1

KIERKEGAARD ON FAITH
Raphael Hudson

Sren Kierkegaard utilised a method of indirect communication involving pseudonyms and

dialectical tension in his writing, ostensively to make the reader work to understand his actual
thought in sufficient depth for upbuilding to occur. As a result, although he suggested that his
work must be viewed as a dialectical whole,1 we do not know how exactly to meld Kierkegaards
works into a coherent whole. In a similar way, we are unable to attach many of Dostoyevskys
ideas to either to himself or to his characters. In this essay, I will show that Kierkegaards
conception of faith and the ethical, proposes a dualistic morality which can deal with the
problems of paradox and objective uncertainty via a dialectical relation between the ethical and
the subjective primacy of the particular in faith. Notwithstanding the aforementioned problems
with Kierkegaards method of indirect communication, I will attempt to show this by examining
the nexus between faith in Fear and Trembling and subjectivity as truth in his Concluding
Unscientific Postscript, and attempt to generate a philosophical theory of faith from these texts
taken together.2 I will then apply this theory to the Grand Inquisitors account of his actions in
Dostoyevskys The Brothers Karamazov, by contending that the account can be understood
adequately, and even clarified, within Kierkegaards theory of faith as I elaborate it.

Firstly, I examine Kierkegaards pseudonym Climacus claim in the Postscript that subjectivity
is truth, as a general theory operating within the bounds of essential knowledge, that
encompasses a logical theory centring around the paradoxical class of the absurd, and a
distinct existential insight emphasising the importance of the particular how, which is
dialectically qualified by the Christian-oriented theory subjectivity is untruth. Secondly, I
analyse the concept of faith and its relationship to the dialectical double movement Johannes
describes in Fear and Trembling, including the underlying notion of qualified subjective primacy
in the face of objective uncertainty. Thirdly, I consider to what extent The Grand Inquisitors
monologue can be understood in terms of Kierkegaards overall faith-model, and to what extent
the two views of faith accord with one another.

I - SUBJECTIVITY IS TRUTH
The question Climacus wants to answer in Concluding Unscientific Postscript is how do I
become a Christian? Or, otherwise put, what are the preconditions for faith that will give me the
possibility of becoming a Christian, what is truth within the realm of faith?3 The answer given is
subjectivity, but in a special sense. Johannes conception of subjectivity relies on the nexus
between faith, uncertainty, and subjectivity; the objective recognition of the limits of objectivity
in the face of the paradox of the absurd; the concept of upbuildings concentration on the truth
for the subject; and the dialectical razor, implicit in the dictum that subjectivity is untruth.

A - Objectivity And Reason

In order to show the type of truth which is appropriate to faith, namely that linked to uncertainty,
Climacus demonstrates that the idea that objective dispassionate thought, is the primary path to
human fulfilment,4 is inadequate. For Climacus, objectivity represents the tendency to eliminate
the potentially contaminating influence of the subjects perspective in order to obtain a
universally valid viewpoint.5 It involves a telos towards certainty which makes choices and
commitments unnecessary.6 However, Climacus contends that this ideal is self-defeating, since
facts and ideas have meaning only when used appropriately within their contexts. The absence of
inwardness in affirming objective truths is a kind of madness.7 Apart from this undesirable ideal,
for Climacus, the objectivist project is unfeasible for existing human beings. The problem with
objectivity is that the human knower is situated in existence,8 which means that the subject and
often the object of knowledge are in a process of becoming.9 Hence, for Climacus not only is the
Hegelian System never complete, but objective knowledge of facts (as opposed to abstract
logical truths) is not possible.10 At most, it is an approximation based on changing evidence and
perspective.11 For Climacus, this exposes the fallacy of an objectivist method in pursuing truth
which has significance for the person in realms which relate to subjects, not objects, viz. Faith.

Climacus contends that subjectivity is a crucial factor in some kinds of knowledge, depending on
the degree to which the passionate interest of the subject is required. This would seem to include
cases where the transformation of the self is required to shape ones life, as in the example of
Christianity.12 Subjectivity is truth where the knowing pertains to existencewhose relation to
existence is essential.13 However, only ethical and ethical-religious knowledge is essential
knowing. 14 Hence, Climacus proposes a formula for subjective truth that truth is precisely the
venture which chooses an objective uncertainty with the passion of the infinite.15 This is not an
alternative epistemological basis to objectivity. Rather it is a momento of the fork in the road,
where the way swings off,16 where the subject realises that to edify oneself and become a
subject one must follow this alternative theory.17 This formula is derived by noticing that
interested passion is closely linked to the project of actualising cognised possibilities in ones
own life uncertainty about life makes a choice possible.18 For Climacus, this is the distinction
between Christendoms objective faith, which is paganism, and Christian faith. If something is
objectively certain, then it does not make sense to believe in it. Rather it is known, since belief
entails the power of the subject to decide. Hence, there is a fundamental link between uncertainty
(or risk) and faith.19 The combination of paradoxical uncertainty and resolution generates passion
and inwardness. Hence, the less objective reliability, the deeper is the possible inwardness.20
Thus, for Climacus, an objective uncertainty held fast in an appropriation-process of the most
passionate inwardness is the truth, the highest truth attainable for an existing individual... [this] is
an equivalent expression for faith. Without risk there is no faith. Faith is precisely the
contradiction between the infinite passion of the individuals inwardness and the objective
uncertainty.21
To understand this definition of faith, which lies behind Climacus claim that truth is
subjectivity, it is necessary to understand his category of the paradox, or as he often misleadingly
terms it, the absurd.22 Climacus has established that the relevant category for the subject is
belief (since belief underscores choice), but in ordinary situations although decisions involve
some kind of risk, we make decisions upon the degree of objective certainty the idea
commands.23 However, what Climacus is proposing is that there is a category of belief which is
inaccessible to objective reason, for which the truth is in subjectivity alone. This category is
contradictory (incomprehensible), but not nonsense. In a journal entry Kierkegaard explains it
thus:
That is what I have developed (for example, in Concluding Postscript) That not every absurdity is the
absurd or the paradox. The activity of reason is to distinguish the paradox negatively but no more. The
absurd, the paradox, is composed in such a way that reason has no power at all to dissolve it in nonsense;
no it is a symbol, a riddle, a compound riddle about which reason must say: I cannot solve it, it cannot be
understood, but it does not follow thereby that it is nonsense.24
While some abstract propositions can be understood by reason to be false, and in this sense
nonsense, some ideas are objectively incomprehensible paradox. Reason cannot verify their
truth claim because they are beyond the limits of reason.25 In fine, a thorough application of
objective reason to possible candidates of belief will negatively distinguish the realm of the
paradox by distinguishing the limits of reason. Thus for Kierkegaard:
Nonsense therefore he cannot believe against the understanding for precisely the understanding will discern
that it is nonsense and will prevent him from believing it; but he makes so much use of the understanding
that he becomes aware of the incomprehensible, and then holds to this believing against the
understanding.26
Climacus presents us with two types of paradox in the Postscript: the Socratic paradox that the
eternal truth is related to an existing individual,27 which is a relative paradox; and the Christian
paradox, the absurd, which is that the eternal truth has come into being in time, that God has
come into being,28 which is an absolute paradox. The Socratic paradox is a paradox and not
nonsense because it accuses the human being as being the source of the paradox and in effect
accus[es] human reason of finitude.29 However, it is only a relative paradox since it can be
mediated by presuming that although that part of reason which is finite has no access to the
eternal, that part of us which is eternal (objective reason not linked to the body) can gain access
to the eternal truth through recollection.30 The Christian paradox also assumes the Socratic
paradox, but then postulates that the eternal truth itself (Christ) is a contradiction, viz. God has
come into being as a man. So, even if the eternal part of us can gain access to the eternal truth
through objectivity, objectively the paradox is inaccessible to reason since it is itself a paradox.
Hence:
When Socrates believed that there was a God, he held fast to the objective uncertainty with the whole
passion of his inwardness, and it is precisely in this contradiction and in this risk, that faith is rooted. Now
it is otherwise. Instead of the objective uncertainty, there is here a certainty, namely that objectively it is
absurd [inaccessible to any form of reason]; and this absurdity held fast in the passion of inwardness is
faith.31

