Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 192463 July 13, 2015

OMAIRA LOMONDOT and SARIPA LOMONDOT, Petitioners,

vs.
HON. RASAD G BALINDONG, Presiding Judge, Shari'a District Court, 4th Shari'a
Judicial District, Marawi City, Lanao del Sur and AMBOG PANGANDAMUAN and
SIMBANATAO DIACA, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before us is a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of demolition seeking
to annul the Order1 dated November 9, 2009 of the Shari'a District Court (SDC), Fourth Shari'a
Judicial District, Marawi City, issued in Civil Case No. 055-91, denying petitioners' motion for
the issuance of a writ of demolition, and the Orders2 dated January 5, 2010 and February 10,
2010 denying petitioners' first and second motions for reconsideration, respectively.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

On August 16, 1991, petitioners Omaira and Saripa Lomondot filed with the SDC, Marawi City,
a complaint for recovery of possession and damages with prayer for mandatory injunction and
temporary restraining order against respondents Ambog Pangandamun (Pangandamun) and
Simbanatao Diaca (Diaca). Petitioners claimed that they are the owners by succession of a parcel
of land located at Bangon, Marawi City, consisting an area of about 800 sq. meters; that
respondent Pangandamun illegally entered and encroached 100 sq. meter of their land, while
respondent Diaca occupied 200 sq. meters, as indicated in Exhibits "A" and "K" submitted as
evidence. Respondents filed their Answer arguing that they are the owners of the land alleged to
be illegally occupied. Trial thereafter ensued.

On January 31, 2005, the SDC rendered a Decision,3 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:

1. DECLARING plaintiffs owners of the 800 square meter land borrowed and turned
over by BPI and described in the complaint and Exhibits "A" and "K";

2. ORDERING defendants to VACATE the portions or areas they illegally encroached as

indicated in Exhibits "A" and "K" and to REMOVE whatever improvements thereat
introduced;
 3. ORDERING defendants to jointly and severally pay plaintiffs (a) 50,000.00 as moral
damages; (b) 30,000.00 as exemplary damages; (C) 50,000.00 as attorney's fees and
the costs of the suit.

SO ORDERED4

Respondents filed an appeal5 with us and petitioners were required to file their Comment
thereto. In a Resolution6 dated March 28, 2007, we dismissed the petition for failure of
respondents to sufficiently show that a grave abuse of discretion was committed by the SDC as
the decision was in accord with the facts and the applicable law and jurisprudence. Respondents'
motion for reconsideration was denied with finality on September 17, 2007.7 The SDC Decision
dated January 31, 2005 became final and executory on October 31, 2007 and an entry of
judgment8 was subsequently made.

Petitioners filed a motion9 for issuance of a writ of execution with prayer for a writ of
demolition.

On February 7, 2008, the SDC granted the motion10 for a writ of execution and the writ was
issued with the following fallo:

NOW THEREFORE, you are hereby commanded to cause the execution of the aforesaid
judgment. If defendants do not vacate the premises and remove the improvements, you must
secure a special order of the court to destroy, demolish or remove the improvements on the
property. The total amount awarded to and demanded by the prevailing party is 150,000.00
(damages, attorney's fees and the cost) which defendants must satisfy, pursuant to Section 8 (d)
and (e), Rule 39, Rules of Court.11

The Sheriff then sent a demand letter12 to respondents for their compliance.

On February 3, 2009, petitioners filed a Motion13 for the Issuance of a Writ of Demolition to
implement the SDC Decision dated January 31, 2005. The motion was set for hearing.

On March 4, 2009, the SDC issued an Order14 reading as follows:

The plaintiffs, the prevailing party, filed a Motion for Writ of Demolition and the motion was set
for hearing on February 16, 2009. On this date, the plaintiffs, without counsel, appeared. The
defendants failed to appear. Thus, the court issued an order submitting the motion for resolution.
Resolution of the motion for issuance of a Writ of Demolition should be held in abeyance. First,
defendant Ambog Pangandamun has filed on February 6, 2009 an Urgent Manifestation praying
deferment of the hearing on the motion for writ of execution. Second, Atty. Dimnatang T. Saro
filed on February 13, 2009 a Notice of Appearance with Motion to Postpone the hearing set on
February 16, 2009 to study the records of the case as the records are not yet in his possession.
Third, the recent periodic report dated January 26, 2009 of the Sheriff shows Sultan Alioden of
Kabasaran is negotiating the parties whereby the defendant Ambog Pangandamun will be made
to pay the five (5)-meter land of the plaintiffs encroached by him and that what remains to be
ironed out is the fixing of the amount.
WHEREFORE, the resolution on the Motion for Writ of Demolition is HELD IN ABEYANCE.
The Sheriff is DIRECTED to exert efforts to bring the parties back to the negotiating table seeing
to it that Sultan Alioden of Kabasaran is involved in the negotiation. Atty. Saro is REQUIRED to
file his comment on the motion for writ of execution within fifteen (15) days from notice to
guide the court in resolving the incident in the event the negotiation fails.

SO ORDERED.15

On May 5, 2009, the SDC issued another Order16 which held in abeyance the resolution of the
motion for issuance of a writ of demolition and granted an ocular inspection or actual
measurement of petitioners' 800-sq.-meter land.

The SDC issued another Order17 dated May 14, 2009, which stated, among others, that: While
the decision has become final and executory and a Writ of Execution has been issued, there are
instances when a Writ of Execution cannot be enforced as when there is a supervening event that
prevents the Sheriff to execute a Writ of Execution.

The defendants claimed they have not encroached as they have already complied with the Writ
of Execution and their buildings are not within the area claimed by the plaintiffs. This to the
Court is the supervening event, thus the order granting the request of Atty. Jimmy Saro, counsel
for the defendants, to conduct a survey to determine whether there is encroachment or not. Thus,
the Order dated May 5, 2009.

WHEREFORE, Engr. Hakim Laut Balt is hereby commissioned to conduct a survey of the 800
square meters claimed by the plaintiffs. Said Eng. Balt is given a period of one (1) month from
notice within which to conduct the survey in the presence of the parties.18

On November 9, 2009, the SDC issued the assailed Order19 denying petitioners' motion for
demolition. The Order reads in full:

It was on February 3, 2009 that the plaintiffs filed a Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Demolition.
The defendants filed their comment thereto on March 24, 2009. They prayed that an ocular
inspection and/or actual measurement of the 800 square meter land of the plaintiffs be made
which the court granted, in the greater interest of justice, considering that defendants claimed to
have complied with the writ of execution, hence there is no more encroachment of plaintiffs
land.

The intercession of concerned leaders to effect amicable settlement and the order to conduct a
survey justified the holding in abeyance of the resolution of the pending incident, motion for writ
of demolition.

After attempts for settlement failed and after the commissioned Geodetic Engineer to conduct the
needed survey asked for relief, plaintiffs asked anew for a writ of demolition. Defendants
opposed the grant of the motion, alleging compliance with the writ of execution, and prayed for
appointment of another Geodetic Engineer to conduct a survey and actual measurement of
plaintiffs' 800 square meter land.
At this point in time, the court cannot issue a special order to destroy, demolish or remove
defendants' houses, considering their claim that they no longer encroach any portion of plaintiffs
land.

