VOL. 200, AUGUST 5, 1991 271: Ganzon vs. Court of Appeals

12/6/2017 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 200
VOL. 200, AUGUST 5, 1991 271

Ganzon vs. Court of Appeals
*
G.R. No. 93252. August 5, 1991.
RODOLFO T. GANZON, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE

COURT OF APPEALS, and LUIS T. SANTOS,
respondents.
*
G.R. No. 93746. August 5, 1991.
MARY ANN RIVERA ARTIEDA, petitioner, vs. HON.

LUIS SANTOS, in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Local Government, NICANOR M.
PATRICIO, in his capacity as Chief, Legal Service of the
Department of Local Government, and SALVADOR
CABALUNA, JR., respondents.
*
G.R. No. 95245. August 5, 1991.
RODOLFO T. GANZON, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE

COURT OF APPEALS, and LUIS T. SANTOS, in his
capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Local
Government, respondents.
Local Governments; Power to discipline local officials.It is

the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the
change in the constitutional language, the charter did not intend
to divest the legislature of its rightor the President of her
prerogative as conferred by existing legislation to provide
administrative sanctions against local officials. It is our opinion
that the omission (of as may be provided by law) signifies
nothing more than to underscore local governments autonomy
from congress and to break Congress control over local
governments affairs. The Constitution did not, however, intend,
for the sake of local autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all
authority over municipal corporations, in particular, concerning
discipline.
Same; Same; Local autonomy explained.It is noteworthy
that under the Charter, local autonomy is not instantly self-
http://central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016029c8d0c36534049e003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/23
executing, but subject to, among other things, the passage of a

local government code, a local tax law, income distribution
legislation, and a national representation law, and measures
designed to realize autonomy at the local level. It is also
noteworthy that in spite of autonomy, the
_______________
* EN BANC.
272
272 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Constitution places the local governments under the general

supervision of the Executive. It is noteworthy finally, that the
Charter allows Congress to include in the local government code
provisions for removal of local officials, which suggest that
Congress may exercise removal powers, and as the existing Local
Government Code has done, delegate its exercise to the President.
Same; Same; Supervision and control, meaning of.The
petitioners are under the impression that the Constitution has
left the President mere supervisory powers, which supposedly
excludes the power of investigation, and denied her control, which
allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken
impression because legally, supervision is not incompatible with
disciplinary authority. x x x Control has been defined as the
power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and
to substitute the judgment of the former for test of the latter.
Supervision on the other hand means overseeing or the power
or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform
their duties.
Same; Same; Suspension.The successive sixty-day
suspensions imposed on Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon is albeit another
matter. What bothers the Court, and what indeed looms very
large, is the fact that since the Mayor is facing ten administrative
charges, the Mayor is in fact facing the possibility of 600 days of
suspension, in the event that all ten cases yield prima facie
findings. The Court is not of course tolerating misfeasance in
public office (assuming that Mayor Ganzon is guilty of
misfeasance) but it is certainly another question to make him
serve 600 days of suspension, which is effectively, to suspend him

out of office. x x x.
Same; Same; Same.The plain truth is that this Court has
been ill at ease with suspensions, x x x because it is out of the
ordinary to have a vacancy in local government. The sole objective
of a suspension, x x x is simply to prevent the accused from
hampering the normal cause of the investigation with his
influence and authority over possible witnesses or to keep him off
the records and other evidence. It is a means, and no more, to
assist prosecutors in firming up a case, if any, against an erring
local official. Under the Local Government Code, it can not exceed
sixty days, which is to say that it need not be exactly sixty days
long if a shorter period is otherwise sufficient, and which is also to
say that it ought to be lifted if prosecutors have achieved their
purpose in a shorter span.
273
VOL. 200, AUGUST 5, 1991 273

PETITIONS to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Nicolas P. Sonalan for petitioner in 93252.
Romeo A. Gerochi for petitioner in 93746.
Eugenio Original for petitioner in 95245.
SARMIENTO, J.:
The petitioners take common issue on the power of the

President (acting through the Secretary of Local
Government), to suspend and/or remove local officials.
The petitioners are the Mayor of Iloilo City (G.R. Nos.
93252 and 95245) and a member of the Sangguniang
Panglunsod thereof (G.R. No. 93746), respectively.
The petitions of Mayor Ganzon originated from a series
of administrative complaints, ten in number, filed against
him by various city officials sometime in 1988, on various
charges, among them, abuse of authority, oppression, grave
misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct, intimidation,
culpable 1violation of the Constitution, and arbitrary
detention. The personalities involved are Joceleehn
Cabaluna, a clerk at the city health office; Salvador
Cabaluna, her husband; Dr. Felicidad Ortigoza, Assistant
City Health Officer; Mansueto Malabor, Vice-Mayor;
Rolando Dabao, Dan Dalido, German Gonzales, Larry Ong,
and Eduardo Pea Redondo, members of the Sangguniang
Panglunsod; and Pancho Erbite, a barangay tanod. The

complaints against the Mayor are2 set forth in the opinion of
the respondent Court of Appeals. We quote:
xxxxxxxxx
In her verified complaint (Annex A), Mrs. Cabaluna, a clerk
assigned to the City Health, Office of Iloilo City charged that due
to political reasons, having supported the rival candidate, Mrs.
Rosa O. Caram, the petitioner City Mayor, using as an excuse the
exigency of the service and the interest of the public, pulled her
out from rightful office where her qualifications are best suited
and assigned her to a work that should be the function of a non-
career service employee. To
_______________
1 Rollo, G.R. No. 93252, 76; 77.