It is now clear, I think, why, when considering the truth of the subject, Climacus proposes that
subjectivity is truth. In this last form of faith, reason, which has found its limit, must be
transcended (suspended) and belief must be a subjective decision based on some reason based in
actuality, and not in objective reason. Evans argues that this occurs through the human being
having some sort of experience which leads him to believe the absurd, which is akin to the
Lutheran idea of grace.32 In this respect, subjectivity is truth to the extent that one has the
subjective passion to follow ones experience against understanding. I think that this is a
narrow interpretation of Climacus Religiousness B (Climacus Christian version of religion),
after all Climacus says :
I contemplate nature in the hope of finding God, and I see omnipotence and wisdom: but I also see much
else that disturbs my mind and excites anxiety.33
In my opinion, it would be reasonable to argue that on Kierkegaards view, faith could be found
through subjectivity in embracing with infinite passion the paradox via the objectively uncertain
corroboration experience gives us from nature, even though Climacus, like Johannes De Silentio
in another way, is unable to do this. On this view, grace would not be required, rather reason
could establish the possibility of faith, and a subjective intuition or experience, could provide the
necessary impetus for actual faith.34

B - Particularity And Edification: The How

However, subjectivity is truth also has a broader meaning, Climacus tells us that when
subjectivity is truth, then the question is based on the how of the subject, not the what:
When the question of truth is raised in an objective manner reflection is directed objectively to the truth as
an object to which the knower is related. Reflection is not focused upon the relationship, however but upon
the question of whether it is truth to which the knower is related. If only the object to which he is related is
the truth, the subject is accounted to be in the truth. When the question of the truth is raised subjectively,
reflection is directed subjectively to the nature of the individuals relationship: if only the mode of this
relationship is in the truth the individual is in the truth even if he should happen to be thus related to what is
not true [with regards to knowledge of God] subjectively, reflection is directed to the question of whether
the individual is related to a something in such a manner that his relation is in truth a God-relationship.35
Perkins has pointed out that this concept can be seen as a mirror for Kierkegaards other concept
of upbuilding (edification).36 Given Climacus interest in the truth of the subject, this can be
conceived as an emphasis on how we relate to the what in our lives. Subjectivity is truth because
it is only through passionate interest (pathos) that some objective truths can edify us. Since we
cannot know truths of fact with certainty, then what matters is how we relate to them. According
to Perkins, an upbuilding belief is an honest subjective interest in the truth of another (i.e. of
Christ or a paradox).37 What Perkins does not realise, is that within the Postscript this applies
specifically to Christianity, because Climacus, in the Lutheran tradition, considers Christianity to
be prescriptive knowledge38 i.e. Christianity does not concern itself with the existence of God,
(that is given), but how to live in a God-relationship. The true emphasis in discovering truth in
faith is thus on the particular in itself, not on the objective truth value of the particular. Honest
subjectivity in the paradox is the only way to obtain faith. Thus for Climacus, a thorough
knowledge of the how in Christianity will affirm the truth that one is in a faithful-relationship.
For example, Barrett points out that the presence of God in the created order, a what, cannot
be discerned without the appropriately passionate inwardness, the how.39 Or, otherwise
expressed, an honest receptivity to the true what of existence is a necessary presupposition for
certain whats within essential knowing.

C - Subjectivity Is Untruth: Dialectical Sharpener

The final element in Climacus dialectical maze of subjectivity is truth is a statement that
Kierkegaard scholars have almost entirely ignored that subjectivity is untruth.40 This is the
dialectical sharpener which saves Kierkegaard from a position of relativism, and compels the
reader towards the specifically Christian version of faith. For Kierkegaard, subjectivity is truth
without the qualifier that subjectivity is untruth is merely Religiousness A. Subjectivity for
Climacus is untruth for two reasons. Firstly, subjectivity is untruth because although passionate
inwardness is necessary for Christianity, Every Christian has pathos as in religiousness A,41
pathos is not sufficient. Subjectivity is untruth because Christianity is not contained within
human pathos, but needs to be given as a what before it is appropriated subjectively.42
Kierkegaard explains it elsewhere in this way:
And one does not become a Christian by being moved by something indefinitely higher, and not every
outpouring of religious emotion is a Christian outpouring. That its to say: emotion which is Christian is
checked by the definition of Christian concepts, and when emotion is transposed or expressed in words in
order to be communicated, the transposition must occur constantly within the definition of concepts.43
Secondly, subjectivity is untruth because of the subjective tendency to become objective about
things. This is because of the inward human tendency to want to become independent or
autonomous from God, which Christianity calls sin.44 This second form is just a specific type of
the first form. It is the tendency of subjectivity to glorify its own inwardness and justify itself in
a relativist manner through ironic resignation.

In summary, many commentators influenced by the misleading clarity of analytical thought, have
either rejected the Postscript as irrational or read into the work a singular meaning that it does
not exhibit. The result has been persistent debate and judicial fudging. I have argued in contrast
for a pluralistic and dialectical interpretation of Climacus theory. On my account the Postscript
gives us a theory of faith which sets itself in opposition to the inadequate objective approach to
truth in faith, and deals ultimately with paradoxical matters beyond the limits of objective reason.
That subjectivity is truth, implies for Climacus not only that any faithful belief must be actively
subjectively held, but that the content of Christian beliefs fundamentally centre around a concern
for the how of existence. Lastly, we are given a dialectical razor in subjectivity is untruth,
which narrows the scope of subjective beliefs until we are ultimately presented with the Christian
belief as the most appropriate candidate for faith.45 On my reading, this is the philosophical
foundation underpinning much of Kierkegaards works. The theory is significant, since in its
heroic but carefully considered elements, it presents a jarring contrast to the cult of objectivity in
post-Renaissance philosophy. In subjectivity is truth we have a method and theory for
approaching areas like faith without presuppositions. Exactly what this means for faith is largely
filled out in Fear and Trembling.

