Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 31012 September 10, 1932

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ESTELA ROMUALDEZ and LUIS MABUNAY, defendants-appellants.

Courtney Whitney, Vicente Nepomuceno and Julio Llorente for appellant Romualdez.
Vicente J. Francisco and Claro M. Recto for appellant Mabunay.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.

VICKERS, J.:

This is an appeal from the following decision of the Honorable E. P. Revilla, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila:

Estela Romualdez and Luis Mabunay are charged with the crime of falsification of public and official documents, committed, according to the information, as follows:

That in or about the month of February, 1927, in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, the accused Estela Romualdez, who, by appointment of the Supreme
Court of the Philippine Islands, was then taking part in the discharge of public functions as secretary to the Honorable Norberto Romualdez, one of the Justices of
the Supreme Court, and by reason of said duty had under her care the compositions and other papers and documents having reference to the examinations for the
admission of candidates to the bar held in the months of August and September, 1926, which were then kept in the archives of the said court, confabulating with
her coaccused, Luis Mabunay, and acting in common accord with him, who was then one of the candidates who took the said Bar Examinations, willfully,
illegally, and criminally extracted from the said archives of the Supreme Court certain public and official documents, to wit: the compositions, which were
written, prepared and submitted by the accused, Luis Mabunay in that examination. Once in possession of the same, the said accused Estela Romualdez and Luis
Mabunay, conspiring together and acting in common accord, willfully, illegally, and criminally erased the grade of fifty-eight (58%) given by the correctors
Alfonso Felix and M. Guevara to the composition in Remedial Law, which was written and prepared by the accused Luis Mabunay, and in its place wrote sixty-
four (64%); and also erased the grade of sixty-three (63%) given by correctors Jeronimo Samson and Amado del Rosario to the composition in Civil Law written
and prepared by the said Luis Mabunay, and in its place wrote seventy-three (73%), and by means of these alterations the said accused Estela Romualdez and
Luis Mabunay were able to change the relative merits of those compositions, thereby attributing to the said correctors, statements and declarations contrary to
what they really made, and the accused Estela Romualdez and Luis Mabunay thus succeeded by means of falsifications made by them in the aforesaid public and
official documents in making it appear that Luis Mabunay obtained the general average required by the rules of the Supreme Court, and in securing the latter's
admission to the practice of law, as in fact he was admitted, to the great prejudice of the public.

Upon arraignment the accused pleaded not guilty.

Both the prosecution and the defense produced an abundance of evidence, oral and documentary, the presentation of which consumed considerable of the court's time.

UNDISPUTED FACTS
There is no question whatsoever as to the following facts which are not disputed either by the prosecution or by the defense:

The accused Estela Romualdez was appointed upon the recommendation of Justice Norberto Romualdez of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands as his secretary on
November 1, 1921, and continued as such until September 15, 1928.

The accused Luis Mabunay was one of the candidates duly admitted to the bar examinations held in 1926.

The clerk of the Supreme Court, Mr. Vicente Albert, who was appointed to that office on July 11, 1912, acts every year as the secretary ex oficio of the examination
committee for admission to the bar.

The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands designated Justice Norberto Romualdez as chairman of the examination committee for admission to the bar in the year 1926,
and upon recommendation of Clerk Vicente Albert, he appointed the following as members of the examination committee, with their respective subjects: Attorney
Francisco Ortigas, Civil Law; Judge Vicente Nepomuceno, Mercantile Law; Attorney Godofredo Reyes, Criminal Law; Judge Jose Abreu, Remedial Law; Attorney C. A.
DeWitt, International Law; Attorney-General Delfin Jaranilla, Political Law; and Attorney Carlos Ledesma, Legal Ethics.

Upon recommendation also of clerk of court Mr. Vicente Albert, a committee of correctors was appointed, composed of the following attorneys: Amado del Rosario,
Assistant Director of Civil Service, and Jeronimo Samson, deputy clerk of the Supreme Court, as correctors in Civil Law; Rafael Amparo, Secretary of Justice Johnson,
and Fulgencio Vega, Secretary of Justice Malcolm, as correctors in Mercantile Law; Cecilio Apostol, Assistant City Fiscal, and Remo, of the Bureau of Audits, as
correctors in Penal Law; Marciano Guevara, of the Bureau of Audits and Alfonso Felix, Assistant City Fiscal, as correctors in Remedial law; Juan Lantin, of the Executive
Bureau, and the accused Estela Romualdez, as correctors in Political Law; Rufino Luna, of the Executive Bureau, and Zoilo Castrillo, of the Bureau of Lands, as
correctors in International Law; and Anatalio Maalac, of the Bureau of Lands, and Jeronimo Samson as correctors in Legal Ethics. On account of illness, Mr. Remo was
substituted by Jeronimo Samson as corrector in Penal Law. All said correctors were designated by clerk of court Albert with the approval of the chairman of the
examination committee.

The work of the members of the examination committee was limited to the preparation of the questions in their respective subjects and of a memorandum or note of the
articles, legal provisions and jurisprudence showing the sources from which the questions were taken. The work of reviewing and grading the compositions was entrusted
to the correctors designated for each subject. Each corrector was furnished with this note or memorandum, and a set of rules, patterned after those of the Civil Service,
was prepared by corrector Amado del Rosario to guide the correctors in grading the examination papers.

The correctors worked separately in reviewing and grading the papers on the subject assigned to them, noting the grades given to each answer, not on the composition, but
in a separate note book, which were later checked with the grades given by the other corrector in the same subject, for the purpose of determining the general average to
be given to the composition.

The report of the examination committee on the final result of the bar examination for the year 1926 was submitted, under date of March 2, 1927, to the Supreme Court
and was published on the fifth of said month. In the list of successful candidates (Exhibit C-5) there appeared the name of candidate Luis Mabunay with a general average
of 75%. The grades of Mabunay in each subject, according to the list Exhibit C-2, which was prepared after the publication of the result of the examination, are: 73 in
Civil Law, 77 in Mercantile Law, 69 in Penal Law, 76 in Political Law, 86 in International Law, 64 in Remedial Law, 80 in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises.
However, a later revision of the composition of Luis Mabunay showed that the grades of seventy-three (73 in Civil Law (Exhibit B-1), and sixty-four (64) in Remedial
Law (Exhibit B-2) had been written on the first page of said compositions after striking out the grades of sixty-three (63) therefore given to the composition in Civil Law,
Exhibit B-1, and fifty-eight (58) theretofore given to the composition in Remedial Law, Exhibit B-2. The investigation of this irregularity by the City Fiscal of Manila led
to the filing of the information in this case.

Admission of the accused Estela Romualdez

Before the prosecuting attorney had finished presenting his evidence tending to show the identity of the person who altered the grades appearing on the first pages of the
compositions Exhibits-B-1 and B-2, the accused Estela Romualdez spontaneously and with the conformity of her attorneys made of record an admission as follows (p.
395, s. n.):

"In Exhibit B-1 the words seventy-three and the figures 73% inclosed in parenthesis are in my regular handwriting, and in Exhibit B-2 the words sixty-four and
the figures 64% inclosed in parenthesis appearing in said composition are also in my regular handwriting."

Authority of the accused Estela Romualdez to alter or change the grades

In view of the admission made by the accused Estela Romualdez that she was the person who wrote on the compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 the words and figures
alleged to have been falsified, it now appears that the burden of establishing the authority under which said changes and alterations were made is on the accused. On this
point the evidence for the defense tended to show that the accused Estela Romualdez, both in her capacity as private secretary of the chairman of the examination
committee and as corrector and at the same time supervisor of the correctors, was authorized by said chairman to revise the compositions already reviewed by the other
correctors and to change the grades given by them.

Justice Romualdez, testifying as a witness for the defense, said that he considered the accused Estela Romualdez and Deputy Clerk Samson as supervisors of the
correctors; and explaining the powers of the former he said (page 721, s. n.):

"As such supervisor I think there was on occasion when I gave her to understand that in order to do justice to the compositions, she could review the
compositions already graded by the other correctors; provided, I want to add, that the new revision was done in order to do justice to the compositions and before
the names of the candidates were known."

Referring to the alterations made by the accused Estela Romualdez to the grades given by the corresponding correctors to compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2, this same
witness testified that said alterations were made within the limits of the powers he had given to said accused (pages 723, 726, s. n.).

For her part the accused Estela Romualdez, testifying as a witness in her own behalf, said that the chairman of the examining committee, gave her to understand that she
"was authorized to correct any composition in any subject" in the bar examinations of the year 1926 and that she had never corrected any composition after the name of
the corresponding candidate was identified (pages 782, 783, s. n.). She denied having known Luis Mabunay, and said that the first time she saw him was on the first day
of the trial of this case (page 783, s. n.).

Contention of the Prosecuting Attorney

The contention of the prosecuting attorney with respect to the accused Estela Romualdez may be summarized in two following propositions: 1st that Justice
Romualdez, as chairman of the examination committee, did not have authority to delegate to his secretary, the accused Estela Romualdez, the power to revise
compositions in subjects in which she was not a corrector and which had already been graded by the other correctors, and much less the power to alter or change the
grades given to and written on said compositions; 2nd that granting that the chairman of the examination committee had such authority, the accused Estela Romualdez
did not exercise the same in the manner prescribed by said chairman, namely, in order to do justice to the compositions and on the condition that the revision and the
changes of grades should be made before the names of the candidates, to whom the compositions belonged, were known.

In support of the first proposition, the prosecuting attorneys maintains that Justice Romualdez was appointed by the Supreme Court as chairman of the bar examination
committee of the year 1926, so that he would supervise the examinations in accordance with law and the rules, and that precisely, in accordance with the rules the
chairman can not by himself exercise the individual powers of the committee, among which were the powers to review, and to change or alter the grades given to the
compositions.
As to the second proposition, the prosecuting attorney maintains that the evidence adduced by the prosecution, specially the testimony of the Deputy Clerk Samson, shows
that the accused Estela Romualdez made the changes in the grades given by the correctors to compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2, in order to favor the accused Luis
Mabunay, to whom she knew said compositions belonged, thus violating the conditions imposed upon her by the chairman of the examination committee when she was
given said authority.

As to the accused Luis Mabunay, the prosecuting attorney also maintains that the evidence for the prosecution shows that he was in connivance with the accused Estela
Romualdez in the alteration by the latter of his grades in Civil Law and Remedial Law for the purpose of raising to 75% the general average of 72.8 which he had
obtained.

Theory of the Defense

In reply to the contention of the prosecuting attorney, the defense argues that the power of supervision given by Justice Romualdez to his secretary, the accused Estela
Romualdez, is not contrary to law, rules or precedents. This assertion is based on the testimony of said Justice that the appointment of a committee of attorneys in
accordance with section 2 of the rules had not been followed by the Supreme Court for a number of years prior to 1926, and that when said court designated Justice
Romualdez as chairman of the examination committee without designating the examiners, it left that function to said chairman, and conferred upon him ample powers to
do what in his judgment was most in line with justice and the law, and that no Court of First Instance has jurisdiction to determine the propriety or illegality of the
procedure employed by the chairman of the examination committee, or of the powers conferred by him upon his secretary, inasmuch as said chairman was responsible
only to the Supreme Court for his acts.

The defense also claims that the accused Estela Romualdez could not have known to whom compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 belonged at the time of making the
alteration of the grades appearing on the first pages thereof, because, according to the testimony of said accused, corroborated by that of Catalina Pons, who was one of
those who helped in the preparation of the list of candidates Exhibit C-1, the envelopes containing the names and the identification numbers of the candidates were opened
just one day before the publication of the result of the examination, and that in order to finish this work and to place the names of the candidates on said list, they had to
work continuously from 8 o'clock in the morning until 8 o'clock in the evening on the day prior to the publication of the result of the examinations.

Considerations on the evidence and contentions of both parties

Upon an examination of the testimony of Justice Romualdez, as a witness for the defense, the court finds that the accused Estela Romualdez, as secretary of the chairman
of the examination committee, and Jeronimo Samson, as deputy clerk of the Supreme Court were considered by said chairman not only as correctors in the subjects
assigned to them but also as supervisors of the correctors (page 721, s. n.), both of them with equal powers and authority so that neither could consider himself superior to
the other (page 727, s. n.). It appears, however, that while the chairman of the committee gave his secretary, the accused Estela Romualdez, to understand that she "was
authorized to revise the compositions already graded by the other correctors provided the new revisions were made for the purpose of doing justice to the compositions
and that the same were mad before the names of the candidates were known" (pages 721, 722, s. n.), he did not do the same with respect to Deputy Clerk Jeronimo
Samson, to whom he said nothing about this matter (page 768, s. n.). It also appears that the accused Estela Romualdez had never informed the chairman of the committee
about the corrections or alterations made by her in compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2; neither did the latter examine said compositions to determine whether or not their
merits justified the changes so made, and he only knew of said changes upon the filing of the information against his said secretary (page 728, s. n.). For her part, she
made no report to the chairman of the examination committee of any error or injustice committed by any corrector, and she only told him during the progress of the work
of grading the papers that they were being graded very strictly and that "she feared that some injustice might be committed" (page 729, s. n.), and for that reason Justice
Romualdez told his secretary, Estela Romualdez, that "should a case of the kind come to her knowledge, she should take special notice of the same in order to do justice,"
that is to say, if any person should bring to her attention any such case in which, in her opinion, some injustice had been committed, she was authorized to put things in
order (page 781, s. n.), and the revision in such cases was left to the judgment of his secretary (page 780, s. n.).

The powers conferred in the manner above stated, by Justice Romualdez as chairman of the examination committee upon his secretary, Estela Romualdez, gave her so
ample a discretionary power of supervision that in its exercise she should act independently, not only of the correctors and of her cosupervisor Jeronimo Samson, but also
of the examination committee. Now, granting that Justice Romualdez, as a chairman of the committee appointed by the Supreme Court to conduct the bar examinations of
1926, was authorized to confer such power of supervision upon his secretary Estela Romualdez, in what manner did she exercise that power when she made the changes in
the compositions in question?

The accused Estela Romualdez who, according to her own admission, made the alterations of the grades originally given by the correctors to compositions of Exhibits B-1
and B-2, is the only person who could give an account of and explain the circumstances under which said alterations were made. But said accused, testifying as a witness
in her own behalf, was not able to explain how and under what circumstances she made those alterations. When pressed by the fiscal during the cross-examination to state
the circumstances under which she came across those compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 the accused Estela Romualdez said: "If I were to make any statement with
reference to the circumstances under which I came across these compositions, you would compel me to tell a lie, because I do not really remember" (page 823, s. n.).
Neither does the accused remember why she did not put her initials under or at the side of those alterations she made on compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2, limiting
herself to say, when she saw the other compositions (Exhibits 3-1, X, X-1 and X-2) bearing her initials which were exhibited to her by the fiscal, that she placed her
initials on said compositions because she graded them as corrector, and she did not put her initials on compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 because she revised them in her
capacity as supervisor (pages 824- 832, s. n.). She also said, that, as corrector, she had instructions to put her initials when writing the original grade on any composition,
but as supervisor "she was under no obligation" to put her initials (page 830, s. n.) and that the chairman of the examination committee "has not gone into such minor
details" (page 831, s. n.). Upon being questioned by the fiscal as to why she wrote the altered grade on composition Exhibit B-2 on the same line and immediately before
the initials of the correctors she said: "Because on that occasion it pleased me to do so" (page 836, s. n.). Neither does the accused remember whether or not she exercised
her supervisory authority with respect to the other five compositions forming part of those marked as Exhibits B-1 and B-2 (page 840, s. n.); and when asked by the fiscal
for an explanation as to why the increase given by her to the grades originally given to said compositions had the effect of raising the general average of the compositions
of the same candidate to 75%, the accused answered that "the fiscal ought to know that in this life there are happy coincidences" (page 848, s. n.). With these answers and
others appearing in her testimony, the accused instead of giving a satisfactory explanation of her conduct, has demonstrated that with the encouragement given by Justice
Romualdez to the effect that the new revision of the compositions was left to her discretion (page 780, s. n.) she assumed that the powers exercised by her in the bar
examinations of 1926 were such that she could revise any composition in any subject already graded and increase or decrease the grades given by the correctors; in other
words, that she could, at her pleasure, do or undo the work done by the correctors without the necessity of accounting to anybody for it (page 834, s. n.), or of keeping a
note or memorandum of the compositions so revised and the alteration of the grades.

The evidence, however, shows that Justice Romualdez himself in reviewing, in his capacity as chairman of the examination committee, the compositions of the candidates
who filed motions for reconsideration of the grades given them, after the publication of the result of the examinations, performed his work with such diligence and zeal
that he noted in a memorandum book (Exhibit F) not only the grades given to each answer of the candidate, but also the total grade obtained by the candidate in the
revision, together with such other data which would explain the increase of the grades of this or that candidate.

The court is loath to believe that Justice Romualdez had given his secretary to understand that she had such unlimited powers, or that the Supreme Court in designating
said Justice as chairman of the bar examination committee of the year 1926, authorizing him to confer such powers upon his secretary, because it is an undisputed fact that
his designation was made so that he should conduct the examinations in accordance with law and the rules.

But, even granting that when the accused Estela Romualdez altered the grades given by the correctors to compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 she acted in the exercise of
the powers conferred upon her by the chairman of the examination committee, is there any ground in support of her claim that she made those alterations only to do justice
to the compositions, and without knowing the name of the candidate to whom they belonged?

Without giving any weight to the testimony of the witness for the prosecution, Juan Villaflor, which, according to the defense is not worthy of credit because of the
contradictions and inconsistencies therein noted, the record contains other evidence establishing certain facts from which such knowledge can be inferred.

It has been proved that after the revision and grading of all the compositions numbering over 8,000, a list, Exhibit C-1, was prepared in pencil. This list was prepared with
the intervention of the said Jeronimo Samson and Josephine Stevens, assisted by Catalina Pons, Juan Villaflor and the accused Estela Romualdez. However, before the
preparation of this list, sometime during the first day of February, 1927, the sealed envelopes containing the identification numbers attached to each composition were
opened. Said numbers were written either on the upper part of each envelope or on the first page of the composition, and that work lasted several days (pages 162, 163, s.
n.). In the list Exhibit C-1 the numbers of the candidates contained in the envelopes attached to the compositions were first written (page 166, s. n.), and then the grades in
each subject, followed by the general average (pages 71, 184, s. n.), leaving in the blank the space intended for the names (page 166, s. n.). Deputy Clerk Samson wrote on
an adding machine the grades in each composition as they were read out by one of the helpers, and then the corresponding general average as computed by him (page 71,
s. n.), and, at the same time, Josephine Stevens wrote said grades in the space corresponding to each subject (page 188, s. n.). The roll of paper used by Deputy Clerk
Samson on the adding machine was presented as Exhibit C-6.

After the list Exhibit C-1 containing the grades in each subject and the general average of each candidate, who was theretofore known by his identification number only,
was prepared, the envelopes containing the names corresponding to the identification numbers written on said list were taken from the safe of the office of the clerk, and
the names of the candidates were inserted in said list by those who assisted in the preparation thereof (pages 166, 167, s. n.) among whom was the accused Estela
Romualdez, who admitted, upon cross-examination, having written many of the names appearing on several pages of said list (pages 859-861, s. n.). After said list Exhibit
C-1 was prepared the examination committee submitted to the Supreme Court a report recommending the admission to the bar and not only for those candidates with a
general average of 75% or more, but also of those who had obtained a general average of 70 or more but below 75%, and said automatic increase was ordered noted on
said list Exhibit C-1. However, this recommendation was not approved by the Supreme Court on the ground that said automatic increase was arbitrary (pages 73, 74, s.
n.), and for that reason the clerk of court, Mr. Albert, instructed his deputy, Mr. Samson, to prepare another list containing only the names of the candidates who had
originally obtained a general average of 75% without having obtained less than 60% in any subject, and in pursuance thereof the typewritten list Exhibit C-5 was prepared
(page 77, s. n.), which was approved by the Supreme Court and published on March 5, 1927. In this list Luis Mabunay is included with an average of 75%.

Eight or ten days after the publication of the result of the examinations the list Exhibit C-2 was prepared in the same form as Exhibit C-1 taking the grades directly from
the compositions; while one of the helpers read them, Deputy Clerk Samson listed them on the adding machine and computed the general average of each candidate. The
roll of paper used by Deputy Samson on this occasion was also presented and marked as Exhibit C-7.

Both rolls, Exhibits C-6 and C-7, as well as the lists Exhibits C-1 and C-2, were kept in the office of Justice Romualdez and were only taken out when the investigation of
the irregularities in the examinations of 1926 was commenced (page 81, s. n.). And only in the course of that investigation it was discovered that the grades of candidate
Luis Mabunay, identified with number 898 in roll Exhibit C-6 and in the list Exhibit C-1, which had been prepared simultaneously, did not agree, because, while roll
Exhibit C-6 shows that the grade in Civil Law of candidate No. 898 is 63, the list Exhibit C-1 shows that the grade of the same candidate is 73; and while roll Exhibit C-6
shows that the grade of candidate No. 898 was 58 (in Remedial Law), his grade in the list Exhibit C-1 is 64 (in the same subject), a difference also being noted between
the general average of candidate No. 898 in Exhibit C-6, which is 72.8%, and his general average on Exhibit C-1, which is 75% (pages 73, 74, s. n.). This discovery led to
the revision of the compositions of Luis Mabunay in the examinations of 1926, which were united to his personal record (Exhibit B), which showed that the grades given
to, and written by the respective correctors on the compositions of said candidate in Civil Law Exhibit B-1 and Remedial Law Exhibit B-2 had been altered, and further,
that the grades that appeared on said compositions before the alterations were identical with those that appeared on the roll, Exhibit C-6. An ocular inspection of page 29
of said Exhibit C-1 shows at first glance that the numbers 73, 64, and 75 in the columns corresponding to Civil Law, Remedial Law and General Average, respectively,
were written after erasing with rubber what was there originally written. It may also be noted, upon an examination of the alterations appearing on the first pages of
compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2, that the grades originally written by the correctors, authenticated by their initials, had been stricken out in such a way that it is
difficult to make out said original grades, leaving, however, intact, the initials of the correctors.

From these facts it is inferred: First, that the person who erased and altered the grades written by the correctors on the first pages of compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2
wished to make it appear that said alterations had been made by the correctors themselves; second, that said alterations were made after the grades written by the
correctors had been noted on the adding machine in roll Exhibit C-6 and on the list Exhibit C-1 which were prepared simultaneously; third, that after said alterations had
been made, and in order that the grades so altered should agree with the grades already written on the list Exhibit C-1, the grades in Civil Law and Remedial Law were
erased with rubber, and in place thereof were written the grades now appearing in said compositions. The accused Estela Romualdez having admitted that she was the
author of such alterations, the only logical inference from her admission and the facts above set out, is that she was also the person who erased not only the grades
originally written by the correctors on the compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 but also those appearing in the columns corresponding to Civil Law and Remedial Law on
the list Exhibit C-1, and the same person who wrote the grades now appearing in said columns, and which agree with those written by her on compositions Exhibits B-1
and B-2. Now, if the accused Estela Romualdez erased in the manner stated the grades originally written, and substituted for them the grades now appearing in said
compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 as well as in the columns corresponding to Civil Law and Remedial Law in the list Exhibit C-1, it cannot be doubted that in making
such erasures and alterations she not only acted with the intent of concealing her identity, but she also knew the number and the name of the candidate to whom said
 composition belonged, because at that time the numbers and the names of the candidates were already written on the list Exhibit C-1, and that list was kept in the office of
Justice Romualdez (page 83, s. n.), were she had complete and absolute control as private secretary and supervisor of the examinations.

Participation of the accused Luis Mabunay

Discarding the testimony of witness Juan Villaflor in which he says that one Luis Mabunay called up the accused Estela Romualdez on the telephone a few days before
the publication of the results of the examinations, there is, indeed, no direct proof in the record showing the participation of the accused Luis Mabunay. However, there is
other evidence for the prosecution establishing certain facts which show strong indications that he operated in the act before or at the time of its execution by his
coaccused. It has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused Luis Mabunay was one of the candidates who took the bar examinations in 1926; that the
general average obtained by him, according to the computation appearing on the roll Exhibit C-6 of the adding machine and that originally written in the list Exhibit C-1
was 72.8%; that after the Supreme Court denied the recommendation of the examination committee that all grades from and between 70% and 75% be automatically
raised to 75%, his name, nevertheless, appeared in the list of successful candidates which was published on March 5, 1927 (Exhibit C-5), and that said inclusion was due
to the increase of these grades in Civil Law (Exhibit B-1) and Remedial Law (Exhibit B-2), which was made by his coaccused by erasing and altering the grades
theretofore given by the correctors.

It is true that the accused Estela Romualdez, in her desire to show that she had no motive whatsoever for favoring his coaccused Luis Mabunay, testified that she did not
know him and that the first time she saw him was on the first day of the trial of this case. However, in view of her inability to explain why precisely the compositions of
said Luis Mabunay had been benefited by the revision, and in view of the admission of Justice Romualdez that the power to revise conferred upon Estela Romualdez
could be exercised by her in the compositions already graded by the correctors in all cases of injustice which came to her knowledge, or which might be brought to her
attention (page 781, s. n.), her testimony lacks foundation, because it is absurd to believe that her revision of the compositions of her coaccused Luis Mabunay was due
only and solely to a happy coincidence.

Furthermore, the accused Mabunay made no effort to contradict the evidence for the prosecution with reference to his withdrawal of the amount of P600 from his savings
account in the Philippine Trust Company on the second day of March, 1927, or three days before the publication of the result of the examinations (Exhibit I) which, when
correlated with the deposit of the sum of P400 made by the accused Estela Romualdez in her current account (Exhibit H) with the Bank of the Philippine Islands on the
seventh day of said March, 1927, may, perhaps, give an explanation of the motive of said accused for increasing the grades of Mabunay with just the necessary points to
reach the lowest passing general average. It is also true that Estela Romualdez testified that said amount had been sent to her by her cousin named Prisca Magpayo Redona
from the province for the purchase of merchandise for sale at the latter's store (page 791, s. n.), but the testimony in that respect was not corroborated either by her said
cousin, or by any other persons mentioned by her as the bearers of said amount, or by the corresponding check or postal money order, as she had done when referring
other deposits in the bank.

Conclusion

In view of the foregoing considerations, the court finds that the allegations of the information are sufficiently supported by the evidence and that the accused, Estela
Romualdez and Luis Mabunay are guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; the former as principal and the latter as accomplice, of the crime of falsification of official
documents with which they are charged and, therefore, a judgment is rendered sentencing Estela Romualdez, who was a Government employee at the time of the
commission of the crime, to suffer, in accordance with article 300 of the Penal Code, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 2712, six years and one day of prision mayor
with the accessory penalties of the law, to pay a fine of 1,000 pesetas, without subsidiary imprisonment in view of the nature of the penalty, and also to suffer the penalty
of perpetual disqualification from public office; and her coaccused Luis Mabunay, who was a private individual with respect to said examination, to suffer, under the
provisions of article 301 as amended by section 2 of Act No. 2712 and article 67 of the Penal Code, the penalty of four months and one day of arresto mayor, with the
accessory penalties of the law, and to pay a fine of 250 pesetas, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and each to pay one-half part of the costs.

The appellant Estela Romualdez through her attorneys makes the following assignments of error:
 I. The trial court erred in finding the accused, Estela Romualdez, guilty of the crime of "falsification of public and official documents" and in sentencing her to suffer
imprisonment without due process of law, contrary to section 3, Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, entitled "An Act to Declare the Purpose of the People of the United
States as to the future Political Status of the People of the Philippine Islands, and to Provide a More Autonomous Government for those Islands".

II. The trial court erred in not finding, that the accused, Estela Romualdez, was fully authorized to make the alterations she in fact made on the composition papers of Luis
Mabunay, Exhibits B-1 and B-2 of the Government, and in denying full credit to the uncontradicted testimony of Mr. Justice Norberto Romualdez, chairman of the bar
examining committee for the year 1926, concerning the authority granted her.

III. The trial court erred in failing to extend to the accused Estela Romualdez a fair and impartial trial.

The attorneys for the appellant Luis Mabunay allege that the trial court committed the following errors:

I. The trial court erred in not crediting the uncontradicted testimony of Justice Romualdez with reference to his authority as chairman of the bar examination committee of
the year 1926, to confer upon the accused Estela Romualdez, the powers he in fact conferred upon her, in connection with said examination.

II. It also erred in not crediting the uncontradicted testimony of Justice Romualdez as to the fact that he, as chairman of the bar examination committee of 1926, really and
truly conferred upon the accused Estela Romualdez the powers which she exercised in that examination.

III. It also erred in concluding that the accused Estela Romualdez did not exercise the powers conferred upon her by the chairman of the bar examination committee of
1926, within the limits fixed by said chairman, to wit: that the new revision and grading of the compositions be made in order to do justice thereto, and before the names
of the corresponding candidates were known.

IV. It likewise erred in concluding that the accused Estela Romualdez changed the general average and the grades of candidate Luis Mabunay in Civil Law and Remedial
law on the list Exhibit C-1.

V. The lower court erred in not admitting the expert testimony of Wm. J. Rhode, Felicisimo Feria, and Claro M. Recto, as well as Exhibits 26 and 27, containing the
opinion of said lawyers as to the grades to which said compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 were justly entitled.

VI. It also erred in not concluding that Jeronimo Samson used the same powers exercised by the accused in the bar examination of 1926.

VII. Granting that the accused Estela Romualdez knew that compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 belonged to her coaccused Luis Mabunay when she reviewed and regraded
them, the court erred in concluding that said act constitutes the offense charged in the information.

VIII. Granting that Justice Romualdez, as chairman of the bar examination committee of 1926, was not authorized by the Supreme Court to confer upon Estela Romualdez
the powers which she exercised in that examination, the court erred in concluding that she altered the grades of said compositions willfully and feloniously.

IX. The lower court also erred in concluding that Estela Romualdez intended to conceal her identity when she revised and regraded compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2.

X. It also erred in concluding that the accused Estela Romualdez, in exercising her powers as supervisor of the correctors in said bar examinations, revised compositions
Exhibits B-1 and B-2 only, in order to regrade them.

XI. It also erred in suggesting that her motive, in revising and regrading said compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2, was the fact that she had received from her coaccused
Luis Mabunay the sum of P400.
 XII. Granting that the accused Estela Romualdez committed the offense of falsification with which she is charged, the lower court erred in concluding that Luis Mabunay
participated in its commission.

In addition to the usual brief for each of the accused, the attorneys for the appellants filed a joint memorandum on July 10, 1929. The Attorney-General filed a brief on behalf of
the People of the Philippine Islands and a reply to the memorandum for the defense.

The court at that time consisted of nine members, one of whom, Justice Romualdez, was disqualified to sit in this case. Upon a consideration of the case on its merits, four justices
were in favor of affirming the decision of the trial court and the same number were in favor of acquitting the defendants. The court being unable to reach a decision in the usual
course, an attempt was made on February 11, 1930 to break the deadlock, as is evidenced by the following resolution:

The court having under consideration again the case of People vs. Romualdez, et al., No. 31012, those participating being all the members of the court, except Mr. Justice
Romualdez, who was disqualified, it was moved that following precedents elsewhere, particularly in the United States Supreme Court, to the effect that when there is an
equal division in the court and there is no prospect of a change in the vote the judgment appealed from stand affirmed, and in accordance with the action taken in the case
of Nacionalista Party vs. Municipal Board of Manila, No. 21265 the judgment in the case at bar be affirmed. Mr. Chief Justice Avancea and Messrs. Justices
Malcolm, Ostrand, and Johns voted in favor of the motion. Messrs. Justices Johnson, Street, Villamor, and Villa-Real voted against the motion. Mr. Justice Johnson based
his dissent on the peculiar statutory provisions in force in the Philippine Islands. For want of a majority, the motion was lost.

The court thereupon directed that the clerk retain the record in the case until the further order of the court.

On January 12, 1931 Luis Mabunay filed a motion praying that the case against him be considered separately and he be absolved from the complaint. This motion was denied by
the court. He renewed his motion on August 1, 1931. This motion was also denied on the ground that no severance had been asked for in the lower court, and for the further reason
that there was a prospect that the membership of the court would soon be increased.

The membership of the court was finally increased to eleven, and due to the death or retirement of three justices only six of the former members remained. On June 23, 1932
Courtney Whitney as attorney for Estela Romualdez filed a petition praying that this case be set for a rehearing before the court as newly constituted. This motion was granted. On
July 2, 1932 he filed a motion for the dismissal of the information, alleging that because of the inability of the court to reach a determination from the facts as to the guilt or
innocence of the defendant-appellant Estela Romualdez, she had been denied her right to a speedy trial. This motion was denied.

After a reargument of the case, the attorney for Estela Romualdez filed an additional memorandum, to which the Attorney-General filed a reply.

Under the first assignment of error, the attorneys for Estela Romualdez maintain that even if the lower court's findings of fact be justified by the evidence of record, "they fail to
sustain that any criminal offense, recognized under the laws of the Philippine Islands, has been committed." They contend that the appointment of the committee of attorneys by
Justice Romualdez to read and grade the examination papers was not warranted by law, and that therefore the alteration by the defendant Estela Romualdez, under the
circumstances alleged in the information, of the grades in question did not constitute a crime.

The testimony of Justice Romualdez, who was a witness for the defense, completely refutes this contention. He testified that the bar examining committee was composed of two
groups of attorneys: Those that were appointed to prepare the questions, and those that were appointed to grade the papers. He further testified that the court was informed of the
way in which the examination was conducted and that it approved thereof. There were more than a thousand candidates and some eight thousand papers. According to the
contention of appellant's attorneys only the seven attorneys appointed to prepare the questions or the court itself could lawfully grade these papers. Such a contention is clearly
untenable. The attorneys that prepared the questions did not intervene in the grading of the papers, but they prepared a key to the questions, which served the other group of
attorneys, the readers or "correctors", as a guide in grading the papers. The intervention of the "correctors" was just as legal as that of the attorneys that prepared the questions, and
the intervention of the two groups of attorneys was perfectly regular and valid.
It is also contended that the examination papers which the defendant Estela Romualdez altered were not public or official documents. That contention is likewise without merit. As
stated by her attorneys, the examination of candidates for admission to the bar is a judicial function. It cannot therefore be maintained with any show of reason that the papers
submitted by the candidates in the course of the examination were not public and official documents, or that the alteration, under the circumstances alleged in the information, of
the grades given to such papers by the "correctors" was not a crime. (In re Del Rosario, 52 Phil., 399, where this court refers to the falsification of his examination papers as
"falsification of public documents"; People vs. Castro and Doe, 54 Phil., 41, where the conviction of Castro for the falsification of his examination papers was affirmed.)

In accordance with the established practice of the court to have one of its members each year make all the necessary arrangements for the bar examination, the Chief Justice in
1926 designated Justice Romualdez for that purpose, and in pursuance thereof he appointed one group of attorneys to prepare the questions and another group to grade the papers.
If any of these attorneys were designated by the clerk of the court, it was with the advice and consent and on the authority of Justice Romualdez.

The phrase "falsification of a document" is not used in articles 300 and 301 of the Penal code in the ordinary acceptation of the words. It has a technical meaning, and according to
article 300 may be committed in the following eight ways:

1. By counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature, or rubric.

2. By causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate.

3. By attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them.

4. By making untruthful statements in a narration of facts.

5. By altering true dates.

6. By making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning.

7. By issuing in authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original document when no such original exists, or by including in such a copy a statement
contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine original.

8. By intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry or official book.

The acts of the accused are covered by paragraphs 2, 3, and 6. She made the alterations in the grades in such a way as to make it appear that the "correctors" had participated
therein, because she blotted out the grades of the "correctors" and wrote new and increased grades opposite their initials, without indicating by her own initials that she had made
the alterations. She in that way attributed to the "correctors" statements other than those in fact made by them. Her only explanation of why she altered the grades in that way was
that it pleased her to do so.

A decision in point has just come to hand. It is reported in 180 N. E., 725, and is referred to in the American Bar Association Journal for August, 1932, p. 497. A bill was presented
in the Massachusetts Senate prohibiting the marking of the examination papers of applicants for admission to the bar by any person not a member of the board of bar examiners.
The Senate wished to know whether such a bill, if enacted, would be an unconstitutional interference with the functions of the Judicial Department, and asked the Justices of the
Supreme Judicial Court for an advisory opinion. They replied that such a law would be unconstitutional. In the course of the opinion they said: "If the judicial department decides
that the marking of the written examinations may be performed by competent persons not members of the board but acting under the direction of such members, that pertains
directly to the ascertainment of the qualifications of applicants. It is a definite attribute of the judicial department and not an immaterial incident." It was also stated that the plan of
employing assistants to aid the bar examiners in marking the papers had been approved by the Supreme Judicial Court.
In the second assignment of error, the attorney for Estela Romualdez maintains that the trial court erred in not finding that she was fully authorized to make the alterations she in
fact made on the examination papers of Luis Mabunay, Exhibits B-1 and B-2, and in denying full credit to the uncontradicted testimony of Justice Norberto Romualdez, chairman
of the bar examining committee for the year 1926, concerning the authority granted her.

In the first place, we find it difficult to believe that Justice Romualdez ever gave the accused the authority which she claims to have received; and in the second place, even if it be
assumed that he gave her the alleged authority, she did not exercise it in accordance with the terms thereof.

The defense would have us believe that Justice Romualdez regarded his secretary, Estela Romualdez, and the deputy clerk, Jeronimo Samson, who were themselves "correctors" as
supervisors of the other "correctors", and that he authorized Estela Romualdez to revise any grade to correct an injustice, without consulting or notifying the other supervisor,
Samson, or the "correctors' who had graded the paper, without requiring her to initial the alteration, or to make any record thereof or any report to him or to anybody else.

Justice Romualdez was designated by the Chief Justice to conduct the examination in accordance with the law and the Rules of Court. He himself had no such authority as he is
alleged to have given his secretary. He is presumed to have discharged his duties in accordance with the law, and it is inconceivable that he would without any warrant of law give
or attempt to give his secretary the unlimited authority which she claims to have received, thereby enabling her to alter at will any grade or any paper, without making any record
thereof or any report to anybody. The mere statement of such a claim shows that it is preposterous.

No such authority was given to Samson, who according to Justice Romualdez was regarded by him as a supervisor of equal rank with Estela Romualdez. Samson was never
notified that he was regarded as a supervisor, and he never acted in that capacity.

Let us notice how this unlimited authority is alleged to have been granted to the accused Estela Romualdez.

It was not in writing or evidenced by any memorandum. It was not even a positive statement. Justice Romualdez testified that he believed that on a certain occasion he gave his
secretary to understand that if a case should be brought to her attention she might revise any grade to prevent an injustice, so long as she did not know the name of the candidate to
whom the paper belonged. When asked where she was when the pretended authority was given to her, the accused could not remember.

There was according to the theory of the defense nothing to prevent Samson from revising the revision of Estela Romualdez, because she did not initial the changes made by her,
and he was supposed to be a supervisor of equal rank.

If it be admitted for the sake of argument that the accused Estela Romualdez was given the authority which she claims to have received, nevertheless she was not authorized to
change the grades now in question, because when she made the changes she already knew that the papers belonged to her coaccused Luis Mabunay. The evidence fully sustaining
that conclusion is carefully set forth by the trial court, and it is unnecessary for us to review it. The testimony of Justice Romualdez to the effect that the accused acted within the
authority granted her in changing the grades in question was a mere expression of opinion. It was clearly inadmissible and not binding on the court. The accused Estela Romualdez
did not even attempt to explain under what circumstances she raised the grades of her coaccused so as to enable him to obtain the necessary general average of 75 per cent. She did
not confer with the "correctors" who had graded the papers in question. She di not attempt to explain how she arrived at the increased grades, or how she came to revise the grades
in question, how she happened to pick these two papers out of eight thousand. She could not point to any other grades that had been altered by her.

Under the second assignment of error the attorney for Estela Romualdez also alleges that she freely and voluntarily admitted from the start of the trial of her case that the
alterations had been made by her, and concludes therefrom that she acted in good faith. We cannot agree either with the statement of fact or the conclusion. The accused Estela
Romualdez did not admit that the alterations were made by her until after the prosecuting attorney had presented three hundred and fifty pages of testimony and announced his
readiness to prove by three handwriting experts that the alterations were in the handwriting of the accused. The evidence shows that before the trial defendant's attorney from the
fiscal's office a photograph that had been made for the purpose of comparing a specimen of defendant's handwriting and that of the altered grades. The fact that the defendant
Estela Romualdez made the alterations under the circumstances which we have mentioned, when she already knew that the papers belonged to Mabunay, disproves any contention
that she acted in good faith.
In the case of the United States vs. Ballesteros (25 Phil., 634), this court said:

When the unlawful acts charged against an accused are established by competent evidence, criminal intent may be and will be presumed, unless such intent is rebutted by
the introduction of evidence sufficient to overcome this presumption, and satisfactorily disclosing the absence of such criminal intent.

The third assignment of error made by the appellant Estela Romualdez is that the trial court erred in failing to extend to her a fair and impartial trial. We shall not waste much time
on this assignment of error, which is utterly without merit. The record itself completely refutes any such contention. If the learned trial judge erred, it was in permitting the
attorneys for the defendants too great latitude in arguing their objections. Arguments four and five pages long were incorporated into the stenographic record of the evidence. The
record shows a most unjustifiable attack on the good faith of the fiscal and a persistent effort to embarrass him in presenting his evidence against the accused.

The appellant Luis Mabunay makes twelve assignments of error. They are for the most part embraced in the assignments of error of his coaccused which we have already
considered. These remain only his fifth, eleventh, and twelfth assignments of error. In his fifth assignment of error it is alleged that the lower court erred in not admitting the expert
testimony of attorneys Wm. J. Rhode, Felicisimo Feria, and Claro M. Recto, and in rejecting Exhibits 26 and 27, which contain the opinion of said attorneys as to the correct
grades which the examination papers Exhibits B-1 and B-2 deserved.

