Maritime Security and Governance of the South Atlantic: The Nigerian

Perspective.
By
Paul G. Adogamhe, Ph.D.1

Introduction:

This chapter deals with Nigerias perspective on maritime security and governance of the
South Atlantic. It reassesses the levels of collaboration among the regional stakeholders and the
prospects for the setting-up of a new security architecture to tackle the potential transnational
threats and challenges, within the overarching framework of a south-south cooperation. It also
examines Nigerias continued interest and commitment to promoting bilateral and multilateral
initiatives in maritime security cooperation and governance with the goal of enhancing the safety
and security of navigation and commerce, the protection of maritime environment, as well as
ensuring peaceful and cooperative maritime operations in the South Atlantic. Unfortunately, the
Gulf of Guinea (in the South Atlantic eastern rim) has become a breeding ground and a safe haven
for a network of local and transnational criminal activities that undermine the security of the entire
region and threaten the supply of critical resources to the global market. Currently, maritime
security issues revolve around cracking down on piracy, human and drug trafficking, and
protecting natural resources and the ecosystem2.
The maritime security and governance in the South Atlantic are not only a subject of a
growing geostrategic importance and geopolitical interest, but also a field of expanding south-
south cooperation. The South-South cooperation model stands as an alternative approach to the
traditional North-South cooperation and is ideally based on principles of mutual respect,
sovereignty, and cooperation. This contrasts with the traditional model of North-South relations,
in which developing countries receive aid linked to economic and political conditions from
developed countries that often include their formal colonial rulers3. The traditional North-South
relations are built on an assumption that is basically asymmetric and vertical rather than symmetric
and horizontal in character; the structures of these former relationships tend to reinforce and
perpetuate the patterns of global inequalities4. The systematic dissemination of lessons learned
from the study of the littoral states of the South Atlantic could contribute much to the international
debate on south-south cooperation.

Maritime Security: Conceptual Analysis

The concept of maritime security is new in the vocabulary of international security. It
offers a holistic term for discussing a range of issues of security within the maritime domain. While
there is no international consensus on the exact meaning of maritime security, some have defined
it as an effective management of the oceans and good order upon them5. Others, like the Brent
Hurst Foundation, define maritime security from an African perspective as anything that creates,
sustains or improves use of Africas waterways and the infrastructure that supports these
waterways6. Stockrugger and Bueger suggest two ways of thinking of maritime security, namely,
operational and relational:
First, from an operational perspective maritime security is the product of a securitization
process in which different issues are rendered as challenges and require coordinated
responses. Second, from a relational perspective maritime security is best understood by
the relations it has to other challenges, including national security and sea power, the
marine environment and marine safety, economic development and blue economy, and
human security and the resilience of coastal populations. Both understandings of maritime
security allow to grasp and discuss which actors are dealing with certain issues in the
maritime domain, and how they relate to each other, or how they should engage with each
other.7

The various meanings of maritime security as acknowledged above reflect the wider debate
on security as the notion of maritime nations becomes increasingly securitized by most nations
and international organizations. The notion of security in international politics has remained an
essentially-contested and value-laden concept, thus opened to various meanings and
interpretations. While the global war on terror has dramatically reinforced the importance of
security, it has also fundamentally altered the terrain of contest over security.
In the post-9/11 world, security has become a much more expansive, fluid and uncertain
concept, for all of its political significance. While the state loudly proclaimed security, and
employed its traditional military means to achieve it, the state no longer seemed to be a
container of security. The expansiveness and uncertainty of security have multiplied the
sites at which security might be found. Traditional sites, such as militaries and conflicts,
have been re-articulated, but they have been joined by border fences, detention centers,
airport check-in counters, container ports, places of worship, universities, and torture
chambers8.

2
 We must, therefore, broaden our understanding of security to encompass the concept of
maritime security. At a time of new mounting non-traditional security threats such as maritime
piracy, terrorism, cyber terrorism, weapon proliferation, drug trafficking, and illegal fishing, it
behooves maritime nations to rethink the national security policy. At present, these security threats
constitute a large part of the security agendas of the international community as a whole, and
regional organizations. South American and African continental and regional institutions must
develop new protocols to enable member-states to deal effectively with terrorists, pirates, and drug
traffickers, among others. Therefore, security is no longer defined primarily as a zero-sum game
[], but is instead increasingly seen as a trans- and supra-national project for solving societal
problems and achieving shared aims9. It becomes necessary then to deconstruct the traditionally
accepted notion of national security which was viewed mainly in military terms as the defense of
the territory, people, and government of one nation-state. The notion of human security goes
beyond conventional conception as the threats to peace and security in the 21st century include
not just international wars [] but organized crime and civil violence. They also include poverty,
deadly infectious disease and environmental degradation10.
The challenge for the twenty-first century is to fashion a broader understanding [] of
what collective security means11. The ultimate goal of human security is to provide a holistic
framework for addressing security. The concept of human security arises from the recognition that
human security needs are different from state security needs and therefore should be addressed
directly. International security must include the well-being of individuals within the states, as well
as within the regional and global communities of states. As Bueger argues human security has
several maritime dimensions, which stretch from the security of seafarers to the vulnerability of
coastal populations to maritime threats more broadly12. More specifically, Gilpin also argues that
the maritime threats in the Gulf of Guinea undermine economic activity, hinder the movement of
goods and services, and make it difficult for these countries to attain their development goals13 In
other words, maritime security problems and the insecurity born of underdevelopment on land
exist in a symbiotic relationship.
The paradigm of non-traditional security consists of a dynamic process of interaction
among individuals, communities, societies and states and for creating institutions to provide
mechanisms for diplomacy and cooperation. States must learn to consider acts of terrorism against
one state as acts of terrorism against all states, because we live in a global village. This paradigm

3
shift provides an understanding of contemporary security challenges through a more inclusive
approach that equates security with people rather than territories, with development rather than
arms14. Today, transnational maritime security faces a range of new threats from terrorists,
unregulated fishing, natural and environmental disasters, mass migration, drug smuggling, human
trafficking, and piracy. The doctrine of a collective security tends to emphasize the growth of
interdependence among nation-states and of cooperation in the international organizations.
Maritime security is a key component of collective security. It is the foundation for any economic
development through the improvement of global competitiveness for goods and services. There is
competition between individual states as realists have correctly observed, but there is also a natural
pull of gravitation towards collective survival and security. This cooperative and communal spirit
is a significant factor to our understanding of South Atlantic maritime states perspective of
security.
Maritime security is a shared responsibility that emphasizes the importance of
multilateralism and joint coordinated responses. Therefore, the South Atlantic maritime security
follows the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region (CSCAP) Memorandum
Guidelines for Regional Maritime Cooperation which states that issues of ocean management are
closely interrelated and need to be considered as a whole. According to the Memorandum, a
comprehensive concept of regional maritime security requires a multidisciplinary approach,
necessitating cooperation and coordination among all interested bodies and activities.15. The areas
promoted for cooperation and integration in such a comprehensive approach to a regional maritime
security include accession to and cooperation under, the Law of the Sea Convention; conflict
prevention at sea; protection and maintenance of Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs); sharing
of maritime surveillance information; naval cooperation (for confidencebuilding purposes);
search-and-rescue operation; maritime safety; management of natural marine disasters (including
humanitarian assistance); law and order at sea; protection and preservation of the marine
environment; marine resources; marine scientific research; technical cooperation and capacity
building, and training and education16.

The Geopolitics of the South Atlantic

The South Atlantic refers not just to oceanic expanses and rim lands located in the
southern half of the Atlantic Basin but rather the entire basin area (sea as well as coastal lands)

4
south of the Tropic of Cancer or if one would rather look at it from such a perspective, the whole
expanse located southwards from the area of jurisdiction of NATO17. This geopolitical space as
a region is strategically situated between Africa and South America and it has become the center
of gravity in inter-regional security cooperation and commerce. The South Atlantic Ocean is a
veritable sea route for international trade and commerce connecting the Far East countries with
those of the North Atlantic. It is also considered a developmental platform because it contains vast
mineral deposits in commercial quantity that could provide the region with immense resources for
development.
Huge hydrocarbon reserves have been identified in Venezuela and Brazil offshore and
under the seas north of the Falklands and near the South Georgia archipelago. On the South
Atlantic eastern rim, Angola, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, Equatorial Guinea and
Gabon also boast of real or expected oil deposits--all potential game changers in economic,
politics and security18.

One of the problems confronting the South Atlantic community is how to implement a
comprehensive institutional framework that will foster an effective maritime security governance
regime in the South Atlantic. The original idea of security community came with the work of
Karl Deutsch on NATO in the 1950s and1960s and according to Deutsch and his collaborators,
security communities are a form of political cooperation largely characterized by an absence of
war, the peaceful settlement of conflict among community members, a growing sense of mutual
trust and the development of a collective identity19. The concept of maritime security community
is an ideal type, as Bueger has claimed, but it is useful for evaluating how actors collaborate in
the domain of maritime security20. He also maintained that the notion of maritime security
communities integrates the current thinking about security communities as well as further indicates
that an appropriate understanding of security has to go beyond the traditional understanding of an
absence of war. According to him, security communities are a distinct form of security governance
that differs from others such as alliances. They are about shared securitizations, how distinct
threats are identified, and how a community deals with them collectively21. Since the cold war
era, there is increasing interest among policymakers and analysts alike on both sides of South
Atlantic on how to evolve an effective maritime security community regime.
South Atlantic, as the zone of peace and cooperation (ZPCSA), was initially proposed by
Brazil and eventually established by the UN General Assembly in October 27, 1986, with the
adoption of UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/41/11. The aim is to promote peace and

5
security in the South Atlantic region. The desire to keep foreign powers out of the South Atlantic
was motivated in large part by Cold War politics. Brazil, in particular, wants to safeguard its
onshore and offshore natural resources in that zone that its navy calls the Blue Amazon22. Since
its creation, the zone of peace and cooperation has provided a flexible regional mechanism for
cooperation on political, technical, cultural and security issues among the members. The zone
consists of countries from South America and Africa that have a littoral border on the South
Atlantic. The ZPCSA which comprises 24 countries (21 African countries and 3 South American
Countries), has extended its original nuclear non-proliferation remit to discussing shared trans-
national security challenges including piracy. The ZPCSA is an entity that has not only the
potential to advance collaboration between African and Latin American states but also has the
prospects of evolving into the South Atlantic security community.
The ZPCSAs 24 country members are Angola, Benin, Brazil, Cape Verde, Cameroon,
Congo-Brazzaville, Cote dIvoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon,
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Namibia, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe,
Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Togo, and Uruguay. The states in the region are linked to one
another by the Atlantic Ocean, which provides the trade route for their commerce. The primary
focus of the ZPCSA is security cooperation. However, there has been limited engagement by
signatory states due to the fact that their sporadic meetings have tended to focus on reinforcing
institutional framework23. All member states are currently signatories of international treaties that
prohibit nuclear weapons, namely the African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty and the Treaty
for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. These commitments
also contribute to strengthening initiatives within United Nations framework aimed at the
establishment of a Nuclear weapon free zone in the South Atlantic. It is primarily aimed at the
preservation of peace in the South Atlantic and at keeping the area free of weapons of mass
destruction. Other areas of concern are the social and economic development, the need to preserve
the environment and the conservation of living resources of the region. The UN Resolution that
have been approved since 1986 regarding the zone also urge all states to take the necessary
measures to ensure the zones protection from environmental damage by abstaining from
transferring to and disposing in the region hazardous, toxic and nuclear wastes (A/RES/44/20).
As a result of recent geopolitical changes in the maritime security situation and new interest
from some key states like Brazil, there has been renewed drive to reinvigorate the ZPCSA24. It has

6
a great appeal to Brazil not only because the ZPCSA was a Brazilian initiative, but also because it
fully meets aspirations of Brazilian current foreign and defense policies. It is much amenable to
Brazilian influence given its status in the region. Other factors that have spurred renewed interest
in the ZPCSA are the ongoing tensions between the UK and Argentina over the disputed status of
the Falklands/Malvinas islands and the growing incidence of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea that have
focused greater attention on peace and security cooperation in the region. The 2007 Luanda Plan
of Action mandated the strengthening of regional security cooperation between African and South
American countries and specifically mentioned the utility of the ZPCSA as the proper institutional
framework to achieving that goal. The Ministerial Meeting of Montevideo (2013) was aimed
mainly to revitalize the ZPCSA and to involve the participation of almost every country in the
region. To strengthen the initiative and to reinforce its institutional framework, a contact group
was established to monitor the implementation of the decisions reached in Montevideo and
coordinate on issues relevant to the zone of peace and cooperation. Through the Montevideo
Declaration, the ZPCSA countries have agreed to maintain an annual meeting during the UN
General Assembly to review the progress attained and to decide on future course of actions25.
There are many relevant stakeholders, forums, and institutions across the region, which
already contribute in different ways to the creation of a security structure at the South Atlantic.
These include the African Union (AU), the Southern Africa Development community (SADC),
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Economic Community of Central
Africa States (ECCAS), the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC), the Maritime Organization of
West and Central Africa (MOWCA) and Indian-Brazil-South Africa-Maritime Exercise
(IBSAMAR). Other organizational entities that have been formed within the South Atlantic for
limited security cooperation include the South Atlantic Maritime Area Command (CAMAS) made
up of Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay, and global institutions such as UN and IMO. As a result of
geographical and mandate overlaps, some argue for greater integration and coordination, as none
of these security initiatives have arguably succeeded in creating a comprehensive framework for
intergovernmental security cooperation. There is no doubt that there is still linguistic and political
division in the region that reflects historical development over the centuries. Looking at the South
Atlantic from a maritime security regional perspective shows a union of diverse cultures and
political strips endeavoring to collaborate in an environment of peace and tranquility.

