: "A Double or a
Western Michigan University Single World?"..................... 13
Linda J. Parrott (Canada)
St. Mary's College
N. H. Pronko OJJOTATIONS
Wichita State University
Roger D. Ray It has become too easy to see that
Rollins College luckless men of the past lived by
Emilio Ribes (Mexico) mistaken, even absurd beliefs; so we may
Escuela Nacional de Estudios fail in a decent respect for them, and
Douglas H. Ruben forget that the historians of the
Western Michigan University future will point out that we too
Robert G. Mahler lived by myths.
University of Tennessee
-Herbert J. Muller
ASSISTANT EDITORS
When we first begin to believe
Jane B. Atwater anything, what we believe is not a
Lisa M. Johnson single proposition, it is a whole
Steven E. Larsen system of propositions.
Susan M. Schneider
James T. Todd -Ludwig Wittgenstein
10
THE INTERBEHAVIORIST
A Quarterly Newsletter of
Interbehavioral Psychology
8755-612X
Edward K. Morris, Editor
Department of Human Development
212B Haworth Hall
University of Kansas
Lawrence, Kansas 660*15, U.S.A.
913-864-3684/4840
The Inberbghavigrls_b is a quarterly
publication of news, information,
discussion, journal and book notes, book
reviews, comments, and brief articles
pertaining to interbehavioral psychology
-- a contextualistic, integrated-field
approach to the natural science of
behavior.
The newsletter publishes professional
communications that fall between informal
correspondence and colloquia, and formal
archival publication. As such, the
newsletter supplements contemporary
journals dedicated to basic and applied
research, to the history and philosophy of
the behavioral sciences, and to
professional issues in the field. The
The newsletter strongly encourages
submission of notes about current
professional activities of its
subscribers, news and observations about
interbehavioral psychology and related
perspectives, comments on journal articles
and books of interest, more extended book
reviews, and brief articles. All
submissions should be sent in triplicate
to the editor and should conform to the
style described in the publication manual
of the American Psychological Association
(3rd edition).
Subscr iption Information
Student Subscriptions (US)......... $ 4.00
Regular Subscriptions (US)......... 6.00
Foreign Subscriptions.............. 8.00
Institutional Subscriptions........ 12.00
Back Volumes 1-12. ................. 6.00
Back Volume Complete Sets.......... Write
MOTES FROM THE HELD
The Winter, 1985, issue of The
Psychological Record saw a flurry of
artlclesby 19W~newsletter subscribers.
Alphabetically, the authors and their
articles were: STEPHEN T. HIGGINS and
EDWARD K. MORRIS, "A Comment on
Contemporary Definitions of Reinforcement
as a Behavioral Process"; JAY MOORE,
"Choice and the Conditioned Reinforcing
Strength of Informative Stimuli"; PAUL T.
MOUNTJOY and DOUGLAS H. RUBEN, "Historical
Note: On Validity Measurement of
Hannibal's Crossing the Alps"; RICHARD
PISACRETA and Kevin Witt, "Movement as the
Discriminative Stimulus in Several
Conditional Discriminations"; and WILLIAM
STEPHENSOM, "Perspectives in Psychology:
Integration in Clinical Psychology."
As most readers know, the annual meeting
of the Association for Behavior Analysis
(ABA) has been receptive to interbehavioral
psychologists through the years, and this
year's convention in Columbus (May 24-27)
is no exception: 46 of this newsletter's
1984 subscribers are listed in the program
AMADO, BAER, BICKEL, BIJOU, BRADY,
BRYSON-BROCKMAN, BURGIO, BUSKIST,
DAURELLE, DELPRATO, EPSTEIN, FOX, GARDNER,
GLENN, GOLA, HANSOR, HAWKINS, HEMINGWAY,
HIGGINS, HINELINE, HOLMES, ISREAL, IVANIC,
IVERSEN, JOHNSON, KIRBY, LARSEN,
KOHLENBERG, LEFRANCOIS, MOORE, MORRIS,
MOUNTJOY, MULICK, PANIAGUA, PARROTT,
POWELL, RAY, ROSALES-RUIZ, RUBEN,
STEVENSON, TODD, ULMAN, WEBER, WHITLEY,
WRUBLE, and WYATT. We will list those
papers that are particularly
interbehavioral in the summer issue of the
newsletter. See THE AGORA for further
interbehavioral news at ABA.

THE AGORA
We apologize for the delay in sending
out the Winter issue, but we had just
switched over to another word processing
system. The new system -- the Editor and
his Personal Computer will be more
flexible and efficient, evidence for which
is the mailing of the Spring issue more
closely on time. The publication cycle in
the future will be January 1 (Winter),
April 1 (Spring) , July 1 (Summer), and
October 1 (Fall).
In the present issue, we highlight news
of a possible interbehavioral
organization, interbehavioral activity at
the upcoming meeting of the Association
for Behavior Analysis, Journal and Book
Notes, and an article by Noel W. Smith, "A
Double or a Single World?"
If we could ask one thing of the
subsribers it would be that you submit
journal and book notes. Many readers have
commented on the value of these notes; in
addition we would like to have a more
diverse authorship than to date. Also,
whenever, you have news for "Notes from the
Field," please send that information on to
us. Brief articles and book reviews are
always welcome. Now to the news.
An Interbehavioral Organization
As noted in the last issue of the
newsletter, Dennis Delprato will chair a
meeting for interested subscribers of the
newsletter, and others with
interbehavioral views, in Columbus, Ohio,
following the Association for Behavior
Analysis convention. The meeting is
scheduled for Monday, May 27, at 4:00 in
the Champagne Room of the Hyatt Regency.
This meeting is being held to discuss
possible interest in an interbehavioral
organization, and the form and function
such an organization might take. The
nature of any eventual organization has
implications for a number of important
matters, ranging from publications
(newsletters, journals, and books), to
various financial considerations, and to
an annual meeting. Me urge all interested
readers to attend.
In addition to the list of subscribers
presenting papers at the ABA convention,
we should also mention several other items
related to the upcoming meeting.
First, Linda Parrott and Rick Amado will
11
co-chair the Interbehavioral Psychology
Special Interest Group (SIG) meeting, to
be held on Sunday at 1:00. The meeting
is an important one -- SIG officers will
be elected and plans made for future ABA
programs and activities.
Second, the Interbehavioral SIG will
join the other ABA SIG's for poster
displays beginning with the ABA Social
Hour on Friday evening, May 24, from 7:00-
9:00. Please drop by.
Third, Linda Parrott will be conducting
an ABA seminar entitled "Introduction to
Interbehaviorism and Interbehavioral
Psychology." The description of the
course is as follows:
The object of this seminar is to provide
participants with an introduction to the
Philosophy of Interbehaviorism and
Interbehavioral Psychology.
Philosophical topics will include the
nature of philosophy, specificity logic,
and the role of philosophy in scientific
system building. Psychological topics
will include the system of
Interbehavioral Psychology and the
analysis of complex human behaviors,
such as perceptual activity, imagining,
linguistic activity, and remembering,
from an interbehavioral perspective.
Participants will have opportunities to
identify the assumptions underlying
common descriptions of psychological
events with the aim of assessing their
compatibility with the postulates of
Interbehaviorism, and will practice
analyzing psychological events from an
interbehavioral perspective.
Recommended Education/Experience:
Enrolled In graduate school or post-
graduate. Level: Introductory. Seminar
fee: $20; materials fee: $2.
For information on enrollment in this
seminar, or about registration for the
convention in general, contact the Society
for the Advancement of Behavior Analysis,
Department of Psychology, Western Michigan
University, Kalamazoo, MI 49008 (616-383-
0452, 9:00am-3:00pm, EST).
Subscriptions
We are always interested in new (and
renewed) subscribers. Please promote
subscriptions as best you can, especially
those from institutions. Subscription
information Is listed inside the front
cover of the newsletter.
Although we have acquired 21 new
subscribers to this volume of the
12
newsletter, we have acquired but one since
the last issue -- Rocio Hernandez Pozo.
Potentially more troublesome is that
subscribers have not renewed. Some of
these individuals were holdovers from
Volume 11 whose subscription status was
never settled, but some were new
subscribers last year. If you know of
someone who would be an interested reader
but who is not a subscriber, please urge
them to consider entering a subscription.
As for more active measures, we will soon
have available new subscription forms for
subscribers to post, distribute, and send
out with reprint requests. More about
this in the next issue.
BOOK AND JOURNAL NOTES
Goldfield, E. C. (1983). The ecological
approach to perceiving as a foundation for
understanding and development of knowing
in infancy. Developmental Review, 3
371-404.
Horowitz, F. D. (1983). A behavioral
alternative to an ecological approach to
understanding the development of knowing
in infancy' A commentary.
Dgvej.opjTigntal__Reyi.ew,. 3, 405-409.
Goldfield, E. C., & Shaw, R. (1984).
Affordances and infant learning: A reply
to Horowitz. Developmental Review, 4,
378-386.
An interesting exchange has recently
taken place between "ecological" and
"behavioral" views on infant knowing. The
exchange makes clear the current attempts
of both the ecological (Goldfield) and
behavioral psychology (Horowitz) to adopt a
truly contextualistic metatheory. In both
cases, these moves are in the right
direction, but both miss the mark, and
hence both miss what is good in the other,
at least in part. Goldfield!s ecological
perspective is offered as an alternative
to behavioral and cognitive
(representational) views, yet cannot seem
to shake the mentalism of information-
processing accounts in its analysis of
"affordances" and related ecological
constraints. Horowitz's behavioral
perspective properly analyzes knowing as
behavior, yet restricts the analysis of
constraints to biological limitations on
conditioning.
This brief summary does injustice to the
arguments actually presented by Goldfield
and by Horowitz. The interested reader is
urged to consult the primary sources.
(Edward K. Morris, University of Kansas)
Wooley, S. C., Blackwell, B, & Winget, C.
(1978). A learning theory model of
chronic illness behavior; Theory,
treatment, and research. Psjrchosomatic
Medicine, 40, 379-401.
Blackwell, B. (1981). Biofeedback in a
comprehensive behavioral medicine
program . Bjf^edback_ajid_Sej.f-
In 1978, Wooley et al. published a
pioneering paper describing their work at
the Psychosomatic Unit of the Cincinnati
General Hospital. Their approach was
innovative because of the "learning
theory" framework within which they
operated.
Blackwell (1981) has since provided a
brief account of the evolution of the
Psychosomatic Unit. First, Blackwell
notes the demise of the psychoanalytic
orientation of the Unit that once was
"supported by one of the strongest
psychoanalytic facilities in the United
States." Psychoanalysis was replaced
because it failed -- "benefits seldom
persisted in the face of real-life
situations outside the hospital."
Clearly, the events at the Psychosomatic
Unit are an ominous warning for those who
might still hold to psychoanalysis as the
wave of the future.
Second, Blackwell 's account suggests a
humble hypothesis for those interested in
an evolutional approach, especially as it
relates to the delivery of behavioral
services. The hypothesis is that J. R.
Kantor's efforts participated, in part, in
the evolution of modern behavioral
medicine. The basis of this hypothesis is
Blackwell 's clear mention of the role of
Dr. Fred Kanfer in the change that went on
at the Psychosomatic Unit. In Blackwell 's
words:
I was eager to expand in this new
direction [a behavioral "learning theory
model"] and fortunate to find one of the
country's leading cognitive
psychologists in Cincinnati, Dr. Fred
Kanfer, who was willing to consult with
the unit and help us retrain our
psychoanalytically oriented nursing

staff, (p. 454)
Kanfer has elsewhere acknowledged the
influence of Kantor's work on his
innovative contributions to clinical
behavior therapy. It is worthwhile to
note that despite Kanfer!s being labeled a
cognitive psychologist in the passage
above, he is not a traditional "cognitive"
psychologist or an advocate of "cognitive
behaviorism." (Dennis J. Delprato,
Eastern Michigan University).
Zuriff, G. E. (1985). Beteviorismj__A
conceptual reconstruction. Mew York:
Columbia University Press.
Zuriff's recent book serves up a feast
of scholarship, erudition, and some
scientific behaviorism. All the proper
entrees are available, and most readers
will find a little something suitable to
their palates.
Interbehavioral psychology, though, was
served up as a side-dish, at best, and the
treatment was unappetizing. Although
Zuriff offers references to 15 of
Professor Kantor's papers (no books)
throughout the text, Professor Kantor
received just a single one-page listing in
the index, and interbehavioral psychology
received but a single three-page listing.
Both were indexed to a brief section
ostensibly devoted to interbehavioral
psychology (pp. 108-111), but which
actually merely focused on the argument
that "the environment is...not a static
independent force outside behavior" (p.
108).
Two aspects of this section were
particularly odd tasting. First, Zuriff
seems to regard "interaction" as no more
than mechanical give-and-take, which is
not at all the meaning of the
interbehavioral perspective on strong
reciprocal interaction within a
contextualistic framework.
Second, Professor Kantor's views are
said to be similar to those of Bandura's
social learning theory and of Skinner's
operant theory. Zuriff's insight into the
(implicit) interactionistn of operant
theory is quite nice, but to equate
Bandura's mind-body interactionism with
interbehaviorism is to misconstrue the
natural science approach to
interactionism. This misconstrual is
further displayed in the mix of citations
13
Zuriff provides in a footnote to this
section:
The classic formulation of this
argument is by Dewey (1896), and
it recurs in various versions in
Bode (1914, 1917, 1922), Tawney
(1915), Davies (1926), Bentley
(1941), Miller, Galanter, and
Pribram (1960, p. 30), Bowers
(1973), Bandura (1977a, ch. 1;
1978), and Bijou (1979). (p. 297)
Interbehavioral psychology did not
receive its just desserts. (Edward K.
Morris, University of Kansas)
We strongly encourage readers to submit
brief journal and book notes for this
section of the newsletter. When you do
submit material, please include the full
address of the author(s), for we have begun
the practice of sending out copies of the
newsletter.
ARTICLE
A Double or a Single World?
Noel W. Smith
SUNY-Plattsburgh
It is a widespread view in traditional
circles of western thought that the world
of reality is known only by transformation
through some inscrutable mind or
consciousness. This view is expressed by
the British empiricist assertion that we
receive sense data from the world and must
then interpret it in the mind. The German
philosopher Immanuel Kant went further,
and held that the world is forever
unknowable: We know only the mental
phenomena that result from input from the
world. The two German physiologists,
Johannes Muller and Herman Helmholtz, gave
this position a physiological form by
declaring that we respond only to our
nerve endings as they interpret the world.
That is, we know only the world of our
nervous system.
This physiologized Kantian view is
prevalent in psychology today. Writing in
the Amer].can Psycho log isit, Attneave (1974)
stated that it is naive to assume that we
experience the world, for all we actually
14
experience is what comes through our
senses and gets transformed by it. This
same viewpoint is maintained in the now
highly fashionable cognitive and
information processing models in
psychology. According to these models,
the organism perceives sense data on the
basis of computer mechanisms and
constructs an internal representation of
the world. Sampson (1981), also writing
in the American Psychologist, tells us
that there is "disparity between what is
'out there1 and its internal
representation," for "behavior is a
function of the subjective world as
transformed and represented internally"
(p. 730).
This view may be called the doctrine of
the double world. It assumes that there
are two worlds one that is independent
of the organism and another that is
created inside the organism. This
doctrine is not based on any observation
of the two worlds, but on the theological
heritage we have received from the Church
Fathers, such as Tertullian, Origin, and
Gregory, who verbally constructed the
transcendental soul. Through the further
word-magic of Muller and Helmholtz, and
others who followed, the soul became the
brain, which gave this theological
construct a pseudo-legitimacy in the realm
of science. This homunculean brain is
said to interpret the world; to excrete
colors, intelligence, and thoughts; and to
direct our every activity.
There is, however, an alternative to
this double world doctrine of theology and
pseudo-science. The alternative existed
prior to the invention of the Church
Fathers, and is well expressed in
Aristotle. In his analysis of perception,
Aristotle held that seeing does not occur
i_n the organism, but involves the joint
activity of two potentials. The eye has
the potential to see, and the flower has
the potential to be seen. The
actualization of the two potentials
together is the seeing event or act of
seeing. Thus, for Aristotle, seeing is an
interaction or interrelationship it is
not a transformation. A transformation or
representation inside the organism would
require a seer (sic) for that
representation, and so on in an infinite
regression.
In recent times, some phenomenologists
have taken a position similar to that of
Aristotle. For example, Giorgi (1975)
argues that the sleekness of an airplane
is not in the plane or in the observer,
but is a relationship between the two.
Kvale and Grenness (1967) argue that "the
necessity of an 'inner man1 to guide
behavior falls away when behavior is
conceived as man's meaningful relatedness
to the world. Behavior is the relation
between man and the world, neither can be
defined independent of the other" (p.
137). Skinner (1963), too, opposes the
double world doctrine. He calls it the
"copy theory" and states, "At some point
the organism must do more than create
duplicates. It must see, hear, smell, and
so on, and the seeing, hearing and
smelling must be forms of actions rather
than reproductions" (p. 954).
A well developed systematic approach
within psychology that also rejects the
theologically derived double world and
that insists on beginning with observable
events is J. R. Kantor's interbehavioral
psychology, which began about 1920.
Interbehavioral psychology starts with an
organism and an object in interaction.
This interaction is in continuity with
previous interactions, that is, the
history of experiences, and occurs in a
setting or contest. Objects have meanings
developed from, and constituted by, those
previous interactions. The psychological
event is not localized in the brain, or in
the heart, or in the endocrine system, or
even in the entire organism. Neither is
it in the object, or in its meaning, or in
the setting, or in the past history of
.interactions. The psychological event is
constituted by the entire field of events,
and that field cannot be reduced to any
one element. The psychological event is
the way in which an organism evolves
historical relationships with its
surroundings. It cannot be reduced to
physics, biology, culture, or any other
factors in the field. It has its own
principles of operation that are different
from any of the components.
If one wants to speak of mind and
consciousness, they are to be defined, not
in terms of invisible entities or internal
agents, but rather concretely in terms of
this interbehavioral field of
relationships or, more specifically, as
cognitive consummatory reaction systems
that are not closely tied to precurrent
reaction systems as are habits (see
Kantor, 1924, pp. 444-445). Such terms as
mind and consciousness with their unsavory

load of historical meanings are, however,
best discarded. Just as a hypothetical
mind or homunculean brain becomes
superfluous when a field of relationships
is identified, so too is a second world
.contained in them superfluous. The
.organism and its functional inseparability
from its surrounding objects is the only
world that has any concrete referent. The
field system does not need, and has no
room for, a second world, the one of
verbal construction.
But are not thinking, believing,
feeling, etc. a different world, a mental
world? Such an assumption is unnecessary.
Interbehavioral psychology deals with all
human activities as concrete interactions
in a field. For example, there is no
difference in principle between reading
aloud and reading silently. Likewise,
there is no difference in principle in
doing arithmetic aloud or doing it
silently, despite the fact that we refer
to the latter as "mental arithmetic." It
is curious that we refer to silent
reading, but to mental arithmetic.
Orientals who learn to do .arithmetic on an
abacus involving patterns of finger
movements use the same finger movements
when doing arithmetic without the abacus.
Is this mental arithmetic? Finger
arithmetic? It is clear that various
parts of the body such as lips, tongue,
and fingers can be functional components
in reading or arithmetic; their degree of
activation is the degree of overtness or
covertness of the activity. There is no
evidence for such a dichotomy as mental
and physical.
But is not an image mental? Is it not
devoid of physical properties? As Sartre,
the French radical phenomenologist, has
indicated, an image is not a thing, but an
act. It is a certain way of relating. To
interbehavioral psychology, similarly,
there is no image, but rather an act of
imaging. It is subtle or covert activity
of the organism in interaction with a
substitute stimulus (Kantor, 1929). If I
ask you to imagine eating cherry pie, you
can to some extent taste the pie. You are
interacting not directly with cherry pie,
but with my suggestion about substitutes
for it. On the organism side of the
interaction, there may be some covert
activity such as taste bud responses and
increased salivation. The interaction
also involves your past history with
cherry pie and other events in the field.
15
There is no inner man or inner woman
(homunculean brain) who tastes the pie and
interprets it for you, and who constitutes
a separate world or separate reality from
the "real world" of you in the act of
actually eating the cherry pie. There is
just the one-and-the-same-you-and-your-
actions, however subtle, complex, and rich
they may be.
The claim for a double world has often
rested on individual differences and on
illusions. If we do not all see, hear,
taste, and smell the same thing, does this
not indicate the unknowability of the
"real" world? On the contrary, it
indicates only that interactions differ
from person to person, and even change
with the same individual as successive
contacts are made with objects.
Individuality is true for other
characteristics of the world as well.
Snowflakes, ocean waves, oak trees, and
other things come in infinite varieties,
and so do their interactions with still
other objects. All of nature consists of
constantly changing events and
relationships, and the sciences must deal
with these changes whether they occur in
stars, physiological processes, or human
behavior.
But if the perceiving involves knowing,
and it keeps changing for a given
individual, and is different for different
individuals, then how can we ever know
with certainty? Probably there is much
that we can never know. But as we
continue to engage in such interactions as
perceiving, thinking, judging, and
reasoning, we improve our knowledge. We
make errors and correct them. We also
develop instrumentation and refined
methods of observation as, for example,
interjudgmental reliability. The
contention here is that the world is quite
knowable, even if imperfectly. Once
again, we can fall back on Aristotle: The
joint activity of a knowing organism and a
knowable world is the actualization of
knowing.
Is the world illusory and unknowable?
If so, there would be no point to science.
It would be a mere compounding of
illusions. With our eyes, we perceive a
tree. With a microscope, we perceive its
cellular structure. Neither is illusory.
From my position, I may perceive a tree as
pointed at the top, and from your position
you may perceive It as rounded. Again,
neither is illusory merely incomplete.
The rattlesnake perceives its victim
because of its sensitivity to infrared
radiation produced by the warm-blooded
rodent. My world is not distorted or
erroneous or illusory because I am
insensitive to infrared radiation as a
medium of contact; it is merely
incomplete. And illusions do exist.
Psychologists are fond of experimenting
with them. But illusions are not
misperceptions so much as perceptions
under unusual or misleading conditions.
The very fact that we can recognize
illusions as such, and take the necessary
steps to differentiate them from what is
actual, indicates that we are not forever
the dupes.of illusion.
Individual differences and illusions are
all part of the same single world. They
provide no support for the contention of a
double world. Me may never fully know the
reality of anything, but we can be
reasonably sure that we know some aspects
of it, for it is the double world that is
an illusion.
Footnote
This paper was presented at Local
Conversations in the Disciplines, State
University of New York, Plattsburgh, April
24s 1982. References have been added
here, along with slight editing, to
accommodate them. A few parts of the
paper were taken from a subsequent chapter
by Smith (1983).
THE INTERBEHAVIOR1ST
Edward K. Morris, Editor
Department of Human Development
University of Kansas
Lawrence, KS 66045
References
Attneave, F. (1974). How do you know?
American Psycholqgist, 29, 493-511.
GiorgT7~A~I (19751". "Convergences and
divergences between phenomenological
psychology and behaviorism: A beginning
dialogue. Behaviorism, 3, 200-212.
Kan tor, J. R. rT929T7~Philosophical
implications of organismic psychology.
In T. V. Smith & W. K. Wright (Eds.),
Essays in philosophy . Chicago: Open
Court.
Kantor, J. R. (1924). Principles of
psychology , Vol. 1. Bloomington, IN:
Principia Press.
Kvale, S., 4 Grenness, C. E. (1967).
Skinner and Sartre: Towards a radical
phenomenology of behavior? Re_view_of
Existential
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . Psychology and Psychiatry,
Sampson, E. E. (1981). Cognitive
psychology as ideology. American
Psychologist, 36, 730-743.
Skinner, B. F. (1963). Behaviorism at
fifty. Science, 140, 951-958.
Smith, N. WT TT983TT~ Sensing is
perceiving: An alternative to the
doctrine of the double world. In N. W.
Smith, P. T. Mountjoy, & D. H. Ruben
( Eds . ) , Reassessment in~psychology;
~ The
SfFT Washing ton," DC : UnTver s i ty Press
of America.
 RBEHAVIOI
Tf T

A Quarterly Newsletter of Interbehavioral Psychology

ISSN 8755-612X

Published at the University of Kansas

oluate 13 1985 lumber 3
EDITOR
Edward K. Morris Notes from the Field................... 18
University of Kansas
The Agora. 19
ADVISORY BOARD An Interbehavioral Organization...... 19
Association for Behavior Analysis.... 20
Sidney W. Bijou Kantor Memorials..................... 20
University of Arizona Principia Press...................... 20
Donna M. Cone The Mahan Book....................... 21
State of Rhode Island Subscriptions........................ 21
Dennis J. Delprato
Eastern Michigan University Book and Journal Notes................. 21
Sandy Hobbs (Scotland)
Paisley College of Technology Comments 24
Paul T. Mountjoy
Western Michigan University Rollo Handys "Interaction or
Linda J. Parrott (Canada) Transaction?" 24
St. Mary's College
M. H. Pronko t^' N. H. Pronko: "Overt-Covert:
Wichita State University Encore" 25
Roger D. Ray
Rollins College Article. 25
Emilio Ribes (Mexico)
Escuela Naclonal de Estudios J. Hilt: "The Information
Douglas H. Ruben Processing Metaphor in Cognitive
Western Michigan University Psychology
Examined"............... 25
Robert G. Wahler
University of Tennessee
QUOTATION

ASSISTANT EDITORS The organism cannot exist without its

supporting environment. Hences a
Jane B. Atwater scientific definition of the organism
Lisa M. Johnson should also include the environment
Steven E. Larsen which influences it.
Susan M. Schneider
James T. Todd - I. M. Sechenov (1861)
18
THE IMTERBEEAIORIST
A Quarterly newsletter of
Interbehavloral Psychology
8755-612X
Edward K. Morris, Editor
Department of Human Development
212B Haworth Hall
University of Kansas
Lawrence, Kansas 66045, U.S.A.
913-864-3684/4840
The__jntgrbehalori3t is a quarterly
publication of news, information,
discussion, journal and book notes, book
reviews, comments, and brief articles
pertaining to Interbehavloral psychology
a contextualistic, iritegrated-fleld
approach to the natural science of
behavior.
The newsletter publishes professional
communications that fall between informal
correspondence and colloquia, and formal
archival publication. As such, the
newsletter supplements contemporary
journals dedicated to basic and applied
research, to the history and philosophy of
the behavioral sciences, and to
professional issues in the field. The
newsletter strongly encourages
submission of notes about current
professional activities of its
subscribers, news and observations about
interbehavioral psychology and related
perspectives, comments on journal articles
and books of interest, more extended book
reviews, and brief articles. All
submissions should be sent in triplicate
to the editor and should conform to the
style described in the Publication Manual
of the American Psychological Association
(3rd edition).
Student Subscriptions (US)......... $ 4.00
Regular Subscriptions (US)......... 6.00
Foreign Subscriptions.............. 8.00
Institutional Subscriptions .... 12.00
Back Volumes 1-12. 6,00
Back Volume Complete Sets... Please Write
Several subscribers contributed comments
to the recent special Issue of Behavioral
a^d_BrjJji_Sc_iOTces, which published six
canonical papers of B. F. Skinner. Among
those offering comments were PHILIP N.
HINELINE and JAY MOORE on "The Operational
Analysis of Psychological Terms" and
WILLIAM S. VERPLANCK on "An Operant
Analysis of Problem Solving."
The Spring, 1985 (Vol. 8, Mo. 1) issue
of T^e_Be2ia^Ior_Araly_s_t contained articles
by subscribers SIGRID S. GLENN, "Some
Reciprocal Roles between Behavior Analysis
and Institutional Economics in Post-
Darwinian Science"; JAY MOORE, "Some
Historical and Conceptual Relations among
Logical Positivism, Operationlsm, and
Behaviorism"; and EDWARD K. MORRIS,
"Public Information, Dissemination, and
Behavior Analysis."
SIDNEY W. BIJOU gave a five-session
seminar on behaviorism and
Interbehaviorism at the Department of
Psychology, University of Granada, Spain,
Hay 13-16. He also delivered an address
entitled, "A Realistic View of Mental
Retardation: Implications for Education
and Training," in the first Lecture Series
Program on Behavior Analysis and
Intervention in Developmental Retardation.
JESUS GIL ROSALES-MIETO and Carmen
Luciano of the Department of Psychology,
University of Granada, Spain, will be
visiting scholars at the Cambridge Center
for Behavioral Studies in the Fall, 1985.

THE_AGORA
As you will undoubtedly notice, we have
enclosed a number of advertising-flyer-
and-subseription-forms for the newsletter
with your current Issue. A pad of these
forms was recently sent to the members of
the newsletter's advisory board for
posting. If anyone else would care for a
pad, please let us know,
, As for the individual forms, we ask that
you pass them around among your
colleagues and institutional libraries.
More important, though, we ask that you
include one with each interbehavioral
publication reprint you send out. Those
who request your interbehavioral papers
are a likely source of new and interested
subscribers. When your supply of these
forms is depleted, please keep some
photocopied extras on hand for mailing.
If these are too expensive for you to
reproduce, however, we will be pleased to
send you an additional supply. By the
way, you will probably notice that the
form has an eye-catching typo; this will
be corrected in the next printing. (No
doubt Kansas has many truths, but then who
can know the truth of that?)
The newsletter seems to have lost
contact with the activities of the Cherion
Society the International Society for
the History of the Behavioral Sciences.
If any readers would like to serve as a
liaison to that group, and keep us
informed of their activities, the general
readership would be appreciative.
Author query: Susan M. Schneider is
searching for the origins of the term
"radical behaviorism." Skinner's first
use of it was apparently in his 1945 paper
on the operational analysis of
psychological terms, but he has since said
that the phrase was "in the air" before
then. Indeed, in The Behavior of
Organisms, Skinner (193~5T citecTa 1933
Psychological Review paper in which Kantor
used the phrase in referring to Warren
(1921). Warren, in another paper
published in 1921, used the phrase to
describe Watsonian behaviorism. If anyone
has further leads as to the origins of the
phrase, especially in regard to Skinnerian
behaviorism, Susan would appreciate
hearing from you. Please write to her,
c/o the Department of Human Development,
University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS 660%.
19
The quotation on the front cover of this
issue was sent to us by Warren K. Bickel
(Frances Scott Key Medical Center,
Baltimore). We would be pleased to accept
other such submissions.
Just before we went to press, Shery
Chamberlain, the assistant business
manager of the Society for the Advancement
of Behavior Analysis (SABA) and Managing
Editor of ^g_JfhavJ.or_Analy_sts sent us a
cassette tape recording and transcript of
Professor Kantor's question-and-answer
conversation hour at the 1977 convention
of the Association for Behavior Analysis.
We are delighted by this kind gesture
from SABA? and with Shery's thoughtfulness
in preparing the transcript and sending
the materials on to us. We will reprint
the transcript (along with Paul Mountjoy's
introduction) in the Fall issue of the
newsletter.
An Interbehavioral Organization
A meeting was held in Columbus, Ohio, on
May 27 to discuss the possible development
of an independent interbehavioral
organization and other ways to assure the
continued publication of interbehavioral
materials. In attendance were Dennis
Delprato, Robert Epstein, Gail Gardner,
William Gardner, Craig Knapp, Lisa
Johnson, Parker Lichtenstein, Jay Moore,
Ed Morris, Linda Parrott, Roger Ray,
Charles Rice, and Jon Williams.
As to the first item of business an
interbehavioral organization the
consensus of the group was that an
interbehavioral organization may be
premature at this time, given the easy
access interbehavioral psychologists have
had to the annual meetings of the
Association for Behavior Analysis (ABA).
An annual gathering of interested
interbehavioral psychologists, though, was
seen as having great value for those
pursuing interbehavioral research; hence,
annual brain-storming meetings may be an
important opportunity worth creating.
Roger Ray will chair a group looking into
the possibility of gathering together
interbehavioral psychologists for such
meetings. Future plans will be announced
in the newsletter.
The second item of business concerned
the interbehavioral publications The
Principia Press, The Psychological tecord,
and Tjve_Interbghay;iorj.st. Robert Epstein,
Director of the Cambridge Center for
20
Behavioral Studies, expressed an interest
In the Center's publishing the newsletter,
with all editorial responsibilities
continuing to rest with the current
editor. The Society for the Advancement
of Behavior Analysis (SABA), the legal
overseer of ABA, also eipressed an
interest In assuring the continued
publication of all forms of
interbehavioral material. Although
flattered by this interest, the group
decided that no decision about either
offer was necessary at this time.
Moreover, some of the decisions were
actually outside the purview of the group.
For the moment, then, the Interbehavioral
publications will maintain their
independent status.
The Association for Behavior Analysis
Convention presentations. As mentioned
in the last issue of the newsletter, the
May 1985 ABA meeting Included numerous
presentations by our subscribers. Those
presentations we found to be particularly
interbehaviorial in orientation are listed
below. If we missed any, we will be
pleased to make corrections.
Bijou, S. W., Urabreit, J., Gheszi, P.
M., & Chao, C. (University of
Arizona), "Who Said What to Whom: 11
Identifying Language Interactions.
Bijou, S. W., & Umbreit, J. (University
of Arizona), "Application of
P3y_cholggical_ Linguistics to Research
on Mormal and Handicapped Children."
Fox,. J. J., Rogers-Warren, A., Daurelle,
L. A., Alpert, C. L., & Hancock, T. B.
(anderbllt University), "Analyzing
Complex Parent-Child Interactions?
Alternate Units of Analysis."
Gardner, W., & Eraser, M. E. A.
(Jacksonville State University),
"Referent-Oriented Interbehavioral
Approach to Language Analysis."
Iversen, I. H. (Southwest Foundation),
"Contiguity: A Fundamental Principle
in Limbo."
Parrott, L. J. (Saint Mary's
University), "An Interbehavioral
Perspective on Ethics and Values."
Ray, R. D. (Rollins College), "Social
and Individual Patterning of Multiple
Behaviors: The Concept of Coupling."
Ray, R. D. (Rollins College), "Of
Bahamian Children, American Whales,
and Soviet Scientists with Puppy Dog
Talesi A Decade of Empirical
Interbehavioral Systems Analysis
Revisited."
Wruble, M., Delprato, D. J., Whitney,
B., Holmes, P. A., & Gola, T. J.
(Eastern Michigan University),
"Response Pattern Analysis of
Schedules that Differentially
Reinforce Pauses in Behavior."
Special Interest Group. The
Interbehavioral Psychology Special
Interest Group (SIG) of ABA held its first
meeting to elect officers and plan for
future ABA activities. Fifteen people
attended the meeting: Sid Bijou, Jim Fox,
Pat Ghezzi, Tom Gola, William Gardner,
Peter Holmes, Craig Knapp, Jan LeFrancois,
Ed Morris, Linda Parrott, Ann Rogers-
Warren, Doug Ruben, Roger Ray, John
Umbreit, and Marc Wruble.
Linda Parrott was elected as the SIG
Chair; Rick Amado will assume the duties
of the secretary- treasurer; Jim Fox and
Ann Rogers-Warren were elected as ABA
Program Chairs; and Ed Morris volunteered
to serve as the newsletter editor, which
will mean that The__Inter behav lor 1st will
publish a column as appropriate on ABA
Interbehavioral Psychology SIG news.
Plans for next year include the
development of a conversation
hour/workshop period by Jim Fox for those
pursuing interbehavioral research, and the
organization of a symposium on family
interactions by Ed Morris, which Ann
Rogers-Warren will chair. In addition,
Roger Ray is planning a workshop on
general systems theory and methods. If
you are interested In contributing in any
of these areas, please contact the
respective organizers.
Kantor Memorials.
We want to thank those who have
contributed to the Kantor Memorial Fund of
the newsletter. The fund serves as the
basis for our long-term financial
stability and special publication and
publicity events. The current fund stands
at $768, reflecting the generous
contributions of Richard Amado, Don
Bloomquist, Dennis Delprato, William
Gardner, Helene Kantor, Louise Kent-Udolf,
Harry Mahan, Henry Pronko, and Doug Ruben.
_
For fa complete list of Professor
Kantor s books, and the prices thereof,
please write: Principia Press, 57^3 N.
Kimbark, Chicago, IL 60637.

The Mahan Book
As mentioned in previous issues of the
newsletter , Harry Mahan (Project Socrates)
has generously donated the remaining
copies of his text, Thji_In^ejgactional
to~u3 for
resale to finance the newsletter. The
book contains a full-page photoportrait
of Professor Kantort chapters on the
interbehavioral approach to major topics
in psychology, and a bibliography of
Professor Kantor 's publications through
1963. The book is available through us
for $5.00 (U.S.) or $7.50 (foreign)
(prepaid).
Subscriptions
Any efforts current subscribers can make
to promote new subscriptions, especially
from university, college, and
institutional libraries, would be greatly
appreciated. Subscription information is
listed inside the front cover of the
newsletter and on the enclosed flyers.
The new subscribers since the last
issue are listed below. For those
interested, a mailing list is available on
request .
New Subscribers
Marybeth Fraser (Jacksonville State
University)
Catling Residential Center, NC
Patrick Ghezzi (University of Arizona)
Marino Perez (Spain)
William Pierce (Clinical Diagnostic,
Golden, CO)
University of Arizona Library
Robert D. Zettle (Wichita State
University)
Gerald Zuriff (Wheaton College)
BOOMJID
Boakes, R. (1984). From Darwin Jbo
behaviorism; Psychology and the minds
gf_animaLs. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
As Boakes says in his preface, "My aim
in this book is to provide an account of
the study of animal behaviour and of
various ideas during the period from
around 1870 to 1930 as to what kind of
minds animals possess" (p. xiii). Boakes
achieves his aim in more detail and at
more length than in any current text. New
21
texts on the history of behaviorism,
though, to be cropping up. The
Boakes book contains a reference to an "in
press" book edited by C. Buxton, entitled
Points of fiew in' ~the
~ ~Modern
~ ' ' 'History
' ^ ~ ~of
~
addition, an advertisement has recently
appeared for a text by John M. O'Donnell,
The Origins "of Behaviorism; American
Press ) .
Getting back to Boakes, his perspective
is neither interbehavioral nor even
radical behavioral, but rather reflects
the eclecticism of the study of animal
behavior. He begins the book with Darwin
in a chapter on mental evolution, and ends
the book just before the ascendance of
radical behaviorism. In between, Boakes
devotes chapters to intelligence and
instinct; experimental psychology and
habits; reflex action and the nervous
system; conditioned reflexes; comparative
psychology and the beginning of
behaviorism; apes, problem-solving, and
purpose; and nature and nurture.
In general, the book is good, though it
does not have the vision of Boring's text.
Nonetheless, it is certainly to be
recommended. The pictures, alone,
are worth the proverbial thousands of
words. Of particularly refreshing note is
the greater role Boakes gives to the
contributions of women to the history of
behavioral psychology than is typical of
history texts. In particular, he notes
the contributions of Washburn, Kohts, and
Rayner, as well as those of the wives of
outstanding psychologists (e.g., Sara
Pavlov and Rosalie Rayner). The -lot of
the latter was not an easy one. Indeed,
Thorndike's comment to his fiancee is
perhaps too indicative of the tenor of
those times. Speaking of their impending
marriage, Thorndike remarked, "I can go
ahead and do something in the world now
and you will find looking after me and the
world of science lots more worthwhile than
anything else you could do" (p. 72).
Enough said.
The only mention of Professor Kantor by
Boakes was contained in the following
footnotes
M. Meyer, A. P. Weiss, E. A. Singer,
and J. R. Kantor are among the people
frequently classed as strict
behaviourists at this time. However,
since they made no direct contribution
to animal psychology and do not appear
22
to have Influenced Its developments they
are not discussed here. '(p. 258)
Boakes then gives a reference to W.
Harrell and R, Harrison's, The rise and
fall of behaviorism. Journal of General
1
938? 18, 3Fpj2"i7~~~~~~
For further commentary on the Boakes
book, see reviews by William Baum In The
BehaviorAnalyst, 1985, (in press) and
by Robert J. Richards in Science, 1985?
228, 862-863. (Edward K. Morris,
University of Kansas)
Boring, E. G. (1950). ^historyof
experimental psychology^2nd''liidTTT
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall,
Inc.
Although admittedly not a proper history
by Interbehavioral standards, Boring's
history of experimental psychology is a
classic. Moreover, it does provide some
interesting comments that may serve as a
basis for interpreting some of Professor
Kantor's approach to the subject matter.
First, Boring makes occasional comments
about national character. For instance,
he defines the phenomenology of German
psychology (pp. 18-21) as unadorned
description, which is propaedeutic to
science -- science in the experimental
sense. In addition, he speaks of
phenomenology as belonging "with the
descriptive, the classificatory, and the
inductive approaches; it contrasts with
the mathematical and deductive [English]
attacks. It represents, moreover, an
attitude that suited the painstaking and
methodical Germans" (p. 18). Boring goes
on about phenomenology: It was "the
careful collection of observational fact,
that was sound, keen-sighted as to detail,
conscientious and thorough, but not as a
rule brilliant, and seldom concerned with
large generalizations" (p. 19). Boring's
comments on brilliantness aside, some of
this seems to describe Professor Kantor's
work. Me must not forget that Professor
Kantor's behavior, as that of all others,
was the product of historical and cultural
context. An understanding of that context
can offer us an understanding of his
inter behavioral program.
Second, in a discussion of Descartes 's
dualism, Boring comments; "Much confusion
resulted from the fact that both soul
and mind are 1'ame in French and Seele In
German. It Is much easier in English to
keep psychology separate from theology"
(p. 162). Professor Kantor's German
heritage, then, perhaps made it easier for
him to see the relationship of theology to
mentalism, and not to be misled in viewing
mentalism as somehow scientific, while
theology Is not. Thus, whereas other
psychologists could blithely, and with
some relief, discard the non-science of
theology In favor of the science of the
mind, Professor Kantor saw no real change,
but rather only the continued evolution of
what remained an unscientific account.
The characteristics of the German and
English languages might also perhaps
explain why Professor Kantor's criticisms
of non-scientific psychology were often
couched as much in terms of theology and
the soul, while B. F. Skinner's criticisms
were predominantly about mentalism and the
mind. (Edward K. Morris, University of
Kansas)
Dannefer, D. (1984). Adult development
and social theory: A paradigmatic
reappraisal. American Sociological
Review, 4 9 , 1 0 0 - 1 1 6 . ~ '
Dannefer's abstract begins, and
interbehavloral psychologists would agree:
"The study of adult development is In need
of theoretical reformulation" (p. 100).
This paper is a step in an interbehavioral
direction from a sociological perspective.
Dannefer's emphasis on context is
refreshing; however, he is not a
behavior1st, and his alternative
"sociogenic" approach is couched in terms
such as "human intentional!ty." Still,
the article Is worth consideration.
Dannefer warns sociologists that the
interdisciplinary nature of the study of
development across the life-span has
resulted in the unwarranted acceptance of
certain implicit assumptions from
developmental theory. The "ontogenetic
fallacy," for example, largely consists of
downplaying the role of the environment,
including the social environment.
Dannefer criticizes several approaches for
using this paradigm, but reserves his
strongest attack for "ontogenetic stage
theories, [which] conceive of the
developmental process as uniform and
constant. Since the sequence is
invariant, the causal factor must be

invariant as well; the enormous range of
environmental variability is thus
logically required to be causally
unimportant" (p. 104).
Dannefer points out, with unintentional
irony, that developmental stage theories
are actually more restrictive of human
autonomy than theories that give the
environment a larger role. (Susan M.
Schneider, University of Kansas)
Duncan, R. , & Weston-Smith, M. (Eds.).
(1985). The encyclopaedia of medical
ignorance; Exploring the frontiers of
medical knowledge . Elms ford, NY;
Pergamon Press. Reviewed by James Le
Fanu in the
(May 12,
Le Fanu's book review is sprinkled with
the to-be-expected brain dogma, but also
with interesting insights, opinions, and
quotations. He argues, for instance, that
the effectiveness of early medicine was
not based on knowledge of basic
mechanisms , but rather that many major
breakthroughs have been due to "relatively
crude screening techniques for new
therapeutic compounds plus serendipity and
a little science." Future success,
though, he argues, will have to depend
increasingly on understanding basic
mechanisms .
Among the chapters singled out for
praise was one by Philip Cell (University
of Cambridge), entitled "Destiny and the
Genes: Genetic Pathology and the
Individual." Mr. Cell argues that
specific gene-disease linkages are the
great exception, not the rule. In place
of the search for simple, mechanical
causation, Cell argues for an
interbehaviorally-sounding perspective :
We are dealing not with a chain of
causation, but with a network, that is,
a system like a spider's web in which a
perterbation at any point of the web
changes the tension of every fiber right
back to its anchorage in the blackberry
bush... If the gap in knowledge of man
between the operations of the genotype
and the behaviour of the person is not
merely unbridged, but in principle
unbridgeable then our ignorance will
remain ineluctable.
Le Fanu concludes his review with a
timely quotation from the late Norman
23
Geschwind of the Harvard Medical School
about the current state of ignorance in
some areas:
There may be neglect of correct
existing fact and theories, either
through deliberate suppression or
through widespread acceptance of
incorrect data or erroneous criticisms.
Furthermore...there are cases in which
research is not carried out either
because of the erroneous belief that
there are no suitable investigative
methods or because well established
scientists and administrators are
unwilling to allocate resources because
of prejudice, timidity, or simple desire
to support their own fields at the
expense of newer less influential ones.
(Edward K. Morris, University of Kansas)
Hursh, S. R. (1984). Behavioral
economics.
Although psychology and economics are
both sciences of behavior, they have
historically had little influence on each
other. Psychology is a more broadly
defined science; thus its principles and
analyses might be viewed as subsuming
economics. In this regard, both Kantor
(1981, pp. 194-231) and Skinner (1953, pp.
384-401) have provided behavioral or
psychological analyses of economic events .
Clearly, economics could benefit from
taking a behavioral perspective, but the
potential benefits of economic
perspectives for psychology have only
recently been suggested.
One such economic perspective is
provided by Steven Hursh in "Behavioral
Economics." In this article, Hursh
describes a number of implications of
economic principles for research In the
experimental analysis of behavior, most of
which are quite compatible with an
interbehavioral perspective. Perhaps the
most important implication of research
Influenced by economic concepts Is Its
emphasis on contextual variables. For
example, in research on reinforcement
schedules, "closed economies," in which
subjects receive their total allotment of
food during experimental sessions, often
engender response rates quite different
from those found In the more frequently
studied "open economies," in which the
subjects' food allotment is constant and
independent of responding during
experimental sessions. Such findings
imply that much of our knowledge of
response rates under various schedules of
reinforcement may need to be qualified to
take into account the economic context of
"closed" and "open" systems .
Contextual effects are also observed in
Hursh's research on what he calls "demand
elasticity" and "inelasticity," that is,
on the relationship between response rate,
reinforcer availability, and response
requirements (i.e., price). "Inelastic"
and "elastic" demands are influenced by a
variety of factors, including the nature
of the reinforcer, the availability of
other reinforcers, the type of species
studied, and again the economic context of
closed and open systems.
Hursh's economic analysis leads to a
view of causation similar to that of
inter behavioral psychology. Hursh rejects
the perspective of unidirectional
causality of dependent and independent
variables. Instead, he advocates a view
of "dynamic behavioral adaptation whereby
both performance and obtained rate of
reinforcement are viewed as outcomes of
adjustment to environmental constraints"
(p. 415).
A potential disadvantage of an economic
analysis is that the terms used to
describe behavioral events are
metaphorical. Although metaphors and
analogies have some place in science, they
can also be misleading. Thus, caution
should be urged when applying economic
concepts to psychological events.
nevertheless, any disadvantage these
economic concepts accrue may well be
offset by their utility in suggesting new
areas of conceptual and experimental
analysis. (Steven E. Larsen, University
of Kansas)
References
Kantor, J. R. (1981). Interbehavioral
Chicago; Principia Press.
Skinner, B. F. (1953). Sc ience and human
behavior. Mew York: Macmillan.
Lundin, R. W. (1985). Theories and
systems of psychology T3^~ed7T7~~
Lexington, MA; D. C. Heath.
The third edition of Robert Lundin's
history and systems text is now available.
In it, he includes J. R. Kantor!s
interbehaviorism in a chapter on "later
behaviorism" that also includes Guthrie,
Hull, Skinner, and Bandura. Lundin
provides references to 10 of Kantor's
works, as well as to the work of
Lichtenstein and of Pronko. Mention is
also made of this newslstter, albeit
albeit under an earlier title.
The 10-page section (pp. 203-212) on
Kantor covers such topics as basic
considerations, psychological
interactions, learning, implicit
interactions, feeling, emotions,
remembering, biological participation, and
criticisms and contributions of
interbehaviorism.
Lundin*s history and systems book is one
of the few to present interbehavioral
psychology accurately and sensitively.
(Edward K. Morris, University of Kansas)
We encourage readers to submit brief
book and journal notes for this section of
the newsletter. Many readers have spoken
of their value. When you do submit
material, please include the address of
the original authors so that we may send
them a copy of the newsletter; we will
automatically send book comments and
reviews to the publishers.
COMMENT
Interaction or Transaction?
Rollo Handy
Behavioral Research Council
I was quite interested in the book note
on Zuriff in The_jnterbehayiorist, Vol.
13, No. 2, 1 gSsTpartTcularly~ TrTthe
statements "Zuriff seems to regard
'interaction' as no more than mechanical
give-and-take, which is not at all the
meaning of the interbehavioral perspective
on strong reciprocal interaction within a
contextualistic framework."
John Dewey and Arthur Bentley (Knowing
andthe Known, Boston; Beacon Press,
T9?9T arguedthat "interaction" probably
most often would be understood in the
"mechanical give-and-take" sense mentioned

in the book note, and they therefore
adopted the word "transaction" to refer to
mutually reciprocal connections occurring
in a specific field. If you have not read
their admittedly difficult discussion of
those matters, you might be interested in
doing so...In general, although there are
differences, the agreement between Dewey
and Bentley, and Kantor on such matters is
striking.
Edj.tor^s__Mote; We concur with Professor
Handy, and recommend as an introduction to
Dewey and Bentley!s analysis his article,
"The Dewey-Bentley Transactional
Procedures of Inquiry/' The Psychological
Record, 1973, 23, 305-317.
COMMENT
Overt-Covert; Encore
M. H. Pronko
Wichita State University
Smith's (1985) comment "'Covert'
Defended" certainly points to the need
for refining the meaning of terms adopted
from ordinary language for more precise
scientific usage (e.g., stimulus,
response, implicit, overt, and covert).
We share this problem with the physicists
and their use of such terms as particle,
force, attraction, and repulsion.
With respect to "overt" and "covert," I
reread relevant portions of Skinner's
(1974) About Behaviorism because of his
frequent use of those terms there, as well
as the terms "public" and "private."
Chapter 2, "The World Within the Skin,"
and Chapter 13, "What Is Inside the Skin,"
alone reveal Skinner's underlying
organism-centered postulate. On page 215,
his reliance on the physiologist to supply
an answer to the question of "how the
organism is changed when exposed to
contingencies of reinforcement" support my
contention that the overt-covert
distinction is derived from and is most
congenial with an organism-centered
approach.
One must agree heartily with Smith's
(1983, p. 28) definition of the
psychological field, which puts the
organism in its proper place in the entire
event. My question is: How can the terms
"overt" and "covert" be applied to an
25
integrated field event when they were
derived from, and are applicable to, the
isolated organism? As to Smith's proposal
of the term "subtle," it might serve if
applied to the field. Its obvious
antonyms are "gross" and "crude." Or,
perhaps all events are observable under
interbehavioral postulation, no such
distinction needs to be made. The
biologist does not set apart subtle neural
activity, osmosis, or secretion from
cardiac activity or the knee jerk. What
would be served by making such a
distinction in behavioral inquiry?
One final points Noel Smith and I may
have started something. We have a forum
now for testing and clarifying viewpoints
and specific formulations. Let others get
into the fray.
Pronko, N. H. (1983-1984). A vote toward
the obsolescence of the terra "covert."
The Interbehayiorist, _12('1), 11.
SkinnerT^TT; 09757. About
behaviorism. Mew York: A. A. Knopf.
Smith, N. W. (1983). An imperative for
revolutionary alternatives to recurring
problems in psychology. In N. W. Smith,
P. T. Mountjoy, & D. H. Ruben (Eds.),
Reassessment in psychology; The
jnterbetoyj^rajralternative' (pp. 21-50).
Washington, DC: University Press of
America.
Smith, M. W. (1985). "Covert" defended.
The Interbehaviorist, 1J, 6-7.
ARTICLE
The Information Processing Metaphor in
Cognitive Psychology Examined
Jeff Hilt
SUNY-Plattsburgh
Metaphor use and metaphorical
understanding in cognitive psychology
raise important questions that warrant
examination. Because cognitive psychology
is clearly the dominating paradigm in
psychology today, a discussion of its
premises that rest on metaphors bears
scrutiny. The cognitive framework,
itself, places little emphasis on
discussion of its theoretical assumptions
and does not critically examine the
conceptual practices imbedded in its
26
dubious metaphorical models, although it
is heavily involved in research that
relies on such models.
A metaphor may be defined as a word or
phrase literally denoting one kind of
thing or idea used in place of another to
suggest a likeness or analogy between
them. Cognitive psychology employs the
metaphor of the mind as an information
processing system or computer. For
metaphorical understanding to take place ,
some similarity or analogy must exist
between the things to which the terms
originally applied and the phenomena to
which the metaphor is extended. If
someone said that a cat was a garden hose,
little would be communicated because no
obvious similarity is immediately evident.
This makes the point that metaphors for
which metaphorical understanding is
lacking because no similarity exists might
more accurately be called myths. Thus, if
at most levels, the brain and computers
are not similar, or are only superficially
similar, then cognitive psychology must be
called mythology.
In a discussion of Max Black's
interactionist view of metaphor, Mary
Hesse (1980) states, "For a conjunction of
terms to be taken as the primary systems
and secondary systems to constitute
metaphor, it is necessary that there
should be patent falsehood in taking the
conjunction literally" (p. 113) FOP our
purposes, the primary system is the
mind/brain, and the secondary system is
the computer. Could cognitive psycholopy
be taking the metaphor literally? Hoffman
and Mead (1983) sound a warning: "In the
analysis of scientists' rhetoric, one must
not let abstractions or thematic
generalizations slip by as literal
foundational claims...(p. 513). By
aligning themselves with the
scientifically recognized field of
computer science, cognitive psychology may
be engaging in yet another misdirected
attempt to scientize psychology. The
history of science points out psychology's
fascination with mechanistic analogies and
the lack of understanding that results.
Indeed, in the present case, no evidence
exists to support the metaphor only
overwhelming popularity supports it.
Estes (1980) has already examined the
comparison of human memory and computer
memory, including capacity and the
retention of information. The capacity of
human memory, for instance, depends on
experience, while that of computers is
independent of experience. In human
memory, retention is graded, while in
computer memory, retention is all-or-none.
Estes concludes, "Human short term memory
is oriented toward events rather than
retention of units" (p. 65). The
distinction made between short-term and
long-term memory is based on observed
recall performance, rather than on any
observable structures of the brain. When
discussing human forgetting, Estes does
not make any distinction between human
short-term and long-term memory, but notes
that
In the human, the forgetting takes
the form of a progressive loss of
precision or completeness of
information about the original
experience; even after considerable
forgetting has occurred, the
individual may remember something
about the events or items making
up the original experience, (p. 6?)
It seems that a basis for an analogy
between computers and people exists at the
observable behavioral level and at the
cellular-bit level. This is assuming that
what computers can do is called behavior.
At some level, be it higher or lower, one
may always find something on which to
establish a comparison or to base an
analogy. Some psychologists, for example,
are fond of comparing the firing of
neurons to the two-state nature of a
computer bit. They feel justified in
using the computer analogy because the
neuron either fires or it does not, and a
bit is either off or on. It should then
follow that an understanding of snail
behavior could result from the comparison
of a snail and many interconnected
light bulbs. Kantor (1978) points out,
however, that "To categorize the neural
structures of the nervous systems as
wires, and synaptic junctions as
electrical connections, is to play games
with things and events by means of
metaphor" (p. 581).
This point is further elucidated by
Waltz (1984, p. 118), who implied that at
the behavioral level, the processes
underlying computer learning could not
provide an explanation of the processes
underlying human learning. Waltz goes on
to say, though, that the computer is
flexible enough to emulate the essential
functions of human thinking. Although
Waltz alludes to the fact that humans and

computers are totally different entities,
he reverts to using terms employed in
describing human behavior for describing
what computers do. This lay be where
confusion arises.
Blewitt (1983) provides criticism for
those who believe that at the behavioral
level a similarity exists:
That the computer analogy predicts
certain findings does not mean that
the processes are involved in
the prediction as in the original
event. Just because the computer can
engage in action which has a
topographical similarity to that of
human memorial behavior does not
mean that the controlling
relationships are the same in the
computer as in the human, (p. 393)
Later, Blewitt concludes that the
information processing analogy teaches
people about how computers work, but fails
to provide any insight into how people
remember.
Swartz (1958) asks rhetorical questions
concerning the history of psychology
relative to the other sciences:
Where are the analogies of yesteryear,
the borrowings from Newtonian
physics, from chemistry, from early
biology, etc.? How many have
survived the inevitable sifting
process of genuine psychological
study? How many have been discarded
barriers to a scientific conception
of behavior? (p. 55)
Swarts concludes by implying that history
has shown that the evolution of psychology
has been suppressed by the use of analogy.
Kantor (1978) sums up the computer
analogy problem this way:
The greatest scientific fault of the
cult of imitation and artificiality
remains, of course, the departure
from the analysis of actual event
fields. Supporters of Artificial
Intelligence avail themselves of the
power of words, and the manipulations
they make possible, to apply names to
events in order to convert them to
substances, powers, and so on, which
are then applied to things.
Overlooked are the basic components
of psychological fields, the
interbehavior of organisms with the
units of the environment including
other organisms, as well as the
invariable setting factors, (p. 583)
The errors in the use of the computer
27'
analogy in cognitive psychology should be
apparent. Psychology does not need
analogies to become more scientific.
Psychologists need to observe events, and
then formulate constructs based on their
observations. In cognitive psychology,
all events will undoubtedly be interpreted
into information processing frameworks.
The computer is a product of hundreds of
years of thought in many fields, including
mathematics, mechanics, electronics, and
engineering. The behavior of the human
being is the result of the complex
interactions of many things, including
setting factors, biological factors,
cultural factors, and the interactional
history of the human and the stimulus
event with which the individual is
behaving. Comparison of a machine
composed of electronic components (e.g.,
diodes, resistors, and transistors), on
the one hand, with an organism of the
complexity of humans, on the other hand,
is a simplifier's solution, and a failure
to recognize that human behavior is the
result of complex interactions. The
journey to understanding human behavior
begins with one indispensable step, that
of observing events. Cognitive psychology
has not taken this step. Its use of
metaphor remains in the realm of
mythology .
References
Blewitt, E. (1983). The computer analogy
in psychology: Memory as interbehavior
or information processing? In N. W.
Smith, P. T. Mount joy, & D. H. Ruben
(Eds.), Reassessment^in^jsychology:
" _The
507T7~~Washington , ~DCl University
Press of America.
Estes, W. K. (1980). Is human memory
obsolete? American Scientist, 68, 62-
69.
Hesse, M. (1980). tevolutions_^nd
_
science. Bloomington, IN: Indiana
University Press.
Hoffman, R. R., & Nead, J. M. (1983).
General contextualism, ecological
science, and cognitive research. The
___^__ _ , _ 4, 507-
Journal_of__M.nd_^nd_Bjte
Kantor, J. R. (1978). Man and machines in
psychology: Cybernetics and artificial
intelligence.
28, 575-583.
28
Swartz, P. (1958), A
note on the computing
machine analogy in
psychology. The
Psy_chjologial_Record,
fTsFsBT
Waltz, D. L. (1984).
Artificial intelligence.
Scientific
______^ American,

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THE INTERBEHAVIORIST
Edward K. Morris, Editor
Department of Human Development
University of Kansas
Lawrence, KS 66045
 fflE
INTERB A Quarterly Newsletter of Interbehavioral Psychology
ISSN 8755-612X

Published at the University of Kansas

Volume 13 1985 Number 4
EDITOR TABLE OFCONTENTS

Edward K. Morris Subscription Information............... 26

University of Kansas
Notes from the Field 26
ADVISORY BOARD The Agora. 27
Sidney W. Bijou The Behavioral and Brain, Scienceg.... 27
University of Arizona
Donna M. Cone Mexican Congress 27
State of Rhode Island
Dennis J. Delprato Subscriptions. 27
Eastern Michigan University
Sandy Hobbs (Scotland) Article. 28
Paisley College of Technology
Paul T. Mountjoy J. R. Kantor: Conversation Hour at
Western Michigan University the third annual 1977 meeting of the
Linda J. Parrott (Canada) Midwest Association for Behavior
St. Mary's College Analysis. Introduced and moderated
N. H. Pronko by Paul T. Mountjoy.
Wichita State University
Roger D. Ray
Rollins College QUOTATION
Emilio Ribes (Mexico)
Escuela Nacional de Estudios It is essential to recognize...that
Douglas H. Ruben Kantor's initiative and leadership in
Western Michigan University this field [of observation] is
Robert G. Wahler unquestioned. In comparison with him,
University of Tennessee Lewin offers us a belated "mentalist"
shadow, while the peculiar significance
of Pavlov's procedure could not readily
ASSISTANT EDITORS have been appraised free from its
ordinary mechanistic discolorations
Jane B. Atwater until after Kantor had established the
Lisa M. Johnson background of observation.
Steven E. Larsen
Susan M. Schneider - A. F. Bentley (1940)
James T. Todd
26
THE INTERBEHAVIORIST
A Quarterly Newsletter of
Interbehavioral Psychology
ISSN 8755-6 12X
Edward K. Morris, Editor
Department of Human Development
212B Haworth Hall
University of Kansas
Lawrence , Kansas 66045, U.S.A.
913-864-3684/4840
_ is a quarterly
publication of news, information,
discussion, journal and book notes, book
reviews, comments, and brief articles
pertaining to interbehavioral psychology
-- a contextualistic, integrated-field
approach to the natural science of
behavior.
The newsletter publishes professional
communications that fall between informal
correspondence and colloquia, and formal
archival publication. As such, the
newsletter supplements contemporary
journals dedicated to basic and applied
research, to the history and philosophy of
the behavioral sciences, and to
professional issues in the field. The
newsletter strongly encourages
submission of notes about current
professional activities of its
subscribers, news and observations about
interbehavioral psychology and related
perspectives, comments on journal articles
and books of interest, more extended book
reviews, and brief articles. All
submissions should be sent in triplicate
to the editor and should conform to the
style described in the Publication Manual
of the American Psychological Association
(3rd edition).
Subscription Information
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Back Volumes 1-12. ................. $ 6.00
Back Volume Complete Sets... Please Write
PAUL T. MOUNTJOY and J. D. HANSOR
published a comment in the American
Psychologist (1985, 40, geT^OW
"The Measurement of Technological Progress
and Its Relationship to War" in answer to
a suggestion made earlier by Sarason that
wars promote scientific and technological
progress. Mountjoy and Hansor provided
data from an analysis of patent-file data
that does not support Sarason's
contention.
Three papers of an interbehavioral
character have recently been published in
Europe by SANDY HOBBS. In "A Permanent
Revolution in Knowledge?" (Scottish
Journal of Adult Education,~198"5TI> 6-9),
he interviews David Cornwell on the
teaching of psychology as a life skill.
Then, with David Cornwell, Hobbs published
two papers in the psychology section of M.
Romer's (Ed.) (1985) Le Temps Libre et Le
Loisir (Paris: Association pour la
Diffusion de las Recherche sur 1'Action
Culturelle) which contains the proceedings
of the World Research Congress on Free
Time and Leisure, held at Marly-le-Roi,
France, in 1984. The two papers were
titled "The Psychology, Leisure, and Work
of Children" and "Spontaneity and Play in
the Child," the latter of which is a
reinterpretation of some of Piaget's work
in terms of the reactional biography
concept. A longer version of the text is
available on request from David Cornwell,
Jordanhall College of Education, Glasgow
G13 1PP, Scotland.
HOBBS also published a brief description
of interbehavioral psychology and of The
Inter behaviour 1st in the new newsletter of
the Scottish Branch of the British
Psychological Association. We thank Sandy
for the good notices.

THE AGORA
This issue is the fourth and final one
for 1985. The first issue for 1986 should
be ready and mailed by the end of January .
We want to thank all of those who
resubscr ibed for 1985 and those who were
new subscribers during the year for your
support. Time now, however, for us to ask
for your resubscr iptions. A subscription
form has been enclosed.
We appreciate the support of readers who
sent us notes from the field, book and
journal notes, comments , and articles this
year. Please continue. If you have
suggestions for how the newsletter might
be improved ? please pass them our way.
As for newsletter subcr iptions, we now
have a mailing list of 115? of whom about
100 are regular subscribers, This number
is lower than last year's final count,
the reason being that we culled the list
for those who were on the subscription
list when we took over from the past
editor, but who had not resubscribed. We
have, however, gained 27 new subscribers
this year, and hope to see the
subscription list grow anew.
Financially, we are on fair footing, and
managing. By culling the subscription
list, we have saved money on postage; we
still, though, print 200 copies of each
issue optimists that we are. Never
fear, we will definitely be with you in
this coming year, and the years to follow.
The feature article in the present issue
is a transcription of Professor Kantor's
conversation hour at the 1977 meeting of
the Association for Behavior Analysis.
Shery Chamberlain, the assistant business
manager for SABA, has kindly sent us the
tape and a typed version of Professor
Kantor's comments, and Paul Mount joy's
introduction. We thank Shery and SABA for
their thoughtf ulness . The tape has been
deposited by Paul in the Archives of the
History of Psychology in Akron, Ohio.
Before turning to that material, however,
we have several items to report.
The Behaiora.andBrainciences
Baltimore) wrote to suggest that the
special issue of The Behay_igr_al ^nd_Braiin
Sciences [1984, 7lOT~feaTurllg^iFoF7
F. Skinner's canonical papers and peer
commentary could be the basis for an
interesting seminar on interbehavioral
27
psychology and the concept of mind. The
commentaries by contemporary philosophers
and philosophers of science are
particularly illuminating as to the
current hold that the "mind" has over
their behavior. This issue of the journal
is available through Cambridge University
Press, 32 East 57th Street, Mew York, NY
10022.
J_9j56_Jtoicajl_C^
Hector Martinez, Coordinator of the
Organizing Committee, has written to
request that we announce the call for
papers for the Vlllth Mexican Congress on
Behavior Analysis, to be held in Veracruz
City, March 10-14, 1986. The meeting will
cover basic and applied research and
conceptual analyses of behavior, both
human and nonhuman. The deadline for
submitting papers is February 15, 1986.
Papers to be read in English must be
submitted beforehand so that brief
translations may be prepared ahead of
time. Papers should not exceed 23
minutes. Submissions should be sent to
Hector Martinez, Coordinacion de Posgardo
en Psicologia, ENEP Iztacala, Apartado
Postal 314, Tlalnepantia Edo. de Mexico,
C.P. 54000. For information regarding
housing, please write Wilfredo Salas and
Maribel Gonzalez, Facultad de Psicologia,
Juarez 81, Xalapa, Mexico*
Sjjbscrip_tions
Efforts that current subscribers make to
promote new subscriptions, especially from
university, college, and institutional
libraries, are appreciated. Subscription
information is listed inside the front
cover of the newsletter.
The new subscribers since the last
issue are listed below. For those
interested, a mailing list is available on
request.
New Subscribers
Fernando C. Capovilla (Temple Univ.)
Tom Wharff (University of Kansas)
Chai-Chen Chao (Univ. of Arizona)
The quotation on the front cover of this
issue was submitted by Susan M. Schneider.
It appeared on p. 239 in A. F. Bentley
(1940), Observable behaviors.
Psychologocal_Review, 47, 230-253.
28
Conversation Hour with J. R. Kantor
Third Annual Convention of the Midwest Association for Behavior Analysis
Blackstone Hotel, Chicago, Illinois
Sunday, May 15, 1977
Introduced and Moderated by Paul T. Mountjoy
MOUNTJOY: We are here for a conversation
hour with Dr. Kantor. I would just like
to remind those of you who do not know
him that8 in the very early 1920s, he
began to develop a system of objective
psychology which stood as a potent
antagonist to the mechanistic systems of
behaviorism at that time. Since then,
both he and his competitors for
psychological eminence have evolved in
many different ways. And, of course, time
has produced changes. Dr. Kantor is now
in his eighty-ninth year, if my
arithmetic is correct, and I think it is.
He is still very active. His latest book
on psycholinguistics is in the hands of
the printer and should be available very
soon. However, unfortunately, his hearing
has deteriorated over the years and he
will be unable to understand questions
from the audience unless they are produced
in written form. I have a volunteer
assistant who will pass out sheets of
paper among you.
[Organizational matters are clarified.
The first question is handed up.
Professor Kantor good-humoredly suggests
to Mountjoy, "Maybe you could read this
[to the audience] so that everybody knows
what the question is."]
MOUNTJOY; Do you think that a cause-
effect, goal-oriented philosophy like
behaviorism is more conducive to research
than a philosophy like interbehaviorism,
and is this justification for dualism in
science?
KANTORt My engagement was to be present
at a discussion hour, and you can imagine
how little actual discussion can go on in
a crystal room like this, and with a man
who is so hard of hearing. I could not
ell anything that my friend Professor
Mountjoy was saying.
Now the first thing I have to say about
this question is that it is not very clear
to me. In the first place, there is a
comparison between behaviorism and
interbehaviorism [but] interbehaviorism is
too. Now the point is, and
this is a very crucial point, behaviorism
and interbehaviorism both are views or
theories in psychology that stand for the
elimination of all kinds of spookology, so
you do not contrast one with the other.
The holder of each view is prepared to do
research in much the same way, that is to
say, by elimination of supernaturals.
Now, I will say a word or two, which
really isn't part of an answer to this
question, as to the difference between
behaviorism and interbehaviorism.
Remember both views are antimentalism
both stand for the elimination of mentals.
There's a difference between the origin of
the two views. One stems, as you probably
know, from Pavlovian conditioning. But
the other view, interbehaviorism, stems
from an older type of psychology, an older
type of science, which merely objected
from the very beginning to limiting
psychology to any particular type of
research or theory.
[Professor Kantor uses a blackboard to
make his points, but before commencing, he
jokes with the audience, "Can you hear me?
I can hardly hear myself, but then if you
can hear me, then I am all right."]
If we make a distinction between
behaviorism and interbehaviorism, it would
be something like this: Remember both are
antimentalism; that is common. Now,
behaviorism tends to two kinds of view.
One is that the organism initiates the
behavior, and the stimulus object is, in a
way, a cue or some condition not too .
prominent in the situation. Now, there's
a second aspect of this behaviorism, and
it works like this'. Great emphasis is put
upon the stimulus, and the organism is
conditioned, and it is modified according
to some kind of stimulus. Mow, this sort
of thing fits quite well in our
psychological traditions in the sense that
your speak of an independent and a
dependent variable. The control is this

way, or the control is that way, when you
emit behavior. Now, this is the
difference between the two.
According to interbehaviorisms
psychological events are fields, so you
have to consider that you do not have any
independence and dependence. You have
reciprocity, which is a different type of
thing. The event consists of these two
actions: They are reciprocal, tod then
you have other things that are happening.
You always have a setting factor which is
as much a part of the field. [Pointings
Kantor says] This is called a field, and
this is the boundary of the field. That
is, we have to think always in terms of a
unit of events. So you have a reciprocal
interaction interbehavior -- that is
performed under setting conditions. Now,
there's something else, and that is what
we call a medium of contact. A good
example of [this] is that an individual
organism cannot interact with a stimulus
object, say in visual interbehavior,
unless you have light as the medium of
contact. In the case of hearing, the
airwaves serve as the medium of contact.
So you see the difference between
behaviorism and interbehavioristn is the
technical difference of how much and how
skillfully you analyze the events which we
call either a behavior or an interbehavior.
MOUNTJOY: Would you please clarify the
scope of the concept "setting factor" and
how does this differ from "discriminative
stimulus"?
KANTOR: Well, I want to give an
illustration of a setting factor in
psychological interbehavior. This is a
simple and maybe a trivial illustration.
If you are interested in language
behavior, you know that in this setting,
in this room, and upon this occasion, my
speech is different from other occasions
and from other settings. In other words,
a setting factor is always present in a
psychological action. Another simple
example would be that if an organism is
satiated, it will not interact with the
food in the same way as when it is hungry.
And that is why in experimental situations
you force the animal or the organism not
to be satiated, that is, to be hungry. So
the question is: How does this differ
from discriminative stimuli. Well, a
stimulus is a different thing. The
setting is the surroundings of an
29
interaction. A stimulus a
discriminative stimulus or any kind of
stimulus is the thing the organism
always interacts with.
MOUNTJOY: Would you give us a brief
preview of the ideas presented in your
book [on linguistics, Kantor (1977)]?
KANTQR: I am afraid that I could not very
well do that. That's too big an order. I
hope that in the next few months there
will be a prospectus available so you can
see what the content of the book is. The
book will be printed in the next month or
so.
MOUNTJOY: Would you review for us what
you feel to be the important reasons for
continuing to study the history of
psychology as a science?
IANTOR: This question has a fairly
obvious answer. I'11 put the matter in a
special way. As a psychologist, it is
obvious that whenever you want to do
anything of any serious consequence, you
want to have as much information about the
situation, that is, about the behavior you
are entering into. And so, the history of
scientific psychology is very important.
I have said a number of times that the
history of science, if it is a valid
history, is really an instrument for
psychological investigation.
I am going to give you an example of
what I mean in the way that indicates I'm
trying to be informal with you and on a
friendly, very friendly basis. I suppose
that all of you are acquainted with the
fact that Boring's history of experimental
psychology is called, very often, a
classical book. And I suppose you all
know that the content of that book is
based on purely mentalistic ideas. So
that kind of history would not be of very
much worth to you in any kind of
psychological work. On the other hand, if
you have a history of psychological work
from a scientific standpoint, it will be
very helpful. I will elaborate this a
little bit further.
In Boring's book, you would read about
visual experiments, and I hope most of you
know that the model that is used for
vision is to have some kind of energy
impinge upon the eye. And then that would
be followed by some kind of physiological
process in the optic pathway, and not
30
until the process reaches the occipital
lobe of the brain would you have any
color. Color, for example, is
manufactured somehow in the brain and is
ejected or emitted out towards some
object,, The object doesn't exist either
until this process happens. Well now, you
don't have there a scientific description
of a psychological activity. So that kind
of history won't do any good. Here, of
course, you could say that I am
prejudiced. If you have an
interbehavioral type of description in
which the organism interacts with a
colored object, and the color is in the
object, based on various kinds of chemical
substances, that is going to help you.
MOUMTJOYi What would you like to see
happen in psychology? That is, what type
of future directionality?
KANTOR: May 1 guess that you know the
answer, really -- all of you. My answer,
if I have to give it, would be of course
the more psychology became interbehavioral
and scientific the better the future of
the science would be. And there's another
angle to this. Actually, you all know
that if there is a genuine experiment in
psychology, it is always an
interbehavioral one and a behavioral one.
You always have a stimulus and a response
to deal with. And what you are trying to
find out in an experiment what the
science of psychology is about is to
discover the kinds of interbehavior you
will have depending upon the kind of
organism you are working with, the kind of
stimulus object you present, the setting
factors, and so on. Mow, one thing that
has recently, fairly recently, become a
generally recognized feature of
experimentation in psychology, is that, if
you are working with infrahuraan organisms
or human organisms, you want to know about
the development of the organism. You want
to be acquainted with it. But always,
psychologists and biologists have wanted
to know the strains of the organism; they
wanted to know its background. Well
that's one thing. And, of course, you
want to know about your stimulus objects.
I want to give an illustration about
that. A colleague of mine once wanted to
know what kind of disturbance a subject
would show if you presented the subject
with a very striking kind of stimulus, and
especially if the individual was presented
with a stimulus without previous knowledge
of what he was going to be interacting
with. And I'm going to make this a very
short story. So one of the things that
this researcher did was to have a test of
stability and then he put a 5-foot snake
on the lap of the subject. It did disturb
some of the subjects, but not all of them.
And, as it happens that most of them were
people who came out of rural environments,
a 5-foot black snake didn't make much
difference to them. They didn't show much
disturbance. That indicates that you have
to know your stimulus object. Would it be
a stimulus for this particular organism
under these setting conditions?
MOUNTJOY: Can you comment on Paul
Fuller's [19731 article in The
Psy_cJioJ.ogJ.ca.l_Record comparing your system
and Skinner's,
Kantor [in reference to a different
article]: There isn't very much
difference. You remember, that was an
experiment [Fuller, 19*19] with pretty much
what you would call vegetating organisms.
The main point was could you modify the
behavior of such an organism. And Paul
proved that you could, up to a certain
extent. And there would be no difference
here because in each case you would be
working with stimuli and responses. And
it wouldn't make much difference which
theory you held to because it is such a
simple kind of situation.
Where the big differences might come out
would be in complex human behavior. For
example, in the study of language, there
you would find a big difference. For
example, Professor Skinner [1957] wrote a
book called Verb_aIJBehayior. And what he
attempted to do was to show that verbal
behavior could be modified and could be
treated on a conditional basis. Mow, the
good point about that was that it broke
down the distinction between language and
other behavior because language has always
been thought to be, and still is by non-
behaviorists, as something spooky. There
is something in the mind that got
translated into a word. So, that
[Skinner's analysis] all good.
However, the question arises whether
complicated action like conversation can
be treated simply as conditioning. There
are a lot of other factors that come in.
And so, while both [behaviorism and
interbehaviorism], again, are united in

the point of excluding mentals, one view
is more capable of dealing with complex
behavior in the human being.
MOUNTJOY: I have often wondered to what
extent Skinner's philosophical base was
influenced if not dictated by Kantor?
KANTOR: I don't know the answer to this
question and so I am going to tell a
couple of little stories.
I was at a meeting in New York City one
time some years ago [that] I only could
see or hear the beginning of. I was quite
hard of hearing at that time and I had an
extension cord from the seats to the
lectern, and somebody unknowingly stepped
on the contacts and so I wasn!t able to
hear anything. I went out of the meeting
in Mew York City and looked for an
electrical shop so I could replace that
part. But I had a hard time finding an
electrical shop. But I finally did find
one, and I wandered back to the hotel,
[but] it seemed to me too late to go to
the meeting, so I stood and looked at some
of the attractive window displays. A
young man came up to me and he said, "So
you are responsible for the whole thing,"
meaning behaviorism and interbehaviorism.
Well that's a story.
And another similar story was that a
student wrote to me from Wales. He had
been to this country, and he had had some
acquaintances in interbehavioral
psychology. But he wasn't, I think, very
politic. And he wrote to Skinner and he
asked him how much he was influenced by
me. Professor Skinner answered him, and
he said, "I have never understood
interbehavioral psychology." So the
implication was that he was not influenced
by it. And that is possible because, as I
said in the beginning, behaviorism is
derived from Pavlovian work. And someone
might have become a behaviorist, as Pavlov
would, not from just thinking in terms of
the actual modification of behavior in the
animals. So that is possible.
Actually, of course, it doesn't matter
about influences. What matters is that
since there are two branches, let us say,
of behaviorism, then you become acquainted
as well as you can be with the points made
by each view and then draw your own
conclusion. You might come out in one of
three ways: You might say that A
influenced B; you could say that B
influenced A; or you might say that there
31
is no influence either way.
MOUNTJOY: Interbehaviorism seems to be
directed toward how we talk about our
research. What are its implications for
how we conduct research? That is, what
are its methodological implications in
contrast with those of behaviorism and
mentalism?
KANTOR: Well, to begin with, nobody can
do any research with a mentalistic
outlook. Mentalism is "spookism" --
something supernatural. It has nothing to
do with any science. That's out of the
question.
Now? the next question is: How
elaborate do you want your researchers to
be? How much leeway do you want in the
selection of problems. Well, my answer to
that would be that the interbehavioral
view has a larger scope. A while ago, I
mentioned, for example, that a book on
verbal behavior [Skinner, 1957], which is
supposed to be on language, isn't on
language because language isn't verbal
behavior. Language is a bigger thing than
verbal behavior. But if you hold to that
view [language is verbal behavior], then
you are limited in your operations, you're
limited in your research.
As I tried to indicate, I would offer as
a final statement the advice that you
should, if you're interested, study the
two views carefully and come to your own
conclusions. It's no good in any science
to be told what is better and what is
worse. That doesn't mean anything. I
speak now as any scientist would. You
must become as well acquainted with the
kind of material you are interested in and
then you will develop your theory about
what has been going on -- what kind of
events you have been dealing with -- and
that's the end of the story. It's not
going to be anything absolute. You know,
or should know, that science is a job of
work. If you are interested in human
behavior or in animal behavior, you must
hold to your job with as few prejudices as
you can. Study hard your subject, your
behavior, or your interbehavior, and then
you are on the right track of science.
But you don't have any absolutes. No
absolutes in any science.
MOUNTJOY: Could you summarize your views
on instinctive behavior in humans?
KANTOR: Well, In my view, instinctive
behavior isn't based ~ that kind of
construction Isn't based on
observation. It is based on some kind of
theory mentalistlc theory. It's no
good at all In any science.
Now, there's one thing we have to do
that is helpful and that is [to see that]
perhaps someone who uses the word
"instinctive" doesn't mean that at all; he
doesn't mean any spooky thing. He really
means behavior. Maybe it's a habitual
behavior or it's reflex behavior, and so
you clarify yourself about that. My main
point here is that terms in psychology,
many of them, have been built up under
very different conditions than is true for
scientific psychology. They were based on
all kinds of spurious philosophy and that
is something we have to watch out for and
we have to avoid as much as we can.
MOUNTJOY: Now that you have completed the
book on language [Kantor, 1977]? are you
working on anything new? Perhaps an
autobiography?
KANTOR: What autobiography? I think you
know I'm a very old man. But I still am
working and I am going to work on
something else after this book is printed.
But it is not an autobiography. And, it's
too early to announce the content or the
name of the book, and so on. But, if you
are interested, maybe If I keep going you
THE IMTERBEHAVIORIST
Edward K. Morris, Editor
Department of Human Development
University of Kansas
Lawrence, KS 66045
will be able to the book, if I can
finish it. [Professor Kan tor was to
publish three more books and two
collections of articles (Kantor, 1981,
1982S 1983, 1984a, 198Mb).]
References
Fuller, P. R. (1949). Operant
conditioning of a vegetative human
organism. American__ Journal of
Psychology , ~ ~ ~ ~ 59CL
Fuller, P. R. T1973). Professors Kantor
and Skinner The "Grand Alliance" of
the 40fs. The Psychological Record, 23,
318-324.
Kantor, J. R. (1977). Psychological
Linguistics Chicago; Principia Press.
Kantor, J. R. (1981). Inberbehavioral
philosophy. Chicago : Principia Press.
Kantor, J. R. (1982). Cultural
psychology. Chicago : Principia Press.
Kantor, J. R. (1983). Tragedy and the
event continuum. Chicago: Principia
Press.
Kantor, J. R. (1984a). Selected writings
in philosophy, psychology, and other
sciences,1929-19o3^Chicago^
Principia Press.
Kantor, J. R. (1984b). Psychological
comments and queries. Chicago:
Principia Press.
Skinner, B. F. (1957). Verbal_behayigr.
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
 A Quarterly Newsletter of Interbehavioral Psychology
ISSN 8755-612X
Published at the University of Kansas
Volume 14 1986 Number 1
EDITOR TABLE OF CONTENTS

Edward K. Morris Notes from the Field 2

University of Kansas
The Agora 3
INVITED EDITOR; Dennis J. Delprato
The Principia Press 3
ADVISORY BOARD
Association for Behavior Analysis... 3
Sidney W. Bijou
University of Arizona New Subscribers 3
Donna M. Cone
; State of Rhode Island Invited Editor's Commentary 4
Dennis J. Delprato
Eastern Michigan University Dennis J. Delprato (Eastern Michigan
Sandy Hobbs (Scotland) University)
Paisley College of Technology
Paul T. Mountjoy
Western Michigan University , QUOTATION
Linda J. Parrott (Canada)
St. Mary's College The development of methods of
N. H. Pronko printing pictures in the fifteenth
Wichita State University century heralded the downfall of the
Roger D. Ray. tyranny of words in man's systems of
Rollins College knowledge. Modern science and
Emilio Ribes (Mexico) technology gradually took shape as
Escuela Nacional de Estudios indispensible picboral components were
Douglas H. Ruben cut or engraved or etched on printing
Western Michigan University surfaces for widespread dissemination.
Robert G. Wahler The import of this analysis is that
University of Tennessee purely verbal structures are apt to
get out of hand and lose contact with
reality unless they can be checked and
ASSISTANT EDITORS corrected against observable specific
events. It occurs to us that the
Lisa M. Johnson dangers of verbal abstraction are
Susan M. Schneider still with us.
James T. Todd
- Smith and Smith, 1966
 THE INTERBEHAVIORIST
A Quarterly Newsletter of
Interbehavloral Psychology
ISSN 8755-612X
Edward K. Morris, Editor
Department of Human Development
212B Haworth Hall
University of Kansas
Lawrence, Kansas 66045, U.S.A.
913-864-3684/4840
The Interbehaviorist is a quarterly
publication of news, information,
discussion, journal and book notes, book
reviews, comments, and brief articles
pertaining to interbehavioral psychology
-* a contextualistic, integrated-field
approach to the natural science of
behavior.
The newsletter publishes professional
communications that fall between informal
correspondence and'colloquia, and formal
archival publication. As such, the
newsletter supplements contemporary
journals dedicated to basic and applied
research, to the history and philosophy of
the behavioral sciences, and to
professional issues in the field. The
newsletter strongly encourages
submission of notes about current
professional activities of its
subscribers, news and observations about
interbehavioral psychology and related
perspectives, comments on journal articles
and books of interest, more extended book
reviews, and brief articles. All
submissions should be sent in triplicate
to the editor and should conform to the
style described in the Publication Manual
of the American Psychological Association
(3rd edition).
Subscription Information
Student Subscriptions (US) $ 4.00
Regular Subscriptions (US) $ 6.00
Foreign Subscriptions $ 8.00
Institutional Subscriptions $12.00
Back Volumes 1-12 $ 6.00
Back Volume Complete Sets... Please Write
NOTES FROM THE FIELD
SIDNEY W. BIJOU and John Unbreit
(University of Arizina) have received
approval of a three^year research grant
from the U. S. Department of Education for
a project on "Improving the
Sociollnguistic Behavior of Retarded
Children In Relation to Nonhandicapped
Peers." PATRICK M GHEZZI will serve as
Research Assistant Professor and CHAI-CHEN
CHAO as Research Associate,
LINDA J. PARROTT (St. Mary's
University) delivered a tutorial on the
interbehavioral treatment of pain and
"private events" at the invitation of Dr.
Josep Roca of the Institut Nacional
d'Educacio Fisica in Barcelona, Spain.
She also gave a one-day workshop on
interbehavioral psychology and philosophy
at Verhaltensacademie in Frankfurt. The
Academy is under the direction of Glaus
Thierman, and has been training applied
behavior analysts for the past ten years.
GERALD R. PATTERSON and Thomas J.
Dishion (Oregon Social Learning Center)
published a paper in Criminology (1985,
23, 63-79) entitled "Contributions of
Families and Peers to Delinquency."
The October, 1985 issue of Soviet Life
reports that ROGER RAY (Rollins College)
participated in the Moscow meeting of the
Pavlovian Society. He said of his work In
relation to current Soviet research, "I am
working on the development of the general
systems theory and its application to
understanding behavioral and psychosomatic
pathologies. Both Sudakov and
Khananashvili [Soviet physiologists] are
Internationally recognized for their
contributions in these fields" (p. 17).
 THE AGORA
We are beginning our seventeenth year
of publication clearly a testimony to
Noel Smith's original vision, and to Ron
Heyduk's hard work after him. We look
forward to being with you for the years to
come, and vice-versa.
This issue filled quickly, and the next
one is well under way, with contributions
from Sandy Hobbs (a review of Markova's,
Paradigms, Thought, and Language) and from
William M. Gar-drier (teaching
interbehavioral psychology). We would be
delighted to hear from more of our readers
on any manner of topics.
This issue also marks the first of what
we hope will be a series of major
contributions from invited editors. In-
house editors become as stale as toll-
house cookies over time; moreover, their
views may not fairly represent the broader
tastes of their readership. Thus, in the
interests of expanding the material we
publishe (i.e., of spreading the dough),
we offer an issue whose main ingredients
are under the editorship of the first of
our invited editors Dennis J. Delprato
(Eastern Michigan University), who speaks
to future directions in the field.
Dennis's contribution, though, was
battered by tight page constraints not
all of his original contribution would fit
into this issue, hence he will offer an
additional brief comment in the next issue
as a follow-up. That's the way the cookie
crumbles.
We hope that this new feature will
invigorate the newsletter's content and
style, as well as set the occasion for
contributions from the broad range of
interbehavioral perspectives and expertese
among our readership. With this brief
editorial (and more low-brow humor than
kneaded), we now turn to the business of
the current issue.
The Principia Press
Professor Helene Kantor writes of both
good news and bad. On the positive side,
she and a Mexican publisher have made an
arrangement for the translation of The
Scientific Evolution of Psychology into
Spanish. In addition, she has received a
large order from China for five of
Professor Robert Kantor"s books as many
as fifty copies of one title.
On the distaff side, she reports
otherwise slow sales. The newsletters'
subscribers could assist here by checking
to see that their institutional (and
personal) libraries carry all of Professor
Kantor's books, and that their college and
university bookstores carry titles that
seem most likely of interest. We will
include a list of available books and
prices in the next issue. If you have
other suggestions for how to promote The
Principia Press, please write directly to
Professor Helene J. Kantor, 5743 Kimbark
Avenue, Chicago, IL 60637.
The Association for Behavior Analysis
Sid Bijou reminds us that the
Association for Behavior Analysis (ABA)
will once again hold its annual meeting at
the end of May, this time in Milwaukee.
Numerous interbehavioral presentations
(e.g., workshops, symposia, papers, and
meetings) have been planned. Enough of
the newsletter's subscribers regularly
attend the convention to constitute a
critical mass that would thereby make the
convention stimulating to other
interbehaviorists. Sid (and I) ask that
you consider the possibility of attending.
If interested, registration and housing
information may be obtained from Shery
Chamberlain, Society for the Advancement
of Behavior Analysis, Department of
Psychology, Western Michigan University,
Kalamazoo, MI 49008 (616-383-0452)
New Subscriptions
We appreciate any efforts that can be
made to promote the newsletter, especially
in university, college, and institutional
libraries. Subscription information is
listed inside the front cover.
The new subscribers since the last
report are:
Carme Basil (Spain)
Steve Boggs (University of Florida)
Jeffrey Hilt (SUNY-Albany)
Ted E. Melson (Plymouth, MI)
Paisley College of Technology
Francisca Serrate (St. Mary's Univ.)
John F. Shannon (SUNY-Plafctsburg)
Robert L. Woolfolk (Kingston, NJ)
The quotation on the front cover was
provided by Dennis Delprato. It is from
K. U. Smith and M. F. Smith's Cybernetic
Principles of Learning and Educational
Design (New York:Rinehart and Winston,
19667 p. 349).
 Invited Editor's Commentary: Where To From Here?
Dennis J. Delprato
Eastern Michigan University
I an pleased to kick of this "Invited
Editor" issue of the newsletter and, to do
so,
epitomizes Professor Kantor's work.
Specifically, I would like to offer some
answers to the question, "Where to from
here?," by which I mean the future of
behavioral acience and technology.
Although I could go on at length regarding
where not to go, time has come to stop
attempting intellectual reconciliation
of integrated-field thinking with
constructs based on mechanism, a remnant
of 19th century science.
I consider Kantor's major contribution
to be having moved behavioral .science and
technology to the latest stage of thinking
about the world. In my view, Kantor has
gone further and in more detail and scope
than has any other-thinker. It is
important to note, however, that Kantor
was not alone in promoting an integrated-
field or systems perspective concordant
views have been put forth by others.
These and other points are addressed in
what follows.
To Participating Biological Factors
One of the directions of- the future is
the systematic study of biological
factors. The following comments
on this topic were prepared by Bryan
Midgley, an .undergraduate at Eastern
Michigan University, who recently suffered
through a' course in physiological
psychology.
Since Aristotle, an understanding of
biology has been recognized as crucial to
an understanding of behavior. If one
agrees that this.is true, and that bio-
behavioral relationships have
traditionally been handled in an
unsatisfactory manner (i.e.,
organocentrism and reductionism), then
just what is implied by considering
biological factors as participative
components in the field? Perhaps the
answer here has not been as clear as it
could be.
Individual scientific disciplines do not
exist in a vacuum. Rather, systems
analysis reveals that relationships among
the sciences are best described as
interdependencies. One implication of
this view is that advancement in any one
discipline will be felt in other areas of
specialization. Thus, an adequate
description (explanation) of the subject
matter of any science must not only be in
terms of principles unique to that ;
science, but must also.take into account
the influences from other sciences. To
take sociology as an example, we can
describe its subject matter in terms of
unique sociological principles, along with
principles contributed by other sciences.
To discuss sociology solely with respect
to biology, psychology, chemistry, or some
other science, however, would constitute
reductionism. Furthermore, to describe
sociology purely in terms of sociological
principles without consideration of
biology and other sciences would be a
grave error. The point .here is that
scientific disciplines are abstractions
that facilitate study of natural objects
and events. The world is not composed of
separate and distinct psychological,
sociological, and biological "corners."
If we are to avoid the error of
rejecting systematic inclusion of
biological factors in our event fields, as
well as avoid the error of biological
reductionism, how should we view
biological factors? That is, what factors
do biological components refer to? The
answer: These components can only serve
as stimulus objects (with respective
stimulus functions), response occurrences
(with respective response functions), and
setting factors. To those more than
superficially familiar with Kantor's work,
there is nothing new here. What would be
new is systematic inclusion of the notion
in basic research and clinical analyses.
To Eclectic Practice
Not too long ago, few suggestions raised
my ire more than the one that we must "be
eclectic." To me, the speaker or writer
waved the banner of eclecticism as a
.combined political weapon and fenestrabed
cloak of ignorance to maintain the
feeblest type of thinking. Such a sorry
use of eclecticism to perpetuate cultural
tradition is, of course, still common.
Thorne (t973)j however, has convinced me
that some alternative referents to
eclecticism are completely naturalistic.
The essence of the argument follows.
Thorne (1973) pointed out that, in the
middle of the nineteenth century, medicine
found itself in a situation similar to
that of present-day psychology,
particularly clinical psychology. More
than MOO proprietary medical schools
flourished in the U.S. at that time in
which were taught a potpourri of
approaches such as homeopathy,
naturopathyj osteopathy, and
chiopractrics. In other words, medicine
was fraught with schools, systems, and
cults. Since that time, however, a major
development in medical science was the
substitution of eclectic training and
practice for culbism. The key to this
change was the medical establishment's
decision to base standards of training and
practice upon basic scientific research.
Thus, eclectic medical practice (a)
evaluates clinical services against
standards provided by basic science
knowledge, (b) has a relatively
standardized curriculum, and (c) does not
foster schools, cults, or essentially
proprietary systems.
The message here is that we refer to
clinical medicine as eclectic, not because
it "accepts the potential value of any
theory (or postulate system)," but because
it-accepts the potential value of any
procedure that is supported by basic
(naturalistic) science. No time- or
space-transcending contructs are included.
The implications of this view for
behavioral science reflect one of
Professor Kantor's (1969) basic points:
The field is organized into systems, "[i]n
the plural since, unfortunately, a
transcendental subject matter allows
indefinite variation" (p. 333)- Because
the integrated-field perspective rules out
all transcendental constructs, clinical
psychology now can move to eclectic
training and practice.
To a Cybernetics (Systems) Approach
Although Kantor undertook no research,
this was not unfortunate, for it was
enough that he pointed the way for others
to deloricate events that have remained
obscured for centures. Nonetheless,
behavioral science will unequivocally
progress to the most advanced stage of
world thinking on a large scale when
research procedures comport with
integrated-field postulates. Only then
will investigators routinely formulate
questions and plans of investigation that
address the interdependences among the
multiple factors that comprise
interbehavioral fields. Although research
literature seems to be bereft of work in
accord with Kantor's guidelines, this is
actually not so, as demonstrated in a
recent review of experiments making use of
multiple-response methodology (Delprato,
in press). Multiple-response methodology,
however, is but one component of the full
range of procedural implications of the
integrated-field perspective, and
multiple-response research represents only
a fraction of the behavioral research
being conducted today.
One body of research that embodies a
wide range of methodological implications
of the integrated-field perspective is
that on behavioral cybernetics or
behavioral systems, as exemplified
especially by the work in K. U. Smith's
Behavioral Cybernetics Laboratory at the
University of Wisconsin.
By about the mid-1960s, the generic
"systems11 approach to training, education,
and organizations had peaked. I say
peaked because a prominent version of this
movement largely died (Hunt, 1984). It
died, however, only because it attempted a
marriage between mechanistic behaviorism
and systems theory. In Smith's approach,
however, we note a very different
application of the systems approach to
training, education, and organizations
(e.g., Smith & Smith, 1966). For example,
they distinguish between two approaches to
worker training and management: One that
promises wage and efficiency rewards, and
another that emphasizes principles of
self-regulation and feedback control.
Smith and his collaborators have conducted
definitive behavioral science research
within the framework of integrated-field
(or systems) thinking (e.g., Smith, 196?,
1972; Smith & Henry, 19&7; Smith & Smith,
1966). Although I cannot begin to offer a
fair sampling of this research, I can
describe a few of its highlights.
Smith did not shy away from general and
Inferential statements (i.e., theory), nor
from polemics befitting an innovative
thinker. For example, he argued that
training and engineering psychology
beginning with WWII, not with orthodox
experimental psychology, provide the most
 significant contributions to learning
science and education.
Smith's (1972) definition of behavioral
cybernetics is that it experimentally
investigates motions of the body
including specific movement patterns,
posture, social behavior, tool-using, and
behavior-physiologic interactions as
dynamic feedback processes. Further,
behavioral cybernetics "is concerned with
systems theory, and analysis of living
activity in which response is conceived of
as;the dynamic reaction sector of closed-
loop control mechanisms that govern and
integrate the stimulus environment,
sensory input, perception, neural
activity, and physiologic function by
feedback control" (Smith, 1972, p. 285).
The systems approach was a replacement for
attempts to "deal with motor activity as
an end product determined by the linear,
one-way influences of environmental
stimuli and internal physiologic states11
(Smith, 1972, p. 285).
Behavioral cybernetics brought to the
forefront a revolutionary alternative to
traditional approaches to the question of
control or governance. Previous accounts
of behavioral control were open-loop or
linear. Staunch adherence to open-loop
control is exhibited by mechanists who
maintain that "initiating causes...lie in
the environment and...remain there"
(Skinner, 1984, p. 508). As is well
known, other linear mechanists hold that
behavioral control lies inside the
organism's mind. Behavioral cybernetics
introduces interactive or transactional
control, according to which cause or
control has no locus independent of a set
of relationships; self-regulation without
autonomy is the basic model. We
previously had a choice between
determinism (i.e., linear, one-way
control) and free will (i.e., no, at least
naturalistic, control). The new approach
to control shows how both determinism and
free will can be rejected, for both missed
the point.
In contrast with the conventional open-
loop analysis of the relationship between
extrinsic events (antecedents and
consequences) and observed responses,
Smith emphasized closed-loop analysis in
which the organism is viewed as a feedback
or control system that generates its own
activities to detect and control specific
stimulus characteristics of the
environment. Thus, to Smith, a
functioning organism is always behaving,
that is, always responding and stimulating
itself by means of feedback (even during
sleep). Further emphasis on the
continuity of organismic activity is
evident in the suggestion that specific
external changes in the stimulation
pattern do not initiate responses, but
rather simply modify organizational
features of the continuous behavior-in-
:
progress.
Considerations such as these led Smith
to use state-of-the-art computer methods
in his basic and applied research.
Further influences in this regard were his
emphasis on (a) the multidimensionality of
organismic actions, (b) multiple classes
of feedback, (c) dynamic vs. static
after-effects of responding, and (d)
articulated movements as guided by
postural and bilateral transport
components of motion that serve as
coordinate references. In brief, the ,
research called for multidimensional on-
line feedback capabilities that could only
be adequately met with what appear to be
the first real-time bio-behavioral
computer facilities in the world. Among
the more important research problems Smith
has addressed are performance variations
as a function of feedback perturbations.
Among the response systems studied have
been posture, gait, hand motion, visual
perceiving, visual-manual tracking,
machine and tool manipulation, breathing,
speaking, and eye movement. In addition,
Smith and his colleagues have conducted
cybernetic analyses of young children's
development of social tracking, of infant
control of environing objects, and of
clinical research in rehabilitation
medicine (e.g., epilepsy and emphysema).
To Human Performance Technology (HPT)
HPT is an Interdisciplinary, integrative
discipline that incorporates principles of
biobehavioral, cognitive (after Kantor),
and systems sciences to address the full
range of human performances. The
postulates are those of an integrated-
field behavioral-systems science. Left
behind are the postulates of the proto-HPT
period and those procedures that do not
comport with naturalistic postulates.
Technological contributions are made by
engineering psychology, human
factors/ergonomics, performance
technology, instructional technology,
training science, biomechanics,
kinesiology, sports medicine, physical
medicine, physical therapy, artificial
intelligence and expert systems, computer-
based training, and organizational
development. Smith (196?) proposed an
early version of HPT in the form of
"physical behavioral science," a field
based upon cybernetic notions of
organization and control and the insight
that physical education pointed the way
into "new domains of behavioral^science."
HPT applies to all levels of systems
involving human performance, ranging from
the individual, to dyads, to small groups,
and to organizations. Kantor's
revolutionary notion of the behavioral
segment within a multifactored field is
actualized, in part, through the notion of
control systems that have negative and
positive feedback and feedforward, which
is descriptive of the way in which open
organlsmic systems function.
Interestingly, an examination of
technological revolutions throughout
history reveals no revolution in human
performance technology (HPT). Although
HPT has been neglected, it is the newest
and most fundamental technology. Because
readers of this newsletter require neither
a detailed description of the reasons for
the neglect of a technology of human
performance, nor an elaboration of how HPT
is fundamental, I will briefly comment on
its newness.
It seems that movement to the
integrated-field stage of scientific
References
Delprato, D. J. (1986). Response
patterns. In H. W. Reese & L. J.
Parrott (Eds.) Behavior science;
Philosophical , methodological , and
empirical advances (pp. b1-113).
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Hunt, G, J. F. (1984). NEBEAT The
systems approach updated. Programmed
Learning and Educational Technology,
sFSo:
Kantor, J. R. (1969). The scientific
evolution of psychology (vol. 3).
Chicago: Principia Press.
Skinner, B. F. (1984). Selection by
and
Sciences, 7, 477-510'.
Smith, K. U. (1967). Cybernetic
foundations of physical behavioral
thinking is required for a complete
technology of human performance. Up to
now, we have been living (a) in the pre-
HPT period of folk tech, the textbook,
apprenticeship, and guilds, and (b) in the
proto-HPT period of Taylor's scientific
management, Gilbreth's motion study,
programmed instruction, clinical
psychology and psychiatry, and behavior
modification. I submit that we are
currently in the early stages of an
authentic HPT as the implications of a
spatio-temporal approach to all human
matters continue to expand.
In its narrowest sense, HPT addresses
human performance needs in the private and
public sector (e.g., training, management,
productivity improvement, performance
appraisal, and rehabilitation). In its
broadest sense, HPT simply refers to the
practice of inbegrated-field behavioral-
systems science. The latter is a
replacement for psychological science
(i.e., psychology).This means that
eventually most of what today passes for
psychological technology will be relegated
to the status of astrology. There will be
no shortage of psychological practitioners
their views will be promoted, widely
known, and lucrative for votaries with the
right marketing system. Psychology,
however, will clearly have joined the
ranks of astrology and alchemy, while
behavioral science (short for integrated-
field behavioral-systems science) will
have joined the natural sciences.
science. Quest, Monograph VIII, 26-82.
Smith, K. U. TT972). Cybernetic
psychology. In R. N. Singer (Ed.), The
psychomotor domain: Movement behavior
(pp. 283-348).Philadelphia:Lea and
Febiger.
Smith, K. U., & Henry, J. P. (1967).
Cybernetic foundations for
rehabilitation. American Journal of
Physical Medicine, 46, 379-467.
Smith, K. U,, & Smith, M. F. (1966).
Cybernetic principles of learning and
educational design. New York: Holt,
Rinehart, and Winston.
Thorns, F. C, (1973). Eclectic
psychotherapy. In R. Corsini (Ed.),
Current psychotheraples (pp. 445-486).
Itasca, IL: F. E. Peacock.
 , THE BEHAVIOR ANALYST
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Edward K. Morris, Editor
The Interbehaviorist
1 "
Department of Human Development
University of Kansas
Lawrence, KS 66045
 A Quarterly Newsletter of Interbehavioral Psychology
ISSN 8755-612X

Published at the University of Kansas

Volume 14 1986 Number 2

EDITOR TABLE OF CONTENTS

Edward K. Morris Notes from the Field, 10

University of Kansas
The Agora 11
ADVISORY BOARD Book and Journal Notes, 13
Sidney W. Bijou Invited Editor's Commentary Continued,
University of Arizona Dennis J. Delprato: Where To From
Donna H. Cone Here? Naturalistic Behavioral
State of Rhode Island Medicine.
Dennis J. Delprato
Eastern Michigan University Book Review, 15
Sandy Hobbs (Scotland) Sandy Hobbs: Review of Markova's
Paisley College of Technology (1982) Paradigms, Thought, and
Paul T. Mountjoy Language
Western Michigan University
Linda J. Parrott (Canada) Comments , 16
St. Mary's University James Fox: On Setting Factors and
N. H. Pronko Interbehavioral Research: A Reply
Wichita State University to Pronko.
Roger D. Ray
Rollins College Article 19
Emilio Ribes (Mexico) William M. Gardner: Advanced
Escuela Nacional de Estudios General Psychology: A Course on
Douglas H. Ruben Interbehavioral Principles.
Western Michigan University
Robert G. Wahler
University of Tennessee QUOTATION
It is a well-founded historical
ASSISTANT EDITORS generalization that the last thing to
be discovered by any science is what
Lisa M. Johnson the science is really about.
Susan M. Schneider
- A. N, Whitehead _
10
THE INTERBEHAVIORIST
A Quarterly Newsletter of
Interbehavioral Psychology
ISSN 8755-612"X
Edward K. Morris, Editor
Department of Human Development
212B Haworth Hall
University of Kansas
Lawrence, Kansas 66045, U.S.A.
913-864-3684/4840
The Interbehaviorist is a quarterly
publication of news, information,
discussion, journal and book notes, book
reviews, comments, and brief articles
pertaining to Interbehavioral psychology
a contextualistic, integrated-field
approach to the natural science of
behavior.
The newsletter publishes professional
communications that fall between informal
correspondence and colloquia, and formal
archival publication. As such, the
newsletter supplements contemporary
journals dedicated to basic and applied
research, to the history and philosophy of
the behavioral sciences, and to
professional issues in the field. The
newsletter strongly encourages
submission of notes about current
professional activities of its
subscribers, news and observations about
interbehavioral psychology and related
perspectives, comments on journal articles
and books of interest, more extended book
reviews, and brief articles. All
submissions should be sent in triplicate
to the editor and should conform to the
style described in the Publication Manual
of the American Psychological Association
(3rd edition).
Subscription Information
Student Subscriptions (US) $ 4.00
Regular Subscriptions (US) $ 6.00
Foreign Subscriptions $ 8.00
Institutional Subscriptions $12.00
Back Volumes 1-12 $ 6.00
Back Volume Complete Sets... Please Write
NOTES FROM THE FIELD
Recent issues of The Psychological
Record have seen the publication of
several articles and book reviews by the
newsletter's subscribers. IVER H. IVERSEN
(Whitman College) published "Response
Interactions in Multiple Schedules: The
Influence of Response Displacement" (1985,
35, 401-410) and "Restricted Access to
Collateral Behavior Affects Operant
Behavior on Variable-Interval Schedules"
(1985, 35, 411-424). JAY MOORE
(University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee)
published "On the Consequences of
Conditioning" (1986, 36, 39-61). PARKER
E. LICHTENSTEIN (Newark, Ohio), NOEL W.
SMITH (SUNY-Plattsburg), and N. H. PRONKO
(Wichita State University) wrote separate
book reviews and notes in these volumes.
ROBERT D. ZETTLE (Wichita State
University) was co-author on a paper
entitled "The Effect of Feedback and Self-
Reinforcement Instructions'on Studying
Performance" (1986, 36, 27-37).
ZETTLE, in addition, was co-author on a
paper published in the Journal of Applied
Behavior Analysis (JABA) (1985, 18, 201-
214), entitled "Self-Reinforcement
Effects: An Artifact of Social Standard
Setting?" MARTIN T. IVANCIC (John F,
Kennedy Institute) was also a co-author of
another paper published in JABA
"Assessment of Stimulus Preference and
Relnforcer Value with Profoundly Retarded
Individuals."
GERALD E. ZURIFF (Wheaton College)
published a book review of Stich's From
Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science in
the Journal of the Experimental Analysis
of Behavior (1985, 44, 391-396).

THE AGORA
A generous contribution to the Kantor
Memorial Fund from a donor who would
prefer to remain anonymous has allowed us
to expand the page length of this issue of
the newsletter, which includes many fine
comments, reviews, and articles from our
subscribers.
In The Agora, we present information on
the availability and cost of Professor
Kantor's books from Principia Press;
updates on new subscribers and the Kantor
Memorial Fund; and the names of all
newsletter subscribers and the titles of
their papers as listed in the 1986
convention program for the May meeting of
the Association for Behavior Analysis.
For further information on thew latter,
write Shery Chamberlain, ABA, Department
of Psychology, Western Michigan
University, Kalamazoo, MI 49008.
As for the other main sections of the
newsletter, we Include further invited
commentary from Dennis J, Delprato, book
and journal notes, a book review by Sandy
Hobbs, a commentary on setting events by
James Fox, and an article on the teaching
of interbehavioral psychology by William
M. Gardner.
The Principia Press
As promised in the last issue of the
newsletter, we provide below a list of
Professor Kantor's books (and their
prices) that are available from Principia
Press. Please check your bookshelves, and
those of your institutional library and
bookstore, for possible omissions. The
books are available directly from
Principia Press, 57^3 Kimbark Avenue,
Chicago, IL 60637. Handling charges are
$.75 per title; prepaid orders post free.
Principles of Psychology (2 volumes)
$20.00
Psychology and Logic (2 volumes)
$25." 00
Interbehavioral Psychology
$15.00
The Logic of Modern Science
$15700
An Objective Psychology of Grammar
$ 1 3 - 0 0 : :
The Scientific Evolution of Psychology
(2 volumes)$40.00
The Science of Psychology: An
Interbehavioral Survey $20.00
11
Psychological Linguistics
$15.00
Interbehavioral Philosophy
27750
Cultural Psychology
$16.50
Tragedy and the Event Continuum
$15.00
Selected Writings, 1929-1983
$ 2 0 . 0 0 '
Psychological Comments and Queries
$20.00
New Subscribers
We appreciate any efforts that can be
made to promote the newsletter, especially
in university, college, and institutional
libraries. Subscription information is
provided inside the front cover.
The new subscribers since the last
issue are listed below.
Brad A. Alford (Martin,'TN)
David Cornwell (Jordanhill College, UK)
Aubrey C. Daniels (Tucker, GA)
Philip N. Hineline (Temple University)
John R. Kunkle (Univ. Western Ontario)
Paul Logeman (Los Angeles)
Ely Rayek (Mexico)
Ellen P. Reese (Mount Holyoke College)
The Kantor Memorial Fund
We want to thank those who have
contributed to the Kantor Memorial Fund
for the newsletter. This fund serves for
our long-term financial stability and for
special publication and promotional
events. Past giving to the fund has
come from (and in some cases continues to
come from) Richard Amado, Don Bloomquist,
William Gardner, Dennis Delprato, Helene
Kantor, Louise Kent-Udolf, Harry Mahan,
Henry Pronko, and Doug Ruben.
Association for Behavior Analysis
The annual meeting of the Association
for Behavior Analysis will be held in
Milwaukee on May 22-25. A number of our
subscribers will be presenting papers or
will be otherwise involved in the program.
For those so interested, we list on the
next page the papers to be presented by
our subscribers, with the subscribers'
names presented in alphabetical order in
first subscriber-author and capitalized.
Co-authored papers are not repeated.
12
Kenzie, L;< Preston, George E. Bigelow, &
WARREN K. BICKEL: "Opioid
Discrimination in Dependent and
Nondependent Human Volunteers."
Maxine L. Stitzer & WARREN K. BICKEL:
"Dosage Contingencies in Methadone
Maintenance Patients: Effects on
Illicit Drug Use."
SIDNEY W. BIJOU: "Skinner's Verbal
Behavior and Kantor's Psychological
Linguistics: Some Comparisons."
COHMUNIDAD LOS HORCONES: "Los Horcones:
Twelve Years of Applied Behavior
Analysis to Cultural Design."
SIGRID GLENN: "Levels of Analysis and
Levels of Selection."
SIGRID GLENN: "Establishing an
Independent Behavior Analysis
Curriculum: A Case Study."
SIGRID GLENN: "Women in Academia."
RICIO HERNANDEZ-POZO: "Second Order
Discrimination in Humans."
RICIO HERNANDEZ-POZO: "Comparative Study
of Conditional Discrimination: An
Experimental Analysis Approach."
Barbara A. Wanchisen, Thomas A. Tatham, &
PHILIP N. HINELINE: "Choice Patterns
on Fixed vs. Progressive Ratios with
Shaped Guessing."
LISA H. JOHNSON, SUSAN M. SCHNEIDER,
EDWARD K. MORRIS, Dale Walker, & LYNDA
K. POWELL: "An Historical Comparison
of Women's Participation in APA and
Behavioral Journals."
PAUL T. MOUNTJOY & JAY D. HANSOR:
"Nicotine Addiction: Historical and
Behavioral Approaches."
Kimberly C. Kirby, Kathleen M. McCandless,
Dale Walker, & LYNDA K. POWELL:
"Women's Participation at the 1985
Convention of the Association for
Behavior Analysis."
EDWARD K. MORRIS & STEVEN E. LARSEN: "All
Causes Have Contexts: A Historical
Note on Contextual Conditions in the
Experimental Analysis of Behavior."
James T. Todd, LYNDA K. POWELL & EDWARD
K. MORRIS: "Individual Performance of
Rats under a Group Contingency."
JAY MOORE: "Some Comments on the Temporal
Law of Effect."
JAY MOORE: "Private Events, Theoretical
Terms, and Material Causes."
LINDA J. PARROTT: "On the Nature and
Operation of Setting Factors."
ROGER D. RAY: "Is There Life Beyond the
Three-Term Contingency? Contrasting
Interbehavioral Systems Analysis with
TEAB and Behavioral Artificial
Intelligence."
ELLEN P. REESE: "Reducing Physiological
Correlates of Anxiety In Conjunction
with Errors."
EMILIO RIBES: "Behavior Analysis at the
National University of Mexico."
SUSAN M. SCHNEIDER & EDWARD K. MORRIS: "0
Behaviorism, Wherefore Art Thou
'Radical?1: History of a Term."
JOSEPH R. SCOTTI, Roxanne Hojnacki, John
McKlssick, Ian M. Evans, & Ronald T.
Murphy: "Brief Response Interruption:
A Further Analysis."
RALPH SPIGA, Joseph D. Allen, & Amos
Zeichner: "Correlations between
Schedule-Induced Physiological
Responses and Schedule-Induced Molar
Behavior."
EDELGARD WULFERT, Richard L. Shull, &
Steven C. Hayes: "Personality
Inventory as a Predictor of Operant
Behavior on a Multiple Schedule of
Reinforcement."
GERALD E. ZURIFF: "Understanding
Behaviorism Through Its Epistemology."
In addition to Roger Ray's invited
presentation listed above, he will also be
conducting a workshop that will count for
continuing education credit. The workshop
is entitled "Naturalistic Interbehavtoral
Systems: Their Structural, Functional, and
Operational Analysis." This will be held
on Friday afternoon, May 23, from 12:00-
3:50.
Those subscribers who are otherwise
participating in the program as
chairpersons, discussants, meeting
coordinators and the like are Richard S.
Amado, William Bryson-Brockman, Stephen T.
Higgins, Peter A. Holmes, Iver Iversen, W.
Joseph Wyatt, and Robert D. Zettle.
In addition to these individual papers
and other forms of participation, the ABA
Special Interest Group for Interbehavioral
Psychology will hold their meeting on
Saturday afternoon, May 24, from 5:00-
5:50. All readers and subscribers invited
to attend.
The quotation on the front cover of
this issue is from Whltehead, A. N.
(1911). An Introduction to Mathematics.
New York: Holt. It was found in Observer
(1976). Comments and Queries: The Science
of Psychology in 1976: What Progress?
The Psychological Record, 26, 289-296.

BOOK AND JOURNAL NOTES
Brozek, J., & Pongratz, L. J. (Eds).
(1980). Historiography of modern
psychology: Aims, resources, and
approaches. Toronto: C. J.
Hogrefe.
The first paragraph of Brozek and
Pongratz's forward describes this
interesting book quite well:
This is not an account of psychology's
development a history of psychology
in the traditional sense. Rather it
deals with the aims, resources, and
approaches of historical research. As
such, the book constitutes the first
attempt, in book form, to deal with
selected aspects and issues of the
history of psychology as a specialty
within psychology. The central
question is the "how" (methods), not
the "what" (content) of historiography,
(p. ix)
The book's four main sections are: (1)
a rationale for the history of psychology
and the prerequisites for its critical
historiography (Wertheimer, Pongratz,
Woodward), (2) a historiography of
psychology around the world (e.g., Brozek,
Pongratz, and Ardila), (3) archival
resources (see especially L. T. Benjamin
on the Archives of the History of American
Psychology), and (4) examples of five
approaches to historiography
biographical (Sokol), descriptive/analytic
(Pongratz), quantitative (Brozek), social
(Thomas), and socio-psychological
(Watson).
Brozek and Pongratz's major point is
"Nemo psychologus nisi historicus," which
translates as "Nobody can effectively
pursue psychology without familiarity with
history." (Edward K. Morris, University
of Kansas)
Newbury, E. (1953). Philosophic
assumptions in operational psychology.
The Journal of Psychology, 35, 371-378,
Newbury cites Professor Kantor's work
frequently in this interesting little
paper. The opening paragraph of the
article reads as follows:
13
Despite considerable pretensions among
operationists in psychology of avoiding
philosophic complications, their
disagreements with introspectionists
and among themselves, sometimes in open
metaphysical terms, suggest the
importance of investigating the
significance of some of their explicit
or implicit epistemological and
ontological assumptions.
The rest of the paper we leave to your
reading, if you are so inclined. (Susan
M. Schneider, University of Kansas)
Zuriff, G. E. (1985). Behaviorism: A
Conceptual Reconstruction. New York:
Columbia University Press.
Although we briefly reviewed Zuriff's
comments on interbehavioral psychology in
a previous issue (1985, No. 2), we recently
found an interesting paragraph on another
matter in the book that bears repeating.
It is not clear what role is played in
the determination of a scientist's
behavior by a priori prescriptions as
to how science "ought" to proceed.
Often these philosophical
pronouncements follow the success of a
theory. Philosophers formulate a post
hoc formal reconstruction of what is
often a successful case of informal
theorizing. The formal reconstruction
is then raised as the model to be
followed by future theory. However, by
the time the nature of this
reconstruction is somewhat clarified by
debate within the philosophical
community, scientists are working on
the next theory, which may not fit the
former model. Philosophy of science is
in a continuous attempt to catch up to
science, and is in this sense an
epiphenomenon of science, affected by
science but having little impact in
return, (p. 94)
(Edward K. Morris, Univerity of Kansas)
We strongly encourage readers to submit
brief book and journal notes. >.
11*
INVITED EDITOR'S COMMENTARY CONTINUED:
Where To From Here? Naturalistic Behavioral Medicine
Dennis J. Delprato
Eastern Michigan University
Our dualistic tradition has placed
psychology at an opposite pole from
biology and the health sciences. Recent
developments, however, are breaking down
the dichotomy. Psychosomatic medicine,
one of the first bridges between the two,
recognized the connection between events
referred to as "mental" and those referred
to as "physical," but collapsed because of
inept postulates that fostered obscure,
impractical, and ineffective procedures.
A new specialty, behavioral medicine, has
evolved to fill this gap. Although
behavioral medicine is largely a
technological affair, its evolution Is
part of the movement towards integrated-
field thinking a la Kantor. Delprato and
McGlynn (1986) provide a more detailed
analysis of this and identify tentative
postulates for behavioral medicine (see
Psychosomatic Medicine
Two Factor Postulate
The events of psychosomatic medicine
are comprised of psychological
(mental) and bodily processes.
Reductionistic Postulate
The ultimate cause of organismic
activity is found in biological
structures and proceses.
Ahistorical Postulate
Although organisms undergo
development, developmental
interactions leave a residue that
when analyzed, provides the answers
to contemporary actions.
Hierarchy of Disciplines Postulate
Although psychosomatic medicine
brings together scientists and
practitioners from various
disciplines, physiology and orthodox
medicine are basic.
table below). Because psychosomatic
medicine continues to pose a threat to
behavioral medicine, which is not
surprising given its foundation in
cultural tradition, I have also taken each
behavioral medicine postulate and shown
its predecessor in psychosomatic medicine.
This juxtaposition nicely represents both
the "From here" and "Where to" aspects of
the present theme.
Reference
Delprato, D. J., & McGlynn, F. D. (1986).
Innovations in behavioral medicine. In
M. Hersen, R. M. Eisler,'& P. M. Miller
(Eds.), Progress in behavior
modification (vol. 20, pp. 67-122).
New York: Academic Press.
Behavioral Medicine
Field Postulate
The events of behavioral medicine are
comprised of multifactor fields.
Holistic Postulate
The entire organism, not only
specific components, participates in
its performances.
Evolutional Postulate
Behavioral medicine works with
multifactor fields that have evolved
and are evolving.
Interdisciplinary Postulate
The practice of behavioral medicine
demands interdisciplinary
cooperation; no discipline is more
basic than any other.
 15

Tactical Postulate Tactical Postulate

Clinical procedures are modifications Clinical procedures are modifications
of psychological (mental) and bodily of field factors.
factors.
Goal Postulate Goal Postulate
The goals of psychosomatic medicine The goals of behavioral medicine are
are alterations of individuals, alterations in developmental
including their emotions, trajectories.
perceptions, cognitions, and even
their behavior.

BOOK REVIEW
Paradigms, Thought, and Language by I. Harkova
Sandy Hobbs
Paisley College of Technology, Scotland
This book has received a highly domination is regrettable, since a
critical review in Contemporary superior "Hegelian" framework is
Psychology (Flanagan, 1984).Although available. To frame the argument in terms
many of the criticisms made there against of historical traditions must surely imply
it are justified, it would be be a pity if that authors identified as belonging to a
such a prominent and unfavorable review given tradition have come under certain
were to keep readers away from a work that common influences and that they thereby
holds some interest from the point of view have more in common with each other than
of interbehavioral psychology. they have with adherents to other
Markova is quite explicit in her traditions. In the case of the
intention to argue for the superiority of "Cartesian" tradition, Markova recognizes
what she sees as a Hegelian approach to she has a problem, in that psychologists
psychology. The language used by to whom she gives this label include
psychologists who see themselves in a people who are often seen as belonging to
Hegelian tradition clearly sets them apart two rival traditions rationalism and
from interbehavioral psychologists. At empiricism. Her contention, however, is
least one of them Riegel (1978) has that the differences between rationalism
praised Kantor, however. This suggests and empiricism are less important than
that a dialogue between dialectical and "their underlying similarities and
interbehavioral psychologists might prove convergences" (p. 7, emphasis in the
fruitful, but, as far as this reviewer is original).A point of view that treats
aware, no such dialogue has taken place. Skinner and Chomsky, for example, as
Markova's book may provide some clues to falling into the same tradition could
what common ground exists, if any. produce stimulating reading.
Paradigms, Thought, and Language Unfortunately, Markova makes no sustained
contains two main parts, the first being attempt to demonstrate the cogency of her
devoted to what Markova calls the "Cartesian" tradition by systematic
"Cartesian" framework and the second to historical analysis. Instead, she picks
the Hegelian alternative. This division particular writers for attack on no
arises from two linked claims the author obvious principle of selection. The fact
appears to make. One is that a that some of her attacks are cogent and
"Cartesian" view has tended to dominate illuminating is a small compensation for
modern psychology. The other is that this the lack of overall coherence. -
 Surpislngly, the treatment of Hegelian
psychology is marred by a similar
weakness. Apart from an outline of
Hegel's own philosophy of mind, we are
provided with only fragmentary accounts of
research that In some way or another meets
with Harkova's approval. She fails to
make clear in what respects the research
she praises either gained from, or would
have been improved by, an explicitly
Hegelian conceptual framework. This
section is too ahistorical. For example,
Harkova deals in favorable terms with the
Soviet psychologist, Leontyev, but fails
to discuss the issues raised by the fact
that it is as a Marxist rather than as a
Hegelian that he writes. Of course,
Marxism can be seen historically as a
derivative of Hegelian philosophy, but it
is surely as unhelpful to discuss a
Marxist writer simply as part of an
undifferentiated "Hegelian" tradition as
it is to group empiricist and rationalist
writers together as undifferentiated
"Cartesians."
The interbehavioral reader may get most
out of this book by abandoning at the
outset any hope of finding sustained
plausible arguments in defense of the
author's main explicit themes. If treated
as a loosely linked set of studies of
particular writers on cognitive and
linguistic psychology, the book may be
responded to more positively. It may be
fruitful to consider Markova's criticisms
and praise in terms of the extent to which
they are and are not compatible with
COMMENTS
On Setting Factors and Interbehavioral Research:
A Reply to Pronko
James Fox
Peabody College of Vanderbllt University
Recently, Pronko (1985) has commented
upon what he views as the expanded, though
incorrect, usage of the term "setting
factors" by certain interbehaviorists.
Citing Kantor's (1958) and Kantor and
Smith's (1975) definition of the term,
Pronko.emphasized the Immediate nature of
setting factors:
interbehavioral perspectives. For
example, there are interesting comparisons
to be made between Blewitt's (1983)
comments on the shifting views of the
cognitive psychologist Neisser and
criticisms of Neisser by Markova. Harkova
quotes Neisser approvingly for saying
"perceiving is a kind of doing" (p. 72),
but regrets that he has failed to
completely abandon the "one-way flow"
model of perception in favor of a truly
"two-way flow" model in which both the
perceiver and the world are transformed.
To sum up, a disappointing work, but
not one to be ignored.
[Published by John Wiley, Chichester,
England, 1982]
References
Blewitt, E. (1983). The computer analogy
in psychology: Memory as interbehavior
or information processing? In N. W.
Smith, P. T. Mountjoy, & D. H. Ruben
(Eds.), Reassessment in psychology: The
interbehavioral alternative (pp. 381-
407).Washington, DC: University Press
of America.
Flanagan, 0. J. (1984). Psychology,
philosophy, and the division of
Intellectual labor [review of
Paradigms, thought, and language].
Contemporary Psychology, 29, 232-233.
Riegel, K. F. (1978).Psychology mon
amour: A countertext. Boston:
Houghton Mifflin.
In addition [to the interbehavioral
history] there is the setting factor
(st); it consists of the immediate
circumstances influencing which
particular sf-rf will occur. (Kantor,
1958, p. 14 as cited by Pronko, 1985)
This was contrasted with Bijou and

Baer's (1961) and Wahler and Fox's (1981)
use of the term to include "stimulus-
response interactions that influence
subsequent stimulus-response
interactions." In Pronko's view such a
definition is in error since it departs
from Kantor's definition of setting
factors as overlapping with the occurrence
of a particular organism-environment
interaction of interest. Moreover, he
argues that "the effects of one stimulus-
response interaction on another are
already covered by the principle, 'Present
events are a function of antecedent
events'" (Pronko, 1985).
Because of the conceptual and empirical
importance of setting factors to an
interbehavioral analysis, I would like to
make several brief comments. First, it is
quite true that in most of his writings
Kantor employed a definition of setting
factors which stressed the immediacy of
such events. In his analysis of the
experimental analysis of behavior,
however, Kanbor (1970) himself gave the
following description of setting
components:
For psychological behavior in general
there are obviously many other
conditions localizable in and around
the organism and its stimuli. For
example, the hygiene of the organism,
its habituation or past behavioral
history, what behavioral circumstances
it has recently or just previously
passed through, the presence or absence
of confining objects and numerous
others. (Kantor, 1970, p. 107)
Indeed, In our similar critique of applied
behavior analysis, Wahler and I used the
above citation as justification for the
inclusion of preceding stimulus-response
Interactions as setting factors (see
Wahler & Fox, 1981, p. 330). Thus, our
use of the term in this manner does not
seem wholly divergent from Kantor's use.
Not only did there seem to be some
precedent for treating prior stimulus-
response interactions as setting factors,
it also seemed a more precise way of
describing those durational events which
have often been used to exemplify setting
factors (e.g., deprivation and satiation).
That is, deprivation does not simply
consist of restricting or eliminating a
subject's access to certain stimuli, but
of replacing one set of stimulus-response
17
interactions with another set or sets of
interactions between subject and
environment. For example, sleep
deprivation operations not only eliminate
sleep but also bring about a series of
interactions between sleep deprived people
and their environments that are different
from t<hose that typically occur during
sleep. Thus, deprivation (and satiation)
would seem to be more accurately
characterized as an ongoing series of
interactions between an organism and its
environment different from those that^
typically transpire in that situation.
Different types of prior person-
environment interaction may have quite
different effects on people's ensuing
interactions with their environment
(Premack, 1971). To continue the previous
example, tossing and turning in bed as
opposed to getting up and reading a book
may exert quite opposite effects on
insomniacs' subsequent attempts to sleep
when they return to bed.
The current debate over the immediacy
of setting factors has stressed,
incorrectly perhaps, a structural
definition at the expense of a functional
definition. Indeed, this has been the
thrust of recent critiques of the concept
by more traditional behavior analysts
(Leigland, 198*1; Michael, 1983). Morris
(personal communication, October, 1985)
has made a similar point, arguing that
defining setting factors with regard to
the time of their occurrence misses the
spirit of Kantor's original definitions,
that interbehavioral history gives the
original functions to stimuli and,
responses and setting factors determine
which of these various functions occurs
at a given time. Such a functional
definition suggests that potential setting
factors may be identified for further
analysis by first looking for variations
in or exceptions to known stimulus-
response (or response-stimulus)
relationships. To complete this analysis,
the contextual conditions would then be
systematically varied as changes in the
stimulus-response relationship are
measured.
This brings me to the third point. In
our discussion of setting factors, Wahler
and I were attempting to provoke more
explicit acknowledgment of the
contributions of such factors by applied
behavior analysts and, we hoped, to
promote investigation of the influence of
18
contextual1 variables on the momentary
exchanges between people and their
environments. At the level of concrete,
confrentable events, such research is
seriously lacking. Interbehaviorists have
written much but have yet to produce (or
at least publicize) empirical
demonstrations of sufficient quantity or
quality to persuade others, especially our
behavior analytic colleagues, of the
utility of the interbehavioral model. The
twin needs of interbehaviorists for
definitional clarity and for research
demonstrating the functional properties of
setting factors have been further pressed
upon us by recent criticisms of the
setting factor concept by more traditional
behavior analysts (Leigland, 198*1;
Michael, 1983). Certainly, precision in
the definition of terms is an important
part of any scientific effort. If such
debate, however, delays or diverts our
efforts from empirical analyses of
contextual or historical events, then we
do ourselves and scientific psychology a
disservice.
Perhaps a functional definition of
setting factors will provide a point of
consensus for interbehaviorists. Perhaps,
too, increasing the definitional clarity
of this and other interbehavioral terms
will address some of the concerns
expressed by others (Leigland, 1984;
Michael, 1983). Still, these and other
criticisms cannot receive an adequate
response in the absence of empirical
research; theory must be derived from an
analysis of events. To understand and
account for the complexities of human
behavior, research must include not only
the operation of immediate contextual
factors, but also the influence of
previous interactions between the person
and the environment. The specific
function of particular events will be made
clear through research, not simply through
discourse. It is time, indeed past time,
that we accelerate research on setting and
historical factors.
. References
Bijou, S. W., & Baer, D. M. (1961).
Child development I: A systematic and
empirical theory. Englewood Cliffs,
NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Kantor, J. R. (1958). Interbehavioral
psychology. Chicago: Principia Press.
Kantor, J. R. (1970). An analysis of the
experimental analysis of behavior
(TEAB). Journal of the Experimental
Analysis of Behavior, 13, 101-108.
Kantor, J. R., & Smith, N. W. (1975).
The science of psychology: An
interbehavioral survey. Chicago;
Principia Press.
Leigland, S. (1984). On setting events
and related concepts. The Behavior
Analyst. 7, 41-45.
Michael, J. L. (1983). Distinguishing
between discriminative and motivational
functions of stimuli. Journal of the
Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 37,
149-155.
Premack, D. (1971). Catching up with
common sense or two sides of a
generalization: Reinforcement and
punishment. In R. Glaser (Ed.), The
nature of reinforcement. New York:
Academic Press.
Pronko, N. (1985). The matter of setting
factors: As I see it. The
Infcerbehaviorlst, 1^, 7.
Wahler, R. G., & Fox, J. J. (1981).
Setting events in applied behavior
analysis: Toward a conceptual and
methodological expansion. Journal of
Applied Behavior Analysis, V4, 327-338.
Preparation of this manuscript was
supported by Grant #6-30426 from the
National Institute of Child Health and
Human Development. The author wishes to
thank William Brown, William Bryson-
Brockman, Mary McEvoy, and Sarah Savelle
for their helpful comments on earlier
drafts. Copies of this manuscript can be
obtained from James Fox, Box 328, Peabody
College, Vanderbilt University, Nashville,
TN 37203.

ARTICLE
Advanced General Psychology;
A Course on Interbehavioral Principles
William M. Gardner
Jacksonville State University
The problems entailed in introducing
interbehavioral principles into a
traditional curriculum Include
restrictions imposed by course
descriptions, the limited selection of
interbehavioral texts, and colleagues who
are uncomfortable with the Interbehavioral
perspective. These problems
notwithstanding, I have discovered a
course-text-method combination that has
proven particularly successful.
Last spring, I made a radical, albeit
informal, change in our psychology
curriculum: I selected Kantor and Smith's
(1975) The Science of Psychology as the
"new" text for our course, Advanced
General Psychology. Although Kantor and
Smith's book requires college-level
reading skills and flouts many widely held
beliefs, both religious and philosophical,
the text was well received. The success
of the course has prompted me to record
the specifics and to share them with the
newsletter's readers.
Text Assignments
The chapters in The Science of
Psychology were assigned In order. Each
week, students were provided with a list
of facts to learn and one of two potential
essay topics. The fact lists and essay
topics were taken more or less directly
from the text. (Note: Students were
assured that the text was the best
available, and that Kantor was a name to
be remembered.)
Format of Lectures
Each chapter was reviewed in lecture.
Diagrams placing the naturalistic view in
the context of traditional psychology were
presented. Examples from everyday life
were then related to the interbehavioral
principles under discussion. The phrase,
"As you know from your personal
experience..." was used frequently.
Students were repeatedly told to trust
their observations rather than what they
have always been told.
Considerable class time was given to
discussions arising from questions raised
19
by the more outspoken students, one of
whom became a decided asset by raising
critical issues. The question that
recurred most throughout the course can be
paraphrased as: "Where are psychological
events if they are not in the mind or
brain?" Each time this question was
raised, the questioner was treated as a
professional who knew the facts, but
suffered the burden of a confusing verbal
tradition.
Evaluation
On test day, one of the previously
assigned essay topics was randomly
selected. Because all essay topics were
known before test day, grading standards
were set unusually high. The essays were
assigned letter grades, without
elaboration. Students were told, "If you
disagree with my assessment of your paper
(after discussing it with me), I will
raise your grade." Only one student
exercised this option, but her overall
course grade was not thereby influenced.
In addition to essay tests,.students
were given a fact recall test each month.
A cumulative list of approximately 75
facts was distributed each month.
Students were required to memorize the
facts and to put them on flashcards for
timed testing. Some examples of these
recall facts are:
1. Front:Interbehavioral history is...
Back: ...the history of experience
necessary for rf-sf
development.
2. Front: No science can be established
firmly until it rejects...
Back: ...verbal traditions.
3. Front: Mentalistic psychology is
based in the metaphysics of...
Back: ...spiritualism and idealism.
Card decks of these items were shuffled
before each fact recall test, and multiple
tries were permitted. The students were
required to say as many facts as possible
In a timed one-minute period. A criterion
20
recall rate of 30 cards per minute was
required for a grade of 100^, (Note:
Students were not required to read the
front of the cards aloud, only to say the
answers aloud. In the future, I plan to
have them read the front aloud before
saying the answers, and to lower the
criterion speed accordingly.) The monthly
fact lists were cumulative, so each
student had a deck of approximately 250
cards by the final timed test. The timed
testing was quite similar to Lindsley's
SAFMEDS technique (McGreevy, 1983);
however, no charting or daily testing was
required.
Course grades were computed by
averaging essay grades equally with
fact recall grades. The median grade on
essays was a C; most students achieved
the 10056 criterion speed on the fact
recall tests. Thus, the median course
grade was a B.
Despite extensive memory work for speed
testing and demanding essay standards, as
well as a textbook low on nonsense and
high on reading level, the students did
not rebel. Indeed, the general reaction
to the course was quite positive. But
there were problems.
The Problems
The course demands were explicit and
high. As might be expected, the course
dropout percentage was high, about 1556.
Anxiety levels on card/speed tests were
also high, especially on the first test.
Allowing practice trials helped to reduce
this anxiety. Because there was potential
for bias in the grading of essays, student
numbers were used to identify essay test
papers. Because tests were not dependent
on lecture information, students with
lower aspirations cut class frequently.
Conclusion
This was arguably the most enjoyable
course I have ever taught. Although
Edward K. Morris, Editor
The Interbehaviorlst
Department of Human Development
University of Kansas
Lawrence, Kansas 66045
pleasure is not the primary objective of
teaching, it can enhance the quality of
lectures, as well as concern for the
students. The testing system used seemed
to eliminate one of the more distasteful
aspects of teaching test postmortems.
Host students seemed to accept the grade
assigned on essays, and once most students
received W0% on their first speed test,
pleas for a lower criterion speed ceased.
Because the potential essay topics
were known weeks in advance, all students
had a chance to prepare scholarly essays,
which served to establish the textbook as
a useful and thereby friendly authority.
The memory work for speed tests did
produce grumbling, with frequent comments
about "regurgitating" facts, but this
changed to exuberance for the majority who
achieved the 1005& criterion. Most
students saved their test cards after the
course was over, and some began using
similar cards and speed recall to study
facts in other courses.
Each teacher has a unique style and
each class has a unique "personality";
therefore, one could easily overgeneralize
from one class to another. Nonetheless,
we must share our experiences or otherwise
learn everything by trial-and-error.
Perhaps other interbehaviorists would
share their methods used In teaching the
interbehavioral perspective.
References
Kantor, J. R., & Smith, N. W. (1975).
The science of psychology. Chicago:
Principia Press.
McGreevy, P. (1983). Teaching and
learning in plain English (2nd~ed.).
Kansas City: Plain English
Publications. (P.O. Box 7224, Kansas
City, MO 64113)
 A Quarterly Newsletter of Interbehavioral Psychology
ISSN 8755-612X
Published at the University of Kansas
Volume 14 1986 Number 3
EDITOR TABLE OF CONTENTS

Edward K. Morris Notes from the Field 22

University of Kansas
The Agora 23
ADVISORY BOARD Reassessment 23
Sidney W. Bijou New Ideas in Therapy 23
University of Arizona
Donna M. Cone Principia Press 24
State of Rhode Island
Dennis J. Delprato The Mahan Book 24
Eastern Michigan University
Sandy Hobbs (Scotland) New Subscribers .. 24
Paisley College of Technology
Paul T. Mountjoy Book and Journal Notes 25
Western Michigan University
Linda J. Parrott (Canada) Comments 30
St. Mary's University
N. H. Pronko N. H. Pronko: A Matter of
Wichita State University Interpretation: A Reply to Fox... 30
Roger D. Ray
Rollins College Harry C. Mahan: On Some
Emilio Ribes (Mexico) Controversial Terms 30
Escuela Nacional de Estudios
Douglas H. Ruben Harry C. Mahan: The Brain and
Eastern Michigan University Psychological Processes: Three
Robert G. Wahler Quotations 31
University of Tennessee
QUOTATION
ASSISTANT EDITORS Why has the part-whole problem not been
solved before? Simply because the human
Lisa M. Johnson mind has not been relativistic enough.
Bryan D. Midgley It has been too absolutistic: atomistic,
Susan M. Schneider mechanistic> and vitalistic.
James T. Todd
- Wheeler, 1935
22
THE INTERBEHAVIORIST
A Quarterly Newsletter of
Interbehavioral Psychology
ISSN 8755-612X
Edward K. Morris, Editor
Department of Human Development
212B Haworth Hall
University of Kansas
Lawrence, Kansas 66045, U.S.A.
913-864-3684/4840
The Interbehaviorist is a quarterly
publication of news, information,
discussion, journal and book notes, book
reviews, comments, and brief articles
pertaining to interbehavioral psychology
a contextualistic, integrated-field
approach tp the natural science of
behavior.
The newsletter publishes professional
communications that fall between informal
correspondence and colloquia, and formal
archival publication. As such, the
newsletter supplements contemporary
journals dedicated to basic and applied
research, to the history and philosophy of
the behavioral sciences, and to
professional issues in the field. The
newsletter strongly encourages
submission of notes about current
professional activities of its
subscribers, news and observations about
interbehavioral psychology and related
perspectives, comments on journal articles
and books of interest, more extended book
reviews, and brief articles. All
submissions should be sent in triplicate
to the editor and should conform to the
style described in the Publication Manual
of the American Psychological Association
(3rd edition).
Subscription Information
Student Subscriptions (US) $ 4.00
Regular Subscriptions (US) 6.00
Foreign Subscriptions 8.00
Institutional Subscriptions 12.00
Back Volumes 1-12 6.00
Back Volume Complete Sets... Please Write
NOTES FROM THE FIELD
The Spring, 1986 issue of The
Psychological Record contained articles by
DAVID CORNWELL and SANDY HOBBS on
"Spontaneous Play in Childhood" and by
IVER H. IVERSEN on "Time Allocation,
Sequential, and Kinematic Analyses of
Behaviors Controlled by an Aperiodic
Reinforcement Schedule." Also in that
issue, PAUL T. MOUNTJOY and DONNA M. CONE
contributed book reviews of Matarazzo,
Weiss, Herd, Miller, and Weiss's
Behavioral Health and of Trower's Radical
Approaches to Social Skill Training,
respectively.
IVERSEN also published an article with
Sidman and Carrigan in the Journal of the
Experimental Analysis of Behavior entitled
"Stimulus Definition in Conditional
Discriminations," 1986, 45, 297-304.
R. J. Corsini's (Ed.) (1984)
Encyclopedia of Psychology (Wiley)
contains a contribution by N. H. PRONKO on
interbehavioral psychology. A brief
biographical sketch of Professor Kantor
also appears in that volume.
DOUGLAS H. RUBEN published "The
'Interbehavioral1 Approach to Treatment"
in the Journal of Contemporary
Psychotherapy, 1986, 16, 62-71 and, with
Marilyn Ruben, "Is Applied Behavior
Analysis Ready for Parapsychology? A
Return to Natural Events" in Psychology:
A Quarterly Journal of Human Development,
1985, 22, 1-11.
NOEL W. SMITH'S "Belief Systems: A
Psychological Analysis" appeared in The
Mankind Quarterly, 1985, 25, 195-225-

THE AGORA
We received some kind words on the
contents and length of the last issue.
Thank you. The compliments, though, go to
those who contributed the material. As
for your urging us to publish lengthier
issues, we are delighted to do so, but
that will take your continued and perhaps
increased support. As you will see from
the current issue, though, the support is
out there.
The response to Dennis Delprato's
(Eastern Michigan University) guest-edited
issue of the newsletter was extremely
positive, and hence we will continue the
editorial policy of having occasional
guest editors. In fact, we are pleased to
announce that this year's fourth issue
(October) will be guest-edited by Linda J.
Parrott (Saint Mary's University). Linda
will have a selection of papers she has
co-authored with her students and will
bring us up to date on interbehavioral
activities at the Association for Behavior
Analysis.
On other matters, Sandy Hobbs (Paisley
College of Technology) sent us abstracts
and papers from the April, 1986 conference
of the European Experimental Analysis of
Behavior Group. Of most interest was a
symposium chaired by Edward Blewitt
entitled "Kantor and the Behaviorist
Tradition." We will present more
information on that in a subsequent issue.
Arthur Kahn (Baltimore, MD) offered us
some interesting observations and a query
on a new book by John M. O'Donnell, The
Origins of Behaviorism; American
Psychology, 1870-1920 (see the Journal and
Book Notes section for a brief review).
Let me excerpt from his letter:
There is an unusual reference to J.
R. Kantor on p. 219. In a discussion
of the University of Minnesota, the
author states: "It is no surprise that
many of the leading behaviorists
including G. M. Guthrie, Joseph
Peterson, J. R. Kantor, Karl Lashley,
and B. F. Skinner spent portions of
their careers at Minnesota." It is
amazing how the author put two and
three together and got five to make his
point. He tries to equate applied
psychology to behaviorism in its early
development. Frankly, I never
considered Lashley a behaviorist. It
would be interesting if someone...could
23
be encouraged to determine from what is
available why Kantor went to Minnesota.
Please let us know if any sleuthing on
this last point by the newsletter's
readers turns up an answer to Art's query.
Not all of popular psychology in print
is terrible. Noel W. Smith (SUNY-
Plattsburgh) sent us a clipping from a
health column Hitten by Lester Coleman,
M.D. in which the columnist answered an
inquiry about whether fish was "brain
food" and whether eating it would make the
reader smart. Coleman responded with a
"No," and commented further: "The brain
is an organ that flourishes and grows on
good nutrition as does every other
organ of the body....Intellectual
development is the result of reading,
studying, and exposure to the sciences and
humanities. These are really the 'brain
foods' that are so vital to that
development." Well said!
That is all from the editor's desk.
Good reading, to you.
Reassessment in Psychology
Noel W. Smith (SUNY-Plattsburgh)
informs us that University Press of
America has recently reprinted more copies
of his Festschrift for Professor Kantor
(with Paul T. Mountjoy and Douglas H.
Ruben), Reassessment in Psychology: The
Interbehavioral Alternative. The
publisher's address is P.O. Box 19101,
Washington, DC 20036.
New Ideas in Therapy
The chapters for Douglas H. Ruben and
Dennis J. Delprato's (Eastern Michigan
University) New Ideas In Therapy have been
submitted to Greenwood Press. We look
forward to the book's publication. As the
book now stands, the chapter authors and
chapter titles are as follows:
Section I: Foundations of the New Therapy
1. J. R. Kantor: What Qualifies
Interbehavioral Psychology as an
Approach to Treatment?
2. N. H. Pronko: Theory versus Practice
3. Paul R. Fuller: From the Classroom to
the Field and Back
Section II: Methods
4. Robert W. Lundin: The Interbehavioral
Approach to Psychopathology
5. Robert G. Wahler and Delia tf; Hann:
24
Interbehavioral Approach to
Clinical Child Psychology: Toward
an Understanding of Troubled
Families
6. F. Dudley HcGlynn, Edwin W. Cook III,
and Paul E. Greenbaum: Toward an
Interbehavioral Medicine
7. D. J. Delprato: Clinical
Implications of Response Patterns
8. William Stephenson: Q-Methodology:
Interbehavioral and Quantum
Theoretical Connections in
Clinical Psychology
9- Douglas H. Ruben and Marilyn J.
Ruben: Assumptions about Teaching
Assertiveness: Training the
Person or Behavior?
10. Dallas W. Stevenson and Michael
Hemingway: Multldisciplinary
Approach to Obesity and Risk
Factor Management
11. Edward K. Morris, Lisa M. Johnson,
Steven E. Larsen, Lynda K, Powell,
James T. Todd, and Jane B. Atwater:
Interbehavioral Perspectives on
Legal Deviance: Some
Considerations of Context
12. Lynne A. Daurelle, Ann P. Kaiser, and
James C. Fox: An Interbehavioral
Perspective on Parent Training for
Families of Developmentally
Delayed Children
13. Mary Ann Scafasci: Community-Based
Psychological Services for
Developmentally Retarded Persons
1*1. Donna M. Cone: Public Policy
Research from a Field-Theory
Perspective
The Principia. Press
Listed below are the currently
available of Professor Kantor's books.
Please check your bookshelves, and those
of your institutional library and
bookstore, for possible oversights. The
books may be purchased directly from
Principia Press, 5743 Kimbark Avenue,
Chicago, IL 60637. Handling charges are
$.75 per title; prepaid orders are post
free.
Principles of Psychology (2 vols.)
$20.00
Psychology and Logic (2 vols.)
$25.00
Interbehavioral Psychology
$15.00
The Logic of Modern Science
$15700
An Objective Psychology of Grammar
$13-00 "
The Scientific Evolution of Psychology
(2 vols.)ipoToo
The Science of Psychology: An
Interbehavioral Survey $20.00
Psychological Linguistics
$15.00
Interbehavioral Philosophy
$27.50
Cultural Psychology
$16.00
Tragedy and the Event Continuum
j1g-QO
Selected Writings, 1929-1983
$20.00
Psychological Comments and Queries
$20.00
The Mahan Book
As mentioned in previous issues of the
newsletter, Harry Mahan (Project Socrates)
has generously donated the remaining
copies of his text, The Interactional
Psychology of J. R. Kantor: An
Introduction (Mahan, 1968), to us for
resale to help finance the newsletter.
The book contains a full-page
photoportrait of Professor Kantor,
chapters on the interbehavioral approach
to major topics in psychology, and a
bibliography of Professor Kantor's
publications through 1963. The book is
available through us for $5.00 (U.S.) or
$7.50 (foreign).
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My Book Service (Japan)
The quotation on the front cover of
this issue was submitted by Susan M.
Schneider (University of Kansas). The
reference is: Wheeler, R. H. (1935).
Organismic vs. mechanistic logic.
Psychological Review, 42, 335-353.

BOOK AND JOURNAL NOTES
Ceci, S. J. Memory development [reviews
of Cognitive learning and memory in
children and Basic processes in memory
development3.Science, 1986, 231
(March), 231.
John H. Grossberg (San Diego State
University) sent us Ceci's review of some
recent books on memory, which contains
Ceci's comments on how current research
might be revitalized. Some of these views
have a distinctly interbehavioral flavor,
as in the following:
The evidence presented in several
chapters suggests that memory processes
cannot be adequately studied In the
disembedded laboratory contexts that
have characterized the majority of work
on the subject. Contexts vary in the
effectiveness with which they recruit
mnemonic strategies, foster motivation,
and shape one's perception of the
particular memory task at hand. One of
the many important messages of these
volumes is that the exclusive reliance
upon laboratory contexts is likely to
result in misleading models of memory
development, (p. 231)
Lewontin, R. C., Rose, S., & Kamin, L. J.
(198*1). Not In our genes: Biology,
Ideology, and human nature. New York:
Pantheon.
In commenting on this book In Volume 12
(number 4), James T. Todd was favorable
about what the authors' Interbehavioral
orientation, but was critical of
misunderstandings the authors had about
contemporary behaviorism. There is still
much that is good in the book, which John
M. Grossberg (San Diego State University)
reminded us of with the following
quotation from it.
We describe [our position] as
dialectical, in contrast to
reductionist. Reductionist explanation
attempts to derive properties of wholes
from intrinsic properties of parts,
properties that exist apart from and
before the parts are assembled Into
complex structures. It is
characteristic of reductionism that it
25
assigns relative weights to different
partial causes and attempts to assess
the Importance of each cause by holding
all others constant while varying a
single factor. Dialectical
explanations, on the contrary, do not
abstract properties of parts in
isolation from their associations in
wholes but see the properties of parts
as arising out of their associations.
That is, according to the dialectical
view, the properties of parts and
wholes codetermine each other. The
properties of individual human beings
do not exist in isolation but' arise as
a consequence of social life, yet the
nature of that social life is a
consequence of our being human and not,
say, plants. It follows, then, that
dialectical explanation contrasts with
cultural or dualistic modes of
explanation that separate the world
into different types of phenomena
culture and biology, mind and body
which are to be explained in quite
different and nonoverlapping ways,
(p. 11)
Lundin, R. W. (1985). An objective
psychology of music. Malabar, FL:
Robert E. Krieger.
Science and music are often regarded as
lying on opposite ends of a continuum, the
former being characterized by objective
demonstration, the latter by subjective
expression. Psychologists interested In
the study of music must overcome such
obstacles in arriving at an adequate
understanding of musical phenomena.. In An
Objective Psychology of Music, Lundin
(1985) demonstrates that what is
ostensibly subjective can be examined
scientifically, and to good effect.
Lundin treats musical behavior as any
other behavior, analyzable into of
stimulus and response functions. On the
stimulus side, we find chapters on the
various dimensions of tone (e.g., pitch
and timbre) and their combinations (e.g.,
melody and harmony). On the response
side, we find chapters on affective and
aesthetic responses to music and the
nature of musical ability. Lundin also
provides material of special interest to
26
applied psychologists, with a discussion
of the uses of music in industry and
therapy. Regardless of the topic, though,
Lundin consistently stands on firm
scientific ground by relying on empirical
research to derive his conclusions.
Although various theoretical
perspectives are given due consideration,
Lundin maintains an interbehavioral view
throughout. For instance, instead of
conceptualizing musical ability as a
single trait, he states that "it consists
of a number of acquired interrelated
behaviors built up through a process of
interaction of individual organisms with
musical stimuli throughout the life
history" (p. 214).
In all, the book is comprehensive, well
organized, and serves as a useful
introduction to a scientific approach to
the study of music. (Steven E. Larsen,
University of Kansas)
O'Donnell, J. M. (1985). The origins of
behaviorism: American psychology, 1870-
1920. New York: New York University
Press.
The Origins of Behaviorism is meant to
be an alternative to traditional histories
of psychology which emphasize the
intellectual and scientific foundations of
the discipline. Thus, according to
O'Donnell, "The object of this inquiry is
not to trace the intellectual sources of
Watson's formulations but to provide a
history of the emergence of the
disciplinary pattern that supported those
fomulations" (p. x). That is, the book is
an analysis of the evolution of the
contexts within the university system
that allowed the development and
existence of early behaviorism.
In this regard, the book Is true to its
purpose. The author provides a great deal
of information about the development of
the university system throughout the
nineteenth century and shows how this
development supported the rise of
professional academic psychology. In
addition, he describes how the formation
of psychology departments separate from
philosophy was based as much on
institutional and practical considerations
as on intellectual ones. In Illustrating
his analysis, O'Donnell quotes numerous
original sources of the era, including
Buch personal correspondence between early
psychologists, and thereby provides a
sometimes intimate view of the personal,
political, and academic bases for many
aspects of early of behaviorism.
Because the emphasis of the book is on
the institutional contexts in which
behaviorism developed only a sketchy
description of its intellectual and
scientific development is provided.
Occasionally, this underemphasis of the
scientific behavior of the early
psychologists makes parts of the book seem
incomplete and, therefore, difficult to
follow. The author's purpose was not,
however, to Include background for a
history of the scientific development of
behaviorism. So, in order to fill some
gaps, readers might want to have handy a
history of psychology's scientific
development during these years, such as
Boakes' (1984) From Darwin to Behaviorism
o r Boring's (1950) A History o f '
Experimental Psychology.(For a generally
earlier scientific analysis, see Kantor,
1963, 1969).
An important consideration for
potential readers is that the author
occasionally clouds his narrative with a
bewildering amount of detail. In the
first half of the book especially, the
sheer number of people, dates, and places
mentioned can be overwhelming. In some
cases, the people and events will seem
obscure even to psychologists who are
familiar with the history of their
discipline. As the book progresses,
however, the focus of the text narrows
from a wide-ranging analysis of the
evolution of academic psychology within
the larger university system to a
description of the development of
behaviorism itself in relation to the
social and institutional pressures on
academic psychology. The narrower focus
in the last half of the book is
accompanied by less cluttered and more
readable prose.
One aspect of the author's attention to
detail should be mentioned separately.
The author supports some of his points by
citing numerical data, such as the number
of hours of class time offered by
universities In various subject areas or
the number of publications in a given area
in a particular year. Although most of
these statistics are probably accurate
enough to support specific points, some of
them seem too accurate to be true. For

example, the number of hours offered in
various subject areas is extrapolated to
the nearest hour out of thousands of hours
(an accuracy much better than one
percent). In a similar manner, the author
reported that in 1908, "only six animal
experiments were published, representing
4.1 percent of the total output of
American laboratories and a mere six-
tenths of 1 percent increase over the
previous decade" (p. 181). An examination
of the 1908 Journal of Comparative
Neurology and Psychology, however, shows
that it alone contained at least seven
articles describing animal experiments;
John B. Watson himself published two
articles in other outlets describing
numerous separate experiments on monkeys
and birds (Watson, 1908a, 1908b), and
several other psychological and
physiological journals of 1908 reported
experiments on the behavior of animals.
Furthermore, the cited 0.656 Increase in
the number of animal experiments published
cannot be correct based on arithmetic
considerations alone. Although most of
the arguments in the text probably do not
depend on 100$ numerical accuracy, that
such unlikely numbers were cited and not
verified could detract slightly from
readers' confidence in the accuracy of the
book in general. (James T. Todd,
University of Kansas)
References
Boakes, R. (1984). From Darwin to
behaviorism; Psychology and the minds
of animals. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Boring, E. G. (1950). A history of
experimental psychology (2nd ed.). New
York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Kantor, J. R. (1963). The scientific
evolution of psychology (Vol. 1).
Chicago: Principia Press).
Kantor, J. R. (1969). The scientific
evolution of psychology (Vol. 2).
Chicago: Principia Press.
Watson, J. B. (1908a). Imitation in
monkeys. Psychological Bulletin, 5,
169-179-
Watson, J. B. (1908b). The behavior of
noddy and sooty terns. In Papers from
the Tortugas Laboratory of the Carnegie
Institution of Washington (Vol. 2, pp.
T87-255).Washington DC: Carnegie
Institution.
27
Rucker, D. (1969). The Chicago
pragmatlsbs. Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press.
This well-written survey provides a
historical and substantive exposition of
the Chicago School of pragmatism (1890s to
1920s; John Dewey, most famous member),
including chapters on the early years of
the University of Chicago (with
interesting political details), and on
education, religion, and other applied
aspects of pragmatism. The book ends with
an analysis of why the School produced
fruitful interdisciplinary cooperation,
and notes its later influence.
The chapters on the philosophy of
pragmatism, Itself, and on functionalism
(psychology's version of pragmatism) and
behaviorism, would probably be of most
Interest to Interbehaviorists. Be
forewarned, though, that the philosophy
chapter was rather heavy going for this
novice. Nonetheless, perhaps the
following will whet the appetite. From
the preface,
Because the Chicago philosophy
reflected an awareness of the
interconnections among the advances
being made in biology, psychology, and
sociology, it was able to provide a
method and a perspective for an array
of disciplines, (p. vi)
And, from the chapter "Psychology:
Functionalism and Behaviorism,"
Titchener was quick to seize upon what
appeared to be two vulnerable spots in
functionalism: its teleological
leanings and its connection with
philosophy. To him, both aspects were
unscientific, (p. 62)
Kantor is mentioned once, as "one of
several [Chicago students in psychology]
who became well known, but not as
functional psychologists" (p. 70). (Susan
M. Schneider, University of Kansas)
Sameroff, A. J. (1983). Developmental
systems: Contexts and evolution. In P.
H. Musseh (Ed.), Handbook of child
psychology (Vol. 1, pp. 238-294) (4th
ed.). New York: John Wiley andt Sons.
28
Sameroff's chapter Is full of _
distinctions between "systems" thinking
and more mechanistic modes of action.
Kuo, Schneirla, Piaget, Reese, Overton,
Bertalanffy, and Lasalo, to name a few,
are presented as expressing the view that
an understanding of developmental
psychology requires that it be viewed in
terms of organized "transactions" between
active participants. The author concludes
that general systems theory (GST) offers
the rubric under which such scientific
phenomena can be best described.
Sameroff, at times, however, strays too
far from pristine events in pursuing
particular analogies. For instance, in
pursuing the extension of Laszlo's GST
principle of "adaptive self-stabilization"
(p. 266) to ontological biological
development, he states:
When a deviation occurs during
embryological development...the self-
righting tendencies must be directed at
reaching the developmental level where
the fetus should be at the current
point in time rather than the
developmental level at the point in
time at which the deviation occurred.
One can imagine the complexity of
genetic coding that is required to
control the interaction of the
developing infant with a temporal
series of environmental conditions so
that the resulting newborn is within
minimal range of variability, (p. 267)
Samaroff appears to be bestowing too
much responsibility on the organism's
genetic make-up as a controlling agent.
This is quite different from treating
different levels of organization as
"potentiality-providing entities" (which
Sameroff does elsewhere on other matters).
Considering the other valuable assets
of Sameroff's chapter, however, such
criticism seems nit-picky. Certainly, his
support of the following assertion is more
representative of his work:
...some biologists see the functional
environment as so tightly organized and
specific to each organism that it is no
longer seen as an environment, but
rather as part of the organism, (p.
242)
Sameroff would profit from an
appreciation of Kantor's "interbehavioral
continuum" and we would profit from a
reading of Sameroff. (Bryan D. Midgley,
University of Kansas)
Snyder, A. W., Bossomaier, T. R. J., &
Hughes, A. (1986). Optical image
quality and cone mosaic. Science,
1986, 231, 499-500.
This paper is interesting because it
shows that we don't have to shape our
behavioral observations to fit an
invariant physiology. Instead, the
authors conclude that the cone mosaic "in
real eyes" varies according to the
organism's "habitat and life-style," a
mutually interactive system if there ever
was one. (John M. Grossberg, San Diego
State University)
Thompson, T., & Zeiler, M. D. (Eds.).
(1986). Analysis and integration of
behavioral units. Hlllsdale, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum.
This volume Is based on a conference In
honor of Kenneth MacCorquodale's 65th
birthday. The contributors were Zeiler,
Thompson, Meazzinl, Ricci, Harzem,
Hineline, Baer, Dews, Marr, Catania,
Cerutti, Sldman, Schnaitter, Lubinski,
Thompson, Meehl, and Falk.
The general topic of the conference
the nature of units of analysis in
behavioral science and the mechanisms
responsible for their integration has
been an important issue throughout the
history of psychology. Although the
Implied purpose of the conference was to
attempt to discover the basic unit of
analysis in a science of behavior, many of
the contributors correctly noted that In
selecting units of analysis, no rigid and
formal specifications should be developed,
suitable only for specific situations (cf.
Kantor, 1950, p. 285). Moreover, many of
the authors questioned the appropriateness
of attempting complete analysis of
behavioral situations in terms of only two
basic units operants and respondents
and, in addition, some authors explicitly
emphasized the relational nature of
behavioral units. These are steps In the
right direction.
Throughout the book, the historically

characteristic overemphasis on the
response factor within the experimental
analysis of behavior (TEAB) is still
evident. The issues addressed in many of
the book's chapters, however, suggest that
progress is being made in terms of the
tendency within the TEAB to transform
events into simpler or perhaps different
events. Whether this tendency has been
due to scientific conventions (e.g., rate
of responding is the appropriate measure
of response strength), available apparatus
(e.g., an operant chamber), or available
species (e.g., rats and pigeons), it is
refreshing to see behavior analysts
attempt to enlarge their domain of
analysis. For instance, over half of the
book explicitly addresses issues related
to complex human behavior, in accordance
with a recommendation Kantor (1970) put
forth to TEAB a number of years ago.
Kantor himself is not referenced in the
book, although a quote from Schoenfeld
(1969) describing Kantor's views on the
relationship between language and logic
appears In Marr's chapter. Those familiar
with Kantor's work, however, may recognize
a trend in many of the chapters towards a
more field-theoretic approach than has
traditionally been explicit in TEAB -- a
trend that is likely to lead to more
complete analyses. (Lisa M. Johnson,
University of Kansas)
References
Kantor, J. R. (1950). Psychology and
logic (Vol. 2). Bloomington, IN:
Principle.
Kantor, J. R. (1970). An analysis of the
experimental analysis of behavior
(TEAB). Journal of the Experimental
Analysis of Behavior, 13, 101-108.
Schoenfeld, W. N.(1559). J. R- Kantor's
Objective psychology of grammar and
Psychology and logic: A retrospective
appreciation. Journal of the
Experimental Analysis of Behavior, ^2,
329-347.
Ribes, E. (1985). Human behaviour as
operant behaviour: An empirical or
conceptual issue? In C. F. Lowe, M.
Richelle, D. E. Blackraan, & C. M.
Bradshaw (Eds.), Behaviour analysis and
contemporary psychology (pp. 117-133)-
Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
29
Ribes's chapter is one of sixteen that
were published from the First European
Meeting on the Experimental Analysis of
Behavior. Unfortunately is the only
chapter to cite the work of Professor
Kantor, though other chapters touch on
contextualism and integrated-field
thinking.
Ribes raises the fundamental issue of
whether current research within the
experimental analysis of behavior is
experimental research on human behavior or
only operant research using human
subjects. Sadly, he concludes, it is the
latter', and he is doubly sad because this
.promotes the view that all human behavior
is operant behavior. One result of the
restriction to the operant paradigm is
that researchers have been led to posit
the covert verbal responses to account for
nonhuman-human differences, whereas an
integrated-field perspective would handle
the issue more naturalistically. In his
words,
Looking at differential complexity
in the mediation of contingencies
allows for the recognition of
hierarchical levels in the organization
of behaviour, without the need to
postulate Internal entities or
autonomous emergent principles, (p.
130)
Ribes presents a scholarly overview of
the reflexological tradition in philosophy
and biology, and Its inadequacies for
human (and nonhuman) behavior, especially
as this tradition relates to (a) causality
relations, (b) atomistic discontinuous-
state categories, and (c) contextual and
historical conditions. As to the first,
Ribes is especially praising of Ernst
Mach's work, though such movement within
behavior analysts will have to be
accompanied by shifts in paradigmatic
assumptions.
We encourage readers to submit brief
book and journal notes for this section of
the newsletter. Many readers have spoken
of their value. When you do submit
material, please Include the address of
the authors so that we may send them a
copy of the newsletter; we will
automatically send book comments and
reviews to the publishers.
30
COMMENTS
A Matter of Interpretation?
A Reply to Fox
N. H. Pronko
Wichita State University
In his "A Reply to Pronko," Fox (1986)
raises a number of points, none of which
are at issue except the one pertaining to
the role of setting factors. What bothers
me is the apparent lifting out of a single
aspect of a prior, integrated field event
(i.e. the setting factors, stimulus
functions, etc.) and endowing that single
feature with a special force or status
influencing succeeding events. Such a
procedure would amount to fragmenting the
prior event in violation of Kantor's
ingenious formulation of an integrated
field, a formulation which treats all the
relevant aspects of a field evenhandedly.
At this point in a personal
conversation along these lines, a
colleague, Grant Kenyon, protests: "But a
construct can't include every single
feature of relevant, prior connected
events." This is a proper criticism. The
resolution? An "awareness of
abstracting," so that, when certain
features of antecedent events need
emphasizing, we do so without fragmenting
them and with the full realization that
such features do their job only within the
behavioral context in which they are
embedded, without which they, by
themselves, are psychologically
meaningless. That was my only concern.
Fox, J. (1986). On setting factors and
interbehavioral research; A reply to
Pronko. The Interbehaviorist, 14, 16-
18.
On Some Controversial Terms
Harry C. Mahan, Oceanside, CA
Some of the most exasperating problems
which psychologists have to face are in
developing a terminology which they can
use to communicate meaningfully with their
students, with their colleagues, and with
the public. This is especially true when
their work requires translation into
another language by a translator, as in
the case of Luria (1966).
In some instances, as in the
translator's use of the words "mental" and
"reflex" in Luria's introductory chapter,
other more appropriate terms may be
available and their use may solve the
problem. In some cases, however, where
English may be the native language of both
the writer and the reader, substitute
terms may not be available, and in such
instances a mutually agreed upon
.definition is required. Examples of terras
which require this solution are
"interactional" and "covert," both of
which have been the subject of adverse
comments on these pages and in other
publications (Dewey & Bentley, 1949J
Handy, 1973, 1985; Pronko, 1983-1984,
1985; Smith, 1985). As one who has
probably used these two terms more
frequently than any other writer (Mahan,
1970), I would like to add my commentary.
Within a longer discussion regarding
the Dewey-Bentley position (1949) in
general, and their terminology in
particular, I made the following statement
in an appendix to my little volume (1970):
Where I have departed from them,
as in using the term "interactional"
rather than "transactional," and
in givingbnames to the parties to
the interaction, I have done so
to facilitate communication and
the development of basic concepts
on the part of students who are
unfamiliar with the system. With
these minor changes, the approach
of my own discussions and that of
Dexey and Bentley is essentially
the same.
It may not be widely known that Kantor
(1924) used the term "interaction" to
describe his psychology, but his use
certainly did not fall under the
objectionable Dewey-Bentley definition. I
quote from him as follows:
Once more we are reminded that the
indispensable methodological minimum
for any form of scientific
investigation Is the Isolation and
observation of the interactions of at -
least two actually observable things.

In the psychological domain we can
definitely conclude that these
interacting things are, on the one
hand, a person who performs reactions
(or those reactions themselves) and, on
the other, the objects, conditions, and
events constituting the stimuli for
these reactions.
As for the term "covert," I used this
term throughout my "Primer" (1970) with
success and no little satisfaction, as the
term "implicit" in its predecessor (1968)
had been very disappointing. In switching
from one term to the other, the
dictionary's definition of "covert" as
"not openly shown" was all that was
intended. I did not then, nor do I now,
think that the term has anything to do
with the location of the interaction.
Actually, the term "covert" as used in
psychology has never had a spiritistic or
intra-organic connotation, and, in both
the classroom and on tape, I have always
pronounced it with a weak "o,11 which seems
to be more pleasing and which clearly
distinguishes it from the CIA variety
(Pronko, 1983-1984).
I consider neither "interaction" nor
"overt" to be more than mildly
controversial, but Lee (1986) has really
opened up a can of worms by arguing that
a number of nouns, including some that
have been very objectionable, indeed be
incorporated into the vocabulary of
contextual interactionism (interbehavioral
psychology) from mainstream traditional
approaches. I shall look forward to
future issues of The Interbehaviorist for
comments on Lee's paper (and I may make
some myself).
References
Dewey, J., & Bentley, A. F. (1949).
Knowing and the known. Boston: Beacon
Press.
Handy, R. (1973). The Dewey-Bentley
transactional procedures of inquiry.
The Psychological Record, 23, 305-317.
Handy, R. (1985).Interaction or
transaction? The Interbehaviorist, 13,
24-25.
Kantor, J.R. (1924). The institutional
foundation of scientific social
psychology. Journal of Abnormal and
Social Psychology, 19, 45-56.
Lee, V. L.(1986). Act psychologies and
the psychological nouns. The
31
Psychological Record, 36, 167-177.
Luria, A. R"(1966).Human brain and
psychological processes. New York:
Harper & Row.
Mahan, H. C. (1968). The interactional
psychology of J. R. Kantor: An
introduction. San Marcos, CA: Project
Socrates Press.
Mahan, H. C. (1970). A primer of
interactional psychology. San Marcos,
CA: Project Socrates Press. (Out of
print)
Pronko, N. H. (1983-1984). A vote toward
the obsolescence of the term "covert."
The Interbehaviorist, _12(1), 11.
Pronko, N. H.(1985). Overt-covert: -
encore. The Interbehaviorist, ^3, 25.
Smith, N. W. (1985). "Covert" defended.
The Interbehaviorist, 13, 6-7.
The Brain and Psychological Processes:
Three Quotations
Harry C. Mahan, Oceanside, CA
Quotation No. 1: Elliot Stellar (1977)
Although the term mind is more abstract
than is more readily observable overt
behavior, it remains a convenient word In
ordinary conversation for designating the
inner (private, subjective) aspects of
human experience. Scientifically,
however, mind cannot be used to refer to
the nonphysical (since science is limited
to phenomena; i.e., to the physical),
despite the great emphasis that
philosophical and cultural heritage has
placed upon the spiritual. Physiological
psychology begins, then, with the basic
understanding that if the word mind is to
be used, it Is to be conceived in such
terms as the activities of the nervous
system or other parts of the living body.
Quotation No. 2: J. R. Kantor (1947)
The fundamental outcome of transforming
psychology into a science by means of the
organic was that the nervous system became
a medium or means whereby psychic factors
could be brought into juxtaposition with
natural processes. Through the nervous
system, nonspatial psychic qualities,
processes or existences were projected
into the spatiotemporal domain, ^he point
32
to be emphasized is that physiological
psychology did not constitute a break in
the perennial commerce with mental states
or qualities, but simply was employed to
legitimize them.
Those who believe that such verbal
gymnastics absolve physiological
psychology from the taint of metaphysics
overlook that the verbal dodge of
abstractionist theory is also a form of
metaphysics. To occupy oneself with
sensations or psychic qualities in any
form is to diverge from the investigation
of discrimative interbehavior with actual
things. There is no question that
physiological psychologists have rung all
sorts of changes on traditional
metaphysics, with the result that whatever
events they treated became patterned as
foci of the great dualistlc tradition
which for twenty centuries has dominated
the thinking concerning psychological
happenings. Like all theorists, the
mental-neural identifiers begin with
events, but the descriptions of these
events and their interpretations are
wrought metaphysically, not
scientifically.
Quotation No. 3: Alexander Luria (1966)
For many years psychological processes
were regarded as direct experiences or as
primary "properties" of mental life,
incapable of further analysis, and most
attempts to discover their material basis
were nothing more than attempts to find
areas of the brain which might serve as
direct carriers or "organs" of these forms
of mental life.
These basic concepts were responsible
for the attempts to "superimpose
nonspatial concepts of modern psychology
on to the spatial structure of the brain"
and for the parallelistic ideas of
"psychomorphology" which remained in
existence for centuries despite changes in
prevailing ideas of mental function. We
THE INTERBEHAVIORIST
Edward K. Morris, Editor
Department of Human Development
University of Kansas
Lawrence, KS 660*15
must therefore pause for a while to
discuss the concept of "function" and the
changes which have taken place in the
concept in modern biology and psychology.
On the one hand, the term function
denotes a particular property of a tissue.
In this sense we are justified in speaking
of the function of bile secretion
characteristic of liver cells, the
function of the insulin production of the
cells of the pancreas, and the function of
perspiration performed by the cell of
sweat glands. However, the word function
may also be used in a quite different
sense. It may denote a complex adaptive
activity of a whole system, and sometimes
of a whole organism, establishing certain
relationships with the external
environment, and producing some form of
adaptive effort. It is obvious that a
wide gulf separates the concepts of
"function" as used in these two senses.
Human psychological processes must
therefore be understood, not as elementary
properties or primary faculties, but as
systems with an historical origin and
complex functional structure. It will be
clear that in place of the obsolete
psychomorphological ideas of narrow (brain
or other bodily) localization we must
introduce new concepts, more in line with
the social origin and systematic structure
of the complex forms of human
psychological activity.
References
Kantor, J. R. (1947). Problems of
physiological psychology. Chicago, IL:
Principia Press.
Luria, A. R* (1966). Human brain and
psychological processes. New York, NY:
Harper & Row.
Stellar, E. (1977). Psychology,
physiological. In Hacropedia (Vol.
15). Encyclopaedia Britannica (15th
ed.). Chicago, IL: Encyclopaedia
Britannica, Inc.
^A
 A Quarterly Newsletter of Interbehavioral Psychology
ISSN 8755-612X
Published at the University of Kansas
Volume 14 1986 Number 4
GUEST EDITOR TABLE OF CONTENTS

Linda J. Parrott Notes from the Field 34

Saint Mary's University
The Agora 35
EDITOR
Study Guide for The Scientific
Edward K. Morris Evolution 35
University of Kansas
Interbehavioral Psychology at ABA... 35
ADVISORY BOARD
New Subscribers 35
Sidney W. Bijou
University of Arizona Articles 36
Donna M. Cone
State of Rhode Island S. M. M. Starbuck, K. J. Carruthers,
Dennis J. Delprato M. Mason, M. D. Fitzgerald, and S.
Eastern Michigan University Thompson: Toward More Effective
Sandy Hobbs (Scotland) Instruction in Interbehavioral
Paisley College of Technology Psychology 36
Paul T. Mountjoy
Western Michigan University Linda J. Parrott: Ethical
Linda J. Parrott (Canada) Situations in Interbehavioral
Saint Mary's University Perspective 38
. H. Pronko
Wichita State University
Roger D. Ray QUOTATION
Rollins College
Emilio Ribes (Mexico) The transactional procedures emphasize
Escuela Nacional de Estudios the entire organismic-environmental
Douglas H. Ruben process in a field of activity. J. R.
Eastern Michigan University Kantor has long maintained a similar
Robert G. Wahler view; rather than the name
University of Tennessee "transaction," he uses "interbehavior,"
(The Logic of Modern Science, 1953, p.
ASSISTANT EDITORS 262).[Quotation from Handy & Harwood
(1973,"p. 6), A Current Appraisal of
Lisa M. Johnson Bryan D. Midgley the Behavioral Sciences.]
Susan M. Schneider James T. Todd
 THE INTERBEHAVIORIST
A Quarterly Newsletter of
Interbehavioral Psychology
ISSN 8755-612X
Edward K. Morris, Editor
Department of Human Development
212B/2035B Haworfch Hall
University of Kansas
Lawrence, Kansas 66045, U.S.A.
913-864-3684/48*10
The Interbehaviorist is a quarterly
publication of news, information,
discussion, journal and book notes, book
reviews, comments, and brief articles
pertaining to interbehavioral psychology
a contextualistic, integrated-field
approach to the natural science of
behavior.
The newsletter publishes professional
communications that fall between informal
correspondence and colloquia, and formal
archival publication. As such, the
newsletter supplements contemporary
journals dedicated to basic and applied
research, to the history and philosophy of
the behavioral sciences, and to
professional issues in the field. The
newsletter strongly encourages
submission of notes about current
professional activities of its
subscribers, news and observations about
interbehavioral psychology and related
perspectives, comments on journal articles
and books of interest, more extended book
reviews, and brief articles. All
submissions should be sent in triplicate
to the editor and should conform to the
style described in the Publication Manual
of the American Psychological Association
(3rd edition).
Subscription Information
Student Subscriptions (US) $ 4.00
Regular Subscriptions (US) , 6.00
Foreign Subscriptions , 8.00
Institutional Subscriptions, , 12.00
Back Volumes 1-14 6,00
Back Volume Complete Sets... Please Write
NOTES FROM THE FIELD
Two books of interest to readers have
been co-edited by LINDA J. PARROTT (Saint
Mary's University). First, with Hayne W.
Reese (first author), she has edited
Behavior Science: Philosophical,
Methodological) and Empirical Advances
(Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1986). In
this book we find a chapter by her on "The
Role of Postulation in the Analysis of
Inapparent Events," by DENNIS J. DELPRATO
(Eastern Michigan University) on "Response
Patterns," by EMILIO RIBES (National
University of Mexico at Iztacala) on
"Language as Behavior; Functional
Mediation versus Morphological
Description," and by Daniel J. Bernstein
and JOSEPH V. BRADY (Johns Hopkins
University) on "The Utility of Continuous
Programmed Environments in the
Experimental Analysis of Behavior."
Second, with Philip N. Chase (first
author), she has edited Psychological
Aspects of Language: The West Virginia
Lectures (Charles C Thomas, 1986), which
is dedicated in part to the memory of J.
R. Kantor. Included in this book are
chapters by her on "On the Differences
between Verbal and Social Behavior," by
EMILIO RIBES on "Is Operant Psychology
Sufficient to Cope with Human Behavior?",
and by PHILIP N. HINELINE (Temple
University) on "Can Verbal Be Nonsocial?
Can Nonsocial Be Verbal?"
Several subscribers to the newsletter
also presented or were co-authors on
papers presented at the annual (November)
meeting of the Association for the
Advancement of Behavior Therapy. These
were LEONARD KRASNER, ED MORRIS, BOB
WAHLER, and MARK WRUBLE.

THE AGORA
Once again, we are pleased to publish
another guest-edited issue of the
newsletter, this time by Linda J. Parrott
(Saint Mary's University), Her
contributions include the piece on
"Interbehavioral Psychologists at ABA" in
The Agora and the article, "Ethical
Situations in Interbehavioral
Perspective." In addition, her students
have contributed an article on effective
instruction in interbehavioral psychology.
For lack of space, we will not include
a year-end report on the newsletter in
this issue, but will do so in January. In
the meantime, please note that
subscription renewals are due. We would
appreciate it if you would complete the
enclosed notice and return it as soon as
possible. Now, to this issue's material.
Study Guide for The Scientific Evolution
Paul T. Mountjoy has kindly offered to
make copies of his "Study Aids and
Objectives to Accompany The Scientific
Evolution of Psychology, Volumes I & II by
J. R. Kantor" (with Paul H. Selden)
available to readers of the newsletter.
If interested, please write Paul at the
Department of Psychology, Western Michigan
University, Kalamazoo, HI 49008.
Interbehavioral Psychologists at ABA
A number of interbehavioral
psychologists met at the May meeting of
the Association for Behavior Analysis
(ABA) to discuss their current and future
activities. Several interbehaviorally-
oriented addresses had been presented, as
well as a workshop by Roger Ray on systems
analysis and inberbehavioral methodology,
which was well received. A previously
planned working session on methodological
issues had not been arranged in time for
the meeting, but interest in such a
session was still strong. Anyone wishing
to organize a working session for future
ABA conventions is encouraged to contact
Linda Parrott, Department of Psychology,
Saint Mary's University, Halifax, Nova
Scotia, Canada B3H 3C3-
A report on The Inberbehaviorisb,
submitted by Ed Morris (University of
Kansas), indicated that the newsletter was
in good shape for the coming year. Dennis
Delprato and Linda Parrott served as guest
editors for the spring and fall issues of
the newsletter, respectively. Robert
35
Epstein, on behalf of the Cambridge Center
for Behavioral Studies, reiterated his
interest in publishing the newsletter
should the group be interested.
Among the other issues discussed were
outlets for interbehavioral publications,
opportunities for graduate study in
interbehavioral psychology, and a meeting
of interbehavioral psychologists. With
regard to outlets, Roger Ray reported some
difficulty finding a publisher for his
volume on interbehavioral logic and
research methodology. He offered to make
the manuscript available to readers for
teaching and other purposes. Those
interested are encouraged bo contact him
at the Department of Psychology, Rollins
College, Winber Park, FL 32789. Several
members of the group indicated concern
that opportunities for graduate study in
interbehavioral psychology were not
readily available. The Behavioral
Services Program at Eastern Michigan
University and the Department of Human
Development at the University of Kansas
were mentioned as possibilities. The
group decided thab further discussion of
this issue, including having group members
on thesis and dissertation committees as
outside readers, should be planned for the
next meeting of the ABA Special Interest
Group. Finally, Linda Parrott reported
that funds for small conferences might be
available from the Social Sciences and
Humanities Research Council of Canada, and
that she would be looking into the
possibility of meeting in Halifax in bhe
coming year. There was considerable
inberesb in such a proposal.
Hew Subscribers
We appreciate all efforts made bo
promote the newsletter, especially in
university, college, and institutional
libraries. Linda Parrott, in particular,
is to be commended for her recruitment at
Saint Mary's Universiby. Her recent
recruibees are Jennifer Beckwith, Patricia
Brown, David L. Caslah, Penny Hope, David
Kerr, Pabricia Kirkpabrick, Greg
Macintosh, Matthew A. Mason, Mary
McCarthy, Gloria J. McClure, Cynthia L.
Power, Sandra Rupno, Karen Slaunwhite,
Michele Spencer, Sandra Sweet, Sandra
Toohey, Gail Ward, and Pamela Yates. One
other new subscriber is Ellas Robles
(Tucson, AZ).
36
Toward More Effective Instruction in Interbehavioral Psychology
Simon M. H. Starbuck, Kerry J. Carruthers, Matthew Mason,
Malcolm D. Fitzgerald, and Scott Thompson
Saint Mary's University
The complexities of Kantor's field
theory often make it difficult to teach to
new students. To help with this dilemma,
we describe some of the frequently
encountered problems that students may
face. In addition, we provide some
methods and analogies we have found
helpful in facilitating our understanding
of the material, especially where the use
of ideas with which students are already
familiar assists in making difficult
concepts more readily understood.
An initial problem concerns the
relations among the various components of
Kantor's field theory. Students sometimes
do not understand how setting factors,
interbehavioral history, and stimulus and
response functions interact continuously
and concurrently, as opposed to operating
sequentially and independently of each
other. Here, we have found it helpful to
conceptualize the interacting field by
analogy to relationships among the planets
in the solar system. A change in the mass
or orbit of any one planet results in
changes in all other aspects of the
system. That no planet operates
independently of the others is an already
well understood idea.
Given our culture's approach to causal
language and thought, introducing students
to a theory lacking a traditional
concept of causality can be confusing.
People are accustomed to dealing with the
events of their everyday life in cause-
and-effect terms. For instance, in
striking a match and holding it to a
flammable substance, we generally say that
the match caused any resulting explosion.
This example, however, can also illustrate
that the explosion would not have occurred
had any one of the participating elements
been absent (e.g., without air as the
medium of contact). The use. of similar
examples for illustrating that no one
variable may be isolated as causally
responsible for other events in the field
may be helpful to students.
Many students initially appear to
pursue psychology for Its practical
implications, hence the seeming lack of
utility in interbehavioral psychology may
deter students from adopting Kantor's
position as a viable alternative to the
conventional approaches. To overcome
this, educators should Illustrate how
Interbehavioral psychology can contribute
to the technology of behavioral change.
For example, in determining what variables
should be manipulated in order to bring
about interbehavioral change, instructors
can stress the relevance of all stimuli
present in the setting relevant to a
greater or lesser extent depending upon
the specific change desired. Attempts
should also be made to trace the client's
history in relation to these stimuli.
Practical examples will help allay fears
that Interbehavioral psychology is removed
from practical considerations, and will
illustrate that it has implications in all
areas of traditional psychology.
Confusion sometimes arises when one
encounters a position that denies the
conventional concepts of mind and soul
that is, a position that denies the mind
as causally responsible for behavior. The
best way we have found for realizing the
unserviceability of such constructs is to
trace out their cultural evolution.
Through this exercise, students can be
educated in the evolution of psychology as
a scientific discipline via its denial of
the intangible as its subject matter.
A related difficulty pertains to
Kantor's approach to complex and subtle
behaviors such as thinking, dreaming, and
imagining. These interactions are
difficult to understand because the
original stimuli are not physically
present rather, we must deal with
substitute stimulation. That is,
interbehavior is understood as occurring
with respect to absent stimuli on the
basis of current substitute stimuli.
Although Kantor's analysis appears
workable, no "interbehaviorally11 derived
experimental evidence supports it. Given
Kanbor's position that everything within
psychology should be analysed in a
naturalistic and systematic manner,
students coming into psychology with a

traditional background will require
substantial empirical evidence from an
explicit interbehavioral orientation
before being willing to adopt this
nontraditional position on complex
behavior.
Another difficult point of
understanding is that the entire
environment is said to change as a
function of each interaction. Students
run into difficulty here when trying to
imagine how inanimate objects are
different after an interaction than
before. In presenting this view,
educators might stress that an organism's
psychological interaction is not with
stimulus objects, but with stimulus
functions. For example, if a flower is
put into a wine bottle, the physical
characteristics of the bottle do not
change, yet the person's actions with
respect to it will be altered. The bottle
is now said to have a different stimulus
function.
A person's history of past interactions
has traditionally been thought of as
causally responsible for current behavior.
In contrast, Kantor analyzes interactional
history in terms of an organism's current
interactions. One way we have found to
facilitate our understanding of history in
this sense is in terms of stimulus
functions. The current stimulus function
of an object is the representation of all
past interactions with respect to that and
other stimulus objects. An analogy to
evolution may be useful here. At any
point in the evolution of a particular
species, the organism's current structure
can be characterized as an adaptation of
previous variations. The species' history
of adaptive interactions is represented in
the current gene pool. "Historical"
research in psychology should focus on
making precise and detailed analyses of
experimentally controlled stimulus
relations such that one may brace the
evolution of these relations to the
currenb interbehavior of the organism.
Kantor is somebimes accused of failing
to consider adequabely the other sciences
and bheir relationship bo psychology.
This is clearly a misconception, perhaps
one bhat arises from Kanbor's approach bo
bhe still currenb reducbionism within
psychology. The solution to this problem
is for educators bo sbress that
interbehavioral psychology actually does
deal directly wibh bhe other sciences
37
(e.g., neurology, chemistry, and biology).
With respect to physiological psychology,
for instance, most current
conceptualizations of the brain are not
acceptable from an interbehavioral
perspective because they focus on it as a
single entity that is causally responsible
for behavior, rather than considering it
to be one of the multitude of conditions
that participate in the continuously
evolving relationships between an organism
and its environment. Inberbehavioral
psychologists are clearly interested in
knowing the details of brain functioning,
for this would add to the account of bhe
participating factors in any interaction.
In any event, the strength of
interbehavioral psychology is that it does
consider the other sciences clearly and
explicitly.
Of great importance to understanding
many of these issues is the general dearbh
of empirical work produced from an
interbehavioral perspective. This lack of
research leads people to question the
adequacy of the formulation. Educators
need bo enlighten students about work
being done by interbehaviorists, as well
as to discuss material published in
journals (e.g., Journal of the
Experimental Analysis of Behavior) from an
interbehavioral perspective. Such
discussion would demonstrate the
superiority of Kantor's views for various
forms of psychological research.
Finally, Kantor's writing style also
complicates matters. His writings are a
difficult form of primary source material
and may deter people from appreciating his
work and adopting his views. One means of
solving this problem is bo encourage
students and obher professionals bo
publish interbehavioral material in The
Interbehaviorisb and obher appropriate
outlets. Such material would provide a
readily available, more understandable
approach to Kanbor's work and, ab bhe same
time, allow readers bo esbablish new lines
of communication with others who have
similar interests.
V/e hope this arbicle will encourage bhe
submission of further material on how to
promobe and improve the understanding of
inberbehavioral psychology; we would also
welcome commenbs direcbly. Our mailing
address is Psychology Deparbmenb,
Behaviour Analysis Lab, Saint Mary's
University, Halifax, Nova Soobia, Canada,
B3H 3C3.
38
Ethical Situations in Interbehavioral Perspective
Linda J. Parrott
Saint Mary's University
The first step in the investigation of
any subject matter consists of its
isolation and identification a step
always taken from within the confines of a
particular scientific enterprise. In
other words, as psychologists, we must
attempt to isolate those aspects of
ethical situations that are distinctly
psychological in nature, and subsequently
identify their unique character as
psychological events.
In psychological perspective, an
ethical situation may be viewed as a
specific behavioral event and, in an
interbehavioral perspective, all
behavioral events are conceptualized as
fields of interacting factors. Such
fields are constituted of a biological
organism in contact with a physical object
(thing, event, or other organism) through
some enabling medium, set in a complex of
other factors. The participating organism
is conceptualized as a source of response
functions which have developed over the
course of its historical contacts with a
particular stimulus object or similar
objects. Likewise, the participating
object is conceptualized as a source of
stimulus functions having their origins in
previous contacts of that object with a
particular organism. The coordination of
a given response function with a given
stimulus function, occurring in a complex
setting at a given moment in time, is
regarded as a unitary psychological event
or interbehavior.
All psychological events are
conceptualized this way by interbehavioral
theorists. It is a general formulation,
however, and specific types of
psychological events vary in detail. In
the case of ethical situations, a number
of distinguishing features may be
identified that warrant specialized
treatment. Among them are an element of
choice and a standard or criterion of
conduct against which given actions may be
evaluated. The element of choice, which
is a prominent and significant feature of
ethical behavior situations, is not unique
ho such situations, It is a feature
shared by behavior *?*/nts of* 3.
superordinate class that Kantor (1926, pp.
312-337) calls .voluntary conduct.
Likewise, not all behavior situations
involving standards of conduct are
properly regarded as instances of ethical
behavior. Hence, before examining ethical
behavior per se, it will be helpful bo
examine the larger classes of conduct into
which ethical behaviors fall.
Voluntary Behavior
Voluntary behavior is characterized bv
the presence of a .prftfe.cfi.nHai rpl^pLnQQo_nr'
cjToice. This preference may be described
in one of two ways: The situation may be
one in which one or another of two or more
responses mav be performed with respect to
the same stimulus object; nr 1h mqy he
in which the functions of two or more
stimulus, objects are possible for
actualization at .a giupn MI^A . The
division of voluntary behavior into these
two general classes response choice and
stimulus preference does not imply two
different kinds of action. All such
behavior constitutes choice responding,
since we cannot consider the object to be
the preferred element until it becomes
coordinated with a choice response
(Kantor, 1926, pp. 312-313). Still, the
distinction is warranted by the clarity it
affords in differentiating among varieties
of voluntary behavior. Voluntary behavior
of an ethical variety, for example, may be
more readily understood if we emphasize
the reactional as opposed to the
stimulational side of the situation.
Given this very general characterization
of voluntary behavior, we may now attempt
to analyze it in more detail.
Specifically, we must attempt to identify
the factors participating in occurrences
of this sort, as well as the nature of
their participation.
Under ordinary circumstances, our
reactions to things and events in our
environs depend merely upon the qualities
and relations of those things and events
to us, in concert with our histories of
contact with them. In voluntary behavior
segments, however, our reactions are
conditioned by an additional factor,
namely, the anticipated consequences of
alternative courses of action. Before .
dealing with what it means to interact

With the possible consequences of actions,
we may examine the course of a voluntary
behavior segment up to the point at which
interactions with consequences take place.
To do so will require some further detail
as to the reactional phase of
interbehavior,
Reactional phase of interbehavior. The
reactional phase of interbehavior is made
up of a series of component actions or
reaction systems. These components
represent logically derived elements of a
single psychological action of an organism
with respect to a stimulating object.
They constitute specific phases of a
reactional pattern, abstracted out of that
pattern. Among them are actions of the
muscular, neural, glandular, and skeletal
systems. Any given psychological act may
be conceptualized as a series of reaction
systems culminating in some final reaction
or adjustment with respect to stimulation.
The final reaction completes the
reactional side of interbehavior, and
psychological acts are named in accordance
with the nature of this reaction. In a
voluntary behavior segment, several
reaction systems make up the response
pattern and the final reaction in that
series consists of responding in one way
as opposed to another, or responding with
respect to one stimulus as opposed to
another. What remains to be analyzed,
then, are the preceding reaction systems
and their operation with respect to this
final preferential or choice reaction.
Keeping in mind that interbehavior is
the coordination of a stimulus function,
having its source in a stimulus object,
with a response function having its source
in a biological organism, it becomes
obvious that the occurrence of
interbehavior depends on an organism's
perceptual contact with an object of some
sort. That is, in order for an organism
to interact with an object, it must see,
hear, taste, touch, or smell it. No other
kind of contact is possible. Further, in
order for the organism to have perceptual
contact with an object, the organism must
be oriented with respect to that object.
For example, one does not see a bird
overhead if one is oriented toward the
ground. Thus, it should be clear that
orientational and perceptual reaction
systems are initial components of all
psychological acts, voluntary acts being
no exception. Voluntary actions are
considerably more complex, however, in
39
that they also entail what Kantor (1924,
pp. 388-393) calls meaning reaction
systems.
Meaning reaction systems. A meaning
reaction system, like all reaction
systems, is a specific phase of a reaction
pattern analyzed out of that pattern. In
other words, it does not occur or operate
alone, but rather in conjunction with
other reactions making up a larger
pattern. The role of the meaning reaction
in that pattern is to condition or lead to
an action that completes the pattern.
The nature of the meaning reaction
system may be understood by contrasting it
with a perceptual reaction system, A
perceptual reaction system is a reaction
with respect to the natural properties of
a stimulus object as immediately
confronted. It is an act of
identification a reaction to what a
thing is. In contrast, a meaning__reaction
system is not a reaction t'cOafiaETa-fchlng
is. but rather to its slgnl floan^, hp.
Hhat it stands forT or to what its
implications are on the basis of the_
person's previous reactions with respect
to it. The essential function of the
meaning reaction, in that it occurs with
respect to circumstances and conditions
not discoverable in the natural properties
of the stimulus object, is to anticipate
Jbhe character of the final
up the psychological response. Thp
"meaning reaction system" was adopted to
suggest this anticipatory fnno.Mnn hhp
reaction serves as a means to an end
(Kantor, 1924, pT 390).
With regard to morphological
characteristics, meaning reactions may
take any form whatsoever. They may, for
example, have a performative character.
In these cases, meaning reactions function
as prior movements which condition the
subsequent operation of another reaction
system. For example, the particular way
in which one grasps a telephone receiver
conditions and anticipates the next
manipulatory reaction with respect to the
receiver. Alternatively, meaning reaction
systems may have an affective character
such that the pleasantness or
unpleasantness felt by an individual in
contact with a stimulus object may
facilitate or hinder the operation of some
final reaction. The most prevalent of all
meaning reactions, however, are those that
are verbal in character. In thes,e cases,
it is what we say or think about an object
that conditions or anticipates our final
reaction to it.
GEhe significance of the concept of the
meaning reaction system is to be found in
its implication of the actor's
interbehavioral history. ^A meaning
reaction is, in asejise_^_the^jrLo_ffleS^ry
manTFes tatiron~"oT~UhaFTdafcfflcy -aa._l h
gertains to a given stimulus object, and
icis~~one oT the~ two means by which an
organism's history may become a
participating factor in the effective
present according to interbehavioral
theor7} The other means by which this is
accomplished fall under the heading of
implicitL_actj.on. I will return to the
topic ofTmpTTclt behavior, but first it
will be helpful to review what we have
said about voluntary actions up to this
point.
A voluntary behavior segment is one in
which the opportunity to respond in more
than one way or to respond with respect to
more than one stimulus is available, and a
preferential response occurs. What I have
been attempting to describe is the nature
of preferential responding. To do so I
have elaborated on the nature of
responding from an interbehavioral
perspective, introducing the concept of a
reaction pattern made up of a series of
component parts called reaction systems.
I suggested that all such reaction
patterns are initiated by orientational
and perceptual reaction systems through
which the stimulational functions of
objects could become actualized in a given
moment. A voluntary reaction pattern was
distinguished by the presence of an
additional reaction system, called a
meaning reaction, the function of which is
to bring the organism's history of
contacts with that particular stimulus
object to bear in the present situation
and, in so doing, condition and anticipate
the final reaction in the pattern.
Interbehavior is not simply a
reactional pattern, though. It is the
coordination of a reactional pattern with
some form of stimulation. Hence, I have
also touched on the stimulabional
circumstances attending voluntary conduct.
In this regard, I suggested that under
ordinary circumstances our reactions to
things and events in our environs depend
merely upon their qualities and relations
with respect to us, in concert with our
histories of contact with them. Voluntary
behavior segments, however, were
distinguished by the relevance of an
additional element, namely, the
anticipated consequences of alternative
courses of action. The consequences of
action, though, are not aspects of the
current situation. They are future
events. Our task now is to determine how
an event which is not present in a given
situation can participate in that
situation. This brings us to the topic of
implicit behavior.
Implicit Behavior
In contrast to a meaning reaction
system, which is conceptualized as a phase
of a larger reactional pattern, an
implicit action is itself considered to be
a complete form of action. That is to
say, an implicit action is a type of
interbehavior and not just an aspect of
the reactional phase of interbehavior.
Unlike meaning reactions, which are
centered around immediately present
objects, implicit .interbehayiors are
described by Kantor (1924, pp. 295-315) as
.actions occurring., in the absence of the_
stimulus objects with which they were
originally connected. Actions occurring
v/itn respect to aos'ent stimulus objects do
so by way of stimulation arising from
other objects In the immediate situation.
How the stimulational functions of one
object become attached to another is
explained by way of a history of contacts
with objects in spatial or temporal
proximity, whereby a given object becomes
part of the setting in which actions with
respect to a second object are taking
place. Consequently, one object may give
rise to actions originally occurring with
respect to another object, and vice versa.
This transfer of stimulus functions from
one object to another is what Kantor
(1924, pp. 295-315) refers to as the
development of substitute stimulation, the
result of which is to enable actions to
occur in the absence of the stimuli with
which they were originally coordinated.
Implicit behavior is the name given to
such interactions.
Returning now to the issue of voluntary
behavior segments,CEbe task is to explain
how the consequences of alternative
courses of action may participate in the
occurrence of preferential responding,
despite their absence from the immediate
situation. The explanation is
accomplished by assuming the occurrence of
implicit behavior during th*3 d^lsy bg^wpgrv
meaning reactloTn^ysT^ms and the final
Choice behavior^'''"'7As previously indicated,
meaning reactions anticipate final
reaction systems in that they constitute
reactions to the significance of objects
from the standpoint of one's previous
contacts with them. Among such reactions
are references to or reflections upon
actions one has taken or might take with
respect to the objects in question.
Because actions taken with respect to
objects or events tend to be followed
closely in time by their consequences,
reflecting upon alternative courses of
action may give rise to actions normally
occurring with respect to the consequences
of those actions. That is, meaning
reactions serve as substitute stimuli for
evaluative and other sorts of actions with
respect to the consequences of alternative
courses of action. It is by way of such
activity that the consequences of action
may be said to participate in voluntary
behavior segments, despite the fact that
as events proper they are not among those
making up such segments.
The role of setting conditions. Having
implicated the role of consequences in
voluntary behavior segments, we have
completed our analysis of this type of
interbehavior, but we have not as yet
discussed the role of factors making up
the setting in which interbehaviors always
occur. We may begin to do so by
describing the development of stimulus and
response functions. The stimulus
functions of an object, that is, the
stimulational properties or actions of an
object, originate in and evolve over the
course of an organism's historical
contacts with that object. Corresponding
to the development of the stimulus
functions of an object is the development
of response functions of an organism with
respect to the object in question. Each
is thereby a source of numerous functions
with respect to the other, the actual
numbers of which vary in accordance with
the frequency and circumstances of their
previous contacts. In any instance of
interbehavior, though, only one stimulus
and one response function operate,
necessitating an explanation for the
selection of one over another at a
particular moment in time. Kantor (1924,
pp. 55-56) argues that it is the setting
in which organism and object make contact
that plays this role. That is, setting
factors determine which particular
functions of object and organism will
become coordinated in an instance of
interbehavior at a given moment.
To describe the role of setting factors
as the determination of interbehaviors is
not entirely satisfactory, however,
because it implicates the standpoint of a
particular observer, namely, one who has
an interest in manipulating the occurrence
of interbehavior. From an event
standpoint, it is more precise to say that
setting conditions are participating
factors in behavior segments, of which
interbehaviors are the focus of analysis.
As such, the constitution and organization
of setting factors are aspects of the
event one is attempting to describe, not
factors upon which other aspects of the
same event may be said to depend. The
factors making up a behavior segment are
interdependent and a new set of factors is
not a new set of determining conditions.
It is a new event.
Ethical Conduct
We are ready now to consider the
special case of ethical conduct. As
argued previously, ethical conduct is a
type of voluntary behavior. Specifically,
it is a type of behavior segment in which
the opportunity to respond in more than
one way or to more than one stimulus
object is available; that is, a choice
occurs. And, as in all other types of
voluntary conduct, the reaction pattern
entails a meaning reaction system followed
by a delay during which implicit
interactions with the consequences of
alternative courses of action take place.
Ethical conduct, as a special case of
voluntary conduct, is further
distinguished by the nature of the meaning
reaction systems and the auspices under
which these reactions have become a part
of the individual's reactional biography
(Kantor, 1926, pp. 440-443).
Value functions. Recall that meaning
reaction systems are not .reactions to what
a thing is, but to its significance, to
what it stands for, or to what its
implications are for a particular
individual on the basis of that
individual's previous contacts with it.
jn the case of ethical conduct, meaning
Reactions are evaluative (Kantor, 1983,
"pp ""91-96) . That is, they are actions
with respect to one value 6T some
person, or evenT^ This means, in essence,
that the value of a stimulus nbjeob 1.s nne
of its stimulational properties or
functions (Kantor, 1981, p. 169>,
 At this point, we may distinguish
between two types of value function, only
one of which is relevant to the issue of
ethical situations. An irrelevant class
of values is that which constitutes the
natural properties of stimuli. Things or
materials may be suitable or required for
certain purposes and may be said to have
value with respect to those purposes. For
example, to pound a tent peg into the
ground, a rock has the value of a hammer.
Cleaning functions in ethical situations
are not coordinated with value functions
having their sources in the natural
properties of stimulus objects. Rather,
they._are coordinated with values that have
been attributed to sbimulusoblects* That
attribution, moreover , has occurred under
group auspices, which is to say, the "
.evaluative meanin^__rgajclians in logical
situations are shared amon^ member sot 4 a
Er_ticular collectivity of persons^ and
~ source of multiple stimulus functions.
situations are generalized across that
Let me explain.
Cultural behaviors. Kantor (1982, pp.
163-192) distinguishes among several large
classes of interbehavior on the basis of
the circumstances of their origin in the
lives of individuals. Among them is a
class called cultural interbehaviors, of
which ethical behavior is a type.
Cultural interbehaviors have their origins
in a group as opposed to individual
circumstances, such that the actions
occurring to the objects in question are
acquired by individuals as a result of
their making contact with those objects in
the presence of other individuals who are
already acting in a specific way with'
respect to them. The stimulus objects
involved in cultural interhehaviors
thereby have common or Reneraliaed
functions, and these functions are
coordinated with common or shared
reaction,^ nn hhp parhs nf mnrp hhar^ one
individual.
___ ii ml
The generalized stimulus functions
involved in cultural interbehaviors do not
arise out of the natural properties of
stimulus objects nor do they necessarily
coincide with those natural properties.
For example, a voodoo doll is an object
that stimulates cultural reactions of fear
or wariness on the part of a particular
group of people. The object itself is nob
harmful in any way however, and fear
therefore does not srise ;is ~i reaction to
the natural properties of a voodoo doll.
Rather, fear reactions arise because a
functional property of "injuriousness" has
been attributed to this object over the
course of a particular group's cultural
evolution.
It should be apparent from this
discussion of cultural interbehavior that .
we are all members of multiple
collectivities, and that most of our
behavior, at least as adults, is cultural
in character. We may include in this
category all of our linguistic, legal,
ethical, and religious behavior, most of
our beliefs and aesthetic conduct, as well
as our styles of dress, eating habits, and
sexual practices, to name only a few. The
significance of our membership in multiple
collectivities for the analysis of ethical
conduct is to be found in the
opportunities it affords for responding in
more than one way to a particular stimulus
object. A given object is typically a
Some of these functions arise out of the
natural properties of the object in
question and, as such, operate in
accordance with the exigencies of the
behavioral situation. Choice responding
is not involved in situations of bhis
sort, since whatever behavior occurs in
these situations is the only behavior that
could have occurred. Other functions are
attributed to objects under the auspices
of collective circumstances and, because
one is a member of more than one
collectivity, the potential exists for
more than one function of an object to
become actualized in an episode of
interbehavior. Any given episode is
characterized by the operation of only one
such function, however, and the eventual
actualization of that function, combined
with its coordinated pattern of action, is
what we are calling choice responding in
the context of ethical situations.
For example, let us assume that one is
a member of a political-intellectual
collectivity in which warfare stimulates
abhorrence. In other words, a value
function of evil has been attributed to
this event, and actions facilitating its
occurrence are considered bad or wrong,
while actions hindering its occurrence are
considered good or right. These
evaluations occur as meaning reaction
systems as reactions to what a thing
stands for or to what its implications are
on the basis of an individual's previous
contacts with ib or with symbolic
representations of it. Were this
political-intellectual collectivity the
only one of which one was a member, choice
responding would not be involved. One is
always a member of more than one
collectivity, however, and the
institutional functions of a given object
or event may differ across those
collectivities. From the standpoint of
one's membership in a national
collectivity, for instance, one may also
react to the protective or self-
preservative value of war. As such,
actions facilitative of warfare, normally
described as patriotic, would be regarded
as right or proper, while actions
hindering its occurrence would be
evaluated as wrong or improper.
Circumstances such as these eventuate in
choice responding, following upon implicit
actions with respect to the two sets of
consequences and a comparative judgment as
to their relative significance or impact.
Ethical situations become even more
complicated when we consider the potential
conflicts among the institutional
functions of warfare arising under the
auspices of religious, ethnic, and
familial group circumstances.
In short, the greater the number of
functions attributed to a given object
across the collectivities of which one is
a member, the more likely it is for
conflicts among those functions to arise,
and the more complicated become the
reaction patterns eventuating in ethical
decisions. The current controversy
surrounding the use of animals in
scientific research is an excellent
example of this point. An enormous number
of stimulus functions have been attributed
to animals under the auspices of different
collective circumstances. Included among
them are actions of husbandry,
companionship, hunting, experimentation,
and butchery all of which may comprise
aspects of the repertoire of a single
individual. Whether it is right or wrong,
good or bad, or proper or improper to use
animals for scientific research is
evaluated on the basis of an elaborate
system of reactions, having their origins
in ar\ individual's varied historical
contacts with animals, followed by
implicit interactions with the
consequences of alternative courses of
action, and a comparative judgment as to
their relative significance or merit. As
such, the ethical situation is exceedingly
complex, and the eventual choice reaction
may be considerably delayed. It may, for
example, depend on a series of immediate
problem-solving activities or.on the
acquisition of additional meaning
reactions with respect to the stimuli
involved. Moreover, it may be subject to
change or modification in accordance with
particular setting conditions, including
the momentary motivations of the
individual or the presence of other
persons and their activities. We may
summarize these features of ethical
behavior situations by suggesting that the
precurrent activities or deliberation
phases of choice reactions have their
sources in an individual's reactional
biography, while the final performative
phase is a product of that history in
concert with more immediate contextual
circumstances. What this means, in
essence, is that one's decision concerning
the appropriate action to take with
respect to some stimulus may or may not be
reflected in the action one actually
takes.
Conclusion
In conclusion, from a psychological
perspective, ethics must be addressed in
terms of the factors participating in
ethical behavior situations. These
situations are characterized by the
potential operation of conflicting
stimulus functions, having their sources
in a single stimulus object or event. The
potential operation of more than one
stimulus function in a given situation is
a product of that stimulus having been
endowed with different functions under the
auspices of different collective
circumstances in the experience of a
particular individual. In ethical
situations, the conflict among those
functions is a conflict of value. That
is, from the standpoint of one
collectivity, the object has the potential
to stimulate action evaluated as good or
right or proper, while from the standpoint
of another collectivity, the same action
is regarded as bad or wrong or improper.
The situation thereby involves a choice as
to whether the individual should or should
not perform that action.
Further, the choice is itself
conceptualized as an instance of
interbehavior, in which one of the value
functions of a stimulus becomes actualized
with respect to a particular pattern of
action performing or not performing the
action in question. Two phases of
reaction are abstracted out of that
pattern a precurrent phase of
deliberation and a final overt
performance. The precurrent phase is
conceptualized as involving an evaluative
meaning reaction system, having its source
in the individual's previous contacts with
the stimulus object or event involved in
the ethical behavior situation. By way of
the meaning reaction system, the
individual's history of contact with
respect to that object is brought to bear
in the moment. These reactions condition
or anticipate the final choice reaction in
the pattern, and as such provide
substitute stimulation for implicit action
with respect to the consequences of
alternative courses of action. The final
phase of the ethical reaction pattern,
conceptualized as an overt preferential
performance, follows upon these precurrent
reactions and constitutes the
actualization of one of the potential
stimulus functions of the object involved.
Which specific function becomes
actualized in a given ethical situation
depends to some extent upon the precurrent
actions; however, they are not regarded as
having causal status with respect to the
final choice reaction. On the contrary,
the precurrent action is part of a larger
reactional pattern of which the final >
reaction is also a part, both of them
constituting abstractions from the larger.
References
Kantor, J. R. (192*1). Principles of
psychology (Vol. 1) Chicago:
Principia Press.
Kantor, J. R. (1926). Principles'of
psychology (Vol. 2) Chicago: : Kantor, J. R. ;(1983). Tragedy and the
Principia Press.
Kantor, J. R. (1950). Psychology and
logic (Vol. 2). Chicago: Principia
Press.
unit. Moreover,"because the unit of
analysis from an interbehavioral
perspective is always an interaction of
responding.and stimulating, the reaction
is itself an abstraction. It is an aspect
of an even larger event which includes as
well the stimulational functions of an
object. As such, neither the reacting
organism nor the stimulating object may be
regarded as playing a causal role in the
events of ethical decision making. They
are simply the focus of analysis in
behavior situations of this type. In
other words, they are the events of
ethical decision making. To account for
the occurrence of such events, we must
look beyond them to the setting in which
they are occurring. Ih that setting are
momentary factors which combine with the
interbehavioral history of a particular
organism and object, such as to make a
behavior segment what it is at a given
moment. Properly speaking, then,
causality in a behavioral situation is to
be found in the organization or pattern of
all of the events participating in that
situation (Kantor, 1950, p. "156-157) ~
and ethical behavior situations are no
exception. In short, to make an ethical
decision is to act in one way as opposed
to another when more than one way -may be
assumed possible of occurrence, and to do
so in a context of implicit action with
the possible consequences of alternative
courses of action.
Kantor, J. R. (1981). Interbehavioral
philosophy.. Chicago: Principia Press
Kantor, J. R. (1982). Cultural
' psychology. Chicago: Principia Press
event continuum. Chicago: Principia
Press;

