Structural Failures - Case Studies

STRUCTURAL FAILURES - CASE STUDIES
THROUGH FORENSIC CIVIL ENGINEERING INVESTIGATIONS
Dr. R. JAGADISH1
Chief Consulting Engineer, Consultants Consortium, Bangalore
Abstract
To satisfy the requirements in modern fast track construction, several noticeable mistakes are committed by
planners, designers, executing agencies and supervision consultants and these are overlooked until and
unless these deficiencies are converted into the sign of distress in structural members. This involves
additional resources, time and money. In this context, out of many structural failures investigated and
rehabilitated, only three case studies are presented in this paper.
Introduction
In most of the modern constructions of high rise buildings, bridges, flyovers, etc., fast track construction
methodology is followed. The basic requirement of fast track construction is time, cost and quality. The
construction management team has to adhere to the given time for completion of construction and see that
the overall cost of construction does not exceed the estimated value. At the same time, it has to follow all
quality assurance and quality system as per requirement in the specification. If these targets are not
reached, heavy penalty will be levied on the concerned parties. Hence, all efforts will be made to see that
the project is completed on time, minimize the excess cost and satisfy QA/QC systems to the best possible
extent.
In the race to satisfy all the above requirements in fast track construction many mistakes / errors / blunders
will be committed by all the parties knowingly or unknowingly, which will be overlooked until the
deficiencies are expressed by the structural members of the building in one way or the other. To make up
these identified deficiencies considerable amount of time will be elapsed and money will be spent, which will
definitely overshoot the estimated cost, time and quality.
In the present paper three such example are presented. The first is a large multistoreyed building which was
under construction, following fast track construction methodologies that had to be investigated after some
deficiencies were observed and later on rectified, thus, overshooting the target time and money.
The second is the investigation of the failure of a cast-in-situ post tensioned prestressed concrete bridge
girder of a bridge under construction on a National Highway in North Karnataka. During post tensioning the
HT cables, the girder hogged considerably and collapsed. An enquiry was conducted, detailed investigation
was done to assess the reasons for the failure. The third case study is the total failure of a new simple L-type
cantilever retaining wall. On a rainy day it collapsed totally. An investigation was conducted to assess the
possible reasons for failure. Finally, it was strengthened and restored.
1
Former Professor and Chairman, Dept. of Civil Engg., UVCE, Bangalore University, Past President, ACCE (I) and ICI
ACCE(I) Conference on Forensic Civil Engineering, Bangalore, Aug. 23-24,2013 Page 1

Structural Failures - Case Studies Through Forensic Civil Engineering Investigations Dr. R Jagadish
CASE STUDY 1 : FAST TRACK CONSTRUCTION LEADS TO FAST TRACK RESTORATION
1.1 Introduction
A multistoried building for a German software company comprising of basement, ground plus five upper
floors of total builtup area 32500sq.mt. (3,50,000sq.ft.) was under construction. Time for completion of
the building in all respects was given as 12 months. The columns and footings were of RCC with flat slab
construction.
Different grades of concrete were used for different levels, columns upto second floor were of grade
M40 and upper floors M35. All other structural members were of grade M25.
Typical photographs of the building at the time of investigation are shown in Fig - 1.1.
Quality control and quality assurance methods were strictly adopted as per company's systems and
procedures based on ISO 9002-Quality Management System and relevant codes of practice for quality
control of materials were followed. Good construction practices were adopted.
Block - X Block - Y
Basement Floor Plan Typical Floor Plan
Fig 1.1 : Typical Views and Plans of Building at the Time of Investigation

1.2 Problems Observed
During routine inspection of the construction activities few cracks were observed in:
a) Two boundary columns at 2nd floor level in Block-X
b) Two boundary columns at 5th floor level in Block-X
These cracks were observed almost after three months after concreting. Typical cracks noticed are
shown in Fig 1.2.
Fig 1.2 : Cracks Identified at 2nd and 5th Floor Levels
1.3 Reasons for the Existing Cracks
Expert Consulting Engineer after critical examination of the cracks declared that the cracks have
appeared in horizontal direction mainly due to the plastic shrinkage of the slurry in the concrete at the
lateral ties level, because the cracks were equally spaced at the level of lateral ties in the columns (Fig
1.3 and 1.4). The construction work had stopped at fifth floor level. Except self load and construction
load, there was no other load on the structure. Hence the cracks are not due to failure of columns due
to crushing.
However, a joint meeting of clients, engineers, project management group and design consultants
declared that the columns have failed by crushing and attributed the following possible reasons for the
failure of these columns.
Crushing of concrete due to overloading
Poor quality of concrete
Deficient structural design
Delayed concreting
Lack of / inadequate curing

Shrinkage
Plastic shrinkage. And What Not!!!
a) Cracks at Second Floor Level
b) Cracks at Second Floor Level in Another Column

Fig 1.3 : Cracks identified at 2nd Floor level
Fig 1.4 : Cracks identified at 5th Floor level

1.4 Core Test
It was decided to extract cores in these columns and the other columns cast on the same day using the
same batch of concrete for estimating the probable compressive strength of hardened concrete in the
columns. The cores were extracted and tested as per Cl. 17.4 of IS 456-2000.
The numbers of cores taken were 9 and of diameter 68.74 mm. The abstract of the core test results is
given in the Table 1.1.
Table 1.1 : Abstract of the Core Test Results
Sl Floor Column Design Actual Field Core Equivalent Equivalent Remark