7
 In terms of transatlantic relations, the idea of actively developing a more tightly-knit
multilateral security system of a South Atlantic Treaty Organization (SATO) along the lines of
NATO initially emerged with the increasing presence of Soviet navy in the South Atlantic during
the cold war period in the late 1970s. This defense project was to include Brazil, Argentina,
Uruguay and Apartheid South Africa. While the proposal for SATO appears to have intuitive logic
that many a strategist finds unchallengeable, the divergence of views amongst the supposed
members of a South Atlantic Pact has been so great that the formation was always highly
improbable26. There were political difficulties in developing such a defense Pact with South Africa,
which was at the time isolated politically as a result of its apartheid policy. In addition, such a
defense mechanism could have been detrimental even to BrazilAfrica relations27.
In the post-cold era, African and South American leaders have participated in a series of
summit conferences in order to promote and expand their commercial and diplomatic engagements
to bridge the South Atlantic divide. In a second Summit of this group held in Margarita Island,
Venezuela, on September 29, 2009, the late Venezuelan President, Hugo Chavez, the late Libyan
leader, Muammar Qaddafi, and 28 other leaders from South America and Africa called for new
links between the continents, including joint military, banking and mining efforts. Chavez and
Qaddafi proposed a military alliance mirroring the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to
counteract the influence of the U.S. and Europe in the South Atlantic. Chavez also called for the
creation of a unified mining company, an Oil Company and a Bank. The Bank of the South was
finally formed at this meeting with an initial seven billion dollar capitalization and rising to 20
billion in future years and was intended as an alternative to borrowing from the IMF and the World
Bank. The Presidents of Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela
signed the foundational document28. Although a vision of transatlantic defense pact may appear to
be strategically attractive to African and South American leaders, it never came to fruition.
The high volume of trade that exist within the South Atlantic elevates the need and
importance of maritime security cooperation and the protection of trading vessels, particularly
considering the crisis situation in the Gulf of Guinea. Most recently, the idea of a quadrilateral
cooperation has been proposed involving South Africa, Brazil, Angola, and Nigeria to focus on
maritime security that will go a long way to addressing the current proliferating insecurity in the
Gulf of Guinea, especially with regards to piracy29. Advocates argue that South Atlantic Ocean,
rich in resources and an important geo-economic space, is increasingly becoming a developmental

8
platform in addition to being a trade route. Because of the trade and political relations between
South America, Africa and Indian, the South Atlantic also functions as a platform for the strategic
partnerships, particularly of a south-south nature. Maritime security in the South Atlantic Ocean
and the Gulf of Guinea becomes even more important due to the increase in trade between states
from Latin America, Europe and Africa. The rationale advanced by the advocates for a
quadrilateral cooperation is a good economic argument, but politically, a collective regional
strategy comprising most members of the zone offers a more realistic strategy for inter-state
cooperation of the South Atlantic. The 2008 UN Secretary-General Report on oceans and the law
of the sea emphasized the importance of international cooperation and coordinated responses, and
stresses that maritime security is a shared responsibility and requires a new vision of collective
security30.
While these maritime security threats are real ones in the South Atlantic, failure to tackle
them from a regional or global perspective only offers further opportunities for their growth and
development. There is need for all stakeholders involved to bring something to the table in crafting
a more effective and integrated maritime security strategy. The suggested four protagonists of a
quadrilateral cooperation could serve as energizers for the rest members of the group. South
Atlantic, as the zone of peace and cooperation, does provide the better prospects for an inter-
regional framework for maintenance of peace and security as well as for promoting an effective
south-south cooperation. Therefore, the existing institutional arrangement of the ZPCSA as well
as its present memberships could serve as a preferred instrument for a diplomatic discourse leading
to the formation of a new and effective governance regime. Such a future South Atlantic Security
Community I propose be known as the Organization for Peace and Security of the South Atlantic
(OPSSA). As Amorim notes:
[]despite its low efficiency, ZPCSA may be important for the countries of the region as
a multilateral forum for addressing regional issues with minimal interference from
countries outside the South Atlantic, especially in a future scenario in which the developed
countries decide to militarily intervene aiming to ensure access to markets, oil and mineral
resources(). It is clear, therefore, that Brazilian initiatives in this regional scenario are
not isolated, and that the actions of other major global players are taken into consideration
in the Brazilian diplomatic calculus31.

The South Atlantic is a region of deep interdependence, broadly-shared security challenges,

fragmented cooperation, and loose political convergence32. Partnerships have been proliferating
among many countries in the region and a jigsaw of regional cooperative frameworks is emerging.

9
But can shared security challenges and interdependence provide political incentives for an
encompassing regional security governance framework as a platform for south-south
collaboration? Are these factors significant enough to establish a strong and practical basis for
Southern Atlantic security governance architecture? There is no doubt that the regional
stakeholders in the South Atlantic share similar broadly compatible threat perceptions even if they
may differ in their assessment of adequate responses33.

Maritime Security Threats and Challenges in the South Atlantic.

One of the challenges is that there seems to be no common understanding as to what exactly
the maritime security governance regime will encompass among the participating states in the
ZPCSA. On the one hand, the countries in the Gulf of Guinea seem to be more concerned by the
immediate insecurity of maritime piracy which threatens the security and economies of their sub-
region and other local issues of governance such as human security, poverty and internal security
rather than the broader strategic issues that concern the wider South Atlantic. On the other hand,
Brazil has more multifaceted goals within the broader framework focusing on the strategic,
political and economic engagement especially with the goals of developing a consensus regional
hegemony and the Blue Amazon --the vast mineral deposits that lie untapped within its Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ). Argentina is still concerned over the ongoing disputed status of the
Falklands/Malvinas islands with Great Britain34. These differences in perception and goals among
ZPCSA member states are serious enough to complicate the efforts aimed at organizing regional
security cooperation in the South Atlantic. Other common and major non-state security challenges
confronting the region include transnational crimes, piracy that threats commercial traffic and oil
supplies in the Gulf of Guinea, narcotic smuggling from Latin America to West Africa and other
related illicit traffics35.
Piracy and Other Transnational Crimes in the Gulf of Guinea
The Gulf of Guineas coastal arc, which stretches over 6,000 kilometers from Senegal to
Angola, has the richest marine natural resources in the world. It is endowed with immense deposits
of hydrocarbon, fish, timber and a substantial bio-diversity of marine resources. It is a commercial
artery of maritime activities, the gateway for exports of oil and hydrocarbons and the imports of
manufactured goods to Africa and Asia. The recent discovery of oil and gas reserves in Ghana,
Republic of Benin, Congo-Brazzaville and Cote dIvoire has escalated the traffic in the Gulf of

10
Guinea. The vast economic potential of the sub-region has increased the importance of the Gulf of
Guinea. That Gulf has become the oil pipeline to the world market. With this commercial boom
came piracy on the high sea. In light of this challenge, it becomes inevitable to establish maritime
security and to restore and maintain good order at sea. Even though piracy in the Gulf of Guinea
has now overtaken Somali piracy in the Indian Ocean, the latter continue to receive far more
attention internationally.36
The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) defines piracy as any illegal acts
of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends on the high seas
against ships or aircraft37. In recent times, as a result of the growing number of incidents of
maritime piracy, the West African waters are considered dangerous to international shipping, and
other maritime transportation38. Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea began off the coast of Nigeria and
has spread to the waters off the coasts of the neighboring countries of the Republic of Benin,
Cameroun, Cote d Ivo ire, Gabon, Togo, and Sao Tome and Principe. The pirates who were hardly
significant have become more sophisticated. There is a significant rise in violence, including
physical abuse and mock executions against seafarers as well as an increase in kidnapfor-ransom
crimes. Maritime security has come at a high price to seamen, estimated cost of about 12 billion
dollars annually. In assessing the piracy of Gulf of Guinea and the clear threat to security, the UN
Undersecretary for Political Affairs, Mr. B. Lynn Pascoe, noted after his visit to the Republic
Benin, Nigeria, Gabon and Angola, that:
[ ]Such crimes increasingly undermined socio-economic development efforts in the
region and were becoming more violent and systematic, targeting lucrative cargo such as
oil onboard the ships, rather than taking hostages for ransom as in East Africa. Incidents of
piracy reported to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) had risen from 45 in
2010 to 64 last year. Gulf of Guinea countries need a united front in order to respond
effectively to the growing threat of piracy along their coasts39.

There is need for a better understanding of the linkages between onshore and offshore
insurgencies that are the drivers of maritime insecurity in the Gulf Guinea. Until recently, the issue
of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea was treated more as purely a security problem rather than a form
of organized crime and a symptom of a deeper governance problem onshore. As a result, the oil
and gas companies have generally responded to piracy by strengthening their defenses. This has
been a narrow security-minded approach to the problem. There is no doubt that illegal activities in
the region are linked to the overall socio-economic, political and security challenges that face the
region. Thus, the growth of piracy can be attributed to structural factors such as economic

11
deprivation, political exclusion, socio-economic tension, poor governance, pervasive corruption,
natural resource mismanagement, pollution, grievances of local communities, and weak maritime
policies. As Chalk succinctly notes,
Perhaps, the biggest problem is that the various initiatives that have been instituted to
secure the GoG [Gulf of Guinea] proceed from the assumption that threats can best be dealt
with at sea. This is at odds with the basic reality that the main drivers for maritime violence
and crime in the gulf stem from landnotably economic marginalization, social
deprivation, poverty, and corruption. Until a comprehensive moves are made to mitigate
these root causes---particularly in the Niger delta, which constitutes a main source for many
of the sea-based threats currently afflicting the region---issues such as armed maritime
crime, oil theft, and drug trafficking will remain an enduring feature of the wider Gulf of
Guinea landscape40.

However, the initial presence of maritime piracy in the Gulf of Guinea has been attributed
mainly to poverty and high unemployment in the Niger Delta of Nigeria. Sometimes, corruption
and dirty deals within the Nigerian Navy have facilitated the piracy attacks. The continuous oil
spillage and degradation of the coastal environment have gradually destroyed the traditional means
of livelihoods in agriculture, fishing and stock-raising of the local population. Thomas A.
Imobighe, an expert on the Niger Delta, has argued that while the presence of huge reserves of gas
and oil has turned the Niger Delta into the economic jewel in the Nigerian crown, the
exploitation of these resources is not in the hands of the people of the region. Since these
Multinational Corporations (MNCs), according to him, provide the technology for translating the
rich resources of the Niger Delta into wealth, they practically control the key to the countrys
economic prosperity. In the exercise of this onerous responsibility, the MNCs fall under the
supervision of the Nigerian state:
[...] Thus the prosperity generated from oil production in the region, instead of creating
wealth for the people of the Niger Delta region, has brought about environmental
dislocation, instability, corruption and repression. Oil production in the Niger delta, instead
of spreading contentment and harmony in the region, has brought about frustration and a
complex, multi-level conflict, which has persisted for a very long time, and has since March
2003 escalated into unprecedented inter-communal violence of the most destructive
nature41.

The inter-communal conflicts and violence have resulted in a massive loss of life and
property while also disrupting economic activities, particularly oil prospecting and extraction. This
has led to severe cutbacks in oil production, estimated at 500,000 barrels/a day, which is almost a
quarter of Nigerias estimated daily production of a about 2 million barrels. The majority of the
youth population in the region are left with few employment opportunities, and thus provides a

12
fertile recruiting ground for insurgent groups and criminal networks that offer alternative work,
financial services, and socio-economic status. While several factors could have contributed to
Nigerias security situation today, there is no doubt that poor governance and a lack of effective
leadership at levels of governance are central to the problem. The high level of corruption among
the ruling elites with the profits from the oil industry and other natural resources created an
inequitable distribution of wealth that fostered income disparities within the society. This, in turn,
has created socio-economic tensions worsened by social inequality that sometimes excludes some
groups both from the wealth and from the political decision-making process.
As a result of continued discontent and frustration brought about by poverty, lack of
employment opportunities, and uncertain livelihoods, the youths of the local communities are
increasingly tempted by, and willing to engage in, illegal forms of trade in the informal sector of
the economy in order to survive their harsh socio-economic situation. The armed youth of the local
communities initially willing engage in oil pipeline vandalism, kidnapping, and extracting large
ransom payments for hostages, before they later diversified into more serious criminal maritime
activities. The creation of the insurgent group, Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
(MEND) in 2005, marked a new stage of the struggle and of violence in the local community of
the Niger Delta region42. These armed militias have used criminal activities such as oil thefts,
kidnapping, and attacks on fishing boats as a way to fight against the oil multinationals (MNCs)
and to bring their struggle to the attention of the Abuja ruling elites. In spite of the amnesty
program given by the late President of Nigeria, Alhaji Umaru Musa YarAdua, to appease these
organized militias and bring peace to the region, a number of splinter groups and factions within
MEND such as the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA), the Niger Delta Liberation Front (NDLF), the
Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF), and the Niger Delta Vigilantes (NDV) have
emerged and have resumed attacks on the oil companies offshore production activities in the sea.
These various militia groups in Niger Delta have graduated into more sophisticated
networks of maritime crimes such as illegal oil bunkering, drug trafficking, kidnapping, small arm
and light weapon trafficking, and maritime piracy. As Paes notes,
What has often started as a small survival strategy of the local population shows
increasingly the characteristics of organized crime, fostered by a climate of lawlessness
and underdevelopment, which puts a large reservoir of disgruntled youth at the disposal of
local warlords. Oil-rigs and workers are seized and held for ransom and in some areas,
such as the Niger Delta, the politically-motivated resistance overlaps with criminal acts43.

