G.R. No.
193643 January 29, 2013 1) An opposition to a petition for registration is not a condition precedent to the
ANTONIO D. DAYAO vs. COMELEC
Facts:
LPGMA is a non-stock, non-profit association of consumers and small industry
players in the LPG and energy sector. It sought to register as a party-list
organization for the May 10, 2010 elections and was approved by the COMELEC.
Petitioners filed a complaint and petition before the COMELEC for the cancellation
of LPGMAs registration as a party-list organization, arguing that LPGMA does not
represent a marginalized sector of the society because its incorporators, officers
and members are not marginalized or underrepresented citizens.
In response, LPGMA countered that Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution does not require that party-list representatives must be members of
the marginalized and/or underrepresented sector of the society. It also averred that
the ground cited by the petitioners is not one of those mentioned in Section 6 of
R.A. No. 7941 and that petitioners are just trying to resurrect their lost chance to
oppose the petition for registration.
The COMELEC dismissed the complaint for two reasons. First, the ground for
cancellation cited by the petitioners is not among the exclusive enumeration in
Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941. Second, the complaint is actually a belated opposition
to LPGMAs petition for registration which has long been approved with finality.
Petitioners motions for reconsideration were denied.
Issues:
1) Whether or not a belated opposition to a petition for registration bars the
action of complainants.
2) Whether or not the Constitution and the Party-List System Act (RA 7941)
require that incorporators, officers and members of a party-list must be
marginalized or underrepresented citizens.
Ruling of the Court:
There was no valid justification for the dismissal of the complaint for cancellation.
However, in light of COMELEC Resolution dated December 13, 2012, the present
petitions ought to be dismissed.
filing of a complaint for cancellation.
Section 6, R.A. No. 7941 lays down the grounds and procedure for the cancellation
of party-list accreditation, viz:
Sec. 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration.
The COMELEC may, motu propio or upon verified complaint of any interested
party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national,
regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association,
organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political
party, foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its
officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan
election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to
elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to
obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-
list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in
which it has registered.
For the COMELEC to validly exercise its statutory power to cancel the registration
of a party-list group, the law imposes only two (2) conditions: (1) due notice and
hearing is afforded to the party-list group concerned; and (2) any of the enumerated
grounds for disqualification in Section 6 exists.
2) In Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC,36 the Court explained
that the "laws, rules or regulations relating to elections" referred to in paragraph 5
include Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941,37 which declares the underlying policy for the
law that marginalized and underrepresented Filipino citizens become members of
the House of Representatives. A party or an organization, therefore, that does not
comply with this policy must be disqualified.
The party-list system of representation was crafted for the marginalized and
underrepresented and their alleviation is the ultimate policy of the law. In fact, there
is no need to categorically mention that "those who are not marginalized and
underrepresented are disqualified."
All told, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
complaint for cancellation of LPGMAs party-list accreditation. In the ordinary
course of procedure, the herein complaint should be remanded to the COMELEC.
However, on August 2, 2012, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9513 which
subjected to summary evidentiary hearings all existing and registered party-list
groups, including LPGMA, to assess their continuing compliance with the
requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and the guidelines set in Ang Bagong Bayani. The
Resolution stated, among others, that the registration of all non-compliant groups
shall be cancelled. LPGMA submitted to a factual and evidentiary hearing before the
COMELEC and was deemed to have complied with all requirements for
registration.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ANTONIO COMADRE
[G.R. No. 153559. June 8, 2004]
at around 7:00 in the evening of August 6, 1995, Robert Agbanlog with four others
were having a drinking spree on the terrace of the house of Robert's father when
they noticed appellants Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano
stopped in front of the house. While his companions looked on, Antonio suddenly
threw an object on the roof of the terrace and fled immediately together with his
companions. The object which happened to be a hand grenade suddenly explode
ripping a hole in the roof. Robert and his companions were hit by shrapnel and
slumped unconscious on the floor. They were all rushed to the Hospital however
Robert died before reaching the hospital.
The undisputed facts show that when Antonio was in the act of throwing the hand
grenade, his companions merely looked on without uttering a single word of
encouragement or performed any act to assist him. The trial court held that the
mere presence of the two provided encouragement and a sense of security to
Antonio, thus proving the existence of conspiracy.
Issue Can there be a conspiracy based on the foregoing facts?