The lower court sustained the objection to the admission of the testimony of these three attorneys on the ground that it was not the best evidence, and suggested that the defense
might call the members of the examining committee that prepared the questions in Remedial Law and Civil Law and the key thereto. The attorneys for the defense did not see fit to
adopt the suggestion of the court. It is not true therefore that the lower court deprived the accused of an opportunity of showing that the examination papers in question deserved
the increased grades which the defendant Estela Romualdez gave them. The attorneys that prepared the questions and the key to the answers were certainly the persons best
qualified to decide whether or not the questions were correctly answered. The opinion of other attorneys, who had nothing to do with the examination, would only lead to
confusion. We find no merit in this assignment of error.

The eleventh assignment of error is that the trial court erred in insinuating that the motive of the accused Estela Romualdez in reviewing and regrading the examination papers
Exhibits B-1 and B-2 was the fact that she had received four hundred pesos from her co-accused Luis Mabunay.

The twelfth assignment of error is that if it be assumed that the accused Estela Romualdez committed the crime of falsification imputed to her in the information, the court erred in
concluding that the accused Luis Mabunay participated in its commission.

For the sake of convenience we shall consider these two assignments of error together.

In the first place we should like to say that there is no evidence to show that Estela Romualdez ever reviewed the examination papers of her coaccused. So far as the evidence
shows, she merely raised his grades in two subjects, thus giving him by "a happy coincidence", to use her own words, a passing mark. She could not or would not enlighten the
court as to why she raised the grades of Luis Mabunay so as to enable him to be admitted to the bar. As already stated, the record does not show that she raised the grades of any
other candidate.

The evidence shows that Luis Mabunay had failed in two previous examinations, and that he failed in the examination in question, receiving a general average of only 72.8%. The
bar examining committee recommended that not only those having the required general average of 75 per cent be admitted, but also that those who had received between 70 and 75
per cent. This is referred to in the record as "an automatic increase". It was not automatic but arbitrary, and was disapproved by the Supreme Court, and the committee was directed
to prepare a new list and to include therein only those who had obtained a general average of 75 per cent. The name of Luis Mabunay was included in the new list submitted three
days later, notwithstanding the fact that he had obtained a general average of only 72.8 per cent, precisely because Estela Romualdez had in the meantime raised the grades now in
question so that he appeared to have obtained the general average required for admission to the bar.
The evidence shows that on March 2, 1927 Luis Mabunay withdrew P600 from the Philippine Trust Co., and that on March 7, 1927 Estela Romualdez deposited P510 in the Bank
of the Philippine Islands. Luis Mabunay did not testify, and he did not present any evidence to show for what purpose he withdrew P600 from the bank immediately after the first
list was disapproved.

In the case of United States vs. Tria (17 Phil., 303, 307), Justice Moreland speaking for the court said:

An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he does not perform that duty he may not always expect the State to perform it for him. If he
fails to meet the obligation which he owes to himself, when to meet it is the easiest of easy things, he is hardy indeed if he demand and expect the same full and wide
consideration which the State voluntarily gives to those who by reasonable effort seek to help themselves. This is particularly so when he not only declines to help himself
but actively conceals from the State the very means by which it may assist him.

In the famous case of the Commonwealth vs. Webster (5 Cushing, 295, 316), Chief Justice Shaw laid down the following rule:

When pretty stringent proof of circumstances is produced, tending to support the charge, and it is apparent that the accused is so situated that he could offer evidence of all
the facts and circumstances as they existed, and show, if such was the truth, that the suspicious circumstances can be accounted for consistency with his innocence, and he
fails to offer such proof, the natural conclusion is, that the proof, if produced, instead of rebutting, would tend to sustain the charge. But this is to be cautiously applied,
and only in cases where it is manifest that proofs are in the power of the accused, not accessible to the prosecution.

Estela Romualdez showed that of the sum of P510 P100 was paid to her by her mother and only P10 by her brother, but she could not satisfactorily prove where the remaining
P400 came from. She said it was sent to her by her cousin, Prisca Magpayo Redona, for the purchase of goods, but she could not name the person that brought the money to her, or
explain why she deposited it in the bank. She did not attempt to show that she had paid it out by means of checks for the purchase of goods for her cousin. She did not call her
cousin as a witness.

An accused person runs the risk of an inference against him because of failure to produce evidence. The inference, unless the failure to produce evidence is explained
away, is that the tenor of the specific unproduced evidence would not support the party's case. (U. S. vs. Sarikala, 37 Phil., 486.)

In the case just cited the court quoted with approval the following rules as stated by Dean Wigmore in his work on Evidence, Vol. IV, p. 3148:

The failure to produce evidence, in general, other than his own testimony, is open to inference against a party accused, with the same limitations applicable to civil parties.
Here the effect of the burden of proof has sometimes tended to confuse. It is true that the burden is on the prosecution, and that the accused is not required by any rule of
law to produce evidence; but nevertheless he runs the risk of an inference from nonproduction. This seeming paradox, which has been already sufficiently noticed in
treating of the general principle, has misled a few courts to deny that any inference may be drawn.

The alterations in the grades made by Estela Romualdez were made for the sole use and benefit of her coaccused Luis Mabunay. They were made willfully and illegally, and after
the Supreme Court had rejected those candidates that had received less than 75 per cent. The alterations were therefore made after Mabunay had failed, and he withdrew the money
after he had time to learn from his coaccused that he had failed. It was under those circumstances incumbent upon the accused Mabunay to present evidence to show for what
purpose he withdrew the six hundred pesos from the bank. As this court said in the case of Worcester vs. Ocampo (22 Phil., 42):

When the circumstances in proof tend to fix the liability on a party who has it in his power to offer evidence of all the facts as they existed and rebut the inferences which
the circumstances in proof tend to establish, and he fails to offer such proof, the natural conclusion is that the proof, if produced, instead of rebutting would support the
inferences against him, and the court is justified in acting upon that conclusion.

The case of In re Del Rosario (52 Phil., 399), is directly on point. Felipe del Rosario failed for the third time in the bar examination of 1926. He then filed a motion for the revision
of his grades, based on an alleged mistake in computation. This motion was granted, and he was admitted to the bar. It was subsequently found that alterations had been made in
his examination papers, and he and Juan Villaflor were prosecuted for the falsification of a public document. Villaflor assumed full responsibility for the commission of the crime,
and testified that Del Rosario did not know anything about the making of the alterations. The trial court acquitted Del Rosario, but upon a view of the case for the purpose of taking
disciplinary actin against him Justice Malcolm, speaking for the court in banc, said:

It is asking a great deal of the members of the court to have them believe that Felipe del Rosario was totally unaware of the illegal machinations culminating in the
falsification of public documents, of which he was the sole beneficiary.

The attorney's certificate of Felipe del Rosario was cancelled.

In the case of People vs. Bella Bautista (53 Phil., 158), the accused was charged with the falsification of a public document. The evidence showed that in the Register of Attorneys
the name of an attorney had been erased, and that the accused had written his own name in that space, although he had not admitted to the bar. The accused contended that he wrote
his name in the register under the direction of an employee of the court, and that he acted in good faith. He was convicted, and on appeal the decision was affirmed. This court in
its decision said: "The trial court suggests in the opinion that the offense committed required the participation of some unfaithful employee of the court. But this fact, as the court
found, did not lessen the criminal responsibility of the appellant."

It is alleged in the information that the accused conspired together and acted in common accord in the commission of the crime. As the Attorney-General says, a conspiracy can
seldom be proved except by circumstantial evidence, but once it is proved, the acts of one of the conspirators are the acts of all. (U. S. vs. Ipil., 27 Phil., 530.)

The existence of the assent of minds which is involved in a conspiracy may be, and, from the secrecy of the crime, usually must be, inferred by the jury from proof of
facts and circumstances which, taken together, apparently indicate that they are merely parts of some complete whole. If it is proved that two or more persons aimed by
their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and
cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting among them to concert
means is proved. Evidence of actual participation, rather than of passive acquiescence, is desirable. But proof of acquiescence in, or consent to, the actions of others is
relevant to show the criminal intention of the passive party, and generally the smallest degree of consent or collusion among parties lets in the act or words of one against
the others. (Underhill on Criminal Evidence, pp. 795, 796.)

For the foregoing reasons, we find that the conclusions of the trial court are fully justified by the evidence.

As the accused Estela Romualdez took advantage of her official position in committing the crime, the trial court found her guilty of a violation of article 300 of the Penal Code, as
amended by Act No. 2712, and sentenced her to suffer six years and one day of prision mayor, and the accessory penalties provided by law, to pay a fine of 1,000 pesetas, and to
suffer perpetual disqualification to hold any public office.

The penalty provided by the Penal Code is prision mayor in full extent, or from six years and one day to twelve years, and the penalty under the Revised Penal Code being the
same, and there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance present in the commission of the crime, the penalty should be imposed in the medium degree, which is from eight
years and one day to ten years. The penalty imposed on the appellant Estela Romualdez is therefore increased to eight years and one day of prision mayor.

The trial court found the defendant Luis Mabunay guilty as an accomplice under article 301 of the Penal Code, the crime not being connected with the performance of his duties as
an employee of the Government, and sentenced him to suffer four months and one day of arresto mayor, and the accessory penalties provided by law, and to pay a fine of
250 pesetas, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The defendants were each sentenced to pay one-half of the costs.

We find that the lower court erred in holding that Luis Mabunay was merely an accomplice. He was a conspirator and coprincipal of Estela Romualdez. The penalty provided by
article 301 of the Penal Code, as amended by Act No. 2712, is prision correccional in the maximum degree, but that has been changed by the Revised Penal Code to prision
correccional in the medium and maximum degrees, and the medium degree of that penalty is from three years, six months, and twenty-one days to four years, nine months and ten
days. The prison sentence of Luis Mabunay is therefore increased to three years, six months, and twenty- one days of prision correccional.
The decision of the trial court is modified as hereinabove stated. In all other respects it is affirmed, with the costs against the appellants.

Ostrand, Abad Santos, Hull, Imperial and Butte, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

AVANCEA, C.J., concurring:

I agree with the majority opinion. My vote regarding the defendant, Estela Romualdez, is based on the ground that she did not act under authority alleged to have been given her by
Justice Norberto Romualdez. She made the alteration after the candidates' names were already known. She did not act in the interests of justice, inasmuch as among the
compositions of 1,056 candidates she examined those of her coaccused Luis Mabunay only, and she failed to show or to allege that before examining his compositions she had
reasons for believing that Mabunay's case was meritorious.

MALCOLM, J., concurring:

I concur with the comprehensive opinion of the majority in its principal features, but more especially am I in accord with the views expressed by the Chief Justice. My position will
bear a word of explanation.

The charge is that of falsification of a public document by the accused Estela Romualdez, secretary to Justice Romualdez, acting in conspiracy with Luis Mabunay, a candidate in
the 1926 bar examinations, by altering the grades of the candidate so that it was feloniously made to appear that he had passed the bar examinations. The finding was of guilt in a
decision by the trial judge, concerned almost entirely with questions of fact. Speaking to these questions, since this case should be considered exactly in the same manner as any
other case, these findings are entitled to our most respectful consideration. Not desiring to enlarge upon the findings, it is only necessary to observe that the changes made in the
papers of the candidate Mabunay have been admitted by the accused Estela Romualdez to have been made by her in her ordinary handwriting. Added to this we have the testimony
of Justice Romualdez as follows: "As supervisor, I believe that there were occasions when I made her understand that in order to do justice to the candidates, she could revise
papers already graded by the other correctors, provided that the new revision was made before the name of the candidate concerned was known." In this connection it has been
demonstrated beyond civil by a series of damaging and fatal circumstances that during the three-day interval between the making of the first report of the bar examinations and the
second report when the names of the candidates were known, the accused Estela Romualdez made changes in the grades of Luis Mabunay in express contravention of the authority
alleged to have been given her by Justice Romualdez and in bad faith. Not alone were the erasures on the papers made in a manner difficult to be deciphered, leaving below the
erasures the initials of the readers; not alone did the accused fail to place her own initials over the changes; not alone was there no attempt to show why the grades were increased
to give exactly a general average of 75 per cent, but there are two other circumstances entirely inconsistent with innocence. The first is that two of the readers, namely, Jeronimo
Samson, the deputy clerk of court, and Estela Romualdez were supposed to have identical authority, yet Samson never understood that he had any right to change grades without
the knowledge of the readers in the particular subject; when Samson acted as a substitute reader, changes were made with the knowledge and consent of the other reader and
Samson placed his initials under the new grades. The second question is how Estela Romualdez could remember having made erasures in the grades in two papers out of eight
thousand to the advantage of one candidate out of more than one thousand, but could not recall any other similar incident and could not offer any explanation of why the grades of
the one candidate merited an increase. I am, therefore, constrained to conclude that the findings of fact, along the line above indicated, made in the trial court and here confirmed
by other judges who have minutely examined the record, must be taken as conclusively established.

The legal features of the case offer no particular difficulties. Articles 300 and 301 of the old Penal Code were violated. Examination papers leading to admission to the bar
constitute a part of judicial proceedings and are in the nature of public documents. These documents were altered and their meaning changed to permit a candidate in the bar
examinations illegally to be admitted at the bar.
A number of cases growing out of the bar scandal of 1926 have reached this court and have resulted in convictions. Basically there is no difference in fact and in law between the
principles governing those cases and the principles governing the case before us. If the accused in those cases merited punishment, the accused Estela Romualdez and Luis
Mabunay are equally guilty.

STREET, J., dissenting:

It is the opinion of the undersigned that the acts imputed to Estela Romualdez do not constitute the crime of falsification of a public document, and with respect to Luis Mabunay
there is no proof connecting him in any way whatever with the acts of Romualdez. As a preliminary to the demonstration of these conclusions it appears desirable to give few
words of explanation to show how the situation arose with which the court is here confronted.

Under the American occupation, prior to the year 1921, high school graduates were eligible to take the course in law in any accredited law in the Philippine Islands. In that year,
however, the court decided to require two years of college work as a prerequisite to matriculation in a law school, thereby materially raising the standard of education of lawyers.
But inorder not to affect adversely the rights of those who were already qualifying under the prior rule, the requirement for two years of college work was made effective beginning
with the examinations in 1927. It resulted that 1926 was the last year in which examinations could be taken under the old rule, and there were nearly 1,100 candidates who
presented themselves for examination in that year.

It has been the usage of this court to place the bar examinations for each year in the hands of a member of the court designated by the Chief Justice; and it is made the duty of this
member to appoint the examiners and to superintend the giving of the examinations. In the year 1926 Justice Norberto Romualdez was named to conduct the examinations, and he
appointed the requisite number of members of the bar to prepare the questions in the several subjects of examination. In view of the great number of papers to be read in that year,
it was quite evident that able lawyers could not be expected to read so many papers, as the work, as could be foreseen, would undoubtedly have taken up months of their time.
Justice Romualdez, therefore, upon the suggestion of our clerk, decided to adopt the plan followed in the Bureau of Civil Service, which is, to appoint readers (referred to in the
record as "correctors") to read and grade the examination papers in conformity with the written guides prepared by the examiners. These readers (as we shall call them) were
qualified lawyers chosen from the Government service, chiefly from the personnel of the Supreme Court and of the Bureau of Justice.

The reading of the papers occupied a period of about six months, and the report presented by the examiners was not finally passed upon by the court until March 5, 1927. The
questions in the examination in Civil Law were prepared by Francisco Ortigas, and the questions in Remedial Law were prepared by Judge J. C. Abreu. The two readers primarily
chosen to read and grade the papers in Civil Law were Jeronimo Samson and Amado del Rosario, and the readers in Remedial Law were Alfonso Felix and Marciano Guevara.

As Justice Romualdez had general charge of the examinations, his niece, Estela Romualdez, who was also his secretary and who had been admitted to the bar in 1925, was selected
as one of the readers. In addition to her duties as mere reader, Justice Romualdez confided to her the custody of the examination papers and other apparatus of examination, which
were kept under key in his office when not in issue. Samson was at this time a deputy clerk of this court, and because of his official position he and Miss Romualdez were charged
with the supervision of the clerical work connected with the examinations.

In the conduct of the bar examinations it is important that the examiner or reader of papers should have no knowledge of the personality of the author of any composition when the
same is read and graded, and a device had been adopted in the clerk's office which was supposed to accomplish this end. This was that the name of the candidate was not permitted
to appear on the composition. Instead, there was assigned in the clerk's office a number to each candidate, and this number was written on the outside of small envelope affixed to
the composition when it was turned in by the candidate. Sealed within the same envelope was a small slip of paper containing the corresponding name of the candidate. A record of
the names and numbers was also kept in the clerk's office. Every step in the reading, grading, and collating of the examination papers was therefore supposedly taken before the
names of the different candidates were known.

When the work of the various readers in this case had been collated in the latter part of February, but before the names of the various candidates had yet been written in the list
showing the results, the committee of the bar examiners was called together. Upon assembling the committee found that the percentage of candidates passing was exceedingly low,
being around ten per centum of the total number of candidates. This result was no doubt partly due to the hasty way in which a great number of immature candidates had rushed in
the hope of being admitted to the bar before the standards of the examination were raised, and in part also doubtless to the fact that the readers had applied the straight-edge pretty
firmly in judging the grades. The committee of the bar examiners therefore thought it proper to suggest to the court the propriety of admitting all the candidates who had made as
much as 70 per centum, and a recommendation to this effect was submitted to the court. With this suggestion the court did not agree, and a new list had to be made up, showing as
passing the names only of those who had made the requisite average of 75 per centum in all subjects without falling below 60 per centum in any.

Among the candidates in these examinations was the accused Luis Mabunay, to whom, at the examinations, was assigned number 898. In the list submitted by the bar examiners
recommending that all be admitted who had made a general average of 70, Luis Mabunay appeared as receiving 72.8 per centum; and when the court decided that the passing
grade could not be lowered, the result was naturally fatal to him as a candidate. But in the list later submitted to the court containing only the names of those who had made an
average of 75 the same Luis Mabunay appeared as having received the requisite per cent. Upon the showing his name was therefore passed as a successful candidate.

The explanation is that, in the interval between the submission of the first recommendation of the bar examiners and the submission of the later list, the grades corresponding to
Luis Mabunay were raised by Miss Romualdez in an amount sufficient to give him a general average of 75 per centum. In this connection it appears that in the subject of Civil Law
Jeronimo Samson and Amado del Rosario had assigned to Luis Mabunay 63 per centum as the value of his composition in that subject, and this number was written on the
composition cover and accredited by the initials of the two examiners. This credit was raised by Miss Romualdez to 73. Likewise in Remedial Law the readers Alfonso Felix and
Marciano Guevara had given 58 as the value of the paper. This credit was changed by Miss Romualdez to 64. In effecting these changes Miss Romualdez in each case obliterated
the original grades by the use of pen and ink, and wrote thereunder in her own hand "73" and "64" in words and figures. She did not sign her name to this alteration but left intact
the initials of the original graders. No attempt was made by her to imitate the script used by the graders, and the making of these changes was admitted by her.

Justice Romualdez, testifying as a witness in the case, stated that he authorized Miss Romualdez, upon finding any error made by the readers, to correct it, provided that this should
be done before the names of the candidates should be known. Miss Romualdez testified that the changes effected by her in the papers of her coaccused were made under this
authority. Furthermore, at the trial of the case, she offered to prove by three able lawyers of the Manila bar that the grades actually assigned by her to the papers referred to were
fully merited by the answers given. The trial court refused to admit this testimony, and there is nothing before us to show whether the changes made were in conformity with the
merit of the papers or not.

The case for the prosecution supposes that the changes above referred to were made by Miss Romualdez in bad faith and that she was corrupted by Luis Mabunay to make the
changes in his papers for the purpose of securing his successful completion of the examinations when in fact he had failed. In this connection proof was submitted showing that on
March 7, 1927, Luis Mabunay withdrew from his savings account in the Philippine Trust Co. the sum of P600, and that on March 7, 1927, Miss Romualdez deposited a sum of
money to her credit in the Bank of the Philippine Islands, among the items of which deposit was the sum of P400.

It appears that there are two persons bearing the name of Luis Mabunay in the City of Manila. The individual who was candidate in the bar examinations of 1926, and who is one
of the two accused in this case, was, at the time with which we are here concerned, assistant chief of the administrative division of the Executive Bureau. The other Luis Mabunay
was, at the same time, a clerk in the law office of Vicente Romualdez, who is a brother of Miguel Romualdez, father of the accused Estela Romualdez. In the early stages of this
prosecution confusion existed concerning these two individuals. So much so that the fiscal, when this proceeding was begun, was under the impression that the Luis Mabunay who
was joined as codefendant in this case was the Luis Mabunay who was employed in the office of Vicente Romualdez. On the other hand Estela Romualdez says that prior to his
appearance in court, she had never seen her codefendant Luis Mabunay and had never known that there was such a person in existence. This point of the confusion over these two
individuals has a bearing on the case against Luis Mabunay, but is not otherwise important.

An incident connected with the examinations now under consideration is found in certain corrections made by our then deputy clerk, Jeronimo Samson, in the grades given by a
reader named Remo who was relieved from duty as a reader. Samson has the complete confidence of the court, and nobody has called in question the good faith of his work
throughout. Well, after Remo was relieved, Samson took the papers in hand that Remo had already graded and in a number of cases changed his grades in precisely the same way
in which Miss Romualdez changed the two papers of Luis Mabunay. In some of these corrections Samson did not append his own initials, and although in one of the corrections
made by Miss Romualdez the obliteration of the original grade was more complete than in the case of the grades obliterated by Samson, the manner of correction was substantially
the same.

The dominating question in the case against Miss Romualdez is, in our opinion, whether Justice Romualdez gave her authority to revise the grades in the two papers marked "898".
If that authority was in fact given, no case of falsification is made out against this accused; for, although she may have abused the authority and increased the grades in question for
a corrupt purpose, her delinquency would have the character of an abuse of authority only. That this authority was given we do not entertain the slightest doubt, and the reason for
crediting Justice Romualdez' statement on this point rests not only upon his character but upon the circumstances under which that statement was made in court. Of course a person
will sometimes testify falsely or distort the truth for the purpose of assisting another; but experience shows that the most powerful motive which operates upon people as witnesses
is the motive of self-protection. When the testimony of Justice Romualdez was delivered in court, the full extent of the irregularities attendant upon the examination of 1926 were
generally known; and the slightest consideration of self-interest would have indicated to Justice Romualdez that he would do himself a service by not testifying as a witness.
However, in the face of all these considerations, Justice Romualdez, in the interest of truth, did not hesitate to go into court and state that he in fact gave his niece authority to
revise the grades. and what necessity can there be for us to debate the question of the truthfulness of Justice Romualdez when the fiscal who prosecuted this case more than once
stated in open court that he had never doubted the veracity of the witness in this case?

Upon this point we quote textually from the transcript of the proceedings in the lower court:

FISCAL GUEVARA. We have never doubted the veracity of the witness.

xxx xxx xxx

FISCAL GUEVARA. On the other hand, as we have already stated, we do not doubt the veracity of the witness in this case.

But it is said that the authority granted by Justice Romualdez contemplated a revision of the grades in good faith and was coupled with the condition that the revision to be effected
by her should be accomplished before the names of the candidates should be known. But the fact that the authority may have been coupled with this condition could not alter the
character of the authority. She was made judge of the conditions under which the revision should be entered upon, as well as judge of the extent of the revision, and the violation of
her by Justice Romualdez' directions on these points could not have the effect of obliterating the authority. However gross may have been her delinquency the offense could be
nothing more than an abuse of authority.

In the course of these proceedings the evidence has been thoroughly combed by the prosecution to discover indications that Miss Romualdez acted in bad faith. Thus it is said that
bad faith is shown in circumstances such as these: That she did not affix her initials to her corrections; that she used black ink to obliterate the grade that had been altered, and that
she confessed her inability to recall the exact considerations which led her to increase the grades allowed by the original reader. All these considerations, and others equally trivial,
as it seems to us, come with very poor grace from a court that had refused to permit the accused to prove by the testimony of experts that the examination papers whose grades
were altered by her were in fact entitled at least to the grades which she affixed to them, if not more. What circumstance could possibly show more effectually the good faith of
Miss Romualdez in increasing the grades than the fact, if it be a fact, that the papers merited the higher grades given by her to the candidate. But the merit of the grades must
remain, by the action of the court in this case, like the location of the grave of Moses, forever unknown; and this long drawn-out litigation will shed no light upon what seems to
the undersigned to be the most vital question with which the court should have concerned itself, namely, whether the grades assigned by Miss Romualdez to two of the papers of
Luis Mabunay were right or wrong. One of the reasons suggested for sustaining the objection against the proffered testimony of experts to show the propriety of the grades given is
that the court itself could judge of the true value of the papers without the assistance of expert testimony, but no attempt had been made by the prosecution or by the court to
demonstrate from the papers themselves that the grades assigned to them by Miss Romualdez were unmerited. Why should the court concern itself so meticulously with the
circumstances indicative of possible bad faith when the grades raised are before us, affording the best evidence of their character.

In United States vs. Michelena (4 Phil., 492), it was held by this court that a person who makes a false statement in a certificate of merit in an application for an examination by the
Civil Service Board cannot be convicted of the falsification of a public document, but of an offense punishable by arresto mayor under article 311 of the Penal Code. This decision
was repeated in United States vs. Dumandan (8 Phil., 61). These decisions apparently attracted the attention of our lawmakers as indicating that the penalties affixed by the Spanish
Code to certain offenses against the Civil Service were too light; and on August 26, 1907, the Philippine Commission adopted a law now incorporated in section 2674 of the
Administrative Code. One of the provisions of this section punishes any person who shall falsely rate, grade, estimate, or report upon the examination or standing of any person
examined by the Bureau of Civil Service. But that provision is limited to Civil Service examinations, and cannot be applied to bar examinations. Therefore, when confronted with
the irregularity, or supposed irregularity, presented in this case, the fiscal's office was unable to proceed with the prosecution under section 2674 of the Administrative Code, and
was compelled to fall back upon article 300 of the Penal Code which deals with the falsification of public documents.
The suggestion contained in the opinion of the court to the effect that Justice Romualdez had no authority to authorize Miss Romualdez to revise grades is in our opinion wholly
untenable. He had as much authority to authorize her to revise grades as he had to authorize her to read and grade papers in the first place, there being no difference whatever in
point of principle between the two acts. Now, the alteration of a grade by one authorized to revise is on exactly the same footing in law, under No. 6 of article 300 of the Penal
Code, as the giving of a false grade, under No. 4 of the same article, by one who is authorized to grade. Does the court mean to suggest by this decision that the assigning of an
untrue grade in bad faith by any reader authorized to grade examination papers constitutes a falsification of a public document? Legal literature does not furnish the slightest hint
that would afford a basis for such a ruling. But this would be no more untenable than the conclusion reached by the court in this case that the alteration of a grade in bad faith by a
person authorized to revise constitutes falsification of the document. A person charged with the duty of grading or revising examination papers exercises a power involving
judgment and discretion. Such duty is evidently of a quasi-judicial nature; and a violation of such duty constitutes an abuse of authority rather than the falsification of a public
document. And if the law in its present state, as thus interpreted, should appear to be inadequate, the Legislature might safely be relied upon to extend to bar examiners and readers
the provisions already applicable to examiners under the Civil Service Law. This court is not called upon to legislate, and it should not distort the severe provisions relating to
falsification for the purpose of covering delinquencies not fairly included therein.

With respect to the connection of Luis Mabunay with this case, we do not hesitate emphatically to say that, in our opinion, there is no item of proof connecting this accused with
the irregularity imputed to Miss Romualdez. It is true that Luis Mabunay was the person whose interests were primarily served by Miss Romualdez in raising the grades above
mentioned; and if there were independent proof connecting him with the offense, the fact that his interests were so served would supply the explanation of the acts committed. But
in the absence of adequate proof, this circumstance supplies no basis upon which to convict him. The only fact supposedly pointing to him as the guilty suborner of Estela
Romualdez is that he drew out six hundred pesos from a savings account on March 2, 1927; but there is no proof that any of this money ever reached Miss Romualdez or that he
was ever in communication with her in any way.

The fact that Luis Mabunay did not testify as a witness in his own behalf cannot be used as an affirmative admission, and the logical propriety of his assumed guilt is no substitute
for proof. It is true that some authority can be cited for the proposition, always guardedly advanced, that where there is some evidence, showing an incriminatory fact, and the
accused is in a position to dissipate the inference drawn from that evidence, his failure to do so may be used as an admission of the injurious inference. But the application of that
rule presupposes the existence of some incriminatory evidence; and in this case, to the mind of the undersigned, there is no proof, even weak, connecting this accused with the
offense charged.

To present in a few words the legal basis of this dissent, we are unable to agree with the court in extending the concept of falsification to cover an abuse of authority on the part of
a reviser of examination papers, a person who is clothed with a discretion in appraising the work revised. The circumstance that the cases against Felipe del Rosario and Jose
Bautista should be cited as authority in the opinion of the court merely shows that there is no legal warrant in past jurisprudence for the decision now made; for the acts of
falsification in those cases were not done by an examiner, reader, or reviser, but by the individual who was prosecuted or by some unauthorized individual acting at his instance.
Moreover, the falsifications there accomplished were effected after the examinations had been concluded and the documents falsified had been committed to the archives of the
court.

In the infancy of jurisprudence a sentiment had its birth in the mind of some jurist-poet which is still thought fit to be inscribed over the Temple of Justice: Fiat Justitia Ruat
Coelum. The decision of the court in this case is a reminder that junctures sometimes occur in human affairs when even courts of last resort are constrained to ignore the suggestion
expressed in this motto. Fortunately such occasions are rare; and we are unable to see any necessity in the present case requiring a departure from accepted doctrines.

For the reasons stated we dissent from the decision in this case.

Villa-real and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
 EN BANC

Resolution March 18, 1954

In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953;
ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners.

Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo, and Antonio Enrile Inton for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag for respondent.

DIOKNO, J.:

In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and concern as Republic Act No. 972, popularly known as the "Bar Flunkers' Act of 1953." Under the
Rules of Court governing admission to the bar, "in order that a candidate (for admission to the Bar) may be deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he must have
obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subject." (Rule 127, sec. 14, Rules of Court). Nevertheless, considering the
varying difficulties of the different bar examinations held since 1946 and the varying degree of strictness with which the examination papers were graded, this court passed and
admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of only 72 per cent in 1946, 69 per cent in 1947, 70 per cent in 1948, and 74 per cent in 1949. In 1950 to 1953,
the 74 per cent was raised to 75 per cent.

Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by this court, and feeling conscious of having been discriminated against (See Explanatory
Note to R.A. No. 972), unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few percentage lower than those admitted to the Bar agitated in Congress for, and secured in 1951 the
passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which, among others, reduced the passing general average in bar examinations to 70 per cent effective since 1946. The President requested the views
of this court on the bill. Complying with that request, seven members of the court subscribed to and submitted written comments adverse thereto, and shortly thereafter the
President vetoed it. Congress did not override the veto. Instead, it approved Senate Bill No. 371, embodying substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. Although the members
of this court reiterated their unfavorable views on the matter, the President allowed the bill to become a law on June 21, 1953 without his signature. The law, which incidentally
was enacted in an election year, reads in full as follows:

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIX UP TO AND INCLUDING
NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIVE.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section fourteen, Rule numbered one hundred twenty-seven of the Rules of Court, any bar candidate who obtained a
general average of seventy per cent in any bar examinations after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six up to the August nineteen hundred and fifty-one bar
examinations; seventy-one per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-two bar examinations; seventy-two per cent in the in the nineteen hundred and fifty-three bar
examinations; seventy-three per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-four bar examinations; seventy-four per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-five bar
examinations without a candidate obtaining a grade below fifty per cent in any subject, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as member
of the Philippine Bar: Provided, however, That for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-half or more of a fraction, shall be considered as one and included as part of the
next whole number.
 SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of seventy-five per cent in any subject in any bar examination after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six shall be
deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing general average that said candidate may obtain in
any subsequent examinations that he may take.

SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Enacted on June 21, 1953, without the Executive approval.

After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar invoking its provisions, while others whose motions for the revision of their
examination papers were still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There are also others who have sought simply the reconsideration of
their grades without, however, invoking the law in question. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of
whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972. Unfortunately, the court has found no reason to revise their grades. If they are to be admitted to the bar, it must be pursuant
to Republic Act No. 972 which, if declared valid, should be applied equally to all concerned whether they have filed petitions or not. A complete list of the petitioners, properly
classified, affected by this decision, as well as a more detailed account of the history of Republic Act No. 972, are appended to this decision as Annexes I and II. And to realize
more readily the effects of the law, the following statistical data are set forth:

(1) The unsuccessful bar candidates who are to be benefited by section 1 of Republic Act No. 972 total 1,168, classified as follows:

1946 (August) 206 121 18

1946 (November) 477 228 43
1947 749 340 0
1948 899 409 11
1949 1,218 532 164
1950 1,316 893 26
1951 2,068 879 196
1952 2,738 1,033 426
1953 2,555 968 284
TOTAL 12,230 5,421 1,168

Of the total 1,168 candidates, 92 have passed in subsequent examination, and only 586 have filed either motions for admission to the bar pursuant to said Republic Act, or mere
motions for reconsideration.

(2) In addition, some other 10 unsuccessful candidates are to be benefited by section 2 of said Republic Act. These candidates had each taken from two to five different
examinations, but failed to obtain a passing average in any of them. Consolidating, however, their highest grades in different subjects in previous examinations, with their latest
marks, they would be sufficient to reach the passing average as provided for by Republic Act No. 972.

(3) The total number of candidates to be benefited by this Republic Acts is therefore 1,094, of which only 604 have filed petitions. Of these 604 petitioners, 33 who failed in 1946
to 1951 had individually presented motions for reconsideration which were denied, while 125 unsuccessful candidates of 1952, and 56 of 1953, had presented similar motions,
which are still pending because they could be favorably affected by Republic Act No. 972, although as has been already stated, this tribunal finds no sufficient reasons to
reconsider their grades
 UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

Having been called upon to enforce a law of far-reaching effects on the practice of the legal profession and the administration of justice, and because some doubts have been
expressed as to its validity, the court set the hearing of the afore-mentioned petitions for admission on the sole question of whether or not Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional.

We have been enlightened in the study of this question by the brilliant assistance of the members of the bar who have amply argued, orally an in writing, on the various aspects in
which the question may be gleaned. The valuable studies of Messrs. E. Voltaire Garcia, Vicente J. Francisco, Vicente Pelaez and Buenaventura Evangelista, in favor of the validity
of the law, and of the U.P. Women's Lawyers' Circle, the Solicitor General, Messrs. Arturo A. Alafriz, Enrique M. Fernando, Vicente Abad Santos, Carlos A. Barrios, Vicente del
Rosario, Juan de Blancaflor, Mamerto V. Gonzales, and Roman Ozaeta against it, aside from the memoranda of counsel for petitioners, Messrs. Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya,
Miguel R. Cornejo and Antonio Enrile Inton, and of petitioners Cabrera, Macasaet and Galema themselves, has greatly helped us in this task. The legal researchers of the court
have exhausted almost all Philippine and American jurisprudence on the matter. The question has been the object of intense deliberation for a long time by the Tribunal, and
finally, after the voting, the preparation of the majority opinion was assigned to a new member in order to place it as humanly as possible above all suspicion of prejudice or
partiality.

Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate
preparation. Quoting a portion of the Explanatory Note of the proposed bill, its author Honorable Senator Pablo Angeles David stated:

The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade is the tremendous handicap which students during the years immediately after the Japanese occupation has
to overcome such as the insufficiency of reading materials and the inadequacy of the preparation of students who took up law soon after the liberation.

Of the 9,675 candidates who took the examinations from 1946 to 1952, 5,236 passed. And now it is claimed that in addition 604 candidates be admitted (which in reality total
1,094), because they suffered from "insufficiency of reading materials" and of "inadequacy of preparation."

By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public interest because it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice of the
profession, as was exactly found by this Tribunal in the aforesaid examinations. The public interest demands of legal profession adequate preparation and efficiency, precisely
more so as legal problem evolved by the times become more difficult. An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the practice of law that should be developed
constantly and maintained firmly. To the legal profession is entrusted the protection of property, life, honor and civil liberties. To approve officially of those inadequately prepared
individuals to dedicate themselves to such a delicate mission is to create a serious social danger. Moreover, the statement that there was an insufficiency of legal reading materials
is grossly exaggerated. There were abundant materials. Decisions of this court alone in mimeographed copies were made available to the public during those years and private
enterprises had also published them in monthly magazines and annual digests. The Official Gazette had been published continuously. Books and magazines published abroad have
entered without restriction since 1945. Many law books, some even with revised and enlarged editions have been printed locally during those periods. A new set of Philippine
Reports began to be published since 1946, which continued to be supplemented by the addition of new volumes. Those are facts of public knowledge.

Notwithstanding all these, if the law in question is valid, it has to be enforced.

The question is not new in its fundamental aspect or from the point of view of applicable principles, but the resolution of the question would have been easier had an identical case
of similar background been picked out from the jurisprudence we daily consult. Is there any precedent in the long Anglo-Saxon legal history, from which has been directly derived
the judicial system established here with its lofty ideals by the Congress of the United States, and which we have preserved and attempted to improve, or in our contemporaneous
judicial history of more than half a century? From the citations of those defending the law, we can not find a case in which the validity of a similar law had been sustained, while
those against its validity cite, among others, the cases of Day (In re Day, 54 NE 646), of Cannon (State vs. Cannon, 240 NW, 441), the opinion of the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts in 1932 (81 ALR 1061), of Guaria (24 Phil., 37), aside from the opinion of the President which is expressed in his vote of the original bill and which the
postponement of the contested law respects.

This law has no precedent in its favor. When similar laws in other countries had been promulgated, the judiciary immediately declared them without force or effect. It is not within
our power to offer a precedent to uphold the disputed law.
To be exact, we ought to state here that we have examined carefully the case that has been cited to us as a favorable precedent of the law that of Cooper (22 NY, 81), where the
Court of Appeals of New York revoked the decision of the Supreme court of that State, denying the petition of Cooper to be admitted to the practice of law under the provisions of
a statute concerning the school of law of Columbia College promulgated on April 7, 1860, which was declared by the Court of Appeals to be consistent with the Constitution of the
state of New York.

It appears that the Constitution of New York at that time provided:

They (i.e., the judges) shall not hold any other office of public trust. All votes for either of them for any elective office except that of the Court of Appeals, given by the
Legislature or the people, shall be void. They shall not exercise any power of appointment to public office. Any male citizen of the age of twenty-one years, of good moral
character, and who possesses the requisite qualifications of learning and ability, shall be entitled to admission to practice in all the courts of this State. (p. 93).

According to the Court of Appeals, the object of the constitutional precept is as follows:

Attorneys, solicitors, etc., were public officers; the power of appointing them had previously rested with the judges, and this was the principal appointing power which
they possessed. The convention was evidently dissatisfied with the manner in which this power had been exercised, and with the restrictions which the judges had
imposed upon admission to practice before them. The prohibitory clause in the section quoted was aimed directly at this power, and the insertion of the provision"
expecting the admission of attorneys, in this particular section of the Constitution, evidently arose from its connection with the object of this prohibitory clause. There is
nothing indicative of confidence in the courts or of a disposition to preserve any portion of their power over this subject, unless the Supreme Court is right in the inference
it draws from the use of the word `admission' in the action referred to. It is urged that the admission spoken of must be by the court; that to admit means to grant leave,
and that the power of granting necessarily implies the power of refusing, and of course the right of determining whether the applicant possesses the requisite qualifications
to entitle him to admission.

These positions may all be conceded, without affecting the validity of the act. (p. 93.)

Now, with respect to the law of April 7, 1860, the decision seems to indicate that it provided that the possession of a diploma of the school of law of Columbia College conferring
the degree of Bachelor of Laws was evidence of the legal qualifications that the constitution required of applicants for admission to the Bar. The decision does not however quote
the text of the law, which we cannot find in any public or accessible private library in the country.

In the case of Cooper, supra, to make the law consistent with the Constitution of New York, the Court of Appeals said of the object of the law:

The motive for passing the act in question is apparent. Columbia College being an institution of established reputation, and having a law department under the charge of
able professors, the students in which department were not only subjected to a formal examination by the law committee of the institution, but to a certain definite period
of study before being entitled to a diploma of being graduates, the Legislature evidently, and no doubt justly, considered this examination, together with the preliminary
study required by the act, as fully equivalent as a test of legal requirements, to the ordinary examination by the court; and as rendering the latter examination, to which no
definite period of preliminary study was essential, unnecessary and burdensome.

The act was obviously passed with reference to the learning and ability of the applicant, and for the mere purpose of substituting the examination by the law committee of
the college for that of the court. It could have had no other object, and hence no greater scope should be given to its provisions. We cannot suppose that the Legislature
designed entirely to dispense with the plain and explicit requirements of the Constitution; and the act contains nothing whatever to indicate an intention that the authorities
of the college should inquire as to the age, citizenship, etc., of the students before granting a diploma. The only rational interpretation of which the act admits is, that it
was intended to make the college diploma competent evidence as to the legal attainments of the applicant, and nothing else. To this extent alone it operates as a
modification of pre-existing statutes, and it is to be read in connection with these statutes and with the Constitution itself in order to determine the present condition of the
law on the subject. (p.89)
 xxx xxx xxx

The Legislature has not taken from the court its jurisdiction over the question of admission, that has simply prescribed what shall be competent evidence in certain cases
upon that question. (p.93)

From the foregoing, the complete inapplicability of the case of Cooper with that at bar may be clearly seen. Please note only the following distinctions:

(1) The law of New York does not require that any candidate of Columbia College who failed in the bar examinations be admitted to the practice of law.

(2) The law of New York according to the very decision of Cooper, has not taken from the court its jurisdiction over the question of admission of attorney at law; in effect, it does
not decree the admission of any lawyer.

(3) The Constitution of New York at that time and that of the Philippines are entirely different on the matter of admission of the practice of law.

