OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

NAJERA v. NAJERA

G.R. No. 164817 July 3, 2009.

FACTS: Petitioner Digna Najera and respondent Eduardo Najera are married on January
31, 1988 as evidenced by their marriage contract. Petitioner claimed that at the time of the
celebration of their marriage, respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of the marriage, and such incapacity became manifest only after
marriage. At the time of their marriage, respondent was jobless, while petitioner was employed
as Clerk at the Special Services Division of the Provincial Government of Pangasinan with a
monthly salary of 5,000.00. It was petitioners brother who helped respondent find a job as a
seaman at the Intercrew Shipping Agency in Manila. On July 30, 1988, respondent was
employed as a seaman, and he gave petitioner a monthly allotment of 1,600.00. After ten
months at work, he went home in 1989 and then returned to work after three months. Every time
respondent was home, he quarreled with petitioner and accused her of having an affair with
another man. Petitioner noticed that respondent also smoked marijuana and every time he went
out of the house and returned home, he was drunk. However, there was no record in their
barangay that respondent was involved in drugs.

Psychologist Cristina Gates testified that the chances of curability of respondents

psychological disorder were nil. Its curability depended on whether the established organic
damage was minimal -- referring to the malfunction of the composites of the brain brought about
by habitual drinking and marijuana, which possibly afflicted respondent with borderline
personality disorder and uncontrollable impulses.

ISSUE: Whether or not the totality of petitioners evidence was able to prove that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated.

HELD: No. In Santos v. Court of Appeals: "psychological incapacity must be

characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing
guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated.

In this case, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the totality of the evidence
submitted by petitioner failed to satisfactorily prove that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. The root cause of
respondents alleged psychological incapacity was not sufficiently proven by experts or shown to
be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.

As found by the Court of Appeals, Psychologist Cristina Gates conclusion that

respondent was psychologically incapacitated was based on facts relayed to her by petitioner and
was not based on her personal knowledge and evaluation of respondent; thus, her finding is
unscientific and unreliable.Moreover, the trial court correctly found that petitioner failed to prove
with certainty that the alleged personality disorder of respondent was incurable as may be
gleaned from Psychologist Cristina Gates testimony.
 PARAS v. PARAS.

G.R. No. 147824 August 2, 2007

FACTS: On May 21, 1964, petitioner Rosa Yap married respondent Justo J. Paras in
Bindoy, Negros Oriental. They begot four (4)children, namely: Raoul (deceased), Cindy Rose
(deceased), Dahlia, and Reuel. Twenty-nine years thereafter, or on May 27, 1993, Rosa filed
with the Regional Trial Court a complaint for annulment of her marriage with Justo,under Article
36 of the Family Code, docketed as Civil Case No. 10613. She was then a student of San Carlos
University, Cebu City. He courted her, frequently spending time at her "Botica." Eventually, in
1964, convinced that he loved her, she agreed to marry him. Their wedding was considered one
of the "most celebrated" marriages in Bindoy. Sometime in 1975, their daughter Cindy Rose was
afflicted with leukemia. It was her family who paid for her medication. Also in 1984, their son
Raoul was electrocuted while Justo was in their rest house with his "barkadas." He did not heed
her earlier advice to bring Raoul in the rest house as the latter has the habit of climbing the
rooftop. To cope with the death of the children, the entire family went to the United States.
However, after three months, Justo abandoned them and left for the Philippines. Upon her return
to the Philippines, she was shocked to find her "Botica" and other businesses heavy in debt and
he disposed without her consent a conjugal piece of land. At other times, he permitted the
municipal government to take gasoline from their gas station free of charge. His act of
maintaining a mistress and siring an illegitimate child was the last straw that prompted her to file
the present case. She found that after leaving their conjugal house in 1988, Justo lived with
Jocelyn Ching. Their cohabitation resulted in the birth of a baby girl, Cyndee Rose, obviously
named after her (Rosa) and Justos deceased daughter Cindy Rose Paras.

He also denied forging her signature in one mortgage transaction. He maintained that he did not
dispose of a conjugal property and that he and Rosa personally signed the renewal of a sugar
crop loan before the banks authorized employee. He did not abandon his family in the United
States. For his part, he was granted only three (3) months leave as municipal mayor of Bindoy,
thus, he immediately returned to the Philippines. He spent for his childrens education. At first,
he resented supporting them because he was just starting his law practice and besides, their
conjugal assets were more than enough to provide for their needs. He admitted though that there
were times he failed to give them financial support because of his lack of income. What caused
the inevitable family break-out was Rosas act of embarrassing him during his birthday
celebration in 1987. She did not prepare food for the guests. When confronted, she retorted that
she has nothing to do with his birthday. This convinced him of her lack of concern. This was
further aggravated when she denied his request for engine oil when his vehicle broke down in a
mountainous and NPA-infested area. As to the charge of concubine, he alleged that Jocelyn
Ching is not his mistress, but her secretary in his Law Office. She was impregnated by her
boyfriend, a certain GrelleLeccioness. Cyndee Rose Ching Leccioness is not his daughter.
After trial or on February 28, 1995, the RTC rendered a Decision upholding the validity of the
marriage. On December 8, 2000, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision in the present
case, holding that "the evidence of the plaintiff (Rosa) falls short of the standards required by law
to decree a nullity of marriage." It ruled that Justos alleged defects oridiosyncrasies "were
sufficiently explained by the evidence," Rosa contends that this Courts factual findings in A.C.
No. 5333 fordisbarment are conclusive on the present case. Consequently, the Court of Appeals
erred in rendering contrary factual findings. Also, she argues that she filed the instant complaint
sometime in May, 1993

ISSUE: Whether the totality of evidence in the case shows psychological incapacity on the
part of Justo.

HELD: A reading of the Court of Appeals Decision shows that she has no reason to feel
aggrieved. In fact, the appellate court even assumed that her charges "are true," but concluded
that they are insufficient to declare the marriage void on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Justo's alleged infidelity, failure to support his family and alleged abandonment of their family
home are true, such traits are at best indicators that he is unfit to become an ideal husband and
father. However, by themselves, these grounds are insufficient to declare the marriage void due
to an incurable psychological incapacity. These grounds, we must emphasize, do not manifest
that he was truly in cognitive of the basic marital covenants that he must assume and discharge
as a married person. While they may manifest the "gravity" of his alleged psychological
incapacity, they do not necessarily show incurability, such that while his acts violated the
covenants of marriage, they do not necessarily show that such acts show an irreparably hopeless
state of psychological incapacity which prevents him from undertaking the basic obligations of
marriage in the future.

