Regional Studies, Vol. 33.7, pp.

593 604

Borders, Border Regions and Territoriality:

Contradictory Meanings, Changing Signi cance
JA M E S AN D ER S O N * and L I A M O D OW D
*Department of Geography and Centre for Transnational Studies, University of Newcastle, Newcastle upon Tyne
NE1 7RU, UK
Department of Sociology and Social Policy, Queens University, Belfast BT7 1NN, U K

(Received February 1999; in revised form April 1999)

A N D ERS O N J. and O D OWD L. (1999) Borders, border regions and territoriality: contradictory meanings, changing
signi cance, Reg. Studies 33, 593 604. The meaning and signi cance of state borders, as well as their geographical location,
can change drastically over space and time. Along with their associated regions, they have competing and contradictory
meanings, both material and symbolic. Their particularities require localized study but also wider contextualization. As a general
response to peripherality, borders tend to generate questionable arbitrage activities, and their signi cance ultimately derives from
territoriality as a general organizing principle of political and social life, one which changes over time. Borders and border
regions are thus particularly revealing places for social research, especially in the present era of accelerated globalization, the end
of the `Cold War and the growth of supra-state regions such as the European Union (E U) and the North American Free
Trade Area (NAFTA). Much of the research literature suggests that bounded territorial units are declining in signi cance given
the increased ows of capital, commodities, information and people across state borders. The key claims of states to control
exit and entry and to monopolize the means of violence within xed borders seem to be under threat. Social and communal
boundaries are seen to be increasingly de-linked from territorial borders. Such propositions raise a series of questions concerning
how and to what extent state borders and border regions are being re-made, re-negotiated and managed or mismanaged. The
paper sketches this changing context for studies and comparisons of particular borders and border regions.

Borders Border regions Material and symbolic meanings Supra-state regions Territoriality Globalization
Arbitrage

A N D ERS O N J. et O D OWD L. (1999) Les frontieres, les
regions frontalieres et la notion de territoire: des signi cations
contradictoires et une importance en pleine evolution, Reg.
Studies 33, 593 604. La signi cation et limportance des
frontieres dEtat, aussi bien que leur situation geographique,
peuvent evoluer sensiblement sur lespace et avec le temps.
Conjointement avec leurs regions annexes, les frontieres ont
des signi cations a la fois opposees et contradictoires, et
materielles et symboliques. Leurs particularites necessitent
non seulement que lon les etudie sur le plan local, mais aussi
que lon les relativise a plus grande echelle. Pour re pondre
de facon generale a la notion de peripherie, les frontieres ont
tendance a engendrer des activites darbitrage douteuses, et,
au bout du compte, leur importance provient de la notion
de territoire comme un fondement de la vie politique et
sociale qui evolue avec le temps. Il sensuit que les frontieres
et les regions frontalieres sont revelatrices dans le domaine
de la recherche sociale, notamment a lheure de la mondialis-
ation, de la n de la guerre froide et de lessor des re gions
supranationales, telles lUnion europeenne (l Ue) et la zone
de libre-echange nord-americaine (la N AF TA). Une grande
partie de la recherche laisse supposer que limportance des
territoires bien delimites diminue, etant donne la vitesse
plus rapide de la circulation transfrontaliere du capital, des
marchandises, de linformation et des personnes. Il semble
que les pre tentions essentielles des Etats concernant le con-
trole de lentree et de la sortie, et quant a la monopolisation
A NDE RSO N J. und O D OWD L. (1999) Staatsgrenzen,
Grenzgebiete und Raumbedarf des Individuums:
widerspruchliche Bedeutungen, sich wandelnde Signi kanz,
Reg. Studies 33, 593 604. Nicht nur der geographische
Standort, sondern auch Bedeutung und Signi kanz staat-
licher Grenzen ko nnen sich im Laufe der Zeit und des
Raumes drastisch verandern. Materialistisch und symbolisch
gesehen kommen ihnen und den dazugehorigen Regionen
konkurrieren de und widerspruchliche Bedeutungen zu.
Ihre Eigenheiten verlangen auf wenige Orte beschrankte
Untersuchungen, aber auch Einordnung in gro ere Zusam-
menhange. In allgemeiner Erwiderung auf ihre Randlage
entwickeln Grenzen vielfach fragwurdige Arbitrageaktivi-
taten, und ihre Signi kanz leitet sich letzten Endes vom
Raumbedarf des Individuums als allgemeinem Ordnungs-
prinzip politischen und sozialen Lebens ab, welches im
Laufe der Zeit Anderungen unterworfen wird. Grenzen und
Grenzgebiete sind daher besonders aufschlu reiche Orte fur
die Sozialforschung, besonders im gegenwartigen Zeitalter
beschleunigter Globalisierung, dem Ende des kalten Krieges
und dem Aufkommen Staaten ubergreifender Regionen wie
der Europaischen Union (EU) und der Nordamerikanischen
Freihandelszone (NAF TA). In der Fachliteratur wird oft
davon gesprochen, da angesichts der Tatsache vermehrter,
Staatsgrenzen uberschreitender Strome von Kapital, Waren,
Information und Menschen die Signi kanz fest abgegrenzter
Gebietseinheiten abnimmt. Die Hauptanspruche von

0034-3404/99/070593-12 1999 Regional Studies Association

594 James Anderson and Liam ODowd
des moyens de la violence au sein des frontieres xes, se
voient remettre en question. De telles propositions font
soulever les questions suivantes: comment et dans quelle
mesure les frontieres et les regions frontalieres sont-elles
refaites, renegociees et gerees ou mal gerees? L article cherche
aussi a esquisser ce contexte en voie de mutation pour ce
qui est des etudes et des comparaisons des frontieres et des
regions frontalieres particulieres.
Frontieres Regions frontalieres
Signi cations materielles et symboliques
Etats supranationaux Notion de territoire
Mondialisation Arbitrage
I N T RO D UC T I O N
Every state border, every border region, is unique.
Their meanings and signi cance can vary dramatically
over space and time, as regimes change in one or
more of the adjoining states, as borders are `closed or
`opened, or as price advantages lurch from one side of
the border to the other. Borders and their associated
regions require localized study and repay detailed com-
parison. But they have a great variety of material
uses and symbolic meanings and display an apparently
bewildering diversity of characteristics and relations. In
these circumstances, a multiplication of empirical case
studies and comparisons is not enough. Local particu-
larities, whether political, economic, social or cultural,
can only be understood in terms of wider conceptual-
izations. Understanding a contemporary border or
border region demands some theoretical and historical
contextualization of borders in general.
