Facts
No. 101083)
This case is unique in that it is a class suit brought by 44
children, through their parents, claiming that they bring
the case in the name of their generation as well as
those generations yet unborn. Aiming to stop
deforestation, it was filed against the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
seeking to have him cancel all the timber license
agreements (TLAs) in the country and to cease and
desist from accepting and approving more timber license
agreements. The children invoked their right to a
balanced and healthful ecology and to protection by the
State in its capacity as parens patriae. The petitioners
claimed that the DENR Secretary's refusal to cancel the
TLAs and to stop issuing them was "contrary to the
highest law of humankind-- the natural law-- and
violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and
perpetuation." The case was dismissed in the lower
court, invoking the law on non-impairment of contracts,
so it was brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari.
Issue
Did the children have the legal standing to file the case?
Ruling
Yes. The Supreme Court in granting the petition ruled
that the children had the legal standing to file the case
based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility. Their right to a healthy environment
carried with it an obligation to preserve that environment
for the succeeding generations. In this, the Court
recognized legal standing to sue on behalf of future
generations. Also, the Court said, the law on non-
impairment of contracts must give way to the exercise of
the police power of the state in the interest of public
welfare.
Relevance
The case of Oposa vs. Factoran has been widely cited
worldwide for its concept of intergenerational
responsibility, particularly in cases related to ecology and
the environment. For example:
Oposa vs. Factoran's concept of
"intergenerational responsibility" was cited in a
case in Bangladesh.[1]
The United Nations Environmental Programme
(UNEP) considers Oposa vs. Factoran a
landmark case in judicial thinking for
environmental governance.[2]
In the book Public Health Law and Ethics by
Larry O. Gostin, Oposa vs. Factoran is cited as
a significant example of the justiciability of the
right to health. [3]
In the book The Law of Energy for Sustainable
Development by the IUCN Academy of
Environmental Law Research Studies, a study
cites Oposa vs. Factoran as basis for asserting
that the right to breathe is part of the right to life
as an acknowledged human right.[4]
Oposa et al. v. Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. et al (G.R.
Nature of the case
Class action seeking the cancellation and non-issuance
of timber licence agreements which allegedly infringed
the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology (Section 16); non-impairment of contracts;
Environmental law; judicial review and the political
question doctrine; inter-generational responsibility;
Remedial law: cause of action and standing; Directive
principles; Negative obligation on State
Summary
An action was filed by several minors represented by
their parents against the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources to cancel existing timber license
agreements in the country and to stop issuance of new
ones. It was claimed that the resultant deforestation and
damage to the environment violated their constitutional
rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health
(Sections 16 and 15, Article II of the Constitution). The
petitioners asserted that they represented others of their
generation as well as generations yet unborn.
Finding for the petitioners, the Court stated that even
though the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies of
the Constitution and not under the Bill of Rights, it does
not follow that it is less important than any of the rights
enumerated in the latter: [it] concerns nothing less than
self-preservation and self-perpetuation, the
advancement of which may even be said to predate all
governments and constitutions. The right is linked to
the constitutional right to health, is fundamental,
constitutionalised, self-executing and judicially
enforceable. It imposes the correlative duty to refrain
from impairing the environment.
The court stated that the petitioners were able to file a
class suit both for others of their generation and for
succeeding generations as the minors' assertion of their
right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same
time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the
protection of that right for the generations to come.
Significance of the case
This case has been widely-cited in jurisprudence
worldwide, particularly in cases relating to
forest/timber licensing. However, the approach of
the Philippino Supreme Court to economic, social
and cultural rights has proved somewhat
inconsistent, with some judgments resulting in the
enforcement of such rights (e.g., Del Rosario v
Bangzon, 180 SCRA 521 (1989); Manila Prince Hotel
v Government Service Insurance System, G. R. No.
122156 (3 February, 1997) but at least one instance
in which the Court made a statement that economic,
social and cultural rights are not real rights (see,
Brigido Simon v Commission on Human Rights, G. R.
No. 100150, 5 January 1994).
 LLDA VS CA GR 110120 shall have the
following
Laguna Lake Development Authority
powers and
v CA (Environmental Law) functions: (d)
GR No. 110120 March 16, 1994 Make, alter
or modify
orders
FACTS: requiring the
The LLDA Legal and Technical discontinuan
personnel found that the City ce of
pollution
Government of Caloocan was
specifying
maintaining an open dumpsite at the the
Camarin area without first securing conditions
an Environmental Compliance and the time
within which
Certificate (ECC) from the
such
Environmental Management Bureau discontinuan
(EMB) of the Department of ce must be
Environment and Natural Resources, accomplished

