her hereditary rights accrued from the moment of the death of the
Rule 89
Case No. 1
Julita Go Ong vs CA
G.R. No. L-75884 September 24, 1987
Ponente: Paras, J.
FACTS:
Two parcels of land under 1 TCT are in the name of Alfredo Ong married to
Julita Go Ong. Alfredo died and Julita Go Ong was appointed administratrix
of her husbands estate. Julita thereafter mortgaged 1 lot to Allied Banking
Corp. to secure a loan.
On the loan there was due a sum and Allied tried to collect it from Julita.
Hence, the complaint alleging nullity of the contract for lack of judicial
approval which the bank had allegedly promised to secure from the court.
In response thereto, the bank averred that it was Julita who promised to
secure the courts approval.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE MORTGAGE CONSTITUTED OVER THE
PARCEL OF LAND UNDER PETITIONERS ADMINISTRATION IS NULL
AND VOID FOR WANT OF JUDICIAL APPROVAL.
HELD: Mortgage is valid
Petitioner, asserting that the mortgage is void for want of judicial approval,
quoted Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court . The CA aptly ruled that
Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court is not applicable, since the
mortgage was constituted in her personal capacity and not in her capacity
as administratrix of the estate of her husband. Sec. 7, Art. 89 of the Civil
Code applies in a case where judicial approval has to be sought in
connection with, for instance, the sale or mortgage of property under
administration for the payment, say of a conjugal debt, and even here, the
conjugal and hereditary shares of the wife are excluded from the requisite
judicial approval for the reason already adverted to hereinabove, provided
of course no prejudice is caused others, including the government.
The mortgage constituted on the property under administration, by
authority of the petitioner is valid, notwithstanding lack of judicial approval
with respect to her conjugal share and to her hereditary rights. The fact
that what had been mortgaged was in custodial legis is immaterial, insofar
as her conjugal share and hereditary share in the property is concerned, for
after all, she was the absolute owner thereof.
Sec. 7, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court cannot adversely affect
the substantive rights of private respondent to dispose of her ideal [not
inchoate, for the conjugal partnership ended with her husbands death and
decedent.
Herodotus Acebedo and 7 others were left an estate consisting of real
properties in Quezon City and Caloocan City. Acebedo became the
administrator pending partition. In the meantime, the property is owned in
common by the heirs.
The case pended for 16 years with the court. Miguel Acebedo et al
(respondents) then filed a Motion for Approval of Sale for them to sell their
shares from the estate. The court approved the motion. Respondents were
able to find a buyer in the person of Yu Hwa Ping who agreed to buy the
properties for P12 Million. He paid P6 million as earnest money.
Acebedo assailed the approval of the sale claiming that the price is quite
low. The court ordered Miguel et al to find a higher bidder within a specified
time frame which was later extended to 7 months but still no other buyer
could provide better terms.
Finally, it was agreed by the parties that respondents sell their share to the
price already agreed upon with Ping and that Acebedo can negotiate his
price with Ping. But Acebedo still filed a Supplemental Opposition against
the approval of the conditional sale.
The court affirmed the approval of the sale and ordered Acebedo to sell his
share at the same rate that the other heirs sold their share to Ping.
ISSUE: Whether or not the other heirs can sell their shares of the estate
prior to adjudication.
HELD: Yes. An heir can sell his share without final adjudication. An heir is a
co-owner of the property (estate) before adjudication.
Although the Rules of Court do not specifically state that the sale of an
immovable property belonging to an estate of a decedent, in a special
proceeding, should be made with the approval of the court, this authority is
necessarily included in its capacity as a probate court. Therefore, it is clear
that the probate court in the case at bar, acted within its jurisdiction in
issuing the Order approving the Deed of Conditional Sale.
The right of an heir to dispose of the decedents property, even if the same
is under administration, is based on the Civil Code provision stating that the
possession of hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the heir
without interruption and from the moment of the death of the decedent, in
case the inheritance is accepted. Where there are however, two or more
heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in
common by such heirs.
PAULMITAN V. CA- Co-ownership of Property
When a co-owner sells the entire property without consent from the other co-
owners, only his pro indiviso share on the property is transferred to the buyer.
FACTS:
The dispute covers 2 lots, Lot 757 and Lot 1091, which were owned by
Agatona Paulmitan. She had 2 children, Pascual and Donato. Pascuals (7)
children (Alicio, Elena, Abelino, Adelina, Anita, Baking, Anito) are the
respondents and Donato and his daughter and son-in-law are petitioners.