No Designation Grade of Cube Dia, Cube Cube
N/mm2 Strength @ mm Strength of Strength of
28 Days, Cores, Cores,
N/mm2 N/mm2 19th N/mm2, 3rd
July August
1 Second F2 40 50 68 25 30 * Fail
2 Floor F1 40 50 68 24 29
3 E1 40 50 68 22 33
4 E2 40 50 68 27 29
5 D2 1 40 50 68 29 28
6 D2 2 40 50 68 23 31
7 E3 40 50 68 14 14
8 F3 40 50 68 14 27
9 A1-1.3 40 50 68 26 36
As seen in the table only 4 out of 9 cores have passed the test as per Cl 17.4.3 of IS: 456-2000.
Due to the failure of large number of cores, the clients along with Project Engineer and Architects
decided to go for core extraction in large number of columns to assess the existing strength of hardened
concrete. The Project Engineer selected critical columns at each floor over the entire height of the
existing blocks and instructed the contractors to extract one core in each column of diameter 68/74/100
mm. It was instructed to extract cores in slabs also at 13 identified locations.
The total number of cores extracted amounted to 263 (170 from Block-X+93 from Block-Y).
As supplementary tests it was also decided to conduct Non destructive testsRebound hammer test and
Ultrasonic pulse velocity test as per IS: 13311 (Part 1 & 2), on all the existing columns not all floors of
both the blocks.
The number of columns amounted to 411 (253 from Block-X + 158 from Block-Y).
An abstract of core test and ultrasonic pulse velocity test results are given in Table 1.2

Table 1.2 : Abstract of Test Results at Second Floor Level
Cube Strength @
Concrete N/mm2
28 Days, N/mm2
Design Grade of
Hammer Test
Actual Fields
Designation
Core Test
Rebound
Remarks
Column
Sl. No.
Result
Result
U.P.V
Floor
1 -A-1.3 40 - - - - - 43 49
40 48 93 56 3.7 Good - -
40 48 93 55 2.9 Doubtful - -
40 48 93 44 3.6 Good
2 -A-1.4 40 48 68 37 - - -
3 A2 40 48 68 31 4.0 Good 41 45
4 A3 40 - - - 3.9 Good 39 42
5 A1-1.3 40 - - 26 - - 38 41
Second Floor
6 A1-1.3 40 48 68 27 - 40 43
7 A2-3.1 40 - - - - - - -
8 B1 40 4.2 Good 42 48
40 49 84 51 44 Good - -
9 B2 40 48 68 23 4.1 Good 40 44
10 B3 40 - - - 4.1 Good 38 41
11 B1 3.1 40 - 94 39 4.2 Good - -
12 C1 40 48 68 28 3.9 Good 41 42
13 C2 40 Good
14 C3 40 48 68 31 4.1 Good 41 45
15 D1 40 - - - 4.00 Good 42 48
16 D2-1 40 50 68 23 4.0 Good 38 40
17 D2-2 40 50 68 29 4.2 Good 38 40
18 D3 40 - - 4.0 Good 40 44
19 E1 40 51 68 22 3.9 Good 39 43
20 E2 40 50 68 27 4.0 Good 39 42
Core test results were correlated with the results of NDTRebound Hammer and UPV test. A typical
correlation is shown in Fig 1.5.
1.4.1 Acceptance criteria of core test results
As per Cl.17.4.3 of IS: 456-2000-Concrete in the member represented by a core test shall be considered
acceptable if the average equivalent cube strength of the cores is equal to atleast 85 percent of the cube
strength of the grade of concrete specified for the corresponding age and no individual core has
strength less than 75 percent. The acceptance value of different concrete grades used are given in the
Table 1.3, as per Cl. 17.4 of IS : 456-2000.

Fig 1.5 : Correlation of Core Test Results and NDT Results
Table 1.3 : Acceptance Criteria as per IS : 456-2000 for Different Concrete Grades Used
Sl. Grade of Design Strength of Concrete 85% of Design Strength, 75% of Design
No. Concrete Fck, N/mm2 N/mm2 Strength, N/mm2
1 M40 40 34.00 30.00
2 M35 35 29.75 26.25
3 M25 25 21.25 18.75
However, the project consultant and client engineers classified the columns into categories A, B and C,
depending on the existing equivalent cube strength of cores, so as to carry out with corresponding
strengthening scheme (Table 1.4).
Table 1.4 : Classification of Columns by Project Consultant and Client
Sl. Type Design Grade of Concrete

No. M40 M35
Equivalent Cube % of Design Equivalent Cube Strength % of Design
Strength of Cores, Strength of Cores, N/mm2 Strength
N/mm2
1 A 14.0 25.0 35.0 62.5 14.0 22.5 40.0 64.2
2 B 25.0 30.0 62.5 75.0 22.5 27.0 64.2 77.1
3 C 30.0 37.5 75.0 93.7 27.0 32.5 77.1 92.8

Based on the Core Test and NDT results (Table 1.5), jointly, it was decided to strengthen the columns
at different floor levels as per Table 1.6.
Table 1.5 : Abstract of Core Test Results
Sl. Stage of Core Core Dia Number of Number of % Pass % Fail Remarks
No. Extraction mm Cores Cores
Extracted Passed
1 I 68/74/75 156 103 66 34 Larger the
2 II 93 55 55 77 23 diameter,
3 III 84/94 59 59 86 14 greater will be
the reliability
of results
Table 1.6 : Columns to be Strengthened at Different Floor Levels
Floor Block X Block - Y

No. of No. of Column No. of No. of Column
Columns Columns Designation Columns Columns Designation
Retrofitted Retrofitted
Basement 39 - - 53 2 P5.2, T4
Ground 39 3 J3, G2, G1-1.2 39 6 P5, M1 5.4, N2

Floor 5.3, P-6, P5.2,
QP 5.2, R4,
C56/1, C56/3
First Floor 39 2 D2(1), C2 39 4 Q4, C56/2
Second 39 14 D2 (1), D2 (2), F3, 27 2 -

Floor F1, E3, E1, E2, C1,
H2, H3, A1 1.3, A1
1.3, F2, D3
Third Floor 39 2 F1-1.1, G1 1.2 - - -

Fourth 37 1 C1 - - -
Floor
Fifth Floor 37 9 A3, B3, C3, D2 (1), - - -
J3, B2, C2, E2, J2
Fifth Floor 23 - - - - -
Total 253 31 158 14 -
Grand Total = 31 + 14 = 45