THE INTERBSHAVIORIST
Edward K. Morris, Editor
Department of Human Development
University of Kansas
Lawrence, KS 66045
Bryan D. Midgley
Department of Human Development
University of Kansas
Lawrence, KS 66045
 A Quarterly Newsletter of Interbehavioral Psychology
ISSN8755-612X

Published at the University of Kansas

Volume 15 1987 Number 1

EDITOR TABLE OF CONTENTS

Edward K. Morris The Agora 3

University of Kansas
Psychological Comments and Queries.. 3
Ninth Mexican Congress 3
ADVISORY BOARD Kantor Memorial Fund 3
Notes from the Field 3
Sidney W. Bijou
University of Arizona Report on an Interbehavioral Symposium
Donna M. Cone Noel Smith and Edward Blewitt 4
State of Rhode Island
Dennis J. Delprato Comment: Ethical Analysis in Practice
Eastern Michigan University Douglas H. Ruben 6
Sandy Hobbs (Scotland)
Paisley College of Technology Book and Journal Notes 7
Paul T. Mountjoy
Western Michigan University Memorial Resolution for J. R. Kantor... 11
Linda J. Parrott (Canada)
St. Mary's University QUOTATION
N. H. Pronko
Wichita State University Some purported scientific procedures
Roger D. Ray that reject the mind, mentalism,
Rollins College consciousness, etc., still reflect some
Emilio Ribes (Mexico) of the consequences of dualistic and
Escuela Nacional de Estudios spiritistic assumptions. Some forms of
Douglas H. Ruben American behaviorism fall into this
Eastern Michigan University category. Beginning with a Cartesian
Robert G. Wahler mind-body dualism, many behaviorists
University of Tennessee and materialists rejected the mental
half of the dualism and constructed
their methodologies on what was left,
ASSISTANT EDITORS but without rejecting thoroughly the
entire framework of the mind-body split
Lisa M. Johnson (For trenchant comments, see J. R.
Bryan D, Midgley Kantor, The LogjLc of Modern Science).
Susan M, Schneider
James T. Todd - Handy and Harwood (1973)
 THE INTERBEHAVIORIST
A Quarterly Newsletter of
Interbehavioral Psychology
ISSN 8755-612X
Edward K. Morris, Editor
Department of Human Development
2035D Haworth Hall
University of Kansas
Lawrence, Kansas 66045, U.S.A.
913-864-3684/4840
The Interbehaviorist is a quarterly
publication of news, information,
discussion, journal and book notes, book
reviews, comments, and brief articles
pertaining to interbehavioral psychology
a contextualistic, integrated-field
approach to the natural science of
behavior.
The newsletter publishes professional
communications that fall between informal
correspondence and colloquia, and formal
archival publication. As such, the
newsletter supplements contemporary
journals dedicated to basic and applied
research, to the history and philosophy of
the behavioral sciences, and to
professional issues in the field. The
newsletter strongly encourages
submission of notes about current
professional activities of its
subscribers, news and observations about
interbehavioral psychology and related
perspectives, comments on journal articles
and books of interest, more extended book
reviews, and brief articles. All
submissions should be sent in triplicate
to the editor and should conform to the
style described in the Publication Manual
of the American Psychological Association
(3rd edition).
Subscription Information
Student Subscriptions (US) $ 4.00
Regular Subscriptions (US) 6.00
Foreign Subscriptions 8. 00
Institutional Subscriptions 12.00
Back Volumes 1-14 6.00
Back Volume Complete Sets... Please Write
THE PRINCIPIA PRESS
Principia Press's list of currently
available titles in interbehavioral
psychology is presented below. Check your
bookshelves, and those of your library and
bookstore, for possible oversights. In
addition, the books make excellent gifts
for colleagues and for students,
especially for the latter in honor of
their completed degree requirements. The
books may be purchased directly from
Principia Press, 5743 Kimbark Avenue,
Chicago, IL 60637. Handling charges are
$.75 per title; prepaid orders are
postpaid. Any queries should also be
directed to the address above.
Principles of Psychology (2 vols.)
$20.00
Psychology and Logic (2 vols.)
$25.00
Interbehavioral
_____ Psychology
The Logic of Modern Science
$15.00
An Objective Psychology of Grammar
$13.00
The Scientific Evolution of Psychology
(2 vols.) $40.00
The Science of Psychology: An
Interbehavioral Survey $20.00
Psychological Linguistics
$15.00
Interbehavioral Philosophy
$27.50
Cultural Psychology
$16.00
Tragedy and the Event Continuum
$15.00
Selected Writings, 1929-1983
$20.00
Psychological Comments and Queries
$20.00
h
 THE AGORA
We apologize for the delays in the past
two issues of the newsletter. They do not
bespeak of weakness in the newsletter, but
rather of an overburdened "editorial
office." We will be caught up shortly;
the next issue is coming along well.
As for the newsletter's health, last
year's final count on the mailing list was
117, 110 of whom were paid subscribers
44 of whom have thus far resubscribed. If
you have not yet resubscribed, this issue
contains the last notice. The seven
unpaid subscriptions represent
complementary copies of the newsletter
sent to the offices of several behavioral
associations. Financially, the newsletter
is on solid footing for another year, in
large part due to past contributions to
the Kantor Memorial Fund. Those are very
much appreciated.
The present issue contains a slight
change in format. In an effort to keep
the available titles from Principia Press
to the fore, we have begun publishing
Principia's booklist on the inside front
cover where "Notes from the Field" had
been appearing; the latter will now be
found towards the end of The Agora.
As for the contents of this issue, we
should make one note: In light of the
Mountjoy and Hansor obituary for Professor
Kantor that appeared in the American
Fsychologist, (see "Notes for the Field"),
we thought we would conclude this issue
with a Memorial Resolution regarding
Professor Kantor from the Indiana
University Department of Psychology.
Psychological Comments and Queries
In reviewing and analyzing "Observer's"
(1984) Psychological Comments and Queries,
Harry C. Mahan (Project Socrates) has
become curious about how the book might
best be used in the classroom, how much
background in interbehavioral psychology
students need before using the book, and
how the individual comments and queries
might best be sequenced.
He would appreciate hearing from those
who have read or have used the book. If
you would write him about your reactions,
he will try to integrate the responses
with his own analysis of the text for a
brief article to be published in The
Interbehaviorist. Please write him at 811
Leonard Avenue, Oceanside, CA 92054 (619-
722-9341).
Ninth Mexican Congress on Behaviojr Analysis
The Ninth Mexican Congress on Behavior
Analysis will be held in Puebla City,
Mexico, October 5-7, 1987. The meeting
will cover theoretical, research, and
applied contributions to human and
nonhuman behavior. The paper submission
deadline is August 26, 1987.
Papers should be submitted to: Hector
Martinez Sanchez, Coordinator Organizing
Committee, Coordinacion de Psicologia,
ENPN Iztacala, Apartado Postale 314,
Tlalnepantla, Edo. de Mexico, C.P. 54000.
Phone: 565-22-33 (Ext. 133).
Papers to be presented in English
should be submitted in their final form so
that short translations may be prepared
ahead of time for meeting attendees.
Presented papers should not exceed twenty
minutes.
Kantor Memorial Fund
We would like to thank those who have
contributed to the Kantor Memorial Fund
for the newsletter over the past several
years. The fund serves for our long-term
financial stability and for special
publication and promotional events. Past
giving has come from Richard Amado, Don
Bloomquist, William Gardner, Dennis
Delprato, Helene Kantor, Louise Kent-
Udolf, Harry Mahan, Ed Morris, Henry
Pronko, and Doug Ruben.
Notes from the Field
William H. Brown, William Bryson-
Brockman, and James J. Fox (George Peabody
College) published "The Usefulness of J.
R. Kantor's Setting Event Concept for
Research on Children's Social Behavior" in
Child and Family Behavior Therapy, 1986,
8(2), 15-25.
Sandy Hobbs (Paisley College of
Technology) and David Cornwell (Jordanhall
College) published "Child Labour: An
Underdeveloped Topic in Psychology" in the
International Journal of Psychology, 1986,
^1_, 225-234. Their two papers from the
1985 Amsterdam International Symposium on
"Play, Play Therapy, and Play Research"
are now available from the ERIC Document
Reproduction Service. Abstracts appear in
ERIC's Resources in Education, 1986
(April), 2U4), 109.
Paul T. Mountjoy and Jay D. Hansor's
(Western Michigan University) obituary for
Professor Kantor has finally appeared In
the American Psychologist (1986, 41, 1296-
1297). It is an excellent and sensitive
piece of writing.
The Fall, 1986 issue of The
Psychological Record was replete with
material from newsletter subscribers.
Sidney W. Bijou and Patrick M. Ghezzi
(University of Arizona) were authors on a
"Manual of Instructions for Identifying
and Analyzing Referential Interactions,"
and William Stephenson (University of
Missouri) published back-to-back articles
on "William James, Neils Bohr, and
A Report on
An Interbehavioral Symposium in Scotland
Noel W. Smith and Edward Blewitt
SUNY-Plattsburgh and United Kingdom
A symposium on "Kantor and the
Behaviourist Tradition" was held at St.
Andrews University, Scotland, as part of
the Annual Conference of the Experimental
Analysis of Behavior Group, April 2-4,
1986; the symposium was organized and
moderated by Ed Blewitt. Papers were
presented by (1) Noel Smith (SUNY-
Plattsburgh), "The Interbehavioral
Postulate System"; (2) Sandy Hobbs
(Paisley College of Technology, Scotland)
and David Cornwell (Jordanhill College of
Education, Scotland), "An Interbehavioral
Perspective on Applied Behavior Analysis";
and (3) Cornwell and Hobbs, "What
Interbehavioral Psychology Has to Offer
Education."
Smith's paper dealt with the postulates
of interbehavioral psychology and compared
them with the implicit postulates of
cognitive psychology. Hobbs and
Cornwell's paper described trends in
applied behavior analysis that move it
towards an interbehavioral perspective,
and then emphasized the benefits this move
/
would provide if more explicitly
1
emphasized. Cornwell and Hobbs paper
reviewed the strengths and weaknesses of
J. M. Thyne's (1966) The Psychology of
Learning and Techniques of Teaching,"
which presents a behavioral approach to
classroom learning that incorporates some
distinctly interbehavioral principles.
In their paper, Cornwell and Hobbs also
describe their EXRIB (Example, Rule
Complimentarity." In addition, Parker E.
Lichtenstein (Newark, OH) and Harry C.
Mahan (Oceanside, CA) prepared book reviews
and book notes.
Quotation
The quotation printed in the last issue
of the newsletter was submitted by Bryan
D. Midgley. In this issue, the quotation
comes from Handy, R., & Harwood, E. C.
(1973). A Current Appraisal of the
Behavioral Sciences. Great Barrington,
MA: Behavioral Research Council.
Indicator, Behaviour) educational program,
which draws on behavioristic principles in
analyzing statements about teaching and
making observations of its actual
occurrence. A few excerpts presented
below illustrate the importance of the
interbehavioral perspective for their
project and related disciplines.
After the model was devised, we
became aware of the possibility of re-
conceptualizing it in interbehavioral
terms, whereby the Rule Indicator
elicits a particular stimulus function
from the stimulus object. The
EXRIB system also includes a category
"Contextual Stimuli" and a category
"Contextual Responses" to allow for the
treatment of other significant stimulus
and response features. Here too, it
can be argued that the model
incorporated features which were aimed
at the more effective handling of
certain practical issues, but which
nevertheless also had the additional
effect of moving it in the direction of
an interbehavioral field model.
Galton (1979) has correctly noted
that EXRIB was the only one of over
forty British classroom observation
schedules he surveyed that was aimed
specifically at comparing classroom
behaviour with stated objectives,
despite the fact that this is clearly
 one of the most obvious reasons for
undertaking observational studies....
If we are correct in suggesting that
there is a need for behaviourists to
devote more attention to developing
persuasive verbalizations about
education, then the experience of Thyne
and, more particularly, of those who
developed EXRIB throws a favorable
light on interbehavioral psychology.
If they found themselves moving towards
an interbehavioral perspective, that
augurs well for a fullblooded attempt
at developing an interbehavioral
analysis of education.
The application of the EXRIB program has
appeared in educational publications.
Those who are interested in either of
the two Hobbs and Cornwell papers or with
the EXRIB application should write to the
authors at the Department of Social
Studies, Paisley College of Technology, 67
High Street, Paisley, PA1 2BE, Scotland.
After the papers were presented,
discussion was opened up to the audience;
after that, the participants met among
themselves still further. In these latter
discussions, they discussed several means
by which interbehavioral psychology might
gain greater attention.
First, interbehavioral psychologists
need to place undergraduate students
interested in the approach into good
graduate programs. This will allow the
students to obtain professional positions
enabling them to promote the approach
through research and the training of
other students. (Those interbehavioral
psychologists who are already teaching in
graduate programs could have a more direct
effect.) Second, interbehavioral
psychologists need to undertake more
research and demonstration programs, such
as the EXRIB. Third, books on topics of
current interest should be written that
better explain the application of the
interbehavioral system. And fourth, an
international organization of
interbehavioral psychologists should be
established that would allow its
supporters to meet, present papers, and
encourage each others' efforts.
The last two recommendations need
further elaboration. As to the writing of
textbooks, we concluded that an
introductory text that was not too
obviously interbehavioral, but that
presented the approach as an alternative,
would be a useful undertaking, although it
would face strong competition from other
texts and might only influence a few
people, even if successful. In contrast,
a book that dealt more directly with the
currently fashionable topic of cognition
and physiology might gain a more
influential audience; it could be written
as a group project through carefully
integrated contributions by several
authors. (Kantor had considered writing a
book called Brajlnglogy.) This project
would require soliciting papers, making
the round of inquiries among publishers,
and some diligent editing. Whether anyone
has the time and inclination to undertake
such a project, we do not know.
As to an international interbehavioral
organization, interbehavioral psychologists
are now scattered throughout several
countries in ways that reduce our
influence. An international society of
interbehaviorists (ISIB?) would give us
more visibility, even if we were few in
number. We could align our meetings with
those of other organizations, just as we
have already been doing. An official
organization, however, would encourage us
further to meet for our own paper
presentations. Moreover, the organization
could invite scholars with allied
viewpoints to be speakers and discussants.
In addition, we might find ways to use an
international organization to introduce
still other scholars to interbehavioral
psychology. Such a society could have
separate chapters on each side of the
Atlantic, and regional ones where needed.
Occasionally, some of us could cross the
Atlantic to join with colleagues on the
other side. We already have The
Interbehaviorist as a medium to keep us
informed and coordinated. Ed Blewitt has
offered to organize in Britain. Perhaps
Roger Ray's group, which arose from the
meeting on May 27, 1985 in Columbus, OH,
could consider another such organization
(see The Interbehaviorist, 1985, _13(3),
19).
References
Galton, M. (1979). Systematic classroom
observation: British research.
Educational Research, 21, 109-115.
Thyne, J. M. (1966). The psychology of
learning and the techniques of teaching
(2nd ed.). London: University of
London Press.
 COMMENT
Ethical Analysis in Practice:
Douglas H. Ruben
Eastern Michigan University
Parrott's (1986) article, "Ethical
Situations in Interbehavioral
Perspective," nicely conceptualized the
role of voluntary interbehavior in choice
situations. Her distinction between
meaning and final reaction systems
clarified the role of a stimulus object's
"value" which, in relation to anticipatory
consequences and cultural influences,
determines choice. Complications among
field factors involving stimulus objects,
properties of objects, multiple responses,
and setting events create legitimate
ethical conflicts, as in her example of
the use of animals in scientific research.
In this comment, I offer an interpretation
of a real-life problem in medical ethics,
reported by Fraser Snowden (1983),
philosopher-in-residence at a parish
hospital in Natchitoches, Louisiana.
Snowden's mission was simple:
Following recent trends in philosophical
thinking (cf. Ruben, 1985), he tried to
broaden philosophy's impact on a medical
staff's understanding of the moral,
psychological, sociocultural, and
religious needs of patients. He conducted
workshops on "Human Values in Nursing" and
"Health and Humanity," and consulted on
"truth-telling," "death and dying," and
"existential advocacy." In doing so, he
was able to offer care providers with
means for resolving their daily dilemmas,
at least until he discovered the hazards
of applied philosophy in the hospital.
His "philosophical counseling"
encountered unexpected repercussions of
sizeable proportion. From outside the
hospital, the "moral majority" depicted
Snowden as a moral reprobate, calling
his pragmatic personalism a threat to
References
Parrott, L. J. (1986). Ethical
situations in interbehavioral
perspective. The Interbehaviorist,
_14, 38-44.
Ruben, D. H. (1985). Philosophy journals
and serials: An analytical guide.
Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
Expansion on Parrott's Analysis
social balance; he became a "witch-
doctor-in-residence." In addition to
protest letters from local Methodist
Sunday School programs, came in-house
harrassment: Nurses, aides, and
physicians cornered Snowden in the halls
and challenged him with such questions as
"Do you believe in God?" and "Are your
values in order?" Risking his status, he
asked the hospital administration and an
attorney for redirection.
Snowden also overlooked the relevant
cultural contingencies in the
interbehavioral histories of the medical
staff members themselves. Snowden's moral
lessons proposed values of health and
illness that, although humanistic, were
at odds with common concerns with cost-
efficiency, scientific technology, and
demonstrable risk-benefit ratios. These
were values of common interest, and
codified in daily practice. Bioethical
issues stirring the greatest controversy
(e.g., transplantation, living will, test-
tube birth, abortion, etc.) left listeners
even more confused, frustrated, and prone
to altercation.
The stimulus objects to which Snowden
attributed certain values were medically
relevant, but his values were derived from
a meaning reaction system incompatible
with that of the hospital personnel.
Snowden, however, accused the medical
establishment of antipathy toward
philosophy not realizing that an
approach to ethical inquiry is not unlike
an approach to scientific psychology.
Clarification depends more on the
awareness of integrated-field factors,
than on underlying concepts of
humanization.
Snowden., F. (1983). Bringing philosophy
into the hospital; Notes of a
philosopher-in-residence. The
International Journal ojf Applied
Philosophy, 1, 67-81.
 JOURNAL AND BOOK NOTES
Bakeman, R. , & Gottman, J. M. (1986).
Observing interaction^ An introduction
to sequential analysis. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press (pp. v-221;
$10.95).
Bakeman and Gottman's Observing
Interaction; An Introduction to
Sequential- Analysis is an important and
excellent introduction to a research
methodology of increasing interest to many
researchers. Investigators examining such
diverse topics as mother-infant
communication interactions (e.g.,
Rosenfeld, 1986), clinician-client verbal
interactions (e.g., Russell & Trull,
1986), and the behavior of killer whales
in captivity (e.g., Ray & Upson, 1977)
have all profited from applications of
sequential-analytic methods. In addition
to these immediately practical benefits,
sequential analysis is also valuable for
its potential in advancing behavioral
science onto higher methodological and
theoretical planes.
Sequential analysis has itself become
incorporated into a larger methodological
framework, referred to as "Behavioral
Systems Methodology" (Ray & Delprato, in
press). In Ray's words, this methodology
represents a "paradigm for a new
psychology." It allows us to look at
old problems in new ways and therefore
points to improved conceptualizations and
descriptions of behavioral phenomena.
A ready example of this is seen in the
independent-dependent variable
controversy. Some behaviorists, for
instance, hold (a) that a full explanation
of behavioral phenomena rests in tracing
its causes back to independent
environmental event(s) and (b) that
behavior itself cannot serve as an
independent variable. Data derived from
sequential-analytic investigations,
though, refute this notion (Henton &
Iversen, 1978; cf. Delprato, 1986). These
analyses have shown responding to be
partially and probabilistically dependent
upon prior responding in the ongoing
stream of behavior. Conceptually and .
practically, little is gained by insisting
that the stream of behavior be traced back
to environmental contingencies, as seems
inherent in the "absolutistic" doctrine of
response chaining (Delprato, 1986; Ray &
Delprato, in press).
Globally, Bakeman and Gottman offer
behavioral science a fine contribution
worthy of attention. The authors take the
reader through every stage of a sequential
analysis of data, as the book's chapter
titles suggest: Developing a coding
scheme; recording behavioral sequences;
assessing observer agreement; representing
observational data; analyzing sequential
data: first steps; analyzing event
sequences; analyzing time sequences; and
analyzing cross-classified events. This
book is highly recommended. (Bryan D.
Midgley, University of Kansas)
References
Delprato, D. J. (1986). Response
patterns. In H. W. Reese & L. J.
Parrott (Eds.), Behavior science:
Philosophical, me^thodologica.1^ and
empirical advances (pp. 61-113).
Hillsdale, NJ:Erlbaum..
Henton, W. W. , & Iversen, I. H. (1978).
Classical conditioning and pperant
conditioning: A response pattern
an a ly si ii. New York: Springer-Verlag.
Ray, R. D. (1986). Structural,
functional^ and operational analysis^ of
interbehavioral systems i Paradigm for
a new psychology;. Unpublished
manuscript, Rollins College, College
Park, FL.
Ray, R. D., & Delprato, D. J. (in press).
Behavioral systems methodology:
Investigating continuity and
organization in developmental
interactions. In S. H. Cohen & H. W.
Reese (Eds.), Life-span developmental
psychology; Methodological
innovations. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Ray, R. D., & Upson, J. D. (1977). A
systems approach to behavior III:
Organismic pace and complexity in time-
space fields. The Psychological
Record, 27_, 649^682.
Rosenfeld, H. M. (1986). Sequential
analysis of naturalistic communication.
In R. L. Schiefelbusch (Ed.), Language
competence: Assessment and
intervent ion, (pp. 131-184). San Diego:
Hill Press.
Russell, R. L, & Trull, T. J. (1986).
Sequential analysis of language
variables in psychotherapy process
research. Journal of Consulting and
Clinical Psychology, 54^16-2i.
Bolles, R. C. (1970). Species-specific
defense reactions and avoidance
learning. Psychological Review, 77,
32-48. ~~
The fable presented below "The Little
Bird and the Big, Bad Hawk" was prepared
as part of a critical review of hereditary
determinants of fears and phobias
(Delprato, 1980). The editor of the
journal in which it was to appear found
the fable unduly harsh, however, and it
was struck from the manuscript. It is
reprinted as follows, with commentary
afterwards.
Let us recall a little fable. It is
a very familiar fable. It was already
part of our lore when Tinbergen gave
his version of it in 1948, and the
story has been told again many times
since then. It goes something like
this: Once upon a time there was a
little bird who had recently hatched.
One day, while he was sitting in his
nest, our hero spied a goose-like
figure sailing against the background
of a lovely blue sky. He was not the
least disturbed. Soon thereafter,
however, our feathered friend saw a
different object sailing in the sky.
Alas! Its short neck indicated it to
be a hawk. Hawks are wont to eat
little birds, but our friend had not
been informed of this alarming fact by
his erudite elders. In fact, he had
never before seen, snielled, felt, or
heard a hawk. Clearly, his very
survival was in the gravest of danger.
Suddenly, our hero ran to safety to
escape the threat to his life! From
that day hence the little animal who
sat in his nest continued to avoid
hawks because the precariousness of his
situation prevented, somehow, his
becoming careless.
The moral of this tale, so we might be
told, is that little birds survive in
nature because they have an innate
("hawk") schema in their heads which, when
activated, causes them to run away from
big, bad hawks. This capacity to avoid
hawks has such obviously great survival
value that we should surely expect birds
to have evolved to where all members of
the species carry the trait in their
genes. We might also be told to expect
birds to avoid innately the other
predators their ancestors faced, and that
we should expand our theories of behavior
to encompass such biological determinants.
This fable was inspired by an earlier
one presented in Bolles (1970), an oft-
cited paper in support of alternatives to
environmentalism. Bolles presented an
argument that behavioral ontogeny could be
explained in one of two ways: (a) as a
function of environmental conditions, with
an emphasis on classical conditioning and
other principles of learning and (b) as a
function of heredity x environment (H x E)
interactionism, with an emphasis on both
learned and unlearned (innate) behavior.
Bolles raised this issue, in part,
because of discoveries that raised serious
questions about the environmentalistic-
learning approach to behavioral
development, a view seemingly advocated in
the pre-eminent learning theories of the
1930s through the 1950s. This
environmentalistic thinking was challenged
during the 1950s, in large part by the
ethological movement as epitomized in the
work of Lorenz and Tinbergen. Ethological
research, for example, appeared to show
that certain behavior patterns were
inherited. The subject of the fable
presented above the hawk-goose effect
is a prototypical case of apparently
innate behavior. Environmentalism, then,
had to make way for hereditary
determinants, out of which H x E
interactionism emerged.
H x E interactionism is a compelling
position, though misguided in its own way.
We are told that learned behaviors
(effects of experience) are usually
intertwined with innate (or genetically
determined) behaviors. Accordingly, if we
carefully analyze what we initially think
are learned behavior patterns, some of their
elements will turn out to be innate and
others will be identified as learned. For
example, consider the frequently discussed
case of the familiar operant chain:
discriminative stimulus (e.g., light on)
operant response (e.g., lever press)
reinforcer (e.g., food) response to
reinforcer (e.g., eating). Is it not the
case that increases in the probability of
learned lever pressing is dependent on
its inclusion in the chain of the innate
response of eating food? The trainer
trained the learned lever pressing, but
did not have to train the innate behavior
of eating. All normal members of the
species eat it is necessary for
survival, so the argument goes.
In applying H x E thinking to
defensive behavior, Bolles (1970, p. 32)
presented the environmentalistic-learning
approach as a fable but H x E
interactionism is just as much a fable.
Although mainstream psychologists may not
realize it, an alternative exists to these
two classic choices regarding behavioral
ontogeny. The alternative rejects the
distinction of unlearned and learned, not
only as a dichotomy, but also as a
meaningful dimension of behavior in the
first place. This nonreductionistic
alternative takes an authentic
developmental perspective, versions of
which have been presented by Lehrman
(1953), Schneirla (1957), Kuo (1967), and
Kantor and Smith (1975).
Tinbergen (1963) himself unequivocally
moved away from the H x E position to
which he made great such contributions.
Unfortunately, too few behavioral
scientists seem to have noticed this.
(Dennis J. Delprato, Eastern Michigan
University)
References
Delprato, D. J. (1980). Hereditary
determinants of fears and phobias.
Behavior Therapy, JJ^, 79-103.
Kantor, J. R., & Smith, N. W. (1975).
The science of psychology: An
interbehavioral survey. Chicago:
Frincipia Press.
Kuo, Z.-Y. (1967). .The dynamics of
behavior development: An epigenetic
view. New York: Random House.
Lehrman, D. S. (1953). A critique of
Konrad Lorenz's theory of instinctive
behavior. Quarterly Review o_f Biology,
28, 337-363.
Schneirla, T. C. (1957). The concept of
development in comparative psychology.
In D. B. Harris (Ed.), The concept of
development: An issue in the study of
human behavior (pp. 78-108).
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press.
Tinbergen, N. (1948). Social releasers
and the experimental method required
for their study. The Wilson Bulletin,
60, 6-51.
Tinbergen, N. (1963). On aims and
methods of ethology. Zeitschrift fur
Tierpsychologie, 20, 410-433,
Harris, M. (1986). Investigating the
unexplained New York: Prometheus
Books.
Harris is a broadcaster and researcher
for the BBC who investigates studies for
accuracy, including those of the
paranormal. He began his investigation of
paranormal claims with no particular
persuasion one way or the other and traced
stories back to their primary sources.
The result, as he states in the Preface,
was that "in the end I was able to say
over and over again with authority:
'Sorry you've been duped!"1 (p. 7).
People who believe in these stories, he
holds, have never developed critical
reasoning ability and "stand crippled by
fears, phantasms, cruel superstitions, and
distorted values picked up during their
vulnerable childhoods" (p. 9). Beliefs
are usually more complex than this, but
lack of critical reasoning is undoubtedly
often a factor. These duped people are,
he notes, prey for those peddling books
for high profit. One might add that they
are also prey for those involved in even
greater chicanery the faith healers,
the mediums, and others who fleece people
out of their life savings and, in the
worst cases, their lives witness the
more than 900 lives lost in the Jonesville
cult.
Harris presents each case by first
giving a colorful account of the tale as
it typically appears, and then taking it
apart piece by piece by citing source
documents. Some of these tales for
example, the Amityville Horror and the
prophecies of Nostradamus have
previously been exposed in the Skeptical
Inquirer and in recent books, many of them
by the same publisher as Harris's
Prometheus Books. The present book
provides independent refutation. Most of
the tales, however, have not (to my
knowledge) been previously exposed.
Harris provides an important service in
doing so, and accomplishes it with an
enjoyable style of writing. The twenty-
two pages of chapter notes at the end add
useful information, much of it almost as
interesting as the text. This book is a
welcome addition to the important and
growing list of Prometheus Books that
bring rationality and objective
investigation to irresponsible claims.
(Noel W. Smith, State University of New
York at Plattsburgh)
10
Watson, J.''B. (1924). Psychology from
the standpoint of a behaviorist (2nd
ed.). Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott.
The details of John B. Watson's
behaviorism are almost completely unknown
to a generation of psychologists who have
read only brief and sometimes inaccurate
descriptions of his work in introductory
textbooks and histories of psychology.
Because most of these descriptions
characterize him as a promoter and
polemicist, the scientific content of his
work might come as a surprise to
contemporary psychologists. I present
below some statements of interest to
interbehavioral psychologists that
indicate Watson's concern with "setting
factors."
It is obvious that if this
formulation is to fit the facts, the
general condition of the organism must
be such that the stimulus can produce
its effect. A child alone in a house
on a stormy night with only a dim
candle burning may display the reaction
of fear at the mournful hoot of an owl.
If the parents are at hand and the room
is well lighted, the stimulus may pass
unreacted to. Stimulus then in this
sense is used in a broad way to refer
not only to the exciting object but
also to the general setting. (p. 215)
In view of the fact that there are
many responses possible, the question
as to which will appear upon the
instance of a given stimulus becomes
one which we must consider. We can
answer this in only a general way and
in probable terms. (1) The response
most likely to appear is the one
which was most recently called out
by the object. (2) When recency is not
pertinent the act which has been most
frequently connected with the object is
the one most likely to be called out.
(3) The act called out is likely to be
one which is most closely connected
with the general setting of the
situation as a whole. For example, one
taking an ocean voyage with agreeable
men and women companions might begin to
hop about and dance at the sight of a
man with a violin. But if earlier in
the morning several conventional ladies
had remarked that "to-day is Sunday, no
dancing will be tolerated," the sight
of the man with the violin may lead
merely to verbal railing against the
blue laws enforced beyond the three
mile limit. We are expected to display
churchly behavior, funeral behavior
and wedding behavior upon certain
occasions. The situation as a whole
envelops us and each object in that
situation can call out for the time
being only a narrowly appropriate and
conventional type of act. (4) The most
important determiners are the
situations which the individual has had
to come up against during the hours
preceding the incidence of the stimulus
to which he must now react, and the
amount of emotional tension those
previous activities have aroused. The
usual reactions to a revolver lying on
the dresser are possibly to polish and
clean it periodically, but if some one
has been rifling your cash drawer or
safe from day to day you may, on
reaching home, pick up the weapon, load
it, return to your office and lie in
wait for the intruder. (5) Temporary
intra-organic factors tremendously
influence our reactions. The onset of
toothache, headache, or indigestion or
the beginning of seasickness may
temporarily make out of an ordinarily
cheerful individual one from whom
normal reactions cannot be obtained.
(6) The most important determiner, of
course, is the life history of the
individual in the sense that his
general and special training,
illnesses, disappointments, hobbies,
family training and the like develop
within him definite attitudes, trends,
or slants to the religious man each
new discovery in science is a direct
evidence of the beneficence of the
Creator; to the scientific man it is an
evidence of the keenness and assiduity
of the research worker; to the down-
trodden each new thing is an added
burden which will merely serve to
overtax him further. (pp. 320-321).
Watson was not an interbehavioral
psychologist, but he was also not the
naive S-'R psychologist he is sometimes
depicted as being. When the dualism of
his times and his lack of data on behavior
are considered, the sophisticated and
modern tone of some of Watson's views
becomes even more surprising. (James T.
Todd, University of Kansas)

Memorial Resolution
PROFESSOR EMERITUS JACOB ROBERT KANTOR
(August 8, 1888 - February 2, 1984)
Jacob Robert Kantor was born in
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania on August 8,
1888, the eldest son of recent German
immigrants. He entered the University of
Chicago in 1910, earning a Ph.B. in 1914
and a Ph.D. in psychology in 1917.
Chicago's Department of Psychology, under
the direction of James R. Angell, was a
leading center of research and training in
functional psychology. Kantor was a
member of the largest Ph.D. class in
American psychology up to that date: Ten
others graduated with him, notably L. L.
Thurstone and Beardsley Ruml. Kantor
began his teaching career as an instructor
at the University of Minnesota, remained
there from 1915 to 1917, and continued as
an instructor at the University of Chicago
from 1917 to 1920.
When Kantor came to Indiana University
in 1920 he joined a small but established
Department of Psychology and Philosophy
with a strong tradition of empirical
investigation. Here Kantor began his long
career as a psychological theorist and
system-builder. The dominant motif in his
varied work was a passionate belief in the
possibility of a truly objective science of
behavior. To this end he developed a
comprehensive analytical framework, termed
interbehaviorism, first published in his
two-volume Principles of: Psychology (1924-
26).
Kantor's interbehaviorism was one among
many forms of behaviorism that emerged
during the 1910s and 1920s and was perhaps
the most ambitious in scope, dealing not
only with relatively simple motor
behavior, but also with complex cognitive
and emotional processes. His work, while
centering on the psychology of learning,
encompassed most of the major subfields of
psychology, including sensory, abnormal,
physiological, and social psychology. In
the last-named areas he contributed to
critiques of Instinct Theory, which was
essentially discredited by 1930. A
representative collection of his papers is
gathered in The Aim and Progress of
Psychology and Other Sciences (1971).
In addition to his general theoretical
framework, Kantor devoted major efforts to
logic and to linguistics. In Psychology
11
and Logic (1945-50) and in The Logic of
Modern Science (1953) he sought to develop
a thoroughly naturalistic, nonmathematical
conception of logic that was based on
actual human behavior rather than on ideal
or formal prescriptions. Likewise,
linguistics was analyzed as a complex
interaction between the performer of
linguistic actions and the controlling
environment in An Objective Psychology of
Grammar (1936) and Psychological
LinguJ-Stics (1977). In a related vein,
his massive and erudite Scientific
Evolution of Psychology (1963-69) was
aimed toward salvaging useful materials
for the reform of modern psychology rather
than toward the goal of understanding past
ideas in their context.
Kantor's productivity did not falter
even into his tenth decade: In the 1980s,
he published Interbehavioral Philosophy
(1981), Cultural Psychology (1982), and
Tragedy and the Event Continuum (1983) .
He was also a frequent editorial
contributor to The Psychological Record, a
journal he established in 1937. Finally,
as a fitting tribute to his long and
continuing influence, his friends and
followers published a Festschrift,
Reassessment in Psychology, last year.
Kantor's scholarly work was
complemented by his teaching. He had a
stimulating effect on generations of
graduate students, particularly after
World War II, and inspired some to
disseminate and to extend his ideas in a
formal way. After his retirement in 1959,
he returned to Chicago, living near the
University where he could pursue his
studies. He received an honorary
doctorate from the University of Akron in
1971. He made his last visit to the
Bloomington Campus in 1978, when he gave a
colloquium in the Psychology Department.
A gentle and dedicated man, who argued
strongly for his beliefs, J. R. Kantor
will be remembered as a scholar and
teacher with a clear vision of psychology
as a natural science and with a lifetime
commitment to revealing that vision to
others through forceful analysis and
critical exposition. His bibliographic
legacy will allow future students to
12

ponder the'significance of his work and to Douglas G. Ellson, co-chairman

assess this outstanding individual for James H. Capshew, co-chairman
themselves. Richard N. Berry
With the certainty that Indiana Eliot S. Hearst
University has benefited by its close ties Harry G. Yamaguchi
with this psychologist, be it resolved with assistance from
that the faculty pay its deepest respect Herman B. Wells and
to the memory of Jacob Robert Kantor; that Cornelia Christenson
this resolution be recorded in the minutes
of the Bloomington Faculty Council; and Commemorated by the Bloomington
that a copy be sent to his daughter, Dr. Faculty Council: October 2, 1984
Helene J. Kantor.

THE INTERBEHAV10RIST
Edward K. Morris, Ph.D.
Department of Human Development
University of Kansas
Lawrence, KS 66045-2133
 A Quarterly Newsletter of Interbehavioral Psychology
ISSN 8755-612X

Published at the University of Kansas

Volume 15 1987 Number 2

EDITOR TABLE OF CONTENTS

Edward K. Morris The Agora 15

University of Kansas
The ABA Convention ; 15

ADVISORY BOARD Notes from the Field 15

Sidney W. Bijou New Subscribers 15

University of Arizona
Donna M. Cone Book and Journal Notes 16
State of Rhode Island
Dennis J. Delprato Comments
Eastern Michigan University Dennis J. Delprato: "J. R. Kantor's
Sandy Hobbs (Scotland) Contributions to Scientific
Paisley College of Technology Psychology" 18
Paul T. Mountjoy
Western Michigan University
Linda J. Parrott (Canada) QUOTATION
St. Mary's University
N. H. Pronko This molar notion of behavior this
Wichita State University notion that behavior presents
Roger D. Ray characterizable and defining
Rollins College properties of its own, which are other
Emilio Ribes (Mexico) than the properties of the underlying
Escuela Nacional de Estudios physics and physiology has been
Douglas H. Ruben defended by other theories than
Eastern Michigan University ourselves. In particular,
Robert G. Wahler acknowledgement must be made to Holt,
University of Tennessee de Laguna, Weiss, and Kantor.

- E. C. Tolman (1932, p. 8).

ASSISTANT EDITORS Purposive behavior in
animals and men. New
Lisa M. Johnson York: Century.
Bryan D. Midgley
Susan M. Schneider (Submitted by Dennis J. Delprato,
James T. Todd Eastern Michigan University, as part
of his "Comments" for this issue.)
14
THE INTERBEHAVIORIST
A Quarterly Newsletter of
Interbehavioral Psychology
ISSN 8755-612X
Edward K. Morris, Editor
Department of Human Development
2035D Haworth Hall
University of Kansas
Lawrence,. Kansas 66045, U.S.A.
913-864-3684/4840
The Interbehaviorist is a quarterly
publication of news, information,
discussion, journal and book notes, book
reviews, comments, and brief articles
pertaining to interbehavioral psychology
a contextualistic, integrated-field
approach to the natural science of
behavior.
The newsletter publishes professional
communications that fall between informal
correspondence and"colloquia, and formal
archival publication. As such, the
newsletter supplements contemporary
journals dedicated to basic and applied
research, to the history and philosophy of
the behavioral sciences, and to
professional issues in the field. The
newsletter strongly encourages
submission of notes about current
professional activities of its
subscribers, news and observations about
interbehavioral psychology and related
perspectives, comments on journal articles
and books of interest, more extended book
reviews, and brief articles. All
submissions should be sent in triplicate
to the editor and should conform to the
style described in the Publication Manual
of the American Psychological Association
(3rd edition).
Subscription Information
Student Subscriptions (US) $ 4,00
Regular Subscriptions (US)......... 6.00
Foreign Subscriptions 8.00
Institutional Subscriptions 12.00
Back Volumes 1-14 6.00
Back Volume Complete Sets... Please Write
THE PRINCIPIA PRESS
Principia Press's list of currently
available titles in interbehavioral
psychology is presented below. Check your
bookshelves, and those of your library and
bookstore, for possible oversights. In
addition, the books make excellent gifts
for colleagues and for students,
especially for the latter in honor of
their completed degree requirements. The
books may be purchased directly from
Principia Press, 5743 Kimbark Avenue,
Chicago, IL 60637. Handling charges are
$.75 per title; prepaid orders are
postpaid. Any queries should also be
directed to the address above.
Principles of. Psychology (2 vols.)
$20.00
Psychology and Logic (2 vols.)
$25.00
Interbehavioral Psychology
$15.00
The Logic of Modern Science
$15.00
An Objective Psychology of Grammar
$13.00
The Scientific Evolution of Psychology
(2 vols.) $40.00
The Science of Psychology; An
Interbehavioral Survey $20.00
Psychological Linguistics
$15.00 -
Interbehavioral Philosophy
$27.50
Cultural Psychology
$16.00
Tragedy and the Event Continuum
$15.00
Selected Writings, 1929-1983
$20.00
Psychological Comments and Queries
$20.00

THE AGORA
This issue of the newsletter brings us
back more in line with our January-April-
August-October publication schedule.
Moreover, the August issue is already well
under way, in large part because Harry C.
Mahan has graciously accepted our
invitation to serve as its guest editor.
We think you will find his material lively
and intelligent, and look forward to
bringing you that issue.
Space is short, so let us move directly
into the contents of the current issue.
The Annual ABA Convention
The annual meeting of the Association
for Behavior Analysis (ABA) will be held
in Nashville, TN from May 25-28. This
year, more than a dozen papers will be
presented by newsletter subscribers, and
even more subscribers are involved as
discussants, chairpeople, and the like.
In addition, Linda J. Parrott will chair
the "Interbehaviorists in ABA Special
Interest Group" on Wednesday, May 27
(5:00-6:20).
The ABA convention is one of the few
opportunities interbehavioral
psychologists have to interact with one
another as a critical (sic) mass. This,
combined with all the other excellent
sessions and professional activities,
makes the convention intellectually
invigorating. If you are interested in
attending, please contact Shery
Chamberlain, ABA Offices, Department of
Psychology, Western Michigan University,
Kalamazoo, MI 49008.
We list below ABA papers and posters of
possible interest to subscribers.
Sidney W. Bijou: "Social Skills Training
Research in Handicapped Elementary
School Children"
Kristina R. Blount, and W. Joseph Wyatt:
"Attention Deficit Disorder: Validity
of Self-Reports of Children"
Philip N. Hineline: "Directional Masking
of Mentalism, and of Anti-Mentalism"
Iver Iversen: "Visual Display of
Behavioral Data"
Iver Iverson: "Superstitious Behavior in
Normal Adult Humans"
Edward K. Morris: "Context, Cognition,
and Biology in Applied Behavior
Analysis"
Bryan D. Midgley and Edward K. Morris:
"The 'Reflex1 or the Integrated Field:
15
Which Is to be the Fundamental Unit of
Psychology?"
Roger D. Ray et al. "The Structural
Analysis of Behavioral Systems: How
Naive Observers Discriminate Behaviors"
Susan M. Schneider and Edward K. Morris:
"The Operant-Respondent Distinction -
and Beyond?: A Brief Review"
Susan M. Schneider, James T. Todd, and
Edward K. Morris: "Effects of Signaled
Timeout on High and Low Rate
Responding"
Wanda L. Smith: "Development of Dependent
Variables for Measuring Therapeutic
Drug Effects in Individuals with
Alzheimer's Disease"
James T. Todd and Edward K. Morris: "What
the Laboratory Has to Say about Private
Events"
Notes from the Field
Sidney W. Bijou was honored by numerous
colleagues at the 21th Banff conference on
behavior modification held March 15-19 in
Banff, Canada. The topic of this year's
conference was early childhood education
and intervention.
The Winter (1987) issue of The
Psychological Record contained material
from numerous newsletter subscribers.
Patrick M. Ghezzi and Sidney W. Bijou were
authors on "Influence of Age of Listener
on Preadolescents1 Linguistic Behavior"
and Harry C. Mahan published
"Interbehavioral Perspectives: On Act
Psychologies and Psychological Nouns."
Book reviews and notes were also prepared
by Donna M. Cone, Parker E. Lichtenstein,
and Harry C. Mahan.
The January issue of the American
Psychologist contained two comments by
newsletter subscribers: Paul T.
Mountjoy's "Nonhuman Animal Research and
and Historical Research" and Lisa M.
Johnson and Edward K. Morris's "Public
Information on Research with Nonhumans."
New Subscribers
The new subscribers since the last
Issue are:
Doug Keyes
Enrique J. Molina
D. Kenneth Nicholas
Diane L. Polster
Paisley College of Technology Library
Joy Ilene Simon
Karen I. Simpson
16
BOOK AND JOURNAL NOTES
Baldwin, J. D., & Baldwin, J. I. (1981).
Beyond sociobiology. New York:
Elsevier North Holland.
In this volume, the Baldwins provide
conceptual balance to the reductionistic
theories of behavior put forth by some
sociobiologists (cf. Todd & Morris, 1982).
The book should be of interest to
newsletter subscribers in that it presents
material that is conceptually consistent
with the work of Bijou and Baer (1978),
Kantor (1959), and Smith (1973).
The heart of the book lies in its
discussion of the features of what is
termed balanced biosocial theory. Such a
theory takes into account the interactive
influence of (a) genetic and biological
variables and (b) the processes of natural
learning (e.g., operant conditioning) in
accounting for behavioral development. In
this, the theory is consonant with field-
based, interactive theories such as
Kantor's.
The Baldwins present several defining
characteristics of balanced theories, and
then evaluate the work of sociobiologists
on that basis. Not surprisingly, they
conclude that sociobiology is unbalanced,
especially in its heavy emphasis on more
distal, evolutionary causes of behavior.
This is followed by a discussion of the
fundamentals of natural learning
processes, and how they may interact with
more distal causes in the development of
primate behavior. Interbehavioral readers
may be particularly interested in material
on the "mapping" of the fields of
reinforcing and punishing interactions in
which an organism is involved.
In presenting an example of a balanced
biosocial theory, the Baldwins focus on
exploratory and play behavior in primates,
(see also Baldwin & Baldwin, 1977, 1978).
Their analysis of the variables that may
account for the development of such
behavior is similar to that of
interbehaviorally-oriented authors. For
example, the Baldwins emphasize the
initial role of sensory stimulation, and
its potential reinforcing and punishing
properties. This is similar to Bijou's
(1976, 1980; see also Bijou & Baer, 1978)
discussion of "ecological reinforcers,"
which result from interactions of
organisms with stimuli in the environment,
and which may be functional in shaping aau
maintaining behavior. The book concludes
with a discussion of the importance of
extending our understanding of the
function of learning processes to the
natural environment, and briefly outlines
a balanced theory of human behavior and
sociocultural development, including both
micro- and macrosocial variables.
The text has been favorably reviewed by
workers from other disciplines (e.g.,
Thomas, 1982), and has much to offer those
interested in conceptual and empirical
work that attempts to integrate organismic
and environmentally-based variables. It
is heartening that scientists from a
variety of disciplines are interested in
developing and promoting such frameworks
for the study of behavior. (Robert
O'Neill, University of Oregon)
References
Baldwin, J. D., & Baldwin, J. I. (1977).
The role of learning phenomena in the
ontogeny of exploration and play. In
S. Chevalier-Skolnikoff & F. E. Poirer
(Eds.), Primate bio-social development
(pp. 343-406). New York: Garland.
Baldwin, J. D., & Baldwin, J. I. (1978).
Reinforcement theories of exploration,
play, creativity, and psychosocial
growth. In E. 0. Smith (Ed.), Social
play in primates (pp. 231-257). New
York: Academic Press.
Bijou, S. W. (1976). Child development:
The basic stage of early childhood.
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Bijou, S. W. (1980). Exploratory
behavior in infants and animals: A
behavior analysis. The Psychological
Record, 330, 483-495"!
Bijou, S. W., & Baer, D. M. (1978).
Behavior analysis of child development.
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Kantor, J. R. (1959). Interbehavioral
psychology. Chicago: Principia Press.
Smith, N. W. (1973). Interbehavioral
psychology: Roots and branches. The
Psychological Record, 23, 153-167.
Thomas, R. K. (1982). Review of Beyond
sociobiology. Ethology and
Sociobiology, .3, 45-46.
Todd, J. T., & Morris, E. K. (1982, May).
Some relationships between sociobiology
and radical behaviorism. Paper
presented at the meeting of the
Association for Behavior Analysis,
Milwaukee, WI.

Blackmore, S. (1986). The adventures of
a parapsychologist. Buffalo, NY:
Prometheus Books. (249 pp., $19.95)
This book lives up to its title as an
"adventure," yet accomplishes an extremely
valuable service. It shows how one firm
believer in parapsychology came to doubt
its validity because she insisted on
rigorous experimental analyses which
yielded consistently negative results.
The book is enjoyable as well as
enlightening; the writing is lively,
personable, and entertaining. As one
episode unfolded after another, I found
myself eager to read yet another chapter.
Blackmore notes that the progress being
made in studying things people experience,
but cannot explain such as "OBE's,
near-death experiences, lucid dreams,
apparitions, divination, and mystical
experiences" (p. 240) is not occurring
within parapsychology, but rather outside
of it. She asks if a new parapsychology
might not emerge, one not committed to
psi. But, she is forced to conclude that
many parapsychologists are interested only
in the paranormal, and would reject such a
proposal.
Perhaps what Blackmore is implicitly
recognizing is that nature is replete with
unexplained events these are what keep
scientific investigation going. Science
has been fruitfully pursued on the
assumption that the unexplained is
natural, and can potentially be accounted
for by natural events. The assumptions of
parapsychologists have proven less
fruitful: "...psi, as I had learned so
painfully, is a useless hypothesis" (p.
241). In the next sentence, she asks if
psi could be "just a red herring," and
ends the book on the following page with
the surprising answer, "I don' t know! "
Suspended judgment is an important part of
science, and the burden of proof rests
with those who make a claim. When
evidence is lacking or negative, then a
claim may be dismissed until supporting
evidence is available. After ten years of
negative evidence, Blackmore would have
been more than justified in answering her
question, "Yes!"
Psi has had a multitude of claims, but
no supporting experimental evidence
replicable by nonparapsychologists. This
cannot be excused by claiming that the
phenomena are not subject to scientific
procedures, for the claimants themselves
17
have tried to use such procedures for
support. Because both evidence and logic
are lacking, the claims of the
parapsychologists need to be put aside and
research directed in more fruitful
directions perhaps to the study of
those who make paranormal claims (a few
studies have been conducted) or to areas
in which Blackmore notes progress has been
made "outside of parapsychology,"
I plan to adopt this book for a seminar
that critically evaluates the paranormal.
Of late, I have been using James Randi's
Film Flam (1982), but it is so
confrontational that students who believe
in the paranormal react with resentment.
His book is so good, however, that I
intend to continue using it, but to
precede it with Blackmore's book. Because
she begins from the standpoint of a
believer, I anticipate that students will
easily follow her ever-increasing
skepticism, Randi's confrontational style
should then be easier for them to accept.
Blackmore's book might also be useful for
beginning courses in experimental
methodology. It explains issues in
methodology and statistics in the context
of material of already high interest.
Instructors could even select among
experiments Blackmore presents and then
explain the relevant methodology. The
book could not stand alone, of course, but
it could pave the way for more traditional
texts.
Finally, a word of commendation should
be given the publishers for bringing out
Blackmore's and Randi's books, and a host
of others that evaluate claims of the
occult. Prior to Prometheus's venture
into this area, most publishers rejected
such manuscripts for fear of jeopardizing
their profits from occult books. The
latter still saturate the market, but
Blackmore's and Randi's works provide
critically needed voices of reason. About
ten years ago, I taught a course that
evaluated occult claims and found such a
dearth of good material that I did not
repeat the effort for another five years.
Now, thanks in large part to Prometheus
Press, there is an abundance of material.
(Noel W. Smith, State University of New
York at Plattsburgh)
Reference
Randi, J. (1982). F l i m f l a m , Buffalo,
NY: Prometheus Books.
18
COMMENTS
J. R. Kantor's Contributions to Scientific Psychology
Dennis J. Delprato
Eastern Michigan University
After I discovered Kantor's work, I
began attending to comments in the
literature regarding his contributions,
and unsystematically recorded them. The
items below are direct quotations from
some of this collection; I will provide
others in a subsequent issue of the.
newsletter. These quotations may be
useful in providing an indication of both
the breadth of Kantor's influence and its
impact on certain influential figures.
This material, of course, is not
complete. For example, it does not
include applications of the
interbehavioral perspective to emotion by
Brady (1975), general psychology by Pronko
(1980), child behavior therapy by Wahler
and Graves (1983), behavioral organization
by Delprato (1986), 'behavioral medicine by
Delprato and McGlynn (1986), and clinical
psychology by various individuals (Ruben &
Delprato, in press). At the very least,
though, perusal of the following
quotations suggests that Kantor's ideas
have always been fresh and far-ranging,
and remain fertile soil for today's
students.
A^ F._ Bentley (1935)
We retain eleven systems for closer
analysis [in Bentley's assessment of the
.science of psychology], the presentations
of the following writers: Madison
Bentley, J. F. Dashiell, John Dewey,
Knight Dunlap, W. S. Hunter, J. R. Kantor,
C. K. Ogden, Margaret Floy Washburn, John
B. Watson, Albert P. Weiss, and R. S.
Woodworth (p. 14).
Let us appraise the significance of
Kantor's approach by removing ourselves,
for the purpose of its inspection, as far
as we can from the present-day
psychological turmoil. Suppose that a Man
from Mars should come along....If our
inquirer then wandered further and came
across Kantor's construction, he might
return to the behaviorist and say: "You
started by telling me that organisms and
non-organic things were all alike natural.
Here, now, I have found a system that
treats them that way. Where it finds
'seeing' or 'knowing' or 'remembering,' it
takes both man and object into account in
the common activity. Is not that just
what you ought to be doing if they are
both natural in the world?11.
The behaviorist's answer I shall not
attempt to guess. Too many evanescent
sparks would probably fly. But the filial
remark which the Man from Mars would make
is clear enough: "You seem to me pretty
sentimental over your little fragments of
'man1; I think I prefer the tough-minded
Kantor" (p. 94).
Recall the present status of confusion
with respect to the term "environment" as
we have seen it in chapters VII and XI.
Dewey sets up a principle, but leaves it
imperfectly developed. Hunter and Weiss
attempt to section environments. Madison
Bentley proposes their ejection from all
psychological research. Kantor alone in
the psychological field makes direct
constructive study of the behavioral
extension upon which the term
"environment" insists. (p. 339)
Bijou (1976)
The analysis presented here...is
theoretical in interpreting behavior in
terms of the empirical concepts and
functional laws that have been generated
by laboratory and field experimental
research in the last fifty years and
organized into a system founded on the
assumptions embodied in the philosophy of
modern behaviorism presented by B. F.
Skinner and J. R. Kantor. (p. xi)
Bijou and Baer (1978)
The theory presented here brings
together the contributions of many
psychologists. ...our most basic debts
are to B. F. Skinner, J. R. Kantor, F. S.
Keller, and W. N. Schoenfeld (p. xi).
This formulation can readily be
identified with the philosophy of science
and behavior theory of B. E1. Skinner and
J. R. Kantor. (p. 33)
Dewey and Bentley (1949/1973)
The other natural approach to logic to

be considered is that of J. R. Kantor in
his book Psychology and Logic.... He
makes his development upon the basis of
his interbehavioral psychology which rates
as one of the most important advances in
psychological construction since William
James. (p. 152)
Ekehammer (1974)
Although interactionist thought can be
traced back to Aristotle..., probably one
of the first attempts in psychology toward
an interactionist conceptualization was
made by Kantor (1924, 1926) (p. 1027)
Fuller (1973)
Without the influence of Kantor,
operant studies might have stayed
exclusively in the animal laboratories a
long, long"time, (p. 324)
Goldstein (1940)
Certainly any reaction is
understandable only if we consider the
individual phenomenon in reference to the
condition of the whole organism. In
animal psychology, too, such a conception
has of late gained more ground. I should
like to mention especially the work of K.
S. Lashley and Kantor. (p. 132)
Kanfer (1968)
A functional approach to verbal
behavior was suggested by J. R.
Kantor....The functional approach was
further developed by Skinner (1957)....
(p. 255)
Kanfer and Karoly (1972)
Almost 50 years ago, Kantor (1924)
argued eloquently against the use in
psychology of metaphysical abstractions,
which find extreme representations in the
"bodyless mind" of the psychiats and the
"mindless body" of the mechanists. His
analysis retains its timeliness. (p. 399)
Kanfer and Phillips (1970)
As must be true for a volume that
reviews the experiments and theories of a
large field, we have been influenced not
only by personal contacts but by the many
writers and colleagues whose efforts have
created the field of behavior therapy. J.
R. Kantor deserves particular recognition
as a teacher who has deeply influenced the
senior author's view of human behavior,
(p. viii)
19
Krasner (1982)
By the end of World War II, there was
already in existence a historically long-
established "behaviorism" stream, solidly
based on a "scientific" psychology and
influenced by the laboratory studies of
Pavlov (1928); the Mowrers1 conditioning
approach to enuresis (1938); John B.
Watson's research and theoretical
formulations (1924); and a stream of
research and theory produced by, among
others, Thorndike, Kantor, Bain, J. S.
Mill, Bentham, and Locke. (p. 23)
In the first article devoted to the
topic of "behavior therapy" published in
the Annual Review of Psychology, Krasner
(1971) argued that 15 streams of
development within the science of
psychology came together during the 1950s
and 1960s to form the approach to behavior
change generally known as "behavior
therapy." These streams may be briefly
summarized as follows:
1. The concept of behaviorism in
experimental psychology, (e.g., Kantor,
1969). [Note: Krasner appears to be
referring to Kantor's historical analysis
here.] (p. 25)
Revusky and Garcia (1970)
Dedicated to J. R. Kantor because he
gave Revusky an insight into the breadth
of psychology. (p. 1)
Riegel (1978)
A few far-sighted psychologists, for
example Jacob Kantor, have for many
decades recognized the problem of
Interactive changes, but their voices have
been drowned by the loudspeakers (and not
the radicals) of modern psychology. (pp.
62-63)
Rotter (1954)
Three of these, with whom I have had
the exceptionally rewarding experience of
studying personally, should be mentioned
for their specific contributions to the
basic theoretical orientation of
this book. They are J. R. Kantor, and
the late Alfred Adler and Kurt Lewin.
(p. viii-ix)
(References on back page.)
20
References
Bentley, A. F. (1935). Behavior,
knowledge, fact. Bloomington, IN:
Principia Press.
Bijou, S. W. (1976). Child development:
The basic stage of early childhood.
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Bijou, S. W., & Baer, D. M. (1978).
Behavior analysis of: child development.
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Brady, J, V. (1975). Toward a behavioral
biology of emotion. In L. Levi (Ed.),
EmotionsTheir parameters and
measurement (pp. 17-45). New York:
Raven Press.
Delprato, D, J. (1986). Response
patterns. In H. W. Reese & L. J.
Parrott (Eds.), Behavior science:
Philosophical^ methodological, and
empirical advances^ (pp. 61-113).
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Delprato, D. J., & McGlynn, F, D. (1986).
Innovations in behavioral medicine. In
M. Hersen, R. M. Eisler, & P. M. Miller
(Eds.), Progress in behavior
modification (Vol. 20, pp. 67-122).
Orlando, FL: Academic Press.
Dewey, J., & Bentley, A. F. (1973).
Knowing and the known. In R. Handy &
E. C. Harwood~TEds.), Useful
procedures of inquiry. Great
Barrington, MA: Behavorial Research
Council. (Original work published
1949)
Ekehammer, B, (1974). Interactionism in
psychology from a historical
perspective. Psychological
Bulletin, 81, 1026-1048.
Fuller, P, R. (1973). Professors Kantor
and Skinner The "grand alliance" of
the 40's. The Psychological Record,
23, 318-324.
THE INTERBEHAVIORIST
Edward K, Morris, Editor
Department of Human Development
University of Kansas
Lawrence, KS 66045-2133
Bryan D. Midoley
Department of Human Developmer.t-
University of Kansas
KS 66045
Goldstein, K. (1940). Human nature in
the light of psycho-pathology. New
York: Schocken.
Kanfer, F. H. (1968). Verbal
conditioning: A review of its current
status. In T. R. Dixon & D. L. Horton
(Eds.), Verbal behavior and
general behavior theory (pp. 254-290).
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Kanfer, F. H., & Karoly, P. (1972).
Self-control: A behavioristic Excursion
into the Lion's Den. Behavior
Therapy, 3, 398-416.
Kanfer, F. H., & Phillips, J. S. (1970).
Learning foundations o_f behavior
therapy. New York: Wiley.
Krasner, L. (1982). Behavior therapy:
On roots, contexts, and growth. In G. T
Wilson & C. M. Franks (Eds.),
Contemporary behavior therapy:
Conceptual and empirical foundations
(pp. 11-62). NY: Guilford Press.
Pronko, N. H. (1980). Psychology from
the standpoint of_ an interbehaviorist.
Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.
Revusky, S., & Garcia, J. (1970).
Learned associations over long delays.
In G. H. Bower (Ed.), The psychology of
learning and motivation (Vol. 4, pp.
1-84). New York: Academic Press.
Riegel, K. (1978). Psychology, mon amour:
A CQuntertext. Boston, MA: Houghton
Mifflin.
Rotter, J. B. (1954). Social learning
and clinical psychology. Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Ruben, D. H,, & Delprato, D. J. (in
press). New ideas in therapy.
Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
Wahler, R. G., & Graves, M. G. (1983).
Setting events in social networks:
Ally or enemy in child behavior
therapy? Behavior Therapy, 14, 19-36.
 A Quarterly Newsletter of Interbehavioral Psychology
ISSN 8755-612X
Published at the University of Kansas

Volume 15 1987 Number 3

INVITED EDITOR TABLE OF CONTENTS

Harry C. Mahan The Agora . 23

Oceanside, CA
The ABA Interbehavioral SIG 23
EDITOR
The Kantor Letters 23
Edward K. Morris
University of Kansas Mahan Reprints Available 23

ADVISORY BOARD Cognition and Computers 23

Sidney W. Bijou Notes from the Field 23

University of Arizona
Donna M. Cone New Subscribers 23
State of Rhode Island
Dennis J. Delprato Comments 24
Eastern Michigan University
Sandy Hobbs Book and Journal Notes 26
Paisley College of Technology
Paul T. Mountjoy
Western Michigan University
Linda J. Parrott
University of Nevada-Reno
N. H. Pronko QUOTATION
Wichita State University
Roger D. Ray Psychology is the scientific study of
Rollins College the way living organisms, particularly
Emilio Ribes human individuals, organize, develop,
Escuela Nacional de Estudios retain, and perform behavior patterns
Douglas H. Ruben or acts, all of which are adaptive
Eastern Michigan University interactions with stimulating objects,
Robert G. Wahler persons, situations, and events.
University of Tennessee
- Harry C. Mahan
ASSISTANT EDITORS

Lisa M. Johnson Susan M. Schneider

Bryan D. Midgley James T. Todd
22
THE INTERBEHAVIORIST
A Quarterly Newsletter of
Interbehavioral Psychology
ISSN 8755-612X
Edward K. Morris, Editor
Department of Human Development
2035D Haworth Hall
University of Kansas
Lawrence, Kansas 66045, U.S.A.
913-864-4840
The Interbehavior1st is a quarterly
publication of news, information,
discussion, journal and book notes, book
reviews, comments, and brief articles
pertaining to interbehavioral psychology
a contextualistic, integrated-field
approach to the natural science of
behavior.
The newsletter publishes professional
communications that fall between informal
correspondence and colloquia, and formal
archival publication. As such, the
newsletter supplements contemporary
journals dedicated to basic and applied
research, to the history and philosophy of
the behavioral sciences, and to
professional issues in the field. The
newsletter strongly encourages
submission of notes about current
professional activities of its
subscribers, news and observations about
interbehavioral psychology and related
perspectives, comments on journal articles
and books of interest, more extended book
reviews, and brief articles. All
submissions should be sent in triplicate
to the editor and should conform to the
style described in the Publication Manual
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(3rd edition).
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THE PRINCIFIA PRESS
Principia Press's list of currently
available titles in interbehavioral
psychology is presented below. Check your
bookshelves, and those of your library and
bookstore, for possible oversights. In
addition, the books make excellent gifts
for colleagues and for students,
especially for the latter in honor of
their completed degree requirements. The
books may be purchased directly from
Principia Press, 5743 Kimbark Avenue,
Chicago, IL 60637. Handling charges are
$.75 per title; prepaid orders are
postpaid. Any queries should also be
directed to the address above.
Principles of_ Psychology (2 vols.)
$20.00
Psychology and Logic (2 vols.)
$25.00
Interbehavioral Psychology
$15.00
The Logic of Modern Science
$15.00
An Objective Psychology of Grammar
$13.00
The Scientific Evolution of Psychology
(2 vols.) $40.00
The_ Science of Psychology: An
Interbehavioral Survey $20.00
Psychological Linguistics
$15.00
Interbehavioral Philojsophy
$27.50
Cultural Psychology
$16.00
Tragedy and the Event Continuum
$15.00
Selected Writings, 1929-1983
$20.00
Psychological Comments and Queries
$20.00

THE AGORA
Once again, we have the pleasure of
having an issue of the newsletter prepared
by an invited editor, this time by Harry
C. Mahan (Oceanside, CA). Except for the
material appearing in The Agora, the
remainder is his the Comments and the
Book and Journal notes. His writing is
enthusiastic, and his analysis hard-
hitting. We welcome both.
The ABA Interbehavioral S1G
The Interbehavioral Psychology ABA
Special Interest Group met again this year
at the convention, and a few notes bear
mentioning.
More than 25 people attended the
meeting and discussed such issues as the
pros and cons of calling their views
"interbehavioral," convention scheduling
problems produced by overlapping
interbehavioral papers, and the need for
an interbehavioral graduate training
directory. Among the actions taken were
the forming of a student committee and a
start on putting together a symposium at
next year's convention tentatively
entitled "Interbehavioral Psychology for
Students."
Linda J. Parrott will prepare a
lengthier report for the next issue of the
newsletter, but if any of this interests
you, please write to Linda, Department of
Psychology, University of Nevada-Reno,
Reno, NV 89557-0062.
As for the convention itself, one wit
quipped that, although hotel food can be
rather tasteless, at least the restaurants
did not serve transcendental sole.
The Kantor Letters
Louise Kent-Udolf asks that persons
interested in sharing their personal
letters from J. R. Kantor write her at 715
S. Broadway, Suite 602, Corpus Christi, TX
78401-2599. Depending on the response,
she would undertake to edit a compilation
of the letters along with commentary
prepared by the correspondents.
Mahan Reprints Available
Harry C. Mahan would be happy to make
reprints available of his recent article
on act psychology and the psychological
nouns in The Psychological Record, 1987,
,37, 131-134. Please write him at 811
Leonard Street, Oceanside, CA 92054.
23
Cognition and Computers
Arthur Kahn wrote to encourage
newsletter readers to take their
interbehavioral orientation into computer
programming and computing systems, where a
natural science orientation is sorely
needed. He commented:
Recently, in a discussion of the
errors made by air controllers, an FAA
administrator said that he could not
get into the minds of the controllers
to determine why they made errors. For
a life and death issue, folk psychology
is no substitute for science. To
further emphasize this issue, in a
discussion of persistent software
problems, an author said that what was
needed is a human mind extender, one
which makes it possible for the human
mind to conceive problems and solutions
beyond its current capacity (Glass, R.
L. IEEE Transactions on Software
Engineering, Vol. SE-7, No. 2, March
1981), None of this material is in
quotation marks...Incidentally, Kantor
discusses many of the relevant issues
in an article entitled, "Man and
Machines in Psychology: Cybernetics
and Artificial Intelligence" (The
Psychological Record, 1978, 28, 573-
583).
On the related issue, Art alerts readers
to Gineste's analysis of Fodor's
Modularity of Mind and Gineste's
conclusion that cognitive psychology does
not exist. Gineste's article is entitled,
"Jerry A. Fodor: La Modularitie de
1'espirit ou de la non existence de la
psychologic cognitive" (Bulletin de
Psychologic Lome, 38(372).
Notes from the Field
Louise Kent-Udolf has recently been
elected president of the Communication
Disorders Division of the American
Association on Mental Deficiency. She
welcomes inquiries from interbehavioral
psychologists about participating in the
organization.
New Subscrib'ers
R. Grauben Assis (Brasil)
Leo Baker (Ireland)
Michael Byck (MI)
Andrew Hawkins (WV)
S. Thios (OH)
Michael Ward (CA)
24
COMMENTS
Before commencing with Professor
Mahan's issue of the newsletter, we
thought a brief biographical listing
might be of interest:
Mahan, Harry C,, psychologist; b.
Ashtabula, OH, March 14, 1909.
Address: 811 Leonard, Oceanside, CA
92054. Phone: 619-722-9341.
A.B., Ohio University, 1931; M.A.,
Ohio State University, 1932; Indiana
University, 1935-1936; Ph.D., Ohio
State University, 1940.
Psychologist, Warren Pa. State
Hospital, 1932-1935, and Indiana
Division of Corrections, 1938-1941;
private practice in industrial
psychology, 1946-1950; associate
professor, psychology and business
administration, University of Wichita,
1947-1950; head, department of
psychology, Palomar College, 1957-1976;
chairman, California State
Psychological Examination Committee,
1957-1960.
Subspecialties: Neuropsychology,
statistics, systematic psychology, and
newsletter guest editor.
Slowly Changing Conceptions of Mind
Never, in human history, has the
development of technology proceeded at as
rapid~a pace as during the past few
decades. This is true in psychology, as
well as in other fields, as attested to by
Trotter (1987): "After years of work,
psychology has finally developed research
tools, methods, and theories sophisticated
enough to examine the subtle abilities of
infants and to interpret their complex
behaviors" (p. 36). Trotter goes on to
mention the use of computers, videotape
equipment, and high-tech methods for
measuring respiration, heart rate, body
movement, visual fixation, and sucking,
all of which, he says, give clues as to
what is going on inside the infant. Two
paragraphs later, he quotes child
psychologist Lewis P. Lipsitt as saying
that we now know that even a newborn child
has a mind and is a cognitive being
capable of mental operations.
The point to be made here is that
although advances in the basic theory of
mind have been available for over 50 years
(Kantor, 1935), they have been almost
entirely ignored by the many psychologists
who demand merely to have the very latest
models in technological equipment. This
is indeed ironic, as the objective results
of painstaking and highly commendable
observations are then translated into
obsolescent constructs.
Although psychologists like Lipsitt may
use the term "mind" when discussing their
work with journalists and others outside
of the profession of psychology, they
probably use it less frequently in
lectures to their students or in
presentations to their colleagues. They
well know that the dictionary definition
of the mind as "the element or complex of
elements in an individual that feels,
thinks, perceives, wills, and esp.
reasons" (Webster's, 1983, p. 755) is
obscure at best, and hearkens back to a
spiritism that has long been avoided,
although perhaps not rejected, by
psychology. They refuse to accept the
behavioristic position that mind does not
exist, but they have not become aware or
refuse to become aware that another
definition exists that will fit their
needs precisely. Unfortunately, there has
been very little, if any, discussion of
this latter definition in the literature
during recent years. However, since the
weaknesses of the older definition must be
made apparent before the need for a
revision can become convincing, a review
of Ryle's famous criticism of it (see
Donnelin, 1986).
In order to defeat the radical dualism
of mind and body that has characterized
much of philosophical thinking, Ryle
pointed out the mistake of regarding the
mind as "a ghost in a machine" a phrase
which is associated with his name. In
investigating such psychological concepts
as memory, perception, and imagination,
which are ordinarily considered mental, he
showed that the basis for the properties
of the dualistic model in which mind is
considered "a ghost" is actually human
action. Ryle did not, however, develop an
approach that provides psychology with a
viable alternative.
Many people have the idea that J. R.
Kantor eschewed mind altogether, but this
is not the case. Although undoubtedly the
most outspoken and persistent critic that
spiritistic mentality has ever had, Kantor
actually accepted the term provided
that it could be retained within his

radical modification of the concept.
Unfortunately, this was not made as clear
as it should have been during his many
years of writing and, as a result,
psychology can hardly be blamed for its
unfamiliarity with this important change
in concept. Indeed, his espousal of the
term to cover his approach to the
emergence of interbehavioral repertoires
on the part of individuals comes as a
surprise even to many of his students.
Because neither Kantor's (1935)
original paper nor its later incorporation
in a volume of his writings (Kantor, 1971)
is readily available, I quote from this
material at some length in the paragraphs
that follow. The first paragraph
describes Kantor's concept of mind, and
the second the mind's development.
Following the quotations, attention will
be returned to Trotter's paper (1987) in
order to show how infant research has
followed Kantor's recommendations and how
the presentation of such research can be
improved by using Kantor's concepts.
Mind is individual. It is a phenomenon
pertaining to particular organisms or
persons. Mind is not a substance or
quality, but action the ways in
which an individual adapts himself or
herself to the things or conditions in
his or her milieu. Now, psychological
action is always interaction. This
means that if I take one or two things
offered me, I do so because of the
effect that thing has upon me, and I am
attracted to it. This interactional
process has evolved during the course
of my psychological life. To trace out
the evolution of all of the myriads of
such interactions summed up by the term
my mind, means to study as many as
possible of the billions of specific
conditions which are unique and
indispensible features of that
evolution. (p. 267)
The primary stage of psychological
evolution undoubtedly takes place
before birth, so that the earliest
psychological evolution closely
parallels late uterine maturation. As
soon, as the organism is born and is
thus enabled to come into contact with
the complicated world of things on its
own account, psychological evolution
proceeds with a tremendous velocity.
(P. 270)
25
Trotter (1987) cites numerous research
studies by psychologists such as Lipsitt,
Meltzoff, Lewis, Kagan, Izard, Huebner,
and others that verify Kantor's principles
of 50 years ago and that show that the
development of meaningful conscious
interactions begins much earlier than was
previously recognized. As a matter of
fact, in a companion article, Roberts
(1987) unknowingly verified that Kantor
was correct in stating that meaningful
communication can take place even prior to
birth. She quotes psychologist Lee Salk:
"Prenatal experience plays an important
role in the continuity of life" (p. 41).
If we now turn back to Trotter's (1987)
early quotation from child psychologist
Lipsitt on the psychological interactions
of newborns, that quotation can now be
changed to read: "We know now that even a
newborn child can participate in
meaningful relationships with his or her
surroundings, and that these relationships
may be cognitive as well as affective in
their nature."
In my opinion, these recommended
changes in the definition of mind in no
way detract from the value of the term nor
should they per se result in a diminution
of its use. On the contrary, they should
make the term more meaningful to both lay
persons and psychologists and, when
combined with recent advances in research
technology, they should result in more
rapid progress and clearer thinking in the
future.
References
Donnelin, K. S. (1986). Gilbert Ryles's
The concept of mind. Encyclopeadia
Britannica (15th ed.) (Vol. 25, p.
616). Chicago: Encyclopeadia
Britannica.
Kantor, J. R. (1935). The evolution of
mind. Psychological Review, 42, 455-
465.
Kantor, J. R. (Ed.). (1971). The aim
and progress of psychology and other
sciences. Chicago: Principia Press.
Roberts, M, (1987, May). Class before
birth. Psychology Today, p. 41.
Trotter, R. J. (1987, May). You've come
a long way, baby. Psychology Today,
pp. 34-45.
Webst.er's ninth new colleagiate
dictionary. (1983). Springfield, MA:
Merriam.
26
Interbehavioral Psychology in Application
During the past few years much has been
said about the cognitive revolution in
psychology, but we have heard very little
about another revolution based on the
principles of contextual interactionism
(e.g., interbehavioral psychology),
although the results of its research have
been of great significance. We have also
been told that interbehavioral psychology
does not lend itself to research and that
it is merely theoretical and
philosophical,
Recent articles covering different
domains of criminal psychology, however,
offer clear evidence that research
projects in which the context of behavior
is considered are much more productive
than those conducted under laboratory
conditions (see Wilkes, 1987). The
authors of these studies probably gave
little thought to any underlying
principles, for these principles are
beginning to permeate the scientific
atmosphere without being recognized. Even
though unrecognized, interbehavioral
principles are there just the same, and
their importance cannot be overestimated.
Perhaps the first area of psychology in
which the contextual aspects of behavior
were emphasized was social psychology,
where Dane Archer made an emphasis on
context the key to his research (Wilkes,
1987). He departed from psychology as the
study of an individual within a single
social context to psychology as the study
of different contexts and the variability
of an individual's behavior within them.
Never before has this been done on as wide
a scale nor with the research skill and
technology that Archer has had at his
command. Like other contextualists,
Archer has succeeded in dispelling many
myths and has obtained results that
provide insight into violent criminal
behavior. Archer's work is such that it
will be examined closely not only by
psychologists and sociologists who are
professionally interested in crime, but
also by policy and lawmakers at all levels
of society. Although interbehavioral
principles may not be recognized as the
theoretical foundation upon which this
work is based, the success of this
research program should provide
considerable encouragement to those who
have long been convinced that such
principles are essential to the
integration of psychology into society at
large.
The paper by Wener, Frazier, and
Farbstein (1987) is of particular interest
to this commentator, who spent three years
(I was about to say "miserable" years) as
a senior psychologist and classification
supervisor in prisons of the type
classified in the article as "first
generation." That was 50 years ago, but
recent riots have demonstrated that
conditions at the Indiana Reformatory are
(due in part to overcrowding) probably
even worse than they were back in those
dark ages. In any event, this is one of
the most gratifying pieces that I have
ever read in my many years as a
psychologist, for it demonstrates that
members of our profession have not only
been instrumental in reconstructing the
jails and prisons described, but also in
changing the entire philosophy of
administering detention and incarceration.
Those of us who broke ground in the 1930s
had little hope for much improvement, let
alone any as marked as this article
describes. Granted, such changes have
occurred only in rare instances, but the
trend has now begun in earnest. With the
resulting economies in detention and
correctional systems now so important,
further progress is inevitable. The day
may not have arrived when psychologists
consider prisons as offering congenial
employment opportunities, but that may not
be far away. I only wish that my
classification staff of the 1930s which,
in its entirety, went into military
service when World War II approached,
could be around to see these changes of
which we never dreamed. We subscribed to
the principles of interbehavioral
psychology in those days; their
application has fulfilled our most
optimistic expectations.
References
Kantor, J. R. (1935). The evolution of
mind. Psychological Review, 4J., 455-
465.
Trotter, R. J. (1987, May). You've come
a long way, baby. Psychology Today,
pp. 34-35.
Wener, R., Frazier, W., & Farbstein, J.
(1987, June). Psychology Today, pp.
40-49.
Wilkes, J. (1987, June). Profile: Dane
Archer: Murder in mind. Psychology
Today, pp. 26-32.

BOOK AND JOURNAL NOTES
Benton, A. (1985). Focal brain damage
and the concept of localization of
function. In L, Costa & 0. Spreen
(Eds.), jitudies in neuropsychology:
Selected papers of Arthur Benton (pp.
85-93). New York: Oxford University
Press.
One of the most important aspects of
interbehavioral psychology is its approach
to the role of the brain in studies of
behavior, and to brain localization in
particular. There seems to be no lack of
books and articles that perpetuate old
myths about the brain; indeed, that such
myths still find wide acceptance in so-
called higher scientific circles is
surprising. It is, therefore, extremely
refreshing to have access to a paper that
not only traces these myths to their
historical sources, but presents the
history of their rejection by outstanding
writers in clinical neurology. This
rejection goes well back into the 19th
century and, although it has been
incorporated into interbehavioral theory,
it did not originate therein.
Two important words which Benton uses
to differentiate between sound and
fallacious thinking with respect to brain
localization are "symptom" and "function."
The former refers to the impairment of
some aspect of behavior resulting from
damage to a particular area of the brain,
and the latter to a mentalistic power that
resides in the particular brain location.
His approach is entirely historical and,
in refuting the concept of localization of
function, he cites such authorities as
Lange, Jackson, Loeb, Head, Goldstein, and
Luria, with pertinent quotations from
each. These writers realized the
difference between (a) the necessity of an
intact brain for action and (b) the
brain's being the seat of action and
they pointed this out in no uncertain
terms. This paper is, therefore, an
important reference for writers of an
interbehavioral perspective involved in
discussions of brain function or brain
localization.
In addition to refuting the
localization fallacy, Benton also points
out that defining the particular aspect of
behavior that is impaired in localized
brain damage is tricky business. Not only
does every act have a number of aspects,
27
any one of which may be impaired, but the
impairment may vary over time or it may
change in amount. In this regard,
Benton's paper is particularly important,
as some of his original sources are
becoming hard to find. It was no doubt
with this awareness that the editors of
the volume in which this paper is
published brought Benton's contributions
together for today's students and for
those yet to come. Benton's paper should
be on the required reading list of every
graduate student and psychology
instructor as a way to overcome brain
dogma.
Gone, D. M. (1983). An objective
analysis of species-typical and other
behaviors. In N. W. Smith, P. T.
Mountjoy, & D. H. Ruben (Eds.),
Reassessment in psychology: The
interbehavioral alternative (pp. 347-
360). Washington, DC: University
Press of America.
Although all of the papers in Smith,
Mountjoy, and Ruben's (1983) Reassessment
in Psychology are very much worth reading
and are worthy of comment, Donna Cone's
chapter contains several very important
points which should be incorporated into
the thinking of all interbehavioral
psychologists. Cone not only illustrates
the important influence J. R. Kantor
(1924) and Zing-Yang Kuo (1976) would have
had, if read, on comparative psychology,
but she brings into relief and clarifies
the difference between biological and
psychological interbehavior, which neither
Kantor and Smith (1975) nor Kuo (1976)
succeed in doing quite as clearly.
In establishing a completely
naturalistic approach to the behavior of
various species of animals, from fish to
mammals, Cone reemphasizes the necessity
of limiting data to that which falls
within the framework of Kantor's stimulus
function, behavior history, setting
factors, media of contact, and response
function. This framework eliminates the
possibility of introducing such extraneous
constructs as instincts, drives, and
motives into the discussion. Although
Cone is obviously quite familiar with Kuo,
she does not mention that his framework of
28
investigation which consists of
morphological factors, biophysical and
biochemical factors, stimulating objects,
developmental history, and environmental
context is almost the same as Kantor's,
though developed independently from it.
Kantor's framework establishes a
foundation for Kuo's more scientific
comparative psychology than is to be found
elsewhere in psychology or ethology and
Cone has followed Kantor's example. This
permits a completely interbehavioral
approach which takes the place of stimuli
as "triggers" for behavior and which
establishes a field concept requiring
observed rather than constructed
explanations.
Perhaps Cone's most original
contribution is her clarification of the
difference between biological and
psychological interbehavior, with the
former depending upon the evolution of the
species and the latter depending upon the
interbehavioral history (see Kantor) or
developmental history (see Kuo) of the
individual organism. Kuo stresses
developmental history in his analysis of
both biological and psychological
interbehavior, but there is little doubt
that some biological behavior is based on
structure-function mechanisms, even though
the entire organism in its ecological
niche is involved. The lower the species
on the evolutionary scale, the more its
behavior will be biological in nature.
This should not be a problem as long as
one remembers that evolutionary
development has taken place not simply
within the organism, but in the
relationship of the members of a species
to that species' environmental context.
It is indeed encouraging to note that
the principles developed from a
philosophical position many years ago by
J. R. Kantor (1924), and that have long
been ignored by the psychological
establishment for not having been based on
actual research, have now been
demonstrated to accomplish exactly what
they were supposed to do: To provide a set
of sound postulations upon which research
in a science of behavior can be based.
Cone has performed a valuable service in
emphasizing this and it is to be hoped
that other comparative psychologists, as
well as students of human behavior, will
follow in her footsteps.
References
Kantor, J. R. (1924). Principles of
psychology (Vol. I). Chicago:
Principia Press.
Kantor, J. R., & Smith, N. W. (1975).
^j}6. science of psychology; An
interbehavioral survey. Chicago:
Principia Press.
Kuo, Z-Y. (1976). The dynamics of
behavior d e ve lopmen t_j__ An epigenetic
view. New York: Plenum Press.
(Original work published 1967)
Gergen, K. M. (1985). Social psychology
and the phoenix of unreality. In S.
Koch & D. E. Leary (Eds.), A century of
psychology ELS science (pp. 528-557).
New York: McGraw-Hill.
A subtitle for this paper might very
well be "An epistemological approach," for
Gergen starts by stating that "it will
prove useful to center our attention on
the critical conflict between
environmental and person-centered theories
of knowledge" (p. 529). The former
characterizes Wundt's Principles of
Physiological Psychology and the latter
his Volkerpsychologie and "elements of
this antagonism now insinuate themselves
into all aspects of psychological inquiry"
(p. 530). It is the history of this
conflict between exogenie and endogenic
thinking to which Gergen's paper is
devoted.
As an introduction to the "lines of
battle," Gergen devotes a page to
describing six differences between
exogenic and endogenic thinking in order
that the reader may "understand the
present complexion of the discipline by
examining its historical development" (p.
532). As far as I am concerned, this
approach is novel and extremely
interesting. Only a writer thoroughly
familiar with epistemology would tackle
such a venture.
Gergen's development of the history of
this dichotomous approach to psychology in
general, and to social psychology in
particular, is astonishingly thorough in
spite of its being telescoped into 23
elucidating pages. In some instances,
however, this condensation detracts from
the smoothness of the writing, for Gergen
is a compulsive bibliographer with a total

of 181 listed references and as many as 44
on a single page, He also includes 23
footnotes, some having considerable length
with additional references included. This
condensation of what might have been an
entire volume into a single chapter
sometimes gives the false impression that
explanation based on total mastery has
given way to an exercise in erudition.
The excess references and explanatory
notes, however, is a minor distraction and
can be overlooked, for the story Gergen
unfolds with considerable skill is vital
to the future of psychology.
The justification for presenting a
commentary on Gergen's paper in The
Interbehaviorist is that, without Gergen's
knowing it, he provides the historical
foundation for the need for the approach
to both general and social psychology that
J. R. Kantor (1924, 1926, 1929, 1982) has
already provided. Never before has a
psychological historian delineated the
theoretical shortcomings of psychology's
past 100 years with such telling accuracy,
nor has anyone previously pointed out that
psychology's immediate future lies in
theory construction rather than in
empirical research, Gergen, However, is
fully aware that, professional politics
and economics being what they are, "as the
availability of academic positions
continues to recede, many institutions may
prefer to select a traditional candidate
over one searching, but uncertain. Those
who wish to fly on new wings may continue
to dream of future weather" (p. 540).
Whether this note of pessimism is
justified or not, only time will tell, but
when the present wave of mentalistic
cognitivism recedes, as it inevitably
will, the spark of interbehavioral
psychology, which is glowing ever
brighter, may at last burst into flame.
One of the most interesting sections of
Gergen's chapter, as far as this
commentator is concerned, is that on Kurt
Lewin. Gergen considers Lewin primarily
as a mentalist (as did J. R. Kantor) who
showed some vacillation from one position
to the other. Although Lewin attempted to
think in terms of a field approach, his
field did not depart enough from the
mentalism in which he had been trained
and, although he left a mark on American
psychology, he did not solve the exogenic-
endogenic problem.
Gergen also presents an excellent
picture of the trends responsible for the
29
recent cognitive movement in psychology.
He correctly describes this movement as a
return to an earlier mentalistic position
and, in presenting the reasons for that
return, does so in a somewhat sympathetic
fashion. He does not, however, try to
give the impression that cognitivism is
capable of meeting psychology's future
theoretical or linguistic needs even
though he does give it credit for the
development of medical psychology.
Upon concluding the historical sections
of his paper, Gergen cites a large number
of writers who have expressed
dissatisfaction with psychology as they
see it at the present time, or at least
when their papers were published in the
1970s. He states that "all are indicative
of a major evolution in thinking" and that
"such generalized ferment has not taken
place in psychology since the advent of
behaviorism in the 1920's" (p. 545). In
attempting to discover where this ferment
and dissatisfaction are likely to lead,
however, Gergen raises many questions, the
answers to which are anything but clear.
This leaves the reader with a sense of
having been "let down" with nothing
definite to tie onto after having been led
to believe that the present, or at least
the future, would show some hope of
bringing order out of chaos. However, it
is under such conditions that
opportunities arise and, if anything is
certain in psychology, it is that some
important changes will be occurring in the
future.
As I concluded my reading of this
theoretically and historically important
paper, 1 could not help but wonder how the
final sections might have been written had
the author been familiar with the work of
J. R. Kantor. An inclusion of Dewey and
Bentley's Knowing the Known (1976) in the
reference list would also have permitted
inclusion of an epistemological
perspective that was conspicuously absent.
Interbehavioral psychologists may be
disappointed (but not surprised) at these
omissions, but the omissions may be for
the best. Authors of surveys have neither
the time nor the inclination to give
interbehavioral principles the attention
they deserve and, as a result, they even
quote adverse criticisms by people who are
not psycholgists at all (e.g., Carroll,
1985, pp. 835-836). As a matter of fact,
Gergen did include one interbehavioral
paper (Sarbin, 1977) among his references,
30
but It was 6nly one of 11 cited in a
single sentence of his text (pp. 544-545)
which, if it were read at all (which is
doubtful), was probably not understood.
In the final analysis, Gergen's paper
becomes one of an increasing number which,
without his awareness, is making the case
for an interbehavioral approach stronger
all the time. Even the entrenched
psychological establishment which has gone
out of its way to ignore and tacitly
suppress the work of J. R. Kantor for so
many years cannot stop this trend.
References
Carroll, J. B. (1985). Psychology and
linguistics: Detachment and
affiliation in the second half-century.
In S. Koch & D. E. Leary (Eds.), A
century of psychology as_ science (pp.
825-855). New York: McGraw-Hill.
Dewey, J., & Bentley, A. F. (1976).
Knowing and the known. Westport, CT:
Greenwood Press. (Original work
published 1949).
Kantor, J. R. (1924). Principles of
psychology (Vol. 1) Chicago:
Principia Press.
Kantor, J. R. (1926). Principles of
psychology (Vol. 2) Chicago:
Principia Press.
Kantor, J. R. (1929). An outline of
social psychology. Chicago: Follett.
Kantor, J. R. (1982). Cultural
psychology. Chicago: Principia Press.
Sarbin, T. R. (1977). Contextualism: A
world view for modern psychology. In
A. W. Langfield (Ed.) Nebraska
Symposium on Motivation; Personal
construct psychology. Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press.
Giorgi, A. (1985). Toward the
articulation of psychology as a
coherent discipline. In S. Koch & D.
E. Leary (Eds.). A century of
psychology as_ science (pp. 46-59) . New
York: McGraw-Hill.
Let me begin these comments by saying
that it is always a pleasure to read a
chapter by a first class scholar who
appreciates the importance of theory in
psychology, even when an understanding of
that chapter requires a review of
literature which has long grown dim in
memory. The excuse for such reviews is
appreciated, especially when they lead to
unfamiliar areas of psychology that one
hardly knew existed. The present paper
has both historical and cultural
significance which, upon first reading, is
not readily apparent.
Giorgi begins by quoting George Henry
Lewes (1817-1878) and J. R. Kantor (1888-
1984) who observed, 100 years apart, that
psychology is in a state of chaos. Giorgi
does not agree with Siginond Koch that this
chaos is beyond remedy, for he considers
the current state of affairs to be a
function of an inadequate theoretical
foundation on the part of both science and
psychology. Giorgi states:
The very conception of science
entertained by psychology is at odds
with the subject matter it seeks to
comprehend. Some people commit
themselves to science first and then
try to make psychology fit their
concept of science without questioning
whether existing science is appropriate
for the study of human psychological
pjienomena [italics mine]. (p. 49)
This last word is the key to Giorgi's
position, for his thesis is that only
phenomenology can include that which is
truly psychological. The fact that some
types of behavioral psychology cannot deal
with mind is no proof that what is
referred to as mind does not exist, but
only their concept of science cannot deal
with it.
The main body of Giorgi's chapter is
devoted to developing a reconceptualization
of psychology within the framework of that
school of philosophical psychology which,
since the days of Edmund Husserl (1859-
1938), has been known as phenomenology.
That this is obviously Giorgi's position
is indicated by his use of the terms
"phenomena" and "phenomenon" 18 times on 8
different pages. Giorgi's major interest
is also listed as "phenomenology" in the
directory of .the American Psychological
Association. That he is a leading United
States authority in this area is indicated
by his publications as listed in the
chapter's reference section.
Due to my lack of previous familiarity
with phenomenology, my understanding and
appreciation of this chapter have been
made possible only by Brett's, Boring's,
Kantor's, and Sahakian's histories of

psychology, all of which present an
excellent coverage of the topic. This
coverage is greatly enhanced by that on
phenomenology under "Schools of
Philosophy" in the 1986 revision of the
15th Edition of the Encyclopaedia
Britannica. This reference is highly
recommended as it describes
phenomenology's 20th century development
in several different countries. Although
phenomenology has many branches and has
apparently influenced the thinking of many
psychologists, including Rollo May and
Carl Rogers, Giorgi appears to be a
follower of the French phenomenologist,
Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961), whose
volume on behavior was translated into
English not many years ago.
Although interbehavioral psychologists
cannot subscribe to Giorgi1s theoretical
position, they can agree with the
following statement in his concluding
section:
I attempted to show that psychology
could be a coherent science by
indicating that the factual absence of
such a status is not intrinsic, but,
rather, is due to poor theorizing
concerning psychological phenomena as
well as the meaning of science.
Whoever can describe the scope of
psychology and specify its proper
object can, on that basis, discover its
principle of coherence. (pp. 57-58)
Interbehavioral psychologists are
convinced that they have found, or can
find, this coherence in the work of J. R.
Kantor. It is good to know, however, that
there is another all-encompassing system
that is also based on the highest level of
philosophical thought, though with
entirely different postulates developed
from a different point of view.
Kantor, J. R. (1959). Psychology and
biology. In J. R. Kantor,
I_nterbehavioral psychology (pp. 203-
210). Chicago: Principia Press.
It is ironic that in dozens of
textbooks in general psychology, each
consisting of several hundred pages
covering many aspects of the subject
matter, students will not find a
description of the relationship of
31
psychology to biology which compares to
that which is presented in this brief
chapter. Although Kantor has, at times,
been accused of being difficult to
comprehend, such is certainly not the case
here. The chapter does deserve careful
reading and rereading, however, because
the material is well worth mastering;
moreover, a number of statements are worth
the effort to commit to memory. There is
certainly nothing difficult about Kantor's
writing here, and his basic points are
covered with a clarity which is seldom
found in such discussions.
It is tempting, even in a brief
commentary, to quote some of Kantor's
statements, but this would dilute the
pleasure of reading the entire chapter and
appreciating the relationships that tie
its parts together. On the very first
page is a description of biological events
which, it should be emphasized, include
not just the structure and functions of
cells, organs, and organ systems, but also
"movements and actions which relate
organisms directly and immediately to
environmental objects and conditions" (pp.
203-204). Psychological events likewise
consist of such adjustments, but at a
different level.
Psychological actions are not limited
to structure-function mechanism, nor to
the natural properties of stimulating
objects. Just where biological
adaptations leave off and psychological
interbehavior begins Kantor does not tell
us, but ecological adjustments are limited
to the preservation of the organism. The
psychological characteristics of
variability and modifiability are
certainly not limited to mammals but, if
an act is truly psychological, it can be
understood only in relationship to other
actions that are also psychological.
Biological structures and functions
provide only possibilities and
limitations.
Some of the topics covered in the
chapter include "things and events unique
to biology," "the historical nature of
biological and psychological events,"
"influence of biology on psychology,"
"influence of psychology on biology," and
"cooperation between psychology and
biology." One of the characteristics of
this presentation that makes it superior
to others is that it does not go into
either an over-emphasis on the brain,
which characterizes much of present day
32
psychology, 'nor does it concern itself
with behavioral genetics. Both of these
bring forth a negative reaction on the
part of interbehavioral psychologists, but
there is nothing negative about the
present presentation.
In his final section, Kantor points out
that biology has as much to gain from an
understanding of psychological principles
as psychology has to gain from biology.
This is particularly true of ethology,
which could profit from including an
analysis of interbehavioral events rather
than falling back on such constructs an
instinct, drives, motives, and
triggering mechanisms to release behavior.
Kantor does not dwell on these or other
points where biology has accepted the
constructs of an obsolescent psychology,
and he makes it clear how these weak
points can be easily alleviated.
The contents of this chapter should be
emphasized in all courses in introductory
psychology and all psychologists should be
able to write at least a paragraph on
psychological-biological relationships.
Kuo, Z-Y. (1976). The dynamics of
behavior; development; An epigenetic
view. New York: Plenum Press.
(Original work published in 1967)
Back in the 1960s, I purchased a copy
of Zing-Yang Kuo's (1967) The Dynamics of
Behavior Development, which was about to
go out of print and which I attempted to
keep in print by writing to psychologists
who were influential with the publisher,
Random House. Dr. Kuo died shortly after
the book came out and Dr. Kantor (1971)
wrote an obituary which appeared in The
Psychological Record and which is included
in Kantor's selected writings (Kantor,
1984). As far as I know, Dr. Kuo was the
only psychologist for whom Kantor had
unconditional praise, and my opinion of
the book at the time was that it is really
basic to the experimental substantiation
of KantorTs position on the so-called
heredity-environment controversy. I was
very disappointed when it went out of
print and I had forgotten it entirely
until I reread it recently. Just out of
curiosity, I looked in Books in Print to
see if it was listed and to my pleasant
surprise 1 found that Plenum Press has it
listed with a 1976 date; the edition of
Books in Print in which I_ was j-goking was
for 1986-1987, so the book is still
available today.
It is a very small book, and hence the
listed price of $29.50 seems steep, but it
has more in it than many books several
times its length. It can be read in a few
hours and it should be read over and over
by anyone who is interested in the
interbehavioral point of view.
One distinctive thing about the book
is that it describes Kuo's nonhuman animal
experimentation in China which involved
such a disregard for animal suffering and
animal life that it is in a class by
itself. Such experiments could not even
be dreamed of in this country, let alone
performed. I am an animal lover and I
do not condone such experiments, but since
they were performed, we should note the
results. After all, they were not any
more barbaric than the great Chinese
cultural revolution, a social and
political experiment that cost about ten
million human lives and which the Chinese
now consider a failure. One does not have
to condone cannibalism to study it; one
does not have to condone animal
experiments of that type to study their
results. In any event, some of Dr. Kuo's
most significant results did not result
from the sacrifice of his animal subjects.
It is difficult for me to imagine how Kuo
performed his experiments, even in China;
and his patience was as remarkable as the
extent of his experiments, some of which
involved hundreds of animals,
When Dr. Kuo was in this country
during the 1920s, he and Kantor,
apparently without knowing about each
other, attacked McDougall's instinct
theory, which had been very influential^
and they did so with a thoroughness that
completely demolished McDougall's theory
for good. It was one of Kantor's real
successes (see Kantor, 1923), but Kuo
received much of the credit .for it.
Unfortunately, instinct theory slipped
back into psychology through Freudian
theory, but the criticisms of McDougall
apply to Freud as well. I spent a lot of
time in the 1930s with Kantor's lengthy
1923 article, but I never read Kuo's
attack on the instinct theory. Some of
the basis of his attack is included in his
little book and one can get his point of
view very clearly from his discussion of
those early days. I can assure you that
there is nothing else like it. It is

highly recommended for very careful
reading.
References
Kantor, J. R. (1923). The problem of
instincts and its relation to social
psychology. Journal of Ahnormal and
Social Psychology. 28~5Q-77.
Kantor, J. R. (1971). In memoriam:
Zing-Yang Kuo. The Psychological
Record, 21, 381-383.
Kantor, J. R. (1984). Selected writings
in philosophy, psychology, and other
sciences, 1929-1983. Chicago:
Principia Press.
Kuo, Z-Y. (1967) The dynamics of
behavior development: An epigenetic
view. New York: Random House
Kuo, Z-Y. (1976). The dynamics of
behavior development: An epigenetic
view. New York: Plenum Press.
Kuo, Z-Y. (1967). Stimulus and
environmental context. In Z-Y. Kuo,
The dynamics of behavioral development:
An epigenetic view (pp. 149-179). New
York: Random House.
Every year when baseball or football
teams assemble at their training camps
prior to the beginning of a new season,
the cry is "back to fundamentals."
Psychology could well profit from this
example. There is no place where some of
the "fundamentals" of the contextual
interactionist (interbehavioral)
perspective are presented more succinctly
than in Kuo's boiled down chapter. Here,
in 30 small size pages, he not only
states, but also illustrates by numerous
examples, how action is dependent upon a
multiplicity of factors, some external and
some within the organism.
These principles have, at some time or
other, been familiar to all
interbehavioral psychologists, but they
should be recalled from the recesses of
memory and made part of daily thinking.
Here is the type of psychology that we
actually apply to the understanding of
behavior in day-to-day situations but
which, when it reaches the classroom and
is presented to students, is either
oversimplified or distorted beyond
recognition. In Kuo's material, though,
we have psychology as science at Its best,
33
with an emphasis on natural events whether
these be physical, chemical,
physiological, or social. Ruled out are
not only transcendental constructs such as
instincts, drives, and motives, but the
oversimplification of organism-stimulus
relationships such as those of Pavlov,
Watson, Hull, and Skinner. If one is to
be scientific, intervening variables and
hypothetical constructs can never take the
place of actual events. Although critical
of others, Kuo does not hesitate to point
out the errors of his own past and how his
thinking changed over a period of years.
In covering his topic, Kuo gets to work
at once under such headings as "definition of
stimulus," "complexity of stimulation,"
"the oversimplification of the conditioned
reflex concept and the S-R formula,"
"quantitative aspects of stimulation,"
"the nature of the environmental context,"
and "combined effects of developmental
history and environmental context." These
are all familiar topics, but here they are
presented in such a way as to take on new
vitality and a convincingness that only
Kuo's decades of careful observation and
experimentation could provide. Gone are
the days when a description of
physiological stimulation was relevant for
students of psychology, because even the
simplest stimulation of a total organism
(in contrast to a nerve-muscle
preparation) involves much more than a
single sense organ and a reflex arc. Kuo
considers the physiological aspects part
of the behavior itself, with both
involving the organism in its
environmental context.
For Kuo, context includes not only
factors that are extraneous to the
reacting organism, but those that are
intraorganismic as well. These include
chemical factors (many of which have come
under careful investigation since Kuo
wrote), as well as matters of health,
fatigue, etc. He points out that to make
the determiners of action investigatable
within the realm of science, research must
be much more painstaking and inclusive
than has been characteristic of the past.
It would seem that science is beginning
to follow the principles that Kuo
enunciated, especially in the refinement
of bio-psychological methodology, although
much of this is being done without any
understanding of the basic principles
involved. It is only when these
principles are stated and are familiar to
34
teachers, students, and research workers
that research and general knowledge of
human and nonhuman actions can be clearly
understood. Not until psychologists and
animal behavior specialists (ethologists)
recognize that the solutions to problems
posed by the interactions between
organisms and environmental contexts must
be sought in the realm of natural events
(no matter how challenging this may be to
research workers) that their efforts will
be worthy of the respect to which science
is entitled.
Sanford, N. (1985). What have we learned
about personality? In S. Koch & D. E.
Leary (Eds.)> A century of psychology
as science (pp. 490-514). New York:
McGraw-Hill.
Of the 42 papers included in the
volume, A Century of Psychology as
^cie_nc_e, the one by Professor Nevitt
Sanford on personality is in a class by
itself. This is true not only because
Professor Sanford has lived the history of
personality study as it has developed
since the 1930s, but also because he
writes in a style that is personal and
warm and that makes his readers wish-that
they might have studied or been associated
with him. By coincidence, Professor
Sanford and this commentator were born
within three months of each other 78 years
ago; however, although each of us has had
a career-long interest in personality, our
backgrounds and the literature that had an
early influence on us are quite different.
Very early in his career, Professor
Sanford found himself at Harvard where he
worked in Henry Murray's clinic, not only
as a student, but also as an associate.
Early on, he also became interested in
psychoanalysis and was one of its early
American practitioners outside of the
medical profession. From that time, until
the very recent past when he retired as
President of the Wright Institute in
Berkeley, California, Professor Sanford
authored and co-authored many well known
books and articles, taught at leading
universities, and held positions of
responsibility in professional
associations. His knowledge of the
literature is profound, not only in
psychology, but in sociology and
anthropology as well. His writing style
indicates not only a thorough mastery of
all he has read, but an ability to glean
the important points, forgetting those
that are irrelevant.
One point made evident throughout
Professor Sanford's chapter is that
personality psychology and academic
psychology are two quite different
subjects, not only with respect to
content, but with respect to departmental
sociology as well. He is one writer who
does not hesitate to mention grantsmanship
as playing a role in the specialty
identification of psychology department
members. In this respect, personality
psychology has very little status. The
reasons he gives for this neglect apply to
interbehavioral psychology as well, these
reasons focusing around lack of
quantification and laboratory studies.
As Professor Sanford unfolds the
history of his subject, as he personally
went through it over a period of 50 years,
he brings out the developments from an
overall perspective. For example, to him,
the development of clinical psychology in
the 1940s was an outgrowth of the
personality psychology of the 1930s, but
the former virtually swallowed up its
parent. He also describes his,
disappointing personal experiences in
discovering how humanistic psychology had
deteriorated within a few years of its
founding. Even with its disappointments,
the Wright Institute must have given
Professor Sanford considerable
gratification during the last years of his
career, for here he could concentrate on
the area of psychology that he considered
most important and where there were no
departmental rivalries or outside
pressures, such as loyalty oaths which
resulted in his leaving the University of
California, although he does not mention
this.
For a personal and very authoritative
coverage of what has transpired in
personality psychology during the past
50 years, this chapter is highly
recommended both to older psychologists,
who will note much that they have missed,
and to students, who will gain
considerable insight into how personality
study can enrich the student much more
than running rats.
Early in his chapter, Professor Sanford
points out that his career was greatly
influenced by psychoanalysis and what he
learned from Freud. One of his most

important lessons was that personality
development and structure are influenced
by experiences during the subject's early
years. This principle is, of course, of
primary importance in interbehavioral
psychology, but without the emphasis on
instincts, which were integral to Freud.
In my own case, I discarded Freudian
theory very early and started reading the
works of J. R. Kantor in 1933. My work
was with state hospital patients of all
types and, during my internship, I was
trained in thorough history taking from
family members. Our histories did not,
however, attempt to include any
explanations based on unconscious
motivation or instincts of any kind
whatever. I agree with Professor Sanford
when he says that taking case histories
should be included in the first course in
psychology. (Not being able to do this, I
had my students read biographies.)
Although I am not familiar with many of
the writers who are well known to
Professor Sanford, I am familiar with the
work of Goldstein and of Lewin, for whom
he has great respect, as do all who are
familiar with them. Professor Sanford
goes so far as to mention the possibility
of combining psychoanalytic and field
theory, but this is not pursued.
To me, it seems ironic that this
brilliant clinician, teacher, research
worker, and administrator should have been
thoroughly familiar with the work of just
about anyone whom one could mention in the
field of personality with the exception of
Professor Kantor, I cannot help but
wonder what Professor Sanford's thinking
would have been like had he read Kantor
early in his career, as I did, and had it
shaped his thinking. One will never know,
but it is to be hoped that future students
of personality will not commit this
oversight, for in interbehavioral
psychology one has the basic foundation
not only of a superior type of approach to
personality, but to general psychology as
well.
Snyderman, M., & Rothman, S. (1987).
Survey of expert opinion on
intelligence and aptitude testing.
American Psychologist, 42, 137-144
Several months ago, 1 wrote a
historical paper, which will remain
35
unpublished, entitled, "Obituary for the
IQ: Old Faculties Die Hard." I did not
realize when I wrote it how premature it
was. Now, Snyderman and Rothman have
conducted a survey that indicates the IQ's
tight grip on life. On the first page of
their report, the authors state:
A comprehensive survey of expert
opinion about intelligence testing is
necessary because the use of
intelligence and aptitude testing
represents an important public policy
issue. A survey of expert opinion will
not settle this issue, but it will
allow a clearer picture of informed
opinion to enter the public debate. In
a way, it is a method of pooling
"expert testimony" for the benefit of
those charged with policy decisions,
(p. 137)
The experts in this case were 1020
psychological, specialists and members of
related behavioral sciences who are in
contact with the testing movement. It is
my contention that the questions included
in this survey were the wrong questions
and that replies favoring pro-intraracial
and interracial genetic differences in
intelligence were virtually inevitable
from the nature of the questions.
A basic assumption of many
psychologists and others who have been
involved with the testing movement since
the days of Henry H. Goddard is that
behavior samples, which tests are,
indicate the presence of a transcending
power or force within the person tested.
At first, this force was known only as
"intelligence," but during recent years it
has also gone under the name of "IQ,"
which was originally a technical term to
refer to children's standing on a test in
relation to their actual ages. Looked at
any way one will, this construct is a
faculty that transcends behavior and that
exists only as a vague generalization at
best; at worst, it is an animistic power
that condemns the individual to a lower
socio-economic status or to a special
track in school. Perhaps its most vicious
application has been in labeling
individuals in relation to their fellows.
Actually, however, this theoretical
interpretation need have no relation to
the technology of testing; for instance,
placement tests have been very widely used
in the armed forces with considerable
36
effectiveness and with little stigma
attached to obtaining a low score. The
same thing can be said of licensing
examinations and tests of special
aptitudes. It is only those tests that
are associated with something subjects are
said to "have," rather than with what they
have accomplished, that become
objectionable.
Although Snyderman and Rothman do not
include a copy of their survey in their
report, they do include one question that
indicates their concept of intelligence as
a faculty responsible for achievement.
This question is, "In your opinion, to
what degree is the average American's
socio-economic status determined by his or
her IQ?" This concept of the IQ as a
force that determines a particular level
of behavior is one interbehavioral
psychologists (Kantor, 1924, p. 97) have
been attempting to expunge from the
science of psychology since the early
1920s. It is a concept that should be
relegated to the past as soon as possible.
The refusal of many recipients to respond
to the survey may be evidence of their
recognition of this fact.
It should have long since been
recognized that the usefulness of
psychological tests in many situations,
although indicative of behavioral
Edward K. Morris, Editor
The Interbehaviorist
Department of Human Development
University of Kansas
Lawrence, KS 66045
Bryan D. Midgley
Department of Human Development
University of Kansas
Lawrence, KS 66045
differences in similar situations, in no
way indicates a mental power that
transcends behavior. One way to
demonstrate this is by using a vocabulary
test, the results of which are never
associated with heredity but which,
nevertheless, are, in a number of
situations, a very good predictor of
success or failure. Most so-called
intelligence tests depend upon vocabulary,
however; so, to say that intelligence is
something biological is to say that
vocabulary must be biological as well.
Since this is patently ridiculous, it can
be seen that the evidence that
intelligence is a faculty based on a
vocabulary test is on shaky ground. It
should be recognized that,.as surely as
children have no vocabulary at birth, they
have no intelligence either, for no
behavior is present that can be described
as intelligent. Intelligence is not, nor
can it be, a biological characteristic, no
matter how much biological impairment or
malfunctioning may affect performance.
References
Kantor, J. R. (1924). Principles of
psychology (Vol. 1). Chicago, IL:
Principia Press.
 A Quarterly Newsletter of Interbehavioral Psychology
ISSN 8755-612X
Published at the University of Kansas

Volume 15 1987 Number 4

EDITOR TABLE OF CONTENTS

Edward K. Morris The Agora 39

University of Kansas
Interbehaviorists at ABA 39
Student Network 40
ADVISORY BOARD Notes from the Field 40
New Subscribers 40
Sidney W. Bijou
University of Arizona Comments 41
Donna M. Cone
State of Rhode Island Book and Journal Notes 43
Dennis J. Delprato
Eastern Michigan University Moore, Jay. He's Always Been There
Linda J. Hayes First, 46
University of Nevada-Reno
Sandy Hobbs (Scotland)
Paisley College of Technology QUOTATION
Paul T. Mountjoy
Western Michigan University The problem of development is the
N. H. Pronko problem of the development of new
Wichita State University structures and activity patterns from
Roger D. Ray the resolution of the interaction of
Rollins College Existing structures and patterns,
Emilio Ribes (Mexico) within the organism and its internal
Escuela Nacional de Estudios environment, and between the organism
Douglas H. Ruben and its outer environment. At any
Eastern Michigan University stage of development, the new features
Robert G. Wahler emerge from the interactions within
University of Tennessee the current stage and between the
Current stage and the environment.
The interaction out of which the
ASSISTANT EDITORS organism develops is no_t one, as
is'often said, between heredity and
Lisa M. Johnson && environment. It is between
Bryan D. Midgley organism and environment!
Susan M. Schneider
James T. Todd D. S. Lehrman (1953, p. 345)
38
THE INTERBEHAVIORIST
A Quarterly Newsletter of
Interbehavioral Psychology
ISSN 8755-612X
Edward K. Morris, Editor
Department of Human Development
2035D Haworth Hall
University of Kansas
Lawrence, Kansas 66045, U.S.A.
913-864-4840
The Interbehaviorist is a quarterly
publication of news, information,
discussion, journal and book notes, book
reviews, comments, and brief articles
pertaining to interbehavioral psychology
a contextualistic, integrated-field
approach to the natural science of
behavior.
The newsletter publishes professional
communications that fall between informal
correspondence and colloquia, and formal
archival publication. As such, the
newsletter supplements contemporary
journals dedicated to basic and applied
research, to the history and philosophy of
the behavioral sciences, and to
professional issues in the field. The
newsletter strongly encourages
submission of notes about current
professional activities of its
subscribers, news and observations about
interbehavioral psychology and related
perspectives, comments on journal articles
and books of interest, more extended book
reviews, and brief articles. All
submissions should be sent in triplicate
to the editor and should conform to the
style described in the Publication Manual
of the American Psychological Association
(3rd edition).
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THE PRINCIPIA PRESS
Principia Press's list of currently
available titles in interbehavioral
psychology is presented below. Check your
bookshelves, and those of your library and
bookstore, for possible oversights. In
addition, the books make excellent gifts
for colleagues and for students,
especially for the latter in honor of
their completed degree requirements. The
books may be purchased directly from
Principia Press, 5743 Kimbark Avenue,
Chicago, IL 60637. Handling charges are
$.75 per title; prepaid orders are
postpaid. Any queries should also be
directed to the address above.
Principles of Psychology (2 vols.)
$20.00
Psychology and Logic (2 vols.)
$25.00
Interbehavioral Psychology
$15.00
The Logic of Modern Science
$15.00
An Objective Psychology of Grammar
$13.00
The Scientific Evolution of Psychology
(2 vols.) $40.00
The Science of Psychology: An
Interbehavioral Survey $20.00
Psychological Linguistics
$15.00
Interbehavioral Philosophy
$27.50
Cultural Psychology
$16.00
Tragedy and the Event. Continuum
$15.00
Selected Writings, 1929-1983
$20.00
Psychological Comments and 'Queries
$20.00

THE AGORA
This issue of the newsletter completes
the 1987 volume year with a potpourri of
news, notes, commentaries, and an article.
The year was a successful one in that we
published more pages than in any previous
volume. Still, we seek additional
submissions of all types from a broader
range of our readers. Our mutual
commitment to a natural science of
behavior is reflected in a diversity of
interests and expertise. More of that
commitment and diversity should grace
the pages of the newsletter.
Little of this issue's Agora eomes
directly from the editor's desk. Linda J.
Hayes has submitted the minutes of the
Interbehavioral Special Interest Group
meeting held at the 1987 Association
for Behavior Analysis convention. In
addition, Laura L, Methot has submitted a
call for an interbehavioral student
network. We are pleased to have both
contributions.
Before turning to this material,
though, we must first note that the
subscription year is over, and ask that
you return your renewal forms. Please do
so at your earliest convenience so that we
can maintain uninterrupted service. Thank
you.
Interbehaviorists at ABA
Twenty three ABA members attended the
Interbehavioral Special Interest Group
(SIG) meeting at the May ABA convention in
Nashville, TN. The following reports were
given and business conducted:
1. The Interbehaviorist. Ed Morris
reported that The Interbehaviorist is sent
to over 100 individuals, libraries, and
organizations, of which approximately 75
are paid subscribers.
2. Committee structure. Hayes
proposed the establishment of three
committees with the following
responsibilities:
(a) A Program Committee responsible
for organizing and submitting an
interbehavioral program to the ABA Program
Committee by the November deadline for
submissions. Among the symposia suggested
was one on how interbehaviorists view the
experimental analysis of behavior almost
two decades after Kantor's critique
published in the Journal of the
Experimental Analysis of Behavior. Hayes
agreed to find a chair for a symposium on
39
this topic. James Fox agreed to organize
a symposium on different theoretical
approaches to a topic of applied interest
along the lines of the symposium organized
by Bud Gardner for the 1987 convention.
Finally, Ed Morris agreed to organize a
symposium on interbehavioral psychology
for students and others interested in the
approach. It was suggested that this
symposium focus on the distinctive
features of the position and how these
features make the approach worthwhile.
(b) A Membership Committee responsible
for recruitment. Hayes agreed to chair
this committee. Suggestions for the
committee included encouraging academic
members to invite their students to join
the SIG and announcing the SIG in other
ABA SIG newsletters.
(c) A Student Committee responsible
for organizing student participation at
ABA. Suggestions included establishing a
student section of The Interbehaviorist
and working with the Program Committee to
ensure student contributions to the ABA
program. Laura Methot (Saint Mary's
University, Canada) agreed to chair this
committee.
3 Graduate Training in
Interbehavioral Psychology. The
unavailability of comprehensive graduate
training in interbehavioral psychology
remains a problem. Students interested in
clinical training are advised to contact
Dr. Peter Holmes or Dr. Dennis Delprato
(Eastern Michigan University). Several
other universities represented by SIG
members attending the meeting were also
mentioned as possibilities for training,
to a greater or lesser extent. These
included: the University of Kansas
(contact Ed Morris), Jacksonville State
University (contact William Gardner),
Peabody College of Vanderbilt University
(contact James Fox), and the University
of Nevada-Reno (contact Linda J. Hayes).
Students are also advised that a very
strong interbehaviorally oriented
experimental program is available at the
National Autonomous University of Mexico
(contact Emilio Ribes).
For additional information about any
of these activities, please contact the
members responsible for them or write to
Linda J. Hayes, Psychology Department,
University of Nevada-Reno, Reno, NV 89557-
0062.
40
An Interbehavioral Student Network
The 1987 ABA Convention provided
opportunities for students of
interbehavioral psychology to meet and
exchange ideas with each other. One of
those ideas was to develop a student
communication network within the
interbehavioral "field." In fact, a
student committee has already been formed
for the purpose of increasing student
participation. The focus of the committee
is to establish ongoing contacts for its
geographically dispersed members, thereby
increasing the extent to which
interbehavioral psychology touches
students at both the undergraduate and
graduate levels.
Of prime importance now is to compose a
mailing list of interested parties.
Individuals, academic departments, and
professional organizations are welcome and
encouraged to become involved. Some of
the objectives of this network include:
1. Regular communications with respect
to recent, current, and ongoing research
of interest to those in the field
there's that word again!
2. Commentaries, theoretical papers,
and articles concerning issues and
developments in interbehavioral studies,
and where they fit into the larger picture
of our interactions.
3. A symposium for ABA 1988 in
Philadelphia. This symposium may consist
of students and teachers of
interbehavioral psychology presenting
papers and studies to other
interbehavioral psychologists and to the
larger ABA group as well.
4. The students at Saint Mary's
University are currently attempting to
establish a special interest group for a
reading-study program utilizing Kantor's
works, as well as current literature from
other interbehavioral sources. This and
others could be even more productive if we
promoted the exchange of ideas and
unpublished material (even papers for
coursework may be of interest here) by
establishing a correspondence network
among members.
Who, specifically, are we looking for?
People with a common interest in the
development and growth of interbehavioral
studies are the starting point. You may
be a student of psychology wishing to
further your knowledge in this area
(possibly looking toward graduate studies
with this orientation) or already a part
of an existing program. You may be a
professor of interbehavioral psychology
who wishes to become involved in the
network more high level input may
decrease the atrophy now experienced in
the student body.
Interested individuals can make the
initial step by contacting me Laura
Methot at the Department of Psychology,
Saint Mary's University, Halifax, Nova
Scotia, Canada, B3H 3C3. I look foward to
your correspondence, and invite your
suggestions about ideas for the
development of this network!
Notes fjrgm the Field
As you may have surmised from the
text, Linda J, Parrott is now Linda J.
Hayes. Linda and Steven C. Hayes were
married on September 20, and reside in
Reno, NV. We wish them the very best.
Douglas H. Ruben and Dennis. J.
Delprato's text, New T-deas in Therapy:
Introduction to an Interdisciplinary
Approach is now available through
Greenwood Press. Its dedication page
reads as follows: "To the memory of
OBSERVER, who revealed the events of
behavior that were obscured for
centuries."
Sidney W. Bijou attended the XXI
Interamerican Congress of Psychology in
Havana, Cuba, June 27-July 4. He gave an
invited address on child behavior therapy
and visited preschools, a psychiatric
hospital, and the Department of Psychology
and Education at the University of Cuba.
New Subscribers
Rue L. Cromwell (University of Kansas)
Janette M. LaBurn (Eastern Michigan U.)
Laura L. Methot (St. Mary's University)
John F. Smith (University of Kansas)
Simon Starbuck (Ontario, Canada)
David J. Wartel (Michigan)
Quotation
The quotation on the front cover was
submitted by Bryan D. Midgley. The
reference is to Lehrman, D. S. (1953).
A critique of Konrad Lorenz's theory of
instinctive behavior. The Quarterly
Review of Biology, 28, 337-363.
Correction
The correct reference to the Gineste
article mentioned in the last issue is
Bulletin de Fsychologie, Tome XXXVIII, no.
372.

COMMENTS
J. R. Kantor's Contributions
to Scientific Psychology (cont.)
Dennis J. Delprato
Eastern Michigan University
This year's second issue of the
newsletter contained some brief comments
on J. R. Kantor's contributions to
scientific psychology, followed
alphabetically by a list of quotations
from prominent psychologists who had
acknowledged as much (Delprato, 1987).
The quotations presented below complete
that little survey of such material.
Sapir (1926)
A notable contribution to the
understanding of language as a particular
type of behavior is J. R. Kantor's paper
on An Analysis of Psychological Language
Data, in which the peculiar
characteristics of speech, whether
communicative or expressive, are sought in
its indirect nature as a response, the
"adaptive stimulus" being responded to not
directly but in the form of a reference,
while a secondary stimulus, generally the
person spoken to, is substitutively
reacted to. (p. 112)
Schoenfeld (1969)
Sometimes when the work of a man of
scholarship and intellectual daring
plunges ahead of the learned community he
v
is addressing, it does not immediately
receive the honor it deserves. Instead,
as it blends unmarked into the scholarly
landscape, it becomes somehow taken for
granted. Something like this has
happened to the writings of J. R. Kantor. '
(p. 329)
Skinner (1938)
Although I continued to use the concept
of drive for many years, J. R. Kantor
eventually convinced me of its
dangers. (p. x)
Skinner (1979)
[The Kantors' house] was a small
intellectual and cultural oasis in the
university community... (p. 284)
When I first met Robert Kantor at a
meeting in Urbana, Illinois, I was
41
impressed by his scholarship and
intellectual vigor. He was a behaviorist,
though of a very special kind,
(p. 283)
Stephenson (1953)
tit bottom, our proposals depend upon a
belief that scientific behavior is
concrete (Kantor), and never the object of
any absolute principles of deduction or
induction. (p. 46)
Kantor's principle lies behind the main
thesis of these chapters, in a grass-roots
manner. (p. 341)
Tolman (1932)
This molar notion of behavior this
notion that behavior presents
characterizable and defining properties of
its own, which are other than the
properties of the underlying physics and
physiology has been defended by other
theorists than ourselves. In particular,
acknowledgment must be made to Holt, de
Laguna, Weiss, and Kantor. (p. 8)
Verplanck (1983)
So long as investigators continue to
interact with their subject matter, they
will move forward to fuller understanding
and scientific knowledge in psychology.
Passing trends and fads of equipment, or
"sophisticated" methodology, of systematic
viewpoint, and of theories may accelerate
or slow this movement, but they will not
stop it. Time, in which research (however
misguided) continues > will inevitably lead
us all to interbehaviorism, if not
necessarily to its vocabulary. (p. xxv)
This personal history may prove the
paradigm where time after time, when I
thought I had reached a new position, I'd
stop myself short.... "Hey, wait a minute,
Kantor wrote that" or "that's what
Kantor would say." He's always been there
first. (p. xxv)
This is the way it will happen for
others, over coming years. (p. xxv)
References
Sapir, E. (1926). Philology. In
Encyclopaedia Britannica (13th ed., pp.
112-115). New York: Encyclopaedia
Britannica.
Schoenfeld, W. N. (1969). J. R. Kantor's
Objective Psychology of Grammar and
42
Psychology and Logic: A retrospective
appreciation. Journal of the
Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 12,
329-347.
Skinner, B. F. (1938). The behavior of
organisms. New York: Appleton-
Century.
Skinner, B. F. (1979). The shaping of a
behaviorist New York: Knopf.
Stephenson, W. (1953). The study of
behavior; Q"Technique and its
methodology. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Tolman, E. C. (1932). Purposive behavior
in animals and men. New York:
Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Verplanck, W. S. (1983). Preface. In N.
W. Smith, P. T. Mountjoy, & D. H. Ruben
(Eds.) , Reassessment in. psychology:
The interbehavioral alternative (pp.
xi-xxv). Washington, DC: University
Press of America.
Are Interbehavioral Linguistics Passe?
Noel W. Smith
SUNY-Plattsburgh
In his historical review of psychology
and linguistics, Carroll (1985) briefly
summarizes Kantor's An Objective
Psychology of Grammar (1936). He notes
quite correctly that Kantor insists on
avoiding a treatment of "language symbols
as 'things' divorced from their function
in social interaction" (p. 835). But, as
for the experimental studies centered on
this system reviewed by Pronko (1946),
Carroll comments that they "represent
mainly demonstrations of rather obvious
referential functions of language symbols"
(p. 835). Carroll then quotes from a
"savage" review of Kantor's Grammar by
Velton (1938), finding it to be "well-
justified" (p. 836). Finally, Carroll
concludes by commenting that Kantor's more
recent Psychological Linguistics (1977)
contains "little more than the same kind
of polemics to be found in the 1936
publication. Psychology of the Kantorian
variety dies hard!" (p. 836).
Perhaps it should die hard. Jenkins'
(1974) extensive studies of recall
involving verbal materials strongly
support the interbehavioral thesis:
Subjects remembered the things to which
phrases and sentences referred as part of
the context, but remembered little of the
verbal material itself. Likewise, the
recent related work on language by Bijou
and associates (Bijou, Umbreit, Ghezzi, &
Chao, 1986a, 1986b, 1986c; Ghezzi, Bijou,
Umbreit, & Chao, 1987) also looks
promising; it includes a methodology and
manual of instructions.
Is it possible that interbehavioral
lingistics is not so passe after all, and
that it is important to keep it alive
because it really does have much to offer?
References
Bijou, S. W. , Umbreit, J., Ghezzi, P. M.,
& Chao, C-C. (1986a). Addendum to
manual of instructions for identifying
and analyzing referential interactions.
Unpublished manuscript. University of
Arizona, Tucson, AZ.
Bijou, S. W. , Umbreit, J., Ghezzi, P. M.,
& Chao, C-C. (1986b). Manual of
instructions for identifying and
analyzing referential interactions.
The Psychological Record, ^, 491-518.
Bijou, S. W. , Umbreit, J., Ghezzi, P. M. ,
& Chao, C-C. (1986c). Psychological
linguistics: A natural science
approach to the study of language
interactions. Analysis of Verbal
Behavior, 4_, 23-29.
Carroll, J. B. (1985). Psychology and
linguistics: Detachment and
affiliation in the second half-century.
In S. Koch & D. E. Leary (Eds.), A
century of psychology as science
(pp. 825-854). New York: McGraw-Hill.
Ghezzi, P. M., Bijou, S. W., Umbreit, J.,
& Chao, C-C. (1987). Influence of
age of listener on preadolescents1
linguistic behavior. The Psychological
Record, 37, 109-126.
Jenkins, J. J. (1974). Remember that old
theory of memory? Well, forget it!
American Psychologist, ^9, 785-795.
Kantor, J. R. (1936). An objective
psychology of grammar. Chicago:
Principia Press.
Kantor, J. R. (1977). Psychological
linguistics. Chicago: Principia
Press.
Pronko, N. H. (1946). Language and
psycholinguistics. Psychological
Bulletin, 43, 189-239.
Velton, H. V. (1938). Review of J. R.
Kantor's An objective psychology of
grammar. Language, 14, 66-68.

BOOK AND JOURNAL NOTES
Hagen, M. A. (1985), James J. Gibson's
ecological approach to visual
perception. In S. Koch & D. E. Leary
(Eds.). A century of psychology as
science (pp. 237-249). New York:
McGraw-Hill.
Readers of The Interbehaviorist are
probably aware that J. J. Gibson (1979)
radically altered his basic postulates
about perceiving in his third and final
book. Hagen describes this and other
developments in Gibson's thought in all
three volumes which, she says, should be
read in their entirety in order to
appreciate his metamorphosis from
mentalism to his final ecological
position. Her advice will not likely be
oft heeded, however, because Gibson's
(1950, 1966) first two books now sell for
over $50 each and because both are now
part of the past. More important is the
influence that his change in underlying
postulates might have on textbooks and
other professional material. Insufficient
time has passed, however, for any effects
to have yet occurred.
In a companion piece to Hagen's paper,
Gibson (1985) makes his position clear.
His brief presentation is an excellent
example of how a lifetime of empirical
research and thought can be summarized
with clarity in the scope of just six
pages. Hagen's coverage is broader, but
she states that it should only whet the
reader's appetite for more of Gibson's own
writing. This she succeeds in doing, at
least for Gibson's final volume, which is
available in paperback for $19.95.
Two commentaries on Gibson's ecological
perspective have been written by
interbehavioral psychologists, in addition
to a review by Smith (1980), which will not
be covered here. The first commentary was
by Observer (1981/1984) in which he, with
as much graciousness as possible, pointed
out that the ecological approach to
perceiving had been developed by Kantor 60
years earlier. Observer's (1981)
justifiable pique showed itself in the
following quotation:
What a waste of time, money, and energy
is the consequence of ignoring the
description of psychological events as
they actually occur instead of as
tradition demands. What a disregard of
43
scientific principles! What price
independent rediscovery? (p. 239)
As a historical comparison, it might be
said that had the abolitionist doctrine of
William Lloyd Garrison (Madison, 1947)
been accepted when it first appeared in
the 1830s, the Civil War might have been
averted. Concepts that later seem
obviously important are, however,
often rejected when they fly in the face
of established beliefs, no matter how
irrational the latter. At least in the
present instance, only time was lost.
Smith's (1983) paper should be read
along with Hagen's, for Smith presents a
thorough coverage of the literature
relative to pre-1979 ecological approaches
to perceiving. Although Gibson was in a
class by himself as a researcher, and,
although we can hope that his ecological
approach will be widely accepted among
others, Kantor aside, he was by no means
the first to espouse the ecological
position. It is unfortunate that Hagen
(1985) could not have had access to
Smith's references, for she makes the
statement that "Gibson's approach to the
problem of meaning is the first radically
different approach since (at least)
Berkeley's" (p. 247). It is interesting
to note in this regard that her references
total but nine, including four to Gibson's
work, whereas Smith includes 150.
In order to give an overall view of
three attitudes toward perceptual
research, I would like to close with
quotations from the papers by Gibson and by
Smith, and also with one from a paper by
Ralph Norman Haber (1985) who is a leader
in the field and whose paper, along with
those of Gibson and Hagen, make up the
section on Sensory Processes and
Perception in Koch and Leary's parent
volume. I begin with Haber (1985):
This has been a great century for
perception, probably better for
perception than for any other area in
psychology. A hundred years ago we
were farther along than the rest of
psychology, and I think we have more
than kept pace. The next century
should be even better, especially if .we
keep in mind that we evolved our visual
system in order to be able to perceive
visual space around us. Only'-by
44
studying perception in that context can
we come fully to appreciate how it
functions. I think we are now able to
do this, so I am very optimistic about
the future. (p. 277)
From Gibson (1985):
The conclusions that can be reached
from a century of research on
perception are insignificant. The
knowledge gained from a century of
research on sensation is incoherent.
We have no adequate theory of
perception, and what we have found in
the search for sensation is a mixed
batch of illusions, physiological
curiosities, and bodily feelings. The
implications are discouraging. A fresh
start has to be made on the problem of
perception and we should abandon the
study of so-called "sensations" to the
input physiologists. Some day they
will learn how to study systems and
when they do we can begin to listen to
them. (pp. 229-230)
And, from Smith (1980):
Gibson's final book (1979) argues that
we cannot see light, only its effects,
on the environment. Hence there are no
sensations of light to be converted to
mental perceptions. We do not perceive
stimuli but conditions of the
environment. Instead, perception is an
ecological event, one involving the
interrelationship of the individual and
surrounding objects and conditions....
The major thrust of Gibson's work is
interbehavioral, although it differs in
many details. Most importantly, like
interbehaviorism, it holds that
perception is an activity in which the
individual gets acquainted with the
world.... Scientific psychology could
make a quantum leap forward if
ecological-interbehavioral psychology
could gain recognition. At the very
least, psychologists would have
available the basis for a more informed
choice. (pp. 197-198)
In spite of its long delay, then,
Gibson's acceptance of an ecological-
interbehavioral perspective can be
considered a major advance, if not a
significant breakthrough toward a more
general recognition of the interbehavioral
position in psychology. The fact that it
may now be expedient to refer to this
position as "ecological-interbehavioral"
does not really matter if that is
necessary for the progress of psychology.
(Harry C. Mahan, Oceanside, CA)
References
Gibson, J. J. (1950). The perception of
the visual world. Hillsdale, NJ:
Erlbaum.
Gibson, J. J. (1966). The senses
considered as perceptual systems.
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Gibson, J. J. (1979). The ecological
approach to vistml perception.
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Gibson, J. J. (1985). Conclusions from a
century of research in sense
perception. In S. Koch & D. E. Leary
(Eds.), A century of psychology as
science "(pp.. 224-230) . New York:
McGraw-Hill.
Haber, R. N. (1985). Perception: A one
hundred year perspective. In S. Koch &
D. E. Leary (Eds.), A century of
psychology as_ science (pp. 250-281) .
New York: McGraw-Hill.
Hagen, M. A. (1985). James J. Gibson's
ecological approach to visual
perception. In S. Koch & D. E. Leary
(Eds.) , A century oj: psychology as
science (pp. 231-249). New York:
McGraw-Hill.
Madison, C. A. (1947). William Lloyd
Garrison: Apostolic crusader. In C.
A, Madison (Ed.), Critics^ crusaders:
A century of Amejcican protest (pp. 14-
38). New York: Holt.
Observer (1984). Priority and the
pace of scientific progress. In
Observer (Ed.). Psychological
comments a.nd queries (pp. 233-240).
Chicago: Principia Press (Original
published in The Psychological Record,
1981, 31, 285-292)
Smith, N. W. (1980). Book review of
Gibson, J. J., The ecological approach
to visua_l perception. The
Psychological Record, _30, 587-588.
Smith, N. W. (1983). Sensing and
perceiving: An alternative to the
doctrine of the double world. In N. W.
Smith, P. T. Mountjoy, & D. H. Ruben
(Eds.), Reassessment in psychology; The
interbehavioral alternative (pp. 161-
211). Washington, DC: University
Press of America.

Klopfer, P. H. (1969). "Behavior"
[review of Ethology f mammals].
Science, August, 29.
In his review of R. F. Ewer's (1968)
Ethology of Mammals, Klopfer takes issue
with the author's characterization of
behavior. In Ewer's words, "Behaviour is
something which an animal has got in the
same way as it may have horns, teeth,
claws or other structural features" (Ewer,
1968, p. 4). Klopfer responds:
The notion that behavior is a "noun," a
palpable entity, has been responsible
for much of the nonsense that
ethologists have uttered. We read of
"aggression" accumulating and needing
discharge, as if it were a fluid liable
to seep through cracks in the cranium.
I believe we "contain" aggression
about as much as a radio "contains" the
music we hear issuing from it. Hardin
["Meaninglessness of the word
protoplasm," Sci. Monthly, 82, 112
(1956)], extrapolating from the work of
Benjamin Lee Whorf (Language, Thought
and Reality, Wiley, 1956), has tried to
show how the grammatical forms of English
have influenced biologists' conceptions
of the body. The polarized structure
of our language, requiring phenomena to
be described by sentences that consist
of nouns and verbs, has often
distracted us from the realization that
a particular event might not lend
itself to such treatment. Thus, "it
thunders," and "lightning flashes,"
[are] tautologies that obscure the
"nounverb" nature of these events. In
the study of behavior,'this kind of
reification has done even more to
retard understanding than in the areas
described by Hardin (Klopfer,
"Instincts and chromosomes," Amer.
Naturalist, in press, and see a
forthcoming volume on evolution and
behavior by G. Bermant).
(John M. Grossberg, San Diego State
University)
Rosnow, R. L,, & Georgoudi, M. (Eds.).
(1986) . Con t e xtu a 1 isin and
understanding in behavioral science:
Implications for research and theory.
New York: Praeger.
45
Rosnow and Georgoudi (1986) have
assembled the first modern, substantive
treatment of the contextualistic world
view since its original explication in
Stephen C. Pepper's (1942) World
Hypotheses (University of California
Press). Whether referred to as
contextualism or transactionalistn, much of
this view is strongly interbehavioral in
flavor. Indeed, contextualism is perhaps
the implicit interbehavioral world view.
As presented by Pepper, contextualism
emphasizes the (a) active, ever-changing
nature of behavior, (b) the relativity of
knowledge, and (c) the pragmatic criterion
of truth. This view, though, comes in
various guises, not all of which are
naturalistic, as is the case in a number
of this book's sometimes uneven chapters.
Naturalistic or not, much is to be
gleaned from Rosnow and Georgoudi's
explicit setting forth of these views.
The book's contents, sections, and
chapters (and authors) are as follows:
I. Introduction: (1) The Spirit of
Contextualism (Rosnow and Georgoudi)
II. Person-Environment Relations: (2)
Contextualism and Environmental Psychology
(Altman), (3) Contextual Discipline: The
Unmaking and Remaking of Sociality
(Morowski), and (4) Descartes, Vico,
Contextualism, and Social Psychology
(Lana)
III. Life-Span Development: (5)
Contextualism and the Study of Child
Effects in Development (Lerner and Lerner),
(6) Contextualism and Relational
Perspectives on Adult Psychology (Blank),
and (7) Contextualism and Life-Span
Developmental Psychology (Dixon)
IV. Personality and Psychotherapy:
(8) Contextual Factors in the Normal
Personality (Veroff), (9) Gontextualism
and Psychotherapy (Elfran, Germer, and
Lukens), and (10) Prospects for a
Contextual Theory of Personality (Sarbin
and McKechnie)
V. Language and Communication: (11)
Speaking Practically: Whorf, the
Formative Function of Communication, and
Knowing of the Third Kind (Shotter), (12)
Media as Social Contexts (Meyerowitz), and
(13) The Symbolic Context of Action and
Communication (Gerbner)
VI. Overview and Conclusions: (14) A
Perspectivist Looks at Contextualism and
the Future of Behavioral Science (McGuire)
and (15) Summing Up (Rosnow). (Edward K.
Morris, University of Kansas)
46
He's Always Been There First
Jay Moore
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
In the conclusion of his personal note
that serves as the preface for
Reassessment in Psychology: The
Interbehavioral Alternative (Smith,
Mountjoy, & Ruben, 1983), W. S. Verplanck
(1983) wrote that
Time after time, when I thought 1 had
reached a new position, I'd stop myself
short.... "Hey, wait a minute, Kantor
wrote that" or "That's what Kantor
would say.'A He's always been there
first. (p. xxv)
My purpose in this brief set of comments
is to draw readers' attention to an area
of fundamental importance where Kantor had
been first. The area is scientific
epistemology, particularly with regard to
critical assessments of the influence of
operationism and logical positivism.
Certain writings of B. F. Skinner on the
same topic are also examined to show
that Kantor anticipated much of Skinner's
position on this topic.
As recounted elsewhere (Moore, 1975,
1985), American psychology underwent a
great conceptual revolution during the
1930s. To be exorcised was the concern
with the contents of consciousness as
revealed through introspection. In its
stead was to be established a concern with
behavior, as revealed through objective
methods. Operationism was hailed as a
means of imparting an objective meaning to
psychological concepts, and together with
the epistemological foundation provided by
logical positivism, the two were regarded
as the distinguishing features of
psychology's new methodological and
epistemological beginnings.
What was not widely recognized at the
time was that the conventional
interpretations of operationism and
logical positivism were themselves tainted
by dualistic presuppositions. This
problem is indeed ironic, because
operationism and logical positivism were
supposed to cure the problems brought
about by transcendental metaphysics,
rather than perpetuate them. In the
second volume of B. F. Skinner's
autobiography, Skinner (1979) includes the
text of a letter he wrote to S. S. Stevens
about operationism in 1935. Although the
text of the letter clearly indicates
Skinner had a number of concerns about
Stevens' interpretation of operationism at
that time, the letter also indicates that,
according to Skinner:
[I am] much impressed with your paper
on operationism.... It is essentially
what I have always supposed behaviorism
to represent....In any event,
congratulations on a damn good job of
exposition. (p. 163)
In referring to this same article by
Stevens, Kantor (1938) was to write three
years later:
Obviously we have here such a
truncation of the operational
conception as to convert it into a
thoroughgoing subjectivism. (p. 15)
These two statements clearly indicate a
different evaluation of Stevens' article,
and although Skinner's correspondence
antedates Kantor's article, it seems
obvious that the two had a quite different
approach to the question of operationism
during the late 1930s.
More pronounced contrasts may be seen
by formally comparing Kantor's (1938)
article with Skinner's (1945) famous
contribution to E. G. Boring's symposium
on operationism. This contribution was
published in 1945, seven years after
Kantor's article, yet they are alike in
many ways. Kantor (1938) begins by
stating:
It is the thesis of the present paper
that the operational principle first
formulated for physics can with
suitable modification be employed to
the psychologist's advantage in
clearing up-many of his age-old
problems. (p. 3)
Skinner (1945) writes:
The operational attitude, in spite of
its shortcomings, is a good thing in

any science but especially in
psychology because of the presence
there of a vast vocabulary of ancient
and non-scientific origin. (p. 271)
Kantor (1938) further suggests:
To reduce properties to observations is
to confuse the operations involved in
discovering and determining the nature
or naming of properties with the
existence of the discovered properties
themselves. (p. 7)
In this regard, Skinner (1945) was to
comment seven years later:
A considerable advantage is gained from
dealing with terms, concepts,
constructs, and so on, quite frankly in
the form in which they are observed, as
verbal responses. There is then no
danger of including in the concept that
aspect or part of nature which it
singles out. (p. 271)
Kantor (1938) continued:
While in all interbehavior, as the term
is meant to imply, stimulus objects are
emphasized quite as much as the
scientist's action, the way the
stimulus objects are approached
differs. How far are investigators
influenced by...their contacts with
events? (p. 29)
Skinner's (1945) language is similar:
What we want to know in the case of
many traditional psychological terms
is, first, the specific stimulating
conditions under which they are
emitted..., and, second..., why each
response is controlled by its
corresponding condition. (p. 272)
Kantor (1938) also notes:
Conventional sensation-psychologists
have attempted to assimilate the
principle [of operationism] with the
result that what has been proposed as a
fundamental improvement in forms of
physical science has been used to
implement conventional dualism in
psychology....Despite the verbal
insistence upon discrimination as
physical and the inevitable acceptance
47
of psychological phenomena as
interbehavior when actual experiments
are described, Stevens' adoption of the
operational principle comes to nothing
more than a mentalistic psychologist's
surface concession to objectivity,
(pp. 14-15)
These statements may be compared with
Skinner's (1945):
What happened instead was the
operationism of Boring and Stevens....
A concession is made in accepting the
claim that the data of psychology must
be behavioral rather than mental if
psychology is to be a member of the
United Sciences, but -the position taken
is merely that of "methodological"
behaviorism.... This was never good
behaviorism, but it was an easy
position to expound and defend and was
often resorted to by the behaviorists
themselves. It is least objectionable
to the subjectivist because it permits
him to retain "experience" for the
purposes of self-enjoyment and "non-
physicalistic" self-knowledge, The
position is not genuinely operational
because it shows an unwillingness to
abandon fictions.... What is lacking
is the bold and exciting behavioristic
hypothesis that what one observes and
talks about is always the "real" or
"physical" world (or at least the "one"
world) and that "experience" is a
derived construct to be understood only
through an analysis of verbal (not, of
course, merely vocal) processes. (pp.
292-293)
According to the logical positivist
view, terms had to refer to either
phenomena that were directly observable or
phenomena whose meanings were determined
by their logical function. Terms whose
meanings could not be so established were
ineffable, and could not be part of
science. The big problem in this regard
was what to do about terms that referred
to the scientist's own mental life. They
were to be regarded as theoretical terms,
provided they could be likened to
observations. Thus, terms like thinking,
images, and so on came to be approached in
a particular way, as a consequence of
transcendental assumptions concerning how
humans constructed unobservable phenomena
from observable. For both Kantor and
48
Skinner, this entire orientation bought
into dualism. Thus, Kantor (1945) says:
Inferential and problem-solving
interbehavior can occur in private
situations which are never recorded.
Let us stress nevertheless that even
the private reflections of individuals
concerning what happens in logical
procedures are inseverably connected
with linguistic events. In other
words, all reflection may be regarded
as an individual's conversation with
himself. (p. 233)
Skinner's (1957) own influential book,
Verbal Behavior, was approximately 20
References
Kantor, J. R. (1938). The operational
principle in the physical and
psychological sciences. The
Psychological Record, 2, 1-32.
Kantor, J. R. (1945). Psychology and
logic (Vol. I). Chicago: Principia
Press.
Moore, J. (1975). On the principle of
operationism in a science of behavior.
Behaviorism, 3, 120-138.
Moore, J. (1985). Some historical and
conceptual relations among logical
positivism, operationism, and
behaviorism. The Behavioj: Analyst, J,
53-63.
Skinner, B. F. (1945). The operational
analysis of psychological terms.
Psychological Review, 52, 270-277, 290-
294.
THE INTERBEHAVIORIST
Edward K. Morris, Editor
Department of Human Development
University of Kansas
Lawrence, KS 66045
years in the making, and when it finally
appeared its language was remarkably
similar:
A better case can be made for
identifying thinking with behaving
which automatically affects the behaver
and is reinforcing because it does so.
This can be either covert or overt. We
can explain the tendency to identify
thinking with covert behavior by
pointing out that the reinforcing
effects of covert behavior must arise
from self stimulation. (p. 438)
Again, it is important to note that Kantor
was there first.
Skinner, B. F. (1957). Verbal behavior.
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Skinner, B. F. (1979). The shaping of a
behaviorist. New York: Knopf.
Smith, N. W., Mountjoy, P. T., & Ruben, D.
H. (Eds.). (1983). Reassessment in
psychology; The interbehavioral
alternative. Washington, DC:
University Press.
Verplanck, W. S. (1983). Preface. In N.
W. Smith, P. T. Mountjoy & D. H. Ruben
(Eds.), Reassessment in psychology:
The interbehavioral alternative (pp. xi-
xxv). Washington, DC: University Press,
Author note: Reprints may be obtained
from the author at the following address:
Department of Psychology, University of
Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Milwaukee, WI 53201.
 A Quarterly Newsletter of Interbehavioral Psychology
ISSN 8755-612X
Published at the University of Kansas

Volume 16 1988 Number 1

EDITOR TABLE OF CONTENTS

Edward K. Morris The Agora 3

University of Kansas
Renewals 3

ADVISORY BOARD The ABA Convention 3

Sidney W. Bijou Notes from the Field 3

University of Arizona
Donna M. Cone Comment s 4
State of Rhode Island
Dennis J. Delprato Delprato, Dennis J.
Eastern Michigan University
Linda J. Hayes Control Systems Theory: A Report
University of Nevada-Reno on a Conference 4
Sandy Hobbs (Scotland)
Paisley College of Technology Mahan, Harry C.
Paul T. Mountjoy
Western Michigan University Cognitive Psychology,
N. H. Pronko Interbehavioral Psychology, and
Wichita State University Clear Writing 6
Roger D. Ray
Rollins College Book and Journal Notes 7
Emilio Ribes (Mexico)
Escuela Nacional de Estudios Schneider, Susan M.
Douglas H. Ruben
Eastern Michigan University Herbert Wendt's In Search of
Robert G. Wahler Adam 7
University of Tennessee
Article 8

ASSISTANT EDITORS Morris, Edward K.

Lisa M. Johnson Not So Worlds Apart:

Bryan D. Midgley Contextualism, Radical
Susan M. Schneider Behaviorism, and Developmental
James T. Todd Psychology 8
 THE INTERBEHAVIORIST
A Quarterly Newsletter
of Interbehavioral Psychology
ISSN 8755-612X
Edward K. Morris, Editor
Department of Human Development
2035D Haworth Hall
University of Kansas
Lawrence, Kansas 66045, U.S.A.
913-864-4840
The Interbehaviorist is a quarterly
publication of news, information,
discussion, journal and book notes, book
reviews, comments, and brief articles
pertaining to interbehavioral psychology
a contextualistic, integrated-field
approach to the natural science of
behavior.
The newsletter publishes professional
communications that fall between informal
correspondence and colloquia, and formal
archival publication. As such, the
newsletter supplements contemporary
journals dedicated to basic and applied
research, to the history and philosophy of
the behavioral sciences, and to
professional issues in the field. The
newsletter strongly encourages
submission of notes about current
professional activities of its
subscribers, news and observations about
interbehavioral psychology and related
perspectives, comments on journal articles
and books of interest, more extended book
reviews, and brief articles. All
submissions should be sent in triplicate
to the editor and should conform to the
style described in the Publication Manual
of the American Psychological Association
(3rd edition).
Subscription Information
Student Subscriptions (USA) $ 4.00
Regular Subscriptions (USA) 6.00
Foreign (Non-USA) Subscriptions.... 8.00
Institutional Subscriptions 12.00
Back Volumes 1-15 8.00
Back Volume Complete Sets... Please Write
THE PRINCIPIA PRESS
Principia Press's list of currently
available titles in interbehavioral
psychology is presented below. Check your
bookshelves, and those of your library and
bookstore, for possible oversights. In
addition, the books make excellent gifts
for colleagues and for students,
especially for the latter in honor of
their completed degree requirements. The
books may be purchased directly from
Principia Press, 5743 Kimbark Avenue,
Chicago, IL 60637. Handling charges are
$.75 per title; prepaid orders are
postpaid. Any queries should also be
directed to the address above.
Principles of Psychology (2 vols.)
$20.00
Psychology and Logic (2 vols.)
$25.00
Interbehavioral Psychology
$15.00
The Logic oj: Modern Science
$15.00
An Objective Psychology of_ Grammar
$13.00
The Scientific Evolution ojc Psychology
(2 vols.) $40.00
The Science of Psychology: An
Interbehavioral Survey $20.00
Psychological Linguistics
$15.00
Interbehavioraj- Philosophy
$27.50
Cultural Psychology
$16.00
Tragedy and the Event Continuum
$15.00
Selected Writings, 1929-1983
$20.00
Psychological Comments and Queries
$20.00
 THE AGORA
This issue of the newsletter celebrates
the beginning of its 16th volume and
more than a decade and a half of
interbehavioral publication. Also cause
for celebration is that Volume 15
contained more pages of substantive
material than published in any previous
year, reflecting the steady, though modest
growth we hope to maintain. The latter,
though, will require a higher submission
rate of articles, book reviews, book
notes, and comments, as well as an
increase in subscription rates. For the
moment, we will maintain our current rates
for another year, though our ability to
remain solvent throughout the remainder of
the volume depends on renewals and new
subscribers. We would appreciate both
your subscription renewal, if you have not
sent it in alreadt, and your assistance in
recruiting new subscribers.
In addition to expanding the
newsletter, our major project for this
year is to prepare a subject and author
index for the first 15 volumes. Because
the newsletter should remain devoted to
substantive issues, however, and because
our income will not cover publishing the
index as a separate issue within this
volume year, the index will be sold
separately. When it is completed, we will
announce its availability in this column.
Finally, let ,us turn to the current
issue: It contains comments by Dennis J.
Delprato on control systems theory and by
Harry C. Mahan on cognitive psychology and
clear writing; a book note by Susan M.
Schneider on Herbert Wendt's In Search of_
Adam; and an article by Edward K. Morris.
The last is a revision of a paper
presented in Philip N. Hineline (Chair),
Behavior Analysis: A Loyal Apposition to
Mainstream Psychology, a symposium
conducted at the 1987 meeting of the
American Psychological Association in New
York City. Other readers should consider
submitting appropriately revised versions
of their pertinent convention
presentations as well.
Renewals
Please renew your- subscription at your
earliest convenience if you have not
already done so. If your renewal is not
received by March 1, we will have to
discontinue your subscription so that we
can keep costs in hand.
The ABA Convention
The 1988 meeting of the Association for
Behavior Analysis will be held in
Philadelphia, May 26 through 30. Of
particular note, this year's conference
will have a mini-theme on the history of
behavior analysis. Although the theme
does not focus on interbehavioral
psychology, one of the mini-theme's
symposia will contain a paper by Linda J.
Hayes, "The Psychological Present" that
addresses interbehavioral issues directly.
Moreover, two interbehavioral symposia
have been planned on other topics. The
first will be chaired by Sidney W. Bijou
and is entitled, "Psychological
Linguistics: Examples of Research and
Theory." It will contain papers by P. N.
Williamson, Patrick M. Ghezzi, Morris, and
Bijou, with discussant comments by Hayes.
The second symposium "An Introduction
to Interbehavioral Psychology" will be
chaired by Bryan D. Midgley and contain
papers by Paul T. Mountjoy, Morris, and
Hayes, as well as discussant comments by
Bijou. When we know more about other
interbehavioral presentations at the
convention, we will publish the
information in the newsletter.
Information on convention registration
and housing should be directed to Shery
Chamberlain, ABA Offices, Department of
Psychology, Western Michigan University,
Kalamazoo, MI 49008.
Notes from the Field
The editor will be on sabbatical in the
Department of Psychology at Harvard
University for the 1988 spring semester,
and at The May Institute (Chatham, MA) for
the 1988 summer session. Newsletter
production, however, will not be
interrupted; indeed, the production
deadlines may be even more expeditiously
met. Submissions and correspondence
should still be sent to the University of
Kansas address.
Sandy Hobbs sent us a reprint of his
"The Social Psychology of a 'Good' Story,"
in which he argues interbehaviorally that
the study of contemporary legend is
hampered by poor definitions. Also, Henry
Pronko sent us an abstract for a book he
is preparing for Greenwood Press; the book
is entitled From AI to Zeitgeist: A
Philosophical Guide for the Skeptical
Psychologist.
 COMMENTS
Control Systems Theory: Report on a
Conference
Dennis J. Delprato
Eastern Michigan University
The 1987 meeting of the Control System
Group was held October 7-11 near Kenosha,
WI. Those interested in an authentically
scientific behavioral science might be
advised to examine the control systems
literature and perhaps attend next year's
meeting. When I addressed possible
directions for behavioral science of the
future (Delprato, 1986), included was a
cybernetic (or systems) approach as
exhibited in the work of K. U. Smith
(see, e.g., Smith & Smith, 1966). Control
systems theory (GST) and research is a
vigorous contemporary area of activity
that applies cybernetic thinking to human
and nonhuman behavior. GST maintains ties
to the contemporary general systems and
the cybernetic movements; however, work by
William T. Powers (e.g., Powers, 1973,
1978) and by those directly influenced by
Powers' work (e.g., Marken, 1985, 1986)
has served to give GST a distinctive
flavor.
The main emphasis of CST is that it
offers an alternative to conventional
open-loop, one-way, lineal, external
control. Far be it for a control system
theorist to suggest that the answer to
understanding behavior is going to be
found in the environment. Far be it for a
control system theorist to suggest that
so-called reinforcers either select or
strengthen responses. As I see it,
readers already responsive to Kantor's
approach might be intrigued with the
possibility that the closed-loop control
model is a way to do something with the
double-headed interactional arrow of
R 1[S. Actually, CST does away with
response and stimulus as formal
constructs, but I am confident that
Kantor's descriptive and transactional
uses of these constructs can be shown to
fit into the CST framework.
The above provides at least some
context for a few remarks on observations
I made at the 1987 conference itself.
First, it was a conference for those who
take their intellectual pursuits
seriously. Forget bus tours, athletic
events, and other activities best handled
under other aegis. Something of value was
going on from 8 a.m. to 1 a.m.
Furthermore, the facility was over 40
miles from Chicago and at least 5 miles
from Kenosha and what's in Kenosha?
All sessions were plenary. The attendance
was only about 25 in number, but given the
intensity of participation this was more
than sufficient. On the first morning, a
schedule was arranged in which those who
wished to present were identified. No one
read papers, but most made available
copies of papers related to their
presentations as well as other relevant
papers.
Second, the group was interdisciplinary,
showing a great integrative potential of
CST. I am sure I'll leave out certain
specialties and misrepresent others, but
the attendees apparently included
experimental psychologists, a human
factors specialist, clinical
psychologists, counselors, sociologists, a
piano teacher, a special education
teacher, an economist, a cyberneticist-
management scientist, a professor of
clinical social work, a cyberneticist-
mechanical engineer-publisher, and a
systems engineer.
What about my reaction to more
substantive issues that came up at the
conference? Well, I put forth .two
papers, copies of which are available from
me upon request. One paper suggested that
cybernetics and CST offer a third
alternative to how we approach control.
Basically, the point was that closed-loop
control can replace one-way, lineal,
external control (determinism) and free
will (which usually comes down to
nonspatiotemporal, one-way control). The
thesis of the other paper was that CST is
a participant in the movement of
behavioral science to the third stage of
scientific thinking, that is, the
field/system approach. I was
disappointed, but not surprised, by the
reaction of the group to these two theses.
I think the crux of the matter comes down
to the fact that both theses place great
weight upon the radical idea of
approaching history scientifically (-e.g.,
Kantor, 1963, 1969). Included in such an
approach is the recognition that science
is not separable from other cultural
influences and the importance of
distinguishing between valid scientific
constructs based on events and invalid
ones derived from cultural traditions. I
fear that the GST movement could be held
back unless participants more carefully
take into account how it is that we come
to make the statements we do. Thus,
although GST has so much to offer
regarding the pervasive control/cause
issue, one reaction was that we should not
too hastily disregard free will! Tied
into this suggestion, I think, was a
tendency to want to keep the organism
autonomous in a traditional way instead of
following through consistently with CST.
As far as the suggestion that CST is
truly on to something and is part of a
growing movement toward the latest way of
approaching the world, it would not be
surprising if "true believers" would
respond something like: "Wait a minute,
we are unique, we are ahead of everyone
else, we have found the answer and are
waiting for other enlightened ones to beat
a path to our door. What do you mean,
there are others who have come to our
insights in other ways? No, they are but
cheap imitations. There is no one else
like us." Most innovative thinkers have
fallen to this sort of thinking even
Kantor at times. Yet sound historical
analysis reveals that new ideas, like all
other natural events, evolve and relate to
other natural events. It does not appear
that most CST advocates are fully aware'of
the devolution and evolution of the
naturalistic cultural tradition. They
tend to not appreciate that behavioral
science (nee, psychology) was given
nonspatiotemporal soul as its subject
matter and that the field is still
struggling with all of the implications of
naturalizing, soul. In brief, most of my
discomfort with observations made at the
conference seems to come down to what I saw
as carryovers from the transcendental
phase of our cultural tradition. To use
the vernacular, I felt frustrated because
I knew that if anyone is prepared to
definitively break with hoary ideas about
the world, it is those who have been
attracted to CST. Yet, even here they
were making some very ancient mistakes.
For example, the perception construct
is a source of much confusion, I heard
statements of how we construct our world
in our brain (reductionism was another
problem), and that we only know our nerves
(Newton-Locke-Kant, J. Muller).
Nonetheless, I also heard one of the most
naturalistic statements I ever heard
concerning perceiving interactions.
The self construct was another source
of confusion. Discussion of this for the
most part was very much like that found in
circles still under the influence of the
older cultural tradition. Some speakers
seemed to come quite close to suggesting
that it is useful to think of a
transcendental self. Yet, signs of truly
new thinking were evident, as when some of
G. H. Mead's ideas were inserted into the
discussion.
There also was some talk of images in
the head (shudder). Certainly, such
theorizing is found in some of the highest
circles of mainstream, that's mainstream,
psychological science (which Mary Powers
has suggested is oxymoronic), but this is
no excuse for careless theorizing.
In brief, for purposes of "truth in
advertising," I point out that those who
have given careful consideration to the
tortuous career of behavioral science and
who thus are very sensitive to statements
having their origin in the venerable
transcendental, dualistic cultural
tradition would have had some
uncomfortable moments at the Control
System Group conference. But we must be
careful not to let such moments turn us
away from an idea of extraordinary
importance for the future of a
naturalistic approach to behavior that
of closed-loop control. I recommend study
of Bill Powers' seminal Behavior: The
Control of Perception (1973a) (note the
emphasis in the title of this work), as
well as the other references cited above.
Furthermore, an overview of some current
thinking in CST, as well as a basic
bibliography, is available in the Winter,
1986 (No. 7) issue of Continuing the
Conversation. This issue can be obtained
for $1.00 from Continuing the
Conversation, c/o Hortldeas, Rt, 1, Box
302, Gravel Switch, KY 40328. A one-year
subscription to the CST newsletter is
available for $10 from Control System
Group, 10209 N. 56th St., Scottsdale, AZ
85253.
References
Delprato, D. J. (1986). Invited editor's
commentary: Where to from here? The
Interbehaviorist, 14(1), 4-7; 14-15,
Kantor, J. R. (1963). The scientific
evolution of psychology (Vol. 1).
Chicago: Principia Press.
Kantor, J. R. (1969). The scientific
evolution of psychology (Vol. 2).
Chicago: Principia Press.
Marken, R. (1985). Selection of
consequences: Adaptive behavior from
random reinforcement. Psychological
Reports, 56, 379-383.
Marken, R. S. (1986). Perceptual
organization of behavior: A
hierarchical control model of
coordinated action. Journaj. of
Experimental Psychology: Human
Perception and Performance, 12, 267-
276.
Powers, W. T. (1973). Behavior; The
control of perception. Chicago:
Aldine.
Powers, W. T. (1978). Quantitative
analysis of purposive systems: Some
spadework at the foundations of
scientific psychology. Psychological
Review, 85, 417-435.
Smith, K. U., & Smith, M. F. (1966).
Cybernetic principles of learning and
educational design. New York: Holt,
Rinehart, and Winston.
Cognitive Psychology, Interbehavioral
Psychology, and Clear Writing
Harry C. Mahan
Oceanside, CA
On numerous recent occasions, this
commentator has seen references to what
has become known as "cognitive psychology."
These references have indicated that these
areas of interest and emphasis have arisen
due to the limitations of behaviorism in
treating cognitive behavior. Instead of
adopting interbehavioral principles,
however, cognitive psychology has reverted
to a mentalistic perspective with which an
interbehavioral view cannot be reconciled.
It was with considerable interest and
curiosity, therefore, that I recently
accepted a request to review an edited
volume (Glaser, 1987) which contains
several papers by people who are
identified as cognitive psychologists.
Although my review has not yet been
completed, reading the volume has
demonstrated that my preconceived notion
of cognitive psychology was somewhat off
the mark. I have found the technology,
about which I had no previous ideas, to be
commendable and, within my limited ability
to pass judgment, quite worthwhile. The
theory underlying the cognitive approach
has, in this case at least, been free from
the brain dogma I had anticipated.
Moreover, in spite of the overuse of such
ambiguous terms as "process" and
"representation" (which I have also found
in J. R. Kantor's writings), clearcut
mentalism is not readily apparent.
The most conspicuous characteristic of
much of the writing in this volume,
although absent in two of the four research
papers, is a style of English composition
that gives the definite impression of a
lack of careful editing or even rereading
on the part of, not just one, but several
of the authors, including the book's
editor. The technical descriptions of
the research conducted were, without
exception, written in a style that was
natural and clear, but one cannot help
concluding that the authors did not feel
comfortable with strictly psychological
materials and, in their self-consciousness,
fell far below their writing capabilities.
The writing, then, is an example of what
may happen when experts in technical
fields attempt to write theoretical
descriptions. Such descriptions are
difficult at best and require a degree of
familiarity with a basic psychological
perspective not taught in colleges and
universities today and emphasized in the
writing of only a few contributors to the
current literature in psychology.
The examples given below are taken from
a very few pages in the editor's
introduction to the volume, but they
should suffice to demonstrate my point.
It is my contention that vast improvement
in the clarity of much of this volume
could have been accomplished with very
little effort; moreover, since all of the
papers, including the introduction, were
written with the aid of United States
government grant funding, the composition
should have been reviewed with
considerably more care. Here are
sentences or partial sentences as they
appeared and as they have been clarified.
All of these, it will be noted, were found
on just three pages.
In the phrase, "basic decoding skills
of word recognition" (p. xi), "decoding"
is superfluous. In the phrase, "higher
level skills of comprehension that
integrate sentence ideas into memory" (p.
xi) , "ideas into memory" should be omitted
and "sentence" should be plural. The
phrase, "the cognitive analysis of human
performance" (p. xi), should be "the
analysis of human cognitive performance."
The sentence "[Naive students] have
little principled understanding" (p. x),
should read "[Naive students] have little
understanding of the principles involved."
"Thus, theories of knowledge should become
targets for instruction" (p. x), should
read, "Thus, theories of the principles
involved should become targets for
instruction."
Finally, the sentence, "As proficiency
develops, these items of information
become structured, are integrated with
past organizations of knowledge, so that
they are retrieved from memory rapidly in
larger units; structuredness and
accessability to interrelated chunks of
knowledge become targets for instruction"
(pp. ix-x), should read, "As proficiency
develops, these items of cognitive
reaction become, integrated with past
organizations of knowledge, so that they
take place rapidly when needed; such
patterns and their combination with
additional cognitive patterns become
targets for instruction."
This type of writing does not
characterize most of the writing of the
contributors, but, given their reputations
and affiliations, such writing should not
appear at all. When this commentator was
assigned to report writing at the
Education Center of the Marine Corps
Schools, Quantico, Virginia in the early
1960s, every report was reviewed
mercilessly by an editorial "murder board"
before it was accepted for forwarding on
"up the line." Review boards are good for
all concerned and, especially where grant
funding is involved, should be standard
practice in psychology. Moreover,
academic departments of psychology should
understand, and incorporate within their
teaching, the view that good theory gives
rise to clear thinking, and clear thinking
to clear writing.
References
Glaser, R. (Ed.). (1987). Advances in
instructional psychology (Vol. 3).
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
BOOK AND JOURNAL NOTES
Wendt, H. (1955). In search of Adam
(J. Cleugh, Trans.). New York:
Collier.
In describing the history of
paleontology and the search for the
origins of mankind, this work offers many
insights and anecdotes on the history of
science in general. Moreover, Wendt does
an excellent job of covering the numerous
personalities, theories, and in-fights
along the way to modern views, using
biographical sketches and imaginary
dialogue to advantage. The second half of
the book, on human paleontology since
Darwin, is progressively less profitable,
though, being now over 30 years out of
date.
In the first half of the book, which
is likely to be of most interest, Wendt
commends the pre-Socratic Greeks and their
"pure natural philosophy" (p. 153; see
also pp. 154-157 on the ancient Greeks)
though his enthusiasm for Aristotle is
definitely muted in comparison to
Kantor's. Other possibly surprising
inclusions in the cast of characters are
Sir Walter Raleigh, La Mettrie, Erasmus
Darwin, Goethe, and Spinoza. Although
these individuals had little to do with
paleontology directly, they were involved
in the gradual move from theology and
authority to naturalism and the theory of
evolution, which has a symbiotic
relationship with modern paleontology.
Considerable, but entirely suitable space,
then, is devoted to Lamarck and Charles
Darwin. Spinoza's cited contribution is
also worth mentioning here: He supported
the "natural reaction against the theory
that had now been taught for two thousand
years and had hardened into dogma, tending
to separate body from soul and matter from
spirit" (p. 152).
Despite mentalistic leanings which show
up toward the end in a discussion of
differences between humans and nonhumans,
Wendt applauds each step towards naturalism
and closer confrontation with events. A
possible truism in the field of scientific
historiography suggests itself here: The
progress of science has been so clearly
bound up with rejection of religious and
other types of authority over science,
that histories of science inevitably
have a naturalistic ring. (Susan M.
Schneider, University of Kansas)
 ARTICLE
Not So Worlds Apart:
Radical Behaviorism, and Developmental Psychology
Edward K. Morris
University of Kansas
In 1942, Stephen C. Pepper (1942/1960)
published a book entitled World
Hypotheses. In that enlightened,
philosophical, but sometimes opaque work,
Pepper presented what he took to be the
four relatively adequate world views
formism, mechanism, contextualism, and
organicism formulated somewhat common-
sensically according to their underlying
root metaphors. Pepper's work, however,
seemed to be of little consequence in
psychology until the early 1970s, At that
time, Hayne Reese and Willis Overton
adapted Pepper's distinctions between the
mechanistic and organismic world views as
a basis for analyzing and explaining
various tensions they observed in
developmental psychology. Those tensions
surrounded, and still surround, such
issues as what are and are not (a)
meaningful research questions, (b)
appropriate research strategies, (c)
acceptable explanations for empirical
findings, and (c) adequate theories of
development in general (see Overton &
Reese, 1973; Reese & Overton, 1970).
The initial and continuing exemplars of
the mechanistic and organismic world views
established by Reese and Overton were,
respectively, Sid Bijou and Don Baer's
behavior analysis of child development
(see Baer, 1970, 1973, 1976; Bijou, 1976;
Bijou & Baer, 1961, 1965, 1978) and Jean
Piaget's cognitive-developmental theory
(see Piaget, 1952, 1970). The root
metaphor for the former was said to be the
machine and, for the latter, the
biological organism. Although Reese and
Overton presented the two views equitably,
the general reception within developmental
psychology has been to champion organicism
and to dismiss mechanism. Indeed,
mechanism has taken on quite pejorative
connotations, and to be cast as a
mechanist is among the gravest of
aspersions (but see Zuriff, 1985, pp. 186-
192, about the varieties of what it means
to be mechanistic).
But mechanism and organicism are only
Contextualism,
two of Pepper's world hypotheses. In the
past two decades, contextualism has
emerged in the developmental literature as
.a third alternative, promoted initially in
the 1970s by Klaus Riegel (1976, 1978) and
now, in the 1980s, most notably by Richard
Lerner (see, e.g., Lerner, 1984; Lerner,
Hultsch, & Dixon, 1983). Moreover,
psychology as a whole seems to be taking
greater notice of contextualism, as
evidenced recently by Rosnow and
Georgoudi's 1986 text, Contextualism and
Understanding in Behavioral Science (see
also Sarbin, 1977).
The rather bold thesis of this paper is
that, in contrast to traditional
caricaturizations, the contemporary
behavior-analytic view of development
adheres to a contextualistic, not a
mechanistic, world view (see also Reese,
1982; Ringen, 1976). This is not a
dogmatic assertion because some
characteristics of behavior analysis
clearly suggest mechanism. The
argument in full, of course, requires more
space and intellectual acumen than is
available, but the present analysis offers
at least the patina of the rich quality
and deep texture of this material.
A Little H_isto_r_y.
A discussion of contextualism seems
appropriately begun with a little
historical background, because
contextualism1s root metaphor is the
"historic event." In the standard
account, behaviorism and mechanism are
taken to be linked through the legacy of
Democritus's atomism, the material side of
Cartesian dualism, and John Locke's
espousal of an epistemological tabula
rasa, on down through the empiricist and
associationist movements in philosophy,
from Berkeley and Hume, through James and
John Stuart Mill, emerging together in
psychology as John B. Watson's (1913)
classical behaviorism. Although this
might be an accurate account of what E. G.
Boring (1950) called "behavioristics" (pp.
620-663), the historical antecedents to
contemporary behavior analysis lie less in
the history of psychological science, and
more in developments within biology.
A more accurate history of behavior
analysis would trace it back (a) through
Charles Darwin's (1859, 1871, 1872) theory
of evolution and its effect on American
functionalist!! (Herrnstein, 1969) ; (b)
through Ernst Mach's (1883/1960)
positivistic epistemology and its basis in
biological economy (see Marr, 1985; cf.
Skinner, 1945); and (c) through
philosophical pragmatism as a theory of
truth, as espoused by Charles Pierce
(1940) and William James (1907) (see
Zuriff, 1985, pp. 257-261).
Although a presentation of this
revisionist history is beyond the scope of
my more focused comments, the three lines
of descent will emerge occasionally in
what follows, In particular, Mach's
positivism has a phenomenological
character to it that belies the
mechanistic distinction between the knower
and the known (Day, 1969a, 1969b; see
Giorgi, 1975). And, contextualism was
literally born of the pragmatism of
Pierce, James, John Dewey (1896) and
George Herbert Mead (1934). Mach's
positivism and American pragmatism stand
in important contrast to the logical
positivism and operationism that are
typically mis-ascribed to behavior
analysis today (Smith, 1986, see
especially, pp. 259-297).
For further introduction and analysis
of this history, I recommend as exemplary
resources Willard Day's (1980) chapter, in
Rieber and Salzinger's Psychology;
Theoretical-Historical Perspectives and
Laurence Smith's (1986) recent Behaviorism
and Logical Positivism: A Reassessment of
the Alliance. Let me now, however, turn
to the substance of my thesis by briefly
describing Pepper's views of mechanism and
contextualism before illustrating the
contextualism of contemporary behavior
analysis.
Mechanism and Contextualism
According to Pepper (1942/1960), the
mechanistic world view would take behavior
and environment to be parsed,
respectively, into responses and stimuli
existing as fundamental and discrete
elements, out of which development in all
its complexities and qualities is built.
As for causation, the elements are said to
act upon one another as do physical
forces, the result of which are chain-like
mechanical connections between, or
sequences of, stimuli and responses.
Causation is thereby immediate and
contiguous, material, and efficient. In
this view, the developing organism is
characterized as passive and empty
inherently at rest. It is just "being,"
and not very "becoming." Mechanism's
locutions are nominal and thing-based.
As for Pepper's treatment of
contextualism, a detailed elaboration will
not be presented here; rather, the view
will be unfolded more inductively in what
follows. For the moment, however, the
briefest of descriptions is offered. In
contextualism, activity occurs in context
and thus must be studied in context, for
context gives activity its meaning, and
does so through historical causation; in
historical causation, change is constant;
and change that is effective that is,
"successful working" - is the pragmatic
criterion for truth. In this view, the
developing organism is characterized as
active and inherently changing. It is
never just "being," but rather always
"becoming." Contextualism's locutions are
verbial and action-based.
With mechanism and contextualism now
sketched, some of the specific
consequences of these views are presented,
both to contrast them and to illustrate
the contextual nature of contemporary
behavior analysis. The main thesis is not
that mechanistic thinking is absent in
behavior analysis, for it is not. Rather,
my point is that, at a fundamental level,
radical behaviorism (Skinner, 1953, 1969,
1971, 1974), especially when seen from a
field-theoretic view such as J. R.
Kantor's interbehavioral psychology
(Kantor, 1959, 1972, 1981, 1982; see
Smith, Mountjoy, & Ruben, 1983), yields a
strong contextualistic flavor and bouquet
for the varietals that are harvested from
the contemporary behavior-analytic
vineyard (Morris, 1982, 1984; Morris,
Higgins, & Bickel, 1982, 1983). I say
this at the risk of offending certain of
my radical behavioral and interbehavioral
colleagues. But, having toured their
respective estates and sipped their best
wine, I find their blend to be a superior
product. To illustrate this, let me speak
directly to some consequences of mechanism
and contextualism, the first of which
relates to elementarism and holism.
Elementarism versus holism.. According
to Pepper, mechanistic theories of
10
development would adhere to elementarism,
as opposed to holism a position that
represents the organism as but a
collection of materially fundamental,
atomic response elements. -Complex
behavior is then but a compounding of the
basic elements, and identical response
elements are taken to have identical
meanings or functions such is the
nature of a machine. The environment is
similarly characterized and, in both
cases, the whole is no more than the sum
of its parts.
But this is not behavior analysis
for at least two reasons. First, behavior
is the unit of analysis, not the response
(see Thompson & Zeiler, 1986). A response
is a formal entity, and the analysis of
behavior in terms of responses alone would
quite plainly be reductionistic.
Behavior, in contrast, is a dynamic
relation, not a thing, in which a response
is but one component. The molar unit of
behavior includes not only responses, but
also their correlated stimuli and their
current and historical context. The
contemporary behavioral view, then, is
holistic in that the meaning or
significance of a response exists not in
itself, but only in relation to the myriad
factors with which it co-relates. The
function or meaning of a response is not
identifiable on the basis of its form
alone (see Krechevesky, 1939; Verplanck,
1954). Behavior analysis knows no
fundamental, atomic response element,
definable a priori. The stream of
behavior is fluid and dynamic, and the
banks of its lines of fracture slippery
and ever-changing.
Second, if responses and stimuli have
no inherent function, then physically
identical responses and stimuli need not
have the same functions or meanings within
or across individuals (Baer, 1981).
Indeed, it must be that they can never
have exactly the same function given that
the context of each individual's history
is unique and ever-changing. Moreover,
physically dissimilar responses and
physically dissimilar stimuli can have
identical functions or meanings. In
general, then, the process-achievement,
means-end relation is a highly dynamic one
in behavior analysis.
These latter points may seem trivial
and obvious, but they are among the most
common misuderstandings about behavior
analysis. For instance, a columnist in
Psychology Today; recently wrote that
behavioral psychologists assume that "all
people respond similarly to the same
stimuli" (Zilbergeld, 1984, p. 9; for
analyses of this and other
misunderstandings, see Bijou, 1979;
Horowitz, 1975; Todd & Morris, 1983; for
brief, informed presentations of the
behavior-analytic view, see Branch, 1987;
Michael, 1985; Reese, 1986). Nothing
could be further from the truth but, on
with the analysis and a presentation of
the second consequence of the mechanistic
and contextual world views, this one
related to the problem of causation.
Causal analysis versus functional
analysis. In mechanism, the analytic task
is to account for behavior in terms of
antecedent-consequent relations, that is,
as contingent and contiguous cause-and-
effect. As a conceptual and investigative
tactic, this antecedent-consequent
procedure of parsing behavior into
linearly sequenced stimuli and responses
is obviously central to many practices
within behavior analysis, and it no doubt
conditions many behavior analysts into a
mechanistic-leaning world view.
In a more broadly based view, though,
the analysis of behavior proceeds more
contextualistically. It focuses, first,
on the general function of behavior as
adaptation and, second, on the general
structure of behavior as the interrelation
of concurrent stimulus and response
functions within their current context.
The latter is exactly the point B. F.
Skinner made in his 1935 analysis of the
generic nature of stimuli and responses
(Skinner, 1935). Subsequently, however,
more specific conceptual structures have
been invoked, subclassifying these
functional interrelations into at least
respondent and operant processes. In
these latter units of behavior, behavior
is typically analyzed in terms of
contiguous antecedent-consequent relations,
but again, that is more heuristic than
model, though clearly some tension
exists (Baltes & Reese, 1977).
Development as behavioral versus
^structural change. A third consequence of
the mechanistic and contextualistic world
views has to do with the characterization
of development. From the mechanistic
perspective, development is little more
than change in responding across
increasing chronological age. Development
occurs as a continuous, linear succession

of cause and effect, where change is
reducible to, and predictable from, its
prior forms.
In contrast, the contextual character
of behavior analysis focuses on change as
the development of interrelated stimulus
and response functions, not change in the
form of a response alone. In this sense,
then, development refers to changes in
behavioral structure, not responses
that is, to changes in the interrelations
among stimulus and response functions and
their contexts. In contextualism, change
is not a derived category, but rather is
categorical. Historical causation means
that stimulus and response functions are
inherently in transaction.
Tjie_ passive versus the active organism.
A final consequence of the mechanistic
and contextualistic world views to be
discussed is the passive versus the active
nature of the organism. Within the
mechanistic account, causation fits the
Newtonian model of the universe wherein
efficient causes affect material
material that is otherwise at rest. More
specifically, stimuli and responses are
cause and effect, the former operating in
a unidirectional, linear fashion. This is
not to say that mechanists do not talk
about "interactions" between stimuli and
responses, but such talk is still usually
about underlying unidirectional causality
causality that bounces back and forth
between the effects of stimuli on
responses and of responses on stimuli.
Research on "child effects" on adult
behavior (see, e.g., Bell & Harper, 1977),
for instance, is not inherently
contextualistic; it can be construed
mechanistically as well. L to the person as an active agent or to the
In contrast, even though the unit of
behavior in behavior analysis is parsed
into stimuli and responses, the focus is
on their mutually defining functions.
More importantly, those functions stand in
a strong reciprocal or, better in Dewey
and Bentley's (1949, p. 108) terminology
in a transactional relation with one
another. They are mutually defining and
implicative. From this perspective, the
behavior-analytic view is that people are
"active," not "passive," participants in
their development. In saying that people
are active participants, however, behavior
analysts are not implying that people are
self-actional, autonomous agents.
Likewise, though, neither should they
assert that the environment is the
11
ultimate autonomous cause, the practical
utility of this perspective
notwithstanding. The tension here between
these views of causality is at the heart
of the trait-situation debate, which
shares some logical characteristics and
flaws with the nature-nurture issue, and
hence I would like to elaborate further in
describing the active agent in behavior
analysis.
Within the behavior-analytic view,
stimulus functions and response functions
develop historically and simultaneously,
and are defined with respect to one
another. As such, stimulus functions have
no more control over behavior than do
response functions the two are
interdependently and mutually defining.
Hence, a situation does not compel a
response to occur except through a
person's historically derived response
functions for that situation. But,
neither does a person compel a response to
occur except through the situation's
historically derived stimulus functions
for the response. Thus, situations do not
possess independent or inherent power to
control behavior any more than persons
possess independent power for such
control. Both are products of unique,
ever-changing interactional histories.
Interactions may display qualities
attributed to personal^or situational
control, depending on how they are viewed
or investigated, but those attributions
are shorthand conventions derived from an
overemphasis on organismic and mechanistic
thinking, as opposed to a contextual world
view. What is really objectionable here
is the reification and causal status given
situation as a stimulating force.
Predictions can be made about behavior on
the basis of information about persons or
situations, but the ability to do so does
not thereby bestow causal power on either.
Indeed, to assert that such power exists
at all moves the analysis of behavior away
from the transactional account it
requires. For further commentary on the
transactional nature of contemporary
behavior analysis, Henry Pronko and David
Herman's article, "From Dewey's Reflex Arc
Concept to Transactionalism and Beyond" is
recommended (see the Fall, 1982 issue of
Be hay i o r i sm; see also Keehn, 1980).
The Context in Contextualism
Before closing, a few comments about
context are in order, for "context" is
12
currently being bandied about with
increasing frequency in behavior analysis
and mainstream developmental psychology.
In behavior analysis, context often refers
to contextual determinants of behavior.
These, however, are typically no more than
broad and sometimes unspecified sets of
multiple antecedent causes (cf. Balsam &
Tomie, 1984). But likewise, in
developmental psychology, context often
refers to no more than the complexity of
various levels in which behavioral
development occurs (see, e.g.,
Bronfenbrenner, 1983). In both cases,
these factors are critically important to
consider, but they are not inherently a
part of a contextualistic world view.
Indeed, talk of context sometimes gives
the facade of greater scope, but with the
loss of precision. Context, as such, is
quite happy in mechanism, and is not
categorical in contextualism. To give
contextual causes their due is not to
embrace contextualism as a world view.
Still, within behavior analysis,
current concerns over context illustrate
that the field does not reduce behavior to
mere stimuli and responses, but rather
that it adheres strongly to the view of
behavior as having a reciprocal and
dynamic nature. Behavior analysis has,
from its very beginning, acknowledged the
importance of both the historical and
current context, though admittedly often
only implicitly so. Concurrently,
however, we see presentations of behavior
analysis that make the roles of
phylogenic, ontogenic, and interactional
historical causation quite explicit. And,
given that the historical context
establishes what reciprocal stimulus and
response functions may occur at any one
time in the first place, the current
context establishes what behavior can and
will then occur. As for what can occur,
the structure of the current context, as
manifest in organismic and environmental
structure, establishes what formal
responses and stimulation can or cannot
physically take place. And, as for what
will occur, the function of the current
context establishes what behavior takes
place by giving meaning to stimuli and
responses (e.g., establishing operations;
see Michael, 1982). As with the nature
of historical causation, the structure
and function of the current context
should also be seen as dynamic and
everchanging.
Conclusion
In conclusion, this characterization of
behavior analysis as contextualistic
remains vastly underdeveloped. Indeed,
for the mechanist and the organicist, the
argument may seem merely to have
translated mechanism into a
contextualistic language without really
having presented contextualism as a viable
alternative. Contextualism, itself, also
rests on a slippery slope it seems
forever about to slide into organicism or
into mechanism (see also Overton, 1984).
Nonetheless, if the behavior analysis
of development and mainstream
developmental psychology are both moving
towards contextualism (see Hayes, 1986;
Hayes & Brownstein, 1986, pp. 177-178;
Morris, 1986), then perhaps they can
interact even transact in a
productive manner. For the past 20 years,
they have been speaking across paradigms,
or across domains, or not speaking at all
(Morris, Hursh, Winston, Gelfand,
Hartmann, Reese, & Baer, 1982).
Developmental psychologists dismissed
behavior analysis as mechanistic and, if
you will, cogniphobic that is,
pathologically unwilling to entertain the
domain of cognition. And, behavior
analysts have dismissed developmental
psychology as organismic and cogniphiliac
in domain. In fact, the world views and
domains often become confused as the basis
of these differences. The differences
were often seen as incommensurable on the
cogniphobic-cogniphiliac dimension,
whereas the incommensurability has largely
been a function of differences in world
view.
With a convergence of behavior analysis
and developmental psychology towards
contextualism, however, they become
commensurable. Moreover, cognition as a
domain of development becomes a matter of
data not, in Pepper's word, of "danda,"
for cogniphobia and cogniphilia are
orthogonal to the world views. This
argument is not that behavior analysis and
developmental psychology will become one,
but that once we see that both adhere to a
common world view, then neither can
dismiss the other on the grounds of
paradigmatic incommensurability. And, as
a consequence, they must confront
important issues, such as cognition and
intentionality, straight on and perhaps
will do so more effectively than before
(Day, 1976; Deitz & Arrington, 1984;

Morris, 1985; Wittgenstein, 1953).
In sum, if these opposites become
apposites, their attraction may give way
to romance and, perchance, to marriage,
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16

SELECTED RECENT ARTICLES

:
. Heredity and Environment The Ettect ol Feedback and Sell-
; Revisited. Hod Vy. Smith. Relnfoicernenl Instructions on
Vivaldi in Venice: An Historical Studyfng Pertoimanee. Ste-.-e C.
. Test ol Psychological PioposiUons. Hayes, Ed/Ai D. tfuri, ZamV Kotn,
. 'J^m H. KurAeL . ' .. ' Ede^gird Wufert, UwS ftosenfarb.
. Defining an interactional Approach aJ Stobed D. Zettfe.
.to Anxiety end Depression. Animal Reseaich: Cotlateial Issues
: Kei-h S. pobson. '.-. .'. Concemtng Sdenlllic Practice in
Interresponse Times and the Ihe Context ol Education.
Molecular Control of Behavior: David Lopalto.
IRTs Conditional Upon Spontaneous Play In ChtMhood,
Changeovers to Alternate QayJd Cwnwel and Sandy Hobbs.
Behaviors. Wendon VI. Henton. Self-Contiol: Essence arvi
On the Consequences of Development. \VESam L tffafas.
' Conditioning. Jay Wtxxe. The Question of Animal
Response Inleiactkms In Multiple Consciousness. Richard LaBo.
Schedules: The Influence ol Prey Capture Behavior In Nine Species
Response Displacement ol Venomous Snakes. Dawd Chiiar,
" : . tver H. h-ersen. - - . - - Charles W. Radcare. Thomas Bj-ers,
Interbehavioriim In the and Rebecca Stoops.
Philosophy ol Science. Manual Ol Insuudlons for tdenllfytng
- . , - .-ParkHE-Uchtenstein. and Anatyiing Referential Intetac-
Honvolition In Hypnosis: A Semtollc llons. Sidney W. BJou,
. . Analysis, Theodore R-SSJb'n.
DoWlllrul Apes Know Whalltiey Adjuncltve Drinking in a Miied
Are Aiming Al! R. Thon^Json Retnfotcement Schedule: Etlecl
Pi/jiey. ' . ol Reinforcement Magnitude on
The Eipl ana lion ol Behavior. Schedule-Induced Polydipsla.
Robert C. BoTes, J. O..Keehn and Emote Stoyaw/.
. Untvetaal and Personal Helplessness:
A Test of Ihe Relormulated Model.
U.'riani E. Kramer and Robert A.
1
'" BoseKri.
The Psychological Record is a quarterly journal ol psychology. Since 1937it has published psychological
theory and research concerned with abroad rar>geo( topics in the discipline. Rapid pubTicafon ot accepted
manuscripts assures that each issue contains very recent vvotk.

Because reading The Psychological Record may faciftate Ihe developmenl o! students' Journal reading
habits. The Psychological Record is continuing a special student subscription rate.

1987 Subscription Rates

Student subscription $10-00

. . Professional indrvWual S15.00 .
. Library/institution$32.00

- . , ' - - - - Bacfc vofumes available

' - 1967 to present

THE INTERBEHAVIORIST
Edward K. Morris, Editor
Department of Human Development
University of Kansas
Lawrence, KS 66045 ___

Bryan D. Midgley Devel0pment

Department ut_ ^um"'_
y of Kansas
Lawrence, KS &6045
 A Quarterly Newsletter of Interbehavioral Psychology
ISSN 87SS-612X
Published at the University of Kansas

Volume 16 1988 Number 2

EDITOR TABLE OF CONTENTS

Edward K. Morris The Agora 19

University of Kansas
The ABA Convention 19
Operant Subjectivity 19
ADVISORY BOARD Theoretical and Philosophical Issues 19
From AI to Zeitgeist 19
Sidney W. Bijou The Kantor Memorial Fund 20
University of Arizona Notes from the Field 20
Donna M. Cone New Subscribers . 20
State of Rhode Island
Dennis J. Delprato Comments 21
Eastern Michigan University
Linda J. Hayes Midgley, Bryan D. The Death of
University of Nevada-Reno Interbehavioral Psychology. 21
Sandy Hobbs (Scotland)
Paisley College of Technology Midgley, Bryan D. Not Natural, You
Paul T. Mountjoy Say. What Is It, Then? 22
Western Michigan University
N. H. Pronko Book Note 22
Wichita State University
Roger D. Ray James on Wundt 22
Rollins College
Emilio Ribes (Mexico) Book Review 23
Escuela Nacional de Estudios
Douglas H. Ruben Mencken, H. L. (1927).
Eastern Michigan University Psychologists in a fog [review of
Robert G. Wahler Psychology: A simplification]... 23
University of Tennessee
QUOTATION

ASSISTANT EDITORS There is no escape from philosophy. The

question is only whether a philosophy is
Lisa M. Johnson conscious or not, whether it is good or
Bryan D, Midgley bad, muddled or clear. Anyone who
Susan M. Schneider rejects philosophy is himself
James T. Todd unconsciously practicing a philosophy.

- K. Jaspers,(1954)
18
THE INTERBEHAVIQRIST
A Quarterly Newsletter
of Interbehavioral Psychology
ISSN 8755-612X
Edward K. Morris, Editor
Department of Human Development
2035D Haworth Hall
University of Kansas
Lawrence, Kansas 66045, U.S.A.
913-864-4840
The Interbehaviorist is a quarterly
publication of news, information,
discussion, journal and book notes, book
reviews, comments, and brief articles
pertaining to interbehavioral psychology
a contextualistic, integrated-field
approach to the natural science of
behavior.
The newsletter publishes professional
communications that fall between informal
correspondence and colloquia, and formal
archival publication. As such, the
newsletter supplements contemporary
journals dedicated to basic and applied
research, to the history and philosophy of
the behavioral sciences, and to
professional issues in the field. The
newsletter strongly encourages
submission of notes about current
professional activities of its
subscribers, news and observations about
interbehavioral psychology and related
perspectives, comments on journal articles
and books of interest, more extended book
reviews, and brief articles. All
submissions should be sent in triplicate
to the editor and should conform to the
style described in the Publication Manual
of the American Psychological Association
(3rd edition).
Subscription Information
Student Subscriptions (USA) $ 4.00
Regular Subscriptions (USA) 6.00
Foreign (Non-USA) Subscriptions 8.00
Institutional Subscriptions 12.00
Back Volumes 1-15 8.00
Back Volume Complete Sets... Please Write
THE PRINGIPIA PRESS
Principia Press's list of currently
available titles in interbehavioral
psychology is presented below. Check your
bookshelves, and those of your library and
bookstore, for possible oversights. In
addition, the books make excellent gifts
for colleagues and for students,
especially for the latter in honor of
their completed degree requirements. The
books may be purchased directly from
Principia Press, 5743 Kimbark Avenue,
Chicago, IL 60637. Handling charges are
$.75 per title; prepaid orders are
postpaid. Any queries should also be
directed to the address above.
Principles of Psychology (2 vols.)
$20.00
Psychology and Logic (2 vols.)
$25.00
Interbehavioral Psychology
$15.00
The Logic of Modern Science
$15.00
An Objective Psychology of Grammar
$13.00
The Scientific Evolution of Psychology
(2 vols.) $40.00
The Science of Psychology; An
Interbehavioral Survey $20.00
Psychological Linguistics
$15.00
Interbehavioral Philosophy
$27.50
Cultural Psychology
$16.00
Tragedy and the Event Continuum
$15.00
Selected Writings, 1929-1983
$20.00
Psychological Comments and Queries
$20.00

THE AGORA
We would like to thank all of this
year's resubscribers to the newsletter for
having done so in such an expeditious
fashion. In addition, though, we would
also like to represent more subscribers in
the material we publish. Please feel free
to offer submissions for any of the
regular columns we publish, as well as for
articles and book reviews. The newsletter
is a" forum for readers, not a publication
outlet for the editor's and editorial
staff's idiosyncrasies. A few fresh and
freshly wizened faces would be welcome.
The ABA Convention
Once again, interbehavioral
psychologists will be actively
participating at the annual (and upcoming)
meeting of the Association for Behavior
Analysis. The convention will be held in
Philadelphia, May 27-30 at the Wyndham
Franklin Plaza.
Judging from the program, a number of
symposia and papers may be of special
interest to newsletter readers. First,
the mini-theme of the convention is the
history of behaviorism, around which much
of the program has been planned. Second,
a number of interbehaviorally-oriented
contributions will be represented in these
and other matters. Among the symposia
are:
An Introduction to Interbehavioral
Psychology (Bryan D. Midgley, Chair)
Mountjoy, Paul T. "Who, What, When,
Where, Why, and"How?"
Morris, Edward K. "The
Interbehavioral Field"
Hayes, Linda J. "Interbehavioral
Philosophy"
Bijou, Sidney W. Discussant
Psychological Linguistics: Examples of
Research and Theory (Sidney W. Bijou,
Chair)
Williamson, Phyllis N., & Lyons,
Charles, A. "Interactional
Components of Psychotic Language"
Ghezzi, Patrick M., Bijou, Sidney
W., & Chao, Chia-Chen
"Developing Social Language
Interactions with Retarded Youth"
Morris, Edward K. "Contextualism
and Language Behavior"
Bijou, Sidney W. "Theory of
Language Development"
Hayes, Linda J. Discussant
Among individual papers of possible
19
interest are:
Hayes, Linda J. "The Psychological
Present"
Ray, Roger D, "A Behavioral Systems
Model for Industrial/Organizational
Research and Development"
These above-mentioned participants, as
well as other newsletter subscribers, will
be represented on the program in still
other ways. Among the subscribers are
Louis D. Burgio, Barbara C. Etzel, Robert
P. Hawkins, Philip N. Hineline, Emilio
Ribes, Susan M. Schneider, Wanda L. Smith,
James T. Todd, and W. Joseph Wyatt.
In addition to these interbehaviorally-
related presentations, the ABA Special
Interest Group (Linda J. Hayes, Chair)
will hold its annual open meeting on
Saturday, June 28, 6:00-6:50pm.
Readers interested in attending the
convention should contact Shery
Chamberlain, Department of Psychology,
Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, MI
49008 about registration and housing (616-
383-1629).
Operant Subj ectivity
Steven R. Brown, editor of Operant
Subjectivity; The Q Methodology
Newsletter, informs us that he published a
paper by Parker E. Lichtenstein, given
originally at the November meeting of the
Institute for the Scientific Study of
Subjectivity (University of Missouri-
Columbia). The article's title is
"Interbehavioral Psychology and Q
Methodology." Its abstract reads as
follows:
Interbehavioral psychology rests
entirely upon naturalistic foundations.
So-called mental events are continuous
with overt behavior, and all behavior
has an objective character.
Subjectivity means simply uniqueness of
occurrence. Stephenson1s emphasis upon
self-reference brings another dimension
to Kantor's interbehavioral approach,
and Q methodology makes possible an
objective, nonmentalistic handling of
subjectivity.
The newsletter is available from Professor
Brown (Department of Political Science,
Kent State University, Kent, OH 44242-
0001) on a per volume basis for $5
(individuals) or $7 (libraries and outside
North America).
20
Theoretical and Philosophical Issues
A special interest group on Theoretical
and Philosophical Issues has been formed
within the Association for the Advancement
of Behavior Therapy. Among the group's
board of advisors are newsletter
subscribers Robert Hawkins and Dennis
Delprato. Interested readers should
contact the SIG chair, Irwin S. Goldfarb,
Department of Psychology, Auburn
University, Auburn, AL 36849.
From AI to geitgeist
The Greenwood Press announces the
impending publication of N. H. Pronko's
From AI to Zeitgeist; A Philosophical
Guide for the Skeptical Psychologist (ISSN
0736-2714). Their advance flyer reads as
follows:
This book is a reflection of a growing
awareness among philosophers and
psychologists of the inescapable
entanglement of psychology with its
philosophical underpinnings. It deals
with the dissection of the assumptions
that control contemporary inquiry into
psychological events, and it offers a
preliminary examination of the
consequences for understanding behavior
that different assumptions provide.
The broad scope of topics provides a
number of bases from which to view
problems and questions bearing on the
philosophy of science for psychology.
Pronko examines how guiding postulates
determine the outcome of inquiry,
raises new questions and new
possibilities regarding old problems,
and stresses the importance of seeing
known facts in a new light and
describing new theories.
A distinctive feature of this work
is its rejection of the traditional
transcendental metaphysics which have
for centuries been imposed upon
psychological data. As an alternative,
a naturalistic philosophy is proposed
for interpreting the same data, which
derives from observations of living
organisms, objects, or happenings, and
which advocates no general assumptions,
presuppositions, or postulates imported
from extraneous metaphysical sources.
The radically different understandings
of psychological events resulting from
application of the two philosophies are
compared and contrasted in an extensive
variety of topics that make up the body
of the book.
This thought-provoking and scholarly
work will be of great interest to
psychologists and philosophers, as well
as to students and researchers in
theoretical, advanced general,
systematic, and philosophical
psychology.
The Greenwood Press address is 88 Post
Road West, P.O. Box 5007, Westport, CT
06881 (203-226-3571).
The Kantor Memorial Fund
We have appreciated all past donations
to the Kantor Memorial Fund. This year,
special thanks are extended to William M.
Gardner and Parker E. Lichtenstein for
their contributions through the "little
extras" they included along with their
resubscriptions.
The function of the fund is to promote
special projects and to cover journal
costs during periods of shortfall. We
will likely have a shortfall this year,
and hence will borrow from the fund in
order to publish all four issues. In
addition, we will likely have to raise
subscription rates next year to cover our
increasing costs probably $7.50 for
regular subscriptions and $5.00 for
students, with an increase in other
categories as well. Just a forewarning we
are unhappy to report.
Notes from the Field
Jesus Gil Roales-Nieto has published
"Blood Glucose Discrimination in Insulin-
Dependent Diabetics" in Behavior
Modification (1988, 12, 116-132). Karen
Simpson is now Karen S. Callaway (LaMesa,
CA). Robert G. Wahler is co-author, with
Jean E. Dumas, on a paper to be published
in the Psychological Bulletin, entitled
"Attentional Problems in Dysfunctional
Mother-Child Interactions: An
Interbehavioral Model.
Readers are encouraged to send titles,
reprints, and other notices to the editor
for inclusion in this column,
New Subscribers
Lisa A. Romano (WMU)
Darlene D. Vanden Hoek (WMU)
Quotation
The full citation to the quotation on
the front cover is: Jaspers, K. (1954).
Way to wisdom: An introduction to
philosophy. New Haven: Yale University
Press.

COMMENTS
THE DEATH OF INTERBEHAVIORAL PSYCHOLOGY
This commentary's thesis is that
interbehavioral psychology is dead dead
as a school of psychology. Or, if not
dead, it should be. Although many of the
newsletter's readership may be surprised
by this thesis, it is actually consonant
with Kantor's proposal for a naturalistic
science of psychology. To wit:
The second description of behaviorism,
the one we may regard as the scientific
one, is much more significant. It is
not based upon a scientific technique
or department of study but upon the
enterprise of investigation. (Kantor,
1968, p. 151)
and
We propose that Behaviorism is best
envisaged as science itself. All
scientists are students of specialized
types of behavior. (Kantor, 1963a, p.
500)
and
In psychology as well as in other
sciences behaviorism is basically
Interbehaviorism. (Kantor, 1971, p.
519)
For Kantor (1963a), "Behaviorism is...
science itself" (p. 500). Physicists,
chemists, astronomers, biologists, and
psychologists all study behavior, the
specific type being a detail (cf. Kantor,
1946). The term "interbehavior" is
superior to "behavior" only in its
emphasis on the field-like character of
all events. More to the point, the
interbehavioral perspective is not a
philosophy of a science of psychological
behavior, but rather, is a systematic
point of view that relates to all natural
events.
As should be apparent, the thesis of
this commentary is actually somewhat of a
misstatement because Kantor never intended
for interbehavioral psychology to be
another school in the first place,
although interbehavioral psychology is
sometimes seen as just that.
An important step in arguing for the
progressive, non-cultish nature of
interbehavioral psychology is to
demonstrate its relationship to other
contemporary developments in the sciences.
To argue that interbehavioral psychology
is unique and independent of other
scientific developments only perpetuates
21
cultism (see Delprato, 1988). More
positively, the argument for the
integrative potential of interbehavioral
psychology follows directly from Kantor's
own historical analysis of the development
of scientific thinking (Kantor, 1946,
1963b, 1969; see Delprato, 1986; Ray &
Delprato, 1987, for examples of fruitful
integration).
Perhaps another, easier, step toward
escaping cultism and advancing toward
more integrative practices is to retire
the label "interbehavioral psychologist."
I propose something like "behavioral
system scientist" or "integrated-field
theorist." What is your opinion?
Bryan D. Midgley
University of Kansas
References
Delprato, D. J. (1986). Invited editor's
commentary: Where to from here? The
Interbehaviorist, 14, 4-7.
Delprato, D. J. (1988). Control systems
theory: Report on a conference. The
Interbehaviorist, 16, 4-6.
Kantor, J. R. (1946). The aim and
progress of psychology. American
Scientist, 34_, 251-263.
Kantor, J. R. (1963a). Behaviorism:
Whose image? The Psychological Record,
13, 499-512.
Kantor, J. R. (1963b). The scientific
evolution of psychology (Vol. 1).
Chicago: Principia Press.
Kantor, J. R. (1968). Behaviorism in the
history of psychology. The
Psychological Record, 18, 151-166.
Kantor, J. R. (1969). The scientific
evolution of psychology (Vol. 2).
Chicago: Principia Press.
Kantor, J. R. (1971). The aim and
progress of psychology ancl other
sciences. Chicago: Principia Press.
Ray, R. D., & Delprato, D. J. (1987).
Behavioral systems analysis:
Theoretical, strategic, and tactical
issues. Unpublished manuscript,
Winter Park, FL.
NOT NATURAL, YOU SAY. WHAT IS IT, THEN?
"Glucose is a natural sweetener,
22
whereas Nutrasweet is not."
"I don't think that person is a natural
blonde."
"Oranges are a natural source of
vitamin C."
A colleague of mine, when confronted
with statements such as these,
characteristically responds, "Is
Nutrasweet a supernatural sugar?", "Are
there supernatural blondes?", and "What
are supernatural sources of vitamin C?"
Usually, the speakers give wearisome
looks and go about their business.
"Natural" is a word that is bandied
about quite a bit, even by individuals who
should treat it with more respect
scientists. We realize, of course, that
statements such as, "I don't think that
person is a natural blonde," are not meant
to imply that supernatural blondes exist.
Such statements, however, do imply that
some sort of human intervention resulted
in the person's blonde hair. In fact,
human intervention into some event appears
to be the defining feature that leads
events and their products to be labeled as
nonnatural so called "man made"
products (e.g., lawn fertilizer).
The use of the word "natural" to
distinguish things developed without human
intervention from things developed with
human intervention is telling of our
transcendental cultural heritage. The
implication is that human participation
and intervention result in non- or super-
natural products. The further implication
is that humans (and human behavior) are
somehow nonnatural, which of course takes
us into the realm of the supposedly extant
soul, mind, or consciousness.
Note that we could also discuss at
length the use of the phrase "human
intervention." This phrase seems to imply
that humans come into a "naturally
occurring" situation of which they are not
a "natural" part, and to modify it in some
fashion or another. Perhaps "human
participation" would be a more accurate
phrase and would not set humans and their
behavior off from other natural events.
What Is glaringly lacking in our
culture is the appreciation that humans
are part of the natural world, and human
behavior can be described with respect to
its own principles. Although many
psychologists appreciate this postulate,
especially those who see behavior as a
worthy subject matter in its own right,
Kantor, by way of his "interbehavioral
continuum" (Kantor, 1959, pp. 42-52),
explicitly discusses the locus of
humans with respect to the rest of the
natural world.
Bryan D. Midgley
University of Kansas
Reference
Kantor, J. R. (1959). Interbehavioral
psychology. Chicago: Principia Press.
BOOK NOTE
James, H. (1920). The letters of Henry
James (Vol. 1). Boston: Atlantic
Monthly Press.
William James and Wilhelm Wundt were
known for their antipathy towards each
other's work. James, though, was the
better wordsmith, and more than once took
up his pen against Wundt. The following
depiction of "the professor" by James has
is not only a case in point, but it has
also a too modern and common a ring to it.
Since there must be professors in the
world, Wundt is the most praise-worthy
and never-too-much-to-be-respected type
of the species. He isn't a genius, he
is a professor a being whose duty is
to know everything, and have his own
opinion about everything, connected
with his [department or specialty]....
He says of each possible subject, "Here
I must have an opinion. Let's see.
What shall it be? How many possible
opinions are there? three? four?
Yes! just four! Shall I take one of
these? It will seem more original to
take a higher opinion, a sort of
Vermittelungansicht [mediating
attitude] between them all. That I
will do, etc., etc." So he acquires a
complete assortment of opinions of his
own; and, as his memory is so good, he
seldom forgets which they are!...He has
utilized to the utmost fibre every gift
that Heaven endowed him with at his
birth, and made of it all that mortal
pertinacity could make. He Is the
finished example of how much mere
education can do for a man. (pp. 263-
264)
(Edward K. Morris, University of Kansas)

PSYCHOLOGISTS IN A FOG
H. L. Mencken
The so-called science of psychology is
now in chaos, with no sign that order is
soon to be restored. It is hard to find
two of its professors who agree, and when
the phenomenon is encouraged it usually
turns out that one of them is not a
psychologist at all, but simply a teacher
of psychology. Even the Freudians, whose
barbaric raid first demoralized and
scattered the placid experts of the old
school, now quarrel among themselves.
Worse, the same psychologist frequently
turns upon and devours himself. The case
of Dr. William McDougall, late of Harvard,
comes to mind at once [see Footnote 1].
Every time he prints a new book, which is
very frequently, he changes his list of
instincts. Some of the others go much
further: Dr. McDougall, indeed, is a
conservative. The gay boys, at short
intervals, throw overboard their whole
baggage. There are psychologists in
America who started out with the classical
introspective psychology, abandoned two-
thirds of it in order to embrace
Freudianism, then took headers into
Behaviorism, and now incline toward the
Gestalt revelation of Kohler and Koffka.
Some say one thing and some another. It
is hard for the layman to keep his head in
this whirl. Not even anthropology offers
a larger assortment of conflicting
theories, or a more gaudy band of steaming
and blood-sweating professors.
Nevertheless, certain general
tendencies show themselves, and in the
long run they may lay the foundation of a
genuinely rational and scientific
psychology. The chief of them is the
tendency to examine the phenomena of the
mind objectively, and with some approach
to the scientific method. The old-time
psychologist did not bother with such
Inquiries, some of which are very
laborious. He simply locked himself in
his study, pondered on the processes of
his own pondering, and then wrote his
book. If, as an aid to his speculations,
he went to the length of mastering the
elements of physiology, he regarded
himself as very advanced, and was so
regarded by his customers. Basically, he
was a metaphysician, not a psychologist.
His concepts of the true were constantly
mellowed and ameliorated by concepts of
23
what ought to be true. These old-time
psychologists, like the metaphysicians,
had a great gift for inventing
terminology, and their masterpieces still
harass in the more backward seminaries of
learning. Most of them, again like the
metaphysicians, believed that they had
sufficiently described a thing when they
had given it a name.
But the psychology of today is mainly
experimental. Its professors do not
attempt to acount for the thought
processes by introspection, but by
observation. Their learning is not on
philosophy, but on physiology. So far, it
must be confessed, they have failed to
solve any of the fundamental problems of
psychology for example, the problem of
consciousness but they have swept away
a great mass of futile speculation, and
unearthed a large number of interesting,
if often embarrassing facts. Here the
Behaviorists, who are relatively recent
comers in the field, have done some good
work. Being psychologists, they are of
course inclined to nonsense, and so one
finds them plunging into doctrines that
war upon common observation for
example, the doctrine that the qualities
of the mind are never inherited, but
spring wholly out of environmental causes
, but they have at least cleared off
the old view of the mental machine as a
mechanism working in a sort of vacuum,
with no relation to the other organs of
the body. These Behaviorists have proved,
what should have been obvious long ago:
that a man thinks with his liver as well
as with his brain in brief, that the
organism is an actual organism, and not a
mere congeries of discordant units. In
their studies of children, in particular,
they have got at some simple and useful
facts, and so disposed of a formidable
accumulation of idle speculations. But
their formula is too simple to be wholly
true, and they seem very likely to ruin it
by trying to get more work out of it than
it is capable of.
So with the Freudians. So with the
Gestalt enthusiasts. So with the
endocrine psychologists. So with all the
rest. Why don't they get together as the
pathologists, physiologists and other
scientists get together, pool their facts,
24 .

scrap their1 theories, and so lay the
foundations of a rational psychology?
Messers. Col'eman and Commins hint at. the
reason. No professional kudos is to be
got by pooling facts. The one way to make
a splash in psychology is to come out with
a new and revolutionary theory. In other
words, public opinion among psychologists
is not yet genuinely enlightened. They
paddle around in what ought to be a
science, but they are not quite
scientists. Some day, perhaps, they will
make the grade, and so become brothers to
the pathologists. But at this moment
they are nearer the osteopaths.
, .
Footnote
1. McDougall left Harvard for Duke in
1927. He died in 1938.
Reprinted from the American Mercury,
1927, July, pp.. 382-383. A review of L.
R. Coleman & S. Commins (1927).
Psychology: A simplification. New York,

THE INTERBEHAVIORIST
Edward K. Morris, Editor
Department of Human Development
University of Kansas
Lawrence, KS 66045 .

