CRIM
At that
Matic v People
By petition for review on certiorari, Virgilio Talampas y Matic
(Talampas) seeks the review of the affirmance of his conviction for
homicide (for the killing of the late Ernesto Matic y Masinloc) by the
Court of Appeals (CA) through its decision promulgated on August 16,
2007.1[1]
The Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, in Bian, Laguna (RTC)
had rejected his pleas of self-defense and accident and had declared
him guilty of the felony under the judgment rendered on June 22,
2004.2[2
Issue
Hence, Talampas is now before the Court, continuing to
insist that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt, and that
the lower courts both erred in rejecting his claim of self-defense and
accidental death.
Ruling
The petition for review is denied for lack of merit.
Firstly, the elements of the plea of self-defense are: (a)
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity
of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression;
and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused in
defending himself.3[9]
In the nature of self-defense, the protagonists should be the
accused and the victim. The established circumstances indicated that
such did not happen here, for it was Talampas who had initiated the
attack only against Eduardo; and that Ernesto had not been at any
time a target of Talampas attack, he having only happened to be
present at the scene of the attack. In reality, neither Eduardo nor
Ernesto had committed any unlawful aggression against Talampas.
Thus, Talampas was not repelling any unlawful aggression from the
victim (Ernesto), thereby rendering his plea of self-defense
unwarranted.
Secondly, Talampas could not relieve himself of criminal
liability by invoking accident as a defense. Article 12(4) of the Revised
Penal Code, 4 [10] the legal provision pertinent to accident,
contemplates a situation where a person is in fact in the act of doing
something legal, exercising due care, diligence and prudence, but in
the process produces harm or injury to someone or to something not in
the least in the mind of the actor an accidental result flowing out of a
legal act.5[11] Indeed, accident is an event that happens outside the
sway of our will, and although it comes about through some act of our
will, it lies beyond the bounds of humanly foreseeable
consequences. 6 [12] In short, accident presupposes the lack of
intention to commit the wrong done.
The records eliminate the intervention of accident. Talampas
brandished and poked his revolver at Eduardo and fired it, hitting
Eduardo, who quickly rushed to seek refuge behind Ernesto.
point, Talampas fired his revolver thrice. One shot hit Ernesto at the
right portion of his back and caused Ernesto to fall face down to the
ground. Another shot hit Eduardo on the nape, causing Eduardo to fall
on his back. Certainly, Talampas acts were by no means lawful, being
a criminal assault with his revolver against both Eduardo and Ernesto.
And, thirdly, the fact that the target of Talampas assault was
Eduardo, not Ernesto, did not excuse his hitting and killing of Ernesto.
The fatal hitting of Ernesto was the natural and direct consequence of
Talampas felonious deadly assault against Eduardo. Talampas poor
aim amounted to aberratio ictus, or mistake in the blow, a
circumstance that neither exempted him from criminal responsibility
nor mitigated his criminal liability. Lo que es causa de la causa, es
causa del mal causado (what is the cause of the cause is the cause of
the evil caused).7[13] Under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code,8[14]
criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although
the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
Nonetheless, the Court finds the indeterminate sentence of
10 years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years and
eight months, as maximum, legally erroneous.
The penalty for homicide under Article 246 of the Revised
Penal Code is reclusion temporal. Under Section 1 of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, 9 [15] the court, in imposing a prison
sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its
amendments, is mandated to prescribe an indeterminate sentence the
maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the
Revised Penal Code, and the minimum term shall be within the range
of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code
for the offense. With the absence of aggravating or mitigating
circumstances, the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its
medium period, or 14 years, eight months, and one day to 17 years
and four months. This is pursuant to Article 64 of the Revised Penal
Code. 10 [16] It is such period that the maximum term of the
indeterminate sentence should be reckoned from. Hence, limiting the
maximum term of the indeterminate sentence at only 14 years and
eight months contravened the express provision of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, for such penalty was within the minimum period of
reclusion temporal. Accordingly, the Court must add one day to the
maximum term fixed by the lower courts.
The Court finds to be unnecessary the increment of one day
as part of the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence. It may be
true that the increment did not constitute an error, because the
minimum term thus fixed was entirely within the parameters of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law. Yet, the addition of one day to the 10
years as the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence of Talampas
may occasion a degree of inconvenience when it will be time for the
penal administrators concerned to consider and determine whether
Talampas is already qualified to enjoy the benefits of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law. Hence, in order to simplify the computation of the
minimum penalty of the indeterminate sentence, the Court deletes the
one-day increment from the minimum term of the indeterminate
sentence.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision
promulgated on August 16, 2007 finding VIRGILIO TALAMPAS y
MATIC guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, and
IMPOSES the indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor, as
1
minimum, to 14 years, eight months, and one day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum.
The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.
Mesina vs People
The appeal has no merit.