2 Hon. Bonifacio Cacdac, Jr., J.
274

make matters worse, a utility worker in the office of the Public

Services, whose duties are alien to the complainants duties and
functions, has been detailed to take her place. The petitioners act
are pure harassments aimed at luring her away from her
permanent position or force her to resign.
In the case of Dra. Felicidad Ortigoza, she claims that the
petitioner handpicked her to perform task not befitting her
position as Assistant City Health Officer of Iloilo City; that her
office was padlocked without any explanation or justification; that
her salary was withheld without cause since April 1, 1988; that
when she filed her vacation leave, she was given the run-around
treatment in the approval of her leave in connivance with Dr.
Rodolfo Villegas and that she was the object of a well-engineered
trumped-up charge in an administrative complaint filed by Dr.
Rodolfo Villegas (Annex B).
On the other hand, Mansuelo Malabor is the duty elected
ViceMayor of Iloilo City and complainants Rolando Dabao, Dan
Dalido, German Gonzales, Larry Ong and Eduardo Pea Redondo
are members of the Sangguniang Panglunsod of the City of Iloilo.
Their complaint arose out from the case where Councilor Larry
Ong, whose key to his office was unceremoniously and without
previous notice, taken by petitioner. Without an office, Councilor
Ong had to hold office at Plaza Libertad. The Vice-Mayor and the
other complainants sympathized with him and decided to do the
same. However, the petitioner, together with his fully-armed
security men, forcefully drove them away from Plaza Libertad.

Councilor Ong denounced the petitioners actuations the following
day in the radio station and decided to hold office at the Freedom
Grandstand at Iloilo City and there were so many people who
gathered to witness the incident. However, before the group could
reach the area, the petitioner, together with his security men, led
the firemen using a firetruck in dozing water to the people and
the bystanders.
Another administrative case was filed by Pancho Erbite, a
barangay tanod, appointed by former mayor Rosa O. Caram. On
March 13, 1988, without the benefit of charges filed against him
and no warrant of arrest was issued, Erbite was arrested and
detained at the City Jail of Iloilo City upon orders of petitioner. In
jail, he was allegedly mauled by other detainees3 thereby causing
injuries. He was released only the following day.
4
The Mayor thereafter answered, and the cases were
shortly
_______________
3 Rollo, id., 76-77.

4 Id., 77.
275
VOL. 200, AUGUST 5, 1991 275

set for hearing. The opinion of the Court of Appeals also set
forth the succeeding events:
xxxxxxxxx
The initial hearing in the Cabaluna and Ortigoza cases were
set for hearing on June 20-21, 1988 at the Regional Office of the
Department of Local Government in Iloilo City. Notices, through
telegrams, were sent to the parties (Annex L) and the parties
received them, including the petitioner. The petitioner asked for a
postponement before the scheduled date of hearing and was
represented by counsel, Atty. Samuel Castro. The hearing officers,
Atty. Salvador Quebral and Atty. Marino Bermudez had to come
all the way from Manila for the two-day hearings but was actually
held only on June 20, 1988 in view of the inability and
unpreparedness of petitioners counsel.
The next hearings were re-set to July 25, 26, 27, 1988 in the
same venueIloilo City. Again, the petitioner attempted to delay
the proceedings and moved for a postponement under the excuse
that he had just hired his counsel. Nonetheless, the hearing
officers denied the motion to postpone, in view of the fact that the
parties were notified by telegrams of the scheduled hearings
(Annex M).
In the said hearings, petitioners counsel cross-examined the
complainants and their witnesses.
Finding probable grounds and reasons, the respondent issued a
preventive suspension order on August 11, 1988 to last until
October 11, 1988 for a period of sixty (60) days.
Then the next investigation was set on September 21, 1988 and
the petitioner again asked for a postponement to September 26,
1988. On September 26, 1988, the complainants and petitioner
were present, together with their respective counsel. The
petitioner sought for a postponement which was denied. In these
hearings which were held in Manila, the petitioner testified in
Adm. Case No. C-10298 and 10299.
The investigation was continued regarding the Malabor case
and the complainants testified including their witnesses.
On October 10, 1988, petitioners counsel, Atty. Original moved
for a postponement of the October 24, 1988 hearing to November
7 to 11, 1988 which was granted. However, the motion for change
of venue was denied due to lack of funds. At the hearing on
November 7, 1988, the parties and counsel were present.
Petitioner reiterated his motion to change venue and moved for
postponement anew. The counsel discussed a proposal to take the
deposition of witnesses in Iloilo City so the hearing was
indefinitely postponed. However, the parties failed to come to
terms and after the parties were notified of the hearing, the
investigation was set to December 13 to 15, 1988.
276

