SOLOMON VERDADERO Y GALERA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

The expectations of a person possessed with full control of his faculties differ from one who is totally deprived thereof and is unable to
exercise sufficient restraint on his. Thus, it is but reasonable that the actions made by the latter be measured under a lesser stringent
standard than that imposed on those who have complete dominion over their mind, body and spirit.
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the July 10, 2014 Decision1 and the December 15, 2014
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 35894 which affirmed the May 30, 2013 Judgment3 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 03, Tuguegarao City (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 13283, finding accused Solomon Verdadero y Galera (Verdadero) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide, defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code ( RPC).

The Facts

In an Information,4 dated September 9, 2009, Verdadero was charged with the crime of murder for killing Romeo B. Plata (Romeo),
the accusatory portion of which reads:
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That on or about March 12, 2009, in the municipality of Baggao, Province of Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused SOLOMON VERDADEROarmed with a Rambo knife, with intent to kill, evident premeditation and with
treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab ROMEO B. PLATA, thereby inflicting upon
him stab wounds on the different parts of his body which caused his death.

Contrary to law.5ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On June 3, 2011, Verdadero was arraigned and pleaded "Not Guilty." During the pre-trial, he invoked the defense of insanity but did
not consent to a reverse trial. Thereafter, trial ensued.6

Evidence of the Prosecution

The evidence of the prosecution tended to establish the following:

On March 12, 2009, at around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Maynard Plata (Maynard) and his father Romeo were at the Baggao Police
Station. Together with Ronnie Elaydo (Ronnie), they went there to report that Verdadero had stolen the fan belt of their irrigation
pump.7

After a confrontation with Verdadero at the police station, the three men made their way home on a tricycle but stopped at a drugstore
as Maynard intended to buy some baby supplies. Romeo proceeded towards a store near the drugstore while Ronnie stayed inside the
tricycle. From the drug store, Maynard saw Verdadero stabbing Romeo, after he was alerted by the shouts of Ronnie.8

Verdadero stabbed Romeo on the left side of the latter's upper back with the use of a Rambo knife. He again struck Romeo's upper
back, just below the right shoulder. Maynard tried to help his father but Verdadero attempted to attack him as well. He defended
himself using a small stool, which he used to hit Verdadero in the chest.9

Meanwhile, Ronnie ran towards the police station to seek assistance. The responding police officers arrested Verdadero, while Maynard
and Ronnie brought Romeo to a clinic but were advised to bring him to the Cagayan Valley Medical Center ( CVMC). Romeo, however,
died upon arrival at the CVMC. Based on the Post-Mortem Examination Report, his cause of death was cardiopulmonary arrest
secondary to severe hemorrhage secondary to multiple stab wounds and hack wounds. 10

Evidence of the Defense

The evidence for the defense did not refute the material allegations but revolved around Verdadero's alleged insanity, to wit:

Since 1999, Verdadero had been an outpatient of CVMCs Psychiatric Department as he claimed to hear strange voices and had
difficulty in sleeping. Sometime in 2001, Miriam Verdadero ( Miriam), Verdadero's sister, again brought him to the Psychiatric
Department of CVMC after he became violent and started throwing stones at a tricycle with a child on board. Verdadero was confined
for two (2) months and was diagnosed to be suffering from mental depression.

On July 21, 2003, he was diagnosed with schizophrenia and was given medications to address his mental illness. Verdadero would
irregularly consult with his doctors as he had a lifelong chronic disease. Then, in 2009, he was again confined for the fourth (4th) time
at CVMC due to a relapse.

On March 12, 2009, Miriam proceeded to CVMC, after she heard of the stabbing incident. There, she saw Verdadero removing the IV
tubes connected to his body and, thereafter, locked himself inside the comfort room. Eventually, Verdadero was given sedatives and
was transferred to an isolation room after Miriam informed the nurses of the incident.11

On March 20, 2009, he was transferred to the Psychiatry Department after Dr. Leonor Andres-Juliana (Dr. Andres-Juliana) had
diagnosed that he was having difficulty sleeping. Dr. Andres-Juliana opined that Verdadero suffered a relapse, as evidenced by his
violent behaviour.
Acting on the January 4, 2011 Order of the RTC, Dr. Ethel Maureen Pagaddu (Dr. Pagaddu) conducted a mental examination on
Verdadero. She confirmed that as early as 1999, he was already brought to CVMC and that he was diagnosed with schizophrenia on
July 21, 2003. Dr. Pagaddu agreed with Dr. Andres-Juliana that Verdadero had suffered a relapse on the day of the stabbing incident. 12

The RTC Ruling

On May 30, 2013, the RTC rendered a decision finding Verdadero guilty for the crime of homicide. The dispositive portion of which
reads:
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WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, this Court finds the accused SOLOMON VERDADERO y Galera GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the felony of Homicide, defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and hereby
sentences him:

1. To suffer an indeterminate prison sentence ranging from twelve (12) years of prision mayor [as maximum] as minimum to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum; and,

2. To pay the heirs of Romeo Plata the amounts of:

a. P50,000.00 as death indemnity;

b. P50,000.00 as moral damages and
c. P30,000.00 as stipulated actual damages; and,

3. To pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.13ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The RTC ruled that the crime committed was only homicide, as the prosecution failed to establish the presence of treachery and
evident premeditation to qualify the killing to murder. The trial court, however, opined that Verdadero failed to establish insanity as an
exempting circumstance. The trial court posited that Verdadero was unsuccessful in establishing that he was not in a lucid interval at
the time he stabbed Romeo or that he was completely of unsound mind prior to or coetaneous with the commission of the crime.

Aggrieved, Verdadero appealed before the CA.

The CA Ruling

In its July 10, 2014 Decision, the CA upheld Verdadero's conviction of homicide. The appellate court agreed that the defense was able
to establish that Verdadero had a history of schizophrenic attacks, but was unable to prove that he was not lucid at the time of the
commission of the offense. The decretal portion of the decision states:
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WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Appeal is DENIED. The Judgment, dated May 30, 2013, rendered by the Regional Trial
Court of Tuguegarao City, Branch 3 in Criminal Case No. 13283, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.14ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Verdadero moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the CA in its resolution, dated December 15, 2014.