The crime of malversation of public funds charged herein is defined
and penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, as follows:
Article 217. Malversation of public funds or property. - Presumption of
malversation. - Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his
office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the
same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, or through
abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take
such public funds or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be
guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property
shall suffer:
xxxx
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum
periods, if the amount involved is more than twelve thousand pesos but
is less than twenty-two thousand pesos. If the amount exceeds the
latter, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
reclusion perpetua.
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty
of perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of
the funds malversed or equal to the total value of the property
embezzled.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds
or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly
authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such
missing funds or property to personal use. (As amended by R.A. No.
1060)
The crime of malversation of public funds has the following elements,
to wit: (a) that the offender is a public officer; (b) that he had the
custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his
office; (c) that the funds or property were public funds or property for
which he was accountable; and (d) that he appropriated, took,
misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or negligence,
permitted another person to take them.11
The elements of the crime charged were duly established against the
petitioner.
The Prosecution proved, firstly, that the petitioner was a public officer
with the position of Local Treasurer Officer I of Caloocan City;
secondly, that by reason of his position, he was tasked to collect fees
and taxes regularly levied by the Mini City Hall, including market fees,
miscellaneous fees, real property taxes, and the subject patubig
collection; and, thirdly, that all of the fees and taxes collected were
unquestionably public funds for which he was accountable.
As to the fourth element of misappropriation, the petitioner did not
rebut the presumption that he had misappropriated the patubig
collection to his personal use. He had earlier feigned ignorance of
having received the patubig collection when he phoned Ms. Baclit to
tell her that he did not receive the collection. He still insisted that he
had not received the sum from Ms. Baclit when the City Treasurer
summoned them both. His denial continued until the next day when
City Mayor Malonzo himself asked them both about the matter. Only
after the petitioner's vault was finally opened did he declare that the
collection was intact inside his vault. Even then, the actual amount
found therein was short by 1!37,876.98. Conformably with Article 217
of the Revised Penal Code, supra, the failure of the petitioner to have
the patubig collection duly forthcoming upon demand by the duly
authorized officer was prima facie evidence that he had put such
missing fund to personal use. Although the showing was merely prima
facie, and, therefore, rebuttable, he did not rebut it, considering that he
not only did not account for the collection upon demand but even
steadfastly denied having received it up to the time of the inspection of
the sealed vault. Under the circumstances, he was guilty of the
misappropriation of the collection.
Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence. The
dolo or the culpa is only a modality in the perpetration of the felony.
Even if the mode charged differs from the mode proved, the same
offense of malversation is still committed; hence, a conviction is
proper.12 All that is necessary for a conviction is sufficient proof that
the accused accountable officer had received public funds or property,
and did not have them in his possession when demand therefor was
made without any satisfactory explanation of his failure to have them
upon demand. For this purpose, direct evidence of the personal
misappropriation by the accused is unnecessary as long as he cannot
satisfactorily explain the inability to produce or any shortage in his
accounts.13 Accordingly, with the evidence adduced by the State
being entirely incompatible with the petitioner's claim of innocence, we
uphold the CA's affirmance of the conviction, for, indeed, the proof of
his guilt was beyond reasonable doubt.
The petitioner bewails the deprivation of his constitutionally guaranteed
rights during the investigation. He posits that a custodial investigation
was what really transpired, and insists that the failure to inform him of
his Miranda rights rendered the whole investigation null and void. We
disagree with the petitioner's position.
According to People v. Marra,14 custodial investigation involves any
questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant manner. The safeguards during custodial investigation
begin to operate as soon as the investigation ceases to be a general
inquiry into a still unsolved crime, and the interrogation is then focused
on a particular suspect who has been taken into custody and to whom
the police would then direct interrogatory questions that tend to elicit
incriminating statements. The situation contemplated is more precisely
described as one where -After a person is arrested and his custodial
investigation begins a confrontation arises which at best may be
termed unequal. The detainee is brought to an army camp or police
headquarters and there questioned and cross-examined not only by
one but as many investigators as may be necessary to break down his
morale. He finds himself in a strange and unfamiliar surrounding, and
every person he meets he considers hostile to him. The investigators
are well-trained and seasoned in their work. They employ all the
methods and means that experience and study has taught them to
extract the truth, or what may pass for it, out of the detainee. Most
detainees are unlettered and are not aware of their constitutional
rights.
And even if they were, the intimidating and coercive presence of the
officers of the law in such an atmosphere overwhelms them into
silence x x x.15
Contrary to the petitioner's claim, the fact that he was one of those
being investigated did not by itself define the nature of the investigation
as custodial. For him, the investigation was still a general inquiry to
ascertain the whereabouts of the missing patubig collection. By its
nature, the inquiry had to involve persons who had direct supervision
over the issue, including the City Treasurer, the City Auditor, the
representative from different concerned offices, and even the City
Mayor. What was conducted was not an investigation that already
focused on the petitioner as the culprit but an administrative inquiry
into the missing city funds. Besides, he was not as of then in the
custody of the police or other law enforcement office.
