We re not convinced that Atty Laureta had nothing to do with Ilustres letters, nor with the
complaint filedwith the tanodbayan. Atty Laureta repeated disparaging remarks such as undue
In re LAURETA
IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. WENCESLAO LAURETA,
AND OF CONTEMPTPROCEEDINGS AGAINST EVAMARAVILLA-ILUSTRE in G.R. No. 68635, entitled "EVA
MARAVILLA-ILUSTRE, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATEAPPELLATE COURT, ET AL
G.R. No. L-68635May 14, 1987
Facts:
Maravilla Illustre wrote to the justices of the SC, complaining about the dismissal of the her case
(aland dispute involving large estate) by a minute-resolution. Illustre claims that it was an unjust
resolutiondeliberately and knowingly promulgated by the 1stDivision, that it was railroaded with
such hurry beyondthe limits of legal and judicial ethics.
Illustre also threatened in her letter that, there is nothing final in this world. This case is far from
finishedby a long shot. She threatened that she would call for a press conference.Illustres letter
basically attacks the participation of Justice Pedro Yap in the first division. It was established
that Justice Yap was previously a law partner of Atty. Ordonez, now the Solgen and counsel for
theopponents.The letters were referred to the SC en banc. The SC clarified that when the
minute-resolution was issued,the presiding justice then was not Justice Yap but Justice
Abad Santos (who was about to retire), and thatJustice Yap was not aware that Atty Ordonez
was the opponents counsel. It was also made clear thatJustice Yap eventually inhibited himself
from the case.Still, Illustre wrote letters to the other justices (Narvasa, Herrera, Cruz), again with
more threats to exposethe kind of judicial performance readily constituting travesty of justice.
True to her threats, Illustre later filed a criminal complaint before the Tanodbayan, charging the
Justiceswith knowingly rendering an unjust Minute Resolution. Justice Yap and Solgen Ordonez
were also chargedof using their influence in the First Division in rendering said Minute
Resolution.Atty LAURETA was the counsel of Illustre. He circulate copies of the complain to the
press, without anycopy furnished the Court, nor the Justices charged. It was made to appear
that the Justices were chargedwith graft and corruption.The Tanodbayan dismissed the
complaint.Now, the SC is charging them with contempt.They claim that the letters were private
communication, and that they did not intend to dishonor thecourt.
Issue: WON privacy of communication was violated
Held: The letters formed part of the judicial record and are a matter of concern for the entire
court.
There is no vindictive reprisal involved here. The Courts authority and duty under the premises
is unmistakable. It must act to preserve its honor and dignity from the scurrilous attacks of an
irate lawyer, mouthed by his client, and to safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal
profession.
influence, powerful influence in his pleadings. This was bolstered by the report that Laureta
distributed copies of the complaint to the newspaper companies in envelopes bearing his name.
He was also heard over the radio.
Lastly, as Illustres lawyer, he had control of the proceedings.SC resolutions are
beyond investigation from other departments of the government because of separationof
powers. The correctness of the SC decisions are conclusive upon other branches of government
An immigration law passed by Congress holds that the attorney general can suspend the
deportation of an illegal immigrant if the immigrant would sustain severe hardship as a result.
Additionally, if either the Senate or House of Representatives voted by majority to veto the
attorney generals decision regarding deportation. Chadha was a student who had remained in
the US with an expired Visa. The attorney general held that he should remain in the US due to
hardship. The House of Representatives vetoed the decision to grant amnesty, thereby
sustaining the deportation order. Chadha brought this litigation after the legislative veto.
ISSUE
Whether a single house can vote to override an executive decision such that it violates the
principle of separation of powers.
HOLDING
Yes, Act invalidated. The court recognize the argument of efficiency regarding a single house
vote. Efficiency is achieved by this measure because the attorney general may frequently
override deportation and calling both houses of the legislature to vote for each instance would be
time consuming and burdensome. However, the constitution is very clear that legislative
decisions are to be bicameral. There are reasons relating to fair representation of states that
maintain this justification as paramount, particularly when weighed against arguments of
efficiency. The act of overriding an executive veto is inherently legislative and therefore
requires bicameral, legislative support.
ARNAULT vs. BALAGTAS
Citation: G.R. No. L-6749; 97 Phil. 358; July 30, 1955
Ponente: Labrador
Topic: Legislative investigation; may Senate hold a person in contempt as a punitive measure.
FACTS:
This was a petition for habeas corpus filed by Jean Arnault against the Director of Prisons,
Balagtas. Arnault was incarcerated pursuant to a resolution by the Senate finding Arnault in
contempt for refusing to disclose the name of a person with whom he transacted business in
relation to a government purchase of of the Buenavista and Tambobong estates. The
circumstances of Arnault's incarceration are described in the companion case Arnaultvs.
Nazareno (1950) which affirmed the Legislature's power to hold a person in contempt for defying
or refusing to comply with an order in a legislative inquiry.
Arnault eventually divulged that he had transacted with one Jess D. Santos in relation to the
Buenavista and Tambobong deal. Upon further inquiry, the Senate, obviously not satisfied with
Arnault's explanations, adopted Resolution No. 114. The title of the resolution states:
RESOLUTION APPROVING THE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE
THE BUENAVISTA AND TAMBOBONG ESTATES DEAL, AND ORDERING THE DIRECTOR
OF PRISON TO CONTINUE HOLDING JEAN L. ARNAULT IN HIS CUSTODY, AND IN
CONFINEMENT AND DETENTION AT THE NEW BILIBID PRISON AT MUNTINLUPA, RIZAL,
UNTIL THE SAID ARNAULT SHALL HAVE PURGED HIMSELF OF CONTEMPT OF THE
SENATE.
xxx
WHEREAS, the Senate holds and finds that the situation of the said Jean L. Arnault has not
materially changed since he was committed to prison for contempt of the Senate, and since the
Supreme Court of the Philippines, in a judgment long since become final, upheld the power and
authority of the Senate to hold the said Jean L. Arnault in custody, detention, and confinement,
said power and authority having been held to be coercive rather than punitive, and fully justified
until the said Jean L. Arnault should have given the information which he had withheld and
continues contumaciously to withhold;
WHEREAS, the insolent and manifest untruthful statements made by the said Jean L. Arnault on
the occasions above referred to constitute a continuing contempt of the Senate, and an added
affront to its dignity and authority, such that , were they to be condoned or overlooked, the power
and authority of the Senate to conduct investigations would become futile and ineffectual
because they could be defied by any person of sufficient stubbornness and malice;
xxx
The Court of First Instance ruled in favor of Petitioner Arnault and ordered his release.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Petitioner may be released from his Senate-imposed incarceration.
1. Whether or not the CFI has the right to review the findings of the Senate.
2. Whether or not the Senate may hold a person in contempt or incarcerate him as a punitive
rather than as a coercive measure.
HELD:
YES. The Senate may continue to keep Petitioner incarcerated.
1. NO. In the first place, the CFI did NOT have the right to review the findings of the Senate. In
the above quoted resolution, the Senate in stating that petitioner has failed and refused, and
continues to fail and refuse, to reveal the person to whom he gave the amount of P440,000 and
that the situation of petitioner has not materially charged since he was committed to prison,
clearly shows that the Senate believes that Arnault was still trying to deceive them. The CFI on
the other hand arrogated unto itself to review such finding and held that Arnault satisfactorily
answered the questions of the Senate in its investigation of the Buenavista and Tambobong
deal.
There is an inherent fundamental error in the course of action that the lower court followed. It
assumed that courts have the right to review the findings of legislative bodies in the exercise of
the prerogative of legislation, or interfere with their proceedings or their discretion in what is
known as the legislative process. The Judicial department has no right or power or authority to
do this, in the same manner that the legislative department may not invade the judicial realm in
the ascertainment of truth and in the application and interpretation of the law, in what is known
as the judicial process, because that would be in direct conflict with the fundamental principle of
separation of powers established by the Constitution. The only instances when judicial
intervention may lawfully be invoke are when there has been a violation of a
constitutional inhibition, or when there has been an arbitrary exercise of the legislative
discretion.
2. YES. The legislature may hold a person in contempt or incarcerate him as a punitive
measure.
Although the resolution studiously avoids saying that the confinement is a punishment, but
merely seeks to coerce the petitioner into telling the truth, the intention is evident that the
continuation of the imprisonment ordered is in fact partly punitive. This may be inferred from the
confining made in the resolution that petitioner's acts were arrogant and contumacious and
constituted an affront to the Senate's dignity and authority.
The legislature has the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses. This power is founded upon
reason and policy. Said power must be considered implied or incidental to the exercise of
legislative power, or necessary to effectuate said power. How could a legislative body obtain the
knowledge and information on which to base intended legislation if it cannot require and compel
the disclosure of such knowledge and information, if it is impotent to punish a defiance of its
power and authority? The legislative department should not be constrained to look to the courts
whenever for every act of refusal, every act of defiance, every act of contumacy with which it is
faced.
The exercise of the legislature's authority to deal with the defiant and contumacious witness
should be supreme and is not subject to judicial interference, except when there is a manifest
and absolute disregard of discretion and a mere exertion of arbitrary power coming within the
reach of constitutional limitations.
The judgment appealed from should be, as it hereby is, reversed, and the petition for the
issuance of the writ of habeas corpus denied. The order of the court allowing the petitioner to
give bail is declared null and void and the petitioner is hereby ordered to be recommitted to the
custody of the respondent. With cost against the petitioner-appellee.
Brief Fact Summary. President Carter terminated a treaty with Taiwan without congressional
approval.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. This is a political question and not justiciable.
Facts. President Carter terminated a treaty with Taiwan, and a few Congressional members felt
that this deprived them of their Constitutional function. However, no Congressional action was
ever taken. The Senate considered a resolution that would require the President to get Senate
approval before any mutual defense treaty could be terminated, but there was no final vote on
the resolution.
Issue. Is this issue of whether a President can terminate a treaty without Congressional
approval a non-justiciable political question?
Held. Yes. Whether or not a President can terminate a treaty closely involves his foreing
relations authority and therefore is not reviewable by the Supreme Court.
Dissent. Even though the Court cannot review political questions, the court has the power to
review whether or not a particular branch of government has exclusive decision-making power
over an issue.
Concurrence. This issue was not ripe because the Senate never tried to invoke a resolution
against it. Were it ripe, however, the issue would be justiciable because it would require an
interpretation of the Constitution. Even though the Supreme Court cannot hear purely political
questions, it can review cases to determine if the interpretation of the Constitution is correct.
Discussion. In the arena of foreign affairs, the Court has held issues to be political questions
even though many Justices believe these issues relate to the interpretation of the Constitution,
and are therefore reviewable. The Court places a great emphasis on establishing a single,
unified voice for the nation on foreign affairs is
GARCIA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 211 SCRA 219 July 3, 1992Feliciano, J.:FACTS:
The President issued an EO which imposed, across the board, including crude oil and
otheroil products, additional duty ad valorem. The Tariff Commission held public hearingson said
EO and submitted a report to the President for consideration and appropriateaction. The
President, on the other hand issued an EO which levied a special duty of P0.95per liter of
imported crude oil and P1.00 per liter of imported oil products.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the President may issue an EO which is tantamount to enacting a bill in
thenature of revenue-generating measures.
RULING:
The Court said that although the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff billsis within the
province of the Legislative, it does not follow that EO in question, assumingthey may be