Ruling
A conspiracy must be shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the commission
of the crime itself. Mere presence of a person at the scene of the crime does not
make him a conspirator for conspiracy transcends companionship.
The evidence shows that George Comadre and Danilo Lozano did not have any
participation in the commission of the crime and must therefore be set free. Their
mere presence at the scene of the crime as well as their close relationship with
Antonio are insufficient to establish conspiracy considering that they performed no
positive act in furtherance of the crime.
Neither was it proven that their act of running away with Antonio was an act of
giving moral assistance to his criminal act. The ratiocination of the trial court that
their presence provided encouragement and sense of security to Antonio, is devoid
of any factual basis. Such finding is not supported by the evidence on record and
cannot therefore be a valid basis of a finding of conspiracy.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ISIDRO FLORES y LAGUA
G.R. No. 188315, August 25, 2010
FACTS:
AAA lived with her adoptive mother, BBB, since she was just a few months old.
BBB is married to appellant, whowas working abroad for six years. Appellant came
home in 1997 and lived with AAA and BBB. BBB was workingas a restaurant
supervisor from 4pm to 2am for six days a week.In February 1999 at around 9:30
pm, AAA then 11 yrs old, was sleeping inside the house when she felt and
sawappellant touch her thighs. The following day, at around the same time and
while BBB was at work, appellantagain touched AAA from her legs up to her
breast.Two weeks after the incident, AAA was already asleep when she suddenly
woke up and saw appellant holding aknife, then appellant was able to penetrate her.
Two days after, appellant again raped her. AAA recounted thatappellant raped her
at least 3 times a week at the same time until October 15, 2002, when she was 14
yrs. old.RTC rendered judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
181 counts of rape.CA affirmed thefinding that AAA was raped by appellant, but did
so only on 2 counts and consider the qualifying circumstances of minority and
relationship.
ISSUE:
Whether or not appellant should be consider as a guardian of the victim even
without court authorityWhether that the qualifying/aggravating circumstances of
relationship is applicable.
HELD:
To justify the death penalty, the prosecution must specifically allege in the
information and prove during the trialthe qualifying circumstances of minority of the
victim and her relationship to the offender.Jurisprudence dictates that the guardian
must be a person who has a legal relationship with his ward. The theorythat a
guardian must be legally appointed was first enunciated in the early case of People
vs. Dela Cruz whichheld that the guardian referred to in the law is either a legal or
judicial guardian as understood in the rules on CivilProcedure.The law requires a
legal or judicial guardian since it is the consanguineous relation or the solemnity of
judicialappointment which impresses upon the guardian the lofty purpose of his
office and normally deters him fromviolating its objectives. The appellant cannot be
considered as the guardian falling within the ambit of theamendatory provision
introduced by RA 7659.Since both logic and fact conjointly demonstrate that he is
actuallyonly a custodian, that is, a mere caretaker of the children over whom he
exercises a limited degree of authorityfor a temporary period, we cannot impose
death penalty contemplated for a real guardian under RA 7659, sincehe does not fit
into that category.Be that as it may, this qualifying circumstance of being a guardian
was not even mentioned in the Information.
What was clearly stated was that appellant was the adopting father of AAA,
which the prosecution nonetheless failed to establish.For failure of the prosecution
to prove the qualifying circumstance of relationship, appellant could only
beconvicted for two counts of simple rape, and not qualified rape.
PEOPLE VS. FLORES Y LAGUA (2010) G.R. No. 188315 | 2010-08-25
Subject: In rape cases, the victims credibility becomes the single most important
issue; Circumstances that qualify a crime and increase its penalty to death cannot be
subject of stipulation
Facts:
AAA is below fifteen (15) years of age; Appellant is the guardian of AAA; and AAA
has been under the care and custody of appellant and his wife since AAA was one
and a half years old.
In 181 Informations, which are similarly worded except for the dates of the
commission of the crime and the age of the complainant, Isidro Floress was accused
of raping AAA.
The RTC rendered judgment finding Isidro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 181
counts of rape. The Court of Appeals affirmed the finding that AAA was raped by
appellant, but it did so only on two (2) counts.
The appellate court found that the guilt of appellant on the first and last incidents of
rape in Criminal Cases Nos. 03-081 and 03-261, respectively, was proven by the
prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. With respect to the other incidents,
according to the appellate court, the testimony of AAA was merely based on
general allegations that she was raped on the average of three (3) times a week
from February 1999 to 15 October 2002.