The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts, and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological -- not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill
to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the
principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological
illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
 ZAMORA v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 141917 February 7, 2007

FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent were married on June 4, 1970 in Cebu City.
After their marriage, they lived together at No. 50-A Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City. The union did
not produce any child. In 1972, private respondent left for the United States to work as a nurse.
She returned to the Philippines for a few months, then left again in 1974. Thereafter, she made
periodic visits to Cebu City until 1989, when she was already a U.S. citizen.

Petitioner filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage anchored on the alleged
"psychological incapacity" of private respondent, as provided for under Article 36 of the Family
Code. To support his position, he alleged that his wife was "horrified" by the mere thought of
having children as evidenced by the fact that she had not borne petitioner a child. Furthermore,
he also alleged that private respondent abandoned him by living in the United States and had in
fact become an American citizen; and that throughout their marriage they lived together for not
more than three years. On the other hand, private respondent denied that she refused to have a
child. She portrayed herself as one who loves children as she is a nurse by profession and that
she would from time to time borrow her husbands niece and nephews to care for them. She also
faulted her husband for the breakup of their marriage, alleging that he had been unfaithful to her.
He allegedly had two affairs with different women, and he begot at least three children with
them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the RTCs decision
dismissing the declaration of nullity of the marriage.

HELD: NO. Under Section 2(d) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages provides that:

(d) What to allege. A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the
complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from
complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of
marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.

The rule is that the facts alleged in the petition and the evidence presented, considered in
totality, should be sufficient to convince the court of the psychological incapacity of the party
concerned. Petitioner, however, failed to substantiate his allegation that private respondent is
psychologically incapacitated. His allegations relating to her refusal to cohabit with him and to
bear a child was strongly disputed, as the records undeniably bear out. Furthermore, the acts and
behavior of private respondent that petitioner cited occurred during the marriage, and there is no
proof that the former exhibited a similar predilection even before or at the inception of the
marriage.

Thus, based on the foregoing, the Court finds no reason to disturb the findings and
conclusions reached by the trial court and the CA.
 PEREZ-FERRARIS v. FERRARIS

G.R. No. 162368 July 17, 2006

FACTS: On February 20, 2001, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 151
rendered a Decision denying the petition for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage with
Brix Ferraris. It held that epilepsy does not constitute as psychological incapacity under Article
36 of the Civil Code and that the evidence on record were insufficient to prove infidelity.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the judgment of the
trial court. It held that the evidence on record did not convincingly establish that respondent was
suffering from psychological incapacity or that his "defects" were incurable and already present
at the inception of the marriage.The Court of Appeals also found that Dr. Dayan's testimony
failed to establish the substance of respondent's psychological incapacity; that she failed to
explain how she arrived at the conclusion that the respondent has a mixed personality disorder;
that she failed to clearly demonstrate that there was a natal or supervening disabling factor or an
adverse integral element in respondent's character that effectively incapacitated him from
accepting and complying with the essential marital obligations.

ISSUE: Whether or not psychological incapacity exists.

HELD: NO. As aptly held by the Court of Appeals:

Simply put, the chief and basic consideration in the resolution of marital annulment cases is the
presence of evidence that can adequately establish respondent's psychological condition. Here,
appellant contends that there is such evidence. We do not agree. Indeed, the evidence on record
did not convincingly establish that respondent was suffering from psychological incapacity.
There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present at the inception of the
marriage, or that those are incurable.

At any rate, Dr. Dayan did not explain how she arrived at her diagnosis that respondent has a
mixed personality disorder called "schizoid," and why he is the "dependent and avoidant type."

The Court finds respondent's alleged mixed personality disorder, the "leaving-the-house"
attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual
infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend more time with his
band mates than his family, are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a
mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
 ANTONIO v. REYES

G.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006

FACTS: Petitioner Leonilo and respondent Marie met in August 1989 when petitioner was
26 years old and respondent was 36 years of age. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got
married before a minister of the Gospel at the Manila City Hall, and through a subsequent church
weddingat the Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila on 6 December 1990.
Out of their union, a child was born on 19 April 1991, who sadly died five (5) months later.

Petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent declared null and void under
Article 36 of the Family Code. He asserted that respondents incapacity existed at the time their
marriage was celebrated and still subsists up to present. Petitioner claims that respondent
persistently lied about herself as she concealed about her illegitimate child as the adopted child
of her family. Moreover, respondent also lied about the people around her, her occupation,
income, educational attainment and other events or things.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner can impose Article 36 of the Family Code as basis for
declaring their marriage null and void.

HELD: Yes. In Republic vs. CA, the Court laid down standards for the declaration of a
nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. In this case the Court finds that it
sufficiently satisfied the Molina Guideline. First, Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden
in proving the psychological incapacity of his spouse. Apart from his own testimony, he
presented witnesses who corroborated his allegations. Second, the root cause of respondents
psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint,
sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the trial courts decision. Third,
respondents psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time of and
even before the celebration of marriage. She fabricated friends and made up letters from
fictitious characters well before she married petitioner. Fourth, the gravity of respondents
psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to assume the essential obligations
of marriage. Whatever such circumstance speaks of the degree of tolerance of petitioner, it
likewise supports the belief that respondents psychological incapacity, as borne by the record,
was so grave in extent that any prolonged marital life was dubitable. Fifth, Respondent is
evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations as embraced by Articles 68 to
71 of the Family Code. As noted by the trial court, it is difficult to see how an inveterate
pathological liar would be able to commit to the basic tenets of relationship between spouses
based on love, trust and respect. Sixth, the marriage of the parties was annulled by the Catholic
Church. Seventh, the totality of evidence presented by the petitioner shows that respondents
psychological incapacity is incurable.

Thus, the Court concluded that petitioner has established his cause of action for
declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC correctly ruled, and the
Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court.
 CARATING-SIAYNGCO vs. SIAYNGCO

G.R. No. 158896 October 27, 2004

FACTS: On 25 September 1997, or after twenty-four (24) years of married life together,
respondent Manuel filed for the declaration of its nullity on the ground of psychological
incapacity of petitioner Juanita. He alleged that all throughout their marriage, his wife exhibited
an over domineering and selfish attitude towards him which was exacerbated by her extremely
volatile and bellicose nature; that she incessantly complained about almost everything and
anyone connected with him like his elderly parents, the staff in his office and anything not of her
liking like the physical arrangement, tables, chairs, wastebaskets in his office and with other
trivial matters; that she showed no respect or regard at all for the prestige and high position of his
office as judge of the Municipal Trial Court; that she would yell and scream at him and throw
objects around the house within the hearing of their neighbors; that she cared even less about his
professional advancement as she did not even give him moral support and encouragement; that
her psychological incapacity arose before marriage, rooted in her deep-seated resentment and
vindictiveness for what she perceived as lack of love and appreciation from her own parents
since childhood and that such incapacity is permanent and incurable and, even if treatment could
be attempted, it will involve time and expense beyond the emotional and physical capacity of the
parties; and that he endured and suffered through his turbulent and loveless marriage to her for
twenty-two (22) years.