characterized as revenue measure are prohibited to the President, that theymust be enacted
instead by Congress. Section 28 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitutionprovides:The Congress
may, by law authorize the President to fix tariff rates and other duties orimposts The
relevant Congressional statute is the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines andSections
104 and401, the pertinent provisions thereof.
In November 1990, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 438 which imposed,
in addition to any other duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles imported into
the Philippines, an additional duty of 5% ad valorem tax. This additional duty was imposed
across the board on all imported articles, including crude oil and other oil products imported into
the Philippines. In 1991, EO 443 increased the additional duty to 9%. In the same year, EO 475
was passed reinstating the previous 5% duty except that crude oil and other oil products
continued to be taxed at 9%. Enrique Garcia, a representative from Bataan, avers that EO 475
and 478 are unconstitutional for they violate Section 24 of Article VI of the Constitution which
provides:
All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the
Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in Congress,
the President may not assume such power by issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which
are in the nature of revenue-generating measures.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are constitutional.
HELD: Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation, revenue
and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within the province of the Legislative rather than
the Executive Department. It does not follow, however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475
and 478, assuming they may be characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to be
exercised by the President, that they must be enacted instead by the Congress of the
Philippines.
Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows:
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject
to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas,
tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national
development program of the Government.
There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the President subject to
such limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may impose to fix within specific limits tariff
rates . . . and other duties or imposts . . . . In this case, it is the Tariff and Customs Code which
authorized the President ot issue the said EOs.
US VS ANG TANG HO
G.R. No. 17122 43 Phil 1 February 27, 1922
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANG TANG HO, defendant-appellant.
Facts:
During a special session, the Philippine Legislature passed and approved Act No. 2868 entitled
An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn. The said act under
extraordinary circumstances authorizes the Governor General to issue the necessary Rules and
Regulations in regulating the distribution of such products. Pursuant to this Act, the Governor
General issued Executive Order 53 fixing the price at which rice should be sold.
Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, voluntarily, criminally and illegally sold a ganta of rice to Pedro
Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos. The said amount was way higher than that prescribed
by the Executive Order. He was charged in violation of the said Executive Order and was found
guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. He
appealed the sentence countering that there was an undue delegation of power to the Governor
General.
Issues:
Whether or not there was an undue delegation of power to the Governor General.
Discussions:
By the terms of the Organic Act, subject only to constitutional limitations, the power to legislate
and enact laws is vested exclusively in the Legislative, which is elected by a direct vote of the
people of the Philippine Islands. As to the question here involved, the authority of the Governor-
General to fix the maximum price at which palay, rice and corn may be sold in the manner power
in violation of the organic law.
Act No. 2868, as analysed by the Court, wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the
standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take
the place of all others without the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to
matters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and without
which the act could not possibly be put in use. The law must be complete in all its terms and
provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of the government and nothing must be left to
the judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and
substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in future, if
necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.
Rulings:
Yes. When Act No. 2868 was analyzed, it is the violation of the proclamation of the Governor-
General which constitutes the crime. Without that proclamation, it was no crime to sell rice at any
price. In other words, the Legislature left it to the sole discretion of the Governor-General to say
what was and what was not any cause for enforcing the act, and what was and what was not
an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, and under certain undefined conditions
to fix the price at which rice should be sold, without regard to grade or quality, also to say
whether a proclamation should be issued, if so, when, and whether or not the law should be
enforced, how long it should be enforced, and when the law should be suspended. The
Legislature did not specify or define what was any cause, or what was an extraordinary rise in
the price of rice, palay or corn, Neither did it specify or define the conditions upon which the
proclamation should be issued. In the absence of the proclamation no crime was committed. The
alleged sale was made a crime, if at all, because the Governor-General issued the proclamation.
The act or proclamation does not say anything about the different grades or qualities of rice, and
the defendant is charged with the sale of one ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos
(P0.80) which is a price greater than that fixed by Executive order No. 53.
CONFERENCE V POEA
FACTS:
The Governing Board of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) issued
Resolution No. 01, series of 1994 amending and increasing the compensation and other benefits
under Part. II, Section C, paragraph 1 and Section L, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the POEA Standard
Employment Contract for Seafarers. POEA also issued Memorandum Circular No. 05, series of
1994 informing all Filipino seafarers, manning agencies, shipowners, managers and principals
hiring Filipino seafarers of the said adjustments.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the assailed issuances violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
RULING:
NO. There can be no dispute about the dissimilarities between land-based and sea-based
Filipino overseas workers in terms of, among other things, work environment, safety, dangers
and risks to life and limb, and accessibility to social, civic, and spiritual activities.
Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Facts:
Petitioner Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc., an incorporatedassociation of licens
ed Filipino manning agencies, and its co-
petitioners, all licensedmanning agencies which hire and recruit Filipino seamen for and in behalf
of theirrespective foreign ship-owner-principals, urge us to annul Resolution No. 01, series
of 1994, of the Governing Board" of the POEA and POEA Memorandum Circular No. 05.
Petitioners contend that POEA does not have the power and authority to fix
andpromulgate rates affecting death and workmen's compensation of Filipino seamenworking in
ocean-going vessels; only Congress can.
Governing Board Resolution No. 1: the POEA Governing Board resolves to amend andincrease
the compensation and other benefits as specified under Part II, Section. C,paragraph 1 and
Section L, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the POEA Standard EmploymentContract for Seafarers
Issue/Held:
WON the POEA can promulgate rules by virtue of delegation of legislativepower.
Yes.
Ratio:
The constitutional challenge of the rule-making power of the POEA-based onimpermissible
delegation of legislative power had been, as correctly contented by thepublic respondents,
brushed aside by this Court in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. POEA.
o The governing Board of the Administration (POEA) shall promulgate the necessaryrules and
regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of theAdministration (POEA).
O To many of the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislaturemay not
have the competence to provide the required direct and efficacious not
tosay, specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected from itsdelegates, who are
supposed to be experts in the particular fields assigned to them.
While the making of laws is a non-
delegable power that pertains exclusively toCongress, nevertheless, the latter may constitutional
ly delegate the authority topromulgate rules and regulations to implement
a given legislation and effectuate itspolicies, for the reason that the legislature finds it
impracticable, if not impossible, toanticipate situations that may be met in carrying the law into
effect. All that is required isthat the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of
the law; that theregulation be not in contradiction to but in conformity with the standards
prescribed bythe law.
(Principle of Subordinate Legislation)
That the challenged resolution and memorandum circular, which merely furtheramended the
previous Memorandum Circular No. 02, strictly conform to the sufficientand valid standard of
"fair and equitable employment practices" prescribed in E.O. No.797 can no longer be disputed.
Caption: PELAEZ VS AUDITOR GENERAL
G.R. No. L-23825 15 SCRA 569 December 24, 1965
EMMANUEL PELAEZ, petitioner,
vs.
THE AUDITOR GENERAL, respondent.
Facts:
The President of the Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating
thirty-three (33) municipalities enumerated in the margin. Petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice
President of the Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted the present special civil action, for a writ
of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as
his representatives and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in
implementation of said executive orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities.
Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said Section
68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 effective January 1, 1960 and
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. The third paragraph of Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 2370, reads: Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their
names changed except under the provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress.
Issues:
Whether or not Section 68 of Revised Administrative Code constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power.
Discussions:
Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law ordains:
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise
general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that
the laws be faithfully executed.
The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the
exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments,
bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This
power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are
concerned. With respect to the latter, the fundamental law permits him to wield no more authority
than that of checking whether said local governments or the officers thereof perform their duties
as provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the President cannot interfere with local
governments, so long as the same or its officers act within the scope of their authority.
Rulings:
Yes. It did entail an undue delegation of legislative powers. The alleged power of the President
to create municipal corporations would necessarily connote the exercise by him of an authority
even greater than that of control which he has over the executive departments, bureaus or
offices. In other words, Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail to
comply with the constitutional mandate. Instead of giving the President less power over local
governments than that vested in him over the executive departments, bureaus or offices, it
reverses the process and does the exact opposite, by conferring upon him more power over
municipal corporations than that which he has over said executive departments, bureaus or
offices.
PEOPLE v. JUDGE AUXENCIO C. DACUYCUY, GR No. L-45127, 1989-05-05
Facts:
In a complaint filed by the Chief of Police of Hindang, Leyte on April 4, 1975, herein private
respondents Celestino S. Matondo, Segundino A.
Caval and Cirilo M. Zanoria, public school officials of Leyte, were charged before the Municipal
Court of Hindang, Leyte in Criminal Case No. 555... thereof for violation of Republic Act No.
4670. The case was set for arraignment and trial on May 29, 1975. At the arraignment, the
herein private respondents, as the accused therein, pleaded not guilty to the... charge.
exercised in discerning the course prescribed by law and which, when discerned, it is the duty of
the court to follow.
criminal jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action.
the decision and resolution of respondent judge are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Criminal Case No. 555 filed against private respondents... herein is hereby ordered to be
remanded to the Municipal Trial Court of Hindang, Leyte
Principles:

the facts charged do not constitute an... offense considering that Section 32 of Republic Act No. The basic principle underlying the entire field of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of
4670 is null and void for being unconstitutional. legislation is that in the enactment of legislation a constitutional measure is thereby created.

On October 26, 1975, private respondents filed a petition[6] for certiorari and prohibition with whether the constitutional prohibition looks only to the form or nature of the penalty and not to
preliminary injunction before the former Court of First Instance of the proportion between the penalty and the crime.

Leyte, Branch VIII, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. B-622, to restrain the Municipal the discretion granted therein by the legislature to the courts to determine the period of
Judge, Provincial Fiscal and Chief of Police of Hindang, Leyte from proceeding with the trial of imprisonment is a matter of statutory construction and not an undue delegation of legislative
said Criminal Case No. power.

555 upon the ground that the former Municipal Court of Hindang had no jurisdiction over the
Powell v.
offense charged.
McCormack
On March 15, 1976, the petitioner herein filed an opposition to the admission of the said
amended petition... respondent judge denied the same in his... resolution of April 20, 1976.[10]
Case
On August 2, 1976, herein petitioner filed a supplementary memorandum in answer to the 395 US 486
Citation:
amended... petition.

Issues:
Year: 1969
It imposes a cruel and unusual punishment, the term of imprisonment being unfixed and may run
to... reclusion perpetua; and
1. Powell was elected by the citizen of NY to be their
(2) It also constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power, the duration of the penalty of Representative in the House for the 90th Congress.
imprisonment being solely left to the discretion of the court as if the latter were the legislative...
2. When the oath was being administered he was asked to
department of the Government.
step aside.
Ruling:
3. A Select Committee determined that although Powell
That the penalty is grossly disproportionate to the crime is an insufficient basis to declare the law met the Constitutional requirements, they felt because he
Facts:
unconstitutional on the ground that it is cruel and unusual. asserted an unwarranted privilege of immunity from NY
courts, and wrongfully diverted funds, and made false
The fact that the punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not... make it cruel or reports on expenditures of foreign currency, he should be
unsual. excluded from taking his seat.

An apparent exception to the general rule forbidding the delegation of legislative authority to the 4. House speaker McCormack determined that a majority
courts exists in cases where discretion is conferred upon said courts. It is clear, however, that vote would render Powells seat vacant, and a vote
when the courts are said to exercise a... discretion, it must be a mere legal discretion which is thereby was rendered.
 discriminated because they were given less representation. Furthermore, they allege that RA
5. District Ct. dismissed for lack of jurisdictional subject
3040 is unconstitutional and void because:
matter. Ct of App affirmed Dismissal. Reversed.
1. It was passed without printed final copies which must be furnished to the members of
the HOR at least 3 calendar days prior to passage.
Whether the House alone, under Article I, Sec. 5, has the
power to determine who is qualified to be a member, under 2. It was approved more than 3 years after the return of the last census of the population.
Issues:
the textual commitment, to be the judge of the
qualifications of is own members? 3. It apportioned districts without regard to the number of inhabitants of the several
provinces.

Requirements for a seat within the Congress, AI; S2, age,

Rule:
citizenship, and residence.
Issues:

Article I, Sec 5 does not confer judicially unreviewable
powers upon the Congress as it relates to the setting of
qualifications of its members. If it did that would be a
political question that this court would be barred from
entering into. Historically the Constitution leaves the House
Analysis:
without authority to exclude persons, who met the
Constitutional requirements, and who have been duly
elected by their constituents. Congress has the power to
punish its members behavior, and expel but it does not
have the Constitutional power to exclude or deny entrance.
No, the House can only judge the three qualifications as set
Conclusion:
forth in the Constitution.
Whether or not the apportionment of representative districts under Republic Act 3040 is in
accordance with the constitution.
Discussions:
The Constitution directs that the one hundred twenty Members of the House of Representatives
shall be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the
member of their respective inhabitants. A law giving provinces with less number of inhabitants
more representative districts than those with bigger population is invalid because it violates the
principle of proportional representation prescribed by the Constitution. Inequality of
apportionment law is arbitrary and capricious and against the vital principle of equality. as held
in Houghton County v. Blacker.