In defense, Isidro contends that an adopting parent is not included within the
purview of qualifying relationships under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code.
Assuming arguendo that an adopting parent may be construed as similar to a parent,
the term adopting parent must be given a definite and technical meaning in that
the process of adoption must first be undertaken and a judicial decree to that
matter must have been issued.
Held: CARANDANG V. SANTIAGO (G.R. NO. L-8238, MAY 25, 1955)

In rape cases, the victims credibility becomes the single most important issue LABRADOR, J

1. In rape cases, the victims credibility becomes the single most important issue.
For when a woman says she was raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to
show that rape was committed; thus, if her testimony meets the test of credibility,
the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof.
2. When the offended party is of tender age and immature, courts are inclined to
give credit to her account of what transpired, considering not only her relative
vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be exposed if the matter to
which she testified is not true. When a girl, especially a minor, says that she has
been defiled, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was inflicted
on her.
Facts:
The petitioner seeks the help of the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to annul
the order of Judge Vicente Santiago suspending the civil case filed by the petitioner
against Tomas Valenton, Sr. and Tomas Valenton, Jr. to await the result of a criminal
case filed by said petitioner against the defendants.
In his contention, Judge Santiago stated that trial of the civil action must await the
result of the criminal case on appeal. The court anchored its decision on the
contention of the defendants that the plaintiff cannot invoke article 33 since the
defendants were charged with frustrated homicide and not for physical injuries.

Circumstances that qualify a crime and increase its penalty to death cannot be Issue:
subject of stipulation
Whether or not the order of the court of first instance is correct.
3. It was stipulated during the pre-trial conference that appellant is the guardian of
AAA. However, we cannot simply invoke this admission to consider guardianship as Ruling:
a qualifying circumstance in the crime of rape. Circumstances that qualify a crime
and increase its penalty to death cannot be subject of stipulation. The accused
cannot be condemned to suffer the extreme penalty of death on the basis of No. The supreme court in its ruling decided in favor of the appellant, the term
stipulations or admissions. physical injuries just like the words defamation and fraud mentioned in the
aforementioned article were used in its generic sense. It does not pertain to the
physical injury stated in the Revised Penal Code, since the defendant in his
4. The guardian must be a person who has legal relationship with his ward. The law attempt to kill the plaintiff caused him bodily injury the court deemed it proper for
requires a legal or judicial guardian since it is the consanguineous relation or the the plaintiff to invoke article 33 of the Civil Code.
solemnity of judicial appointment which impresses upon the guardian the lofty
purpose of his office and normally deters him from violating its objectives. (See
People v Garcia)

5. In this case, this qualifying circumstance of being a guardian was not even
mentioned in the Informations. What was clearly stated was that appellant was the
adopting father of AAA, which the prosecution nonetheless failed to establish.
Thus, for failure of the prosecution to prove the qualifying circumstance of
relationship, appellant could only be convicted for two (2) counts of simple rape,
and not qualified rape.
ROMUALDEZ VS MARCELO (G.R. NOS. 166510-33, JULY 28, 2006)
Facts:
Petitioner claims that the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in
recommending the filing of 24 informations against him for violation of Section 7 of
Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; that the
Ombudsman cannot revive the aforementioned cases which were previously
dismissed by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution of February 10, 2004; that the
defense of prescription may be raised even for the first time on appeal and thus
there is no necessity for the presentation of evidence thereon before the court a
quo. Thus, this Court may accordingly dismiss Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049
pending before the Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04-23185704-231860
pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, all on the ground of prescription.
In its Comment, the Ombudsman argues that the dismissal of the informations in
Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 does not mean that petitioner was thereafter
exempt from criminal prosecution; that new informations may be filed by the
Ombudsman should it find probable cause in the conduct of its preliminary
investigation; that the filing of the complaint with the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG) in 1987 and the filing of the information with the
Sandiganbayan in 1989 interrupted the prescriptive period; that the absence of the
petitioner from the Philippines from 1986 until 2000 also interrupted the aforesaid
period based on Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code.