13
Other social challenges include violent crimes, ethno-religious conflicts, resource-based conflicts,
trans-border criminal activities, and election-induced violence. All these security violations
undoubtedly pose threats to the socio-economic and political stability in the Gulf of Guinea. Given
the easy wealth associated with maritime piracy activities, the pirates have stretched their criminal
activities into the high seas throughout the Gulf of Guinea. Most West African nations generally
have weak domestic legislations against piracy and this limits the ability of states in the region to
prosecute incidents of piracy and thus provides incentives for alleged criminals to continue to
further their criminal activities to the detriment of the entire sub-region.
The location of oil fields and other natural resources has sometimes resulted in considerable
maritime boundary disputes when a state in the region unilaterally determines and apportions
exploration blocks that infringe upon areas of disputed ownership by a neighboring state. These
border disputes hamper cooperation between the security forces of neighboring states and hinder
the application of the right of hot pursuit of criminals. In many areas, these pirates have exploited
their geographical knowledge of the coastal terrain (islands, peninsulas, and mangroves with
difficult access that makes them ideal hiding places). In fact, they know the terrain better than
coastguards and therefore operate in total freedom without being caught44. Furthermore, the
economic and political fragmentation of the states has hindered collective regional responses to
challenges that are common to many states in the region.
Transnational Criminal Networks and Illicit Flows in the South Atlantic
The transatlantic drug trade has grown tremendously, using some West African countries as
key strategic transshipment points for distribution of cocaine from Latin America to the lucrative
markets in Europe, United States, and beyond. Colombian and Mexican drug cartels are known to
be developing illegal activities in some West African countries, sometimes in collusion with
political and military elites.45 Drawing on statistics from the United Nations Office on Drug and
Crime (UNODC), McGuire notes that between 2005 and 2008, about 46 metric tons of cocaine
destined for the Western European market were seized by law enforcement officials in or around
West Africa, where only years before amounts of over one ton for the entire African continent
were rare. 46
One transshipment route is through Guinea-Bissau and Guinea and the other route
is through Ghana and Nigeria. There is a loose network of drug barons in Nigeria and it is clear
that these criminal networks are increasingly involved in the illegal drug trade and distribution of
drugs to Europe and North America47. The use of West Africa for transshipment also reflected the

14
desire of the South American drug traffickers to expand and diversify available trafficking routes
as well as complicate the task of interdiction by the law enforcement agents. Crime and violence
associated with organized crime is gradually spreading in West Africa and undermining the state
capacities and the rule of law to fight against criminality involved in drug trafficking. Investigators
posit that once large shipments of cocaine are off-loaded from planes and boats in Guinea-Bissau,
the drugs are then disbursed in smaller quantities throughout the region before being shipped out
on commercial air flights and other means to Europe. Guinea-Bissau remains a central hub for
narcotics trafficking in West Africa and is in danger of becoming a fragile and genuine narco-
state.48
A fragile state such as Guinea-Bissau is commonly defined as one having weak authority,
capacity or legitimacy and suffering from poor state-society relations and inadequate
governance49. People moving illicit commodities typically choose transshipment states that offer
ease of transit and access to final targets or markets.50 Most of the states in West Africa have
weak democratic institutions, high levels of corruption, low levels of law enforcement, and no
more than a nominal adherence to the rule of law. Generally, they tend to meet the ease-of-transit
criterion and, therefore, are particularly attractive to traffickers of illicit commodities51. The other
problem is that some illicit flows are accompanied by violence, money laundering, and
intimidation that are associated with organized crime at one or more stages in the process of
production, transportation, and marketing. According to the Washington-based Office of National
Drug Control Policy (ONDCP),52 it is estimated that Mexican and Colombian drug trafficking
organizations generate, remove, and launder between $18bn. and $39bn. in wholesale drug
proceeds annually. Perhaps, even more widespread for shipment protection is the use of corruption,
with targets from customs and immigration officers, to the highest levels of the political elite, and
from the military and law enforcement to bureaucracies and politicians. In effect, illicit flows are
often accompanied by export of instability53. As William notes:
Flows and concomitant presence of traffickers create particular adverse consequences when
states are already weak and corrupt, when poverty levels and economic and social
marginalization are widespread, and when governments are formed by political and military
elites less concerned with enhancing the collective good of the people than with exploiting
individual and group opportunities for rent-seeking. At the same time, it is important not to
see the illicit flows of cocaine as the major problem in a region that has much more
fundamental and long-term challenges ranging from widespread poverty to atrocious
governance and corrupt political elites. It is indisputable that the flows of cocaine exacerbate
the challenges of security, governance, and development; but it is equally important to point

15
 out that these flows and the accompanying presence of Latin American drug trafficking
networks did not create those challenges.54

Narcotic trade between Brazil and Guinea-Bissau is facilitated by linguistic and cultural
affinity between the two Portuguese-speaking countries. From the Gulf of Guinea, drugs are
smuggled across the Sahara along well-established migratory routes into Europe via Portugal and
Spain. There are other several routes that have been identified by UNODC as two parallel drug
flows to Europe, involving large maritime and private air shipments owned and managed by South
Americans. There are overland routes that move through North Africa, and there were concerns
that al-Qaeda in the Islam Maghreb (AQIM) was funding its terrorist operations in part by
providing protection for cocaine shipments55. Such concerns intensified the instability in the Sahel
and the claims that Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Chad have become part of the preferred overland
route to Europe. As a result of economic stagnation and the lack of viable economic alternatives,
drug traffickers have taken an economic and political stranglehold of Guinea-Bissau. Corruption
is a serious problem for narcotics law enforcement all over Africa and Guinea-Bissau is
particularly susceptible. Traffickers are able to pay off law enforcement and coopt high-ranking
politicians and military officers. The irony of the situation is that once the political elites have a
share of the cocaine proceeds, they will do nothing to stop the drug trade; rather they solicit both
Latin American and indigenous traffickers by offering protection and other inducements. The
Guinea-Bissau military officials guaranteed a safe passage through the country for cocaine
shipping en-route to consumers in Europe and North America.
The spread of the drug trade across the South Atlantic clearly illustrates growing trends
and the increasing complexity of security between Western and Eastern rims of South Atlantic.
The growth of this transatlantic cocaine trade has corroded governmental structures in fragile West
African states already hampered by years of internal conflict and economic stagnation. These
transnational criminal syndicates also undermine international efforts to restore constitutional
order and build a more transparent and representative democratic structure. The South Atlantic
drug trade shows signs of becoming entwined with violent networks such as kidnapping, murder,
and armed smuggling in the region. The attempt to establish drug and weapon links with the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) was also indicative of deepening connections
between the illicit South Atlantic drug trade and the wider network of violent extremist groups and
criminal gangs. The drug challenges of West Africa, according to James Cockayne and Phil

16
Williams observation, stem mainly from the interaction between the regions growing drug-
consumption and drug trafficking problems on the one side and pre-existing social, economic and
political vulnerabilities on the other.56 While there is the real problem of the growing
consumption of the drug in West Africa and the long term social impact on the region, this fades
in significance, according to Williams, when compared with the massive illicit financial flows out
of Africa that stem from corruption, tax evasion and other criminal activities.57

Nigerias Strategic Security Interests in the South Atlantic

The prevailing perception of Nigeria as a predominant leader in Africa plays an important
role in determining the countrys foreign and security policies. Nigeria plays a critical leading role
in regional security governance at two levels: at the regional level in West Africa and of the
continental level in Africa. We can argue that Nigerias dual regional role is a carefully-constructed
narrative that is central to its foreign policy objectives and indeed its identity as an African State58.
While these two roles are interlinked and can reinforce each other, they are nevertheless different
to the extent that Nigeria is the clear regional leader in the West African sub region where it
dominates the security architecture while it is competing as a leader at the continental level.59 The
implication of this is that it highlights the various opportunities, challenges and tensions that
underscore Nigerias roles as both a regional (African) leader as well as a sub-regional (West
African) power. With this status comes certain responsibilities which might occasionally require
the use of force to promote peace and stability in the region. Apart from Nigeria, and to a lesser
degree Angola and Ghana, no other country of the Gulf of Guinea can boast of any significant
naval or coastguard capability to constitute any significant deterrence or counter-measure against
growing maritime crimes. Yet the Gulf of Guinea continues to experience a major security problem
with piracy, including the hijacking of transport ships and oil tanker ships. It is therefore, in the
interest of regional governments to have strong navies to monitor their waters so as to cope with
these asymmetrical threats. As Ukeje notes:
[]Except for a handful of them--except, perhaps, Senegal and Cameroon--most of the
other Gulf of Guinea countries cannot boast of a national strategy, or even a wellresourced
action plan to tackle maritime security challenges beyond paying lip service to the desire
to scale-up the capability of their navy and coastguard services. Even the largest of the
navy in the region, the Nigerian navy, faces the problem of acute resource deficits;
especially in terms of dwindling statutory allocation that affects training, equipment,
facilities and operational costs.60

17
 While ECOWAS has remained central to Nigerias responses to transnational security
threats and challenges in the Gulf of Guinea,61 the overarching strategic objective is to make the
sub-regional maritime domain safe and secure and to be investment friendly. ECOWAS security
strategy includes the strengthening of maritime governance, maritime safety and security, maritime
environmental management, optimization of maritime economy, and maritime awareness and
research62. Hence, the body recently adopted the ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Strategy (EIMS)
and the 2012 Yaound Declaration of the Heads of States and Governments of Central and West
African states. The Yaound Memorandum of Understanding was established 24-25 June, 2013 to
create an inter-regional integrated coastguard network in West and Central Africa, and to share
intelligence, among other things. The Joint Agreement also provides the legal framework to
facilitate the pursuit and arrest of such criminals outside maritime territorial waters. It also aims to
define the modalities for extradition as well as facilitating judicial procedures against criminals,
whatever their nationality.63 In a recent address to a meeting of the Joint Committee on Political
Affairs, Peace and Security of the ECOWAS, the Director General of the Nigerian Maritime
Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA), Dakuku Peterside, reiterated this commitment:
The adoption of the ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Strategy (EIMS) and 2012 Yaound
Declaration of the Heads of States and Governments of Central and West African States
on Maritime Safety and Security is clear demonstration of the critical role of the ECOWAS
parliament in ensuring safety and security of the sub-regions shipping and maritime
transportation including the territorial waters and the seas[]Our economies are
unfortunately tied to the prospects of the ocean; the ocean is the medium for which most
of our trade and transactions are conducted, the ocean also provides a unique opportunity
for us to optimize the benefits of the blue economy and a special opportunity for us to tap
into the benefits of nature.64

Nigeria is the most prominent member of the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) and it is also the largest and the most influential economy in ECOWAS. While the
defense of sovereignty and territorial integrity are key security priorities, the Nigerian foreign
policy is directed toward enhancing its position in key regional and global institutions. Nigeria is
one of the strong pivotal countries to drive the process of maritime security and governance in the
region. The smaller nations in ECOWAS do not want to lose their national identity to the larger
community of ECOWAS and this sometimes dampens the enthusiasm to embrace implementing
EIMS. Nigeria, however, has sought to advance its perceived security and developmental interests
within the regional organization and is committed to preserving the freedom of the seas in order

18
to facilitate the movement of desirable goods, services, and people across border within the
framework of UNCLOS and the International Maritime Organization (IMO).
Nigerias strategic objectives include defending the country from direct attack, ensuring
freedom of the seas, and access to ports, and freedom of navigation in international waters;
strengthening partnerships and alliances, and establishing favorable maritime security conditions
in the South Atlantic. Nigerias strategic objectives in the South Atlantic hinges on the countrys
geographical and strategic location on the Gulf of Guinea as a littoral nation. This advantageous
coastline location makes it to act as a trade-transit state, which is of significant importance to some
West African landlocked states economies, particularly those states that require exporting of their
commodities and importing of goods. This requires cooperation with Nigeria and other littoral
states by landlocked states. With its long land and coastal boundaries straddling on Western and
Equatorial Africa and its significant onshore and offshore oil and gas deposits as well as its
commitment to a peaceful use of sea lines of communication, Nigeria definitely has maritime
security interests in the South Atlantic. At the International Maritime Conference organized by the
Nigerian Navy in Lagos, the Nigerian Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Defense, Alhaji
Aliyu Ismaila, underscored this point:
As for us in Nigeria, the need to cooperate and share maritime intelligence, particularly
among the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) nations is incontestable. This is underscored by under
scale of relevance of Nigerias economy on the maritime resources within the nations
Exclusive Economic Zone. The exploitation of oil and gas deposits is responsible for over
80 percent of government revenue and contributes 85 percent to our GDP making it the
mainstay of our national economy. Regrettably, this is being undermined by a myriad of
maritime security challenges perpetuated by local and international collaborators in the
form of oil theft, piracy, sea robbery, poaching, among others. There is thus the necessity
to step up surveillance activities along our waterways so as to allow the unperturbed
movement of goods, services and passengers in the entire Gulf of Guinea (GoG) region.65