Bryan D= Midqley
Department of Human Development
University of Kansas
Lawrence,, KS SS045
 A Quarterly Newsletter of Interbehavioral Psychology
ISSN8755-612X
Published at the University of Kansas

Volume 16 1988 Number 3

EDITOR TABLE OF CONTENTS

Edward K. Morris The Agora 19

University of Kansas
The ABA Convention 19

ADVISORY BOARD Mexican Congress 19

Sidney W. Bijou Query from the Field 19

University of Arizona
Donna M. Cone Delprato on Powers 20
State of Rhode Island
Dennis J. Delprato New Subscribers 20
Eastern Michigan University
Linda J. Hayes Quotation 20
University of Nevada-Reno
Sandy Hobbs (Scotland) Book and Journal Notes , 21
Paisley College of Technology
Paul T. Mountjoy Comments 22
Western Michigan University
N. H. Pronko Powers on Control System Theory 22
Wichita State University
Roger D. Ray Article 23
Rollins College
Emilio Ribes (Mexico) Hayes, Linda J. Philosophical
Escuela Nacional de Estudios Implications of the
Douglas H, Ruben Interbehavioral Field 23
Eastern Michigan University
Robert G. Wahler
University of Tennessee
QUOTATION

ASSISTANT EDITORS A fact is like a sack it won't

stand up till you've put something in
Lisa M. Johnson it.
Bryan D. Midgley
Susan M. Schneider - H. A. Carr (1961)
James T. Todd
18
'' THE INTERBEHAVIORIST
A Quarterly Newsletter
of Interbehavioral Psychology
ISSN 8755-612X
Edward K. Morris, Editor
Department of Human Development
2035D Haworth Hall
University of Kansas
Lawrence, Kansas 66045, U.S.A.
913-864-4840
The Interbehaviorist is a quarterly
publication of news, information,
discussion, journal and book notes, book
reviews, comments, and brief articles
pertaining to interbehavioral psychology
a contextualistic, integrated-field
approach to the natural science of
behavior.
The newsletter publishes professional
communications that fall between informal
correspondence and colloquia, and formal
archival publication. As such, the
newsletter supplements contemporary
journals dedicated to basic and applied
research, to the history and philosophy of
the behavioral sciences, and to
professional issues in the field. The
newsletter strongly encourages
submission of notes about current
professional activities of its
subscribers, news and observations about
interbehavioral psychology and related
perspectives, comments on journal articles
and books of interest, more extended book
reviews, and brief articles. All
submissions should be sent in triplicate
to the editor and should conform to the
style described in the Publication Manual
of the American Psychological Association
(3rd edition).
Subscription Information
Student Subscriptions (USA) $ 4.00
Regular Subscriptions (USA) 6.00
Foreign (Non-USA) Subscriptions 8.00
Institutional Subscriptions 12.00
Back Volumes 1-15 8.00
Back Volume Complete Sets... Please Write
THE PRINCIPIA PRESS
Principia Press's currently available
titles in interbehavioral psychology are
listed below. Check your bookshelves, and
those of your library and bookstore, for
possible oversights. In addition, the
books make excellent gifts for colleagues
and students, especially for the latter in
honor of their completed degree
requirements. The books may be purchased
directly from Principia Press, 5743 Kimbark
Avenue, Chicago, IL 60637. Handling
charges are $.75 per title; prepaid orders
are postpaid. Any queries' should also be
directed to the address above.
Principles o_f Psychology (2 vols.)
$20.00
Psychology and Logic (2 vols.)
$25.00
Interbehavioral Psychology
$15.00
The Logic of Modern Science
$15.00
An Objective Psychology of Grammar
$13.00
The Scientific Evolution of Psychology
(2 vols.) $40.00
The Science of Psychology; An
Interbehavioral Survey $20.00
Psychological Linguistics
$15.00
The Aim and Progress of Psychology and
Other ^ciences
In terb eh aviora1 Philosophy
$27.50
Cultural Psychology
$16.00
Tragedy and, the Event Continuum
$15.00
Selected Writings, 1929-1983
$20.00
Psychological Comments and Queries
$20.00

THE AGORA
This issue of the newsletter has been
delayed not for lack of material, but for
the temporary lack of an editor. As for
the newsletter, although the submission
rate has not been high, we continue to
have a sufficient amount of material for
publication. We welcome of course even
encourage additional material of the
sort suitable to our broadly stated
purposes.
As for the editor, his bicycle suffered
an accident and, as a consequence, so did
he. The bike underwent cycle-analysis,
but the cycle-analyst pronounced the
breakdown complete and irreparable. In
contrast, the editor received more of an
interbehavioral diagnosis and treatment,
and is a field factor once again,
The ABA Convention
Interbehavioral participation at the
May, 1988 meeting of the Association for
Behavior Analysis (ABA) was strongly
reinforced, if such a thing may be said in
these pages.
The two interbehavioral symposia "An
Introduction to Interbehavioral Psychology"
and "Psychological Linguistics: Examples
of Research and Theory" were well
attended, to the point of standing-room-
only in the case of the former. Audience
members at the "Introduction" symposium
suggested that those papers be published
in the newsletter, and we are pleased to
do so in reverse serial order, beginning
in this issue with Linda J. Hayes's
contribution, "An Introduction to
Interbehavioral Psychology: Interbehavioral
Philosophy." The other papers, which
provide (a) an introduction to the
interbehavioral field, (b) a biographical
sketch of J. R. Kantor, and (c) commentary
on all of the preceeding, will be
published in subsequent issues of the
newsletter.
About a dozen people attended the ABA
Interbehavioral Special Interest Group
business meeting, chaired by Linda. Among
the issues discussed were next year's
interbehavioral program at ABA and means
for encouraging further student
participation. Two symposia were
tentatively planned, entitled "Recent
Advances in Interbehavioral Psychology:
Research, Application, and Theory" and
"Research and Application with Multiple
Response Methodologies." In addition to
19
these discussions, Linda announced that
she and Emilio Ribes-Inesta will edit the
Fall issue of APA Division 25's
newsletter, Behavior Analysis, which will
be a celebratory issue in honor of the
100th year of J. R. Kantor's birth.
Next year's ABA convention will be held
in Milwaukee, WI from May 25 to 28. If
you are interested in attending,
presenting, or registering, please
contact: Shery Chamberlain, ABA/SABA,
Department of Psychology, Western Michigan
University, Kalamazoo, MI 49008 (616-387-
4495)
Mexican Congress on Behavior Analysis
The 10th annual Mexican Congress on
Behavior Analysis will be held in
Hermosillo, March 15-17, 1989. The
meeting will cover basic and applied
research with humans and nonhumans, and
conceptual and theoretical analyses of
behavior.
Submissions should be sent to Elisa E.
Corrales Vargas, the Congress coordinator,
by December 15. Her address is: Congress
Organizing Committee, Apartado Postal 794,
Hermosillo, Sonora, Mexico (Phone: 621-2-
69-96). Papers to be delivered in English
should be submitted in their final version
so that a brief translation can be
prepared ahead of time. Presentations
should not exceed 20 minutes in length.
Additional information about the
Congress may be obtained from Victor
Corral Verdugo, Universidad de Sonora,
Herraosillo, Sonora, Mexico (Phone: 621-7-
31-81, Ext. 104).
A Query from the Field
Noel Smith (SUNY-Plattsburgh) writes
that, while working on a new project, he
prepared some material that left him
concerned. He would welcome responses to
the following passage and to the questions
that follow.
The psychological field consists
solely of concrete things and events,
consisting of the organism, response
and response functions, stimulus object
and stimulus functions, setting,
interactional history, and media of
contact. These apparently exhaust the
relevant categories, but if others can
be identified, they could be added.
20
One possibility is the reinforcement
principle. But this may be a special
case of stimulus function/response
function and interactional history.
Another possibility is Kuo's "behavior
gradient" Kuo's concepts being fully
compatible with interbehaviorism,
though limited to nonhumans. The
behavior gradient is the extent to
which any particular biological
component participates in a given
interaction.
With the field factors, it is
possible to develop a functional
description of all psychological events
on a metatheoretical level. This does
not, of course, replace empirical
research that can provide information
for augmenting the functional
descriptions. Interbehaviorism, in
turn, can guide research to investigate
multiplex factors and to keep
interpretations consistent with
observations.
1. Can reinforcement be subsumed as
stimulus function/response
function?
2. Is it appropriate to refer to
interbehavioral accounts of
psychological events as "functional
descriptions"?
3. Are the field factors sufficient
to account for all psychological
events, even metatheoretically?
If so, how could this be
demonstrated other than by dealing
with them one by one?
4. Is interbehavioral psychology a
metatheory? Metaprogram?
Metadescription? Metaeonstract?
Me ta-anything?
Delprato on Powers^
Dennis J. Delprato (Eastern Michigan
University) writes that that one reason
for interbehavioral psychologists to
examine W. T. Powers' control system
theory is that the theory may provide a
framework for empirical work to be done
within the context of the abstract double-
headed arrow (M)--{j|).
To introduce Powers' views, the
Comments section of this issue presents
Powers' elaboration of this idea, which he
has agreed to share with readers of this
newsletter. Following that, a brief
sketch is offered of Powers' feedback
analysis of the question of the
relationship between organism and
environment; the latter is an abstract of
a paper Powers presented at the Annual
Meeting of the Control System Group,
Kenosha, WI (October, 1987).
For some key references to Powers'
Control System Theory, see:
Powers, W. T. (1973). Behavior: The
control p_f perception. Chicago:
Aldine.
Powers, W. T. (1978). Quantitative
analysis of purposive systems: Some
spadex-rork at the foundations of
scientific psychology.
Psychological Review, 85, 417-435.
Powers, W. T. (1979). The nature of
robots. Part 2: Simulated control
system. Byte, 4(7), 134-152.
New Subscribers
Robert A. Babcock
University of Massachusetts
Elson Bihm
University of Central Arkansas
Stephen T. Higgins
University of Vermont
Paulo Moderate
University of Messina (Italy)
Ann B. Pratt
Capitol University
Masaya Sato
Keio University (Japan)
Timothy B. Sinnott
Ypsilanti, MI
Michael N, Wiest
Eastern Michigan University
Quotation
This issue's quotation is from H. A.
Carr (1961, p. 9), who himself quotes from
one of Pirandello's characters. The
quotation was found in R. Schafer's
(1976, p. 5), A New Language for
Psychoanalysis. New Haven: Yale
University Press. Schafer's views, by the
way, are interbehavioral in orientation.
For a review of the book, see Vicki Lee's
(1988) comments in the Journal of the
Experimental Analysis _of Behavior, 4j),
429-436. For a review of Schafer's book
and some of his other work, see Dennis
Delprato's (1981) earlier comments in the
newsletter (Vol. 10, No. 4, pp. 3-6).

BOOK AND JOURNAL NOTES
Anastasi, A. (1972). Reminiscences of a
differential psychologist. In T. S.
Krawiec (Ed.), The psychologists (Vol
1, pp. 3-37). New York: Oxford
University Press.
Anne Anastasi (1972, p. 8) characterizes
J. R. Kantor's work and recollects about
his influence on her as follows:
Another influence that I consider to be
of primary importance was more indirect.
It is the influence of J. R. Kantor of
Indiana University. In some ways,
Kantor resembles Hollingworth. He,
too, is one of the last of the
generalists in psychology, with a
remarkable breadth of knowledge
extending over psychology and related
fields. He, too, formulated a
comprehensive theoretical system for
psychology. And he, too, pursued his
interests with vigor and independence.
It is, however, his emphasis on the
role of environment and his explication
of the specific operation of
environmental factors in individual
development that I recognize as the
predominant influence on my own work.
Kantor's influence on Anastasi stemmed
not just from her study of his work, but
also from contacts with his views through
John Foley Porter, Jr., of Bloomington,
Indiana, whom she married in 1933. Porter
had been one of Kantor's students at
Indiana University.
Hillner, K. P. (1984). History and
systems of modern psychology: A
conceptual approach. New York:
Gardner Press.
Hillner discusses J. R. Kantor's
interbehaviorism (pp. 294-295) in a
chapter entitled "Dialectical Psychology,"
His brief commentary reads as follows:
Jacob Kantor .(1888-) is an American
behaviorist who developed an overall
system of psychology that is
reminiscent of Riegelian dialectics
(see Riegel, 1975, 1976a, 1976b).
Kantor's system is more philosophical
than actual: It is empirical, but has
21
not served as an impetus to actual
experimental research. Kantor has no
formal concept of dialectical
interaction; however, he does stress
an explicit environmental x organismic
interaction. Unlike the typical
behaviorist, Kantor places equal stress
on the stimulus and response such that
they constitute an emergent entity:
Behavior exists in space and time and
should be analyzed in terms of segments
that are related to functional stimulus
events. The conceptual correspondence
between Kantor's system and Riegel's
dialectics is so pervasive that the
former even includes the notion of
implicit interactions, such as
thinking, reasoning, and imagining,
that involve invisible substitute
stimuli: The concept of an implicit
interaction is analogous to that of an
internal dialogue.
Riegel, K. F. (1975). Toward a
dialectical theory of development.
Human Development, 18, 50-64.
Riegel, K. F. (1976a). The dialectics of
human development. American
Psychologist, 31, 689-700.
Riegel, K. F. (1976b). Psychology in
development and history. New York:
Plenum.
Kidd, R. V., & Natalicio, L. (1982).
Toward a radical interbehaviorism.
Interamerican Journal of Psychology,
L5, 123-131.
Readers interested in parallels and
anti-parallels between interbehavioral
psychology and radical behaviorism might
consult this brief article. The abstract
reads as follows:
A rapproachement between
interbehavioral psychology as described
by J. R. Kantor and the experimental
analysis of behavior as described by
B. F. Skinner is proposed. The extant
similarities and differences between
these two approaches to the scientific
study of behavior are identified and
an analytic field approach is described
as paradigmantic for their
reconciliation.
22
COMMENTS
From the Standpoint of Control System Theory
William T. Powers
On R<>S
The double-headed arrow joining
R<>S should really be drawn like this
/"
The two paths are no;t simply the same path
taken in reverse: One is the link from S
through the organism to R, the other from
R through the environment to S. This
gives you two equations with two unknowns,
hence you can solve for both unknowns.
Add a disturbance and a reference signal,
and spell out the connecting functions (f
and g), and you have a control system:
> R S <- S*
R = g(S - S*) and S = f (R + D)
The Asymmetry of_ Control
The circular relationship between
organisms and environments is well known:
Behavior affects the environment and the
environment affects behavior. On
superficial consideration, we apparently
have no choice: The organism controls its
environment or, equally well, the
environment controls the organism, but
this is not true.
To see that there is asymmetry in this
relationship we can boil the situation
down to its simplest elements. The figure
below depicts two triangles representing
agencies. The points are the outputs.
The side opposite each point is the input
surface, which receives two input effects.
One effect is constant the inputs
labeled r and d. The other effect is
simply the outputs of the other triangle,
labeled respectively p and a. The output
a is some constant K times the sum of
inputs r and p, and the output p is
another constant E times the sum of inputs
a and d.
1 1
If a = K(r + p) and p = E(a + d) , then
we have a feedback situation. For this
combination to be stable, the feedback must
be negative, so K and E must have opposite
signs. That is not, however, the
asymmetry of which I speak, as either one
can be negative. To see the asymmetry, we
must solve the system equations as a
simultaneous pair, to get
KE
a - + r/E) , and
1 - KE
KE
P = (r + d/K).
1 - KE
If K and E are both very large numbers,
one negative, then a = d and p = r. Each
agency makes the other's output match the
"loose" input the reference signal.
Thus, each agency controls the output of
the other, and symmetry exists. But if K
is a large number and E around unity, the
agency with K in it will make the other's
output match its own reference signal, r,
but the other agency will not be able to
maintain the same relationship. The agency
with K in it is the organism. Organisms
are highly sensitive to inputs, but
environments do not correspondingly amplify
the inputs that affect them. Normally
there is a loss of effect: E is
generally less than unity. The organism's
reference signal, r, thus does affect the
environment, while the environment's
"reference signal" the disturbance d
does not have a corresponding amount of
effect on the organism. Organisms control
environments, but not vice versa.

Philosophical Implications of the Interbehavioral Field
Linda J. Hayes
University of Nevada-Reno
Kantor's philosophy is articulated as
a relatively large set of postulates
concerning issues ranging in scope from
the very broad to the very narrow. They
appear in one form or another in numerous
articles and in several books, among the
latter: Interbehavioral Philosophy
(Kantor, 1981), Interbehavioral Psychology
(Kantor, 1958), and Psychology and Logic,
Vol. I & II (Kantor, 1945, 1950). It is
not my plan to reiterate these postulates.
Instead, I will try to elucidate
interbehaviorism by drawing attention to
only a few of the most unusual
implications of the field concept in
interbehavioral psychology. It is my
intention to be true to the system as
proposed by Kantor in making this
abstraction; however, some issues are
necessarily featured at the expense of
others in the process of abstraction.
With that apology, let me begin by
examining the concept of the integrated
field.
The Interbehavioral Field
The psychological field, depicted as an
organization of participating factors, is
a verbal construction that is not assumed
to represent or otherwise correspond to
the psychological event, ontologically
considered. The psychological events
themselves exist as evolving functions
having no substantive structure and no
parts at least this is how the
interbehaviorist conceptualizes such
events. In fact, from an interbehavioral
perspective, there are no psychological
events as distinguishable from the whole
of nature. That is, the concept of the
psychological event is also a
construction. It is just what we say
about events.
While no correspondence with events
may be assumed, regardless of what we say
about them, different ways of speaking
suit different analytical purposes, and
the field construction suits the purposes
of the interbehavioral psychologist. So
let us consider the integrated field
construction in relation to those
purposes.
The field construction depicts a
psychological event at a particular point
23
in time, specifically, the present moment.
All factors depicted as participants in an
interbehavioral field participate in the
present moment no one participating to
a greater or lesser extent than another,
and no one's participation preceding or
following that of another. An
interbehavioral field is conceptualized as
a simultaneous interaction of all co-
present factors. This conceptualization
has a number of implications of which we
shall consider three: the uniqueness of
psychological events, their ever-present
character, and their indetermination.
Uniqueness. A psychological event is a
unique event, occurring only once, never
to be repeated again. This is not a
matter of probabilities. It is not a
comment on the improbability of a precise
reconfiguration of all of the relevant
factors at some future moment. The
recurrence of a psychological event is not
improbable, it is impossible.
This impossibility is owing to the
evolutionary character of psychological
events. More specifically, a
psychological event is a function ~ an
interaction of stimulating and responding
occurring in a context of other
participating factors. As such, a given
event is but a point in the evolution of a
function wherein each current
manifestation includes all previous
manifestations. The "second" occurrence
of a psychological event thereby includes
the first occurrence of that event, a
factor not present in the first
occurrence. But a psychological event is
an organization of factors all factors
no one any more or less important than
another. Consequently, the "second"
occurrence, by including factors not
present in the first occurrence, is not a
second occurrence of that event. It is a
different event, comprised of different
factors. To reiterate the point, a
psychological event is a unique event.
Time. A second implication of the
field as a simultaneous interaction of
factors concerns the concept of time
itself. Time, like weight or height or
length, is a metric not an event. As
such, it occupies no place in the
interbehavioral field) when conceptualized
from an event standpoint.
This is not a happenstance of graphic
portrayal of the interbehavioral field
it is not a matter of how many fields you
can draw on the same sheet of paper.
There are no other fields to draw. There
are no past fields, no future fields.
There is only one field the field
existing in the present moment.
It is in the continuously evolving
present moment that we find the past and
future. From an interbehavioral
standpoint, they exist as facts of
substitute stimulation implicit
interaction.
Causal it/y. A third implication of the
field construction has to do with the
issue of causality. While causal systems
vary in detail, all modern systems share
certain characteristics, For instance,
causal postulation always involves a
dichotomization of events into those that
cause and those that are caused. Further,
causal constructions are typically
articulated over time. They are ways of
accounting for events occurring at one
point in time by reference to events
occurring at another point. For example,
a stimulus occurring at time X is held to
be responsible for the occurrence of a
response at time Y.
Causal constructions are also ways of
accounting for contemporaneous events
articulated at one level of analysis by
reference to events articulated at another
level. For example, an organism's
psychological interaction is held to be
caused by biological factors participating
in the organization of the organismic
structure involved in the psychological
interaction. As such, behavior is said to
be caused by inherited susceptibilities,
genes, instincts, and so on.
Finally, causal knowledge as the
ability to predict and control the
occurrence of events depends on the
possibility of event recurrence.
None of this is applicable to the field
construction of interbehavioral
psychology. In the first place, from an
interbehavioral perspective, all factors
present in a given field of interaction
participate in that field, including those
isolated for study by different
disciplines and articulated at different
levels of analysis, and no factor
participates in any special way with
respect to the other factors. There are
no causes and no effects, only
participating factors. Temporal causal
constructions likewise are ill-suited to
the field construction of interbehavioral
psychology since there is no point in time
other than the present moment from which
putative causes may be said to exert their
powers. Second, psychological events are
nonrecurring. Each is a unique event
and one neither predicts nor controls the
unique event.
From an interbehavioral perspective, a
psychological field is a unified field
an interactive whole. It is not caused
from within to suggest as much would be
to argue that the field causes itself.
And it is not caused from without there
is no without. The field is not caused.
It just is,
I should like to point out before going
on that the interbehavioral position on
this issue has nothing to do with
contentions of capriciousness, nor of
randomness in the universe.
The former contention emerges,
actually, out of clausal not noncausal
thinking. The causal agent in such cases
is just an inscrutable one usually the
mind. This sort of argument has its
origins in cultural traditions,
particularly those of a theological sort.
God is the ultimate and most inscrutable
causal agent. The interbehavioral
perspective on causality bears no
similarity to this position.
The argument in support of randomness
in the universe is a more sophisticated
argument articulated in the face of an
inability to produce certain sorts of
occurrences, particularly those presenting
problems of observation by virtue of their
size. The concept of causality under such
conditions comes to be understood as
probability. It is suggested in the
context of this argument that something
other than what occurred might have
occurred, because causality is
probabilistic not absolute. This argument
is made on practical, not philosophical
grounds, and has its sources in scientific
thinking.
Despite the scientific origins of
probabilistic causal notions, the
interbehaviorist does not hold to a
position of randomness in the universe.
The interbehaviorists1 argument, though,
is made on philosophical, not practical
grounds. It goes something like this: An
event is a unique configuration of

participating factors. It is what it is.
Just as there is no past apart from the
present, there is no other condition of
this event. It could not have been
otherwise: There is no otherwise for this
event. We cannot speak of what "might
have been" when confronting what is
because what is is a point in the
evolution of what has been. Had it been
otherwise, it would be otherwise. But it
is not otherwise it is as it is.
Moreover, if an event exists as a
present event, it has no probability of
occurrence. It just is. If it doesn't
exist as a present event, it has no
probability of occurrence. It just isn't.
Analytical Purposes
Now what does all of this have to say
about the analytical purposes of the
interbehaviorist? What is accomplished by
conceptualizing the psychological event in
this way?
Kantor would argue that the goal of
basic science and scientific philosophy is
systematic functional description. The
scientist's goal is to construct a
description of nature that is continuous
with our observations of nature. The goal
is to describe our observations of events
in such a way that no reference is made to
factors not found among the events
themselves; to cleave to our observations;
to avoid the impositions of cultural
tradition. From such description will
come a better understanding of our world.
These suggestions are problematic for a
number of reasons. They seem to imply a
correspondence between events and what we
say about them. There appear to be right
and wrong, accurate and inaccurate ways of
describing events, the criterion being
whether or not the events actually include
the factors mentioned in our descriptions
of them. But what about the fact that a
field is supposed to be a verbal
construction one that is not assumed to
represent or otherwise correspond to the
events themselves? What about the fact
that psychological events are supposed to
exist as evolving functions, having no
substantive structure and no parts. Are
there or are there not factors among the
events that we can include in our
descriptions of those events? What,
exactly, does description amount to? And
by what criterion, if not correspondence
with nature, can its accuracy be judged?
In addition to this issue of
correspondence, Kantor leaves us with the
25
assertion that systematic descriptions of
nature however we are to achieve them
will somehow enable us to understand
our world better. But how will they do
so? And how will we know when this has
happened? Both issues deserve comment. I
will begin with correspondence, then move
on to the issue of understanding.
Correspondence. Correspondence of
descriptions with the events described is
really an issue of reference for Kantor.
The point he is making in this regard is
that descriptive or linguistic action,
like any action, is action with respect to
stimulation. Stimulation inheres in a
source of one sort or another. Some of
those sources are themselves products of
linguistic actions they are words.
Some are not. Sometimes when words serve
as sources of current stimulation they
were themselves once products of
linguistic acts with respect to other
words, and those with respect to other
words, and so on.
If, in the final analysis, the
stimulation for a descriptive act arose
from a linguistic source, the description
is not continuous with the events
described. Such discontinuity is believed
to distort our understanding of nature.
Alternatively, if the ultimate source
of stimulation for a descriptive act is
nonlinguistic at least from the
standpoint of the linguistic community, if
not the individual the descriptive
action of the individual may be considered
continuous with the events described.
Continuity of this sort Kantor regards as
necessary if the goal of greater
understanding of our world is to be
achieved.
Truth. Whether or not this distinction
between sources of stimulation for
descriptive acts can be sustained given
the ever increasing difficulty of
sustaining the distinction between verbal
and nonverbal events in the human realm
(L. J. Hayes & S. C. Hayes, 1988) is not
known. Whether or not the distinction has
been or is a valuable one is another
matter. From Kantor's perspective, the
value, adequacy, or truth of a
construction or analytical strategy is to
be found in how well it works in the
achievement of a. goal. It is a pragmatic
criterion, although not of the ordinary
sort, in part because the goal is
considerably broader in scope than is
typical of pragmatic thinking, ,and also
26
because the' assessment of workability is
made across a much greater span of time
than is required when more limited goals
are involved.
For Kantor, the goal of system building
in psychology is progress in the
development of psychology as a science.
Progress is measured in the extent to
which psychology has passed or is passing
through recognizable stages in the
development of other basic sciences, as
observed throughout the course of their
historical developments. Four specific
stages of scientific system development
are mentioned by Kantor (1953, pp. 71-72)
in this regard, including: thing systems,
knowledge systems, operational systems,
and postulational systems. (The details
of this classification are not pertinent
to the present discussion.)
The value or truth of a construction or
analytical strategy is assessed by
observing tiie participation of such
factors in the historical development of
scientific systems showing progress. To
whatever extent particular sorts of
constructions and strategies are involved,
and continuously so in progressive system
building efforts, that is the extent to
which they have value.
It is on the basis of this criterion
that discontinuous constructions are
eschewed by Kantor. More specifically,
constructions making reference in the
final analysis only to other constructions
have not been maintained in progressive
scientific system building enterprises.
Over the course of system development in
other sciences, constructions of this type
have been replaced by others having their
sources in nonlinguistic things and
events. If psychology is to register
progress, it too must abandon unproductive
constructions and analytical strategies.
Much of Kantor's energy was spent
identifying factors of this sort and
illustrating their debilitating influence
on the development of psychology as a
science.
Unde^rstanding. In addition to this
issue of referential description and the
rationale for the perpetuation of only
certain kinds of descriptive constructs,
Kantor contends that systemic description
will eventuate in a better understanding
of psychological events (and the world at
large) than will other sorts of system
products. As such, the following
questions arise: What is meant by
understanding in this context? How will
systemic description improve our
understanding of the world? And how will
we know when it has, in fact, done so?
Kantor's response takes the following
form: Understanding the world means being
precisely oriented with respect to it.
Orientation involves psychological contact
with the world. Some of that contact is
direct; most is achieved indirectly.
Description and its products are the means
of such indirect interaction. Some forms
of description are valuable, others are
not. The sort of systemic description
Kantor advocates has participated in the
development of other scientific
understandings and may, thereby, be
expected to contribute to a greater
understanding of events peculiar to the
science of psychology. We will know that
our understanding of the world is improved
when we are better oriented with respect
to it.
This response is not entirely
satisfactory, as it is still not clear
what Kantor means by "orientation." It
appears to refer, in part, to the number
of stimulational functions having some
potential of arising from a given source.
To put it another way, the larger the
number of responses we are able to make
with respect to some aspect of our world,
the better we are oriented with respect to
that aspect. For example, we are better
oriented with respect to the biological
process of reproduction now than in the
past: We are able both to prevent its
natural occurrence and to produce it in
artificial ways, neither of which we were
able to do or to do as successfully in the
past. We might say that we "understand"
this process better today than in the
past. This is the sense in which Kantor
uses these terms.
There is also a sense in which to be
better oriented means to derive greater
practical benefit. Kantor (1953) argues
that the sciences may be distinguished
from the nonsciences on the basis of
certain characteristics of the products of
these two enterprises. The products of
scientific activity are said to be novel
and useful, unlike those of the
nonsciences. The novelty aspect makes
contact with orientation as described
above: Science enables us to respond in
new ways with respect to our world.
Emphasis on the useful character of
scientific products, including ways of

.speaking about events, implies a
conditionality with respect to the
character of novelty. It is not just new
ways of responding to events that are of
value, but rather, new ways that have as
their outcome benefits of a practical
nature. As such, to be better oriented
with respect to our world means to derive
greater benefits from it. What those
benefits may be vary with the
circumstances in which they are
anticipated. Consequently, it is only in
the context of such circumstances that a
judgment as to whether or not particular
ways of speaking about events improve our
orientation with respect to them.
Summary
Interbehavioral philosophy is of a
nonparochial pragmatic sort. Its aim is
the progress of psychology as a .science,
to be achieved by way of historically
tested constructional practices and
analytical strategies. It takes a highly
unconventional stand with respect to the
central issues of event character, time,
and causality. And it is for this reason
that interbehaviorism remains the
philosophy of the few.
As a psychological enterprise,
interbehaviorism has been slow to develop
a vigorous applied subsystem. This, I
believe, has been a result of the apparent
incompatibility of Kantor's philosophical
system with the constructional categories
and practices typical of applied science.
How can there be an applied science of
ever-present, uncaused, unique events?
Obviously, an applied science of events
construed in this way cannot develop.
If this is a problem, the solution lies
in our understanding of the
interbehavioral field and its implications
as verbal constructions. The ever-
present, uncaused, unique event is a way
of speaking about events that suits a
particular analytic purpose. If there be
other purposes to fulfill, other ways of
speaking will have to be adopted.
But does this mean that the categories
and postulates and practices of
interbehavioral philosophy will be
completely abandoned, replaced by those
better suited to applied purposes? This
could happen, of course. If it did, old
ways of thinking and proceeding would be
the outcome. The alternative is to keep
before us the view that changes in any
aspect of a scientific system are a
function of changes in other aspects of
27
that system, the implication being that
the relation between the philosophical and
applied branches of a science is one of
mutual influence.
Operating from this perspective will
not be easy: We will be forced to address
some difficult questions, and our identity
and integrity will depend on the answers
we are able to provide. Among them will
be the following: How can applied science
benefit from contact with a synthetic
philosophy like interbehaviorism? And,
conversely, how can interbehaviorism
benefit from contact with an analytic
enterprise?
Footnotes
1. This article is based on a paper
entitled "Interbehavioral Philosophy,"
presented at the 1988 meeting of the
Association for Behavior Analysis,
Philadelphia.
2. Linda J. Hayes is the former Linda J.
Parrott. Please address correspondence to
her at the Department of Psychology,
University of Nevada-Reno, Reno, NV
89557-0"062.
References
Hayes, L. J., & Hayes, S.-C. (1988, May).
Equivalence and meaning. Paper
presented at the Association for
Behavior Analysis, Philadelphia, PA.
Kantor, J. R. (1945). Psychology and
logic (Vol. 1) . Chicago: Principia
Press.
Kantor, J. R. (1950). Psychology and
logic (Vol. 2). Chicago: Principia
Press.
Kantor, J. R. (1953). The logic o
modern science. Chicago: Principia
Press.
Kantor, J. R. (1958). Interbehavioral
psychology. Chicago: Principia Press.
Kantor, J. R. (1981). Interbehavioral
philosophy. Chicago: Principia Press.
28

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THE INTERBEHAVIQRIST
Edward K. Morris, Editor
Department of Human Development
University of Kansas
Lawrence, KS 66045

Bryan D. Midgley
Department o Human Development
University of Kansas
KS 66045
 A Quarterly Newsletter of Interbehavioral Psychology
ISSN8755-612X

Published at the University of Kansas

Volume 16 1988 Number 4

EDITOR TABLE OF CONTENTS

Edward K. Morris The Agora 31

University of Kansas
Principia Press 31

ADVISORY BOARD The May Institute 31

Sidney W, Bijou Ecobehavioral Analysis 31

University of Arizona
Donna M. Gone Notes from the Field 32
State of Rhode Island
Dennis J. Delprato New Subscribers 32
Eastern Michigan University
Linda J. Hayes Book and Journal Notes ; 33
University of Nevada-Reno
Sandy Hobbs (Scotland) Article 34
Paisley College of Technology
Paul T. Mountjoy Morris, E. K. The Interbehavioral
Western Michigan University Field: An Introduction 34
N. H. Pronko
Wichita State University
Roger D. Ray QUOTATION
Rollins College
Emilio Ribes (Mexico) So long as investigators continue to
Escuela Nacional de Estudios interact with their subject matter,
Douglas H. Ruben they will move forward to fuller
Okemos, MI understanding and scientific knowledge
Robert G. Wahler in psychology. Passing trends and
University of Tennessee fads of equipment, of "sophisticated"
methodology, of systematic viewpoint,
and of theories may accelerate or slow
ASSISTANT EDITORS this movement, but they will not stop
it. Time, in which research (however
Lisa M. Johnson misguided) continues, will inevitably
Bryan D. Midgley lead us all to interbehaviorism, if
Susan M. Schneider not necessarily to its vocabulary,
James T. Todd
- W. S. Verplanck
30
THE INTERBEHAVIORIST
A Quarterly Newsletter
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listed on the page opposite, every
newsletter subscriber should consider
having a complete library of Kantor's
works.
With the reprinting of The Logic of
Modern Science) the only other out-of-
print text is Problems of Physiological
31
Psychology. Principia, though, is
planning to republish the latter as well,
but with some updated bibliographical
material and an appendix by Kantor "a
little parable about the brain". It is
hoped that the volume will be available in
early 1989.
Still additional work is planned on an
unfinished manuscript on which Kantor was
working at the time of his death. We will
keep you informed as these matters
progress.
The May Institute
The May Institute would be pleased to
accept (a) job applications from bachelor-
level graduates or (b) practica proposals
from undergraduate and graduate students
for its programs, which encompass a
comprehensive continuum of behavior-
analytic services for individuals with
autism, behavior disorders, and
developmental disabilities. The Institute
has programs in early intervention, early
childhood education, vocational training
and education, specialized foster care
services, outreach group homes,
intermediate care facilities, and
residential and educational services.
The Institute emphasizes research,
evaluation, and training: Client programs
are individually based on careful
behavioral assessments; programming and
procedure changes are data-based and data-
driven; and the entire program continually
undergoes evaluation.
Applicants from the fields of special
education, psychology, behavior analysis,
speech, recreation, and child care are
especially encouraged to apply. As the
newsletter editor can attest from a recent
sabbatical stay at the Chatham-based
facility, these positions are more than
mere jobs: The May Institute's staff
training program is outstanding in
providing staff with the wide range of
skills necessary for working humanely with
child and adolescent clients.
Interested newsletter readers and their
students should contact: Peter J. Troy,
The May Institute, 100 Seaview Street,
P.O. Box 708, Chatham, MA 02633 (508-945-
1147/1172).
Ecobehavioral Analysis
Steven R. Schroeder of the Nisonger
Center at Ohio State University.wrote
32
regarding plans he has for editing a text
entitled Ecobehavioral Analysis and
Developmental Disabilities: The Twenty-
First Century. We were pleased to read
the following explanatory material in his
prospectus:
Nearly 40 years ago, J. R. Kantor
published his theory of interbehavioral
psychology. The impact of this work
was not felt in the field of
developmental disabilities for 20
years, when the environmental design
work of Barker (1968), Cleland (1969),
Wahler (1971), and others ushered in
the era of social ecological studies.
In 1977, a book edited by Rogers-Warren
and Warren (1977) entitled Ecological
Perspectives in Behavior Analysis
merged these trends under the rubric,
"ecobehavioral analysis." This view
was greeted with only modest enthusiasm,
Nevertheless, there has been a
considerable amount of research in the
past 10 years done with people with
developmental disabilities in a variety
of settings that would warrant pulling
together a symposium and an edited
volume.
Steve and his colleagues have our best
wishes in this project.
Notes from the Field
Newsletter subscribers have been
prolific as book and journal authors of
late. Please continue sending us reprints
or notices so that we can announce your
work in this column. In books of note, we
hope it not injudicious to announce that
Edward K. Morris and Curtis J. Braukmann
edited Behavioral Approaches to Grime and
Delinquency; A Handbook pjf Applications,
Research, and Theory (Plenum). Also of
applied interest is Sigrid S. Glenn's
(with H. A. C. Ninness) Applied Behavior
Analysis and School Psychology
(Greenwood/Praeger). More explicitly
interbehavioral is Henry Pronko's From AI
to Zeitgeist; A Philosophical Guide for
the Skeptical Psychologist (Greenwood/
Praeger). Noel W. Smith published a brief
and glowing review of it in the Fall 1988
issue of The Psychological Record.
Not only did Smith's review appear in
that issue of The Record, but so too did
numerous other articles by newsletter
subscribers. Bryan D. Midgley co-authored
a strongly interbehavioral manuscript,
"The Integrated Field: An Alternative to
the Behavior-Analytic Conceptualization of
Behavioral Units." Susan M. Schneider co-
authored a paper, "Comments on Quanta in
the Analysis of Stimulus Control." And,
William M. Gardner and Linda J. Hayes
(formerly Parrott) were first authors on,
respectively, "Analysis of Cheating on
Academic Assignments" and "Extending
Equivalence Class Membership to Gustatory
Stimuli." In addition, the Summer 1988
issue of The Record included a paper co-
authored by Sidney W. Bijou and Patrick M.
Ghezzi, "Manual of Instructions for
Identifying and Analyzing Referential
Interactions II," as well as book reviews
by Pronko, Parker E. Lichtenstein, Morris,
and Robert W. Lundin.
In addition to her research article
mentioned above, Hayes also co-authored an
important book review in the Journal of
the Experimental Analy^sis ijf Behavior
(JEAB) (1988, 50, 97-111), in which she
and her colleagues made the case for the
contextualistic world view of contemporary
behavior analysis. The manuscript was
entitled "Finding the Philosophical Core:
A Review of Stephen C. Pepper's World
Hypotheses: A Study in Evidence." In
another JEAB publication, Stephen T.
Higgins and Lisa M. Johnson were co-
authors on "An Inverse Relationship
between Baseline Fixed-Interval Response
Rate and the Effects of a Tandem Response
Requirement" (1988, 50, 211-218), a paper
that presents in part, an empirical
analysis of historical causation.
Johnson, Higgins, and James T. Todd were
also co-authors on "Laboratory Lore and
Research Practices in the Experimental
Analysis of Human Behavior: Subject
Selection," published in The Behavior
Analyst (1988, JJ., 43-50). In addition,
Johnson was first author on a paper
appearing in Behaviorism "When Speaking
of Probability in Behavior Analysis";
Kantor's views figure prominently in her
analysis (1988, 15_, 107-129.
Finally, Iver H. Iversen was first
author on "A Multi-Purpose Vertical
Holeboard with Automated Recording of
Spatial and Temporal Response Patterns for
Rodents," published in the Journal of
Neuroscience Methods, 1988, ^5, 251-263.
New Subscribers
Jane Bennett (Michigan)
Jing "naibin (China)

BOOK AND JOURNAL NOTES
Hilgard, E. R. (1987). Psychology in
America; A historical survey. New
York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich.
The only reference to Kantor and inter-
behavioral psychology in Ernest Hilgard's
recent Psychology in America reads as
follows:
Another American behaviorist, J. R.
Kantor (b. 1888), a professor at
Indiana University, had long been
interested in language. He summarized
his views in his Objective Psychology
of Grammar (1936), where the expression
psycholinguistics found an early use.
Kantor was always much admired by those
who knew him and engaged.in
conversation with him, but his books
were never widely influential. (p.
251)
As a footnote, Hilgard added:
Although Skinner was chairman of the
Department of Psychology at Indiana
University (1945-1948), including the
year in which he gave his Harvard
lectures on verbal behavior, and Kantor
was active on the faculty, their mutual
interests in varieties of behaviorism
and in psycholinguistics apparently did
not lead to common understanding about
language. Skinner (1957) found no
occasion to cite Kantor's book of 1936,
and when Kantor wrote again on
psycholinguistics (Kantor, 1977) he
found no occasion to mention Skinner's
of 1957, although he did mention
Chomsky. (p. 821)
In an earlier footnote on behaviorism
after Watson, Hilgard also wrote:
The roots of behaviorism prior to
Watson have been documented by Burnham
(1968b), along with the influences on
Watson himself. Woodworth (1924)
identified four varities. Other
behaviorisms as they branched out in
America included anthroponomy (Hunter,
1930)> biosocial psychology (Weiss,
1930), and the interbehavioral
psychology (Kantor, 1924, 1942), in
addition to the more widely familiar
later variants of Guthrie, Tolman,
Hull, and Skinner. (p. 813)
33
Marsella, A. J. (1984). An interactional
model of psychopathology. In W. A.
0'Conner & B. Lubin (Eds.), Ecological
approaches to clinical and community
psychology (pp. 232-250). New York:
Wiley.
In a chapter in a recent edited book on
ecological psychology (1984), A. J.
Marsella associates Kantor not with the
behavioral movement, as is typical, but
with the early interactionist movement and
with those such as Angyal, Brunswik,
Goldstein, Lewin, Meyer, Murray, and
Perls. In a particularly favorable quote,
Marsella (1984) had this to say:
Still others who became supporters
of the interactional model in this
period included Henry Murray and Jacob
R. Kantor, both well-known American
personality theorists. Kantor was one
of the earliest writers in this area
and has not been given the credit he
deserves. He was influenced by Adolf
Meyer, the famous psychiatrist
associated with "psychobiological"
approaches to psychopathology. Kantor
(1933) believed that the individual
interacts as a whole with certain
stimuli. He noted the individual does
not exist in a vacuum but rather in an
environmental setting and the subject
matter of psychology is the
"interbehavior" of the individual with
objects, events, other individuals and
groups. (p. 238)
According to Marsella (1984), however,
things did not end too well for Kantor and
his colleagues:
By the 1960s, Lewin, Kantor, Angyal,
and Goldstein had died [metaphorically],
Perls had turned to Gestalt therapy,
and Murray and Brunswik's theories had
failed to capture the energies of new
generations of psychologists. (p. 239)
Regardless, Marsella noted that the
interactionist movement was perpetuated
via the influence of other developments,
such as Roger Barker's ecological
psychology (see R. Barker, 1968,
Ecological psychology. Stanford, GA:
Stanford University Press.) (Contributed
by Bryan D. Midgley)
34
The Interbehavioral Field:
Edward K. Morris
Every relatively adequate psychological
system has, at its basis the scientists
who establish and maintain the system
science is, ultimately, the behavior of
scientists. Second, adequate systems have
a philosophical world view that describes
the broad metatheoretical commitments of
its scientists (whether known or unknown
to them) and that reflects more specific
criteria for what constitutes (a) an
adequate theory, (b) meaningful and
appropriate research and research
methodology, and (c) proper explanations
for empirical findings. And third,
adequate systems have a basic conceptual
unit of analysis that brings into focus
and makes explicit the necessary and
sufficient factors to be encompassed by
the theory. The purpose of this paper is
to describe interbehavioral psychology's
basic unit of analysis the
interbehavioral field.
In so doing, I provide, where possible,
parallel concepts from behavior analysis,
and occasionally draw some comparisons and
contrasts between the two systems (see
also Morris, 1982, pp. 197-209). These
comparisons and contrasts, though, will be
kept to a minimum, because that would take
us into an arena where the commonalities
(Morris, 1982, 1984; Morris, Higgins, &
Bickel, 1982, 1983) and differences
(Parrott, 1983, 1987) between the two
systems are not a settled matter.
The Interbehavioral Field
The basic conceptual unit of analysis
in interbehavioral psychology is the ever-
evolving interbehavioral field which, when
excised from the stream of behavior for
examination, is referred to as the
"behavior segment." As shown in the
figure on the next page, the behavior
segment is composed of five conceptually
separable, but in actuality, inseparable
factors: (a) the organism and (b) the
stimulus environment the two most
obvious factors and the contexts for
the interactions between organism and
environment, those being (c) their medium
of sensory contact, (d) their setting
factors, and (e) their interbehavioral
history.
Several of these factors may be
described in further detail, though any
particular level of analysis, like the
An Introduction
factors more generally, is not actually
separable from the other levels or from
the behavior segment as a whole. These
descriptions range from being explicitly
described for a particular factor, to
being implicit in the factor's
representation in the behavior segment, to
not being formally distinguished within
the segment at all.
As for the factors having explicit
levels of analysis, the figure depicts the
organism as a set of concentric circles
and the stimulus environment as a set of
embedded squares, both representing three
systematic ways of understanding those
factors ways that elucidate the manner
in which organism and environment
participate at every level in the
interbehavioral field.
The factor with the more implicit level
of analysis is the interbehavioral
history, that is, the historical context
that establishes the initial basis for
organism-environment interactions. The
interbehavioral history is indicated to
the left of the main behavior segment in
the figure, and is composed of two
subcomponents: first, the organism1s
"reactional biography," abbreviated "RB"
to the left of the concentric circles, and
second, the environment's "stimulus
evolution," abbreviated "SE" to the right
of the embedded squares.
Not formally distinguished in terms of
any levels of analysis are the setting
factors and the medium, comprising largely
the current context which enables and
actualizes organism-environment
interactions. Setting factors may,
however, be characterized as having two
separable features. First, setting
factors have a physical character in that
the material nature of the organism and
environment "enable" (or not) the
occurrence of particular interactions.
Second, setting factors have a functional
character in that they influence what
organism-environment interactions will be
"actualized" (or not) given that they are
physically enabled.
As for the medium of contadt between
organism and environment, no subsystems
are offered within interbehavioral
psychology, except perhaps that the media
may be organized according to the

TIME
EVENT OR FIELD B O U N D A R Y
different systems involved in the five
senses seeing, hearing, touching,
smelling, and tasting.
Conclusion. That, then, is an
overview of the interbehavioral field, the
behavior segment, and the five factors
(and their different levels of analysis)
that comprise the segment. In the
material to follow, I describe the five
factors and their subsystems more
specifically, beginning with the organism
and the stimulus environment, and then
moving on to the historical and current
contexts.
Organism and Environment
The organism. The participation, of the
organism within the behavior segment
occurs, as described before, in three
different levels, each typically more
interesting to us as psychologists. As
depicted in the figure by the concentric
circles, the outer circle represents the
organismic equipment., the middle circle
represents the response form, and the
center circle represents the response
function.
The organismic equipment refers to no
more and no less than the organism's
entire biological structure and
functioning its anatomy, physiology,
and neurology as instantiated through
species phylogenic and individual
ontogenic history. The comparable
behavior-analytic concept here might be
the "response equipment" of the organism.
The mechanistic metaphor
notwithstanding, the organismic
"equipment" is not a static participant
35
within the interbehavioral field, but
rather is a continually changing
participant changing as a consequence
of its continued interactions with the
other field factors. For instance, the
organismic equipment develops and is
altered as a function of sensory exposure,
functional use, maturation, disease, and
injury. Although not an efficient "cause"
of behavior, the organismic equipment is
nonetheless necessary for and participates
in all psychological activity (cf. Kantor,
1947).
A second way in which the organism may
be understood is in terms of its response
forms, represented in the figure by the
middle concentric circle. The response
form refers to the (in principle)
physically measurable activity the
organism is said to be engaging in when
behaving or, more precisely, when
"interbehaving" with a stimulus. The form
of this activity may be relatively simple
and discrete, such as a young child's
first spoken word or halting steps, or it
can be lengthier and more complex, such as
spoken adult language and athletic
prowess. Comparable behavior-analytic
terminology would be the response instance
defined topographically: a key peck and a
bar press are instances of responding that
involve the participating organismic
equipment, be those responses inside or
outside the skin.
Although respectively necessary for
behavior and for the measurement thereof,
the organismic equipment and response
forms are not what is usually of
36
compelling interest to us. We are often
not so much interested in the material
constitutents of activity or in the form
it takes, but rather in its function
that is, in its response function,
represented by the RF in the center
circle. The focus here is on
understanding the organism in terms of the
function or "meaning" of its activity
within the interbehavioral field.
In behavior analysis, response
functions are., in one sense, broadly
classified as operant or respondent. In
another sense, though, when respondents
and operants are analyzed more closely,
the comparable behavior-analytic concept
is that of the "response class" a
response class of response forms or
instances, either homogeneous or
heterogeneous in structure (see Skinner,
1931, 1935).
Two points are critical here. First,
the function of a response form cannot be
identified (or established, enabled, or
actualized) independently of the other
factors in the behavior segment. Instead,
response functions are defined by those
interrelations with the other factors,
especially with their corresponding
stimulus functions. Just as one cannot
identify what operant or response class a
response instance is a member of without
understanding how it is affected by the
environment, so one cannot identify a
response function on the basis of its form
alone. For example, as Irv Wolf once
pointed out when I was a student at
Denison University, you cannot tell
whether a person running alongside a
railroad bed is "training for a run" or
"running for a train" on the basis of the
response form or topography alone.
The second point is that response form-
response function relationships exist in
wide dynamic variability and multiplicity.
As in the example above, the same response
form running may have either of two
functions running for a train or
training for a run, or many, many more
functions, either concurrently or
successively, within individuals or across
them. Likewise, crying may be either an
elicited respondent or an accomplished
thespian's operant. Additionally,
different response forms, for instance,
acting out in class and working
studiously, may have the same response
function or be part of the same operant
its function residing in its relationship
to teacher attention. In sum, and put in
other terms, the means-end, process-
achievement relationship is a highly
dynamic and variable one from an
interbehavioral perspective.
The stimulus. Corresponding to the
three ways in which the psychological
organism can be understood are three
analogous means for analyzing the
participation of the stimulus with which
organisms interact. Here we turn to the
right hand side of the figure to the
embedded squares that represent, in order,
the stimulus object, the stimulus form,
and the stimulus function. Because the
following analyses of the stimulus closely
parallel those of the organism, I will be
briefer, but I hope illustrative.
The stimulus object, represented by the
outer square border, is akin to the
organismic equipment in that it refers to
the material constitution of a stimulus as
it exists in nature and with which an
organism may interact.
Of more interest to us, though, is the
form of the stimulus with which the
organism interacts, that is, its structure
or form as measured (at least potentially)
in terms of its physical characteristics.
The stimulus environment, either inside or
outside the organism, may be discrete and
simple, such as a lit response key, a food
pellet, words of social approval, or a
toothache, or it may be complex,
involving, for instance, the linguistic
practices of a community of speakers or
the diffuse emotional disquietude felt
when presenting a paper at a national
convention.
Although the stimulus object is
necessary for a world with which to
interact, and the stimulus form is
necessary for the measurement thereof, we
are typically less interested in the form
and energy of a stimulus than in its
function or meaning within the
interbehavioral field (Lichtenstein,
1970). This "stimulus function" is
represented by the SF in the central
square in the figure. Here, our concern
is with understanding the stimulus in
terms of its function or meaning for the
organism.
Within behavior analysis, stimulus
functions are broadly classed as
eliciting, discriminative, and
reinforcing, though for closer analysis, a
stimulus function is usually characterized
as a "stimulus class" a stimulus class

of forms, either homogeneous or
heterogeneous (see Skinner, 1931, 1935).
As with response functions, two points
bear emphasizing. First, the stimulus
function of a stimulus form cannot be
identified (or established, enabled, or
actualized) independently of the other
factors within the interbehavioral field.
Rather, stimulus functions are defined by
their interrelations with the other
factors, especially with their
corresponding response functions. Just as
a stimulus cannot be identified as a
reinforcer without understanding its
relationship to behavior, so a stimulus
function cannot be identified on the basis
of a stimulus form alone. Verbal
approval, for instance, is not a
reinforcer on the basis of its form alone,
but rather is described as such on the
basis of its effect on the rate of
responding.
Second, and relatedly, a wide
multiplicity of stimulus form-stimulus
function relationships exist, such that
the same stimulus form may have more than
one function, concurrently or at different
times, both for the same and for different
individuals. Drugs, for instance, may
serve eliciting, discriminative, and
reinforcing functions as well as
function as setting factors.
Concommitantly, different stimulus forms
may have quite similar functions. For
instance, verbal approval and verbal
disapproval, different by formal
definition, may have the same function for
classroom behavior: Given an appropriate
interbehavioral history and setting
factors, both may function as reinforcers.
Summary. To summarize to this point,
interbehavioral psychology is focally
concerned with the interactions among
responses and stimuli in terms of the
functional relationships into which they
enter. In this sense, the behavior
segment is an irreducible whole: It
cannot be understood in terms of the
formal elementary responses or stimuli
alone.
The Context of the Organism-Environment
Interaction
There is, of course, more to the
interbehavoral field than this there is
the medium, setting factors, and
interbehavioral history, all of which are
contexts for the interrelationships among
stimulus and response functions.
Interestingly, whereas stimuli and
37
responses are explicit in both the
interbehavioral field and in the behavior-
analytic, operant three-term contingency,
the medium, setting factors, and
behavioral history have typically been
but implicit in the latter, while being
explicit in the former a point I will
focus on in my conclusion.
The medium. The medium refers to the
physical means by which sensory contact is
made between organisms and their
environments. For instance, light and air
are, so to speak, the medium for the
message. In any event, the medium is not
a property of a stimulus, but rather is an
enabling condition for contact between
organism and environment, which in turn
allows realization of their functional
relationship. Because changes in the
medium (e.g., in illumination) can affect
the relationship between organism and
environment, interbehavioral psychology is
explicit in distinguishing the medium from
the other factors, as opposed to simply
allowing its implicit inclusion as, for
instance, a supplementary condition
imbedded in the operant three-term
contingency.
Settling factors. Setting factors refer
to the effects of the current context in
establishing what interbehavior can and
will occur that is, what interbehavior
is respectively enabled and actualized.
Because setting factors affect the
relationship between responding and
stimulation, both formally and
functionally, they are shown as
surrounding them jointly in the figure.
What functional relations can occur
depends on the physics of the current
context, whereas what relations will occur
depends on its function.
The physics of the current context
is, in a sense, a reiteration of the first
levels of analysis for the organism and
the stimulus. That is, setting factors
exist materially as both the organismic
equipment (i.e., anatomy, physiology, and
neurology) and as stimulus objects (i.e.,
as the physical ecology). As such, the
physics of the current context enables
(or not) what interbehavioral
relationships cannot materially occur.
For instance, physical strength and
sensory-perceptual capabilities affect
what an organism can do, as does the
architectural design or ecology of the
environment in which an organism lives.
More central to our concerns, however,
38
is the function of the current context.
In interbehavioral terms, this character
of setting factors "actualizes" the
stimulus and response functions that have
been established and enabled, and that may
now occur. That is, setting factors
establish what behavior will occur by
imbuing responses and stimuli with their
respective functions or meaning for the
present.
At one time, behavior analysis
explicitly acknowledged such a factor via
Skinner's (1931) concept of "third
variables." Involved here were
habituation-dishabituation operations
affecting the elicitation of respondent
behavior and deprivation-satiation
operations affecting the reinforcement of
operant behavior, but also, for example,
the effects of fatigue, emotion, and
drugs. Currently, the behavior-analytic
function of setting factors is represented
by terms that usually specify subclasses
of such setting factors in both basic and
applied research, for instance, in Bijou
and Eaer's (1978) and Wahler and Fox's
(1981) use of "setting events," in Jack
Michael's (1982) suggestions regarding
"establishing operations" and
"establishing stimuli," in Murray Sidman's
(1986) analysis of the "conditional
stimulus control" involved in stimulus
equivalence, and in Schlinger and
Blakely's recent comments on "function-
altering, contingency-specifying stimuli,"
such as rules (Schlinger & Blakely, 1987;
Blakely & Schlinger, 1987)
Interbehavioral history. The third
contextual feature, and the fifth and
final factor in the behavior segment, is
the interbehavioral history, the
specification of which appears to the left
of the main behavior segment in the
figure. This history pertains both to the
organism, where it is referred to as the
"reactional biography," designated with
the "RB" to the left of the organism, and
it pertains to the stimulus, where it is
referred to as the "stimulus evolution,"
designated with the "SE" to the right of
the stimulus.
Interbehavioral history (or the
historical context) encompasses part of
what behavior analysts refer to as
"phylogenic" and "ontogenic" history,
though actually the interbehavioral stages
encompass inorganic, phylogenetic,
ontogenetic, and interbehavioral history.
If we may so parse, phylogenic history
establishes species-typic biological
structure and function for behavior,
the ontogenic history establishes the
individual-typic biological structure and
function, and interbehavioral history
begets the individual-typic behavioral
structures and functions. Of most concern
to us, interbehavioral history establishes
what response-stimulus functions may occur
and is, as well, a primary source of
individual differences in those functions,
both across people and within them over
time. Spoken of more behavior-
analytically, conditioning or
reinforcement history establishes the
conditioned functions of eliciting,
discriminative, and reinforcing stimuli.
Conclusion
My description of the interbehavioral
field remains, of course, underdeveloped.
As such, its implications and import
extend in more directions than a
conclusion can properly contend with, but
I would like to emphasize one point in
closing: Interbehavioral psychology is
decidedly contextualistic, as opposed to
mechanistic, in world view (Morris, 1982;
Reese, 1982; cf. Pepper, 1942). Behavior
analysis, in contrast, is commonly cast
and castigated for being mechanistic,
although it may also be characterized as
contextualistic (see S. C. Hayes, 1988;
S. C. Hayes, Hayes, & Reese, in press;
Morris, 1988, in press).
Interbehavioral psychology has been
construed as contextualistic, and not
mechanistic, in part, because of its
explicit inclusion of contextual factors
within its unit of analysis the media,
setting factors, and interbehavioral
history. In this sense, interbehavioral
psychology may be said to hold to a
context theory of meaning in that stimuli
and responses have no meaning in and of
themselves, but only in context.
A similarly explicit rendering of
context within behavior analysis might
usefully suggest contextualism as well,
because context is categorical in
contextualism, and might mitigate against
presumptions about mechanism. In doing
so, that account might begin to clarify
many of the misunderstandings about
behavior analysis, especially that it does
not account well for intra- or
interindividual differences differences
that have led others to posit
hypothetical biological and cognitive
constructs to account for such

variability. The phenomena referred to by
biology and cognition in these cases,
sometimes proposed as two new terms
(Molloy, 1984) for the three-term
contingency, are generally handled quite
well by the historical and current context
References
Bijou, S, W., & Baer, D. M. (1978).
Behavior analysis of child development.
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Blakely, E., & Schlinger, H. D. (1987).
Rules: Function-altering contingency-
specifying stimuli. The Behavior
Analyst, H), 183-187.
Hayes, L. J. (1988, May). Interbehavioral
philosophy. Paper presented in B. D.
Midgley (Chair), An introduction to
interbehavioral psychology. Symposium
conducted at the meeting of the
Association for Behavior Analysis,
Philadelphia, PA.
Hayes, S. C. (1988). Contextualism and
the next wave of behavioral psychology.
Behavior Analysis) 23, 7-22.
Hayes, S. C., Hayes, L. J., & Reese, H. W.
(1988). Finding the philosophical
core: A review of Stephen C. Pepper's
World Hypo_theses_. Journal of the
Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 50,
97-111.
Kantor, J. R. (1946). The aim and
progress of psychology. American
Scientist, 34, 251-263.
Kantor, J. R. (1947). Problems of
physiological psychology. Chicago:
Principia Press.
Lichtenstein, P. E, (1970). The
significance of the stimulus function.
Interbehavioral Psychology Newsletter,
1(1), 4-6.
Michael, J. (1982). Distinguishing
between discriminative stimuli and
motivational functions of stimuli.
Journal of the Experimental Analysis of
Behavior, 37, 149-155.
Molloy, G. N. (1984). A five-factor
framework for conceptualizing human
behaviour change: Old wine in newly
at the arranged casks. Behaviour
Change, J., 18-24.
Morris, E. K. (1982). Some relationships
between interbehavioral psychology and
radical behaviorism. Behaviorism, 10,
187-216.
Morris, E. K. (1984). Interbehavioral
psychology and radical behaviorism:
Some similarities and differences. The
39
(Morris, 1985). A five-term contingency
that included not biological and cognitive
constructs as the two additional factors,
but rather the historical and current
context, might make behavior analysis more
outstanding in its field.
Behavior Analyst, _7, 197-204.
Morris, E. K. (1985). The Molloy-
Birnbrauer controversy: How many
factors do a psychology make?
Behaviour Change^, 3_, 1-14.
Morris, E. K. (1988). Not so worlds
apart: Contextualism, radical
behaviorism, and developmental
psychology. The Interbehaviorist,
16(1), 8-15.
Morris, E. K. (in press). Contextualism:
The world view of behavior analysis.
Journal of Experimental Child
Psychology.
Morris, E. K., Higgins, S. T., & Bickel,
W. K. (1982). The influence of
Kantorrs interbehavioral psychology on
behavior analysis. The Behavior
Analyst, .5, 158-173.
Morris, E. K., Higgins, S. T., & Bickel,
W. K. (1983). Contributions of J. R.
Kantor to contemporary behaviorism. In
N. W. Smith, P. T. Mountjoy, & D. H.
Ruben (Eds.), Reassessment in
psychology: The interbehavioral
alternative (pp. 51-89). Washington,
DC: University Press of America.
Mountjoy, P. T. (1988, May). Who, what,
when, where, why, and how. Paper
presented in B. D. Midgley (Chair)
Introduction to interbehavioral
psiy_c_hology. Symposium conducted at the
meeting of the Association for Analysis,
Philadelphia, PA.
Parrott, L. J. (1983a). On the
differences between Skinner's radical
behaviorism and Kantor's
interbehaviorism. Mexican Journal of
Behavior Analysis, , 95-115.
Parrott, L. J. (1987). On the
distinction between setting events and
stimuli. Experimental Analysis of
Human Behavior Bulletin, 5_, 6-11.
Reese, H. W. (1982). Behavior analysis
and life-span developmental psychology.
Developmental Review, 2, 150-161.
Schlinger, H. D., & Blakely, E. (1987).
Function-altering effects of
contingency-specifying stimuli. The
Behavior Analyst, 10, 41-45,
40

Sidman, M. (1986). Functional analysis Skinner, B. F. (1935). The generic

of emergent verbal classes. In T.
Thompson & M. D. Zeiler (Eds.),
Analysis and integration of behavioral
units (pp. 213-245). Hillsdale, NJ:
Erlbaum.
Skinner, B. F. (1931). The concept of
the reflex in the description of
behavior. Jpurna.1 of General
Psychology, 5, 427-258.
nature of the concepts of stimulus and
response. Journal of General
Psychology, JJ!, 40-65.'
Wahler, R. G., & Fox, J. J. (1981).
Setting events in applied behavior
analysis: Toward a conceptual and
methodological expansion. Journal of
Applied Behavior Analysis, 14, 327-338

THE INTERBEHAVIORIST
Edward K. Morris, Ph.D.
Department of Human Development
University of Kansas
Lawrence, KS 66045

Bryan D. Midgley
Department of Human Development
University of Kansas
Lawrence, KS 6&045
 A Quarterly Newsletter of Interbehavioral Psychology
ISSN 8755-612X

Published at the University of Kansas

Volume 17 1989 Number 1

EDITOR TABLE OF CONTENTS

Edward K. Morris The Agora 3

University of Kansas
The Observer... 3

ADVISORY BOARD AABT Special Interest Group.... 3

Sidney W. Bijou Notes from the Field 3

University of Arizona
Donna M. Cone Quotations 3
State of Rhode Island
Dennis J. Delprato Book and Journal Notes 3
Eastern Michigan University
Linda J. Hayes Comments 10
University of Nevada-Reno
Sandy Hobbs (Scotland) Noel W. Smith: A Reply to Hayes:
Paisley College of Technology Is the Interbehavioral Field a
Paul T. Mountjoy Non-Event? 10
Western Michigan University
N. H. Pronko
Wichita State University QUOTATION
Roger D. Ray
Rollins College Behavior is serial, not mere
Emilio Ribes (Mexico) succession. It can be resolved it
Escuela Nacional de Estudios must be into discrete, acts, but no
Douglas H. Ruben act can be understood apart from the
Okemos, MI series to which it belongs.
Robert G. Wahler
University of Tennessee - John Dewey (1930, p. 412)

ASSISTANT EDITORS From Dewey, J. (1930). Conduct

and experience. In C. Murchison
Lisa M. Johnson (Ed.), Psychologies of 1930 (pp.
Bryan D. Midgley (pp. 409-423). Worcester, MA:
Susan M. Schneider Clark University Press.
James T. Todd
 THE INTERBEHAVIORIST
A Quarterly Newsletter
of Interbehavioral Psychology
ISSN 8755-612X
Edward K. Morris, Editor
Department of Human Development
2035D Haworth Hall
University of Kansas
Lawrence, Kansas 66045, U.S.A.
913-864-4840
The Interbehaviorist is a quarterly
publication of news, information,
discussion) journal and book notes, book
reviews, comments, and brief articles
pertaining to interbehavioral psychology
a contextualistic, integrated-field
approach to the natural science of
behavior.
The newsletter publishes professional
communications that fall between informal
correspondence and colloquia, and formal
archival publication. As .such, the
newsletter supplements contemporary
journals dedicated to basic and applied
research, to the history and philosophy,of
the behavioral sciences, and to
professional issues in the field. The
newsletter strongly encourages
submission of notes about current
professional activities of its
subscribers, news and observations about
interbehavioral psychology and related
perspectives, comments on journal articles
and books of interest, more extended book
reviews, and brief articles. All
submissions should be sent in triplicate
to the editor and should conform to the
style described in the Publication Manual
of the American Psychological Association
(3rd edition).
Subscription Information
Student Subscriptions (USA) $ 4.00
Regular Subscriptions (USA) 6.00
Foreign (Non-USA) Subscriptions 8.00
Institutional Subscriptions 12.00
Back Volumes 1-16 8.00
Back Volume Complete Sets... Please Write
THE PRINCIPIA PRESS
Principia Press's currently available
titles in interbehavioral psychology are
listed below. Check your bookshelves, and
those of your library and bookstore, for
possible oversights. In addition, the
books make excellent gifts for colleagues
and students, especially for the latter in
honor of their completed degree
requirements. The books may be purchased
directly from Principia Press, 5743 Kimbark
Avenue, Chicago, IL 60637. Handling
charges are $.75 per title; prepaid orders
are postpaid. Any queries should also be
directed to the address above.
Principles of Psychology (2 vols.)
$20.00
Psychology and Logic (2 vols.)
$25.00
Interbehavioral Psychology
$15.00
The Logic oj: Modern >cience
$15.00
An Objective Psychology of Grammar
$13.00
The Scientific Evolution of Psychology
(2 vols.) $40.00
The Science of Psychology; An
Interbehavioral Survey $20.00
Psychological Linguistics
$15.00
The Aim and Progress of_ Psychology and
Other Sciences $20.00
Interbehavioral Philosophy
$27.50
Cultural Psychology
$16.00
Tragedy and the Event^ Continuum
$15.00
Selected Writings, 1929-1983
$20.00
Psychological Comments and Queries
$20.00
 THE AGORA
In the last two issues of the
newsletter, we reprinted papers from a
symposium conducted at last year's meeting
of the Association for Behavior Analysis
"An Introduction to Interbehavioral
Psychology." A paper by Paul Mountjoy and
discussant comments by Sid Bijou remain,
and will be published in the next two
issues. When the series is complete, the
papers will be prepared as a monograph and
made available for distribution.
The Observer
The American Psychological Association
has struggled with several reorganization
plans in recent years plans that would
better balance the science and the
practice of psychology. Last summer, the
APA membership voted down the latest
effort, and no reorganization plan seems
likely to succeed in the near future.
Before the vote, pro-science APA members
had already organized themselves. Now,
they have formally established an
alternative: the American Psychological
Society. Its purpose is:
To promote, protect, and advance the
interests of scientifically-oriented
psychology in research, application,
and the improvement of human welfare.
The Society offers a science-of-psychology
alternative to an increasingly guild-
oriented APA. How APS will fare, we do
not know, but the organization's past and
current presidents Charles Keisler and
Janet Spence and its current Advisory
Board members are certainly eminent and
credible. Among the latter are Albee,
Atkinson, Bijou, Conger, Cronbach,
Denmark, Glaser, Hilgard, Kagan, Lindzey,
Loftus, McKeachie, Resnick, Rotter,
Sarason, Scarr, Thompson, Tyler, Wright,
and Zigler.
APS plans to publish a Science-type
journal, beginning in 1990; has already
sent out a call for posters for its first
annual meeting, June 10-12, in Arlington,
VA; and has begun publishing a newsletter,
edited by Steven C. Hayes (University of
Nevada-Reno). Although the newsletter's
name did not originate in Reno, the force
of coincidence seems too strong for us to
overlook its title the Observer. Dare
we say that selection by consequences
works in mysterious ways?
If you are interested in further
information about APS, please contact:
The American Psychological Society, Box
1553, Norman, OK 73070
AABT Special Interest Group
A special interest group (SIG) on
Theoretical and Philosophical Issues has
been formed within the Association for the
Advancement of Behavior Therapy. Dennis
J. Delprato is a founding member of the
SIG's advisory board. Among the comments
solicited from the AABT membership
regarding the SIG was a notable one from
Fred Kanfer (1987):
Among major current problems and
issues, I see the following...the
conceptual base for a general-systems
approach, without idealistic biases,
and revitalization and application of
J. R. Kantor's views. (p. 3)
The Fall issue of the SIG's newsletter,
The Issues, reprinted the table of
contents of, and commented positively
about, Ruben and Delprato's New Ldeas in
Therapy. Readers interested in the SIG
should contact Irwin S. Rosenfarb,
Department of Psychology, Auburn
University, Auburn, AL 36849-3501.
Reference
Kanfer, F. H. (1987). Comments. The
Issues, 1_, 3.
Notes fjrom the Field
A special issue of the Journal of
Experimental Child Psychology has been
published (Vol. 46, No. 3) to commemorate
the 25th anniversary of the journal's
founding by Sidney W. Bijou.
Quotations
The quotation on the cover of the last
issue was from: Verplanck, W. S, (1983).
Preface. In N. W. Smith, P. T. Mountjoy,
& D. H. Ruben (Eds.), Re a s s e s sme n t in
psychology; The interbehavioral
alternative (pp. xi-xxv). Washington, DC:
University Press of America (p. xxv). The
quotation for this issue was drawn from N.
H. Pronko's (1988) From AI to Zeitgeist,
which is reviewed in this issue.
 BOOK AND JOURNAL NOTES
Beach, F. A. (1985). Conceptual issues
in behavioral endocrinology. In R.
Gandelman (Ed.)- Autobiographies in
experimental psychology (pp. 5-17).
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
In a recent autobiographical essay, the
noted behavioral endocrinologist, Frank
Beach, discussed the importance of viewing
behavior as a transactional process. He
stated:
.When we observe behavior as it occurs
under natural circumstances we do not
observe reactions of individuals to
various stimuli. Instead we observe
in te_ractions between the organism and
various features of its environment,
(p. 10)
Behavior includes both actions of
the organism on the environment and
actions of the environment on the
organism. The 0 {> E model represents
an interactional or transactional
definition of behavior. It can also be
classified as an ecological definition.
Such definitions are not new to
psychology. In fact they have been
proposed as alternatives to the S)R
model. John Dewey emphatically denied
that behavior can be dichotomized into
stimuli and responses (Dewey, 1896).
Kurt Lewin's influential theories of
personality and social behavior were
based on the concept that individuals
react to a surrounding field in which
potential sources of stimulation have
different valences determined by
internal characteristics of the
individual (Lewin, 1935). J. R.
Kantor's physiological psychology dealt
with interbehavior of organisms and
stimulus objects in a specific field
(Kantor, 1947). B. F. Skinner
originally defined behavior as "that
part of the functioning of an organism
which is engaged in acting upon or
having commerce with the outside world"
(Skinner, 1938). (p. 11).
References
Dewey, J. (1896). The reflex arc concept
in psychology. Psychological Review,
3, 357-370.
Kantor, J. R. (1947). Problems of
physiological psychology. Chicago,
IL: Principia Press.
Lewin, K. (1935). A dynamic theory of
personality. New York: Harpers.
Skinner, B. F. (1938). The behavior of
organisms: An experimental analysis.
New York: Appleton-Century.
(James T. Todd, University of Kansas)
Behavior Analysis, 1988, 23.(3) .
(Newsletter for APA Division 25 for the
Experimental Analysis of Behavior)
The most recent issue of the APA
Division 25 newsletter Behavior
Analysis (Linda J. Hayes, editor) was
largely given over to a section honoring
the centennial of J. R. Kantor's birth.
Linda introduced the section with "The
Psychology of J. R. Kantor," in which she
commented astutely and informatively on
Kantor as a "consulting psychologist" for
psychology. The section was concluded
with a letter-to-the-editor from Edward K.
Morris "Twice a Heretic?" that
criticized the ongoing schism between
interbehavioral psychology and radical
behaviorism. The major substantive
contributions to the special issue were
contained in four articles, whose
abstracts are reproduced below.
Emilio Ribes (National University of
Mexico-Iztacala). "Kantor's Contribution
to Psychology, or What Is Behavior?"
Based on the conception of science as a.
socio-linguistic process of knowing, an
analysis is carried out about how
modern behavioristic psychology, as
formulated in terms of conditioning
theory, derives from belief systems
rooted in dualism and mechanistic
thinking. Kantor's most important
contribution to the development of a
science of behavior is his alternative
formulation of psychology and his
explanation for behavior.
Josep Roca (Universitat de Barcelona), "On
the Organism and the Environment."
The concepts of organism and
environment are reviewed. It is-argued
that when mind is interpreted as action
or as a kind of behavior continuous
 with other natural behaviors, the use
of these concepts implies a dependence
on the criterion of extension and not
on the criterion of movement. The
interbehavioral approach of J. R.
Kantor with respect to this issue, and
the Aristotelian concepts of
"material", formal", and "final" causes
are used to provide a more dynamic, but
not mechanical, definition of
psychological events.
Robert W. Lundin (The University of the
South), "An Interbehavioral Approach to
the Psychology of Music."
The "musical mind," one of the earliest
conceptions used to explain responses
to music, has reappeared in the
writings of cognitive psychologists.
The present article describes an
objective approach to the topic, based
on interbehavioral principles.
Charles A. Lyon and Phyllis N. Williamson
(Las Vegas Medical Center), "Contributions
of Kantor's 'Psychological Linguistics' to
Understanding Psychotic Speech,"
The linguistic field concept of J. R.
Kantor is applied to the study of
psychotic speech. Various measures of
psychotic speech, including reference
topic, are shown to vary as a function
of listener context. It is argued that
descriptive analyses of naturally
occurring speech are a useful starting
place for the development of a
functional analysis of psychotic
speech.
Ceci, S. J. (1986). Reviews of Brainerd,
C. J., & Pressley, M. (Eds.)- (1985).
Progress in cognitive development
research. New York: Springer-Verlag.
(xvi-324 pp., $39.00) and Pressley, M.,
& Brainerd, C. J. (Eds.). (1985).
Progjress in cognitive development
research. New York: Springer-Verlag.
(xiv-250 pp., $33.00). Science, 231,
1452.
In reviewing these two texts, Ceci
describes cognitive psychology's slow
coming to grips with contextual
perspectives in psychology. As a world
view, contextualism is not enjoined, but
the effects of context on cognitive
activity are pointed out and a more
naturalistic account is called for.
The evidence presented in several
chapters suggests that memory processes
cannot be adequately studied in the
disembedded laboratory contexts that
have characterized the majority of work
on the subject. Contexts vary in the
effectiveness with which they recruit
mnemonic strategies, foster motivation,
and shape one's perception of the
particular memory task at hand. One of
the many important messages of these
volumes is that the exclusive reliance
upon laboratory contexts is likely to
result in misleading models of memory
development.
(John M. Grossberg, San Diego State
University)
Costall, A., & Still, A. (Eds.). (1987).
Cognitive psychology in question. New
York: St. Martin's Press. (260 pp.)
Costall and Still have organized a
fine, albeit eclectic, collection of
essays that both criticize contemporary
cognitive psychology and that offer
alternatives thereto. The cognitive
psychology in question is largely the
representational and computational model
of the mind, whose internal states mediate
stimulus and response, and whose "design"
cognitive psychologists seek to know.
In their introduction, Still and
Costall point out that the chapters share
three assumptions: anti-dualism
(e.g., "intentionality" is not inferred,
but is seen directly), mutualism (e.g.,
organism and environment cannot be
understood apart from one another), and
"the questioning of abstraction" (e.g.,
the abstract rules of cognitive conduct do
not explain such conduct).
The criticisms of cognitive psychology
fall under two headings: skills and
action, and intentionality and
classification. Under the first, the
Dreyfus brothers argue that novices do not
abstract rules out of their initial
interactions with the environment, later ,
internalizing them as they become experts,
but just the opposite: Novices apply
rules given them and, as they become
expert, their actions are more and more
controlled by particulars, not rules.
Mixon points out that cognitive psychology
offers an impoverished account of social
behavior: Abstract knowledge of the rules
of social conduct does not mean we can
behave in a socially appropriate manner,
or will. Finally, Shotter speaks to the
social ills that may beset the mechanizing
of the workplace.
Under intentionality and classification,
Palmer argues that the computational model
of the mind does not solve "Hume's
problem" of the infinite regress of
homunculi. Although regress does not
occur past the mechanical homunculi of the
compter, mechanical homunculi have no
"intentionality" and intentionality was
Hume's problem in the first place the
need for an intentional agent. Ghiselin
argues that classifications are not
absolute entities and that studying them
in order to understand the behavior of
classifying yields but circular
explanations. A historical approach is
urged for the latter, one that focuses not
on formal similarities within
classifications, but on how things are
classified according to "what they do" and
"where they come from."
The alternatives to cognitive
psychology are J. J. Gibson's ecological
psychology and a variety of approaches
grouped together as the "radical
tradition," stemming largely from James,
Dewey, and Mead, The four chapters on
Gibson are of variable quality and
comprehensibility. The two by Reed were
almost opaquej but he does make clear the
mechanistic world view of cognitive
psychology and Gibson's anti-dualism.
Katz points out that Gibson is a
"relativist," not a realist. And Noble
argues for an ecological psychology that
embraces both perception ajid language.
As for the radical tradition, Still
offers an excellent chapter on Tolman's
failure to hold the anti-dualist middle
ground between mentalism and reflex
mechanics. The reason: He adopted the S-
R language game and the logical positivist
view of science. Noel Smith offers
Kantor's interbehavioral psychology as an
alternative to cognitive psychology and
mechanistic behaviorism. Markova makes
the case for the superiority of Hegelian
"becoming," over Platonic-Cartesian
"being," as an approach to cognition. And
finally, Bolton pleads the case for a more
phenomenological psychology.
The importance of this book for modern
interbehaviorists is summed up in E. B.
Holt's (1915) advice to the different
groups of psychologists of his day who
were seeking an alternative to cognitive
psychology:
It should be obvious that a fundamental
unity of purpose animates the
investigators of these several groups,
although they approach the question of
cognition from different directions.
Will it not be a source of strength for
all if they can manage to keep a
sympathetic eye on the methods and
discoveries of one another? (p. 208)
References
Holt, E. B. (1915). The Freudian wish
and its place in ejihicj?. New York:
Holt.
(Edward K. Morris, University of Kansas)
Ninness, H. A. C., & Glenn, S. S. (1988).
Applied behavior analysis and school
psychology; A research guide to
principles and procedures^. New York:
Greenwood.
As a work self-statedly addressed to
teachers and other school personnel, this
well-written book emphasizes practical
advice, while at the same time living up
to its subtitle. Although intended for
readers of all theoretical persuasions,
most of the research reviewed is taken
from the Journal of Applied Behavior
Analysis; moreover, the authors remark
pointedly: "the material in this
book...is not based on people's opinions,
and the data may conflict with some of our
own opinions" (p. xi). However, the
subsequent theoretical discussions about
cognitive and behavioral approaches that
do arise are handled deftly and gently,
all the while emphasizing the practical
benefits of behaviorism.
The book begins with the practical
problem of teacher "burnout," a topic that
leads directly into presentation of the
remedy: behavioral procedures. These are
presented in brief in a chapter on oasic
principles, and then in more depth with
respect to specific problem areas, such as.
hyperactivity, self-mangement, suicide,
and aggression. Chapters on behavioral
contracting, token economies, and other

procedures cover the remainder of the
relevant literature.
Specific points are offered regarding
the pros and cons of positive vs. aversive
control, the necessity of maintaining
contingencies for long periods of time in
some cases to help ensure maintenance, the
advantages of providing immediate
consequences, and, of interest to some of
this newsletter's readers, the importance
of involving a student's family in solving
selected problems.
To-the-point practical examples are
given throughout; however, occasional
small doses of basic research are also
included. The book should prove useful to
its intended audience, and to anyone
interested in the topic.
(Susan M. Schneider, University of Kansas)
Hershman, D. J., & Lieb, J. (1988). The
key to genius: Manic-depression and
the creative life. Buffalo, NY:
Prometheus Books.
A long tradition has postulated a
relationship between creative genius and
mental pathology, Aristotle, for example,
associated extraordinary achievement with
melancholia, and Plato held similar
notions. Hershman and Lieb (1988) point
out that great talent alone cannot account
for genius. There must also be a powerful
motivational factor, which the authors
identify as manic-depression.
One can agree with the authors to some
degree. Certainly there have been
geniuses who have been hypomanic at times
and at other times depressed, but one
might question the applicability of this
explanation to most geniuses. The claim
made by the authors is too strong.
Extreme depression makes creative work all
but impossible, and an acute manic attack
is a condition far too disorganized for
solid achievement. One cannot deny that a
creative period can follow depression or
that this phase may be characterized by
intense effort carried out over days or
even weeks with little or almost no sleep.
In fact, it is the ability to work
indefatigably at a single task which may
be the most striking trait of the genius,
a trait often described by the genius as
an "inner demon." But, .as the authors
themselves point out, a creative idea and
7
the work to which it may lead can generate
a euphoric mania. In other words, the
mania of genius is not always indigenous,
as required by a simplistic biological or
genetic view of manic-depression, but
clearly can be influenced by exogenous
factors.
The authors appear to lean heavily
toward a disease model of manic-depression
that stresses the inheritance factor. At
the same time, they occasionally recognize
social, interpersonal and general
environmental conditions influencing the
life and work of the genius. What is
lacking, however, is any hint of an
interactional or field interpretation that
could embrace all such factors in a
unified conception.
The bulk of the book is devoted to an
examination and analysis of the lives of
Newton, Beethoven, Dickens, and Van Gogh.
Although the authors describe pathological
behaviors in all four men, they fail to
provide convincing evidence of manic-
depression, except perhaps in the case of
Van Gogh, and even in his case a diagnosis
of schizophrenia remains a possibility.
What seems to be evident in all four cases
is a tendency to find release and relief
from pressing problems in creative work.
This evidence might be read as supporting
an anxiety-reduction interpretation of
unusually Intense productive effort.
Hershman and Lieb have attempted to
reduce the complexities of genius to a
single primary factor a key. That
there is such a key and that this key is
manic-depression is not only not proven, -
it is quite implausible. Nevertheless,
this is an interesting book which uncovers
much valuable information about the nature
of genius and about the lives of four
outstanding geniuses from the arts and
literature.
(Parker E. Lichtenstein, Newark, OH)
Popplestone, J. A., & McPherson, M. W.
(1988). Dictionary of concepts in
general psychology. New York:
Greenwood Press. (380 pp. HB, $65.00)
Although this book is a "dictionary" of
concepts in general psychology, it does
not define hundreds or thousands of terms.
Rather, the book consists of 66 essays on
the historical development and modern
usage of about 200 important concepts in
psychology. These concepts are drawn from
psychology as a whole, but are so well
chosen that anyone reasonably well-read in
psychology will recognize most or all of
them. For example, the first ten essays
cover in order: achievement, adjustment,
aggression, anger, anxiety, attention,
authoritarian personality, behaviorism,
body image, and cognition.
Newsletter readers will be especially
interested in the treatments of
behaviorism, conditioning, drive, effect,
habituation, heredity, instinct,
introspection, learning theory,
phenomenology, stimulus, and stimulus
function. Given that such a broad range
of topics is covered, the treatments of
behavioral topics is surprisingly
balanced, up-to-date, and well-informed.
Each entry is accompanied by a brief
definition and definitions of related
terms. For example, the entry for
interbehavioral psychology is part of a
main entry for stimulus function. Each
historical/conceptual essay has its own
complete, annotated reference section,
which is follwed by a section on "Sources
of Additional Information," featuring
annotated references to pertinent original
and secondary sources not cited in the
essay references. Readers of The
Interbehaviorist will find in these
references a surprising number of familiar
names, including Bijou, Kantor, Mountjoy,
Pronko, Ray, Smith, and Verplanck. Of
course, the book includes separate name
and subj ect indexes.
The Dictionary of_ Concepts in General
Psychology would be most useful for a
person needing a broad, but well-informed
historical overview of important topics in
general psychology. For example, it would
be a valuable reference for a serious and
conscientious student or instructor of
general psychology courses who wants to go
beyond the standardized and oversimplified
accounts available in most introductory
texts. It would also be valuable as a
starting point for a more scholarly look
at some important topics in psychology.
The only major drawback of the book is its
price: At $65.00 in hardcover it will be
too expensive for many bookshelves, and
students would be best advised to go to
the library or wait for a paperback
edition.
(James T. Todd, University of Kansas)
Pronko, N. H. (1988) From Al to
A philosophical guide for
the skeptical psychologist^. New York:
Greenwood Press.
Take a dash of Skinner's (1980)
Notebooks, a pinch of Kantor 's
("Observer's") (1984) Psychological
Comments and Queries, stir in a lot of
integrated-field thinking (e.g., Dewey,
Bentley, Einstein, and Inf eld) , and you
have something approximating N, H.
Pronko's (1988) latest contribution, From
AI to Zeitgeist.
Pronko offers a collection of essays
(91 in all, in addition to a preface and
an epilogue) that range from two lines
("Metaphysics") to ten pages ("Space-time
in psychology") in length. So, if you
have always wanted to know the answers to
questions such as "Reality: What is it?"
(pp. 166-167), "Is why a proper scientific
question?" (pp. 229-230), or "Aristotle:
Saint Thomas's philosopher or Mrs.
Aristotle's husband?" (pp. 7-11), then you
should consult this book.
Two additional features of From AI to
Zeitgeist are the "for further reading"
material at the end of each essay, and the
general reference section at the end of
the book. Here, Pronko pools together
material, some of it recent, but much of
it classic (see p. xvi) , that attests to
the existence of approaches, both in
psychology and in other disciplines, akin
to an integrated-field perspective. Also,
in the course of reading Pronko's book, I
often found myself usefully referring back
to the reference section to locate a book
or a journal article just cited.
In all, From AI to Zeitgeist brings
together a great many topics of undoubted
interest to readers of this newsletter.
That it does so in small, easy to digest
portions makes it all the more thought-
provoking and enjoyable.
References
Observer. (1984). Psychological
comments and queries. Chicago:
Principia Press.
Skinner, B. F. (1980). Notebooks.
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
(Bryan D. Midgley, University of Kansas)
Weisberg, R. W. (1986). Creativity:
. Genius and other myths, New York:
Freeman, (169 pp.)
Robert W. Weisberg's Creativity:
Genius and Other Myths (1986) is a popular
exposition of the view that "creative"
behavior is explicable in terms of normal
psychological processes. That is,
"creativity" is not the product of genius,
sudden insight, subconscious activity, or
other hidden mental processes.
In contrast, creativity is defined as
problem-solving that is both novel and
useful for the individual. It is a
product of experience, and its analysis
can be achieved by appropriate research.
Creative thought is, thus, normal
thinking; no special or magical processes
need be invoked to account for it.
According to Weisberg: "Creative thinking
becomes extraordinary because of what the
thinker produces, not because of the way
in which the thinker produces it" (p. 69).
In behavioral terms, what is special
about people who appear to be unusually
creative is an unusual interactional
history. In fact, a large proportion of
the book contains descriptions of unusual
interactional histories of famous
"creative" people, including artists such
as Picasso and scientists such as Watson
and Crick. When the behavioral
antecedents of the great achievements of
these people are described, surprisingly
little is left to "insight."
This view, although not unique, is a
refreshing contrast to many modern
descriptions that ascribe creativity to
"insight" or "aha!" experiences, but that
leave the causes of insight and the "aha"
as mysterious as creativity itself (cf.
Papalia & Olds, 1988).
Despite these positive aspects of the
book, readers will be disappointed that
Weisberg uses but a few sentences from
John B. Watson's Behaviorism (1930) to
dismiss all behavioral perspectives on
creativity. Weisberg states: "For the
behaviorist, creativity need not be
studied or explained because there is no
creativity in the sense of some specific
process involved in producing something
new" (p. 3).
In Weisberg's account, behaviorists
believe that random combinations of
stimuli produce behavior, some of which is
selected if it solves the problem at hand.
But this closely parallels the way in
which natural selection is creative.
Without dwelling too much longer on
what are minor points, Weisberg could have
strengthened his own case by citing some
of the many behavioral articles on
creativity, insight, and problem solving,
such as "Creating the Creative Artist"
(Skinner, 1972), experiments from the
Columban simulations of insight (cf.
Epstein, Kirshnit, Lanza, & Rubin, 1984),
and "An Operant Analysis of Problem
Solving" (see Skinner, 1969; recently
revised and reprinted with peer commentary
in Catania & Harnad, 1988).
Because Creajtivity is brief, available
in paperback, cites numerous recent
studies on creative behavior, and presents
a view that is congenial to an
interbehavioral perspective, it could be
used as a text in a graduate or
undergraduate course on creativity (with
appropriate additional readings).
Moreover, although Weisberg's book is not
a scholarly treatise, it is well
documented and could serve as a starting
point for those with a serious academic
interest in creativity. In any case, the
book should be of interest to anyone who
wishes to replace mental and magical
explanations of human behavior with a more
naturalistic account.
References
Catania, A. C., & Harnad, S. (1988). The
selection of behavior: TJie ope rant
behaviorism of_ B_._ F_._ Skinner: Comments
and consequences^. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Epstein, R., Kirshnit, C. E., Lanza, R.
P., & Rubin, L. C. (1984). Insight in
the pigeon: Antecedents and
determinants of an intelligent
performance. Nature, 308, 61-62.
Papalia, D. E., & Olds, S. W. (1988).
Psychology (2nd ed.) New York:
McGraw-Hill.
Skinner, B. F. (1969). Contingencies of
reinforcement: A theoretical analysis .
. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Skinner, B. F. (1972). Cumulative
record^ A selection of papers.
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Watson, J. B. (1930). Behaviorism
(rev. ed.) Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
(James T. Todd, University of Kansas)
10
COMMENTS
A Reply to Hayes: Is the Interbehavioral
Field a Non-Event?
Noel W. Smith
SUNY-Plattsburgh
Hayes1 (1988) understanding of the
nature of the interbehavioral field is
quite different from mine on some
important points. Hayes tells us we may
not assume that the field corresponds to
any events, This is precisely the
opposite of what I always thought
interbehaviorism was claiming. The field
is, to be sure, a construct and therefore
not an event, but it is a construct that,
if it is worth anything, has a direct
correspondence to actual events.
Constructs, such as consciousness,
essences, ontologies, brain powers, etc.,
having no concrete referents, are those
with which interbehaviorists have no
traffic. They are "products of linguistic
actions," as Hayes (p. 25) says at another
point. The field is not just a useful or
analytic way of speaking, as Hayes avers,
but is an attempt to refer directly to the
events that the interbehaviorist observes
happening.
The reference to observation is also
important because it indicates that the
field is not just a convenient fiction or
one that is based on traditional doctrine,
but consists of events that can be
observed and verified, and is itself a
product of observation. For example, we
can observe that a book functions as a
stimulus object for a given individual,
who can also be observed, and that the
book has a variety of stimulus functions
for that individual, such as something to
read or as something to toss into a fire.
We may also be able to observe some of the
interactional history that led to those
stimulus functions. Similarly, we can
observe the setting that influences the
interaction in which the book has one or
another function. It-is observations such
as these that lead to the field construct
itself. That the words or the diagrams we
use in referring to these events are not
the events themselves, but only
constructs, does not negate the direct
reference to such events.
At one point, Hayes declares, "no
reference is made to factors not found
among the events themselves" (p. 25), but
then she goes on to assert that this is
contradictory to "the fact" that the field
does not correspond to events and that
"evolving functions" have "no parts"
(emphasis hers). Where do.es Kantor, or
any other interbehaviorist, make such a
statement? Hayes has turned a fiction
into a "fact." Apparently she considers
psychological events to be disembodied.
But events are what things do. Organisms,
stimulus objects, and setting factors are
concrete things in interaction. They are
"things and events" as Kantor often called
them. Perhaps eventing things would be a
better description. Descriptions of non-
linguistic sources of stimulation, as
Hayes says, are what Kantor regards as
necessary for scientific understanding.
And, it is my understanding that these are
events or "eventing things." And
things that are eventing have parts.
Nothing I am familiar with in the
multiplex field construct requires that
all events participate equally, as Hayes
insists. This is so because no
observation compels such a requirement.
In any given instance, a medium such as
lighting or a setting factor such as the
illness of the organism may be more
salient than other factors, although the
others still participate. Kuo (1967)
refers to behavior gradients of the
organism. Perhaps we should recognize
field component gradients.
I am not at all sure that I can agree
with Hayes that truth for Kantor is
strictly pragmatic. Kantor was no
Jamesian. I have heard Kantor say that we
do not know what truth is. But Kantor's
work points to the expectation that we can
at least approximate truth, or continually
advance toward it, by starting our
investigations with events rather than
with constructs and developing our
constructs laws, theories,
descriptions, and formulae out of those
same events. A cardinal principle of
interbehavioral psychology is that
interpretations must be consistent with
observations. (Witness Kantor's pseudonym
of "Observer.") By maintaining that
consistency, we can at least advance our
knowledge, whatever the truth may be.
Knowledge or understanding will be a way
of construing those observations
(theories, formulae, etc.) that improves

our orientation, a topic that Hayes
handles commendably.
I also have a slightly different
interpretation than Hayes of what Kantor
means by causation, which leads to
consequences that are different from those
that she advances. Let us look at the way
in which Kantor (1950) describes
causation:
Causal factors consist of actions of
things or persons, which, in combination
with each other, constitute new fields
as compared with other correlations.
In other words, correlations are
regarded as a special sort of factorial
combination, a coming together of
causal factors, which, when together,
constitute a different system....Causal
changes in any field constitute a
rearrangement in the simultaneous
coexistence of factors in a unique
pattern. (p. 157)
It would appear from this that when a
change occurs and changes are always
occurring the change results in a
different field complex. It is these
changes that constitute causation. Thus,
we bring about changes by introducing new
causal factors, themselves changes. I do
not see this as "ever-present, uncaused,
unique events" (p. 27). The events are
unique, to be sure, but not uncaused.
They are new functional relationships.
In addition, rather than ruling out an
applied science, as Hayes avers, this
approach merely directs our attention to
multiple factors. As McKearney (1977)
argues, we should not be looking for the
cause, but for multiple causation. And,
as I have suggested as an example of
application of interbehaviorism (Smith,
1984), this approach leads us to advocate
a psychotherapy that treats not just the
person, as is the case with almost all
therapies from behavior modification to
psychoanalysis, but the person together
with the milieu in which that person
functions. As another example,
interbehaviorism leads us to seek reform
of criminal behavior not in just trying to
rehabilitate criminals, but in the
rehabilitation of those individuals in
conjunction with the environment of which
they are a part. Sommer (1968) makes a
similar point when he observes that we
"must replace the notion of the causal
11
chain with the concept of ecosystem....One
is not dealing with a child from a broken
home, but with a child-from-a-broken-home-
living-in-a-slum-attending-a-rundown-slum-
school-staff ed-by-frightened-teachers, and
so forth" (p. 593).
In her summary, Hayes (p. 27)
reiterates that the interbehavioral field,
and more specifically causality, "is a way
of speaking about events that suits a
particular analytic purpose" (emphasis
hers) and refers to it as "a synthetic
philosophy." This is about 180 degrees
from the way I have always understood the
field and its derivation: It derives from
observation and represents observation,
and is a way of speaking about events only
because it seems to be the best way of
representing what is actually observed
about them. If the interbehavioral field
is synthetic, it is so not in the sense of
something artificial, but in the sense of
recognizing the mutiplex factors that
comprise an integral event. In
collaborating with Kantor on the revision
of the Survey (Kantor & Smith, 1975), and
in sending him some pre-publication papers
for discussion, I always thought that that
was what we were talking about
psychology bot as a study of constructs
but as a study of events occurring in an
interbehavioral field.
References
Hayes, L. J. (1988). Philosophical
implications of the interbehavioral
field. The Interbehaviorist, HK3) ,
23-27.
Kantor, J. R. (1950). Psychology and
logic (Vol. 2). Chicago: Principia
Press.
Kantor, J. R., & Smith, K. W. (1975).
The science <3f psychology: An
interbehavioral survey. Chicago:
Principia Press.
Kuo, Z. Y. (1967). The dynamics of
behavior development: An epigenetic
view. New York: Random House.
McKearney, J. W. (1977). Asking
questions about behavior. Perspectives
AH Biology and Medicine, 2JL, 109-119.
Smith, N. W. (1984). Fundamentals of
interbehavioral psychology. The
Psychological Record, 34, 479-494.
Sommer, R. (1968). Hawthorne dogma.
Psychological Bulletin, ^0, 592-595.
12
SELECTED RECENT ARTICLES
An Animal Analogue ol Gambling.
Stephen B. Keodal.
An EthoexpertmentBl Approach lo the
Sludy of Fear. Robert J. Blancha/d
and D. CaroToe Blanchard.
Ettecls of Shock Controllability on Alpha
Male Aggression end Defense, Defaal
of Intruders, end Defensive Burying.
Jon L VflSams.
"SupersliUous" Behavior fn Children.
Gregory A. Y/agner and Edward K. Morris.
Behaviorism and lha New Science of
Cognlllon. Laurence MJer,
Professional and Personal Blunders In
Child Development Research.
Myrtle McGraw.
Response tnlefactions In Multiple
Schedules: Tha Influence of Response
Displacement. Iver H. rversen.
Won volition In Hypnosis: A Semlollc
Analysls.Thsodore R. SaiKn.
Universal and Personal Helplessness: A
Test of the Reformulated Model.
Miriam E. Kfamer and Robert A, Rose5.nl.
The Logic ol Research end the Scientific
Status ol ihe Law of Effect.
WiSam OTJonobue and Leonard Kfasner.
Backward Second-Order Conditioning In
Flavor Aversion Learning. Robert R_
Mowrer, Douglas E. Krug, and
Stephen B. Klein.
The Psychological Record te a geiwal journal of psychology. Since 1937 H has pubSshed psychotog'cal theory and
research concerned v.itri a broad ranga of topics in the dtsdpTne. Rapy putfcafon of accepted manuscripts assures that
each issue contains very recent work.
In the beSaf thai reacTng The Psychological Record may facHtats the development of students' Journal reading habits.
The Psychological Record is contlntKng a special student subscript'ion rate.
1989 Subscription Rates
Student subscrip&xi - $10.00
Professional IndHdual - $15.00
LRxaryAistitufon - $45.00
The Psychological Record, Gambier, Onto 43022-9623
THE INTERBEHAVIORIST
Edward K. Morris, Editor
Department of Human Development
University of Kansas
Lawrence, KS 66045
Bryan D= Midgley
Department of Human Development
University of Kansas
Lawrence, KS 66045
Preference lor Terminal-Link Key Pecking
In Concurrent Homogeneous and
Heterogeneous Chains.
Stephen P. Starin.
Second-Order Conditional Control of
Symmetric and TranslUva Stimulus
Relations: The Influence of Order
Effects. Craig H. Kennedy and Richard
Lajtinen.
Response of Neonatal Prairie Rattlesnakes
(Crolalus vtrtdis) lo Conspeclllc and
Heteros peel tic Chemical Cues. Kent M.
Scudder, Davkl Ctilszar, Hobart M. Smith,
and Ted MeJcer.
Effects of Schedule and Length ol Training
on Re ward-Induced Stereo typy and
Negative Transler In Humans. Denfee K.
Gf oss and Arthur Gutrnan.
Please Parse Ihe Sentence Animal
Cognlllon In lha Procrusteen Bed of
Linguistics. RonaVJ J. Schusterman and
Robert C. GisVier.
In Which Procrustean Bed Does the Sea
Lion Sleep Tonight? Louis M. Herman.
Some Factors that Influence Transfer of
Oddity Performance In the Pigeon.
Richa/d Pisacreta, DavkJ Gouflti, James
Kramer, and WSSam Schuttz.
The Effects of Lag Value on lha Operant
Control o! Response Variability Under
Free-Operant and Discrete-Response
Procedures. Charles J. Morris.
Bat* volumes avaSable
1967lo pfesert
 A Quarterly Newsletter of Interbehavioral Psychology
ISSN8755-612X

Published at the University of Kansas

Volume 17 1989 Number 2

EDITOR TABLE OF CONTENTS

Edward K. Morris
University of Kansas
ABA Convention 15

ADVISORY BOARD Subscription Renewals 15

Sidney W. Bijou New Subscriptions 15

University of Arizona
Donna M. Cone New Subscribers 15
State of Rhode Island
Dennis J. Delprato Book Review
Eastern Michigan University
Linda J. Hayes Mahan, Harry C. Recent Changes in
University of Nevada-Reno Theoretical Orientation Among
Sandy Hobbs (Scotland) School Psychologists: Review of
Paisley College of Technology Elliot and Witt's The Delivery of
Paul T. Mountjoy Psychological Services in
Western Michigan University Schools: Concepts, Processes,
N. H. Pronko and Issues 16
Wichita State University
Roger D. Ray Articles
Rollins College
Emilio Ribes (Mexico) Mountjoy, Paul T., & Hansor, Jay D,
Escuela Nacional de Estudios Jacob Robert Kantor (1888-1984), 18
Douglas H. Ruben
. Okemos, MI Bijou, Sidney W. Analysis of the
Robert G. Wahler Response Function in a Unit of
University of Tennessee Interbehavior 21

ASSISTANT EDITORS QUOTATION

Lisa M. Johnson Knowledge is proud that he has learn1d

Bryan D. Midgley so much; wisdom is humble that he
Susan M. Schneider knows no more.
James T. Todd - William Cowper
14
THE INTERBEHAVIORIST
A Quarterly Newsletter
of Interbehavioral Psychology
ISSN 8755-612X
Edward K. Morris, Editor
Department of Human Development
2035D Haworth Hall
University of Kansas
Lawrence, Kansas 66045, U.S.A.
913-864-4840
The j.n_terbeh_aviorist is a quarterly
publication of news, information,
discussion, journal and book notes, book
reviews, comments, and brief articles
pertaining to interbehavioral psychology
a contextualistic, integrated-field
approach to the natural science of
behavior.
The newsletter publishes professional
communications that fall between informal
correspondence and colloquia, and formal
archival publication. As such, the
newsletter supplements contemporary
journals dedicated to basic and applied
research, to the history and philosophy of
the behavioral sciences, and to
professional issues in the field. The
newsletter strongly encourages
submission of notes about current
professional activities of its
subscribers, news and observations about
interbehavioral psychology and related
perspectives, comments on journal articles
and books of interest, more extended book
reviews, and brief articles. All
submissions should be sent in triplicate
to the editor and should conform to the
style, described in the Publication Manual
of the American Psychological Association
(3rd edition).
Subscription Information
Student Subscriptions (USA) $ 4.00
Regular Subscriptions (USA) 6.00
Foreign (Non-USA) Subscriptions...-. 8.00
Institutional Subscriptions........ 12.00
Back Volumes 1-16 8.00
Back Volume Complete Sets... Please Write
THE PRINCIPIA PRESS
Principia Press's currently available
titles in interbehavioral psychology are
listed below. Check your bookshelves, and
those of your library and bookstore, for
possible oversights. In addition, the
books make excellent gifts for colleagues
and students, especially for the latter in
honor of their completed degree
requirements. The books may be purchased
directly from Principia Press, 5743 Kimbark
Avenue, Chicago, IL 60637. Handling
charges are $.75 per title; prepaid orders
are postpaid. Any queries should also be
directed to the address above,
Principles of Psychology (2 vols.)
$20.00
Psychology and Logic (2 vols.)
$25.00
Interbehavioral Psychology
$15.00
The Logic of Modern Science
$15.00
An Objective Psychology of Grammar
$13.00
The Scientific Evolution of Psychology
(2 vols.) $40.00
The Science of Psychology: An
Interbehavioral Survey $20.00
Psychological Linguistics
$15,00
The Aim and Progress of Psychology and
Other Sciences $20.00
Interbehavioral Philosophy
$27.50
Cultural Psychology
$16.00
Tragedy and the Event Continuum
$15.00
Selected Writings, 1929-1983
$20.00
Psychological Comments and Queries
$20.00

THE AGORA
This issue contains the final two
contributions to last year's Association
for Behavior Analysis (ABA) symposium,
"An Introduction to Interbehavioral
Psychology" Paul T. Mountjoy's brief
biography of Professor Kantor and Sidney
W. Bijou's discussant comments. Paul's
contribution was largely drawn from his
1986 (Vol. 41, pp. 1296-1297) American
Psychologist obituary, co-written with Jay
D. Hansor, hence we reprint that article
in full, with permission from the American
Psychological Association.
We had commented earlier that we would
combine the symposium's papers into a
single monograph. Now, however, we will
invite the inclusion of a few additional
papers, namely those being presented at
this year's ABA convention in a same-named
symposium (see below). We will keep you
apprised as matters develop.
ABA Convention
The 1989 meeting of the Association for
Behavior Analysis will be held in
Milwaukee, WI, May 25-28. For further
information, please contact Shery
Chamberlain, ABA/SABA Office, Department
of Psychology, Western Michigan
University, Kalamazod, MI 49008
(616-387-4495).
Among the many interesting sessions,
two sypmosia may be of special interest
to newletter readers, the first being
An Introduction _to I_nterbehavioral
Psychology, chaired by Carmenne Chiasson.
This symposium includes papers by Donna M.
Cone on "Kantor's Major Contributions,"
Roger D. Ray on "Explorations in
Interbehavioral Methodology," and Dennis
J. Delprato on "Clinical Applications,"
and discussant comments by Paul T.
Mountjoy. The second symposium is
entitled Basic Behavioral and Linguistic
Processes: Multiple Response
Methodologies, co-chaired by S. W. Bijou
and E. K. Morris. This symposium includes
papers by Iver Iversen on "Multiple
Response Analyses of Single Reinforcement
Schedules," Patrick M. Ghezzi on
"Categories of Linguistic Behavior," Marc
K. Wruble and colleagues on "Synchrony
Analysis of Conduct Disordered Children
and Their Mothers," and Magnus Magnusson
on "Sequential Analysis of Human
Behavior," and discussant comments by
Hennry S. Pennypacker.
15
Among other convention papers of clear
interest will be Robert G. Wahler's, "An
Interbehavioral Model of Child Abuse and
Neglect." In addition to these, many
other 1988/1989 newsletter subscribers
will also be presenting papers and
posters: Robert Babcock, Max Brill,
Comunidad Los Horcones, Sigrid S. Glenn,
Andrew Hawkins, Stephen T. Higgins, Laura
Methot, Jay Moore, Robert E. O'Neill,
Joseph J. Plaud, Ann B. Pratt, Masaya
Sato, Susan M. Schneider, James T. Todd,
and Edelgard Wulfert.
Finally, Linda J. Hayes has arranged
for a meeting of the Interbehaviorists in
ABA Special Interest Group.
Subscription Renewals
This volume's first renewal notice,
included in Volume 16(4), produced a 48%
resubscription rate by the time Volume
17(1) was mailed a figure with which we
are pleased. That notice, and the one for
Volume 17(1), bring our current renewal
rate to 56%. The notice enclosed with
this issue is the final notice.
We apologize if we offended readers by
commenting on long renewal latencies last
Fall. Heavy workload and reading
schedules often bring our notices to light
only when the stacks of work are pared
down during the summertime. Committed
professionals and heavy readers, though,
are just the readers we value.
New Subscriptions
Noel Smith suggested that we include
with the newsletter a subscription form
that can be copied and passed around among
colleagues. We have done so in this
issue. Please distribute copies of it to
interested faculty members and students,
and retain copies in your files for ready
reference and hand out. In the future, we
will insert these forms with each volume's
first issue.
New Subscribers
Comunidad Los Horcones (Mexico)
Frances J. Currier (South Lyon, MI)
Donna Marie Meszaros (Canton, MI)
Max S. Schoeffler (Matawan, NJ)
Tom Sharp (West Virginia University)
Cynthia M. Stackpoole (Mt. Clemens, MI)
Susan M. Steiner (Ann Arbor, MI)
Mark A. Swain (Ypsilanti, MI)
University of Waikato (New Zealand)
16
BOOK REVIEW
Recent Changes in Theoretical Orientation
Among School Psychologists
Harry C. Mahan
Oceanside, CA
I was recently asked to review in its
entirety the book, The Delivery of
Psychological Services in Schools:
Concepts, Processes, and Issues, edited by
Stephen N. Elliot and Joseph C. Witt
(1986). The book covers many aspects of
school psychology, the most outstanding of
which is its emphasis on theory. Because
this emphasis is prominent in only five of
the 14 papers included in the volume, it
is discussed in more detail in the present
commentary than was possible in a general
review.
The initial paper of the volume was
authored by the editors, Elliot and Witt.
In a section entitled "What Are the
Major Theoretical Orientations for
Service Delivery Systems?," they
emphasized, first and foremost, the
necessity for theoretical work. This
insistence is, in itself, a tremendous
advance for psychology, for educational
psychologists have for generations been
ignoring the necessity of theory,
especially elementary textbook writers.
If such an orientation is necessary for
school psychologists, it must be necessary
for other psychologists as well. The
theoretical orientation, though, should be
selected with care rather than being
allowed to establish itself on the basis
of custom and tradition.
After presenting reasons why a
theoretical orientation is needed in
school psychology, Elliot and Witt go on
to describe three orientations they have
subjected to examination: These are the
medical model, the behavioral-ecological
model, and Bandura's reciprocal-
determinism model. The first is rejected
because it is person-centered, with both
the causes and the modification of
behavior centered within the individual.
The behavioral-ecological model is
rejected because it presupposes that the
environment plays a predominant role in
the shaping of behavior, although
interactions are stressed to a limited
extent. Another objection to this model
is that it is directed primarily toward
potentially abnormal cases rather than
toward all children. Bandura's model is
accepted because it is concerned primarily
with events and because cognitive
interactions are included. It is more
inclusive than the behavioral-ecological
model and it has room for beliefs, values,
and perceptions which cannot be omitted in
any understanding of human interactions.
In the second paper in the book,
Ysseldyke's selection, entitled "A
Model for Viewing the Practice of School
Psychology," elaborates on Bandura's
reciprocal-determination orientation and
presents diagrams that compare it to the
other two positions covered by Elliot and
Witt, which Ysseldyke also deems
inadequate. However, he modifies the
first two types somewhat and, following
Bandura, refers to them in different
terminology. The first model is referred
to as unidirectional and the second as
only partially bi-directional. Within the
reciprocal-determinism model, "behavior is
seen as influenced by the environment, but
the environment is seen as partly a
function of the person's own making" (pp.
29). This model emphasizes cognitive
factors, as these partially determine what
external events will be perceived and how
information will be organized for future
use. Ysseldyke then goes on to explain
how this model can be extremely useful to
school psychologists. This final step --
application is one that is badly needed
in various areas of professional
psychology.
With Bandura's reciprocal-determinism
model having been established in the first
two papers as appropriate for school '
psychology, Bardon (1986) devotes ten
pages of his paper to "four approaches
compatible with reciprocal-determinism
[which] seem especially appropriate to the
work of school psychologists: attribution
theory, affectance, organizational and
gro'up theory, and aptitude-treatment
interaction" (pp. 54). This discussion
illustrates the relationship between the
school psychologists' basic theoretical
orientations and the conceptual basis of
their approach to considerations of
behavior.
Curtis and Zins, in the fifth
chapter in the book, discuss school
psychology in terms of systems theory,

which they describe by saying that "Basic
.to systems theory and of central
importance to our discussion of the
organization of school psychological
services is the concept of reciprocal
interaction. Operationally, this concept
refers to the tendency for a change in any
system component to affect other
components within the system, as well as
the output of the system as a whole" (pp.
110). .They then go on to discuss the
various aspects and ramifications of
systems as they apply to schools and
school psychology. Needless to say, this
provides school psychologists with
considerable insight into the dynamics of
the system in which they are functioning.
From the standpoint of the theoretical
orientation of the school psychologist,
the most important paper in the book is
the one by Christenson, Abery, and
Weinberg, devoted almost exclusively
to this topic. They present what
they consider an alternative model to
that which prevails at present in school
psychology. Theirs, they state, "is based
on a developmental perspective, rooted in
ecological and transactional theories and
affirming a proactive and preventive
stance for the school psychologist" (pp.
349).
These authors go into considerably more
detail than have those of the preceding
papers, and they cite a number of writers
.who have contributed to the development of
their theoretical perspective. Their
careful documentation is commendable and
adds considerable status to their
conceptual position. They refer to this
position as a "developmental perspective"
(pp. 364) and they describe eleven
assumptions upon which it is founded.
These assumptions apply specifically to
school psychology and they are directly
related to the application of the authors'
basic theory. In order to clarify the
latter, the paper also includes a set of
seven defining characteristics, the first
five of which apply to all psychology and
are clearly interbehavioral in character.
Christenson, Abery, and Weinberg!s
delineation of their general theoretical
position is only the beginning, for their
chapter covers not only the development of
this position through the work of Lewin,
Barker, Wright, Bronfenbrenner, and
Gabarino, (but not J. R, Kantor), but also
description of the nature-nurture
problem (a la Zing-Yang Kuo) and
17
implications for the application of the
position in school psychology. In
addition, they have wprked out a six-page
table that compares and contrasts six
school psychology aspects of the
developmental-transactional model in
considerable detail. All in all, this
paper is as good a current presentation of
both the foundation and the professional
relevance of what many of us refer to as
interbehavioral psychology as one could
hope to find.
In summary, I found school psychology's
recent enthusiastic wholesale acceptance
of a set of principles extremely
gratifying. That J. R. Kantor (1924,
1926) was not cited is a small matter, and
actually, since many people still consider
his Principles as dated, this may be for
the best. The important thing is that we
now have proof that what many of us
learned from him many years ago is not
only up-to-date in these latter 1980s, but
still well ahead of most thinking in the
field. Interbehavioral principles are
just as fresh and exciting today as they
have ever been, whether they be called
transactional, developmental,
interactional, ecological, or reciprocal-
deterministic and they will serve the
theoretical needs of psychologists for
many years to come. Fortunately, J. R.
Kantor's Principles is still in print and
a preliminary reading of the relevant
chapters of Elliott and Witt will permit
young psychologists to have a fuller
appreciation of Kantor's contribution than
has been possible before. Their
acquaintance with his great classic may
provide them with the lasting pleasure and
enthusiasm with which it has provided me
for over 50 years.
References
Kantor, J. R. (1924). Principles of
psychology (Vol. 1). Chicago:
Principia Press.
Kantor, J. R. (1926). Principles of
psychology (Vol. 2). Chicago:
Principia Press.
The complete reference is: Elliot, S. K.,
& Witt, J. C. (1986). (Eds.), The
delivery of psychological services in
Scjioolsj^ Concepts, processes, and
issues. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
18
Jacob Robert Kantor (1888-1984)
Paul T. Mountjoy and Jay D. Hansor
Western Michigan University
Robert Kantor organized scientific
values into a coherent entity and
implemented a naturalistic system of
psychology. This is his permanent
contribution and monument.
Born in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania on
August 8, 1888, Robert attended the
University of Chicago where an early
interest in chemistry was soon supplanted
by devotion to psychological science. He
earned the Ph.D. in 1914 and was an
instructor at the University of Minnesota
from 1915 to 1917. Marriage to Helen Rich
on September 2, 1916 provided him with a
long-term collaborator and later a
daughter, Helene Juliette. His Ph.D. was
awarded in 1917 and he served as an
instructor at the University of Chicago
from 1917 to 1920. In 1920 he became
Assistant Professor of Psychology at
Indiana University where he was to remain
for 39 years; he was promoted to Associate
Professor in 1921 and became Professor of
Psychology in 1923.
Following retirement in 1959 Robert
continued his productive life, as Visiting
Professor at New York University (1952-
1963) and then at the University of
Maryland (1963-1964). He lectured often
at universities and professional societies
in the United States, and beginning in
1974 he frequently lectured and presented
seminars at various universities in
Mexico. He was appointed a research
associate at the University of Chicago in
1964 and continued his scholarly
activities there until he was fatally
stricken on January 31. He died
peacefully two days later on February 2 in
his 96th year.
Robert's dissertation was the beginning
of the critical historical analysis that
is the hallmark of his unique contribution
to American psychology. The Functional
Nature of the Philosophical Categories
(1917) constituted an examination of the
psychological aspects of the history of
philosophy from Anaximander to the
Pragmatists. Discernible in this work are
the foundations of the scientific values
that were to guide his career as he
struggled to produce a natural science of
psychology. In it he commented on the
barrenness and futility of philosophies of
the past and the necessity of considering
the actual actions of individuals rather
than reified abstractions. These concerns
inevitably led to the problem of the
definition of the subject matter of
psychology.
At the time of Robert's appointment,
the Indiana Department was prominent
because it boasted the second
psychological laboratory established in
this country and was in the process of
establishing one of the earliest
psychological clinics. This eminence in
scientific psychology provided a nurturant
environment in which Robert flourished and
contributed greatly to the continued
development of the department. Between
1918 and 1924 alone, Robert published a
total of 34 papers, 32 of which reflect
his struggle to develop the concepts and
terminology that allowed the establishment
of an authentic scientific psychology.
Robert entered the lists as a champion
of objective psychology in the second
decade of the 20th century. Naturalistic
viewpoints had been achieved already in
physics, chemistry, and biology. Thus,
the time was ripe for a scientific
revolution in psychology. Robert,
however, founded no school of psychology.
Instead he proposed a broad group of
scientific hypotheses based on minimal
assumptions regarding the data of
psychology. This was the first modern
comprehensive and completely naturalistic
program for psychology, that is, the first
to advocate complete departure from
historically imposed preconceptions.
Robert followed the accepted canons of
science in his definition of the primary
data of psychology. He proposed that the
relationship between two entities in a
field be regarded as an event to be
studied. In "A Tentative Analysis of the
Primary Data of Psychology" (1921) these
entities were identified as the stimulus
object and responding organism. These
names not only indicated his objective
posture but also acknowledged continuity
with previous workers. Principles of
Psychology (1924, 1926). further
demonstrated that all phenomena with which

psychologists were concerned could be
.described and analyzed as a series of
natural events. The concept that an
organism is in active interbehavior with
environmental conditions provided the
foundation for all Robert's subsequent
work. He successfully avoided any
overemphasis on either of those two
mutually participating factors in the
psychological event.
During the early 1920s, Robert
investigated the field of social
psychology. He began to construct an
event-based social psychology in An
Outline of Social Psychology (1929) and
Cultural Psychology (1982).
Psycholinguistics was of special interest
to Robert. His paper, "An Analysis of
Psychological Language Data" (1922),
represents a departure from both the
mentalism rampant at the time and the
physiological reductionism of Watson.
Detailed analyses of complex.linguistic
responses are found in An Objective
Psychology of Grammar (1936) and
Psychological Linguistics (1977).
An objective science of psychology as
an independent member of the family of
natural sciences was the goal at which
Robert aimed during all of his 67 years of
productive life following his
dissertation. He furthered the attainment
of that goal by founding the Principia
Press shortly before World War II.
Originally a cooperative organization of
faculty who represented various scientific
fields the press gradually concentrated on
his own publications. In 1937 Robert
founded The P sy c ho Log i c a1 Record, which
still flourishes. From 1968 onward, under
the num de plume of "Observer," he
published over 50 comments and queries in
that journal.
Robert justified the title of his 1947
book Problems p_f Physiological Psychology
on the ground that the area is
characterized as "grievously encumbered by
a series of paradoxes and perplexities."
For him these paradoxes flowed from the
perseveration of historical concerns with
the relationship between soul and body.
The age-old questions remain unanswerable
by means of the techniques of modern
science because they arose long ago in a
culture devoid of empirical analyses and
hence are not amenable to scientific
methodology.
What was needed was a ruthless
rejection of the old philosophy that had
19
formulated those questions and the
substitution of a new scientific
philosophy oriented toward events that
would lead to scientific questions derived
from the events themselves. New
categories needed to be derived from
investigation of actual events to replace
the theoretical preconceptions of bygone
eras, in which mentalistic terms were
regarded as entities worthy of scientific
concern. For him no amount of verbal
obfuscation could conceal the
nonnaturalistic origins of mentalistic
concepts. Robert also decried all efforts
to exalt nervous tis'sues into the
exclusive explanatory factor for behavior
and steadfastly advocated an integrated
field interpretation that would include
physiological events as a portion of his
vision of a naturalistic science of
psychology.
Robert was unmatched as a modern
philosopher of science. Psychology and
Logic (1945, 1950) pointed to the central
role of behavior in the independent
enterprise of logic. And logic, or
analytic philosophy, was separated
rigorously from speculative philosophy
(which he derisively labeled specious
philosophy). The necessity for rigorous
logical analysis of the scientific
enterprise was further explicated in The
Logic of Modern Science (1953) and
Interbehavioral Psychology (1959) . In all
these works he emphasized that valid
scientific work included both an empirical
and an analytic (logical) component. Most
important to him was the clear statement
of the assumptions that guided the
development of scientific systems and the
banishment of all absolutes from the
scientific realm.
Only one scholarly treatment of the
history of psychology from a completely
naturalistic viewpoint is now in existence
and that is his monumental work, The
Scientific Evolution of Psychology (1963,
1969). In these volumes Robert returned
in part to the topic of his dissertation,
but intellectually enriched by nearly a
half century of scholarly work he
transcended it. It is an analytic
panorama of the self-corrigibility of
science over two and one-half millenia.
The message is clear: In spite of its
missteps psychology is an integral
component of science and consequently
shares in the progress enjoyed by science
as a whole throughout the historical
20
record. All his intellectual activities
rested on the assumption that scientific
work led to a definite and precise
orientation with respect to things and
events.
Teaching was a central and valued
portion of Robert's life. All his
students remember fondly his application
of the Socratic technique. Best of all
were'the sessions that closed with
students arguing among themselves. These
stimulating interchanges continued between
classes, and the next session began with
the most assertive class members offering
the solutions they had developed.
Following his retirement, there
appeared in the Revista Mexicana de
Analisis de la Conducta a regular "sequence
of 16 contributions beginning in 1975.
These and the "Observer" comments
illustrate not only his continued
productivity well beyond the age at which
creativity usually ceases, but also the
broad range of his interests within
psychological science.
Robert retired soon after the death of
his wife Helen and moved to Chicago to
live with his daughter Helene (now
Professor of Archaeology at the Oriental
Institute and Department of Near Eastern
Language and Civilizations at the
References
Kantor, J. R. (1917). Functional nature
of the philosophical categories.
Unpublished doctoral dissertation,
University of Chicago.
Kantor, J. R. (1921). A tentative
analysis of the primary data of
psychology. Journal o_f Philosophy,
Psychology, and Scientific Method, _U3,
253-269.
Kantor, J. R. (1922). An analysis of
psychological language data.
Psychological Review, 29, 267-309.
Kantor, J. R. (1924, 1926). Principles
of psychology. Chicago: Principia
Press.
Kantor, J. R. (1929). An outline of
socj.al psychology. Chicago: Principia
Press.
University of Chicago). A house near the
university was renovated to serve as a
combined office and residence. Robert's
second floor workroom/library/bedroom
overlooked the garden-like backyard. Here
he continued his productive life in
surroundings that visitors thought
idyllic.
A cultured gentleman, Robert was an
exceptionally knowledgeable connoisseur of
literature, art, and music. One of his
last publications, Tragedy and the Event
Continuum (1983) examined a sample of
literature in light of his naturalistic
philosophy and psychology. His artistic
preference favored the Impressionists and
especially German. Expressionism.
As we write this we have before us what
seems to be Robert's last will and
testament for psychology. It was found on
his work table by his daughter and
probably represents his final statement of
what psychology must escape to become a
natural science. It is appropriate that
our summary of his life and achievements
should end as did his life; "No spirits,
wraiths, hobgoblins, spooks, noumena,
superstitions, transcendentals, mystics,
invisible hands, supreme creator, angels,
demons, . . . . "
Kantor, J. R. (1936). An objective
psychology of grammar. Chicago:
Principia Press;
Kantor, J. R. (1945, 1950). Psychology
and logi 12. Chicago: Principia Press.
Kantor, J. R. (1947). Problems of
physiological psychology. Chicago:
Principia Press.
Kantor, J. R. (1953). The logic o
modern science. Chicago: Principia
Press.
Kantor, J. R. (1959). Interbehavioral
psychology. Chicago: Principia Press
Kantor, J. R. (1963, 1969). The
scientific evolution of_ psychology.
Chicago: Principia Press.
Kantor, J. R. (1982). Cultural
psychology. Chicago: Principia Press

Analysis of the Response Function in a Unit of Interbehavior
Sidney W. Bijou
The University of Arizona
In a paper presented at the meeting of
the Association for Behavior Analysis,
Morris (1988) described a unit of
interbehavior in terms of four factors:
(1) mutually related stimulus and response
functions, (2) medium of contact, (3)
setting, and (4) interactional history.
He also compared this unit with the
behavior-analytic three-term contingency.
The present paper is an elaboration of the
first factor mutually related stimulus
and response functions, with an emphasis
on the response function.
Although a response function always
involves the action of the total
individual, a specific psychological act
can be analyzed into biological and
behavioral factors. Biological factors
include the muscular, neural, glandular,
receptive, effective, skeletal, tendon,
and skin activities characteristic of a
species. Psychological factors, in
contrast, consist of either a single
reaction, such as a reflex action, or a
multiple reaction such as problem-solving.
The former is an undifferentiated
response, while the latter is an
interconnected series of reaction systems.
The series of reaction systems in a
complex response may be divided into two
categories: those precurrent to the
completing (consummatory) reaction, as in
attending and perceiving, and the
completing reaction itself, such as a
linguistic response to a friend. All of
these precurrent and completing reactions
evolve through previous contacts between
total functioning individuals and the
objects and events which constitute their
environment.
The focus of the following discussion
is on the nature and categories of
precurrent and completing reactions in a
complex response function.
Precurrent Reactions
The first reaction in a complex
response function is an attending reaction
which serves to bring behavior and an
object, person, or event into a
psychological interaction. The attending
reaction prepares an individual for
further action with respect to whichever
object will be reacted to by subsequent
21
reactions. Thus, the first precurrent
reaction may be said to systematize
behavior and facilitate its effectiveness.
Considerable research has been done on the
properties of attending reactions and the
way they function under various conditions
(see, e.g., Rabbitt & Dornic, 1975).
The precurrent reaction that follows
attending behavior in a complex response
function is a perceiving reaction which
orients a person to the actualized object
or event and its setting. A perceiving
reaction involves both discriminative and
conceptualizing processes.
Perceiving reactions range extensively.
They include (1) discerning the properties
of objects, (2) the preliminary activities
of choice behavior, (3) apprehending the
utterances of a speaker, and (4) the
preparatory acts "for comparing and
contrasting things, for artistically
enjoying, discussing, or speculating about
an object" (Kantor & Smith, 1975, p. 176).
Perceiving reactions are influenced by an
individual's biological make-up,
interactional history, and situational
factors, such as fatigue, concurrent
responses, interest, media of stimulus-
response contact, and setting.
The study of perception has been almost
as extensive as the field of psychology
itself, as evidenced by the once
vigorous school of Gestalt psychology
which was based primarily on perceptual
phenomena. That this movement,
spearheaded by Koffka, Kohler, Wertheimer,
Lewin, and their students, enjoyed
considerable recognition is
understandable, considering that
perceptual reactions strongly influence
both observable and nonobservable
completing reactions.
. We say that perceptual reactions
"strongly influence" rather than
"determine" completing reactions because
in many instances a perceptual reaction
may be followed by one or more additional
kinds of precurrent reactions. One such
class is meaning reactions which involve
further behavior in relation to the
actualized stimulus function; these are
different in form and function from the
perceiving reaction (Parrott, 1986). As
22
an example of a performative meaning
reaction, a person may perceive a small,
round metal object as a coin, and then
heft it (a meaning reaction) to determine
whether it is counterfeit or genuine.
Other examples can be found in linguistic
and affective reactions.
Another class of precurrent reactions
which might be included in a precurrent
chain prior to a completing reaction is
imagining reactions involving implicit
responses to substitute stimuli. For
example, someone might have to visualize
the layout of a city before they can give
someone directions to the zoo.
Another category of precurrent
reactions is a cognitive, or knowledge,
reaction. Asked by a newcomer about the
speed limit in a residential area of the
city, we might first have to inquire about
the city ordinance governing driving
speeds before giving a reply.
Still another class of precurrent
reactions is feeling reactions which may
be generated by the perceptual reaction.
A pain in the chest may be perceived as a
heart attack and arouse anxiety.
And finally, a class of precurrent
reactions might take the form of
manipulative reactions. These involve
interactions with objects and events in
different settings to increase the
probability of a specific completing
reaction. Manipulating reactions play a
prominent role in decision-making and
problem-solving, as in, for example,
transforming research data to see if
meaningful relationships emerge among
variables.
Completing (Consummatory) Reactions
Completing reactions, which include all
of the overt and covert responses in
behavioral psychology, may be classified
in a number of ways. In an effort to
cover this tremendous territory, and yet
not become bogged down in minutia, we
suggest four basic categories: effective,
linguistic, cognitive (knowing), and
affective (feeling) (Bijou, 1984). In the
discussion to follow, we adhere to the
practice of referring to an entire
interaction, or a unit or segment, by the
name of the completing reaction.
Effeetive reactions. Reactions that
have direct consequences on the object,
person, or event interacted with are
effective completing reactions. They are
essentially operant interactions (Skinner,
1953) with an antecedent stimulus, operant
behavior, a consequent stimulus, and a
setting condition or "third variable."
The operant behavior is the response
function, which can be fractionated for
analytical purposes into attending,
perceiving, and all the other reaction
systems discussed in the previous section.
A simple example readily reveals the
essential components. Sitting on the
floor playing with his building blocks, a
child suddenly notices a small black
moving object, identifies it as a water
bug, picks it up, carries it outside, sets
it down on the lawn, goes back in, and
resumes play. The stimulus is the
crawling object, the first response to
which is an attending reaction which
shifts orientation from the blocks to the
moving object. The next reaction is one
in which the child perceives the black
moving object as a harmless bug. The
second precurrent reaction prompts an
effective completing reaction: The child
picks up the bug and deposits it on the
lawn, returns, and resumes playing with
the blocks. Had the black moving object
been perceived as a threatening looking
spider, the child would have engaged in a
different completing behavior trying to
kill it or possibly calling for help.
Linguistic reactions. There are two
kinds of linguistic completing reactions:
referential and symbolizing (Kantor,
1977). Referential reactions, which may
be gestural as well as verbal-vocal, have
indirect effects on the environment. They
are related to two separate antecedent
stimulus functions, one inherent in the
listener, the other in the referent. They
may result in either a narrative
linguistic episode in which the listener
responds linguistically, as in a casual
conversation between friends, or in a
mediative linguistic episode wherein the
listener behaves nonlinguistically, as in
passing the mustard at the request of the
speaker. Because the speaker and listener
functions'may reside in the same person, a
distinction is made between communicative
and expressive linguistic interactions.
Symbolizing reactions, in contrast, are
reactions to stimulus functions that are
substitutes for something else. They may
be orientative alone, as in recognizing
the meaning of a caution sign at an
intersections or they may involve the
coupling of an orientative and an
additional reaction to the object or event
symbolized. In our example, the reaction

would be orienting to the caution sign,
then stopping and looking to the right and
left for approaching vehicles.
Cognitive (knowing) reactions.
Orienting completing reactions are labeled
cognitive reactions. Unlike simple
symbolizing reactions, they are in
interaction with all sorts of stimulus
functions rather than with substitute
stimulus functions only. Furthermore,
cognitive reactions terminate in
nonobservable, or implicit, reactions.
Cognitive reactions, which evolve from
past interactions with objects and events,
vary in their complexity. Some may only
be reactions to the elementary properties
of things, for instance, discerning the
difference between edible and nonedible
apples. Some may be reactions in relation
to previous experience with an object,
person, or event, for example, recognizing
a person who was once your elementary
school teacher. Some may be reactions to
the properties of an object or event and
the ability to predict their occurrence
under certain circumstances; for instance,
water will turn into ice when it is
exposed to temperatures below zero degrees
Celsius. And some may involve
understanding the origin, development, and
implications of an object or event, such
as an appreciation of the geological
history of the Grand Canyon.
The careful reader will note that
cognitive reactions have been included
among the precurrent reactions. There is
no contradiction here. Cognitive
reactions may be either completing
reactions, as just described, or they may
be precurrent reactions occurring between
a perceiving reaction and an effective or
References
Bijou, S. W. (1984). Cross-sectional and
longitudinal analysis of development:
The interbehavioral perspective. The
Psychological Record, 34, 525-535.
Kantor, J. R. (1977). Psychological
linguistics. Chicago: Principia Press.
Kantor, J. R., & Smith, N. W. (1975). The
science of psychology^ An
interbehavioral surve1 Chicago:
Principia Press.
Morris, E. K. (1988, May). The
interbehavioral field. In B. D.
Midgley (Chair), An introduction to
interbehavioral p_sy_cho_lo_gy. A
symposium conducted at the meeting of
23
linguistic completing reaction.
Affective ^feelijig) reactions.
Affective reactions are predominately
glandular and smooth muscle actions. Most
often referred to as emotional reactions,
they may be tensions in relation to
surprising and unexpected events, or
diffused pleasant or unpleasant reactions
to stimulus functions with histories of
positive reinforcement or of aversive
stimulations, respectively. The specific
biological factors involved include
changes in heart rate, respiration, blood
pressure, visceral tension, adrenal
secretion, and the like. These activities
function in accordance with respondent
conditioning principles (Skinner, 1953).
Like cognitive reactions, affective
reactions may be completing or precurrent
reactions, depending on the situation.
When precurrent, the completing reactions
are effective or linguistic reactions, or
both. And, like cognitive reactions,
affective completing reactions do not
ordinarily modify the object, person, or
event interacted with.
Interrelationships Among Interactions
It should be apparent that response
functions in complex segments consist of
permutations and combinations of
precurrent and completing reactions. For
example, the effective behavior of opening
a sticky door not only fosters strenuous
muscular effective activity, but also
increases the adrenalin flow and
stimulates feeling and linguistic
reactions: "Doggone! This door ought to
be fixed!" It is possible, however, to
identify the dominant interaction or
interactions and to observe in what way or
ways other interactions are involved.
the Association for Behavior Analysis,
Philadelphia, PA.
Parrott, L. J. (1986). Ethical situations
in interbehavioral perspective. The
Interbehaviorist, ^4_, 38-44.
Rabbitt, P. M. A., & Domic, S. (Eds.).
(1975). Attention and performance, V.
New York: Academic Press.
Skinner, B. F. (1953). Science and human
behavior. New York: Macmillan.
Author Note: I would like to thank
Patrick M. Ghezzi for his astute comments
on an earlier draft of this paper.
24

THE INTERBEHAVIQRIST
Edward K. Morris, Editor
Department of Human Development
University of Kansas
Lawrence, KS 66045

Bryan D, Midgley
Department o Human Development
University of Kansas
Lawrence, KS 66045

SELECTED RECENT ARTICLES

An Animal Anilogiw ol Gambling.
Stephen B. Kenda!
An EthotXfMrimanul Appi&ieh lo Ihs
Study ol Feif. Robert J. Sancham
and D. CaroTng f&anchard.
Eflacta ol Shock Controllability on Alphi
Mala Anflretilon and DaftnM, DtlMt
ol lmru*jr, nd Dalinatve Burying.
Jon L WliFams.
Sop*rilillou' Bthavlor In Children.
Gregory A Waonar and Edward K. Morris.
Bhivlorl*m and ir Haw Stlane* ot
Cognition. Lamenca M.Ket.
PrataMlorul ind Paraonal Blunders In
Child Davelofxnanl Rmitch-
Mynta McGraw.
Riiponw inlarictloni In Multipfe
Ser>duJet: Tha InRuerw* ol Reiponw
Di*p)icmant l<r H. t/eiseo.
Honvotlllon In Hypnoila: A Semlollt
Aruilyila.Theodote R. SarbVt
Unlvirul ind Paraorul Halpliunatt; A
Taat ol tna Rlormulilad Model.
tffaain E. Kramer and Robert A RoselTri
Tha Logic ol Rauirch and Iht SctanlHIc
SUhjaollhaUwolEttect.
Wffiam OtJonohije and Leonard Kfasnar.
Bickwird Scor>d-0n5r Conditioning In
Flavor Avaralon Leimlng. Robert R_
Mcfflier. Doog'as E. Krug, and
Stephen 6. KJeVt
Th PychologlMl Rwrd te a general Journal ol psytftotoff/. Sw 1937 K has j
research concerned wSh a broad range ol topics in Ihe iSitipTne. RafJ'd pubKaSon oi aixepled manuscripts assures t
each Issua cofitekis very recent mwk.
Prl*nnc lor TirmtniHlnk Kay P*cklng
In Concurrent Komogr>*ou* ind
HflHogtnBout Chiini.
Stephen P. Starln.
Scond-Or<(er CcrxHUotuI Control ol
Symmetric *nd Tnnlttvt Stlmulu*
RtUUoni: The Indwix* ol <hd*r
t. Cra^g H. Kenned/ and ftchard
Rtipont* of HtoniUI Pnlri* Ritlttinikil
(Crotilu* vlridli) 10 ConipttClOc ind
HtUroipttlHc Chemleil Ci. Kent M
Swddsr, Da/d CWSzar, Kobait M. Sm^,
and Ted Hefcer.
EHKti ol Scheduto ind Ltngth ol Training
on Bwird4nduc<t Stsrttypy ind
Kegillvi Trintler In Kumini. De^se 1C
Gross and Arthur Gulman.
Pl*t w Pr tht Sntnt*: Anlmil
Cognition In lh PiocnJiUtri B*d ol
UnguliUo. RonaM J. Schusterman and
Ftobert C. Gistor.
Lion Slwp Tonight? Lotfa M. Henran.
Soma FKtort thai Inllvunc* Tran*l*r ol
Oddity Parforminc* in lh Plgton.
Rchsrd Pisaaela, Oa^'id Gooah,1famss
Kramer, and WiKarn Sdnflj.
Tha EHttta ol Ltg Vilu* on tha Ootnnl
Control ol Rt*pona Virliblttty UrxHr
Frea-OfMrant and D)cralt-RHpont
P . Charies J. Monfe.

In the baTef that readVg Ths Payehologlctl Racoid may lacKtate Uve devetopment ol students' Jourral rea.
Tha PayehologlMl Record is cwvtVmVig a spatial studerrt subscripts rate.

1939 SobsoipSon Rales

Student subscrip5on - 510.00 8ach\i

ProfesstertH indVxi-jal - $15.00 1M
i - W5.00

Th* Payehologlwl Rwotd, Garnb.V, Ohio 022-M3

 A Quarterly Newsletter of Interbehavioral Psychology
ISSN8755-612X

Published at the University of Kansas

Volume 17 1989 Number 3

EDITOR TABLE OF CONTENTS

Edward K. Morris The Agora

University of Kansas
ABA Convention 27

ADVISORY BOARD Notes from the Field 27

Sidney W. Bijou New Subscribers 27

University of Arizona
Donna M, Cone Comments^
State of Rhode Island
Dennis J. Delprato Kahn, A. What Can You Believe from
Eastern Michigan University Print? 28
Linda J. Hayes
University of Nevada-Reno Mahan, Harry C. Is Behavior
Sandy Hobbs (Scotland) Organism-Centered or
Paisley College of Technology Interactional Field
Paul T. Mountjoy Relationships? 30
Western Michigan University
N. H. Pronko Book and Journal Notes
Wichita State University
Roger D. Ray Midgley, B. D. on S. Oyama's "Ontogeny
Rollins College and the Central Dogma" 31
Emilio Ribes (Mexico)
Escuela Nacional de Estudios
Douglas H. Ruben
Okemos, MI QUOTATION
Robert G. Wahler
University of Tennessee Nature and nurture are...not
alternative sources of form and causal
power. Rather, nature is the product
ASSISTANT EDITORS of the process of the developmental
interactions we call nurture.
Bryan D. Midgley
Susan M. Schneider Susan Oyama (1989, p. 5)
James T. Todd
26
THE INTERBEHAVIORIST
A Quarterly Newsletter
of Interbehavioral Psychology
ISSN 8755-612X
Edward K. Morris, Editor
Department of Human Development
2035D Haworth Hall
University of Kansas
Lawrence, Kansas 66045, U.S.A.
913-864-4840
The Interbehayiprist is a quarterly
publication of news, information,
discussion, journal and book notes, book
reviews, comments, and brief articles
pertaining to interbehavioral psychology
a contextualistic, integrated-field
approach to the natural science of
behavior.
The newsletter publishes professional
communications that fall between informal
correspondence and colloquia, and formal
archival publication. As such, the
newsletter supplements contemporary
journals dedicated to basic and applied
research, to the history and philosophy of
the behavioral sciences, and to
professional issues in the field. The
newsletter strongly encourages
submission of notes about current
professional activities.of its
subscribers, news and observations about
interbehavioral psychology and related
perspectives, comments on journal articles
and books of -interest, more extended book
reviews, and brief articles. All
submissions should be sent in triplicate
to the editor and should conform to the
style described in the Publication Manual
of the American Psychological Association
(3rd edition).
Subscription Info rmat ion
Student Subscriptions (USA) $ 4.00
Regular Subscriptions (USA) 6.00
Foreign (Non-USA) Subscriptions.... 8.00
Institutional Subscriptions 12.00
Back Volumes 1-16 8.00
Back Volume Complete Sets... Please Write
THE PRINCIPIA PRESS
Principia Press's currently available
titles in interbehavioral psychology are
listed below. Check your bookshelves, and
those of your library and bookstore, for
possible oversights. In addition, the
books make excellent gifts for colleagues
and students, especially for the latter in
honor of their completed degree
requirements. The books may be purchased
directly from Principia Press, 5743 Kimbark
Avenue, Chicago, IL 60637. Handling
charges are $.75 per title; prepaid orders
are postpaid. Any queries should also be
directed to the address above.
Principles of Psychology (2 vols.)
$20.00
Psychology and Logic (2 vols.)
$25.00
Interbehavioral Psychology
$15.00
The Logic of Modern Science
$15.00
An Objective Psychology of Grammar
$13.00
The Scientific Evolution of Psychology
(2 vols.) $40.00
The Science of Psycho 1 ogyj^ An
In t e rbehavior a 1 Sjoryey $20.00
P s_y ch ologi ca1 Linguistics
$15.00
The Aim and Progress of Psychology and
Other Sciences $20.00
Interbehavioral Philosophy
$27.50
Cultural Psychology
$16.00
Tragedy and ;the Event Continuum
$15.00
Selected Writings, 1929-1983
$20.00
Psychological Comments and Queries
$20.00

THE AGORA
The Association for Behavior Analysis
The May ABA meeting once again provided
fertile soil for interbehavioral
psychology. The two planned symposia
"An Introduction to Interbehavioral
Psychology" (Cone, Delprato, Mountjoy, and
Ray) and "Basic Behavioral and Linguistic
Processes: Multiple Response Methodologies"
(Ghezzi, Iversen, Pennypacker, and Wruble)
were well-prepared and well-received.
The meeting of the Interbehaviorists in
ABA Special Interest Group (SIG) drew more
than a dozen ABA members, some for the
first time. Linda J. Hayes (University of
Nevada-Reno), the SIG chair, was unable to
attend, but did send minutes and an
agenda. Her comments on the special issue
of Behavior Analysis, the APA Division 25
newsletter, whose contents were listed in
the last issue of this newsletter, bear
repeating.
As announced at the SIG meeting at
ABA 1988, a special issue of Behavior
Analysis, APA Division 25's journal,
commemorating the 100th anniversary of
Kantor's birth was published in
December of 1988.
The idea for a special issue of
Behavior Analysis arose as it appeared
that a book planned for this purpose,
to be edited by Emilio Ribes and Linda
Hayes, would not be finished before the
end of 1988. (These authors are still
planning to produce a book of Kantor's
work, and have a commitment from
Trillas for publication in Spanish. An
English version may be available
through a desk-top publishing outfit.
More news on this later.) The authors
originally contacted for the edited
volume were asked if they would agree
to have short versions of their
chapters appear in the special issue,
given the time constraints. Most
agreed, although as it turned out not
all could be accommodated due to space
limitations. Skinner was one of those
who did not agree. In fact, he was
outraged at the idea of a special issue
of Behavior Analysis in celebration of
Kantor's work, and made this known to me,
as editor, and to several present and
past members of the Division 25
Executive Committee, among others. The
special issue was produced as planned
nonetheless.
27
I think Skinner's (1988) "Cuckoos"
piece in the ABA Newsletter may have
been prompted by these events, at least
in part. As Chair of the
Interbehaviorists in ABA Special
Interest Group, I felt some obligation
to respond, but in fact did not do so.
I don't think Skinner's feelings about
interbehaviorists in ABA are shared by
the ABA membership. I think we should
just carry on as always respectfully
educating the masses!
Enough said. The main SIG business
focused on planning next year's ABA
symposia, two of which were tentatively
proposed - an "introductory" one on
Kantor's analysis of complex behavior
(e.g., feelings, emotion, cognition, and
language) and one on the implications of a
systems or ecological (i.e.,
Interbehavioral) perspective for problems
in clinical psychology. If readers have
suggestions about topics or presenters,
please write the editor, who will pass
them on.
Notes from the Field
Sidney W. Bijou has published an up-
date on the behavior analysis of child
development in a chapter entitled
"Behavior Analysis" in R. Vasta (Ed.).
(1989). Annals of Child Development: Six
Theories of Child Development (Vol. 6, pp.
61-83). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. Bijou,
with T. R. Kratochwill also published a
chapter on the impact of behaviorism on
educational psychology for J. A. Glover
and R. R. Ronning's (Eds.). (1987).
Historical foundations of educational
psychology (pp. 131-157). New York:
Plenum.
Among publications by other newsletter
readers are Roger D. Ray and Dennis J.
Delprato's (1989) "Behavioral systems
analysis: Methodological strategies and
tactics" in Behavioral Science, 34, 81-127;
William M. Gardner's (1987) Language: The
Most Human Act; Edward K. Morris's review
of Costall and Still's Cognitive
Psychology in Question in The Behavior
Analyst (1989, 12, 59-67; and Robert G.
Wahler and Jean E. Dumas's "Attentional
Problems in Dysfunctional Mother-Child
Interactions: An Interbehavioral Model"
in the Psychological Bulletin. 1989, 105,
116-130.
28
COMMENTS
What Can You Believe from Print?
Arthur Kahn
Annapolis, MD
The following comments are based on
a footnote by Hilgard (1987, p. 821),
reprinted in The Interbehaviorist, 1988,
.16(4), 33. It reads as follows:
Although Skinner was the chairman of
the Department of Psychology at Indiana
University (1945-1948), including the
year in which he gave his Harvard
lectures on verbal behavior, and Kantor
was active on the faculty, their mutual
interests in varieties of behaviorism
and in psycholinguistics apparently did
not lead to common understandings about
language. Skinner (1957) found no
occasion to cite Kantor's book of 1936,
and when Kantor wrote again on
psycholinguistics (Kantor, 1977) he
found no occasion to mention Skinner's
of 1957, although he did mention
Chomsky.
The purpose of this commentary is to
clarify the relationship between Kantor
and Skinner and to point out Kantor's
criticisms of mind-body dualism. To begin
with, because Kantor mentions Chomsky, but
not Skinner, Hilgard's footnote might be
interpreted to mean that Kantor was
sympathetic to Chomsky. Nothing could be
further from the fact. Let me quote from
Kantor's Psychological Linguistics:
A brief description of what has been
called transformational grammar
illustrates the heavy emphasis that is
placed upon a "mind." Upon this
intellectual sand they erect the
following set of autistic propositions.
(1) The "soul" or "mind" is fitted
-with innate powers or competencies
which determine, guide, and govern
linguistic performances. It is owing
to this innate and intuitive principle
that children at an early age know and
achieve grammatically correct sentence
structures.
(2) The mind is furnished with a
primary generative level of deep
structures which generate the surface
structures of language presumed to
involve semantic e.lements or rules
such as subject-predicate, verb-object,
as well as modifier-noun combinations.
Surface structure consists of the
actual sentences with their phonological
components as ordered by the rules of
deep structure.
(3) Since language is generated by
a "mind" the development of speech by
children is simply a matter of
maturation. Here is a glaring
misinterpretation of maturation based
upon a false analogy. It is a false
assumption that the development of
speech is like the maturation of
physiological acts upon the development
of cellular structures.
(4) Language development consists
of the ability to create sentences out
of words by means of imitation and
analogy.
How can Chomsky believe these fairy
tales? No doubt by the self-assumed
authority to make the study of language
contribute to the understanding of
human nature. (p. 266)
If justification is required for the
treatment of such an involved and
theologically tinged form of language
theory, it is to be looked for in the
social background of linguistics.
Transformational linguistics has
temporarily transformed general
linguistics and the library-sized
literature that it has provoked has
marked a regression in an important
field of study and so must be taken
into account. (p. 267)
Hilgard's footnote notwithstanding, the
relationship between Skinner and Kantor
was closer than might be surmised. For
example, prior to World War II, Kantor
asked John B. Carroll, a Ph.D. from
Minnesota, to join the Indiana faculty.
He was asked, in part, because he was
interested in language and was conversant
with Skinner's ideas through Minnesota.
Carroll had lost interest in language,
however, and had taken up factor analysis

(Carroll, personal communication; I am
indebted to Dr. James Capshew of the
University of Maryland for assistance in
locating Dr. Carroll).
Hilgard apparently considered Kantor's
concerns as solely psycholinguistic, for
he ignored Kantor's writings on the mind-
body problem. Even though Hilgard
discusses this problem, he does not see
it as the pervasive problem Kantor did.
For instance, although Hilgard
discusses James J. Gibson's contribution
to psychology, he misses Gibson's
rejection of dualism. As pointed out by
Reed (1988), Gibson was anti-dualistic.
Following Holt, Gibson believed that no
mind existed as separate from the physical
world. Gibson had sent Hilgard a
manuscript copy of his book Perception o_f
the Visual World at Hilgard's request
while Hilgard was writing a chapter on the
role of learning in perception. According
to Hilgard, he in turn sent Gibson a copy
of the chapter. Gibson wrote back: "I
appreciate your kind words about my book,
but I am disappointed that you were not
instructed by it." As Reed points out:
Once a dualism was erected, it seemed
impossible to eliminate it. Without an
elimination of dualism of mind-body
that has been ingrained into the
knowledge base of the non-
psychologists, the ability to look at
psychological research objectively by
non-psychologists is suspect.
A good example of this is offered in
Capshew1s (1986) "Engineering a Technology
of Behavior: B. F. Skinner's Kamikaze
Pigeons in World War II" (see Skinner,
1960). As described by Capshew, Skinner's
contract was cancelled by the National
Defense Resource Council (NDRC), even
after "continued support," due to a
perceived lack of interest by the armed
forces and due to difficulties with the
missile development team at MIT. The
failure of the project was not due to
technical reasons. In Capshew1s words:
Rather it was due to fundamental
differences In disciplinary outlook and
style between the Skinner group and the
NDRC engineers. Coming from laboratory
psychology,' Skinner was at a
disadvantage in trying to enter
territory that was considered part of
electrical and mechanical engineering.
29
He lacked experience in dealing with
extramural research agencies even in
his own field of psychology.
Furthermore, he failed to mobilize the
support of influential psychologists
involved in government scientific
circles. Instead, Project Pigeon
members felt their way, eventually
learning to conceptualize their work in
engineering terms, as we have seen in
their use of the metaphor of the bird
as a machine. But that occurred after
NDRC officials had already begun to
lose their initial enthusiasm for the
idea. The contract administrators
tried to be open minded about the
project's unusual approach, but without
a compelling rationale from its
advocates they retreated behind
traditional disciplinary boundaries.
The official account of the project
noted the prevailing mood:
Investigators in the physical sciences
are inclined to discount unduly the
findings of their colleagues in the
field of psychological behavior. Such
an attitude is far from scientific...
(p. 10)
In sum, Kantor's comments on Chomsky
illustrate that what non-psychologists
know about psychology has not improved
since Skinner's experience during World
War II. Hilgard's book demonstrates that,
in the main, American psychology is still
burdened by mind-body dualism in spite of
the writings of Kantor and a few others.
References
Capshew, J. H. (1986, October).
Engineering a. technology of behavior:
B^ F. Skinner' s kamikaze pigeons^ in
World War II. Paper presented at the
meeting for the History of Technology,
Pittsburgh, PA.
Hilgard, E. R. (1987). Psychology in
America: A historical survey. San
Diego: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich.
Kantor, J. R. (1977). Psychological
lingistics. Chicago: Principia Press.
Reed, E. S. (1988). James J. Gibson and
the psychology of perception. New
Haven: Yale University Press.
Skinner, B. F. (1957). Verbal behavior.
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Skinner, B. F. (I960.). Pigeons in a
pelican. American Psychologist, 15,
28-37.
30
Is Behavior Organism-Centered Reactions or Interactional Field Relationships?
Harry C. Mahan
Oceanside, CA
Almost since the beginning,
interbehavioral psychology and behavior
analysis have run parallel courses, more
often in rivalry than in collaboration.
The rivalry, though, is becoming
counterproductive, for each has something
to offer the other. Behavior analysis has
a productive basic and applied research
paradigm; interbehavioral psychology has a
philosophical orientation to benefit both
scientific and practical work.
Realizing that the science of behavior
needs all the support possible, Linda J.
Hayes, editor of Behavior Analysis,
prepared a 1988 (Vol. 23, No. 3) issue of
the newsletter in honor of the centennial
of Kantor's birth. Among the
contributions, Emilio Ribes's and Joseph
Roca's are noteworthy for their concern
with the fundamental Kantorian principle
that context is essential to behavior.
Ribes and Roca provide excellent
philosophical background in their
comparison of interbehavioral psychology
with the tenets of behavior analysis.
Both papers, it is hoped, will be read by
psychologists of other persuasions.
Although space does not permit lengthy
commentary, brief quotations from the two
papers convey a sense of their common
theme. The first is from Roca:
To understand behavior without locating
it in the organism may be achieved by
considering biological behavior to be
the material basis for psychological
behavior. The effect is to undermine
the organism-environment duality, in
that both kinds of behavior are
essential features of being an
organism-in-the-environment. From this
perspective, the concepts of "stimulus"
and "response" are meaningful only as
functionally related segmentations of
the environment and the organism for
the purposes of specific analyses,
(p. 102)
Ribes discussed the history of
mechanism as applied to behavior,
following which he stated:
Psychological theory might deal more
effectively with the role of history
and context in psychological behavior
were these mechanical restrictions
eliminated. In doing so, it may be
possible to propose sound
interpretations of complex behaviors
(i.e., thinking, communicating,
remembering, etc.) as relations.
Kantor's contributions in this regard
may be considered philosophical in
kind. (p. 95)
Ribes' concluding paragraph is important
and succinct:
Changing the assumptions or belief
systems upon which our science is built
means changing the facts with which our
science deals. Changing belief systems
and conceptual models is not an easy
task. The history of science is full
of examples of resistance to new ideas.
Although many contemporary behaviorists
do not feel that Behaviorism and
Psychology must be revisited for the
purpose of evaluating the adequacy of
our theoretical frameworks, others feel
that the time has come for such an
endeavor to be undertaken... Kantor's
formulations may result in a
substantial contribution to this
enterprise if we have enough ingenuity
to use them in ordinary research and
theory construction. To do so, would
recognize his most important
contribution: telling us what psycho-
logical behavior is about! (p. 99)
To an octogenerian long since retired,
who, as a young psychologist, enrolled as
a graduate student at Indiana University
in 1935 to find out from Kantor "what
psychological behavior is about," such
words are indeed gratifying.

JOURNAL AND BOOK NOTES
Oyama, S. (1989). Ontogeny and the
central dogma: Do we need the concept
of genetic programming in order to have
an evolutionary perspective? In M. R,
Gunnar & E. Thelen (Eds.), Systems and
development: The Minnesota symposia on
child psychology (Vol. 22, pp. 1-34).
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Oyama's chapter leads off this
collection of papers exploring several
relationships between general system
theory and developmental psychology. The
collection also includes chapters by
Fentress, Thelen, Belsky, and Patterson,
and commentaries by Horowitz and
Sameroff. Although each chapter is
worthy of comment, this note focuses only
on Oyama's contribution.
Oyama is critical of traditional
assumptions and definitions that form the
basis of much scientific practice (see
also Oyama, 1982, 1985). In the present
instance, she is fore most concerned with
"the central dogma" that development is
guided by a "one-way flow of information..,
from genes" to phenotype, and ultimately
to some behaviors (p. 7).
Scientists often use the rhetoric of
"interaction" between nature and nurture,
but Oyama is again critical because this
"interactionism" treats nature, as well as
nurture, as independent, weighted causes.
"Interaction," as such, is only minimally
removed from "lineal-mechanism." Oyama
also astutely points out that descriptions
of development based on this interactional
perspective are also preformationistic
(i.e., self-actional) in that genes are
usually given final power as the
repository of control. After all,
development is not a whilly-nilly affair;
it must be controlled by something
right? (see also Dewey & Bentley's, 1949,
discussion of interaction).
In presenting an alternative to
lineal-mechanical and preformationistic
accounts of developmental phenomena, Oyama
asks "What is inherited?" (p. 23). She
answers that genes are inherited but so
too are cultures. Inheritance goes beyond
the biological boundries of the organism;
it includes whatever extraorganismic
"developmental influences" make up the
"developmental-system." Eventual
outcomes, whether biological phenotypes or
31
psychological behaviors, are the result
of developmental processes." It is ironic
that some developmental psychologists
speak of the inheritance of behavior or of
the genetic control of behavior, for in
doing so they are thereby ignoring the
actual processes of development. As
Oyama notes in this regard, "the
transmission metaphor denies development"
(p. 24).
As for the constructs "nature" and
"nurture," Oyama does not abandon them,
but rather, offers new definitions:
"Nature is the product of the process of
the developmental interactions we call
nurture" (p. 5). That is, nurture is a
developmental process, which includes all
components (biological and otherwise) of
the developmental system. Nature is the
outcome, at any point along the
developmental stream, of nurture.
Reasonably so, all is nature, or natural;
science does not deal with the nonnatural.
Note should also be made of Oyama's
treatment of evolution, for she argues
that the relationship between it and
development needs reworking. Although
evolutionary phenomena are intimately
related to developmental phenomena,
traditional conceptualizations of their
are inadequate, for they are not based
on principles of contemporary
"constructivist interactionism" Oyama's
term for a field or system perspective.
Here, as elsewhere (e.g., Oyama, 1982,
1985), Oyama challenges some hoary
concepts and provides important insights
into how we might better deal with some
problems at the very heart of
biobehavioral phenomena. (Bryan D.
Midgley, University of Kansas)
References
Dewey, J., & Bentley, A. F. (1949).
Knowing and the known. Boston: Beacon
Press.
Oyama, S. (1982). A reformulation of the
idea of maturation. In P. P. G. Bateson
& P. H. Klopfer (Eds.), Perspectives in
ethology: Ontogeny (Vol. V 5,
pp. 101-131). New York: Plenum.
Oyama, S. (1985). The ontogeny of
information: Developmental systems and
evolution. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
32

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Effecla ol Shock Controllability on Alpha
Mile Aggression end Defense, Defeat
of Intruders, and Defensive Burying.
Jon L. WiSarns.
"Suparallllous" Behavior In Children.
Gregory A. Wagner and Edward K. Morris.
Behaviorism and tha Hew Selene* ol
Cognition. Laurence loiter.
Professional and Personal Blunders In
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Myrtfc HoOfa-i*.
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Schedule* The Influence ol Besponw
Olsplawmtnl. Ivw H- Jversen.
Monvolltlon In Hypnoili: A Semtollc
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Universal and Pei*nil KalpIsisneM: A
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Mtfam E. Kranw and Robed A. BoseSinL
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BacVward Second-Order Conditioning In
Ravor Avartlon Learning. Robert R.
NtoAiet, Doug'as-E. Kiug, and
Stephen B. KJeii.
The Psychological Record Is a gefveral (ournal o( psychcfegy. SVice 1937 '. has pubfehed psychotoo'cal Oieory and
research concerned wSh a broad rar^e ol lop'cs ki Ihe cEscJjtfoa. RapW pubTcafon erf accspied marajscripls aswes that
each Issue conta'ns very Iecnt viwk.
Preference for TBrmlnal-UrA Key PtcWng
In Concurrent Homogeneous and
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Stephen p. Starin.
Second-Orrftr Conditional Control ol
Symmetric nd TransiUva SUmulus
RaliUoru: The Influence of Onfflr
EflKd, Cf a!g H- Kennedy and R*Jiard
Lal'osn.
Rsiponw ol HeonBliI Prairie RtHtsjntist
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Betefop*elne Chsnueal Cue*. Kent M,
Seudder. DsM ChSzar, Hobart M. SmSh,
and Ted W*!cr.
Effects of Schedule and Length ol Training
on Reward-Induced Stersotypy end
DegaUva Transfer In Humans. Dsn&e K-
Gross and Arthur Outran.
PleaM ParM the Sentence: Animal
Cognlllon In lha Procrustean Bed ol
Linguistics. RotaW J. Schusismran and
Robert C. GisifW.
In Wrikri Procrustean Bsd Does the Sea
Lion Sleep Tonight? Lotis M. Herman.
Some Factor* that Influence Tianifer of
Oddity Performance In tha Pigeon.
Richard Pisacreta, Davy Gough, Jamas
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. Procedure!. Charles J. Morris.

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THE INTERBEHAVIQRIST
Edward K. Morris, Editor
Department of Human Development
University of Kansas
Lawrence, KS 66045 .
Bryan D. Hidqley
Department of Human Development
University of Kansas
Lawrence, KS 6&045
 A Quarterly Newsletter of Interbehavioral Psychology
ISSN 8755-612X

Published at the University of Kansas

Volume 17 1989 Number 4

EDITOR TABLE OF CONTENTS

Edward K. Morris The Agora 35

University of Kansas
In Memoriara: Parker E. Lichtenstein
on William Stephenson 36
ADVISORY BOARD
Comments 37
Sidney W. Bijou
University of Arizona Delprato, Dennis J. A Point Well
Donna M. Cone Taken , 37
State of Rhode' Island
Dennis J. Delprato Book and Journal Notes 38
Eastern Michigan University
Linda J. Hayes Editorial Staff on Gardner's (1989)
University of Nevada-Reno Language: The Most Human Act... 38
Sandy Hobbs (Scotland)
Paisley College of Technology H. C. Mahan on Prilleltensky's
Paul T. Mountjoy (1989) "Psychology and the
Western Michigan University Status Quo" 38
N. H. Pronko
Wichita State University N. W. Smith on Spanos and Chaves's
Roger D. Ray (1989) Hypnosis 40
Rollins College
Emilio Ribes (Mexico) Book Reviews 41
Escuela Nacional de Estudios
Douglas H. Ruben D. J. Chlubna. on Kerry W. Buckley's
Okemos, MI (1989) Mechanical Man 41
Robert G. Wahler
University of Tennessee H. C. Mahan on B. F. Skinner's (1989)
Recent Issues in the AnajLysi.s of
Behavior 43

ASSISTANT EDITORS Article 45

Bryan D. MIdgley Sharpe, Thomas L., Jr., Hawkins,

James T. Todd Andrew H., & Landin, Dennis An
Interbehavioral View of Sport
Pedagogy Expertise 45
 THE INTERBEHAVIORIST THE FRINCIPIA PRESS

A Quarterly Newsletter Principia Press's currently available

of Interbehavioral Psychology
ISSN 8755-612X
Edward K. Morris, Editor
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The Inter behavior is t is a quarterly
publication of news, information,
discussion, journal and book notes, book
reviews, comments, and brief articles
pertaining to interbehavioral psychology
-- a contextualistic, integrated-field
approach to the natural science of
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The newsletter publishes professional
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correspondence and colloquia, and formal
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newsletter supplements contemporary
journals dedicated to basic and applied
research, to the history and philosophy of
the behavioral sciences, and to
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newsletter strongly encourages
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and books of interest, more extended book
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and students, especially for the latter in
honor of their completed degree
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Psychological Linguistics
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THE AGORA
The time has finally come. During the
past several years, your editor has off-
and-on-again sought the advice of The
Interbehaviorist's Advisory Board
regarding the newsletter's direction and
his handling of the editorship. The Board
always responded enthusiastically and
supportively. In seeking the Board's
advice, though, I must admit to having
been subtly suggesting that the
newsletter might benefit from a new
editor.
Finally, I have made the difficult
decision myself: I am stepping down as
editor, albeit after consultation with the
Advisory Board. Taking over the
newsletter in 1983 brought excitement and
stimulation. It was among the best times
of my professional life time with my
assistant editors and with the Advisory
Board, though mostly with you, the
readers. But, I have lost my edge. Just
seeing to the newsletter's management has
become more of a job than an abiding
passion. I have been putting in little
more time and effort than has been
required. You and the newsletter deserve
better than that.
What you deserve is what the new
editor, Linda J. Hayes (University of
Nevada-Reno), will offer the special
interest, the passion, the time, and the
energy. In consulting with several
Advisory Board members and readers about
the selection of a new editor, we all
agreed that Linda was just the right
person, just the right professional, just
the right interbehavioral psychologist.
We are pleased that she has accepted the
honor and the responsibility.
Linda takes over Th_e Interbehaviorist
as of the mailing of this issue. Several
matters remain to be settled, of course,
but the publication is now in her hands.
The composition of the Advisory Board, the
editorial policies, and the title and
format of the newsletter are hers to
retain .or alter as she sees fit just as
they were mine. I see no need to burden
Linda with formalities and traditions that
may not be functional for her interests,
though we have agreed to increase the
subscription rates slightly. If you have
any concerns about the future of the
newsletter, Linda of course welcomes your
comments and suggestions. She may be
reached at the Department of Psychology,
35
University of Nevada-Reno, Reno, NV 89557-
0062 (702-784-4998)
Linda and I are optimisitic about the
future of the newsletter, in part because
of what is evident in the present issue:
an increased number of submissions,
especially from new authors. We thank
David J. Chlubna, Thomas L. Sharpe, Andrew
H. Hawkins, and Dennis Landin for their
contributions, and encourage others to
submit material as well. The newsletter
is your newsletter.
Thank you all for your splendid support
during my tenure as editor. It was
occasionally a dickens of a time, but it
was always the best of times.
In Memoriam
Now to some sad news. Although the
current issue of the newsletter contains
an interesting and lively potpourri of
material, we first note the passing of
William Stephenson (University of
Missouri). In preparing a thoughtful
memoriam for this issue (see p. 36),
Parker E. Lichtenstein (Newark, OH)
remarked:
I am glad that I had an opportunity to
meet Stephenson. He spoke of his
desire to promote closer cooperation
with interbehaviorists. It is
unfortunate that groups with so much in
common are often so isolated from one
another.
Notes from tzhe Field
Sidney W. Bijou (University of Arizona)
has published a 1989 chapter in Advances
in Child Development and Behavior,
entitled "Psychological Linguistics:
Implications for a Theory of Initial
Development and a Method for Research."
That Little Extra
We appreciate the "little extra" a
number of subscribers included with their
last year's subscriptions William M.
Gardner, Linda J. Hayes, Noel W. Smith,
and an unnamed generous other. These
gifts allowed us to keep our subscription
rates below actual costs once again.
New Subscribers
Theresa A. Habib (Farmington Hills, MI)
Steven J. Meyers (Ann Arbor, MI)
J. L, Penrod (Adrian, MI)
36
IN MEMORIAM
William Stephenson (1902-1989)
William Stephenson's long and
productive academic career was unusual in
that it embraced two fields in which he
held doctorates physics and psychology.
As assistant to Charles Spearman, he
became involved with factor analysis; this
interest was further developed during his
work as assistant to Cyril Burt, who was
Spearman1s successor at the University of
London.
From 1939 to 1947, Stephenson was in
military service. Then, in 1948, he went
to the University of Chicago where he
served until 1956 as Visiting Professor
and Lecturer. In the late 1950s, he
accepted an appointment in the School of
Journalism of the University of Missouri,
where he worked for the remainder of his
life. Missouri gave him the freedom to
follow his interests pretty much as they
led him and as a result, given his great
energy and enthusiasm, he was highly
productive.
In 1935, Stephenson introduced the Q-
methodology with q representing person
correlations rather than the trait
correlations expressed by Pearson's r.
From the beginning, however, Q-methodology
was seen as controversial. Burt and
Stephenson were in disagreement, and the
American factor analysis establishment led
by Thurstone ignored or rejected Q. Yet
for more than fifty years Stephenson
nurtured, developed, and refined Q-
methodology with unabated zeal. Although
his sights were constantly fixed upon Q,
his scholarly interests were extremely
broad, ranging over practically all areas
in which subjectivity might be considered
important.
Stephenson and Carl Rogers were friends
from the Chicago days. Rogers and some of
his associates used Q-sorts, but did not
employ the full Q-methodology of
correlations and factors. It is somewhat
paradoxical that most psychologists have
used or at least have been familiar with
Q-sorts, but very few have made use of the
Q-methodology. This is not to say that Q-
studies have not been conducted by people
in other fields; they have been in
relative abundance in such areas as
political science, communication,
advertising, and education.
It was Stephenson's ambition to.
establish a science of subjectivity. He
was sympathetic with the aims of
humanistic psychologists, like Rogers, who
employed a phenomenological method. At
the same time, he was convinced that
phenomenology lacked a satisfactory
postulational foundation and methodology.
Stephenson sought to work within a fully
naturalistic framework and was, therefore,
intent upon avoiding all "psychisms." He
found what he was looking for in Kantor's
interbehavioral psychology and, in
particular, in Kantor's behavior segment
and the formula for a psychological event.
These Stephenson regarded as fundamental.
Kantor, however, approached the subject
(person) from the psychologist's
standpoint (i.e., objectively).
Stephenson, through use of the Q-
methodology, extended an interbehavioral
approach to embrace subjectivity, defined
as self-reference.
In time, it became clear to Stephenson
that Q operates within the probabilistic
framework of quantum theory, A full
statement of the implications of this
position appeared as a five-part article
by Stephenson in The Psychological Record
entitled "William James, Niels Bohr, and
Complementarity" (e.g., Stephenson, 198-).
Stephenson was a friendly man, and
gracious in manner, yet he was an intense
and enthusiastic person obviously
completely dedicated to his work. He was
often a severe-and even a harsh critic,
but his criticism was intended simply to
place the same heavy intellectual demands
on his associates as he had already placed
them on himself. As a professional
psychologist, Bill Stephenson was a
maverick in the best sense of the word.
He served psychology well and provided
inspiration to many. We should be
fortunate to have more like him. (Parker
E. Lichtenstein, Newark, OH)
Reference
Stephenson, W. (1988). William James,
Niels Bohr, and complementarity. The .
Psychological Record, 38, 19-35.

COMMENTS
A Point Well Taken
Dennis J. Delprato
Eastern Michigan University
Comments on the relationship between
interbehavioral psychology and the
behavioral sciences more generally
continue to arise, as well they should.
Hayes (1989) has addressed one of the more
forceful of these comments Skinner's
(1988) disavowal of kinship between
interbehavioral psychology and the
Association for Behavior Analysis (ABA).
He urged the interbehaviorists to steer
clear of ABA because they are disruptive
they are too critical. In return,
Hayes commented that interbehavioral
psychologists will continue with business
as usual - educating "the masses."
Hayes apparently thinks that the
marriage between interbehaviorism and ABA
is worth saving, I hope so, but Skinner's
comments may be more in tune with how
things are than with how we may wish they
were. The marriage may once have had a
chance of surviving, for Kantor
(interbehaviorism) and Skinner (the major
figure behind ABA) were driving forces in
a literature that was unique in its
potential for moving psychology forward.
But survival may no longer be possible
because Skinner's views have not developed
beyond the advanced behavioral sciences of
the 1930s (see Parrott, 1983). In
contrast, modern scientific thinking is
field- and system-oriented, which is
incompatible with approaches such as
Skinner's which hold, for example, that
the ultimate causes of behavior are to be
found in "the environment."
Hayes's optimism is based on her view
that Skinner does not speak for ABA as a
whole, which is supported by the actions
of ABA and the Society for the Advancement
of Behavior Analysis (SABA) SABA
publishes The Behavior Analyst. For
instance, ABA has approved the
interbehavioral special interest group and
SABA has appointed individuals with
interbehavioral expertese to its journal
editorial board. Given the vast
difference between the field-systems
perspective of interbehavioral psychology
and the views of the major impetus for ABA
(Skinner), then perhaps ABA has
37
progressed. Such conciliatory-appearing
actions, however, may reflect little more
than a superficial accedence to particular
circumstances than a resolute commitment
to examine critically what ABA stands for
and to move ABA thinking forward.
To the extent that ABA is tied to
Skinner's dictates, his point that
interbehaviorists are unwelcome is well-
taken. No tears should be shed over the
rebuff, for Skinner's behaviorism has
nothing to offer those who seek to advance
behavioral science beyond schools that
offer so-called philosophies of
psychological science. Skinner does not
realize that when sciences become
sciences, then there is a discipline a
science. Philosophies, such as radical
behaviorism, are followed when workers
have yet to get clear on their job. To
Kantor, behaviorism was never a
philosophy, but was science itself. The
interbehaviorism that Skinner finds
repugnant is not a philosophy in search of
a science. Interbehaviorism refers to the
most-recently evolved science of behavior
(see Midgley, 1988).
We sometimes read that interbehaviorism
offers a philosophy for the experimental
and applied analyses of behavior (see
Mahan, 1989). Here, for instance,
interbehaviorism is taken to be strictly
philosophical, attaining scientific status
and applied significance by remora-like
attachment to the "authentic" data-based
science of the two aforementioned branches
of behavior analysis. As my remarks
should make clear, though,
interbehaviorism is not a philosophy in
search of a science and application.
References
Hayes, L. J. (1989). ABA convention.
The Interbehaviorist, 1_7, 27.
Mahan, H. C. (1989). Book review. The
Interbehaviorist, 17, 16-17.
Midgley, B. D. (1988). The death of
interbehavioral psychology. The
Interbehaviorist^ 16(2), 21.
Parrott, L, J. (1983). On the
differences between Skinner's radical
behaviorism and Kantor's
interbehaviorism. Mexican Journal pjE
Behavior Analysis, ^, 95-115.
Skinner, B. F. (1988). The cuckoos. The
ABA Newsletter, 11(3), 9.
38
BOOK AND JOURNAL NOTES
Gardner, W. M. (1989). Language: The
most human act. Jacksonville, AL:
Center for Social Design.
William M. Gardner's (Jacksonville State
University) Language: The Most Human Act
an interbehavioral account of the
behavior of speakers has b'een revised.
We reprint the book's preface below. An
advertisement appears on the back cover
of the newsletter.
Preface
Few subjects in the history of science
have generated the controversies that mark
the history of the study of language. No
subject matter in psychology, with the
possible exception of perception, has
become so much identified with speculative
accounts mired in mind-brain-body
metaphysics. Selection of a textbook for
a course titled "Psychology of Language"
has become a choice between the mentalists
and radical behaviorists. That is,
language is conceived as either a mind-
brain process or conditioned behavior.
The notion of internal controllers of
human behavior is a legacy of the Dark
Ages. The soul-mind has a reality born of
verbal traditions of Christian thinkers.
Even Western philosophers who became
Christian atheists stipulate an unseen
internal controller of human behavior. In
Western philosophy, the soul has survived
God, Moreover, the mind (the mortal
aspect of the soul) has in recent decades
been reincarnated as the brain.
Psychologists have come to present the
brain as an inscrutable force that
controls behavior.
Skinner's behavioral account (by far
the most credible behavioral account)
reduces linguistic acts to operant
contingencies, and in that sense is
adequate. Unfortunately, it is an
explanation that preceded the description
of language acts. It is fair to say that
radical behaviorists (or Skinnerians) are
prepared to explain any behavioral
phenomenon that other, less inspired,
researchers bother to observe, document,
and describe. For the faithful
SkinnerIan, observations of reinforcement
contingencies alone supply a sufficient
operant account. It would appear that
Skinner has exorcised the mind at some
cost to the status of the subject matter
the behavior of organisms.
The eclectic instructor teaching the
Psychology of Language may give both
accounts (i.e., mentalistic and
behavioristic) equal time, and then
evaluate the students on their ability to
conduct the wise exegesis. In this case,
much time will be spent on definitions and
conceptions, and little time will be given
to description of actual linguistic
behaviors.
There is little hope that psychologists
in general will ever focus on the
naturalistic subject matter that Aristotle
gave us the interactions that develop
between organisms and stimulus objects,
interactions which develop from
experience. If we could leap back over
the years dominated by the Roman Church,
back to Greek naturalism, language acts
would appear as the premier examples of
psychological events. Such a leap was the
goal and inspiration in writing Language:
The Most Human Act. My objective was to
approach language as though it were
naturally occurring behavior, that is,
organisms making specific acquired
adjustments to stimulus objects. Thus,
there was no attempt to follow Skinner's
lead and reconceive, or preconceive,
language as operant contingencies. And,
of course, no speculations about Internal
controllers were entertained.
Specifically, the principles followed were
those formulated by J. R. Kantor.
Prilleltensky, I. (1989). Psychology and
the status quo. American Psychologist,
44, 795-802~
In a recent American Psychologisj:,
Prilleltensky (1989) brings attention to
what he considers psychology1s failure to
integrate itself with and influence the
political, economic, and social
institutions of which it is a product. He
points out that, according to the codes of
ethics of both the American and Canadian
Psychological Associations, psychology's
own objectives may be hindering the

improvement of the human condition by
"guarding the interests of the status
quo." In explaining why this is so, he
comments on the adverse characteristics of
the behavioral perspective, the organic
perspective (functionalism), humanistic
psychology, and cognitive psychology,
Their shortcomings are summarized in his
conclusion that all four approaches are
organism-centered rather than integrated
with the institutions in which psychology
plays a part.
In the case of behavioral psychology,
Prilleltensky (1989) points out that
although it emphasizes the modification of
environmental conditions, a significant
differentiation should be made between (a)
altering the immediate conditions versus
(b) modifying more encompassing social
environments. As for functionalism, he
comments:
The clear conforming message of
functionalism was and still is that
human suffering is predominantly a
result of a deficient organism. From
this viewpoint, environmental factors
such as poor nutrition, detrimental
living conditions, and unemployment are
caused by the inability of those people
to help themselves, (p. 798)
In discussing humanistic psychology, he
concludes: "In its battle against
determinism it overlooked some
environmental variables that exercise
considerable influence on human
personality and behavior" (pp. 798-799).
Of cognitive psychology, he notes:
The cognitive psychologist, by focusing
almost exclusively on internal
processes, is exposed to the risk of
losing sight of sociohistorical
variables that may influence our way of
thinking and operating in society. (p.
799)
Prilleltensky makes no mention of
interbehavioral psychology, and one cannot
help but wonder whether Kantor's (1971)
following comments would have met with his
approval:
It is our theory that through contact
with persons and institutions we
acquire a very large series of behavior
39
segments which make the reaction
conditions of our everyday conduct.
These social reactions are integration
products of the interplay of men and
institutions and let us not for a
moment overlook the fact that we are
talking about actual acts, ways of
eating, walking, talking, playing,
etc....There are as many reactions as
there are permutations of individuals,
groups, and institutions in social
situations....Social conduct, we
repeat, consists of behavior segments
developed through contact with social
institutions' or common stimuli, and the
nature of the behavior is a direct
derivation of the stimulating
circumstances in which the person
acquires it, (p. 799)
Toward the end of his paper,
Prilleltensky's basic thesis becomes more
obviously the advocacy of some vague and
undefined political or social reform, for
he says:
Unless individuals are aware of its
ideological deceptions of v/hich they
are victims, they are unlikely to
engage in change promoting activities.
Although awareness does not necessarily
guarantee action, it is certainly a
condition sine qua non. Psychology is
probably the most appropriate science
to develop that awareness. In exposing
the mechanisms of the prevalent
ideology, psychology can make a
meaningful contribution to the course
of social change. (p. 799)
The activist role that Prilleltensky
recommends for psychology, though, is
inappropriate for a scientific enterprise.
It is already the role of such groups as
Common Cause, environmental activist
organizations, and investigative reporting
by the media. However, again, as in so
many cases, the words of Kantor (1971)
seem appropriate:
Although scientific workers are
presumed to be absolutely critical in
their attitudes and to base their
scientific information and judgment
upon what they can determine to be
actual occurrences, they are
nevertheless greatly influenced by
40
authorities and school affiliations....
The subtle character of their
acquisitions is readily understood from
the fact that institutions and
reactions to them appear to the person
to be as natural facts with apparently
no beginning and no end. Anyone who
attempts to change or remove one of
these absolute institutions meets with
the dire wrath of the individuals who
have already built their behavior
around such common stimuli. Only
through an acquaintance with other and
conflicting institutions can we be
freed from the influence upon our
behavior of the original stimuli found
in our own family, nation, or other
groups. (p. 254)
The primary institution with which
psychology is striving, or should be
striving to identify itself, is the
scientific community. This, like other
institutions, has its standards and its
ethics, and although the latter does and
should include the furtherance of human
welfare, this goal can be achieved by
psychology only through the study of human
behavior in all of its contexts,
including those that are institutional in
nature. When the favorable or unfavorable
effects of a person's surrounding become
apparent, modification of such
surroundings, when indicated, will, we
hope, be undertaken by groups outside the
scientific community. Psychology, more
than any other scientific discipline, has
problems with its own identity as an
institution, and any restructuring will no
doubt have to be directed toward them for
quite some time to come. (Harry G. Mahan,
Oceanside, CA)
References
Kantor, J. R. (1971). The aim and
progress of psychology and other
sciences. Chicago: Principia Press.
Spanos, N. P., & Chaves, J. F. (Eds.).
(1989). Hypnosis: The cognitive-
behavioral perspective, Buffalo, NY:
Prometheus Books. (511 pp. + iv.
$34.95)
Building on the work of Robert White,
Theodore Sarbin, and Theodore Barber, the
editors of Hypnosis have compiled a volume
of theoretical and empirical papers that
adds considerable weight to the view that
hypnotic behavior does not consist of a
mysterious trance in which the individual
is an automaton. Instead, hypnosis
involves a context in which the individual
interacts with a "director" and strives to
behave in the manner the director
describes. Kantor likewise argued against
a mechanistic interpretation. He
described hypnosis as detachment from most
sources of stimulation, but did not
discuss any role for a director.
From this perspective, so-called
hypnosis comes into continuity with such
ordinary behaviors as communication,
social interaction, expectancies,
imagining, and reinforcement. However,
the dualism implied in the title's
hyphenated "cognitive-behavioral" is
represented by some of the writers and to
that extent fails to break with the
problems of the past. For example, in a
section devoted to theory, Michael Diamond
states that the "cognitive model is in no
way antithetical to the notion of trance
and/or altered state(s) of consciousness"
(p. 382). He is quite right: The
cognitive model is both mechanistic and
dualistic, and is thereby in total harmony
with concepts of trance and state. As a
result, many of the old confusions
continue. In the same section, Kirsch and
Council use response expectancy as an
explanatory principle; and Sarbin
contrasts his dramaturgical or role-taking
model with mechanistic accounts. These
two papers do not assume cognition to be
an internal event set apart from behavior,
but instead they deal with cognitive
activity as concrete events. The result
is much more salutary and cogent.
In nineteen papers, this book provides
an abundance of information on empirical,
conceptual, and methodological
accomplishments that advance our
understanding on a variety of topics in
hypnosis. A section on applications is
also valuable. In all, Spanos and Chaves
present the state of the art in
understanding hypnotic behavior. Their
book is an invaluable reference for anyone
interested in the topic. (Noel W. Smith,
SUNY-Plattsburgh)

BOOK REVIEWS
Review of K. W. Buckley's Mechanical Man:
and the; Beginnings of_ Behaviorism
David J. Chlubna
Sturgeon Bay, WI
Kerry W. Buckley's (1989) biography of
John Broadus Watson, Mechanical Man, is
not so much the story of one of American
psychology1s great pioneers as, more
importantly, the history of the social and
cultural events that were instrumental in
transforming the institutionalized
traditional (i.e., European) thought of
this country from a pastiche of
phenomenological philosophy to an exciting
and vigorous method of human behavioral
control from the turn of the century
through World War I and the 1920s.
Buckley traces a fascinating line of
American cultural development from the
advent of industrialization and the steady
migration of populations to large cities,
post World War I economic boom, and
subsequent bust. In a country eager to
separate itself from European influences,
John Watson was viewed by many of his
contemporaries as the embodiment of an
America that could correct the mistakes of
the past through scientific research and
the strategic application of behavioral
prediction and control. According to
Buckley, the quest for human efficiency
and planning fueled Watson's attempts to
help create a new kind of professional
a professional who would design programs
to insure stability and predictability,
not only for the individual, but for
society as a whole. This formidable
undertaking would require a technology
that would be able to address all the
needs of an optimistic and future-oriented
culture. John Watson presented
Behaviorism as an answer to the long
unresolved questions of human behavior and
became its champion/hero as a result.
In his attempt to integrate historical
events with the developmental history of
John Watson, Kerry Buckley has done a
magnificent job. His concise but detailed
profiles of G. Stanley Hall, John Dewey,
and James McKeen Cattell are superb and
relevant to the understanding of the
evolution of American psychology, and
behaviorism in particular, since Watson
41
John Broadus Wat_so_n
challenged the vagueries that abounded in
the works of these notable psychologists.
Of particular interest is Buckley's
numerous references to the ever-changing
character of American society at a time of
transition from a basically rural or
village life-style to highly productive
industries and cities. Parallel to the
discussion of cultural changes taking
place Is the life of John Watsonborn in
a South Carolina hamlet in 1878, rising to
fame (Johns Hopkins University) and fortune
(New York City), and retiring for his
remaining 13 years to a Connecticut farm,
not unlike the farm of his childhood,
until his death in 1958.
The largest section of Mechanical Man
is devoted to Buckley's examination of
Watson's development of behaviorism, first
from his work with terns and white
rats, to infants, and finally, to
consumers. Watson seemed to relish the
opportunity to use his behavioral
technique with such a large "experimental"
group. He viewed his role at the
advertising agency as just one more
example of the everyday uses of
behaviorism for the control of human
functioning, in this case, buying and
selling.
The early part of this century offered
few opportunities to make a suitable
living at the practice of psychology.
Indeed, Watson himself seemed very well
acquainted with the limitations of
traditional (i.e., introspective)
psychology and the. lack of opportunities
to put into practice the methods gleaned
from years in the animal labs of the
University of Chicago and, later, Johns
Hopkins University.
As is well known, after Watson's
ignoble exit from Johns Hopkins in 1920,
he began a career with two of the largest
advertising agencies in the business, J.
Walter Thompson and William Esty. Many
observers have speculated about Watson's
possible sense of betrayal concerning his
"exile" from the academic community,
42
despite his many active connections with
former students and teachers. One popular
tale is that of Watson wreaking revenge on
the society he hoped to improve through a
new kind of advertising based on his own
theories of emotion (i.e., fear, rage, and
love as the basis of all emotional
expression) and through the calculated
pairing of powerful unconditioned stimuli
with suitable neutral stimuli. Hence,
according to some researchers, Watson's ad
campaigns had the stamp of scientific
credibility and, therefore, were used
extensively and effectively to control the
direction of society from self-denial to
self-fulfillment. What seems more
accurate is Buckley's argument that Watson
was interested in the panacea of the post-
war period: personal success and the
.prestige, power and financial security
that follow. If he couldn't have success
in academia, then success in the
commercial world would have to do. "It
can be just as thrilling to watch the
growth of a sales curve of a new product
as to watch the learning curve of animals
or man," writes Watson in the 1936 edition
of The History of Psychology in
Autobiography (Watson, 1936, p. 280).
Watson never lost his fervor for
behaviorism, writing many scholarly and
popular articles on the application of
behaviorism to daily life, especially the
raising of children. One piece of writing
unpublished during Watson's lifetime, but
thankfully quoted at length in Mechanical
Man, is his article titled "The
Behaviorist's Utopia." In this projection
of an alternative sociopolitical system,
all conventional codes of conduct and
mores are replaced with Watsonian
behavioral laws. While not as polished as
Skinner's (1948) Walden Two, Watson's
paradise is an illuminating, if not
frightening, look at 1920s behaviorism
writ large.
In his examination of. the changes
occurring in American psychology at the
turn of the century and of the effort made
on the part of American psychologists to
legitimize their profession, Buckley
credits, in part, the work of historian
Christopher Lasch (1977, 1979) who has
painstakingly considered the long term
effects industrialization has had on the
world and, in particular, on American
families and culture. Those readers
interested in cultural change in the 20th
century will not be disappointed with a
perusal of Lasch's viewpoints on the many
pitfalls of self-fulfillment.
In summary, Mechanical Man is a work
that not only considers the powerful
impact John Broadus Watson had on American
psychology and society, but also the
changing cultural traditions of his time
and the effects such an upheaval had on
Watson and his peers. A great void was
present in American culture after the rise
of industrialism: Ethics and values were
questioned and some rejected in favor of
new explanations of human events. Watson
and others attempted to explain and
improve the lives of people trying to
adjust to the cultural turmoil in America
and Europe. While some observers are
skeptical of Watson's tangible
contributions to psychology, no one can
deny the tremendous influence his ideas
and writings had on succeeding generations
of behaviorists, not to mention consumers.
Mechanical Man will be of interest to
interbehaviorists who want to know more
about the major historical events that
produced the early behaviorists and their
struggle for acceptance as natural
scientistsa status so yearned for and
now so easily taken for granted.
References
Buckley, K. W. (1989). Mechanical man:'
John Broadus Watson and the beginnings
of behaviorism. New York: The
Guilford Press.
Lasch, C. (1977). Haven in a heartless
world: The family besieged. New York:
Basic Books.
Lasch, C. (1979). The culture of
narcissim: American life in an age of_
diminishing expectations. New York:
Norton.
Skinner, B. F. (1948). Walden two. New
York: Macmillan.
Watson, J. B. (1936). John Broadus
Watson. In C. Murchison (Ed,), The
history of_ psychology in autobiography
(Vol. 3, pp. 271-281).Worcester,
MA: Clark University Press.

Some Comments on B, F. Skinner's Recent Issues in the Analysis of Behavior
Harry C. Mahan
Oceanside, CA
The twelve papers in B. F. Skinner's
(1989) recent collection should be of
interest to interbehavioral psychologists,
but two of them address particularly
important issues issues long-prominent
in Skinner's thinking.
First, in "Whatever Happened to
Psychology as the Science of Behavior?,"
Skinner answers that the ancient concept
of mind is very much alive. Explaining
why this is so is anything but simple. It
is not my purpose to cover the many points
emphasized by Skinner, as his original
paper is readily accessible. Attention
should be called, however, to what he
considers the main obstacles to
psychology's acceptance of behavior as its
subject matter. These obstacles represent
an active effort on the part of organized
psychology to advance ideologies at the
expense not only of psychology's future,
but of the future of the human race.
This is a serious charge, and one that
perhaps only Skinner could express
convincingly, but it is unlikely to be
answered because anti-behaviorists seek to
avoid such confrontation. They either
refer to imaginary straw men presented in
patronizing references to behaviorism's
advocates or they completely ignore the
contributions of behaviorists and
interbehaviorists published in books and
journal articles. Added to these is the
"silent sabbotage" of the contributions
made by behaviorists in psychological
organizations and psychology departments.
The three anti-behavioral movements to
which Skinner's accusations are directed
are humanistic psychology, psychotherapy,
and cognitive psychology. By far the most
powerful is cognitive psychology because
of its success at identifying itself with
science, as well as its political power
within academic psychology. Ironically,..,,
Skinner points out, cognitive psychology
has within itself a self-destruct mechanism
that will eventually go off as it adheres
to the assumption that psychological
problems will eventually be solved through
studies of the brain.
Interbehaviorists will find much to
agree with in Skinner's arguments, but a
somewhat broader picture is also
43
available, which J. R. Kantor offered in
his advanced course in general psychology,
which I was privileged to take in 1935.
Kantor pointed out that the doctrines of
established institutions are very
difficult to change and that mentalistic
psychology was already well-established in
the days of William James. Although most
psychologists nurture the illusion that
they are rational, independent thinkers,
we are all products of some psychology
department, and our acceptance or
rejection of ideas in psychology will fall
within the framework of our backgrounds.
History tempts one to make a comparison
between Kantor and John Wycliffe who, in
the 14th century, attacked the
institutions of his day, proclaiming among
other things that transubstantiation was
nonsense or words to that effect,
Because transubstantiation was basic to
the political and religious institutions
of his time, Wycliffe was fortunate to
have the protection of the most powerful
man in England, John of Gaunt, who saw to
his survival. His followers> however,
were less fortunate: They were often
executed and their dissenting doctrine
(Lollardry) was driven underground.-
Almost two centuries passed before
Wycliffe's challenge surfaced once again.,
and since then progress in combating the
control of human thought by the defenders
of institutionalized beliefs has advanced
tremendously. That it still has some
distance to go is brought out by Skinner.
I have a very good friend, a highly
intelligent and well educated woman in
West Sussex, who, as a member of the
Church of England, completely accepts
transubstantiation. However, she and I
have enjoyed discussing English history by
the hour with no mention of my
naturalistic orientation as an
interbehavioral psychologist. Her beliefs
are no threat to me, nor mine to her, but
were she head of a psychology department
in which I was a member, I would either
react like a biologist expected to accept
"creation science" or seek employment
elsewhere, depending on her tolerance.
Although the doctrine of
transubstantiation is no longer an issue,
44
other issues are equally dear to the
hearts of modern-day psychologists
issues that are completely unacceptable to
those who are interbehaviorally inclined.
I am fortunate to be a member of the
latter group and to live in an age when
many others feel as I do - that human
action, human thought, and human feelings
must be considered as behavioral events
within nature.
The second paper of note is Skinner's
"The Origins of Cognitive Thought." It
also deserves careful scrutiny by
interbehavioral psychologists because they
will find much in it with which they can
agree, but also, at the end, an excellent
example of the differences that still
exist between.behavior analysis and
interbehavioral psychology. Although
Skinner, himself, has castigated the
psychological establishment for ignoring
behaviorism, he is just as guilty of
ignoring interbehavioral psychology.
The title of Skinner's paper is not
quite right because the paper actually
deals, not with the origins of cognitive
thought, but with the origins of about 80
terms in the English language referring to
cognitive thought. Skinner obviously
spent a great deal of time in etymological
research, finding that many terms that now
refer to events and processes considered
raentalistic originally had much more
behavioral referents. They pertained to
events that included the individual's
stimulating surroundings, as well as to
the behavior of the total individual. In
some instances, the same term had a
variety of meanings, referring to
different aspects or to different
orientations toward the behavior taking
place. The results of Skinner's research
should be of interest to all
psychologists, for psychologists need to
be clearer and more precise in their
thinking and writing which Skinner
points out has not yet come to pass.
As one proceeds with Skinner's paper, a
number of quotable statements arise.
These emphasize points that behavior
analysts and interbehaviorists have
accepted unconsciously, but that they have
probably not set down on paper. In
Skinner's writing, these points seem to
fall into place quite naturally; they are
worth copying for further reference. Some
examples are, "To remember what something
looks like is to do what we did when we
saw it," "Take any sentence in which the
mind does something, and see if the
meaning is substantially changed if you
substitute person," and "Cognitive
processes are behavioral processes; they
are things people do."
The place where the interbehaviorist
parts company with Skinner is in over-
simplification a long-standing
occupational disease afflicting
behaviorists. This tendency, and the
related attempts to describe complex
psychological interactions in terms of
physical and physiological stimulation and
response, has made behaviorism unappealing
to me for quite some time (e.g., "but we
have only begun to construct a science
needed to analyze the complex interactions
between the environment and the body; and
the behavior to which it gives rise." [p.
251] (italics mine).
By oversimplification, I am referring
to Skinner's insistence on analyzing
behavior solely with respect to the
"contingencies of reinforcement." The
first thing the student of interbehavioral
psychology learns is that, in addition to
reactions being variable, differential,
modifiable, integrated, delayable, and
inhibitable, an analysis must also be made
of the nature of the stimulation, the
media of contact, the surrounding
circumstances, the setting of the
stimulating agent, the reacting agent's
reaction systems operating at the time,
and the behavioral history of the
individual. The latter, by the way, is a
person and not just a body.
In short, in reading Skinner, or any
other behavioristic writer, one must
remember that behaviorists as well as
cognitive psychologists are expressing
views that, although they may appear to
represent the writer's independent
thinking, are nevertheless constrained by
previous commitments to a particular
school of thought with which they are
identified. Although Skinner has
developed a technology that takes full
advantage of the strong points of
behaviorism, and they are very strong
indeed, he is still limited in his
thinking by the boundaries of behaviorism.
References
Skinner, B. F. (1989). Recent issues in
the analysis of behavior. Columbus,
OH: Merrill.
 An Interbehavioral View of Sport Pedagogy Expertise
Thomas L. Sharpe, Jr. and Andrew H. Hawkins
West Virginia University
Dennis Landin
Louisiana State University
Instructional effectiveness is
fractionated by evaluation research that
yields conflicting findings (Borich, 1986)
and by practitioners who are often
unwilling to accept each other's point of
view (Berliner, 1986; Finn, 1988;
Firestone, 1987). Alternative strategies
and tactics are required if we are to mend
the fragmentation within educational
research practices and then determine what
comprises expert instruction (Howe, 1988;
Rothig, 1987).
Behavioral research on instructional
effectiveness has historically viewed
teacher behavior in terms of isolated
components, disregarding the field-like or
systemic nature of instruction-in-context
(Graham & Heimerer, 1981; Johnston &
Pennypacker, 1980). The lineal-mechanical
views have largely overlooked important
characteristics such as temporal locus and
the extent of teacher behavior, the
context or setting in which the
instruction occurs, and the multi-
directional relationships among the
factors operating within an expert
teacher's domain. An alternative
perspective one that focuses on
response-response and stimulus-response
interdependencies and that monitors the
rapidly occurring streams of events is
required to portray accurately and
completely the complex relationships which
are operative within expert instruction.
Although traditional research methods
have been able to describe gross
differences between effective and
ineffective instructors, they lack a
systemic focus and have only allowed
educational researchers to point to "true"
experts in an intuitive fashion (Dawe,
1984; Eisner, 1983; Gage, 1978; Rubin,
1985). These methods have not been able
to demonstrate how expert teachers
orchestrate their complex repertoires in a
well-understood or empirically well-
defined fashion. What is needed is a
paradigm that allows for fine-grained,
systemic analysis of experts engaged in
the teaching process.
One alternative may be found in the
interbehavioral model, for it departs from
single-response and isolated stimulus-
response lineal analyses (Kantor, 1922;
Lichtenstein, 1983; Ray & Delprato, 1989).
Implementation of a multiple-component,
multiple-cause paradigm that recognizes
the probabilistic organization of
behavioral and environmental events across
time allows the educational researcher
to move beyond a mere intuitive grasp of
the expert pedagogue.
The purpose of the present study was
twofold. First, we sought to improve the
extant descriptions of expert instruction
specific to physical education. Second,
we sought to validate the utility of the
interbehavioral paradigm in describing the
inherent coherency of the behavioral
interactions of an expert teacher. More
specifically, an "interbehavioral
analysis" was conducted on an expert
tennis instructor engaged in a model
demonstration lesson.
Method^
A model demonstration lesson was
videotaped and then analyzed according to
the flow chart presented in Figure 1 on
the next page (see also Ray & Upson,
undated; Ray & Delprato, 1989).
First, a narrative account of the
lesson was constructed an account-that
identified and operationally defined
contextual/environmental setting factors,
discrete environmental stimulus elements,
contextual organismic setting elements,
and specific behavioral events. An
exhaustive coding system was then
developed on the basis of this initial
analysis. Mutual exclusivity with respect
to event categorization (i.e., the
inability to track simultaneously
occurring and/or overlapping events) was a
constraint on retaining temporal locus and
extent, and was therefore disregarded.
Real time coded data from the
videotaped lesson were entered into a
microcomputer and the data groups merged
46

(!) RICH VERBAL DESCRIPTION

(2) BEHAVIOR/ELEMENT CATEGORIZATION & SYNTHESIS

Contextual/environmental Discrete Environmental

Setting Elements Stimulus Elements

Contextual Organismic Specific Behavioral

Setting Elements Elements

(3) DATA PRESENTATION

Individual Probability Kinematic Quasi-graphic

Time-line Matrix Flow-charting Behavior
Display Analysis Stream
Construction

(4) DATA INTERPRETATION

Coherence Velocity Fluency

temporally into one exhaustive data set indicate a lack of coherence.

upon completion. Conditional probability
matrices and kinematic analyses were then
employed to identify strings of elements
(see Ray & Delprato, 1989). Lag analyses
were conducted to determine the relative
temporal contiguity among element strings.
Finally, graphic analyses of high
probability element strings were made in
order to examine temporal relationships in
terms of rhythm, coherence, velocity,
complexity, and fluency (see Ray & Upson,
undated).
Results
These analyses yielded three primary
findings. First, we found evidence of a
highly coherent system of teacher
activity. The degree of coherence
reflects the actual versus possible number
of different elemental pairings or
chains observed. In effect, coherence
represents the degree of order and
consistency (i.e., predictability) in the
system under study. In other words, high
elemental pairing probabilities of high
frequency occurrences reflect a greater
organization in the field system.
Conversely, low elemental probabilities of
low frequency dispersed evenly throughout
the behavioral and elemental categories
Second, we found that high behavioral
velocity (e.g., speed of change in teacher
behavior) covaried positively with the
degree of complexity (e.g., number of
behavioral events necessary to describe
the system). That is, the rate at .which
any kind of elemental change is initiated
covaried with the number of different
elemental categories required for
exhaustive systemic description. This
finding corroborates the intuitive
perception that as teachers attain greater
expertise, they acquire a larger
repertoire of instructional behaviors and
implement them at a more rapid and time
efficient rate.
Third, we found strong evidence for a
consistent rhythm of behavioral display.
That is, recurrent chains or streams of
elements were found to have a high
probability of occurrence. This supports
the proposition that expert teachers
attain a great degree of consistency and
predictability in their instructional
displays.
With respect to the content of the
instructional interaction, these data
showed, first, that relatively brief
modeling episodes were dispersed evenly

throughout the lesson, with instructor
modeling being alternately supplanted by
students imitating. Second, positive
feedback (e.g., "Good job") functioned as
a reliable precursor (trigger) for verbal
instruction (e.g., "Hold the racquet
higher") and for practice management
statements (e.g., "Try to serve the ball
ten times and then move to the volleying
station"). That is, positive feedback
keyed the emission of the immediately
succeeding behaviors of verbal instruction
and practice management statements.
Third, verbal skill sequence descriptors
were used by the teacher within and
immediately following modeling episodes.
Discussion
Overall, the interbehavioral approach
was shown to fulfill a number of roles in
sport pedagogy research. First, it
provides a more effective means for
categorizing instructional systems in that
it avoids imposing a value-laden
conceptual scheme on the data inherent in
deductive methodologies. Granted, a
completely valueless system is improbable,
but there are degrees of value-ladenness.
The interbehavioral paradigm allows a more
inductive, date-driven approach than is
typically implemented.
Second, the interbehavioral paradigm
proved an excellent model for describing
the components of expert instruction. An
improved understanding of the behavioral
intricacies and environmental contexts of
the systems in which expert teachers
operate, and in which they optimally
orchestrate, should teach us more about
what it means to be a teacher ga_r
excellence.
References
Berliner, D. C. (1986), In pursuit of
the expert pedagogue, Educational
Researcher, 15(7), 5-13.
Borich, G. D. (1986). Paradigms of
teacher effectiveness research: Their
relationship to the concept of
effective teaching. Education and
Urban Society, JJK2), 143-167.
Dawe, H. A. (1984). Teaching: Social
science or performing art?. Harvard
Educa.tjLonaj. Review, f>4_, 111-114.
Eisner, E. W. (1983). The art and craft
of teaching. Educational Leadership,
40, 4-13.
Finn, C. E. (1988). What ails education
research. Educational Researcher,
47
17(1), 5-8.
Firestone, W. A. (1987). Meaning in
method: The rhetoric of quantitative
and qualitative research. Educational
Researcher, _16(7), 16-21.
Gage, N. L. (1978). The scientific basis
of the art of teaching. New York:
Teachers College Press.
Graham, G., & Heimerer, E. (1981).
Research on teacher effectiveness.
Quest, 33(1), 14-25.
Howe, K. R. (1988). Against the
quantitative-qualitative
incompatibility thesis or dogmas die
hard. Educational R^s^a^rcher, _T7(8) ,
10-16.
Johnston, J. M., & Pennypacker, H. S.
(1980) . Strategies and tactics o_
human behavioral research. Hillsdale,
NJ: Erlbaum.
Kantor, J. R. (1922). Can the
psychophysical experiment reconcile
introspectionists and objectivists.
American Journal of Psychology, 32,
481-510.
Lichtenstein, P. E. (1983). The
interbehavioral approach to
psychological theory. In N. W. Smith,
P. T. Mountjoy, & D. H. Ruben (Eds.),
Re a s s e ssin ent in psychology; The
interbehavioral alternative^ (pp. 3-20)
Washington, DC: University Press of
America.
Ray, R. D., & Delprato, D. J. (1989).
Behavioral systems analysis:
Methodological strategies and tactics.
Behavioral Science, 34(2), 81-127.
Ray, R. D., & Upson, J. D. (undated).
Redoing psychology: A naturalistic
systems approach. (Available from
Roger D. Ray, Department of Psychology
Rollins College, Winter Park, FL
32789).
Rothig, P. (1987). Reflections on
researching sport pedagogy. In G. T.
Barrette, R. S. Feingold, C. R. Rees,
M. Pieron (Eds.), Myths, models,
methods in sport p_edagogy_ (pp. 51-55).
Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics
Publishers.
Rub in, L. J. (1985). Artistry in
teaching. New York: Random House.
Author note: A fuller description of
this research is available from the first
author, Professional Physical Education,
P.O. Box 6116, West Virginia University,
Morgantown, WV 26506-6116.
48

BOOK ANNOUNCEMENT

Title: Language: -The Most Human Act

Author: William M. Gardner, Ph.D.

Description; A short textbook on description, evolution, development and misconceptions

of linguistic interactions, written for the sophomore level student in
accordance with interbehavioral concepts.

