B U I L D I N G A R M I E S F O R DEMOCRACY: U.S.

A T T E M P T S TO REFORM THE

ARMED FORCES O F CUBA (1906-1909) AND N I C A R A G U A (1927-1933)

A t h e s i s p r e s e n t e d t o t h e F a c u l t y o f t h e U.S. A r m y Command

and G e n e r a l S t a f f C o l l e g e i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l l m e n t o f t h e

r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r the degree

M A S T E R O F M I L I T A R Y A R T AND S C I E N C E

by

FREDDY L. POLK, MAJ, USA

B.S., United States M i l i t a r y Academy,
M.P.A., A m e r i c a n U n i v e r s i t y , 1982

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

1987

A p p r o v e d f o r p u b l i c release; distribution i s u n l i m i t e d .

873597

 MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

APPROVAL PAGE

Name o f c a n d i d a t e : F r e d d y L. Polk, MAJ, IN

T i t l e o f t h e s i s : B u i l d i n g Armies f o r Democracy: U.S.

A t t e m p t s t o R e f o r m t h e Armed F o r c e s o f Cuba and
Nicaragua

Approved by:

, T h e s i s Committee Chairman

Member, Graduate F a c u l t y

L T C L a r r y 8. Hamby, M.6.

.
, Member, Graduate F a c u l t y

COL R i c h a r d S w a i n , Ph.D.

Accepted t h i s 5 t h day o f J u n e 1987 b y :

, Director, Graduate Deqree Programs

Philip Brookes, Ph.D.

The o p i n i o n s and expressed h e r e i n a r e those o f

t h e s t u d e n t a u t h o r and do n o t n e c e s c a r i l y r e p r e s e n t t h e
v i e w s o f t h e U.S. Army Command and G e n e r a l S t a f f C o l l e g e o r
any o t h e r g o v e r n m e n t a l agency. ( R e f e r e n c e s t o thi..s.tgdy
should include the foreqoina statement.)


FOR U.S.

USA,

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ....................................

Concepts and D e f i n i t i o n s ..............5

11: Background ................................ 9

111: Review o f L i t e r a t u r e ..................... 17

I V : Methods o f A n a l y s i s and P r i m a r y ..24

V : Scope and L i m i t a t i o n s .................... 27

V I : S i g n i f i c a n c e ............................. 28

CHAPTER 2: CUBA (1906 - 1909) ............................. 30

Overview ................................. 30

11: The Wood Legacy .......................... 33

111: I n t e r v e n t i o n o f 1906: New S i t u a t i o n s ,

New O b j e c t i v e s . and O l d S o l u t i o n s ........39

I V : The Permanent Army Debate ................46

V : The American W i t h d r a w a l ..................52

V I : An E p i t a p h f o r M i l i t a r y Reform i n Cuba:
C a p t a i n Frank P a r k e r ..................... 53

CHAPTER 3: N I C A R A G U A (1927 - 1933) ........................

Overview ................................. 55

11: America, N i c a r a g u a , and a Trans-

i s t h m i a n Passage ......................... SB

111: A C o u n t r y and a Canal f o r Panama;

A W a t c h f u l E y e on N i c a r a g u a ..............60

I V : I n t e r v e n t i o n and t h e F i r s t I n v i t a t i o n
f o r Reform ............................... 62

V : The American P u r s u i t o f E l e c t i o n s
and S t a b i l i t y ............................ 64

V I : The R i s e o f t h e S t a t e Department and

D o l l a r Diplomacy ......................... 66

MaJOr C a r t e r s C o n s t a b u l a r y and

Chamorro . .. .........

Cons t i t u t i o n a 1 Coup
V I I I : R e l u c t a n t Reform and N i c a r a g u a n
...........................
Power P o l i t i c s 74

I X : The Two F r o n t War f o r Reform:

Sandino and Moncada ...................... 76

X : Time t o Withdraw .........................

V
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89

..89

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...

of

U.S.

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................... 1 1 1

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 CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Today, the United States m i l i t a r y i s b u i l d i n g ,

training, and a d v i s i n g armed f o r c e s t h r o u g h o u t the world.