Gleaned from Engineer Hakim Laut Balt's Narrative Report, he could have conducted the
required survey had not the plaintiffs dictated him where to start the survey.

WHERFORE, the motion for issuance of a writ of demolition is DENIED. A survey is still the
best way to find out if indeed defendants' houses are within plaintiffs' 800 square meter land.
Parties are, therefore, directed to choose and submit to the court their preferred Geodetic
Engineer to conduct the survey within ten (10) days from notice.20

Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration which the SDC denied in an Order21 dated
January 5, 2010 saying that the motion failed to state the timeliness of the filing of said motion
and failed to comply with the requirements of notice of hearing. Petitioners' second motion for
reconsideration was also denied in an Order22 dated February10, 2010. The SDC directed the
parties to choose and submit their preferred Geodetic Engineer to conduct the survey within 15
days from notice.

Undaunted, petitioners filed with the CA-Cagayan de Oro City a petition for certiorari assailing
the Orders issued by the SDC on November 9, 2009, January 5, 2010 and February 10, 2010. In
a Resolution23 dated April 27, 2010, the CA dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction,
saying, among others, that:

xxxx

In pursuing the creation of Shari'a Appellate Court, the Supreme Court En Banc even approved
A.M. No. 99-4-06, otherwise known as Resolution Authorizing the Organization of the Shari'a
Appellate Court.

However, the Shari'a Appellate Court has not yet been organized until the present. We, on our
part, therefore, cannot take cognizance of the instant case because it emanates from the Shari'a
Courts, which is not among those courts, bodies or tribunals enumerated under Chapter 1,
Section 9 of [Batas] Pambansa Bilang 129, as amended over which We can exercise appellate
jurisdiction. Thus, the instant Petition should be filed directly with the Supreme Court.24
Petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari assailing the SDC Orders, invoking the
following grounds:

RESPONDENT JUDGE, HONORABLE RASAD G. BALINDONG, COMMITTED GRAVE

ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF
DEMOLITION AFTERTHE WRIT OF EXECUTION ISSUED BY THE COURT COULD
NOT BE IMPLEMENTED AND INSTEAD DIRECT THE CONDUCT OF THE SURVEY.

RESPONDENT JUDGE HAD COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN

MAKING IT APPEAR THAT HE WAS IN COURT AT HIS SALA IN MARAWI CITY LAST
JANUARY 28, 2010 WHEN THE PARTIES WERE PRESENT AND HE WAS NOT
THERE.25

Preliminarily, we would deal with a procedural matter. Petitioners, after receipt of the SDC
Order denying their second motion for reconsideration of the Order denying their motion for the
issuance of a writ of demolition, filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. The CA dismissed the
petition for lack of jurisdiction in a Resolution dated April 27, 2010 saying that, under RA 9054,
it is the Sharia Appellate Court (SAC) which shall exercise jurisdiction over petition for
certiorari; that, however, since SAC has not yet been organized, it cannot take cognizance of the
case as it emanates from the Sharia Courts, which is not among those courts, bodies or tribunals
enumerated under Chapter 1, Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, as amended, over which
it can exercise appellate jurisdiction.

Under Republic Act No. 9054, An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, amending for the purpose Republic Act No. 6734,
entitled, "An Act Providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as amended", the
Shari'a Appellate Court shall exercise appellate jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari of
decisions of the Shari'a District Courts. In Villagracia v. Fifth (5th) Sharia District Court,26 we
said:

x x x We call for the organization of the court system created under Republic Act No. 9054 to
effectively enforce the Muslim legal system in our country. After all, the Muslim legal system
a legal system complete with its own civil, criminal, commercial, political, international, and
religious laws is part of the law of the land, and Sharia courts are part of the Philippine judicial
system.

The Sharia Appellate Court created under Republic Act No. 9054 shall exercise appellate
jurisdiction over all cases tried in the Sharia District Courts.1avvphi1 It shall also exercise
original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, habeas corpus, and
other auxiliary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. The decisions of the
Sharia Appellate Court shall be final and executory, without prejudice to the original and
appellate jurisdiction of this court.27

and

In Tomawis v. Hon. Balindong,28 we stated that:

x x x [t]he Sharia Appellate Court has yet to be organized with the appointment of a Presiding
Justice and two Associate Justices. Until such time that the Sharia Appellate Court shall have
been organized, however, appeals or petitions from final orders or decisions of the SDC filed
with the CA shall be referred to a Special Division to be organized in any of the CA stations
preferably composed of Muslim CA Justices.29

Notably, Tomawis case was decided on March 5, 2010, while the CA decision was rendered on
April 27, 2010. The CA's reason for dismissing the petition, i.e., the decision came from SDC
which the CA has no appellate jurisdiction is erroneous for failure to follow the Tomawis ruling.
However, we need not remand the case, as we have, on several occasions,30 passed upon and
resolved petitions and cases emanating from Sharia courts.

Petitioners contend that their land was specific and shown by the areas drawn in Exhibits "A"
and "K" and by oral and documentary evidence on record showing that respondents have
occupied portions of their land, i.e., respondent Pangandamun's house encroached a 100 sq.
meter portion, while respondent Diaca occupied 200 sq. meters; and that the SDC had rendered a
decision ordering respondents to vacate the portions or areas they had illegally encroached as
indicated in Exhibits "A" and "K" and to remove whatever improvements thereat introduced.
Such decision had already attained finality and a corresponding entry of judgment had been
made and a writ of execution was issued. Petitioners' claim that the SDC's order for a conduct of
a survey to determine whether respondents' land are within petitioners' 800-sq.-meter land
would, in effect, be amending a final and executory decision.

Only respondent Pangandamun filed his Comment, arguing that petitioners' motion for the
issuance of a writ of demolition has no factual and legal basis because his houses are clearly
outside the 800-sq.-meter land of petitioners; that his house had been constructed in 1964 within
full view of the petitioners but none of them ever questioned the same.

We find for the petitioners.

The SDC Decision dated January31, 2005 ordered respondents to vacate the portions or areas
they had illegally encroached as indicated in Exhibits "A" and "K" and to remove whatever
improvements thereat introduced. Thus, petitioners had established that they are recovering
possession of 100 sq. meters of their land which was occupied by respondent Pangandamun's
house as indicated in Exhibit "K-1", and 200 sq. meter portion being occupied by Diaca as
indicated in Exhibit "K-2". Such decision had become final and executory after we affirmed the
same and an entry of judgment was made. Such decision can no longer be modified or amended.
In Dacanay v. Yrastorza, Sr.,31 we explained the concept of a final and executory judgment,
thus:

Once a judgment attains finality, it becomes immutable and unalterable. A final and executory
judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct
what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of factor law and regardless of whether the
modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land.
This is the doctrine of finality of judgment. It is grounded on fundamental considerations of
public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional errors, the judgments or orders of
courts must become final at some definite time fixed by law. Otherwise, there will be no end to
litigations, thus negating the main role of courts of justice to assist in the enforcement of the rule
of law and the maintenance of peace and order by settling justiciable controversies with
finality.32

However, the SDC later found that while the decision has become final and executory and a writ
of execution has been issued, there are instances when a writ of execution cannot be enforced as
when there is a supervening event that prevents the sheriff to execute the writ of execution. It
found that respondents' claim that their buildings are not within the area claimed by petitioners is
a supervening event and ordered a survey of the land, hence, denied the motion for a writ of
demolition.

