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FACTS: This case originated from a complaint filed by Agao against petitioner for
illegal dismissal, violation of P.D. No. 851, and non-payment of five days SIL. Private
respondent had been employed as a bodegero or ships quartermaster. He
complained that he had been constructively dismissed by petitioner when the latter
refused him assignments aboard its boats. Private respondent alleged that he had been
sick and thus allowed to go on leave without pay for one month but that when he
reported to work at the end of such period with a health clearance, he was told to come
back another time as he could not be reinstated immediately. Thereafter, petitioner
refused to give him work.
Petitioner, on the other hand, alleged that it was private respondent who actually
abandoned his work. It claimed that the latter failed to report for work after his leave
had expired and was, in fact, absent without leave for three months .
Labor Arbiter Amansec rendered a decision ordering respondents to
reinstatecomplainant with backwages, pay him his 13th month pay and incentive leave
pay.
Petitioner appealed to the NLRC which dismissed the appeal for lack of merit. The
NLRC dismissed petitioners claim that it cannot be held liable for SIL pay by fishermen
in its employ as the latter supposedly are field personnel and thus not entitled to
such pay under the Labor Code.
ISSUE:is Agao a field employee, hence not entitled to SIL pay?
HELD:WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED
NO; Agao is NOT a field employee, he is entitled to SIL pay
PRANGAN v NLRC
Private respondent, a corporation engaged in providing security services to its
client, hired petitioner on November 4, 1980 as one of its security guards.Thereafter, he
was assigned to the Cat House Bar and Restaurant with a monthly salary ofP2,000.00
until its closure on August 31, 1993.
On May 4, 1994, petitioner filed a complaint[1] against private respondent for
underpayment of wages, non-payment of salary from August 16-31, 1993, overtime pay,
premium pay for holiday, rest day, night shift differential, uniform allowance, service
incentive leave pay and 13th month pay from the year 1990 to 1993.
Private respondent, in its position paper,[2] rejected petitioners claim alleging it
merely acted as an agent of the latter in securing his employment at the Cat House Bar
and Restaurant.Thus, the liability for the claims of the petitioner should be charged to
Cat House Bar and its owner, being his direct employer.
In resolving the dispute in a decision dated May 31, 1995,[3] the Labor Arbiter
brushed aside the private respondents contention that it was merely an agent of the
petitioner and concluded:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, respondents MASAGANA
SECURITY SERVICE CORPORATION and/or VICTOR C. PADILLA are hereby
ORDERED to pay within ten (10) days from receipt hereof herein complainant
EDUARDO B. PRANGAN, the total sum of Nine Thousand Nine Hundred
Thirty Two Pesos & Sixteen Centavos (P9,932.16) premium pay for holiday and
rest days, night shift differential, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay,
uniform allowance, and unpaid salary.
Complainants other claims as well as respondents counter claim are hereby
DISMISSSED either for the reason of prescription and/or lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Apparently not satisfied with the above-mentioned monetary award, petitioner
appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) contending that the
Labor Arbiter erred in concluding that he only worked for four hours and not twelve
hours a day.Evidently, the shorter work hours resulted in a lower monetary award by
the Labor Arbiter.However, the NLRC dismissed his appeal for failure to file the same
within ten-day reglementary period.[4]
Undaunted, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which, in the interest of
justice, was favorably granted by the NLRC resulting in the reinstatement of his
appeal. Nonetheless, petitioners victory was short-lived as the NLRC eventually
dismissed his appeal for lack of merit,[5]the dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby dismissed for lack of merit and decision is
affirmedin toto.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner is now before us imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondent NLRC (a) declaring that he rendered only four hours and not twelve hours
of work, and (b) affirming the monetary award.
The public respondent, through the Solicitor General, and the private respondent
filed their respective comments on the petition refuting the allegation of the
petitioner.Specifically, they asserted that the decision was supported by ample evidence
showing that petitioner indeed worked for only four hours and not twelve hours a day.
A review of the alleged error raised by the instant petition leads us to conclude that
the same is factual in nature which, as a rule, we do not pass upon.As a general rule, it
is not for us to correct the NLRCs evaluation of the evidence, as our task is confined to
issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.[6]Obviously, however, the same will
not apply where the evidence require a reversal or modification.[7]
As proof of petitioners actual hours of work, private respondent submitted the daily
time records allegedly signed by the petitioner himself showing that he only worked
four hours daily.
In contrast, petitioner argues that these daily time records were falsified for the
simple reason that he was not required to submit one. He further stressed that,
assuming such documents exist, its authenticity and due execution are questionable and
of doubtful source.
We find merit in the petition.
To be sure, findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC, particularly when
they coincide with those of the Labor Arbiter, are accorded with respect even finality if
supported by substantial evidence.[8] In this regard, we have defined substantial
evidence as such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion.[9] Absent such quantum of evidence, the Court is not
precluded from making its own independent evaluation of facts.[10]
In the instant case, there is no dispute that matters concerning an employees actual
hours of work are within the ambit of management prerogative. However, when an
employer alleges that his employee works less than the normal hours of employment as
provided for in the law,[11]he bears the burden of proving his allegation with clear and
satisfactory evidence.
In the instant petition, the NLRC, in declaring that petitioner only worked for four
hours, relied solely on the supposed daily time records of the petitioner submitted by
the private respondent.[12]We, however, are of the opinion that these documents cannot
be considered substantial evidence as to conclude that petitioner only worked for four
hours. It is worth mentioning that petitioner, in his Sur-Rejoinder to Respondents
Rejoinder,[13]unequivocably stated that:
Complainant (petitioner herein) never made nor submitted any daily time
record with respondent company considering the fact that he was assigned to a
single post and that the daily time records he allegedly submitted with
respondent company are all falsified and his signature appearing therein forged.
Private respondent hardly bothered to controvert petitioners assertion, much less
bolster its own contention. As petitioners employer, private respondent has unlimited
access to all relevant documents and records on the hours of work of the petitioner.Yet,
even as it insists that petitioner only worked for four hours and not twelve, no
employment contract, payroll, notice of assignment or posting, cash voucher or any
other convincing evidence which may attest to the actual hours of work of the petitioner
were even presented. Instead, what the private respondent offered as evidence were
only petitioners daily time record, which the latter categorically denied ever
accomplishing, much less signing.
In said alleged daily time record, it showed that petitioner started work at 10:00
p.m. and would invariably leave his post at exactly 2:00 a.m.Obviously, such unvarying
recording of a daily time record is improbable and contrary to human experience.It is
impossible for an employee to arrive at the workplace and leave at exactly the same
time, day in day out. The very uniformity and regularity of the entries are badges of
untruthfulness and as such indices of dubiety.[14]
Another consideration which militates against private respondents claim is the fact
that in the personnel data sheet of the petitioner,[15] duly signed by the formers
operation manager, it shows on its face that the latters hours of work are from 7:00 p.m.
to 7:00 a.m. or twelve hours a day.Hence, private respondent is estopped from assailing
the contents of its own documents.
Further, the attendance sheets of Cat House Bar and Restaurant[16] showed that
petitioner worked from 7:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. daily, documents which were never
repudiated by the private respondent.
All told, private respondent has not adequately proved that petitioners actual hours
of work is only four hours. Its unexplained silence contravening the personnel data
sheet and the attendance sheets of Cat House Bar and Restaurant presented by the
petitioner showing he worked for twelve hours, has assumed the character of an
admission. No reason was proffered for this silence despite private respondent, being
the employer, could have easily done so.