An abstract of the work done is presented in Table 1.7.
Table 1.7 : Abstract of the Work Done
BLOCK X BLOCK Y
Total number of columns existing 253 158
Number of columns in which cores were taken 170 93
Number of columns on which NDT tests conducted 235 114
Total number of columns retrofitted 31 14
GRAND TOTAL = 31 + 14 = 45
1.5 Strengthening Scheme Proposed and Implemented
After long deliberations and discussions of the Project Structural Engineer with clients and strengthening
consultant a mutually acceptable and feasible strengthening scheme was proposed (Fig 1.6 and 1.7).
Even though the proposed scheme was tedious and costly the clients insisted that the scheme may be
adopted keeping in mind the safety of the structure.
Methodology of Execution of Strengthening Scheme for Identified Columns
Slab and beams to be adequately supported prior to and during retrofitting works
Existing concrete surface to be cleaned and roughened.
Grout the affected columns using low viscosity epoxy grout
Fix MS plate and ISMC 150 using M24 high strength Hilti expansion bolts at top and bottom of
slab
Weld reinforcement steel (32Y16) as indicated in the drawing
Jacketing by using M50 grade free flow micro concrete as per specifications
Grade of reinforcement steel-Fe 415
Grade of steel plates, channels and angles 240 Mpa

Fig 1.6 : Strengthening Scheme Proposed
Fig 1.7 : Details of Different Activities of the Strengthening Scheme

Typical photographs of implementation of strengthening scheme of columns at
different stages are given in Fig 1.8.

Fig 1.8 : Views of Different Stages of Strengthening Scheme Executed

1.6 Inferences on the Present Case Study Based on Fast Track Construction
The following inference can be drawn after a critical study of the existing condition of the existing of the
building, test results and execution of the proposed strengthening scheme.
TIME Exceeded considerably

- total stoppage of work
- decision making
- investigation and evaluation
- finalizing the retrofitting scheme
- implementation of retrofitting
-
COST - escalation due to time
- additional cost due to retrofitting
-
QUALITY - difficult to achieve as desired
- many a times questionable
1.7 Conclusion
In meeting the target of completion of construction and handing over the building to the client, do not
forget to follow good construction practices
In the name of Fast Track Construction do not forget QA / QC procedures to be implemented

Identify the type of cement used-OPC or PPC or Blended Cement in the manufacture of concrete
(RMC or SMC). Accordingly, give adequate time for cement to hydrate completely and allow
concrete to attain its design strength
Allow the concrete to gain its full strength in its natural way
Implement adequate curing
Give more importance for curing of vertical members, in particular columns
Follow all codal provisions to achieve required durability of concrete
Appoint qualified Civil Engineers as Project Managers and Site Supervisors
For durability, produce concrete of: Dense
Impermeable Required strength
CASE STUDY 2 : PARTIALLY CONSTRUCTED PSC BRIDGE CONNECTING ROAD FROM

GULBARGA TO HUMNABAD
2.1 Introduction
PSC bridge under construction is located in the backwaters area of the reservoir dam which is about 11
kms from the bridge. It is along the national highway no. 218 connecting Gulbarga and Humnabad. It
consists of 7 spans of 30.2m each comprising of 4 PSC girders on each span totaling 28 girders with deck
slab and approaches. The overall length of the bridge is 210m. The foundation consists of open
foundation and well foundation depending upon the location of the piers and abutments. Details are
given in Fig - 2.1. A panoramic view of the site is shown in Fig 2.

In the AL-P1 span the G2 girder had been successfully prestressed. However, the GI girder during post
tensioning hogged in the form of a bow, got cut into two pieces at midspan and miserably collapsed
onto the supporting centering. The entire work was stopped immediately and ordered for an enquiry
for the collapse.
The salient features of the bridge during the visit are as follows :
Location : Across Bennethora river, on National

Highway No.218 between Gulbarga and Humnabad.
Type of bridge : PSC deck girders (4 Nos.) of overall depth 1500mm
supported on R C piers and Abutments rested on open
/ well foundations.
Number of spans : Seven spans of 30.20m each.
Total Length of Bridge : 210 m
Grade of concrete : Abutment, Pier, Pier cap, Well, Well cap
and Steining M30
PSC deck girders M40
Grade of steel : Fe-415
Strands : Nominal ultimate stress 19000kg/cm2
Contract Period : 17 months
Construction work stopped : August 2010
Construction status : Abutment left - Completed
at the time of investigation Abutment right - Completed
Pier-P1 - Completed
Pier-P2 - Completed
Pier-P3 - Completed
Pier-P4 - Completed
Pier-P5 - Well foundation partially completed
Pier-P6 - yet to be started
Deck Girders span 1 : Girder G1 & G4 reinforcement fabrication partially
completed.
Girder G2 prestressing completed.
Girder G3 only concreting completed.
Span 2 : GirderG3 & G4 reinforcement fabrication partially
completed.
Girder G1 & G2 only centering completed.


Fig 2.2 : Panoramic View of PSC Bridge under Construction
2.2 Physical Investigation
A detailed physical inspection was made and it was observed that the construction works are at
different levels as presented (Fig 2.2 and 2.3).
a) Overall construction work had come to a standstill (Fig 2.2 and 2.3)
b) PSC Girder G1 was possessing central cracks due to failure by post tensioning and was resting on
centering below (Fig 2.4)
c) PSC girder G2 has been cast in place, post tensioned and grouted. But end anchorages are left open
without any cover. The unprotected end anchorages have corroded considerably. (Fig 2.3)
d) Girder G3 has hogged up to an extent of about 90-95mm due to pre-stressing.
e) At the left support of G2 girder, it has cracks from support extending upwards. Corners have got
crushed and the inside honeycomb concrete is exposed. This shows that the concrete is not all that
good.
f) PSC girder G3 has been cast and pretension cables are inserted in respective ducts but not pre-
stressed (Fig 2.3)
g) PSC girder G4 reinforcement cage is ready, partially shuttering is done and not concreted (Fig 2.3)
h) Piers P1 and P2 are completed including pier cap (Fig 2.2).
i) Piers P3 and P4 are completed including pier cap (Fig 2.2)
j) Approach and exit abutments are completed. But concreting is of poor quality.
k) Pier P5 well sinking has been completed, but it is submerged in standing water and only
reinforcement is seen above water.
l) P6 pier with foundation yet to be constructed.
m) The unused reinforcement lying on the ground exposed to atmosphere is totally corroded.