Territorial borders both shape and are shaped by
what they contain, and what crosses or is prevented
from crossing them. The `container and `contents
are mutually formative. Ultimately the signi cance of
borders derives from the importance of territoriality as
an organizing principle of political and social life. The
functions and meanings of borders have always been
inherently ambiguous and contradictory; and these
characteristics seem to take on a new salience with
claims about emerging `borderless worlds and the
`space of places giving way to the `space of ows.
Borders, and the regions that adjoin or straddle them,
are thus particularly rich and revealing places for social
research. And this is especially so in the present era of
accelerated globalization, the end of the `Cold War,
and the growth of supra-state regions such as the
European Union (EU) and the North American Free
Trade Area (NAFTA).
How are state borders and border regions being
Staaten, Einreise in und Ausreise von dem Gebiet innerhalb
der von ihnen selbst festgelegten Grenzen zu kontrollieren,
und am, Monopol der Lizenzerteilung fu r Mittel der Gewal-
tanwendung festzuhalten, scheint bedroht zu sein. Gesellsch-
aftliche und kommunale Abgrenzungen erweisen sich zu-
nehmend als unabhangig von Gebietsgrenzen. Solche
Aussagen werfen die Frage auf, wie und inwieweit Staats-
grenzen und Grenzgebiete erneut festgelegt, ausgehandelt,
gut oder schlecht verwaltet werden. Der vorliegende Aufsatz
skizziert diesen, im Wandel begriVenen, Zusammenhang fu r
Untersuchungen und Vergleiche ausgewahlter Grenzen und
Grenzgebiete.
Grenzen Grenzgebiete
Materielle und symbolische Bedeutungen
Staaten ubergreifende Regionen
Raumbedarf des Individuums
Globalisierung Arbitrage
transformed in this changing context? In introducing
this Special Issue we consider borders under two broad
headings. In the rst section we seek to convey a sense
of how borders express contradictory meanings and
diverse relationships. We consider in turn de nitional
questions, border contradictions, and the unequal and
asymmetrical relationships which borders encapsulate.
In the second section, we suggest some of the ways in
which territoriality, globalization and contemporary
historical change impact on the diverse and contradict-
ory dimensions of borders. Here the objective is not
to present a fully edged theoretical framework for
border research; rather, it is to underline some of the
pressing research themes and questions arising from
contemporary social change. Some of these are
addressed by the contributors to this issue; others
constitute agenda for future research.
C O NT RA D I C T O RY M E A N I N G S A ND
D I V E RS E RE L A T I O N S H I P S
De nitional variety
Terms for borders, boundaries and frontiers exist in all
languages to signify the limits of social groups, but
their connotations diVer widely across cultures and
through time.1 This Special Issue focuses on `borders
de ned primarily as external state boundaries. Clearly
demarcated boundaries have become a crucial element
in an increasingly global state system since the seven-
teenth century. `Borders then refer to the legal lines
separating diVerent jurisdictions; or to a `frontier area
of variable width on either side of this legal line; or
simply to a broad `zone of transition between diVerent
societies and centres of power, as was more typical of
some pre-modern states and their `frontier societies
(see B A RTL ET T and M AC KAY, 1989). `External state
borders also frame related `internal borders such as
 Borders, Border Regions and Territoriality
those demarcating internal divisions of a state, as in a
federal system (e.g. the US), or a devolved system of
provincial and local government (e.g. in the UK).
These external and internal state borders are mapped
on to, and interact with, a plethora of other social
boundaries such as those distinguishing national, ethnic,
religious or linguistic groups. But a lack of congruence
between state borders and the other types of boundary
remains a perennial source of border disputes and
con icts.
`Border as `frontier area or `zone is a meaning
which merges into `border region , and this term
too has a variety of meanings. It encompasses areas
immediately beside a states external border, or strad-
dling it, and also administrative regions abutting a
border whose centres are physically and socially distant
from that border. Thus the French Basque Country
and the adjoining Spanish Basque Country are both
`border regions , and together they constitute an ethno-
national `cross-border region. But the administrative
entity of Aquitaine, of which the French Basque Coun-
try is a small part, may also be considered a `border
region because a section of its border coincides with
the state border; and indeed some Basques (L ETAM EN -
D I A et al., 1996) fear that the immediate border area
may suVer from being `leapfrogged by cross-border
co-operation (see also K R A T K E , this issue).
Regions that straddle state borders cross-border
regions have grown in number and importance in
Europe, initially with the encouragement of the
Council of Europe, and more recently with the EUs
promotion of the Single Market (A ND E R S O N and
G OO D M A N , 1995; O D OWD , 1998a). Such cross-
border regions may be entities of limited, and some-
times transient, governance created to take advantage
of EU funding and the abolition of border controls
(see P ER K M A N N ; C HU R C H and R EI D ; and K RA T KE ,
this issue). They may be constituted via transactions
arising from the juxtaposition of two asymmetrical
politico-economic or ideological systems (see S C OT T ,
this issue), as in the case of the US Mexico border
(H EYM A N , this issue), or the East/West Cold War
borders in Europe (see P A A S I ; and K R A T K E , this
issue). Cross-border regions may have an underlying
cultural unity not congruent with state borders or,
alternatively, their raison detre may be the very border
that divides them. In other words, regional unity may
derive from the use of the border to exploit, legally
and illegally, funding opportunities or diVerentials in
wages, prices and institutional norms on either side of
the border.
As with our other terms, `border change too can
be de ned in quite diVerent ways. Most obviously, it
refers to completely new, revived or geographically
relocated state borders; more subtly, it refers to chang-
ing the symbolic meanings and/or the material func-
tions of existing borders in situ (OD OWD , 1998b).
Border change in the former sense of creating new, or
595
reviving old, borders has been a spectacular feature of
the collapse of the Soviet Empire into several new
independent states (F OR S BE R G , 1996). The reuni ca-
tion of Germany was border relocation on a grand
scale. National con icts in places such as Ireland, the
Basque Country, Corsica, Quebec, Cyprus, Yugoslavia
and Kashmir are a continuing reminder of the unsettled
geography of state borders. Together, these various
instances have helped put `border change on the
political and academic agenda. Simultaneously, how-
ever, economic, political and cultural forms of global-
ization are altering the functions and symbolic
meanings of seemingly `settled borders in western
Europe, North America and much of the rest of the
world. This form of border change has no immediate
implications for altering the location of state borders.