as required under Presidential

Decree No. 1586, and clearance from As a
LLDA as required under Republic Act general rule,
No. 4850 and issued a CEASE and the
adjudication
DESIST ORDER (CDO) for the City
of pollution
Government of Caloocan to stop the cases
use of the dumpsite. generally
pertains to
ISSUES: the
Pollution
Adjudication
1. Whether the LLDA and its
Board (PAB),
amendatory laws, have the except in
authority to entertain the complaint cases w
against the dumping of garbage in here the
the open dumpsite in Barangay special law
Camarin authorized by the City provides for
another
Government of Caloocan?
forum
2. Whetjer the LLDA have the power
and authority to issue a "cease and
RULING:
desist" order?
1. YES, LLDA has authority. It must be
APPLICABLE LAWS:
recognized in this regard that the
Executive
Order No. LLDA, as a specialized
927 series of administrative agency, is specifically
1983 which mandated under Republic Act No.
provides,
thus: Sec. 4.
4850 and its amendatory law s to
Additional carry out and make effective the
Powers and declared national policy of
Functions.
promoting and accelerating the
The authority
development and balanced growth
of the Laguna Lake area and the
surrounding provinces of Rizal and
Laguna and the cities of San Pablo,
Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan
with due regard and adequate
provisions for environmental
management and control,
preservation of the quality of human
life and ecological systems, and the
prevention of undue ecological
disturbances, deterioration and
pollution. Under such a broad grant
and power and authority, the LLDA, by
virtue of its special charter, obviously
has the responsibility to protect the
inhabitants of the Laguna Lake
region from the deleterious effects
of pollutants emanating from the
discharge of wastes from the
surrounding areas.
2. YES, pursuant to EO 927 Section 4.
While it is a fundamental rule that an
administrative agency has only such
powers as are expressly granted to it
by law , it is likewise a settled rule that
an administrative agency has also
such powers as are necessarily
implied in the exercise of its ex
press powers. In the exercise,
therefore, of its express powers
under its charter as a regulatory
and quasi-judicial body with respect
to pollution cases in the Laguna
Lake region, the authority of the
LLDA to issue a "cease and desist
order" is, perforce, implied. NOTE:
HOWEVER, writs of mandamus and
injunction are beyond the power of
the LLDA to issue.
Garcia vs. Board of Investments (BOI)
Garcia vs. Board of Investments (BOI)
191 SCRA 288
November 1990
FACTS:
Former Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC), now
Luzon Petrochemical Corporation, formed by a group of
Taiwanese investors, was granted by the BOI its have
its plant site for the products naphta cracker and
naphta to based in Bataan. In February 1989, one
year after the BPC began its production in Bataan, the
corporation applied to the BOI to have its plant site
transferred from Bataan to Batangas. Despite vigorous
opposition from petitioner Cong. Enrique Garcia and
others, the BOI granted private respondent BPCs
application, stating that the investors have the final
choice as to where to have their plant site because
they are the ones who risk capital for the project.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the BOI committed a grave abuse of
discretion in yielding to the application of the investors
without considering the national interest
COURT RULING:
The Supreme Court found the BOI to have committed
grave abuse of discretion in this case, and ordered the
original application of the BPC to have its plant site in
Bataan and the product naphta as feedstock
maintained.
The ponente, Justice Gutierrez, Jr., first stated the
Courts judicial power to settle actual controversies as
provided for by Section 1 of Article VIII in our 1987
Constitution before he wrote the reasons as to how the
Court arrived to its conclusion. He mentioned that
nothing is shown to justify the BOIs action in letting
the investors decide on an issue which, if handled by
our own government, could have been very beneficial
to the State, as he remembered the word of a great
Filipino leader, to wit: .. he would not mind having a Tanada vs Angara
government run like hell by Filipinos than one
subservient to foreign dictation. Justiciable Question;
Theory of Auto-Limitation;
Justice Grio Aquino, in her dissenting opinion, argued
that the petition was not well-taken because the 1987 Declaration of Principles
Investment Code does not prohibit the registration of a and State Policies
certain project, as well as any decision of the BOI
regarding the amended application. She stated that the
fact that petitioner disagrees with BOI does not make
TANADA VS ANGARA
the BOI wrong in its decision, and that petitioner
G.R. No. 118295 May 2, 1997
should have appealed to the President of the country
and not to the Court, as provided for by Section 36 of
the 1987 Investment Code. Wigberto E. Tanada et al, in representation of various
taxpayers and as non-governmental
organizations, petitioners,
Justice Melencio-Herrera, in another dissenting
vs.
opinion, stated that the Constitution does not vest in
EDGARDO ANGARA, et al, respondents.
the Court the power to enter the realm of policy
considerations, such as in this case.