II - FEAR AND TREMBLING

If Concluding Unscientific Postscript gives us a theorem to pursue truth in faith, then Fear and
Trembling analyses a real test case and delineates a dualistic morality which deals with
irresolvable dilemmas by suspending the ethical, in favour of a qualified primacy of the
subjective particularity that is faith.46 Having explained the salient features of Climacus
subjectivity is truth, without attempting to explain the argument of Fear and Trembling,47 I
will now examine Johannes De Silentios distinctions between the knight of infinite
resignation the knight of faith, and the tragic hero; and examine the teleological
suspension of the ethical in favour of an absolute duty to God in the light of Climacus theory of
subjectivity is truth. It will be my contention that in interpreting the work in this way, a
powerful conceptual framework for analysing faith is delineated.48

A - Knights and Heroes

In Fear and Trembling, by examining the test case of Abraham, Johannes tries to understand
how someone who acts in faith, a knight of faith, acts. Since Johannes does not have faith
himself, 49 he defines the knight of faith negatively, by distinguishing him from the knight of
infinite resignation, who has subjectively different attitudes to a dilemma, and the tragic hero,
who is both subjectively and objectively different. Since the idea of subjectivity is untruth is
what makes subjectivity is truth singularly Christian in the Postscript, it is not surprising that
in Johannes analysis of what characterises the knight of faith we are presented with a number
of examples where subjectivity is untruth from the Christian perspective. Firstly, there is a prima
facie difference between the appearance of the knight of faith and the knight of resignation
which is linked to Kierkegaards subjectivity of faith. While the knight of resignation are
instantly recognisable, their gait is gliding, bold,50 a knight of faith has nothing of the
strangeness and superiority that mark the knight of the infinite,51 but appears to belong entirely
to the finite world like any tax collector.52 Notwithstanding this however, viewed objectively,
there is no necessary difference between the actual actions of the knight of resignation and the
knight of faith.53 The fundamental difference between the two classes and the reason for their
different appearances is in the subjective movements they perform when faced with the
dilemmas of life.

The knight of resignation is not a subjective utilitarian risk minimiser. Rather, when faced with
the impossibility of possessing something that he wants (e.g. Isaac), he unifies his will on the
object as his most precious thing, then finitely renounces it. But at the same time, having
resigned the possibility of finite attainment of the wish, he eternalises his claim on, or love of the
object. He keeps it at the centre of his being, but as a Platonic-like form. This is explained by
Johannes in the example of the boy who loves a princess as:
His love for the princess would take on for him the expression of an eternal love, would acquire a religious
character, be transfigured into love for the eternal being which, although it denied fulfilment, still
reconciled him once more in the eternal consciousness of his loves validity in an eternal form that no

reality can take from him.54
As Lippitt puts it, the knight of resignation devalues the finite (or immanent) in favour of the
infinite (or transcendental).55 On the other hand, the knight of faith, like the knight of
resignation, resigns the possibility of finite joy humanly speaking, but retains his attachment
to the finite through the double movement of faith.

This distinction between the knight of resignation and the knight of faith is a mirror of
Kierkegaards distinction in The Concept of Irony between ironic resignation and reconciliation,
and religious resignation and reconciliation.56 The ironist resigns the possibility of being attached
to the uncertain whims of the finite and creates his own ideal reality. As Sderquist points out,
the ironist teleologically suspends the ethical [in the present context resigns the finite], but the
telos for this suspension is not a command of God as in Fear and Trembling but rather the
particular will of the individual.57 In other words, the movement of infinite resignation is a
humanly self-sufficient philosophical conceptual change. And yet in the Concept of Irony, too,
the ironic critical distance from the values of conventional life precedes the religious life.58
Hence, unlike the knight of resignation who infinitises his reality to achieve the only
reconciliation with it he sees as possible, an idealised one, the knight of faiths telos is to God.
His faith, despite his philosophical detachment59 from resignation at the impossibility of the
dilemma, is for this life.60 Yet his reconciliation in joy with actuality is through God if at all.
This nebulous concept is explained thus:
He drains in infinite resignation the deep sorrow of existence, he knows the bliss of infinity, he has felt the
pain of renouncing everything, whatever is most precious to him in the world, and yet finitude tastes just as
good as to one who has never known anything higher the whole earthly form he presents is a new
creation on the strength of the absurd. He is continually making the movement of infinity, but he makes it

with such accuracy and poise that he is continually getting finitude out of it.61
This double movement of faith appears to be a paradox similar to that encountered in the
Postscript. The KOF is supposed to continually be resigning the finite and embracing it on the
strength of the absurd. In Abrahams case (which is central to Fear and Trembling) this double
movement becomes the belief that Isaac will die and that Isaac will not die. This continual
movement has been seen as irrational by many commentators. The paradox is seen as Johannes
mistake because he is outside of faith.62 They rely on Kierkegaards statement that when the
believer has faith, the absurd is not absurd - faith transforms it the passion of faith is the only
thing which masters the absurd.63 Mooney uses this to escape the problem by interpreting the
double movement not as absurd, but as merely the capacity of human beings to have
contradictory emotions.64 This, despite the fact that it turns faith into indecisiveness, in contrast
to Johannes admiration of Abrahams decisiveness.65 Similarly, Hall interprets the movement of
resignation as an alternative possibility that one must be aware of, but continually annul in order
to faithfully embrace finitude.66 Halls interpretation that the movement of infinite resignation
must be a conscious temptation appears to be correct, since in terms of the Postscript,
uncertainty is necessary for subjective faith. But Halls insistence then that there is no absurd
duality is incorrect, since without the presence of finite resignation, Abraham is merely
deceiving himself. As Lippitt points out, Johannes states that he [Abraham] must know at the
decisive moment what he is about to do, and accordingly must know that Isaac is to be
sacrificed. If he doesnt he is an irresolute man simply a parody of faith.67

This can be explained by reference to the concept of absurd in the Postscript, where objective
reason is used to discover its own limits, and yet, due to some overriding intuition, the faithful
believe the objective uncertainty. In Abrahams case, reason is able to see that objectively all
signs point to the loss of Isaac, and yet through the subjective embrace of the absurd, Abraham
believes that he will have Isaac, notwithstanding his knowledge that he is going to kill Isaac. The
position is a duality, but not nonsense. It would appear that the knight of faith renounces the
finite philosophically, and embraces it through the absurd that is faith in God, although reason
continually recognises the impossibility of the finite. The distinguishing characteristics between
the knight of resignation and the knight of faith therefore is threefold: the knight of faiths
finite concern, his lack of self sufficiency, and the necessity of being ethically oriented in
resignation.

