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Judge denies motion, orders enforcement of IRS summons; Petitioner moves for relief from
Order, as Order is void
September 28, 2017supremecourtcase Leave a comment
At the September 13, 2017, hearing of Petitioners July 17, 2017, motion to dismiss, the United
States Department of Justice attorney opened with the usual perversion of the facts and
falsification of the record after finding himself in checkmate.
The Internal Revenue Services case depends 100 percent on the presumption that Petitioner is a
26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(1) person, but presents no evidence of said presumption ([A] presumption
is not evidence and may not be given weight as evidence.[1]).
Rather than copping to failure and inability to produce such evidence upon challenge by
Petitioner, said USDOJ attorney, as is typical, pretended Petitioner never raised the issue and
went off on a tangent, accusing Petitioner of arguing that Petitioner was not a personwhich
Petitioner did not do.
The USDOJ attorneys tag-team partner, the judge, then began accusing Petitioner of arguing
things which Petitioner never did (nor are reflected in the record of the case) and asking for case
citations in support of the false arguments he falsely attributed to Petitioner.
Thereafter, the judge entered his Order Compelling Compliance with Summons.
As the transcript of the September 13, 2017, hearing and record of the case evince, the court is a
kangaroo court:
kangaroo court. 1. A self-appointed tribunal or mock court in which the principles of law and
justice are disregarded, perverted, or parodied. . . . 2. A court or tribunal characterized by
unauthorized or irregular procedures, esp. so as to render a fair proceeding impossible. 3. A
sham legal proceeding. Blacks Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, Bryan A. Garner, Editor in Chief
(St. Paul, Minn.: West Group, 1999), p, 359.
There literally is nothing about what people believe is the federal judicial system throughout the
Union that is legitimate; when exposed for fraud or treason, executive and judicial officers
thereof pretend nothing was said, ignore material facts and failures harmful to their objective,
and instead attribute to those proving the fraud and treason, events which said officers fabricate
from whole cloth and never happened and of which there is no evidence.
This is possibleand their M.O.only because they enjoy a monopoly over what appears to be
the judicial system of the national government of the Republic but in actuality is the judicial
system of the District of Columbia, a municipal corporation,[2] usurping exercise of jurisdiction
beyond the boundaries fixed by its corporate charter, 16 Stat. 419, to the District of Columbia.
Achilles heel of executive and judicial officers of the United States
Except for the President of the United States of America (Constitution, Article II, Section 1), the
Achilles heel of every other executive and judicial officer of the 28 U.S.C. 3002(15) United
States (a Federal corporation by the name of the District of Columbia, a municipal
corporation) is that none have taken an oath or affirmation that conforms to the requirements of
Article VI, Section 3 of the Constitution.
The oath of office of the President of the United States of America (Constitution, Article II,
Section 1) is the only such oath or affirmation that is provided by the Constitution (see Article II,
Section 8 thereof) and therefore not subject to alteration by Congress.
This is a critical defect for all other executive and judicial officersas none have acceded to, or
are authorized to exercise, the executive or judicial power of that certain United States of the
Constitution (wherein United States is a proper noun and not a contrived statutory term with
an opposite constitutional meaning) anywhere in the Union.
This is just more proof that all courts of the United States (the District of Columbia, a municipal
corporation) throughout the Union are kangaroo courts.
The same deficiency is true for all Senators and Representatives of Congressas none have
taken an oath or affirmation that conforms to the requirements of Article VI, Section 3 of the
Constitution or acceded to the legislative power conferred in Article I of the Constitution.
Republican versus municipal form of government
Said congressmen and executive and judicial officers of the statutory United States (the District
of Columbia, a municipal corporation) have betrayed the trust vested in them by the American
People and foisted on each member of the Union by way of stealth legislation, a municipal form
of government and denied each such member of the Union a republican form of government as
guaranteed by Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution.
The transition from a republican to a municipal form of government was:
commenced June 30, 1864, 13 Stat. 223, 306 (see 182), when Congress, with malice
aforethought, transmuted the word state into a statutory term with a constitutionally opposite
meaning that comprehends only the District of Columbia and the territories and excludes every
commonwealth united by and under authority of the Constitution and admitted into the Union;
secured when Congress on June 16, 1866, proposed, 14 Stat. 358, and on July 9, 1868, ratified
the political Trojan horse known as the Fourteenth Article of Amendment to the Constitution,
whose primary purpose was to create an artificial class of Americans, municipal citizen-residents
of the new State of the new United States, i.e., the District of Columbia, called citizens of
the United States;
augmented when Congress on February 21, 1871, 16 Stat. 419, incorporated the District of
Columbia as a municipal corporation;
facilitated by Congress creation August 14, 1935, of the Social Security retirement program
(and Ponzi scheme) to provide justification for construing all participants thereof to be a
resident, for legal purposes, of the District of Columbia (see 5 U.S.C. 552a(a)(13)); and
completed upon transmutation of every definition of the statutory terms state, State, and
United States in all American law to include and mean the District of Columbia (a municipal
corporation) and exclude every commonwealth united by and under authority of the
Constitution and admitted into the Union.
During and following the above and other related events, among numerous other things:
Government began treating of the supreme political power and sovereign authority in the
Republic, the American People, also known as the join tenants in the sovereignty (Chisholm v
Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 472 (1793)), as political subjects of Congress and so-called persons with
rights and duties;
The focus shifted away from unalienable rights, which every man holds inherently and are
guaranteed in the Preamble to the Declaration of Independence, to civil rights, which are
bestowed by Congress on the new citizens of the United States and alleged subjects of
Congress, the American People; and
Government began requiring a permission, in the form of a license (because of the fraudulent
statutory definitions of state, State, and United States in all American law, every license in
Americaeven the drivers licenseis the requirement of the payment of a certain sum by an
alleged person for the privilege of pursuing his profession or calling for the general purpose of
producing a reliable source of revenue within the jurisdiction of the District of Columbia, a
municipal corporation), to exercise the unalienable and constitutional right to liberty and
property and the inseparable right to contract derived therefrom.
The entire modern legal apparatus throughout the Union and the entire United States Code is
municipal law of the District of Columbia, a municipal corporationwith alleged political
subjects and persons with rights and duties.
The only provision of the Constitution to which the current oath of office of Congressmen and
executive and judicial officers of the United States (the District of Columbia, a municipal
corporation) have a duty to honor is Art. I, 8, cl. 17all shows of apparent fidelity to the
contrary notwithstanding.
It is time to abolish the current municipal form of government which has been implanted in
every member of the Union and establish in each a republican form of government as intended
by the Framers and guaranteed in the Constitution.
Courts of the United States: Enforcers of municipal law
The situation with the courts (and United States Department of Justice) is that they refuse to
follow or adhere to the definition or meaning of their own fraudulent statutory termsmeaning
there is no basis for agreement and therefore no due process of law or remedy, and the
situation, ultimately, is not a legal one per se but a political in nature, a predicament succinctly
encapsulated in the following maxims of law:
A verbis legis non est recedendum. From the words of the law there should be no departure.
John Bouvier, Bouviers Law Dictionary, 3rd rev. (8th ed.), rev. by Francis Rawle (St. Paul, Minn.:
West Publishing Co., 1914), p. 2154.
Misera est servitus, ubi jus est vagum aut incertum. It is a miserable slavery where the law is
vague or uncertain. Id. at 2145.
Ubi jus incertum, ibi jus nullum. Where the law is uncertain, there is no law. Id. at 2165.
Notwithstanding that petitioner is facing A court or tribunal characterized by unauthorized or

irregular procedures, esp. so as to render a fair proceeding impossible (see kangaroo court,
supra): There being no other immediate remedy for the instant situation, Petitioner on
September 25, 2017, filed Petitioners Rule 60(b)(4) Motion for Relief from Orderas the said
Order is void for the issuers (the judges) lack of constitutional authority to discharge or perform
the duties of a judge anywhere in the Union, in places like Texas, for failure to take an oath or
affirmation that conforms to all provisions of Article VI, Section 3 of the Constitution.
The contents of said motion are backed up with citations from Supreme Court cases and are
conclusive and devastating and have direct application in every civil or criminal proceeding
throughout the Union in every court of the 28 U.S.C. 3002(15) United States: a Federal
corporation by the name of the District of Columbia, a municipal corporation.
[1] This court has never treated a presumption as any form of evidence. See, e.g., A.C.
Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1037 (Fed.Cir.1992) ([A] presumption is
not evidence.); see also Del Vecchio v. Bowers, 296 U.S. 280, 286, 56 S.Ct. 190, 193, 80 L.Ed. 229
(1935) ([A presumption] cannot acquire the attribute of evidence in the claimants favor.); New
York Life Ins. Co. v. Gamer, 303 U.S. 161, 171, 58 S.Ct. 500, 503, 82 L.Ed. 726 (1938) ([A]
presumption is not evidence and may not be given weight as evidence.). Although a decision of
this court, Jensen v. Brown, 19 F.3d 1413, 1415 (Fed.Cir.1994), dealing with presumptions in VA
law is cited for the contrary proposition, the Jensen court did not so decide. Routen v. West,
142 F.3d. 1434, 1439 C.A.Fed. (1998).
[2] An Act to provide a Government for the District of Columbia, ch. 62, 16 Stat. 419, February
21, 1871; later legislated in An Act Providing a Permanent Form of Government for the District
of Columbia, ch. 180, sec. 1, 20 Stat. 102, June 11, 1878, to remain and continue as a municipal
corporation (brought forward from the Act of 1871, as provided in the Act of March 2, 1877,
amended and approved March 9, 1878, Revised Statutes of the United States Relating to the
District of Columbia . . . 187374 (in force as of December 1, 1873), sec. 2, p. 2); as amended by
the Act of June 28, 1935, 49 Stat. 430, ch. 332, sec. 1 (Title 1, Section 102, District of Columbia
Code (1940)).
Standard
Second IRS summons suit; Petitioner moves to dismiss; USDOJ goes silent; Petitioner moves for
summary judgment
August 22, 2017supremecourtcase Leave a comment
When the United States Department of Justice attorney at the May 30, 2017, hearing voluntarily
dismissed the previous IRS summons case for an error in the name used in the IRS summons and
USDOJ petition to enforce IRS summons, the IRS agent who issued that IRS summons was also in
the courtroom at the time and served on Petitioner a second IRS summons with the name
corrected.
Petitioner on June 5, 2017, responded commercially to the new IRS summons with a Demand,
Notice, and Warning of Commercial Grace to the IRS agent, IRS Group Manager, and Secretary of
the Treasury and a courtesy copy to the USDOJ attorney who handled the aforementioned case.
Following Petitioners failure to appear at the time and place appointed in the IRS summons the
same USDOJ attorney filed in the court and on June 26, 2017, served on Petitioner a fresh
petition to enforce the new IRS summons and an Order to Show Cause from the Court with a
hearing date set for July 17, 2017.
Petitioner on July 17 (the hearing date) filed in the court a Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)
(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, with an
attached affidavit in support, and mailed a copy to the USDOJ attorney, but declined to attend
the hearing.
At the July 17 hearing the judge set another hearing for August 8 and, evidently, ordered the U.S.
Marshal to serve Petitioner with notice of the new hearing date.
Petitioners Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss documents for the first time how executive and
judicial officers of the modern (statutory / non-constitutional) United States justify extending
their jurisdiction beyond the boundaries fixed by the charter[1] of their corporate employers
existence to the District of Columbia, and usurping exercise of general jurisdiction (territorial,
personal, and subject-matter jurisdiction) throughout the Union and around the globe.
Petitioner on August 3 (five days before the calendared hearing) received a phone call from the
judges assistant inquiring of Petitioner if it would be OK to reschedule the hearing for a month
later, to September 7.
Petitioner responded that Petitioner would be out of town on September 7; whereupon the
judges assistant suggested September 13 and Petitioner accepted the offer.
Because Petitioner received from the USDOJ attorney representing the IRS, no response in
opposition to Petitioners July 17, 2017, Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, Petitioner yesterday,
August 21, 2017, filed in the court a 2 page motion for entry of summary judgmentto which
summary judgment Petitioner is entitled as a matter of law, and mailed a copy to the USDOJ
attorney.
_____________________________________
District of Columbia . . . 187374 (retroactive to December 1, 1873), sec. 2, p. 2); as amended by
Code (1940)).
Standard
USDOJ dismisses Houston IRS summons case; IRS agent issues new summons; Petitioner
responds commercially
June 7, 2017supremecourtcase Leave a comment
The previous post (May 28, 2017) mentions a hearing in the Houston IRS summons case
scheduled for May 30, 2017, to hear Petitioners motion to dismiss by reason of coram non
judice (before a person not a judge), and motion to withdraw the unwarranted order included in
the order to show cause.
At the hearing on May 30, 2017, the judge immediately announced that the United States
Department of Justice attorney for the IRS had, that very morning, submitted a motion to
dismiss and that the motion was granted and the case dismissed.
The United States Department of Justice attorneys motion to dismiss, only half a page in length,
states that the reason for the dismissal is that the original IRS summons listed John B.
Trowbridge as the target of the investigation and that the actual target is John Parks
Trowbridge [sic] even though the Social Security Account Number included in the summons is
that of John Parks Trowbridge, Jr.s.
In such governmental legal matters, errors in the name typically are glossed over if the intended
party appears; to wit:
Praesentia corporis tollit errorem nominis, et veritas nominis tollit errorem demonstrationis.
The presence of the body cures the error in the name ; the truth of the name cures an error in
the description. John Bouvier, Bouviers Law Dictionary, Third Revision (Being the Eighth
Edition), revised by Francis Rawle (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1914), p. 2154.
A possible explanation is that neither the source of the summons, the Internal Revenue Service,
nor its parent organization, the Department of the Treasury, are part of the government that
filed the lawsuit.
The Department of the Treasury is a private organization, independent of government, 41 Stat.