Facts:

This is a case petition by Sen. Wigberto Tanada,

together with other lawmakers, taxpayers, and
various NGOs to nullify the Philippine ratification of
the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement.

Petitioners believe that this will be detrimental to the

growth of our National Economy and against to the
Filipino First policy. The WTO opens access to
foreign markets, especially its major trading partners,
through the reduction of tariffs on its exports,
particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus,
provides new opportunities for the service sector cost
and uncertainty associated with exporting and more
investment in the country. These are the predicted
benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed
by the signatory Senators, a free market espoused
by WTO.

Petitioners also contends that it is in conflict with the

provisions of our constitution, since the said
Agreement is an assault on the sovereign powers of
the Philippines because it meant that Congress could
not pass legislation that would be good for national
interest and general welfare if such legislation would
not conform to the WTO Agreement.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the petition present a
justiciable controversy.
2. Whether or not the provisions of the
Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization and the Agreements and Associated
Legal Instruments included in Annexes one (1),
two (2) and three (3) of that agreement cited by
petitioners directly contravene or undermine the
letter, spirit and intent of Section 19, Article II and
Sections 10 and 12, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution.
3. Whether or not certain provisions of the
Agreement unduly limit, restrict or impair the
exercise of legislative power by Congress.
4. Whether or not certain provisions of the
Agreement impair the exercise of judicial power by
this Honorable Court in promulgating the rules of
evidence.
5. Whether or not the concurrence of the Senate
in the ratification by the President of the
Philippines of the Agreement establishing the
World Trade Organization implied rejection of the
treaty embodied in the Final Act.
Discussions:
1987 Constitution states that Judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government.
Although the Constitution mandates to
develop a self-reliant and independent national
economy controlled by Filipinos, does not
necessarily rule out the entry of foreign
investments, goods and services. It contemplates
neither economic seclusion nor mendicancy in
the international community. The WTO itself has
some built-in advantages to protect weak and
developing economies, which comprise the vast
majority of its members. Unlike in the UN where
major states have permanent seats and veto
powers in the Security Council, in the WTO,
decisions are made on the basis of sovereign
equality, with each members vote equal in weight
to that of any other. Hence, poor countries can
protect their common interests more effectively
Rulings:
through the WTO than through one-on-one
negotiations with developed countries. Within the
WTO, developing countries can form powerful
blocs to push their economic agenda more
decisively than outside the Organization. Which is
not merely a matter of practical alliances but a
negotiating strategy rooted in law. Thus, the basic
principles underlying the WTO Agreement
recognize the need of developing countries like
the Philippines to share in the growth in
international trade commensurate with the needs
of their economic development.
In its Declaration of Principles and State
Policies, the Constitution adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of
the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of
peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and
amity, with all nations. By the doctrine of
incorporation, the country is bound by generally
accepted principles of international law, which are
considered to be automatically part of our own
laws. A state which has contracted valid
international obligations is bound to make in its
legislations such modifications as may be
necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the
obligations undertaken. Paragraph 1, Article 34 of
the General Provisions and Basic Principles of the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) may intrudes
on the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate
rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedures. With regard to Infringement of a
design patent, WTO members shall be free to
determine the appropriate method of
implementing the provisions of TRIPS within their
own internal systems and processes.
The alleged impairment of sovereignty in the
exercise of legislative and judicial powers is
balanced by the adoption of the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of
the law of the land and the adherence of the
Constitution to the policy of cooperation and
amity with all nations. The Senate, after
deliberation and voting, voluntarily and
overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO
Agreement thereby making it a part of the law of
the land is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign
duty and power.
1. In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine
Senate on the ground that it contravenes the
Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a
justiciable controversy. Where an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the
right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle
the dispute. As explained by former Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion, the judiciary is the final
arbiter on the question of whether or not a branch
of government or any of its officials has acted
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or
so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This
is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass
judgment on matters of this nature.
2. While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias
in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and
enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the
need for business exchange with the rest of the
world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and
limits protection of Filipino enterprises only
against foreign competition and trade practices
that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution
did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It
did not shut out foreign investments, goods and
services in the development of the Philippine
economy. While the Constitution does not
encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods,
services and investments into the country, it does
not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an
exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity,
frowning only on foreign competition that is
unfair.
3. By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or
restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their
voluntary act, nations may surrender some
aspects of their state power in exchange for
greater benefits granted by or derived from a
convention or pact. After all, states, like
individuals, live with coequals, and in pursuit of
mutually covenanted objectives and benefits, they
also commonly agree to limit the exercise of their
otherwise absolute rights. As shown by the
foregoing treaties Philippines has entered, a
portion of sovereignty may be waived without
violating the Constitution, based on the rationale
that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law
of the land and adheres to the policy of
cooperation and amity with all nations.
4. The provision in Article 34 of WTO agreement
does not contain an unreasonable burden,
consistent as it is with due process and the
concept of adversarial dispute settlement inherent
in our judicial system.
5. The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97
expressed concurrence in exactly what the Final
Act required from its signatories, namely,