The other class to which the knight of faith does not belong, is that of the tragic hero. Like
the knight of resignation, for the tragic hero everything [meaning the finite] is lost.68 The
tragic hero is exemplified by Agamemnon, who must sacrifice his daughter to the gods so that
the fleet will have good sail to sack Troy. Importantly, however, for Johannes it is with heroism
that the father has to make that sacrifice.69 Agamennon acts heroically because his actions,
which hierarchically subordinate his personal duty, are for the well-being of the whole.70 The
fundamental difference between the knight of faith and the tragic hero is that the tragic
hero remains within the ethical. As Johannes puts it:
Abrahams whole action stands in no relation to the universal, it is purely private undertaking. While, then ,
the tragic hero is great through his deeds being an expression of the ethical life, Abraham is great through
an act of purely personal virtue.
Hence, the tragic hero is a species of the knight of resignation who acts with the ethicals
understanding. Understanding why the tragic hero can be comprehended when Abraham
cannot is central to understanding why faith allows a suspension of the ethical, so we will
discuss it presently. The significance of these distinctions is that they provide further
qualifications to the Postscripts subjectivity is truth theory. The classes might be conceived of
as an aspect of the subjectivity is untruth concept, provided that it is acknowledged that the
knight of infinite resignation and the tragic hero are not a priori inappropriate classes qua
existence; they represent different possible attitudes to existence. Moreover, the knight of
infinite resignation and tragic hero classes negatively distinguish the defining characteristics of
the faithful individual, who exemplifies the Postscript theory.

B - Suspending The Ethical: The Paradox of Faith

There are three ways in which Abrahams actions as portrayed in Fear and Trembling cannot be
understood within the ethical, given Johannes theory that the ethical as such is the universal.71
These correspond to three ethical theories which Johannes can be seen to undermine: Kantian
absolutism; Hegels concept of Sittlichkeit (ethical life) as the universal; and the logical
metaethical consequences of the universalizability principle.

Firstly, Kant proposed that the ethical was the universal such that I should never act except in
such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law.72 Under this view
of ethics, ethical laws admit no exceptions. As Lippit puts it, I would not be allowed to kill a
human being, even if commanded to do so by God.73 It has been argued by some that
Kierkegaard found this view preposterous74 and Abraham is said to teleologically suspend the
ethical because his case is one where we are compelled not to pronounce moral condemnation
upon him and yet Kants categorical imperative cannot encompass his intent to kill his son Isaac.
It is certain that Kierkegaard thought there could be exceptions to such an absolutist position (his
characterisation of Agamennon who kills a human being as within the ethical shows that), but
this does not explain why Abrahams case is exceptional among exceptions. This suggests that it
is a different ethical theory that Abraham suspends in his actions.

Secondly, for Hegel the ethical is the universal in the sense that although the individuals task is
to make his individual will conform to the universal will (Moralitt), this view of the universal
will must ultimately be subordinated to Sittlichkeit, the ethical life of ones society.75 Hence,
Abrahams being an individual higher than the universal means that Abraham considers his own
private relationship with God to take precedence over his social duties. Our contemporary ethical
life (Sittlichkeit), as in Kierkegaards time, finds Abrahams willingness to sacrifice his son on a
direct command from God, which stands to detriment only his own faithful worthiness,
unacceptable. As Johannes says, the individuals ethical task is to abrogate his particularity so as
to become the universal76 and Abrahams relation to Isaac, ethically speaking, is quite simply
this, that the father shall love the son more than himself.77 Abrahams private direct relation to
the absolute is Meinung (opinion) for Hegel. Meinung is my particular subjective idiosyncratic
meaning (think of Davidsons prior theories78), which cannot be expressed in the domain of
universal public language.79 Meinung for Hegel could conceivably make a principle out of what
is peculiar to particularity, placing it over the universal and realising it in action. This is evil.80
and renders religion moribund. Johannes
This conception of the ethical is its own telos81
summarises the Hegelian position as:
As soon as the single individual wants to assert himself in his particularity, in direct opposition to the
universal, he sins, and only by recognising this can he again reconcile himself with the universal.
Whenever, having entered the universal, the single individual feels an urge to assert his particularity, he is
in a sates of temptation, from which he can extricate himself only by surrendering his particularity to the
universal in repentance.82
It must be said that Kierkegaards constant dialectical sharpening of his endorsement of
subjectivity in the Postscript and Fear and Trembling suggests that like Hegel, he is concerned
by the possibly dangerous consequences of Meinung. Indeed, Kierkegaard attacked Shlegels
suspension of universal ethical requirements in favour of the desires of the particular
individual.83 However, on Hegels view Abraham is unavoidably Meinung. Abraham suspends
the ethical, and cannot speak. Since thought for Hegel consists in publicly available and
understandable concepts, which are therefore mediated by the confines of speech; and since for
Johannes all mediation occurs precisely by virtue of the universal;84 Abrahams particular
direct relationship (which renders him an individual, who, as the particular, stands in an
absolute relation to the absolute85 placing him as an individual above the universal,) cannot be
mediated. It is therefore a paradox inaccessible to thought86 viz. the telos of his suspension of
the ethical is a direct unmediated absolute duty to God.87

This brings us back to the tragic heroes, fathers who were prepared to sacrifice their sons for
something higher. All of these figures can be explained in universal, public, objectively
comprehensible language, and although some of these figures ostensive justifications discord
with contemporary social morality, they are all comprehensible and possibly commendable
within universal morality. In contrast, Abrahams explanation that it is a trial, we are being
tested,88 is not a reason which can be expressed or understood in Hegelian concepts. Its only
foundation is an unmediated privative relationship, which for Hegel is nonsense or evil.
Abraham in his action has gone beyond ethical explanations, in his action he overstepped the
ethical altogether, and had a higher telos outside it, in relation to which he suspended it.89
Therefore, for Johannes, Abrahams story contains a teleological suspension of the ethical.90

Thirdly, Johannes teleological suspension of the ethical can be read as not merely attacking
several ethical theories, but as making the deeper metaethical point that faith cannot be
encompassed by any objective logical ethical system due to the universalizability principle.
Edmund Santurri has suggested that Kierkegaards suspension of the ethical asserts that given
certain considerations pertinent to the logical rules governing moral judgments, the patriarchs
act defies moral approbation.91 This relies on the universability principle, which Santurri
identifies in Kierkegaards work viz. that when a given word is applicable in a certain context it
is applicable in all contexts where the same characteristics, or the same relevant characteristics,
are present.92 In terms of ethical judgements, this applies because value terms like good and bad
are void of meaning without reference to further descriptive concepts, which can only be
elucidated through analysis of the reasons given in support of the judgement.93 In Abrahams
case, saying that his judgement is good is not a universalizable judgement, without being
linked to some comprehensible description i.e. because he has faith in God which is
universalised, so that where every similar circumstance-description appears we can summarily
judge the situation, otherwise the judgement is nonsense. When applied to the Fear and
Trembling suspension, this principle becomes that Abrahams decision to sacrifice Isaac is not
normatively unethical, but cannot be logically morally commendable metaethically, and is
non-ethical if no intelligible reason for morally commending Abrahams act is obtainable.94 In
my opinion, Santurri is right to the extent that this point seems to be the broader concern behind
the differing contexts in which Johannes presents the suspension of the ethical. As Johannes puts
it:
Abraham keeps silent but he cannot speak. Therein lies the distress and anguish. For if I when I speak am
unable to make myself intelligible, then I am not speaking- even though I were to talk uninterruptedly day
and night. Such is the case with Abraham. He is able to utter everything, but one thing he cannot say, i.e.
say it in such a way that another understands it, and so he is not speaking.95
Abraham cannot speak, because the only reason he could give to justify his actions are
objectively absurd.

