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Brian Abbinanti

Gregory Spendlove

PHIL 1000-405

November 13, 2017

Divine Foreknowledge and Free Will

There is a major theological problem that has vexed thinkers for thousands of years. If

God knows what people will do before they do it then no-one can do otherwise. If no one can do

otherwise then free will does not exist. So, if God knows what everyone will do before they do it

then free will doesnt exist. Kevin Tempe takes this problem into light by outlining, The

traditional Christian doctrine of Hell . . . is that Hell is a place of eternal punishment for non-

repentant sinners. But if theological determinism is true, then whether or not agents repent is

ultimately up to God, not to the agents themselves. Is it really right that people be punished for

what they cannot control? In this essay I will argue that the argument presenting this problem is

unsound, or in other words that divine foreknowledge and free will are compatible. In order to do

this, I will first explain the nature of free will, second explain that if God knows what people will

do before they do it they can indeed do otherwise, and finally respond to anticipated critiques to

my argument.

Before we begin any real discussion of free will and how it relates to Gods knowledge

we first have to understand what is meant by those words, free will. Now, this is a topic that is

well deserving of its own conversation, but this is not the setting for such a conversation. To

begin lets look at some basic intuitions of free will. One, to be free a person must have viable

options to choose from. Second, free will implies the ability to do otherwise. Third, if your

actions are free then you are worthy of praise or blame. These three features are key in the
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conventional definition of free will. For the duration of this paper, I will be functioning under

this definition of free will.

The first major point that will be discussed is exactly what divine foreknowledge is. A

more elaborate argument for theological fatalism goes something like this. God knows yesterday

that I will take my dog Bittsey for a walk tomorrow. His knowledge is accidentally necessary

today. For a belief to be knowledge it has to be true. Through the transfer of necessity, the truth

that I will take my dog for a walk tomorrow is also accidentally necessary. If I cant change that I

will take Bittsey for a walk tomorrow then I cannot do otherwise conflicting with our established

definition of free will. So, I am not free.

This argument implies that it is Gods knowledge that brings about my action. This is

false. In actuality, it is my action that brings about Gods knowledge. Some will say that idea of

an action in the present being sufficient to bring about knowledge in the past is counterintuitive,

and simply makes the problem more obscure. To this I would argue that those people are not

considering the reality of time. I function under the B-Theory of time which, simply put, is that

all time exists at once. Past, present, and future. Ned Markosian adds, time is very much like

the dimensions of space. Just as there are no genuine spatial properties (like being north),

but, rather, only two-place, spatial relations (like north of) God is eternal, or outside of time,

and as such is able to see the whole of it all at once. There is no knowing the future for God,

there is just knowing.

With that in mind I ask you to consider this. Imagine you are walking through a very

busy city and are about to cross the road. Just before you take your first step two cars collide

with each other directly in front of you. You now possess the knowledge of those two cars

crashing with each other. Why? Because you observed it. Why did the cars crash? Surely it
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wasnt because you knew about them crashing. It was because they were moving toward the

same space and did not stop. The vehicles moved independent of your knowledge. They were not

forced by your knowledge, your knowledge did not prevent the cars from doing otherwise by

stopping, and the drivers of at least one vehicle would be worthy of blame. All three of these

conditions allows free will of the drivers to be compatible with your knowledge of it. So, it is

with God. Since all of time exists at once, God is able to perceive it all at once, as it happens

before Him. Knowledge is no different if you hold it, or if God holds it. So, Gods knowledge

doesnt interfere with free will, just as your knowledge cant interfere with free will. As David

Hunt said, God foreknows what you are going to do, because you are going to do it. You dont

do it because God foreknows you are going to do it.

Now, some may say that this understanding of Gods relationship of knowledge and time

are counter intuitive. That the present cannot affect the past. That For her contribution to the

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Linda Zagzebski stated, Gods past beliefs seem to be as

good a candidate for something that is strictly past as almost anything we can think of she

even goes as far as to call this way of thinking ad hoc. Yes, saying that I can change the past

is counter intuitive. And it should be! What needs to be understood is that me taking the

action of taking my dog for a walk does not, did not, and will not change Gods knowledge

of weather or not I would take my dog for a walk in the past. What Zagzebski and others

seem to have forgotten is that his knowledge is not is the past. He and His knowledge are

outside of time. So my actions bringing about his knowledge does not change his knowledge

in the past. It may just appear to be in the past as a result of us living within time.

To conclude, we have first explained the nature of free will, second explained that if God

knows what people will do before they do it they can indeed do otherwise, and finally responded
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to criticisms that this model of Gods obtaining of knowledge can change the past. To be clear, I

have not made arguments attempting to prove or disprove Gods existence, or whether or not free

will exists. The purpose of this argument is to show that divine foreknowledge cannot impede on

the existence of free will.

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Works Cited

Hunt, David If God Knows the Future, What is Free Will? Closer to Truth,

www.closertotruth.com/series/if-god-knows-the-future-what-free-will.

Markosian, Ned. Time. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford University, 25 Nov.

2002, plato.stanford.edu/entries/time/#PreEteGroUniThe.

Timpe, Kevin. Free Will. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy,

ISSN 2161-0002 www.iep.utm.edu/freewill/#H4. 11/24/17

Zagzebski, Linda. Foreknowledge and Free Will. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,

Stanford University, 13 Apr. 2017, plato.stanford.edu/entries/free-will-

foreknowledge/#OckhSolu.