concurrence of the Senate in the WTO Agreement.
Moreover, the Senate was well-aware of what it
was concurring in as shown by the members
deliberation on August 25, 1994. After reading the
letter of President Ramos dated August 11, 1994,
the senators of the Republic minutely dissected
what the Senate was concurring in.
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No.
122156, February 3, 1997
DECISION
(En Banc)
BELLOSILLO, J.:
I. THE FACTS
Pursuant to the privatization program of the
Philippine Government, the GSIS sold in public
auction its stake in Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC).
Only 2 bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince
Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which
offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares
at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a
Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel
operator, which bid for the same number of shares
at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of
petitioner.
Petitioner filed a petition before the Supreme
Court to compel the GSIS to allow it to match the bid
of Renong Berhad. It invoked the Filipino First
Policy enshrined in 10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution, which provides that in the grant of
rights, privileges, and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos.
II. THE ISSUES
1. Whether 10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution is a self-executing provision and does not
need implementing legislation to carry it into effect;
2. Assuming 10, paragraph 2, Article XII is self-
executing, whether the controlling shares of the
Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our patrimony
as a nation;
3. Whether GSIS is included in the term State, hence,
mandated to implement 10, paragraph 2, Article XII
of the Constitution; and
4. Assuming GSIS is part of the State, whether it should
give preference to the petitioner, a Filipino
corporation, over Renong Berhad, a foreign
corporation, in the sale of the controlling shares of the
Manila Hotel Corporation.
III. THE RULING
[The Court, voting 11-4, DISMISSED the
petition.]
1. YES, 10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision
and does not need implementing legislation to
carry it into effect.
Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in
such a way as not to make it appear that it is non-self-
executing but simply for purposes of style. But,
certainly, the legislature is not precluded from
enacting further laws to enforce the constitutional
provision so long as the contemplated statute squares
with the Constitution. Minor details may be left to the
legislature without impairing the self-executing nature
of constitutional provisions.
xxx xxx
xxx
Respondents . . . argue that the non-self-
executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is
implied from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs
of the same section which undoubtedly are not self-
executing. The argument is flawed. If the first and
third paragraphs are not self-executing because
Congress is still to enact measures to encourage the
formation and operation of enterprises fully owned by
Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still
needs legislation to regulate and exercise authority
over foreign investments within its national
jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori,
by the same logic, the second paragraph can only be
self-executing as it does not by its language require
any legislation in order to give preference to qualified
Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self-
executing in one part and non-self-executing in
another.
xxx. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987
Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which
is complete in itself and which needs no further
guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision does
not require any legislation to put it in operation. It
is per se judicially enforceable. When our
Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights,
privileges, and concessions covering national
economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that -
qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our
Constitution declares that a right exists in certain
specified circumstances an action may be maintained
to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of
any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is
no statute especially enacted to enforce such
constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its
own inherent potency and puissance, and from which
all legislations must take their bearings. Where there
is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
2. YES, the controlling shares of the
Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our
patrimony as a nation.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the
term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the
Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not
only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the
Constitution could have very well used the
term natural resources, but also to the cultural
heritage of the Filipinos.
xxx xxx
xxx
For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel
has bore mute witness to the triumphs and failures,
loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is
impressed with public interest; its own historicity
associated with our struggle for sovereignty,
independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel
has become part of our national economy and
patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC
comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter
for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so
that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have
actual control and management of the hotel. In this
instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated
from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice
stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain
respondents claim that the Filipino First
Policy provision is not applicable since what is being
sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the
corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land upon
which the building stands.
3. YES, GSIS is included in the term
State, hence, it is mandated to implement 10,
paragraph 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the
MHC could only be carried out with the prior approval
of the State acting through respondent Committee on
Privatization. [T]his fact alone makes the sale of the
assets of respondents GSIS and MHC a state
action. In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of
persons distinct from the government are considered
state action covered by the Constitution (1) when
the activity it engages in is a public function; (2)
when the government is so significantly involved with
the private actor as to make the government
responsible for his action; and, (3) when the
government has approved or authorized the action. It
is evident that the act of respondent GSIS in selling
51% of its share in respondent MHC comes under the
second and third categories of state action. Without
doubt therefore the transaction, although entered into
by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the
State and therefore subject to the constitutional
command.
When the Constitution addresses the State it
refers not only to the people but also to the
government as elements of the State. After all,
government is composed of three (3) divisions of
power - legislative, executive and
judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional mandate
directed to the State is correspondingly directed to the
three (3) branches of government. It is undeniable
that in this case the subject constitutional injunction is
addressed among others to the Executive Department
and respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality
deriving its authority from the State.