Donato executed an Affidavit of Declaration of Heirship, adjudicating to
himself Lot 757 claiming that he is the sole surviving heir thus the OCT of
Agatona was cancelled and a TCT was issued in his name. He executed a
deed of sale of Lot 1091 in favor of his daughter, Juliana. For non-payment
of taxes, the lot was forfeited and sole at a public to the Provincial Govt of
Negros Occidental, however, Juliana was able to redeem the property.
Upon learning these, the children of Pascual filed w/ the CFI a complaint
against petitioners to partition the land plus damages. Petitioners defense
was that the action has already prescribed for it was filed more than 11
years after the issuance of the TCT and that Juliana has acquired exclusive
ownership thru the Deed of Sale and by redeeming the said property.
The CFI dismissed the complaint and became final and executory. With
respect to Lot 1091, the court decided in favor of respondents. They are
entitled to of Lot 1091, pro indiviso. The redemption did not in anyway
prejudice their rights. The land was ordered to be partitioned and the
petitioners were ordered to pay the respondents their share of the fruits
and the respondents to pay their share in the redemption of the land. The
CA affirmed the decision thus the case at bar.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not Pascuals children and Donato and Juliana were co-
owners of their mothers lot
(2) Whether or not Juliana acquired full ownership by redeeming the
property
HELD:
(1) YES: When Agatona died, her estate was still unpartitioned. Art. 1078
states that Where there are 2 or more heirs, the whole estate of the
decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to
the payment of debts of the deceased. Since Pascual and Donato were still
alive when she died, they are co-owners of the estate. When Pascual died,
his children succeeded him in the co-ownership of the property.

When Donato sold to his daughter the lot, he was only a co-owner of the
same thus he can only sell his undivided portion of the property. Art. 493
states that each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of
the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate,
assign or mortgage it and even substitute another person in its enjoyment,
except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or
mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion
which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership.
Only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred making the buyer
(Juliana) a co-owner.
(2) NO: When she redeemed the property, it did not end the co-ownership.
The right of repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner w/ respect to
his/her share alone as stated in Art. 1612. But she may compel them to
reimburse her for half of the repurchase price for a co-owner has the right
to compel other co-owners to contribute to the expenses for the
preservation of the thing and to taxes.
AGUILAR v. CA- Co-ownership
Any of the Co-owners may demand the sale of the house and lot at any time
and the other cannot object to such demand; thereafter the proceeds of the
sale shall be divided equally according to their respective interests.
FACTS:
Petitioner Vergilio and respondent Senen bought a house and lot in
Paraaque where their father could spend and enjoy his remaining years in
a peaceful neighborhood. They initially agreed that Vergilio will get 2/3 and
Senen will get 1/3; but later they agreed on equal shares. Senen was left in
the said lot to take care of their father since Vergilios family was in Cebu.
After their fathers death petitioner demanded from private respondent
that the latter vacate the house and that the property be sold and proceeds
thereof divided among them but the latter refused. Petitioner then filed to
compel the sale of the property. The chunk of the issue tackled by the
courts was regarding the pre-trial. Respondent filed a motion to cancel Pre-
trial since the counsel had to accompany his wife in Dumaguete City where
she would be a principal sponsor in a wedding. CFI denied the motion; and
the pre-trial proceeded on the scheduled date. The respondents did not
appear thus they were declared in default. The trial went on ex parte
without the respondent and held that the property should be sold to a third
party and that the proceeds be distributed to the parties; in addition
respondent was made to pay rent from the time the action was filed.
Respondents appealed this and the decision was reversed by the CA saying
that the TC erred in declaring respondents in default; the case was then
remanded to the trial court. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
A) W/N CA erred (1) in holding that the motion of respondent through
counsel to cancel the pre-trial was dilatory in character and (2) in
remanding the case to the trial court for pre-trial and trial?
ISSUE RELEVANT TO PROPERTY:
B) W/N trial court was correct with regards to the sale and rent?
RULING:
A) YES, CA erred in granting the respondents motion and remanding the
case. The law is clear that the appearance of parties at the pretrial is
mandatory. A party who fails to appear at a pre-trial conference may be
non-suited or considered as in default. It is the discretion of the court to
grant the motion if it sees that the reason for the cancelation of the same
would be reasonable. SC found that the reason for the cancelation of the
pre-trial was insufficient and that the trial court was not in grave abuse of
discretion when they denied it.
B) YES, with a few modification. Petitioner and respondents are co-owners
of subject house and lot in equal shares; either one of them may demand
the sale of the house and lot at any time and the other cannot object to
such demand; thereafter the proceeds of the sale shall be divided equally
according to their respective interests.