Even as we affirm the CA, we have to clarify the penalty imposed in
terms of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.1wphi1
Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law states that an
indeterminate sentence is imposed on the offender consisting of a
maximum term and a minimum term.16 The maximum term is the
penalty properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code after
considering any attending circumstance; while the minimum term is
within the range of the penalty next lower than that prescribed by the
Revised Penal Code for the offense committed. Conformably with the
instructions on the proper application of the Indeterminate Sentence
law in malversation reiterated in Zafra v. People:17 (a) the penalties
provided under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code constitute
degrees; and ( b) considering that the penalties provided under Article
217 of the Revised Penal Code arc not composed of three periods, the
time included in the prescribed penalty should be divided into three
equal portions, each portion forming a period, pursuant to Article 65 of
the Revised Penal Code.18 With the amount of P37,876.98 ultimately
found and declared by the CA to have been misappropriated
exceeding the P22,000.00 threshold, the imposable penalty is
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua (that is,
17 years, four months and one day to reclusion perpetua), the
minimum period of which is 17 years, four months and one to 18 years
and eight months, the medium period of which is 18 years, eight
months and one day to 20 years, and the maximum period is reclusion
perpetua.
Accordingly, the maximum of the indeterminate sentence of the
petitioner is the medium period in view of the absence of any
aggravating or mitigating circumstances, while the minimum of the
2
indeterminate sentence shall be taken from the penalty next lower,
which is reclusion temporal in its minimum and medium periods (i.e.,
from 12 years and one day to 17 years and four months). Hence, the
indeterminate sentence for the petitioner is modified to 12 years and
one day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to 18 years, eight months
and one day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
In addition, the Court notes that both lower courts did not require the
petitioner to pay the amount of P37,876.98 subject of the malversation.
That omission was plain error that we should now likewise correct as a
matter of course, for there is no denying that pursuant to Article 100 of
the Revised Penal Code, every person criminally liable for a felony is
also civilly liable. The omission, if unchecked and unrevised, would
permanently deprive the City of Caloocan of the misappropriated
amount. Such prejudice to the public coffers should be avoided.
The Court has justifiably bewailed the omissions by the lower courts in
this respect, and has seen fit to point out in Zafra v. People:
One more omission by the CA and the R TC concerned a matter of
law. This refers to their failure to decree in favor of the Government the
return of the amounts criminally misappropriated by the accused. That
he was already sentenced to pay the fine in each count was an
element of the penalties imposed under the Revised Penal Code, and
was not the same thing as finding him civilly liable for restitution, which
the RTC and the CA should have included in the judgment. Indeed, as
the Court emphasized in Bacolod v. People, it was "imperative that the
courts prescribe the proper penalties when convicting the accused,
and determine the civil liability to be imposed on the accused, unless
there has been a reservation of the action to recover civil liability or a
waiver of its recovery," explaining the reason for doing so in the
following manner:
It is not amiss to stress that both the R TC and the CA disregarded
their express mandate under Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court
to have the judgment, if it was of conviction, state: "(1) the legal
qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the
accused and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances which
attended its commission; (2) the participation of the accused in the
offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact;
(3) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (4) the civil liability or
damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be recovered from
the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the
enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has been
reserved or waived." Their disregard compels us to act as we now do
lest the Court be unreasonably seen as tolerant of their omission. That
the Spouses Cogtas did not themselves seek the correction of the
omission by an appeal is no hindrance to this action because the
Court, as the final reviewing tribunal, has not only the authority but also
the duty to correct at any time a matter of law and justice.
We also pointedly remind all trial and appellate courts to avoid omitting
reliefs that the parties are properly entitled to by law or in equity under
the established facts. Their judgments will not be worthy of the name
unless they thereby fully determine the rights and obligations of the
litigants. It cannot be otherwise, for only by a full determination of such
rights and obligations would they be true to the judicial office of
administering justice and equity for all. Courts should then be alert and
cautious in their rendition of judgments of conviction in criminal cases.
They should prescribe the legal penalties, which is what the
Constitution and the law require and expect them to do. Their
prescription of the wrong penalties will be invalid and ineffectual for
being done without jurisdiction or in manifest grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. They should also determine and set
the civil liability ex delicto of the accused, in order to do justice to the
complaining victims who are always entitled to them. The Rules of
Court mandates them to do so unless the enforcement of the civil
liability by separate actions has been reserved or waived.19
Under the law, the civil liability of the petitioner may involve restitution,
reparation of the damage caused, and indemnification for
consequential damages.20 Given that his obligation requires the
payment of the amount misappropriated to the City of Caloocan, the
indemnification for damages is through legal interest of 6% per annum
on the amount malversed, reckoned from the finality of this decision
until full payment.21
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on July
24, 2003 finding petitioner BERNARDO U. MESINA guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of malversation of public funds subject to the
MODIFICATIONS that: (a) he shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of
12 years and one day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to 18 years,
eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and pay
a fine of P37,876.98; and (b) he shall further pay to the City of
Caloocan the amount of P37,876.98, plus interest thereon at the rate
of 6% per annum, reckoned from the finality of this decision until the
amount is fully paid.