Publisher: Center for Social Design (a non-profit organization involved in

publishing, promoting research, and program evaluation in environmental
psychology). Order address:

Center for Social Design

P.O. Box 1111
Jacksonville, AL 36265

Format: 109 pages, size 8.5 x 5.5in., soft cover, plastic binding, 10 pt-type
fonts

Price: $10.00 (Shipping paid in the U.S.; desk copies available)

THE INTERBEHAVIORIST
Edward K. Morris, Editor
Department of Human Development
2035D Haworth Hall
University of Kansas
Lawrence, KS 66045

"Bryan D= Hidgley
Department of .Human Development
University of Kansas
Lawrence, KS 66045
 Volume 18 1990
- Linda J. Hayes
University of Nevada, Reno
ADVISORYBOARD
Sidney W. Bijou, University of Arizona
-. Donna M. Cone, State of Rhode Island
Dennis JLDelprato, Eastern Michigan
University
Patrick Ghezzi, University of Arizona
Sandy Hobbs, Paisley College of Technology
(Scotland)
Edward K. Morris, University of Kansas
PaulT, Mountjoy, Western Michigan University
, N. P. Pronko, Wichita State University
Roger D, Ray, Rollins College
: American women psychologists.
' Emilio Ribes, National University of Mexico,
. -.Iztacala . Featured Article
Doiiglas.H. Ruben, Okemos, MI
Robert G. Wahler, University of Tennessee
ASSISTANT EDITORS
Debra Fredericks, University of Nevada, Reno
Barbara S. Kohlenberg, University of Nevada,
Reno
Regina Lipkins, University of Nevada, Reno
ISSN 8755-612X
Number 1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Editorial
The Agora
Notes From the Field 3
Interbehaviorists in ABA 4
Book and Journal Notes 5-7
Smith, N. W. (1990). Greek and
Interbehavioral Psychology: Selected
and Revised Papers of Noel W. Smith.
White, A. D. (1896). A history of the
warfare of science with theology in
Christendom.
Hayes, L. J. & Chase, P. N. (1990).
Dialogues on Verbal Behavior.
Scarborough, E. & Furumoto, L. (1987).
Untold lives: The first generation of
Emilio Ribes-Inesta. Pseudotechnical lan-
guage and conceptual confusion in psy-
chology: The cases of learning and
memory 8
Comments
Harry C. Mahan. Habits: The Cinderella
of Psychology. Let's Get Her Out of the
Kitchen 11
Dennis J. Delprato. Needed: History and
Systems of Scientific Psychology ........ 13
 THE PRINCIPIA PRESS
A Quarterly Newsletter of Principia Press's currently available titles in in-
Interbehavioral Psychology terbehavioral psychology, all by J.R. Kantor, are
ISSN8755-612X listed below. Check your bookshelves, and those of
your library and bookstore, for possible oversights.
Linda J. Hayes, Editor In addition, the books make excellent gifts for col-
Department of Psychology leagues and students, especially for the latter in
University of Nevada honor of their completed degree requirements. The
Reno, Nevada 89557, U.S.A. books may be purchased directly from Principia
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natural science of behavior. Interbehavioral Psychology $15.00
The newsletter publishes professional commu- The Logic of Modem Science $15.00
nications that fall between informal correspondence An Objective Psychology of Grammar $13.00
and colloquia, and formal archival publication. As The Scientific Evolution of
such, the newsletter supplements contemporary Psychology (2vols) $40.00
journals dedicated to basic and applied research, to The Science of Psychology:
the history and philosophy of the behavioral sci- An Interbehavioral Survey $20.00
ences, and to professional issues in the field. The Psychological Linguistics ' $15.00
newsletter strongly encourages submission of notes The Aim and Progress of Psychology
about current professional activities of its subscrib- and Other Sciences $20.00
ers, news and observations about interbehavioral Interbehavioral Philosophy $27.50
psychology and related perspectives, comments on Cultural Psychology $16.00
journal articles and books of interest, more extended Tragedy and the Event Continuum $15.00
book reviews, and brief articles. All submissions Selected-Writings, 1929-1983 $20.00
should be sent in triplicate to the editor and should Psychological Comments and Queries $20.00
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Debra Fredericks (Verdi, NV) The next issue of THE
Vincent T. Francisco (Lawrence, KS) IOTERBEHAVIORIST
That Little Extra will be sent to 1990
We appreciate Ihe "little extra" a number of
subscribers included with their 1990 subscriptions:
subscribers. Don't miss it!
Sidney Bijou, David Cornwall, William Gardner and
James Herrick. Thank you.
 Paul Mountjoy introduced me to the work of J. R. Kantor in 1976 while I was a student at Western Michigan
University. I was at the time a radical behaviorist, studying Skinner's writings under the tutelage of Jack Michael,
I was captured by the field construction of interbehaviorism, by the comprehensiveness of the interbehavioral
system, and by the scholarship of J. R. Kantor. I still am. . . .
I assume the role of Editor of THE INTERBEHAVIORIST with mixed feelings. In my experience,
interbehaviorists are an heterogenous group. What some.have argued in the name of interbehaviorism sounds
unfamiliar to me, and what I have argued in its pame has been met with disagreement. Some are tolerant ofothgr.
positions, see possibilities for cooperation, while others are intolerant in principle. Some wish to be ideritifted'as:
interbehaviorists; others feel their impact will be greater if their identity remains ambiguous. By their contribu-
tions to this publication, it would appear that some believe its purpose to be the preservation of Kantor's thought.
Others seem more inclined to see it as a sounding board for elaboration and development of the interbehavioral
system. I am, as such; both honored to serve the interbehavioral community as the Editor of its newsletter, arid
a little afraid of the responsibility of leadership that such an honor inevitably entails. I can say only that! will take
my servitude as seriously as my leadership in this capacity.
This issue has been slow to arrive as many of you have noticed. We plan to combine numbers 2 and 3 of
volume 18 in a somewhat larger issue/so as to achieve our target of 4 issues this year. 1990 marks the 20 year
anniversary of THEINTERBEHAVIORIST, and we are working on a retrospective for the combined issue to
be out this fall. We will begin a regular quarterly schedule in 1991. You will notice as .well that this issue has a
different look to it thanks to free desktop publishing assistance from Context Press.
In closing, we encourage you to rjiake THE INTERBEHAVIORIST serve you - to make it source of news
and to find it an outlet for your scholarly work. We are your best audience.
., . Linda J.Hayes
. . - : ; - University o f Nevada, Reno

Notes from the Field Wither Behavior Analysis: Resolution of Revolu-

Anumber of papers with an interbehavioral ori-
entation were presented at the recent Association
for Behavior Analysis convention in Nashville. Some
of JhesearementionedintheSpeciallnterest Group
Meeting Minutes. Some others are listed, below. If
you. wish to receive copies, please contact the au-
thors directly. ; Clinical Science - Dennis Delprato (Eastern
Sources of Conflict in Behavior Analysis - Dennis
Delprato, (Eastern Michigan University, Ipsi-
lanti) ' - . > . .
Continuities in Behavior Analytic^ and Behavioral
Systems Methodologies - Roger Ray (Rollins
College, Winter Park, FL)
Developmental Systems: A resolution to the Na-
ture-NurtureConflict in Behavior Analysis -
Bryan MidgleyXtteptof HJDFL, University of
Kansas, Lawrence)
tion? - Edward Morris (Dept of HDFL, Univer-
sity of Kansas; Lawrerice) -
Interbehavioral Psychology: Outstanding in the
Field or Out Standing in its Field? :- Edward
.Morris (Dept of HDFL, University of Kansas,
Lawrence)
An Organization for a School orfor a ScjEence and
Michigan University, Ipsilanti)
ms
Approach to AppliedResearch'- Tom Sharpe &
Andrew Hawkins (West Virginia University,
Morgantown) '' ' - _ ""
Designing Interventions for Challenging Behaviors
- Sidney Bijou (Dept of Special Ed., University
of Arizona, Tucson)
Reality and Truth - Linda Hayes (University of
Nevada, Reno)
 Interbehaviorists in ABA
Special Interest Group Meeting
Nashville, May 1990
Linda Hayes chaired the annual meeting of the
SIG with approximately 15 members in attendance!
The following items of business were discussed:
1. Interbehaviorists* Contributions to the ABA
Program.
The SIG had been asked to organize two invited
presentations for the 1990 ABA program. These
were an address by Robert Wahler of the University
of Tennesee entitled "Maternal surveillance in child
conduct disorder", and a symposium on Learning
and Memory in Interbehavioral Perspective, includ-
ing papers by Emilio Ribes of the National Autono-
mous University of Mexico entitled "Are learning
and memory process accounts?", Linda Hayes of the
University of Nevada entitled "Learning and mem-
ory as evolving functions", and William S. Ver-
planck, University of Tennessee entitled "Then and
Now." Hayne W. Reese of West Virginia University
served as the disuccsant. Both sessions were well
attended. . letter categories on a regular basis.
Information about thelnterbehaviorists in ABA
SIG and THEmTERBEHAVIORISrwas posted
during the ABA Social Hour, and at the University
of Nevada hospitality suite.
A number of suggestions were made concerning
the SIG's contibution to the 1991 ABA program.
Dennis Delprato will organize-a symposium .tenta-
tively titled "Field Behaviorism meets Radical Be-
haviorism," Linda Hayes will organize the SIG's
now traditional session on what interbehaviorism is,
and William Gardner will organize a sysmposium
featuring empirical work from an interbehavioral
perspective. Persons interested in contributing to
the empirical symposium should contact Dr. Gard-
ner at.the Psychology Department, Jacksonville State
University, Jacksonville, AL, 36256. Members were
also encouraged to submit papers to the ABA pro-
gram committee independently.
Linda Hayes will also organize a working meet-
ing for interbehaviorists in conjunction with the
annual meeting of the SIG at the 1991 convention,
to be held in Atlanta in May. Details about this
meeting will be published in a subsequent issue of
the newsletter.
Other suggestions for SIG contributions to the
ABA program should be addressed to Linda Hayes
who will be serving as the Interbehaviorists' Area
Coordinator for the 1991 program.
Z THE INTERBEHAVIORIST. Ed Morris
has stepped down as Editor .of the newsletter. The
SIG expressed appreciation for Ed's good work over
the past seven years. Linda Hayes has been ap-
pointed the new editor. Linda said that she would be
contacting members of the Advisory Board con-
cerning their continued participation and would
appoint some new members to the board. She also
announced that Volume 18 of the newsletter would
be produced in 3 instead of 4 issues. She further en-
couraged members to submit materials in all news-
3. Graduate Training Opportunities for Inter-
behaviorists. Linda Hayes announced the estab-
lishment of a Professional Masters' and Doctoral
specialization in Behavior Analysis at the University
of Nevada, Reno. Interbeha'viorally-oriented stu-
dents are encouraged to apply. Contact the Linda
Hayes, Department of Psychology, University of
Nevada, Reno, NV 89557-0062 for more informa-
tion.
Graduate training opportunities are also avail-
able in Clinical Psychology at Eastern Michigan
University, and in Human Development and Family
Life at The University of Kansas.
Members are encouraged tosubmit information
about training programs of interest to interbehav-
iorists to THE INTERBEHAVIORIST.
Noel W. Smith (1990). Greek and Interbehavioral
Psychology: Selected and Revised Papers of Noel
W. Smith. Lanham, MD: University Press of
America, (341+ pages. Paperback. $19.95. ISBN
0-8191-7738-5.)
The preface reads as follows:
When an author brings some or all of his or her
papers together into a single source (or an editor
does it for the author) it provides convenience for
those who make use of those papers. It also often
brings attention to those papers that readers might
have overlooked and gives more coherence to the
author's contributions-although it might also reveal
the author's diversity. In this case I have selected
only those papers that provide a coherent theme.
The specific purposes for these papers are the fol-
lowing;
To draw together Greek and interbehavioral
psychology that otherwise might seem quite dispa-
rate and to show their relationships.
To bring together in one place the fundamentals
of interbehavioral psychology and some of itsspecial
topics.
To provide an alternative and less voluminous
route for those who have found J.R. Kantor's works
difficult to read and understand. - ing the changes in that paper. .A list of the original
To serve a propaedeutic function to Kantor's.
and Aristotle's works on psychology and perhaps to
supplement them. t Although a complete list of the works of J.R.
To supplement other writers on ihterbehavr
iorism. -. . ioral psychology, may be found in this volume, the
As for the subject matter itself, only Kantor and-
a few other scholars have recognized the non-dual-
istic nature.of Pre-Greek and Hellenic Greek psy-
chology and.even fewer have understood that for
Aristotle'a psychological event resides not in the or-
ganism or in the object but in their relationship. It is
this Greek incipient field psychology that puts it into
league with interbehavioral field psychology of 2400
years later.. By providing some of the details of both,
I hope these papers will document that relationship
and indicate some of the advantages of the interbe-
havioral field as an alternative to mechanism and
mentalism that prevails in psychology today. Aris-
totle and Kantor form a continuity and progression
(although independently developed1) in scientific
theory construction of psychology that was inter-
rupted by 2000 years of metaphysical confusion.
That confusion between events and constructs con-
tinues today almost unabated.
An unconventional characteristic of this selec-
tion of writings is that I have taken the opportunity
of revising them vyherever that seemed advanta-
geous. Some of these revisions are fairly minor, such
as corrections of typographical errors and the re-
writing of some lines that readers have found con--.
fusing. In other caseslhaverewritten paragraphs or
sections or added or deleted them.; In the case of a
paper on Egyptian psychology that addressed only
the Old Kingdom I expanded it to include the whole
of ancient Egypt and changed the title as well.
The Introduction attempts to tie together the
separate papers as well as the topics of Greek psy-
chology and interbehaviorism. It also fills in a few
areas that the papers do not address. For example,
Mesopotamia is addressed only briefly as a part of
one paper. The Introduction develops that culture
more extensively as an important ingredient in the
beliefs and psychology of early civilizations. It also
provides information on a few additional aspects of
Greek psychology.
. At the top of each paper is a statement describ-
sources in the Table of Contents provides the means
for comparisons should anyone wish to make them.
Kantor, who founded and developed interbehav-
reader may find other writers on interbehaviorism
also of interest. Therefore I have compiled a se-
lected list of these authors and placed them at the
end of the volume. The more important works on
Greek psychology may.befdund in the citations of
the relevant papers.
1
Zing-Yang Kuo's epigenetic psychology is also an inde-
pendently developed system which is fully compatible
with interbehaviorism although it is somewhat limited in
comprehensiveness (no reference to language behavior,
for example) because Kuo addressed it only to non-
humans. It was influenced by Chinese culture and John
Watson.
 . Dennis Delprato has offered to make available
copies of notes on A. D. White's (1896)^4 History of
the Warfare of Science with Theology m Christen-
dom. He reports as follows: .
I finally got around to reading one of the defini-
tive works on the history of dualism-science con-
frontations: A. D. White, A History of the Warfare of
Science with Theology in Christendom (New York:
D. Appleton and Company): White's account of the
great conflicts between attempts to take naturalistic
approaches to the world and the forces of the tran-
scendental cultural tradition may be of interest to
those who aspire to anaturalisticbehavioralscience.
By the time of White's writing, thinkers were in the
early phases of taking human behavior as non-theo-
logical. That they still are speaks to the power of
cultural impediments to our contacting events. White
concludes that the warfare in areas he addresses has
been resolved in favor of science. Of course, he
covers aspects of the world conventionally allotted
to science today, e.g., events of creation (but is this
resolved?), geography, astronomy, meteorology,
. chemistry, physics, biology, and language. It is tell-
ing that although Whitedelves into certain classes of
unusual behavior ("insanity," "hysteria") and thus
contacts human psychological behavior, the follow-
ing key terms for study of the naturalization (actu-
ally re-naturalization, as students of Kantor know)
of humari behavior are not even in the index: Fech-
ner, psychology, soul, Wundt, One wonders when
the chapter on human behavior will be written.
The book is chock full of interesting stories and
themes. I found it difficult to pick out a favorite.
The practice of "safe science" seems to describe
today's mainstream psychology. The havoc wreaked
upon humans by theologically-inspired filth is a strik-
ing commentary upon the extravagances of commit-
ments to authority and tradition and should'give
pause to those who ignore hygienic practices today.
And there is White himself struggling to reconcile
supernaturalism and naturalism. He may, in fact, be
more dangerous than any of the religious types with
whom he finds fault, for .he seeks a 'new improved'
Christianity with the capability of exerting a very
subtle influence. One might prefer the explicitness
of the inquisitors; at feast, they were readily identifi-
able.
I took 36 pages (singly-spaced) of notes on
White's two volumes and would be happy to send
copies to anyone interested. If you would like to add
to my notes, I could send the file on a MS-DOS
formatted diskette. Write to: Dennis Delprato,
Department of Psychology, Eastern Mich. Univ.,
Ypsilanti, MI 48197.
Hayes, L. J. and Chase, P. N. (1990) Dialogues on
Verbal Behavior. Reno: Context Press. (349
pages. Paperback. $34.95. ISBN 1-878978-00-
4.)
Current work in the analysis of verbal interac-
tions from behavioral points of view are examined in
this edited volume. Of particular interest to interbe-
haviorists are chapters by Emilio Ribes-Inesta en-
titled Language as Contingency Substitution and by
Linda J. Hayes entitled Substitution and Reference.
Chapters address a wide variety of topics including
artificial intelligence, connect ionism, memory, cog-
nition, concept formation, rule governance, stimu-
lus equivalence, and private events. Empirical meth-
odologies in the behavioral tradition are explored,
-including the study of derived stimulus relations,
and the computerized assessment of linguistic self
editing. -Each chapter is followed by a short com-
mentary. The book is available from Context Press,
Box 50172, Reno, NV 89513.
Call for Papers
u-
The Interbehaviorists in ABA Special
Interest Group will sponsor a symposium
featuring empirical interbehavioral work
at the Association for Behavior Analysis
convention in Atlanta, May 24-27,1991. If
you are conducting interbehaviora! research
and wish to be a part of this symposium,
please contact William M. Gardner, De-
partment of Psychology, Jacksonville State
University, Jacksonville, AL 36256, by Oc-
tober 1,1990.
Scarborough, E., & Furumoto, L. (1987). Untold
lives: The first generation of American women
psychologists. New York: Columbia University
Press.
Scarborough and Furumoto describe the trials
and tribulations of five outstanding first-generation
American women psychologists Mary Calkins,
Millicent Shinn, Ethel Puffer, Margaret Floy Wash-
burn, and Christine Ladd-Franklin in addition to
providing cameo portraits of six others (e.g., Helen
Bradford Thompson Wooley). In between, the
authors offer a collective picture of these women's
origins, education, careers, and contributions. Scar-
borough and Furumoto's "new" history of psychol-
ogy (see Furumoto, 1989) brings a liveliness and
reality to the research and theory of the period that
most history of psychology textbooks fail to convey.
A picture caption in the chapter on Calkins
(1863-1930) caught our attention:
The Agora Society, Wellesley College, 1897. A
group composed of students and faculty that met to
discuss social and political issues of the day. (p. 41)
. The chapter title: "The Quest for Graduate
Education: Mary Calkins' Contest with Harvard
University" (pp. 18-51). Calkins'career exemplifies
both the difficulties faced by the first generation of
women psychologists and the success some of them
achieved. . . .
Calkins completed her Doctorat'eof Philosophy
degree requirements at Harvard University under
William James and Hugo Munsterberg, and passed
her (informal) doctoral examination in the spring of
1895 with an impressive display of erudition and
intelligence. Harvard, however, did not grant doc-
toral degrees to women at that, time, nor would it
until 1963. ,
This professional "inconvenience" notwithstand-
ing, Calkins invented the paired associates method
for studying verbal learning and memory (Calkins,
1894), published an influential monograph on "as-
sociation psychology" (Calkins, 1900, 1908), origi-
nated the terms "radical behaviorist" and "radical
behaviorism" in print to denote John B. Watson and
his views (Calkins, 1921; see Schneider & Morris,
1987), and served as president of the American Psy-
chological Association (1905) and of the American
Philosophical Association (1918).
Call for News
THEINTERBEHAVIORISTpublishes
news about subscribers' activities and infor-
mation about others' activities that maybe of
interest to readers. If yoirhave'published air.
article, chapter, or book with an interbehav-
ioral orientation, or have read one published
by someone else, particularity if the source is
obscure, please let us know^boutit.oLiket.'
wise, if you have read a paper at a meeting of
potential interest to our readers, let us know.
Doyou know of a conference that might be of
interest? Have you had a grant to do interbe-
havioral research funded? Do you know of a
training program for students interested in
interbehavioral psychology? Keep us informed.
Mary Whiton Calkins - outstanding in her field.
.The Agora redux.
Edward K Morris
University of Kansas
References ,
Calkins, M.W. (1894). Association. Psychological
Review, 1, 476-483.
Calkins, M. W.' (1896). Association: An essay
. analytic and experimental. Psychologies I Mono-
graphs, 1, 1-56.
Calkins, M.W. (1900). Psychology as a science of
, "selves. Philosophical Review, 9, 490r50l. .
Calkins, M. W. (1908). Psychology as a science of
the self. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and
Scientific Method, 5, 12-19,64-68,113-121.
Calkins, M., W. (H2t),', The. truly .psychological,
behaviorism. Psychological Review, 28, 1-18
Furumoto, L. (1989). The new history of psychol-
ogy.. In I. Cohen (Ed.), The G. Stanley Hall Lec-
ture Series (Vol. 9, pp. 9-34); Washington,-D.C:
American Psychological Association.
Schneider, S. M., & Morris, E. K.. (1987). A history
of the term "radical behaviorism": From Watson
to Skinner. The Behavior Analyst, 10, 27-39.
 Pseudotechnical Language and Conceptual Confusion in Psychology:
The Cases of Learning arid Memory
Emilio Ribes-Inesta
National University of Mexico - Iztacala
Behaviorism and Functionalism, as natural out-
growths of evolutionary thinking, brought learning
and memory into the conceptual mainstream of
experimental psychology. Learning became the central
topic in behavior theory as was developed in condi-
tioning models; while memory and its ancillary con-
cepts were the focus of human learning theory and
investigation. The incorporation of these terms has
not been without problems, however. More specifi-
cally, while learning and memory refer to psycho-
logical events in ordinary language, they do not
- constitute technical terms; and, because psychology
in general and behavior analysis in particular have
adopted them as technical terms, theoretical and
empirical developments in psychology have been
hampered by conceptual confusion.
In this paper, I shall try to clarify the difference
between ordinary and technical language terms, to
show why learning and memory do not constitute
technical terms so defined, and to address the impli-
cations of this confusion for a natural science of psy-
chology.
Ordinary and Technical Language
Although others (Wittgenstein, 1953; Ryle, 1964;
. Mundle, 1970) have discussed the distinction be-
tween ordinary and technical language, I shall allow
myself to establish their differences in the following
way: While words and expressions in ordinary lan-
guage make sense, in technical language, they have
particular and unequivocal meanings.
Ordinary language has to do with standard us-
ages of words and expressions in particular contexts.
The essential feature of ordinary language is that it
makes sense in relation to the behavior and situation
where it takes place, as part of a conventional prac-
tice. Ordinary language is as such multivocal, which
is to say, the sense it makes depends on the context
in which it occurs. For this reason, it is not a useful
language for describing objects and events -- al-
though objects and events are routinely named in
ordinary language. Further, terms that come from
technical languages such as those of engineering
and science, are often incorporated into ordinary
language, while the reverse is rarely true.
Technical language, on the contrary, is a de-
scriptive and denotative language. It is used both to
name and to describe operations, outcomes, objects
and events. To be useful for this purpose it must be
univocal. Technical languages normally do not in-
corporate ordinary language terms and expressions
as technical units, since the latter, being multivocal
do not fulfill the requirements set up by the need of
univocal denotation and description.
In discussing the difference between ordinary
language and technical language, Wittgenstein (1953)
introduces the concept of "language games". The
concept of a game is suggested by the observation
that words and phrases, interlocked with particular
activities, make sense or are appropriate in particu-
lar contexts according to practical social rules.
Language games correspond to what Ryle calls
the logical geography of ordinary language. Accord-
ing to Ryle (1964) ordinary language terms and
expressions obey multiple logics corresponding to
the multiple contexts in which they are used. When
terms .and expressions are used to denote logical
dimensions or categories different from those to
which they normally pertain, a species-invasion or
categorical mistake is made (Ryle, 1949). In such
cases, terms and expressions are used as if they
pertained to a different set of uses and contexts to
a different logical category. This phenomenon,
normally descriptiveof metaphor (Turbayne, 1974),
is not a categorical mistake when done consciously
and the as if relations between terms and their
referents is explicitly acknowledged. The categori-
cal error occurs when expressions and terms are
used as though they actually did pertain to different
logical dimensions or, in Wittgenstein's terms, to
different language games.
 Both Ryle (1949) and Wittgenstein (1953,1980),
contend that psychological terms are not technical
terms but, rather, ordinary language terms posing as
technical terms. According to Wittgenstein (1980):
"Psychological concepts are just everyday con-
cepts. They are not concepts newly fashioned by
science for its own purpose, as are the concepts of
physics and chemistry. Psychological concepts are
related to those of.the exact sciences as the concepts
of the sciences of medicine are to those of old
women who spend their time nursing the sick" (p.12,
paragraph 62.)
In other words, most so-called technical psycho-
logical terms are unintentional metaphors, drawn
from ordinary language and from technical languages
associated with other disciplines. They are used as if
they were descriptions of processes, actions, or enti-
ties, when in actuality they have a multivocal refer-
ence to conventional practices related to tendencies
to behave or to specific kinds of relations in particu-
lar contexts. Whenscientific terms are derived from
ordinary language in this manner, not only do they
not gain univocal meaning in the process but they
also loose their practical social meanings. They become
mere logical illusions. The result has been that
unexamined and unintentional metaphors have come
to masquerade as descriptions of nonexistent occur-
rences. Learning and memory are two such terms, to,
which we'now turn". ...
Learning and Memory as
- - Conceptual
'i Confusions
I shall examine the logic of the terms learning
and memory in ordinary language in order to pro--
vide1 evidence that these terms do not refer to the
type of events that psychologists assume they do,
and show that their use as technical terms has led to
conceptual confusion.
Learning
Learning is the central concept of formulations
spawned by. evolutionary thinking and conditioning
theories. Although the identification of learning as
_ an essential feature of psychological behavior repre-
sents a step forward, the concept of learning di-
vorced from its ordinary meaning, has given rise to
serious conceptual confusions and theoretical blind-
alleys.
As a concept, learning comes from the meta-
phor of acquisition of knowledge through experi- :
ence. Locke (1690,1956 Spanish translation) in his
Essay Concerning Human Understanding, asserted
that all human knowledge comes from experience,
either by sensation or by reflection on sensations.
Although the mind was conceived by Locke as a set
of operations, these were operations mpotence, and
only through the contact with the actions of objects
in the external world, did they become actual actions
providing knowledge. In other words, the mind is
interpreted as operations with respect to objects in
the external world. Its content -- including its aware-
ness of itself comes from experience.
As the mechanical thinking of the time dictated,
the mind was held by Locke to depend upon the
workings of the brain. Nonetheless, the mind as
experience is a mental construction. Psychological
activity, as distinct from biological activity, consisted
in acquisition of knowledge by experience, that is,
by learning. It is in this sense that learning and
psychological behavior are synonymous. And it is
here that the term becomes a source of conceptual
confusion: If learning is considered a special process
or category of behavior, then it stands to reason that
there must be an opposite, alternative, or additional
category, namely unlearned behavior and the proc-
esses that work.independently of experience and
individual interactions with the world.-' The recur-
rent nature-nurture controversy about the determi-
nation of behavior exemplifies this categorical mis-
take.
The distinction between learned and unlearned
behavior has been based on the amenability of change
of the former as opposed to the Fixedness of the
latter.. Technically, learning had been identified
with the processes responsible for change in behav-
ior and, as such, is regarded as an explanatory con-
cept in the analysis of psychological behavior. But to
what do we ordinarily refer when we speak of learn-
ing or of behavior as having been learned? Do we
refer to a special process taking place within the
individual which results in a change of behavior?
Ordinary expressions about learning are used in
two ways. First, the concept is used to identify
achievements or outcomes, :in terms of particular
morphologies of behavior or their effects on the
environment. Second, learning is a modal or capac-
10
ity term, describing the tendency to engage in cer-
tain behaviors given their occurrence in the past
under similar circumstances. Both meanings refer
to tendencies or achievements. Neither refers to
special activities, changes in the individual, or proc-
esses conceived as special kinds of changes and
activities. In ordinary language, to learn means to
fulfil criteria in terms of the effects, outcomes or
achievements of behavior, and to be able to behave
in similar ways to produce similar effects or achieve-
ments in the future.
If learning does refer to achievements and capa-
bilities (as a dispositional term), it is misleading to
use the term technically to refer to effects on the
organism (i.e., the what that is learned), or assumed
processes involving unobserved activities and neu-
ral workings (i.e., the how of learning.) These mis-
conceptions have dominated psychological theory,
orienting research towards the analysis of different
"types" of learning (stimulus-bound, response-bound,
representation-bound, etc.), or to search for special
kinds of correlations between biological functioning
and behavior acquisition and maintenance.
It is nonetheless still reasonable to speak of a
"process" of learning. It is not a process occurring
within the behaving organism however. Learning as
a process consists in the techniques arranged by
teachers in order to facilitate the occurrence of
certain ways of behaving on the parts of learners so
as to achieve particular outcomes. The processes of
learning are the processes shared by any behavior
(being learned or already learned). The difference
lies not in the behavior of the learner but in the
- behavior of those setting up the conditions for the
acquisition of new functions of behavior, or the
development of potential morphologies as effective
behavior in particular situations. Learning is a tech-
nological issue, not a fundamental psychological
category or process.
Memory
Memory is a concept intimately attached to learn-
ing within psychological tradition. On one hand,
because of the organocentric conception of learning
as a change taking place in the organism, memory
has been advocated as a process complementary to
learning, dealing with the storage of changes in
behavior and with their retention and retrieval for
effective performance at a later time. On the other
hand, since learning has been identified with know-
ing about something as different from performing in
some way (i.e., knowing that determining knowing
how ), memory has been postulated as a complex
representational system where performance in a
situation is encoded, stored, recognized and de-
coded for future successful action. Memory is the
storage of representations, while perception and
imagination are the external and internal factories
of such cognitive entities consisting in what is learned.
Because of this tradition of dividing thought from
action, many contemporary memory researchers view
their work as focused on the actual core of learning:
Its content as representation, and its role in the
repeated occurrence of acquired performance.
To speak about memory is to ask about where
representations are stored, how they are stored,
how many representation may be stored and how
are they are retrieved. Memory as a cognitive proc-
ess or capacity is conceived as remembering or re-
calling, recognizing or evoking, and reminding be-
haviors or situations as a repeated experience
(reminiscence). All of these processes imply pres-
ent action with respect to past events existing in the
form of internal activities or representations. They
signify a revivified past as internal present. Wittgen-
stein (1980) comments on this conceptual confusion
when he says: "But if memory shows us the past,
how does it show us that it is the past? It does not
show us the past. Any more than our senses shows us
the present" (p. 103, paragraph 593.)
When we refer to remembering or memory in
ordinary language, our expressions correspond to
different types of facts. In one case, remembering is
synonymous with knowing. Memory as knowing means
that the individual has learned to do or to say some-
thing, and to know what has been learned is not to
forget it. It is not possible to say that something is
known if it has been forgotten, and it would be
absurd to suggest that a person learns to forget.
Wherrsomething is remembered as an exercise of
knowing there is no repetition of a past event.- To
remember, as knowing, is to be in the same circum-
stances in which the original learning took place.
This is why memory, in this sense, does not mean a
retrieval from the past. Memory is not a source of
knowledge; it is rather the evidence of knowledge.
In this sense of the term, memory is a modal concept.
In another sense, to remember, as in recalling or
evoking, is a circumstance concept. To remember in
this sense means to do or to say something in circum-

stances previously projected. There is no repetition
of actions or circumstances in this case. Memory
does not involve internal storage of what will even-
tually be done in the future. It rather consists in
organizing in the present those conditions in which
the behavior will have to occur in the future. Be-
cause of this, in this kind of remembering there is no
identity or similarity between the circumstance in
which an event is remembered and the circumstance
which is remembered. In this case, remembering is
not a hidden and mysterious activity but rather eve-
rything that the individual says, does or recognizes
with respect to the projected circumstance in order
to act accordingly at a particular future time. To
remember is to act in accordance with a projection;
it does not mean to re-encounter or to search for the
past. It is acting based upon a projected or antici-
pated future.
There is a third meaning of remembering: To
remember something as a re-experience of a situ-
ation. To remember in this sense, however, is not to
live in the past as a kind of imagining. To remember
as a reminiscence is to repeat a situation, or to
repeat or recognize the effect of an. action in a
similar circumstance, it is to re-act in a situation. It
is not to imagine, since the re-action is not planned
or regulated by the individual. It is a consequence of
doing or saying something in the same, way in a
particular current circumstance as one had done in a
past circumstance.. It is to feel one situation as
- though it were another. Memory, as reminiscence,
is to be described as both an effect and a circum-
stance concept.
-In contrast to imagining, in remembering as
reminiscence the circumstance is not modified; the
circumstance is rather perceived as a circumstance,
similar to another in the past. It is not an exercise of
knowing because it is senseless to say that it is known
that it is being felt. It is a fact related to the effects
of acting in a particular circumstance. It is to recog-
nize without knowing, and to act without imagining.
A Final Note
Wittgenstein (1953) pointed out that: "...in psy-
' chology there are experimental methods and con-
ceptual confusions" (p. 232, paragraph XIV.) The
use of ordinary language terms and expressions re-
ferring to psychological relations and dispositions
(in Ryle's sense) as evidence of internal activities
and processes is an example of this confusion. By
11
way of it, ordinary language terms are reduced to
pseudotechnical concepts with assumed univocal
reference to hidden entities and actions. Concep-
tual analysis allows for the undoing of logical mis-
takes such as this and permits the recovery of au-
thentic meanings of psychological expressions as
those used in ordinary language. A different task is
that related to the construction of a technical lan-
guage with univocal references to abstracted facts
corresponding to the multiplicity of psychological
events and phenomena described and represented
by ordinary language practices.
References
Locke, John (1690,1956 Spanish translation). Ensayo
sobreelentendimientohumano. Mexico: Fondo
de Cultura Economica,
Mundle, C. W. K. (1970)/4 critique of linguistic phi-
losophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ryle, G. (1949). The concept of mind. New York:
Barnes & Noble.
Ryle, G. (1964). Ordinary language. New York:
Dover.
Tyrbayne, C. M, (1974, Spanish translation). Elmito
. de la metafora. Mexico: Fondo de Cultura
Economica.
Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical investigations.
. Oxford: Basil Biackwell.
Wittgenstein, L, (1980). Remarks on the philosophy
' 'ofpsychology (Vol. II). Oxford: Basil Blackweli.
: Comments
Habits: The Cinderella of Psychology
. Let's Get Her Out of the Kitchen
Harry C. Mahan
- . Oceanside, CA
One of the most promising but now recently
neglected areas of psychology is that of habit. The
irony of this is that up:until the early 1900's habits
not only received considerable attention from a
number of writers (Kantor, 1924, pp. 463-464), but
were also probably the best known and most fre-
quently quoted topic discussed by William James
(1890). It may, in fact, have been partially due to
Jame's thoroughness that subsequent writers, with
12
the exception of J. R. Kantbr (1924), have omitted
the topic from their textbooks altogether.
James, with his emphasis on the nervous system
as the foundation of psychology in general, explained
habits in terms of the functioning of this system.
This overall approach is consistent with that of to-
day's mainstream psychology which, having nothing
new to add to his discussion, has long since ceased
quoting from his rightly famous chapter.
This contrasts with the approach and contribu-
tion of Kantor (1924) who, as the founder of inter-
behavioral psychology, considered habit from an
altogetherdifferentpointofview. Although Kantor
did leave habit until the 15th chapter of his work, he
emphasized its importance not only as encompass-
ing a large portion of all behavior, but as an excellent
example of the relevance of interbehavioral prin-
ciples to understanding the psychology of oneself
and others.
Unfortunately, not only have Kantor's Principles
(1924) been read only by relatively few psycholo-
gists, but his chapter on habit (pp. 440-464), al-
though containing virtually everything that needed
to be said, was not as clearly written as might have
been desired. Two attempts to simplify this chapter
(Mahan, 1968,1970) were only partially successful
and both were intended for the instruction of the
writer's students only. As far as I know, except for
Kantor's work itself, no other attempt has been
made to present the topic of habit from the interbe-
havioral perspective -.- this in spite of the publication
of three interbehaviorally oriented introductory
textbooks (Kantor, 1933; Kantor & Smith, 1975;
Pronko, 1980). Ail of these mentioned habit briefly,
but only as one of the many facets of personality or
as an aspect of the learning process (Kantor, 1933).
Since all of these texts are now out of print, the point
is moot, but their omission of any significant treat-
ment of habit was noted when they first appeared -
- a disappointing omission.
Space does not permit more than a brief outline
of the interbehavioral approach to habit interac-
tions, but calling attention to its need for and ease of
elaboration may encourage its choice as a term
paper assignment and as a suitable topic for papers
to be written for widely circulated publications.
First of all, two widely held misconceptions of
habit interactions should be dispensed with. The
first of these is that the locus of habits is inside of the
reacting individual; thesecond one is that a criterion
of habit is the frequency of the act's occurrence.
Interbehavioral psychology rejects both of these
approaches, and defines habit in terms of the rela-
tionship between the stimulational and responding
aspects of the act and the strength of the relation-
ship which integrates these two aspects into a single
unitary interaction*
This definition requires that habits be divided
into two types: routine habits and dynamic habits,
with the former being performed frequently with
little or no compulsion from the relationship itself
and the latter, although perhaps infrequent in per-
formance, being compelling by its nature. Of course,
some routine habits, particularly those which are
personal in nature, may become compelling over a
period of time.
Defining habits in terms of the strength of a
relationship emphasizes the importance of the stimu-
lating agent and the context in which the act occurs,
and permits options to various techniques for con-
trolling habits, whether desirable, undesirable, or
neutral. Such options are not possible when habits
are considered to be centered in the person.
In the past, habits have often been thought to be
limited to overt actions but, actually, any interac-
tions can become habitual no matter what its nature,
some of the most characteristic habits are intellec-
tual, affective, or motivational in nature. Habits can
be classified in many different ways, with the system
being used depending upon the problem. Examples
are health habits, work habits, recreational habits,
affective habits, belief habits, arid many others. There
are categories to fit any occasion which might give
rise to the need for information regarding any indi-
vidual. Everyone has to answer questions regarding
his or her habits on some occasion or another.
In summary, the point of this commentary is that
habits are important aspects of behavior and that
they have been neglected by psychology Practical
knowledge regarding them is part of popular psy-
chology, but it is in the formulation of general prin-
ciples and their application that science is impor-
. tant. In the case of those principles with which
psychology is concerned in the case of habit, it can be
said that science is deductive and the principles are
there ready to be tried. It must be remembered that
in applications of psychology we are always using
principles, whether formulated or not. The contex-
tual principles of interbehavioral psychology are
certainly as good as thosewehavebeen using. Using
the deductive method, we at least know what are
doing and if the principles do not apply they can be

modified. When principles have not been formu-
lated, a&is the case at present with most applications,
they cannot be modified or changed without affront-
ing beliefs which may go back to folklore or tradi-
tion.
Although it may require some effort, every psy-
chologist, and not just behaviorists and interbehav-
iorists, should master Kantor's habit chapter (1924,
pp. 440-464) and should incorporate its powerful
insights into his or her nature as a fully trained
professional.
References
James, W. (1890). Principles of psychology. New
York: Holt.
Kantor, J. R. (1924). Principles of psychology (Vol.
1). Chicago: Principia Press.
Kantor, J. R. (1933). A survey of the science of
psychology. Chicago: Principia Press.
Kantor, J.R,,& Smith, N.W. (1975). Thescienceof
psychology: An interbehavioral survey. Chicago:
Principia Press.
Mahan, H. C. (1968). The interactional psychology
ofj. R. Kantor: An introduction. Lawrence, KS:
The Interbehaviorist.
Mahan, H. C. (1970). A primer of interactional
psychology. San Marcos, CA: Project Socrates
Press.
Pronto, N. H. (1980). Psychology from the stand-
point of an mterbehaviorist. Belmont, CA: Wad-
;
sworth.
Needed: History and Systems of
Scientific Psychology
Dennis J. Delprato
Eastern Michigan University '
' been a naturalistic one, but progress in the renatu-
1
E-Maii:DELPRATO@UM.CC.UMICH.EDU
The longer I am around the fascinating area of
psychology the more convinced I become that prog-
ress in the discipline requires, above all else, greater
dissemination of what is known about psychology's
role in the big picture. The big picture, of course, is
comprised of the general scientific matrices and
especially the general cultural matrices that have
13
provided the contexts for thinking about human
behavior over the centuries. The mega-problem is
that in the modern era psychology took on a subject
matter that remains the final gasp and hope of the
most influential view of things and the most power-
ful institutions the world has ever known. We con-
tinue to be bombarded with claims that psychology is
the study of mind (and perhaps behavior as well in
some cases), and erudite scholars and researchers
continue to fabricate munchausen tales concerning
the role of mental structures and processes in hu-
man affairs. I am led to believe that an infinitesi-
mally small number of people have more than a
superficial appreciation for what mind is all about,
despite virtually a century of formal behavioristic
literature.
It might be expected that I would not have to
spell out for readers of this newsletter the connec-
tion between continued resistance to beginning
psychological science without mind and the evolu-
tion of our culture, but I will do so briefly nonethe-
less. Human beings are the last stronghold of the
transcendental cultural tradition that verbally re-
moved humans from the natural world hi the first
place. The escapistic dualistic material-spiritual split,
evolving under naturalistic conditions, involved the
invention of another worldan invisible nonspatio-
temporal one, and it made humans the repository in
the natural world of a part of the verbally-created
mysterious spiritual realm known only by revelation
to special humans (and transmitted bywords). What
amounted to asynonym for "life" with purely natu-
ralistic referents was transformed to where the
construct-soul-was given supernaturalistic refer-
ents and placed inside humans. As conditions.of
living began changing, critical thinkers gradually
altered the. referents of soul to where psychological
functions were said to be taken over more and more
by mind'and consciousness. The'movement from
soul to mind, consciousness, and experience has
ralization process has been excruciatingly slow, and
characterized by much gnashing of teeth and auto-
shooting of feet. We have had dynamic psychiatry
and later behaviorism, but these movements re-
mained too close to the material-spiritual cultural
tradition that remains the dominant force in our
present society. Furthermore, no science can com-
pletely step outside of the cultural matrix that pro-
vides its origins and development. But there is
reason to believe that it is now possible for those
14
who undergo particular developmental histories to
forge ahead with an approach to humans that is
novel in the modern era. This approach renatural-
izes humans by recapturing them from the realm of
the supernatural and making possible a policy of
humans for humans.
The complete re-naturalization of humans would
complete, the final step of the secularization of soci-
.ety that had its beginnings around the llth century
of the rnodern era in Western civilization. Such a re-
naturalization would require a total revamping of
those still powerful institutions whose existence,
support, and operation rest on their supposed role
in securing the salvation of humans' nonspatiotem-
poral souls. Certainly, holders of cultural tradition
readily detected the threat to their interests posed
by dynamic psychiatry and behaviorism, as evidenced
by their attacks on these early naturalization move-
ments. However, for various reasons and in various
ways, the mental world has persisted to the present
day. , Mind, in whatever form and by whomever
advocated-white-coat wearer or not--is the final
stratagem for the perpetuation of the most influen-
tial collection of institutions of the modern era. The
two-world, view has lost all of the other concrete
subject matters. Only human behavior, taken as a
manifestation of the nonspatiotemporal soul-mind
stuff, remains to buttress the forces of spirit,
As I have mentioned, the behavioristic move-
ment unquestionably represents an attempt to re-
naturalize humans^ and one can find in this litera-
ture indications that behaviorists have at least some,
understanding of the conditions under which mind
was invented. Unfortunately, the understanding
invariably is superficial. It is sad to see. sincere,
bright, and well-credentialed thinkers spend all or
virtually all of their careers arguing against mental-
ism and vigorously and valiantly defending human
behavior as completely subject to scientific
understanding who do not understand the bigpicture.
They simply give no indication that they appreciate
the gravity of what they propose. For example, we
are told in order to save the world we must let mind
go and concentrate on behavior. How hopelessly
naive-well intentioned, but naive-to expect such
strident appeals by themselves to have any effect
whatsoever when peoplestill believe that the way to
save that which is important to save is by relying on
the transnatural, not what the spatiotemporal world
has to offer. Coping with a foe as formidable as that
posed by transcendental institutions requires much
more than additional laboratory data and forceful
writing. The problem is not one that can be ad-
. dressed by what we ordinarily treat as data. One can
talk about the ineptness of "cognitive internaliza-
tion," "mental causes," "storing pieces of the envi-
ronment," "dogs associating bells with food," "re-
trieving encoded copies/' and the like and how
mounds of research point to alternatives to these
ways of describing behavior until one is either blue
in the face or dead. However, do not expect to
impress many beyond those already committed to
the rejection of these absurdities. I submit that what
is lacking in naturalization attempts to date is a deep
understanding of the full history of thinking about
human behavior and its cultural matrices. We will
have more than a minuscule amount of naturalistic
thinking about human behavior only when we bring
to bear on the problem data and application of what
is known about the development and present con-
text of soul-mind doctrine.
Demonstrating that it is likely that few of us
know all that is relevant to our activities, one propo-
nent of the behavipristic naturalization of humans
has made the statement that as of a few.years ago, at
least, there was, no history of psychology written
from a behavioristic perspective. If behaviorism,
above all else, does not represent an attempt to take
a scientific approach to human behavior, I do not
know what it represents. Thus, I arrive at the title of
this little note: "Needed: History and Systems of
Scientific Psychology." The major source for the
views* -expressed herein is, of course, Kantor's
enormous Scientific Evolution of Psychology (1963,
1969), and, given these views, it seems reasonable
for me to suggest that this work is must reading for
those committed to an authentic scientific approach
to human behavior.
Now I delve further into the reason I prepared
this note in the first place. Usually^ at least once a
year, I teach an undergraduate course entitled "History
and Systems of Psychology." I use Kantor's two-
volume set and carefully pare down the reading to an
amount reasonable for a one-term course and to
allow readings of pertinent material not covered by
Kantor. Given that many departments continue to
offer courses in the history.of psychology, systems of
psychology, or combined versions such as my De-
partment, I suggest that one could make a valuable
contribution by abridging Kantor's Scientific Evolu-
tion and supplementing it to cover more of the de-
velopments closer to recent times (e.g., neobehav-
 15

iorism, "third-force" attempts, radical behaviorism,
certainly the cognitive movement) in such a way that
this new book would be reasonable for a one-term
course in history or history and systems of psychol-
ogy, and perhaps even systems of psychology. My
suggestion is based, in part, on the fact that we
cannot wait around for mature workers to study The
Scientific Evolution of Psychology, rather this mate-
rial needs to be made more accessible to students
and the many instructors who are not specialists in
the history of psychology, but who teach the course
on the basis of an appreciation for history. In other
works, Kantor could not have seriously considered
his tome to be a serious contender for adoptions in

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The Psychological Record is a quarterly journal ol psychology. Since 1937 it has published
psychological theory and research concerned with a broad range of topics in the discipline. Rapid
publication of accepted manuscripts assures that each issue contains very recenl work.
In the belief that reading The Psychological Record may facilitate the development of students' iournal
reading habits, The Psychological Record is continuing a special student subscription rate.
1990 Subscription Rates
Student subscription - $10.00
Professional individual-$15.00
LJbrary/lnslilulion - $45.00
The Psychological Record, Gambier, Ohio 43022-9623
16
undergraduate (or graduate, for that matter) courses.
Scientific Evolution is a serious scholarly work, not a
textbook, and it is not often that the twain meet;
Possibly the most difficult aspect of the task I
propose is to prepare the text so as not to jar the
reader as a result of variations in writing style. I say
this because, in my opinion, Scientific Evolution
represents some of the most adept and beautiful
writing I have ever seen. It is the best written of
Kantor's work. Despite some claims of the obscurity
of Kantor's writing, I find that undergraduates fol-
low what he is saying in Scientific Evolution - pro-
vided they are warned to use a dictionary! But I
handle Kantor's use of rare words by at the begin-
ning demonstrating to students that when Kantor
uses a rare word, he is not being ostentatious. When
he uses a rare word, it is the one best word that could
THE INTERBEHAVIORIST
Department of Psychology
University of Nevada
Reno, NV 89557-0062
TOASS
Bryan D. Midgley
HUm Dev & Fam Life, University of Kansas
Lawrence, KS 66045
have been used to get across the point being made.
Kantor's exemplary use of the English language in
Scientific Evolution makes it desirable that an abridged
revision follow to some extent the original style.
A text such as I describe would be a usable text
that addressed psychology in the big picture. Users
would have a much more important understanding
of what the history of psychology is all about than
they do from current mainstream works. They would
be much better prepared to handle claims that
psychology's subject matter is mind and behavior,
that cognitions cause behavior, that depression causes ^
crying, and the like. Some might even go so far as tor
take on the role of 21st-century behaviorists. .'f . ,
References . "^
Kantor, J.R, (1963,1969). The scientific evolution of <
psychology (2 Vol.). Chicago: Priricipia Press^--
 A Newsletter of Interbehavforal Psychology

Volume 18 1990 Numbers 2-3

EDITOR
Linda J. Hayes, University of Nevada
The Agora 3
PAST EDITORS
Featured Article
Noel W. Smith, Volumes 1-7 (1970-1978) Tom Sharpe. Field systems data: An exploration
Ronald G. Heyduk, Volumes 8-11 (1978-1983) of alternative visual representations ...4
Edward K. Morris, Volumes 12-17 (1983-1989)
ADVISORY BOARD Comments
Harry C. Mahan. Preventing AIDS among
Sidney W. Bijou, University of Arizona college students: A challenge to
Donna M. Cone, State of Rhode Island behaviorally oriented psychologists ... 8
Dennis J. Delprato, Eastern Michigan University
Patrick Ghezzi, University of Arizona THE INTERBEHAVIORIST:
Sandy Hobbs, Paisley College of Technology A 20 Year Retrospective
(Scotland)
Edward K. Morris, University of Kansas Noel W. Smith. The Interbehavioral
PaulT. Mountjoy, Western Michigan University Newsletter; In the past and in the fature .9
N. H. Pronko, Wichita State University Linda J. Hayes. Getting there 11
Roger D. Ray, Rollins College News of JRK: As reported in The Agora
Emilio Ribes, National University of Mexico, 1969-1988 13
Iztacala Harry C. Mahan. J. R. Kantor's 1976
Douglas H. Ruben, Okemos, MI address to behavior analysts 20
Robert G. Wahler, University of Tennessee A. Mitsorg. Nevertheless, the earth is flat:
MANAGING EDITOR A review of a review 21
A. Mitsorg. Interaction: Transaction:
Steven C. Hayes, University of Nevada Which? 22
ASSISTANT EDITORS J. R. Kantor. Apropos Watson's
hyperbola ....23
Debra Fredericks, University of Nevada Abstracts of Articles: Volumes 1-18 27
Barbaras. Kohlenberg, University of Nevada Author Index: Volumes 1-18 ...' 34
Regina Lipkins, University of Nevada Subject Index: Volumes 1-18 35

ISSN 8755-612X
 A Newsletter of
Interbehavioral Psychology
ISSN 8755-612X
Linda J. Hayes, Editor
Department of Psychology
University of Nevada
Reno, Nevada 89557, U.S.A.
702-784-1137
INTERBEHAVIORIST publishes news,
information, discussion, journal and book notes,
bookreviews, comments, and brief articles pertaining
to interbehavioral psychology - a contextual istic,
integrated-field approach to the natural science of
behavior.
The newsletter also publishes professional com-
munications that fall between informal correspon-
dence and colloquia, and formal archival publication.
As such, the newsletter supplements contemporary
journals dedicated to basic and applied research, to the
history and philosophy of thebehavioral sciences, and
to professional issues in the field. The newsletter
strongly encourages submission of notes about cur-
rent professional activities of its subscribers, news
and observations about interbehavioral psychology
and related perspectives, comments on journal ar-
ticles and books of interest, more extended book
reviews, and brief articles. All submissions should be
sent in triplicate to the editor and should conform to
the style described in the Publication Manual of the
American Psychological Association (3rd edition).
Subscription Information
Student Subscriptions (USA). $5.00
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Back Volumes 1-18 8.00
1991 subscription fees are now
due. If you have not already
done so, be sure to send them
in right away.
Principia Press's currently available titles in in-
terbehavioral psychology, all by J.R. Kantor, are
listed below. Check your bookshelves, and those of
your library and bookstore, for possible oversights.
In addition, the books make excellent gifts for col-
leagues and students, especially for the latter in honor
of their completed degree requirements. The books
may be purchased directly from Principia Press, 5743
Kimbark Avenue, Chicago, IL 60637. Handling
charges are$.75 per title; prepaid orders are postpaid.
Any queries should also be directed to the address
above.
^/Principles of Psychology (2 vols.) $20.00
Psychology and Logic (2 vols.) $25.00
^Interbehavioral Psychology $15.00
^The Logic of Modern Science $15.00
An Objective Psychology of Grammar $13.00
^The Scientific Evolution of
Psychology (2 vols) $40.00
The Science of Psychology:
An Interbehavioral Survey $20.00
Psychological Linguistics $15.00
u^The Aim and Progress of Psychology
and Other Sciences $20.00
Interbehavioral Philosophy $27.50
^Cultural Psychology $16.00
Tragedy and the Event Continuum $15.00
Selected Writings, 1929-1983 $20.00
^Psychological Comments and Queries $20.00
THE INTERBEHAVIORIST publishes
news about subscribers' activities and informa-
tion about others' activities that may be of inter-
est to readers. If you have published an article,
chapter, or book with an interbehavioral orien-
tation, or have read one published by someone
else, particularily if the source is obscure,
please let us know about it. Likewise, if you
have read a paper at a meeting of potential
interest to our readers, let us know. Do you
know of a conference that might be of interest?
Have you had a grant to do interbehavioral re-
search funded? Do you know of a training
program for students interested in interbehav-
ioral psychology? Keep us informed.
Editor's Note
With this combined issue of THE INTERBE-
HAVIORIST, Volume 18 is complete. The 20 Year
Retrospective on THE INTERBEHAVIORIST makes
up the bulk of the issue. Included in it is a history of
the newsletter, some reflections on the past and plans
for the future, some materials of particular interest
reprinted from past volumes, plus author and subject
indexes for volumes 1-18 and abstracts of all articles
published in THE INTERBEHAVIORIST since its
inception. The contribution of the Assistant Editors
hi assembling these materials is gratefully acknowl-
edged.
Interbehaviorists in ABA
The Interbehaviorists in ABA Special Interest
Group has submitted two symposia for presentation at
the upcoming convention hi response to ABA's invi-
tation. The two invited symposia are as follows:
Title: Boundaries of Behavior Analysis
Chair: Bryan D. Midgley, University of Kansas
Discussant: Hayne W. Reese,
West Virginia University
Presenters:
Molar Behavior Analysis. William M, Baum,
University of New Hampshire
TheBoundariesofBehavioralTechnology. H. S.
Pennypacker, University of Florida
From MacDougall through Skinner and Kantor
and Beyond. William S. Verplanck, Univer
sity of Tennessee
TheDomain of Behavior Analysis: Psychology as
the Science of Behavior. Dennis J. Delprato,
Eastern Michigan University
Title: Understanding Interbehaviorism
Chair: Linda J. Hayes, University of Nevada
Discussant: Hayne W. Reese,
West Virginia University
Presenters:
Allies of Interbehaviorism. Noel W. Smith,
SUNY-Plattsburgh
TBA. Emilio Ribes, National Autonomous Uni-
versity of Mexico
Implications of Specificity Logic for Science.
Linda J. Hayes, University of Nevada
Several other presentations with an interbehav-
ioral orientation have been submitted independently.
If you have submitted a paper of this sort and the
orientation is not obvious by the title or your reputa-
tion, let us know so that we can get the word - and
audience - out.
Tribute to B. F, Skinner Planned
In addition, ABA has planned a special tribute to
the lateB. F. Skinner at this year's convention. As
part of that tribute, the special interest groups were
invited to address Skinner's contribution to their
interest areas in particular. Linda Hayes accepted this
challenge on behalf of The Interbehaviorists in ABA
and will give an address entitled Cross purposes: A
perspective on the conflict bet\veen Skinner and Kan-
tor.
Special Interest Group Meeting at ABA
As usual, The Interbehaviorists in ABA SIG will
meet at the convention. We have requested additional
tune for the meeting this year to accomodate a long
discussed but not yet implemented idea. The idea is
to arrange an opportunity for interbehaviorists to
consult with one another on problems they have
encountered in interbehavioral analysis, method,
practice or whatever. Tune would also be available
for a more extended discussion of the life and future
of interbehavioral psychology than has been available
in the past. Further structure for this meeting will be
proposed in the next issue of THE INTERBEHAV-
IORIST. Any suggestions as to content or means are
most welcome and should be sent to the editor.
Biography of Kantor in Progress
Drs. Donna M. Cone and Paul T. Mountjoy are
undertaking a biography of Jacob Robert Kantor. We
request that anyone who has information relevant to
this project contact us at the following addresses.
Dr. Donna M. Cone, Department of Mental
Health, Rehabilitation & Hospitals, 600 New London
Ave, Cranston, R.I. 02920, Day Phone (401) 464-
2334, Evening Phone (401) 821-8796
Dr. Paul T, Mountjoy, Department of Psychol-
ogy, Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, M.I.
49008-5052, Day Phone (616) 387-4498, Evening
Phone (616) 344-0814
 Alternative Visual Representations
Tom Sharpe
University of Nebraska, Lincoln
Educational measurement and statistical analysis
of results have tended to follow a pattern where
variables are measured separately and then a mathe-
matical model is chosen to portray .the relationship
among those variables. This linear models approach
can be characterized as follows; Measure variables
separately, then relate, them mathematically (Frick,
1983). Some temporally and contextually oriented
alternatives have gained attention hi the educational
research community hi the past decade (refer to Guba
& Lincoln, 1981; Maccia & Maccia, 1976), though
full blown interbehavioral systems methodologies are
still scarce (refer to Ray & Delprato, 1989; Sharpe &
Hawkins-, 1990).
A time and context perspective may be character-
ized as follows: Measure relations among observable
behaviors directly by counting their temporalpatterns
within a certain setting. If we are to subscribe to this
epistemological avenue, however, a subtlebut signifi-
cant shift in one's world view, compared to that often
taught in educational measurement and statistics courses,
is required. To illustrate this perspective, the example
of a baseball coach who observes how often each
player has hit safely against left-handed pitchers when
runners are in a scoring position, comes to mind. In
this case, temporal patterns are observed and enumer-
ated rather than estimating beta weights for regression
analysis or means for ANOVA, as is typically done
within the constraints of a linear models approach.
In essence a linear models strategy historically
has tended to dominate educational research method-
ology, although naturalistic descriptive methods have
recently gained status. Again, the traditional world
view attempts to measure variables separately and
then attempts to characterize their relationship with a
mathematical model, where variable Y is some func-
tion of variable X. Though this principle may be
extended to multiple variables, the relation is ulti-
mately modeled by a line surface, whether straight or
curved, in n-dimensional space. When such a relation-
ship does indeed exist, then a mathematical model is
an elegant means of relationship expression.
However, this oftentimes is not the case for the
complex relationships among observable behaviors
in an instructional setting. Utilizing a more temporal
and contextual perspective in regard to the applied
pedagogical environ may yield a more connectionist
picture, relating previously undetected relationships
among the complex array of ongoing behaviors and
setting elements. If relationships among variables are
viewed as a set of temporal patterns, and not as a line
surface, mathematical models become ill suited to
their identification and characterization. Rather, re-
lationships are measured by counting the occurrences
of relevant temporal patterns and aggregating the fre-
quencies and durations of those patterns. Addition-
ally, temporal and contextual characteristics - such
as rhythm, complexity, coherence, velocity, and
fluency (Sharpe, Hawkins, & Landin, 1989) - may
be used in describing the extant behavioral patterns
which typify a particular experimental situation.
For those accustomed to a linear models ap-
proach to their work, a focus on patterns in time may
appear rather simplistic. However, Kendall (1973)
notes that:
Before proceeding to the more advanced meth-
ods, however, we may recall that in some cases
forecasting can be successfully carried out merely by
watching the phenomena of interest approach... Nor
should we despise these simple-minded methods in
the behavioral sciences... (p. 116).
Rationale
Though patterns in tune do not necessarily indi-
cate causal relationships, the ability to recognize
these patterns helps in the forecasting process regard-
ing future occurrences. The gleaning of relative
probabilities in this manner may, at least, provide
direction for further experimental study and, at most,
provide probable relations of '-effect in context"
among observable behaviors.
When analyzing patterns in time with regard to
observable behavior, a variable is usually the tempo-
ral pattern. While contemporary technology has
allowed for the efficacy of multiple variable, overlap-
ping time series, data collection (refer to S & K behavioral and contextual categories have evolved
Computer Products, Ltd, 1985); the literature re- from initial setting description and have been tracked
mains in infancy regarding applicable visual represen- accordingly (refer to Sharpe & Hawkins, 1990 for
tations of this type of data, once collected. While ob- systemic data collection strategies). Further, it must
servation and mapping of occurring behavior has bemade clear that each data representation stems from
taken root in the social sciences within the last ten a construed conditional probability matrix, in which
years, visual representation of the data has remained all preceding and succeeding behaviors within the
purely sequential and largely linear in orientation data set are listed according to frequency and relative
(refer to Bakeman & Gottman, 1986); Powell & probability of occurrence in temporal relation to one
Dickie, 1990). Needed still are clear depictions of another.
interbehavioral time series data which accurately Figure 1 portrays a listing example of dual
convey behaviors within the greater temporal and behavior chains with their accompanying frequency
contextual stream in which they reside. Further, and relative probability characteristics. Clusters of
succinct representations of thesecomplexpatterns and behaviors are listed after each trigger event (i. e., the
relationships as they occur hi time must be couched in event around which preceding and/or succeeding
a manner easily understood by the scientific and lay behaviors and context elements are grouped). In the
community. examples, numerals indicate specific behaviors and
Therefore, the recommended task is to find new the values hi parentheses relate frequency and relative
means of representing the overlapping complexities probability of the succeeding numeric behavior. To
and multiple occurrences of systemic field data. illustrate, trigger event #18: content unrelated en-
However, a recommended perspective should preface couragement's onset is followed by #18, itself (11
the exegesis of the four figure prototypes. They are times with a relative probability of .20), #26: positive
meant to stimulate discussion within a relatively un- instructional feedback, #28: positive non-task verbal,
charted portion of interbehavioral methodology, and and/or #31: positive non-verbal communication. It
should not be construed as a set of rigid delineated should be underscored, again, that all patterns hi time
blueprints inflexibly mandated as the means of sys- represented are built upon behavioral start times to
temic representation. My hope is to further then- allow for overlapping event scrutiny (e.g., behaviors
evolution, via scholarly reaction and interaction, #18, 26, 28, and 31 evidence themselves post start-
toward even more clearly defined visual alternatives.
Obviously, any methodology, or even subpart of a
particular paradigm, may be artificially elevated to Expert Dual Chains Frequency/Probability
dogma status. However, my aim is to show a few
12 (16/.16)
.examples of possible visual representations in the
19 (257.26)
hope of inspiring the behavioral research community 26 (18/.19)
toward a broader array of conceivable tools with 31 (14/.14)
which to work. Choosing a specific research tactic to ,75
fit the unique needs and requisites of a particular
experimental question is advocated over the: "Have 18 (I1/.20)
method, will travel" mentality, oftentimes articulated 26 (6/:ll)
by various advocacy groups within the social science 28 (9/.16)
community. Success may only be possible when 31 (21/.38)
predicated upon a flexible, tentative, and open per- .85
spective.
28 (8/.IO)
18 (19/.24)
Visual Alternatives
19 (IO/.13)
Grounded in a malleable perspective, four alter- (17/.21)
26
native visual representation examples of a field sys- 31 (7/.08)
tems data base are illustrated. The data pertain to ,76
systemic behavior collected on one expert movement
education instructor for one class period.For discus-
sion purposes, we must assume that well defined Figure 1. Behavioral dual chain examples
 type of representation a glimpse of simultaneously
occurring and overlapping behavior patterns which
frequent the investigative system may be shown.
Additionally, this type of depiction is more represen-
tative of the multiple behavioral interactions within
the complete field system. Though not shown for the
sake of brevity and initial clarity, relative line thick-
ness may be used to indicate strength of relationship,
arrows may be used to show direction hi time, and
numerical frequency/relative probability indicators
may be included in parentheses in representing as
much interactive information within a particular field
system as possible.
Once a greater understanding of the interaction
among many of the elements within the field is
achieved via Figure 2, a return to the study of
microscopic patterns may be warranted. Similar to
whole-part-whole strategies found within the herme-
neutic tradition (Ormiston & Schrift, 1990), the
Figure 3 data representation allows an interpretive
Figure 2. Behavioral sequential field example reversion to high frequency/probability nests of be-
haviors which immediately precede and succeed a
time of trigger event #18, though the trigger event particular trigger. This form of data depiction may be
may still be ongoing). helpful in assimilating the complex data network
Figure 2's configuration allows insight to the oftentimes represented within Figure 2.
greater field of behaviors in action and interaction To illustrate, trigger event #18; content unrelated
within time and context, and is therefore recom- encouragement is shown to bepreceded by #18, itself,
mended after an initial sense of simple dual behavior #25: physical guidance, and #28: positive non-task
patterns are gleaned from a data set (i.e., Figure 1). verbal. Numerical frequencies and relative probabili-
In this illustration, the trigger event of interest (i.e., ties may also be added in parentheses to aid in
#18: content unrelated encouragement) is shown to be description of the extant relationships in tune.
followed by teacher behaviors #18,26,28, and 31 as The final visual representationrevolves around an
in the Figure 1 example. These four succeeding attempt to augment interbehavioral data within a
behaviors of high frequency/probability are, in turn, graphic vehicle (See Figure 4), It seems a logical
secondary trigger events as the succeeding behaviors extension that if field systems and interbehavioral
for each are then represented, and so forth. From this theory focus upon the importance of evolving beyond
the linear model, then visual representations of this
type of data should move toward a time pattern focus.
As can be readily discerned from Figure 4,
streaming alternate behaviors and context elements
within the field system horizontally across time (i.e.,
specific behaviors are configured on the ordinal axis
and strung across the abscissa in terms of elapsed
time) allows the investigator a visual sense of the
rapidly recurring, overlapping multiplebehavior field
in action and interaction. Akin to a musical score,
complex relationships in time and intricate chains of
behaviors may be simultaneously viewed within the
context in which they actually occurred. Frequencies
and durations of multiple behaviors are easily read in
Figure 3. Macro-micro behavioral nesting example
(the Immediately preceding and Immediately following coliims pre~ and terms of the number and length of the boxed portions
post trigger event meet a cumulative 50% minimum probability level) of each behavior contained on the Y axis. A sense of
Keystroke

12

17

19 II

21

24

26

31

60000 62000 64000 66000 68000 70000 72000

Time (1.953125E-02 seconds)
Figure 4. Four minute graphic represennion across teacher behaviors #12: Specific observation, #17: Context specific
encouragement, #19: Verbal instructional prompts, #21: Skill statements, #24: Individual modeling, #26: Positive
instructional feedback, and #31: Non-verbal positive communication.

the rhythm and continuity of a particular system may
be articulated via this visual format. The X axis may
also be collapsed in terms of length of time to display
a microscopic slice of the field system under investi-"*
gation (as in the Figure 4 example) or expanded to
includetheconipleteexperimental system from begin-
ning to conclusion.
Closing Remarks
Only a few of the myriad of alternative visual rep-
resentations regarding systemic or interbehavioral
data have been piloted above. Though data results and
conclusions thereof have been neglected, the means
of visual fieid systems representation has hopefully
been expanded. If impetus has been given to provide
those with an interbehavioral or systemic behavioral
focus, instalments to more accurately and clearly
visually portray their data in light of its deviation from
traditional linear modeling techniques, then this essay
has served its purpose. For only if our visual data
representations evolve hi concert with the theoretical
and methodological constructs of a field systems focus
may both the scientific and lay community truly
understand and benefit from the temporal and contex-
tual information that this particular research avenue
has to offer.
A detailed account of the strategies and tactics in-
volved in data collection, visual presentation, and
interpretation is available from the author, Dept. of
HPER, 232 Mabel Lee Hall, University of Nebraska-
Lincoln, Lincoln, NE 68588-0229.
References
Balceman, R., & Gottman, J. M. (1986). Observing
interaction: An introduction to sequential analy-
sis. New York: Cambridge University Press.
 Preventing AIDS Among College Students:
A Challenge to Behavioraily Oriented Psychologists
Harry C..Mahan
A recently released report of a survey by Student
Health Services on 19 university campuses indicates
that .20% of students, reporting to such services for
any reason, test positive for the AIDS-reiated virus.
Extraoplated to the entire student population of the
United States, this means that mere are 25,000
students carrying the AIDS virus at the present time.
(Editorial note: These figures, calculated more than a
year ago, are lower than those currently estimated for
this population.)
As pointed out by the director of the survey, who
was interviewed on the McNeil-Lehrer News Hour on
May 22, 1989, college students now have, and have
had for some time, all the information that is possible
to give them regarding AIDS prevention meausures.
"The thing which is necessary now/' he said, "is to
conduct a program of habit modification which will
convert their knowledge into habits."
Such a program will certainly requirepeer leader-
ship and pressure, for it cannot be successfully
conducted by health services and faculty alone. Channels
of communication must be established to "sell" the
idea that, for those engaging in sexual activity, the use
of condoms is a "must", the availability of other
methods of contraception notwithstanding, no matter
who the partner. These channels of communication
Sharpe (continued)
Frick, T. W. (1983). Non-metric temporal path
analysis: An alternative to the linear models ap-
proach for verification of stochastic educational
relations. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, In-
diana University School of Education.
Cuba, E. G., & Lincoln, Y. S. (1981). Effective
evaluation: Improving the usefiilness of evalu-
ation results through responsive and naturalistic
approaches. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Maccia, E. S., & Maccia, G. S. (1976). On the
contribution of general systems theory to educa-
tional research. Paper presented at the Society for
General Systems Research, Boston, MA.
Ormiston, G. L., &Schrift, A. D. (Eds.). (1990). Tfie
hermeneutic tradition: From Ast to Ricoeur. Al-
bany, NY: State University of New York Press.
must inevitably include juniors and seniors, and
graduate students, who are sexually more sophisti-
cated and who can, therefore, be convincing. Rap
sessions between such communicators and the more
junior students should bebetween individuals who are
well acquainted with each other, and held at a
convenient time and place so that the sessions will
have an air of spontaneity and informality about them.
The function of behavioral and interbehavioral
psychologists in such AIDS preventive projects should
be as consultants to health service directors and as
facilitators in establishing a student network of com-
munications. This is an opportunity for such psy-
chologists to demonstrate that they can deal with
"habit" problems on a broad scale, whereas their
cognitive and clinical colleagues are concerned with
problems of cognition and personality that are cen-
tered in the individual.
In the present instance, the problem is neither one
of learning nor of personality, but rather one that in-
volves the habitual interactions of a person in a
context. Where AIDS preventive measures involving
condoms is not already a part of established sexual
habits, such habits should be modified and, since they
are behavior, it is appropriate that behaviorally-
oriented psychologists should be at the forefront.
Powell, J., &Dickie, R. F. (1990). Kinetic output: A
conceptual, dimensional and empirical analysis.
The Behavior Analyst, 13, 3-10.
Ray, R. D., & Delprato, D. J. (1989). Behavioral
systems analysis: Methodological strategies and
tactics. Behavioral Science, 34, 81-127.
S & K Computer Products, Ltd. (1985). Portable
event recorder manual, (available from P.O. Box
146, Station M, Toronto, Ontario M6S 4T2,
Canada).
Sharpe,T.L.,Hawkins, A.H,,&Landin,D. (1989).
An interbehavioral view of sport pedagogy
expertise. Tlielnterbehaviorist, 17(4), 45-47.
Sharpe, T. L., & Hawkins, A. H. (1990. May).
Computer based demonstration of afield systems
approach to applied research. Paper presented at.
the Association for Behavior Analysis, Nashville,
TN.
 The Interbehavioral Newsletter: !n the B
Noel W. Smith
State University of New York at Plattsburgh
The newsletter had its inception at what may have
been the only independent interbehavioral conference
ever held. This tookplace at Miner Institute at Chazy,
New York, June 16-21,1969. We called the confer-
ence "The Emerging Role of Interbehavioral Psy-
chology" . The major participants were Sam Campbell,
Paul Fuller, Louise Kent, Neil Kent, Wayne Lazar,
Paul Mountjoy, and myself. Toward the end of the
conference Neil declared that interbehaviorism should
have a newsletter. Everyone agreed with this but no
one came forward with any further plans. Because I
thought we needed such apublication, I finally agreed
to launch and edit it in lieu of any other volunteers.
(I don't recall the actual details of this discussion, and
the conference proceedings no longer exist: the tran-
scription of the tape recording of the conference was
just beginning when someone stole the recorder with
the tape.)
I gathered all the addresses of interbehaviorists
that I could obtain and on November 19,1969 mailed
out a prospectus that was in the form that the
newsletter would take. The third page was a form for
subscribing that had a place for names and addresses
of anyone whom the subscriber thought might be
interested. It also had a space for desired features and
another for statements for the newsletter. From the
initial mailing and from the leads the recipients
provided, over seventy subscriptions came in at two
dollars each (one dollar for students).
Volume 1, Number 1 of "The Interbehavioral
Psychology Newsletter" was mailed out in January
1970. the first issue provided an account of the
conference that spawned the newsletter. From the
first I had at the top of the front page a representation
of an investigator's interaction with the interbehav-
ioral field of another person adapted from one by
Kantor in his paper of 1942 on motivation. Beiow it
was a quotation from Kantor about the investigative
field it represented. Below the quotation in a double
column was ' 'News & Notes" that I changed to' "The
Agora" in the second issue and continued by that
name thereafter. The diagram had several flaws in it
for all of volume 1, but that was corrected and the
whole diagram redrawn for volume 2. The color
changed with each new volume. I maintained the front
page format during the eight years I edited the news-
letter: Masthead and color diagram across the full
page with a quotation under it and below that the
double columned agora. The diagram at the top often
brought questions about its meaning from those unfa-
miliar with interbehaviorism. The newsletter was a
quinterly for two years but then lapsed into a quarterly
which it has remained up to the present.
Getting material for it was always a struggle, and
sometimes the amount of material I had available to
publish was rather slim. But from time to tune we
published some substantial works including transla-
tions of two French accounts of interbehaviorism that
had been available only in that language. Kantor
wrote two articles under the pseudonym "A. Mitsorg",
and others also wrote for it from time to time, I
gathered whatever news I could find and wrote a few
pieces myself. It was mostly a one-man operation.
Often I had to do my own typing (manual typewriter,
no computer), but sometimes received assistance. I
usually did all the folding, envelope labeling, stuff-
ing, and sealing myself but occasionally had a student
assistant.
The name "Interbehavioral Psychology News-
letter" always seemed rather long and awkward to
me, and for volume 7 I changed the name to "Inter-
behavioral Quarterly". After seeing that name in
print it seemed rather pretentious to me, suggesting a
full-fledged journal. When I turned the newsletter
10

over to Ron Heyduk in 1978 I suggested calling it
"The Interbehayiorist" which name he used. I don't
know why it took me eight years to think of that name.
whether the publication would have enough sup-
port to continue over the years was very uncertain
from its outset. But it is now in its twentieth year and
its fourth editor and shows no signs of waning. In fact
it continues to grow in quality under the able steward-
ship of these successive editors. Its future appears to
be reasonably secure. I suspect that we could greatly
expand its readership if we could make it better known
to the natural allies of interbehaviorism.
The major goal of the publication stated in the
prospectus was ' 'to provide a ready means of commu-
nication among those interested in interbehavioral
psychology and to offer a means of consolidating
efforts toward the promotion of it...". Similarly, the
first issue stated the goal to be "to promote an interest
in the development and dissemination of objective
approaches to psychology and (to) facilitate efforts
toward that end". These are still worthy goals.
Perhaps an equally important function of the newslet-
ter is to enable interbehaviorists to share viewpoints
i I
and information and to maintain contact with each
other as a means of maintaining a community of
identification toward common pursuits. These goals t3
II
make the THE INTERBEHAVIORIST an essential
medium. We owe it to ourselves to keep it alive and
well. Hook forward to a Jong future of reading THE
INTERBEHAVIORIST.

Total Number of Pages and Number of Substantive Pages1

Volumes 1 - 18

Total Number of Pages

25

20

15

10

Number of Substantive Pages

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

Volume
*Odd-iized pages converted to 8.5 x 1 1 equivalents. "Substantive page*" include article), comments, and substantive book reviews.

Linda J. Hayes
University of Nevada
The career of a newsletter often depends in large
part on the determination and creativity of its succes-
sion of editors. Noel Smith's account of the early days
of THE INTERBEHAVIORISTillustrates this point.
There was not then, nor has there ever been an
abundance of materials from which to select a few
gems for publication. Each of the former editors has
pleaded for submissions at one point or another. And
on only one occasion in a 20-year history was it ever
reported that "submissions were up" (V.12.) But as
Noel notes, and as is evident from the quality and
longevity of The Newsletter, there was always enough
for another issue, another volume. And, as Noel has
also noted, from time to time substantial works not
elsewhere available have filled its pages. In retro-
spect, we may agree that The Newsletter has had a
very respectable career.
What can we glean from its pages about the
career of interbehaviorism -- about the intellectual
movement The Newsletter reflects? To begin, we
know that the group for whom the newsletter was
originated was rather small. The first group of
subscribers numbered 74 in all, 24 of whom were
students. An early list of "Interbehaviorists and
Allies", complied by Noel Smith on the basis of
"personal knowledge and/or consistent subscribing
to the Interbehavioral Newsletter", numbers 86.
Many of these are graduates of Indiana University -
first generation Kantorians -- and a second generation
of their students.
Numbers of subscribers were not reported consis-
tently over the years however some figures are
available. By the end of Volume 1, subscriptions had
risen to 145, and by the end of Volume 2 reaches an
all-time high of 176, including some from a number
of foreign countries. By the end of Volume 5, the list
had settled at 100. Heyduk reported significantly
more subscribers by the end of Volume 9, reversing
a trend, although the actual number was not included.
The next available figure, 65, is published in Volume
12. By the end of Volume 13, subscriptions had risen
to 140. The trend from this point on is downward.
There are 110 subscribers at the outset of Volume 15,
75 by Volume 16, and an all-time low of 50 paid
subscribers for the current volume. Of these 50, 17
were among those included in Smith list of "Interbe-
haviorists and Allies". The point we are making with
11
these names and numbers is that THE 1NTERBEHAV-
IORIST serves a smaller and smaller number of
scholars. What does this mean for the movement - for
Interbehaviorism?
We look again to The Newsletter for answers,
Intellectual movements are spearheaded by academi-
cians through whose students movements grow and
multiply, a point acknowledged by repeated notices of
opportunities for interbehavioral training and place-
ment of graduates in The Newsletter. The first such
notice appears in Smith's memo announcing the
inauguration of the Interbehavioral Newsletter. He
writes:
We might include notices of graduate pro-
grams for which we are seeking satisfactory
students as well as descriptions of our faculty
openings when appropriate. Those who are
seeking to place graduating students into
faculty positions could provide information
about the student's field of specialization and
invite inquiries (V. 10.)
And notices do appear over the years: In Volume 1
it is announced that Michigan State University has an
interbehaviorally-oriented comparative psychology
program and SUNY-Plattsburgh has an interbehav-
iorally-oriented school psychology program. In a
related vein, Heduk (V. 6) urges subscribers to
communicate with one another about the teaching of
interbehavioral psychology or teaching psychology
from an interbehavioral perspective. There are no
immediate responses to his call, although from tune to
time subscribers submitted news of their courses or
materials relevant to them, among whom were Pronko.
Mountjoy, Delprato, and Gardner.
By Volume 14 concern is raised that few oppor-
tunities for graduate study in interbehavioral psychol-
ogy are available. Eastern Michigan University and
the University of Kansas are mentioned as possibili-
ties, each with its own limitations, however. The
same issue is raised again in Volume 15, with
Jacksonville State University and Peabody College of
Vanderbuilt University added to the list. In each of
these cases, however, while an interbehaviorist is on
faculty, the program is not interbehaviorally oriented.
In Volume 18, the development of a new Ph.D.
program with an interbehavioral orientation at the
University of Nevada is announced. While there may
12
yet be opportunities for graduate training in interbe-
haviorally psychology, the long and short of it is that
few interbehaviorists can boast of placing their stu-
dents in influential academic positions, and it seems
unlikely that tlie movement will survive -- in its
present form at least - in the absence of so critical a
means of its survival.
The question here of' 'form'' raises another issue.
Different views of the future of the movement have
made themselves evident in the pages of The News-
letter over the years. For example, in stepping down
as Editor, Smith reiterated the purpose of the Inter-
behavioral Newsletter as follows:
THE 1NTEBBEHAVIORIST will continue to
provide a forum for the exchange of informa-
tion and ideas concerning the development of
objective psychology. As before, this en-
deavor will be to scrutinize modern empirical
and theoretical psychology, separating events
from what is cultural imposition, and offering
alternatives when necessary in an effort to
encourage a naturalistic psychology - that of
a field of iflterbehaviors (V. 7.)
A better description of Kantor's life work is hard to
come by; and it might be implied by this that to
continue his work is or ought to be the aim of those
communicating by way of the Newsletter.- This may
or may nothavebeenSmith's view, however, no more
specific aim of another sort is put forward. -
By contrast, Heyduk (V. 10) argues not for the
continuation of Kantor's work so much as the align-
ment of interbehaviorists with other like-minded
thinkers, even to the point of loosing identity as
interbehaviorists in the process. He argues that inter-
behaviorists would have a greater impact on the
science of psychology if they adopted a positive as
opposed to the critical tone so characteristic of
Kantor's writing. In his own words:
I am not recommending that our aim ought to
be to 'convert' those with similar ideas to
interbehaviorism. I suggest that such a goal
would be naive and counterproductive. Per-
haps it is obvious to readers , but if the
psychology we desire is to come about, it will
almost certainly not come about under the
banner of "interbehaviorism", or any other
provincial banner for that manner. It is highly
unlikely that the size and structure of modern
psychology will allow our small group of
interbehaviorists to lead a revolution analo-
gous to the behavioral revolution spearheaded
by John B. Watson. It is more realistic to
expect a gradual evolution (perhaps already in
progress) toward a less se!f-actional, reduc-
tionistic, elementalistic psychology....As
interbehaviorists, our goal ought to be to
make sure we are an integral part of the
evolution by being productive psychologists
who can interact with and give support to
others with different labels but similar con-
victions (V. 10.)
To these remarks Heyduk invited replies, and one
was received from Michael MacRoberts. Referring to
Heyduk's editorial of the previous issue, MacRoberts
(V. 10) writes:
There now exists a second generation of inter-
behaviorists. This handful of scholars obvi-
ously considers Kantor's work revolutionary
and important, but they seem to be neither
prolific nor especially concerned with spear-
heading a revolution.,.. Instead of proselytiz-
ing, interbehaviorists appear willing to let
psychology slowly and falteringly evolve
toward its own position.... It is as if interbe-
haviorism had its Darwin but lacked its
Huxley.
He went on to say:
Passivity is abnormal or contrary to normal
science where, in all ages, men with novel
ideas have fought to get these ideas before
their colleagues. If interbehaviorists feel that
they have a contribution to make then they
have the obligation as scientists to challenge
psychology and to change it either by deflect-
ing its course or by speeding it up.
Some agreement was reached between Heyduk and
MacRoberts after two or three more volleys, but the
question remains: As interbehaviorists, what are we
trying to accomplish, and by what means are we likely
to accomplish it? And further, what role has and can
this newsletter play toward that end?
Furthering the development of psychology as a
natural science is what we are trying to accomplish.
To do so, it is necessary to find and to work with our
allies, while retaining our identity so as not to lose the
richness of our heritage. Perhaps it is time for the
newsletter to evolve into an archival forum published
by distinct but allied collectivities-of which the
interbehaviorsts would be one-for substantive works
pertaining to the science of psychology from a contex-
tual istic, integrated-field perspective.
I invite responses.

As reported in "The Agora" 1969-1989
June, 1969
A telegram sent to Kantor from the summer con-
ference on interbehavioral psychology group, read as
follows:
From June 16 through June 22 near the village of
Chazy, New York, at Miner Institute under the joint
auspices of the Miner Foundation and the Faculty of
Social Sciences of State University College of Arts and
Science at Plattsburgh, N. Y., we are discussing the
current status of interbehaviorism, its contributions
to the science of behavior, and its future.
In addition to stimulating discussions centered on
interbehavioral psychology, historical incidents have
been recalled which point up the interpersonal contri-
butions to the development of interbehavioral psy-
chologists. These emphasize the warm personal
affections we allfeel toward you, Dr. Kantor. Please
accept our kindest regards.
Signed, Sam Campbell, Paul Fuller, Louise Kent,
Neil Kent, Wayne Lazer, Paul Mountjoy, and Noel
Smith.
A letter sent to Kantor from Noel Smith:
The conference on interbehavioral psychology
seems to have been quite successful. It was a great
pleasure to be able to discuss topics on the basis of a
common orientation and a common understanding of
principles. It was the interbehavioral principles
themselves that dominated much of the discussion, but
the utilization of the principles in such fields as
linguistics, physiological psychology, and operant
conditioning received much attention.
As for fruitfiilness of the meetings, it was agreed
that we should, meet again next year and make
provisionsfor graduate students to attend, we should
start a newsletter, and we should begin some joint
efforts at book publishing. I will be editing the
newsletter and hope to get it underway by fall.
>July r .1969
Kantor's,reply to Smith:
Your indicated future plans of the group in all its
phases, inclusion of graduate students, starting a
newsletter, and developing of a publication program,
all sound appealing and I hope they will all work out
13
to your satisfaction and to that of the group. I will
surely follow the development of the Conference \vith
great interest, and if conditions allow I would very
much like to participate in and helpjurther the good
work of the group. Please keep me informed of any
new developments.
You probably know about the appreciative tele-
gram I received from the members of the conference.
It was a beautiful gesture and I was very much touched
by it. Should you be in communication with any of
them I would like to convey my deep thanks.
January, 1970
University of Akron announces that it will present
an honorary Doctor of Letters degree to Kantor on
May 9, 1970 at second annual meeting of Cheiron
Society: The International Society for the History of
the Behavioral and Social Sciences.
May, 1970
The granting of an Honorary Doctorate to Kantor
by the University of Akron was postponed due to
closing of the university subsequent to the nearby
Kent State tragedy.
June, 1970
The Honorary Doctor of Letters degree is awarded
by the University of Akron with the following state-
ment:
The author of numerous books, and thefounder of
the widely respected journal, The Psychological Rec-
ord, JACOB ROBERT KANTOR, Professor Emeritus
of Indiana University, has been active for five dec-
ades.
Structuralist psychologists, in ascendance when
he began his work, saw the advent of Watsonian Be-
haviorism and soon thereafter the emergence of
Gestalt Psychology. Both without and within the
academy questions were repeatedly asked, "Wiat is
psychology about?" "Wfiat is its major concern?"
and -- in all candor ~ "How can psychology become
a science?"
Winds of doctrine blew heavily in all directions.
Professor Kantor withstood these gales and main-
14
lamed a victorious immunity to the mandates of
tradition, ever seeking to match the label' 'scientific''
to the fact of scientific psychology. His endeavors
have promoted tnan's directorship of man.
Hence it is fitting to honor this Nestor among
psychologists, JACOB ROBERT'KANTOR, aperson-
age of impressive academic accomplishments whose
seminal ideas may wellyield the richest harvests in the
years ahead.
June, 1970
The Cheiron Society (International Society for the
History of the Behavioral Sciences) presented Kantor
with a certificate. Attending the honor guard were:
Sam Campbell, Arthur Kahn, Parker Lichtenstein,
Marion McPherson, Paul Mountjoy, Stanley Ratner,
Noel Smith, Robert Topper, and Irv Wolf.
January, 1971
Kantor's Logic of Modern Science and The Scien-
tific Evolution ofPsychology havebeen reprinted due
to demand.
April, 1971
Kantor's new book The Aim and Progress ofPsychol-
ogy and Other Sciences is finished and will be
available by September.
December 1971
Kantor gave a colloquium at Queen's College in New
York.
January, 1972
The Principia Press moved from Granville, Ohio to
5743 South Kimbark Avenue, Chicago, IL 60637.
February, 1972
Kantor gave a colloquium at the University of
Chicago.
June, 1972
Kantor presented a paper entitled: Segregation in
science: A historico-cultural analysis at the Cheiron
Society meeting in Pittsburgh. He was introduced by
Henry Pronko.
September, 1973
Kantor is to be Distinguished Visiting Scholar at
Lynchburg College in Lynchburg, Virginia for 6-7
weeks. He will make two presentations and consult
with students and staff, A weekly discussion group is
also part .of the program. Donna Cone made the
arrangements and will study with him this year on her
sabbatical,
April, 1974
Kantor was the Honorary Chairman of the first
Mexican Congress on Behavior Analysis, held at
Xalapa, Veracruz, Mexico. His address was entitled:
How is Interbehavioral Psychology Related to the
Experimental Analysis of Behavior?
September, 1974
Kantor's 1933 textbook Survey of Scientific Psy-
chology has been revised and will be available in 1975
under with title The Science of Psychology: An
Interbehavioral Survey with co-author Noel W. Smith.
April, 1975
Editorial Trillas, a publishing firm in Mexico
City, and the Principia Press have contracted for a
Spanish translation of Kantor's Interbehavioral Psy-
chology.
April, 1976
Kantor was the honored guest at dinner party
given by the Department of Psychology at Western
Michigan University. Among those in attendance
were the following graduates of Indiana University:
Paul Mountjoy, Marjorie Mountjoy, Fred Gault,
Dave Lyon, Dick Malott, and Louise Kent, A small
number of graduate students were also invited among
whom was Linda Parrott. After dinner, Dr. Kantor
presided at a conversationhour. Over 75 students and
w faculty made up the standing room only audience.
Because of his hearing loss, Dr. Kantor requested that
questions be put in writing. He responded to them
with his customary analytic acumen and lively wit.
For those in attendance, it was the high point of the
academic year.
May, 1976
Kantor gave two lectures to large audiences at the
University of Mexico and several additional lectures
to other centers of the University around the city,
January, 1977
Kantor's Psychological Linguistics is published. -

May, 1977
Kantor gave an address and conversation hour at
the Association for Behavior Analysis in Chicago
[Note; see Comment by Mahan in this issue - Ed.].
A transcript of the conversation was prepared, and a
synopsis appears below;
Paul Mountjoy: We are here for a conversation hour
with Dr. Kantor. I would just like to remind those of
you who do not know him that, in the very early 20s,
he began to develop a system of objective psychology
which stood as a potent antagonist to the mechanistic
systems of behaviorism at that time. Since then, both
he and his competitors have evolved in many different
ways. And, of course, timehas produced changes. Dr.
Kantor is now in his eighty-ninth year. He is still very
active. His latest book on psycholinguistics is now in
the hands of the printer and should be available very
soon. However, unfortunately, his hearing has dete-
riorated over the years and he will be unable to take
questions from the audience unless they are produced
in written form. (Questions are collected in written
form from the audience.)
Q: Do you think that a cause-effect, goal oriented
philosophy like Behaviorism is more conducive to
research than a philosophy like interbehaviorism, and
is this justification for cause-effect dualism in sci-
ence?
JRK: My engagement was to be present at a discus-
sion hour, and you can imagine how little discussion
can go on in a crystal room like this, and with a man
so hard of hearing. I could not tell anything that my
friend Professor Mountjoy was saying. Now, the first
thing I have to say about this question is that it is not
very clear to me. In the first place there is a compari-
son of behaviorism with interbehaviorism, but inter-
behaviorism is behaviorism too. Now the point is,
and this is a very crucial point, behaviorism and inter-
behaviorism both are views or theories in psychology
that stand for the elimination of all kinds of spookol-
ogy, so you do not contrast one with the other. The
holder of each view is prepared to do research in much
the same way, that is to say, by elimination of super-
naturals.
Now I will say a word or two, which really isn't
part of the answer to this question, as to the difference
15
between behaviorism and interbehaviorism. Remem-
ber both views are antimentalism - both stand for the
elimination of mentals. There's a difference between
the origin of the two views. One stems, as you
probably know, from Pavlovian conditioning. But the
other view, interbehaviorism, stems from an older
type of science, which merely objected from the very
beginning to limiting psychology to any particular
type of research or theory.
(JRK jokes with the audience: Can you hear me?
I can hardly hear myself, but then if you can hear me,
I am alright.)
If we make a distinction between behaviorism and
interbehaviorism, it would be something like this:
Remember both are antimentalism; that is common.
Now behaviorism tends to two kinds of view. One is
that the organism initiates the behavior, the stimulus
object is, in a sense a cue or some condition not too
prominent in the situation, Now, there's a second
aspect of this behaviorism, and it works like this;
Great emphasis is put upon the stimulus, and the
organism is conditioned, and it is modified according
to some kind of stimulus. Now, this sort of thing fits
quite well in our psychological traditions in the sense
that you speak of an independent and a dependent
variable. The control is this way (from stimulus to
behavior) or that way (from behavior to stimulus)
when you emit behavior.
Now this is the difference between these behav-
iorisms and interbehaviorism. According to interbe-
haviorism, psychological events are fields, so you
have to consider that you do not have any independ-
ence or dependence. You have reciprocity, which is
a different type of thing. The event consists of these
two actions: They are reciprocal. And then you have
other things that are happening. You always have a
setting factor which is as much a part of the field. We
must think always in terms of a unit of events. So you
have a reciprocal interaction - interbehavior - that is
performed under setting conditions. Now there is
something else, and that is what we call a medium of
contact. A good example of this is that an individual
organism cannot interact with a stimulus object, say
in visual interbehavior, unless you have a light as the
medium of contact. In thecaseofhearingthe airwaves
serve as the medium. So you see the difference
between behaviorism and interbehaviorism is the
technical difference of how much and how skillfully
you analyze the events which we call either a behavior
or an interbehavior.
16
Q: Would you please clarify the scope of the concept
of "setting factor*' and how does this differ from
"discriminative stimulus."
JRK: Well, I w.33it to give an illustration of a setting
factor inpsychologicalinterbehavior. Thisisasimple
and maybe a trivial illustration. If you are interested
in language behavior, you know that in this setting, in .
this room, and upon this occasion, my speech is
different from other occasions and from other set-
tings. In other words a setting factor is always present
in a psychological action, Another simple example
would be that if an organism is satiated, it would not
interact with food in the same way as when it is
hungry. And that is why in experimental situations
you force the antmal or the organism not to be satiated,
that is to be hungry. So the question is: How does this
differ from discriminative stimuli. Well, a stimulus
is a different thing. The setting is the surroundings of
an interaction. A stimulus -- a discriminative stimulus
or any other kind of stimulus - is the thing the
organism always interacts with.
Q: Would you review for us what you feel to be the
important reasons for continuing to study the history
of psychology as a science?
JRK: This question has a fairly obvious answer. I'll
put the matter in a special way. As a psychologist, it
is obvious that whenever you want to do anything of
any serious consequence, you want to have as much
information about the situation, that is, about the
behavior you are entering into. And so, the history of
scientific psychology is very important. I have said a
number of times that the history of science, if it is a
valid history, is really an instrument for psychological
investigation.
I am going to give you an example of what I mean
in the way that indicates I'm try ing to be informal with
you and on a friendly, very friendly basis. I suppose
that all of you are acquainted with the fact that
Boring's history of psychology is called, very often,
a classical book. And I suppose that you ail know that
the content of the book is based on purely mentalistic
ideas. So that kind of history would not be very much
worth to you in any kind of psychological work. On
the other hand, if you have a history of psychological
work from a scientific standpoint, it will be very
helpful. I will elaborate this a little bit further.
In Boring's book, you would read about visual
experiments, and I hope most of you know that the
model that is used for vision is to have some kind of
energy impinge on the eye. And then that would be
followed by some kind of physiological process in the
optic pathway, and not until the process reaches the
occipital lobe of the brain would you have any color.
Color, for example, is manufactured somehow in the
brain, and is ejected or emitted out towards some
object. The object doesn't exist either until this
process happens. Well now, you don't have there a
scientific description of a psychological activity. So
that kind of history won't do any good. Here, of
course, you could say that I am prejudiced. If you
have an interbehavioral type of description in which
the organism interacts with a colored object, and the
color is in the object, based on various kinds of
chemical substances, that is going to help you.
Q: What would you like to see happen in psychology?
That is, what type of future directionality?
JRK: May I guess that you know the answer, really
- all of you. My answer, if I have to give it, would
be of course, the more psychology became interbe-
havioral and scientific the better the future of the
science would be. And there's another angle to this.
Actually, you all know that if there is a genuine
experiment in psychology, it is always an interbehav-
ioral or behavioral one. You always have a stimulus
and a response to deal with. And what you are trying
to find out in an experiment - what the science of
psychology is about - is to discover the kinds of
interbefaavior you will have depending upon the kind
of organism you are working with, the kind of
stimulus object you present, the setting factors, and
so on. Now one thing that has recently, fairly recently,
become a generally recognized feature of experimen-
tation in psychology, is that, if you are working with
inftahuman organisms or human organisms, you want
to know about the development of the organism. You
want to be acquainted with it. But always, psycholo-
gists and biologists have wanted to know the strains
of the organism; they wanted to know its background.
Well, that's one thing.
And, of course, you want to know about your
stimulus object. I want to give an illustration about
that. A colleague of mine once wanted to know what
kind of disturbance a subject would show if you

presented the subject with a very striking kind of
stimulus, and especially if the individual was pre-
sented with a stimulus without previous knowledge of
what he was going to be interacting with. So one of
the things that this researcher did was to have a test of
stability and then he put a 5-foot snake on the lap of
the subject. It did disturb some of the subjects but not
all of them. And, as ithappens, most of them cameout
of rural environments and a 5-foot black snake didn't
make much difference to them. They didn't show
much disturbance. That indicates that you have to
know your stimulus object. Would it be a stimulus for
this particular organism under these setting condi-
tions?
Q: Interbehaviorism seems to be directed toward how
we talk about our research. What are its implications
for how we conduct research? That is, what are its
methodological implications in contrast to those of
behaviorism and mentalism?
JRK: Well, to begin with, nobody can do any
research with a mentalistic outlook. Mentalism is
"spookism"something supernatural. Ithas nothing
to do with science. That's out of the question.
Now the next question is: How elaborate do you
want your researchers to be? How much leeway do
you want in the selection of problems? My answer to
that would be that the interbehavioral view has larger
scope. I mentioned, for example, that abook on verbal
behavior (Skinner, 1957) which is supposed to be on
language, isn't on language, because language isn't
verbal behavior. Language is bigger than verbal
behavior. But if you hold to the view that language is
verbal behavior, then you are limited in your opera-
tions, you are limited in your research.
As I tried to indicate, I would offer as a final
statement the advise that you should, if you are
interested, study the two views carefully and come to
your own conclusions. It's no good in any science to
be told what is better and what is worse. That doesn't
mean anything. I speak how as any scientist would.
You must become as well acquainted with the kind of
material you are interested in and then you will
develop your theory about what has been going on -
- what kind of events you havebeen dealing with -- and
that's the end of the story. It's not going to be anything
absolute. You know, or should know, that science is
a job of work. If you are interested in humanbehavior,
H 17
or animal behavior, you must hold to your job with as
few prejudices as you can. Study hard your subject,
your behavior, or your interbehavior, and then you
are on the right track of science. But you don't have,
any absolutes. No absolutes in any science.
Q: Could you summarize your views on instinctive
behavior in humans?
JRK: Well, in my view, instinctive behavior isn't
based -- that kind of construction isn't based - on
observation. It is based on some kind of theory ~
mentalistic theory. It's no good at all in any science.
Now there's one thing wehaveto do that is helpful
and that is to see that perhaps someone who uses the
word "instinctive" doesn't mean it at all; he doesn't
mean any spooky thing. He really means behavior.
Maybe its a habitual behavior or its a reflex behavior,
and so you clarify yourself about that. My main point
here is that terms in psychology, many of them, have
been builtup under different conditions than is true for
scientific psychology. They were based on all kinds
of spurious philosophy and that is something we have
to watch out for and we have to avoid as much as we
can.
Q: Now that you have completed the book on lan-
guage, are you working on anything new? Perhaps an
autobiography?
JRK: What autobiography? I think you know I am
a very old man. But I am still working and I am going
to work on something else after this book is printed.
But it is not an autobiography. And, it's too early to
announce the content or the name of the book, and so
on. But if you are interested, maybe if I can keep
going you will be able to see the contents of it, if I can
finish it.
(Professor Kantor was to publish 3 more books and 2
collections of articles.)
August 1978
Birthday message to Kantor from Irvin S. Wolf is
reprinted from 1Jie Psychological Record:
To reach the age of 90 is itself notable. To be
professionally productive from more than 60 of the 99
years since the bench mark founding of Wundt's
18
laboratory is especially remarkable. Two facets of
Kantor's contributions characterize his work. First,
with historical perspective he has been inveighed
against the pervasive and continuing spiritistic influ-
ence upon the sciences, particularly psychology. He
has been insistent that in .all scientific behavior the
scientist needs to differentiate between construct and
event and, rejecting prevailing animistic thinking, to
derive theformer from the observation of the later. In
his long list of papers and books he also originated
and elaborated the interbehavioral viewpoint, a natu-
ralistic approach offering a framework for studying
and understanding the whole spectrum ofpsychologi-
cal events. He avoided both dualism and the newer
neurologizing while emphasizing the role of cultural
conditions in the development of human behavior. He
went beyond other critics among the behaviorists who
seemed to concentrate on what he labeled "learnol-
ogy" and who thus, with something like benign
neglect, left certain areas minimally treated. Claim-
ing to fill this void, many current writers seem openly
to embrace mentalism or not to comprehend that their
efforts mirror the persisting and perhaps burgeoning
mysticism. In addition to his writing, Kantoralso had
an impact in the scientific world through The Prin-
cipia Press which he still heads, founding of the
journal, The Psychological Record, and teaching his
many students. Dr. Kantor^ we mark your day this
AugustSth, congratulateyouandthankyou, andwish
you many happy returns.
January, 1983
Kantor's book Cultural Psychology is published,
and in the same year, Tragedy and the Event Contin-
uum.
April, 1983
Publication of a Festschrift for Kantor edited by
Noel Smith, Paul Mountjoy, and Doug Rubin, en-
titled Reassessment in Psychology: The Interbehav-
ioral Alternative. Other contributors were: Parker Li-
chtenstein, Edward Morris (with Steven Higgins and
Warren Bickel), Donna Cone, N. H. Pronko, Dennis
Delprato, Sid Bijou, Emilio Ribes, Linda Parrott, J.
Herrick, M. MacRoberts (with B, MacRoberts),
Larry Shafer, Roger Ray, and Edward Blewitt,
Inscribed on the dedication pageof Reassessment
are the following words:
To /. R. Kantor in his ninety-fifth year: Wfiose
stalwart insistence on apsychology whose constructs
are continuous with observation, Whose untiring
devotion to the explication of fundamental assump-
tions to science in general and psychology inparticu-
lar, Whose interbehavioral field psychology provides
a revolutionary program for moving from recurring
problems to scientific advancement, We dedicate this
book with gratitude and affection.
Paul Mountjoy described the dedication of the volume
in the following way:
On April 22, 1983, we drove to Chicago with
Dennis Delprato to present a copy of Reassessment to
Professor Kantor. Professor Kantor, filled with
vitality as usual, was in remarkable health and showed
the intellectual rigor for which he is well known. His
greetings were never more hospitable, and he was
eager to discuss the works of colleagues. This, of
course, led to talk of philosophy and science. He
made us promise to maintain a steady correspondence
with him.
Just before lunch was served, prepared by Profes-
sor Kantor and his daughter, we handed him a signed,
cloth copy of thebook, explaining that it was symbolic
of his years of contributions to the science of psychol-
ogy. He straightened his bow tie and pince-nez, both
somewhatlooseiromhisanimateddiscussionwithus.
Stammering a bit, he turned to Paul with a glowing
grin of enthusiasm. He realized that this book and the
contributions in it were for him. Professor Kantor
repeated several times how grateful he was that
interbehaviorism meant so much to so many, espe-
cially to his friends.
February, 1984
Jacob Robert Kantor died on February 2, 1984
The following editorial comment, by Ed Morris,
appeared in THE INTERBEHAVIORIST ;
Professor Kantor's death is felt acutely and
deeply. But, what have \ve lost, what more might we
lose, and what can we do about that? In one sense, we
lost Professor Kantor, the man. He was real and
material: He occupied space and time in our world. It
seems somehow incomprehensible that this vital and
physical person can simply have disappeared- never,

never to return. Lamenting over this biological event,
however, is too materialistic of us, as Professor
Kantor would have chastised,
What we lost is more than Professor Kantor, the
man. We have lost a long-lived and established
pattern in our lives and an interbehavioral event of ex-
traordinary potential. Our interbehavioralfields have
been disrupted. We lost the man who educated us,
who corresponded with us, and who wrote for us and
for many others. We can, of course, try to attach
ourselves to substitutes for these patterns, or to our
libraries of Professor Kantor's books. But material
substiti4tes cannot reestablish the patterns in our
interbehavioral fields.
Professor Kantor's interbehavioral potential,
though, need not be lost. That potential remains \vith
all of us, in the lives he touched. We interact with our
worlds more wisely for having known Professor
Kantor. In that sense, his potential remains with us.
But for how long? A greater and worse tragedy than
Professor Kantor's death would be to lose the poten-
tial that was his and that he has bestowed upon us.
Professor Kantor'spotential, however, can be main-
tained through us in our continued dedication to a
natural science of psychology. In that way, he
remains with us.
We have chosen not to write an obituary in the
newsletter because that would have focused on the
biological event and our material loss. Moreover, in
looking backthrough aformal review of his career, we
might overlook Professor Kantor's continued poten-
tial as an interbehavioral event, and hence truly lose
the man. In looking forward to establishing a natural
science of psychology, however, we can find Profes-
sor Kantor in our lives forever.
^Volume 12, Number 3 of THE INTERBEHAV-
IOR1ST is a memorial issue with commentaries by
Richard Amado, DonBaer, RamonBayes, Sid Bijou,
Edward Blewitt, Donald Bloomquist, Edward Bor-
din, Joe Brady, Donna Cone, David Cornwell, Den-
nis Delprato, Robert Epstein, William Gardener,
Albert Haas, Rollo Handy, Jay Hansor, Sandy Hobbs,
Billy Hopkins, Arthur Kahn, Craig Knapp, Jan Le-
Francois, Parker Lichtenstein, Robert Lundin, Mi-
chael and Barbara MacRoberts, Harry Mahan, Mar-
ion White McPherson, Jay Moore, Paul Mountjoy,
Robert O'Neill, Linda Parrott, N. H, Pronko, Emilio
' Ribes, Doug Ruben, Theordore Sarbin, Noel Smith,
19
William Stephenson, Louise Kent Udolf, Bill Ver-
planck, Robert Wahler, and Edward Walker.
A Kantor Memorial Fund was established at the
suggestion and initial support of Harry Mahan for the
purpose of maintaining THE INTERBEHAVIORIST .
July, 1984
Principia Press announces the publication of Psy-
chological Comments and Queries by Observer.
August, 1984
Memorial paper sessions for Kantor were held at
the Mexican Association for Behavior Analysis (papers
were given by Emilio Ribes, Linda Parrott, and Ely
Rayek), and at the XXIH International Congress of
Psychology in Acapulco, Mexico, in which Sid Bijou,
Linda Parrott, and Emilio Ribes participated.
October, 1984
The Indiana University-Bloomington Faculty
Council commemorated Kantor in a memorial resolu-
tion. The resolution was signed by Douglas Ellson,
James Capshew, Richard Berry, Eliot Hearst, and
Harry Yamaguchi.
The Psychological Record published a com-
memorative issue (1984, 34, #4) Contributors in-
cluded: Marion White McPherson (with John Pop-
plestone), Irvin Wolf, Parker Lichtenstein, Noel
Smith, James Upson (with Roger Ray), Sid Bijou,
Theodore Sarbin, Paul Mountjoy (with Doug Rubin),
Emilio Ribes, William Stephenson, and Doug Rubin,
The Behavior Analyst (1984,7, #2) published a
memorial section. Contributors included Linda Par-
rott, Jay Moore, Jackson Marr, and Ed Morris.
Announcements also appeared in Operant Sub-
jectivity: The Q Methodology Newsletter and Iztacala
Bulletin.
Paul Mountjoy has been invited to prepare an
obituary for The American Psychologist.
December 1988
A special issue of Behavior Analysis in honor of
the 100th anniversary of Kantor's birth, edited by
Linda Hayes and Emilio Ribes, is published.
 J. R. Kantor's 1976 Address to Behavior Analysts
Harry C. Mahan
Oceanside, CA
Few behavior analysts are probably aware of or
remember J. R. Kantor's address to the Midwestern
Association of Behavior Analysts in Chicago in May,
1976 (Kantor, 1976,1984). His remarks emphasized
the basic contribution that interbehavioral principles
had to offer the behavioral movement in general and
to behavior analysis in particular, and hence still bear
careful study. His comments are, fortunately, in print
and readily available, so only a brief condensation of
them will be presented in the paragraphs below.
Kantor began by pointing out that the rise of
behaviorism in psychology constituted a great scien-
tific revolution. Its importance was based upon its
insistence that psychology is a science, that it be based
upon the actual confrontations of organisms with
things and events, and that the science had to eschew
unquestioned tradition. By confrontation, Kantor
made clear that he meant direct observation, experi-
mentation, analysis, and interpretation of events. The
things and events confronted comprise stimulating
factors resulting in the confrontations becoming inter-
actions.
In the early development of behaviorism, John B.
Watson was influenced by the work of Jacques Loeb
and other biologists before he discovered the work of
Pavlov and his co-workers and this, together with
Darwin's evolution theory and the limitations of
Watson's own work on animal behavior, led to
behaviorism's postulates being almost entirely bio-
logical in nature. These limitations persisted among
Watson's followers.
What characterizes the revolutionary nature of
behaviorism as a perspective in psychology is its
elimination of transcendental or nonspatiotemporal
entities such as soul, self, mind, consciousness, raw
feels, sensations, percepts, and so on that exist only
in the form of words,.assertions, and beliefs. Behav-
iorism, properly understood, reflects mentalism and
animism as ancient but still widely accepted autistic
inventions.
Behaviorism is not synonymous with condition-
ing, but conditioning has been a common representa-
tion of behaviorism. What Pavlov discovered was
that a stimulating function could be transferred from
one object (e.g., meat powder) to other objects (e.g.,
a bell or buzzer). This involves an interbehavioral
field, the concept of which can be applied to all sorts
of psychological events, including thinking, reason-
ing, affective feeling,.and all other behavior without
introducing the age-old constructs that go beyond the
realm of actual events in nature.
At this point In his presentation, Kantor turned his
attention to attacks on behaviorism, stating that these
were based on serious misunderstandings rooted in an
unwitting adherence to tradition. These objections to
behaviorism fall under the four headings of material-
ism, reductionism, learnological limitations, and limited
research projects. He deals with all of these summa-
rily by saying that none of them constituted a devalu-
ation of behaviorism and that even classical experi-
menters like Wundt, Fechner, and Kulpe were actu-
ally observing organisms in action.
In the second part of his paper, Kantor addressed
himself directly to behavior analysis, pointing out
three models of behaviorism: organocentric behavior-
ism, environmentalistic behaviorism, and the interbe-
havioral field approach to behavior. These were
illustrated by diagrams, with the interbehavioral
diagram being the interbehavioral field that is now
usually reprinted on the inside cover of issues of this
newsletter.
Kantor pointed out that among the virtues of the
interbehavioral model was its comprehensive cover-
age of all psychological actions. The model not only
includes all species of organisms, but all of the events
in the psychological domain, no matter how com-
plex-and it treats these as entirely naturalistic and
completely free from the imposition of traditional
mentalistic qualities or traits.
In the third section, Kantor briefly described
some of the advantages of the interbehavioral ap-
proach, the first being that it emphasized both field
and laboratory observations, without limiting its data
to analogies borrowed from mathematics, physiol-
ogy, engineering, or chemistry. Interbehavioral
psychology insists that the brain is purely a biological
organ which participates in every action, but which is
not the locus of the action nor the seat of its control.
The second and third advantages are that it harmo-
nizes postulation and operation. Thefourth advantage

is that interbehavioral psychology is an interdiscipli-
nary perspective related to, butnotreducibleto, other
disciplines.
Kantor's brief presentation laid the groundwork
for closer cooperation between behavior analysis and
interbehavioral psychology with the hope that behav-
ior analysts might find interbehavioral principles of
value in their work, in their thinking, and in their
written contributions to the science of behavior.
References
Kantor, J. R. (1976). Behaviorism, behavior analy-
sis, and the career of psychology. The Psycho-
logical Record, 26, 305-312.
Kantor, J, R. (1984). Behaviorism, behavior analy-
sis, and the career of psychology. InJ.R. Kantor,
Selected writing in philosophy, psychology and
other sciences, 1929-1983 (pp. 276-282). Chi-
cago: Principia Press.
Nevertheless, the earth is fiat:
A review of a review
A. Mitsorg
[Editor's Note: It is little known thatJ. R, Kantor pub-
lished in the newsletter under the pseudonym "A.
Mitsorg." We have been unable as yet to detertnine
why this pseudonym was used, nor what it means, if
anything. Tfiis particular comment appeared in Vol-
ume 3 in 1972. The review of which this was a review
was not referenced in the original publication of this
article,]
Fundamentalists who persistently maintain that
the earth is flat bear witness to the great power of
infallible intuition to outweigh the claims of meticu-
lous observation. That unfailing power is the'essence
of fundamentalism, a trait which is manifested on
every intellectual level. Psychologists no more than
other professionals escape the contagion of fundamen-
talism. The burden of their faith is the existence of
mind. Overtly and covertly they paraphrase the New
York editor; "Yes, Virginia, thereis a mind", though
in the succession of generations the same entity is
dominated by different nouns.
Clear as day are the mechanisms that fortify faith.
At bottom is ignorance concerning the nature of things
believed, and next is the vigor of established cultural
institutions when encapsulated in an amber of words.
Names support the conviction in the existence of
nothings.
21
All the above is effectively illustrated in a recent
book review by Professor Neisser who comments
upon three books on Mental Imagery. He waxes
approvingly of the change of fashion in psychology
which makes possible a renewed commerce with
mental processes despite the demise of introspective
psychology. Hesays, "In thelastten years,...thebe-
havioristic taboos have been broken and the mind
seems worth studying after all" (p. 628).
As is only to be expected Professor Neisser
follows closely hi the footsteps of the early detractors
of behaviorism and reiterates that "what
contemporary... .psychologists mean by' 'the mind",
however, is very different from what their predeces-
sors meant. The definition is no longer in terms of
conscious, introspectively given phenomena. Instead
it is in terms of a flow of information in the organism.
Theoretical terms like 'storage', 'retrieval', 'reced-
ing*, and 'selection'...,refer to hypothetical stages of
activity or processing" (p. 628).
Note the glaring contradictions. If behavioristic
taboos havebeen broken, what are the referents of the
terms 'storage', 'retrieval', 'recodings', and 'selec-
tion'? Can they be other than the conscious, intro-
spectively given Noumena? So where is the shift in
the meaning of mind? Can the juggling with syno-
nyms transform the transcendental into something
else? Can nonbehavioral imagery be anything else
than supernatural processes disguised by other names?
The camouflage fails to conceal. The reviewer states
that one of the three books is organized entirely in the
classical mode, another includes papers from both
sides of the [mental-behavioral] watershed, while the
third is written from the perspective of association-
ism. The reviewer even points out that in one of the
three books, images 'have become the psychological
correlate of linguistic deep structure" (p. 630).
What else can one conclude but that the stream of
psychological thinking is heavily polluted by tran-
scendental fallout? Though the labors of a Hercules
may not suffice to clear it, one is tempted to point out
(1) that opposition to behaviorism is really a sign of
being influenced by supernatufalism, (2) that: mbuglv
behaviorism is simply antimentalism in every form, it
need not be Pavlovian reflexology, and (3) that
antibehaviorism, despite verbal camouflage, holds to
"mind" as the age-old mystical conscious known
only through introspective intuitions. It is only the
prevalence of scientific work and achievements of the
other disciplines that influences.psychologists to
presume that mind can be nonbehavioral and at the
same time nonsupernatural.
22
A striking feature of the clinging to the flat-earth
type of fundamentalism in psychology is the misinter-
pretation of the behavioral movement. Instead of
regarding it as admirable attempt to comply with
scientific demaads to deal only with the actual behav-
ior of organisms it is looked upon as a fad in psychol-
ogy to avoid the recognition of rhentalistic imagery,
thinking, and other noumena. Those who unwittingly
accept the dogmas of the Church Fathers concerning
the existence of two worlds, two essences-minds and
bodies, as well as other mentalistic dualisms, decry
behaviorism despite the fact that their observations
and experiments never concern anything but the
cognitive and affective interactions of organisms with
concrete objects through the mediation of direct or
substitute stimulation. By disregarding this fact they
find it easy to delude themselves that by a curtain of
words they can conceal their adherence to the funda-
mentalist^ belief in the existence of the supernatural.
Interaction: Transaction; Which?
A. Mitsorg
[Originally published in Volume 1,1970]
In the excerpt from the new book of Professor
Rollo Handy appearing hi Volume 1, number 4 of The
Newsletter, the author avers that while Dewey and
Bentley1 differentiate sharply between transactional
and interactional interpretations of events there is a
strong family resemblance between Kantor's interac-
tion and their transaction. Thus Professor Handy joins
other writers who have denied claims of transaction-
ists to have invented a different and superior principle
of explicating events.
Are these claims only rhetorical autism? That
appears to be the case. Still where there is so much
clamor a look-in may be appropriate. Accordingly,
we inquire briefly why there is such bombastic and
strident emphasis upon the term "transaction" in-
stead of "interaction." If there is a problem here it
certainly must be examined upon two levels -- a super-
ficial semantic one and a deeper philosophic one. We
suspect that this modern homo-homoi issue masks a
great divergence between scientific interactions and
metaphysical transactions.
Semantics first. As Professor Handy and other
writers suggest, when concrete situations are de-
scribed there is no compulsion to prefer one term to
another. Words are seldom used descriptively, mainly
they are metaphorical Those who are attuned to the
commercial aspects of our culture - merchants,
brokers, fathers and sons of bankers - alert to loans,
borrowers, and lenders favor the term' 'transaction*'.
But those interested in analyzing and describing
events and not merely applying names cannot accept
favored terms as identical with confronted things and
events. Transaction or Interaction? De gustibus ...
Turning next to the deeper philosophical consid-
erations we discover that extremely different postu-
lates underliethedifferentusages. Thetransactionists
draw then: intellectual sustenance from the bottomless
well of Hegelian objective idealism, in which actor
and thing acted upon, the knower and the known, are
interfused in one gigantic spiritual cosmochaos. For
them nature is only knowledge of nature, and in all
situations naming is identical with the named.
To cozen themselves and their readers the meta-
physical transactionists loudly proclaim that the names
or the events, hunter, hunted, and the hunting do not
exist in isolation but in a system. What need to blast
the man of straw who disagrees? Though Johnny may
not know how to read, he does know that "borrower
cannot borrow without a lender to lend, nor lender
lend without a borrow to borrow." He knows too,
that no transaction creates the interactors who by their
actions engender the transaction. Moreover, he is
quite aware that the borrower is not the lender but
usually the victim of an exaction interaction. If ever
the roles are reversed it is not because the actors were
identical to begin with but rather because two separate
and distinct people enter into an economic game in its
various phases. No great acumen is required to see
that there is no connection between any concrete
transaction and any metaphysical transactionism, and
no acumen is needed to conclude that the writings
aimed at making such connections are gossamer spun
to support the vast concrete universal.
Since it appears probable that of the Dewey-
Bentley couple it is the latter who is mainly respon-
sible for the great emphasis upon the power of words
and their identity with knowledge and with things, it
is instructive to exemplify his mentalistic dialectic
that is the basis of transactionism.
"We return to a status of the world in the mind,
yet mind in the world. We solve it by symbiotaxis.
The world is in the mind socially taken as action
(symbiotaxis). The symbiotaxium constructs the
world-knowledge -- i.e., it "is" that world. The
world (knowledge) includes mind (mind as psycho-
logical technique)."2

J.R. Kantor
[Originally appeared in Volume 3,1973]
In the continuing dialogue between nativistic and
empiristic psychologists concerning the genetics of
behavior, the classical statement of Watson turns up
occasionally. Even empirically inclined psycholo-
gists appear to regard Watson's claim to produce
desirable or undesirable types of personality, given
his conditions of operation, as an unmitigated hyper-
bola. But what is the alternative? It is alleged that to
reject the extreme developmental hypothesis is to
entertain an ungrounded belief in occult determiners.
Surely Watson's declaration and its validity deserves
careful examination. Despite its familiarity it may be
(Continuation of "Interaction: Transaction")
In complete contrast to such transactionism the
interactional viewpoint stands firmly on a scientific
philosophy. That is to say, all premises are exclu-
sively derived from descriptive and analytic confron-
tations with actual events. Specifically in psychology
the term "interaction" is employed as a synonym for
the interbehavior of organisms with other organisms,
or things and conditions with which they come into
contact. The interbehavioral scientist is completely
justified in investigating the components of interact-
ing fields since they also interact with many other
different things in other behavioral fields. Moreover,
he may study how he himself fits into the different
behavior fields and how he influences the various
entire fields. The only "metaphysics" of the interbe-
havioral scientist consists of the demand that he rid
himself of all assumptions derived from autistic
constructions, instead of from interbehavioral obser-
vations.
References
1. Bentley, Arthur F. (1949) Knowing and the known.
Boston: Beacon Press.
2. Bentley, Arthur F. (1954) Inquiry into inquiries.
Boston: Beacon Press.
23
worth quoting here for purposes of ready reference
I should like to go one step further now and
say, "Give me a dozen healthy infants, well-
formed and my own specified world to bring
them up in and I'll guarantee to take any one
at random and train 'him to become any type
of specialist I might select-doctor, lawyer,
artist, merchant-chief, and yes, even beggar-
man and thief, regardless of his talents, pen-
chants, tendencies) abilities, vocations, and
race of his ancestors." lamgoingbeyondmy
facts and I admit it, but so have the advocates
of the contrary and they have been doing it for
many thousands of years. Please note that
when this experiment is made, I am to be
allowed to specify the way the children are to
be brought up and the type of world they have
to live in.
It is not surprising in view of the circumstances
under which Watson formulated his argument that it
comprises some opacities and even some paradoxes.
For example, fellow behaviorists have pointed out
that Watson himself admitted that he was going
beyond his facts, and that he affirmed that some
behavior is Inherited. Itmay be contended, however,
that Watson's basic hypothesis is thoroughly sound
and that an analysis of the issues Involved can
illuminate the problem of behavioral genetics as well
as genetics in general and the process of biological
reproduction.
In what way did Watson go beyond the facts?
Surely, he as an.individual had not performed the
experiment, but is there any doubt that such.an
experiment would succeed? How else but by means
of the variables of personal and social development
are personalities with all their traits evolved? Is it not
through the conditions of parental and familial circum-
stances, economic and ethnic conditions, and cultural
institutions that doctors, lawyers, merchants, artists,
beggars, thieves, murderers, and governors are pro-
.duced? No events available to scientists are more
revealing than the modes of cultivating the many
occupational, professional, and political personalities
ofcomplexsocieties. As wehaveintimated above, the
objection to the evolutional theory concerning the
24
origin of various traits and capacities may be prompted
by lingering notions that occult powers determine the
characteristics of persons and their later perform-
ances.
As to the paradoxes in Watson's statement, it
cannot be, denied that he slipped in asserting bis
disregard of talents, penchants, tendencies, and abili-
ties. For there is no evidence that such traits are not
evolved in the interbehavior of growing organisms in
their encounters with things and events. It is not
special pleading in defense of Watson's hypothesis to
suggest that what counts are the observed events and
not the rhetoric used to argue for them. We turn now
to some relevant issues.
The Problem of Behavioral Inheritance
Geneticists in unending recurrence insist that no
anatomical character is transmitted to offspring. What
passes from parents to offspring are patterns of genes
which in interaction with environing factors result in
certain structure-function traits. Gene patterning in
interaction with environing conditions constitute the
mechanisms whereby offspring conserve the species
similarities of successive generations of organisms.
Such being the case with anatomical structures
and physiological functions, how much less are be-
haviors transmitted? Surely we need here some
critical analysis of what is happening. And this is
easily done by observing an organism as it begins its
life as a zygote and later as a neonate and as a
developing personality.
The entire process clearly goes on upon several
stages. In each we find definite interactions with
copresent things and events. For the foetus these
conditions of development are located in the narrow
confines of the uterus where the total situation does
not allow for more than anatomical and physiological
development. On the whole it is proper to say that
whatever psychological action is performed consists
primarily of the operation of cellular systems.
The development of the neonate is facilitated by
the enlarged range of confrontable things and condi-
tions. At the point of birth the foundation is laid for
a tremendous repertoire of action and action traits.
The individual becomes the speaker of a particular
ethnic and dialectic language, a sectarian believer, a
unique type of craftsman or vocationist, a cultural
male or female, a conformer or unorthodox per-
former, a conventional moralist or transgressor.
In every case, whether the development is straight
or oblique, smooth or rough, difficult or relatively
easy, rapid or slow, there is always development in
complex interbehavior with objects, persons, condi-
tions, circumstances, aids andhinderances, all within
the range of biological normality or abnormality of
organisms and their surroundings.
Does any unbiased observation of the actual
development of organisms allow for any alternative
interpretation? The answer is, of course, no. Yet an
alternate one is proposed based not on observation,
but on cultural indoctrination. It is derived from the
acceptance of historical transcendentalism, from the
traditional belief in occult powers and forces that are
the creations of verbalistic imagination. In substance,
such non-developmental constructions .are blood
brothers to Orenda, Wakanda, and Mana of primitive
peoples.
The Tabula Rasa Argument
Writers who unwittingly deny or are skeptical
about the universal and inevitably complete develop-
ment of behavior and personality drag into thediscus-
sion the redherring of the tabula rasa. Theyharkback
to the seventeenth century debate between those who
affirmed that the soul was loaded with faculties and
those who held that the souls of individuals were only
raw materials that had to be completely developed.
However sympathetic we may be with those who
believe they are espousing the principle of nihil ex
nihilo, we cannot but criticize them for dragging a
metaphysical problem into biological and psychologi-
cal situations. In both biological and psychological
situations we perforce meet with tradition conditions
in which few things and actions are evolved. Surely
at one stage in their development organisms start at a
psychological zero point. But this is not to say any-
thing about a metaphysical nothing. We are con-
cerned with a growing organism, which, if it interacts
effectively with its surrounds, will develop psycho-
logical behavior and psychological traits.
By the same token the organism has passed
through a biological zero point when it was only a
prezygotic ovum and sperm. The evolutional process
involves a before and after, and the observer can see
how it is that scientific potentialities are actualities on
a preexistent level. The evolutional process in
biology and psychology comprises discontinuities as
well as continuities.
Psychological and Biological Relations
To stress observations rather than conjectural
dialogue with little or no connection with events is to
be able to solve many of the problems concerning the
intimate relations of psychological and biological
events. We consider the proximal and divergent con-

nections under the conditions of emergence and
participation.
Emergence
Psychological and biological events are continu-
ous in the sense that it is organisms and their behavior
that are the locus of both. For most of the prenatal life
of even complex organisms behavior is purely bio-
logical, they are only physiological functions of
cellular structures. A definite, though partial, differ-
entiation begins in late gestation and in greater and
greater amplitude in post-natal development. The
neonate enters a new world, so to speak, and develops
adjustments to the great variety and constantly chang-
ing things and events with which it becomes sur-
rounded.
Psychological events may truly be said to emerge
from biological matrices, but this fact in no way
obliterates the differences between psychological and
biological behavior. Evolutionally both may be
variant performances of the same organisms. The
variation hi development of the two types of events
may be regarded as stemming from either forward or
backward reference points. Biological interactions
are influenced by the continuity of individuals with
the members of the species from which they spring
through the agency of their cellular organization.
Psychological interactions are cumulative adjustments
developed under current conditions with potential
competence for acting in future similar exigencies.
Undoubtedly, an appreciation of the similarities
and dissimilarities in the two types of situations is
important for the analysis of heredity problems.
Participation
Heredity problems, too, are illuminated by the in-
evitable participation of biological factors in all
psychological activities. Since all psychological
events are at the same time biological events, it is
overlooked that the two types can differ markedly.
The greatest similarity is found in simple reflex
behavior. But even here we must distinguish between
biological reflexes of tissue preparations and the
conditioned reflexes of intact organisms.
The most striking difference between the partici-
pation of organisms in psychological interactions are
to be observed while comparing a conditioned reflex
with the complexities of a thinking or reasoning
performance. In the later it is obviously an organism
that interacts, but the interaction has been derived in
a cultural development and is not just the functioning
of tissues or organs. Given a particular anatomical
part, say, a hand or foot, it can perform in enormously
25
different ways; the hand can-hold something, clap,
play an instrument, transcribe records, and so on.
Similarly, the foot can support, kick something, walk,
and in rare cases draw and paint. Participation in all
sorts of interbehavior is possible. Comparable or
variant anatomical traits-size, race, sex-can partici-
pate equally well in crude or precise actions. Coex-
istence and participation when properly interpreted
are exact indications of how biology and psychology
are interrelated.
Participatory Graduation
When we compare the participation of biological
components in comparatively simple reflexes and in
the formulation of a mathematical law, we must be
struck with ranges of participation. Always a biologi-
cal organism is the performer, but the degree of
cellular functioning must be considered in the ratio of
anatomico-physiololgical contribution to the proc-
esses and adjustmental results as compared with the
cultural factors. Minus the cells and tissues and
organism there is no psychological behavior, but the
evolution of a biologically competent organism-
upright walking and elaborately neuralized-must be
followed by the invention of a cultural environment
and the accumulation of its products or it will remain
a metabolizing, maturizing, and reproducing animal.
Behavior and Behavior
Problems of innateness in biology and psychol-
ogy are invariably beclouded by the use of common,
names for the description of different types of events.
Certainly this is the case when the term "behavior"
is used to mask the differences in biological and
psychological events. Here is the source of consider-
able misinterpretation. It may be helpful, therefore,
to clarify some prominent terms in their discussion of
nativism and empiricism.
Biological Behavior
Essentially biological behavior consists of theop-
eration or functioning of cells as living entities or
factors in various structures or organizations as
tissues, organs, and organisms, in ecological interac-
tion with energizing conditions as in reflex action, or
with objects as evolved animals or plants. Basically,
biological behavior is localized in the phylogenetic,
structural, reproductive, and mutational conditions of
a line of cellular organizations.
Psychological Behavior
The identifying mark of psychological perform-
ances is that they constitute adjustmental interactions
with immediately occurring events, or adjustments
26
based upon a number of encounters with other organ-
isms or environing objects and conditions ordinarily
grouped as a class called stimuli. The emphasis is
upon individual developmental or historical contacts
of organisms rather than upon their evolution as
members of species or cellular organizations. The
cellular structures, that is, the organic or species traits
of the interacting organism, may be central or periph-
eral in the behavior.
Psychological Innateness
This term is predominately linguistic and has no
correspondence with confrontable events. It is illic-
itly employed to refer to some non-existent, non-de-
veloped power or force to act in a certain way.
Nativists assume that organisms are endowed with
inherent characteristics such as intelligence, morality,
genius, creativity, affectivity, artistry, and so on.
Behavioral Development
Of the many kinds of behavior development we
have only to distinguish two types, the biological and
the psychological. On the biological level develop-
ment begins with conception, the fertilization of an
ovum, then the differentiation and growth of azygote,
and the gradual succession of foetus, embryo, and a
neonate organism. At each stage the developmental
process involves contacts with things and conditions
which may directly affect organisms in their future re-
sponses to similar situations.
The development of psychological behavior be-
gins in the late prenatal stages of biological develop-
ment. Psychological acts and traits arise from single
or serial contacts with stimulus objects under specific
circumstances. After stimulus and response fields are
developed they may recur periodically when the
original situation or some phases of them reappear.
Psychological development by contrast with biologi-
cal development differs in the rapidity of the process
and the increasingly enlarged scope available for
confrontations with organisms and other objects and
conditions.
Learning
Properly employed, this term refers to a speciali-
zation and modification of behavioral development
mediated by contrivances of various sorts. Among the
many different kinds of contrivance that can be
arranged are included rewarding, punishing, encour-
aging, cajoling, isolating, grouping, and general
control of the learning situation. The various contriv-
ances may be singly employed or in concert.
Summary and Conclusion
Upon close examination Watson's hyperbola turns
out to be no such thing. On the contrary, what seems
to Watson himself and others as overstepping the
bounds of observable data actually fall short of this
process. Watsort does not go far enough when he'
asserts that his training procedures operate in disre-
gard of talents, penchants, tendencies, and abilities.
These terms all refer to traits that are developed in
their entirety during the individual's psychological
development and are subject to control' during the
development of the social traits and behavior of
persons as doctors, lawyers, merchants, and so on.
It must be admitted that Watson reveals here his
transition from a belief in innate traits and tendencies
toward the new emphasis upon biological evolution
and psychological development each from a zero point
emergence from an earlier embryological stage, but
this is no impeachment of his new anti-innateness at-
titude.
It is sometimes implied that Watson could not give
up a belief in the inheritance of behavior because he
shared the layman's belief that respiration, digestion,
elimination, growth, and random activity are inher-
ited. This allegation merely stimulated the study of
the differences between the concrete reproduction
processes in species continuity and the putative simi-
larity of such processes to the transfer of property.
When Watson says he is going beyond his facts, he is
merely paying tribute to the great complexity of
developmental circumstances and the paucity of eco-
nomic, legal, and social control over the complex
operations.
Abstracts of Articles, Volumes 1-18
Volume 1
Smith, N, W; Hie emerging role of interbehavioral
psychology.
The interbehavioral postulate concerning the datum
of psychology and the implications of this as-
sumption are discussed.
Fuller, P. Some thoughts on the Summer Community
of Scholars.
.Comments on the suitability of the interbehav-
ioral framework for every conceivable type of be-
havior field, as evidenced by the diversity of
issues being addressed at the conference.

Lichtenstein, P. E. The significance of the stimulus
Junction
Kantor's concept of stimulus function is discussed
as an alternative to stimulus concepts prevalent in
reductionistic behaviorism and phenomenology.
Kantor's reply to the experimental psychologists'
notion of the stimulus as independent variable is
addressed. The predictive value of the stimulus
function concept is explained in terms of interbe-
havioral history.
Farrington, Jacqueline: A student's view of the Inter-
behavioral Conference
Comments on the sense that interbehaviorism is
applicable to all areas of human endeavor.
Heduk, Ronald G. Cracks in the "billiard ball"
organism
Discusses the development of experimental meth-
odologies suitable for the study of interbehavioral
fields. R. G Barker's conception of "behavior
units" as inherent segments of the behavior
stream are argued to require new methods for
their study and the interbehavioral model for their
interpretation. Likewise, J. W. Atkinson and J.
D. Birch's theory of action, in which the determi-
nants of the flow of activity are of interest, is
mentioned as an example of this development. He
further encourages interbehaviorists to take up
Kantor's struggle against mentalistic interpreta-
tions of the nervous system.
Handy, Rollo. The measurement of value: Transac-
tionism
The distinction proposed by Dewey and Bentley
between self-action, interaction and transaction.
The latter, taken to designate the " full ongoing
process in a field in which the inquirer may be in
reciprocal relation with many aspects and phases
of that field", is taken to be the preferred janit of
analysis in psychology.
Mitsorg, A.: Interaction: Transaction: Wfiich?
Argues that the trans actionism supported by Handy
draws its "intellectual sustenance from the bot-
tomless well of Hegelian idealism.'" In contrast,
the interactionism of Kantor is based on a scien-
tific philosophy, wherein all premises are derived
from descriptive and analytical confrontations
with actual events.
27
Volume 2
Carter, Jerry. A case of reactional dissociation
(hysterical paralysis.)
Excerpts from a 1937 publication (American
Journal ofOrtfwpsychiatry, 7, 219-224) includ-
ing a case history by Jacqueline Farrington,
Heyduk, R. G. Alleged relations between the nervous
system and psychology.
Discusses the prevalence of dualism in physio-
logical psychology with quotations from 1769 to
the present.
McPherson, Marion White. Deficiency in,patients
and professionals.
Implications of ignoring the reactional biography
in patients diagnosed as mentally defective. Dis-
cusses the theory involved in assessing pathology
by means of I.Q. tests and quotes studies which
dispute many common perceptions of the men-
tally deficient held by practitioners.
Farrington,Jacqueline. '7mloachshav,matai"...If
not now, then when ? In defense of the Interbehav-
ioral position.
While acknowledging the difficulties in applying
an interbehavioral perspective, particularly in
clinical situations, asserts that not'doing so is a
regression to oversimplification.
Volume 3
Sullivan, John. "Skinner's Razor"
Skinner's book Beyond freedom and dignity is
addressed as a series of arguments, presented in
such a way as to heighten their dialectical quality.
The following dialectics are discussed: technol:
ogy, values, autonomous man, dignity, freedom,
reinforcement, and empiricism. Sullivan agrees
with Skinner's view that psychology is the
. propaedeutic social science; and disagreestKatthe'
reduction of humanistic terms to technical con-
structs of behavioristsic psychology will be usefiil,
in coming to an understanding of humanistic
concepts.
Pronko, N. H. Notes for a freshman: On the free will
vs determinism controversy.
Pronko asserts that the "free will" vs "determin-
28
ism" controversy is one product of common-
sense truisms which have confounded progress.
An interbehavioral orientation views psychologi-
cal occurrences as events in which all participat-
ing variables are neutrally perceived, predomi-
' nance of one over another never assumed within
a field perspective,
Herrick, James W. The collective mind construct and
its influence upon culture-personality research:
An application of the interbehavioral model
Herrick claims that classes of conditioning stimuli
during the basic stage differ from those of the
societal satge only in their availability to the
responding person. As societies become more
complex so do the opportunities for cultural
behavior, with the result that there is less uni-
formity among members of complex cultures than
is found among members of less complex cultures.A
knowledge of the conditions upon which various
institutions arose and the subsequent evolution of
those institutions is cruicial to the understanding
of why things and events are the way they are
today.
Mitsorg, A. Nevertheless, the earth is flat: A review
of a review
The author comments on Professor Neisser's
reviews of three books onmental imagry in which
Neisser claims that the mind is worth studying
again, though it is a new mind modem thinkers are
dealing with. The author disagrees, maintaining
that it is the same old mind, with all of its
supernatural character, called by a different name.
Jacqueline Farrington. Rite words - but are they
right?
Presentation of a pilot study which attempts to
explore the concept that constructs carry an
assumed and Implicit meaning which is seldom
defined or agreed upon by group participants.
Study involved 25 subjects involved hi a drug
awareness workshop. Results suggest that reper-
toires of verbal responses alter under varying
conditions, appear to be descriptive of reactions
and have different effects upon others.
Smith, N. H. An interbehaviorist looks at Santa
Claus.
Examines why the perpetuation of a Santa Claus
myth is thought to benefit children and how an
approach devoid of lies may be facilitated.
Volume 4
Martin, Robert F. Toward conceptualization of the
learning process in the college classroom:
Operant psychology and Rotter's Social Learning
Theory as a basis for research
In this paper the basic processes of learning are
conceptualized according to two approaces, oper-
ant psychology and Rotter's Social Learning
Theory. These orientations are viewed as compli-
mentary in characterizing college learning. The
theory and relevant research of the operat orien-
tation are reviewed and criticized. Specifically, it
is suggested that operant theory is limited in two
ways: a) It is duifficult to determine the relevant
contingencies for individual learners, and b) it is
difficult to determine what is a reinforcer for a
given student. It is suggested that Rotter's ap-
proach may solve these problems. A program of
research on this issue is suggested.
Fowler, C. M. A comparison of the field-system
approaches ofD. L. Clarke and J. R. Kantor
Many similarities are found between the field-
system approach of D. L. Clarke and J. R. Kantor
and attempts are made to show how a field-
systems approach may be appropriate across
disciplines.
Kantor, J. R. A Propos Watson's Hyperbola
Explores some common criticisms of Watson's
classical statement' 'Give me a dozen healthy in-
fants...,". Concludes that In actuality Watson
falls short of his assertion that he overstepped the
bounds of observable data.
Mountjoy, P, X- ^ rose by any other name
The author responds to Martin's article concern-
ing the limitations of operant theory applied to
college education by describing the innovative
teaching methods at Western Michigan Univer-
sity, where the supposed limitations are over-
come.
Martin, Robert F. But there are roses and there are
roses.
Martin responds to Mountjoy's reply to his initial
article. He suggests that if the reinforcers for all
students were known, all students would have
achieved As in the course. The fact that they did
not argues for a non-historic approach like Rot-

ter's. He maintains further that the college class-
room is too complex a circumstance for the appli-
cation of reinforcement theory in a simple and
direct fashion.
Volume 5
LaShier, Cynthia. B. F. Skinner on motivation: A
crtique.
LaShier reviews Skinner's discussion of the con-
cepts of drive and emotion in his 1938 and 1953
publications. She argues that Skinner's system in
1938 was based on observation and measure-
ments, and his discussions of drive were reports
of observations. Drive was operationally defined
as a function of deprivation. By 1953, Skinner
appears to be attempting to define drive and other
motivational concepts from a conceptual stand-
point. This attempt results in descriptions of these
concepts in non-behavioristic terms.
Johnson, Steven, The springs of action: Afountain of
youth?
The hedonistic theories of P. T. Young andDavid
McClelland are criticized ifrom the standpoint of
a science of behavior. The author argues that
while both individuals have contributed to the
body of fact in psychology their reliance on
hedonism as a source of action is disserviceable to
the development of a science of psychology.
Miller, David. Can social scientists be humane?
The author argues that social scientists must come
to terms with the concept of mind and its signifi-
cance in human affairs. Specifically, he argues
that mind is an emergent process, emerging out of
a social process. Mind as such is in nature, but
nature is not in mind. This veiw, he argues allows
one to deal more adequately with such concepts as
freedom of choice and personal responsibility.
Volume 6
Goodson, L. Emotions vs. emotional behavior.
Watson's definition of emotion, approach to its
study, and his conclusions are described. Kan-
tor's definition of emotional behavior as a mo-
mentary condition of "no response" is explored,
includinghis description of four emotional behav-
ior segments, distinction between emotion vs.
feeling behavior, passion and sentiments. Good-
29
son concludes with an examination of positive and
negative attributes of both Watson's and Kantor's
approaches.
Martin, R. Bouquets of roses: A final reply to Mountjoy,
Martin discusses implications of the interbehav-
ior between students and environmental vari-
ables, including instructors upon effective class-
room teaching.
Sanders, S. & Cone, D. A. Critique ofKohlberg's
theory of moral developmentfrom the vie\vpoint of
interbehavioral psychology,
The central concepts of Interbehavioral psychol-
ogy are first described as 'clarification of:- the
viewpoint upon which Kohlberg's theory is cri-
tiqued. Kohlberg's orientation to the study of
morality, developmental theory of moral judge-
ment, methodology, moral judgement categoriza-
tions, and Kohlberg's views on the development
of guilt are examined. Sanders concludes that
Kolberg's work is predominantly influenced by
dualistic assumptions.
Cone, D. Operationism vs. operational definitions.
Cone describes the proper use of Operationism in
experimental psychology. By defining terms at
proper times in the sequence of events during ex-
perimentation Cone asserts that common pitfalls
can be avoided. Most importantly one must avoid
using operational definitions to authenticate a
measure of mentalism.
Heyduk, R. Interbehavioral Psychology: A proposal
for a clear direction.
Heyduk maintains that clearer goals adopted by
Interbehavioral psychologists is required in order
to influence the' 'psychological Zeitgeist'' which
has, in recent years given way to mentalism, in
other words, brain reductionism. As a result of
his experience Heyduk proposes a more system-
atic commitment to the teaching of interbehav-
iorism in the classroom..- < " -
Farrington, J. Some advantages of interbehaviorism.
Interbehaviorai psychology's comprehensiveness
applied to thestudy of nonhuman as well as human
organisms is explored. Interbehavioral naturalis-
tic assumptions and the benefits of practical
application are examined.
Thompson, V. hesitations ofJ.H. Kantor's Prin-
ciples of Psychology.
Thompson asserts that although written in 1924
Kantor's Principles of Psychology can he a source
of "continuing inspiration". Two chapters from
Principles, which deal with issues commonly seen
as "mental" or internal are reviewed, "Implicit
Action as Responses to Stimuli Objects" and
"Wishing, Desiring, and Kindred Forms of Re-
sponses".
Volume 7
Tilquin, A. Behaviorism and biology: The organic
psychology of Kantor (Excerpt from: The origin
of behaviorism and development of psychology of
reaction in America. Translated from French by
Nanette Weissinger and Lucien Leduc in consul-
tation with Noel Smith.)
"The Organic Point of View" and "Character-
istics of Psychological Activities" are the sub-
headings of Tilquin's critical and account of Inter-
behavioral Psychology. He concludes "Kantor
has succeeded in distinguishing his psychology
from physiological behaviorism, but he fails to
separate it ftom biology."
Cone, D, Notes from a comparative animal behavior-
ist in exile or what observations of retarded
human adult behaviors can teach the student of
general animal behavior.
Cone examines the significance of human biologi-
cal interbehaviors, particularly when working
with multi-handicapped adults who are classified
as severely or profoundly retarded. The impor-
tant role of precursory psychological interbehav-
iors, setting factors and the difficulty hi condi-
tioning rudimentary behaviors is explored.
Cone, D. Potentiality as basic to prediction and
control in science.
Cone asserts the use of the term "potentiality"
has acquired excess meaning due to our dualistic
heritage. However, by maintaining a naturalistic
view the term can be basic to both "pure" and
applied science. In addition, can allow for predic-
tion and control without use of spiritualistic
terminology.
Volume 8
Zeiser, S. andHeyduk, R. Interbehaviorism, behav-
iorism and humanism: A comparative analysis of
three psychological systems.
Compares behaviorism with interbehaviorism in
regards to the approach of each to ridding psy-
chology of the "mind" concept. Similarities and
differences between interbehaviorism and hu-
manism are also explored.
Foulquie, P. & Deledalle, Gerald. Le Behaviorisme
Organismique de Kantor. (Translation from the
French by Lucien Leduc.)
Examination of Kantor's organismic behaviorism
with references to Kantor's Principles of Psy-
chology, primarily. He concludes with a descrip-
tion of organismic psychology as an "indirect
constitution of a subjective world".
Tilquin, A. Behaviorism and Operationalism. (from
The origin of behaviorism and development of
psychology of reaction in America)
Tilquin discusses the concepts of epistemological
dualism, immediate experience, intuitive experi-
ence, and logical positivism in relation to psy-
chology as a science.
Heyduk, R. Aristotle's conception of the sold: A
grammatical solution to a metaphysical problem.
A quote from Aristotle's de Anima is critiqued
with attention given to Aristotle's conceptualiza-
tion and misinterpretation of the' 'soul.'' Aristot-
lean and interbehavioral conceptions of mind and
body are compared and reconciled.
Farrington, J. The interbehavioral approach and
motivation.
Farrington's premise is that motivation, as de-
fined by J. R. Kantor, has been largely ignored by
social scientists even though an understanding of
interbehavioral analysis of events would lead to a
greater understanding of not only activities of the
human animal but the "whys" of their choices.
An overview of the interbehavioral system is
presented followed by a critique of the psychol-
ogy of motivation including a discussion of pos-
sible reasons why motivation psychologists have
tailed to adopt an interbehavioral approach.

Delprato, D. An interbehaviorally oriented under-
graduate course in the psychology of learning,
Delprato shares an outline of his undergraduate
course in learning, having evolved an interbehav-
iorally oriented approach.
Morris, E. Some relationships beftveen the psycholo-
gies of Kantor and Skinner.
Morris stated that some relationships between the
two approaches are discussed in an attempt to
promote a useful interchange. First, the interbe-
havioral field and the three-term contingency are
described according to their points of correspon-
dence with special attention given to the concepts
of stimulus and response function. Second,
points of disagreement on the issue of complexity
in human interactions and on the concept of
causality are outlined, and resolutions suggested.
It is concluded that the two psychologies can be
related constructively.
Volume 9
Barfield, D. James and Kantor on hypnosis: 1\vo
early naturalistic perspectives,
Compares William James (1890) and J. R. Kantor"s
(1926) attempts to "de-spook" the phenomenon
of hypnosis.
Larson, C. An Interview with J. R. Kantor about John
B. Watson.
Kantor elaborates upon the growth of behavior-
ism, Watson's contributions and contrasts Wat-
son's behaviorism with interbehaviorism.
Cohen, D. Analysis vs. wholism revisited,
Examined whether consciousness and behavior
are more fruitfully viewed analytically or wholis-
tically. Concludes that a knowledge of complex
psychological events is better understood using
both methods.
MacRobertsM. H. andMacRobertsB. R. Interbehav-
iorism and animal communication theory.
Attempts to show how an interbehavioral ap-
proach is applicable to the study of animal behav-
ior. Semiotics and zoosemiotics are defined and
contrasted. Concludes ethologists have found the
study of animal behavior from an interbehavioral
perspective valuable.
31
Volume 10
Mountjoy, P. T. A review of Daniel N. Robinson's
Intellectual history of psychology,
Mountjoy provides a critical review of this book
claiming that Robinson misunderstands science,
and lacks scholarship.
Michael H. MacRoberts. A challenge to the interbe-
haviorists.
D
MacRoberts argues that if interbehaviorists feel
that they have a contribution to make then they
have an obligation as scientists to challenge
psychology and to change it either by deflecting
its course or by speeding it up. He offers some
suggestions as to how this might be done.
Heyduk, Ronald G. A reply to MacRobert's challenge
to the interbehaviorists.
Heyduk agrees with MacRoberts on the issue of
obligation but argues that an aggressive style is
less desireable than emphasizing points of agree-
ment among potential allies. He suggests that we
become part of an evolution in psychology, even
if we lose our identity as interbehaviorists in the
process,
Deiprato, D. Some notes onRoy Schafer's revolution-
ary alternative to Freudian metapsychology,
Delprato praises Schafer's injection of "action
language*' into psychoanalysis, and his rejection
of the metapsychology of psychoanalysis. He ar-
gues that Schafer's viewpoint is compatible with
interbehaviorism, radical behaviorism, radical
phenomenology, behavioral epigenesis, and dia-
lectical psychology.
Smith, N. Corrections on use of "psyche".
Smith corrects some historical inaccuracies re-
garding the term psyche, as used in a recent article
in American Psychologist (Denmark, 1980). He
argues that we should be questioning the assump-
tion that mind and body are separate, rather than
trying to integrate them~as suggested by Den-
mark.
Volume 11
Commentator. Priority and Interbehaviorism,
32
Commentator suggests that Kantor has not been
recognized osatside of the field of psychology
because he has not been embraced within the field
of psychology. He notes that psychology is
headed toward a field perspective, which Kantor
already articulated. In short, Kantor has been
neglected, it is argued, because he is ahead of his
time.
Gordon, Alice J. Toward an interbehavioral science
of'memory".
Gordon proposes that memory can be analyzed
from an interrelation^ perspective. Memory is
not regarded as a mentalistic construct, rather it
can be viewed as a set of interactions between an
individual and the environment of the individual.
Remembering activities involve stimuli no longer
present, and also involves the interaction of
persons with current things and events.
Volume 12
Pronko, N. H. A vote toward the obsolescence of the
term "covert".
Pronko argues that a naturalistic psychology must
not rely on the familiar, mainstream dual classi-
fication imposed upon data by the terms overt and
covert. The interbehavioral approach to events
that are not apparent is to regard these "events as
occurring in a locus "beyond" the organism,
within a field in which the organism must share
the spotlight with the stimulus object."
Stevenson, D. & Hemingway, M. A brief commentary
on autistic abstraction vs. confrontation with
things and events: Reinforcing power and gener-
alization.
The authors argue that verbal abstraction of
observed events used as explanations is no substi-
tute for careful scientific inquiry. The notions of
reinforcing power and generalization are exam-
ined, and the argument is made that these terms
are often used as explanations. This is an error,
in that the interaction of things and events is not
specified.
Smith, N. W. Do }ve need the concept of mind in
psychology?
The evolution of terms related to psychophysical
dualism is described. Psychophysical dualism
began in the School of Alexandria about 200 B.
C., and was not questioned until the 17th century
when Descartes and Spinoza began grappling
with the issue. Aristotle, however, did not need
psychophysical dualism for his psychology, and
nor do contemporary psychologists. It is sug-
gested that only confrontable events be studied,
not metaphysical constructs.
Moore, J. On reciprocal behavioristic concerns.
The question of what factors are inhibiting the
interaction between interbehaviorists and radical
behaviorists in pursuit of the common goal of a
truly effective science of behavior is considered.
Radical behaviorists often criticize interbehav-
iorists for not having a research program. This is
problematic because interbehaviorists often do
interpretive work, which radical behaviorists
embrace in other contexts (e. g. verbal behavior).
Interbehaviorists often reject Skinner, in part due
to the rather mechanistic view of causation held
by many radical behaviorists. Many radical
behaviorists fail to recognize the integrated-field.
perspective of Skinner, so it is not surprising that
they would find it foreign when presented by
Kantor.
Volume 13
Pronko, N. H. The matter of setting factors: Aslsee
it,
Pronko argues that the term setting factor must
retain the notion of immediacy. Some interbehav-
ioral psychologists regard setting factors as en-
compassing the stimulus-response interactions
that influence subsequent stimulus response inter-
actions. This extension muddies the clarity of the
term.
Cone, D. The usefulness of certain mentalistic
concepts.
Arguments are made regarding why mentalistic
terms are useful. Primarily, the events that
occasion the use of the terms are of interest. It is
not necessary to wrestle with the term on its own
terms.
Smith, N. W. A double or a single world?
The traditionally held doctrine of the double
world is described. In this view, two worlds are
in existence-one an outside world which is inde-
pendent of the organism, and the other that is
created inside of the organism. This view is

contrasted with the views held by Aristotle, some
recent phenomenologists, Skinner, and the inter-
behaviorists. These views emphasize that a
psychological event is constituted by an entire
field of events. An individual can never know the
"reality" of anything,
Hilt, J. The information processing metaphor in
cognitive psychology.
Hilt argues that cognitive science relies heavily on
metaphorical models, the premises of which have
not been carefully analyzed. The emphasis on the
computer metaphor in cognitive science is cri-
tiqued. A Kantorian position is taken regarding
the use of the computer analogy which essentially
is that psychologists need to do more observing of
events and less analysis of mythical metaphors.
Volume 14
Gardner, W. M. Advanced general psychology: A
course on interbehavioral principles
Gardner shares his method in teaching Advanced
General Psychology. He selected Kantor and
Smith's (1975) text. He describes the text assign-
ments, format of lecture, the evaluation, and the
problems of this course.
Starbuck, S. M. M., Carruthers, K, J., Mason, M.,
Fitzgerald, M. D., and Thompson, S. Toward
more effective instruction in interbehavioral psy-
chology.
The frequently encountered problems students
face in a course in Interbehavioral Psychology are
described. In addition, some methods and analo-
gies students have found helpful in facilitating
their understanding of the material are provided.
Parrott, L. J. Ethical situations in interbehavioral
perspective,
Parrott attempts to isolate those aspects of ethical
situations that are distinctly psychological in
nature, and subsequently identify their unique
character as psychological events. Ethical situ-
ations are characterized by the potential operation
of conflicting stimulus functions. The conflict
among those functions is a conflict of value. An
action is regarded as right from the standpoint of
one collectivity and wrong from the standpoint of
another collectivity. Choice is then conceptual-
ized as an instance of interbehavior, in which one
of the value functions becomes actualized with
respect to a particular pattern of action.
33
Volume 15
Moore, J. He's always been there first.
Moore provides a set of statements of Kantor and
Skinner in the area of scientific epistemology,
particularly with regard to critical assessments of
the influence of operationism and logical positiv-
ism. The writings of Kantor and Skinner are
examined to show thatKantor anticipated much of
Skinner's position on this topic.
Volume 16
Morris, E. K. Not so worlds apart: Contextualism,
radical behaviorism, and developmental psychol-
The main thesis is that radical behaviorism,"
especially when seen from a field-theoretic view
such as J. R. Kantor's interbehavioral psychol-
ogy, adheres to a contextualistic world view. He
illustrates this by discussing some consequences
of mechanism and contextualism: elementarism
versus holism, causal analysis versus functional
analysis, development as behavioral versus struc-
tural change, the passive versus the active organ-
ism, and the role of context. He concludes that
with a convergence of behavior analysis and
developmental psychology towards contextual-
ism, they become commensurable.
Hayes, L. J. Philosophical implications of the inter-
behavioral field.
Hayes examines the concept of the integrated field
conceptualized as a simultaneous interaction of all
participating factors. She considers three implica-
tions of this conceptualization: the uniqueness of
psychological events, their ever-present charac-
ter, and their indeterminatkm.
Morris, E. K. The interbehavioral field: An introduc-
tion.
Morris describes interbehavioral psychology's
basic unit of analysis, the interbehavioral field.
The interbehavioral field, is composed of .five .
conceptually separable, but in actuality, insepa-
rable factors: (a) the organism and (b) the stimulus
environment and the context for the interactions
between organism and environment, those being
(c) their medium of sensory contact, (d) their
setting factors, and (e) their interbehavioral his-
tory. In part because of its inclusion of contextual
factors within its unit of analysis, interbehavioral
psychology is decidedly contextualistic.
34

Volume 17

Mountjoy, P. T., & Hansor, J. D. Jacob Robert Articles in

Kantor (1888-1984). THE INTERBEHAVIORIST
This is a reprint of the obituary of Professor Volumes 1-18
Kantor published in the American Psychologist in 1970-1990
1986 (Vol. 41, pp. 1296-1297).
[Citations list the Volume, Number, and Page]
Bijou, S. W. Analysis of the response junction in a
unitofinterbehavior.
This is an analysis of the response functions in Albee, George 1-3-2
complex segments which consist of permutations Barfield, D. 9-1-4
and combinations of precurrent and completing Bauer, Harold 2-1-1
reactions. Bijou describes the nature and different Bijou, S. W. 17-2-21
categories of precurrent reactions (i.e. attending, Blewett, E. 7-3-11; 8-2-7; 8-3-5; 15-1-4
perceiving, meaning, imagining, cognitive, feel- Carruthers, K. J. 14-4-36
ing, and manipulative reactions) and of complet- Carter, Jerry 2-2-3
ing reactions (i.e. effective, cognitive, linguistic, Commentator, 11-1-5
and affective reactions).
Cone, D. 6-2-8; 6-3-3; 7-1-12; 7-2-13; 9-2-8; 12-4-7;
Sharpe, T, L. Jr., Hawkins, A. H, &Landin, D. An 13-1-7
interbehavioral vie\v of span pedagogy expertise. Delprato,D. J. 104-3; 11-34; 11-3-5; 12-1-7;
The interbehavioral approach is shown first, to 124-8; 14-14; 14-2-14; 15-2-18; 154-41;
provide a more effective means for categorizing 16-14; 174-37
instructional systems in that it avoids imposing a Farrington, Jacqueline 1-3-3; 2-5-2; 3-4-3; 6-3-9;
value-laden conceptual scheme on the data inher- 8-1-6
ent in deductive methodologies and second, to Fitzgerald, M, D. 14-4-36
provide an excellent model for describing the
Fluent, T. 11-3-5
components of expert instruction,
Fouiquie, P. 7-3-7
Volume 18 Fowler, Christopher M. 4-2-3
Fox, J. 14-2-16 _
Ribes-Inesta, Emilio. Pseudotechnical language and Fuller, Paul 1-1-3
conceptual confusion in psychology: The cases of Gardner, W. M. 14-2-19
learning and memory, Goodson, L. 6-14
The author argues that learning and memory refer Gordon, A. J. R. H-24
to psychological events in ordinary not technical Handy, Rollo 144
language terms, and that failure to appreciate this Hansor, J. D. 17-2-18
distinction has led to conceptual confusion in Hawkins, A. H. 17445
psychology. This argument is elaborated through
Hayes, L. J. (see also Parrott) 16-3-23
a discussion of the origin and use of these terms.
A technical analysis of the events represented by Hemingway, M. J. 12-5-7
these terms is provided. Herrick, James W, 3-3-3; 7-2-2
Heyduk, Ronald, G. 1-3-5; 2-3-2; 6-3-5; 8-14;
Sharpe, Tom, Field Systems Data: An Exploration of 10-3-5
Alternative Visual Representations. Hilt, J. 13-3-25
The author illustrates four means of depicting Johnson, Steven, L. 5-2-3 '
interbehavioral time series data which convey Kahn, A. 17-3-28
behaviors within the greater temporal and contex- Kantor, J. R, (see also A. Mitsorg) 4-3-3
tual streams in which they reside. These means
Landin, D. 17445
are offered as alternatives to a linear models
approach.
 35

Larson, C. 9-2-4 Association for Behavior Analysis 174-37

LaShier, Cynthia J. 5-1-4 behavior segment 7-2-10
Lazar, Wayne 1-2-3 behavioral decrements 11-34
Liechtenstein, P. E. 1-1-5 behavioral inheritance 4-34
MacRoberts, M. H. 9-4-4; 10-3-3 behavioral medicine 14-2-14
MacRoberts, B. R, 9-4-4 behavioral science 14-14
Mahan, H. C. 14-3-30; 14-3-31; 15-3-24; 15-3-26; behaviorism 7-1-4; 7-3-5; 9-24
16-1-6; 17-3-30 and operational ism 74-6
Martin, Robert F. 4-1-2; 4-4-6 Bentley, A. F. 144
Mason, M. 14-4-36 biological factors 14-14
McPherson, Marion White 2-4-3 biology 7-14
Miller, David L. 5-3-5 relation to psychology 4-3-3
Mitsorg, A. (see also J. R. Kantor) 1-5-4; 3-3-7 brain 14-3-31
Moore, J. 12-5-10; 15-4-46 Carter, J. W. 1-3-3
Morris, E. K. 8-4-3; 16-1-8; 16-4-34 choice 144-38
Mountjoy, Paul T. 4-4-2; 6-1-2; 13-4-28; 17-2-18 Clark, D. L. 4-2-3
Parrott, L. J, (see also Hayes) 14-4-38 clinical intervention 11-3-5; 12-1-7
Powers, W. T. 16-3-22 cognitive psychology 13-3-25; 16-1-6
Pronko, N. H. 3-2-3; 12-1-11; 12-5-7; 13-1-6; complexity 9-3-3
13-3-25; 14-3-30 constructs 34-9
Ruben, D. H. 15-1-6 contextualism 16-1-8; 164-34
Sanders, S. 6-2-8 control systems theory 16-14; 16-3-22
Sharpe, T. L. 17-4-45 covert behavior 12-1-11; 12-4-8; 13-1-6; 13-3-25
Smith, N. 3-4-9; 10-3-7; 104-6; 11-1-8; 11-2-7; criminal psychology 15-3-26
13-1-6; 13-2-13; 15-14; 17-1-10 cultural behavior 3-3-3; 144-38
Starbuck, S. M. 144-36 cybernetics 14-14; 16-1-4
Stevenson, D. W. 12-5-7 determinism 3-2-3
Sullivan, John 3-1-3 development
Thompson, S. 144-36 basic stage of 3-3-3
Thompson, V. 64-7 societal stage of 3-3-3
Tilquin, A. 7-1-4; 7-2-3; 7-4-6 developmental psychology 16-1-8
Wittgenstein, L. 18-1-8 Dewey, J. 1-44
Zeiser, S. 7-3-5 dignity 3-1-3
dualism 2-3-2; 3-3-7; 12-5-8; 13-2-13; 17-3-28
eclectic practice 14-14
educational practices 4-1-2; 44-1; 6-1-2; 6-2-6;
17445
Articles in
emotion 6-1-4
THE INTERBEHAVIORIST
epistemology 154-46
Volumes 1-18 ethical behavior 144-38; 15-1-6
1970-1990 events 7-3-11
family therapy 12-1-7
[Citations list the Volume, Number, and Page] fantasy 3-4-9
field perspective 1-1-5; 1-44; 4-2-3; 11-1-5; 14-1-4;
analysis 9-2-8 14-2-14; 14-3-30; 17-1-10; 174-37
animal behavior 7-1-12; 944 free will 3-1-3; 3-2-3
history of psychology 10-1-4 Patterson, G. R. 12-1-7
human performance technology 14-1-4 personality 3-3-3
humanism 7-3-5 personalized system of instruction 4-4-1
hypnosis 9-1-4 physiological psychology 14-3-31
hysterical paralysis 2-2-3 potentiality 7-2-13
instruction in interbehavioral psychology 14-2-19; prediction
14-4-36 and control 7-2-13
interbehavioral psychology 6-2-8; 6-3-5; 6-4-7; psyche 10-4-6; 12-5-8
8-1-6; 8-4-3; 14-4-38; 15-1-4; 16-1-8; 16-4-34; psychoanalysis 10-4-3
. 17-4-34 psychological activities 7-1-7
interbehavioral field 16-3-23; 16-4-34 psychology
interbehavioral research 14-2-16 relation to biology 4-3-3
Interbehaviorism 1-1-5; 1-3-4; 1-4-4; 1-5-4; 2-5-2 psychosomatic medicine 14-2-14
6-3-5; 6-3-9; 7-2-3; 7-3-5; 16-3-23 Radical Behaviorism 16-1-8
strategy of 10-3-5; 10-3-6. and Interbehaviorism 12-5-10
and Radical Behaviorism 12-5-10 reactional dissociation 2-2-3
neglect of 11-1-5 reality 13-2-13
bibliography 10-3-7; 11-1-8; 11-2-7 response function 17-2-21
Kantor, J. R. 8-4-3; 9-2-4; 14-3-31; 15-2-18; retardation (see also mental deficiency) 7-1-12;
15-3-24; 15-4-41; 15-4-46; 17-2-18; 17-3-28 12-4-7
language games 18-1-8 Robinson, D. N. 10-1-4
learning 18-1-8 Rotter, J. B. 1-3-4
learning theory 4-1-2 Santa Claus 3-4-9
Leigland, S. 12-1-9 Schafer, R. 10-4-3
linear models 18-2-4 self 3-4-3; 5-3-5
linguistics 15-4-42 self-actionism 1-4-4
logical positivism 15-4-46 setting factors 13-1-6; 14-2-16
Luna 14-3-31 Skinner, B. F. 3-1-3; 5-1-4; 5-3-6; 8-4-3; 15-4-46;
MacRoberts, M. H. 10-3-6 17-3-28; 17-4-37
mechanism 16-1-8 social learning theory 4-1-2
memory 11-2-4 soul 8-1-4
mental deficiency (see also retardation) 2-4-3 sport pedagogy 17-4-45
mentalistic concepts stimulus
usefulness of 13-1-7 as cause 1-1-5
methods for field analysis 1-3-5; 1-4-4; 18-2-4 as function 1-1-5
mind 5-3-5; 12-5-7; 15-3-24 as object 1-1-5
moral behavior 6-2-8 terminology 2-1-3; 14-3-30; 16-1-6; 18-1-8
moral development 6-2-8 transactionalism 1-4-4; 1-5-4
motivation 5-1-4; 5-2-3; 8-1-6 unit of analysis 16-4-34; 17-2-21
observer's role 2-5-2 verbal abstraction
operant psychology 4-1-2 problems with 12-5-7
operational ism verbal behavior 12-1-9
and behaviorism 7-4-6 voluntary behavior 14-4-38
operationism (see also operationalism) 7-3-3; 15-4-46 Watson, J. B. 4-3-3
organic psychology 7-1-4; 7-3-7 wholism 9-2-8
 A Newsletter oftoterbdhavioralPsychology t futf

Volume 19 1991 Number 1

EDITOR
Linda J. Hayes, University of Nevada The Agora 3
PAST EDITORS Interbehaviorists in ABA SIG Meeting
Problems Solving Discussion at ABA
Noel W. Smith, Vols 1-7 (1970-1978) ABA Expo and Social Hour
Ronald G. Heyduk, Vols 8-11 (1978-1983) Interbehavioral Presentations at ABA
Edward K Morris, Vols 12-17 (1983-1989) Tribute to Skinner in Mexico
ADVISORY BOARD That Little Extra
The Meaning of Mitsorg
Sidney W. Bijou, University of Arizona E-Mail Addresses
Donna M. Cone, State of Rhode Island
Articles
Patrick Ghezzi, University of Arizona
Sandy Hobbs, Paisley College of Technology Linda J. Hayes. Learning and Memory
(Scotland) 7
Edward K, Morris, University of Kansas
PaulT. Mountjoy, Western Michigan Univ. Regina Lipkens. Idealism, Realism)
N. H. Pronko, Wichita State University Coherence, and Correspondence
Roger D, Ray, Rollins College in Kantor's Interbehavioral
Emilio Ribes, National University of Philosophy 8
Mexico, Iztacala
Douglas H. Ruben, Okemos, MI Comments
Robert G. Wahler, University of Tennessee
MANAGING EDITOR Noel W. Smith. A Joint Newsletter
with Allies? 19
Steven C. Hayes, University of Nevada Kelly G. Wilson. A Naturalistic
ASSISTANT EDITORS Analysis of Transcendence 19
Harry C. Mahan. Feeling
Debra W. Fredericks, Kenneth Huntley, Reactions in Interbehavioral
Barbara S. Kohlenberg, Regina Lipkens, Psychology 21
University of Nevada

ISSN8755-612X
2

A Newsletter of Principia Press's currently available titles

Inter-behavioral Psychology in interbehavioral psychology, allby J.R. Kantor,
ISSN 8755-612X are listed below. Check your bookshelves, and
those of your library and bookstore, for possible
Linda J. Hayes, Editor oversights. In addition, the books make excel-
Department of Psychology lent gifts for colleagues and students, especially
- University of Nevada for the latter in honor of their completed degree
Reno, Nevada 89557, U.S.A. requirements. The books may be purchased
702-784-1137 directly from Principia Press, 5743 Kimbark
Avenue, Chicago, IL 60637. Handling charges
THE INTERBEHAVIORISTpublishesnews,
are $.75 per title; prepaid orders are postpaid.
information, discussion, journal andbooknotes, Any queries should also be directed to the
book reviews, comments, and brief articles per- address above.
taining to interbehavioral psychology a con-
textualistic, integrated-field approach to the Principles of Psychology (2 vols.) $20.00
natural science of behavior. Psychology and Logic (2 vols.) $25.00
The newsletter also publishes professional Interbehavioral Psychology $15.00
communications that fall between informal cor- The Logic of Modern Science $15,00
respondence and colloquia, and formal archival An Objective Psychology of
publication. As such, the newsletter supple- Grammar $13.00
ments contemporary journals dedicated to ba- The Scientific Evolution of
sic and applied research, to the history and Psychology (2 vols) $40.00
philosophy of the behavioral sciences, and to The Science of Psychology;
professional issues in the field. The newsletter An Interbehavioral Survey $20.00
strongly encourages submission of notes about Psychological Linguistics $15.00
current professional activities of its subscrib- The Aim and Progress of Psychology
ers, news and observations about interbehav- and Other Sciences $20.00
ioral psychology and related perspectives, com- Interbehavioral Philosophy $27.50
ments on journal articles and books of interest, Cultural Psychology $16.00
more extended book reviews, and brief articles. Tragedy and the Event Continuum $15.00
All submissions should be sent in triplicate to Selected Writings, 1929-1983 $20.00
the editor and should conform to the style Psychological Comments
described in the Publication Manual of the and Queries $20.00
American Psychological Association (3rd edi-
tion).

Subscription Information Call for News

Student Subscriptions (USA) $5.00
Regular Subscriptions (USA) 7.00 THE INTERBEHAVIORIST pub-
Foreign (Non-USA) Subscriptions 8.00 lishes news about subscribers' activities
Institutional Subscriptions 12.00 and information about others' activities
Back Volumes 1-18 8.00 that may be of interest to readers. If you
have published an article, chapter, or book
with an interbehavioral orientation, or
The Interbehavlorlst is published as a public service by have read one published by someone else,
CONTEXT PRESS, Box 50172, Reno, NV 89513. CONTEXT particularily if the source is obscure, please
PRESS publishes books of interest to contextualists and
interactioniets. Write for brochures on the books avail- let us know about it.
able.
 Interbehavlorists In ABA
Special Interest Group
Meeting
Time:
" 12-12:50, Sunday, May 26, 1991
Place:
Adams Room, Hilton Inn & Towers, Atlanta
Purpose:
To function as an opportunity for
interbehaviorists to jdiscuss issues of mutual
interest as well as help one another solve prob-
lems peculiar to the interbehavioral perspec-
tive in psychology and philosophy. The meeting
is open to anyoneinterestedininterbehaviorism.
Please encourage your students and colleagues
to attend.
Agenda;
1. Contributions to the ABA Program, 1991
and!992.
2. Report on The Interbehaviorist and dis-
cussion of its future.
3. Election of Officers & Committee appoint-
ments.
4. Opportunities for graduate training.
5. Interbehavioral news and notes.
6. Problem solving discussion (see note be-
low.)
Problem Solving Discussion at ABA
As mentioned in the last issue of The
Interbehaviorist, we had requested additional
time for our S.I.6. meeting this year to provide
an opportunity for us to consult with one an-
other on problems we may have encountered in
interbehavioral analysis, method, practice, or
whatever. We had also planned to spend some
time discussing the life and future of
interbehavioral psychology and philosophy in a
more structured way. Unfortunately, we were
not allotted additional time by the ABA pro-
gram committee and have just our usual 50
minutes to spend together. . Nonetheless, it
seems a good idea to attempt some of what we
had planned. Consequently,.! wish to suggest
a topic for discussion following the business
portion of our meeting (and invite others to do
likewise). We will have insufficient time to deal
with this issue satisfactorily, I'm sure. Still, it
may be useful to open the discussion with the
chance that it might continue elsewhere. I sug-
gest the following: 1. What changes, if any, in
the categorical constructs of interbehavioral
philosophy/psychology are needed to faciliate
its elaboration as an applied science?
ABA Expo and Social Hour
lime:
8:30-10:30 p.m., Friday, May 24,1991
Place:
Grand Salon, Hilton Inn & Towers, Atlanta
The Interbehaviorists in ABA will have aposter
display at this social hour. Drop by and say
hello.
Some Interbehavioral (or possibly so)
Presentations at ABA
We came up with the following selection of
talks by subscribers to The Interbehaviorist.
that seemed likely to represent the
interbehavioral point of view. We apologize for
any misrepresentations, andfor any omissions.
ABA Schedule
FRIDAY
SYMPOSIUM: Biochemical Events and
Psychological Fields
CHAIR: Linda Hayes (University of Nevada)
DISCUSSANT: Suzanne Gleeson (Uniformed
Services University of the Health Sciences)
Setting Factors. Linda Hayes (University of
Nevada) '>
Synchronizing medical and behavioral
management. Debra Fredericks, Linda
Hayes (University of Nevada)
Use of psychotropic medication with the
 institutionalized developmentally dis-
abled: Contingencies maintain staff
behavior. David Stroffe, LmdaHayes (Uni-
versity of Nevada)
SYMPOSIUM: The Teaching of the History
of Psychology: A Naturalistic Perspec-
tive on the Study of the Study of Behav-
ior
CHAHfc Bryan Midgley (University of Kansas)
DISCUSSANT: Jack Michael (Western Michi-
gan University)
The distant past and its relation to current
psychology: A tour of psychophysical
" dualism and nondualism. Noel Smith
(State University of New York-Plattsburgh)
The history of psychology should not be
boring: A platyopic alternative to myo-
pia, William Verplank (University of Ten-
-- nessee-Knoxville)
History of psychology from a behavioral
standpoint, MarkSwain,DenrrisDelprato,
Peter Holmes (Eastern Michigan Univer-
sity)
INVITED ADDRESS: Feelings aren't
epiphenomenal: Implications of verbal
behavior for the analysis of emotions.
Steven Hayes (University of Nevada)
SATURDAY
SYMPOSIUM: Fear of Going Cognitive
CHAIR: Steven Hayes (University of Nevada)
DISCUSSANT: Hayne Reese (West Virginia
University)
Lifespan cognitive development and speed
of information processing: Notes from
the underground. Joel Meyerson, Sandra
Hale (Washington University)
Behavior analysis of complex human func-
tioning: The example of analogical
reasoning. ReginaLipkens, Steven Hayes
(University of Nevada)
Behavior analysis ventures into complex
processes: Are we falling into the deep
end? Marc Branch (University of Florida)
Radical monism. Linda Hayes (University of
Nevada)
PAPER: Setting events and problem be-
haviors in school settings. Robert H.
Horner, StellaDadson, JanRamsden, Lora
Tuesday-Heathfield, Richard Albin, Robert
O'Neill (University of Oregon)
SYMPOSIUM: Understanding Interbekav-
iorism
CHAIR; linda Hayes (University of Nevada)
DISCUSSANT: Hayne Reese (West Virginia
University)
Some allies oflnterbehaviorism. Noel Smith
(State University of New York-Plattsburgh)
Implications of specificity logic for sci-
ence. Linda Hayes (University of Nevada)
Science as an interbehavioral enterprise:
Some reflections on Wittgenstien's lan-
guage games. Emilio Ribes Inesta (Na-
tional Autonomous University of Mexico)
PANEL DISCUSSION: Social Skills: So-
cial Validation and Generalization
with Persons with Developmental
Handicaps
CHAIR: Patrick Ghezzi (University of Arizona)
PARTICIPANTS: Dorothy Griffiths (York
Behavior Management Services/ York Cen-
tral Hospital-Richmond Hill, Canada)
Susan l*Q\igh(York Behavior Management Ser-
vices/ York Central Hospital-Richmond
Hill, Canada)
SUNDAY
SYMPOSIUM: Boundaries of Behavior
Analysis
CHAIR: Bryan Midgley (University of Kansas)
DISCUSSANT: Hayne Reese (West Virginia
University)
Molar behavior analysis. William Baum
(University of New Hampshire)
The boundaries of behavioral technology.
Henry Pennypacker (University of Florida)
From MacDougall through Skinner and
Kantor and beyond. William Verplank
(University ofTennessee-Knoxville)
The domain of behavior analysis: Psychol-
ogy as the science of behavior. Dennis
Delprato (Eastern Michigan University)
PAPER: The experience of meaning. Kelly
Wilson (University of Nevada)
SYMPOSIUM: Behavioral Development
and the Notion of Stage
CHAIR AND DISCUSSANT: Ann B. Pratt
(Capital University)
A developmental stage notion enhances
behavior analysis, Michael Commons
(Harvard Medical School)
Mathematically demonstrated hierarchi-
cal complexity of tasks and behavior
development theory. Edward Trudeau
(Harvard University)
ADDRESS: Who, what, and when: Chrono-
logical comparison of Skinner to his
competitors within the behavioristic
movement. Paid Mountjoy (Western Michi-
gan University)
INVITED ADDRESS: Cross purposes: A
perspective on the conflict between Skin-
ner And Kantor. Landa Hayes (University
ofNevada)
PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: The aim and
progress of behavior analysis. Edward
Morris (University of Kansas)
ADDRESS: Coordinating psychology with
other disciplines: Undergraduate
learning communities with philosophy,
historyj and geology, Charles A: Lyons
(Eastern Oregon State College)
SYMPOSIUM: Cognitive Development: Be-
havior-Analytic Findings and Commen-
tary
CHAIR: Ann Pratt (Capital University)
DISCUSSANT: Sidney Bijou (University of
Arizona)
Is self-instruction another way to do task
analysis? DonaldBaer (University of Kan-
sas)
Stimulus relations and cognitive develop-
ment. ArnoldKunian (Universityof'Minne-
sota)
Behavior analysis of cognitive develop-
ment: The training ofPiagetian con-
versation skills. Barry Parsonson (Uni-
versity of New Zealand)
An analysis of the relationship between
object/person permanency and mother-
infant attachment. Jacob Gewirtz
(Florida International University)
ADDRESS: Towards a definition of social
skills. Patrick Ghezzi (University of Ari-
zona)
PAPER: A chronological comparison of
Skinner to his competitors^ a brief ver-
sion. Paul Mountjoy (Western Michigan
University)
SYMPOSIUM: Interbehavioral Analysis of
Research Data
CHAIR: William Gardner (Jacksonville State
University)
DISCUSSANT: Roger Ray (Rollins College)
Cutting through the behavioral stream;
An interbehavioral investigation of
 behavioral systems and of some of their Sidney Bijou
properties. Bryan Midgley, Edward Morris David Cornwell
(University of Kansas) Debra Fredericks
Inductive analysis in pedagogy: The util- Louise Kent-Udolf
ity of an interbehavioral strategy. Tom Edward Morris
Sharpe (University of Nebraska) Thomas Sharpe
Linguistic interactions of normally devel- Noel Smith .
oping and retarded children. Patrick Robert Thompson
Ghezzi, Elias Robles, Sidney Bijou (Univer- Marian White McPherson
sity of Arizona)
Vigilance as a precurrent psychological
event in traffic accident avoidance. The Meaning of Mitsorg
Kimberly Hayes, Cynthia Chapman, Wil-
liam Gardner, Donald Patterson (Jackson- In the last issue of The interbehaviorist, it
ville State University) was noted thatKantor had used the pseudonym
"A. Mitsorg" on a couple of pieces in The
Interbehaviorist for which we had no explana-
Tribute to Skinner in Mexico tion. We have since learned that mitsorg may
be understood as "with care or concern" in
Atribute to Skinner was organizedby Emilio German. Thanks to Regina Lipkens for solving
Ribes in conjunction with the Mexican Associa- the puzzle.
tion for Behavior Analysis meeting held in
Mexico City in March of this year. The editor
and two of the assistant editors attended the E-Mail Addresses of Some Subscribers
meeting. It was interesting to note that almost to The Interbehaviorist
all of the speakers mentioned Skinner's experi-
mental preparation, including his investigative You can reach the following on BITNET or
cons tructs(e.g.,theoperant),uivestigative prac- INTERNET. BITNET addresses do not have
tices, and the development of apparatus (the periods in them. On most systems, there are
"Skinner box", cummulative record, etc.) as his automatic gateways between the two networks,
most significant contributions to psychology. A however some file transfer protocols will not
few also mentioned his extrapolations from work between them.
animal findings to certain human domains such
as the design of cultures, eductaional systems, Steve Brown of Q Methodology:
human development and language. No one SRB@KENTVM
credited him with a significant contribution to Control Systems Group informal network
the philosophy of the science of psychology. The (Garry Cziko, Coordinator):
speakers included: Fred Keller, Peter Dews, G-CZIKO@UIUC.EDU
Peter Harzem, Charles Shimp, Phil Hineline, Noel Smith;
Howard Rachlin, Jim Dinsmoor and Jacob SMITHNW@SNYP.IAVA
Gewirtz. A similar tribute is planned for ABA Steven C. Hayes:
It will again be interesting to note for what HAYESOTNSSUN.NEVADAEDU
Skinner is remembered by his followers. Dennis Delprato:
DELPRATO@UM,CC.UMICH.EDU
Roger Ray:
That Little Extra RAY@ROLLINS

A number of subscribers made donations be- If you would like to have your e-mail address
yond their regular subscription fees for 1991, published, please sendit to The Interbehaviorist.
for which we are grateful. They were:
 Linda J. Hayes
University of Nevada
Everyday experience tells us that what we
and others around us are doing today is different
from it was yesterday, and the day before that,
Our repertoires are changing ~ we are learning.
We note too that what we learn, by and large, is
not here today and gone tomorrow. What we
learned yesterday stays with us we remember
it.
Systematic thinking, as is the hallmark ,of
science, evolves out of everyday experiences of
this sort and the systemic concepts of learning
and memory are examples of this evolution. They
occupy a central position in almost all present day
psychological systems. Their technical exposi-
tion in the multitude of historical psychologies
varies, of course, although perhaps not as widely
as might he expected. For example, it would be in
keeping with most historical and current per-
spectives in psychology to claim that learning is
something that happens to an organism, or is
enacted by an organism, or is in some other way
related to the organism ia particular. Memory,
likewise, has almost always been assumed to be of
the organism in some manner.
These claims reflects the widely held view
that organismic events constitute the essential
subject matter of psychology, and this applies
both in caseswhere the essential subject matter is
taken to be the behavior of an organism and
where it is regarded as the organism's mental
action. To reiterate, to argue that learning and
remembering as psychological events happen to
an organism or is accomplished by an organism, is
to propose that organismic events constitute the
subject matter of psychology. Most historical and
current psychological systems have adopted this
position.
I am not suggesting that there are no differ-
ences across psychologies - behavioral and men-
talistic alike -- as to their interpretations of these
happenings. On the contrary, each has found it
necessary, or at least workable, to come up with
its own version of learning and memory theory.
The principle difference between psychologies of
these two general types has to do with then*
systemic assumptions concerning the relation of
psychology to biology. Mentalistic theories pro-
pose a parallel relation. Behavioral theories an
interactive one. Let us consider these positions in
somewhat greater detail.
Mentalistic Theories
Modern mentalistic theories developed out of
theological traditions in which the biological or-
ganism was of little or no importance, and this
attitude has not changed in any fundamental
way. There is still no real connection between the
psychological entities and processes postulated
by cognitivists and the biological substrate. Learn-
ing is held to be a conscious matter, involving the
processing of information, the derivation of rules,
the construction of schemas, the weighing of al-
ternatives, and any number of other rational acts
- none of which has anything to do with biology
and all of which is enough to make one wonder at
just how a flatworm could be so clever.
Memory is similarly conceptualized. From a
cognitive perspective, the past experience of an
organism is converted into a possession of the
organism. These possessions are not of the sort
that one's spleen or tonsils are a possession,
though. They are not biological entities. They are
not brain tissues. They are entities of some other
sort. Memory, it is held, is the conversion of past
experiences into copies of them, the storage of
those copies until such time as they are necessary
to explain behavior that cannot be explained by
appeal to current conditions, and the retrieval of
the stored copies for reexperience.
In summary, the reluctance of modern
cognitivists to conceptualize psychological events
in thoroughly naturalistic terms eliminates cer-
tain alternatives as to the relation possible to
postulate between biological and psychological
events. It is, first, not a reductionistic one, as this
would strip metal events of their special charac-
ter. It is also not a genuine interaction, as to
suggest as much would initiate the age old debate
in psychology as to how events of fundamentally
different substance are able to make contact.
With these possibilities eliminated, the only real
alternative is parallelistic, as I have tried to
illustrate here.
Behaviorial Theories
Behavioral theories of learning and memory
tend to be more interactionistic. No doubt this is
due to their historical affiliation with biology and
especially to their persuasion by the doctrine of
natural selection. So p ersuaded by D arwin's theory
are these theorists, that psychological events are
subordinated to biological events - subordinated
enough on occasion to give rise to the suggestion
that they are based on or may be reduced to
biological events. Skinner's position is a case in
point.
Skinner argues that operant learning is indi-
cated by an increase in the probability of re-
sponses that have been effective hi producing
particular consequences. The consequences are
the principle causal variable in this formulation
and the ability of organisms to be influenced by
them is said to be a product of natural selection
(Skinner, 1971, p. 114-115).
The causal efficacy of consequences, Skinner
continues, has evolved in conjunction with two
other sets of conditions. One of these is an inher-
ited susceptibility to reinforcement by certain
kinds of consequences (Skinner, 1981, p, 501), It
is this that makes these consequences capable of
increasing the frequencies of the behaviors they"
follow. .The other condition is the availability of a
supply of behavior not specifically committed to
eliciting or releasing stimuli (Skinner, 1981, p,
501).
Given an inherited ability to be influenced by
the consequences of our actions, inherited suscep-
tibilities to be influenced by certain kinds of
consequences, and a supply of behavior not spe-
cifically committed to other influences, the out-
come is as follows: Responses occur for no particu-
lar reason. Some of these responses produce
consequences which increase their frequency of
occurrence by which they are maintained in the
organism's repertoire. Other responses fail to
produce consequences having this effect, and these
responses are thereby not maintained. The out-
come of selection by consequences, then, analo-
gous to the modified species of natural selection,
is the modified repertoire of the organism. Learn-
ing is this process, according to Skinner.
The concept of memory, while not typically
addressed as such by behaviorists, has not been
overlooked in behavioral theory. An organism's
history of interactions with its environment is of
central concern to behaviorists; and they too have
a solution to the problem of how that history may
be brought to bear in the present. Skinner, for
example, argues that the past is brought to bear
in the present byway of the presence of a changed
organism- conceptualizedsubstantivelynotfunc-
tionally. In his words:
"Something is done today which affects the
behavior of the organism tomorrow. No matter
how clearly that fact can be established, a step is
missing, and we must wait for the physiologist to
supplyit. Hewillbeabletoshowhowanorganism
is changed when exposed to contingencies of rein-
forcement and that the changed organism then
behaves in a different way, possibly at a much
later date" (Skinner, 1974, p. 215).
In summary, both learning and memory have
a biological basis in behavioral theory both are
"of the organism" so to speak. In the case of
learning, particular stimuli and their temporal
arrangement with respect to behavior have the
effects they do because of the way the organism,
as a biological entity, is built. In other words, that
we learn is attributable to a particular course of
biological evolution. Likewise, remembering is a
biological matter. The vehicle in which an
organism's past experience is carried into the
effective present is the biological organism -- its
physiology.
Summary of Mentatistic and
Behavioristic Theories
As I suggested earlier, the cognitive and be-
havioral constructions, while not wholely alike in
this regard, do share certain views on the topics of
learning and memory. Both assume that history
or experience is something that an organism has,
that is, learning insomething that happens to an
organism. It is the organism that learns and
subsequently remembers. As such, both take the
position that if an organism's history is to be
brought to bear in the effective present, it must be
done so via the organism.
In both cases, also, the past is assumed to bear
 some responsibility for the present, which is why
both are obligated to find ways of actualizing the
past in the present condition. And both do so via
the organism. A causal relation of past to present
events can be postulated only if the past and
present are conceptualized as having indepen-
dent existence. In short, both behaviorists and
cognitivists acknowledge a distinction between
the past and present.
These arguments are not unusual by any
means. On the contrary, they are quite conven-
tional, So much so, in fact, that alternatives are
difficult to imagine. Unfortunately, conventional
wisdomparticularlywithrespectto psychological
history has not been particularly fruitful. It has
left us lamenting how little we know about an
organism's history in one breath; and hi the next,
explaining whatever it is an organism may be
doing by appeal to that history. Something is
amiss "when the problem is the solution; and the
solution is the problem.
My purpose in raising these issues is not to
criticise conventional wisdom, asthoughbydoing
so the adequacy of some other position would be
enhanced. Conventional wisdom serves the pur-
poses of those who abide by it and is for them the
truth concerning such matters. Neither is it my
purpose to change anyone's belief. On the con-
trary my purpose has been to provide an intellec-
tual background against which the unusual fea-
tures of the interbehavioral analysis may stand
out. Let us turn then to a very different set of
assumptions -- those of interbehaviorism -- and
see where it leads us in our quest for more satis-
fying concepts of learning and memory.
Interbehaviorial Theory
Recall that conventional treatments of learn-
ing and memory were articulated on the premise
that organismic events constitute the essential
subject matter of psychology. This premise is
evident in the argument that learning happens to
an organism or is accomplished by an organism,
and that the past is present in the organism in
some way.
The interbehavioral postulate as tathe sub-
ject matter of psychology is completely at odds
with this view. From an Interbehavioral perspec-
tive a psychological event is a field of interaction,
the focus of which is a function obtaining between
stimulating and responding. While organisms
and environments participate in psychological
events -- there could be no psychological events in
their absence - they are not themselves the events
of interest hi this domain. It is the function
obtaining between stimulating and responding
that is the essential subject matter of psychology
from an interbehavioral perspective.
Accordingly, the psychological event of learn-
ing is not of the organism for an interbehaviorist. ,
Learning is not something accomplished by an
organism. It is not something that happens to an
organism. Learningissomethingthathappensto
a function obtaining between stimulating and
responding. It is a modification of function -- a
change in responding with respect to stimulating.
The interbehavioral field concept further sug-
gests that learning, as modification of function, is
Incessant. Thatis to say, our interactions with our
environments are constantly changing. To sug-
gest otherwise would be to suggest that field
events are possible of reconfiguration- in every
detail, as it is only in such a circumstance that a
function could be assumed to be sustained with-
out modification. Such a reconfiguration is not
possible however because a "second" occurrence
of a psychological event necessarily includes the
first occurrence of that event, a factor not present
in the first occurrence. Consequently, to the
extent that a psychological event is a field event
- an organization of interacting factors the
"second" occurrence, by including factors not
present in the first occurrence, is not a second
occurrence of that event. It is a different event,
comprised of different factors. In summary, a
psychological event is never repeated from an
interbehavioral perspective. As an function ob-
taining between stimulating and responding, a
given psychological event is but a point in the
evolution of function wherein each current mani-
festation includes all previous manifestations.
Learning, as such, is evolving function.
There is, further, no systemic requirement in
interbehaviorism to locate, base, reduce, or other-
wise connect psychological functions with sub-
stantive structures of any sort. They have no
substantive structure in themselves nor do they
acquire it through some form of association with
other events. Psychological events are not held to
reside in the organism, even when the events at
issue are such things as thinking, imagining or
dreaming. All functions, no matter how subtle,
10
are field occurrences. They are, as such, interre-
lated with all other event types, though bear no
special relation to the events of any particular
domain, including biology.
Turning more specifically to the issue of
memory, recall that hi more traditional theories
the past is held to be causally responsible for the
present. This presupposition makes it necessary
for these theories to postulate a means by which
the past could be brought to bear in the present,
the means agreed up on being the organism. As we
have just discussed this particular means cannot
be adopted from an interbehavioral perspective.
We will return to the issue of means. For the
moment, however, let us consider the larger issue
of memory from an interbehavioral perspective.
There are really two issues. First, is there a
past distinct from the present that could bear
causal responsibility for the present from an
interbehavioral standpoint? And secondly, if there
were, what would its causal responsibility mean
from this standpoint?
Time. Let us consider first the issue of the
past distinct from the present. The issue of time.
Time, like weight or height or length, is a metric
not an event. As such, it occupies no place hi the
psychological field. The field concept depicts a
psychological event at a particular point in time,
specifically, the present moment. All factors
depicted as participants in a field event partici-
pate in the present moment; no one participating
to a greater or lesser extent than another, and no
one's participation preceding or following that of
another. An interbehavioral field is conceptual-
ized as a simultaneous interaction of all co-present
factors.
The interbehavioral field, so depicted, is not
just the present field of interaction. There are no
otherfields- no pastfields,no futurefields.From
an event standpoint, at least, there is only one
field -- the field existing in the present moment.
Accordingly, the facts of past and future are to be
found in the continuously evolving present mo-
ment.
Given this interpretation, there is no possibil-
ity of a past exerting.causal influence over the
present, as there is no past distinct from the
present to have such an influence. The past inter-
actions of a given individual, rather, exist in the
current interactions of that individual. They
differ from current interactions only in that they
operate exclusively on the basis of substitute
stimulation. To reiterate, past interactions exist
as current interactions. They have no other exist-
ence. The past is the present.
In taking this stand, interbehaviorists avoid
the troublesome problem of finding a plausible
vehicle by which to carry the past into the effec-
tive present. They are not obliged to find replicas
or residues of previous interactions inside the
organism, as does the cognitivist. There are no
previous inter actions stored there. Neither is
there a need to postulate a residue of past interac-
tion in the substance of the organism, as does the
behaviorist: The past history of psychological
interaction does not exist as changes in organic
tissue, at least no from a psychological perspec-
tive. The past history of interaction exists as
current interaction. Our past is not stored within
us. Ourpastdoesnotchangeus. We are our pasts.
As such, there is no need to postulate a means of
making the past present.
Causality. Turning to the problem of causal
responsibility, it may be obvious by now that
there is no such concept in interbehavioral psy-
chology. This is not so much a denial of causality
as the absence of a need for it. When all factors
present in a field are held to participate in it, and
no field is ever repeated in every detail, and only
one field constitutes the present moment in which
all previous fields are included -- there is no need
for a concept of causality. If, indeed, our past
exists in our present interactions -- and no where
else -- then it makes little sense to argue that our
interfactional history is causally responsible for
our current interactions. To suggest as much is to
argue that our current interactions are respon-
sible for themselves.
In sum, there no need to explain the facts of
learning and memory by reference to casual vari-
ables of one or another sort as is the style of
conventional thinking on these topics. From an
interbehavioral standpoint, learning and memory
may be understood simply as evolving functions.
Other Issues
As satisfied as I might be with this conclusion,
I am certain that it will seem to some readers that
I have failed to address myself to some rather
important issues in this area. For example, have

learning and memory no distinguishing features?
Are all psychological occurrences, in other words,
to be understood as evolving functions without
further differentiation? Or too, what role does
motivation play in learning - what role reinforce-
ment ~ in short, why do functions evolve as they
do? Why did evolution not take a different course?
I will deal with each of these issues briefly.
Distinguishing Characteristics of Learning
and Memory
With regard to distinctions between learning
and memory and between these concepts and any
of a number of others, let me say that of course
there are distinctions that could be made, By and
large, however, the distinctions that could be
made amongtypes of interbehavior would have to
do with differences in the specific factors partici-
pating in those various events, including the
types of functions, the types of setting conditions,
and the types of response systems. Some might
involve universal, others conventional stimulus
functions, some direct, some substitutive. Like-
wise, some might involve settings impacting the
responding organism, others the stimulating ob-
jects. Some might involve glandular reaction
systems, others skeletal, and so on.
These distinctions could be made and have
been by Kantor and his followers in many other
places (e.g., Kantor, 1924-26;. Kantor & Smith,
1975.) In the case of learning, for example, Kantor
(1926, pp. 338-362; 1959, pp. 128-138) distin-
guishes learning fields from those of other sorts
by suggesting that the former involve new coordi-
nations of stimulating and responding, not merely
the occurrence of previously acquired functions.
Learning fields are also-distinguished in these
works by the degree to which they are contrived
for the purpose of establishing new functions.
This analysis,inthatthereisimpliedherethe
possibility of eventreconfiguration-eventrecur-
rence - appears to contradict what I have argued
to be an interbehavioral interpretation of learn-
ing. The contradiction is eliminated, However,
when the different perspectives on analysis are
taken into account. An analysis of learning in
which events are assumed possible of recurrence
is made from the standpoint of an applied science
of psychology, where the goals of science are
prediction and control. One cannot predict nor
control the unique event. To accomplish goals of
11
this sort itis necessary to subordinate the unique-
ness of events to their similarities. In so doing a
type of event may be said to recur. In the analysis
that I have been attempting in this eassy, predic-
tion and control are not the goals. I have been
speaking from the standpoint of basic science, the
aim of which is to describe events. From this
perspective all events are unique events and the
acquisition of new functions, cannot be distin-
guished from the performance of "already ac-
quired" functions. A similar analysis might be
made of memorial fields (1926, pp. 85-118.)
To reiterate, I have been addressing issues of
learning and memory as psychological events, not
as types of psychological event. At the level of the
psychological event, learning and memory are
more alike than different,
Motivation and Reinforcement
Secondly, as to the role played by such things
as motivation and reinforcement, I can only say
that these concepts, when it is argued that they
play a role, reflect a different set of postulates
than those on the basis of which I have been
making my case. The role these concepts have
played in psychological theories to date is an
explanatory one. There are no roles of this sort in
interbebavioral perspective. From a descriptive
standpoint. From this standpoint, motivation
and reinforcement - if these terms refer to any-
thing at all - they refer to events of the sort I have
been speaking: They constitute interactions of
stimulating with responding - evolving func-
tions. Their specific characteristics as psycho-
logical events have been addressed by Kantor and
others elsewhere. The distinguishing character-
istic of motivational events, for example, is their
duration. I repeat, however, that it is not my
intention to distinguish among psychological
events of different varieties but rather to identify
the psychological event per se. Hence I will not
elaborate further as to the specific characteristics
of motiavtional and consequential fields.
I would, nonetheless, like to comment further
on the issue of motiavtion and reinforcement as
explanatory processes. Throughout this paper I
have been articulating the interbehavioral posi-
tion as it stands in philosophical perspective.
There is, as well, an interpretation of psychologi-
cal events that may be considered interbehavioral
in which some field participants are held to play
12
an influential role with respect to other field
participants. Interbehaviorists sometimes ar-
gue, for example, that the role of the setting is to
actualize functions. Which function obtains at
any given moment is siad to be determined by the
setting. The concept of interbehavioral history is
also said to have a role of this sort to play on
occasion. Reinforcement and motivational opera-
tions might be understood in this way for particu-
lar purposes. From my perspective as an
interbehaviorist, however, the setting is merely a
participant in a unique field, and like other par-
ticipants,ithasnospecialroletoplay. Similarity,
from my perspective, the field is timeless.
Evolution of Functions
Finally, why do functions evolve as they do?
Why do they take the course that they do and not
some other course? With regard to the issue of
evolution per se, I can only reply that change is a
categorical concept in interbehavioral psychol-
ogy. Functions are events and events by defini-
tion are processes of change. Hence the answer to
the question of why functions evolve at all is
simply that they do.
As to why they evolve as they do, why they
take the course that they do and not some other
course, our answer must be somewhat more in-
volved, though in principle it amounts to the same
answer. The question might be better framed:
Could things be other than they are? The answer
to this question from an interbehavioral perspec-
tive is no. This does notmean that how things will
be is predictable. Prediction is not a requirement
of the system. It means only that in retrospect
nothing that is not could have been. The situation
might be different, but it could not have been
different than what it was. This is the case
because all things are assumed to be involved in
the same evolution. All things are related to all
other things. Things are the way they are because
they are the end point of the evolution of them-
selves. Had they been different they would be
different. But they weren't different, they were
what they were and, as a result, they are what
they are. In short, functions evolve as they do,
take the course that they do, because they take
the course that they do.
Summary and Conclusions
By way of summary, I have argued that it is
only when psychological events are localized in
organisms that learning is held to be something
an organism does and as such must be accounted
for in terms descriptive of the oprganism's opera-
tion -- in biological or physiological terms, for
example, or in those of comupter science.
likewise, it is only when the past is conceptu-
alized as existing independently of the present
that past events can be claimed causally respon-
sible for present events. It is thinking of this sort
that requires the specification of a means by
which the past may be brought to the present -
that means being the organism.
In contrast to these views is the position of the
interbehaviorist. From this standpoint, psycho-
logical events are conceptualized as evolving func-
tions, without substantive structure, occurring in
a context from which they cannot be torn. Andin
as much as the context and history of a
psychologicalevent participate hi that event as
that event, there is nothing apart from the event
to which may be attributed its occurrence.
Learning and memory are psychological
events of this sort. They need no explanation -
their analysis needs.no reference to motivation,
or reinforcement, or any other explanatory con-
struction. They just are. They just are evolving
functions.. The fact of their evolution also just is.
And the course of then4 evolution could not be
other than it is. It just is.
, References
Kantor, J. R. & Smith N. M. (1975) The science of
psychology; An interbehavioral survey. Chi-
cago; The Principia Press.
Kantor, J. R. (1924-26) Principles of psychology,
Vol. 1 & 2. Granville, OH: The Principia
Press.
Kantor, J. R. (1959) Interbehavioral psychology.
Chicago: The Principia Press.
Skinner, B. F. (1971) Beyond freedom and dig-
- nity. New York: Bantam/Vintage.
Skinner, B. F. (1974)A6ow behaviorism. New
York: Knopf.
Skinner, B. F. (1981) Selection by consequences.
Science, 213, 501-504.
Author's Notes
An earlier version of this paper was presented
at the Association for Behavior Analysis, Nash-
ville, May, 1990. For reprints, write to the author
at the Psychology Department, University of Ne-
vada, Reno, NV 89557.

Regina Lipkens
University of Nevada
The question whether there is a real inde-
pendent world and whether we can know it has
been asked by philosophers throughout the
ages. Another question closely related to the
first one is whether our beliefs of the world can
correspond to the actual world. In the first
section of this paper, the doctrines of idealism
and of realism are described. Then, we discuss
Kantor's position on these issues. In the second
section, the two traditional theories of truth,
the correspondence theory and the coherence
theory are presented. Next, we describe a third
theory of truth, the impure coherence theory,
that was constructed to avoid the problems
inherent in the correspondence and coherence
theories. Finally, we discuss the nature of truth
in Kantor's interbehavioral philosophy.
Idealism
Idealism in its philosophical sense, as op-
posed to naturalism, is the view that mind and
spiritual values are fundamental in the world
as a whole (Acton, 1967, p. 110). Naturalism is
the view that mind and spiritual values have
emerged from or arer educible to material things
and processes (Acton, 1967, p. 110). In another
sense, philosophical idealism is opposed to real-
ism and is the denial of the common-sense
realist view that material things exist indepen-
dently of being perceived (Acton, 1967, p. 110).
It is thus possible to hold a naturalistic and an
antirealistic position or to be an antinaturalist
and a realist. More often, however, arguments '
against common-sense realism have been used
in order to establish an antinaturalistic posi-
tion. In this paper, the terra idealism is used as
opposed to realism. We use the term
antinaturalist to indicate the idealistic position
!as opposed to naturalism in order, to avoid
confusing between the two meanings of ideal-
ism.
Two arguments that are very prominent in
13
idealist theories are the metaphysical and the
epistemological arguments for immaterialism.
Immaterialism is the name given by Berkeley
to the thesis that there is no such thing as
material substance (Acton, 1967, p. 111). The
metaphysical argument states that it is impos-
sible that matter can be independently real;
nothing can exist apart from mind, since if we
try to think of something existing un thought of
we have to think of it (Acton, 1967, pp. 112,
117). Berkeley's argument "esse est percipi"
expressing that the colors, shapes, and sounds
that are taken to belong to independently exist-
ing material objects are in fact sensible quali-
ties that cannot exist apart from being per-
ceived is called the epistemological argument
for immaterialism.
In idealism, epistemologically, the known is
absorbed in the knowing o&the knower and
metaphysically, the material is absorbed in the
spiritual for the antinaturalist or the real world
of obj ects and events is absorbed in the actions
of the organism for the naturalist. In a weaker
sense of idealism, it is the thesis not that minds
create the world or that there is no world but
that the character of things are determined by
the mind logically not causally (Walker, 1989,
pp. 38-39). In this sense, there is a known but
its character is logically determined by the
knowing of the knower. There is a world but its
nature depends entirely upon mind.
Realism
In modern philosophy realism is the view
that material objects exist externally to us and
independently of our sense experience (Hirst,
1967, p. 77). Realism is thus opposed to ideal-
ism, which holds that no such material objects
or external realities exist apart from our knowl-
edge or consciousness of them (Hirst, 1967, p.
77). Realist philosophers object to idealism
because idealists fail to distinguishbetween the
14
act of perceiving and knowing and the object of
the act. In realism, epistemologically, the known
exists independently of the knower and meta-
physically, the material world exists indepen-
dently of the mind for the antinaturalist and the
real world of things and events exists indepen-
dently of the organism for the naturalist.
Direct realism is the view that perception is
a direct straightforward confrontation or con-
tact with the external'object (Hirst, 1967, p. 80).
In contrast, indirect or dualist realism claims
thatperceptionis primarily of mental represen-
tations of the external object or that our percep-
tion of the external objectis by means of private,
mental sensa (Hirst, 1967, p. 78). Indirect
realists distinguish between external material
objects as the causes and ultimate objects of
perceiving and private sensa which are the
mental effects of brain processes due to the
action of those objects on the sense organs
(Hirst, 1967, p. 80). Many philosophers have
taken the idealist position because of a serious
defect of indirect realism: it is difficult to see
how we can break out of the circle of private
sensa and observe the external objects (Hirst,
1967, p. 81).
lie realist not only believes that there is a
world of objects and events independent of us
but also that when we investigate the nature of
this world, the nature of what we find is inde-
pendent of our cognitive capacities and investi-
gative methods. In other words, our concepts
and investigative methods do not create or
influence the data. The observer remains out-
----- side the things he observes.
Idealism and realism in Ranter's philosophy
On the basis of a historico-context analysis
Kantor concludes that traditional spiritistic
--- philosophy is invalid because it misrepresents
andmystifies scientific work(1981,p. 8). Kantor
argues that in train with traditional dualistic
philosophies come such verbal puzzles or
pseudoproblems as the independence or depen-
dence of things upon knowledge, whether the
mind creates reality, or the existence of an outer
world (1959, pp. 9, 41; 1981, p. 96). Cosmic-
reality problems, traditional ontology and epis-
temology have no place in Kantor's
interbehavioral philosophy (1959, p. 41; 1981,
p. 126).: : : . '
Kantor objects to antinaturalistic philoso-
phies based on mind-body principles because
antinaturalists regard things and events as
creations andprojections of spirit (Kantor, 1981,
p. 6). Kantor objects the position that the soul
is the source of knowledge and that it guaran-
tees all existence. InKantor's words: "Through-
out the entire history of psychology and philoso-
phy including the present, knowledge along
with every other psychological act or process
has been attributed to the mind of the knower.
little if anything in the knowing process has
been credited to the things or events known"
(1981, p. 51). According to Kantor spiritistic
philosophers integrated observers and observed
and they adopted the slogan that the observer
is part of the observed (1981, p. 121).
Kantor's goal is to develop a valid philoso-
phy and avoid the errors of traditional philoso-
phy by holding a naturalistic position and by
assuming that nature comprises of integrated
fields and that valid philosophical propositions
must be built up on the basis of observation of
things and events (1981, pp. 4, 72). From the
standpointof actual things and events spiritistic
substances are reducible to nothing more than
institutional verbiage (Kantor, 1981, p. 6).
The assumption that nature comprises of
integrated fields typifies Kantor's philosophy
as idealistic and realistic. In Kantor's
interbehavioral philosophy and psychology
events occur in fields with responses of organ-
isms in reciprocal action with stimulus objects.
Here, Kantor's position is idealistic and realis-
tic: the sources oftheinteractionaretobefound
in the organism as well as in the stimulus
objects.
However, the assumption that valid philo-
sophical propositions must be built up on the
basis of observation of things and events char-
acterizes Kantor's philosophy as more realistic
than idealistic. Kantor is especially concerned
not to unite the observed with the observer or to
have the observer create the observed, as the
following quotations indicate: "Specifically valid
psychology will dictate a strict differentiation
between stimuli, that is, objects and events
confronted with, and theresponses toward those
things" (Kantor, 1981, p. 98, 1981).-And, u_ .
Colors, as well as all other properties, charac-

teristics,andrelationshipsoughttoberegarded
as existing and confrontable things. ... In no
way does the individual who reacts to stimulus
objects create them" (Kantor, p. 123,1981).
Kantor argues that characteristics andprop-
erties of events are originally autonomous and
independent of the investigator (1959, p. 99).
The basic goal of scientific workis to obtain light
on these characteristics of natural events. This
excludes any assumption thatprocedures, mea-
surements and recordings determine the prop-
erties of things investigated (Kantor, 1959, p.
99). To do so he has to make a move from a field
approach with symmetrical stimulus and re-
sponse functions to a field structure in which
the stimulus obj ects seem to be dominant source
in the interactions. He does this by making the
folio wing assumptions. First, although philoso-
phers are subject to ideological influences, they
are able to free themselves from traditional
invalid philosophies. Secondly, by means of
proper methods the treatment of refined data
which showadependency upon the investigator's
attitudes and manipulation as well as the traits
imposed by his apparatus, do not depart radi-
cally from the original events and the basic
research motive of discovering their character-
istics (Kantor, 1959, p. 99).
To summarize Ranter's position on the is-
sue of idealism and realism, it seems to me that
Kantor wants to avoid idealism as opposed to
naturalism by holding a realist position. He
thus opposes the idealist or antirealist position
that mind creates the world and the absorption
of the known by the spiritual knower. He holds
adirectrealistpositionthatseparatestheknown
from the knower, the stimulus objects and events
from the organism. His position is also idealis-
ticinthesensethatbesides the stimulus objects
the organism is the source of responses func-
tions in the interactions. He gives the known
and the knower an equal function in the act of
knowing.
Thus Kantor emphasizes realism to avoid
antinaturalism. Maybe Kantor confuses ideal-
ism as opposed to naturalism with idealism as
opposed to realism. Most antinaturalists are
antirealist but one does not entail the other
(Acton, 1967, p. 77). Being realist does not
secure your position as naturalist. You can be
15
an antinatural realist or a natural realist. What
Kantor opposes is being an antinatural
antirealist.
Correspondence Theory of Truth
The correspondence theory is one of the two
traditional theories of truth, the other being the
coherence theory. The correspondence theory of
truth states that truth consists in some form of
correspondence between a proposition and the
real world whose nature and existence are quite
independent of what may be believed about it
(Walker, 1989, p. 2). This theory is thus based
on a realistic assumption.
Realist argue that the existence of a man,
for instance, implies the truth of the statement
in which we assert his existence. But the truth
of the statement is in no way the cause of his
existence; for we call the statement true or false
according as he exist or not. Our statements are
matched to the world, the world is not matched
to our statements. The truth-value of a state-
ment is something that it possesses indepen-
dently of our actual capacity to decide what that
truth-value is (Walker, 1989, p. 19).
The correspondence theory has one main
problem: it is hard to see how we could ever lay
a belief against an independent world and de-
termine its truth that way (Walker, 1989, p. 9).
What is open to controversy is how we construe
the correspondence relation (Walker, 1989, p.
3).
Coherence Theory of Truth
According to the coherence theory of truth,
to say that a statement (usually called a judg-
ment or belief) is true or false is to say that it
coheres or fails to cohere with a system of other
statements (Walker, 1989, p. 2; White, p. 130).
This theory has close historical links with ideal-
ism.
Opinions differ about what is to be meant by
coherence. It has been taken to be simply con-
sistency with the basic principles of the system,
but in general the system will itself determine
what coherence with it amoitnts to (Walker,
1989, pp. 4-5).
The appeal of the coherence theory is that it
offers to obliterate the problem of how our
beliefs can correspond to the world. Coherence
theorists argue that no intelligible account can
be given of the correspondence Delation (Walker,
16
1989, p. 21). "What singles out any one relation
R as 'the' relation of reference?" has no answer
(Putnam,-p. 2O6, 1988).
Coherence theorists also obj ect to the notion
of correspondence theory that facts are inde-
pendent of our beliefs about them, as explained
by Putnam: " Iobjects are,' at least when you
get small enough, or large enough, or theoreti-
cal enough, theory-dependent, then the whole
idea of truth as being defined or explained in
terms of a 'correspondence' between items in a
language and items in a fixed theory-indepen-
dent reality, has to be given up" (1988, p.
,209). The main strand of this argument of the
coherence theory has to do with classification.
It is the denial that there are objective similari-
ties among things, independently of the way we
classify them (Walker, 1989, p. 15). If there
were such obj ective similarities, there is no way
in which we could know about them, since we
can be aware of things only by applying con-
cepts to them and hence by classifying them
(Walker, 1989, p. 17). However, stating that
the nature of this objective reality is deter-
mined by the coherent system of beliefs is not
saying that the system of beliefs create the
world.
Thus,trutb. cannot be amatter of correspon-
dence with independent reality, and there would
seem nothing else for it to be than some kind of
internal coherence amongst our beliefs (Walker,
1989, p. 16). Some coherence theorists think of
this set of truth as a determinate totality but
others argue that what can be recognized as
i-s true is indeterminate and open-ended.
Impure Coherence Theory
Some philosophers claim that no pure co-
herence theory can be satisfactory (Walker,
1989,p.210). Theirfirstcriticismisthatitisnot
rL
wholly up to us how we classify. They do not
agree that there is nothing save the practice of
the community to make one classification right
or wrong (Walker, 1989, p. 166).
Their second criticism is that the coherence
theory cannot take into account the facts of
experience: the theory cannot give an account
what is it for a proposition to be believed (a belief
is always a belief about some state of affairs
that lies outside the making of the belief)
(Walker, 1989, pp. 168,177).
Their third criticism is that at least some
beliefs must play a foundational role in the
system. This is what the coherence theorist
denies. To know that a particular belief is
justifiedis to know that it coheres with the other
beliefs of the system, which must be justified
themselves by coherence with the beliefs of the
system and so on. In order to be able to do so,
we must take at least,for granted a certain
amount ofbeliefs with foundational status which
canbeusedtojustifytherest(Walker, 1989, pp.
179-183).
The impure coherence theorists try to- es-
cape these objections to the pure coherence
theory by combining coherence with correspon-
dence (Walker, 1989, p.. 6). The impure coher-
ence theory offers a correspondence account of
the truth of statements about our experiences,
but a coherence account of the truth of more
theoretical statements which we construct on
the basis of them (Walker, 1989, p. 6).
The impure coherence theory obliterates
the three problems of the pure theory. It is no
longer wholly up to us how we classify. It is
through observation that we make contact with
what is independent real (Walker, 1989, p.
214). Foundational status is assigned to the
class of observation statements for which truth
consists in correspondence. These observation
statements determine what the coherent sys-
tem itselfis(Walker, 1989,p.213). Itisbytheir
means that the truth-values of other (theoreti-
cal) statements are assessed (Walker, 1989, p.
173).
The impure coherence theory avoids the
problems of the pure coherence theory but can-
not avoid the main problem of the correspon-
dence theory, namely, how can the observation
statements correspond to the way things are?
There are several ways to solve this problem.
First, it is possible to hold he belief that the
beliefs are true of the world as a matter of pure
accident despite the lack of any explanation
why our beliefs and the world should match
(Walker, 1989, p. 222). Another solution would
be to assume that the correspondence is guar-
anteed by the goodness of God (Walker, 1989,
pp. 222-223). A third possibility is that the
correspondence is theresultofevolution(Walker,
1989, p. 223). What is needed is not simply a

causal account butan account why beliefs should
match the world(Walker,1989,p.224). But the
evolutionary account says almost nothing about
this. It is hard to see what theories have to do
with survival as we look at the many nonhuman
animals that survive (Walker, 1989, pp. 224-
225). The only way out seems to be to hold the
position that these principles of correspondence
work for us now. But this does not assure that
it will keep working any time in the future.
The impure coherence theory provides a
third alternative as a theory of truth. The
system of beliefs is neither read off from the
world as the correspondence theorist says, nor
read into it as the coherence theorist argues. It
combines a realist and an idealist position.
Coherence and Correspondence in
Kantor's Philosophy
Ranter's philosophy can be typified as an
impure coherence theory. According to Kantor,
the actually encountered things and events
should be the starting point for all valid specu-
lation in a scientific valid philosophy (1981, pp.
4-11). According to Kantor, "While construc-
tions are very different from the things ob-
served, experimented up on, or speculated about,
they must in the/maZ [emphasis mine] analysis
be derived from those things" (1981, p. 10).
Kantor does not hold the position of a corre-
spondence theorist that all our statements
should be directly derivedfrom the actual world,
as seen in the following: "At any rate, they
[interpretive constructions] point directly and
immediately to the constructing individual and
less directly to the events being described^or
explained" (Kantor, 1959, p. 138). He also does
not hold the position of a pure coherence theo-
rist that our statements cannot correspond to
the actual independent world but that they all
must cohere with each other to be valid. Kantor's
view is that of an impure coherence theorist: he
assigns foundational status to observation state-
ments.
How does Kantor deal with the correspon-
dence problem? Kantor emphasizes the distinc-
tion between constructions and the things ob-
served. What is his account of the relation
between them? Although Kantor argues that
constructions are very different from the things
observed, he postulates that there is a continu-
17
ity between scientific constructions and the
original crude events (1959, pp. 88-89; 1981, p.
10). "Proposition 7. Postulate 6. Event-con-
struct continuity. Psychological constructions
are continuous with crude-data events" (Kantor,
1959, p. 88).
Whenever the scientist studies an original
crude event, he endows it with properties addi-
tional to those it originally possesses and it
becomes a refined event (Kantor, 1959, p. 80).
But a close parallel between crude and refined
data can be brought about by means of rigid
statistical controls, care with scales, use of
proper origins and coordinates, etc. (Kantor,
1959, pp. 99-100). When you assume that
the psychological events consist of
interbehavioral fields, it is difficult to accept the
argument that refined data can closely parallel
preanalytic crude data as Kantor does. Kantor
seems to say that we should try with proper
methods to observe and describe the actual
things and events as purely as possible, i.e.,
without influence from a priori categories. The
problem is how can we know when our refined
data parallel the crude data? Kantor would
answer that refined data that parallel crude
data will lead to effective orientation with re-
spect to things and events and will lead to
prediction and control which will confirm the
procedures and applications (Kantor, 1959, p.
102).
Kantor further argues that his continuity is
also designated to emphasize that whenever it
is necessary to build upon prior constructions
suchbuildingmustbe carefullycontrolled(1959,
p. 89). He stresses the point that the events
themselves are not constructs; "The fact that
the scientist constructs abstractions, descrip-
tions, and laws concerning events is not be
confused with the belief that the events them-
selves are constructs" (Kantor, 1959, p. 89).
Here, Kantor makes clear his objection to a
pure coherence theory. He wants to avoid
spiritistic theories without any reference to the
actual real world and which absorb the known
into the knower. But the problem with Kan tor's
argument that constructions differ from the
actual things observed is that in his
interbehavioral psychology there is no distinc-
tion possible between descriptive and interpre-
18

tative constructs and the events themselves
because you cannot interact with the events
without observing, describing, interpreting them
and vice versa you cannot observe, describe,
interpret, or construct without interacting with
the events. Your history is always a participant
in the interaction and pure observation or de-
scription is not possible. Naming and categoriz-
ing the world is always based upon the organ-
ism, its history, the context and the stimulus
objects. In Kan tor's philosophy, the known and
the knower equally participate in the knowing,
.-To conclude Kantor's position on coherence
and correspondence, his interbehavioral phi-
losophy can be typified a an impure coherence
theory that gives foundational status to obser-
vation statements. Kantor tries to give an
intelligible account of the correspondence rela-
tion between beliefs and the real world. How-
ever, some criticisms remain as to how this
account .of the correspondence relation can be
possible in an interbehavioral philosophy
Conclusion
We discuss ed Kantor's position on the issues
of idealism, realism and the nature of truth in
his philosophical system. We came to the con-
clusion that Kantor's interbehavioral philoso-
phy can be characterized as both idealistic and
realistic but with the emphasis on reah'stic.
The impure coherence theory of truth de-
fines the nature of true statements in Kantor's
theoretical system. His. philosophy offers a
correspondence account of the truth of observa-
tion statements but a coherence account of the
truth of theoretical statements which are con-
structed on the basis of the observation state-
ments.
References
Acton, H, B. (1967), Idealism. In P. Edwards
(Ed.), The encyclopdia of philosophy, Vol.
IV; pi). 110-118. New York: Macmillan;'
Hirst, R. J. (1967). Realism. In P. Edwards
. (Ed.), The encyclopedia of philosophy, Vol.
VII, pp. 77-83. New York: Macmillan.
Kantor, J, R. (1959). Interbehavioral Psychol-
ogy. Granville, OH: The Principia Press.
Kantor, J. R. (1981). Interbehavioral Philoso-
phy. Chicago: The Principia Press.
Prior, A. N. (1967). Correspondence theory of
truth. In P. Edwards, (Ed.), The encyclope-
dia of philosophy,Vol. II, pp. 223-232. New
York: Macmillan.
Putnam, H. (1988). The realist picture and the
idealist picture. InV, Cauchy(Ed,),P/u7oso-
phy and culture: Proceedings oftheXVUth
world congress of philosophy, Vol. I, pp, 207-
210. Montreal, Canada: Montmorency.
Walker, R. C. S. (1989). The coherence theory of
truth:Realism, anti-realism, idealism. Lon-
don: Routledge.
White, A. R. Coherence theory of truth. In P.
Edwards, (Ed.), The encyclopedia of philoso-
phy, Vol. II, pp. 130-133. New York:
Macmillan.
Author's Notes
For reprints, write to the author at the Psychol-
ogy Department, University of Nevada, Reno,
NV 89557.