BASIS: Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no co-owner shall be
obliged to remain in the co-ownership, and that each co-owner may
demand at any time partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his
share is concerned. Corollary to this rule, Art. 498 of the Code states that
whenever the thing is essentially indivisible and the co-owners cannot
agree that it be allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others, it
shall be sold and its proceeds accordingly distributed.
SC held that of the proceeds should go to the petitioner and the
remainder to the respondent (1,200 each.) Also rent was awarded 1,200
pesos per month with legal interest from the time the trial court ordered
the respondent to vacate, for the use and enjoyment of the other half of
the property.
BASIS: When petitioner filed an action to compel the sale of the property
and the trial court granted the petition and ordered the ejectment of
respondent, the co-ownership was deemed terminated and the right to
enjoy the possession jointly also ceased.
Pamplona v. Moreto
No. L-33187 March 31, 1980
Facts:
Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega, a husband and wife, who
acquired adjacent lots nos. 1495, 4545, and 1496 of the Calamba Friar Land
Estate covered by certificates of title issued in the name of Flaviano Moreto
married to Monica Maniega. They had 6 children who left heirs after their
death as well as became co-heirs with respect to the property owned by
Flaviano and Monica. More than 6 yrs after Monica Maniegas death,
Flaviano sold lot 1495 for P900 to spouses Pamplona without the consent
of his heirs and without any liquidation of the conjugal partnership. The
spouses Pamplona constructed their house on the eastern part of lot 1496
as it was pointed out by Flaviano which was a mistake on the part of both
seller and buyer. Flaviano died intestate on August 12, 1956 and in 1961, the
plaintiffs demanded on the defendants to vacate the premises where they
had their house and piggery on the ground that Flaviano had no right to sell
the lot which he sold to Pamplona as the same belongs to the conjugal
partnership. The spouses Pamplona refused to vacate the premises and this
suit was instituted by the heirs of Monica Maniega seeking for the
declaration of nullity of the deed of sale executed in the formers favor. The
RTC ruled in favor of the plaintiff declaring null and void the sale with
respect to 390.5 sq.m. of the total 781 sq.m. of which is rightfully owned by
the plaintiffs. The RTC decision was affirmed by the CA; hence, this petition
was instituted appealing the decision of the CA.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the full
ownership of the property in litigation, or only of the same?
Held:
Yes, they are entitled to the full ownership of the property in
litigation because at the time of the sale, the co-owner (Flaviano) as vendor
pointed out its location and even indicated the boundaries over which the
fences were to be erected without objection. Despite the fact that at the
time of sale, there was no partition of the subject property between the co-
owners and Flaviano, as vendor, had ownership of an undetermined portion
of the hereditary estate which he had a perfect and legal right to dispose of
to the Spouse Pamplona. According to Art. 776, the inheritance which
private respondents may receive from their deceased parents includes all
the property, rights and obligations of a person which are not extinguished
by their parents death. In addition, under Art. 1311 of the NCC, the contract
of sale executed by Flaviano took effect between the parties, their assigns
and heirs which includes the private respondents; therefore, they must
comply with said obligation. The petition is affirmed with modification with
respect to the fact that the sale executed in favor of Spouses Pamplona is
legal and valid in its entirety.
2. G.R. No. L-25014. October 17, 1973.
DOLORES LAHORA VDA. DE CASTRO, ARSENIO DE CASTRO, JR.,
WILFREDO DE CASTRO, IRINEO DE CASTRO and VIRGINIA DE CASTRO
ALEJANDRO, in substitution for the deceased, defendant-appellant,
ARSENIO DE CASTRO, SR.)., petitioners, vs. GREGORIO ATIENZA,
respondent.
FACTS: On January 24, 1956 the brothers Tomas de Castro and Arsenio de
Castro, Sr. leased to plaintiff a fishpond containing an area of 26 hectares
situated in Polo, Bulacan and forming part of a bigger parcel of land. The
lessors are co-owners in equal shares of the leased property.
According to the contract of lease, the term of the lease was for five years
from January 24, 1956 at a rental of P5,000 a year.
In the meantime, Tomas de Castro died.
In the month of November, 1956, plaintiff as lessee and defendant Arsenio
de Castro, Sr. as one of the lessors, agreed to set aside and annul the
contract of lease and for this purpose an agreement (Exhibit A) was signed
by them.