For its part, the PCGG avers in its Comment that, in accordance with the 1987
Constitution and RA No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the Ombudsman
need not wait for a new complaint with a new docket number for it to conduct a
preliminary investigation on the alleged offenses of the petitioner; that considering
that both RA No. 3019 and Act No. 3326 or the Act To Establish Periods of
Prescription For Violations Penalized By Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and
to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin To Run, are silent as to whether
prescription should begin to run when the offender is absent from the Philippines,
the Revised Penal Code, which answers the same in the negative, should be applied.
Issues:
(a) Whether the preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman in
Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 was a nullity?
(b) Whether the offenses for which petitioners are being charged with have already
prescribed?
Held:
Petitioner claims that the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in
recommending the filing of 24 informations against him for violation of Section 7 of
Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; that the
Ombudsman cannot revive the aforementioned cases which were previously
dismissed by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution of February 10, 2004; that the
defense of prescription may be raised even for the first time on appeal and thus
there is no necessity for the presentation of evidence thereon before the court a
quo. Thus, this Court may accordingly dismiss Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049
pending before the Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04-23185704-231860
pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, all on the ground of prescription.
Benjamin (?Kokoy?) Romualdez vs. Ombudsman Marcelo (2006)
G.R. Nos. 165510-33 | 2006-07-28
Subject: Dismissal of information on grounds other than prescription or double
jeopardy does not preclude the filing of another information for a crime
constituting the same facts; No double jeopardy arises from re-filing of the
information; Preliminary investigation; Quashal of information on the ground of
prescription of the offense charged therein; Prescriptive period for offenses
punishable under RA No. 3019; Computation of prescriptive period; In the
prescription of offenses punished under special penal laws, absence of offender from
the country does not toll the running of the prescriptive period; The proceeding
that could interrupt the running of prescription is that which is filed or initiated by
the offended party before the appropriate body or office; Suppletory application of
the Revised Penal Code to special laws finds relevance only when the provisions of
the special law are silent on a particular matter; Act No. 3326 is not a special law as
contemplated under Art 10, RPC; Prescription of offenses punished under special
laws is governed by Act No. 3326; Liberal application of the law on prescription in
criminal cases; Offenses charged have prescribed

Facts:
Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez was charged with violations of Section 7 of RA No.
3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) for failure to file his Statements of
Assets and Liabilities for the period 1967-1985 during his tenure as Ambassador
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and for the period 1963-1966 during his tenure
as Technical Assistant in the Department of Foreign Affairs.
Romualdez claims that the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion
in recommending the filing of 24 informations against him for violation of Section 7
of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). he claims
that the Ombudsman cannot revive the aforementioned cases which were
previously dismissed by the Sandiganbayan (Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429).
Moreover, Romualdez claims that the crime charged has prescribed and the defense
of prescription may be raised even for the first time on appeal and thus there is no
necessity for the presentation of evidence thereon.
The Ombudsman argues that the dismissal of the informations in the Sandiganbayan
(Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429) does not mean that Romualdez was thereafter
exempt from criminal prosecution, and that new informations may be filed by the
Ombudsman should it find probable cause in the conduct of its preliminary
investigation. The Ombudsmand also claims that the filing of the complaint with the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) in 1987 and the filing of
the information with the Sandiganbayan in 1989 interrupted the prescriptive period.
Also, the absence of Romualdez from the Philippines from 1986 until 2000 also
interrupted the prescriptive period based on Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code.
The issues for resolution are: (1) whether the preliminary investigation conducted
by the Ombudsman in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 was a nullity; and (2)
whether the offenses for which Romualdez are being charged have already
prescribed.
Held:
Dismissal of information on grounds other than prescription or double jeopardy
does not preclude the filing of another information for a crime constituting the
same facts
1. The preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman in Criminal Case
Nos. 13406-13429 is a valid proceeding despite the previous dismissal thereof by
the Sandiganbayan in its Minute Resolution.
2. The dismissal by the Sandiganbayan was because the informations were filed by
an unauthorized party, hence void. In such a case, Section 6, Rule 117 of the Rules
of Court is pertinent and applicable. Thus:
SEC. 6. Order sustaining the motion to quash not a bar to another prosecution;
exception. - An order sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense unless the motion was based on the grounds
specified in section 3(g) and (i)[10] of this Rule.
3. An order sustaining a motion to quash on grounds other than extinction of
criminal liability or double jeopardy does not preclude the filing of another
information for a crime constituting the same facts.