According to Johannes there are two ways that Abraham might justify his action: firstly, that he
loves Isaac; secondly, that it is a trial.96 To this Santurri adds the suggestion that the action is
teleological.97 Firstly, Abraham might say that he loved Isaac, so his action is a sacrifice not a
murder, but this justification is problematic:
The instant he is ready to sacrifice Isaac the ethical expression for what he does is this: he hates Isaac. But
if he really hates Isaac, he can be sure that God does not require this, for Cain and Abraham are not
identical, Isaac he must love with his whole soul; when God requires Isaac he must love him if possible
even more dearly, and only on this condition can he sacrifice him; for in fact it is this love for Isaac which,
by its Paradoxical opposition to his love for God, makes his act a sacrifice.98
The problem is not immediately obvious conceptually speaking, and appears to be bound up with
a Kantian ethical theory. However, the problem can be logically extracted if it is remembered
that Johannes contends that one cannot make analogies to Abrahams action:
In the whole world one will not find a single analogy (except a later instance which proves nothing), if it
stands fast that Abraham is the representative of faith, and that faith is normally expressed in him whose
life is not merely the most paradoxical that can be thought but so paradoxical that it cannot be thought at
all.99

As Santurri puts it, a comparison or analogization of Abrahams act with other acts is a priori
impossible because any complete and relevant classification of that act is unintelligible.100 In
other words, the difficulty is for the imagination101
in trying to think myself into102
Abraham.
Under the universalizability principle, any description we provide to justify a judgement claim
must be universably analogizable, lest we incur the charge of self-contradiction. So when
Johannes tells us that had he been called upon to sacrifice Isaac he could have done so but:
That I loved him with all my soul is the presumption apart from which the whole thing becomes a crime,
but yet I did not love like Abraham, for in that case I would have held back even at the last minute, though
not for this would I have arrived too late at Mount Moriah.103
He is making the point that analogy is impossible when the abstract thought of loving sacrifice is
applied to the reality of existence, wherein love entails not willing to kill. This makes the
sacrifice (the willing to kill) contradictory, and hence nonsense as a universalizable analogy or
description.104
The second possible justification, the trial, is also objectively nonsense. Again, the problem
with the trial justification only appears when it is attached to actual existence, here phrased as
common usage. This clarifies the significance of Johannes statement claiming that the trial
concept cannot provide moral justification for Abraham capable of sensible universalisation:
To the question, Why? Abraham has no answer except that it is a trial, a temptation (Fristelse) terms
which express the unity of two points of view: that it was for Gods sake and for his own sake. In
common usage these two ways of regarding the matter are mutually exclusive. Thus when we see a man do
something which does not comport with the universal, we say that he scarcely can be doing it for Gods
sake, and by that we imply that he does it for his own sake.105
When situated within existence, the claim is objectively self-contradictory: that I do something
for Gods sake means acting not for my sake within the context of temporal existence. This
demonstrates why Abrahams action, described as teleological, is not an ends justifies means
justification. We cannot claim that Abrahams action is entirely for God since it is a trial in
which he is being tested. Passing the trial can only be oriented towards to proving his worthiness.
Or alternatively to show his worthiness to please his God (which can only finally be linked to
satisfying his own albeit perhaps selfless volition.) All justifications therefore appear to be
objectively absurd. The consequence of which is that any objective ethical system which relies
on objective universalisation cannot morally commend Abrahams action.

This means that if we are to hold up Abraham as a knight of faith whose actions are
commendable, then it can only be because in faith subjectivity is truth. That the
incomprehensible justifications, whose possibility seems uncertain at best, cannot be embraced
without a subjectively orientated catalyst whose basis is not in objective ethical systems.
Johannes has shown, in Edward Mooneys terms, that there are dilemmas that ethics can give no
clear answer to:
[A] terrible deadlock where inescapable requirements clash an ordeal of reason which leaves an individual
without the comfort of moral assurance or definitive guidance.106
Any commendation of Abraham, therefore, must assume that he suspends the ethical in favour of
the subjective primacy of an absolute duty to God. Of course, we could still condemn Abraham,
saying that his justifications avoid ethical commendation because he is morally in the wrong.
But, getting back to the Postscript uncertainty-thesis, this is not appropriate within the context of
faith, since it implicitly denies the existence of a God-relationship to the eternal truth, something
which is for Kierkegaard outside the limits of reason and squarely within the confines of the
subjective, viz. the absurd. If Abraham is a KOF, Johannes (rightly in my opinion) tells us that:
Faith is this paradox, that the individual as the particular is higher than the universal, is justified over
against it, is not subordinate but superior yet in such a way be it observed, that it is the particular
individual who after he has been subordinated as the particular to the universal, now through the universal
becomes the individual who as the particular is superior to the universal, for the fact that the individual as
the particular stands in an absolute relation to the absolute Faith is this paradox- or else Abraham is
lost.107

It is my contention that we can now understand Kierkegaards concept of faith as it is presented

from the philosophical standpoint.108 In the Postscript, we were given an abstract theory of truth
in faith. The theory entailed the rejection of objective supremacy in existential thought, and an
emphasis on the importance of active subjective appropriation of uncertain truths, tempered by
the dialectical confines of subjectivity as untruths array of essentially Christian concepts. Fear
and Trembling then looked at one of the situations when this theory operates, the objective
dilemma. In the manner later explicated in the Postscript, Johannes negatively distinguished
several possible forms of subjectivity, which either do not separate themselves sufficiently from
objectivity, or do so in a manner inappropriate to faith. This clarifies the status of the faithful
response, which centres around the paradox of the absurd and unsurprisingly turns out to be
beyond the scope of both ethical systems and ethical judgements. Which leaves us with the
cash-value consequence that faith for Kierkegaard entails a subjective life choice which may not
rest within normative confines, but which, if it is to be an upbuilding lifestyle which is
appropriately subjective, will ultimately be governed by Christian concepts. However, although
this may be the final consequence for faith of the combination of the two theories, the completed
fusion provides a plethora of distinctions capable of operating as a conceptual framework for
analysing dealings qua faith. I will now apply the analysis to Dostoyevskys work, The Brothers
Kamarazov.

III - DOSTOYEVSKY: THE GRAND INQUISITOR

In The Brothers Kamarazov Dostoyevsky presents us with a famous monologue directed by The
Grand Inquisitor to Jesus. The story can be understood within the conceptual framework of
Kierkegaards109 concept of faith as I have elucidated it. I will examine two areas: firstly, I will
examine how the depiction of the Jesus figures silence accords with Kierkegaards ideas of
subjectivity and the paradox in faith; secondly, I will contend that the Grand Inquisitor can be
seen as for the most part recognising Kierkegaards version of faith in terms of subjectivity, but
rejecting it in favour of the objective tragic heroism and ironic resignation.