As is well-settled, if doubts exist between the evidence presented by the employer
and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the employee.Since it is
a time-honored rule that in controversies between a laborer and his master, doubts
reasonably arising from the evidence, or in the interpretation of agreements and
writings should be resolved in the formers favor.[17]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby
GRANTED. Accordingly, the decision of the NLRC dated July 31, 1996 is hereby
VACATED. Whatever money claims due to the petitioner shall be computed on the
basis of a twelve-hour daily work schedule. For this purpose, the case is hereby
REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter for immediate recomputation of said claims in
accordance with the foregoing findings.No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners filed a complaint for Illegal Dismissal before the DOLE and later a complaint
for Unfair Labor Practice (ULP), both cases eventually consolidated. The labor arbiter
ordered the parties to submit their respective memorandum but instead of doing this,
the Union filed an Appeal Memorandum with a petition for injunction and/or a TRO
before the NLRC. The labor arbiter later dismissed the case for lack of merit. It found
the lockout valid and legal, and justified by the incidents of continued work slowdown,
mass absences, and consistent low production output, high rate of waste and scrap tires
and machine breakdown. It also considered the mass termination of all the employees
valid as an authorized termination of employment due to closure of the establishment,
the company having complied with due process.
Petitioners appealed the labor arbiters Decision to the NLRC which was also dismissed
for lack of merit. It also ruled that that the labor arbiter could not have lost jurisdiction
over the case when petitioners appealed the formers order since the order was
interlocutory in nature and cannot be appealed separately. In the Court of Appeals, the
petition was similarly denied.
Petitioners reiterate that they were denied due process when they were dismissed right
on the day they were handed down their termination letters, without the benefit of the
thirty (30)-day notice as required by law, and invoke the Courts ruling in Serrano v.
NLRC; that the labor arbiter had lost jurisdiction over the issue when have already
perfected their appeal to the NLRC; and that labor arbiter deprived petitioners of the
chance to present their evidence during the formal trial.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not the labor arbiter has lost jurisdiction over the Unions petition due to
the appeal on the labor arbiters order that the Union filed before the NLRC?
2. Whether or not petitioners were deprived by the labor arbiter of the right to a
presentation of evidence in a formal trial?
3. Whether or not petitioners were illegally dismissed due to lack of due process and
also as a consequence of an illegal lockout?
HELD
Petition DENIED. Decision affirmed as the labor arbiter never lost its jurisdiction to
decide on the case and has decided the case without grave abuse of discretion. The
Court gives due credence to the factual findings of the labor arbiter and NLRC.
The order by the labor arbiter to the parties to submit their respective memorandum is
in the nature of an interlocutory order. An interlocutory order is not appealable until
after the rendition of the judgment on the merits for a contrary rule would delay the
administration of justice and unduly burden the courts. Nor could the Court finds any
grave abuse of discretion on the labor arbiters part. For one, the holding of an
adversarial trial is discretionary on the labor arbiter and the parties cannot demand it as
a matter of right. The New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC grants the labor arbiter
wide latitude to determine, after the submission by the parties of their position papers/
memoranda, if there is need for a formal trial or hearing.
Petitioners argument that had the labor arbiter allowed respondents to present their
evidence during the formal trial, the Decision would have been different, cannot be
sustained. As previously stated, the labor arbiter enjoys wide discretion in determining
whether there is a need for a formal hearing in a given case, and he or she may use all
reasonable means to ascertain the facts of each case without regard to technicalities.
When the parties submitted their position papers and other pertinent pleadings to the
labor arbiter, it is understood / given /deemed that they have included therein all the
pieces of evidence needed to establish their respective cases. A formal hearing is not
compulsory in consonance with the need for speedy disposition of labor cases. If it were
necessary, the parties may then willfully withhold their evidence and disclose the same
only during the formal hearing, thus creating surprises which could merely complicate
the issues and prolong the trial. There is a dire need to lessen technicalities in the
process of settling labor disputes.
Well-settled is the rule that hearings and resolutions of labor disputes are not governed
by the strict and technical rules of evidence and procedure observed in the regular
courts of law. Technical rules of procedure are not applicable in labor cases, but may
apply only by analogy or in a suppletory character, for instance, when there is a need to
attain substantial justice and an expeditious, practical and convenient solution to a labor
problem.
Petitioners claim that the alleged failure of the company to notify them of their
termination renders their dismissal illegal, and thus they should be reinstated and paid
with full backwages or given separation pay, following the Courts ruling in Serrano v.
Court of Appeals. The argument does not hold. The ruling in Serrano has already been
superseded by the case of Agabon v. National Labor Relation Commission. The Agabon
enunciates the new doctrine that if the dismissal is for just cause but statutory due
process was not observed, the dismissal should be upheld. While the procedural
infirmity cannot be cured, it should not invalidate the dismissal. However, the employer
should be held liable for non-compliance with the procedural requirements of due
process.
But in any case, the issue of illegal dismissal had already been resolved by the NLRC
and the Court of Appeals, which both found that the company had an authorized cause
and had complied with the requirements of due process when it dismissed petitioners.
PAL v DR FABROS
Petitioner Philippine Airlines, Inc. assails the decision of the National Labor
Relations Commission dismissing its appeal from the decision of Labor Arbiter
Romulus S. Protacio which declared the suspension of private respondent Dr. Herminio
A. Fabros illegal and ordered petitioner to pay private respondent the amount
equivalent to all the benefits he should have received during his period of suspension
plusP500,000.00 moral damages.
The facts are as follow:
Private respondent was employed as flight surgeon at petitioner company.He was
assigned at the PAL Medical Clinic at Nichols and was on duty from 4:00 in the
afternoon until 12:00 midnight.
On February 17, 1994, at around 7:00 in the evening, private respondent left the
clinic to have his dinner at his residence, which was about five-minute drive away. A
few minutes later, the clinic received an emergency call from the PAL Cargo
Services. One of its employees, Mr. Manuel Acosta, had suffered a heart attack. The
nurse on duty, Mr. Merlino Eusebio, called private respondent at home to inform him of
the emergency.The patient arrived at the clinic at 7:50 in the evening and Mr. Eusebio
immediately rushed him to the hospital.When private respondent reached the clinic at
around 7:51 in the evening, Mr. Eusebio had already left with the patient. Mr. Acosta
died the following day.
Upon learning about the incident, PAL Medical Director Dr. Godofredo B. Banzon
ordered the Chief Flight Surgeon to conduct an investigation.The Chief Flight Surgeon,
in turn, required private respondent to explain why no disciplinary sanction should be
taken against him.
In his explanation, private respondent asserted that he was entitled to a thirty-
minute meal break; that he immediately left his residence upon being informed by Mr.
Eusebio about the emergency and he arrived at the clinic a few minutes later;that Mr.
Eusebio panicked and brought the patient to the hospital without waiting for him.
Finding private respondents explanation unacceptable, the management charged
private respondent with abandonment of post while on duty.He was given ten days to
submit a written answer to the administrative charge.
In his answer, private respondent reiterated the assertions in his previous
explanation. He further denied that he abandoned his post on February 17, 1994. He
said that he only left the clinic to have his dinner at home. In fact, he returned to the
clinic at 7:51 in the evening upon being informed of the emergency.
After evaluating the charge as well as the answer of private respondent, petitioner
company decided to suspend private respondent for three months effective December
16, 1994.
Private respondent filed a complaint for illegal suspension against petitioner.