However, although it may lead to such pressures in the
longer term if state borders are devalued vis-a-vis the
borders of supranational entities such as the E U or
NAFTA or those of subnational entities based on
regionalist or ethnic distinctiveness.
Border contradictions
Going beyond de nitions, borders have both material
and symbolic uses (see P A A S I ; and A N D ER S O N and
O D OWD , this issue). They can have a very obvious
physical presence (the Berlin Wall being an extreme
example), and even where visually indistinct, they are
typically the bearers of a wider symbolism as the
material embodiment of history as `time written
in space (R U P NI K , 1994). They are often seen as
encapsulating a history of (not necessarily successful)
struggle against `outside forces, and as marking the
limits of the `community or `society. By the same
token, however, studies of border regions and societies
expose misleading assumptions that `state and `society ,
or `state and `nation , are necessarily synonymous or
coterminous. The drawing of any given state border
represents an arbitration, and simpli cation, of complex
geo-political, political and social struggles (see A N D ER -
S O N and O D OWD , this issue). It seldom, if ever,
oVers a coincidence of economy, polity and culture,
but instead represents and often rei es a particular
relationship between them that may prove either trans-
itory or durable.
But closer critical scrutiny of borders challenges their
rei cation and reveals them as far from simple. Instead,
they appear inherently contradictory, problematical and
multifaceted. They are at once gateways and barriers
to the `outside world, protective and imprisoning,
areas of opportunity and/or insecurity, zones of contact
and/or con ict, of co-operation and/or competition,
of ambivalent identities and/or the aggressive assertion
of diVerence. These apparent dichotomies may altern-
ate with time and place, but more interestingly
they can co-exist simultaneously in the same people,
596 James Anderson and Liam ODowd
some of whom have to regularly deal not with one
state but two.
Borders are lters with highly variable degrees of
permeability or porosity; and border regions are
peripheries of in ltration, transition or separation,
defences for the supposed `purity of the `centre . But
although geographically far from central administra-
tions, state control may paradoxically be strongest at
the vulnerable border, which is mainly where the
`Berlin Walls of exclusive territorial sovereignty are
asserted and defended. Like the Janus-faced national-
isms with which they are intimately associated in the
so-called sovereign `nation-state, borders look inwards
and outwards: they simultaneously unify and divide,
include and exclude. They are coercive, disabling and
limiting, including and excluding many people against
their will; but they are also benign and enabling,
providing the basis for security, dominant forms of
identity and conventional representative democracy.
`Prison or `refuge , they can facilitate oppression or
provide an escape from it.
The nation-state ideal of cultural homogeneity and
centralized political control is both con rmed and
disrupted at the border. Here the divisive aspects of
states and nationalisms predominate over their unifying
aspects, and that despite (or maybe because of ) the fact
that the borders of would-be nation-states often fail to
coincide with the borders of nation, culture or ethni-
city. So contradictions abound at borders. They are
very obvious in situations of national territorial con ict,
such as Cyprus, Kashmir or Ireland, and one answer to
the ensuing problems is to strengthen the barriers: `shut
out the world . But not surprisingly it rarely works.
Resolving (or partly resolving) the contradictions gen-
erally requires opening the gateways and reducing the
`barrier functions of the border. Border con icts are
typically waged in the name of `nation and `democracy
(by both sides), but democracy is often the one thing
missing (on all sides) and for a reason which involves
another contradiction.
State borders de ne the constituency or electorate
for the exercise of representative, territorially-based
democracy; but these borders are themselves rarely the
product of democracy, even where established since the
advent of popular representation. This is a particular
instance of what C O N NO L LY, 1991, pp. 464 66, has
termed `the paradox of origins and `the politics of
forgetting; the origins of democracies are generally
undemocratic and need to be `forgotten for democracy
to be accepted as legitimate. The paradox is that for
democratic polities to exist and function there have to
be democratic institutions, but until the institutions are
brought into existence there cannot be democracy.
This applies par excellence to the delimitation and institu-
tionalization of territorial borders whether this
involves the acceptance of existing territorial entities,
the carving out of new territories or the imposition of
borders by an external power. Typically it is violence
or the threat of force, rather than democracy, which is
embodied in state borders, whether established before
or after the advent of mass democracy. But the legacy
of undemocratic and often violent origins whether
in national con ict, political revolution or the slaughter
of native populations needs to be played down or
concealed for territorial democracy to perform its
legitimizing functions. The contemporary relevance of
the origins has to be oYcially `forgotten.
The problem with contested borders is precisely that
`origins remain a live issue and cannot be `forgotten .
In Ireland, for example (A N DE R S O N and O D OWD ,
this issue), the territorial legitimacy of the existing
border is denied by one side, and upheld by the other.
Both sides appeal to `democracy. But here the paradox
re-emerges in the form of a diYculty. Old borders
had undemocratic origins but new borders cannot
be originated by conventional democratic procedures
precisely because the territorial basis for the exercise of
democracy is the issue: the border con ict is fundament-
ally a con ict over who is a citizen, who should have
the vote and who should organize the election in the
rst place. Squaring that circle and overcoming the
diYculty may demand the democratization of ever
more complex forms of transnational governance in
order to qualify the `zero-sum character of disputes
over national borders (A N DE R S O N and H A MI LTO N ,
1999).
Asymmetrical relationships and `border arbitrage
Borders and border regions display many dimensions
of diVerence, inequality and asymmetry economic,
political, cultural and social. They vary widely in terms
of their history, geography, symbolism and permeability.
They may be highly porous for some things (e.g. capital
ows), but relatively impervious to others (e.g. labour
immigration). Likewise, border regions come in all
shapes and sizes, some highly populated, others virtually
empty, some stagnating in economic and social peri-
pherality, others turning their geographical peripheral-
ity to political and economic advantage. So, rather than
concentrating only on internal characteristics, it is
generally more fruitful to study a border region in terms
of its comparisons and relations with other regions and
institutions. The crucial relations include ones with:
(1) other regions of its own state (including other
border regions); (2) the central state institutions; (3)
immediately adjacent regions of the neighbouring
state(s); (4) its other regions; (5) its central institutions;
and all in the context of (6) direct relations between
the states, and wider forms of transnational governance.