A -Dostoyevskys Jesus
Dostoyevskys portrayal of Jesus in Ivans poem accords with Kierkegaards idea of subjectivity
and the paradox as fundamental to the truth in faith. Prima facie the objective depiction of Jesus
as universally recognisable110 does not sound like Johannes knight of faith, but that is not
surprising since Jesus is the object of faith, not a man of faith. However, the depiction of the
prisoner as silent has its basis in two Kierkegaardian factors, one of which the Grand Inquisitor
explains, the other is implicit in the Grand Inquisitors view of Jesus faith. Firstly, the Grand
Inquisitor tell us that Jesus:
may not add anything to what has been said before and so as not to deprive men of the freedom which you
upheld so strongly when you were on earth. All that you [Jesus] might reveal anew would encroach on
mens freedom of faith, for it would come as a miracle.
This suggests a view of faith similar to that of Climacus, which has subjective freedom as a
fundamental presupposition. Jesus cannot speak because any response to the Grand Inquisitors
account of Jesus faith as ethically unjust might produce objective justification, which would
reduce the possible inwardness that comes with an objectively uncertain faith. Secondly, since
the Grand Inquisitor accepts that Jesus faith is based around objectively absurd ideas which he
terms to serve madness,111 the text implicitly acknowledges that Jesus could not speak because
any true response he could give in justification for the kind of suspension of the ethical that the
Grand Inquisitor accuses Jesus of (setting up a faith unattainable to most men for the good of the
few) would be based on those fundamental ideas which are objectively absurd. The Grand
Inquisitor who, has lapsed into an objective understanding of the world, could not hear
(understand) Jesus words if he were to speak. This strongly accords with Johannes idea that a
knight of faith cannot speak.
B - Faith Through The Eyes Of The Grand Inquisitor
The Grand Inquisitors portrayal of Jesus faith manifests many of the concerns about the
inadequacy of objectivity, and about subjectivity as untruth found in Kierkegaards analysis of
faith, but his portrayal is from the standpoint of tragic heroism and ironic resignation.

Firstly, like Kierkegaard, the Grand Inquisitor recognises, that Jesus faith is based on
uncertainty and paradox and that subjectivity is thus truth in faith. The Grand Inquisitor portrays
Jesus rejection of providing objective justification for peoples beliefs by finding concrete
rewards for their faith, in the terms of Jesus refusing to buy mens free choice with bread.112 But
the Grand Inquisitor also recognises that subjectivity which is at the heart of Jesus faith is
untruth, because of the subjective tendency of man towards objectivity. For the Grand Inquisitor,
mans ultimate desire is to be able to universalise their wants and thoughts, thus qua worship the
absolutely essential thing is that they should do so all together. It is this need for universal
worship that is the chief torment of every man individually.113 Hence the Grand Inquisitor
paraphrases Satans first temptation as:
You want to go into the world and you are going empty-handed, with some promise of freedom, which men
in the simplicity and their innate lawlessness cannot even comprehend, which they fear and dread- for
nothing has ever been more unendurable to man and human society than freedom!114
The Grand Inquisitor, in effect, accuses Jesus of suspending the ethical by setting a standard of
faith devoid of objectivity, which exhibits a want of love for the weak men who cannot
appropriately deal with their sinful desire for objective autonomy, not for the good of the whole,
but for the good of the few God-like115 who can. Hence his condemnation:
There is nothing more alluring to man than this freedom of conscience, but there is nothing more
tormenting, either. And instead of firm foundations for appeasing mans conscience once and for all, you
chose everything that was exceptional, enigmatic and vague, you chose everything that was beyond the
strength of men, acting consequently, as if you did not love them at all you who came to give your life for
them!116
Kierkegaard would have of course agreed, but he would argue that grace was the element that
made subjective appropriation of a faith founded upon the paradox beyond human reason
obtainable for mankind. However, like Kierkegaard, the Grand Inquisitor realises that neither can
man find content in an objective approach to reality. Since although through objectivity man may
realise that there is no crime, and therefore, no sin, but there are only hungry people,117 and try
to convert this utilitarian principle into a system for existence, the dreadful Tower of Babel will
rise again.118 Like the first one, it will not be completed119 since existential systems are
impossible. The Grand Inquisitor thus recognises that although objectively motivated men may
suspend the ethical, it is through ironic resignation. Their suspension is for their own will and
utility, but since this kind of resignation divorces human beings from a meaningful relation to
reality they will return to the Church and cry out to us, Feed us, for those who have promised
us fire from heaven have not given it to us!120 In essence, the Grand Inquisitor proposes to
complete the System (Tower of Babel) by providing definite answers which are objectively
certain, and proposes to give them back religious meaning but in an objective manner, supported
by the authority of mystery. He provides a renewed ethical ideal to mankind, and in so doing
he is teleologically suspending the ethical towards the telos of the ethical! Which renders him
within the ethical ambit. Hence for the Grand Inquisitor, That deception will be our suffering,
for we shall be forced to lie.121
Secondly, as a consequence of this action the Grand Inquisitor is no longer a knight of faith,
but has succumbed to the temptation of the ethical and become a tragic hero, who falsely takes
mans sin upon himself for the good of the whole. The Grand Inquisitor probably within the
knight of resignation class not the knight of faith. As he states:
Know that I, too was in the wilderness, that I, too. Fed upon locusts and roots, that I, too, blessed freedom,
with which you have blessed men, and that I, too, was preparing to stand among your chosen ones, among
the strong and mighty, thirsting to make myself of the number. But I woke up and refused to serve
madness.122
The Grand Inquisitor appears to see faith as purely subjective. He therefore emphasises that
Jesus rejected miracle as a way of securing mens worship. Unlike the knight of faith, his faith
was monastic. He had resigned the possibility of embracing finitude on the strength of the
absurd, and he was therefore, like Johannes, at most a knight of resignation.123

However, with his action the Grand Inquisitor becomes a tragic hero. He lies to people giving
authoritative answers to uncertain questions and permits them to sin by tak[ing] it upon
ourselves. His justification for breaking with the ethical is the hierarchically higher ethical
justification of the good of the whole:
Everything they bring to us we shall give them our decision for it all, and they will be glad to believe in our
division, because it will relieve them of their great anxiety and of their present terrible torments of coming
to a free decision themselves. And they will be happy, all the millions of creatures, except the hundred
thousand who rule over them. For we alone, we alone guard the mystery, we alone shall be unhappy.124
Like Aloysha, we can speculate that he becomes a tragic hero because he has resigned the
Yet he still deals with the finite, wanting ethical
rational possibility of God, godlessness. 125
satisfaction not through God, but through his own will, which in Kierkegaards terms is ironic
resignation. That he is settled in this role is confirmed by Ivans ending, where we are told that
although he has received the subjective intuition to believe something further through grace since
The kiss glows in his heart,126 he is resigned in such an inappropriate way that he consciously
gives primacy to his objective reasons, viz. the old man sticks to his idea.127 So we can see that
from a Kierkegaardian perspective, the actions of the man stem from his incorrect view of what
an appropriate approach to faith would be. His is the lot of subjectivity is untruth.

