Romeo Glenn B.

Bongulto
UNC Law 3rd Year

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Vs.
BONIFACIO ALIBEN, DIOSDADO NICOLAS, and RONNIE NICOLAS
G.R. No. 140404

FACTS:

Aliben, D. Nicolas, and R. Nicolas were charged of the crime of murder for allegedly killing
Bongon, Sr. on October 5, 1997. The prosecution presented witnesses who testified that they saw the
alleged mauling incident. The Bongon Jr.,son of the victim, testified that he heard the dying declaration
of the victim saying the names of those who mauled him. Two witnesses saw Aliben carrying a bolo
marked with blood stains immediately after the incident. Dr. Millena, the municipal health officer,
testified for the prosecution stating that the victim was probably hit by more than one instrument and
that after hitting the victim he could not have possibly talked and should have instantaneously died. The
defense presented the accused and the barangay chairman whom D. Nicolas surrendered to. According
to the defense, Nicolas and the others were watching several people playing tong-its in his house when
Bongon, Sr. threw soil, dirt and stone twice at them and after Nicolas went out, Bongon tried to stab
Nicolas with a balisong. He hit Bongon with a wood which happens to be the lock of his house.
Thereafter, Nicolas, together with the other accused, went to the house of the Brgy. Chairman to
surrender. The chairman accompanied them to the police authorities. After trial, the trial court found
the accused guilty of murder.

ISSUE:

Is the dying declaration of the victim admissible considering the testimony of the expert witness
that said victim cannot talk after he was hit?

RULING:

According to the trial court, although the doctor testified that based on his post-mortem
examination, the victim could have died immediately after sustaining the injuries on the right side of his
head, Josefa Bongon and Juanito Bongon, Jr. however testified that the victim remained alive for a few
seconds.1[75] Bongon, Jr. testified that when he saw the victim, he was still alive, moaning. After he
carried the victim to his padyak, the victim was able to reply to his question as to the identity of his
assailants by uttering the names Dado and Ronnie. The victim was about to say more but his serious
physical condition prevented him from doing so. For a dying declaration to be admissible in evidence,
the following requisites must concur: (1) the dying declaration must concern the cause and surrounding
circumstances of the declarants death; (2) at the time of making his declaration, the declarant was
under a consciousness of impending death; (3) the declarant must have been competent to testify as a
Romeo Glenn B. Bongulto
UNC Law 3rd Year

witness; and (4) the declaration was offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder or parricide in
which the declarant was the victim.

These requisites are present in the case at bar. The injuries sustained by the victim were serious enough
to make the declarant conscious of impending death, which in fact occurred even before he reached the
hospital. His declaration, which identified his assailants, referred to the cause of his death. The declarant
was competent to testify as a witness if he had been called upon to give testimony in court. The
declarants dying declaration was offered in this case wherein he is the victim. Having satisfied all the
aforementioned requisites, the trial court did not err in admitting in evidence the victims dying
declaration. A dying declaration is an exception to the hearsay rule, because of its necessity and
trustworthiness: Necessity, because the declarants death makes it impossible for him to take the
witness stand; and trustworthiness, because when a person is at the point of death, every motive for
falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the most powerful consideration to speak the truth.2
Romeo Glenn B. Bongulto
UNC Law 3rd Year

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

VS
JOEL KAWIT YATAR
G.R. NO. 150224

FACTS:

On June 30, 1998, at 9 am,Kathryn Uba was left alone in her grandmothers house after her
aunt, Judilyn Pas-a, together with her husband and Dawang, her grandmother, went to the market. At
aroung 10 am, Wania, her aunt, and Deneng stopped by the house of Dawang to drink water. They saw
Yatar, accused, at the back of the house, and after inuiry accused told them that he just fetch lumber to
give to his mother. At 1:30 am, Pas-a, again saw the accused near her house. In the eveniong of the
same day, Dawang arrived home and found that the lights are off. While she groped in the dark, she felt
a lifeless body, Kathryn. She called for help and the neoghbors arrived to offer assistance. The police was
informed about the incident. They found the clothings behind the naked cadaver and another dirty
white shirt splattered with blood within 50 meters from the house of Dawang. The accused denied the
accusations against him but he was put under police custody. On July 3, 1998 while in prison accused
tried to escape but was later recaptured. He was charged with rape with homicide and was accordingly
sentenced to death. Hence the automatic review.