Nigerias growing maritime interests is in protecting the booming oil and gas industry
offshore in the Gulf of Guinea. It sees the Gulf of Guinea as an area of priority concern, not the
least due to the discovery of vast off-shore fossil fuel reserves and that 90 percent of its trade goes
through its ports. Therefore, as a matter of national prerogative, Nigeria has invested heavily in
the Gulf of Guinea maritime security, which is considered vital to Nigerian national security
because it safeguards Nigerias economic crown jewel, the oil and gas industry, as well as the
serves the enforcement of national and international maritime laws. Nigeria prioritizes naval
cooperation, with the Nigerian Navy playing an active role in projects such as officer training,

19
joint exercises, and equipment provisions especially with African countries in the sub-regional
cooperation of ECOWAS and ECCAS. Illegal fishing costs often have an immediate impact on
the lives of local populations; at least one study suggests that fishery depletion from illegal fishing
is a contributing cause of maritime piracy. Therefore, Nigeria and other African states have valid
reasons to upgrade their naval forces to protect them from natural and human security threats
within territorial waters. Maritime strategy should serve the interests of the state and, in terms of
security, the type of strategy a maritime force adopts must reflect the national objectives of the
state. Maritime forces of the state are important for the protection of a countrys natural resources
and rights in war and in peace. Hence, Nigeria is building a robust naval force and coastguard to
secure the Gulf of Guinea and to protect its natural resources and to support its foreign policy.
The overall strategy of Nigerias defense policy objectives is to deter any attack on the
countrys territorial integrity and should deterrence fail, to repel or defeat the enemy and end the
conflict on terms favorable to Nigeria. The 1964 Navy Act assigned to the Nigerian Navy the tasks
of defending territorial waters, of training in naval duties, of conducting hydrographic surveys, of
assisting in the enforcement of customs laws, and of undertaking other missions assigned by the
government. Since the 1980s, the specific tasks of the Nigerian Navy include defense against
seaborne attack, protection of international shipping and maritime commerce, offshore oil and sea
resources, and prevention or prosecution of illegal bunkering and lifting of petroleum. The
Nigerian maritime security objectives include the protection and exploitation of resources in the
Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs); the prevention of illegal fishing; the protection of maritime
environment from pollution and other environmental damages, combating smuggling and
trafficking at sea, illegal oil bunkering, and maritime terrorism; ensuring security of ports and other
facilities; and safeguarding the communities living in the coastal regions66. In his address at an
International Maritime Conference in Lagos organized to mark the 60thAnniversary of the Nigerian
Navy, President Buhari of Nigeria called for greater collaboration between the Nigeria Navy and
other stakeholders in tackling maritime security challenges in the Gulf of Guinea:
[]The challenges of maritime threats in the Gulf of Guinea have gone beyond what
Nigeria alone could deal with. The Nigerian Navysince inception has applied only the
most optimal policies and strategies to resolve maritime challenges in our maritime areas.
They have remained constant in ensuring sea control and arrest of illegal bunkers,
smugglers, pipeline vandals and other miscreants in the fight against illegalities in the
nations maritime domain and beyond. But the situation has gone beyond our capability to
handle. It, therefore, calls for greater international collaboration between the Nigerian
Navy and other international maritime stakeholders.67

20
Nigeria/Regional Cooperation and Partnership in the Gulf of Guinea:
The West African nations have made tremendous progress toward cooperating to combat
piracy at sea in order to improve the maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. Nigeria has been at
the forefront of this efforts to combat both piracy and other transnational crimes at sea in order to
improve the maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. It has helped to establish the Gulf of Guinea
Commission (GGC) in 1999 and the treaty was ratified in 2001. The treaty harmonizes the policies
of member states on peace and security, the transport of oil and natural resources, and the free
circulation of good and services in the Gulf of Guinea. The Nigerian government has also taken
steps to enhance maritime security by being signatory to a number of conventions such as the 2050
African Union Integrated Maritime Strategy (AIMS) in 2015. The African Union 2050 Integrated
African Maritime Security Strategys goals are, among others, to ensure security and safety of
maritime transportation systems and to prevent hostile and criminal acts at sea and to
coordinate/harmonize the prosecution of the offenders.68 The 2050 AIMS also provides a broad
framework for sustainable exploitation of the maritime domain of Africa for wealth creation and
for the purpose of promoting the blue economy. Nigeria is also a signatory to other international
legal instruments to combat threats posed by piracy, such as the UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS) that prescribes exclusive zones over which individual states have the rights for
exploration, cultivate energy production from water and wind, and use marine resources. For this
agreement to be operative, states have to adopt and incorporate it into their national laws, and most
West African countries have signed and ratified the Law of the Sea Convention.
As a sub-regional leader, Nigeria has played a leading and critical role in shaping the
surrounding regional maritime security and governance through its membership of the Maritime
Organization for West and Central Africa (MOWCA), which was established in May 1975.
MOWCAs objective is to serve the regional and international community for handling all
maritime matters that are regional in character. Since 2001, it has been working with IMO to
establish an integrated coastguard function network to facilitate regional coordination and
cooperation. MOWCA unifies 25 countries on the West and Central African countries in an
organization larger than the ZPCSA69. What is of special interest about MOWCA is that in
1998MOWCAmember states generated an estimated 4.8% of the world cargo, 95% of which was
seaborne.70 This helped to stimulate commerce and boost the capacity for sustainable development
among members through the SouthSouth partnerships. Other functions performed by MOWCA
21
include maintenance of maritime safety and environmental protection with regards to creating
effective contingency plans for pollution prevention and curtailment in member states, the
establishment of reception facilities for the discharge of waste from tankers, the enhancement of
efficiency of maritime administrations, the implementation of identified state control measures and
the regional Memorandum of Understanding on port control. Nigeria has also actively promoted
such regional initiatives through MOWCA.
The Nigerian government has participated in extra-regional interventions to help improve
maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea by hosting a series of multinational maritime training
exercises christened Obangame Express. The exercises were done to enhance the collective and
response capabilities of the Gulf of Guinea and West African nations to help deter piracy, illicit
trafficking and other maritime threats. These annual joint training exercises of the navies have been
sponsored by the US-AFRICOM71. The other idea was to encourage countries in the region to
improve on the interoperability of communication and on sharing Maritime Domain Awareness
(MDA) information to collectively combat piracy and maritime crimes.72 In the Obangame
Express 2017 about 29 foreign navies participated in the training exercises including United
States, France, Italy, Netherlands Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, Angola, Cameroon, Ghana,
Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Liberia, Mauritania, Sao Tome and Principe, Togo, Benin Republic,
the Republic of Congo, South Africa, among others. Nigeria has also helped to improve and
enhance the naval system and coastal surveillance capabilities in order to tackle the maritime
security threats in the African waters, especially in the Gulf of Guinea. Some states in the Gulf of
Guinea include Nigeria, the Republic of Benin, Togo, and Ghana have taken collaborative
measures in the form of increased policing, provision of detection and surveillance systems,
creation of Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) capabilities and acquisition of requisite platforms
to suppress piracy. In January 2012, Nigerias government transformed its joint task force,
Operation Restore Hope, which was initially established to combat militancy in the Niger Delta
into an expanded maritime security framework, known as Operation Pulo Shield to collaborate
with neighboring West African countries.73
The Gulf of Guineas International donor partners, especially the US, France, UK and the
EU, see the Gulf of Guinea as strategically important. The US military has played an important
role in capacity-building in the region through AFRICOMs African Partnership Station (APS)
initiative74. The US military has been involved in joint training exercises with navies in the region

22
to develop proficiencies in areas such as maritime interdiction operations, search-and-rescue
operations, and counter-terrorism, among others. To this end, the US spent about $35 million in
the training of naval personnel in Nigeria and other countries within the Gulf of Guinea on how to
combat piracy, oil bunkering and other maritime crimes that have plagued the region in recent
years75. These and other efforts are meant to improve safety and security at sea, which are vitally
important in the security/development nexus for both the Gulf of Guinea and the international
community. Nigeria has worked with the US Command in its efforts to help train the Nigerian
Navy through its African Partnership Program. Since 2007, the US has been improving the
countrys Regional Maritime Awareness Capability (RMAC) by helping to set-up radar, radio
equipment, and Automated Identification Systems (AIS) at several sites along the coast. The US
has also donated at least five boats to Nigeria, mostly the former US Coast Guard Cutter Chase,
commissioned as NNS Thunder in February 2012. It also supports maritime security exercises, for
example, Operation Hot Pursuit involving the navies of Nigeria, Togo and Benin76.
In addition to bilateral support because of their oil interest in Nigeria, the UK is backing
the Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF), an association of oil companies that
ship hydrocarbons, and it set up a Maritime Trade Information Sharing Center MTISC) in Ghana77.
The goal of the Center is to collect and disseminate information on security incidents in the whole
of the Gulf of Guinea via a secure website. Apart from supports for former colonies like Benin,
Togo, Cote dIvoire, and Guinea, France has started ASECMAR (Support for Maritime Security
in the Gulf of Guinea) that seeks to strengthen state sovereignty by improving the capacities of the
internal security administration and the maritime capacities through promoting regional
coordination. France has encouraged Nigeria to join ASECMAR. In fact, the US, UK and France
have encouraged stronger cooperation among the Gulf of Guinea states. The US and French
warships stationed in the Gulf of Guinea to train local navies have also helped to deter piracy and
on some occasions offered assistance to ships attacked by pirates78. The EU has adopted a Gulf of
Guinea Action Plan for 2015-2020 to support countries in the region to improve maritime security
and counter organized crime. The EU, in addition to commissioning many studies on Gulf of
Guinea piracy, also leads a Port Cooperation Program (SEA-COP) in several West African
countries, which aims at curbing drug trafficking from Latin America to Europe by strengthening
national and regional maritime control79. The UN has provided technical support to Gulf of Guinea
coastal states and shipping companies through the IMO and UN Office on Drugs and Crime

23
(UNODC). It has planned and organized a summit to encourage leaders of the Gulf of Guinea
states to agree on a comprehensive strategy to counter maritime insecurity.

Transatlantic Partnership and Cooperation: Bridging the South Atlantic Divide

The focus on transatlantic strategic partnership and cooperation hinges on the
Nigeria/Brazil transatlantic relationship because of the phenomenal dimensions of the trade and
investment flows, military equipment supply between the two countries, as well as the fact that
they both occupy dominant and influential positions in their respective continents. Brazil has also
a strong relationship with countries on the West coast of Africa, primarily based on the joint
stewardship of the South Atlantic Ocean as well as cultural ties. The historical links between Brazil
and Africa go beyond linguistic connections with Portuguesespeaking countries to include the
legacy of slavery and other important historical, demographic, cultural and political bonds that
bridge the two sides of the South Atlantic. The key countries on the western perimeter of South
Atlantic include Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay while Nigeria, South Africa, Angola and Namibia
are key partners on the eastern perimeter of the South Atlantic. The shifting strategic and economic
concerns have not only contributed to the growing importance that Nigeria attaches to the South
Atlantic but also its growing new interest in the changing ecology of the region. It seems Nigerias
maritime security agenda has evolved gradually and that it is genuinely ready to cooperate with
other countries in fighting the most prominent security threats in order to make the ocean safer for
navigation especially in the Gulf of Guinea.
Nigerias growing maritime and security interests in the zone are bolstered by the discovery
of offshore large oil and gas reserves in the Gulf of Guinea, especially those mineral deposits that
lie untapped within its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). This is similar to Brazils Blue Amazon
policy aimed at gaining popular support for the notion that it has a responsibility to enforce peace
and security in the South Atlantic in order to protect and safeguard the newly discovered natural
resources. The Blue Amazon in the maritime area off the coast of Brazil is now recognized by
UNCLOS as the exclusive property of the coastal state. The Brazilian main security interest in the
South Atlantic includes this area that is extremely rich in petroleum and has great potential for
exploration for a variety of metallic nodules found on the seabed. Brazil is now looking eastward,
asserting its influence across the South Atlantic. It has increased its engagement not only with its
traditional African Lusophone partners, but also with countries such as Nigeria, Burkina Faso,

