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CASE NUMBER: 19 SCRA 10 (GR NO. L-25181)


The ICC approved the license of the petitioner to import tobacco, but the approval was advised on the same
day the import control law expired.
600 hogheads then arrived at the port of Manila but the customs, doubting the legality of the import, refused to
release the shipment of said Virginia leaf tobacco.
Petitioner then filed an action for mandamus and Judge Barcelona issued an order to release the tobacco
shipment to petitioner.
The Collector of Customs and the Commissioner of Customs then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for
certiorari to annul the order of release.
[Barcelona case decision: ruled that the Court of First Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction to
issue the (questioned) order releasing the tobacco shipment; and this Court incidentally declared
that the importation of the tobacco, notwithstanding the alleged approval of the importation by the
President of the Philippines, was illegal upon the ground that the importation was made long after the
expiration of the effectivity of the Import Control Law, and that the importation contravened the
government policy as declared in Republic Acts Nos. 698 and 1194]
Collector of Customs instituted seizure proceedings against the 600 hogsheads of tobacco, and issued a
warrant of seizure and detention, rendered a decision declaring the tobacco forfeited to the government, and
ordering the sale thereof at public auction.
Petitioner appealed the decision to the Commisioner of Customs but the Com Cus affirmed the decisione of
collector of customs
Petitioner the appealed to CTA, Court of Tax Appeals dismissed the petition upon the ground that it had no
jurisdiction to entertain the appeal because the Supreme Court had already decided in the Barcelona and
Area cases that the importation in question was illegal.
From this resolution Auyong Hian appealed to the Supreme Court. But SC remanded the case to CTA. And
CTA found the appeal to be without merit and dismissed the same, with costs against petitioner. Petitioner
appealed the decision to the SC.


Whether or not CTA has jurisdiction over the case of the petitioner?


But this Court, in the first CTA Case held that the Court of Tax Appeals, had jurisdiction to pass upon the
appeal of Auyong Hian from the decision of the Commissioner of Customs because the appeal involved
matters related to the administrative proceedings in connection with the seizure, forfeiture and sale of the
tobacco in question.

Here is what this Court said:

It appears to Us that the Court of Tax Appeals had overlooked the fact that the appeal of Auyong Hian
from the decision of the Commissioner of Customs had raised not only the question of the legality of
the importation but also other matters which called for a ruling by the Court of Tax Appeals in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction especially the question of whether the tobacco thus imported
were goods the importation of which was relatively prohibited or absolutely prohibited, and also the
question regarding the disposal of the tobacco that was thus seized. The declaration by this Court, in
the Barcelona and Arca cases, supra, that the importation of the tobacco in question was illegal was
not intended to stop the course of the administrative proceedings in relation to the importation of said
tobacco. Let it be noted that when the Barcelona case was decided on July 31, 1962 the seizure
proceedings against the 600 hogsheads of tobacco in question had not yet been instituted by the
Collector of Customs. It was not until November 8, 1962 when Seizure Identification No. 6669 was

And so this Court, in the First CTA case, declared the Court of Tax Appeals as possessed of jurisdiction to
pass upon the questions raised by Auyong Hian in his appeal from the decision of the Commissioner of
Customs regarding administrative matters relating to the seizure proceedings of the 600 hogsheads of
tobacco in question.
CASE NUMBER: 21 SCRA 519 (GR NO. L-22488)