The petitioner sought for another postponement on the ground

that his witnesses were sick or cannot attend the investigation
due to lack of transportation. The motion was denied and the
petitioner was given up to December 14, 1988 to present his
evidence.
On December 14, 1988, petitioners counsel insisted on his
motion for postponement and the hearing officers gave petitioner
up to December 15, 1988 to present his evidence. On December
15, 1988, the petitioner failed to present evidence and the cases
were considered submitted for resolution.
In the meantime, a prima facie evidence was found to exist in
the arbitrary detention case filed by Pancho Erbite so the
respondent ordered the petitioners second preventive suspension
dated October 11, 1988 for another sixty (60) days. The petitioner
was able to obtain a restraining order and a writ of preliminary

injunction in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 5 of Iloilo City.
The second preventive suspension was not enforced.
Amidst the two successive suspensions, Mayor Ganzon

instituted an action for prohibition against the respondent
Secretary of Local Government (now, Interior) in the
Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City, where he succeeded in
obtaining a writ of preliminary injunction. Presently, he
instituted CA-G.R. SP No. 16417, an action for prohibition,
in the respondent Court of Appeals.
Meanwhile, on May 3, 1990, the respondent Secretary
issued another order, preventively suspending Mayor
Ganzon for another sixty days, the third time in twenty
months, and designating meantime Vice-Mayor Mansueto
Malabor as acting mayor. Undaunted, Mayor Ganzon
commenced CA-G.R. SP No. 6
20736 of the Court of Appeals,
a petition for prohibition, (Malabor, it is to be noted, is one
of the complainants, and hence, he is interested in seeing
Mayor Ganzon ousted.)
On September 7, 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered
judgment, dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 16417. On July 5,
1990, it likewise promulgated a decision, dismissing CA-
G.R. SP No. 20736. In a Resolution dated January 24,
1990, it issued a
_______________
5 Id., 77-78.
6 Id., 78. The first suspension was on the Cabaluna and Ortigoza
complaints. CA-G.R. No. 16417 was on the Erbite complaint. CA-G.R. No.
20736 was a challenge on the designation of Vice-Mayor Malabor.
277
VOL. 200, AUGUST 5, 1991 277

Resolution certifying the petition of Mary Ann Artieda, who

had been similary charged by the respondent Secretary, to
this Court.
On June 26, 1990, we issued a Temporary Restraining
Order, barring the respondent Secretary from
implementing the suspension orders, and restraining the
enforcement of the Court of Appeals two decisions.
In our Resolution of November 29, 1990, we consolidated
all three cases. In our Resolutions of January 15, 1991, we
gave due course thereto.
Mayor Ganzon claims as a preliminary (G.R. No. 93252),

that the Department of Local Government in hearing the
ten cases against him, had denied him due process of law
and that the respondent Secretary 7had been biased,
prejudicial and hostile towards him arising from his
(Mayor Ganzons) alleged refusal 8
to join the Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino party and the running political
rivalry they
9
maintained in the last congressional and local
elections; 10and his alleged refusal to operate a lottery in
Iloilo City. He also alleges that he requested the Secretary
to life his suspension since it had come ninety days prior to
11
an election (the barangay elections of November 14, 1988),
notwithstanding which, the latter proceeded with the
hearingand meted out two 12
more suspension ordersof
the aforementioned cases. He likewise contends that he
sought to bring the cases to Iloilo City (they were held in
Manila) in order to reduce the13 costs of proceeding, but the
Secretary rejected his request. He states14 that he asked for
postponement on valid and justifiable grounds, among
them, that he was suffering from a heart 15
ailment which
required confinement;
16
that his vital witness was also
hospitalized but that the latter
_______________
7 Id., 21
8 Id.
9 Id., 27.
10 Id., 28.
11 Id., 30.
12 Id., 31-32.
13 Id., 34-35.
14 Id., 36.
15 Id.
16 Id.
278

17
unduly denied his request.
Mayor Ganzons primary argument (G.R. Nos. 93252
and 95245) is that the Secretary of Local Government is
devoid, in any event, of any authority to suspend and
remove local officials, an argument reiterated by the
petitioner Mary Ann Rivera Artieda (G.R. No. 93746).
As to Mayor Ganzons charges of denial of due process,