No double jeopardy arises from re-filing of the information
4. If the complaint or information was insufficient because it was so defective in
form or substance that the conviction upon it could not have been sustained, its
dismissal without the consent of the accused cannot be pleaded. As the fiscal had
no authority to file the information, the dismissal of the first information would not
be a bar in petitioner's subsequent prosecution. (see Cudia v. Court of Appeals)
Preliminary investigation
5. The preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman in the instant cases
was not a violation of Romualdez's right to be informed of the charges against him.
6. It is of no moment that the cases investigated by the Ombudsman bore the same
docket numbers as those cases which have already been dismissed by the
Sandiganbayan, to wit: Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429. The assignment of a
docket number is an internal matter designed for efficient record keeping. It is
usually written in the Docket Record in sequential order corresponding to the date
and time of filing a case. The use of the docket numbers of the dismissed cases was
merely for reference. In fact, after the new informations were filed, new docket
numbers were assigned, i.e., Criminal Cases Nos. 28031-28049.
Quashal of information on the ground of prescription of the offense charged therein
7. Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides that the accused may, at any time
before he enters his plea, move to quash the complaint and information on the
ground that the criminal action or liability has been extinguished, which ground
includes the defense of prescription considering that Article 89 of the Revised Penal
Code enumerates prescription as one of those grounds which totally extinguishes
criminal liability. Indeed, even if there is yet to be a trial on the merits of a criminal
case, the accused can very well invoke the defense of prescription.
8. In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following should
be considered:
(a) the period of prescription for the offense charged;
(b) the time the period of prescription starts to run; and
(c) the time the prescriptive period was interrupted
Prescriptive period for offenses punishable under RA No. 3019
9. Section 11 of RA No. 3019 provides that all offenses punishable therein shall
prescribe in 15 years.
10. However, prior to the amendment of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 by B.P. Blg.
195 which was approved on March 16, 1982, the prescriptive period for offenses
punishable under the said statute was only ten (10) years. The longer period of 15
years provided under the amendment, not being favorable to the accused cannot be
given retroactive effect.
11. Thus, for offenses allegedly committed by the petitioner from 1962 up to
March 15, 1982, the same shall prescribe in 10 years. On the other hand, for
offenses allegedly committed by the petitioner during the period from March 16,
1982 until 1985, the same shall prescribe in 15 years.
Computation of prescriptive period
12. As to when these two periods begin to run, reference is made to Act No. 3326
which governs the computation of prescription of offenses defined by and penalized
under special laws. Section 2 of Act No. 3326 provides:
SEC. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery
thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the
guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for
reasons not constituting jeopardy.
13. The court has ruled that the phrase "institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment" may be either disregarded as surplusage or should be
deemed preceded by the word "until." (see People v. Duque).
14. Thus, the prescriptive period of the offenses herein began to run from the
discovery thereof or on May 8, 1987, which is the date of the complaint filed by the
former Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez against Romualdez with the PCGG.
15. In cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed prior to the February
1986 EDSA Revolution that ousted President Ferdinand E. Marcos, we ruled that
the government as the aggrieved party could not have known of the violations at
the time the questioned transactions were made. Moreover, no person would have
dared to question the legality of those transactions. Thus, the counting of the
prescriptive period commenced from the date of discovery of the offense in 1992
after an exhaustive investigation by the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest
Loans. (see Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v.
Desierto)
In the prescription of offenses punished under special penal laws, absence of
offender from the country does not toll the running of the prescriptive period
16. The ombudsmand aver that, applying Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code
suppletorily, the absence of the Romualdez from the Philippines from 1986 until
April 27, 2000 prevented the prescriptive period for the alleged offenses from
running.
17. Section 2 of Act. No. 3326 is conspicuously silent as to whether the absence of
the offender from the Philippines bars the running of the prescriptive period. The
silence of the law can only be interpreted to mean that Section 2 of Act No. 3326
did not intend such an interruption of the prescription unlike the explicit mandate
of Article 91.
18. Even on the assumption that there is in fact a legislative gap caused by such an
omission, the Court [cannot] presume otherwise and supply the details thereof,
because a legislative lacuna cannot be filled by judicial fiat. Indeed, courts may not, in
the guise of the interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein
situations not provided nor intended by the lawmakers. An omission at the time of
the enactment, whether careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied
however after later wisdom may recommend the inclusion. Courts are not
authorized to insert into the law what they think should be in it or to supply what
they think the legislature would have supplied if its attention has been called to the
omission.