On July 16, 1996, Labor Arbiter Romulus A. Protasio rendered a decision[1]declaring
the suspension of private respondent illegal. It also ordered petitioner to pay private
respondent the amount equivalent to all the benefits he should have received during his
period of suspension plus P500,000.00 moral damages. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the
suspension of complainant as illegal, and ordering the respondents the restitution to the
complainant of all employment benefits equivalent to his period of suspension, and the
payment to the complainant ofP500,000.00 by way of moral damages.[2]
Petitioner appealed to the NLRC. The NLRC, however, dismissed the appeal after
finding that the decision of the Labor Arbiter is supported by the facts on record and the
law on the matter.[3]The NLRC likewise denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
[4]
and convincing evidence for the law always presumes good faith.[8]
In the case at bar, there is no showing that the management of petitioner company
was moved by some evil motive in suspending private respondent. It suspended
private respondent on an honest,albeiterroneous, belief that private respondents act of
leaving the company premises to take his meal at home constituted abandonment of
post which warrants the penalty of suspension. Also, it is evident from the facts that
petitioner gave private respondent all the opportunity to refute the charge against him
and to defend himself. These negate the existence of bad faith on the part of
petitioner.Under the circumstances, we hold that private respondent is not entitled to
moral damages.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The portion of the
assailed decision awarding moral damages to private respondent is DELETED. All
other aspects of the decision are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
LAMBO v NLRC
FACTS: Lambo and Belocura were employed as tailors by J.C. Tailor Shop and/or
Johnny Co in 1985. As in the case of the other 100 employees of private respondents,
petitioners were paid on a piece-work basis, according to the style of suits they made.
In 1989, petitioners filed a complaint against private respondents for illegal dismissal
and sought recovery of overtime pay, holiday pay, premium pay on holiday and rest
day, SIL pay, separation pay, 13th month pay, and attorneys fees.
After hearing,LA Gutierrez found private respondents guilty of illegal dismissaland
accordingly ordered them to pay petitioners claims.
On appeal, theNLRC reversed the decision of the LA. It found that petitioners had not
been dismissed from employment but merely threatened with a closure of the business
if they insisted on their demand for a straight payment of their minimum wage, after
petitioners, in 1989, walked out of a meeting with private respondents and other
employees. According to the NLRC, during that meeting, the employees voted to
maintain the company policy of paying them according to the volume of work finished.
Only petitioners allegedly insisted that they be paid the minimum wage and other
benefits.The NLRC held petitioners guilty of abandonment of workand accordingly
dismissed their claims except that for 13th month pay. Petitioners deny that they
abandoned their work.
ISSUE:Are Lambo and Belocura regular employees?
HELD: WHEREFORE, the decision of the nlrcis SET ASIDE and another one is
RENDERED ordering private respondents to pay petitioners the total amount of
P181,102.40, as computed [by the LA]
YES
ARICA v NLRC
FACTS: This case stemmed from a complaint filed against private respondent Stanfilco
for assembly time, moral damages and attorneys fees, with the Regional Arbitration-
Davao City. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of private respondent
STANFILCO, holding that:
We cannot but agree with respondent that the pronouncement in that earlier case, i.e. the
thirty-minute assembly time long practiced cannot be considered waiting time orwork time and,
therefore, not compensable, has become the law of the case which can no longer be disturbed
without doing violence to the time-honored principle of resjudicata.
NLRC uphold the Labor Arbiters decision and declared that:
Surely, the customary functions referred to in the above-quoted provision of the agreement
includes the long-standing practice and institutionalized non-compensableassembly time. This,
in effect, estopped complainants from pursuing this case.
MR was denied hence this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioners contend that the
preliminary activities as workers of respondents STANFILCO in the assembly area is
compensable as working time (from 5:30am to 6:00 am) since these preliminary
activities are necessarily and primarily for private respondents benefit. These
preliminary activities of the workers are as follows-.
(a) First there is the roll call. Followed by getting their individual work assignments
from the foreman.
(b) Then, they are individually required to accomplish the Laborers Daily
Accomplishment Report during which they are often made to explain about their
reported accomplishment the following day.
(c) Then they go to the stockroom to get the working materials, tools and equipment.
(d) Lastly, they travel to the field bringing with them their tools, equipment and
materials.
All these activities take 30 minutes to accomplish.
.Respondent avers that the instant complaint is not new because it is the very same
claim they brought against respondent by the same group of rank and file employees in
the case of Arica vs. National Labor Relations Commission which was filed before in a
different case. The said case involved a claim for waiting time, as the complainants
purportedly were required to assemble.
In the previous case, the 30-minute assembly time long practiced and institutionalized
by mutual consent of the parties under their CBA cannot be considered as waiting time
within the purview of Section 5, Rule 1, Book III of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Labor.
ISSUE:
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision dismissing the money claims. Respondents filed
an appeal with the NLRC where it granted the money claims of Ofialda, Morente and
Allaguian. Petitioners appealed with the CA but it was denied. It said that the company
having claimed of exemption of the coverage of the minimum wage shall have the
burden of proof to the claim.
In the present petition, the Petitioners insist that C. Planas Commercial is a retail
establishment principally engaged in the sale of plastic products and fruits to the
customers for personal use, thus exempted from the application of the minimum wage
law; that it merely leases and occupies a stall in the Divisoria Market and the level of its
business activity requires and sustains only less than ten employees at a time.
Petitioners contend that private respondents were paid over and above the minimum
wage required for a retail establishment, thus the Labor Arbiter is correct in ruling that
private respondents claim for underpayment has no factual and legal basis. Petitioners
claim that since private respondents alleged that petitioners employed 24 workers, it
was incumbent upon them to prove such allegation which private respondents failed to
do.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is exempted from the application of minimum wage
law.
Ruling: The contention of the petitioners that they are exempted by the law must be
proven. The petitioners have not successfully shown that they had applied for the
exemption.
R.A. No. 6727 known as the Wage Rationalization Act provides for the statutory
minimum wage rate of all workers and employees in the private sector. Section 4 of the
Act provides for exemption from the coverage, thus: Sec. 4. (c) Exempted from the
provisions of this Act are household or domestic helpers and persons employed in the
personal service of another, including family drivers. Also, retail/service establishments
regularly employing not more than ten (10) workers may be exempted from the
applicability of this Act upon application with and as determined by the appropriate
Regional Board in accordance with the applicable rules and regulations issued by the
Commission. Whenever an application for exemption has been duly filed with the
appropriate Regional Board, action on any complaint for alleged non-compliance with
this Act shall be deferred pending resolution of the application for exemption by the
appropriate Regional Board.
In the event that applications for exemptions are not granted, employees shall receive
the appropriate compensation due them as provided for by this Act plus interest of one
percent (1%) per month retroactive to the effectivity of this Act.
ROCHE v NLRC
This is a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to nullify the 14
August 1995 Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission which affirmed with
modification the Decision of Labor Arbiter Eduardo J. Carpio. The Labor Arbiter held
that private respondents were illegally constructively dismissed and ordered petitioners
to reinstate them and pay them back wages as well as their proportionate 13th month
pay, service incentive leave pay and salary differentials.The NLRC set aside the award
of incentive leave pay.
Petitioners Eduardo Dayot and Susan Dayot were President and Vice President,
respectively, of their co-petitioner Mark Roche International (MRI), a corporation
organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, engaged in the garments
business. Private respondents Eileen Rufon, Lilia Briones, Beatriz Managaytay, Delia
Arellano, Anita Marcelo, Rio Mariano, Marissa Sadili, Wilma Patacay, Estella Mallari,
Delia Laroya and Divina Villarba were employed as sewers of MRI with lengths of
service varying from three (3) to nine (9) years.