24
Mali, and Tanzania. In Africa specifically, the Portuguese colonists also connected Brazil to
countries in the Gulf of Guinea, such as Benin, Ghana, Nigeria, and Togo, whose citizens were
taken as slaves to Brazil, the only Portuguese colony in South America. Today, Brazil has the
secondlargest population of people of African descent in the world, in absolute number, behind
only Nigeria80. There are not only convergences of interests between Brazil and Africa but also a
strong cultural and historic affinity.
Nigerias growing population and economy along with its improved democratic
governance offer new opportunities and prospects for a south-south trade and investment that can
benefit both South American and African countries. Nigeria is the most populous country in
Africa, with a 2010 World Bank population estimate of about 175 million. Like Brazil, the huge
population presents an enormous market. However, Nigerias economy is largely dependent on
foreign trade and generates more than 90 percent of the GDP through exports of oil and gas. Like
other littoral states in the zone, Nigeria relies heavily on the South Atlantic Ocean for both imports
and exports. It is an important the trading sea route that must be kept open and free to enable
commercial traffic to conduct its business without constraints or danger of being attacked by
pirates. The high volume of Nigerias international trade elevates the importance of maritime
security and the protection of trading vessels, particularly taking into consideration Nigerias huge
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) that must be patrolled and secured. To the Nigerian government,
the region requires an adequate and proper protection in order to ensure a safe and smooth flow of
goods, services, people and commerce. This becomes particularly important in order to promote
and enhance economic interaction among countries in the South Atlantic and thus improve South-
South economic relations. As the regional hegemon of the Gulf of Guinea, Nigeria is also
aggressively building alliances and partnerships with states along the western perimeter of the
South Atlantic with Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela and Argentina. Nigeria and Venezuela have an
interest in more solid energy relations, being key players themselves in OPEC.
Although Nigeria, as one of the regional powers within the South Atlantic region, has not
been able to play an active leadership role comparable to Brazil because of its limited resources
endowments, inadequate technology, and internal security problems, its foreign policy direction
and strategic posture have enhanced cooperation in the immediate West African region and beyond
as Nigeria struggles to pursue transatlantic relations in order to help bridge the South Atlantic
divide. The new patterns of cocaine trade across the South Atlantic have raised serious and

25
legitimate security concerns about connections and collusion between Latin American and West
African drug trafficking networks81. Nigeria has collaborated with the other states in the region to
disrupt these illicit drug flows and other transnational crimes within the broader framework of a
south-south cooperation. Nigeria also has often taken a critical role in articulating the views of
developing nations on the need to modify the current international economic order. The
prominence that Nigerias foreign policy attaches to South-South relations was underscored in the
annual address to the nation in 1986 by the former President of Nigeria, Ibrahim Babangida.
Babangida underlined the increasingly vital role which the South must concertedly play in alerting
the consciousness of the North to the Souths legitimate advocacy of an equitable world order. He
reiterated that Africa and Latin America form part of the emergent south-south dialogue82.
Over the last two decades, an unprecedented growth in political, diplomatic, and economic
relations between South American and African nations, has been witnessed. Trade between Africa
and South America has risen 75 percent since 2006 reaching $39 billion in 201183. Brazil, owns
70 percent of the South American trade with Africa. The former Brazilian President, Luiz Inacio
Lula da Silva and his administration (2003-2011) were responsible for the commercial and
diplomatic success with Africa. President Lula da Silvas foreign policy in Africa has been
continued under President Dilma Rousseffs administration. Africa-Brazil trade reached $26
billion in 2012, an 85 percent increase over six years. It is reported that the government-run
Brazilian Cooperation Agency, charged with the South-South technical cooperation, spent upto
$70.5 million of its budget in 42 African countries from 2012 to 201484. This renewal of
transatlantic relations between African nations and Brazil is significant, not only when seen against
the backdrop of their shared history, but also within the broader framework of SouthSouth
cooperation. Together, Brazil and African countries are forging a new model of South-South
relations with innovative approaches to trade, investments, security cooperation, and cultural
exchanges. In 2010, at the end of a special summit between regional leaders of ECOWAS and their
Brazilian counterpart in Sal, Cape Verde, the two parties agreed to focus on new initiatives that
will boost their economic, security, and political cooperation, by addressing the issues of poverty,
food security, environment, renewable energy, capacity-building and political dialogue. By
focusing on these priorities the summits final document declared that both regions would be
expanding, upgrading and strengthening their strategic partnership for their mutual benefit85.

26
However, the connection between Brazils economic interest and its development cooperation in
Africa has become the focus of attention in recent years. As Yonemura notes,
Brazil seems to be shifting its ambition from regional political influence to commercial and
technological interests. Like China, which emphasizes mutual support and non-
interference in domestic affairs as the key principles, Brazil also prefers the concept of
horizontal cooperation. As far as motivation goes, there are mixed views--on the one hand,
it is observed that Brazils foreign policy has been emphasizing cooperation and solidary
with developing countries, while on the other hand, it is suggested that the Brazilian
policies are also consistent with its economic self-interest .86

From the Brazilian perspective, the political motives behind the recent Brazilian
governments ambitious foreign policy agenda in Africa can be classified as follows: First, as a
rising global power, Brazil is motivated to globalize its diplomatic network in order to signal its
arrival as a global player on the world stage and to encourage the developing world to do the same.
Second, there is a strong cultural and historic affinity between Brazil and Africa since
approximately half of Brazils population is of African descent. They trace their ancestry and
religious practices to Africa especially to Nigeria. Brazil shares similar food, music, religion, and
sports in common with African. Finally, Brazils interest in Africa lies in opportunities for trade
and investments in a growing African market. Brazil as one of the emerging economies (as a
member of the BRICS), that can play a significant role in Africas growth, contributing to
development and prosperity on the continent, an extensive development program that is aimed at
agriculture, health, energy, and poverty alleviation87. Brazil has sought to transfer to Africa
technology used in its own industries for cotton and biofuel, for example, in order to take advantage
of the economic opportunities in the continent.
Both Nigeria and Brazil have shown strong support and commitment to the regional
integration and development as demonstrated by their membership of and leadership roles they
have played in their respective regional groupings. Brazil has sought to strengthen the South
American regional integration process (MERCOSUR), while Nigeria has pursued a similar policy
of integration with ECOWAS, a regional economic union of fifteen countries located in West
Africa. The union was formally established on 28 May 1975 with the signing of the Treaty of
Lagos. ECOWAS stated goal is to promote economic integration across the region. The
MERCOSUR agreement, which was created in 1991 by the Treaty of Asuncion, links Argentina,
Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. It is the Latin American largest trade bloc and it hopes to
incorporate the Andean Group (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela) in its free-trade

27
union. The goals include the harmonization of the economic policies of its members and the
promotion of economic development. The promotion and deepening of trade relations between
these two regional groupings could provide the potential opportunity to expand the channels for
greater cultural, diplomatic, and economic collaboration and engagement in the South Atlantic.
Brazil has coupled economic power initiatives with a dramatic boost in military
cooperation with Africa over the past decade, conducting joint naval exercises, providing training
and arms, and establishing outposts in ports across the continents coast. Both Brazil and Nigeria
are manifestations of rising great powers in the South Atlantic and both countries are interested in
fostering security and safety in the South Atlantic. Brazils security partnership with African states
is also motivated to a large extent by a desire to expand business opportunities for Brazilian defense
firms. It has given military equipment to a number of West African nations, including maritime
patrol aircraft to Cape Verde and Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs) to the Namibian Navy in order
to enhance the maritime security of these important partners88. Brazil has slowly moved eastward,
asserting its influence across the South Atlantic Ocean by signing defense cooperation accords
with a number of African nations including Nigeria in 2010, Cape Verde in 1994, South Africa in
2003, Guinea-Bissau in 2006, Mozambique in 2009, Namibia in 2009, Senegal in 2010, Angola in
2010, Equatorial Guinea in 201089. It has provided them with technical assistance in science,
technology and professional development. Brazil is the only new maritime power with credible
future prospects for projecting military might across the South Atlantic. Through its capacity
building in West Africa, the Brazilian government have also demonstrated their interest and
willingness to help the local powers to counter the threat posed by maritime criminals in the Gulf
of Guinea90. According to Vaz,
[.] Brazil has participated actively in the OBANGAME Express, a series of annual
naval training exercises led by AFRICOM. These have been carried out since 2011 in the
Gulf of Guinea with the aim of enhancing multinational capabilities to foster security and
safety in that area. Brazil is also strengthening bilateral cooperation with countries such
as Guinea itself, Nigeria, Cameroon, Ivory Coast and Ghana. Also included are some of
its African partners of the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries such as Cape
Verde, Angola and Sao Tome & Principe91.

However, some critics have argued that these Brazilian military initiatives, trade and
investments in Africa have done too little to address governance issues in Africa, rather dooming
them to the same failures of past projects. Brazils argument is that it purportedly bring something
different to the tablea commitment to south-south cooperation and development forged through

28
a shared experience, culture and history. According to the Council of the Americas Vice President,
Eric Farnsworth, The idea of South-South cooperation for so long little more than an aspiration,
is finally here and it is remaking the world92.The practice of SouthSouth cooperation by Brazil
involves the transfer of knowledge and takes into account the interests and priorities of the
recipient countries, different from the imposing cooperation of North-South relations where
donor countries often indicates which projects they want to fund, in accordance with their own
interests93. Brazil has opened about 37 embassies on the African continent while African countries
have 33 embassies in Brazil, giving Brazil the greatest number of African embassies in any Latin
American country94. Brazilian/Nigerian bilateral relations have brought not only attention on Afro-
Brazilian connections but also a renewed focus on the emerging intra-south trade relations.

The South Atlantic as a Region for South-South Cooperation: An Assessment

There has been a recent resurgence of a south-south cooperation as an alternative
complementary relationship between developing countries as opposed to a North-South relations.
The current debate on South-South cooperation tends to be what should be the pattern of
engagement especially for those who are optimistic in transforming the world economic order. The
key questions are: Can the horizontal regional arrangements enable South-South states to take
advantage of a growing interdependence to achieve both their developmental and security goals
that deliberately exclude the North Atlantic nations? How do you assess the role of international
donor partners such as the US, France, the UK and the EU vis--vis the need for local ownership
of the process. To what extent is their support agenda accepted and internalized by the very
institutions and political communities in which they take place? In the Gulf of Guinea for instance,
the US and the EU have been helping to combat piracy and maintain maritime security in the
region, but they also called upon to support a greater operational autonomy of regional actors and
a greater leadership of emerging actors.
Buzan and Waever assert that there would be advantages in thinking about the South
Atlantic maritime security from a regional perspective since this perspective would give a standing
to the local developments of security and thereby force an evaluation of how global and regional
trends interplay with each other. Such a perspective would help to define a possible policy structure
for the current maritime security context95. Brazil is, however, still wary of the presence of NATO
powers in the South Atlantic. Brazils self-perception as a rising power in the South Atlantic,

29
whose objective is to establish a consensus regional hegemony96 and therefore, view the
reconstitution of the ZPCSA as a strategic initiative to integrate the region and to address its
security challenges. As Lete notes,
[] one cannot ignore Brazils growing interest in the South Atlantic and its efforts to
integrate the region by promoting international, legal and institutional strategies and
rapidly expanding the defense cooperation along the perimeter of the South Atlantic. The
Brazilian strategy for security in the South Atlantic is certainly innovative because it has a
clear trans-regional focus, involving not only South America, where Brazil has a long
history of political, economic and military ties, but also West Africa, where its involvement
was, until recently, far more episodic. For example, the cooperation that forms part of this
strategy suggests Brazils growing relevance to security in Africa. Nevertheless, Brazils
strategy is also based on very clear South-South lines, and suggests no opportunities for
pan-Atlantic approaches involving the countries of the Northern Atlantic97.

Thus, South-South cooperation has become part of the search for autonomy of Brazilian
foreign policy, expressed in the diversification of partnerships and forums for action98. However,
the prospects for South Atlantic security community depend upon the extent to which potential
partner countries share Brazils vision and commitment for such security cooperation as useful as
well as their willingness to significantly invest resources and contribute to its full realization. On
the contrary, the foreign policies of Argentina and Uruguay (Brazils neighbors) appear to be more
modest and focused on sub-regional issues, and do not share the Brazils enthusiasm for enhanced
transatlantic relations with West Africa. With regards to development assistance to developing
countries from the international donor partners, Edmunds recommends local ownership and local
leadership because for the donors projects to be sustainable, they need the support and
empowerment of local actors over the long term99. The local ownership is also necessary to
maximize the chance that these projects will be sustained and continued once the specific donor
initiatives have come to an end as well as to empower local actors to grapple with the problems
themselves. For instance, some critics have expressed reservation about the US leading anti-piracy
efforts at the tactical or security level. They argue that rather, the US should partner with regional
organizations specifically like ECCAS and ECOWAS, using US-AFRICOM to empower these
groups to combat piracy through a multifaceted approach as recommended and sanctioned by UN
Resolutions 2018 and 2039. In fact, the effectiveness of anti-piracy efforts will also depend on the
ability of regional governments to prosecute perpetrators and provide the foundations for increased
economic opportunities.