654; to wit: Neither the senior executive of the Department of the Treasury or Internal Revenue
Service (the Secretary of the Treasury and Commissioner of Internal Revenue, respectively) is
required by law to take an oath of office (meaning they are non-governmental, private-sector
workers) and the sole beneficiary of all their collections of income tax[1] is a private bank, the
Federal Reserve.[2]
The IRS revenue agent who issued the summons that resulted in the lawsuit was present at the
hearing and, following dismissal of the case, presented Petitioner with a new IRS administrative
summons, dated that day, May 30, 2017, for an examination 15 days later, on June 14, 2017.
The United States Department of Justice attorney (who had just dismissed the case) informed
Petitioner that he would be attending the June 14, 2017, examination personally.
Dismissal of the case and issuance and presentment of the new IRS summons means there is no
court case and the entire cycle starts over from scratch.
Remedy
The previous post shows why there is no due process of law or remedy in any United States
district court anywhere in the Union and that the immediate remedy[3] is not a legal one per se
but commercial, under common-law rules, before the court gets involved.
In response to the new summons, Petitioner on June 5, 2017, sent the IRS revenue agent, IRS
group manager, and Secretary of the Treasury a Demand, Notice, and Warning of Commercial
Grace, and the United States Department of Justice attorney a courtesy copy thereof.
The Demand, Notice, and Warning of Commercial Grace is four pages in length and self-
explanatory; it is intended to resolve things without the need for a lawsuit.
That is not to say, however, that things will not end up in the courts again.
Attorneys of the United States Department of Justice and United States district and magistrate
judges are concerned in the face of Petitioners demands for a constitutional authority (because
there is none) and scrambling to protect the secrets of the cabalbut recipients of the Demand,
Notice, and Warning of Commercial Grace may be inclined to move on to the next customer
rather than seek the courts assistance in enforcing the new summons, and thereby avoid non-
judicial enforcement of the penalties in the Demand, Notice, and Warning of Commercial Grace
against them personally.
This type of response is proper for any type of situation where an officer of the U.S. Government
seeks to take territorial jurisdiction over person or property and enforce some statute against a
Union-member resident or his propertybecause there is no provision of the Constitution that
authorizes it.
The Constitution confers upon Congress only power of personal (regarding certain criminal
offenses only) and subject-matter legislation throughout the Union at Article I, Section 8, Clauses
1-16; thus, these provisions of the Constitution give executive and judicial officers the capacity to
take only personal and subject-matter jurisdiction throughout the Union, in respect of the
statutes enacted by Congress regarding those things.
The Constitution grants Congress no power of territorial legislation over person or property
anywhere in the Union, thus depriving executive and judicial officers of the capacity to take
territorial jurisdiction over person or property anywhere in the Union.
An IRS summons issued against a resident of any member of the Union and the lawsuit filed to
enforce it are examples of usurpation of exercise of territorial jurisdiction against person and
property by United States Department of Justice personnel and district and magistrate judges of
the United Statesbecause there is no provision of the Constitution that authorizes it.
* * * *
[1] 100 percent of what is collected [in income tax] is absorbed solely by interest on the Federal
debt . . . . In other words, all individual income tax revenues are gone before one nickel is spent
on the services which taxpayers expect from their Government. J. Peter Grace, Presidents
Private Sector Survey on Cost Control: A Report to the President, dated and approved January
12 and 15, 1984, p. 3.
[2] The Federal Reserve is not an agency of government. It is a private banking monopoly. Rep.
John R. Rarick, Deficit Financing, Congressional Record (House of Representatives), 92nd
Congress, First Session, Vol. 117Part 1, February 1, 1971, p. 1260.
[3] The long-term remedy is to abolish the current municipal form of government and institute a
federal / constitutional form of government as provided in the Constitution.
Standard
Hearing set in Houston IRS summons case; Lufkin judge confirms it is time to abolish the current
form of government
May 28, 2017supremecourtcase Leave a comment
Houston IRS summons case
There are two pending motions in the Houston IRS summons case, a motion to dismiss by reason
of coram non judice (before a person not a judge), and a motion to withdraw the unwarranted
order included in the order to show cause.
A hearing is set for May 30, 2017: Notice Setting Hearing.
Lufkin motion to vacate final judgment as void
The judge who entered final judgment in the Lufkin case March 3, 2016, Michael H. Schneider,
retired seven months later, October 1, 2016, and Ron Clark took over.
Petitioner on January 23, 2017, filed a supplemental motion to vacate the final judgment as void
for Michael H. Schneiders failure to take an oath or affirmation that conforms to the provisions
of Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution.
The government responded February 6, 2017, with its opposition to Petitioners supplemental
motion to vacate.
Petitioner on February 22, 2017, filed Petitioners reply to the governments opposition to
Petitioners supplemental motion to vacate.
Ron Clark on May 4, 2017, denied Petitioners motion to vacate (Clarks denial hyperlinked
below).
Nature of the situation that necessitated Petitioners motion to vacate
Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution expressly prohibits the requirement of a religious test as a
qualification to any office or public trust under the United States; to wit (Underline emphasis
added.):
The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State
Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several
States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious Test
shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.
The oath mandated by Congress in Section 453 of Title 28 of the United States Code and taken
by Michael H. Schneider, however, requires a religious test as a qualification to the office of
district judge; to wit (Underline emphasis added.):
453. Oaths of justices and judges
Each justice or judge of the United States shall take the following oath or affirmation before
performing the duties of his office: I, ____ ____, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will
administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and
that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon me as
____ under the Constitution and laws of the United States. So help me God.
In accordance with Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution, the religious test (So help me God.)
required of the former judge in the Lufkin case, Michael H. Schneider, as a qualification to the
office of district judge, bars Michael H. Schneider from assuming or holding any office under the
United States.
But Michael H. Schneider (and every other district, magistrate, and circuit judge and Supreme
Court justice) keeps rolling alongin blatant repudiation of Article VI, Clause 3 of the
Constitution.
How do they justify this?
Congress create another kind of United States for use in the courts
The reason all the aforementioned judicial officers willfully repudiate and disregard Article VI,
Clause 3 of the Constitution is that they are using a different United States created by Congress
exclusively for use in the courts and withholding from the American People that they are
pretending that the new statutory United States displaces / supersedes the organic United
States of the Constitution.
All civil and criminal proceedings in all district courts of the United States are administered in
accordance with Chapter 176 of Title 28 of the United States Code.
For purposes of all civil and criminal proceedings in all district courts of the United States,
Congress have decreed in subsection 15 of Section 3002 of Chapter 176 of Title 28 U.S.C. that
United States means a Federal corporation; to wit:
3002. Definitions
As used in this chapter:
. . . (15) United States means
(A) a Federal corporation;
(B) an agency, department, commission, board, or other entity of [a Federal corporation]