The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
People vs Obaldo
An indispensable requisite of self-defense is that the victim
must have mounted an unlawful aggression against the accused.
Without such unlawful aggression, the accused cannot invoke self-
defense as a justifying circumstance.
The accused prays for the review and reversal of the
decision promulgated on June 29, 2006,11[1] whereby the Court of
Appeals (CA) affirmed his conviction for murder handed down by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 34, in Balaoan, La Union.
We affirm the conviction.
Fontanilla pleaded self-defense. In order for self-defense to
be appreciated, he had to prove by clear and convincing evidence the
following elements: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim;
(b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself. 12 [19] Unlawful aggression is the indispensable
element of self-defense, for if no unlawful aggression attributed to the
victim is established, self-defense is unavailing, for there is nothing to
repel.13[20] The character of the element of unlawful aggression is
aptly explained as follows:
Unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim is the primordial element of the justifying
circumstance of self-defense. Without unlawful
aggression, there can be no justified killing in
defense of oneself. The test for the presence of
unlawful aggression under the circumstances is
whether the aggression from the victim put in real
peril the life or personal safety of the person
defending himself; the peril must not be an
imagined or imaginary threat. Accordingly, the
accused must establish the concurrence of three
elements of unlawful aggression, namely: (a) there
must be a physical or material attack or assault;
(b) the attack or assault must be actual, or, at
least, imminent; and (c) the attack or assault must
be unlawful.
Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a)
actual or material unlawful aggression; and (b)
imminent unlawful aggression. Actual or material
unlawful aggression means an attack with physical
force or with a weapon, an offensive act that
positively determines the intent of the aggressor to
cause the injury. Imminent unlawful aggression
means an attack that is impending or at the point
of happening; it must not consist in a mere
threatening attitude, nor must it be merely
imaginary, but must be offensive and positively
strong (like aiming a revolver at another with intent
to shoot or opening a knife and making a motion
as if to attack). Imminent unlawful aggression must
not be a mere threatening attitude of the victim,
such as pressing his right hand to his hip where a
3
 revolver was holstered, accompanied by an angry
countenance, or like aiming to throw a pot.14[21]
By invoking self-defense, however, Fontanilla admitted
inflicting the fatal injuries that caused the death of Olais. It is basic that
once an accused in a prosecution for murder or homicide admitted his
infliction of the fatal injuries on the deceased, he assumed the burden
to prove by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence the justifying
circumstance that would avoid his criminal liability.15[22] Having thus
admitted being the author of the death of the victim, Fontanilla came to
bear the burden of proving the justifying circumstance to the
satisfaction of the court,16[23] and he would be held criminally liable
unless he established self-defense by sufficient and satisfactory
proof.17[24] He should discharge the burden by relying on the strength
of his own evidence, because the Prosecutions evidence, even if
weak, would not be disbelieved in view of his admission of the
killing. 18 [25] Nonetheless, the burden to prove guilt beyond
reasonable doubt remained with the State until the end of the
proceedings.
Fontanilla did not discharge his burden. A review of the
records reveals that, one, Olais did not commit unlawful aggression
against Fontanilla, and, two, Fontanillas act of hitting the victims head
with a stone, causing the mortal injury, was not proportional to, and
constituted an unreasonable response to the victims fistic attack and
kicks.
Indeed, had Olais really attacked Fontanilla, the latter would
have sustained some injury from the aggression. It remains, however,
that no injury of any kind or gravity was found on the person of
Fontanilla when he presented himself to the hospital; hence, the
attending physician of the hospital did not issue any medical certificate
to him. Nor was any medication applied to him.19[26] In contrast, the
physician who examined the cadaver of Olais testified that Olais had
been hit on the head more than once. The plea of self-defense was
thus belied, for the weapons used by Fontanilla and the location and
number of wounds he inflicted on Olais revealed his intent to kill, not
merely an effort to prevent or repel an attack from Olais. We consider
to be significant that the gravity of the wounds manifested the
determined effort of the accused to kill his victim, not just to defend
himself.20[27]
The CA and the RTC found that treachery was attendant.
We concur. Fontanilla had appeared out of nowhere to strike Olais on
the head, first with the wooden stick, and then with a big stone,
causing Olais to fall to the ground facedown. The suddenness and
unexpectedness of the attack effectively denied to Olais the ability to
defend himself or to retaliate against Fontanilla.
The imposition of reclusion perpetua by the CA was
warranted under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,21[28] which
prescribes reclusion perpetua to death as the penalty for murder.
Under the rules on the
application of indivisible penalties in Article 63 of the Revised Penal
Code,22[29] the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua is imposed if
there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances. Yet, the
Court points out that the RTC erroneously imposed RECLUSION
PERPETUA TO DEATH as the penalty. Such imposition was bereft of
legal justification, for reclusion perpetua and death, being indivisible,
should not be imposed as a compound, alternative or successive
penalty for a single felony. In short, the imposition of one precluded the
imposition of the other.