Proposition 7. Dependency Relations are Strictly Operational.

Psychologists frequently use a dependence formula - R = f(s) -- in which emphasis
is:i placed upon the responses of organisms as the dependent variables, while
stimulus objects are regarded as the independent variables. These relations are
only operationally justified. Such assumptions are not valid except hi specific
investigational circumstances and do not imply that the events are structured on
suchabasis. R = Ks) is therefore a pragmatic device. The same thing is true when
the range of independent variables is enlarged to include factors beyond the
stimulus - for example, conditions of the organism, number of stimulus
presentations, and time factors.

Kantor (1958, pp. 89-90).

Interbehavioral Psychology.
 19

A Joint Newsletter with Allies?

Noel W. Smith
State University of New York-PIattsburg
In the Newsletter, numbers 2-3, 1990, the
editor notes the decline in subscribers as well as
the lack of any indication that interbehavioral
psychology can grow. She suggests the possibil-
ity of strengthening our position by a joint
newsletter with "allied collectivities" as "an
archival forum". I will advance one suggestion
along that line but only as a point to be debated,
not as one I necessarily advocate. I will do so by
way of a description of a conference.
At the Fifth Annual Meeting of the Cheiron
Society in 1973 (at Plattsburgh) I organized a
symposium called "Contextual Interactionists".
Clarence Shute spoke on Aristotle, Whitehead,
and Buber; David Miller onMead; Rollo Handy
on Dewey and Bentley; and Paul Fuller on
Skinner and Kantor. Parker Lichtenstein was
the discussant. (The proceedings of the sympo-
sium were published in The Psychological
Record, 1973, 23, 281-334.)
Without endorsing the principals in these
papers or their followers as necessarily being
satisfactory allies, I will suggest that a newslet-
ter by the title of "Contextual Interactionists"
might provide the scope that would permit a
selection of allies to combine efforts to address
some common issues and to debate or clarify
others. We would not expect to be in agreement
on all points but only have enough in common
that a joint effort toward that commonality
would be worthwhile. One section of the News-
letter could be set aside for the exclusive use of
each party, as, for example, "The
Interbehaviorists."
It would take a lot of discussion to decide on
who constitutes "contextual Interactionists,"
and once decided we might or might not be able
to persuade them to participate. And some
might want other participants that we would
not. Some prospective participants might like
the proposition but dislike the title. I am sure
still other problems would occur. The road
would almost surely be bumpy. Whether it
would be worthwhile we need to ponder.
Now that Linda has made the suggestion; I
hope others will join in to discuss it.

A Naturalistic Analysis of Transcendence

Kelly G.Wilson
University of Nevada

Editor's Note: Kantor again and again dismisses religious

The following commentary emerged in the
context of a behavior theory and philosophy
seminar at the University of Nevada, Reno.
Students were required to write brief weekly
commentaries on issues addressed in the read-
ings and class discussions. The following is one
such commentary. The particular question ad-
dressed was:
Kantor rejects all notions of transcendent
reality. Is there a naturalistic way of under-
standing transcendence, and can some religious
talk be understood through that elaboration?
talk as having no referent in the world of things
and events'. - Transcendent reality is seen as
being purely the'invention of religious people.
From some religious perspectives, engagement
with religrtius .text and teachings, along with
' contemplation and participation in prayer and
other devotional activities can bring one into
contact with a reality which transcends ordi-
nary reality. Contact with this transcendent
reality is then 'said to shape the subsequent
activities of the devotee. Kantor attributes this
sort of religious activity to "systems of defense
against the evils of human existence both cos-
mic and cultural" (1981, p. 281). The artifacts
20
of these defenses are autistic verhal formula-
tions such as heavens, gods, transcendent reali-
ties, and so on.
,:. From ^.monistic, perspective, reference to
another reality is problematic. This is only so,
however, if there is an ontological commitment
?to anotherreality (i.e. two realities, one of which
exists apart from observing and otherwise in-
teracting organisms). If, however, the worlds or
realities we are speaking of are psychologically
construed, more than one ceases to be problem-
atic. Furthermore, verbal behavior can be
understood as making such transcendent reali-
ties possible.
For nonverbal animals the world is mean-
ingful (i.e. has the stimulus functions that it
has) by virtue of that organism's direct interac-
tional history with respect to environing events.
Verbal organisms not only have tneir direct
interactional history, they additionally engage
in verbally constructing their world. As result
of this verbal construction, the world which is
then psychologically present for them is in fact
a different world (from a psychological perspec-
tive) from the world of their direct interactional
history. The stimulus equivalence literature
contains numerous examples of transfer of
stimulus functions across members of a class of
disparate stimulating events without any his-
tory of direct training.
Understanding the religiously generated
experience of transcendence, one need only
understand that reality as constructed as a
result of a history of interacting with religious
materials and devotional activities is a different
reality (psychologically) than reality before such
interactions. Transcendent experience goes
beyond, in that the environing events can be
understood according to the world as construed
before, as well in terms of the world as con-
strued after, the religious experience. There
are now two realities (psychologically) with the
latter being necessarily more or beyond the
former. This is so, in the sense that the context
within which a particular behavioral act is
understood is enlarged in the latter transcen-
dent case. (That is, events in it have more
stimulus functions).
A biblical example may serve to illustrate
my point. In the synoptic gospel Mark, Jesus'
experience in the garden at Gethsemane is
described, He knows that he is about to be
betrayed and arrested. He come to the garden
to pray. The text describes him as being "sor-
rowful .to the point of .death" (The Jerusalem
Style, 1967, p.; 66). He throws himself to the
ground and asks of God, "that if it were possible,
this hour might pass him by? (The Jerusalem
Bible, 1967, p. 66). Ultimately though, he
knows that.he is participating in a larger his-
tory of human salvation,- -Rather than succumb
to the immediate contingencies and escape, he
elects to stay-in light of the broader context.
Devotees of this religion interact with this ma-
terial and assess their current Ijfe circumstances'
in light of this story as metaphorically related to
their own presentsituation. The text calls them
to assess which ways they are about to respond
to immediate contingencies, rather than con-
sider the broader implications of a given act.
They come to see each act as a recapitulation of
this participation in a salvation history both
personal and on the broader human scale. Now
they respond to the act not only in its original
historical and current context, but also in the
context of their personal participation in a his-
tory of salvation (the later being a verbally
constructed context). The prior context is thus
transcended in the sense that the act in context
is considered in a broader context.
This notion of transcendence does not ap-
peal to other worlds or realities (ontologically),
and thus does not violate any monistic premise.
Additionally, it appeals only to observable things
and events as explanatory, which presumably
meets the requirements of a naturalistic analy-
sis. ,:...'
References
Kantor, J. R. (1967). Interbehavioral psychol-
ogy. Granville, Ohio: Principia Press.
Kanto'r, J. R. (1981). Interbehavioral philoso-
phy, Chicago: Principia Press.
The Jerusalem Bible: Reader's edition. (1967).
Garden City, New York: Doubleday.

Feeling Reactions in Interbahavioral Psychology
Harry C. Mahan
Recently, I acquired a newly published col-
lection of papers by B. F. Skinner (1989), the
first chapter of which is entitled "The Place of
Feelings in the Analysis of Behavior". I have
now read this paper several times in an attempt
to broaden my understanding of this important
topic, but I regret to say that the result has been
somewhat disappointing. In the present com-
mentary, I shall refrainfromcriticizing Skinner's
paper, but shall, instead, call attention to the
more carefully organized and thorough
interbehavioral treatment of feelings offered by
Kantor (1924). Like Skinner, Kantor consid-
ered human behavior, including feelings, from
a position of non-mentalistic objectivity. This
means that feelings are events, or, more pre-
cisely, aspects or characteristics of events that
occur in time and space the very nature of
which demands that they be described and
analyzed by psychologists as well as by physi-
ologists and biochemists.
The first thing that is necessary for a truly
objective psychology of feelings is to define what
is meant by a "feeling interaction". This is not
as difficult, as most psychologists make it out to
be when they attempt to develop their analysis
on the basis of classical mind-body assump-
tions. What is needed is an unencumbered,
purely observational approach to a human indi-
vidual (a person) interacting with his or her
contextual surroundings, both physical and
social. In all instances, it is the behavior of the
individual in the total situation that is impor-
tant for psychology.
The first thing that must be done in an
interbehavioral analysis of feeling is to distin-
guish such reactions from other types of psycho-
logical activity. As a total class, they are best
referred to as affective interactions in that they
do not, in themselves, act upon their stimulat-
ing agents. In affective interactions, it is the
reacting individual who is acted upon, although
he or she is certainly not passive in the process.
Affective interactions are definitely adaptive
and are more primitive and basic than are a
21
person's more scientifically amenable cognitive
reactions. In contrast, affective reactions pro-
vide never-ending subject matter for drama,
literature, and the daily news.
In the interbehavioral analysis, the ele-
ments of affective interactions should first be
compared to those of non-affective behavior.
This may be done through the use of an eight-
point scale that ignores differences between
different affective reactions and between differ-
ent reactions of a non-affective nature. This
scale, which is described in detail elsewhere
(Kantor, 1924;Mahan, 1968),includes discrimi-
nation, attention, changes in visceral mecha-
nisms, stimulation by objects and persons, glan-
dular functioning, involvement of the sympa-
thetic division of the autonomic nervous sys-
tem, involvement of the limbic system and the
thalamus andhypothalamus ofthe centralner-
vous system, and relative activity of the skel-
etal and smooth musculature.
A particularly important consideration in
the analysis of affective (feeling) interactions is
their position and functioning within complex
interactions. Most, but certainly not all, adap-
tive interactions have an affective aspect, the
prominence of which will differ in some degree
withthecircumstances. The affective aspects of
complex interactions are present in an infinite
variety of types, the most recognizable of which
have been given common names. Such names
have become established to fill a vital commu-
nicative need and they have had considerable
influence upon conceptualization of affective
interactions. Various classification systems for
affective interactions have been attempted, that
devised by Kantor (1924) having included very
useful major categories.
One of the outstanding characteristics of
affective interactions is their susceptibility to
conditioning. This sensitivity results not only
in a variety of problems, but also in presenting
a challenge to therapists who utilize behavioral
techniques. Such techniques are now being
widely applied in a variety of situations (includ-
ing disasters) and their use is bringing more.
and more favorable attention to behavioral
psychology as a specialized profession. . : ,
l
< As the purpose of my commentary is only to
call attention'to the important contribution
that interbehavioral psychology has made to an
: understanding of Affective (feeling) interactions,
I will simply conclude by pointing out some of
the important aspects have not been touched
upon above. These include individual differ-
ences in such reactions and the formation and
changing of affective habit patterns, including
their duration over long periods of time, their
presence and transmission as cultural charac-
teristics, and their pathology in a variety of
forms.
Readers who are further interested in this
important topic should turn to chapter XII of
Ranter's (1924) Principles of Psychology for 40
pages of thorough coverage. This is also avail-
able in a 15 page synopsis (see Mahan, 1968).
Students of behavior who are unfamiliar with
the interactional approach to feeling interac-
tions may be pleasantly surprised. And, behav-
ior therapists, esp ecially, will be presented with
a better understanding of .the principles upon
which their technical approach has, knowingly
or unknowingly, been painstakingly established.
; References
Kantor, J. R. (1924). Principles of Psychology
(Vol I). Chicago: Principia Press.
Mahan, H.C. (1968). Theinteractionalpsychol-
ogy of J. R, Kantor: An introduction.
Lawrence, KS: The Interbehaviorist.
Skinner, B. F. (1989), Recent issues in the analy-
sis of behavior. Columbus, OH; Merrill.

Kantor on Operational and Explanatory Laws

The distinction between operational and explanatory laws possibly applies more to psychology than
to physics of chemistry. In the latter sciences the entire distinction between description and
explanation frequently breaks down becuase the worker's operations yield all the information
obtainable concerning the essential character of certain events. Such physical laws as that of the lever,
Hooke's law of elasticity, and the law of the freely falling body illustrate this point.
Operational laws generally yield correlational propositions which formulate correspondences
between factorsin event fields, such as the balencing of 1's and w's in the lever situation. The fact,
however, that one may select and emphasize certain factors when manipulating them has led to the
notion of dependency laws. From the proposition PV = K one may assert that P = K/V.
Dependency Laws in Psychology. Psychologists have often attempted to repudiate correlational
laws in favor of dependency, on the questionable ground that functional equations are relatively more
basic. Coupling this belief with the psychological tradition, psychologists have developed a strong
conviction that responses are dependent varibales are are what they are because of stimulus and
environmental conditions. In this situation the employment of R= f(s) for y=f(s) constitutes a flagrant
example of substituting descriptions and symbolic presentations for original events.
; i : s ; ,The:above mathematical expressiontakenby itself really indicates only a correlation between two
variables. Its importance in science lies in the fact that no description of any event can be made with
less than two terms. But even in Boyle's law one can put volume or pressure as the emphasized or
"dependent" variable. In psychological situations nothing-is easier to demonstrate than that the
stimuli are as dependent upon responses as responses on stimuli. To disregard the mutuality of
occurrence is to slip into the objectionable causal way of thinking.
An important suggestion here is to distinguish between variables - the special relations of a
mathematical system - and event factors, which are usually, if not always, entirely different things.

Kantor (1958, pp, 95-96).

Interbehauioral Psychology
 Number 2

Linda J. Hayes, University of Nevada

The Agora
Noel W. Smith, Vols 1-7 (1970-1978)
Ronald G. Heyduk, Vols 8-11 (1978-1983) Conference announcements 3
Edward K. Morris, Vols 12-17 (1983-1989) That little extra 3
E-mail addresses 3
ADVISORY BOARD Interbehaviorists in ABA 3
Sidney W. Bijou, University of Arizona Noel W. Smith. Meeting Recounted ..4
Donna M. Cone, State of Rhode Island
Dennis J. TtelpratojEasternMichigan Univ. Articles
Patrick Ghezzd, University of Arizona
Sandy Hobbs, Paisley College of Technology Harry C. Mahan. Seventy years of the
Scotland interbehavioral approach to nature-
Edward K. Morris, University of Kansas nurture 5
Paul T. Mountjoy, Western Michigan Univ.
N. H. Pronko, Wichita State University Thomas L. Sharpe. Interbehavior: A
Roger D. Ray, Rollins College teacher education perspective .9
Emilio Ribes, University of Guadalajara,
Mexico Comments
Robert G. Wahler, University of Tennessee
Dennis J. Delprato. Brief commentary on
MANAGING EDITOR Lipkens' "Idealism, Realism, Coher
Steven C. Hayes, University of Nevada ence and Correspondence in Kantor's
Interbehavioral philosophy" 18
ASSISTANT EDITORS
Debra W. Fredericks, Kenneth Huntley,
Barbara S. Kohlenberg, Regina Lipkens,
DuaneC. Lord, David G. Stroffe, Mark A.
Swain, University of Nevada

ISSN 8755-612X
 A Newsletter of Principia Press's currently available titles
Inter behavioral Psychology in interbehavioral psychology, allbyJ.R. Kantor,
ISSN 8755-612X are listed below. Check your bookshelves, and
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taining to interbehavioral psychology a con-
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ers, news and observations about interbehav- and Other Sciences $20.00
ioral psychology and related perspectives, com- Interbehavioral Philosophy $27.50
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more extended book reviews, and brief articles. Tragedy and the Event Continuum $15.00
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CONTEXT PRESS, Box 50172, Reno, NV 89513. CONTEXT let us know about it.
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able.

Association for Behavior Analysis
San Franscico, May 24-28,1992
The 1992 ABA convention will be held at the
Hyatt Regency Hotel. This meeting is a good
opportunity for interbehaviorists to get together
as the program always includes a number of
interbehaviorially oriented presentations and a
fair number of interbehaviorists usuallly attend
the meeting. For further information about reg-
istration andhotelaccomodations, contact: Shery
Chamberlain, ABA, Wood Hall, Western Michi-
gan University, Kalamazoo, MI 49008.
Nevada Conference on the Varieties of
Scientific Contextuaiism
Reno, Nevada, January 3-5,1992
Organizers: Steven Hayes, Linda Hayes,
Hayne Reese & Ted Sarbin
A number of interbehaviorists are participat-
ing in a working conference on contextualistic
positions in psychology. The papers will be pub-
lished in a volume of proceedings by Context
Press. For more information on the conference or
the proceedings, contact Steven Hayes, Psychol-
ogy Department, University ofNevada, Reno, NV
89557,
First International Congress on
Behaviorism and the Sciences of
Behavior
Guadalajara, Mexico, October 5-9,1992
Organizers Emilio Ribes Inesta and Peter
Harzem.
Emilio Ribes has organized a special sympo-
sium on interbehavioral research and practice for
this meeting featuring talks by both English and
Spanish speaking interbehaviorists. The con-
gress also features behavioral work of a theoreti-
cal and philosophical sort. For more information,
contact: Peter Harzem, Psychology Department,
Auburn University, Auburn, AL 36849.
That Little Extra
A number of additional subscribers made
donations beyond their regular subscription fees
for 1991. We thank: Patrick Ghezzi, Linda &
Steve Hayes and James Herrick
E-Mail Addresses
The Interbehaviorist wishes to solicit E-mail
addresses of its subscribers. Some were pub-
lished in the last issue. To that list, we add the
following:
Stephen Brown (this is a correction):
SBROWN@KENTVM
Linda Hayes
HAYES@EQUINOX.UNR.EDU
Meeting Minutes, Atlanta, May 24,1991
Asmall group ofinterbehavioriststookpartin
the annual meeting of Interbehaviorists in
ABAheldat theannual convention ofthe Assotia-
tionfor Behavior Analysis inAtianta. Linda Hayes
chaired the meeting. The following items were
discussed:
1. Election of Officers:
Hayes attempted to recruit a Communica-
tions and Membership chairperson to help build
the membership base. There were no volunteers.
There were no volunteers to serve as the ABA
Program coordinator.
Debra Fredericks agreed toserve as aStudent
Coordinator for the group. She agreed to help
organize an informal discussion among
interbehaviorists at the 1992 convention.
2. ABA Program:
Members agreed that the Interbehavioral
sessions had been well attended. A number of
symposum topics were suggested for 1992 includ-
ing; Private Events, to be chaired by MarkSwain
and Interbehavioral Research Methodology, to be
chaired by Tom Sharpe. Evolution, Ecology and
Linguistics were also mentioned as possible topics
bySidByouandNoelSmith. Linda Hayes agreed
to help Debra Fredericks organize an informal
discussion among the group to follow the annual
meeting.
 Harry C. Mahan
Oceanside, CA
The following paper presents a number of
quotations from various sources covering the
development of the interbehavioral approach to
the heredity-environment controversy since
1921. It was prompted by the Encyclopaedia
Britannica article entitled "Innate Factors in
Human Behavior" by the late behavior geneti-
cist, W. R. Thompson (Thompson, 1986). In the
first paragraph of his article, Thompson makes
the statement that, "One's hereditary endow-
ment (genotype) predisposes one to become
bright or dull, or to be prone to show specific
personality traits fully as much as to be tall or
short, or to have dark or light hair" (p. 718).
Thompson begins, however, by discussing bodily
characteristics and then moves on to geneti-
cally transmitted diseases such as sickle cell
anemia, hemophilia, and enzyme defects, cov-
ering under psychological characteristics sen-
sory limitations in gustation, vision, and audi-
tion.
Itis hoped thatthepresentpaper will clarify
some hitherto confusing differences between
the nature of a psychological event and the
biological equipment, including sensory, physi-
ological, and bio chemical functioning which are
necessary for that event to occur.
One of the first descriptions of the
interbehavioral position relative to he-
redity vs. environment was in 1921
(Kantor, 1921) although reference was
made to an earlier paper which had
appeared the year before (Kantor, 1920).
In the 1921 article Kantor states that:
All complex responses are the operation
of reaction systems gradually evolved
through the integration of simpler
reactions....The first forms of psycho-
logical behavior are very simple acts
organized very gradually in the prena-
tal growth of the organism; these consti-
tute the sole innate reactions of the
organism and according to our way of
thinking furnish a hypothetically inad-
equate basis for the belief in innate
capacities and other fundamental types
of reactions (p. 248).
This statement demonstrates that
interbehavioral psychology is definitely a devel-
opmental psychology and that its subject is
human action as it evolves during the life (both
prenatal and postnatal) of a particular indi-
vidual.
Several pages later in the same article
Kantor emphasizes that he is not an environ-
mentalist by saying:
Let it be understood that one should not
draw the conclusion from our argument
that we are denying the potency of he-
redity in favor of the strength of the
environment. Our argument assumes
that the condition for adjustment is the
presence of both the stimulating object
and the reaction system (pg. 255).
For Kantor the subject matter of psychology
was always the interaction between these two
and for this interaction to take place one is as
necessary as the other. No interaction can be
fully understood without an understanding of
its history.
Three years later Kantor (1924) clarified his
concept of the ways in which biological equip-
ment, which is indeed subject to heredity influ-
ences, can affect behavior. He discusses this as
follows:
Since we are dealing with the actual
individual and his various responses, it
is obvious that the psychological person-
ality has a very definite biological foun-
dation (p. 70)....The biological factors of
personality exert a negative influence
upon its development and operation. A
person of slight stature will not be able
to build up behavior equipment to per-
form certain actions which one ofheavier
 stature will be able to acquire and
perform....Again, an individual who has
defective ear mechanisms should not
attempt to develop musical traits for
which normal organs are requisite; an
individual having color blind retinae
should not attempt to prepare himself
for a career in which the distinction
between hues is a prominent element.
All of these biological factors clearly do
influence personal development and op-
eration but only in a negative way, for
observe that the mere possession of the
anatomical characteristics of an athlete
does not mean that the individual will be
an athlete, but rather that he will not be
(biologically) prevented from being one.
No evidence at all exists which indicates
that a persons particular anatomical or
physiological.makeup determines in any
sense his type of positive development,
his intelligence, skills, capacities, etc. (p.
78).
Two years later in the second volume (1926)
Kantor went oii to discuss the relationship
between the development of behavior capabili-
ties and biological maturation:
On the basis, then, of what kind of
organism we have and its correlation
with certain kinds of psychological phe-
nomena we must consider the stage of
maturity of the organism. Whatever
possibilities originally exist in a certain
organism for the development of psycho-
logical phenomena [behavior capabili-
ties] we find that the specific develop-
ment of its behavior circumstances is
tied up with the individual's stage of
maturation. The immature individual is
unable to do various things which the
mature organism is especially well fit-
ted to perform.
Once more we must give heed to our
psychological defenses [our interbehavior
principles]. The maturation of the or-
ganism must in no sense be thought of as
an actual biological basis for psychologi-
cal phenomena [interaction] whether the
latter be assumed to be mental powers
or processes, or actual responses to
stimuli. Especially must we eschew any
suggestions that psychological phenom-
ena are functions of biological struc-
tures. It is impossible to disregard the
fact that biological variations can only
affect biological conditions....
But all the time we have biological and
psychological activities performed by the same
organism. The more complex psychological
action develops out of less complex psychologi-
cal action. But naturally such developments
must wait upon biological maturation (p. 367).
Shortly after the publication of his Prin-
ciples Kantor (1929) published a volume on
social psychology in which he presented
interbehavior principles for this special field.
One chapter is entitled "The Biological Implica-
tions of Cultural Conduct" (pp. 65-100) andinit
he extends and elaborates the points which he
had covered previously in the references from
which the above quotations have been taken.
There is also one additional point which should
be touched on here since it is in direct disagree-
ment with Freudian instinct theory which has
recently (Cple & Cole, 1989) been cited as
grounds for considering Freud's orientation bio-
logical in nature. Ranter's comments on in-
stinct theories such as Freud's are as follows:
We suggest that we must guard our-
selves vigilantly against thinking that
the limitations provided by complex evo-
lutionary biological development are -
teleological processes and forces which
. are assumed to be responsible for the
existence of specific human reactions.
Even rigid scientists have been guilty of
this intellectual crime. It appears ex-
ceedingly easy to ascribe all sorts of
particular human actions to hypotheti-
cal structures and functions, upon the
presumed analogy of genuine biological
conditions of psychological phenomena.
This type of thinking always goes fur-
ther than merely assuming that biologi-
cal structures and functions account for
psychological conduct in general. It pre-
supposes in addition that specific ac-
tions are actually caused by or founded
uponparticularbiological structures and
their functions.
We recall a notable example of how
behavior possibilities are translated into
 powers or forces of development. We
refer to the theory that once was hailed
as a revelation, namely that man in all
his conditions of behavior is influenced
by two so-called fundamental forces or
biological functions, namely food and
,- -r.-'Sex. .While such ^suggestion bespeaks M,W
an abstractionist philosophy, its insidi-
ous influence lies precisely ia the cir-
cumstance that it may be easily con-
nected with actual facts, namely the
fundamental character of alimentary
and sexual phenomena in biological
events (pp. 71-72).
Actually, the concept of instincts, drives,
and inborn motives is only remotely related to
behavior genetics, but since drive theorists al-
ways tie their forces to biology and to the
species wide presence of such forces it is a
collateral subject worthy of discussion. During
the past three quarters of a century it has been
thought that instincts as governors of human
behavior* had been laid to.rest on several occa^
sions but they seem to creep back under differ-
ent guises (see Maslow, Abraham, 1986) and
with the widespread seductive influence of
Freudian infiltration into mainstream psychol-
ogy, new generations of psychologists fail to be
on guard.
In 1933 Kantor published his introductory
text in general psychology in which he contin-
ued to attempt to convince his readers that he
was not an environmentalist (pp. 74-75). His
argument was weakened, however, by his fail-
ure to include what he had already pointed out
elsewhere, namely, that there are hereditary
biological differences between individuals within
species as well as between species. It remained
for Kuo (1967) to independently develop exactly
the same heredityenvironment position as
Kantor but this time it was made much clearer
than before.
Unlike Kantor, Kuo performed hun-
dreds of experiments on behavior devel-
opment in animals. He was well known
as an animal behaviorist working in
California until the 1920's when he
moved his studies to China and eventu-
ally to Hong Kong, publishing once again
in English in 1967. Although his volume
published then was small, it included
descriptions of his China studies in con-
siderable detail and brought out several
major premises of his theoretical posi-
tion, which, although developed during
observations of animal behavior, applies
as well to humans. With respect to he-
, redity.environment, Kuo's thesis is that
in scientific investigations of behavior
development the concept of neither cat-
egory is acceptable nor can they be made
acceptablebyjoiningthem together. The
subject matter of behavior epigenesis is
behavior and to demonstrate how be-
havior shows it development under con-
cretehistoricalconditions. Thisposition
is almost identical with that of Kantor
except that Kuo goes farther into bio-
logical development. After devoting sev-
eral pages to the castigation of the in-
stinct theory (for which he became very
well known in the 1920's) he turns to the
nature/nurture problem as follows (ref-
erences omitted from quotation):
It must be clear that the concepts of
nature and nurture are equally obso-
lete. Whatever an animal of any species
is capable of doing is natural inasmuch
as it is also a result of nurture. ...Is it not
natural that parrots in the wild utter
only wild noises, but vocalize human
voices when brought up with human
companions? The same Asian song
thrushes can grow up to be eaters of
small birds, but they can also become
friendly or even protective to them. This
has been accomplished without punish-
ment or reward.
In all these studies, it is not our
purpose to determine which behavior is
due to nature and which to nurture, or
show how much to nature and how much
to nurture, but rather to explore the
potentials and limitations in creating
new patterns. Statements like the fol-
lowing: (1) heredity and environment
are both essential and inseparable in
ontogeny, that is, one is complementary
to the other in development, or (2) cer-
tain types of behavior patterns (such as
the calls of parrots or mynahs in the
wild) are natural or instinctive, that is,
 not learned, while other patterns (such
as human vocalizations when parrots or
mynahs are brought into the house) are
acquired, all beg the question and are
beyond experimental verification. They
add nothing to our understanding of the
causes or origin of behavior, and they
close the door to future experimental
investigation. For this reason alone, I
have called the concepts of instinct and
heredity "a finished psychology."
The chief concern of the behavioral
epigeneticist is the problem of develop-
ment. And development is the process of
interaction between the "organism and
its environment, internal as well as ex-
ternal. As Lehrman has clearly stated,
this is not interaction between "heredity
and environment." Let us put the issue
in very plain language. The earnest plea
of the behavior epigeneticist is: Let us
drop bothj&e concepts of nature and
nurture. Give us a zygote and we will
follow up from stage to stage its morpho-
logical chancsfe (cellular, histological, and
gross structures), their physiological (bio-
chemical and biophysical) accompani-
ments, and the zygote's overt move-
ments. All these are integral aspects of
one single event, the interwoven inter-
action through inputs and feedbacks of
the developing organism with its envi-
ronment (pp. 116-117).
The next several pages are devoted to de-
scriptions of experiments which Kuo states
refute the nativist position and the chapter is
concluded with several more pages devoted to a
scathing criticism of behavior genetics and be-
havior geneticists. These criticisms make those
of Kantor on various subjects over a period of
many years appear extremely gracious and
restrained. Their tone is reminiscent of the
early days of behaviorism in the 1920's when
Kuo, Knight Dunlap, and H. M. Johnson were
literary hatchet men for John B. Watson. De-
velopment of the interbehavioral approach to
environment - heredity finally arrived at a p oint
of summarization and conclusion with the ap-
pearance of Kantor and Smith's text, The Sci-
ence of Psychology: An Interbehavioral Survey,
in 1975. This volume contains separate chap-
ters on the relationship of psychology to other
sciencessuch as physics, chemistry and biology.
The chapter on psychology and biology contains
a section entitled "Behavioral Genetics" with
lengthy paragraphs devoted to the problem of
heredity and psychological development and
behavioral genetics. The entire discussion is far
too lengthy to be included here but assurance
can be given that it covers the iaterbehavioral
position with a degree of clarity which is incom-
plete in previous presentations. Although it is
not free from criticizing opposing positions, it is
remarkably restrained which makes its argu-
ment even more effective. It is impossible to
summarize, but two of its sentences can be
quoted to make a major point;
Geneticists know that there is no trans-
mission of traits or characters in biologi-
cal heredity, but only the potentiality
that lies in the fertilized ovum and the
molecular patterns that are contained
in the zygote. While in fact the
unmutated cellular substance of off-
spring continues the species line of the
reproducing organisms, the particular
structures and functions of both the bio-
logical and psychological traits depend
upon the interactional influences of
environing things and events (p. 459).
As one looks back on the 70 years during
which the interbehavioral position relative to
the environment-heredity controversy has been
presented many many times, one wonders
whether this position has, by any chance, gained
general acceptance. Particularly since psycho-
logical sources are unlikely to agree, a neutral
source would seem to be the Encyclopaedia
Britannica, an article from which (but by a
behavior geneticist) got this paper started. This
time we will look under the heading Heredity-
Environment controversy (Vol. 6, p. 870) for an
answer to our question. Here the following is
stated: Though once a heated point among
scientists, it is now generally conceded that the
geneticbackground provides cert am limitations
within which the environment acts to allow
individual expression. Summed up in one short
sentence, this seems to be what the inter-be-
havioral approach has said from the beginning!
Cole,M. & Cole, S. R. (1989). The development
of children. New York: Freeman.
Heredity-Environment Controversy (1986). In
.-, v. Encyclopaedia Britannica (15th ed.) (Vol. 6,
p. 870.) Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica,
Inc.
Kantor, J. R. (1920). A functional interpreta-
tion of human instincts. Psychological Re-
view, 27, 50-72.
Kantor, J. R. (192171971). How do we acquire
our basic reactions? In J. R. Kantor (Ed.).
The aim and progress of psychology and
other sciences. Chicago: Principia Press.
Kantor, J. R. (1924). Principles of psychology,
(Vol. 1). Chicago, Principia Press.
Kantor, J, R. (1926). Principles of psychology,
(Vol. 2). Chicago Principia Press.
Kantor, J. R. (1929). An outline ofsocialpsy-
chology. Chicago: Follett.
Kantor, J. R. (1933). A survey of the science of
psychology. Bloomington, Ind.: Principia
Press.
Kantor, J. R. & Smith, N W. (1975). The science
of psychology: An interbehavioral survey.
Chicago: principia Press.
Kuo, Z-Y. (1967). The dynamics of behavior
development. New York: Random House.
Maslow, A. (1986).
Thompson, W. R. (1986). Innate factors in
human behavior. In Encyclopaedia
Britannica (15th ed.) (Vol. 14, p. 718-723.)
Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc.
10
Interbehavior: A Teacher Education Perspective
All things prepare the event. Watch.
T. S. Eliot (Murder in the Cathedral, p. 183).
A fundamental assumption underlying
interbehavioral, or field systems, work in edu-
cational research is that such tactics are
desireable, and even necessary, in order to
enhance understanding of applied settings in
general, and teaching expertise in particular.
However, to adopt alternatives indiscriminately
is a dangerous practice. No one engaged in any
scientific enterprise can ever be assured that all
alternative forms of research are created equal.
Therefore, it is important to illustrate field
systems implementation tactics, as well as con-
vey epistemological arguement. This is particu-
larly salient in light of the oft sighted criticism
that interbehaviorism and its host of semantic
couterparts, are mearly philosophies in search
of methodology (cf., Midgley, 1988). Such a
commentary has been facilitated by the behav-
ior analysis community's perception of inordi-
nate complexity of a systemic conceptual orien-
tation. Though clearly a specious reproach,
technological ease of implementation must be
presented in a readily understood fashion for
acceptance within the methodological commu-
nity. For only when systemic investigated
tactics are precieved to be feasible, non-aversive,
and of resultant utility will they not be
dismissed as the voice of the cuckoos (cf., Skin-
ner, 1988). Once tactically portrayed, it is
equally important to relate the utility of
interbehavioral research outcomes to the tech-
nology of a particular discipline. By traditional
interpretation, a scientist must necessarily be
judged inpart by the usefulbenefits of empirical
knowledge generated to the culture at large.
Hence, a summary of current research applica-
tions on the preparation of preservice teachers
is in order.
Foundations
To discuss educational field systems tactics
with efficacy, familiarity with the philosophy of
science, the temporal and cohtexual constraints
of the behavior analysis tradition, and the epis-
temological considerations within which
interbehavioral methods have evolved is as-
sumed. These issues should be well understood
to evaluate properly research results produced
thusfar and to illustrate the need for such an
alternative. Bertalanfiy(1972),Delprato(1986),
Ray and Delprato (1989), Sbarpe and Hawkins
(In Press), Smith, Mountjoy, and Ruben (1983),
and Upson and Ray (1984} provide excellent
reference points.
Causation in systemic research is essen-
tially viewed via Cook and Campbell's (1979)
conception, which avoids an essentialist expla-
nation andsettlesforprobingprobabilisticcausal
connections using description as the fundamen-
tal analytic vehicle. This begets the proposition
that all one knows scientifically is gleaned from
sensory experience. Coupled with the judg-
ment that experience tells one that something
is, rather than how or why it is (Hendel, 1963),
gives rise to the possibility that science is very
similar to description rather than the provision
of incontrovertible explanation. A concomitant
proposition upon which educational systems
research stands is that "good" science is one
which is deemed useful, or pragmatic. Espe-
cially germane to educational circles is the
belief that the best scientific theories are those
that offer practical advantages for the teacher
in the classroom (Metzler, 1989).
Toward an Interbehavioral Alternative
Finn (1988), and Shavelson and Berliner
(1988) have emphasized the need for alterna-
tive pedagogy research methodologies which
draw from the advantages of multiple research
perspectives. It could be argued that any lack
of public respect for behavior analytic research

is related to the lack of paradigmatic
communality which functions to limit effective-
ness. Though each particular paradigm often
claims a different philosophical route to author-
ity which is mediated in a different way and
arises from differing sources, each has particu-
lar benefits ;wlueh may *often-complement one
another. Methodological repprochement may
be supported, for example, by the coupling ofan
ecology's ability to uncover subtle influences in
a setting context with a behavior analytic em-
phasis upon organismic relationships, and con-
necting the relationships in time across both
domains (cf,, Schroeder, 1990).
Recommendations
Schutz (1989) has cautioned that strong
advocacy of one particular paradigm could en-
courage researchers to adopt the "have method,
need problem system" (p. 31). Researchers
should stress the need for research question
development prior to framing it within a meth-
odological context. J. R. Kantor (1979) advo-
^cated. that .any science which insists on the
priority of methodology is not yet true science.
That the research question ought to dictate the
method of investigation is perhaps the most
self-evident, yetmostoftenignored, principle of
genuine science.
It is recommended, therefore, that greater
understanding be attained by experimenting
with alternative research strategies. One ap-
proach, an interbehavioral strategy illustrated
by Ray and Delprato (1989) and extended to
educational research by Sharpe and Hawkins
(In Press), may serve to surmount current meth-
odological constraints while leaving their
strengths intact. At the very least, an inductive
field systems perspective may give researchers
a greater methodological comparative base,
providing advocacy for further alternatives.
A Systems Approach
Though a systems orientation may be ex-
tended to many areas of the social sciences, the
instructional setting is used in illustration as it
exemplifies a complex interactive system. The
consensus among mainstream contemporary
pedagogical researchers is that traditional sci-
entific attempts to analyze teaching as a
preplanned or predictive process are difficult
and time consuming undertakings as multiple
11
events come and go with astonishing rapidity
(Jackson, 1968). Morris" conceptualization of
the interbehavioral field: "[that] response form
cannot be identified independently of the other
factors in the behavior segment, and . . . re-
sponse form-response function relationships
exist in wide dynamic variabihty^and multiplic-
ity" (1988, p. 36) eloquently sums the
longstanding dilemma which has plagued peda-
gogy research and consequent teacher educa-
tion.
It is not an easy task to determine just what
comprises successful teaching, for multiple or-
ganismic, contextual, and historical variables
are extant (Ornstein, 1986). Failure to control
accurately for multiple variables and their tem-
poral interaction effects leads to inconsistent
findings anddifficultyinrecommendingbehav-
ioral taxonomies for "good" teaching. Addition-
worKS in sonic sii/usi>ions may
work in others with variable settings, lesson
content, students, and goals. Many believe
teaching, to be so. complex that it is better
evaluated in terms of a single content and
setting. Thus, investigation may be better
focused upon which variables produce optimal
effects within the unique context of a particular
classroom, rather than attempts to determine
which maybe superior in a universally general-
izable sense (Cruickshank, 1976; Johnston,
1988).
Arnold (1987) has advocated a descriptive/
analytic paradigm for its ability to provide a
wealth of detailed, objeciive information. Ex-
haustive descriptive data, he argued, should
make educators more acutely aware of what
they are doing within a particular lesson and
how to change their behavior toward more
optimal instruction for that same lesson in
future.
An interbehavioral strategy seems ideally
suited to provide an exhaustive account of par-
ticular instructional settings. Priorityis placed
upon the interaction and interdependence
among setting and behavioral events in this
form of analysis, rather than the behaviors or
events themselves (Lichtenstein, 1983). Ad-
vantages regarding this approach include: (a) it
provides asystemicorholisticview, allowingfor
representaiton of an entire instructional sys-
12
tern in action and interaction; (b) it deals di-
rectly with temporal locus and extent of ele-
ments tracked; (c) it is predicated upon induc-
tion; and (d) category systems are developed
from setting-specific verbal description provid-
ing an element of objectivity in data-collection
and interpretation.
Strategies and Tactics
Comparison of expert and novice teachers in
discerning instructional effectiveness is well
documented (cf., Berliner, 1986; Metzler, 1989;
Siedentop, 1989). According to Metzier (1989),
research and development models that better
integrate a teacher's experiential history, the
content being taught, the observable context,
behavioral process, and student outcomes within
particular instructional settings are the models
which hold promise for validating and further-
ing pedagogical knowledge. Systemic descrip-
tion and comparison should glean much needed
information in better determining the charac-
teristics of instructional expertise.
In application, an attempt is made via exhaus-
tive verbal description to categorize and track
all environmental stimuli and specific behav-
ioral elements as they actually appear within a
particular classroom setting, as well as provide
an organismic and environmental history which
inherently impact upon that setting. Data are
presented in alternative formats and interpre-
tation is couched in systemic terminology de-
signed to accurately describe the relationships
in time among elements (cf., Ray & Delprato,
1989; Sharpe, 1990; Sharpe & Hawkins, 1990,
in press).
Category System Construction
The historical portion of category system
construction is important from a generality
perspective and in gaining abetter understand-
ing of past environmental and organismic
characterisitcs which impact the current in-
structional situation. The current interaction
portion of the category system is synthesized
from a complete narrative chronology of the
actual investigative setting. As many elements
may overlap or occur simultaneously, mutually
exclusive conceptually related subsystems are
generated, across which many elements may
conceivably ocurr in concert. Though differen-
tial category system elements across studies
may raise a generality concern, many previ-
ously unaccounted for teacher and student be-
havior, and contextual elements may be discov-
ered in this manner, allowing for more accurate
data representation.
Data Presentation
After a category system is temporally col-
lected via the appropriate technology (cf., S&k
Computer Products, Ltd.; Sharpe, Wood, &
Bahls, 1991); data are represented in multiple
formats in providing a systemic characteriza-
tion. First, a summary is used to present
multiple dimensions of all discrete environmen-
tal stimuli and specific behavioral elements.
This step is quite similar to traditional behavior
analytic techniques. However, multiple char-
acteristics of each element are simultaneously
available, allowing for a multi-dimensional el-
emental depiction.
A dual chain temporal matrix is next con-
structed, representing the frequency and rela-
tive probability of all preceding and succeeding
behavior and context elements in a system.
This step comprises the foundation for an
interbehavioral analysis, thus departing from
the traditional lineal mechanics perspective. It
should be noted that given a complete ASCII
data file, this matrix and all further systemic
representations and analyses are generated by
menu driven logical parameters and "push but-
ton" technology.
The matrix thus portrays an initial sense of
elemental relationships in time, or which ele-
ments tend to cluster around other contiguous
elements temporally. Further, this data repre-
sentation relates a sense of the complexity (i.e.,
number of elements necessary for system de-
scription), rhythm (i.e., repetitive or consis-
tency of element pattern occurrence), velocity
(i.e.,frequency of elemental change), and coher-
ence (i.e., predictability of temporal relation-
ships many matrix cells are left unfilled
which could conceivably have occurred and ele-
ments tend to cluster within particular cells
with high frequency) of a particular system.
For example, Figure 1 shows a window of a
complete matrix. It may be discerned that for
this teacher/subject, the relationships among
the seven elements (#12-specific observation,
 13

Succeeding Elements
Aggregate
#12 #17 #19 #21 #24 #26 #31 Probability
#12 16 25 6 2 18 14
.16 . .26 .6 .2 .19 .14 .83
10 25 38 32 11 70 47
.03 .09 .14 .10 .04 .25 .17 .83
9 36 7 18 12 30 41
.04 .18 .04 .09 .06 .15 .21 .77
Preceding #21 2 27 5 10 24 27 38
Elements .02 .17 .03 .06 .15 .17 .24 .84
#24 4 19 11 22 12 17.
.04 .20 .11 .23 .12 .17 .87
#26 11 59 31 22 15 41 85
.03 .18 .09 .07 .05 .12 .25 .79
#31 24 59 37 33 19 80 30
.07 .17 .10 .09 .05 .23 .08 .79

Figure 1. Teacher/subject probability matrix window

#17-content specific encouragement, #19-ver-
bal instructional prompts, #21-skill statements,
#24-individual modeling, #26-positive instruc-
tional feedback, and #31-positive non-verbal
communication) occurred as a function of one
another in time with a high degree of frequency
and probability relative to the remaining 27
behaviors and contexts emitted.
Once a matrix is built, various forms of
kinematic flow charting are used to portray the
relationships in time among elements (cf,,
Sharpe, 1990). Within a kinematic context, (a)
packages of high frequency and probability
elements post trigger element (i.e., primary or
initial elementofinterest)inclusive offrequency,
relative probability, and aggregate relative prob-
abih'ty information for succeeding element clus-
ters; (b) macroscopic tree structure views of how
particular elements flow through time; and (c)
nesting packages which cluster around
particular trigger elements with regularity, may
be represented,
Systemic graphic depiction of the actual
relationships in time for multiple elements
within a given field are also available (cf.,
Sharpe, 1990; Sharpe & Hawkins, In Press).
Many interbehavioral characteristics pertinent
to systemic analysis are available from graphic
representation such as: (a) variable time pa-
rameter slices of the complete experimental
setting, (b) duration and frequency of occur-
rence in relation to other contiguous elements
for a time parameter of interest, and (c) depic-
tion of multiple elements as they are actually
emitted across time, allowing for clear repre-
sentation of complex elemental temporal rela-
tionships, as well as differential characteristics
of the same element over time.
The advantage of systemic graphic repre-
sentation lies in its ability to circumvent tradi-
tional data portrayals which have typically
isolated individual elements of interest from
the larger temporal and contextual stream in
which they reside. An illustration may be
drawn between this graph and musical compo-
sition. Merely counting the frequency or dura-
tion of a particular note within a particular
composition, or musical system, does not ad-
equately portray the characteristics of that
composition. Exemplary musical scores are
better characterized by tbe differential rela-
tionships and emphases over time among par-
ticular clusters of notes as they repeatedly
appear throughout a musical piece. It is there-
fore plausible that complex interactional sys-
tems, organismic or otherwise, would be more
accurately portrayed, not simply by counting
occurrences of one or two dimensions of particu-
lar elements," but by portraying the variable
relationships in time among all elements within
a system.
Comparative analyses are also uniquely
facilitated by systemic graphic representation
of similar elements across differential systems.
For example, Figure 2 represents relatively
longperiods of specificobservation, interspersed
with more frequent/short duration encouraging
statements for a four minute slice of an expert
14

Keystroke
#12
Observation:
Specific

#17
Encouragement: HUH IIIO 0 Illfii Mil 1110
Content Specific

#19
Verbal Instruction:
MO
Prompts

#21
Verbal Instruction:
Skill Statements
a a
#24
Non-Verbal Instruction:
Individual
Modeling

#26
Instructional Feedback:
ill! I HI I
Positive

#31
Non-Verbal
Communication:
Positive

60000 62000 64000 '66000 68000 70000 72000

Time (1.953125E-02 seconds)

Figure 2. Expert 4 minute class segment across specific observation (#12), content specific
encouragement (#17), verbal instruction (#19: prompts, #21: skill statements), individual
modeling (#24), and positive communication elements (#26: instructional
feedback, #31: non-verbal).
teacher/subject instructional repertoire. These occurrences of individual elements markedly
encouraging statements are temporally followed differ in terms of lower frequency and differen-
by verbal instructional prompts. Instructional tial durations. Additionally, far greater lag
prompts are followed by longer duration skill times are evident between individual occur-
statements, and when necessary even longer rences of a particular element. Second, a clear
duration individual modeling episodes. These temporal relationship does not appear to exist
instructional clusters are then consistently fol- with respect to these seven elements. In other
lowed by high frequency/short duration feed- words, the system is better characterized as
back statements and positive non-verbal cues. chaotic or random, rather than coherent and
It is also clear if one were to draw a vertical rhythmic. Third, the novice teacher does not
line through portions of the graph that the appear to be able to emit more than two ele-
expert subj ect is capable of emitting three to six ments in concert. This infers a more rule
elements in concert, inferring a contingency governed system with much more time needed
managed repertoire emitted automatically, to search past instructional schemes to deter-
numerically akin to short-term memory storage mine an appropriate repertoire for the present
capabilities. setting.
A contextually similar four-minute depic- From a comparison of these two graphs
tion of a novice teacher/subject across the same marked differences across the two teachers are
elements (see Figure 3) clearly differs. First, clearly demonstrated, which would not have
 15

been as easily discerned by simply tracking one
or two dimensions of a particular teacher be-
havior and viewing other operative elements as
extraneous. Though only an overview of field
systems analysis with selected teacher behav-
ior data, many previously undiscovered behav-
ioral and contextual elements have the propen-
sity to be identified and more accurately por-
trayed temporally via an appliedinterbehavioral
strategy. Further, it should be emphasized that
contemporary technology is only now allowing
the behavior analytic community to tap into
complex systemic analyses, with the future
holding great promise for even more time effi-
cient and complex investigative techniques.
Teacher Preparation Utility
Again, a primary indicator of scientific merit
lies in its utility to a particular discipline and
the culture at large. In this regard, it is appro-
priate to shed light upon the relationship among
the more complex field systems analysis of
instructional expertise in particular, and its
utility to the preparation of preservice teachers
in general. A first step is presentation of a
simplified interbehavioral model specific to in-
structional systems (see Figure 4).
It is important not only to provide teacher
trainees with a linear package of interactive
instructional responses. It is also critical to
provide insight into the interconnected, contex-
tual nature of the representative field systems
in which they reside. Otherwise, instruction
may become misleading and even frustrating.
Frustration may be due to the inappropriate
use of instructional responses in the context of
the unique class setting in which a particular
teacher operates. These inappropriate responses
may flow from a lack of understanding of the

Keystroke
#12
Observation: II! 1 Illl II II
Specific

#17
Encouragement: 1
Content Specific

#19
Verbal Instruction:
Prompts
1 . 0 1 01 1 01
#21
Verbal Instruction:
Skill Statements
1 I Oil D Of
#24
Non- Verbal Instruction:
Individual
0 0
Modeling

#26
Instructional Feedback:
Positive
1 1 II I
#31
Non-Verbal ID 0 0 0 .1 -
Communication:
Positive

108000
i110000 i
112000
r
114000
i
116000
i
118000 120000
Time (1.953125E-02 seconds)
Figure 3. Novice 4 minute class segment across specific observation (#12), content specific
encouragement ($17), verbal instruction ($19: prompts, $21: skill statements), invidiual
modeling ($24), and positive communication elements ($26: instructional
feedback, $31: non-verbal).
16
larger context of a complete instructional field
system, including the many operative extrane-
ous variables, which are virtually always
present in applied settings. The advantage of
a systemic model lies in its unique ability to
enable teachers to conceptualize more ad-
equately their enterprise in its interdepen-
dent, interconnective framework, and accord-
ingly, operate more effectively within a par-
ticular context.
Once a holistic model is conceptualized it is
equally important to provide preservice teach-
ers with microscopic schemes or repertoires
within each of the Setting Specific Process
boxes (refer to Figure 4). Table 1 highlights
selected behavioral results from an exemplary
comparative study which fit within the Specific
Teacher Behavioral Elements box for one nov-
ice and expert teacher comparison. It is appar-
ent from this model that further interbehavioral
study is warranted to provide a more complete
account of each of the systemic educational
model's subunits, as well as extending specific
teacher behavior knowledge.
Historical
Components Setting Specific Process
Behavioral
Discrete
Environmental
Stimulus
Elements
Behavioral
Figure 4. Field systems closed loop instructional model.
Once a generic field systems model and
accompanying data-based subunit taxonomies
have been introduced in the didactic portions of
undergraduate methods classes, a simplified
evaluation and feedack system may be utilized
to facilitate a common terminological ground in
which to systematically track particular
practicum instructional episodes and provide
systems oriented feedback. Similar data collec-
tion techniques are implemented, the critical
difference between the science and technology
of field systems tactics occurring in the relative
simplification of the category system to allow
live recording of preservice teacher practicum
experiences.
Collapsed, more simplistic versions of
managable category sytems are used in track-
ing preservice teachers. Multiple dimensions
(e.g., frequency, duration, percentage of the
total observation time, rate per minute, stan-
dard deviations, etc.) across teacher and stu-
dent behaviors are tracked as well as inclusion
of lesson context elements felt to be of great
import. Software technologies also allows for
Products
Teacher Outcomes
Short Long
Term Term
Specific
Teacher
Elements
Process
Feedback
Specific
Student
'
Elements
Student C
, L
>"
Short
Term
1
1
Two Directional Feedback Loop
Novice
1. Lackof clear temporal sequences for #1: preview, #2: instruction, #3: review.
2. Behavioral chains appear scripted, not student and context dependent. .
3. Low frequency and duration of instructional elements (#17, #19, #20-26, #36), interspersed
with long periods of instructional inactivity.
4.- Longer periods of peripheral (#10) versus central (#9) positioning.
5. Low frequency and long duration of genral (#11) and specific (#12) observation coupled with
low velocity of observational change.
6. High frequency management (#14-16) elements throughout lesson, coupled with a narrow
classroom focus,
7. Primary emphasis on class control, though lacking in managerial efficacy as determined by
lack of management (#15) -- transition (#13) temporal contiguity.
8. Frequent indecision (#33) when behavioral elements are of high velocity.
9. Instruction/management ratio is low.
10. Low frequency encouraging (#17, #18), reinforcing (#28, #31), and correcting (#26, #27) behav-
iors.

Expert
1. Clearly defined preview (#1), instruction (#2) and review (#3).
2. Behavioral emissions are context dependent, drawn from a complex instructional repertoire.
3. Remains in a central (#9) position with respect to class activity.
4. Active supervision pattern as evidenced in the observational elements (#11, #12), ensuring
multiple contact with all of the gymnasium.
5. Knows all pupils by name and talks with all outside of the content focus (#18, #28).
6. Quick and efficient managerial (#14-16) behaviors of low frequency, as evidenced by brief,
immediate transitions (#13).
7. Management cues reach entire gymnasium.
8. Displays a clear "can do", positive (#26, #28, #31) attitude, coupled with a complete lack of
indecision (#33).
9. Frequent episodes of individual modeling (#24) and physical guidance (#25).
10. Frequently ties in skill content to be learned with life-situations (#36). f'
11. High frequency and immediacy of encouraging (#17, #18), positive correction (#26), and rein- j
forcing (#28, #31) behaviors which surround all instructional activity.
12. Lack of negative (#27, #30, #32) interactive behaviors.
13. Ties beginning and end of class with high frequency non-task positive (#28) interaction, though
non-task positive interactions also frequent in the instructional portions.
14. Great range of high frequency non-verbal (#31, #32) expression.
15. Great fluency, complexity, rhythm, velocity, and coherence to a largely sequential instructional
repertoire. Clearly maintains a constant "leadership" role with respect to class momen-
tum. '
18
differential categories systems definitions and
notations for atypical or new behaviors as par-
ticular instructional episodes may dictate.
Current technology enables recording of on
sight behavior and context relationships in time.
Software applications allow for immediate list-
ing of all contiguous element sequences within
specified chain length and lag time of element
occurrance parameters post observation. Given
the information described above, goals for in-
structional improvement which directly relate
to a systemic conception and a particilar context
may be given immediately post practice teach-
ing episode.
Kinematic and graphic representations of
preservice teaching episodes are also readily
available in relating alternative depictions of
what actually occurred within a particular in-
structional, A composite evaluation portfolia is
thus created within the context of a systemic
approach, which' provides conceptually similar
systematic data records across multiple
practicumteachingepisodes for preservice teach-
ers throughout their educational experience. In
this manner, a/common linguistic ground is
furnished for both teacher educator and
preservice instructor, providing a systemic pic-
ture of what is actually occurring across mul-
tiple instructional episodes in better facilitat-
ing behavioral change.
Conclusions
Locke (1989) has stated that"... anykindof
science can be done as rigorous and systematic
inquiry, just as any can be done as a careless or
dishonest contribution to the pollution of knowl-
edge .... superiority rests not in the method, but
in the match with particular problems" (p. 11).
While true, this observation begs the question
of whether traditional methods of inquiry, done
rigorously and systematically, still leave one
with an inadequate understanding of social
science settings. In this light, alternative ap-
proaches are still necessary to surmount the
current constraints which plague pedagogical
research. The fact must be recognized that
there are alternative approaches and applica-
tions of formalized data analyses, though prob-
lems, criticisms, and unresolved methodologi-
cal questions may remain. Indeed, problems,
criticisms andunresolvedmethodologicalques-
tions abound even in the currently accepted
traditions. A larger repertoire of available
research methods can therefore only serve to
enhance an understanding of the research en-
terprise.
The fact that the underlying assumptions of
any paradigm pose limits to the knowledge
which has been generated is well demonstrated
(Schempp, 1987). Further, subscription to one
dominant mode of inquiry could be of dire con-
sequence to the development of any disciplinary
body of knowledge. Regarding teacher effec-
tiveness research, Good (1979) has stated that
alternative conceptualizations of variables and
alternative measures are sorely needed. This,
coupled with the inherent disadvantages of
current research traditions, lead one to believe
that the pursuit of alternative strategies is
warranted. If longitudinally demonstrable, a
more substantive foundation maybe realized in
establishing an interbehavioral perspective as
a legitimate pedagogy research enterprise.
References
Arnold, R. K. (1937). A model for teaching: A
model forlearning. In G. T. Barrette, R. S.
Feingold, C. R. Rees, & M. Pieron (Eds.),
Myths, models, & methods in sport pedagogy
(pp. 1O1-106). Champaign, IL: Human Ki-
netics Publishers, Inc.
Berliner, D. C. (1986). In pursuit of the expert
pedagogue. Educational Researcher, 15(7),
5-13.
Bertalaniry, L. V. (1972). The history and
status of general systems theory. In G. J.
Klir (Ed.), Trends ingeneral systems theory
(pp. 21-41). New York: Wiley.
Cook, T.D., & Campbell, D.T. (1979). Quasi-
experimentation:Design and analysis issues
for field settings. Boston, MA: Houghton
Mifflin Company.
Cruickshank, D. R. (1976). Synthesis of se-
lected recent research on teacher effects.
Journal of Teacher Education, 27(1), 57-60.
Delprato, D. J. (1986). Response patterns. In
H. W. Reese & L. J. Parrott (Eds.), Behavior
science: Philosophical, methodological and
empirical advances (pp. 61-113). Hillsdale,
NJ: Erlbaum.
Eliot, T, S. (1971). The complete poems and
plays: 1909-1950. New York: Harourt, Brace
20
Brief Commentary on Lipkens'
"Idealism, Realism, Coherence, and
Correspondence in Kantor's
Dennis J. Delprato
Eastern Michigan University
I wish to thank Lapkens1 for the paper of the
above title that appeared in the first number of
the 1991 issue of this newsletter. What follows
are some of my reactions. As far as idealism and
realism, I view Kantor as a radical naturalist
who takes the very distinction between ideal-
ism and realism as based on the notion of a
world without/beyond time and space. It seems
that to argue whether or not something is real
is to tacitly lend credence to the unreal. Thus,
I do not find -Kantor holding to, for example,
realism, naive realism, or neorealism. (I am not
sure what Lipkens means by direct realism
when she concludes this best describes Kantor's
position onp. 15.) Furthermore, Kantor's natu-
ralism certainly is not one that views mind and
spiritas reducible to thematerialhow Lipkens
apparently views naturalism (p. 13). To me,
Kantor's naturalism is simply that there is but
one world the spatiotemporal. His position is
neither materialism nor idealism.
Perhaps Lipkens' presentation on realism
and idealism would have been somewhat differ-
ent had she examined Kantor's The Logic of
Modern Science (1953) and Psychology and
Logic (1945, 1950).
On truth, or epistemology: First, I think
Lipkens accurately represents Kantor's posi-
tion when she notes that the observer's history
always participates in knowing interactions,
thusmakingpureknowingimpossible. Itisthis
point that has led less naturalistic thinkers to
conclude that individual knowers construct
events. I do not know how she justifies the
statement that Kantor's position makes impos-
sible the distinction between descriptive and
interpretative constructs, on the one hand, and
events themselves, on the other. To me, one of
the important lessons from Kantor is the crucial
distinction between events and constructs. I
may be mis-reading Likens here. I take
Kantor's epistemological position to be one of
pragmatism (effective action). Lipkens notes
this aspect of Kantor's views on p. 17 but seems
to take "impure coherence" theory as more
reflective. I don't follow. To me, Kantor was
much influenced by the same stream that influ-
enced the great American pragmatist, Dewey.
I congratulate Lipkens for taking on the
topics she did. These are important areas that
we need to discuss and debate from a radically
naturalistic viewpoint.
References
Kantor, J. R. (1945), 1950). Psychology and
Logic (2 vol.). Bloomington, IN": Principal
Press.
Kantor, J. R. (1953). The Logic of Modern Sci
ence. Chicago, IL: Principal Press.
 t)
05

CO

O~j

en
 Volume 19 1991 Number 3

EDITOR
Linda J. Hayes, University of Nevada. TABU

PAST EDITORS The Agora

Noel W. Smith, Vols 1-7(1970-1978) Editorial
Ronald G.Heyduk,Vols 8-11(1978-1983) Conferences
Edward K. Morris, Vols 12-17(1983-1989)
ADVISORY BOARD Articles
Sidney W. Bijou, University of Arizona,
Noel W. Smith. Some possible attits of
Donna M. Cone, State of Rhode Island
Inttrbehaviorism
DennisJ. DdpTato,EastetnA4u&igan Univ.
Patrick Ghezzi, University of Arizona
Sandy Hobbs, Paisley College of Technology
Comments
Edward K. Morris, University of Kansas
Paul T. Mountjoy, Western Michigan Univ.
Harry C. Mahan. Some observations on "psycho-
N, H. Pronko, Wichita State University
Roger D. Ray, Rollins College biology"; The name and concept ...,11
Emilio Ribes, University of Guadalajara
Niloofar Afari. Can naturalistic science survive in
Robert G. Wahler, University of Tennessee
todays cultured 13
MANAGING EDITOR
Steven C. Hayes, University of Nevada.
Reports
ASSISTANT EDITORS
Duane C. Lord, Mark A. Swain and Linda J.
Debra W. Fredericks, Kenneth Huntley, Hayes. Interbehavioralfield studies at the
Ramona Houmanfar, Duane C. Lord, Cynthia University of Nevada..... ...15
Reinbold, David G. Stroffe, Mark A. Swain,
University of Nevada

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 Editorial
Volume 19 is complete with this issue. We plan
to publish three issues ofVolume 20 in 1992. The first
issue ofVolume 20 is due to arrive before the ABA
convention in May. In previous years, we have
constructed a list of interbehavioral papers from the
ABA program in the May issue, always with more
than a little uncertainty about our selections. If you
wish to be sure your paper is (or is not) included,
please let us know as soon as possible.
This issue of THE INTERBEHAVIORIST fea-
tures a new category, "Reports," in which we intend to
highlight interbehavioral work of an empirical sort.
While, empirical works have always been welcome as
articles in the newsletter, we haven't explicitly encour-
aged less formal discussions of what might better be
called "empirical news.*1 We are interested in hearing
about works in progress, research ideas and problems,
methodological issues, grants funded, andotheritems
of this general sort. We have described some of our
own work as an example of the sort of news that is
suitable for the "Reports" section of the newsletter,
although we do not mean by this example to discour-
age other kinds of materials or expressions. We
welcome your news.
Conferences Held
First International Congress on Interbebavioral
Psychology
University of Guadalajara, Mexico
February 24-26, 1992
Organizer: Emilio Ribes
Several members of The Interbehaviorist Advi-
sory Board and a number of subscribers to THE
INTERBEHAVIORIST recently attended the First
International Congress on Interbehaviorhm in Mexico.
The conference was held at a lovely villa near
Guadalajara, with approximately 50 people in atten-
dance. The conference featured 30 papers by scholars
from Universities in Guadalajara, Mexico City, and
Chihuahua in Mexico, Barcelona, Seville and Madrid
in Spain, and from the Universities of Arizona, Kan-
sas, Auburn, Nevada and Tennessee-Knoxville in the
United States. The papers addressed a variety of
topics, among which methodological issues and philo-
sophical considerations figured prominendy. Appli-
cations of interbehavioral theory to societal problems
and the problems of special populations, including
mentally retarded persons and conduct disordered
children, made up a substantial portion of the pro-
gram. A number of papers also addressed issues of
complex responding of animals and humans, includ-
ing conditional discrimination, relational respond-
ing, and language. Selected papers will be edited by
Emilio Ribes and Linda Hayes for a Spanish volume
to be published by Trillas Press of Mexico City,
Mexico, and an English volume to be published by
CONTEXT PRESS of Reno, Nevada.
(Editor's note: In my experience^ behavior scientists in
Mexico aremorefamiUarwitbthework ofJ.R.Kantor and
are more often interbebavioralfy oriented than are their
counterparts in the United States and Canada.
Interbehaviorists interested in making contact with this
community oflike minded scholars are encouraged to attend
the International Meeting on Behaviorism and the Sciences
of Behavior to be held in Guadalajara in October of this
year. The deadline for paper submissions is May 1> 1992.
Information about the meeting may be obtained/torn Peter
Harzem, Psychology Department, Auburn University,
Auburn, Alabama.)
The Nevada Conference on the Varieties of Scientific
ContextUfflism
Reno, Nevada
January 3-5,1992
Organizers: Steve Hayes, Linda Hayes, Hayne Reese,
and Ted Sarbin,
The Nevada Conference on the Varieties of Sci-
entific Contextual ism was not a conference on
interbehaviorism. Nonetheless, several
interbehaviorists participated in the program and
several attended as members of the audience, finding
themselves in sympathy with some portion at least of
what goes by the name of contextualism. The talks
covered a broad range of topics from an equally broad
range of theoretical, if not philosophical, perspec-
tives. What follows is a brief synopsis constructed
from notes taken during the meeting, not from a
careful reading of the manuscripts submitted by the
participants. They are included here with apologies
forany misunderstandings or misrepresentations. (The
manuscripts are currently under preparation as chap-
ters of an edited volume for those inclined to study
them in more detail.)
 The four organizers' addresses showed almost no
overlap. Ted Sarbin, of the University of California-
Santa Cruz, argued that the root metaphor of contex-
tualism, the "historical act," was usefully interpreted
as the narrative, and went on to consider the implica-
tions of this interpretation for ordinary science. Steve
Hayes focused not so much on the root metaphor of
contextualism to make his case, but on the truth
criterion of the position instead. He argued that
successful working as a truth criterion could not be
evaluated as having been demonstrated unless the
goals to which one's works were directed were stated
in advance of the work. Linda Hayes took the
position that it was not possible to evaluate the truth
of a proposition if one's truth criterion were either
correspondence based or based on successful work-
ing, and that it matter not if one's goals were stated at
the outset in the latter case. Her arguments had to do
with the nature and role of language in human affairs.
Hayne Reese, ofWest Virginia University, laid out the
similarities and differences between contextualism
and dialectical materialism.
Michael Chandler, of the University of British
Columbia, compared contextualism to postmodern-
ism, implying that just as post modernism may be
understood as a phase of modernism; contextualism
might be understood as a phase of organicism. Michael
was the only self-pro claimed organicist in the group.
Jim Mancuso, of SU NY-Albany, made a case for
die personal construct system or what might be
interpreted interbehavioraily as reactional biography
- as the relevant context for an individual's action,
and in doing so found himself in conflict with the
radical behaviorists in the group. For their part, the
radical behaviorists, among whom may be included
Mike Dougher of the University of New Mexico and
Tony Biglan of the Oregon Research Institute, gave
two of the more concrete papers of the program.
Dougher focused on interpretive and hermeneutic
research methods in the analysis of verbal behavior,
arguing that these methods might prove useful in
identifying the conditions that give rise to knowledge
claims-an empirical epistemology of sorts. Biglan
talked about community interventions from a con-
textualistic perspective.
Taking a rather different political perspective on
the social environment* and on the meaning of con-
textualism, was Carl Ratner of Humboldt State Uni-
versity. Carl's argument was that psychological events
were determined by the socio-economic system of the
actor.
Ed Morris and Emilio Ribes both addressed them-
selves to the position of behavior analysis or radical
behaviorism. Ed argued that behavior analysis con-
sidered itself a natural science on the grounds that it
had selected not the individual as its subject matter,
but rather spatially unrestricted behavior; and was
interested in the development of principles of behav-
ior (i.e., process), not an understanding of particular
types of behavior (i.e., content.) Emilio Ribes gave
what seemed to be two papers: one a discussion of
logical insufficiencies in radical behavioral theory,
and the other a discussion of language as human
action, in keeping with Wittgenstein's idea of lan-
guage games. His arguments with respect to language
were of particular interest to interbehaviorists in that
they gave new significance to the interbehavioral
concept of media of contact Human conduct, he
argued, was always linguistic in function, though not
always linguistic in morphology.
Finally, Karl Scliiebe, of Wesleyan University,
gave a very poetic address entitled "Getting serious
about context" in which he asked why some forms of
activity were considered to be serious, others not.
At the closing, the participants considered what
had been accomplished by the group during their
days together and what remained to be resolved about
contextualism, its nature and allies. The full papers,
as mentioned above, along with brief comments by
the discussants for those papers, and some of these
closing remarks will be the text of the volume due to
be published by CONTEXT PRESS this year.
 Noel W. Smith
State Uriiverisity of New York at Pittsburgh
Interbehavioral psychology has always taken a
strong departure from traditional approaches to
psychology, namely those that are dual is tic, mental-
istic, or reductionistic-the three being interdepen-
dent In taking this departure it has staked out its own
position and contrasted it with mentalism and mecha-
nism. This has helped to keep its position clear, but
has not provided it with many friends. I doubt
whether any of us who claim to be interbehaviorists
would wish to obliterate these distinctions and team
up with incompatible systems, but it may be instruc-
tive to examine positions or systems that have some
important similarities with interbehaviorism and
whose differences may be primarily those of emphasis
rather than incompatibility. At the same time we
should not overlookany actual incompatibilities that
do exist or the uniqueness that is interbehaviorism. I
propose to examine five systems or approaches: be-
havior analysis, dialectical psychology, phenomeno-
logical psychology, and contextual psychology.
Those who are here at this annual meeting of the
Association for Behavior Analysis will already know
about that system and so I will keep my comments
brief. Both interbehaviorism and behavior analysis
emphasized that all inquiry must begin with observa-
tion; and constructs must be drawn from these obser-
vations, not imposed on them from traditional sources.
Behavior analysis emphasizes the reinforcement prin-
ciple as central to its system and in so doing seems to
put more emphasis on the organism and a determin-
ing role for biology than does interbehaviorism. The
latter^ emphasis is on a field of interaction of which
one component is the organism. Despite this differ-
ence, there is much similarity in the philosophy of
science of the two.
Dialectic Psychology
With dialectic psychology one has to be quite
selective because some of those who advance this
position are distinctly mentalistic. Riegel (1976)
provides the most favorable model. Riegel attacks
static things, categories, and entities such as intelli-
gence and traits. He insists that humans continually
act upon and change the world and in turn are
changed by it Behavior occurs in a continuous
manner rather than in discrete units. It occurs in
context and is historically developed. Human dialec-
tics are not organism centered but interactive, recipro-
cal relationships between humans and the world.
Equilibrium and stability are only temporary condi-
tions that result from the resolution of contradictions
and lead in turn to further contradictions. His mani-
festo is a call to arms: "Dialectical psychologists unite!
You have nothing to lose but the respect of vulgar
mechanists and pretentious mentalists; you will win a
world, a changing world created by ever changing
human beings" (pp. 164-165). (Unfortunately, Riegel
died while still in his prime.)
Another exponent of dialectical psychology,
Ratner (1971), describes an outlook that sounds even
closer to that of interbehaviorism: "...we would say
that the individual and the world do not exist in-
themselves or one in the other, but are intertwined in
an individual-world field that comprises their unity.
Within this gestalt, various aspects (e.g., individual,
world) may be distinguished, but they are always parts
of the field and refer to it for their identity" (p. 85).
A major postulate of generic dialectics is that
everything is in opposition or conflict. The resolu-
tion of a conflict leads to a new conflict. An antithesis
arises out of each new synthesis. I suspect that most
interbehaviorists would prefer to describe the nature
of the world by means of observation rather than by
postulation of various conflicts. I also suspect that
they would not conceive of interactions as necessarily
in conflict. Still, it is not dear that the resulting
description of, say, a child's language interaction with
its mother (Riegel calls it a "dialogic interaction")
would be very different from an interbehavioral de-
scription of interaction.
 Dialectical psychology has been rather promi-
nent in Scandinavian countries (Dreier & Kvale,
1984). Its contributions have been diverse, but it has
especially emphasized qualitative studies in natural
contexts rather than laboratory experiments with
qualitative analyses.
Phenomenological philosophy springing from
the work of Husserl and further developed or modi-
fied by Heidegger has become very prominent in
Europe and received much attention here as well.
Phenomenological psychology has developed out of
it, especially under the hand of the novelist and
playwright, Jean-Paul Sartre (1939/1965, 1956), and
the academic psychologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty
(1942/1965,1945/1962), who were colleagues at the
Sorbonne. Of the two, Merleau-Ponty's work is the
most directly appropriate to academic psychology,
but Sartre made a useful contribution. This system I
will call French phenomenological psychology to
distinguish it from the writings of Rogers, May,
MacCleod, and a few other Americans whose
psychology, from the point of view of the French
phenomenological psychologists, is little more than
mentalism with a phenomenological overlay. The
French approach is sometimes also called radical
phenomenology. ThtEn<ydopediaofPhilosophy(\967)
states that "Merleau-Ponty has interpreted the notion
of phenomenology in a sense rather different from
that subscribed to wholly or partly by members of the
phenomenological movement, as well as from that
used by either Heidegger or Sartre" (p. 150). It
concludes that Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty
belong to a different school from that of Husserl and
his followers.
The French system has a number of interesting
similarities with interbehaviorism, and for that reason
I want to dwell on it a little more than some of the
other systems outlined here and to include some
doubt that I have about it. I should point out at the
outset that these writers are very difficult to under-
stand, and I am not sure that I have always understood
them. Someone has said that those who believe that
they have understood the phenomenologists have
almost surely misunderstood them.
A major point of interest is that Merleau-Ponty
and Sartre attempt to overcome the assumptions of
dualism, mechanism, and reductionism. They are, I
think, reasonably successful, but 1 do have some
doubts that I will present later. They also emphasize
that psychology must include meaning and therefore
cannot be modeled on the impersonal sciences such
as physics or chemistry. Merleau-Ponty has called
one ofhis books The Structure ofBehaviorby which he
means relationships as part of a context. Giorgj
defines "structure" as "behavior that is ordered with
respect to its situation" (1975, p. 208). In the intro-
duction to the English translation of Merleau-Ponty's
book Wild characterizes the position this way;
Human behavior is neither a series of blind
reactions to external "stimuli," nor the projec-
tion of acts which are motivated by the pure
ideas of a disembodied, worldless mind. It is
neither exclusively subjective nor exclusively
objective, but a dialectical interchange be-
tween man and the world...It is out of this
dialectical interchange that human meanings
emerge.
Some specific similarities in Merleau-Ponty with
interbehaviorism include the following. Because
every stimulation from the surroundings is influ-
enced by preceding acts of the organism and because
these past acts have brought the organism into con-
tact with the stimulus, we cannot attribute the acts to
the surroundings or to the organism but only to their
dialectical interchange, their interactions. Similarly,
stimulus and response are interdependent: the stimu-
lus has no independent reality from the organism,
and physiological excitation is a response, not an
effect from outside.
Merleau-Ponty recognizes that distinction be-
tween stimulus function and stimulus object when he
relates that the concept of stimulus confuses two
meanings: one is that of the physical event and the
other is that of the meaning of the event. He also
recognizes two meanings of response that parallel
those of response and response function: the move-
ments of the organism provide one meaning and the
meaning of these movements the other. He seems to
also indicate the interdependence of setting and re-
sponse, but the mode of expression-makes a judge-
ment difficult: "Situation and reaction are linked
internally by their common participation in a struc-
ture in which the mode of activity proper to the
organism is expressed. Hence they cannot be placed
one after the other as cause and effect: they are two
moments of a circular process" (p.130). Because of
 this dialectic or interactive relation between milieu
and individual it is not possible to reduce them to
anatomy and physiology.
What things mean to people is central to phe-
nomenology, and phenomenology holds that a
'psychology.must take account of these, meanings,
tather than resortingto 'descriptionsibfphysicalisticor
biological mechanisms. The world constructed by
the physicist is not more real than is behavior nor is
the world of the physicistrelevant to behavior; behav-
ior is a different type of event, one involving meaning,
Giorgi (1975) takes up the case of a sleek airplane.
Where does sleekness lie? In the plane? In the
person? It lies not in either alone but in their
relationship. In his words, "...perceived sleekness
is...a certain way of relating to an object of the world;
it is a way of behaving" (p. 208), Meaning is not mind
but the relationship of the individual to the object
Merleau-Ponty (1963) tells us that "the subject does
not live in world of states of consciousness or repre-
sentations from which he would believe himself able
to act on and know external things by a sort of miracle.
He lives uYa universe of experiences, ..;in a-direct
commerce with beings, things and his own body*1 (p.
189). In another work (1962) he states "from the
moment behavior is considered 'in its unity* and in its
human meaning, one is no longer dealing with mate-
rial reality nor, moreover, with a mental reality, but
with significant whole or structure which properly
belongs neither to the external world not to internal
life". Giorgi (1964) notes that phenomenology at-
tempts to discover meanings people live, not means
of control. It looks for no fixed or final truth but for
continual change, a dialectic process. A truth is just
something open to examination for whatever rel-
evance it might have to the examiner. Likewise,
Kruger (1981) refers to the world as a system of
meanings, not stimuli. A stimulus is *a physicalistic
abstraction highlighting one profile of a Gestalt im-
bedded in meaning". We do not perceive light or
sound waves but houses, animals, leaves resulting in
the wind, people talking, etc,
Phenomenologists sometimes use the word
"mind" and regularly use the word "consciousness",
but they redefine both. Consciousness is not a thing
that contains objects from the world but rather it is a
relationship. Sartre (1956) states "A table is not in
consciousnessnot even in the capacity of a represen-
tation. A table is in space, beside the window....**
Lyotard (1945/1954) explains that the "mental" is not
inside the individual but consists of the relationship
between the person and the situation. Further, "the
me and the situation cannot be defined but in and by
this relation". Zaner (1985) defines consciousness or
mental life as a stance toward something or as an
orientation toward things [intentionality]. Kvale and
Grenness (1967) point but that "The necessity of an
'inner man* to guide behavior falls away when behav-
ior is conceived as man's meaningful relatedness to
the world, Behavior is a relation between man and the
world, neither can be defined independent of the
other*1 (p. 137) if behavior as such is to be compre-
hended.
Kruger (1981) attempts to describe the total inter-
dependence of person and object by referring to the
stimulus object as "that which shows itself. (Because
of their mechanistic tone the phenomenologists usu-
ally avoid the word "organism" and * object** when
speaking of this relationship). He wants to indicate
that the world acts on the person as much as the
person acts on the world even though we have no
words that ordinarily express this. We can say "I see
a stone", but haVe no way of expressing the stone*s
actions on our seeing, (Aristotle reported the same
problem in Greek; the "actuality of color* and of
flavor have no name (426a, 14),) To try to remove a
person from this cohesion with things-that-are would
be to destroy that person's context and therewith his
or her meaningful life. Death destroys this cohesion.
I am reminded here of a statement by Epicures in the
4th century BC: "When we are, death is not; and
when death is, we are not".
Now that I have presented some features that I
consider positive I want to balance that with some
reservations. These are directed more at those whose
psychology is influenced by Husserl than those of the
French school. Husserl never managed to escape
mentalism or organocentrism and, apparently, nei-
ther have his followers. One of the difficulties, it
appears to me, is with the concept of intentionality. A
prominent spokesman for Husserlian psychology is
Amadeo Giorgi whom I cited above. In one of his
papers (1976) he tells us that w...consciousness is
always consciousness of something that is not con-
sciousness itself-and this is what is known as inten-
tionality." So far, this is in line with Lyotard and
others of the French school, who refer to conscious-
ness as an orientation. But in the same paragraph he
calls consciousness, after Gurwitsch, a "medium of
 access", which suggests an intervening variable. He
also refers to it as "a stream of activity that keeps
bursting forth toward the world and needs, so to
speak, objects in the world to help stop its centrifugal
movement" (p. 311). Here we seem to dearly have an
organism acting on the world, not a reciprocal ac-
tions. In the next paragraph he refers to ^behavior and
consciousness" as being directed toward something.
Within two paragraphs he has gone from a
nonmentalistic definition of consciousness to one in
which it is an intervening variable, having directional
powers of its own, and' being additive to behavior.
The old mentalisti'c and organocentric meanings of
the word triumph. Kvale and Grenness, similarly, at
times refer to consciousness and behavior and bring
in directionality when the term intentionality arises. I
must confess that I am unable to understand from the
phenornenologists whether consciousness and inten-
tionality are one thing or two, and if they do differ
what that difference is; but I find that I usually part
company from them whenever that term arises. A
lesser criticism goes to the French. Ratner (1971)
points out that both Merleau-Ponty and Sartre give
emphasis to acts being determined by the individual
and ignore the reciprocal action of the world. In light
of phenomenology's effort to stress the interdepen-
dence of object and subject this seems to be a glaring
inconsistency but, I suspect, another legacy ofHusserl's
notion of intentionality. The influence of William
James on Merleau-Ponty may have also been a factor
in his failure to breakcompletelywithorganocentrism.
Contextualism
Contextual psychology has no major leader and
no dear focus, but one can discern in some of the
literature a number of psychologists who are giving
greater emphasis to the context of which the organism
is one part. We might better call it a movement, even
if a rather vague one, than a system. Some writers take
their framework from Stephen Pepper (1942) who
considered contextualism to be one of several world
hypotheses, but it seems to have developed somewhat
independently of Pepper who, nevertheless, retro-
spectively provides a handy reference point. Some of
the cbntextualists embrace dualism and some are
seemingly free of it. A prime example of the latter is
Jenlans-at least in seminal paper (1974)-whose re-
search in verbal learning and recall led him to reject
asscociationism with its machinery and to explicitly
embrace contextualism including the context, tex-
ture, and strands delineated by Pepper (but without
reference to him). What is especially impressive
about Jenkins is his profusion of experimental evi-
dence that supports a contextualist framework and his
refutation of a mechanistic or mentalistic one. In line
with the phenornenologists he hold that no final truth
or analysis exists because contexts are ever changing.
Similarly, Chronbach (1974) notes the multiple inter-
actions that occur in psychological events involve "a
hall of mirrors that extends to infinity*1 (p. 119) He
suggests that we give up looking for generalization
and look instead for "contemporary facts" (p.' 126).
Sarbin (1977) examines the role of various root meta-
phors a la Pepper in personality theory. He finds the
contextualist metaphor to be the most advantageous
and relates it to his dramaturgical model for human
behavior. We should, he argues, abandon the models
of physical sciences in psychology as inappropriate;
we should instead "deal with the human condition as
we find it: in ever changing, ever renewing drama" (p.
39). This has elements of the dialecticians's constant
change and the phenomenologist's rejection of physi-
cal models.
Hoffman and Nead (1983) consider Gibson's
(1979, 1985) ecological perception to be a form of
contextualism. Gibson abjures assumptions of inter-
nal representation and transformation and argues for
perception as visual selection. He considers the world
to be directly perceived. The sense organs extract
from the flux of energy the stable features of the
world. Practice brings increasing focus and differen-
tiation. Gibson rejects the mechanics of optics and
the presumed interpretation of the brain as providing
any real understanding of perception. Haber (1985)
commends Gibson's emphasis on the stimulus condi-
tions as one pole but feds he still needs another pole
to perception, that of a Helmholtzian organism role,
an organism that processes the information from the
stimulus array. An interbehavioral approach with its
inclusion of the history of the organism and the
meaning of stimulus objects that comprise the inter-
actions-in other words, a more complete field-seems
to be needed in the Gibsonian formulation. It would
ward off the Helmholtzians and the information
processors. The interbehavioral emphasis on mean-
ing in perception and its occurrence as a jointproduct
of object and organism may be closer to the French
phenornenologists than to Gibson, although it is not
inconsistent with Gibson. Gibson's work has had an
influence on cognitive psychology as well as percep-
tion, especially through die work of Neisser (1976).
 This brand of cognitivism moves decidedly toward
naturalism' but still retains some of its mentalistic
tinge.
Among numerous additional examples of con-
textualism Icouldmentionjmustincludeareference
to the fact that some, perhaps most, contextual is are
. merityists.WHoffrnaiv.and NeadJnfprm^us that?the,
general philosophy of contextualism is not at all
constrained to be anti-mentalistic" (p. 509). Al-
though they hold that contextualism starts with events,
they implicitly assume the reality of minds and hold
that various metaphors including those of informa-
tion processing -are ways of "getting) at different
aspects of psychological phenomena for different
purposes" (p. 538). Evenjenkins(1981)invokesmind
and mental structures ("higher order structures", p.
232) despite his earlier paper (1976) that repudiated
structures. Two further mentalistic examples are
Bronfenbrenner's (1979) "ecology of human devel-
opment" and Mischel's (1977) work in personality.
Bronfenbrenner puts his nesting systems in a mind,
and Mischel has recourse to information processing.
Gpntextualism's flexibilityJs its .disadvantage as well
as its advantage. It can embrace or is embraced by
those who begin with verbal constructs drawn from
the common folklore as well as those who confine
their work to actual events. Any contextual allies for
interbehaviorism would have to be sought as indi-
viduals, not as a group.
Conclusions
Originally I had entitled this article "Some Allies
of Interbehaviorism" but changed it to "...Possible
Allies..." after a more careful examination of each of
the systems, for in the majority of cases there are
incompatibilities of interbehaviorism with some of
the proponents or some of the components. But if we
pick our way carefully through the thickets of thorns
we might find a little fruit.
References , Lyotard, Jean-F. (1954/1991). Phenomenology. Al-
Bronfenbrenner, U. (1979). The ecology of human
development: Experiments by nature and by design.
Harvard University Press.
Chronbach, L. J. (1975). Beyond the two disciplines
of scientific psychology. American Psychologist,
30,116-127.
Dreir, O. & Steiner, K. (1984). Reviews of Scandina-
vian Psychology I: Dialectical and hermeneutical
psychology, Scandinavian Journal of Psychology,
25, 5-29.
Encyclopedia of philosophy (\967). Ed. by Paul Edwards.
Macmillan.
Gibbon, J. J. (1979). The ecological approach to visual
perception. Houghton Mifflin.
Gibson, J. J. (1985). Conclusions from a century of
research on sense perception. In S. Koch & D.E.
ir^,;;I^(Eds.),y4tfte^^^
York; McGraw-Hill.
Giorgj, A. (1975). Convergences and divergences
between phenomenological psychology and be-
haviorism. Behaviorism, 3,200-212.
Giorgi, A. (1976). Phenomenology and the founda-
tions of psychology. In Nebraska Symposium on
Motivation, University of Nebraska Press.
Haber, R, N. (1985). Perception: A one-hundred-year
perspective. In S. Koch & D..E. Lary (Eds.), A
century of psychology as a science. New York:
McGraw-Hill.
Hagen, M. A. (1985). James J. Gibson's ecological
approach to visual perception. In S. Koch & D.E.
Lary (Eds.), A century of psychology as a science. New
York: McGraw-Hill.
^Hoffinan, R. R. & James M. N. - (1983). General
contextualism, ecological science and contextual
research. Journal of Mind and Behavior, 4, 507^-
559.
Kvale, S. & Carle E. G. (1967). Skinner and Sartre:
Towards a radical phenomenology of behavior.
Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry, 7,
128-150.
Kruger, Dreyer (1981). An introduction tophenomeno-
logical psychology. Duquesne University Press.
Jenkins, J. J. (1974). Remember that old theory of
memory? Well, forget it! American Psychologist^
29, 785-795.
Jenkins, J.J. (1974). Can we have a fruitful cognitive
psychology? In Nebraska Symposium on Motiva-
tion, 1980, University of Nebraska.
bany: State University of New York.
Merleau-Ponty,M. (1942/1963). neslructureofbehav-
ior. Trans, by Alden F. Fisheir. Beacon Press.
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1945/1962). Phenomenology of
perception. Trans, by Colin Smith. London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Mischel, W. (1977). On the future of personality
measurement American Psychologist 31,246-254.
Neisser, U. (1976). Cognition and reality. San Fran-
cisco: Freeman.
10
Pepper, S. C. (1942), World hypotheses; A study in
evidence, Berkeley: University of California Press.
Ratner, C. (1971). Principles of dialectic psychology.
Telos, 9, 83-W9.
Reigel, K. R (1976). The dialectics of human develop-
ment. American Psychologist, 31,161-166.
Sarbin, T. R. (1977). A world view for modem
psychology. In Nebraska Symposium on Motiva-
tion, Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press.
Sartre, Jean-Paul (1939/1948). The Emotions: Out-
line of a Theory. Philosophical library. (French
ed. 1939.)
Sartre,Jean-Paul(l956). Being and nothingness. Hazel
Barnes.
Zaner, R. M. (1985). The logos of psyche; Phenom-
enological variations on a theme. In S. Koch
& D.E. Leary (Eds.), A century of psychology as a
science. New York; McGraw-Hill.

Harry C. Mahan
Oceanside, CA
One of the most interesting papers to appear in
The American Psychologist for some time is one by
Donald Dewsbury (1990) in which the author dis-
cusses the history and recent applications of the term,
"psychobiology." It is the purpose of the present
commentary to present some observations on this
term and on the variations of the concept which it
represents. These comments will be based on the
perspective of Zing-Yang Kuo's (1969) epigenetic
behaviorism combined with the interactional
psychology of J. H Kantor (1971).
In one sense, every act which is performed by an
animal or personis psychobiological in that the entire
organism as both a biological and a psychological
being is involved. Whether the act is primarily
biological or primarily psychological depends upon
die level which the individual's species has reached
on the phylogenedc and which the individual has
reached on the ontogenetic developmental scale.
This is because it is only at the higher levels of both of
these scales that any organism can interact with Its
environmental context with a degree of variability,
modifiability, and discrimination which goes beyond
a purely biological level of adjustment. It is at diis
transition stage that the increasing complexity of the
subject's capabilities become more and more depen-
dent upon the history of its interactions with its
context and less upon the development of its mor-
phology and physiology. From that time on, its
biological equipment provides the potential for but
not the nature of its repertoire of interactions. It is
those interactions which have evolved from the
individual's previous interactional history which
should be referred to as "psychological** according to
the Kuo-Kantor thesis.
One of the most important principles of Kuo's
(1969) epigenetic behaviorism is his behavior gradient
theory. This theory postulates that the internal as well
as the overt actions of the organism are actually part
of every interaction and are not to be considered as
the behavior's cause or its accompaniment, let alone
11
II r".
thought of as the behavior itself or as a substitute for
the action of a "mind.*1 In addition, behavior includes
not only overt and covert bodily activity but also the
ever-changing relationships between the organism
and its environmental context.
Kuo considers his epigenetic behaviorism as a
synthetic science which includes both psychology
and the various branches of biology as parts of his
approach. He regards the divisions of what are
ordinarily thought of as different sciences as simply
divisions of labor requiring different equipment and
techniques of investigation and the use of a different
nomenclature. Workers in these fields usually have
special research interests, many of which are primarily
physiological, or who study animal behavior experi-
mentally (even with the lower species), and are ac-
cepted as psychologists. The necessity for the integra-
tion of these previously considered separate sciences
is demonstrated by the recent text in child develop-
mentby Cole and Cole (1989). Here the evolution of
a child's interactions from biological to psychological
are brought out very clearly.
One of the applications of the term "psychobiol-
ogy" that is discussed by Dewsbury (1990) is that of
Adolph Meyer (Meyer, 1986). Meyer's approach has
the only utilization of the term which applies to an
understanding of human subjects, in this case psychi-
atric patients. Meyer had studied with both William
James and John Dewey (according to the Encyclopedia
Britannica) and his all encompassing approach to his
subjects turns out to be similar in theory and thor-
oughness to those of Zing-Yang Kuo andj. R. Kantor.
It was my good fortune to be a psychological intern in
the early 1930's in a Pennsylvania state hospital at
which the superintendent had come from the
Worchester State Hospital in Massachusetts where
Meyer's system was developed. In this case the system
was not merely a theory but was incorporated into a
mental hospital administration by a staff of special-
ists. The staff included not only psychiatrists but
psychologists and social workers. My internship and
12
subsequent two year residency included thorough
tiainingin the various aspects ofMeyer*s system, from
the taking of patient's case histories to assisting the
pathologist at autopsies. I was so intrigued with
Meyer's broad approach to the understanding of
behavior that I returned to campus life to study more
anatomy; physiology and particularly the
interbehavioral psychology of J, R. Kantor.
In his comments on the history of the term
"psychobiology" Dewsbury expresses the opinion
that its use has been prompted by an effort to avoid
reductionism. Of this I have my doubts and Dunlap
probably used it to avoid being associated with the
dualistically oriented physiological psychology text-
books of his day. Others, such as Yerkes, no doubt
wanted to identify their work as entirely different
from that of other psychologists who were engaged in
introspection. In this connection, it is interesting to
note that both Yerkes and Dunlap became presidents
of the American Psychological Association, Yerkes in
1917 and Dunlap in 1923. That psychology still
thinks very highly of its outstanding scientific psycho-
biologists, is demonstrated byJames McGaugh's presi-
dency of the American Psychological Society as re-
cently as 1990.
Following his history of the use of the term
"psychobiology" by individuals, Dewsbury discusses
its recent adoption by departments, journals, and
grant awarding agencies. Although such adoptions
are so far limited in number, they seem to indicate a
trend. From a practical (status?) standpoint the term
gives research workers and their sponsoring units a
definite advantage within the scientific community in
that psychobiology is a recognizable and accepted
branch of science which is worthy of support. If
scientifically ambitious young psychologists are to be
attracted to the field and if psychology is to survive as
a science, one of many grant seeking scientific disci-
plines, the encouragement of psychobiological re-
search is one good way to do it
In closing, Dewsbury makes the comment, and it
is certainly as good as any I could make, that the
"complete psychobiologist" should seek whatever
explanations can be found through biological re-
search as long as he or she does not lose sight of the
fact that every psychologist's primary interest should
be the integrated behavior of the entire living, adapt-
ing, interacting organism.
References
Cole, M. & Cole, S. R. (1989). The dtvekpmcnt of
children. New York: Freeman.
Kantor, J.R. (1971). The evolution of mind. InJ.R.
Kantor(Ed.). Thtaimandprogrtssofpsycbokgyand
other sciences, Chicago: Prindpia Press.
Kuo,Z-Y(1967). The dynamics ofbthavior devekpment.
New York; Random House.
Meyer, A. (1986). Encykpedia Britennica (15th ed.)
(Vol. B, p. 83). Chicago: EncyclopediaBritannica,
Inc.

Niloof ar Afari
University of Nevada
Philosophy and psychology are two inseparable
scientific enterprises that have been plagued with the
problem of dualism throughout history. This dual-
ism, according to J. R. Kantor (1963; 1969), is the
product of the many contexts in which philosophy
and psychology were evolved. In The Scientific Evo-
lution ofPsycholegy(1963; I969)andinlttter&dbaviorol
Philosophy (1981), Kantor offers that the cultural,
social, political, and economic contexts of various
schools of thought, contribute to the naturalism or
supernaturalism of intellectual activity in a given
period (Kantor, 1981, pp. 44-45). Kantor concludes
that the systems of philosophy and psychology of the
present day are permeated with dualistic beliefs, aris-
ing from these contextual circumstances. Following
his historical analysis, Kantor offers a systemic phi-
losophy and a related psychology that are claimed to
be naturalistic and monistic (Kantor, 1959; 1981). In
this paper, the question is raised as to whether the
current cultural community will support naturalistic
science, including Interbehaviorism.
The State of the Cultural and
Scientific Community
Science, akin to political and economic systems,
is a social institution. This institution, while making
a mark on the culture, is also direcdy influenced by
the culture in which it exists. Presently, the cultural
context for scientific activity is dualistic. Dualism, in
turn is shaped by the social, political, and economic
climate of the times. A doser look at these conditions
and how spiritism is manifested in today's society,
may provide some evidence concerning the character
of psychology as a science.
Cultural Context
Kantor has made the case that in the past, factors
such as population size, form of government, life
circumstances, and other societal events, set the stage
for naturalistic, nonnaturalistic or mixed sciences. As
cultural circumstances become unstable, intellectual
enterprises become increasingly nonnaturalistic.
13
Presently, the cultural and societal factors in
most parts of the world are those that previously
have prevailed during nonnaturalistic periods, as
might be predicted by the instability in such societ-
ies. For example, the entire world's attention was
recently captured by the Gulf War, a war fought
6ver economic and political prowess. Worsening
sodoeconomic conditions for a majority of the
population have been the breeding ground for
lengthy revolutions'in many countries, induding
Ethiopia, El Salvador, and Lebanon. In the not too
distant past, the socially and economically op-
pressed people oflran sought refuge in a fundamen-
tal religious group to provide them with promised
freedom and the basic necessities of life. In Nicara-
gua, while the revolution for equality and freedom
was not led by religious groups, it was strongly aided
by the Catholic church (Randall, 1983).
Even in the United States, a vast group of people
must increasingly struggle to provide food, shelter
and adequate health care for themselves and their
families.
In accordance with Ranter's analysis of the
societal conditions giving rise to nonnaturalism in
sdence, as people's economic situation worsens,
their faith in god strengthens. In a recent Gallup
poll (1987), 85% of a national sample said that they
view religion as at least "fairly important" in their
own lives. 91% of this population reported a
religious preference, 71% believe in life after death,
and 94% believe in god.
Scientific Context
Inasmuch as the scientific community is a sub-
division of the larger culture, it is not surprising that
scientists' attitudes toward religion are similar to
dioseofnonscientists. For example, a survey of 425
behavioral psychologists, found that 80% reported
a religious preference, 77% try to live according to
religious principles and 46% said that their whole
approach to life is based upon their religion (Bergjn,
1990). It is not dear how such individuals can
participate as members of a naturalistic scientific
community during the week, and go home to
religious practices on the weekend,
In addition to explicitreligious beliefs, contem-
porary scientists incorporate religious doctrines of a
less obvious nature into their scientific theories.
14
Dualisiic institutions such as free wiU or the freedom
to choose actions still thrive in psychological theory.
Interest in the brain - the naturalized mind - as the
subject matter of psychology, provides another ex-
ample of this trend. These examples indicate a
lack of readiness on the part of contemporary western
culture to embrace a thoroughgoing naturalism in
science.
Religious institutions serve important functions
for members of society, among them a source of life
meaning. Presumably, the conditions that give rise to
religious belief have not disappeared: People are still
in search of meaning and validity in their lives.
A Natural Science of Psychology
Nonnaturai institutions are the main obstacles to
the advancement of philosophy and psychology,
according to Kantor, For this reason, Kantor has
attempted to articulate completely naturalistic per-
spectives in these domains.
In order for a naturalistic view to take hold, "a
complete change in intellectual culture" (Kantor,
1981, p. 343) is necessary. For Kantor, this means,
"rebuilding the foundations of thinking and reason-
ing-changing the system of postulates with respect to
man and his relations to the cultural milieu in which
he finds himself (1981, p. 343).
Herein lies the problem. Kantor himself-has
suggested that "if scientific psychology does not
universally prosper as against transcendental systems,
it is because the idealistic, or spiritistic ways of think-
ing are still too strong for a complete emancipation of
the majority of psychologists" (Kantor, 1969, p. 382).
Furthermore, how is any one scientist to construct a
naturalistic system outside of the influence of the
prevailing culture? Drawn into question, then, is the
naturalism of Kantor's own philosophy and
psychology.
Scientific work occurs in a cultural context. Pres-
ently, this context is dualistic, mainly due to the
political, economic and social needs of the people.
The science of psychology that has emerged within
this culture is also dualistic. Kantor explains that as
long as science is a linguistic activity, there is the risk
of "metaphysics as the disease of language" (Kantor,
1963, p. 48). Interbehaviorism attempts to minimize
this risk by emphasizing that the scientist is verbally
constructing an event which is continuous with but
different from the original event. Science, however,
is a social institution, and "the formulations of a novel
system with new postulates may or may not become
readily diffused" (Kantor, 1969, p. 382). What may
help in its acceptance, is specification of the notion
that Interbehaviorism itself and all other systems are
verbally constructed. On the social level, measures
can be taken to provide more cultural, political, and
economic stability for the greatest number of people.
While the cultural context of today has influenced
intellectual and scientific work, Interbehaviorism as a
naturalistic intellectual institution can also be influ-
ential in changing cultural practices.
References
Bergin, A. E. (1990). Religiosity of psychotherapists:
' A national survey. Psychotherapy, 27, 3-7.
The Gallup Report (1987). Rttighn in America (Re-
port No. 259). Princeton, NJ: The Gallup Orga-
nization.
Kantor,). R. (1959). Interbehaviordpsychology.
(2nd ed.). Bloomington: Principia Press.
Kantor,}. R (1963). The scientific evolution of
psychology. Volume 1. Chicago: Principia Press.
Kantor, J. R (1969). The scientific evolution of
psychology, Volume 2. Chicago:.Principia Press.
Kantor.J. R (1981). Interbehavfardphilosophy.
Chicago: Principia Press.
Randall, M. (1983). Christians in the Nicaraguan
revolution. Vancouver: New Star Books.

Occasionally circumstances arise which allow re-
searchers to pursue pragmatic purposes while simulta-
neously maintaining a coherence with their philo-
sophical agenda. Here at the University of Nevada,
we are currently involved in such a project.
Under contract with the State of Nevada, our
Behavior Analysis Program provides a number of
services to developmentally disabled clients in the
Reno area. One of our clients, who resides in an
institution, has displayed many dysfunctional behav-
ior patterns for several years. These behavior patterns
have been described as cyclical by the staffwho work
at the institution. Throughout the years, traditional
behavioral methods of analyzing these patterns have
not yielded descriptions of their contextual circum-
stances which allow for better interactions with this
client Our current research effort involves examin-
ing this client's interactions within their specific con-
texts. In order to accomplish this, undergraduates
have been trained to observe and record coded inter-
actions using a palmtop computer. The data acquisi-
tion phase of this project entails the recording of
coded interactions for a period of 4 weeks, on an 18
hour per day schedule, corresponding with the wak-
ing hours of the client.
We see the use of a programmable DOS based
palmtop PC (Hewlett Packard 95LX) as a technologi-
cal improvement over the limited flexibility of a
dedicated event recorder. Rather than being limited
to a few fixed events the programmable palmtop is
limited only by the number of codes that the observ-
ers are capable of mastering. The software, that was
created specifically for this project by the researchers
records coded interactions via a QWERTY keyboard
using mnemonic codes (e.g., V = crying) and all
15
interactions are recorded in real time. The data are
recorded in a usable format which can be directly
uploaded via modem to either another PC or the
University mainframe. This eliminates the burden-
some (and often error ridden) task of entering data for
later analysis. , .
The planned analysis of these data will provide
some unique opportunities to examine the client's
interactions from an interbehavioral perspective. In
addition to the usual frequency counts, distributions,
and resultant graphs, the software will generate graphi-
cal representations of the interactions on a moment-
to-moment basis as they evolve from one field into
the next. This will be accomplished in much the same
way as meteorological graphics on the nightly news.
Advances in technology represented by the intro-
duction of the palmtop PC, combined with sophisti-
cated software capable of representing data consistent
with an interbehavioral perspective, may make it
possible to mount research projects which demand a
more thorough analysis of the circumstances in which
behavior interactions transpire than was heretofore
possible.
Duane C. Lord
Mark A. Swain
Linda J. Hayes
 Volume 20 1992 Number 1

EDITOR
Linda J. Hayes, University of Nevada
PAST EDITORS The Agora
Noel W, Smith, Vols 1-7(1970-1978) Interbehavioral Sessions at ABA
Ronald G. Heyduk, Vols 8-11 (1978-1983) News and Notes
Edward K. Morris, Vois 12-17 (1983-1989) That Little Extra

ADVISORY BOARD Articles f

Sidney W. Bijou, University of Arizona

Steven C. Hayes. Field theory and the legitimacy
Donna M. Cone, State of Rhode Island
of causal constructions 5
Dennis). Delprato,<#fera Michigan Unw.
Patrick Ghezzi, University of Arizona.
Sandy Hobbs, Paisley College of Technology
Mark A. Swain. Consciousness Reconsidered 8
Edward K. Morris, University of Kansas
PaulT, Mountjoy, Western Michigan Unw.
N. H. Pronko, Wichita State University
Roger D. Ray, Rollins College
Emilio Ribes, University of Guadalajara
Robert G, Wahler, University of Tennessee
MANAGING EDITOR
Steven C. Hayes, University of Nevada
ASSISTANT EDITORS
Debra "W. Fredericks, Kenneth Huntley,
Ramona Houmanfar, DuaneC. Lord, Cynthia
Reinbold, David G. Stroffe, Mark A, Swain,
GinaToubouras University of Nevada

ISSN 8755-612X
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Interbehavioral Psychology behavioral psychology, all by J.R. Kantor, are listed
ISSN8755-612X below. Check your bookshelves, and those of your
library and bookstore, for possible oversights. In
Linda J. Hayes, Editor addition, the books make excellent gifts for colleagues
Department of Psychology and students, especially for the latter in honor of their
University of Nevada completed degree requirements. The books may be
. Reno, Nevada 89557, U.S.A. purchased directly from Principia Press, 5743 Kimbark
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tion. As such, the newsletter supplements contempo- Psycfjology (2 vols) $40.00
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newsletter strongly encourages submission of notes The Aim and Progress of Psychology
about current professional activities of its subscribers, and Other Sciences $20.00
news and observations about interbehavioral psy- Interbehavioral Philosophy $27.50
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 Interbehavioral Sessions at the
Association for Behavior Analysis
San Francisco Hyatt Regency
May 24-28, 1992
(Editor's note: We have included sessions known
or thought to have an interbehavioral
orientation. We apologize for any mis-
characterizations and omissions.)
Monday, May 25
4:00-5:20pm PACIFIC O
The concept of context in the description of behavior
Chair: Edward K. Morris (University of Kansas)
The concept of context in the conceptual analysis of
behavior. Edward K. Morris (University of Kansas)
The concept of context in the experimental analysis
of behavior. Bryan D. Midgley (University of
Kansas)
The concept of context in applied behavior analysis.
Pete Peterson (University of Kansas)
Summing up: The generic nature of the concept of
context. Edward K. Moms (University of Kansas)
8:30-10:30pm GOLDEN GATE
ABA EXPO
Interbehaviorists in ABA
(Please stop by and say hello)
Tuesday, May 26
ll:00-ll:30am PACIFIC K
Some thoughts on complex human behavior and
its relation to conditional discrimination
procedures. Emilio Ribes-Inesta (University of
Guadalajara, Mexico)
ll:00-12:50pm PACIFIC O
Behaviorism, and naturalism
Chair: Noel W. Smith (State University of New
York-Piattsburgh)
Discussant: Donna M. Cone (University of Rhode
Island)
Naturalism and psychological science. Paul T.
Mountjoy (Western Michigan University)
Behaviorism re-defined: Subjectivity re-examined.
Parker E. Lichtenstein (Denison University)
Scientific status of mental and spiritual powers
from the standpoint of the new science and
liberal religion. Dennis J. Delprato (Eastern
Michigan University)
Toward a naturalistic psychology. Noel W, Smith
(State University of New York-Plattsburgh) &
Lance L. Smith (University of California-Berkeley)
12:30-2:00pm GOLDEN GATE
Poster session
#31 Comparative analysis of game manipulations
in the Oregon and Arizona lotteries: Ticket
sales as a function of game adjustments.
Charles A. Lyons (Eastern Oregon State College)
& Patrick M. Ghezzi (University of Arizona)
1:00-1:50pm PACIFIC A
Interbehaviorists in ABA Special Interest Group
Meeting
Chairs: Linda J. Hayes & Debra W. Fredericks
(University of Nevada)
Purpose: To function as an opportunity for
interbehaviorists to discuss issues of common
interest as well as help one another solve
problems peculiar to the interbehaviorai
perspective in psychology and philosophy.
Agenda:
1. Election of officers;
2. Convention report and plans;
3. The Interbehaviorist report;
4. Student issues;
5. interbehavioral news and notes;
6. Discussion.
Wednesday, May 27
ll:00-12;50pm PACIFIC O
Are private events private?
Chair: Mark A. Swain (University of Nevada)
Discussant: Elliot Bonem (Eastern Michigan
University)
Constructs and events in theory formulation: -
Implications for psychology. Kelly G. Wilson
(University of Nevada)
Privacy and the distinction between psychological
and non-psychological events. Dennis J.
Delprato (Eastern Michigan University)
The privacy construct as a stumbling point in
psychology. Noel W. Smith (State University of
Neio York-Plattsburgh)
In praise of "subtle events". Linda J. Hayes
(University of Nevada)
l;00-2:50pm PACIFIC K
Mechanism and contextualism compared
Chair; Peter Harzem (Auburn University)
Discussants: A..Charles Catania (University of
Maryland-Baltimore County) & Gary Novak
(California State University-Stanislaus)
What it would be like to be a mechanist. Edward
K Morris (University of Kansas)
The straw machine as tar baby. M.Jackson Marr
(Georgia Institute of Technology)
l:00-2:50pm SEACLIFF
Current technologies in interbehavioral data collection
Chairs: Tom Sharpe (University of Nebraska) &
James J. Fox (East Tennessee State University)
Discussant; Donald M. Baer (University of Kansas)
Field systems technological applications: Teacher
education strategies and tactics. Tom Sharpe
(University of Nebraska) & Andrew Hawkins
(West Virginia University)
An approach to measuring interbehavipral fields
within early educational environments. Judith
J. Carta & Jane B. Atwater (Juniper Gardens
Children's Project/University of Kansas)
Computerized data acquisition and analysis of
multi-dimensional behavior. Duane C. Lord,
Mark A. Swain & Linda J. Hayes (University of
Nevada)
Thursday, May 28
10:30-12;00pm GOLDEN GATE
Poster Session
#29 A peer-mediated intervention for enhancing
conversations between normally developing
and educably retarded children. Patrick M.
Ghezzi, Sidney W. Bijou, Elias Robles
(University of Arizona)
ll:00-12:50pm PACIFIC G
Are all data useful? Behavior analytic, medical and
psychotberapeutic perspectives,
Chair: Ramona Houmanfar (University of Nevada)
Discussant: John D. Cone (United States
International University)
A functional analysis of how data can
insubstantiate intuition. Ramona Houmanfar
& Linda J. Hayes (University of Nevada)
Behavioral data and pharmacology: Real concerns
regarding illusory beliefs. Debra W. Fredericks,
Linda J. Hayes, Dee Ann M. Radcliffe &
Jacqueline E. Collins (University of Nevada)
Clients and clinicians: Whose behavior needs
changing anyway? Niloofar Afari & Kelly
Wilson (University of Nevada)
News and Notes
Sidney W. Bijou and Patrick Ghezzi have co-
authored a useful text entitled Outline off. R,
Kantor's Psychological Linguistics, which is
being published by Principia Press and will be
available in time for the fall semester.
Marion White McPherson, of the Archives of the
History of Psychology, has authored an article
that may be of interest to interbehaviorists
entitled Ispsydwlogy the science of behavior? This
article appears in the February 1992 issue of the
American Psychologist.
Context Press has just published two new books of
interest: Hayes, S. C. & Hayes, L. J. (Eds.),
Understanding Verbal Relations, and Leigland,
S. (Ed.), Radical Behaviorism: WillardDay on
Psychology and Philosophy. The Context Press
address is listed on Page 2.
That Little Extra
The Interbehaviorist thanks the following persons
who contributed a little extra when renewing
their subscriptions for 1992:
James Herrick
Charles Lyons
Ed Morris
 Steven C. Hayes
Univerisity of Nevada
The present paper argues that from a field
theoretical viewpoint 1. causality has no ontologi-
cal status, and 2. causal talk has a place in basic
and applied science. The contradiction between
these two points is removed when the general and-
ontologies! nature of field theory is explored.
Causality in the World
In a field theoretical account of psychology,
causality cannot be said to exist in the world. That
is because, within this perspective, all events are to
be seen as situated in a context, and no contextual
event that participates in a field can be said to be
irrelevant, by definition. When the totality of the
field is described, the nature of each participant is
defined in terms of all others. Thus, for example,
the statement "the spark caused the explosion"
assumes combustible material, oxygen, tempera-
turej and so on. When all of these arejncluded in
the analysis one can only say that there was an
explosion that included the participation of sparks,
combustible material, oxygen, temperature, and so
on. None of these participants caused the whole
event, rather the working together of all these
participants is the event.
If it is true that causality cannot be said to exist
in the world, it is also incorrect to say "causality
does not exist in the world" and to mean this as an
ontological statement of what does and does not
exist. Let me explain,
The Realness of Events
From a thoroughgoing field theoretical view-
point, while (as a matter of postulation) the world
is real, there can be no grounds upon which to
assert the reality of any specific event in the world.
Quite simply, no event can be said to exist, if we
mean this ontologically. This is because any
statement about anything is itself an action that is
situated in a context. The action of analysis - of
identifying events - cannot step outside of the field
in which that action occurs.
Any attempt to claim reality status for the
referents of statements is an attempt to appeal
either to some other event outside of the present
field or to a special status for a current participant.
Suppose I say "I am now referring to something
that is real." What is the role of the "realness" of
the referent in the statement. The "realness" of the
event could be a priori and separable from the
participants in the statement. For example, if I say
"Buicks exist" 1 could defend the truth of the
statement by asserting that there truly are cars
called Buicks. I could take an observer to a Buick
dealer and point to the cars. But in this defense,
the issue of realness is being argued outside of the
field that was directly involved in the particular
claim made by a particular individual. This
method of argument'violates a field theoretical
perspective, and in the same way as does claiming
there are causal events in the world. "Realness" is
not a thing that has causal properties over behav-
ior, or that can be viewed independently of behav-
ior. The question of "realness" must bear on the
participants in the field that included the statement
"Buicks exist." We are not speaking of some other
field - we are speaking of this one.
Speaking of this field presents another prob-
lem. The "realness" of events could involve an
appeal to some special property of a participant.
Perhaps "realness" is a quality of particular events
more than others and this quality has some special
role in certain statements. From a field theoretical
view, any claim that gives special status to some
participants over others in a field should be viewed
as illegitimate, because all participants participate.
No participants can be any more real than any
other.
Analysis as Construction
An act of analysis is an act of verbal construc-
tion. Construction is not the same as discovery.
The metaphor of discovery assumes that the event
is already there before "the cover is taken ofF and
it is Mis-covered." But we have no reason to
suppose that events pre-exist as events, indepen-
dently of our history with regard to them. This is
not. to say that construction occurs in a vacuum.
From a thoroughgoing field theoretical perspective,
an act of analysis is occurring in and with the one
world - the "real" world. The realness of the world
is a matter of postulation, not an empirical matter.
When we make reality claims for talk about
events we are claiming that the event was already
there as an event and our. talk corresponds with it.
But.the context in which there is an event at all is
also historical and situational. For example, when
I show an observer the Buicks in the car lot,-this at
least assumes a history with visual stimulation or
visual categorization, if not a more specific history
with automobiles. When we make reality claims
for statements by saying that "the event was already
there, waiting to be discovered" we ignore these
contextual participants. When they are included
we have no independent access to any event
What I am asserting is that no ontological
claims of any land are legitimate within a thor-
oughgoing form of field theoretical psychology
because such .claims always reduce themselves to
some form of correspondence in which particular
participants in an interaction are illegitimately
given special status - causal or otherwise (Hayes, L.
J., in press). We cannot step outside of the world
and view our acts of analysis as direct avenues to
anything. They begin and remain as situated
actions. Thus, there can be no legitimate claim to
a reality basis for particular forms of talk.
Talk as Doing
Some may view these assertions as solopcistic
or mystical. Those used to justifying talk on the
basis of its "basis in reality" might ask "Given this
view, why do we speak?" It is because some verbal
actions are more useful than others, quite apart
from our analysis of the reality basis of these
actions. On the basis of experience it is evident
that there are ways that the world works and that
our talk about the world makes a difference. That
fact diat the world works as it does, however, is not
an avenue to "reality" conceived of as preorganized
events awaiting dis-covery. Instead, the working of
the world is simply a context for speaking.
If speaking is always ultimately pragmatic, then
we must examine any truth claim no.t in terms of
its reality basis but in terms of its utility (Hayes, S.
C., Hayes, L. J., & Reese, 1986). I return now to
the statement "the spark caused the explosion."
The word "cause" in this statement is invalid -
from a field theoretical viewpoint - if it is taken to
be a statement about the existence of events in the
world. But so -1 am claiming - are the words
"spark" or "explosion." The world is not divided
up apriori into two classes of events called sparks
and non-sparks, and if it were there would be no
way for us to know that. The presence of
"sparkness" in a field is a reflection of our unique
histories with regard to the abstraction of aspects of
a totality. If we could see only infrared radiation,
"sparks" might be in the same class as "friction" -
in this case there might be only one event, not
two. If we could see only gravity there might be
no event at all. Whether we are dealing with no
events, one event, two events, or an infinity of
events is not a matter of the world but of our
interaction with it. For us to claim "oh no, sparks
and friction are really separate" or "oh no, sparks
really do exist" - as if it is the real world we.are
speaking of when we speak - is to impose our
history upon the world when it is only through
that history that events can be abstracted as events
at all.
Those who field theorists who think that
scientists must speak ontologically are lead inexora-
bly into silence. Instead of "the spark caused the
explosion" we would have to say nothing at all
(Hayes, L. J., in press). This would be absurd and
would also be inconsistent with a field theoretical
account because we would then be giving the view
"scientists must speak ontologically" some reality
status such that it would dominate over all other
aspects of a situation. It is evident to any experi-
enced human that speaking makes a difference. A
person who claims otherwise might as well claim
that it does not hurt to be hit by a 2 by 4. If such a

claim is made in front of me, I wi!l be quite happy
to test the claim via a vigorous whack to the head.
There is a real world (by postulation); there is a
way that things work (by experience); some talk is
more useful than others (by experience). None of
this is an avenue to the reality of events qua events.
Utility
What is meant by "talk is useful"? Usefulness
is not a thing. It makes sense only relative to the
desirability of given outcomes. What is useful with
regard to one goal is useless with regard to another.
Thus, if all talk is only pragmatic the best we can
do is to state naked and in the wind, so to speak
- what we are trying to do and to get on about
doing it. We cannot justify ours goals and we
cannot evaluate them except in a limited sense
(Hayes, S. C. & Brownstein, 1986). We can only
declare them.
Measured against some goals, causal talk can be
quite legitimate. Causal talk is useful when the
purpose of talk about events is change in these
events. Causal talk always assumes some partici-
pants and focuses on others. When I say "the
spark caused the explosion" I am saying "avoid
sparks if you wish to avoid explosions." Such talk
is not making an ontological claim/or at least it
should not be. This particular causal construction
(the cause was a spark) would only be useful when
cdmbustible material, oxygen, temperature, and so
on do not vary enough in the current context to
provide useful guidance to a listener with regard to
the avoidance of explosions. Conversely, if I am
welding combustible metal in a vacuum and there
is an explosion, I might say "the loss of vacuum
caused the explosion." With regard to avoiding
explosions, sparks become context when welding,
joining other contextual features such as heat or
combustible material. In terms of the goals of
causal constructions these contextual features are
no longer an issue. Instead the causal issue now"
focuses on the ways that oxygen can participate in
the situation.
Stripped of its ontological claim, causal talk is
especially useful only when control of phenomena
is a goal of analysis. There can be no basis, how-
ever, to argue that causal talk is relevant only to
applied science and not to basic science (Kantoir,
7
1961). This would be true only if basic science
wwworhave the goal of control of the phenomena
of interest. Such an assertion would be dogmatic,
however, because there are no non-dogmatic
grounds to argue that some goals are more legiti-
mate than others. Basic science need not have
control as a goal, and when it does not, causal talk
will not be helpful. But it can have such a goal. It
is perfectly Ultimate to have such a goal. And when
it does causal talk can be helpful.
The careful avoidance of causal talk can be
useful if control is not a goal and one wishes to
take a descriptive approach. Part of the value of
field theoretical perspectives lie in the way that
they focus our attention on features of a total
phenomenon that are often missed in normal
discourse. Even then, however, we must not let
ontology creep in through the descriptive door.
There are no "events" to describe independently of
our histories with regard to the abstraction of
events, and the pragmatic impact of such abstrac-
tion can only be seen in transitions from one field
to another field.
Conclusion
I have argued that any attack on causal talk is
inconsistent with field theory unless the attack
simply specifies the pragmatic weakness of causal
talk as measured against a particular valued out-
come. Indeed, making room for causal talk is
helpful to field theoretical perspectives because it
can help innoculate adherents more generally
against unwarranted reality claims.
References
Hayes, L. J. (in press). Reality and truth. In S. C.
Hayes, H, W. Reese, & T. R. Sarbin (Eds.), The
varieties of scientific contextualism. Reno, NV;
Context Press.
Hayes, S. C. & Brownstein, A. J. (1986). Mentalism,
behavior-behavior relations and a behavior ana-
lytic view of the purposes of science. The
Behavior Analyst, 9, 175-190.
Hayes, S. C., Hayes, L. J., & Reese, H. W. (1988).
Finding the philosophical core: A review of Ste-
phen C. Pepper's World Hypotheses. Journal
of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 50,
97-111.
Kantor,J. R. (1961). Inter behavioral psychology.
Chicago: Principia Press.
 Mark A. Swain
Univerisity. of Nevada
A problem exists in behavior analysis. It is not a
new problem and has proven itself to be a vexatious
thorn which nobody has removed. This problem has
created riffs betweenpsychologiststhatstand staunchly
impervious to attempts at resolve. The problem is
consciousness. In the following pages I would like to
clarify my philosophical positioning on the topic of
consciousness as it relates to the scientific study of
behavior. This topic has been chosen because it
seems to be present in the most deep-rooted discords
that exist between behaviorism and traditional psy-
chologies^
Behavioral Science and Traditional
Psychology
To most psychologists, behaviorism is a hopeless
post-positivistic and crude analysis of motor move-
ment - rat psychology, lever presses and food-pellets.
However, for those intimately involved there is a
richness and beauty which far exceeds these common
descriptions of our science. Yet, we seem to compart-
mentalize ourselves into a tiny group, studying what
interests us and publishing in "behavioral journals"
which "behaviorists" read - while at the same time
reserve little room in our intellectual harbor for so-
called "mentalism". Is it possible that we too tend to
limit our understanding of other psychological fields
as they limit ours. Perhaps a conceptual reconstruc-
tion of consciousness is in order.
Denial of Consciousness
Watson (1925, p. 3) criticized introspection and
claimed that "consciousness is neither a definable nor
a usable concept; that it is merely another word for
"soul" of more ancient times." Zuriff(1985, p. 15)
also recapitulates that the behaviorist movement for
the most part rejects the notion of consciousness "as
some non-physical substance" which is a left over
"residue from earlier unscientific mystical belief in
spirit or soul.*1 Perhaps the rejection of consciousness
is a wise scientific decision for which credit should be
due. Then again, where are the prizes and accolades
from the rest of psychology and the scientific commu-
nity? .Why are the masses not impressed with our
rejection of consciousness? Perhaps Klein, (1984)
echqes some of this sentiment, when he makes the
claim .that Watson railed to recognize a "dividing line
between man and brute.*1 Ironically, these were
Watson's actual words, he indeed, saw no dividing
line. Watson was emphatic that his reactions against
consciousness was areaction against the longstanding
religious tradition of dualism. It is still true that
behavioristic reaction against consciousness is in part
their reaction against dualism (e.g., Kantor, 1924)
however, some see this as an over reaction and there-
fore dismiss behaviorism and behavioristic over-reac-
tivity (Lycan, 1987). If we are being dismissed perhaps
we should investigate. The notion that behaviorists
are "right" and everybody else is "wrong" (although
romantic) is a dogma that we need to address.
Both Stephenson, (1953) and Zuriff, (1985) ques-
tion the tactics by which consciousness is rejected by
the behavioral movement. Stephenson laments that
the rejection of consciousness has also resulted in the
neglect of studying "personal subjectivity".
Stephenson (1953, p. 87) went on to say... "[behav-
iorists] take pride in ridding themselves of subjectiv-
ity: a corpse would be more welcome at a wedding
than anything subjective in a conditioning experi-
ment" Zuriff (1985, p. 15) contends similarly, that
behaviorists tend to question the ontological status of
consciousness, while at the same time, address meth-
odological problems associated with it's study, namely,
that it cannot be studied "objectively." If the onto-
logical existence of consciousness is questioned or
denied, why then are methodological concerns at
issue? Perhaps there is contusion as to what is meant
by the word "consciousness.** This is my position.
The Meaning of Consciousness
Although some contend that consciousness ex-
ists ontologically as anon-physical entity (Underwood
and Stevens, 1981, p. vii) my radically naturalistic
 positioningholds that consciousness, conscious, con-
science, knowing, awareness, experience, and subjec-
tivity are all interbehavior. Therefore, investigative
efforts may (and should) be applied to their descrip-
tion. As Kendon Smidi (1969) wrote, "the history of
science attests plainly to the fact that any investigative
effort gets along better if it knows exactly what it is
talking about" therefore, we continue with just this
task.
The Etymology of Consciousness
- The following definitional talk comes from the
Oxford English Dictionary (unless otherwise noted).
Consciousness refers to "joint or mutual knowledge"
not to an entity. Conscience is derived from the Latin
conscire"con- together+scire to know; thus conscire
... to know along with another...[or]... to know with
oneself only." St. Thomas Aquinas also refers to this
definition of conscience in his 13 th century essays on
"truth" arid he further refers to conscience as "the
application of knowledge to something** he also
specifically refers to conscience as an act "conscience
cannot denote any special habit or power, but desig-
nates the act itself." Knowledge or know is derived
from the Latin cognoscere meaning to "know by the
senses" - the definition refers to "perceive (a thing or
person) as identical with one perceived beforeto
recognke.,.ordistinguish(onething)from(another).M v '
This definition of "know" straddles much of what
behaviorists mean when they say "matching to
sample." Therefore, knowing implies some act of
discrimination., Consciousness must therefore refer
(in part) to discriminative behavior. The dictionary
also implies that conscious and awareness are syn-
onyms. The definition of awareness then refers one
back to consciousness in the following manner -
The quality or state of being aware; consciousness."
The word consciousness also is related by nomencla-
ture to conscious experience. Experience is derived
from the Latin experientia which translates Mto try,
put to the test thus one is.not surprized to find the
following definition of experience: "The action of
putting to the test." Therefore it is submitted that "to
put into experience" is to "put into action."
This etymological description implies that the
word consciousness, and it's cognates conscience,
know, awareness, and experience all are denned by
some sort of action or behavior. Why then is there a
long tradition upheld by behaviorists of referring to
. these words in italics as if they were impure or implied
something unscientific? Skinner, (1953) and Kantor,
(1924) were both adamant that these constructs were
troublesome because they were too often reified by
traditional philosophies and then transmutated into
entities which somehow transcended events. Skinner
used the term "explanatory fictions" to refer to inner
constructs which are used to explain behavior. Kantor
(1969) was clear when he wrote "...all psychological
activities are directly observable and can be described
without reference to consciousness and introspec-
tion." Ryle (1949, p. 13) stated that "as the faces of
coins are eitherheads or tails...so, it is supposedysome
existing is physical existing, other existing is mental
existing." The problem of consciousness is that it has
been traditionally condemned to a non-physical
mental existence.
Evolutional Continuity
Naturalists who adhere to a monistic philosophy
have argued that there is no reason to assume that
there exists both a physical realm and a non-physical
realm (e.g., Kantor, 1924,1926; Ryle, 1949). Kantor
(1959, p. 43) developed what he termed a Schema of
Evolutional Continuity which was designed to reveal,
outwardly, that only physical things and events exist.
The first evolution encompasses the development of
the planets, stars, chemical elements, chemical com-
pounds and the various chemical processes and was
thus referred to as inorganic evolution. The second
evolution entails phylogenetic evolution which com-
prises the evolution of organism-environment adjust-
ments and adaptations along with the evolution of
species, genera phyla and the further development of
the planets. The third evolution (Ontogenetic Evolu-
tion) consists of the "embryological development of
individual organisms". The forth evolution
(Interbehavior History) involves the "evolution of
acts, traits as responses to objects, conditions, and
institutions and the development of stimulus and
response functions." Kantor, (1959) used this con-
tinuum to argue that all interbehavior is continuous
with all other interbehavior and all sciences are related
by this continuity. Kantor(1959, p. 42) went on to say
"There is no point, in other words, where transpatial
processes suddenly .appear^ for example 'conscious-
ness'. If anything actual is meant by the term 'con-
sciousness1 itmustbe aninterbehavioralfield". Globus
(1976, p. 290) made a similar argument when he stated
"...there is no place to arbitrarily draw a line (or even
a range) in a hierarchy of systems increasing in com-
plexity, above which we can say that mind occurs and
below which it does not." Ryle(1949,p, 199)similarly
10
commented: "Nothing but confusion is achieved by
labeling worlds after particular avocations." This is
precisely the problem with the traditional
conceptualization of consciousness, it has been de-
fined as "unobservable and intangible, hence known
only through its manifestations" (Kantor, 1924, p.
32).
The Diphaneity of Epiphenomenalism
The traditional separation of consciousness from
worldly events has been associated with Descartes.
Stephenson (1980, p. 885) suggested "...over the
:
centuries, until the time of Descartes, conscious was
a matter of being conscious with... [meaning shared
knowledge] ... Descartes changed this in his separa-
tion of mind and matter by putting what had hitherto
been completely public (but unmentioned) ... into
each and everyone's.own unshareable mind, as con-
sciousness, unsharable with anyone." The 1900th
century epiphenomenalistic view of consciousness,
althoughmore naturalistic, accommodated non-physi-
cal consciousness by viewing it as a by-product of
brain metabolism. This "by-product" consciousness
although the product of a physical system was postu-
lated as having no reciprocal effect on it's physical
originator. As Huxley (taken from James, 1890, p.
135) remarked, "...consciousness would appear to be
related to... body simply as a collateral product of it's
working, ... without any power of modifying that
working ... there is no proof that any state of con-
sciousness is the cause of change,,., the brain... is the
immediate cause." This theory, known as the Con-
scious Automation-Theory, clearly allows for the
non-physical consciousness, however, impugns any
scientific investigation towards its understanding be-
cause of its superfluous, non-causal, existence.
James (1890, p. 147) questioned the
epiphenomenalists portrayal of consciousness, be-
lieving that consciousness must serve^ome biological
function. The Jamesian perspective heavily inspired
by Darwinian evolutional thinking postulated con-
sciousness as an agent that navigated complex
adjustmental interactions. This regulative function of
consciousness was thought to be necessary in order to
provide direction to the.brain, which was, according
to James, biologically unstable. James (1890, p. 144)
refers to the instability of the brain in the following
passage,K. ..let consciousness only be what it seems to
itself, and it will help an uns table brain to compass i ts
proper ends." James argued that the cerebral hemi-
spheres were so intricate and complex that they could
not possibly operate as to keep Man alive without
some selecting agency. As James (1890, p. 144)stated;
The brain is an instrument of possibilities, but of no
certainties. But the consciousness, with its own ends
present to it, and knowing also well which possibilities
lead thereto and which away; will, if endowed with
causal efficacy, reinforce the favorable possibilities
. and repress the unfavorable or indifferent ones."
Although, James agreed that consciousness was
an epiphenomenon of brain activity, (like that of
Conscious Automation Theory) he vehemently op-
. posed the view that it did not fimctionin a causal role.
However, James (1890) denied that there exists some
pure conscious "stuff detached from all physical
: coordinates* -According to James, (1890) "I believe
.that 'consciousness,' when once it has evaporated to
this estate of pure diphaneity, is on the point of
disappearing,;. It is the name of a nonentity, and has
no place among first principles." James appears to
have sat on the fence, not willing to give up dualism
yet not willing to attribute all psychological processes
to it. Kantor (1924, p. 32) viewed this type of position
as "...a last refuge and sanctuary into which the
psychologist plans to escape from responsibility... of
interpreting his facts and making them into definite
materials of natural science." Today, behavioral
psychology still is reliant on the biology of the organ-
ism to account for certain behavioral phenomena
such as reinforcement "sensitivities" which suppos-
edly are passed phylogenetically to aid in species
survival. Consciousness and private events have also
been given to biology. It seems that psychology
.(including behavior analysis) has a prolonged history
of giving its unexplained to biological science.
Biological Tradition
As. Skinner (1989, p. 60) mentioned, "a central
issue in early behaviorism was the existence of con-
sciousness" - this he explains was a product of cultural
bias towards the preoccupation with internal explana-
tory agents. Skinner (1953, p. 258) also commented
on dualistic culture when he described the "distin-
guished men" and their efforts to describe the struc-
ture of the universe: The scientists humbly admits
that he is describing only half of the universe, and he
defers to another world ... a world of mind and
consciousness... for which another mode of inquiry
is assumed to be required. Such a point of view is by
no means inevitable, but it is part of the cultural
heritage from which science has emerged." However,
Skinner (1953,1989) does not explain consciousness,

private events, or mental events entirely by cultural
tradition, instead he urges that they are in fact biologi-
cal. According to Skinner; (1953, p. 281) "The
modern counterpart of the study of mental events in
a world of consciousness is the study of the action of
receptors and the afferent and central nervous system
... [and] ... "I preferred radical behaviorism, which
accepted the existence of private states, but as states of
the body, the study of which should be left to the
physiologist (Skinner, 1989, p. 110)." Behaviorism
has been sharply criticized for its reliance on physiol-
ogy to explain its so-called private events (e.g., Kantor,
1947). Ryle, (1949, p. 12) explained the situation as:
"They [episodes of private occurrences] can be in-
spected neither by introspection nor by laboratory
experiment. They are theoretical shuttlecocks which
are forever being bandied from the physiologist back
to the psychologist and from the psychologist back to
the physiologist. I suggest that Ryle is correct in his
humorous, yet, scathing assessment. Behavior analy-
sis has, like James, sacrificed its own to biology.
Event-Bounded Consciousness
Science and Meta-Physics
It is not appropriate to assert that science does not deal
with meta-physical content. Scientist-philosophers
have been grappling with meta-physical queries for at
least two thousand years. There is a difference in
explaining things and events meta-physically, and
explaining things and events which are referred to as,
meta-physical. I submit that consciousness has long
been referred to as meta-physical, explained meta-
physically, but is not necessarily, meta-physical.
For the duration of this paper, I will describe the_
categorical mistake associated with consciousness,
provide a naturalistic conception of consciousness,
and then address the issue of psychological subjectiv-
ity.
Category Mistakes
For those who reject dualism (or safely assume it
does not impact scientific -lawfulness) a mistake re-
lated to die first is suspected. Ryle (1949, p. 16)
depicted a scene where a visitor is given a complete
tour of the Oxford campus. During this tour, the '"
visitor sees the beautiful buildings, meets the people,
goes to the libraries, views the museums, goes to the
sporting fields, etc. Yet when the tour is completed,
asks, "But where is the University?" According to
Ryle, (1949, p. 16) the visitor has erroneously as-
sumed diat the University is another element in the
set of elements which comprise the university. This
11
he refers to as a "category mistake." I suspect the same
occurs when the behavior analyst studies die behavior
of an organism in ail its delicate elements of anteced-
ent control, response topographies, operant develop-
ment, consequential control, schedule performance,
discriminative control, elicitati'on, conditionedstimuli,
habituation, potentiation, stimulus gradients, gener-
alization, differential reinforcement, reflexes, condi-
tional reflexes, etc., yet, then is asked, "But where is
consciousness?" Hopefully, the behavioranalystwill
say, "everything I study is what we refer to when we
use the word consciousness. There is no separate
category called consciousness. You see, I cannot pick
it up and show it to you. That would be a silly
notion!" In the words of Karl Lashley^ (1954, p. 425)
"There is no one criterion of consciousness."
Coordinates of Consciousness
If one were to map a brain using a Cartesian
coordinate system, the brain would be extended with
definite parameters. However, if one wished to map
consciousness on the same coordinate system, con-
sciousness, would be unextended. To explain, ex-
tended implies that something must be "here" and
not "there", therefore it must have parameters, if not,
it is spatially unextended. Unextended therefore
implies that the "object" in question is either "no
where" or "everywhere" (Globus, 1976, p. 278). Con-
sciousness I submit is unextended, in both defini-
tional senses. If one speaks of consciousness as a
meta-physical entity (a super naturalistic choice deter-
miner) then it is unextended in the sense that it is "no
where" - simply a fictional substance, like phlogisten.
However, if one speaks of consciousness as complex
interbehavior, then it is "everywhere."
Criterion of Consciousness
In order for something to be (or act as) conscious,
itmust be physically extended, it must be somewhere.
Therefore, it is possible that there exists a continuum
of consciousness which parallels Kantor*s Schema of
Evolutional Continuity. The rock sitting on a hill
satisfies the first criterion of consciousness. If one
wishes to recognize the rocks "thereness" and specify
;thardie first criterion is satisfied, so be it. However,
psychologically we mean more when we speak of
consciousness. We must also have a Jiving creature.
A living creature is defined by "an object which will
absorb substances from some environment and syn-
thesize from them a replication of each of the sub-
stances which comprise the object" (Smith 1958).
Thirdly, in order to psychologically be spoken of in
12
terms of consciousness the living organism must
demonstrate cognoscere - "to know by the senses" - to
discriminate. Therefore, if something is (1) physically
extended, (2) a living object and (3) can discriminate,
it can be spoken of in terms of consciousness. In this
fashion, consciousness need not be denied.
This conception does not violate any behavioral
or scientific principles. Behavior is what behaviorists
proudly study - and yes, it is conscious behavior. We
do riot study dead non-conscious bodies rollingdown
hills or falling to the ground. We do, however, study
situated activities of living organisms. .Therefore, the
behaviorists hope for a continuity between the or-
ganic and inorganic sciences is recognized and sup-
ported. Consciousness does not represent anything
non-material that differs radically from that of which
other sciences investigate. Consciousness is not an
entity, kdoesnotguide, it does notinterpret, or cause.
It just is.
Scientific Subjectivity
The area of subjectivity seems to have little credit
in the behavioral movement (Zuriff, 1985). Perhaps,
subjective reports remind us too much of the tradi-
tional introspection offered as a means of accessing
some inner world of consciousness or mentality. The
psychological concept of inner and outer is a distinc-
tion that has outlived its usefulness. The notion that
some behaviors^are outward (or public) and some are
inward (thus private) is another verbal bifurcation of
nature which has not yielded much in the way of
understanding. The traditional dualistic "inner and
outer" distinction is elementary, yet, non-sense, as
Ryle (1949, p. 12) explains, the "antithesis of outer
and inner is of course meant to be construed as a
metaphor, since minds, not being in space, could not
be described as being spatially inside anything else, or
as having things going on spatially inside themselves."
If the distinction between traditional "outer and
inner** is rejected by behavioralists why then is the
distinction between public and private so important
to behavioral psychology? Especially, in light that it
has been decided that private events are events for the
physiologist to study! Perhaps, it is important to take
a lesson from Bretando, who recommended that
psychology.stand on its own, and explain actions on
psychological grounds.
There is little to doubt that people have personal
reactions to things and events. However,-introspec-
tive self report has been largely avoided as a means to
study this type of behavior. Both Stephenson, (1953)
and Zuriff, (1985) agree that the behavioral avoidance
of self report is largely pragmatic. . Talk involving
one's personal views and opinions seems to be "loose",
"sloppy", "variable", and is unscientific, not objec-
tive. As Stephenson, (1953, p. 88) stated, "According
to logical analysis "subjectivity", when it is not con-
fused with "mind," is merely,an indication of
undependability, variability, and absence of attain-
able "constant relations.** The scientist is engaged in
separating what is dependable.from what is
undependable from what is unstable or variable, and
'subjectivity* is the name we give to^the latter, die
untamed horses of the scientific ranch." When one
reads this quote by Stephenson it is difficult not to
think of T. S. Kuhn's work on scientific evolution in
which he desaibes "normal science" and the strict
adherence to proper paradigm pursuits. According to
Kuhn, (1970, p. 37) "...one of the things a scientific
community acquires with a paradigm is a criterion for
choosing problems...To an extent these are the only
problems that the community will admit as scientific
or encourage its members to undertake."
Stephenson (1953, p. 91) argued that it is not
entirely correct to reject introspection: "The argu-
ment that, because introspection is unreliable, we
must therefore give up the internal framework is a
cliche of the American Behaviorists. The logical
position, however, is merely that introspection proved
unprofitable, undependable, and generally unreli-
able; therefore, either the method was inadequate, or
its objectives chimerical, orboth," Stephenson (1953)
saw no need to completely abandon the study of
subjective personal opinion. He spoke of subjectivity
in terms of consciring, in the communicational sense
- simply, someone speaking from their own subjec-
tive point of view. Ryle (1949) spoke of the first
personal pronoun, "P as being unique, "I...always
indicates me. 'You*, 'she* and 'the/ indicate different
people at different times. T is like my shadow; I can
never get away from it.-.there is no mystery about this
consistency, but I mention it because it seems to
endow T with a mystifying uniqueness." As such,
subjectivity need not imply anything mysterious.
The q-technique that Stephenson (1953) offers in
which only "concrete behavior" is studied without
resorting to the explanatory "brain" or "physiological
correlates" of behavior is both naturalistic and consis-
tent with rational scientific tenets. Perhaps most
behaviorists arenot familiar withStephenson's (1953)
The Study of Behaviorbecause the study of subjectiv-
ity, even If approached naturalistically, with objective
and measurable behavior, it is simply not supported
within our "normal science" of behaviorism.
Conclusion
These arguments in no way imply that behavior-
ists should abandon the positions by which they have
achieved sound scientific descriptions of behavior.
The retreat back to earlier epoches of spiritualisms
and other fictional inner agents would be a horrible
mistake. Skinner's (1961, p. 334) claim that "behavior
is an acceptable subject matter in it's own right" still
rings very true. However, we need to better address
"personal" issues such as consciousness and subjectiv-
ity without dogmatically reminding the public that
these issues are illegitimate or "the action of receptors
and of the afferent and central nervous system" (Skin-
ner, 1953). I firmly believe that behavior analysis is
capable of addressing these issues while standing on
its own. The analysis of conditioned seeing, condi-
tioned hearing, and other implicit phenomena is just
a beginning.
References
Globus, G. G., Maxwell, G., Savodnik, I., Conscious-
ness and TJw Brain: A Scientific and Philosophical
Inquiry. New York & London: Plenum Press,
(1976).
James, W., -Principles of Psychology, (Vol 1) Cambridge,
Massachusettes: Harvard University Press, (1890).
Kantor, J. R,, Principles of Psychology. (Vol 1)
Bloomington Indiana: Principia Press, (1924).
Kantor, J. R., Principles of Psychology. (Vol 2)
Bloomington Indiana: Principia Press, (1926).
Kantor, J. R., Problems of Physiological Psychology.
Bloomington, Indiana: Principia Press, (1947).
Kantor, J. R., InterbehavioralPsyc/wtogy. Bloomington
Indiana: Principia Press, (1959).
Kantor, J. R,, Tf)e Scientific Evolution of Psychology,
Bloomington, Indiana: Principia Press, (1969).
Klein, D. B., The Concept of Consciousness: A Survey,
Lincoln & London: University of Nebraska Press,
(1984).
Kuhn, T. S., T}K Structure of Scientific Evolution.
Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press,
(1962).
Lashley, K. S., 1954. Dynamic Processes in Perception.
Taken from: Brain Mechanisms and Conscious-
ness, 422-43., Springfield, III. Charles CThomas.
Lycan, W. G., Consciousness. Cambridge & London ;
The M.I.T. Press, (1987).
McGinn, C., Tl)e Problem of Consciousness: Essays to-
wards A resolution, Oxford & Cambridge: Basil
Blackwell(1991).
Ryle, G., Tl)e Concept of Mind, New York: Barnes &
Noble Inc. (1949).
St. Thomas Aquinas, out of: McGlynn, J. V., Truth St
Tlwmas Aquinas: Translated from the Definitive
Leonine text. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co.,
(1953).
Skinner, B. F., CurrentTrends in Psychological Theory.
Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. Re-
printed in: Marx, H. M., Theories in Contemporary
Psychology. New York: MacMillian Co., (1962).
Skinner, B. F., Science and Human Behavior. New
York; Macmillan Co., (1953).
Skinner, B. K, Recent Issues in the Analysis of 'Behavior.
Columbus, Ohio., (1989).
Stepbenson, W., Newton's Fifth Rule and QJvleth-
odology: An Application to Educational
Psychology. American Psychologist, 1980, Vol 35,
No. 10,882-889.
Stephenson, W,, The Study of behavior: QTedmique
and its Methodology, Chicago: University of Chi-
cago Press, (1953). .
Smith, K, Behavior and Conscious Experience: A Con-
ceptual Analysis. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University
Press, (1969).
Tlje Oxford English..Dictionary (Second Edition) Pre-
pared by: Simpson, J. A., & Weiner, E. S. W.,
Oxford: Clarendon Press, (1989).
Underwood, G., & Stevens, R., Aspects of Conscious-
ness (Vol 2), London; Academic Press.
Watson, J. B., Behaviorism, London: Kegan Paul, &
Trench, Trubner & Co., (1925).
Zuriff, G. E., Behaviorism: A ConaptualReconstruction,
New York: Columbia University Press, (1985).
Af^sWerafj^^^
 Volume 20 1992 Number 2

EDITOR
Linda J. Hayes, University of Nevada ff, ft p*| pa
TABLE OF CONTENTS
fifa f^f\ k ftff- . If-A

PASTEDITORS ^^ 3

Noel W. Smith, Vois 1-7(1970-1978) Interbehaviorist SIG at ABA

Tnat Little
Ronald G. Heyduk, Vols 8-11 (1978-1983) Extra
Edward K. Morris, Vols 12-17 (1983-1989)
Articles
ADVISORY BOARD
o-j w/TV TT >* CA Noel W. Smith. Thefprivacy construct as a
Sidney W. Biiou, University of Arizona ,,. . A. t , .
r^
Donna \* M. r- cf t offnt
Cone, State J-TI j
R})odeIsland stumbling*pomt
r in psychology
r j> & 4
DennisJ.Ddpteto^astemMWpanUntvew'ty ~, . , T T ,.
T Tv ' P, . r? v Thomas rl
Sharpe
r & Andrew Hawkins.
JamesJ. Fox, EastTennesseeState University n . , .,. f. t 1 , . , -
nPatnck
- i Ghezzi,
<-L University
rr -, ofr*j Nevada
j Pragmatics
j,
and utility^ of
J interoen amoral meth-
R
Sandy Hobbs, Paisley College of Technology ^
Edward K. Morris, University of Kansas _, ,
n I T Mountjoy,
PaulT. \x s m * Michigan
Western */L- TT -.
University Research Reports
N. H. Pronko, Wichita State University t . , , . , ., , .. .,
n I-A n n ^ tt Patrick Ghezzi and 0Sidneyww. Bijou. r Social
RogerD.Ray,RottinsColkge *. , ,;,..{_ r . c
T- -i- T>-L rr -, ?^ j i stalls research on children at we rUniversity of
EmmoRibes, University of Guadalajara * . VS
Robert G. Wahler, University of Tennessee
MANAGING EDITOR
Steven C. Hayes, University of Nevada
ASSISTANT EDITORS
Debra W, Fredericks, Ramona Houmanfar,
DuaneC. Lord, Cynthia Reinbold, David G.
Stroffe, Mark A. Swain, GinaToubouras,
University of Nevada

ISSN8755-612X
 A Newsletter of Principia Press's currently available tides in inter-
Interbehavioral Psychology behavioral psychology, all by J.R. Kantor, are listed
ISSN8755-612X below. Check your bookshelves, and those of your
library and bookstore, for possible oversights. In
Linda J. Hayes, Editor addition, the books make excellent gifts for colleagues
Department of Psychology and students, especially for the latter in honor of their
University of Nevada completed degree requirements. The books may be
Reno, Nevada 89557, U.S.A. purchased direcdy from PrincipiaPress, 5743 Kimbark
702-784-1137 Avenue, Chicago, IL 60637. Handling charges are
$.75 per tide; prepaid orders are postpaid. Any
THE INTERBEHAVIORIST publishes news, queries should also be directed to the address above.
information, discussion, journal and book notes,
bookreviews, comments, and brief articles pertaining Principles ofPsydwlogy (2 vols.) $20.00
to interbehavioral psychology - a contextualistic, Psychology and Logic (2 vols.) $25.00
integrated-field approach to the natural science of Interbehavioral Psychology $15.00
behavior. The Logic of Modern Science $15.00
The newsletter also publishes professional com- An Objective Psychology of
munications that fall between informal correspon- Grammar $13.00
dence and colloquia, and formal archival publica- Tfx Scientific Evolution of
tion. As such, the newsletter supplements contempo- Psychology (2 vols) $40.00
rary j oumals dedicated to basic and applied research, The Science ofPsy etiology:
to the history and philosophy of the behavioral An Interbehavioral Survey $20.00
sciences, and to professional issues in the field. The Psychological Linguistics $15.00
newsletter strongly encourages submission of notes The Aim and Progress of Psychology
about currentprofessional activities of its subscribers, and Other Sciences $20.00
news and observations about interbehavioral psy- Interbehavioral Philosophy $27.50
chology and related perspectives, comments on jour- Cultural Psychology $16.00
nal articles and books of interest, more extended Tragedy and the Event Continuum $15.00
book reviews, and brief articles. All submissions Selected Writings, 1929-1983 $20.00
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THE INTERBEHAVIORIST is published as a public service by
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publishes books of interest to contextualists and interactionists.
Write for brochures on the books available.
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 Interbehaviorist S.I.G. Minutes
Association for Behavior Analysis
San Francisco, May 26,1992
Chairs: Linda Hayes & Debra Fredericks
Members Present: Bill Boose, Barbara Dahl, Chris
Empey, James Fox, Ramona Houmanfar, Parker
Lichtenstein, Duane Lord, Chris McCurry, Noel
Smith, David Stroffe and Mark Swain.
1. The Interbehaviorist - Linda Hayes reported
that the cost of publishing and mailing The
Interbehaviorist exceeded the income from sub-
scriptions, and that subscription rates may have to be
raised next year.
Suggestions for increasing subscriptions and sub-
missions included adding a "research notes" column,
publishing special issues of papers given at ABA and
other conferences, and establishing an E-mail jour-
nal. Mark Swain and Duane Lord agreed to be
responsible for establishing an interbehavioral E-
mail. Advisory Board members present agreed to
continue to support the newletter with submissions
and to encourage others to do so as well.
2. ABA Program - It was decided that interbehavioral
symposia at next year's ABA conference will not be
submitted from the special interestgroup as the group
no longer has representation on the ABA Program
Committee due to its reorganization this past year.
Ideas for symposia included a collection of expert
papers with responders from outside the
interbehavioral group. Mark Swain volunteered to
organize a symposium.
3. SIG Offices - Linda Hayes appointed Mark Swain
and Debra Fredericks as co-chairs of the Special
Interest Group.
4. Training opportunities for interbehaviorists -
Unda Hayes reported that the University of Nevada
at Reno was hiring a new faculty member in Behavior
Analysis this fall and encouraged members of the
group to make the interbehavioral emphasis of the
program known to prospective grduate students.
5. Interbehavioral publications - It was announced
that proceedings from the First International Congress
on Interbebaviorism, held in Guadalajara, Mexico, in
1992 will be published in English by CONTEXT PRESS,
and in Spanish by the University of Guadalajara.
News and Notes
JamesJ. Fox, Research Director of the Centerfor Early
Childhood Learning and Development at East Ten-
nessee State University, has joined the Editorial Board
of The Interbehaviorist.
Patrick Ghezzi, formerly of the University of Arizona,
has joined the faculty of the Department of
Psychology, University of Nevada, Reno, NV. Dr.
Ghezzi will serve as an Associate Professor in the
Behavior Analysis Program.
That Little Extra
The Interbehaviorist thanks the followingpersons
who added a little extra to their subscriptions dues:
Joe Brady, Louise Kent-Udolf, John Grossberg, Allan
Lazar, Parker Lichtenstein, Harry Mahan and Reginald
Marsack.
 Noel W. Smith
State University of New York at Plattsburgh
Customary Assumptions
The concept of "privacy" began with Rene
Descartes as a part of the psychophysical dualism that
he helped accentuate. According to Descartes and
other dualists who followed him, two radically differ-
ent forms of reality exist: on the one hand, physical
phenomena made of atoms and molecules that ex-
tend into space and are perceptually public and, on
the other hand, mental phenomena that do not
extend into space, do not have any physical proper-
ties, and are intrinsically private. The medieval
Aristotelians who preceded Descartes held no con-
cept of privacy, For them, thought was best known
through thoughtful behavior, intellect through intel-
ligent behavior. But Descartes defined thought in
terms of something existing in us of which we have an
immediate consciousness. As a corollary he argued
that only one's thoughts are known with any certainty
and all else is a matter of inference and therefore of
doubt. Franz Brentano brought the privacy question
to a sharper focus by insisting that it is only by inner
perception of our minds or consciousness thatmental
phenomena are known and that it is therefore dear
that such mental phenomena can never be perceived
by more than one person.
But is it not true, as Descartes and others claimed,
that such psychological events as perceptions, desires,
feelings, and many others are private? And does this
not indicate that they are internal and inaccessible?
Can we ever really know what another person sees,
hears, smells, tastes? Is our toothache not private?
Challenges to the Assumptions
Woodbridge (1913) answered by asking, "Does
the fact that I can not sense my brother's pain, but
must infer it, prove anything else than that my pain-
sensing machinery is limited to my own pain?" And
Kantor (1963) observed"
The famous and perennial argument that
only the possessor of the aching tooth could
have direct experience or knowledge of the
toothache is simply the product of the evolu-
tion of psychic doctrine. Those who accept
the doctrine have always been influenced by
the dogma of mind to overlook the act that all
events are unique. What A is digesting is not
digested by B. The fall of A is not the fall of
B, Nor does the fact that neither A nor Bean
see what the other is digesting nor observe the
fall of the other, unless both happen to be in
a favorable situation, indicate that psychic
stuff or principle is involved (p. 292),
Pronko,Ebert, and Greenberg (1966) pointed out
that chemists cannot be the reactions they study or
entomologists the insects they observe; yet this does
not make the events any less knowable. Psychologists
may, in fact, have an advantage over other scientists
in that they have a commonality with other people's
perceptions and feelings as expressed in the phrase "I
feel for you" or, similarly, **I know how you feel".
Lichtenstein (1971) noted that under the influ-
ence of Locke andMullerwehave traditionally placed
seeing red in the organism and this in turn leads us
"very easily to a subjective psychology in which the
world does not exist independently but only as a
construct of the human mind" (p. 11). He further
points out that covert behaviors maybe more difficult
to deal with than overt ones but do not differ in
principle regardless of the difficulty of the technical
problems. Even so, othersciences also have difficulty
in observing some of the phenomena that are impor-
tant to them: the basic particles of matter, the causes
of cancer, the social organization of prehistoric
peoples, the structure of the universe. Difficulty of
observation makes them no less objective. Homme's
(1965) success in applying operant procedures to
"coverants" is indication that the problem is far from
unsurmountable. In fact psychologists regularly study
covert interactions by asking subjects to fill out ques-
tionnaires about their attitudes, interests, and desires
and by such procedures as asking what they see
projected on a screen. Jacob and Sachs (1971) edited
a book on ''private events*1 and noted that the evi-
dence contained therein "supports] the proposition
that covert events operate as if they are amenable to
some of the same learning processes and manipula-
tions as other classes of responses (p. 2-3). Lichtenstein
observed that the question about whether seeing red
or the verbal statement "I see red" is the "actual
datum*5 for the psychologist was well handled by
Schoenfeld and Gumming (1963) who took the see-
ing red as the verbal response for exactly what it is-a
report Thus there is a perceptual response and a
verbal response as a reference to it. One cannot be
reduced to the other nor should there be any confu-
sion about them, but dualistic assumptions inevitably
produce such confusion (e.g., Alston, 1973).
Greenspoon (1961) offered two resolutions to the
privacy "problem". One is to recognize that experi-
ence is behavior and thus there really is no problem.
The other solution, a methodological refinement of
the first, is to consider objectivity to be high reliability
of either intra- or inter-observer reports and subjectiv-
ity to be low reliability. Stephenson (e.g., 1953,1968,
1980) developed an entire methodology, Q^ which is
totally objective, out of a recognition of the objectiv-
ity of subjectivity as suggested by the tide of one
paper: "Consciousness OutSubjectivity in" (1968).
A subjective point of view can be represented by a Q_
sort and an objective point of view by another ol>
server. There is no mind-body dualism here.
Replacing "Privacy" with a Field of
Events
The perennial problem of how do I know that the
red I see is the same red thatyou see involves both the
assumption of privacy and of creationism. The
privacy and the color matters I have already dealt
with, but the question can still be a meaningful one
with regard to possible color blindness and to differ-
entviewingarrangements. These problems are easy to
resolve: color blindness can be checked with appro-
priate tests, and viewing arrangements can be stan-
dardized. This results in high inter-observer reliabil-
ity. We can then say with a high degree of confidence
that the red I see is the same as the red you see. (This
assumes a simple discrimination or identification and
disregards any differences in meaning, e.g., the red is
harsh to you but attractive to me.) As for the retort
that we may have learned the same word while seeing
different things, this same claim might be made for
the names we give to anything in our surroundings.
The objects I call by the names "house" and "dog" are
the same for all those who share the same language
reference system. The color red can in no way differ
from this unless we assume that the organism creates
that color and that different organisms may create
different colors. And that takes us back to the original
assumption of creationism.
Such covert events as joy or a toothache or seeing
a color are not different in principle from more overt
activities such as speaking or walking, both overt and
covert events being equally individualistic and equally
concrete. The only difference is in the degree of
accessibility to other observers. We could say that the
biologist gazing on a new species in the rain forest is
having private experience in that others are not in a
position to engage in the same interbehaviors. Al-
though in any interaction any component of the field
may vary in accessibility to others, one or another
component of the field is usually accessible. In many
cases the stimulus is easier to observe than the re-
sponse.
This suggests that when so-called privacy is ana-
lyzed into concrete events it appears to have two
major referents: (1) the accessibility of the stimulus
object or the response to more than one person and
(2) the meaning of the stimulus object to the indi-
vidual-that is, the individuality or uniqueness of the
interaction. Looking at each of these in turn,
(1) Accessibility
The availability of the stimulus object to one or
more than one person often depends on whether it
resides within the individual organism or outside of it.
Ratliff (1962) makes a similar point-a visual stimulus,
though different for each observer, has the same
source for all and is highly correlated among them
while a pain stimulus rarely has a common source and
therefore has a low correlation,
(2) Meaning of the Stimulus Object
In all cases each individual may react differently
from any other. To you the sighting of a rare bird may
be something to enter into your record book. To a
deer hunter it is just a distraction. To a small boy it is
something to throw a stone at. That is, the same
stimulus object has different stimulus functions for
different persons depending on each person's prior
reactions and the circumstances of the moment. As
for the present circumstances orsetting, hunters might
be more interested if they are not looking for deer; the
boy might not throw a rock in the presence of an
adult; and bird watchers will be less than enthusiastic
if they are lost in the woods. Privacy merely refers to
the fact that no two people interact in the same way
with the same stimulus object even when that same
object can stimulate more than one person.
However, there is no need to assume that a mental
state or phenomenal field resides inside each person
constituting his or her private reality. Rather, the
different interactions are themselves objective events
comprising a part of the reality or ongoing events of
the universe.
For example, any number of persons may interact
with a giant redwood tree as a stimulus object but their
responses may be less accessible and quite individual-
istic; one person may feel awe for its size and age, but
another might feel that it should be cut down to
provide lumber for houses and jobs for loggers and
mill workers. We might not know these responses
without asking the person, but a knowledge of that
person's past historyconservationistor mill worker-
might lead us to infer the response. In other cases the
response is accessible or readily observed by others
while the stimulus conditions may be unknown. For
example, we may know that a person has committed
a crime but be uncertain about the "motive". Simi-
larly, if we observe someone suddenly turn about and
walk in the opposite direction for no observable
reason (which in fact was due to her suddenly noting
that she had forgotten her purse) the stimulation is
not known to us even though the response is.
In still another situation such as a toothache, both
the stimulus object and the response are primarily
accessible only to the person engaged in the interac-
tion. This is only to say that it is a unique event as all
other events are unique. The wind does not blow in
exactly the same way twice; one does not sing a song
in precisely the same way twice. The toothacheis only
one of a universe of unique events but even so is not
entirely inaccessible. Some phase of the field of
events which comprise it remains accessible, even if
only by inference, just as some aspects of the interior
of the earth are inferred by a geophysicist. The
inflammation of the tooth may be observable by the
dentist who would expect it to be painful. The verbal
reference may also be indicative of the interaction,
and the dentist makes use of it in identifying the
problem; similarly we often rely on a technician's
report of a dial reading that is no longer available to
others.
When the object of stimulation or the response to
it or the entire interaction are largely covert, accessible
to only one person, we often rely on self-reports. We
do this regularly in psychological studies and often
successfully; subjects' reports to questionnaires pre-
dict the outcome of elections and their reports of phi
phenomena give us reliable information for rate of
presentations of still pictures that are perceived as
motion pictures. Psychology is in the fortunate
position of dealing with human subjects who can give
these self-reports; this contrasts markedly with the
inert rocks of geology or the mute potsherds of
prehistory. In that respect psychology has an advan-
tage in its efforts to acquire knowledge, not a disad-
vantage in relying on self-reports as some have main-
tained. This is not to overlook the fact that not all self-
reports are valid or even informative. For example,
the person with anxiety reactions may not know the
source of the reactions. Consequently, self reports
may be treated as (a) the equivalent of the investigator's
own observation of the stimulus object or the re-
sponse or both concerning the topic on which the
subject is reporting, (b) as data to be interpretedfor
example, as errors, lies, distortions, judgments, etc., or
(c) as objective statements about subjectivity. Obser-
vation of other components of the field might suggest
whether the first or second category is likely to obtain
for any given situation or subject; do we have a
reliable or unreliable witness, a trained or untrained
observer? Do we have a situation given to accurate or
inaccurate observation? The third category might be
deliberately chosen for application of (^methodol-
ogy.
The contrast between private and non-private
events may be useful for indicating what components
of the interaction are more or less accessible to more
than one person at any given time, but as a distinction
between internal-external, knowable-unknowable,
mental-physical it is artificial and should be dis-
carded. In sum, private and non-private or covert and
overt responses are continuous with each other and
are both made of the same stufffields of interacting
factors. As with all sciences there are various condi-
tions under which knowledge may be obtained and
various means and degrees of difficulty of obtaining
it All components of psychological events, wherever
they may lie on the covert-overt continuum, are, on
the whole, as amenable to being known as those of
any other science.
References
Allston, W. P. (1972). Can psychology do without
private data? Behaviorism, I, 71-102.
Greenspoon, J. (1961). Private experience revisited.
 Tf)e Psychological Record, 65, 56-63.
Homme, L. E. (1965). Control of covenants, the
operants of the mind. IJtfPsycbobgicalRecord, 15,
501-511.
Jacobs, A. & L.B.Sachs (1971). Private events. In A.
Jacobs & L. B. Sachs (Eds.), Tfje Psychology of
Private Events: Perspectives on Covert Response Sys-
tems. New York; Academic Press.
Kantor,J. R. (1963). Scientific Evolution of Psychology,
Vol. 1. Chicago: Principia Press.
Lichtenstein, P. E. (1971). A behavioral approach to
"phenomenologicaJdata". TJiePsychologicalRecord,
21, 1-6.
Pronko, N. E., Ebert, R. & Greenberg, G. (1966). A
critical review of theories of perception. In A. L
Kidd &J. L Rivoire (Eds.), Perceptual Development
in Children. New York: International Universities
Press.
Radiff, R (1962), Some interrelations among physics,
physiology, and psychology in the study of vi-
sion. In S. Koch (Ed.), Psychology: A Study of a
Science, Vol. 4. New York; McGraw-Hill.
Schoenfeld, W. N. & N. W. Gumming (1963). Be-
haviorandperception. 'h\S.'Koch(Ed.)t Psychology:
A Study of a Science, Vol. 5. New York; McGraw-
Hill.
Stephenson, W. S. (1953). The study of behavior; Q
technique and its methodology. University of Chi-
cago.
Stephenson, W. S. (1968). Consciousness out -
subjectivity in. Tlie Psychological Record, 18, 499-
501.
Stephenson, W. S. (1980). Newton's fifth rule and Q:
methodology: Application to educational
psychology. American Psychologist, 35, 882-889.
Woodbridge, F.J. E. (1913). The belief in sensations.
Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific
Method, 10, 599-608.
AversionofthispaperwaspresentedattheAnnualMeeting
of the Association of BehaviorAnalysis, May 25-28,1992,
San Francisco. Portions of it are drawn from previous
publications of the author.
 Tom Sharps
University of Nebraska-Lincoln
Andrew Hawkins
West Virginia University
Educational, clinical, and social psycholo-
gists, among others, have shown a . . . change
in focus from the study of one organism over
time to the study of the social interaction
between organisms (Dillon, Madden, &
Kumar, 1983, p. 564).
Behavior analytic oratory which questions the
relative value of a field systems research perspective
(cf, Baer, 1992; Skinner, 1988) remains prevalent in
the context of applied interbehavioral methodology
portrayal (Sharpe & Fox, 1992). Though systems
scholars currently carrying the methodological ban-
ner are commended for the depth and breadth of such
complex efforts, two contemporary arguments in
rebuff of a systems, conceptual orientation arise as
follows: (1) Are methodologists pursuing a systems
perspective for the singular purpose of knowledge
enhancement, regardless of its pragmaucorutilitarian
nature?; or (2) Are any attempts to (a) enable a more
concise method of inquiry, and (b) provide informa-
tion of use in enhancing the quality of life of the larger
culture, inherent to interbehavioral scholarship?
As these issues frequent discussion of the relative
value of an interbehavioral methodology within be-
havior analytic circles, further rejoinder is warranted.
Though interbehavioral neophytes, our hope is that
argument rebuttal based upon the professional focus
and concomitant literature with which we are familiar
will serve to stimulate greater reflection with regard to
other's advocacy of interbehavioral implementation.
In turn, we hope to focus interbehavioral scholars on
the importance of demonstrating the pragmatics of
their methodology and ultimate utility of their schol-
arship in light of prevailing criticism,
A Radical Behaviorist Polemic
One of the most pressing arguments put forth by
contemporary scholars who still cling to a Sldnnerian
world view takes the form of analogy. A parallel is
made between interbehavioral methodology and epi-
demiology - the latter endeavor attempting to de-
scribe the sum of possible factors which control the
presence or absence of a disease or pathogen, and the
former attempting to thoroughly describe the func-
tional interactions among all behavioral and ecologi-
cal variables within a particular experimental setting.
As science, epidemiology seeks to describe the
incidence, distribution, and possible control factors
of a disease extant to a particular population. Painstak-
ing efforts are undertaken to inductively track the
many possible functional relationships among all
variables which are conceivably related to a particular
disorder. However, only a microscopic portion of the
time-consuming data collection and analysis effort
are proven to be functionally related and, hence, of
ultimate use to the practitioner in primary remediation
of the disease. Questions, therefore arise as to the
relative cost-effectiveness of such a methodology, and
its relative utility given alternative means of coming to
a greater understanding a particular disease.
In this light, analogous issues of (a) inordinate
application complexity related to the pragmatics of
interbehavioral methodology, and (b) its relative util-
ity to the surrounding profession and culture are
brought forth. The central argument against imple-
mentation of interbehavioral methodology in an-
swering investigative questions is currendy portrayed
in terms of cost and time factor concerns weighed
against possible knowledge gained and the cultural
utility of such knowledge.
On Pragmatism
As argument against interbehavioral application
separates the issues of pragmatism and utilitarianism,
it may be best to address each independently. Though
each conceptual issue is readily assumed to have been
successfully confronted on repeated occasions by
interbehavioral researchers, the question of a systems
methodology's pragmatic nature in light of a quest for
knowledge extension in and of itself warrants farther
buttress.
Methodological Advocacy
In substantiating the practicality of interbehavioral
methodology, one must first consider that recent
theory and research point to the functional insepara-
bility of behavioral and ecological events in interac-
tive settings with regard to their joint contribution to
the meaning and nature of the whole (Altman &
Rogoff, 1987; Kantor, 1969). Not taking into account
the functional interactions of multiple operative events
has often led to confounding research, for one stimu-
lus may affect many responses, and responses are
seldom the function of a single stimulus (refer to
Delprato, 1987; Miller, 1952; Morris & Midgley,
1990; and Willems, 1974 for further discussion of
these issues). At issue is the importance of investiga-
tive recognition of the many interactive components
contained within behavior/environment fields as a
matter of representative accuracy. As the opening
quotation suggests, movement away from the study
of the properties of one organism over time (e.g.,
appliedbehavioranalysis), toward the study ofbehav-
ioral and ecological interactions (i.e., interbehavioral
analysis), is recommended to more representatively
and, hence, more accurately map the functional char-
acteristics of an experimental setting (c.f., Dickie,
1989; Dillon, Madden, & Kumar, 1983; Pronko,
1980; Schroeder, 1990; Smith, Mountjoy, & Ruben,
1983). In quick illustration, when a mechanic at-
tempts to determine why an automobile will not
operate, it is not only important to ascertain if particu-
lar engine components such as the carburetor are
operating effectively (the molecular perspective of
applied behavior analysis); it is also important to
ensure that the many engine and transmission com-
ponents interact effectively in concert (the molar
perspective of interbehavioral analysis).
Many behavior analysts interested in applied
questions, however, often lack the analytic curiosity
recommended above and thus limit their interest to
the simple function of summarizing the effects of the
primary conditions for comparison 0ohnston, 1990).
If one subscribes to Johnston's definition of the act of
behavioral science: ", . .those who are genuinely
interested in learning new things about behavior
whatever it takes (p. 165)," then one must necessarily
reflect upon the relative effectiveness of traditional
means of doing research in applied settings versus the
development cost of alternative methodologies.
A means of mutual consideration of organismic
history, setting context, and the interactive effects of
current behavioral events and ecological variables
should, therefore, be pursued in attempts to more
accurately capture and analyze applied settings and
make an informed decision with regard to relative cos t
effectiveness. The way in which one conceptualizes,
or categorizes observable events is as important (and
perhaps more important) than the characteristics of
the event itself in avoiding confounding research
result and contraindicated intervention recommen-
dations. As such, alternative methodological explora-
tion in an attempt to provide more accurate represen-
tations of applied settings play an important role in
extending an existing knowledge base.
To illustrate the recommended shift in scientific
thought from Skinnerian cause .> effect explanation
toward aKantorianinterbehavioral conceptualization,
Newtonian physics may be used as analogy. Many
concepts borrowed from classical physics have clear
implications for the explanation of behavior. That is,
force may represent the strength of an independent
variable intervention, mass may represent baseline
rates ofresponding, and velocity may represent the rate
of change in responding as a function offeree (Nevin,
1988).
Such principles have contributed in part to initial
understanding of free operant behavior (e.g., Benes,
Gutkin, & Kramer's (1991) work in defining consult-
ant and consultee verbal and nonverbal behaviors in
school psychology settings specific to consultation
based interventions; and Bouzas (1978) study of the
law of effect). However, focus in this genre has, until
very recendy, been largely confined to laboratory
research, and has not as yet successfully captured the
more complex ecological setting variables and mul-
tiple concurrentand bidirectional force<>mass <
> velocity relationships extant to accurate functional
representation of human interaction in applied set-
tings. Primary to this issue is the longstanding diffi-
culty of studying "basic" behavioral processes in
humans by traditional means, due to the inherent
complexity of organism <-> organism, organism <-
> environment, and organism <> behavioral his-
tory interactions (cf., The Behavior Analyst, 14,1991).
It is in this regard that interbehavioral methodology
has greatest potential - the direct observation and
accurate representation of the complex relationships
inherent to the functional determinants of human
interaction.
10
Termed pragmatism, and founded on the writ-
ings of William James and C. S. Pierce (Titus, Smith,
& Nolan, 1986), methodological concision is marked
by the doctrine that conceptual meaning is to be
sought in its practical bearings, that the function of
thought is to guide action, and that truth is preemi-
nently to be tested by the practical consequences of
belief. Given that an interbehavioral orientation may
provide a more accurate representation of the experi-
mental domain and, in turn, a heightened propensity
for intervention success; what remains is argument in
favor of implementation relative to traditional meth-
odological alternatives.
Germane to pragmatics advocacy is explication
of the relationship between scientific knowledge (and
accompanying methodology) and cultural applica-
tion. If such a relationship lags historically in bidirec-
tional manner as Moxley (1989) suggests, then more
representative analyses of experimental phenomena
should result in professional and cultural benefit in
future - though present time, cost, and complexity
challenges are frequent.
The scientific evolution of transportation tech-
nology and resultant cultural enhancement serves to
illustrate Moxle/s point well. With the turn of the
twentieth century western culture evidenced a cata-
clysmic shift from animal to fuel driven transporta-
tion. Initially, the quest for additional knowledge to
enhance transportation mode was time and cost
aversive to the extent of general non-understanding of
possible benefit, and to the point of great cultural
resistance. In retrospect, however, initial expenditure
has provided significant benefit as the science of
transportation has been translated into time and cost
efficient travel, in turn fueling the search for greater
knowledge specific to even more optimal travel modes
despite the initial insurgency encountered.
In similar fashion, the science of interbehavioral
methodology is rapidly evolving in concert with
computer technology to provide a time and cost
efficient means of data collection, topographic de-
scription, and parametric analysis (cf., Bakeman &
Gottman, 1986; Barton &Johnson, 1990; Gottman Sc
Roy, 1990; Ray & Delprato, 1989; Sharpe ScHawkins,
1992; Sharpe, Hawkins, & Wood, 1991; S&K com-
puter Products, 1985). Though by no means con-
strued to be exhaustive, referenced examples of such
an evolving technology provide evidence of very time
efficient "push-button" implementation. With regard
to cost efficiency, current economic trends in com-
puter technology provide interbehavioral researchers
with an inexpensive avenue to the equipping of
laboratory facilities necessary to the implementation
of research agendas in applied settings. Relative to the
economic costs of laboratory facility establishment of
other disciplines (e.g., biological science, exercise
physiology, epidemiology, biomechanics), and the
time-intensive nature of alternative methodologies
(e.g., ethnography, experimental analysis of behavior
with non-human subjects), a case may be readily
made for the relative time and cost effectiveness of
interbehavioral methodology implementation, given
evolving computer applications.
From this, it is clear that a systems conceptual
world view is beginning to guide methodological
action in a practical and relatively succinct manner.
As previously indicated by Sharpe and Hawkins (1990),
it may be more accurate to speak of applied behavior
analysis and interbehaviorism in methodological con-
text as similar scientific perspectives. Each view is
moving quickly toward scientific and technological
application, though interbehavioral methodology is
in tumultuous infancy (absorbing the brunt of intol-
erant aberrations) and a Skinnerian view has, perhaps,
evolved to fruition (though largely resistant to meth-
odological evolution). What is now necessary is re-
joinder to the issue of professional and cultural im-
pact with regard to the utilitarian nature of
interbehavioral knowledge gained.
On Utilitarianism
Though by no means an exhaustive content area
list, the view that field system constructs have utilitar-
ian promise are currently found in (a) family therapy
(cf., Wahler & Hann, 1987), (b) school psychology
consultation (cf., Martens & Witt, 1988a, 1988b), (c)
clinical psychology (cf., Ruben & Delprato, 1987), (d)
ethology (cf., Mjrberg, 1972; Ray, in press), (e) health
related issues (cf., Ray, 1983) and (f) instructional
effectiveness (cf., Greenwood, Carta, Arreaga-Mayer,
& Rager, 1991; Hawkins & Sharpe, in press; Kamps,
Leonard, Dugan, Boland, & Greenwood, 1991). In
each of these disciplines scientific information has
been uniquely uncovered via a systems methodology
which serves to (a) better train professionals toward
expertise in their respective content area, and (b)
impact positively on dients and students served by
such trained professionals, ultimately providing for
enhanced quality of life for the larger culture.
The wealth of conceptual literature in advocacy

of more accurate representation of naturalistic set-
tings via a systemic view, when coupled with recently
emerging applications of interbehavioral research re-
sults, brings one to the conclusion that clinging to a
linear view of cause -> effect based upon implemen-
tation efficacy runs counter to scientific evolution in
the ideal. In light of narrowly focused applied behav-
ior analytic study's propensity to lead one to
contraindicated interventions when attempting to
enhance the quality of life of a part of the culture (i.e.,
student, client, etc.), evolving toward an
interbehavioral world view as applied to method-
ological implementation becomes particularly salient.
Though pockets of resistance still remain within
the behavior analytic community, the utilitarian in-
formation which may be gained from a field systems
methodology warrants further illustration. As the
instructional domain is most familiar to we authors, it
is used as our example.
It has been asserted by many interbehaviorists
that a systems methodology embodies applied behav-
ior analysis and much more, rather than embracing a
separatist view. Drawing, again, on the automobile
mechanic depiction, both molecular and molar char-
acteristics are inherent to interbehavioral study. Spe-
cific to education research, it has been reassuring to
find that a systemic methodology provides molecular
information that is already known, making it easier to
accept the molar knowledge that is also generated by
a new methodology (cf., Berliner, in press). With
regard to new information generated, the following
areas provide example; (a) sensitivity to the functional
differences in teaching behavior across different grade
levels, (b) sensitivity to the particular ecologies of
lesson forms across content and context, (c) examina-
tion of the functional differences in the behaviors of
the same teacher across subject matter content areas,
(d) scrutiny of effective (and not so effective) instruc-
tional differences across differential SES and cultural
characteristics of classroom settings, and perhaps
most importantly, (e) making more explicit the con-
nection among functional teacher stimuli and stu-
dent responses (and, in turn, student stimuli and
teacher responses) within particular teacher and stu-
dent fields. In addition, though effective time based
behavioral patterns of rule-example-rule and struc-
ture-solicit- respond-evaluate are well known and
reinforced via interbehavioral research, previously
unaccounted for chains extant to exemplary instruc-
tion are also amenable to discovery (cf., Hawkins &
11
Sharpe, in press).
It is our position that a cost and time efficient tool
now exists via interbehavioral technology for the
study of some of the basic processes of successful
instruction in different settings, subject matter areas,
and across different lesson forms. However, one may
readily agree that the ultimate value of scientific
pursuit may be gauged by its usefulness to the profes-
sion from which it stems and the culture at large. In
this light, this instructional assessment technology
and research information, in turn, has been integrated
with undergraduate teacher certification program in-
struction and evaluation functions directly applied
to the training of more effective teachers in treatment
package form (cf., Hawkins, Sharpe, & Ray, in press).
Initial study of the utilitarian nature of interbehavioral
application to preservice teacher training has shown
great promise in (a) making teachers more aware of the
functional connections among teacher and student
behavior; (b) effectively changing singular teacher
behaviors and complex analytic units of functionally
related teacher behaviors over time toward greater
instructional expertise; (c) providing for simulation
and comparison of effective and novice instructional
episodes, of great utility in preservice instruction
(Berliner, 1986); and (d) overcoming the historical
impediment of first year teacher socialization away
from the teachereffectiveness principles learned within
the certification program context (Sharpe, 1992).
Though this paper is limited to one disciplinary
illustration, it should be apparent that such a utilitar-
ian argument is plausible across many research areas
in which interbehavioral methodology is amenable to
application. It, therefore, becomes not an inability
dilemma with regard to the pointing to what we know
about the world around us via interbehavioral re-
search. Rather, it is a responsibility challenge with
regard to effective communication of interbehavioral
research results and their utilitarian application to
both scientific and popular cultures in a readily un-
derstood fashion. This is particularly germane in view
of current systems methodology resistance within the
applied behavior analysis community.
Conclusions
In spite of the productive nature of the behavior
analytic tradition, there is much that is yet unknown
about the determinants of more complex forms of
human behavior. It is likely that these behavior clus-
ters, and the ecology in which they reside, are those
which are next in need of development in furthering
an applied behavior analytic knowledge base. Itis also
apparent that a spatio-temporal perspective which
emanates from an interbehavioral world view is nec-
essary for more representative evaluation and, hence,
a better understanding of the complete meaning and
nature of organismic interaction. Thus, the need is
apparent for more sophisticated methodological tech-
nologies, to not only better assess human interaction,
but to discover how to more effectively enhance the
behaviors of the involved organisms. This brings one
to our advocacy of current attempts to employ tech-
nologically driven methodological systems related to
an interbehavioral perspective, though philosophical
cautions are replete,
Itis also well recognized within the interbehavioral
community that the following four areas of recom-
mended methodological application (Greenwood,
Delquadri, Stanley, Terry, & Hall, 1985) are currently
underway in many disciplines: (a) development of a
comparative data base derived from differential set-
tings as temporal conglomerates of contextual and
behavioral variables, (b) implementation of subse-
quent causal analyses of relationships which appear
frequently in such data bases, (c) monitoring of the
fidelity of interventions in specific contexts based
upon descriptive-analytic conclusions, and (d) assess-
ment of long term changes in contextual and behav-
ioral functional dependencies which have resulted
from these interventions.
The point is well taken that, as the technological
revolution approaches human research, careful con-
sideration of the empirical and ethical limits of tech-
nology must be undertaken through the scholarly
dissemination of its functional possibilities. How-
ever, the end of more thorough and more accurate
methodological strategies, as applied to human inter-
action, will necessarily include calculated experimen-
tation with emergent technologies.
Though the interbehavioral research community
may readily accept that many other examples regard-
ing the utility of systems research are available, it is
hoped that our education research exemplar wilt give
impetus to focus future presentation and publication
efforts around both methodological pragmatics and
cultural enhancement issues which are currently serv-
ing to inhibit wide acceptance of systems methodolo-
gies. With regard to current radical behaviorist po-
lemic, the systems research community must repeat-
edly illustrate that interbehavioral science fits a prag-
matic orientation to methodological evolution and is
moving toward greater time and cost efficiency as
technological means allow.
Such efficiency issues as related to knowledge
gained must be argued favorably if one is to espouse
systems research as a legitimate pursuit of knowledge,
even if for the singular purpose of knowledge exten-
sion. Second, our community must continually place
priority on dissemination of the professional and
cultural utility of research result, given consensus
specific to a utilitarian definition of scientific pursuit
In presentation of an alternative conceptual orienta-
tion toward the interactive world around us, and
concomitant means of representatively studying that
world, interbehaviorists must be eternally viligant
regarding opportunities to advocate (a) methodologi-
cal feasibility as related to evolving computer tech-
nologies, (b) the evolving cost and time efficacy of
methodological implementation as related to alterna-
tive strategies, and (c) the utilitarian nature of scien-
tific results.
The concerns illuminated above by our more
traditional behavior analytic colleagues are well taken
(c, Baer, 1992), albeit with a necessary rebuttal.
However, concentrated focus on the above issues
must remain at the forefront of future interbehavioral
symposiums held within the hallowed halls of ABA
among attendant traditional behavior analytic think-
ers. For only in this light will intenSehaviorism realize
the full measure of its methodological capacity under
an applied behavior analytic umbrella.
It is readily acknowledged that interbehaviorism
embodies all that behavior analysis is (Morris &
Midgley, 1990) and merely attempts to evolve origi-
nal precepts toward greater focus on the complexity of
organismic and environmental interactions in ap-
plied settings. In this regard, it is our hope that the
behavior analysis community will become more re-
ceptive to interbehavioral research efforts (and not
take to blowing up automobile prototypes so 'to
speak), given an evolving ability on our part to convey
the concision and utility of our research.
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Hawkins, A., & Sharpe, T. L. (Eds.), (in press). Field
systems analysis: An alternative strategy for the
study of teaching expertise. Journal of Teaching in
13
Pltysical Education [special monograph issue],
Hawkins, A., Sharpe, T. L, & Ray, R. (in press).
Toward instructional process measurability; An
interbehavioral field systems perspective. In R.
Gardner (Ed.), Behavior analysis in education; Focus
on measurably superior instruction.
Johnston, J. M. (1990). What it means to be a scientist.
UeBehaviorAnalyst, 13, 163-165.
Kamps, D. M., Leonard, B. R,, Dugan, E. P., Boland,
B., & Greenwood, C. R. (1991). The use of
ecobehavioral assessment to identify naturally
occurring effective procedures in classrooms serv-
ing students with autism and other developmen-
tal disabilities. Journal of Behavioral Education, 1,
367-397.
KantorJ. R, (1969). The scientific evolution of psychology
(Vol. 2). Chicago: Principia Press.
Martens, B. K, & Witt, J. C. (1988a). Ecological
behavioral analysis. In M. Hersen, R. M. Eisler, &
P. M. M&lerfidskProgressinbehaviormodification
(Vol. 27, pp. 115-140). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage
Publishing.
Martens, B. K., & Witt, J. C. (1988b). Expanding the
scope of behavioral consultation: A systems ap-
proach to classroom change. Professional School
Psychology, 3, 271-281.
Miller, G. A. (1952). Finite Markov processes in
psychology. Psychometrika, 17, 149-167.
Mjrberg, A. A. (1972). Ethology of the bicolor dam-
selfish, Eupomaclatsus partitus (Pisces
Pomacentridae): A comparative analysis of labo-
ratory and field behaviour. Animal Behavior Mono-
graphs, 5.
Morris, E. K., & Midgley, B. D. (1990). Some histori-
cal and conceptual foundations of ecobehavioral
analysis. In S. R. Schroeder (Ed.), Ecobehavioral
analysis and developmental disabilities: The twenty-
firstcentury(pp, 1-32). New York: Springer-Verlag.
Moxley, R. A. (1989). Some historical relationships
between science and technology with implica-
tions for behavior analysis. The Behavior Analyst,
12, 45-57.
Nevin, J. A. (1988). Behavioral momentum and the
partial reinforcement effect Psychological Bulletin,
103,44-56.
Pronko, N. H. (1980). Psychology from the standpoint of
an interbehaviorist. Monterey, CA; Brooks/Cole.
Ray, R. D. (in press). Interbehavioral methodology;
Lessons from simulation. Journal of Teaching in
Physical Education [special monograph issue].
14
Ray, R. D. (1983). Interbehavioral systems, temporal
settings and organismic health. In N. W. Smith,
P. T. Mountjoy, & D. H. Ruben (Eds.), Reassess-
ment in psydwfagy; Tl)e interbehavioral alternative
(pp. 361-380). Washington, DC: University Press
of America.
Ray, R. D., & Delprato, D. J. (1989). Behavioral
systems analysis: Methodological strategies and
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Ruben, D, H., & Delprato, D. J. (Eds.). (1987). New
ideas in therapy. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
Schroeder, S. R. (Ed.). (1990). Ecobehavioral analysis
and developmental disabilities: Tfie twenty-first cen-
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Sharpe, T. L. (1992). Validation of a behavior analytic
preservice teacher certification program. Paper pre-
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Behavior Analysis, San Francisco (May).
Sharpe, T. L, & Fox, J. (1992). Current technologies in
interbehavioral data collection and analysis. Paper
presented at the meeting of the Association for
Behavior Analysis, San Francisco (May).
Sharpe, T. L., & Hawkins, A. (1992). Field systems
analysis; Prioritizing patterns in time and context
among observable variables. Quest, 44, 15-34.
Sharpe, T. L., & Hawkins, A. (1990). Interbehaviorism:
Philosophy or science? A rejoinder to Delprato.
Ue ABA Newsletter, 13(3), 16-17.
Sharpe, T. L, Hawkins, A., & Wood, D. (1991).
"Hawkins" and "Sharpe" temporal analysis system
users'manual. (Available fromTom Sharpe, School
of HPER, 204 MABL, University of Nebraska-
Lincoln, Lincoln, NE 68588-0229).
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ter> 11(31 7.
Smith, N. W., Mountjoy, P. T., & Ruben, D. H.
(Eds.). (1983). Reassessment in psychology: The
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Products, Ltd., P.O. Box 146, Stau'onM, Toronto,
Ontario, M6S 4T2, Canada).
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Living issues in philosophy (8th ed.). Belmont, CA;
Wadsworth Publishing.
Wahler, R..G., & Hann, D. H. (1987). An
interbehavioral approach to clinical child
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Greenwood Press.
Wiilems, E. P. (1974). Behavioral technology and
behavioral ecology. Journal of Applied Behavior
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Direct manuscript correspondence to Tom Sharpe, Gradu-
ate Pedagogy Director, Department of Health and Human
Performance, 204 MABL, VN~Lt Lincoln, NE 68588-
0229.
 15

iocial Skills Research on Children at the University

P of Arizona

P. M. Ghezzi*
S.W. Bijou

University of Arizona

The research at the University of Arizona on References

elementary school-age, withdrawn children with mild
retardation is based on the assumption that deficien-
cies in social skills are, for the most part, deficiencies
in linguistic behavior. The method for analyzing
such behavior is based on J.R. Ranter's concept of
psychological linguistics (1977; see also Bijou &
Ghezzi, in press).
Guidelines for using the method, which requires
rating videotaped conversations, have been published
in The Psychological Record (Bijou, Chao, & Ghezzi,
1988; Bijou, Umbreit, Ghezzi, & Chao, 1986; Ghezzi,
Bijou, & Chao, 1991). Procedures for enhancing
social skills, which are based on the operantparadigm,
are conducted in a quasi-laboratory, elementary school
setting and involve a five-stage subject selection pro-
cess.
Thus far, the research has proceeded through
three phases: The first investigated the feasibility of
applying the method toa well-known rinding, namely,
the differential effects on a speaker of varying listener
age (Ghezzi, Bijou, Umbreit, & Chao, 1987). The
second investigated the various parameters of adult-
mediated social skills training, and the third examined
peer-mediated training (Ghezzi & Bijou, in press).
The results of the training studies highlight some
of the advantages of not only conceptualizing social
skills in terms of interpersonal linguistic behavior, but
also of studying linguistic behavior from an
interbehavioral point of view.
Bijou, S.W., Chao, C.-C, & Ghezzi, P.M. (1988).
Manual of instructions for identifying and ana-
lyzing referential interactions II. The Psychologi-
cal Record, 38, W\4\*.
Bijou, S.W., & Ghezzi, P.M. (in press). Outline of J.R.
Kantor's Psychological Linguistics (1977). Chi-
cago; Principia Press.
Bijou, S.W., Umbreit,]., Ghezzi, P.M., & Chao, C-
C. (1986). Manual of instructions for identifying
and analyzing referential interactions. The Psy-
chological Record, 36, 491- 518.
Kantor, J.R. (1977). Psychological Linguistics. Chi-
cago: Principia Press.
Ghezzi, P.M., & Bijou, S.W. (in press). Social skills
training for withdrawn mildly retarded children.
In E, Ribes, LJ. Hayes, & A. Lopez (Eds),
Interhehaviorism: Proceedings of the First Interna-
tional Congress oflnterbehavioralPsychology. Reno,
NV: Context Press.
Ghezzi, P.M., Bijou, S.W., &Chao, C.-C. (1991). A
manual for training raters to identify and analyze
referential interactions. The Psychological Record,
41, 473-486.
Ghezzi, P.M., Bijou, S.W., Umbreit,;., & Chao, C.-
C. (1987). Influence of age of listener on preado-
lescents' linguistic behavior. The Psychological
Record, 37, 109-136.
* Now at the University of Nevada, Reno, NV
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 Bryan D. Migley
~i Hum Dev & Fara Life
^ University of Kansas
| Lawrence, KS 66045-21

Volume 21 1993 Number 1

Linda J. Hayes, University of Nevada TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAST EDITORS The Agora

Noel W. Smith, Vois 1 -7 (1970-1978)
Ronald G. Heyduk, Vols 8-11(1978-1983)
Edward K. Morris, Vols 12-17(1983-1989) Research Notes

ADVISORY BOARD Andrew Hawkins & Thomas Sharpe.

