LE G A L RE SE A RCH & T HE SIS W RIT IN G |1
INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL RESEARCH
THE LEGAL RESEARCH PROCESS
A. Definition of Legal Research
- the search for an applicable law for a certain set of facts
(*from class)
- it is the process of finding the laws, rules and regulations
that govern activities in human society. It involves locating
both the laws and rules which are enforced by the State and
the commentaries which explain or analyze these rules
- the investigation for information necessary to support legal
decision making. Legal Research includes each step of a
process that begins with analyzing the facts of a problem
and concludes with applying and communicating the results
of the investigation
B. Basic Steps in Conducting Research
1. Identify and Analyze the Significant Facts
begins with compiling a descriptive statement of
legally significant facts. The TARP Rule is a useful
technique to analyze your facts according to the
following factors:
T Thing or subject matter
A Cause of Action or group of defense
R Relief sought
P Persons or parties involved
2. Formulate the Legal Issues to be Researched -
this is the initial intellectual activity that presumes
some knowledge of the substantive law. The goal is
to classify or categorize the problem into general,
and increasingly specific, subject areas and to
begin to hypothesize legal issues.
- Consult general secondary sources for an overview
of all relevant subject areas, this can be used to
provide background information to help formulate
issues; they are tools NOT the objects of research
- Statement of the issues should be arranged in a
logical pattern to form an outline
3. Research the Issues Presented begin to research
the issue
a. Organize and Plan write down all
sources to be searched under each issue to
be researched, even if sources are repeated
b. Identify, Read and Update All Relevant
Constitutional Provisions, Statutes and
Administrative Regulations these
primary sources can be identified in
several ways:
- Statutory Compilations tables of contents and
indexes that list the subject and topics covered by
the statutes
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- Computer-Assisted Legal Research
- PHILJURIS and LEX LIBRIS
- Secondary Sources treaties and commentaries
and law review articles, commonly cite relevant
constitutional provisions, statues, and
administrative regulations
c. Identify, Read and Update All Relevant
Case Law note its full citation, the
ponente, date of decision, relevant facts,
the holding, summary of the courts
reasoning, and the sources cited by the
Court
d. Refine the Search expand your
arguments
4. Update consult the PHILJURIS or LEX LIBRIS
to determine whether the authorities have been
interpreted or altered in any way, or whether new
cases, statutes or regulations have been published;
law changes constantly; our Congress passes new
statutes and modify old ones; our Supreme Court
either refines the law or reaffirms the law or even
changes the interpretation of the law.
C. Plagiarism
In the Matter of Charges of Plagiarism, etc. Against
Associate Justice Mariano C. del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-
17-SC, October 12, 2010 & February 8, 2011.)
FACTS: On April 28, 2010, the Supreme Court issued a
decision which dismissed a petition filed by the Malaya
Lolas Organization in the case of Vinuya vs Romulo. Atty.
Herminio Harry Roque Jr., counsel for Vinuya et al,
questioned the said decision. He raised, among others, that
the ponente in said case, Justice Mariano del Castillo,
plagiarized three books when the honorable Justice twisted
the true intents of these books to support the assailed
decision. These books were:
a. A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens by Evan J. Criddle and
Evan Fox-Descent, Yale Journal of International Law
(2009);
b. Breaking the Silence: Rape as an International Crime by
Mark Ellis, Case Western Reserve Journal of International
Law (2006); and
c. Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations by Christian J. Tams,
Cambridge University Press (2005).
As such, Justice del Castillo is guilty of plagiarism,
misconduct, and at least inexcusable negligence.
Interestingly, even the three foreign authors mentioned
above, stated that their works were used inappropriately by
Justice Del Castillo and that the assailed decision is different
from what their works advocated.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is plagiarism in the case at
bar.
 LE G A L RE SE A RCH & T HE SIS W RIT IN G |2
HELD: No. Even if there is (as emphasized by the Supreme
Court in its ruling on the Motion for Reconsideration filed
by Vinuya et al in 2011), the rule on plagiarism cannot be
applied to judicial bodies.
No Plagiarism
According to Blacks Law Dictionary: Plagiarism is the
deliberate and knowing presentation of another persons
original ideas or creative expressions as ones own.
This cannot be the case here because as proved by evidence,
in the original drafts of the assailed decision, there was
attribution to the three authors but due to errors made by
Justice del Castillos researcher, the attributions were
inadvertently deleted. There is therefore no intent by Justice
del Castillo to take these foreign works as his own.
But in plagiarism, intent is immaterial.
On this note, the Supreme Court stated that in its past
decisions, (i.e. U.P Board of Regents vs CA, 313 SCRA
404), the Supreme Court never indicated that intent is not
material in plagiarism. To adopt a strict rule in applying
plagiarism in all cases leaves no room for errors. This would
be very disadvantageous in cases, like this, where there are
reasonable and logical explanations.
On the foreign authors claim that their works were used
inappropriately
According to the Supreme Court, the passages lifted from
their works were merely used as background facts in
establishing the state on international law at various stages
of its development. The Supreme Court went on to state that
the foreign authors works can support conflicting theories.
The Supreme Court also stated that since the attributions to
said authors were accidentally deleted, it is impossible to
conclude that Justice del Castillo twisted the advocacies that
the works espouse.
No Misconduct
Justice del Castillo is not guilty of misconduct. The error
here is in good faith. There was no malice, fraud or
corruption.
No Inexcusable Negligence
The error of Justice del Castillos researcher is not reflective
of his gross negligence. The researcher is a highly
competent one. The researcher earned scholarly degrees
here and abroad from reputable educational institutions. The
researcher finished third in her class and 4th in the bar
examinations. Her error was merely due to the fact that the
software she used, Microsoft Word, lacked features to
apprise her that certain important portions of her drafts are
being deleted inadvertently. Such error on her part cannot be
said to be constitutive of gross negligence nor can it be said
that Justice del Castillo was grossly negligent when he
assigned the case to her. Further, assigning cases to
researchers has been a long standing practice to assist
justices in drafting decisions. It must be emphasized though
that prior to assignment, the justice has already spelled out
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his position to the researcher and in every sense, the justice
is in control in the writing of the draft.
Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno dissenting
There is such a thing as judicial plagiarism. And though
judicial plagiarism does not necessarily carry with them the
imposition of sanctions nor does it mean that a case should
undergo retrial based on it, the existence of which should be
acknowledged.
D. Other unethical conducts
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or
allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or
misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language or the
argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or
authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already
rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a
fact that which has not been proved.
Hipos v. Bay (G.R. Nos. 174813-15, Mar. 17, 2009)
The statement of petitioners counsel is utterly misleading.
There is no such statement in our Decision in Ledesma, 278
SCRA 656 (1997). The excerpt from Ledesma, which
appears to have a resemblance to the statement allegedly
quoted from said case, provides: No Grave Abuse of
Discretion in the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice, In
the light of recent holdings in Marcelo and Martinez; and
considering that the issue of the correctness of the justice
secretarys resolution has been amply threshed out in
petitioners letter, the information, the resolution of the
secretary of justice, the motion to dismiss, and even the
exhaustive discussion in the motion for reconsiderationall
of which were submitted to the courtthe trial judge
committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the
motion to withdraw the information, based solely on his
bare and ambiguous reliance on Crespo. The trial courts
order is inconsistent with our repetitive calls for an
independent and competent assessment of the issue(s)
presented in the motion to dismiss. The trial judge was