Hence, this present petition, raising the following

ISSUE

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE PETITIONER'S CONVICTION DESPITE THE
FACT THAT HIS INSANITY AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT WAS ESTABLISHED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE.
Verdadero insists that he was able to fully support his defense of insanity. He claims that Maynard even admitted that he was not in
the proper state of mind when they were at the police station before the stabbing took place. Further, it appeared that Verdadero was
having hallucinations after the stabbing incident as testified to by Dr. Andres-Juliana. Verdadero notes that Dr. Pagaddu concluded that
he had a relapse at the time of the stabbing incident on March 12, 2009.

In its Comment,15 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contended that the present petition presented a question of fact, which
could not be addressed in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, it asserted that the CA did not
misapprehend the facts as the evidence presented failed to completely establish Verdadero's insanity at the time of the stabbing.

In his Manifestation (in Lieu of Reply),16 Verdadero indicated that he would no longer file a reply as his petition for review already
contained an exhaustive discussion of the issues.

The Court's Ruling

The present petition primarily assails the conviction despite his defense of insanity. Before delving into the merits of the case, a
discussion of the procedural issue is in order.
Only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45; Exceptions

The OSG argues that the Court should not entertain Verdadero's petition for review as it principally revolves around the issue of his
insanity a question of fact which should no longer be addressed in a petition for review. The Court disagrees.

Generally, questions of fact are beyond the ambit of a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court as it is limited to
reviewing only questions of law. The rule, however, admits of exceptions wherein the Court expands the coverage of a petition for
review to include a resolution of questions of fact. In Laborte v. Pagsanjan Tourism Consumers' Cooperative et al.,17 the Court
reiterated the following exceptions to the rule that only questions of law may be raised under Rule 45, to wit: (1) when the findings are
grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or
impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on misappreciation of facts; (5)
when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings, the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant
and appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply
briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record.

The present petition mainly delves into Verdadero's state of mind at the time of the stabbing incident. Obviously, it is a question of
fact, which, ordinarily is not entertained by the Court in a petition for review. As will be discussed below, the Court, nevertheless, finds
that the circumstances in the case at bench warrant the application of the exception rather than the rule.

Insanity must be present at the time the crime had been committed

To completely evade culpability, Verdadero raises insanity as a defense claiming that he had suffered a relapse of his schizophrenia.
Under Article 12 of the RPC, an imbecile or an insane person is exempt from criminal liability, unless the latter had acted during a lucid
interval. The defense of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved for there is a presumption that the acts penalized by law are
voluntary.18

In the case at bench, it is undisputed that (1) as early as 1999, Verdadero was brought to the Psychiatric Department of CVMC for
treatment; (2) he was diagnosed with depression in 2001; (3) he was diagnosed with schizophrenia on July 21, 2003; (4) he was
confined in the psychiatric ward sometime in 2009 due to a relapse; (5) he was in and out of psychiatric care from the time of his first
confinement in 1999 until the stabbing incident; and (6) he was diagnosed to have suffered a relapse on March 20, 2009.

Thus, it is without question that he was suffering from schizophrenia and the only thing left to be ascertained is whether he should be
absolved from responsibility in killing Romeo because of his mental state.

Schizophrenia is a chronic mental disorder characterized by inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality, and often accompanied
by hallucinations and delusions.19 A showing that an accused is suffering from a mental disorder, however, does not automatically
exonerate him from the consequences of his act. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability. 20

In People v. Florendo,21 the Court explained the standard in upholding insanity as an exempting circumstance, to wit:
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Insanity under Art. 12, par. 1, of The Revised Penal Code exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in
committing the act, i.e., appellant is deprived of reason; he acts without the least discernment because of complete absence of the
power to discern; or, there is a total deprivation of freedom of the will. The onus probandi rests upon him who invokes insanity as an
exempting circumstance, and he must prove it by clear and convincing evidence.

[Emphasis Supplied]
In People v. Isla,22 the Court elucidated that insanity must relate to the time immediately preceding or simultaneous with the
commission of the offense with which the accused is charged. Otherwise, he must be adjudged guilty for the said offense. In short, in
order for the accused to be exempted from criminal liability under a plea of insanity, he must categorically demonstrate that: (1) he
was completely deprived of intelligence because of his mental condition or illness; and (2) such complete deprivation of intelligence
must be manifest at the time or immediately before the commission of the offense.

In raising the defense of insanity, Verdadero admits to the commission of the crime because such defense is in the nature of a
confession or avoidance.23 As such, he is duty bound to establish with certainty that he was completely deprived, not merely
diminished, of intelligence at the time of the commission of the crime. Failing which, Verdadero should be criminally punished for
impliedly admitting to have stabbed Romeo to death.

Proving insanity is a tedious task for it requires an examination of the mental state of the accused. In People v. Opuran24 the Court
explained how one's insanity may be established, to wit:
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Since insanity is a condition of the mind, it is not susceptible of the usual means of proof. As no man can know what is going on in the
mind of another, the state or condition of a person's mind can only be measured and judged by his behavior. Thus, the vagaries of the
mind can only be known by outward acts, by means of which we read the thoughts, motives, and emotions of a person, and then
determine whether the acts conform to the practice of people of sound mind.

Insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental faculties which is manifested in language and conduct. xxx

Establishing the insanity of an accused often requires opinion testimony which may be given by a witness who is intimately acquainted
with the accused; has rational basis to conclude that the accused was insane based on his own perception; or is qualified as an expert,
such as a psychiatrist.
In the earlier case of People v. Austria,25 the Court elucidated that evidence of the mental condition of the accused during a reasonable
period before and after the commission of the offense is material, to wit:
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In order to ascertain a person's mental condition at the time of the act, it is permissible to receive evidence of his mental condition
during a reasonable period before and after. Direct testimony is not required nor are specific acts of disagreement essential to establish
insanity as a defense. A person's mind can only be plumbed or fathomed by external acts. Thereby his thoughts, motives and emotions
may be evaluated to determine whether his external acts conform to those of people of sound mind. To prove insanity, clear and
convincing circumstantial evidence would suffice.
Guided by the precepts laid out by the above-mentioned jurisprudence, the Court finds that Verdadero sufficiently proved that he was
insane at the time of the stabbing. Thus, the Court takes a view different from that of the CA as the latter concluded that Verdadero's
insanity was not clearly proven.