In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their
supervision have been disputably a judicial function and responsibility. Because of this attribute, its continuous and zealous possession and exercise by the judicial power have
been demonstrated during more than six centuries, which certainly "constitutes the most solid of titles." Even considering the power granted to Congress by our Constitution to
repeal, alter supplement the rules promulgated by this Court regarding the admission to the practice of law, to our judgment and proposition that the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of the attorneys at law is a legislative function, properly belonging to Congress, is unacceptable. The function requires (1) previously established
rules and principles, (2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals. and (3) decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules and
principles; in effect, a judicial function of the highest degree. And it becomes more undisputably judicial, and not legislative, if previous judicial resolutions on the petitions of
these same individuals are attempted to be revoked or modified.

We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the
profession is concededly judicial. A comprehensive and conscientious study of this matter had been undertaken in the case of State vs. Cannon (1932) 240 NW 441, in which the
validity of a legislative enactment providing that Cannon be permitted to practice before the courts was discussed. From the text of this decision we quote the following
paragraphs:

This statute presents an assertion of legislative power without parallel in the history of the English speaking people so far as we have been able to ascertain. There has
been much uncertainty as to the extent of the power of the Legislature to prescribe the ultimate qualifications of attorney at law has been expressly committed to the
courts, and the act of admission has always been regarded as a judicial function. This act purports to constitute Mr. Cannon an attorney at law, and in this respect it stands
alone as an assertion of legislative power. (p. 444)

Under the Constitution all legislative power is vested in a Senate and Assembly. (Section 1, art. 4.) In so far as the prescribing of qualifications for admission to the bar
are legislative in character, the Legislature is acting within its constitutional authority when it sets up and prescribes such qualifications. (p. 444)

But when the Legislature has prescribed those qualifications which in its judgment will serve the purpose of legitimate legislative solicitude, is the power of the court to
impose other and further exactions and qualifications foreclosed or exhausted? (p. 444)

Under our Constitution the judicial and legislative departments are distinct, independent, and coordinate branches of the government. Neither branch enjoys all the powers
of sovereignty which properly belongs to its department. Neither department should so act as to embarrass the other in the discharge of its respective functions. That was
the scheme and thought of the people setting upon the form of government under which we exist. State vs. Hastings, 10 Wis., 525; Attorney General ex rel. Bashford vs.
Barstow, 4 Wis., 567. (p. 445)
 The judicial department of government is responsible for the plane upon which the administration of justice is maintained. Its responsibility in this respect is exclusive. By
committing a portion of the powers of sovereignty to the judicial department of our state government, under 42a scheme which it was supposed rendered it immune from
embarrassment or interference by any other department of government, the courts cannot escape responsibility fir the manner in which the powers of sovereignty thus
committed to the judicial department are exercised. (p. 445)

The relation at the bar to the courts is a peculiar and intimate relationship. The bar is an attache of the courts. The quality of justice dispense by the courts depends in no
small degree upon the integrity of its bar. An unfaithful bar may easily bring scandal and reproach to the administration of justice and bring the courts themselves into
disrepute. (p.445)

Through all time courts have exercised a direct and severe supervision over their bars, at least in the English speaking countries. (p. 445)

After explaining the history of the case, the Court ends thus:

Our conclusion may be epitomized as follows: For more than six centuries prior to the adoption of our Constitution, the courts of England, concededly subordinate to
Parliament since the Revolution of 1688, had exercise the right of determining who should be admitted to the practice of law, which, as was said in Matter of the
Sergeant's at Law, 6 Bingham's New Cases 235, "constitutes the most solid of all titles." If the courts and judicial power be regarded as an entity, the power to determine
who should be admitted to practice law is a constituent element of that entity. It may be difficult to isolate that element and say with assurance that it is either a part of the
inherent power of the court, or an essential element of the judicial power exercised by the court, but that it is a power belonging to the judicial entity and made of not only
a sovereign institution, but made of it a separate independent, and coordinate branch of the government. They took this institution along with the power traditionally
exercise to determine who should constitute its attorney at law. There is no express provision in the Constitution which indicates an intent that this traditional power of the
judicial department should in any manner be subject to legislative control. Perhaps the dominant thought of the framers of our constitution was to make the three great
departments of government separate and independent of one another. The idea that the Legislature might embarrass the judicial department by prescribing inadequate
qualifications for attorneys at law is inconsistent with the dominant purpose of making the judicial independent of the legislative department, and such a purpose should
not be inferred in the absence of express constitutional provisions. While the legislature may legislate with respect to the qualifications of attorneys, but is incidental
merely to its general and unquestioned power to protect the public interest. When it does legislate a fixing a standard of qualifications required of attorneys at law in order
that public interests may be protected, such qualifications do not constitute only a minimum standard and limit the class from which the court must make its selection.
Such legislative qualifications do not constitute the ultimate qualifications beyond which the court cannot go in fixing additional qualifications deemed necessary by the
course of the proper administration of judicial functions. There is no legislative power to compel courts to admit to their bars persons deemed by them unfit to exercise the
prerogatives of an attorney at law. (p. 450)

Furthermore, it is an unlawful attempt to exercise the power of appointment. It is quite likely true that the legislature may exercise the power of appointment when it is in
pursuance of a legislative functions. However, the authorities are well-nigh unanimous that the power to admit attorneys to the practice of law is a judicial function. In all
of the states, except New Jersey (In re Reisch, 83 N.J. Eq. 82, 90 A. 12), so far as our investigation reveals, attorneys receive their formal license to practice law by their
admission as members of the bar of the court so admitting. Cor. Jur. 572; Ex parte Secombre, 19 How. 9,15 L. Ed. 565; Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L. Ed. 366;
Randall vs. Brigham, 7 Wall. 53, 19 L. Ed. 285; Hanson vs. Grattan, 48 Kan, 843, 115 P. 646, 34 L.R.A. 519; Danforth vs. Egan, 23 S. D. 43, 119 N.W. 1021, 130 Am. St.
Rep. 1030, 20 Ann. Cas. 413.

The power of admitting an attorney to practice having been perpetually exercised by the courts, it having been so generally held that the act of the court in admitting an
attorney to practice is the judgment of the court, and an attempt as this on the part of the Legislature to confer such right upon any one being most exceedingly
uncommon, it seems clear that the licensing of an attorney is and always has been a purely judicial function, no matter where the power to determine the qualifications
may reside. (p. 451)

In that same year of 1932, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in answering a consultation of the Senate of that State, 180 NE 725, said:
 It is indispensible to the administration of justice and to interpretation of the laws that there be members of the bar of sufficient ability, adequate learning and sound moral
character. This arises from the need of enlightened assistance to the honest, and restraining authority over the knavish, litigant. It is highly important, also that the public
be protected from incompetent and vicious practitioners, whose opportunity for doing mischief is wide. It was said by Cardoz, C.L., in People ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin,
242 N.Y. 456, 470, 471, 162 N.E. 487, 489, 60 A.L.R. 851: "Membership in the bar is a privilege burden with conditions." One is admitted to the bar "for something more
than private gain." He becomes an "officer of the court", and ,like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the end of justice. His cooperation with the court is
due "whenever justice would be imperiled if cooperation was withheld." Without such attorneys at law the judicial department of government would be hampered in the
performance of its duties. That has been the history of attorneys under the common law, both in this country and England. Admission to practice as an attorney at law is
almost without exception conceded to be a judicial function. Petition to that end is filed in courts, as are other proceedings invoking judicial action. Admission to the bar
is accomplish and made open and notorious by a decision of the court entered upon its records. The establishment by the Constitution of the judicial department conferred
authority necessary to the exercise of its powers as a coordinate department of government. It is an inherent power of such a department of government ultimately to
determine the qualifications of those to be admitted to practice in its courts, for assisting in its work, and to protect itself in this respect from the unfit, those lacking in
sufficient learning, and those not possessing good moral character. Chief Justice Taney stated succinctly and with finality in Ex parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 13, 15 L. Ed.
565, "It has been well settled, by the rules and practice of common-law courts, that it rests exclusively with the court to determine who is qualified to become one of its
officers, as an attorney and counselor, and for what cause he ought to be removed." (p.727)

In the case of Day and others who collectively filed a petition to secure license to practice the legal profession by virtue of a law of state (In re Day, 54 NE 646), the court said in
part:

In the case of Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 333, 18 L. Ed. 366, the court, holding the test oath for attorneys to be unconstitutional, explained the nature of the attorney's
office as follows: "They are officers of the court, admitted as such by its order, upon evidence of their possessing sufficient legal learning and fair private character. It has
always been the general practice in this country to obtain this evidence by an examination of the parties. In this court the fact of the admission of such officers in the
highest court of the states to which they, respectively, belong for, three years preceding their application, is regarded as sufficient evidence of the possession of the
requisite legal learning, and the statement of counsel moving their admission sufficient evidence that their private and professional character is fair. The order of
admission is the judgment of the court that the parties possess the requisite qualifications as attorneys and counselors, and are entitled to appear as such and conduct
causes therein. From its entry the parties become officers of the court, and are responsible to it for professional misconduct. They hold their office during good behavior,
and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by the judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded. Ex parte Hoyfron,
admission or their exclusion is not the exercise of a mere ministerial power. It is the exercise of judicial power, and has been so held in numerous cases. It was so held by
the court of appeals of New York in the matter of the application of Cooper for admission. Re Cooper 22 N. Y. 81. "Attorneys and Counselors", said that court, "are not
only officers of the court, but officers whose duties relate almost exclusively to proceedings of a judicial nature; and hence their appointment may, with propriety, be
entrusted to the court, and the latter, in performing his duty, may very justly considered as engaged in the exercise of their appropriate judicial functions." (pp. 650-651).

We quote from other cases, the following pertinent portions:

Admission to practice of law is almost without exception conceded everywhere to be the exercise of a judicial function, and this opinion need not be burdened with
citations in this point. Admission to practice have also been held to be the exercise of one of the inherent powers of the court. Re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 172 Pac. 906.

Admission to the practice of law is the exercise of a judicial function, and is an inherent power of the court. A.C. Brydonjack, vs. State Bar of California, 281 Pac.
1018; See Annotation on Power of Legislature respecting admission to bar, 65, A.L. R. 1512.

On this matter there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and legislative departments of the government.

The distinction between the functions of the legislative and the judicial departments is that it is the province of the legislature to establish rules that shall regulate and
govern in matters of transactions occurring subsequent to the legislative action, while the judiciary determines rights and obligations with reference to transactions that are
past or conditions that exist at the time of the exercise of judicial power, and the distinction is a vital one and not subject to alteration or change either by legislative action
or by judicial decree.
 The judiciary cannot consent that its province shall be invaded by either of the other departments of the government. 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, p. 229.

If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control the action of the courts by requiring of them construction of the law according to its own views, it is very plain it cannot do
so directly, by settling aside their judgments, compelling them to grant new trials, ordering the discharge of offenders, or directing what particular steps shall be taken in
the progress of a judicial inquiry. Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 192.

In decreeing the bar candidates who obtained in the bar examinations of 1946 to 1952, a general average of 70 per cent without falling below 50 per cent in any subject, be
admitted in mass to the practice of law, the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment a judgment revoking those promulgated by this Court during the aforecited year
affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and
not the legislative nor executive department, that may be so. Any attempt on the part of any of these departments would be a clear usurpation of its functions, as is the case with the
law in question.

That the Constitution has conferred on Congress the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rule promulgated by this Tribunal, concerning the admission to the practice of law, is
no valid argument. Section 13, article VIII of the Constitution provides:

Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of
law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and
procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall
have the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.
Constitution of the Philippines, Art. VIII, sec. 13.

It will be noted that the Constitution has not conferred on Congress and this Tribunal equal responsibilities concerning the admission to the practice of law. the primary power and
responsibility which the Constitution recognizes continue to reside in this Court. Had Congress found that this Court has not promulgated any rule on the matter, it would have
nothing over which to exercise the power granted to it. Congress may repeal, alter and supplement the rules promulgated by this Court, but the authority and responsibility over the
admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law and their supervision remain vested in the Supreme Court. The power to repeal, alter and supplement the
rules does not signify nor permit that Congress substitute or take the place of this Tribunal in the exercise of its primary power on the matter. The Constitution does not say nor
mean that Congress may admit, suspend, disbar or reinstate directly attorneys at law, or a determinate group of individuals to the practice of law. Its power is limited to repeal,
modify or supplement the existing rules on the matter, if according to its judgment the need for a better service of the legal profession requires it. But this power does not relieve
this Court of its responsibility to admit, suspend, disbar and reinstate attorneys at law and supervise the practice of the legal profession.

Being coordinate and independent branches, the power to promulgate and enforce rules for the admission to the practice of law and the concurrent power to repeal, alter and
supplement them may and should be exercised with the respect that each owes to the other, giving careful consideration to the responsibility which the nature of each department
requires. These powers have existed together for centuries without diminution on each part; the harmonious delimitation being found in that the legislature may and should
examine if the existing rules on the admission to the Bar respond to the demands which public interest requires of a Bar endowed with high virtues, culture, training and
responsibility. The legislature may, by means of appeal, amendment or supplemental rules, fill up any deficiency that it may find, and the judicial power, which has the inherent
responsibility for a good and efficient administration of justice and the supervision of the practice of the legal profession, should consider these reforms as the minimum standards
for the elevation of the profession, and see to it that with these reforms the lofty objective that is desired in the exercise of its traditional duty of admitting, suspending, disbarring
and reinstating attorneys at law is realized. They are powers which, exercise within their proper constitutional limits, are not repugnant, but rather complementary to each other in
attaining the establishment of a Bar that would respond to the increasing and exacting necessities of the administration of justice.

The case of Guaria (1913) 24 Phil., 37, illustrates our criterion. Guaria took examination and failed by a few points to obtain the general average. A recently enacted law
provided that one who had been appointed to the position of Fiscal may be admitted to the practice of law without a previous examination. The Government appointed Guaria and
he discharged the duties of Fiscal in a remote province. This tribunal refused to give his license without previous examinations. The court said:
 Relying upon the provisions of section 2 of Act No. 1597, the applicant in this case seeks admission to the bar, without taking the prescribed examination, on the ground
that he holds the office of provincial fiscal for the Province of Batanes.

Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted February 28, 1907, is as follows:

Sec. 2. Paragraph one of section thirteen of Act Numbered One Hundred and ninety, entitled "An Act providing a Code of Procedure in Civil Actions and Special
Proceedings in the Philippine Islands," is hereby amended to read as follows:

1. Those who have been duly licensed under the laws and orders of the Islands under the sovereignty of Spain or of the United States and are in good and regular standing
as members of the bar of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this code; Provided, That any person who, prior to the passage of this act, or at any time
thereafter, shall have held, under the authority of the United States, the position of justice of the Supreme Court, judge of the Court of First Instance, or judge or associate
judge of the Court of Land Registration, of the Philippine Islands, or the position of Attorney General, Solicitor General, Assistant Attorney General, assistant attorney in
the office of the Attorney General, prosecuting attorney for the City of Manila, city attorney of Manila, assistant city attorney of Manila, provincial fiscal, attorney for the
Moro Province, or assistant attorney for the Moro Province, may be licensed to practice law in the courts of the Philippine Islands without an examination, upon motion
before the Supreme Court and establishing such fact to the satisfaction of said court.

The records of this court disclose that on a former occasion this appellant took, and failed to pass the prescribed examination. The report of the examining board, dated
March 23, 1907, shows that he received an average of only 71 per cent in the various branches of legal learning upon which he was examined, thus falling four points
short of the required percentage of 75. We would be delinquent in the performance of our duty to the public and to the bar, if, in the face of this affirmative indication of
the deficiency of the applicant in the required qualifications of learning in the law at the time when he presented his former application for admission to the bar, we should
grant him license to practice law in the courts of these Islands, without first satisfying ourselves that despite his failure to pass the examination on that occasion, he now
"possesses the necessary qualifications of learning and ability."

But it is contented that under the provisions of the above-cited statute the applicant is entitled as of right to be admitted to the bar without taking the prescribed
examination "upon motion before the Supreme Court" accompanied by satisfactory proof that he has held and now holds the office of provincial fiscal of the Province of
Batanes. It is urged that having in mind the object which the legislator apparently sought to attain in enacting the above-cited amendment to the earlier statute, and in view
of the context generally and especially of the fact that the amendment was inserted as a proviso in that section of the original Act which specifically provides for the
admission of certain candidates without examination. It is contented that this mandatory construction is imperatively required in order to give effect to the apparent
intention of the legislator, and to the candidate's claim de jure to have the power exercised.

And after copying article 9 of Act of July 1, 1902 of the Congress of the United States, articles 2, 16 and 17 of Act No. 136, and articles 13 to 16 of Act 190, the Court continued:

Manifestly, the jurisdiction thus conferred upon this court by the commission and confirmed to it by the Act of Congress would be limited and restricted, and in a case
such as that under consideration wholly destroyed, by giving the word "may," as used in the above citation from Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, or of any Act of
Congress prescribing, defining or limiting the power conferred upon the commission is to that extent invalid and void, as transcending its rightful limits and authority.

Speaking on the application of the law to those who were appointed to the positions enumerated, and with particular emphasis in the case of Guaria, the Court held:

In the various cases wherein applications for the admission to the bar under the provisions of this statute have been considered heretofore, we have accepted the fact that
such appointments had been made as satisfactory evidence of the qualifications of the applicant. But in all of those cases we had reason to believe that the applicants had
been practicing attorneys prior to the date of their appointment.
 In the case under consideration, however, it affirmatively appears that the applicant was not and never had been practicing attorney in this or any other jurisdiction prior to
the date of his appointment as provincial fiscal, and it further affirmatively appears that he was deficient in the required qualifications at the time when he last applied for
admission to the bar.

In the light of this affirmative proof of his defieciency on that occasion, we do not think that his appointment to the office of provincial fiscal is in itself satisfactory proof
if his possession of the necessary qualifications of learning and ability. We conclude therefore that this application for license to practice in the courts of the Philippines,
should be denied.

In view, however, of the fact that when he took the examination he fell only four points short of the necessary grade to entitle him to a license to practice; and in view also
of the fact that since that time he has held the responsible office of the governor of the Province of Sorsogon and presumably gave evidence of such marked ability in the
performance of the duties of that office that the Chief Executive, with the consent and approval of the Philippine Commission, sought to retain him in the Government
service by appointing him to the office of provincial fiscal, we think we would be justified under the above-cited provisions of Act No. 1597 in waiving in his case the
ordinary examination prescribed by general rule, provided he offers satisfactory evidence of his proficiency in a special examination which will be given him by a
committee of the court upon his application therefor, without prejudice to his right, if he desires so to do, to present himself at any of the ordinary examinations prescribed
by general rule. (In re Guaria, pp. 48-49.)

It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of
permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.

The law in question, like those in the case of Day and Cannon, has been found also to suffer from the fatal defect of being a class legislation, and that if it has intended to make a
classification, it is arbitrary and unreasonable.

In the case of Day, a law enacted on February 21, 1899 required of the Supreme Court, until December 31 of that year, to grant license for the practice of law to those students who
began studying before November 4, 1897, and had studied for two years and presented a diploma issued by a school of law, or to those who had studied in a law office and would
pass an examination, or to those who had studied for three years if they commenced their studies after the aforementioned date. The Supreme Court declared that this law was
unconstitutional being, among others, a class legislation. The Court said:

This is an application to this court for admission to the bar of this state by virtue of diplomas from law schools issued to the applicants. The act of the general assembly
passed in 1899, under which the application is made, is entitled "An act to amend section 1 of an act entitled "An act to revise the law in relation to attorneys and
counselors," approved March 28, 1884, in force July 1, 1874." The amendment, so far as it appears in the enacting clause, consists in the addition to the section of the
following: "And every application for a license who shall comply with the rules of the supreme court in regard to admission to the bar in force at the time such applicant
commend the study of law, either in a law or office or a law school or college, shall be granted a license under this act notwithstanding any subsequent changes in said
rules". In re Day et al, 54 N.Y., p. 646.

. . . After said provision there is a double proviso, one branch of which is that up to December 31, 1899, this court shall grant a license of admittance to the bar to the
holder of every diploma regularly issued by any law school regularly organized under the laws of this state, whose regular course of law studies is two years, and
requiring an attendance by the student of at least 36 weeks in each of such years, and showing that the student began the study of law prior to November 4, 1897, and
accompanied with the usual proofs of good moral character. The other branch of the proviso is that any student who has studied law for two years in a law office, or part
of such time in a law office, "and part in the aforesaid law school," and whose course of study began prior to November 4, 1897, shall be admitted upon a satisfactory
examination by the examining board in the branches now required by the rules of this court. If the right to admission exists at all, it is by virtue of the proviso, which, it is
claimed, confers substantial rights and privileges upon the persons named therein, and establishes rules of legislative creation for their admission to the bar. (p. 647.)

Considering the proviso, however, as an enactment, it is clearly a special legislation, prohibited by the constitution, and invalid as such. If the legislature had any right to
admit attorneys to practice in the courts and take part in the administration of justice, and could prescribe the character of evidence which should be received by the court
as conclusive of the requisite learning and ability of persons to practice law, it could only be done by a general law, persons or classes of persons. Const. art 4, section 2.
 The right to practice law is a privilege, and a license for that purpose makes the holder an officer of the court, and confers upon him the right to appear for litigants, to
argue causes, and to collect fees therefor, and creates certain exemptions, such as from jury services and arrest on civil process while attending court. The law conferring
such privileges must be general in its operation. No doubt the legislature, in framing an enactment for that purpose, may classify persons so long as the law establishing
classes in general, and has some reasonable relation to the end sought. There must be some difference which furnishes a reasonable basis for different one, having no just
relation to the subject of the legislation. Braceville Coal Co. vs. People, 147 Ill. 66, 35 N.E. 62; Ritchie vs. People, 155 Ill. 98, 40 N.E. 454; Railroad Co. vs. Ellis, 165
U.S. 150, 17 Sup. Ct. 255.

The length of time a physician has practiced, and the skill acquired by experience, may furnish a basis for classification (Williams vs. People 121 Ill. 48, II N.E. 881); but
the place where such physician has resided and practiced his profession cannot furnish such basis, and is an arbitrary discrimination, making an enactment based upon it
void (State vs. Pennyeor, 65 N.E. 113, 18 Atl. 878). Here the legislature undertakes to say what shall serve as a test of fitness for the profession of the law, and plainly,
any classification must have some reference to learning, character, or ability to engage in such practice. The proviso is limited, first, to a class of persons who began the
study of law prior to November 4, 1897. This class is subdivided into two classes First, those presenting diplomas issued by any law school of this state before
December 31, 1899; and, second, those who studied law for the period of two years in a law office, or part of the time in a law school and part in a law office, who are to
be admitted upon examination in the subjects specified in the present rules of this court, and as to this latter subdivision there seems to be no limit of time for making
application for admission. As to both classes, the conditions of the rules are dispensed with, and as between the two different conditions and limits of time are fixed. No
course of study is prescribed for the law school, but a diploma granted upon the completion of any sort of course its managers may prescribe is made all-sufficient. Can
there be anything with relation to the qualifications or fitness of persons to practice law resting upon the mere date of November 4, 1897, which will furnish a basis of
classification. Plainly not. Those who began the study of law November 4th could qualify themselves to practice in two years as well as those who began on the 3rd. The
classes named in the proviso need spend only two years in study, while those who commenced the next day must spend three years, although they would complete two
years before the time limit. The one who commenced on the 3rd. If possessed of a diploma, is to be admitted without examination before December 31, 1899, and without
any prescribed course of study, while as to the other the prescribed course must be pursued, and the diploma is utterly useless. Such classification cannot rest upon any
natural reason, or bear any just relation to the subject sought, and none is suggested. The proviso is for the sole purpose of bestowing privileges upon certain defined
persons. (pp. 647-648.)

In the case of Cannon above cited, State vs. Cannon, 240 N.W. 441, where the legislature attempted by law to reinstate Cannon to the practice of law, the court also held with
regards to its aspect of being a class legislation:

But the statute is invalid for another reason. If it be granted that the legislature has power to prescribe ultimately and definitely the qualifications upon which courts must
admit and license those applying as attorneys at law, that power can not be exercised in the manner here attempted. That power must be exercised through general laws
which will apply to all alike and accord equal opportunity to all. Speaking of the right of the Legislature to exact qualifications of those desiring to pursue chosen callings,
Mr. Justice Field in the case of Dent. vs. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121, 9 S. Ct. 232, 233, 32 L. Ed. 626, said: "It is undoubtedly the right of every citizen of the United
States to follow any lawful calling, business or profession he may choose, subject only to such restrictions as are imposed upon all persons of like age, sex, and
condition." This right may in many respects be considered as a distinguishing feature of our republican institutions. Here all vocations are all open to every one on like
conditions. All may be pursued as sources of livelihood, some requiring years of study and great learning for their successful prosecution. The interest, or, as it is
sometimes termed, the "estate" acquired in them that is, the right to continue their prosecution is often of great value to the possessors and cannot be arbitrarily
taken from them, any more than their real or personal property can be thus taken. It is fundamental under our system of government that all similarly situated and
possessing equal qualifications shall enjoy equal opportunities. Even statutes regulating the practice of medicine, requiring medications to establish the possession on the
part of the application of his proper qualifications before he may be licensed to practice, have been challenged, and courts have seriously considered whether the
exemption from such examinations of those practicing in the state at the time of the enactment of the law rendered such law unconstitutional because of infringement upon
this general principle. State vs. Thomas Call, 121 N.C. 643, 28 S.E. 517; see, also, The State ex rel. Winkler vs. Rosenberg, 101 Wis. 172, 76 N.W. 345; State vs.
Whitcom, 122 Wis. 110, 99 N.W. 468.

This law singles out Mr. Cannon and assumes to confer upon him the right to practice law and to constitute him an officer of this Court as a mere matter of legislative
grace or favor. It is not material that he had once established his right to practice law and that one time he possessed the requisite learning and other qualifications to
entitle him to that right. That fact in no matter affect the power of the Legislature to select from the great body of the public an individual upon whom it would confer its
favors.
 A statute of the state of Minnesota (Laws 1929, c. 424) commanded the Supreme Court to admit to the practice of law without examination, all who had served in the
military or naval forces of the United States during the World War and received a honorable discharge therefrom and who (were disabled therein or thereby within the
purview of the Act of Congress approved June 7th, 1924, known as "World War Veteran's Act, 1924 and whose disability is rated at least ten per cent thereunder at the
time of the passage of this Act." This Act was held |unconstitutional on the ground that it clearly violated the quality clauses of the constitution of that state. In
re Application of George W. Humphrey, 178 Minn. 331, 227 N.W. 179.

A good summary of a classification constitutionally acceptable is explained in 12 Am. Jur. 151-153 as follows:

The general rule is well settled by unanimity of the authorities that a classification to be valid must rest upon material differences between the person included in it and
those excluded and, furthermore, must be based upon substantial distinctions. As the rule has sometimes avoided the constitutional prohibition, must be founded upon
pertinent and real differences, as distinguished from irrelevant and artificial ones. Therefore, any law that is made applicable to one class of citizens only must be based on
some substantial difference between the situation of that class and other individuals to which it does not apply and must rest on some reason on which it can be defended.
In other words, there must be such a difference between the situation and circumstances of all the members of the class and the situation and circumstances of all other
members of the state in relation to the subjects of the discriminatory legislation as presents a just and natural cause for the difference made in their liabilities and burdens
and in their rights and privileges. A law is not general because it operates on all within a clause unless there is a substantial reason why it is made to operate on that class
only, and not generally on all. (12 Am. Jur. pp. 151-153.)

Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, have obtained a general average of 69.5 per cent in the bar examinations in 1946 to
1951, 70.5 per cent in 1952, 71.5 per cent in 1953, and those will obtain 72.5 per cent in 1954, and 73.5 per cent in 1955, will be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding
oath of office as members of the Bar, notwithstanding that the rules require a minimum general average of 75 per cent, which has been invariably followed since 1950. Is there any
motive of the nature indicated by the abovementioned authorities, for this classification ? If there is none, and none has been given, then the classification is fatally defective.

It was indicated that those who failed in 1944, 1941 or the years before, with the general average indicated, were not included because the Tribunal has no record of the
unsuccessful candidates of those years. This fact does not justify the unexplained classification of unsuccessful candidates by years, from 1946-1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955.
Neither is the exclusion of those who failed before said years under the same conditions justified. The fact that this Court has no record of examinations prior to 1946 does not
signify that no one concerned may prove by some other means his right to an equal consideration.

To defend the disputed law from being declared unconstitutional on account of its retroactivity, it is argued that it is curative, and that in such form it is constitutional. What does
Rep. Act 972 intend to cure ? Only from 1946 to 1949 were there cases in which the Tribunal permitted admission to the bar of candidates who did not obtain the general average
of 75 per cent: in 1946 those who obtained only 72 per cent; in the 1947 and those who had 69 per cent or more; in 1948, 70 per cent and in 1949, 74 per cent; and in 1950 to 1953,
those who obtained 74 per cent, which was considered by the Court as equivalent to 75 per cent as prescribed by the Rules, by reason of circumstances deemed to be sufficiently
justifiable. These changes in the passing averages during those years were all that could be objected to or criticized. Now, it is desired to undo what had been done cancel the
license that was issued to those who did not obtain the prescribed 75 per cent ? Certainly not. The disputed law clearly does not propose to do so. Concededly, it approves what has
been done by this Tribunal. What Congress lamented is that the Court did not consider 69.5 per cent obtained by those candidates who failed in 1946 to 1952 as sufficient to
qualify them to practice law. Hence, it is the lack of will or defect of judgment of the Court that is being cured, and to complete the cure of this infirmity, the effectivity of the
disputed law is being extended up to the years 1953, 1954 and 1955, increasing each year the general average by one per cent, with the order that said candidates be admitted to the
Bar. This purpose, manifest in the said law, is the best proof that what the law attempts to amend and correct are not the rules promulgated, but the will or judgment of the Court,
by means of simply taking its place. This is doing directly what the Tribunal should have done during those years according to the judgment of Congress. In other words, the power
exercised was not to repeal, alter or supplement the rules, which continue in force. What was done was to stop or suspend them. And this power is not included in what the
Constitution has granted to Congress, because it falls within the power to apply the rules. This power corresponds to the judiciary, to which such duty been confided.

Article 2 of the law in question permits partial passing of examinations, at indefinite intervals. The grave defect of this system is that it does not take into account that the laws and
jurisprudence are not stationary, and when a candidate finally receives his certificate, it may happen that the existing laws and jurisprudence are already different, seriously
affecting in this manner his usefulness. The system that the said law prescribes was used in the first bar examinations of this country, but was abandoned for this and other
disadvantages. In this case, however, the fatal defect is that the article is not expressed in the title will have temporary effect only from 1946 to 1955, the text of article 2
establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time. This is contrary to Section 21 (1), article VI of the Constitution, which vitiates and annuls article 2 completely; and because
it is inseparable from article 1, it is obvious that its nullity affect the entire law.

Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds: first, because they are not within the legislative powers of Congress to enact, or Congress has exceeded its powers; second,
because they create or establish arbitrary methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; and third, because their purposes or effects violate the Constitution or its basic
principles. As has already been seen, the contested law suffers from these fatal defects.

Summarizing, we are of the opinion and hereby declare that Republic Act No. 972 is unconstitutional and therefore, void, and without any force nor effect for the following
reasons, to wit:

1. Because its declared purpose is to admit 810 candidates who failed in the bar examinations of 1946-1952, and who, it admits, are certainly inadequately prepared to practice law,
as was exactly found by this Court in the aforesaid years. It decrees the admission to the Bar of these candidates, depriving this Tribunal of the opportunity to determine if they are
at present already prepared to become members of the Bar. It obliges the Tribunal to perform something contrary to reason and in an arbitrary manner. This is a manifest
encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court.

2. Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of this Court on the petitions of these 810 candidates, without having examined their respective examination papers,
and although it is admitted that this Tribunal may reconsider said resolution at any time for justifiable reasons, only this Court and no other may revise and alter them. In
attempting to do it directly Republic Act No. 972 violated the Constitution.

3. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules on admission to the Bar. Such additional or amendatory rules are, as
they ought to be, intended to regulate acts subsequent to its promulgation and should tend to improve and elevate the practice of law, and this Tribunal shall consider these rules as
minimum norms towards that end in the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers to the Bar, inasmuch as a good bar assists immensely in the daily
performance of judicial functions and is essential to a worthy administration of justice. It is therefore the primary and inherent prerogative of the Supreme Court to render the
ultimate decision on who may be admitted and may continue in the practice of law according to existing rules.

4. The reason advanced for the pretended classification of candidates, which the law makes, is contrary to facts which are of general knowledge and does not justify the admission
to the Bar of law students inadequately prepared. The pretended classification is arbitrary. It is undoubtedly a class legislation.

5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the Constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of article 1, the
entire law is void.

6. Lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of that part of article 1 referring to the examinations of 1953 to 1955, said part of article 1, insofar as it concerns the examinations in
those years, shall continue in force.

RESOLUTION

Upon mature deliberation by this Court, after hearing and availing of the magnificent and impassioned discussion of the contested law by our Chief Justice at the opening and close
of the debate among the members of the Court, and after hearing the judicious observations of two of our beloved colleagues who since the beginning have announced their
decision not to take part in voting, we, the eight members of the Court who subscribed to this decision have voted and resolved, and have decided for the Court, and under the
authority of the same:
1. That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952, and (b) all of article 2 of said law are unconstitutional and, therefore,
void and without force and effect.

2. That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of article 1 which refers to the examinations subsequent to the approval of the law, that is from 1953 to 1955 inclusive,
is valid and shall continue to be in force, in conformity with section 10, article VII of the Constitution.

Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of the candidates who failed in the examinations of 1946 to 1952 inclusive are denied, and (2) all candidates who in the
examinations of 1953 obtained a general average of 71.5 per cent or more, without having a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, are considered as having passed, whether they
have filed petitions for admission or not. After this decision has become final, they shall be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar
on the date or dates that the chief Justice may set. So ordered.

Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Labrador, Pablo, Padilla, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

ANNEX I

PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

A resume of pertinent facts concerning the bar examinations of 1946 to 1953 inclusive follows:

August, 19461
Board of Examiners: Hon. Pedro Tuason, Chairman, Prof. Gerardo Florendo, Atty.
Bernardino Guerrero, Atty. Joaquin Ramirez, Atty. Crispin Oben, Hon. Jose Teodoro,
Atty. Federico Agrava, Atty. Jose Perez Cardenas, and Hon. Bienvenido A. Tan,
members.
Number of candidates 206
Number of candidates whose grades were raised 12
73'S 6
72'S 6
Number of candidates who passed 85
Number of candidates who failed 121
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 18
Percentage of success (per cent) 41.62
Percentage of failure (per cent) 58.74
Passing grade (per cent) 72
November, 1946
Board of Examiners: The same as that of August, 1946, except Hon. Jose Teodoro who
was substituted by Atty. Honesto K. Bausan.
Number of candidates 481
Number of candidates whose grades were raised 19
(72 per cent and above 73 per cent ---
Minutes of March 31, 1947)
Number of candidates who passed 249
Number of candidates who failed 228
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 43
Percentage of success (per cent) 52.20
Percentage of failure (per cent) 47.80
Passing grade (per cent) 72
(By resolution of the Court).
October, 1947
Board of Examiners: Hon. Cesar Bengzon, Chairman, Hon. Guillermo B. Guevara,
Atty. Antonio Araneta, Atty. Simon Cruz, Hon. Sixto de la Costa, Atty. Celso B.
Jamora, Hon. Emilio Pea, Atty. Federico Agrava, Atty. Carlos B. Hilado, Members.
Number of candidates 749
Number of candidates whose grades were raised 43
70.55 per cent with 2 subject below 50 per cent 1
69 per cent 40
68 per cent 2
Number of candidates who passed 409
Number of candidates who failed 340
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 972
Percentage of success (per cent) 54.59
Percentage of failure (per cent) 45.41
Passing grade (per cent) 69
(by resolution of the Court).

