Philosophical Review

Disappointment, Sadness, and Death

Author(s): Kai Draper
Source: The Philosophical Review, Vol. 108, No. 3 (Jul., 1999), pp. 387-414
Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical Review
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 Review,Vol. 108, No. 3 (July1999)
ThePhilosophical

Disappointment, Sadness, and Death

Kai Draper

Manyfindthe prospectof deathdistressing at leastpartlybecause

theybelievethatdeathdeprivesitssubjectof life'sbenefits.Prop-
erlyqualified,the beliefis surelytrue.'But shouldits truthlead
us to conclude thatthereis somethingdreadfulor awfulabout
death,somethingthatmerits distress?
A number of contemporaryphilosophersthinkso. They advance
"arguments from deprivation,"argumentsfromthe premise that
death involvesthe absence or loss of a good to some disturbing
conclusion about death. I begin this essay by exposing a mistake
that is common to many of these arguments.Then I advance my
own argumentfrom deprivation.It justifiesregarding the typical
prematuredeath as a terriblemisfortune,but provideslittlereason
to be troubled by the prospect of dyingat an advanced age. Ac-
cordingly,I proceed to explore the possibilityof developinga more
ambitious argument from deprivation.Ultimately,I arrive at the
conclusion that,withfewexceptions,death at any age is apt to be
a serious evil.2

I would like to thank Philip Clark, Paul Draper, Sean Foran, Michael
Ialacci, JeffMcMahan, Michael O'Rourke, Laurie Pieper, Charles Young,
Daniel Zelinski,and the editorsof the PhilosophicalReviewfortheirvaluable
contributionsto this essay.
11 am assuming, of course, that we are mortal, that death is not an
illusion, but rather exactlywhat it appears to be: the end of conscious
existence. (This assumptionmay be false,but everyindication I have sug-
gestsotherwise.)I am not assumingthatdeath deprivesits subject of each
and everybenefitthat he or she enjoyed while alive. Some have argued
thatone can continue to receivecertainbenefits(forexample, fame) after
death, and I want to leave open the possibilitythat theyare right.Thus,
when I claim that death deprivesits subject of life's benefits,I should be
taken to mean that death, understood as the permanentend of conscious
existence, deprives its subject of benefits (for example, enjoyment) the
receipt of which requires conscious existence.
2Perhaps I should mention that I will not consider two verycommon
Epicurean objections to argumentsfromdeprivation.One is the objection
thatbeing deprived of a good is an evil for the subject of the deprivation
only if the subject misses the good or otherwisesuffersas a resultof the
deprivation.The second is the argumentthat,since death annihilatesits
subject,afteryou die, thereis no "you" thatcan be identifiedas the victim
of a deprivationor any other evil. These objections have been adequately

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1. Death Is Bad, but So What?

A good illustration of the rather common mistake I want to expose

can be found in Fred Feldman's recent book, Confrontationswith
theReaper Feldman proposes a general formula for calculating the
value for a person S of a state of affairs P and, on the basis of that
formula, argues that death is often (though not always) a misfor-
tune. The formula is this:

D: the extrinsic value for S of P = the difference between the

intrinsic value for S of the life S would lead if P is true and
the intrinsic value for S of the life S would lead if P is false.3

Notice that D assigns value or disvalue to a state of affairs on the

basis of whether its obtaining would be good or bad by comparison
with its not obtaining. To capture this fact about D, let us refer to
it as a formula for calculating the "comparative value" for a person
S of a state of affairs P.
Given D, death can have great disvalue for its subject. Feldman
offers this example:

Suppose I am thinkingof takingan airplane tripto Europe. Suppose

I'm worriedabout accidents,hijackings,sabotage, etc. I thinkI might
die en route. I thinkthiswould be bad forme. D directsus to consider
the life I would lead if I do die en route to Europe on this trip,and
to consider the value for me of this life. . .. Let's suppose that that
life is worth +500 to me. ... Next, D directsus to consider the life I
would lead ifI do not die en route to Europe on thistrip.The relevant
featureof thislife is that I do not die a painfuland prematuredeath
in an airplane accident. Suppose in that life I do live to enjoy the
fruitsof myretirement.Let's suppose the intrinsicvalue forme of that
life is + 1100. Fairlysimple calculations then yield the resultthatsuch

refutedby others. See, for example, Fred Feldman, Confrontations withthe

Reaper(New York: Oxford UniversityPress, 1992), 127-56, and Thomas
Nagel, "Death," reprintedin his Mortal Questions(New York: Cambridge
UniversityPress, 1979), 1-10.
3Feldman, Confrontation, 150. I have a fewquibbles withFeldman's for-
mulation of D. One is the awkwardnessin speaking of a state of affairsas
being true or false.Anotheris that,unless I am mistaken,the definiendurn
in D should be the total(extrinsicand intrinsic)value for S of P rather
than the extrinsic
value for S of P. For the differencebetween the intrinsic
value for S of the life S would lead if P obtains and the intrinsicvalue for
S of the life S would lead if P does not obtain would depend partlyon
how much intrinsicvalue P would have for S.

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 DISAPPOINTMENT SADNESS,AND DEATH

a deathwould have a value of -600 forme. It would be a terrible

misfortune.4

At firstglance, there appears to be little to disagree with here.

Feldman's death in the plane crash would preventhim from re-
ceivingthe huge benefitof survivinghis tripto Europe. Hence, D
yields the plausible conclusion that the disvalue for Feldman of
such a death would be verylarge.
But Feldman is not satisfiedwiththis conclusion. He draws the
furtherconclusion that such a death would be a "terriblemisfor-
tune" for him. This furtherconclusion does not follow. For 'P
would have (great) comparativedisvalue for S' does not entail 'P
would be a (terrible) misfortunefor S.' To suppose otherwise
would be to expand the notion of a misfortunewell beyond its
ordinaryboundaries. It would implythatI have suffereda terrible
misfortunetoday in that I did not findAladdin's lamp and hence
have not been granted three wishes by an omnipotentgenie. For
the intrinsicvalue forme of the lifeI would lead should I findthe
lamp would be far greater than the intrinsicvalue for me of the
life I would lead should I not findit. Hence, given D, the disvalue
for me of not findingthe lamp is enormous. But surelyit would
be a peculiar use of the word 'misfortune'to say,"I've suffereda
terriblemisfortunetoday,forI have not happened upon Aladdin's
lamp." Feldman can, of course, retreatto the conclusion that his
death in the plane crash would be comparativelybad. But notice
that this conclusion is too modest to be of much interest.Failing
to find Aladdin's lamp is also comparativelybad, but it does not
meritany distress.5It is, as Epicurus said of death, "of no concern
to us." Thus, by itself,the conclusion that death is comparatively
bad is consistentwiththe Epicurean position that death is not, in
any troublingsense, an evil.
Feldman's mistakeis not uncommon. Many writershave noted
that because death typicallydeprives its subject of benefits she

4Feldman, Confrontations, 151; myemphasis.

5When I describe an emotional response as "fitting,"or "merited," or
"appropriate," I do not intend to implythat one ought to have that re-
sponse. If I am cornered by a dangerous beast, for example, the danger
would meritfear even if,because the beast is of the sortthatis more likely
to attackifit senses fear,I ought to avoid feelingfearifI can. (In a similar
way,someone's behavior can meritblame or punishmenteven if special
circumstancesmake it unwise to blame or punish.)