Ramolete and Celestino were dissatisfied by the decision of Director of Mines, affirmed by the Secretary of
Agriculture & Natural Resources, declaring that Bacalso and Gonzales established superior location rights on
certain mining claims situated in the City of Toledo, Cebu, which were in dispute between Celestino Bacalso
and Mateo Bacalso with Gonzales.
Celestino Bacalso filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, against the Secretary of Agriculture
& Natural Resources, Mateo C. Bacalso and Cesar Gonzalez
Respondents filed separate motions to dismiss the case, based on a common ground, that the decision of the
administrative body had become final and executory. The motions were denied. The private respondents
moved to reconsider the order which was also denied.
Before the trial on the merits, private respondents filed an "Ex-parte motion to order the clerk of court, Atty.
Vicente Miranda, to transfer civil case No. 7278 from branch V to Branch VII, Barili, Cebu", alleging that " by
virtue of the Administrative Order No. 302 of the Department of Justice, Series of 1962, as amended by
Administrative Order No. 337, in the sense that the City of Toledo be included under the Seventh Branch in
Barili, Cebu and considering that the properties involved in the litigation are located in Toledo City as above-
stated compliance to the said Administrative Orders of the Department of justice by the clerk of court is
Defendants Mateo Bacalso and Cesar Gonzales, in their motion ex parte dated May 15, 1963, ask this court
to order the clerk of court to transfer this case to Branch VII of this court at Barili, Cebu, alleging as grounds
that after the said additional branch was created, the Department of Justice ordered that all cases originating
from Toledo and other southern towns of this province should be heard by the said branch; that this case
involves mining claims which are situated in Toledo City, within the jurisdiction of the said branch at Barili,
Cebu; and that the trial of this case has not been started yet. The movants attached to their motion certified
copies of their mining claims showing that the said claims are situated in the City of Toledo.
The record shows that this case was filed on November 22, 1961, long before the said Branch VII at Barili,
Cebu was created by law, and since then several important incidents have taken place, one of which was a
motion to dismiss the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction, which motion was resolved by this court denying the


Whether or not the respondent judge presiding over branch V of the CFI of Cebu has lost jurisdiciton to try
and decide the said case by virtue of the Administrative Orders Nos 302 and 337 of the Sec. of Justice


It is a settled rule that jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or the law. It cannot be fixed by the will
of the parties; it cannot be acquired through, enlarged or diminished by any act of omission of the parties.
Constitutionally viewed, apportionment of jurisdiction is vested in Congress. As this Court has said, thru
Justice Concepcion (now Chief Justice) in Gumpal v. CFI of Isabela, et al., L-16409 and L-16416, November
29, 1960:

It is trite to say, however, that the validity of a given judicial action is dependent upon the jurisdiction
of the court taking it, and that, by specific constitutional mandate, the power to define, prescribe and
apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts, is subject to the limitations set forth in the fundamental
law, within the exclusive province of Congress. Since, being legislative, said power cannot be
delegated to the Secretary of Justice...

It is incorrect to assume, as the respondent Judge did assert in his order complained of, that because the
case No. 7278 has been assigned to Branch V, by agreement of the Judges presiding over the six branches,
of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, that he has acquired exclusive jurisdiction to try and decide the case to
the exclusion of the other Judges presiding over the other branches of the same court.

Wherever an additional branch or branches of the Court of First Instance is or are established in this Act in the
same place where there is an existing court or courts of first instance, all cases already filed in the latter
court or courts shall be heard, tried and decided by such latter court or courts.


In July 1977, Jesus Wee Eng filed an action to recover real property against Lolita Amigo. The trial court found in favor
of Wee Eng. Amigo appealed but the the Court of Appeals eventually dismissed the appeal on the ground that Amigo
failed to submit her appellants brief.

Amigo then appealed to the Supreme Court on the ground that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the case
because it never acquired jurisdiction over Amigos person.


Whether or not the appeal filed by Amigo should be granted?


No. As a rule, lack of jurisdiction, as a ground for dismissing a case, may be raised at any stage of the proceeding.
However, the Supreme Court clarified that this rule finds proper application in cases where the court does not have
jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Unlike the question of jurisdiction over the subject matter which may be invoked at any stage of the proceedings (even
on appeal), the issue of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, however,must be seasonably raised, and it can
well be pleaded in a motion to dismiss or by way of an affirmative defense in an answer.