ISSUE:

May the accused be convicted even if no eyewitness was availabl?

RULING:

The weight of the prosecutions evidence must be appreciated in light of the well-settled rule
which provides that an accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is available, as long as sufficient
circumstantial evidence is presented by the prosecution to prove beyond doubt that the accused
committed the crime.

Significantly, subsequent testing showed that the Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) of the sperm specimen
from the vagina of the victim was identical the semen to be that of appellants gene type.
Romeo Glenn B. Bongulto
UNC Law 3rd Year

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the following
factors: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the
samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and
procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted
the tests.29

In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified by the prosecution as an
expert witness on DNA print or identification techniques.30 Based on Dr. de Ungrias testimony, it was
determined that the gene type and DNA profile of appellant are identical to that of the extracts subject
of examination.31 The blood sample taken from the appellant showed that he was of the following gene
types: vWA 15/19, TH01 7/8, DHFRP2 9/10 and CSF1PO 10/11, which are identical with semen taken
from the victims vaginal canal.32 Verily, a DNA match exists between the semen found in the victim and
the blood sample given by the appellant in open court during the course of the trial.

Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to induce belief in
its existence or non-existence.34 Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar, the DNA evidence
obtained through PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis, and which was appreciated by the court a quo is
relevant and reliable since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid principles of human genetics and
molecular biology.
Romeo Glenn B. Bongulto
UNC Law 3rd Year

EDWIN TABAO
VS
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 187246

FACTS:
On January 21, 1993, Tabao was driving his Toyota Corolla along G. Forbes corner Tuazon St.
towards Nagtahan when it ramped on an island divider and hit Rochelle Lanete who was crossing the
street. As a result, Lanete was thrown at the middle of the road. Thereafter, Mendez, who was driving a
Toyota Corona ran over Lanetes body. Cielo,a newspaper boy, together with Tabao brought the victims
body inside Mendez car and brought her to the UST hospital where she subsequently died. In their
defense, Tabao said that on that night of the accident, his car ramped on an island at the foot of
Nagtahan flyover, he tried to move backwards his car but failed to do so. He alighted his car and noticed
that his rear wheels were elevated. He returned inside his car and turned off the engine. He again
alighted his car and saw a body lying on the road. He looked at his left and saw a car running by. It was
Mendez car. He approached the victim and carried her towards Mendez car and brought her to the UST
hospital. Mendez said that on the night of the accident he saw a vehicle ramped on an island divider and
saw on his right another vehicle overtaking his car. He slowed down when a ruglike object fall from the
car that overtook him and stopped when he realized that what had fallen was a persons body. Then
Tabao carried the victim and placed her in Mendez car went to UST hospital. After trial, the RTC
convicted both accused of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide. It held that the two failed to
observe the necessary precaution and due care in operating their respective vehicles. The petitioners
filed an appeal in the CA. the CA agreed with the finding of the RTC. The petitioner filed a petition for
review on certiorari but the SC denied the oetitioin. The petitioner now files a motion for
reconsideration.

ISSUE:
Did the CA erred when it disregarded the testimony of defense witness Police Senior Inspector
Cornelio who testified that the petitioners car could not have bumped the victim because the latters
body was not thrown in line with the car, but on its side?

RULING:
Section 49, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court states that the opinion of a witness on a
matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training, which he is shown to possess, may be
received in evidence. The use of the word may signifies that the use of opinion of an expert witness is
permissive and not mandatory on the part of the courts. Allowing the testimony does not mean, too,
that courts are bound by the testimony of the expert witness. The testimony of an expert witness must
be construed to have been presented not to sway the court in favor of any of the parties, but to assist
the court in the determination of the issue before it, and is for the court to adopt or not to adopt
depending on its appreci
Romeo Glenn B. Bongulto
UNC Law 3rd Year

We emphasize that P/Sr. Insp. Cornelio was not an eyewitness to the incident; his testimony was
merely based on the Traffic Accident Report prepared by SPO4 Edgar Reyes who himself did not witness
the incident. At any rate, nowhere in P/Sr. Insp. Cornelios testimony did he conclusively state that the
petitioner could not have been involved in the incident.ation of the attendant facts and the applicable
law.
From his testimony, it is clear that P/Sr. Insp. Cornelio did not discount the possibility that the
victim could have been thrown on the side. He likewise admitted that the location of an accident victim
in relation to the vehicle would also depend on the speed of the vehicle and the point of impact.