Technologically Driven Research Methodology:
Sidney W. Bijou, University of Arizona Behavioral and Interbehamoral
Donna M. Cone, State of Rhode Island
Perspectives 4
Dennis J. Delprato, Eastern Michigan University
JamesJ. Fox, EastTennessee State University
Patrick GhezziJ University of Nevada Comments
Sandy Hobbs, Paisley College of Technology
Edward K. Morris, University of Kansas Noel W. Smith. TliePsi Chi Ceremony and
Paul T, Mountjoy, Western Michigan Univer- Mind-Body Dualism 13
sity
N. H. Pronko, Wichita State University Dennis J. Delprato. InterbehavioralPsychology
Roger D. Ray, Rollins College and Behavior Analysis:
EmilioRibes, University of Guadalajara An Opinon........................... .'..16
Robert G. Wahler, University of Tennessee
Patricia Bach. The Relation.Between
MANAGING EDITOR Epistemology, Ontology, and System
Steven C. Hayes, University of Nevada Building in Kantor^s Psychology and
Logic....,, , 19
ASSISTANT EDITORS
DebraW. Fredericks, Ramona Houmanfar,
Duane C. Lord, Cynthia Reinbold, David G.
Stroffe, Mark A. Swain, GinaToubouras,
University of Nevada
ISSN 8755-612X
 A Newsletter of Principia Press's currently available titles
Interbehavioral Psychology in interbehavioral psychology, all by J.R. Kan-
ISSN 8.755-612X tor, are listed below. Check your bookshelves,
and those of your library and bookstore, for
Linda J, Hayes, Editor possible oversights. In addition, the books
Department of Psychology make excellent gifts for colleagues and stu-
University of Nevada dents, especially for the latter in honor of their
Reno, Nevada 89557, U.S.A. completed degree requirements. The books
- 702-784-1137 may-be purchased directly from Principia Press,
5743 Kimbark Avenue, Chicago, IL 60637. Han-
THE INTERBEHAVIORIST publishes dling charges are $.75 per title; prepaid orders
news, information, discussion, journal and book are postpaid. Any queries should also be di-
notes,, book reviews, comments, and brief ar- rected to the address above. .
ticles pertaining to interbehavioral psychology
- a contextualistic, integrated-field approach Principles of Psychology (2 vols.) $20.00
to the natural science of behavior. Psychology and Logic (2 vols.) $25.00-
The newsletter also publishes professional Interbehavioral Psychology $15.00
communications that fall between informal The Logic of Modern Science $15.00w
correspondence and colloquia, and formal ar- An Objective Psychology of
chival publication. As such, the newsletter Grammar $13.00-
supplements contemporary journals dedicated The Scientific Evolution of
to basic and applied research, to the history Psychology (2 vols)- $40.00
and philosophy of the behavioral sciences, and The Science of Psychology;
to professional issues in the field. The newslet- An Interbehavioral Survey $20.00-*
ter strongly encourages submission of. notes Psychological Linguistics $15.00-
about current professional activities of its sub- The Aim and Progress of Psychology
scribers, news and observations about interbe- and Other Sciences $20.00
havioral psychology and related perspectives, Interbehavioral Philosophy $27.50 -
comments on journal articles and books of Cultural Psychology $16.00
interest,. more extended book reviews, and brief Tragedy and the Event Continuum $15.00"
articles. All submissions should be sent in Selected Writings, 1929-1983 $20.00-
duplicate hard copy and a single computer disk Psychological Comments
copy (any major word processor; any Mac or and Queries $20.00
IBM disk format) to the editor and should
conform to the style described in the Publica-
tion Manual of the American Psychological
Association (3rd edition). Call for News
Subscription Information THE INTERBEHAVIORIST pub-
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Regular Subscriptions (USA) 10.00 and information about others' activities
Foreign (Non-USA) Subscriptions 12.00 that may be of interest to readers. If you
Institutional Subscriptions 15.00 have published an article, chapter, or book
Back Volumes 1-18 12.00 with an interbehavioral orientation, or
have read one published by someone else,
THE INTERBEHAVIORIST is published as a public service particularity if the source is obscure, please
by CONTEXT PRESS, Box 50172, Reno, NV 89513. CONTEXT let us know about it.
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 Editorial
THE INTERBEHAVIORIST has been through
some changes these past years, and we have yet
another to announce: The interbehaviorist will be
published twice ayear, once in the spring and once in
the fall. Volume 20 reflects this change as does the
current volume. There are a number of reasons for
eliminating an issue. The first of these is a very low
rate of submissions, with the result that the same few
people are contributing most of the manuscripts.
(We do appreciate their contributions!) Secondly,
the subscriptions rates are very low. And third, the
cost of production exceeds the revenue from sub-
scriptions. (We thank CONTEXT PRESS for underwrit-
ing the difference,) Producing two issues per volume
instead of three seemed a workable plan until we are
able to solve these problems.
Linda J. Hayes, Editor
Publications
Noel Smith has two new publications which may
be of interest to our readers.
The first is a recent book review of James E.
Faulconer & Richard N. Williams (Eds.). Re-
considering Psychology: Perspectives from
Continental Psychology. Pittsburgh: Du-
quesne University Press. The review was pub-
lished in 1992 by The Psychological Record,
42. Noel has some copies of this review that he
can provide to interested parties.
Noel's second publication, titled "The Dis-
tant Past and Its Relation to Current Psychology:
A Tour of Psychophysical Dualism" can be found
in Mankind Quarterly > 1992, 32, 261-273.
Sidney W. Bijou's classic child development text
has been completely revised, and is now available
through CONTEXT PRESS. An order form is on the back
cover of this issue of THE INTERBEHAVIORIST.
The International Journal of Conflict
Management
This journal is soliciting original empirical and con-
ceptual articles, case studies, simulations, and teach-
ing notes in the following areas:
1. Organizational conflict
2. Communication and conflict
3. Mediation
4. Arbitration
5. Negotiation
6. Bargaining and industrial relations
7. law and procedural justice
8. Peace and international conflict
9. Conflict in the public sector
10. Social psychological conflict
This journal is published in January, April,
July, and October. Manuscripts must be pre-
pared according to the latest edition of the
Publication Manual of the American Psycho-
logical Association and are reviewed by a double-
blind review process. Four copies of the manu-
scripts and requests for other details may be
addressed to:
Dr. Afaal Rahim, Editor
Department of Management
Western Kentucky University
Bowling Green, KY 42101, USA
University Phone/FAX: 502-745-2499/2559
IJCM Phone & FAX: 502-782-2601
 Andrew Hawkins
West Virginia University
Tom Sharpe
University of Nebraska - Lincoln
It is remarkable, we think, that Skinner-
and Kantor did not see eye to eye on behavioral
theory, even though they were contemporaries
and on the same faculty for a time. In our
judgment, the distinctions between their two
theories are relatively minor, (see, for example,
Morris, 1988.) The differences really amount to
a matter of emphasis. The chief distinction
between the behaviorism of Skinner and the
interbehaviorism of Kantor is that in Skinner,
context is implicit and taken for granted. In
Kantor, context is explicit, and of central im-
portance in any kind of scientific analysis. In
Skinner, behavior is the unit of analysis. In
Kantor, the unit of analysis is interbehavior,
i.e., the interaction of an individual with ob-
jects, events, other individuals, groups, and
even one's own behavior.
Why, then, has Skinner dominated behav-
ioral psychology in the last half-century? We
don't know. We have not conducted the neces-
sary behavioral analysis (or even
interbehavioral analysis) to be sure. But there
are a couple of salient possibilities. First,
Kantor's work was thoroughly conceptual and
philosophical, making his writing less appeal-
ing to experimental types and pragmatic psy-
chologists, and, let's face it, less accessible due
to shear difficulty. (See, for instance, Kantor,
1959; Kantor, 1969; Skinner, on the other hand,
while he wrote conceptually, was never far
from his roots in the experimental laboratory
(e.g., Skinner, 1950). That tended to make his
writing less abstract, more concrete and de-
scriptive, and hence more accessible. In addi-
tion, since Skinner's roots were in the labora-
tory, his theory was closely tied to technology,
particularly as the technology related to a re-
search methodology. That, in itself, could ex-
plain the lack of acceptance of Kantor. His was
a theory always seemingly in search of a meth-
odology. Kantor's own philosophical work was
most likely partially responsible for the lack of
empirical interbehavioral research. Also a fac-
tor, however, was that his theory was simply
too complex for, and too far ahead of, the avail-
able technology. That is no longer the case. The
computer revolution has made a remarkable
technology available - a technology that is par-
ticularly well suited tn interbehavioral theory.
That, we believe, explains the current interest
in developing research methods carrying such
labels as interbehavioral (Ray, 1983),
ecobehavioral (Greenwood, Carta, & Atwater,
1991), and field systems analysis (Hawkins &
Sharpe, 1992).
The purpose of this paper is to describe how
forms of behavioral research are technology-
driven and technology dependent. Our thesis is
that In order for theories to spawn viable re-
search methodologies there must be a close
conceptual relationship between the theory and
the available technology. We will illustrate this
thesis with a brief technological history of ap-
plied behavior analytic research methods , and
will conclude with one of our applications of
interbehavioral research based on currently
available technology.
A Brief History of the Technology of
Behavior Analysis
Much of our own research has been classic
behavior analysis (e.g., Sharpe, Hawkins, &
Wiegand, 1989). A substantial portion of what
little we know about teaching is probably. the
result of one form or another of behavior analy-
 sis. And the fundamentals of behavior analy-
sis, i.e., the determination of measurable di-
mensions of behavior, the definition of specific
response classes, and the technical means to
measure and analyze those response classes,
provide an important, even prerequisite, foun-
dation for interbehavioral research applica-
tions. Perhaps a brief history of the technology
of data management in behavior analysis will
illustrate.
The content of courses that we negotiated
as part of our professional training in applied
behavior analysis included the basic types of
data collection systems. There was event re-
cording for counting behavior and duration
recording for timing behavior. The idea was to
select a problem behavior, determine which
dimension (i.e., its repeatability or its dura-
tion) was most relevant to the problem, and
then either count it or time it accordingly.
Usually, that would be done in a session, and
the total number of counts or the total time
would be divided by the total session time to
produce a rate or a percentage for that behavior
for that session.
Occasionally, if the behavior was difficult to
count or time for some reason (e.g., if it re-
peated itself too rapidly to count accurately, or
if it was unclear in its starting and stopping
points making duration recording difficult) we
would try to estimate the rate of the behavior
using some type of interval recording system.
In that system, a recording sheet would be
divided into a number of intervals determined
to last for a brief number of seconds, say six
seconds. The observer would watch the subject
for six seconds, then record whether or not the
target behavior occurred within that six second
period. Then the observer would watch again
for six seconds, then record again, and so forth.
At the end of the session the number of inter-
vals scored for the target behavior would be
divided by the number of total intervals, pro-
ducing a percentage of intervals score for the
session.
Ordinarily, data like this would be collected
over a number of sessions, say, five. They would
be graphed with the sessions plotted on the
abscissa and the rate or percent of intervals on
the ordinate. That portion of the graph would
be called the "baseline." If the baseline were
judged to be "stable" then it was appropriate to
use an intervention of some sort, like a teaching
strategy or a disciplinary procedure, to try and
change the rate or percent or percent of inter-
vals in subsequent sessions. If the behavior
changed over the next several sessions, then to
determine if the change was due to the inter-
vention, rather than to some natural fluctua-
tion or an uncontrolled variable, the procedure
was to remove the intervention, return to
baseline conditions and see if the rate, percent
or percent of intervals also returned to a baseline
level. If it did, the intervention was reinsti-
tuted, and if the level resembled the previous
intervention it would be declared that the in-
tervention was responsible for the change. A
clear, parsimonious demonstration of the rela-
tionship between a behavior and an interven-
tion could be demonstrated in this way.
There are a couple of interesting observa-
tions that must be made about this procedure,
however. First, such a procedure was techno-
logically very simple, even primitive. Paper
and pencil were all that were necessary. A
watch with a second hand was helpful as well.
Those things had been around for dozens of
years, and, in the case of paper and pencil, for
centuries in one form or another. Eventually,
some of us became more sophisticated and used
a tape recorder to pace our use of interval
recording, but that was about the limit of our
technical finesse.
The other observation is that, in spite of the
clean parsimonious demonstration of control
possible in this procedure, Jn order to achieve it
we had to remove the behavior from its context.
We didn't simultaneously count or time any
other behaviors or events. We just looked for
the one target behavior. And then we further
removed it from its context by summing it with
all the other instances of its occurrence. Even
the graphs, known as time series graphs, hid
the context of the behaviors. Even though the
data points were connected with a line which
traversed a temporal dimension (i.e., sessions)
there was really no temporal connection in the
data themselves. What were connected were
simply the session summations of the indi-
vidual events - events which were lost in the
 analysis.
Eventually, of course, some more sophisti-
cated innovations were developed on this foun-
dation. Data collection was applied to, not one,
but multiple behaviors. The use of interval
recording systems became more prevalent since
the plurality of behaviors could be developed
into a category system, the behaviors given
codes, and any one of several response classes
could be assigned to a. given interval. Most of
the time, however, the category systems were,
by definition, mutually exclusive (i.e., any one
behavior could not be recorded as occurring
simultaneously with any other behavior). And
when an interval included more than one be-
havior in the category system the one response
class which predominated was recorded and
the others were ignored.
Some of these systems were quite complex,
involving several different forms of data collec-
tion In the same setting. One system we recall
utilized interval recording for certain behav-
iors, event recording for others, along with an
occasional use of a momentary time sampling tech-
Cues for Student Responding
11 Attention Signal
12 Go Statement
29 Prompt
Instructional Elements
14 Verbal Instruction
18 Group Directed Modeling
27 Question
28 Repeat
Encouraging and Feedback Elements
15 Encouragement
16 Specific Positive Feedback
26 General Positive Feedback
33 Positive Contact
36 Corrective Feedback
nique. In addition to the increased complexity of the
data collection systems, there appreared other, more
complex graphic designs with which to evaluate data.
To the standard reversal design were added multiple
baseline, changing criterion and multi-element de-
signs, as well as some hybrid designs. Multiple
behaviors would be displayed on the same graph, so
there was clearly a sense of increased complexity and
sophistication in the analysis.
Nevertheless, some of the same observa-
tions made ealier applied even to these more
complex procedures. Paper and pencil were
still the primary data collection instruments,
and even though multiple behaviors were col-
lected, they were all still removed from their
temporal context, summed, and graphed in the
same way so as to imply a temporal connection
when, in fact, there was none.
There were some nascent attempts during
this period to collect contextual data. The 1982
Academic Learning Time - Physical Education
system (ALT-PE) was an example with which
we were familiar. That system involved a two
level decision for each interval. The observer
Interpersonal Elements
13 Courtesy Comment
17 Non-Task Verbal
Class Context
19 Activity: Aerobic Obstacle Course
31 Transition
35 Activity: Sideline Basketball
Teacher Movement Patterns
20 Jog/Run
21 Walking
22 Sit/Kneel
25 Stand
Teacher Management Elements
23 Management Direction
24 Equipment Management
would make a context decision, then a student behav-
ior decision. In addition, there were some other
systems designed to collect data on teachers and
students which employed two level decisions for each
interval - what the teacher was doing and what the
student was doing. Unfortunately, however, these
data were often treated in the same way as previous
systems. The data were removed from their temporal
contexts, summed, and graphed separately as de-
scribed.
It could be argued that during the 1960's
and 1970's the technology did not exist to collect
behavioral data on multiple, simultaneously
occurring, contextual and behavioral events,
and certainly the technology did not exist to
analyze them either. However, during the 80's
the revolution in microelectronics changed the
landscape of data collection and analysis possi-
bilities. A number of computer based data col-
lection and analysis systems were developed,
and some of the paper and pencil systems were
reworked so that data could be analyzed on
PC's, and even collected on lap-top computers.
We were among the first in applied behavior
analysis to experiment with microprocessors
as data collection instruments (Hawkins &
Wiegand, 1987), beginning with the Datamyte
800 series (which are now as extinct as the
brontosaurus) and later moving to NEC 8300
lap-tops and PC's for analysis.
Unfortunately, however, for the most part
the computer revolution did not affect behavior
analysis in any substantive way. Behaviors
were still removed from their contexts, summed,
and graphed in the same way as before, we just
did it all more quickly and easily, but the
fundamental nature of the analysis remained
the same. Nevertheless, through the computer
revolution, a foundation was laid for a funda-
mental change in the nature of behavior analy-
sis. Through enhanced technology it became
possible to collect data on multiple, simulta-
neously occurring, contextual and behavioral
events, to leave those events in their temporal
contexts, and to analyze them in context, ob-
serving the nature of their interrelationships
with each other. However, though such an
analysis was possible technologically, like other
forms of scientific advancement, a theory was re-
quired to provide that technology with a purpose and
a direction. At last, technology had caught up with
Kantor. Interbehaviorism had found its marriageable
partner.
An Interbehavioral Example Using
Current Technology
We have been particularly interested in
studying teaching expertise from an
interbehavioral perspective (Hawkins &
Sharpe, 1992). There has always been a sense
of mystery about someone who was truly an
expert, especially when an expert is someone
who is distinguished from one who is merely
experienced (Siedentop & Eldar, 1989). There
are teachers who just dazzle us, who seem to be
in a class by themselves, whose expertise seems
to be inexplicable. In our judgment, one reason
true experts seem so mysterious is that in our
analysis of them, contextual factors have re-
mained implicit.
One teacher with whom we have been par-
ticularly impressed is a male elementary physi-
cal education teacher in his mid to late 30's,
well known in his state and region, who was
selected as a model demonstration teacher for
a nationally known elementary physical educa-
tion curriculum, we analyzed one of his demon-
stration lessons which included the use of an
aerobic obstacle course and a sideline basket-
ball lead up game (Hawkins, Sharpe & Jewell,
1992).
Our investigation began with the develop-
ment of a rich verbal description of the setting,
including both contextual and behavioral ele-
ments. That description was reduced to a 23
element category system for the teacher's be-
havioral elements and for the major contextual
changes which occurred during the class. (Table
1)
A NEC PC-8300 lap computer, modified by
S & K Computer products, LTD, as an event
recorder, was used to collect real time data for
all elements of the category system. Three or
four discrete elements were collected at any one
viewing and the data were merged into one
data set after all elements were collected. Fi-
nally, the categorization, order and the location
of each element in the data set was verified by
a frame by frame viewing by two researchers.
The data were first analyzed by generating a data
summary, including the frequency, duration, mean
Element Duration Mean Percent Rate
Duration Duration

Context
19 Obst Crs 6.54 .73 22.84 0.31
31 Transition 6.06 .34 21.15 0.63
35 Basketball 14.66 2.09 51.18 0.24

Movement Patterns
20 Jog/Run 24 3.17 .13 11.07 0.84
21 Walking 38 18.05 .48 63.00 1.33
22 Sit/Kneel 5 .87 .17 3.04 0.17
25 Stand 31 5.41 .18 18.89 1.08

11 Att. Signal 38 .28 .01 1.00 1.33

12 Go Statement 25 .64 .03 2.23 0.87
29 Prompt 113 3.40 .03 11.87 3.94

Instruction
14 Verbal Inst 33 2.15 .07 7.52 1.15
18 Grp. Dir. Model 1 .65 .65 2.28 0.03
27 Question 36 .65 .02 2.27 1.26
28 Repeat 16 .37 .02 1.28 0.56

Encouragement/Feedback
15 Encouragement 50 1.49 .03 5.21
1.75
16 Spec. Pos. Feed. 51 1.08 .02 3.76 1.78
26 Gen. Pos. Feed. 24 .55 .02 1.90
0.84
33 Pos. Contact 50 1.48 .03 5.17 1.75
36 Corrective Feed. 26 .79 .03 2.76 0.91

Interpersonal
13 Courtesy Comment .08 .01 0.26 0.21
17 Non-Task Verbal .17 .02 0.58 0.24

Management
23 Man. Direction 51 2.26 .04 7.89
1.78
24 Equipment Man. .40 .06 1.40 0.24

Total 666 28.646 100.00

 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 31 33 35 36 Fr

3 2 1 1 1 10 1 8 1 8 2 38
11 08 05 03 03 03 26 03 21 03 21 05 06

1 1 1 2 2 2 4 1 1 2 I 7 25
12 16 04 04
04 04 04 08 08 08 04 08 04 28

1 1 2 1 1 6
13 17 17 17 01
17 33

2 1 3 3 6 3 2 1 3 7 1 1 33
14 05
06 03 09 09 18 09 06 03 09 21 03 03

3 9 3 1 4 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 9 10 50
15
06 18 06 02 08 10 02 02 02 02 02 02 18 20 08

4 1 2 4 2 2 1 1 1 4 2 16 1 3 1 6 51
16 02 02 02 08
08 02 04 08 04 04 02 02 08 04 31 02 06 12

1 1 1 1 2 7
17
14 14 14 14 29 01

1 1
18
1 00

3 1 1 2 1 1 9
19 11 22 01
33 11 11 11

6 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 5 1 1 24
20 08 04 08 04 21 04 04 04
25 04 04 04 04 04

1 3 2 1 4 4 3 1 2 1 11 1 2 5 38
21 11
03 08 05 03 11 08 03 05 03 29 03 05 02 06

1 1 1 4 5
22
20 20 20 20 01

3 3 1 4 1 3 3 7 2 5 1 2 5 1 3 2 2 51
23
06 06 02 08 02 06 06 14 04 10 02 04 10 02 06 04 04 08

24
1 3 1 1 1 7
14 43 14 14 14 01

4 9 1 1 1 2 2 1 3 1 2 2 1 1 31
25 03 06
13 29 03 03 06 03 10 03 06 06 03 03 05

4 1 1 3 2 1 2 1 5 4 24
26
27 04 04 13 08 04 08 04 21 17 04

27 1 3 1 2 3 2 1 7 10 4 1 1 36
03 08 03 06 08 06 03 19 28 11 03 03 05

1 2 7 1 1 2 1 1 16
28
06 13 44 06 06 13 06 06 02

7 1 7 8 15 1 2 8 2 5 S 3 30 2 10 4 13
29 07 02 07 27 17
06 01 06 13 01 02 04 07 03 02 09 04

1 1 I 2 6 2 2 2 17
31
06 06 06 12 35 12 12 12 03

1 1 2 13 5 2 2 - 2 2 1 1 9 3 1 5 50
33 02 04 26 04 04 04 02 18 06 08
02 10 04 02 02 10

1 3 2 1 7
35
14 43 29 14 01

1 1 4 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 4 3 1 26
36
04 04 15 08 08 04 08 04 04 08 04 15 12 04 04

T 665
10
duration, percent duration and rate per minute of
each element (Table 2). Next, a conditional probabil-
ity matrix was produced showing the probability with
which each element immediately succeeded the oth-
ers. The matrix was generated on the basis of element
start times (see Table 3).
The probability matrix was the basis for two
fypes of kinematic analysis. The first type in-
volved a depiction of dual chains of events
based on the most frequently occurring ele-
ments. The second type involved a depiction of
"nesting characteristics/' or preceding and suc-
ceeding elements which tend to cluster around
the most frequently occurring elements (See
Hawkins, Sharpe, & Jewell, 1992, for more
detail concerning the kinematic analysis).
Finally, graphs of elements by time were
produced, first for all the element combinations
which appeared in the dual chains and nests, and
then for any other element combination of interest as
the analysis progressed. These graphs seem to us to
represent the field, or systemic, character of the
observed setting. There are clear advantages in ana-
lyzing these graphs, where events are allowed to
remain in context throughout the analysis.
It might be useful to examine one graph as an
example. This figure displays the flow through the
entire lesson of three contextual elements (19 ob-
stacle Course, 35 Sideline Basketball, and 31 Transi-
tion) along with the four teacher movement patterns
(22 Sit/Kneel, 20 Jog/Run, 21 walk, and 25 Stand).
(Figure 1)
Clearly the class was comprised of two seg-
ments, the first devoted to the aerobic activity
and the second to the lead up game of basket-
ball. There are a few noteworthy characteris-
tics relating to the contextual patterns apart from
their relations with behavioral elements. First, there
is a markedly regular rhythmic pattern in the sideline
basketball activity. Each episode appears similar in
duration, separated by brief transitions during which
team members on the court were alternated with
those on the sideline. Such a regular rhythmic pattern
does not appear with the obstacle course, although
the variability in duration does not appear to be
extreme.
The transitions in the midst of the obstacle
course activity also are more frequent and
usually somewhat longer than those during basket-
ball. This may imply that the basketball activity was
more efficiently managed than was the obstacle
course. We think not. 19 Obstacle course was coded
only when the students were actually engaged in the
activity. Transitions were used to change equipment
at certain stations, but also seemed to carry another
function as restperiods. Since the obstacle course was
aerobic in nature these interruptions were not alto-
gether inappropriate.
This figure also includes the movement
patterns as they occurred throughout the en-
tire lesson. Only one pattern, 25 stand, retains
a relatively stable rhythmic pattern through
the period. All the other movement patterns
are correlated with the lesson context.
All five episodes of 22 Sit/Kneel were brief
and occurred during the portion of the class
allotted to the obstacle course. These periods
either involved kneeling to fix some equipment
that Had moved during the obstacle course, or
occurred as a model for students when the
teacher wanted them to assume a sitting or
kneeling position during rest periods. Most of
the running episodes occurred during the ob-
stacle course as well. It appeared that these
served encouragement and modeling functions
as well, in the sense that students would be
more likely to aerobically extend themselves if
the teacher was energetically involved in the
lesson.
21 walking episodes show a fairly regular
rhythmic pattern in each context respectively,
though the durations are longer in basketball.
One may surmise that our teacher tired after
his own aerobic, involvement in the obstacle
course. Perhaps. However, it appears to us that his
functions in the two contexts were different, and that
his movement pattern changed to reflect them. The
instructional demands during an aerobic obstacle
course are usually minimal. Normally, the primary
demands are motivational. The teacher appeared to
function in the role of an encourager in this portion,
and his frequent bursts served to motivate students to
keep moving. By contrast, the instructional demands
increase during a skill based activity like basketball, as
do the management (officiating) demands, walking
serves this purpose more effectively.
Finally, it occurs to us that in addition to these
movement patterns serving motivational and in-
structional functions respectively, this teacher exhib-
ited them in a way which reflected the relative

DO
__
31 D 0 D II ID D
IOC SCI I! 1 0 I D 1 I D D S O I !
lion ninaiooDa i oa
25 0 D D 1 0 3 1 0 ' 10
11667 29333 44880
Tine ( L953125E-02 seconds)
Figure 1
intensity of the activity of the students. Perhaps there
is a subtle modeling influence at work here, or
possibly our instructor communicates "enthusiasm"
in his movement. It is interesting to note that while
25 stand occurred fairly frequently, each episode was
short in duration. This teacher did not stand still for
very long. (A more detailed interpretation of this and
other graphs is available from Hawkins, Sharpe, &
Jewell, 1992.)
Conclusion
The marriage of interbehaviorism and tech-
nology is evident in this example, under earlier
forms of behavior analysis we might only note
that 74% of the lesson time was spent either
walking or running. As a summary datum, 740
walking or running is perhaps important. But
it does not really do justice to the way in which
each of those behavioral elements are related to the
lesson contexts and to each other. That is the value of
11
M IG C 3 5
58667 73333
an interbehavioral, or field systems, analysis vis a vis
more traditional behavior analysis where events are
analyzed apart from their contexts. And that is an
analysis made possible by the unique marriage of
theory and technology, in which interbehaviorism
finds a conceptual ally in contemporary microelec-
tronics.
References
Greenwood, C. R., Carta, J. J., & Atwater, J. B.
(1991). Ecobehavioral analysis in the class-
room: Review and implications. Journal of
Behavioral Education, 1, 59-77.
Hawkins, A. & Sharpe, T. (1992). Special Mono-
graph: Field systems analysis: An alterna-
tive for the study of teaching expertise,
Journal of Teaching in Physical Education,
12, 1.
Hawkins, A., Sharpe, T., a Jewell J. (1992). A curricu-
lum demonstration teacher: A positive, prompt-
12
ing, perpetual motion pedagogue Journal oJTeacb-
ing in Physical Education, 2, 1.
Hawkins, A. H., Weigand, R. L. (1987). where tech-
nology and accountability converge: Confes-
sions of an educational technologist. In G. T.
Barrette, R. S. Feingold, C. R. Rees, & M. Pieron
(Eds.), Myths, models, and methods in sport pedagogy
(pp. 67-75). Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics.
Kantor, J. R. (1959). Interbehavioral psychology.
Granville, OH: Principia Press.
Kantor, J. R. (1969). Tl)e scientific evolution of
psychology (Vol. 2). Chicago: Principia Press.
Morris, E. K. (1988). Not so worlds apart: con-
textualism, radical behaviorism, and develop-
mental psychology. T/ieInterbebaviorist, 16, I.
Ray, R. D. (1984). Interbehavioral systems, temporal
settings and organismic health. In N. W. Smith,
P. T. Mountjoy & D. H. Ruben (Eds.), Reassess-
ment in psychology: Tfje interbebavioral alternative
(pp. 361-380). Washington, DC:University Press
of America.
Sharpe, T. L., Hawkins, A. H., & Weigand, R. L.
(1989). An analysis of model/practice versus
verbal/rehearsal introductions of systems skills
within an individually prescribed instructional
system. JournalofTeaching in Physical Education, 9,
25-38.
Siedentop, D., & Eldar, E. (1989). Expertise, experi-
ence, and effectiveness. Journal of Teaching in
Physical Education, 8, 254-260.
Skinner, B. F. (1950). Are theories of learning neces-
sary? Psychological Review, 57,193-216.
 ;i
Noel W. Smith
State University of New York at Pittsburgh
According to a statement in the Psi Chi
ceremony, Greek "psyche" means "mind" and
suggests "enrichment of the mind". This mind-
body assumption is in good company. In 1980
Florence Denmark, the president of the Ameri-
can Psychological Association, declared in her
presidential address, "Psyche is derived from
the Greek, in which it originally signified the
soul, the spirit, and the source of all vitality".
Let's take a look at the actual Greek use of
the word "psyche". The earliest written source
for the use of "psyche" is by Homer around 800
BCE. He used it to refer to the last gasp of
breath (e.g., Odyssey, Chp. 5, 1. 468) much as
we use "expire", meaning to breathe out and to
die; in the course of succeeding centuries
"psyche" came to have an affective meaning
and was finally used in a systematic way by
Aristotle (De Anima, 4l8a,6 - 426a,26; Smith,
1974). For Aristotle, "psyche" is to the body as
cutting is to an ax (412b, 14-17): it is what the
organism does. In another analogy he tells us
that if "the eye were an animal-sight would
have been its [psyche]" (412b, 18-19). Psyche is
the life-function of the organism and is similar
to what we should call "behavior" but more
encompassing, for it includes nutritive and
locomotive acts. It also involves such covert
behaviors as perceiving, thinking, dreaming,
imagining, knowing, and others. These are all
life-functions of the organism.
This is decidedly not a mind-body dualism
or a putting together of mind and body, for
there is no such distinction to start with.
Aristotle's analysis of psychological events is
one of a thorough going organism-environment
relationship. It is the potential of the organism
to see, think, or recollect together with the
potential of the object to be seen, thought about,
or recollected, The joint actualization of these
potentials constitutes the acts of seeing, think-
ing, or recollecting (Kantor, 1963; Randall, 1960;
Shute, 1941/1964; Smith, 1971, 1974, 1990).
The psychological event then is not inside the
organism, or in a mind acting upon or directing
the body, but in the interaction of the organism
and its environment.
We can clearly see that the imposition of
such agents and powers as "mind" and "soul"
upon the Greeks is entirely lacking in accuracy.
The Greeks naturalistic approach to all sub-
jects including psychology was with a view to
observable events. Psychological events con-
sisted of organism-environment interactions,
not hypothetical powers and agents residing in
the organism which cause it to act.
If the mentalistic meaning of "psyche" did
not arise in the classical Greek period, when
and how did it arise? We find the answer to this
question by examining events in the second
century B.C. The period from 146-30 B.C., was
one of decline. Rome gained total power at that
time. For four hundred years Rome's adminis-
tration was so bad that it nearly destroyed
Greece and Rome too. Piracy flourished; the.
ruling class was corrupt from new wealth; work-
ing classes were submissive. Civil war, inter-
national war, and class conflict were rampant.
The danger of enslavement or death was great.
In this climate rose despair, pessimism, and
asceticism (Murray, 1955; Rostovtseff, 1957).
Cults flourished. The response to these condi-
tions in the intellectual community was to
create the supernatural as a domain to which
the debased world did not apply (Kantor, 1963).
Philo and others at the School of Alexandria
constructed a deity that was completely outside
of time and space. Others endowed Greek
"psyche" with similar supernatural attributes.
One's psyche was akin to the supernatural
deity and carried with it the powers of willing
and reasoning. As a supernatural power its
 14
relationship to the body was that of an insuper-
able mystery. The psychophysical dualism
that has descended to us in modern day
psychology was created by an intellectual lead-
ership in the Greco-Roman world under the
debilitating conditions of long-standing insecu-
rity.
Beginning in the 18th century "psyche" was
converted to brain, and many people have la-
bored strenuously to reduce complex interac-
tions of organisms and surroundings to neural
impulses, often with analogies to the computer.
Our mind or brains are said to process informa-
tion and interpret the world for us. The inside
world is said to be merely a representation of
the outside world. Thus we live in a double
. world, a real external world and an internal
world that merely represents it. This assump-
tion leads to either of two logical consequences.
If the brain or mind processes and interprets
the world it must be self-acting or self-caused.
Yet we know of nothing in the world that causes
itself. If the brain or mind is not self-caused it
must itself have a cause and that cause must
have a cause and so on infinitely. Because such
an infinite regress has no beginning point,
human activity could never occur. If propo-
nents of brain/mind constructs would ever face
the consequences of their assumptionsself
causation or infinite regressthey might be
inspired to look for an alternative.
If psychology is not about an inner agent
running the body in the form of a computer
brain or mind, what is it about? If nature has
not divided us into two parts, what is the
alternative. The alternative is as old as Aristotle.
Psychology is about a history of interactions
that develop as human and nonhuman organ-
isms interact with their surroundings within a
context. We can call this a field of interactions.
The brain and other biological factors are par-
ticipants in this interaction just as are .cultural
factors and individual histories, but no single
factor is converted into a determiner of the
entire complex events. We need not assume
that we are robots with computer brains or
minds in bodies or that we are walking around
in a double world. And just as we need not
assume minds in bodies neither do we need
assume mindless bodies. A psychology that
moves its focus from the organism or the inside
of the organism to the field of relationships of
which the organism is one component avoids
both mechanism and mentalism and can deal
with the full range and richness of human
activity that the Psi Chi ceremony refers to. It
is a context or field psychology.
One can, of course, make the kinds of as-
sumptions that the ceremonial statement does,
assumptions that are widespread in psychology.
But if "psyche" suggests scholarship, as the
statement also maintains, we need to at least
be aware that such assumptions are just that-
-assumptions--and that these assumptions have
logical consequences such as requiring a double
world with.its self-causation or infinite regress.
Good scholarship should also allow us to see
alternative to these assumptions such as that
of a field or context psychology (Kantor 1959;
Smith, 1984). And, finally, scholarship should
lead us to an accurate understanding of such
historical terms as Greek "psyche" rather than
to distortions drawn from cultural assump-
tions about the nature of psychology. With good
scholarship we can achieve a better under-
standing of psychology's history and the kinds
of psychologies we have available to choose
from.
References
Denmark, F. L. (1980). Psyche: From rocking
the cradle to rocking the boat. American
Psychologist, 35, 1057-1065.
Kantor, J. R. (1963). The scientific evolution of
psychology, Vol. 1. Chicago: Principia Press.
Kantor, J. R. (1959). Interbehavioral psychology;
A sample of scientific system construction.
Bloomington, Ind.: Principia Press.
Murray, G. (1955). Five stages of Greek reli-
gion. New York: Doubleday, Doran.
Randall, J. (1960). Aristotle. New York: Colum-
bia University Press.
Rostovtseff, M. I. (1957). The social and eco-
nomic history of the Roman empire (2nd rev.
ed.), 2 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Shute, C. (1941/1964). The psychology of
Aristotle; An analysis of the living being,
New York: Russel & Russel, (Orig. Colum-
bia University Press).
Smith, N. W. (1971). Aristotle's dynamic ap-
proach to sensing and some current impli-
 cations. Journal of the History of the Behav-
ioral Sciences, 1971, 7, 375-377.
Smith, N. W. (1974). The ancient background
to Greek psychology and some implications
for today. Psychological Record, 24, 309-
324.
Smith, N. W. (1984). Fundamentals of
interbehavioral psychology. Psychological
Record, 34, 479-494.
Smith, N. W. (1990). The continuity between
Greek and interbehavioral psychology. In
N. W. Smith (Ed.), Greek and interbehavioral
psychology: Selected and revised papers (pp.
3-16). Lanham, Md.: University Press of
America.
Smith, N. W. (1992). The distant past and its
relation to current psychology; A tour of
psychophysical dualism and non-dualism.
Mankind Qjtarterly, 32, 161-173,
Note: This paper was presented as the invited
address at the induction of the Psi Chi
chapter of the College of St. Joseph, Rutland,
Vermont, March 21, 1993.
16
Dennis J. Delprato
Eastern Michigan University
What Is the connection between interbehaviorai
psychology and behavior analysis ? What is the nature
of the relationship between these two literatures? Is
there an alternative to continuing with attempts to
link interbehaviorai thinking to behavior analysis?
As far as the first question, the connection seems
to be strained. Despite the claims, both formal and
informal, of those advocating a fundamental com-
patibility of the psychology of Kantor and the
psychology especially inspired by Skinner, no one
has yet been able to convincingly integrate the two
realms. But the latest example of possibly fruitless
attempts to bring together interbehaviorai psychology
and behavior analysis is Sharpe and Hawkins's (1992)
argument of how interbehaviorai methodology could
be profitably incorporated into behavior analysis.
Apparently, Sharpe and Hawkins were replying to a
recent rebuff by a votary of mainstream behavior
analysis. Certainly, we find no better example of
downright ugly relations between our two areas of
interest than Skinner's (1988) hostile repudiation of
interbehaviorai psychology for "His" Association for
Behavior Analysis and division of the American
Psychological Association. Doing little to encourage
one as regards the possibility of harmonious relations
between interbehaviorai thinking and behavior analy-
sis is behavior analyst Marr's (1992) (a) fallacious
association of Kantor's field theory with the contex-
tualism of the mentalist and logico-analytic philoso-
pher, Pepper, and (b) disdain of psychological field
theory based on his ignorance of the great difference
between physical and psychological field construc-
tions.
What about the future of the relationship
between the two areas? I see it as very bleak.
Mainstream behavior analysts seem as resistant to
field and system theory as were the neobehaviorists.
Furthermore, taken in toto, the fundamental postu-
lates of Skinnerian behavior analysis may be incom-
patible with those of field psychology (compare
Delprato & Midgley, 1992 with Kantor & Smith,
1975, pp. 415- 417). On the other hand, the two
postulate systems may be compatible. Given the
latter possibility, unfortunately, many behavior ana-
lysts appear to consider contemporary behavior analy-
sis as not quite identical with Skinner's specifications
to where the situation today seems to be that the only
way of reconciling behavior analysis with
interbehaviorai psychology is for one or the other to
"bend," and I do not foresee this happening. A
crucial problem in bringing together behavior analy-
sis and interbehaviorai science is that the former is
simply closer to the venerable psychological tradi-
tion (Kantor, 1963, 1969). For behavior analysts to
enthusiastically incorporate interbehaviorai postu-
lates they would have to move forward in the direc-
tion of naturalism in the second cycle in the evolu-
tion of psychology (Kantor, 1963, 1969). The basic
way for them to so move is for them to shed the last
vestiges of traditional thinking, adopt field postu-
lates, and so on. I do not deny the possibility of those
who identify themselves as behavior analysts doing
this, but doubt if we will find this sort of behavior
change among many of those living today.
Is there an alternative to continued attempts at
linking interbehaviorai thinking to behavior analy-
sis? Yes, there are at least two. Interbehaviorai
theorists can go the route ofKantor, i.e., "go it alone."
The literature contains a fair amount of grist for
interbehaviorai work, and with sufficient effort and
skill it is possible for interbehaviorai science to
continue growing. However, what I offer for consid-
eration as an alternative to going it alone and to
continued attempts at reconciliation with behavior
analysis is for those impressed with the value of
interbehaviorai views to examine a little-known de-
velopment that is entirely consistent with Kantor's
(1963, 1969) historico-critical analysis of the scien-
tific evolution of psychology.
Briefly put, Kantor's analysis suggests that as our

culture continues becoming more secularized, the
postulates of psychological science should gradually
reflect this by more and more taking into account the
field/system nature of psychological events. To
Kantor, his work alone adequately recognizes the
field nature of psychological events; thus, he places
only "interbehaviorism" at the end of the second
cycle in the evolution of psychology. Notwithstand-
ing Kantor's evaluation of the status of his particular
work and with his historical analysis in view, I find
several literatures converging on a radically naturalis-
tic, field psychology (Delprato, 1989, 1992). With
very little cross citation, various ostensibly unrelated
literatures are converging on a psychology as natural-
istic as any of the "more advanced" sciences that once
and for all will be unified on the most fundamental
issues. In addition to the interbehavioral literature,
including (^methodology that Stephenson (1953)
views as a subarea of interbehavioral psychology, we
find radical phenomenology (Merleau-Ponty, 1942/
1963), general system theory (Bertalanfry, 1968),
behavioral cybernetics/perceptual control theory
(Powers, 1989; Smith, 1972), behavioral epigenetics
(Kuo, 1967), action psychoanalysis (Schafer, 1976),
dialectical psychology (Riegel, 1976), and ecological
psychology (Mace, 1986).
These converging movements, with very little
indication of cross-fertilization, show a great deal of
agreement on such basic issues as:
1. Rejection of the cause>effect framework
(lineal causality, mechanism) in favor of the
field/system and circular causality.
2. Rejection of dualism and all occult states and
processes.
3. Rejection of reductionism.
4. Stimuli are not causes; response and stimu-
lus are interdependent; action-in-the world is
fundamental.
5. Organisms are in direct contact with world;
there are no mental mediators; there is no
pure consciousness.
6. Private experiences are not counterparts of
public events and are not equated with
inner experiences.
7. Dynamic: centrality of action as opposed to
static constructs.
8. The organism acts as an integrated whole.
9. Broadly evolutional: psychological change is
not imposed on the organism; change is
inherent.
17
Those knowledgeable in interbehavioral science
might accomplish more for themselves and others by
working within areas that have already largely come
around to their way of thinking than if they persist
with efforts to somehow update mainstream behav-
ior analysis by trying to get its adherents to "see the
light" (or the field).
To follow my proposal it is not necessary to
abandon behavior analysis altogether. Although
behavior analysis is not sufficiently advanced
philosophically to be a member of the converg-
ing movements at the end of the second cycle in
the scientific evolution of psychology, it does
have much of value to offer, especially to those
with applied concerns. In its present form it
simply is not the wave of the future, despite the
fervent commitment to this belief by so many of
the leaders of this rather minor member of
today's psychological sciences.
References
Bertalanffy, L. v. (1968). General system theory.
New York:Braziller.
Delprato, D. J. (1989, November). An organiza-
tion for a school or for a science and clinical
science? In A. W. Staats (Chair), AABT/
ABA/Division 25: Inadequate organizational
structure for the new challenge? Sympo-
sium conducted at the meeting of the Asso-
ciation for Advancement of Behavior
Therapy, Washington, DC.
Delprato, D. J. (1992). Converging movements
in psychology. Unpublished manuscript,
Eastern Michigan University, Department
of Psychology., Ypsilanti, MI.
Delprato, D. J., & Midgley, B. D. (1992). Some
fundamentals of B. R Skinner's behaviorism.
American Psychologist, 47,1507-1520.
Kantor, J. R. (1963, 1969). The scientific evolu-
tion of psychology (Vols. 1-2). Chicago, IL:
Principia Press.
Kantor, J. R., & Smith, N. W. (1975). The
science of psychology: An interbehavioral
survey. Chicago, IL: Principia Press.
Kuo, Z.-Y. (1967). The dynamics of behavior
development: An epigenetic view. New York:
Random House.
Mace, W. M. (1986). J. J. Gibson's ecological
theory of information pickup: Cognition from
the ground up. In T. J. Knapp & L. C.
Robertson (Eds.), Approaches to cognition:
18
Contrasts and controversies. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Marr, M. J. (1992, May). Ti)e straw machine as tar baby.
In P. Harzem (Chair), Mechanism and contextu-
alism contrasted. Symposium conducted at the
meeting of the Association for Behavior Analy-
sis, San Francisco, CA.
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1963). The structure oj"behavior (A..
L. FisherTrans.). Boston: Beacon Press. (Original
work published 1942)
Powers, W. T. (1989). Living control systems;
Selected papers of William T. Powers. Gravel
Switch, KY: The Control Systems Group,
Riegel, K. F. (1976a). The dialectics of human
development. American Psychologist, 31,
689-700.
Schafer, R. (1976). A new language for psycho-
analysis. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Sharpe, T., & Hawkins, A. (1992). Pragmatics and
utility of interbehavioral methodology. Thtlnler-
bebaviorist, 20, 8-14.
Skinner, B. F. (1988). The cuckoos. The ABA
Newsletter, 11 (3), 7.
Smith, K. U. (1972). Cybernetic psychology. In R. N.
Singer (Ed.), The psychomotor domain: Movement
bebavior(pp. 285-348). Philadelphia, PA: Lea and
Febiger.
Stephenson, W. (1953). T/je study of behavior:
Qjtecbnique and its methodology. Chicago,
IL: University of Chicago Press.
 Patricia Bach
University of Nevada
Kantor argues against the opinion that logic is not
ontological in nature. He instead takes the position
that logical practices are indeed ontological. His
views on the relationship between the logical and the
ontological are inextricably linked to, and lend
support to, his views on the epistemological nature of
logic.
Kantor's primary reason for disagreeing with those
who deny that logic is ontological is that arguments
made against the ontoiogical nature of logic are made
from a non-interfaehavioral perspective. Those who
claim that the logical is distinct from the ontological
claim that this is so because logical systems can be
built on abstractions. As such, abstracted relations
do not have any physical existence, they are merely
conceptual constructions, and therefore are not
ontological in nature. Kantor's argument in favor of .
an ontological view of logic is contingent on the
assumption that interbehavioral events are always
ontological. Kantor counters the non-ontological
view of logic by pointing out that abstract ideas are
conceived of through interbehavioral contact, direct
or indirect, with real things and events. Logical
operations are interbehavioral, and are therefore
ontological.
As is typical of Kantor, he also has some
disagreement with those who hold that the logical is
also ontological. His primary objection to such
positions is that they are not interbehvioral. For
example, there are those who claim that logic is
; ontological because ideas are derived from, and thus
continuous with, things and events. Kantor agrees
with this in the sense that all logical behavior is
psychanthropic in nature. However, Kantor goes a
step further in his analysis and describes how logic
can be used to build systems based on non-existants
and still be described as an ontological enterprise. In
this case, as in his argument against a non-ontological
view of logic, Kantor makes his argument from an
interbehavioral perspective. He points out that all
logical operations occur within interbehavioral fields.
Non-existants are derived from contact with existing
things, and constructing behavior is interbehavior.
Therefore, the existence of it's subject matter is not a
criterion for an endeavor to be characterized as
ontological. An enterprise need only involve
interbehavioral events to be considered ontological.
There is a direct relationship between this view of
the ontology of logic and Kantor's position on the
epistemological nature of logic. Kantor claims that a
serious flaw in most logical treatises is the assumption
that logic is universal, ultimate and transcendant.
Kantor instead contends that logic is limited.
The ontological nature of logic, in the sense that
Kantor views it, is precisely what limits the
universality, ultimacy, and transcendence of logic.
According to Kantor, logical systems are constructed
through the logicians contact with ontological things
and events within particular interbehavioral fields.
An interbehavioral logic addresses specific questions,
using specific techniques, within the framework of a
particular logical system. It is this quality of logic
that limits it's ultimacy and universality. Because
logical behavior is human behavior, it is not
transcendent. A non-ontological logic could have
some of these qualities, because such a logical system
would not require that it's epistemology be limited to
interbehavioral events. For example, knowledge
could be imparted through revelation as well as
through direct contact with things and events. Such
a logical system would not meet Kantor's
requirements for an ontological logic.
Kantor's views on ontology are based on
interbehavioral psychology, and make clear that
logical behavior is merely one form of human
behavior. His position on the ontology of logic is
consistent with his view of the epistemology of logic.
Such a view is functional, as it allows one to account
for such things as the study of abstractions, and even
non-existants, without resorting to notions of
ultimacy, universality, and transcendence.
20

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 Volume 21 1993-94 Number 2

Linda J. Hayes, University of Nevada

Noel W. Smith, Vols 1 -7 (1970-1978) Conference Notices

Ronald G. Heyduk, Vols 8-11 (1978-1983) Book Announcements
Edward K. Morris, Vols 12-17 (1983-1989) J. R. Kantor Publications
Interbehaviorists at the University of Nevada
ADVISORY BOARD
Sidney W. Bijou, University of Arizona
Donna M. Cone, State of Rhode Island
Articles
Dennis J. Delprato, Eastern Michigan University
James J. Fox, East Tennessee State University
Edward K. Morris.
Patrick Ghezzi, University of Nevada
Interbehamoral Psychology:
Sandy Hobbs, Paisley College of Technology
Outstanding in the Field or
Edward K. Morris, University of Kansas
Out Standing in Its Field?...
PaulT. Mountjoy, Western Michigan University
N. H, Pronko, Wichita State University
Roger D. Ray, Rollins College
Thomas Sharpe & Andrew Hawkins.
Emilio Ribes, University of Guadalajara
A Return to the Space<->Continuum;
Robert G. Wahler, University of Tennessee
Empirical Notes From Teacher
MANAGING EDITOR Educators , .10

Steven C. Hayes, University of Nevada Notes

ASSISTANT EDITORS
Debra W. Fredericks.
Debra W. Fredericks, Duane C. Lord, The OntologicalDilemma in System
Cynthia Reinbold, Mark A. Swain, University Building. ,18
of Nevada

ISSN8755-612X
 A Newsletter of
Interbehavioral Psychology
ISSN 8755-612X
Linda J. Hayes, Editor
Department of Psychology
University of Nevada
Reno, Nevada 89557, U.S.A.
702-784-1137
THE INTERBEHAVIORIST publishes news,
information, discussion, journal and book notes,
book reviews, comments, and brief articles per-
taining to interbehavioral psychology a contex-
tualistic, integrated-field approach to the natural
science of behavior.
The newsletter also publishes professional com-
munications that fall between informal correspon-
dence and colloquia, and formal archival publica-
tion. As such, the newsletter supplements con-
temporary journals dedicated to basic and applied
research^ to the history and philosophy of the
behavioral sciences, and to professional issues in
the field. The newsletter strongly encourages
submission of .notes about current professional
activities of its subscribers, news and observations
about interbehavioral psychology and related per-
spectives, comments on journal articles and books
of interest, more extended book reviews, and brief
articles. All submissions should be sent in dupli-
cate hard copy and a single computer disk copy
(any major word processor; any Mac or IBM disk
format) to the editor and should conform to the
style described in the Publication Manual of the
American Psychological Association (3rd edition).
Subscription Information
Student Subscriptions (USA) $7.00
Regular Subscriptions (USA). 10.00
Foreign (Non-USA) Subscriptions 12.00
Institutional Subscriptions 15.00
Back Volumes 1-18.. 12.00
THE INTERBEHAVIORIST is published as a public service
by CONTEXT PRESS, Box 50172, Reno, NV 89513. CONTEXT
PRESS publishes books of interest to contextualists and
interactionists. Write for brochures on the books available.
Linda J. Hayes
The Behavior Analysis Program at the University
of Nevada, Reno has hired Duane Lord, a graduate
student in the program, as a production manager for
THE INTERBEHAVIORIST. This move will make
it possible for us to distribute THE INTERBEHAV-
IORIST as planned, and to do the work necessary to
help us overcome our declining numbers of subscrip-
tions and low submission rates. We are grateful to the
Behavior Analysis Program for this contribution to
the future of interbehaviorism; and we are very
pleased to be able to serve our subscribers better as a
result.
The next issue is planned for distribution in May,
1994. The deadline for submission of materials for
that issue is April 1,1994. We encourage you to think
of THE INTERBEHAVIORIST as a outlet for talks
you have given, ideas, comments, book reviews,
works in progress, research notes, as well as more
substantive or finished works. We also encourage
responses to comments and articles published in
THE INTERBEHAVIORIST. And if you have any
suggestions as to how we might reach a larger audi-
ence, we look forward to hearing from you. Please
join us at the Interbehaviorists in ABA Special Inter-
est Group Meeting at the upcoming ABA convention
in Atlanta to talk about these and other issues.
Call for News
THE INTERBEHAVIORIST pub-
lishes news about subscribers' activities
and information about others' activities
that may be of interest to readers. If you
have published an article, chapter, or
book with an interbehavioral orientation,
or have read one published by someone
else, particularily if the source is obscure,
please let us know about it.

The Kantor Institute
There will be an Interbehavioral conference as
part of the activities of thej. R. Kantor Institute. This
conference will be held in Madrid, Spain, The dates
are July 13, 14, & 15, 1994. If you would like more
information on this conference please call Linda
Hayes at (702) 784-1137.
Association for Behavior Analysis
The 1994 ABA convention will be held at the
Atlanta Hilton and Towers in Georgia. We hope to
see a strong representation of interbehaviorists at this
years meeting. For further information about regis-
tration and hotel accommodations, contact: Sherry
Chamberlain, ABA, Wood Hall, Western Michigan
University, Kalamazoo, MI 49008.
International Conference on Advances
in Management
The Second Biennial International Conference
on Advances in Management will be held at
Marlboroughtlnn, 1316-33 Street Northeast, Calgary,
AlbertaT2A6B6,CANADA(Phone: 403-248-8888;
Fax: 403-248-0749) on June 17-20, 1994. The
Distinguished Speakers for the conference are: Pro-
fessors Edwin M. Epstein, University of California at
Berkeley; Robert T. Golembiewski, University of
Georgia; Edwin A. Locke, University of Maryland;
and Craig C. Lundberg, Cornell University.
Requests for further information should be ad-
dressed to the Conference President Dr. Afzal Rahim,
3109 Copperfield Ct., Bowling Green, KY 42104,
USA; Phone/Fax 502-782-2601.
Book Announcements
A new book entitled Interbehavioral Psychol-
ogy has been published by the University of
Guadalajara Press, 1993. This book is printed in
Spanish and will be of interest to those seeking
reading on Interbehavioral psychology. The authors
are Emilio Ribes Inesta, Francisco Lopez Valadez,
and Linda J. Hayes. This book is also expected to be
printed in English by Context Press in 1994. The
1994 English edition will be authored by Emilio
Ribes Inesta, Linda J. Hayes, Patrick Ghezzi, and
Francisco Lopez Valadez.
Sidney W. Bijou and Patrick M. Ghezzi have
published an Outline of J. R. Kantor's Psychological
Linguistics. The outline covers Kantor's book, point
by point, and clarifies difficult material. It is ideal for
classroom use, but also serves as a kind of "Cliff
Notes for Kantor" for anyone wanting to understand
Kantor's approach. The book is available from
Context Press (see ad on last page).
J. R. Kantor's Publications
With the recent death of Helene J. Kantor the
inventory of Principia books authored byj, R. Kantor
has been moved to the University of Akron archives.
For now, you may call John A. Popplestone [(216)
972-7285] at the University of Akron, if you would
like to order any of J. R. Kantor's books.
Interbehaviorists at UNR
We are happy to acknowledge that both Patrick
Ghezzi and Sidney Bijou have made their way to our
department at the University of Nevada.
Patrick has been teaching both undergraduate
and graduate classes. He has also initiated contracts
to consult in local school districts which have proven
to be excellent training opportunities for our gradu-
ate students. We are very happy to have Patrick with
us.
Sidney Bijou has been helping with the school
consultations and is also serving as a mentor to all of
us. Sid has been an excellent addition to our pro-
gram, he inspires both students and faculty alike. We
are grateful to Sid for his services.
Missing Persons
We have received a number of our newsletters
"returned to sender" with no forwarding, address.
Your help in locating these individuals is appreci-
ated:
Melissa Cooper, Louise Kent-Udolf, John
Lyons, Katy Maloney, Peter Morgan, Tim
Murphy, Timothy B. Sinnott, Paul Stewart,
Linda Talmoge, Lynn Tubbs
 Outstanding in the Field or Out Standing in Its Field
Edward K, Morris
University of Kansas
I am honored to speak with you this morning
about the place of interbehavioral psychology in the
organizational structure of the behavioral psycholo-
gies more generally. Art, though, may have selected
a wrong person, for I am not, as Kantor might have
put it, a "pristine" interbehaviorist. I defer to my
colleague, Dennis Delprato, for a truly interbehavioral
perspective on the matters before us (see Delprato,
1979, 1990a).
I am not pristine because my interests are in
integrating radical behaviorism, interbehavioral
psychology, and related views into a more effective
science, technology, and epistemology (Morris, 1982,
1984,1988a; Morris, Higgins, & Bickel, 1982). Inte-
gration, though, can be dangerous because for an
interbehaviorist to value radical behaviorism, and
vice versa, is sometimes to be, not once, but twice a
heretic (Morris, 1988b). As I have noted elsewhere,
we live sometimes in a dogma eat dogma world
Problems
Let me begin by suggesting that behavioral
psychology's organizational problems are actually
behavioral problems. Cast that way, we can address
an apparent problem in the sociology of science as a
problem in the behavior of scientists. The organiza-
tion as host, as it were(cf. Baer, 1976).
The Behavior Analysts' Problem
Skinner's 1988 ABA Newsletter article, "The
Cuckoos," sets the occasion for my remarks, for it was
there that he chastised the interbehaviorists for being
members of the Association for Behavior Analysis
(ABA) and Division 25 of the American Psychologi-
cal Association (APA). Since its publication, "The
Cuckoos" has been viewed, by some, as a serious
intellectual and organizational threat to
interbehavioral psychology. But is "The Cuckoos"
really a problem? No, Skinner's writing it was,
perhaps. But is Skinner responsible for that? No, his
behavior is just as lawful and orderly as is any other
organism's. The problem is in controlling variables
that lie elsewhere.
Why would Skinner write "The Cuckoos"? He
told us why, in part, via his criticisms, but let me offer
some background. Before "The Cuckoos" was pub-
lished, Skinner read it to me while I was on sabbatical
in Cambridge. He also told me it was not for
publication, only for circulation among colleagues,
though some of them were urging him to go public.
He was irked at the criticisms of radical behaviorism
published and presented in behavior-analytic forums
(e.g., Kantor, 1970). What he especially emphasized
to me, though, was his displeasure over the harsh
tone of those criticisms (e.g., Parrott, 1983). "The
Cuckoos," then, was partly a side-effect of aversive
control, and should have come as no surprise.
Having written "The Cuckoos" for private circu-
lation, why would Skinner then publish it? Others
undoubtedly know more about this than I but I
speculate that one proximal cause was the Fall, 1988
issue of Behavior Analysis, the Division 25 journal,
which contained a special section on "The Psychology
of J. R. Kantor," dedicated to the centennial of
Kantor's birth. Not all of this material was celebratory,
however. Again, some of it was harsh in criticism of
behavior analysis, misunderstanding it as well (e.g.,
Roca, 1988;cf,Marr, 1984). That it was published in
the journal of an organization established for the
experimental analysis of behavior must have greatly
aggrieved Skinner (but see Moore, 1983-1984).
Counter-control quite naturally ensued.
The Interbehaviorists' Problems
I was editor of the newsletter, The Interbehavior-
ist, when "The Cuckoos" was published, and received
concerned inquiries about what problems might
ensue. My first concern, though was for Skinner:
Someone I like and respect had been, I though, a little
ungracious in public. That, alone, hurt. Second, I
did not see "The Cuckoos" as a scientific or an
organizational problem, for it seems not to apply to
interbehavioral psychology, but to some of the be-
havior of some interbehaviorists. Let me address
some of the issues raised in "The Cuckoos."
 Skinner (1988) asked: "Why have
interbehaviorists joined and why do they remain
members of the Association for Behavior Analysis
and Division 25 of the American Psychological Asso-
ciation?" (p. 9). An answer: Because these organiza-
tions promote a natural science of behavior, just as
does interbehavioral psychology. That
interbehaviorists join is a compliment, not a com-
plaint.
Skinner (1988): "Those organizations were
founded to promote the experimental analysis of
behavior and the use of its principles in solving
problems" (p. 9) A reply: True, but those organiza-
tions also promote conceptual analyses of behavior,
such as those offered by radical behaviorism.
Interbehavioral psychology is, to date, also largely a
conceptual and interpretive undertaking- as Skinner's
work has been for the past 30 years - and naturally
finds a home in organizations that share many of its
perspectives (see Moore, 1984; Morris, 1982, 1984).
Skinner (1988): "Interbehaviorists criticize the
validity of [behavior] analysis and its applications.
But one does not join the Darwin Society and use its
journals and meetings to promote creationism" (p.
9). A reply: Creationists, of course, do not join the
Darwin Society, any more than out-and-out
cognitivists join ABA or Division 25 to promote
mentalism. Neo-Darwinians, though, do join the
Darwin Society and, in extending and elaborating on
Darwin's views, they advance the filed of evolution-
ary biology. Interbehaviorists join ABA and Division
25 out of similar interest and concern, seeking to
advance the science.
Skinner (1988): "Why do they not have an
association of their own to hold meetings and pub-
lish journals? In other words, why have they not built
a nest of their own to lay their eggs in?" A reply: The
interbehaviorists are too few to support an associa-
tion or a journal. AABT has about 4000 members,
ABA 2000, and Division 25 1000, whereas The
Interbehaviorist has only about 100 subscribers. The
first behavior analysts, though, were also once too
few, and so they belonged to APA Division 3 for
Experimental Psychology. When they eventually
increased in number, they formed an independent
division and published their own journals. Thus,
even if we organized something like Art's suggestion
for an over-arching "Society for Behavioral
Psychology" (Staats, 1989), the problems faced by the
interbehaviorists would be no different than they are
now - interbehaviorists would remain simply too
few.
Yes, then, ABA and Division 25 are behavior-
analytic organizations. They were established as such
in the first place, and we should not expect them to
be otherwise. Even so, have behavior analysts con-
strained any interbehavioral activities? Is it that
interbehaviorists cannot join ABA or Division 25?
Or cannot present papers at ABA or Division 25
meetings? Or cannotpasteditors and the editor-elect
of The Behavior Analyst -myself, Sigrid Glenn, and
Jay Moore - are interbehavioral in persuasion, or
subscribe to or publish in The Interbehaviorists, and
if Division 25's past and current journal/newsletter
editors -Linda Hayes and myself- are
interbehaviorists, pristinely or not, then
interbehaviorists cannot take "The Cuckoos" as
indicative of any limiting features in behavioral
psychology's current organizational structure. "The
Cuckoos" is not the cause of correlative of any
difficulties, but rather a consequence of interactions
among individuals holding different views on behav-
iorism as a natural science of psychology.
Interbehavioral Solutions
Given these lack of constraints on interbehavioral
activities, I see no necessity for changing any organi-
zational structures at this time. Given that still other
means for representing interbehavioral interests are
available, further complaints about any impediments
may be more a function of restricted acumen, energy,
and imagination than opportunity. AABT and ABA,
for instance have a special interest group (SIG) struc-
ture that allows interbehaviorists to form their own
internal groups and to sponsor convention sympo-
sia, which they have done.
As for the ABA symposia, two are usually offered
each year. One is explicitly interbehavioral and
offers "introduction to" material (e.g. Hayes, 1990;
Chiasson, 1989; Midgley, 1988). It targets ABA
members who are curious about interbehavioral
psychology, but who are uninterested in criticisms of
behavior analysis, especially when presented in a
sometimes foreign tongue. The second symposium
targets advanced topics, but keeps "interbehavior-
ism" out of its title (see Bijou & Morris, 1989;
Delprato, 1990b). Importantly, these symposia in-
vite well-known behavior analysts to serve as discus-
sants (e.g., Baer, 1990;Pennypacker, 1989). Not only
does this increase session attendance, but it also
requires the behavior analyst to engage in interbehav-
iorism deeply and seriously, the consequence being
that at least one behavior analyst's repertoire might
be altered. Interbehaviorists ought not always be
discussants on their own symposia - behavioral
scientists of other persuasions should also be invited
(see, e.g., Reese, 1990).
If the Jnterbehaviorists offer behavior analysis
something useful, then their ABA SIG will grow in
size and their newsletter will become a journal.
Neither is disallowed by behavioral psychology's
organizational structure. Unfortunately, neither is
the possibility that we may soon have as many
behaviorisms as there are behaviorists, which is not a
very pretty sight.
For instance, in addition to the behaviorisms
represented this morning (i.e., interbehavioral
psychology, Kantor, 1959, 1981; radical behavior-
ism, Skinner, 1953,1974; paradigmatic behaviorism,
Bums, 1988;Eifer&Evans, 1990;Staats, 1981,1986,
1987), we can point to "praxics" (Epstein, 1984,1985,
1987; contra. Barry, 1986; Deitz, 1986; Gaydos,
1986;Leigland, 1985; Maiagodi& Branch, 1985) and
"behaviorology" (Comunidad Los Horcones, 1986;
Fraiey & Vargas, 1986; Fraley, 1987; Vargas, 1987;
contra. Barry, 1986). Also not represented are emer-
gent behaviorism (Killeen, 1984), social learning
theory (e.g., Bandura, 1977), and cognitive behavior-
ism (e.g., Meichenbaum, 1977). We need to be
careful, though, in aligning with some of these behav-
iorism, for some of them are no behaviorism at all.
Indeed, if radical behaviorists are really concerned
about the pernicious effects outsiders may have on
ABA, then they should be aghast that the cognitive
behaviorists make up almost 10% of the ABA mem-
bership (Survey Results, 1989, p, 19). That their
interbehavioral colleagues comprise but 3.6% of the
membership should be an organizational irrelevancy.
Conclusion
In conclusion, those behaviorisms that are be-
haviorism need to avoid cloistering themselves from
and critically abusing each other. As for the criticism,
its sometimes trident tone has an unhealthy religious
fervor to it, as though the truth had been revealed to
one group and not the others - the others being but
dissenting religious sects. Although many behavior-
isms may dissent over particulars, they share more
than is worth the consequences of sectarian animos-
ity. As I have noted elsewhere (Morris, 1988a), that
they share so much should be the basis for some
"sects" - that's S-E-C-T-S - some "sects" appeal, as
well as some "sects" education. We ought to be
putting our "sectual" energy to better use.
As for the cloistering, one consequence of orga-
nizational isolation is the inbreeding that produces
anomalies and sterile monsters, if any breeding at all.
The related conceptual systems may then grown
narrow, inflexible, and nonadaptive. With that, they
become less able to draw strength from and assimilate
related perspectives or accommodate what might be
valid criticisms of their own programs. They simply
stop evolving. The organizational isolation of inter-
behaviorism, radical behaviorism, and paradigmatic
behaviorism may have just those effects.
In the end, there will be but one science of
behavior, just as there is essentially one physics, one
chemistry, and one biology. Unfortunately, the
allure that our behaviorism will be the behaviorism
fragments us, forcing us to compete with one another
- pre-paradigmatic science, red in tooth and claw.
The duplication of effort and resources this produces
decreased our collective ability to establish and pro-
mote a science of behavior and its application. It also
diminishes our collective force both within the pro-
fession and the discipline of psychology, as well as
within the culture at large (Staats, 1983). Indeed, if
behaviorists cannot take each other seriously, why
should anyone else?
Our long-term interests are best served, I think,
by altruistically enhancing our inclusive fitness. Only
by accommodating and assimilating our behavioral
diversity scientifically and professionally - but not
eclectically - can we insure our survival. Art's asking
us to consider these issues seems a maximally adap-
tive thing to do.
Footnote
1. Item #7 on the ABA Membership Survey (Survey
Results, 1989, p. 19) asked "What one conceptual
orientation best describes your position?" Of the 560
respondents, these were the answers:
Behavioral 264(47.1%)
Radical Behavioral 180 (32.1%)
Cognitive Behavioral 56 (10.0%)
Interbehaviora! 20 (3.6%)
Behaviorological 15 (2.7%)
Cognitive 4 (0.7%)
Other 18 (3.2%)
NA 7 (1.3%)

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Author Note
I thank Art Staats for inviting an earlier version of
this paper (Morris, 1989), and Bryan D. Midgley and
James T. Todd for their perspicacious comments on
it and still other versions. Reprint requests should be
sent to the author at the Department of Human
Development, 4001 Dole Human Development
Center, University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS 66045-
2133.
Paper presented in A. W. Staats (Chair), ABA/
AABT/Division 25: Do They Adequately Represent
Behaviorism, Maximize Behaviorism's Strengths and De-
velopment! Syposium conducted at the meeting of
the Association for Behavior analysis, Nashville, TN,
May 30, 1990.
The Society for the Quantitative Analyses of Behavior (SQAB) is holding its annual meeting in conjunction with
the Association for Behavior Analysis (ABA) rather than at Harvard. This year's meeting will be held at the Atlanta
Hilton beginning May 26th the day before ABA, Presentations will be given by K. Cheng, M. Davidson, E.
Fantino, G. Fetterman, R. Grace, R. Kessel, P. Killeen, A. Logue, J. Mazur, J. Nevin, H. Rachlin, J. Richards, W.
Roberts, R. Shull, C. Shimp,J. Staddon, and J. Wixted. Topics will include analyses and models of: choice,
discrimination, timing, steady-state, and transitional behavior.
For membership, registration or information contact:
Bill Palya, Program Chair
Department of Psychology
Jacksonville State University
Jacksonville, AL 36265
(205) 782-5641 FAX: (205) 782-5680
palya@sebac.jsu,edu(e-mail)
10
Tom Sharpe
University of Nebraska-Lincoln
Andrew Hawkins
West Virginia University
It has long been challenging for educational
researchers to describe and analyze in concert the
complex, rapidly occurring, array of behavioral and
setting events operating in live instructional settings
Pawe, 1984; Eisner, 1983; Gage, 1978, 1984; Jack-
son, 1968). In a theoretically post-positivist era,
current methodological debate often centers around
the ability of particular tactics to capture "private"
events, correlating such ability with tactical viability
(cf., Heward & Cooper, 1992). Specific to educa-
tional research, the current Zeitgeist of constructivist
and qualitative assessment approaches purport to
succeed in the private event arena, however are
criticized for their inherent subjectivity and lack of
validated measures (Salomon, 1991). On the other
hand, quantitative and behavior analytic instruments
are often viewed as either: (a) too time consuming an
undertaking in naturalistic settings, or (b) lacking in
their ability to fully capture teacheK>pupil inter-
actions due to what has been termed a simplification
by isolation technique (Iran-Nejad, McKeachie, &
Berliner, D., 1990).
Behaviorally oriented literature may, however,
be argued as an exception to Lloyd's (1992, p. 333)
perspective that "one can discern too few rational and
thoughtful observations" in the midst of current
educational reform. Behavior analytic measurement
of the processes emitted in instructional settings
facilitate: (a) a common terminological language
across teacher educator and student, intern, or prac-
ticing teacher that may be translated into well defined
instructional procedures; (b) the formulation of a
viable metric in determining relative improvement
from teaching trial to teaching trial, and (c) teacher
education program substantiation of the observable
characteristics of its final products.
Our empirical efforts in this area have been first
driven by Heward and Cooper's (1992, p. 358) per-
spective that a "scientific approach [with all of its
attendant assumptions] to produce an effective and
reliable technology of education" is warranted re-
garding teacher education, Second, our work is
predicated on Leary's (taken from Wilson, 1986, pp.
36-38) "game" analogy regarding group interaction.
Akin to the interbehavioral position of post Einstein
physics, organismic interaction described objectively
and relativistically must include neuro- muscular
interaction (behavior) and the larger defining rules of
the game (ecological and historical events). A seven
dimensional game model was derived in which the
researcher must ask the following questions for com-
plete mapping of the experimental territory:
1, What are the defined roles of the players (history)?
2, What is the language of the game and the seman-
tic/linguistic world view implied (history)?
3, What are the goals of the game and the purpose
served (history)?
4, What are the rules of the game accepted by all
players (context)?
5, What are the recommended strategies for success
(context)?
6, What is the ongoing character of space<->time
location (setting)?
7, What are the characteristic movements and behav-
iors in space<->time (behavior)?
Similar to the transactional conception of organ-
ismic interaction which interbehavioral theory es-
pouses, Leafy emphasized that: (a) specification of
where organisms are in space<->time, and (b) defi-
nition of the observable signals exchanged, are both
necessary to complete understanding of psychologi-
cal events.

In this light, an interbehaviorai field systems
tactical approach is viewed as an amenable educa-
tional research and instructional assessment tool,
given: (a) its suitability with the largely behavioral
character of the teaching<->learning process, and
(b) its technological capability of more completely
capturing the nature of the instructional process than
traditional paper and pencil recording methods which
constrain the evaluator to a more limited number of
variables tracked (see Sharpe & Hawkins, 1993; Sharpe,
Hawkins, & Ray, submitted).
Instruction as a System
In defining an interbehavioral field systems ap-
proach to educational phenomena, we rely primarily
on methodological interpretation of Kantor's (cf.,
1922,1959,1969) conceptual contributions, and Ray
and Delprato's (1989) tactical interpretation thereof,
In summary, the term interbehavior is. used to em-
phasize the interaction among organisms in teach-
ing'slearning environments, field speaks to an
attempt to take into account the interaction among
teacher and student behavior and the instructional
setting factors within which they operate, and system
is used to emphasize the dynamic and reciprocal
interaction of these many operative elements in
space<->time.
Altaian and Rogoff (1987, p. 24) provide the
following definition of the instructional setting in
supporting the "goodness-of-fit" between
interbehavioral research tactics and educational phe-
nomena:
"... the [instructional] whole is composed of insepa-
rable aspects that simultaneously and conjointly
define thewhole.. .aspatial and temporal confluence
of people, settings, and activities that constitutes a
complex organized unit . . . these aspects, that is,
person and context, coexist jointly and define one
another and contribute to the meaning and nature of
. . . the [instructional] event."
If one compares the scientific evolution of biol-
ogy, physics, and psychology toward field systems
contextualism as presented by Morris (1992, Table 3,
p. 21), with the above characterization of classroom
settings, it is apparent that an interbehavioral field
systems methodology is compatible with the charac-
ter of typical educational settings.
To illustrate, if evaluating the teaching of a
middle school movement education class, taking
into account isolated teacher behaviors (e.g., instruc-
tion, observation, management, etc.), even when
11
coupled with a dimension of student behavior (such
as subject matter engagement or on-task), does not
provide a complete structural mapping of the situa-
tion. One must also provide information concern-
ing: (a) the sequential nature of teacher and student
behaviors (e.g., instruction->observation->task en-
gagement->feedback; rule->example->rule; struc-
ture->solicit->respond->evaluate; etc.), (b) the situ-
ational features of the lesson (e.g., IPI, large group,
materials used, etc.), and (c) the space<->time rela-
tionships among teacher stimulus and student re-
sponse packages and the larger lesson ecology. Char-
acterization of instruction across curriculum areas
and instructional settings may also require differing
behavioral terminology, as the Bloom taxonomy for
example may capture effective social studies teaching
but not be necessary to the typical movement educa-
tion classroom. Herein lies interbehavioral field
systems' tactical utility in providing a technological
tool which may objectively evaluate instructional
interactions in differential context, with a space and
time based metric primary to description and analysis
endeavors.
Empirical Examples
Familiarizing researchers with current empirical
applications has generally been a productive avenue
in encouraging use of alternative means of scrutiniz-
ing experimental phenomena. Our notes addition-
ally render an inclusionary stance in relating what we
feel to be forms of interbehavioral (as conceptual-
ized) field systems research and training applications.
It is our perspective that those who take an exclusion-
ary perspective to their work within a larger profes-
sion or culture run the danger of extinction within
their lifetime. On the other hand, an inclusionary
stance should better ensure that a particular world
view survives beyond the generation which spawned
it. Currently, behavioral systems efforts exhibit a
wide and diverse authorship which has fostered
many linguistic characterizations. In this regard,
some of the emerging work by systems researchers
who choose the term of ecobehavior (as well as other
characterizations) are included.
Most interbehavioral work in education may be
traced to the precision intervention conceptual frame-
work of Greenwood, Carta, Arreaga-Mayer, & Rager,
(1991). A generic describe and analyze strategy is
typically used which first inductively derives struc-
tural mapping schemes, and second analyzes time
dependent relationships contained within from a
12

|<1) Wrtoal Plaid DaacrlpU&n]

Table 1

BEST Categories, Descriptions, Codes, and Exarrples

of Examples of
Categories Description Codes

Ecological;
Setting Service delivery Regular class,
setting resource room,
partitioned,
gyimasium

Content Subject [ratter Science, math,

content english, physical
education

WJ Content Temporal status Introduction,

Stage of lesson lesson body,
review
Rhyshm Vetoefiy Complexity
Duration Task cards,
Physical resources
pupil folders,
workbooks

Pupil Physical Large group,

Grouping ar rang exigents small group,
Func&anal Evnfuattoo individual

Ketbod of Stimulus method to Command style,

Instruction occasion responding task teaching,
questioning,
Figure 1 peer teaching,
self
instructional,
probabilistic stance. Application to a diverse set of cooperative

settings and circumstances is therefore possible, high- Teacher:

Behavior Teacher's behavior Observation,
lighting the unique characteristics of each. Figure 1 relative to student verbal
provides a schematic of a general tactical protocol. instruction,
in te rpers ona1,
managerial

Evaluation Hov behavior is Individual

directed student,
Ongoing teacher evaluation work in our practi- general class,
cum based teacher certification programs provide a non-student

first example of fruitful application of interbehavioral Position Relative proximity

to target student
Central,
peripheral,
methods. We are currently implementing a teacher proxiinate,
distant,
assessment procedure based largely upon the generic .out of room
Student:
category system in Table 1 (derived from effective Acadenic Active response Task appropriate.
Task engaged,
instructional behavior identification in the literature, Dotor, cognitive,
and associated empirical work with teachers of vari- verbal

able experience and expertise, teaching various sub- Organizational

responses
Transition,
absorption,
ject matters in different settings) and the related waiting,
supportive,
tactical guide (Figure 1), in providing descriptive and instruction of
peers
prescriptive information to student, intern, and
Off-Task Academically Active disruption,
inservice teachers in portfolio fashion. competing responses self-stimilation,
passive
As the Figure 2 example demonstrates, findings Historical:
indicate that complex preservice teacher stimulus Teacher
Definition
Organismic history
of setting inpact
Educational
certification,
packages may be changed in the recommended direc- years and type
of experience
tions over time, based upon: (a) an interbehavioral
Student Organismic history Age, cultural
technology's ability to describe and analyze temporal Definition of setting icpact background, SES,
achievenent,and
data in applied settings, and (b) consequent teacher discipline
evaluator ability to provide detailed goals for instruc-
tional improvement based upon systems oriented
data (see Sharpe & Hawkins, 1993; Hawkins, Sharpe, teacher<->student temporal data).
& Ray, in press; Sharpe & Hawkins, submitted; for a Data which substantiates the interbehavioral
detailed implementation description inclusive of evaluation system's ability to effect complex tempo-

a>
I better understanding of how the quality and charac-
'30-
120
6 1991). Related research examples include the struc-
10-
Figure 2
rally based behavior change in undergraduate train-
ees in applied contexts, is viewed as quite salient in
light of teacher education's longstanding challenge
of maintaining recommended instructional practices
in their certified charges post preservice education
experiences. Such long term empirical substantia-
tion of the interbehavioral assessment protocol pro-
vides impetus for further experimentation with be-
haviorally oriented instructional evaluation tech-
niques which include a systems character.
Applied Research
As we have stated, the above teacher education/
evaluation application example is largely based upon
behavioral systems research designed to discover the
most salient relationships among stimulus and re-
sponse classes in situational context. Much of this
recently emerging work has come forth under the
terms ecobehavior analysis, which adds to behavior
analysis the assessment of situationat or contextual
factors (e.g., classroom physical arrangements, in-
structional materials, etc.), and field systems analysis,
which adds probabilistic analyses of temporally based
behavioral interactions (e.g., structure->solicit->re-
13
spond->evaluate). Though their full importance
and eventual additions to education are yet to be
realized, current contributions include: (a) the devel-
opment and validation of specific classroom instruc-
tional procedures, (b) the development of a number
of approaches to the reduction of challenging behav-
iors, (c) an improved understanding of the compo-
nents of effective instruction in context, and (d) a
ter of instructional implementation functions as a
mediating variable for student outcomes (refer to
Greenwood, Carta, & Atwater, 1991 for a complete
literature review).
From this type of work, precision intervention
techniques have been developed and proven to be
beneficial to particular educational settings (e.g.,
Kamps, Leonard, Dugan, Boland, & Greenwood,
tural description of educational phenomena in con-
text (Carr & Durand, 1991), setting specific interven-
tions (Patterson, 1974; 1982), behavioK->ecology
analyses (Carta, Greenwood, & Robinson, 1987;
Greenwood, Delquadri, & Hall, 1984, 1989), and
expert<->novice teacher comparisons in context
(Sharpe & Hawkins, 1992).
Consistent findings from this research avenue in
school settings include the importance of, and means
to: (a) accelerating students' academic responding,
and (b) increasing time allocated for active student
engagement in academic responses. Systemic inter-
ventions which alter instructional behavior and class-
room contexts to determine relative gains in aca-
demic responding and related achievement indica-
tors show great promise for educational improve-
ment. Though only summary has been provided for
select empirical applications, emerging systems tac-
tics (e.g., Frick, 1990; Greenwood, Carta, Arreaga-
Mayer,&Rager, 1991; Ray ScDelprato, 1989;Sharpe
& Hawkins, 1992) should serve to help educational
researchers determine the effects of particular in-
structional processes for specific instructional set-
tings, subject matters, and learner profiles.
Simulation and Theory Testing
Often greater rewards flow to quick and clever
followers than to brilliant and original inventors,
however, without the inventors we followers would
be without original impetus. This statement is par-
ticularly salient with respect to both the simulation
work of Roger Ray (1992) as applied to educational
14
concerns, and to the testing of basic science prin-
ciples such as Matching Law in applied educational
settings.
It is with emerging instructional simulation ap-
plications that a test for the fidelity of the
interbehavioral instructional maps made is provided.
It is also in the simulation area that most research and
development applications remain yet to be discov-
ered. With technologically enhanced data file repro-
duction used in concert with videodisc copies of the
actual instructional episodes from which the data
files were made, applications such as: (a) tests of
instructional episode reproduction accuracy, (b)
preservice, novice insemce, and expert instruction
comparisons and related scaffolding, and (c) labora-
tory based practice teaching simulation inclusive of
decision making and predictive functions, may be
realized (refer to Berliner, 1992; and Ray, 1992 for
greater depth of discussion in this area). Computer
driven forums for teacher aspirants to learn and
practice their skills without the inherent challenges
of pupil accountability when in front of an actual
classroom is an appealing concept to teacher educa-
tion. Providing student and intern teachers with an
introductory means to instructional practice without
the detrimental effects of poor practice with live
students may have the propensity to dramatically
improve teacher education efforts. In addition,
striving toward a more complete view of the simu-
lated relationships among operative variables in par-
ticular instructional settings, when endeavored in
concert with advancing technologies, should only
serve to facilitate greater pedagogical understanding.
If pursued, a more effective science of teacher educa-
tion should naturally evolve, inclusive of enhanced
intern teacher instruction and assessment applica-
tions.
Another appealing application which has re-
mained largely unrealized, is that of basic theory
testing in applied educational settings through
interbehavioral methodologies. The study of labora-
tory science principles in applied settings via strate-
gies which can more completely track the complex
stimulus and response classes (and the rate and
character of emitting and responding behaviors)
related to a particular theory, has been an ongoing
challenge to those interested in behavioral phenom-
ena (see The Behavior Analyst, 1991). It seems to us
that a systems oriented describe and analyze proce-
dure may shed greater light on the traditional search
and validate challenges related to the transcription of
"basic" behavioral processes to "human" settings.
Shriver, Kramer, and Sharpe (submitted) provide one
appealing exampleinvalidatingMatchingLaw Theory
in educational settings via interbehavioral methodol-
ogy-
Operating on our view that a primary means to
improving the current state of public education lies
in improving the day-to- day effectiveness of the
individual teacher, development of technologies
which enable concurrent evaluation of behavioral
and context variables within particular instructional
episodes should demonstrate great promise. The
ongoing methodological question is thus one of,
'how should such a rich setting be evaluated, given
emerging technologies which may be of help?1
Many advances related to technological applica-
tion are currently emerging, overcoming the skeptic's
concern of, 'is conducting interbehavioral research
worth the increased effort and expense in terms of the
yield in new knowledge?' Cost of hardware is rapidly
diminishing. Software applications are rapidly be-
coming more efficient, with capabilities designed for
individual implementation on-site in applied set-
tings. Current software packages allow for complex
overlapping event collection (via virtual keyboard-
ing) and immediate screen or hard copy analysis (e.g.,
discrete event summaries, graphic representation,
and descriptive and "Z" score temporal analyses
based upon Bakeman & Gottman (1986), and
Gottman & Roy's (1990) sequential analysis illustra-
tions). Notation programs are available for recording
atypical characteristics of existing events, or induc-
tively recording additional and/or overlapping events
as they become manifest. Logically specified pattern
in time event searches are now possible using preced-
ing event, succeeding event, origination event, and
length of chain parameters. Lag time specifications
may also be generated in a pattern in time search (a
time parameter between the onset of a central event
and the onset of others), particularly useful if mul-
tiple ongoing events obscure a temporal cluster of
interest. Many data collection and analysis applica-
tions are now contained on disk and may be driven
by laptop hardware. Compatibility, and the ability
for time-stamped hook-up, with video technology is
also available (see Sharpe, Hawkins, & Wood, in
press; or contact the primary author for tactical

examples of all mentioned applications). The en-
hanced complexity of data collection and immediate
availability of analysis results is viewed as a distinct
advantage to the favorable arguing of interbehavioral
research.
Though inductive systems methodologies, and
advancing technologies, are currently being imple-
mented in efforts to gain greater understanding of
psychological phenomena, scientific protocol is still
scarce with regard to: (a) category system construc-
tion, and (b) interrater reliability issues regarding
temporal data (Wruble & Ray, 1992). Questions
concerning parsimony versus complexity of induc-
tively derived category systems, the danger of infinite
regress versus accurate field representation as systems
become more complex, and statistically viable meth-
ods of assessing temporally based interrater accuracy,
still need to be addressed in facilitating the scientific
maturation of interbehavioral methodology. Experi-
menting with rules of governance related to these
issues remains largely uncharted at present.
The current methodological challenge lies not
only in continuing with the task of trying to describe
and assess the instructional process, but also in
recognizing and experimenting with new tools avail-
able for accomplishing the task. As we come to
greater understanding of the many attendant vari-
ables of the instructional process, we should also
focus empirical efforts on the technology available to
well research that process.
Summary
Though empirical applications of interbehavioral
methods are beginning to emerge in educational
research, much remains as yet unknown about the
primary functional relationships of instructional ex-
pertise in context. What remains, however, is that
experimental models which attempt to discern the
behavioral processes which maximize instructional
potential in context for particular students, are the
models which hold greatest promise for direct educa-
tional improvement (Metzler, 1992).
Inherent in efforts toward a scientific technology
of teacher education via interbehavioral methods,
lies the propensity for a better means of providing
student and intern teachers with: (a) the ability to
describe and better understand what exactly should
be done in particular instructional settings, (b) the
means of ensuring contextual understanding across
instructional settings, (c) what to look for in student
behavior and in the evaluation of their own teaching
15
behavior, and (d) how to initiate behavior change
with future instructional attempts. Related to further
methodological/technological exploration, areas
which should significantly impact teacher education
are: (a) more capable recording instruments designed
for use in naturalistic instructional settings which
bring us to greater understanding of the primary
components of instructional expertise, and (b) more
sensitive data analyses which focus upon temporally
based behavioral interactions.
What hopefully endures is the view that a sys-
tems oriented categorical approach to empirical work
provides a vehicle for a more complete representa-
tion of the phenomena of interest. Therefore, con-
ceptual systems and related technologies which fa-
cilitate the implementation of interbehavioral ap-
proaches to educational research will hopefully flour-
ish in coming to greater understanding of just what
teacher, student, and ecological categories are most
strongly related to student learning in context and,
hence, should be prioritized for preservice teacher
education.
Prior to recommendations of adopting better
advertising techniques with regard to interbehavioral
methods, one must first agree that answers to what is
as yet unknown about instructional settings may
require exploration of alternative research and evalu-
ation practices. As a final thought, if we are to accept
the premise that "laws" contained in traditional re-
search models are only "generalizations" based on
experience, then concepts which do not fit these
traditional models should not be rejected a priori.
They should be given careful scrutiny, as clues that
might lead us to better models tomorrow. The
position which rejects this view and claims to know
with certitude which "laws" are absolute brings one
full circle historically to Plato's absolutism. Absolute
laws in the Platonic sense cannot be known scientifi-
cally, as even Plato himself realized. They can only
be "known" by acts of faith based on traditional
model outcomes. From both empirical and existen-
tial perspectives, no one knows at a certain point in
time if we have any absolute laws in our intellectual
common market. All that we know is that we have
some models which seem to work better in accurately
characterizing the world about us than some of the
older models which the scientific community has
shelved. Only time, and tentative experimentation
with new models and their attendant technologies,
will provide answers regarding the ultimate utility of
new models.
16
It is our hope that continued experimentation
with temporally based systems analyses of stimulus
and response classes in context, and data-based simu-
lation of particular settings may provide greater un-
derstanding of why teachers are more or less effective
given a particular set of circumstances, and why
particular students respond in a particular way in
particular contexts within the ongoing instructional
process. Even in the mainstream of behavior analysis
it is now apparent that it is not always enough to
attempt to establish that one particular variable causes
change in another in isolated fashion in gaining a
better "understanding" of applied settings (Morris,
1992). By addressing applied interests through alter-
native search and validate tactics, many of the yet
unknown educational variables primary to optimal
instruction may come to light,
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psychology: Trait, interactional, organismic,
and transactional perspectives. In D. Stokolis &
I. altman (Eds.), Handbook of environmental
psychology (pp. 1-40). New York: Wiley.
Bakeman, R., & Gottman, J. M. (1986). Observing
interaction: An introduction to sequential analysis.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
The Behavior Analyst, 14(2), 95-186.
Berliner, D. C. (1992). Some perspectives on field
systems research for the study of teaching exper-
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cial monograph issue], 12(1), 96-103.
Carr, E. G., & Durand, V. M. (1985). Reducing
behavior problems through functional commu-
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Analysis, 1SS 111-126.
Carta, J. J., Greenwood, C. R,, & Robinson, S. L
(1987). Application of an ecobehavioral ap-
proach to the evaluation of early intervention
programs. In R. Prinz (Ed.), Advances in the
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Dawe, H. A. (1984). Teaching: Social science or
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111-114.
Eisner, E. W, (1983). The art and craft of teaching.
Educational Leadership, 40, 4-13.
Frick,T.W. (1990). Analysis of patterns in time: A
method of recording and quantifying temporal
relations in education. American Educational Re-
search Journal, 27(1), 180-204.
Gage, N. L. (1978). The scientific basis of the art of
teaching. New York: Teachers College Press.
Gage,N.L. (1984). What do we know about teaching
effectiveness? Phi Delta Kappan, 66, 87-90.
Gottman, J. M., & Roy, A. K. (1990). Sequential
analysis: A guide for behavioral researchers. New
York: Cambridge University Press.
Greenwood, C. R., Carta, J.J., Arreaga-Mayer, C., &
Rager, A. (1991). The behavior analyst consult-
ing model: Identifying and validating naturally
effective instructional methods Journal of Behav-
ioral Education, 1, 165-191.
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Ecobehavioral analysis in the classroom: Review
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18
Debra W. Fredericks
University of Nevada
All philosophical systems include fundamen-
tal assumptions regarding the existence of the
world. Inotherwords, whether or not it is believed
that there exists something outside of our study of
it participates in all interbehaviors of scientists,
philosophers, theologians, and layman alike. For
scientists, clearly stating the basic ontological (and
epistemological) beliefs underlying their system is
necessary for the development of a cohesive sys-
tem. J. R, Kantor always conscientiously elucidates
his underlying assumptions. In Psychology and
Logic (1945), he considers the building of logical
systems on the basis of two theses; specificity
theorem and interbehavioral theorem. The basic
ontological and epistemological assumptions un-
derlying these theses are defined and analyzed,
thereby contributing to the cohesiveness of his
philosophical system as a whole.
According to Kantor, logical interbehavior is a
system building activity, e.g., "an enterprise for
organizing, arranging, and ordering things for par-
ticular purposes" (Kantor, 1945, p. 293). Those
"things" which are organized, arranged, and or-
dered are the products of the logician's direct or
indirect interaction with natural events. Some-
times the logician interacts directly with events and
other times with the products of their, or other's,
direct or indirect interactions with events. The
implication is that"... even though logical systems
can be built of detached responses... the system
builder is always located in an interbehavioral
field" (Kantor, 1945, p. 164). Although Kantor
states that he is unwilling to deal with
"ultrametaphysica!" (1945, p. 161) ontological ques-
tions, e.g. interbehavioral psychology simply as-
sumes the existence of organisms and objects, I
think he deals with this issue by making traditional
ontological concerns a non-question.
The traditional ontological dilemma "concerns
the relationship between logical work and products
and actual things and events" (Kantor, 1945, p.
161). In other words, do stimulus objects exist distinct
from logician's responses to them? This results in a
dichotomization ofthoughts, sentences, orforms (prod-
ucts of logical interbehavior) and existingthings (stimu-
lus objects). Kantor states that this dichotomy prob-
lem is resolved by "taking strict account of the field in
which the logician is operating and especially the
particular kinds of stimulus objects he is handling"
(1945, p. 162). Herein is how Kantor makes the
ontological dilemma a non-question; he allows for
systems to be built using concepts or constructions
without regard to whether or not these concepts or
constructions directly correspond to existing events.
The important issue is in regard to "system building
procedures. .. (and). . . the specific conditions under
which the construction takes place" (Kantor, 1945, p.
169) instead of the existence of things. In other words,
logic is inherently ontological; the logician exists in an
interbehavioral field and the products are derived from
this existence.
This is not to say that Kantor accepts the possibility
of the nonexistence of things. By focusing upon
specific interactions and, particularly, the kinds of
stimulus objects participating in these interactions, it
can be determined whether or not the "construction is
completely unjustified by the event" (Kantor, 1945, p.
165); such of which occurs in dualistic, metaphysical
system building. To clarify, constructions are not
determined to be unjustified on the basis of whether or
not it is an abstraction, but on the basis of the interac-
tion with products of which the abstraction, itself, is a
product. In contrast, nonexistence is traditionally
confused with "abstraction products as materials" (p.
163) but Kantor (1945) argues that all products, even
products derived from natural events are abstractions.
In addition to ontological concerns of whether or
not things exist outside of our interaction with them is
the epistemological question of how we come to have
knowledge of the world. Traditional epistemology is
"centered in such questions as how to achieve, cer-
tainty, how to integrate appearances with underlying
reality" (Kantor, 1959, p. 25). The ontological
logician's verification of correspondence between
real events and our knowledge of the events results
from spurious confusion between the events them-
selves and our description of them. According to
Kantor (1959), the products of our interaction with
stimuli and those stimuli are of the same spatiotem-
poral (naturalistic) framework, including knowing
action. Knowing is an orientative behavior, e.g., we
assume an intellectual attitude, or develop an idea
about something (Kantor & Smith, 1975). In regard
to the traditional treatment of knowing, the ontologi-
cal logician overlooks two important points relevant
to system building. First, system building is an
activity of logicians operating in an interbehavioral
field; the materials, as such, derived from interbehavior
(Kantor, 1945, p. 164). The linguistic reference to an
event may function both as a product or stimulus
object in system building. By establishing the valid-
ity of our knowledge of events on the basis of our
referential interaction is to overlook the field within
these products were derived and confuse the event
with it's description.
Secondly, events themselves cannot validate the
system of constructions built upon the products of
our interactions with those events. Kantor (1945)
states "neither a reaction to things nor a description
of that interaction exists antecedently to the interac-
tion" (p. 165). In other words, our "knowledge" of
things is not something inhered in the events them-
selves. Knowledge is a type of interaction with
things;
it is, itself, a type of product of that interaction.
Within the context of system building, logic is,
therefore, not a product of interaction with "items"
of knowledge. Traditionally, assumptions are based
upon a metaphysical doctrine that logic deals with
absolute reality. From an interbehavioral perspec-
tive, our knowing responses are a type of logical
interbehavior which participates in the operations of
system building.
Kantor, J. R. (1945). Psychology and Logic, Chicago:
Principia Press.
Kantor,J. R. (1959). InterbehavioralPsychology. Ohio:
Principia Press.
Kantor, J. R. & Smith, N. (1975). The Science of
Psychology, An Interbehavioral Survey. Chicago:
Principia Press.
20

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 Volume 22 1994 Number 1

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Linda J. Hayes, University of Nevada

Noel W. Smith, Vols 1-7 (1970-1978) Interbehaviorist SIG at ABA

Ronald G. Heyduk, Vols8-11 (1978-1983) ABA Expo and Social Hour
Edward K. Morris, Vols 12-17 (1983-1989) Interbehavioral Presentations at ABA

ADVISORY BOARD
Articles
Sidney W. Bijou, University of Arizona
Donna M, Cone, State of Rhode Island
John A Mills.
Dennis J. Delprato, Eastern Michigan University
Jacob Robert Kantor (1888-1984) .....8
James J. Fox, East Tennessee State University
Patrick Ghezzi, University of Nevada
Bryan D. Midgley.
Sandy Hobbs, Paisley College of Technology
A Reply to Professor Mills 14
Edward K. Morris, University of Kansas
PaulT. Mountjoy, Western Michigan University Carmenne Chiasson.
N. H. Pronko, Wichita State University Kantor's Interbehaviorism versus
Roger D, Ray, Rollins College Skinner's Behaviorism:
Emilio Ribes, University of Guadalajara Comparison and Contrast.. , 20
Robert G. Wahler, University of Tennessee

MANAGING EDITOR Charles Baxter.

An Interbebaviorial Approach To Teaching
Duane C. Lord, University of Nevada And Problem Solving In Education..... ....26
ASSISTANT EDITORS Jacqueline E. Collins.
DebraW: Fredericks, Mark A. Swain, Cultural Evolution and
University of Nevada the Survival of Cultures..... ......31

ISSN8755-612X
 J. R, Kantor's Publications
A Newsletter of \Vith.the recent death of Helene J. Kantor
Interbehavioral Psychology the inventory of Principia books authored byj. R.
ISSN 8755-612X Kantor has been moved to the University of Akron
archives. For now, you may calljohn A. Popplestone
Linda J. Hayes, Editor [(216) 972-7285] at the University of Akron, if you
Department of Psychology would like to order any of J. R. Kantor's books.
University of Nevada
Principles of Psychology (2 vols.) $20.00
Reno, Nevada 89557, U.S.A.
Psychology and Logic (2 vols.) $25.00
702-784-1137
Interbehavioral Psychology $15.00
Tfw Logic of Modem Science $15.00
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Psychology (2 vols) $40.00
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TJ)e Science of Psychology:
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An Interbehavioral Survey $20.00
The newsletter also publishes professional
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communications that fall between informal corre-
Tf)eAim and Progress of Psychology
spondence and colloquia, and formal archival pub-
and Other Sciences $20.00
lication. As such, the newsletter supplements con-
Interbehavioral Philosophy $27.50
temporary journals dedicated to basic and applied
Cultural Psychology $ 16.00
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ioral sciences, and to professional issues in the
Selected Writings, 1929-1983 $20.00
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Psychological Comments
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andQiieries . $20.00
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 Interbehaviorists in ABA
Special Interest Group
Meeting
11-11:50 AM, Friday, May 27, 1994
Place:
Thomas Jefferson Room, Atlanta Hilton &Towers
Purpose:
To function as an opportunity for interbehaviorists
to discuss issues of common interest as well as to help
one another solve problems peculiar to the interbehav-
ioral perspective in psychology and philosophy.
Election of officers, convention program report,
The Interbebaviorist report, student issues, interbe-
havioral news and intellectual discussion.
We came up with the following selection of talks
by subscribers toThelnterbehaviorist that seemed
likely to represent the interbehavioral point of view.
We apologize for any misrepresentations, and for any
omissions.
Friday
Stimulus Equivalence I
Address (#122)
Chair: Jacqueline Henry (University of North Caro-
lina-Greensboro, NC)
InapparentEvents in the Generation ofDerived Stimu-
lus Relations. MICHAEL C. CLAYTON, Linda
J. Hayes, Tom Brundige (University of Nevada-
Reno, NV)
Mutual Exclusivity and Exclusion: Converging Evi-
dence from Two Contrasting Traditions. KEN-
NETH R. HUNTLEY, PatrickM. Ghezzi (Univer-
sity of Nevada-Reno, NV)
The Effects of Punishment on Trained and Untrained
Stimulus Equivalence Relations. MARILYN K.
BONEM Patricia Tracey, Karsten Beckemeier
(Eastern Michigan University-Ypsilanti, MI)
Whatever Happened to Research On...
Symposium (#123)
Chair: Patrick M. Ghezzi (University of Nevada-
ABA Expo and Social Hour
941:00 PM, Friday, May 27, 1994
Place:
Grand Salon, Atlanta Hilton & Towers.
Posters:
Interbehaviorists in ABA
Members of the staff ofTHE iNTERBEHAVIORIST
along with other interbehaviorists will be present
throughout the Expo and Social Hour. Please drop by
and join us.
University of Nevada-Reno: Graduate
Programs in Behavior Analysis and
Clinical Psychology
This is an excellent opportunity forstudents, especially
those with interbehavioral interests, to meet with faculty
and students from the University of Nevada, Reno,
Reno, NV)
Discussant: BEN A. WILLIAMS (University of Cali-
fornia, San Diego)
Schedules ofReinforcement. ELLIOT BONEM (East-
ern Michigan University-Ypsilanti, MI)
Avoidance. CARLO. CHENEY (Utah State Univer-
sity-Logan, UT)
Conditioned Suppression. PATRICKM. GHEZZI
(University of Nevada-Reno, NV)
Multiple-Response Repertoires. CHARLES A.
LYONS (Eastern Oregon State College)
Preparing for War or Preparing for
Peace: Behavioral Contributions To-
ward Understanding and Influencing the
Choice
Symposium (#134)
Chair and Discussant: AnthonyJ.M. Marcattilio (St.
Cloud State University)
Peace, War, and Military Strength. JOHN A. NEVIN
(University of New Hampshire-Durham, NH)
Ethnic Conflict and International Security: A Case
History of an Effort to Breach the Wall that Sepa-
rates Behavior Analysis from Policy Analysis,
SHERMAN D. ROBERTS (Cambridge Center
for Behavioral Studies)
Marshalling Popular Support for War: A Behavioral
 Analysis of Media Manipulation. RICHARD F.
RAKOS (Cleveland State University)
Organizational Consujtation: Isolating
the Organizational Unit and Evaluating
the Consultational Effort
Symposium (# 157)
Chair: Linda J. Hayes (University of Nevada-Reno,
NV)
Discussant: JONE. KRAPFL(COBA, Inc.-Chicago,
IL)
Identifying Organizational Culture. MARK A.
ADAMS, Linda J. Hayes (University of Nevada)
A Study of Change in Organizational Culture. TINA
M. CLAYTON, Linda J. Hayes (University of
Nevada)
An Empirical Evaluation of Organizational Consulta-
tion. RAMONAHOUMANFAR,DavidM.Sayrs,
Linda J. Hayes (University of Nevada)
Consultation Process Analysis. MARK A. SWAIN,
Linda J. Hayes (University of Nevada)
Interbehavioral Technology Revisited:
Research and Evaluation Applications in
Education
Symposium (#159)
Chair: Tom Sharpe (University of Nebraska-Lincoln,
NE)
Discussant: JOHN O. COOPER (Ohio State Univer-
sity-Columbus, OH)
InterbehavioralMethodology: ATechnologicalIllus-
tration. TOM SHARPE, Dave Wood (University
of Nebraska- Lincoln, NE), Andrew Hawkins
(West Virginia University-Morgan town, WV)
Behavioral Systems Based Multimedia/Virtual-Real-
ity Laboratory Modules for Undergraduate Teach-
ing. ROGER RAY, Suzanne Jarrett (Rollins Col-
lege)
Field Systems Analysis of Disparate Learning Envi-
ronments in a Parent-Child Preschool Movement
Education Program. ANDRE HAWKINS (West
Virginia University), Wallace Neel (Bethany Col-
lege), Tom Sharpe (University of Nebraska-Lin-
coln)
Assessing the Impact of Contextual Factors on the
Behavior Problems of Preschool-Aged Children.
JAMES FOX, Maureen Conroy (East Tennessee
State)
Seeing Order. DARYL SIEDENTOP (Ohio State
University)
Saturday
Theoretical, Philosophical, and Concep-
tual Issues
Address (#228)
Chair: Carmenne Chiasson (University of New
Mexico-Albuquerque, NM)
Observing Private Events. LINDA J. HAYES (Uni-
versity of Nevada-Reno, NV)
Some Thoughts about "Selection by Consequences".
JAY MOORE (University ofWisconsin- Milwau-
kee. WI)
Further Evaluations of Functional Com-
munication Training
Symposium (#218)
Chair: David P. Wacker(The University oflowa-Iowa
City.IA)
Discussant: GLEN DUNLAP (University of South
Florida)
Maintenance and Generalization of Functional Com-
munication Training with Voice Output Devices
V. MARK DURAND (State University of New
York at Albany)
Teaching Alternative Communication Responses for
Challenging Behaviors Serving Multiple Func-
tions. ROBERT O'NEILL, H. Michael Day, Rob-
ert Horner (The University of Oregon-Eugene,
OR)
Long-Term Generalization and Maintenance Using
Functional Communication Training with
Preschoolers in Home Settings. K. MARK
DERBY, David P. Wacker, Wendy K. Berg, Jay
Harding, Jennifer Asmus, Sonya Ulrich, Anne-
Marie Prouty (The University oflowa-Iowa City,
IA)
Establishing the Conditional Use of Socially Accept-
able Communicative Alternatives to Escape Mo-
tivated Challenging Behavior. JOE REICHLE
(University of Minnesota)
Extending the Stimulus Control Opera-
tive in Children's Discriminating the
Common Features of Stimuli
Symposium (#256)
Chairand Discussant: JESUS ROSALES (University
of Kansas-Lawrence, KS)
What Do These Pictures Have in Common? CORY
ROYER, Jesus Resales, Donald Baer (University
of Kansas-Lawrence, KS)
Point to the Picture with Red in Common. JORGE
GARCIA, Jesus Resales, Irene Grote, Donald
 Baer (University of Kansas-Lawrence, KS)
Put Here the Pictures with Triangles in Common, and
the Others There. RICHARD THOMSON Jesus
Resales, Irene Grote, Donald Baer (University of
Kansas-Lawrence, KS)
Put Here What These Pictures Have in Common, and
the Others There. IRENE GROTE,Jesus Resales,
Donald Baer (University of Kansas-Lawrence,
KS)
Speaking of Using, and Some Origins of
Reification
Address (#269)
PHILIP N. HINELINE (Temple University-Philadel-
phia, PA)
Educational Methods and Small Groups
Address (#271)
Chair: Wayne Piersel (University of Nebraska-Lin-
coln, NE)
A Cooperative Learning Strategy in a College Level
PSI Class. JOHN H. HUMMEL (Valdosta State
University-Valdosta, GA)
Peers as Teachers of Generalized Social Interaction
Among High School Students with Developmen-
tal Disabilities. OLYN HUGHES (Vanderbilt
University-Nashville. TN)
Conversation Topic Identification and Topic Compo-
nent Identification Training for Individuals with
Mental Retardation and the Effects of the Training
on Conversations in Natural Settings. HARRY
MATTIE (University of Nevada-Reno)
Sunday
Theoretical, Philosophical, and Concep-
tual Issues
Address (#313)
Chair Jay Moore (University of Wisconsin-Milwau-
kee-Milwaukee, WI)
Translating Pragmatism into Psychology: The Func-
tions of Language and the Limits of Social Knowl-
edge. BERNARD GUERIN (University of
Waikato-New Zealand)
Conceptual Analysis as the Empirical Study of Lin-
guistic Convention: Some Implications for Be-
havior Analysis. ULLIN T. PLACE (University
of Wales, Bangor)
Conceptual and Historical Analysis
Address (#317)
Chair: Francis Leyner (Eastern Michigan University-
Ypsilanti, MI)
Title of Proposed Presentation: B'Chirah Chofshis
and Dignity: Judaic and Humanistic Views of
Free Will. BOBBY NEWMAN, Devorah Rosen
(City University of New York- Flushing, NY)
An Empirical Science of Propaganda. RICHARD
EDWARD LAITINEN (University of Washing-
ton-Seattle, WA
Behavioral Approaches to Development
Symposium (#323)
Chair: Martha Pelaez (University of Miami School of
Medicine)
Discussant: HAYNE REESE (West Virginia Univer-
sity-Mo rgantown, WV)
Developmental Cusps: A Relevant Concept for Be-
havior Analysis. DONALD M. BAER, Jesus
Resales (University of Kansas- Lawrence, KS)
Does a Quantitative Analytic Developmental State
Theory Enhance Behavior Analysis? MICHAEL
COMMONS (Harvard Medical School-Boston,
MA)
Some Reflections on the Concept of Development in
Behavior Analysis. VICENTE GARCIA
(Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico)
On Doing What's Right: Issues in
Prosocial Behavior
Symposium (#332)
Chair: Elizabeth V. Gifford (University of Nevada-
Reno, NV)
Discussant: RICHARD RAKOS (Cleveland State
University-Cleveland, OH)
Taste of the Fish Head. DOSHEEN TOARMINO
(University of Nevada-Reno, NV)
Verbal Behavior in Ethical Contexts: Toward a Func-
tional Analysis of Virtuous Activity. ELIZA-
BETH V. GIFFORD, LindaJ. Hayes (University
of Nevada-Reno, NV)
The Role of Verbal Behavior in the Development of
Children's Ethical Behavior. RUTH ANNE
REHFELDT, LindaJ. Hayes, Elizabeth V. Gifford
(University of Nevada-Reno, NV)
A Psychological Analysis of the Behavior of Institu-
tional Review Boards. GREGORY J. HAYES,
Steven C. Hayes (University of Nevada-Reno,
NV)
On Quine and Skinner
Address (#349)
Chair: Edward K. Morris (University of Kansas-
Lawrence, KS)
STEVEN M. JAMES, Edward K. Morris, Anne E.
 Cudd (University of Kansas-Lawrence, KS)
Developmental Disabilities
Address (#355)
Chair: Dana Toth (Eastern Michigan University-
Ypsilanti, MI)
Behavioral Momentum: An Evaluative Review of
Treatment Applications and Directions for Future
Research. KIM KILLU (Ohio State University-
Columbus, OH)
Observations of Choice Situations in the Daily Inter-
actions of Developmentally Disabled Individuals.
RICHARDJ. THOMSON (University ofKansas-
Lawrence, KS)
The Stereotypy Analysis: An Instrument for Examin-
ing Variables Associated with Differential Rates
of Stereotypic Behavior. DAVID A. M. PYLES
(Howe Developmental Center-Tinley Park, IL),
Mary M. Riordan (Behavior Management Con-
sultants, Inc.), Jon S. Bailey (Florida State Univer-
sity)
Investigations and Reconceptualizations
of Rule Governance
Symposium (#363)
Chairs: Duane C. Lord, LindaJ. Hayes (University of
Nevada-Reno, NV)
Discussants: W.SCOTT WOOD (Drake University)
& MARGARET E. VAUGHN (Salem State Col-
lege)
Rule Governed Behavior: Another Contingency
Shaped Operant. DAVID G. STROFFE, LindaJ.
Hayes (University of Nevada-Reno, NV)
Skinner's Level of Analysis for Rule Governed Be-
havior: Molar, Molecular or Mixed? DUANE C.
LORD, Linda J. Hayes (University of Nevada-
Reno, NV)
Social Labels as Rules. TRICIA COULTER, LindaJ.
Hayes (University of Nevada-Reno, NV)
Pain Perception as a Verbal Construction. SCOTT N.
COMPTON,J. M. Serafm, LindaJ. Hayes (Uni-
versity of Nevada-Reno, NV)
Verbal Substitution in Children's Choice Making.
RUTH ANNE REHFELDT, LindaJ. Hayes (Uni-
versity of Nevada-Reno, NV)
Effect of Atmosphere, Culture, and Se-
lection on Moral Behavior and Develop-
ment
Symposium (#370)
Chair: ANN B. PRATT (Capital University)
Discussants: SIDNEY W. BIJOU (University of Ne-
vada-Reno, NV), ANN B. PRATT (Capital Uni-
versity)
Atmosphere and Behavioral Moral Stage of Develop-
ment in the Workplace. MICHAEL L. COM-
MONS (Harvard Medical School-Boston, MA),
Sharon R Krause, Eric A. Goodheart (Harvard
University-Boston, MA), Maryellen Meaney (Yale
University Law School)
Organizational Cultures, Ethical Climates, and Moral
Development JESUS FRANCISCO GALAZ-
FONTES, Irene Sierra-Morales, Michael Com-
mons (Harvard Medical School-Boston, MA)
Kurtz, Neilson, Lamont, Skinner and Malott: The
Selectionist View of Morality. BOBBY
NEWMAN (City University of New York)
Community and Corrections
Address (#374)
Chair: Michelle Thompson (Eastern Michigan Uni-
versity-Ypsilanti, MI)
Health Psychology, Health Care Reform, and Culture.
DEBRAW. FREDERICKS, LindaJ. Hayes (Uni-
versity of Nevada-Reno, NV)
The Goals of Behavior Analysis: From
Prediction and Control to Understanding
Symposium (#377)
Chair and Discussant: JOHN C. MALONE (Univer-
sity of Tennessee-Knoxville, TN)
Background: Science, Psychology, and Behaviorism.
JAMES T. TODD (Eastern Michigan University-
Ypsilantt, MI)
B.F. Skinner's Other Goals. BRYAN D. MIDGLEY
(University Kansas-Lawrence, KS)
Understanding the Behavior of Organisms: Theirs and
Ours. EDWARD KMORRIS (University of Kan-
sas-Lawrence, KS)
Monday
Taking Development Seriously: Re-
search and Theory on Developmental
Systems
Symposium (#409)
Chairs: Bryan D. Midgley, Edward K. Morris (Uni-
versity of Kansas)
Discussants: JOHN W. DONAHOE (University of
Massachusetts), PATRICIA M. MEINHOLD
(Western Michigan University)
Developmental Systems: Developmental and Evolu-
tionary Formation, SUSAN OYAMA John Jay
College, City University of New York)
The Development of "Instinctive" Behavior: Alarm
Call Responsivity of Mallard Ducklings. DAVID
B. MILLER (University of Connecticut)
On the Prenatal Experiential Origin of "Inate" Behav-
iorin Infants. GILBERT GOTTLIEB (University
of North Carolina at Greensboro)
Relating Animal Research on Choice to
Choice-Making in Humans
Symposium (#412)
Chair: Linda J. Hayes (University of Nevada-Reno,
NV)
Discussant: HOWARD RACHLIN (SUNY-Stony
Brook)
Choice Froman Event Standpoint. LINDAJ. HAYES
(University of Nevada)
Experimental Analyses of Choice. MARK A. ADAMS,
Linda J. Hayes (University of Nevada)
Problematic Applications of Choice Procedures.
KRISTI L. RYDEEN, David M. Sayrs, Linda J.
Hayes (University of Nevada)
Replications and Revelations. MICHAEL C.
CLAYTON, Mark A. Swain, LindaJ. Hayes (Uni-
versity of Nevada)
Reinforcement Reconsidered from the
perspective of Behavioral Momentum
Invited Address (#421)
JOHN A. NEVIN (University of New Hampshire-
Durham, NH)
Chair: Mike Perone (West Virginia University-
Morgantown, WV)
Theoretical, Philosophical and Concep-
tual Issues
Address (#424)
Chair: Jay Moore (University of Wisconsin-Milwau-
kee)
From Chaos to Chaos: The Quest for Sources of
Behavioral Variability. GIOVAMBATTISTA
PRESTI, Renato Gentile (Universita di Palermo-
Palermo, Italy), Simona Ravera (Assocezkme
Apprendimento e Recupero-Milano, Italy)
Are Neural Nets a Snare for Behavior An alysis?JAMES
S. McEWAN, B. Guerin,T.M. Foster (University
ofWaika to-Hamilton, New Zealand)
Integrating Buckminster Fuller's Synergetics with
BehaviorAnalysis. JOHNW. ESHLEMAN (Pre-
cision Learning Systems, Inc.-Tucker, GA)
Non-Metaphysic Field Contextualism is Radical Be-
haviorism by a Different Name. NATHAN
STEMMER (Bar-Han University-Ram at Can, Is-
rael)
Uncertain About Heisenberg: Indeterminacy or
Undeterminacy? STEVEN M. JAMES, Edward
K. Morris, Ann E. Cudd (University of Kansas-
Lawrence, KS)
Positive Strategies for Effective Educa-
tion in American Urban Schools-Number
Two
Panel Discussion (#426)
Chair: Corrine R Donley (University of Wisconsin
Oshkosh-Oshkosh.WI)
SAM DEITZ (Georgia State University)
CLAUDIA McDADE (Jacksonville State University)
BETH SULZER-AZAROFF (University of Massa-
chusetts)
JULIE VARGAS (West Virginia University)
PAUL WEISBERG (University of Alabama)
Guest Panelists:
DEBRA CAMPBELL (Education for Atanta Project)
ELIZABETH LYONS (C.W. Hill Elementary School)
NEIL SHORTHOUSE (Georgia Cities in Schools)
GLENDA SURRENCY (C.W. Hill Elementary
School)
MYRTICE TAYLOR (Atlanta School System)
Applications of Behavioral Momentum
Symposium (#433)
Chairs: Rarnona Houmanfar, Linda J. Hayes
(Universiy of Nevada-Reno, NV)
Discussant CLOYD HYTEN (University of North
Texas-Denton,
What are Cultural Practices and How are They Se-
lected? MICHAEL C. CLAYTON, LindaJ.
Hayes (Universiy of Nevada-Reno, NV)
Cultural Evolution and the Survival of Cultural Prac-
tices. JACQUELINE E. COLLINS, Linda J.
Hayes (Universiy of Nevada-Reno, NV)
Cultural Stability and Survival. RAMONA
HOUMANFAR, Linda J. Hayes (Universiy of
Nevada-Reno, NV)
Identifying a Useful Unit of Analysis at the Cultural
Level. CYNTHIA A. REINBOLD, Linda J.
Hayes (Universiy of Nevada-Reno, NV)
Skinner's World. RUTH L. STEINAGLE, LindaJ.
Hayes (Universiy of NevadaReno, NV)
 John A. Mills
University of Saskatchewan
Introduction
Even though Kantor continued publishing until
1984 and even though the school he founded (interbe-
havioral psychology) has many living adherents, I
have decided to include an account of his theory in the
present chapter. Like the other psychological behav-
iorists who first published in the 1920s, Kantor did not
develop a research-oriented theory. So, he stood apart
from the neo-behaviorists. Besides refusing to create a
research-oriented theory, Kantor rejected operational-
ism and did not accept the reality of the concept
learning. As we will see in Chapter 6, the engine
driving neo-behaviorism was the conjunction of learn-
ing theory, operattonalism, and research designs de-
rived from the analysis of variance . Kantor's theory
was very similar to Skinner's. However, although
Skinner repudiated conventional psychological ex-
perimental designs his theory became increasingly
research driven. Moreover, as we will see in Chapters
9 and 10, Skinner believed that psychology's role was
to create technologies of behavior rather than theories
ofbehavior.
Kantor completed his Ph. D. at Chicago under
Angell in 1914, thereafter spending two years as an
instructor in philosophy and psychology at the Univer-
sity of Minnesota.1 Following the formal award of his
doctorate in 1917, Kantor was an instructor in psychol-
ogy at Chicago, taking up his only full-time academic
post in the Department of Psychology at the University
oflndianain 1920. Heretiredfromlndianain 1959.He
was a Visiting Professor at New York University and
the University of Maryland in 1962-3 and 1963-4
respectively, ending his post-retirement career as a
Research Associate at the University of Chicago.
Kantor's first intellectual affiliations were with
functionalism. His doctoral thesis ("The Functional
Nature of the Philosophical Categories") was a survey
of psychological themes within philosophy from
Anaximander to the pragmatists and attempted to
demonstrate that philosophers, by concerning them-
selves almost exclusively with fictional categories
(such as "mind"), had systematically misled their
readers. Kantor remained determinedly a theorist
throughouthis career. He produced only one graduate
student, Paul T. Mountjoy, and it seems that he did
only one piece of empirical work in his entire career.2
However, Kantor encouraged others to engage in both
scholarship and research. He started the journal The
Psychological Record m 1937. Until the founding of
the Journal for the Experimental Analysis of Behavior
and the Journal for the Applied Analysis of Behavior,
Tfje Psychological Record was the only outlet for the
publication of strictly behavioral empirical studies,3
In 1931, Kantor and others founded the Principia
Press. It was intended to be a non-profit organization
that would act as the official press for the University of
Indiana. However, the university established its own
press on a commercial basis. From 1954 onwards
Principia Press published only Kantor's books.
Throughout Kantor's pre-retirement career Indi-
ana was one of the centers for behaviorism in the
United states. Between 1945 and 1947 Kantor raised
its profile by bringing Skinner in as department head.
During that time, representatives of three schools of
behaviorism (interbehaviorism, radical behaviorism,
and HulHan behaviorism) co-existed in what seems to
have been a state of friendly rivalry.4 Skinner and
Kantor, for example, co-taught a graduate seminar
called "Theory Construction in Psychology."
Kantor's Theory
Kantor created his mature theory very early in his
career. He resembled his behaviorist confreres in that
its inspiration was negative rather than positive. He
was an anti-mentalist, argued against both body: mind
and brain: body dualism, and believed that instincts
played merely a fleeting role in the psychological
economy.5 He also resembled the other behaviorists in
his acceptance of Watson's aspirations to create an
over-arching theory ofbehavior but could not accept
Watson's means of realizing them. In particular, by
taking an anti-mechanist stance Kantor rapidly dis-
tanced himself from Watson.
 Kantor was also distinctive in rejecting some of
the constitutive tenets of the behaviorist school. He did
not believe that physics was the master or model
science, instead espousing a scientific pluralism, a
pluralism that he applied to both psychology as a
whole (he claimed that certain concepts and data-
gatheringtechniques were unique to psychology) and
within psychology (claiming that the various areas
within psychology had fundamentally distinct fea-
tures). He did not believe that psychologists could
make predictions and he did not believe that standard
models of causation applied within psychology. As he
wrote, criticizing classical behaviorism:
With its abstruse and arbitrary explana-
tions, it stands in marked contrast to the inter-
behavioral view, which deals with actual be-
havioral adjustments of all types. Interbehav-
ioral constructs are authentically descriptive
as well as interpretive. 6
Like the other behaviorists, once again, there were
powerful positive elements in Kan tor's thought. Of all
the behaviorists, it was he who gave ontogeny pride of
place in a theory. In his very first writings, Kantor
recognized that developing adequate explanations for
smoothly and unthinkingly generated human adaptive
actions was a crucial problem for any psychological
theory.7 He believed passionately, like all the other
behaviorists, that explanations appealing to mind,
consciousness, or instinct were not explanations at all.
Following Watson, he believed that the explanations
for adaptive actions lay in a close study of their
ontogenesis. His anti-mechanism and his distrust of
the possibility of prediction led him to develop the
concept of the interbehavioral field. Verplanck de-
scribes the interbehavioral field as follows:
Behavior is the interaction of parts of the
activities of the individual ("responses"), with
parts of the activities of the environment
the events surrounding that part. No event in
Psychology can be specified without equal
reference to both the individual and to the
individual's environment. Psychological
events interactions lie in between. 8
The components of any given interbehavioral field
were the organism, the stimulus, themedia (or medium
of contact), the setting factor, and the reactional biog-
raphy.9
Kantor's treatment of the organism did not differ
from that of the other behaviorists (that is, he saw the
organism has a set of dispositions).10 He treated the
stimulus, however, very differently from all other
behaviorists. For him, stimuli were simply occasions
for reaction and were fluently created out of past
actions. For example, presenting a blue flower to
human beings elicited an infinite range of reactions, all
of which were controlled both by past experience of
flowers and cultural expectations regarding them.11
Thus, past experience with flowers (some of which
was collective, thatis, symbolically mediated), consti-
tuted the stimulus. Stimuli, then, could not be physi-
cal; physical objects and events were mere occasions
or settings for actions; they could not cause actions.
Kantor used the concept of medium of contact to
emphasize the distance between his and all other
psychological theories. He wrote that a medium of
contact: "... is certainly not a stimulus in the sense of
energy 'mediating mental qualities by its effect on the
brain'."12 Media of contact, such as light or sound,
then, were necessary but not sufficient conditions for
psychological events. Because he was not a dualist,
Kantor did not believe that physical events were reg-
istered by either the brain or the mind and those
registrations were then interpreted.13 Kantor's treat-
ment of media of contact allows us to understand his
theory of meaning. Both dualists and materialists
would say that events can be meaningful in them-
selves. For example, a red patch is meaningful merely
by being perceived and thereby incorporated into the
perceiver's experience. Kantor, however, saw the
matter quite differently. First, for him meaning arose
from the domain circumambient to an event (such as
the impingement of light rays onto a living retina).
Second, he believed it was wrong to say that an event
could be endowed with a meaning from outside its
ontological domain (so that aphysical eventcould not
derive its meaning from a mental or neurological
one)."
Setting factors were Kantor's version of interven-
ing variables. His treatment of them demonstrates
how, as in the case of reinforcement, he relegated that
which was central to neo-behaviorism to the periphery
of hts theory. 15 Morris discusses setting factors as
follows:
Setting factors or setting events are the
contextual conditions in which organism-en-
vironmentinteractions occur. They are notthe
stimuli with which an organism interacts di-
rectly, but are the contexts of those interac-
tions. These factors or events may exist as
internal organismic or biological conditions
 ... and as external environmental conditions,
both physical-chemical... and socio-cultural
... The critical aspects of setting events is that
they influence the functional properties of
interacting stimuli and responses.16
Kantor's treatment of responses was very similar
to his treatmentof stimuli. That is, like Skinner, he did
not believe that responses could be characterized solely
or even largely by their physical form. Instead, a
response was the expression of a complex concatena-
tion of circumstances. It was also the avenue down
which psychologists had to travel in order to under-
stand behavior. For example, weeping could have
complex origins (anger, sorrow, frustration, etc.) There
were also individual differences in the threshold for
weeping. Even the various types of weeping showed
complex differences (for example, bouts of sorrowful
weeping might have various sub-components such as
love, misery, lost opportunities, etc.; in the same
person, some sorrows provoked weeping, others did
not).
The reactional biography comprised constituent
events distant in both time and space from any given
action. Furthermore, the components of the field re-
acted with one another in highly complex ways. To
explicate the interbehavioral field, I will take the
example of the contrasting effects of malnourishment
and adequate nourishment in infancy on intellectual
development. If malnourishment is sufficiently se-
vere, brain growth is retarded, with a consequent effect
on intellectual growth (that is, we apply a linear causal
model in derivingour explanation). Kantor would then
ask us to consider the effects of normal nourishment.
We cannot say, he claimed, that normal nourishment
results in normal brain growth and that the simple
consequence of having a normal brain is an adequate
level of intellectual functioning. Instead, the well
nourished childmakescontactwith its environment on
a very broad front. Those contacts are not merely
passively recorded. Instead, they form the basis for
furtherreactions, which themselves constitute a basis
for differing reactions.
So, even if we take a reaction as simple as sneez-
ing, the sneeze of an infant is quite different from that
of a forty-year old adult. The infant's sneeze is a
simple reflex response and has no further conse-
quences; the adult's might be the portent of an annual
spring allergy attack and will resultin a visit to the drug
store, besides eliciting gloomy thoughts about future
red, sore eyes, lassitude, etc. Furthermore, the reac-
tional biography included cultural components. A
middle-class English sneeze might elicit scornful looks,
whereas a German sneeze elicits a good-natured, "Ge-
sundheit."
Kantor's Influence.
Because Kantor did not believe that his theory
could find expression in research or have practical
applications he concerned himself, almost exclusively,
with metatheoretical issues, that is, he tried to estab-
lish a secure framework within which to develop a
comprehensive behaviorist psychology.17 An addi-
tional problem for those not already convinced of
interbehaviorism's value is Kantor's diffuse writing
style.18 To make his difficulties worse, Kantor consis-
tently took on the role of a critic rather than that of an
expositor of some distinctive theory, exacerbating his
difficulties in this respect by criticizing behaviorism
as freely as he criticized other theories."
So, although Kantor did create a school of psy-
chology and did inspire a surprisingly large group of
followers, he could not, given his theory's form, in-
spire a group of research-oriented acolytes,20 Skinner
was far more successful in that respect. Because
Skinner's and Kantor's theories were so similar, Kan-
tor, if he lives on at all, lives in Skinner's shadow.21
From Chapter 6 onwards we will see that the neo-
behaviorist theories of the 1930s and 1940s contained
explicit research-oriented components, so that adher-
ents were given clear guidelines that allowed them to
generate findings consistent with their chosen theory.
I can illustrate my point by contrasting Skinner's
and Kantor's treatment of reinforcement. For Skinner,
reinforcement referred to a class of events designed to
control the rate of emission of responses. By specify-
ing the means of measuring and controlling the rates of
emission of responses and of correlating those rates
with the rate of delivery of reinforcement, Skinner
could show his followers how to generate an infinite
set of research techniques. Kantor almost dismissed
reinforcement, treating it as a conceptual device that
permitted the neo-behaviorists to generate distinctive
theories."
Finally, I think that we can say that Kantor devel-
oped his theory at a time when it would be seen merely
as a recondite variant of a psychological doctrine,
competing in an ideological war both with its fellow
within the behaviorist camp and with enemy theories
outside. The key development in behavioral science
was the creation of new research technologies in the
1930s. The conjunction of learning theory, operation-

alism, and research designs based on factor analysis,
combined with an enunciation of the relevant prin-
ciples in the language of logical positivism, ensured
research productivity for generations of graduate stu-
dents. Theories outside the charmed circle, Kantor's
among them, withered on the vine.
Final Note
I would like to consultyou all about the nature of
Kantor's influence. It seems that he engendered a great
deal of respect and loyalty for reasons thatare not at all
clear to me. I can dimly see that he offered a refuge to
those of an intellectual bent (the neo-behaviorists,
with some exceptions, were a rough lot). I think I can
also see that not all psychological intellectuals would
be attracted by neo-behaviorism's major rivals (Ge-
stalt, psychoanalysis, and, from the mid-fifties on-
wards, humanism. But all that gets me to thinking that
American psychology was much more variegated than
the history books aver or as it appears to an outsider
like me.
Notes
1. My biographical information comes from Paul T.
Mountjoy and Jay D. Hansor, "Jacob Robert Kan-
tor (1888-1984)," American Psychologist, 41
(1986): 1296-7, Edward K. Morris, "Some Rela-
tionships betweenlnterbehavioral Psychology and
Radical Behaviorism," Behaviorism, 10 (1982),
pp. 188-90, Morris, Interbehavioral Psychology
and Radical Behaviorism," The Behavior Analyst,
1 (1984), pp. 197-9, and Morris, Stephen T.
Higgins, and Warren K. Bickel, "The Influence of
Kantor's Interbehavioral Psychology on Behavior
Analysis," Ibid., 5 (1982), pp. 160-3.
2. Dr. Paul Mountjoy wrote: "To my knowledge Kan-
tor did only one piece of empirical work himself.
He was the hypnotist for a study published by R.
C. Davis, his colleague for many years at IU.5)
Letter to the author, February 16,1993.
3. Skinner was among the behaviorists who availed
themselves of the opportunity to publish. He
authored or co-authored eight studies in T})e Psy-
chological Record. The journal was published
from the University of Indiana until 1945, when it
suspended publication. It re-started from the Uni-
versity of Wichita in 1956. In the first number of
the re-issue, the editor stated that the journal
would be devoted to furthering the cause of inter-
behavioral psychology. In the next issue, the edi-
torial statement gave the journal a broader scope.
n
T7)e Psychological Record is still being published
(from Kenyon College). There are several
inter behaviorists on the editorial board. Kantor
published numerous items in the journal under the
pseudonym "Observer." (Mostof this information
comes from James H. Capshew and Eliot Hearst,
"Psychology at Indiana: From Bryan to Skinner,"
Ue Psychological Record, 30 [1980]: 319-42.)
4. William S. Verplanckhas a vivid description of the
social and intellectual atmosphere in the depart-
ment in the 1940s. See his introduction to Reas-
sessment in Psychology: T}>e Interbehavioral Al-
ternative, ed. by Noel W. Smith, Paul T. Mountjoy,
and Douglas H. Ruben (Washington, DC: Univer-
sity Press of America, 1983).
5. Skinner commented that Kantor was an even more
extreme environmentalist than he was, writing;
We differed quite clearly on one point. Robert
seemed to be the pure environmentalist. When
a pair of robins nested outside his study win-
dow and hatched and raised their young, he
told me with great satisfaction that they drove
the young from the nest, not by 'instinct', but
quite obviously because the nest was becom-
ing crowded. (The Shaping of a Behaviorist
[New York: Knopf, 1979], p. 326)
6. Kantor, Interbehavioral Psychology: A Sample of
Scientific System Construction (Bloomington, ID:
Principia Press, 1959), p. 14.
7. See, for example, his, "A Functional Interpretation
of Human Instincts," Psychological Review, 27
(1920): 50-72.
8. Verplanck, "Introduction," p. xx.
9. Foraccounts ofthe interbehavioral field see Kantor
and Morris, "Some Relationships between Inter-
behavioral Psychology and RadicalBehaviorism,"
pp. 197 ff
10. Kantor and Morris, Ibid., pp. 198-9.
11. Kantor enunciated his concept of the stimulus very
early in his career. See his, "Suggestions Toward
a Scientific Interpretation of Veiception"Psycho-
logical Review 27(1920): 191-216.
12. Interbehavioral Psychology, p. 16.
13. Of media, Morris writes:
Kantor's concept ofthe media of stimulation
refers to the means by which contact is made
between an organism and a stimulus. The
medium is not a property of a stimulus object,
but is an enabling event or condition (though
not a stimulus) through which contact be-
 tween organisms and stimulus objects is made.
Changes in the medium of stimulation change
the presenting form of a stimulus object, and
hence, the interaction of the organismwith the
object. The media are factors to be taken into
account in the analysis of any organism-envi-
ronment interaction because they affect the
interaction among the other aspects of the
interbehavioral field. (Ibid., p. 205}
14. We have to bear in mind that Kantor treated "the
brain" as a construct.
15. Kantor discussed setting factors as follows:
Such setting factors as the hungry or sati-
ated condition of the organism, its age, hy-
gienic or toxic condition, as well as the pres-
ence or absence of certain environing objects
clearly influence the occurrence or non-oc-
currence of inter behavior or facilitate the oc-
currence of the activities in question in vary-
ing degrees.
Because at least some setting factors have
been interpreted as intervening variables, their
character as actual features of behavior seg-
ments may be clarified by contrasting them
with conventional intervening variables. An
early and widespread notion of intervening
variables presents them as factors occurring
between stimulation and response. There are
threeoutstandingobjections to this idea. First,
it definitely reverts to the old way of thinking
according which psychological events consist
of internal powers causing the organism to
act; behaviorists, of course, translate the old
psychic powers into neural powers. Secondly,
the construct of intervention reduces the re-
sponse to motions or other simple actions or
processes, so that some other features of it are
made into factors intervening between the
simple movements and the stimulating condi-
tions. Thirdly, the construct of intervention
serves to break up the complex dynamic psy-
chological event. (Interbehavioral Psychol-
ogy, p. 95)
16. Ibid., pp. 205-6.
17. On this issue, see William S. Verplanck, who
wrote: "The most that can be expected from labo-
ratory research are statements about what hap-
pened in specific laboratories at specific times
using specific methodologies with particular kinds
of subjects.These are data incapable of supporting
applicable generalizations." (Preface to Reassess-
ment in Psychology, p. xxii )
Verplanck continued:
It is no accident that Robert Kantor has
not done experimental research. It is no acci-
dent that those who understand the viewpoint
and apply it successfully both in doing re-
search and in communicating with one an-
other (if not to the classical hard-core pseudo-
physicists of the experimental psychologists)
keep their methodology simple, and carry out
their work elsewhere than the lab.
In sum, the experimental literature does
not reward close study. The most productive
experimental research has been that using the
simplest of operations, most free of theory,
and most close to the straightforward interac-
tions of individuals in natural (uncontrived)
environments. (Ibid., p. xxii).
18. To quote Verplanck again: "A contributing factor
[to Kantor's obscurity] ... is the difficulty of
Kantor's prose, both in sentence structure and
vocabulary, and in his frequent stylistic use of
allusion rather thandirectstatement in developing
his arguments. He places demands on his reader,
that the reader too often cannot meet. (Ibid., p.
xxv).
19. Morris commented:"... Kantor's criticisms ofboth
behavioral and nonbehavioral psychology have
been severe, unyielding and negative. In addition,
those criticisms rarely offered clear, tangible means
or methods for change; they were, for the most
part, rather general conceptual suggestions."
("Some Relationships between Interbehavioral
Psychology and Radical Behaviorism," p. 196).
20.1 am not saying that Kantor was a pure theorist.
Kantorwrote;
Interbehavioral psychology is presented
both as a model for specific research and as a
formulated system to provide basic orienta-
tion concerning a specialized scientific do-
main. Indeed we take the position that there
are no uncrossable barriers between enter-
prise and system.
As a system, interbehavioral psychology
embodies the results of isolating those factors
and conditions which have proved serviceable
in psychological research. It is proposed as a
means of studying psychological events with
the least possible interference by cultural tra-

ditions. Banished are all constructs, such as
mind, body, ego, sensation, which lack corre-
spondence with events. (Interbehavioral Psy-
chology, p . 19)
In that passage, Kantor seemed to be ad-
vancing an unfettered empiricism (he invited
psychologists to throw away their intellectual
blinkers and examine the world of pure fact).
Skinner was an equally extreme empiricist.
However, he provided his followers with dis-
tinct paradigms (the manipulation of the vari-
ous schedules of reinforcement). I suspect that
Kantor would have treated schedules of rein-
forcement as intellectual blinkers. Regretta-
bly for Kantor, pure concepts are not enough.
In order to gain ascendancy, a scientific theory
(even in the behavioral sciences) must contain
the means to actualize its concepts.
21, Morris clearly feels that, as a theorist, Kantor
should be in the sunlight. However, by stressing
the similarities between the two I do not feel that
he does Kantor a service.
Can anyone doubt the claims of the his-
tory of psychology to be a valuable aid in the
development of the science itself? When the
history of psychology is pursued as the origin
and development of a discipline, much can be
learned about the results of observing things
and events along with established presupposi-
tions which condition the processes which
support the conclusions or become blocks in
the way of proper descriptions and interpreta-
tions.
J.R. Kantor writing as Observer, (1975). The
Psychological Record, 25, 583-589.
13
22. Kantor compared the concept of reinforcement to
atomism in physics. From the time of Dalton
onwards, chemists and physicists progressively
refined the concept of the atom (which started life
a conceptual device allowing chemists to explain
the constant weight ratios characteristic of any
given chemical reaction). In the same way, said
Kantor, reinforcement began as observations re-
garding the constant time relations between condi-
tioned stimuli and unconditioned stimuli or be-
tween responses and certain fixed consequences
of those responses. He then hinted that the neo-
behaviorist theories of learning merely represented
conceptual elaborations and hypothetical causes
of those time relations. (See Interbehavioral Psy-
chology, pp. 151-2)
Author Note
"JACOB ROBERT KANTOR (1888-1984)" is a
chapter front an as yet untitled manuscript on the
history of American psychology. Please direct corre-
spondence to John A. Mills, Department of Psychol-
ogy, University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, Canada
S7NOWO.
J.R. Kantor in 1979
Photo courtesy of Linda J, Hayes
 Bryan D, Midgley
University of Kansas
Dear Professor Mills,
Enclosed are some comments on your manuscript,
"JACOB ROBERTKANTOR(1888-1984),M arranged
roughly in the order in which you address specific
topics and issues. I have taken this opportunity to
respond not because whatyou say is way off the mark,
but because, in many ways, it comes close to the mark,
in my opinion. For instance, toward the end of your
manuscript, you note that, "He [Kantor] concerned
himself, almost exclusively, with metatheoretical is-
sues, that is, he tried to establish a secure framework
within which to develop a comprehensive behaviorist
psychology." I agree with this assessment, but it is not
what I understood from reading your manuscript,
which prompts the following comments.
Introduction
(a) You write, "Kantor rejected operationalism." I
would modify this statement to read, "Kantor rejected
the traditional handling of operationalism" (see Kan-
tor, 1922,1938,1939); (b)you assert that Kantor "did
not accept the reality of the concept learning," but I am
not sure of your rationale (see, e.g., Kantor & Smith,
1975, pp. 264-282); (c) for material on Skinner and
theory, see Skinner (1947, 1950); (d) for further bio-
graphical material on Kantor, see Kantor (1976), Parrott
(1984), and Wolf (1984); and (e) you write that,
"Kantor's first intellectual affiliations were with func-
tionalism," but if you mean to imply that Kantor was
a functionalist, this is not accurate (Parrott, 1984).
Kantor's Theory
"School" and "Theory"
Depending on how literally you apply the terms
"school" and "theory" to Kantor's system, they may or
may not be appropriate (I will argue for not). As for
"school,"MountjoyandHansor(1986)stated: Robert
[Kantor] ...founded no school of psychology. Instead
he proposed a broad group of scientific hypotheses
based on minimal assumptions regarding the data of
psychology, (p. 1296) As for "theory," Verplanck
(1983) confessed that writing his chapter on B. F.
Skinner for the book Modern Learning Theory (1954)
brought about a "revelation":
At the same time I understood and also grasped
that interbehaviorism isalso not a theory, but
as Parker [Lichtenstein] had told me over and
over, a systematic view, a different way of
looking at all matters behavioral, (p. xvii)
The important point of these two passages is that
interbehavioral psychology is a scientific system (Kan-
tor, 1953, 1959), that is, "a collection of formal as-
sumptions orpostulates" (Parrott, 1986, p. 42). But the
matter goes beyond that. Kantor's efforts at system-
ization were complex, involving a system and a
metasystem of interbehavioral psychology, into which
postulates, protopostulates, and other elements (e.g.,
criteria, definitions) were integrated (e.g., Kantor,
1953 p. 28). Here,you mightwantto examine Kantor
(1953,1959), Kantor and Smith (1975, pp. 407-417),
Lichtenstein (1983), and Parrott (1986).2
Interbehavioral psychology, then, is not a school
of psychology or a theory of behavior. In one sense,
interbehavioral psychology is more than these; in
another sense, itis less. Kantor made some apparently
grandiose claims, as when he asserted that, "To iden-
tify psychology as a natural science I most frequently
use the term 'Interbehavioral Psychology'" (1971, p.
viii). His enterprise, however, was also more humble
than mostpeople recognize. Interbehavioral psychol-
ogy was Kantor's attempt to provide a foundation for
all domains of psychology (e.g., abnormal, develop-
mental, physiological). To the extent that interbehav-
ioral psychology applies to ail of psychology, then it is
grandiose; to the extent that it is but afoundation, then
it is humble. Hence, I believe, part of Kantor's
contribution to psychology goes largely unnoticed or
misunderstood. For an extension of the interbehav-
ioral orientation to domains other than psychology per
se, see, for example, Kantor (1981).
Causation
Kantor's treatment of causality is fundamental to

his handling of psychological processes and events.
For him, the psychological event consists of, among
other things, a relation between response function and
stimulus function. Response function and stimulus
function are interdependent, not one dependent and
the other independent, except from amethodological
(e.g., experimental) point of view (Delprato, in press;
Kantor, 1959, pp. 98, 105-106, 213-214). If we want
a metaphor for causality, psychological events might
be seen as analogous to, for example, chemical reac-
tions. As Midgley and Morris (1988) described it:
From this [integrated-field] perspective, the
and S are not sequential, but rather, what is
sequential are the R-S units. For example, in
describing the intricate interactions between
sodium and chlorine that produce table salt,
only the most rudimentary descriptions would
posit that sodium, given the presence of chlo-
rine, is an antecedent cause to the formation of
table salt. This does not imply, however, that
the two substances do not progress through a
sequential series of interactions by which salt
emerges, (p. 491)
(Only later did Ed Morris and I discover that
Kantor himself had used a similar example; see, e.g.,
Kantor, 1950, pp. 156-158.) As an aside, can you
support the statement that, "He [Kantor] did not be-
lieve that psychologists could make predictions"?
Ontogeny
Strictly speaking, "ontogeny" refers to biological
(e.g., embryological) development. For analytic pur-
poses, Kantor (1959) distinguished among four types
of evolutionary or developmental (descriptive) stages,
of which ontogeny or "ontogenetic evolution" is one
(pp. 42-48). You are correct in pointing out that
Kantof's overall perspective is developmental (e.g.,
Delprato, 1980). In discussing the subsystem of devel-
opmental psychology, Kantor (1959) noted that, "It is
a basic postulate of interbehavioral psychology that all
psychological events are developed or evolved in the
lifetime of specific individuals (Chapters, Postulate
4)" (p. 165). Psychology itself is inherently develop-
mental.
The Interbehavioral Field, Integrated
Field, and Behavior Segment
If you feel that you "have missed something
crucial about Kantor" (cover letter from). A. Mills to
E. K. Morris), the significance of the interbehavioral
15
field construct may be one component. The field is
possibly one ofKantor's most important contributions
(e.g., Delprato, in press). The field pervades Kantor's
work. Some topics to which it is related are causality,
the essence of psychological events (i.e., behavior or
interbehavior), the relation of psychology to other
sciences, and the evolution of psychology from the
ancient Greeks to the present.
Components of the Field
You note that, "The components of any given
interbehavioral field were the organism, the stimulus,
the media (or medium of contact), the setting factor,
and the reactional biography." First, it is probably
more correct to speak not of "the organism," but of "the
response" or, even better, of "the response function."
Second, "setting factor" probably should be plural.
Third, at some point, Kantor started speaking of the
"interbehavioral history," of which the "reactional
biography" and the "stimulus evolution" are compo-
nents, analytically speaking (see Kantor, 1942).3
You then write, "For him [Kantor], stimuli were
simply occasions for reaction." This sounds very
much like the Skmnerian way of saying that a discrimi-
native stimulus sets the occasion for an operant re-
sponse. It does not seem to describe the interrelation
between response function and stimulus function that
is the essence ofKantor's interbehavioral field. Shortly
after this, you write: "Thus, past experience with
flowers...constituted the stimulus. Stimuli, then, could
notbe physical; physical objects and events were mere
occasions or settings for actions; they could not cause
actions." I believe Kantor would have said that past
experiences with flowers are part of an interbehavioral
history. A flower, as a psychological stimulus, func-
tions as it does (and a psychological response func-
tions as it does) because of an interbehavioral history,
setting factors, and a medium of contact. A stimulus
(as an object) becomes a psychological stimulus when
it acquires (a) function(s).
As for the medium of contact and the meaning of
events, I do not see the relations you propose. You
write, "First, for him [Kantor] meaning arose from the
domain circumambient to an event (such as the im-
pingement of light rays onto a living retina)." Maybe
the problem I have is with the parenthetical example.
As I have pointed out, for Kantor, meaning or function
is the result of previous interactions (interbehavioral
history) and current conditions (setting factors, me-
dium of contact). A contact medium could affect the
 function or meaning of astimulus (and therefore, of its
coordinated response), as when a teddy bear looks like
a scary monster in a child's dimly lit bedroom, but this
seems different from what you are proposing. (Is it?)
You go on to write, "Second, he believed it was wrong
to say that an event could be endowed with a meaning
from outside its ontological domain (so thataphysical
event could not derive its meaning from a mental or
neurological one)." ("Endowed" is atricky word.) For
Kantor, setting factors can be, for instance, biological
(e.g., hormonal imbalance, physical injury).. If you
mean that something like hormonal imbalance or physi-
cal injury cannot serve as setting factors in an interde-
pendentrelation between response function andstimu-
lus function, Kantor would not agree. If you mean to
deny explanatory reductionism (e.g., reducing psy-
chological events to nothing more than neurological
ones), Kantor would agree.
Related to this matter ofbehavioral and biological
events and processes is Kantor's distinction between
biological causation and biological participation (see,
e.g., Kantor, 1947, 1982, Chapter 3, esp. pp. 71-74).
An understanding of this, along with Kan tor's empha-
sis on individual developmental history, demonstrates
that he was not a "pure environmentalist," Skinner's
(1979, p. 326) uninformed comments notwithstand-
ing.
Also relatedly, why do you write that, "Kantor
treated 'the brain' as a construct"? The distinction to
be made is between the brain as a biological vs. a
psychological organ. As Smith (1993) has pointed
out:
Brain as an intervening variable is a mere
surrogate for the intangible mind or soul.
Historically, this special power was attributed
to it as a means of objectifying the mind or
soul. Thus, a biological organ became also a
psychological organ and assumed the role of
container, initiator, director, and interpreter.
This doctrine is, perhaps, the worst hang-up in
modern psychology. As a derivative of medi-
eval theology, it is used to reduce complex
field events to neuronal activity.
Interbehaviorism puts that brain in its biologi-
cal place as a participant in interbehavior
along with all the other biological organs and
processes, (p. 158; see Delprato, 1979; Kan-
tor, 1947)
You argue that, "Setting factors were Kantor's
version of intervening variables." After rereading this
statement and the passage by Kantor (1959, p. 95), the
operative terms seem to be "Kantor's version." My
reading of the Kantor passage suggests that if indi-
viduals were going to refer to setting factors as inter-
vening variables, then he was going to at least make
sure that the former were not confused with the typi-
cally understood (Kantor said "conventional") mean-
ing of the latter (e.g., MacCorquodale & Meehl, 1948).
This is implicitin your manuscript, butperhaps should
be made explicit. To avoid confusion, I would not
even mention intervening variables (see Smith, 1993,
p. 133, footnote 1).
You write that Kantor "did not believe that re-
sponses could be characterized solely or even largely
by their physical form. Instead, a response was the
expression of a complex concatenation of circum-
stances." This sounds good, but it may be illustrative
of sometimes subtle difficulties. Here, the main prob-
lem is with the referents to "complex concatenation of
circumstances." Kantor observed that, "Psychologi-
cal events are at the same time biological events"
(Kantor & Smith, 1975, p. 453; Observer, 1984, p.
158), which implies that responses are both psycho-
logical and biological events (Kantor & Smith, 1975,
p. 65). They also are both physical and chemical
events (Kantor & Smith, 1975,p.65).4 Hence.Kantor
would agree that "a response [is]...the expression of a
complex concatenation of circumstances" if, by "cir-
cumstances," you mean psychological, biological,
physical, and chemical factors. However, by noting
that Kantor "did not believe that responses could be
characterized solely or even largely by their physical
form," I assume that you are referring to something
different to a response as a distinctly psychological
event, that is, to a response function. If so, Kantor
would again agree with your "complex concatenation
of circumstances" statement if, by "circumstances,"
you mean an interbehavioral history, setting factors,
and a medium of contact. Depending on the intended
meaningofyourpassage, though, the interpretation is
different.
On the interbehavioral field and its constituent
components, see, forexample, Bentley (1935, pp. 89-
99), Delprato (in press), Hayes (1988; contra Smith,
1989), Kantor (1924,1946,1969, pp. 369-382,1980),
Kantor and Smith (1975), Midgley and Morris (1988),
Mountjoy (1976), Pronko (1988), Pronko and Herman
(1982), and Smith (1973, 1984).
Kantor's Influence
You write, "...Kantor did not believe that his

theory could find expression in research or have prac-
tical applications...." From Kantor's perspective and
that of many others, I am tempted to say that this is not
so (see, e.g., Kantor, 1987), but not everyone may
entirely agree with me. Part of the problem, as already
noted, is that Kantor did not develop atheory. In a note
attached to a then unpublished manuscript by Delprato
(in press), he (i.e., Delprato) had this to say, in part:
It Is my personal opinion that the interbehav-
ioral literature is perhaps not best thought of
as designed to directly generate research ques-
tions and clinical procedures but that it repre-
sents a point of departure of great value to all
who aspire to doing "psychology as a sci-
ence."
The manuscript's opening paragraph read, in part, as
follows:
Above all else, interbehavioral psychology
aims to provide a coherent and systematic
science and practice of psychology "from the
ground up." The interbehavioral perspective
suggests that essential for psychological prac-
tice that is authentically based on science is a
completely naturalistic approach to both sci-
ence itself and psychology in general.
IwasthinkingaboutDelprato's comments atabout
the same time that I was reading Kantor's (1953) The
Logic of Modern Science this (last) summer. Taken
together, they gave me a perspective on Kantor's work
somewhat different from how I had previously seen it
(see my comments on "School" and "Theory").
Reinforcement
Relevant commentary on reinforcement may be
found in Kantor (1970). As for Kantor's "theory"
lying "outside the charmed circle," see Schoenfeld
(1969).
Closing Remarks
I have come to my views on Kantor through
contacts with individuals who are more informed than
I and through studying his work. Where I have been
influenced by others, I hope that I have not misrepre-
sented their views. On those few occasions where I
have come to my own conclusions, I hope that they are
representative of Kantor's work. But for now, I hope
that the foregoing "diatribe" may be of some use to
you.
Sincerely,
Bryan D. Midgley, M.A.
NICHHD Trainee
17
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 19

Psychological Record, 34, 451-453.
This article originally was an informal response to
a manuscript by Professor John A. Mills (Univer-
sity of Saskatchewan). Although slightly edited
for the purpose of publication, the current version
has retained the original's informal style.
In addition to systems and metasystems, Kantor
discussed "cultural institutions" and "the level of
philosophy" (e.g., Kantor StSmith, 1975, pp.409-
410). Although uncertain, I have detected what
appear to be some incongruities m Kantor's dis-
cussions of these four levels. For example, are
protopostulates elements of the metasystem (Kan-
tor, 1953, p. 28) or of "the level of philosophy"
(Kantor & Smith, 1975, p. 410)?
3. The point about analytic abstraction has been
particularly noted by Pronko and Herman (1982,
pp. 250, 253).
4. Similarly, stimuli may be "analyzed as having a
physio-chemical makeup" (Smith, 1993, p. 135).
Author Note
My thanks to Edward K, Morris and Kendo.
Morrison for their comments, fineries, and editorial
suggestions on earlier versions of this paper. Corre-
spondence should be addressed to Bryan D, Midgley,
Department of Human Development and Family Life,
University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, 66045-2133

International Conference on Advances in Management

The Second Biennial International Conference vnAdvances in Management will be held at Marlborought
Inn, 1316-33 Street Northeast, Calgary, Alberta T2A6B6, CANADA (Phone: 403-248-8888; Fax: 403-248-
0749) onjune 17-20,1994. Requests for further information should be addressed to the Conference President
Dr. Afzal Rahim, 3109 Copperfield Ct., Bowling Green, KY 42104, USA; Phone/Fax 502-782-2601.
Second Congress on Interbehaviorism
There will be an Interbehavioral conference as part of the activities of the J. R. Kantor Institute of Madrid.
This conference will be held in Madrid, Spain. The dates are July 13-16, 1994. If you would like more
information on this conference please contact:
Eduardo Sanchez Gatell
Instituto Kantor
DePsicologialnterconductual
Avenida Pio XII, 97.7 F. 28036
Madrid, Espana
International Congress on Behaviorism and the Sciences of Behavior
The Second International Congress on Behaviorism and the Sciences of Behavior will be held in Palermo,
Italy. The dates are October 6-9,1994. Information about organization and accomodations can be obtained from:
S.G. Studio
Via Enrico Albanese, 114
90139 Palermo
Telephone: 39-91-328179
Fax: 39-91-582090
Cheiron Conference
The International Society for the History of the Behavioral Sciences will be holding its 26th Annual
Conference in meeting m Montreal, Quebec, Canada. The dates are June 2-5,1994. For information contact:
Dr.HarryA.Whitaker
Department de Psychologie
Universite du Quebec a Montreal
Case postale 8888, Succursale Centre-ville
Montreal, Quebec, CanadaH3C 3P8
 205
Carmenne Chiasson
University of New Mexico
Although Kantor's interbehavioral psychology is
probably closer to Skinner's behaviorism than it is any
other psychological perspective, interbehavioral psy-
chology differs from behavioral psychology on a num-
ber of fundamental issues. Perhaps the main differ-
ence of the two perspectives is in their underlying
philosophies: Kantor and Skinner aspire to achieve
different goals. Kantor's main concern is with the
accurate and scientific description and explanation of
the theory which underlies the science of psychology
and the unit of the psychological field event. Skinner's
focus is on psychology as a science concerned with the
prediction and control of behavior.
This paper begins with a discussion of some simi-
larities between behaviorism and interbehaviorism,
then addresses the differences between the two theo-
ries on the issues of: 1) the method of selection oftheir
subject matter, 2) the nature of the psychological
event, 3) the role of cause and 4) the goal of each
perspective. Finally, contributions, criticisms and
relative adequacies of interbehavioral and behavioral
theories are discussed.
Similarities of Behaviorism and
Interbehaviorism
As an illustration of the similarities between
interbehaviorism and behaviorism, Kantor (1969, p.
376) actually describes the field of interbehaviorism
as a culmination of and an improvement on behavioral
theory. Both behaviorism and interbehaviorism have
their origins in the 1920's. The major similarity
between the two viewpoints is their inclusion of the
organism and the environment in their analysis of the
psychological event. This distinguishes theirperspec-
tives from other views which analyze the mind or other
mental constructs.
Another similarity between the two perspectives
is that both Kantor and Skinner agree that all psycho-
logical behavior is culture-bound (Skinner, 1974 p.
20;Kantor, 1969 Vol. I,p. 12). Kantor(1968,p. 376)
proposes that both behaviorism and interbehaviorism
maintain that extraspatial and unobservable mental
processes are notpartof the subject matter of psychol-
ogy. However, Kantor qualifies this point by saying
that both perspectives hold this belief for different
reasons. This point brings me to a discussion of the
differences between behavioral and interbehavioral
psychology.
Differences in the Analysis of
Psychological Events
Subject Matter
Kantor (1945, p. 150) states that "For a naturalistic
psychology, it is no paradox to say that the "body" of
the mind-body construction exits no more than the
"mind"...". Kantor(1969) purports that the behavioral
treatment of the subject matter of psychology (as
confined to events that are observable in space and
time) is not a denial of the dualism per se, rather it is
a position which "maintains the physical aspects of
dualism while rejecting the psychical side of organ-
isms and their behavior." Thus, the behaviorists have
rid themselves of the mind part of the mind-body
construction yet maintained the body part. In this
treatment of the 'dualistic turned into monistic' sub-
ject matter of behaviorism, Kantor proposes that the
dualistic tradition must be left behind entirely, not just
in part. A science that focuses on half of a dualistic
position by eradicating the other half in order to make
the position monistic will necessarily encounter diffi-
culties in analysis. The same old parasites of the
dualistic view of psychology (namely psychical inter-
pretation and the allocation ofpowers to unobservable
structures within the organism) continue to thrive on
the half which the behaviorists retain. Kantor argues
that behavioral monism not only introduces unneces-
sary fabrication but also detracts from the possibility
of leaving the dualistic tradition behind once and for
all (for example by referring to behaviors that occur
"inside the skin", e.g. Skinner, 1971). In contrast to
the behavioral position, the interbehavioral perspec-
tive does not maintain the traditional dualistic con-
structions of either the mind or the body as part of its

subject matter. Kantor (1969, Vol. II, p. 376) explains
that interbehaviorists presuppose "...a complete ho-
mogeneity of the data and the investigation of all the
sciences". Following this line, psychological events
differonly in detail from nonpsychological events, in
the same way that nonpsychological events differ
among themselves.
Kantor feels that the interbehavioral psychologist
has two main responsibilities. The first is to formulate
an accurate description of observed psychological
events and the second is to "guard against the cultural
traditions which in the past have set psychology apart
from other sciences" (Kantor 1969, Vol. II, p. 376). It
is my opinion that goals such as these are both appro-
priate and necessary for the scientific analysis of
psychological events. Complete and accurate descrip-
tion of an event field is necessary in any science (e.g.
a chemist could not leave out half of a formula).
Also, it is of particular importance to guard against
the re-entry of the mentalistic tradition into psychol-
ogy because mentalism has historically led (and pres-
ently is still leading) psychology away from naturalis-
tic science. In keeping with a natural and scientific
approach to psychology,Kantor(1969, p. 377) defines
the central hypothesis of interbehaviorism: "...psy-
chological events consistof symmetric fields in which
the acts of organisms and the acts of stimulus objects
are thesimultaneouslyoccurringpoles." He points out
thatother sciences such as physics and chemistry have
prospered by recognizing the use of the field in analyz-
ing the mutually reciprocal action involved in an
event.
The nature of the Psychological Event
The following is a diagram of a unit interbehav-
ioral event field (Kantor, 1963).
Boundary of fnveiligttive Event-field
Boundary o/ Psychological Evcnt-ff Id
The field boundary is arbitrarily defined by a
21
particular observer for a particular purpose. The
psychological event is an interaction of an organism
with its environments OR, or similarlyROS. As
there is nocausalrole norany conception of time, these
two representations are interchangeable. Kantor's
model represents simultaneous interaction of the stimu-
lus and the response with respect to each other.
In a Skinnerian analysis, there is a stimulus which
elicits a response, time is involved linearly and there is
a causal connection between the stimulus and the
response, S -> R. Skinner's left to right arrow repre-
sents the passage of time. Since it is the stimulus that
evokes the response and not vice versa, and since time
proceeds linearly from left to right, it would not be
appropriate to represent Skinner's formulation in the
opposite manner (R -> S).
Kantor's (1963) interbehavioral analysis of psy-
chology postulates the psychological event as operat-
ing in an event field. The assumptions of interbehav-
ioral psychology which lead to this field analysis of
psychology are as follows:
a) No science is concerned with a reality outside the
bounds of time and space, thus psychology cannot
admit any entity presumed to exist outside of these
boundaries (events that are not natural).
b) Psychology is a basic science like other basic
sciences (e.g. chemistry, biology). There is noth-
ing about chemistry or biology that is more basic
than psychology. All sciences isolate particular
events out of the same universe. Psychology is
concerned with isolating and describing the inter-
action of an organism with respect to its environ-
ment.
c) Psychology is not reducible to the subject matter of
any other science. The subject matter of psychol-
ogy cannot be reduced to biology nor that of
biology to psychology. In his analysis of complex
psychological events, Kantor assumes that the
event, (e.g. thinking), does not involve only die
organism - it is (as are all psychological events)
an interaction between the organism and the envi-
ronment.
Thinking is not an activity that is going on
'within' the organism (e.g. inside the brain).
Kantor sees the brain as a coordinating and
integrating organ.
When distinguishing between Kantorian
and Skinnerian perspectives, it is important to
note the distinction between Skinner's analy-
sis where a stimulus evokes a response(S ->R)
 and Kantor's (S <-> R) conceptualization of
stimulus and response simultaneously acting
with respect to each other.
Kantor holds that the brain is not where
the mind is found. Skinner holds that there are
behaviors that occur 'inside the skin' and
behaviors that occur'outside the skin'. Under
Kantor's formulation, if complex psychologi-
cal behavior such as thinking is not occurring
'inside the skin', then one would ask the
question "where is this behavior occurring?".
From a Kantorian perspective, there is no
where. Behavior is of necessity an interaction
between an organism and an environment
within a context of certain settingfactors and
within a particular medium of contact. This
analysis also incorporates the ontogenic
(within the organism's lifetime) history of the
organism,
d) Psychological events involve the whole organism -
not its parts considered separately-e. g. it is not
the legs that walk, nor the eyes that see, nor the
brain that thinks.
e) Psychological events are ontogenic: defined as
taking place during the lifetime of the organism; it
does not refer to innate or genetic traits. The
psychological event is the interaction of the whole
organism (including the organism's interbehav-
Joral history) with the environment in an interbe-
havioral field.
f) There are functional properties to both the response
and the stimulus in Kantor's model. What one
does with respect to a stimulus object are the
stimulus functions of the object. For example,
how one behaves with respect to a comb, such as
comb one's hair, put it into one's pocket, etc.
What one does with respect to astimulus objectis
the response function of the organism. Stimulus
functions are reciprocal with the response func-
tions of organisms. Skinner's behaviorism does
not share this reciprocal functional
conceptualization with Kantor's interbehaviorism.
Skinner's model constitutes an observer with the
purpose of describing psychological events as
repeatable. For Skinner, stimuli are independent
ofresponding.
The Contrasting Goals of Behavioral and
Interbehavioral Psychology
Skinner's goal is the prediction and control of
behavior. Skinner has developed a causal model of
psychology in which time is linear. The focus of his
approach is a stimulus evoking a response model. In
his treatment of complex human behaviors such as
thinking and remembering, Skinner postulates that
there are some behaviors that occur within the skin and
some outside of the skin. Perhaps what he means by
this is that some behaviors are more directly observ-
able than others - the distinction that Kantor makes
when he says that some behaviors are more subtle than
others (such as thinking and remembering).
In contrast to Skinner's position, Kantor's goal is
the accurate description and explanation of events.
Kantor's model is neither causal nor linear with re-
spect to time.
Causal Versus Non-Causal Model
Skinner (1974) discusses the causes of behavior
and the layman's interpretation ofbehavior as causally
related to the physical and/or affective state directly
preceding it or concurrent to it. He (1974, p. 10)
describes this formulation of a causal model ofbehav-
ior as having derived from the ancient principle of post
hoc, ergo, propter hoc (after this, therefore because of
this). An everyday example of this interpretation is
that of seeing affective behavior as being caused by
bodily changes. Thus, when one is asked "Why did
you yell?" one may reply "Because I was angry,"
Skinner (1974) explains this focus on bodily condi-
tions as the cause ofbehavior and indicates the histori-
cal quality of this belief as follows: "Feelings occur at
just the right time to serve as causes ofbehavior, and
they have been cited as such for centuries" (1974, p.
11). The question then arises as to how mental states
can give rise to physical events and vice versa. One
historical approach to this problem was to assume that
there is a physical basis to the mind. For the most part,
Skinner feels that this puzzling aspect ofbehavior has
been largely ignored. Thus he attempts to deal with
causation from a behavioral perspective through the
experimental manipulations of prediction and control.
Kan tor maintains an unusual position in psychol-
ogy -~ a non-causal approach. With the possible
exception of Guthrie, Kantor is the only person histori-
cally to hold this position; all others agreed to some
variation of a causal model. Because Kantor does not
include cause in his approach, it does not mean that
behavior is free or capricious. Freedom of that sort is
only possible when one also believes in the concepts of
duality, and Kantor has no duality in his approach.

Within Ranter's interbehavioral psychology, there
is no place for a causal role. Psychological events
occur in a continuous evolution ~ an organism is
responding with respect to his stimulating environ-
ment. The stimulating and responding represent one
thing-arelation. A psychological field is determined
by the isolation of some features out of the evolving
universe in order to study them. A psychological event
is a relation in a context, .In Kantor's analysis there is
no past and similarly no future -- there is only the
present. However, for the purposes of isolation of an
event, time is constructed. Skinner's view of time is
more conventional; he believes that there is a pas t and
that there is a future, but not an effective future.
Much of psychology today centers around the
contributions of B. F. Skinner and the Radical
Behaviorism approach to psychology which he devel-
oped. Skinnerhas made vast contributions to applied
psychology. At the present time, behavior therapies
are recognized as the leading and possibly only effec-
tive treatment for such problems as phobias and anxi-
ety disorders.
As well, Skinner's approach to verbal behavior
(Skinner, 1957) is one of the major systematic treat-
ments of the complex subject of language.
Perhaps Behaviorism can be compared to a small
minority party in a democratic government -e.g. the
New Democratic Party in Canada, The minority party
has never won and is not likely in the near future to win
a federal election or even to be the major opposition to
the winning party. However, this minority party, like
Behaviorism within psychology, usually conies up
with the best ideas and these ideas are used by the
majority government or by the other psychological
disciplines - simply because its what is best for the
population.
Criticisms of Behaviorism
Kantor (1969) describes several criticisms of Be-
haviorism. His first criticism is that behaviorism is
limited in its achievement due to a neglect of certain
types of events such as thinking and language. Perhaps
Kantor's criticism would be more accurate if he claimed
thatbehavioral theory lacks the ability to scientifically
describe complex psychological events, as there have
been some attempts to deal with these complex issues,
e. g. Skinner's Verbal Behavior (1957).
Secondly, Kantor points out the problem of
23
analogism in which "the urge to develop descriptions
of concrete observable events has led to a proliferation
of mechanical and electrical models of the human and
infra-human organism" (Kantor, 1969, p. 367).
A third criticism which Kantor has of behaviorism
is an interpretation of the behavioral theory as reduc-
tive. Fourthly, Kantor criticizes organocentrism -- the
position that the data of psychology is exclusively
concentrated in the organism. Kantor argues thatthis
attitude usually leads to the belief that there are inter-
nal powers in the organism.
A last criticism of behaviorism from an interbe-
havioral perspective is based on Skinner's assertion
that some behaviors occur 'inside the skin' and some
occur 'outside the skin' (Skinner, 1957, p. 130; 1974,
p. 242). These mentalistic assumptions may stem from
the adoption in behaviorism of certain aspects of the
historical dualistic tradition.
Benefits of Interbehaviorism
Kantor (1969) also describes the benefits of inter-
behavioral theory. He includes in this explanation
benefits with respect to data, with respect to investiga-
tions and with respect to interpretation. With respect
to data, the use of interbehavioral fields "facilitates
sharp and sound distinction between data" (p. 378).
Secondly, the use of responses and fields helps to
express the developmental character of interbehav-
ioral fields and makes it clear that psychological
events are not merely". . . responses, movements, or
acts of organisms either elicited by some external
conditions or extruded by some hidden internal power"
(p. 378). Thirdly, stimulus functions help to illustrate
that the stimulus does not impel acts or conditions.
Rather, the stimulus function has a reciprocal relation-
ship with the response function of an organism.
A fourth benefit of the interbehavioral approach is
that the evolutionary quality of interbehavioral fields
is readily evident. Fifthly, the inclusion of medium
and setting factors in the interbehavioral field lends a
completeness to the analysis of the interaction because
it emphasizes the importance of context in an psycho-
logical event.
One benefitof interbehavioral theory with respect
to investigations is the avoidance of the organocentric
(centered on the organism) attitude. The field hypoth-
esis of interbehaviorism rejects the conventional be-
havioral formula of R= f(S) and supports the use of the
interbehavioral field model.
A benefit of interbehavioral psychology with re-
spect to interpretation is that interbehavioral theory
holds that all behavior changes, whether gains or
losses, are changes in total fields and similarly psycho-
logical evolution or devolution is not just a change in
an organism, it is a change of an entire field event.
Also, it is important in science for the scientist to be as
close to the event field as possible and an interbehav-
ioral approach assures this proximity.
Contributions of Interbehaviorism
The main contribution of Kantor's interbehav-
ioral psychology is the presentation of a naturalistic
scientific approach to psychology. Although rela-
tively few studies have been done to date involving
interbehavioral theory, there has been some applied
research in the area of interbehaviorism (e. g. Bijou,
Chao.GhezziandUmbreit, 1986,1987;Williamson
and Lyons, 1986; Chiasson and Hayes, in press) and
others. The main applied work in interbehaviorism
that has been accomplished is based on Kantor's
Psychological Linguistics (1977). In this book, Kan-
tor introduces a systematic naturalistic approach to the
analysis of language,
Criticisms of Interbehaviorism
To a certain extent, Interbehaviorism has been
criticized for inappropriately being considered a group
within Behaviorism (Skinner, 1988). As there is a
Special Interest Group for Interbehaviorism within the
Association for Behavior Analysis and since most
Interbehaviorists are also, in many ways, practicing
Behavior Analysts, it seems that Interbehaviorists can
be described at least in some ways as being closely
associated with Behaviorism. Rather than viewing
Interbehaviorism as entirely distinct from behavior-
ism, it may be better to view interbehaviorism as a
division within the party ofbehaviorists and one which
allows for a challenging of some of the ideas of
behaviorism. This challenging of ideas is mutual
between these two approaches to psychology and it is
the challenging of the old and the fruit of the ensuing
discussion and defense of positions which provides
the fertilizer from which new ideas grow. The main
criticism of interbehaviorism is the distinct lack of
applied research that has been generated by the field.
This deficiency becomes especially obvious when the
few applications of interbehavioral psychology are
compared to the vast contributions that behaviorism
has made to applied psychology. In response to this
criticism, Kantor would argue that his goal as a theo-
retical scientist is the accurate description and expla-
nation of psychological events. Kantor's goal in
psychology is explanation and description, not appli-
cation. It is necessary to understand and to know the
underlying postulates of a theory before applying the
theory to research. Kantor's interbehavioral psychol-
ogy is in its beginning stages. Now that the ground-
work has been established, applications of the theory
will proceed.
Kantor's writings on interbehavioral theory have
also received criticisms because of the difficulty in
understanding Kantor's unique style of writing. Intel-
lectually, this is not a valid criticism because it is not
a remark on either the quality of Kantor's work or on
his enormous contribution to a scientific approach to
psychology.
From a practical viewpoint, however, this criti-
cism makes a valid point because writings, no matter
how important they are, are not useful unless they can
be understood. Also, it is possible that Kantor's works
may be put aside by students in favor of material
provided by writers who are easier to comprehend.
One solution to this practical problem of the interpret-
ability of Kantor's works is to rewrite his main works
in a more comprehensible style. It would be a terrible
mistake to neglect Kantor's contribution to psychol-
ogy due to difficulties in understanding his style of
prose.
Adequacies of Behaviorism and Interbe-
haviorism
In terms of the applied contributions of these two
theories, it is not appropriate to compare the adequacy
ofbehaviorismversusthe adequacy of interbehaviorism
because the two theories serve different functions.
This is illustrated by the different goals of each theory:
Kantor's goal of accurate description and explanation
and Skinner's goal of prediction and control. Both
theories are important and valuable contributions to
psychology.
Conclusion
In conclusion, I will summarize the main differ-
ences between the Kantorian and the Skinnerian per-
spectives. In terms of a natural, scientific approach to
the analysis of psychological events, Kantor's posi-
tion, in contrast to Skinner's, satisfies certain elements
of a natural science.
However, whereas Skinner's psychology has gen-
erated a vast amount of applied research, Kantorian
psychology has just begun to generate applied re-

search.
A third major difference between Kantorian and
Skinnerian psychology is the use of the concept of
causation; the concept of cause is absent from Kantor's
perspective and is thoroughly embedded in Skinner's.
For Skinner, this concept has pragmatic value as it is
useful for the prediction and control ofbehavior. From
the Kantorian perspective, the causal model is neither
useful nor helpful because his goal is the accurate
description and explanation ofevents.
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Apple ton-Century-Crofts.
Author Note
My thanks to Linda J. Hayes for her comments on
an earlier draft of this paper. Correspondence should
be addressed to Cannenne Chiasson, Departmento of
Psychology, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque,
NM87131
 Charles Baxter
Ithaca Public Schools, Ithaca, New York
Presently, ourschools attempt to function on the
basis of western psychologies that are dualistic in
nature and based on myth or on relatively unsophisti-
cated behaviorial psychologies. Consequently, some
educators, under the tutelage of these psychologies,
assert that a stimulating environment enriches intelli-
gence and a deprived one detracts. Other educators
under the same tutelage argue that no force or forces
can push a person over an innate upper limit. Both
factions are dreamers, because palable, tangible, intel-
ligence has never been seen, felt, heard or in any way
sensed. It has always been a hypothetical construct
and one whose reality base has been confined merely
to human belief.
On a realistic basis, intelligence is not a thing, but
an adjective. Performance that society honors is called
superior, talented, genius; skilled and that which is
disparaged is termed inferior, imcompetent, dull, or
stupid.
When intelligence is used as an explanation of the
behavior it describes, circularity is invoked. The con-
struct becomes a mythical causal power for described
characteristics. As clinical testers we impose upon the
student a series of contrived closed events, one ex-
ample; the student recites digits in order as dictated,
thus embarking on the "mythological rampage." This
myth encompasses a creation ofsimilar problem types
described as reified constructs, in the case of the above
example; the construct "auditory sequential memory",
implying cause. The natural outcome with almost any
student tested is a cluster of poor, relatively low scores
which we assume to be organismic "deficits". At this
point, continuing to freely use our imagination we
relate these theoretical "deficits" to some disparaging
characteristic of a completely separate and indepen-
dent natural event, ie. the student's demonstrated
difficulty in remembering sound symbol matches in
reading, which is made up of a different set of
controlling variables.
We have now completed the cycle. We start with
a mythological construct, impose it on a natural event
and finish with a reification, implying cause, leaving
the classroom teacher with no implied remedy. It is a
diagnostic procedure that relieves the teacher of blame
at the expense of the child, but leaves her/him with
little or no help in resolving the problem. Finally this
procedure is almost always done without ever truly
observing or describing the natural event in question.
In another more logical setting this could and probably
would be called a destructive act of witchcraft. In
causal psychology there is a failure to recognize that
the event in question is a field of factors, a field that is
not reducible to any one of its components, for the field
consists of a different level of organization than any of
its components. To place emphasis only on one com-
ponent or set of components would be to over simplify
the event. Therefore it would be futile to search for a
controlling force; for there are a multitude of contribu-
tors and the only meaning of awareness or intelligence
is as a description of these interactions and their
relationship to similarly described events.
We may use intellect or intelligence as an adjec-
tive in describing natural events. For example, a sur-
geon can be accepted as commendably superior in his
surgery, grossly inefficient in interpreting
heiroglyphics, skilled m windsurfing, and incompe-
tent in art. We will not incorrectly define him as
intelligent in everything he does, as we do with "learn-
ing disabled" children, which, by the way, is another
reified label.
Intelligence is only one of many mythical con-
structs that we in education treat as real things. Educa-
tional language, mostly taken from western psycho-
logical language, is replete with jargon that logicians
have called "a disease of the language". For example,
we as professionals treat the many forms of perception
auditory sequential perception, visual perception,
motor perception, spatial perception, to name a few,
as reifications that actually exist in some biological
form.

A New Perspective on Perception
In reality, perception is an act, as m the act of
perceiving. The act, from an interbehavioral perspec-
tive involves:
A. An organism which has organs for sensing,
B. The object which has properties which can be
sensed
C. A medium that facilitates the contact.
D. An interaction of the sensing organism and the
object.
There are no mysterious internal processes that
reflect the external world, but only an interaction that
is comprised of an interbehavioral field.
The implicit postualate of speech and language
therapists that speech consists of sounds which form
strings of words must be replaced with the explicit
postulate that speaking is a field of events involving
speakers, listeners, and things referred to. It then
becomes clear that living language involves a speaker
interacting simultaneously with a listener and the
object of reference. Thus language is a bistimulational
interaction for both speaker and listener. In short,
language is speaking about something to someone.
Therefore, it is an interbehavioral act and not a con-
struct of internal processes. Ascientific analysis should
be made on the basis of direct observation of the
natural actabsentofthese imposed mythical reifications
such as visual and auditory learning styles, visual and
auditory reception, auditory expression, visual and
auditory association, manual and kinesthetic recep-
tion, multisensory reception, visual and auditory clo-
sure, on and on and on. And of course the clinical
psychologist has come up with a plethora of reified
labels according to the testee's construct score or test
behavior: visual or auditorily handicapped, specific
language disabled, and this is a good one
attention deficit disordered. This is the reified label
placed on the child who has difficulty paying attention
to disagreeable things in school. And of course, we
keep adding labels as we create new and interesting
construct tests.
More logically as testers, when a child is having
difficulty reading, we should not ask which reified
construct is the cause of the child's reading failure, for
we are already proceeding on the basis of at least three
false assumptions:
1. The fault is due to the child.
2. A behavioral or psychological event is localized in
the organism. Therefore the natural event of learn-
27
ing to read can be described by a total focus on the
child.
3. There are no other significant variables outside the
organism affecting the child's progress.
Again, from an interbehavioral perspective the
psychological event is not localized in the organism,
nor is it a mere organismic act. Thus it is not reducible
to structure or function. The psychological event, as a
natural event, is not just an action of the organism; it
is not just behavior but interbehavior. It is mutual and
reciprocal activity in a field.
Failure in learning to read, as a natural event, may
be caused by a multitude of variables, only one of
which may be due to the fault of the child. We know
that the intellectual crippling of children is caused
overwhelmingly by faulty instructional presentations,
not faulty constructs in children. In other words if the
learner fails to learn, the problem may lie within the
learner, but it is more likely that the problem lies in the
instructional-communications-interaction. So what is
the basic remedy?
1. Identify faults in the communications and correct
them.
2. If the child does not learn via sophisticated commu-
nications, then those communications need to be
modified according to the mistake type made in
the context of which it was made.
Assuredly, the successful accomplishment of the
above is no small feat. The following describes some
of the instructional changes that can be made, espe-
cially for the more naive learner, to assure the begin-
nings of effective instruction:
1. Use clear, concise, consistent language in instruc-
tion.
2. Juxtapose connected concepts side by side showing
sameness, while placing similar but different con-
cepts far apart and treating them differently.
3. Provide effective correction procedures, according
to learner mistake type made for all instructional
objectives.
4. Develop effective problem solving strategies for
concepts to be taught.
5. Determine appropriate concepts to be taught on the
basis of what the learner knows and does not
know.
6. Provide a broad range of applications of the concept
being taught to promote effective learner generali-
2arion.
7. Provide necessary practice to assure mastery.
8. Provide distributed review spaced over time to
 secure retention.
9. The instructor uses:
a. the "HEAT'approach (High Energy Animated
Teaching).
b. an effective, warm, but demanding relationship
with the learner, where the learner is always
corrected with dignity.
c. effective fast pacing in teaching to assure
learner attention.
d. effective signals for clarity in monitoring crite-
rion performance.
Problem Solving in Education
From an Interbehavioral Perspective
Problem solving from the inter behavioral per-
spective, focuses on the interaction of the primary
variables in a contextual field. In teaching, the instruc-
tional communication is the primary variable that
defines the interaction. This focus is different from the
child centered approach or the clinical diagnostic
approach, where the focus is on the child. Conse-
quently, the position of responsibility and blame is
different. The language that is used in the interbehav-
ioral approach places the position of responsibility on
the interaction and the communications of the interac-
tion; consequently, it is the contextual communication
that is blamed when learning problems are demon-
strated.
If, for example, the learner in kindergarten is
reversing numbers, a child-centered practitioner con-
cludes, from an exclusive focus on the child, a normal
developmental delay. If the same learner, at the age of
8 1/2, is still reversing numbers, the clinical diagnos-
tician, also from an exclusive focus on the learner,
describes the child as perceptually handicapped. In
either instance it is noted that there is no implied
remedy in the developmental or diagnostic language.
The interbehavioral teacher (IBT), operates from
a different perspective. From a contextual focus on the
interaction (the communications between the teacher
and learner), the IBT recognizes some basic principles
that make for the most effective teaching. For ex-
ample, one of those principles describes the probable
confusion that is created when the teacher introduces
the teachings of similar, but different concepts close
together, and treats them the same. Therefore, to
preventlearner confusion, when teaching similar con-
cepts, the ITB teaches them far apart, and shows
difference: This is one demonstration of how a study
of the interbehavioral language implies a remedy. The
(IBT) notices, for example, that in number writing (0-
9), the efficientproduction of those numbers falls into
three separate groups:
1. Those numbers that are initiated by drawing a down
and to the right (ie., the number "4").
2. Those numbers that are initiated by drawing a line
to the right 1st and then down (ie., the number 7).
3. Those numbers that are initiated by drawing a line
to the left before going down (ie., the number 9).
The IBT knows that constructing instructional
formats where these numbers are clustered into 3
separate groups, and taught far apart, showing differ-
ence, literally prevents the most naive learner from
writing numbers in reverse form. Consequently, where
the above basic principle has not been considered, and
the naive learner reverses, it is the communications,
not the learner that the IBT blames. The IBT realizes
that some learners, who are confused by the instruc-
tional communications, not delayed, notvisually per-
ceptually handicapped, will reverse numbers, or let-
ters, or will work a double digit additon problem from
right to left if ambiguity is not eliminated from the
communications. Anothercommon problem inlearn-
ing the basics is spelling accurately in the context of
composition writing. Third and fourth grade teachers
frequently notice the learner who consistently spells
well on the 10 to 20 word spelling test given ever)'
Friday, but misspells the same words later in the
context of composition writing. The learning problem
is typically referred and diagnosed by the clinician as
a "visual imagery long term memory deficit," which is
only one of many reifications the psychologist uses
that implies no practical remedy.
The IBT, on the other hand, is familiar with the
principle that states: To promote generalization, pro-
vide a broad range of applications. If we want the
learner to spell accurately on Friday spelling tests and
in the context of composition writing we must commu-
nicate that expectation by treating the two situations as
similar.
Some common communications that set up the
naive learner to treatthe two spellingsituations differ-
ently are:
1. Spelling accuracy is of primary importance on
spelling tests, but often is treated as unimportant in
teaching writing. In fact, it is emphasized in the
Writing Process Approach to encourage the learner
not to worry about spelling, so as not to discourage
the fluency of getting the thought down on the
page.

1. Learner performance on spelling tests typically
amounts to writing only the word beingspelled. In
composition writing, words written are almost
always in the context of sentences.
3. In the better spelling programs (ie. Spelling Mas-
tery) spelling is taught to mastery. Rarely, if ever,
is there an intention to specifically teach or even
review spelling accuracy in the context of teach-
ing expressive writing.
The IBT, rather than imposing some reified clini-
cal label that blames the learner, recognizes these
spelling mistakes as under-generalizations or as
sameness mistakes, where the learner stipulates, or
undergeneralizes, by not transferring sameness from
one situation to another. This occurs because two
similar situations appear to be different to the learner.
The IBT knows that the implied remedy is to place the
two situations side by side and show how they are the
same.
A third, and most frequently reported learning
problem is where the learner has shown proficiency in
learninga concept on one occasion, but fails to exhibit
thatproficiency on other occasions. Anyone who has
been in education for any period of time has heard the
classroom teacher report, "I don't understand, he knew
the concept yesterday, but today he didn't. He must
have some kind of memory problem."
The IBT also recognizes the situation as amemory
mistake, but Instead of blaming the learner, (s)he again
blames the communications. The IBT knows that in
order to successfully teach proficiency or the mastery
of any concept, experiences must be constructed that
provide practice that effectively shapes proficiency.
But to establish demonstrated proficiency does not in
any way assure that the learner will remember how to
exhibit the concept when it is called for in the future.
To assure remembering, distributed review is required
in future teachings. Teaching mastery is remarkably
different from teaching remembering: To provide for
the most effective mastery of a given concept the
learner must experience uninterrupted practice. But to
assure the most effective remembering of a given
concept systematic interruption is needed where the
learner is required to recall the concept in unpredict-
ablyoccuringsituations.
Becoming an IBT Teacher
The traditional teacher who converts to becoming
an IBT will discover that taking the interbehavioral
approach empowers one to promote effective intellec-
29
tual-academic/social-emotional learning beyond the
scope of any other teaching approach.
There is a plethora of research that has been
accumulated over the past 25 years to support this
prediction.
Some other exciting events that are in store for the
IBT are:
1. With a better understanding of communicatons that
make for effective teaching interactions, comes a
sense of self assurance and compentency in pre-
venting learning failure.
2. The IBT never has to assume a defensive posture
where they find themselves blaming people for
learning failure. More traditionally, either the
child, the parent, or both are blamed. The IBT only
takes responsibility for modifying the interactive
communications, where necessary.
3. Most importantly, the IBT notices that the learner
who has previously experienced learning failure,
now, as a student of the IBT approach, changes.
From an interbehavioral perspective, people are
what they do. In this sense the communications of
the interaction define the learner. Through well-
constructed communications even the most naive
learner experiences 90% 1st time success in all
learning. Consequently, he feels smart. He be-
comes confident in knowing, at least in the IBT
situation, that he is smart. And finally, his self
esteem soars. He feels smarter, safer, more re-
sponsible, and respected, in a place where he does
not make as many mistakes as he used to. And
when he does make mistakes, he doesn't get
blamed.
Concluding Comments
The intention of this paper is to give a brief
description of the differences in teaching, and problem
solving associated with teaching, from an interbehav-
ioral perspective, as opposed to other approaches
based on more traditional psychological perspectives.
From the interbehavioral perspective the primary fo-
cus in effective teaching, as in any interbehavioral
event, is not just on the learner, but is a study of a
multitude of interacting variables. In the case of the
natural event of teaching, the primary variables are the
instructional communications.inaccompanimentwith
other interacting variables that define the event, such
as those of the teacher-learner interaction, setting, and
event history.
To achieve effective instruction in our schools the
teacher must first acquire a true understanding of
learning and learning failure by skillfully performing
an analysis of the contextual event by delivering
behavioral constructs directly from observation, not
the other way around where we impose speculative
developmental or clinical constructs on the natural
event derived from such traditions as those of religion,
mythology, and folklore. To make our schools more
effective there are a number of circumstances that we
in education must face. But, by far, the greatest deter-
rent to effective teaching and problem solving in
education is the present approach to problem solving
that is based on psychological superstition. These
superstitions cloud our vision to the point of ritual. \Ve
make critical decisions on the basis of these ritualist
habits and politically correct views rather than on the
basis of direct observation of what is happening and
what is effective. If we are to be successful m creating
effective change in education we must make it known
to teachers thatthere is a psychology thatis an alterna-
tive to those psychologies that use a mythological
language that immobilizes the teacher and prevents
him/her from becoming effective. From an achieved
The Experimental Analysis of Human Be-
havior Special Interest Group of ABA (EAHB-
SIG) seeks submissions for its 1994-95 Student
Paper Competition, which is designed to recog-
nize and promote scholarly activity in the experi-
mental analysis of human behavior.
Who is eligible to submit? All current stu-
dents and individuals who received degrees less
than 1 year before the submission deadline. Un-
dergraduate papers will receive special consider-
ation in the review process as long as they were
authored during bachelor's training.
What sort of paper is appropriate for the
contest? Any paper (e.g., conceptual, review,
empirical) that addresses issues relevant to the
experimental analysis of human behavior. Papers
that consider animal research to draw conclu-
sions or make predictions about human behavior
are also appropriate.
How are winners selected ? Awards are based
on blind review by established members of the
EAHB-SIG and selected outside experts. All pa-
interbehavioral perspective, the teacher is capable of
becoming proficient in constructing effective teach-
ings, and skilled in the analysis and modification of
interactions that interfere with learning. By using a
scientic language that truly describes the natural be-
havioral event under consideration, the teacher be-
comes empowered to construct implied remedies that
induce effective change. But to ask the educator to
create effective change in teaching, via traditional
western psychological jargon, would be equivalent to
asking a blind person, who has never driven a vehicle,
to win the Grand Prix with a square wheeled car that
has no steering mechanism.
References
Engelmann S. & Carnine D. (1982). Tf)eory of Instruc-
tion: Principles and Applications, New york:
Irvington.
Kantor J.R, & Smith N. W. (1975). The Science of
Psychology: An Interbehavioral Survey, Chi-
cago: The Principia Press, Inc.
Correspondence should be addressed to Charles
Baxter, 1085 Taugh Blvd., Ithaca NY 14850
pers receiving favorable reviews will be recog-
nized.
What are the benefits of participating? The
primary benefitof the competition is exposure to
the peer review process. All student authors re-
ceive journal-caliber reviews, primarily from in-
dividuals, who serve on editorial boards of the
major behavioral journals. Winners receive a
commemorative plaque and an invitation (includ-
ing convention registration fees) to present a
summary of their work in a special symposium at
the 1995 ABA Convention. Space permitting, a
summary of each winning paperwill appear in the
EAHB Bulletin. Past winners also have received
wider recognition within ABA.
Submissions must be received by September
19,1994. For further information contact:
EAHB Competition
c/o Barbara}. Kaminski, Ph.D.
BehBiol. Res. Ctr./Suite 3000
SSlONathanShockDr.
Baltimore, MD 21224
 Jacqueline i. Collins
University of Nevada
Practices as the Defining Character
of a Culture
An evolving culture "begins at the level of the
individual. A better way of making a tool, growing
food, or teaching a child is reinforced by its conse-
quences.... A culture evolves when practices originat-
ing in this way contribute to the success of the practic-
ing group in solving its problems." (Skinner, 1981) It
is such practices which define a culture. A culture is
a group of people who respond in a similar way to
particular environmental stimuli. Therefore, an indi-
vidual Is part of a certain society or culture because he
engages in behaviors in which that particular group of
people engages. A person is regarded as Catholic if he
engages m behaviors which define the Catholic cul-
ture, such as catechism and not eatingmeat on Fridays
during lent. If he did not engage in those behaviors, we
would not consider him a "Catholic", When we say
"what does it mean to be an American?" we usually
describe such things as baseball, hot dogs and apple
pie, in other words Americans play baseball, and eat
hot dogs and apple pie. All of these things are practices
engaged in by people who are said to be "American"
or part of the American Culture. One can live in
America and not take part in these practices, but the
people around him are likely to call him "Unamerican".
We might say that one who does not engage in any
practices embraced by any culture does not belong to
any culture.
If it weren't for the practices of cultures, cultures
would have no defining characteristics. Skin, eye, or
hair color may have some prominence in various
places in the world, but they are in noway exclusive to
those places. Only the practices are. exclusive to
particular cultures, and it is through those practices
that a culture becomes a particular culture.
A Changed Culture
When is it that a culture is no longer the culture it
was before? From the previous discussion it follows
that if the practices were to change then the society
defined by those practices would be changed as well.
Although this alteration in cultural practices is not
typically immediate, these changes can be traced
through written or vocal reports across generations of
a particular culture.
A logical extension can be made from Skinner's
analysis of a changed organism. "Men act upon the
world, and change it, and are changed in turn by the
consequences of their action." (Skinner, 1957). As a
person interacts with his environment, he is changing,
and this change occurs because of the consequences
that are provided by environmental change. Skinner
makes this analysis to replace the concept of behavior
coming to the present situation by way of storage. In
cultural practices this is not a problem because the
culture is not a single organism, therefore the concept
of storage is not relevant. Rather it is a group of
organisms who behave similarly in given settings
because the group has survived long enough to trans-
mit those practices. The extension from organism to
culture is made here to analyze when an organism
behaves differently to stimuli, he is changed. When a
culture as a whole practices differently, it is a changed
culture.
Skinner has also used the analysis of natural selec-
tion to not only explain the evolution of a species, but
the repertoire of an individual and the evolution of
social environments. With the expansion of natural
selection across these different levels of analysis, the
expansion of a changed organism could also be applied
to an analysis at the level of the culture.
This extensionrequires some explaining. Skinner's
analysis of a changed organism refers to a change in
the physiology of an organism. The organism behaves
differently because of this changed physiology. He
states thata person "behaves because of its "biological
equipmentatthatmoment."(Catania&Hamad, 1988).
However, as psychologists we are not in a position to
discuss the physiology of an organism. We are only in
a place to make expert comments concerning the
psychological aspects of an organism. When the
 321
physiology of an organism is altered this will naturally
have an influence upon the psychological organism. It
is here that psychologists are in a position to say
something about a changed physiological organism. It
makes more sense, when speaking from a psychologi-
cal perspective, that it is the psychological aspects of
the organism thatare changed. Itis from this psycho-
logically changed organism that this changed cultural
concept is extended. If an organism behaves differ-
ently with respect to stimuli, it is a changed organism
if a culture interacts differently (practices differently)
with respect to its environment, it too is a changed
culture.
Consider those who engage in the practices that
have changed. Practices are the particular behaviors in
which that group of people engage. As an individual
in the culture engages in a behavior, that behavior is
a part of a cultural practice. When the behavior of that
individual changes the practice changes. The person
has changed because his behavior is different. If a
collectivity of people who engage in acertain behavior
(or practice) all change the way they engage in that
particular behavior (or practice) then all of those
people are changed. The way they interact with the
environment is different, so the environment changes,
and so do those people. When the people and the
behaviors they engage in are different, the practices of
the collectivity are differentand the culture is changed.
Form and Function
Another questionis whether a culture is necessar-
ily a different culture when the topographical qualities
of a practice are different. Skinner's whole philosophy
of operant conditioning implies function (Skinner,
1938). An organism operates on (or functions with
respect to) the environmental stimuli that surround it.
However, a couple of perspectives concerning the
form of responses should be considered.
Form is Irrelevant
One of these perspectives follows from Skinner's
position of form. If the topography or "form" of a
practice changes, this does not necessarily mean the
culture changes. When a practice is different in form
but serves the same function it has always served,
nothing has changed except for how that function is
now served. The agricultural cultures are an example.
Atonepointpersons of this culture plowed a field with
a plow towed by a horse and a person walked or ran
behind the apparatus with reins to steer the horse. The
topography of this has now changed to the extent that
a person now sits on a tractor and steers it with a
steering wheel. Some members of the culture even
have automated plows in which the steering is done by
preprogramming the plow to move from one end of the
field to the other. Regardless of how the steering has
been done the function of the plowing and steering the
plow has remained the same, to harvest food from the
field.
Form and Function as the Same Thing
On the other hand, form and function are the same
thing. If the form of something changes the function
is inherently altered as well. From this perspective the
farming culture described above would be considered
changed, because once the form of the practice was
changed the function of the practice would be differ-
ent. When the practice changed from a horse and hand
plow to an automated plow, the function of that
practice changed. Perhaps when persons used horse
and hand plows the function of the practice was to
cultivate food only for their families. When the
practice evolved to the automated plow the function
was not only to cultivate food for their families but for
other families as well, due to the fact that other families
were now working in areas which were not food
producing. The function, as well as the form of the
plowing is different too, therefore the culture has
changed. Of course, this change was due to another
change in the culture. That being that those who at one
time were farmers now engage in work of an industrial
sort.
If a practice didn't serve a particular function, that
is considered by the culture to be important in solving
its problems, the form would alter so that it did serve
that function. If one or the other changes the practice
has changed and so the culture itself changes.
What is Good for the Culture?
"What is good for the culture is whatever pro-
motes its ultimate survival, such as holding a group
together or transmittingits practices" (Skinner, 1981).
There are some practices in cultures that should be
examined as to whether they are "good" in terms of
"good" as described above. Itis interesting howmany
practices survive over longperiods of time that do not
necessarily meet these standards. At the surface, many
practices may seem to promote the ultimate survival of
a culture such thatthose practices may be transmitted.
At another level some practices really are not serving

the main purpose of survival. To look at all practices
of all cultures is certainly beyond the scope of this
discussion, but a discussion of a few practices is in
order.
A couple of practices to analyze take place in the
medical field. The practice of finding a way to make
the survival of an individual more probable is one such
practice. At the surface the concept of survival seems
apparent) someone is kept alive, but for what purpose ?
Is it for purposes of the survival of the culture as it is ?
This cannot be argued if the person is kept alive by the
superficial means of machines. What sorts of prac-
tices (or behaviors), survivalistic to the culture or not,
can be successfully transmitted by such a person? This
may be a ruthless way of looking at such a practice
from a personal perspective, but in terms of cultural
survival itmay be practical. Time spent studying how
to keep people alive individually is taking away from
the time and dollars spent to find cures for fatal
diseases which could be significant for not just one
individual, but masses of the culture.
This must be viewed, of course, as a "value" of the
culture. Perhaps the culture is one in which the
transmission of the view that persons will be taken care
of, by the culture, when needed is important to the
culture as it is characterized. Therefore, such a prac-
tice, as described above, would be necessary for the
survival of that culture.
Another practice of the medical field that is ques-
tionable with respect to its cultural survival value is
abortion. This practice may appear to be one that does
not promote the survival of a society. How can we
expect to pass on survivalistic practices if we don't
allow those to which practices are to be transmitted to
live? On the other hand, if those persons are permitted
to live, will truly "good" practices be transmitted to
them? If a homeless person is able to give birth what
practices, which promote the survival of a culture will
be passed on? An adolescent or drug user might not be
in a place to pass on the "good" practices of a culture.
If the adolescent was to obtain more experience and
education in the practices of a culture, the chance for
"good" practices to be passed on would be more
probable. This depends, once again, upon what a
particular culture deems good. If it does not value the
behaviors of drug users and inexperienced parents,
then encouragement of pregnancies in those persons
will be low.
In the American culture, practices of the penal
33
system also seem questionable. According to Skinner,
a more effective way of changing behavior is through
positive reinforcement (Skinner, 1974). The penal
system is a practice which does not follow this basic
principle of Skinner's. It was created to control
behavior by negative rather than positive means. The
effect being, supposedly, that the probability of re-
sponding in certain ways such as stealing, murdering,
raping and etc., is lower. Even though this is supposed
to decrease the probability of such responding, it is a
fact that recidivism rates are high for just these kinds
of behaviors. This is not an effective practice for
removing those practices which serve a deleterious
function with respect to survival of the members of a
culture.
The Evolution of Cultures
In Selection by Consequences Skinner makes an-
other statement. "Ultimately... it is all a matter of
natural selection, since operant conditioning is an
evolved process, of which cultural practices are spe-
cial applications." (Skinner, 1981).
This quote deals with the evolution of social
environments. This sort of evolution is deserving of a
couple of comments. First, the detectability of change
in such an evolution, and second, how some practices
of cultures may have been due to adventitious contin-
gencies which played a role in the selection of certain
practices.
Rate of Cultural Evolution
Unlike the evolution of an individual's repertoire,
the evolution of a culture takes a very long time and it
is not easy to detect. This raises a practical question of
whether or not it is worth while to attempt to find and
establish those practices that promote the survival of a
culture? Should any attempt to change practices for
purposes of utmost survival be disregarded because
the change will be too difficult to detect? When
considering this type of evolution, one must under-
stand that notkable changes will probably not be seen
in his lifetime. Also, if there is a goal of prediction and
control for utilitarian purposes then this answer is not
satisfactory. A functional analysis of historical records
and of practices engeged in could be done to see what
function those practices have had a history of serving,
and whatfunction those practices have been intended
to serve. If there is a difference between the two, an
attempt should be made to alter practices such that the
variation between those two functions is decreased.
Though not an easy task, it may be important to the
survival of a particular culture.
Adventitious Contingencies
of Cultural Practices
In Skinner's paper Tlw Phytogeny and Ontogeny
of Behavior he discusses this issue of adventitious
contingencies and their effect on behavior. He states,
"Behavior may have advantages which played no role
in its selection. The converse is also true. Events
which follow behavior but are not necessarily pro-
duced by it may have a selective effect."
Itseems reasonable to askwhether it is possible for
such contingencies to operate in such a way at the level
of social environments? In many cases this could be
true. One such area is the political practices in the
United States, A sort of Democratic-Capitalistic
economy is thought to be the crux of the nation's
political and economic practices. In many ways these
practices might not be survivalistic for a culture, yet
remain in the center of the system. How has this
become the case? A good and somewhat satisfactory
answer may be adventitious contingencies. This has
become apparent as other nations have attempted,
unsuccessfully, to transform their systems into ones
similar to those followed in the United States. Perhaps
the large scale contingencies that may have selected
practices of this sort in the U.S. were simply adventi-
tious and therefore cannot be duplicated in other
places. These contingencies would be adventitious in
the sense that consequences followed certain practices
but were not necessarily produced by those practices.
However, the statement concerning behavior hav-
ing advantages which play no role in its selection
makes more sense in this analysis. When the United
States became anindependent nation, people engaged
in various political and economic practices. The
simple fact that those practices were different from
ones in which people previously had to adhere to may
have led those persons to be satisfied with the products
of those practices as long as they were self-governing.
The practice is adventitious because the practice en-
gaged in is not anything like the .previous practices,
and was therefore selected. For those who exercise
these practices it may seem as though people who
adhere to such a system will have economic and
political success because of the product which comes
from the system, when actually those practices have
been "adventitiously" selected. This becomes more
and more apparent as people of the U.S. find that this
system is not effective in dealing with many problems
which arise such as national deficit, poverty, educa-
tion, unemployment and etc.. If the system worked as
well as it is purported to, many of these problems
would not have arisen.
On the other hand, it takes a long time for cultural
evolution to be noticed. Itmay be the case that some
of these nations that have recently turned over have not
yet had the opportunity to show a promising effect of
such practices. Perhaps more time is required to see if
this type of setup will indeed be successful for these
societies in the future.
Concluding Statement
The issue of cultural change and how good that
change is should be seriously examined. Many prac-
tices, as they currently exist, do not promote the
survival of a culture and therefore are not good for
cultures. The concern should not be that those prac-
tices exist but that not very much is being done to
actively alter those practices. It is one thing to be
aware of those things and another to act upon them. By
looking at practices as the defining property of cul-
tures these changes can be more directly identified and
manipulated.
The matter of cultural evolution is an important
one, and there is a lot that the field of behavior analysis
can contribute to the success of changes in cultures.
The reason being that behavior analysis inherently
looks to those factors which can be altered. That being
the controlling and influential variables which effect
or influence behavior (or practices). It will be through
attempts to modify those factors thatmore functional
practices, with respect to cultures, can be made.
References
Catania, A. C. & Harnad, S. (1988). The Selection of
Behavior, Tfje Operatit Behaviorism ofB. F. Skin-
ner: Comments and Consequences. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Skinner, B.F. (1957). Verbal Behavior, New York:
Appleton-Century-Crofts
Skinner, B.F..(1966). The phyiogeny and ontogeny of
behavior. Science 153:1205-13.
Skinner, B. F. (1974). About Behaviorism. New
York: Knopf.
Skinner, B. F. (1981). Selection by consequences.
Science 213:501-4.
Correspondence should be addressed to Jacqueline
E. Collins, Departmento of Psychology, University of
Nevada, Reno, Nevada 89557
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ADVISORY BOARD * InterbebavioredPsychology: Critical,

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 Attention Interbehaviorists
With the new academic year ahead we need people
to contribute to The Interbehaviorist. In particular, we
need all readers to renew old subscriptions and submit
papers and comments for the newsletter. Also, we
would like those ofyou conducting empirical research
to provide us with a short "research note" describing
the type of research you are doing. We would like to
publish these "research notes" to promote the research
being done by our subscribers.
Comments & Queries
This new regular section of The Interbehaviorist
will begin in the next issue and will provide an oppor-
tunity for discourse on a variety of discrete issues of
interest to behavior analysts. Short comments, ques-
tions, or criticisms are invited from both interbehav-
ioral and non-interbehavioral psychologists.
Responseswill include answers to questions and clari-
fications of interbehavioral psychology. Readers are
encouraged to submittheir own comments in addition
to facilitating submissions from colleagues and stu-
dents. Submissions should be sent to:
The Interbehaviorist
Dept. of Psychology
University of Nevada
Reno, NV, 89557-0062
Notes From the Interbehaviorism
Conference in Spain
The Instituto KantorDe Psicologialnterconductual
recently held its second international conference in
Madrid, Espana this July, 1994. The conference fea-
tured participants from the United States, Venezuela,
Mexico, and Spain. Those attending the conference
from the U. S. A. included Linda J. Hayes (paper on
learning and memory) and graduate students Cynthia
A. Reinbold (paper on changing a culture) and Mark A.
Adams (paper on inherited behavior) from the Univer-
sity of Nevada, Reno. In addition Mark A. Swain, also
from the University of Nevada, Reno had a paper
(Kantor's analysis of causation and probability) read
in his absence. Although communication was some-
what difficult (the conference was entirely in Span-
ish, except for the translation of the papers from the
U.S.A.), some very interesting discussions arose about
issues such as the place of causality and realism in
interbehaviorism. In particular, there was a reaction to
the position of presentism proposed by Linda Hayes,
and where this position might eventually take the
psychologist, in both applications and philosophy.
Also, the possibility of making The Interbehaviorist
bi-lingual was discussed. At present, these discus-
sions are continuing among members of the Advisory
Board.
This was a great opportunity to meet other
interbehaviorists, and it was very refreshing to talk to
some psychologists who look at the study of behavior
in a similar way. Anyone interested in the Kantor
Institute should write to:
Instituto KantorDe Psicologia
Avenida Pio XII, 97.7 F
28036 Madrid, Espana
Second International Congress on
Behaviorism and the Science of
Behavior
The Second International Congress on Behavior-
ism and the Sciences of Behavior will be held October
6-9, 1994, in Palermo Italy. The conference will
involve addresses, symposia and discussion sessions
covering a variety of topics, including, epistemologi-
cal and conceptual issues, theory and method, histori-
cal studies & practical applications. There will be a
small contingent of Interbehaviorists at the confer-
ence.
New Faculty at UNR
W. Lawrence Williams, Ph.D. will be joining the
behavior analysis faculty at University of Nevada.
Lawrence received his Ph.D. from the University of
Manitoba and has since spent time at Surry Place
Center in Toronto, Canada, as well as doing work in
special education in San Carlos, Brazil.
 Dennis J. Delprato
Eastern Michigan University
Introduction
Above all else, an interbehavioral approach alms
to provide a coherent and systematic science and
practice of psychology "from the ground up." The
interbehavioral perspective considers it essential for a
psychological practice, authentically based on sci-
ence, to have a completely naturalistic approach to
both science itself and psychology in general. With
this in view, this chapter first covers historical devel-
opments and basic orienting assumptions pertaining to
science itself. Next, it sets forth some fundamentals
for psychology as a completely naturalistic science.
Finally, it presents several assumptions for clinical
services themselves, along with practices recommended
by them.
Science and Knowing
J. R. Kantor and Interbehaviorism
Kantortook on the ambitious task of developing a
coherentphilosophy and psychology that centered on
scientific understanding of human psychological be-
havior as the basis of all disciplines, whether conven-
tionally taken as sciences or humanities. This writer is
struck by how far Kantor's work goes toward accom-
plishingone of the earliest aims of the behavior therapy
movement, i.e., clinical theory and practice as continu-
ous and harmonious with basic science and theory in
a fundamental way. This chapter aims to highlight the
systematic advantages of the interbehavioral frame-
work for the behavioral clinician.
At the heart of Kantor's thinking was his early
leanings toward and, later, explicit advocacy of, field
theory. After trying various terms to refer to the
approach he favored, Kantor ended up with
interbebeiviorism. He added inter to behaviorism to
communicate that behavior mustrf/aw}tf be described
infield terms. But what does this mean? Kantorused
the prefix inter to recognize that psychologically the
organism's actions are always coordinated with spe-
cific conditions such that the two sides are always
mutual or reciprocally related (i.e., neither stimu-
lus~>response nor response->stimulus but response
<-->stimulus). Although it is possible for analysts to
isolate response or stimulus factors, the actions of
reciprocally related stimulus and response factors con-
stitute a single psychological unit. The mutuality of
response and stimulus makes response-function and
stimulus-function the relevant constructions for psy-
chologists. These abstractions, although related to
physiological and physical factors, are not to be con-
fused with them.
From Lineal Mechanics to Fields/Systems
Although the physical sciences, and to some ex-
tent biology, have abandoned lineal mechanism, main-
stream contemporary psychology has not. According
to lineal mechanism, the fundamental descriptive and
explanatory model is cause->effeet. The classic
experimental model whereby causes are identified
with independent variables and effects with dependent
variables continues to reign supreme. The psychologi-
cal field is
the entire system of things and conditions
operating in any event taken in its available
totality. It is only the entire system of factors
which will provide proper descriptive and
explanatory materials for the handling of
events. It is not the reacting organism alone
which makes up the event but also the stimu-
lating things and conditions, as well as the
setting factors. (Kantor, 1969, p. 371)
Descriptions of psychological event (PE)-fields require
several factors: PE = C(k, sf, rf, hi, st, md). In this
formulation, ksymbolizes that all psychological events
are unique, sf represents stimulus-function, rf stands
for response-function, hi is thehistorical process through
which the correlated sf and rf developed, st recognizes
that particular sf-rcoordinations always take place in
immediate ecological and organic settings, md
represents a class of setting factor given separate status
as the medium by which the organism contacts the
physiological and physical correlates of sf, and C
communicates that the PE consists of an entire system
of interdependent factors.
Kantor's field conception of psychological events
helps us capture their complexity without invoking
anything fictitious. I find it difficult to imagine any
effective clinician who does not take at least a minimal
field perspective. This point is nicely illustrated by
one of the classic cases of psychological analysis (and
treatment). Ellenberger (1970, pp. 361-364) relates
Pierre Janet's account of the recalcitrant case of Marie
that Janet published in 1889. One component of
Marie's plight consisted of depressive and violent
episodes marked by sudden termination of menstrua-
tion 20 hours after the beginning, a great tremor of the
entire body, reports of severe pain ascending slowly
from the abdomen to the throat, violent bodily contor-
tions, and other symptoms. Ifjanet's reconstruction of
Marie's history is accurate, from today's perspective it
appears that a self-initiated classical conditioning in-
teraction (conditional stimulus menstruation at 20
hours, unconditional stimulus = cold water, uncondi-
tional response = vasoconstriction, shivering, and
sequela) was a critical contributor to Marie's condi-
tion. Upon her first menstruation at the age of 13,
Marie interpreted it as shameful and tried to stop the
flow by plunging herself into a large bucket of ice
water approximately 20 hours after the onset of men-
struation. She was successful. Menstruation suddenly
stopped, and Marie returned home shivering violently.
For several days after the episode Marie was ill and
delirious. She experienced no menstruation until five
years later at which time the presenting symptoms
appeared.
At the risk of oversimplifying and relying on
incomplete assessment, it is rather easy to apply the
interbehavioral conception of the fundamental event-
field to two important event-fields in the case of Marie.
First, at the time of Marie's initial menstruation, sf-rf
corresponds to menstruation-as-shameful/undesirable/
aversive/to be avoided as a result of one or more
historical (hi) episodes in which others directly or
indirectly communicated thisaboutaperfectly normal
bodily process. Prominent setting factors (st) include
distinctive organic conditions concurrent with men-
struation and a bucket of cold water. Media of contact
(md) for menstrual flow are light for visual contact and
the more intimate tactual medium. All named factors
are interdependent participants (C) in the field that is
uniquely and only (k) Marie's at a particular point in
time. A second important event-field in this case
occurs 20 hours into a particular episode of the adult
Marie's menstruation several years later. The earlier
(hi) self-imposed adjustment of Marie's to her first
menstruation has contributed to the establishment of
an sf-rf coordination whereby vasoconstriction, shiv-
ering, and so on is called forth by conditions 20 hours
into menstruation. Setting factors (st) again include
distinctive organic conditions concurrent with men-
struation and media of contact (md) are light and
tactual. All factors in this unique (k) event-field are
interdependent(C).
To systems. One hears little about fields in the
sense here described in psychology today other than
from those impressed with the Kantorian interbehav-
ioral literature. However, although few have recog-
nized it, field theory is rather healthy as found in the
form of "system" constructs.
NistoricoCritical Analysis
The field/system nature of interbehavioral theo-
rizing is but one of its distinguishing marks. Kantor's
macro-historical and historico-critical analysis of the
scientific evolution of psychology leaves no doubt that
he viewed interbehaviorism as the culmination of the
behavioral movement. The Scientific Evolution of
Psychology (Kantor, 1963,1969)documents two major
developments in Western thought that get at the heart
of nonbehavioral and behavioral approaches to psy-
chology. The first, involving departure from natural-
istic Hellenic thinking and invention of a nonspatio-
temporal world, underlies non- or antibehavioral psy-
chologies. The new nonspatiotemporal world was
verbally placed in opposition to the world in which
people live-the natural world. The venerable spiri-
tual-material dualism developed, and we see Aristote-
lian naturalistic soul transformed into supernaturalis-
tic soul-spirit. Spiritual-material dualism became in-
stitutionalized in the form of the Church, and the
sacred view of the world reigned supreme for centu-
ries. Supernaturalism, based on the idea of an invisible
nonspatiotemporal world, made humans the reposi-
tory in the natural world of a part of the verbally-
created spiritual realm said to be confirmed with
certainty only by a new alleged way of knowing,
revelation. What amounted to a synonym for "life"
with purely naturalistic referents was transformed to
where the construct-Aristotelian soul-was given su-
pernaturalistic referents and placed inside humans. In
the case of humans, spiritual-material dualism is ex-
hibited in the soul-body and mental-behavior distinc-
1L
 tion that continues up to the present to haunt those who
attempt take a scientific-that is, naturalistic or behav-
ioral, approach to psychological events.
Thesecond major developmentin Western thought
consists of society's gradual transition from extreme
supernaturalism to evermore naturalistic thinking. As
part of the gradual change from sacred to secular
orientations, thinkers transformed supernaturalistic
soul to mind, consciousness, and experience; the soul
construct became less theological. Critical thinkers
gradually altered the referents of soul to where psy-
chological functions were said to be taken over more
and more by secular processes. Eventually, a point
was reached when soul was given to a so-called new
science, a science that was given an impossible task. It
was asked to take a radically different (that is, natural-
istic) approach to soul and, at the same time, remain the
repository of centuries of cultural tradition in the form
of insubstantial, spaceless, and timeless soul.
The movement from soul to mind, consciousness,
experience, and later, behavior, has been a naturalistic
one, but progress in the re-naturalization process has
been excruciatingly slow. With the aid of historico-
critical analysis of psychology over the centuries,
interbehavioral thinkers plunge forthrightly into radi-
cal naturalism that opts for the thorough re-naturaliza-
tion of humans and rejection of all vestiges of mental-
physical dualism to complete the final step of the
secularization of society and psychology.
Systematics
Critical analysis of the history of a science is one
valuable way of advancing knowledge, in particular,
by removing cultural obstacles. The interbehavioral
perspective adds to historico-critical analysis the broad
area ofscientific systematics. The argumentis that we
must examine the logic (or systematics) of a science to
clear away impediments to sound knowledge and to
most efficiently develop new knowledge. In order to
do this, we have to identify the fundamental assump-
tions that underlie the work we are analyzing. All
intellectual enterprises are based on premises or pos-
tulates whether or not we explicitly identify them.
Assumptions deleterious to understanding are most
likely to impede progress when they are not made
explicit and thus remain unexamined.
In brief, interbehavioral systematics involves
identifying and organizing postulates such that they
are (a) open to critical examination and (V) available to
serve as guides for workers and students. The most
effective practice shows that postulates are not of-
fered a priori as unalterable principles, but are de-
rived from workers interbehaving with their subject
matter and altering them as work proceeds. The
remainder of this chapter is organized around state-
ments of fundamental interbehavioral assumptions
at the levels of basic science, psychology as a science,
and the clinical practice of psychology. Given that
the ultimate aspiration of the interbehavioral per-
spective simply is scientific understanding of psy-
chological events and that psychologists have pur-
sued this goal for some time, one would expect to
find several familiar points and recommendations.
Indeed from a global point of view, perhaps the only
novel feature of the interbehavioral approach is the
organizing framework it provides. When all rem-
nants of nonscientific (i.e., non-naturalistic) think-
ing have vanished from how we approach human
behavior, interbehaviorism will no longer be neces-
sary, for what it offers.(e.g., field/system perspective)
will have been incorporated into psychology itself.
Scientific Fundamentals
Essential Work said to be scientific or based on
science must take observation as paramount. Judg-
ments for acceptability of claims at a particular point
are to be made with respect to their status from the
standpoint of observation and observational infer-
ence, not authority, tradition, or logic.
Primary concern. Scientific work is above all else
concerned with the nature and operation of events. A
major task of basic scientists and practitioners of
science is to guard against any received practice,
assumption, or behavior on their part that impedes
their descriptions and interpretations of events.
Science as behavior-in-culture. Science is insepa-
rable from the behavior of scientists, and scientific
enterprises evolve in cultural situations making very
difficult the autonomous practice of science within a
cultural complex.
Locus of events. Science finds no justification for
the culturally-transmitted assumption of a double-
world-one in which we live, experience, and find
things and another world beyond the boundaries of
space-time. Events, be they astronomical, geological,
physiological, micro-physical (e.g., quantum), or psy-
chological occur only in a spatiotemporal frame.
Any position that promotes the ancient tradition that
psychological events such as perceiving, knowing,
reasoning, judging, and thinking are uniquely differ-
ent from seemingly more knowable events because
of only the latter's locus in the spatiotemporal is to
be guarded against.
Constructs. Science requires constructs (descrip-
tions, interpretations) that are (a) products that must be
derived from interbehaving with events and not im-
posed upon events from sources such as cultural pre-
suppositions, () not to be confused with events, and
(c) not all equal. To fail to distinguish between
constructs and events is to run the risk of imposing the
products of contacts with events upon the original
events, as when the scientist of old imbued combustion
processes with heat substances or the psychologist
permits "attention-deficit disorder" to obscure
children's interactions with their world.
Procedures and postulates. A common class of
event in basic and applied science consists of the
expert interacting with events, as when experimenters
arrange for a particular thing to follow occurrences of
a given movement of a subject or clinicians pose a
particular question to a client and note their reply.
Manipulative procedures are events and are not to be
confused with constructions such as descriptions and
interpretations that observers use to talk about their
procedures or about results deriving from procedures.
Furthermore, we should distinguish between proce-
dures and the stated or unstated hypotheses and as-
sumptions, called postulates, that contribute to the
institution of one procedure instead of another or to
particular interpretative remarks.
Knowing and the known. To one who has not
explicitly thought of the issue, the concern with know-
ing and the known may appear an esoteric largess of
philosophy. However, the central (so-called episte-
mological) issue is readily apparent once one realizes
the status of events relative to anyone's knowledge of
them. Events are spatially and temporally extended.
Our knowledge of an event is not the event itself.
Cultural tradition passed on formally by philosophers
takes knowing as fundamentally different from things
known, i.e., nonspatiotemporal. This has led to many
ways of attempting to account for how we have the
feeling of knowing events; hence, idealisms, realisms,
positivisms, empiricism, logical empiricism, concep-
tualism, constructionism, and phenomenalism. Prac-
titioners of science have no need for any of these.
Instead, they take knowing as belonging to the same
(spatiotemporal) framework as the things and events
known. The scientist's knowing behavior is not to be
confused with the known. It never reveals a "reality"
behind the knowing activities, never reveals "reality"
in mental states called experience, never yields abso-
lute "truth," and is always personal in the sense that
knowing is continuous with the knower's current
circumstances, cultural background, and unique long-
term and short-term developmental history.
Objectivity and subjectivity. As the above im-
plies, to distinguish between objective and subjective
knowledge is unjustified and perpetuates the view that
experiencing, perceiving, thinking, imagining, feel-
ing, reasoning, judging, and knowing are
nonspatiotemporal and "unreal" and only legitimized
for science by making these psychological activities
analogous to familiar physical and physiological events.
Criteria, for valid knowledge. Thinkers have of-
fered various criteria for evaluating knowledge claims.
None of them is necessary once we identify and act on
the above fundamentals. Taken together, they guide us
in making decisions on the soundness of particular
claims and sets of claims. The fundamentals presented
here assist workers tQ_maximize their knowledge of
things and events with the assistance of whatever
resources they have available, leading to the further
behavior of prediction, if desired. That we reach this
perhaps somewhat surprising solution to one of the
most recalcitrant of epistemological problems may
speak to the advantages of specifying the basics of
science as is attempted in this chapter,
Interbehavioral Psychology as Science
Field/System as Analytic Unit
The subject matter of psychology consists of the
interactions of organisms with other organisms, ob-
jects, and events under the auspices of particular
settings, contactmedia, and historical circumstances.
Thus, all psychological events are comprised of mul-
tifactor, integrated fields or systems. One part of the
field does not cause either other parts or the event-field
itself. Multiple field factors simultaneously partici-
pate in the psychological event. Field factors are not
related by way of independence and dependence, but
rather by mutual implication or interdependence.
Nature of Participating Field Factors
Physical, chemical, biological, ecological, and
socio-cultural factors participate in psychological
events. Although in no way properly thought of as
causes of psychological events, these events studied
by other specialists are always involved and to ignore
them is to risk incomplete description and understand-
ing.
The Organism as Participant
The psychological event is never centered in the
organism. It is not located in or at the organism. The
organism is a participant in a field of other factors.
Psychological events are systemic, not restricted to
parts of fields.
Event Evolution: Inorganic
** and Biological
o hidden from observers (private). Psychological be-
All psychological events are the outcome of prior
evolutions: inorganic (e.g., chemical elements, plan-
ets, earth) and biological. Biological evolution has
two major phases: phylogenetic (e.g., plants, animals,
species) and ontogenetic (begins with the union of the
gametes and involves the embryological and biologi-
cal development of the individual organism). All
psychological behavior has bioecological roots, al-
though socio-cultural factors take increasing promi-
nence as psychological development proceeds. None-
theless, all psychological events are at the same time
biological ones.
Event Evolution: Psychological
All psychological event-fields are the outcome of
prior psychological evolution. After biological onto-
genetic evolution reaches a certain point (before birth
in humans) at which the requisite biological founda-
tion is available, psychological evolution begins and is
ongoing. Thus, all psychological events are develop-
mental and dynamic.
Event Continuity
As the outcome of a long series of evolutions
(inorganic, phylogenetic, ontogenetic, and psycho-
logical), psychological events are not unique due to the
operationofanynonspatiotemporalprocesses. There
is no break in event continuity from particle impacts to
biological activity to cognitive events such as knowing
behavior. At no point do any other than naturalistic
processes occur. Thus, cognitive and mental cannot
and do not refer to occult or nonspatiotemporal events
in whole or in part.
Distinguishing Characteristics
of Psychological Events
If psychological events are not distinguished from
physical and biological ones by their mental (as
nonspatiotemporal) make-up, then what, if anything,
does make them unique? Clearly, to suggest that
psychology takes behavior as its subject matter and
this marks it off from other disciplines is erroneous
because all sciences take behavior as a fundamental
construct. However, the prevalence of the behavior
construct throughout science is consistent with the
interbehavioral position that behavior pertains to ail
events and that events are classified as physical, bio-
logical, and so on according to their behavioral char-
acteristics. Psychological behavior is not movement
in space, glandular and/or muscular, overt (public) or
havior has other distinguishing marks and is not yet
well classified.
The most striking aspect of psychological behav-
ior is that it is never directly seen. Behavior of concern
to the psychologist must always be inferred; it is an
abstraction. What the person is doing psychologically
is never available to direct observation.
Given that psychological behavior is not directly
observed, its status is that of a construct that must be
inferred from events. The in terbehaviorist argues that
when theorists use the construct mental to typify the
central concern of psychology, it is often possible to
identify characteristics of the events from which they
derive the construct. Psychological interactions are
adjustive (or adaptive) as when the participating or-
ganism anticipates and avoids harmful conditions or
seeks out circumstances that facilitate its adjustments
to the world. Psychological adjustments are historical,
specific, integrative, variable, and modifiable. Fur-
thermore, an importantclass of psychological interac-
tion found with humans is when self-reflection is
involved. In contrast to rocks falling down a cliff,
persons exhibiting the same physical trajectory may
think of their plight; humans, have a point of view
concerning participating field factors.
Clinical Practice
Integrative and Eclectic
The radically naturalistic interbehavioral perspec-
tive rules out no procedure a priori but does not
countenance non-naturalistic postulates. Given the
firmdistinction between events and procedures, on the
one hand, and constructs and postulates, on the other,
we recognize that clinical practice has two major
divisions. First, there is what the clinician does, what
the identified client does, and what others may do, with
specific spatial and temporal relationships among the
participating factors, all at the event level. Second,
there are the postulates clinicians use to guide their
work and the interpretations clients, clinicians, and
others make of the events. Therapists with the most
supernatural postulates imaginable cannot institute
nonspatiotemporal procedures, although procedures
derived from non-naturalistic presuppositions may
very well be inept. Indeed, given that interbehavioral
psychology offers no unique procedures because it is
not a theory in the conventional sense, only evidence
that procedures based on non-naturalistic postulates
are superior to those based on naturalistic postulates
would disconfirmit.
Implicit in the interbehavioral position is Kantor's
(1963, 1969) macro-and historico-critical analysis
demonstrating that the behavioral movement above all
represents an increasing tendency for workers to treat
psychological events as completely based in the natu-
ral (spatiotemporal) world. From this it follows that
what is distinctive about behavior therapy is that we
expect this class of clinical work to follow postulates
that are more naturalistic (scientific) than earlier ap-
proaches, and because the postulates are closer to
relevant events, stand a better chance of effectively
handling real-world problems (events).
The interbehavioral orientation promotes an inte-
grative and eclectic clinical practice. However, the
eclecticism is rather far removed from most of what
passes for the very socially acceptable brands found
today.
Interdisciplinary
In view of the integrated participation in psycho-
logical events of nonpsychological factors, clinical
services must always allow for interdisciplinary coop-
eration. The field/system nature of psychological
events does not justify the common-practice of many
interdisciplinary "teams" in which a biomedical speci-
ality is placed in a position of ultimate authority partly
based on the reductionistic assumption that biological
factors are underlying causes of psychological behav-
ior.
Fundamental to Problem Resolutions:
Modification of Field Factors
The field/system nature of psychological events
requires that basic to all problem resolutions is the
modification of field factors, including biological,
ecological, social, domestic, economic, educational,
vocational, and interpersonal conditions, as well as
psychological ones.
Nonpsychological Sources of Problems
and Solutions
Because criteria for psychological problems are
always extra-scientific and extra-psychological (Kan-
tor, 1959) and nonpsychological factors participate
at all times in psychological event-fields, the clini-
cian is advised to explore nonpsychological solu-
tions to problems.
All Psychological Problems Require a
Complainant
It is not to trivialize psychological complaints to
recognize that no problem is found in the absence of a
complainant, whether the identified client (see below)
is the sole complainant or not. In many cases, the first
task of the clinician is to explore the conditions sur-
rounding the complaining: who, when, where, and
consequences. Even when acceptable outcomes do
not result from modifying complaining itself, few, if
any, problems will be adequately handled without
addressing the complaining component.
De-emphasis of Intervention/Treatment
The field/system nature of psychological events,
their continuity with other classes of events, interde-
pendencies among participating factors, and the con-
tinuity of psychological event-fields call for a de-
emphasis of conventional intervention and treatment
solutions and avoidance of the over-professionalization
of what are largely social and moral issues.
Clients are Always "Identified Clients"
Given that organisms are but participants in psy-
chological event-fields, problems are never centered
in individuals. Thus, even when individuals other than
the presenting client are not obviously participants in
the client's problem field, we are advised to think of the
nominal client as the identified client.
Psychological Evolution: Developmental
Interactions
Behavior therapy took an important step by
placing more emphasis than most alternative therapies
on clients' contemporary circumstances relative to
their histories. Nonetheless, behavioral ontogeny can-
not be ignored, and one would expect clinical practice
aspiring to scientific foundations to articulate a sound
etiological theory. The interbehavioral suggestion
here is a thoroughgoing developmental perspective
that follows from the fundamental field view that the
field at a given instance is a function of the field at a
time just past. Like all natural events, psychological
behavior fields are naturalistic outcomes of a continu-
ous evolutional process. Delprato (1987) used the
term developmental interactionism in referring to this
view to recognize the interdependencies in interbe-
havioral fields.