tasked to evaluate the secretarys recommendation finding
the absence of probable cause to hold petitioner criminally
liable for libel. He failed to do so. He merely ruled to
proceed with the trial without stating his reasons for
disregarding the secretarys recommendation. It very much
appears that the counsel of petitioners is purposely
misleading this Court, in violation of Rule 10.02 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, which provides: Rule
10.02A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or
misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language or the
argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or
authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already
rendered inoperative by repel or amendment, or assert as a
fact that which has not been proved. Counsels use of block
 LE G A L RE SE A RCH & T HE SIS W RIT IN G |3
quotation and quotation marks signifies that he intends to
make it appear that the passages are the exact words of the
Court. Furthermore, putting the words Underscoring ours
after the text implies that, except for the underscoring, the
text is a faithful reproduction of the original. Accordingly,
we are ordering Atty. Procopio S. Beltran, Jr. to show cause
why he should not be disciplined as a member of the Bar.
Allied Banking Corporation v. CA (G.R. No. 144412,
Nov. 18, 2003)
The syllabus of cases in official or unofficial reports of
Supreme Court decisions or resolutions is not the work of
the Court, nor does it state this Courts decision. The
syllabus is simply the work of the reporter who gives his
understanding of the decision. The reporter writes the
syllabus for the convenience of lawyers in reading the
reports. A syllabus is not a part of the courts decision. A
counsel should not cite a syllabus in place of the carefully
considered text in the decision of the Court.
In the present case, Labor Arbiter Almirante and Atty.
Durano began by quoting from Dosch, but substituted a
portion of the decision with a headnote from the SCRA
syllabus, which they even underscored. In short, they
deliberately made the quote from the SCRA syllabus appear
as the words of the Supreme Court. We admonish them for
what is at the least patent carelessness, if not an outright
attempt to mislead the parties and the courts taking
cognizance of this case. Rule 10.02, Canon 10 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility mandates that a lawyer shall
not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the text of a
decision or authority. It is the duty of all officers of the court
to cite the rulings and decisions of the Supreme Court
accurately.
COMELEC v. Noynay (G.R. No. 132365, July 9, 1998)
If Atty. Balbuena was diligent enough, he would have
known that the correct name of the complainant in the case
referred to is neither Alberto Naldeza as indicated in the
motion for reconsideration nor Alberto alone as stated in the
petition, but ALBERTO NALDOZA. Moreover, the case
was not reported in volume 245 of the Supreme Court
Reports Annotated (SCRA) as falsely represented in the
paragraph 16 of the petition, but in volume 254 of the
SCRA. Worse, in both the motion for reconsideration and
the petition, Atty. Balbuena deliberately made it appear that
the quoted portions were our findings or rulings, or, put a
little differently, our own words. The truth is, the quoted
portion is just a part of the memorandum of the Court
Administrator quoted in the decision.
Heirs of Tan v. Pollescas (G.R. No. 145568, Nov. 17,
2005)
The case of Garchitorena v. Panganiban which the Tan
Heirs invoked to justify the extinguishment of leasehold
relation does not appear on page 339 of Volume 8 of the
Supreme Court Reports Annotated. What is printed on such
page is the case of Republic v. Perez with docket number L-
16112 and promulgated on 29 June 1963. For making a
wrong citation, the Court admonishes Atty. Jesus S. Anonat,
counsel for the Tan Heirs, to be more careful when citing
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jurisprudence. The Court reminds him of his duty not to
knowingly misquote the text of a decision or authority lest
he be guilty of misleading the Court.
E. Basic legal citation
ATENEO LAW JOURNAL, LEGAL CITATION GUIDE
<see book>
THE CONSTITUTION AND STATUTORY LAW
A. Overview of the Philippine legal system
In re: Application of Max Shoop (41 Phil. 213, 1920)
FACTS
- Max Shoop is applying for admission to practice law in the
Philippines under Par. 4 of the Rules for the Examination of
Candidates for Admission to the Practice of Law. It was
shown in his application that he was practicing for more
than 5 years in the highest court of the State of New York.
- The said rule requires that:
New York State by comity confers the privilege of
admission without examination under similar circumstances
to attorneys admitted to practice in the Philippine Islands.
(Aside from comity, the satisfactory affidavits of applicants
must show they have practiced at least 5 years in any
(district or circuit or highest) court of the US or territory of
it. But admission is still in the discretion of the court.)
- The rule of New York court, on the other hand, permits
admission without examination in the discretion of the
Appellate Division in several cases:
1. Provided that the applicant also practiced 5 years as a
member of the bar in the highest law court in any other state
or territory of the American Union or in the District of
Columbia
2. The applicant practiced 5 years in another country whose
jurisprudence is based on the principles of the English
Common Law (ECL).
ISSUE
WON under the New York rule as it exists the principle of
comity is established
HELD
- The Philippines is an UNORGANIZED TERRITORY of
the US, under a civil government established by the
Congress
In interpreting and applying the bulk of the written laws of
this jurisdiction, and in rendering its decisions in cases NOT
covered by the letter of the written law, this court relies
upon the theories and precedents of Anglo-American cases,
subject to the limited exception of those instances where the
remnants of the Spanish written law present well-defined
civil law theories and of the few cases where such
precedents are inconsistent with local customs and
institutions.
 LE G A L RE SE A RCH & T HE SIS W RIT IN G |4
- The jurisprudence of this jurisdiction is based upon the
ECL in its present day form of Anglo-American Common
Law to an almost exclusive extent.
- New York permits conferring privileges on attorneys
admitted to practice in the Philippines similar to those
privileges accorded by the rule of this court. - Petition
granted. Decision is based on the interpretation of the NY
rule; doesnt establish a precedent with respect to future
Applications.
REASONING ON TERRITORY:
a. Comity would exist if we are a territory of the US
b. We are NOT an organized territory incorporated into the
United States but
c. We are NOT a "foreign country" or "another country"
either
d. Like Puerto Rico, we may not be incorporated but we are
a territory since the US Congress legislates for us and we
have been granted a form of territorial government, so to
that extent we are a territory according to the US Atty. Gen.
e. It is not believed that the New York court intended the
word territory" to be limited to the technical meaning of
organized territory or it would have used the more accurate
expression.
f. Therefore, We have a basis of comity to satisfy the first
requirement since the full phraseology indicates a
SWEEPING INTENTION to include ALL of the territory of
the US.
ON COMMON LAW JURISDICTION:
(On what principle/s is the present day jurisprudence
based?)
g. In most of the States, including New York, codification
and statute law have come to be a very large proportion of
the law of the jurisdiction, the remaining proportion being a
system of case law which has its roots, to a large but not
exclusive degree, in the old English cases.
h. In speaking of a jurisprudence "based on the English
Common Law" it would seem proper to say that the
jurisprudence of a particular jurisdiction Is based upon the
principles of that Common Law if its statute law and its case
law to a very large extent includes the science and
application of law as laid down by the old English cases, as
perpetuated and modified by the American cases.
COMMON LAW ADOPTED BY DECISION:
i. In the US, the ECL is blended with American codification
and remnants of the Spanish and French Civil Codes. There
a legal metamorphosis has occurred similar to that which is
transpiring in this jurisdiction today.
ii. New York uses the phrase "based on the English
Common Law" in a general sense
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iii. And that such Common Law may become the basis of
the jurisprudence of the courts where practical
considerations and the effect of sovereignty gives round for
such a decision.
iv. If in the Philippines, ECL principles as embodied in
Anglo-American jurisprudence are used and applied by the
courts to the extent that Common Law principles are NOT
in conflict with the LOCALWRITTEN laws, customs, and
institutions as modified by the change of sovereignty and
subsequent legislation, and there is NO OTHER FOREIGN
case law system used to any substantial extent, THEN it is
proper to say in the sense of the New York rule that the
"jurisprudence" of the Philippines is based on the ECL.
IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS:
i. The extent of the English or Anglo-Am Common Law
here has not been definitely decided by the SC. But there is
a similarity to the quotations from the American decisions
cited with reference to the ECL.
ii. Alzua & Arnalot vs. Johnson: we apply Anglo-Am
jurisprudence only in "xxxso far as they are founded on
sound principles applicable to local conditions, and are not
in conflict with existing law; nevertheless, many of the
rules, principles, and doctrines of the Common Law have, to
all intents and purposes, been IMPORTED into this
jurisdiction, a RESULT of the enactment of new laws and
the organization of new institutions by the Congress of the
USxxx"
iii. The Spanish judicial system was abrogated replaced with
a new one modelled after the judicial systems of the US.
Therefore, those Spanish doctrines and principles in conflict
with the new one were abrogated.
iv. US. v. De Guzman: For proper construction and
application of the terms and provisions we borrowed from or
modelled upon Anglo-Am precedents, we review the
legislative history of such enactments.
v. US. v. Abiog and Abiog: The courts are constantly guided
by the doctrines of Common Law. Neither ECL or
American Common Law is in force in this Islandssave
only in so far as they are founded on sound principles
applicable to local conditions and aren't in conflict with
existing law."
vi. What we have is a PHILIPPINECOMMON LAW
influenced by the ECL or American Common Law.
vii. A great preponderance of the jurisprudence of our
jurisdiction is based upon Anglo-American case law
precedents-exclusively in applying those statutory laws
which have been enacted since the change of sovereignty
and which conform more or less to the American statutes,
and-to a large extent in applying and expanding the
remnants of the Spanish codes and written laws.
PHILIPPINE STATUTE LAW:
i. The chief codes of Spain that were extended to us were as
follows: Penal Code, Code of Commerce, Ley Provisional,
Code of Criminal Procedure, and Code of Civil Procedure,
 LE G A L RE SE A RCH & T HE SIS W RIT IN G |5
Civil Code, Marriage Law, Mortgage Law, Railway laws,
Law of Waters.
ii. There were also special laws having limited application.
iii. The foregoing written laws had acquired the force of
statute law by change of sovereignty.
iv. There was no properly called Case Law of Spain since
Spanish jurisprudence does not recognize the principle of
Stare Decisis.
1. Manresas discussion of Art. 6 of the civil shows how far
from a case law system is jurisprudence. Spanish courts are
governed by:
a. First, by written law
b. 2nd, by the customs of the place (derives its force because
it is the acknowledged manner on how things are done and
not jurisprudence)
c. 3rd, by judicial decision (when in practice, these were
considered last; the development of case law was impeded
because the courts were free to disregard any information or
decisions of other courts.)
d. 4th, by general principles of law
SPANISH STATUTE LAW:
i. All portions of political law were abrogated immediately
with the change of sovereignty.
ii. All Spanish laws, customs, and rights of property
inconsistent with the Constitution and American principles
and institutions were superseded.
iii. It was as if Congress had enacted new laws for the
Philippines modelled upon those same Spanish statutes.
CASES UNDER AMERICAN DERIVED STATUTES:
i. It appears that the bulk of present day Statute Law is
derivative from Anglo-American sources; derivative in a
sense of having been COPIED, and in the sense of having
been enacted by Congress or by virtue of its authority.
ii. In all of the cases, Anglo-American decisions and
authorities are used and relied upon to a greater or less
degree. Although in many cases, the use is by way of
dictum, nevertheless, the net result is the building up of a
very substantial elaboration of Anglo-American case law.
CASES UNDER SPANISH STATUTES:
i. We use Anglo-Am cases in interpreting and applying the
remnants of the Spanish statutes thus showing how
permanent the hold of the Anglo-Am Common Law has on
our jurisprudence.
ii. Anglo-Am case law plays a very great part in amplifying
the law on those subjects, which are still governed by the
remaining portions of the Spanish statutes, as exhibited in
the groups of cases cited in the footnotes.
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iii. Anglo-Am case law has entered practically every field of
law and in the large majority of such subjects has formed the
sole basis for the guidance of the Court in developing
jurisprudence.
iv. The result is that we've developed a Phil. Common Law
which is based almost exclusively, except in cases where
conflicting with local customs and institutions, upon Anglo-
Am Common Law.
COLLATERAL INFLUENCES:
i. There are no digests of Spanish decisions to aid the study
of Bench and Bar vs. the abundance of
digests/reports/textbooks on English/Am. courts.
ii. There is a prolific use of Anglo-Am authorities in the
decisions of the court, plus, the available sources for study
and reference on legal theories are mostly Anglo-American
iii. Therefore, there has been developed and will continue a
common law in our jurisprudence (i.e. Philippine Common
Law) based upon the ECL in its present day form of an
Anglo-Am CL, which is effective in all of the subjects of
law in this jurisdiction, in so far as it does not conflict with
the express language of the written law (where the remnants
of the Spanish written law present well- defined civil law
theories) or with the local customs and institutions.
B. Authorities and hierarchy of laws
Primary authorities
Primary authorities are statements of law that issue from the
sovereign body, the legislature, the courts, or any other body
with official capacity to issue or to clarify rules within its
jurisdiction.
Secondary authorities
Secondary authorities are sources of information which help
explain, comment on, or analyze the law. These are never
binding statements of law, but they may be persuasive.
C. Constitution
CIVIL CODE, art. 7
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and
their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by
disuse, custom, or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declare the law to be inconsistent with the
Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall
govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations
shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or
the Constitution.
Angara v. Electoral Commission (G.R. No. L-45081,
July 15, 1936)
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our
system of government. It obtains not through express
provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each
department of the government has exclusive cognizance of
 LE G A L RE SE A RCH & T HE SIS W RIT IN G |6
matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own
sphere.
The original provision regarding this subject in the Act of
Congress of July 1, 1902 (sec. 7, par. 5) laying down the
rule that "the assembly shall be the judge of the elections,
returns, and qualifications of its members", was taken from
clause 1 of section 5, Article I of the Constitution of the
United States providing that "Each House shall be the Judge
of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own
Members, * * *." The Act of Congress of August 29, 1916
(sec. 18, par. 1) modified this provision by the insertion of
the word "sole" as follows: "That the Senate and House of
Representatives, respectively, shall be the sole judges of the
elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective
members, * * *" apparently in order to emphasize the
exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred upon each
House of the Legislature over the particular cases therein
specified. This court has had occasion to characterize this
grant of power to the Philippine Senate and House of
Representatives, respectively, as "full, clear and complete".
(Veloso vs. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar
[1919], 39 Phil., 886, 888.)
In the matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar
(94 Phil. 534, 1954)
ID.; ID.; POWER OF CONGRESS TO REPEAL, ALTER
OR SUPPLEMENT RULES.The Constitution has not
conferred on Congress and this Tribunal equal
responsibilities governing the admission to the practice of
law. The primary power and responsibility which the
Constitution recognizes, continue to reside in this court.
Congress may repeal, alter and supplement the rules
promulgated by this court, but the authority and
responsibility over the admission, suspension, disbarment
and reinstatement of attorneys-at-law and their supervision
remain vested in the Supreme Court.
ID.; TITLE OF LAW MUST EMBRACE ALL ITS
PROVISIONS.Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not
embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the
Constitution enjoins. Being inseparable from the provisions
of article 1, the entire law is void.
Serrano vs. Gallant (G.R. No. 167614, Mar. 24, 2009)
First Issue
Does the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of the
Constitution, and Section 18, Article II and Section 3,
Article XIII on Labor as protected sector?
The answer is in the affirmative.
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution guarantees:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law nor shall any person be denied