the United States; or
(C) an instrumentality of [a Federal corporation] the United States.
This means that every appearance of United States in anything to do with any civil or criminal
proceeding in any district court means a Federal corporation.
That the 28 U.S.C. 453 oath of office requires a religious test as a qualification to every judicial
office means that no taker of said oath may assume or hold any judicial office under the organic
United States of the Constitutionbut said religious test, however, does not preclude a taker
from holding a judicial office under the statutory United States of 28 U.S.C. 3002(15).
Every contemporary judge is an officer of the statutory United States of 28 U.S.C. 3002(15),
i.e., a Federal corporation.
Every such judge throughout the Union is also impersonating a judicial officer of the organic
United States of the Constitution.
Fraud and treason to the Constitution
This, of course, is wholesale fraud and treason to the Constitution on the part of Congress and
connivance therewith on the part of every Supreme Court justice and district, magistrate, and
circuit judge of the purported 28 U.S.C. 3002(15) United Statesbecause no government
official or officer is authorized to construe United States to mean anything other than what it
means in the Constitution; to wit:
A provision of the Constitution, it is hardly necessary to say, does not admit of two distinctly
opposite interpretations. It does not mean one thing at one time and an entirely different thing
at another time. . . .
Chief Justice Taney, in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393, 426, said that, while the
Constitution remains unaltered, it must be construed now as it was understood at the time of its
adoption; that it is not only the same in words, but the same in meaning, and as long as it
continues to exist in its present form, it speaks not only in the same words, but with the same
meaning and intent with which it spoke when it came from the hands of its framers, and was
voted on and adopted by the people of the United States. Any other rule of construction would
abrogate the judicial character of this court, and make it the mere reflex of the popular opinion
or passion of the day.
And in South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 448-449, in an opinion by Mr. Justice
Brewer, this court quoted these words with approval, and said:
The Constitution is a written instrument. As such, its meaning does not alter. That which it met
when adopted, it means now. . . . [Underline emphasis added.] Home Building & Loan
Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 448-450 (1934).
The purported legislative act of Congress that says United States means a Federal
corporation, i.e., 28 U.S.C. 3002, is a hoax and bogus and void; to wit:
It is a proposition too plain to be contested, that the constitution controls any legislative act
repugnant to it . . .
. . . Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the
fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and consequently the theory of every such
government must be, that an act of the legislature repugnant to the constitution is void.
. . . If then the courts are to regard the constitution; and he [sic] constitution is superior to any
ordinary act of the legislature; the constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case
to which they both apply. [Underline emphasis added.] Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177-
178 (1803).
A municipal (not federal / constitutional) judicial system and government
The 28 U.S.C. 3002(15) definition of United States also includes an agency, department,
commission, board, instrumentality, or other entity of a Federal corporation.
The only Federal corporation that possesses agencies, departments, commissions, boards,
instrumentalities, and other entities is the District of Columbia, a municipal corporation.[1]
The District of Columbia Municipal Corporation, 16 Stat. 419, was created by Congress under
authority of Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the Constitutionbut that is where the relationship
between said corporation and the Constitution begins and ends, as the selfsame provision
confers upon Congress power of exclusive (territorial, personal, and subject-matter) legislation
within (what will be) the District of Columbia, and therefore carte blanche to legislate whatever
they want for that municipal corporation within the exterior limits of the District of Columbia.
The problem is, district, magistrate, and circuit judges of the District of Columbia Municipal
Corporation are extending their jurisdiction beyond the boundaries fixed by the charter of said
Municipal Corporations existence at 16 Stat. 419, i.e., the District of Columbia, and usurping
exercise of jurisdiction throughout the Union.
Courts constituted by Congress under authority of Article, I, Section 8, Clause 9 of the
Constitution are courts of limited jurisdiction, exercising only personal and subject-matter
jurisdiction, with no power of territorial jurisdiction over person or property anywhere in the
Union; such jurisdiction being the exclusive domain of each respective member of the Union; to
wit:
[W]ithin any state of this Union the preservation of the peace and the protection of person and
property are the functions of the state government. . . . The laws of congress in respect to those
matters do not extend into the territorial limits of the states, but have force only in the District of
Columbia, and other places that are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the national goverment
[sic]. Caha v. U.S., 152 U.S. 211, 215 (1894).
The several States of the Union are not, it is true, in every respect independent, many of the
right [sic] and powers which originally belonged to them being now vested in the government
created by the Constitution. But, except as restrained and limited by that instrument, they
possess and exercise the authority of independent States, and the principles of public law to
which we have referred are applicable to them. One of these principles is that every State
possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its
territory. . . . Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1878).
As can be verified at any news outlet, however, the judges of todays United States district
courts usurp exercise of territorial jurisdiction over person and property throughout the Union
on a daily basis.
There is no provision of the Constitution that authorizes any such actand every one of
Petitioners demands for constitutional authority in the nine cases in which Petitioner has been
involved over the last three and a half years has been met with silence.
Because the oath of office of every executive and judicial officer and Member of Congress
requires the same religious test, So help me God, as a qualification to his respective office or
public trust, none are authorized to assume or hold such office or public trust under the organic
United States of the Constitution, only the purported statutory United States of 28 U.S.C.
3002(15), i.e., the Federal corporation by the name of District of Columbia.
By reason of the oath of office mandated by Congress for justices and judges at 28 U.S.C. 453
and the repugnancy of the religious test therein to Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution, no
such justice or judge is an officer under the organic United States of the Constitution, only a
municipal officer under the statutory United States of 28 U.S.C. 3002(15), the Federal
corporation by the name District of Columbia.
Whereas, there is nothing inherently wrong with a judicial officer of the District of Columbia
Municipal Corporation exercising general (territorial, personal, and subject-matter) jurisdiction
within his territory (the District of Columbia), everything is wrong with such officer usurping
exercise of general jurisdiction anywhere else, in places like Tyler County, Texas.
How the Lufkin judge disposed of Petitioners motion to vacate
The substance of Petitioners supplemental motion to vacate is laid out above.
As mentioned in the previous post (May 9, 2017), the M.O. of United States district, magistrate,
and circuit judges when it comes to Petitioners proofs of lack of jurisdiction and the United
States attorneys inability / failure to prove jurisdiction, is to ignore all material facts and failures
fatal to the cause of the United States (District of Columbia) and make false allegations and
cherry-pick immaterial facts which will support the United States' (District of Columbias)
position.
True to form, Ron Clark ignored all facts and failures relating to the religious test required of
Michael H. Schneider as a qualification to the office of district judge under the organic United
States of the Constitution and on May 4, 2017, repudiated the meaning of the 28 U.S.C.
3002(15) definition of United States, and entered his Memorandum Opinion and Order
denying Petitioners motion to vacate.
Most of the content of Ron Clarks Memorandum Opinion and Order is a regurgitation of
immaterial facts; the ruling is based on allegation for which there is no evidentiary support.
The only portion that relates directly to the substance of Petitioners motion is in the second
paragraph on page two, where Clark alleges that Petitioner argues that (a) the phrase So help
me God violates the religious-test provision of Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution, and (b)
the oath is not valid and the final judgment therefore void.
Inspection of Petitioners motion to vacate shows that Petitioner never used any form of the
word violate in respect of the oath of office taken by Michael H. Schneider in its relation to
Article VI, Clause3 of the Constitution or stated that the oath was not valid.
Rather, that the subject oath of office is insufficient as authority for Michael H. Schneider to
assume or hold an office under the organic United States of the Constitution, accede to The
judicial Power of the [organic] United States, Constitution, Art. III, 1, or exercise the limited
jurisdiction of an Article III court anywhere in the Union.
As stated in Petitioners motion and reply, the oath of office taken by Michael H. Schneider is
benign and wholly valid for a territorial or municipal judge, but insufficient for a federal /
constitutional judge by reason of requirement of a religious test as a qualification to the office of
district judge under the organic United States of the Constitution.
Having falsely attributed to Petitioner the aforesaid arguments fabricated by himself, Ron Clark
then summarily dismissed Petitioners motion by slyly destructively declaring that His
arguments are meritless and not relevant to the judgment.
Institutionalized piracy
The behavior exhibited by Ron Clark is systemic among all executive and judicial officers of what
most people falsely believe are the executive and judicial branches of the government of the
organic United States of the Constitution.
Because of the religious test required in the oath of office for every executive and judicial officer
and the fraudulent United States of 28 U.S.C. 3002(15) for which they all work and to which
they are all beholden for a paycheck, all aforesaid officers are municipal employees ensconced in
the legislative branch under the exclusive control of Congress and there is no de jure executive
or judicial branch of the government as contemplated in the Constitution, no separation of
powers, and no due process of law or remedy in any so-called United States district court
anywhere in the Union.
All challenges of authority / jurisdiction are stonewalled via application of their general policy
Never respond, confirm, or deny.
They are usurpers.
They are incorrigible.
And the current municipal form of government is destructive of the unalienable rights of Life,
Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.
This is why the only civilized short-term remedy for such institutionalized piracy is pre-judicial,
i.e., commercial, under common-law rules, as outlined in the previous post, i.e., before matters
arrive in the courts.
The American People are joint tenants in the sovereignty, Chisholm v Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 471
472 (1793), and the Founding Fathers long ago provided them with the long-term remedy in the
Preamble to The unanimous Declaration of the thirteen united States of America of July 4, 1776:
Abolish the current municipal form of government and institute a federal / constitutional form of
government, with separation of powers, as contemplated by the Framers and established in the
Constitution.
District of Columbia . . . 187374 (in force as of December 1, 1873), sec. 2, p. 2); as amended by
Code (1940)).
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DOJ attorney in Houston IRS summons case floundering; Lufkin court silent on motion to vacate
final judgment
May 9, 2017supremecourtcase Leave a comment
Petitioner has frozen United States Department of Justice attorneys and United States district
and magistrate judges in their tracks numerous times.
When cornered and beaten at their own game, their general policy is Never respond, confirm,
or deny.
The United States attorney has failed to prove jurisdiction in any of Petitioners nine related
cases (defendant in three, plaintiff in six) despite the legal duty to do so upon Petitioners
challenge thereof; to wit:
Generally, a plaintiffs allegations of jurisdiction are sufficient, but when they are questioned, as
in this case, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove jurisdiction. McNutt v. General Motors
Acceptance Corp., 1936, 298 U.S. 178, 56 S.Ct. 780, 80 L.Ed. 1135; Welsh v. American Surety Co.,
5 Cir. 1951, 186 F.2d 16; 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra Sec. 1363 at 653. . . . Rosemound Sand
and Gravel Co. v. Lambert Sand and Gravel Co., 469 F.2d 416 (1972).
The above cited decisions [six Supreme Court cases] and authorities cited therein conclusively
establish the rule that if the issue is presented in any way the burden of proving jurisdiction rests
upon him who invokes it. . . . Town of Lantana, Fla. v. Hopper, 102 F2d 188 (5th Cir.1989).
Whereas, United States Department of Justice attorneys are too terrified of exposure for fraud to
tangle with Petitioner on the question of jurisdiction using actual evidence, they rely on their
tag-team partners, United States district, magistrate, and circuit judges, to do the dirty work for
them.
District, magistrate, and circuit judges, however, do not have the luxury of ignoring Petitioner;
they must deal with unresolved motions and bring a case to a conclusion.
The M.O. of United States district, magistrate, and circuit judges when it comes to Petitioners
proofs of lack of jurisdiction and the United States attorneys inability / failure to prove
jurisdiction is to ignore all material facts and failures fatal to the cause of the United States and
cherry-pick and present immaterial facts which appear to support their position.
This is called lying by omission.
It is also constructive fraud.
It is the same reason no legal professional will execute an affidavit sworn to as true, correct, and
complete; only a so-called declaration, which is sworn to only as true and correct (in some
instances only based on information and belief).
This approach allows attorneys and judges to present a false picture of things without risking a
charge of perjury; they simply leave out whatever works against them.
Since the United States district and magistrate judges control all the trial courts and the United
States circuit judges the appeals courts, they figure no one is going to be able to penetrate their
little coven or hold them accountable for the consequences of what they omitted to say.
This may be true legally, once things are in the court, but it is not true commercially, before
matters arrive at a lawsuit.
Only municipal judges in United States district courts
Courtesy of a corrupt Congress, who fraudulently defined United States to mean a Federal
corporation, 28 U.S.C. 3002(15), i.e., the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation, all
municipal district, magistrate, and circuit judges rely for their existence exclusively on linguistic
confusion and cognitive dissonance among the victims of the scheme, the American People,
joint tenants in the sovereignty, Chisholm v Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 471472 (1793), to perpetrate
their fraud.
In civil actions, the primary job of attorneys of the United States Department of Justice is to get
past the demand-letter stage (a common-law requirement before invoking the assistance of the
court) and file suit and get the matter into the hands of a municipal co-worker, a United States
(District of Columbia) district judge.
Once the United States (District of Columbia) attorney has done that, he can count on the United
States (District of Columbia) district judge to usurp exercise of general jurisdiction (territorial,
personal, and subject-matter jurisdiction) and adopt and prosecute the cause sua sponte (of his
own will), essentially guaranteeing the outcome; unless, of course, the case is too high-profile
and the facts too clear and judgment for the United States (District of Columbia) would work
against the appearance of impartiality and operate to erode public confidence in the judiciary.
The main outpoint in this and every other action at law in every United States (District of
Columbia) district court in which the United States is plaintiff, is that the district judge takes
territorial jurisdiction (an aspect of general jurisdiction) over the defendant and the defendants
propertya measure which is not authorized by any provision of the Constitution and
amounting to usurpation of exercise of territorial jurisdiction.
Municipal judges (every justice and judge of the United States is a District of Columbia municipal
bench officer) have authority to exercise general jurisdiction, but only in the District of Columbia.
Todays municipal district, magistrate, and circuit judges have extended their jurisdiction beyond
the boundaries fixed by the charter of their corporate existence, 16 Stat. 419, to the exterior
limits of the District of Columbia, into the Union.
As shown in most of Petitioners filings and particularly in the recent ones in the Houston IRS
summons case hyperlinked below, they are all District of Columbia municipal judges
impersonating Article III constitutional judges.
The foregoing is verifiable in the record of any of the recent nine cases in which Petitioner is
involved.
A municipal (not federal per se) debt collection operation
What we know as the executive and judicial branches are a collective corporate commercial
debt-collection operation of the District of Columbia (United States), operating under color of
law and masquerading as the de jure executive and judicial branches established by the
Constitution; to wit: Every so-called civil or criminal proceeding in every United States District
Court is administered under the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure,
Chapter 176 Federal Debt Collection Procedure.
The jurisdiction of executive and judicial officers is co-extensive with the legislative powers of
Congress (Chisholm v Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 435, (1793), Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9
Wheat., 738, 808 (1824)): If judicial officers do not have jurisdiction in a particular geographic
area, such as the Union, the same is true for executive officersand no United States attorney
has presented evidence of constitutional authority despite being challenged for the same in
every one of the nine cases in which Petitioner has been involved.
The remedy to the situation is commercial (not legal per se): by dealing with matters prior to the
filing of a suit, before a District of Columbia municipal judge gets involved, by holding the District
of Columbia Department of Justice municipal attorney personally accountable for knowing and
willful usurpation of exercise of jurisdiction outside his territory (District of Columbia) under
color of authoritya criminal offense for which he has no immunity and is personally liable.
Upon receipt of a demand letter from a United States (District of Columbia) attorney, by
presenting him with a Demand, Notice, and Warning of Commercial Grace requiring proof of
jurisdiction and presenting evidence that he has no jurisdiction anywhere in the Union, if he
proceeds with a lawsuit without first presenting constitutional authority to take jurisdiction and
do so (impossibility), he acts on his own.
Thereafter, the next step is the filing with competent authority in the particular county / borough
/ parish in which one is a resident or ones property is located or the court is located or the
District of Columbia or more than one of the foregoing, of an Affidavit of Information (criminal
complaint) sworn to as true, correct, and complete before two or three witnesses (do not use a
notary public), swearing as to the entire commercial exchange with the United States attorney
and attaching documentary evidence when appropriate.
Every such criminal act sworn to in the Affidavit of Information has a monetary (commercial)
valueand, having warned the United States attorney beforehand in the Demand, Notice, and
Warning of Commercial Grace of everything you intend to do if he proceeds against you without
constitutional authority, the next step is to do a verified accounting of the criminal offenses
sworn to in the Affidavit of Information and invoice him for the commercial value thereof, due
and payable in 15 days from the date the invoice is sent.
After 20 days of mailing (five days grace for payment to arrive if mailed on the fifteenth day), if
the United States attorney has not discharged his debt to you, the next step is a commercial lien
in the amount of unpaid debt, filed with (a) the county recorder against any real property held in
his name, and (b) the Secretary of State of the particular Union member where the county is
situate, against his name.
You can also do it in the District of Columbia or with the Secretary of State of any Union member
where the United States attorney debtor is considered a resident.
Such liens are passive claims which can be sold to professional debt collectorsaccompanied by
indisputable documentary evidence of the entire commercial exchange with the United States
attorneyat a discount. The commercial paperwork can even lead to a lawsuit against him by
the debt collector.
Petitioners below two Replies (third document in each of Set 1 and Set 2) are the most recent
filings and demonstrate the judges lack of authority in simple terms.
Set 1:
Motion to dismiss by reason of coram non judice (in the presence of a person not a judge)
Counsel for IRSs response in opposition to motion to dismiss
Reply to counsel for IRSs response in opposition to motion to dismiss
Set 2:
Motion to withdraw tag-end order in order to show cause
Counsel for IRSs response in opposition to motion to withdraw tag-end order
Reply to counsel for IRSs response in opposition to motion to withdraw tag-end order
Petitioner on January 23, 2017, filed a supplemental motion to vacate the final judgment as void
for the judges failure to take an oath or affirmation that conforms to Article VI, Clause 3 of the
Constitution.
The United States on February 6, 2017, filed United States opposition to Petitioners
supplemental motion to vacate the final judgment as void.
Petitioner on February 22, 2017, filed a reply to United States opposition to Petitioners
supplemental motion to vacate the final judgment as void.
Petitioner filed the original motion 106 days ago, the above reply 76 days ago; the judge remains
silent.
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Houston IRS summons case exposes linchpin of judicial-authority scam; Lufkin motion to vacate
final judgment update
April 14, 2017supremecourtcase Leave a comment