MACIAS VS COMELEC

G.R. No. L-18684 32 SCRA 1 September 14, 1961

LAMBERTO MACIAS, LORENZO TEVES, FAUSTO DUGENIO, ROGACIANO MERCADO

Rulings:
and MARIANO PERDICES, petitioners,
vs. No. The Court concluded that the statute be declared invalid. Republic Act 3040 clearly violates
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and VICENTE GELLA in his Capacity as National
the said constitutional provision in several ways namely:
Treasurer, respondents.

It gave Cebu seven members, while Rizal with a bigger number of inhabitants got four
only.

Facts:
Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives from Negros Oriental, Misamis
Oriental and Bulacan and the provincial Governor of Negros Oriental. They are requesting that
the respondent officials be prevented to implement RA 3040, an act that apportions
representative districts in the country. They alleged that their respective provinces were
It gave Manila four members, while Cotabato with a bigger population got three only
Pangasinan with less inhabitants than both Manila and Cotabato got more than both,
five members having been assigned to it.
Samar (with 871,857) was allotted four members while Davao with 903,224 got three
only.
 Bulacan with 557,691 got two only, while Albay with less inhabitants (515,691) got
three.
Misamis Oriental with 387,839 was given one member only, while Cavite with less
inhabitants (379,904) got two. These were not the only instances of unequal
apportionment.
unconstitutional and not in complete accord with the Local Government Code because:
The voters of the parent province of Negros Occidental, other than those living within the
territory of the new province of Negros del Norte, were not included in the plebiscite.
The area which would comprise the new province of Negros del Norte would only be about
2,856.56 sq. km., which is lesser than the minimum area prescribed by the governing statute,
Sec. 197 of LGC.

Issue:
Mountain Province has 3 whereas Isabela, Laguna and Cagayan with more
WON the plebiscite was legal and complied with the constitutional requisites of the Consititution,
inhabitants have 2 each. And then, Capiz, La Union and Ilocos Norte got 2 each,
which states that Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided,
whereas Sulu that has more inhabitants got 1 only. And Leyte with 967,323
merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria
inhabitants got 4 only, whereas Iloilo with less inhabitants (966,145) was given 5.
established in the Local Government Code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the
votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected? NO.
Tan vs COMELEC, G.R. No. 73155 case brief summary
July 11, 1986 Held:
Whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the
Facts: The complainants are residents of Province of Negros Occidental. This case is boundaries, the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected
petition contesting the constitutionality of RA No. 885, An Act Creating a New Province must first be obtained. The creation of the proposed new province of Negros del Norte will
in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte, effective necessarily result in the division and alteration of the existing boundaries of Negros Occidental
Dec. 3, 1985. Pursuant to and in implementation of this law, the COMELEC scheduled (parent province).
a plebiscite for January 3, 1986 on the proposed new province. The plebiscite resulted
Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two political units would be affected. The first would
in the affirmative votes thus the proclamation of the new province known as Negros
del Norte. be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially
altered. The other affected entity would be composed of those in the area subtracted from the

mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte.
Issue:
Paredes vs. Executive (G.R. No. 55628) should not be taken as a doctrinal or compelling
(1)This case question whether as residents of the parent province, the citizens should precedent. Rather, the dissenting view of Justice Abad Santos is applicable, to wit:
be included in the plebiscite as the constitution provides that it should be conducted in
when the Constitution speaks of the unit or units affected it means all of the people of the
the affected area
municipality if the municipality is to be divided such as in the case at bar or of the people of two
(2)They also question the constitutionality of the law as the territory did not reach the
or more municipalities if there be a merger.
required minimum of 2500 sq.km
The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an area affected. The substantial