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 KAI DRAPER

would have received had she not died, dyingis oftencomparatively

verybad-it is much worse than not dying.But manyof these have
failed to notice thatthe truthof the propositionthatdeath is com-
parativelyverybad does not byitselfjustify any disturbingconclu-
sion about death. An argument from deprivationought to show
that death is a genuine evil in the sense of being something that
meritshorroror dread or sadness or despair or disappointmentor
some other negative emotional response.6And there is a logical
gap between the premise that death is comparativelybad and the
conclusion that death is a genuine evil in this sense.7

2. Death and Disappointment

Perhaps it should come as no surprise that not all comparatively

bad deprivationsmeritdistress.For each of us is the subject of an

6What I am calling a "genuine evil" is to be distinguishedfromwhat

philosophers often call an "evil." In common philosophical parlance, a
good is somethingworthyof being desired or sought,and, corresponding-
ly,an evil is somethingworthyof aversionor avoidance (or somethingthe
absence of which is worthyof being desired or sought). Given thisuse of
the term 'evil', one can quicklyreach the conclusion that being deprived
of life's benefitsis an evil. But the conclusion is not veryinterestinggiven
that many deprivationsthat are not the least bit troublingare also evils.
Failing to findAladdin's lamp, for example, is a deprivationthat is quite
worthyof being avoided howeverimpossible it may be to avoid it. Accord-
ingly,I am concerned in thisessaynot withthe question of whetherdeath
is an evil in the sense of being worthyof avoidance, but ratherwith the
question of whetherdeath is a genuine evil in the richersense of being a
suitable object of fear or sadness or dread or dissatisfactionor some other
negative emotional response (in addition to being a suitable object of
avoidance). In particular,I am concerned with the question of whether
death is a genuine evil for its subject-thatis, whether it is fittingto be
troubledbythe prospectof one's own death (and to avoid one's own death
if one can).
7There is also a general lesson forvalue theoryhere. If we assignvalue
or disvalue to a state of affairson the basis of comparing the value of its
obtainingwiththe value of its not obtaining,then we divorcethe concepts
of value and disvalue from theirusual emotional and attitudinalconnec-
tions. We are forced to say of certain thingsthat,on the one hand, they
have enormous disvalue (or value) forus, but on the other hand, it would
be inappropriateforus to be the least bit troubled (or delighted) bythem.
This shouldn't cause any mischiefso long as we are aware of whatwe are
doing. But if we are unaware, then we will be apt to make mistakesin
reasoninglike Feldman's-leaping fromthe premisethatsomethingwould
have great comparative disvalue for someone to the conclusion that it
would be awful,or dreadful,or a terriblemisfortune,for her.

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 DISAPPOINTMENT, SADNESS,AND DEATH

infinitevarietyof comparativelybad deprivations,and yetwe would

regard veryfew of them as mattersof concern. And why should
we? The absence of a good, like the absence of an ill, is a mere
privation,and so typicallyequanimityis the appropriateresponse.
Typically,but not always.In a varietyof cases, and for a variety
of reasons, it is fittingto be troubled by certaincomparativelybad
deprivations.Let us suppose, for example, that unexpected jury
dutydeprives me of the enjoymentof making a long-awaitedtrip
to Barcelona in the company of my dearest friends.This depriva-
tion is apt to be comparativelybad, but not nearly as bad as the
deprivationinvolved in not findingAladdin's lamp. Nevertheless,
we are inclined to say that it is a misfortune(though perhaps not
a great one) and that disappointmentis a fittingresponse to this
misfortune.
What distinguishesmycanceled tripfrommyfailureto happen
upon Aladdin's lamp? No doubt I would have had my heart set
upon the tripto Spain, whereas I have never hoped to finda mag-
ical lamp that, as everyone knows, does not even exist. But it is
easy to see that this cannot be the crucial differencebetween the
two cases. For even if I did hope to find Aladdin's lamp, even if
findingit were mylife'scentralconcern, myfailureto finditwould
not be a misfortunefor me, nor would disappointmentbe the
appropriate response to this failure.Rather my misfortunewould
be that I desire to find,hope to find,and waste mytime tryingto
find a lamp witha genie in it.
One mightthinkthat the crucial differenceis that,whereas the
jury duty preventsme from receiving a benefit that otherwise I
would have received, the benefitof findingAladdin's lamp is not
one that I would have received had I not been prevented from
doing so. It does seem plausible to suppose that the absence of a
good withina lifecounts as a misfortuneonlyifone would receive
that good were it not for the interventionof an identifiablepre-
ventingcondition. Thus, the absence of such a condition prevent-
ing me fromfindingAladdin's lamp may adequately explain why
myfailureto find it cannot be a misfortune.Be that as it may,we
stilllack an explanation of whymyfailureto go to Barcelona with
my friendsis a misfortune.For it is not alwaysa misfortuneto be
preventedfromreceivinga benefit.If $1,000,000 were offeredto
the firstperson who manages to climb Everestbarefoot,the cold
weather on the mountain inevitablywould prevent anyone from

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 KAI DRAPER

acquiring the money by fulfillingthe termsof the offer.And even

if some foolish,barefootclimberwould reap the rewardof reach-
ing the summit were it not for this preventingcondition, there
would be no misfortunein his inevitablefailure.
Like the benefitof findingAladdin's lamp, any benefitthatcan
be secured onlybyclimbingEverestbarefootis among those count-
less imaginable benefitsthatwe failto receive as a matterof course,
benefitsthatwe cannot reasonably expect or want because there is
no reason at all to thinkthatwe willreceive them,or thatwe ought
to receive them.Typicallythereis nothingamissin being prevented
fromreceivingsuch a benefit;and so thereis no basis forregarding
the deprivationas a misfortunerather than as a mere absence of
unreachable good fortune.
On the other hand, ifone of us failsto receive a significantgood
to which she is entitled,or if an individual or a societyor nature
arbitrarilydenies her the goods that most others receive, or if a
freak accident prevents her from receiving a substantialbenefit
thatshe was about to receive,then it is likelythatshe has suffered
both a misfortuneand a genuine evil. For ordinarily,it is reason-
able to resentbeing denied a benefitto which one is entitled,and
to feel dissatisfiedwithone's allotmentif one is arbitrarily denied
the goods that most othersreceive,and to feel disappointed when
a substantialbenefit that one reasonably expected to receive is
snatched awayby some unlikelyturn of events.In cases like these
(and in other kinds of cases as well) there is apt to be something
amiss in being deprived, something that merits a negative emo-
tional response and so provides a basis for regardingthe depriva-
tion as a misfortune.
These remarkssuggest a way to explain why being denied my
anticipated trip to Barcelona is both a misfortuneand a suitable
object of disappointment.For it was highlylikelythat I would go
to Barcelona with my dearest friends;this benefitwas withinmy
reach and would have been mine but for an unlikelyconfluence
of events that caused it to slip throughmy fingers.Thus, my rea-
sonableexpectation that I would receive the benefitwas frustrated
by what we would ordinarilyreferto as "bad luck." By contrast,it
is impossible to receive the benefitof findingAladdin's lamp, or
the benefit (supposing there is one) of climbingEverestbarefoot.
Thus, no reasonable expectation or hope is frustratedby the fail-
ure to receive such a benefitand, of course, it would be absurd to

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 DISAPPOINTMENT, SADNESS,AND DEATH

attributeto bad luck one's failure to receive a benefitthe receipt

of which is humanlyimpossible.
There are, of course, cases thatfallbetween these twoextremes.
If my state lotteryticketdoes not have the winningnumbers,for
example, then I am deprivedof a huge financialbenefitthe receipt
of which was possible but highlyunlikely.Is failing to have the
winningnumbers a misfortune?I am inclined to say no-picking
the wrong numbers would have to be much less likelyto count as
a misfortune,or as a suitable object of significantdisappointment.
One can, perhaps, reasonablyhope to get lucky,but settingone's
heart on winningin a way thatwould make losing anythingmore
than the mildestof disappointmentswould be foolish.On the oth-
er hand, suppose that my lotterytickethas the winningnumbers,
but in my haste to collect my winnings,I trip and fall and drop
the ticketdown a storm drain. Once again a large benefit that I
was very likelyto receive manages to elude my grasp, and once
again we have a misfortuneto which disappointmentis a fitting
response (although the disappointmenthere may be tempered by
the knowledgethatI was unlikelyto have chosen the winningnum-
bers in the firstplace).
It appears, then, that wheneversomeone is preventedfromre-
ceiving a large benefit that she was very likely to receive and,
hence, reasonablyhoped to receive,she has suffereda misfortune.
And at least typically,disappointmentis a perfectlyreasonable re-
sponse to this kind of misfortune.8E below is an attemptto for-
mulate these suggestionswithgreaterprecision:
E: For any person S and event P, if (1) it is highlylikelythat S
will receive a large benefitand, knowingthis,S hopes to re-
ceive it, but (2) P preventsS from receivingit and, conse-
quently,preventsS fromleading a life thatwould have much
more value for S than the life S does lead, then (3) ceteris
paribus, P is a misfortunefor S, and severe disappointment
on the part of S would be a fittingemotional response to this
misfortune .