The Court also modifies the limiting of civil damages by the
CA and the RTC to only the death indemnity of P50,000.00. When
death occurs due to a crime, the damages to be awarded may include:
(a) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (b) actual or
compensatory damages; (c) moral damages; (d) exemplary damages;
and (e) temperate damages.23[30]
Accordingly, the CA and the RTC should also have granted
moral damages in addition to the death indemnity, which were of
different kinds.24[31] The death indemnity compensated the loss of life
due to crime, but appropriate and reasonable moral damages would
justly assuage the mental anguish and emotional sufferings of the
surviving family of Olais.25[32] Although mental anguish and emotional
sufferings of the surviving family were not quantifiable with
mathematical precision, the Court must nonetheless strive to set an
amount that would restore the heirs of the deceased to their moral
status quo ante. Given the circumstances, P50,000.00 should be
reasonable as moral damages, which, pursuant to prevailing
jurisprudence,26[33] we are bound to award despite the absence of
any allegation and proof of the heirs mental anguish and emotional
suffering. The rationale for doing so rested on human nature and
experience having shown that:
xxx a violent death invariably and necessarily
brings about emotional pain and anguish on the
part of the victims family. It is inherently human to
suffer sorrow, torment, pain and anger when a
loved one becomes the victim of a violent or brutal
killing. Such violent death or brutal killing not only
steals from the family of the deceased his precious
life, deprives them forever of his love, affection
and support, but often leaves them with the
gnawing feeling that an injustice has been done to
them.27[34]
Another omission of the CA and the RTC was their non-
recognition of the right of the heirs of the victim to temperate damages.
The victims wife testified about her familys incurring funeral expenses
of P36,000.00, but only P18,000.00 was backed by receipts. It is
already settled that when actual damages substantiated by receipts
sum up to lower than P25,000.00, temperate damages of at least
4
P25,000.00 become justified, in lieu of actual damages in the lesser
amount actually proved by receipts. It would obviously be unfair to the
heirs of the victim to deny them compensation by way of actual
damages despite their honest attempt to prove their actual expenses
by receipts (but succeeding only in showing expenses lower than
P25,000.00 in amount).28[35] Indeed, the heirs should not be left in a
worse situation than the heirs of another victim who might be
nonetheless allowed temperate damages of P25,000.00 despite not
having presented any receipts at all. With the victims wife having
proved P18,000.00 worth of expenses, granting his heirs temperate
damages of P25,000.00, not only P18,000.00, is just and proper. Not
to do so would foster a travesty of basic fairness.
The Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be
imposed in criminal cases as part of the civil liability when the crime
was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. 29[36]
The Civil Code permits such damages to be awarded by way of
example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.30[37] In light of such
legal provisions, the CA and the RTC should have recognized the
entitlement of the heirs of the victim to exemplary damages on account
of the attendance of treachery. It was of no moment that treachery was
an attendant circumstance in murder, and, as such, inseparable and
absorbed in murder. As well explained in People v. Catubig:31[38]
The term aggravating circumstances used
by the Civil Code, the law not having specified
otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or
generic sense. The commission of an offense has
a two-pronged effect, one on the public as it
breaches the social order and the other upon the
private victim as it causes personal sufferings,
each of which is addressed by, respectively, the
prescription of heavier punishment for the accused
and by an award of additional damages to the
victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a
graver felony underscores the exacerbation of the
offense by the attendance of aggravating
circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in
its commission. Unlike the criminal liability
which is basically a State concern, the award
of damages, however, is likewise, if not
primarily, intended for the offended party who
suffers thereby. It would make little sense for
an award of exemplary damages to be due the
private offended party when the aggravating
circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld
when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or
qualifying nature of an aggravating
circumstance is a distinction that should only
be of consequence to the criminal, rather than
to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine,
relative to the civil aspect of the case, an
aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or
qualifying, should entitle the offended party to
an award of exemplary damages within the
unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil
Code.
For the purpose, P30,000.00 is reasonable and proper as exemplary
damages,32[39] for a lesser amount would not serve result in genuine
exemplarity.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision promulgated on
June 29, 2006 by the Court of Appeals, subject to the MODIFICATION
of the civil damages, by ordering accused Alfonso Fontanilla y Obaldo
to pay to the heirs of Jose Olais P25,000.00 as temperate damages
and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages in addition to the P50,000.00
as death indemnity and the P50,000.00 as moral damages, plus
interest of 6% per annum on such amounts from the finality of the
judgment.
The accused shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
People vs Quindao
To obtain a conviction for the illegal sale of a dangerous drug, like
ecstacy, the State must prove the following, namely: (a) the identity of
the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale and the consideration;
and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment thereof. What is
decisive is the
proof that the sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in
court of the corpus delicti as evidence.
People vs Reyes
Slightest penetration of the labia of the female victim's genitalia
consummates the crime of rape.
People vs Reyes
Firstly, the defense of consensual sexual intercourse, like
the sweetheart defense, demands corroboration. Yet, Toriaga offered
no corroboration, thereby exposing his belatedly offered defense as a
self-serving after-thought resorted to after his original defenses of
denial and alibi had failed to ensure his acquittal by the CA. Thus, his
new defense deserved scant consideration.
