The value and justification of knowledge, according to Francis Bacon,

consists above all in its practical application and utility;

its true function is to extend the dominion of the human race,
the reign of man over nature.

In the Novum Organum Bacon calls attention to the practical effects of the
invention of printing, gunpowder and the magnet, which 'have changed
the face of things and the state of the world; the first in literature,
the second in warfare; the third in navigation'. (cf. 129)

the fact remains that he did look forward

to the new era of scientific and technical achievement: his claim
to be a herald or buccinator of that era was justified, even if he
over-estimated his power of vision.

Francis Bacon was born in r56r in London.

Bacon planned a great work, the

Instauratio magna, of which the first part, the De dignitate et
augmentis scientiarum, appeared in r623. This was a revision and
extension of The Advancement of Learning. The second part, the
Novum organum, had appeared in 1620.

3. According to Bacon 'that division of human learning is most

true which is derived from the threefold faculty of the rational
soul'. Taking memory, imagination and reason to be the three
faculties of the rational soul, he assigns history to memory,
poetry to imagination and philosophy to reasoning. History,
however, comprises not only 'civil history', but also 'natural
history', and Bacon remarks that 'literary history' should be
attended to.

Philosophy falls into three main divisions; the first

being concerned with God (de Numine), the second with nature
and the third with man. The first division, that concerned with
God, is natural or rational theology; it does not comprise 'inspired
or sacred theology', which is the result of God's revelation rather
than of man's reasoning. Revealed theology is, indeed, 'the haven
and sabbath of all human contemplations', 3 and it is a province
of knowledge (scientia), but it stands outside philosophy. Philo-
sophy is the work of the human reason, nature being known
directly (radio directo), God indirectly by means of creatures
(radio refracto), and man by reflection (radio reflexo).

The divisions of philosophy, he says,1 are like the branches of a

tree which are united in a common trunk. This means that there
is 'one universal science, which is the mother of the rest' and is
known as 'first philosophy'.
This comprises both fundamental
axioms, like quae in eodem tertio conveniunt, et inter se conveniunt,
and fundamental notions like 'possible' and 'impossible', 'being'
and 'not-being', etc.

The philosophy of
nature Bacon divides into speculative and operative natural
philosophy. Speculative natural philosophy is subdivided into
physics (Physica specialis) and metaphysics. Metaphysics, as part
of natural philosophy, must be distinguished, Bacon says,3 from
first philosophy and natural theology, to neither of which does he
give the name 'metaphysics'. What, then, is the difference between
physics and metaphysics? It is to be found in the types of causes
with which they are respectively concerned. Physics treats of
efficient and material causes, metaphysics of formal and final
causes. But Bacon presently declares that 'inquiry into final
causes is sterile and, like a virgin consecrated to God, produces
nothing'.. One can say, then, that metaphysics, according to him,
is concerned with formal causes. This was the position he adopted
Novum organum.

By 'forms', the object of metaphysics, he meant

what he called 'fixed laws'. The form of heat is the law of heat.

Actually there is no radical division between physics and meta-

physics. Physics started with examining specific types of matter
or bodies in a restricted field of causality and activity; but it goes
on to consider more general laws. Thus it shades off into meta-
physics, which is concerned with the highest or widest laws of
nature.

Bacon's use of Aristotelian terminology is misleading.

Metaphysics is for him the most general part of what might
otherwise be called physics. Moreover, it is not directed to
contemplation but to action. We seek to learn the laws of nature
with a view to increasing human control over bodies.

Speculative natural philosophy consisting, then, of physics and

metaphysics, what is operative natural philosophy?
It is the application of the former; and it falls into two parts, mechanics
(by which Bacon means the science of mechanics) and magic.
Mechanics is the application of physics in practice, while magic is
applied metaphysics.

By 'magic' he does not mean, he tells us, the superstitious

and frivolous magic which is as different from true magic as the
chronicles about King Arthur are different from Caesar's com-
mentaries: he means the practical application of the science of
'hidden forms' or laws.

restored to an old man; but it is probable

that a knowledge of the true natures of assimilation, bodily 'spirits',
etc., could prolong life or even partly restore youth 'by means of
diets, baths, unctions, the right medicines, suitable exercises and
the like'.

The 'appendix' of natural philosophy is mathematics. 2 Pure

mathematics comprises geometry, which treats of continuous
abstract quantity, and arithmetic, which treats of discrete abstract
quantity. 'Mixed mathematics' comprises perspective, music,
astronomy, cosmography, architecture, etc.

Elsewhere,3 however, Bacon remarks that astronomy is rather the noblest part of
physics than a part of mathematics. When astronomers pay
exclusive attention to mathematics they produce false hypotheses.

The third main part of philosophy is the part dealing with man.
I t comprises philosoPhia humanitatis or anthropology and philo-
sophia civilis or political philosophy. The former treats first of the
human body and is subdivided into medicine, cosmetics, athletics
and ars voluptuaria, including, for example, music considered from
a certain point of view.

Secondly it treats of the human soul, though the nature of the rational,
divinely created and immortal soul (sPiraculum) as distinct from the
sensitive soul is a subject which belongs to theology rather than to philosophy.