8Notice too thatit is equally plausible to suggestthatwhen someone is

preventedfrombeing harmed in a waythatwas likely,she is the recipient
of good fortune.It would be good fortunefor me, for example, should
the police lose the evidence thatwill otherwiseput me behind bars.
9Condition (1) standsin need of clarification, forthereare manysenses
in which the receipt of a benefitmightbe "likely." The notion of likeli-

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 KAI DRAPER

Notice that E does not say that (1) and (2) are necessarycon-
ditionsfor (3). (2) may be necessary,but I suspect that (1) is not.
Suppose, for example, that I am a finalistin a sweepstakes,witha
one in three chance of having a winning number and collecting
$1,000,000. It is not likelythatI will receive the benefitof winning.
Nevertheless,because winningis not terriblyunlikely,and the ben-
efitof winningwould be verylarge, I am (at least somewhat) in-
clined to say thatlosing would be both a misfortuneand a suitable
object of rather severe disappointment.10Accordingly,E claims
only that (1) and (2) are jointly sufficientfor (3).
The ceterisparibusclause in (3) is necessary because, although
the truthof (2) ensures that P is (comparatively)undesirablefor
S, P mightbe desirable in other respects and, in some cases, this
can make P unsuitable as an object of disappointment.Suppose,
forexample, thatI am likelyto receive a huge inheritancebecause
a wealthyaunt, whom I have never met, is gravelyill. Suppose
furtherthat,against all odds, she recoversher health. Then even
if my aunt's recoveryis comparativelyverybad for me-perhaps I
have an immediate need for a large sum of money-disappoint-
ment is apt to be unfitting.For if I hoped to receive the inheri-
tance, and consequentlyI am disappointed to learn thatI will not
receive it, then I must have been hoping that my aunt would die
and disappointed that she survived.And that would reflectvery
poorly on me.11Thus, to accommodate this sort of case, we need

hood that I am employing here is sometimes referredto as "objective

chance." The objective chance of a faircoin coming up heads on a given
toss is one half, to cite the usual example. In appealing to this notion, I
do not intend to invoke any mysteriousmetaphysicalcategories.For state-
ments about objective chances may be translatableinto statementsabout
relativefrequencies,as some have argued. What is crucial here is to avoid
defining'likely'in a way that makes it a purelysubjectivematterwhether
an event is likely.For if something could be likelysimplybecause one
regardsit as so, then E would wronglyimplythat,forexample, the barefoot
climberwho believed that he was likelyto reach the summitand so win
the million dollars would be the victimof a misfortunewhen he failed to
do so.
10I owe thisexample to Charles Young.
1'On the other hand, assumingthatmyaunt's recoveryis comparatively
quite bad for me, I am inclined to describe her recoveryas a misfortune
for me. If I am rightabout this, then this case suggeststhat,just as we
should resistthe temptationto leap to the conclusion thatdeath is a gen-
uine evil fromthe premise thatdeath is comparativelybad, we should also

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 DISAPPOINTMENT, SADNESS,AND DEATH

to stipulatethat the ceterispan bus clause in (3) is not satisfiedif P

(my aunt's recovery,for example) is desirable enough to make
severe disappointmenton S's part unfittingin spite of P's undesir-
abilityfor S.
E can serve as the cornerstone of a plausible argument from
deprivation.Let us returnto Feldman's hypotheticalplane crash.
When Feldman boarded the plane, it was highly likely that he
would receive the huge benefitof survivinghis tripto Europe; and
knowingthis,he no doubt hoped to receive this benefit.But his
death en route to Europe prevented him from receivingit and,
consequently,prevented him from leading a life that, because it
would have included things like enjoying the fruitsof his retire-
ment,would have had more than twice as much value for him as
the life he did lead (by hypothesis,+1100 as compared to +500).
Thus, if E is true then, ceterisparfius, Feldman's death en route to
Europe was a misfortunefor him, and severe disappointmenton
the part of Feldman would have been a fittingresponse if and
when he became aware that he would sufferthismisfortune.
Furthermore,in all likelihood, the ceterisparyius clause is satis-
fied. For Feldman's premature death is not apt to be desirable in
any respect; and even if some good does come fromit, this good
is not apt to be of the kind and degree necessaryto have made it
inappropriate for him to have been severelydisappointed by the
factthat he would be deprived of the substantialbenefitof surviv-
ing his trip to Europe. Perhaps severe disappointmenton Feld-
man's part would have been unfittinghad he been guiltyof some
crime so heinous thathe deserved to die. Perhaps there are other
possibilitieshere as well. But I think it is safe to assume that,in
general, the list of possible goods that might make severe disap-
pointment an inappropriate response to the knowledge that one
will suffera premature death like Feldman's hypotheticalone is
rathershort,and the possibilitieson it are rarelyactualized.
Given E, then,we can conclude that,withfewexceptions,a high-
ly unlikelydeath that dashes its subject's hopes for the futureby
deprivingher of a futurethat would have great value for her is a
misfortune,a genuine evil and, more specifically,something to
which severe disappointmentis a fittingemotional response.

avoidleapingto thisconclusionfromthe premisethatdeathis a misfor-

tune.

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Nor is thisconclusion threatenedby Lucretius'swell-knownwor-

ryabout temporal asymmetry.12 Endorsing E does not commitone
to the proposition that there is any misfortuneor evil to be found
in failingto receive life's benefitsprior to the time at which one
came into existence.For it is never true of anyone thatit was likely
that she would receive life's benefitsprior to that time.13

3. The Evils in Death May Be Legion

Although I believe that E justifiesregardingmany deaths as (gen-
uine) evils,perhaps I should say immediatelythatI do not believe
that E provides the only adequate basis for regardingdeath as an
evil. E justifies thinkingthat disappointmentis typicallya fitting
response to the discoverythat one's life will be cut short by an
unlikely death. But disappointmentis certainlynot the only,or
even the most common, negative emotional response to the dis-
coverythatdeath is near. Fear,horror,despair,depression,sadness,
and anger are other common responses,and while some of these
may be unfitting-we shouldn't assume the worstabout death-it
would be rathersurprisingif none of themwere ever appropriate.
As shall become apparent below,I am convinced thata complete
account of the evilsin death mustbe pluralistic.E has a significant
role to play in such an account, especially in accounting for the
misfortunein a premature death. But even here E's role may be
limited,forI suspect thatthereare severalroutesto the conclusion
that premature death is an evil. It may be possible, for example,
to constructa plausible argument to the effectthat inasmuch as
most of us receive the benefitof reaching old age, someone who
is arbitrarilydenied thatbenefitcan reasonablybe dissatisfiedwith
her relativelymeager allotmentof life.

12Lucretius,On Nature(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill,1965), 3.969-74.

'30f course, it may be possible to constructimaginarycases of persons
so deprived. Perhaps we can imagine, for example, a fetal human being
sufferinga freakaccident thatpreventsits brain fromdeveloping for,say,
fiftyyears.Begging a fewmetaphysicalquestions,we can then say thatthis
individualwhose life is decades shorterbecause he comes into existence
decades later than he mighthave was deprived of manygood yearsof life
that he was likelyto enjoy. But given that description,I thinkwe would
also wantto saythat,barringany compensatingbenefitsfromthe accident,
the individualin question was the victimof a misfortune.Moreover,while
disappointmentwould not be a fittingresponse here, clearlydissatisfaction
of some sortwould be appropriate.