Note.--In passing the 2 whose grades were 68.95 per cent and 68.1 per cent
respectively, the Court found out that they were not benefited at all by the
bonus of 12 points given by the Examiner in Civil Law.
August, 1948
Board of Examiners: Hon. Marceliano R. Montemayor, Chairman Hon. Luis P. Torres,
Hon. Felipe Natividad, Hon. Jose Teodoro, Sr., Atty. Federico Agrava, Atty. Macario
Peralta, Sr., Hon. Jesus G. Barrera, Hon. Rafael Amparo, Atty. Alfonso Ponce Enrile,
Members.
Number of candidates 899
Number of candidates whose grades were raised 64
71's 29
70's 35
Number of candidates who passed 490
Number of candidates who failed 409
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 11
Percentage of success (per cent) 62.40
Percentage of failure (per cent) 37.60
Passing grade (per cent) 70
(by resolution of the Court).
August, 1949
Board of Examiners: Hon. Sabino Padilla, Chairman, Hon. Fernando Jugo, Hon.
Enrique Filamor, Atty. Salvador Araneta, Hon. Pastor M. Endencia, Atty. Federico
Agrava, Hon. Mariano H. de Joya, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Atty. Emeterio Barcelon,
Members.
Number of candidates 1,218
Number of candidates whose grades were raised (74's) 55
Number of candidates who passed 686
Number of candidates who failed 532
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 164
Percentage of success (per cent) 56.28
Percentage of failure (per cent) 43.72
Passing grade (per cent) 74
(by resolution of the Court).
August, 1950
Board of Examiners: Hon. Fernando Jugo,2 Chairman, Hon. Guillermo B. Guevara,
Atty. Enrique Altavas, Atty. Marcial P. Lichauco, Atty. Carlos B. Hilado, Atty. J.
Antonio Araneta, Hon. Enrique V. Filamor, Hon. Francisco A. Delgado, Hon. Antonio
Horrilleno, Members.
Number of candidates 1,316
Number of candidates whose grades were raised 38
(The grade of 74 was raised to 75 per cent by recommendation and authority
of the examiner in Remedial Law, Atty. Francisco Delgado).
Number of candidates who passed 432
Number of candidates who failed 894
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 26
Percentage of success (per cent) 32.14
Percentage of failure (per cent) 67.86
Passing grade (per cent) 75
August, 1951
Board of Examiners: Hon. Guillermo F. Pablo, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M. Endencia,
Atty. Enrique Altavas, Hon. Manuel Lim, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Hon. Vicente Albert,
Atty. Arturo Alafriz, Hon. Enrique V. Filamor, Hon. Alfonso Felix, Members.
Number of candidates 2,068
Number of candidates whose grades were raised (74's) 112
Number of candidates who passed 1,189
Number of candidates who failed 879
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 196
Percentage of success (per cent) 57.49
Percentage of failure (per cent) 42.51
Passing grade (per cent) 75
August, 1952
Board of Examiners: Hon. Sabino Padilla, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M. Endencia, Hon.
Enrique V. Filamor, Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Hon. Emilio Pea, Atty. Emilio P. Virata,
Hon. Alfonso Felix, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Atty. Macario Peralta, Sr., Members.
Number of candidates 2,738
Number of candidates whose grades were raised (74's) 163
Number of candidates who passed 1,705
Number of candidates who failed 1,033
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 426
Percentage of success (per cent) 62.27
Percentage of failure (per cent) 37.73
Passing grade (per cent) 75
August, 1953
Board of Examiners: Hon. Fernando Jugo, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M. Endencia, Atty.
Enrique Altavas, Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Jr., Hon. Emilio Pea, Atty. Jose S. de la
Cruz, Hon. Alfonso Felix, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Hon. Mariano L. de la Rosa,
Members.
Number of candidates 2,555
 Number of candidates whose grades were raised (74's) 100
Number of candidates who passed 1,570
Number of candidates who failed 986
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 284
Percentage of success (per cent) 61.04
Percentage of failure (per cent) 38.96
Passing grade (per cent) 75

A list of petitioners for admission to the Bar under Republic Act No. 972, grouped by the years in which they took the bar examinations, with annotations as to who had presented
motions for reconsideration which were denied (MRD), and who filed mere motions for reconsideration without invoking said law, which are still pending, follows:

PETITIONER UNDER THE BAR FLUNKERS' LAW

Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen.
Av.
MRD- 1. Agunod, Filemon L. 66 71 61 76 80 83 73 75 71.4
MRD- 2. Cunanan, Albino 76 72 74 75 70 70 65 72 71.45
MRD- 3. Mejia, Flaviano V. 64 64 65 68 83 74 68 80 69.85
1948
MRD- 4. Orlina, Soledad R. 71 68 66 75 63 75 70 88 69.9
MRD- 5. Vivero, Antonio Lu. 75 73 73 65 63 66 65 80 69.95
MRD- 6. Gatchalian, Salud 72 66 71 75 78 68 65 50 69.65
1949
7. Abaya, Jesus A. 69 79 75 75 71 89 55 75 70.8
MRD- 8. Advincula, David D. 76 80 62 86 81 72 60 65 70.5
9. Agraviador, Alfredo L. 63 85 70 77 80 81 65 80 71.8
10. Alacar, Pascual C. 61 63 83 79 71 85 65 80 72.05
11. Amog, Pedro M. 75 66 76 78 81 74 55 85 72.2
12. Apolinario, Miguel S. 75 84 78 78 70 70 60 75 71.95
13. Aquino, Maximo G. 82 77 71 77 76 77 60 75 73.15
14. Asinas, Candido D. 75 83 69 80 81 83 55 85 72.65
15. Baldivino, Jose B. 75 65 72 82 82 69 60 80 71.95
16. Balintona, Bernardo 75 80 64 78 74 67 65 70 70
17. Banawa, Angel L. 78 70 70 75 81 83 60 60 72.3
18. Bandala, Anacleto A. 66 80 66 71 93 72 55 70 69.6
 19. Bandon, Alawadin L. 74 79 69 77 91 73 60 80 73.35
20. Baquero, Benjamin 76 79 64 77 85 72 65 75 72.5
21. Blanco, Jose 75 75 70 75 77 76 60 90 72.5
22. Buenaluz, Victoriano T. 75 71 72 78 67 82 60 75 70.85
23. Canda, Benjamin S. 75 72 75 82 76 77 65 75 73.55
24. Canon, Guillermo 77 86 67 88 75 69 70 85 73.9
25. Carlos, Estela S. 75 81 81 79 72 73 65 70 73.8
26. Cerezo, Gregorio O. 69 76 76 79 71 80 55 80 70.4
27. Clarin, Manuel L. 75 82 76 81 73 69 70 75 73.95
28. Claudo, Conrado O. 76 62 78 77 73 72 60 70 71.4
29. Condevillamar, Antonio V. 68 65 74 80 85 75 60 75 71.65
MRD- 30. Cornejo, Crisanto R. 72 75 69 82 83 79 65 80 73.4
31. Corona, Olvido D. 68 76 73 81 81 72 60 75 71.15
32. Dizon, Marcial C. 76 86 69 83 75 74 65 80 73.1
33. Enriquez, Agustin P. 75 77 70 81 81 77 65 80 73.75
34. Espiritu, Irineo E. 80 88 69 75 76 77 65 75 73.8
35. Fernandez, Macario J. 63 82 76 75 81 84 65 75 72.95
36. Gallardo, Amando C. 78 79 67 77 76 75 60 65 70.95
37. Garcia, Freidrich M. 76 80 66 75 72 70 60 75 69.7
38. Garcia, Julian L. 64 77 68 82 89 77 65 75 72.15
39. Garcia, Leon Mo. 77 86 71 80 60 82 65 75 71.85
40. Garcia, Pedro V. 76 82 73 81 74 83 60 85 73.6
41. Garcia, Santiago C. 62 91 79 75 72 75 65 80 71.8
42. Genoves, Pedro 75 83 70 78 87 76 55 80 72.7
43. Gonzales, Amado P. 75 71 71 75 86 75 60 75 72.65
44. Guia, Odon R. de 77 76 66 81 74 76 60 75 70.9
45. Fernandez, Simeon 62 68 71 80 74 90 65 75 70.85
46. Jakosalem, Filoteo 82 83 73 82 61 87 65 70 73.6
47. Jesus, Felipe D. de 75 83 67 79 78 85 60 75 72.45
48. Jocom, Jacobo M. 77 77 74 77 74 64 55 85 70.65
49. Juares, Nicolas 77 84 56 76 73 82 60 85 70
50. Kalalang, Remigio 65 75 74 80 70 70 65 85 70.3
51. Layumas, Vicente L. 67 84 65 75 89 66 60 80 70.3
 52. Leyson, Amancio F. 69 83 75 76 81 75 65 75 73.15
53. Libanan, Marcelino 71 83 61 77 80 81 65 85 71.75
54. Lim, Jose E. 77 77 72 76 72 64 65 70 71.15
55. Lim, Jose F. 70 75 62 83 80 71 65 80 70.4
56. Linao, Mariano M. 66 84 76 78 80 75 60 75 71.75
57. Lopez, Angelo P. 67 81 75 72 79 81 55 80 71
58. Lopez, Eliezar M. 77 75 60 75 77 85 60 75 70.7
59. Lopez, Nicanor S. 72 71 70 78 77 84 60 75 71.55
60. Manoleto, Proceso D. 72 70 65 78 81 90 60 80 71.95
61. Mancao, Alfredo P. 67 64 71 83 76 76 65 80 70.95
62. Manera, Mariano A. 75 78 75 75 68 79 60 65 71
63. Mercado, Arsenio N. 67 64 71 83 76 76 65 80 70.95
64. Miranda, Benjamin G. 76 81 67 82 74 77 65 80 72.55
65. Manad, Andres B. 77 75 68 82 69 72 65 75 71.15
1948
66. Orosco, Casimiro P. 72 84 69 81 70 82 65 75 71.9
67. Padua, Manuel C. 76 76 68 80 79 79 50 75 70.1
68. Palang, Basilio S. 71 75 82 71 55 87 55 75 69.6
69. Palma, Cuadrato 62 75 69 93 80 79 55 80 69.5
70. Paganiban, Jose V. 67 83 61 81 91 74 60 75 70.6
71. Pareja, Felipe 66 71 75 81 67 74 60 70 68.75
72. Patalinjug, Eriberto 73 77 78 73 78 71 55 75 71.25
73. Paulin, Jose C. 66 69 71 77 83 82 65 75 72.1
74. Pido, Serafin C. 72 78 63 80 71 85 70 80 72.05
75. Pimentel, Luis P. 77 75 76 81 76 68 55 80 71.6
76. Plantilla, Rodrigo C. 72 78 68 89 79 81 65 85 73.55
77. Regalario, Benito B. 72 80 64 80 75 81 55 80 69.55
78. Robis, Casto P. 62 77 74 73 68 80 70 80 70.9
79. Rodil, Francisco C. 68 69 70 81 76 75 65 75 70.75
80. Rodriguez, Mariano I. 80 75 69 80 72 80 65 80 73.35
81. Romero, Crispulo P. 78 75 66 77 76 83 65 75 72.85
82. Saez, Porfirio D. 75 75 72 81 69 77 60 75 71
83. Saliguma, Crisogono D. 79 79 74 78 69 65 65 70 71.8
 84. Samano, Fortunato A. 75 84 72 77 70 82 60 75 71.9
85. Santos, Faustina C. 71 68 68 76 75 85 55 75 69.5
86. Santos, Josefina R. 68 69 76 71 77 82 65 75 72.3
87. Seludo, Ananias G. 75 80 69 79 77 82 65 75 73.25
88. Semilia, Rafael I. 68 85 55 83 89 79 65 80 71.25
89. Telan, Gaudencio 77 79 70 75 70 75 60 75 70.85
90. Tesorero, Leocadio T. 75 71 63 75 82 62 65 63 69.65
91. Torre, Valentin S. de la 85 81 71 76 69 65 55 70 70.4
92. Torres, Ariston L. 78 71 72 81 61 84 55 85 70.4
93. Veyra, Zosimo C. de 70 75 71 79 65 80 65 80 70.65
94. Viado, Jose 67 70 74 75 75 90 55 80 70.7
95. Villacarlos, Delfin A. 73 87 71 82 69 70 75 85 73.85
96. Villamil, Leonor S. 73 81 76 86 86 73 55 85 73.6
97. Zabala, Amando A. 76 70 67 75 76 76 60 75 70.6
1950
MRD-98. Cruz, Filomeno de la 70 71 78 81 76 72 64 96 73.4
99. Espaola, Pablo S. 71 78 55 76 85 69 65 93 70.2
100. Foronda, Clarencio J. 60 78 68 79 84 88 62 93 71.9
101. Hechanova, Vicente 59 76 75 75 69 68 75 96 71.3
MRD-102. Pealosa, Osias R. 80 78 61 76 61 77 66 85 70.2
103. Sarmiento, Floro A. 65 86 63 82 89 72 60 72 70.15
MRD-104. Torre, Catalino P. 75 85 68 78 69 67 65 69 70.25
105. Ungson, Fernando S. 61 87 75 70 57 85 83 82 72.8
1951
106. Abasolo, Romulo 77 70 64 65 76 70 76 64 71.7
107. Adeva, Daniel G. 75 59 74 65 69 51 78 67 70.4
108. Aguilar, Vicente Z. 73 63 68 75 70 69 75 75 71.25
109. Amodia, Juan T. 75 76 66 75 76 60 77 76 72.35
MRD-110. Aosa, Pablo S. 76 78 63 75 74 61 75 79 71.6
111. Antiola, Anastacio R. 68 76 75 70 71 70 81 66 73.05
112. Aquino, S. Rey A. 70 71 71 60 74 62 76 77 71.1
113. Atienza, Manuel G. 71 78 68 80 86 51 82 75 73.85
114. Avancea, Alfonso 71 71 65 75 70 72 78 80 71.8
MRD-115. Balacuit, Camilo N. 75 73 75 70 72 65 75 76 73.25
116. Barinaga, Jeremias L. 68 69 73 70 74 50 80 79 71.2
MRD-117. Barrientos, Ambrosio D. 76 60 67 55 74 63 77 62 70.25
MRD-118. Benitez, Tomas P. 67 75 75 60 73 72 75 78 72.2
119. Biason, Sixto F. 73 82 67 65 66 72 77 68 71.25
MRD-120. Brias, Isagani A. 71 69 74 70 76 52 79 72 71.95
121. Buela, Arcadio P. 72 77 61 70 71 58 79 71 69.75
122. Cabilao, Leonardo S. 73 50 75 75 75 60 71 79 71.25
123. Cabrera, Ireneo M. 75 66 70 65 72 81 70 79 72.4
124. Cacacho, Emilio V.
125. Calilung, Soledad C. 64 73 73 80 73 57 75 59 69.65
MRD-126. Calimlim, Jose B. 64 73 73 80 73 57 75 59 69.65
127. Calimlim, Pedro B. 66 82 69 60 69 52 83 75 70
128. Camello, Sotero H. 70 77 63 65 75 66 84 64 71.55
129. Campos, Juan A. 71 88 70 75 64 69 71 62 70.15
130. Castillo, Antonio del 78 78 70 60 79 67 69 76 72.65
MRD-131. Castillo, Dominador Ad. 75 61 72 75 74 71 67 66 71.1
MRD-132. Castro, Jesus B. 72 86 72 75 65 75 76 71 72.85
133. Casuga, Bienvenido B. 75 72 72 70 69 61 75 60 70.95
134. Cabangbang, Santiago B. 77 67 61 80 73 59 83 76 72.2
135. Cruz, Federico S. 69 74 75 75 68 65 76 70 71.65
136. Dacanay, Eufemio P. 70 73 62 75 72 69 85 71 72.05
137. Deysolong, Felisberto 66 62 72 75 70 62 83 62 70.85
MRD-138. Dimaano, Jr., Jose N. 78 79 63 75 73 75 81 59 73.5
139. Espinosa, Domingo L. 78 63 58 70 70 67 87 63 71.6
MRD-140. Farol, Evencia C. 80 78 66 75 81 72 62 73 72.25
141. Felix, Conrado S. 71 71 75 65 70 58 75 69 70.75
142. Fernan, Pablo L. 67 88 66 85 73 68 78 75 72.35
143. Gandioco, Salvador G. 64 58 66 65 76 70 89 75 72.1
144. Gastardo, Crispin B. 70 69 68 75 78 66 86 72 73.9
145. Genson, Angelo B. 75 57 73 65 67 54 78 56 69.55
146. Guiani, Guinald M. 68 60 75 65 74 67 75 77 71.5
147. Guina, Graciano P. 66 69 67 60 78 52 83 61 69.6
MRD-148. Homeres, Praxedes P. 74 74 75 75 71 69 75 71 73.35
149. Ibarra, Venancio M. 60 75 74 70 74 70 80 75 71.9
150. Imperial, Monico L. 72 78 75 75 72 56 82 77 73.7
MRD-151. Ibasco, Jr., Emiliano M. 71 70 63 85 71 60 85 53 70.85
152. Inandan, Fortunato C. 77 77 67 53 73 75 79 57 72.5
153. Jimenez, Florencio C. 75 70 70 75 72 61 75 78 72.05
154. Kintanar, Woodrow M. 70 83 72 65 76 73 75 69 72.95
155. Languido, Cesar V. 63 71 63 85 70 61 85 79 70.55
156. Lavilles, Cesar L. 61 89 75 55 73 63 75 78 70.55
157. Llenos, Francisco U. 64 70 65 60 72 65 92 75 71.75
158. Leon, Marcelo D. de 63 73 60 85 75 75 90 70 72.75
159. Llanto, Priscilla 72 68 60 65 76 67 84 68 71.35
160. Machachor, Oscar 68 59 78 70 67 57 75 75 70.15
MRD-161. Magsino, Encarnacion 77 66 70 70 76 71 75 61 72.75
MRD-162. Maligaya, Demetrio M. 70 61 75 65 75 50 91 51 72.3
163. Manio, Gregorio 67 67 69 80 71 67 75 75 70.65
164. Puzon, Eduardo S. 72 82 60 60 69 70 68 72 62.05
MRD-165. Marcial, Meynardo R. 66 75 74 70 75 67 81 75 73.15
166. Martin, Benjamin S. 68 72 63 75 69 63 84 62 70.1
MRD-167. Monterroyo, Catalina S. 70 80 75 80 76 66 82 51 73.95
MRD-168. Montero, Leodegario C. 73 67 66 80 81 65 81 75 73.75
169. Monzon, Candido T. 70 72 74 75 67 70 77 69 72.05
170. Natividad, Alberto M. 73 79 68 65 73 69 75 79 72.2
MRD-171. Navallo, Capistrano C. 70 72 68 85 81 66 71 74 72.1
172. Nisce, Camilo Z. 66 66 75 65 79 68 85 62 73.5
MRD-173. Ocampo, Antonio F. de 75 81 76 65 74 67 75 69 73.75
174. Olaviar, Jose O. 72 70 69 55 66 70 77 75 70.5
MRD-175. Perez, Cesario Z. 75 76 66 80 72 63 82 69 72.95
176. Pogado, Causin O. 70 66 65 70 75 64 75 70 69.95
177. Ramos-Balmori, Manuela 75 73 62 65 78 59 75 66 70.2
178. Recinto, Ireneo I. 73 76 68 75 74 68 80 53 72.3
MRD-179. Redor, Francisco K. 62 77 73 75 69 64 76 69 70
MRD-180. Regis, Deogracias A. 76 74 68 65 65 65 88 75 73.35
 181. Rigor, Estelita C. 67 78 61 80 71 77 79 65 70.9
MRD-182. Rimorin-Gordo, Estela 70 72 62 60 88 66 67 79 70.15
183. Rosario, Prisco del 70 64 70 70 72 73 85 57 72.65
184. Rosario, Vicente D. del 75 91 65 75 68 68 79 62 72.2
185. Saavedra, Felipe 73 80 63 75 76 73 68 62 70.35
186. Salazar, Alfredo N. 66 72 73 75 67 68 77 69 70.85
187. Salem, Romulo R. 77 81 72 65 73 60 76 75 73
188. Foz, Julita A. 75 72 75 75 65 70 76 64 72.5
189. Santa Ana, Candido T. 77 69 65 75 81 75 70 75 73
190. Santos, Aquilino 72 66 69 65 68 70 81 71 71.7
191. Santos, Valeriano V. 76 72 75 75 68 62 76 79 73.1
192. Suico, Samuel 73 79 72 75 71 59 84 65 73.3
193. Suson, Teodorico 74 68 66 80 66 59 79 67 70.35
194. Tado, Florentino P. 64 76 67 65 76 72 76 53 69.7
195. Tapayan, Domingo A. 69 72 69 70 76 73 82 79 73.75
MRD-196. Tiausas, Miguel V. 67 60 71 75 79 67 84 60 72.7
197. Torres, Carlos P. 68 71 71 70 70 63 82 71 71.6
198. Tria, Hipolito 69 72 75 60 69 54 78 66 70.05
199. Velasco, Avelino A. 65 72 75 75 71 67 78 76 72.1
200. Villa, Francisco C. 65 80 73 75 68 79 65 75 70.2
201. Villagonzalo, Job R. 78 67 74 65 72 51 69 71 70.25
202. Villarama, Jr., Pedro 75 74 75 55 75 66 67 75 71.45
1952
203. Abacon, Pablo 75 72 78 81 78 72 64 55 72.7
MRP-204. Abad, Agapito 73 76 73 85 75 63 62 75 70.95
MRP-205. Abella, Ludovico B. 70 81 76 81 70 66 77 58 72.7
MRP-206. Abellera, Geronimo F. 75 79 79 87 76 51 63 70 71.7
MRP-207. Abenojar, Agapito N. 71 72 78 84 70 75 69 70 72.9
208. Alandy, Doroteo R. 64 83 93 91 68 59 60 60 71.2
209. Alano, Fabian T. 70 83 61 83 72 87 72 70 71.9
MRP-210. Alcantara, Pablo V. 71 79 80 81 73 70 72 62 73.65
211. Arcangel, Agustin Ag. 75 85 71 73 76 65 68 65 71.85
212. Acosta, Dionisio N. 75 81 78 87 56 65 77 70 72.8
MRP-213. Abinguna, Agapito C. 66 85 80 84 75 58 76 75 73.65
214. Adove, Nehemias C. 76 86 78 77 66 78 69 62 73.55
215. Adrias, Inocencio C. 75 83 61 88 76 67 79 75 73.4
216. Aglugub, Andres R. 75 83 73 88 72 62 72 62 72.65
217. Andrada, Mariano L. 76 85 66 87 63 77 75 77 73.
MRP-218. Almeda, Serafin V. 72 72 75 81 61 67 73 65 70.75
219. Almonte-Peralta, Felicidad 73 71 72 91 75 67 65 53 70.7
MRP-220. Amodia, Juan T. 75 79 68 85 62 64 75 78 71.4
MRP-221. Antonio, Felino A. 71 76 81 83 79 52 72 70 73.3
MRP-222. Antonio, Jose S. 75 92 90 68 65 64 68 60 73.75
223. Aonuevo, Ramos B. 71 87 78 81 64 63 74 76 72.7
224. Aquino, S. Rey A. 67 77 57 78 69 70 69 80 67.7
225. Arteche, Filomeno D. 78 83 50 89 76 77 70 70 70.8
MRP-226. Arribas, Isaac M. 75 78 70 81 73 70 67 78 72.2
MRP-227. Azucena, Ceferino D. 72 67 78 89 72 67 77 65 73.95
228. Atienza, Ricardo 72 87 70 79 66 55 75 75 70.85
229. Balacuit, Camilo N. 75 78 89 75 70 54 66 75 73.3
MRP-230. Baclig, Cayetano S. 77 84 83 80 69 70 61 65 73
231. Balcita, Oscar C. 75 77 79 90 64 60 67 50 70.65
232. Barilea, Dominador Z. 71 67 82 77 64 61 65 80 70.5
MRP-233. Banta, Jose Y. 75 80 77 81 75 63 71 75 73.95
MRP-234. Barrientos, Ambrosio D. 76 70 67 80 67 65 70 81 70.7
235. Batucan, Jose M. 66 76 78 88 62 76 67 78 71.2
236. Bautista, Atilano C. 70 82 84 85 58 61 71 62 71.25
237. Bautista, Celso J. 71 68 63 87 80 67 80 70 72.75
238. Belderon, Jose 76 81 76 92 70 66 67 62 72.65
MRP-239. Belo, Victor B. 76 77 64 73 75 71 76 76 72.85
MRP-240. Bejec, Conceso D. 79 80 73 82 63 77 75 50 73.15
MRP-241. Beltran, Gervasio M. 72 75 81 73 75 57 75 80 73.95
MRP-242. Benaojan, Robustiano O. 74 84 77 84 75 63 68 62 72.85
MRP-243. Beria, Roger C. 70 80 79 79 68 72 64 78 71.85
MRP-244. Bihis, Marcelo M. 75 86 65 92 64 64 84 75 73.45
MRP-245. Binaoro, Vicente M. 73 69 78 83 73 59 70 82 72.75
MRP-246. Bobila, Rosalio B. 76 86 76 83 68 59 71 78 73.05
247. Buenafe, Avelina R. 78 80 75 75 70 55 72 80 72.75
248. Bueno, Anastacio F. 73 78 71 78 71 67 71 60 71.15
249. Borres, Maximino L. 67 85 62 91 72 63 76 80 70.9
MRP-250. Cabegin, Cesar V. 72 71 76 75 74 70 71 60 72.2
MRP-251. Cabello, Melecio F. 72 78 78 89 58 70 67 71 70.5
MRP-252. Cabrera, Irineo M. 79 88 53 91 71 85 75 76 73.3
253. Cabreros, Paulino N. 71 79 83 84 60 62 71 50 70.85
254. Calayag, Florentino R. 69 79 66 88 69 75 68 76 70.6
MRP-255. Calzada, Cesar de la 76 72 80 67 62 71 66 62 70.85
256. Canabal, Isabel 70 82 81 77 78 51 75 75 73.7
MRP-257. Cabugao, Pablo N. 76 87 69 80 58 64 78 75 71.8
258. Calagi, Mateo C. 73 93 71 87 70 66 69 62 71.8
259. Canda, Benjamin S. 72 71 77 90 62 75 66 82 71.95
260. Cantoria, Eulogio 71 80 71 89 70 55 72 75 71
261. Capacio, Jr., Conrado 67 78 71 90 65 75 72 60 70.65
262. Capitulo, Alejandro P. 75 70 53 87 78 63 76 91 71.2
MRP-263. Calupitan, Jr., Alfredo 75 93 81 76 64 75 68 56 73.15
MRP-264. Caluya, Arsenio V. 75 86 70 87 77 52 77 82 73.9
MRP-265. Campanilla, Mariano B. 80 75 78 77 73 71 63 76 73.65
MRP-266. Campos, Juan A. 66 85 83 84 67 61 80 57 73.25
267. Cardoso, Angelita G. 78 71 73 76 79 56 69 60 71.8
268. Cartagena, Herminio R. 71 72 65 89 64 73 80 70 71.65
MRP-269. Castro, Daniel T. 65 75 77 76 85 60 75 69 73.15
270. Cauntay, Gaudencio V. 70 78 72 73 77 69 64 80 71.2
271. Castro, Pedro L. de 70 68 69 87 76 75 72 70 73.35
272. Cerio, Juan A. 75 82 75 86 60 54 76 75 71.75
273. Colorado, Alfonso R. 68 75 80 74 77 66 67 80 72.6
274. Chavez, Doroteo M. 73 65 79 84 73 69 66 84 73.1
275. Chavez, Honorato A. 77 76 79 86 74 53 71 75 73.65
MRP-276. Cobangbang, Orlando B. 69 81 74 82 76 61 78 80 73.85
277. Cortez, Armando R. 78 60 88 86 60 66 69 64 73.1
278. Crisostomo, Jesus L. 76 87 74 76 62 55 76 66 71.45
MRP-279. Cornejo, Crisanto R. 68 87 78 86 79 50 80 60 73.7
MRP-280. Cruz, Raymundo 75 81 79 85 72 57 68 75 72.95
MRP-281. Cunanan, Jose C. 78 92 63 83 76 72 68 65 72.4
282. Cunanan, Salvador F. 70 82 64 92 67 75 73 76 71.45
283. Cimafranca, Agustin B. 71 76 76 80 70 71 75 71 73.35
284. Crisol, Getulio R. 70 91 78 85 68 55 71 50 70.8
MRP-285. Dusi, Felicisimo R. 76 82 69 82 66 62 80 71 72.85
MRP-286. Datu, Alfredo J. 70 75 72 86 80 55 68 79 71.5
287. Dacuma, Luis B. 71 67 87 83 71 50 65 70 71.25
MRP-288. Degamo, Pedro R. 73 80 82 74 80 67 67 57 73.65
289. Delgado, Vicente N. 70 84 82 84 77 52 73 50 72.65
MRP-290. Diolazo, Ernesto A. 75 83 86 73 54 54 75 75 72.25
291. Dionisio, Jr., Guillermo 73 84 64 89 71 78 75 66 72.8
MRP-292. Dichoso, Alberto M. 71 77 71 81 69 75 80 70 73.65
MRP-293. Dipasupil, Claudio R. 70 76 82 73 79 70 72 56 73.9
MRP-294. Delgado, Abner 75 84 63 67 64 60 70 72 68.35
MRP-295. Domingo, Dominador T. 70 69 81 82 68 63 71 75 72.2
296. Ducusin, Agapito B. 70 78 53 88 75 77 62 76 68.05
MRP-297. Duque, Antonio S. 75 77 78 86 76 72 64 75 73.9
298. Duque, Castulo 75 80 73 83 66 67 65 66 70.65
299. Ebbah, Percival B. 70 80 85 76 66 63 76 75 73.95
300. Edisa, Sulpicio 65 77 75 89 75 62 75 65 72
301. Edradan, Rosa C. 70 75 84 84 71 59 69 86 73.4
MRP-302. Enage, Jacinto N. 66 70 88 93 72 67 65 75 73.2
MRP-303. Encarnacion, Alfonso B. 75 86 73 81 63 77 69 75 72.65
304. Encarnacion, Cesar 65 78 58 68 66 64 75 78 67.1
305. Estoista, Agustin A. 78 76 74 86 58 67 70 76 71.7
MRP-306. Fabros, Jose B. 66 75 80 82 80 71 67 70 73.05
MRP-307. Fajardo, Balbino P. 77 69 82 83 65 60 75 75 73.9
308. Fajardo, Genaro P. 70 79 77 79 79 50 73 75 72.5
309. Evangelista, Felicidad P. 75 75 72 87 63 63 77 70 72.15
310. Familara, Raymundo Z. 68 75 87 83 64 65 68 65 71.85
311. Farias, Dionisio 70 78 89 66 65 75 70 50 72.75
 312. Favila, Hilario B. 71 84 74 70 75 67 73 59 72.2
MRP-313. Feliciano, Alberto I. 71 69 70 85 69 81 72 70 72.25
MRP-314. Fernando, Lope F. 73 77 86 79 70 76 64 50 73
MRP-315. Flores, Dionisio S. 78 72 77 83 67 60 68 73 72.05
MRP-316. Fortich, Benjamin B. 70 82 70 70 78 65 64 75 70.35
MRP-317. Fuente, Jose S. de la 76 88 72 74 60 71 79 79 73.55
318. Fohmantes, Nazario S. 72 79 71 77 68 61 76 60 70.9
MRP-319. Fuggan, Lorenzo B. 76 81 74 69 71 71 73 60 72.85
320. Gabuya, Jesus S. 70 83 82 83 70 63 75 65 73.75
321. Galang, Victor N. 69 83 84 76 70 57 71 60 71.95
322. Gaerlan, Manuel L. 73 87 77 90 67 61 72 75 73.15
323. Galem, Nestor R. 72 79 86 78 60 61 75 70 73.05
324. Gallardo, Jose Pe B. 75 88 75 75 63 70 70 65 71.85
MRP-325. Gallos, Cirilo B. 70 78 84 91 80 51 65 70 72.85
326. Galindo, Eulalio D. 70 89 87 65 78 71 62 62 73.4
327. Galman, Patrocinio G. 72 72 80 85 71 56 70 53 71.15
328. Gamalinda, Carlos S. 76 79 81 86 67 63 69 55 72.55
329. Gamboa, Antonio G. 71 67 70 72 76 60 75 68 70.95
330. Gannod, Jose A. 69 80 75 81 68 62 73 68 71.25
MRP-331. Garcia, Matias N. 67 78 74 90 79 59 76 65 72.8
MRP-332. Ganete, Carmelo 75 87 77 82 74 57 68 81 73.3
333. Gilbang, Gaudioso R. 75 67 80 82 67 57 64 70 70.5
334. Gofredo, Claro C. 68 78 72 86 78 52 70 76 70.9
335. Gomez, Jose S. 71 76 71 81 76 63 69 62 70.85
MRP-336. Gosiaoco, Lorenzo V. 68 93 85 78 64 69 70 54 72.35
MRP-337. Gonzales, Rafael C. 77 75 71 89 55 70 70 60 70.05
MRP-338. Gracia, Eulalia L. de 66 68 90 84 77 59 69 65 73.3
339. Grageda, Jose M. A. 70 85 72 67 70 60 73 73 70.75
340. Guzman, Juan de 75 86 69 84 64 79 75 76 73.6
MRP-341. Guzman, Mateo de 76 79 79 73 72 69 68 80 73.9
342. Guzman, Salvador B. 71 61 74 72 61 66 78 75 70.75
343. Guzman, Salvador T. de 75 84 64 81 74 61 78 58 71.75
344. Habelito, Geronimo E. 71 76 71 87 73 60 67 55 69.65
 345. Hedriana, Naterno G. 75 68 84 76 66 58 76 60 72.9
346. Hernandez, Quintin B. 67 75 72 81 72 72 66 76 70.6
1952
347. Homeres, Agustin R. 73 84 65 86 70 77 63 76 70.7
348. Ines, Leonilo F. 65 88 71 88 77 73 61 70 70.55
349. Jamer, Alipio S. 68 75 83 89 80 61 65 50 72
MRP-350. Ibasco, Jr., Emiliano M. 75 65 68 85 76 70 83 54 73.8
MRP-351. Jardinico, Jr., Emilio 73 86 72 78 82 67 67 64 72.8
MRP-352. Jaen, Justiniano F. 76 75 78 84 71 66 70 77 73.85
353. Jaring, Antonio S. 72 77 79 70 72 57 71 50 70.75
MRP-354. Javier, Aquilino M. 75 84 79 78 77 61 66 66 73.05
355. Jomuad, Francisco 75 75 72 88 78 58 76 43 72.4
MRP-356. Jose, Nestor L. 78 61 64 73 68 76 64 80 69.7
357. La Q, Jose M. 75 71 75 72 70 67 81 59 73.5
358. Leon, Brigido C. de 67 75 78 91 78 51 72 80 72.55
359. Leones, Constante B. 68 81 79 84 73 60 77 60 73
360. Liboro, Horacio T. 72 69 80 87 73 62 70 61 72.4
361. Llanera, Cesar L. 77 81 80 78 64 59 75 63 73
362. Lomontod, Jose P. 75 76 69 70 73 76 74 75 73.2
363. Luna, Lucito 70 75 69 83 59 53 74 75 68.4
MRP-364. Luz, Lauro L. 76 90 78 88 64 58 75 77 73.95
MRP-365. Macasaet, Tomas S. 73 81 72 83 66 75 72 70 72.5
366. Magbiray, Godofredo V. 80 67 84 76 70 62 65 68 73.05
367. Majarais, Rodolfo P. 70 62 64 82 88 75 71 79 72.85
MRP-368. Makabenta, Eduardo 75 90 77 83 59 71 72 78 73.3
MRP-369. Malapit, Justiniano S. 74 83 74 89 58 60 72 76 71.1
370. Maloles, Iluminado M. 70 87 73 76 77 50 76 76 72.3
371. Maniquis, Daniel R. 75 80 73 91 69 71 65 70 72.1
372. Maraa, Arsenio 65 79 60 72 73 51 75 86 67.9
373. Marasigan, Napoleon 75 71 83 75 69 62 69 70 72.75
MRP-374. Marco, Jaime P. 75 67 74 76 64 75 75 57 71.9
MRP-375. Martir, Osmundo P. 70 86 76 78 72 71 75 53 72.95
MRP-376. Masancay, Amando E. 73 87 75 77 72 50 78 80 73.2
MRP-377. Mati-ong, Ignacio T. 62 87 72 79 73 76 69 77 71.3
378. Mara, Guillermo L. 70 78 78 89 75 67 66 65 72.35
MRP-379. Mercado, Felipe A. 73 77 82 82 78 52 69 85 73.9
MRP-380. Miculob, Eugenio P. 70 82 73 86 77 52 79 65 72.8
381. Mison, Rafael M. Jr., 79 78 73 75 71 68 69 53 71.95
MRP-382. Monponbanua, Antonio D. 79 79 68 88 64 78 69 83 73.1
MRP-383. Montero, Leodegario C. 72 89 69 89 70 68 70 75 72.15
384. Morada, Servillano S. 75 76 67 71 65 66 75 76 70.9
385. Mocorro, Generoso 78 84 78 84 60 73 68 70 73
MRP-386. Mosquera, Estanislao L. 75 78 75 85 72 55 77 66 73.15
387. Motus, Rodentor P. 80 78 70 94 72 75 70 57 73.75
388. Macario, Pedro R. 70 67 74 86 78 63 72 66 72.15
MRP-389. Nadela, Geredion T. 72 64 64 81 73 50 75 75 69.15
MRP-390. Nazareno, Romeo P. 67 70 71 76 76 79 75 57 72.05
391. Nieto, Benedicto S. 69 79 77 77 72 62 76 76 72.9
MRP-392. Noguera, Raymundo 71 86 81 80 73 56 72 70 73.15
MRP-393. Nodado, Domiciano R. 70 70 69 73 57 37 64 72 63.6
394. Nono, Pacifico G. 67 77 78 67 75 59 71 76 71.35
MRP-395. Nuval, Manuel R. 78 72 67 90 72 68 78 67 73.65
396. Ocampo, Augusto 75 90 77 72 69 55 65 67 60.7
397. Oliveros, Amado A. 72 75 68 72 84 50 75 79 71.9
398. Opia, Jr., Pedro 76 77 74 67 73 66 68 70 71.85
MRP-399. Olaviar, Jose O. 70 62 85 81 74 50 68 79 71.8
MRP-400. Olandesca, Per O. 70 91 76 87 72 66 70 79 73.45
401. Orden, Apolonio J. 72 65 84 86 66 50 72 68 71.45
402. Ortiz, Melencio T. 71 75 78 81 66 67 70 78 72.1
MRP-403. Pablo, Fedelino S. 72 64 76 86 72 61 76 75 72.95
404. Pacifico, Vicente V. 76 79 69 80 76 52 72 80 71.95
MRP-405. Paderna, Perfecto D. 75 69 72 75 78 58 75 70 72.6
406. Padlan, Crispin M. 71 66 76 79 68 67 74 66 71.65
407. Padilla, Jose C. 70 65 67 82 78 75 78 75 73.3
408. Padilla, Jr., Estanislao E. 71 88 78 86 59 75 78 50 72.95
MRP-409. Palma, Bartolome 67 81 80 82 71 75 69 75 73.25
MRP-410. Papa, Angel A. 75 72 85 85 77 59 63 71 73.45
MRP-411. Parayno, Mario V. 71 88 74 89 69 66 76 73 73.65
412. Paria, Santos L. 70 87 85 77 64 67 63 76 71.85
MRP-413. Pasion, Anastacio 63 80 68 81 82 79 76 58 72.55
414. Pastrana, Rizal R. 69 76 71 76 68 63 77 83 71.65
MRP-415. Paulin, Jose O. 70 66 80 87 75 50 65 80 70.9
MRP-416. Pelaez, Jr., Vicente C. 79 87 73 83 69 71 68 65 73.2
417. Pea, Jesus 75 75 75 62 75 70 60 66 70.4
418. Perez, Toribio R. 71 64 81 92 69 58 67 70 71.25
419. Pestao, Melquiades 77 81 74 87 59 68 76 75 73.2
MRP-420. Pido, Serafin C. 77 81 72 82 69 71 60 75 71.15
421. Pinlac, Filemon 67 76 74 86 65 79 65 72 70.55
422. Poblete, Celso B. 72 79 82 76 66 64 74 50 72.15
MRP-423. Piza, Luz 68 70 75 87 74 67 64 75 70.8
424. Puzon, Eduardo S. 72 80 81 69 72 53 67 70 71.05
425. Quetulio, Josefina D. 75 90 60 93 64 78 76 83 72.9
MRP-426. Quipanes, Melchor V. 69 88 79 82 65 62 71 66 71.55
MRP-427. Quietson, Bayani R. 73 75 76 77 70 81 71 53 72.85
428. Racho, Macario D. 68 75 81 82 78 53 66 54 70.55
429. Ramirez, Sabas P. 71 80 73 87 62 62 75 80 71.65
MRP-430. Raffian, Jose A. 80 83 79 79 62 72 68 65 73.25
MRP-431. Ramos, Patricio S. 75 87 76 75 72 72 61 75 72.25
MRP-432. Ramos-Balmori, Manuela 78 84 76 90 48 75 80 65 73.45
MRP-433. Raro, Celso 75 81 76 67 75 77 55 77 71.4
MRP-434. Rayos, Victor S. 75 86 79 91 71 67 67 70 73.9
435. Revilla, Mariano S. 75 78 81 90 70 54 69 81 73.35
436. Reyes, Abdon L. 72 64 81 78 76 73 69 53 72.85
437. Reyes, Domingo B. 72 87 78 83 72 75 62 70 72.7
438. Reyes, Francisco M. 75 85 84 68 75 71 68 50 73.9
439. Reyes, Lozano M. 80 57 78 79 78 65 64 79 73.35
MRP-440. Reyes, Oscar R. 75 75 82 82 76 64 68 60 73.65
441. Rigonan, Cesar V. 71 85 65 86 75 70 76 70 72.7
442. Rivera, Honorio 71 56 70 90 71 65 75 71 71.2
MRP-443. Rivero, Buenaventura A. 72 88 72 94 68 73 66 80 72.6
MRP-444. Robles, Enrique 75 77 75 77 82 64 69 70 73.7
445. Rodriguez, Orestes Arellano 76 75 76 63 69 77 65 78 72.25
446. Roldan, Jose V. 67 80 79 83 73 71 75 70 73.9
447. Rosario, Adelaida R. del 80 75 65 70 68 72 80 70 73.15
448. Rosario, Restituto F. del 75 75 79 90 68 65 66 63 72.1
MRP-449. Sabelino, Conrado S. 71 81 69 75 77 71 75 70 72.95
450. San Juan, Damaso 77 86 72 89 59 76 65 72 71.6
451. Saiel, Felix L. 72 93 76 80 67 75 66 62 72.1
452. Samaniego, Jesus B. 75 80 76 72 60 67 68 70 70.6
MRP-453. Sandoval, Emmanuel M. 75 83 70 83 77 67 77 60 73.95
MRP-454. Sanidad, Emmanuel Q. 71 75 81 90 62 64 76 68 72.95
455. Santiago, Jr., Cristobal 75 76 84 93 63 65 59 70 71.8
456. Santillan, Juanito Ll. 76 89 83 83 63 58 65 52 71.25
MRP-457. Santos, Rodolfo C. 75 75 78 82 73 76 66 70 73.7
MRP-458. Santos, Ruperto M. 67 54 69 76 63 64 71 60 66.75
MRP-459. Santos, Aquilino C. 72 71 73 79 73 79 71 85 73.8
MRP-460. Santos, Rufino A. 75 81 79 85 74 72 66 54 73.3
461. Suanding, Bantas 75 67 67 92 79 59 76 76 73.1
MRP-462. Sulit, Feliz M. 76 79 76 78 72 75 68 67 73.5
463. Songco, Felicisimo G. 70 68 82 84 60 69 76 65 73.35
464. Soriano, Aniceto S. 64 79 77 80 80 53 70 65 70.7
465. Suarez, Pablo D. 73 85 70 87 76 70 64 70 71.9
MRP-466. Sybico, Jesus L. 79 70 70 72 75 75 72 60 73.05
467. Tabaque, Benjamin R. 69 68 77 79 74 68 72 60 71.85
MRP-468. Tan Kiang, Clarita 81 79 72 80 62 75 73 80 73.95
MRP-469. Tando, Amado T. 71 82 78 83 71 61 71 60 72
470. Tasico, Severo E. 71 69 75 89 70 75 67 63 71.65
471. Tiburcio, Ismael P. 73 82 72 93 76 57 68 54 71.15
MRP-472. Tiongson, Federico T. 70 70 76 84 77 75 75 50 73.45
MRP-473. Tolentino, Jesus C. 75 89 63 84 85 73 73 50 73.4
474. Torrijas, Alfredo A. 77 66 67 83 68 75 71 63 71.3
MRP-475. Tobias, Artemio M. 69 58 74 81 71 55 65 57 67.55
 MRP-476. Trillana, Jr., Apolonio 76 86 76 86 70 68 75 50 73.8
MRP-477. Trinidad, Manuel O. 66 91 83 75 63 66 67 65 70.8
478. Trinidad, Pedro O. 66 78 78 85 78 51 64 75 70.8
MRP-479. Udarbe, Flavio J. 80 82 77 82 67 56 68 75 72.6
480. Umali, Osmundo C. 68 75 81 80 71 69 68 60 71.7
481. Umayam, Juanito C. 77 75 87 85 56 56 66 60 71
MRP-482. Usita, Gelacio U. 75 72 75 74 73 76 71 70 73.55
483. Valino, Francisco M. 72 81 80 84 62 78 71 75 73.7
484. Varela, Dominador M. 67 75 81 86 72 57 81 70 73.85
485. Vega, Macairog L. de 78 62 79 87 70 70 71 65 73.8
MRP-486. Velasco, Emmanuel D. 71 80 74 85 60 66 76 76 71.85
487. Velez, Maria E. 73 70 89 80 56 50 72 67 71.05
MRP-488. Venal, Artemio V. 78 91 58 67 76 55 75 73 73.65
489. Venus, Conrado B. 69 81 74 85 62 66 72 77 77.05
MRP-490. Verzosa, Federico B. 75 79 72 88 76 68 74 59 73.7
MRP-491. Villafuerte, Eduardo V. 75 83 70 76 64 64 75 65 71.2
MRP-492. Villanueva, Cecilio C. 75 85 79 88 66 77 67 70 73.95
493. Villar, Custodio R. 73 69 70 88 76 66 69 50 70.75
MRP-494. Villaseor, Leonidas F. 80 85 67 77 62 75 76 73 73.15
495. Viterbo, Jose H. 80 77 65 93 70 65 65 65 70.65
496. Yaranon, Pedro 70 77 76 85 72 50 75 75 71.85
MRP-497. Yasay, Mariano R. 75 75 72 76 63 77 70 60 71.1
MRP-498. Ygay, Venancio M. 73 80 83 84 62 59 72 77 72.65
499. Yulo, Jr., Teodoro 73 82 78 75 60 81 75 75 73.95
500. Zamora, Alberto 70 65 76 79 62 77 69 82 71.3
501. Rigonan, Felipe C. 70 79 69 89 76 62 71 64 71.2

A list of those who petitioned for the consolidation of their grades in subjects passed in previous examinations, showing the years in which they took the examinations
together with their grades and averages, and those who had filed motions for reconsideration which were denied, indicated by the initials MRD, follows:

PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 72

Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen.