the records do not show very clearly in what manner the
Mayor might have been deprived of his rights by the
respondent Secretary. His claims that he and Secretary
Luis Santos were (are) political rivals and that his
persecution was politically motivated are pure
speculation and although the latter does not appear to have
denied these contentions (as he, Mayor Ganzon, claims), we
can not take his word for it the way we would have under
less political circumstances, considering furthermore that
political feud has often been a good excuse in contesting
complaints.
The Mayor has failed furthermore to substantiate his
say-sos that Secretary Santos had attempted to seduce him
to join the administration party and to operate a lottery in
Iloilo City. Again, although the Secretary failed to rebut his
allegations, we can not accept them at face value, much
more, 18as judicial admissions as he would have us accept
them, for the same reasons above-stated and furthermore,
because his say-sos were never corroborated by
independent testimonies. As a responsible public official,
Secretary Santos, in pursuing an official function, is
presumed to be performing his duties regularly and in the
absence of contrary evidence, no ill motive can be ascribed
to him.
As to Mayor Ganzons contention that he had requested
the respondent Secretary to defer the hearing on account of
the ninety-day ban prescribed by Section 62 of Batas Blg.
337, the Court finds the question to be moot and academic
since we have in fact restrained the Secretary 19from further
hearing the complaints against the petitioners.
_______________
17 Id., 38.
18 Id.
19 By virtue of the Temporary Restraining Order the Court issued on
June 26, 1990.
279
VOL. 200, AUGUST 5, 1991 279

As to his request, finally, for postponements, the Court is

afraid that he has not given any compelling reason why we
should overturn the Court of Appeals, which found no
convincing reason to overrule Secretary Santos in denying
his requests. Besides, postponements are a matter of

discretion on the part of the hearing officer, and based on
Mayor Ganzons above story, we are not convinced that the
Secretary has been guilty of a grave abuse of discretion.
The Court can not say, under these circumstances, that
Secretary Santos actuations deprived Mayor Ganzon of
due process of law.
We come to the core question: Whether or not the
Secretary of Local Government, as the Presidents alter
ego, can suspend and/or remove local officials.
It is the 20
petitioners argument that the 1987
Constitution no longer allows the President, as the 1935
and 1973 Constitutions did, to exercise the power of
suspension and/or removal over local officials. According to
both petitioners, the Constitution is meant, first, to
strengthen self-rule by local government units and second,
21
by deleting the phrase as may be provided by law, to
strip the President of the power of control over local
governments. It is a view, so they contend, that finds
support in the debates of the Constitutional Commission.
The provision in question reads as follows:
Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general

supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to
component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities
with respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of
their component units22
are within the scope of their prescribed
powers and functions.
It modifies a counterpart provision appearing in the 1935

Constitution, which we quote:
_______________
20 CONST., art. X, sec. 4.

21 CONST. (1935), art. X, sec. 10(1). The 1973 Constitution contained
no similar provision, but see art. VII, sec. 18.
22 CONST. (1987), supra.
280

Sec. 10. The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision
over all local governments as may be provided
23
by law, and take
care that the laws be faithfully executed.
The petitioners submit that the deletion (of as may be

provided by law) is significant, as their argument goes,
since: (1) the power of the President is provided by law
and (2) hence, no law may provide for it any longer. It is to
be noted that in meting out the suspensions under
question, the Secretary of Local Government acted in
consonance with the specific legal provisions of Batas Blg.
337, the Local Government Code, we quote:
Sec. 62. Notice of Hearing.Within seven days after the

complaint is filed, the Minister of Local Government, or the
sanggunian concerned, as the case may be, shall require the
respondent to submit his verified answer within seven days from
receipt of said complaint, and commence the hearing and
investigation of the case within ten days after receipt of such
answer of the respondent. No investigation shall be held within
ninety days immediately prior to an election, and no preventive
suspension shall be imposed within the said period. If preventive
suspension has been imposed prior 24to the aforesaid period, the
preventive suspension shall be lifted.
Sec. 63. Preventive Suspension.(1) Preventive suspension
may be imposed by the Minister of Local Government if the
respondent is a provincial or city official, by the provincial
governor if the respondent is an elective municipal official, or by
the city or municipal mayor if the respondent is an elective
barangay official.
(2) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after
the issues are joined, when there is reasonable ground to believe
that the respondent has committed the act or acts complained of,
when the evidence of culpability is strong, when the gravity of the
offense so warrants, or when the continuance in office of the
respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the
safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. In all cases,
preventive suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days after
the start of said suspension.
(3) At the expiration of sixty days, the suspended official shall
be deemed reinstated in office without prejudice to the
continuation of
_______________
23 CONST. (1935), supra.

24 Batas Blg. 337, sec. 62.
281
VOL. 200, AUGUST 5, 1991 281

the proceedings against him until its termination. However, if the

delay in the proceedings of the case is due to his fault, neglect or
request, the time of the
25
delay shall not be counted in computing
the time of suspension.
The issue, as the Court understands it, consists of three