We do not agree.

It is settled that there are recognized exceptions to the execution as a matter of right of a final
and immutable judgment, and one of which is a supervening event.

In Abrigo v. Flores,33 we said:

We deem it highly relevant to point out that a supervening event is an exception to the execution
as a matter of right of a final and immutable judgment rule, only if it directly affects the matter
already litigated and settled, or substantially changes the rights or relations of the parties therein
as to render the execution unjust, impossible or inequitable. A supervening event consists of facts
that transpire after the judgment became final and executory, or of new circumstances that
develop after the judgment attained finality, including matters that the parties were not aware of
prior to or during the trial because such matters were not yet in existence at that time. In that
event, the interested party may properly seek the stay of execution or the quashal of the writ of
execution, or he may move the court to modify or alter the judgment in order to harmonize it
with justice and the supervening event. The party who alleges a supervening event to stay the
execution should necessarily establish the facts by competent evidence; otherwise, it would
become all too easy to frustrate the conclusive effects of a final and immutable judgment.34 In
this case, the matter of whether respondents' houses intruded petitioners' land is the issue in the
recovery of possession complaint filed by petitioners in the SDC which was already ruled upon,
thus cannot be considered a supervening event that would stay the execution of a final and
immutable judgment. To allow a survey as ordered by the SDC to determine whether
respondents' houses are within petitioners' land is tantamount to modifying a decision which had
already attained finality.

We find that the SDC committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners' motion for
the issuance a writ of demolition. The issuance of a special order of demolition would certainly
be the necessary and logical consequence of the execution of the final and immutable decision.35
Section 10(d) of Rule 39, Rules of Court provides:

Section 10. Execution of judgments for specific act.

xxxx

(d) Removal of improvements on property subject of execution. - when the property subject of
the execution contains improvements constructed or planted by the judgment obligor or his
agent, the officer shall not destroy, demolish or remove said improvements except upon special
order of the court, issued upon motion of the judgment obligee after due hearing and after the
former has failed to remove the same within a reasonable time fixed by the court.
Notably, this case was decided in 2005 and its execution has already been delayed for years now.
It is almost trite to say that execution is the fruit and end of the suit and is the life of law.36 A
judgment, if left unexecuted, would be nothing but an empty victory for the prevailing party.37

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated November 9, 2009, January 5,
2010 and February 10, 2010, of the Shari'a District Court, Fourth Shari'a Judicial District,
Marawi City are hereby CANCELLED and SET ASIDE. The Shari'a District Court is hereby
ORDERED to ISSUE a writ of demolition to enforce its Decision dated January 31, 2005 in
Civil Case No. 055-91.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals for
whatever action he may undertake in light of our pronouncement in the Tomawis v. Hon.
Balindong case quoted earlier on the creation of a Special Division to handle appeals or petitions
from trial orders or decisions of the Shari' a District Court.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 194560 June 11, 2014

NESTOR T. GADRINAB, Petitioner,

vs.
NORAT. SALAMANCA, ANTONIO TALAO AND ELENA LOPEZ, Respondents.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

A judgment on compromise agreement is a judgment on the merits. It has the effect of res
judicata, and is immediately final and executory unless set aside because of falsity or vices of
consent. The doctrine of immutability of judgments bars courts from modifying decisions that
have already attained finality, even if the purpose of the modification is to correct errors of fact
or law.

This Rule 45 petlt10n seeks the review of the Court of Appeals' Decision1 dated July 22, 2010
and its resolution2 dated November 19, 2010.

The Court of Appeals dismissed petitioners appeal and affirmed the Regional Trial Courts
decision granting respondent Salamancas motion for physical partition pending the execution of
a judgment on compromise agreement between the parties.

Respondents, together with Adoracion Gadrinab and Arsenia Talao, are siblings and heirs of the
late Spouses Talao, Nicolas and Aurelia.3 The Spouses Talao died intestate, leaving a parcel of
land in Sta. Ana, Manila.4

The five Talao children divided the property among themselves through an extrajudicial
settlement.5 Subsequently, Arsenia Talao waived her share over the property in favor of her
siblings.6

Respondent Salamanca filed a complaint for partition against her siblings, Antonio, Elena
(deceased, now represented by her husband, Jose Lopez), and Adoracion (deceased, now
represented by heirs, petitioner Nestor and Francisco Gadrinab) before the Regional Trial Court
of Manila.7

All parties claimed their respective shares in the property.8 They also claimed shares in the
rentals collected from one of the units of a duplex apartment on the property.9 The total amount
of rental collection in the possession of Jose Lopez was 528,623.00.10 The amount, according to
Joses counsel, was ready for distribution.11
Upon being referred to mediation, the parties entered into a compromise agreement and
stipulated the following:

1) That the subject property (land with all the improvements) situated at 2370 Nacar
Street, San Andres, Sta. Ana, Manila will be subject for sale and the amount will be
divided among the four (plaintiff and defendants);

2) That the subject property will be appraised by independent appraiser and the appraised
value will be divided into four. Mr. Antonio Talao will pay in advance the share of
Francisco Gadrinab immediately after the report of the said appraisal;

3) That Cuervo Appraiser will be the one who appraised [sic] the property on or before
March 21, 2003 and any appraised value shall binding [sic] on all parties;

4) That the rental collection in its total amount of Five Hundred Twenty Eight Thousand
and Six Hundred Twenty Three Pesos (528,623.00) and the uncollected amount up to
February 2003 once collected will be divided among the parties;

5) That the amount of 528,623.00 divided by four be distributed among the parties will be
given to all parties on or before March 12, 2003 by Mr. Antonio Talao;

6) That upon payment of the appraised value to Francisco Gadrinab, Mr. Nestor Gadrinab
is given forty-five (45) days within which to leave the premises in question;

7) That the parties agreed to waive all their claims and counter-claims arising from this
case; and

8) That the parties agreed to request this Honorable Court that a decision be issued base
[sic] on this Compromise Agreement or this Compromise Agreement be submitted before
this Honorable Court for approval.12

On April 10, 2003, the Regional Trial Court approved the compromise agreement.13 Based on
the entry of judgment, the case became final and executory on April 10, 2003.14

Nestor Gadrinab filed a motion for execution of the compromise agreement.15 He demanded his
one-fourth share in the accumulated rentals.16 During the hearing on the motion for execution,
the parties agreed that the rentals shall be divided only into three since Nestor had already been
occupying one of the duplex units.17 The parties also agreed that Antonio Talao would shoulder
Nestors share, equivalent to one-fourth of the rental amount.18