Av.
 1. Amao, Sulpicio M.
1946 68 67 76 76 73 73 49 50 66.5
1950 59 80 67 77 62 80 71 57 67.4
2. Baldo, Olegario Ga.
1951 65 76 58 55 59 63 75 72 64.9
1952 65 68 75 84 72 59 73 57 69.75
1953 57 74 68 68 76 52 71 76 66.7
3. Blanco, Jose B.
MRD-1949 75 75 70 75 77 76 60 90 72.15
1951 64 71 58 65 68 70 75 71 66.95
4. Condeno, Mateo
1950 71 80 62 75 75 81 55 92 69.3
1951 70 60 61 65 77 64 67 81 67.85
5. Ducusin, Agapito B.
MRD-1949 69 70 76 73 76 71 55 60 68.65
1950 60 71 55 67 67 75 56 89 68.1
6. Garcia, Manuel N.
MRD-1949 60 70 82 79 70 69 60 80 69.25
1950 57 65 51 69 54 85 56 84 60.3
7. Luna, Lucito A.
1946 63 53 69 76 75 76 57 69 66.55
1952 70 75 69 83 59 53 74 75 68.4
8. Maraa, Arsenio s.
1949 72 68 68 75 75 72 60 75 69.35
1952 65 79 60 72 73 51 75 86 67.9
9. Montano, Manuel M.
1951 61 60 58 60 70 63 75 64 64.8
1952 70 77 65 79 66 52 70 50 66.4
1953 78 64 66 68 81 50 71 78 70.65
10. Pea, Jesus S.
1950 25 75 45 75 45 52 46 71 46.2
1951 70 77 65 79 66 52 70 50 66.4
1952 75 75 75 62 75 70 60 66 70.4
11. Placido, Sr., Isidro
1950 68 78 70 75 69 70 58 69 67.75
1951 65 62 75 60 73 57 75 71 66.8
12. Rementizo, Filemon S.
1949 65 75 72 75 60 75 55 85 66.65
1951 68 57 48 60 91 66 55 75 64.05
1952 68 53 68 67 58 56 75 64 65.7
13. Amao, Sulpicio M.
1952 67 80 51 69 69 77 73 53 66.35
1953 65 67 78 74 75 62 69 80 70.9
14. Rodulfa, Juan T.
1951 67 60 70 65 68 56 75 66 67.75
1952 70 71 67 78 67 75 71 70 70.1
15. Sanchez, Juan J.
1948 39 69 82 75 76 72 55 50 63.5
MRD-1949 67 56 69 75 72 77 60 75 68
1951 70 59 55 60 68 57 78 67 65.8
16. Santos, Constantino
1952 62 76 54 82 72 77 66 65 66.65
1953 73 71 70 65 78 64 65 78 70.4
17. Santos, Salvador H.
1951 60 64 55 70 68 52 70 75 62.85
1952 75 64 70 81 76 55 61 75 69.1
1953 70 71 79 65 72 54 66 80 70
18. Sevilla, Macario C.
MRD-1948 50 64 76 66 66 69 60 52 63.1
MRD-1949 47 66 78 64 71 86 65 85 68
 1950 35 65 40 75 63 57 27 49 45
MRD-1951 68 59 72 55 69 65 75 75 69.3
1953 70 73 74 70 81 56 69 71 71.05

Finally, with regards to the examinations of 1953, while some candidates--85 in all--presented motions for reconsideration of their grades, others invoked the provisions of
Republic Act No. 972. A list of those candidates separating those who filed mere motions for reconsideration (56) from those who invoked the aforesaid Republic act, is as
follows:

1953 PETITIONERS FOR RECONSIDERATION

Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen.

Av.
1. Acenas, Calixto R. 73 70 68 62 82 51 67 77 73.45
2. Alcantara, Pedro N. 67 70 75 85 87 54 71 80 72.8
3. Alejandro, Exequiel 67 72 71 75 80 76 75 77 73.4
4. Andres, Gregorio M. 70 73 86 58 79 50 71 78 72.7
5. Arnaiz, Antonio E. 66 80 76 58 79 68 77 81 73.4
6. Asis, Floriano U. de 66 78 75 81 77 55 73 69 71.25
7. Bacaiso, Celestino M. 71 65 76 68 76 50 75 70 70.95
8. Bala, Florencio F. 64 82 47 70 82 58 75 82 67
9. Baldo, Olegario A. 57 74 68 68 76 52 71 76 66.7
10. Barrios, Benjamin O. 65 71 76 75 80 62 83 73 73.95
11. Buhay, Eduardo L. 73 76 71 91 76 61 74 78 73.35
12. Burgos, Dominador C. 72 80 89 61 66 37 69 68 70.05
13. Cario, Eldo J. 79 81 60 75 74 74 76 74 73
14. Casar, Dimapuro 67 73 84 79 77 61 71 74 73.35
15. Castaeda, Gregorio 70 73 80 71 75 70 73 78 73.95
16. Estrellado, Benjamin R. 67 79 64 73 82 62 71 74 70.2
17. Fabunan, Edilberto C. 70 72 68 69 77 60 76 74 71.1
18. Feril, Domingo B. 75 71 84 65 70 60 65 70 71.6
19. Fernandez, Alejandro G. 65 75 87 80 81 63 61 80 72.8
20. Gapus, Rosita S. (Miss) 76 80 86 77 64 74 66 69 73.9
21. Garcia, Rafael B. 70 86 70 75 73 63 73 75 71.65
22. Gracia, Miguel L. de 73 68 75 59 80 51 72 71 71
23. Gungon, Armando G. 68 76 76 84 77 57 77 83 73.6
24. Gutierrez, Antonio S. 68 77 66 70 72 59 71 74 69.1
25. Ilejay, Abraham I. 77 70 76 77 81 62 70 68 73.7
26. Leon, Benjamin La. De 66 66 75 70 77 55 71 82 70.35
27. Lugtu, Felipe L. 62 70 78 65 78 56 69 81 69.9
28. Lukman, Abdul-Hamid 76 64 67 69 73 59 73 75 70.45
29. Maloles, Jr., Benjamin G. 77 76 68 68 71 51 75 78 70.85
30. Maloles, Julius G. 77 71 60 71 79 62 68 72 69.75
31. Mandi, Santiago P. 65 76 70 61 79 68 75 72 71.1
32. Margete, Rufino C. 70 76 66 75 85 73 71 75 72.75
33. Melocoton, Nestorio B. 70 81 73 78 83 52 72 75 72.35
34. Molina, Manuel C. 75 78 70 61 75 63 66 85 70.95
35. Muoz, Mariano A. 75 80 86 67 74 57 68 76 73.75
36. Navarro, Buenaventura M. 80 75 65 75 83 55 73 79 73
37. Nodado, Domiciano R. 60 67 67 50 70 50 56 75 61.7
38. Papas, Sisenando B. 65 62 71 61 70 56 66 67 66
39. Pagulayan-Sy, Fernando 63 75 71 62 83 67 70 72 70.4
40. Padula, Benjamin C. 70 77 54 62 74 78 75 68 69.05
41. Pasno, Enrique M. 78 72 66 54 71 58 72 78 69.85
42. Pea, Jr., Narciso 70 95 81 78 67 66 67 73 72.55
43. Peralta, Rodolfo P. 70 70 52 81 68 63 59 69 63.7
44. Pigar, Leopoldo R. 76 75 78 61 72 72 71 79 73.75
45. Publico, Paciano L. 68 69 76 76 70 59 74 67 70.6
46. Radaza, Leovigildo 75 78 76 61 77 50 71 86 72.2
47. Ramos, Bernardo M. 64 62 75 93 81 52 66 80 70.1
48. Rabaino, Andres D. 68 72 75 73 78 55 69 76 70.65
49. Ravanera, Oscar N. 70 77 80 71 82 62 69 78 73.6
50. Renovilla, Jose M. 65 75 80 68 79 52 62 78 69.5
51. Sabaot, Solomon B. 69 73 80 69 82 69 69 79 73.85
52. Sumaway, Ricardo S. 66 76 69 76 74 56 72 68 69.1
53. Torrefiel, Sofronio O. 70 77 74 75 73 50 68 72 69.55
54. Vera, Federico V. de 60 61 47 77 69 50 67 77 60.9
55. Viray, Venancio Bustos 65 67 67 52 73 64 71 65 67.15
56. Ylaya, Angela P. (Miss) 63 70 56 75 68 54 70 77 64.5
 PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen.

Av.

1. Ala, Narciso 70 71 73 59 73 74 81 77 73.5

2. Alcantara, Pedro N. 67 70 75 85 87 54 71 80 72.8
3. Arellano, Antonio L. 74 66 73 60 78 63 78 72 72.9
4. Buhay, Eduardo L. 73 76 71 91 76 61 74 78 73.35
5. Calautit, Celestino R. 71 78 84 75 75 61 68 72 73.2
6. Casuncad, Sulvio P. 61 73 82 69 81 68 71 84 73.05
7. Enriquez, Pelagio y Concepcion 84 69 76 75 82 50 58 79 72.05
8. Estonina, Severino 80 74 64 89 81 56 68 82 72.4
9. Fernandez, Alejandro Q. 65 75 87 80 81 63 61 80 72.8
10. Fernandez, Luis N. 70 75 77 75 78 67 72 73 73.35
11. Figueroa, Alfredo A. 70 75 87 78 75 50 68 68 72.3
12. Formilleza, Pedro 65 75 89 68 83 51 70 75 73.25
13. Garcia, Manuel M. 69 68 83 83 73 62 62 70 71
14. Grospe, Vicente E. 68 75 78 66 79 61 69 82 71.6
15. Galema, Nestor R. (1952) 72 79 86 78 60 61 75 70 73.05
16. Jacobo, Rafael F. 76 76 75 74 76 50 72 76 72.3
17. Macalindong, Reinerio L. 67 77 79 79 74 72 68 77 72.75
18. Mangubat, Antonio M. 70 70 78 61 80 74 62 70 71.45
19. Montano, Manuel M. 78 64 66 68 81 50 71 78 70.65
20. Plomantes, Marcos 73 67 74 58 68 70 76 71 71.6
21. Ramos, Eugenio R. 70 80 76 67 72 69 72 79 72.6
22. Reyes, Juan R. 71 73 77 76 81 59 72 74 73.2
23. Reyes, Santiago R. 65 78 83 60 76 75 70 70 72.9
24. Rivera, Eulogio J. 65 67 78 74 75 62 69 80 70.9
25. Santos, Constantino P. 73 71 70 65 78 64 65 78 70.4
26. Santos, Salvador H. 70 71 79 65 72 54 66 80 70
27. Sevilla, Macario C. 70 73 74 70 81 56 69 71 71.05
28. Villavicencio, Jose A. 78 75 70 67 69 77 64 77 73.2
29. Viray, Ruperto G. 76 73 76 73 80 58 68 83 73.25
There are the unsuccessful candidates totaling 604 directly affected by this resolution. Adding 490 candidates who have not presented any petition, they reach a total of 1,094.

The Enactment of Republic Act No. 972

As will be observed from Annex I, this Court reduced to 72 per cent the passing general average in the bar examination of august and November of 1946; 69 per cent in 1947; 70
per cent in 1948; 74 per cent in 1949; maintaining the prescribed 75 per cent since 1950, but raising to 75 per cent those who obtained 74 per cent since 1950. This caused the
introduction in 1951, in the Senate of the Philippines of Bill No. 12 which was intended to amend Sections 5, 9, 12, 14 and 16 of Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, concerning the
admission of attorneys-at-law to the practice of the profession. The amendments embrace many interesting matters, but those referring to sections 14 and 16 immediately concern
us. The proposed amendment is as follows:

SEC. 14. Passing average. In order that a candidate may be deemed to have passed the examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 70 per
cent without falling below 50 per cent in any subject. In determining the average, the foregoing subjects shall be given the following relative weights: Civil Law, 20 per
cent; Land Registration and Mortgages, 5 per cent; Mercantile Law, 15 per cent; Criminal Law, 10 per cent; Political Law, 10 per cent; International Law, 5 per cent;
Remedial Law, 20 per cent; Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, 5 per cent; Social Legislation, 5 per cent; Taxation, 5 per cent. Unsuccessful candidates shall not be
required to take another examination in any subject in which they have obtained a rating of 70 per cent or higher and such rating shall be taken into account in determining
their general average in any subsequent examinations: Provided, however, That if the candidate fails to get a general average of 70 per cent in his third examination, he
shall lose the benefit of having already passed some subjects and shall be required to the examination in all the subjects.

SEC. 16. Admission and oath of successful applicants. Any applicant who has obtained a general average of 70 per cent in all subjects without falling below 50 per
cent in any examination held after the 4th day of July, 1946, or who has been otherwise found to be entitled to admission to the bar, shall be allowed to take and subscribe
before the Supreme Court the corresponding oath of office. (Arts. 4 and 5, 8, No. 12).

With the bill was an Explanatory Note, the portion pertinent to the matter before us being:

It seems to be unfair that unsuccessful candidates at bar examinations should be compelled to repeat even those subjects which they have previously passed. This is not
the case in any other government examination. The Rules of Court have therefore been amended in this measure to give a candidate due credit for any subject which he
has previously passed with a rating of 75 per cent or higher."

Senate Bill No. 12 having been approved by Congress on May 3, 1951, the President requested the comments of this Tribunal before acting on the same. The comment was signed
by seven Justices while three chose to refrain from making any and one took no part. With regards to the matter that interests us, the Court said:

The next amendment is of section 14 of Rule 127. One part of this amendment provides that if a bar candidate obtains 70 per cent or higher in any subject, although failing
to pass the examination, he need not be examined in said subject in his next examination. This is a sort of passing the Bar Examination on the installment plan, one or two
or three subjects at a time. The trouble with this proposed system is that although it makes it easier and more convenient for the candidate because he may in an
examination prepare himself on only one or two subjects so as to insure passing them, by the time that he has passed the last required subjects, which may be several years
away from the time that he reviewed and passed the firs subjects, he shall have forgotten the principles and theories contained in those subjects and remembers only those
of the one or two subjects that he had last reviewed and passed. This is highly possible because there is nothing in the law which requires a candidate to continue taking
the Bar examinations every year in succession. The only condition imposed is that a candidate, on this plan, must pass the examination in no more that three installments;
but there is no limitation as to the time or number of years intervening between each examination taken. This would defeat the object and the requirements of the law and
the Court in admitting persons to the practice of law. When a person is so admitted, it is to be presumed and presupposed that he possesses the knowledge and proficiency
in the law and the knowledge of all law subjects required in bar examinations, so as presently to be able to practice the legal profession and adequately render the legal
service required by prospective clients. But this would not hold true of the candidates who may have obtained a passing grade on any five subjects eight years ago, another
three subjects one year later, and the last two subjects the present year. We believe that the present system of requiring a candidate to obtain a passing general average
with no grade in any subject below 50 per cent is more desirable and satisfactory. It requires one to be all around, and prepared in all required legal subjects at the time of
admission to the practice of law.
 xxx xxx xxx

We now come to the last amendment, that of section 16 of Rule 127. This amendment provides that any application who has obtained a general average of 70 per cent in
all subjects without failing below 50 per cent in any subject in any examination held after the 4th day of July, 1946, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the
corresponding oath of office. In other words, Bar candidates who obtained not less than 70 per cent in any examination since the year 1946 without failing below 50 per
cent in any subject, despite their non-admission to the Bar by the Supreme Court because they failed to obtain a passing general average in any of those years, will be
admitted to the Bar. This provision is not only prospective but retroactive in its effects.

We have already stated in our comment on the next preceding amendment that we are not exactly in favor of reducing the passing general average from 75 per cent to 70
per cent to govern even in the future. As to the validity of making such reduction retroactive, we have serious legal doubts. We should not lose sight of the fact that after
every bar examinations, the Supreme Court passes the corresponding resolution not only admitting to the Bar those who have obtained a passing general average grade,
but also rejecting and denying the petitions for reconsideration of those who have failed. The present amendment would have the effect of repudiating, reversing and
revoking the Supreme Court's resolution denying and rejecting the petitions of those who may have obtained an average of 70 per cent or more but less than the general
passing average fixed for that year. It is clear that this question involves legal implications, and this phase of the amendment if finally enacted into law might have to go
thru a legal test. As one member of the Court remarked during the discussion, when a court renders a decision or promulgate a resolution or order on the basis of and in
accordance with a certain law or rule then in force, the subsequent amendment or even repeal of said law or rule may not affect the final decision, order, or resolution
already promulgated, in the sense of revoking or rendering it void and of no effect.

Another aspect of this question to be considered is the fact that members of the bar are officers of the courts, including the Supreme Court. When a Bar candidate is
admitted to the Bar, the Supreme Court impliedly regards him as a person fit, competent and qualified to be its officer. Conversely, when it refused and denied admission
to the Bar to a candidate who in any year since 1946 may have obtained a general average of 70 per cent but less than that required for that year in order to pass, the
Supreme Court equally and impliedly considered and declared that he was not prepared, ready, competent and qualified to be its officer. The present amendment giving
retroactivity to the reduction of the passing general average runs counter to all these acts and resolutions of the Supreme Court and practically and in effect says that a
candidate not accepted, and even rejected by the Court to be its officer because he was unprepared, undeserving and unqualified, nevertheless and in spite of all, must be
admitted and allowed by this Court to serve as its officer. We repeat, that this is another important aspect of the question to be carefully and seriously considered.

The President vetoed the bill on June 16, 1951, stating the following:

I am fully in accord with the avowed objection of the bill, namely, to elevate the standard of the legal profession and maintain it on a high level. This is not achieved,
however, by admitting to practice precisely a special class who have failed in the bar examination, Moreover, the bill contains provisions to which I find serious
fundamental objections.

Section 5 provides that any applicant who has obtained a general average of 70 per cent in all subjects without failing below 50 per cent in any subject in any examination
held after the 4th day of July, 1946, shall be allowed to take and subscribed the corresponding oath of office. This provision constitutes class legislation, benefiting as it
does specifically one group of persons, namely, the unsuccessful candidates in the 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949 and 1950 bar examinations.

The same provision undertakes to revoke or set aside final resolutions of the Supreme Court made in accordance with the law then in force. It should be noted that after
every bar examination the Supreme Court passes the corresponding resolution not only admitting to the Bar those who have obtained a passing general average but also
rejecting and denying the petitions for reconsideration of those who have failed. The provision under consideration would have the effect of revoking the Supreme Court's
resolution denying and rejecting the petitions of those who may have failed to obtain the passing average fixed for that year. Said provision also sets a bad precedent in
that the Government would be morally obliged to grant a similar privilege to those who have failed in the examinations for admission to other professions such as
medicine, engineering, architecture and certified public accountancy.

Consequently, the bill was returned to the Congress of the Philippines, but it was not repassed by 2/3 vote of each House as prescribed by section 20, article VI of the Constitution.
Instead Bill No. 371 was presented in the Senate. It reads as follows:
 AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM 1946 UP TO AND INCLUDING 1953

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 14, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, any bar candidate who obtained a general average of 70 per cent in any bar
examinations after July 4, 1946 up to the August 1951 Bar examinations; 71 per cent in the 1952 bar examinations; 72 per cent in the 1953 bar examinations; 73 per cent
in the 1954 bar examinations; 74 per cent in 1955 bar examinations without a candidate obtaining a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, shall be allowed to take and
subscribe the corresponding oath of office as member of the Philippine Bar; Provided, however, That 75 per cent passing general average shall be restored in all
succeeding examinations; and Provided, finally, That for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-half or more of a fraction, shall be considered as one and included as part
of the next whole number.

SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75 per cent in any subject in any bar examination after July 4, 1945 shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or
subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing general average that said candidate may obtain in any subsequent examinations that he may
take.

SEC. 3. This bill shall take effect upon its approval.

With the following explanatory note:

This is a revised Bar bill to meet the objections of the President and to afford another opportunity to those who feel themselves discriminated by the Supreme Court from
1946 to 1951 when those who would otherwise have passed the bar examination but were arbitrarily not so considered by altering its previous decisions of the passing
mark. The Supreme Court has been altering the passing mark from 69 in 1947 to 74 in 1951. In order to cure the apparent arbitrary fixing of passing grades and to give
satisfaction to all parties concerned, it is proposed in this bill a gradual increase in the general averages for passing the bar examinations as follows; For 1946 to 1951 bar
examinations, 70 per cent; for 1952 bar examination, 71 per cent; for 1953 bar examination, 72 per cent; for 1954 bar examination, 73 percent; and for 1955 bar
examination, 74 per cent. Thus in 1956 the passing mark will be restored with the condition that the candidate shall not obtain in any subject a grade of below 50 per cent.
The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade, is the tremendous handicap which students during the years immediately after the Japanese occupation has
to overcome such as the insufficiency of reading materials and the inadequacy of the preparation of students who took up law soon after the liberation. It is believed that
by 1956 the preparation of our students as well as the available reading materials will be under normal conditions, if not improved from those years preceding the last
world war.

In this will we eliminated altogether the idea of having our Supreme Court assumed the supervision as well as the administration of the study of law which was objected
to by the President in the Bar Bill of 1951.

The President in vetoing the Bar Bill last year stated among his objections that the bill would admit to the practice of law "a special class who failed in the bar
examination". He considered the bill a class legislation. This contention, however, is not, in good conscience, correct because Congress is merely supplementing what the
Supreme Court have already established as precedent by making as low as 69 per cent the passing mark of those who took the Bar examination in 1947. These bar
candidates for who this bill should be enacted, considered themselves as having passed the bar examination on the strength of the established precedent of our Supreme
Court and were fully aware of the insurmountable difficulties and handicaps which they were unavoidably placed. We believe that such precedent cannot or could not
have been altered, constitutionally, by the Supreme Court, without giving due consideration to the rights already accrued or vested in the bar candidates who took the
examination when the precedent was not yet altered, or in effect, was still enforced and without being inconsistent with the principles of their previous resolutions.

If this bill would be enacted, it shall be considered as a simple curative act or corrective statute which Congress has the power to enact. The requirement of a "valid
classification" as against class legislation, is very expressed in the following American Jurisprudence:
 A valid classification must include all who naturally belong to the class, all who possess a common disability, attribute, or classification, and there must be a "natural" and
substantial differentiation between those included in the class and those it leaves untouched. When a class is accepted by the Court as "natural" it cannot be again split and
then have the dissevered factions of the original unit designated with different rules established for each. (Fountain Park Co. vs. Rensier, 199 Ind. 95, N. E. 465 (1926).

Another case penned by Justice Cardozo: "Time with its tides brings new conditions which must be cared for by new laws. Sometimes the new conditions affect the
members of a class. If so, the correcting statute must apply to all alike. Sometimes the condition affect only a few. If so, the correcting statute may be as narrow as the
mischief. The constitution does not prohibit special laws inflexibly and always. It permits them when there are special evils with which the general laws are incompetent
to cope. The special public purpose will sustain the special form. . . . The problem in the last analysis is one of legislative policy, with a wide margin of discretion
conceded to the lawmakers. Only in the case of plain abuse will there be revision by the court. (In Williams vs. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 286 U. S. 36, 77 L.
Ed. 1015, 53 Sup. Ct. 431). (1932)

This bill has all the earmarks of a corrective statute which always retroacts to the extent of the care of correction only as in this case from 1946 when the Supreme Court
first deviated from the rule of 75 per cent in the Rules of Court.

For the foregoing purposes the approval of this bill is earnestly recommended.

(Sgd.) PABLO ANGELES DAVID

Senator

Without much debate, the revised bill was passed by Congress as above transcribed. The President again asked the comments of this Court, which endorsed the following:

Respectfully returned to the Honorable, the Acting Executive Secretary, Manila, with the information that, with respect to Senate Bill No. 371, the members of the Court
are taking the same views they expressed on Senate Bill No. 12 passed by Congress in May, 1951, contained in the first indorsement of the undersigned dated June 5,
1951, to the Assistant Executive Secretary.

(Sgd.) RICARDO PARAS

The President allowed the period within which the bill should be signed to pass without vetoing it, by virtue of which it became a law on June 21, 1953 (Sec. 20, Art. VI,
Constitution) numbered 972 (many times erroneously cited as No. 974).

It may be mentioned in passing that 1953 was an election year, and that both the President and the author of the Bill were candidates for re-election, together, however, they lost in
the polls.

Separate Opinions

LABRADOR, J., concurring and dissenting:

The right to admit members to the Bar is, and has always been, the exclusive privilege of this Court, because lawyers are members of the Court and only this Court should be
allowed to determine admission thereto in the interest of the principle of the separation of powers. The power to admit is judicial in the sense that discretion is used in is exercise.
This power should be distinguished from the power to promulgate rules which regulate admission. It is only this power (to promulgate amendments to the rules) that is given in the
Constitution to the Congress, not the exercise of the discretion to admit or not to admit. Thus the rules on the holding of examination, the qualifications of applicants, the passing
grades, etc. are within the scope of the legislative power. But the power to determine when a candidate has made or has not made the required grade is judicial, and lies completely
with this Court.

I hold that the act under consideration is an exercise of the judicial function, and lies beyond the scope of the congressional prerogative of amending the rules. To say that
candidates who obtain a general average of 72 per cent in 1953, 73 per cent in 1954, and 74 per cent in 1955 should be considered as having passed the examination, is to mean
exercise of the privilege and discretion judged in this Court. It is a mandate to the tribunal to pass candidates for different years with grades lower than the passing mark. No
reasoning is necessary to show that it is an arrogation of the Court's judicial authority and discretion. It is furthermore objectionable as discriminatory. Why should those taking the
examinations in 1953, 1954 and 1955 be allowed to have the privilege of a lower passing grade, while those taking earlier or later are not?

I vote that the act in toto be declared unconstitutional, because it is not embraced within the rule-making power of Congress, because it is an undue interference with the power of
this Court to admit members thereof, and because it is discriminatory.

PARAS, C.J., dissenting:

Under section 145 of Rule of Court No. 127, in order that a bar candidate "may be deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average
of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subject.' This passing mark has always been adhered to, with certain exception presently to be specified.

With reference to the bar examinations given in August, 1946, the original list of successful candidates included only those who obtained a general average of 75 per cent or more.
Upon motion for reconsideration, however, 12 candidates with general averages ranging from 72 to 73 per cent were raised to 75 per cent by resolution of December 18, 1946. In
the examinations of November, 1946 the list first released containing the names of successful candidates covered only those who obtained a general average of 75 per cent or
more; but, upon motion for reconsideration, 19 candidates with a general average of 72 per cent were raised to 75 per cent by resolution of March 31, 1947. This would indicate
that in the original list of successful candidates those having a general average of 73 per cent or more but below 75 per cent were included. After the original list of 1947 successful
bar candidates had been released, and on motion for reconsideration, all candidates with a general average of 69 per cent were allowed to pass by resolution of July 15, 1948. With
respect to the bar examinations held in August, 1948, in addition to the original list of successful bar candidates, all those who obtained a general average of 70 per cent or more,
irrespective of the grades in any one subject and irrespective of whether they filed petitions for reconsideration, were allowed to pass by resolution of April 28, 1949. Thus, for the
year 1947 the Court in effect made 69 per cent as the passing average, and for the year 1948, 70 per cent; and this amounted, without being noticed perhaps, to an amendment of
section 14 of Rule 127.

Numerous flunkers in the bar examinations held subsequent to 1948, whose general averages mostly ranged from 69 to 73 per cent, filed motions for reconsideration invoking the
precedents set by this Court in 1947 and 1948, but said motions were uniformly denied.

In the year 1951, the Congress, after public hearings where law deans and professors, practising attorneys, presidents of bar associations, and law graduates appeared and argued
lengthily pro or con, approved a bill providing, among others, for the reduction of the passing general average from 75 per cent to 70 per cent, retroactive to any bar examination
held after July 4, 1946. This bill was vetoed by the President mainly in view of an unfavorable comment of Justices Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, Bautista and Jugo. In
1953, the Congress passed another bill similar to the previous bill vetoed by the President, with the important difference that in the later bill the provisions in the first bill regarding
(1) the supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court of the study of law, (2) the inclusion of Social Legislation and Taxation as new bar subjects, (3) the publication of the bar
examiners before the holding of the examination, and (4) the equal division among the examiners of all the admission fees paid by bar applicants, were eliminated. This second bill
was allowed to become a law, Republic Act No. 972, by the President by merely not signing it within the required period; and in doing so the President gave due respect to the will
of the Congress which, speaking for the people, chose to repass the bill first vetoed by him.

Under Republic Act No. 972, any bar candidates who obtained a general average of 70 per cent in any examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951; 71 per cent in the 1952
bar examinations; 72 per cent in 1953 bar examinations; 73 per cent in the 1954 bar examinations; and 74 per cent in the 1955 bar examinations, without obtaining a grade below
50 per cent in any subject, shall be allowed to pass. Said Act also provides that any bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75 per cent in any subject in any examination after July
4, 1946, shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing in any subsequent examinations.

Numerous candidates who had taken the bar examinations previous to the approval of Republic Act No. 972 and failed to obtain the necessary passing average, filed with this
Court mass or separate petitions, praying that they be admitted to the practice of law under and by virtue of said Act, upon the allegation that they have obtained the general
averages prescribed therein. In virtue of the resolution of July 6, 1953, this Court held on July 11, 1953 a hearing on said petitions, and members of the bar, especially authorized
representatives of bar associations, were invited to argue or submit memoranda as amici curiae, the reason alleged for said hearing being that some doubt had "been expressed on
the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 972 in so far as it affects past bar examinations and the matter" involved "a new question of public interest."

All discussions in support of the proposition that the power to regulate the admission to the practice of law is inherently judicial, are immaterial, because the subject is now
governed by the Constitution which in Article VII, section 13, provides as follows:

The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said
rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive right. The existing laws on pleading, practice, and procedure
are hereby repealed as statutes and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the
power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.

Under this constitutional provision, while the Supreme Court has the power to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law, the Congress has the power to
repeal, alter or supplement said rules. Little intelligence is necessary to see that the power of the Supreme Court and the Congress to regulate the admission to the practice of law is
concurrent.

The opponents of Republic Act No. 972 argue that this Act, in so far as it covers bar examinations held prior to its approval, is unconstitutional, because it sets aside the final
resolutions of the Supreme Court refusing to admit to the practice of law the various petitioners, thereby resulting in a legislative encroachment upon the judicial power. In my
opinion this view is erroneous. In the first place, resolutions on the rejection of bar candidates do not have the finality of decisions in justiciable cases where the Rules of Court
expressly fix certain periods after which they become executory and unalterable. Resolutions on bar matters, specially on motions for reconsiderations filed by flunkers in any give
year, are subject to revision by this Court at any time, regardless of the period within which the motion were filed, and this has been the practice heretofore. The obvious reason is
that bar examinations and admission to the practice of law may be deemed as a judicial function only because said matters happen to be entrusted, under the Constitution and our
Rules of Court, to the Supreme Court. There is no judicial function involved, in the subject and constitutional sense of the word, because bar examinations and the admission to the
practice of law, unlike justiciable cases, do not affect opposing litigants. It is no more than the function of other examining boards. In the second place, retroactive laws are not
prohibited by the Constitution, except only when they would be ex post facto, would impair obligations and contracts or vested rights or would deny due process and equal
protection of the law. Republic Act No. 972 certainly is not an ex post facto enactment, does not impair any obligation and contract or vested rights, and denies to no one the right
to due process and equal protection of the law. On the other hand, it is a mere curative statute intended to correct certain obvious inequalities arising from the adoption by this
Court of different passing general averages in certain years.

Neither can it be said that bar candidates prior to July 4, 1946, are being discriminated against, because we no longer have any record of those who might have failed before the
war, apart from the circumstance that 75 per cent had always been the passing mark during said period. It may also be that there are no pre-war bar candidates similarly situated as
those benefited by Republic Act No. 972. At any rate, in the matter of classification, the reasonableness must be determined by the legislative body. It is proper to recall that the
Congress held public hearings, and we can fairly suppose that the classification adopted in the Act reflects good legislative judgment derived from the facts and circumstances then
brought out.
As regards the alleged interference in or encroachment upon the judgment of this Court by the Legislative Department, it is sufficient to state that, if there is any interference at all,
it is one expressly sanctioned by the Constitution. Besides, interference in judicial adjudication prohibited by the Constitution is essentially aimed at protecting rights of litigants
that have already been vested or acquired in virtue of decisions of courts, not merely for the empty purpose of creating appearances of separation and equality among the three
branches of the Government. Republic Act No. 972 has not produced a case involving two parties and decided by the Court in favor of one and against the other. Needless to say,
the statute will not affect the previous resolutions passing bar candidates who had obtained the general average prescribed by section 14 of Rule 127. A law would be objectionable
and unconstitutional if, for instance, it would provide that those who have been admitted to the bar after July 4, 1946, whose general average is below 80 per cent, will not be
allowed to practice law, because said statute would then destroy a right already acquired under previous resolutions of this Court, namely, the bar admission of those whose general
averages were from 75 to 79 per cent.

Without fear of contradiction, I think the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power conferred by the Constitution, may pass a resolution amending section 14 of Rule
127 by reducing the passing average to 70 per cent, effective several years before the date of the resolution. Indeed, when this Court on July 15, 1948 allowed to pass all candidates
who obtained a general average of 69 per cent or more and on April 28, 1949 those who obtained a general average of 70 per cent or more, irrespective of whether they filed
petitions for reconsideration, it in effect amended section 14 of Rule 127 retroactively, because during the examinations held in August 1947 and August 1948, said section (fixing
the general average at 75 per cent) was supposed to be in force. In stands to reason, if we are to admit that the Supreme Court and the Congress have concurrent power to regulate
the admission to the practice of law, that the latter may validly pass a retroactive rule fixing the passing general average.

Republic Act No. 972 cannot be assailed on the ground that it is unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, since this Court had already adopted as passing averages 69 per cent for the
1947 bar examinations and 70 per cent for the 1948 examinations. Anyway, we should not inquire into the wisdom of the law, since this is a matter that is addressed to the
judgment of the legislators. This Court in many instances had doubted the propriety of legislative enactments, and yet it has consistently refrained from nullifying them solely on
that ground.

To say that the admission of the bar candidates benefited under Republic Act 972 is against public interest, is to assume that the matter of whether said Act is beneficial or harmful
to the general public was not considered by the Congress. As already stated, the Congress held public hearings, and we are bound to assume that the legislators, loyal, as do the
members of this Court, to their oath of office, had taken all the circumstances into account before passing the Act. On the question of public interest I may observe that the
Congress, representing the people who elected them, should be more qualified to make an appraisal. I am inclined to accept Republic Act No. 972 as an expression of the will of
the people through their duly elected representatives.

I would, however, not go to the extent of admitting that the Congress, in the exercise of its concurrent power to repeal, alter, or supplement the Rules of Court regarding the
admission to the practice of law, may act in an arbitrary or capricious manner, in the same way that this Court may not do so. We are thus left in the situation, incidental to a
democracy, where we can and should only hope that the right men are put in the right places in our Government.

Wherefore, I hold that Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional and should therefore be given effect in its entirety.

Separate Opinions

LABRADOR, J., concurring and dissenting:

The right to admit members to the Bar is, and has always been, the exclusive privilege of this Court, because lawyers are members of the Court and only this Court should be
allowed to determine admission thereto in the interest of the principle of the separation of powers. The power to admit is judicial in the sense that discretion is used in is exercise.
This power should be distinguished from the power to promulgate rules which regulate admission. It is only this power (to promulgate amendments to the rules) that is given in the
Constitution to the Congress, not the exercise of the discretion to admit or not to admit. Thus the rules on the holding of examination, the qualifications of applicants, the passing
grades, etc. are within the scope of the legislative power. But the power to determine when a candidate has made or has not made the required grade is judicial, and lies completely
with this Court.

I hold that the act under consideration is an exercise of the judicial function, and lies beyond the scope of the congressional prerogative of amending the rules. To say that
candidates who obtain a general average of 72 per cent in 1953, 73 per cent in 1954, and 74 per cent in 1955 should be considered as having passed the examination, is to mean
exercise of the privilege and discretion judged in this Court. It is a mandate to the tribunal to pass candidates for different years with grades lower than the passing mark. No
reasoning is necessary to show that it is an arrogation of the Court's judicial authority and discretion. It is furthermore objectionable as discriminatory. Why should those taking the
examinations in 1953, 1954 and 1955 be allowed to have the privilege of a lower passing grade, while those taking earlier or later are not?

I vote that the act in toto be declared unconstitutional, because it is not embraced within the rule-making power of Congress, because it is an undue interference with the power of
this Court to admit members thereof, and because it is discriminatory.

PARAS, C.J., dissenting:

Under section 145 of Rule of Court No. 127, in order that a bar candidate "may be deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average
of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subject.' This passing mark has always been adhered to, with certain exception presently to be specified.

With reference to the bar examinations given in August, 1946, the original list of successful candidates included only those who obtained a general average of 75 per cent or more.
Upon motion for reconsideration, however, 12 candidates with general averages ranging from 72 to 73 per cent were raised to 75 per cent by resolution of December 18, 1946. In
the examinations of November, 1946 the list first released containing the names of successful candidates covered only those who obtained a general average of 75 per cent or
more; but, upon motion for reconsideration, 19 candidates with a general average of 72 per cent were raised to 75 per cent by resolution of March 31, 1947. This would indicate
that in the original list of successful candidates those having a general average of 73 per cent or more but below 75 per cent were included. After the original list of 1947 successful
bar candidates had been released, and on motion for reconsideration, all candidates with a general average of 69 per cent were allowed to pass by resolution of July 15, 1948. With
respect to the bar examinations held in August, 1948, in addition to the original list of successful bar candidates, all those who obtained a general average of 70 per cent or more,
irrespective of the grades in any one subject and irrespective of whether they filed petitions for reconsideration, were allowed to pass by resolution of April 28, 1949. Thus, for the
year 1947 the Court in effect made 69 per cent as the passing average, and for the year 1948, 70 per cent; and this amounted, without being noticed perhaps, to an amendment of
section 14 of Rule 127.

Numerous flunkers in the bar examinations held subsequent to 1948, whose general averages mostly ranged from 69 to 73 per cent, filed motions for reconsideration invoking the
precedents set by this Court in 1947 and 1948, but said motions were uniformly denied.

In the year 1951, the Congress, after public hearings where law deans and professors, practising attorneys, presidents of bar associations, and law graduates appeared and argued
lengthily pro or con, approved a bill providing, among others, for the reduction of the passing general average from 75 per cent to 70 per cent, retroactive to any bar examination
held after July 4, 1946. This bill was vetoed by the President mainly in view of an unfavorable comment of Justices Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, Bautista and Jugo. In
1953, the Congress passed another bill similar to the previous bill vetoed by the President, with the important difference that in the later bill the provisions in the first bill regarding
(1) the supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court of the study of law, (2) the inclusion of Social Legislation and Taxation as new bar subjects, (3) the publication of the bar
examiners before the holding of the examination, and (4) the equal division among the examiners of all the admission fees paid by bar applicants, were eliminated. This second bill
was allowed to become a law, Republic Act No. 972, by the President by merely not signing it within the required period; and in doing so the President gave due respect to the will
of the Congress which, speaking for the people, chose to repass the bill first vetoed by him.

Under Republic Act No. 972, any bar candidates who obtained a general average of 70 per cent in any examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951; 71 per cent in the 1952
bar examinations; 72 per cent in 1953 bar examinations; 73 per cent in the 1954 bar examinations; and 74 per cent in the 1955 bar examinations, without obtaining a grade below
50 per cent in any subject, shall be allowed to pass. Said Act also provides that any bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75 per cent in any subject in any examination after July
4, 1946, shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing in any subsequent examinations.

Numerous candidates who had taken the bar examinations previous to the approval of Republic Act No. 972 and failed to obtain the necessary passing average, filed with this
Court mass or separate petitions, praying that they be admitted to the practice of law under and by virtue of said Act, upon the allegation that they have obtained the general
averages prescribed therein. In virtue of the resolution of July 6, 1953, this Court held on July 11, 1953 a hearing on said petitions, and members of the bar, especially authorized
representatives of bar associations, were invited to argue or submit memoranda as amici curiae, the reason alleged for said hearing being that some doubt had "been expressed on
the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 972 in so far as it affects past bar examinations and the matter" involved "a new question of public interest."

All discussions in support of the proposition that the power to regulate the admission to the practice of law is inherently judicial, are immaterial, because the subject is now
governed by the Constitution which in Article VII, section 13, provides as follows:

The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said
rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive right. The existing laws on pleading, practice, and procedure
are hereby repealed as statutes and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the
power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.

Under this constitutional provision, while the Supreme Court has the power to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law, the Congress has the power to
repeal, alter or supplement said rules. Little intelligence is necessary to see that the power of the Supreme Court and the Congress to regulate the admission to the practice of law is
concurrent.

The opponents of Republic Act No. 972 argue that this Act, in so far as it covers bar examinations held prior to its approval, is unconstitutional, because it sets aside the final
resolutions of the Supreme Court refusing to admit to the practice of law the various petitioners, thereby resulting in a legislative encroachment upon the judicial power. In my
opinion this view is erroneous. In the first place, resolutions on the rejection of bar candidates do not have the finality of decisions in justiciable cases where the Rules of Court
expressly fix certain periods after which they become executory and unalterable. Resolutions on bar matters, specially on motions for reconsiderations filed by flunkers in any give
year, are subject to revision by this Court at any time, regardless of the period within which the motion were filed, and this has been the practice heretofore. The obvious reason is
that bar examinations and admission to the practice of law may be deemed as a judicial function only because said matters happen to be entrusted, under the Constitution and our
Rules of Court, to the Supreme Court. There is no judicial function involved, in the subject and constitutional sense of the word, because bar examinations and the admission to the
practice of law, unlike justiciable cases, do not affect opposing litigants. It is no more than the function of other examining boards. In the second place, retroactive laws are not
prohibited by the Constitution, except only when they would be ex post facto, would impair obligations and contracts or vested rights or would deny due process and equal
protection of the law. Republic Act No. 972 certainly is not an ex post facto enactment, does not impair any obligation and contract or vested rights, and denies to no one the right
to due process and equal protection of the law. On the other hand, it is a mere curative statute intended to correct certain obvious inequalities arising from the adoption by this
Court of different passing general averages in certain years.

Neither can it be said that bar candidates prior to July 4, 1946, are being discriminated against, because we no longer have any record of those who might have failed before the
war, apart from the circumstance that 75 per cent had always been the passing mark during said period. It may also be that there are no pre-war bar candidates similarly situated as
those benefited by Republic Act No. 972. At any rate, in the matter of classification, the reasonableness must be determined by the legislative body. It is proper to recall that the
Congress held public hearings, and we can fairly suppose that the classification adopted in the Act reflects good legislative judgment derived from the facts and circumstances then
brought out.