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 DISAPPOINTMENT, SADNESS,AND DEATH

Furthermore,notice thatE does not provide a basis forthe plau-

sible view that any premature death that has great comparative
disvalue for its subject is an evil. For we can at least imagine cir-
cumstances in which a prematuredeath would not be an unlikely
event. In a plague-riddenworld, for example, it might be highly
unlikelyfor a human being not to die young. And then E would
not generate the conclusion that the prospect of an early death
would merit distress.This should not raise doubts about E (since
E onlyofferssufficientconditionsforan event'sbeing an evil). But
it does give us another reason to doubt thatE can offera complete
account of the disvalue of prematuredeath.
E's limitationsare even more pronounced if our concern is to
account forthe disvalue of dyingat an advanced age. This is partly
because it is often unlikely (or, at least, not highlylikely) that an
elderly person will live substantiallylonger. It is also partlybe-
cause the death of an elderly person often preventsthis person
from receiving only a relativelysmall amount of extra life. Fur-
thermore,I do not thinkit is ageist to suggestthatthere are many
elderly individuals who, because of ill health, or loneliness, or
some other source of unhappiness, would not benefitgreatlyfrom
receivinga fewmore days,months,or (in some cases) even years
of life.
Of course, there remain many cases in which the death of an
elderly person deprives him of many good years of life that he
was verylikelyto receive. An eighty-year-old who has enjoyed ex-
cellent health, for example, mightreasonably hope to receive the
likelybenefitof several good years of additional life. And then E
would yield the conclusion that it would be appropriate for him
to be disappointed should he learn that he will not receive this
benefit because death will arrive sooner than he had reasonably
expected. Nevertheless,it might be worth noting that his disap-
pointment is apt to be tempered if he considers the fact that,
given the number of persons who die before the age of eighty,to
receive eightyyears of life is to be dealt a prettygood hand. So
long as one does well with respect to a given sort of good (for
example, wealth, friendship,success, or life span), not doing as
well as one was likely to have done with respect to that good is
typicallynot terriblydisappointing. Thus, put into perspective,the
discovery that an unlikelydeath at an advanced age will deprive
one of several additional years of life is apt to be less disappoint-

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ing than the discovery that one will suffera comparable depri-
vation of life at an early age.14

4. Gluttonyand the Insatiable Hunger for Life

If myown feelingscan be trusted,death at an advanced age is apt

to be a genuine evil even when it is not disappointingat all. For I
find it disturbingthat, inevitably,I will die within the next few
decades, having received, at most, only a few score years of life.
Thus, what troublesme now is not some contingentfactabout my
lifespan (forexample, thatI will not live as long as myfriendswill,
or that I will die before finishingmy life's work,or that I will not
live as long as I had reasonably expected to live), but rather a
necessaryfactabout mylifespan given the human condition.15 Let
us turn,then, to the question of whetheran argumentfromdep-
rivationcan reach the conclusion that it is a genuine evil not to
live longer than a human being possiblycan.
Lucretius argued that someone blessed with a long, full life is
foolishifshe is distressedby the factthather lifewill soon be over.
He suggested that this fortunateindividual ought to "depart like
a guest satisfiedat the banquet of life,and with a calm mind ...

14There are, then, at least two ways that certain unlikelydeprivations

can be "put into perspective,"therebytemperingthe disappointmentthat
typicallyattends such deprivations.First,the fact that one has done well
withrespectto some kind of good can temperone's disappointmentwhen
one does not do as well as one was likelyto have done. And second, the
fact thatit was unlikelythatone would receive a benefitcan temperone's
disappointmentwhen, even though it subsequentlybecame likelythatone
would receive it, one is neverthelessdeprived (as in the example of losing
the winninglotteryticketdown the stormdrain).
Some maywantto insistthatin certaincases of thissort,disappointment
is unfittingeven if conditions (1) and (2) of E are fulfilled.My own intu-
itions do not support this conclusion. But if the objection were pressed, I
could respond by stipulatingthat the ceteris paribusclause in E is satisfied
only if the deprivationin question cannot be put into perspectivein one
of these two ways.This would narrow the scope of E, but E would still
justifyregardingthe typicalprematuredeath as a misfortuneand a genuine
evil.
'5Perhaps I should say, "given the human condition as we know it."
Advances in the biological sciences may extend the human life span be-
yond a few score years. It is not clear, then, how long it is possible for a
human being to live.Nevertheless,as shall become apparentbelow,I would
not be satisfiedwithany finitelife span that progressmightbestow upon
our descendants.

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 DISAPPOINTMENT, SADNESS,AND DEATH

welcome a carefree sleep."116By implication,he likened the indi-

vidual who cannot accept death afterenjoyinga long, fulllife to a
gluttonwho, having had the good fortuneto be a guest at a ban-
quet, and to feastheartilythere,is neverthelessdissatisfiedbecause
he must soon depart. The proposal seems to be that such dissat-
isfactionmanifestsexcessive desires.
As we have seen, E provides a basis for thinkingthat at least
some individualswho have lived a long, fulllife can reasonablybe
dissatisfiedwith not having the good fortuneto live even longer.
For again, if an elderlyindividual is likelyto live substantiallylon-
ger,but is preventedfromdoing so, then (in accordance withE)
some disappointmenton her part is apt to be perfectlyreasonable.
Nevertheless,one mightinsistthatLucretiusis at least partlyright.
For it is not implausible to suppose thatsomeone who has already
enjoyed a long life does displayexcessive desires if she is troubled
by the fact that,given the natural limit on the human life span,
her life inevitablymust end in the riot too distantfuture.To be
troubled by the prospect of thishumanlyunavoidable deprivation
of lifewould reflecta desire to receive more yearsof life'sbenefits
than is humanlypossible. And any desire for a humanlyunattain-
able benefitis certainlya good candidate for being excessive."7
Some, however,have been quick to dismiss the idea that the
inevitabilityof a deprivation can be a basis for denying that its
prospect meritsdistress.Thus, Thomas Nagel writes:
Suppose thatwe were all inevitablygoingto die in agony-physical
agonylastingsix months.Wouldinevitability make thatprospectany
lessunpleasant?Andwhyshouldit be different fora deprivation?18

16Lucretius, On Nature,3.935-36.
'7Perhaps Lucretiuswas thinkingalong these lines when he offeredthis
advice to the old who cannot bear the thoughtof their passing: "Come
now, give up all these thingswhich are foreignto your time of life,and
with a calm mind yield them to your sons, for yield you must (my em-
phasis). Here Lucretiusseems to move fromthe premise thatinevitably the
elderlyare soon to be deprived of life's benefitsto the conclusion that it
is inappropriatefor the elderlyto be troubledby the prospect of thisdep-
rivation.See Lucretius,3.959.
'8Nagel, "Death," 10. To be fairto Nagel, there are indications (9-10)
that he may not regard this dismissal of the relevance of inevitabilityas
decisive.He does concede that "we have to set some limitson howpossible
a possibilitymust be for its nonrealization to be a misfortune(or good
fortune,should the possibilitybe a bad one)." And he suggeststhat the
"most serious difficultywith the view that death is alwaysan evil" is to
justifyregardingas a misfortunea "limitation,like mortality,thatis normal

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But surelythissort of dismissalis too facile. Granted,the prospect

of inevitable agony meritsdistress.But agony inherentlyinvolves
distress,whereas deprivationsdo not. And although there are dep-
rivationsthat clearlymeritdistresseven though theyare, in some
sense, inevitable'9 I have been unable to discover a deprivation
thatis inevitablein the strongsense of being humanlyunavoidable
and is, nevertheless,unquestionablya genuine evil. Furthermore,
there are countlessexamples of humanlyunavoidable deprivations
that,unquestionably,are not genuine evils.Clearlyit would be silly,
forexample, to be troubledbylackingomnipotence,or the service
of a genie, or the abilityto leap tall buildings in a single bound.
And if such benefitswere not humanlyunreachable, then it would
not be so unreasonable to be troubledby theirlack. If desertswere
litteredwith lamps containing all-powerfulyet servile genies, for
example, then (in accordance withE) we would regardthe unlikely
event of failingto find one as a misfortuneto which disappoint-
ment would be a fittingresponse. At the veryleast, then, it is not
an obvious mistake to suppose that it is preciselybecause certain
deprivationsare inevitable,in the sense of being humanlyunavoid-
able, that theycannot possiblymeritdissatisfaction.
Nor is it an obvious mistaketo suppose withLucretiusthatsuch
dissatisfactionwould manifestexcessive desires. Imagine someone
saying,"I have a wonderfulfamily,excellent friends,and a great
career, and my many meaningful projects and pursuits have all
yielded much fruit,but look at what I lack: I'm not omnipotent,