It is true that there is no direct evidence to show Verdadero's mental state at the exact moment the crime was committed. This,
however, is not fatal to the finding that he was insane. His insanity may still be shown by circumstances immediately before and after
the incident. Further, the expert opinion of the psychiatrist Dr. Pagaddu may also be taken into account.

Dr. Pagaddu categorically testified that Verdadero was suffering a relapse at the time of the stabbing incident. During her testimony,
she stated as follows:
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On direct examination

Atty. Tagaruma
Q: By the way what was the mental condition of the accused referred which involved your diagnosis as a life long chronic disease?

Witness
A: The accused was diagnosed schizophrenia, sir.

Q: When for the first time Solomon Verdadero was diagnosed with schizophrenia?
A: It was on July 21, 2003, sir. xxx

Q: As an expert witness tell the Honorable Court if a person who has relapse of schizophrenia could distinguish his act?
A: This mental disorder influence (sic) the impulse. It could at the time of the commission of the crime that the impulse control and
judgment of an individual was affected sir.

Q: Could it be accurate to state that a person who has the relapse of schizophrenia could not distinguish any act from right or wrong?
A: There is a possibility, sir.

Court
Q: Why did you say that Solomon Verdadero has the possibility of relapse upon admission on March 19, 2009?
A: There was a period of relapse meaning the symptom was present and there must be a remission if the symptom is abated, your
Honor.

xxx

Atty. Tagaruma
Q: You have read for the record the report of Dr. Juliana on the alleged violent behavior of Solomon Verdadero on
March 12, 2009 which is the date of the incident, as an expert psychiatrist is it possible that the violent behavior of
Solomon Verdadero on March 12, 2009 was the basis of Dr. Juliana in diagnosing that the accused was in relapse upon
admission on March 12, 2009?
A: Yes sir.

Q: Following the remark of scientific conclusion of Dr. Juliana, Dr. Janet Taguinod and the conclusion made by you, is it
also your conclusion that Solomon Verdadero was in relapse on March 12, 2009 due to violent behavior?
A: Yes, sir.

On cross examination

Prosecutor Aquino
Q: But definitely during the disorder of the patient, the relapse would somewhat be continued even when medications is administered
to him?
A: The symptom is controlled although there is a circumstances (sic) that the patient may have relapse (sic) even with medication, sir.

Q: If a continuous medication was undertaken by the accused-patient in this case could that have a long effect on his mental
condition?
A: Continuous medication could somehow control the symptom and not absolutely eradicate the symptom.

Q: On March 12 , 2009 the accused-patient was on a lucid interval, in view of the medication undertaken as of January 19, 2009?
A: It's haphazard, sir.

xxx

Court
Q: Madam witness what type of schizophrenia the accused was diagnosed?
A: Undifferentiated, your honor.26

[Emphases Supplied]
Dr. Paggadu, without any reservations, stated that Verdadero was suffering a relapse of his schizophrenia at the time of the stabbing
incident. In contrast, she was hesitant to opine that Verdadero might have been in a lucid interval because of the medications taken.
Thus, it is reasonable to conclude, on the basis of the testimony of an expert witness, that Verdadero was of unsound mind at the time
he stabbed Romeo.

Further, the finding of Verdadero's insanity is supported by the observations made by Maynard, a witness for the prosecution. In his
testimony, Maynard gave his opinion on Verdadero's behavior and appearance when they met at the police station, to wit:
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On cross examination

Atty. Tagurama
Q: Having made the report against Solomon Verdadero, do I (sic) correct to say that you are familiar with Solomon Verdadero even
before March 12, 2009?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: Tell us why you are familiar to him even prior to March 12, 2009?
A: We are neighbors, sir.

Q: You are immediate neighbors?

A: Yes, sir

Q: Since you are neighbors with Solomon Verdadero you see him almost a (sic) time?
A: Yes, sir. I saw him daily.

Q: When you see Solomon Verdadero daily you see his actuation?
A: Yes, sir.

xxx

Q: Sometimes he boxes when he is not in his proper mind, what aberrant behavior did you observe from him?
A: That's the only thing I observed and sometimes he steal (sic), sir.

Q: For a long time that Solomon Verdadero is your neighbor does his relapse or what you called not in his proper mind occurred
often?
A: It occurred once in a while, sir.

Q: When you said it occurred once in a while, this relapse may occur once a week?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: Prior to March 12, 2009, when did you first observe that Solomon Verdadero appears not in his proper mind?
A: He was not in his proper mind for a long time, sir.

Q: Maybe it could be 5 months before March 12, 2009?

A: Yes, sir.

xxx

Court
Q: You testified that you observed the accused not in his proper mind for the passed (sic) years before this incident was he also violent
like what happened on March 12, 2009?

Witness
A: Yes, your honor.

Q: When you went to the police station you allegedly reported the stolen fan belt do I get you right that Solomon Verdadero was with
you at the police station?
A: Yes, your honor.

Q: When he was with you at the police station what did you observe?
A: He was not again in his proper mind (sumro manen), your Honor.

xxx

Q: Can you describe his appearance?

A: His eyes was (sic) very sharp and reddish.

xxx

Q: As far as his appearance is concern (sic) do you remember his actuation or how he was reacting?
A: Yes, your honor. He was somewhat drank (sic).