the equal protection of the law.
Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII accord all
members of the labor sector, without distinction as to place
of deployment, full protection of their rights and welfare.
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To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the
foregoing constitutional provisions translate to economic
security and parity: all monetary benefits should be equally
enjoyed by workers of similar category, while all monetary
obligations should be borne by them in equal degree; none
should be denied the protection of the laws which is enjoyed
by, or spared the burden imposed on, others in like
circumstances.
Imbued with the same sense of obligation to afford
protection to labor, the Court in the present case also
employs the standard of strict judicial scrutiny, for it
perceives in the subject clause a suspect classification
prejudicial to OFWs.
Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially
neutral, for it applies to all OFWs. However, a closer
examination reveals that the subject clause has a
discriminatory intent against, and an invidious impact on
OFWs
The subject clause does not state or imply any definitive
governmental purpose; and it is for that precise reason
that the clause violates not just petitioners right to equal
protection, but also her right to substantive due process
under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution.
Second Issue
It is plain that prior to R.A. No. 8042, all OFWs, regardless
of contract periods or the unexpired portions thereof, were
treated alike in terms of the computation of their monetary
benefits in case of illegal dismissal. Their claims were
subjected to a uniform rule of computation: their basic
salaries multiplied by the entire unexpired portion of their
employment contracts.
The enactment of the subject clause in R.A. No. 8042
introduced a differentiated rule of computation of the money
claims of illegally dismissed OFWs based on their
employment periods, in the process singling out one
category whose contracts have an unexpired portion of one
year or more and subjecting them to the peculiar
disadvantage of having their monetary awards limited to
their salaries for 3 months or for the unexpired portion
thereof, whichever is less, but all the while sparing the other
category from such prejudice, simply because the latters
unexpired contracts fall short of one year.
Prior to R.A. No. 8042, a uniform system of computation of
the monetary awards of illegally dismissed OFWs was in
place. This uniform system was applicable even to local
workers with fixed-term employment.
The subject clause does not state or imply any definitive
governmental purpose; and it is for that precise reason that
the clause violates not just petitioners right to equal
protection, but also her right to substantive due process
under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution.
The subject clause being unconstitutional, petitioner is
entitled to his salaries for the entire unexpired period of nine
months and 23 days of his employment contract, pursuant to
 LE G A L RE SE A RCH & T HE SIS W RIT IN G |7
law and jurisprudence prior to the enactment of R.A. No.
8042.
Third Issue
Petitioner contends that his overtime and leave pay should
form part of the salary basis in the computation of his
monetary award, because these are fixed benefits that have
been stipulated into his contract.
Petitioner is mistaken.
The word salaries in Section 10(5) does not include
overtime and leave pay. For seafarers like petitioner, DOLE
Department Order No. 33, series 1996, provides a Standard
Employment Contract of Seafarers, in which salary is
understood as the basic wage, exclusive of overtime, leave
pay and other bonuses; whereas overtime pay is
compensation for all work performed in excess of the
regular eight hours, and holiday pay is compensation for any
work performed on designated rest days and holidays.
In the same vein, the claim for the days leave pay for the
unexpired portion of the contract is unwarranted since the
same is given during the actual service of the seamen.
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency v. Cabiles (G.R.
No. 170139, Aug. 5, 2014)
In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is supreme. No
branch or office of the government may exercise its powers
in any manner inconsistent with the Constitution, regardless
of the existence of any law that supports such exercise. The
Constitution cannot be trumped by any other law. All laws
must be read in light of the Constitution. Any law that is
inconsistent with it is a nullity. Thus, when a law or a
provision of law is null because it is inconsistent with the
Constitution, the nullity cannot be cured by reincorporation
or reenactment of the same or a similar law or provision. A
law or provision of law that was already declared
unconstitutional remains as such unless circumstances have
so changed as to warrant a reverse conclusion.
We observe that the reinstated clause, this time as provided
in Republic Act. No. 10022, violates the constitutional rights
to equal protection and due process. Petitioner as well as the
Solicitor General have failed to show any compelling
change in the circumstances that would warrant us to revisit
the precedent. We reiterate our finding in Serrano v. Gallant
Maritime that limiting wages that should be recovered by an
illegally dismissed overseas worker to three months is both a
violation of due process and the equal protection clauses of
the Constitution. Equal protection of the law is a guarantee
that persons under like circumstances and falling within the
same class are treated alike, in terms of privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced. It is a guarantee against
undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as
hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality.
In creating laws, the legislature has the power to make
distinctions and classifications. In exercising such power, it
has a wide discretion. The equal protection clause does not
infringe on this legislative power. A law is void on this
basis, only if classifications are made arbitrarily. There is no
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violation of the equal protection clause if the law applies
equally to persons within the same class and if there are
reasonable grounds for distinguishing between those falling
within the class and those who do not fall within the class. A
law that does not violate the equal protection clause
prescribes a reasonable classification. A reasonable
classification (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2)
must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply
equally to all members of the same class. The reinstated
clause does not satisfy the requirement of reasonable
classification.
There can never be a justification for any form of
government action that alleviates the burden of one sector,
but imposes the same burden on another sector, especially
when the favored sector is composed of private businesses
such as placement agencies, while the disadvantaged sector
is composed of OFWs whose protection no less than the
Constitution commands. The idea that private business
interest can be elevated to the level of a compelling state
interest is odious. Along the same line, we held that the
reinstated clause violates due process rights. It is arbitrary as
it deprives overseas workers of their monetary claims
without any discernable valid purpose. Respondent Joy
Cabiles is entitled to her salary for the unexpired portion of
her contract, in accordance with Section 10 of Republic Act
No. 8042. The award of the three-month equivalence of
respondents salary must be modified accordingly. Since she
started working on June 26, 1997 and was terminated on
July 14, 1997, respondent is entitled to her salary from July
15, 1997 to June 25, 1998. To rule otherwise would be
iniquitous to petitioner and other OFWs, and would, in
effect, send a wrong signal that principals/employers and
recruitment/manning agencies may violate an OFWs
security of tenure which an employment contract embodies
and actually profit from such violation based on an
unconstitutional provision of law.
Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS (G.R. No. 122156, Feb. 3,
1997)
Since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and
supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every
statute and contract. A provision which lays down a general
principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision
which is complete in itself and becomes operative without
the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that
which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it
grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.
A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and
extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are
fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be
determined by an examination and construction of its terms,
and there is no language indicating that the subject is
referred to the legislature for action. Unless it is expressly
provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all
provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the
constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation
instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the
 LE G A L RE SE A RCH & T HE SIS W RIT IN G |8
power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the
fundamental law.
10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a
mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself
and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws
or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the
provision does not require any legislation to put it in
operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our
Constitution mandates that in the grant of rights, privileges,
and concessions covering national economy and patrimony,
the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it
means just that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And
when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain
specified circumstances an action may be maintained to
enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any
legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute
especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such
right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and
puissance, and from which all legislations must take their
bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus
ibi remedium.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony
pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of
national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources
of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well
used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural
heritage of the Filipinos.
It also refers to Filipinos intelligence in arts, sciences and
letters. In the present case, Manila Hotel has become a
landmark, a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While
it was restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in
1912, a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the
venue of various significant events which have shaped
Philippine history.
Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national
economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the
MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter
for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that
anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual
control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51%
of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the
land on which the hotel edifice stands.
It is not premature.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest
bid in a public bidding concerning the grant of rights,
privileges and concessions covering the national economy
and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there
is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to
match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino
matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the
Filipino. It must be so if the Court is to give life and
meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987
Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated
nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat
is omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would
be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.
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The Court does not discount the apprehension that this
policy may discourage foreign investors. But the
Constitution and laws of the Philippines are understood to
be always open to public scrutiny. These are given factors
which investors must consider when venturing into business
in a foreign jurisdiction. Any person therefore desiring to do
business in the Philippines or with any of its agencies or
instrumentalities is presumed to know his rights and
obligations under the Constitution and the laws of the
forum.
There was grave abuse of discretion.
To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when
there is a Filipino group willing to match the bid of the
foreign group is to insist that government be treated as any
other ordinary market player, and bound by its mistakes or
gross errors of judgement, regardless of the consequences to
the Filipino people. The miscomprehension of the
Constitution is regrettable. Thus, the Court would rather
remedy the indiscretion while there is still an opportunity to
do so than let the government develop the habit of forgetting
that the Constitution lays down the basic conditions and
parameters for its actions.
Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered
by Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent
GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the
block of shares of MHC and to execute the necessary
agreements and documents to effect the sale in accordance
not only with the bidding guidelines and procedures but with
the Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to
execute the corresponding documents with petitioner as
provided in the bidding rules after the latter has matched the
bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.
D. Parts of a statute
Title (full title v short title)
Reference number
o Acts
o Commonwealth Acts
o Batas Pambansa
o Republic Acts
o Presidential Decrees
o Executive Orders
Preamble
Enabling Clause
Body
o Contents
o Definition of Terms
o Separability Clause
o Repealing Clause
o Effectivity Clause
Sunset Provision*
Repeals:
2 ER 1 x1
2 IR 1 x1; irreconcilable differences
3 R 2 ER 1 x1; except if 3 says otherwise
 LE G A L RE SE A RCH & T HE SIS W RIT IN G |9
3 R 2 IR 1 1; (1) except if 3 says otherwise, (2) 3 IR 1
E. How a bill becomes law
PHIL. CONST. art. VI, 26, 2 & 27.
SECTION 26 (2) No bill passed by either House shall
become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate
days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been
distributed to its Members three days before its passage,
except when the President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or
emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment
thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken
immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the
Journal.
SECTION 27 (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall,
before it becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he
approves the same, he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto
it and return the same with his objections to the House
where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large
in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such
reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such
House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together
with the objections, to the other House by which it shall
likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of
all the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all
such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by
yeas or nays, and the names of the Members voting for or
against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall
communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it
originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof;
otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it.
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular
item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but
the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does
not object.
F. Effectivity
CIVIL CODE, art. 2.
Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette,
or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines,
unless it is otherwise provided. (As amended by EO 200)
Taada v. Tuvera (G.R. No. L-63915, December 29,
1986)
After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments
of the parties, both on the original petition and on the instant
motion, we have come to the conclusion, and so hold, that
the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date
of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself,
which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not
mean that the legislature may make the law effective
immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its
previous publication.
lt is not correct to say that under the disputed clause
publication may be dispensed with altogether. The reason is
that such omission would offend due process insofar as it
9|P age
would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are
supposed to govern it. Surely, if the legislature could validly
provide that a law shall become effective immediately upon
its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after
an unreasonably short period after publication), it is not
unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as
a result; and they would be so not because of a failure to
comply with it but simply because they did not know of its
existence. Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as
is commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal
measures, like a law on prescription, which must also be
communicated to the persons they may affect before they
can begin to operate.
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to
those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws
relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do
not apply to them directly. An example is a law granting
citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of