n) Bearing pads are completed on the top of few pier caps and some reinforcement fabrication ready
for concreting. But the reinforcement exposed are corroded.
o) As the construction work has totally stopped, engineering records like quality control, sequence of
working etc., were not available at site.
p) The centering and scaffolding provided for the PSC girder are unprotected. If anybody moving
around the place removes any of the centering due to some reason or the other, it will be a total
collapse of the existing girders which may lead to further problems (Fig 2.4a)
G3 G4
G1 G2
Fig 2.3 : Four Girders in the First Span AL P1
2.3 Details of Failure PSC Girder G1
Figure 2.4 shows clearly the failure mode of PSC Girder. A closeup view of the girder indicates that the
quality of concrete is questionable.
The probable sequence of failure of the PSC girder is indicated in the Fig 2.4. When the maximum
permissible prestressing force was reached, the girder would have got hogged upwards. The magnitude
of hogging deflection was so high that the elongation in the HT cables exceeded maximum permissible
value and have got cut, releasing the entire prestressing force. At this stage the maximum tensile stress
would have definitely crossed in ultimate value and hence concrete has also failed.
At this stage the PSC girder with zero prestressing force had become an ordinary RCC girder which could
not withstand its own self weight and has fallen flat onto the centering below.
The magnitude of the impact due to sudden fall was so high that the vertical stirrups in the girder have
buckled as if it is subjected to severe earthquake (Fig 2.5).


G1
a) Girder Failed during Post Tensioning
G1 G1
b) Close-up of Failed Sections c) Close-up of Cracked Section
Fig 2.4 : Girder - G1 as on June 16, 2010

G1
G1
a) Crippled Reinforcement b) Buckled Reinforcement
G1 G1
c) Spalled Concrete showing Weak d) High Tension Steel with Pre-tension

Honeycomb Concrete Released after Failure
Fig 2.5 : Few More Views of Failed Girder - G1

2.4 Why should PSC Girder Fail
The other girder G2 had already been post tensioned successfully earlier and it is lying next to it in the
middle of the breadth of span. This girder G1 which is similar to the girder G2 in all respects failed. The
question now is why G1 failed when G2 is intact.
2.5 Probable Reasons for the Failure of PSC Girder G1
The girder G1 would have failed due to any one or combination of the following factors.
1) Errors in structural designs

2) Misalignment of HT cables
3) Excessive prestressing force
4) Excessive elongation of HT cables
5) Erroneous pressure gauge of prestressing jack
6) Calibration of pressure gauge questionable
7) Quality of concrete and concreting
8) Compressive strength of hardened concrete was much less than the designed strength
To ascertain the above factors detailed investigation was done one after another.
2.6 Proof Checking of Structural Designs
The following documents were provided for proof checking of the structural designs of the PSC bridge.
a) Drg. No. U3/60/BEN/01 (ALT) Rev A General arrangement drawing at Ch.20.119 `
(Alternative)
b) Drg. No. U3/60/BEN-01/05 Cable layout details of PSC girder at Ch. 20.119
c) Drg. No. U3/60/BEN-01/06 Reinforcement details of longitudinal girder at Ch.
20.119
d) Drg. No. U/GEN/UPG-01 General Notes
2.6.1 STAAD Modelling
Using the data given in the INPUT FILE in the detailed design calculation document provided, an
independent computer analysis was made using the standard software package STAAD-PRO-2007,
creating separate 3D model.
It was observed that the design values of maximum bending moment and shear force considered
matched with the present analysis values.
The maximum deflection was well within the permissible values.
2.6.2 Design of Post-tensioned Beam Outer Girders
Provisions of design requirement as per IRC : 18-2000 have been followed throughout the designs.
Grade of concrete : M40
Grade of reinforcement steel : Fe 415
Yield strength of prestressing cable : 1900 N/mm2

Four numbers of prestressing cables have been provided (Fig 2.5d) as per the design requirements
which is in order.
The design stresses in concrete and pre-stressing steel are well within the permissible limits as per the
relevant codes of practice.
All the losses due to prestress are considered as per codal requirements.
Final mid span deflections due to self weight, live load and prestress are within the permissible limits.
Cable layout details as per design and as per details provided in the Drg. No. U3/60/BEN-01/05 are
presented in the Table 2.1.
Table 2.1 : Comparative Statement of Cable Profile

Sl. Cable X (m) 6m 8m 10m 12m 13m 14m 14.6m
No. No. Y (mm)
1 Cable 1 Drawing 681 866 1051 1236 1329 1421 1477
Design 663 751 1014 1102 1278 1366 1419
2 Cable 2 Drawing 338 465 592 719 783 846 884
Design 323 382 559 618 735 794 829
3 Cable 3 Drawing - - - - 160 232 180
Design - - - - 152 199 231
4 Cable 4 Drawing - - - - 160 232 280
Design - - - - 152 131 231
2.6.3 Inferences on Proof Checking
Based on the independent structural analysis and design of PSC Bridge, made as per relevant IRC Codes
of Practice and after comparing with original designs made by the Consultants, it was observed that the
structural designs and the relevant structural drawings provided are in order.
2.7 Non Destructive Testing of RC Structural Elements
Non Destructive Tests were conducted by a reputed agency accredited by NABL, to assess the existing
strength of hardened concrete and the quality of construction. The following investigative studies were
carried out :
1. Semi-Destructive test (core test).
2. Non-Destructive tests to assess the quality / homogeneity of in-situ concrete :
a) Ultrasonic Pulse Velocity Test.
b) Rebound Hammer Test.
3. Covermeter studies to assess the thickness of cover concrete provided.
2.7.1 Core Testing
To assess the compressive strength of concrete as per IS: 516, concrete cores of dia 90mm were taken
spaced at 2m c/c over the entire length of the failed girder and cores were tested in the laboratory.