Q: You said that he was not on his proper mind for the passed (sic) years?
A: Yes, your honor.27cralawred

[Emphases Supplied]
Maynard was familiar with Verdadero as the latter was his neighbor for a long time. He had observed that there were times that
Verdadero appeared to be of unsound mind as he would sometimes become violent. On the day of the stabbing incident, Maynard
perceived that Verdadero was again of unsound mind noting that he had reddish eyes and appeared to be drunk. Moreover, he was
immediately transferred to the psychiatry department because of his impaired sleep and to control him from harming himself and
others.28

These circumstances are consistent with Dr. Paggadu's testimony that drinking wine, poor sleep and violent behavior were
among the symptoms of a relapse, the same testimony that was used as basis for his previous diagnosis.29 The evidence on record
supports the finding that Verdadero exhibited symptoms of a relapse of schizophrenia at the time of the stabbing incident. Thus, Dr.
Pagaddu reiterated Dr. Andre-Juliana's conclusion that Verdadero was having a relapse of his illness on that fateful day.

Further, on March 22, 2009, he was officially diagnosed to have suffered a relapse of schizophrenia. Generally, evidence of insanity
after the commission of the crime is immaterial. It, however, may be appreciated and given weight if there is also proof of abnormal
behavior before or simultaneous to the crime.30

Indeed, the grant of absolution on the basis of insanity should be done with utmost care and circumspection as the State must keep its
guard against murderers seeking to escape punishment through a general plea of insanity.31 The circumstances in the case at bench,
however, do not indicate that the defense of insanity was merely used as a convenient tool to evade culpability.

The Court notes that at the very first opportunity, Verdadero already raised the defense of insanity and remained steadfast in asserting
that he was deprived of intelligence at the time of the commission of the offense. He no longer offered any denial or alibi and, instead,
consistently harped on his mental incapacity. Unlike in previous cases32 where the Court denied the defense of insanity as it was raised
only when the initial defense of alibi failed to prosper, Verdadero's alleged insanity was not a mere afterthought.

In exonerating Verdadero on the ground of insanity, the Court does not totally free him from the responsibilities and consequences of
his acts. Article 12(1) of the RPC expressly states that "[w]hen an insane person has committed an act which the law defines as a
felony, the court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not
be permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court." Instead of incarceration, Verdadero is to be confined in
an institution where his mental condition may be addressed so that he may again function as a member of society. He shall remain
confined therein until his attending physicians give a favorable recommendation for his release.

Verdadero still liable for damages in spite of his exoneration

In appreciating insanity in favor of Verdadero, the Court absolves him from criminal responsibility. He is, nevertheless, responsible to
indemnify the heirs of Romeo for the latter's death. An exempting circumstance, by its nature, admits that criminal and civil liabilities
exist, but the accused is freed from the criminal liability.33

The amount of damages awarded, however, must be modified in order to conform to recent jurisprudence.34 The P50,000.00 civil
indemnity and P50,000.00 moral damages awarded by the RTC must each be increased to P75,000.00. In addition, an interest at the
rate of six per cent (6%) per annum should be imposed on all damages awarded computed from the finality of the decision until the
same have been fully paid.chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, the Court grants the petition and ACQUITS accused-appellant Solomon Verdadero yGalera of Homicide by reason of
insanity. He is ordered confined at the National Center for Mental Health for treatment and shall be released only upon order of the
Regional Trial Court acting on a recommendation from his attending physicians from the institution.

He is also ordered to pay the heirs of Romeo B. Plata the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; P75,000.00 as moral damages; and
P30,000.00 as stipulated actual damages, plus interest on all damages awarded at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality
of this decision until the same shall have been fully paid.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. MANUEL MACAL y BOLASCO, Accused-Appellant.

Violence between husband and wife is nothing new. Marital violence that leads to spousal killing is parricide. Perceived as a horrific kind
of killing, penal laws impose a harsher penalty on persons found guilty of parricide compared to those who commit the felony of
homicide.

For review is the June 28, 2013 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-CR H.C. No. 01209 which affirmed with
modification the August 18, 2009 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban City, Branch 6, convicting Manuel
Macal y Bolasco (accused-appellant) of the crime of parricide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The Facts

For allegedly killing his spouse, Auria Ytac Macal (Auria), the accused-appellant was charged with the crime of parricide in a February
13, 2003 Information3 that reads:

"That on or about the 12th day of February, 2003, in the City of Tacloban, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, MANUEL MACAL y BOLASO, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with evident
premeditation, that is, having conceived and deliberated to kill his wife, AURIA MACAL y YTAC, with whom he was united in lawful
wedlock, armed with an improvised bladed weapon (belt buckle) and a kitchen knife, stab said Auria Macal on the front portion of her
body inflicting a fatal wound which caused her death, which incident happened inside the bedroom of the house they are residing.

CONTRARY TO LAW."

On July 7, 2003, upon arraignment, the accused-appellant, duly assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge of
parricide.4 During the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed to stipulate that Auria was the wife of the accused-appellant.5 Thereafter,
trial on the merits ensued.

Version of the Prosecution

To prove the accusation, the prosecution presented Angeles Ytac (Angeles) and Erwin Silvano (Erwin) as witnesses.

Angeles, the mother of Auria, narrated that Auria and the accused-appellant got married in March 2000 and that out of their union,
they begot two (2) children. Angeles claimed that, at the time of the incident, they were all living together in a house located in V & G
Subdivision, Tacloban City. The said house was entrusted to Angeles by her brother, Quirino Ragub, who was then residing in Canada.

Angeles testified that at around 1:20 in the morning of February 12, 2003, she, her children Catherine, Jessica, Auria and Arvin were
walking home after playing bingo at a local peryahan. Some friends tagged along with them so that they could all feast on the leftover
food prepared for the fiesta that was celebrated the previous day. Along the way, Angeles and her group met Auria's husband, the
accused appellant. The latter joined them in walking back to their house.