The Regional Trial Court issued it resolution denying Manuels petition for declaration of nullity
of his marriage. However, the Court of Appeals reversed its decision relying on Dr. Garcias
psychiatric evaluation that finding both petitioner and respondent are psychologically
incapacitated.

ISSUE: Whether or not psychologically incapacity exist.

HELD: No, the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in holding that respondent
Manuel is psychologically incapacitated. The psychological report of Dr. Garcia, which is
respondent Manuels own evidence, contains candid admissions of petitioner Juanita, the person
in the best position to gauge whether or not her husband fulfilled the essential marital obligations
of marriage. What emerges from the psychological report of Dr. Garcia as well as from the
testimonies of the parties and their witnesses is that the only essential marital obligation which
respondent Manuel was not able to fulfill, if any, is the obligation of fidelity.49 Sexual infidelity,
per se, however, does not constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the
Family Code. On the other hand, respondent Manuel failed to prove that his wifes lack of
respect for him, her jealousies and obsession with cleanliness, her outbursts and her controlling
nature (especially with respect to his salary), and her inability to endear herself to his parents are
grave psychological maladies that paralyze her from complying with the essential obligations of
marriage. Neither is there any showing that these "defects" were already present at the inception
of the marriage or that they are incurable.
 VILLALON v. VILLALON

G.R. No. 167206 November 18, 2005

FACTS: Petitioner Jaime F. Villalon filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage to
respondent Ma. Corazon N. Villalon before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City as he claimed
that he is psychologically incapacitated. According to petitioner, the manifestations of his
psychological incapacity were: (a) his chronic refusal to maintain harmonious family relations
and his lack of interest in having a normal married life; (b) his immaturity and irresponsibility in
refusing to accept the essential obligations of marriage as husband to his wife; (c) his desire for
other women and a life unchained from any spousal obligation; and (d) his false assumption of
the fundamental obligations of companionship and consortium towards respondent.

Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad Dayan, a clinical psychologist, to testify on his alleged
psychological disorder of "Narcissistic Histrionic Personality Disorder" with "Casanova
Complex". Dr. Dayan described the said disorder as "a pervasive maladaptation in terms of
interpersonal and occupational functioning" with main symptoms of "grand ideation about
oneself, self-centeredness, thinking he is unique and wanting to always be the one followed, the I
personality."

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is psychologically incapacitated under Article 36 of the

Family Code.

HELD: NO, the totality of the evidence in this case does not support a finding that
petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations. On the contrary, what
is evident is the fact that petitioner was a good husband to respondent for a substantial period of
time prior to their separation, a loving father to their children and a good provider of the family.
Although he engaged in marital infidelity in at least two occasions, the same does not appear to
be symptomatic of a grave psychological disorder which rendered him incapable of performing
his spousal obligations. The same appears as the result of a general dissatisfaction with his
marriage rather than a psychological disorder rooted in petitioners personal history.

In the case at bar, although Dr. Dayan testified that petitioner suffered from Narcissistic
Histrionic Personality Disorder with Casanova Complex even before the marriage and thus had
the tendency to cheat on his wife, such conclusion was not sufficiently backed by concrete
evidence showing that petitioner indeed had several affairs and finds it difficult to be faithful.
Moreover, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that petitioner failed to establish the
incurability and gravity of his alleged psychological disorder. it appears that petitioner has
simply lost his love for respondent and has consequently refused to stay married to her.
 BUENAVENTURA v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 127358 March 31, 2005

FACTS: Petitioner Noel filed for a petition of the declaration of nullity of marriage, on the
ground of the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife, Isabel Singh Buenaventura, herein
respondent. Thereafter, petitioner amended his petition by stating that both he and his wife were
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.

On July 31, 1995, the Regional Trial Court promulgated a decision declaring the
marriage between petitioner Noel and respondent Isabel null and void ab initio.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is psychological incapacity under Art. 36 of the Family
Code.

HELD: Yes. As articulated by the Court of Appeals, the lower court found that plaintiff-
appellant deceived the defendant-appellee into marrying him by professing true love instead of
revealing to her that he was under heavy parental pressure to marry and that because of pride he
married defendant-appellee; that he was not ready to enter into marriage as in fact his career was
and always would be his first priority; that he was unable to relate not only to defendant-appellee
as a husband but also to his son, Javy, as a father; that he had no inclination to make the
marriage work such that in times of trouble, he chose the easiest way out, that of leaving
defendantappellee and their son; that he had no desire to keep defendant-appellee and their son
as proved by his reluctance and later, refusal to reconcile after their separation; that the
aforementioned caused defendant-appellee to suffer mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched
reputation, sleepless nights not only in those years the parties were together but also after and
throughout their separation.

The Court of Appeals and the trial court considered the acts of the petitioner after the
marriage as proof of his psychological incapacity, and therefore a product of his incapacity or
inability to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
 DEDEL v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 151867 January 29, 2004

FACTS: Petitioner David met respondent Sharon L. Corpuz Dedel while he was working
in the advertising business of his father. Subsequently, they got married and begot four children.
However, on April 1, 1997 petitioner filed a petition seeking for the declaration of of nullity of
his marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity as defined in Article 36 of the Family
Code.

Petitioner present Dr. Dayan which declared that Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social
Personality Disorder exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity; that she committed several
indiscretions and had no capacity for remorse, even bringing with her the two children of
Mustafa Ibrahim to live with petitioner. Such immaturity and irresponsibility in handling the
marriage like her repeated acts of infidelity and abandonment of her family are indications of
Anti-Social Personality Disorder amounting to psychological incapacity to perform the essential
obligations of marriage.

After trial, judgment was rendered declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null
and void.

ISSUE: Whether or not the totality of the evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated.

HELD: No. In this case, respondents sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that she could not have known the obligations she
was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given a valid assumption thereof. It appears that
respondents promiscuity did not exist prior to or at the inception of the marriage. What is, in
fact, disclosed by the records is a blissful marital union at its celebration, later affirmed in church
rites, and which produced four children.