Potentialities
Clarification of the potential and actual phases of
event evolution is always important to maintain natu-
ralistic interpretations (Kantor, 1983). Potentiality
refers to the "what" of development; the evolution of
structures and functions, but in the absence of other
factors needed for actualization of another unique
event-field. Potentiality and actualization handle the
events forming the justification for distinctions be-
tween learning and performance, respectively, with-
out the need for hypothetical mental, dualistic, or
mechanistic assumptions. Naturalistically, potentiali-
ties evolve and when coupled with other particular
components, form a new event-field. At the level of
problem solution, our basic goal is to assist in the
actualization of potentialities which may require de-
velopment of new potentialities. '
Person as Self-Regulatory System
The movement in scientific thinking from lineal
mechanism to field/system constructions is of great
import for how we view the regulation or control of
behavior. The evolution of field/system thinking
was a radical development in large part because it
approached causality in terms of integrated event-
fields instead of causal chains. The double-headed
arrow (e.g., organism<->object), representing simul-
taneity of participating factors, -replaced the single-
headed arrow and temporal separation of causal fac-
tors from effects. Now there is no conventional
directionality to causality. Behavior is no longer only
an effect implied by its traditional role as a dependent
variable. What this means for psychology is that the
organism is a self-regulating system. The double-
headed arrow of response<->stimulus, e.g., describes
the simplest version of a closed-loop feedback-control
system (Delprato, 1989; Powers, 1988), Now control
is not from outside the system (external) in either the
form ofwhatis commonly represented as environmen-
tal variables or as mental/cognitive ones.
There are numerous implications of the indi-
vidual as always a self-regulating system. Despite
behavior therapy's less than complete conceptual de-
velopment of the inherently self-regulatory nature of
human behavior, many behavior therapists have em-
phasized the importance of a self-management model
of clinical services and have used various procedures
to increase identified clients' active involvement in
therapy(e.g.,self-monitoring,homeworkassignments).
One general way of making clinical services more
likely to take into account the self-regulatory nature of
all behavior is to make them as participative as pos-
sible.
Responses are Interdependent (Patterned)
When researchers removed methodological blind-
ers inherited from lineal mechanism, they found that
responses are field phenomena, i.e., interdependent or
patterned. What this means is that responses are not
independent of one another. The patterned nature of
responses recommends several strategies and tactics
to the clinician, including routine use of multiple-
response assessment and incorporation of pattern iden-
tification methods such as sequential analytic tech-
niques.
In terms of interventions, response patterning
places the indirectmodification of responses in afresh
light. If two responses, one of which is problematic,
covary, there is no reason why field alterations such as
therapeutic contingencies and other factors must al-
ways directly contact problematic responses.
One of the mostimportant approaches to clinical
assessment and intervention that the interbehavioral
system, and especially response patterns, calls for is
the constructional model of service delivery
(Goldiamond, 1974). Constructional approaches are
consistent with the fundamental goal of actualizing
potentialities by placing the focus on the construction
of behaviors, not their elimination.
Assessment: Behavioral Systems
Methodology
The interbehavioral perspective's strong commit-
ment to events makes it favorably disposed to behav-
ioral assessment and functional analysis. Methodol-
ogy must take into account the temporal continuity of
event-fields, multiple classes of participating field
factors within each of many domains, interdep.enden-
cies among participating factors, and varying interbe-
havioral settings in which event interactions occur.
In Conclusion
In one sense, interbehavioral work is not for stu-
dents of psychology who are satisfied with the status
quo. This little-known approach calls for several new
ways of thinking and of providing clinical services.
Despite interbehavioral psychology's radical posture
when viewed from many conventional points of view,
I submit that those who have developed even mod-
erate skills at approaching the world from the stand-
point of what science is virtually uniformly taken as
"all about" (i.e., observation and rejection of author-
ity) will find considerable food for thought in the
interbehavioral perspective. In essence,
interbehavioral psychology is merely a continuation
of the idea that psychological events are completely
capable of being understood scientifically. It is this
feature that makes interbehavioral psychology con-
ventional and integrative rather than yet another
theory or system.
References
Delprato, D.J. (1987). Developmental interactionism:
An integrative framework for behavior therapy.
Advances in Behaviour Research and Tfierapy, 9,
173-205.
Delprato, D. J, (1989). A paradigm shift in behavior
therapy: From external control to self-control. In
W. A. Hershberger (Ed.), Volitional action:
Conation and control (pp. 449-467). New York:
Elsevier.
Ellenberger, H. F. (1970). Tf)e discovery of the uncon-
sciousness: Tl)e history.and evolution of dynamic
psychiatry. New York: Basic Books.
Goldiamond, I. (1974). Toward a constructional ap-
proach to social problems. Behaviorism, 2, 1-84,
Kantor, J. R. (1959). Interbehavioralpsychology (2nd
ed.). Granville, OH: Principia Press.
Kantor, J. R, (1963). The scientific evolution of psy-
chology (Vol. 1). Chicago, IL: Principia Press.
Kantor, J. R. (1969). 77)e scientific evolution of psy-
chology (Vol. 2). Chicago, IL: Principia Press.
Kantor, J. R. (1983). Tragedy and the event con-
tinuum. Chicago, IL: Principia Press.
Powers, W. T. (1988). Comments from the standpoint
of control system theory. T})e Interbehaviorist,
16,22.
II
 Mark A, Adams
University of Nevada
Although many scholars do not recommend
arguing issues across philosophical positions (Pep-
per, 1942, for example, calls these "illegitimate argu-
ments"), comparing positions on particular topics
can be useful as a means of increasing one's aware-
ness and understanding of one's own position. In
this paper we compare the assumptions of radical
behaviorism and interbehaviorism on the issue of
inherited behavior, providing an avenue for better
understanding of each and demonstrating the im-
pact of adopting particular sets of assumptions on
our interpretations of particular types of psychologi-
cal events.
The Inheritance of Behavior
When an individual is considered to be shy an
explanation for this characteristic is sought in the
substance of the person, as when it is suggested "he
was born that way," This is especially true if this
person behaves in this manner for an extended period
of time. Another example is an athlete who plays a
particular sport with little apparent effort. This person
is often called a "natural athlete." These examples are
statements about the inheritance of behavior. More
specifically, a statement of preparedness to behave,
where preparedness is seen as an inborn "thing" of
some kind. The premise is that a person is born "hard-
wired" to behave in certain ways. It is statements of
this sort that are implied by a radical behavioral
philosophy and that do not fit anywhere within an
interbehavioral philosophy.
What exactly is the behavior that radical behavior-
ists claim to be inherited? According to radical behav-
iorists, what is inherited in any particular species may
be considered as one of three kinds of behavioral
relations. Each will be discussed in turn,
Three Behavioral Relations
Behavioral Relation 1
"(A)ll organisms inherit some fairly specific stimu-
lus-response relations called unconditioned reflexes,
for example, the reflex whereby an increase in light
striking the retina leads to pupillary constriction"
(Michael, 1985.) Another example stated as evidence
for the inheritance of unlearned relations between the
environment and behavioris blinking when a burst of
air is blown into the eye.
In response to this notion, it seems reasonable to
consider that there is always some amount of pressure
on the eyes. There is never a complete absence of
pressure. The organism is biologically constituted in
such a way as to blink when exposed to certain envi-
ronmental conditions. When the amount of wind
pressure on the eyes is suddenly increased, the organ-
ism responds, usually by blinking. From an interbe-
havioral position, it is inappropriate to consider this
response ofblinkingas inherited; the reason being that
the environment was required in order for the response
tooccur. Psychological behavior, forinterbehaviorists,
is the interaction of an organism with its environment.
As such, couldn't it just as easily be said that the
environment was inherited, not the blinking of the
eyes. Radical behaviorists, in otherwords, seem to be
focusing on the organism and neglecting the contribu-
tion ofthe environment to the genesis of psychological
behavior.
Where is the evidence that the response of blink-
ing when air is blown into the eyes is inherited? Just
because this response occurs in almost all humans,
without much time for the organism to develop a
history of this type of interaction does not warrant the
label ofthe inheritance.. As was already mentioned,
the child does have a history, from the moment they
eyes begin to develop, of relative pressure on the eyes.
The fact is that the organism did not blink untilairwas
blown into its eyes, and this happened for the first time
in its lifetime. That is to say, even unconditioned
responses are ontogenic from an interbehavioral per-
spective.
Behavioral Relation 2
"(S)ome organisms inherit more complex envi-

ronment-behavior relations, previously referred to as
instinctive and now more likely to be called released
behavior (fixed-action patterns)." Mating behavior
and nest building are provided as types of "inherited
functional relations." Another example stated as evi-
dence for phylogenic inheritance of this type of behav-
ioral relation is the rooting and washing that pigs and
raccoons exhibit when given tokens.
In experimental situations, with food deprivation
as a setting factor, tokens quickly become conditioned
to elicit respondent behaviors, such as salivation.
Generalization of stimuli that are paired with primary
reinforcers, such as food, can provide an ontogenic
explanation for conditioned operants, such as rooting
and washing of tokens. In this instance radical behav-
iorists are arguing for the phylogenic inheritance of
this behavior, while interbehaviorists would contend
that this behavior is also completely ontogenic in its
origins.
Behavioral Relation 3
"(O)rganisms inherit certain capacities to be
changed behaviorally by the environment; thus the
capacity for reflex responses to be conditioned to
novel stimuli (respondent conditioning) and the ca-
pacity for some environmental occurrences to increase
the future frequency of the type of behavior they
follow (operant conditioning)."
Inheritance of behavior in this sense is notdenied
from an interbehavioral position. This behavioral
relation is simply stating that some structures will
interact with the environment in different ways. This
is most notable in the differences seen in the learning
and social behavior of "normal" versus "retarded"
individuals. The interbehavioral perspective on this
issue is better stated as the inheritance of structures
which function in particular ways when confronted
with particular types of environmental stimulation, as
opposed to the inheritance of behavior, however.
In instances where reproduction of two separate
individuals yields a "normal" functioning physiology
of an anatomy, whether these people behave like their
fathers or are "natural" athletes is greatly determined
by environmental conditions. The functions and forms
of behavior that develop as an organism interacts with
its environment are influenced by an organism's struc-
ture and the characteristics of the environment. If
there are no pianos one does not become a concert
pianist. Hence, although inheritance of the speed of
respondent and operant conditioning is not denied,
13
it does not seem very useful in most situations where
comparisons of an individuals behavior are made,
Methods for Identifying Phylogenic and
Ontogenic Variables
The lack of evidence for the phylogenic inherit-
ance of behavior, or the passing on of phylogenic
contingencies (environment naturally selecting "be-
havioral traits" of species), is made evident by the
methods utilized by radical behaviorists to identify
and/or distinguish between ontogenic and phylogenic
variables. Studying "pure" strains is one example.
The problem with this type of research is how varia-
tions due to environmental or genetic variables are
singled out. Skinner cites Plutarch Licurgus, a Spar-
tan, who demonstrated the importance of environment
by raising puppies from the same litter to prefer hunted
food or food provided on a plate (Skinner, 1966).
What does this say about identifying phylogenic vari-
ables? Why does Skinner use this as an example of
finding phylogenic and ontogenic variables? Is he
saying that the ontogenic contingencies "took-over"
for a genetic predisposition to prefer hunted food or
food on a plate? This is only an identification of
ontogenic variables. Skinner has let phylogenic
variables become his waste-basket for behaviors that
appear unconnected to ontogenic contingencies (al-
though in this example he does not explicitly offer any
behavior of the dogs thatis phylogenic in origin). But,
the very fact that these behaviors are happening to an
individual in it's lifetime, makes them necessarily
connected to ontogenic variables.
In his article, The phytogeny and ontogeny of
behavior, Skinner (1966) contends "The contingen-
cies responsible for unlearned behavior (phylogenically
inherited behavior) acted a very long time ago. The
natural selection of a given formofbehavior, no matter
how plausibly argued, remains an inference." Why
would Skinner find it necessary to make this infer-
ence? It seems that he is allowing himself to make an
inference that will never have the opportunity to be
anythingbutaninference. On purely pragmatic grounds
(Skinner is undoubtedly a pragmatist) making these
inferences seems completely useless.
Skinner makes a good point that when experiment-
ers set up phylogenic contingencies such as breeding
horses for speed, "the contingencies which select a
given behavioral trait in a genetic experiment must be
shown to play a plausible role in natural selection."
But, this can also be explained without an appeal to
 the inheritance of behavior. Can it not also be stated
that what is bred in the horses Is structure (stemming
from the gene), not a behavioral trait of "running
fast." Skinner is claiming you can breed organisms
for the behavior of speed.
What is happening, according to
interbehaviorists, takes place at a "suborganismic
level." Hayes, 1988 argues against Skinner's notion
that the survival of the species and of the culture is
a suggestion that selection takes place at a group
level. Hayes argues selection takes place at the
"geneing" level, a sub-organismic level. What is
selected is genes, not behavioral traits, and structure
comes from genetic reproduction. What replicates in
biological evolution is not the individual and not the
species, but the gene.
If two horses that are "fast" reproduce, and this
off-spring is raised for speed, as well as bred for speed,
why is it that most off-spring of this kind do not
become future racing champions? Interbehaviorists
contend it is because the behavior of "running fast" is
not inherited. The chances that the animal will be
faster than average, provided an environment set up to
increase and foster the speed of horses is not argued. It
is not questioned that organisms come equipped with
bodily features that enable them to behave more effec-
tively when exposed to a similar environment than
other organisms. For interbehaviorists, the future
racing champion is a result of both an inherited struc-
ture and an ontogenic history of interactions with an
environment. The organism is a necessary condition
for behavior to occur, but not a sufficient condition.
There must also be an environment for behavior to
occur. Therefore, the interbehavioral difference on
this issue does not deny inheritance of structure, but
does deny inheritance of behavior and/or behavior
traits.
Storage of Contingencies and the
Reduction of Psychology to Biology
For radical behaviorists, how is it that ontogenic
contingencies that operated "a longtime ago" are able
to be phylogenically passed on? This seems to imply
that ontogenic contingencies are stored, somewhere in
some genetic material, and then passed on to off-
spring. This is a reduction of psychological behavior
to physiological functioning. An example is fixed-
action patterns. If an animal has inherited nest-build-
ing behavior, then it must be alive and functioning for
quite some time before nest building behavior can be
seen. If this behavior is inherited, it seems as though
it must be somewhere (in the organism), waiting to
be released. If the organism has contained this
behavior, yet not ever exhibiting it until later life, the
only place for it to be contained is in the organism's
biology. Interbehaviorists contend that there is no
storage of behavior of any kind. All behavior is
ontogenic, and must be understood as interactions
between organisms and environments.
Conclusions
The principle differences between radical behav-
iorism and interbehaviorism, as they pertain to the
issue of inheritance are: (a) radical behaviorists at-
tribute psychological occurrences to processes of bio-
logical evolution, while interbehaviorists contend that
all psychological events are ontogenic; (b) radical
behaviorists reduce psychological events to biological
events, while interbehaviorists sustain psychological
events.
The first of these differences may be attributed to
differences of opinion as to when ontogenesis begins.
For interbehaviorists, once the genetic transfer has
occurred to produce a zygote and the organism has
reached viability, all that occurs from this point on is
ontogenic, including so-called unconditioned reflexes.
The radical behaviorist, alternatively, looks for evi-
dence of psychological development or learning at a
much later stage to rule out phylogenic origins.
The difference between the two positions on the
issue of reductionism is part of a larger set of issues
having to do with the nature of explanation. Explana-
tion is achieved by identifying causes in radical behav-
iorism while in interbehaviorism it is achieved by ever
widening descriptions of interrelated factors. Reduc-
tion of psychological events to biological events is a
useful strategy in the search for causes. It has no utility
foradescriptive understanding ofpsychological events,
as is characteristic of the interbehavioral approach.
References
Hayes, S. C.(1988). Contextualismand the next wave
of behavioral psychology. Behavior Analysis, 23,
7-22.
Kantor, J. R. (1959). Interbehavioral Psychology.
Bloomington, Ind., Principia Press.
Michael.}. L. (1985). Behavior analysis: a radical
perspective, in B. L. Hammonds (Ed.) Master
Lecture Series, Volume 4: Psychology of Learn-
ing, Washington, DC: American Psychological
 Association.
Pepper, S.C. (1942). World Hypotheses. Berkely,CA:
University of California Press.
Skinner, B. F. (1966). The phylogeny and ontongeny
of behavior. Science, 153, 1205-1213.
Skinner, B. F. (1981). Selection by consequences.
Science, 213, 501-504.
Author's Notes
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the
International Congress on Interbehaviorism in Madrid,
July, 1994. Tin author thanks Linda J. Hayes for her
assistance in conceptualizing these ideas and in preparing
the manuscript.
 Tlje problem of units of analysis surfaced at the University of Nevada last year among faculty and students
working in the area of organizational behavior management. Was the subject matter in this domain somehow
different than in other psychological domains? Was an organization just a collection of individuals to which
principles of individual behavior could apply or was it something else? And if it was something else, what was it,
and what did we, as experts in individual behavior analysis and change, have to offer toward its understanding and
manipulation? To answer these questions, we reviewed the literature and surveyed practicing organizational
psychologists to identify units of analysis in use in research and application, and we organized an in-house
conference to discuss the more general problem of units of analysis in science and in the science of psychology. Tlie
conference featured papers by graduate students on a variety of issues. As a result, only a couple of papers had
anything to do with organizational psychology. Selected for inclusion in this issue are four that seemed of most
potential interest to the readers of The Interbehaviorist, none of which has an organizational content as it turns out..
However, each makes a point about units of analysis that is applicable wherever this concept is invoked and is held
to be significant. Commentary on these offerings to our understanding of this important topic are invited.

Patricia A. Bach and Annette Bzdawka

University of Nevada

While planning this talk it occurred to us that the
fact that we were even having this event, a conference
on units of analysis, is significant. Priorto beginning
graduate study in psychology, I worked in microbiol-
ogy for several years. In the different labs I worked in
I studied single cells, groups of cells, cell colonies, and
cell cultures. No one ever suggested that one of these
units was more appropriate to microbiology than an-
other. One might be more appropriate to answering a
particular question, but all were considered acceptable
generally.
Psychology is unique compared to the so called
hard sciences In that our subject of study is ourselves,
rather than something separate from us. And we can't
seern to agree on which unit, or level, of ourselves is
the appropriate one for research.
A Skinnerian behaviorist might say the operant is
the bestunit of analysis, and that the appropriate level
is the individual. Meanwhile the social psychologist
might suggest that the dyad or group is a proper level
of analysis. Still other psychologists might suggest
that we study organizations or cultures.
Coming from a radical behavioral perspective
myself, I would argue that levels such as the family,
organization or culture are part of the context of the
individual. Further, the study ofevents atany of these
levels can tell us something about events occurring at
the levels immediately above and below it. At the
point where two levels interface, a single unit may be
applied to either, and yield useful psychological data.
For, example, where the individual interfaces with
the culture, the study of a cultural practice may tell us
somethinguseful about the individual, and the study of
an individual's behavior may tell us something useful
about the culture. Why should we limit ourselves to
only one or a few fundamental units when there are
may units and levels of analysis currently used by
research producing psychologists?

In our undying envy of the "hard" sciences, some
say, "but they have fundamental units, and look how
faraheadofustheyare". Suchastatementis,however,
inaccurate. The only thing they have that we lack is
agreement on their subject matter, and willingness to
accept that a subject matter can be understood at many
levels, usingmany different units, to the benefit of the
discipline as a whole.
In a discipline as broad as psychology, including
biological, experimental, clinical, social, organiza-
tional, community and others, there are many levels of
analysis from biochemical to individual organism to
community or culture. The most appropriate unit of
analysis depends on which level one is studying.
Much of the disagreement occurs around whether
the psychologistmustproperly confine her study to the
level of the individual, whether it is appropriate to
study larger levels, and if so, should the units of
analysis be uniform across levels. This disagreement
aside, I thinkwe can find some points of agreement. I
would argue that there are no cultural, or community,
or familial events that do not also involve psychologi-
cal events occurring in the context of the individual.
What the psychologist strives to understand or change,
or predict and control, is the behavior of individuals
considered at any of several levels of analysis. No
matter how such change is measured, it is always
change in individuals. The level and unit of analysis
may vary-itmay be the number ofviolent acts Johnny
commits, the number ofviolent acts in a high school,
in a city, or in the entire country, but one is still talking
about the actions of individuals no matter how the
numbers are aggregated. Yet we still need to have
conferences such as this one, discussing appropriate
units and levels of analysis.
Compare psychology to another discipline, a "hard"
science, for a moment. Take a simple chemistry
experiment you probably saw in elementary or junior
high school. To demonstrate diffusion one can take a
neutral medium like water, add a red solution to one
side of the medium, add a blue solution to the other
side, and within a short time diffusion will be complete
and there will be a uniform purple solution. There is
even a mathematical equation to describe the event.
But suppose the chemist confined his study to
individual molecules. He would find that some of the
blue ones moved across to the other side while some
hardly moved at all, and some of the red ones moved
across the other side, and some did not so they are
now uniformly distributed and the solution appears
purple. It is highly unlikely that the behavior of
17
individual molecules in the solution could be de-
scribed by a single equation.
Now imagine that chemistry were like psychol-
ogy. You'd have the cultural chemist saying, "let's
study this purple solution", and the social chemist
might ask, "why do these blue molecules now look
purple?", and the behavior analytic chemist might ask,
"what about this particular red molecule's reinforce-
ment history lead it to move to the other side?", and
finally, the family systems chemist might conclude
that the blue molecule that didn't move at all came
from a dysfunctional compound.
The above example sounds ridiculous in terms of
chemistry. The suprising thing is that this is, more or
less, what happens in chemistry. The physical chemist
will talk about the energy quanta of the single mol-
ecule, the analytic chemist about the amount of some
compound in the solution, and the organic chemist
about the different aggregates of cells. But the physi-
cal chemist will not tell the analytic chemist that
solutions and molarity are inappropriate levels and
units of analysis, or insist that any chemical phenom-
ena be measured in units of single atoms and mol-
ecules.
Chemistry is defined as the study of the composi-
tion, structure, and properties of substances and the
transformations they undergo. That's a pretty broad
definition, almost as broad as "the study of human
behavior". Yet chemistry is considered a hard science,
while psychology is soft.
Some might suggest that this is a poor analogy, and
claim that we can't specify the behavior of humans as
well as that of molecules, because a human's history is
so complex. But to predict the behavior of a particular
molecule or atom at any given moment we'd need to
know it's pressure, volume, temperature, pH, compo-
sition, what other molecules it's been around in the
recent past, it's speed of motion and etcetra. And even
then the uncertainty principle still applies and the
chemist admits that she can't predict precisely what
the atom will do.
Perhaps, as objects of scientific study, we are not
as different from non-human, and even non-living,
subjects as we'd like to think. The problem isn't so
much with the subject of study as with those studying
it. We are our subject matter, and study ourselves as
subject matter, and as subject matter studying subject
matter! The chemist and physicist don't do this,
they accept, or don't even consider, that units like
temperature, bond strength, and electric charge are
arbitrary and are constructs. Meanwhile, we psy-
chologists treat such things as temperature as if they
are somehow more "real" than our own units and
constructs. We speak of our own science as "soft"
and imprecise, and of the others as "hard" and exact,
and at the same time we demand more of psychology
than of chemistry or physics.
The con textu alis ts maintain that the critical cri-
teria is workability. The chemist and physicist have
used this criteria effectively all along without even
talking about constructs, contextualism, or the proper
unit of analysis. If they did so they would still
probably be discussing the four elements of fire,
water, earth and air, and what unit applies to all of
them.
One can talkabout human behavior atmany levels
using many units. The importance to other types of
psychologists lies not in the particular subject of
analysis, but in the specific units and levels of analysis,
and their usefulness when applied at different levels
with respect to a general subject matter. In psychol-
ogy, virtually all units of analysis can be derived from
the individual level of analysis. One can look at
culture, school, family, or organization and all are
Realism, Nihilism and A Psychological Unit-of-Analysis
Mark A. Swain
University of Nevada
While we are referring to a Realistic philosophi-
cal system we should acknowledge two distinct brands
of this philosophy which support somewhat diver-
gent views on the nature of scientific observation.
Naive Realism
First, we have Naive Realism. This brand of
Realism is associated with the assumption that indi-
viduals, as observers, are in some direct contact with
a rew/ontological reality. This view has the labdnaive
because philosophers are often skeptical of a direct-
sense relation to the world. However, how many times
have we come across statements in academics texts
referring to the ability of observers to "systematically
compare observations (or perhaps data sets) to what
actually occurred." Although labeled naive, this type
ultimately derived from individuals, and all teach us
something about human behavior.
For example, one can understand the three term
contingency observing the behavior of individuals in
the unit of the operant. And this individual level may
be useful in telling us something about cultural prac-
tices. Similarly, if one wants to study human's seem-
ing ability to respond to long term contingencies, one
must consider the presence of other individuals. One
cannot talk about such behaviors as altruism, or getting
a Ph.D., without talking about larger units and levels of
analysis such as families, institutions, or cultures.
In conclusion, many units and levels of analysis
are appropriate in psychology. All share a common
denominator of theindividual. The important factor is
not the particular unit or level, but the interface-how
understanding at one level can enhance understanding
at the same or another level of analysis. An appropriate
unit of analysis is anyone that expands our knowledge
at any of several levels of analysis including individu-
als, and groups as large as cultures, as long as such
knowledge can be integrated into a body of science, the
science of human behavior.
of Realism in my view, is far from being out of the
main stream.
Not-So-Naive Realism
Second, we have another brand of realism which
in contrast to the first is referred to as Not-So-Naive
Realism. Those who accept this brand of Realism also
accept a real or objective world, however, those who
practice this brand officially doubt that the products of
observation practices correspond to theactualstate of
affairs observed. However, while these Realists may
not believe their descriptions reflect a true state-of-
affairs some remain certain that rigorous methods will
bring them closer and closer to apristine description of
events. In practice, these observers often maintain a
humble approach making a conspicuous dichotomy
between events and constructs (e.g., such as some
modeling theories).
Implications of Realism
Upon consideration of these issues one might be
compelled to ask: "In what way does this philosophi-
cal discussion bear upon the question of this confer-
ence?" I would say these issues bear important consid-
erations when speaking of the nature of a untt-of-
analysis. After all, how .is such a unit determined?
What type of impact does this so-called unit have on
any particular science? The answers I suggest differ
depending on: 1) The analysis of interest; and 2) The
explicit and implicit assumptions regarding the nature
of elements within any particular unit.
The first point refers most exclusively to the
impact the dominant verbal culture has on the pre-
scientific description of the analysis. Often verbal
practices impact observation practices differently de-
pendingonwhatis observed; for example, theassump-
tion of dualism is more prevalent in some sciences than
others. The second point refers to the description of
individual elements within any unit. While I admit
some questions are best answered experimentally some
are forever mired in philosophical verbal interac-
tions--an example is reductionism.
The Nature of a Unit
Therefore, a so-called naive Realist might claim
that the unit of analysis is "discovered." In contrast,
the not-so-naive Realist might assume this unit is a
construction: Aconstruction/we^on the observation
of physical events. In this manner, the not-so-naive
construction may be understood as incorporeal. That
is, any particular unit is not assumed to exist
ontologically, instead, it is considered to consist of
ongoing H-/fe/va://<w--interaction which does not as-
sume any type of fixed spatio-temporal geometry
and therefore, "no-thing" may be directly measured or
offered up for exhibition. The unit is simply a verbal
construction. However, even when described as incor-
poreal the unit is assumed to be derived from some sort
of contact with a real or actual world; thus, both of
these Realisms avoid the nihilistic conclusion that
"no-things" exist. In other words, even though a
Realist might consider a unit to be incorporeal, the
verbal behavior responsible for the development of
this unit is assumed itself to have been developed
through contact with actual (or "physical") events. For
some, this provides solace.
However, questions regarding how one comes to
know reality when one confronts reality is indeed a
philosophical question. The question of how this
philosophical talk relates to pragmatic unit issues
will be answered with an opinion. This opinion is
related to the purpose of a unit-of-analysis and
nihilism. Let me explain.
Nihilism
While those who adopt aRealistic philosophy may
see nihilism as unnecessary (and even damaging) to
any analysis, I see a certain type of nihilism as impor-
tant to maintain the integrity of any scientific unit.
This certain type of nihilism may be described by
comparing it to another nihilistic practice. The first
practice maintains this unit and allows it to be modi-
fied; the second practice threatens the unit. I will call
the first "constructive-nihilism" and the second "de-
teriorative-nihilism."
Constructive Nihilism
Within the constructive system the unit is consid-
ered a verbal construct. That is, the unit is conceptu-
alized as continuous with observing practices and is
never understood as a separate phenomena. The unit
is "self-sufficient" and does not represent any "thing"
which transcends its construction. Its participants and
terms relate to one another and eventually relate to the
guiding philosophical tenets. Therefore, certain ques-
tions do not contact any meaningful characteristic (or
referent) of the unit and subsequently have no answer;
not because the unit is inadequate, instead itis because
the language of the unit eventually folds into itself like
mathematics reduce to fundamental axioms. In other
words, there are seemingly fundamental questions that
may be directed at the unit that cannot be coherently
answered because these questions concern basic axi-
omatic (or assumptive) issues. Einstein (1916) recog-
nized this issue when he wrote: "We cannot ask
whether it is true that only one straight line goes
through two points. We can only say that Euclidean
geometry deals with things called "straight lines," to
each of which is ascribed the property ofbeing uniquely
determined by two points situated on it." In this
manner the unit is complete and any attempt to go
beyond the scope of the unit results in the breakdown
(ornihilism)oftheunit. I consider this type ofnihilism
appropriate. Here, the observer is forced to deal with
a specific level of analysis (e.g., physics, biology,
physiology, psychology, etc.,) and cannot transplant.
the facts of one science to anotherwhile maintaining
the integrity of the unit or the specific analysis. Notice,
in order to accept this view Realism must be rejected.
(See Swain, 1993, for further discussion).
Deteriorative Nihilism
Within the deteriorative system the unit is not
protected from conflation with other units. This is due
to the fact that the unit is considered to be a direct
extension of other units. Thus, the psychological analy-
sis may fall to another level (perhaps biology) or may
be overshot to some cultural unit. In psychology these
practices are most evident when physiological, bio-
logical or sociological units are conflated with psy-
chological units. In the deteriorative system the unit is
legitimized only when it is garbled with other units of
analysis. The problem then becomes a confusion and
lack of clarification between different units and analy-
ses. The unit then becomes an extension of other
for Social Scientific Inquiry
Paul M. La Marca
University of Nevada
Itmight be argued that a good definition of the unit
of analysis being utilized in a particular field of study
is crucial in guiding proper interpretations of particu-
lar lines of research as well as the integration of
research addressing diverse objects of analysis. Zeiler
(1986) underscores this importance noting that the
definition of the unit of analysis guides theory and
research. With the biological sciences Zeiler indicates
that only after some searching and evolution did biolo-
gists define the cell as the basic unitofanalysis in their
field. While the cell could be further reduced to its
component parts it offers the simplest structure with
properties which define life. Thus, this basic unit of
analysis can be reduced or expanded to address vary-
ing objects of analysis.
A like unit offered by Zeiler (1986) in the psycho-
logical domain of investigation (derived from Skinner's
analysis) is R=f(S) where S is a stimulus and R is a
response. Kantor (1950), although not explicitly,
offers a different unit of analysis for psychology. This
unit is what he terms the interbehavioral field in which
studies and the original unit becomes less important.
Here, the potential exists for a long and slow deterio-
ration of the original unit while units from other
disciplines are contemplated, understood, misunder-
stood and perhaps adopted. Hence we have psycholo-
gists studying physiology, biology, sociology, etc., in
the hopes ofprovidingmore expertise on psychologi-
cal issues. It is at this point that the philosophical
system needs attention.
References
Einstein, A. (1916). Relativity: The Special and
General Theory. New York: Crown Publishers,
Inc.
Swain, M. A. (1993). Science has No Business in the
Truth Business. In S.C. Hayes, L. J. Hayes, H. W,
Reese, T. R. Sarbin (Eds.), Varieties of Scientific
Contextualism (pp. 45-49). Reno, NV: Context
Press.
stimulus functions and response functions occur si-
multaneously within a context that includes cultural
influences and histories of persons involved. The
interbehavioral field can be observed and described
(also see Johnson & Morris, 1986, for a discussion of
clearly defining units of analysis from a behavioral
analytic perspective and Parrott, 1983, for a discussion
of different behavioral analytic units of analysis).
Pepitone (1976) in a quite influential article, and
others (Steiner 1974; Carlson 1984) also make the
implicit argument that clear specification for the ap-
propriate unit of analysis in a given area of study is
necessary. Pepitone distinguishes between normative
and non-normative influences ofbehavior defining the
latter as individualistic and the former as influenced by
the greater collective1. Pepitone argues that social
psychology should be more geared toward study of
normative influences ofbehavior and thatmuch be-
havior often thought of as idiosyncratic is more often
shared among groups or collectives of people suggest-
ing the normative level of analysis as more appropri-
ate. Pepitone condemns many theoretical perspectives
within social psychology for adopting overly individu-
alistic perspectives and thus units of analysis.
The question guiding this discussion is whether or
not the more micro units offered by Zeilerand Kantor
or the more macro approach suggested by Pepitone are
adequate to assess diverse objects of analysis in a
broader social scientific domain of study. If we take a
step back, or perhaps forward, and begin to ask the
question the biologists asked we may decide to adopt
a unit of analysis which is a simple and basic unit
providing the properties necessary to assess the ques-
tions,we raise as social scientists. It is important to
underscore a distinction central to this line of argu-
ment and perhaps one that when not addressed can
raise some of the theoretical debates which question
the particular units researchers employ. This distinc-
tion is that the unit of analysis is that 'unit' which is
analyzed in such a way that the analysis of it informs
us about our target of analysis. The target of analysis
is what has been described earlier as 'objects' of
analysis (Ginsburg, 1994). For instance, if mother-
infant interaction episodes were our unit of analysis
this unitcould be used to targetparentingstyle, infant's
temperament, or patterns of mother-infantinteraction
among other potential targets.
When this distinction is made Pepitone's (1976)
condemnation might be modified to some degree. If
Social Psychologists and perhaps social scientists as a
whole chose a unit of analysis which was not too
individualistic, nor too broad, but which could be
analyzed to assess individualistic research questions
there would be less need of debate.
The present article takes the dyad (two persons
interacting in a given social context) as its theoretical
unit of analysis arguing that this unit might offer a
basic starting point from where other research strate-
gies could further reduce to address componential
parts or expand to address more macro levels of
analysis. In this way this unit may offer important
explanations for both normative and non-normative
influences of behavior. The dyad as a unit of analysis
represents what has been termed a micro-sociological
unit of analysis (Turner 1988) but which might be
better described as one basic unit for the social sci-
ences. This latter term may be more representative of
the present conception since behavior or how the dyad
may influence individual behavior, not just the struc-
ture and process of interaction is of equal interest.
The basis from which the claim will be made that
the dyad possesses the basic properties to be utilized as
a unit of analysis will be guided by the theoretical
perspective of Symbolic Interactionism. This per-
spective has been and remains quite influential in the
field of Sociology as well as Social Psychology and
may contain tenets which make it useful for all social
sciences.
Symbolic Interactionism: A Meadian
Perspective
Stryker (1990) indicates that symbolic
interactionism has its roots in the Scottish moral phi-
losophers who believed that association processes
were key in developing a science of human behavior.
According to Stryker, the American Pragmatists (Wil-
liamjames, John Dewey, George Herbert Mead) fur-
ther influenced the theoretical perspective with per-
haps George Herbert Mead being the centerpiece to
the formalization of symbolic interactionist thinking.
Charles Horton Cooley is also credited with Mead as
offering clear specifications of the core assumptions
of symbolic interactionism. Cooley (1902) argued
that self and society are two sides of the same coin and
that no individual can exist apart from others. Cooley
is perhaps most known for his discussion of the "look-
ing glass self in which person's see themselves in the
reflection of how significant others see them. It is
important to note that Cooley is discussing our imagi-
nation (perception) of how others see us not how they
actually see us (Backman, 1988)z. When reflecting
upon ourselves in this way we often will experience
feelings of "pride" or "mortification". Cooley's ap-
proach is an individualistic approach. For Cooley self
arises out of reflective thoughtand imagination and in
essence creates a social process (Mead, 1934).
Mead (1934) posits that the social process should
be the starting place for social psychological study
"start from the ongoing social process, from that
process, mind, self, and society derive" (Stryker, 1990
p. 7). Mead is a self-acclaimed social-behaviorist and
in contrast to Cooley does not take an individualistic
approach but instead a social approach. Like Cooley
however, there can be no individual without the group
in Mead's analysis. An individual is an individual
based on group membership and the social relation-
ships the person finds themselves in. The individual
becomes an individual by "taking the role" or the
attitude of the other(s) and reflecting upon himself as
an object3. This is the process of self-consciousness
and how "self is created. For Mead, "mind" is this
 ability to 'take the role* of the other and is made
possible via the communication between persons. Thus
language has central importance for Mead. Language
is a system of symbols which allow us to gesture others
and in so doing we indicate to ourselves as well. This
paradox is really the definition of why language is
symbolic. It is not separate from the social process but
a part of the whole of this process and allows for the
complexities of social life to occur. "Language as
made up of significant symbols is what we mean by
mind. The content ofourminds is (l)innerconversa-
tion, 'the importation of conversation from the social
group to the individual (2)... .imagery. Imagery should
be regarded in relation to the behavior in which it
functions'."(pg. 190-191). This importation process is
what is occurring when we take the role of others. We
converse with ourselves concerning how certain oth-
ers (and/or the community as a whole) might act in
some situation or the attitudes they hold concerning
something. This inner conversation is made up of the
same symbols as that which guides the social process
in general and in that way is no different in kind then
what occurs between two individuals. The importa-
tion can be conceptualized as planning behavior.
Through it we actively create and effect the situations
and environments we find ourselves in. This 'ability'
is that which defines at least some of our behavior as
not simply responsive (passively or in concert) to an
active environment.
Imagery or "mental images"~"can exist in their
relation to the organism without being lodged in a
substantial consciousness" (pg. 332). Consciousness
as such is not some preexisting state or structure but
simply the organism in response to the environment at
any point in time. Images are symbols of our past
experiences brought to bare in a present situation. So
as I talk to you over the phone I can see your face. The
image of your face is based upon the previous experi-
ences I have had with you.
The discussion of Mead thus far attempts to estab-
lish how 'mind1 and 'self are derived from the social
process4, what is left is society. Society also derives
from the social process. Mead does not accept the
theoretical position that society is created by individu-
als already intelligent and with 'selves' who decide to
get together. Society is instead created by the same
symbols instrumental in creating 'mind' and the 'self.
Society is an emergent process made possible through
communication. "Human society, then, is dependent
upon the development of language for its own distinc-
tive form of organization" (pg. 235).
Society can be seen as the complex cooperative
behaviors of individuals made possible through com-
munication of significant symbols. Again, by 'taking
the role' of the other or by indicating to the other
through a significant symbol a particular response,
which also indicates to the 'self the same response,
cooperative behavior is made possible.
All behaviors are not cooperative or common
responses (institutions) made by various individuals in
response to certain stimuli. Each of us uniquely
interprets the symbols which we use in communica-
tion. Although we take the attitudes of other(s) and
may utilize these in preparing behavior, behavior isn't
determined by this process but occurs as it occurs in a
given interaction. This behavioral experience, through
symbolization, becomes part of "me", part of my
interpretation ofothers actions, attitudes, as well as my
actions and attitudes^ In essence, we are active partici-
pants in the social process and while being influenced
by it we influence it. This is how society emerges,
within the social process as does everything else we
have discussed thus far.
So, as social scientists, if we can accept such an
account of social process and what is derived from it,
we can offer descriptions of and gain insights concern-
ing unique individual behavior (idiosyncratic behav-
ior, non-normative behavior) and cooperative behav-
ior (institutional, cultural, normative). The task be-
comes one of deciding what unit can represent social
process in its most simple and basic form.
The Dyad as a Starting Point
Certainly Mead's analysis doesn't suggest central
importance to studying the dyad. Equal importance
would have to be given to studying the influence of the
"generalized other", or the attitudes taken from the
community as a whole. However, the dyad may offer
a micro analytic unit from which part of the 'social
process or part of what is derived from it can be studied
including the 'generalized other' as an object of analy-
sis.
Jonathan Turner (1988) argues that the most el-
ementary unit in Sociology is social interaction. He
defines social interaction as " a situation where the
behaviors of one actorare consciously reorganized by,
and influence the behaviors of, another actor, and vise
versa."(pg. 14). He notes that this unit is sociological
because in his use of ithe is primarily interested in the
process of interaction from a structural viewpoint as

opposed to an explicitstudy of behavior which would
be the subject matter of psychology. Radzikhovskii
(1984) takes "joint action" as the unit of analysis in
studying an individual's behaviors. Influenced prima-
rily from the work of Leont'ev and Vygotsky,
Radzikhovskii argues that "joint action" in itssimplest
form is constituted by a subject (person), object (a
primary sign), another subject (person), in short an
interaction between two people about something. This
communication takes place through signs. The signs
become the object and are at the same time separate
from it but allow communication about it. What is
important here is that in this analysis the other defines
the boundary of an individual's behavior. This point is
perhaps derived from Leont'ev's statement (cited in
Radzikhovskii, 1984, pg. 37) "...Relations to the world
are always mediated by man's relations to other people;
his activity is always embedded in communication....".
The above two examples are illustrative of how
the dyadic unit of analysis can yield information
concerningmore sociological issues (process of social
interaction) and more social psychological issues (in-
dividual behavior). Many others have taken the dyad
as their unit of analysis as well. Ickes, Bissonnette,
Garcia, & Stinson (1990) discuss their Dyadic Interac-
tion Paradigm which utilizes video tape of informal
interactions between pairs of subjects. Subjects then
view the video tape of their interaction separately and
stop the tape at points where they 'remember' having
thoughts and/or feelings about their behavior, the
others behavior, oratanyotherimportantpoint. The
video tape is then presented again but now is stopped
by the experimenter for each person separately based
upon where the other person had stopped the tape at
various points. Subjects then indicate what they
believe the other was thinking and/or feeling at these
particular points of the interaction. The paradigm
seems to offer quite an innovative way to address many
social psychological issues, in particular, the reflected
appraisal process and its influence upon behavior.
Kenny and Albright (1987) also make use of the dyad
as a unit of analysis in some of their investigations.
Kenny has created a statistical model which allows the
researcher to partial out three influences (actor effects,
partner effects, and relationship effects) upon person
perception derived from dyadic interactions. Analysis
can reveal 'Response-set' accuracy which assesses
whether a given individual's judgement of others on
some criterion corresponds to other's general behavior
with the given individual on the same criterion, 'Indi-
23
vidual' accuracy or the correspondence between other's
general ratings of a given individual on some criterion
and that individual's general behavior with regard to
that same criterion, and 'Dyadic' accuracy or an
individual's rating of another individual on some crite-
rion, controlling for the first individual's general rat-
ings of others on this criterion and how others usually
rate this specific other person on this criterion, in
correspondence to the specific others' behavior with
the rating individual on this criterion, controlling for
people's general behavior on this criterion and the
specific others' general level of behavior on this di-
mension. This model could easily be employed to
target the relationship, the partner or other, or the
individual as objects of analysis utilizing the dyad as
the unit of analysis.
In a like manner, more and more developmentalists
(Baumrind, 1989; East, 1991; Denham, Renwick, &
Holt, 1991; and Bajthe & Parke, 1993) are taking
parent-child interaction episodes as their unit of analy-
sis. This approach has been adopted to identify pat-
terns of interactions which may effect various out-
comes (individual and processual) while limiting some
of the criticisms levied against developmentalists us-
ing self-report methodologies. Many of these re-
searchers and others are utilizing mother-child inter-
action as a starting point to assess the effects of these
interactions upon interactions the child has in other
social settings such as peer interactions in preschool.
Finally, Heritage (1984) discusses
ethnomethodological studies which often utilize dy-
adic interaction in attempts to reveal the 'rules' of
social interaction. And the 'accounts' literature also
contains many examples ofutilization of dyadic inter-
action as the unit of analysis. This is of course a short
list of those who use this unit of analysis but does
provide examples of research more psychologically
oriented and others more sociologically oriented.
Methodological Implications
Blumer's (1966) interpretation of Mead provides
some suggestion for how symbolic interaction at the
dyadic level might be studied. Blumer argues that
since 'mind', 'self, and 'society' are derived from an
ongoing social process it does not make sense to break
up this process into static structures such as norms,
culture, social order, or rules in an attempt to objec-
tively assess the influence or causes these structures
may have. This misses the point that it is group life that
creates and maintains norms, culture, social order, and
 rules. These ought to be targets which are assessed
through observing social interaction.
In a like manner 'objective1 experimental ap-
proaches may involve the observer substituting his
views of the field for the actors. For Blumer it makes
little sense to break things into independent and depen-
dent variables since these constructed static variables
defy the fluid nature of the social process and deny that
anything that is defined can be redefined. Blumer
suggests descriptive approaches in studying the social
process. Through Exploration (observing, interview-
ing, listening) we aim at gaining a clear picture of some
area of social life. Then through Inspection, you can
frame what you have described in theoretical form.
This may generate new questions to be answered using
the same explorative methods. Blumer's approach is
a naturalistic approach with a strong emphasis placed
upon getting at the views of those who you are study-
ing.
Other important implications of using the dyad as
a unit of analysis are offered by Thompson and Walker
(1982). To begin they make two important points.
First, just because we study two people that doesn't
mean we are doing so at the dyadic level of analysis. In
regard to this they discuss some research which samples
married couples but then aggregates data by gender
focusing on individual differences between the sexes.
This research may be quite valuable and credible but
does not utilize a dyadic unit of analysis.
Second, the dyad as a unit of analysis does not
require that two people are studied to gain the informa-
tion. One member of a dyad can provide information
concerning the dyadic relationship. The authors go on
to note that "excluding outside observers there are
three sources of data which can be used dyadically; the
person herself or himself (P), the partner or other (O),
and the pair reporting as a unit." (pg.892).
Most of the above described research areas, as
well as the methodological issues and approaches
suggested by Blumer (1966) and Thompson et al
(1982), make an attempt to stick closely to the interac-
tions between people and gain information from the
perspective of those studied as opposed to using ex-
perimental designs in which independent variables are
manipulated to assess their effect upon dependent
variables. These contextual approaches to investiga-
tion are consistent with Kantor's (1950) specificity
principle at the heart of his descriptive scientific
approach.
The present investigation centers around illustrat-
ing the dyad as a useful unit of analysis for scientific
research in the social sciences. An attempt was made
to offer a theoretical grounding justifying the use of
this unit and why this unit is an important starting
point. If we conceptualize all as deriving from and
being apart of the social process it may not make sense
to study human behavior or psychological phenom-
enon from an asocial basis. In fact, from a Meadian
position you probably can't, all behavior is social.
S tudyingan individual in an isolated context does not
in any way eliminate the significant symbols we as
individuals share with greater collectives. These sym-
bols still undoubtedly influence our conduct and are
modified through our conduct. Isolation ofvariables
in an attempt to establish cause and effect relation-
ships will eliminate contextual features which could
add richly to our descriptions and interpretations.
The argument is put forth that the dyad can be
utilized to address more typical general psychological
events (idiosyncratic behavior) and sociological events.
For social psychology, and with regard to Pepitone's
(1976) charge that we concern ourselves more with
normative behavior, the dyad may be especially well
suited for this endeavor. Analysis of dyadic interac-
tion can yield information with respect to cooperative
behavior. Although individuals interpret symbols
uniquely their shared use leads to cooperative behav-
ior, if you will, conforming behavior, or more pre-
cisely normative behaviorwhich is descriptive of the
societies from which we are a part.
Perhaps like the cell to the biological sciences, the
dyad may provide one basic starting point for the
social scientist. It seems to posses qualities which
enable it to be utilized to address both micro analytic
questions and macroanalytic questions. It would be
misleading and most definitely inaccurate to argue that
the dyad is the single appropriate unit of analysis for
such a broad domain of study. Instead the argument is
that it is just one unit which might allow a bridging of
research areas within the social sciences offering an
integration of diverse ideas and thus enhancing inter-
pretations made and understandings achieved.
Footnotes
1 Pepitone's distinctions appear quite similar to
Kantor's (1982) distinction between idiosyn-
cratic and cultural behavior with cultural behavior
being equivalent to that behavior influenced nor-

matively.
2 Backman suggests that few but some have offered
"vulgar" interpretations of Cooley indicating that
the impact of others evaluations of us can be
directly experienced, not mediated by our percep-
tions or imaginations. It is emphasized here that
whether or not the actual views of others about
ourselves mesh accurately with ourperceptions of
others views is of little consequence. In this we are
sticking with W. I. Thomas's dictum " If men
define situations as real, they are real in their
consequences" (Stryker, 1990, p. 7).
3 Recentstudies influenced by symbolic interaction
from both a Meadian and a Cooley school of
thought refer to this process as the 'Reflected
Appraisal Process1 (Felson 1987; Ichiyama 1993;
and various others). It is worth noting that it is
quite difficult to establish influence from the 'gen-
eralized other' as posited in the Meadian model.
This derives from extreme difficulty in
operationalizing this construct. The difficulties in
this operational ization and of other like constructs
is a criticism often levied against symbolic
interactionism (Stryker 1990).
4 If not clear in the above description, what is central
to this position is that 'mind' and 'self are not
transcendental bodies or psychic structures or
qualities but derivatives of, not independent from,
the social process and thus can be addressed through
a behavioristic psychology.
References
Backman, C. (1988). Theself: A dialectical approach.
In L. Berkowitz (Ed) Advances in Experimental
Social Psychology, 21. San Diego: Academic
Press
Barthe, J.M. & Parke, R.D. (1993). Parent-child
relationship influences on children's transition to
school. Merril-Palmer Quarterly, 39, 173-195.
Baumrind, D. (1989). Rearing competent children. In
W. Damon (Ed) Child Development Today and
Tomorrow. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publish-
ers
Blumer, H. (1966). Sociological implications of the
thought of George Herbert Mead. American Jour-
nal of Sociology, 71, 535-548.
Carlson, R. (1984). What's social about social psy-
chology? Where's the person in personality re-
search? journal of Personality and Social Psy-
chology, 47, 1304-1309.
25
Cooley, C.H. (1902). Human Nature and the Social
Order. New York; Scribner's.
Denham. S.A., Renwick, S.M., & Holt, R.W. (1991).
Working and playing together: Prediction ofpre-
school social emotional competence from mother-
child interaction. Child Development, 62, 242-
249.
East, P.L. (1991). The parent-child relationship of
withdrawn, aggressive, and sociable children:
Child and parent perspectives. Merril-Palmer
Quarterly, 37, 425-444.
Felson, R.B. (1989). Parents and the reflected ap-
praisal process: A longitudinal analysis. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, 56, 965-
971.
Ginsburg, G.P. (1994). Personal Communication.
January 21st
Heritage, J.C. (1984). Garfinkle and
Etbnomethodolog^ New York: Cambridge Pol-
ity Press.
Ichiyama, M.A. (1993). The reflected appraisal pro-
cess in small-group interaction. Social Psychol-
ogy Quarterly, 56, 87-99.
Ickes, W., Bissonnette, V., Garcia, S., & Stinson, L.L.
(1990). Implementingand using the dyadic inter-
action paradigm. In C. Hendrick & M.S. Clark
(Eds) Research Methods in Personality and So-
cial Psychology. Newbury Park, Ca.: Sage Pub-
lications.
Johnson, L.M., & Morris, E.K. (1987). When speak-
ing of probability in behavioral analysis. Behav-
iorism, 15, 107-129.
Kantor, J.R. (1950). Psychology and Logic, Vol. 1.
Chicago: Principia Press
Kantor, J.R. (1982). Cultural Psychology. Chicago:
The Principia Press.
Kenny, D.A., & Albright, L. (1987). Accuracy in
interpersonalperception: Asocial relations analy-
sis, Psychological Bulletin, 102, 390-402.
Mead, G.H. (1913). The social self. Thejournalof
Philosophy: Psychology and Scientific Methods,
14, 374-380.
Mead, G.H. (1934). Mind, Self, & Society: From the
Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist. Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press.
Parrott, LJ. (1983). On the differences between
Skinner's radical behaviorism and Kantor's
interbehaviorism. Revista Mexicana de Analisis
de la Conducta, 9, 95-115.
Pepitone, A. (1976). Toward a normative and com-
parative biocultural social psychology. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 34, 641-653.
Radzikhovskii, LA. (1984). Activity: Structure,
genesis, and units of analysis. Soviet Psychology,
23, 35-53.
Steiner, I.D. (1974). Whatever happened to the group
in social psychology? Journal of Experimental
Social Psychology, 10, 94-108.
Stryker,S.(1990). Symbolic interactionism: Themes
and variations. In M. Rosenberg & R.H. Turner
(Eds) Social Psychology: Sociological Perspec-
Paul Devereux
University of Nevada
The idea that psychology is at least a contribut-
ing factor in an individual's behavior has had a long
history in Western thought. During the time of the
Greeks, Erasistratus used physiological measures to
study lovesickness. The role of physiology was dis-
cussed in the mind/body debates of the 19th and 20th
centuries, addressed in the early writings of William
James and first appeared in a modern experiment in
1925 when Riddle used physiological measures to
study deception in a poker game (Cacioppo, 1982).
With the aid of more sophisticated measures, informa-
tion from physiology is gaining acceptance as source
of psychological understanding (Boneau, 1992),
Psychophysiology has long had difficulty being
accepted in the field of psychology which may reflect
the conservative nature of science in general and its
resistance to new developments. Regarding physiol-
ogy more specifically, this reluctance may have also
been due to the lack of technical sophistication of its
methods. Psychologists were right to respond hesitat-
ingly to this incoming information. Today, with the
advent of sophisticated research tools, this apprehen-
sion must be considered as mere reluctance. Further,
the search for invariant relationships or isomorphic
one-to-one associations between psychology and physi-
ology and the not surprising lack of consistent findings
has also led some to argue for the invalidation of
tives. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
Thompson, L, & Walker, AJ. (1982). The dyad as the
unit of analysis: Conceptual and methodological
issues. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 44,
889-900.
Turner, J.H. (1988). A Theory of Social Interaction,
Stanford, Ca.: Stanford University Press.
Zeiler, M.D. (1986). Behavioral units: A historical
introduction. In T. Thompson & M.D. Zeiler
(Eds) Analysis and Integration of Behavioral
Units. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Asso-
ciates, Publishers.
physiological psychology. One could argue, how-
ever, that very little in psychology would withstand
these criteria. More recent conceptualizations, how-
ever, have been less constricting. Most notably
researchers John Cacioppo and Louis Tassinary (1989)
advance that physiological mechanisms may or may
not be part of some information processing activity
and when they are they may or may not be mono-
tonic functions of some arbitrarily selected perfor-
mance measure. When such functions are found
they are useful to the extent that it is possible to
address issues of theoretical import by employing
psychophysiological measures as a source of data
about the organism (Donchin, 1982). Physiological
information in the above view can be seen then as an
outcome, concomitant, a marker or even by the
earlier standard as an invariant of psychological
events.
Physiological processes can be construed as com-
ponents of an individual organism and it is important
as scientists of human beings to understand what these
components consist of and how they operate. This is
especially true when the argument that one's physiol-
ogy affects one's pyschology is considered. It will be
seen that evidence is accumulating that supports this
argument.
If physiology can be seen as a context of the
individual then a change physiologically represents
an internal contextual change such that information
coming to an individual is now coming into a
different milieu. We can use Dolf Zillmann's ideas
about excitation transfer as an example here. Excita-
tion transfer theory suggests that an individual who
is physiologically aroused will respond to a subse-
quent non-related event in a differential manner as a
result of this arousal. Excitation transfer theory
projects the intensification of subsequent emotional
behaviors and emotional experiences as a function of
residual excitation from earlier emotional reactions
(Zillmann, 1983). The idea of context is especially
important when our language is configural descrip-
tion versus causal prescriptions, with the latter nec-
essarily putting constraints on the phenomenon we
wish to examine. There exists no logical inconsis-
tency between examining physiology in psychology
and a symbiotic relationship between the two fields
will serve the effect of one enhancing the other. For
example, as it has been argued elsewhere, the very
concreteness of physiological data that must be dealt
with on their own terms exerts a healthy disinclina-
tion to "nuerologize" or to attribute nonexistent
properties to the universe for the sake of theoretical
elegance (Donchin, 1982).
One should be aware that this is not a call for
reductionism, rather to use Teitelbaum's (1992) idea
simply a reduction to build back up to the level of
psychology. Stated differently, psychology's use of
physiology is complete when used as a re-synthesis
with psychological information with the goal to in-
crease our psychological understanding. Teitelbaum
(1992) uses the example of a Martian scientist study-
ing human beings. By applying ever more powerful
technology to study more and more molecular pro-
cesses in their tissue will we Martians ever understand
human psychology? The answer is of course no and
the need for psychology remains. It cannot grow in
isolation, however. Information from relevant fields
require examination and psychology's findings need
to be viewed in tandem with this information. It is
important to note here that physiology as well as
subjective experience and overt actions all contain
information about human nature but they all also
contain irrelevant data and misinformation. One could
argue for the supremacy of each as a source of data. To
dismiss any source a priori (as has been the case with
physiology) is not defensible.
In that physiological techniques provide nonver-
bal, objective relatively bias-free indices of human
reaction, historically, they have been relegated to the
task of construct validation (for a review see Cacioppo,
1982). Beginning in the 1980's the role of physiology
has been expanding in its own right. Numerous
journals address physiology in psychology specifi-
cally. While the influence of psychology on health has
long been examined, physiological processes are now
implicated in the effects of facial display and body
posture or subjects' attractiveness ratings of stimuli
(Adelman & Zajonc, 1989; Miler & Kotses, 1987) as
well as sources of long-term marital discord (Bradbury
& Fincham, 1988) and social influence (Cacioppo,
1982) and social facilitation (Gale & Baker, 1981).
The examination of physiology has also been
flourishing in social psychology. Social psychophysi-
ology, (Cacioppo, Petty & Tassinary, 1989) is charac-
terized by the use of noninvasive procedures to study
relationships between actual or perceived physiologi-
cal events and the verbal behavioral effects of human
association. It is a metatheoretical orientation that
recognizes the inherent biopsychosocial nature of hu-
mans. It is hoped that in examining even basic psycho-
logical processes like learning, categorization and
emotion the large part social factors play in their
occurrences can be explained. For example what is
considered an emotion is culturally and biologically
determined and therefore the focus ofeitherdiscipline
to the exclusion of the other is incomplete as long as
social and nonsocial physiological reactions are not
interchangeable (Cacioppo, Rourke, Marsh all-Goo dell,
Tasinary & Baron, 1990)
Physiology has a place in the advancement of
psychology. The fear that physiology will replace
psychology is unjustified as there will always exist a
need for the study of humans in their totality. Physi-
ology can be used to further psychology's goals and to
paraphrase Cacioppo (1982), the methods and theo-
retical constructs of psychology and physiology are
not pitted against one another but rather are joined to
form a powerful, complemented armamentarium for
the study of human behavior.
References
Boneau, C.A. (1992). Observations on psychology's
past and future. American Psychologist, 47, 1586-
1596.
Cacioppo, J.T. (1982). Social psychophysiology: A
classic perspective and contemporary approach.
Psychophysiology, 19, 241-251.
Cacioppo, J.T., Petty, R.E., and Tassinary, L.G.
 (1989). Social psychphysiology: A new look,
Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 22,39-
91.
CacioppoJ.T., Rourke, P.A., Marshall-Goodell, B.S.,
Tassinary, L.G., & Baron, R.S. (1990). Rudimen-
tary physiological effects of mere observation.
Psychophysiology, 27, 177-186,
CacioppoJ.T., and Tassinary, L.G. (1990). Inferring
psychological significance from physiological sig-
nals. American Psychologist 45, 16-28.
Donchin, E. (1982). The relevance of dissociations
and the irrelevance of dissociationism. Psycho-
physiology, 19, 457-463.
Gale, A., and Baker, S. (1981). In vivo or in vitro?
Some effects of laboratory environments, with
particular reference to the psychophysiology
experiment. In MJ. Christie & P.G. Mellett
(Eds.), Foundations of Psychosomatics. (pp. 363-
384). Chichester: Wiley. 4
Ginsburg, G.P. (1994) Personal communication.
Gottman, J.M., and Levenson, R.W. (1988). The
social psychophysiology ofmarriage. InP.Noller
& M.A. Fttzpatrick (Eds.), Perspectives on Mari-
tal Interaction, (pp. 182-200). Clevedon, En-
gland: Multilingual Matters.
RiskindJ.H. (1984). They stoop to conquer: Guiding
and self-regulatory functions of physical posture
after success and failure. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 47, 479-493.
Teitelbaum, P. and Pellis. S.M. (1992). Toward a
synthetic physiological psychology. Psychologi-
cal Science, 3, 4-20.
Zillmann, D, (1983). Transfer of excitation in emo-
tional behavior. In j.T. Cacioppo & R.E. Petty
(Eds.), Social psychophysiology; A sourcebook.
New York: Guilford Press.
Dept. of Psychology
University of Nevada
Reno, NV 89557-0062

Bryan .
Hum Dev
University
, L avirence,KS
 Volume 22 1994 Number 3

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Linda J, Hayes, University of Nevada

PAST EDITORS The Agora

Noel W. Smith, Vols 1-7 (1970-1978) Interbehaviorist SIG at ABA Minutes
Ronald G. Heyduk, Vols 8-11 (1978-1983) Cheiron Conference Notes
Edward K. Morris, Vols 12-17(1983-1989) Graduate Students ofJ.R. Kantor

ADVISORY BOARD
Sidney W. Bijou, University of Nevada
Special Section on Psychological
Donna M, Cone, State of Rhode Island
Subjectivity
Dennis J. Delprato, Eastern Michigan University
James J. Fox, East Tennessee State University
Edited by
Patrick Ghezzi, University of Nevada Dennis J. Delprato and
Sandy Hobbs, Paisley College of Technology Mark A. Swain
Edward K. Morris, University of Kansas
PaulT. Mountjoy, Western Michigan University Noel W. Smith.
N. H, Pronko, Wichita State University PhenomenologicalPsychology
Roger D, Ray, Hollins College
EmilioRibes, University of Guadalajara Dennis J. Delprato and John R. Knapp.
Robert G. Wahler, University of Tennessee Q Methodology and
Interhehavioral Description 14
MANAGING EDITOR
DuaneC. Lord, University of Nevada Steven R. Brown.
QMethodology and Interhehavioral
ASSISTANT EDITORS Phenomenology 24
DebraW. Fredericks, Mark A. Swain
University of Nevada Roger Ray.
A Readers Comments. 27

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 Interbehaviorists in ABA SIG
Meeting Minutes
May 26,1994
Atlanta, GA
Co-Chairs: Linda J. Hayes, Debra W. Fredericks,
Mark Swain
I. TJje Interbehaxriorist Report:
It was announced that despite the increased sub-
scription rates, publication of The Interbehaviorist
continues to run in the deficit. Production and distri-
bution has averaged $2,550.00/year. Income from
subscriptions and donations averages $750.00. Nev-
ertheless, Context Press has subsidized publication of
the newsletter and will continue to do so.
Due to a decreased number of submissions, the
number of yearly issues had been decreased to two.
The number of issues will increase by one beginning
with volume 22. Meeting this goal, and eventually
returning to quarterly issues, will require efforts to-
ward procuring more submissions. Attendants were
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ing their colleagues to do the same.
Linda Hayes introduced the current working staff
of Tl: Sid Bijou, Debra Fredericks, Patrick Ghezzi,
and Mark Swain. It was announced that Duane Lord
had been hired as managing editor.
II. Newsletter Sections:
Some changes to format were proposed and dis-
cussed. Along with regular sections including the
agora, articles, comments and research notes, the addi-
tion of three new sections were under consideration: a
student forum, "alternative views" and interviews.
The student forum, possibly called "student com-
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polished paper.
The "alternative view" commentary will be a
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discrete issue of concern to bothinterbehaviorists and
non-interbehavioral psychologists. It was decided that
the utility of this section will depend upon selecting
participants who, although not interbehavioral ly ori-
ented, are familiar with interbehaviorism.
Interviews, titled "varieties of interbehavioral psy-
chology", will each explore the personal evolution of
a prominent interbehavioral psychologist. The first
interview, scheduled for publication in 22(3) will be
with Sidney W. Bijou.
Ill.PromotinglnterbehavioralPsychology
Increasing the circulation of The Interbehaviorist
is seen as a top priority.
It has become evident over the years that only a
few members of the advisory board have remained
active. This is understandable given competing de-
mands on already busy professional lives, nonethe-
less, efforts will be made to increase participation of
advisory board members.
A number of ways in which to expose students to
interbehavioral psychology were discussed. Astudent
paper competition was tabled since the group did not
feel adequate resources for an award were currently
available. "Student packets" will be mailed to univer-
sities with significant student involvement in A.B.A..
These packets will contain a synopsis of interbehav-
ioral psychology, information on the newsletter, invi-
tations to submit materials, news frominterbehaviorally
oriented graduate programs, and the names of contact
persons near their universities.
It was the consensus of the group that we needed
to maintain a higher profile at ABA in order to recruit
new SIG members. The Context Press exhibition
booth has advertised the newsletter and a poster was
presented at the ABA expo. In addition, it was an-
nounced that a representative of The Interbehaviorist,
Debra Fredericks, will attend this year's Cheiron meet-
ing.
IV. General Discussion
The meeting closed with a general discussion of
future activities. Topics for symposia at ABA' 95 were
discussed, including one on varieties of
interbehaviorism and the construct of time. Upon
conclusion of the meeting members concurred that
they would enjoy spending more time together in
informal settings, such as social hours or round table
discussions at next year's ABA meeting.
Please submit any corrections or additions to the
minutes to Debra W. Fredericks, assistant editor, The
Interbehaviorist, Dept. of Psychology, University of
Nevada, Reno, NV, 89557-0062.
 Conference Notes purpose is to correct that error.
Hearst and Capshew (1988) complied a complete
Cheiron list of all graduate degrees granted between 1886 and
The twenty sixth annual meeting for The Interna- 1919 by the Indiana University Department of
tional Society for the History of Behavioral and Social Philosophy,andfroml929tol987bytheDepartnient
Sciences was held June 2-5 in Montreal, Canada. of Psychology. To my knowledge it was only at
Among those attending were Debra Fredericks, John Indiana that Kantor served as Chair of graduate
Mills, Edward Morris, PaulMountjoy, and Noel Smith. committees. Hearst and Capshew list Chairs when
Given the strong interest of most interbehavioral sci- possible (the first such faculty identification occurs
entists in historiography, most of the papers presented in 1920, the year Kantor arrived at Indiana).
at the meeting would have appealed to readers in one Correction of the record seems best accomplished
way or another. However, of particular interest was the by simply listing in chronological order the names
symposium chaired byjohn Mills titled, "The imperial and the degree granted.
theme: American behaviorism 1896 to 1944." In- 1934
cluded were papers by: Charles Tolman, Carter, Jerry W. (MA)
"DeconstructingAmerican functionalism; Nancy Innis, 1936
"E. C. Tolman's purposive behaviorism"; John Schroeder, Paul M. (MA)
Staddon, "Behaviorism, cognitivism and theoretical 1938
behaviorism; and HankStam, "Rats, pigeons and other Briones, Ignacio T. (Ph.D); Carter, Jerry \V. (Ph.D)
human beings/' Thomas Leahey was the discussant 1942
and affected stimulating debate which continued well Bowles, J.\V. (MA); Bucklew, John (Ph.D)
after the meeting adjourned for the day. A relatively 1943
small group attended the Cheiron meeting. There were Lundin, Robert W. (MA)
no concurrent sessions and the papers were substan- 1944
tive and stimulating. These factors, combined with an Lehndorffj Annemarie (MA);Pronko, Nicholas H. (Ph.D)
adequate amount of free time scheduled for interaction 1947
among attendants, resulted in arelaxed, intellectually Herman, DavidT. (Ph.D); Lundin, Robert W. (Ph.D)
satisfying experience. Readers are encouraged to Neu, D. Morgan (MA)
consider participating in next year's meeting, June 22- 1948
25, at Bowdoin College, Brunswick, Maine. For Hill, Harris E. (Ph.D), Wolf, Irvin S. (Ph.D)
information, contact Dr. Raymond E. Fancher, Cheiron 1951
Executive Officer, Department of Psychology, York Mountjoy, Marjorie, P. (MA)
University, North Yord, ON, Canada, M3J 1P3 (E-- 1952
mail: fancher@vml.yorku.ca). Bowles, J.W. (Ph.D)
1953
Comments and Correction
Mountjoy, Paul T. (MA)
In the last issue ofTHE INTERBEHAVIORIST, 1954
we published an article by Dennis Delprato entitled: Weinstock, Solomon (Ph.D)
Interbehavioral Psychology: Critical, Systematicand 1957
Integrative Approach to Clinical Services. It should Mountjoy, Paul T. (Ph.D)
have been noted that the paper was an abridged
version of a chapter by the same title that will appear References
in W. O'Donohue and L. Krasner (Eds.), Tfwories in Hearst, Eliot and Capshew, James, H. (1988). Psy-
Behavior Therapy, Washington, DC: American Psy- chology at Indiana University: A Centennial
chological Association Review and Compendium. Bloomington, Indiana:
Paul Montjoy on Kantor Graduates Indiana University Department of Psychology.
Mills (1994) stated that I was the only graduate Mills, John, A. (1994). Jacob Robert Kantor (1888-
student produced by Kantor. He based this upon an 1984). ne Interbehaviorist, 22, 8-13.
erroneous statement in one of my letters to Mm. My
 Special Section

Mark A, Swain Dennis J. Delprato

University of Nevada Eastern Michigan University

Despite successful efforts by interbehaviorists to develop innovative empirical methodologies (see, Ray and
Delprato, 1989, Hawkins and Sh'arpe, 1992) the Interbehavioral movement has been criticized because there is no
conspicuous methodology which is exclusively interbehavioral. This criticism reflects a basic misunderstanding of
the position, in that, the interbebavioral community is best described as a community comprised of individuals who
share a similar philosophical and theoretical orientation regarding a general system, or approach, to the study of
psychological events. This is our strongest commonality; not a commitment to any one specific methodology.
However, as indicated above interbehaviorists are eager to develop and explore alternative scientific methodolo-
gies; especially those developed by researchers sharing similar philosophical and theoretical orientations. This
special section will describe the philosophy, theory, and empirical techniques common to the naturalistic study of
psychological subjectivity. The first article is authored by Noel Smith, Ph.D. and describes the historical
development of this study. The second article is authored by Dennis Delprato, Ph.D. and John Knapp, Ph.D. and
describes the identifying assumptions and techniques common to William Stepbenson's ^methodology. As you will
see, the historical and current study of psychological subjectivity as described in these two articles involves many
fundamental similarities to the interbehavioralposition.
References
Hawkins,A., &Sharpe,T. (Eds.) (1992). Field systems analysis: An alternative for the study of teaching expertise
[Monograph]. Journal of Teaching in Physical Education, 12 (1).
Ray, R. D., and Delprato, D. J. (1989). Behavioral systems analysis: Methodological strategies and tactics.
Behavioral Science, 34, 81-127.

Article

Phenomenological Psychology
Noel W. Smith
State University of New York at Pittsburgh
Introduction
Many psychologists believe that phenomenologi-
cal psychology claims to study a mind or subjective
experience and is a form of introspection that ignores
behavior. This, however, is a misconception. Accord-
ing to Kruger (1983), phenomenological psychology
may be defined as "the study of the nature of our
presence to the world' (p. 19). This means that when
we think we think about something, when we are angry
we are angry about something, when we remember we
remember something. Such relationships involve
meanings, and phenomenological psychology investi-
gates these meanings of things to us and us to them
rather than using the impersonal mode of the physical
sciences thatmuch of psychology has largely adopted.
The world to us, phenomenologists insist, is not one
of bare or impersonal objects nor is the body's role
one of a computing machine that processes informa-
tion or neurally interprets the world. The world has
meaningful structure and our bodies live as part of
that meaning.
In the nineteenth century when it was breaking
away from theology and philosophy, psychology be-
gan imitating the physical sciences, especially physics
and chemistry. These two sciences served as presti-
gious models, and the mechanistic philosophy ofBrit-
ish empiricism added to the orientation. The early
investigators held that their task was to determine how
the organism used its physiological equipment to dif-
ferentiate colors, sounds, brightness, size, and even
feelings about the physical objects around it.
Ebbinghaus in the nineteenth century began his
pioneering studies in memory by inventing non-
sense syllables to represent memorized items. (More
directly, he assumed that the syllables represented
the items that comprised a mind as propounded by
the British empiricists; the syllables were an outer
form of inner mental atoms.) He wanted to know
how people learned what was devoid of meaning-
nonsense. Similarly, the behaviorists and more
recently the cognitivists regarded the world to be
stimuli to the organism, stimuli that have physical
properties of contours, loudness, number, size, etc.
The current form of behaviorism, behavior analysis,
holds that reinforcements shape the organism's be-
havior. Cognitivists hold that the organism is a
computing machine that processes information. For
both behaviorists and cognitivists, research in psy-
chology is largely confined to the laboratory where
experimenters set up experiments from their own
point of view, strive to keep all conditions as mecha-
nistic as possible, and direct the "subjects" to their
tasks in such a way as to minimize any possibility that
they might be actually subjective. They take mea-
surements of subjects' responses to stimulus objects
where those responses are assumed to btdependenton
the stimulus, and the stimulus is independent of the
subject and then amalgamate all data so that all
individuality is lost.
What is missing in all this? According to the
phenomenologists it is meaning. To them, we do not
perceive stimuli, but meanings of objects and condi-
tions. The task of psychology should be to study the
meaning of things to people. A desk is not just a
rectangular configuration made of atoms and mol-
ecules but means to us a surface on which we can write
or place certain objects. Meanings may also involve
feelings, values, and judgments. And these meanings
will change in different contexts. It is these meanings
that should be central to any investigation of human
activity, and meanings always involve a relationship
between the person and the world. We cannot study
the person or the person's world in isolation but only
as a relationship.
The modes of expression thatwe have available in
our language do not readily allow us to express this
mutuality. We regularly refer to the automobile we see
or the child we hear, but it is difficult to express the
way in which the automobile or the child acts on us.
(Aristotle noted the same problem.) In order to indi-
cate that action Kruger (1981) refers to "that which
shows itself and Zaner (1985) to "the awareness-of
something, and that~of~which there is the awareness" (p.
620) as a co-relationship.
Consciousness and mind get redefined by phe-
nomenology. Consciousness is said to point beyond
itself to an object either an actual object or one thought
about. Therefore consciousness is not something in
the person nor do objects occur in consciousness. As
Sartre (1956) puts it: "a table is not in consciousness-
-not even in the capacity of a representation. A table
is/w space, beside the window, etc." And according to
Lyotard (1991):
We arrive at a new locus of the "psychologi-
cal" which is no longer interior!ty, but inten-
tionality-that is, the relation between the sub-
ject and the situation, it being understood that
this relation does not unite two separable
poles, but on the contrary that the ego, like the
situation, is definable only in and by this
relationship, (p. 80)
Mind-body or inner-outer dualism along with con-
sciousness as a receptacle for objects of the world or as
a representation of an outer world are all rejected and
replaced with relationships. Consciousness is the
process of being present to something else. Similarly
rejected is the explanation of psychological events in
terms of physiology. For example, Giorgi (1976)
notes of the trace theory of memory, "memory always
involves the awareness of the past as past from the
present" (p. 305). If memory were the activation of a
trace, the memory should appear in the present as its
trace does; yet it appears to be in the past. He notes
further that researchers have searched for the trace in
the neuron, the synapse, and RNA and DNA. "Thus in
the history of the search, one moves nonchalantly from
anatomical, to functional, to chemical conceptions
without blinking" (p. 306). Arcaya (1989) gives an
extended argument against the notion of memory
traces and stored memory and indicates that phenom-
enology replaces storage with memory as part of a
temporal context thatinvolves a way of relatingto the
world. The notion that the brain is an interpreter of an
outside world also comes in for criticism: Kruger
(1981) insists that he is not sitting in his brain looking
out at the world and interpreting it. Rather, he is
present in the world, a part of it, interacting with
people and other components of it.
Early Development and Some Issues
Husserl
A key concept, one used by Lyotard in the quota-
don above, is intentionalityt the word referring not to
something deliberate but rather to relatedness. The
 concept of intentionality comes down from the
scholastics of the Middle Ages, especially Thomas
Aquinas, and is derived from Latin intendere, mean-
ing "to stretch forth'. In this view a mind is directed
to or intends its object which is not necessarily a real
thing but is what the mental act is about. In the
nineteenth century Franz Brentano (1838-1907), a
dozent and priest at the University of Vienna,1
employed the concept in his psychology (in which
the mental content is physical but the act of judging,
representing, or valuing it comes from the nonphysi-
cal soul); and Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), a profes-
sor of philosophy and mathematician by training
used it is his development of phenomenological
philosophy.2
For Husserl, phenomenology was the attempt to
describe the essence of consciousness of things rather
than the features of the physical world. This means
that even purely imaginary things such as mermaids
and ghosts as well as objects such as trees are the
sublime sounds of a symphony orchestra could be
included. Essence is what makes things what they are.
It is what gives existence and stability to things and
determines their characteristics. To determine the
essence of the experience of things one must suspend
or bracket (as brackets are used in algebra) all biases
and other habitual modes of thinking. By this means
one obtains an intuition of the essence. This is the first
step. The second step is that of analyzing the essence:
one imagines certain features such as form, color,
extension of the object or any similar object and
thereby apprehends seeing not just a dog, for example,
but any visual object. The third step is that of describ-
ing the essence. The vagueness of this procedure led
to varied interpretations among Husserl's followers.
Experience, Husserl argued, is not caused by an
external object, a stimulus, that is independent of the
experience. Rather, what one experiences is a mean-
ing quality that comprises an interdependence of the
thing and the person. Aslice of lemon on one's plate
means sourness and flavoring; this meaning is a qual-
ity of the person's experience with the lemon and the
presence of the lemon in that particular context. Simi-
larly, anger is not something in itself but is a way of
relating to something. Anger is always anger about
something, not isolated physiology of glands or action
of the nervous system.
But phenomenology is notjustsubjective experi-
ences or the particular point of view of an individual.
It is, according to Husserl and his followers, away of
obtaining absolute knowledge through intuiting the
essences of conscious events. One may intuit that a
square has fourrightangles of ninety degrees each, and
this can be ascertained as a universal, eternal truth by
anyone in any culture at any time period. Conscious-
ness along with mathematics and other essences is not
in time and space as is the natural world.
Phenomenologists argue that psychology com-
mits an error when it treats mind or consciousness as
connected with the body and as a part of the natural
world that obeys natural law. Psychology cannot
experiment on the essence of consciousness, but phi-
losophy can do this and at the same time provide a
foundation for empirical psychology that will enable
psychology to become scientific. This is where brack-
eting comes in. One suspends fatattitude of a natural
world (not belief in ^.existence of a natural world) to
achieve pure consciousness. By stripping away all of
our presuppositions about something's existence or
nonexistence one takes on a new attitude ornew focus
in which essences can be apprehended. This Husserl
called "transcendental reduction" in which one no
longer studies the object of consciousness but rather
essences which provide meaning to those objects and
events. One can, for example, reflect on a visual object
such as a book; and by imagining various characteris-
tics of it such as its weight, its appearance from various
angles, its printwith readable characters, its shape, one
intuits its essence and that of similar objects. This
procedure apprehends the process by which the char-
acteristics of objects come to have a unity and whole-
ness to us despite their diverse features, features by
which we know the object and which persist on subse-
quent contacts with it. These characteristic meanings
differ from the natural ones that the chemist or physi-
cist would describe. As an example, consider the
Miiller-Lyer illusion:
The investigator could, following a physicalistic model,
ask participants to measure the length of each arrow
shaft and report the results. This would miss the
illusion that would occur in a phenomenological pro-
cedure. In another example, Purkinje, a Czech physi-
ologist, observed a color shift in his flower garden at
dusk. Reds turned to grays while blues became lighter
and retained the color after other colors had faded. By
holding a neutral attitude-bracketing or accepting
what was presented to consciousness instead of inter-
preting what he "knew" to be reds and blues-he
discovered the true essence under those lighting
conditions. This color shift could not be learned
 from reading of instruments because it is a strictly
organismic event. Today it is known as the Purkinje
phenomenon or Purkinje effect and has applications
in what colors show up most or least in varying
intensities of light. Phenomenologists cite this find-
ing as a example of the fruits of the phenomenologi-
cal method and as indispensable to psychology
(although Purkinje did not knowingly use such a
method).
Attitudes about natural events arise from a par-
ticular time and context or a particular theory. For
example, Newtonian physics considered gravity to be
force acting at a distance between bodies in space;
physics of general relativity considers gravity to be
equivalent to acceleration in a space that is distorted by
bodies of mass. In contrast to these theories, the
knowledge of essences such as the apparent difference
of arrow shafts in the Muller-Lyer illusion is, accord-
ing to Husserlerians, free of all theories, opinions,
assumptions, biases, cultural beliefs, etc. It is abso-
lute, nonrelative, and eternal. A stone age woman or
a Wall Street broker would intuit the same essence.
Some phenomenological psychologists reject the
claims of absoluteness (e.g., Snyder, 1988); some even
reject Husserl (e.g. Henley, 1986). Others have main-
tained that phenomenological philosophy withits tran-
scendental reduction (often referred to as "phenom-
enological reduction" or-rnerely "reduction") is anec-
essary foundation for a scientific psychology (e.g.,
Davidson, 1988 Jennings, 1986).
Toward the end of his life Husserl began develop-
ing a phenomenological psychology in which he ac-
cepted experimental methods as a means of assistance
in the phenomenological method. But he always
rejected the collection of correlated facts as making for
an empirical psychology. Rather it was the discovery
of the meanings of things as people orient toward the
world that remained paramount for him, life as it is
lived.
The Frencff Connection
Merleau-Ponty
It was in France that a more direct effort to apply
phenomenology to psychology was developed. The
principal figure in this event was Merleau-Ponty (1908-
1961) who held an appointment in psychology and
child pedagogy at the Sorbonne in Paris and later
received an appointment in philosophy at the College
de France. (Jean Piaget later filled his position at the
Sorbonne and replaced his phenomenological psy-
chology of children with cognitive child psychol-
ogy.) It was his work in phenomenology that came
to the attention of American psychologists. His
book, The Structure of Behavior, as the title suggests,
has important points in common with behaviorism.
However, this is not the mechanistic behaviorism of
Watson but behaviorism as broadly conceived. In
Kvale and Grenness's interpretation (1967), behavior
is "man's meaningful relatedness to the world" and in
such a relationship "neither can be defined indepen-
dent of the other" (p. 137). Merleau-Ponty's major
goal was to study the relationship between con-
sciousness and nature, and consciousness he found
to be a form of behavior. He rejected the assumption
of consciousness as pure subjectivity. To him behav-
ior is part of a structured context and replaces the
mind-body distinction. Structure refers to the dia-
lectic process (Kockelmans, 1985, p. 126) or relation-
ship as part of a context. These relationships involve
a more or less stable form. For example, joy will
differ in its character from one situation and one
time to another. It is never the same twice, but it has
a meaningful commonality, form, or structure that
runs through all instances.
In his analysis, a presumed transcendental mind
and mechanistic reactions to stimuli give way to an
interaction or dialectical interchange between the per-
son and that person's world. That is, rather than
assuming a ghostly guiding agent inside the organism
or responses due to conditioning, he looks for concrete
interchanges between the person-and the person's
world. The organization of the human body with its
particular sensory organs, mobility and capabilities
for thinking, perceiving, etc. select for the behaviors
that occur in this circular dialectic; and these behav-
iors in turn provide further selection to the body's
participation and it to the qualities of the behaviors.
This dialectic process comprises meanings.3
Rather than a stimulus that elicits a response,
Merleau-Ponty finds that one cannotidentify a stimu-
lus apart from a response, as for example in a painful
stimulus. Further, the stimulus is actually both "the
physical event as it is in itself, on the one hand, and the
situation as it is 'for the organism,1 on the other, with
only the latter being decisive in the reactions (p. 129).
In other words, it is not the physical properties of the
stimulus that are important in behavior but what the
object or event means to the person. Fine wine may
mean a delightful tasting experience to a wine connois-
seur but an evil liquid to a Muslim. Its physical
 properties have no direct relevance to the dialectic
process.
Just as stimulus separates into two distinct charac-
teristics, so too does response. The "sum of the
movements actually executed" have an "objective
relation with the physical world" whereas these same
movements as "behavior so-called" have an internal
articulation as a kinetic melody gifted with a meaning"
(p. 130). That is, movements as mere movements are
physicalistic and devoid of meaning butmovements as
behavior (in interdependence with the stimulus as
meaning, presumably) are a part of the meaningful
world, the world as experience. Both stimulus and
response "are linked internally by their common par-
ticipation in a structure" (p. 130) involving a circular
process rather than cause and effect. A stimulus does
not cause a response but the two interact with each
other giving rise to ever changing meanings.
Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception is
aimed more at providing a basis ofhis philosophy than
at establishing a model for psychology. Nevertheless,
it provides much that is relevant to psychology; and,
like Structure of Behavior draws heavily on research
that was available at that time, including that from
psychology, psychopathology, and clinical medicine
(esp. brain injuries), often with a point by point refer-
ence to that research.
It is perception, he holds, that provides "a win-
dow" to meanings. It is a way of understanding the
dialectic between consciousness and the world. Fun-
damental to perceiving is attending. In an objectivist's
world, he notes, there would be no way for us to attend
to one object or situation ratherthan another. But the
experience of attention establishes figure on what was
previously ground. Now we see the bird in the tree as
figure where we previously saw only the tree, the
ground. Attending provides the unity of a new mean-
ings but does not constitute new meanings or provide
for their origin. New meanings occur in perception as
happens in examining a cube (treated primarily in
Structure of Behavior). In a phenomenological reduc-
tion one finds that a cube never presents itself as
having six sides with equal angles at each corner.
Instead, "it presents itself in a series of profiles, each
of which announces the cube inits entirety but without
revealing it" (Brannon, 1967, p. 29). What it shows is
affected by its context, such as lighting and the view-
ing angle and the viewer's distance from it. Never does
it present itself as a six sided figure. That would only
be possible in a completely disembodied conscious-
ness. By redefining and recognizing the object and -
consciousness of it in terms of the experience in which
both occur, one can function phenomenological. Such
a procedure constitutes a reduction. The reduction
provides the tools for a critique ofvarious approaches
to psychology and the presuppositions involved. It
also provides a basis for a redefining of the mental and
the physiological.
Rather than regarding perception as a product of
the body's physiology, Merleau-Ponty regards the
body as providing the condition for perception of
objects and the meanings that come from the percep-
tion. An object is a structure for consciousness, and
consciousness is always of some object. Conscious-
ness ofsomethingand the structure for consciousness
that the object provides would each cease to be without
the other.4 This is a dialectical relationship. Each
implies the other, its opposite. The body is only
completely constituted with consciousness. The ob-
ject then is a counterpoint to the body and to existence
in which the body provides stabilized structure. Mean-
ing is as much a part of the body as it is of the object:
in Merleau-Ponty's expression, "j'en suis" (I am of it.)
Giorgi (1975) addresses this when he says, "Sleekness
belongs to the airplane as much as it does to my
perceiving it." It is not that one is objective and the
other subjective but both are objective in their own
way.
In his analysis of the senses, each -sense-such as
taste, vision, hearing, smelling-involves a different
behavior structure which cannot be interchanged but
nevertheless interpenetrate one another. Welookata
drum and see its loudness. We read a maxim and see .
its lesson. We see strength in a steel beam and weight
in a boulder; we hear fire in a "hot" trumpet; we hear
a lively rhythm and feel energized. Perceptual synthe-
sis is through the body, not through thought, not
through interpretation. Although we see our word
through two separate eyes, the single view of .that
world we experience is not because of transformation
by neurons or because we think about the merger of
two images or reinterpret two images as one but
because of body organization as it relates to the per-
ceived world. And intersensory events (hear fire in the
sound of a trumpet) involve a perceptual synthesis
similar to that of intrasensory events (see a single
object with two eyes). Sensing involves the whole
body but particularly with the sense modality in-
volved. No interpreter-neuronal or intellectual-is
needed. Instead, there is a unity involving visual
10
intentionality with the object seen. Merleau-Ponty
refers to "the roots of the mind in its body and in its
world" (1964b, p. 3) in opposition to perception as
result of mechanical actions of stimuli on the sense
organs and to consciousness ormind as an interpretive
agent sitting in the body. Perhaps a statement about
color expresses as well as any the thoroughgoing
interdependence of thebody and its world thatMerleau-
Ponty emphasizes: "...colors...are themselves differ-
ent modalities of our co-existence with the world"
(1964b, p. 5).
An important question in understanding percep-
tion is that of constancies. In the case of size con-
stancy, for example, why do we see an adult at a
distance not as small but as the same size as when the
person is close? For Merleau-Ponty it is not because
a disembodied mind or brain is reinterpreting the size
as the distance changes. Rather, it is because the
perception as lived, as experienced, is one of same size
adult at different distances against the appropriate
ground. He(1964a)treatsanumberofotherconstancies
in a similar manner.
As for the role of illumination in perception it is
not, he insists, one of the brain converting light waves
into color or into an object. We don't see illumination
but according to it; it is a medium for those things we
do see. Illumination mediates color and provides a
condition.
Because he holds that the person and the person's
world comprise one another, he finds that psychologi-
cal events do not involve cause-effect relationships.
The world does not cause the person to behave. This
means that phenomenological psychology does not
use the experimental study of cause and effect, and for
the same reason rejects independent and dependent
variables, control groups, and testing of hypotheses.
Hypotheses imply that some hidden condition is caus-
ing the observed event, and so this cause-effect as-
sumption, too, is replaced with descriptions of the
lived world.
Merleau-Ponty's approach to thinking is to treat it
as expressing experience we have previously lived
(Structure of Behavior). However, it involves not only
previous meanings but also gives new meanings to
things. Thinking, he concludes, is not locatedin us but
is intentional with the thing thought about and there-
fore has no location except as a relationship, but the
relationship excludes itself. Thatis, it does not reflect
back on itself. Like perception and other psychologi-
cal behaviors, thinking is not a product of neurons
though it depends on the body; it too is a dialectical
process.
His analysis of these psychological events indi-
cates that Merleau-Ponty attempts to avoid both mind-
body dualism and physiological mechanism in favor of
an organism-environment relationship. "Truth does
not 'inhabit' only the 'innerman,' or more accurately,
there is no inner man, man is in the world, and only in
the world does he know himself (Merleau-Ponty,
1962, p. xi).
Interbehavioral Psychology
If we compare Merleau-Ponty's phenomenologi-
cal psychology with J. R. Kantor's interbehavioral
psychology we findmanysimilariries and a few differ-
ences. Both distinguish between the functional or
meaning character of a stimulus and its physical char-
acteristics; both similarly distinguish the response
from the response function; both consider the stimulus
and response to be interdependent, not one dependent
on the other; both indicate the interdependence of
setting and response; both reject mechanism of exter-
nal stimulation or of internal physiology causing re-
sponses and emphasize interaction or dialectical inter-
change between the person and surroundings; both
reject an internal-external distinction; both consider
light to be amedium of contact rather than a stimulus
to be converted into an object; and both reject linear
causality. Further, Merleau-Ponty's concept of the
"lived body" as potentials that interact with the sur-
roundings seems to be consistent with
interbehaviorism's stress on biology as a participating
factor (anecessarybutnotasufficientcondition) in all
psychological events.
They differ in that Merleau-Ponty retains the men-
tal or consciousness in some sense and through the
concept of intentionality seems to contradict his at-
tempt to move toward a thoroughgoing dialectic. In-
terbehaviorism holds that to the extent that the "men-
tal" refers to anything beyond historically invented
abstract constructs, it can only refer to concrete events
that comprise the field of interactions. Thus, enjoying,
believing, perceiving, etc. are interactions and are not
reducible to physiology or to something special to the
organism- As the phenomenologists would insist,
when we enjoy we enjoy something; when we believe,
we believe something; when we perceive, we perceive
something. Interbehaviorism emphasizes these rela-
tionships (while recognizing that some acts involve
the organism and its own response-produced stimu-

lation more than others) as field events to the exclu-
sion of any additional mentalistic constructs whereas
phenomenology retains same mentalism and
organocentrism, of which the unidirectionality as-
signed to intentlonalityis one example,
Interbehaviorism agrees on the importance of
meanings as lived (the interbehavioral field comprises
meaning) and would agree that research with that
emphasis is indispensable; at the same time it finds
merit in the more traditional research as well. Perhaps
this is not entirely inconsistent with Merleau-Ponty if
one considers his position that factual information can
serve as a basis for phenomenological information.
Interbehaviorism rejects causality and hypothesis test-
ing only if these are linear but can accept them if they
refer to field interactions. Apparently phenomeno-
logical psychology cannot accept them under any
conditions.
Q methodology
The search for subjective meanings to which phe-
nomenological psychology is dedicated could be fa-
cilitated by the use of Qmethodology. Both share a
determination to avoid imposing the researcher's ob-
jective structure on the person, to find what things
mean to the person, and to do this objectively. Q^
methodology provides a rigorous way to do exactly
this in almost any situation or subject matter, even with
veryyoung children (e.g., Taylor, Delprato,&Knapp,
1994).
Aphenomenologist's characterization of psychol-
ogy is quite apropos to Q_ methodology: "an
intersubjective communicative science, systematically
studying the structure of human existence by explicat-
ing lived (historical) experience.... While the word
'intersubjective' indicates that psychology is to be a
shared, validated enterprise, the word 'communica-
tive1 indicates that the psychology as a science, must be
built up by what people can communicate about their
expenactions" (Kruger, 1983, p. 19).5 Communica-
tion of subjectivity is exactly what Qmethodology is
all about. William Stephenson (1988), the founder and
developerofQi recognized the relationship with phe-
nomenology and advocated its use for that orientation.
He notes that communicability would replace con-
sciousness, events of experience provide for the con-
course (statements to be sorted), and Q^sorts allow for
grasping essences-but those of the subjectrather than
those of the investigator; when factor analysis reduces
the self-references to clusters of factors, new under-
standings of subjective meanings emerge.
11
On the positive side, phenomenological
psychology's emphasis on studyingmeanings in life is
one that the larger body of psychology can hardly
afford to continue ignoring. Nor do phenomenology
and the traditional natural world approach necessarily
need to be mutually exclusive methods. We would not
want to abandon what we have learned aboutpercep-
tion as it applies to improving the safety of pilot's
approaching a landing strip, but we also need to
explore perceptions as meanings while recognizing
that when meaning to the pilot has not been consonant
with reality the result has been tragic. We would not
want to abandon operant conditioning where it has
vastly improved self-care by the retarded, but we
might also make advances in helping the retarded ifwe
tried to better understand things from their point of
view (note the statement above by the schizophrenic).
Environmental psychologists have found that play-
ground design, as one of many examples, is vastly
different when children and adolescents are asked
what they want than if the designer merely observes
children at playgrounds and records statistics. As for
laboratory studies, eco-behavioral psychology has
shown us the value of getting out of the laboratory into
the world of various behavior settings. These and a
variety ofother methodologies such as Qwill no doubt
be necessary for obtaining a major advancement to-
ward understanding the complexities and richness of
"the structure of behavior" and human "experiaction"
of which phenomenological psychology has made
critically important contributions.
Footnotes
]
He later resigned his position atthe university andhis
priesthood rather than accept papal infallibility that
became official 1870.
2
One of Husserl's students, Martin Heidegger (1889-
1976) renamed intentional ity "being-in-the-world"
(Dasein), and this phrase has enjoyed wide usage. For
the psychologists Merleau-Ponty and Sartre (see be-
low) it included not just cognitive acts but the relation-
ship between one's body and an object prior to any
verbalization or other recognition, for the body has a
rapport with a situation and an understanding of its
possibilities even prior to explicitly recognizing it or
reflectingon it. For example, one jumps out of the path
of a moving car seen only in peripheral vision; one has
a reply to a verbal statement prior to reflecting on it.
Intentional ity also comes to mean a direct dialectic,
a bi-directional interaction between persons and
12
world, See Eckartsberg (1989) for the evolution of
meanings of "intentionality".
3
Husserl referred to our meaning making activity as
the "intentional arrow of consciousness". This comes
from two sources: the inner horizon of our conscious-
ness with its domain of meanings and the outer horizon
of objects and the meaning contextin which they are
embedded. Although Merleau-Ponty adopted the con-
cept of a dialectic to indicate this relationship, Kwant
(1966) holds that near the end of his life he replaced
dialectic, a kind of duality, with reversibility, an inter-
changeability orintercommunicabilityrrom one mode
of responding to another-touch to sight, to touch,
perceiving to speaking and even reversibility between
different persons. Further, "reversibility manifests"
itself in the relationship between man and world: man
is part of the world, buthe is apart which possesses the
whole....There is an interpenetration of man and world"
(p. 90-91).
''Kwant (1963) notes that he refers to consciousness as
t[t
a presence of man to himself" (p. 228) but provides
no analysis of it.
5
"Expenaction" is one of phenomenology's neolo-
gisms; it indicates that experience is an action or
behavior, not a separate event. There is no dualism of
experience and behavior, that is, mind and body.
There is only a single unified behavior but with the
emphasis on subjective or meaningful behavior that
the "experiaction" suggests.
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Davidson, L. (1988). Husserl's refutation of
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Eckartsberg, R. (1989). The unfolding meaning of
intentionality and horizon in phenomenology.
Humanistic Psychology, 17, 146-160.
Giorgi, A. (1975). Convergences and divergences
between phenomenological psychology and be-
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Giorgi, A. (1976). Phenomenology and the founda-
tions of psychology. In Nebraska Symposium on
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sity of Nebraskda Press.
Henley, T. B. (1986) Beyond Husserl. American
Psychologist, 43, 402-403.
Jennings, J. L. (1986). Husserl revisited: The
forgotten distinction between psychology and
phenomenology. American Psychologist, 41,1231-
1240.
KockelmansJ.J. (1985). On the function of psychol-
ogy in Merleau-Ponty's early works. Review of
Existential Psychology and Psychiaty, 18, 119-
132.
Kruger, D. (1981). An Introduction to Phenomeno-
logical Psychology. Pittsburgh: Duquesne Uni-
versity Press.
Kruger, D. (1983). Psychotherapy research and
existential-phenomenological psychology-an ex-
ploration. In A. Giorgi, A. Barton, & C. Maes
(Eds.), Duquesne Studies in Phenomenological
Psychology, Vol. 4. Pittsburgh: Duquesne Uni-
versity.
Kvale, S. & Grenness, C. E. (1967). Skinner and
Sartre: Towards a radical phenomenology of
behavior. Review of Existential Psychology and
Psydiatry, 7, 128-150.
Kwant, R. C. (1963). Tfie Phenomenological Philoso-
phy of Merkau-Ponty. Pittsburgh: Duquesne
University Press.
Kwant, R. C. (1966). From Phenomenology to Meta-
physics: An Inquiry into the Last Period ofMerleau
Ponty^s Philosophical Life. Pittsburgh: Duquesne
University Press.
Lyotard, J. (1991). Phenomenology. (B. Beakley,
Trans.) Albany: State University of New York
Press.
Merluea-Ponty, M. (1962). Phenomenology of Per-
ception^. Smith, Trans.). London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul.
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1963). Tix Structure of Behavior.
Boston: Beacon Press.
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1964a). The primacy of percep-
tion and its philosophical consequences, (f. M.
Edie, Trans.). In J. M. Edie (Ed.), Tfje Primacy of
Perception and Other Essays on Phenomenologi-
cat Psychology, the Philosophy of Art, History
and Politics. Northwestern University Press.
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1964b). An unpublished text by
Maurice Merleau-Ponty: A prospectus of his
work. (A. Dallery, Trans.). In J. M. Edie (Ed.),
The Primacy of Perception and Other Essays on
Phenomenological Psychology, the Philosophy of

Art, History and Politics. Northwestern University
Press.
Sartre, J. (1956). Being and Nothingness. London:
Methuen.
Snyder, D, M. (1988). Comment on Jennings.
American Psychologist, 43, 403-404.
Stephenson, \V. (1988). William James, Niels Bohr,
and complementarity: V-Phenomenology of sub-
jectivity. Psychological Record, 44, 171-183.
Zaner,R. M. (1985). The logos of psyche: Phenom-
enological variations on a theme. In S. Koch &
D.E. Leary (Eds.), A Century of Psychology as
Science. McGraw-Hill.
Author's Comments
Tlsepreceeding chapter on Phenomenolgoy is an excerpt
from a book in progress titled, "Current Systems in Psychol-
ogy: TJwory and Applications," 77;e book is intended as a
supplementary text in courses in theory and systems of
psychology. At present no book exists that systematically
presents the various theoreticalsysterns in psychology today.
Tljose that are catted history and systems books, in addition
to history, deal primarily with the classical systems-those
up to about 1950and add a few bits and pieces of two or
three more recent ones. I plan to include ten systetns
including one, of course, on interbehaviorism. A final
13
chapter wittbe "Conclusion: Two Major Trends". Tfietwo
I see (and this may change after working in more detail with
all of the systems) is (1) a convergence on organism-object
interactions and(2) mentalism. Some of the interactionists
also include the organism's historical development and/or
setting conditions. (The chapter on interbehaviorism should
illustrate to those who are reasonably astute how this can aU
come together in an integratedfashion, though I am trying
to avoid any advocacy.) Mentalism, to be sure, creeps into
some of these; and some of the organism-object orimtation
shows up in mentelistic systems. Butlthinkthe two general
distinctions are there.
Tin three completed chapters are behavior analysis,
pbenomenologicalpsychology, anddialecticalpsychology. I
would be pleased to send a copy of any or all of the chapters
to anyone who is willing to offer suggestions for improve-
ment: clearer writing, correction of errors, addition of
important points, deletion ofunnecessay detail, etc.^what-
ever would be an improvement for an advanced under-
graduate textbook.
Please direct all correspondence to: Noel W. Smith,
Department of Psychology, S.U.N.Y. Plattsburgh,
Pittsburgh, NY12901
14
Article
Dennis J. Delprato and John R. Knapp
Eastern Michigan University
In 1953, William Stephenson published a remark-
able program for a naturalistic study of behavior.
According to Stephenson, Kantor's interbehavioral
science provided crucial foundations for the former's
(^methodology. Despite what Stephenson saw as
close ties between interbehavioral science and (^meth-
odology (see also Stephenson, 1982, 1988/1989), it
does notappear they have been explored in data-based
basic or applied work, A few of us at Eastern Michigan
University (e.g., Taylor, Delprato, & Knapp, 1994)
have begun examining Qrnethodology from an inter-
behavioral viewpoint. In the first section of this paper
we will set forth some of our preliminary thinking on
this. Subsequent sections will take up some additional
considerations. The hope is that we will say something
helpful to others who might be looking for ways to
answer questions about behavior.
Stephenson (1953, 1982, 1988/1989) and
Lichtenstein (1988) have written extensively about the
(^interbehavioral connection. We recommend these
sources.
Taxonomic Classification
In trying to understand what one might be accom-
plishing with Qmethodology, we have found it conve-
nient to focus on a fundamental component of all
scientific and applied activity. In particular, as Kantor
recognized from the time of his doctoral work, classi-
fication is a fundamental component of all attempts to
understand.
At the level of scientific activity, classification
comes down to deriving categories in the form, of
products that the observer uses to express the outcome
of particular observations, i.e., taxonomy. The most
obvious classificatory outcomes are those we derive
from what we commonly refer to as measurement
operations. Thus, after determining what features of
events we wish to measure, we record such character-
istics as frequency counts and durations. In measuring
event frequency, we have ready-made categories in the
form of the number system1, 2, etc. Timing mea-
sures, as of duration, provide categories such as 1.3
ms, 4.8 hr, and so on. Scientists, in general, find such
physical scales valuable in their descriptions of the
outcomes of observations of physical (or geographi-
cal, or topographic) components of events.
From the earliest point of modern scientific psy-
chology, researchers realized that physical scales per
semightnotyield sufficiently complete classifications
of psychological events. Admittedly, the initial inspi-
ration for the development of scales beyond ordinary
physical ones was the dualistic assumption that sensa-
tions and perceptions had to be measured. However,
one need not endorse physical- psycho dualism to
favor the need for uniquely psychological measure-
ment operations, scales, and categories. Along this
line, we are impressed with the mutually-compatible
views of writers in two seemingly separate literatures.
In both Q_methodological (Stephenson, 1953) and
certain phenomenological (e.g., Giorgj, 1970) work
we find important interbehaviorally-consistent views
that call for nondualistic and naturalistic descriptive
classification of psychological events.
Qmethodology stresses the distinction between
objective sx\.& subjective statements made about events.
The former use categories, linguistic or in the form of
other symbols, that have physical meaning. "It snowed
last night" and "It snowed 3 inches last night" have no
psychological content per se. They can be evaluated
outside the context of psychology. Butwhatmightbe
apsychologicalconcomitantofthesestatements?This
brings in an organism such as a young boy who reports
he enjoys the snow or an adult who is miffed because
of the snow removal activity the snow calls for. Ac-
cording to Stephenson, the psychological events of
interest are distinguished by subjectivity or self-refer-
ence, and Qmethodology provides a vehicle by which
they can be addressed. Subjectivity is not
nonspatiotemporal, nor does subjectivity refer to hid-
den realms of consciousness or awareness. Subjectiv-
ity is a particular person's point of view.
Like Stephenson and Kantor, advanced

phenomenologists "are against dualisms, both of the
world, i.e., a physical real world and its duplications in
terms of representations in a mind, and of man, i.e., a
real man that is visible to everyone and then an 'inner
man' consisting of conscious states of which he alone
is aware" (Giorgi, 1975, p. 201). To phenomenologists
such as Giorgi (1970) and Merleau-Ponty (1963)
Stephenson's subjectivity is the phenomenal which
refers to the person's actual lived world, or how the
world appears to the person. From this view, experi-
ence is not "inner," "private," or distinguished from
(psychological) behavior. Description of the phenom-
enal (or subjective) level of events requires different
categories than the physical ones provided by science
to date. The phenomenological perspective argues
that psychological science has yet to develop adequate
descriptive categories thatreflectexperience from the
point ofvieW of persons who are the nominal subjects
ofstudy.
The phenomenological psychology that we find to
be fundamentally compatible with interbehavioral
psychology takes a radically descriptive approach to
psychological study. Of interbehavioral writers, per-
haps Verplanck (1970, 1983) and Ray (see Ray &
Delprato, 1989) have most emphasized the centrality
of descriptive and taxonomicwork. Most phenomeno-
logical work to date goes about description and classi-
fication without the aid of quantitative aids. Research-
ers derive categories ("essential properties") follow-
ing various guidelines, including critical self- reflec-
tion. Basically, Qjnethodology offers a way of ex-
tracting categories with the aid of a particular type of
multivariate analysis. Kuiken,Schopflocher, and Wild
(1989) have demonstrated that multivariate methodol-
ogy in the form of cluster analysis shows promise as a
way of identifying categories (clusters) in the phenom-
enal or subjective domain.
To help make more concrete our proposal for
using Qjnethodology in mterbehaviorally-oriented
work, let us consider Roger Ray's development of
behavioral systems analysis (BSA). Given the reali-
ties of space, we have to assume the reader is quite
familiar with Ray's strategies and tactics. These are
presented in most complete form in Ray and Delprato
(1989).Sharpe(1991)andHawkinsandSharpe(1993)
provided examples of research based on BSA in this
newsletter. Furthermore, Hawkins and Sharpe (1992)
edited an entire issue of the Journal of Teaching in
Physical Education which was devoted to Ray's data
generation processes.
15
With BSA we seekmore complete descriptions of
psychological events than are provided by conven-
tional data- collection methodologies. BSA allows the
observer to take into account numerous participating
field factors. This is accomplished by first identifying
domains of interest. Domains are macro-categories
within which various measurement operations occur.
For example, in a study of mother-child interactions
we may select domains such as mother vocalizations,
mother posture, mother heart rate, child vocalizations,
child posture, and child heart rate. For descriptions of
the heart rate domains, we can use categories (codes or
elements) following established physiological record-
ing methods. In the case of the other domains, we
might use direct observational codingsystems already
developed for them or first complete aunique coding
system for one or more of them. The codes, e.g.,
mother's eyes directed at child, mother reaches for
child's hand, are categories by which we obtain sym-
bols as outcomes of the observational (measurement)
process.
Ourfield perspective, inconjunction with Qmeth-
odology and phenomenological thinking, lead us to
identify an important component of the above mother-
child field that is not included in our descriptive
system. Although we have included verbo-vocal, pos-
tural, and physiological domains, our descriptions are
incomplete in that they do not allow us to record
uniquely human behavior in the subjective, experien-
tial, or phenomenological domain. By incorporating Q^
methodology into our study, we can obtain categories
(codes) thatcapture each participant's subjective reac-
tions, the point ofview of the participant, while taking
into account our biases as observers.
The outcome of Qjnethodology is a factor struc-
ture yielded by analysis of the correlation matrix of q
sorts. We will overview the essential details of factor
analysis and subsequent rotation in a section to follow.
In the next section, we examine the assumptions that
underlie the claim that factors represent phenomenal
codes saturated with psychological meaning.
Assumptions for Extracting Factors
The extraction of meaning from a quantitatively-
derived factor structure is the most unique aspect of Q_
methodology and the reason we discuss it now. To
those familiar with Qmethodology, it may appearthat
we are "putting the cart before the horse" by bringing
up what is essentially the interpreting of factors at this
point, especially because, according to the quantum
16
theoretical stance underlyingQmethodology, mean-
ing can only emerge from our operations on events,
i.e., the details of the procedures by which q sorts are
generated and analyzed. However, because the quan-
tum methodological nature of Qjnethodology is so
often overlooked, we feel that it is valuable to orient
potential users "up front" so they have a better idea of
justwhere the operations are headed.
The key to getting from factor structure to phe-
nomenal codes is measurement, but not the measure-
ment typically found in psychology. Qmethodology
and phenomenology (see Giorgi, 1970) call for a
radically different approach to measurement from that
inherited by psychology from "objective" science.
In one of the most important papers ever written in
interbehavioral psychology, Zimmerman (1979) dem-
onstrated the close relationship between quantum phys-
ics and the interbehavioral point of view. Subse-
quently, in several places, Stephenson (e.g., 1988,
1988/1989) discussed the implications of this for Q^
methodology. Readers who examine faithful repre-
sentations of quantum theory will develop further
understanding of the points below.
Subjectivity is inseparable from condi-
tions of measurement.
To illustrate the interrelationship between subjec-
tivity and measurement, it might be helpful to first
consider what subjectivity is not and what we are not
doing with quantum measurement operations. There
is a tendency to equate subjectivity, phenomenal, or,
indeed,'mental with "private" events in a "public-
private" distinction and with "covert" events given a
"overt-covert" distinction. Skinner (e.g., 1974, pp. 27,
103-104)has beenaprominenttheoristwhohas adopted
a public-private distinction, albeit with shifting bound-
aries. Thus, in maintaining dualism of inner-outer,
private-public, and mental-physical, mentals an inner
process, often "behaving weakly" amenable to study
by amplification methodology, such as physiological
. ones and by asking the person to "think out loud."
Q_ methodology, phenomenology, and
interbehaviorism(e.g.,Pronko, 1983/1984) reject du-
alisms of inner-outer and covert-overt, whether taken
as dichotomies or as continuities. Descriptions of
subjectivity are akin to those of quantum phenomena.
As Frank (195 5) put it, "Speaking exactly, a particle by
itself without the description of the whole experimen-
tal set up is not a physical reality" (p. 474). In the same
way, a private event by itself without the description of
the observational/measurement operations is not a
psychological reality. In brief, phenomenal descrip-
tions do not follow lineal rules as they might if they
obeyed a principle of private event -> manifestation
on recording instrument. Instead, they are systemic
where interdependency (<->) reigns.
The observer is an inherent participant
in measurement.
It seems possible to argue that the truly radical and
unsettling discovery of quantum physics was that the
outcomes of measurement operations were always
"contaminated" by observers' behavior. Because this
introduces an inherent psychological factor into knowl-
edge of quantum events, itis not surprising that physi-
cal scientists who have confronted it often remain
befuddled. They fail to completely accept that quan-
tum measurement entails departure from measure-
ment strategies and tactics of classical physical sci-
ence, and, in extreme cases, adopt classical dualistic
psychology and impart mental or spiritual powers and
forces to physical events. Phenomenologists have long
recognized the role of the observer in psychological
measurement and have used the strategy of bracketing
in attempts to take this into account. Phenomenologi-
cal bracketing is aversion of Kantor's dictate that we
explicitly identify presuppositions (postulates, assump-
tions) in knowledge operations.
In applications of Qjmethodology, one way in
which the inherent participation of the observer's
point of vie w is addressed is by the tactic of judgmental
(as opposed to purely statistical/mathematical) rota-
tion of factors. Another way is by "structuring" in
advance the objects (q items) upon which respondents
operate (sort). A third tactic for incorporating the
observer's vantage point is by including it in the
experimental conditions ("conditions of instruction")
under which the participant operates on the q items.
Factors begin with concourse, are inde-
terminate, and are subsumed by the
specificity principle.
The outcome of a (^methodological measurement
undertaking is a catalogue of subjective codes that
ultimately evolves from our interpretative behavior.
By considering how concourse, indeterminancy, and
specificity are involved, we can gain further insight
into how this process is coordinated. Furthermore,
these considerations might help some avoid the temp-
tation to assume that the measurement process, espe-
cially the observer, is magically creating events, a

persistent problem in accounts of quantum measure-
ment.
By concourse is meant the full range of communi-
cative self-referable (usually, but not necessarily)
verbo-vocal statements made by a participant in a
psychological event. There is no limit to the possible
number of elements in a concourse. A concourse can
be obtained by interviewing a participant in a manner
recommended by phenomenologicai methodologis ts.
Each statements assumed to be equally probable and
is devoid of meaning to the observer. The researcher
selects q items from concourse.
Frank (1955) makes it clear that Heisenberg's
much misunderstood relation of (quantum) "uncer-
tainty" or "indeterminancy" conies down to laws of
predicting future events. Indeterminismhasnothingto
do with the capaciousness of events. It pertains to our
knowing relations, to knowing <-> known. In the
case of subjectivity, there is no fact or set of facts (e.g.,
covert behavior) contained in concourse that lies hid-
_den to be revealed by measurement operations. We
believe this point underlies phenemenologists' (e.g.,
Giorgi, 1970) objections to attempts to apply an "ob-
jective" attitude of "natural science" (i.e., classical
physics) to psychological events. The concourse of
subjective (self)-communicability is saturated with
potentiality. It is, as Brown (1988) put it, the
"'quantumstuff of a science of subjectivity" (p. 192),
The measurement process is an indeterminant one
insofar as nothing in concourse is "there" from which
an observer can predict outcome in a cause > effect
manner. AparticularQmethodologicalmeasurement
process does proceed lawfully, and the end point is the
actualization of specific potentiality as a result of a
convergence ofcomponentinterdependentvariables
(for discussion of potentiality and actuality, see Kan-
tor, 1983).
Kantor (1938, 1978) finds the principle of speci-
ficity a defense against absolutism and metaphysical
license unjustified by events, thus of great advantage
for scientific description. As applied to our derivation
of subjective factor structure., specificity means that
the outcome of (^methodological measurement is
conditional on an entire set of particular operations.
This is not to imply that we must abandon goals of
generalizable knowledge. Specificity does suggest
that general principles of event operation are most
effectively uncovered by taking into account that all
knowledge operations are about particularities de-
rived under specific conditions. The specific factors
17
we extract from a particular set of operations are not
the only ones that could be legitimately derived from
the "quan turns tuff" (concourse). There is no one
absolutely "correct" outcome of (^methodological
measurement.
Taxonomy is polythetic.
Until recently, classificatory strategies have been
based on attempts to discern one or a few characters of
a taxonomic group. In contrast, Qfactor structure is
poly the tically derived. This means (^methodological
classification identifies phenomenal codes on the ba-
sis of over-all similarity, multiple correlated charac-
ters, or "family resemblances" (Jensen, 1970). Al-
though phenomenologists frequently describe their
goal as one of describing the essential properties of
phenomena, which might imply classification on the
basis of key characters, Kuiken, Schopflocher, and
Wild (1989) showed how the full complexity of phe-
nomenologicai data is best handled by methods that
allow for class membership to be constrained by mul-
tiple properties. When this is done, we find quantum
indeterminancy in the data. Indeed, polythetic tax-
onomy seems to have been one of the implications of
factor analysis from the inception of this class of
multivariate tactic.
Categories are abductively or reflec-
tively derived.
We eventually reach a point at which we must
come to some conclusion regarding just what quanti-
tatively-specified factors mean. Stephenson (1983)
describes part of his behavior during this process
thusly:
I like to spend a lot of time with each factor,
statement by statement.... This gives me time
to cogitate about statements....(p. 81)
Phenomenologists refer to "reflective reading" or the
reflective method. As Giorgi (1970) puts it, "reflection
is not speculation; the former is always directed towards
the actual and is based upon it..." (p. 214). Admittedly,
the method of reflection, or what Stephenson (1961)
has referred to as abduction, following C. S. Peircej is
in need of methodological attention. However,
Stephenson (1961) and Giorgi (1970) are recognizing
an important class of scientific behavior that is not
covered by conventional categories of deduction and
induction. Abductory reasoning seems to be consistent
with field/system views (e.g., Plas, 1986) in which we
lookforcommonalityofpatternandredundanciesover
18
seemingly disparate phenomena. Reasoning is not
lineal as with deduction and induction, but recursive.
Consistent with the principle of quantum
indeterminancy, there are no absolute criteria of "right"
and "wrong" behind the method ofreflectionorabduc-
tion, a state of affairs that has been associated with no
small number of problems forphenomenologists them-
selves. And scientists holding to "natural science"
methods (classical physics) tend to find reflection
abhorrent. But, as we have tried to indicate, it appears
that subjectivity is best not viewed as following prin-
ciples of classical science.
Selecting Q Items
The most obvious feature of the (^methodological
procedure is the participants' active manipulations of
what are generically referred to as q items. Partici-
pants operate on (sort) q items according to rules that
we will discuss in the following section. At this point,
we will overview some considerations for selecting q
items.
Q_ items can be anything that participants can
interactwith from their point ofview. Although, they
can be in the form of pictures, things, or statements, we
will concentrate on the latter here. The investigator
derives the q-item sample from the concourse. Be-
cause concourse has no fixed limitation on the number
of elements it contains, most procedures for selecting
q items begin with a sample from concourse that is
further reduced in size according to particular consid-
erations.
One source of q items is any available body of oral
or written material on a topic. For example, in
researching a psychologist's stance on methodology,
one might consider using statements from the litera-
ture ("the experimental method is necessary to deter-
mine cause and effect/' "experimentation is over-
rated," "careful study of single cases is the key to
understanding"). We have developed a method of
selecting q items that is based on phenomenological
research as presented in Kruger (1981). We find this
method is flexible (it can be applied with varying
degrees of completeness), and it is-compatible with
Brown's (1980) guidelines.
Participants.
The investigator can rely on a single participant
or on multiple participants as the source of q items.
Interview.
Data collection begins with a spoken interview
on the focal topic. It is tape-recorded and subsequently
transcribed. The interview should be open- ended
and as non-directive as possible. Interviewers must
avoid as best they can anything that might "lead" the
interviewee. A structured interview would introduce
too many of the researcher's assumptions. Thus, we
use a semi- structured interview, with questions
designed to help participants verbalize their
experience.
Extracting q items.
The process of reducing the protocol begins by
identifying natural meaning units (NMUs). These are
statements that express a single aspect of the
participant's experience. Four NMUs are indicated
in the following portion of a protocol when the
participant was asked, "What's it like when you're
sad? How do you feel?"
A little bit withdrawn./1 Probably not too
much of a behavioral difference./2 Not as
muchenergy./3 Generally won't be doing any
of those up behaviors./,
Next, the NMUs are reduced as much as possible while
retaining the participant's meaning. The above four
were reduced as follows:
1 Withdrawn feeling.
2 Feelings of sadness not obvious to others.
3 Reduced energy.
4 When sad, I don't exhibit behavior that would be
indicative ofsomeone being in aparticularly good
mood.
As the "reduction" ofltem 4 indicates, communication
of meaning in the reductions takes priority over mere
quantity.
Items 1-4 are candidates for q items, subjectto the
specifics of the research undertaking. If we want to
develop a q sample from multiple participants, we
would pool potential q items from all, examine the set
for redundancies and breadth of coverage, and reduce
it to the size of q sample we have decided to use.
Number of q items.
There is no fixed answer regarding the number of
q items that is most desirable to address a particular
question. Certainly, the larger the q sample, the more
time it takes participants to manipulate them. We have
obtained satisfactory results with 24 items. For certain
purposes, 60 items may be desirable. It seems reason-

able that if one is working with a very small number
of participants (e.g., clinical cases), then an item
sample size at the high end might be considered.
Because the q item sample is a sample from con-
course we must be sensitive to its representativeness.
Structuring the q sample.
Qmethodologists have identified two techniques
for selecting q items. Unstructured samples are formed
without systematic consideration given to the inclu-
sion of differentmeanings. Of course, the principle of
representativeness is taken into account. But with
structured samples differentmeanings (points ofview,
perhaps theories) are explicitly organized according to
principles of single-factor or multiple-factor variance
design. For example, in studying psychologists' ori-
entations, items might be selected in a 2 x 2 factorial
design on the basis of two "effects" such as world
views (lineal mechanical, field/system) and science-
practice (basic science, applied). This would entail
includingin the sample equal numbers of q items that
fall into each of the four cells and thus constrains the
number of items to multiples of four. Brown (1980)
maintains that structured sampling is a means for
investigators to be explicit about their own biases.
This idea is intriguing because it is directly consistent
with phenomenoiogists5 tactic of bracketing.
Once we have formed the q sample, we are ready
to arrange and administer the next phase of data
collection. We take up this in the following section.
Administering Q Sorts
Now we address procedural matters and bring up
some of the options available to the Qmethodological
investigator.
In most cases, the q items can be placed on cards
that the participant will actively manipulate. The q
sort is the basic procedural unit. A completed q sort
consists of a distribution of q items. The items are
distributed such that some are ranked "most unlike my
point ofview," or " most unlike me," or "least pre-
ferred," on one end of the distribution. Other items are
ranked "most like my point ofview," or "most like
me," or "most preferred," on the other end of the
distribution. Still other items are ranked somewhere
between these points.
More precisely, the investigator must decide on
particular details of the distribution. The typical
distribution is quasi-normal, thus it is said that the
participant sorts the items into a "forced-normal"
19
distribution. The investigator must decide how
many levels (piles) to use in the distribution. A
distribution of 54 q items might consist of 11 piles
with 8 q items assigned to the "neutral" pile (Pile 6,
going from left-to-right), and 6, 5, 5, 4, and 3 items
in the 5 piles, respectively, on either side of Pile 6.
We ask the participant to form the distribution
of q items by first identifying those that apply to the
left-most pile (e.g., "most unlike my point ofview"
Pile 1 in the above example), and next identifying
those that apply to the right-most pile (e.g., "most
like my point ofview"-Pile 11 in the above example),
or vice versa. Next, they are asked to select the q
items out of those remaining that apply to Pile 2
(now "most unlike"), then those that apply to Pile 10
(now "most like"), and so on until the last remaining
q items are placed into the "neutral" pile. In most
cases, the participant actively places the q items into
piles on a table using a distribution marker or aid that
indicates the Pile numbers, number of items for each
pile, and anchors.
The data recorded from each q sort is the pile
number ofeachqitem. This is easily accomplished by
assigning each q item a number from 1-n (the total
number of q items).
A single q sort performed by a single individual is
not particularly informative. Data analysis begins
with correlations between sorts, and at least 6-7 sorts,
usually more, are required for useful information.
There are two basic ways to collect multiple sorts; they
can be combined in a single study. First, we can collect
sorts from several participants, in which case our
analysis will reveal individuals who form "families"
on the basis of commonalities in their sorts. Second,
and perhaps ofmostinterestfromaphenomenological
perspective and of most relevance for clinical applica-
tions, we can have the same individual do multiple
sorts under different conditions of instruction. In this
case, factors will indicate conditions of instruction
that bear a family resemblance to one another on the
basis of subjectively shared attributes. It is also
possible to have the same individual do multiple sorts
over time (e.g., days) under the same conditions of
instructions. With thisprocedure, we canidentify sorts
(e.g., days) that reflect commonalities in lived experi-
ences.
We find it useful to think of the "baseline" condi-
tion under which a q sort is made to be somethinglike
"Me now" or "Myself." This is a common rule, or
condition of instruction, we ask participants to follow
20
when distributing q items. Therefore, if someone
sorts particular q items under this condition of
instruction over a period of several successive days,
we stand a chance of learning something about how
the individual lived different days. However, we can
increase the degree to which we probe into subjectiv-
ity by using several conditions of instruction. Most
generally, we select conditions of instruction on the
basis of (a) which facets of a question we believe
might be informative if explored, (b) hypotheses
(theories) that suggest particular conditions should
be important, and (c) biases in the sense of phenom-
enological methodology.
Finally, we make a procedural suggestion that to
our knowledge has yet to be made. Because q sorting
is always a series of active acts of preference, we find
no barriers to applying Qmethodology to any organ-
ism, including nonhumans. Why should study of sub-
jectivity be restricted to humans?
Data Analysis and Interpretation
After the desired q sorts have been collected, they
are ready for analysis. Covariation is the fundamental
conceptunderlying analyses of sorts, and it is assessed
by determining correlation coefficients. Because each
sorthas the same distribution properties, the bounds of
the correlations are never constrained. Furthermore,
the outcome of the sort is taken at face value; there is
no need to consider whether a sort is a "true sort," i.e.,
a sort that would be revealed if no measurement ever
were to intrude. Two individuals with similar experi-
ences underacommon condition ofinstruction should
sort q items with similar (correlated) distributions. If
an individual performs sorts over several days, days
with highly correlated sorts supposedly representmore
commonality of experience than do days whose sorts
correlate only minimally. Although all analyses begin
with acorrelation matrix, the interpretative problemis
one of detecting meaningful patterns in the
intercorrelations. Factor analysis is a data reduction
technique for revealing patterns in correlation matri-
ces. More particularly, factor analysis is a family of
quantitative procedures that removes redundancy from
a collection of correlations and represents the vari-
ables with a smaller set of derived variables or factors.
It is these factors that we treat as phenomenal codes.
Thanks to the availability of computerized factor
analysis programs, it is easy to obtain factors. How-
ever, Q^ methodology does bring up some unique
considerations at the stage of factor analysis and
interpretation. \Ve touch on these, as well as on
some general considerations of factor analysis that
might be helpful to one just getting started.
First, there are several methods for extracting
factors from the correlation matrix. Stephenson
advocated the centroidmethod apparently because its
inherent indeterminancy is consistent with the quan-
tum foundations of Q_methodology. But initial
factor extraction by principle components, readily avail-
able in many software packages, seems to produce
factor structures comparable to those obtained by
the centroid method.
A difficult question to answer in the initial
extraction of factors is when to stop factoring, i.e.,
how many factors does one accept? One rule is to
accept no factor that accounts for less variance in the
data than would one variable; this rule relies on
eigenvalues which represent solutions to equations
which will reproduce correlations between the sorts.
Another rule that is used in determining the number
of factors from principle components analysis is the
scree test. This uses a plot of the eigenvalues in the
data as a function of successive factors extracted (the
first factor accounts for the largest amount of the
variance, the second one for the next largest amount,
and so on). The curve will be a negatively acceler-
ated, decreasing one, and the scree test criterion
accepts factors just prior to the levelling of the curve.
There are other criteria as well. In line with the
quan turn undercurrent apparently contributing to the
development of factor analysis itself, factor analysis
requires no absolute criteria for selecting the number
of factors extracted. Indeterminancy reigns, measured
is not independent of measurer.
Factors are defined in terms of how they account
for variance in the correlation matrix. Recall, the
process is one of polythetic taxonomy. We would like
to end up with a factor structure (categories) that
partitions the correlation matrix into as many
polythetically distinctive factors as necessary to ad-
equately describe the data. To include too many
factors runs the risk of imposing an esoteric category
specific to an individual, an occasion, or a condition of
instruction. How we attend to the number of factors
extracted will, therefore, bear on whether or not we
include relevant factors and exclude nonessential ones.
The matter of the distinctiveness of categories is
addressed by factor rotation.
Upon initial extraction of factors, each variable (q
sort) forming the correlation matrix will have ^factor

loading (saturation) on each factor. The loading of a
variable onafactorrepresents the correlation between
the variable (qsort) and the derived factor. Note what
this means. We use factor analysis to reduce the
correlation matrix (of q sorts). If some members of
a set of q sorts have high factor loadings on Factor A
and low factor loadings on Factor B, then the mem-
bers of this set fall into a category defined by Factor
A, and they do not fit into the category defined by
Factor B. If some q sorts of a set have high correla-
tions with a particular factor, they share something
in common. Given the procedures by which the q
sorts were obtained, we take the commonality to
pertain to what we often refer to as meaning or
subjectivity. Just how we determinew/M/a particular
factor means is discussed below. But first, we go back
to factor rotation.
Ideally, we would conduct a factor analysis of the
q sort correlation matrix and end up with a number of
factors far less than the number of q sorts. And each
factor would be defined by a distinctive set of q sorts
whereby each q sort in a set would load highly on one
factor and load little, if any, on all other factors.
Although this scenario is not quite "ideal" for CL
methodology, let us assume it is (until "simple struc-
ture" comes up below). The initial extraction of
factors (e.g., via the centroid method or principle
components method), in which we decided on how
many factors to accept, is not likely to yield even an
approximation to the ideal pattern from a taxonomic
standpoint. That is, variance in the correlation matrix
will not be partitioned in such a "neat" way as we
would like. Acommon result is that several sorts load
moderately on more than one factor. Thus, although
the composite factors are "accounting for variance" in
the data set, interpretation of them is difficult because
their boundaries, as specified by q sorts, are too ob-
scure. Factor rotation is a way of redistributing the
variance in the correlation matrix such that we obtain
a clearer definition of the factors. Factor rotation does
not involve altering the number of factors, nor does it
change the relationships among the q sorts. Factor
rotation is akin to altering our perspective, point of
view, or a reference level. As Brown (1980) put it,
after rotation "the sum total of reality remains the same
...just as the distance betweenMoscowand Washing-
ton is the same no matter where we might draw the
equator or the International Date Line" (pp. 226-227).
Factor analysts have developed several methods
for rotating factors. Of particular importance for Q_
21
methodology is whether rotation is completely sta-
tistical or based on a combination of statistical
criteria and the investigator's judgments. Today's
computerized factor analysis packages make statisti-
cal rotation as easy as a few key strokes. Programs
prepared especially for Q_methodological work (see
below) contain thevarimax type of rotation. Varimax
provides a rotated factor structure that works toward
simple structure. Simple structure seems to be the
most straightforward approximation to a factor struc-
ture from a taxonomic perspective because, at its most
elegant level, each q sort would define one factor only.
Statistical rotation clearly has a place in Qrneth-
odology. However, ifwe are to study subjectivity even
more fully fromamodern quantum and phenomeno-
logical perspective, we will want to consider rotation
that uses both statistical and judgmental criteria (judg-
mental, hand, or graphical rotation). Recall
phenomenologists' concern about the investigator's
biases and attempts to handle this problem by bracket-
ing. (Interbehavioral comment Noteworthy it is that
only an area much maligned for being less than satis-
factorily scientific by many mainstream psychologists
has explicitly confronted biases in the constructional
process ofpsychological science and has attempted to
do something about it. Meanwhile, interpretations in
leading journals, textbooks, and classrooms remain
permeated with the unrecognized and unpurged biases
ofpre-scientific and cultural influences.) With judg-
mental rotation the investigator examines graphic rep-
resentations of the loadings of q sorts on two factors at
a time (in two-factor space} and manually moves axes
used to identify factors (but not the relationships
among the q sort variables) to alter the loadings of q
sorts on factors. Instead of achieving rotated factor
structure by relying solely on statistical criteria, this
can be attained by using one's judgments concerning
which point of view to take. In this way, we can control
for biases, i.e., examine the data from different points
of view.
If judgmental rotation is acceptable, the implica-
tion is that simple structure may not always be the most
desirable criterion for final factor structure, for
judgmentally we may find it valuable to examine the
factor structure from a perspective (by having certain
qsorts define a particular factor) thatis not justified by
only statistical criteria. This seems to be a "revolting
development" from thestandpointoftaxonomy, where
we are not aware of even polythetic taxonomists who
have endorsed "subjective" criteria (but perhaps some
22
have). However, Brown (1980) expressed the situa-
tion well when he argued that simple structure is an
"idealization more akin to a reconstructed logic [as
opposed to logic-in-use which is specific], or to an
absolute interjected into a situation for which it may be
inapplicable" (p. 236). Judgmental rotation and
willingness to accept other than simple structure in
factor structure are consistent with the observer as
inseparable from observed, the quantum relation of
indeterminancy, the specificity principle, the
abductive logic of Q_ methodology, and modern
phenomenology.
The final stage in typical phenomenologically-
oriented Qmethodological work is the interpretation
of the factors. The question of what each means is at
issue. It is easiest to do this when the q items are
statements as opposed to pictures. Factor scores are
used in factorinterpretation. A factor score for each q
item is calculated for each factor. Essentially a factor
score is a weighted pile number (e.g., -5 = "least
preferred," 0 = "neutral," +5 = "most preferred,"
where for ease of interpretation Pile numbers 1-11
have been transformed to -5 through +5, respectively)
that expresses where the q item is ranked for the factor
(recall factors are statistically-formed, representative
q sorts). In interpreting factors we examine the content
of statements with more extreme factor scores on the
factor. It is more correct to say that we examine the
entire pattern of factor scores on the factor, but the
extreme scores are especially noteworthy. Actually,
the extraction of meaning, is very much a reflective
process using factor scores (see above section on
assumptions for extracting factors).
Anyone considering doing (^methodological work
is advised to obtain a program that contains factor
score routines and a judgmental rotation option. We
are familiar with two such programs. One is Michael
Stricklin's PCQ_ prepared for IBM-compatible PC
applications. PCQ_can be obtained by contacting
Michael Stricklin, 3234 South 17th Street, Lincoln,
StevenBrown directed the preparation ofQ^METHOD,
with versions that can be run on IBM mainframes or
VAX systems . (^METHOD can be obtained by send-
ing the command GET Q;METHOD PACKAGE (for
the IBM version) or GET VAXQPACKAGE (for the
VAX version) as the sole content of an e-mail message
addressed to LISTSERV@KENTVM.KENT.EDU.
Conclusion
We have attempted to say something that might
help interbehaviorally-oriented psychologists better
understand Q_methodology. Despite Stephenson's
stress on interbehavioral psychology as foundational
in Qme thodology, most of the latter literature contains
no hint of interbehavioral thinking. And few of those
who take the interbehavioral literature as valuable
seem to have examined Q_ methodology. A small
bridge at present connects the two realms.
It might be appropriate to say a few words about
the operant construct in relation to Q_methodology.
Indeed, the operant has such a central place in Q_
methodology that the only periodical devoted to Qis
entitled Operant Subjectivity. We have found it diffi-
cult to determine just what Qmethodologists find so
valuable in the concept of the operant. TheSkinnerian
operant has not taken mainstream behavior analysis
anywhere near to quantum theory. Aprirne example
here is Skinner's view of private behavior as covert
("behaving weakly") and subject to observation by
amplificationmethodology such as bio-amplification
and "thinkaloud" instructions. Wedoubtthatphysical
scientists would take quantum measurement to be so
revolutionary if it were merely a way of amplifying
events in this sense. The operant turns out to be a
multi-headed construct. Beginning with aprocedural
distinction between Pavlovian and Thorndiltian con-
ditioning, to a purely inferential distinction of elicited-
emitted, through response classes of "non-elicited"
"response instances, and behavior that is a function of
(maintained by) consequences (reinforcers), the oper-
ant is difficult to pin down. In one place, Brown (1980)
states that behavior ofinterest to Qmethodologists "is
operant because it exists naturally within a particular
setting" (p. 4), This does not help us determine how
the operant is so important in Qme thodology. Our
hypothesis is that the operant does contain a germ of
quantum psychology (related to the theoretical notion
of not being elicited and formed antecedently) but that
Stephenson and Brown appreciate this, not the typical
psychologist who favors that aspect of psychology in
which the operant is prominent. If the latter ever
discover what Stephenson and Brown have and follow
through on it, we will witness arevolution in behavior
analysis. In the meantime, we probably are advised not
to confuse operant subjectivity with what is typically
associated with operant psychology.
Operant Subjectivity, the journal of the Interna-
tional Society for the Scientific Study of Subjectivity,

is a valuable resource for Qjnethodology. Subscrip-
tion information can be obtained from the Editor, Dan
B. Thomas, DepartmentofSocialSciences,Wartburg
College, Waverly, IA 50677-1003 (email:
thomas@wartburg.edu). Another resource is Q^
METHOD, an electronic-mail network. To subscribe,
send the e-mail message:
SUBSCRIBE QMETHOD YOUR NAME
to LISTSERV@KENTVM.KENT.EDU. Brown's
(1980) Political Subjectivity: Applications of Q^
Methodology in Political Science is the best resource
for theoretical and technical guidance. McKeown and
Thomas's (1988) monograph covers Qmethodology in
a condensed manner and is recommended.
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America.
24
Response to Smith, Delprato and Knapp
Steven R. Brown
Kent State University
Dennis Delprato, John Knapp, and Noel Smith
have performed an important service by bringing Wil-
liam Stephenson's Qmethodology to the direct atten-
tion of interbehaviorists, and by indicating its connec-
tion to major intellectual streams in psychology, espe-
cially phenomenology. S tephenson maintained a life-
time interest in phenomenology, beginning with his
early work with David Katz (Katz & Stephenson,
1937) and including his critique of that brand of
phenomenology advanced by Snygg and Combs (1949;
Stephenson, 1953, p. 243) and relating his self theory
to Koffka (Stephenson, 1979), who was the first psy-
chologist he ever met, while a student of physics at the
University of Durham in the mid-1920s. And finally,
a year before his death, he showed how Husserl's
phenomenology was compatible with quantum-theo-
retical features ofQmethodology (Stephenson, 1988),
But if Stephenson felt himself in league with the
phenomenologists, he felt no less so with Kantor and
interbehaviorism (Stephenson, 1982,1984,1987).
As Noel Smith documents, phenomenology has
had great difficulty in separating itself from substan-
tive categories such as consciousness, and it was only
in respect to this difference that Stephenson (1979)
took issue with Koffka: "Our theory of self is devel-
oped out of Koffka's, but we forgo perceptual con-
cepts for those of communicability" (p. 8). We are not
conscious ofsomething, then, nor do we hold apercep-
tion of itperse; rather, we are communicable about it,
which means that the playing field is in the open air of
confrontable behavior (mainly linguistic) rather than
the deep recesses of covert mental activities. It is this
that renders a naturalistic science of subjectivity pos-
sible, and it is this aspect of Stephenson's work, among
others, that some interbehaviorists have found attrac-
tive.
So many important points havebeen raised in the
preceding papers that one cannot hope to address them
all. Perhaps the best tackis to present a brief case study
illustrating a few of the main ones.
A point of departure is provided by a line of
research on nursing care begun by Larson (1987), who
administered her caring Qsort (CARE-Q) to nurses
and their patients, all of whom were asked to provide
their conception of what constitutes good provision of
healthcare. Note that this is a conceptual exercise that
engages the higher intellective capacities based on a
priori knowledge. Procedurally, Larson's (^sorting
operation consists of ranking a set of statements from
most indicative of good care (+4) on down to those
most counter-indicated (-4), and the statements in this
instance were of the following kind: "Gives the patient's
treatments and medications on time/' "Tells the pa-
tient of support systems available," "Knows when to
call the doctor," and the like. Larson then proceeded
to calculate an average score for each of the statements
and then to examine item-by-item differences between
nurses and patients.
We will return to Larson's averaging subsequently.
For the moment, however, and with respect to her
asking nurses and patients to provide their general
conceptions of care, recall Noel Smith's reference to
the "Purkinje effect," named after the Czech physiolo-
gistJ.E. Purkinje, one of Goethe's devoted followers,
who in 1825 reported the "fact" thatyeliows diminish
in brilliance relative to greens as illumination de-
clines. This fact runs contrary to what is known -
e.g., thatyellow and green flowers do not really change
brilliance as the sun sets but Purkinje was a remark-
able obsen'er in the tradition of Goethe and was able
to put aside what he knew to be true objectively so as
to enable new phenomena to make an impression and
to register their own factualness. It is this observa-
tional naivete that is central to phenomenology; and by
extension, what is important about nursing care is not
simply how it is conceived in a factual or logical sense,
as is implied in Larson's approach, but in how it shifts
phenomenologically with alterations in the
psychosocial field, analogous to shifts in the colors of
flowers with changes in sunlight.

The contextual nature of nursing care can be seen
mostreadily by "ascending downward" from the group
averages which Larson employs to the specificity of
the single case (Brown, 1981; Kantor, 1978;
Stephenson, 1974). The event was a relatively minor
surgery of my own requiring only a day or two of
hospitalization. Using a shortened version of Larson's
CARE-Qi I provided Q^sort representations of the
kind of care which I experienced at the hands of the
surgeon and the three nurses with whom I came into
contact (one Q^sort for each of the four). I also
reflected back on another hospitalization when I was a
college student, and also provided a Qsort of the kind
of care provided by my mother when I was sick as a
youngster. In addition, Q^sort representations were
provided for each of Larson's nurse and patient per-
ceptions. Duly factor analyzed, the structure was as
shown in the following table.
Factors
Conditions 1 2 3 patient's reaction one of assurance); the second is
Surgeon X deferential (for which the patient feels gratitude); the
Nurse 1 X third is warm and intimate (the patient feels sympa-
Nurse 2
Nurse 3 X Larson's nurses and patients, when asked to give their
Student X conceptions of good care, do so in such a way as to
Mother
Larson's nurses
Larson's patient
Xsignificantloading
Before continuing, it is important to take account
of how the above comports with Kantor's (1959, p. 16)
formula for a psychological event:
PE-C(k J sf 3 rf ) hi > st ) md).
The stimulus function (sf) consisted of the actions
of the doctor, nurses, and others, and the response
function (rf) consisted of rny reactions; combined, sf
and rf comprise the behavior segment. (A total picture
would also include Qsorts by the doctors and nurses
themselves.) The Student and Mother conditions
bring in the historical function (hi). As to the setting
(st), suffice it to say that Nurse 1 administered a painful
but necessary procedure, but with the patient's ap-
proval; and that Nurse 2 sought to administer the same
procedure without authorization, and would have had
Nurse 3 not intervened. The medium (md) through
which the interactions tookplace included not only the
light and air which made sight and sound possible, but
25
also the social and political forces which brought
stimulus and response functions together in this par-
ticular configuration. The situation was unique (k)
and interactive (C). Factor analysis transforms the
above functions into operant factors (Stephenson,
1982), hence:
PE-C(k, factors fl,f2,f3)
Factors 1,2, and 3 above are all indicative of kinds
of care, and this is revealed in those statements that
received the highest scores:
(Factor 1, Surgeon and Nurse 1): Was honestwith me
aboutmy condition.... Gave me good physical care....
Was well organized.
(Factor 2, Nurse 3): Knew when I had had and acted
accordingly....Whenever possible, included me in the
planningandmanagementofmy care....Was perceptive
of my needs, and acted accordingly.
(Factor3, Mother and Larson's concepts): Listened to
me.... Talked to me.... Touched me when I needed
comforting.
The first factor is therefore professional (and the
thized with). It is, of course, interesting to see that
correlate with Mother, the archetype of good care.
Larson's work therefore implicates only one aspect of
care from among a wider array, as can be easily
demonstrated even when N=l.
DelpratoandKnapp,in their article, wonder about
the importance of the operantcy principle in Qmethod-
ology and properly distinguish it from any bio-ampli-
fication that might be intrinsic to Skinner's methodol-
ogy, except in the more generic sense of "rendering
manifest." Qsorts are not the result of introspection,
but (in this case) a reporting of hospital care as naively
experienced. Larson's CARE-Qjnstrumentis builtup
of structured effects (accessibility, facilitating, com-
forting, anticipating, etc.), but none of these emerges
as an effect, any more than do the components of
Kantor's psychological event. The Q_factors have
their own reality, however, much as Purkinje's flower
garden, and it is the operantcy of these subjective
effects of assurance that one is in competent hands,
of gratitude that one is being taken into account, and of
warmth at being understood that are as real as the
increasing brilliance of greens and blues as the sun
goes down.
26
The forgoing will come as no surprise to Profes-
sors Delprato, Knapp, and Smith, for they have already
joined the ranks of those artists, writers, and scientists
who have appealed to us to be honest with nature and
to set aside our theoretical claims so as to be able to see
the world in its own terms before trying to explain it in
ours. The value of Qmethodology in this regardis that
it takes its measures by placing the Qsortin the hands
of the person to be understood, thereby giving us
relative assurance that the categories which emerge
will have some relevance to that person. This, too, is
a form of care.
References
Brown, S.R. (1981). Intensive analysis. In D.D.
Nimmo & K.R. Sanders (Eds.), Handbook of po-
litical communication (pp. 627-649). Beverly
Hills: Sage.
Kantor, J.R. (1959). Interbebavioral psychology (2nd
ed.). Granville, OH: Principia Press.
Kantor, J.R. (1978). The principle of specificity in
psychology and science in general. Re-vista
Mexicana de Analisis de la Conducta, 4, 117-132.
Katz, D. & Stephenson, W. (1937). Experiments on
elasticity. British Journal of Psychology, 28, 190-
194.
Larson, P.J. (1987). Comparison of cancer patients3
and professional nurses' perceptions of important
nurse caring behaviors. Heart & Lung, 16, 187-
193.
Snygg, D. & Combs, AAV. (1949). Individual behav-
ior. New York: Harper.
Stephenson, W. (1953). The study of behavior. Chi-
cago: University of Chicago Press.
Stephenson, \V. (1974). Methodology of single case
studies. Journal of Operational Psychiatry, 5(2),
3-16.
Stephenson, W. (1979). The communicability and
operantcy of self. Opera.nl Subjectivity, 3, 2-14.
Stephenson, W. (1982). (^methodology, interbehav-
ioral psychology, and quantum theory. Psycho-
logical Record, 32, 235-248.
Stephenson,W. (1984). Methodologyforstatements
of problems: Kantor and Spearman conjoined,
Psychological Record, 34, 575-588.
Stephenson, W. (1987). Qmethodology: Interbehav-
ioral and quantum theoretical connections in clini-
cal psychology. In D.H. Ruben 8c D.J. Delprato
(Eds.), New ideas in therapy (pp. 95-106).
Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
Stephenson, W. (1988). William James, Niels Bohr,
and complementarity: V. Phenomenology ofsub-
jectivity. Psychological Record, 38, 203-219.
 Response to Smith, Delprato and Knapp
Roger Ray
Rollins College
The combination of Smith's article on "Phenom-
enological Psychology" and Delprato and Knapp's
article on "Q_Methodology and Interbehavioral De-
scription" makes a very important contribution to the
Interbehavioral literature. Together, these articles
articulate several important points of convergence
among what many researchers would consider dispar-
ate approaches, especially phenomenological, (^Meth-
odological, and Interbehavioral philosophies.
By articulatingphilosophicalconvergences within
the context of measurement and description problems,
Delprato and Knapp especially build a very important
methodological bridge between these approaches as
philosophy and their implications for empirical psy-
chology. It is no small task to bring reliable order to
subjective experiences that are concomitant with the
more overt dimensions that are so much more easily
monitored by "objective" observers. Nor is it a small
task to articulate the role of the observer, as Q^meth-
odology allows one to do. The authors are to be
congratulated for the success of their efforts to bring
this important methodology to those who would aspire
to better understand how to accomplish subjective
measurement in Interbehavioral research.
I would, however, like to encourage these authors
to return with additional articles which might illumi-
nate some remaining questions. The questions I have
in mind relate to how one comes closer to tracking
some of the important temporal nuances ofinterbehav-
ioral events. In my 6rst article introducing a behav-
ioral systems approach (Ray & Brown, 1975), Brown
and I wrote,
"As one first views the living organism, he is
struck by the most obvious and often overlooked fact
that behavior is a continuous and somewhat integrated
stream rather than a series of temporally spread and
segmented events....the behavioralmeasurement pro-
cess is largely a problem of analog-to-digital conver-
sion, which many experimental situations oversim-
plify." (Ray & Brown, 1975, p 460)
This observation seems as true to me today as it
was nearly twenty years ago, despite continuous at-
tempts by myself and others to find better means for
converting the analog to the requisite digitization of
language and numbers (be they factor structures or
formal linguistic descriptions). The strength of Q_
methodology clearly lies in its ability to create win-
dows which allow us to glimpse a subject's view of
events. One weakness is how temporally spaced those
windows are, both from the experience we are glimps-
ing and from other temporal windows into the same
stream. By the time the intrusion of measurement
takes place, the event beingmeasured has longpassed,
and we are much more likely to measure only the
remembrance of the original events or even the expe-
rience of being measured as we are the subjective
experiences we wish to infer with our factor loadings.
I should caution readers not to misinterpret me
here. I amnotsuggestingthere is no placefor question-
ing subjects, whether formally or informally. And I
especially like the prospects of (^methodology as a
means for making such inquiries. After all, how are we
to gather even the simplest of subjective observations
if we don't stop the subject and ask, either implicitly '
or explicitly, in some way?
But I sometimes worry that we do serious damage
to the events themselves, much less the continuity of
the stream of such events (and the stream of the
subject's consciousness of those events), when we ask
subjects to reflect on them after-the-fact. In these
instances, measurement is now the stream of behavior
in progress, not the stream that most researchers intend
to measure.
Interestingly, that is one of the core problems
articulated by quantum indeterminacy. The problem
is much the same as not being able simultaneously to
know the position and the velocity of matter because
we intruded with the light necessary to illuminate it.
That doesn't lead us to despair, of course. It only
cautions us that we know one piece of a very complex
28
puzzle, not the full picture.
Imagineifwehadtousethecurrenttechnologyof
Q^sorts to measure the temporal dynamics and nu-
ances of subjective experiences created by sexual
intercourse-from foreplay, through heightened
arousal into orgasm and beyond. In doing so, one
might begin to appreciate why after-the-fact questions
of "was it as good for you..." become more the ele-
ments of comedy, not serious digitizations of the
analogprocess. The temporal-windows, both in terms
ofwindowed sampling rates and sample window dura-
tions, are just all wrong for the process. But there
surely are many experiences with sufficient stability
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 Number 1

TABLE OF CONTENTS
;Linda J. Hayes, University of Nevada
milio Ribes, University of Guadalajara
The Agora
Editorial
.501)1^051-7(1970-1978) ABA 1995 Program
RonaldG. HeyduW, Vo!s8-11 (1978-1983)
K, ^orrisA/ols 12-17 (1983-1989)
Articles
ADVlSORYjBOApD William S. Verplank.
Some Reflections on Kantor, Kantorians, and
ifJSidney W. Bijou, University of Nevada Kantor's Career 6
:f|ponna M. Cone, &ate of Rhode Island Nole Smith - Response .' 13
Jpennis J. Delpratoj Eastern Michigan University
i|jjarnes J. Fox, Eas|Tennessee State University Tom Sharpe and Mark Shriver.
^Patrick Gh^zzi, University of Nevada The Closet Interbehaviomm of Matching Law
ftjSandy HobBs, Paisley College of Technology Theory 15
./JFEdward K. ^orrisfJL/n;Vers/Yy of Kansas
;g-Paul T. MoCihtjoy, Western Michigan University Comments
^N. i|J. Pronto, Wfehita State University Sidney W. Bijou and Patrick M. Ghezzi.
JlJRoger D, Ray, Rollins College Background Notes on Kantor's Treatment of
^Robert G. Wahlerj University of Tennessee Linguistic Behavior 22
^ASSISTANT
1:
EDitORS Edward K. Morris
* '3 ' .:T-~ ~-'*
SfjMarkA. Adams, DebraW. Fredericks, Mark Notes from the Field. 25
|]A. Swain, University of Nevada
Research Notes
Mark A. Adams <y Linda]. Hayes 26

ISSN8755-612X
 J. R. Kantor Books
A Newsletter of The estate of Helene J. Kantor (1919-1993) has
Interbehavioral Psychology given The Archives of the History of American
ISSN 8755-612X Psychology the inventory and copyrights of The
Principia Press, long the publisher of the works ofj.
Linda J. Hayes, English Editor R. Kantor (1888-1984). The Archives is now pre-
Department of Psychology pared to respond, as The Principia Press, to orders
University of Nevada from the list of books in print and in stock written by
Reno, Nevada 89557, U.S.A. J. R. Kantor.
(702)784-1137
Aim and Progress of Psychology $23.34
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12 de Deciembre 204 Chapaiita The Logic of Modern Science $17.91
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lishes news about subscribers' activities
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 Editorial ABA '95 Program
of
At a meeting of interbehaviorists this past sum- Special Interest to Interbehaviorists
mer in Madrid, the possibility of publishing The
Interbehaviorist in both Spanish and English was dis- Thefollowingpresentationswere selected/row thefullABA
cussed. Since that time, the Editorial Board has been Program as havingpotential interest to interbehaviorists on
consulted and all of their responses to this idea have the basis of past contributions by these presenters. We
been favorable. Hence we are going to go ahead with apologizefor inadvertantly excluding some, and/or includ-
this plan in a somewhat limited manner to start, as of ingothers here that may notjnfact, have an intcrbehavioral
the next issue. Emilio Ribes of the University of character.
Guadalajara, Mexico, has agreed to serve as the
Spanish Editor. Manuscripts and other material in Invited Symposium #134 Understanding Behav-
Spanish should be submitted direcdy to him. His ior Analytic Theory
address appears on the inside front cover of this issue. Saturday, May 27
Submissions in English should continue to be sub- Conference Theater
mitted to Linda Hayes. 2:00-3:50 pm
At this time, the plan is as follows: Articles and - SAM A, LEIGLAND (Gonzaga University - Spo-
Comments will be published in either English or kane, Wa.)
Spanish, with abstracts in both languages. Authors Questions Regarding the Nature of Behavior Analytic
will be required to include abstracts with their sub- Theory.
missions in these categories. Authors are not respon- - PHILIP N. HINELINE (Temple University Psych
sible for the translations of abstracts; however, those Dept - Philadelphia, Pa.)
who are proficient in both languages are encouraged When we Speak of Theorizing.
to provide their own translations. Research Notes - LINDA J, HAYES (University of Nevada-Reno)
and The Agora will be published only in the language Going all the Way
in which they are submitted unless the author pro-
vides a translation. Poster Session #157 Experimental Analysis of
We are very pleased with this development and Behavior (33)
hope that it will bring together our two collectivities Saturday, May 27
in new and constructive ways. Constitution A
5:00-6:30 pm
Linda J. Hayes, English Editor -MICHAEL CLAYTON, Linda Hayes, Tom
Emilio Ribes, Spanish Editor Brundige (University of Nevada-Reno)
Inapparent Events in the Generation of Derived Stimulus
Relations

Paper Session #212 Behavior and Biology

INTERBEHAVIORISTS IN ABA Sunday, May 28
Conference Theater
SPECIAL INTEREST GR OUP MEETING 9:00-10:50 am
- BRYAN D. MIDGLEY, Edward K. Morris (Univer-
Title: Interbehaviorism SIG Business sity of Kansas-Lawrence, KS)
Meeting B.F. Skinner's Dualism: Nature and Nurture.
Date: Monday, May 29,1995 - EDWARD K. MORRIS (University of Kansas -
Room: Bumham Lawrence, KS)
Time: 6:30 P.M. - 7:20 P.M. Evolutionary Ontology.
Paper Session #233 Select Topics in the Area of Paper Session #283 Contingencies and
Ethical, Legal, and Social Issues (ELS). Reinforcers
Sunday, May 28 Sunday, May 28
Roosevelt Independence F
10:30-11:50 am 3:00-3:50 pm
- CHARALAMBOSC.CLEANTHOUS (Children's -FLORENTE LOPEZ (Universidad Nacional
Hospital of Pittsburgh - Pittsburgh, PA), Bryan D. Autonoma de Mexico- Mexicco, DF), Daniel Gomez
Midgley (University of Kansas - Lawrence, KS) (Universidad Veracruzana - Veracruz, Mexico)
Questioning Unquestionable Assumptions: Comments Parents as Tutors of Their Children: A Sequential
on and Extensions ofHuhbardand Wald's Exploding Analysis.
the Gene Myth,
Symposium #327 New Thrusts in the Behavior Analy-
Symposium #235 Book Reviews: The Loyal sis of Development; Going Where We Haven't Been.
Apposition. Monday, May 29
Sunday, May 28 Farragut Square
Burnham 10:00-11:50 am
10:30-11:50 am - Steven C. Hayes (University of Nevada - Reno, NV)
- EDWARD K. MORRIS (University of Kansas - Knowledge of Self.
Lawrence, KS)
Review of George Basalla's "The Evolution of Technol- Poster Session #344 Experimental Analysis of
ogy." Behavior (22)
Monday, May 29
Symposium #240 The Role of Individual Constitution A
Differences and Competence Analysis 12:00-1:00 pm
Sunday, May 28 - lindaj. Hayes, Otto H. MacLin, MARK A. ADAMS
Independence F (University of Nevada - Reno, NV)
10:30-11:50 am Stimulus Functions and Suhstitutional Equivalence.
-EMILIO RIBES-INESTA (Universidad de
Guadalajara - Guadalajara, Jalisco, Mexico) Poster Session #346 Developmental Disabilities:
Development as a Variation in Behavior: The Meaning Interventions With Adults (64)
of Individual Differences. Monday, May 29
- RHECTORMARTINEZ-SANCHEZ(Universidad Constitution A
de Guadalajara- Guadalajara,Jalisco, Mexico), Rafael 12:00-1:00pm
Moreno (Universidad de Sevilla - Sevilla, Spain) - MARKA. ADAMS, PatrickMcCloskey (University
The Acquisition of Basic Competences and the Evolution of Nevada - Reno, NV), Anthony DiVittorio, Rich-
of Psychological Processes. ard LeClerq (Trinity Services - Joliet, II), Linda J.
-JULIO VARELA (Universidad de Guadalajara - Hayes (University of Nevada - Reno, NV
Guadalajara, Jalisco, Mexico) Modijyingthe Value of Living Spaces Through Response
Psycokgical Development: The Role of Competence Deprivation.
Transfer.
Symposium #366 Functional Contextualism and
Symposium #255 Book-Length Treatments of Pragmatism: Philosophical Integration in the Science of
Behaviorism: Representations and Responses. Behaviorism.
Sunday, May 28 Monday, May 29
Bumham Renwick
1:00-2:50 pm 1:00-2:50 pm
- WILLIAM M. BAUM (University of New Hamp- -STEVEN C. HAYES (University of Nevada -
shire - Durham, NH) Reno, NV)
Dualism and Private Events in Radical Behaviorism. Functional Contextualism as a Resurgence of the Prag-
matic Tradition.
- ELIZABETH V. GIFFORD, Kelly G. Wilson and Symposium #407 What is a Word?
Steven C. Hayes (University of Nevada - Reno, NV) Tuesday, May 30
Science, Truth and Values. Bumham
- ANTHONY BIGLAN (Oregon Research Intsitute - 9:00-10:50 am
Eugene, Or) - Linda J. Hayes, MARK A. SWAIN (University of
The Practical Value of Pragmatism, Nevada - Reno, NV)
- RICHARD J. DEGRANDPRE (University of Ver- Words and Behavioral Function.
mont College of Medicine - Burlington, Vt)
Pragmatism's Rolf in the Competitive Struggle Between Symposium #410 The Use of Complex Direct
Scientific and Socially-Constructed Knowledge. Observation Research Procedures to Study Social
Behavior in School Settings.
Symposium #369 Advances in Functional Tuesday, May 30
Assessment: Biological Variables, Generalization Constitution D
of Communication Skills, Functional Assessment 9:00-10:50 am
by Families. - MAUREEN A. CONROY, James J. Fox (East Ten-
Monday, May 29 nessee State University -Johnson City, TN)
Franklin Square Incorporating Setting Events into Direct Observation
2:00-3:50 pm Measurement Systems.
- EDWARD G. CARR, Christopher E. Smith,
Theresa A. Giacin, Joe Pancari, Bemadette M. Panel Discussion #428 How Do We Persuade
Whelan (State University of New York - Stony Linguists and Developmental Psychologists that
Brook, NY) Language is Learned?
The Role of Biological Setting Events in tghe Analysis Tuesday, May 30
and Intervention of Severe Problem Behavior. Independence C
11:00-12:50 pm
Invited Address #380 Theory in Behavior - BRIAN MACWHINNEY (Pittsburg, Pa),
Analysis: A Contcxtualistic Perspective - ERNST L. MOERK (California State University -
Monday, May 29 Fresno, Ca),
Conference Theater - JULIE TETEL-ANDRESEN (Duke University),
3:00-3:50pm - PHILIP N. HINELINE (Temple University Psych
- STEVEN C. HAYES (University of Nevada - Dept. - Philadelphia, Pa),
Reno, NV) -ROBERT E. SANDERS (SUNY Albany -
Albany, NY)
 William S. Verplanck
Knoxville, TN
Some Reflections on Kantor, Kantorians,
Query: Why have I found Katttor's viewpoint
"attractive and inspirational"? Answer: Because
it was based on profound and thorough scholar-
ship that, when coupled with Ranter's capacity for
critical and original thought, leads to an approach
that brings order to our interactions with the world
in which we live. It confronts the behavior we
observe in ordinary, every day living - our own, as
well as that of others. It provides intellectual tools
for ordering and evaluating what psychologists do
- academic, research, clinical, and otherwise.
Grounded in "common-sense" and in behavior
that occurs without the contrivance of experimen-
tal research and theoretical "special effects,"
Ranter's interbehaviorism provides the basis for a
Linnaean taxonomizing of a Baconian collection
ofbehavioral phenomena. Interbehaviorism points
the way to a general psychology that can reunify
what is now an absurdly fractionated field of in-
quiry.
In sum, Ranter's viewpoint enables one to
look at the science of psychology with a sharper
pair of eyes. It provides a naturalistic and empirical
view that (a) summarizes what has been done that
will also survive, (b) identifies the discardably fad-
dish, and (c) indicates what needs to be done in the
future. His diagrams tell us more than do other
people's books. So, reason enough to become a
"Rantorian." One wonders, though, why more
psychologists have not found Ranter's viewpoint
not only attractive, but fundamental for further
advance in the psychological sciences.
Query: Why aren't there more of Kantorians?
Answer: This cannot be dealt with satisfactorily
until we answered another question. The ques-
tion: How does one come to have, or to arrive at,
an interbehavioral view? With this, a third ques-
tion will have to be partially addressed: Why have
Ranter's ideas remained unknown to everybody
else, except, perhaps, as the words of an elderly
speaker at a colloquium who went on and on,
battling what he called "spooks" - or as a name in
a footnote,
"Kantorians" and Fellow-Travelers
Shortly after having heard Rarl Pribram tell me
that he had read Rantor and has been influenced
by him, and then listening to a presentation he
gave on metaphors in psychology, I was led to
consider four groups (fuzzy sets?) of psychologists
who might be termed "interbehavioral" to some
degree. There are psychologists:
1. who know and sing all the lyrics in perfect
harmony;
2. who know some of the lyrics and can carry
the tune, but have to hum a lot;
3. who do not know the words, but can carry
the tune, and hum along; and
4. who have heard the melody, recognize it,
and like it.
Group 1 and 2 are "Rantorians" - psycholo-
gists who identify themselves as interbehaviorists.
The members of Group 1 talk and think exclusively
in terms of Ranter's writings, and they are inclined
to believe that members of Group 2 do not really
understand Rantor, that they misuse or misinter-
pret his concepts. Members of Group 3 might term
themselves interbehavioral, but they have notdone
so explicitly; Roger Barker, for example, might fall
in this group.
Members of Group 4 cannot be called
"Ramorian," but are reasonably knowledgeable,
and have been influenced, if not positively (as by
adopting some part of his conceptual system), then
negatively (by taking heed of his criticisms of what
they have been doing or thinking, and then modi-
fying their activities). Frank Beach might be an
example. In the early 1950s, when I saw a good-
deal of Frank, he told me how Ranter's (1947)
Problems in Psychological Psychology, and his own
work on the Ford and Beach (1951) book, Patterns
of Sexual Behavior, led to his discontinuing his
"rigorously experimental" program of research on
"sexual behavior." (It involved dropping solitarily
raised and housed male rats into a box in which was
placed a similarly solitarily raised and housed fe-
male, brought into oestrus by artificial means.)
Quite a few other psychologists fall into this group,
but have had no opportunity to acknowledge
Ranter's influence by reference.
Almost all "Rantorians*1 (Groups 1 and 2) have
been students of Kantor, students of students of
Kantor, or close associates of these. For students
who encountered Ranter's system "fresh,*1 the af-
filiation came easily. They learned Ranter's con-
ceptual system from the ground up, and did not
have to unlearn so much. Others, who had previ-
ously been trained in different conceptual systems
and research methodologies had difficulty grasp-
ing what Rantor wrote, and learning how to think
and work within the framework. The critical factor
seems to have been long, first-hand exposure to
Ranter's concepts.
To work and to write within the interbehavioral
system requires more than book-knowledge. Fa-
miliarity with Ranter's difficult writings sufficient
enough to paraphrase them on an examination or
in a lecture with a degree of accuracy does not give
the grasp, the overview, or the aptitudes required
for practicing or thinking in interbehavioral terms.
It also takes experience in talking and writing about
a variety of topics within the interbehavioral com-
munity. If you do not begin in such a community,
joining one requires that you identify and reexam-
ine the premises on which you (and almost all
other academic and experimental psychologists)
have been functioning, and doing so using Ranto^s
concepts. Such self-examination is not easy, and
the need for such review is not much recognized.
Most psychologists have the notion that psychol-
ogy is an "experimental" science, carried out in a
laboratory with a research methodology borrowed
from physics, drilled into them from the first
chapter of the first textbook of psychology they
studied.
Grasping Ranter's point of view requires lots
of talk with others in the interbehavioral commu-
nity, and lots of practice (a) looking at the world
with an unprejudiced, fresh, and naturalistic eye
and (b) detecting when you are appealing to an
unobservable agent of one sort or another to ac-
count for what you observe. You acquire new skills
in observing your own and others' behavior,
whether in or out of an experiment, as either the
"S" or the "E." You learn to catch yourself when
one of Ranter's "spooks" slips into your thinking.
These include fashionable and scientifically so-
phisticated spooks such as intervening variables
and hypothetical constructs, as well as "processing
centers," "minds," and "brains." The study of how
the brain functions is both interesting and impor-
tant, but it is the study of the brain's behavior not
of the individual's. Interbehavioral thinking is
holistic. As part of the body, the brain participates
in interbehaving, but does not "explain" or "cause"
it.
It is not easy to break away from Humean views
of causality and from scientific analysis in terms of
single or limited sets of independent and depen-
dent variables, with other variables "held con-
stant." Rantor demands that we consider the
whole array of natural events - of ob.servables past
and present - that play a role in any descriptive
(and hence "explanatory") account of who does
what, and when. Furthermore, we must always
remember that, as observers, we are pail of the
event. (Here, Rantor anticipated some physicists.)
It is not easy to shed the "analyses*1 and "scientific
methodology" expounded in textbooks.
Thus, participation in a continuing verbal com-
munity helps make the break from conventional
tacit premises, the axioms of "scientific methodol-
ogy," and the limited analyses of behavior associ-
ated with Cartesian, mechanistic thinking.
"Stimuli" cannot be thought of as physical events
or energies that are antecedent to responses. "Re-
sponses" are not limited to muscle twitches and the
like. You need to bypass retinal images, nerve
impulses, projection areas - even the electrical
brain-field wholes of Gestalt psychology - and
start with the world in which we live, a world of
tables and chairs, of circles and squares, of speak-
ing sentences, of Roseanne, Beavis, and Butthead,
and of leaning forward in your chair, picking up
the remote, and then changing channel. You need
to take into account all that is going on, as you
observe an event, remembering always that observ-
ing is part of the event. When you have had the
experience of being a member of an interbehavioral
community, it shows in your later work, whether
or not it is labelled "interbehavioral." Witness the
careers and emphasis of Foley, Anastasi, and
Humphreys - each of whom spent time at Indiana
University.
My Coming to Interbehaviorism
I came to interbehaviorism - to be a Group 2
Kantorian - the hard way. My first graduate work
at the University of Virginia was with Geldard and
Spence. Geldard led me into sensory psychology
and psychophysics; Spence made me a confirmed
Hullian. At Brown University, Graham led me
deeper into sensory psychology and psychophysics
(vision), exposed me to Skinner, pounded deeper
into my head the problems of measurement, and
grounded me in scientific methodology. Walter
Hunter further hammered me into the shape of a
confirmed "experimental psychologist," convinced
that the retina/brain and the nervous system held
all the answers. I had already persuaded myself
that Hull had found the true path into that
Camapian unified science.
For me, the stepping stones to interbehavioral
views went as follows;
During World War II, I did field research with
real people, real ships, and real problems.
At Indiana University, when I worked late in the
office, Parker Lichtenstein would come by and
talk, and I would listen.
For a year, I worked closely with Kantor, as
Assistant to the Acting Department Head, and
observed what he did, and how he did it.
As a non-Skinnerian, but nevertheless a close
and good friend of Fred and his family, I under-
took the critical analysis of Fred's system (see
Verplanck, 1954), for the book, Modern Learning
Theory (Estes et al., 1954). I identified it as a
systematic viewpoint, rather than a theory. This
led me to a reexamination of my own views on
"scientific method"* as laid out in the introduc-
tion to that book. This prepared me for a fresh
look at Kantor's system.
e My own research on psychophysics was showing
that variables other than the physical properties
of the stimulus were of major importance in
determining the value of a "threshold," and
indeed there was no such animal no "the thresh-
old" I realized that the more I learned about
vision the less I knew about seeing.
I read Kantor's (1947) Problems of Physiological
Psychology, and worked through its diagrams.
An extended visit with ethologists led me to a
full functional concept of both "stimulus" and
"response," and to recognize the indispensabil-
ity of first-hand observation in uncontrived
"naturalistic" or "ecological*1 contexts.
o In giving a course on Hull's theory, I found
myself progressively skeptical of both his theory
and of the rationale of putting such a theory
together.
With student participation, I tinkered around
with operant methodologies and, in extending
them, noted that the behaviors we found were
more congruent with Kantor's precepts than
with Skinner's narrow views.
I started work on clarifying vocabulary, sorting
out classes of interactions of subject and envi-
ronment, and trying to take into account the
active role of subjects' histories, the environ-
mental context, and the observer in experimen-
tal research. This led me to examine in detail the
operations carried out in published experiments.
I reached the conclusion (to put it crudely) that
if you have a theory, you are sure to find a way
to confirm it to your satisfaction. Such minor
disconfirmation as you may detect can be easily
rectified by appeal to "further research" and
"theoretical development." If not, you just "leave
it lay," and move into a new research area. In
sum, the identity of the experimenter too often
seemed a more important variable than either
the subject or the experimental environment.
That did it; I had gotten there. I was an
interbehaviorist! I had been a slow learner, but
then I had a lot to unlearn.
One other Kantorian has had a somewhat
similar history: Sid Bijou. Like me, he followed
the path from Hull-Spence through Skinner, and
L
then on to his present view. He and his students
now study language in children, using Ranter's
vocabulary and conceptual system, rather than
Skinner's (1957) Verbal Behavior (e.g., Bijou, Chao,
& Ghezzi, 1988; Bijou, Umbreit, Ghezzi, & Chao,
1985).
The Kantor-Skinner Relationship;
Query; What about Fred Skinner? Answer: In
Skinner's earliest papers, he expounded the func-
tional interbehavioral point of view clearly and
cogently. The substrate of interbehaviorism in the
Skinnerian system is unmistakable in these papers
(e.g., Skinner, 1931, 1935), as it is in The Behavior
of Organisms (Skinner, 1938). Robert Kan tor recog-
nized Skinner's systematic and research compat-
ibility, and brought him to Indiana from the Uni-
versity of Minnesota in 1945 for that reason. Kantor
considered Aristotle the first interbehaviorist, him-
self the second, and Skinner the third,
Kantor had substantial influence on Skinner at
Indiana, persuading him, among other things, that
"drive" was a "spook," to use one of Kantor's
favorite words. But at Indiana, Skinner exhibited
the first clear signs of the equivocal way in which
he would later use the word "stimulus," shifting
back and forth between a physical definition and a
functional one (see Verplanck, 1954). He also
became hooked on ever more elaborate apparatus,
progressively limiting the need to observe behav-
ior directly. The Skinner box gave an illusion of
objectivity; it was easy for Skinner to forget that the
apparatus he designed and built was an intrinsic
part of the behavior recorded by the recorders he
designed. (Query: Is it the pigeon in the Skinner
box, or Skinner in the pigeon box?)
Given the close similarity of Skinner's early
writings to Kantor's views, you might expect
Skinnerians to become attracted to Kantor. Some
were, for example, Nat Schoenfeld, who spent a
year at Indiana alongside Kantor and thereafter
exhibited his intellectual influence in both work
and writing (see, e.g., Schoenfeld, 1969). Through
the 1950s and 1960s, there were many other signs
of Kantor's acceptability to Skinnerians in the
Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior
and in other Skinnerian writings -much to Skinner's
uneasiness. (Fred did not like to be considered the
third anything, including being an interbehaviorist.)
This encouraging trend ended abruptly in 1970,
at an invited address Kantor gave to the American
Psychological Association's Division 25 for the
Experimental Analysis of Behavior (see Kantor,
1970). He spent the first part of his talk remarking
favorably on the diligence of Division 25 members
in their research, but then went on to criticize them
positively, stating his strong regrets for the experi-
mental obsession of Skinnerians with pigeons,
rats, hardware, and schedules of reinforcement.
He exhorted them to get out in the world and
tackle real problems, seeking accounts of and solu-
tions to the problems that occur naturally.
From that time on, Kantor was, as it were, read
out of the Party. Skinner himself went out of his
way to ignore Kantor and, when he could not, to
minimize Kantor's workhoweverhe could. Kantor
got footnotes, not paragraphs in Fred's writings.
Toward the end of his life, Skinner's last effort to
remain "first" appeared in a testy (and both sad and
funny) letter published in the ABA Newsletter
(Skinner, 1988) complaining about the "cuckoos*1
who were laying their eggs in his nest. He was
referring to interbehaviorists who participated, as a
Special Interest Group, in the annual meetings of
the Association for Behavior Analysis.
But times are now changing. Kantor's "setting
factors" are creeping in as "establishing opera-
tions." The Cambridge Center for Behavior Sci-
ence tackles issues such as those Kantor spoke to in
1970. Those Skinnerians who have had a full grasp
of Fred's writings prior to approximately 1955 will
not find their development into interbehaviorists
difficult, although sadly, they will probably be
called "neo-Skinnerians."
Un-Kantorians, Anti-Kantorians, and
Non-Kantorians
In addition to "Kantorians" (Groups 1 and 2)
and the "Kantor-influenced" (Groups 3 and 4),
other groups of psychologists may be identified on
the basis of their parallel or anti-parallel perspec-
tives with respect to Kantor - or by none at all.
There are, for instance, un-Kantorians: those
who have read Kantor, but have been unable (or
have not been troubled to try) to use his concepts.
There is no way to tell how may of them there are,
10
that is, to tell how many have read Kantor, but did
not take the trouble to think his propositions
through.
Then there are and-Kantorians; those who
read and to a degree understand Kantor, but reject
or are openly hostile to his proposals. The anti-
Kantorians surely include some contemporaries
from the 1920s. A former student of one of the
latter sat beside me in Kan tor-Skinner "meetings"
at Indiana, where he muttered under his breath
and into my ear in agreement with me - then a
doctrinaire logical-positi vis t-theory-cons true ting-
experimental psychologist - and in disagreement
with Kantor. Thereafter, I had the advantage of
working first-hand with Kantor, and came to know
him as the thorough, conscientious, and sophisti-
cated scholar he was, even though I disagreed with
him in toto. My colleague rejected Kantor*s con-
cepts so completely, however, that he rejected -
even hated - the person himself. I could not
tolerate listening to such paeans of contempt, and
broke off what had been a close friendship.
Still, I was scientifically outraged by such
Kantorisms as his denial of the importance (even
existence) of retinal images, and his statements to
the effect that "there are no such phenomena as
monochromatic light** James J. Gibson caught on
much later. Interestingly, a comparable aversion
to unwelcome ideas is found in elementary text-
books in relation to Skinner, as well as in Skinnerian
books that ignore "cognitive" problems in behav-
ior (e.g., remembering, perceiving),
Finally, there are the non-Kantorians. These
are psychologists who never heard of Kantor, but
who were or are working along interbehavioral
lines, rediscovering interbehavioral concepts. View-
points advanced by Kantor seventy years ago, for
instance, have reappeared in the guise of
contextualism, dialectic psychology, and the like,
Among the non-Kantorians, we may now add Paul
Schiller who was developing interbehavioral con-
cepts parallel to Kantor*s shortly before his un-
timely death in 1950. Ironically, he was then about
to work closely with Skinner at Harvard.
Why So Many Non-Kantorians?
The largest sub-group of non-Kantorians in-
cludes just about every psychologist - both then
and now. Why have so few people had the oppor-
tunity to study with Kantor, his students, or other
interbehaviorists, to examine critically at first-hand
his systematic approach? Why did Kantor remain
relatively isolated in Indiana? Given the publica-
tion and immediate, but short-lived success of
Kantor*s first books (Kantor, 1924,1926), why was
he not brought back east, into the intellectual
power-center of the Ivy League universities, as was,
for example, Clark Hull? If Kantor had been
brought to those centers and been able to teach
their graduate students, the history of psychology
would likely have taken a very different course.
Certainly, he must have been considered as a
possibility for Ivy League appointment, but he was
unwelcome, for at least two reasons.
First, Kantor was an iconoclast. He taught that
almost everything being done in psychological
laboratories was misguided and that psychology
demanded its own new investigative methods. His
views on the research and research methods suit-
able to psychology were unacceptable to men such
as Walter Hunter; even Boring had research publi-
cations. The mainstream establishment depart-
ments of psychology accepted fully the philoso-
phers* of science cookie-cutter recipes for how to
do experimental research, construct theories, and
find explanations. They identified themselves
with haid scientists, with physicists and chemists
in style and in action. The metric of quality -
whether of individuals, departments or universi-
ties - was the number of research papers published.
Universities had succumbed to the strangulation
predicted by William James (1912) in "The Ph.D.
Octopus."
It was all but impossible for students to com-
plete dissertation requirements under Kantor*s di-
rection. Able students of Kantor had to complete
their dissertations under the direction of others.
With no published experimental research of his
own, nor dissertation students publishing research,
Kantor was a most unlikely candidate for appoint-
ment at any of those universities whose unadmitted
motto was "Publish or Perish." (Kantor, we can
safely say, was in no way responsible for the kilopiles
and macropages of trivialities that pass for disserta-
tions, most of which become published as scien-
tific research.)

The second reason for Kantor's exclusion from
the power-structure of psychology, and his isola-
tion from the variety and number of graduate
students found in the northeast, is one I might
hesitate to put forth, but it must be stated. Most
psychologists, including historians of psychology
who do not consider the social context of people
and events, prefer to overlook this regrettable part
of our history,
During World War I, eminent psychologists
who developed and worked on the Army Alpha
and Beta intelligence test had proved to their
satisfaction the intellectual inferiority of, among
others, "Eastern Europeans." These mainly Ivy
League psychologists, together with labor unions,
then played a role in the Congressional enactment
of the restrictive and racist 1922 immigration laws.
The social and intellectual climate of the times
was, in short, more than mildly xenophobic. The
Ku Klux Klan ruled state politics in Indiana, and
was powerful elsewhere. In universities, xenopho-
bia was more specifically anti-Semitic. Restrictive
racist quotas applied, except at the City College of
New York and, perhaps, at New York University.
As for Jacob Robert Kantor, he was very Jewish
- in name, in origin, and in appearance. Like his
positions on causality and research methodology,
he was personally alien, too. Moreover, his icono-
clasm was likely confirmed to the WASP ascen-
dancy their preexisting suspicions of "Eastern Eu-
ropeans." Kantor was not alone, of course. As late
as the mid-193Os, Isidore Krechevsky had to change
his name to David Krech; and the gentile, Harry
Israel, had his surname legally changed to Harlow.
It is ironic that the dissemination of Kantor* s views
was limited by anti-semitism, for Kantor himself
was a thorough secularist, a card-carrying atheist.
Although he acted like the prototypical rabbinical
scholar - albeit one who studied people and their
behavior, rather than the Talmud - he was an
opponent of any theology.
Kantor's brilliance, and the public recognition
gained by the publication of Principles of Psychology
(Kantor, 1924, 1926) were not enough to break
through the social walls built around the major
graduate universities by the WASP establishment.
There was no way on God's Green Earth that, in
the 1920s and 1930s, this Jew with iconoclastic
11
views of psychology as a science could have won an
appointment at an Ivy League school. Well, there
was S. W. Fernberger at the University of Pennsyl-
vania. And, at Columbia University, Otto
Klineberg first broke the barrier, and proceeded to
deflate the conclusions of Army Alpha and Beta.
If Kantor had been admissible into the psycho-
logical power-structure of the Ivy League, things
might have been very different. When talents such
as Hunter and Hull emerged from mid-western or
other non-northeastern roots, they wound up on
Ivy League faculties in fairly short order. But not
Kantor. He never had access to those generations
of graduate students who, through old-boy net-
works, have dominated psychological research over
the years, either directly or through colonization
(as at Stanford, Berkeley, Rochester, and Duke).
Indeed, Kantor was fortunate to get to Indiana.
That he was appointed and was able to stay attests
to his brilliance and promise. I have no doubt that
if it had not been for the systematic anti-semitism
of the WASP establishment, which did not end
until World War II, the number of Kantorians
today would be greater indeed.
Coda
Robert Kantor was a land, gentle, and wise
man, profound in his scholarship, cogent in his
arguments, incisive in his criticism, original in his
contributions, seminal in his thinking, worthy of
the deepest respect and admiration - and is nation-
ally neglected. Sadly, too, he did not always
explicate and emphasize his own unique positive
contributions as one wishes he had. When, in
retirement, he was asked to teach or speak, he spent
time and effort pursuing his war against "spooks,"
that is, against explanations or descriptions in
terms of the supernatural - the mentalistic in any
form, shape, or guise.
Toward the end of his life, he told me of his
disappointment that his viewpoint had received
such limited acceptance. He remained confident,
however, that if psychologists kept interacting with
their subject matter, they would eventually arrive
at the interbehaviorai point of view. Some are well
on their way to getting there. Like Kantor, I expect
they will, but for psychology, this may take a
generation or so.
Robert was a quiet man, a humble man, a
12
gentle man. There is a photo of him taken while
lecturing in the University of the South. He looks
like a Michelangelo Jehovah, caught in an intense
but compassionate moment, a moment when he
may be in the very act of deciding whether to
conceive/have/become a son. (How is that for
hyperbole?)
Author's Note: This manuscript is based on recent
queries from and correspondence with Professor John A.
Mills (University of Saskatchewan). My answers and
other commentary, and the bases on which they were
formed, were written to some degree in the context of my
own progression to the interbchavioral viewpoint. The
author thanks Edward K. Morris for his considerable
editorial contributions to this manuscript. Correspon-
dence and requests for reprints should be sent to me at
4605 ChickasawRoad, Knoxville, TN37919.
References
Bijou, S. "W., Unbreit,J., Ghezzi, P. M., & Chao, C.-C.
(1985). Research methodology for language stud-
ies; A Kantorian perspective. Experimental Analysis
of Human Behavior Bulletin, 3, 1-4.
Bijou, S. W., Chao, C.-C., & Ghezzi, P. M. (1988).
Manual of instructions for identifying and analyz-
ing referential interactions II. The Psychological
Record, 38, 401-414.
Estes, W. K., Koch, S., MacCorquodale, K, Meehl, P.
E., Mueller, C. G., Schoenfeld, W, N. & Verplanck,
W. S. (1954). Modern learning theory. New York:
Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Ford, C. S., & Beach, F. A. (1951).
behavior. New York; Harper & Row.
James.W. (1903). The PhD octopus. Harvard Monthly.
l(March), 1-9.
Kantor, J . R . (1924). Principles of psychology (Vol. 1).
Chicago: Principia Press.
Kantor, J. R. (1926). Principles of psychology (Vol. 2).
Chicago: Principia Press.
KantorJ.R. (1947). Problems of physiological psychology.
Chicago: Principia Press.
Kantor, J. R. (1970). An analysis of the experimental
analysis of behavior (TEAB). Journal of tbe Experi-
mental Analysis of Behavior, 13, 101-108.
Schoenfeld, N. W. (1969). J. R. Kantor's Objective
psychology of grammar and Psychology and logic: A
retrospective appreciation. Journal of the Experimen-
tal Analysis of Behavior, 12, 329-347,
Skinner, B.F. (1931). The concept of the reflex in the
description of behavior. Journal of General Psychol-
ogy, 5, 427-458.
Skinner, B. F. (1935). The generic nature of the
concepts of stimulus and response. Journal of
General Psychology, 12, 40-65.
Skinner, B. F. (1938). The behavior of organisms.
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Skinner, B. F. (1957). Verbal behavior. Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Skinner, B.F. (1988). Thecuckoos. The ABA Ncwslcl-
Ier, 11(3), 9.
Verplanck,W.S. (1954). BurrhusF. Skinner. InW.K.
Estes, S. Koch, K, MacCorquodale, P. E. Meehl, C.
G. Mueller, W. N. Schoenfeld, & W. S. Verplanck
Modern learning theory (pp. 267-316). New York:
Appleton-Century-Crofts.

Noel W. Smith
State University of New York at Pittsburgh
The insights that Verplanckprovides on Kantor
and Kantorians is intriguing indeed, and he has
added new understandings to a problem for which
I have long sought an answer: why was Kantor so
neglected when his system provided such enor-
mous potential benefits to psychology and when
he wrote so prolifically to disseminate it and on
such a diversity of topics?
Partly out of a desire to seek answers to this
question I began a study of the citations to his work
to see if they would offer an answer (Smith, 1981;
Smith & Ray, 1981). The data revealed that the
positive comments far outnumbered the negative
in all categories .(e.g., perception, social psychol-
ogy, language, history). Most importantly, in the
case of seventy-nine references to field and setting,
fifty-five were positive and the remainder neutral.
Not one was negative. What then was the answer?
A few clues emerged from the citations. Out of
a total of 526, twenty mentioned the neglect of his
work. Of these, ten pointed out his ponderous
writing style. No doubt the writing deterred some,
but if one considers the enormous difficulty of
understanding much of the writings of phenom-
enological psychology and yet notes the success it
has had in Europe and to a lesser extent in the
United States, one would have to conclude that
writing style is probably a minor factor. Others
mentioned Ranter's negativism toward those with
whom he disagreed, often at the expense of an
explication of his own position, his failure to
identify with potential allies, his being far ahead of
his time, his lack of an experimental program, and
his lack of concentration in one area of psychology
in which he might have become renowned. These
were, of course, only opinions; and I added my
own;
Of far greater probable importance for obscu-
rity [than writing style or diversity of works] is the
advanced position of this formulation-its falling
outside the familiar dualistic constructs. The lack
13
of an experimental program is probably also im-
portant. American psychology has been almost
slavish in following the experimenter, even when
the experimental program dealt with trivia and/or
unscientific postulation and theory. The latter is
well exemplified by Clark Hull's drive reduction
theory that dominated much of American psychol-
ogy for more than a decade and by the current
fashion for "information processing" studies.
Kantor has been concerned with analyzing basic
assumptions and providing a sound system of
postulation upon which a scientific psychology
can be built; the resulting system provides guid-
ance for experimentation or other data collection
procedures and interpretation of that data consis-
tent with scientific postulates. Such establishment
of assumptions and consistent conceptualization
prior to experimentation, however, has not been
the operational mode in the past. (Smith & Ray,
1981, p. 131).
Another attempt to assess Ranter's influence
was that of Morris, Higgins, and Bickel (1983).
They sent a questionnaire to board members of
three behavior analysis journals. The respondents
noted four weaknesses: writing style, lack of a
research program, failure of the supporters to com-
municate much beyond themselves, and the unat-
tractiveness of "interbehavioral" as the name of the
system. Of these, I suspect that the lack of empiri-
cal research is the most important. Had Kantor
undertaken such research it would probably have
overcome the other handicaps. Verplanck, too,
refers to the research problem in his reference to
Kantor's insistence "that psychology demanded its
own investigative methods" and that this left him
out of the mainstream. Kantor did not provide
those methods, and only now are some beginning
to emerge (e.g., Ray, 1992; Ray & Delprato, 1989;
Sharpe, 1992). However, Kantor did not oppose
all conventional research: much is cited with ap-
proval in the two editions of the Survey (Kantor,
14
1933; Kantor & Smith, 1975). But he did oppose
interpreting the results in terms of traditional con-
structs.
In addition to the research iconoclasm,
Verplanck provides a reason that I had previously
seen no reference to and had never even conceived
of. Chalk up that oversight to my ignorance or
naivete" orboth. Verplanck's revelation of the anti-
semitism in the prestigious universities that shut
out all persons who had Jewish backgrounds puts
what is probably the final piece into the puzzle,
and most likely a big piece at that. Kantor's system
that did not include a research program but that
did include vigorous criticisms of many of the
interpretations of those who were doing research
might alone have kept him out of the halls of the
mighty; but when we add his Jewish name to that
disadvantage, the combination not only kept him
out but probably also precluded much serious
consideration of his views. When we join to those
major factors the minor ones, we can see why he
was so deeply buried by mainstream psychology.
It is now clearer why only his direct students and
associates and a handful of others came to appreci-
ate the brilliant and far-reaching contribution that
he had to offer. That misfortune is the misfortune
of psychology today.
References
Kantor.J.R, (1933). A survey of the science of psychology.
Bloomingt'on, IN: Principia Press.
Kantor, J.R. (1975). The science of psychology: An
Inter&ebavioral Survey. Chicago: Principia Press.
Morris, E. K., Higgins, S. T., & Bickel, W. K. (1983).
Contributions of J. R. Kantor to contemporary
behaviorism. In N. E. Smith, P. T. Mountjoy, fit D.
H, Ruben (Eds.). Reassessment in psychology: The
interbebavioral alternative. Washington, D. C.: Uni-
versity Press of America.
Ray, R. D. (1992). Interbehavioral methodology: Les-
sons fromsimulation. Journal of Teach ing in Physical
Education, 12, 105-114.
Ray, R. D. &Delprato, D.J. (1989). Behavioral systems
analysis: Methodological strategies and tactics. Be-
havioral Science, 34, 81-127.
Sharpe, T. & Hawkins, A. (1992). Field systems analy-
sis: Prioritizing patterns in time and context among
observable variables. Qjiest, 44, 15-34.
Smith, N. W. (1981). Annotated citations to andblbliog-
raphy of the interbehavioral psychology off. R. Kantor.
JSAS Catalog of Selected Documents in Psychol-
ogy, 11(1), 13. (ms. 2198)
Smith, N. W. & Ray, C. E. (1981). A citation study of
theinterbehavioralfield psychologyofj. R. Kantor.
Revista Mexicana de Andlisis de la Conduca, 7, 117-

University of Nebraska-Lincoln
Mark Sh river
University of Nebraska Medical Center
The Closet Interbehaviorism of Matching
Behavior analysts have long been involved in
discovering what they believe to be the natural laws
governing behavior, explaining those laws in terms of
mathematical and topographic formulae, and apply-
ing those laws in attempts to better describe, predict,
and control for therapeutic value particular naturalis-
tic settings. For more than a decade, however, much
discussion has been presented concerning the in-
creasing separation among experimental analysts
(those primarily involved in 'discovery*), and applied
analysts (those primarily involved in 'application*)
(cf., Marr, 1991; Pierce & Epling, 1980; Rider, 1991).
If we agree that the general goal of behavior
analysis is to identify and describe regularities in the
interaction of behavior and environment (Nevin,
1984; Skinner, 1953), then it would seem that applied
concerns may benefit from experimentally derived
mathematical and topographic laws, and experimen-
tal analyses may benefit from the data derived from
technologically capable applied strategies which have
been designed to better incorporate those laws into
their therapeuticaily driven interventions. Though
most behavior analysts would agree that the identifi-
cation and testing of the laws governing behavior are
of little value unless they are of use to applied
concerns, the primary focus of applied researchers
has been on the development of therapeutic inter-
vention strategies, often to the exclusion of recent
research and developments in the experimental analy-
sis of behavior. Common argument follows that
while many interesting phenomena have been dis-
covered in behavioral laboratories, the interactive
complexities of organism, environment, and context
15
in natural settings when coupled with the operant
complexity of the human organism makes the testing
and application of laboratory-based laws difficult at
best, and is sometimes shrugged off by the applied
researcher as an insurmountable challenge.
However, the conceptual world view of
interbehaviorismwhen coupled with the technologi-
cal developments now available to applicatively drive
applied interbehavioral research provide an appeal-
ing source for the testing and application of labora-
tory-based theory in complex and interactive applied
settings. Some would argue that the present state of
interbehavioral methodology is somewhat idiosyn-
cratic due to (a) its reliance upon the unique non-
replicable structure and function of the sequential
nature of the behavior<->environment data col-
lected, and (b) the current lack of a robust collection
of rules of governance which often results in the
subjective manipulation of the observational systems
used to describe and analyze particular settings rather
than strict adherence to consistent inter and intra-
experimental practices (e.g., when observing and
coding classroom instruction is instruction simply
'instruction' or is it a hierarchy of separately coded
events such as 'verbal, non-verbal modeling, infor-
mational, higher order, synthesis'; how do we go
about assessing the reliability of recorded sequential
transactions, etc., etc.). On the other hand,
interbehavioral technology does provide the applied
researcher with an enabling tool when endeavoring
to more completely describe and analyze the array of
behavior<->environment variables which conjointly
operate in highly interactive settings. Given the
emerging capabilities of interbehavioral methods,
there are some appealing experimentally derived be-
havioral laws from which applied concerns could
16
benefit if studied interb ehavioraliy. One area of
experimental study that has much potential to bridge
the gap between basic and applied literatures is that of
matching law, a behavioral phenomena widely sup-
ported in the experimental analysis of behavior
(Davison & McCarthy, 1988), but not widely tested
in applied settings. With a similar interbehavioral
emphasis upon context specific organism<->envi-
ronment interactions or transactions, matching law
comprises a formal mathematical representation of
those behavior<->environment transactions found
in an experimental setting. If more completely tested
in applied settings, formal or mathematical represen-
tations of behavior (or proposed experimental laws)
such as matching law have the potential to increase
the effectiveness of applied behavior analytic tech-
nologies as this leads to quantifiable prediction of the
relationship between the behavior of an organism
and the many facilitating and impeding events oper-
ating in the organism's environment. Once
applicatively tested, the mathematical quantification
focus of experimental research would allow a more
- precise assessment of applied concerns, in turn, facili-
tating the ability to predict and control various be-
haviors as specific variables within the quantitative
equation are manipulated.
A Brief History of Matching Law Theory
Matching law theory is based largely upon
Herrnstein's (1970) proposed quantitative law of
effect and related research on single, multiple, and
concurrent schedules of reinforcement (e.g., Ferster
& Skinner, 1957). Experimentalfocus has been upon
efforts to mathematically describe and contrast the
functional relationships among components of mul-
tiple schedules and the matching found among re-
sponding behaviors and the reinforcing (and indi-
rectly, the inhibiting) factors operating within con-
current schedules (Davison & McCarthy, 1988;
McSweeny, Farmer, Dougan, & Whipple, 1986).
Again akin to interbehavioral theory, matching
theory states that an individual may exhibit many
behaviors at any given time and that the behavior
exhibited is a function of obtaining the greatest
reinforcing factors over time relative to the total
amount of reinforcing factors within the environ-
ment at the particular point in time in which the
behavior is emitted. For example, the reader of this
article may continue reading or quit at any point in
time and engage in another behavior (e.g., write
down some notes, call a colleague, or take a nap).
Within the confines of matching theory, the behav-
ior of the readeris proportional to the relative amount
of reinforcing events obtained for that behavior
versus the relative amount of reinforcement available
for other behaviors within thatunique field of events.
Behavior choice is continuous (McDowell, 1989)
and dependent upon the complete configuration of
enabling and impeding events within the
behavior<->environment field in which those be-
havioral choices are emitted.
Behavioral choices within matching theory are
thought to be affected by the relative richness of the
reinforcing environment in which the choice is tak-
ing place (refer to Figure 1).
For example, the frequency and velocity of be-
havior in an environment that contains little rein-
forcement quickly reaches its asymptote (e.g., read-
ing this article in a library in which minimal reinforce-
ment for alternative behaviors exists provides an
Figure 1
larger.
R k(r)/r+r.
r RalnforcemBfit Rate
environment in which the reader will probably con-
tinue to read this article and reading behavior will
approach the total amount of behavior the reader
could conceivably exhibit). On the other hand, in an
environment rich in reinforcing alternatives the.rate
of behavior approaches the asymptote more slowly

(e.g., reading this article in a bar in which much
reinforcement exists for alternative behaviors pro-
vides less reinforcement for reading behavior and
consequently the behavior of reading will receive less
relative reinforcement and tend to approach the total
amount of behavior the reader could conceivably
exhibit much more slowly).
Hermstein (1961, 1970) has been primarily re-
sponsible for the proposition of an equation which
topographically maps behavioral response, not as a
function of an absolute rate of reinforcement, but as
a function of relative rates of reinforcing conditions
overrelativeresponse time periods. The initial match-
ing equation proposed was:
= r/r1+r2
in which R represents a rate of behavioral responding
for a particular behavior and r represents the rate of
relative reinforcement obtained for R within a par-
ticular behavior<->environment field. Herrnstein
(1970) further proposed that matching law include
alternative responses not under primary experimen-
tal or observational control. This was described by
the equation:
where Rl represents a response manipulated or con-
trolled by an experimental situation and RO repre-
sents the rate of all other behavior the individual
under observation may exhibit (i.e., R0= R2+R3 ... Rn
and rO = r2+r3...rn). Similarly, rl represents the rate
of reinforcement obtained for Rl and rO represents
the rate of reinforcement obtained for RO. Assump-
tion at this point was that Rl+RO was a relatively
constant k describing the total amount of behavior an
individual could exhibit. When k is substituted for
Rl+RO and algebraically manipulated, a hyperbolic
equation results commonly termed Hermstein's hy-
perbola:
Recent work has demonstrated that k may vary
with respect to parameters such as magnitude and
immediacy, however, matching law theory remains
conceptualized as behavior emission by choice
(McDowell, 1986). Recent articulations of the match-
ing law equation have additionally included a time
17
parameter to topographically map the time an indi-
vidual spends responding on one alternative rein-
forcer relative to the time spent responding on other
alternatives as a function of the relative rates of
reinforcing and inhibiting conditions operating for
each alternative (Baum & Rachlin, 1969; Brownstein
& Pliskoff, 1968). Including a time parameter, the
respective multiple and single alternative matching
law equations are:
T1/T1+T2+...Tn-r1/r1+rz+...rn
where T is a measure of the duration of time an
individual spends engaging in a behavior.
Two deviations from strict matching are ac-
counted for in a mathematical equation termed 'gen-
eralized' matching law. This generalized equation is
represented as:
where h represents a bias parameter (e.g., a deviation
from strict matching that occurs when the choice
between behaviors is not symmetrical such as in the
difficulty or complexity of response, or the latency or
type of reinforcement; Baum, 1974; Davison &
McCarthy, 1988; McDowell, 1989) and a represents
a sensitivity parameter (e.g., the individual alternates
between responses more or less often than is pre-
dicted by strict matching; Baum, 1979, 1982;
Weardon, 1983). Time may also be expressed by this
equation, most frequently by substituting R (rate of
response) with T (time measure of response). When
a = 1 and b = 1 the equation reduces to strict
matching, when a is < or > 1 undermatching and
overmatching are represented, and when h deviates
from 1 the magnitude of bias in either reinforcer or
response value is reflected (refer to Allen, 1981;
Houston, 1982; and Prelec, 1984 for further discus-
sion of these issues). The logarithmic form of the
generalized matching law is:
log R1/R1+R2+...Rn = (a) log r/r log (b)
Hence, matching theory and its mathematical
counterpart describe behavior contingencies not as a
specific consequence of a specific behavior, but as
contextually related to all other behaviors and their
18

many consequential relationships within the unique
field in which they operate (Catania, 1973; White,
McLean, & Aldiss, 1986). Akin to interbehavioral
field theory, matching law provides at the mathemati-
cal level of analysis an appealing molar perspective
and a more formal representation of behavior at the
molar level. As Delprato (1994, p. 4, PE=C(k, sf, rf,
hi, st, md) and other interbehavioral theorists allude,
such a mathematical representation is required to
more completely and accurately describe, explain,
predict, and therefore control complex human inter-
actions in applied settings.
An Education Research Illustration
We conducted a pilot study to begin to examine
if the generalized matching law could be useful to the
description of student<->teacher interaction in a
particular classroom context (reading instruction in a
rural 4th grade elementary setting). Our primary
objectives were to develop a technologically based
procedure to apply matching law to data from
interbehaviorally derived classroom observations. It
is hoped that efforts such as this one provide impetus
for further study of matching law (and any systems
oriented mathematical formulae which attempts to
represent behavioral transactions) in the context of
prediction and control applications, given its docu-
mented usefulness in topographically mapping edu-
cational environments in more molar fashion.
Table 1 summarizes the interbehaviorally based
observation system used, and Table! summarizes the
logarithmic ratios derived from the generalized match-
ing law used for data analysis.1
Though the rigorous experimental analyst may
require scrutiny of the specific procedures used to
implement a matching law analysis prior to agree-
ment with our findings, review of Table 2 indicates
that the generalized matching law accounted for a
median 84.7% of the variance in the interaction
across the two students and one teacher's behavior.
Undermatching was also the norm across the major-
ity of the data, consistent with experimental research
on matching law. Student 1 exhibited a negative
slope (a value) in two equations interpreted as an
inverse relationship between rate of teacher behavior
following a particular student behavior and the rate
of that student behavior, possibly due to the punish-
ing context of teacher behaviors rather than being
reinforcing. Behavioral micro-economics and
complementarity of reinforcers provide another ex-
planation for the negative slopes (e.g., Green & Freed,
1993; Hursh, 1978; Iwata & Michael, 1994). Com-
patible with interbehavioral theory, micro-econom-
ics points to the difference in quality of reinforce-
ment that determines the negative slopes. For ex-
ample, teacher attention may be reinforcing for stu-
dent Ts behavior, but peer attention may be a more
highly valued reinforcerfor that same student behav-
ior. In this scenario, teacher attention increases for
the student behavior and peer attention decreases
with the student behavior not increasing at the rate

Tablet
InterbehavioralObservationSystemSummary

Task Structure Student Behavior Teacher Behavior

o. Opening 1. Reading Aloud (RA) Teacher Attention

r. Reading 2. Reading Silently (RS) g. Group (GR)
a. Related Content Activity 3. Writing (WR) t. Target Student (TS)
c. Closure 4. Listening (LI) p. Peer Student (PS)
5. Transition (TR) n. No Attention (NA)
6. Waiting (WA) Specific Teacher Behavior
7. Verbal Approprite (VA) I Instruction (IN)
8. Verbal Inapporpriate (VI) I. Listening (LI)
9. Task Appropraite (TA) v. Approval (AP)
0. Task Inapproapraite (T!) d. Disapproval (Dl)
b. Other Talk (OT)
m. Monitoring (MO)
 19

expected. This is also consistent with indications that
no attention from the teacher was reinforcing for
some of student 1's behaviors.
Conducting our pilot study was only a first
attempt to develop a procedure to describe the
confluence of variables operating in a naturalistic
classroom setting and test one experimental theory's
ability to mathematically represent the multiple be-
havioral and environmental variables, mterbehavioral
methodology, now thatitis well supportedby emerg-
ing technologies (cf., Sharpe, Hawkins, & Ray, in
press), was demonstrated as one avenue to overcom-
ing the methodological complexity of replicating
experimental research in highly interactive applied
settings.
From our pilot data and other literature we have
cited it seems that generalized matching law can serve
to help in the mathematical description of interac-

Generalized Matching Law Values.

Student Teacher
Classroom Student Behavior Behavior a Value b Value % VAF

4th 1 WR/LI OT/IN .373 1.369 76.8

WR/TR OT/OT -1.375 5.165 48.7
WR/WA OT/MO .427 2,203 91.6*
WR/TI OT/OT -.334 1.644 20.7
LI/TR IN/OT .612 1.024 64.8
LI/WA IN/MO .594 1,057 58.3
LI/TI iN/OT .370 1.027 96.0
TR/TI OT/MO .639 1.081 72.2
WA/TI MO/OT .509 .651 93.5

2 RA/LI LI/LN 1.099 .931 99.7*

RA/TR LI/OT .324 .460 16.0
RA/TA LI/MO .756 .257 100.0**
WR/LI MO/IN .794 1.214 99.8*
WR/TA MO/MO .720 .636 99.9*
WR/TI MO/MO .193 1.278 15.3
LIHTC IN/OT .414 1.226 80.8
LI/TA IN/MO .643 .610 95.1*
LI/TI IN/MO .511 1.537 59.1
TR/TA OT/MO .327 .956 88.5
TA/TI MO/MO .932 1.537 99.9*

Note: * = p < .05, ** = p < .01 Acronyms are listed in Table 1.

Medians and Ranges of the Generalized Matching Law

Classroom Student a Value b Value % VAF

4th 1 .427 1.081 72.2

(-1.375-.638) (.6851-5.165) (20.7 - 96.0)

.643 .956 95,1

(.193-1.099) (.257-1.537) (15.3-100.0)

1&2 .510 1,069 84.7

(-1.375-1.099) (.257-5.165) (15.3-100.0)
20
tion among student behavior and classroom environ-
ment in educational settings. If interpreted as suc-
cessful, a logical next step is to test ifby manipulation
of one of the variables within the matching equation
we may be able to predict the effect of the manipula-
tion on other variables within the equation. Future
research may address if this will allow us to predict
and control primary and collateral relationships
among a 'field* of variables and better construct
sophisticated conglomerates of behaviors designed
for educational intervention (cf., Shull & Fuqua,
1993). Given the bias and sensitivity parameters
contained in the generalized matching equation,
greater empirical light should be shed on unique
values of behaviors for particular individuals and the
unique reinforcing contingencies which act to con-
trol those behaviors (cf., Neef, Mace, Shea, & Shade,
1992; Neef, Mace, & Shade, 1993).
Some Closing Thoughts
Matching law seems to be one experimental/
mathematical model designed to move the principles
and practice of behavior analysis toward a more
molar and contextually dependent conceptualization
of human behavior. While traditional reinforcement
theory has focused primarily on the contiguity be-
tween a particular behavior and its immediate conse-
quence, matching law articulates that contiguity is
not as important as the correlation between an
individual's behavior and the type and amount of
consequential feedback received over time within the
behavior<->environment field in which thatbehav-
ior is operating (Baum, 1973). This, when substanti-
ated by more rigorous empirical study similar to the
pilot study summarized, should be viewed as theo-
retically and experimentally supportive of an
interbehavioral field conceptualization of operant
behavior,
Such efforts are clearly aligned with
interbehavioral field thinking and should be pursued
in bridging the chasm between theory and practice,
or more specifically, the gap between theory derived
from the experimental analysis of behavior and ef-
forts at application of effective behavioral principles
for therapeutic ends. Regardless of how speciously
derived, interbehavioral theory has long carried with
it the subjective warrant of experimentally unsup-
ported theory. While many general conceptual
models have been proposed (Morris, 1992; Sharpe &
Hawkins, 1992), few attempt to bridge the gap be-
tween interbehavioral theory as conceptualized, and
full blown mathematical representation (e.g., those
which include a specified mathematical relationship
capable of prediction and control of any or all of the
components of the behavior<->environment field;
e.g., Ray & Delprato, 1989; Ray, 1992).
A science of behavior should ideally be con-
cerned not just with the character of particular behav-
iors, but with behavior as an operative component of
the transactional relationships inherent to individual
and environment. Even Skinner (cf., Ferster & Skin-
ner, 1957,) alluded to a transactional
conceptualization in collaboratively stating thatwhen
an individual behaves within an environment in
which it lives, it changes the environment and the
behaviors of others in ways which then have differen-
tial effects on the future behavior of the individual.
Matching law, if viewed as a correlational model of
transactional effect, provides a plausible method of
describing more precisely the interactions operating
within a particular interbehavioral field than has
been possible with traditional linear S->R->C laws
of effect. In addition, pairing an amenable
conceptualization of the principles of behavior (i.e.,
interbehaviorism) with a more sophisticated and
conceptually compatible mathematical model (i.e.,
generalized matching law) should only serve to en-
hance the prediction and control functions inherent
to applied endeavors - especially in the context of
emergent technological means.
Tom Sharpe is with the Department of Health and
Human Performance, 244 MABL> University of Ne-
braska-Lincoln* Lincoln, NE 68588-0229. MarkShrwer
is a post-doctoral school psychologist at the Meyer Rehabili-
tation Institute. Address all manuscript correspondence to
the primary author:
Telephone: 402472-3922
FAX: 402472-8317
E-Mail; tsharpe@unlinfo.unl.edu
Authors Note: This paper is based on a completed
dissertation by the second author whicj) focused on empiri-
cal substantiation of matching law theory in public educa-
tion settings using an interbehavioral field systems data
collection technique.