4. YES, GSIS should give preference to

the petitioner in the sale of the controlling shares
of the Manila Hotel Corporation.

It should be stressed that while the Malaysian

firm offered the higher bid it is not yet the winning
bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide that the
highest bidder shall only be declared the winning
bidder after it has negotiated and executed the
necessary contracts, and secured the requisite
approvals. Since the Filipino First Policy provision of
the Constitution bestows preference
on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest
bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder will be
declared the winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents
are not bound to make the award yet, nor are they
under obligation to enter into one with the highest
bidder. For in choosing the awardee respondents are
mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987
Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to
be known to all the bidders and other interested
parties. G.R. No. 78742 July 14, 1989

xxx xxx Petitioner: Association of Small Landowners

xxx
Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides
that [i]f for any reason the Highest Bidder cannot be
awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to
other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted
bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing
to match the highest bid in terms of price per
share. Certainly, the constitutional mandate itself
is reason enough not to award the block of shares
immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding its
submission of a higher, or even the highest, bid. In
fact, we cannot conceive of a stronger reason than
the constitutional injunction itself.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm
submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning
the grant of rights, privileges and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby
exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question
that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the
bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches
the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the
Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and
meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the
1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be
expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding
rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be
simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction
a perilous skirting of the basic law.
in the Philippines
Respondent: Honorable Secretary of Agrarian
Reform
Facts: These are consolidated cases which
involve common legal, including serious
challenges to the constitutionality of the several
measures such as P.D. No. 27, E.O. No. 228,
Presidential Proclamation No. 131, E.O. No.
229, and R.A. No. 6657.
G.R. No. 79777
The petitioners are questioning P.D. No.
27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds
inter alia of separation of powers, due
process, equal protection and the
constitutional limitation that no private
property shall be taken for public use
without just compensation. G.R. No.
79310
G.R. No. 79310
This petition seeks to prohibit the
implementation of Proc. No. 131 and
E.O. No. 229. They contend that taking
must be simultaneous with payment of
just compensation as it is traditionally
understood, i.e., with money and in full,
but no such payment is contemplated in exercise not of the police power but of the
power of eminent domain
Section 5 of the E.O. No. 229.
G.R. No. 79744
The petitioner argues that E.O. Nos. 228
and 229 are violative of the
constitutional provision that no private
property shall be taken without due
process or just compensation.
G.R. No. 78742
Petitioners claim they cannot eject their
tenants and so are unable to enjoy their
right of retention because the
Department of Agrarian Reform has so
far not issued the implementing rules
required under the above-quoted
decree.