When they arrived at the house, the group proceeded to the living room except for Auria and the accused-appellant who went straight
to their bedroom, about four (4) meters away from the living room. Shortly thereafter, Angeles heard her daughter Auria
shouting, "mother help me I am going to be killed."6 Upon hearing Auria's plea for help, Angeles and the rest of her companions raced
towards the bedroom but they found the door of the room locked. Arvin kicked open the door of the bedroom and there they all saw a
bloodied Auria on one side of the room. Next to Auria was the accused-appellant who was then trying to stab himself with the use of
an improvised bladed weapon (belt buckle). Auria was immediately taken to a hospital, on board a vehicle owned by a neighbor, but
was pronounced dead on arrival. Angeles declared that the accused-appellant jumped over the fence and managed to escape before
the policemen could reach the crime scene.
Erwin corroborated Angeles' testimony that Auria was killed by the accused-appellant. Erwin claimed that he was part of the group that
went to Angeles' residence on that fateful morning. From where he was seated in the living room, Erwin recounted that he heard
Auria's screaming for her mother's help. The cry for help prompted him to ran towards the bedroom. Once the door was forcibly
opened, Erwin became aware that the accused-appellant stabbed Auria on the upper left portion of her chest with a stainless knife.
Erwin testified that the accused-appellant stabbed himself on the chest with a knife-like belt buckle and that soon after, the accused-
appellant hurriedly left the house.

The prosecution formally offered in evidence the Certificate of Death wherein it is indicated that Auria died of hemorrhagic shock
secondary to stab wound.7

Version of the Defense

To substantiate its version of the fact, the defense called to the witness stand the accused-appellant, Benito Billota (Benito) and
Nerissa Alcantara (Nerissa).1wphi1

The accused-appellant did not refute the factual allegations of the prosecution that he stabbed his wife, resulting in the latter's death,
but seeks exoneration from criminal liability by interposing the defense that the stabbing was accidental and not intentional.

The accused-appellant admitted that he was married to Auria in March 2000 and the wedding was held in Manila. The couple had two
children but one of them died. According to the accused-appellant, he was employed as a security guard by Fighter Wing Security
Agency which was based in Manila. While the accused-appellant was working in Manila, his family lived with Angeles in Tacloban City.
The accused-appellant came home only once a year to his family in Tacloban City.

On February 12, 2003, the accused-appellant arrived home in V & G Subdivision, Tacloban City from Manila. Before the accused-
appellant could reach the bedroom, he was warned by Arvin, his brother-in-law, not to go inside the bedroom where his wife was with
a man for he might be killed. Ignoring Arvin's admonition, the accused-appellant kicked the door but it was opened from the inside.
After the bedroom door was opened, the accused-appellant saw his wife and a man seated beside each other conversing. Furious by
what he had seen, the accused-appellant went out of the room, got a knife and delivered a stab blow towards the man but the latter
was shielded by Auria. In the process, the stab blow landed on Auria. After Auria was accidentally stabbed, the man ran outside and
fled. The accused-appellant testified that out of frustration for not killing the man, he wounded himself on the chest. He then left the
house and went to Eastern Visayas Regional Medical Center (EVRMC) for medical treatment.

Benito attested that he came to know the accused-appellant while they were seated next to each other on board a Christopher Bus
bound for Tacloban City. The bus they were riding reached Tacloban City past midnight of February 12, 2003. Considering the lateness
of the hour and there was no bus available that would take Benito to his final destination, the accused-appellant convinced Benito to
simply go home with him. Once they got home, the accused-appellant went inside the house while Benito opted to stay by the main
door. The accused-appellant asked someone from the living room the whereabouts of his wife, Auria. Benito testified that a female
informed the accused-appellant that Auria was inside the bedroom but advised him not to go in as Auria was not alone in the room.
Undettered, the accused-appellant proceeded to the bedroom and was able to get inside the room. Moments later, Benito heard a
thudding sound coming from the bedroom. Then, Benito saw a man running out of the house. Sensing trouble, Benito immediately
proceeded to the bus terminal.

To support the accused-appellant's claim that he brought himself to a hospital on February 12, 2003, Nerissa, the Administrative
Officer/OIC Records Officer of EVRMC, was presented as witness for the defense. Her testimony focused on the existence of the
medical record concerning the examination conducted on the accused-appellant by a physician at EVRMC. Per hospital record, Nerissa
confirmed that the accused-appellant sustained a three-centimeter wound located at the left parastemal, level of the 5th ICS non-
penetrating and another lacerated wound in the left anterior chest.8

The RTC's Ruling

The RTC convicted the accused-appellant of the crime of parricide and the dispositive portion of its judgment reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, this Court finds accused MANUEL MACAL y BOLASCOguilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Parricide, and sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA; to
pay the heirs of the victim, Aurea Ytac Macal, P.50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and P.50,000.00 for moral damages. And, to pay the
Costs.

SO ORDERED.9

The RTC gave full credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. In contrast, the RTC found accused-appellant's
declarations doubtful and contrary to human experience and reason. The RTC was not persuaded by the accused-appellant's argument
that the stabbing incident was purely accidental after it took into account Auria's terrifying wail that she was going to be killed. The
RTC also refused to believe accused-appellant's claim that there was a man with Auria inside the bedroom. Logic dictates that a man in
that situation would normally run away the first opportunity he had specifically when the accused-appellant stepped out of the
bedroom to obtain a knife. The RTC even went further by saying that the accused-appellant injured himself so that he can later on
invoke self-defense which he failed to do as there are witnesses who can easily disprove his theory of self-defense.

The CA 's Ruling

On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the RTC decision. The fallo of the CA decision states:

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby AFFIRMS with MODIFICATION the assailed Decision dated August 18, 2009, of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Tacloban City in Criminal Case No. 2003-02-92. Accused-Appellant MANUEL MACAL y BOLASCO is
found GUILTY of parricide committed against his legal wife, Auria Ytac Macal, on February 12, 2003 and is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is further ordered to pay the heirs of Auria Ytac Macal the amounts of Php 50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, Php 50,000.00 as moral damages, Php 25,000.00 as temperate damages and Php 30,000.00 as exemplary damages. All
monetary awards for damages shall earn interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from date of finality of this Decision
until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.10

The appellate court ruled that all the elements of parricide are present in this case. Moreover, the CA reasoned out that while Angeles
did not actually see the accused-appellant stab Auria, the prosecution adduced sufficient circumstantial evidence to sustain his
conviction. From the viewpoint of the CA, the prosecution's case against the accused-appellant was strengthened by the latter's own
testimony and admission that he stabbed his wife. The CA further held that neither can the act of the accused-appellant be covered
under the exempting circumstance of accident under Article 12(4)11 of the Revised Penal Code nor under absolutory cause found in
Article 2412 of the same Code.