30
 The main premise of a south-south argument is that current characteristics of the
international economic system do not suit the interest of developing countries, and that they in fact
work against them, and are unlikely to be structurally changed by the generous concessions of the
industrial states in the North100. The idea of South-South Cooperation is to encourage
collaboration among developing countries in political, economic, cultural, environmental, and
technical domains. It is also meant to strengthen and enhance the bargaining power of developing
and least-developed countries in multilateral negotiations, such as those related to international
trade, investment, or climate change. Development assistance is based on the notion of solidarity
and is guided by the principles of respect for national sovereignty, national ownership and
independence, equality, non-conditionality, non-interference in domestic affairs, and mutual
benefits (the so-called win-win situations). Global South nations share knowledge, skill, expertise
and resources to address their developmental and security challenges such as high population
pressure, poverty, hunger, disease, environmental deterioration, conflict and natural disasters and
to deal with cross-border issues such as environmental protection. However, in 1983, the former
President of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere warned:
South-South cooperation cannot be developed along the pattern of the past North-South
interactions. Within the Third World there are the poor and the less poor; there are the large
and small; the landlocked and the Third world, those with advantages seek to exploit the
weaker ones, then we shall simply repeat among ourselves and at a lower level, the kind of
dependency imbalance which now exists between the South and the North. And if we try
to establish systems of Third World cooperation which would produce reasonably balanced
results only on condition that all started equal, then we shall intensify the inequalities which
now exist between us.101

Some analysts have pointed that the very same patterns of asymmetries might be
reproduced among southern countries102, while other analysts have not arrived at any satisfactory
answer to the question103. Therefore, there is need for further investigation on the question whether
the patterns of asymmetries in the relations between South-South countries develop differently
from those of North-South countries. However, the North Atlantic nations are beginning to address
some of the counterproductive aspects of the traditional technical cooperation such as disregard
for local ownership, foreign aid, disconnection with reality and unconcern with sustainability. The
US and the EU have also begun to pursue a partnering approach within and well beyond the
Atlantic Basin, seeking to shift the paradigm of the North-South relationship to a new joint
approach to common challenges104. This approach suggests a triangular cooperation whereby
traditional donor countries and multilateral organizations facilitate South-South initiatives through

31
the provision of funding, training, and management and technological systems, as well as other
forms of support105. However, the South-South nations is still fearful of the good will of North
Atlantic nations because of historic precedents of imperialist and colonial occupation in the 19th
and 20th centuries.
While the ZPCSA is built strictly on South-South cooperation principles, there are also
wide disparities, uneven capabilities and commitment of participating states in terms of maritime
security forces, coastguard capabilities and resource/budget constraints. One of the maritime
security challenges facing most of the countries dealing with piracy in the Gulf of Guinea is
inadequate surveillance systems for establishing Maritime Domain Awareness, for the purpose of
interdiction and response in civil-military capacities106. Lack of knowledge about illegal activity
at sea (or sea blindness) is a threat to security because it makes the area an ungoverned space and
a haven for armed non-state actors illegal activities107. The south-south initiatives alone will not
be able to address the South Atlantic emerging maritime security challenges if the South-South
nations keep excluding all the necessary operational and financial capabilities of the North Atlantic
nations from their equation. Pirates, terrorists and criminals take advantage of our sea blindness to
operate. Because of this, improving maritime vision is a necessary first step in dealing with them.
Hence, some critics have alleged that although ECOWAS has remained central to Nigerias
responses to these transnational security challenges in the Gulf of Guinea, not much has been
achieved in terms of concrete results such as counter-piracy operations. While there is great pride
and interest on the part of the states in the region to assert a south-south identity and solidarity, the
prospects for evolving a successful and effective maritime security architecture in the South
Atlantic also appear uncertain due to lack of advanced technology and the under-resourced
capacity of these states to deal with the immediate problems of piracy and other transnational
maritime crimes.
The outbreak of piracy off the coast of the Gulf of Guinea has provided a catalyst for extra-
regional involvement in the region because of a legitimately stated interest in the regional maritime
safety and security of navigation. The involvement of these extra-regional countries makes the
governance arrangements a vexed issue as all the current major powers are involved including the
US, France, Great Britain and China. The warships of these global dominant powers routinely
crisscross the South Atlantic Ocean. The UK is still laying claim to some territories in the region,
thereby continuing its territorial disputes with Argentina. Apart from the disputed Island of

32
Falklands/Malvinas, the UK also controls South Georgia, Sandwich and Ascension Islands.
Moreover, the British-controlled Ascension Island is strategically important to the UK and it was
a stopover for British warships and transport vessels during the Falklands war. China, through its
clever use of soft-power, has been gaining influence in both Africa and South America and this
has brought economic competition with the Western nations. While there is certainly a new
momentum for a new maritime security governance in the South Atlantic, the challenges arising
from multiple and perhaps cross-cutting bilateral relations in the region, contending institutions
and initiatives, competing priorities and interests among the participating regional and
international actors make it more difficult to implement an effective maritime security governance
regime at the moment. However, there is also ample room for continuous dialogue and agenda
among the major actors involved on how to evolve an effective security architecture for the region.

Conclusion
The South Atlantic is dotted by twenty-four littoral nation-states and stretches from South
America to South Africa and the Gulf of Guinea in Africa. The South Atlantic body of water
contains the richest mineral deposits in the world, most of which still lie under the Atlantic seabed
unexplored mostly because the South Atlantic nation-states are industrially and technologically
underdevelopment. Since the twentieth century, oil and gas industries in the Gulf of Guinea have
escalated the commercial traffic in the South Atlantic. As a result of lack of effective surveillance
capabilities, insufficient cooperation and information sharing among governments, as well as weak
coastguard capabilities, the national maritime security and governance have proven to be
inadequate to deal with piracy, drug trafficking, and transnational crimes across the South Atlantic.
Piracy not only poses a real threat to the safety and security of vessels and their crews but also
increasingly portends grave danger to the stability and prosperity of countries in the South Atlantic.
For this reason, the nation-states of the South Atlantic, in the spirit of the dictate of human security,
decided to endorse and implement the United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/41/11
of October 27th, 1986. This resolution has triggered off a flurry of other regional organizations by
some members of the South Atlantic maritime security and governance community in order to
improve their capacity to deal with the challenges and security risks involved in trading in the
South Atlantic.

33
 Notwithstanding these giant strides in building international organizations of collaboration
to deal with piracy, drug smuggling, and other transnational crimes in the South Atlantic, a lot
more remains to be done. The South Atlantic needs a new maritime security and governance
architecture to develop the coastal surveillance and satellite technology to survey the vast South
Atlantic Ocean. It also needs the communication networks to monitor and detect illegal activities
as well as the capacity to effectively deal with them. Consequently, the South Atlantic nations need
the cooperation not only among themselves but also with the North Atlantic nations who have the
superior technology, expertise, and resources at hand to make a difference. Despite its anti-
imperialist ideology and rhetoric, Nigeria appears to be the front-runner in soliciting for these types
of collaborations because it is fully committed to a collective security strategy on the high sea. It
also believes that the attainment of maritime security in the region will be through cooperation and
partnerships with its neighbors and the international community. The US and the EU might play a
crucial role here since they, too, are engaged in capacity-building efforts in the region and they
also have direct energy security interest in ensuring minimal disruption of oil supply chains in the
Gulf of Guinea. Most of the export products are ultimately destined for either Europe or the US
with the former receiving approximately 4% of its oil from the Gulf of Guinea.

Endnotes:
1
ADOGAMHE, PAUL G. is currently a Professor of International Relations in the Department of Political Science
at the University of Wisconsin, Whitewater, USA. He holds M.Phil. /Ph.D. degrees in Political Science from the
CUNY Graduate Center, New York. He also earned an M.A. degree in International Political Economy and
Development (IPED) from Fordham University, New York. Aside from the contributions to other edited volumes, his
articles have been published in the Nigerian Journal of International Affairs (NJIA), African Integration Review,
Poverty and Public Policy, the Journal of Energy and Development, Journal of Development Alternatives and Area
Studies, among others.
2
SANCHEZ, Alejandro. How Peaceful Is the South Atlantic? Center of International Maritime Security
February17, 2016, 8. <http://cimsec.org/21903-2/21903> Accessed on 11/19/2016.
3
WORLD BANK, Bridging the Atlantic: Brazil and the Sub-Sahara AfricaSouth-South Partnering for Growth,
World Bank Publication, 2012: 98.
4
LUNDSGAARDE, E. New Actors and global devilment cooperation, Policy Brief.19 European Development
Cooperation to 2020EDC 2020: 2. Accessed fe.27, 2017 from
<http://www.edc2020.eu/fileadmin/pulications/EDC2020_-_PolicyYBrief_No. 19_-_New Actors and Global
Development Cooperation.pdf>.
5
RAHMAN, Chris. Concepts of Maritime Security: Strategy Perspective on alternative Visions for Good Order and
Security at Sea, with Policy Implications for New Zealand Discussion Paper, No. 07/09, Center for Strategic Studies:
New Zealand Victoria University of Wellington, 2009: 31. <http://www.vuw.ac.nz/css/>.
6
THE BRENTHURST Foundation. Maritime development in Africa: An Independent Specialists Framework,
Discussion Paper 2010/03: 10. <www.thebrenthurstfoundation.org.>.
7
STOCKBRUEGGER, JAN and Christian Bueger, Into the Blue: Rethinking Maritime Security Piracy-
Studies.org -the Research Portal for Maritime Security. 17 comments. July11, 2014, pp.1-11.