Issue: Whether agrarian reform is an exercise

of police power or eminent domain

Ruling: There are traditional distinctions

between the police power and the power of
eminent domain that logically preclude the
application of both powers at the same time on
the same subject. Property condemned under
the police power is noxious or intended for a
noxious purpose, such as a building on the
verge of collapse, which should be demolished
for the public safety, or obscene materials,
which should be destroyed in the interest of
public morals. The confiscation of such
property is not compensable, unlike the taking
of property under the power of expropriation,
which requires the payment of just
compensation to the owner.
The cases before us present no knotty
complication insofar as the question of
compensable taking is concerned. To the
extent that the measures under challenge
merely prescribe retention limits for
landowners, there is an exercise of the police
power for the regulation of private property in
accordance with the Constitution. But where, to
carry out such regulation, it becomes
necessary to deprive such owners of whatever
lands they may own in excess of the maximum
area allowed, there is definitely a taking under
the power of eminent domain for which
payment of just compensation is imperative.
The taking contemplated is not a mere
limitation of the use of the land. What is
required is the surrender of the title to and the
physical possession of the said excess and all
beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor
of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an
Basco vs. PAGCOR (G.R. No.
91649) - Digest
Facts:
Petitioner is seeking to annul the Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR) Charter -- PD 1869, because it is
allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and
order, and because it constitutes a waiver of a
right prejudicial to a third person with a right
recognized by law. It waived the Manila Cit
governments right to impose taxes and license
fees, which is recognized by law. For the same
reason, the law has intruded into the local
governments right to impose local taxes and
license fees. This is in contravention of the
constitutionally enshrined principle of local
autonomy.
Issue:
Whether or not Presidential Decree No. 1869 is
valid.
Ruling:
1. The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal
corporation has no inherent right to impose
taxes. Their charter or statute must plainly
show an intent to confer that power, otherwise
the municipality cannot assume it. Its power to
tax therefore must always yield to a legislative
act which is superior having been passed upon
by the state itself which has the inherent
power to tax.
The Charter of Manila is subject to control by
Congress. It should be stressed that municipal
corporations are mere creatures of Congress,
which has the power to create and abolish
municipal corporations due to its general
legislative powers. Congress, therefore, has
the power of control over the Local
governments. And if Congress can grant the
City of Manila the power to tax certain matters,
it can also provide for exemptions or even take
back the power.

2. The City of Manilas power to impose license

fees on gambling, has long been revoked by
P.D. No. 771 and vested exclusively on the
National Government. Therefore, only the
National Government has the power to issue
license or permits for the operation of
gambling.

3. Local governments have no power to tax

instrumentalities of the National Government.
PAGCOR is government owned or controlled
corporation with an original charter, P.D. No.
1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by
the National Government. PAGCOR has a dual
role, to operate and to regulate gambling
casinos. The latter role is governmental, which
places it in the category of an agency or
instrumentality of the Government. Being an
instrumentality of the Government, PAGCOR
should be and actually is exempt from local
taxes. Otherwise, its operation might be
burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a
mere Local Government.
4. Petitioners also argue that the Local
Autonomy Clause of the Constitution will be
violated by P.D. No. 1869.
Article 10, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution:
Each local government unit shall have the
power to create its own source of revenue and
to levy taxes, fees, and other charges subject
to such guidelines and limitation as the
congress may provide, consistent with the
basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes,
fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to
the local government.
SC said this is a pointless argument. The
power of the local government to impose
taxes and fees is always subject to
limitations which Congress may provide by
law. Besides, the principle of local autonomy
under the 1987 Constitution simply means
decentralization. It does not make local
governments sovereign within the state.
Wherefore, the petition is DISMISSED.
Rev. Ely Velez Pamatong Vs. Commission on
Elections
G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004
FACTS:
Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy
(COC) for President. Respondent COMELEC declared
petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who
could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not
nominated by a political party or are not supported by a
registered political party with a national constituency.
Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the
Supreme Court claiming that the COMELEC violated his
right to "equal access to opportunities for public service"
under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, by
limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those
who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or
are nominated by political parties. The COMELEC
supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the
most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e.,
he possesses all the constitutional and legal
qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable
of waging a national campaign since he has numerous
national organizations under his leadership, he also has
the capacity to wage an international campaign since he
has practiced law in other countries, and he has a
platform of government.
ISSUE:
Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public
office?
RULING:

No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the
Constitution is merely a privilege subject to limitations
imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor
elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right.
There is nothing in the plain language of the provision
which suggests such a thrust or justifies an
interpretation of the sort.
The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of
Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of
Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the
Article are generally considered not self-executing, and
there is no plausible reason for according a different
treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of
the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does
not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional
right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or
executive action. The disregard of the provision does not
give rise to any cause of action before the courts.
Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the
State to enact positive measures that would
accommodate as many people as possible into public
office. Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to
be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive
rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in
the absence of legislation since its effective means and
reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the
myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric
appear to be entirely open-ended. Words and phrases
such as "equal access," "opportunities," and "public
service" are susceptible to countless interpretations
owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was
not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people
an operative but amorphous foundation from which
innately unenforceable rights may be sourced.
The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public
office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid
limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective
office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus
Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates. As long as the
limitations apply to everybody equally without
discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not
violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens
engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by
any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy.
In the case at bar, there is no showing that any person is
exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they
create.
The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance
candidates and the disqualification of candidates who
have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is
easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to
ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective,
and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into
account the practical considerations in conducting
elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of
candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical
confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of
time and resources in preparation for the election. The
organization of an election with bona fide candidates
standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix
candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to
run a viable campaign would actually impair the
electoral process. This is not to mention the candidacies
which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-
note joke. The poll body would be bogged by irrelevant
minutiae covering every step of the electoral process,
most probably posed at the instance of these nuisance
candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part
of the State.
The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance
candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis of
the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus,
the remand of this case for the reception of further
evidence is in order. The SC remanded to the COMELEC
for the reception of further evidence, to determine the
question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong
is a nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of
the Omnibus Election Code.
Obiter Dictum: One of Pamatong's contentions was
that he was an international lawyer and is thus more
qualified compared to the likes of Erap, who was only a
high school dropout. Under the Constitution (Article
VII, Section 2), the only requirements are the following:
(1) natural-born citizen of the Philippines; (2)
registered voter; (3) able to read and write; (4) at least
forty years of age on the day of the election; and (5)
resident of the Philippines for at least ten years
immediately preceding such election.
At any rate, Pamatong was eventually declared a
nuisance candidate and was disqualified.
CASE DIGEST : Legaspi Vs
Civil Serv. Comm.
G.R. No. L-72119 May 29, 1987 VALENTIN L. LEGASPI,
petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,
respondent.
FACTS : The fundamental right of the people to
information on matters of public concern is invoked in
this special civil action for mandamus instituted by
petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi against the Civil Service
Commission. The respondent had earlier denied
Legaspi's request for information on the civil service
eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in
the Health Department of Cebu City. These government
employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, had
allegedly represented themselves as civil service
eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for
sanitarians.
ISSUE : WON the petitioner has legal to access
government records to validate the civil service
eligibilities of the Health Department employees
HELD : The constitutional guarantee to information on
matters of public concern is not absolute. It does not
open every door to any and all information. Under the
Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc., are
"subject to limitations as may be provided by law" The
law may therefore exempt certain types of information
from public scrutiny, such as those affecting national
security It follows that, in every case, the availability of
access to a particular public record must be
circumscribed by the nature of the information sought,
i.e., (a) being of public concern or one that involves
public interest, and, (b) not being exempted by law from
the operation of the constitutional guarantee. The
threshold question is, therefore, whether or not the
information sought is of public interest or public concern.
This question is first addressed to the government
agency having custody of the desired information.
However, as already discussed, this does not give the
agency concerned any discretion to grant or deny
access. In case of denial of access, the government
agency has the burden of showing that the information
requested is not of public concern, or, if it is of public
concern, that the same has been exempted by law from
the operation of the guarantee. To hold otherwise will
serve to dilute the constitutional right. As aptly observed,
". . . the government is in an advantageous position to
marshall and interpret arguments against release . . ."
(87 Harvard Law Review 1511 [1974]). To safeguard the
constitutional right, every denial of access by the
government agency concerned is subject to review by
the courts, and in the proper case, access may be
compelled by a writ of Mandamus Public office being a
public trust it is the legitimate concern of citizens to
ensure that government positions requiring civil service
eligibility are occupied only by persons who are eligibles.
Public officers are at all times accountable to the people
even as to their eligibilities for their respective positions.
In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny the
claims of eligibility, the respondent has failed to cite any
provision in the Civil Service Law which would limit the
petitioner's right to know who are, and who are not, civil
service eligibles. We take judicial notice of the fact that
the names of those who pass the civil service
examinations, as in bar examinations and licensure
examinations for various professions, are released to the
public. Hence, there is nothing secret about one's civil
service eligibility, if actually possessed. Petitioner's
request is, therefore, neither unusual nor unreasonable.
And when, as in this case, the government employees
concerned claim to be civil service eligibles, the public,
through any citizen, has a right to verify their professed CASE DIGEST : VALMONTE vs
eligibilities from the Civil Service Commission. The civil
service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern, BELMONTE
and in the absence of express limitations under the law G.R. No. 74930 February 13, 1989 RICARDO
upon access to the register of civil service eligibles for VALMONTE, OSWALDO CARBONELL, DOY DEL
said position, the duty of the respondent Commission to CASTILLO, ROLANDO BARTOLOME, LEO OBLIGAR,
confirm or deny the civil service eligibility of any person JUN GUTIERREZ, REYNALDO BAGATSING, JUN
occupying the position becomes imperative. Mandamus, "NINOY" ALBA, PERCY LAPID, ROMMEL CORRO and
therefore lies ROLANDO FADUL, petitioners, vs. FELICIANO
BELMONTE, JR., respondent.