alteration of the boundaries of the parent province, not to mention the adverse economic effects
Rulings:
it might suffer, eloquently argue the points raised by the petitioners.
(Issue 1): The Supreme Court held the citizens of the parent province should also be SC pronounced that the plebscite has no legal effect for being a patent nullity.
included in the plebiscite as they are also affected by the division of the province. This
division will cause an alteration to the parent provinces territorial boundaries, political
units as well as may have adverse economic effects.
(Issue 2): Based on records, it was proved that the territorial boundaries of the new RA 7941 the Party list Act (1995)
province will not reach the required minimum of 3500 sq.km.
As such, the Supreme Court ruled that RA No. 885 is unconstitutional. BANAT V. COMELEC , G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009Facts:
TAN vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 73155 July 11, 1986
Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT)filed before the
Governing law: Art XI Sec. 3 of Constitution in relation to Sec. 197 of Local Government Code
National Board of Canvassers(NBC) a petition to proclaim the fullnumber of party list
representatives provided by the Constitution. However, therecommendation of the head of the
Facts:
legal group of COMELECs national board of canvassers to declare the petition moot and
This case was prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, An Act Creating a New
academic was approved by the COMELEC en banc.
Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte, effective Dec.
3, 1985. (Cities of Silay, Cadiz and San Carlos and the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso,
BANAT filed for petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the resolution of COMELEC to
Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona, and Salvador Benedicto proposed to
their petition to proclaim the full number of party listrepresentatives provided by the Constitution.
belong to the new province).
Pursuant to and in implementation of this law, the COMELEC scheduled a plebiscite for January
3, 1986. Petitioners opposed, filing a case for Prohibition and contending that the B.P. 885 is
 The COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated a resolution proclaimingthirteen (13) parties
as winners in the party-list elections in May 2007. TheCOMELEC announced that, upon
completion of the canvass of the party-listresults, it would determine the total number of seats of
each winning party,organization, or coalition in accordance with Veterans Federation Party
v.COMELEC formula.
Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through Action,Cooperation
and Harmony Towards Educational Reforms (A Teacher) asked theCOMELEC, acting as NBC,
to reconsider its decision to usethe
Veterans formula. COMELEC denied the consideration.
Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher filed for certiorari with mandamus andprohibition assailing
the resolution of the COMELEC in its decision to use theVeterans formula.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section5(2), Article
VI of the Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling
Whether or not the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 is constitutional
Whether or not the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 toqualify for
one seat is constitutional
How shall the party-list representatives be allocated?
Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list
elections? If not, can the major political parties be barred from participating in the party-list
elections?
RULING:
The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives
cannot be more than 20% of the members of the House of Representatives.
Yes, it is constitutional. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that
aqualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device thatprevents any
party from dominating the party-list elections.
The second clause of Section 11(b) of R. A. 7941 those garnering more than twopercent
(2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes
is unconstitutional. The two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the
additional seats presents an unwarranted obstacle to thefull implementation of Section 5(2),
Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of "the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives."
In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No.
7941, the following procedure shall be observed:1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions
shall be ranked from the highest tothe lowest based on the number of votes they garnered
during the elections.2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent
(2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed
seateach.3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking inparagraph 1,
shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the
additional seats are allocated.4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not
more than three (3)seats.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties fromparticipating in
the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitutionclearly intended the major
political parties to participate in party-list elections throughtheir sectoral wings. Also, in defining a
"party" that participates in party-list elections aseither "a political party or a sectoral party," R.A.
No. 7941 also clearly intended thatmajor political parties will participate in the party-list elections.
Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution,
the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. However, by thevote of 8-7,
theCourt decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from
participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.
ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY V. COMELEC, GR No. 190582, April 8, 2010
This is a Petition for
Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with an application for a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction, filed by
Ang Ladlad
LGBT Party (
Ang Ladlad
) against theResolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated November 11, 2009
(the First Assailed Resolution) and December 16, 2009 (the Second Assailed Resolution) in SPP
No. 09-228 (PL)(collectively, the Assailed Resolutions). The case has its roots in the
COMELECs refusal to accredit
Ang Ladlad
as a party-list organization under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-
ListSystem Act.
FACTS:
Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT (lesbians, gays, bisexuals and
transgender)community is a marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly
disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are victims of
exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that because of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are
constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and that
Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by this Court in
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections
.Ang Ladlad laid out its national membership base consisting of individual members and
organizational supporters, and outlined its platform of governance. On August 17, 2009,Ang
Ladlad filed a Petition for registration with theCOMELEC. On November 11, 2009, after admitting
the petitioners evidence, the COMELEC (Second Division)dismissed the Petition on moral
grounds that petitioner tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs, and advocates sexual
immorality. Petitioner should likewise be denied accreditation not only for advocating immoral
doctrines but likewise for not being truthful when it said that it
or any of its nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or failed to comply with laws,
rules, or regulations relating to the elections. Furthermore, states COMELEC,Ang Ladlad will be
exposing our youth to anenvironment that does not conform to the teachings of our faith.
When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration, COMELEC still, on December 16, 2010, upheld the
First Assailed Resolution. On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad a Petition, praying that the Supreme
Court annul the Assailed Resolutions and direct the COMELEC to grant Ang Ladlads
application for accreditation. Ang Ladlad also sought the issuance ex part of a preliminary
mandatory injunction against the COMELEC, which had previously announced that it would
begin printing the final ballots for the May 2010 elections by January 25, 2010.
ISSUES:
1 Whether or not the denial of accreditation by COMELEC, violated the constitutional guarantees
against the establishment of religion. insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious
dogma.
2Whether or not the Assailed Resolutions contravened the constitutional rights to privacy,
freedomof speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, of Ang Ladlad , as well as
constituted violations of the Philippines international obligations against discrimination based on
sexual orientation.
Ruling:
Ang Ladlad LGBT Partys application for registration should be granted.
Comelecs citation of the Bible and the Koran in denying petitioners application was a violation
of the non-establishment clause laid down in Article 3 section 5 of the Constitution. The
proscription by law relative to acts against morality must be for a secular purpose (that is, the
conduct prohibited or sought to be repressed is detrimental or dangerous to those conditions
upon which depend the existence and progress of human society"), rather than out of religious
conformity. The Comelec failed to substantiate their allegation that allowing registration to
Ladlad would be detrimental to society.
The LGBT community is not exempted from the exercise of its constitutionally vested rights on
the basis of their sexual orientation. Laws of general application should apply with equal force to
LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other
marginalized and under-represented sectors. Discrimination based on sexual orientation is not
tolerated ---not by our own laws nor by any international laws to which do we adhere.
Case Digest Bello & Rosales v. COMELEC, et al.
G.R. No. 191998,
G.R. No. 192769, G.R. No. 192832 : December 7, 2010
WALDEN F. BELLO AND LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, Petitioners, v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, Respondent/LIZA L. MAZAAND SATURNINO C. OCAMPO, Petitioners, v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent /BAYAN MUNA PARTY-LIST REPRESENTED
BY TEODORO CASINO, Petitioners,v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND JUAN MIGUEL
"MIKEY" ARROYO OF ANG GALING PINOY PARTY-LIST, Respondents.
BRION,J.:
FACTS:
Ang Galing Pinoy Party-List(AGPP) filed with the Commission on Elections its Manifestation of
Intent to Participate in theMay 10, 2010elections. Subsequently, onMarch 23, 2010, AGPP filed
its Certificate of Nomination together with the Certificates of Acceptance of its nominees.
OnMarch 25, 2010, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8807which prescribed the rules of
procedure applicable to petitions to disqualify a party-list nominee for purposes of theMay 10,
2010elections.
OnMarch 25, 2010, petitioners Liza L. Maza, Saturnino C. Ocampo, and Bayan Muna Party-List,
represented by TeodoroCasi, (collectively referred to ascertiorari petitioners) filed with the
COMELEC a petition for disqualification against Arroyo, pursuant to Resolution No. 8696, in
relation with Sections 2 and 9 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7941 (the Party- List System Act).
The certiorari petitioners argued that not only must the party-list organization factually and truly
represent the marginalized and the underrepresented; the nominee must as well be a Filipino
citizen belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties,
citing in this regard the case ofAng Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC. On this
basis, thecertioraripetitioners concluded that Arroyo cannot be considered a member of the
marginalized and underrepresented sector, particularly, the sector which the AGPP represents
tricycle drivers and security guards because he is not only a member of the First Family, but is
also (a) an incumbent member of the House of Representatives; (b) the Chairman of the Houses
Energy Committee; and, (c) a member of key committees in the House, namely: Natural
Resources, Aquaculture, Fisheries Resources, Ethics and Privileges, Justice, National Defense
and Security, Public Works and Highways, Transportation and Ways and Means.
On April 6, 2010, petitioners Walden F. Bello and Loretta Ann P. Rosales (mandamus
petitioners) wrote the COMELEC Law Department a letter requesting for a copy of the
documentary evidence submitted by AGPP, in compliance with Section 6 of Resolution No.
8807.On the same day, the COMELEC Law Department replied that as of that date, the AGPP
had not yet submitted any documentary evidence required by Resolution No. 8807.
Themandamuspetitioners requested the COMELEC and its Law Department to act, consistently
with Section 10 of Resolution No. 8807, and declare the disqualification of the nominees of
AGPP for their failure to comply with the requirements of Section 6 of Resolution No.
8807. Section 6 of the Resolution provides that the party-list group and the nominees must
submit documentary evidence to duly prove that the nominees truly belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented sector/s, and to the sectoral party, organization, political party or coalition
they seek to represent. It likewise provides that the COMELEC Law Department shall require
party-list groups and nominees to make the required documentary submissions.
In its May 7, 2010 Joint Resolution, the COMELEC Second Division dismissed the petitions for
disqualification against Arroyo. It noted that Section 9 of RA 7941 merely requires the nominee
to be "abona fidemember [of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for] at least
ninety (90) days preceding the day of the elections." The COMELEC En Banc refused to
reconsider.
Themandamuspetitioners filed with the Supreme Court their Petition forMandamusand
Prohibition with Application for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction,docketed asG.R. No. 191998.They sought to compel the COMELEC to
disqualifymotu propriothe AGPP nominees for their failure to comply with Section 6 of Resolution
No. 8807, and to enjoin the COMELEC from giving due course to the AGPPs participation in the
May 10, 2010 elections.
On July 23 and 29, 2010, thecertioraripetitioners elevated their case to the Supreme Courtviatwo
(2) separate petitions forcertiorari, docketed asG.R. Nos. 192769 and192832, to annul the
COMELEC Second Divisions May 7, 2010 joint resolution and the COMELECen bancsJuly 19,
2010 consolidated resolution that dismissed their petitions for disqualification against Arroyo as
AGPPs nominee.
In the interim, AGPP obtained in theMay 10, 2010elections the required percentage of votes
sufficient to secure a single seat.This entitled Arroyo, as AGPPs first nominee, to sit in the
House of Representatives. OnJuly 21, 2010, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of
Canvassers, proclaimed Arroyo as AGPPs duly-elected party-list representative in the House of
Representatives.
ISSUES:
I. Whetheror not mandamuslies to compel the COMELEC to disqualify AGPPs
nomineesmotu proprioor to cancel AGPPs registration;
II. Whether or not the COMELEC can be enjoined from giving due course to AGPPs participation
in the May 10, 2010 elections, the canvassing of AGPPs votes, and proclaiming it a winner; and
III. Whether or not the HRET has jurisdiction over the question of Arroyos qualifications as
AGPPs nominee after his proclamation and assumption to office as a member of the House of