The proceeding that could interrupt the running of prescription is that which is filed
or initiated by the offended party before the appropriate body or office
19. Under Section 2 of Act No. 3326, the prescriptive period shall be interrupted
"when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person." However, there is no
such proceeding instituted against Romualdez to warrant the tolling of the
prescriptive periods of the offenses charged against him.
20. In Romualdez vs. Sandiganabayan, the court declared invalid the preliminary
investigation conducted by the PCGG in 1987 over the 24 offenses ascribed to
Romualdez (of failure to file annual statements of assets and liabilities), for lack of
jurisdiction of said offenses. Likewise, the information filed with the Sandiganbayan
by the PCGG in 1989 were declared invalid for being filed by an unauthorized party.
Indeed, the nullity of the proceedings initiated by then Solicitor General Chavez in
1987 with the PCGG and by the PCGG with the Sandiganbayan in 1989 is judicially
settled. In contemplation of the law, no proceedings exist that could have merited
the suspension of the prescriptive periods.
21. The only proceeding that could interrupt the running of prescription is that
which is filed or initiated by the offended party before the appropriate body or
office. (see People v. Maravilla, Llenes v. Dicdican)
22. In the case at bar, however, the complaint was filed with the wrong body, the
PCGG. Thus, the same could not have interrupted the running of the prescriptive
periods.
Suppletory application of the Revised Penal Code to special laws finds relevance
only when the provisions of the special law are silent on a particular matter
23. In his Dissenting Opinion, Mr. Justice Carpio contends that Article 10 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) makes Article 91 "supplementary to special laws, unless
the latter should provide the contrary." Nothing in RA 3019 prohibits the
supplementary application of Article 91, RPC which provides that Article 91 of the
Revised Penal Code which provides that "[t]he term of prescription should not run
when the offender is absent from the Philippine Archipelago." Hence, the offenses
charged against Romualdez could not have prescribed because the latter was absent
from the Philippines from 1986 to April 27, 2000 and thus the prescriptive period
did not run from the time of discovery on May 8, 1987.
24. Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. - Offenses which are
or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the
provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the
latter should specially provide the contrary.
25. However, it must be pointed out that the suppletory application of the Revised
Penal Code to special laws, by virtue of Article 10 thereof, finds relevance only
when the provisions of the special law are silent on a particular matter. (see People
v. Moreno; People v. Li Wai Cheung; People v. Chowdury)
Act No. 3326 is not a special law as contemplated under Art 10, RPC
26. According to Mr. Justice Carpio, Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code fills the
so-called "gap" in Act No. 3326. While it is true that Article 10 of the Revised Penal
Code makes the RPC suppletory to special laws, however, Act No. 3326 cannot fall
within the ambit of "special law" as contemplated and used in Article 10 of the RPC.
27. The term "special laws" refers to penal laws that punish acts not defined and
penalized by the (revised) Penal Code of the Philippines. (see United States v.
Serapio)
Prescription of offenses punished under special laws is governed by Act No. 3326
28. The law on prescription of offenses is found in Articles 90 and 91 of the
Revised Penal Code for offenses punishable thereunder. For those penalized under
special laws, Act No. 3326 applies. (Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on
Behest Loans v. Desierto)
29. Section 2 of Act No. 3326 provides that the prescription shall begin to run
from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not
known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The running of the prescriptive
period shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty
person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy. Clearly, Section 2 of Act No. 3326 did not provide that the
absence of the accused from the Philippines prevents the running of the prescriptive
period. Thus, the only inference that can be gathered from the foregoing is that the
legislature, in enacting Act No. 3326, did not consider the absence of the accused
from the Philippines as a hindrance to the running of the prescriptive period.
30. It is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the express
mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others.
This rule is expressed in the familiar maxim "expressio unius est exclusio
alterius." Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain
matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to
others. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would
not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention
been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those
expressly mentioned.
31. Had the legislature intended to include the accused's absence from the
Philippines as a ground for the interruption of the prescriptive period in special
laws, the same could have been expressly provided in Act No. 3326. [Example: In
RA No. 8424 (Tax Reform Act of 1997), Sec 281 expressly provided that The
term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the
Philippines.]