On different dates private respondents filed separate complaints for underpayment
of wages and non-payment of overtime pay against petitioners MRI, Eduardo Dayot
and Susan Dayot.Private respondents alleged that they usually worked eleven (11) to
twelve (12) hours daily, except on Mondays during which they worked eight (8) hours,
and were paid wages on a piece-rate basis amounting to P450.00 to P600.00 per
week.They likewise asserted that sometime in 1992 they were unable to avail of their
SSS benefits, e.g., salary loan, sickness benefits and maternity benefits because, as they
found out, the company did not remit their contributions to the SSS.
On 11 October 1992 private respondents sought the assistance of a labor
organization which helped them organize the Mark Roche Workers Union (MRWU).On
14 October 1992 they registered the union with the Department of Labor and
Employment - National Capital Region (DOLE-NCR) and on the same date filed a
Petition for Certification Election before the Med-Arbitration Board.
On 27 October 1992 petitioners received a notice of hearing of the
petition. Apparently irked by the idea of a union within the company, petitioners
ordered private respondents to withdraw the petition and further threatened them that
should they insist in the organization of a union they would be dismissed. Unfazed,
private respondents refused. As expected, on 29 October 1992 they were discharged
from work.
On 30 October 1992 private respondents amended their earlier complaints to
include as additional causes of action their illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice, non-
payment of 13th month pay, underpayment for legal holidays, and for damages.
Petitioners countered that private respondents were not dismissed from work but
voluntarily abandoned their jobs thereby paralyzing company operations. Petitioners
likewise contended that private respondents incurred numerous absences without prior
notice and clearance from their superiors as evidenced by several company memos sent
to them. Only Divina Villarba showed up and told petitioners that she was voluntary
resigning because she had found better employment elsewhere. It was only later that
petitioners learned that private respondents absences were due to their preoccupation
with the organization of a labor union. Notwithstanding these absences, petitioners
expressed their willingness to reinstate private respondents within a reasonable
time. They however disclaimed knowledge of any deficiency owing to private
respondents since all the benefits due them as required by law were fully paid, except
overtime pay which they were not entitled to on account of their being piece-rate
workers.
On 3 March 1993 the Labor Arbiter rendered his decision declaring as illegal the
constructive dismissal of private respondents. Petitioners were thus ordered to
immediately reinstate private respondents as sewers and to pay each of them his (a)
back wages computed from 29 October 1992 to 31 March 1993 in the amount
ofP15,524.08 subject to adjustments until reinstated but not to exceed three (3) years; (b)
proportionate share in the 13th month pay for the period January to October 1992 in the
amount ofP2,538.77; unpaid five (5) days service incentive leave pay for 1989, 1990 and
1991 in the amount ofP1,565.00; and, (c) wage differentials in the amount ofP24,707.38.
On appeal the NLRC affirmed the reinstatement of private respondents and the
payment of back wages, salary differentials and proportionate 13th month pay but set
aside the award of service incentive leave pay on the ground that private respondents
were not entitled thereto as they were piece-rate workers. Petitioners moved for
reconsideration but was denied for lack of merit.
Petitioners now contend that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in sustaining the Labor Arbiter by declaring
private respondents as having been constructively dismissed from their jobs, hence,
illegal. On the contrary, they argue that private respondents voluntarily abandoned
their jobs without justifiable reason nor prior notice. The NLRC disregarded the
company memos addressed to each of the private respondents which were indicative of
their intention to leave the company and showed their propensity to incur frequent
absences in violation of company rules and regulations.
Abandonment, as a just and valid ground for dismissal, means the deliberate and
unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his employment.The burden of proof is on
the employer to show an unequivocal intent on the part of the employee to discontinue
employment. The intent cannot be lightly inferred or legally presumed from certain
ambivalent acts. There must be a concurrence of both the intention to abandon and
some overt act from which it can be deducted that the employee has no more intention
to resume his work.[1]
These are not obtaining in the instant case. No overt act was established by
petitioners from which to infer the clear intention of private respondents to desist from
their employment.The company memos submitted by petitioner could not be the basis
of such intention since they referred to absences incurred by private respondents long
before their dismissal. The lack of proximity of those absences to the actual dismissal
rendered them unreliable, even worthless.Moreover, as correctly found by the NLRC, it
was unlikely that private respondents had abandoned their jobs considering their
lengths of service in the company and the difficulty in finding similar employment.In
addition, if they had truly forsaken their jobs, they would not have bothered to file a
complaint for constructive dismissal against petitioners immediately after they were
dismissed and prayed for their reinstatement.An employee who forthwith takes steps
to protest his layoff cannot by any logic be said to have abandoned his work.[2]On the
contrary, there is ample proof showing that private respondents were dismissed from
their jobs for their refusal to withdraw their petition for certification election filed before
the DOLE.
However, it must be made clear here that the dismissal of private respondents was
not a constructive dismissal but an illegal dismissal, and this is where both the NLRC
and the Labor Arbiter erred.Constructive dismissal or a constructive discharge has been
defined as a quitting because continued employment is rendered impossible,
unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion in rank and a diminution in
pay.[3]In the instant case, private respondents were not demoted in rank nor their pay
diminished considerably. They were simply told without prior warning or notice that
there was no more work for them.After receiving the notice of hearing of the petition
for certification election on 27 October 1992, petitioners immediately told private
respondents that they were no longer employed. Evidently it was the filing of the
petition for certification election and organization of a union within the company which
led petitioners to dismiss private respondents and not petitioners' allegations of absence
or abandonment by private respondents.The formation of a labor union has never been
a ground for valid termination, and where there is an absence of clear, valid and legal
cause, the law considers the termination illegal.[4]
Petitioners likewise contend that the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in
granting private respondents reinstatement with payment of back wages. They argue
that reinstatement can no longer be effected in view of the lapse of a considerable
period of time from the dismissal of private respondents in October 1992 to the time the
order for reinstatement was released.As for the award of back wages, they assert that it
is capricious and arbitrary since it only encourages indolence and promotes enrichment
of private respondents at the expense of petitioners.
The award of reinstatement and back wages belongs to an illegally dismissed
employee by direct provision of law and cannot be defeated by mere allegations of
inconvenience, inconceivability or implausibility. Article 279 of the Labor Code
provides that an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to reinstatement without loss
of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full back wages from the time his
compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.Back
wages are granted on grounds of equity for earnings which a worker or employee has
lost due to his illegal dismissal.[5] Petitioners are however given the alternative of
paying separation pay to illegally dismissed employees where reinstatement is no
longer possible.
Petitioners further aver that the NLRC likewise abused its discretion when it
affirmed the Labor Arbiters ruling that private respondents were not paid their money
claims.They insist that they have already paid private respondents all the amounts and
benefits due them and that had the Labor Arbiter conducted trial on the merits, they
could have presented documents proving their claim to be true.
The decision of the Labor Arbiter not to schedule the case for another hearing could
not be considered arbitrary. The holding of a hearing is discretionary with the Labor
Arbiter and is something which the parties cannot demand as a matter of right.[6]It is
entirely within the bounds of the Labor Arbiters authority to decide a case based on
mere position papers and supporting documents without a formal trial or hearing.The
requirements of due process are satisfied when the parties are given the opportunity to
submit position papers wherein they are supposed to attach all the documents that
would prove their claim in case it be decided that no hearing should be conducted or
was necessary.