Pursuant to the compromise agreement, Cuervo Appraiser appraised the property.19 Unsatisfied
with the appraisal, Antonio Talao moved for the propertys reappraisal.20 This was denied by the
Regional Trial Court.21

The portion of the duplex that Nestor refused to vacate,22 remained unsold.23
Because of the attitude of her co-heirs, respondent Salamanca moved for the physical partition of
the property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.24 She prayed for the physical partition
of the property instead of having it sold.25

Nestor and Francisco Gadrinab opposed the motion.26 They contended that the judgment on the
compromise agreement had already become final and executory and had the effect of res
judicata.27 Antonio Talao and Jose Lopez did not object to the motion for physical partition.28

On December 29, 2005, the Regional Trial Court of Manila granted the motion for physical
partition.29

Nestor and Francisco Gadrinab appealed to the Court of Appeals. They assailed the grant of
Salamancas motion for physical partition after the issuance of the judgment on compromise
agreement.30

In a decision promulgated on July 22, 2010,31 the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal. The
Court of Appeals ruled that the exception to the immutability of judgments, that is, "whenever
circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and
inequitable,"32 applies in this case. The Court of Appeals specifically noted that the "parties
seemingly endless disagreements on matters involving the disposition of the subject property"33
were such circumstances that rendered the compromise agreements execution unjust and
inequitable. The Court of Appeals agreed with the Regional Trial Courts ruling that "the
proposed physical partition of the subject lot . . . is just another way of enforcing the [c]ourts
decision and will not in anyway vary the parties agreement nor affect their right over the
property."34

On November 19, 2010, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.35

Hence, this petition was filed.

Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Regional Trial Courts order
granting respondent Salamancas motion for physical partition.36 A judgment on the
compromise agreement had already been rendered and had attained finality.37 Petitioner also
argued that the Court of Appeals failed to consider the following terms of the compromise
agreement:

2. That the subject property will be appraised by independent appraiser and the appraised
value will be divided into four (4). Mr. Antonio Talao will pay in advance the share of
Francisco Gadrinab immediately after the report of the said appraisal;

....

4. That the rental collection in its total amount of FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY EIGHT
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED TWENTY THREE PESOS (Php528,623.00) and the
uncollected amount up to February 2003 once collected [sic] will be divided among the
parties;
 5. That the amount of FIVEHUNDRED TWENTY EIGHT THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED TWENTY THREE PESOS Php528,623.00 divided by four (4) among the
parties will be given to all parties on or [sic] March 12, 2003 by Mr. Antonio Talao at
Greenbelt, Mc Donald at 9:00 oclock in the morning;

6. That upon payment of the appraised value to Mr. Francisco Gadrinab, Mr. Nestor
Gadrinab is given forty five (45) days within which to leave the premises in question[.]38
(Emphasis in the original)

Petitioner alleged that the judgment on the compromise agreement had already been partially
complied with, as respondent Salamanca had already been paid her share in the accrued
rentals.39 On the other hand, petitioner still had not been paid his share,40 prompting him to file
the motion for execution.41

Petitioner pointed out that there was no agreement that he must vacate the property before it
could be sold.42

Moreover, petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals decision violated his right to due
process.43 According to him, had there been a full-blown trial on the action for partition, he
would have been able to present evidence of exclusive possession of half of the property.44

In their separate comments, respondents Salamanca and Talao argued that this case fell under the
exception of the rule on immutability of judgments.45 The non-compliance of some of the
parties with the compromise agreement constituted an event that "[makes] it difficult if not
totally impossible to enforce the compromise agreement."46

Respondents Salamanca and Talao also argued that the physical partition of the property would
not prejudice the parties.47 The order granting the motion for physical partition was a mere
enforcement of the compromise agreement, which entitled the parties to their shares in the
proceeds of the sale.48 Respondent Salamanca pointed out that the grant of the motion for
physical partition would still be consistent with the intent of the compromise agreement since it
would result in the proceeds being divided equally among the parties.49 "The Order granting the
physical partition was within the inherent power and authority of the court having jurisdiction to
render a particular judgment to enforce it and to exercise equitable control over such
enforcement."50

Moreover, petitioners refusal to vacate the property prevented it from being sold so that the
proceeds could already be distributed among the parties.51

On the violation of due process, respondents Salamanca and Talao argued that it was only before
this court that this issue was raised.

The issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Regional Trial
Courts decision allowing the physical partition of the property despite finality of a previous
judgment on compromise agreement involving the division of the same property.
The petition is meritorious.

The Court of Appeals erred in

affirming the Regional Trial
Courts decision allowing the
physical partition of the property

Respondent Salamanca filed two actions for physical partition. The two parties settled the first
action through a judicial compromise agreement. The same respondent filed the second action
after she had determined that her co-heirs were not being cooperative in complying with the
compromise agreement.

In a compromise agreement, the parties freely enter into stipulations. "[A] judgment based on a
compromise agreement is a judgment on the merits"52 of the case. It has the effect of res
judicata. These principles are impressed both in our law and jurisprudence.

Thus, Article 2037 of the Civil Code provides:

Article 2037. A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata; but
there shall be no execution except in compliance with a judicial compromise.

In Spouses Romero v. Tan,53 this court said:

It is well settled that a judicial compromise has the effect of res judicata and is immediately
executory and not appealable unless set aside [by mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, undue
influence, or falsity of documents that vitiated the compromise agreement].54

There is res judicata when the following concur:

1. Previous final judgment;

2. By a court having jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter;

3. On the merits of the case;

4. Between identical parties, on the same subject matter, and cause of action55

There are two rules that embody the principle of res judicata. The first rule refers to "bar by prior
judgment,"56 which means that actions on the same claim or cause of action cannot be
relitigated.57 This rule is embodied in Rule 39, Section 47, paragraph (b) of the Rules of Court,
which provides:

Section 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. The effect of a judgment or final order
rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final
order, may be as follows:
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or
as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the
parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or
special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same
capacity[.]

The second rule refers to "conclusiveness of judgment."58 This means that facts already tried
and determined in another action involving a different claim or cause of action cannot anymore
be relitigated.59 This rule is embodied in Rule 39, Section 47, paragraph (c) of the Rules of
Court, which provides:

Section 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. The effect of a judgment or final order
rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final
order, may be as follows:

....

(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is
deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to
have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary
thereto. (49a)

This case involves "bar by prior judgment." Respondents cannot file another action for partition
after final judgment on compromise had already been rendered in a previous action for partition
involving the same parties and property.

This court explained in FGU Insurance Corporation v. Regional Trial Court60 the doctrine of
finality of judgment:

Under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment, a decision that has
acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and
whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. Any act
which violates this principle must immediately be struck down.61

This doctrine admits a few exceptions, usually applied to serve substantial justice:

1. "The correction of clerical errors;

2. the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party;

3. void judgments; and

4. whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its
execution unjust and inequitable."62
Doctrines on bar by prior judgment and immutability of judgment apply whether judgment is
rendered after a full-blown trial or after the parties voluntarily execute a compromise agreement
duly approved by the court.