Secondly, the physical evidence spoke more vividly than the
testimony of the victim, whose multiple injuries confirmed the use of
brutal force and violence in her rape. Also, the multiple stab wounds
she sustained negated his claim of consensual sexual intercourse.
Third, the CAs rejection of Toriagas contention of being
liable only for qualified seduction was correct. Indeed, the information
did not allege the presence of the elements of qualified seduction, to
wit: (a) that AAA was a virgin; (b) that she was over 12 and under 18
years of age; (c) that he had sexual intercourse with her; and (d) that
there was abuse of authority, or of confidence, or of relationship.
Fourthly, the RTC and the CA correctly determined the
penalty of reclusion perpetua as imposable. The information alleged
the use of a bladed weapon in the commission of the rape. Article 335
of the Revised Penal Code provides that whenever the crime of rape is
committed with use of a deadly weapon the imposable penalty is
reclusion perpetua to death. The Prosecution established that the
accused wielded an icepick to intimidate her into submission and later
to assault AAA with intent to kill her to seal her mouth forever. Under
Article 63, 2, Revised Penal Code, where the prescribed penalties of
reclusion perpetua and death, and there are neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstances present or attendant, like herein, the lesser
penalty of reclusion perpetua is imposable.
And, fifthly, we will not disturb the awards of P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity and P75,000.00 as moral damages, but we add the
amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages by reason of the
established presence of the qualifying circumstance of use of a deadly
5
weapon. Under Art. 2230 of the Civil Code, AAA was entitled to
recover exemplary damages.33[9]
People vs Sabadlab
We affirm the conviction.
First of all, Sabadlab continues to assail the credibility of
AAAs recollections. We understand why he does so, because the
credibility of the victims testimony is a primordial consideration in
rape. 34 [11] Yet, because both the RTC and the CA unanimously
regarded AAA as a credible and spontaneous witness, he has now to
present clear and persuasive reasons to convince us to reverse both
lower courts determination of credibility and to resolve the appeal his
way.
Our review reveals, however, that Sabadlab has not
tendered any clear and persuasive reasons that may warrant the
reversal or modification of the findings of both lower courts on the
credibility of AAA and his criminal liability. The supposed
inconsistencies dwelled on minor details or collateral matters that the
CA precisely held to be badges of veracity and manifestations of
truthfulness due to their tendency of demonstrating that the testimony
had not been rehearsed or concocted. It is also basic that
inconsistencies bearing on minor details or collateral matters should
not adversely affect the substance of the witness declaration, veracity,
or weight of testimony.35[12] The only inconsistencies that might have
discredited the victims credible testimony were those that affected or
related to the elements of the crime. Alas, that was not true herein.
The supposed inconsistencies were inconsequential to the
issue of guilt. For one, the matter of who of the three rapists had
blindfolded and undressed AAA was trifling, because her confusion did
not alter the fact that she had been really blindfolded and rendered
naked. Nor did the failure to produce any torn apparel of AAA disprove
the crime charged, it being without dispute that the tearing of the
victims apparel was not necessary in the commission of the crime
charged. In fact, she did not even state that her clothes had been torn
when Sabadlab had forcibly undressed her. Verily, details and matters
that did not detract from the commission of the crime did not diminish
her credibility.
We hardly need to remind that the task of assigning values
to the testimonies of witnesses and of weighing their credibility is best
left to the trial judge by virtue of the first-hand impressions he derives
while the witnesses testify before him.36[13] The demeanor on the
witness chair of persons sworn to tell the truth in judicial proceedings is
a significant element of judicial adjudication because it can draw the
line between fact and fancy. Their forthright answers or hesitant
pauses, their quivering voices or angry tones, their flustered looks or
sincere gazes, their modest blushes or guilty blanches - all these can
reveal if the witnesses are telling the truth or lying in their teeth.37[14]
As the final appellate reviewer in this case, then, we bow to the age-old
norm to accord the utmost respect to the findings and conclusions on
the credibility of witnesses reached by the trial judge on account of his
unmatched opportunity to observe the witnesses and on account of his
personal access to the various indicia available but not reflected in the
record.38[15]
Secondly, AAAs recollection of the principal occurrence and
her positive identification of the rapists, particularly Sabadlab, were
firm. It is reassuring, too, that her trustworthiness in identifying
Sabadlab as one of the rapists rested on her recognition of him as the
man who had frequently flirted with her at the store where she had
usually bought pandesal for her employers table. As such, the
identification of him as one of the rapists became impervious to doubt.
Thirdly, AAAs failure to shout for help and her failure to
escape were not factors that should diminish credibility due to their
being plausibly explained, the first by the fact that her mouth had been
stuffed by Sabadlab with crumpled newspaper, preventing her from
making any outcry, and the second by the fact that the culprits had
blindfolded her and had also tied her hands behind her back.