In case of employees money claims, the employer bears the burden to prove that
employees have received their wages and benefits and that the same were paid in
accordance with law. It is incumbent upon the employer to present the necessary
documents to prove such claims. In their position paper, petitioners failed to present
necessary documentary evidence to substantiate their allegation that private
respondents money claims were fully paid. They cannot use the absence of trial as an
excuse for their failure as they could have presented documentary evidence at any time
before the Labor Arbiter and, on appeal, before the NLRC. Hence, they cannot at this
late stage bewail that they were not afforded due process.
Finally, as correctly held by the NLRC, private respondents as piece-rate employees
are not entitled to service incentive leave pay as well as holiday pay even if they are
entitled to other benefits like COLA and 13th month pay. Service incentive leave pay
shall not apply to employees whose performance is unsupervised by the employer,
including those who are paid in a fixed amount for performing work irrespective of the
time consumed in the performance thereof.[7]
WHEREFORE, this Court finds that private respondents Eileen Rufon, Lilia
Briones, Beatriz Managaytay, Delia Arellano, Anita Marcelo, Rio Mariano, Marissa
Sadili, Wilma Patacay, Estrella Mallari, Delia Laroya and Divina Villarba were illegally
dismissed - not merely illegally constructively dismissed - by petitioners Mark Roche
International and/or Eduardo Dayot and Susan Dayot, and to this extent, the assailed
Decision of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission affirming that of
the Labor Arbiter, is MODIFIED. However, it is AFFIRMED insofar as it ordered the
reinstatement of private respondents with back wages, salary differentials and 13th
month pay.The service incentive leave pay awarded by the Labor Arbier but deleted by
the National Labor Relations Commission is likewise DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
MALABAGO v NLRC
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
79225 which modified the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
in NLRC Case No. V-000580-2000.The NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter
dismissing the complaint for illegal dismissal filed by
petitioner Loida V. Malabago against private respondent Pacifica Agrivet Supplies,
Inc.Oncertioraribefore the Court of Appeals, the appellate court affirmed the dismissal
of the complaint but ordered private respondent to grant separation pay to petitioner as
financial assistance.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner made a partial payment onNovember 15, 1999.She paid only for the CBM-
Vitarich and Vetracin, and told Doit that she would settle the balance on December 8,
1999, upon the release of their 13thmonth pay.
OnNovember 19, 1999, petitioner again took one (1) bag of BFC-Vitarich.She instructed
the store utility man to inform Doit about the matter as the latter was off duty at the
time.
OnNovember 20, 1999,Doitand utility man AllanBaldezamade a written report[1]to
Ms.NimfaBuenafe, Area Manager,Leyte, regarding petitioners act of taking out stocks
without issuing cash slips or sales invoices.They also reported that petitioner paid only
a fraction of her debt at a later date using the cost price and not the selling price, and
that petitioner overpriced the items sold to customers to offset the items taken out
without cash slips or sales invoices.
Acting on the report, the Area Manager issued a memorandum dated November 23,
1999directing petitioner to explain why she did not make the proper documentation for
the items that she took from the stores stock. The memorandum also stated that
releasing stocks without any cash slip or charge invoice is a Type D offense under the
company policy, punishable with dismissal.[2]
Petitioner submitted her explanation on the same date. She admitted the allegations
in Doits and Baldezas report. She however argued that only releasing stocks to
customers without charge slip or sales invoice is considered as Type D offense under
their company policy. The act is not punishable if the items are released to the
companys employees like herself. She also highlighted the fact that she always
informed her co-workers every time that she took out items from the store to show her
good faith.[3]
TO:LOIDA MALABAGO
FROM:AREA MANAGER / OFFICE OF THE AVP
SUBJECT:SUSPENSION
It was noted that you have done a very grievous offense by releasing
stocks without proper documentation. I think you are fully aware that
disciplinary action of this offense is DISMISSAL.
You are hereby suspended for fifteen (15) days effective today,November
24, 1999toDecember 8, 1999without pay.
Further evaluation of this case shall be done during your suspension
period.
Please report directly to the undersigned, your Area Manager, after
expiration of your suspension period which will be on December 9,
1999for further review and discussion.
(sgd) MA. NIMFA BUENAFENoted by:
AREA MANAGER(sgd) ISABEL R. BUNAC
EasternVisayasLeyteAsst. Vice-President
On November 29, 1999, petitioner received another memorandum from the Area
Manager advising her to report to the Cebu Main Office on December 3, 1999 in
connection with the ongoing investigation of her case.[5]
The Labor Arbiter, in a decision datedMarch 30, 2000, dismissed the complaint for lack
of merit.[10]
Petitioner appealed to the NLRC.The Commission, however, dismissed the appeal and
affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter.[11] It likewise denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.[12]
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, again raising the
same arguments.
The Court of Appeals upheld the validity of petitioners dismissal on the ground of
violation of a company policy, which violation is punishable by dismissal under the
employees manual. It, however, found appropriate the award of separation pay to
petitioner as financial assistance.[13]
Petitioner filed a petition for review before this Court on the following grounds:
1.The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that there exists a valid
ground to terminate petitioners employment;
2.The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that private respondent
has observed procedural due process;and
3.The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not awarding overtime fee to
the petitioner in addition to the other monetary awards as a
consequence of the illegal dismissal.[14]
Private respondent, meanwhile, filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision
of the Court of Appeals.It sought to set aside the award of separation pay to petitioner.
[15]
The Court of Appeals did not rule on the motion for reconsideration in view of
this Courts resolution giving due course to the petition at bar. It instead elevated the
records of the case to this Court.[16]
Hence, the issues that need to be resolved in this case are:
Thus, we find that the Court of Appeals did not err in rendering its assailed
decision.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals isAFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Rule of Law:Article 287 of the Labor Code provides that "In the absence of a retirement
plan or agreement providing for retirement benefits of employees in the establishment,
an employee x x x may retire and shall be entitled to retirement pay equivalent to at
least one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of service."
Facts:Pedro Latag (P) was a regular employee of La Mallorca Taxi since 1961. When La
Mallorca closed down, Latag (P) transferred to R&E Transport (P). As a taxi driver,
Latag (P) received an average daily salary of five hundred pesos.
Latag (P) got sick in 1995 and was forced to apply for partial disability with the SSS,
which was granted. When he recovered, he reported for work in 1998 but was no longer
allowed to continue working due to old age.
Latag (P) thus asked R&E Transport (D) for his retirement pay pursuant to Republic Act
7641, but he was ignored. Thus, Latag filed a case for payment of his retirement pay
before the NLRC.
The labor arbiter credited Latag (P) with 37 years of service for La Mallorca and R&E
Transport (D). This was reversed by the NLRC and credited Latag (P) with only 14 years
of service at R&E Transport (D). However, before the NLRC decision, Latag's (P) widow
accepted a part of the retirement pay and signed a quitclaim or waiver.
Later on appeal, the appellate court upheld the finding of the labor arbiter.
Ruling: Yes. Latag (P) was credited with 14 years of service with R&E Transport (D)
pursuant Article 287 of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7641,
provides:
Unless the parties provide for broader inclusions, the term one half-month salary shall
mean fifteen (15) days plus one-twelfth (1/12) of the 13th month pay and the cash
equivalent of not more than five (5) days of service incentive leaves.
As to the Quitclaim and Waiver signed by Latag's (P) widow, the appellate court
committed no error when it ruled that the document was invalid and could not bar
Latag (P) from demanding the benefits legally due.
Petitioner contends that there is no provision in the Labor Code, or the omnibus rules
implementing the same, which either provides for the "third-party liability" of an
employment agency or recruiting entity for violations of an employment agreement
performed abroad, or designates it as the agent of the foreign-based employer for
purposes of enforcing against the latter claims arising out of an employment agreement.