Representatives.
HELD: The petitions are dismissed.
REMEDIAL LAW; MANDAMUS
First Issue: For a writ ofmandamusto issue (inG.R. No. 191998), Petitioners must comply with
the condition that there be "no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law." However, they failed to do so.Under Section 2, in relation with Section 4, of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8807 (quoted below), any interested party may file with the COMELEC a petition
for disqualification against a party-list nominee. Furthermore, under Section 6 of RA 7941, any
interested party may file a verified complaint for cancellation of registration of a party-list
organization. These provisions effectively provide the "plain, speedy and adequate remedy" that
themandamuspetitioners should have taken. In filing the present petition,
themandamuspetitioners also violated the rule on the exhaustion of administrative remedies.
The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies provides that a party must exhaust all
administrative remedies to give the administrative agency an opportunity to decide and thus
prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the courts.
REMEDIAL LAW; MOOTNESS
Second Issue: The court finds that the second issue has been mooted by the supervening
participation, election and proclamation of AGPP after it secured the required percentage of
votes in the May 10, 2010 elections.The prohibition issue has been rendered moot since there is
nothing now to prohibit in light of the supervening events.A moot case is one that ceases to
present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon
(in this case, the prevention of the specified acts) can no longer be done.
POLITICAL LAW; HRET
Third Issue: The consistent judicial holding is that the HRET has jurisdiction to pass upon the
qualifications of party-list nominees after their proclamation and assumption of office; they are,
for all intents and purposes, "elected members" of the House of Representatives although the
entity directly voted upon was their party. In the present case, it is not disputed that Arroyo,
AGPPs first nominee, has already been proclaimed and taken his oath of office as a Member of
the House of Representatives.The court takes judicial notice, too, of the filing of two (2) petitions
forquo warrantoagainst Arroyo, now pending before the HRET.The court holds that the Court
has no jurisdiction over the present petitions and that the HRET now has the exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear and rule upon Arroyos qualifications as a Member of the House of
Representatives.
Case Digest: Atong Paglaum v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 203766 : April 2, 2013
ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan Igot, Petitioner, v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
52 party-list groups and organizations filed separate petitions totaling 54 with the Supreme Court
(SC) in an effort to reverse various resolutions by the Commission on Elections (Comelec)
disqualifying them from the May 2013 party-list race. The Comelec, in its assailed resolutions
issued in October, November and December of 2012, ruled, among others, that these party-list
groups and organizations failed to represent a marginalized and underrepresented sector, their
nominees do not come from a marginalized and underrepresented sector, and/or some of the
organizations or groups are not truly representative of the sector they intend to represent in
Congress.
Petitioners argued that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections, either by denial of their new petitions for registration under the party-list system, or by
cancellation of their existing registration and accreditation as party-list organizations; andsecond,
whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down inAng Bagong Bayani and
Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on
Elections(BANAT) should be applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list
elections.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong
Bayani and BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the
COMELEC as the Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which abandoned
some principles established in the two aforestated cases.
Political Law- Party-list system
Commissioner Christian S. Monsod, the main sponsor of the party-list system, stressed that "the
party-list system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral representation." Indisputably, the
framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list system to include not only sectoral
parties but also non-sectoral parties. The framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a
part, but not the entirety, of the party-list system.As explained by Commissioner Wilfredo
Villacorta, political parties can participate in the party-list system "For as long as they field
candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this
Constitution."
Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act is the law that implements the party-list
system prescribed in the Constitution.
Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a "party" as"either a political party or a sectoral partyor a
coalition of parties." Clearly, a political party is different from a sectoral party. Section 3(c) of
R.A. No. 7941 further provides that a"political partyrefers to anorganized group of citizens
advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of
government."On the other hand, Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that a "sectoral
partyrefers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in
Section 5 hereofwhose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their
sector."R.A. No. 7941 provides different definitions for a political and a sectoral party. Obviously,
they are separate and distinct from each other.
Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is clearly
different from a sectoral party. A political party need not be organized as a sectoral party and
need not represent any particular sector. There is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a
national or regional political party must represent a "marginalized and underrepresented" sector.
It is sufficient that the political party consists of citizens who advocate the same ideology or
platform, or the same governance principles and policies,regardless of their economic status as
citizens.
Political Law- parameters in qualifying party- lists
The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections those that did
not satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national, regional, and sectoral groups or organizations must
represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors, and (2) all nominees must belong to
the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. Petitioners may have been
disqualified by the COMELEC because as political or regional parties they are not organized
along sectoral lines and do not represent the "marginalized and underrepresented."
Also, petitioners' nominees who do not belong to the sectors they represent may have been
disqualified, although they may have a track record of advocacy for their sectors. Likewise,
nominees of non-sectoral parties may have been disqualified because they do not belong to any
sector. Moreover, a party may have been disqualified because one or more of its nominees
failed to qualify, even if the party has at least one remaining qualified nominee.
In determining who may participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list
elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize
along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized and underrepresented"
sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list
system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major
or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections
only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The
sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a
coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented" or
lacking in "well-defined political constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy
pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are "marginalized
and underrepresented" include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined
political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented"
sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations
that lack "well-defined political constituencies" must belong to the sector they represent. The
nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented," or that represent those who lack "well-defined political constituencies," either
must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their
respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be
bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of
their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains
qualified.
This Court is sworn to uphold the 1987 Constitution, apply its provisions faithfully, and desist
from engaging in socio-economic or political experimentations contrary to what the Constitution
has ordained. Judicial power does not include the power to re-write the Constitution. Thus, the
present petitions should be remanded to the COMELEC not because the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioners, but because petitioners may now possibly
qualify to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the new parameters
prescribed by this Court.
Petitions Granted
AQUINO vs. COMELEC
(248 SCRA 400)
Facts:
On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position
of Representativefor the new Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his certificate of
candidacy, Aquino stated that he was aresident of the aforementioned district for 10 months.
Faced with a petition for disqualification, he amended theentry on his residency in his certificate
of candidacy to 1 year and 13 days. The Commission on Electionsdismissed the petition on 6
May and allowed Aquino to run in the election of 8 May. Aquino won. Acting on amotion for
reconsideration of the above dismissal, the Commission on Election later issued an order
suspendingthe proclamation of Aquino until the Commission resolved the issue. On 2 June, the
Commission on Electionsfound Aquino ineligible and disqualified for the elective office for lack
of constitutional qualification of residence.
Issue:
Whether residency in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes domicile to warrant thedis
qualification of Aquino from the position in the electoral district.
Held:
The place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no
matterwhere he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his
domicile, is that towhich the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of
election law. The purpose is toexclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the
conditions and needs of the community from takingadvantage of favorable
circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain. Aquinos certificate of candidacy in a
previous (1992) election indicates that he was a resident and a registered voter of San
Jose,Concepcion, Tarlac for more than 52 years prior to that election. Aquinos connection to the
Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement of a condominium unit in the area.
The intention not to establish apermanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a
condominium unit instead of buying one. The shortlength of time he claims to be a resident of
Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac and his claims of other residences in Metro
Manila) indicate that his sole purpose in transferring his physical residence is not toacquire a
new, residence or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second
Districtof Makati City. Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections.
Santiago vs Guingona
FACTS:
During the first regular session of the eleventh Congress Sen. Marcelo B. Fernan was declared
the duly elected President of the Senate. The following were likewise elected: Senator Ople as
president pro tempore, and Sen. Franklin M. Drilon as majority leader.
Senator Tatad thereafter manifested that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago, allegedly the
only other member of the minority, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He
explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the "majority," while only
those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the "minority."
During the discussion on who should constitute the Senate "minority," Sen. Juan M. Flavier
manifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party numbering seven
(7) and, thus, also a minority had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader. No
consensus on the matter was arrived at. The following session day, the debate on the question
continued, with Senators Santiago and Tatad delivering privilege speeches. On the third session
day, the Senate met in caucus, but still failed to resolve the issue.
On July 30, 1998, the majority leader informed the body chat he was in receipt of a letter signed
by the seven Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as
the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate President formally recognized Senator
Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate.
The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before this Court the subject petition for
quo warranto, alleging in the main that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding
and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them,
rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.
ISSUES:
1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition?
2. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?
3. Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of
Senate minority leader
4. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Respondent
Guingona as the minority leader?
HELD:
FIRST ISSUE
The Court initially declined to resolve the question of who was the rightful Senate President,
since it was deemed a political controversy falling exclusively within the domain of the Senate.
Upon a motion for reconsideration, however, the Court ultimately assumed jurisdiction (1) "in the
light of subsequent events which justify its intervention;" and (2) because the resolution of the
issue hinged on the interpretation of the constitutional provision on the presence of a quorum to
hold a session and therein elect a Senate President (read Avelino vs. Cuenco about the scope
of the Court's power of judicial review).
The Court ruled that the validity of the selection of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal by
the senators was not a political question. The choice of these members did not depend on the
Senate's "full discretionary authority," but was subject to mandatory constitutional limitations.
Thus, the Court held that not only was it clearly within its jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of
the selection proceedings, but it was also its duty to consider and determine the issue.
SECOND ISSUE
unanimous resolution of the members of this party that he be the minority leader, he was
recognized as such by the Senate President. Such formal recognition by Respondent Fernan
came only after at least two Senate sessions and a caucus, wherein both sides were liberally
allowed to articulate their standpoints.
Therefore, the Senate President cannot be accused of "capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment" or of "an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility." Where no
provision of the Constitution, the laws or even the rules of the Senate has been clearly shown to
have been violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to
Senate officials for acts done within their competence and authority.