And, lastly, Sabadlabs allegation that AAA did not sustain
any bodily injuries was actually contrary to the medical certification
showing her several physical injuries and the penetration of her female
organ. 39[16] This should debunk without difficulty his submission that
she did not offer any resistance to the sexual assaults she suffered.
Her resistance to Sabadlabs order for her to go with him was
immediately stifled by his poking of the gun at her throat and by
appearance of his two cohorts. At any rate, it is notable that among the
amendments of the law on rape introduced under Republic Act No.
8353 (The Anti-Rape Act of 1997) is Section 266-D, which adverts to
the degree of resistance that the victim may put up against the rapist,
viz:
Article 266-D. Presumptions. - Any
physical overt act manifesting resistance against
the act of rape in any degree from the offended
party, or where the offended party is so situated as
to render her/him incapable of giving valid
consent, may be accepted as evidence in the
prosecution of the acts punished under Article
266-A.
We next deal with the characterization of the crime as
forcible abduction with rape. The principal objective of Sabadlab and
his two cohorts in abducting AAA from Dapitan Street and in bringing
her to another place was to rape and ravish her. This objective became
evident from the successive acts of Sabadlab immediately after she
had alighted from the car in completely undressing her as to expose
her whole body (except the eyes due to the blindfold), in kissing her
body from the neck down, and in having carnal knowledge of her (in
that order). Although forcible abduction was
seemingly committed,40[17] we cannot hold him guilty of the complex
crime of forcible abduction with rape when the objective of the
abduction was to commit the rape. Under the circumstances, the rape
absorbed the forcible abduction.41[18]
The penalty of reclusion perpetua was correctly prescribed.
Article 266-A and Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 8353,42[19] respectively define and punish
simple rape as follows:
Article 266-A. Rape; When and How
Committed. Rape is committed
6
 1) By a man who shall have carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the
circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machinations or
grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve
(12) years of age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances mentioned above be
present.
Article 266-B. Penalties. Rape under
paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua.
xxx
Although the CA deleted the RTCs award of exemplary
damages because of the absence of aggravating circumstance
(sic),43[20] we reinstate the award in view of the attendance of the
aggravating circumstance of use of a deadly weapon in the
commission of the crime. The Civil Code provides that exemplary
damages may be imposed in a criminal case as part of the civil liability
when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances. 44 [21] The Civil Code allows such damages to be
awarded by way of example or correction for the public good, in
addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages.45[22] Present here was the need for exemplarity. Thus, the
CA should have recognized the entitlement to exemplary damages of
AAA on account of the attendance of use of a deadly weapon. It was of
no moment that the use of a deadly weapon was not specifically
alleged in the information. As fittingly explained in People v.
Catubig:46[23]
The term aggravating circumstances used
by the Civil Code, the law not having specified
otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or
generic sense. The commission of an offense has
a two-pronged effect, one on the public as it
breaches the social order and the other upon the
private victim as it causes personal sufferings,
each of which is addressed by, respectively, the
prescription of heavier punishment for the accused
and by an award of additional damages to the
victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a
graver felony underscores the exacerbation of the
offense by the attendance of aggravating
circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in
its commission. Unlike the criminal liability
which is basically a State concern, the award
of damages, however, is likewise, if not
primarily, intended for the offended party who
suffers thereby. It would make little sense for
an award of exemplary damages to be due the
private offended party when the aggravating
circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld
when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or
qualifying nature of an aggravating
circumstance is a distinction that should only
be of consequence to the criminal, rather than
to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine,
relative to the civil aspect of the case, an
aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or
qualifying, should entitle the offended party to
an award of exemplary damages within the
unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil
Code.
Accordingly, the Court grants the amount of P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages in addition to the civil indemnity of P50,000.00
and the moral damages of P50,000.00 the CA awarded to AAA.
Sabadlab is further liable for interest of 6% per annum on all the civil
damages.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM decision of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on April 26, 2006, with the MODIFICATION that ERLAND
SABADLAB y BAYQUEL is: (a) DECLARED GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT of SIMPLE RAPE as defined under Article
266-A and as penalized with reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article
266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
8353; and (b) ORDERED TO PAY to the victim P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages, plus interest of 6% per annum on each of the
amounts reckoned from the finality of this decision.
The accused shall pay the costs of suit.
People vs Wagas
The Bill of Rights guarantees the right of an accused to be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved. In order to overcome the
presumption of innocence, the Prosecution is required to adduce
against him nothing less than proof beyond reasonable doubt. Such
proof is not only in relation to the elements of the offense, but also in
relation to the identity of the offender. If the Prosecution fails to
discharge its heavy burden, then it is not only the right of the accused
to be freed, it becomes the Courts constitutional duty to acquit him.
Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
provides:
Article 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud
another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished
by:
xxxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
xxxx
(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an
obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds
deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check.
The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary
to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the
bank and/or the payee or holder that said check has been dishonored
for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit
constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.