FACTS : Petitioners in this special civil action for

mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke their right
to information and pray that respondent be directed: (a)
to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the
Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO
and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans
immediately before the February 7 election thru the
intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda
Marcos; and/or (b) to furnish petitioners with certified
true copies of the documents evidencing their respective
loans; and/or (c) to allow petitioners access to the public
records for the subject information On June 20, 1986,
apparently not having yet received the reply of the
Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS)
Deputy General Counsel, petitioner Valmonte wrote
respondent another letter, saying that for failure to
receive a reply, "(W)e are now considering ourselves
free to do whatever action necessary within the premises
to pursue our desired objective in pursuance of public
interest."

ISSUE : WON Valmonte, et. al. are entitled as citizens

and taxpayers to inquire upon GSIS records on behest
loans given by the former First Lady Imelda Marcos to
Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO
and PDP-Laban political parties.
 HELD : Respondent has failed to cite any law granting
the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as regards the
documents subject of this petition. His position is
apparently based merely on considerations of policy. The
judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can
only declare what the law is, and not what the law should
be. Under our system of government, policy issues are
within the domain of the political branches of the
government, and of the people themselves as the
repository of all State power. The concerned borrowers
themselves may not succeed if they choose to invoke
their right to privacy, considering the public offices they
were holding at the time the loans were alleged to have
been granted. It cannot be denied that because of the
interest they generate and their newsworthiness, public
figures, most especially those holding responsible
positions in government, enjoy a more limited right to
privacy as compared to ordinary individuals, their actions
being subject to closer public scrutiny The "transactions"
used here I suppose is generic and, therefore, it can
cover both steps leading to a contract, and already a
consummated contract, Considering the intent of the
framers of the Constitution which, though not binding
upon the Court, are nevertheless persuasive, and
considering further that government-owned and
controlled corporations, whether performing proprietary
or governmental functions are accountable to the
people, the Court is convinced that transactions entered
into by the GSIS, a government-controlled corporation
created by special legislation are within the ambit of the
people's right to be informed pursuant to the
constitutional policy of transparency in government
dealings. Although citizens are afforded the right to
information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access
to official records," the Constitution does not accord
them a right to compel custodians of official records to
prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their
desire to acquire information on matters of public
concern.