Psychology thus leads on to

a consideration of logic, doctrina circa inteUectum, and ethics,
doctrina circa voluntatem. 1 The parts of logic are the artes inveniendi,
judicandi, retinendi et tradendi. The most important subdivision of
the ars inveniendi is what Bacon calls 'the interpretation of nature',
which proceeds ab experimentis ad axiomata, quae et iPsa nova
experimenta designent. 2 This is the novum organum. The art of
judging is divided into induction, which belongs to the novum
organum, and the syllogism.

In the first
place, he eliminated from physics consideration of final causality,
on the ground that the search for final causes leads thinkers to be
content with assigning specious and unreal causes to events when
they ought to be looking for the real physical causes, knowledge
of which alone is of value for extending human power.

Metaphysics was for

him neither the study of being as being nor a contemplation of
unmoving final causes: it is rather the study of the most general
principles or laws or 'forms' of the material world, and this study
is undertaken in view of a practical end.

His conception of
philosophy was to all intents and purposes naturalistic and
materialistic... It does mean, however, that he excluded from philosophy any
consideration of spiritual being.

Bacon thus made a sharp division

between theology and philosophy, not simply in the sense that he
made a formal distinction between them but also in the sense that
he accorded full liberty to a materialistic and mechanistic inter-
pretation of Nature. The philosopher is concerned with what is
material and with what can be considered from the mechanistic
and naturalistic point of view.

for him first philosophy was the study of the axioms

which are common to the different sciences and of various 'trans-
cendental' concepts considered in their relations to the physical
sciences. In a broad sense, Bacon's conception of philosophy was
positivistic in character, provided that this is not taken to imply
a rejection of theology as a source of knowledge.

4. I turn now to the second part of the Instauratio magna,

which is represented by the N ovum organum sive indicia vera de
interpretatione naturae.

'Knowledge and human power come

to the same thing', for 'nature cannot be conquered except by
obeying her'. (cf. III)

The sciences which man now

possesses, says Bacon,2 are useless for obtaining practical effects
(ad inventionem operum) and our present logic is useless for the
purpose of establishing sciences. 'The logic in use is of more value
for establishing and rendering permanent the errors which are
based on vulgar conceptions than for finding out the truth; so
that it is more harmful than useful. (cf. XI e XII)

The syllogism consists of propositions; and propositions consist of words; and

words
express concepts. Thus, if the concepts are confused and if they
are the result of over-hasty abstraction, nothing which is built
upon them is secure.

Our only hope lies in true induction. (cf. 14)

First, the mind

may proceed from sense and from the perception of particulars to
the most general axioms and from these deduce the less general
propositions. Secondly it may proceed from sense and the percep-
tion of particulars to immediately attainable axioms and thence,
gradually and patiently, to more general axioms. The first way
is known and employed; but it is unsatisfactory, because particulars
are not examined with sufficient accuracy, care and comprehen-
siveness and because the mind jumps from an insufficient basis to
general conclusions and axioms. It produced anticipationes
naturae, rash and premature generalizations. The second way,
which has not yet been tried, is the true way. The mind proceeds
from a careful and patient examination of particulars to the
interpretatio naturae.

Bacon does not deny, then, that some sort of induction had been
previously known and employed; what he objected to was rash
and hasty generalization, resting on no firm basis in experience.

Induction starts with the operation of the senses; but it requires

the co-operation of mind, though the mind's activity must be
controlled by observation. Bacon may have lacked an adequate
notion of the place and importance of hypothesis in scientific
method; but he saw clearly that the value of conclusions based on
observation depend on the character of that observation.

He does not
accuse the Aristotelians and Scholastics of neglecting induction
entirely but rather of being in too much of a hurry to generalize
and to draw conclusions. He thought of them as being more
concerned with logical consistency, with ensuring that their con-
clusions followed in due form from their premisses, than with
giving a sure foundation to the premisses on the truth of which
the conclusions depended. Of the logicians he says. that 'they seem
to have given scarcely any serious consideration to induction; they
pass it over with a brief mention and hurry on to the formulas of
disputation'. He, on the other hand, rejects the syllogism on the
ground that induction must take its rise in the observation of

things, of particular facts or events, and must stick to them as

closely as possible. The logicians wing their way at once to the
most general principles and deduce conclusions syllogistically.
This procedure is admittedly very useful for purposes of disputa-
tion; but it is useless for purposes of natural and practical science.
'And so the order of demonstration is reversed';l in induction we
proceed in the opposite direction to that in which we proceed in
deduction.

It might appear that Bacon's insistence on the practical ends

of inductive science would itself tend to encourage the drawing of
over-hasty conclusions. This was not his intention at least. He
condemns 2 the 'unreasonable and puerile' desire to snatch at
results which, 'as an Atlanta's apple, hinders the race'. In other
words, the establishment of scientific laws by the patient employ-
ment of the inductive method will bring greater light to the mind
and will prove of more utility in the long run than unco-ordinated
particular truths, however immediately practical the latter may
seem to be.

But to attain a certain knowledge of nature is not so easy or

simple as it may sound at first hearing, for the human mind is
influenced by preconceptions and prejudices which bear upon our
interpretation of experience and distort our judgments.

Hence Bacon's famous doctrine of 'the idols'.

The 'idols of the tribe' (idola tribus) are those errors, the ten-
dency to which is inherent in human nature and which hinder
objective judgment.