There was no violation. The Court finds that the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no AVELINO VS. CUENCO
clear support from the Constitution, the laws, the Rules of the Senate or even from practices of
the Upper House. The Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected Political Question; Separation of Power; Legislative Branch
by a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it however does not
provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the "minority," who Avelino vs Cuenco
could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated
candidate shall automatically become the minority leader. While the Constitution is explicit on 83 PHIL 17, March 4, 1949
the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on
the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter JOSE AVELINO, petitioner,
says is that "[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary." The vs.
method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the MARIANO J. CUENCO, respondent
prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must
be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.

THIRD ISSUE

Facts:
Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary assumption and exercise of power by one
without color of title or who is not entitled by law thereto. A quo warranto proceeding is the
1. In a session of the Senate, Tanadas request to deliver a speech in order to formulate
proper legal remedy to determine the right or title to the contested public office and to oust the
charges against then Senate President Avelino was approved. With the leadership of
holder from its enjoyment. The action may be brought by the solicitor general or a public
the Senate President followed by his supporters, they deliberately tried to delay and
prosecutor or any person claiming to be entitled to the public office or position usurped or
prevent Tanada from delivering his speech. Before Senator Taada could deliver his
unlawfully held or exercise by another.
privilege speech to formulate charges against the incumbent Senate President, the
petitioner, motu propio adjourned the session of the Senate and walked out with his
In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the person suing must show that he or
followers.
she has a clearright to the contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the office
allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the respondent. In this case, petitioners present not
2. Senator Cabili request to made the following incidents into a record:
sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate minority leader.
Furthermore, no grave abuse of discretion has been shown to characterize any of his specific
1. The deliberate abandonment of the Chair by the petitioner, made it
acts as minority leader.
incumbent upon Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz and the remaining
members of the Senate to continue the session in order not to paralyze the
FOURTH ISSUE
functions of the Senate.