32. Moreover, Act No. 3326 must prevail over Article 91 because it specifically and
directly applies to special laws while the Revised Penal Code shall apply to special
laws only suppletorily and only when the latter do not provide the contrary. Indeed,
elementary rules of statutory construction dictate that special legal provisions must
prevail over general ones.
Liberal application of the law on prescription in criminal cases
33. A liberal interpretation of the law on prescription in criminal cases equally
provides the authority for the rule that the prescriptive period runs while the
accused is outside of Philippine jurisdiction. The nature of the law on prescription
of penal statutes supports this conclusion.
34. In the interpretation of the law on prescription of crimes, that which is more
favorable to the accused is to be adopted. The said legal principle takes into
account the nature of the law on prescription of crimes which is an act of amnesty
and liberality on the part of the state in favor of the offender. (see People v.
Pacificador; People v. Moran)
Offenses charged have prescribed
35. In the present case, the applicable 10-and-15-year prescriptive periods were
not interrupted by any event from the time they began to run on May 8, 1987. As a
consequence, the alleged offenses committed by Romualdez for the years 1963-
1982 prescribed 10 years from May 8, 1987 or on May 8, 1997. On the other hand,
the alleged offenses committed for the years 1983-1985 prescribed 15 years from
May 8, 1987 or on May 8, 2002.
36. Therefore, when the Office of the Special Prosecutor initiated the preliminary
investigation of Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 on March 3, 2004 by requiring
Romualdez to submit his counter-affidavit, the alleged offenses subject therein have
already prescribed. Indeed, the State has lost its right to prosecute Romualdez for
the offenses subject of Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049 pending before the
Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04-231857-04-231860 pending before the
Regional Trial Court.
COCONUT OIL REFINERS VS TORRES (GR 132527 29 JULY 2005)
Facts:
This is a Petition to enjoin and prohibit the public respondent Ruben Torres
in his capacity as Executive Secretary from allowing other private
respondents to continue with the operation of tax and duty-free shops
located at the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) and the Clark Special
Economic Zone (CSEZ). The petitioner seeks to declare Republic Act No.
7227 as unconstitutional on the ground that it allowed only tax-free (and
duty-free) importation of raw materials, capital and equipment. It reads:
The Subic Special Economic Zone shall be operated and managed as a
separate customs territory ensuring free flow or movement of goods and
capital within, into and exported out of the Subic Special Economic Zone, as
well as provide incentives such as tax and duty-free importations of raw
materials, capital and equipment. However, exportation or removal of
goods from the territory of the Subic Special Economic Zone to the other
parts of the Philippine territory shall be subject to customs duties and taxes
under the Customs and Tariff Code and other relevant tax laws of
thePhilippines [RA 7227, Sec 12 (b)].
Petitioners contend that the wording of Republic Act No. 7227 clearly limits
the grant of tax incentives to the importation of raw materials, capital and
equipment only thereby violating the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
He also assailed the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 97-A for being
violative of their right to equal protection. They asserted that private
respondents operating inside the SSEZ are not different from the retail
establishments located outside.
Issue:
Whether or not Republic Act No. 7227 is valid on the ground that it
violates the equal protection clause.
Decision:
The SC ruled in the negative. The phrase tax and duty-free importations of
raw materials, capital and equipment was merely cited as an example of
incentives that may be given to entities operating within the zone. Public
respondent SBMA correctly argued that the maxim expressio unius est
exclusio alterius, on which petitioners impliedly rely to support their
restrictive interpretation, does not apply when words are mentioned by
way of example.
The petition with respect to declaration of unconstitutionality of Executive
Order No. 97-A cannot be, likewise, sustained. The guaranty of the equal
protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based which was based
on reasonable classification. A classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on
substantial distinction, (2) be germane to the purpose of the law, (3) not be
limited to existing conditions only, and (4) apply equally to all members of
the same class. Applying the foregoing test to the present case, this Court
finds no violation of the right to equal protection of the laws. There is a
substantial distinctions lying between the establishments inside and outside
the zone. There are substantial differences in a sense that, investors will be
lured to establish and operate their industries in the so-called secured area
and the present business operators outside the area. There is, then, hardly
any reasonable basis to extend to them the benefits and incentives accorded
in R.A. 7227.