In these relations, four dimensions are particularly
important: relative economic wealth; political power;
national loyalties; and cultural identities.
Thus a border areas `periphery centre dynamics of
economic and political power, and whether or not its
population (or a majority of it) shares the majority
 Borders, Border Regions and Territoriality
national identity, or has the same language or religion
as the majority population of the state, all have a crucial
bearing on its cross-border relations. This is particularly
the case if the region has more in common with the
neighbouring region across the border.
Borders are generally imposed through force and
intimidation in the course of wars, conquests and
state formation. Power accumulation and state-nation
building typically progress outwards from the `centre,
with the peripheral border regions the objects rather
than the subjects of policies and politics. However, it
is important to acknowledge the historical role of local
social forces and local con icts within the border areas
(S A H L I N S , 1989), in particular the role of regional
elites, the nature and extent of their cross-border
networks and their relationships to adjoining states
(B AUD and V A N S C H EN D EL , 1997). Borderland elites
and people do help to shape cross-border relations
while interacting with external factors and the wider
geo-political environment (see S C OT T ; K R A T K E ;
P A A S I ; A N D ER S O N and O D OWD , this issue). Con-
temporary anthropological studies reveal the extent to
which borders are reproduced in everyday transactions
in ways which express but also modify the interstate
and geo-political in uences on border regions (W I L-
S ON and D O NNA N , 1998). For example, using the
Italo Slovene border as an example, A R M S T R O NG ,
1998, p. 23, has suggested that multi-faceted, multi-
lingual and multi-cultural border environments have
the capacity to teach their respective national govern-
ments tolerance while working out a modus vivendi that
gives viability to, and de nes, their society.
A border areas comparative standing with regions
and institutions in the neighbouring state has a particu-
larly crucial bearing on the nature and extent of its
cross-border relations. They may have very similar or
very diVerent economies and levels of development.
Degrees of cross-border diVerence, complementarity
or asymmetry in terms of economic in/equality,
political in/compatibility, and cultural and national
identities determine the potential for diVerent types
of cross-border relations that are aVected, in turn, by
the degree of `openness of the border concerned.
The political economy of borders and border regions
is particularly revealing of unequal and asymmetrical
relationships. Almost by de nition, for the states
involved, the political (and often military) aspects of
borders generally take precedence over their econom-
ics. So borders can negatively aVect regional economies
by splitting economic catchment areas and by increasing
transaction costs. TariVs, diVerences in language and
customs, the inability of public contracts and `oYcial
traYc to cross the boundary, and actual or potential
political instability or military con ict, can all inhibit
cross-border trade and production (H A NS EN , 1981,
pp. 23 24), rendering border regions economically as
well as geographically peripheral. However, as Chri-
staller, Losch and others have pointed out, stable border
597
regions can bene t from trading activities focused on
the border, such as the storage of goods, earnings
from border controls and policing, and transfrontier
investments made to avoid customs duties (ibid., p. 25).
An important distinction needs to be made, however,
between economic activities for which the border is
the raison detre and those which it disrupts or inhibits.
The co-existence of diVerent regulatory regimes on
either side of the state border generates a form of
opportunity structure which invites smuggling,
unoYcial exchange rates and illegal immigration
(B AU D and V A N S C HE ND E L , 1997, pp. 230 31).
Adapting A LT VAT E R s, 1998, analysis of post-Soviet
`arbitrage economies, `border-dependent activities
may be seen in terms of `arbitrage or the exploitation
of diVerentials in prices, interest rates, exchange rates
and share prices over time and space. This is mainly
con ned to the sphere of circulation rather than the
production of goods; and the cross-border economic
relationships generated by arbitrage tend to be limited,
sometimes short term and unstable, `informal and
perhaps illegal. They are dependent on asymmetries,
including diVerent market failures or dysfunctionalities
(e.g. shortages of diVerent goods) on either side of the
border. While, such `border-dependent economies can
show remarkable exibility in adapting to short term
policy changes and in accommodating to shifts in global
and national economies, they are conservative in a
deeper sense. They serve to sustain, rather than to
undermine or supersede, the state border, feeding oV
the juxtaposition of diVerent, frequently asymmetrical
or mis-matched, politico-administrative institutions,
policies and markets on either side of the border.
Although arbitrage brings opportunistic economic
gains, including to areas which may have few other
resources, it can inhibit or `crowd out the emergence
of more soundly-based, dynamic cross-border produc-
tion networks, cluster developments, or learning
regions (see K R A T K E s discussion, this issue, of the
`low and `high roads to development in a Polish
German border region). In some areas, of course, cross-
border production complexes do emerge and as a
result of arbitrage, as in the maquiladora system on the
US Mexican border. However, here the border is
utilized to maintain and exploit massive wage diVeren-
tials, and to regulate the supply of very cheap and
controllable Mexican labour (see H EYM A N , this issue).
T E RRI T O RI A L I T Y, G L O B A L I Z A T I O N
A N D H I S T O RI C A L C H A N G E
The border characteristics discussed above are the
diverse, imperfect and often contradictory products of
a state-centric system. The hallmark of this system has
been a particular form of territoriality used by state
governments to control resources and people, by mak-
ing or sometimes failing to make the bounded
territory of the state the primary focus of economic,
598 James Anderson and Liam ODowd
political and cultural identi cation for its citizens. Con-
temporary forms of globalization, however, have begun
to unsettle or recon gure this state-centric system.
They bring with them ever denser webs of transnational
governance, new supranational institutions and new
technologies which increase the ows of capital, com-
modities and people across state borders, putting older
forms of territoriality and borders into question. The
study of state borders and border regions thus challenges
state-centric predispositions. However, it also has the
potential to challenge facile assumptions about globaliz-
ation and the imminent demise of states and their
borders. This points to the need for historical analysis
in order to assess the novelty and speci city of the
amalgam of processes connoted by `globalization .
We discuss the implications for borders and border
research rstly in terms of territoriality, and then its
connections with globalization and with phases of
historical change. Our three related themes do not
exhaust the list of elements necessary for understanding
border change (for example, comparative research is
not discussed) but we suggest that these three themes
are indispensable to any agenda for researching contem-
porary borders and border regions.