In response to a petition for an order to enforce an IRS summons, Petitioner on February 9,

2017, filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.
In opposition thereto, counsel for IRS on March 8, 2017, filed his IRS response to the Rule 12(b)
(6) motion to dismiss.
Although he could not provide a legal explanation as to why, the judge at the March 27, 2017,
hearing denied said Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss (click here for transcript of hearing).
Thereafter, Petitioner on April 5, 2017, filed the following three separate documents: (1)
Response to Petition, (2) Motion Dismiss by Reason of Coram Non Judice, and (3) Motion to
Withdraw Tag-end Order of Order to Show Cause.
As the reader will discover in the three aforementioned filings, particularly in the Motion Dismiss
by Reason of Coram Non Judice, the linchpin of the judicial-authority scam is the special
statutory definition of United States created by Congress exclusively for use in the courts, and
used sub silentio (under silence; without any notice) by every executive and judicial officer.
Whereas, the United States of the Constitution is the collective of the several commonwealths
united by and under authority thereof and admitted into the Union; the United States of Title
28 U.S.C. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure in every civil or criminal proceeding in every United
States District Court rather is a Federal corporation, 28 U.S.C. 3002(15).
The organic United States of the Constitution has no relation to the statutory United States
of Title 28 U.S.C. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure 3002(15).
Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution expressly prohibits a religious test as a qualification to any
office or public trust (elected office) under the United States (of the Constitution).
Because the oath of office of every executive and judicial officer requires a religious test (So
help me God.) as a qualification to each respective office (whether elected or appointed), none
are officers under the organic United States of the Constitution, only the statutory United
States of Title 28 U.S.C. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure 3002(15), i.e., a Federal corporation.
The supreme Federal corporation, incorporated February 21, 1871, under authority of Art. I, 8,
cl. 17 of the Constitution, is a municipal corporation: the District of Columbia.
Because of their oath of office and the Title 28 U.S.C. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure 3002(15)
definition of United States, all executive and judicial officers are municipal officers under the
District of Columbia.
Executive and judicial officers under the United States of the Constitution, have the capacity to
take limited jurisdiction (personal and subject-matter jurisdiction) all over the Union
(Constitution, Art. 1, 8, cl. 116).
The problem is there are no such executive or judicial officers and never have been because, in
accordance with Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution, the oath of office taken by every one of
them disqualifies him from holding an office under the United States of the Constitution.
Executive and judicial officers under the United States of Title 28 U.S.C. Judiciary and Judicial
Procedure 3002(15) have the capacity to take general jurisdiction (territorial, personal, and
subject-matter jurisdiction), but only in the District of Columbia (16 Stat. 419).
All of todays executive and judicial officers are municipal officers under the Title 28 U.S.C.
Judiciary and Judicial Procedure 3002(15) United States (the District of Columbia)
impersonating federal officers under the United States of the Constitutionand rely on mass
ignorance of the meaning of the fraudulent statutory definition of United States to justify
usurpation of exercise of general jurisdiction outside their territory (the District of Columbia).
The most egregious usurpation is that of exercise of territorial jurisdiction over property located
or Americans residing within the Unionsomething about which we hear every day in the news
for which there is no constitutional authority.
The three short, above-numbered and -hyperlinked filings in the Houston IRS summons case lay
out the judicial-authority scam in simple terms.
Although counsel for IRS has no obligation to file a reply to the Response to Petition, the court-
ordered deadline to do so expired April 10, 2017.
Ten and a half months after the March 3, 2016, final judgment in the Lufkin action at law against
Petitioners ranch, Petitioner on January 23, 2017, filed a motion to vacate said final judgment as
void for the judges failure to take an oath or affirmation that conforms to Article VI, Clause 3 of
the Constitution.
No judge who fails to take an oath or affirmation that conforms to both the mandate and
express-prohibition provisions of Article VI, Clause 3 accedes to any office under the United
States of the Constitution or The judicial Power of the United States, Constitution, Art. III, 1.
Out of legal ammo and nowhere to hide, counsel for plaintiff on February 6, 2017, filed his
response in opposition to Petitioners motion to vacate the final judgment, making various
ridiculous / frivolous arguments and factual contentions, with no evidentiary support, for which
Petitioner, on February 22, 2017, in Petitioners reply to counsel for plaintiffs response in
opposition, recommended that said counsel be sanctioned under Rule 11(b)(1)-(4) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and Petitioners motion granted.
The magistrate judge in charge of the Lufkin case has remained silent since receiving Petitioners
February 22, 2017, reply to plaintiffs February 6, 2017, response to Petitioners January 23,
2017, motion to vacate the final judgment as void over seven weeks ago.
Revision to previous post
Near the top of the previous post of February 11, 2017, there were two sets of bulleted items:
the first a set of three bullets and the second a set of five.
The second set of five bulleted items has been reduced to three as follows:
The totality of the limited or exclusive legislative power conferred upon Congress by a particular
provision of the Constitution, and the respective geographic area in which such power obtains,
consists of:
power of personal and subject-matter legislation throughout the Union and upon the high
seas at Art, I, 8, cl. 1-16;
power of territorial, personal, and subject-matter legislation over (what will be) the District of
Columbia at Art, I, 8, cl. 17; and
constructive (implied) power of territorial, personal, and subject-matter legislation at Art. IV,
3, cl. 2 in the form of Rules and Regulations, id., respecting the Territory or other Property
belonging to the United States, id., i.e., federal territories and enclaves.
Please note that the Constitution confers upon Congress no power of territorial legislation over
person or property anywhere in the Union.
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The Great Mystery solved: seminal act of congressional, executive, and judicial fraud and
treason
February 11, 2017supremecourtcase Leave a comment
This post reveals the ultimate reason why, when Petitioner on September 14, 2015, in the Lufkin
action at law demanded the constitutional authority that gives the court the capacity to take
jurisdiction and enter judgment against Petitioners real property in Tyler County, Texas, the
United States attorney went silent on the subject and remained so for the duration of the case
(which ended five and half months later), the magistrate gave his adverse recommendation, and
the court accepted the recommendation and entered judgment against Petitioner by pretending
that Petitioner had never made such demand, thereby concealing by way of deliberate omission
from court process the United States attorneys failure to respond to said demand or prove
jurisdiction (despite burden to do so) or oppose Petitioners subsequent motion to dismiss.
This post also gives a remedy for the situation it reveals, as well as an application thereof in a
new case filed against Petitioner for failure to produce books and records for an IRS summons.
Legislative power determines executive and judicial jurisdiction
The executive and judicial power of the new government implemented by the Constitution
March 4, 1789, is co-extensive with the legislative power established by that instrument; officers
of the executive and judicial branches have jurisdiction to the same extent that Congress have
legislative power in a particular geographic area; to wit:
It [the judicial power] is indeed commensurate with the ordinary legislative and executive
powers of the General Government . . . Chisholm v Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 435, (1793).
[I]t is an obvious maxim, that the judicial power should be competent to give efficacy to the
constitutional laws of the Legislature. The judicial authority, therefore, must be co-extensive
with the legislative power. . . . Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat., 738, 808 (1824).
The Constitution confers upon Congress either limited or exclusive (general) legislative power,
depending upon the geographic area; to wit:
It is clear that Congress, as a legislative body, exercise two species of legislative power: the one,
limited as to its objects, but extending all over the Union: the other, an absolute, exclusive
legislative power over the District of Columbia. . . . Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 434 (1821).
Three kinds of legislative power and executive or judicial jurisdiction
Jurisdiction is synonymous with authority and means, essentially, the geographic area in
which a particular officer is authorized by law to discharge or perform his duties.
There are three and only three kinds of legislative power and executive or judicial jurisdiction:
Territorial (over cases arising or those residing in a particular geographic area);
Personal (over someones rights); and
Subject-matter (over the nature of the case or type of relief sought).
Unilateral authority to exercise all three types of legislative power or executive or judicial
jurisdiction in a particular geographic area is called power of exclusive legislation or general
jurisdiction; anything less is called limited legislative power or limited jurisdiction.
The totality of the limited or exclusive legislative power conferred upon Congress by a particular
provision of the Constitution, and the respective geographic area in which such power obtains,
consists of:
power of personal and subject-matter legislation throughout the Union and upon the high
seas at Art, I, 8, cl. 1-16;
power of territorial, personal, and subject-matter legislation over (what will be) the District of
Columbia at Art, I, 8, cl. 17; and
constructive (implied) power of territorial, personal, and subject-matter legislation at Art. IV,
3, cl. 2 in the form of Rules and Regulations, id., respecting the Territory or other Property
belonging to the United States, id., i.e., federal territories and enclaves.
Please note that the Constitution confers upon Congress no power of territorial legislation over
person or property anywhere in the Union.
This means executive and judicial officers of the United States have no territorial jurisdiction
anywhere in the Union.
Territorial jurisdiction is defined as follows:
Territorial jurisdiction. Jurisdiction considered as limited to cases arising or persons residing

within a defined territory, as a county, a judicial district, etc. The authority of any court is limited
by the boundaries thus fixed. Henry Campbell Black, A Law Dictionary, Second Edition (St. Paul,
Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1910), p. 673.
Were Congress to be authorized to exercise territorial legislative power over the Union they
would have absolute exclusive legislative control over the entire country and there would be no
need for any Union-member legislature or the Constitution in its present form.
Blackletter law[1] confirms that no executive or judicial officer of the United States has territorial
jurisdiction over property located or Americans residing anywhere in the Union; to wit
(Underline emphasis added.):
[W]ithin any state of this Union the preservation of the peace and the protection of person and
property are the functions of the state government. . . . The laws of congress in respect to those
matters do not extend into the territorial limits of the states, but have force only in the District of
Columbia, and other places that are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the national goverment
[sic]. Caha v. U.S., 152 U.S. 211, 215 (1894).
The several States of the Union are not, it is true, in every respect independent, many of the
right [sic] and powers which originally belonged to them being now vested in the government
created by the Constitution. But, except as restrained and limited by that instrument, they
possess and exercise the authority of independent States, and the principles of public law to
which we have referred are applicable to them. One of these principles is that every State
possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory. As
a consequence, every State has the power to . . . regulate the manner and conditions upon
which property situated within such territory, both personal and real, may be acquired, enjoyed,
and transferred. . . . Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1878).
[95 U.S. 723] [T]he exercise of this jurisdiction [over those domiciled within its limits] in no
manner interferes with the supreme control over the property by the State within which it is
situated. Penn v. Lord Baltimore, 1 Ves. 444; Massie v. Watts, 6 Cranch 148; Watkins v. Holman,
16 Pet. 25; Corbett v. Nutt, 10 Wall. 464.
Every State, Pennoyer, supra, possesses supreme and exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty,
id., over property located and Americans residing within its borders, and there is no provision of
the Constitution that gives Congress power of territorial legislation anywhere in the Union or any
executive or judicial officer of the United States the capacity to take territorial jurisdiction or
direct the disposition of any property located or American residing there.
The Great Mystery
The Great Mystery, then, is how certain officers of the United States canwith a straight face
and no hesitation, even when directly challengedknowingly and willfully repudiate the
provisions of the Constitution relating to the legislative power of Congress and the
commensurate jurisdiction of executive and judicial officers of that certain government
established by the Constitution March 4, 1789, and usurp exercise of territorial jurisdiction over
property located or Americans residing within the Union.
Such officers include the attorney general of the United States, assistant attorneys general of the
United States, United States attorneys, assistant United States attorneys, United States marshals
and deputy marshals, and other officers of the United States Department of Justice, Supreme
Court justices, United States circuit judges, United States district judges, and United States
magistrate judges, as well as personnel of the Department of the Treasury and Internal Revenue
Service.
A primary example of such usurpation of exercise of territorial jurisdiction within the Union by
officers of the United States is the United States district judge in the Houston action at law
ordering (a) Petitioner to vacate the premises of Petitioners home in Montgomery County,
Texas, under threat of application of deadly force by the United States marshal, and (b) seizure
and sale of said real property.
Other examples of usurpation of exercise of territorial jurisdiction within the Union by executive
or judicial officers of the United States, as facilitated by congressional legislation, against
property located or Americans residing there, are:
IRS summonses
Lawsuits for failure to respond to an IRS summons
Judicial orders to show cause why defendant should not be compelled to obey an IRS
summons
Judicial orders to show cause why defendant should not be held in contempt for failure to
produce books and records in response to an IRS summons
Judicial reduction of tax liens to judgment for purposes of foreclosure on real property
IRS summons hearings and audits
IRS seizure of funds in bank accounts by levy
IRS seizure / garnishment of wages by levy
Executive seizure of real or personal property
Judicial or executive enforcement of the USA PATRIOT ACT
Judicial or executive enforcement of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(Obamacare)
Judicial or executive enforcement of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (e.g., orders issued by
Department of Homeland Security personnel to travelers at airports for non-immigration or non-
customs reasons; detention of such travelers)
Judicial or executive enforcement of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2017
Judicial or executive enforcement of among others, the Fourteenth, Sixteenth, and Eighteenth
Articles of Amendment to the Constitution
Principal part of executive and judicial jurisdiction
Cujusque rei potissima pars principium est. The principal part of everything is the beginning.
John Bouvier, Bouviers Law Dictionary, Third Revision (Being the Eighth Edition), revised by
Francis Rawle (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1914) (hereinafter Bouviers), p. 2130.
The beginning of our tripartite system of government is the Constitution, ordained and
established by the People September 17, 1787, and implemented March 4, 1789, where Articles
I, II, and III thereof establish, respectively, the legislative, executive, and judicial branches.
The beginning of the authority for any elected official or officer of the United States to exercise
the legislative, executive, or judicial power of the United States is Article VI, Clause 3 of the
Constitution, which provides:
The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State
Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several
States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious Test
shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.
The beginning of all congressional legislation is Section 1 of Statute I, Chapter I, An Act to