In conclusion, in his two works Concluding Unscientific Postscript and Fear and Trembling
Kierkegaard gives us a theory for truth in faith and an in depth analysis of its theoretical
implications. Together this forms a conceptual framework, which is useful as it gives us a way of
understanding and categorising peoples dealings with faith. The Grand Inquisitor is but one
example of the consequences of taking a subjectively incorrect approach to matters of faith. In
the final analysis, we can affirm that Kierkegaards conception of faith reinvigorates an area
which has often been robbed of meaning through overly objective approaches like Hegels,
which are logically shown to be inappropriate through the two works. One suspects, however,
that his approach to Christianity undervalues certain important relationships between aesthetics,
ethics and religion, and ultimately notwithstanding his dialectical sharpeners, leaves the faithful
subject dancing on a razors edge over the abyss of nihilism into which some later existentialist
thought fell.
1 H. Ferguson (1995) Melancholy And The Critique of Modernity: Sren Kierkegaards
Religious Psychology, London: Routledge, p. 150.
2 This is somewhat controversial due to Kierkegaards pseudonym use. Although I acknowledge
that it is sometimes necessary to separate Kierkegaard from sentiments of the pseudonym I read
Johannes De Silent as being silent about the definite meaning of his text, and Johannes Climacus
has providing such a meaning from a philosophical outlook.
3 M. Westphal (2002) The Subjective Issue Truth Is Subjectivity, in D. Conway (ed) Sren
Kierkegaard: Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers, Routledge: New York p.306.
4 S. Evans (1983) Kierkegaards "Framgnetsand "Postscript: The Religious Philosophy of
Johannes Climacus, Atlantic Highlands NJ: Humanities Press, p.119-23.
5 S. Kierkegaard (1941) Concluding Unscientific Postscript, D. Swenson and W. Lowrie (transl.)
Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1: p. 11.
6 Ibid. p. 203.
7 Ibid. p. 194. For example, my repeated enthusiastic affirmation that I believe that 2 +2 = 4 (an
objective certainty) would appear inappropriate to the discerning audience familiar with the
distinct experiences of knowledge and belief. Indeed, one becomes uncertain that the uttered
claim is even being used in any ordinary sense.
8 S, Kierkegaard (1992) Concluding Unscientific Postscript, H. V. Hong and E. H. Hong
(transl.) vol. 1, p. 85. As quoted in M. Westphal, op cit. p. 296.
9 M. Westfal op cit. 296.
10 M. Piety (1996) Kierkegaard On Religious Knowledge, in History of European Ideas, vol.
22, No. 2, pp. 106.
11 S. Kierkegaard CUP (Swenson), op cit. 1: p.189. For example so called scientific truths an
atom is indivisible, the world is flat were an approximation on the logically unverifiable
evidence of the time.
12 L. Barrett (1984) Subjectivity Is Untruth, in G. A. Macon (ed), International Kierkegaard
Commentary: Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, Mercer
University Press 291-306, in D. Conway (ed) Sren Kierkegaard: Critical Assessments of
Leading Philosophers, Routledge: New York p.26-27, Referring to S. Kierkegaard CUP
(Swenson) op cit. 1: p.197)
13 S. Kierkegaard CUP (Hong) op cit. p. 198. As quoted in M. Westphal op cit. p. 297.
14 Ibid.
15 S. Kierkegaard CUP (Swenson) op cit. 2: p.182.
16 Ibid.
17 R. Perkins (1990) Kierkegaard, A Kind Of Epistemologist, in History of European Ideas,
12 (1) 7-18 in Conway, D (ed) Sren Kierkegaard: Critical Assessments of Leading
Philosophers, Routledge: New York p. 224.
18L. Barrett op cit. p.26.
19 G. Shufreider (1981) Kierkegaard on Belief Without Justification, in Int J Phil Rel Volume
12, p.149.
20 S. Kierkegaard CUP (Hong) op cit. 1: p. 209.
21 S. Kierkegaard (1959) excerpts from Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the
Philosophical Fragments, in R. Brefall (ed.) A Kierkegaard Anthology, New York: The
Modern Library, p. 215
22 The problem is that whereas the unfamiliar reader is likely to recognise that something
paradoxical has no ascertainable truth value, something absurd is usually assumed to be
manifestly false. Of course sometimes particular concepts within the class of the absurd will
appear to be false to reason, but in these cases some overriding subjective experience transforms
the proposition from false to paradox. This experience could it seems post facto become
objectively accountable for the subject who experienced it.
23 G. Shufrieder (1983) The Logic of the Absurd, in Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, Vol XLIV.
24 H. V. and E. Hong (eds) (1967) Sren Kierkegaards Journals and Papers, vol I,
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, p. 5. (My italics)
25 G. Shufrieder (1983) op cit. p.68-70.
26 S. Kierkegaard CUP (Swenson) op cit. 2: p. 504. [my italics]
27 S. Kierkegaard CUP (Brefall) op cit. p. 219.
28 Ibid, p. 220.
29 G. Shufrieder op cit. P. 73.
30 S. Kierkegaard CUP (Brefall) op cit. p. 216.
31 Ibid. pp. 219-220.
32 C. Evans (1992) Reason And The Paradox, in Passionate Reason: Making sense of
Kierkegarrds Philisophical Fragments, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992, pp
96-118, in D. Conway (ed) Sren Kierkegaard: Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers,
Routledge: New York p.107.
33 S. Kierkegaard CUP (Brefall) op cit. p.215.
34 Although I do not have space to pursue this hear, I see no reason why such an intuition would
have to be a God-given experience. Rather, it could be a carefully considered Pascal-like
response, even based on some emotion such as dread of an atheistic reality.
35 S. Kierkegaard CUP (Brefall) op cit. p. 211.
36 R. Perkins op cit. P 224.
37 Ibid, 233. Perkins gives us the example of comparing Jesus dying on the cross for humanity
with Socrates taking the Hemlock, both according to Perkins are in the truth regardless of the
objective truth, because of their sincere attitude towards the truth which upbuilds them.
38 M. Piety (1996) op cit. p. 108
39 L. Barrett op cit. pp. 26-27. Referring to S. Kierkegaard CUP (Swenson), 1: p.243.
40 S. Kierkegaard CUP (Brefall) op cit. p.217.
41 S. Kierkegaard CUP (Swenson) op cit. 1: p.582.
42 L. Barrett op cit. p.29. Referring to S. Kierkegaard CUP (Swenson) op cit. 1:243.
43 Sren Kierkegaard Practice in Christianity, Walter Lowrie (transl.) (1955) New York NY:
Harper & Prow Publishers, p. 163.
44 S. Kierkegaard CUP (Brefall) op cit. p. 218.
45 L. P. Pojman (1981) The Logic of Subjectivity, Southern Journal of Philosophy, Spring pp.
73-84. Who takes this point too far in arguing that Kiekegaards argument in the postscript is an
argument intending to prove the truth of Christianity.
46 Of course the Postscript was actually written after Fear and Trembling. In typical
Kierkegaard fashion he gives us an ambiguous concept and then explains it at length some time