Territoriality
Territoriality is a `spatial strategy to aVect, in uence, or
control resources and people, by controlling area. It is
a form of enforcement that `uses area to classify and
assign things, and it works by controlling access into
and out of speci ed areas (S ACK , 1986, pp. 21 34). It
simpli es issues of control and provides easily under-
stood symbolic markers `on the ground, giving rela-
tionships of power a greater tangibility and appearance
of permanence. It involves the active use of geographic
space to classify social phenomena, to communicate
social boundaries and to in uence or control resources,
things, information, symbols and people, by delimiting
and asserting some form of control over territorial
borders.
Territoriality, therefore, necessarily produces and
focuses attention on borders. It is embodied in the
modern, sovereign, `territorial nation-state and pro-
vides the basis of the states system in which states claim
sovereignty and immunity from outside interference
within their own borders.2 But although a very simple
and eYcient form of control in some circumstances,
its strengths are also its weaknesses. It is arbitrarily
divisive and disruptive of social processes, particularly
at borders. In the interests of control, it rei es power,
de-personalizes social relationships, and oversimpli es
and hence distorts social realities. Whether employed
for benign or malign purposes, by peaceful or violent
means, territoriality is inherently con ictual with a
marked tendency to generate rival territorialities.
Borders need to be constantly maintained and socially
reproduced through particular practices and discourses
which emphasize `the other (see P A A S I ; and A N D ER -
S O N and O D OWD , this issue), itself a source of
con ict. Because territory (unlike other dimensions of
wealth) generally has a xed, nite total, territoriality
actively encourages the `zero-sum games characteristic
of national and border con icts (A ND E R S O N and
S H UT T L EWO RTH , 1998). Thus other, non-territorial
forms of control are needed to complement terri-
toriality and, in some cases, may indeed be preferable
as alternatives. But whether preferable or not, they may
be increasing with globalization, as for example in the
partial replacement of border immigration controls by
internal surveillance.
Yet the capacity to organize space and cross-border
relationships remains a key to power in the contempor-
ary global system. In this respect, those who control
capital and investment have a decisive advantage over
the mass of workers who are restricted in their move-
ments by state immigration controls. Access to techno-
logy and other resources, along with geopolitical power,
nationality, religion, language, political ideology, race
and sometimes gender can all in uence the capacity to
cross borders. Especially in the industrialized world,
state borders are signi cantly more diYcult to cross if
one is poor and non-white. Indeed, the growing co-
ordination of more restrictive immigration and political
asylum policies within the European Union testi es to
the continuing signi cance of territorial borders as a
means of exerting power and control (B UN YA N , 1993;
M I L E S and T H R A NH A R D T , 1995), as does the gather-
ing of refugees along borders in the Balkans. Studies of
borders and border regions are therefore essential for
exploring the limitations of state territoriality, and
the capacity of the relatively powerless to resist and
circumvent the territorial strategies of states and other
powerful actors.
State borders, however, have an ambiguous or
double-edged signi cance. While signifying power,
control and exclusion, they simultaneously also stand
for empowerment and inclusion. In many cases, state
territoriality oVers a more inclusionary basis for demo-
cratic citizenship than other social markers such as
religion, nationality, ethnicity or race. The drawing of
state borders does generate a dynamic for state projects
of internal homogenization. But this territorial dynamic
has limits and is confronted (often in border regions) by
counter-dynamics based on pre-existing socio-cultural
diversity, on rival territorialities or on the limits of
territoriality and the need for complementary or alter-
native forms of cross-border social organization. Thus,
bounded territory can create the conditions for devel-
oping multicultural and multidimensional identities
predicated on more open borders and cross-border
relationships which are not monopolized by the state.
The problematic nature of territoriality has a direct
bearing on the question of whether, or to what extent,
state borders are now undergoing an historic change;
and in typically contradictory fashion contemporary
 Borders, Border Regions and Territoriality
globalization can be read as supporting both their
inclusionary and their exclusionary aspects.
Globalization and state territoriality
Globalization is currently an even more problematical
and contested concept than territoriality though the
two are intimately connected. No discussion of con-
temporary state borders can avoid addressing globaliz-
ation though, while it has sweeping connotations, it is
far from constituting a cohesive `master narrative.
Instead, the term encompasses a disputed amalgam of
processes driving what A M I N , 1997, p. 129, describes
as `the growing number of chains of economic, social,
cultural and political activity that are world wide in
scope and `the intensi cation of levels of interaction
and interconnectedness between states and societies .
The burgeoning debates about new and accelerated
forms of globalization are bound up with questions
about the future of states and borders and whether
national states are losing their pivotal role in the global
system (A N D ER S O N , 1995). Research taking territorial
borders rather than globalization as its point of depar-
ture, such as the work reported in this issue, is informed
by at least two related themes: on the one hand, the
stubborn particularities of borders and their adaptability
to wider forms of social change, including globaliz-
ation; and, on the other hand, the increased lack of
territorial congruence between economy, polity and
culture in all states a major theme in contemporary
globalization studies. However, some extreme variants
of the `globalization thesis rather exaggerate the degree
of congruence that might have existed at some time in
the past, thereby over-emphasizing the novelty of
recent globalizing trends.
In crude terms, it is possible to distinguish between
`strong and `weak versions of globalization, with con-
trasting implications for state borders and territoriality.
There are diVerent strands within each version and a
degree of overlap between them,3 and they are also
cross-cut by disciplinary diVerences in the emphasis
given to economic, political or cultural processes and
how their interconnections are conceptualized. Never-
theless, strong versions all stress the novelty of recent
forms of globalization, with the 1970s typically seen as
the watershed. They all pose a serious challenge to
border research insofar as they suggest a secular decline
in the signi cance of borders and territoriality. They
stress the development of a `borderless global economy
(O H MA E , 1990), the dominance of new communica-
tions and information technology (C A S T EL L S , 1997)
and the intensi cation of transnational cultural and
governance networks, with signs of an emerging global
consciousness (R O BE RT S O N , 1992; G I D D EN S , 1999).
The more extreme variants see the `end of the state-
centric world of territoriality and borders , and the
`end of the nation-state (O H M A E , 1990, 1995); the
`end of ideology (F U KAYA MA , 1991); and even the
599
`end of geography (O B R I EN , 1992). More measured
exponents such as A M I N , 1997, and G I D DE NS , 1999,
are somewhat more sceptical of this `endism but never-
theless stress the extent to which globalization is over-
coming distance and diVerentiating localities, regions
and states, even to the point where the latter fragment
or can no longer sustain credible claims to be the
decisive in uence on activities within their borders.