regulate the Time and Manner of administering certain Oaths, 1 Stat. 23, June 1, 1789, which
provides the oath of office for the president of the Senate and all members of the Senate and
House of Representatives of the United States; to wit (Underline emphasis added):
Sec. 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and [House of] [sic] Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress Assembled, That the oath or affirmation required by the sixth article of the
Constitution of the United States, shall be administered in the form following, to wit : I, A.B., do
solemnly swear or affirm (as the case may be) that I will support the Constitution of the United
States. The said oath or affirmation shall be administered within three days of the passing of this
act . . .
The beginning of authority for executive and judicial officers of the United States to exercise the
executive or judicial power of the United States is Section 4 of the Act of June 1, 1789, 1 Stat. 24;
which provides (Underline emphasis added):
Sec. 4. And be it further enacted, That all officers appointed, or hereafter to be appointed
under the authority of the United States, shall, before they act in their respective offices, take
the same oath or affirmation [as provided in Section 1], which shall be administered by the
person or persons who shall be authorized by law to administer to such officers their respective
oaths of office ; and such officers shall incur the same penalties, in case of failure, as shall be
imposed by law in case of failure in taking their respective oaths of office.
Seminal act of congressional treason to the Constitution and American People
The rich rules over the poor, and the borrower is the servant of the lender. Proverbs 22:7.
Congress always has had other loyalties, bought and paid for by the highest bidderin 1789 the
Rothschild-run private Bank of England, worlds first state-sanctioned fractional-reserve
lender[2] and future parent bank[3] of todays Rothschild-run[4] private Federal Reserve,[5]
sole lender (creditor) to todays financially insatiable borrower, Congress.
Notwithstanding the clarity of Sections 1 and 4 of the Act of June 1, 1789, supra, as to the oath
of office to be taken by all executive and judicial officers appointed, or hereafter to be
appointed under the authority of the United States, supra, 1 Stat. 24, Congress 12 weeks later in
An Act to establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, September 24,
1789 (the Judiciary Act), repudiate the provisions of Section 4 of the Act of June 1, 1789, at 76
in Section 8 thereof and create a special oath or affirmation exclusively for judicial officers of the
United States; to wit (Underline emphasis added):
Sec. 8. And be it further enacted, That the justices of the Supreme Court, and the district
judges, before they proceed to execute the duties of their respective offices, shall take the
following oath or affirmation, to wit : I, A.B., do solemnly swear or affirm, that I will administer
justice without respect to persons, a do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will
faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon me as
, according to the best of my abilities and understanding, agreeably to the Constitution and laws
of the United States. So help me God.
The above oath, taken by the original Supreme Court justices and district judges differs
materially from the oath mandated at Section 1 of the Act of June 1, 1789, 1 Stat. 23, supra, and
taken by the president of the Senate (vice president of the United States) and every member of
the Senate and House of Representatives, in that it contains a religious test; to wit: So help me
God.
Irrespective of how noble or virtuous said organic oath or affirmation for judicial officers may
seem, said oath or affirmation and the ordinary act of Congress providing it are repugnant to
Article VI, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution, as such species of oath or affirmation is expressly
prohibited by the provisions of said article and clause, supra, and therefore, for purposes of
accession to The judicial Power of the United States, Constitution, Art. III, 1, void; to wit:
It is a proposition too plain to be contested, that the constitution controls any legislative act
repugnant to it . . .
. . . Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the
fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and consequently the theory of every such
government must be, that an act of the legislature repugnant to the constitution is void.
. . . If then the courts are to regard the constitution; and he [sic] constitution is superior to any
ordinary act of the legislature; the constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case
to which they both apply. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177-178 (1803).
Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution tells us that The judicial Power of the United States,
shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time
to time ordain and establish.
The religious test required as a qualification to the office of justice of the Supreme Court or
district judge in the oath or affirmation at Section 8 of the Judiciary Act taken by every such
judicial officer means that no such justice or judge is authorized to exercise The judicial Power
of the United States, Constitution, Art. III, 1, anywhere within the Union for failure to have
taken an oath or affirmation that conforms to the provisions of Article VI, Clause 3 of the
Constitution.
Every oath or affirmation taken by every justice or judge of the United States since September
24, 1789, requires a religious test as a qualification to the office of justice of the Supreme Court
of the United States, circuit judge of the United States, United States district judge, or United
States magistrate judge, the most modern of which is 28 U.S.C. 453 Oath of justices and judges
of the United States, December 1, 1990, 104 Stat. 5124, which provides (Underline emphasis
added.):
Each justice or judge of the United States shall take the following oath or affirmation before
performing the duties of his office: I, ___ ___, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will
administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and
that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon me as
___ under the Constitution and laws of the United States. So help me God.
Whereas, any oath or affirmation that has a religious test as a qualification to any judicial office
under the United States operates as an automatic bar to accession to authority to exercise The
judicial Power of the United States, Constitution, Art. III, 1, there has never been a justice or
judge of the United States in the history of the Republic authorized to exercise The judicial
Power of the United States, id., for universal failure to take an oath or affirmation that conforms
to the provisions of Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution.[6]
No judge of the United States has taken an oath or affirmation that conforms to Article VI, Clause
3 of the Constitution and no such judge has any business sitting on the bench of any United
States district court anywhere in the Unionand each and every judge who does is a rogue
judge.
Three species of court and judge