34
8
MUTIMER, David, Kyle Grayson and J. Marshall Beier, Critical Studies on Security: An Introduction in Critical
Studies on Security, Vol.1 Number 1, (April, 2013): 7; The Critical Security Studies (CSS) works within the tradition
of Critical Theory which has its roots on Marxism and is based on the pioneering work of Ken Booth and Richard
Wynn Jones. It is also heavily influenced by the Frankfurt School of critical social theory, Post-structuralism
(Foucault) and radical International relations theory associated with Robert W. Cox.
9
MOROFF, Holger. Is the EU a Problem or a Solution for German Foreign Policy? in Germany in Europe:
Powerhouse at the Crossroads Working Papers, ed. Christiane Lemke and Max Weber Chair (New York: New York
University, Center for European and Mediterranean Studies, (August 2013): 80-81.
<http://cems.as.nyu.edu/docs/CP/4751/MW.pdf.> Accessed on 3/5/2017.
10
ANNAN, Kofi A. In Larger Freedom towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, Report of the
Secretary-General for the Millennium Summit. New York: United Nations General Assembly, 2005.
11
UNITED NATIONS. A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility. Report of the Secretary-Generals High-
level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, New York: United Nations, 2004.
12
BUEGER, Christian. What is Maritime Security? Marine Policy 53 (2015): 161.
13
GILPIN RAYMOND Enhancing Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea, Strategic Insights 21December,
2004, p. 2. 32.< https://issuu.com/aboyer/docs/maritime_security_cooperation-boyer/15>
14
UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM (UNDP). Human Development Report 1994. New York:
Oxford University Press. <http: //hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/255/hdr_1994_en_complete_nostats.pdf.>
Accessed on 3/5/2017.
15
See CSCAP, Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, (CSCAP) the Memorandum No13, Guideline
for Regional Maritime Cooperation 1997: 7.
<http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/kiyo/pdf/bulletin_e1999_3.pdf>. This document puts forward the
proposed Guidelines for Regional Maritime Cooperation, which have been developed by the Maritime Cooperation
Working Group of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP). The Guidelines are a set of
fundamental, non-binding principles to guide regional maritime cooperation and to ensure a common understanding
and approach to maritime issues in the region.
16
RAHMAN, Chris. Concepts of Maritime Security: Strategy Perspective on alternative Visions for Good Order and
Security at Sea, with Policy Implications for New Zealand Discussion Paper, No. 07/09, Center for Strategic Studies:
New Zealand Victoria University of Wellington, 2009: 43. < http://www.vuw.ac.nz/css/>.
17
GUEDES, Marques, Armando. Liaisons Dangereuses Reading and Riding the Wind of Security Risks in the South
Atlantic in HAMILTON, Daniel S. Dark Networks in the Atlantic Basin: Emerging Trends and Implications for
Human Security. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, May 24, 2016, 205.
18
GUEDES, Armando Marques. Geopolitical Shifts in the Wider Atlantic: Past, Present and Future, in Richardson
et al. Fractured Ocean: Current Challenges to Maritime Policy in the Wider Atlantic (Wider Atlantic Series), The
German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2012: 242-3. <https://www.amazon.it/Fractured-Ocean-Challenges-
Maritime-Atlantic...>.
19
DEUTSCH, Karl W. Sidney A. Burrell, Robert A. Kann, Maurice Lee Jr. Political Community in the North Atlantic
Area: International Organization in Light of Historical Experience. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957.
20
BUEGER, Christian. What is Maritime Security? Marine Policy 53 (2015): 163.
21
BUEGER, Christian. What is Maritime Security? Marine Policy 53 (2015): 163.
22
THOMPSON, Nathan and Robert Muggah. Blue Amazon: Brazil Asserts its Influence across the Atlantic Foreign
Affairs June 11, 2015: 2.
23
LALBAHADUR, Aditi, Neuma Grobbelaar & Rudolf Du Plessis Cooperation in the South Atlantic Zone:
Amplifying the African Agenda Policy Insights21, July 2015: 3.
24
ABDENUR, Adriana Erthal; Frank Matthias & Pedro Seabra An Ocean of the Global South: Brazil and the Zone
of Peace and Cooperation in the South Atlantic Review of International Affairs, (2016)29:3, 11-12.
DOI:10.0180/09557571.2016.1230592 <http://dx.doi.org> 10.0180/09557571.2016.1230592.
25
MONTEVIDEO DECLARATION. Zone of Peace and Cooperation in the South Atlantic (ZPCSA)
(2013).<http://kitplone.itamaraty.gov.br/sala-de-imprensa/notas-a-imprensa/vii-encontro-ministerial-da-zona-de-
paz--e-cooperacao-do-atlantico-sul-zopacas-declaracao-de-montevideu>.
26
HURREL, Andrew. The Politics of South Atlantic security: a Survey of the Proposals for a South Atlantic Treaty
Organization In The Royal institute of international Affairs, Vol.59, No.2 (spring, 1983): 179-193.
27
AGUILAR, Sergio Luiz Cruz. Seguranca e Defesa no Cone sul:da rivialidade da Guerra Fria a cooperacao atual.
Sao Paulo: Port de Ideias, 2010: 86; OGWU, Joy U. Nigerian Navy and the South Atlantic: Strategic Maritime
Opportunities and Foreign Policies challenges. Occasional Monographs No1. Directorate of Naval Information
Nigeria, 1996: 21-23.
35
28
MARQUEZ, Humberto leaders in South America, Africa seek Unity, progress, World News.October14, 2009: 1-
2. <http://www.finalcal.call/artman/publish/world-News-3/article-6498.shtml> Accessed on 4/3/2017.
29
JUMAL, Wayne. Quadrilateral Cooperation: Angola, Brazil, Nigeria and South Africa Institute for Global
Dialogue, 2016: 1-2. Available at <http://www.igd.org.za/index.php/8784-quadrilateral-cooperation-angola-brazil-
nigeria-an...>. Accessed on 11/13/2016.
30
UNITED NATIONS. Oceans and the law of the sea. Report of the Secretary-General, UN General Assembly
Document A/63/63, 10 March 2008, United Nations, New York (2008).
31
AMORIM, S. G. Brazilian Perspectives on the Convergence of SISBIN and ZOPACAS, Austral: Brazilian Journal
of Strategy and International Relations, v. 2 n. (4) 2013: 23.
32
GREVI, Giovanni. The Atlantic Basin: An Eclectic But Converging Region, Working Paper, No.127 Presented
at the ATLANTIC FUTURE Workshop, University of Pretoria, and May 2014. FRIDE: A European Think Tank for
Global action.
33
GREVI, Giovanni. The Atlantic Basin: An Eclectic But Converging Region, Working Paper, No.127 Presented
at the ATLANTIC FUTURE Workshop, University of Pretoria, and May 2014: 19. FRIDE: A European Think Tank
for Global action.
34
ROZOFF, Rick. South Atlantic: Britain May Provoke New Conflict with Argentina February 23 rd, 2010: 1-10.
Available at <thttp;s://rickrozoff.wordpress.com/2010/02/23/south-atlanticc-britain-may-provoke-new-conf>.
Accessed on 12/6/2016.The Falklands/Malvinas: Argentina claims these islands, currently controlled by the United
Kingdom (the two countries had a brief, bloody war in 1982 over the ownership of these Islands). In 2013, the
inhabitants of the Island held a referendum in which they voted to remain part of the UKArgentina did not recognize
the ballot. Although, on the14th of September 2016, the UK and Argentine governments issued a new Joint Statement
on areas of mutual cooperation. <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-and-argentina-agree-joint-statement-on-
areas-of--mutual-cooperation>.
35
ABDENUR, Adriana Erthal, and DaniloMarcondes de Souza Neto. Brazils Maritime Strategy in the South
Atlantic: The Nexus between Security and Resources in South African Institute of international Affairs. (SAIIA),
2013: 7.
36
CHALK, Peter. Maritime Crimes in the Gulf of Guinea, In Paul Shemella, (ed.) Global Responses to Maritime
Violence: Cooperation and Collective Action, Standard, California: Standard University Press, 2016: 266;
GARDDNER, ardner, Frank. West Africa Piracy Overtakes Somali Ship Attacks, BBC African News, 16 June 2013:
1-3.
37
UNTED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, Oceans and law of the Sea Division for Ocean
Affairs and the law of the Sea, 2001: art 101. Available at
<wwwun.org/depts./los/convention.agreemnets/texts/unclos/part7.htm.article100>.
38
See INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, The Gulf of Guinea: The New Danger Zone, Africa Report No.195,
December 2012: 1-18. The Nigerian Government estimated by mid-2012 that about 400,000 barrels of oil were being
stolen each day, costing the country about $1bn. per month in lost revenues and the activity of various ports in the
region has also been severely affected as a result pirate attacks. See Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea by
Chatham House, 2013:12). Between 2002 and 2012, 551 acts of armed maritime crimes occurred in the Gulf of
Guinea. International Maritime Organizations (IMO) data reported in Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea,
Chatham House, Conference Report, London: Chatham House March 2013.TheInternational Maritime Bureau (IMB)
recently highlights the persisting violence in piracy hotspots off Nigeria and around Southern Philippines, where it
was reported that out of the 27 seafarers who were reported to have been kidnapped worldwide for ransom in the first
quarter of this year (i.e. between January and March, 2017), 63 percent were in the Gulf of Guinea, adding that Nigeria
was the main kidnap hotspot, with 17 crew taken in three separate incidents, up 14 in the same period last year. All
three vessels, a general cargo ship, an oil tanker and a bulk carrier, were attacked while underway 30-60 nautical miles
off the Bayelsa coast. Three more ships were fired upon at up to 110 nautical miles from land. Many other attacks are
also believed to go unreported.
39
UNITED NATIONS. Secretary Council Report. 6723rd Meeting (AM): Gulf of Guinea Piracy Clear Threat to
Security , Economic Development of Region; Countries Need United Front in Response, Top UN Official Tells
Security Council 2012a: 1,<www.un.un.org/news/press/docs/2012/sc10558.doc.htm>.
40
CHALK, Peter. Maritime Crimes in the Gulf of Guinea, In Paul Shemella, (ed.) Global Responses to Maritime
Violence: Cooperation and Collective Action, Standard, California: Standard University Press, 2016: 276.
41
IMOBIGHE, Thomas A. Conflict in Niger delta: A Unique Case or a Model for Future Conflicts in Other Oil-
Producing Countries? In TRAUB-MERZ, Rudolf & Douglas Yates (eds.) Oil Policy in the Gulf of Guinea: Security
& Conflict, Economic Growth, Social Development. Lagos: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2004: 101-102, chapter 8.

36
42
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP. The Gulf of Guinea: The New Danger Zone, African Report No.195,
December 12, 2012: 8-9.
43
PAES, Wolf-Christian. Oil Production and National Security in Sub-Saharan Africa In Traub-Merz, Rudolf &
Douglas Yates (eds.) Oil Policy in the Gulf of Guinea: Security& Conflict, Economic Growth, Social Development.
Lagos Nigeria: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2004: 96, chapter 7.
44
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP. The Gulf of Guinea: The New Danger Zone, African Report No.195,
December 12, 2012: 4.
45
ADOGAMHE, Paul G. Transnational Economic Crimes and Corruption: A Note on the Nigerian Connection in
Nigerian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 27, No 1 and 2, 2001:1-35.
46
MCGUIRE, Peter I. Narcotics Trafficking in West Africa: A Governance Challenge (Boston: Boston University)
Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer Range Future. 2010: 21.
47
WILLIAMS, Phil and Ernesto U Savona. The United Nations and Transnational Organized Crime. London: Frank
Cas, 1996: 20.
48
KAN, Rexton Paul. Drug Trafficking and International Security. New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016: 64.
49
KAN, Rexton Paul. Drug Trafficking and International Security. New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016: 73-99;
CASTILLEJO, C. Fragile States: An Urgent Challenge for EU foreign Policy, FRID Working Paper126, Madrid:
FRIDE, February 2015.
50
FRIMAN, Richard H. Just Passing Through: Transit States and Dynamics of Illicit Transshipment
Transnational Organized Crime, vol. 1, No.1, 1995, pp.65-83.
51
WILLIAMS, Phil. Illicit Flows and Networks in the Atlantic Basin in Hamilton, Daniel S. Dark Networks in
the Atlantic Basin: Emerging Trends and Implications for Human Security. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution,
May 24, 2016: 8.
52
ONDCP. (OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY). National Drug Threat Summary.
Washington, D.C. Office of National Drug Control Policy, 2009. Available at
www.usdoj.gov./ndic/pubs31379/index.htm.
53
WILLIAMS, Phil. Illicit Flows and Networks in the Atlantic Basin in Hamilton, Daniel S. Dark Networks in
the Atlantic Basin: Emerging Trends and Implications for Human Security. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution,
May 24, 2016: 88.
54
WILLIAMS, Phil. Illicit Flows and Networks in the Atlantic Basin in Hamilton, Daniel S. Dark Networks in
the Atlantic Basin: Emerging Trends and Implications for Human Security. Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Institution, May 24, 2016, pp.75-99.
55
HOFFMAN, Max & Cone lane, Guinea-Bissau and the South Atlantic Cocaine in Center for American Progress.
July16, 2007: 4-5. https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2013/08/22/72557/guinea-bissa...>.
Accessed on 12/15/2016; WILLIAMNS, Phil. Illicit Flows and Networks in the Atlantic Basin in Hamilton, Daniel
S. Dark Networks in the Atlantic Basin: Emerging Trends and Implications for Human Security. Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution, May 24, 2016: 94-95.
56
COCKAYNE, James and Phil Williams. The Invisible Tide: Towards an International strategy to deal with Drug
Trafficking through West Africa. New York: international Peace Institute October 2009: 1.
57
WILLIAMS, Phil. Illicit Flows and Networks in the Atlantic Basin in Hamilton, Daniel S. Dark Networks in
the Atlantic Basin: Emerging Trends and Implications for Human Security. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution,
May 24, 2016: 99.
58
HAASTRUP Toni and Elisa Lopez Lucia. Nigeria and Regional Security European University Institute (EUI)
Working Paper RSCAS 2014/49, May, 2014. <http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Publications/>.
59
ADOGAMHE, Paul G. Nigerias Diplomacy: The Challenges of Regional Power and Leadership in Globalizing
World, In Brave Boy-Wagner, Jacqueline Anne, (ed.) Diplomatic Strategies of Nations in the Global South: The
search for Leadership. New York: The Palgrave Macmillan, 2016: 182-213.
60
UKEJE, Charles. The Abuja Declaration and Challenges of Implementing a Maritime Security Strategy in the Gulf
and the South Atlantic, Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, Vol. 11. No 2, 2015: 225-226
<.http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/194808881.2015.1074784>.
61
OBI, C.I. Nigerias Foreign Policy and Transnational Security Challenges in Wes Africa. Journal of Contemporary
African Studies.Vol.26, no.2, (2008): 193.
62
DABUUGAT, Kopep. African Approaches to Maritime Security: The West and Central Africa Perspectives A
Report of International Conference organized by The Friedrich Ebert Stiftung in Collaboration with the National
Defense College, Held at the National Defense College , Abuja , Nigeria on 21-23 May, 2014.
63
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP. The Gulf of Guinea: The New Danger Zone, African Report No.195,
December 12, 2012: 21.
37
64
NIGERIAN THEGUARDAIN EDITOR, ECOWAS Must Eradicate Piracy to Enhance Economic Growth
Http://guardian.ng/business-services/maritime/ecowas-must-eradicate-piracy-to-enhance-e...Nov. 23rd, 2016:1-2.
65
HELLENIC SHIPPING NEWS WORLDWIDE, Nigeria: Enhancing Maritime Security Available at
http;//www.hellenshippingnews.com/Nigeria-enhancing-maritime-security/ 31/08/2015:4-5.
66
OGWU, Joy U. Nigerian Navy and the South Atlantic: Strategic Maritime Opportunities and Foreign Policies
challenges. Occasional Monographs No1. Directorate of Naval Information Nigeria, 1996.
67
ADEKUNLE, Aliyu. Buhari Seeks Collaboration on Maritime security in Gulf of Guinea VANGUARD
NEWSPAPER on May 24, 2016: 2. http://www.vanguard.com/2016/05/buhari-seeks-collaboration-on-maritime-
security i... Accessed11/13/2016.
68
AFRICAN UNION (AU), 2050 African Integrated Maritime Strategy, (AIM) African Union Publication, 2012.
69
MOWCA. Member states are Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic,
Chad, Congo, Cote DIvoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea
Bissau, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.
70
AFRICAN MARITIME SAFETY AND SECURITY AGENCY (AMSSA). Maritime Organization of West and
Central Africa (MOWCA)http://www.amssa.net/framework/MOWCA.aspx 11/13/2016, pp.1-4.
71
AFRICOM was created in 2007 under President George Bush on the premise that a politically unstable environment
breeds terrorists. Therefore, it assumed that Africas failing states provided an environment for breeding potential
terrorists. AFRICOM was established as a protective measure against terrorists and the spread of radical Islamism in
these weak states. In: ADJAYE, Joseph, AFRICOM: A view from Below: What I s human Security? Whose
Security? BUSS, Terry F. Joseph Adjaye, Donald Goldstein and Louis A Picard (eds.) African Security and the
African Command, Sterling, VA: Kumarian press, 2011: 83.
72
ONUOHA, Freedom C. Piracy and Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea: Nigeria as a Microcosm A Report
by Al Jazeera Center for studies June 12th, 2012: 10. < http://studies-en@aljazeera.net/en/reports/2012/06/2012
612123210113333.htm>.
73
ONUOHA, Freedom C. Piracy and Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea: Nigeria as a Microcosm A Report
by Al Jazeera Center for studies June 12th, 2012: 10. <http://studies-en@aljazeera.net/en/reports/2012/06/2012
612123210113333.htm>.
74
The APS is an initiative that falls under US-AFRCOM and which aims to encourage engagement between a range
of partner African coastal states and relevant nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to improve collective maritime
professionalism, infrastructure, integration and domain awareness. For more detail on this program, see About African
Partnership Station AFRICOM, available at <http://wwww.africom.mil/Newsroom/photo/10193/africa-partnership-
station,as>. Accessed on February 5, 2017.
75
CHALK, Peter. Maritime Crimes in the Gulf of Guinea, In Paul Shemella, (ed.) Global Responses to Maritime
Violence: Cooperation and Collective Action, Standard, California: Standard University Press, 2016: 275.
76
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP. The Gulf of Guinea: The New Danger Zone, African Report No.195,
December 12, 2012: 22.
77
Ibid.
78
ibid.
79
Ibid, 21.
80
WORLD BANK, Bridging the Atlantic: Brazil and the Sub-Sahara AfricaSouth-South Partnering for Growth,
World Bank Publication, 2012: 39.
81
ABDENUR, Adriana Erthal, and Danilo Marcondes de Souza Neto. Brazils Maritime Strategy in the South
Atlantic: The Nexus between Security and Resources in South African Institute of international Affairs. (SAIIA),
2013: 7; WILLIAMS, Phil. Illicit Flows and Networks in the Atlantic Basin in Hamilton, Daniel S. Dark Networks
in the Atlantic Basin: Emerging Trends and Implications for Human Security. Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Institution, May 24, 2016: 99.
82
OGWU, Joy U. Nigeria and Brazil: A Model for the Emerging SouthSouth Relations? In J. Carlsson (Ed.)
South-South Relations in a Changing World Order. Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies.
83
WORLD BANK, Bridging the Atlantic: Brazil and the Sub-Sahara AfricaSouth-South Partnering for Growth,
World Bank Publication, 2012.
84
GLICKHOUSE, Rachel. Africa-South American Summit to Boost South-South Ties, Americas Society/Council
of the Americas. (2013).
85
NIGERIAN (MINISTRY OF INFORMATION). ECOWAS, Brazil Agree New Initiatives to Bolster their
Collaboration. Federal Ministry of Information, 2010 <.http:// allafrica.com/stories/ 201007050891.html>.
86
YONEMURA, Akemi. Brazil in Africa, In NORRAG, A Brave New World of Emerging, Non DAC donors
and their differences from traditional donors. Hong Kong Institute of Education/NORRAG: Hong Kong. 2010, pp.
38
40-42.
87
PARK, Ariella. Brazil in Africa AS/COA PROGRAM March 01, 2012: 1-2. Available at<http:www.as-
coa.org/articles/brazil-africa>. Accessed on 11/18/2016.
88
THOMPSON, Nathan and Robert Muggah. Blue Amazon: Brazil Asserts its Influence across the Atlantic Foreign
Affairs June 11, 2015: 5.
89
AGUILAR, Sergio Luiz Cruz. South Atlantic: Brazil-Africa Relations in the Field of Security and Defense ,
Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy and International Relations Vol.2, No.4, July-December 2013: 55.
90
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP. The Gulf of Guinea: The New Danger Zone, African Report No.195,
December 12, 2012: 21.
91
VAZ, Alcides Costa. Brazilian Approaches to Maritime Security Cooperation in IBSA and the Prospects for an
Atlantic-Indian maritime security Governance Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, 11:2, 2015: 177,
DOI:101080/19480881.2015.1067382.
92
PARK, Ariella. Brazil in Africa AS/COA PROGRAM March 01, 2012: 1. Available at<http:www.as-
coa.org/articles/brazil-africa>. Accessed on 11/18/2016.
93
AGUILAR, Sergio Luiz Cruz. South Atlantic: Brazil-Africa Relations in the Field of Security and Defense
Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy and International Relations. Vol.2, No.4, July-December 2013: 63; SEIFERT,
Jurek. New Dynamics or Old Patterns? South-South Cooperation between Brazil and Angola in VAN DER
MERWE, Justin, Ian Taylor and Alexandra Arkhangelskaya. (eds.) Emerging Powers in Africa: A new Wave in the
Relationship? Boston: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016: 136.
94
AMORIM, Celso Brazilian Foreign Policy under President Lula (2003-20010): An Overview Rev. bras. polit int.
vol. 53 no.spe Brasilia Dec. 2010, 13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/50034-73292010000300013; SEIFERT, Jurek. New
Dynamics or Old Parterns? South-South Cooperation between Brazil and Angola (pp.129-157) in VAN DER
MERWE, Justin, Ian Taylor and Alexandra Arkhangelskaya. (eds.) Emerging Powers in Africa: A New Wave in the
Relationship? Boston: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016: 136.
95
BUZAN Barry and WAEVER Ole. Regions and Power: the Structure of International Security. United Kingdom:
Cambridge University Press, 2003: 27.
96
ABDENUR, Adriana Erthal; Frank Matthias & Pedro Seabra. An Ocean of the Global South: Brazil and the Zone
of Peace and Cooperation in the South Atlantic Review of International Affairs, (2016) 29:3, 1112-1131,
DOI:10.0180/09557571.2016.1230592 <http://dx.doi.org> 10.0180/09557571.2016.1230592.
97
LETE, Bruno. Addressing the Atlantics Emerging Security Challenges, Atlantic Future. Scientific Papers 34,
Lisbon, 24 April, 2015: 177.
98
AGUILAR, Sergio Luiz Cruz. South Atlantic: Brazil-Africa Relations in the Field of Security and Defense,
Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy and International Relations Vol.2, No.4, July-December2 013: 60-61.
99
EDMUNDS, Timothy. Maritime Security Sector Reform: lessons from the Mainstream, Working Paper of the
Lessons Learned Project of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS), Cardiff: Cardiff
University August, 2014: 6.
100
OGWU, Joy U. Nigeria and Latin America in the Emerging South-South Interactions: A New Mode of Relations,
In Joy U. Ogwu. & R.O Olaniyan (eds.) Nigerias International Economic Relations: Dimensions of Dependence and
Change 2nd edition. Lagos: NIIA, (2005): 439-470, Scand.
101
NYERERE, Julius K. South-South Option, In Gaular, A. (ed.) South-South Strategy. London: Third World
Foundation. 1983:14-15..
102
CUNHA, A.L.M., Bichara, J., & Lima M. (2012) Brazil in Face of the Chinese Rise: The Risk of Regressive
Specialization. Brazilian Journal of Strategy and International Relations 1 (2), 129-168; MAWDSLEYE. From
Recipients in Donors: Emerging Powers and the Changing Development Landscapes. London: Zed Books. 2012: 8;
CESARINO, L.M C.D.N. Anthropology of Development and the Challenge of South-South Cooperation, Vibrant
9(1), 2012: 522.
103
CARLSSON J. The Emergence of SouthSouth Relations in a Changing World Economy In J. Carlsson (Ed.)
South-South Relations in a Changing World Order (10-54) Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies;
OGWU, Joy U. Nigeria and Brazil: A Model for the Emerging SouthSouth Relations? In J. Carlsson (Ed.) South-
South Relations in a Changing World Order. Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1982.
104
GREVI, Giovanni. The Atlantic Basin: An Eclectic but Converging Region. Working Paper, No.127 Presented
at the ATLANTIC FUTURE Workshop, University of Pretoria, and May 2014. FRIDE: A European Think Tank for
Global action, p. 15.
105
UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION (UNOSSC), What is South-South
Cooperation? 2016: 1-2. <http://ssc.undp.org/content/scc/about/what-is-ssc.html> Accessed on the 12th May, 2016.