In this case, Amigo let the issue of lack of jurisdiction over her person pass until the rendition of judgment. It is now too
late in the day for her to assail the jurisdiction of the lower court over her person, a somersault that neither law nor
policy will sanction.

Nevertheless, the records show that the court actually acquired jurisdiction over the person of Amigo. Amigo
voluntarily submitted herself to the trial courts jurisdiction when she filed her Answer to Engs complaint. Her
contention therefore is without merit.


The SC also emphasized that once a decision of the lower court is appealed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the
appellant cannot insert any other issue for the Supreme Court to resolve. The SC will just ignore these other issues
(especially if raised for the first time) and will solely delve into the issue of lack of jurisdiction.

1 http://www.uberdigests.info/2014/12/lolita-amigo-vs-court-of-appeals/
CASE NUMBER: 121 SCRA 621 (GR NO. L-61259)


Petitioner associations Constitution specifically provides that all Lions Clubs so organized shall be under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the International Board of Directors (IBD) and that all District Governor election results
shall be adopted by the IBD and thereby become effective, except in the case of an election protest filed or
legal action resulting therefrom in which event the appointment or election of such District Governor shall be
subject to action by the IBD and in accordance therewith, the election protest between petitioner and
respondent for the position of District Governor of District 301- Phils for the year 1982-1983 was filed and
elevated to the IBD thru its Constitution and By-Laws Committee following the Consti Complaints Procedure
and Comm conducted a hearing attended by the parties, each claiming to be duly elected to the disputed
Vicente Josefa of the Manila Traders Lions Club (respondent) & James So of the Manila Centrum Lions Club
(petitioner); both affiliations are duly organize, chartered and affiliated with Lions Club International (LCI)
July 1, 1982, Josefa filed for Quo Warranto, Injuction, Damages with Preliminary Injunction and Prayer for
TRO in the CFI of Mnl against LCI & So
Allegations: that both Josefa and So filed their certificate of candidacy; that before the elections, Josefa & So
entered an agreement for So to withdraw his candidacy in favor of Josefa; that said withdrawal was duly
accepted by the District thru Gov. Huang who affixed his signature on the agreement news items published
conveying the idea that So did not withdraw from the gubernatorial race; Huang informed Josefa that So did
not file a new cert. of candidacy and is not recognized as a candidate by the District; that a telex sent to LCI
asking if So was still a candidate after his withdrawal & LCI admonished Huang to enforce the Consti & By-
Laws if the withdrawal was made and accepted by the District
June 6, 1982, Chairman of the Nominations Committee reported that because So did not file a new cert of
candidacy, Josefa is the only recognized candidate; however, members of the Council of Past District Govs
set aside the report and proclaimed So as a candidate
Josefa won by 115 votes & proclaimed as Governor-elect; but LCI unlawfully recognized So was the winner


WON the case at bar is purely an internal affair of the LCI and is therefore, beyond judicial review


We adopt the general rule that "... the courts will not interfere with the internal affairs of an
unincorporated association so as to settle disputes between the members, or questions of policy,
discipline, or internal government, so long as the government of the society is fairly and honestly administered
in conformity with its laws and the law of the land, and no property or civil rights are invaded. Under such
circumstances, the decision of the governing body or established private tribunal of the association is binding
and conclusive and not subject to review or collateral attack in the courts. "

o where law and justice so require, and the proceedings of the association are subject to judicial review
where there is fraud, oppression, or bad faith, or where the action complained of is capricious,
arbitrary, or unjustly discriminatory.
o Also, the courts will usually entertain jurisdiction to grant relief in case property or civil rights are
invaded, although it has also been held that the involvement of property rights does not necessarily
authorize judicial intervention, in the absence of arbitrariness, fraud or collusion.
o Moreover, the courts will intervene where the proceedings in question are violative of the laws of the
society, or the law of the land, as by depriving a person of due process of law.
o Similarly, judicial intervention is warranted where there is a lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
tribunal conducting the proceedings, where the organization exceeds its powers, or where the
proceedings are otherwise illegal.