As regards the alleged interference in or encroachment upon the judgment of this Court by the Legislative Department, it is sufficient to state that, if there is any interference at all,
it is one expressly sanctioned by the Constitution. Besides, interference in judicial adjudication prohibited by the Constitution is essentially aimed at protecting rights of litigants
that have already been vested or acquired in virtue of decisions of courts, not merely for the empty purpose of creating appearances of separation and equality among the three
branches of the Government. Republic Act No. 972 has not produced a case involving two parties and decided by the Court in favor of one and against the other. Needless to say,
the statute will not affect the previous resolutions passing bar candidates who had obtained the general average prescribed by section 14 of Rule 127. A law would be objectionable
and unconstitutional if, for instance, it would provide that those who have been admitted to the bar after July 4, 1946, whose general average is below 80 per cent, will not be
allowed to practice law, because said statute would then destroy a right already acquired under previous resolutions of this Court, namely, the bar admission of those whose general
averages were from 75 to 79 per cent.

Without fear of contradiction, I think the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power conferred by the Constitution, may pass a resolution amending section 14 of Rule
127 by reducing the passing average to 70 per cent, effective several years before the date of the resolution. Indeed, when this Court on July 15, 1948 allowed to pass all candidates
who obtained a general average of 69 per cent or more and on April 28, 1949 those who obtained a general average of 70 per cent or more, irrespective of whether they filed
petitions for reconsideration, it in effect amended section 14 of Rule 127 retroactively, because during the examinations held in August 1947 and August 1948, said section (fixing
the general average at 75 per cent) was supposed to be in force. In stands to reason, if we are to admit that the Supreme Court and the Congress have concurrent power to regulate
the admission to the practice of law, that the latter may validly pass a retroactive rule fixing the passing general average.

Republic Act No. 972 cannot be assailed on the ground that it is unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, since this Court had already adopted as passing averages 69 per cent for the
1947 bar examinations and 70 per cent for the 1948 examinations. Anyway, we should not inquire into the wisdom of the law, since this is a matter that is addressed to the
judgment of the legislators. This Court in many instances had doubted the propriety of legislative enactments, and yet it has consistently refrained from nullifying them solely on
that ground.

To say that the admission of the bar candidates benefited under Republic Act 972 is against public interest, is to assume that the matter of whether said Act is beneficial or harmful
to the general public was not considered by the Congress. As already stated, the Congress held public hearings, and we are bound to assume that the legislators, loyal, as do the
members of this Court, to their oath of office, had taken all the circumstances into account before passing the Act. On the question of public interest I may observe that the
Congress, representing the people who elected them, should be more qualified to make an appraisal. I am inclined to accept Republic Act No. 972 as an expression of the will of
the people through their duly elected representatives.

I would, however, not go to the extent of admitting that the Congress, in the exercise of its concurrent power to repeal, alter, or supplement the Rules of Court regarding the
admission to the practice of law, may act in an arbitrary or capricious manner, in the same way that this Court may not do so. We are thus left in the situation, incidental to a
democracy, where we can and should only hope that the right men are put in the right places in our Government.

Wherefore, I hold that Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional and should therefore be given effect in its entirety.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
 EN BANC

A.C. No. L-1117 March 20, 1944

THE DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, complainant,

vs.
ESTANISLAO R. BAYOT, respondent.

Office of the Solicitor General De la Costa and Solicitor Feria for complainant.
Francisco Claravall for respondent.

OZAETA, J.:

The respondent, who is an attorney-at-law, is charged with malpractice for having published an advertisement in the Sunday Tribune of June 13, 1943, which reads as follows:

Marriage

license promptly secured thru our assistance & the annoyance of delay or publicity avoided if desired, and marriage arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation on any
matter free for the poor. Everything confidential.

Legal assistance service

12 Escolta, Manila, Room, 105
Tel. 2-41-60.

Appearing in his own behalf, respondent at first denied having published the said advertisement; but subsequently, thru his attorney, he admitted having caused its publication and
prayed for "the indulgence and mercy" of the Court, promising "not to repeat such professional misconduct in the future and to abide himself to the strict ethical rules of the law
profession." In further mitigation he alleged that the said advertisement was published only once in the Tribune and that he never had any case at law by reason thereof.

Upon that plea the case was submitted to the Court for decision.

It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the
public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The
lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public. As a member of the
bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worth and effective advertisement possible,
even for a young lawyer, . . . is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of
character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.)

In In re Tagorda, 53 Phil., the respondent attorney was suspended from the practice of law for the period of one month for advertising his services and soliciting work from the
public by writing circular letters. That case, however, was more serious than this because there the solicitations were repeatedly made and were more elaborate and insistent.

Considering his plea for leniency and his promise not to repeat the misconduct, the Court is of the opinion and so decided that the respondent should be, as he hereby is,
reprimanded.
Yulo, C.J., Moran, Horrilleno, Paras and Bocobo, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 2756 November 12, 1987

PRUDENTIAL BANK, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE JOSE P. CASTRO and ATTY. BENJAMIN M. GRECIA, respondents.

PER CURIAM:

On April 11, 1985, the late Pio Pedrosa, former President of complainant Prudential Bank, filed this Administrative Complaint praying that Judge Jose P. Castro, former Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City, Branch LXXXV, be disciplinarily dealt with and that Disbarment proceedings be instituted against respondent Atty. Benjamin
M. Grecia.

This Decision deals only with the Disbarment Case against Respondent Grecia, the Complaint as against respondent Judge Castro having been decided by this Court en banc on
June 5, 1986.

The Complaint alleges, among others:

xxx xxx xxx

3. In 1976, 1979 and 1983, Macro Textile Mills Corporation (MACRO for short) applied for and was granted credit facilities by the bank secured by real estate
mortgages.

4. MACRO having repeatedly defaulted on its obligations, the bank finally applied for extrajudicial foreclosure of its mortgages over TCT No. 261842. The sale
was conducted, consummated and registered in the day book of the register of deeds and annotated on the title itself.

5. On August 2, 1984, MACRO through Atty. Mario E. Valderrama filed a complaint for annulment of mortgage and to enjoin foreclosure.

6. On August 6, 1984, MACRO through new counsel here respondent Benjamin M. Grecia filed an amended complaint alleging and claiming P50,000,000.00
actual and compensatory damages and P20,000,000. 00 as value of the mortgaged property.
7. On the same day, August 6, 1984, respondent Judge Jose P. Castro issued an order restraining the register of deeds of Quezon City "from acting on, and
completing by affixing his signature on, the assailed registration of the sale at public auction of the mortgage property described under TCT No. 261842 subject
of this action"

xxx xxx xxx

8. On the same day, August 6, 1984, respondent Judge Jose P. Castro also issued an order of attachment of the properties of the bank "to the value of the said
demands of costs of suit.. ...

9. The writ of attachment having been attempted to be executed against the bank, the bank posted on August 16, 1984 a P10 million bond to discharge it and filed
a motion to discharge attachment without prejudice. Respondent judge never acted on said bond or motion.

10. On August 10, 1984, the day scheduled for the hearing of respondent MACRO's application for pre injunction, the bank filed a motion to discharge
restraining order and opposition to application for preliminary injunction and attachment. Respondent judge never resolved the motion nor approved the bond.

11. For the filing of the complaint, the clerk of court collected only the amount of P210.00 evidenced by Official Receipt Nos. 6328484 and 6328645 both dated
August 2, 1984. ...

Since the original complaint interposed a P50 million claim for damages and sought the annulment of mortgage over a property worth several millions although
its value was not stated and since the amended complaint increased the claim for damages to P70 million and also sought the annulment of mortgage over a
property now stated to be worth P20 million, the bank filed a motion on August 15, 1984 to collect the proper filing fees which at least should have been
P139,900.00. Despite motions to resolve dated August 17, September 3 and October 26, 1984, respondent Judge Jose P. Castro took no action whatsoever.

11. Respondent Judge Jose P. Castro rendered on November 16, 1984 (notice received November 26, 1984) summary judgment annulling the bank's mortgage
and ordering the bank to pay P30 million as actual damages and P3 million as exemplary damages plus 20% attorneys' fees for respondent Atty. Benjamin M.
Grecia-despite opposition. ...

xxx xxx xxx

12. On February 7, 1985, respondent Judge Jose P. Castro issued an order denying the bank's 19-page (excluding affidavits) motion for reconsideration as pro-
forma and on February 13, 1985 an order granting MACRO's motion for execution of his summary judgment as final and executory on the ground that the
allegedly pro forma motion for reconsideration did not toll the running of the period of appeal.

xxx xxx xxx

(b) He issued that writ of execution notwithstanding the timely filing by petitioner of a notice of appeal.

The bank's counsel having received notice of the order denying their motion for reconsideration on February 13, 1985, on that same day of their receipt of said
notice, the bank filed their notice of appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court-though it still had four (4) days left of its 15-day period of appeal.

(c) Worse, the execution of said writ of execution was attempted on a Friday, at 3:55 P.M., with a demand for the moneys of the bank's tellers rather than for
other assets.
 At 3:55 P.M., Friday, February 15, 1985, the sheriff accompanied by MACRO's Atty. Benjamin Grecia (respondent here) and several other deputy sheriffs and
men swooped down on the bank's branches and principal office to enforce the writ of execution dated February 14, 1985. They demanded delivery to them of all
available cash money but, it having been closing house, the tellers had already brought their cash to the vaults which were then closed. They thereupon took the
boxes and coin counters, adding machines, typewriters, etc. and set them near the doors of the bank. At past midnight, they left with notice that they would
resume execution on Monday morning at the principal office of the bank and its branches.

With those boxes, coin counters, adding machines, typewriters, etc. sequestered, the bank and its branches would not be able to service depositors and clients
next Monday-and feared that if it could not service its depositors and clients a 'run' might occur.

Fortunately, the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 69907 intervened that early Monday morning with a restraining order.

xxx xxx xxx

16. Attached hereto as Annex "N" hereof is a list of other cases involving other parties which show a 'joint venture' between respondent Judge Jose P. Castro and
respondent Atty. Benjamin M. Grecia.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Supreme Court order the investigation of respondents Judge Jose P. Castro and Atty. Benjamin M. Grecia. 1

Answering the charge for disbarment, Respondent Grecia avers, inter alia: (1) that the facts and proceedings alleged in the complaint do not constitute any of the recognized
grounds for disbarment besides the fact that they are the very subject matter of the appeal taken to the Court of Appeals in AC-G.R. CV No. 05611 still pending thereat, so that the
complaint is improper and premature; (2) that the charge is purely and plainly an unfounded grievance of a party which lost its case in the Trial Court against the lawyer of the
party which prevailed in that case and is intended merely to harass, embarrass and degrade him and to deprive him of his livelihood; (3) that the collection of the docket fee is an
act within the province of the clerk of court which cannot be imputed to respondent nor serve as a ground for his disbarment; (4) that the "list of other cases involving other parties
... show a 'joint venture' between respondents is an empty and a gratuitous conclusion, an unjust, improper and insupportable accusation, which renders the complaint insufficient
and, consequently dismissible," nine (9) out of the fourteen (14) cases in the list being cases of other lawyers, and that the proper parties to make the charge of a "joint venture"
being the parties in the "other cases;" and (5) that in almost thirty (30) years of law practice, respondent has not once betrayed his oath of office but has observed photographic
fidelity to the Canons of Legal Ethics.

On May 8, 1986, Respondent Grecia filed a Motion to Dismiss Disbarment Complaint and for Early Resolution of the Case on the ground that the Decision of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on April 23, 1986 in AC-G.R. No. 05611 (Case No. Q-42349 of the RTC of Quezon City) entitled "Macro Textiles Mills Corp., Plaintiff-Appellee vs. Prudential Bank
& Trust Co., et al., Defendants-Appellants" "conclusively sustained and upheld the facts involved and proceedings taken in Case No. Q-42349; overruled the arguments advanced
by the complainant bank against said facts and proceedings; and with the exception of a modification of the sums of damages and attorney's fees awarded to Macro, affirmed the
decision of the trial court."

On June 5, 1986, the Court en banc rendered a Per Curiam Decision as against respondent Judge Jose P. Castro, which is quoted in full below in order to furnish the proper
backdrop to the Disbarment Case against Respondent Grecia.

Prudential Bank (Complainant Bank) instituted this administrative case on April 11, 1985, praying this Court to investigate Respondent Judge Jose P. Castro,
presiding over Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch LXXXV, Quezon City, (Respondent Judge), and Atty. Benjamin M. Grecia
(Respondent Grecia), in connection with their actuations in a civil case (the RTC CASE), tried and decided by Respondent Judge and where plaintiff was
represented by Respondent Grecia.
The RTC CASE was entitled "Macro Textile Mills Corporation, Plaintiff, vs. Prudential Bank & Trust Co., AKA The Prudential Bank and Benjamin Baens del
Rosario, Notary Public for Quezon City, Defendants." Plaintiff in the RTC CASE shall hereinafter be referred to simply as MACRO. It was the registered owner
of a 19,493 sq. m lot in Quezon City, covered by TCT No. 261842 (the 'MACRO PROPERTY'), alleged to have a value of about P20 million.

What has been prayed for by Complainant Bank is the exercise by this Court of its power to discipline Respondent Judge, and the initiation of proceedings for the
disbarment or suspension of Respondent Grecia.

Based on documents submitted to this Court, the relevant facts upon which this Resolution is based may be stated as follows:

1. The President and General Manager of MACRO is named Go Cun Uy. He is also a partner of, or a signatory for, a partnership named Galaxy Tricot
Manufacturing Co. (GALAXY, for short ).

2. As of January 24, 1983, MACRO and GALAXY, together, were indebted to Complainant Bank in the principal sum of P9,510,000.00

3. On the said date of January 24, 1983, MACRO, through o Cun Uy, executed a mortgage over the MACRO PROPERTY (notarized" on January 26, 1983) in
favor of Complainant Bank to guarantee the then, as well as future, obligations of MACRO and/or GALAXY in favor of the mortgage.

4. More than a year after, or on April 11, 1984, Complainant Bank sent a letter of demand to MACRO/GALAXY demanding payment of their pending
obligations in the total sum of Pl1,629,503.92 exclusive of interest.

5. On July 12, 1984, Benjamin Baens del Rosario, as a Notary public for Quezon City, issued a "Notice of Sale By Notary," scheduled for August 6, 1984, for the
extra-judicial foreclosure sale of the MACRO PROPERTY.

6. On August 2, 1984, MACRO filed the complaint in the RTC CASE through Atty. Mario E. Valderama, alleging principally that Go Cun Uy had no authority
to mortgage the MACRO PROPERTY and that his execution of the mortgage was due to fraudulent manipulations of Complainant Bank. The Complaint further
stated that MACRO was entitled "to actual damages amounting to at least P50,000,000.00 as well as to compensatory damages." Preliminary attachment was
prayed for on 'so much of the properties of defendant Bank and defendant Notary as may be sufficient to satisfy any judgment that may be rendered against them.

7. Four days thereafter, or on August 6, 1984, the Complaint was amended over the signature of Respondent Grecia. The amendments are of no substantial
relevance to this Resolution. The same prayer for preliminary attachment was reiterated.

8. On the same date of August 6, 1984, Respondent Judge, stating that the sale had not taken place on that date, issued an Order temporarily restraining the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City from registering any Deed of Sale of the MACRO PROPERTY.

9. Respondent Judge then resolved the RTC Case through a summary judgment rendered on November 16, 1984. In the Decision, the mortgage of the MACRO
PROPERTY was declared null and void, and Complainant Bank and Notary Public del Rosario were ordered to pay MACRO more than P33 million in damages
plus 20% attorney's fees.

10. Further, paragraph 2 of the dispositive part of the Decision provided as follows:

2. The Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel immediately the registration and annotation of the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage dated January 26, 1983, as
well a its foreclosure, notice of sale and certificate of sale on the Original Transfer Certificate of Title No. 261842;
The foregoing paragraph 2 is of primary relevance to this Resolution. What will be noted therein is that the owner's duplicate of TCT No. 261842, still in the
possession of Complainant Bank, was not declared cancelled. The continued existences of that owner's duplicate could prevent the registration of a sale of the
MACRO PROPERTY without it being surrendered to the Register of Deeds as the law requires the production of the owner's duplicate certificate whenever any
voluntary instrument is presented for registration (Sec. 53, P.D. No, 1529, the Property Registration Decree).

11. On December 7, 1984, Complainant Bank filed a Motion reconsideration of the summary judgment.

12. Without ruling on Complainant Bank's Motion for Reconsideration, Respondent Judge, in an Order dated January 7, 1985, amended paragraph 2 of his
Decision, by directing the Register of Deeds of Quezon City

... to cancel immediately the registration of the Deed of real estate mortgage dated January 24, 1983 on the back of TCT No. 261842 pursuant to the aforesaid
decision, and to issue in favor of the plaintiff another owner's copy of said transfer certificate of title after said cancellation, in lieu of the copy in the possession
of the defendant-bank which is hereby deemed cancelled.

The amendment of paragraph 2 ordered the cancellation of the owner's duplicate of TCT No. 261842, in the possession of Complainant Bank, and the issuance
of a new owner's duplicate of said TCT to MACRO. Thus, MACRO was placed in a position to dispose of the MACRO PROPERTY.

13. (a) Seven days thereafter, or on January 14. 1985, MACRO sold the MACRO PROPERTY to Falconi Marketing and Manufacturing, Inc. (FALCONI, for
short) for P6 million.

(b) On January 15, 1985, TCT No. 261842 was cancelled and TCT No. 326740 was issued in the name of FALCONI.

14. On February 7, 1985, Respondent Judge denied Complainant and Bank's Motion for Reconsideration 'not only for being pro forma but also for lack of merit.'
Upon receipt of the corresponding Order on February 13, 1985, Complainant Bank filed a notice of appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court.

15. Consequent to the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Complainant Bank, Respondent Judge, in his Order of February 13, 1985, considered his
Decision in the RTC CASE to be final and ordered the issuance of a Writ of Execution, which also constituted a denial of Complainant Bank's appeal.

16. (a) On February 18, 1985, Complainant Bank came to this Court on Mandamus/Certiorari (G.R. No. 69907), asking that Respondent Judge be ordered to
allow its appeal from the Decision rendered in the RTC CASE to the Intermediate Appellate Court and to annul the Order and Writ of Execution he had
previously issued.

(b) Probably because of the Order of this Court restraining execution of the Decision in the RTC CASE, Respondent Judge, on March 13, 1985, gave course to
the appeal of Complainant Bank to the Intermediate Appellate Court.

17. (a) On April 1, 1985, Complainant Bank caused a Notice of Lis Pendens to be annotated on FALCONI's title.

(b) In G.R. No. 69907, this Court, on May 31, 1985, set aside the Resolution of January 7, 1985 of Respondent Judge.

(c) On June 26, 1985, the Acting Register of Deeds of Quezon City denied the request of Complainant Bank, invoking this Court's resolution in G.R. No. 69907,
for the cancellation of TCT No. 326740 in the name of FALCONI.
(d) Sometime in June, 1985, FALCONI instituted a Complaint against Complainant Bank and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City for the cancellation of the
Notice of Lis Pendens on its TCT No. 326740, which case is pending before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch LXXXVI.

(e) On September 23, 1985, this Court in G.R. No. 69907, ordered the Register of Deeds (i) to cancel the new owner's DUPLICATE OF TCT No. 261842; (ii) to
restore the old TCT No. 261842, with the annotated mortgage lien in favor of Complainant Bank; and (iii) to cancel TCT No. 326740 in the name of FALCONI

Nothing in this Resolution should be construed as a determination of a factual issue in the controversy between Complainant Bank and MACRO in the RTC
CASE, which is now pending before the Intermediate Appellate Court. This Resolution deals only with the steps taken by Respondent Judge in regards to the
RTC CASE when he was still acting on it. Considered in the light of the facts related above, we find he had committed serious and grave misfeasance in
connection with his actuations in the said RTC CASE in that:

(a) In both original and amended Complaints in the RTC CASE, it was apparent that MACRO was suing for an amount of at least P50 million. On the very date
of August 6, 1984, when the Amended Complaint was filed, which was only four days after the original Complaint was instituted, Respondent Judge was already
aware, per his Order of attachment, that MACRO "in its verified complaint and affidavit," was asking defendants "to pay the sum of P50,000,000.00 as actual
and compensatory damages which plaintiff seeks to recover from defendant in this case.

In the original and amended Complaints, the prayers did not ask for damages specifically in the sum of more than P50 million, clearly in order to avoid payment
of filing fees of more than P100,000.00. The filing fee actually paid was only P210.00.

Ordinarily, a Trial Judge may be excused from immediately noting a mistake made by the Clerk of Court in assessing filing fees. However, considering
Respondent Judge's realization of the mistake, on August 6, 1984, the date he issued his Order for preliminary attachment, and his actuations thereafter in the
RTC CASE, his failure to require payment of the correct amount of filing fees indicated his partiality towards, not to say confabulation with, MACRO and/or its
lawyers.

(b) The summary judgment was ill-conceived. For one thing, the Amended Complaint had charged Complainant Bank with fraud and deceit. Under the law, good
faith is to be presumed, and the fraud and deceit imputed to Complainant Bank cannot be other than a question of fact, which should have been resolved after due
reception of evidence pro and contra. There was nothing in the Answer, and in its pleadings in connection with MACRO's Motion for summary judgment, which
could indubitably be deemed an admission, or proof, of Complainant Bank's alleged fraud and deceit. Respondent Judge's statements to the contrary are bereft of
veracity.

Worse errors have been committed by Trial Judges but, in the RTC CASE, the erroneous promulgation of the summary judgment indicates, in the light of the
entire scenario, that the error was deliberate in order to favor plaintiff, or that it was in actual confabulation with plaintiff and its lawyers.

(c) The issuance of the summary judgment was bad enough. The grant therein of damages in the amount of more than P33 million, plus 20% attorney's fees,
when the property involved in the litigation was alleged in the amended complaint (Annex "F") as 20 million (sold to FALCONI for 6 million) immediately
raises the thought that Respondent Judge had really taken a stand of partiality in favor of MACRO and its lawyers.

(d) The Order of January 7, 1985 of Respondent Judge also shows his partiality to, or his confabulation with MACRO and the latter's lawyers.

The summary judgment was rendered on November 16, 1984, and notice thereof was served on Complainant Bank on November 26, 1984. The latter filed a
Motion for Reconsideration on December 6, 1984. If, as Respondent Judge has ruled, the Motion for Reconsideration was pro forma, the summary judgment
became final on December 11, 1984. Respondent Judge, therefore, would no longer have authority to amend his Decision on January 7, 1985. When the Motion
for Reconsideration was denied on February 7, 1985, Respondent Judge should also have set aside his Order of January 7, 1985 amending the summary
 judgment. It can now become clear that deferment of action on Complainant Bank's Motion for Reconsideration was precisely for the purpose of allowing
amendment of the Decision on January 7, 1985.

The Order of January 7, 1985 was set aside in G.R. No. 69907. It is now for us to state herein that Respondent Judge, in issuing such Order, clearly intended to
favor MACRO by allowing it to sell, as it did sell, the MACRO property to FALCONI on January 14, 1985.

(e) Respondent Judge, in his Order of March 13, 1985, gave course to the appeal of Complainant Bank although he had already ruled that the latter had lost the
right of appeal. That Order of March 13, 1985 was issued after Complainant Bank had instituted G.R. No. 69907 on February 19, 1985, asking that Respondent
Judge be ordered to allow its appeal from the summary judgment. The Order of March 13, 1985 was clearly intended to render G.R. No. 69907 moot and
academic. Said Order was disrespectful of this Court. If at all Respondent Judge should have come to this Court in said G.R. No. 69907, to ask for leave to allow
the appeal of Complainant Bank with admission that he had realized that his previous denial of the appeal was erroneous. And it may be recalled that, in De Leon
VS. Castro, 104 SCRA 241 (1981), this Court had occasion to state that Respondent Judge's 'submission of false certificate of service under Section 5 of the
Judiciary Law is not excusable

WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES:

l. Respondent Judge is hereby ordered dismissed from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and pay and which prejudice to reinstatement in any
branch of the government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities. This decision is immediately executory.

2. The Complaint for disbarment and suspension of respondent Atty. Benjamin M. Grecia is hereby referred to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation. Let the relevant pleadings in this case in regards to Respondent GRECIA, and relevant pleadings as well as the Decision in G.R. No. 69907 be
furnished the Solicitor General for the purpose.

SO ORDERED. 2

Pursuant to paragraph 2 of the dispositive portion of the Decision above-quoted, the Disbarment Case was referred to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation.

On March 4, 1987, this Court received the Solicitor General's Report recommending:

WHEREFORE, for lack of evidence, it is respectfully recommended that the disbarment case against respondent be dismissed.

The recommendation of dismissal was predicated on the principal findings 1) that complainant failed to prove with preponderant evidence that Respondent Grecia and Judge
Castro had an existing "unholy alliance or joint venture" in disposing of the Macro Case in favor of MACRO; 2) that based on the pleadings submitted by complainant "it cannot
be definitely established that any deliberate misrepresentation was committed much less who, specifically, had perpetrated it" since "the motion for summary judgment and the
amended complaint involved were filed by two collaborating lawyers, namely, respondent and Atty. Mario Valderrama," who however, has not been charged "for unknown
reasons;" and (3) "on the matter of the non-payment of the correct amount of filing fees, no evidence was presented by complainant to prove that respondent was responsible for
such omission or for that matter that he did not encourage and compel his client to pay the right amount."

The Court resolves differently, however (Sec. 4, Rule 139). As pointed out in the Per Curiam Decision of this Court against respondent Judge, partiality and confabulation are
clearly discernible from the actuations of respondents in the Macro Case.

In the original Complaint filed on August 2, 1984 by Atty. Valderrama and in the Amended Complaint filed on August 6, 1984 over the signature of Respondent Grecia in the
Macro Case, the prayers were silent as to the amount of damages being demanded, clearly in order to avoid payment of filing fees of approximately P139,000.00. The filing fee
actually paid was only in the amount of P210.00. Complainant Bank filed a Motion for the collection of the proper filing fees but Respondent Judge denied the same only on
November 19, 1984 after the summary judgment had been rendered on November 16, 1984 and despite the three Motions to Resolve filed by Complainant Bank on August 17,
October 26, and September 3, all in 1984. 3 The reason for the denial was that the certification of the Clerk of Court as to the correct amount of the docket fee to be paid by plaintiff
was not submitted and for "lack of merit and for being moot and academic. 4

Respondent Grecia filed the Amended Complaint on August 6, 1984, and on the same day Respondent Judge issued an Order of Attachment. A P10M bond had to be posted by
Complainant Bank to discharge it accompanied by a Motion to Discharge Attachment, which Respondent Judge, resolved on August 21, 1984.

The summary judgment was rendered by Respondent Judge on November 16, 1984 despite the allegation of fraud and deceit in the Complaint, thereby resulting in the avoidance
of trial and the presentation of witnesses, and the Bank was ordered to pay P30M as actual damages, P3M as exemplary damages plus 20% attorney's fees when the property
involved in the litigation was alleged in the Amended Complaint as P20M (and was sold to Falconi for P6M).

Complainant Bank filed a Motion for Reconsideration of that Decision on December 7, 1984 but Respondent Judge did not rule on it and instead amended that judgment on
January 1985 by directing the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to issue another owner's copy of the transfer certificate of title in MACRO's favor in lieu of the owner's copy in the
possession of Complainant Bank, which was deemed cancelled. Thereby MACRO was placed in a position to dispose of the mortgaged property, which it sold on January 14, 1985
to Falconi Marketing and Manufacturing, Inc., for P6M.

Respondent Judge denied the Motion for Reconsideration only on February 7, 1985 for being pro forma Complainant Bank filed a Notice of Appeal on February 13, 1985. On the
same day, February 13, 1985, Respondent Judge considered the Summary Judgment final and ordered the issuance of a Writ of Execution notwithstanding the timely notice of
appeal filed by Complainant Bank Execution was implemented two (2) days thereafter, or on February 15, 1985 at 3:55 P.M., with Respondent Grecia included in the group, which
went to the Bank premises to enforce execution, leaving said place "at past midnight."

With the issuance of the Writ of Execution, which also constituted the denial of the appeal, Respondent Judge had foreclosed Complainant Bank's right to appeal had it not been
for the Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 69907 promulgated on May 31,1985 entitled "Prudential Bank, et al. vs. Hon. Jose P. Castro, Macro Textile Mills Corporation, et al.,"
ordering Respondent Judge to give due course to the appeal.

Respondents' foregoing actuations reveal an "unholy alliance" between them and a clear indication of partiality for the party represented by the other to the detriment of the
objective dispensation of justice. Writs of Attachment and Execution were issued and implemented with lightning speed; the case itself was railroaded to a swift conclusion
through a summary judgment; astronomical sums were awarded as damages and attorney's fees; and topping it all, the right to appeal was foreclosed by clever maneuvers.

The Court also takes judicial notice of a strikingly similar modus operandi followed in "Manchester Development Corporation, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, Cityland Development
Corporation, et als. (G.R. No. 75919, May 7, 1987; Civil Case No. Q-43867, RTC Quezon City), where the original complaint was filed by the same Atty. Mario E. Valderrama
and was originally pending before Respondent Judge's Sala. Thus he staggering sum claimed in the Complaint of about P78M but the clear attempt to limit the filing fees to
P410.00 by the simple expedient of limiting the prayer to such sums of money as "may be duly proved during the trial;" the fraud alleged in the complaint; the issuance of a writ of
attachment by Respondent Judge the day after the filing of the Complaint after the approval of a P10M bond issued by Stronghold Insurance Co., a company blacklisted in Quezon
City; the immediate implementation of the attachment the day after its issuance with the garnishment of the operating funds of Cityland, and the denial by Respondent Judge of the
Motion to Strike Out Complaint filed by Cityland for the reasons that the insufficiency of the filing fee is not a ground for dismissal citing Magaspi vs. Ramolete (115 SCRA 193)
and that the action was one for specific performance. If respondent Judge was unable to see the case to completion, and perhaps resolve it in the same manner as he did the Macro
Case, it was only by reason of the reraffle ordered by this Court of that case, with 22 others, to all the Regional Trial Court Judges of Quezon City, "with the exception of
Respondent Judge," in this Court's Resolution of June 18,1985 in Adm. Matter No. 85-6-7899-RTC.

While it was Atty. Valderrama, who was counsel of record in the Manchester case, considering the striking similarity in the pattern of the cases he and Respondent Grecia handled,
signing either singly or as co-counsel (as in the Amended Complaint, 5 and in the Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration in the Macro Case), 6 a close collaboration
between them is evident. In actual fact, a joint venture did exist between Macro and Manchester known as the Macro Manchester Realty Corporation. 7
The Court takes further judicial notice of other cases where a similar modus operandi particularly in respect of astronomical sums claimed but minimal docket fees paid, is
apparent, with one of the parties represented by either Respondent Grecia or Atty. Valderrama, and the common denominator being that the cases pended before Respondent
Judge. A summary of those cases was made in a Report, dated October 2, 1985, to the Acting Court Administrator Arturo Buena submitted by then Executive Judge Ernani Cruz
Patio in Case No. AM 85-10-8752-RTC as a consequence of a letter complaint of Atty. Antonio Bautista in connection with the Manchester case.

Thus, in Civil Case No. Q-35093, RTC, Quezon City, entitled "Ocean Park Development Corporation vs. Kumho Construction & Engineering, Inc.," which was also pending
before Respondent Judge, with counsel for plaintiff therein being Respondent Grecia, for "Trespass or Destruction, Illegal Occupation of Real Property with Damages and Writ of
Attachment and Injunction," the body of the complaint alleged that defendant therein had inflicted damages on the plaintiff in the total sum of approximately P13M but the prayer
merely asked for payment of "such sums as may be proved during the trial." The filing fee paid was P200.00.

In Civil Case No. Q-41177, RTC, Quezon City, entitled "Manuel Chua Uy Po Tiong vs. Sun Insurance Office Ltd." (incidentally, the President of Manchester is the same Manuel
Chua Uy Po Tiong for "Sum of Money, Damages with Writ of Preliminary Attachment" for alleged fraudulent cancellation of an insurance policy issued by defendant therein, the
body of the complaint mentioned the damages suffered by plaintiff in the amount of around P30-M, but again the prayer asked for the payment of "such amounts as may be proved
during the trial" and the filing fee paid was P200.00. The original complaint was filed by Atty. Valderrama while Respondent Grecia filed the Amended Complaint therein. The
case was before Respondent Judge's Sala.

In Civil Case No. Q-41229, RTC, Quezon City, entitled Kumho Construction & Engineering, Inc. vs. Atty. Vicente E. del Rosario" the body of the complaint claimed damages in
the sum of P3M but, true to form, the prayer asked for "such sums as may be proved during the trial" and the filing fee paid was P200.00. Counsel for Kumho was Atty. Mario E.
Valderrama; the Court before which the case was pending was that of Respondent Judge, who, by the way, also rendered a summary judgment therein.

The modus operandi in the foregoing cases, taken cognizance of by this Court either judicially or administratively, reveal the hidden maneuvers of a nefarious network, with
respondents as the prime movers. Those cases sufficiently provide the basis for the determination of respondents' administrative liability without need for further inquiry into the
matter under the principle of res ipsa loquitur (People vs. Hon. Manuel Valenzuela, G.R. Nos. L-63950-60, April 19, 1985, 135 SCRA 712; Resolution, In The Matter Of
Proceedings For Disciplinary Action Against Atty. Wenceslao Laureta, etc., in G.R. No. 68635, entitled "Eva Maravilla Ilustre vs. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.," May
14, 1987). The imposition of disciplinary sanctions against respondents is warranted as we were already constrained to do in respect of Respondent Judge. Their questionable
operations have blotted the image of both Bench and Bar and have been inimical to public interest and welfare. Their unethical misdeeds call for the supreme sanction. Indeed,
those actuations would have passed unnoticed but for this Administrative Complaint filed by a highly respected member of the business community, and the disclosure by
concerned colleagues in the profession appalled by respondents' anomalous actuations in a string of cases.

Respondent Grecia has been proven to be lacking in fidelity to his oath of office essential to his continuance as an attorney-at-law.

The affirmance on April 23, 1986 by the Court of Appeals in AC G. R. CV No. 0561 1 * of the Summary Judgment rendered by Respondent Judge in the Macro Case, for which
reason, Respondent Grecia had moved to dismiss this case against him on May 8, 1986 is not a ground for the dismissal of this Disbarment Case, the said Decision not having
attained finality besides the fact that the issue herein is the fitness of Respondent Grecia to continue in the practice of law.

WHEREFORE, respondent Benjamin M. Grecia is hereby DISBARRED for having proven himself unfit to continue in the pursuit of the profession.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Sarmiento, J, took no part.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 94-1-061-SC March 29, 1995

ATTY. JOAQUIN YUSECO and BENJAMIN GRECIA, complainants,

vs.
DEPUTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR JUANITO A. BERNAD, respondent.

MENDOZA, J.:

This complaint was filed by Atty. Joaquin Yuseco and Benjamin Grecia against Deputy Court Administrator Juanito A. Bernad, charging him with suppressing facts and making
false statements in his report to the Court in the disbarment case against complainant Grecia for the purpose of causing injury to him (Grecia).

The complaint for disbarment against Grecia was filed by Doctors Alberto Fernandez, Isabelo Ongtengco and Achilles Bartolome and the St. Luke's Medical Center who charged
him with dishonesty and grave misconduct in connection with the theft of some pages of a medical chart used in evidence in a damage suit1 filed by Grecia's clients against the
doctors and the hospital. The disbarment case2 was assigned to respondent Bernad for investigation, report and recommendation. 3 On December 18, 1992,4 respondent submitted
report in which Bernad found therein respondent Benjamin Grecia guilty of the charges. Bernad refrained from recommending the penalty but instead left the matter to the Court to
determine, observing that whether the penalty should be disbarment or suspension, the two are "severe forms of disciplinary action [which] should be resorted to only in cases
where a lawyer demonstrates an attribute or course of conduct wholly inconsistent with approved professional standard." 5

On June 17, 1993, the Court rendered a decision in which it adopted the findings of respondent and ordered the disbarment of complainant Benjamin Grecia.6

Grecia filed a motion for new investigation and reconsideration but his motion was denied by the Court in its resolution of August 12, 1993.7 He later sought reconsideration.

Grecia also moved for the reconsideration of the resolution of July 27, 1993 which denied his motion for extension to file a motion for reconsideration and directed the entry of
final judgment. But in its resolution of October 19, 1993,8 the Court denied both motions of the complainant and reiterated its resolution directing entry of final judgment.

Benjamin Grecia and his counsel in the disbarment case, Atty. Joaquin Yuseco, thereafter filed this complaint for "falsification by a public officer" as defined in Art. 171 of the
Revised Penal Code and for violation of 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Rep Act. No. 3019) with the Office of the Ombudsman. This Court, taking cognizance
of the complaint against Deputy Court Administrator Juanito A. Bernad, required him to comment.

On August 25, 1994, the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the complaint on the ground that it was based on matters already decided by this Court in the disbarment case.
Complainants charge respondent with (1) submitting a report and recommendation to this Court in the disbarment case without furnishing complainant Benjamin Grecia with a
copy thereof; (2) falsifying his written report by narrating facts which are absolutely false; (3) deliberately not revealing his relationship with former Chief Justice Marcelo Fernan,
whose brother-in-law, Atty. Pompeyo Nolasco of the Quasha law firm, is the counsel for complainant-doctors in the disbarment case as well as in Civil Case No. 3548-V-91 which
Grecia had filed against the doctors and the hospital.

We have considered the grounds of the complaint and found them to be without merit. Accordingly we have resolved to dismiss the complaint.

First. Respondent had no duty to complainant to furnish him a copy of his report in the disbarment case. That report was submitted to the Court solely for its use.9 It was the
decision of the Court, in connection with which the report was required, that complainant Grecia, as respondent in the disbarment proceeding, was entitled to receive. What was
important was that he was given a copy of the Court's decision ordering his disbarment and not that a copy of respondent's report be furnished to him.

Second. Complainants cite fourteen (14) cases or instances in which respondent allegedly made false statements in his report to the Court. These instances, however, are the same
ones cited in complainant Grecia's motion for new investigation and reconsideration which this Court denied way back on August 12, 1993.

This is shown by the following table, with indication of the corresponding pages of the complaint and the Motion for New Investigation and Reconsideration filed in the
disbarment case (Adm. Case No. 3694).

Page No. Page No.

No. Allegations against Bernad OMB-93- Adm. Case
3223 No. 3694
1 ATTY. GRECIA HAS NO REASON 5(A) 14(B.2)
OR MOTIVE TO REMOVE OR
DETACH THE ALLEGED PAGES 72
AND 73 OF THE MEDICAL CHART
BECAUSE THE ENTRIES AND
CONTENTS THEREOF ARE
MATERIAL AND FAVORABLE TO
THE CLAIM OF HIS CLIENTS
AGAINST COMPLAINANTS.
2 THE CORRUPT PRACTICES AND 7(B) 10(A.1)
UNHOLY ALLIANCE OF JUDGE
BERNAD.
3 MASSIVE SUPPRESSION OF 9(C) 16(C)
WHOLE BODY OF EVIDENCE
DECISIVE OF THE INNOCENCE
OF ATTY. GRECIA.
4 JUDGE BERNAD SUPPRESSED AND 21(D) 28(C.9)
WITHHELD FROM THE COURT THE
STRONG AND POSITIVE DECLARA-
 TION OF JUDGE TERESITA
CAPULONG THAT ATTY. GRECIA
WAS NOT PRESENT WHEN THE
ALLEGED INCIDENT HAPPENED
AND THAT SHE DID NOT ASK HIM
TO EXPLAIN ANYTHING.
5 JUDGE BERNAD SUPPRESSED AND 22(E) 30(C.10)
WITHHELD FROM THE COURT THE
ADMISSION OF COMPLAINANTS'
LAWYER, ATTY. BU CASTRO, THAT
HE WAS THE ONE WHO BORROWED
THE MEDICAL CHART AND NOT
ATTY. GRECIA.
6 JUDGE BERNAD SUPPRESSED THE 25(F) 32(C.11)
FACT THAT THERE WAS NO
CONFUSION AND THAT THE MAN
FROM WHOM JUDGE CAPULONG
ALLEGEDLY GOT THE PAGES OF
MEDICAL RECORD STAYED IN THE
COURTROOM FOR SOMETIME BUT
NEITHER THE CLERK, THE JUDGE
NOR THE LAWYERS OF THE
COMPLAINANTS CAUSED HIS
ARREST, FILED A MOTION FOR
CONTEMPT OR GOT HIS NAME
AND FULL IDENTITY.
7 JUDGE BERNAD CRIMINALLY 29(G) 36(C.12)
SUPPRESSED AND WITHHELD
THE FACT THAT NO COMPLAINT
AND NO AFFIDAVIT WAS FILED
IN THE CASE AND THAT THE
RECORDS OF CIVIL CASE NO.
3548-V-91 DO NOT CONTAIN ANY
REPORT, AFFIDAVIT OR
COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION
ON AN ALLEGED UNTOWARD
 INCIDENT.
8 JUDGE BERNAD SUPPRESSED 31(H) 38(C.13)
THE FACT THAT LONG AFTER
THE ALLEGED INCIDENT, THE
QUASHA LAW OFFICE GOT
BACK THE MEDICAL CHART
WITHOUT ANY PROTEST OR
RESERVATION THAT ANY
PAGE OR PAGES THEREOF WERE
LOST, DETACHED, TORN OR
CRUMPLED.
9 JUDGE BERNAD DID NOT EXERT 32(I) 39(C.14)
EFFORT TO HAVE THE MYSTERY
MAN PRODUCED BEFORE HIM
SO HE CAN BE CONFRONTED. HE
ALONE CAN PROVE WHAT PAPER
OR PAPERS WERE GIVEN TO HIM
AND WHO GAVE IT TO HIM.
10 EVIDENCE OF SIMILAR ACT OF 37(J) 39(C.15)
PLANTING EVIDENCE BY THE
QUASHA LAW OFFICE WAS
SUPPRESSED BY JUDGE BERNAD.
11 THE POLICE HAS RECENTLY 37(K) 2
GOTTEN HOLD OF THIS
EXTREMELY VITAL WITNESS,
THE "UNIDENTIFIED MAN"
MENTIONED IN THE DECISION
OF THE SUPREME COURT.
12 JUDGE BERNAD SUPPRESSED 43(L) 43(C.16)
AND DID NOT INCLUDE IN HIS
FINDINGS THE FOLLOWING
FACTS WHICH ARE DECIDEDLY
DESTRUCTIVE OF HIS
ABSOLUTELY FALSE FINDINGS
OF FACTS: No one identified pages
72 and 73 of the medical chart as the
 one detached; pages 72 and 73 were
not yet marked as exhibits of any party
on July 16, 1991; no evidence was
offered to link respondent to the
unidentified man, etc.
13 JUDGE BERNAD FAILED TO HAVE 51(M) 51(D)
THE MAN TO WHOM THE
ALLEGED PAGES OF THE MEDICAL
REPORT WERE ALLEGEDLY
HANDED LOCATED AND BROUGHT
TO HIM FOR QUESTIONING.
14 EVIL MOTIVE BEHIND THE 52(N) 9(A)
COMPLAINT AGAINST ATTY.
GRECIA.