Therefore, petitioner concludes, it cannot be held jointly and severally liable with
ZAMEL for violations, if any, of private respondent's service agreement.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner as a private employment agency may be held jointly
and severally liable with the foreign-based employer for any claim which may arise in
connection with the implementation of the employment contracts of the employees
recruited and deployed abroad.
Held: Yes, Petitioner conveniently overlooks the fact that it had voluntarily assumed
solidary liability under the various contractual undertakings it submitted to the Bureau
of Employment Services. In applying for its license to operate a private employment
agency for overseas recruitment and placement, petitioner was required to submit,
among others, a document or verified undertaking whereby it assumed all
responsibilities for the proper use of its license and the implementation of the contracts
of employment with the workers it recruited and deployed for overseas employment. It
was also required to file with the Bureau a formal appointment or agency contract
executed by the foreign-based employer in its favor to recruit and hire personnel for the
former, which contained a provision empowering it to sue and be sued jointly and
solidarily with the foreign principal for any of the violations of the recruitment
agreement and the contracts of employment. Petitioner was required as well to post
such cash and surety bonds as determined by the Secretary of Labor to guarantee
compliance with prescribed recruitment procedures, rules and regulations, and terms
and conditions of employment as appropriate.
These contractual undertakings constitute the legal basis for holding petitioner, and
other private employment or recruitment agencies, liable jointly and severally with its
principal, the foreign-based employer, for all claims filed by recruited workers which
may arise in connection with the implementation of the service agreements or
employment contracts.
PEOPLE v CHOWDURY
Facts:Bulu Chowdury was charged with the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale
by recruiting Estrella B. Calleja, Melvin C. Miranda and Aser S. Sasis for employment in
Korea. Evidence shows that accused appellant interviewed private complainant in
1994 at Craftrades office. At that time, he was an interviewer of Craftrade which was
operating under temporary authority given by POEA pending the renewal of license.
He was charged based on the fact that he was not registered with the POEA as
employee of Craftrade and he is not in his personal capacity, licensed to recruit overseas
workers. The complainants also averred that during their applications for employment
for abroad, the license of Craftrade was already expired.
For his defense Chowdury testified that he worked as interviewer at Craftrade from
1990 until 1994. His primary duty was to interview job applicants for abroad. As a mere
employee, he only followed the instructions given by his superiors, Mr. Emmanuel
Geslani, the agency's President and General Manager, and Mr. UtkalChowdury, the
agency's Managing Director.
On June 21, 1995, herein appellant Maritess Martinez and her daughter,Jenilyn
Martinez, were charged with seven counts of Estafa before the RTCof Manila.That in or
about and during the period comprised between February 1993and July, 1994, the said
accused, conspiring and confederating together andhelping one another, representing
themselves to have the capacity tocontract, enlist and transport Filipino workers for
employment abroad, didthen and there willfully and unlawfully for a fee recruit and
promiseemployment/job placement abroad without first having secured the
necessarylicense or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment (POEA).
Issue:Whether or not appellant should be convicted even if she merely
assistedcomplainants in their applications with the recruitment agency and there is
noproof that she falsely represented to have the capacity to send complainantsas factory
workers in South Korea?
Held:Yes,In this case, all the four complainants unanimously declared thatappellant
offered and promised them employment abroad. Notwithstandingsaid promises and
payments, they were not able to leave for abroad to work.These testimonies, as well as
the documentary evidence they submittedconsisting of the receipts issued them by the
appellant, all prove that thelatter was engaged in recruitment and placement
activities.Even conceding that appellant merely referred the complainants to JHImperial
Organization Placement Corp., the same still constituted an act of recruitment
In sum, accused-appellant posits that the prosecution did not present a single
evidence to prove that she promised or offered any of the complainants jobs
abroad. Illegal recruitment is committed when two (2) elements concur: 1) that the
offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable one to lawfully
engage in recruitment and placement of workers; and 2) that the offender undertakes
either any activity within the meaning of recruitment and placement defined under
Article 13(b), or any prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34.[3]
Article 13(b), of the Labor Code provides, thus:
(b) Recruitment and placement refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract
services, promising or advertising for employment locally or abroad, whether for profit
or not:Provided, that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for
a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and
placement.
To prove illegal recruitment, it must be shown that the accused-appellant gave
complainants the distinct impression that he had the power or ability to send
complainants abroad for work such that the latter were convinced to part with their
money in order to be employed.[4] To be engaged in the practice of recruitment and
placement, it is plain that there must at least be a promise or offer of an employment
from the person posing as a recruiter whether locally or abroad.
In the case at bar, accused-appellant alleges that she never promised nor offered any
job to the complainants.
We agree.
A perusal of the records reveals that not one of the complainants testified that accused-
appellant lured them to part with their hard-earned money with promises of jobs
abroad. On the contrary, they were all consistent in saying that their relatives abroad
were the ones who contacted them and urged them to meet accused-appellant who
would assist them in processing their travel documents. Accused-appellant did not
have to make promises of employment abroad as these were already done by
complainants relatives.Thus, in the cross-examination of Maria Tolosa de Cardena:
(5) In Criminal Case No. 94-140489 for Illegal Recruitment, accused-appellant Samina
Angeles is ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
Four months had passed when private respondent WPP filed before the Bureau of
Immigration an application for petitioner GALERA to receive a working visa, wherein
she was designated as Vice President of WPP. Petitioner alleged that she was
constrained to sign the application in order that she could remain in the Philippines and
retain her employment.
On December 14, 2000, petitioner GALERA alleged she was verbally notified by private
respondent STEEDMAN that her services had been terminated from private respondent
WPP. A termination letter followed the next day. Thus, a complaint for illegal dismissal
was filed against WPP.
The LA held that WPP, Steedman, Webster, and Lansang liable for illegal dismissal and
damages. Arbiter Madriaga stated that Galera was not only illegally dismissed but was
also not accorded due process. The NLRC reversed the LA decision. The NLRC stressed
that Galera was WPPs Vice-President, and therefore, a corporate officer at the time she
was removed by the Board of Directors. Such being the case, the imperatives of law
require that we hold that the Arbiter below had no jurisdiction over Galeras case as,
again, she was a corporate officer at the time of her removal.
On appeal, the CA reversed the NLRC decision. It ruled that a person could be
considered a "corporate officer" only if appointed as such by a corporations Board of
Directors, or if pursuant to the power given them by either the Articles of Incorporation
or the By-Laws.
ISSUE:
Galera being an employee, then the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have jurisdiction over
the present case.
***
WPPs dismissal of Galera lacked both substantive and procedural due process. Apart
from Steedman's letter dated 15 December 2000 to Galera, WPP failed to prove any just
or authorized cause for Galeras dismissal.
The law further requires that the employer must furnish the worker sought to be
dismissed with two written notices before termination of employment can be legally
effected: (1) notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for
which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the subsequent notice which informs the
employee of the employers decision to dismiss him. Failure to comply with the
requirements taints the dismissal with illegality. WPPs acts clearly show that Galeras
dismissal did not comply with the two-notice rule.
***
The law and the rules are consistent in stating that the employment permit must be
acquired prior to employment. The Labor Code states: "Any alien seeking admission to
the Philippines for employment purposes and any domestic or foreign employer who
desires to engage an alien for employment in the Philippines shall obtain an
employment permit from the Department of Labor."
Galera cannot come to this Court with unclean hands. To grant Galeras prayer is to
sanction the violation of the Philippine labor laws requiring aliens to secure work
permits before their employment. We hold that the status quo must prevail in the
present case and we leave the parties where they are. Hence, Galera is not entitled to
monetary awards. This ruling, however, does not bar Galera from seeking relief from
other jurisdictions.