Hence, this appeal.

The Issue

The principal issue before the Court is whether the court a quo erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of parricide.

In the resolution of March 10, 2014, the Court required the parties to submit their respective supplemental briefs within thirty (30) days
from notice. However, both parties manifested that they will no longer file the required briefs as they had already exhaustively and
extensively discussed all the matters and issues of this case in the briefs earlier submitted with the CA.

The Court's Ruling

The Court affirms the conviction of the accused-appellant with modifications.

All the Essential Elements of Parricide Duly Established and Proven by the Prosecution

Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or
child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendants or other descendants, or the legitimate spouse of the
accused.13

Among the three requisites, the relationship between the offender and the victim is the most crucial.14 This relationship is what actually
distinguishes the crime of parricide from homicide.15 In parricide involving spouses, the best proof of the relationship between the
offender and victim is their marriage certificate.16 Oral evidence may also be considered in proving the relationship between the two as
long as such proof is not contested.17

In this case, the spousal relationship between Auria and the accused-appellant is beyond dispute. As previously stated, the defense
already admitted that Auria was the legitimate wife of the accused-appellant during the pre-trial conference. Such admission was even
reiterated by the accused-appellant in the course of trial of the case. Nevertheless, the prosecution produced a copy of the couple's
marriage certificate which the defense admitted to be a genuine and faithful reproduction of the original. 18 Hence, the key element that
qualifies the killing to parricide was satisfactorily demonstrated in this case.

Just like the marital relationship between Auria and the accused-appellant, the fact of Auria's death is incontestable. Witnesses, from
both the prosecution and defense, were in agreement that Auria expired on February 12, 2003. As additional proof of her demise, the
prosecution presented Auria's Certificate of Death which was admitted by the RTC and the defense did not object to its admissibility.
Anent the remaining element, there is no doubt that Auria was killed by the accused-appellant. The stabbing incident was
acknowledged by the accused-appellant himself during his direct examination by defense counsel Emelinda Maquilan, to wit:

xxxx

Q: What is the name of your wife?

A: Aurea Ytac.

Q: You said you saw your wife in your room with a man. Now, what was the man doing when you saw this man together with your
wife?

A: They were conversing.

Q: They were conversing in what part of your room?

A: At one side of the room.

Q: So, what did you do upon seeing the man, if there was any?

A: Because of my anger, I stabbed the man.

Q: Were you able to hit the man?

A: No, because my wife shielded him.

Q: Since your wife shielded the man, what happened to your wife?

A: My wife got hit.

Q: Now, in what of the body of his wife was hit?

A: I cannot exactly tell where she was hit but he delivered a stabbing blow at the man.

Q: So, after your wife was hit by the stabbing blow to be directed to the man, what happened next?

A: Out of desperation because I was not able to kill the man, I wounded myself.

Q: How about the man whom you wanted to stab, what happened to him?

A: He ran.

Q: Since you said your wife was hit by that stabbing blow, what happen to your wife then?

A: She died.

Q: How about you, what happened to you after you yourself?

A: I left the place.19

The outright admission of the accused-appellant in open court that he delivered the fatal stabbing blow that ended Auria's life
established his culpability.

Clearly, all the elements of the crime of parricide as defined in Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code are present in this case.

Affirmative Defense of Accident as an Exempting Circumstance Must Fail

The defense invoked Article 12 paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code to release the accused-appellant from criminal liability. Pursuant
to said provision, the essential requisites of accident as an exempting circumstance are: (1) a person is performing a lawful act; (2)
with due care; (3) he causes an injury to another by mere accident; and (4) without fault or intention of causing it.20

A close scrutiny of the transcripts of stenographic notes would reveal that the accused-appellant was not performing a lawful act at the
time Auria was stabbed. This can be gathered from the narration of the accused-appellant during cross-examination conducted by
Prosecutor Percival Dolina:

xxxx

Q: Now, of course, when you saw the man and your wife, according to you, they were just conversing with each other, correct?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: How far where they to each other?

A: They were beside each other.

Q: They were sitting?

A: Yes, sir, both were sitting.

Q: Of course, when you saw them, you got angry?

A: I became angry.

Q: That is why you got a knife and stabbed the man?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And when you stabbed the man, you had the intention to kill him?

A: Yes, my intention was to kill him.

Q: But it was your wife who was hit?

A: My wife was the one hit.21

The defense of accident presupposes lack of intention to kill. 22 This certainly does not hold true in the instant case based on the
aforequoted testimony of the accused-appellant. Moreover, the prosecution witnesses, who were then within hearing distance from the
bedroom, testified that they distinctly heard Auria screaming that she was going to be killed by the accused-appellant.

Given these testimonies, the accused-appellant's defense of accident is negated as he was carrying out an unlawful act at the time of
the incident.

It also bears stressing that in raising the defense of accident, the accused-appellant had the inescapable burden of proving, by clear
and convincing evidence, of accidental infliction of injuries on the victim.23 In so doing, the accused-appellant had to rely on the
strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution's evidence.24 As aptly pointed out by the CA, the defense
failed to discharge the burden of proving the elements of the exempting circumstance of accident that would otherwise free the
accused-appellant from culpability. Aside from the accused-appellant's self-serving statement, no other proof was adduced that will
substantiate his defense of accidental stabbing.

Further, contrary to what the accused-appellant wants the Court to believe, his actuations closely after Auria was stabbed tell a
different story.1avvphi1 If Auria was really accidentally stabbed by him, the accused-appellant's natural reaction would have been to
take the lead in bringing his wife to a hospital. Instead, his priority was to come up with an improvised bladed weapon that he could
use to hurt himself. Additionally, the fact that the accused-appellant ran away from the crime scene leaving Auria's relatives and
neighbors to tend to his dying wife is indicative of his guilt.