Because a judicial compromise agreement is in the nature of both an agreement between the
parties and a judgment on the merits, it is covered by the Civil Code provisions on contracts. It
can be avoided on grounds that may avoid an ordinary contract, e.g., it is not in accord with the
law;63 lack of consent by a party; and existence of fraud or duress. Further, the pertinent Civil
Code provisions on compromise agreements provide:

Article 2038. A compromise in which there is mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, undue
influence, or falsity of documents is subject to the provisions of Article 1330 of this Code.

Article 1330. A contract where consent is given through mistake, violence, intimidation, undue
influence, or fraud is voidable.

Therefore, courts cannot entertain actions involving the same cause of action, parties, and subject
matter without violating the doctrines on bar by prior judgment and immutability of judgments,
unless there is evidence that the agreement was void, obtained through fraud, mistake or any vice
of consent, or would disrupt substantial justice.

In this case, there was no issue as to the fact that the parties freely entered into the compromise
agreement. There was also no dispute about the clarity of its terms. Some of the parties simply
do not wish to abide by the compromise agreements terms.

This court does not see how substantial justice will be served by disturbing a previous final
judgment on compromise when failure of its execution was caused by the parties themselves.

Likewise, respondents argument that a supervening event, i.e. disagreement among the parties,
was present to justify disturbance of the final judgment on compromise fails to persuade. A
supervening event may justify the disturbance of a final judgment on compromise if it "brought
about a material change in [the] situation"64 between the parties. The material change
contemplated must render the execution of the final judgment unjust and inequitable. Otherwise,
a party to the compromise agreement has a "right to have the compromise agreement executed,
according to its terms."65

The subsequent disagreement among the parties did not cause any material change in the
situation or in the relations among the parties. The situation and relations among the parties
remained the same as the situation and their relations prior to the compromise agreement. They
remained co-owners of the property, which they desired to partition.

Moreover, the parties voluntarily agreed to the compromise agreement, which was already
stamped with judicial approval. The agreements execution would bring about the effects desired
by all parties and the most just and equitable situation for all. On the other hand, the judgment
granting the second action for partition filed by respondent Salamanca was obtained with
opposition.
Judges "have the ministerial and mandatory duty to implement and enforce [a compromise
agreement]."66 Absent appeal or motion to set aside the judgment, courts cannot modify, impose
terms different from the terms of a compromise agreement, or set aside the compromises and
reciprocal concessions made in good faith by the parties without gravely abusing their
discretion.67

"[They cannot] relieve parties from [their] obligations . . . simply because [the agreements are] . .
. unwise."68 Further, "[t]he mere fact that the Compromise Agreement favors one party does not
render it invalid."69 Courts do not have power to "alter contracts in order to save [one party]

from [the effects of] adverse stipulations. . . ."70

Respondents have remedies if

parties to the compromise
agreement refuse to abide by its
terms

The issue in this case involves the non-compliance of some of the parties with the terms of the
compromise agreement.1wphi1 The law affords complying parties with remedies in case one of
the parties to an agreement fails to abide by its terms.

A party may file a motion for execution of judgment. Execution is a matter of right on final
judgments. Section 1, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. Execution shall issue as a matter of
right, on motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the
expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected. (1a)

If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may forthwith be
applied for in the court of origin, on motion of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith
certified true copies of the judgment or judgments or final order or orders sought to be enforced
and of the entry thereof, with notice to the adverse party.

The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of justice so requires,
direct the court of origin to issue the writ of execution. (n)

If a party refuses to comply with the terms of the judgment or resists the enforcement of a lawful
writ issued, an action for indirect contempt may be filed in accordance with Rule 71 of the Rules
of Court:

Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. After a charge in writing
has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such
period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any
of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt;

....
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court,
including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by
the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces
another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership
or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be
entitled thereto[.]

Since a judgment on compromise agreement is effectively a judgment on the case, proper

remedies against ordinary judgments may be used against judgments on a compromise
agreement. Provided these are availed on time and the appropriate grounds exist, remedies may
include the following: a) motion for reconsideration; b) motion for new trial; c) appeal; d)
petition for relief from judgment; e) petition for certiorari; and f) petition for annulment of
judgment.71

Respondent Salamanca knew that the only reason for the failed compromise agreement was the
non-compliance with the agreements terms of some of her co-heirs. Particularly, it was
stipulated that petitioners removal from the property was conditioned upon payment of an
amount equivalent to his share. Respondent Talao refused to abide by his own undertaking to
shoulder respondent Salamancas share. He also refused to acknowledge the appraisal of the
appraiser appointed in the compromise agreement. This refusal caused the failure of the
compromise agreement.

Instead of availing herself of the proper remedies so the compromise could be enforced and the
partition could be effected, respondent Salamanca chose to move again for the partition of the
property and set aside a valid and final judgment on compromise. This court cannot allow such
motion to prosper without going against law and established jurisprudence on judgments.

WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The judgment
on the compromise agreement is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 171095 June 22, 2015

MAYOR MARCIAL VARGAS and ENGR. RAYMUNDO DEL ROSARIO, Petitioners,

vs.
FORTUNATO CAJUCOM, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the trial court's Order denying petitioners'
motion to quash a writ of execution.

The facts are as follows:

On August 15, 2000, Fortunato Cajucom (Cajucom) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Cabanatuan City a Complaint for mandamus and abatement of nuisance against the Municipal
Mayor of Aliaga, Nueva Ecija, in the person of Mayor Marcial Vargas (Mayor Vargas), the
Municipal Engineer of Aliaga, Nueva Ecija, namely, Engr. Raymundo del Rosario (Engr. del
Rosario), and a number of private persons, namely, Rodel Puno, Vicente Mata, Tony Maderia,
Rene Maderia, and German Maderia (Puna, et al.).1 The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
3776 and assigned to the RTC of Cabanatuan City, Branch 86.2

In the complaint, Cajucom alleged that he had intended to start a gasoline station business on his
lot in Aliaga, Nueva Ecija, but several illegal structures built on the road shoulder by Puno, et al.
were obstructing access to his site, thus, also frustrating his plan. He claimed that demand was
made for Puno, et al. to remove their structures, but to no avail. Cajucom then alleged that he
tried to enlist the help of Mayor Vargas and Engr. Del Rosario, but the latter similarly did not
act. Cajucom ultimately prayed for the court to command the said municipal mayor and engineer
to cause the removal of all buildings and structures built on the concerned road shoulder by
Puno, et al.

On February 14, 2001, the court rendered a Decision in favor of Cajucom.3 It held that as
correctly alleged by Cajucom, the mayor and municipal engineer failed to perform their duties
under the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code (Republic Act No.
7160), among which duties is the duty to order the demolition or removal of illegally constructed
houses, buildings or other structures on the road shoulder.4 Thus, the court held: WHEREFORE,
in view of the foregoing the petition for MANDAMUS is hereby GRANTED and the public
defendants Municipal Mayor Marcial Vargas and Municipal Engineer Raymundo del Rosario,
both of the Municipality of Aliaga, Nueva Ecija, are hereby ordered to comply with the above-
cited provision of law.