An abstract of NDT and Core test results is given in Table 2.2
Design compressive strength of concrete : 40 N/mm 2

Table 2.2 : Abstract of NDT and Core Test Results
Sl. Test Point Compressive Strength assessed in N/mm2 Remarks

No. Non Destructive Tests
Rebound Hammer Test UPV Test Core Test
1 1 23 21 18 Poor concrete
2 2 25 23 22 unfit for
3 3 20 18 17 prestressing
4 4 30 25 28
5 5 21 18 18
6 6 24 20 21
7 7 22 20 18
8 8 21 18 16
9 9 22 19 18
Quality of Existing Concrete in Failed Girder G1
From the photographs presented in Fig 2.4 and 2.5, it is clearly seen that the concrete is honey
combed. The disintegrated concrete around the central crack clearly indicates that the concrete is not
well compacted and there is no bond between concrete and reinforcement steel.
2.7.2 Inferences from Test Results
Quality/strength of concrete in the failed PSC Girder G1 is non-uniform and does not conform to M40
grade concrete. The existing strength is less than M25. Hence, it was not fit for prestressing / post
tensioning as per IS : 1343 and IRS Codes of Practice.
2.8 Reasons for Failure
Based on the results of proof checking of structural designs of PSC girders and NDT and core test results
it is confirmed that the failure of PSC girder during post tensioning is mainly due to poor quality of
concrete and construction.

Dismantled PSC Girder G1
G1 G2 G3 G4
a) Group of Girders after Dismantling G1
b) Debris of Dismantled Concrete of Girder G1
Fig - 2.6 : Dismantled Concrete of PSC Girder G1 after Failure

2.9 Final Recommendations
1) The detailed design calculations submitted for main PSC girders, were critically scrutinized
independently as per relevant IRC Codes of Practice and other relevant IS Codes and were found to
be in order.
2) It was recommended to dismantle the failed PSC girder G1 immediately (Fig 2.6 ).
3) In the present site condition, in situ casting of PSC girders shall not be carried out.
4) It is strongly recommended to adopt Precast Post Tensioned PSC girders in the new construction.
5) The existing girders G2 and G3 having variable strength and are not dependable, from durability
consideration, shall be dismantled totally.
CASE STUDY 3: CLASSICAL CASE OF COLLAPSE OF A NEW RETAINING WALL

AND ITS REHABILITATION
3.1 Introduction
There could be several reasons for collapse of structures and many means of rehabilitating them. The
main reasons for collapse can be attributed to any one or combinations of design deficiency,
construction deficiency, poor quality of materials, deterioration of concrete and lack of communication.
Investigations to be carried out depend on the type and extent of failure. It is necessary to
appropriately diagnose the reasons for failure to propose a judicious rehabilitation schemes.
Newly built retaining walls of length 120m on eastern and western side and 80m on northern side with
concrete block masonry constructed over them as compound walls formed the enclosures of a MNC
factory building in Bangalore. The cantilever retaining wall on eastern side was L shaped, retaining earth
to a height of 5.0 5.5m above the NGL. Similar retaining wall was constructed on the western side but
with shallower height of earth retained varying from 3m to 4m. Northern side retaining wall was of
counterfort type.
It was shocking to see that on a heavy rainy day, the L shaped Cantilever Retaining Wall (LCRW) on
eastern side had collapsed for a length of about 15m in the middle portion (Fig 3.1), but luckily
without causing any loss or damage to life.
This paper deals with the details of investigations carried out to identify the reasons for the collapse and
the alternative strengthening measures suggested and adopted to stabilize the
retaining walls.

Factory side Earth side
Fig 3.1 : Longitudinal Views of Overturned Retaining Wall
3.2 Investigations Carried Out
As a first step, the physical inspection of the collapsed retaining wall as well as the other retaining walls
existing at site was carefully carried out and site conditions were observed. Procurement of GFC
structural drawings from the contractor and their verification with as built condition at site formed
the next part of investigation. Proof checking of the structural drawings provided by the structural
consultant was absolutely necessary. It was also decided to assess the existing strength of hardened
concrete of the retaining wall to compare with that assumed strength in design. The results of all these
investigations would contribute in unfolding the reasons for collapse.
3.2.1 Physical inspection
A thorough physical inspection of the failed retaining wall and of the entire site was made by the
investigation team consisting of the consultants, contractors and owners representatives and the
following observations were recorded:
i. The LCRW on the eastern side had overturned in the mid portion from the earth side to factory
side disturbing the retained earth (Fig 3.1) on the outside of the factory.
ii. Removal of earth was being carried out to make way for dismantling the collapsed retaining
wall.
iii. Most of the portion of the masonry of about 1m height which was existing over the failed
retaining wall had collapsed.
iv. At about mid length, the retaining wall had sheared off, exposing the reinforcement in the stem.
The lapped horizontal reinforcement had snapped. At this section total failure had taken place.
(Fig 3.2 and 3.3)
v. And on both sides of this failed section, number of diagonal cracks had developed due to
torsion. (Fig 3.4).

vi. The stem of the retaining wall showed stepped crosssection with stepped face towards the
inside of the factory and vertical face towards the outside where the earth was retained.
Dismantling of collapsed retaining wall had commenced exposing the reinforcement in the stem
at about 2.0-2.5m from the top.
vii. Examination of exposed reinforcement in the stem of LCRW showed that the main
reinforcement was placed on the stepped face towards the factory whereas the earth was
retained on the face outside the factory, which was surprising.
viii. There were no weep holes provided throughout the length of this part of the retaining wall.
ix. Retaining walls on the other sides were found to be intact. Few weep holes were seen on the
northern side counterfort retaining wall.
x. The natural land on the east side outside of the factory was sloping substantially from upper
east side towards the factory forcing the rain water on this area to flow towards the retaining
wall.
Fig 3.2 : Closer View of Failed Fig 3.3 : Sheared Stem of the Retaining Wall
Retaining Wall
Fig 3.4 : Damaged Portions of Stem