later. However, unfortunately with the exception of Edward Mooney (discussed below) no
commentators have explicitly compared the two works in this way.
47 It has been dealt with in much detail elsewhere and it would be prolix for me to repeat it here.
48 I do not intend to argue that other readings of Fear and Trembling are not possible or
meritous. Stephen Mulhall has presented a Christian reading of the work which interprets the
work allegorically to exhibit a specific Christian method. There may be some merit to this
position, but even so, pace Mulhall it is undeniable that the work does manifest several
philosophical points. S. Mulhall (2001) Inheritance and Originality: Wittgenstein, Heidegger,
Kierkegaard, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
49 S. Kierkegaard (1985) Fear and Trembling, A. Hannay (trans) Harmondsworth: Penguin, p.
66.
50 Ibid. p. 67.
51 Ibid. p. 68.
52 Ibid. p. 69.
53 B. Sderquist (2002) The Religious Suspension of the Ethical and the Ironic Suspension of
the Ethical: The Problem of Actuality in Fear and Trembling, in Sren Kierkegaard Studies
volume 4, p. 272.
54 S. Kierkegaard, FT op cit. p. 72. (my italics)
55 J. Lippitt (2003) Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Kierkegaard and Fear and Trembling,
New York: Routledge, p. 46. (Italics in original)
56 B. Sderquist op cit. p. 268. This also shows that the knight of resignation need not be
within the ethical but can be outside it, thus there is yet another way in which subjectivity is
untruth operates to narrow faiths specific utilisation of subjectivity is truth since the knight of
faith needs to perform the movement of resignation but must be ethically serious.
57 Ibid. p.264. (my italics)
58 Ibid. p. 270.
59 J. Lippitt, op cit. p. 46.
60 S. Kierkegaard, FT op cit. p.53.
61 Ibid, p. 70.
62 J. Lippitt op cit. p. 55.
63 S. Kierkegaard (1967-68) Sren Kierkegaards Journals and Papers, ed. and trans. Howard
V. and Edna H. Hong, volume 1, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, p. 10.
64 E. Mooney (1991) Knights of Faith and Resignation: Reading Kierkegaards Fear and
Trembling, Albany: State University of New York Press, p. 58.
65 A. C. Habbard (2002) Time and testimony, contemporaneity and communication: a reading
of the ethical in Kierkegaards Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard-Studies, pp. 165-170.
66 R. Hall (2000) The Human Embrace: The Love of Philosophy and The Philosophy of Love:
Kierkegaard, Cavell, Nussbaum, University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, p.
34.
67 J. Lippitt, op cit. p 67. Referring to S. Kierkegaard FT op cit. p.143.
68 S. Kierkegaard FT, op cit. p. 64.
69 Ibid. p. 86.
70 Ibid.
71 S. Kierkegaard FT op cit. p.64.
72 Kant (1993) Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. J. Ellington, Indianopolis:
Hackett, p. 14.
73 J. Lippitt, op cit. p. 83
74 See E. Duncan (1963) Kierkegaards Teleological Suspension of The Ethical: a Study of
Exception-Cases, Journal of Southern Philosophy volume 1 (winter) pp. 9-16
75 J. Lippitt, op cit. p. 86.
76 S. Kierkegaard FT op cit. p. 83
77 Ibid. p. 86.
78 D. Davidson (1977) A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs, in E. LePore (ed) Truth and
Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford: Claredon Press, pp
433-446.
79 J. Lippett op cit. p. 88 Referring to G. W. F. Hegel (1996) Philosophy of Right, trans. S
Dyde, New York: Prometheus.
80 G. Hegel op cit. p.139.
81 S. Kierkegaard FT op cit. p. 83.
82 Ibid.
83 B. Sderquist op cit. p. 261.
84 Ibid. p. 84.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
87 This could be conceived in two ways. Firstly, for Hegelian thought it simply does not make
sense to have a comprehensible thought unaccompanied by mediation (Vermittlung). Hence, the
proposition that such a relationship exists is paradoxical in the same way as the Socratic paradox
in the Postscript. Secondly, God conceived as the universal, as having an individual, private
relationship, overriding a universal relationship is paradoxical.
88 Ibid. p. 87.
89 Ibid. p. 88.
90 Ibid. p. 95.
91 E. Santurri, (1977) Kierkegaards Fear and Trembling in Logical Perspective, in JRE
volume 5 (2) p. 227.
92 G. Chryssides (1973) Abrahams Faith, Sophia (April), p.13
93 E. Santurri op cit. p. 230.
94 E. Santurri op cit. pp. 228- 234.
95 S. Kierkegaard FT op cit. p. 137.
96 S. Kierkegaard (1941) Fear and Trembling and The Sickness Unto Death, Trans. By Walter
Lowrie, Princeton: Pinceton University Press, p.122-123. In E, Santurri, op cit. p. 232.
97 E. Santurri op cit. p. 244.
98 S. Kierkegaard (1941) FT op cit. p. 84.
99 Ibid. p. 67. [My italics]
100 E. Santurri op cit. p.231.
101 J. Lippitt op cit. p.37.
102 S. Kierkegaard (1985) FT op cit. p.63.
103 S. Kierkegaard (1941) FT op cit. p. 46. Find in 1985 version.
104 Nor can the movements be used to show that Abrahams belief on the absurd that he will
have Isaac finitely be used to show that he does not really will to kill Isaac. Any such belief is on
the basis of the absurd (the objectively contradictory) and thus cannot be used to universalise
objectively it being similarly nonsense.
105 S. Kierkegaard (1941) FT op cit. p. 81. (My italics)
106 E. Mooney op cit. p. 80. Mooney then goes on to contend that Kierkegaards is wanting us to
reject Johannes account in favour or a different virtue ethics systems which renders things
morally praisable by the subjective integrity in which they are done. In my opinion this conflicts
with Johannes dismissal of calling Abraham great as if Abraham has acquired property rights to
the title of great man, so that whatever he does is great. S. Kierkegaard (1985) FT op cit. p.60. It
also does not sit well with the Climacus idea that subjectivity is untruth which I have identified
as reappearing in Fear and Trembling in the contexts of the sub-Abrahams and the many figures
who are not knights of faith. I have argued alternatively for a duality concept that keeps the idea
of subjectivity as untruth as a real presence in Fear and Trembling's version of faith.
107 S. Kierkegaard (1941) FT op cit. p. 66. (My italics).
108 Contrast Anti-Climacus.
109 I speak of Kierkegaard now since I contend that I have isolated his overall view of faith in
his philosophical period.
110 F. Dostoyevsky (1990), The Grand Inquisitor, from The Brothers Karamazov, in D,
Raymond Existentialism and the Philosophical Tradition, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall,
p. 353.
111 F. Dostoyevsky op cit. p.364.
112 Ibid. p. 357.
113 Ibid p. 359.
114 Ibid p. 357. (my italics)
115 Ibid p. 361.
116 Ibid. p. 359.
117 Ibid. p. 358.
118 Ibid.
119 Ibid.
120 Ibid.
121 Ibid.
122 Ibid. p. 364.
123 This conception of God appears to be a form of deism for which God cannot interfere with
actuality.
124 F. Dostoyevsky op cit. p. 364.
125 Ibid. p. 366.
126 Ibid. p. 367.
127 Ibid.