IT IS SO ORDERED.5

No appeal was interposed from the decision.6 As the decision became final and executory,
Cajucom filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution.7

On May 11, 2001, the RTC issued an Order granting Cajucom's motion.8 It directed that a writ
of execution be issued to implement and enforce the decision of February 14, 2001.
Subsequently, a Writ of Execution was issued by the clerk of court on May 25, 2001.9

Then, the court sheriff reported that on May 28, 2001, he served a copy of the writ of execution
on MayorVargas and Engr. del Rosario.10 The writ of execution was signed as received by the
mayor's private secretary and by Engr. del Rosario on said date.11 However, the sheriff also
reported in his Return of Service dated July 2, 2001 that, as of June 13, 2001 the judgment has
not been executed.12

Meanwhile, on February 8, 2002, Puno, et al. filed a petition for Annulment of Judgment with
the Court of Appeals to annul the February 14, 2001 decision of the RTC.13 That case was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 69035 entitled Rodel Puno et al. v. Raymundo Annang, et al. The
grounds alleged in the petition include the trial court's lack of jurisdiction and its speculation as
to certain facts of the case.14 The CA, in a Decision dated January 12, 200515 and a Resolution
dated March 18, 2005,16 denied such petition. The appellate court held that the petition's
allegations are flimsy and unacceptable in addition to the fact that Puno, et al. indeed have no
right to build residential and commercial structures on the shoulder of a public road.17 Puno, et
al. then went to the Supreme Court via a Petition for certiorari with injunction and request for
temporary restraining order (TRO), dated April 8, 2005, to assail the CA's decision denying the
petition for annulment of judgment.18 However, on May 3, 2005, the Supreme Court, in G.R.
No. 167537 entitled Rodel Puno, et al. v. Fortunato Cajucom, denied the petition of Puno, et
al.19 A subsequent motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in another resolution dated
July 27, 2005.20

On April 13, 2005, Cajucom filed a Motion to Compel Defendants Mayor Marcial Vargas and
Engineer Raymundo Del Rosario to Implement the Writ of Execution and to Explain Why They
Should Not Be Cited for Contempt of Court.21

In response to the said motion, Puno, et al. immediately filed their written Opposition (in lieu of
oral arguments) to the same.22 Likewise, Mayor Vargas and Engr. del Rosario filed their own
Motion to Quash Writ of Execution with Explanation Why Public Defendants Should Not Be
Cited for Contempt of Court.23

Cajucom then followed up with a Motion to Punish Respondents Mayor Marcial Vargas and
Municipal Engineer Raymundo Del Rosario for Contempt of Court.24 Mayor Vargas and Engr.
Del Rosario filed an Opposition25 to the same.
On September 15, 2005, the RTC issued its assailed Order26 denying the motion filed by Mayor
Vargas and Engr. Del Rosario to quash the writ of execution of the court's Decision dated
February 14, 2001.The court held that the mayor can be compelled to do his duty by writ of
mandamus.27 It also held that issuance of the writ was not premature as Cajucom had previously
demanded for the structures to be removed but to no avail.28 Meanwhile, the court suspended
the resolution of the motion to punish Mayor Vargas and Engr. Del Rosario.29 The dispositive
portion of the said assailed Order states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Quash Writ of Execution filed by public
defendants Mayor Marcial Vargas and Engr. Raymundo del Rosario, both of Aliaga, Nueva
Ecija, is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Their Explanation Why They Should Not Be Cited
For Contempt Of Court is hereby NOTED. Said public defendants, however, are hereby granted
a period of thirty (30) days from notice within which to implement and execute the decision of
this court dated February 14, 2001 with respect to private defendants Rodel Puno, Vicente Mata,
Tony Maderia, Rene Maderia and German Maderia, pursuant to Art. 87(b)(3)(VI) of Rule XV of
the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code of 1991. For this
purpose, let a writ of Mandamus be issued to Mayor Marcial Vargas and Municipal Engineer
Raymundo del Rosario for execution.

The resolution of the Motion To Punish Respondents Municipal Mayor Marcial Vargas and
Municipal Engineer Raymundo del Rosario For Contempt Of Court Pursuant to Sections 7 and 8
of Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure filed by the plaintiff through counsel is hereby
SUSPENDED until after the lapse of the 30-day period from notice granted to the said public
defendants to execute the decision of this court.

IT IS SO ORDERED.30

Hence, the petitioners, Mayor Vargas and Engr. Del Rosario, filed this petition. Petitioners sum
up their arguments for the allowance of their petition as follows:

1. THE WRIT OF EXECUTION IS BEING ENFORCED TO COMPEL ENGINEER

RAYMUNDO DEL ROSARIO TO EXERCISE THE POWERS AND PERFORM THE
DUTIES AND FUNCTIONS OF MAYOR MARCIAL VARGAS UNDER RULE XV,
ART. 87(3) (VI) OF THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991 (RA 7160);31

2. THE WRIT OF EXECUTION IS BEING ENFORCED TO COMPEL MAYOR

MARCIAL VARGAS TO PERFORM A DISCRETIONARY DUTY, CONTRARY TO
LAW AND APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT;32

3. RESPONDENT NOT HAVING EXHAUSTED ALL ADMINISTRATIVE

REMEDIES BEFORE FILING THE PETITION, THE WRIT OF MANDAMUS
SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED AND THE WRIT OF EXECUTION ISSUED
TO ENFORCE IT ([SHOULD BE QUASHED];33
 4. RESPONDENT NOT HAVING [A] WELL-DEFINED, CLEAR AND CERTAIN
RIGHT TO WARRANT THE GRANT OF MANDAMUS, THE SAME SHOULD NOT
HAVE BEEN GRANTED AND THE WRIT OF EXECUTION ISSUED TO ENFORCE
IT [SHOULD BE QUASHED];34

5. THE WRIT OF EXECUTION IS NOT CAPABLE OF BEING ENFORCED AND

SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ISSUED IN THE FIRST PLACE.35

6. THE WRIT OF EXECUTION IS BEING ENFORCED IN A WAY [THAT] NOT

ONLY VARIES THE JUDGMENT, BUT [IS] CONTRARY TO LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE.36

The Court is now confronted with the singular issue of whether grounds exist to quash the
subject writ of execution.

It is a consistent practice that once a judgment has become final and executory, a writ of
execution is issued as a matter of course, in the absence of any order restraining its issuance.37
In addition, even a writ of demolition, if the case calls for it, is ancillary to the process of
execution and is logically also issued as a consequence of the writ of execution earlier issued.38

Rule 39 of the Rules of Court is clear:

Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. Execution shall issue as a matter of right,
or motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the
expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected. (1a)

If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may forthwith be
applied for in the court of origin, on motion of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith
certified true copies of the judgment or judgments or final order or orders sought to be enforced
and of the entry thereof, with notice to the adverse party.