Indeed, Grecia's complaint is nothing but an attempt to circumvent the resolution of this Court declaring the decision in the disbarment case final.

Third. What complainants must know is that while the Court in the disbarment case agreed with much of what was contained in the report of the Deputy Court Administrator, it did
so only after it had examined the record of the case and found the report to be in accordance with the evidence. To the extent that the Court agreed with the findings of respondent,
his findings became those of the Court and complainants have no basis for charging suppression of material facts. Indeed, "the Court assumes full responsibility for all its acts. Its
personnel cannot answer and should not be made to answer for acts of the Court." 10 It is presumptuous for complainants to presume that because of alleged omissions and
suppression of material facts in the report the Court was thereby misled in its decision.

The truth is that even a cursory examination of the grounds alleged in the present complaint will show the utter baselessness of the charges. Complainants' allege

[1] Respondent did not include or mention in the slightest degree the contents and handwritten entries in the stolen pages which show beyond doubt that they
were favorable to Grecia's clients.

This allegation is made in an effort to show that Grecia had no motive in stealing the pages. This defense might be considered if there was no evidence that Grecia had been seen
removing the pages. But the fact is that two witnesses, who are personnel of the RTC in which the case was being heard, pointed to Grecia as the person who had removed two
pages of the medical chart.

[2] Respondent suppressed the testimony of Judge Capulong that Grecia was not present when the incident happened.

Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong, before whom the case was pending at the time of the incident, did not testify that complainant was not present at the time of the incident. What she
said was that she "could not see Atty. Grecia" during the confrontation with the unidentified person found in possession of the stolen pages. Judge Capulong's testimony did not
exculpate Grecia. To the contrary, according to Judge Capulong, it was either Mrs. Avelina Robles, from whom Grecia allegedly got the medical chart, or Ms. Sandico, another
court personnel who saw Grecia tear off the pages, who reported to her that Grecia had pulled pages of the medical record. 11
 [3] Respondent suppressed the fact that it was the lawyers of complainants in the disbarment case who had secured a falsified document and passed it off as the
missing pages which were recovered from an unidentified person.

There was no credible evidence presented in the disbarment proceedings to prove this allegation. The alleged discrepancy with respect to appearance and numbering of the stolen
pages between the original copies and the photocopies was more apparent than real. It was mentioned in respondent's report but given no weight in view of the satisfactory
explanation given by the personnel of St. Luke's who prepared the original copy and caused the numbering of the pages to be made in accordance with standard procedure. 12

[4] Respondent suppressed the material contradictions in the testimony of the two court personnel and the inherent impossibility of their testimony due to the
arrangement of the chairs, tables, desk, etc., that completely obstructed their view and sight. Respondent also wrongfully withheld pictures which show their
relative positions.

Contrary to complainants' claim, there were no material contradictions in the testimonies of the court personnel. Their testimonies were spontaneous and direct to the point, which
make them credible and truthful.13 On the other hand, the pictures submitted by Grecia do not show that the witnesses could not have seen him in the act of detaching the pages.
The arrangement of the chairs, tables and desks did not obstruct the view of the inside of the court. Anyone sitting on any of the chairs could easily be seen from any part of the
court.

[5] Respondent suppressed the admission of Mrs. Robles on cross-examination that she did not see Grecia removing the pages from the medical record.

The records contain no such admission by Mrs. Robles. Nowhere in the report of the hearings conducted, particularly the hearing of August 4, 1992 when Mrs. Robles testified,
does it appear that Mrs. Robles contradicted her earlier testimony that she had seen Grecia removing two pages of the medical chart. To the contrary, together with Ms. Sandico,
Mrs. Robles stoutly maintained that it was Grecia who had detached the pages.

[6] Respondent suppressed and withheld from the court the admission of complainants' lawyer, Atty. Bu Castro, that he was the one who borrowed the medical
chart and not Atty. Grecia.

It was unnecessary to mention this considering that according to Mrs. Robles, the official custodian of the report, both Atty. Castro and Grecia had separately borrowed the report.
What was important was that there was direct testimony as to who was responsible for tearing off the pages.

[7] Respondent suppressed the fact that there was no confusion and that the man from whom Judge Capulong allegedly got the pages of the medical record
stayed in the courtroom for sometime but neither the clerk, the judge nor the lawyers of the complainants caused his arrest, filed a motion for contempt, or got his
name and full identity.

This is not true. The removal of pages of the medical report created a commotion in the court as a result of which Mrs. Robles fainted and she had to be taken to the hospital. The
records show this happened after the stolen pages had been recovered and the incident was reported to the police at the instance of Judge Capulong. Mrs. Robles, Ms. Sandico and
Judge Capulong gave testimonies about the incident to respondent Bernad at the hearing of the disbarment case.

[8] Respondent criminally suppressed and withheld the fact that no complaint and no affidavit was filed in the case and that the records of Civil Case No. 3548-
V-91 do not contain any report, affidavit or complaint or information on the alleged untoward incident.

There was no evidence in the record of the disbarment case to show the supposed lack of complaint against Grecia or the unidentified person as a result of the incident.
Accordingly no such "fact" could have been mentioned in the report. Nor was it material that there was allegedly no complaint made of the attempt to destroy evidence by the
removal of certain pages of the medical record. Judge Capulong explained that she and the court personnel were so unnerved by the incident that they failed to get the name of the
person from whom they recovered the missing pages and charge him in court. The Judge testified, however, that she instructed Ms. Sandico to report the matter to the police.
Nor is there truth to the claim of the complainants that no report or information regarding the incident was mentioned in the damage suit, Civil Case No. 3548-V-91. In her orders
dated July 16, 1991 and July 23, 1991, Judge Capulong specifically mentioned the "untoward incident" which she explained in her testimony to be the incident involving the
tearing off of pages of the medical chart.

[9] Respondent suppressed the fact that long after the alleged incident, the Quasha Law Office got back the medical chart without any protest or reservation that
any page or pages thereof were lost, detached, torn or crumpled.

Whether the medical record was intact and received by the law office without protest that it was not complete is immaterial to the charge against complainant Grecia. The issue
against him was the removal, not the recovery, of the pages in question.

[10] Respondent did not exert effort to have the mystery man produced before him so he can be confronted. He alone can prove what paper or papers were given
to him and who gave it to him. He did not seek the help of the National Bureau of Investigation to find the unidentified person.

Respondent did not have a duty to bring the unidentified man before him. That was the duty of the parties to the case. His job was to make findings on the basis of evidence
submitted to him. On the basis of such evidence Grecia was found to have torn off the pages and later given them to the unknown person.

[11] Respondent withheld evidence of similar act of planting evidence by the Quasha Law Office.

This is not true. On page 15 of his report respondent stated:

These statements of Atty. Yuseco were controverted by the lawyers from the Quasha Law Office who asserted that in the Tan Ping Hok case, there was no
eyewitness to sustain the charge of evidence planting, while in the instant case, there are two eyewitnesses who are judicial personnel and whose integrity as
witnesses was never doubted nor put in issue by both parties.

[12] Respondent suppressed and did not include in his findings the following facts which are decidedly destructive of his absolutely false findings of facts:

a. No one identified the stolen pages as the ones which had been detached.

This allegation is false. At the hearing held on August 4, 1992, the pages were identified by Mrs. Robles as those which had been filched by Grecia and later recovered from the
unidentified person. They were marked as Exhibits A and B. 14

b. The testimony of Damaso Aves that he saw Atty. Castro holding the medical record and later hand a piece of paper to the unidentified
person.

The testimony of Aves was accounted for in respondent's report, although respondent did not give it much weight for the following reason stated in his report:

Assuming arguendo that the unidentified man accosted and confronted by Judge Capulong was the man actually seen by Atty. Aves receiving the questioned
papers from Atty. Castro, it is rather surprising why Atty. Aves did not mention such incident to Judge Capulong during the meeting in her chambers. And
instead of simply insisting that nobody, but nobody, took interest in detaining the unidentified man and establishing his identity, why did not Atty. Aves take
such initiative considering that he has as much interest in establishing the identity of that person? Moreover, from among those concerned, he alone had the
opportunity to observe that the unidentified man was still present in the courtroom even after the confrontation in the chamber of Judge Capulong.
 [13] Respondent failed to reveal the evil motive behind the complaint against Grecia. This motive originated from Grecia's successful cross-examination of the
doctors who were the defendants in the case for damages from whom damaging admissions were elicited.

This was mentioned although again it was not believed by respondent. On page 15 of his report, respondent Bernad stated:

On the purported scheme to destroy respondent Atty. Grecia, this has something to do with the hearing on June 24, 1991 where the latter succeeded in calling Dr.
Alberto Fernandez to the witness stand as his hostile witness and allegedly elicited from him damaging admissions over the vigorous objections of Atty. Bu
Castro. A perusal of the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the hearing (Exhibits "E to E-42", pp. 219 to 261, ibid) do not, however, show such fiasco.

Fourth. Complainants allege that respondent Bernad is a close personal friend of Atty. Pompeyo Nolasco, counsel of the complainants in the disbarment case against Grecia, and
that because of this Bernad's objectivity and impartiality were in "grave doubt and in serious question."

Atty. Nolasco is a brother-in-law of former Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan. While acknowledging his gratitude to the former Chief Justice for appointing him to his present
position, respondent denies that he is beholden to the former Chief Justice or that he maintains "fellowship" with him and Atty. Nolasco. As respondent points out, the fact was that
the disbarment case was assigned to him three months after Chief Justice Fernan had retired from the Court. Indeed, aside from this allegation, there is no evidence in the record to
support the charge of complainants.

In conclusion, we find no basis for the charge that respondent suppressed material facts in his report which this Court adopted in its decision disbarring complainant Grecia. What
complainants charge as suppressions in the report are in reality omissions of facts which in the exercise of sound judgment were found to be immaterial. Complainants confuse
appreciation of evidence with suppression of facts. The so-called omissions are the inevitable result of the evaluation of the evidence the sifting of the grain from the chaff
rather that the suppression of truth.

WHEREFORE, the complaint is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Kapunan and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Narvasa, C.J. and Vitug, J., took no part.

EN BANC

February 7, 2017

G.R. No. 187257

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL (OSG) as the PEOPLE'S TRIBUNE, and the NATIONAL
POWER BOARD, Petitioners
vs.
HON. LUISITO G. CORTEZ, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 84, Quezon City, ABNER P. ELERIA, MELITO B. LUPANGCO, NAPOCOR
EMPLOYEES CONSOLIDATED UNION (NECU), and NAPOCOR EMPLOYEES AND WORKERS UNION (NEWU), Respondents

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 187776

ROLANDO G. ANDAYA, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management and member of the Board of Directors of the National Power
Corporation, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. LUISITO G. CORTEZ, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 84, Quezon City, ABNER P. ELERIA, MELITO B. LUPANGCO, NAPOCOR
EMPLOYEES CONSOLIDATED UNION and NAPOCOR EMPLOYEES AND WORKERS UNION, Respondents.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

The implementation of Republic Act No. 6758 resulted in the integration of all allowances previously received, including Cost of Living Allowance and Amelioration Allowance,
into the basic standardized salary. When a government entity ceases to be covered by Republic Act No. 6758, the new position classification and compensation plan must also
include all allowances previously received in the basic salary, in line with the principle of non-diminution of pay.

This is a consolidated case resulting from a Petition for Mandamus filed by the president of the National Power Corporation Employees Consolidated Union (NECU) and the
president of the National Power Corporation Employees and Workers Union (NEWU) before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 84, Quezon City.1 The Petition sought to direct the
National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR), its President and its Board of Directors to release and pay the Cost of Living Allowance (COLA) and Amelioration Allowance (AA) to
all NAPOCOR employees beginning July 1, 1989 to March 16, 1999. 2 The Petition for Mandamus was granted by the trial court and the NAPOCOR was ordered to pay a total of
6,496,055,339.98 as back payment for COLA and AA with an additional 704,777,508.60 as legal interest. 3

NAPOCOR was created under Commonwealth Act No. 1204 as a government-owned and controlled corporation. Under the law, its National Power Board was authorized to fix the
compensation of its officers and employees.5

In 1976, a salary standardization and compensation plan for public employees, including that of government-owned and controlled corporations, was enacted through Presidential
Decree No. 985.6 The Decree likewise provided that notwithstanding the standardization and compensation plan, additional incentives may be established by government-owned
and controlled corporations from their corporate funds. 7 Pursuant to the Decree, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Letter of Implementation No. 97, 8 granting additional
financial incentives to employees of government-owned and controlled corporation performing critical functions, among which was NAPOCOR.9 The additional incentives
included COLA and AA.10

On August 21, 1989, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6758, or the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, to standardize compensation and benefits of public
employees, effective July 1, 1989.11 The law applied to all positions, whether appointive or elective, including those in government-owned and controlled corporations.12 The law
also provided that all allowances and other additional compensation not otherwise stated "shall be deemed included" 13 in the prescribed standardized salary rates. Section 12 reads:

Section 12. Consolidation of Allowances and Compensation. - All allowances, except for representation and transportation allowances; clothing and laundry allowances;
subsistence allowance of marine officers and crew on board government vessels and hospital personnel; hazard pay; allowances of foreign service personnel stationed abroad; and
such other additional compensation not otherwise specified herein as may be determined by the DBM, shall be deemed included in the standardized salary rates herein prescribed.
Such other additional compensation, whether in cash or in kind, being received by incumbents only as of July 1, 1989 not integrated into the standardized salary rates shall
continue to be authorized.

Existing additional compensation of any national government official or employee paid from local funds of a local government unit shall be absorbed into the basic salary of said
official or employee and shall be paid by the National Government.

On October 2, 1989, the Department of Budget and Management issued Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10 (DBM-CCC No. 10),14 which provided for the integration of
COLA, AA, and other allowances into the standardized salaries of public employees effective November 1, 1989. 15

On April 5, 1993, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7648, or the Electric Power Crisis Act of 1993, allowing the President of the Philippines to upgrade the compensation of
NAPOCOR employees "at rates comparable to those prevailing in privately-owned power utilities[.]"16

Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7648, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Memorandum Order No. 198 17providing for a different position classification and compensation plan for
NAPOCOR employees to take effect on January 1, 1994.18

On August 12, 1998, this Court promulgated De Jesus v. Commission on Audit,19 which found DBM-CCC No. 10 ineffective for lack of publication in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation.20 Thus, the circular only became effective on March 16, 1999.21

In Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) Employees Hired After July 1, 1989 v. Commission on Audit,22 this Court recognized that the ineffectivity of DBM-CCC No. 10 from July 1,
1989 to March 16, 1999 created a "legal limbo" wherein the COLA and AA were "not effectively integrated into the standardized salaries."23 Hence, during the period of the legal
limbo, affected employees would be entitled to receive the two allowances:

To stress, the failure to publish DBM-CCC No. 10 meant that the COLA and the amelioration allowance were not effectively integrated into the standardized salaries of the PPA
employees as of July 1, 1989. The integration became effective only on March 16, 1999. Thus, in between those two dates, they were still entitled to receive the two allowances.24

On December 28, 2007, Abner P. Eleria, president of NECU, and Melito B. Lupanggo, president of NEWU, filed a Petition for Mandamus with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 84, praying that NAPOCOR be ordered to release the COLA and AA due them. 25 NECU and NEWU filed their Motion for Leave of Court to file a Petition-
in-Intervention, which was granted by the trial court on March 14, 2008. 26 The trial court consolidated the petitions and treated them as a class suit.27

NECU and NEWU alleged that they requested NAPOCOR to release their COLA and AA on March 12, 2006.28NAPOCOR subsequently created a Committee29 "to study ... the
grant of [the] additional allowances[.]" 30

On May 28, 2007, the Committee issued a Certification that the COLA and AA were not integrated into the salaries of NAPOCOR employees hired from July 1, 1989 to March 16,
1999.31 NAPOCOR "thereafter referred the matter to the Department of Budget and Management[.]" 32

On September 18, 2007, then Secretary of Budget and Management Rolando Andaya, Jr. (Secretary Andaya, Jr.) wrote a letter to NAPOCOR stating that the determination of
whether the COLA and AA were factually integrated rested with it since the payment of the allowances did not require the prior approval of the Budget and Management
Secretary.33

NECU and NEWU again requested the release of their COLA and AA pursuant to Secretary Andaya, Jr.'s letter. NAPOCOR again referred the matter to the Committee for further
study. Due to the continued refusal of NAPOCOR to release the allowances, NECU and NEWU were constrained to file the Petition for Mandamus. 34

In its Consolidated Comment before the trial court, the Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of NAPOCOR, alleged that the Notice of Position Allocation and Salary
Adjustment (NPASA) of employees should be examined to find out if the COLA and AA were nevertheless integrated into the salaries despite the ineffectivity of DBM-CCC No.
10. The affected employees must also show that they suffered a diminution of pay as a result of its implementation. The Office of the Solicitor General likewise pointed out that the
COLA and AA were not among those allowances specifically excluded in Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6758 and thus were deemed to have been included in the standardized
salary rates.35

In their Reply with Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings before the trial court, NECU and NEWU submitted the following documents to prove right to COLA and AA:

a. Letter of [NPC President] Del Callar dated October 9, 2007 categorizing the workers/employees of the NAPOCOR into three groups, viz:

a. l NPC employees who were incumbent as of June 30, 1989 are no longer entitled to their COLA and AA from July 1, 1989 to December 31, 1993 since said allowances have
been factually integrated into their salaries but entitled to COLA and AA from January 1, 1994 to March 15, 1999;

a.2 NPC employees hired between July 1, 1989 and December 31, 1993 are entitled to COLA and AA since said benefits were not factually integrated into their salaries from their
date of employment up to March 15, 1999; and

a.3 NPC employees as of January 1, 1994 to March 15, 1999 are entitled to COLA and AA from their date of employment up to March 15, 1999.

b. Certification issued by Mr. Alexander P. Japon, NPC's Senior Finance Department Manager dated April 22, 2008 admitting its obligation to pay COLAs and AAs due the NPC
workers/employees as well as certifying the availability of funds in the amount of 8.5 Billion for the purpose and pursuant to DBM CCC No. 12; and

c. Letter of [NPC President] Del Callar dated April 23, 2008 to the NAPOCOR Board certifying the NPC stand to pay the COLA and AA to the workers/employees. 36 (Citations
omitted)

The Office of the Solicitor General filed an Omnibus Motion seeking to withdraw its appearance as counsel for NAPOCOR and asking for leave to intervene as the People's
Tribune. The Motion stated that the position taken by NAPOCOR ran counter to the Office of the Solicitor General's stand that the COLA and AA were already integrated into the
standardized salaries.37

The Department of Budget and Management likewise submitted a Supplemental Comment to the trial court, arguing that the COLA and AA were already integrated into the
standardized salary rates, as shown in their Notice of Position Allocation and Salary Adjustment. 38 It further posited that De Jesus only applied in instances where the integration of
allowance was by "mere legal fiction"39 and that Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) Employees Hired After July 1, 1989 was similarly inapplicable since there was already a factual
integration of allowances.40 It likewise pointed out that the new compensation plan for NAPOCOR employees did not include the grant of additional COLA and AA and that the
2008 General Appropriations Act prohibited the use of savings for additional COLA and AA. 41 It maintained that the test to the entitlement of additional allowances was whether
there was a diminution of pay as a result of the law's implementation and that mandamus only lied "where there is a clear legal right sought to be enforced." 42

On November 28, 2008, the Regional Trial Court rendered its Decision43 in favor of NECU and NEWU. According to the trial court, the determination of whether the COLA and
AA had been factually integrated was already resolved when the NAPOCOR Committee certified that the COLA and AA of the employees from July 1, 1989 to December 31,
1993 were not factually integrated into their standardized salaries. 44 The trial court also cited De Jesus, Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) Employees Hired After July 1,
1989, and Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System v. Bautista, et al. 45 in support of the conclusion that the employees were entitled to COLA and AA from 1989 to 1999 as
a matter of right.46 The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioners and intervenors NECU & NEWU and against the respondents
National Power Corporation, its President and Board of Directors ordering them as follows:

1. To RELEASE and to PAY the amount of SIX BILLION FOUR HUNDRED NINETY SIX MILLION FIFTY-FIVE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED THIRTY NINE
PESOS AND NINETYEIGHT CENTAVOS [Php 6,496,055,339.98], Philippine Currency representing the COLAs and AAs and TO PAY the amount of SEVEN HUNDRED
FOUR MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED SEVENTY-SEVEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED EIGHT HUNDERED (sic) PESOS AND SIXTY CENTAVOS [Php
704,777,508.60], Philippine Currency, representing interest computed from December 28, 2007, within 30 days from finality of this Decision to petitioners, intervenors and other
non-union employees similarly situated.

The said monetary judgment shall earn another interest of 12% per annum from date of finality of the decision until its full satisfaction.

2. To PAY Attorney's fees in the amount of 100,000.00 in favor of the Petitioners and 200,000.00 in favor of the Intervenors NECU & NEWU;

3. To DEDUCT the amount of ONE HU[N]DRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION FOUR HUNDRED SIXTY-FOUR THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED SEVENTY-TWO
PESOS AND FIFTY-FIVE CENTAVOS [Php 145,464,872.55] representing the deficiency payment of docket and other legal fees to be taken from the said lists of
NAPOCOR officials, workers, and employees including non-union beneficiaries similarly situated, and to REMIT AND PAY the same to the Office of the Clerk of Court of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, within 15 days from finality of this Decision, and finally, to FURNISH this court proof of compliance hereof. The said Amount shall be
without prejudice and subject to the final computation and assessment of the Office of the Clerk of Court. The said docket and legal fees shall be a lien on this judgment and shall
be first satisfied pursuant to the provisions of Rule 141 and Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

4. DECLARING the Consultancy Agreement to be valid and binding between the counsels and the Petitioners and the Intervenors NECU & NEWU, and its members.

4.1 To DEDUCT the FIVE percent (5%) of the amount payable to each of the NAPOCOR employees including non-union beneficiaries similarly situated for the said attorney's
fees PRO RATA, AND to PAY the amount deducted to Atty. Napoleon Uy Galit and Atty. Jonathan S. Presquito, after deducting the appropriate taxes.

SO ORDERED.47 (Emphasis and underscoring in the original, citation omitted)

The Office of the Solicitor General filed a Notice of Appeal of this Decision. 48 Secretary Andaya, Jr. also filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing, among others, that the
employees were duly notified that their COLA and AA were already integrated into their standardized salaries and that a Certification could be used as basis since this was merely
advisory for the Board of Directors.49 NECU and NEWU, on the other hand, filed an Urgent Motion for Execution even within the period for appeal alleging that the needed
amount had already been certified available and that the release of the allowances did not require the approval of the Department of Budget and Management.50

In a Joint Order51 dated March 20, 2009, the Regional Trial Court denied the Notice of Appeal and Motion for Reconsideration; and granted the Motion for Execution.52

The trial court noted that since the Office of the Solicitor General withdrew its appearance as counsel for NAPOCOR and entered its appearance as the People's Tribune, it could
no longer file an appeal that would accrue to NAPOCOR' s benefit. 53 The trial court also reiterated that the Committee Certification was approved by the NAPOCOR President and
was included in NAPOCOR' s Certified Obligation from 2001 to 2007. As a Certified Obligation submitted to Congress, its funds were already earmarked for the payment of the
obligation.54

The trial court likewise found that the Motion for Execution could be granted since NAPOCOR could set aside the funds needed for the payment of the COLA and AA. Its
payment would not only redound to the benefit of the affected employees and their families, but also to the economy due to increased consumer spending. The National Treasury
could also benefit from the tax remittances due from these allowances.55 The dispositive portion of the Joint Order reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court resolves as follows, viz:

1. GRANTS the Motion for Execution filed by NPC workers, petitioners and intervenors NECU & NEWU.

Accordingly, the Branch Clerk of Court is directed to forthwith issue the Certificate of Finality of Judgment and the Writ of Execution to enforce the Court's Decision dated
November 28, 2008.
Let the corresponding Writ of Execution be issued and served simultaneous with the service of this Order to the parties to be implemented by the deputy sheriff of this Court.

The initial computation of filing fees amounting to ONE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION FOUR HUNDRED SIXTY FOUR THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED
SEVENTY-TWO PESOS AND FIFTYFIVE CENTAVOS, [Php 145,464, 872.55], Philippine Currency, SHALL be first executed and paid to the Clerk of Court of RTC
Quezon City, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court, to be eventually remitted to the account of the Supreme Court.

2. GRANTS the motion of petitioners and intervenors to Deposit the Amount Equivalent to Judgment Award and Interest.

Accordingly, ORDERS the NPC Management through its President, NPC BOARD, and Treasurer to DEPOSIT the amount of SIX BILLION FOUR HUNDRED
NINETY SIX MILLION FIFTY-FIVE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED THIRTY NINE PESOS AND NINETY EIGHT CENTAVOS [Php 6,496,055,339.98],
Philippine Currency representing the COLAs and AAs, and the amount of SEVEN HUNDRED FOUR MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED SEVENTY SEVEN THOUSAND
FIVE HUNDRED EIGHT PESOS AND SIXTY CENTAVOS (Php 704,777,508.60), Philippine Currency, representing interest computed from December 28, 2007, with
Land Bank of the Philippines, with high yielding bearing interest, within 30 days from receipt hereof.

Thereafter, to SUBMIT their COMPLIANCE hereto within 15 days from date of deposit of said amounts for the information of the Court.

The said amount shall be under Custodia Legis of the Court pending its distribution to the listed and qualified beneficiaries or pending appeal with the Higher Court.

3. DENIES and DISMISSES the Notice of Appeal filed by the Office of the Solicitor General for utter lack of merit.

4. DENIES the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Public Respondent Hon. Rolando G. Andaya, Jr. with finality.

SO ORDERED.56

On March 23, 2009, the trial court issued a Certificate of Finality of Judgment57 and a Writ of Execution.58

Aggrieved, the Office of the Solicitor General, acting as the People's Tribune filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (With Urgent Prayer for the Immediate Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction),59 docketed by this Court as G.R. No. 187257.

The Department of Budget and Management, through then Secretary Andaya, Jr., also filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Joint Order dated March 20, 2009 and a Motion to
Quash the Writ of Execution dated March 23, 2009. 60 While the Motions were pending before the trial court, the Department of Budget and Management filed a Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition61 with this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 187776.

On April 14, 2009, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Very Urgent Plea for a Temporary Restraining Order 62to enjoin the implementation of the trial court's November 28,
2008 Decision, March 20, 2009 Joint Order, and March 23, 2009 Writ of Execution.

In a Resolution63 dated April 15, 2009, this Court issued a TemporaryRestraining Order64 to enjoin the implementation of the Writ of Execution.

On April 21, 2009, NECU and NEWU filed a Petition65 before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 187359, seeking to restrain the implementation and enforcement of the Operations
and Maintenance Agreement entered into by NAPOCOR and Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management (PSALM).66 The Petition alleged that certain provisions of the
Agreement regarding the remittance of NAPOCOR' s revenues to PSALM was an attempt to thwart the execution of the trial court's November 28, 2008 Decision. 67
Another Petition68 was filed by the Power Generation Employees Association-NPC (PGEA-NPC), seeking to restrain the implementation of the Operations and Maintenance
Agreement, arguing that the Agreement contravened the provisions of Republic Act No. 9136 or the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001.69 This Petition was docketed
as G.R. No. 187420.70

In the Resolution71 dated July 13, 2009, this Court consolidated G.R. No. 187359 with G.R. Nos. 187257 and 187776. Upon motion of the Office of the Solicitor General, this
Court, in the Resolution72 dated September 9, 2009 also consolidated G.R. No. 187420 with these cases.

On February 17, 2011, NECU and NEWU filed an Omnibus Motion 73 seeking to withdraw the Petition in G.R. No. 187359 and to detach the petition from G.R. No. 187420 and
have it consolidated instead with G.R. No. 156208,74a case then pending on the extent by which PSALM would answer for NAPOCOR' s liabilities.

In a Resolution75 dated June 22, 2011, the Court granted the Motion to Withdraw the Petition in G.R. No. 187359 but denied the prayer to have G.R. No. 187420 consolidated with
G.R. No. 156208. The Court then considered G.R. No. 187359 as closed and terminated. 76

On March 10, 2014, this Court, in the Resolution77 resolving the motion of NECU and NEWU,78 deconsolidated G.R. No. 187420 from G.R. Nos. 187257 and 187776. Thus, only
the Petitions in G.R. Nos. 187257 and 187776 are to be resolved in this Decision.

Procedural

Whether the Regional Trial Court committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the Notice of Appeal filed by the Office of the Solicitor General as the People's Tribune.

Whether the appeals were timely filed as to bar the finality of the Decision dated November 28, 2008.

Whether the case presented pure issues of law that should have been appealed directly to this Court through a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Whether the trial court erred in deciding the case based on a judgment on the pleadings.

Substantive

Whether NAPOCOR employees are entitled to the payment of their COLA and AA from the period of July 1, 1989 to March 16, 1999.

Whether the COLA and AA were already deemed factually integrated into the standardized salaries pursuant to Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6758.

Whether the COLA and AA were already integrated into the standardized salaries pursuant to the New Compensation Plan for NAPOCOR employees in Republic Act No. 7648
and Memorandum No. 198, series of 1994.

Whether the trial court violated the Constitution when it ordered NAPOCOR to back pay COLA and AA from its corporate funds.

Procedural Issues

The Office of the Solicitor General maintains that it filed its Notice of Appeal before the trial court as the People's Tribune with the authority and duty to uphold the best interests
of the State.79 Although it was initially tasked with representing the NAPOCOR and its Board of Directors, it withdrew as counsel. 80 The trial court also granted its motion for
leave to intervene as the People's Tribune, so it had standing to file its own petition on its "perceived best interest of the State."81
The Office of the Solicitor General argues that its Notice of Appeal was timely filed and thus, the trial court had the ministerial duty to give due course to it.82 It also pointed out
that the trial court's November 28, 2008 Decision had not yet attained finality since the Writ of Execution was issued by the trial court on March 23, 2009, merely three calendar
days after it issued its Joint Order on March 20, 2009. 83

The Department of Budget and Management likewise points out that the issuance of a Writ of Execution was premature since it still had a fresh 15-day period within which to
appeal the Decision when its Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the trial court in its March 20, 2009 Joint. 84 Order. It also agrees that the Office of the Solicitor General
had standing to file a Notice of Appeal as the People's Tribune. 85 It avers that the Regional Trial Court should not have decided mainly on the pleadings since the case raises
several substantive issues.86

NECU and NEWU, on the other hand, insist that the Notice of Appeal was correctly denied since the case only presented pure issues of law, which required a direct resort to this
Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.87They also contend that the Department of Budget and Management's Motion for Reconsideration was correctly denied since it did not
contain a notice of hearing.88 Since the appeal was not perfected, there was no bar to the Decision attaining finality. 89 They argue that a judgment on the pleadings was proper since
the facts were undisputed.90

NECU and NEWU further claim that the Office of the Solicitor General, as the People's Tribune, "should realize that upon the 16,000 workers' lawful and legitimate demand to
their long withheld wages, the 80 million Filipinos are behind them in this honorable quest." 91 They argue that the Department of Budget and Management has no standing to
appeal since it is the Secretary of the Department, who is designated as a member of the NAPOCOR Board of Directors. They point out that then Secretary Andaya, Jr. instructed
NAPOCOR "to proceed [with the] payment of the workers['] COLA/AA from its Corporate Funds." 92

Substantive Issues

The Office of the Solicitor General contends that Section 12 93 of Republic Act No. 6758 already integrated all allowances into standardized salary rates, including the COLA and
AA since these allowances were not specifically mentioned in the exempted allowances under the law. 94 It cites Gutierrez, et al. v. Department of Budget and Management, et
al.,95promulgated after De Jesus, Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) Employees Hired After July 1, 1989, and Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System, wherein this Court
stated that the COLA was already deemed integrated into the standardized salary rates of public employees. 96

The Office of the Solicitor General argues that the Certification of NAPOCOR's Board was not binding since it did not specify the premise of its conclusion that the COLA and the
AA were not factually integrated and the persons who certified the document stood to benefit from the certification. 97 It cites NAPOCOR Employees Consolidated Union (NECU)
v. National Power Corporation (NPC),98 wherein this Court used the Notice of Position Allocation and Salary Adjustment to conclude that the employee welfare allowance was
already deemed factually integrated into the standardized salary rates. 99 It claims that De Jesus, Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) Employees Hired After July 1,
1989, and Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System were inapplicable since NAPOCOR Employees Consolidated Union (NECU) already clarified that the non- publication
of DBM-CCC No. 10 did not render ineffective Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6758.100 The Office of the Solicitor General also points out that the back pay of COLA and AA in
addition to the standardized salary was an "additional compensation that [was] prohibited by the Constitution[.]" 101

The Department of Budget and Management echoes the Office of the Solicitor General's argument that the COLA and AA were already deemed factually integrated into the
standardized salary rates as shown in its Notice of Position Allocation and Salary Adjustment. 102 It presents the 1992 notices of several employees, where it was clearly stated that
the COLA and AA were received in addition to their salaries and other benefits. 103 Also submitted is a Memorandum from the Office of the General Counsel of NAPOCOR,
stating that the employees actually received their COLA and AA from July 1, 1989 to August 31, 1992 and that these allowances were deemed factually integrated into their
salaries from September 1992 to December 31, 1993. 104

The Department of Budget and Management maintains that the New Compensation Plan pursuant to Republic Act No. 7648 and Memorandum No. 198, series of 1994 did not
authorize the grant of additional COLA and AA from January 1, 1994. 105 The law provided that only the President of the Philippines could upgrade the compensation of the
employees; thus, only those allowances in the compensation plan could be modified by the NAPOCOR Board of Directors. 106 It points out that NECU and NEWU have not shown
"any evidence of diminution [of] pay to justify their claim for additional COLA and AA[,]" 107 as required by this Court in NAPOCOR Employees Consolidated Union (NECU).108
The Department of Budget and Management also argues that the trial court violated the Constitution when it ordered NAPOCOR to pay the COLA and AA from its corporate
funds without the required appropriation for that purpose. 109 It alleges that Executive Order No. 518, series of 1979 requires that government-owned and controlled corporations
prepare their Corporate Operating Budgets to obligate the amounts used for its operations and "serves [as] the appropriation[s] cover for the utilization of corporate
funds[.]"110 When the NAPOCOR officers were asked specifically where in their Corporate Operating Budget the payment of COLA and AA would be included, they stated that it
"was not included in the [Corporate Operating Budget] approved by Congress." 111Despite lacking the requisite Congressional approval, the trial court still ordered the NAPOCOR
officials the release of the corporate funds, in direct contravention to the Constitution. 112

NECU and NEWU, on the other hand, maintain that De Jesus, Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) Employees Hired After July 1, 1989, and Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage
System have all decreed that they were entitled to their COLA and AA from July 1, 1989 to March 16, 1999.113 The Office of the Solicitor General is trying to confuse the issue by
citing NAPOCOR Employees Consolidated Union (NECU), which concerned the employee welfare fund allowance, and not the COLA and AA. 114 They also point out that the
Office of the Solicitor General "selectively" 115 chose the three Notices of Position Allocation and Salary Adjustment instead of subpoenaing the notices of all the workers. 116 They
insist that Memorandum No. 198, series of 1994 did not include the COLA and AA on the presumption that DBM-CCC No. 10 was still in effect.117 They also argue that the funds
to be used to pay are the corporate funds of the NAPOCOR, which could be subject to garnishment. 118

Generally, the Office of the Solicitor General "represent[s] the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation,
proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers." 119

The exception to this rule is when it acts as the "People's Tribune." As such, it represents the best interests of the State, and may take an adverse position from the government
agency under litigation. In Pimentel, Jr. v. Commission on Elections:120

True, the Solicitor General is mandated to represent the Government, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or
matter requiring the services of a lawyer. However, the Solicitor General may, as it has in instances take a position adverse and contrary to that of the Government on the reasoning
that it is incumbent upon him to present to the court what he considers would legally uphold the best interest of the government although it may run counter to a client's position.121

The rationale for the Solicitor General's role is further explained in Gonzales v. Hon. Chavez:122

Indeed, in the final analysis, it is the Filipino people as a collectivity that constitutes the Republic of the Philippines. Thus, the distinguished client of the OSG is the people
themselves of which the individual lawyers in said office are a part.

....

Moreover, endowed with a broad perspective that spans the legal interests of virtually the entire government officialdom, the OSG may be expected to transcend the parochial
concerns of a particular client agency and instead, promote and protect the public weal. Given such objectivity, it can discern, metaphorically speaking, the panoply that is the
forest and not just the individual trees. Not merely will it strive for a legal victory circumscribed by the narrow interests of the client office or official, but as well, the vast concerns
of the sovereign which it is committed to serve.123

In this instance, the Office of the Solicitor General initially represented NAPOCOR and its Board of Directors in the proceedings before the Regional Trial Court. It later on filed
an Omnibus Motion To Withdraw Appearance as Counsel for Respondents and For Leave to Intervene as People's Tribune,124 which was granted by the trial court in its June 20,
2008 Order.125 In denying the Office of the Solicitor General's Notice of Appeal, the trial court stated:

The Court is of the humble opinion and so holds that OSG has ceased to be the counsel of NPC and the subsequent filing of the notice of appeal is not appropriately filed or such
notice will accrue to the benefit of NPC.126
In granting the Office of the Solicitor General's Omnibus Motion, the trial court allowed a party, separate from NAPOCOR- the People's Tribune - to enter its appearance in the
case. As with any other party, it was allowed to file a Notice of Appeal separately from NAPOCOR. Its Notice of Appeal was not for the benefit of NAPOCOR; rather, it was for
the protection of the interests of the State. Its Notice of Appeal would have been timely filed.

A similar issue was raised regarding the Department of Budget and Management's standing to file a Motion for Reconsideration of the November 28, 2008 Decision.

The case was brought against NAPOCOR and its Board of Directors, which included the Secretary of Budget and Management. 127 All members of the Board were served a copy of
the petition before the trial court but only then Secretary Andaya, Jr. filed his Comment. 128 Thus, when he filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the trial court's Decision, it was "as
a member of the Board of Directors of the [NAPOCOR.]" 129 Being a party to the case, the Secretary of the Budget and Management had standing to file the Motion for
Reconsideration.

NECU and NEWU likewise assail Secretary Andaya, Jr.'s Motion for Reconsideration for failing to state a notice of hearing.

Generally, all written motions are required to include a notice of hearing and must be addressed to all parties and served to them at least three (3) days before the date of the
hearing.130 When a party fails to comply, "the running of the period to appeal is not tolled by [the] filing or pendency." 131 This three-day notice rule, however, is not absolute. The
motion may still be acted upon by the court "provided doing so will neither cause prejudice to the other party nor violate his or her due process rights." 132

The trial court in this case nevertheless conducted a hearing on January 23, 2009 and resolved the Motion for Reconsideration on its merits.133 NECU and NEWU likewise did not
allege any violation to their right to due process due to the lack of a notice of hearing. Thus, the filing of the Motion of Reconsideration was able to toll the running of the period of
appeal.

II

The Office of the Solicitor General's appeal required a review of the documentary evidence presented, thus, it was necessary to first file a notice of appeal with the trial court under
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. A direct appeal with this Court through a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court would have been dismissed outright for presenting
questions of fact.

There are three modes of appeal from a decision or final order from the Regional Trial Court. The first mode is an ordinary appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the
trial court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. This is done by filing a notice of appeal with the trial court. 134 The second mode is through a petition for review with the Court
of Appeals in cases decided in the exercise of the trial court's appellate jurisdiction. 135 The third mode is by filing a petition for review on certiorari with this Court if the appeal
involves only questions of law.136

Only the third mode of appeal limits the scope of the issues to be brought. The first and second modes of appeal thus involve appeals where there are both questions of law and of
fact. The test used to determine whether there is a question of fact or of law "is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the
appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact." 137

By filing a Notice of Appeal, the Office of the Solicitor General intended to appeal to the Court of Appeals via an ordinary appeal under Rule 41, sec. 1 (a). NECU and NEWU
questioned this mode of appeal on the ground that only questions of law were presented.

The Office of the Solicitor General's main argument, however, was that the COLA and AA were already factually integrated into the standardized salary rates of NAPOCOR' s
employees. It had intended this fact to be established by documentary evidence such as the Notice of Position Allocation and Salary Adjustment. NECU and NEWU likewise
presented documentary evidence before the trial court to establish their position. In order to review any appeal of the case, it would have been necessary to review the weight and
evidentiary value of the documents presented. These would have been questions of fact better addressed in an ordinary appeal before the Court of Appeals.
The Office of the Solicitor General, thus, did not err in first filing a notice of appeal before the Regional Trial Court.