In order to constitute estafa under this statutory provision, the act of
postdating or issuing a check in payment of an obligation must be the
efficient cause of the defraudation. This means that the offender must
be able to obtain money or property from the offended party by reason
of the issuance of the check, whether dated or postdated. In other
words, the Prosecution must show that the person to whom the check
was delivered would not have parted with his money or property were it
not for the issuance of the check by the offender.25
The essential elements of the crime charged are that: (a) a check is
postdated or issued in payment of an obligation contracted at the time
the check is issued; (b) lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the
check; and (c) damage to the payee thereof.26 It is the criminal fraud or
deceit in the issuance of a check that is punishable, not the non-
payment of a debt.27 Prima facie evidence of deceit exists by law upon
proof that the drawer of the check failed to deposit the amount
necessary to cover his check within three days from receipt of the
notice of dishonor.
The Prosecution established that Ligaray had released the goods to
Caada because of the postdated check the latter had given to him;
7
and that the check was dishonored when presented for payment Article 89. How criminal liability is totally
because of the insufficiency of funds. extinguished. Criminal liability is totally
In every criminal prosecution, however, the identity of the offender, like extinguished:
the crime itself, must be established by proof beyond reasonable
doubt.28 In that regard, the Prosecution did not establish beyond 1. By the death of the convict, as to the
reasonable doubt that it was Wagas who had defrauded Ligaray by personal penalties; and as to pecuniary
issuing the check. penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only
Communications by telephone are admissible in evidence where they when the death of the offender occurs before
are relevant to the fact or facts in issue, and admissibility is governed final judgment.
by the same rules of evidence concerning face-to-face conversations xxx
except the party against whom the conversations are sought to be
used must ordinarily be identified. It is not necessary that the witness The death of the accused likewise extinguished the civil
be able, at the time of the conversation, to identify the person with liability that was based exclusively on the crime for which the accused
whom the conversation was had, provided subsequent identification is was convicted (i.e., ex delicto), because no final judgment of conviction
proved by direct or circumstantial evidence somewhere in the was yet rendered by the time of his death. Only civil liability predicated
development of the case. The mere statement of his identity by the on a source of
party calling is not in itself sufficient proof of such identity, in the
absence of corroborating circumstances so as to render the
conversation admissible. However, circumstances preceding or obligation other than the delict survived the death of the accused,
following the conversation may serve to sufficiently identify the caller. which the offended party can recover by means of a separate civil
The completeness of the identification goes to the weight of the action.47
evidence rather than its admissibility, and the responsibility lies in the
first instance with the district court to determine within its sound
discretion whether the threshold of admissibility has been met.35 (Bold
emphasis supplied)
It is a fundamental rule in criminal procedure that the State carries the
onus probandi in establishing the guilt of the accused beyond a
reasonable doubt, as a consequence of the tenet ei incumbit probation,
qui dicit, non qui negat, which means that he who asserts, not he who
denies, must prove,40 and as a means of respecting the presumption of
innocence in favor of the man or woman on the dock for a crime.
Accordingly, the State has the burden of proof to show: (1) the correct
identification of the author of a crime, and (2) the actuality of the
commission of the offense with the participation of the accused. All
these facts must be proved by the State beyond reasonable doubt on
the strength of its evidence and without solace from the weakness of
the defense. That the defense the accused puts up may be weak is
inconsequential if, in the first place, the State has failed to discharge
the onus of his identity and culpability. The presumption of innocence
dictates that it is for the Prosecution to demonstrate the guilt and not
for the accused to establish innocence.41 Indeed, the accused, being
presumed innocent, carries no burden of proof on his or her shoulders.
For this reason, the first duty of the Prosecution is not to prove the
crime but to prove the identity of the criminal. For even if the
commission of the crime can be established, without competent proof
of the identity of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, there can be
no conviction.42
There is no question that an identification that does not preclude a
reasonable possibility of mistake cannot be accorded any evidentiary
force.43 Thus, considering that the circumstances of the identification of
Wagas as the person who transacted on the rice did not preclude a
reasonable possibility of mistake, the proof of guilt did not measure up
to the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt demanded in
criminal cases. Perforce, the accuseds constitutional right of
presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved is not overcome,
and he is entitled to an acquittal,44 even though his innocence may be
doubted.45
Nevertheless, an accused, though acquitted of estafa, may still be held
civilly liable where the preponderance of the established facts so
warrants.46 Wagas as the admitted drawer of the check was legally
liable to pay the amount of it to Ligaray, a holder in due course. 47
Consequently, we pronounce and hold him fully liable to pay the
amount of the dishonored check, plus legal interest of 6% per annum
from the finality of this decision.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision
rendered on July 11, 2002 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, in
Cebu City; and ACQUITS Gilbert R. Wagas of the crime of estafa on
the ground of reasonable doubt, but ORDERS him to pay Alberto
Ligaray the amount of P200,000.00 as actual damages, plus interest of
6% per annum from the finality of this decision.
People vs Bringay
Under the foregoing circumstances, the death of the accused during
the pendency of his appeal in this Court totally extinguished his
criminal liability. Such extinction is based on Article 89 of the Revised
Penal Code, which pertinently provides:

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