Respondents sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves

constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could
her emotional immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity. It must
be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make respondent
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due to
her youth, immaturity or sexual promiscuity.
 REPUBLIC vs. DAGDAG

G.R. No. 109975 February 9, 2001

FACTS: Respondent Erlinda Matias Dagdag and Avelino Parangan Dagdag were married
on September 7 1975 at the Iglesia Filipina Independent Church in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. A
week after the wedding, Avelino started leaving his family without explanation. He would
disappear for months, suddenly reappear for a few months, then disappear again. During the
times when he was with his family, he indulged in drinking sprees with friends and would return
home drunk. He would force his wife to submit to sexual intercourse and if she refused, he
would inflict physical injuries on her.

On July 3, 1990, Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City a petition for
judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code. She presented her sister-in-law, Virginia Dagdag, who testified
that Erlinda and Avelino always quarrelled, and that Avelino never stayed for long at the
couple's house. She knew that Avelino had been gone for a long time now, and that she pitied
Erlinda and the children.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly declared the
marriage as null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code.

HELD: No. In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,19 the Court laid down the
following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code.

Taking into consideration these guidelines, it is evident that Erlinda failed to comply with
with guideline No. 2 which requires that the root cause of psychological incapacity must be
medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or
medical doctor testified as to the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband. Further, the
allegation that the husband is a fugitive from justice was not sufficiently proven. In fact, the
crime for which he was arrested was not even alleged. The investigating prosecutor was likewise
not given an opportunity to present controverting evidence since the trial court's decision was
prematurely rendered.
 PESCA v. PESCA

G.R. No. 136921 April 17, 2001

FACTS: Sometime in 1975, Petitioner Lorna G. Pesca and respondent Zosimo A. Pesca
met on board an inter-island vessel bound for Bacolod City. After a whirlwind courtship, they
got married. However, in 1988, petitioner said that she noticed that respondent surprisingly
showed signs of "psychological incapacity" to perform his marital covenant. His "true color" of
being an emotionally immature and irresponsible husband became apparent. He was cruel and
violent. He was a habitual drinker, staying with friends daily from 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon
until 1:00 o'clock in the morning. When cautioned to stop or, to at least, minimize his drinking,
respondent would beat, slap and kick her. At one time, he chased petitioner with a loaded
shotgun and threatened to kill her in the presence of the children. The children themselves were
not spared from physical violence. Subsequently, petitioner sued respondent before the Regional
Trial Court for the declaration of nullity of their marriage invoking psychological incapacity.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the decision of the trial
court declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent valid and subsisting.

HELD: No. At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the
complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part of
respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of the contract, so as to warrant a declaration
of nullity of the marriage. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be
equated with psychological incapacity.

The Court reiterates its reminder that marriage is an inviolable social institution and the
foundation of the family6 that the State cherishes and protects. While the Court commiserates
with petitioner in her unhappy marital relationship with respondent, totally terminating that
relationship, however, may not necessarily be the fitting denouement to it. In these cases, the law
has not quite given up, neither should we.
 BOLOS v. BOLOS

G.R. No. 186400 October 20, 2010

FACTS: On July 10, 2003, petitioner Cynthia Bolos (Cynthia) filed a petition for the
declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under Article 36 of
the Family Code, docketed as JDRC No. 6211.

After trial on the merits, the RTC granted the petition for annulment in a Decision, dated August
2, 2006. A copy of said decision was received by Danilo on August 25, 2006. He timely filed the
Notice of Appeal on September 11, 2006.

In an order dated September 19, 2006, the RTC denied due course to the appeal for
Danilos failure to file the required motion for reconsideration or new trial, in violation of
Section 20 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages.

On January 16, 2007, the RTC issued the order declaring its August 2, 2006 decision final and
executory and granting the Motion for Entry of Judgment filed by Cynthia.Not in conformity,
Danilo filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul the orders of the
RTC

As earlier stated, the CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the assailed orders of the
RTC. The appellate court stated that the requirement of a motion for reconsideration as a
prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did not apply in this case as the marriage
between Cynthia and Danilo was solemnized on February 14, 1980 before the Family Code took
effect. It relied on the ruling of this Court in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli3 to the effect that
the "coverage [of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC] extends only to those marriages entered into during
the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988."

ISSUE: Whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC entitled "Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages," is applicable to the case at
bench.

HELD: Her stance is unavailing. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which
the Court promulgated on March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope. Section 1 of the Rule, in fact,
reads:

Section 1. Scope This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.

The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage
extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which
took effect on August 3, 1988.The rule sets a demarcation line between marriages covered by the
Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code.
The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to petitioners interpretation that the phrase "under the
Family Code" in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word "petitions" rather than to the word
"marriages."

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

 GROUNDS FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE

MALLION v. ALCANTARA

G.R. No. 141528 October 31, 2006.

FACTS: On October 24, 1995, petitioner Oscar Mallion filed with the regional trial court
seeking a declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent Editha Alcantara on the ground of
psychological incapacity.

The trial court denied the petition. Likewise, it was dismissed in the Court of Appeals.

After such decision, petitioner filed another petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with
the regional trial court alleging that his marriage with respondent was null and void due to the
fact that it was celebrated without a valid marriage license.

Respondent filed an answer with motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata and forum
shopping.
The trial court grated her petition.

ISSUE: Is the action of the husband tenable?

HELD: No. Section 47(b) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court pertains as bar by prior
judgment or estoppels by verdict, which is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution
of the second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action. In Section 47(c) of the
same rule, it pertains to res judicata in its concept as conclusiveness of judgment or the rule of
auter action pendant which ordains that issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit
cannot again be raised in any future case between the same parties involving a different cause of
action. Therefore, having expressly and impliedly concealed the validity of their marriage
celebration, petitioner is now deemed to have waived any defects therein. The Court finds then
that the present action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of lack of marriage
license is barred. The petition is denied for lack of merit.
 PROPER ACTION AND PROCEDURE

LEONOR vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R No. 112597 April 2, 1996

FACTS: The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari assailing the validity of the judgment
of the lower court. It was shown that she was married to the private respondent and they had
three kids. While her husband was studying and working abroad, he cohabited with another
woman. This prompted her to file for separation and alimony against her husband. Her husband
in return filed a divorce case against her in Swiss Courts, contending that their marriage was void
for absence of valid marriage certificate. The Swiss Court held infavour of the private
respondent. Subsequently the Private Respondent filed a petition for the cancellation of the
marriage certificate in the Philippines. The trial court granted his petition and denied Petitioners
appeal. The Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari in the CA, but the latter denied the
same. She filed this petition with the Supreme Court to assail the validity of CAs decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in declaring the marriage null and void?