President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It
surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the
public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to
all the people. The subject of such law is a matter of public
interest which any member of the body politic may question
in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the
courts of justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on the
public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class
legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be
valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even
if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or
some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local
application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days
after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed
by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive
orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of
legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated
by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the
Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also
be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement
existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in
nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the public, need not be
published. Neither is publication required of the so-called
letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties.
Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published
notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the
national territory and directy affects only the inhabitants of
that place. All presidential decrees must be published,
including even, say, those naming a public place after a
favored individual or exempting him from certain
prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the
Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not
 L E G A L R E S E A R C H & T H E S I S W R I T I N G | 10
merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central
Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.
However, no publication is required of the instructions
issued by, say, the Minister of Social Welfare on the case
studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid
down by the head of a government agency on the
assignments or workload of his personnel or the wearing of
office uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are
not covered by this rule but by the Local Government Code.
We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no
publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of
the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the
petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the
presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts
(e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of
effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette
cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even
substantial compliance. This was the manner, incidentally,
in which the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a
presidential decree undeniably of general applicability and
interest, was "published" by the Marcos administration. The
evident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose
information on this vital law.
At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the
wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if we find it
impractical. That is not our function. That function belongs
to the legislature. Our task is merely to interpret and apply
the law as conceived and approved by the political
departments of the government in accordance with the
prescribed procedure. Consequently, we have no choice but
to pronounce that under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the
publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette,
and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity after
fifteen days from such publication or after a different period
provided by the legislature.
We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith, or
at least as soon as possible, to give effect to the law pursuant
to the said Article 2. There is that possibility, of course,
although not suggested by the parties that a law could be
rendered unenforceable by a mere refusal of the executive,
for whatever reason, to cause its publication as required.
This is a matter, however, that we do not need to examine at
this time.
G. Other Principles
CIVIL CODE, arts. 3, 4, & 7.
Article 3. Ignorance of the law excuses no one from
compliance therewith.
Article 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the
contrary is provided.
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and
their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by
disuse, custom, or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declare the law to be inconsistent with the
Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall
govern.
10 | P a g e
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations
shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or
the Constitution.
ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, bk. I, chaps. 5 & 6.
Chapter 5: OPERATION AND EFFECT OF LAWS
Sec. 18. When Laws Take Effect. - Laws shall take effect
after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation, unless it is otherwise provided.
Sec. 19. Prospectivity. - Laws shall have prospective
effect unless the contrary is expressly provided.
Sec. 20. Interpretation of Laws and Administrative
Issuances. - In the interpretation of a law or administrative
issuance promulgated in all the official languages, the
English text shall control, unless otherwise specifically
provided. In case of ambiguity, omission or mistake, the
other texts may be consulted.
Sec. 21. No Implied Revival of Repealed Law.- When a
law which expressly repeals a prior law itself repealed, the
law first repealed shall not be thereby revived unless
expressly so provided.
Sec. 22. Revival of Law Impliedly Repealed. - When a
law which impliedly repeals a prior law is itself repealed,
the prior law shall thereby be revived, unless the repealing
law provides otherwise.
Sec. 23. Ignorance of the Law. - Ignorance of the law
excuses no one from compliance therewith.
Chapter 6: OFFICIAL GAZETTE
Sec. 24. Contents. - There shall be published in the
Official Gazette all legislative acts and resolutions of a
public nature; all executive and administrative issuances of
general application; decisions or abstracts of decisions of the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, or other courts of
similar rank, as may be deemed by said courts of sufficient
importance to be so published; such documents or classes of
documents as may be required so to be published by law;
and such documents or classes of documents as the
President shall determine from time to time to have general
application or which he may authorize so to be published.
The publication of any law, resolution or other official
documents in the Official Gazette shall be prima facie
evidence of its authority.
Sec. 25. Editing and Publications. - The Official Gazette
shall be edited in the Office of the President and published
weekly in Pilipino or in the English language. It shall be
sold and distributed by the National Printing Office which
shall promptly mail copies thereof to subscribers free of
postage.
Tawang Multipurpose Cooperative v. La Trinidad
Water District (G.R. No. 166471, March 22, 2011)
The President, Congress and the Court cannot create directly
franchises for the operation of a public utility that are
 L E G A L R E S E A R C H & T H E S I S W R I T I N G | 11
exclusive in character. The 1935, 1973 and 1987
Constitutions expressly and clearly prohibit the creation of
franchises that are exclusive in character. x x x Plain words
do not require explanation. The 1935, 1973 and 1987
Constitutions are clearfranchises for the operation of a
public utility cannot be exclusive in character. The 1935,
1973 and 1987 Constitutions expressly and clearly state that,
nor shall such franchise x x x be exclusive in character.
There is no exception.
The dissenting opinion states two reasonable and legitimate
grounds for the creation of exclusive franchise: (1)
protection of the governments investment, and (2)
avoidance of a situation where ruinous competition could
compromise the supply of public utilities in poor and remote
areas. There is no reasonable and legitimate ground to
violate the Constitution. The Constitution should never be
violated by anyone. Right or wrong, the President,
Congress, the Court, the BOD and the LWUA have no
choice but to follow the Constitution. Any act, however
noble its intentions, is void if it violates the Constitution.
This rule is basic.
CASE LAW
A. Stare decisis
CIVIL CODE, art. 8.
Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the
Philippines.
De Castro v. JBC (G.R. No. 191002, etc., April 20, 2010)
Stare decisis derives its name from the Latin maxim stare
decisis et non quieta movere, i.e., to adhere to precedent and
not to unsettle things that are settled. It simply means that a
principle underlying the decision in one case is deemed of
imperative authority, controlling the decisions of like cases
in the same court and in lower courts within the same