References
Alien, C. M. (1981). On the exponent in the
ized" matching equation. Journal of the Experimental
Analysis of Behavior, 35, 125-127.
Baum.W. M. (1973). The correlation-based law of effect
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The unnatural selection of foxes and hedgehogs. The
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21
McDowell, J.J. (1986). On the falsifiability of matching
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22
Sidney W. Bijou & Patrick M. Ghezzi
University of Nevada
Kantor*s early interest in the psychological as-
pects of language behavior was evidentin his writings
in the 1920's (1921,1922,1928, 1929). During this
period, he published not only a series of journal
articles in which he argued for an objective analysis of
meaning and language behavior, but also he devoted
a chapter to the psychology of language in volume
two of his Principles of Psychology (1926). Here, he (a)
differentiated psychological data from other lan-
guage-related activities and things, (b) analyzed lan-
guage action situations, and (c) speculated on the
acquisition, development, and classification of lin-
guistic behaviors. Seven years later, in another text-
book on general psychology (1933) he published a
somewhat revised but less technical account of his
systematic approach, and three years after that he
published his first volume on language behavior, An
Objective Psychology of_Grammar (1936). Here he
emphasized the difference between actual linguistic
interactions and their products. The former was
deemed to be the domain of psychology as a natural
science; the latter, the bailiwick of general linguistics,
including lexicology (semantics and etymology), gram-
mar, and semiotics.
Reviews of an Objective Psychology ofGrammarby
linguists and philosophers were less than enthusias-
tic, for the book was interpreted as a discourse in
negative criticism (see Esteves, 1955; Hess, 1929;
Newman, 1953; Velten, 1936) However, an evalua-
tion by an experimental psychologist (Wolfle, 1937)
declared the volume to be one of considerable merit,
inasmuch as it offered a basis for many of the prob-
lems in the study of language and covered the
grammatical categories in a consistent theoretical
manner. It is interesting to note that long after its
publication - 33 years to be exact - another experi-
mental psychologist (Schoenfeld, 1969) wanted psy-
chologists to know that An objective psychology of
grammar was a "stunning" volume.
Kantor's early writings on language inspired a
series of studies by his Indiana University students
(Brions, 1937; Bucklew, 1943; Grace, 1952; Herman,
1951a, 1951b; Pronko, 1945; Rattier, Gawronski, &
Rice, 1964;Ratner&Rice, 1963;Rosenberg&Cohen,
1964,1966; Rosenberg & Curtis, 1954; Wolf, 1958a,
1958b), a comprehensive review of the literature
(Pronko, 1946), and an innovative approach to ana-
lyzing language behavior in natural settings (Ratner,
1957; Rice & Rattier, 1967).
After An objective psychology of grammar (1936),
Kantor published only one more paper on language
behavior, this on the role of language in logic and
science (1938), directing his attention during the next
three decades mainly to other psychological "projects."
He nevertheless returned to the problems of language
behavior in the 1970's in four papers under the
authorshipof<'Observerw(1970,1971a, 1971b, 1976),
reiterating his position that language behavior, which
consists of referential and symbolizing behavior,
should be distinguished from their products, particu-
larly the structuring of vocal-verbal sounds into pho-
nemes, words, phrases, and sentences. His systematic
position appeared once again in another textbook of
psychology, The science ofpsydwlogy (Kantor & Smith,
1975), emphasizing here the special character of
referential and symbolic behavior. In the same year,
in an article in \hz Mexican Journal oJ'Behavior Analy-
sis (1975), Kantor labeled his position "psychological
linguistics" despite the fact that "linguistics" was
then, and is now, associated with the study of words
and word combinations. His nextbook, Psychological
linguistics (1977), was for the most part an elaboration
of the chapter on language in The science of'psychology
(1975) and the above mentioned article in the Mexi-
canJournal of Behavior Analysis (197 5). His strategy in
this volume was to "...indicate the relations between
nonpsychological and psychological linguistic fac-
tors by analyzing outeach of them from the pool of
linguistic events" (pp. 11-12).
Vigorously critical of the whole language field,
Kantor argued in his Jast articles that the confusion
between speech and language was due to a lack of

unity in the premises of an authentic objective psy-
chology (1981); that the use of metaphors has had
regressive effects on the study of language (Observer,
1983a); and that the concept of meaning in psychol-
ogy and linguistics is misunderstood because of the
continued confusion between events and constructs
(Observer, 1983b).
So we see that over a period spanning more than
60 years, Kantor devoted a tremendous amount of
effort to making a case for the objective study of the
psychological aspects of language behavior. Interest-
ingly enough he began and ended his campaign with
a critical and constructive analysis of the concept of
meaning (1921 ;1983).
We shall review only those highlights ofPsycho-
logicallinguistics (1977) which apply to a systematic
approach to the study of language in natural settings.
But first a comment on the origins of the approach.
According to Kantor, psychological linguistics
originated simultaneously with social psychology in
the middle of the nineteenth century. While the
initial formulations by philosophers and psycholo-
gists were entirely mentalistic, later accounts, though
still mentalistic, included, thanks to the writings of
ethnologists and anthropologists, the functional
adjustive character of language. Contributions came
also from developmental psychologists who pro-
vided normative data on the course of individual
language development.
Extant formulations by behavioral psychologists
present decided contrasts to the earlier versions in
that they are based on objective psychology. Out-
standing are Verbal behavior by Skinner (1957) and
Psychological linguistics by Kantor (1977). It is a curious
fact of history that Skinner did not refer to Ranter's
analysis of language behavior and Kantor did not
take into account Skinner's analysis of verbal behav-
ior.
Highlights
Language phenomena, according to psychologi-
cal linguistics, may be classified into three categories:
(a) as authentic psychological language, (b) parapsy-
chological language, and (c) nonpsychological lan-
guage. Authentic psychological language, which is
communicative, interactional, and is intrinsic to the
23
language event, includes referential language (speak-
ing and hearing, verbal and nonverbal behavior, and
writing and signaling); symbolizing behavior (acts of
relating signs to other signs or with things); and
gestural language. Parapsychological language in-
cludes those things or actions that participate in or
merely support authentic psychological language:
verbal formulae (e.g., "Hi" and "How are you?"),
speech derivatives such as transcriptions and poten-
tial stimuli for language behavior (e.g., notes for
delivering a lecture). Nonpsychological language
includes language things in context that are not
involved in central language adjustments, namely,
signs and signals, textual materials, inscriptions, lin-
guistic systems (French, German, etc.), standard
speech, speech description, such as phonetics and
grammars, and spoken or written formal lectures.
Psychological language, the focus here, is defined
as: The acts ofpersons as they adjustto other people,
objects, and events either through referential interac-
tions, involving verbalizations and/or gestures, writ-
ing, or through symbolizing behavior. Referential
interactions are analyzed as a person's (the speaker or
"referor") coincidental reaction to a listener (the
"referee") and a referent (the thing talked about)
underspecificcircumstances, or setting events. When,
in a conversation, a listener takes the role of a speaker,
he or she responds to what the speaker has said and
coincidentally react to a listener (formerly the speaker)
and a new referent under the prevailing circum-
stances. Referential interactions may be narrative,
mediative, or a combination of both. In narrative
interactions, a speaker's referential behavior is coor-
dinated with a listener's referential behavior which
may range from a casual discussion, to a serious
interchange about a scientific issue, or a debate on an
affair of state. In mediative interactions a speaker's
referential behavior is coordinated with a listener's
nonreferential behavior (e.g., the listener closes the
door at the request of the speaker). A speaker's
behavior, and a listener's as well, varies in style in
accordance with the dialectical, communal, and cul-
tural practices, which include grammatical struc-
tures. Thelistenermaybeaperson, a surrogate, or the
speaker himself or herself (i.e., when a person is both
speaker and listener). A referent may be present or
absent, concrete or abstract, existent or nonexistent.
Symbolic interactions, the other component of
authentic psychological language, refer to a person's
reactions to a stimulus that has been made to substi-
24
tute for something else, either by that person or by
someone else. A reaction to a symbol may be simply
an orientational reaction with respect to a substitute
stimulus (e.g., noticing an exit sign as you enter a
theater and take your seat); or an orientational reac-
tion followed by contact with the object or event
symbolized (e.g., noticing, the exit sign and then
leaving the theater through the door under the sign).
Psychological language takes into account what
might be called the secondary functions of language
behavior, that is, the functions of language behavior
other than communicative. This instrumental use of
language brings about consequences of special value
to the speaker and sometimes to the listener as well.
Examples are readily found in the market place, the
legal system, the theater, and in the language of
oratory, rhetoric, and argument.
Conclusion
Ranter's interest in the psychological aspects of
language behavior began in the early 1920's and
continued throughout his career. In a way, a sum-
mary of his position on language behavior is con-
tained in Psychological linguistics (1977):
Psychological linguistics focuses upon the psy-
chological acts or adjustments of organisms as they
adapt themselves to their congeners, along with the
things which they encounter, either direcdyby means
of vocal utterances and gestures, or indirectly by
means of writing and symbolizing behavior (xiii),
Authors1 Note: Correspondence should be ad-
dressed to Sidney W. Bijou or Patrick M, Ghezzi,
Department of Psychology, University of Nevada,
Reno, NV 89557.
References
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forms of linguistic learning. The Psychological Record,
I 205-214.
Bucklew.J. (1943). An exploratory study in the psychol-
ogy of speech perception. Journal of Experimental
Psychology, 32, 473-494.
Esteves.N.G. (1955). Review of an objective psychology
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Grace, H.A. (1952). Effects of different degrees of
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Herman, D.T. (1951a). Linguistic behavior: I. Some
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Hess, M.W. (1929). Kantor's language behavior. Journal
of Philosophy, 26, 354-356.
Kantor, J.R. (1921). An objective interpretation of
meanings. American Journal of Psychology, 32, 231-
248.
Kantor, J.R. (1922). An analysis of language data.
Psychological Review, 29,267-309.
Kantor.J.R, (1926). Principlesofpsychology. Vol. II. New
York: Alfred Knoph.
Kantor, J.R, (1928). Can psychology contribute to the
study of linguistics? Monist, 26, 630-648.
Kantor.J.r. (1929). Language as behavior and a symbol-1
ism. Journal of Philosophy, 26, 150-159.
Kantor, J.R, (1933). A survey of the science of psychology.
Bloomington, IN: Principia Press.
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Kantor, J.R. (1938). The role of language in logic and
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Kantor, J.R, (1975). Psychological linguistics. Mexican
Journal of Behavior Analysis, 1, 249-268.
Kantor, J.R. (1977). Psychological linguistics. Chicago:
Principia Press.
Kantor, J.R. (1981). Reflections upon speech and lan-
guage. Mexican Journal of Behavior Analysis, 7, 91-
106.
Kantor, J.R, & Smith, N.W. (1975). The science of 'psychol-
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Press.
Newman, S. (1953). Review of An objective psychology
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tics, 79,312-313.
Observer. (1970). Wanted: A better direction for
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263-265.
Observer. (1971a). Comments and queries: Words,
words, words. The Psychological Record, 21,269-272.
Observer. (1971b). Comments and queries: Toward an
improvedlinguisticmodelfor science. The Psychologi-
cal Record, 21,429434.
Observer. (1976). Comments and queries: What mean-
ing means in linguistics. The Psychological Record, 26,
44M45.
Observer. (1983a). Comments and queries: Meanings as
events and as constructions in psychology and lin-
guistics. The Psychological Record, 33, 433-440. -
Observer. (1983b). Comments and queries: The role of

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study. Ut PsychologicalRecord, 33,279-284.
Pronko, N.H. (1945). An exploratory investigation of
language by means of oscillographic and reaction
time techniques. Journal of Experimental Psychology,
35, 433-458.
Pronko, N.H. (1946). Language and psychological lin-
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Ratner, S.C. (1957). Toward a description of language
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Ratner, S.C.& Rice, F.E. (1963). The effect of the listener
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13, 265-268.
Rice, F.E. & Ratner, S.C. (1967). Toward a description of
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Rosenberg, S. & Cohen, B.D. (1964). Speaker's and
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Comments
Edward K. Morris
University of Kansas
In their chapter, "Evolution and Differentiation
within Behavior Therapy: A Theoretical and Epistemo-
logical Review," fishman and Franks (1992) conclude
by describing recent trends in behavior therapy that
resonate warmly to an interbehavioral perspective. They
note, for instance, the field's increasing interest in
philosophical and conceptual issues, citing Hass,
Rosenfaib, and Hayes(1987). They see,dso,ashiftaway
from a "simplistic stimulus-response model to a nonlin-
ear, multicausal, but methodologically rigorous, per-
spective*1 (p. 189), citing Goldiamond's (1984) approach
to contingency systems and Delprato's (1989) integra-
tive framework.
Perhaps most encouraging of all, they detect a
revival of interest in Kantor*s (1959) "much neglected"
interbehavioral psychology, describing Kantor and his
25
Science, 145,1201-1203.
Rosenberg, S. & Cohen, B.D. (1966). Referential pro-
cesses of speakers and listeners. Psychological Review,
75,208-231.
Rosenberg, S.Sc Curtis,]. (1954). The effect of stuttering
on the behavior of the listener. Journal of abnormal
and Social Psychology, 49,355-361.
Schoenfeld, W.N. (1969). J.R. Kantor's Objective psy-
chology of grammar and Psychology and logic: A
retrospective appreciation. Journal of the Experimental
Analysis of Behavior, 12, 329-347,
Skinner.B.R (1957), Verbal behavior. New York: Appleton-
Century-Crofts, Inc.
Velten.H.V. (1936). Review of an objective psychology
of grammar. Language, 14, 66-68.
Wolf, I.S. (1958a). Stimulus variables in aphasia: I.
Setting conditions. Journal of the Scientific Laborato-
ries, Denison University, 44, 203-217.
Wolf, I.S. (1958b). Stimulus variables in aphasia: II:
Stimulus objects. Journal of the Scientific Laboratories,
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Wolfle.D.L. (1937). Review of an objective psychology
of grammar. Psychological Bulletin, 34, 398-402.
work as follows:
With the notable exception of behavior therapists
in Mexico and certain other areas of Latin America,
Kantor has been overlooked or misunderstood despite
hislifdongcontributionsandmanypublications.Karitor
was an outspoken critic of metaphysical dualism. He
insisted, perhaps prematurely, that behavioral theory
and therapy can be as scientific as the physical sciences.
In place of metaphysical dualism, Kantor offered a
monistic behavioral field theory with an organismk
focus upon mutual and simultaneous interactions be-
tween organism and environment. For Kantor,
psychology's primary subject matter is the holistic and
naturalistic coordination of the entire organism. Thus,
there is no artificial and exclusively linear, one-to-one
relationship between stimulus and response (see Ruben
& Delprato, 1987). (p. 190)
26
This is nice; however, the chapter is not without
faults. It contains errors in historical and conceptual
detail, for instance, in stating that Pavlov used a bell as
his conditional stimulus, which he rarely did because it
was unreliable (see Evans, 1991), and depicting Skinner
as alogjcalpositivist,whichhewasnot(see Smith, 1986,
pp. 257-297), In addition, the metatheoretical world-
view framework within which Fishman and Franks cast
contemporary behavior therapy seems a little idiosyn-
cratic to their own views. These points notwithstanding,
Fishman and Franks successfully portray the complex
interplay of the many historically and currently diverse
contributions to what is today "behavior therapy" and
they see as its future something imminently
interbehavioral.
References
Delprato, D. J. (1989). Developmental interactionism: An
emerging integrative framework for behavior therapy.
Advances in Behavior Research and Therapy, 9,173-205.
Evans, R-B. (1991). MisportrayingPavIov'sapparatus./^wm-
At the University of Nevada we have been strug-
gling to develop research from an interbehavioral per-
spective and have come to realize that the methods we
employ are usually indistinguishable from those typical
of JEAB and JABA research. What does differ is the
nature of the discussion surrounding observed out-
comes; and we are beginning to notice an impact of this
discussion on the kinds of events selected forstudy. For
example, we are currently conducting research in the
vein of response deprivation, as defined by Timberlake
and Allison (1974). The response deprivation paradigm
is compatible with an interbehavioral approach in its
rejection of thing-like reinforcers in favor ofmore event-
like constructions, rnaddition,wehavereconceptualized
the response component in this work We are not
investigating schedule effects on localized, replicable
responses such as coloring, reading, licking, or solving
math problems (Konarski, 1980; Timberlake & Allison,
1974). Rather, we have identified,/tt& of interaction as
the instrumental and contingent "responses". More
specifically, being in one room of a home (a duration
measure) is conceptualized as the instrumental response
can Journal of Psychology, 104( 135-141.
Fishman, D. B., & Franks, C. M. (1992). Evolution and
differentiation within behavior therapy: A theoretical
and epistemological review. In D. K. Freedheim (Ed.),
History of psychology (pp. 159-196). Washington, DC:
American Psychological Association.
Goldiamond, I. (1984). Training parent trainers and ethicists
in nonlinear analysis of behavior. In R. F. Dangle & R.
A. Polster (Eds.), Parent training: Foundations of research
andpractict (pp. 504-546). New York: Guilford.
Haas, J, R., Rosenfarb, I. S., 8c Hayes, S. C. (1987). Back to
basics: The formation of a special interest group con-
cerned with the contribution ofphilosophy, theory, and
basic research to behavior therapy. The Behavior Thera-
pist, 4, 88.
Kantor, J. R. (1959). Interbehavioral psychology. Chicago:
Principia Press.
Ruben, D. K, & Delprato, D.J. (Eds.). (1987). New ideas in
therapy; Introduction to an interdisciplinary approach.
Westport, CT: Greenwood.
Smith, L D. (1986). Logical positivism and behaviorism; A
reassessment of the alliance. Stanford, CA; Stanford Uni-
versity Press,
and being in another room is conceptualized as the
contingent response, with no attempt to identify more
discrete responses or reinforcers in these fields. Our aim
is merely to examine the redistribution of participation
across settings as a function of manipulating opportuni-
ties to participate in a given setting. We think that this
focus and this aim are a product of approaching this
research from an interbehavioral perspective.
References
Allison, J,, & Timberlake, W, (1974). Instrumental and
contingent saccharin licking in rats: response depriva-
tion and reinforcement. Learningand Motivation, 5,231-
247.
Konarski, E. A, Jr., Johnson, M. R., Crowell, C. R., &
Whitman, T. L. (1980). Response deprivation and
reinforcement in applied settings: a preliminary analy-
sis. Journal of 'Applied Behavior Analysis, 13, 595-609.
Timberlake, W., & Allison, J. (1974). Response deprivation:
an empirical approach to instrumental performance.
Psychological Review, 81,146-164.
Submitted by Mark A. Adams

Books from
Sidney W. Bijou and Patrick M. Ghezzi
Outline of J. R. Kantor's
Psychological Linguistics
A complete, point by point outline of Kantor's
book, that makes it much more readily under-
stood. Perfect for classroom use or as a quick way
to introduce others to Kantor's approach.
Sidney W, Bijou, Behavior Analysis of Child De-
velopment (Second Revision)
An entirely new version of this classic text
Steven C. Hayes, Neil S. Jacobson, Victoria M.
Follette, and Michael J. Dougher (Eds.)*
Acceptance and Change: Content and Context
in Psychotherapy. The first volume to focus
entirely on psychological acceptance methods
from the point of view of modem empirical
clinical psychology.
Linda J. Hayes, Gregory J. Hayes, Stephen C. Moore,
and Patrick M. Ghezzi (Eds.), Ethical Issues in
Developmental Disabilities. If you work with
persons who have disabilities, you need this book.
Steven C. Hayes, Linda J. Hayes, Masaya Sato, and
Koichi Ono, Behavior Analysis of Language and
Cognition. A contemporary look at the nature of
stimulus relations and verbal events, and their
impact on cognitive activity.
27
Bernard Guerin, Analyzing Social Behavior:
Behavior Analysis and the Social Sciences.
Provides the first full coverage of the social
sciences from the perspective of modem
behavior analysis.
Steven C. Hayes, Linda J. Hayes, Hayne W.
Reese, & Theodore R. Sarbin (Eds.), Variet-
ies of Scientific Contextualism
Contextualism from soup to nuts.
Sam Leigland (Ed.), Radical Behaviorism:
Willard Day on Psychology and Philoso-
phy
The wonderful thought of a man ahead of
his time.
Steven C. Hayes and Linda J. Hayes (Eds.),
Understanding Verbal Relations. The best
available book on equivalence and similar
relational phenomena.
Linda J. Hayes and Philip N. Chase (Eds.),
Dialogues on Verbal Behavior. Statements
about verbal behavior from leaders in the
field.
28

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 Volume 23 1995 Number 2

Linda J. Hayes, University of Nevada

Emilio Ribes, University of Guadalajara

Editorial ...3
Noel W. Smith, Vols 1 -7 (1970-1978) ABA '95 SIG Minutes 3
Ronald G. Heyduk, Vois 8-11 (1978-1983) Charon XXVII 4
i-_i Jix * \ / i HO .(-7/xnrto ^nnnv Conference Announcements 4
Edward K. Morns, Vols 12-17 (1983-1989) Noel Smith's Retirement 4
ADVISORY BOARD
Article
Sidney W, Bijou, University of Nevada Paul T. Mountjoy and Donna M. Cone.
Dennis J. Delprato, Eastern Michigan University The Functional Nature of the Philosophical Categories:
James J. Fox, East Tennessee State University J&u& Robert Kantofs Doctoral Dissertation 5
Patrick Ghezzi, University of Nevada
Edward K. Morris, University of Kansas Interview
An
Paul T. Mountjoy, Western Michigan University Interbehwioral Approach to Ue Study ofPycbopa-
N. H. Pronko, Wichita State University Mo: An Interview with Rue Cromwell 9
Noel Smith, State University of New York
Bookreview
ASSISTANT EDITORS Glenn M. Gallaghan.
In Search) of a Comprehensive Behavioral Account of
Mark A. Adams, Debra W. Fredericks, Duane Sdizophrenia: A Review of Cromwell and Snydtr's
Lord, Mark A. Swain, University of Nevada Schizophrenia - Origins, Processes, Treatment,
and Outcome 12
PRODUCTION STAFF
Scott N. Compton, Joaquin Borrego, Univer- Discussion
sitv ofNevada An Internet Discussion of Constructs 15

ISSN 8755-612X
 J. R. Kantor Books
A Newsletter of The estate of Helene J. Kantor (1919-1993) has
Interbehaviora! Psychology given The Archives of the History of American
ISSN8755-612X Psychology the inventory and copyrights of The
Principia Press, long the publisher of the works of J.
Linda J. Hayes, English Editor R. Kantor (1888-1984). The Archives is now pre-
Department of Psychology pared to respond, as The Principia Press, to orders
University of Nevada from the list of books in print and in stock written by
Reno, Nevada 89557, U.S.A. J. R. Kantor.
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interbehavioral psychology - a contextuaiistic, inte- Psychological Linguistics $17.48
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The newsletter also publishes professional commu- Tragedy and The Event Continuum $17.05
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and colloquia, and formal archival publication. As
such, die newsletter supplements contemporary jour- Send order to:
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strongly encourages submission of notes about current The University of Akron
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vations about interbehavioral psychology and related (216)972-7285
perspectives, comments on journal articles and books of
interest, more extendedbookreviews,andbrief articles.
All submissions should be sent in duplicate hard copy
and a single computer disk copy (any major word
processor; any Mac or IBM disk format) to the editor
and should conform to the style described in the Call for News
Publication Manual of the American Psychological
Association (3rd edition). THE INTERBEHAVIORIST pub-
lishes news about subscribers' activities
Subscription Information and information about others* activities
Student Subscriptions (USA) $10.00 that may be of interest to readers. If you
Regular Subscriptions (USA) $13.00 have published an article, chapter, or
Foreign (Non-USA) Subscriptions $15.00 book with an interbehavioral orienta-
Institutional Subscriptions $20.00 tion, or have read one published by
Back Volumes 1-18 .' $15.00 someone else, particularily if the source
is obscure, please let us know about it.
THE INTERBEHAVIORIST is published as a public service
by CONTEXT PRESS, Box 50172, Reno, NV 89513. CONTEXT
PRESS publishes books of interest to contextualists and
interactionists. Write for brochures on the books available.
 Editorial
We have not been able to move into the English-
Spanish mode as fully as we had intended with this
issue. EmiUo and I will make a much more concerted
effort to do so in the final issue of this volume due out
in December.
I wish to thank Debra Fredericks forher sustained
and considerable contribution to the production of
The Interbehaviorist. This issue is almostentirely her
doing. Thanks, Debbie.
Linda J. Hayes, English Editor
Emilio Ribes, Spanish Editor
Interbehaviorists in ABA SIG
Meeting Minutes
May, 1995
Washington B.C.
Co-chairs: Linda J. Hayes and Debra W. Fredericks
I. Tlie Interbehaviorist Report:
A. Substantive changes; It was announced that
The Interbehaviorist will be available in both English
and Spanish. Spanish papers will include an English
abstract and English papers, a Spanish abstract. The
new Spanish language Co-Editor is Emilio Ribes.
Spanish language submissions should be sent di-
rectly to Emilio at:
Emilio Ribes
Center for Psychological Research
12 de Deciembre 204 Chapalita
Guadalajara, JAL. 45030, Mexico
B, Editorial Board: Consequent to the discus-
sion at the 1994 SIG meeting regarding editorial
board members' participation, a letter was mailed to
all current board members suggesting a re-organiza-
tion. Responses to this letter encouraged: (1) a
reorganization of the board, (2) each board member
to identify, on a yearly basis, what their contribution
to the newsletter would include, and (3) limited terms
with the opportunity to renew. Additional feedback
included support for continued publication of stu-
dent papers, branching out to kindred literatures, and
establishing an interbehavioral e-mail network. Nomi-
nations for new members to the advisory board
should be sent to Linda J. Hayes, Dept. of Psychol-
ogy/296, University of Nevada, Reno, NV, 89557-
0062.
. C. Financial: Subscription fees have been in-
creased to $10.00 student, $13.00 regular, $15.00
foreign, $20.00 institutional, and $15,00 per back
volume. Income from subscriptions is approximately
$800.00 whereas production costs have been ap-
proximately $2,500 yearly. Given the deficits in
publishing the newsletter, the paid position of man-
aging editor has been eliminated. Context press will
continue to underwrite production costs.
D. Sections: Submissions are always needed for
all sections of the newsletter.
E. Increasing Circulation & Submissions: It is
anticipated that the new Advisory Board will facili-
tate an increase in the number of submissions. Sub-
stantive papers will be subject to peer review. Greater
effort must be attempted in marketing to universities,
in addition to maintaining a higher profile at ABA.
An Interbehavioral symposium at next year's ABA
was suggested. The Interbehavioral Expo poster was
well received at this year's meeting.
II. Interbehaviorists in ABA Special Interest
Group:
The meeting was concluded with a general dis-
cussion about the role of the special interest group. It
was suggested that we target groups in mainstream
psychology and applied behavior analysis for partici-
pation in our activities. For example, popular con-
structs, such as "behavioral momentum", might be
addressed from an interbehavioral perspective in a
symposium at ABA. Symposium topics might in-
clude applied issues or interbehavioral implications
for different levels of analysis and practice.
Notice
We are looking for a volunteer to organize an
interbehavioral symposium for ABA'96. If you are
interested in chairing such a symposium contact
Linda Hayes or Debra Fredericks: Dept, of Psychol-
ogy, University of Nevada, Reno, NV, 89557-0062 or
e-mail dwf@pogonip.scs.unr.edu.
Special Thanks
A special thanks to James Herrick and Sid Bijou
for their generous donations to The Interbehaviorist.
 Cheiron XXVII 1995
Edward K. Morris
University of Kansas
Inteibehaviorists were well represented at this year's
meeting of Cheiron (The International Society for the
History of the Behavioral and Social Sciences}, held
June 22-25 atBowdoin College (Brunswick, ME). Paul
Mountjoy (Western Michigan University) was the most
visible, with a paper, "Memories of Alfred Kinsey"
(Bowdoin, 1916), and aposter co-authored with Donna
Cone (New England Gerontology Academy), "The
Functional Nature of the Philosophical Categories: J.
Robert Ranter's Doctoral Dissertation" (see this issue of
Tlxlnterfchaviorist). In addition, Debra Fredericks (Uni-
versity of Nevada) presented a poster, "Historiography
and J. R. Kantor"s Tlje Scientific Evolution ofPsydology."
In attendance were Noel W. Smith (SUNY-Plattsburgh),
founder of this newsletter (and a founding member of
Cheiron), and Marc Rilling (Michigan State University),
a sympathiser from the Midwest.
Papers were also presented by the nonsectarian,
Edward K. Morris (University of Kansas) "B. F.
Skinner, Third Variables, and the Problem of the Prov-
ince of Knowledge" and by a Sid Bijou protegee from
the 1970s, Andrew Winston (University of Guelph,
ONT) - "'As his name indicates1: R. S. Woodwork's
Letters of Reference and Employment for Jewish Psy-
chologists in the 1930's." Among other tides of interest
were Donald Dewsbury's (University of Florida), "The
Psychonomic Society: A Society in the Image of Its
Founders," and Gary Hughes1 (S t. Thomas University,
MB), "Ten Good Reasons to Read the Word of B. F.
Skinner."
Next year's meeting will be held on June 27-30 at
Earlham College (Richmond, IN). For information,
please write Donald Dewsbury (Program Chair), De-
partment of Psychology, University of Florida,
Gainesville, FL32611 (904-392-0596)orKatherineMilar
(Conference Host), Department ofPsychology, Earlham
College, Richmond, IN (317-983-1556):
[Editor's note: Cheiron maintains afundfor student travel
$upportt also, students-who present papers or posters receive
afree 3year membership.]
For E-Mail Aficionados
Steven Brown (Kent University) has organized a
chapter-by-chapter read of William Stephenson's Tfx
Study of Behavior over (^method internet If you are
interested in participating, contact Steve at:
sbrown@kentvm.bitnet or sbrown@kentvm.kent.edu.
Conference
Announcements
The Eleventh International Conference on Subjec-
tivity, "Advancing the Study of Subjectivity", will be
held October 12-14, 1995 at the University of Illinois,
Chicago. This years scheduledpresentersindudeSteven
Brown (Kent State University), "Uses of (^Methodol-
ogy as the Foundation of Scientific Study of Subjectiv-
ity." In addition, a scheduled panel discussion on
"Introducing studies on subjectivity into proposals for
research, theses, and dissertation" should be of interest
to anyone considering a Q-Method research project
For more information, e-mail Robert Mrtek at:
MRTEK@UIC.EDU.
The Nevada Conference on Psychological Philoso-
phy is scheduled for December 28-30, 1995 in Reno.
Anyone interested should contact: Linda Hayes or Pat
Ghezzi at the Psychology Department, University of
Nevada, Reno, 89557.
Noel Smith Retires?
After 32 years of teaching here (and 2 elsewhere), I
decided it was time for a change. My department
apparently decided to keep the change minimal and to
that end has allotted me an office, telephone, and
computer; and so I am doing what I have always been
doing but without the burden of teaching.
Beginning later this year, I anticipate spending a few
months of the year in the warmer climate of Gainesville
Florida. The University ofFlorida which is located there
has an excellent library that should facilitate my work on
the textbook I am now writing.
The first time I noticed any difference in being
retired was this fall when I didn't have to do all the
scurrying around that marks the beginning of every
semester. Andnowthechoiceofbeingatworkorbeing
at leisure is a pleasant change. Before retirement I
couldn't have taken advantage of a beautiful day and
gone into the mountains in the middle of the week to
view the fall foliage as I can now do. Even so, it seems
that I am keeping incredibly busy and wondering where
all the time is going. Much of it, I hope will help
promoteinterbehaviorism. Thetextbookinprogress,a
symposium I am organizing for Cheiron next year,
correspondence with colleagues, reviewing of manu-
scripts, and so on, are aimed in that direction.
Noel W. Smith Ph.D.
Department ofPsychology
S.U.N.Y.
 Article
The Functional Nature of the Philosophical Categories;
Jacob Robert Kantor's Doctoral Dissertation
Paul T. Mountjoy
Western Michigan University
Donna M. Cone
New England Gerontology Academy
Annque la disertacion dej. R. Kantor era en la esfera
de filosofia, existe extendido equivocation de las
contributions, de la disertacion de Kantor porquees mirado
principlamente como unpskologo quien ofrecio otra escuale
depsicohgia. En esta, los autores exanien la disertacion de
Kantory su relation a m carrera posterior para disipar las
malas interpretations y concluirque cuando pensando eft
ntodo general, Kantor primero era unfllosofo de tiencia
quien aplico sufilosofia printipalmente apsicologia.
John Mills (1994) has published a draft of the
section on Kantor (1888-1984) from his forthcoming
book on the history of American psychology. In it he
characterized the dissertation as a treatment of psy-
chological issues in the history of philosphy (Kantor,
1917). Webelieve this to be an incorrect characteriza-
tion, and in view of the widespread misinterpreta-
tions of Kantor's writings (as well as the foundational
role of the dissertation in Kantor's career) therefore
believe that this document is of sufficient general
interest that a proper description of it should be made
available.
Perhaps a majorreasonfor the widespread misun-
derstanding of Kantor's contributions lies in the fact
that he is regarded primarily as a psychologist who
proposed another "school" of psychology. Examina-
tion of his dissertation, and its relationships to his
later career, should help to dispel this misapprehen-
sion. Viewed broadly, Kantor was first and foremost
a philosopher of science who applied his philosophy
primarily to psychology, and in this sense he indeed
did develop a specific approach to the data of psy-
chology. That is, Interbehavioral Psychology (Kantor,
1959), as a model system, illustrates how implemen-
tation of Interbehavioral Philosophy (Kantor, 1981)
results in a completely naturalistic system of psychol-
ogy which allows the investigation and understand-
ing of all types of psychological events which are, of
course, subject to revision as empirical investigation
proceeds; however, the basic philosophical assump-
tions are expected to be verified by these research
activities.
Kantor's scholarly career spanned some 68 years
from his first publications in 1915 (which predated
the dissertation by two years) to his final book and
articles in 1983. During these productive years he
contributed thoughts concerning every area of scien-
tific psychology as well as the history and philosophy
of science. Functioning both as a critic and as a
creative thinker his activities deserve careful scrutiny
by modem critics and scholars. In an ideal world the
Ph.D. dissertation serves as a foundation upon which
a scholarly career is constructed. Kantor achieved this
ideal, as he returned repeatedly in his later writings to
themes from the dissertation which he then pro-
ceeded to elaborate in detail (e.g., Kantor, 1963;
1969). Thus, his analysis of the functional nature of
the philosophical categories did serve as a broad
philosophical basis for his subsequent publications.
The context of time and place within which the
dissertation was produced serve as an instructive
starting place. The University of Chicago in 1917
certainly was a center of intellectual activity. The
cornerstones of the Department of Philosophy and
Psychology were Angell and Carr. Kantor has spoken
of a visit by Watson. This was a time of incredible
intellectual ferment with far reaching changes in the
intellectual climate. Such was the case not only in
science and philosophy, but in art, literature, archi-
tecture, music and drama as well. The very founda-
tions of many human intellectual enterprises were
undergoing a process of revision. It is evident that the
faculty at Chicago carried outwell the dual tasks of a
University by teaching .both the current states of
affairs and the changes which were occurring within
the culture. As a graduate student, Kantor would
have been taught to be both critical and creative by
his mentors. The dissertation shows that he learned
his lessons well.
The dissertation consists of 236 typewritten
double-spaced pages, and the Table of Contents
indicates a division into five parts, each containing
between two and four chapters. Since no page num-
bers are given in the Table of Contents, and each
chapter is individually numbered in either typescript
or pen at the top of its pages, and some pages are
inserted without numeration, we shall not reference
page numbers in this paper. However, the major
portions of the dissertation may be briefly character-
ized by this summary of the Table of Contents:
Part One - The Realistic Attitude toward Experi-
ence. (The pre-Athenians, and Plato and
Aristotle.)
Part two - The Transition Attitude toward Expe-
rience. (Hellenistic and Alexandrian.)
Part three-The Romantic Attitude toward Expe-
rience. (Roman-Christian and Early Scholas-
tic.)
Part Four - The Naturalistic Attitude toward
Experience. (Scholastic, Nationalist, and
Experience Periods.)
Part Five - The Humanistic Attitude toward
Experience. (Personalistic, British, Kantian,
and Current Attitudes.)
Even a passing familiarity with the history of
philosophy allows the conclusion that Kantor has
dutifully demonstrated his familiarity with the broad
sweep of this aspect of history to his mentors. That is,
he knows the conventional wisdom. Where is the
creativity? That is to be found within certain of the
details. Within the body of the dissertation Kantor
has inserted five small sections which are notlisted in
the Table of Contents, and these contain the creative
aspects of this unusual graduate student. Kantor
titled each of these interpolated sections "Analytical
Table of Contents." It is clear to us that those few
pages contain the concepts which are dear to his
heart, indeed, in a sense to his very soul, which he is
disclosing for all the world to see. What, we wonder,
were the reactions of his mentors to these bold
thoughts?
The first analytical table of contents proceeds
Part One, and consists only of one page. It bears the
appellation of Introduction, and the first paragraph
consists of this single sentence:
"The futility and bareness of philosophy
is owing to a failure to appreciate its aim and
purposed
Who among us today would have dared to begin
our dissertation by calling into question the validity
of the very discipline in which we were hoping to
receive our Ph.D.? We confess that neither of us
would, and we do regard ourselves to be appropri-
ately assertive individuals. Formake no mistake about
it, this is a dissertation submitted to the Department
of Philosophy, in partial fulfillment, etc.
The first Analytic Table of Contents then contin-
ues to state that this study of the categories will make
it evident that the categories are evaluations of expe-
rience. This realization leads to a rejection of the view
that the history of philosophy is a record of abstract
logical systems. Current philosophical attitudes are
stated to be moving in this direction, and his study
will serve to distinguish the categories of philosophy
from those of science and religion by considering
their significant features.
AH in all, a very ambitious introduction. What
follows? We shall ignore the conventional materials
and concentrate upon the four remaining Analytical
Tables of Contents, and the Abstract.
The second (one and one-half pages) is inserted
just preceding the Athenian Period, and, in pen,
Kantor has added "The Platonic Phase" as an addi-
tional heading. These pages argue that the entire
philosophical attitude changed from a study of exter-
nal nature to an interest in human conduct. Plato's
viewpoint is limited to a fixed metaphysical reality,
while Aristode is the first to setup a conscious table
of categories. It is concluded that Greek philosophy
remained far removedfrom actual experiential condi-
tions.
The third (a single page) precedes the Hellenistic
Period andiridicatesashift toward philosophy highly
conscious of its own attitudes toward experience. In
the Alexandrian-Roman period the categories reflect
the influence of a fusion of western and eastern
civilizations. The individual feels helpless and de-
pendent upon God.
The fourth Analytical Table of Contents is the
longest, extending onto a third page, and precedes
The Humanistic period, which "marks the begin-
nings of the ascendancy of the human experiences as
a basis for the interpretation of reality." That is, in the
naturalistic period the study of nature is pursued,
while the later rise of Personalistic attitudes begins the
emphasis upon the capacity of the human mind to
know reality. Locke is presented as concerned with
what can and cannot be the object of human inves-
 tigarion, while monadism is the central theme for
Leibnitz. In British thought reality is found in con-
scious states of the individual, while Kant empha-
sized the judging processes of a thinker.
Fifth and last is the one and one-half page Ana-
lytical Table of Contents which precedes the fourth
and final chapter of Part Five, and of the dissertation,
The Current Attitudes. It begins by stating "that
reality is to be sought for only in experience which
consists of the actual conditions and events of every-
day life." A reduction of philosophy to "a mechanical
science" (e.g., the Kantian machine shop for grinding
out knowledge, and later, Spencer) was reacted to by
"a metaphysics which sought reality outside of the
domain of science" (Bergson). Currentphilosophical
movements "may be termed Neo-Realism and Prag-
matism." Neo-Realism resembles "the rationalistic
philosophy of the seventeenth century." Since Prag-
matists see the categories of philosophy as evalua-
tions of experience which the practical sciences pro-
duce, they omit "all of that experience which falls
without the domain of the special sciences."
It should be obvious at this point that Kantor was
concerned with the basic problem of the nature of
reality, and how it was to be known, rather than with
the psychological aspects of the history ofphiloso-.
phy. It is equally obvious that the Analytical Tables
of Contents refer variously to the entire dissertation
(the first), one chapter (the second), two chapters (the
third), six chapters (the fourth), and again to one
chapter (the fifth), while the three chapters of Part
Four of the dissertation proper are essentially ig-
nored.Thus, by concentratingupon those Analytical
Tables of Contents we have neglected a significant
portion of the dissertation. However, we shall justify
this treatment at the conclusion of our paper.
The Abstract consists of a cover sheet plus seven
pages of text, and these pages neither merely summa-
rize the dissertation nor the Analytical Tables of
Contents. Instead, Kantor introduces six new "ru-
brics" under which he reorganized the materials. In a
footnote he states that these "actual terms do not
appear in the original dissertation; they areemployed
here for convenience in summarizing the material,"
We argue that these rubrics organize the materials in
a creative manner, and herewith list them with de-
scriptive comments paraphrased from his discussion
of each, and some brief quotations.
Rubric one Attributive Categorization. Govern-
ing principles are the source of facts. Thales (water),
Anaximines (air), Anaximander (the boundless).
Rubric two Predicative Categorization. Catego-
ries constitute particular predications of things. "With
Plato the Pythagorean forms... become predicates of
reality."
Rubric three Protective Categorization. Departure
from objective conditions to personal activities. For
example, Plotinus projected the interests and desires
of mankind into a mystic interpretation of things.
Rubriefour Interpretive Categorization. A return
to concrete phenomena under changing social and
political conditions, .culminating in the methodol-
ogy of Bacon and Descartes.
Rukricfivt Evaluative Categorization. In the 17th
and 18th centuries philosophy becomes Humanistic
and Personalistic, with a final development in Kant
whose formal categories are purely mechanical and
hence "not generally serviceable in the description of
any scientific phenomena."
Rubricsix Instrumental Categorization. "Here we
have a clear and complete acceptance of the idea that
philosophical work is primarily an attempt to de-
velop an attitude toward the actual world in which
the thinker finds himself."
Now, we ask you to compare the above quoted
sentence to the first sentence of the dissertation
quoted earlier concerning the futility and bareness of
philosophy! Kantor began in despair and worked out
a solution satisfactory to himself within the confines
of 236 pages. Would that we all could do so well at
least once in our life in so brief a compass.
Kantor's dissertation contains no discussion of
any of the traditional topics of psychology. For
example, there is neither a mention of the traditional
faculties of knowing, willing, and feeling, nor of the
more modem topics such as sensation, perception,
thinking, memory, motivation, etc. The body of the
text defines the philosophical categories as intellec-
tual tools which are used in the human intellectual
enterprise known as philosophy. Philosophy itself is
defined as orientation toward things and events, and
the dissertation discusses manifold shifts in these
orientations as a Function of time and specific cul-
tural conditions. That is, the human experience is
expressed in categories, and these categories have
changed as a function of various temporal changes in
the human condition. The references that support
the arguments are philosophical works, histories of
philosophy, and political and social histories. To be
sure, there are citations to the books of figures in the
 history of philosophy who also are treated of in
histories of psychology (Aristotle, Leibnitz, and Kant,
to name a few) but their psychological doctrines are
basically ignored. Actually, the one citation to James
is to his Pluralistic Universe. There is no citation of his
Principles of Psychology which clearly was the domi-
nant psychological treatise of the period.
The dissertation, then, constitutes an establish-
ment of a philosophical foundation, a general orien-
tation toward the world of things and events, which
will serve to guide any scientist in carrying out the
scientific job. Science is, in Kantor's view, applied
philosophy.
In his dissertation, Kantor laid the foundation for
his later arguments that humankind had a propensity
to elevate concepts to a status of reality which tran-
scended events. He attempted to reverse this error
and argued that reality was actually those events
within which humanldnd's experience is embedded.
In this way he established a firm foundation for the
empirical enterprises of all the sciences, not just for
psychology alone.
We have concentrated upon the Analytical Tables
of Contents and the Rubrics of the Abstract because
these pages contain the essence of his original contri-
butions to philosophy. We feel that our failure to
discuss the more conventional aspects of the disserta-
tion in detail is justified by our evaluation of those
materials as data from which Kantor generated his
conclusions concerning the function of the philo-
sophical categories. To do justice to those data would
require far more space than is available to us here.
And, the conclusion that the proper aim and purpose
of philosophy is the categorization of people's expe-
riences with environing things and events rather than
with transcendent mental states or sterile mathemati-
cal abstractions is indeed the essence of the disserta-
tion since it was to serve as the guide to Kantor's
scholarly works throughout his life. This, then, was
his response to his opening statement that:
"The futility and bareness of philosophy
is owing to a failure to appreciate its aim and
purpose."
A few words concerning the physical aspects of
the dissertation manuscript, as wel! as to its role in his
life, seem to. be in order. The typescript was devel-
oped on a manual typewriter long before the advent
of word processing. Anyone who has directed doc-
toral dissertations in recent years is familiar with the
fact that deans of graduate schools currently demand
a perfect manuscript. In 1917 standards were differ-
ent. On almostevery page of his dissertation there are
multiple corrections and changes in the purple foun-
tain pen ink that was Kantor's trademark until the
end of his life. We assume that examination of other
dissertations from the period would reveal that today's
standards of absolute typescript perfection were not
enforced at that time. And this very imperfection of
the finished product seems to indicate that to Kantor
it was not actually a finished product; instead it was
a work in progress. The presence of a copy of his
dissertation in his personal papers at the time of his
death also appears to indicate that he regarded the
dissertation as a work in progress; one to which he
couldretumfrom time to rime to evaluate the progress
of his life work. To him, the development of natural-
istic constructs was an unending task to which he
wholeheartedly devoted his energies. He felt that his
own works were not the final stage in the process of
philosophical and scientific analyses of the event
continuum. In lectures and conversations during the
early 1950s (and later) he often reiterated that his life
would be fulfilled only when his students progressed
beyond his own achievements.
References
Kantor, J. R. (1917). The functional nature of the
philosophical categories. Ph.D. Dissertation, Uni-
versity of Chicago.
Kantor, J. R. (1959). Interhehavioral psychology; A
sample of scientific system construction. (Second, re-
vised edition). Bloomington, IN: The Principia
Press.
Kantor, J. R. (1963; 1969). Tlie scientific evolution of
psychology (Two Volumes). Chicago, IL, Granville,
OH: The Principia Press.
Kantor,]. R. (1981). Interbehavioralphilosophy. Chi-
cago, IL: The Principia Press.
MillsJ, A, (1994). Jacob Robert Kantor(i888-1984).
Tht Interbebawomt, 22, pp. 8-13.
[Author's note: Tins paper is a revision of the poster
presented at Cheiron 1995 Conference, It is a conceptual
draftwe are working onfor Kanterls biography. Assuch, it
should be considered work in progress, suggestions and
comments are welcome.}
 Interview

An Interbehavioral Approach to The Study of Psychopathology:

An Interview with Rue Cromwell

This interview begins our series of interviews with prominent Interbehavioral psychologists, in addition to
some who may not be recognized as such. Inspired by Verpianck's (1995) description of four groups of
"Interbehavioral" psychologists published in The Interbebaviorist, 23(1)} these interviews are part of a larger project
that will attempt to identify divergences and convergences in the scientific work of scholars who have interacted
with Kantor (either directly or indirectly) at some point in their training or career. Excerpts from interviews will
be published periodically in THE INTERBEHAVIORiST.

RueL. Cromwell received his Ph.D. in Clinical Psy-
chologyfrom Ohio State University in 1955, After holding
a number of academic positions in both psydnatry and
psychology, Dr. Cromwell accepted the M. Erik Wright
Distinguished Professor of Clinical Psychology position at
the University of Kansas in 1986. He currently supervises
an active reward) lab studying information processing and
genetic factors in sdiizophrenia. Dr. Cromwell has been a
long-time subscriber to THE INTERBEHAVIORIST,
studied under Kantor as an undergraduate, and prof esses to
have carried Kantor's influence throughout his career. Dr.
Cromwell was interviewed by THE
INTERBEHAVIORIST in November of 1994.
TI: When wereyou introduced to Kantor's work?
Cromwell: I was an undergraduate at Indiana Uni-
versity 1946 to 1950 and, during my senior year, took
a seminar from Kantor. At that time, an
interbehavioral course was required for psychology
majors. The class was quite full, about 50 people.
This course was not an entirely pleasant experience;
Kantor was a very stem, tough individual for his
students who did not have a very clear or coherent
monistic framework. The bottom line was that the
students, almost without exception, were frightened
by him. I, like the other students, coming out of rural
middle Midwestern, lower middle class America,
with backgrounds in dualistic religious thinking, did
not have a clear conceptual monistic view, therefore,
I was one of a good number of people who made
straight F's on the quizzes. We struggled with this
throughout the year, often getting together to study
and finally, like a light bulb, it just suddenly dawned
on me what a monistic framework of thinking was all
aboutand why it was so important to psychology. All
of a sudden, from then on and for the rest of the
semester and the next semester I was making straight
A's. The shift was as extreme as that. And while a lot
of students went away grumbling about being mis-
treated with these bad grades and so forth I became
very enthusiastic. Kantor was very difficult for an
undergraduate to get close to, yet, I admired him.
Still, it was only later, atpsychology conventions that
I got a chance to really approach him and talk to him
about psychology,
TI: Didyou continue to study interbehaviorism in gradu-
ate school?
Cromwell; The Korean war broke out that summer
in 1950. I received a deferment because at that time
clinical psychology was known as a critical occupa-
tional specialty since they needed thousands more
psychologists for the Veterans Administration so I
entered a Clinical psychology program at Ohio State.
Two of the people there I worked with were George
Kelly and Julian Hitter. George Kelly had published
some stuff in The PsyMogical Record (Kantor's jour-
nal) but Julian Ritter was the one who had really been
influenced by Kantor, in fact, crediting Kantor for
SodalLeaming Theory (Ritter, 1954). Ritter and I had
a common bond in that we both knew Kantor and
had a great respect for him. Kilter's personality
theory was pretty much continuous with the basic
philosophy of science framework laid out by Kantor
in regard to his views about dualism, reductionism,
and so forth.
10
TI: Sis a graduate student in Clinicalpsydiology, didyour
interest in interbehaviorhm kadyou in a different direction
from accepted spools of thought?
Cromwell: I think the major way of conceptualizing
the influence of Kantor had to do with a keen
awareness or sensitivity to dualistic thinking which
was rampant at that time in learning clinical psychol-
ogy and in my view, still is. I was intrigued that one
can approach clinical psychology, which a lot of
people would still say is actually dealing with the
mind, from a strictly monistic point of view and so
became aware of how important it is for constructs in
psychology to be reducible to events in time and
space. Ifyou cannotreduce aconstruct to its denotable
or point-to-able events in time and space you are in
trouble. Another issue that is closely related is the
distinction between an event as opposed to the
construction of events; a lot of people even today
think of the construct as the fundamental data of
psychology. For example, I just read a textbook
manuscript that said cognitive schema are the basic
determinants of behavior. This would cause Kantor
to turn over in his grave, it is so blatantly a dualistic
type of construction where you have the construc-
tion of the event composed as causing the event.
That is a little bit different than dualism although
closely related but it was that framework where I
learned not only to think about psychology, but life
in general; within a monistic framework and, like I
said, shifting from Fs to A's it was kind of like a
religious conversion because all of sudden I had a
new framework of thinking about things. It was not
only a new way of going about science but also a new
way of going about existence and activities outside
my role as a scientist.
TI: Didyou continue to keep in contact with Kantor after
graduate school and/or continue to read his writings?
Cromwell: After I got out of graduate school I took
a faculty job at Peabody college. In the clinical
training program there was a lot of research on mental
retardation and except for applying Hitter's social
learning theory to research on mental retardation in
a way consistent with the Kantorian point of view, I
can't remember focusing much on Interbehaviorism
per se. The next thing I recall is taking a sojourn as a
professor in medical schools: Vanderbilt University
Medical School, Wayne State University, and Uni-
versity of Rochester Medical School. Medical stu-
dents and psychiatric residents were so far removed
from philosophy of science and the type of good
conceptual thinking that provides a base for psychol-
ogy I really didn't have a chance to communicate
with any one at all. Then, when I came here to
Kansas, my first effort (with large auditorium under-
graduate abnormal psychology courses) was to do an
introduction to the nature of concepts and different
ways to explain why events occur. I reviewed con-
cepts of dualistic explanations, reductionistic expla-
nations, and constructionistic fallacies with circular
ontologies. Forth would be the monistic mode of
explanation in order to get across the notion that
there is a lot of garbage that we are still dealing with
in abnormal psychology in terms of faulty construc-
tions. I spent a lot of time covering these issues when
I taught so that brought me back in touch with
Kantor. It seems to be so important when dealing
with abnormal psychology and schizophrenia (where
a lot of concepts are mentalistic) to get across the
notion that there are very real, very valid scientific
problems there and it would be much more clear and
useful to approach those problems from a monistic
framework. This lead me to do that first chapter in
the schizophrenia book where I again bring in Kantor
here as part of this evolutionary process. [Editor's
note: see hook review this issue.]
TI: It is interesting that you have brought Kantor into an
area that is traditionally very biodeterminislic. How do
you integrate these two seemingly incompatible approaches?
Cromwell: Kantorwas not one to discard biological,
physical, psychological, or sociologic constructs but
basically, I learned from him that there are different
modes or levels of construction of the same event and
the goal of science is to find which mode of construc-
tion has the greater utility in predicting these events
- all of which involve interaction. In the particular
area of psychology there is an arbitrary division of
labor. Psychologists are interested in those events
that involve the interaction of the individual with
stimulus objects in the environment. You record the
data, you analyze it, and build your constructs on
that basis and if it should turn out that a biological
construction buys something in terms of predicting
human behavior better, then that's a viable construc-
tion until at some time it may be superseded with
some other construction.

Tl: Do you view biological events as setting/actors?
Cromwell: I view genetics and biology as one
alternative group or set of constructs and proposi-
tions which are constructions for events that we first
have to describe in behavioral terms. I do genetic
research on monozygotic and dizygotic twins and the
whole point to the game for me is that you've got to
depict the subject matter, e.g. the basic data of
psychology, clearly within a time-space frameworkin
terms of what you are observing and what you are
measuring. Then, if one can enhance one's predict-
ability by making predictions about monozygotic
twins behaving with more similarity than dizygotic
twins then fine go with that construction, as long
as it includes predictability beyond any other frame-
work. An example would be a study 1 did recently on
visual iconic integration. The visual system resolves
visual images within about 100 milliseconds - this
construction is derived from the fact that you can
present a pattern of dots, remove them within a few
milliseconds and after a short stimulus asynchrony
(offset with nothing), you present another pattern of
dots - if the first pattern is still "being retained" it will
integrate with the second pattern and be seen as, for
example, the number "68" when the number "68" is
a combination of the two sets of dots. However, if
these two anomalous patterns of dots get separated
from each otherin time to 100 milliseconds apart, the
person becomes less and less able to detect the
number or the visual pattern which these two sets of
dots integrate into. We did a very nice study to show
11
that tricyclic antidepressant drugs actually lengthen
the decay line of the image of the integrated pattern
of dots. As it turns out, people not on any antidepres-
sant drugs have a complete decay at about 100
milliseconds. In other words, if the two dot patterns
are 100 milliseconds apart there is a probability close
to zero accuracy. Persons on tricyclic antidepressants
still do pretty well out about 80 and 100 milliseconds
apart. As a result, we have had to develop a set of not
just biological but neurochemical constructs, at least
in order to predict the results to begin with. Under-
standing neurotransmitters, we predicted the results
ahead of time and hit it right on the nose - it was
exacdyas we predicted. Tomethatis"goodKantor"
in that you are using the construct system to describe
the event which increases your ability to predict. If it
should happen thatyou'vegot to move to some other
level such as sociologic or political scientific to for-
mulate constructs to describe the event and enhance
predictability so be it. The flaws in thinking are the
ones of assuming that the construct system you are
using causes the event. That would be dualistic in the
biological realm and is also reductionism. So often
the fundamental flaws in construction in psychologi-
cal propositions have to do with the, in my opinion,
unbelievably fallacious assumption that once you
have a set of constructs which improve predictability,
that is causing the event. My perspective may not be
"orthodox" interbehaviorism, especially my focus on
predictability, however, I believe it is consistent with
what I learned from Kantor.
 12

Bookreview

In Search of a Comprehensive Behavioral Account of Schizophrenia;

A Review of Cromwell and Snyder's
Schizophrenia Origins, Processes, Treatment, and Outcome

Glenn M. Callaghan
University of Nevada.

The following discussion of Cromwell and
Snyder's Schizophrenia. - Origins, Processes, Treatment,
and Outcome (1993) represents a mixed review of the
authors' approach to compiling information on this
topic. While Cromwell and Snyder's edited text
provides the reader with a thorough up to date
collection of research on a broad range of topics, the
text fails to capitalize on the authors' philosophical
paradigm based in contemporary behaviorism. This
review highlights the obvious contributions of
Cromwell and Snyder's text and calls attention to
what is noticeably absent.
Cromwell and Snyder have gathered informa-
tion on a variety of issues relevant to research in the
field of schizophrenia and have assembled chapters
by notable specialists. Most chapters emphasize the
role of biology and purported psychophysiological
aspects related to the cause and condition of schizo-
phrenia. Several chapters emphasize the necessarily
multifactorial model of inheritance of this particular
psychopathology (e.g., Chapter 6, "Smooth Pursuit
Oculomotor Dysftinctionas an Index of Schizotaxiaw)
by McGuffin & O'Donovan). Many of the other
chapters summarize research that has been published
elsewhere on topics such as research on reaction time
(Stefry & Waldman) and hemispheric and structural
differences (i.e., globus pallidus [Early]; thalamus,
[Oke, Carver, & Adams]). Chapter 13, "Social Self
andtheSchizophrenicProcessiTheoryandResearch",
discusses subject matterbased less in biological mod-
els and describes research on the self and schizophre-
nia. Chapter 19, "Mapping the Intrafamiiial Envi-
ronment of the Schizophrenic Patient", continues
this break from a medical model explicating research
results and theoretical issues surrounding family re-
lated issues.
The strongest chapters of the text are those writ-
ten by Cromwell (Chapters 1, "Heritage of the Schizo-
phrenia Concept"; 4, "Schizophrenia Research:
Things To Do Before the Geneticist Arrives"; and 20,
"A Summary View of Schizophrenia"). These remain
the most thoughtful and useful to the reader. The
first chapter clearly outlines some of the significant
issues relevant to the history of schizophrenia, em-
phasizing that the concept of schizophrenia devel-
oped in a cultural context in the same way that the
paradigm of Skinnerian behaviorism developed.
Cromwell dares describe the tenets of radical behav-
iorism and J. R. Kantor*s interbehaviorism in a field
that rarely sees these topics mentioned. The author
thoughtfully acknowledges the importance of each
position and highlights the same basic tenets of
interbehaviorism for the reader using readily acces-
sible language. Another noteworthy aspect of Chap-
ter 1 lies in Cromwell's poignant discussion of prob-
lems with dualism, reification, and reductionism.
Few researchers and theoreticians in the field of
schizophrenia bother to announce their theoretical
position and approach to understanding the multi-
tude of data that come before them. Cromwell has
eloquently denounced the difficulties inherent with
these three challenges faced by investigators.
Cromwell's fourth chapter presents a well-stated
set of questions researchers and readers alike should
pose before concluding that the seemingly unex-
plainable determinants of schizophrenia lie in genet-
ics. This is one of this book's stronger chapters
because it offers the reader a set of practical guidelines
to approach a difficult topic area in psychopathol-
ogy. The chapter highlights the importance of con-
sidering base rates when determining the heritability
probability of schizophrenia. Cromwell also points
out that not all shared characteristics of schizophre-
nia are negative, calling into question a "flawed gene"

hypothesis (p. 58). This chapter is required reading
for any contemporary schizophrenia researcher.
Chapter 20 is likewise useful to the reader as it
summarizes the preceding chapters and highlights
important considerations that follow. In addition,
Cromwell emphasizes the oligogenic nature of schizo-
phrenia stating that "not one, nor many, but a small
number of factors" is responsible of causing this
disorder, (p. 335) This is a conceptually useful
conclusion for readers as it begins to limit variables to
what are more causal. For readers unsure whether the
text is appropriate for their needs, a reading of this
closing chapterwould provide sufficient information
to make that decision.
While Cromwell argues against reductionism in
Chapter 1, much of what follows in the text, albeit
consistent from within a biological model, remains
reductionistic. The structural reductionism seen in
Chapter 2, "Left Globus Pallidus Hyperactivity and
Right-Sided Hemineglect in Schizophrenia" (Early),
and Chapter 3, "Dopamine-Initiated Disturbances of
Thalamic Information Processing in Schizophrenia"
(Oke, et al,) reduces a set of observable behaviors and
those that are more subtle (i.e., thoughts, feelings) to
a level of analysis that is entirely unobservable. This
is not to argue that neurological and structural func-
tioning is not an appropriate level of research. How-
ever, as Cromwell makes clear in Chapter 1, reducing
human behavior to the smallest possible level of
analysis does not necessarily advance knowledge in
the field of psychology.
The critical statement made above illustrates the
shortcomings found in this text. These criticisms do
not lie in the editors1 selection of authors or their
respective contributions, as the chapters remain aca-
demically sound. The primary criticism lies with the
fact that Cromwell does not provide more room for
an interbehavioral nor radical behavioral analysis of
this disorder. What the reader gets is a set of chapters
on schizophrenia summarizing research from several
different perspectives, but primarily a biological one.
Psychology lacks, especially in the area of schizo-
phrenia, a coherent text written from a paradigm that
is not rooted in a medical model of illness. A
contemporary behavioral approach is one obvious
missing and much needed perspective on schizo-
phrenia. Noticeably missing in this book is an
explicit interbehavioral analysis. Readers will recog-
nize Cromwell's continued emphasis on the multiple
determinants of schizophrenia as it is repeated through
13
his chapters. However, without making explicit why
multiple determinants matter, the reader is left won-
dering why it is important to emphasize this point.
There exist at least three ways to remedy this lack
of representation of contemporary behavioral views.
The first would be to write a text that summarizes the
behavioral research conducted thus far and to point
out areas needing furtherexploration. This approach
is the simplest and does not add a great deal to our
current understanding of this phenomenon; how-
ever, even this strategy might fill a few gaps in this
book. Clearly absent in Cromwell and Snyder*s text
is any discussion of current behavioral strategies to
treat schizophrenia such as those by Bellack and
colleagues (1986, 1989) or Mueser and colleagues
(1991). Withtheabsenceofthisinformation.thetext
is not as thorough as it might otherwise be. Apart
from this fact, this approach has already been taken
by thoughtful authors such as Bellack (1986). A
second strategy might be to summarize relevant re-
search in contemporary behaviorism and related
theoretical papers and combine them to provide a
more conceptually cohesive account of how this set
of behaviors continues to be maintained. The strat-
egy of integrating behavioral views would prove the
most challenging as it would require a substantial
amount of conceptual thinking. A third technique
would add considerably to our understanding and
offer a great deal to readers with philosophical inter-
est outside a medical model. This approach could
present the current research findings in the same
manner as Cromwell and Snyder, but would provide
abehavioral interpretation or explanation of findings
in various fields.
To illustrate this third approach, Cromwell could
provide the reader with a discussion of Rosenberg's
chapter on the social self (written from a personal
construct and psychodynamic perspective) with a
contrasting analysis of the self by one of several
contemporary behaviorists (e.g., Hayes, 1995;
Kohlenberg & Tsai, 1991, 1995) or a behavioral
interpretation of why Rosenberg's chapter is impor-
tant. One problem with books on schizophrenia is
they often combine multiple paradigms by experts in
each area, but do little to offer any cohesive set of
explanations about how these areas might relate.
This suggested analysis could afford the reader with
an opportunity to notice differences between para-
digms. It could also convey to the reader the concep-
tual importance of this information in a manner
14
consistent with the his or her perspective. As with the
second solution, this is not a simple task. However,
because the reader is missing out on Cromwell's
interbehavioral perspective as the text exists in its
current form, it appears a challenge worth facing.
Additionally, this latter strategy would help clarify to
the reader why a chapter on reaction time in schizo-
phrenia (Steffy & Waldman; Chapter 9) is important
to consider and assists in understanding this disorder.
Further, chapters on cognition and perception could
be supplemented with an analysis of why these par-
ticular behaviors are important to contemplate.
Of considerable interest would also be an inclu-
sion of a set of chapters on the behavior of the
researcher and providers of treatment. An analysis of
the behavior of the clinician who provides medica-
tions and how changed behavior by the patient
impacts the clinician would be of great importance.
This strategy would capitalize on one ofbehaviorism's
finest achievements, the ability to turn its analytical
tools on the behavior of the scientist.
These criticisms are not meant to dissuade read-
ers from pursuing this text. Again, it is a noteworthy
text summarizing valuable research topics and pro-
viding up to date empirical results. In addition it is
clearly written and provides the reader with access to
a variety of topical discussions relevant to the field.
However, interbehavioral and radical behavioral ap-
proaches offer a valuable perspective to the field of
psychology. Itwouldbe tremendously advantageous
to capitalize on the philosophical knowledge base of
Cromwell and address prominent disorders such as
schizophrenia from these unique, environmentally
rooted paradigms. It is this reviewer's hope that a
reader will rise to this challenge.
References
Bellack, A. S. (1986). Schizophrenia: Behavior
therapy's forgotten chil<^. Behavior Tljerapy, 17,
199-214.
Bellack, A. S., & Morrison, R. L. (1989). Social
problem solving in schizophrenia. Schizophrenia
Bulletin, 15, 101-116.
Bellack, A. S. & Mueser, K. T. (1986). A comprehen-
sive treatment program for schizophrenia and
chronic mental illness. Community MentalHealth
Journal, 22, 175-189,
Cromwell, R. L, & Snyder, C. R. (Eds.). (1993).
Sdiizopbrenia - origins, processes, treatment, and out-
come. New York: Oxford.
Hayes, S. C. (1995). Knowing selves. Use Behavior
Therapist, 18, 94-96.
Kohlenberg, R. J., & Tsai, M. (1991). Functional
analytic psydwtherapy: Creating interne and curative
therapeutic relationships. New York; Plenum.
Kohlenberg, R. J., & Tsai, M. (1995). I speak there-
fore I am: A behavioral approach to understand-
ing problems of the self. The Behavior Therapist,
/*, 113-116.
Mueser, K. T., Bellack, A. S., Douglas, M. S., &
Wade, J. H. (1991). Prediction of social skill,
acquisition in schizophrenic and major affective
disorder patients from memory and
symptomatology. Psychiatry Research, 37, 281-
296.
 15

Discussion

An Internet Discussion of Constructs

At every Interbehaviorists in ABA SIG meeting over the past few years, Interbehaii'wrists have spoken of their wish to have
more time set aside at ABA for socializing among the group, as it is in these informal gatherings that many stimulating
discussions have been held. In this age of communications technology, e-mailhas surfaced as an alternative to in-person informal
gatherings. We invite readers to submit their comments in response to the following interactions on e-mail. One such interaction
is reprinted below. We thank those who participated in this interaction for allowing us to publish their remarks without an
opportunity for editing.

In response to a statement by Dennis Delprato
about relationships being abstractions, the following
dialogue developed:
Noel Smith: I am not convinced that a relation-
ship is abstract.
Dennis Delprato: Did you ever teach anything
like experimental psychology to undergraduates?
y=f(x) is abstract to them. Or think of the operant,
taken as either a class of R instances having common
environmental consequence or as class of R instances
functionally related to environmental consequences
("under control oP in Skinner's terminology). In
either case, the operant is not directly point-at-able.
This is what I mean by abstract. I believe some of
Kantor*s comments somewhere (perhaps on math-
ematics) contributed to my view on abstractions -
not that he is to be blamed for any possible misrep-
resentations on my part.
Noel: It seems to me that the relation of bodies
and space and of people and environments is quite
concrete.
Dennis: I agree with this. But does not the
relation here have different referents from the func-
tional relationship in y=f(x) or in the expression
relationship between variables X & Y as in correla-
tion? The latter, along with Stephenson-inspired
emphasis on subjectivity and other considerations,
lead me to question the value of continuing with
Kantor*s stress on "objective" science. Such an
emphasis may mislead us to draw a firm line of
distinction between objective (e.g., overt, observ-
able) and subjective (private).
Noel: I too have difficulty with these terms.
Perhaps a useful direction is to construe science as the
systematic study of observable events that can be
categorized, even if ratherartificially or arbitrarily, for
further study.
Dennis: What you have just said leads me to
think of the "Reno" approach to the field construct.
Think about Linda's (Hayes) paper that you replied
to. Her student, Mark Swain, has also made similar
comments. The Reno school certainly doesn't deny
that observable events are fundamental. They just
ask where do we go from them? To objectivity or to
observer-constructions? Which is why postulates are
so important. RecallLinda's private events chapterin
the bookshe co-edited with H. Reese, Bryan Midgley
and I, I believe, came to the conclusion that we
resolved apparent differences in your and Linda's TI
field papers. Did we? 1*11 pass this on to Bryan and
to Mark for their reference.
Bryan Midgley: I don't have Noel's or Linda's
paper in front of me, but the way in which I recall
resolving their apparent conflict went something like
this. Noel seemed to stress the participants that
coexist in the interbehavioral field while, of course,
not denying their interrelations. Linda, in contrast,
seemed to stress the interrelations while, of course,
not denying that which interrelates - the partici-
pants. Perhaps my resolution is too simplistic. Den-
nis mentions Noel's use of "relations" as having
different referents than "functional relation" (e.g.,
x=f(y)). I wonder.
Noel: Are these examples not constructs - scien-
tific constructs? That is, the operant (and possibly
16

y=f(x), depending on its referent if any) are constructs nothing else comes to mind... about events, relations,
derived from concrete events. One could also call abstractions, constructs. My guess is - and it's only
them abstractions, but abstractions with a very im- a guess - that he would consider any and all of these
portant character. I maintain that a relation is an as substantive (each has a dictionary definition and
event, not a construct, and therefore not an abstrac- means something specific), about which there could
tion. But the mathematical description of an event is be transitive thought galore. Consider the example,
not the event itself and therefore is a construct or a offered by Bryan, of two psychologists looking at a
type of abstraction. I hold that it is extremely graph and wondering if a relationship exists. They
important to be clear about constructs and events ponder aloud:
and to keep them distinct in order to avoid miscom-
- The t-test is almost significant. I'll bet
munication as well as muddled thinking. The word
there's something there.
"abstraction", it seems to me, is too broad and leads
-Ifwetookintelligenceoutasacovariate,
to confusion. The observer-constructions you men-
I'm sure the effect would.show itself.
tion are absolutely essential, but they must be distin-
- Is there some statistic with more power
guished from the events to which they refer. The
than t or F?
components of the field and their relationships are all
- Maybe we should add more cases.
events, as I see it. so is the field itself which is
- 1 told everybody that this was a wild-
comprised of those events, thus being an event itself
goose chase.
- just a more encompassing one than the compo-
- Let's see if we can replicate this with
nents. But the description of that field whether
different Ss.
verbal or diagrammatic or mathematical is a con-
-Noelwas right. We should have used Q_
struct (an "observer-construction", if you wish).
methodology instead!
Bryan: I found Noel's latest response very infor-
And so forth. Even if "abstraction" cannot be
mative and very useful. The most significant points
used to describe anything substantive, this wouldn't
seem to revolve around the question of whether we
preclude measurement. It might even be an interest-
should use the word "abstraction" to describe any-
ing real study. I thought of doing this 20 or so years
thing. There are events and there are constructs.
ago when I sat in on a graduate course on experimen-
Where do abstractions fit in (I ask rhetorically)? As
tal personality. The instructor thought he was being
for relations as events, Kantor did indeed describe
so objective, and I was dying to take some "objective"
them as such. The (or at leasta) problem seems to be
findings of his and get him and some of his colleagues
that relations are not immediately apparent (this, I
to talk about them. I'm sure all the talk was hiding
believe, being one of Dennis' points). Indeed, we
objectivities of another sort- i.e., subjectivities! The
have probably all been involved in research meet-
one possibly significant story of Stephenson's that
ings, looking at graphs (constructions), wondering if
might be pertinent is found on p. 182 of his "Quan-
a "real" relationship actually exists. Relations as
tum Theory of Subjectivity," in Integrative Psychiatry
events are sometimes hard to get at. I feel like the old
(1989), in which he reminisced about one of
time behaviorist involved in a debate with a Gestalt
Spearman's experiments. Spearman placed a subject
psychologist. The gestalt psychologist has taught a
in front of a matchbox and the subject was to imagine
rat to discriminate a relationship - respond to "larger
what was on the far side and the bottom (which
than" when presented with two differently sized
couldn't be seen). He was trying to distinguish
stimuli (e.g., two triangles) - which the rat does
between sensorial cognition (based on what you
perfectly well. The relation was an event to the rat
could see) from notional cognition. He thought that
and to the Gestalter.
cognition had a notional component that could be
Noel: Did Stephenson ever address this issue accessed via introspection. Stephenson saw that
[constructs & events]? His viewpoint would be of what was really involved was not introspection, but
considerable interest. the talk that clothed the so-called introspections -
i.e., the concourse of communicability about the
Steve Brown: I see nothing about "events" as
matchbox. He provides no concrete study, but it
such in the Index to Tlw Study Of Behavior, and
wouldn't be hard to provide one. I suspectyou could

do the same thing with all of Bryan et al.'s talk about
abstractions, i.e., with the subject-matter of "abstrac-
tion" replacing the matchbox. The email notes that
you sent me already have the beginnings of a Q_
sample.
Debra Fredericks; One thing that Linda has
focused on here in Reno is realism and the truth
criterion of maintaining that a construction is a direct
or indirect product of interaction -isn't everything
actually a construction except the event itself? - as
soon as we engage in deriving or abstracting as a
product of direct interaction with the "real world" we
have taken an observer perspective. How do we
determine, (as Kantorseems to do too easily at times),
then, the validity of our product (validity in terms of
how far removed from naturalistic interaction the
product is) - correspondence? But, correspondence
with what? Coherence? But coherence with what? -
our own constructions? Pragmatic utility - but men-
talists can claim utility also. It depends on one's
goals. It seems that stating that a relation is an event
is neither defensible or indefensible. From a one-
world event perspective there are no relations be-
cause there are no two things to relate (automatically
a dualism). So, even if relations are derived from
direct interaction with the world it is still necessarily
an observer perspective.
Dennis: Could the Reno School be applying
criteria of truth to constructs? Thus, the "correspon-
dence" and "coherence" questions. Then the
nondualistic one-world view is that correspondence
and coherence do not apply to relationships between
constructs because this is a unified construction in
itself.
Bryan: Actually you and Debra both lost me
here. Care to clarify?
Dennis: To go back to abstractions, as I recall, I
claimed that relationships were abstractions. You
maintained they were events. I just took a quick look
at Psychology & Logic. On page 163 Kantor blasts
Dewey for giving the "impression of confusing non-
existence with abstraction products as materials."
Indeed, Kantor here is referring to Dewey's reference
to "abstracted relations." It seems that, following
Kantor, you were pointing out that abstracted rela-
tions do notdestroy the events upon which they were
derived and create something outside of rerum natura.
Furthermore, the abstracted relations function as
17
events, as any linguistic reference to events serve as
events. I was merely focusing on the abstractive
aspect of relationships. Certainly, as Kantor says on
pp. 254 of Psychology & Logic (vol. 1), RELATIONS
ARE STIMULUS OBJECTS TO INTERACT WITH.
Bryan: When you read this last sentence, Den-
nis, do you take "relations" to mean the pristine
interbehavioral events or the linquistic references
(themselves pristine interbehavioral events) to those
events? Although you and Noel would certainly
agree that constructs are derived from events, I'm not
sure that you both would necessarily agree on what
psychologists study. Given your exchange with Noel
so far, I imagine that Noel might say that psycholo-
gists study the events of interbehaving (i.e., they
study behavior). In contrast, you seem to be imply-
ing that psychologists study constructs (somehow
derived from events), That is, scientists usually
describe what they study in terms of events (e.g.,
behavior, molecular genetics, the rings of Saturn).
Perhaps what they should say is that they study
graphs, video tapes, and/or computer printouts some-
how related to behavior, molecular genetics, the rings
of Saturn, etc. These ideas came about because you
have presented the idea of behavior as an abstraction.
If I understand your comments above, behavior is an
abstraction when we are focusing on constructs.
Behavioris a stimulus object when we are focusing on
events. True? You have said that: "The most striking
feature of psychological behavior is that it is never
directly seen. Behavior of concern to the psycholo-
gist must always be inferred; it is an abstraction.
What the person is doing psychologically is never
available to directobservation" (The Interbehaviorist,
1994, p. 8, emphasis added). Does this support my
notion that you are treating constructs as the subject
matter of psychology (or is this more a reference to
issues related to subjectivity and Q}? Perhaps I can
put this differently: Ed [Morris] distinguishes be-
tween what psychologists study and what their sub-
ject matter is. He argues that for behavior analysis,
behavior is both what is studied and the subject
matter. Would you, Dennis, disagree? (i.e., psy-
chologists study graphs, charts, etc. Their subject
matter is interbehavior.) So, have I completely
misunderstood these issues?
Noel: I think you have handled them very. well.
The distinction between "what psychologists study
and what their subject matter is" is another reference
 to that all too common confusion between con-
structs and events. Most psychologists claim to be
studying sensations, information processing, con-
sciousness, and the like when what they are actually
studying and what they can only study is what
organisms do (or do in relationship to other things).
As Kantor sometimes put it, what psychologists say
they are studying and what they are actually studying
often do not correspond.
I would say that "psychologists study the events
of interbehaving but in order to do so they often do
it indirectly through such constructs as numbers,
graphs, Quoits, etc. after making the direct observa-
tions. As long as the referent is closely tied to the
event, thatposesno problem andinfactisanecessary
part of the scientific enterprise. What has led psy-
chology and other behavior sciences so astray is what
Kantor sometimes called "autistic construct" and
what I like to call imposed constructs as opposed to
derived constructs. This gets to what the Reno
School apparently means by "truth criteria". I would
argue that those derived constructs that are most
useful (or are mostlegitimate or scientific in Dennis's
words or have the highest truth value in Reno terms)
are those that refer to relationships. It seems to me,
that is what interbehaviorism is all about. I think Q^
handles this very well. While t's and F's are also about
relationships they are often closely tied to
organocentrism and mechanistic assumptions. Indi-
viduality is an "error term" to F. Subjectivity hardly
exists in conventional statistics. In another message
Debbie stated that "stating a relation is an event is
neither defensible or indefensible. From a one-world
event perspective there are no relations because there
are no two things to relate (automatically a dualism)."
This is an issue on which Bentley and Kantor tangled
and eventually parted ways. The Dewey and Bentiey
transactionalism absorbed everything into an amal-
gam from which, for example, stimulus and object
could only be differentiated in abstraction and subse-
quent to the transaction. They criticized Kantor for
having separate end points in the interaction from
the outset. Kantor argued that their undifferentiated
amalgam was nothing less than Hegelian idealism -
more spookology - with which he would have no
traffic. For him, the organism, object, setting, and
other components of the field are events of nature
that are known from observation (unlike Dewey and
Bentley, he refused to fuse the knower with the
known). The way they are related is studied by
further observation. One makes such observations
by whatever means are available and expedient and
then categorizes those observations in some way that
seem to give some systematic understanding of the
events. I found Dennis's two citations of Kantor's
Psychology & Logic to be very useful. Others might
want to check them. Itseemsthatsomepointsarestill
hanging, and I will leave them for others.
[Editorial Comment: Iflcanspeakforthe "Reno School",
I would say that the issue of truth h irrelevant to our
position. The "confusion " of the knower with the known,
which Kantor was careful to avoid, is not so much a
confusion as an assertion on our part that the focus of
psychological study isfunction. Tins, alongwith an appre-
ciation of the observer's participation in any act of descrip-
tion ~ any act of knowing - is what has led us to the Reno
position. If our position is of some continuing interest,
perhaps my students and I can put together a longer, more
thoughtful response to these very interesting remarks in the
next issue of The Interbehaviorist.J
 Books from
Sidney W. Bijou and Patrick M. Ghezzi
Outline of J. R. Kantor's
Psychological Linguistics
A complete, point by point outline of Kantor's
book, that makes it much more readily under-
stood. Perfect for classroom use or as a quick way
to introduce others to Kantor's approach.
Sidney W. Bijou, Behavior Analysis of Child De-
velopment (Second Revision)
An entirely new version of this classic text
Steven C. Hayes, Neil S. Jacobson, Victoria M.
Follette, and Michael J. Dougher (Eds.),
Acceptance and Change: Content and Context
in Psychotherapy. The first volume to focus
entirely on psychological acceptance methods
from the point of view of modem empirical
clinical psychology.
Linda J. Hayes, Gregory). Hayes, Stephen C. Moore,
and Patrick M. Ghezzi (Eds.), Ethical Issues in
Developmental Disabilities. If you work with
persons who have disabilities, you need this book.
Steven C. Hayes, Linda J. Hayes, Masaya Sato, and
Koichi Ono, Behavior Analysis of Language and
Cognition, A contemporary look at the nature of
stimulus relations and verbal events, and their
impact on cognitive activity.
Bernard Guerin, Analyzing Social Behavior:
Behavior Analysis and the Social Sciences,
Provides the first full coverage of the social
sciences from the perspective of modem
behavior analysis.
Steven C. Hayes, Linda J. Hayes, Hayne W.
Reese, & Theodore R. Sarbin (Eds.), Variet-
ies of Scientific Contextualism
Contextualism from soup to nuts.
Sam Leigland (Ed.), Radical Behaviorism:
Willard Day on Psychology and Philoso-
phy
The wonderful thought of a man ahead of
his time.
Steven C. Hayes and Linda J. Hayes (Eds.),
Understanding Verbal Relations. The best
available book on equivalence and similar
relational phenomena.
LindaJ. Hayes and Philip N. Chase (Eds.),
Dialogues on Verbal Behavior. Statements
about verbal behavior from leaders in the
field.
20

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 Volume 23 1996 Number 3

Linda J. Hayes, University of Nevada Special Issue of JBTEP 3

Emilio Ribes, University of Guadalajara ABA'96 News 3
Book Publication Notices 3
The J.H. Kantor Research Fellowship ,3
Debra W. Fredericks, Mark A. Adams, Conference Notice 4
University of Nevada Article
N.W. Smith
PAST EDITORS Eco-Behavioral Science Introduction 5
Noel W. Smith, Vols 1 -7 (1970-1978) Abstracts: Q-Conference
Ronald G. Heyduk, Vols 8-11 (1978-1983) Q Methodology as the Foundation for a
Edward K. Morris, Vols 12-17 (1983-1989) Science of Subjectivity 9
Presidents in the Public Mind: The Social
ADVISORY BOARD Construction of Bill Clinton 9
Sidney W. Bijou, University of Nevada Directing Health Messages Toward African-
Dennis J. Delprato, Eastern Michigan University Americans: Attitudes Toward Healthcare
James J. Fox, East Tennessee State University and the Mass Media 9
Patrick M. Ghezzi, University of Nevada Dissolution and Reconstruction of National
Edward K. Morris, University of Kansas Identity: The Experience of Subjectivity in
Paul!. Mountjoy, Western Michigan University Taiwan 10
N. H. Pronko, Wichita State University A study of the Professional Nursing
Noel Smith, State University of New York Images of Nursing Unit Managers:
A Q Methodological Approach 10

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Interbehaviohsm On A Bulletin Board 11
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Una teoria de la conducta: tporgue la
necesitamos?
A behavior theory: Why we need it? 13

ISSN8755-612X
 A Newsletter of
Interbehavioral Psychology
ISSN8755-612X
Linda J. Hayes, English Editor
Department of Psychology
University of Nevada
Reno, Nevada 89557, U.S.A.
(702)784-1137
THE INTERBEHAVIORIST publishes news, in-
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The newsletter strongly encourages submission of
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ISSN8755-612X
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 Special Issue of JBTEP
The September 1995 issue of tiit Journal of
Behavior Therapy andExperimentalPsychiatry (Vol.
23, No. 3) is devoted entirely to "Cognition,
behavior, and causality: A broad exchange of
views stemming from the debate on the causal
efficacy of human thought." This special issue,
edited by Leo L. Reyna, has provocative papers
by Albert Bandura, A. Charles Catania, Kevin J.
Corcoran, Patric W. Corrigan, P. Christopher
Early and Amy Handel, John Garcia, Russell M.
F. Hawkins, Steven C. Hayes and Kelly G.
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ABA'96 News
At the ABA convention in San Francisco
there will be a symposium centering on the
book, Meaningful differences in the everyday experi-
ence of young American children by Betty Hart and
Todd R. Risley. The participants and the topics
of the symposium, titled "American parenting of
language-learningchildren," are: Sidney W. Bijou
on "Natural science in behavior analysis," Betty
Hart on "What parents and families actually
DO," Todd R. Risley on "The BIG variables of
early family experience," John Mabry on "Impli-
cations of this natural science data set for ad-
vancing the debate in 'modern 1
psycholinguistics," and Jack Michael on "Impli-
cations of this natural science data for advancing
the analysis of verbal behavior."
Book Publication Notices
Yau, C. (1995). Qualitative research in creativ-
ity. Buffalo, NY: Creative Education Founda-
tion (68 pp, $14,95). Yau argues that the study of
subjectivity must integrate both quantitative
and qualitative methodologies. To order con-
tact: cefpubl@aol.com.
Brown, J. (1996). The Lin Science, Training to
Utilize Subjectivity in Research. Dr. Judith Brown,
with her husband, Professor Emeritus George I.
Brown, conducted a four-year exploratory re-
search project upon which much of the text is
based. It describes components of a participa-
tory, experiential, step-by-step approach in which
the central role of the researcher is stressed. For
more information contact: Scandinavian Uni-
versity Press North America, 875 Massachusetts
Ave., Ste. 84, Cambridge, MA, 02139 (800-498-
2877). European readers should contact: Scandi-
navian University Press, Book Department, P.O.
Box 2959 T0yen, N-0608 Oslo, Norway.
If you are interested in writing a book review
on either of these publications or any other book
that may be of interest to the readership of THE
INTERBEHAVIORIST contact Linda Hayes,
Dept. of Psychology, University of Nevada,
Reno, NV, 89557-0062 or e-mail
dwf@pogonip.scs.unr.edu.
The J.R. Kantor Research Fellowship -
Archives of the History of American
Psychology-1996
This Fellowship, offered to promote research
in the history of psychology, is supported by
the sale of books published by the Principia
Press and distributed by the Archives. Propos-
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Archives are invited, but since this award is in
honor of Dr. Kantor, preference may be given
to projects that deal with the topics that were
critical in the history of interbehaviorism. The
Fellowship will be offered annually in the
amount of $750. It is intended to assist the
recipient in meeting travel and living expenses
while procuring archival data. A fact sheet
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Call for News
THE INTERBEHAVIORIST pub-
lishes news about subscribers' activities
and information about others' activities
that may be of interest to readers. If you
have published an article, chapter, or
book with an interbehavioral orienta-
tion, or have read one published by
someone else, particularily if the source
is obscure, please let us know about it.
El Intercomportamientista publica
noticias sobre las actividades de sus
subscribidores e informacion sobre otras
actividades que pueden ser de interes
para los leectores. Si usted ha publicado
un articulo, capitulo, o un libro con
orientacion intercomportamientista, o
ha lei'do una publicada por otra per-
sona, particularmente si su procedencia
es desconocida, por favor dejenos saber
sobre eso.
 Article
EGO-BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE
(Also Known as ECOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY)
INTRODUCTION1
N.W. Smith
S.U.N.Y, Pittsburgh
When we enter a store there are certain patterns
that we engage in with respect to the merchandise
in the store and with the clerks. In a grocery store
we go during the hours it is in operation, obtain a
shopping cart, move down the aisles selecting food
items and placing them in the cart while avoiding
running into other cars, get in line and wait our
turn to be checked through, pay the cashier, and
carry or cart away the groceries. The pattern is quite
predictable. A description of our behavior in a post
office, tennis lesson, basketball game, or work-
place would be equally predictable. These are be-
havior settings. We follow the expected patterns of
the setting; our personalities have little influence.
Individuals with quite different personalities all
follow similar patterns in any given setting. We
even take measures to make sure that those pat-
terns continue. For example, if we are attending a
meeting at which there is no table for a slide
projector that we wish to use, we will search for and
bring in a table; this corrects the deficiencies of the
physical components that would interfere with or fail
to support those patterns. Similarly, we might try
to modify non-conforming behavioral components
by explaining to a newcomer in a coffee shop that
one must go to the counter to place an order. These
natural settings with their orderly and self-regulat-
ing character are the subject matter of ecological
' Editors note: This article is an excerpt from Smith,
N.W. (in press). Current Systems in Psychology,
i
The term "ecological psychology" is still found in the
older literature and continues to be used to the present by some
writers.
psychology now often called ecobehavioral sci-
ence or the science of behavior settings - as devel-
oped by Roger Barker and his associates.2
FUNDAMENTALS OF BEHAVIOR
SETTINGS
Standing Patterns
Behavior settings, such as the grocery store
example, are situations where human activity and
physical conditions are in interaction. Here are
some additional examples of behavior settings:
classrooms, factory shipping rooms, pizza parlors,
athletic events, dentists' waiting rooms, card games,
court rooms, and auto repair shops. A behavior
setting has several recognizable orderly character-
istics. First of all it has standing patterns of behavior.
These are behaviors that recur each time the behav-
ior setting is in operation. In the classroom this
includes the students' sitting down and facing the
front of the room, the instructor in the front facing
the students, the instructor's taking the lead in
discussion or presentation, and the students' rais-
ing their hands to be recognized by the instructor
in order to speak.
Synomorphs
The standing behavior patterns are closely tied
to the environment, most of it inanimate. In the
case of the classroom, there is a chalkboard and
chalk, chairs for students, perhaps a table or lectern
in front for the instructor, lighting, heat in cold
weather, and walls that shut out distractions. These
inanimate components are an integral part of the
behavior patterns, and in fact the behavior pat-
terns cannot readily occur without them.
Barker refers to the co-relationship of behavior
and physical objects as synomorphs, e.g. "same
structure." A set of synomorphs comprise the
structure of the behavior setting. The classroom
behavior setting will illustrate these structures as
examples of behavior patterns interconnected with
objects: students sitting on chairs and taking notes
with a pen on a tablet resting on the arm of the
chair, instructor lecturing from notes placed on a
lectern and writing with chalk on a chalkboard,
and both within walls that shut out distracting
sounds and views.
In an iron foundry the melting furnace and the
pouring areas are different synomorphs within the
same factory but are functionally interdependent
and comprise a single behavior setting. But the
shipping room that prepares iron castings for trans-
port acts independently as long as it has a stockpile
of castings. What goes on in the manufacture of
castings has only limited effect on the shipping
activities and vice-versa. They are separate behav-
ior settings.
The synomorphs have a degree of interdepen-
dence with one another. An institution will at-
tempt to schedule events in such a way that no
serious time conflicts occur. For example, a depart-
ment of a university will not schedule its classes
during a designated period when faculty hold de-
partment meetings, and a foundry will not sched-
ule maintenance and repair of equipment while
production is occurring. Any synomorphs that are
related in structure but function independently of
one another must be parts of separate behavior
settings. The criteria of structure and interdepen-
dence permit the differentiation of behavior set-
tings from non-behavior settings. Because an iron
foundry has functionally independent synomorphs,
the whole foundry is not a behavior setting. Nei-
ther is a university or even a university department.
It is usually easy to assess whether a situation is or
is not a behavior setting, but Barker and his associ-
ates have developed rating scales for components
of the situation that provide a quantitative means
of assessment whenever doubt arises.
Because the physical sciences have avoided
events that include behavior, and the behavioral
sciences have avoided events involving inanimate
objects, the interface between them has been ne-
glected by both. That relationship falls through
the cracks, yet comprises a great deal of human
activity.
Environment
A behavior setting is also characterized by an
environment that surrounds the behavior and de-
limits its geography. For a classroom it is walls, for
a factory it is the work area. For a tennis game it is
lines around the court. For skiing it is the marked
trails along with the lodge and lift line areas but
might include unmarked areas for the more daring
skier.
The environment is a well organized arrange-
ment of nested assemblies that are like layers of an
onion. These layers are circumjacent to each other.
Each assembly or unit contains some of the com-
ponents of the assembly it is circumjacent to so
that some interdependence occurs. The individual
is one such assembly. Each os his or her biological
organs is a component of the individual's body,
and each in turn is another assembly. For example,
the heart is a component of the circumjacent body
and a cell is a component of the circumjacent
heart. Going the other direction from the indi-
vidual toward larger units, we find that the behav-
ior setting is an assembly of which the individual is
a component, and the behavior setting may be a
circumjacent component of an institution such as
a factory or a university with numerous behavior
settings. Thus, what may be a component in one
assembly can be environment in an assembly that
is circumjacent to it. A unit, then, can be both
circumjacent and interjacent.
There are mutual causal relations up and down
the nesting series in which many environmental
entities occur; the preperceptual environment is
made up of systems within systems. An entity
in such a series both constrains and is constrained
by the outside unit that surrounds it and by the
inside units it surrounds. This means that entities
in nesting structures are parts of their own con-
texts; they influence themselves through the
circumjacent entities which they, in part, compose
(Barker, 1963, p. 23).
Definition of Behavior Settings
A behavior setting consists of five characteris-
tics. It must (a) have standing patterns of behavior;
(b) be established in a particular environmental
context; (c) occur at a specific place; (d) consist of
behavior and environment in synomorphic rela-
tionship; (e) involve an environment circumjacent
to behavior (Schoggen, 1989, p. 52). Wicker and
Kirmeyer (1976) list three more: (a) a hierarchy of
positions orroles in the behavior setting with some
having a more vital function than others (such as a
dentist versus a receptionist in a dentists office), (b)
the inter change ability of one participant with an-
other (a replacement dentist or a replacement re-
ceptionist would allow the behavior setting to
continue without much change) and (c) the con-
trol circuits described in the next section.
Control Circuits or Mechanisms
A behavior setting has human components,
non-human components, and control circuits or
control mechanisms. The term "circuit" refers to the
interchange or feedback loops among components
as opposed to a straight line cause and effect
sequence; some writers, however, refer to "mecha-
nisms." The stability of settings with their behav-
ior-environment relationships involves the opera-
tion of four types of circuits. These four are goal
circuits, program circuits, deviation countering circuits,
and -vetoing circuits.
Every behavior setting must exist for some
purpose: recreation, production of goods, sale of a
commodity, acquisition ofknowledge, and so forth.
Such apurpose or goal is the behavior setting's,^*?/
circuits. The goal circuits involve procedures for
reaching goals that are satisfying to the participants
("inhabitants", Barker calls them) of the setting.
The participants must perceive the goals and the
routes to them. When some participants leave,
others take their places and receive whatever in-
struction is necessary for the role. The participants
actively attempt to keep the setting operating be-
cause its goal provides them with satisfactions. If it
fails to be satisfying, they will no longer strive to
maintain the setting, and it will go out of existence.
People relate to their setting through the pursuit of
goal achievement and the satisfaction it brings.
People also relate to their settings through
program circuits. Programs are the specifications of
behaviors that the participants of the setting will
carry out, such as rules for a game, production
methods in a factory, and procedures for conduct-
ing a meeting. One or more participants must
know the program and thereby control the se-
quence of events in it.
Deviation countering circuits occur when the par-
ticipants recognize that some person or condition
prevents the program of the setting from occurring
and acts to remedy the situation. It may involve
persuading someone to behave in a different or
more effective manner ("if you don't hurry up we
won't get this job completed by the deadline").
The previous example of explaining to the new-
comer to the coffee shop that orders are placed at
the counter is also deviation countering. Remedy-
ing some fault in the physical environment also
falls into this type of control circuit. A speaker with
a soft voice may need a microphone; a classroom
may need additional chairs; a motor that runs an
important piece of machinery in a machine shop
needs replacing; a work situation needs a replace-
ment for a person off work because of sickness.
When deviation-countering circuits are insuf-
ficient to bring behaviors into line with the needs
of the setting and its goals, vetoing circuits come into
play. A supervisor discharges an employee who
does sloppy or incompetent work; a band leader
requests the departure of a player who is high on
narcotics; a teacher removes a noisy and disruptive
pupil from the room. Inanimate components of
the setting are also subject to veto: a new lighting
device for a theatrical production that gives an
unsatisfactory effect, loud music at a gathering that
interferes with conversation, a machine check-out
device for library books that is more cumbersome
than the old method.
The control circuits change the components in
anticipated ways that keep the schedules or pro-
grams on course. When one control circuit fails to
induce the participant or other component to
appropriately contribute to the goal of the behav-
ior setting, the participants will activate another.
The components and circuits operate as a homeo-
static control to keep everything functioning in a
predictable and prescribed manner. The foundry
worker who is too slow at pouring molten iron into
the molds will be pressured to speed up by the
worker who is fast approaching with a huge bucket
to resupply the pouring ladles. The person who is
going too fast will be limited by the rate at which
the molds on the conveyor belt reach him or her.
any molds that are improperly filled will bring
feedback to the pourers and result in correction
(deviation countering circuits). The actions of the
 workers, the physical environment, and the regu-
lating circuits function together to produce a pre-
dictable program that meets a goal.
Barker (1963) holds that the behavior setting
resides not in behavior or physical environment
but "in the circuitry that interconnects behavior
settings, the inhabitants and other behavior setting
components" (p. 171). This circuitry enables the
setting to be self-regulating.
Behavior settings are self-regulating, active systems.
They impose their program of activities on the
persons and objects within them. Essential persons
and materials are drawn into the settings, and
disruptive components are modifies or ejected. It's
as if behavior settings were living systems intent on
remaining alive and healthy, even at the expense of
theirindividual components. (Wicker, 1979, p. 12)
Still other mechanisms or circuits can be iden-
tified (Stokols & Shumaker, 1981). In order to
accommodate more people rather than veto them,
overstaffed settings often enlarge theirsetting. They
may also limit admission of newcomers rather than
admit people than veto them. Settings vary in their
repetitions and continuity. Academic classes and
factory work shifts have well defined durations.
They both occur for a set time and repeat this
regularly, but academic classes discontinue at the
end of a semester while work shifts go on indefi-
nitely. A birthday party may have a clear beginning
and only a vague ending and no likely repetition.
Some settings remain viable only as long as particu-
lar people, such as strong leaders or doers, remain
active. Others are quite independent of any par-
ticular type of individual, and probably many are
in between. The stability of a setting may be
threatened by pressing environmental conditions
(competing settings, funding ended, present quar-
ters no longer available, hostility of opponents).
Unexpected termination can occur due to fire,
hurricanes, or death of a key person such as a store
owner. Settings vary in the way in which they
anticipate and prepare for environmental change
and crises and thereby whether they stand, fall, or
become crippled when these events occur. Some-
times the participants change the patterns of the
setting to prepare for such events; and sometimes
they change them just to gain variety, be more
efficient, upgrade the setting, or countless other
reasons.
References
Barker, R. G. (1963). On the nature of the environ-
ment. Journal of Social Issues, /9(4), 17-38.
Schoggen, P. (1989). Behavior Settings: A Revision
and Extension of Roger C. Barker's Ecological
Psychology. Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press.
Stokols, D. & Shumaker, S. A. (1981). People in
places: A transactional view of settings. InJ. H.
Harvey (Ed.), Cognition, social behavior, and the
environment. Hillside, NJ: Erlbaum.
Wicker, A. W. (1979). An introduction to ecological
psychology. Monterey, Ca: Brooks/Cole.
Wicker, A. W. & Kirmeyer, S. (1976). Prom church
to laboratory to national park: A program of
research on excess and insufficient popula-
tions in behavior settings. In S. Wapner & S. B.
Cohen (Eds.), Experiencing the envtronmetit.New
York: Plenum.
 Abstracts
1995 QrConference

dMETHODOLOGYAS THE tive and view the Clinton Presidency like most
FOUNDATION FOR A SCIENCE OF political events as a spectacle, the meaning ofwhich
SUBJECTIVITY is ambiguous. Examined from this angle, attention is
directed away from the search for a singular meaning,
Steven R. Brown towards ascertaining the range of meanings and un-
Department of Political Science, derstandings which actually do exist. Secondly, we
Kent State University adopt what Jeffrey Tulis refers to as the "interpretative
turn" in presidential studies by utilizing the presi-
dency as a window through which to evaluate condi-
William Stephenson's 1935 letter to the Editor of
tions in the culture and the larger political system.
Nature, published 60 years ago, contains within its
Thirdly, we employ Qjnethodology to ascertain the
four short paragraphs all the essentials fora science of
variety of meaning attributed by the mass public to
subjectivity. Focusing on two studies on the con-
troversies surrounding animal experimentation and Bill Clinton and his Presidency. Four factors result
from this analysis indicating four distinct under-
of problem selection in policy analysis - illustrations
standings of the President. Most persons in this
are provided of the new phenomena brought to light
study, however, are strongly loaded on one bipolar
through "inverted" factor analysis, and of the advan-
factor which illustrates how the Clinton Presidency
tages of experimentation which Qmethodology en-
has become a central symbol in the contemporary
joys. A proposed study on food habits demonstrates
"Culture Wars."The other factors are considered and
how experimental probes can be made into the
the implications of these understandings is discussed.
cognitive and orectic aspects of nutrition and food
choice. The conclusion is reached that Qmethodol-
ogy remains the foundation of the study of subjective
behavior. DIRECTING HEALTH MESSAGES
TOWARD AFRICAN-AMERICANS:
ATTITUDES TOWARD HEALTHCARE
AND THE MASS MEDIA
PRESIDENTS IN THE PUBLIC MIND;
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF BILL
Judith Sylvester
CLINTON
Louisiana State University
Lairy Baas
Department of Political Science,
Qjnethodology is sometimes criticized because
Valparaiso University
results are often based on small, non-random samples
that cannot be generalized to a larger population.
Dan Thomas
This study seeks to overcome these limitation by
Department of Political Sciences,
clustering a large group of randomly-selected tele-
Warburg College
phone residents into Qjtvpes obtained from a Qsort.
Specifically, this study isolates five Qjtypes from the
This study seeks to add theoretically, substan-
factor analysis of 56 sorts. The following Q, types
tively and methodologically to the growing body of
demonstrate that there are attitudinai differences
literature on the "public presidency," as well as to between African-Americans and Caucasians that con-
increase our understanding of the Clinton Presi-
tribute to the discrepancies in health status between
dency. First, we borrow Murray Edeiman's perspec-
the two races. The Equalizers (59% African-Ameri-
10
can) are the most concerned about transportation to
healthcare facilities. They do not believe federal
policies help minorities. The Adjusters (80% African-
American) believe that blacks are victims of the
economic system, that rich people get better care
than poor people and that minorities have not been
taught to use the healthcare system. The Preventers
(predominately Caucasians) have pride in the
healthcare system. They believe the key to good
health is to lead a clean, moral life. The Empathizers
(all African-American) rank statements greater than
other types that have to do with media bias and
economic barriers, they also may avoid doctors. The
Fixers (50% African-American) rank statements greater
than other types that concern improving preventive
efforts in disadvantaged areas and providing more
black healthcare providers. These types are used to
cluster 527 subjects (49% African-American) who
responded to a telephone survey based on the Q^
statements. The results are used to suggest possible
marketing strategies to deliver healthcare messages to
African-Americans.
DISSOLUTION AND
RECONSTRUCTION OF NATIONAL
IDENTITY: THE EXPERIENCE OF
SUBJECTIVITY IN TAIWAN
Timothy Ka Ying Wong
Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies
and Department of Government
Milan Tung Wen Sun
Public Administration,
Chinese University of Hong Kong
Taiwan society has long been haunted by the
national identity problem, due to its special histori-
cal-structural status. The problem has captured sig-
nificant academic interest in recent years. Yet, much
work paid insufficient attention to the subjectivity of
national identity discursive formation among Tai-
wan people in the present-day setting. This study
attempts to reconstruct, from the subject's perspec-
tive, Taiwan people's national identity discourses. A
specifically designed method - Qmethodology is
used. We can identify five discourses through an
intensive analysis of carefully selected Taiwan sub-
jects. The five discourses are Chinese nationalism,
status-quoism, confused identity, Taiwan-prioritism
and Taiwanese nationalism. We find that the dis-
courses are intertwined and share some loosely de-
fined viewpoints regarding Taiwan's present situa-
tion. Our findings are in sharp contrast with the
precons true ted "reunification-independence" bifur-
cation or "reunification-status Quo-independence"
bifurcation approach characteristic of the existing
Taiwan national identity studies. The findings may
be served as a new basis for constructing a more
comprehensive analytical framework for future re-
search.
A STUDY OF THE PROFESSIONAL
NURSING IMAGES OF NURSING UNIT
MANAGERS: A Q_METHODOLOGICAL
APPROACH
Eun Ja Yeun and Sung Ai Chi
Department of Nursing, Chung-Ang University
Hung Kyu Kim
Department of Mass Communication, Hankuk
University of Foreign Studies,
Seoul, Korea
The purpose of this study was to scientifically
analyze subjective schemata of nursing unit manag-
ers in order to promote our understanding of indi-
viduals* images of nursing as a profession. The study
also sought to provide appropriate strategies for im-
proving the image of nursing based on each
individual's own characteristics and perceptions about
the profession. A Q_methodological approach was
used in this study because the method effectively
measures highly abstract and subjective concepts,
such as personal experience and perception. The
results, based on a study of nursing unit managers at
five Korean university hospitals, revealed three dis-
tinct types of images of nursing as a profession: the
views of the Proud, the Self-Conflicted and the
Progressive manager. It was found that these three
types could change continuously through interac-
tion with their environment. Based on the findings,
the study also suggested guidelines for constructing a
desirable professional nursing image.

Discussion
Interbehaviorism On A Bulletin Board
The following e-mail exchange was submitted by Mike Kullman
Spectrum Center, CA
Ken Wildman (Ohio Northern University) writes:
You ask: "Mustwe leave the study of thinking to
cognitive psychology?", and I would answer; Yes.
The issue, as I see it, is not whether these phenomena
can be studied or not, but which methodologies are
appropriate. I maintain that the methodology known
as science requires certain criteria be met. One of
these is public observability. This requirement is
based on long experience with the fallibility of single
person observations. If a goal of inquiry is to move us
from less certainty towards more certainty, then
increasing the number of observers increases the
reliability of the observations. Individual variations
(including personal biases, beliefs, and motives) are
randomly distributed among the observers, and hope-
fully tend to cancel out.
Joe Parsons [University of Victoria] replies:
This sort of requirement of science serves to
establish a duaiistic universe along the public and
private dimension, and then restrict study to one. I'd
prefer a science that does not require such a dualism.
Mike Kullman takes up the conversation:
I agree with Joe's response. If we subscribe to
truth by agreement we then also commit to a world
which has both a physical and nonphysical nature. If
this is our world view then the "laws" we have about
the physical world do not hold in the nonphysical.
Reading this thread reminded me of an article
that I read several years ago concerning the principle
of psychological privacy by Observer (f.R.Kantor*s
nom de pume), so I retrieved it and re-read it. I think
the article speaks to this topic - private events, dual-
ism, verbal behavior, and concepts such as con-
sciousness. Any quotes below are from the article
(Observer, The Psychological Record, 1981, 31, 101-
106.)
11
Kantor does not subscribe to dualism and notes
its verbal origins. "One can not look into another
person's mind because there is no mind to look and
there is no mind to look into. The entire problem of
minds is unadulterated verbal gossamer" (p. 228).
The major point of the article is that "private" is
actually specificity. In other words every flight path
of a falling leaf or rock is private in the sense that it is
specific to that rock or leaf and the conditions for
which it is falling at the rime of the fall. Similarly,
"Those who hold that sensations of X's
mind cannot be transferred to Y's mind
simply are asserting that some quality or
property of stimulus objects responded to
belongs invariably to that object in a psycho-
logical interaction and to no other object"
(p.228).
We do not speak of the private aspect of the rock
or leaf and perhaps should behave the same way
when it comes to humans.
I wonder if it is the fact that we can talk about
the relation of the stimulus object with our own
behavior (to ourselves and others) that leads us to
talk about our private behavior. I also wonder if
this phenomena is what leads to Ken's statement
about Individual variations (including personal
biases, beliefs, and motives). Kantor goes further
than Skinner in his argument against dualism and
privacy.
"The behaviorist does not realize that in
a world where every event is "private," that is
unique, there is no problem of privacy. Ev-
erything is public in the sense of being di-
rectly or inferentially available for observa-
tion" (p.230).
12

I think Ken would have trouble with the word
"inferential" in the above quote. If I understood him
however, he would be satisfied with verbal accounts
about a private event. The verbal accounts are infer-
ential in a sense. We have learned from a verbal
community how to le t others know "what it is we feel"
- our unique interaction with the environment.
The end of this article notes the limitation of
knowledge and is a good example of the extensive-
ness of field theory.
"What is known in part leaves room for
the erroneous assumption of something
strange and mysterious beyond. What is miss-
ing is the view that all authentic knowledge is
only the initial approach to the nature of
things and events. But even the most cumu-
lative and substantiated information never
covers all and every phase of things and
events" (p. 231).
Bill Verplanck [Knoxville, TN] responds in part:
And shouldn't behavior analysts be appalled
when a "Behavior Analyst" proposes that research on
remembering, perceiving, and so on, should be left to
the cognitive psychologists? What kind of a science
of behavior is it that would omit so much of what we
and our fellow animals do? What, one wonders, if
19th century chemists had left what became "organic
chemistry" to chefs, because they knew a lot about
meat and veggies?

One of the pioneers of behavior analysis, Israel Goldiamond, died at his home in Chicago of cancer
on November, 19, 1995. He was 76 years old. At the time of his death, he was Professor Emeritus of
Psychiatry and Psychology at the University of Chicago. Prior to his appointment at the University of
Chicago in 1968, he held positions at Southern Illinois University, Arizona State University, and the
Institute of Behavior Research in Silver Springs, Maryland.
Is, as he was known by his friends and colleagues, was one of the founders of the Association of
Behavior Analysis and served as its president from 1977 to 1978. In recognition of his creative work and
numerous publications in both basic and applied research, which included the treatment of weight
control, smoking, stuttering and phobic behavior, he received the Don Hake Award from Division 25 of
the American Psychology Association and in recognition of his service on the Board of Social and Ethical
Responsibility in Psychology, he received a certificate of appreciation from APA's Public Interest
Directorate.
An automobile accident in 1970 left him paralyzed from the waist down but he quickly resumed his
professional work and became a powerful advocate for handicapped persons. He is survived by Betty, his
wife of nearly 50 years, Two daughters, one son and four grandchildren. Is will be sorely missed by his many
friends world-wide and his devoted students.
 13

Article

Una teoria de la conducta: iporgue la necesitamos?

A behavior theory: Why we need it?

Hector Martinez Sanchez

Universidad de Guadalajaral

This paper attempts to show why abehavior theory is needed. Historical and philosophical backgrounds about
behavior theory are briefly exposed. Statements fromSkinne^SchoerifeldjKantorandotherbehavioraliy oriented
authors stressing relevance and significance about progress of a behavior theory are reviewed. Every theoretical
proposal should be useful in guidance of research programs. Some remarks addressed to call attention on
interbehavioral perspective, as an example contributing to historical continuity in the construction of behavior
theory, are added. A provisional conclusion may be summarized: theoretical efforts advocating a behavior theory
should be considered as a progressive, gradual and dynamic process more than as a terminal outcome.
Hector Martinez Sanchez can be contacted at: Centre de Estudios e Investigaciones en Comportamiento.
Address: Av. 12 de diciembre 204, Col. Chapalita, Apartado Postal 5-374, C.P. 45030. Guadalajara, Jal. Mexico.
Email: hectorm@udgserv.cencar.udg.mx.

<:Es posible hablar de una teoria de la conducta?.
Tal vez esta pregunta en su sentido mas ampiio sea
difi'cil responderla sin caer en simplificaciones,
omisionesy, enultimo caso tambie"nsinexageraciones;
pero actualmente puede ser una pregunta valida para
reflexionar alrededor de un problema vigente para
aquellos quienes se interesan en los aspectos teoricos
de una ciencia de la conducta. Hace algunos anos
Schoenfeld (1983) publico una breve pero excelente
revision hist6rica, acerca de las condiciones empf ricas
y conceptuales que guarda la teorfa de la conducta y
cuales son sus perspeco'vas de desarrollo hacia el
future. Despues de la lectura de su articulo, uno
puede quedar con la impresion optimista de que la
teoria de la conducta en lo que va de este siglo, ha
producido importantes avances desde la
conceptuacion de la conducta como objeto de estudio
de la psicologia. Sin embargo, no queda
suficientemente claro el lugar que ocupa esta teoria
entre muchos psicologos para guiar sus propios
programas de investigacion.
Indudablemente, resulta discutible cualquier
definicion de lo que es una teoria. De acuerdo con
Rychlak (1981) la palabra teoria en su raiz griega
significa ei acto de inspection, de contemplacion, o
de consideraci6n. Sin embargo, existen bastantes
extensiones de la sigm'ficacion del termino, por
ejemplo: una creenria, una tactica, o un procedimiento
propuesto como una base para la action; un cuerpo
de generalizations derivado de ia experiencia o
practica en algun campo (como, en la teoria de la
musica); un cuerpo de teoremas matematicos
presentando una vision clara, redondeaday sistemica
de un objeto (como la teoria de los numeros); un
analisis sistematico, o la definicion de un concepto;
una entidad hipotetica o hipotesis de trabajo,
relacionando o explicando algun patr6n de hechos
observado, con o sin evidencia experimental en su
apoyo, y cosas porel estilo. Las nociones de conjetura,
especulaci6n, y suposicion tambien estan ligadas a la
definicion de teoria.
En la psicologia a su vez, coexisten diverges
significados respecto a la definicion de teoria. Podria
decirse sin ningun temor a exagerar, que cada autor
tienesumanera particular para definirlo que entiende
por teoria. Como es de esperarse esto ha resultado
poco ftuctifero en el desarrollo conceptual de nuestra
disciplina. El obj etivo del presente trabaj o, es mos tear
14
de unamanerasenciila, que efectivamente serequiere
de una teoria de la conducta, que desde hace varias
decadas ha entrado en vigor y que no es posible
borrar o desconocer sus antecedentes hist6ricos para
evaluar sus alcances.
Antecedentes histtiricos
Desde que Watson, en 1913, proclamo
formalmente el nacimiento del conductismo,
surgieron series intentos por conformar un marco
te6ricoadecuado,quepermitieraeslabonardemanera
16gica y congruente un mosaico de eventos y
fenomenos que directa o indirectamente tenian que
ver con ia psicologfa. A panir de ese momento
historico, fue posible reinterpretar un conjunto de
problemas, que, o bien se excedi'an en su explicacion,
o por otro lado, carecian de un rigor metodologico
que hacfan sospechar de su legitimidad. La virtud de
las aportaciones de Watson, no radica tamo en su
impacto inmediato - que dicho sea de paso fue
bastante espectacular sino lo que posibilito y de
hecho produjo en el future mediate. La renovacion
en el lenguaje que introdujo Watson a la psicologia,
permia'6 estructurar una postura critica frente a todas
aqueilas aproximaciones psicologicas que se
sustentaban en premisas de origen mentalista y de
tipo ficticio, muy en boga por los inicios de este siglo.
Antiguos problemas como el de la relation objeto
sujeto, o la dicotomia de eventos privados y eventos
publicos, el papel de la conciencia, etc... fueron
sometidos nuevamente a examen y reformulados en
te"rminos que pudieran ser abordados con una
perspecriva menos especuladva.
El mismo caracter de la psicologia para
considerarse una ciencia fue polemizado y oblige a
importantes definiciones de los psicologos de los
anos 30 y 40. Cabe notar, que la formulacion de una
teorfa supone un compromise, no siempre explfcito,
de quien la sustenta, por lo que es muy difkil encontrar
cientificos que se retracten de su propia formulacion.
Se puede decir, sin embargo, que este periodo fue
frucb'fero en el sentido de que cuaiquier esfuerzo
te6rico debia explicitar la metodologia empleada
paia realizar sus proposiciones conceptuales. Un
hecho interesante que vale la pena destacar en la
producci6n te6rica de esos anos, es la estrecha
vinculaci6n entre las teorias y las situaciones
experimentales de donde eran derivadas dichas teorias.
Aun cuando la production emprrica de ese tiempo,
estaba relacionada con el problema del aprendizaje,
era comun que cada teoria que surgia alrededor de
este fenomeno estaba completamente tamizada por
ei tipo de exp crime ntacion que en particular era
desarroliada. Harzem y Miles (1978), a este respecto
senalan:
"...hay muchos ejemplos en la hhtoria de la ciencia.
donde el aparato usado ha influido la manem en la cuallos
investigations ban concehido elfen6meno en el que estdn
interesados, y esto no es menos cierto en la psicologia..."
p.5.
En el caso de Watson, hay que hacer notar que
aunque sus afirmaciones constituyen una verdadera
apologia del metodo experimental, que en forma tan
exitosahabian desarrollado las ciencias naturales, no
fue 61, sin embargo, quien en realidad predicara con
el ejemplo. Seria de mayor justiciareconocer que fue
Skinner, quien en 1938 en su libro The behavior of
organisms, expuso un robusto programa experimental
acompanado de evidencia empt'rica estableciendo
una estricta congruencia entre lo que se decfa y lo que
se hacia. Hist6ricamente, esta obra consdtuye el
verdadero manifiesto conducdsta que permitio la
exposidon de modvos del programa experimental
que ha tenido una gran influencia en la psicologia.
Con la incursion de Skinner, los teoricos del
comportamiento se tornaron mas cautos y se
establecieron normas de confiabilidad en las
declaraciones interpretarivas y en la generation de
constructos akededor delos fenomenos psicologicos.
La siguiente declaracion de Skinner, en la conclusi6n
del mencionado libro, ilustra ia parsimonia que
caracteriza ala mayoria de los teoricos de la conducta:
"...si la extrapolacidn - a la conducta humana -
puede estar o no justificada no puede ser decidido en este
momento, Es posible qut hay a propiedades de la conducta
kumanaque requerirdn de un tipo de Iratamiento diferente,
Peroestos6lopuedeserevaluadoaproximdndosealproUetna
de una forma ordenaday siguiendo los procedimientos
acostumbradospor una ciencia experimental. Nopodemos
afirmar ni negar una discontinuidad entre los campos
humanoy subhumano en tanto que sabemos muy poco
acerca- de ellos..." p.442.
Una interpretacion superficial de este principle
parsimonioso, implicaria ubicar a Skinner como un
cientffico reticente a la elaboracion de teorias por
considerarias aventuradas y especulativas. Nada mas

aiejado de la realidad. En efecto, como veremos mas
adelante, Skinner nunca afirm6 nada en tal senudo,
simplemente desilusiono a aquellos ingenues que
pensaban que con unas cuantos estudios bajo
condiciones controladas, podfan encontrar una
explicacion a cada fenomeno de la vida diaria que
implicara factores psicol6gicos.
El virtual casamiento historico de Watson y
Skinner, visto a distancia, puede suponerse como
logico y congruente, en la medida de sus
consecuencias. El sistema formal planteado por Skin-
ner, ha resultadodeincaiculablevalorparaeldesarrollo
de una teoria de la conducta; se logrd conformar una
comunidad de investigadores que desde diferentes
campos y areas establecieron un lenguaje apegado a
los datos, generando una metodologia con te"cnicas y
procedimientos que demostraban tener efecto sobre
!a conducta de un sinnumero de especies incluido el
Hombre mis mo.
Evidentemente, estos hechos repercutieron no
solo dentro de la propia psicologia, sino que permitio
establecer cdntactos con datos y teorias de otras
ramas cientificas que pronto vieron un prometedor
desarrollo de este novedoso enfoque psicologico.
Fue posible, al mismo tiempo, senalar los li'mites y
extensiones de la psicologia con otras empresas de la
ciencia; la fisiologia, tan cercana al origen del andlisis
experimental de la conducta, la biologia que con la
teorfa de la evolucion habfa impulsado entre otras al
funcionalismo, encontro un trato distinto con reiaci6n
a los aspectos filogeneticos del comportamiemo. El
conductismo, entendido como una filosofia de la
ciencia de la conducta, plante6 un desprendimiento
radical de la filosofia dualis ta tradicional de principios
de sigio. Estos son s61o algunos ejemplos del n'po de
relaciones establecidas entre la ciencia de la conducta
y otras disciplinas cientfficas.
For otro lado, Harzem y Miles (1978) han trazado
la importante diferencia entre lo que significa un
andlisis y una revision de tipo conceptual. El primero
se refiere, a las declaraciones conceptuales que
conciernen a las fronteras existentes; mientras que la
segunda, se refiere a las declaraciones conceptuales
que implican la redefinicion de esas fronteras. En este
sentido, es claro que el conductismo y el analisis
experimental de la conducta, se adjudican un lugar
que los distingue nitidametite del resto de las otras
ciencias a lo externo, y al mismo tiempo, de las otras
aproximaciones actuales dentro de la psicologia.
En resumen, se puede decir que canto Watson
15
con su pronunciamiento, como Skinner con su
programa, abrieron un sinnumero de posibilidades
sembrando la semilla que servtria como gui'a para la
investigacion de los elementos basicos que cimentaron
la construccion de una teoria de la conducta.
Definicidn de Teorfa
Pero, <!que es una teoria?. Seguramente, la
respuesta a esta pregunta, en ultima instancia nos
remite diiectamente al problema del conocimiento
cientifico en su conjunto y por ende, a tener que
considerar los aspectos filos6ficos que le subyacen.
No es prop6sito de este trabajo hacer un examen a
fondo sobre este topico, por lo que unicamente
ilustraremos de manera muy escueta, lo que algunos
filosofos contemporaneos consideran respecto del
significado de una teoria.
Si aceptamos provisionalmente que la ciencia
nos remite a proposiciones (teorias) que predicen que"
sucederia dadas ciertas condiciones, de inmediato
surgiria el problema de como evaluar estas
proposiciones (teorias). Asi, podemos hablar de la
probabilidad de que una proposicion sea verdadera,
dada cierta evidencia. Sin embargo, es facil reconocer
que ia evidencia disponible no es toda la evidencia
posible, por lo que nos encontramos con un vacio
dificil de cubrir (Burton, 1980). En el caso de Popper
(citado en Burton, 1980), proponia que unicamente
sabiendo como una teoria pudiera serempiricamente
refutable, podriamos saber algo acerca de ella. Lakatos
(1970, tambien citado en Burton, 1980), ofrece una
aproximacion bastante distinta. Este autor habla de
"programas de investigacion" en vez de teorias; de
este modo, los programas de investigacion son
conjuntos de teorias, a traves de los cuales el cientifico
semueve.utilizandoreglas para hacer modificaciones.
Entonces las teorias de un programa de invesu'gaci6n,
comparten un micleo comun pero tienen diferencias
individuales. En el caso de T. S. Kuhn (1962), mas
que hablar de teorias, se refiere al establecimiento de
paradigmas y las transiciones en las que un paradigma
caduco es subsdtuido por uno nuevo; y la nocion de
paradigma en el sentido sociologico que le adjudica
Kuhn, significa el esfiierzo cientifico universalmente
reconocido.
Como es facil advertir, tambien resulta un tanto
complicado por su diversidad lo que los filosofos
enrienden por teoria, y ios criterios de validez que son
relevantes para su legitimacion varian en un amplio.
rango. Por ello, sera conveniente abandonar el tema
 16
por el memento, para dar cabida de forma menos
breve, a fa revision de lo que algunos te6ricos de la
conducta consideran respecto a la teoria, y la
metodologia en ocasiones implicita - utilizada
para arribar a ella.
De manera intenciona!, no seguiremos una
secuencia crono!6gica para esta exposicion; por lo
que no hay ningiin impedimento para empezar con
K. \V. Spence (1960), quien considera que las teorias
en las ciencias fisicas cuyo nivel de conocimiento esta
mas desarrollado, cumplen unafunci6nintegradora;
mientras que en el estado actual de la psicologia y las
ciencias sociales, las teorias juegan un papel bastante
diferente, Dejemos que hable el propio Spence:
"...en estos campos complejos - la psicologfa y las
ciencias sociales - la situad6n mds simple quepuede ser
arreglada, usualmente involucra un numero tangrande de
variables, que es extremadamente diflcil, sino imposible,
descubrirdirectamente las leyesempMcas que las reladonan.
Las teorias en estas circunstandas fundonan como un
dispositiw utilpara laformuladdn de las leyes. Consisten
primeramenteenlaintroducd6nopostulad6ndeconstructos
hipottticos los cuales ayudan a llenar el vacio entre las
variables experimentales? p.18.
Kantor (1983)por su parte, ha enfatizado el papel
de la explicaci6n en la investigacion cientffica,
estableciendotambiensunaturaiezapsicologica.Para
este autor la explicacion es un modo avanzado de
descripti6n, involucrando tipos de contacto especiales
de personas con cosas y eventos. En un nivel mas
general establece las relaciones de la explicacion en la
ciencia de la siguiente manera:
"La ciencia como una busqueda de conodmietito y
comprensi6n requiere de registros estables de avance. Para la
mayor/a, eltesoro dentffioo se cristalizacomo explicadones,
esto es, reportes analiticos acerca de las cosas y eventos
estudiados. Estas explicadones son expresadas en form a de
proposidones tedricas y leyes que representan a los
experimentos, la investigacion y los ballazgos de la
investigaci6n denttfica...si aceptamos que la investigation
dentfficaesunprocesopamdesarrottarorientadonesvdlidas
con respecto a cosas y eventos, podemos considerar la
explicaddn en ciencia como unaforma mds elaborada de
orientaddn de la que se disponegeneralmente con respecto a
contactosno denifftcos con cosas y eventos." p.31.
For otro Jado, Harzem y Miles (1978) en una
actitudconciiiadora,tratanderesponderalapregianta
de dcual es el objeto de estudio de la psicologia?, bajo
cinco rubros que denominan teorias y cuya utilidad
es organizar las diferentes concepciones existentes de
lo que debe estudiar la psicologia, a saber: a) teorias
dualistas, b) teorias conductistas, c) teorias de
agrupamiento (cluster), d) teorias ciberneticas, y
finalmente, e) teorias operantes. Actualmente, estos
autores se inclinan por el ultimo ti'po de teoria,
aunque ellos toman lapalabra teoria no en un sentido
de propiedad y prefieren, en ultima instancia, hablar
de fbrmulacion conceptual en vez de teoria, y a parrir
de e llo mo s trar que ",.. si se reconoce que losproblemds son
conceptuales en cardcter no bay ninguna necesidad de
considerar a la psicologia invadida por controversias
indisolubles..."p.3l.
Tomemos ahora to que dice Skinner en su aru'culo
Tendencias actuates en psicologia experimental
(1975), en el que abunda mas que en ningun otro
lado, acerca del sentido que tiene formularuna teoria
de la conducta:
"una ttoria> como usartel termino aqui, no tiene nada
que ver con lapresenda o ausenda de confrmad6n experi-
mental Los bedosy las teorias no se oponen los unos con
las otras. La reladdn, en todo caso, es la siguiente: las
teorfas estdn basadas sobre hecbos; son declaradones acerca
de Us organizaciones de los becbos. La terofa at6mica, la
teroia de la euoludd^y la terofa delgene, son ejemplos de
teroias cientfficas utiles y con bitena reputaddn. Son
declaradones acerca de becbos, y con un tratamiento
operadonal adecuado no necesitan ser mds que eso. Pero
tienen unageneralidadque trasdende becbos par ticularesy
lesda-unautilidadmdsamplia. Cadacienciaeventualmente
akanza unafase de terofa en este sentido," p.337.
Para Skinner hay tres pasos a seguir en la
construcci6n de una teoria. El primero, es identificar
el dato bdsico; el segundo, expresar relaciones
ordenadas entre los datos, y por ultimo; derivar
conceptos de orden superior de las relaciones
ordenadas.
En 1952 ClarkL. Hull, otro importante expositor
de la construccion teoricaen psicologia, senala en las
consideraciones introductorias de su libro A behavior
system, lo siguiente:
".. la ciencia tiene dos aspectos esendales, el empiricoy
el explicativo. El aspecto empirico estd primeramente
involucrado con los becbos de la ciencia reveladospor la

observad6nyelexperimento.Elaspectote6ncoo explicative
consiste en elintento ser'to for comprender tot hechos de la
cietidapara integrarlos dentro de un sistema coherente; por
ejemplo, detipo!6gico.De estas obseruadoneseintegradones
se ban derivado direclamente o indirectamente, las leyes
bdsicas de la cienda," p. 1.
Mas alld del alcance de este trabajo, se ubica la
posibilidad de matizar las diferencias y semejanzas de
cada una de las concepciones aqui apuntadas acerca
del status de la teoria en la ciencia en general y de la
psicologfa en particular. El hecho que hemos querido
remarcaraquies que, en efecto, existe una orientacion
generalizadaentrelospsicologosconductualeshacia
el establecimiento y desarrollo de una teoria de la
conducta. En este contexto, la conclusion de
Schoenfeld (1983) es compartida por nosotros, en el
sentido de que la teoria de la conducta se encuentra
en un largo momento de transicion; podriamos anadir
a esta conclusi6n, que la construcci6n de una teoria
en ciencia se entiende como un proceso de elaboration
y nunca como un producto terminado. La teoria de
la evoluci6n, por ejemplo, es cierto que resolvio
muchos problemas en la biologfa, pero tambie"n es
cierto, que planted muchos mis que estin aun por set
resueltos. Paralelamente en la psicologfa, una teoria
de la conducta ha generado un caudal de preguntas
que han ido guiando el tipo de evidencia factica
requerida.
Es importante senalar en este punto, que con
estas afirmaciones no se pretende borrar las
controversiasconceptualesyfiiosoficasquecoexisten
al interior del conductismo y hacia fuera de el; en el
sentido filos6fico Moore (1981), ha escrito un
interesante trabajo en el que desentrana las diferencias
epistemologicas entreelmentalismo, el conductismo
metodologico y el conductismo radical. Este autor
concluye que el conductismo, de acuerdo al punto de
vista de Skinner, o conductismo radical, no es
simplemente ei estudio cientffko de la conducta,
sino que es una filosofla de la ciencia comprensiva e
integrada, involucrada con el objeto de estudio,
me'todos y dimensiones de la psicologfa.
En esta direccion, tambien podemos estar de
acuerdo con la division que establece Schoenfeld
(1983), entre Conductismo con y conductismo
cone:
"Cada psicdlogo es un conductista con minuscula
cuando trata con la conducta de los organismos out k
17
rodean. El Conductismo con mayuscula, es unajiosoftay
unprograma; es la visidn de lo que la. ciencia. de la, conduct a,
(con mintiscula) deberd lomar como su interns; y cuales
deberdn ser sus me'todos de investigacidn; es la aceptaddn de
dertos datos de la conducts y elrechazo de dertas melas
como losfnes apropiadospara la cienda de la conducta; es
una actitud acerca de la cienda en gemraly dertos sistemas
metafhicosyfilosoftcos en particular," p.60.
Esta diafana exposition de lo que significa el
conductismo, sorprendentemente, no ha sido tan
claramente entendida por muchos psicologos que
lievan a cabo sus invesngaciones sin la gufa filos6fica
y ciendflca que seria deseable. El propio Skinner se
vio obligado a escribir un libro About behaviorism
(1974), dedicadocompletamenteaesclareceryreru tar
una serie de criticas y confusiones tanto en lo intemo
como a lo externo de la psicologfa, y que revelan una
falta de comprensi6n respecto al desarrollo de una
teoria de la conducta. Muchos esfuerzos podrian ser
mejor apreciados y aprovechados si pudieran ser
difundidas con una mayor ex tensi6n estas importantes
nociones. Es ei caso de la aproximacion
interconductual que nace justo donde el conductismo
radical de Skinner muestra sus limites con respecto a
la explicaci6n del comportamiento humano. J. R.
Kantor (1973, version casteilana) propone una forma
mucho mas comprensiva de entender ios fen6menos
psico!6gicos al plantear un modelo de campo como
basamento analirico. Ribes y Lopez (1985) y Roca
(1989) han contribuido de manera tmportante a
extender esta vision en diferentes ambitos del
comportamiento humano e infrahumano. Esta
aproximacion interconductual aunque anrigua en su
planteamiento original - es relativamente joven en
su desarrollo y difusi6n , constituye un excelente
ejemplo de la continuidad historica que se requiere
para conformar una teoria de la conducta que
corresponda a las demandas de una disciplina
cientffica.
En conclusidn, la pregunta que da origen a este
trabajo, puede ser respondida no solo en un sentido
utilitario de necesidad, sino de manera mas precisa,
en un sentido creative; quedando todavia muchos
aspectos que no han sido evaluados en su totalidad.
Conflrmandose con ello la pertinencia de una teoria
de la conducta que no es que nos haga falta, sino que
debemos desarrollar. El tema de otro trabajo, seria
analizar el contexto social y politico en el que surge
una teoria; asf como la metodologl'a pertinente para
18
normar la actividad cienrffica que da lugar a Ja
formulacion de una teoria. Para terminar me gustaiia
recordarlas palabras de Skinner (1975) a este respecto:
"Les guste o no a los psicdlogos experimental en
particular, la psicologia experimental esta adtcuada e
inevitablemente comprometida con la comtrucci6n de una
teoria de la conducta, Una teoria es esencial para la
comprensidn tientiftca de la conducta como objeto de
estudio."p.337.
Referencias
Burton, M. (1980). Determinism, relativism and the
behavior of scientists. Behaviorism, S, 113-122.
Harzem, P., & Miles, T. R. (1978). Conceptual issues in
operantpsychology. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Hull, C. L (1952). A behavior system. New York: John
Wiley & Sons.
Kantor, J. R. (1978). Pskologta interconductual Un
ejemplo deconstruccidn cientticasistemdtm, Mexico:
Editorial Trillas.
Kantor, J. R. (1983). Explanation: psychological na-
ture, role in scientific investigation. Revista
Mexicans de Andlhis de la Conducta, 9, 29-38.
Kuhn, T. S. (1962). La estructura de las revoluciones
cientffjcas. Mexico: Fondo de CulcuraEconomica.
Moore, J. (1981). On mentalism, methodological
behaviorism, and radical behaviorism. Behavior-
ism, 9, 55-77.
Ribes, E. y Lopez, F. (1985). Teoria de la conducta. Un
andlisisdecampoyparametrico. Mexico: Editorial
Trillas.
Roca.J. (1989). Formas ekmentales de comportamiento.
Mexico: Editorial Trillas.
RychlakJ. F. (1981). A philosophy of science for person-
ality theory. Malabar, Florida: Krieger Publishing
Company.
Schoenfeld,W. N. (1983). The contemporary stateof
beha.vioidieory.RevistaMexicanat/eAtta'lisisdela
Conducta, 9, 55-82.
Skinner, B. F.(1938). The behavior of organisms. New
York: Apple ton-Century Crofts.
Skinner, B. F. (1974). About behaviorism. New York;
Knopf.
Skinner, B. F. (1975). Registro acumulativo. Barcelona:
Editorial Fontanella.
Spence, K, W. (1960). Behavior theory and learning.
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice Hall.

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Sidney W. Bijou, Behavior Analysis of Child De-
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An entirely new version of this classic text
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Noel W. Smith, Vols 1-7(1970-1978) ^ ^.Williams
FredSimmons Keller
Ronald G. Heyduk, Vols8-11 (1978-1983) '*
Sldn0
Edward K. Morris, Vols 12-17 (1983-1989) y w- Biiou
A person recollection on Fred Keller 9
ADVISORY BOARD Book Review
Sidney W. Bijou, University of Nevada Kathleen Zanolli . ,,
A
David Cornwell, University ofStrathcydyde <**?<*"* and fl/s/eys Meamngful Differ-
~ . , ^ i i r- * m-i_- ,1 -i. ences in the Everyday
y Experience of Young
Dennis J. Delprato, Eastern Michigan University Amertoan Childre n _ , , 10
James J. Fox, East Tennessee State University
Debra W. Fredericks, University of Nevada Comments
Patrick M. Ghezzi, University of Nevada Gary Greenberg
Gary Greenberg, Wichita State University Outrages: The decate of the brain 11
Bryan Midgley, University of Kansas Noel W, Smith
Edward K. Morris, University of Kansas On the observability of a stimulus function..... 13
PaulT. Mountjoy, Western Michigan University ' Abstract volumes 18 - 23
N. H. Pronko, Wichita State University Enqlish version 14
Noei Smith, S.U.N.Y. -Plattsburg y . .. . . '"" '" " ia
Author index 18
Subject index 19
PRODUCTION STAFF Spanish version 19
Scott N. Compton, Eric Fox
University of Nevada
ISSN 8755-612X
 J. R. Kantor Books
The estate of Helene J. Kantor (1919-1993) has
A Newsletter of
Interbehavioral Psychology given The Archives of the History of American
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Student Subscriptions (USA)....... $10.00 '
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 Editorial
This volume oTi}eInterbehaviomtm&&s its twenty-
fifth anniversary. Few newsletters can boast of such
continuation, and for good reason. Most newsletters
are politically motivated; and survive just long enough,
if they're lucky, to foster the political purposes they
serve. TlieInterbebaviorist has had a different purpose. It
never assumed so lofty a mission as converting the
masses to its vision. While such might have been a fond
dream, I doubt that anyone who took upon themselves
the task of producing it, quarter by quarter, thought that
this would be the outcome of their efforts. Tfie
Interbebavionstvfas, instead, promoted and understood
as an means of sustaining a collectivity of scientists and
philosophers engaged in a particular understanding of
frankly all things. It was, and is, the platform on
which we have played our particular language game, to
borrow a phrase from Wittgenstein.
The Interbehaviorht has fewer than 70 subscribers.
This circumstance is not, in my view, a reflection of the
significance of interbehavioral thinking. Interbehavioral
thinking is in keeping with contemporary thinking in all
of the basic sciences and, increasingly, with the theoreti-
cal underpinnings of applied workin the social sciences,
broadly speaking. Interbehavioral thinking is no longer
peculiar to J. R. Kantor. Interbehavioral thinking is
representative of the mainstream of intellectual work
across all disciplines.
Interbehaviorism is not the source of this intellec-
tual revolution. It is going on everywhere, and we are
too small a group to imagine that we have had such an
influence. In Psychology perhaps we may think our-
selves leaders; though even here I doubt that many of
those who have begun to incorporate concepts of
setting and context and who are moving toward non-
linear thinking, would count among their influences
the work off. K. Kantor. All such fundamentally similar
views, including Interbehaviorism, emerged out of the
same set of cultural conditions. There are plenty of
leaders both inside and outside of our domain, and they
are all moving in the same direction.
As Interbehaviorists in ABA, and through The
Interbehaviorist, we work to sustain our identity - our
distinctiveness. Early on I argued, along with several
others, that it was important to preserve our historical
identity, and gave addresses at the Association for
Behavior Analysis and elsewhere with
"interbehaviorism" in their tides. There is not a single
title in the 1996 ABA program that includes this word
or its derivatives; and I shudder to think of the atten-
dance we will have at our Special Interest Group
meeting this year. If it weren't for the like-mindedness
of our intellectual colleagues everywhere, and the po-
tential infusion of interest and effort on the part of
Spanish speaking interbehaviorists, I would be ready to
mourn the extinction of our tribe.
I acknowledge and respect those who would wish to
sustain a publication and interest group in honor and
appreciation of the work of J. R. Kantor. I believe,
however, if this is all we are about, we will severely limit
our participation and contribution to the future. As I
see it, we need to break out of our mold. We need to able
to grow and change if we are to keep pace with the
intellectual revolution that surrounds and surpasses us.
We need to revel in our commonalities with other
thinkers. We need to abandon our contentmentthrough
critical analyses of our views and in alignment with non-
linear thinking everywhere. Were we to travel down this
path, our future would be bright indeed.
What does all of this mean for The Interbehaviorisft
I believe it means a change of name and the articulation
of a much broader purpose to reach a larger and
interdisciplinary audience. It is not my place to make
these changes unilaterally, of course. I invite (and will be
soliciting) reactions to these views, with the intent of
developing a more workable plan for our participation
in the ruture.
Linda]. Hayes, Editor
Interbehaviorists in ABA Special Interest
Group Meeting
Time: 8-8:50 AM, Saturday, May 25, 1996
Place: Pacific, suite B
Purpose: To function as an opportunity for
interbehaviorists to discuss issues of common interest
as well as to help one another solve problems peculiar
to the interbehavioral perspective in psychology and
philosophy.
Agenda: Election of board members, convention pro-
gram report, THE INTERBEHAVIORIST report, fu-
ture plans.
 The Agora continued...
The Friends of the Archives of the History of
American Psychology (AHAP)
In a recent newsletter of AHAP there appeared the
following notice: The estate of Robert Kantor gave the
inventory and copyrights of the Principia Press to the
Archives in 1993. The Press is the publishing house that
handled the writings of J. R. Kantor and the 6,000
volumes have a list value of approximately $140,000.
They are stored in rent-free space near the Archives, and
since June 1993 almost $4,000 worth of books have
been sold.
We came up with the following selection of
presentations that may be of interest to sub-
scribers of THE INTERBEHAVIORIST. We
apologize for any misrepresentations, and for
any omissions.
Paper Session International
Tuesday 9:OOAM - 10:50AM
Yerba Buena Ballroom (Salon 5)
EDC
Recorded
Conceptualizing behavioral expertise in classroom leaching
situations: Implications/or training and practice.
Tom Sharpe, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Andrew
Hawkins, West Virginia University.
Couched within an educational symposium,
"Fostering Behavior Analysis in Social Institutions,"
an interbehavioral approach to expertise is presented.
Focus is upon the importance of a behavioral view of
expertise and its implications for professional train-
ing. A behavioral scaffold from novice to expertise is
proposed using teachers in training to illustrate. An
interbehavioral, or interactional, metric of behav-
ioral expertise is emphasized in advocating move-
ment away from a traditional demonstration/justifi-
cation or rule governed approach to
stimulus->response training to a recommended (cf.,
Morris, 1992) discovery or contingency managed
Announcement
We are pleased to announce the election of four
new advisory board members: David Cornwell (Uni-
versity of Strathclyde, Scotland), Gary Greenberg
(Wichita State), Debra Fredericks (University of Ne-
vada), and Bryan Midgley (University of Kansas). They
each bring a three year term beginning with this issue.
We also anticipate adding Advisory Board Members
from our Spanish readership. Contact Emilio Ribes if
you are interested in being considered as a Spanish
representative on the Advisory Board.
approach which brings trainer behavior under the
control of trainee behavior in applied context.
Workshop #19
Friday 5:OOPM - 8:OOPM
Current data collection and analysis technologies for the
behavioral psychologist,
TomSharpe, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Andrew
Hawkins, West Virginia University.
The workshop will provide hands on application
of a sophisticated software package designed to col-
lect and analyze behavioral data when complex
configurations of behaviors are present, when behav-
ior rates are high and of low duration, when the
behaviors of interest are highly interactive, and when
multiple behavioral occurrences of interest overlap
in time or are emitted simultaneously. Discussion
includes an introduction to (a) recommended proce-
dures when collecting time-based data in the live
setting and from videotape records, (b) computer
generated discrete and sequential analyses (Bakeman
& Gottman, 1986), alternative graphic representa-
tions, and (d) reliability issues related to sequential
data.
Workshop participants will be given demonstra-
tion copies of the software and should leave with a
greater understanding of the importance of collect-
ing and analyzing transactional behavioral data in
a systems context.
Presentations continued...
Workshops
#77 Friday 2:00pm-8:00pm Sierra (Suite C)
Techniques of Conceptual Analysis
Peter Harzern (Auburn University)
# 19 Friday 5;QOpm-8;QOpm Pacific (Suite H)
Current Data Collection and Analysis Technologies
for the Behavioral Psychologist
Tom Sharpe (University of Nebraska), Andrew
Hawkins (West Virginia)
Convention Sessions
#7 Friday 7:OOam-10:QOam Golden Gale Hall A
Society for Quantitative Analyses ofBehavior(SQAB)
#9 Saturday 8:00am-8;50am Pacific (Suite B)
Interbehaviorists in ABA Special Interest Group
#76 Saturday l:00pm-2:50pm Yerba Buena Ballroom
(Salon 5)
Understanding and Analyzing the Behavior of
Children with Behavioral and Developmental
Disabilities: Methodological Issues and Empirical
Findings of Expanded Environmental Analysis
#75 Saturday l:QQpm-2:50pm Yerba Buena Ballroom
(Salon 3)
Bi-Directional Influences in Behavioral Interactions
#35 Saturday 3:OQpm-4:20pm Yerba Buena Ballroom
(Salon 3)
Are Behavioral-Developmental Stages Necessary in
the Behavioral Analysis of Human Development?
#36 Saturday 3:00pm-4:50pm Yerba Buena Ballroom
(Salon 2)
Relational Frame Theory: Extending the Analysis
Invited Presentations
Sunday
$137 From Basics to Contemporary Paradigms: Timing
Peter Killeen; Chair: Kennon Lattal
#7 48 From Basics to Contemporary Paradigns; Matching
Howard Rachlin; Chair: Jack McDowel
Sunday 9:QQam-lQ:2Qam Nob HillB
Teaching Behavior Analysis: Battle of the Behavior
Analysis Graduate Programs II
#98 Sunday lQ;QQam-ll:5Qam Yerba Buena Ballroom
(Salon 13)
Toward a Stronger Science of Deprived Relations:
Developing Critical Empirical Tests
#707 Sunday 10:30am-l2:20pm Yerba Buena Ballroom
(Salon 8)
American Parenting of Language-Learning Children
#774 Sunday ll:30am-ll:50am Pacific (Suite B)
Rules and Verbal Behavior in Clinical Therapy
#779 Sunday 12:00pm-l:50pm Nob Hill A
Post-Positivism and Behavior Analysis: Four Book
Reviews
#727 Sunday l:QOpm-2:2Qpm Yerba Buena Ballroom
(Salon 10)
Future Directions for Behavior Analysis Around the
World-I: Latin America and the Far East
#73(7 Sunday l:OQpm-2;5Qpm Nob Hill C&D
Cross-Fertilization of Basic and Applied Research on
Choice and Matching
#733 Sunday l-.OOpm-l-.SOpm Pacific (SuiteI)
Variable Affecting Delayed Matching-to-Sample
Performance in People and Pigeons
#737 Sunday 2;00pm-2:50pm Pacific (Suite I)
From Basics to Contemporary Paradigms: Timing
#739 Sunday 2:30pm-3;50pm Yerba Buena Ballroom
(Salon 6)
Future Directions for Behavior Analysis Around the
World-II: Europe
$148 Sunday 3:00pm-3:50pm Pacific (Suite I)
From Basics to Contemporary Paradigms: Matching
#753/725 Sunday 5:QQpm-6:3Qpm Golden Gate Hall
Effects of Varying Stimulus Modality in the
Acquisition and Transference of a Conditional
Discrimination in Human Subjects
#777 Monday 9;00am-10:50am Yerba Buena Ballroom
Contiguity, Contingency and Reinforcement
#779 Monday 9:QOam-9:5Qam Yerba Buena Ballroom
(Salon 5)
Verbal Behavior and Pavlovian Learning Processes
#183 Monday 9:00am to 9:50am Yerba Buena Ballroom
(Salon 1)
Presentations continued,.,
Future Directions in the Analysis for Verbal Behavior
#199 Monday 10;00am-10:50am YerbaBuenaBattroom
(Salon 11)
On Behaviorism, Theories and Hypothetical
Constructs
$209 Monday 10:30am:ll:50am Nob Hill A
Social Contingencies of Religion
#214 Monday 1 l:QOam-l 1:50 am YerbaBuenaBattroom
(Salon 11)
Computer Simulations of Operant and Classical
Conditioning Phenomena
#218Monday 12:00pm-l:20pm YerbaBuenaBattroom
(Salon 6)
Research Studies and Technical Assistance Efforts
Concerning Proactive Antecedent Interventions for
Challenging Behavior
#23 IB Monday l:QOpm-2:5Qpm Nob Hill C&D
Israel Golddiamond: A most Scientific Life
#241 Monday 2:00pm-3:20pm Yerba Buena Ballroom
(Salon 12)
Feminism and Radical Behaviorism: Bridging an
Alliance
#272/34 Monday 5:00pm-6;30pm Golden Gate Hall
Are Trials Independent in DMTS Tasks Using
ClosingHumanSubjects ?
Call for News
THE INTERBEHAVIORIST pub-
lishes news about subscribers' activities
and information about others' activities
that may be of interest to readers. If you
have published an article, chapter, or
book with an inter behavioral orienta-
tion, or have read one published by
someone else, particularity if the source
is obscure, please let us know about it.
Special Events
#326 Tuesday l:00pm-3:00pm Yerba Buena Ballroom
Event: Chapters in the Life of Fred S. Keller; Memorial
Symposium
#283 Tuesday 9:00am-10:50am Yerba Buena Ballroom
(Salon 5)
Fostering Behavior Analysis in Social Institutions
#293 Tuesday 9:00am-ll:00am Nob Hill A
Unresolved Issues Revisited: Arbitrary Reinforcement,
Covert Behavior, Autism and Response
Generalization
#299 Tuesday 9:00am-10:50am Pacific (Suite I)
Experimental Analysis of Variability and Resurgence
of Human Responding
#305 Tuesday Il:00am-I2:50pm Yerba Buena Ballroom
(Salon 7)
Magical, Mystical and Religious Talk
#3 lOTuesday 11:00am-12:50pm YerbaBuenaBattroom
(Salon 3)
Behavior Analysis of Social Phenomena
#320 Tuesday ll:00am-ll;50am Pacific (Suite H)
Conceptual Issues in the Experimental Analysis of
Behavior
#323 Tuesday ll:10am-l:00pm Nob HittA
Epistemology and Methodology in Behavior Analysis
Llama para Noticlas
El Intercomportamientista publica
noticlas sobre las actividades de sus
subscribidores e information sobre otras
actividades que pueden ser de interes para
los leectores. Si usted ha publicado un
articulo, capitulo, o un libro con
orientation intercomportarnientista, o ha
leido una publicada por otra persona,
particularmente si su procedencia es
desconocida,porfavordejenos saber sobre
eso.
 Rememberances
Fred Simmons Keller
1899 -1996
On Febmary 2nd of this year, his family gathered
to be with Fred Keller as he moved on. While his family
said good bye to their husband, father, grandfather and
great grandfather, those thousands of others from
around the world who knew Fred found themselves
reflecting upon the loss of not one but several special
people. This was the unique situation ofFred Keller that
most modern social scientists and certainly all behav-
ioral scientists, practitioners and theorists recognized,
for over the span of 70 years of practice, Fred had made
significant contributions in each of the areas of Science,
Psychology, Education and Society. He may well be
most remembered, however, for his general behavioral
integrity, and his never failing modeling of how to act
towards other human beings. Ironic features no doubt,
from a lay perspective, for a man considered a pioneer
in the early development and promotion of Radical
Behaviorism and the co-founder of modem behavioral
Psychology.
Fred was a pragmatist and a "hands-on" type of
teacher. This is evidenced in his pre-university training
as a Western Union Telegrapher and later Columbia
University researcher into Morse code acquisition and
its nature. This interest led to over 15 scientific publica-
tions, the certificate of Merit from President H. S.
Truman (1948) for radio operator training during World
War II, as well as the first article in the first volume of
thejournal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior in
1958 (The Phantom Plateau). Not surprisingly, a semi-
nal article describing a practical and extremely effective
alternative to lecturing teaching method, that may
arguable be the major advance in educational technol-
ogy this century, was published 10 years later in the first
issue of fazjoumalofApplied Behavior Analysis. At still
another level, Fred along with W. N. Shoenfeld pro-
vided us with Principles ofPsyc/Jology (1950), a systematic
approach to behavioral psychology. Among other fea-
tures, it included the first discussion of the only recendy
developing analysis of the "establishing operation" and
a contextualistic analysis of behavior in general.
 .Professor Keller taught at eight universities after
graduating from Tufts College and Harvard University
where he developed his famous collegial relationship
with B. F. Skinner, The eight books, over 80 published
articles, six honorary doctorate degrees, approximately
20 distinguished honors presentations, including the
distinguished teaching award from the American Psy-
chological Foundation (1970) and the distinguished
Contribution for Applications of Psychology award of
the American Psychological Association (1975), attest
to a career of outstanding achievement. But Fred was
not finished. His pioneering work in the development
of the Personalized System of Instruction (PSI) together
with the first "Psychology" students in Brazil was
accomplished after what for most would be the end of
an outstanding professional life. Fred not only helped
start Psychology as an area separate from Philosophy in
University system and the degree earned, but his stu-
dents, and their students, and their students have
expanded the original efforts over the entire country,
into virtually every state. Fred Keller's Behavioral Psy-
A Personal Recollection on Fred Keller
Sidney W. Bijou
University of Nevada
Fred Keller and I were invited, in 1978, to
participate in the Second International Course in
Experimental Analysis and Behavior Analysis in
Lima, Peru by Professor Jose (Pepi) Anicama Gomez,
Director de Psicologia, Universidad Peruaria
Cayetano Heredia. Since it was a two-week course,
Professor Anicama arranged for Fred, his wife Frances,
my wife Janet, and me to stay in a modern furnished
apartment rather than an impersonal hotel. To make
life easy for us, he provided a maid to prepare our
breakfasts and do the household chores.
During this period of close contacts, Janet and I
had many opportunities to enjoy Fred's sly humor,
to listen to his many stories, to see students flock
around him for his company and advice, and to
console him when he came down with a cold.
Incidentally, Fred believed that the way to overcome
a cold was to stay in bed for seven days. In this case,
considering the length of the Course, he made an
exception and recovered in only two days, much to
chology also has reached into areas other than Psychol-
ogy such as in the design and implementation of the
first graduate program in Special Education in Latin
America at the Federal University of Sao Carlos, Brazil
in 1978.
The respectand thrill thathis presence commanded,
and the universal respect his name and his work receive
from the thousands influenced by his work, are truly
impressive. Perhaps more impressive however, is the
long standing and frequent identification, by the thou-
sands who knew him, of their desire to be able to act
toward others, with the respect, courtesy,
unpretentiousness, and genuine listening. It is perhaps
this lesson, from all of his contributions to the human
situation that he would have wanted us to firmly
acquire and especially engage in. Thus, we say with
gratitude, "Good bye.. . Teacher."
W, L Williams, University of Nevada
the joy of all.
We also had an opportunity to attend one of
Fred's lectures in which he took great pains to
describe, in his inimitable style, a professor who
shamefully neglected his duties by delivering rou-
tine lectures, which indeed fulfilled his obligation of
teaching a course, but who paid mighty little atten-
tion to whether or what his students were learning.
He went on to confess that he was that professor but
that all had changed now that he was applying
behavior principles to the teaching of his courses. He
then described his teaching method which is now
known as the PSI method.
At the end of the course, Fred and I were asked
to attend a University faculty ceremony in which we
were made Honorary Professors of Psychology,
Universidad Cayetano Heredia. As Fred accepted
his certificate he was so overwhelmed by emotion,
he could barely say "Muchas Gracias", as he wiped
away the tears.
 Book Review
At Last, Something Reasonable:
A Review of Hart and Risley's Meaningful Differences in the
Everyday Experience of Young American Children
Kathleen Zanolli
University of Kansas
Nothing is more disheartening than the ongoing
discourse aboutthe problems ofdisadvantaged children.
The nineteenth-century debate between environmental-
ism and eugenics has been dressed up in code words and
qualifiers for the 1990s, but the core values of both sides
of the debate have always been thesame. Social engineer-
ing is the goal, legislation is the means, and the facts must
always be filtered and twisted through a theoretical point
of view - so much so that proponents of both sides cite
the same facts to support their case. Herrnstein and
Murray (1994) describe many studies in which low IQis
associated with out-of-wedlock births, crime, poverty,
unemployment, and low educational achievement. They
conclude from these data that low intelligence is, in part,
inherited. Further, they assume that low intelligence
causes all the problems with which it is associated, and
propose policies designed to make "the rules of society"
easier for people who "aren't very smart" to follow, so
that even those with low IQjs can understand that crime
is punished, industry is rewarded, and marriage is insepa-
rable from reproduction. Conversely, these findings
have also been used to make the case for compensatory
education and other "Great Society" programs (Zigler,
1983; Lee, Brooks-Gunn, & Schnur, 1988).
Everyone agrees that IQJs correlated with poverty
and with all the social and behavioral problems associ-
ated with poverty. That both environmentalists and
eugenicists can use this fact to support their political
agendas leads one to conclude that, although both sides
collect empirical evidence and build logical theories -
both reasonable pursuits - the debate itself is entirely
unreasonable. Hart and Risley (1995) inject a welcome
dose of rationality and, not incidentally, uncover some
interesting information.
Hart and Risley report a series of studies based on a
surprisingly simple idea. If you want to know why
disadvantaged and middle class children have different
language and school achievement, you must observe
closely what actually happens while the children are
learning language. It's tedious and it produces an over-
whelming amount of hard to analyze data, but this
simple idea proved to be productive. As it turns out,
children from professional families heard over twice as
many utterances than poor children. Professionals' chil-
dren also heard an average of 1400 more words per hour
and nearly five times as many encouraging, affirmative
statements. Given this stark picture of the differences in
language exposure and encouragement, it is not surpris-
ing that these aspects of parenting were related to children's
later language ability. The parenting measures were more
strongly related to children's language skills and IQjiian
socioeconomic status was. Interestingly, the parenting
measures predicted language skills at age 9 better than
either socioeconomic status or KX
Hart and Risley's proposed solution to the problem
of disadvantaged early experience is to provide
high-quality education and parent assistance, beginning
before age two. This solution is as reasonable as the rest
of the book, and far less expensive than many more
popular prescriptions. The success of this book does not
rest on the solution, however. The real success is in
abandoning the eugenics-environment conundrum for
a really good, close look at the phenomena under study.
At last, something reasonable.
References
Herrnstein, R.J., & Murray,C. (1994). Thebellcurve:
Intelligence and doss structure in American life. New York:
Free Press.
Hart, B., & Risley, T. (1995). Meaningfuldifferences in
theeverydaylifeofyoungcbildren. Baltimore, MD; Brookes.
Lee, V., Brooks-Gunn, J., & Schnur, E. (1988). Does
Head Start work? Developmental Psychology, 24,210-222.
Zigler, E. (1983). Discerning the future of early
childhood intervention. American Psychologist, 38,
894-906.
 Comment
Outrages
The decade of the brain
Gary Greenberg
Wichita State University
With this introductory essay I begin a regular
series of columns for The Interbeha&iorist in which
I will discuss matters that may be of interest to our
readers and identify recent efforts to biologicize
psychology and the invocation of biological re-
ductionismin discussing behavioral origins. I think
few would disagree that such reductionism is not
dead and has played a significant role in the
sciences since it was popularized in the late 19th
century by Galton's eugenics movement. The re-
cent development of a discipline called evolution-
ary psychology (Buss, 1995) and the continuing
popularity of sociobiology underscore a political
agenda identified by E. O. Wilson in 1975 - the
cannibalizing of psychology by the biological
sciences. Indeed, we are in the latter half of "the
decade of the brain" and a major scientific effort is
underway to uncover the mystery of the genetic
code in the Human Genome Project. Of course,
readers of The Interbehaviorist eschew such efforts.
While we recognize the significance of biological
factors in behavior, we also recognize the need for
a social perspective. Organisms are biological crea-
tures which are fused with their environments, a
relationship recognized and developed by Schneirla
(see Aronson, Tobach, Rosenblatt & Lehrman,
1972) and subsequently by many others, This
perspective goes by many names - contextualism,
probabilistic epigenesis, interbehaviorism, etc. The
common feature is that we recognize that biology
is just one more participating set of factors in
behavior.
I think readers o The Interbehaviorist z\$o work
within the framework of the important principle
of levels of organization or integrative levels
(Aronson, 1984), an idea which recognizes the
hierarchical organization of events in the uni-
verse. Rather than defining psychology as a bio-
logical science, we see psychology as qualitatively
different from biology, emerging from it, but not
reducible to it. Psychological principles are differ-
ent from those of biology. Psychology is organized
on a level higher than is biology. Indeed, psychol-
ogy is more complex than biology or chemistry or
physics. Thus, with so many variables to consider
and control, we have yet to figure out precise
mathematical relationships between crucial events
that regulate behavior. In'my writing I will refer to
the work of Zing Yang Kuo, T. C. Schneirla,
Richard Lerner, Ethel Tobach, N. H. Pronko, J. R.
Kantor and others who have recognized that psy-
chology is a mature enough science to develop its
own way of thinking. My columns will be against
genetic determinism, against reductionistic analy-
ses and for contextual, developmental, and socio-
historical analyses.
So, okay, here's my first outrage. I have before
me the Spring, 1996 issue of a newsletter pub-
lished by the National Alliance for the Mentally 111
(NAMI). The title of this publication is, "The
Decade of the Brain," and to make matters worse,
the editor notes that "NAMI supports the in-
creased use of brain disorders" (p. 8) in place of the
term "mental illness." Lest you think that this is an
anomaly and that mainstream psychology does
not go along with this suggested change, I refer
you to a recent article about schizophrenia that
appeared in the official journal of the American
Psychological Association in which it is alleged
that "it is difficult to quarrel with the general
proposition that schizophrenia is a kind of brain
disease that should be approached as a problem in
neuroscience. There are no viable alternatives. Gone
are the days when defective parenting or family
life were seen as primary causes" (Heinrichs, 1993,
p. 221, emphasis added). Of course, I disagree.
One of the most impressive analyses of schizo-
phrenia that I have ever read identifies parenting
and life style as the crucial foundations of this
disorder (Haley, 1986). In this regard I have always
11
Outrage continued...
been persuaded by Thomas Szasz's (1961) pen-
etrating discussion of the medical model approach
to mental illness, or in his terms, "problems in
living." Being mentally "ill" is not to be sick or
diseased, but rather to have developed ineffective
coping skills.
I want to close with a different sort of outrage
- not because of what someone said in a paper but
because of what no one has said about a very
important finding and I have been dumbfounded
about this silence. In 1980, in a paper in Science,
Roger Lewin wrote of a British pediatrician, John
Lorber, who had identified and studied several
.college aged adults who,despite their having only 5%
of the normal extent of brain tissue, were none the less
normal in every regard, Lorber has himself pub-
lished two papers about this (Berker, Goldstein,
Lorber, Priestly & Smith, 1992; Priestly & Lorber,
1981). Now, you would think that these very
impressive findings would be studied and pursued
by everyone, especially during the decade of the
brain. The sad truth is that no one seems to have
paid this any attention at all. My query to a
neurology e-mail network yielded no responses.
Indeed, I was surprised to find this referred to in a
recent developmental psychobiology text (Michel
& Moore, 1996), but even these authors treated
this rather glibly tossing it aside with no more than
a single sentence, "After all, a hydrocephalic pa-
tient with virtually no cortical tissue received an
honor's degree in mathematics and led a com-
pletely normal social life" (p, 364). Why has this
been ignored by neuroscience? Because findings
such as these are considered to be a nuisance,
despite the fact that these are the findings that
should command our attention. One of Skinner's
important rules for doing good science was "When
you run into something interesting, drop every-
thing else and study it (1961, p. 81)."
So, yes, I am outraged by some of the state-
ments made by biologically oriented behavioral
scientists and also by their failure to make some
statements when they have the chance. Let's hope
my outrages allow me to vent in a constructive and
interesting fashion as I continue to write these
short pieces. Please write me with your comments,
good or bad.
References
Aronson, L. R. (1984). Levels of integration and
organization: A reevaluation of the evolution-
ary scale. In G. Greenberg & E. Tobach (Eds.).
Behavioral evolution and integrative levels (pp.
57-81). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Aronson. L. R., Tobach, E., Rosenblatt, J. S. &
Lehrman, D. S. (1972). Selected writings ofT, C.
Sehneirla. San Francisco: Freeman.
Berker, E., Goldstein, G., Lorber,]., Priestly, B. &
Smith, A. (1992). Reciprocal neurological de-
velopments of twins discordant for hydro-
cephalus. DevelopmentalMedicine andChildNeu-
rology, 34, 623-632.
Buss, D. M. (1995). Evolutionary psychology: A
new paradigm for psychological science. Psy-
chological Inquiry, 6, 1-30.
Haley,]. (1986). The art of being a schizophrenic.
In The power tactics of Jesus Christ and other essays
(Second edition) (pp. 55-80). Rockville, MD:
Triangle Press.
Heinrichs, R. W. (1993). Schizophrenia and the
brain. Conditions for a neuropsychology of
madness. American Psychologist, 48, 221-233.
Lewin, R. (1980). Is your brain really necessary?
' Science, 210, 1232-1234.
Michel, G. F. & Moore, C. L. (\W 6}. Developmental
psychobiology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Priestly, B. L. & Lorber,]. (1981). Ventricular size
and intelligence in achondroplasia. Zeitschrift
fur Kinderchirugie, 34, 320-326.
Skinner, B. F. (1961). A case history in scientific
method. In Cumulative record (Enlarged edition)
(pp. 76-100). New York: Appleton-Century-
Crofts. (Reprinted from American Psychologist,
77,1956,221-233).
Szasz, T. (1961). The myth of mental illness. New
York: Harper.
Wilson, E. O. (1975). Sociobiology. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press.

Comment
On the
Obsevabilify of a Stimulus Function
Noel. W. Smith
State University of New York at Pittsburgh
I was recently addressing some members of the
department of psychology and about twenty gradu-
ate students at the University of Florida on the
fundamentals of the interbehavioral field and some
recent research that it has inspired or influenced.
I had gone over a few of Kantor's postulates and
especially stressed the protopostulate that events
must be the starting point from which constructs
are drawn rather than with traditional constructs
which get imposed on the events. After describing
the seven components of the interbehavioral field
and giving examples of them, I stated that these
components are all observable and therefore en-
tirely consistent with the protopostulate about
events.
A student then asked me how one could ob-
serve stimulus functions. I said that if I put my
papers on a table it has the stimulus function for
me of a surface on which to put papers, and one
could observe that by my response to it. After
some discussion it seemed that he was comfort-
able with the observability of response functions
but not with stimulus functions. I pointed out that
stimulus functions and response functions are
interdependent, and which one we refer to de-
pends on which side of the interaction we wish to
emphasize.
If we observe my response function to the
table of putting papers on it, we can also say that
it stimulated me to put my papers there or that it
meant to me something on which I could put my
papers. The student was not satisfied, and so I
added that we could always observe ourselves and
determine what the stimulus function is, and
similarly we could ask people and make use of
their verbal reports. I might have added, but didn't
that all sciences have to struggle to get relevant
data, but in psychology we have that wonderful
advantage of verbal report both from our self-
12
observations and from others' self observations
that non-human sciences do not, however much
we have to treat such reports with caution.
Although I consider those answers to be ad-
equate (I don't know if the student did) it occurred
to me later that there is an additional answer.
Kantor sometimes referred to observable events or
those that can be reasonable inferred. He never
defined what a reasonable inference might be, and
I would be reluctant to try to supply such a
definition. Nevertheless, I suspect that we might
agree about some instances of reasonable infer-
ence. When students enter a classroom it-would
seem to me to be a reasonable inference that in
that particular setting chairs have the stimulus
function of something to sit on as appropriate to
the social circumstances and not of something to
relieve fatigue, although one could hot make the
distinction on the basis of the response. If some-
one picks up a rock, its stimulus function might be
less certain to an observer: a missile to hurl? An
object to examine? If the person picking up the
rock is a geologist, the latter would have a high
probability, especially if the setting is one of
geological exploration and there is no particular
reason to hurl it at anything. Given some knowl-
edge about the person and the setting or often just
the setting, it seems to me we can make reasonable
inferences about the stimulus function of a stimu-
lus object and a certain inference if we observe the
response function.
With this additional consideration, the case is
all the more compelling that the stimulus function
as well as all other components of the
interbehavioral field are observable by one means
or another or can be reasonably inferred from
observation. All aspects of the fields are totally
consistent with Kantor's protopostulate that pre-
scribes starting with events.
13
Abstracts of Articles
Volumes 18 - 23
1990 1995
Volume 18
Ribes-Inesta, Emilio. Pseudotechnical Language and
Conceptual Confusion in Psychology: Tilt Cases of learn-
ing and Memory.
The author argues that learning and memory
refer to psychological events in ordinary not tech-
nical terms, and that failure to appreciate this dis-
tinction has lead to conceptual confusion in psy-
chology. This argument is elaborated through a
discussion of the origin and use of the terms learn-
ing and memory. A technical analysis of the events
represented by these terms is provided.
Sharpe, Tom. Field Systems Data: An Exploration of
Alternative Visual Representations.
The author illustrates four means of depicting
interbehavioral time series data which convey be-
haviors within the greater temporal and contextual
streams in which they reside. These means are of-
fered as alternatives to a linear models approach.
Volume 19
Hayes, Linda J. Learning and Memory.
The author describes cognitive, behavioral,
and interbehavioral theories of learning and
memory, then contrasts the cognitive and behav-
ioral view with the interbehavioral position. The
differences between the positions, with respect to
biology, time, and the location of events is consid-
ered. The distinguishing features of learning and
memory are discussed from an interbehavioral per-
spective. Finally, the concepts of motivation, rein-
forcement, and causality are described in
interbehavioral terms.
Lipkins, Regina, Idealism, Realism, Coherence, and
Correspondence in Kan tor's Interbehavioral Philosophy.
Idealism, realism, and naturalism are compared
and contrasted. An account of J. R. Kantor's
Interbehaviorism is given with respect to idealism,
realism,and naturalism, and he is identified as both
an idealist and a realist, but especially a realist. The
author then describes and contrasts correspon-
dence, coherence, and impure coherence theories
of truth. The problems of each theory are dis-
cussed. The interbehavioral truth theory is then
described, and is identified as an impure coherence
theory of truth.
Mahan, Harry C. Seventy Years of the Interbehavioral
Approach to Nature-Nurture
The interbehavioral position on the heredity
versus environment controversy is described
through the presentation of quotes from several
different sources dating back to 1921. The author
concludes that the interbehavioral position is con-
sistent with modern theories that emphasize inter-
action between the organism and the environment.
Sharpe, Thomas L. Interbehavior: A Teacher Educa-
tion Perspective
An interbehavioral approach to education re-
search is advocated and described. The utility of
this approach is detailed. The.author presents ex-
amples from the field of education research illus-
trating of how the interbehavioral, or field systems
approach can be used in data collection, analysis,
and presentation. The author then points out the
advantages of these methods over more traditional
approaches.
Smith, Noel W. Some Possible Allies of
Interbehaviorism
The author compares interbehaviorism with
several theoretical approaches that share some
similarity with interbehaviorism. Interbehaviorism
is contrasted with behavior analysis, dialectic psy-
chology, phenomenological psychology, and con-
textuausm. Both points of compatibility and in-
compatibility are described.
Volume 20
Hayes, Steven C. Field T/jeory and the Legitimacy of
Causal Constructions
The author argues that, in a field theoretical
account of psychology, causality has no ontologi-
cal status. Tne author then argues, that despite this
lack of ontological status, causal talk does have
utility in basic and applied psychology,
Swain, Mark A. Consciousness Reconsidered
The author describes the history of conscious-
ness, how it has been viewed from different philo-
sophical positions and scientific approaches, and
its rejection by methodological behaviorists as a le-
gitimate object of study. A monistic,
interbehavioral view of consciousness is presented.
The author then argues that behavior analysis is ca-
pable if addressing consciousness and other im-
plicit phenomena
Smith, Noel W, H)e privacy construct as a stumbling
point in psychology.
Traditional assumptions regarding "privacy"
are based upon Cartesian dualistic assumptions
which lead to a positivistic theoretical stance. A
number of challenges to traditional assumptions
are posed, and it is suggested that "privacy" may be
replaced with the concept of interactions between

Five Year Index continued...
environments and observers. Although the con-
trast between private and non-private events may
be useful for indicating what components of the
interaction are more or less accessible to more than
one person at any given time, it is argued that as a
distinction between external-internal, knowable-
unknowable, and physical-mental it is artificial and
should be discarded.
Sharpe, Thomas L. & Hawkin, Andrew. Pragtfiatics
and utility of interbehavioral methodology.
Two charges are raised against inter behavioral
methodology: 1) inordinate application complex-
ity related to the pragmatics of interbehavioral
methodology, and 2) a question as to whether
interbehavioral methodology has utility as com-
pared with other methodologies. These are dis-
cussed in turn, and it is concluded that
interbehaviorism embodies all that behavior analy-
sis is and merely attempts to evolve original pre-
cepts toward greater focus on the complexity or or-
ganismic ana environmental interactions in ap-
plied settings.
Volume 21
Morris, Edward K. Interbehavioral psychology; out-
standing in the field or out standing in its field.
Skinner's 1988 ABA Newsletter article, "The
Cuckoos," raised some important issues that are
here addressed. Responses are offered for specific
points that Skinner made. Finally, a number of
interbehavioral solutions are given. It is concluded
that, in the end, there will be but one science of
behavior, just as there is essentially one physics,
one chemistry, and one biology. Only by accom-
modating and assimilating our behavioral diversity
scientifically and professionally but not eclecti-
cally- we can insure our survival as a discipline.
Sharpe, Thomas L, & Hawkins, Andrew. A return
to the space<->time continuum: empirical notes from
teacher educators.
An interbehavioral field systems approach is
an amenable educational research ana instruc-
tional assessment tool, given 1) its suitability with
the largely behavioral character of the teaching<
>learning process, and 2) its technological capabil-
ity of more completely capturing the nature of the
instructional process that traditional paper & pen-
cil recording methods which constrain the e'valua-
tor to a more limited number of variables tracked.
Empirical examples are provided.
Fredericks, Debra W. T/je ontological dilemma in sys-
tem building.
Kantor conscientiously elucidates his underly-
ing assumptions when developing his analytic sys-
14
tem. In Psychology and Logic (1945) he considers the
building of logical systems on the basis of two the-
ses: the specificity theorem and the interbehavioral
theorem. The basic ontological and epistemologi-
cal assumptions underlying these theses are de-
fined and analyzed, which contribute to the cohe-
siveness of his philosophical system as a whole.
Hawkins, Andrew & Sharpe, Tom. Technologically
driven research methodology: behavioral and
interbehavioral perspectives.
Although Kantor and Skinner did not see eye
to eye on behavioral theory, the distinctions be-
tween their two theories can be considered as rela-
tively minor when conceptualized as differences in
empnasis. With Kantor, context is explicit, and
with Skinner, context is implicit and taken for
granted. Despite theoretical similarities between
these two, Skinner has dominated behavioral psy-
chology, perhaps due to the relative accessability
of his writings and their firm foundations in tech-
nology. In order for theories to spawn viable re-
search methodologies there must be a close rela-
tionship between the theory and the available tech-
nology. When Kantor established his theory, the
technology to establish workable methodologies
did not exist. Today's computer technology can
ameliorate interbehaviorist gaps between theory
and methodology. An example of an application
of interbehavioral research based on currently
available technology is provided.
Smith, Noel W. The psi chi ceremony and the mind-
body dualism.
An etymological history of the term "psyche"
is provided and discussed with respect, particularly,
to the issue of mind-body dualism. Understanding
psychology's history of ideas enables us to be in a
position to choose from among the kinds of psy-
chologies we have available to us.
Delprato, Dennis J. Interbehavioral psychology and be-
havior analysis: an opinion.
The connection between interbehavioral psy-
chology and behavior analysis is strained. Al-
though attempts have been made to integrate the
two, under the assumption that the two postulate
systems may be compatible, there is little evidence
tnat interbehavioral psychology is moving any
closer to mainstream behavior analysis. Field theo-
retical ideas have been spreading in a number of
distinct fields with very little indication of cross-
fertilization. Although Behavior analysis is not suf-
ficiently advanced philosophically to be a member
of the converging movements at the end of the
second cycle in the scientific evolution of psychol-
ogy, it does have much to offer, especially to those
with applied concerns.
15
Five Year Index continued...
Bach, Patricia. Tin relation between epistemology, ontol-
ogy, and system building in Kantor's Psychology and
Logic.
Kantor's position of the ontology of logic is
consistent with his view of the epistemology of
logic. By arguing that interbehavioral events are al-
ways ontological, Kantor takes issue with those
who hold that the logical is also ontological. His
primary objective to such positions is that they are
not interbehavioral. Kantor's views are functional,
allowing one to account for such things as the
study of abstractions and non-existants without re-
sorting to notions of ultimacy, universality and
transcendence.
Volume 22
Smifb, Noel L. Pbenomenological psychology.
The world, phenomenologists insist, is not one
of bare or impersonal objects, nor is the body's
role one of a computing machine that processes
information or neurally interprets the world. The
world has meaningful structure and our bodies live
as part of that meaning. The early development of
phenomenology is traced, with emphasis on the
ideas of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and their similari-
ties and differences with Kantor. Q^ methodology
is discussed, and a brief critique of phenomeno-
logical psychology is presented.
Delprato, Dennis, J, & Knapp, John R. Qmethodol-
ogy and interbehavioral description.
This article discusses issues that might help
interbehaviorally-oriented psychologists better un-
derstand Q_ methodology. First, issues regarding
taxonomic classification are raised with respect to
dualism. Then some assumptions underlying Q_
methodology are discussed: 1) subjectivity is ines-
capable from conditions of measurement, 2) fac-
tors begin with concourse, are indeterminate, and
are subsumed by the specificity principle, 3) tax-
onomy is polythetic, and 4) categories are
abductively or reflectively derived. The important
features which enter into selecting O items, admin-
istering Q_sorts, data analysis and data interpreta-
tion are each addressed. Finally, the relation be-
tween the operant construction and (^methodol-
ogy is noted.
Broitm> Steven R. Qmetbodology and interbehavioral
phenomenology.
Delprato, Knapp, and Smith have performed
an important service by bringing William
Stephenson's (^methodology to the direct atten-
tion of interbehaviorists, and by indicating its con-
nection to major intellectual streams in psychol-
ogy, especially phenomenology. The process of a
Q_methodology is elaborated upon. The Q^meth-
odology takes its measures by placing the Qjsort in
the hands of the person to be understood, thereby
giving us relative assurance that the categories
which emerge will have some relevance to the per-
son. It is in this way that we may be honest with
nature, and set aside our theoretical claims so as to
be able to see the world on its own terms before
trying to explain it in ours.
Ray, Roger. A reader's comments.
The combination of Smith's article on "Phe-
nomenological Psychology" and Delprato and
Knapp's article on "Q^ methodology and
interbehavioral description" makes a very impor-
tant contribution to the Interbehavioral literature.
Together, these articles articulate several important
points of convergence among what many research-
ers would consider disparate approaches, especially
phenomenological, (^Methodological, and
Interbehavioral philosophies. Delprato and Knapp
build a methodological bridge between these ap-
proaches as philosophies and their implications for
empirical psychology. There are a number of unre-
solved issues, however. Among them are: How is
one to measure an event which has already oc-
curred? This problem is discussed in the context of
quantum indeterminacy.
Above all else, an interbehavioral approach
aims to provide a coherent and systematic science
and practice of psychology "from the ground up."
The interbehavioral perspective considers it essen-
tial for a psychological practice, authentically
based on science, to have a completely naturalistic
approach to both science itself and psychology in
general. With this in view, this article first covers
historical developments and basic orienting as-
sumptions pertaining to science itself. Next, it sets
forth some fundamentals for psychology as a com-
pletely naturalistic science. Finally, it presents sev-
eral assumptions for clinical services themselves,
along with practices recommended by them.
Adams, Mark A, Inherited behavior: interbehavioral
and radical behavioral interpretations.
Although many scholars do not recommend
arguing across philosophical positions, comparing
positions on particular topics can be useful as a
means of increasing one's awareness and under-
standing of one's own position. In this paper we
compare the assumptions of radical behaviorism
and mterbehaviorism on the issue of inherited be-
havior, providing an avenue for better understand-
ing of each and demonstrating the impact of
adopting particular sets of assumptions on our in-

Five Year Index continued...
terpre rations of particular types of psychological
events.
Bach, Patricia A. & Bzdawka, Annette. Integrating
levels of analysis.
The study of events at various levels (e.g., indi-
vidual, family, culture) can tell us something about
events occurring at trie levels immediately above
and below it. The most appropriate unit of analysis
depends upon which level one is studying. The im-
portant factor is not the particular unit or level,
but the interface how understanding at one level
can enhance understanding at the same or another
level of analysis. An appropriate unit of analysis is
any one that expands our knowledge at any one of
several levels of analysis including individuals, and
groups as large as cultures, as long as such knowl-
edge can be integrated into a body of science, the
science of human behavior.
Swain, Mark A. Realism, nihilism and A psychological
unit-of-analysis.
The philosophies of.realism, not-so-naive real-
ism, constructive nihilism, and deteriorative nihil-
ism are explained in reference to the nature of a
unit of analysis for behavior. Implications for
holding realistic and nihilistic assumptions are dis-
cussed.
La Marca, Paul M. A search for a basic and common
unit of analysis for social scientific inquiry.
A good definition of the unit of analysis being
utilized in a particular field of study is crucial in
guiding proper interpretations of particular lines of
research as well as the integration of research ad-
dressing diverse objects of analysis. The dyad (two
persons interacting in a given social context) is pre-
sented as a theoretical unit of analysis which might
serve as a starting point. The dyad possesses the
basic properties to be utilized as a unit of analysis
is guidecf by the theoretical perspective of Sym-
bolic Interactionism. This perspective is explained
in the broader context of the dyad as a basic unit
of analysis.
Devereux, Paul Toward an integrated psychology.
The role of physiology to psychology is dis-
cussed in its historical context. Physiology is ex-
plained from an interbehavioral stance: it is nei-
ther reductionistic, nor dualistic. Physiology has a
place in the advancement of psychology. Method-
ological and theoretical constructs of psychology
and physiology are not pitted against one another
but rather may be joined to form a powerful,
complemented armamentarium for the study of
human behavior.
Mills John A. Jacob Robert Kantor (1888-1984).
A brief history of J. R. Kantor's professional
16
life is recounted. His philosophical ideas and theo-
retical assumptions are explained and contrasted
with those of Skinner. Finally, Kantor's lasting in-
fluence on Inter behaviorism and psychology in
general are discussed.
Midgley, Bryan D. A reply to Professor Mills.
Mills discussed a number of points in "Jacob
Robert Kantor (1888-1984)" which prompt a num-
ber of comments. Particularly, these issues center
on: Kantor's so-called rejection of operationalism,
the ability for psychologists to make predictions,
Kantor's view on ontology, the components of the
field, and .Kantor's continuing influence on psy-
chology. These points are presented, not as criti-
cisms of Mills, but in a spirit of interpreting
Kantor's work in as consistent a fashion as pos-
sible.
Chiasson, Carmenne. Kantor's interbehaviorism versus
Skinner's behaviorism: comparison and contrast.
Kantor and Skinner aspire to achieve different
philosophical goals. Kantor's main concern is with
the accurate and scientific description and explana-
tion of the theory which underlies the science of
psychology and the unit of the psychological field
event. Skinner's focus is on psychology as a sci-
ence concerned with the prediction and control of
behavior. Similarities and differences between the
philosophies are addressed, centering around four
issues: 1) the method of selection of their subject
matter, 2) the nature of the psychological event, 3)
the role of cause, and 4) the goal of each perspec-
tive., Finally, contributions, criticisms, and relative
adequacies of interbehavioral and behavioral theo-
ries are discussed.
Baxter, Charles. An interbehavioral approach to teach-
ing andprobkm solving in education.
Presently, our schools attempt to function on
the basis of western psychologies that are dualistic
in nature. Consequently, educators focus on vari-
ous aspects of the field (e.g., the student or the en-
vironment) or a hypothesized construct, such as
intelligence. Considering education and the tradi-
tional ideas of intelligence from an interbehaviorist
perspective, an account is given for perception and
problem solving. Strengths of considering educa-
tion from an interbehavioral perspective are dis-
cussed.
Collins, Jacqueline E. Cultural evolution and the sur-
vival of cultures.
The selection of one culture over another is a
multidetermined process analyzed by Skinner, He
applied the concept of natural selection as a meta-
pnor to explain the evolution of social environ-
ments. This extension is discussed, and a number
17

Five Year Index continued,,.

of issues are raised: 1) Skinner's analysis failed to Sanchez, Hector M. A behavior theory: Wlyy we need
differentiate form and function when isolating dif- it?
ferences among cultures, 2) what is good for the (Spanish) The author argues that behavioral
culture, which presumably promotes survival, 3) theory is needed. Behavioral theory as a progres-
how cultures evolve, and 4) adventitious contin- sive, gradual and dynamic process more than as a
gencies of cultural practices. terminal outcome is described within a historical
context.
Volume 23
Verplanck, William S. Some reflections on Kantor, Author Index
Kantorians, and Kantor *s career. Volumes 18 - 23
Verplanck reflects upon his own and others 1990 -1995
evolution toward an interbehavioral viewpoint.
Four types of "Kantorians" are described and the [Citations list the Volume - Number - Page]
participative circumstances of falling into one or Adams, Mark A. 22-2-12
another of these categories is discussed. Skinner's Afari, Niloofar 19-3-13
and Kantor's early association and the emergence
of "non-Kantorians" is also explored. Bach, Patricia 21-1-19; 22-2-16
Baxter, Charles 22-1-26
Sbarpe, Thomas L. & Shriver, Mark. Ttie closet Bijou, Sidney W. 20-2-15; 23-1-22
interbebaviorism of matching law theory.
The authors contend that matching law pro- Brown, Steve R. 22-3-24
vides potential usefulness in bridging the gap be- Bzdawaka, Annette 22-2-16
tween basic and applied research. It is argued that Chiasson, Carmenne 22-1-20
matching law is inherently interbehavioral due to Collins, Jacqueline E. 22-1-31
its "molar and contextually dependent Cone, Donna M. 23-2-5
conceptualization of human behavior." A brief his-
tory of the development of matching law and an Delprato, Dennis], 18-1-13; 19-2-i8;2i-l-16;22-2-4;
example of its application to applied research is 22-3-14
presented. Devereux, Paul 22-2-26
Bijou, Sidney W. & Ghezzi, Patrick M. Background Fredericks, Debra W. 21-2-18
notes on Kantor's treatment of linguistic behavior. Ghezzi, Patrick M. 20-2-15; 23-1-22
Bijou and Ghezzi present a historical descrip- Hayes, Linda J. 18-2/3-11; 19-1-7
tion of Kantor's stucfy of linguistics, including Hayes, Steven C. 20-1-5
mention of studies by his students. This is fol- Hawkin, Andrew. 20-2-8; 21-1-4
lowed by an account of the highlights of Psychologi-
cal linguistics Kantor, J.R. 18-2/3-23
Knapp, John R. 22-3-14
Mountjoy, Paul T. & Cone., Donna M, Ttit func- LaMarca, Paul M. 22-2-20
tional nature of the philosophical categories; Jacob Robert Lipkins, Regina 19-1-13
Kantor's doctoral dissertation.
The authors argue that misrepretations of Manan, Harry C. 18-1-11; 18-2/3-8; 18-2/3-20; 19-1-
Kantor's contributions may be dispelled by an ex- 21; 19-2-5; 19-3-11
amination of Kantor's dissertation and its relation- Midgley, Bryan D. 22-1-14
ship to his later writings. A detailed description of Mills, John A. 22-1-8
Kantor's dissertation follows that highlights an im- Mitsorg, A. 18-1-11; 18-2/3-21; 18-2/3-22
portant consideration common to misunderstand-
ing Kantor's perspective: that Kantor was foremost Morris, Edward K. 18-1-7; 21-2-4; 23-1-25
a philosopher and his concerns were that of phi- Mountjoy, Paul T. 23-2-5
losophy applied to psychology, not psychological Ray, Roger 22-3-27
issues per se. Sanchez, Hector M, 23-3-13
Smith, Noel W. Eco-behavioral science. Sharpe, Thomas L. 18-2/3-22; 19-2-9; 20-2-8; 21-1-4;
This article is an excerpt from Smith (in press) 21-2-10; 23-1-15
Current Systems in Psychology and provides an intro- Shriver, Mark 23-1-15
duction to the key concepts of Roger Barker's Smith, NoelW. 18-2/3-9; 19-1-19; 19-3-5; 20-2-4; 21-
"ecological psychology."
1-13; 22-3-5; 23-3-5
 18

Five Year Index continued,,.

Swain, Mark A. 20-1-8; 22-2-18 INDICE DE CINCO AnOS

Verplanck, William S. 23-1-6 Resumenes de Artfculos
Wilson, Kelly G. 19-1-19 Volumenes 18-23
19904995

Subject Index Volutnen 18

Volumes 18 - 23
1990-1995 Ribes-Inesta, Emilio. Pseudotechnical Language and
[Citations list the Volume - Number - Page] Conceptual Confusion in Psychology: The Cases of
Learning and Memory. (Lenguaje pseudotecnico y
Behavior Analysis 19-3-5; 21-1-16; 22-3-5 confusion conceptual en psicologia: El caso del
Behaviorism 22-1-20; 22-242; 23-3-13 aprendizajey la memoria).
El autor argumenta que el aprendizaje y la me-
Book'reviews 184-5; 18-2/3-21; 18-2/3-22; 18-2/3- moria se refieren a eventos psicologicos en
23; 23-242 terminos ordinaries no tecnicos, y que el no
Causality 19-1-7; 204-5 apreciar esta distincion ha llevado a confusion con-
Consciousness 204-8 ceptual en la psicologia. Este argumento se elabora
Cuckoos 21-2-4 con base en fa discusion del origen y uso de los
terminos aprendizaje y memoria. Se proporciona
Culture 22-1-31 un analisis tecnico de los eventos representados
Ecological Psychology 23-3:5 por estos terminos.
Epistemology 21-1-19
Sbarpe, Tom, Field Systems Data: An exploration of
Habits 18-141 Alternative Visual Representations, (Datos de sistemas
History of psychology 18-143 de campo: Una exploracion alternative de las
Idealism 194-13 representaciones visuales).
Inherited Behavior 22-2-12 El autor ilustra cuatro medios de descripcion
Interbehavioral Psychology 21-2-4; 22-2-4 de datos de series temporales interconductuales
que expresan conductas dentro de los flujos
Interbehaviorism 19-143; 19-1-21; 19-2-18; 19-3-5; contextuales y temporales mayores .en los que
22-1-20; 234-6 residen. Estos medios se ofrecen como alternativas
Interbehavioral Research 19-2-9; 21-240 a los enfoques de modelos lineales.
Kantor 18-2/3-20; 224-8; 22-1-14
Volume 19
doctoral dissertation 23-2-5
Learning and Memory 18-1-8, 194-7 Hayes, Linda J. Learning and Memory. (Aprendizajey
Matching Law 234-15 memoria),
Methodology 18-2/3-4; 19-2-5; 19-2-9; 19-3-15; 20-2- El autor describe las teorias cognoscitivas,
conductuales e interconductuales del aprendizaje
8; 214-4 ' y la memoria, y contrasta despues el punto de vista
Nature vs Nurture 19-2-5 conductual y el cognoscitivo con la posicion
Ontology 21-2-18 interconductista. Se consideran las diferencias las
Private Events 20-2-4 posiciones respecto de la biologia, el tiempo, y la
Psychology locacion de los eventos. Se discuten los rasgos
distintivos del aprendizaje y la memoria desde una
as natural science 19-3-13 perspectiva inter- conductual. Finalmente, se
relation to biology 19-3-11 describen los conceptos de motivacion,
Psyche 21-143 reforzamiento y causalidad en terminos inter-
Qmethod 22-344; 22-3-24; 23-3-9 conductuales.
Subjectivity (special section) 22-3 Lipkins, Regtna. Idealism, Realism, Coherence, and
Transcendence 194-19 Correspondence in Kantor's Interbehavioral Philosophy.
Unit .of Analysis 22-2-16; 22-2-18; 22-2-20; 22-2-26 (Idealnmo, realismo coherenciay conespondencia en la
filosofia interconductual de Kantor).
Se comparan y contrastan el idealismo, el
realismo y el naturalismo. Se explica el
Interconductismo de J.R. Kantor respecto del
idealismo, el realismo y el naturalismo, y se le
19
Five Year Index continued,,.
identifica como un idealista y un realista, pero
especialmente un realista. El autor describe y
contrasts entonces las teorias de la verdad por
correspondencia, por coherencia y por coherencia
impura. Se discuten los problemas de cada teoria.
La teoria interconductual de la verdad se describe,
y se identifica como teoria de la verdad por
coherencia impura,
Maban, Harry C. Seventy Years of the Interbehavioral
Approach to Nature-Nurture. (Setenta anos del enfoque
interconductual a la natura-crianza).
Se describe la posicion Interconductual sobre
la controversia herencia-ambiente mediante la
presentacion de citas de diferentes fuentes
partiendo de 1921. El autor concluye que la
posicion interconductual es consistente con las
teorias modernas que hacen enfasis en la
interaccion entre el organismo y el ambiente.
Sharps, Thomas L. Interbehavior: A Teacher Educa-
tion Perspective. (Interconducta: una perspectiva de la.
educacion del maestro).
Se plantea y describe un enfoque
interconductual en la investigacion educativa. Se
detalla la utilidad de este enfoque. El autor
presenta ejemplos del campo de la investigacion
educativa que ilustran como el enfoque. inter-
conductual o de campo puede utilizarse en la
recoleccion, analisis y presentacion de datos. El
autor senala las ventajas de estos metodos sobre
aquellos enfoques mas tradicionales.
Stttitb, Noel W. Some Possible Allies of
hiterbehaviorism. (Algunos posibks aliados del
interconducthmo).
El autor compara al Interconductismo con
varios enfoques teoricos que comparten similitud
con el Interconductismo. Se contrasta el
Interconductismo con el analisis de la conducta, la
psicologia dialectica, la psicologia fenomenologica
y el contextualismo. Se describen los puntos de
compatibilidad e incompatibilidad.
Volumen 20
Hayes, Steven C. Field Tljeory and the Legitimacy of
Causal Construction. (Teoria. de campo y la kgitimidad
de la construccion causal).
El autor argumenta cjue, en una explicacion
teorica de campo de la psicologia, la causalidad no
tiene estatuto ontologico. Despues el autor plantea
que, a pesar de esta falta de estatuto ontologico, el
discurso causal tiene utilidad en la psicologia
basica y aplicada.
Swain, Mark A. Conciousness reconsidered. (La
condencia reconsiderada).
El autor describe la historia de la conciencia,
como ha sido vista desde diferentes posiciones
filosoficas y cientificas, y su rechazo por el
conductismo metodologico como un objeto de
estudio legitimo. Se presenta un punto de vista
interconductual, momsta, sobre la conciencia. El
autor argumenta que el analisis de la conducta es
capaz de tratar la conciencia y otros fenomenos
implicitos.
Smith, Noel W. Tfw privacy construct as a stumbling
point in psychology. (El constructo de la privacta como
un escollo en la psicologia).
Los supuestos tradicionales sobre la "privacia"
se basan en IQS supuestos cartesianos duahstas que
condujeron a una posicion teorica positivista. Se
plantean una serie de desaflos a los supuestos
tradicionales, y se sugiere que la "privacia" puede
remplazarse por el concepto de interacciones entre
observadores y ambientes. Aunque el contraste en-
tre los eventos privados y no privados puede ser
util para indicar cuando los componentes de la
interaccion son mas o menos accesibles a mas de
una persona al mismo tiempo, se argumenta que es
una distincion artificial como la de interno-
externo, cognoscible-incognoscible y fisico-mental,
y deberiera descartarse.
Sbarpe> Thomas L. & Hawkins^ Andrew. Pragnat-
ics and utility of interbehavioral methodology.
(Prdgmatica y utilidad de la metodologia
interconductual).
Se hacen dos cargos en contra de la
metodologfa interconductual; 1) una complejidad
de aplicacion inusual relacionada a la pragmatica
de la metodologia interconductual; y 2) la
pregunta de si la metodologia interconductual
tiene utilidad en comparacipn a otras
metodologias. Estas se discuten a su vez, y se
concluye que el interconductismo incluye a todo
el analisis de la conducta e intenta meramente
desarrollar preceptos originales con un foco mayor
en la complejidad de las interacciones organismicas
y ambientales en situaciones aplicadas.
Volumen 21
Morris, Edward K. Interbehavioral psychology; out-
standing in the field or out standing in its field. (La
psicoloeta interconductual: destacando en el campo o
saliendose de su campo).
El articulo de Skinner en la ABA Newsletter en
1988, "The Cuckoos", planteo varios problemas
importantes que aqui se tratan. Se ofrecen
respuestas a los puntos especificos senalados por
Skinner. Finalmente, se dan una serie de
soluciones interconductuales. Se concluye que, en
ultima instancia, solo habra una ciencia de la
conducta, tal como hay esencialmente una sola

Five Year Index continued.,.
fisica, una quimica y una biologfe. Solo
acomodando y asinulando nuestra diversidad
conductual cientffica y profesionalmente -pero no
de inanera eclectica- podemos asegurar nuestra
supervivencia como disciplina.
Sbarpe, Thomas L. & Hawkins, Andrew, A return
to the space < > time continuum. (Un regreso al al
continuo tiempo < > espacio).
Un enfoque sistemico de campo
interconductual es un instrumento accesible de
investigacion educativa y de evaluacion
ins truce ional, dada: 1) su adecuacion con el
caracter mayormente conductual del proceso de
ensenanza < >aprendizaje, y 2) su capacidad
tecnologica para capturar de manera mas completa
la naturaleza del proceso instruccional en
comparacion con los metodos tradicionales de
papel y lapiz que restringen al evaluador a seguir
un numero mas limitado de variables. Se
proporcionan ejemplos empiricos.
Fredericks, Debra W. The ontological dilemma in sys-
tem building. (El dilema ontologico en la construction de
sistemas).
Kantor concientemente elucida sus supuestos
subyacente cuando desarrollo su sistema analitico.
Si Psychology and Logic (1945) considera la
construccion de sistemas logicos sobre la base de
estas dos tesis: el teorema oe la especiflcidad y el
teorema interconductual. Los supuestos basicos
ontologicos y epistemologicos que subyacen a
estas tesis se defmen y analizan, lo que contribuye
a la cohesividad de su sistema filosofico como un
to do.
Hawkins, Andrew & Sharpe, Tom. Technologically
driven research methodology: behavioral and
interbehavioral perspectives. (Metodologfa de
investigation dirigida tecnologicamente: perspectivas
conductuaks 'e interconductuales).
Aunque Kantor y Skinner no se vieron
directamente en teoria de la conducta, las
distinciones entre sus dos teorias pueden
considerarse relativamente menores cuando se
conceptualizan como diferencias en enfasis. Con
Kantor, el contexto es explicito, y con Skinner el
contexto implicito y se toma como dado. A pesar
de las similitudes teoricas entre ambos, Skinner ha
dominado la psicologia conductual, quiza debido
a la accesabilidad relativa de sus escritos y a sus
fundamentos firmes en la tecnologia. A fin de que
las teorias germinen metodologi'as de investigacion
viables debe haber una relacion estrecha entre la
teoria y la tecnologia disponible. Cuando Kantor
establecio su teoria, no existia la tecnologia para
establecer metodologfas que fueran operables. Hoy
dia la tecnologia computacional puede paliar los
20
vacios interconductistas entre la teoria y la
metodologia. Se proporciona un ejemplo de
aplicacion de investigacion interconductual basada
en tecnologia disponible actualmente.
Smith, Noel W. Tlje psi chi ceremony and the mind-
body problem. (La ceremoniapsi cbiy elproblems mente-
cuerpo).
Se proporciona una historia etimologica del
termino "psyche" y se examinaj particularmente,
respecto del problema del dualismo mente-cuerpo.
La comprenston de la historia de la psicologia nos
permite estar en posicion de escoger entre los tipos
de psicologias disponibles.
Delprato, Dennis J, Interbehavioral psychology andbe-
havior .analysis: an opinion. (Psicologia. interconductual
y analish de la conducta: una opinion).
Se subraya la conexion entre la psicologia
interconductual y el analisis de la conducta.
Aunque se ha intentado integrar a ambos, bajo el
supuesto de que los dos sistemas de postulados
pueden ser compatibles, hay poca evidencia de que
la psicologia interconductual se este acercando al
analisis de la conducta en boga. Las ideas teoricas
de campo se han esparcido en distintas areas con
pocas mdicaciones de fertiiizacion . reciproca.
Aunque el analisis de la conducta no esta lo
suficientemente avanzado filosoficamente para ser
miembro de los movimientos convergentes al final
del segundo ciclo de la evolucion cientifica de la
psicologia, tiene mucho que ofrecer, especialmente
a los que tienen preocupaciones aplicacfas.
Bach, Patricia. UK relation between episfemoloey, ontol-
ogy, and system building in Kantor's Psychology and
Logic. (La relation entre epistemologia, ontologta y
construccion de sistemas en "Psychology and Logic" de
Kantor).
La posicion de Kantor sobre la ontologia de la
logica es consistente con su vision de la
epistemologia de la logica. Al argumentar que los
eventos interconductuales siempre son
ontologicos, Kantor toma posicion con aquellos
que suponen que la logica es tambien ontologica.
Sus principals objeciones a dichas posiciones es
ue no son interconductuales. Los puntos de vista
3 e Kantor son runcionales permitiendo que se
expliquen cosas tales como el estudio de las
abstracciones y los inexistentes sin recurrir a
nociones de ultimidad, universalidad y
trascendencia.
Volumen 22
Smith* Noel L. Pbenomenological Psychology.
(Psicologia fenomenologica).
Los fenomenologos insisten en que el mundo
21
Five Year Index continued,,.
no esta constituido por objetos llanos,
impersonales, ni es el papel del cuerpo el de una
maquina de computacion que procesa informacion
o interpreta neuralmente el mundo. El mundo
tiene una estructura significativa y nuetsros
cuerpos viven como parte de ese significado. Se
traza el desarrollo temprano de la fenomenologia,
con enfasis en las ideas de Husserl, Merleau-Ponty,
y sus similitudes y diferencias con Kantor. Se
examina la metodologia Q_y se presenta una breve
critica de la psicologia fenomenologica.
Delprato, Dennis J. & Knapp, John R. ^methodol-
ogy and interbehavioral description. (Metodologia Qy
description Interconductual).
Este articulo examina. problemas que podria
ayudar a los psicologos orientados
interconductualmente a comprender mejor la
metodologia CX Primero, se plantean problemas de
la clasificacion taxonomica en relacion al
dualismo. Despues se discuten algunos supuestos
subyacentes a la metodologia Q: 1) no puede
escaparse de la subjetividad en las condiciones de
mecficion, 2) los factores se inician por concurso,
son indeterminados, y se asumen bajo el principio
de especificidad, 3) la taxonomia es politetlca, y 4)
las categorias se derivan abductiva o ciencia misma y de la psicologia en general. Con
reflexivamente. Se tocan las caracteristicas
importantes que intervienen en la seleccion de
reactivos CL aaministracion de clases Q el analisis
y la interpretation de datos. Finalmente, se nota la
relacion entre la construccion operante y la
metodologia CX
Brown, Steven R. Q. methodology and interbehavioral
phenomenology. (Metodokgia Q y fenomenologia
Interconductual).
Delprato, Knapp y Smith han hecho una
contribucion importante al poner bajo atencion
directa de los interconductistas la metodologia Q_
de Stephenson, y ai indicar su conexion con las
principales corrientes de la psicologia,
especialmente la fenomenologia. Se elabora
respecto del proceso de la metodologia CX La
metodologia Q_ toma sus medidas colocanob la
clasificacion Q^ en manos de la persona a ser
comprendida, dandonos la seguridad relativa de
que las categorias que surgiran seran pertinentes
para la persona. De esta manera podemos ser
honestos con la naturaleza, y dejar a un lado
nuestras suposiciones de manera que podamos ver
el mundo en sus propios terminos antes de
intentar explicarlo en los nuestros.
Ray, Roger. A reader's comments. (Comentanos de un
lector).
La combination del articulo de Smith sobre
"Phenomenological Psychology" y el de Delprato y
Knapp sobre "Q_methodology and interbehavioral
description" es una contribucion importante a la
Hteratura Interconductual. Juntos, estos escritos
articulan varies puntos importantes de
convergencia entre lo que muchos investigadores
consideran enfoques distintos, especialmente las
filosofias fenomenologica, la metodologica Q_y la
interconductual. Delprato y Knapp construyen un
puente entre estos enfoques como filosofias y sus
implicaciones para la psicologia empirica. Sin em-
bargo, hay varios problemas no resueltos. Entre
ellos destaca; <C6mo medir un evento que ya ha
ocurrido? Este problema se discute en el contexto
de la indeterminacion del quanto.
Delprato, Dennis J, Interbebavioral psychology; critical,
systematic and integrative approach to clinical services.
(Psicologia interconductual: un enfoque sistenatico,
critico e integrativo de los servicios clinicos).
Por encima de todo, un enfoque
.interconductual asume que proporciona una
ciencia y practica de la psicologia coherente y
sistematica "desde abajo". La perspectiva
interconductual considera esencial para un practica
psicologica, basada autenticamente en una ciencia,
tener un enfoque completamente naturalista de la
esto en vista, este articulo cubre desarrollos
hist6ricos y supuestos basicos orientadores que
pertenecen a la ciencia misma. Despues, se
formulan algunos fundamentos de la psicologia
como una ciencia completamente naturalista.
Finalmente, se presentan varios supuestos para los
servicios clinicos, junto con practicas
recomendadas por ellos.
Adams, Mark A. Inherited behavior; interbehavioral
and radical behavioral interpretations. (Conducta
heredada: interpretaciones interconductuales y
conductuaks radicates).
Aunque muchos estudiosos no recomiendan
argumentar entre posiciones filosoficas, el
comparar posiciones respecto de problemas
particulars puede ser util como medio para
aumentar la conciencia y comprension de la
posicion propia. En este trabajo comparamos los
supuestos del conductismo radical y del
interconductismo sobre el problema de la
conducta heredada, proporcionando una avenida
para un mejor entendimiento de cada uno y
demostrando el impacto que tiene adoptar
conjuntos particulares de supuestos sobre nuestras
interpretaciones de tipos particulares de eventos
psicologicos.
Bach, Patricia A. &* Bzdawka, Annette. Integrating
levels of analysis. (Integrando niveles de analisis).
El estudio de los eventos en varios niveies

Five Year Index continued...
(vbgr., individual, familiar, cultural) nos puede
decir algo sobre los eventos que ocurren
inmediatamente arriba o abajo. La unidad mas
apropiada de analisis depende del nivel que se este
estudiando. El factor importante no es la unidad o
nivel particular, sino la interfase - como la
comprension en un nivel puede aumentar la
comprension en el mismo o en otro nivel de
analisis. Una unidad de analisis apropiada es
aquella que expande nuestro conocimiento en
cualquiera de varios niveles de analisis, incluyendo
individuos, y grupos tan grandes como las culturas,
siempre que dicno conocimiento pueda integrarse
en un cuerpo de ciencia, la ciencia de la conducta
humana,
Swain, Mark A, Realism, nihilism and a psychological
unit-of-analysis. (Realismo, nihilismo y una unidad de
andlisis psicologico).
Se explican las filosofias del realismo, del
realismo no tan ingenuo, el nihilismo
constructive, y el nihilismo deteriorate en
referencia a la naturaleza de una unidad de analisis
de la conducta. Se examinan las implicaciones de
sostener los supuestos realistas y nihilistas,
La Marca, Paul M, A search for a basic and common
unit of analysis for social scientific inquiry. (Una
bt'tsqueda de una mtidadbdsicay comiin de andlisispara
la. investigacion social cientiftca).
Una buena definicion de la unidad de analisis
que se utiliza en un campo particular de estudio es
crucial en la guia de interpretaciones apropiadas de
lineas particulars de investigacion, asi como en la
integracion de investigacion dirigida a diversos
objetos de analisis. Se presenta la diada (dos perso-
nas interactuando en una contexto social dado)
como una unidad teorica de analisis que puede
servir como punto de partida. La diada posee las
propiedades basicas para ser utilizada como unidad
de analisis y es guiada por la perspectiva del
Interaccionismo Simbolico. Se explica esta
perspectiva en el contexto mas amplio de la diada
como una unidad basica de analisis.
Deveraux> Paul Toward an integrated psychology,
(Hacia una psicologia integrada).
Se discute el papel de la fisioiogia hacia la
psicologia en su contexto historico. La fisiologia se
explica desde una plataforma interconductual: no
es reduccionista, ni dualista. La fisiologia tiene un
lugar en el avance de la psicologia. Los constructos
metodologicos y teoricos de la psicologia y la
fisiologia no se enfrentan uno contra el otro sino
que mas bien pueden conjuntarse para formar un
armamento complementado, mas poderoso para el
estudio de la conducta humana.
22
Mills, John A. Jacob Robert Kantor (1888-1984).
Se hace un recuento historico breve de la vida
profesional de J.R. Kantor. Se explican y
contrastan sus ideas filosoficas y sus supuestos
teoricos con los de Skinner. Finalmente, se discute
la influencia permanente de Kantor en el
Interconductismo y la psicologia en general.
Midgley, Bryan D, A reply to Professor Mills. (Una
replica a! Profesor Mills).
Mills discutio una serie de puntos en "Jacob
Robert Kantor (1888-1984)" que provocan una
serie de comentarios. Particufarmente, estos se
centran en; el supuesto rechazo por Kantor del
operacionalismo, la capacidad de los psicologos
para hacer predicciones, el punto de vista de
Kantor sobre la ontologia, los componentes del
campo, y la influencia conti'nua de Kantor sobre la
psicologia. Se presentan estos puntos, no. como
una critica a Mills, sino con el espiritu de
interpretar el trabajo de Kantor de la manera mas
consistente posible.
Chiasson, Carmenne, Kantor's Interbehaviorism versus
Skinner's Behaviorism: comparison and contrast. (El
interconductismo de Kantor versus el conductismo de
Skinner: comparaciony contraste).
Kantor y Skinner aspiran lograr diferentes
metas filosoficas. La preocupacion principal de
Kantor es la descripcion y explicacion cientificas y
precisas de la teoria que subyace a la ciencia de la
psicologia y la unidad del evento psicologico de
campo. Skinner se centra en la psicologia como
una ciencia preocupada por la prediccion y el con-
trol de la conducta. Se senalan similitudes y
diferencias entre las filosofias, centrandose en
cuatro problemas: 1) el metodo de seleccion de su
objeto de estudio, 2) la naturaleza del evento
psicologico, 3) el papel de la causa, y 4) la meta de
cada perspectiva. Finalmente, se discuten las
contribuciones, criticas y adecuaciones relativas de
las teorias interconductual y conductual.
Boxter> Charles. An interbehavioral approach to teach-
ing and problem solving in education. (Un wfoque
interconductual de la ensenanza y la solucion de
problemas en la educacion).
Actualmente, nuestras escuelas intentan
funcionar sobre la base de las psicologias
occidentals que son dualistas por naturaleza. En
consecuencia, los educadores se concentran en
varios aspectos del campo (vbgr., el estudiante o el
ambiente) o en un constructo hipotetizado, como
la inteligencia. Al considerar a la educacion y las
ideas tradicionales sobre la inteligencia desde una
perspectiva interconductual, se da una explicacion
de la percepcion y la solucion de problemas. Se
23
Five Year Index continued...
discuten las fortalezas de considerar a la education
desde una perspectiva interconductual.
Collins, Jacqueline E. Cultural evolution and the sur-
vival of cultures. (Evolution cultural y la sobrevivencia
de las culturas).
La selection de una cultura respecto de otra es
un proceso multideterminado anahzado por Skin-
ner. El aplico el concepto de la seleccion natural
como una metafbra para explicar la evolucion de
ios ambientes sociales. Se examina esta extension,
y se plantean una serie de problemas: 1} el analisis
de Skinner no diferencio forma y funcion cuando
aislo las diferencias entre culturas, 2) que es bueno
para la cultura, que supuestamente promueve la
sobrevivencia, 3) como evolutionan las culturas, y
4) contingencias adventicias de las practicas
culturales.
Volumen 23
Verplanck, William S. Some reflections on Kantor,
Kantorians, and Kantor's career. (Algunas reflexiones
sobre Kantor, Ios Kantorianos y la carrera de Kantor).
Verplanck reflexiona sobre su evolucion y las
de otros hacia una punto de vista interconductual.
Se describen cuatro tipos de "Kantorianos" y se
examinan las circunstancias participativas de caer
en una u otra de estas categorias. Tambien se
explora la asociacion temprana de Kantor y Skin-
ner y el surgimiento de "no-Kantorianos".
Sharpy Thomas L. & Shriver, Mark. 77ie closet
interbehaviorism of matching law theory. (El
interconductismo de gabinete de la teoria de fa ley de
igualacion).
Los autores sostienen que la ley de igualacion
es de utilidad potencial para cubrir la brecha entre
la investigacion basica y la aplicada, Se argumenta
que la ley de igualacion es inherentemente
interconductual debido a su "conceptualization
molar y dependiente del contexto respecto de la
conducta humana". Se presentan una historia
breve del desarrollo de la ley del efecto y un
ejemplo de su aplicacion a la investigacion
aplicada.
Bijou, Sidney W. & Ghezzi, Patrick M. Background
notes on Kantor's treatment of linguistic behavior.
(Notas de fondo sobre el tratamiento por Kantor de la
conducta linguistica).
Bijou y Ghezzi presentan una description
historica del estudio de Kantor sobre la linguistica,
incluyendo la mention de escritos por sus
estudiantes. Esto se ve seguido por una description
de Ios puntos sobresaiientes de "Psychological Lin-
guistics" (1977).
Mountjoy, Paul T. & Cone, Donna M. Tlie func-
tional nature of the philosophical categories; Jacob Robert
Kantor's doctoral dissertation. (La naturaleza funcional
de las categorias filosdficas: la tests doctoral de Jacob
Robert Kantor).
Los autores argumentan que las
representaciones incorrectas de las contribuciones
de Kantor se pueden hacer a un lado al examinar la
tesis de Kantor y su relation con sus escritos
posteriores. Sigue una description detallada de la
tesis de Kantor que destaca una consideration
importante comun a todas las representaciones
incorrectas sobre la perspectiva de Kantor: que
Kantor rue mas que nada un filosofo y que sus
preocupaciones fueron las de la filosofia aplicada a
la psicologia, y no Ios problemas psicologicos per
se.
Smith, Noel W. Eco-behavioral science, (Ciencia eco-
conductual).
Este articulo es un resumen (en 'prensa) de
"Current Systems in Psychology" de Smitn, y
proporciona una introduction a Ios conceptos
clave de la "psicologia ecologica" de Roger Barker.
Martinez-Sanchez, Hector, Una teoria de la conducta
kporc{ui la necesitamos? (A behavior theory, Why we
need it?).
El autor argumenta que se necesita la teoria de
la conducta. Se describe dentro de su contexto
historico a la teoria de la conducta como un
proceso progresivo, gradual y dinamico mas que
como un resultado terminal.

Books from
Sidney W. Bijou and Patrick M. Ghezzi
Outline of J. R. Kantor's
Psychological Linguistics
A complete, point by point outline of Kantor's
book, that makes it much more readily under-
stood. Perfect for classroom use or as a quick
way to introduce others to Kantor's approach.
Sidney W. Bijou, Behavior Analysis of Child
Development (Second Revision)
An entirely new version of this classic text
Steven C. Hayes, Neil S. Jacobson, Victoria M.
Foilette, and Michael J. Dougher (Eds.),
Acceptance and Change: Content and Context
in Psychotherapy. The first volume to focus
entirely on psychological acceptance methods
from the point of view of modern empirical
clinical psychology.
Linda J. Hayes, Gregory J. Hayes, Stephen. C. Moore,
and Patrick M. Ghezzi (Eds.), Ethical Issues in
Developmental Disabilities. If you work with
persons who have disabilities, you need this
book,
Steven C. Hayes, Linda J. Hayes, Masaya Sato, and
Koichi Ono, Behavior Analysis of Language and
Cognition. A contemporary look at the nature of
stimulus relations and verbal events, and their
impact on cognitive activity.
24
Bernard Guerin, Analyzing Social Behavior:
Behavior Analysis and the Social Sci-
ences. Provides the first full coverage of the
social sciences from the perspective of
modern behavior analysis.
Steven C. Hayes, Linda J. Hayes, Hayne W.
Reese, & Theodore R. Sarbin (Eds.), Vari-
eties of Scientific Contextualism
Contextualism from soup to nuts.
Sam Leigland (Ed.), Radical Behaviorism:
Willard Day on Psychology and Philoso-
phy
The wonderful thought of a man ahead of
his time,
Steven C. Hayes and Linda J. Hayes (Eds.),
Understanding Verbal Relations. The best
available book on equivalence and similar
relational phenomena.
LindaJ. Hayes and Philip N. Chase (Eds.),
Dialogues on Verbal Behavior. Statements
about verbal behavior from leaders in the
field.
25

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