HELD: Yes. Rule 108 as the basis of the private respondents contention is untenable.
The Court explained that the Rule only applies to cases concerning typographical or other
clerical errors in the marriage contract. It does not apply to cases where the status of the parties
and their children shall be affected. The Supreme Court held in favour of the petitioner
contending that A void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all.
 ERIC U. YU, vs. REYES-CARPIO

G.R. No. 189207 June 15, 2011

FACTS: Eric Yu filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against Caroline T.
Yu with the RTC of Pasig. Judge Suarez on May 30, 2006 issued an order stating that Erics
partial offer of evidence dated April 18, 2006 would be submitted for resolution after certain
exhibits have been remarked. But the exhibits were only relative to the issue of the nullity of the
marriage of Eric and Caroline. On September 12, 2006, Caroline moved to submit the case for
resolution, considering that the incidents on custody, support, and property relations (incidental
issues) were mere consequences of the declaration of nullity of the parties marriage.

Eric opposed this motion saying that the incident on declaration of nullity cannot be resolved
without presentation of evidence for the incidents on custody, support, and property relations.
Eric added that the incidental issues and the issue on declaration of nullity can both proceed and
be simultaneously resolved. RTC ruled in favour of Erics opposition.

Caroline caused the inhibition of Judge Suarez, so that the case was re-raffled to another branch
presided by Judge Reyes-Carpio. While the case was being tried by Judge Reyes-Carpio,
Caroline filed an Omnibus Motion seeking the strict observation by the said judge of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriage as codified in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, and that
the case on the declaration on nullity be already submitted for resolution ahead of the incidental
issues, and not simultaneously. Eric opposed this motion.

Judge Reyes-Carpio granted the Omnibus Motion, saying that the main cause of action is the
declaration of nullity of the marriage and the incidental issues are merely ancillary incidents
thereto. Eric moved for reconsideration, which was denied by Judge Reyes-Carpio. Eric then
filed for certiorari with the CA under Rule 65. CA affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether the main issue of nullity of marriage must be submitted for resolution
first before the reception of evidence on custody, support, and property relations (incidental
issues)

HELD: It appears in the records that the Orders in question, or what are alleged to have
been exercised with grave abuse of discretion, are interlocutory orders. An interlocutory order is
one which does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the Courts task of adjudicating
the parties contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but
obviously indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court. Eric Yu to prove that the
assailed orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion and that those were patently
erroneous. Considering that the requisites that would justify certiorari as an appropriate remedy
to assail an interlocutory order have not been complied with, the proper recourse for petitioner
should have been an appeal in due course of the judgment of the trial court on the merits,
incorporating the grounds for assailing the interlocutory orders.
It must be noted that Judge Reyes-Carpio did not disallow the presentation of evidence on the
incidents on custody, support, and property relations. It is clear in the assailed orders that the trial
court judge merely deferred the reception of evidence relating to custody, support, and property
relations. And the trial judges decision was not without basis. Judge Reyes-Carpio finds support
in the Court En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. Particularly, Secs.
19 and 21 of the Rule clearly allow the reception of evidence on custody, support, and property
relations after the trial court renders a decision granting the petition, or upon entry of judgment
granting the petition:

Section 19. Decision. (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare
therein that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the court
only after compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the
Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.

Section 21. Liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, support of common children and
delivery of their presumptive legitimes. Upon entry of the judgment granting the petition, or, in
case of appeal, upon receipt of the entry of judgment of the appellate court granting the petition,
the Family Court, on motion of either party, shall proceed with the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, including custody, support of common children and
delivery of their presumptive legitimes pursuant to Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code unless
such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.

Evidently, Judge Reyes-Carpio did not deny the reception of evidence on custody, support, and
property relations but merely deferred it, based on the existing rules issued by this Court, to a
time when a decision granting the petition is already at hand and before a final decree is issued.
Conversely, the trial court, or more particularly the family court, shall proceed with the
liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, support of common children, and delivery of their
presumptive legitimes upon entry of judgment granting the petition. And following the pertinent
provisions of the Court En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, this act is undoubtedly
consistent with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code, contrary to what petitioner asserts.
Particularly, Arts. 50 and 51 of the Family Code state:

Article 50. The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children,
and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in the
previous judicial proceedings.

Article 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children,
computed as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash,
property or sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had
already provided for such matters.

Also, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC clearly allows the deferment of the reception of evidence on
custody, support, and property relations. Conversely, the trial court may receive evidence on the
subject incidents after a judgment granting the petition but before the decree of nullity or
annulment of marriage is issued. And this is what Judge Reyes-Carpio sought to comply with in
issuing the assailed orders. As correctly pointed out by the CA, Eric Yus assertion that ruling
the main issue without receiving evidence on the subject incidents would result in an ambiguous
and fragmentary judgment is certainly speculative and, hence, contravenes the legal presumption
that a trial judge can fairly weigh and appraise the evidence submitted by the parties.

Therefore, it cannot be said at all that Judge Reyes-Carpio acted in a capricious and whimsical
manner, much less in a way that is patently gross and erroneous, when she issued the assailed
orders deferring the reception of evidence on custody, support, and property relations. To
reiterate, this decision is left to the trial courts wisdom and legal soundness. Consequently,
therefore, the CA cannot likewise be said to have committed grave abuse of discretion in
upholding the Orders of Judge Reyes-Carpio and in ultimately finding an absence of grave abuse
of discretion on her part.
 YU v. YU-LIM

GR No. 200072 June 20, 2016

FACTS: Philip Yu and Viveca Lim Yu were married on 1984. However, in 1993, Viveca
left their home together with their children and filed a Petition for Legal Separation against her
husband for repeated physical violence, grossly abusive conduct, sexual infidelity, and attempt
on her life. Philip denied the accusations and prayed in his Counterclaim for the declaration of
nullity of their marriage.

However, in 2007, Philip moved for the dismissal of his counterclaim for nullity of
marriage in the Legal Separation case and was granted by the Pasig RTC. The same court, in
2009, rendered a decision dismissing the Petition for Legal Separation on the ground that the
same became moot, with the decision of the RTC of Balayan, Batangas declaring the nullity of
the parties marriage.

Viveca was unaware of the proceedings before the Batangas RTC. Thus, she filed before
the CA, a Petition for Annulment of Judgment of the said RTCs decision. According to Viveca,
jurisdiction over her person did not properly vest since she was not duly served with Summons.
She alleged that she was deprived of her right to due process when Philip fraudulently declared
that her address was still at their conjugal home, when he clearly knew that she was in the USA.