The CA took one step further when it examined the applicability of Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code in this case. For this purpose,
the CA assumed arguendo that there is another man inside the bedroom with Auria.
Article 247 is an absolutory cause that recognizes the commission of a crime but for reasons of public policy and sentiment there is no
penalty imposed.25 The defense must prove the concurrence of the following elements: (1) that a legally married person surprises his
spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person; (2) that he kills any of them or both of them in the act or
immediately thereafter; and (3) that he has not promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his wife (or daughter) or that he or she has
not consented to the infidelity of the other spouse.26 Among the three elements, the most vital is that the accused-appellant must
prove to the court that he killed his wife and her paramour in the act of sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter.27

Having admitted the stabbing, the burden of proof is shifted to the defense to show the applicability of Article 247.28As disclosed by the
accused-appellant, when he saw Auria with a man, the two were just seated beside each other and were simply talking. Evidently, the
absolutory cause embodied in Article 247 is not applicable in the present case.

In sum, the Court agrees with the trial and appellate courts that the evidence of the prosecution has established the guilt of the
accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt.

Penalty and Pecuniary Liability

Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the imposable penalty for parricide is reclusion perpetua to death.1wphi1 With the
enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 (RA 9346), the imposition of the penalty of death is prohibited. Likewise significant is the provision
found in Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code stating that in the absence of mitigating and aggravating circumstances in the
commission of the crime, the lesser penalty shall be imposed. Applying these to the case at bar and considering that there are no
mitigating and aggravating circumstances present, the penalty of reclusion perpetua was correctly imposed by the RTC and CA.

Civil indemnity is automatically awarded upon proof of the fact of death of the victim and the commission by the accused-appellant of
the crime of parricide.29 Current jurisprudence sets civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00. As such, the Court finds it necessary to
increase the civil indemnity awarded by the trial and appellate courts from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00.

There is no question that Auria's heirs suffered mental anguish by reason of her violent death. Consequently, the award of moral
damages is in order. Similar to civil indemnity, prevailing jurisprudence pegs moral damages in the amount of P75,000.00. On that
account, the Court must also adjust the moral damages from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00.

Given that this is a case of a husband killing his wife where relationship a qualifying circumstance, the award of exemplary damages is
justified. The exemplary damages of P30,000.00 awarded by the CA is maintained as it is consistent with the latest rulings of the Court.

Temperate damages may be recovered when some pecuniary loss has been suffered but definite proof of its amount was not
presented in court.30 In People v. De Leon,31 the Court awarded P25,000.00 as temperate damages where the expenses for the funeral
cannot be determined with certainty because of the absence of receipts to prove them. In keeping with the said ruling, the Court
affirms the CA's award of P25,000.00 as temperate damages.

On a final note, the Court upholds the imposition of interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum on all the monetary awards for
damages reckoned from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid. 32 This is in accordance with the Court's discretionary
authority to levy interest as part of the damages and in conformity with the latest Court policy on the matter.

WHEREFORE, the CA's decision dated June 28, 2013 in CA-G.R. CEB-CR H.C. No. 01209, finding accused-appellant, Manuel
Macal y Bolasco, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Parricide, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-
appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim, Auria Ytac Macal, the amounts of
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P25,000.00 as temperate
damages. In addition, all the monetary awards shall earn an interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this
Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE VS ANOD

Before this Court is an Appeal,[1] assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[2] dated August 27, 2008 which affirmed with modification
the Decision[3] dated July 3, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bislig, Surigao del Sur, Branch 29, finding appellant Samuel Anod

(appellant) and his co-accused Lionel Lumbayan (Lumbayan) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder committed against

Erlando Costan (Costan).

The Facts
Appellant and Lumbayan were charged with the crime of Murder in an Information dated June 23, 1997 which reads:

That on or about 10:30 oclock (sic) in the evening, more or less, of May 16, 1997, at Purok 1, [B]arangay
Borbonan, [M]unicipality of Bislig, [P]rovince of Surigao del Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named [appellant] conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another for a
common purpose, with intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault[,] stab and hack one Erlando Costan with the use of a pointed bolo, thereby inflicting
upon the latter multiple stab and hack wounds which cause[d] his instantaneous death, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of the said Costan.

CONTRARY TO LAW: In violation of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.[4]

During the arraignment on November 12, 1997, appellant and Lumbayan entered pleas of not guilty to the crime charged. Thereafter,

trial on the merits ensued. In the course of the trial, two varying versions arose.

Version of the Prosecution

Before midnight of May 16, 1997, the victim, Costan, was stabbed and hacked to death in his house situated

in Barangay Borbonan,[5] Bislig, Surigao del Sur (Borbonan). His body was found by Miguel Platil. The following day, May 17, 1997,

appellant and Lumbayan surrendered to Andromeda Perater, Barangay Chairperson of Borbonan (BarangayChairperson), before whom

they admitted the killing of Costan. On May 18, 1997, appellant and Lumbayan were brought to the police station.

The Barangay Chairperson testified before the RTC that appellant narrated and admitted to her that he and Lumbayan killed Costan.

This narration of facts

was entered in the Barangay Logbook, duly signed by appellant and Lumbayan, and authenticated by two (2) other witnesses.

Version of the Defense

Appellant averred that at around 7 p.m. of May 16, 1997, he and Lumbayan were having a drinking spree in the store of one Dodoy

Advincula in Borbonan where they were joined by a certain Angges. An hour later, appellant asked his companions to go home. On
their way home and upon reaching a dark place, Lumbayan suddenly stabbed Angges. He then invited appellant to sleep at the house

of Lumbayan's aunt. Subsequently, however, Lumbayan told appellant that they would spend the night at Costan's house.