3.2.2 Drawings Procured from Contractor
It was learnt that the structural drawings pertaining to construction of the LCRW under consideration
were supplied by the structural consultant to the owner of the project. These were transferred to the
contractor by the clients site engineer. Copies of these drawings giving the structural details as
executed at site were procured from the contractor. The cross section of LCRW obtained from one of
the structural drawings is shown in Fig 3.5. As the reinforcement in the stem was already exposed, it
was easy to verify both the concrete section and reinforcement provided with that present in the
procured structural drawings.
In addition, drawings pertaining to contour map of the factory site and master plan with contours were
made available by the contractor.
3.2.3 Observations
Examinations of structural drawing revealed the following :

i. The earth retained seemed to have changed from the factory side (with stepped stem) of the
retaining wall (indicated as inside) to outside the factory side (with vertical face of stem) (Ref. Fig
3.5).
ii. However, the main reinforcement indicated in the drawing remained towards inside face of stem i.e.,
original face towards which the earth was expected to be retained.
iii. Contour maps confirmed that the earth was sloping from east to west i.e. towards the retaining wall.
AND BALANCE OF
FOR EAST,NORTH & SOUTH
SIDE COMPOUND WALL
Fig 3.5 : Cross Section of L-Type Retaining Wall as in Procured Structural Drawing
3.2.1 Core Test Rresults

Though initially it was thought to conduct NDT tests to assess the quality and compressive strength of
concrete, this was not felt necessary as concrete core tests were already conducted by a reputed agency
and the results of the same were made available to the present consultant.

From the core test results, neglecting such cores which contained reinforcement, the compressive
strength of concrete in the stem was assessed as 25N/mm 2 (based on the acceptance criteria for
compressive strength for cores as per IS:456 2000), which was same as that adopted in the design (as
mentioned in structural drawing).
3.3 Inferences Drawn from Observations
i. LCRW was designed by the structural consultant such that the earth retained was towards the
stepped face of the stem i.e., towards the inside of the factory (Fig 3.5). Correspondingly, the
placement of main reinforcement was on the inside face in the drawing which was also found to
have been employed in the field.
ii. The site observations revealed that the earth was retained outside the factory building with the
vertical face of stem being towards the earth but the main reinforcement was located on the
opposite face of the stem.
iii. After few discussions it came to light that as per site condition, the clients site Engineer had changed
the face of earth retained from inside to outside in the structural drawing issued by the structural
designer without bothering about any consequential change in the structural features
(reinforcement details in particular).
iv. The main vertical reinforcement in the stem of the LCRW is therefore placed not on the face
towards the earth retained but happens to be on the rear face of the stem which essentially means
wrong placement of main tension reinforcement and becomes ineffective to a large extent under
load.
v. This indicates severe lack of communication between the personnel of design group, site engineer
(owners side) and contractor.
vi. Due to heavy rain the previous day, all the water has flown towards the retaining wall thereby
saturating the soil.
Therefore it is necessary to carry out the proof checking of structural designs for saturated soil
condition in addition to natural soil condition.
3.4 Proof Checking of Structural Drawings
Proof checking of structural drawings of the LCRW was done using the data from as-built conditions,
core tests results, structural drawings provided and adopted at site and soil properties available. The
structural designs were carried out for two conditions. a) Lateral Earth pressure due to soil in natural
condition b) Lateral Earth pressure due to soil in saturated condition. Measured from NGL, the height
of earth retained was confirmed as 5m and depth of foundations as 1.6m. The main design details of
concrete section and main reinforcement required for the two states of soil are presented in Table 3.1.
The proof checking of design considering the actual earth face and actual reinforcement existing on
tension face revealed the following:
i. For the condition of Earth pressure due to normal soil, thickness of stem and main reinforcement
provided fall short by 25% & 108%. In addition, thickness of base slab (heel only) provided falls short
by 50% (however, reinforcement available is adequate when calculated for required higher depth of
base slab (Table 3.1) and hence, strengthening is required.
ii. For earth pressure due to saturated soil condition, when compared to normal soil condition, the
quantities of concrete section and main reinforcement required in both stem and heel slab are
substantially high (Table 3.1) and obviously strengthening is required.

Table 3.1 : Comparison of Main Design Details between Required and Existing Quantities
Sl Component Concrete section D, mm Main(tension) Reinforcement area, Remarks

No mm2
Existing Reqd.* Reqd.** Existing Reqd.* Reqd.**
Cond. 1 Cond. 2 Cond. 1 Cond. 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1 Stem 300 400 1200 753.3 1570.0 2512.0 Strengthening
(for D in (for D in required
Col.4) Col.5)
2 Base Slab 600 1200 - 1148.6 1148.6 - Strengthening
B= 4500mm required
3 Base Slab 600 - 1200 1148.6 - 523.3 Strengthening
B= 6000mm required
* Cond. 1 Lateral pressure due to Normal soil
** Cond. 2 Lateral pressure due to Saturated soil
3.5 Reasons for Failure of L-Type Cantilever Retaining Wall
The failure of retaining wall based on physical observations, study of the structural drawings and the
redesign of the cantilever retaining wall for the condition as constructed at site may be attributed to the
following reasons.
i. As per the existing condition at site as provided and as constructed, the main vertical reinforcement
in the stem of LCRW is provided on the opposite face of the earth retained (Fig 3.5). Hence, the
existing main vertical reinforcement provided on the earth face is totally inadequate to resist the
lateral earth pressure in normal condition itself.
ii. In addition a day before the failure it was informed that there was heavy rain. The rain water from
the upper regions of the natural ground towards the eastern side of the factory has flown towards
the retaining wall and got flooded against the retaining wall which had no weep holes. The lateral
pressure exerted by the fully saturated earth is very much more than the lateral earth pressure due
to earth alone. The existing width and depth of base slab and available tension reinforcement are
grossly inadequate to resist the lateral earth pressure due to fully saturated soil condition. Hence,
the failure.
iii. Lack of communication: From Sec. (3.3) above, it can be seen that the additional factor leading to
failure is the lack of communication between the clients site engineer, design group and the
construction group.
3.6 How the Failure could have been Avoided
i. Taking into consideration the realistic site condition, the structural drawing should have been
studied by the clients in consultation with PMC or original structural consultants before releasing
the drawing for construction.
ii. When once the earth retaining face is changed as per the structural drawings, the clients should
have contacted the consultants for providing revised structural drawings.
iii. As proposed in the original structural drawings weep holes should have been provided in the
retaining wall which would have reduced the additional lateral pressure due to water.