Philip contends that Viveca was duly served summons by publication and by sending a
copy of the summons to the defendants last known address.

CA granted Vivecas petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Batangas RTC validly acquired jurisdiction when Summons
was duly served to the respondent by publication

HELD: Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought
against him. Through its service, the court acquires jurisdiction over his person. Under Section
15 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, a defendant who is a non-resident and is not found in the
country may be served with summons by extraterritorial service when the action affects the
personal status of the plaintiff. In such case, extraterritorial service of summons may be effected
under any of three modes: (1) by personal service out of the country, with leave of court; (2) by
publication and sending a copy of the summons and order of the court by registered mail to the
defendant's last known address, also with leave of court; or (3) by any other means the judge
may consider sufficient.

It is undisputed that when Philip filed the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage,
an action which affects his personal status, Viveca was already residing in the United States of
America. Thus, extraterritorial service of summons is the proper mode by which summons may
be served. Philips contention that the second mode of extraterritorial service of summons
mentioned above was sufficiently complied with, cannot be deemed compliant with the
requirements of the rules and is even tantamount to deception warranting the annulment of the
Batangas court's judgment.

Philip cannot be allowed to feign ignorance to the fact that Viveca had already intentionally
abandoned their conjugal abode and that of all the addresses that Viveca resided at, their
conjugal home is her least recent address. In fact, it may very well be considered as the address
she is least likely to be found considering the circumstances in which she left the same. There is,
therefore, no reason for Philip to assume, in good faith, that said address is in fact Viveca's "last
known address. As a result, Viveca never had knowledge Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
suit, only finding out when the Pasig City RTC had promulgated its decision on the Legal
Separation case. Because of the service of summons at the erroneous address, Viveca was
effectively prevented from participating in the proceedings.

The SC deems as proper the annulment of the Batangas court's judgment issued without proper
service of summons.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
 PARTIES

JULIAJVO v. REPUBLIC

G.R. No. 169766 March 30, 2011

FACTS: About 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamanao married Estrellita twice
initially under the Islamic laws and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City and,
subsequently, under a civil ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on
June 2, 1993. In their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamano s civil status was indicated as divorced.
Since then, Estrellita has been representing herself to the whole world as Sen. Tamanos wife,
and upon his death, his widow.

On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and her
son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen.
Tamanos legitimate children with Zorayda, filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for
the declaration of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous.
The complaint alleged that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and
that this marriage remained subsisting when he married Estrellita in 1993.

ISSUE: Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was bigamous.

HELD: Yes. The civil code governs the marriage of Zorayda and late Sen. Tamano; their
marriage was never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamano subsequent marriage to Estrellita is
void ab initio.

The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958, solemnized
under civil and Muslim rites. The only law in force governing marriage relationships between
Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only
one marriage can exist at any given time. Under the marriage provisions of the Civil Code,
divorce is not recognized except during the effectivity of Republic Act No. 394 which was not
availed of during its effectivity.

As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano s prior marriage to Zorayda has been severed by
way of divorce under PD 1083, the law that codified Muslim personal laws. However, PD 1083
cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law applies to marriage
and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and
the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the
Philippines. But Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were
married both in civil and Muslim rites.
 ENRICO vs. HEIRS OF MEDINACELI

G.R. No. 173614 September 28, 2007

FACTS: Spouses Uelogio Medinaceli and Trinidad Catli-medicani were married on June
14 1962. They had seven children, herein respondents. Trinidad died on may 1 2004 and on
august 26 2004, Eulogio marries petitioner Lolita Enrico on february 10 2005. respondent filed
an action for declaration of nullity of marriage between Eulogio and Lolita on two grounds: that
the marriage was entered into without the requisite marriage license and; lack of a marriage
ceremony due to Eulogio's illness.

Enrico contended that she has been living with Eulogio for 21 years hence exempt from getting a
marriage license under Art. 34 of the Family Code. More importantly, she sought the dismissal
of his action on the ground that it is only the contracting parties while living who can file an
action for the declaration of nullity of marriage pursuant to AM 02- 11-10 SC which provides in
sec. 2 (a) that the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of a void marriage may be filled
solely by the husband or the wife. The heirs invoked the ruling in the case of Ninal vs. Bayadog.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between Eulogio and Enrico is exempt from securing
marriage license.

HELD: Petition is dismissed. Under Art. 34 of the family code, a man and a woman who
have been living together for at least five years without any legal impediments are exempt from
securing a marriage license. The said exemption cannot possibly apply because the second
marriage contracted by Eulogio with Enrico took place barely 3 months after Trinidad dies.
Moreover, the respondent heirs have no standing to assail the validity of the second marriage
even after te death of their father, Eulogio.

While it is true that Ninal vs. Bayadog allowed the heirs therein to file a petition for the
declaration of nullity of the Father's 2nd marriage after the death, the court held that the same
rule cannot be applied for the reason that the impugned marriage therein was solemnized prior to
the effectivity of the family code.Nonetheless, the heirs are not left without remedy. They can
still protect their successional rights as compulsory or intestate heirs of Eulogio by questioning
the validity of his second marriage with Enrico, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity, but
in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate deceased father filed in the regular courts.
 NIAL V. BAYADOG

G.R. No. 133778 March14, 2000

FACTS: Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of
their marriage were born herein petitioners. Pepito resulting to her death on April 24, 1985 shot
Teodulfa. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 24, 1986, Pepito and respondent
Norma Bayadog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma
executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband
and wife for at least 5 years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license.

After Pepitos death on February 19, 1997, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage
license.

ISSUE: What nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code
(now Article 34 of the Family Code) to warrant the counting of the 5-year period in order to
exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage license.

HELD: The 5-year common law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date
of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of
the marriage. This 5- year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage
and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity-meaning no third party was
involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity is unbroken.

Any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and
void, subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved
or annulled.

In this case, at the time Pepito and respondents marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived
with each other as husband and wife for at least 5 years prior to their wedding day. From the time
Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about 20
months had elapsed. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with
respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been
separated in fact from his lawful spouse.

The subsistence of the marriage even where there is was actual severance of the filial
companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any
third party as being one as husband and wife.