Upon reaching Costan's house, Lumbayan called for the victim. Costan opened the door for them and immediately thereafter,

Lumbayan poked a knife at Costan and ordered appellant to tie the victim while the latter was lying down. He then ordered appellant to

stab Costan. Out of fear of being stabbed by Lumbayan who, at the time, was poking a knife at appellant's breast, appellant stabbed

Costan once at the back. Thereafter, appellant and Lumbayan went to the house of Lumbayan's aunt. They surrendered to

the Barangay Chairperson allegedly upon the prodding of appellant. On the other hand, Lumbayan denied all the charges, claiming that

he and appellant slept early on the night of the incident at his aunt's house. The following day, they were fetched and brought to the

house of the Barangay Chairperson.

The RTC's Ruling

On July 3, 2001, the RTC found appellant and Lumbayan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and sentenced them

to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetuaand to pay the widow of Costan in the amount of P50,000.00 as damages.

Only appellant interposed an appeal[6] assailing the RTC Decision. Accordingly, the case was elevated to this Court on automatic

review. However, in our Resolution[7] dated September 6, 2004, and pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo, the case was

transferred to the CA.

The CA's Ruling

In its Decision dated August 27, 2008, the CA affirmed the factual findings of the RTC with modification, imposing upon appellant the

penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole and ordering him to pay the heirs of Costan the amount of P75,000.00 as civil

indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P25,000.00 as actual damages.

Aggrieved, appellant appealed. In their respective Manifestations filed before this Court, appellant, as represented by the Public
Attorney's Office, and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opted to adopt their respective Briefs filed before the CA as their

Supplemental Briefs.

Hence, this Appeal with the following assignment of errors:

I.

ASSUMING WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT APPELLANT'S CULPABILITY WAS PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT,
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES OF IRRESISTIBLE
FORCE AND UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR.

II.

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING TREACHERY AND EVIDENT PREMEDITATION AS
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES.[8]

Appellant argues that he blindly obeyed Lumbayan and stabbed Costan, an act that was against his will and done under the compulsion

of an irresistible force and uncontrollable fear for his life. Moreover, appellant contends that the qualifying circumstances of evident

premeditation and treachery were not proven beyond reasonable doubt. Except for the testimony of the Barangay Chairperson which

did not prove these qualifying circumstances, no other witness was presented to corroborate the same. [9]

On the other hand, the OSG opines that the force supposedly exerted upon appellant was not sufficient to exempt him from criminal

liability. Apart from initially refusing Lumbayan's order, as appellant alleged, he did not offer any protest or objection to the said order.

Appellant could have easily evaded Lumbayan, or he could have defended himself in equal combat as he himself was armed with a

knife. The OSG claims that, while it may be conceded that evident premeditation was not adequately proven, treachery was, however,

duly established. Thus, the crime committed was murder.[10]

Our Ruling

We dismiss the appeal.

Appellant failed to sufficiently show that the CA committed any reversible error in its assailed Decision. Under Article 12 of the Revised

Penal Code, a person is exempt from criminal liability if he acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, or under the impulse of an

uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, because such person does not act with freedom. However, we held that for such a

defense to prosper, the duress, force, fear, or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce

a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of future injury is not enough. In this case,

as correctly held by the CA, based on the evidence on record, appellant had the chance to escape Lumbayan's threat or engage

Lumbayan in combat, as appellant was also holding a knife at the time. Thus, appellant's allegation of fear or duress is untenable. We

have held that in order for the circumstance of uncontrollable fear may apply, it is necessary that the compulsion be of such a

character as to leave no opportunity for escape or self-defense in equal combat.[11] Therefore, under the circumstances, appellants

alleged fear, arising from the threat of Lumbayan, would not suffice to exempt him from incurring criminal liability.

Indubitably, the killing of the victim was attended by treachery. Treachery exists when the offender commits a crime against persons,

employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend, directly and specifically, to ensure its execution, without risk

to himself arising from any defense or retaliatory act which the victim might make. Here, appellant tied Costan while the latter was

lying down before he and Lumbayan stabbed the latter to death; thus, ensuring the execution of the crime without risk to themselves.

Obviously, Costan could not flee for his life or retaliate. This aggravating circumstance qualifies the crime to murder. [12]

We apply the cardinal rule that factual findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses, and its conclusions

anchored on its findings are accorded with great respect, if not conclusive effect, more so when affirmed by the CA. The exception is

when it is established that the trial court ignored, overlooked, misconstrued, or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances that, if

considered, would change the outcome of the case. We have reviewed the records of the RTC and the CA and we find no reason to

deviate from the lower courts' findings and their uniform conclusion that appellant is indeed guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the

crime of murder.[13]

As to damages, we held in People of the Philippines v. Judito Molina and John Doe, and Joselito Tagudar,[14] that when death occurs

due to a crime, the following damages may be awarded: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or
compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; and (5) temperate damages.

Civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other than the commission of the crime. In

this regard, however, we reduce the award made by the CA, from P75,000.00 to P50,000.00.

It is worth stressing that, at the outset, the appellant, together with Lumbayan, was sentenced by the RTC to suffer the penalty

of reclusion perpetua. Thus, the CA's reliance on our ruling in People v. dela Cruz[15] was misplaced. In dela Cruz, this Court cited our

ruling in People v. Tubongbanua,[16] wherein we held that the civil indemnity imposed should be P75,000.00. However, the instant case

does not share the same factual milieu as dela Cruz and Tubongbanua. In the said cases, at the outset, the accused were sentenced to

suffer the penalty of death. However, in view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 or the Act Prohibiting the Imposition of the
Death Penalty on June 24, 2006, the penalty meted to the accused was reduced to reclusion perpetua. This jurisprudential trend was

followed in the recent case of People of the Philippines v. Generoso Rolida y Moreno, etc.,[17] where this Court also increased the civil

indemnity from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00. Based on the foregoing disquisitions and the current applicable jurisprudence, we hereby

reduce the civil indemnity awarded herein to P50,000.00.[18] We affirm all the other awards made by the CA.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated August 27, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00195, finding appellant

Samuel Anod guilty of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion

perpetua is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the award of civil indemnity of P75,000.00 is reduced to P50,000.00. In all other
respects, the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.