iv. The authorized engineer of the client had given site instructions through the structural drawings
incorporating the revision in the levels of earth retained and indicating the change of earth
retaining surface on the outer face of the retaining wall.
v. Unfortunately, as per revised earth surface, corresponding change in the main vertical
reinforcement had not been indicated. (No engineering judgement has gone in before issuing the
revised drawing).
vi. A drain of sufficient capacity should have been provided on the outer periphery of the retaining
wall to drain off the rain water flowing from upper region of the sloping land on the eastern side
outside the factory, in the absence of weep holes.
3.7 Recommendations
Based on the physical observations made, information gathered from the original structural drawings
and based on the results of the redesign of the LCRW, the following recommendations were made:
i. The stem of the failed portion (plus 5m on either side) of LCRW on the eastern side shall be
totally demolished from south to north and reconstructed with new design details and existing
base slab to be strengthened (Fig 3.6).
ii. Instead of building a retaining wall to resist the huge lateral earth pressure due to fully saturated
condition of soil, a better solution would be to provide a drainage system to prevent flow of rain
water towards open area of retaining wall. Then the LCRW can be strengthened for normal earth
conditions.
Fig 3.6 : Strengthening of Base Slab and with New Construction of Stem

iii. The same original detailing has been adopted in the LCRW constructed on the southern side and
part of northern side. Accordingly similar type of failure may occur any time. Hence, it is advised
to strengthen these existing retaining walls as per requirement immediately.
iv. The design and structural detailing of counter fort type retaining wall constructed on the
northern side of the factory along the existing natural drain shall also be checked appropriately.
v. Weep holes shall be provided in the retaining wall depending on the requirements, at site.
3.8 Strengthening Scheme Adopted
Of the two options of strengthening suggested, strengthening of stem as well as base slab from outside
was recommended.
Following step-by-step procedure was provided to execute the strengthening scheme. The details are
shown in Fig 3.7.
Fig 3.7 : Strengthening by Jacketing (by Concreting) of Existing Stem and Base Slab
and Anchoring of Base Slab to Rock
3.8.1 Strengthening of Base Slab
i. Remove the existing soil above the base slab from inside upto the top of existing base slab.
ii. Clean the top surface by water jetting until the soil is completely removed and the concrete surface
is exposed.

iii. Roughen the top surface of base slab, using wire brush and clean the dust by water jetting or air
blasting.
iv. Drill holes of 25mm diameter from the top of base slab into the rock below the slab to a depth of
1.5m at a spacing of 1m in zigzag manner.
v. Pour polyester resin grout completely into the drilled holes as per manufacturers specifications.
vi. Insert 20mm diameter rod into the hole right through the depth, such that 150mm is exposed above
the top of the base slab.
Steps (iv) to (vi) are meant for anchoring base slab to rock below.
vii. Apply a coat of epoxy adhesive over the roughened surface of base slab to integrate new concrete
with existing concrete.
viii. Provide leakproof shuttering for concreting above the base slab.
ix. Provide prefabricated reinforcement on to the base slab as per the detailing given in the drawing.
x. Pour free flow / self compacting ready mix concrete of grade M25, as per the requirement.
xi. Cure well for a minimum period of 10 days.
xii. Continue this process over the entire length of base slab both for new construction of stem, as well
as for strengthening of stem.
3.8.2 Strengthening of Stem by Jacketing
i. Remove the earth from outside completely upto the bottom of the base slab.
ii. Clean the vertical surface of the stem by water jetting, such that the concrete surface is free from
earth.
iii. Roughen the surface of the stem by wire brushing and clean the dust by water jetting or air blasting.
iv. Provide shear connectors of 12mm diameter at a spacing of 1000mm c/c in zigzag manner.
v. Provide reinforcement as per the new design and tie with shear connectors such that they stand
vertically to plumb.
vi. Apply a coat of epoxy adhesive to bring about integral action between new and existing concrete.
vii. Provide leakproof shuttering to the stem such that the cover is 25mm and pour ready mix concrete
of M25 grade completely.
viii. Remove shuttering after 24 hours and cure well for a minimum period of 10 days.
ix. Continue this process to the entire length of retaining wall to be strengthened.
3.9 Conclusions
The reasons for the failure of the L-shaped cantilever retaining wall were attributed to the incorrect
placement of the vertical reinforcement in the stem away from the earth surface which was mainly due
to the lack of communication between the stake holders. Design details and drawings were provided for
construction of new retaining wall in place of failed portion of retaining wall. Dismantling of the
retaining wall in the distressed portion followed by reconstruction and strengthening measures for the
remaining portion of the retaining wall were suggested and successfully executed. The strengthened L-
shaped cantilever retaining walls was found to be stable and performing satisfactorily.
4.0 Overall Conclusions
All the three Case Studies of structural failure presented are due to human mistake / blunders. It may
be due to lack of quality control during construction, errors in structural designs, wrong detailing going
unnoticed by qualified Consultants and reputed contractors, awarding more contracts to incapable
contractors, etc.