III

Considering that the Office of the Solicitor General represented an adverse position, a judgment on the pleadings was improper in this instance.

A judgment on the pleadings may be allowed in cases "[w]here an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's
pleading[.]"138 NECU and NEWU's documentary evidence consisted of documents by the NAPOCOR Board of Directors stating that the employees were entitled to the back pay
of their COLA and AA. Thus, the Regional Trial Court concluded that since the NAPOCOR admitted the material allegations of the complaint, a judgment on the pleadings was
proper.139

The trial court, however, operated on the mistaken assumption that the Office of the Solicitor General represented NAPOCOR. At this point in the proceedings, the Office of the
Solicitor General had already withdrawn its appearance as counsel for NAPOCOR and entered its appearance as the People's Tribune.140 In presenting an adverse position, the
Office of the Solicitor General could not be deemed to have admitted the material allegations of the complaint.

IV

COLA and AA are already deemed integrated into the standardized salaries of the NAPOCOR employees from July 1, 1989 to December 31, 1993.

Before the enactment of Republic Act No. 6758, previous compensation and position classification laws, such as Presidential Decree No. 985, as amended by Presidential Decree
No. 1597,141 only granted allowances and fringe benefits upon the recommendation of the Commissioner of Budget and the approval of the President of the
Philippines.142 Republic Act No. 6758 aimed "to standardize salary rates among government personnel and do away with multiple allowances and other incentive packages and the
resulting differences in compensation among them." 143 Thus, Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6758 introduced the concept of integration of allowance upon the standardization of
the salary rates.144 Section 12 states:

Section 12. Consolidation of Allowances and Compensation. - All allowances, except for representation and transportation allowances; clothing and laundry allowances;
subsistence allowance of marine officers and crew on board government vessels and hospital personnel; hazard pay; allowances of foreign service personnel stationed abroad; and
such other additional compensation not otherwise specified herein as may be determined by the DBM, shall be deemed included in the standardized salary rates herein prescribed.
Such other additional compensation, whether in cash or in kind, being received by incumbents only as of July 1, 1989 not integrated into the standardized salary rates shall
continue to be authorized.

Existing additional compensation of any national government official or employee paid from local funds of a local government unit shall be absorbed into the basic salary of said
official or employee and shall be paid by the National Government.

As a general rule, "all allowances are deemed included in the standardized salary [rates]." 145 The following allowances, however, are deemed not to have been integrated:

... representation and transportation allowances; clothing and laundry allowances; subsistence allowance of marine officers and crew on board government vessels and hospital
personnel; hazard pay; allowances of foreign service personnel stationed abroad; and such other additional compensation not otherwise specified herein as may be determined by
the DBM ...146

The phrase "such other additional compensation not otherwise specified herein as may be determined by the DBM" specifies that the Department of Budget and Management has
the delegated authority to determine other allowances that are not deemed integrated into the standardized salaries. 147 The Department of Budget and Management subsequently
issued DBM-CCC No. 10, enumerating all allowances deemed included in the basic salary and discontinuing all allowances and fringe benefits granted on top of the basic
salary.148 Item 4.1 states:
4.1 The present salary of an incumbent for purposes of this Circular shall refer to the sum total of actual basic salary including allowances enumerated hereunder, being received as
of June 30, 1989 and authorized pursuant to P.D. No. 985 and other legislative or administrative issuances:

4.1.1 Cost-of-Living Allowance/Bank Equity Pay (COLA/BEP) equivalent to forty percent (40%) of basic salary or 300.00 per month, whichever is higher;

4.1.2 Amelioration Allowance equivalent to ten percent (10%) of basic salary of 150.00 per month, whichever is higher;

4.1.3 COLA guaranteed to GOCCs/GFIs covered by the Compensation and Position Classification Plan for the regular agencies/offices of the National Government and to
GOCCs/GFIs following the Compensation and Position Classification Plan under LOimp. No. 104/CCC No. 1 and LOimp.No. 97/CCC No. 2 in the amount of 550.00 per month
for those whose monthly basic salary is 1,500 and below, and P500 for those whose monthly basic salary is 1,501 and above, granted on top of the COLA/BEP mentioned in
Item No. 4.1.1 above[.]149

Item No. 5.6 of the Circular states:

Payment of other allowances/fringe benefits and all other forms of compensation granted on top of basic salary, whether in cash or in kind, .. . shall be discontinued effective
November 1, 1989. Payment made for such allowances/fringe benefits after said date shall be considered as illegal disbursement of public funds. 150

In De Jesus, the Commission on Audit disallowed the payment of honoraria to employees of the Local Water Utilities Administration on the ground that this was a fringe benefit
granted on top of the basic salary.151 This Court, however, set aside the disallowance and rendered DBM-CCC No. 10 ineffective for non-publication in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation:

[I]t is decisively clear that DBM-CCC No. 10, which completely disallows payment of allowances and other additional compensation to government officials and employees,
starting November 1, 1989, is not a mere interpretative or internal regulation. It is something more than that. And why not, when it tends to deprive government workers of their
allowances and additional compensation sorely needed to keep body and soul together. At the very least, before the said circular under attack may be permitted to substantially
reduce their income, the government officials and employees concerned should be apprised and alerted by the publication of subject circular in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines - to the end that they be given amplest opportunity to voice out whatever opposition they may have, and to ventilate their stance
on the matter. This approach is more in keeping with democratic precepts and rudiments of fairness and transparency.

In light of the foregoing disquisition on the ineffectiveness of DBM-CCC No. 10 due to its non-publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
country, as required by law, resolution of the other issue at bar is unnecessary. 152

In Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) Employees Hired After July 1, 1989, the Philippine Ports Authority had been paying its officials and employees COLA and AA prior to the
issuance of DBM-CCC No. 10.153 Upon the issuance of the Circular, it discontinued the payment of these allowances as these were already deemed integrated into the standardized
salaries.154 De Jesus, however, rendered the Circular ineffective for non-publication. Thus, a question arose as to whether the employees were entitled to the back pay of their
COLA and AA.

This Court held that since the Philippine Port Authority has already granted these allowances to its employees, the employees should continue to receive them during the period of
ineffectivity of DBM-CCC No. 10:

The parties fail to cite any law barring the continuation of the grant of the COLA and the amelioration allowance during the period when DBM-CCC No. 10 was in legal limbo.

The present case should be distinguished from PNB v. Palma, in which the respondents sought by mandamus to compel the petitioner therein to grant them certain fringe benefits
and allowances that continued to be given to Philippine National Bank (PNB) employees hired prior to July 1, 1989. This Court held that PNB could not be compelled to do so,
because the respondents had been hired after that date. Under Section 12 of RA 6758, only "incumbent" government employees (as of July 1, 1989) already receiving those
benefits may continue to receive them, apart from their standardized pay.

In the present case, the PP A already granted herein petitioners the COLA and the amelioration allowances, even if they were hired after July 1, 1989. The only issue is whether
they should have continued to receive the benefits during the period of the "ineffectivity" of DBC-CCC No. 1 O; that is, from July 1, 1989 to March 16, 1999, the period during
which those allowances were not deemed integrated into their standard salary rates. Furthermore, in the PNB Decision, the employees claimed a right to receive the allowances
from July 1, 1989 to January 1, 1997. PNB was able to grant the benefits post facto, because on that date (January 1, 1997) it had already been privatized and was thus no longer
subject to the restrictions imposed by RA 6758 (the Salary Standardization Law).

Tellingly, the subject matter of the PNB case involved benefits that had not been deemed integrated into, but in fact exempted from, the standardized salary rates. In the present
case, the subject matter refers to those deemed included, but were placed "in limbo" as a result of this Court's ruling in De Jesus v. COA.

To stress, the failure to publish DBM-CCC No. 10 meant that the COLA and the amelioration allowance were not effectively integrated into the standardized salaries of the PPA
employees as of July 1, 1989. The integration became effective only on March 16, 1999. Thus, in between those two dates, they were still entitled to receive the two allowances.155

Thus, Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) Employees Hired After July 1, 1989 clarified that those who were already receiving COLA and AA as of July 1, 1989, but whose receipt
was discontinued due to the issuance of DBM-CCC No. 10, were entitled to receive such allowances during the period of the Circular's ineffectivity, or from July l, 1989
to March 16, 1999. The same factual premise was present in Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System, wherein this Court reiterated that those already receiving
COLA as of July l, 1989 were entitled to its payment from 1989 to 1999. 156

In neither of these cases did this Court suggest that the compensation of the employees after the promulgation of Republic Act No. 6758 would be increased with the addition of
the COLA and AA. If the total compensation package were the same, then clearly the COLA or AA, or both were factually integrated.

NECU and NEWU anchor their entitlement to the back pay of COLA and AA from July 1, 1989 to March 16, 1999 on these three cases. It is necessary to examine first if the
officers and employees of the NAPOCOR were already receiving COLA and AA from July 1, 1989 and whether their receipt of these allowances were discontinued due to the
issuance of DBM-CCC No. 10.

In NAPOCOR Employees Consolidated Union (NECU), this Court was confronted with the issue of whether the employees' welfare allowance was deemed integrated into the
standardized salaries of the NAPOCOR employees.157 In holding that the employee welfare allowance was already deemed integrated, this Court also found that the NAPOCOR
employees were already receiving COLA and AA prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6758:

The State aims in Rep. Act No. 6758 to provide equal pay for substantially equal work and to base differences in pay upon substantive differences in duties and responsibilities,
and qualification requirements of the positions. Prior to the effectivity of that law, NPC employees were receiving, aside from cost of living allowance, myriad of allowances like
social amelioration allowance, emergency allowance, longevity pay and employee welfare allowance.158 (Citation omitted)

NAPOCOR Employees Consolidated Union (NECU) also clarifies that Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) Employees Hired After July 1, 1989 was inapplicable since it only applied
to back pay of COLA and AA that was previously withheld and not to those who continued to receive these benefits even after the issuance of DBM-CCC No. 10:

The Court has, to be sure, taken stock of its recent ruling in Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) Employees Hired After July I, 1989 vs. Commission on Audit. Sadly, however, our
pronouncement therein is not on all fours applicable owing to differing factual milieu. There, the Commission on Audit allowed the payment of back cost of living allowance
(COLA) and amelioration allowance previously withheld from PPA employees pursuant to the heretofore ineffective DBM-CCC No. 10, but limited the back payment only to
incumbents as of July 1, 1989 who were already then receiving both allowances. COA considered the COLA and amelioration allowance of PP A employees as "not integrated"
within the purview of the second sentence of Section 12 of Rep. Act No. 6758, which, according to COA confines the payment of "not integrated" benefits only to July 1, 1989
incumbents already enjoying said allowances.
In setting aside COA's ruling, we held in PPA Employees that there was no basis to use the elements of incumbency and prior receipt as standards to discriminate against the
petitioners therein. For, DBM -CCC No. 10, upon which the incumbency and prior receipt requirements are contextually predicated, was in legal limbo from July 1, 1989 (effective
date of the unpublished DBM-CCC No. 10) to March 16, 1999 (date of effectivity of the heretofore unpublished DBM circular). And being in legal limbo, the benefits otherwise
covered by the circular, if properly published, were likewise in legal limbo as they cannot be classified either as effectively integrated or not integrated benefits.

There lies the difference.

Here, the employee welfare allowance was, as above demonstrated, integrated by NPC into the employees' standardized salary rates effective July 1, 1989 pursuant to Rep. Act No.
6758. Unlike in PPA Employees, the element of discrimination between incumbents as of July 1, 1989 and those joining the force thereafter is not obtaining in this case. And while
after July 1, 1989, PPA employees can rightfully complain about the discontinuance of payment of COLA and amelioration allowance effected due to the incumbency and prior
receipt requirements set forth in DBM-CCC No[.] 10, NPC cannot do likewise with respect to their welfare allowance since NPC has, for all intents and purposes, never really
discontinued the payment thereof.159 (Citation omitted)

Republic Act No. 6758 remained effective during the period of ineffectivity of DBM-CCC No. 10.160 Thus, the COLA and AA of NAPOCOR officers and employees were
integrated into the standardized salaries effective July 1, 1989 pursuant to Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6758, which provides:

Section 12. Consolidation of Allowances and Compensation. - All allowances, except for representation and transportation allowances; clothing and laundry allowances;
subsistence allowance of marine officers and crew on board government vessels and hospital personnel; hazard pay; allowances of foreign service personnel stationed abroad; and
such other additional compensation not otherwise specified herein as may be determined by the DBM, shall be deemed included in the standardized salary rates herein prescribed.
Such other additional compensation, whether in cash or in kind, being received by incumbents only as of July 1, 1989 not integrated into the standardized salary rates shall
continue to be authorized.

Existing additional compensation of any national government official or employee paid from local funds of a local government unit shall be absorbed into the basic salary of said
official or employee and shall be paid by the National Government.

Unlike in Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) Employees Hired After July 1, 1989, there would be no basis to distinguish between those hired before July 1, 1989 and those hired
after July 1, 1989. Both sets of NAPOCOR employees were continuously receiving their COLA and AA since these allowances were already factually integrated into the
standardized salaries pursuant to Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6758.

In order to settle any confusion, we abandon any other interpretation of our ruling in Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) Employees Hired After July 1, 1989 with regard to the
entitlement of the NAPOCOR officers and employees to the back payment of COLA and AA during the period of legal limbo. To grant any back payment of COLA and AA
despite their factual integration into the standardized salary would cause salary distortions 161 in the Civil Service. It would also provide unequal protection to those employees
whose COLA and AA were proven to have been factually discontinued from the period of Republic Act No. 6758's effectivity.

Generally, abandoned doctrines of this Court are given only prospective effect. 162 However, a strict interpretation of this doctrine, when it causes a breach of a fundamental
constitutional right, cannot be countenanced. In this case, it will result in a violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

Furthermore, Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) Employees Hired After July 1, 1989 only applies if the compensation package of those hired before the effectivity of Republic Act
No. 6758 actually decreased; or in the case of those hired after, if they received a lesser compensation package as a result of the deduction of COLA or AA. Neither situation
applies in this case.

NECU and NEWU take exception to the application of NAPOCOR Employees Consolidated Union (NECU) to this case, arguing that this case involved COLA and AA, and not
the employee welfare allowance. NECU and NEWU, however, are arguing on semantics. At its most basic, NAPOCOR Employees Consolidated Union (NECU) involved an
allowance appearing in the Notices of Position Allocation and Salary Adjustment to have already been integrated into the basic salary. The two allowances involved in this case
appear on the same notices.

The prior acts of the parties likewise support the finding that from July 1, 1989 to December 31, 1993, the COLA and AA were already deemed integrated into the basic salary.

On March 20, 2006, the Department of Budget and Management issued Corporate Compensation Circular No. 12, 163 providing the guidelines for implementation of this Court's
decisions on the grant of additional allowances to officers and employees of government-owned and controlled corporations and government financial institutions. It stated, in part:

For employees hired after July 1, 1989 or the effectivity of RA 6758, a finding that the subject allowance was factually integrated into the basic salaries of incumbents as of July 1,
1989 shall mean that said allowances were likewise paid and factually integrated into the basic salaries of those hired after July 1, 1989.

Any finding that the concerned allowance was not factually integrated into the basic salary, and hence, has not been paid, shall be supported by sworn certifications from the
President of the concerned GOCC/GFI, its Vice President for Human Resource and Finance, and other relevant officers directly in charge thereof, or officials with equivalent ranks
and responsibilities, attesting to the fact that the subject allowance was not factually integrated in the basic salary after accomplishment of the above matrix, and as supported by
the foregoing documents.164

Pursuant to this Circular, NAPOCOR submitted to the Department of Budget and Management a Certification 165dated May 28, 2007166 stating:

This is to certify that the Cost of Living Allowance (COLA) and Amelioration Allowance (AA) to be paid to the four thousand nine hundred thirteen (4,913) NPC employees hired
during the period 01 July 1989 to 31 December 1993 per the attached matrix were not factually integrated in their respective basic salaries for the subject period.

This is to further certify that the COLA and AA to be paid to the nine thousand seven hundred seventy-seven (9,777) NPC employees concerned during the period 01 January 1994
to 16 March 1999 have not been factually integrated into the basic salaries of the subject employees.

Attached herewith is the accomplished matrix prescribed under DBM CCC# 12, which forms an integral part of this certification.167

The Department of Budget and Management, through Secretary Andaya, Jr., wrote a letter 168 dated September 18, 2007 concerning the submission of these documents, stating:

Based on CCC No. 12, determination of whether such allowances authorized by the Supreme Court to be granted have factually been integrated or not and paid to the NPC
employees concerned now rests with the NPC management. The documents enumerated under paragraph 2.1 to 2.4 of said Circular shall serve as basis for determining whether
their officials and employees are still entitled to payment of such allowances. It may be noted that CCC No. 12 does not require GOCCs/GFIs to submit the said documents to the
Department of Budget and Management. Likewise, payment of such allowances does not require prior approval of the DBM Secretary.

The findings of the NPC as to who are entitled to payment of back COLA and AA can only be possible after a diligent and exhaustive review and evaluation of all pertinent
documents enumerated in CCC No. 12. May we call your attention, however, to the following[:]

a) NPC employees who were incumbents of positions as of June 30, 1989 are no longer entitled to COLA and AA for the period July 1, 1989 to December 31, 1993 since said
allowances have been factually integrated into the standardized salaries as clearly reflected in a Notice of Position Allocation and Salary Adjustment (NPASA) of an employee
submitted by NPC in connection with the En bane decision of the Supreme Court in the case NAPOCOR EMPLOYEES CONSOLIDATED UNION[,] et al. vs. THE NATIONAL
POWER CORPORATION, et al. under G.R. No. 157492 dated March 10, 2006. As reflected in the said NPASA, not only the Welfare Allowance was integrated, but likewise the
COLA and Amelioration Allowance being claimed by the NPC employees.
b) For employees hired between July 1, 1989 and December 31, 1993, it is inconceivable that NPC was not aware of the Implementation of RA No. 6758. The SSL had already
been in effect on July 1, 1989 and as such, the hiring rate under the SSL should have been allowed to NPC employees hired effective the said period. NPC could not have
continuously and separately granted any COLA and AA to those hired effective July 1, 1989 and thereafter.

c) It may also be worth mentioning that in CY 1994, NPC adopted a new Salary Pay [sic] pursuant to RA No. 7643, the Energy Power Crisis Act, as implemented by
Memorandum Order (MO) 198. Under the said Salary Plan, the COLA and AA are no longer subsisting and these have already been integrated into the standardized salary of
employees effective July 1, 1989.169

In a letter170 dated October 9, 2007, President Cyril C. del Callar (President del Callar) conceded Secretary Andaya, Jr.'s first point but took exception to the second and third point:

[W]e would like to make some clarifications on the following concerns made on our request:

a) NPC employees who were incumbents of positions as of June 30, 1989 are no longer entitled to COLA and AA for the period July 1, 1989 to December 31, 1993 since said
allowances have been factually integrated into the standardized rates as reflected in a NPASA of an employee submitted by NPC in connection with the En bane decision of
the Supreme Court ........ by NPC employees ..

Your position on item a) above is the same with our position as stated in our letter of 10 May 2007. NPC employees who were incumbents of positions as of 30 June 1989 may not
be entitled to COLA and AA because during the period 01July1989 to 31 December 1993, these employees either actually received such benefits or the said benefits were already
factually integrated into their respective standardized salaries.

Attached are copies of pay slips of employees who were incumbents as of 30 June 1989 to illustrate that their COLA and AA were integrated into their standardized salaries during
the covered period.

b) For employees hired between July 1, 1989 and December 31, 1993, it is inconceivable that NPC was not aware of the implementation of RA No. 6758. The SSL had already
been in effect on July 1, 1989 and as such, the hiring rate under the SSL should have been allowed to NPC employees hired effective the said period. NPC could not have
continuously and separately granted any COLA and AA to those hired effective July 1, 1989 and thereafter.

NPC is very much aware of the implementation of RA 6758 and that the SSL took effect on 01 July 1989. However, we would like to remind you that CCC No. 10 was declared
ineffective by the Supreme Court due to its non-publication in the Official Gazette in the case of De Jesus, et al. vs. COA (294 SCRA 152). In the case of Philippine Ports
Authority Employees vs. COA (GR No. 160396, September 6, 2005), the High Court ruled that the failure to publish DBM-CCC No. 10 meant that the COLA and AA were not
effectively integrated into the standardized salaries. It was further ruled that "All - not only incumbents as of July 1, 1989 - should be allowed to receive back pay corresponding to
the said benefits, from July 1, 1989 to the new effectivity of DBM-CCC No. 10 - - March 16, 1999.

Attached for your reference are copies of pay slips of NPC employees hired after the effectivity of the SSL to serve as proof that the subject benefits were not factually integrated
into the respective basic salaries of employees hired after June 30, 1989. Being non-incumbents as of 30 June 1989, nothing was integrated into their salaries effective July 1, 1989
or respective dates they were actually employed thereafter. The COLA and AA were not part of the total compensation package they were receiving during the period 01July1989
to 31December1993.

c) It may also be worth mentioning that in CY 1994, NPC adopted a new Salary Pay [sic]pursuant to RA No. 6743 [sic], the Energy Power Crisis Act, as implemented by
Memorandum Order (MO) 198. Under the said Salary Plan, the COLA and AA are no longer subsisting and these have already been integrated into the standardized salary of
employees effective July 1, 1989.
The new NPC Pay Plan which took effect in 1994 was authorized under Memorandum Order (MO) 198. The salary and benefits level accorded to NPC personnel was aligned with
the private sector and was based on the result of the study conducted by SGV. The grant of several existing govemment-mandated allowances was allowed. However, the COLA
and AA were not included in the Schedule of Monthly Allowances due to the belief that DBM-CCC No. 10 was still in effect.171(Emphasis in the original)

Unfortunately, the attached Notices of Position Allocation and Salary Adjustment and pay slips only served to prove that from July 1, 1989 to December 31, 1993, the COLA and
AA were already deemed integrated into the basic salary. According to the various Notices of Position Allocation and Salary Adjustment 172 submitted to this Court, the receipt of
COLA and AA was not discontinued due to the implementation of Republic Act No. 6758. One employee, Ernesto Camagong (Mr. Camagong), was a Plant Equipment Operator,
classified as Salary Grade 10:

JOB GRADE: 10 WITH A SALARY AS OF 06/30/89 AS

FOLLOWS: BASIC SALARY []
3,912.00
COST OF LIVING ALLOWANCE (COLA) 1,564.80
ADDITIONAL COLA 200.00
SOCIAL AMELIORATION ALLOWANCE 391.20
EMERGENCY ALLOWANCE 255.00
RED CIRCLE RATE (RCR) 1,592.10
LONGEVITY PAY 200.00
EMPLOYEE WELFARE ALLOWANCE 391.20
TOTAL AS OF 06130189 8,506.30
SALARY ADJUSTMENT EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 1989 NONE
TRANSITION ALLOWANCE EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 1989 4,120.30
ADJUSTED SALARY EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 1989 4,386.00
TOTAL COMPENSATION EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 1989 8,506.30 173

Prior to Republic Act No. 6758, or on June 30, 1989, Mr. Camagong was receiving a total salary of 8,506.30. Upon the effectivity of the law, or on July 1, 1989, all allowances,
except those specifically excluded, were deemed integrated into his basic salary. To stress, all allowances previously granted were already deemed integrated into the standardized
salary rates by July 1, 1989.

As shown above, Mr. Camagong's adjusted salary of 4,386.00 already included all allowances previously received. This amount is obviously less than his previous total
compensation of 8,506.30. The law, however, provided a remedy in the form of a transition allowance. NAPOCOR Employees Consolidated Union (NECU) explains:

When Rep. Act No. 6758 became effective on July 1, 1989, the new position title of Camagong was Plant Equipment Operator B with a salary grade of 14 and with a monthly
salary of 4,386.00.

Admittedly, in the case of Camagong, his monthly gross income of 8,506.30 prior to the effectivity of Rep. Act No. 6758, was thereafter reduced to only 4,386.00. The situation,
however, is duly addressed by the law itself. For, while Rep. Act No. 6758 aims at standardizing the salary rates of government employees, yet the legislature has adhered to the
policy of non-diminution of pay when it enacted said law. So it is that Section 17 thereof precisely provides for a "transition allowance," as follows:
Section 1 7. Salaries of Incumbents. - Incumbents of positions presently receiving salaries and additional compensation/fringe benefits including those absorbed from local
government units and other emoluments, the aggregate of which exceeds the standardized salary rate as herein prescribed, shall continue to receive such excess compensation,
which shall be referred to as transition allowance. The transition allowance shall be reduced by the amount of salary adjustment that the incumbent shall receive in the future.

The transition allowance referred to herein shall be treated as part of the basic salary for purposes of computing retirement pay, year-end bonus and other similar benefits.

As basis for computation of the first across-the-board salary adjustment of incumbents with transition allowance, no incumbent who is receiving compensation exceeding the
standardized salary rate at the time of the effectivity of this Act, shall be assigned a salary lower than ninety percent (90%) of his present compensation or the standardized salary
rate, whichever is higher. Subsequent increases shall be based on the resultant adjusted salary.

Evidently, the transition allowance under the aforequoted provision was purposely meant to bridge the difference in pay between the pre-R.A. 6758 salary of government
employees and their standardized pay rates thereafter, and because non-diminution of pay is the governing principle in Rep. Act No. 6758, Camagong, pursuant to Section 17 of
that law was given a transition allowance of 4,120.30. This explains why, in the case of Camagong, his gross monthly income remained at 8,506.30, as can be seen in his NP
ASA, clearly showing that the allowances he used to receive prior to the effectivity of Rep. Act No. 6758, were integrated into his standardized salary rate.174(Citation omitted)

The integration of COLA into the standardized salary rates is not repugnant to the law. Gutierrez, et al. v. Department of Budget and Management, et al.175 explains:

COLA is not in the nature of an allowance intended to reimburse expenses incurred by officials and employees of the government in the performance of their official functions. It
is not payment in consideration of the fulfillment of official duty. As defined, cost of living refers to "the level of prices relating to a range of everyday items" or "the cost of
purchasing those goods and services which are included in an accepted standard level of consumption." Based on this premise, COLA is a benefit intended to cover increases in the
cost of living. Thus, it is and should be integrated into the standardized salary rates. 176

Thus, it would be incongruous to grant any alleged back pay of COLA and AA from July 1, 1989 to December 31, 1993, when the NAPOCOR officers and employees have
already received such allowances for this period. The grant would be tantamount to additional compensation, which is proscribed by Section 8, Article IX (B) of the Constitution:

SECTION 8. No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, nor accept
without the consent of the Congress, any present, emolument, office, or title of any kind from any foreign government.

Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double, or indirect compensation.

Mandamus cannot lie to compel the performance of an unconstitutional act. 177 The Regional Trial Court clearly acted in grave abuse of discretion in ordering the back payment, to
the affected NAPOCOR officers and employees, the COLA and AA for the period of July 1, 1989 to December 31, 1993.

The question remains, however, as to the entitlement of NECU and NEWU to the back pay of COLA and AA from January 1, 1994 to March 16, 1999.1wphi1

The enactment of Republic Act No. 7648, or the Electric Power Crisis Act of 1993 authorized the President of the Philippines to reorganize NAPOCOR and to upgrade its
compensation plan. From this period, NAPOCOR ceased to be covered by the standardized salary rates of Republic Act No. 6758.

Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7648, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Memorandum Order No. 198, providing for a different position classification and compensation plan for
NAPOCOR employees to take effect on January 1, 1994. The compensation plan states:
SEC. 2. COMPENSATION PLAN. The NPC Compensation Plan consists of the following:

2.1 Total monthly compensation structure as shown in Annex "A" which shall include:

2.1.1 Monthly basic salary schedule as shown in Annex "B"; and

2.1.2 Schedule of monthly allowances as provided in Annex "C" which include existing government mandated allowances such as PERA and Additional Compensation, and Rice
Subsidy, and Reimbursable Allowances, i.e., RRA, RT A and RDA, provided however, that the NP Board is hereby authorized to further rationalize and/or revise the rates for such
allowances as may be necessary; and

2.2 "Pay for Performance". Pay for Performance is a variable component of the total annual cash compensation consisting of bonuses and incentives but excluding the 13th month
pay, earned on the basis of corporate and/or group performance or productivity, following a Productivity Enhancement Program (PEP), and step-increases given in recognition of
superior individual performance using a performance rating system, duly approved by the NP Board. The corporate or group productivity or incentive bonus shall range from zero
(0) to four (4) months basic salary, to be given in lump-sum for each year covered by the PEP. The in-step increases on the other hand, once granted, shall form part of the monthly
basic salary.

Thus, Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) Employees Hired After July 1, 1989 is inapplicable for the period following the enactment of Republic Act No. 7648. This case interprets
provisions of Republic Act No. 6758. The "legal limbo" contemplated in this case does not apply to a period where a new position classification and compensation plan has already
been enacted. Thus, entitlement to the back pay of COLA and AA from 1994 to 1999 should not be premised on this case.

The question as to whether the COLA and AA were deemed integrated in this new compensation plan was the subject of then NAPOCOR President del Callar's letter178 dated May
10, 2007 to Secretary Andaya, Jr. Secretary Andaya, Jr. replied:

It may also be worth mentioning that in CY 1994, NPC adopted a new Salary Pay [sic] pursuant to RA No. 6743 [sic], the Energy Power Crisis Act, as implemented by
Memorandum Order (MO) 198. Under the said Salary Plan, the COLA and AA are no longer subsisting and these have already been integrated into the standardized salary of
employees effective July 1, 1989.179

NAPOCOR's Office of the General Counsel disagreed with this assessment, stating that Memorandum Order No. 198, series of 1994 did not include the COLA and AA
"presumably due to the belief that DBM-CCC No. 10 was still in effect (the Supreme Court decisions declaring the said Circular as ineffective were not yet promulgated as of that
time)."180 This sentiment was echoed in President del Callar's letter181 dated October 9, 2007 to Secretary Andaya, Jr.

This statement, however, fails to take into account that DBM-CCC No. 10 implements Republic Act No. 6758,182not Republic Act No. 7648. By January 1, 1994, NAPOCOR
officers and employees were no longer covered by the standardized salary rates of Republic Act No. 6758. Thus, the effectivity or ineffectivity of DBM-CCC No. 10 from January
1, 1994 is irrelevant.

Memorandum Order No. 198, series of 1994 only includes the basic salary and the following allowances: Personal Economic Relief Allowance (PERA) and Additional
Compensation, Rice Subsidy, and Reimbursable Allowances. Republic Act No. 7648 also provides that only the President of the Philippines can upgrade the compensation of
NAPOCOR personnel:

SECTION 5. Reorganization of the National Power Corporation. - The President is hereby empowered to reorganize the NAPOCOR, to make it more effective, innovative, and
responsive to the power crisis. For this purpose, the President may abolish or create offices; split, group, or merge positions; transfer functions, equipment, properties, records and
personnel; institute drastic cost-cutting measures and take such other related actions necessary to carry out the purpose herein declared. Nothing in this Section shall result in the
diminution of the present salaries and benefits of the personnel of the NAPOCOR: Provided, That any official or employee of the NAPOCOR who may be phased out by reason of
the reorganization authorized herein shall be entitled to such benefits as may be determined by the Board of Directors of the NAPOCOR, with the approval of the President.
The President may upgrade the compensation of the personnel of the NAPOCOR at rates comparable to those prevailing in privately-owned power utilities to take effect upon
approval by Congress of the NAPOCOR's budget for 1994. (Emphasis supplied)

In issuing Memorandum No. 198, series of 1994, the President determined that the New Compensation Plan for the NAPOCOR personnel shall include the basic salary, PERA and
Additional Compensation, Rice Subsidy, and Reimbursable Allowances. The discretion of the President to specify the new salary rates, however, is qualified by the
statement: "Nothing in this Section shall result in the diminution of the present salaries and benefits of the personnel of the NAPOCOR." This qualification is repeated in Section 7
of the Memorandum:

SEC. 7. NON-DIMINUTION IN PAY. Nothing in this Order shall result in the reduction of the compensation and benefits entitlements of NPC personnel prior to the effectivity of
this Order.

The Board of Directors is authorized to rationalize or revise only the rates for PERA and Additional Compensation, Rice Subsidy, and Reimbursable Allowances:

2.1.2 Schedule of monthly allowances as provided in Annex "C" which include existing government mandated allowances such as PERA and Additional Compensation, and Rice
Subsidy, and Reimbursable Allowances, i.e., RRA, RTA and RDA, provided however, that the NP Board is hereby authorized to further rationalize and/or revise the rates for such
allowances as may be necessary[.]183(Emphasis supplied)

As previously discussed, COLA and AA were already deemed integrated into the basic standardized salary from July 1, 1989 to December 31, 1993. These allowances need not be
separately granted. All basic salaries by December 31, 1993 already included the COLA and AA.

Thus, in order to conclude that the NAPOCOR employees were not able to receive their COLA and AA upon the implementation of the New Compensation Plan, it must first be
determined whether its implementation resulted in the diminution of their salaries and benefits.

Evidence on record, however, shows that the affected employees suffered no diminution in their compensation upon the implementation of the New Compensation Plan on January
1, 1994.

The pay slips184 of an employee, Melinda A. Bancolita, from December 1993 to January 1994 are instructive. For the period of December 1 to 7, 1993, she had the position of "SR
IRD/IRM OFFICER", and was receiving a total compensation of 8,017.40.185 From January 1 to 7, 1994, she held the same position and was still receiving a total compensation
of 8,017.40.186 The pay slips187 of another employee, Corazon C. San Andres, from this period are similarly instructive. For the period of December 1 to 7, 1993, she held the
position of "SECRETARY A," and was receiving a total compensation of 3,917.00. 188 From January 1 to 7, 1993, she held the same position and was receiving the same amount
of compensation.189

Considering there was no diminution in the salaries and benefits of the NAPOCOR employees upon the implementation of the New Compensation Plan, there was no basis for the
Regional Trial Court to grant NECU and NEWU's money claims. To repeat, the indiscriminate grant of additional allowances would be tantamount to additional compensation,
which is proscribed by Section 8,190 Article IX (B) of the Constitution.

VI

The Regional Trial Court committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the immediate execution of its November 28, 2008 Decision even before the lapse of the period for
appeal.

Execution issues as a matter of right only "upon the expiration of the period to appeal ... if no appeal has been duly perfected."191 The Regional Trial Court denied the Office of the
Solicitor General's Notice of Appeal and the Department of Budget and Management's Motion for Reconsideration in the Joint Order dated March 20, 2009. From this date, the
parties had 15 days to file an ordinary appeal,192 a petition for review with the Court of Appeals193 or a petition for review with the Supreme Court.194 They also had 60 days to file
a petition for certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus with the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court. 195 Despite these clear periods for appeal, the Regional Trial Court issued a
Certificate of Finality of Judgment196 and a Writ of Execution197 on March 23, 2009, or a mere three (3) calendar days from the issuance of its Joint Order.

The Regional Trial Court premises its order of finality on the alleged failure of the Office of the Solicitor General, as counsel for NAPOCOR and its Board of Directors, to perfect
its appeal.198 As previously discussed, the Office of the Solicitor General's Notice of Appeal was timely filed. The Regional Trial Court failed to take into account that by the time
the Office of the Solicitor General filed its appeal, it ceased to represent NAPOCOR and its Board of Directors. The Decision dated November 28, 2008 should not have been
considered final and executory as against the Office of the Solicitor General, acting as the People's Tribune.

Even assuming that the Office of the Solicitor General failed to file a timely appeal, the Department of Budget and Management, through Secretary Andaya, Jr., was able to file its
Motion for Reconsideration of the November 28, 2008 Decision. Upon the denial of the Motion, Secretary Andaya, Jr. still had a fresh period within which to appeal the Decision
with a higher court. Thus, the November 28, 2008 Decision would not have been considered final and executory as against the Department of Budget and Management.

The Regional Trial Court likewise found "strong and compelling reasons" 199 for the immediate issuance of its Decision. In particular, it stated that:

[O]n the basis of the testimonies of the aforementioned key officers of the NPC who categorically stated that NPC had sold and has been selling all its power plants and
transmission lines and the proceeds thereof were given to Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management ["PSA[L]M"] for payment of its obligations to the exclusion of the
present COLAs and AAs; that at present, NPC has 400 Million bank deposits but the payment of COLAs and AAs can be sourced from the revenues of generated funds and
guaranteed receivables from 58 power customers; that the effect of selling all the NPC's power plants and transmission lines will result to lesser future income that cannot meet the
present judgment award. That if ordered by the Court, the management can set aside funds based on the present generated income revenues where NPC has been receiving 10
Billion per month from the present 58 customers.200 (Citation omitted)

The preparation of corporate operating budgets of government-owned and controlled corporations is governed by Executive Order No. 518, series of 1979. 201 Through Republic
Act No. 7638,202 NAPOCOR was placed under the supervision of the Department of Energy, and their corporate operating budgets were submitted to Congress for approval.203

An examination of the testimony the Regional Trial Court relied on reveals that the corporate officers attempted to mask the back payment of additional COLA and AA as a
Certified Obligation, to avoid scrutiny by Congress:

COURT: Can you explain to the Court what does the administration or management of National Power Corporation, as certified obligation insofar as this matter is concerned?

[NPC VP EDMUNDO ANGULUAN]: No, your Honor, what we do is we advise the finance to include this in our certified obligation at the end of the year. That should be the
case.

COURT: Are you telling to the Court that this obligation amounting to 6,496,055,339.98 plus 2 billion estimated amount of back COLA for those persons who claimed their
salary thru disbursement voucher were included in the year 2005 of certified obligation?

A: Yes, your Honor.

COURT: So what happened after the same has been submitted in Congress, was it approved by Congress?

A: It is only internal to us, your Honor, the inclusion of the certified obligation submitted to the Finance is internal to the NPC and this has been carried on for two (2) [years}.
Because during the first year, we were not successful in getting paid of the cost of living so we included it again in the CO.

COURT: So, when it is included as certified obligation, can you please explain to the Court in a common parlance, what did the corporation do insofar as this obligations are
concerned? Am I correct to say or to state that as a certified obligation that seems to be that the NPC or the management recognized this proposition will be due and payable?
A: Yes, your Honor.

COURT: Does it also mean that as certified obligation they are now earmarking portion of their funds for the payments of this obligation?

A: Yes, your Honor.204 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)

It should be noted that the corporate officers of NAPOCOR, including Vice President Anguluan, also stand to benefit from the back payment of any additional COLA and AA.

In any case, the back payment of any compensation to public officers and employees cannot be done through a writ of execution. Under Section 26 of the Government Auditing
Code of the Philippines,205 only the Commission on Audit has the jurisdiction to settle claims "of any sort" against the government:

SECTION 26. General Jurisdiction. - The authority and powers of the Commission shall extend to and comprehend all matters relating to auditing procedures, systems and
controls, the keeping of the general accounts of the Government, the preservation of vouchers pertaining thereto for a period of ten years, the examination and inspection of the
books, records, and papers relating to those accounts; and the audit and settlement of the accounts of all persons respecting funds or property received or held by them in an
accountable capacity, as well as the examination, audit, and settlement of all debts and claims of any sort due from or owing to the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies
and instrumentalities. The said jurisdiction extends to all government-owned or controlled corporations, including their subsidiaries, and other self-goveming [sic] boards,
commissions, or agencies of the Government, and as herein prescribed, including non-governmental entities subsidized by the government, those funded by donation through the
government, those required to pay levies or government share, and those for which the government has put up a counterpart fund or those partly funded by the government.
(Emphasis supplied)

Money claims and judgments against the government must first be filed with the Commission on Audit. Trial courts have already been strongly cautioned against the issuance of
writs of execution in cases involving the disbursement of public funds in Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 10-2000:206

[SUPREME COURT] ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 10-2000

TO: All Judges of Lower Courts

SUBJECT: Exercise of Utmost Caution, Prudence and Judiciousness in the Issuance of Writs of Execution to Satisfy Money Judgments Against Government Agencies and Local
Government Units

In order to prevent possible circumvention of the rules and procedures of the Commission on Audit, judges are hereby enjoined to observe utmost caution, prudence and
judiciousness in the issuance of writs of execution to satisfy money judgments against government agencies and local government units.

Judges should bear in mind that in Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego (31 SCRA 617, 625 [1970]), this Court explicitly stated:

The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant's action 'only up to the completion of
proceedings anterior to the stage of execution' and that the power of the Court ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under
writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the
corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public
funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.

Moreover, it is settled jurisprudence that upon determination of State liability, the prosecution, enforcement or satisfaction thereof must still be pursued in accordance with the
rules and procedures laid down in P.D. No. 1445 [,] otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines (Department of Agriculture [vs.] NLRC, 227 SCRA
693, 701- 02 [1993] citing Republic vs. Villasor, 54 SCRA 84 [1973]). All money claims against the Government must first be filed with the Commission on Audit which must act
upon it within sixty days. Rejection of the claim will authorize the claimant to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court on certiorari and in effect sue the State thereby (P.D. 1445,
Sections 49-50)[.]

Thus, in National Electrification Administration v. Morales,207 this Court held that while any entitlement to the back payment of allowances under Republic Act No. 6758 may be
adjudicated before the trial court, the parties must file a separate action before the Commission on Audit for the satisfaction of any judgment award.208

The Regional Trial Court should have been more prudent in granting the immediate execution, considering that the execution of the judgment award involves the payment of
almost 8.5 billion in public funds. As previously discussed, there was no legal basis to grant the back payment of additional COLA and AA to NAPOCOR personnel from July 1,
1989 to March 16, 1999.

WHEREFORE, the Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition in G.R. Nos. 187257 and 187776 are GRANTED. The Decision dated November 28, 2008, Joint Order dated March
20, 2009, and Writ of Execution dated March 23, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 84 in Civil Case No. Q-07-61728 are VACATED and SET
ASIDE. The Temporary Restraining Order dated April 15, 2009 is made PERMANENT.

SO ORDERED.