BREWMASTER v NLRC
This is a special civil action forcertiorariseeking the reversal of the 7 October 1994
decision[1] of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC Case No.
00-06-04136-93 (CA No. L-007370-94), which modified the 11 July 1994 decision[2]of the
Labor Arbiter by directing the reinstatement of private respondent Antonio D. Estrada,
the complainant, without loss of seniority rights and benefits.
Private respondent National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU), a co-
complainant in the labor case, is a labor union of which complainant is a member.
The factual and procedural antecedents are summarized in the decision of the Labor
Arbiter which we quote verbatim:
Complainant was first employed by respondent on 16 September 1991 as route helper
with the latest daily wage of P119.00. From 19 April 1993 up to 19 May 1993, for a
period of one (1) month, complainant went on absent without permission (AWOP).On
20 May 1993, respondent thru Mr. Rodolfo Valentin, sent a Memo to complainant, to
wit:
Please explain in writing within 24 hours of your receipt of this memo why no
disciplinary action should be taken against you for the following offense:
You were absent since April 19, 1993 up to May 19, 1993.
For your strict compliance.
In answer to the aforesaid memo, complainant explained:
Sa dahilan po na ako ay hindi nakapagpaalam sainyo [sic] dahil inuwi ko ang mga anak
ko sa Samar dahil ang asawa ko ay lumayas at walang mag-aalaga sa mga anak
ko. Kaya naman hindi ako naka long distance or telegrama dahil wala akong pera at
ibinili ko ng gamot ay puro utang pa.
Finding said explanation unsatisfactory, on 16 June 1993, respondent thru its Sales
Manager, Mr. Henry A. Chongco issued a Notice of Termination which reads:
We received your letter of explanation dated May 21, 1993 but we regret to inform you
that we do not consider it valid.You are aware of the company Rules and Regulations
that absence without permission for six (6) consecutive working days is considered
abandonment of work.
In view of the foregoing, the company has decided to terminate your employment
effective June 17, 1993 for abandonment of work.
Hence, this complaint.
Complainants contend that individual complainants dismissal was done without just
cause; that it was not sufficiently established that individual complainants absence from
April 19, 1993 to June 16, 1993 are unjustified; that the penalty of dismissal for such
violation is too severe; that in imposing such penalty, respondent should have taken
into consideration complainants length of service and as a first offender, a penalty less
punitive will suffice such as suspension for a definite period, (Position Paper,
complainants).
Upon the other hand, respondent contends that individual complainant was dismissed
for cause allowed by the company Rules and Regulations and the Labor Code; that the
act of complainant in absenting from work for one (1) month without official leave is
deleterious to the business of respondent; that it will result to stoppage of production
which will not only destructive to respondents interests but also to the interest of its
employees in general; that the dismissal of complainant from the service is legal,
(Position Paper, respondent).[3]
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit, citing the principle of
managerial control, which recognizes the employers prerogative to prescribe reasonable
rules and regulations to govern the conduct of his employees.The principle allows the
imposition of disciplinary measures which are necessary for the efficiency of both the
employer and the employees. In complainant's case, he persisted in not reporting for
work until 16 June 1993 notwithstanding his receipt of the memorandum requiring him
to explain his absence without approval.The Labor Arbiter, relying onShoemart, Inc. vs.
NLRC,[4]thus concluded:
Verily, it is crystal clear that individual complainant has indeed abandoned his
work. The filing of the complaint on 25 June 1993 or almost two (2) months from the
date complainant failed to report for work affirms the findings of this Office and
therefore, under the law and jurisprudence which upholds the right of an employer to
discharge an employee who incurs frequent, prolonged and unexplained absences as
being grossly remiss in his duties to the employer and is therefore, dismissed for cause,
(Shoemart, Inc. vs. NLRC, 176 SCRA 385).An employee is deemed to have abandoned
his position or to have resigned from the same, whenever he has been absent therefrom
without previous permission of the employer for three consecutive days or more.This
justification is the obvious harm to employers interest, resulting from [sic] the non-
availability of the workers services, (Supra).(underscoring supplied)[5]
and ruled that complainants termination from his employment was legal, the same with
just or authorized cause and due process.[6]
Complainant appealed to the NLRC, alleging that the immediate filing of a
complaint for illegal dismissal verily indicated that he never intended to abandon his
work, then citedPolicarpio v. Vicente Dy Sun, Jr.,[7]where the NLRC ruled that prolonged
absence does not, by itself, necessarily mean abandonment.Accordingly, there must be
a concurrence of intention and overt acts from which it can be inferred that the
employee is no longer interested in working. Complainant likewise invoked
compassion in the application of sanctions, as dismissal from employment brings
untold hardship and sorrows on the dependents of the wage earners. In his case, a
penalty less punitive than dismissal could have sufficed.
In the assailed decision[8]of 7 October 1994, the NLRC modified the Labor Arbiter's
decision and held that complainants dismissal was invalid for the following reasons:
Complainant-appellants prolonged absences, although unauthorized, may not amount
to gross neglect or abandonment of work to warrant outright termination of
employment.Dismissal is too severe a penalty.For one, the mere fact that complainant-
appellant is a first offender must be considered in his favor. Besides, it is generally
impossible for an employee to anticipate when he would be ill or compelled to attend to
some family problems or emergency like in the case at bar.
Reliance on the ruling enunciated in the cited case of Shoemart Inc. vs. National Labor
Relations, 176 SCRA 385, is quite misplaced because of the obvious dissimilarities of the
attendant circumstances in the said case vis-a-vis those obtaining in the case at
bar. Unlike in the aforecited Shoemart Case, herein complainant-appellant was not
dismissed for unauthorized absences and eventually reinstated anterior to his second
dismissal for the same offense nor was he given a second chance which he could have
ignored.
Otherwise stated, the difference between the two cases greatly lies [in] the fact that
complainant in the Shoemart Case in the language of the Supreme Court was an
inveterate absentee who does not deserve reinstatement compared to herein
complainant-appellant who is afirstoffender[9]
The NLRC then decreed as follows:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, and [sic] the Decision of the Labor Arbiter, dated 11 July
1994 is hereby MODIFIED, by directing the reinstatement of complainant-appellant to
his former position without loss of seniority rights and other benefits, but without
backwages.The other findings in the appealed decision stand AFFIRMED.[10]
Petitioners motion for the reconsideration[11] was denied by the NLRC in its 7
December 1994 resolution.[12] Petitioner thus filed this special civil action contending
that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering complainant's
reinstatement, which in effect countenances the reinstatement of an employee who is
found guilty of excessive absences without prior approval. It further argued that the
NLRC failed to consider the rationale behind petitioners Rules and Regulations; that it
was deprived of its prerogative to enforce them; and that complainant's reinstatement
would adversely affect its business and send the wrong signals to its employees.
In its comment[13] for public respondent NLRC, the Office of the Solicitor General
maintained that dismissal from employment was too severe a penalty for a first time
offender like complainant. Although he violated petitioners rules and regulations, his
absences were justified:he had to bring his children to Samar, his home province, as his
wife deserted him.While that by itself might not excuse the failure to seek permission,
the Office of the Solicitor General submitted, however, that it would be at [sic] the
height of callousness if one, considering his plight under the circumstance[s], would not
give due consideration to [complainants] explanation.There has to be an exception.[14]
Applying Itogon-Suyoc Mines, Inc. v. NLRC,[15] the Office of the Solicitor General
recommended complainants reinstatement, which would be more harmonious to the
dictates of social justice and equity.It further emphasized that the reinstatement should
not be considered a condonation of complainants irresponsible behavior, rather, it must
be viewed as a mitigation of the severity of the penalty of dismissal. Accordingly, it
prays that this petition be dismissed.