Hence, the lessons learnt from the above, is that it has become absolutely necessary to:
1) Implement appropriate measures of strict QA/QC at site.

2) Site Engineers and supervisors shall be trained and made known about the proper use and pros
and cons of RMC.
3) Detailing of reinforcement shall be read, checked, rechecked and understood before fabrication
at site. If any errors are noticed shall be brought to the notice of the Consulting Engineer
immediately.
4) Peer review / proof checking of structural designs shall be made compulsory, irrespective of the
original designer.
5) In the fast track construction, in the race to reach the target, many factors are ignored, in
particular, curing of concrete, it shall be given due importance from the durability point of view.
References
A comprehensive report on Core test Non Destructive Test and Retrofitting of Columns of a
Multistoried Building under Construction, Whitefield, Bangalore, Vol. 1 and 2, 2006.
Jagadish. R., Editor. -Structural Failure-Case Histories'. Oxford IBH Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., 1995.
ACI Committee 364, Guide for Evaluation of Concrete Structures Prior to Rehabilitation,
American Concrete Institute, 1999.
Jagadish, R., Investigation report submitted to KSHIP, Bangalore
Jagadish, R., Editor, Structural Failures Case Histories, Oxford and IBH Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd.,
1995.

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STRUCTURAL FAILURES - CASE STUDIES

THROUGH FORENSIC CIVIL ENGINEERING INVESTIGATIONS

ACCE(I) Conference on Forensic Civil Engineering, Bangalore, Aug. 23-24,2013 Page 1

CASE STUDY 1 : FAST TRACK CONSTRUCTION LEADS TO FAST TRACK RESTORATION

Basement Floor Plan Typical Floor Plan

ACCE(I) Conference on Forensic Civil Engineering, Bangalore, Aug. 23-24,2013 Page 2

1.2 Problems Observed

Fig 1.2 : Cracks Identified at 2nd and 5th Floor Levels

1.3 Reasons for the Existing Cracks

ACCE(I) Conference on Forensic Civil Engineering, Bangalore, Aug. 23-24,2013 Page 3

a) Cracks at Second Floor Level

b) Cracks at Second Floor Level in Another Column

Fig 1.4 : Cracks identified at 5th Floor level

ACCE(I) Conference on Forensic Civil Engineering, Bangalore, Aug. 23-24,2013 Page 4

1.4 Core Test

Sl Floor Column Design Actual Field Core Equivalent Equivalent Remark

ACCE(I) Conference on Forensic Civil Engineering, Bangalore, Aug. 23-24,2013 Page 5

Table 1.2 : Abstract of Test Results at Second Floor Level

1.4.1 Acceptance criteria of core test results

ACCE(I) Conference on Forensic Civil Engineering, Bangalore, Aug. 23-24,2013 Page 6

Fig 1.5 : Correlation of Core Test Results and NDT Results

Table 1.4 : Classification of Columns by Project Consultant and Client

Sl. Type Design Grade of Concrete

ACCE(I) Conference on Forensic Civil Engineering, Bangalore, Aug. 23-24,2013 Page 7

Table 1.5 : Abstract of Core Test Results

Table 1.6 : Columns to be Strengthened at Different Floor Levels

Floor Block X Block - Y

Ground 39 3 J3, G2, G1-1.2 39 6 P5, M1 5.4, N2

First Floor 39 2 D2(1), C2 39 4 Q4, C56/2

Second 39 14 D2 (1), D2 (2), F3, 27 2 -

Third Floor 39 2 F1-1.1, G1 1.2 - - -

ACCE(I) Conference on Forensic Civil Engineering, Bangalore, Aug. 23-24,2013 Page 8

An abstract of the work done is presented in Table 1.7.

Table 1.7 : Abstract of the Work Done

Total number of columns existing 253 158

Number of columns in which cores were taken 170 93

Number of columns on which NDT tests conducted 235 114

Total number of columns retrofitted 31 14

1.5 Strengthening Scheme Proposed and Implemented

Methodology of Execution of Strengthening Scheme for Identified Columns

ACCE(I) Conference on Forensic Civil Engineering, Bangalore, Aug. 23-24,2013 Page 9

Fig 1.6 : Strengthening Scheme Proposed

Fig 1.7 : Details of Different Activities of the Strengthening Scheme

ACCE(I) Conference on Forensic Civil Engineering, Bangalore, Aug. 23-24,2013 Page 10

Fig 1.8 : Views of Different Stages of Strengthening Scheme Executed

ACCE(I) Conference on Forensic Civil Engineering, Bangalore, Aug. 23-24,2013 Page 11

TIME Exceeded considerably

In the name of Fast Track Construction do not forget QA / QC procedures to be implemented

CASE STUDY 2 : PARTIALLY CONSTRUCTED PSC BRIDGE CONNECTING ROAD FROM

ACCE(I) Conference on Forensic Civil Engineering, Bangalore, Aug. 23-24,2013 Page 12

Location : Across Bennethora river, on National

ACCE(I) Conference on Forensic Civil Engineering, Bangalore, Aug. 23-24,2013 Page 13

ACCE(I) Conference on Forensic Civil Engineering, Bangalore, Aug. 23-24,2013 Page 14

Fig 2.2 : Panoramic View of PSC Bridge under Construction

2.2 Physical Investigation

ACCE(I) Conference on Forensic Civil Engineering, Bangalore, Aug. 23-24,2013 Page 15

Fig 2.3 : Four Girders in the First Span AL P1

2.3 Details of Failure PSC Girder G1

ACCE(I) Conference on Forensic Civil Engineering, Bangalore, Aug. 23-24,2013 Page 16

ACCE(I) Conference on Forensic Civil Engineering, Bangalore, Aug. 23-24,2013 Page 17

a) Girder Failed during Post Tensioning

b) Close-up of Failed Sections c) Close-up of Cracked Section

Fig 2.4 : Girder - G1 as on June 16, 2010