Grave abuse of discretion - such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to 2. Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz suggested that respondent be
lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion designated to preside over the session which suggestion was carried
of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in unanimously.
contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion and hostility. 3. The respondent, Senator Mariano Cuenco, thereupon took the Chair.
By the above standard, we hold that Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion as
Senate President in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader. To recall, the
latter belongs to one of the minority parties in the Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. By
 3. Gregorio Abad was appointed Acting Secretary upon motion of Senator Arranz,
because the Assistance Secretary, who was then acting as Secretary, had followed
the petitioner when the latter abandoned the session.
4. Senator Taada, after being recognized by the Chair, was then finally able to deliver
his privilege speech. Thereafter Senator Sanidad read aloud the complete text of said
Resolution (No. 68), and submitted his motion for approval thereof and the same was
unanimously approved.
5. The petitioners, Senator Jose Avelino, in a quo warranto proceeding, asked the court
to declare him the rightful Senate President and oust the respondent, Mariano
Cuenco, contending that the latter had not been validly elected because twelve
members did not constitute a quorum the majority required of the 24-member
Senate.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction on subject matter.
2. Whether or not Resolutions 67 and 68 was validly approved.
3. Whether or not the petitioner be granted to declare him the rightful President of the
Philippines Senate and oust respondent.
Rulings:
In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:
1. The Supreme Court held that they cannot take cognizance of the case. The court will
be against the doctrine of separation of powers.
1. In view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy
and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own
president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the
judiciary.
2. The court will not interfere in this case because the selection of the
presiding officer affect only the Senators themselves who are at liberty at
any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them. If, as the petition
must imply to be acceptable, the majority of the Senators want petitioner to
preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall not in the Supreme
Court.
2. Yes, it was validly constituted, supposing that the Court has jurisdiction.
1. Justice Paras, Feria, Pablo and Bengzon say there was the majority
required by the Constitution for the transaction of the business of the
Senate, because, firstly, the minute say so, secondly, because at the
beginning of such session there were at least fourteen senators including
Senators Pendatun and Lopez, and thirdly because in view of the absence
from the country of Senator Tomas Confesor twelve senators constitute a
majority of the Senate of twenty-three senators.
2. When the Constitution declares that a majority of each House shall
constitute a quorum, the House: does not mean all the members. Even a
majority of all the members constitute the House. There is a difference
between a majority of the House, the latter requiring less number than the
first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the Senate
less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the
purpose of a quorum.
3. The Court adopts a hands-off policy on this matter.
1. The Court found it injudicious to declare the petitioner as the rightful
President of the Senate, since the office depends exclusively upon the will
of the majority of the senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of the
President of that body being amenable at any time by that majority.
2. At any session hereafter held with thirteen or more senators, in order to
avoid all controversy arising from the divergence of opinion here
about quorum and for the benefit of all concerned, the said twelve senators
who approved the resolutions herein involved could ratify all their acts and
thereby place them beyond the shadow of a doubt.
Hence, by a vote of 6 to 4, The Supreme Court dismissed the petition on the ground as it
involved a political question. The Supreme Court should abstain in this case because the
selection of the presiding officer affects only the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any
time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them.
Alejandrino v. Quezon, 46 Phil. 83 (1924)F:The petitioner in this original petition for mandamus
andinjunction is Jose Alejandrino, a Senator appointed by theGovernor General. to represent the
12th Senatorial District. Thecasus belli is a resolution adopted by the Philippine
Senatecomposed of the respondent Senators, On February 5,1924,depriving Alejandrino of all
the prerogatives, privileges, andemoluments of his office for the period of 1 yr from 1/24
havingbeen declared guilty of disorderly conduct and flagrant violationof the privileges of the
Senate for having treacherouslyassaulted Sen. de Vera on the occasion of certain phrases
beinguttered by the latter in the course of the debate regarding thecredentials of Mr. Alejandrino.
The burden of petitioner'scomplaint is that the resolution is unconstitutional and entirelyof no
effect.Issue: WON the Supreme Court by mandamus and injunctionmay annul the suspension of
Senator Alejandrino and compelthe Philippine Senate to reinstate him in his official
position?Held. The general rule is that the writ will not lie from one branch of the gov't to a
coordinate branch, for the very obvious reasonthat neither is inferior to the other. Mandamus will
not lieagainst the legislative body, its members, or its officers, tocompel the performance of
duties purely legislative in theircharacter w/c therefore pertains to their legislative functionsand
over w/c they have exclusive control.The courts cannotdictate action in this respect without a
gross usurpation of power.Precedents have held that where a member has been expelledby the
legislative body, the courts have no power, irrespectiveof whether the expulsion was right or
wrong, to issue amandate to compel his reinstatement.
Case Digest: Casco Chemical Co. vs Gimenez
Facts of the Case:
Casco Chemical Co., which is engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues used in
bonding lumber and veneer by plywood and hardwood producers, bought foreign exchange for
the importation of urea and formaldehyde which are the main raw materials in the production of
the said glues. They paid P33,765.42 in November and December 1949 and P6345.72 in May
1960. Prior thereto, the petitioner sought the refund of the first and second sum relying upon
Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Board of said bank, dated November 3, 1959, declaring
that the separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from said fee. The Auditor of
the Bank, Pedro Gimenez, refused to pass in audit and approve the said refund on the ground
that the exemption granted by the board in not in accord with the provision of section 2 of RA
2609.
Issue of the Case:
Whether or Not Urea and formaldehyde are exempt by law from the payment of the margin fee.
Held:
No, it is not exempt from payment of the marginal fee. Urea formaldehyde is clearly a finished
product which is distinct from urea and formaldehyde. The petitioners contends that the bill
approved in Congress contained the conjunction and between the terms urea and
formaldehyde separately as essential elements in the manufacture of urea formaldehyde and
not the latter. But this is not reflective of the view of the Senate and the intent of the House of
Representatives in passing the bill. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before
it was passed the only remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.
Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with cost against the petitioner.
Philippine Constitution Association, Inc.(PHILCONSA) vs. Mathay (G.R. No. L-25554)
Facts: Petitioner has filed a suit against the former Acting Auditor General of the Philippines and
the Auditor of the Congress of the Philippines seeking to permanently enjoin them from
authorizing or passing in audit the payment of the increased salaries authorized by RA 4134 to
the Speaker and members of the House of Representatives before December 30, 1969.
The 1965-1966 Budget implemented the increase in salary of the Speaker and members of the
House of Representatives set by RA 4134, approved just the preceding year 1964. Petitioner
contends that such implementation is violative of Article VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the
Constitution. The reason given being that the term of the 8 senators elected in 1963, and who
took part in the approval of RA 4134, would have expired only on December 30, 1969; while the
term of the members of the House who participated in the approval of said Act expired on
December 30, 1965.
Issue: Does Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution require that not only the term of all the
members of the House but also that of all the Senators who approved the increase must have
fully expired before the increase becomes effective?
Held: In establishing what might be termed a waiting period before the increased compensation
for legislators becomes fully effective, the Constitutional provision refers to all members of the
Senate and the House of Representatives in the same sentence, as a single unit, without
distinction or separation between them. This unitary treatment is emphasized by the fact that the
provision speaks of the expiration of the full term of the Senators and Representatives that
approved the measure, using the singular form and not the plural, thereby rendering more
evident the intent to consider both houses for the purpose as indivisible components of one
single Legislature. The use of the word term in the singular, when combined with the following
phrase all the members of the Senate and the House, underscores that in the application of
Art. VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10), the fundamental consideration is that the terms of office of all
members of the Legislature that enacted the measure must have expired before the increase in
compensation can become operative.
The Court agreed with petitioner that the increased compensation provided by RA 4134 is not
operative until December 30, 1969, when the full term of all members of the Senate and House
that approved it will have expired.
Ligot vs Mathay GR No 34676 30 April 1974
Facts: Petitioner was re-elected to a third term (December 30, 1965 to December 30, 1969) but
was held not entitled to the salary increase of P32,000.00 during such third term by virtue of this
Courts unanimous decision in Philconsa vs. Mathay. He lost his next bid and filed for retirement
claim. House of Representative issued a treasury warrant using the unapproved amount.
Congress Auditor did not sign the warrant. Petitioners request for reconsideration was denied,
hence the petition.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to retirement using php 32k?
Decision: Petition denied. To grant retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose terms
expired on December 30, 1969 computed on the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per
annum (which they were prohibited by the Constitution from receiving during their term of office)
would be to pay them prohibited emoluments which in effect increase the salary beyond that
which they were permitted by the Constitution to receive during their incumbency
FACTS:
Petitioner, Benjamin Ligot, served as a member of the House of Representatives of the
Congress of the Philippines for three consecutive four-year terms covering a twelve-year span
from December 30, 1957 to December 30, 1969.
On July 1, 1964, R.A. 4134 "fixing the salaries of constitutional officials and certain other
officials of the national government" took effect increasing the salary of the members of
Congress from P7,200 to P32,000. The Act expressly provided that the increases "shall take
effect in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution."
When Ligot was elected for his third four-year term, he was not entitled to the salary increase
byvirtue of the Courts unanimous decision in Philconsa v. Mathay:"that the increased
compensation provided by Republic Act No. 4134 is notoperative until December 30, 1969
when the full term of all members of the Senate andHouse that approved it on June 20,
1964 will have expired" by virtue of the constitutionalmandate in Section 14, Article VI of
the 1935 Constitution
...
Ligot lost in the 1969 elections and filed a claim for retirement under Commonwealth Act
186,section 12 (c) as amended by Republic Act 4968 which provided for retirement gratuity.
On May 8, 1970, the House of Representatives issued a treasury warrant in the sum
ofP122,429.86 in Ligot's favor as his retirement gratuity, using the increased salary of
P32,000.00 per annum of members of Congress.
Respondent Velasco as Congress Auditor did not sign the warrant due to a pending resolution
by the Auditor General of a similar claim filed by former Representative Melanio T. Singson,
whose term as Congressman also expired on December 30, 1969.
On July 22, 1970, respondent auditor Velasco formally requested petitioner to return the
warrant and its supporting papers for a recompilation of his retirement claim by virtue
of the Auditor-
Generals adverse decision to Singsons claim
On January 20, 1972, the Auditor General through Velasco denied Ligots request for
reconsideration.
Ligot then filed a petition for review appealing the decision of the Auditor-General alleging tha
at the time of his retirement, the salary for members of Congess as provided by law was
alreadyP32,000 per annum, so, he should receive his retirement gratuity based on that salary
increase.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Ligot is entitled to retirement benefits based on the salary increase of the
member of Congress
HELD: The petition was dismissed.
Ratio Decidendi:
There is no question that Ligot is entitled to a retirement gratuity based on Commonwealth
Act186, section 12 as amended by RA4968. The issue is whether or not he can claim in based
on theP32,000 per annum salary of the members of Congress. The Court decided that to grant
retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose terms expired on December 30, 1969
computed on the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum (which they were
prohibited by the Constitution from receiving during their term of office) would be to pay them
more than what is constitutionally allowed. Section 14, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution
provides that: No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the
full term of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such
increase.
People v. Jalosjos
GRs 132875-76 | February 3, 2000
Recit-Ready Digest:
Cong. Romeo Jalosjos, imprisoned in the national penitentiary for two counts of rape and acts of
lasciviousness, filedmotion asking to be allowed to fully discharge duties of a Congressman
(i.e. to attend legislative sessions, committeemeetings) despite having been convicted in the first
instance of a non-bailable offense. He claims the people chose himto represent them in
Congress so he should be allowed to attend sessions freely (5 times a week). But the court
ruledthat members of Congress are not exempt from detention for crime. They may be arrested
even when the house is insession, for crimes punishable by a penalty of more than six months.
FACTS:
Jalosjos was re-elected as Representative of 1st District of Zamboanga del Norte despite the
fact that he wasincarcerated for two counts of rape and acts of lasciviousness FiledMotion to be
Allowed To Discharge Mandate As Member of House of RepresentativesPrimary argument of
petitioner: themandate of sovereign will claims he has the duty to perform functionsof a
Congressman (attend sessions, blahblah) to be able to represent the people of his district.
ISSUE:
W/N membership in Congress exempts petitioner from statutes and rules which apply to validly
incarcerated persons ingeneral
HELD/RATIO:
True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. In the exercise of suffrage,
a free people expectsto achieve the continuity of government and the perpetuation of its
benefits. However, in spite of its importance, theprivileges and rights arising from having been
elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. A person charged with crimeis taken into custody
for purposes of the administration of justice.
Imprisonment is the restraint of a man s personalliberty ; coercion exercised upon a person to
prevent the free exercise of his power to locomotion. Incarceration changesan individuals
statues in society.
Note-worthy:
Petitioner claims that fear that he might escape eventual punishment if permitted to perform
congressional dutiesoutside his regular place of confinement (AKA Bilibid) is unfounded. But
when a warrant for his arrest was issued, he fledand evaded capture despite a call from his
colleagues in the House of Reps for him to attend the sessions and tosurrender voluntarily to the
authorities :P
RULING:Petition DENIED