United States attorneys and district and magistrate judges and Supreme Court justices are
constantly chirping about how federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction; to wit:
As we have repeatedly said: Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only
that power authorized by Constitution and statute . . . Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 489 (2004)
(quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 611 U. S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations
omitted)).
However true said statement may be, federal courts of limited jurisdiction are devoid of federal
judges per sebecause those who haunt the corridors and chambers of the federal courts of
limited jurisdiction throughout the Union are not federal judges per se but judges of a different
species.
It is essential that the reader understand the actual meaning of the word federal; to wit:
federal . . . Of or pertaining to, or founded upon and organized by, a compact or act or union
between separate sovereign states . . . A Standard Dictionary of the English Language, Isaac K.
Funk, Editor in Chief (New York: Funk & Wagnalls Company, 1903), p. 667.
In the case of the Republic, the compact is the Constitution and the separate sovereign states
the members of the Union.[7]
As shown below, all official use of the term federal judge is specious and intended to deceive
because no such judge has ever existed.
The three kinds of courts brought into existence by Congress, and their respective judges, are:
Federal: courts of limited jurisdiction ordained and established by Congress under express
authority Article III 1 of the Constitution, and federal judges authorized to exercise The judicial
Power of the United States, id., in such courts throughout the Union for having taken an oath or
affirmation that conforms to the provisions of Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitutionof which
there has never been any such judge in American history.
Territorial: courts of general jurisdiction created by Congress under implied authority of the
territorial clause of the Constitution, Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2, and territorial judges
authorized to exercise general jurisdiction in Territory or other Property belonging to the United
States, id., i.e. United States territories and enclaves; between the Judiciary Act (September 24,
1789) and sometime after incorporation of the District of Columbia, 16 Stat. 419 (February 21,
1871).
Municipal: courts of general jurisdiction created by Congress under implied authority of Article
I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the Constitution following incorporation of the District of Columbia
February 21, 1871, 16 Stat. 419, and municipal judges authorized to exercise general jurisdiction
within the exterior limits of the District of Columbia; Congress on November 29, 1990, 104 Stat.
4935, Congress in 28 U.S.C. Chapter 176, 3002(15), in Chapter 176 of Title 28 U.S.C. (under
which all civil or criminal proceedings are conducted), define United States to mean a Federal
corporation, id., the object of which definition and meaning is the District of Columbia
Municipal Corporation, and omit to define United States in a geographical senseand today
every United States district and magistrate judge in every district court of limited jurisdiction
throughout the Union is a District of Columbia municipal judge usurping exercise of general
jurisdiction and declaring municipal law of the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation
throughout the Union with no authority to do so.
Bereft of authority to exercise The judicial Power of the United States, Constitution, Art. III, 1,
every justice of the Supreme Court and every United States district judge and magistrate judge is
under the exclusive control of the legislative power (Congress), who manages the activities of
such justices and judges by way of the laws of the United States (District of Columbia
Municipal Corporation), i.e., municipal law of the District of Columbia known as, among others,
the United States Code and Code of Federal Regulations.
Legal tyranny
What distinguishes the Constitution from all other sovereign instruments of creation in the
community of nations is the doctrine of separation of powers manifested in the tripartite system
of government established by Articles I, II, and III thereof; to wit:
separation of powers. The division of governmental authority into three branches of
government legislative, executive, and judicial each with specified duties on which neither
of the other branches can encroach; the constitutional doctrine of checks and balances by which
the people are protected against tyranny. Blacks Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, Bryan A.
Garner, Editor in Chief (St. Paul Minn.: West Group, 1999) (hereinafter Blacks), pp. 1369-1370.
The political opposite of tyranny is liberty; to wit (Underline emphasis added.):
LIBERTY (Lat. liber, free; libertas, freedom, liberty). Freedom from restraint. The faculty of
willing, and the power of doing what has been willed, without influence from without.
Civil liberty . . . . Under the Roman law, civil liberty was the affirmance of a general restraint,
while in our law it is the negation of a general restraint . . .
Natural liberty is the right which nature gives to all mankind of disposing of their persons and
property after the manner they judge most consistent with their happiness, on condition of their
acting within the limits of the law of nature and so as not to interfere with an equal exercise of
the same rights by other men. . . .
Personal liberty consists in the power of locomotion, of changing situation, of removing ones
person to whatever place ones inclination may direct, without imprisonment or restraint unless
by due course of law [*] . . . . Bouviers, pp. 1964-1965.
* The essence of due course of lawalso known as due process of law and the law of the land
is constitutional authority; to wit:
Due process of law . . . refers to that law of the land which derives its authority from the
legislative powers conferred upon Congress by the Constitution of the United States, exercised
within the limits therein prescribed . . . Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 3 Sup. Ct. 111, 292
(1884).
The primary purpose of separation of powers in government is the preservation of liberty; to wit
(Underline emphasis added in all citations.):
The framers of our political system had a full appreciation of the necessity of keeping separate
and distinct the primary departments of the government. Mr. Hamilton, in the seventy-eighth
number of the Federalist, says that he agrees with the maxim of Montesquieu, that there is no
liberty if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers. Ex
Parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866).
This Court [Supreme Court] consistently has given voice to, and has reaffirmed, the central
judgment of the Framers of the Constitution that, within our political scheme, the separation of
governmental powers into three coordinate Branches is essential to the preservation of liberty.
See, e. g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 685 -696 (1988); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S., at 725 .
Madison, in writing about the principle of separated powers, said: No political truth is certainly
of greater intrinsic value or is stamped with the authority of more enlightened patrons of liberty.
The Federalist No. 47, p. 324 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380
(1989).
[488 U.S. 380-381] Madison, defending the Constitution against charges that it established
insufficiently separate Branches, addressed the point directly. Separation of powers, he wrote,
d[oes] not mean that these [three] departments ought to have no partial agency in, or no
controul over the acts of each other, but rather that where the whole power of one department
is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of another department, the
fundamental principles of a free constitution, are subverted. The Federalist No. 47, pp. 325-326
(J. Cooke ed. 1961) (emphasis in original). See Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433
U.S., at 442 , n. 5. . . .
[488 U.S. 394] [W]e recognize the continuing vitality of Montesquieus admonition: Were the
power of judging joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed
to arbitrary controul, The Federalist No. 47, p. 326 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (Madison), quoting
Montesquieu . . .
[A]fter stating that the judiciary is the weakest of the three departments of the government,
and that though oppression may now and then proceed from the courts of justice, he [Hamilton,
in Federalist 78] says: The general liberty of the people can never be endangered from that
quarter; I mean so long as the judiciary remains truly distinct from both the legislative and the
executive. For I agree that there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the
legislative and executive powers. And it proves, in the last place, that as liberty can have nothing
to fear from the judiciary alone, but would have everything to fear from its union with either of
the other departments . . . McAllister v. United States, 141 U.S. 174, 180-181 (1891).
Absent the faculty of liberty, as derived from Articles I, II, and III of the Constitution by way of
institution of separation of the powers of government, there would be no substantial difference
between the tyrannical sovereignty of Great Britain from which the American People originally
freed themselves beginning in 1776, and the new government in America, with Congress as
collective monarch and the People its subjects; to wit (Underline emphasis added.):
It will be sufficient to observe briefly that the sovereignties in Europe, and particularly in
England, exist on feudal principles. That system considers the Prince as the sovereign, and the
people as his subjects; it regards his person as the object of allegiance, and excludes the idea of
his being on an equal footing with a subject, either in a court of justice or elsewhere. . . . The
same feudal ideas run through all their jurisprudence, and constantly remind us of the
distinction between the Prince and the subject. No such ideas obtain here; at the Revolution, the
sovereignty devolved on the people, and they are truly the sovereigns of the country, but they
are sovereigns without subjects . . . and have none to govern but themselves; the citizens of
America are equal as fellow citizens, and as joint tenants in the sovereignty.
Sovereignty is the right to govern; a nation or State sovereign is the person or persons in whom
that resides. In Europe, the sovereignty is generally ascribed to the Prince; here, it rests with the
people. . . . Chisholm v Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 471472 (1793).
The judicial powers jurisdictional equal: the executive power
We know that the judicial power is commensurate or co-extensive with the legislative power;
the same is true for The executive Power, Constitution, Art. II, 1, cl. 1.
Section 4 of Statute I, Chapter I cited supra, 1 Stat. 24, June 1, 1789, requires that all executive
officers of the United States take the oath or affirmation provided in Section 1 thereof prior to
exercising The executive Power, Constitution, Art. II, 1, cl. 1.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Article VI, Section 3 of the Constitution, supra, and Section 4
of the Act of June 1, 1789, supra, as to the requirement to be bound by oath or affirmation to
support the Constitution free of a religious test, the organic act establishing the first attorney-
general for the United States, 1 Stat. 93, i.e., the Judiciary Act, requires only that said executive
officer be sworn or affirmed to a faithful execution of his office, id.; no mention of the
Constitution.
Todays attorney general of the United States, Jeff Sessions, and every other officer of the United
States Department of Justice takes what is known as the Standard Form 61, Appointment
Affidavit part A Oath of Office, which provides (Underline emphasis added.):
I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and
domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely,
without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully
discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help me God.
Every officer of the United States Department of Justice who takes the above oath of office self-
disqualifies himself from acceding to The executive Power, Constitution, Art. II, 1, cl. 1and
now we have our answer as to why in the Lufkin action at law the United States attorney goes
silent when Petitioner on September 14, 2015, demands the provision of the Constitution that
gives the Court the capacity to take jurisdiction and enter judgment against property in Tyler
County, Texas, and the magistrate and district judge pretend in their court process and judgment
that Petitioner never asked the question: None are authorized to exercise The executive Power,
id., or The judicial Power of the United States, id. at Art. III, 1 anywhere within the Union for
failure to have taken an oath or affirmation that conforms to the provisions of Article VI, Clause 3
of the Constitution.
Every executive and judicial officer of the United States in the history of the Republic is a
legislative-branch officer under the absolute exclusive legislative control of Congress, a political
alien to the executive or judicial power, and bereft of authority without the boundaries of
federal territory.
Beginning with the Judiciary Act of September 24, 1789, the People have been denied the
unalienable Rights, The unanimous Declaration of the thirteen united States of America,
Preamble, of Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness, id., and deprived of life, liberty, and
property[8] without due process of law by legislative-branch super-factotums ensconced in the
so-called United States Department of Justice and district courtscourts where the power of
judging is joined with that of legislating and executing and there is no separation of powers and
there is no due process of law.
This means that in addition to the bulleted examples of usurpation of territorial jurisdiction cited
supra, there is no authority for any such executive or judicial officer to exercise any form of
jurisdiction anywhere in the Union, that every such act constitutes usurpation of exercise of
jurisdiction and is an act of tyranny, and that the entire legal system is a fraud and hoax, with
every United States district court a kangaroo court; to wit:
kangaroo court. 1. A self-appointed tribunal or mock court in which the principles of law and
justice are disregarded, perverted, or parodied. . . . 2. A court or tribunal characterized by
unauthorized or irregular procedures, esp. so as to render a fair proceeding impossible. 3. A
sham legal proceeding. Blacks, p. 359.
It also means that every single Supreme Court decision and district court judgment since
September 24, 1789, is void for every participating executive and judicial officers failure to have
taken an oath or affirmation that conforms with the provisions of Article VI, Clause 3 of the
Constitution and every such officers culpability for betrayal of public trust, usurpation of
exercise of general jurisdiction within the Union, and treason to the Constitution; to wit:
We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that
which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution. Cohens v.
Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 404 (1821).