Other transnational actors such as transnational cor-
porations, social movements and communities are seen
as challenging the pivotal role of the state in ways
which are less than respectful of state borders.
The strong version of the globalization thesis tends
to place primary emphasis on economics and techno-
logy with a secondary emphasis on culture. Its central
metaphor is the Internet which facilitates the emer-
gence of `virtual economies, communities, cultures
and even systems of governance transcending territorial
borders. Thus, H OOG VELT , 1997, p. 1, distinguishes
between the `real territorial world inhabited by physical
persons and the globalized `phenomenal world where
people develop economic, political and social relation-
ships regardless of geographical location and the terri-
tory they share or the space which separates them. This
globalized phenomenal world supports the emergence
of `a global market discipline that is distinct from the
global market place linking real territorial economies.
It also facilitates the emergence of what C A S T EL L S ,
1996, p. 472, has termed the `meta-network of global
nancial ows driven by the fusion of nancial deregu-
lation and the revolution in communications and
information technology. As H O OG V ELT , 1997, pp.
5 6, observes, `money is being made out of moving
money around , free from the traditional restrictions of
space and time, and she cites Peter Druckers claim that
90% of nancial transactions have no relationship to
either production or trade.
Transnational corporations, rather than states, are
perceived to be the key actors in this new world,
developing global production, sales and nancial strat-
egies relatively free from the restrictions of territorial
(especially state) borders. In its cultural form, this
strong version of globalization emphasizes the spread of
capitalist consumerism symbolized by global products
such as McDonalds, Coca-Cola and Levi-Strauss jeans
(F EAT H ER STO N E , 1990). Along with these go the
globalization of largely North American values of
modernization, technological progress, the non-
interventionist state and representative democracy all
summed up and celebrated by F U KAYAM A , 1991, as
`the end of history and the nal victory of neo-liberal
capitalism over socialism in the aftermath of the Cold
War. While disputing the victorys nality, more
Marxist-oriented scholars emphasize the emergence of
a transnational bourgeoisie as carriers of these global
values and practices (see S K LAI R , 1991; H OL M A N and
V A N DE R P I J L , 1996).
`Weak versions of the globalization theory see `inter-
600 James Anderson and Liam ODowd
nationalization as more important than `globalization
(e.g. H I R S T and T H O M P S ON , 1995; M A NN , 1997;
W E I S S , 1998). They argue that states remain pivotal
actors in the global arena with respect to markets and
emerging forms of transnational governance; and they
question the novelty of contemporary globalization,
arguing that global economic integration was as
advanced before World War One as it is today (H I R S T
and T H O MP S O N , 1995). `New institutionalists in sev-
eral disciplines challenge the abstraction of the `market
from political structures, and emphasize the extent
to which global capitalism is embedded in national
frameworks, increasingly augmented by macro-
regionalism as in the EU (e.g. B OYE R and D R ACH E ,
1996). Territorial boundaries emerge here as delimiters
of national systems of innovation (N EL S O N , 1993), or
of particular capitalisms infused with the political and
socio-cultural characteristics of states and macro-
regions. Obviously, this approach takes much more
cognisance of borders as regulators of global production
and markets. In this view, the `virtual global markets
of nancial investment and speculation are less import-
ant than the `real world of inter-territorial economies
and cross-border linkages.
Weak globalization perspectives point, implicitly or
explicitly, to the adaptability of state territoriality as
new macro-regional borders develop around (and
within) the EU, NAFTA, and looser, weaker associ-
ations such as APEC (the Asian Paci c Economic
Community) or Mercosur (dominated by Brazil and
Argentina) in South America. The emergence of these
blocs suggests that the economic integration of `real
territorial economies (especially trade and investment
ows) is becoming relatively more concentrated geo-
graphically and particularly in North America, western
Europe and the Far East (H I R S T and T H O MP S O N ,
1995, p. 68). They may be `barriers rather than `step-
ping stones to genuine globalization; and H OOG VE LT ,
1997, even suggests that the geographical reach of
world capitalism is actually receding at present, redu-
cing the global economic role of most of Latin America
and Africa. Whatever the merits of these arguments,
even in economic terms they raise the question of new
and exclusionary territorial borders being constructed.
Local, state and macro-regional borders connote ways
of mediating wider globalizing in uences, of compro-
mising with them or even resisting them.
The empirical study of borders brings out their
economic, political and cultural aspects and the diVer-
ent way these relate to each other. Accordingly, research
on borders needs to be framed within a conception of
globalization that is multi-dimensional, where eco-
nomic, political and cultural aspects are connected but
retain their distinctive qualities. Economic globaliza-
tion, conceived as the expansionary thrust of capitalism,
has contingent rather than necessary relationships with
politics and culture within any given bounded locality,
region, national state or macro-regional bloc. Yet,
historically, capitalism has favoured, and indeed privil-
eged the structures of the inter-state system. So now
one of the big questions concerns the extent to which
state borders have become less important to the
working of the contemporary global economy, or are
being replaced by the new borders of macro-
regionalism. However, the globalization of the inter-
state system is not reducible to phases of economic
development and has much to do with conquest,
colonialist expansion, geopolitical rivalry and war.
Similarly, cultural forms of globalization are not redu-
cible to its economic and political dimensions and are
carried by social movements, migrants and global media
with consequences that escape the agenda of economic
or state elites.
The debates about globalization and its interactions
with state borders lose much of their force and precision
if not located within an historical periodization which
brings out the continuities and discontinuities in the
wider, multi-dimensional trajectory of globalization.
Strong globalization perspectives tend to overemphasize
the historical discontinuities while their opponents
tend to underplay the novelty of contemporary global
change. Of course, analytical separation of globalization
into its economic, political and cultural components
produces diVerent periodizations; but the empirical
study of state borders forces a recognition of the
relationships between these components, even if they
develop at diVerent rates in diVerent periods.
Phases of historical change
One way of approaching historical periodization, there-
fore, is to distinguish periods of border change that
are characterized by diVerent relationships between
economic, political and cultural forms of globalization.
This historical approach also allows us to bridge the
distinction between strong and weak globalization per-
spectives, and bring events as well as processes into the
analysis of border change. Periodization may diVer,
however, depending on the geographic frame of analy-
sis, with periods of border change in Africa, for
example, or in Latin America, diVering from each
other and from those in Europe (B AU D and V A N
S C HE ND E L , 1997).