The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of justice so requires,
direct the court of origin to issue the writ of execution.39

Stated differently, once a judgment becomes final, the prevailing party is entitled as a matter of
right to a writ of execution.40 Its issuance is, in fact, the trial courts ministerial duty, the only
limitation being that the writ must conform substantially to every essential particular of the
judgment promulgated, more particularly, the orders or decrees in the dispositive portion of the
decision.41 Even the holding in abeyance of the issuance of a writ of execution of a final and
executory judgment can be considered abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.42

In sum, this Court has explained the principle as follows:

It is not disputed that the judgment sought to be executed in the case at bar had already become
final and executory. It is fundamental that the prevailing party in a litigation may, at any time
within five (5) years after the entry thereof, have a writ of execution issued for its enforcement
and the court not only has the power and authority to order its execution but it is its ministerial
duty to do so. It has also been held that the court cannot refuse to issue a writ of execution upon a
final and executory judgment, or quash it, or order its stay, for, as a general rule, the parties will
not be allowed, after final judgment, to object to the execution by raising new issues of fact or of
law, except when there had been a change in the situation of the parties which makes such
execution inequitable or when it appears that the controversy has ever been submitted to the
judgment of the court; or when it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently
issued, or that it is defective in substance, or is issued against the wrong party, or that judgment
debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied; or when the writ has been issued without authority.
Defendant-appellant has not shown that she falls in any of the situations afore-mentioned.
Ordinarily, an order of execution of a final judgment is not appealable. Otherwise, as was said by
this Court in Molina v. De la Riva, a case could never end. Once a court renders a final
judgment, all the issues between or among the parties before it are deemed resolved and
itsjudicial function as regards any matter related to the controversy litigated comes to an end.
The execution of its judgment is purely a ministerial phase of adjudication. The nature of its duty
to see to it that the claim of the prevailing party is fully satisfied from the properties of the loser
is generally ministerial.43

And equally settled is the rule that when a judgment is final and executory, it becomes
immutable and unalterable.44 It may no longer be modified in any respect, except to correct
clerical errors or to make nunc pro tunc entries, or when it is a void judgment.45 Outside of these
exceptions, the court which rendered judgment only has the ministerial duty to issue a writ of
execution.46 A decision that has attained finality becomes the law of the case regardless of any
claim that it is erroneous.47 Any amendment or alteration which substantially affects a final and
executory judgment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings held
for that purpose.48 Thus, an order of execution which varies the tenor of the judgment or
exceeds the terms thereof is a nullity.49

In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the trial court's decision had become final and
executory, as petitioners themselves did not appeal the same. In the current petition, neither is
there an allegation that the judgment is a void one. But even if there is such an allegation, the
issue is a settled one, as this Court itself, in the petition for annulment of judgment filed by
petitioner's co-obligors, i.e., Puno et al., had upheld the judgment rather than declare the same
void. That petition also alleged lack of jurisdiction and raised other issues which are similarly
raised in the instant petition.

Therefore, at this late stage, nothing more may be done to disturb the said final judgment.

As for the regularity of the issuance of the writ of execution itself, it is uncontested that all the
requirements for the issuance of such a writ, as laid down in the rules, were followed in the case
a bar. No issue was raised before the trial court which qualifies as an exception to the general
rule that parties may not object to its issuance. Instead, for the most part, the petition appears to
pray for a quashal of the writ of execution on grounds that, when closely examined, go into the
merits of the case and the judgment being executed and are not based on any defect in the writ of
execution itself or in its issuance.
To illustrate, petitioners cite the following as grounds for the quashal of the writ of execution: (1)
that it allegedly would compel the municipal engineer to exercise the powers and duties of the
mayor; (2) that it forces the mayor to perform a discretionary duty;(3) that there was no
exhaustion of administrative remedies; and, (4) that the judgment obligee had no well-defined,
clear and certain right to warrant the grant of mandamus.

Such grounds, however, go into the substance and merits of the case which had been decided
with finality, and have no bearing on the validity of the issuance of the writ of execution. They
raise issues which have been properly joined and addressed by the trial court in its decision. But
at this late stage of execution, tackling those matters is a re-litigation of those issues, which no
court can perform without offending well-settled principles. Essentially, arguments as to these
issues are proper for an appeal, a remedy which none of the petitioners and the other judgment-
obligors have taken. Instead, petitioners' co-defendants in the case, the other judgment-obligors
Puno, et al., filed a petition to annul the judgment, also raising the trial court's alleged lack of
jurisdiction and the same arguments as aforementioned, but such petition was denied by the CA,
which denial was affirmed with finality by the Supreme Court. Hence, to this Court, the final
judgment has become the law of the case which is now immovable. The rudiments of fair play,
justice, and due process require that parties cannot raise for the first time on appeal from a denial
of a motion to quash a writ of execution issues which they could have raised but never did during
the trial and even on appeal from the decision of the trial court.50

The simple matter is that petitioners herein may not do indirectly, by assailing the writ of
execution, what they cannot do directly, which is attacking the final, immutable and unalterable
judgment of the RTC. They may not raise in their opposition to the writ of execution issues that
they should have raised in the case during the trial proper or against the judgment via an appeal.
They may not object to the execution by raising new issues of fact or law, except under the
following circumstances:

(1) the writ of execution varies the judgment;

(2) there has been a change in the situation of the parties making execution inequitable or
unjust;

(3) execution is sought to be enforced against property exempt from execution;

(4) it appears that the controversy has been submitted to the judgment of the court;

(5) the terms of the judgment are not clear enough and there remains room for
interpretation thereof; or

(6) it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is
defective in substance, or issued against the wrong party, or that the judgment debt has
been paid or otherwise satisfied, or the writ was issued without authority.51

For the most part, the petition does not clearly state whether the subject writ of execution falls
under any of the above exceptions. It raised two grounds, i.e., that the writ is incapable of being
enforced and that it varies the judgment, which can be interpreted as falling under the exceptions
above, but these grounds as applied to the case at bar simply lack merit.1wphi1

Petitioners claim that the writ could not be enforced since Mayor Vargas had left office after the
elections of May 2001 before he was elected again in May 2004.52

This argument fails. Even on its face, the statement is untenable and fails to logically argue that
the writ is incapable of enforcement. The statement, is in fact, an admission that Mayor Vargas
could have implemented the writ during his two incumbencies the one before the May 2001
elections and the one after the May 2004 elections - as both times, he was served with the writ
well inside his term as mayor. Such service, as well as Mayor Vargas' two terms, also fell within
the five-year period within which the Decision dated February 14, 2001 could have been
enforced. Yet, the petition admits that it was Mayor Vargas himself who refused, without any
valid or legal reason, to enforce the writ during his two terms even if it is clear that the judgment
is final and there was no order restraining its enforcement. Mayor Vargas had the time and
opportunity to perform his obligation but he did not. Then, it bears stressing that the writ was
directed at Mayor Vargas not in his personal capacity, but in his capacity as municipal mayor, so
that it is not irregular whether it was served upon him during his earlier term or in his subsequent
one.53 His failure to enforce the same on both times suggests his own disobedience to the court's
final judgment, so that it is even immaterial whether or why the writ was not enforced by the
other mayor who served between his two terms. Thus, it is incorrect to state that the writ is
incapable of enforcement, as it is only the petitioners themselves who refuse to enforce the same.