to the species." Clearly strugglingwith this issue, he goes on to make a

series of puzzling remarks.He says,for example, that a "man's sense of
his own experience ... does not embody thisidea of a naturallimit,"and
thathuman beings do not have an "essentiallylimitedfuture."No doubt,
but it is not clear what conclusion can be drawnfromthese facts.He then
says,"Normalityseems to have nothing to do withit, for the fact thatwe
willall inevitablydie in a fewscore yearscannot byitselfimplythatitwould
not be good to live longer." Here he seems to make the same mistake
made by Feldman. Granted,even ifdeath in a fewscore yearsis inevitable,
it may be good to live longer and, hence, comparativelybad not to live
longer. But again, the real issue is not whetherdeath is comparativelybad
forthe one who dies, but whetherit is a genuine evilforthe one who dies.
'9For example, a woman whose societyhas deeply rooted sexistnorms
suffersa misfortunewhen, inevitably,she is denied benefits(such as the
opportunityto develop her talents) that she ought to receive. And al-
though disappointmentwould not be the appropriateresponse to her in-
evitable deprivation,a varietyof other negative emotional responses (for
example, dissatisfaction and resentment)would be quite fitting.

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 DISAPPOINTMENT, SADNESS,AND DEATH

I'm not adored by all, and I can't even flylike a bird. Woe is me."
Clearlythis person wantstoo much, and it seems plausible to sup-
pose thathe wantstoo much preciselybecause he wantsmore than
is humanlypossible.20Perhaps, then, the same is true of someone
who is dissatisfiedwith a normal human life span. Immortalityis
no more a human possibilitythan omnipotence. Thus, it is tempt-
ing to conclude that those who want to live longer than a human
being can possiblylive unreasonablywant more than a human be-
ing can possibly receive. Like the glutton who cannot bear the
thoughtof leaving the banquet, theirmisfortuneis that theywant
too much, not that theyfail to get what theywant.
If we concede the premise thatit is excessivefora human being
to want a humanlyunreachable benefit,then I can see no way to
avoid the conclusion that it is unfittingto be troubled by the fact
that one will not receive more years of life's benefitsthan is hu-
manly possible. But should we concede the premise? Granted, it
does provide an initiallyattractiveexplanation of why lacking a
benefitlike omnipotence does not merit dissatisfaction.But con-
siderationof other cases raises some doubt about thisexplanation.
Suppose, forexample, thathuman beings inevitablylost theirabil-
ityto enjoy themselvesduring the last six months of their lives. I
am somewhat inclined to say that it would be appropriate to be
troubled by the prospect of this deprivationeven though it would
be humanlyimpossibleto avoid it. Or suppose that,as manypeople
rightlyor wronglybelieve, aging inevitablybringswithit a decline
in mental acuity,or in the capacityto experience intense sensual
pleasures, or in some other desirable human capacity.Again, I feel
some temptationto say that it is reasonable to be troubled by the
prospect of the deprivationregardless of how inevitable it might
be.
Perhaps, then,it can be appropriateto be troubledbya humanly
unavoidable deprivation.But untilwe discovera convincingexpla-

20Myuse of the terms'want' and 'desire' in thisessayis rathernarrow.

Most of us would (veryreasonablyI think) preferto be omnipotent,but
we do not desire omnipotence in the sense I intend. That is, we do not
want it in the sense that implies that we will be dissatisfiedif we do not
receiveit. This sense of 'want' and 'desire' is not uncommon. If I told you,
for example, that I want to be omnipotent,you would be more likelyto
respond, "Too bad," or, "You want too much," rather than, "Who
doesn't?"

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nation of whycertainhumanlyunavoidable deprivationsmeritdis-

tresswhile othersdo not, any conclusion to thiseffectmustremain
highlytentative.Hence, at the very least, the argumentwe have
been consideringposes a serious challenge to someone who wants
to claim that it is a genuine evil not to receive more yearsof life's
benefitsthan is humanly possible. For in order to establish that
thisdeprivationis a genuine evil,one mustfinda wayto distinguish
it from the many humanly unavoidable deprivationsthat clearly
cannot be regarded as genuine evils.

5. The Meager Prospects of the Dying

I shall tryto meet this challenge in section 6 below. Here I want

to discuss what is perhaps the most common varietyof those ar-
guments from deprivationthat yield the rather paradoxical con-
clusion thatit can be an evil for a human being not to live longer
than a human being possiblycan. It is an argument that,if suc-
cessful,would meet the challenge posed above in a very natural
way;but we shall see that substantialobstacles stand in the wayof
its success.
Consider again the hypotheticalrace of human beings who in-
evitablyfail to enjoy anythingin the six months prior to death.
What distinguishestheirinevitabledeprivationfrominevitabledep-
rivationsthat clearlycannot be regarded as genuine evils, depri-
vations such as not findingAladdin's lamp, or not being able to
leap tall buildings in a single bound? Notice that one strikingdif-
ference is this.A human being can flourishwithout,for example,
ever findingAladdin's lamp. Thus, receivingthisbenefitis notjust
impossible; it is unnecessary in the sense that one can fare well
enough withoutit (well enough, that is, to make dissatisfactionan
inappropriateresponse to how well one fares). On the otherhand,
someone deprived of all enjoymentfor a six-monthperiod cannot
be described as flourishingor faringwell during those six months.
Such a person is not even faring"reasonablywell" or "fairlywell."
Enjoymentis indispensable in a waythatfindingAladdin's lamp is
not: since one cannot possiblyfare even reasonablywell withoutit,
one cannot farewell enough if one never receivesit. And perhaps
this explains whyit is reasonable for our hypotheticalrace of hu-
man beings to be dissatisfiedwith the last months of their lives.
For deprived of all enjoyment,these impoverishedcreaturescan-

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 DISAPPOINTMENT, SADNESS,AND DEATH

not possibly fare even reasonably well during these months. It

would seem, then, that theycannot fare well enough.
If this is so, then death at any age may be a serious evil. For
inasmuch as the dead do not receive any of life's benefits,they
neitherflourish,nor farewell, nor fare even reasonablywell. They
are permanentlydenied a varietyof indispensable benefits,includ-
ing enjoyment,and so it would seem that they fail to fare well
enough to make dissatisfactionan inappropriate response to the
prospect of theircondition.
Of course, as optimistsabout death are quick to point out, the
dead are not troubled by their impoverishment.Death has liber-
ated them from all of the pain, discomfort,and distressthat op-
pressed them in life. Moreover,some have argued (quite persua-
sivelyI think) that the dead can even receive certain positiveben-
efits,posthumous fame,for example, or the posthumous advance-
ment of a central life project. Nevertheless,whateverone might
say on behalf of death, its advantages pale by comparison to the
usual advantagesof life.To see thisclearly,one onlyhas to imagine
how poor one's prospects for the remainder of one's life would
have to be before one could reasonablyenvythe prospectsof the
dying.Indeed, I can see no way to plausiblydeny that,as judged
by the same standardswe apply to the prospects of those in the
midst of life,the prospects of the dyingare extremelypoor.
But perhaps some will object that,although the dead farepoorly
by comparison withmost of the living,it does not followthat dis-
satisfactionis a fittingresponse to the prospect of death. For given
that life's evils,as well as life's goods, are absent in death, there is
no reason to suppose that the dead fare poorly in the noncom-
parativesense thatwhateverevilsbefall them exceed whateverben-
efitstheyreceive. Presumably,the dead (at least typically)neither
fare well nor fare poorly in this sense. And whereas delight is an
appropriate response to the prospect of faringwell, and distress
an appropriate response to the prospect of faringpoorly (in the
noncomparativesense), it is temptingto thinkthat equanimityis
the fittingresponse to the prospect of neither.
This objection fails,however,because it rests on the false sup-
position that the prospect of a futurein which the evils do not
exceed the goods cannot merit distress.Should one of us learn
that tomorrowa brain injurywill render her incapable of both
sufferingand enjoyment,and will in every other way make her