Having determined that the second marriage involve in this case is not covered by the exception
to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such
element.
 CARLOS v. SANDOVAL

G.R. No. 179922 December 16, 2008

FACTS: Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos were brothers who each have
three parcels of land by virtue of inheritance. Later Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by
respondents Felicidad Sandoval and their son, Teofilo Carlos II. Upon Teofilos death, two
parcels of land were registered in the name of Felicidad and Teofilo II. In August 1995, Carlos
commenced an action against respondents before the court a quo. In his complaint, Carlos
asserted that the marriage between his late brother and Felicidad was a nullity in view of the
absence of the required marriage license. He likewise maintained that his deceased brother was
neither the natural nor the adoptive father of Teofilo Carlos II. He argued that the properties
covered by such certificates of title, including the sums received by respondents as proceeds,
should be reconveyed to him.

ISSUE: Whether or not both parties should file for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages

HELD: The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be proved.
Neither judgment on the pleadings nor summary judgment is allowed. So is confession of
judgment disallowed. Carlos argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35 of the Rules of
Court governing summary judgment, instead of the rule on judgment on the pleadings. Petitioner
is misguided. Whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment, the CA
was correct in reversing the summary judgment rendered by the trial court. Both the rules on
judgment on the pleadings and summary judgments have no place in cases of declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage and even in annulment of marriage

A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband
or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the effectivity of A.M. No.
02- 11-10- SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code. Under the
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed by any
party outside of the marriage. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may
be filed solely by the husband or the wife. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a
petition for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The
Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or
intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and, hence, can
only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.
 ABLAZA vs. REPUBLIC

G.R. No. 158298 August 11, 2010

FACTS: On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Cataingan, Masbate a petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage
contracted on December 26, 1949 between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila
Honato.

The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been
celebrated without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9, 1950,
thereby rendering the marriage void ab initio for having been solemnized without a marriage
license. He insisted that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any
issue entitled him to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death,
thereby making him a real party in interest; and that any person, himself included, could impugn
the validity of the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of
Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void ab initio.

ISSUE: Whether a person may bring an action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of
the marriage of his deceased brother

HELD: Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted
on December 26, 1949, the applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of
the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage
as having the right to initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner.

Pursuant to the provisions of the old Civil Code, the presence of descendants, ascendants, or
illegitimate children of the deceased excludes collateral relatives like the petitioner from
succeeding to the deceased's estate. Necessarily, therefore, the right of the petitioner to bring the
action hinges upon a prior determination of whether Cresenciano had any descendants,
ascendants, or children (legitimate or illegitimate), and of whether the petitioner was the late
Cresenciano's surviving heir. The petition is returned to the RTC for further proceedings of the
case.
 MINORU FUJIKI v. MARINAY

G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013

FACTS: Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent
Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines on 23 January 2004. The marriage did
not sit well with petitioners parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he
resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.

In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first
marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City,
Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical
abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.

Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In
2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. On 14 January 2011,
Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree
of Absolute Nullity of Marriage).

The decision of the lower courts (RTC): dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition
of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper venue and
the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.

ISSUE: Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign
citizen on the ground of bigamy.

HELD: Yes, the recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Rule 108,
Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may
file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the
Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis
supplied)

There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the
integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it.
 APPEARANCE OF THE STATE

MAQUILAN v. MAQUILAN

G.R. No. 155409 June 8, 2007

FACTS: Herein petitioner and herein private respondent are spouses who once had a
blissful married life and out of which were blessed to have a son. However, their once sugar
coated romance turned bitter when petitioner discovered that private respondent was having
illicit sexual affair with her paramour, which thus, prompted the petitioner to file a case of
adultery against private respondent and the latters paramour. Consequently, both the private
respondent and her paramour were convicted of the crime charged and were sentenced to suffer
an imprisonment ranging from one(1) year, eight (8) months, minimum of prision correccional as
minimum penalty, to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty one (21) days, medium of prision
correccional as maximum penalty.

Thereafter, private respondent, through counsel, filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage, Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Damages on June
15, 2001 with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3 of Nabunturan, Compostela Valley, docketed
as Civil Case No. 656, imputing psychological incapacity on the part of the petitioner.

During the pre-trial of the said case, petitioner and private respondent entered into a Compromise
Agreement. The said Compromise Agreement was given judicial imprimatur by the respondent
judge in the assailed Judgment On Compromise Agreement, which was erroneously dated
January 2, 2002.

ISSUE: Whether the partial voluntary separation of property made by the spouses pending
the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is valid.

HELD: A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be

recorded in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the
instance of any interested person, with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and
without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is
disputed. Where a subsequent marriage is terminated because of the reappearance of an absent
spouse; while Article 63 applies to the effects of a decree of legal separation. The present case
involves a proceeding where the nullity of the marriage is sought to be declared under the ground
of psychological capacity.

Article 2035 of the Civil Code is also clearly inapplicable. The Compromise Agreement partially
divided the properties of the conjugal partnership of gains between the parties and does not deal
with the validity of a marriage or legal separation. It is not among those that are expressly
prohibited by Article 2035. Moreover, the contention that the Compromise Agreement is
tantamount to a circumvention of the law prohibiting the guilty spouse from sharing in the
conjugal properties is misplaced. Existing law and jurisprudence do not impose such
disqualification.

Under Article 143 of the Family Code, separation of property may be effected voluntarily or for
sufficient cause, subject to judicial approval. The questioned Compromise Agreement which was
judicially approved is exactly such a separation of property allowed under the law. This
conclusion holds true even if the proceedings for the declaration of nullity of marriage was still
pending. However, the Court must stress that this voluntary separation of property is subject to
the rights of all creditors of the conjugal partnership of gains and other persons with pecuniary
interest pursuant to Article 136 of the Family.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CUISON-MELGAR

G.R. No. 139676 March 31, 2006

FACTS: On March 27, 1965, Norma and Eulogio were married before the Catholic Church
in Dagupan City. Their union begot five children. On August 19,1996, Norma filed for
declaration of nullity of her marriage on the ground of Eulogios psychological incapacity to
comply with his essential marital obligations. According to Norma the manifestations of
Eulogios psychological incapacity are his immaturity, habitual alcoholism, unbearable jealousy,
maltreatment, laziness, and abandonment of his family since December 27, 1985.

ISSUE: Whether or not the alleged psychological incapacity of respondent is in the nature
contemplated by Article 36.

HELD: The Supreme Court set aside and reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The marriage between Norma and Eulogio is valid. The immaturity, habitual alcoholism,
laziness, jealousy and abandonment of respondent do not constitute psychological incapacity.
The Court ruled that it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and
duty as a married person; it is essential that he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing so
because of some psychological, not physical, illness. In other words, proof of a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person an adverse integral element in the personality
structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying
with the obligations essential to marriage had to be shown. A cause has to be shown and linked
with the manifestations of the psychological incapacity.
 MALCAMPO-SIN v. SIN

G.R. No. 137590 March 26, 2001

FACTS: On January 4, 1987, Florence and respondent Philipp Sin, a Portuguese citizen,
were married at St. Jude Catholic Parish in San Miguel, Manila. On September 20, 1994,
Florence filed with the RTC, Pasig City, a complaint for declaration of nullity of Marriage
against Philipp. Trial ensued and the parties presented their respective evidences.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in not ordering a prosecuting attorney or fiscal on
behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.