Then, petitioners allege that the writ varies the judgment as the writ allegedly would require
them to demolish the houses of the other defendants, as opposed to the judgment which merely
ordered them to comply with their duties under the implementing rules.

Petitioners are in error because the writ does not contain anything other than a command to the
sheriff to enforce what is in the dispositive portion of the final judgment. The writ of execution
merely states:

TO: The Deputy Sheriff

Regional Trial Court
Branch 86
Cabanatuan City-wide

GREETINGS:

WHEREAS, on February 14, 2001, a decision was rendered by this Court in the above-entitled
case, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing the petition for MANDAMUS is hereby GRANTED
and the public defendants Municipal Mayor Marcial Vargas and Municipal Engineer Raymundo
del Rosario, both of the Municipality of Aliaga, Nueva Ecija, are hereby ordered to comply with
the above-cited provision of law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

WHEREAS, on May 11, 2001, an order was issued for the issuance of (a) Writ of Execution for
the full implementation of the decision against the defendants.

NOW THEREFORE, you are hereby commanded to execute and make effective the decision
of this Court dated February 14, 2001 in accordance with law, together with your lawful fees
on this Writ and return you proceedings pursuant to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended.54

Clearly, nothing in the writ alters or varies the judgment, the dispositive portion of which it
faithfully reproduces. Equally, nothing in it necessarily limits the judgment obligations to an
order to demolish the subject houses. Purely, the writ merely commands compliance by
petitioners with the following legal provisions: First, the law itself, or the Local Government
Code, Book III, Title II, Chapter III, Article I, Section 444(b) (3), which states:

ARTICLE I
The Municipal Mayor

Section 444. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation.

xxxx

(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general
welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the municipal
mayor shall:

x x x x (3) Initiate and maximize the generation of resources and revenues, and apply the same to
the implementation of development plans, program objectives and priorities as provided for
under Section 18 of this Code, particularly those resources and revenues programmed for agro-
industrial development and country-wide growth and progress, and relative thereto, shall:

xxxx

(vi) Require owners of illegally constructed houses, buildings or other structures to obtain the
necessary permit, subject to such fines and penalties as may be imposed by law or ordinance, or
to make necessary changes in the construction of the same when said construction violates any
law or ordinance, or to order the demolition or removal of said house, building or structure
within the period prescribed by law or ordinance;55

Next, the following provision of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government
Code, which is almost a verbatim reproduction of the law, states:

RULE XV
POWERS, DUTIES, AND FUNCTIONS OF LOCAL CHIEF EXECUTIVES
 xxxx

Art. 87. Powers, Duties, and Functions of the Municipal Mayor. -

xxxx

(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general
welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of the Code, the municipal
mayor shall:

xxxx

(3) Initiate and maximize the generation of resources and revenues, and apply the same to the
implementation of development plans, program objectives and priorities as provided under these
Rules, particularly those resources and revenues programmed for agro-industrial development
and countrywide growth and progress, and relative thereto, shall:

xxxx

(vi) Require owners of illegally constructed houses, buildings, or other structures to obtain the
necessary permit, subject to such fines and penalties as may be imposed by law or ordinance, or
to make necessary changes in the construction of the same when said construction violates any
law or ordinance, or to order the demolition or removal of said house, building, or structure
within the period prescribed by law or ordinance;56

And if the enforcement would be limited to a demolition of the structures, it is not due to any
defect in the writ itself, but to the circumstances of the case and the situation of the parties at the
time of execution. As the trial court correctly observed, the above enumerations speak of three
(3) alternative duties, namely: (1) require the owners of illegally constructed structures to obtain
the necessary permit, subject to fines and penalties; (2) make necessary changes in the
construction of the same when said construction violates any law or ordinance, or (3) order the
demolition or removal of said house, building, or structure within the period prescribed by law or
ordinance. The obligations as enumerated are separated by the word "or," which the rules in
statutory construction dictate should be treated as a disjunctive article indicating an
alternative.57 The use of "or" often connects a series of words or propositions indicating a choice
of either, which means that the various members of the enumeration are to be taken separately,
with the term signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from each of the other
things enumerated.58 Thus, petitioners are clearly obliged to perform a duty that is one of the
three alternatives that the law enumerates, where a choice of one excludes the others.

Flowing from this, however, is the reality that two of the three obligations, those which would
"require owners of illegally constructed structures to obtain the necessary permit" and "make
necessary changes in the construction of said structures" are simply not enforceable due to the
inherent illegality of the structures concerned which were all built on public areas. No amount of
permits nor change in construction would legitimize the illegal structures as they are built on
property for public use, which is the public highway. Such is a factual finding that is binding on
this Court. The court below found that the areas occupied are the shoulder and drainages which
are part of the road's right-of-way and which, in turn, is considered part of the highway under
Presidential Decree No. 17, as amended, otherwise known as the Revised Philippine Highway
Act of 1972.59 Puno et al. will never legally acquire the same by prescription, for prescription
does not run against the State or its subdivisions on any of its non-patrimonial property.60 The
provincial road whose shoulder was occupied by these defendants is one such non-patrimonial
property.61 And as far as the structures obstruct free passage to the road, they likewise will never
attain legality by mere lapse of time.62

Therefore, the enforcement of the subject decision through the writ issued by the trial court is
presently limited to just one of the three alternatives, i.e., a demolition of the structures. The said
limitation is not because the writ "altered" the judgment; it is because the situation of the parties
and the practicalities of such enforcement require it. In addition, the decision subject of the
execution itself noted that it was the "failure of the public defendants to act on (Cajucom's)
letter-complaint to cause the removal of the structures located on the shoulder of the road" that
"constrained (him) to file the instant case."63 Removal or demolition of the structures was
likewise what was prayed for by Cajucom in the complaint.64 Thus, the trial court recognizes
that a removal of the structures is what is called for in this case. Such is expressed in the decision
and the dispositive portion thereof must be understood in this context. When interpreting the
dispositive portion of the judgment, the findings of the court as found in the whole decision must
be considered; a decision must be considered in its entirety, not just its specific portions, to grasp
its true intent and meaning.65

But even if the decision was entirely silent on the matter, this Court has held that a judgment is
not confined to what appears upon the face of the decision, but extends to those necessarily
included therein or necessary thereto.66 In the case at bar, the dispositive part of the trial court's
decision did not specify which of the alternative duties the public officers were to perform, but
since the decision itself factually states that the plaintiff sues for the removal of the subject
structures, and that the structures are built on a public highway, then it follows that only one of
the alternative duties - that of demolition - is capable of enforcement. As demolition stands as the
only and necessary way to effectuate the judgment, then it is what the execution of the judgment
should consist of. The writ of execution and a companion writ of demolition, if later prayed for
and issued by the trial court, are just a natural consequence of and a necessary means to enforce
the said decision.67

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed Order dated
September 15, 2005, of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 86, is AFFIRMED.
The parties and the officers of the court below are hereby ORDERED to IMPLEMENT the writ
of execution with dispatch.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.