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futureexistence neithergood nor bad, she would be horrifiedand

rightlyso. (E captures one reason whyit would be appropriatefor
her to be distressed.For her injurywould make her life farworse
than it was likelyto have been.) Thus, by itself,the supposition
thatdeath does not involvefaringpoorly (that is, does not involve
a negative balance of goods to evils) is insufficientgrounds for
denyingthat the prospect of death meritsdistress.
Another temptingobjection urges that the standards to which
argumentsof the sortunder considerationappeal are standardsof
well-being,and so are misapplied when applied to the dead. Since
the dead do not exist,theyoccupy no level of well-being.Thus, they
cannot possiblyoccupy a substandardlevel of well-being.
I would need to be convinced that we cannot sensiblyspeak of
the dead as occupying a level of well-being.For if at least some
nonexistentobjects have being, as more than a fewhave argued,21
then the fact that the dead do not exist does not necessarilypre-
clude them from occupying a level of well-being.Furthermore,I
suspect that it makes sense to speak of the dead as occupying a
level ofwell-beingbecause it is possible to referto the livingperson
who was, and to assign thispast-existenta level of well-beingin the
present based on the no doubt limited extent to which he is now
being benefitedor harmed.
But we needn't resort to exotic metaphysicalclaims to under-
mine the objection at hand. For there are two waysthat one can
fail to occupy an acceptable level of well-being:one is to occupy a
differentlevel, the other is to occupy no level at all. And even if
we want to say that the dead occupy no level at all, it would be
absurd for us to take consolation in thisfactif it is also a factthat
occupyingno level of well-beingis no less undesirable than occu-
pyingsome unacceptablylow level of well-being.This point can be
made perspicuous by comparing the (biologically) dead to some-
one who is kept alive foreverin an irreversiblestate of uncon-
sciousness. The eternallyunconscious individual existsand, being
the sort of thing that can be benefited and harmed, occupies a
level of well-being.Thus, the objection at hand givesus no reason
to deny thatbecause thislevel is below whatwould (ordinarily)be
minimallyacceptable, he suffersan evil. (I am not sayingthat he

86
21See, forexample, Palle Yourgrau,"The Dead," JournalofPhilosophy
(1987): 84-101.

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 DISAPPOINTMENT, SADNESS,AND DEATH

does sufferan evil; the point is that the objection under consid-
eration does not provide a reason to thinkthathe doesn't.) But if
it is allowed that this individual suffersan evil in virtue of occu-
pying an unacceptably low level of well-being,then it would be
absurd to insistthat those who pass out of existence and so cease
to occupy any level of well-beingdo not sufferan evil. For if it
would be fittingto be dissatisfiedwithone's prospectsshould one
face an eternityof unconscious biological life,then surelyit is also
fittingto be dissatisfiedwith one's prospectswhen one faces bio-
logical death (as indicated byhow absurd it would be to argue that
the otherwiseeternallyunconscious individual ought to be killed
so that throughnonexistence he mightescape the evil of occupy-
ing a substandardlevel of well-being).
Let us move on, then, to more serious objections. Recall that
the argument under consideration moves from the assumption
that the dead are permanentlydeprived of life's benefitsto the
intermediate conclusion that the dead never fare even fairlyor
reasonablywell, and fromthisintermediateconclusion to the final
conclusion that death is a genuine evil and, more specifically, that
the dead fare so poorly that dissatisfactionis an appropriate re-
sponse to the prospect of dying.But it appears thatsuch reasoning
is undermined by Lucretius's remarksabout temporal asymmetry.
For if we say that (1) the dead do not fare even reasonablywell
because theydo not receive any of life'sbenefits,and (2) the dead
sufferan evil because theydo not fare even reasonablywell, then
we commitourselvesto the implausible position thatthose who do
not yet exist sufferpreciselythe same evil, for theytoo fail to re-
ceive any of life'sbenefitsand so do not fare even reasonablywell.
Even more telling,perhaps, is the fact that endorsing (1) and (2)
would commit us to the absurd proposition that undergoing sus-
pended animation for,say,a million yearswould be an evil simply
because one would not enjoy life'sbenefits,and so would not fare
even reasonablywell, during those years.
The fundamentalproblem here is that there is a huge gap be-
tweenthe premise thatdeath precludes the possibilityof itssubject
ever again faringeven reasonablywell to the conclusion that the
dead do not fare well enough to make dissatisfactionan inappro-
priate response to the knowledge that one must die. For how well
one has to fare in order to fare well enough varies with the cir-
cumstances.If I am undergoing an extended period of suspended

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animation, and my total life prospects will in no way be reduced

by this suspension of life's benefits,then I am faringwell enough
during this period even though I am not receiving any of life's
benefits.Similarly,even though I received none of life's benefits
priorto existing,itwould be inappropriateforme to be dissatisfied
with how well I fared then. For, again, there was nothing unac-
ceptable about failingto farewell, or even reasonablywell, during
thistime.But given thatone can, under certaincircumstances,fare
well enough without faring even reasonably well during an im-
mense and perhaps even an infinitestretchof time, we cannot
establish the conclusion that the dead do not fare well enough
simplyby pointing to the factthat,permanentlydenied life'sben-
efits,the dead never fare even reasonablywell.
Furthermore,there is a plausible Epicurean argument to the
conclusion that it is possible to fare well enough afterdeath. For
notice thatit is unreasonable to wantto fareimpossiblywell during
the course of one's lifetime.It would be silly,for example, to be
dissatisfiedby the fact that one will never experience greaterjoy
than a human being can possiblyexperience. Our standards for
assessingwhethera human being's quality of life is adequate are
shaped by whateverlimitsnature has placed on the qualityof hu-
man life.But thenwhyshouldn't our standardsforassessingwheth-
er a human being's quantityof lifeis adequate be similarlyshaped
by whateverlimit nature has placed on the human life span? It
seems plausible to reject any apparent asymmetry between quality
and quantityhere in favorof the Epicurean viewthatit is excessive
to want to do (qualitativelyor quantitatively)betterthan a human
being can possiblydo. This view allows for the possibilitythatit is
reasonable to want a good humanlife, and it even allows for the
possibilitythat it is reasonable to want a long humanlife, but it
precludes the possibilitythat it is reasonable to want a better or
longer life than is humanlypossible. Hence, it precludes the pos-
sibilitythat dissatisfactionis a fittingresponse to the limitthatna-
ture has placed on the human life span.
This second "asymmetryargument" reinforces the temporal
asymmetryargument.For we now have a plausible explanation of
whyit is unfittingto be dissatisfiedwiththe fact that,prior to ex-
isting,one did not fareeven reasonablywell-namely, thisfactdoes
not preclude one fromdoing as well as a human being can possibly
do, and hence does not preclude one from doing well enough.

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 DISAPPOINTMENT, SADNESS,AND DEATH

Furthermore,if this explanation is correct,there is no temporal

asymmetry: it is also unfittingto be dissatisfiedbythe merefactthat,
afterone no longer exists,one will not enjoy any of life'sbenefits.
For, again, thisfactdoes not preclude one fromdoing as well as a
human being can possiblydo.
It appears, then, that substantialEpicurean obstacles stand in
the way of the attemptto argue that it is fittingfor us to be dis-
satisfiedwith our admittedlymeager prospects for the time after
we are dead. And yet, in spite of these obstacles, I am inclined
towardsreformulatingthe argumentrather than abandoning the
attempt.Perhaps I am biased by my own negative feelings about
death. But the underlyingintuitionhere is difficultto dismiss:It
seems fittingforme, an individualwho rightlyvalues his own well-
being, to be disturbedby the fact that,however good my imme-
diate prospects might be, my long-termprospects are not good.
AfterI die, I will receive none of life's benefits,ever again. And
Epicurean reassurances notwithstanding, I find it difficultto be-
lieve that it is unreasonable for someone with a healthymeasure
of self-loveto be dissatisfiedwithsuch meager prospects.
Although our discussion in this section has been somewhatin-
conclusive,it is worthnoting thatone positiveresultmaybe forth-
coming. For we have stumbled upon anotherjustificationfor re-
garding premature death as an evil. Even if it is unreasonable to
want a betteror longer life than is humanlypossible, it can hardly
be unreasonable for a human being to want a good human life.
Thus, given that having a good human life requires receiving a
certain quantityof life's benefits(or a certain quantityof the ben-
efitsof each stage of life), an early death would typicallydeprive
its subject of benefitsshe reasonablywants.Accordingly,it would
be appropriate to be dissatisfiedwith the prospect of such a
death.22
Of course, one possible limitationto this argumentfromdepri-
vation is that it may apply only to veryearly death. For it is not
obvious whethera good human life must extend into old age or
even into middle age. On the other hand, unlike the argument
fromdeprivationbased on E, thisnew argumentwould apply even
to an earlydeath in a world where earlydeath was the norm. For

22I owe thispoint to Michael Ialacci.