In its reply,[16] petitioner disputed the application of Itogon-Suyoc because: (1) the
employee involved therein had been in the service for twenty-three years while
complainant herein had served petitioner for only two years; and (2) the offense
in Itogon-Suyoc was limited to a single act of high grading while complainant herein
committed a series ofunexcused absences.
We gave due course to the petition and dispensed with complainants comment.
The sole issue to be resolved is whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion in modifying the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
The answer must be in the negative.
A scrutiny of the facts discloses that complainants absence was precipitated by a
grave family problem as his wife unexpectedly deserted him and abandoned the
family. Considering that he had a full-time job, there was no one to whom he could
entrust the children and he was thus compelled to bring them to the province.It would
have been extremely difficult for him to have been husband and wife/father and
mother at the same time to the children in the metropolis. He was then under
emotional, psychological, spiritual and physical stress and strain. The reason for his
absence is, under these circumstances, justified. While his failure to inform and seek
petitioner's approval was an omission which must be corrected and chastised, he did
not merit the severest penalty of dismissal from the service.
Petitioners finding that complainant was guilty of abandonment is misplaced.
Abandonment as a just and valid ground for dismissal requires the deliberate,
unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment.Two elements must then
be satisfied: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable
reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship. The
second element is the more determinative factor and must be evinced by overt acts.
[17]Likewise, the burden of proof is on the employer to show the employees clear and
above, complainant's absence was justified under the circumstances. As to the second
requisite, we are not convinced that complainant ever intended to sever the employer-
employee relationship. Complainant immediately complied with the memo requiring
him to explain his absence, and upon knowledge of his termination, immediately sued
for illegal dismissal.These plainly refuted any claim that he was no longer interested in
returning to work.[20]Without doubt, the intention is lacking.
Moreover, petitioner failed to discharge the burden of proof that complainant was
guilty of abandonment. No evidence other than complainants letter explaining his
absence was presented. Needless to state, the letter did not indicate, in the least, that
complainant was no longer interested in returning to work. On the contrary,
complainant sought petitioners understanding. In declaring him guilty of
abandonment, petitioner merely relied on its Rules and Regulations which limited its
application to a six-day continuous absence, contrary to the purpose of the law.While
the employer is not precluded from prescribing rules and regulations to govern the
conduct of his employees, these rules and their implementation must be fair, just and
reasonable. It must be underscored that no less than our Constitution looks with
compassion on the workingman and protects his rights not only under a general
statement of a state policy,[21]but under the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights,
[22] thus placing labor contracts on a higher plane and with greater safeguards. Verily,
relations between capital and labor are not merely contractual.They are impressed with
public interest and labor contracts must, perforce, yield to the common good.[23]
We then conclude that complainants "prolonged" absence without approval does
not fall within the definition of abandonment and that his dismissal was
unjustified. While we do not decide here the validity of petitioner's Rules and
Regulations on continuous, unauthorized absences, what is plain is that it was wielded
with undue haste resulting in a deprivation of due process, thus not allowing for a
determination of just cause or abandonment. In this light, petitioner's dismissal was
illegal.This is not to say that his absence should go unpunished, as impliedly noted by
the NLRC in declining to award back wages.In the absence of the appropriate offense
which defines complainants infraction in the companys Rules and Regulations, equity
dictates that a penalty commensurate to the infraction be imposed.
WHEREFORE,the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the National
Labor Relations Commission in NLRC Case No. 06-04136-93 is hereby AFFIRMED.No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
ALCOSERO v NLRC
In 1992, the Apex Mining Co., Inc. shut down its Masara mining operations Maco,
Davao Del Norte. As a result, the employment of Rizalino Alcosero and 260 other
employees were terminated. Alcosero et al were supervisors, security guards, and other
personnel for the said mining site.
In June 1992, Alcosero et al filed a labor case against Apex for unpaid 13th month pay
for the years 1990, 1991, and 1992 for a total of about P11.3 million. Apex admitted
liability for unpaid 13th month pay for the year 1990 only or for P3.2 million. The Labor
Arbiter then ordered Apex to pay. Apex made separate payments in December 1992 and
January 1993. Alcosero et al, however, signed a quitclaim when they received the
payment. The quitclaim used was the standard formprepared and issued by the DOLE
and were signedwith the knowledge of the labor arbiter.
But later, Alcosero et al asserted before the labor arbiter that Apex still has to pay the
13th month pays for 1991 and 1992. The Labor Arbiter ordered Apex to file a comment
which it repeatedly failed to do. The labor arbiter then issued an order mandating Apex
to pay the rest.
From the date of receipt of the decision, Apex, under NLRC rules, has 10 days to file an
appeal and pay the appeal bond. Apex appealed on the 7th day before the NLRC but
instead of paying an appeal bond (also required by the rules), Apex filed a motion to
reduce the appeal bond. The NLRC granted an extension and Apex filed a reduced
bond within the extended period.
Eventually, the NLRC ruled that since the employees signed the quitclaim, Apex was
released from the other claims. The employees did not file a motion for reconsideration
for the NLRC decision, instead, they immediately filed, through another petitioner,
Oscar Atup, a petition forcertiorariunder Rule 65 with the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
1. Is the filing of the petition forcertiorariunder Rule 65 by Atup et al proper?
2. Is the appeal by Apex to the NLRC perfected even though Apex did not pay the
appeal bond within the 10-day period?
3. Is the quitclaim valid?
HELD:
1. No. The filing of a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non to the
institution of a special civil action for certiorari. The rationale therefor is that the law
intends to afford the tribunal, board or office an opportunity to rectify the errors and
mistakes it may have lapsed into before resort to the courts of justice can be had. Atup
et als explanation that it is their quest for justice which prompted them to avail of
Rule 65 is not a valid ground to dispense of the procedural requirement.
2. Yes. As a general rule, in labor cases where the employer has lost and wishes to file an
appeal, he must post an appeal bond equivalent to the monetary award (excluding
award for moral and exemplary damages). The period of appeal and posting of bond
must be within 10 days from receipt of the decision the posting of bond perfects the
appeal. However, if the appellant filed a motion to reduce the appeal bond, the appeal is
nevertheless perfected if the appellant pays within the extended period even if it is
already beyond the original 10-day period prescribed by the rules. In short, the 10-day
rule may be relaxed depending on the merits of the case.
Side issue:Does the Labor Arbiter still have jurisdiction?
Yes, the LA retains jurisdictionover the case until the NLRC has acted on the motion to
reduce the appeal bond and appellant has filed the bond as fixed by the NLRC.
3. Yes. While quitclaims executed by employees are commonly frowned upon as
contrary to public policy and are ineffective to bar claims for the full measure of the
employees legal rights, there are legitimate waivers that represent a voluntary and
reasonable settlement of laborers claims which should be respected by the courts as the
law between the parties.
Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement was
voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the
parties and may not later be disowned simply because of a change of mind.But where it
is shown that the person making the waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding
of what he was doing, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and
reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as a valid and binding undertaking.
In this case, there is no evidence that Apex pressured the employees into signing the
quitclaim. In fact, the employees were assisted by the DOLE and the signing was with
the knowledge of the labor arbiter. Further, there was no qualification in the quitclaim
which provides that it only covers the liabilities of Apex for the year 1990.