jurisdiction, unless and until the decision in question is
reversed or overruled by a court of competent authority. The
decisions relied upon as precedents are commonly those of
appellate courts, because the decisions of the trial courts
may be appealed to higher courts and for that reason are
probably not the best evidence of the rules of law laid down.
Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute
itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily
become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria
that must control the actuations, not only of those called
upon to abide by them, but also of those duty-bound to
enforce obedience to them. In a hierarchical judicial system
like ours, the decisions of the higher courts bind the lower
courts, but the courts of co-ordinate authority do not bind
each other. The one highest court does not bind itself, being
invested with the innate authority to rule according to its
best lights.
The Court, as the highest court of the land, may be guided
but is not controlled by precedent. Thus, the Court,
especially with a new membership, is not obliged to follow
blindly a particular decision that it determines, after re-
11 | P a g e
examination, to call for a rectification. The adherence to
precedents is strict and rigid in a common-law setting like
the United Kingdom, where judges make law as binding as
an Act of Parliament. But ours is not a common-law system;
hence, judicial precedents are not always strictly and rigidly
followed. A judicial pronouncement in an earlier
decision may be followed as a precedent in a subsequent
case only when its reasoning and justification are relevant,
and the court in the latter case accepts such reasoning and
justification to be applicable to the case. The application of
the precedent is for the sake of convenience and stability.
For the intervenors to insist that Valenzuela ought not to be
disobeyed, or abandoned, or reversed, and that its wisdom
should guide, if not control, the Court in this case is,
therefore, devoid of rationality and foundation. They seem
to conveniently forget that the Constitution itself recognizes
the innate authority of the Court en banc to modify or
reverse a doctrine or principle of law laid down in any
decision rendered en banc or in division.
PHIL. CONST. art. VIII, 4, 3.
Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or
resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members
who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in
the case and voted thereon, and in no case, without the
concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the
required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en
banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid
down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in
division may be modified or reversed except by the court
sitting en banc.
B. Types of court opinion
Majority opinions - expresses the reasons the court is
deciding the case the way it is.
Concurring opinion a justice will write this type of opinion
when they generally agree with the majority opinion but
want to make a specific point that the majority chose not to.
Concurring in the judgment - a justice will write this kind of
opinion when they disagree with the reasoning of the
majority but their own reasoning leads to the same results
(affirmance, reversal, etc.) as the majority.
Dissenting opinion - this is the kind of opinion when the
justice writing it disagrees with the result of the majority
opinion.
PHIL. CONST. art. VIII, 13.
The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any case submitted
to it for decision en banc or in division shall be reached in
consultation before the case is assigned to a Member for the
writing of the opinion of the Court. A certification to this
effect signed by the Chief Justice shall be issued and a copy
thereof attached to the record of the case and served upon
the parties. Any Member who took no part, or dissented, or
abstained from a decision or resolution must state the reason
therefor. The same requirements shall be observed by all
lower collegiate courts.
 L E G A L R E S E A R C H & T H E S I S W R I T I N G | 12
C. Minute resolutions
Minute resolutions are issued for the prompt dispatch of the
actions of the Court. While they are the result of the
deliberations of the Justices of the Court, they are
promulgated by the Clerk of Court or his assistants whose
duty is to inform the parties of the action taken on their
cases by quoting verbatim the resolutions adopted by the
Court. Neither the Clerk of Court nor his assistants take part
in the deliberations of the case. (Agoy v Araneta Center,
Inc., GR No 196358, 2012)
Not a decision; merely signed by the clerk of court; binding
only for the parties of the same issues. Do NOT use for
research.
Philippine Health Care Providers, Inc. v. CIR (G.R.
No. 167330, Sep. 18, 2009)
It is true that, although contained in a minute resolution, our
dismissal of the petition was a disposition of the merits of
the case. When we dismissed the petition, we effectively
affirmed the CA ruling being questioned. As a result, our
ruling in that case has already become final. When a minute
resolution denies or dismisses a petition for failure to
comply with formal and substantive requirements, the
challenged decision, together with its findings of fact and
legal conclusions, are deemed sustained. But what is its
effect on other cases?
With respect to the same subject matter and the same issues
concerning the same parties, it constitutes res judicata.
However, if other parties or another subject matter (even
with the same parties and issues) is involved, the minute
resolution is not binding precedent. Thus, in CIR v. Baier-
Nickel, the Court noted that a previous case, CIR v. Baier-
Nickel involving the same parties and the same issues, was
previously disposed of by the Court thru a minute resolution
dated February 17, 2003 sustaining the ruling of the CA.
Nonetheless, the Court ruled that the previous case had no
bearing on the latter case because the two cases involved
different subject matters as they were concerned with the
taxable income of different taxable years.
Besides, there are substantial, not simply formal,
distinctions between a minute resolution and a decision. The
constitutional requirement under the first paragraph of
Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution that the facts and
the law on which the judgment is based must be expressed
clearly and distinctly applies only to decisions, not to minute
resolutions. A minute resolution is signed only by the clerk
of court by authority of the justices, unlike a decision. It
does not require the certification of the Chief Justice.
Moreover, unlike decisions, minute resolutions are not
published in the Philippine Reports. Finally, the proviso of
Section 4(3) of Article VIII speaks of a decision. Indeed, as
a rule, this Court lays down doctrines or principles of law
which constitute binding precedent in a decision duly signed
12 | P a g e
by the members of the Court and certified by the Chief
Justice.
Accordingly, since petitioner was not a party in G.R. No.
148680 and since petitioners liability for DST on its health
care agreement was not the subject matter of G.R. No.
148680, petitioner cannot successfully invoke the minute
resolution in that case (which is not even binding precedent)
in its favor. Nonetheless, in view of the reasons already
discussed, this does not detract in any way from the fact that
petitioners health care agreements are not subject to DST.
D. Obiter dicta
A judges expression of opinion uttered in a court or written
judgment, but not essential to the decision and therefore not
legally binding as precedent.
An obiter dictum has been defined as an opinion expressed
by a court upon some question of law that is not necessary
in the determination of the case before the court. It is a
remark made, or opinion expressed, by a judge, in his
decision upon a cause by the way, that is, incidentally or
collaterally, and not directly upon the question before him,
or upon a point not necessarily involved in the determination
of the cause, or introduced by way of illustration, or analogy
or argument. It does not embody the resolution or
determination of the court, and is made without argument, or
full consideration of the point. It lacks the force of an
adjudication, being a mere expression of an opinion with no
binding force for purposes of res judicata. (Landbank v
Suntay, GR No. 188376, 2011)
E. Ratio decidendi
reason for the decision
Ratio decidendi is defined as:
"1. the principle or rule of law on which a courts decision is
founded; 2. The rule of law on which a later court thinks that
a previous court founded its decision xx"
(People v Sandiganbayan, GR No 188165, 2013)
F. Fallo
Florentino v. Rivera (G.R. No. 167968, Jan. 23, 2006)
It is settled rule that the operative part in every decision is
the dispositive portion or the fallo, and where there is
conflict between the fallo and the body of the decision, the
fallo controls. This rule rests on the theory that the fallo is
the final order while the opinion in the body is merely a
statement, ordering nothing.
G. Difference between question of law and question of
fact
Pagsibigan v. People (G.R. No. 163868, June 4, 2009)
 L E G A L R E S E A R C H & T H E S I S W R I T I N G | 13