In Europe, the rst great marker of border change
in the twentieth century is World War One, a watershed
between two major periods of globalization which saw
the beginning of the end of the great European empires
and of British imperial hegemony and global free trade.
As many researchers have pointed out, the nineteenth
and early twentieth century was characterized by a
very considerable increase in international trade and
investment. Transnational migration, notably to the
countries of `white settlement, was substantial and
signi cantly less regulated than subsequently. Borders
were relatively porous, and were largely determined by
the interplay of imperial power, and regional, national,
 Borders, Border Regions and Territoriality
ethnic or tribal forces. Even in this period, however,
the rise of modern nationalism was pre- guring a new
border dispensation characterized by the globalization
of the `western national state as the world norm
(R O BE RT S O N , 1992).
The subsequent post World War One period, dating
from the treaties of Versailles, Trianon and St Germain,
lasted arguably until the early 1970s, and indeed many
of its qualities continue to exist. It was characterized
by a proliferation, consolidation and privileging of state
borders, by the doctrine of `national self-
determination , and by the development of trans-
national governance in which national states played a
pivotal role. Borders on the whole were less porous
than in the pre-1918 period, and they represented a
more concerted, if less than successful, attempt to align
national economies, polities and cultures.
The period between roughly 1918 and 1970 is, in
fact, better divided into two sub-phases. The inter-war
period, 1918 39, saw a general world-wide retreat
from free trade and the rise of state-sponsored national
development, as borders became barriers and countries
strove for self-suYciency behind protective frontiers.
This occurred most dramatically in Stalins USSR; and
most generally in the widespread economic trade wars,
protectionism and self-suYciency of the 1930s Depres-
sion and the war of 1939 45. National (i.e. state)
economies really were the `building blocks of the
world economy. Then, in another phase from around
1945 to the early 1970s, national economies became
substantially more open in some respects, in a world
economy regulated by the Bretton Woods settlement
and policed by a hegemonic US. But while the `barrier
eVect of borders was now signi cantly reduced, the
importance of the state and state activities de ned and
delimited by those borders was greatly enhanced, most
notably through the dominance of mixed economies
and the development of welfare states which impinged
much more directly on the lives of the general popula-
tion. With this general increase in the `infrastructural
power of states (M A NN , 1993), the net eVect was that
state borders retained the signi cance built up in the
previous phase. With state education, health and social
welfare systems diVerentiating adjacent populations on
either side of state borders, state territories tended to
delimit separate societies, and despite the continuing
growth of multi-national corporations, national eco-
nomies continued to be the building blocks of the
world economy.
Thus state borders were still historically strong in the
early 1970s when the long post-war boom collapsed,
with the return of the generalized crises in world
capitalism which had been assumed to have ended with
the 1930s. The immediate manifestation and cause was
a general pro tability decline in the worlds leading
economies; and the main response was economic
globalization in the shape of moving capital overseas
(though largely to the more developed economies), de-
601
regulation which facilitated the movement of capital
across borders, and direct foreign investment in foreign
markets. Indeed, it is an open question whether prob-
lems and developments attributed to the spatial phe-
nomena of globalization might more accurately or
fundamentally be attributed to the return of capitalist
crises. But either way, there were profound though
very uneven and contradictory eVects in changing the
material and symbolic meanings of borders.
The debate between strong and weak approaches to
globalization hinges on the extent to which the 1970s
mark a transition to a new and unprecedented phase
of globalization. If globalization is conceptualized in
multi-dimensional, rather than narrowly economic
terms, there is considerable evidence that, rather than
representing simply a return to the pre-World War
One situation, globalization had begun to forge genu-
inely new relationships between economy, polity and
culture that have far reaching eVects on state borders.
At the same time, recognition that we are in a new
phase should not obscure the continuities with previous
phases, nor should it lead to an embracing of apocalyp-
tic or Utopian assertions of the `end of history, the
`end of geography or the `death of the nation-state
(A ND E R S O N , 1995; C OX , 1997). The empirical stud-
ies of borders in this issue and elsewhere provide little
evidence for such assertions.
While some of the powers and functions of states
particularly in relation to industry and economic
development have been signi cantly reduced since
the 1970s, others have been enhanced and new roles
have been adopted, especially in relation to the welfare
and control of populations, and in extra-territorial
activities and alliances. States retain control over law
and order, education, health, welfare and taxation,
albeit within limits set by external pressures, including
institutions such as the E U. They remain by far the
most important agents of redistributive policies, and by
comparison the EUs budget is still puny (amounting,
for instance, to less than 2% of its GD P, while the
comparable gures for Member States range from
approximately 40% to 60%, and actually increased
between 1970 and 1995). Although states have lost any
claims they might have had to monopolize foreign
aVairs, they continue to shape or mediate cross-border
co-operation despite the growth of direct region-to-
region linkages (see P E R K MA NN ; and C H U RC H and
R E I D , this issue). State borders are now weaker in
some respects, but they remain rmly in place for
many purposes. Moreover, some state borders are much
weaker than others. The emerging geopolitical order
is characterized by direct, but highly selective, cross-
border military intervention by strong states, most
notably US-led intervention in regional and intra-state
con icts in the Balkans, Africa and the Middle East.
More generally, following B U L L , 1977, there are
suggestions of a return to a neo-medieval political
con guration of overlapping authorities and entities,
602 James Anderson and Liam ODowd
because of globalization and its interactions with the
local over the last 30 years. Bull rejected his particular
neo-medieval hypothesis, but 20 years later the basic
idea is not so easily dismissed. While the metaphor
should not be taken too literally, it provides a useful
means of radically rethinking the possible futures of
political borders and territoriality (A N D ER S O N , 1996).
Clearly, political territoriality is undergoing an his-
toric change because of a series of related developments
which include: the partial pooling of state sovereignty
in supra-state regions like the EU; the increase of
sub-state regionalisms and of autonomist or separatist
nationalisms within states; related tendencies towards
federalization or the devolution of central state powers;
geo-political changes following the demise of the
USSR and the end of the Cold War; the growth
of various types of transnational non-governmental
organizations and agencies; and the fact that the
national state increasingly has to share the political
stage with other institutions in systems of multi-level
governance. In a contradictory world where increasing
transnationalization co-exists with increasing stress on
ethnic, regional and national identities, there is a long
term shift away from the relatively simple, monopolistic
and absolute sovereignty claims of national states
towards a reality of multiple or overlapping jurisdictions
and partial or quali ed sovereignties.