questions: (1) Did the 1987 Constitution, in deleting the
phrase as may be provided by law intend to divest the
President of the power to investigate, suspend, discipline,
and/or remove local officials? (2) Has the Constitution
repealed Sections 62 and 63 of the Local Government Code?
(3) What is the significance of the change in the
constitutional language?
It is the considered opinion of the Court that
notwithstanding the change in the constitutional language,
the charter did not intend to divest the legislature of its
rightor the President of her prerogative as conferred by
existing legislation to provide administrative sanctions
against local officials. It is our opinion that the omission (of
as may be provided by law) signifies nothing more than to
underscore local governments autonomy from congress and
to break Congress control over local government affairs.
The Constitution did not, however, intend, for the sake of
local autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all authority
over municipal corporations, in particular, concerning
discipline.
Autonomy does not, after all, contemplate making mini-
states out of local government units, as in the federal
governments of the United States of America (or Brazil or
Germany), although Jefferson is said to have compared
municipal 26 corporations euphemistically to small
republics. Autonomy, in the constitutional sense, is
subject to the guiding star, though not control, of the
legislature, albeit the legislative responsibility under the
Constitutionand as the supervision clause itself suggest
is to wean local government units from overdependence
on the central government.
It is noteworthy that under the Charter, local
autonomy is not instantly self-executing, but subject to,
among other things,
_______________
25 Supra, sec. 63.

26 CRUZ, PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW 64 (1987 ed.)
282

27 28
the passage of a local government code,
29
a local tax law,
income distribution 30
legislation, 31 and a national
representation law, and measures designed to realize
autonomy at the local level. It is also noteworthy that in
spite of autonomy, the Constitution places the local
government under the general supervision of the
Executive. It is noteworthy finally, that the Charter allows
Congress to include in the local government code provisions
for removal of local officials, which suggest that Congress
may exercise removal powers, and as the existing Local
Government Code has done, delegate its exercise to the
President. Thus:
Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which

shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local
government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative,
and referendum, allocate among the different local government
units their powers, responsibilities and resources, and provide for
the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term,
salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all
other matters
32
relating to the organization and operation of the
local units.
As hereinabove indicated, the deletion of as may be

provided by law was meant to stress, sub silencio, the
objective of the framers to strengthen local autonomy by
severing congressional control of its affairs, as observed by
33
the Court of Appeals, like the power of local legislation.
The Constitution did nothing more, however, and insofar as
existing legislation authorizes the President (through the
Secretary of Local Government) to proceed against local
officials administratively, the Constitution contains no
prohibition.
_______________
27 CONST., supra, art. X, sec. 3.

28 Supra, secs. 5, 6.
29 Supra, sec. 7.
30 Supra, sec. 9.
31 See supra, sec. 14, providing for regional development councils to be
organized by the President.
32 Supra, sec. 3.
33 G.R. No. 95245, id., 53; see Mendoza, J., Concurring.
283
VOL. 200, AUGUST 5, 1991 283

The petitioners are under the impression that the

Constitution has left the President mere supervisory
powers, which supposedly excludes the power of
investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly
embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken
impression because legally, supervision is not
incompatible
34
with disciplinary authority as this Court has
held, thus:
xxxxxxxxx
It is true that in the case of Mondano vs. Silvosa, 51 Off. Gaz.,
No. 6 p. 2884, this Court had occasion to discuss the scope and
extent of the power of supervision by the President over local
government officials in contrast to the power of control given to
him over executive officials of our government wherein it was
emphasized that the two terms, control and supervision, are two
different things which differ one from the other in meaning and
extent. Thus in that case the Court has made the following
digression: In administration law supervision means overseeing
or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate
officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill
them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by
law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other
hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify of
set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance
of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that
of the latter. But from this pronouncement it cannot be
reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of the President
over local government officials does not include the power of
investigation when in his opinion the good of the public service so
requires, as postulated35 in Section 64(c) of the Revised
Administrative Code. xxx
xxxxxxxxx
Control has been defined as the power of an officer to

alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute
36
the judgment of the former for test of the
latter. Supervision on the other hand means
overseeing or the power or authority of
_______________
34 Ganzon v. Kayanan, 104 Phil. 484 (1985). In this concurrence (id.,

48-61), Justice Mendoza cited this case.
35 Supra, 489-490.
36 Mondano v. Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143, 148 (1955).
284

an officer
37
to see that 38subordinate officers perform their
duties. As we held, however, investigating is not
inconsistent with overseeing, although it is a lesser power
than altering.
The impression is apparently exacerbated by the Courts 39
pronouncements40in at least three cases, Lacson41
v. Roque,
Hebron v. Reyes, and Mondano v. Silvosa, 42
and possibly, a
fourth one, Pelaez v. Auditor General. In Lacson, this
Court said that the President enjoyed no control43powers
but only supervision as may be provided by law, a rule
we reiterated in Hebron, and Mondano. In Pelaez, we
stated that the President may not . . . suspend an elective
official of a regular municipality or take any disciplinary
action against him, except on appeal
44
from a decision of the
corresponding provincial board. However, neither Lacson
nor Hebron nor Mondano categorically banned the Chief
Executive from exercising acts of disciplinary authority
because she did not exercise control powers, but because no
law allowed her to exercise disciplinary authority. Thus,
according to Lacson:
The contention that the President has inherent power to remove

or suspend municipal officers is without doubt not well taken.
Removal and suspension of public officers are always controlled
by the particular law applicable 45and its proper construction
subject to constitutional limitations.
In Hebron, we stated:
Accordingly, when the procedure for the suspension of an officer is

specified by law, the same must be deemed mandatory and
adhered to strictly, in the absence of express or clear provision to
the
_______________
37 Supra, 147.
38 Ganzon v. Kayanan, supra.
39 92 Phil. 456 (1953).
40 104 Phil. 175 (1958).
41 Supra.
42 No. L-23825, December 24, 1965, 15 SCRA 569.