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no matterhow likelyan earlydeath, a good human lifemayrequire

livinglonger.

6. Death and the Sadness of SayingGood-bye

But let us returnto the central concern of the preceding section:
the problem of how to distinguishour inevitablefailureto receive
more than a fewscore years of life's benefitsfromthose humanly
unavoidable deprivationsthat clearlyare not genuine evils.A sec-
ond approach to solving this problem is to argue that it is appro-
priate to be troubled by certain kinds of losseseven if they are
humanlyunavoidable. By 'a loss' I mean 'a permanentdeprivation
of a benefitthatone has alreadyreceived'. Thus, since I have never,
for example, flown like a bird, possessed Aladdin's lamp, or
climbed Everest,I cannot possiblylose these benefits.But I am well
acquainted withthe usual benefitsof human existence.Thus, I can
and will lose these benefits.Death may not be the instrumentof
thisloss (since a severe injury,forexample, could cause me to lose
life's benefitsprior to my death), but the inevitabilityof this loss
is a consequence of the inevitabilityof death.
The possibilityof basing an argumentfromdeprivationon the
significanceof loss has been dismissedby some on the ground that
losses are not inherentlyworse than other sorts of deprivations.
The followingpassage froman essaybyAnthonyL. Bruecknerand
John MartinFischer is representative:
It mightseem appealing to suggestthatwhatmakes death a bad thing
fora person is thatit is the deprivationof good thingsalreadyhad by
the person.
The plausibilityof this suggestionmay come froma psychological
truthwhich says that,in general, if a person has experienced a good
thingand then been deprivedof it,he tends to lament itsabsence (to
"miss it") in a wayin which a person who has never experienced the
good doesnot.... But whywould one regretthe absence of something
good to which one has grown accustomed? Presumablybecause one
tends to be frustratedby the lack of such goods-their absence causes
unpleasantexperiences....In general, it is true that,when one is accus-
tomed to a good thing,its absence causes unpleasant experiences and
is thereforeespeciallyregrettable.
But clearlythisprinciple is not applicable to death, since death de-
privesa person of goods without causing anyexperiences at all.23

23AnthonyL. Bruecknerand John MartinFischer,"WhyIs Death Bad?"

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I want to argue that this dismissal is too quick and that it is

possible to constructa plausible argumentfromdeprivationbased
on the significanceof loss. Indeed, I suspect thatthereare multiple
possibilitieshere,24but I want to focus on an argumentthat I be-
lieve to be especiallyworthyof attention,partlybecause it has been
ratherneglected, and partlybecause, if successful,it would show
that some of our most negativefeelingsabout death are perfectly
reasonable. In outline, the argumentI have in mind is simplythis:
Death is a genuine evil. For death takes fromus the objects of our
emotional attachments,and sadness is a fittingresponse to the
prospectof losing the object of an emotional attachmentregardless
of how unavoidable that loss mightbe.
This argumentis apt to seem attractiveto those of us who, when
reflectingon death, are liable to sad thoughts such as, "Never
again shall I look into mybeloved's eyes." For the sadness here is
the sadness in a good-bye.It is the sadness of losing someone to
whom one is emotionallyattached.
Most human beings formstrongemotional attachments.These
attachmentsmay be to persons, places, possessions,or even mem-
ories (to mention only a few of the possibilities). Regardless of
their object, emotional attachmentscarrywith them an aversion

in The Metaphysics ofDeath, ed. John Martin Fischer (Stanford:Stanford

University Press, 1993), 226-27.
240ne possibilityhere is suggestedbyF. M. Kamm. She argues thatlosses
are typicallyworse than mere privationsof benefitsat least partlybecause
theyinvolvea decline froma relativelygood condition to a relativelybad
one. Thus, on her view,death is troublingpartlybecause it involvesa sharp
decline frombeing a recipientof life'sbenefitsto not being a recipientof
those benefits.See Morality, Mortality,
vol. 1 (New York:Oxford University
Press, 1993), 40-42, 67-71.
Anotherpossibilityis suggestedby consideringjust how high a standard
is being set by Lucretiuswhen he insiststhatit is unreasonable forthe old
to be troubledby the loss of life'sbenefits.I have never ruled the universe
or flownlike a bird. This makes it easy to accept the factthatI will never
receive these benefits.But I am well acquainted withthe usual benefitsof
human existence. This is partlywhyI want them. And regardlessof how
long I live, I cannot simplychoose to stop wantingmore of these benefits
as ifmydesiresflowedfroma spigotthatcan be shut offat will.It is rather
demanding,then,forLucretiusto insistthatit is foolishand vicious of the
elderlyto continuewanting,forexample, to be withtheirloved ones simply
because theycannot possiblybe withthem too much longer. On the con-
trary,it may even be vicious to stop wanting to be with them. Imagine
tellinga loved one, "I have had my fillof life and am ready to die. Never
seeing you again is not troublingto me."

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to loss. So long as you are emotionallyattached to someone or

something,that person's or thing's presence is precious to you.
Thus, while you may not mind periods of absence, especiallyshort
periods, you do not want to be deprived foreverof the presence
of thatperson or thing.And the strongerthe attachment,the more
unbearable the thoughtof permanent deprivation.
The problem withsuch a loss is not simplythatyou are deprived
of any benefitsthat may resultfromthe presence of the object of
yourattachment.Suppose thatI have thoroughlyenjoyed myvisits
to New York City,but I know I shall never return.Even if I know
that I would benefit greatlyfrom returning,this may be of little
concern to me since, as a native Californian,I am not attached to
New York City.But if Woody Allen were to leave New York City
knowing that he would never return, he would be deeply de-
pressed, perhaps even suicidal. New York is his city;he is strongly
attached to it. Nor is the differencehere only that I would derive
less pleasure fromreturningto New York than Mr. Allen would. I
mightadore New York but, not being attached to it, I mightnot
mind never going back to it. And it is possible to be stronglyat-
tached to a city even if one derives very little pleasure from its
presence.
FollowingBruecknerand Fischer,it mightbe proposed thatwhat
would distinguishMr. Allen's loss from my own is that he would
findthe absence of his beloved cityterriblyunpleasant,whereas I,
not being attached to thiscity,would hardlynotice itsabsence from
my life. This would be a relevantdifferencebetween his loss and
my own, but it is not the only or even the most significantdiffer-
ence. For the primaryproblem in losing the object of an emotional
attachmentis not the unpleasantness of the loss, but rather the
loss itself.Because Mr. Allen is attached to New York,its presence
is precious to him and forthatreason he desperatelywantsto avoid
permanentlybeing deprived of thispresence. (He mightalso want
to avoid the unpleasantness of the deprivation,but this is apt to
be secondary.) On the other hand, since I am not attached to New
YorkCity,any desire I have to returnis moderate by comparison.
To use a differentexample, should I learn thatsoon I will see a
dear friendfor the last time,I would dread my loss even if I also
learned (1) that a spell had been cast thatwould make me forget
her and therebypreventme frombeing aware of myloss, and (2)
that I would, as a result of losing her, meet someone else who