A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court 3. Ruling courts decision on the question that is actually
should cover only questions of law. Questions of fact are not before it, but if they do not relate to the question
reviewable. A question of law exists when the doubt centers actually before it, they are dicta or dictum (expression
on what the law is on a certain set of facts. A question of of opinion or a point other than the precise issue
fact exists when the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of involved in determining a case).
the alleged facts. There is a question of law if the issue
raised is capable of being resolved without need of * provides the answer to the question asked in the
reviewing the probative value of the evidence. The issue to issues
be resolved must be limited to determining what the law is * supported by courts reasoning explaining and
on a certain set of facts. Once the issue invites a review of supporting the courts decision
the evidence, the question posed is one of fact.
A. Synthesizing Cases process of relating the cases to
The factual findings of the trial court, especially when each other. By this process, we can understand the
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on the Court. applicable area of law and then use the synthesis to
The exceptions to this rule are (1) when there is grave abuse analyze the proble
of discretion; (2) when the findings are grounded on
speculations; (3) when the inference made is manifestly 1. Understand the applicable area of law
mistaken; (4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
2. Use the synthesis to analyze the problem
based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the factual
findings are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals went 3. Synthesizing is the step between your research and your
beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to writing
the admissions of the parties; (7) when the Court of Appeals
overlooked undisputed facts which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion; (8) when the findings
of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial
court; (9) when the facts set forth by the petitioner are not
disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of
the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of
evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.
After a careful review of the records, the Court finds that
none of these circumstances is present.

H. Reading a case

Case Briefing process of digesting or the condensation of

a reported case. There is no one correct form for a case
brief since it is a document that is created to meet the
students needs. The typical components of a case brief are:

1. Facts describe the events between the parties leading

to the litigation and tell how the case before the court
that is now deciding it. Include those facts that are
relevant to the issue the court must decide and to the
reasons for it decision. You will not know which facts
are relevant until you know what the issue or issues are.

State the plaintiff ad defendant

Basis for plaintiffs suit

Plaintiffs relief

Include the ruling of the Lower Court and Court of

Appeals

2. Issue(s) question that the court must decide to resolve

the dispute between the parties in the case before it.

Identify the rule of law that governs the dispute and

ask how it should apply to those facts

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