Authority over all aspects of social life, previously
bundled together territorially into `sovereign states, is
now being partially `unbundled . But it is important to
emphasize the partiality of the process. It is very uneven,
aVecting diVerent activities and state functions in very
diVerent ways or to diVerent degrees, which means that
state borders have increasingly diVerentiated implica-
tions or meanings for diVerent social processes. On the
other hand, while few if any governments can now
plausibly claim to have exclusive control over activities
within their borders, this is to some extent oVset by the
internationalization of state elites and parts of the state
apparatus, and their increased extra-territorial activity
in concert with other states and other agencies.
In addition to the meaning of a state border becom-
ing more diVerentiated for diVerent processes, political
borders per se may also become more diVerentiated. A
multiplication of other types of political entity suggests
a corresponding multiplication of types of border and
an increase in their complexities and contradictions.
We already see this in the distinction between the EUs
`external and `inner state borders, while devolution
and growing regionalism in the UK would transform
the existing borders between Scotland, Wales, North-
ern Ireland, and England (including English regions if
or when they emerge).
C O N C L US I O N S
The analysis of state borders and border regions needs
to be alive to the complex and uneven pattern of
continuities and discontinuities in contemporary border
change; and to the de nitional questions, contradic-
tions and problems of asymmetry and arbitrage identi-
ed in the rst section of this article. There are
signi cant variations between the major world regions,
including between North America and Europe, with
borders in the latter remaining signi cantly more vola-
tile both in terms of locational change and the qualita-
titive in situ changes induced by recent globalization.
Locational change remains largely a matter of force
majeure, arising from the interaction of intra-state con-
ict and a geopolitical order shaped by the demise of
the USSR and the as yet largely unchallenged domin-
ance of the US. Its `new interventionism and over-
riding of the United Nations, in conjunction with
NATO and other allied states, has echoes of nineteenth
century imperialism. Nevertheless, at the end of the
twentieth century, the state system is far more
developed and diversi ed, and enmeshed in new global
and transnational interdependencies. In situ qualitative
border change has more general relevance than loca-
tional change, and this may help distinguish the con-
temporary period of accelerated globalization from
some previous periods of border change.
The increasing transnational ows of capital, goods,
services, labour and information have generated a
growing need for border-crossing mechanisms and
institutions of governance. They are needed to facilitate
economic development and cultural enrichment,
including for cross-border regions, or to counter
`democratic de cits within the traditional national
state context of democracy. But state borders are also
becoming more porous to ows deemed `undesirable ,
involving such things as drugs, crime and pollution, so
the need for preventative controls whether symbolic
or material, at the border or internally within the state
territory is also increasing. Problems and contradic-
tions arise when cross-border facilitation and preven-
tion clash.
State borders also continue to derive signi cance
from the continuing high density of state involvement
in civil society. Thus, while we cannot assume that
state borders are xed or settled, neither can we assume
that they have become so porous as to be irrelevant,
nor that their signi cance has been lost in a proliferation
of other boundaries. Rather, they need to be related to
these other boundaries, territorial and non-territorial,
including the divisions of ethnic and national identity.
They must also be related to variations in geopolitical
power. A putative Europe Without Frontiers the
European version of the `borderless ideology coexists
with tendencies towards a Fortress Europe; and both
coexist with a new willingness to intervene selectively
alongside the US in intra-state and inter-state con icts
that might impinge on the EU.
Borders, states and societies are mutually formative
borders shape what they contain and are shaped by
them but border research undermines lazy assump-
 Borders, Border Regions and Territoriality
tions that `state and `society, `state and `nation , or
`state and `governance are synonymous or territorially
co-terminous. Instead of becoming redundant in a
`borderless world, the increasing diVerentiation, com-
plexity and contradictions of political borders make
border research more important and more revealing of
wider social change.
NO T E S
1. There is a profusion of terms that approximate to `borders
in diVerent languages. Whereas German has only one
term (grenze), French has four: frontiere, front (military),
limite and marche; Spanish has three: frontera, marca and
limite; and English three: frontier, boundary and border. These
terms generally carry diVerent connotations, though in
English usage there is often confusion with frontiers,
boundaries and borders used interchangeably or in an
overlapping fashion. Usually, however, frontier carries the
broadest meaning while boundary has the most precise
meaning as a clearly demarcated line (though when used
to distinguish social groups in anthropology or sociology,
the term `social boundary is typically deemed to be
imprecise or indeterminate and contested). Frontier often
refers to a zone or region between jurisdictions approxi-
mating the more archaic term march (B A RTL ET T and
M AC KAY, 1989); or it can refer to a moving zone of
settlement into `empty territories as in the case of the
nineteenth century `American frontier. In contrast, most
modern states have well de ned boundary lines (A N D ER -
603
SO N , 1996, pp. 9 10; B AU D and V A N S CH EN D EL ,
1997, pp. 213 14). `Border , the term preferred here, falls
somewhere between `frontier and `boundary in terms of
geographical precision, though `border (or cross-border)
region and `borderland carry some of the connotations
of `frontier. Our usage is similar to that of B AU D and
V A N S CH EN D EL , 1997, p. 214, who see borders as
political divides or social constructions that are a product
of modern state-building and the global state system.
2. Territoriality is about power and politics widely de ned
but here we are concerned with state-related forms of
territoriality. The term itself has wider connotations, and
F O RSB ERG , 1996, for example, distinguishes six forms of
territoriality: existential; operative; ecological; biological;
psychological; and political.
3. The globalization literature is riven with disagreements
over the politics, de nition, direction and novelty of
contemporary globalization. Neo-liberal advocates of the
`borderless global market are resisted both by the social
democratic `old left and by right-wing nationalists who
appeal to the state for protection against the inequalities
and insecurities generated by the `unbridled market
(B O RO SAG E , 1998). Disagreements about the extent and
signi cance of globalization are exacerbated by disciplin-
ary divisions as, for example, when it is de ned in
narrowly economistic terms, ignoring the extensive con-
tributions from sociology (e.g. S KLAIR , 1991; R O BERT-
SO N , 1992; C A ST EL L S , 1997, 1998), geography (e.g.
H A RVEY, 1989; C OX , 1997), or political science and
international relations (e.g. R U GG IE , 1997; L I N KLAT ER ,
1998).

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