43 Lacson v. Roque, supra, 463.
44 Pelaez v. Auditor General, supra, 583.
45 Lacson v. Roque, supra, 462.
285
VOL. 200, AUGUST 5, 1991 285

contrarywhich
46
does not exist with respect to municipal officers
...
In Mondano, the Court held:
x x x The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the

provincial supervision over municipal officials in the provincial
governor who is authorized to receive and investigate complaints
made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty,
oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of
office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving
moral turpitude. And if the charges are serious, he shall submit
written charges touching the matter to the provincial board,
furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused either personally
or by registered mail, and he may in such case suspend the officer
(not being the municipal treasurer) pending action by the board, if
in his opinion the charge by one affecting the official integrity of
the officer in question. Section 86 of the Revised Administration
Code adds nothing to the power of supervision to be exercised by
the Department Head over the administration of x x x
municipalities x x x. If it be construed that it does and such
additional power is the same authority as that vested in the
Department Head by section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative
Code, then such additional power must be deemed to have47 been
abrogated by Section 110(1), Article VII, of the Constitution.
xxxxxxxxx
In Pelaez, we stated that the President can not impose

disciplinary measures on local officials except on appeal
from 48
the provincial board pursuant to the Administrative
Code.
Thus, in those case that this Court denied the President
the power (to suspend/remove) it was not because we did
not think that the President can not exercise it on account
of his limited power, but because the law lodged the power
elsewhere. But in those cases in which the law gave him
the power, the Court, as in Ganzon
49
v. Kayanan, found little
difficulty in sustaining him.
_______________
46 Hebron v. Reyes, supra, 185.

47 Mondano v. Silvosa, supra, 148.
48 Pelaez v. Auditor General, supra, 583.
49 G.R. No. 95245, id., 50-51; see Mendoza, J., Concurring.
286

The Court does not believe that the petitioners can

rightfully point to the debates of the Constitutional
Commission to defeat the Presidents powers. The Court
believes that the deliberations are by themselves
inconclusive, because although Commissioner Jose Nolledo 50
would exclude the power of removal 51
from the President,
Commissioner Blas Ople would not.
The Court is consequently reluctant to say that the new
Constitution has repealed the Local Government Code,
Batas Blg. 37. As we said, supervision and removal are
not incompatible terms and one may stand with the other
notwithstanding the stronger expression of local autonomy
under the new Charter. We have indeed held that in spite
of the approval52of the Charter, Batas Blg. 337 is still in
force and effect.
As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy
means a more responsive and accountable local
government structure
53
instituted through a system of
decentralization. The Constitution, as we observed, does
nothing more than to break up the monopoly of the
national government over the affairs of local governments
and as put by political adherents, to liberate the local
governments from the imperialism of Manila. Autonomy,
however, is not meant to end the relation of partnership
and interdependence between the central administration
and local government units, or otherwise, to usher in a
regime of federalism. The Charter has not taken such a
radical step. Local governments, under the Constitution,
are subject to regulation, however limited, and for no other
purpose than precisely, albeit paradoxically, to enhance
self-government. 54
As we observed in one case, decentralization means
devolution of national administrationbut not powerto
the local levels. Thus:
Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or

decentralization of power. There is decentralization of
administration
_______________
50 Id., 23.
51 Id., 53.
52 Bagabuyo v. Davide, G.R. No. 87233, September 21, 1989.
53 CONST., supra, art. X, sec. 3.
54 Limbona v. Mangelin, G.R. No. 80391, February 28, 1989, 170 SCRA 786.
287
VOL. 200, AUGUST 5, 1991 287

when the central government delegates administrative powers to

political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government
power and in the process to make local governments more
responsive and accountable, and ensure their fullest
development as self-reliant communities and make them more
effective partners in the pursuit of national development and
social progress. At the same time, it relieves the central
government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it
to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises
general supervision over them, but only to ensure that local
affairs are administered according to law. He has no control over
their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments
with his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an
abdication of political power in the favor of local governments
units declared to be autonomous, In that case, the autonomous
government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future
with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to
a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to
self-immolation, since in that event, the autonomous
government becomes accountable
55
not to the central authorities
but to its constituency.
The successive sixty-day suspensions imposed on Mayor