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 DISAPPOINTMENT, SADNESS,AND DEATH

would immediatelytake her place in my affections.For given my

attachmentto her, I want very much to avoid losing her forever
even ifthisloss would be neitherunpleasant forme nor even some-
thing of which I am aware. And because I am attached to her,the
benefit of her presence is not replaceable by an equal or even
greaterbenefit.
I suspect thatmanypeople find the thoughtof dyingdisturbing
partlybecause it does involvethe loss of persons or thingsto which
theyare emotionallyattached. Indeed, perhaps some of the variety
one finds in attitudestowardsdeath is due to the fact that some
of us have strong emotional attachmentswhile others do not.
There are some who, although stillalive, have alreadylost the per-
sons and things to which theywere once stronglyattached. The
most common example, of course, is the elderlywoman who has
outlived all of her close relativesand friends. (Even one's home-
town may change so much in the course of a long life that one's
attachmentto it graduallyweakens.) Such persons,even iftheyare
contentwithlife,maynot findthe sadness in the thoughtof death
that is found by those who have not yet lost the objects of their
attachments.On the other extreme,perhaps the miserable some-
times cling desperatelyto their miserable lives at least partlybe-
cause theyare deeply attached to persons or things,or even to life
itself.
In spite of its initialplausibility,defendingthe viewthatdeath is
an evilbyappeal to the sadness of losing the object of an emotional
attachmentis no easy task. Besides the general difficulty of pre-
cisely characterizing the alleged evil, such an appeal must over-
come at least two serious objections. First,in the ordinarycase of
losing someone or something to which you are emotionallyat-
tached, the loss is an evil because, afterthe loss, you remain at-
tached to whatis lost. Withtime,thatattachmenttypically weakens
and eventuallymay disappear altogether.In that case, the loss is
no longer a serious problem. But if detachmentis the solution to
a loss, then it is not clear whydeath itselfisn't a solution to the
problem it seems to create. For upon dying,the deceased is no
longer attached to that which he loses throughdeath. Rather,he
and all of his attachmentsare no more.
A successful reply here will no doubt begin by insistingthat
death does not bring withit detachmentin the way that time can
in the case of ordinarylosses. Death preventsdetachmentjust as

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much as it eliminatesattachment.Hence, death does not provide

the solution that time offersin the case of ordinarylosses. The
crucial issue, then, is whetherit provides somethingjust as good.
I am inclined to say that it does not, on the grounds thatbecause
one dies attached, one's death clearlypreventsone fromfulfilling
the desires that partlyconstituteone's attachments,including the
desire not to lose that to which one is attached. I desperatelydo
not wantto lose mybeloved forever.My death would ensure losing
her forever.The fact that death eliminates the desire does not
obviate the factthat death also preventsits fulfillment.
A second objection urges thatit is no evilto be deprivedbydeath
of the objects of one's attachmentsbecause it is unreasonable to
form such attachments.If Epicurus was correct in claiming that
practicalwisdominvolvesparing down the desiresso thatone wants
only those things that one can obtain and that bring happiness
withoutpain, then it is unwise to form strong emotional attach-
mentspreciselybecause of the impermanence of oneself and oth-
ers.25Thus, the Epicurean might object that the desire for per-
manence inherent in attachmentsis a foolish or excessive desire,
and so its nonfulfillment is not a genuine evil.26
Two lines of reply are possible here. One is to insist that the
Epicurean project of overcomingattachmentis futile.Humans un-
avoidablyform emotional attachments.Hence, the desire not to
be permanentlydeprived of the objects of one's attachmentsis
unavoidable for human beings. Such a desire cannot, therefore,
be described as excessive or unreasonable.
This is not to say that the nonfulfillmentof an unavoidable de-

25Much of what we know about Epicurus's ethical systemcan be found

in his Letterto Menoeceus, in Letters,Principle Doctrines, and Vatican Sayings
(New York:Macmillan, 1988), 53-59.
26CertainBuddhists might raise similar concerns. For it is a tenet of
Buddhismthatsufferingis the product of attachment,of the graspingsort
of desire that makes us cling to whateverwe have (including ourselves).
To rid ourselvesof this sort of desire, we need to overcome the illusion
that there is anythingto cling to, that is, we must recognize that radical
impermanence is one of the marks of all being. Even the persistenceof
the selfis regarded as an illusion,and hence clingingto the selfis a prod-
uct of ignorance.Accordingly,we can freeourselvesfromour attachments
ifwe can fullyrealize thateverythingis radicallyimpermanent.And having
freedourselvesfromour attachments,we will be freed fromour fear and
loathing of death. (As many Buddhistswould readilyaffirm,this is easier
said than done.)

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 DISAPPOINTMENT, SADNESS,AND DEATH

sire is alwaysan evil. One might have an unavoidable desire for

something bad. But in the case of most attachments,we desire
somethingit would be good to have. It would be good for me if I
did not lose the objects of my emotional attachments.Therefore,
if mydesire for thisgood is unavoidable, then its nonfulfillmentis
a genuine evil.
But is this desire trulyunavoidable? Many human beings (in-
cluding,apparently,Epicurus) have claimed to have achieved a life
of detachment.Thus, the burden of proof must fall on those who
deny the possibilityof this achievement.Accordingly,I am more
inclined to relyupon a second possible line of reply,which is to
argue that the cure offeredby the Epicurean is apt to be worse
than the disease. Emotional attachmentsare, in spite of theircosts,
a richsource of meaning in the livesof mosthuman beings. Hence,
by pursuing a life of detachment,one may well condemn oneself
to an impoverishedexistence. But then it can hardlybe unreason-
able to form attachmentseven though this does involve wanting
thingsthat one cannot possiblyhave.
Even this replyis littlemore than a suggestion,and so I must
concede thatI have failed to firmlyestablishthe position thatit is
fittingto be saddened by the fact that death deprives us of the
objects of our emotional attachments.More workneeds to be done
to reveal the nature and value of emotional attachmentsin order
to settle this matterconclusively.

7. Towards a Complete Account of the Disvalue of Death

To conclude, it appears that at least one argumentfromdepriva-

tion (namely,the argumentbased on E) can successfullyestablish
that,typically,an early death is a genuine evil. But it is less clear
whetheran argumentfrom deprivationcan reach the conclusion
that it is a genuine evil not to live longer than a human being
possiblycan. For the deprivationhere is inevitable in the strong
sense of being humanlyunavoidable. Thus, such an argumentmust
meet the challenge of distinguishingthis deprivationfrom those
manyhumanlyunavoidable deprivationsthatare not genuine evils.
I have brieflyexplored two promisingapproaches to meeting this
challenge and, takingthe second of these, I have reached the con-
clusion that death at any age is apt to be a serious evil in virtueof
deprivingits subject of the objects of her emotional attachments.

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However,lingeringEpicurean doubts leave open the possibilityof

retreatingto less troublingground.
Even if both of the argumentsfromdeprivationpresented here
succeed, it is worthemphasizing that I do not thinkthat theycan
provide a complete account of whatis bad about death. There may
be evils in death that do not involvedeprivationsat all. And even
if that is not the case, there are many plausible argumentsfrom
deprivation that I have not considered here. I have not, for ex-
ample, explored F. M. Kamm's suggestionthat there is an evil to
be found in the factthat death involvesa decline froma relatively
good condition to a relativelybad one. Nor have I investigatedthe
possibilitythat someone who is preventedby death fromcomplet-
ing her projects has (at least typically)therebysufferedan evil.
Thus, this essay offersonly a partial account of the disvalue of
death (and a fewsuggestionson how to move towardsa complete
account).
Regardless of whetherthis partial account proves to be success-
ful,I will regard this essay as a success if it nudges the contempo-
raryphilosophical discussion of argumentsfrom deprivationin a
more fruitfuldirection. I can reasonably hope that it will. For, at
the veryleast,thisessaydemonstratesthe importanceofaddressing
the neglected question of how to distinguishdeprivationsthatmer-
it distressfromdeprivationsthat,although comparativelyverybad,
are not the least bit troubling.This question should be of interest
to anyone who wantsto knowwhetherthe factthatdeath deprives
us of life'sbenefitsis any more suitable as a basis fordissatisfaction
with the human condition than our inevitable failure to happen
upon Aladdin's lamp.
Kansas State University

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