"Condition No. 2 of Exhibit A reads as follows:
"2. Na sa pamamagitan nito ay pinawawalang kabuluhan namin and
nasabing kasulatan at nagkasundo kami na ang bawat isa sa amin ni
Arsenio de Castro at Felisa Cruz Vda. de Castro ay isauli kay GREGORIO
ATIENZA ang tig P2,500.00 o kabuuang halagang P5,000.00 na paunang
naibigay nito alinsunod sa nasabing kasulatan; na ang nasabing tig
P2,500.00 ay isasauli ng bawat isa sa amin sa o bago dumating ang Dec. 30,
1956.
Felisa Cruz Vda. de Castro refused to sign Exhibit A. Defendant did not pay
the P2,500.00 which under the above-quoted paragraph of Exhibit A, he
should have paid on December 30, 1956. Demand for payment was made
by plaintiff's counsel on January 7, 1957 but to no avail, hence the present
action."
On the conflicting contentions between the parties as to who between
them would attend to securing the signature of Mrs. Felisa Cruz Vda. de
Castro (widow of Tomas de Castro) to the agreement of cancellation of the
lease with respondent Atienza, the appellate court found that "the
testimony of the defendant (Arsenio de Castro, Sr.). . . supports the
contention of the plaintiff (Atienza) "that it was the defendant Arsenio who
was interested and undertook to do so, citing Arsenio's own declaration
that "I agreed to sign this document (referring to the cancellation) because
of my desire to cancel our original agreement" and that his purpose in
obtaining the cancellation of said lease agreement with plaintiff Atienza
was "(B)ecause I had the intention of having said fishpond leased to other
persons and I cannot lease it to third parties unless I can see in the signature
of Felisa Vda. de Castro."
The appellate court thus held in effect that as Arsenio "was the one
interested in cancelling the lease (Exh. 1), it stands to reason that he most
probably undertook to obtain the signature of Mrs. Castro [widow and
successor-in-interest of his brother Tomas]" and that he could not invoke The appellate court's judgment is fully supported by the Civil Code
his own failure to obtain such signature to elude his own undertaking and provisions on the rights and prerogatives of co-owners, and specifically by
liability to refund respondent (plaintiff) his share of the rental paid in Article 493 which expressly provides that:
advance by respondent on the cancelled lease in the sum of P2,500.00. Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the
fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign
The appellate court furthermore correctly held that the consent or or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except
concurrence of Felisa Vda. de Castro (as co-owner in succession of Tomas) when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the
was not an essential condition to the validity and effectivity of the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which
agreement of cancellation of the lease (Exhibit A) as between Arsenio and may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-
respondent-lessee, contrary to petitioners' claim, holding that "(S)ince then ownership.
specific provision in Exhibit A supporting defendant's claim, we are not
prepared to supply such condition unless the same can be deduced from
other evidence or unless the terms of Exhibit A cannot be performed by
plaintiff and defendant without Mrs. Castro being bound as a party
thereto."
ISSUE: Whether Arsenio as co-owner of the fishpond owned pro-indiviso
by him with his brother Tomas (succeeded by Felisa Vda. de Castro) could
validly lease his half-interest to a third party (respondent Atienza)
independently of his co-owner, and in case his co-owner also leased his
other half interest to the same third party, whether Arsenio could cancel his
own lease agreement with said third party?
RULING: The Court rejects petitioners' appeal as without merit and affirms
the judgment of the appellate court. Petitioners' predecessor-in-interest as
co-owner of an undivided one-half interest in the fishpond could validly
lease his interest to a third party, respondent Atienza, independently of his
co-owner (although said co-owner had also leased his other undivided one-
half interest to the same third party) and could likewise by mutual
agreement independently cancel his lease agreement with said third party.
Said predecessor-in-interest (and petitioners who have substituted him as
his heirs) therefore stands liable on his express undertaking to refund the
advance rental paid to him by the lessee on the cancelled lease and cannot
invoke the non-cancellation of the co-owner's lease to elude such liability.
The appellate court correctly resolved the issue thus: "Our view of the
contract of lease Exhibit 1 is that each of the Castro brothers, leased his
undivided one-half interest in the fishpond they owned in common to the
plaintiff.
Could one of them have validly leased his interest without the other co-
owner leasing his own?
The answer to this is given by appellant in his own brief when he said that it
would result in a partnership between the lessee and the owner of the other
undivided half. If the lease could be entered into partially by one of the co-
owners, insofar as his interest is concerned, then the lease, Exhibit 1, can
also be cancelled partially as between plaintiff and defendant. Therefore,
we conclude that the consent of Mrs. Felisa Cruz Vda. de Castro is not
essential for the cancellation of the lease of defendant's one-half undivided
share in the fishpond to plaintiff."