HELD: Article 48 of the Family Code states that in all cases of annulment or declaration
of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned
to it to appear on behalf of the state to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to
take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. The trial court should have ordered the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification briefly stating
his reasons for his agreement or opposition as the case may be, to the petition. The records are
bereft of an evidence that the State participated in the prosecution of the case thus, the case is
remanded for proper trial.

The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals.
 TUASON vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 116607 April 10, 1996

FACTS: Maria Victoria Lopez and Emilio Tuason were married on June 3,1972. Lopez
alleged that at the time of the marriage. Emilio was already psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations that became manifested afterwards. The same
resulted in violent fights. Emilio was also said to be using prohibited drugs, he was a womanizer
and gave minimal support to the family. Likewise, he became spendthrift and abusive of his
administration of the conjugal partnership by alienating some of their assets without Victorias
consent. Attempts for reconciliation failed because Emilios refusal to reform. In the prayer of
Victoria for annulment of marriage, she further prayed for powers of administration to save the
conjugal properties from further dissipation. At variance, Emilio denied the imputation against
him. Thereafter, trial ensued and Victoria presented four witnesses including documentary
evidence consisting of newspaper articles of Emilios relationship with other women, his
apprehension for illegal possession of drugs and copies of prior church annulment decree. After
Victoria rested her case, reception for Emilios evidence was scheduled. It was postponed and on
the reset date, he failed to appear. The court then declared Emilio to have waived his right to
present evidence and deemed the case submitted for decision.

On June 29, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the nullity of Victorias
marriage to Emilio and awarded custody of the children to Ms. Lopez. Emilio filed a petition for
relief from judgment but was denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for relief from judgment is warranted under the
circumstance of the case where petitioner was declared in default due to non-appearance during
the hearing.

HELD: Rule 38, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, governs a petition for relief
from judgment. Under the rules, a final and executor judgment or order of the Regional Trial
Court may be set aside on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. In
addition, the petitioner must assert facts showing that he has a good, substantial and meritorious
defense or cause of action. If the petition is granted, the court shall proceed to hear and
determine the case as if a timely motion for new trial had been granted therein. Furthermore, the
failure of counsel to notify his client on time of an adverse judgment to enable the latter to appeal
there from is negligence that is not excusable. Similarly inexcusable is the failure of a counsel to
inform the trial court of his clients confinement and medical treatment as the reason for his non-
appearance at the scheduled hearings. Indeed, a petition for relief from judgment is an equitable
remedy, allowed only in exceptional cases where there is no other available or adequate remedy.
MARGIE MACIAS CORPUS vs. JUDGE WILFREDO G. OCHOTORENA

A.M. No. RTJ-04-1861 July 30, 2004

FACTS: Mrs. Macias asserts before the Court that the respondent judge's actuations
constitute bias, partiality and conduct unbecoming a judge. Moreover, according to her, what is
more glaring and conclusive from the records is that the respondent is grossly ignorant of the law
and procedure. For these administrative lapses, Mrs. Macias concludes that the Court should
sanction him.

The conclusion is amply supported by the Court of Appeals' Decision which states that
the respondent judge totally disregarded Mrs. Macias' right to due process when he proceeded
with the trial on the merits of the case completely ignoring the fact that her Motion to Dismiss,
which was filed within the 30-day reglementary period, was still pending resolution.

The respondent judge disregarded the provisions of Section 1, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules
on Civil Procedure, which states that: "After the last pleading has been served and filed, it shall
be the duty of the plaintiff to promptly move ex-parte that the case be set for pre-trial."
Considering that the last pleading was Mrs. Macias' Motion to Dismiss, the respondent judge
should have first resolved the motion and then waited for Mr. Macias' motion to set the case for
pre-trial.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Wilfredo G. Ochotorena is found guilty of gross ignorance
of the law and incompetence.

HELD: Under Section 3 in relation to Section 10 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, gross
ignorance of the law is considered a serious offense, for which a penalty of either dismissal from
the service with forfeiture of benefits, suspension from office for more than three (3) months but
not exceeding six months or a fine of more than Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) but not
exceeding Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) may be imposed. With this, Judge Wilfredo G.
Ochotorena is found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and incompetence and is hereby
FINED the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) to be taken from the amount earlier
withheld from his retirement benefits. The Fiscal Management Office of the OCA is DIRECTED
to immediately release to the respondent judge the remaining balance of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00) from the aforesaid retained amount, unless there are other valid reasons for its
further retention.
 DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

PACETE vs. CARRIAGA

G.R. No. L-53880 March 17, 1994

FACTS: Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on October 1979, for the Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la
Concepcion, as well as for legal separation between her and Pacete, accounting and separation of
property. She averred in her complaint that she was married to Pacete on April 1938 and they
had a child named Consuelo; that Pacete subsequently contracted a second marriage with Clarita
de la Concepcion and that she learned of such marriage only on August 1979. Reconciliation
between her and Pacete was impossible since he evidently preferred to continue living with
Clarita.

The defendants were each served with summons. They filed an extension within which to
file an answer, which the court partly granted. Due to unwanted misunderstanding, particularly in
communication, the defendants failed to file an answer on the date set by the court. Thereafter,
the plaintiff filed a motion to declare the defendants in default, which the court forthwith
granted. The court received plaintiffs evidence during the hearings held on February 15, 20, 21,
and 22, 1980. After trial, the court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff on March 17,
1980.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioners
motion for extension of time to file their answer, in declaring petitioners in default and in
rendering its decision.

HELD: The Civil Code provides that no decree of legal separation shall be promulgated
upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of the
defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion
between parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the
State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.

The above stated provision calling for the intervention of the state attorneys in case of
uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of marriages, under Article 88) is
to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract. Article 103 of the Civil Code, now
Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that an action for legal separation must in no
case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition, obviously in
order to provide the parties a cooling- off period. In this interim, the court should take steps
toward getting the parties to reconcile.
The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further or underscored by the
inclusion of a provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court which provides that no defaults in
actions for annulments of marriage or for legal separation. Therefore, if the defendant in an
action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not collusion between the parties exists, and if
there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is
not fabricated.