39
106
CHALK, Peter. Maritime Crimes in the Gulf of Guinea, In Paul Shemella, (ed.) Global Responses to Maritime
Violence: Cooperation and Collective Action, Standard, California: Standard University Press, 2016: 271; UKEJE,
Charles. AND MVOMOELA Wullson. African Approaches to Maritime Security-The Gulf of Guinea, Abuja, Nigeria:
FES Monograph Series, December, 2013:23.<http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/nigeria/10398.pdf.>
107
SAGUNSKY, David. Improving Our Maritime Vision Working to Together to Secure the Future. December 2,
2008: 1-4. Available at <http://www.atlantic council.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/improving-our-maritime-vision>
Accessed 11/13/2016.

Selected Bibliographical References:

ABDENUR, Adriana Erthal, & Danilo Marcondes Souza Neto. Brazil and African Security, In Elling N. Tjonneland
(ed.) Rising Powers and Africa Security Landscape. CMI Report, n. R2014: 4.
<http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/527-rising-powers-and-the-africa-security-landscape.pdf>
BATEMAN, Sam. Maritime Security Governance in the Indian ocean region, Journal of the Indian Ocean Region,
12: I, 2016: 15-23<http://dx.dol.org/10.1080/19480881.2016.1138709>.

BUZAN Barry and WAEVER Ole. Fractured Ocean: Current Challenges to Maritime Policy in the Wider Atlantic.
Washington, D.C: The Garman Marshall Fund of the United States, 2012.
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY. A Comparative Strategy for 21 st Century Sea power, Washington, D.C:
Department of Navy, October 2007. Available at <www.navy.mil/maritime/maritimestrategy.pdf..>.
GILPIN, Raymond. Enhancing Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea, Strategic Insights, January 2004(1) 37:4,
557-574. Available at <http://dx.dol.org/10.1080/01436597.1128817>.
---------. Piracy and Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea: Trends, Concerns, and Propositions. Journal of the
Middle East and Africa, Vol.7, 4:267293, 20 December 2013.

GRAY, Kevin & Barry k. Gills. South-South Cooperation and the Rise of Global South, Third World Quarterly,
March 24, 2016: 557-574 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2015.1128817>.

IHEME, Chuks Onwumere. Security Challenges in the Gulf of Guinea Sub-region: Strategy for Nigeria. M.A. Thesis
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive, June 2008.
<http://hdl.handle.net/.>.

JACOBSON, Katja Lindskov & Johannes Riber Nordby. Maritime Security in the Guinea. Copenhagen: Royal Danish
Defense College Publishing House, 2015.
KIRCHNER, Emil J. and James Sperling (eds.) Global Security Competing Perception of Security in the 21st century.
New York: Routledge, 2007.
KOTSOPOULOUS, John. The Atlantic as a New Security Area? Current Engagements and Prospects for Security
Cooperation between Africa and Atlantic Counterparts. Atlantic Future Scientific Paper 06, Affiliation Atlantic
Future Technical Report. September 2014, DOI: 10.13140/2.1.2076.4963. <http://www.atlanticfuture.eu/files/324
ATLANTIC%20FUTURE_06_ >.

LOPEZ, Lucia, E. A Tool for Security Governance: How is the shaping ECOWAS Security and Defense
Regionalization Process? Green Working Paper, No.17.2012. Available at:
<http://wwww2.warwickac.uk/fac/soc/esgr/green/papers/workingpapers/gem/no1.-elisalopezlucia.pdf>.
ONUOHA, Freedom C. Socio-Economic Development and Maritime (In) security in West and Central Africa. Paper
presented at the International Conference on African Approaches to Maritime Security, Abuja.May21-23, 2014.

SOUSA, Ines. Maritime Territorial Delimitation and Maritime Security in the Atlantic. Scientific Paper 07,
presented at the ATLANTIC FUTURE Workshop, University of Pretoria, June 2014.

40
UADIALE, Martin. Issues of Maritime (In) Security in HAMILTON, Daniel S. Dark Networks in the Atlantic
Basin: Emerging Trends and Implications for Human Security. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, May 24,
2016: 193-204.

UNODC, Cocaine Trafficking in West Africa: the Threat to Stability and development with Special Reference to
Guinea Bissau), December 2007: 21.
UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY. Declaration of a Zone of Peace and Cooperation in the South Atlantic.
A/RES/41/11, 27 October 1986. 14 November 1989, A/RES/44/20, available at:
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00efe27a.html [accessed 18 November 2016].
VIILUP Elina and Anna Ayuso. Maritime Security in the Atlantic, ATLANTIC FUTURE, European Policy Brief,
31st November. 2014. Available at <http://cresativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0./deed.es>.

WHITE HOUSE. National Strategy for Maritime Security. Washington, D.C: White House, September, 2005.
YAOUNDE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (MOU), September 12, 2014. Available at:
<http://www.ecowas.int/publications/en/maritime-security/mou.pdf>. Accessed on 11/16/2016.

Abstract: This chapter examines Nigerias perspective on maritime security and governance of the South
Atlantic. The Gulf of Guinea in particular and the wider South Atlantic in general, have recently become
a hotbed of piracy and other transnational crimes that impede legitimate maritime activities. Given the
nature of transnational crimes and the jurisdictional and organizational complexity for setting-up a maritime
security operation, the growing range of threats and challenges tend to exceed the capacity of individual
states to address them. Therefore, the chapter reassesses the levels of collaboration among the regional
stakeholders and the prospects for setting-up a maritime security governance to tackle the potential threat
and challenges, within the overarching framework of a south-south cooperation. It also analyzes Nigerias
continued interest and commitment to promoting bilateral and multilateral initiatives in maritime security
cooperation and governance with the goal of enhancing the safety and security of navigation and commerce,
the protection of maritime environment, as well as ensuring peaceful and cooperative maritime operations
in the South Atlantic.

Key Words: Nigerias Perspective, South Atlantic, South-South Cooperation, Maritime Security, Governance

41
42