New lawsuit to enforce IRS summons; Petitioners response
In June of 2016 a certain IRS revenue agent issued and personally served on Petitioner an
administrative summons, Internal Revenue Manual 25.5.6.3.1.1, deceitfully entitled Summons,
tacitly representing to be authorized to exercise The executive Power, Constitution, Art. II, 1,
cl. 1, take territorial jurisdiction in Harris County, Texas, and issue the summons against
Petitioner.
Petitioner responded with a Notice and Warning of Commercial Grace and heard nothing back
for seven months when, on January 24, 2017, the same revenue agent personally served on
Petitioner a petition instituted by the United States attorney in the local United States district
court in behalf of the revenue agent and Internal Revenue Service, and accompanying Order to
Show Cause, signed by the judge, as to why Petitioner should not be ordered to comply with
the Internal Revenue Service summons.
Notwithstanding that said petition only contemplates the need for an order for Petitioner to
produce the documents described in the summons, which would be determined at the hearing,
the Order to Show Cause nevertheless asserts its own preemptive order for Petitioner to bring to
the hearing the documents enumerated in the IRS summons.
The judge wants Petitioner to suffer the object of the lawsuitproduction of books and records
prior to having a fair hearing and determining the need for such an order, confirmation that
there is no due process of law in any United States district court; to wit:
due process. The conduct of legal proceedings according to established rules and principles for
the protection and enforcement of private rights, including notice and the right to a fair hearing
before a tribunal with the power to decide the case. Blacks, p. 516.
Also, the docket in the previous case, the Houston action at equity, now includes a new
reference to the current IRS summons case, noting Related Case: 4:16-mc-02878 (the IRS
summons case)which is unusual because that case was closed two months ago (December 5,
2016) and the subject matter of the two cases is unrelated; to wit: The previous case is an action
at equity concerning a prior void judgment; the new case is about failure to respond to an IRS
summons.
Wherefore, it is reasonable to presume that the judge in the new summons case is prejudiced
against Petitioner, likely for steps taken by Petitioner against his co-worker, the judge in the said
Houston action at equitywhere Petitioner sued 47 defendants, the judge ruled against
Petitioner, and Petitioner filed a criminal complaint against the judge and then amended it (upon
resolution of the Great Mystery)and would be happy to be able to hold Petitioner in
contempt and have Petitioner arrested and incarcerated and who knows what else.
In Petitioners response to the IRS summons petition, which incorporates the fruits of resolution
of the Great Mystery, supra, Petitioner on February 8, 2017, sent to the court for filing
February 9, 2017, and counsel for petitioner United States of America (and constructive
petitioner Internal Revenue Service) a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.
A Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss must be heard and decided before
proceeding any further (Rule 12(i)).
Petitioners Rule 12(b)(6) motion demonstrates that (a) the subject revenue agent has no
authority to exercise The executive Power, Constitution, Art. II, 1, cl. 1, or take territorial
jurisdiction in Harris County, Texas, or issue said summons against Petitioner, for failure to take
an oath or affirmation that conforms to the provisions of Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution,
and (b) the summons is a legal nullity, thereby depriving the United States attorney of any
evidence of any fact upon which a claim for relief could be granted.
The actual situation
As of September 24, 1789, the People have been denied the unalienable Rights, The
unanimous Declaration of the thirteen united States of America, Preamble, of Life, Liberty, and
the pursuit of Happiness, id., and deprived of life, liberty, and property without due process of
law by legislative-branch super-factotum executive and judicial officersin courts where the
power of judging is joined with that of legislating and executing and there is no separation of
powers and the unalienable rights to life, liberty, and property are a fantasythe essence of
tyranny.
The raison dtre of the actors perpetrating the above organized treasonous conspiracy is the
longevity of their sole lender (creditor), the Rothschild private Federal Reserve (see fns. 3-5)
for without wholesale extortion and retirement from circulation of a substantial amount of
electronic digits in the paychecks and bank accounts of ordinary Americans the fraud of the
banking system reveals itself through rampant inflation and higher and higher prices with no
commensurate rise in wages.
Although Petitioner and those helping him, as well as the American People, are forced to cope in
a legal context with the fraud and treason of those trusted with the custody of the law and its
execution by the Framers and those who ratified the Constitution, the ultimate situation is not of
a legal nature but rather politicala potential state of affairs for which the Founding Fathers
presciently provided; to wit:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed
by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the
pursuit of Happiness. . . . That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these
ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government,
laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall
seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. Id.
Same family of bankers pulling the strings today as in 1776
[T]he policies of the monarch are always those of his creditors. Rep. John R. Rarick, Deficit
Financing, Congressional Record (House of Representatives), 92nd Congress, First Session, Vol.
117Part 1, February 1, 1971, p. 1261.
The ultimate source of the policies of todays stealth congressional, executive, and judicial
tyranny is the same usurious family of fractional-reserve bankers and exclusive creditors to
borrower-servant King George III: Rothschild.
Sen. Robert Latham Owen (D-Okla.), former Chairman of the Senate Committee on Banking and
Currency and Senate sponsor of the Glass-Owen Federal Reserve Act of December 23, 1913,
tries to make amends for supporting the Federal Reserve and on January 24, 1939, places into
the Congressional Record the following historical account of Benjamin Franklins visit to England
and events shortly thereafter (Benjamin Franklins words underlined); to wit:
Benjamin Franklin, on being asked in Great Britain how he accounted for the prosperous
condition of the Colonies, said:
That is simple. It is only because in the Colonies we issue our own money. It is called colonial
scrip[9], and we issue it in the proper proportion to the demand of trade and industry.
It was not very long until this information was brought to the Rothschilds bank, and they saw
that here was a nation that was ready to be exploited; here was a nation that had been setting
up an example that they could issue their own money in place of the money coming through the
banks. So the Rothschild Bank caused a bill to be introduced in the English Parliament which
provided that no colony of England could issue their own money. They had to use English money.
Consequently the Colonies were compelled to discard their scrip and mortgage themselves to
the Bank of England in order to get money. For the first time in the history . . . our money began
to be based on debt.
Benjamin Franklin stated that in 1 year from that date the streets of the Colonies were filled
with the unemployed, because when England exchanged with them, she gave the Colonies only
half as many units of payment in borrowed money from the Rothschild Bank as they had in scrip.
In other words, their circulating medium was reduced 50 percent, and everyone became
unemployed. The poor houses became filled, according to Benjamin Franklins own statement. . .
.
He said that this was the original cause of the Revolutionary War. In his own language:
The Colonies would gladly have borne the little tax on tea and other matter had it not been
that England took away from the Colonies their money, which created unemployment and
dissatisfaction. Benjamin Franklin, quoted in John R. Elsom, Lightning over the Treasury
Building (Boston: Forum Press, 1941), pp. 29-30, quoted in Robert Latham Owen, National
Economy and the Banking System of the United States: An Exposition of the Principles of
Modern Monetary Science in their Relation to the National Economy and the Banking System of
the United States, Senate Document No. 23, January 24, 1939, 76th Congress, 1st Session
(Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1939), pp. 98-99.
It took only about one percent of the American Colonists to defeat the Bank of England-financed
British army and navy and 30,000 paid killers (Hessian mercenaries) and break free of Rothschild
policies enforced by King George III.
There are today not near so many Rothschild quislings[[10]], grunts, or white-collar mercenaries
in the District of Columbia or scattered around the Union (and globe).
PDF version (sans hyperlinks) of todays post
______________________
[1] blackletter law. One or more legal principles that are old, fundamental, and well settled.
The term refers to the law printed in books set in Gothic type, which is very bold and black.
Also termed hornbook law. Blacks Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, Bryan A. Garner, Editor in
Chief (St. Paul Minn.: West Group, 1999), p. 163.
[2] [T]he Bank [of England] had the power to issue [i.e., create from thin-air and loan into
circulation its own promissory] notes.
It issued [created from thin-air and loaned] these [promissory notes] to an amount equal to the
sum [of gold] advanced [loaned] to the Government [thereby doubling its wealth as to the value
of the loan, every time it made a loan of gold to the government]. . . . A. Andrads, History of
the Bank of England 1640 to 1903, Fourth Edition (Reprint), Christabel Meredith, Translator
(London: Frank Cass & Co., Ltd., 1966), p. 85.
It [Bank of England] coined, in short, its own credit into paper money. Thorold Rogers, The First
Nine Years of the Bank of England (Oxford, 1887), p. 9, quoted in Andrads, supra, p. 82.
[3] The Federal Reserve Act of December 23, 1913, is the creation of Baron Alfred Charles de
Rothschild (18421918), director of the Bank of England (Eustace Mullins, The World Order: Our
Secret Rulers, Second Edition, 1992 Election Edition (Staunton, Va.: Ezra Pound Institute of
Civilization, 1992), p. 102), implemented via his straw author, Paul Moritz Warburg (id. at 128), a
German banker and Rothschild confederate awarded United States citizenship in 1911
specifically for this purpose; later dubbed Father of the Federal Reserve by the New York
Times. The private Federal Reserve, incorporated under aegis of the District of Columbia
Municipal Corporation, is modeled by its architect, Baron Rothschild, after the private Bank of
England.
[4] An extremely rare public disclosure (Rothschild proxies own 96% of all media worldwide)
reveals unilateral Rothschild control of the American economy (via controlling interest in each of
the New York Feds nominal-stockholder banks, which, collectively, own controlling interest in
the stock of the other 11 regional Federal Reserve Banks; thereby securing Rothschild control of
the entire private Federal Reserve System and documenting the reality of unilateral, alien
domination of the Feds primary borrower-servant, Congress, and Congress employer, the U.S.
Government, and, by virtue of the Feds private ownership of the currency, Federal Reserve
Notes, the American economy); to wit, in pertinent part:
This said Rothschild [i.e., the Rothschild Dubai office, institutional proxy of Sir Evelyn Robert
Adrian de Rothschild] is not getting directly involved but will act through commercial banks in
which it has equity or has connections with, like JP Morgan and other ones. Moreover, through
the same commercial banks, Rothschild has a say, and a powerful one, over the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York (FRBNY).
By law the latter plays a key role in the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) and thus has a
crucial role in making key decisions about interest rates and the US money supply.
Through the FRBNY Rothschild is in a privileged position to influence US monetary policy and
shaping US monetary supply, crucially important since the US dollar remains the main reserve
currency in the world. AsiaNews, Signs of a new financial storm for September coming from
Dubai and Saudi Arabia, June 1, 2009, http://www.asianews.it/index.php?
l=en&art=15402&size=A.
[5] Federal Reserve Banks . . . are not federal instrumentalities . . . but are independent,
privately owned and locally controlled corporations. Lewis v. United States, 680 F.2d 1239 (9th
Cir.1982).
The Federal Reserve is not an agency of government. It is a private banking monopoly. . . . Rep.
John R. Rarick, Deficit Financing, Congressional Record (House of Representatives), 92nd
Congress, First Session, Vol. 117Part 1, February 1, 1971, p. 1260.
[6] It will come as a shock for every officer of the uniformed services who has taken the oath at 5
U.S.C. 3331 to learn that he or she and his or her compatriots are serving something other
than the Republic or their country: the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation (infra,
under Three species of court and judge).
[7] These facts are acknowledged by Congress in but a single obscure provision of Title 28 U.S.C.,
which admits of members of the Union as actual countries; to wit (Underline emphasis added.):
297 Assignment of judges to courts of the freely associated compact states
(a) The Chief Justice or the chief judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit may assign any circuit, district, magistrate, or territorial judge of a court of the Ninth
Circuit, with the consent of the judge so assigned, to serve temporarily as a judge of any duly
constituted court of the freely associated compact states whenever an official duly authorized by
the laws of the respective compact state requests such assignment and such assignment is
necessary for the proper dispatch of the business of the respective court.
(b) The Congress consents to the acceptance and retention by any judge so authorized of
reimbursement from the countries referred to in subsection (a) of all necessary travel expenses,
including transportation, and of subsistence, or of a reasonable per diem allowance in lieu of
subsistence. The judge shall report to the Administrative Office of the United States Courts any
amount received pursuant to this subsection.
[8] Rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are equivalent to the rights of life, liberty,
and property. . . . Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 116 (1872).
[9] scrip. . . . [U. S.] paper currency of a denomination less than a dollar: not now issued. A
Standard Dictionary of the English Language, Isaac K. Funk, Editor in Chief (New York: Funk &
Wagnalls Company, 1903), p. 1606.
[10] quisling , , , noun . . . a traitorous national who aids the invader of his country and often
serves as chief agent or puppet governor. Websters New Third International Dictionary,
Unabridged (Springfield, Mass.: Merriam-Webster, Incorporated, 1993), s.v. Quisling.
Standard
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September 28, 2017supremecourtcase Leave a comment