Rodolfo Ganzon is albeit another matter. What bothers the
Court, and what indeed looms very large, is the fact that
since the Mayor is facing ten administrative charges, the
Mayor is in fact facing the possibility of 600 days of
suspension, in the event that all ten cases yield prima facie
findings. The Court is not of course tolerating misfeasance
in public office (assuming that Mayor Ganzon is guilty of
misfeasance) but it is certainly another question to make
him serve 600 days of suspension, which56

is effectively, to
suspend him out of office. As we held:
2. Petitioner is a duly elected municipal mayor of Lianga, Surigao

del Sur. His term of office does not expire until 1986. Were it not
for this information and the suspension decreed by the
Sandiganbayan according to the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, he would have been all this while in the full discharge of his
functions as such municipal mayor. He was elected precisely to do
so. As of October 26,
_______________
55 Supra, 794-795.
56 Layno, Sr. v. Sandiganbayan, No. 65848, May 24, 1985, 136 SCRA 536.
288

1983, he has been unable to. It is a basic assumption of the

electoral process implicit in the right of suffrage that the people
are entitled to the services of elective officials of their choice. For
misfeasance or malfeasance, any of them could, of course, be
proceeded against administratively or, as in this instance,
criminally. In either case, his culpability must be established.
Moreover, if there be a criminal action, he is entitled to the
constitutional presumption of innocence. A preventive suspension
may be justified. Its continuance, however, for an unreasonable
length of time raises a due process question. For even if thereafter
he were acquitted, in the meanwhile his right to hold office had
been nullified. Clearly, there would be in such a case an injustice
suffered by him. Nor is he the only victim. There is injustice
inflicted likewise on the people of Lianga. They were deprived of
the services of the man they had elected to serve as mayor. In that
sense, to paraphrase Justice Cardozo, the protracted continuance
of this preventive suspension had outrun the bounds of reason
and resulted in sheer oppression. A denial of due process is thus
quite manifest. It is to avoid such an unconstitutional
57
application
that the order of suspension should be lifted.
The plain truth is that this Court has

58
been ill at ease with
suspensions, for the above reasons, and so also, because it
is out of the ordinary to have a vacancy in local
government.
59
The sole objective of a suspension, as we have
held, is simply to prevent the accused from hampering
the normal cause of the investigation60 with his influence
and authority over possible witnesses or to keep him off
61
61
the records and other evidence. It is a means, and no
more, to assist prosecutors in firming up a case, if any,
against an erring local official. Under 62 the Local
Government Code, it can not exceed sixty days, which is to
say that it need not be exactly sixty days long if a shorter
period is otherwise sufficient, and which is also to say that
it ought to be lifted if prosecutors have achieved their
purpose in a shorter span.
_______________
57 Supra, 541.
58 See supra.
59 Lacson v. Roque, supra.
60 Supra, 469.
61 Batas Blg. 337, sec. 63.
62 Supra.
289
VOL. 200, AUGUST 5, 1991 289

Suspension is not a penalty and is not unlike preventive

imprisonment in which the accused is held to insure his
presence at the trial. In both cases, the accused (the
respondent) enjoys a presumption of innocence unless and
until found guilty.
Suspension finally is temporary, and as the Local
Government Code provides, 63it may be imposed for no more
than sixty days. As we held, a longer suspension is unjust
and unreasonable, and we might add, nothing less than
tyranny.
As we observed earlier, imposing 600 days of suspension
which is not a remote possibilityon Mayor Ganzon is to
all intents and purposes, to make him spend the rest of his
term in inactivity. It is also to make, to all intents and
purposes, his suspension permanent.
It is also, in fact, to mete out punishment in spite of the
fact that the Mayors guilt has not been proven. Worse, any
absolution will be for naught because needless to say, the
length of his suspension would have, by the time he is
reinstated, wiped out his tenure considerably.
The Court is not to be mistaken for obstructing the
efforts of the respondent Secretary to see that justice is
done in Iloilo City, yet it is hardly any argument to inflict
on Mayor Ganzon successive suspensions when apparently,
the respondent Secretary has had sufficient time to gather
the necessary evidence to build a case against the Mayor-

without suspending him a day longer. What is intriguing is
that the respondent Secretary has been cracking down, so
to speak, on the Mayor piecemealapparently, to pin him
down ten times the pain, when he, the respondent
Secretary, could have pursued a consolidated effort.
We reiterate that we are not precluding the President,
through the Secretary of Interior from exercising a legal
power, yet we are of the opinion that the Secretary of
Interior is exercising that power oppressively, and needless
to say, with a grave abuse of discretion.
The Court is aware that only the third suspension is
under questions, and that any talk of future suspensions is
in fact premature. The fact remains, however, that Mayor
Ganzon has been made to serve a total of 120 days of
suspension and the
_______________
63 Layno, Sr. v. Sandiganbayan, supra.
290

possibility of sixty days more is arguably around the corner

(which amounts to a violation of the Local Government
Code)which brings to light a pattern of suspensions
intended to suspend the Mayor the rest of his natural
tenure. The Court is simply foreclosing what appears to us
as a concerted effort of the State to perpetuate an arbitrary
act.
As we said, we can not tolerate such a state of affairs.
We are therefore allowing Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon to suffer
the duration of his third suspension and lifting, for the
purpose, the Temporary Restraining Order earlier issued.
Insofar as the seven remaining charges are concerned, we
are urging the Department of Local Government, upon the
finality of this Decision, to undertake steps to expedite the
same, subject to Mayor Ganzons usual remedies of appeal,
judicial or administrative, or certiorari, if warranted, and
meanwhile, we are precluding the Secretary from meting
out further suspensions based on those remaining
complaints, notwithstanding findings of prima facie
evidence.
In resum, the Court is laying down the following rules:
Local autonomy, under the Constitution, involves a

1.
mere decentralization of administration, not of
power, in which local officials remain accountable to
the central government in the manner the law may
provide;
2. The new Constitution does not prescribe federalism;
3. The change in constitutional language (with respect
to the supervision clause) was meant but to deny
legislative control over local governments; it did not
exempt the latter from legislative regulations
provided regulation is consistent with the
fundamental premise of autonomy;
4. Since local governments remain accountable to the
national authority, the latter may, by law, and in
the manner set forth therein, impose disciplinary
action against local officials;
5. Supervision and investigation are not
inconsistent terms; investigation does not signify
control (which the President does not have);
6. The petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon, may serve
the suspension so far ordered, but may no longer be
suspended for the offenses he was charged
originally; provided:
291
VOL. 200, AUGUST 5, 1991 291

a) that delays in the investigation of those charges

due to his fault, neglect or request, (the time of the
delay) shall not be counted in computing the time of
suspension. [Supra, sec. 63(3)]
b) that if during, or after the expiration of, his
preventive suspension, the petitioner commits
another or other crimes and abuses for which
proper charges are filed against him by the
aggrieved party or parties, his previous suspension
shall not be a bar to his being preventively
suspended again, if warranted under subpar. (2),
Section 63 of the Local Government Code.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are

DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued is
LIFTED. The suspensions of the petitioners are
AFFIRMED, provided that the petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo
Ganzon, may not be made to serve future suspensions on

account of any of the remaining administrative charges
pending against him for acts committed prior to August 11,
1988. The Secretary of Interior is ORDERED to consolidate
all such administrative cases pending against Mayor
Ganzon.
The sixty-day suspension against the petitioner, Mary
Ann Rivera Artieda, is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera,

Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla,
Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
Petitions dismissed. Suspension of petitioners affirmed.
Note.Complaints against elective provincial or city

officials should be filed before the Minister of Local
Government. (Regidor, Jr. vs. Chiongbian, 173 SCRA 507.)
o0o
292
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12/6/2017 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 200

VOL. 200, AUGUST 5, 1991 271

RODOLFO T. GANZON, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE

MARY ANN RIVERA ARTIEDA, petitioner, vs. HON.

RODOLFO T. GANZON, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE

Local Governments; Power to discipline local officials.It is

executing, but subject to, among other things, the passage of a

272 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ganzon vs. Court of Appeals

Constitution places the local governments under the general

serve 600 days of suspension, which is effectively, to suspend him

VOL. 200, AUGUST 5, 1991 273

PETITIONS to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

The petitioners take common issue on the power of the

Panglunsod; and Pancho Erbite, a barangay tanod. The

1 Rollo, G.R. No. 93252, 76; 77.

274 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

make matters worse, a utility worker in the office of the Public

security men, forcefully drove them away from Plaza Libertad.

3 Rollo, id., 76-77.

VOL. 200, AUGUST 5, 1991 275

276 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The petitioner sought for another postponement on the ground

was able to obtain a restraining order and a writ of preliminary

Amidst the two successive suspensions, Mayor Ganzon

VOL. 200, AUGUST 5, 1991 277

Resolution certifying the petition of Mary Ann Artieda, who

Mayor Ganzon claims as a preliminary (G.R. No. 93252),

278 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

As to Mayor Ganzons charges of denial of due process,

VOL. 200, AUGUST 5, 1991 279

As to his request, finally, for postponements, the Court is

his requests. Besides, postponements are a matter of

Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general

It modifies a counterpart provision appearing in the 1935

20 CONST., art. X, sec. 4.

280 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The petitioners submit that the deletion (of as may be

Sec. 62. Notice of Hearing.Within seven days after the

23 CONST. (1935), supra.

VOL. 200, AUGUST 5, 1991 281

the proceedings against him until its termination. However, if the

The issue, as the Court understands it, consists of three

25 Supra, sec. 63.

282 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ganzon vs. Court of Appeals

Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which

As hereinabove indicated, the deletion of as may be

27 CONST., supra, art. X, sec. 3.

VOL. 200, AUGUST 5, 1991 283

The petitioners are under the impression that the

Control has been defined as the power of an officer to

34 Ganzon v. Kayanan, 104 Phil. 484 (1985). In this concurrence (id.,

284 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The contention that the President has inherent power to remove

Accordingly, when the procedure for the suspension of an officer is

42 No. L-23825, December 24, 1965, 15 SCRA 569.

VOL. 200, AUGUST 5, 1991 285

In Mondano, the Court held:

x x x The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the

In Pelaez, we stated that the President can not impose

46 Hebron v. Reyes, supra, 185.