Achilles heel of executive and judicial officers of the United States

Republican versus municipal form of government

The transition from a republican to a municipal form of government was:

Courts of the United States: Enforcers of municipal law

Notwithstanding that petitioner is facing A court or tribunal characterized by unauthorized or

August 22, 2017supremecourtcase Leave a comment

June 7, 2017supremecourtcase Leave a comment

The Department of the Treasury is a private organization, independent of government, 41 Stat.

May 28, 2017supremecourtcase Leave a comment

Houston IRS summons case

A hearing is set for May 30, 2017: Notice Setting Hearing.

Lufkin motion to vacate final judgment as void

Nature of the situation that necessitated Petitioners motion to vacate

453. Oaths of justices and judges

How do they justify this?

As used in this chapter:

. . . (15) United States means

(A) a Federal corporation;

(B) an agency, department, commission, board, or other entity of [a Federal corporation]

(C) an instrumentality of [a Federal corporation] the United States.

Fraud and treason to the Constitution

A municipal (not federal / constitutional) judicial system and government

How the Lufkin judge disposed of Petitioners motion to vacate

The substance of Petitioners supplemental motion to vacate is laid out above.

They are usurpers.

They are incorrigible.

May 9, 2017supremecourtcase Leave a comment

This is called lying by omission.

It is also constructive fraud.

Only municipal judges in United States district courts

A municipal (not federal per se) debt collection operation

Houston IRS summons case

Counsel for IRSs response in opposition to motion to dismiss

Reply to counsel for IRSs response in opposition to motion to dismiss

Motion to withdraw tag-end order in order to show cause

Counsel for IRSs response in opposition to motion to withdraw tag-end order

Lufkin motion to vacate final judgment as void

April 14, 2017supremecourtcase Leave a comment

In response to a petition for an order to enforce an IRS summons, Petitioner on February 9,

Lufkin motion to vacate final judgment as void

February 11, 2017supremecourtcase Leave a comment

Legislative power determines executive and judicial jurisdiction

Territorial (over cases arising or those residing in a particular geographic area);

Personal (over someones rights); and

Subject-matter (over the nature of the case or type of relief sought).

Territorial jurisdiction is defined as follows:

Territorial jurisdiction. Jurisdiction considered as limited to cases arising or persons residing

The Great Mystery

Lawsuits for failure to respond to an IRS summons

IRS summons hearings and audits

IRS seizure of funds in bank accounts by levy

IRS seizure / garnishment of wages by levy

Executive seizure of real or personal property

Judicial or executive enforcement of the USA PATRIOT ACT

Principal part of executive and judicial jurisdiction

The beginning of all congressional legislation is Section 1 of Statute I, Chapter I, An Act to

Seminal act of congressional treason to the Constitution and American People

Three species of court and judge

The political opposite of tyranny is liberty; to wit (Underline emphasis added.):

The judicial powers jurisdictional equal: the executive power

New lawsuit to enforce IRS summons; Petitioners response

The actual situation