These m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e programs -- i m p o r t a n t and i n t e g r a l

p a r t s o f United States foreign p o l i c y -- a r e designed t o

f o s t e r and s u p p o r t t h e growth o f democratic regimes.'

i s t h e case i n L a t i n America, where t h e armed f o r c e s o f the

U n i t e d S t a t e s a r e a t t e m p t i n g t o promote and a s s i s t m i l i t a r y

f o r c e s which w i l l s u p p o r t d e m o c r a t i c i n s t i t u t i o n s and

p r o t e c t l e g i t i m a t e governments f r o m insurgency.

Many U n i t e d S t a t e s m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s believe that

such s e c u r i t y a s s i s t a n c e and f o r e i g n i n t e r n a l d e f e n s e

m i s s i o n s a r e p o s t World War developments. Most a r e

unaware t h a t t h e armed f o r c e s o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s have

history, p r e d a t i n g t h e F i r s t World War, of trying to build

m i l i t a r y f o r c e s t o support democratic experiments i n the

C a r i b b e a n and C e n t r a l America.

U n i t e d S t a t e s Department o f Defense, U n i t e d S t a t e s o f
America C o n q r e s s i o n a l P r e s e n t a t i o n f o r S e c u r i t v A s s i s t a n c e
Proarams. F i s c a l Vear 1987. Volume ( 1 9 8 6 ) pp. 1-2.
G e n e r a l John R . G a l v i n , " C h a l l e n g e & Response: O r i t t l e
S o u t h e r n F l a n k Three Decades L a t e r , ' ' M i l i t a r y Review,
( ~ ~ g 1986) ~ s t


(1906 - 1909) (1927 - 1933).

of

of

1981.) 1-2.

 The o p e r a t i o n a l level deals w i t h the b u i l d i n g o f

o r g a n i z a t i o n s and t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f programs. The

U n i t e d S t a t e s o f f i c i a l s charged w i t h b u i l d i n g , training, and

a d v i s i n g t h e s e armed f o r c e s , lacked a s t r a t e g y f o r m i l i t a r y

r e f o r m which c o u l d i n c o r p o r a t e t h e p o l i t i c a l elements o f the

problem, and f a i l e d t o c o n v i n c e t h e i n d i g e n o u s e l i t e s o f the

v i a b i l i t y and v a l i d i t y o f t h e i r programs f o r r e b u i l d i n g t h e

armed f o r c e s o f t h e i r nations.

Despite these f a i l i n g s , the United States d i d

succeed i n c r e a t i n g e f f i c i e n t and e f f e c t i v e m i l i t a r y

organizations i n both nations. Ironically, t h i s success

appears t o have been a m a j o r f a c t o r i n t h e f a i l u r e t o

achieve the u l t i m a t e p o l i t i c a l o b j e c t i v e o f s t a b l e

d e m o c r a t i c regimes .
A t the i n s t i t u t i o n a l l e v e l reform eluded the

fimerican o f f i c a l s . F a i r e l e c t i o n s were h e l d under Pmerican

s u p e r v i s i o n and r e s p o n s i b l e f i s c a l p o l i c i e s were i n i t i a t e d ,

b u t t h e r e f o r m s necessary t o c r e a t e s t a b l e p o l i t i c a l systems

c a p a b l e o f c o n t r o l l i n g these new armed f o r c e s and i n s u r i n g

t h e i r a p o l i t i c a l nonpartisan nature, never occurred.

Despite extensive r e v i s i o n o f the c o n s t i t u t i o n s , laws. and

m i l i t a r y r e g u l a t i o n s of these n a t i o n s , t h e c i v i - m i 1i t a r y

i n s t i t u t i o n s of these n a t i o n s remained e s s e n t i a

unchanged.

 for

 KEY CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS

i
W h i l e t h e meanings o f most o f t h e terms used i n t h i s
' i
I .

t h e s i s s h o u l d be e v i d e n t from t h e i r c o n t e x t , s e v e r a l key

concepts r e q u i r e d e f i n i t i o n . T h e words o r g a n i z a t i o n ,

institution, professionalism, apolitical, and n o n p a r t i s a n

s u f f e r d i s t o r t i o n i n common usage. I n some cases, they have

i m p l i c i t meanings, a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e p e r i o d under s t u d y ,
I
which may n o t correspond w i t h some c u r r e n t l y accepted

interpretations.

The terms o r g a n i z a t i o n and i n s t i t u t i o n a r e

f r e q u e n t l y used i n t e r c h a n g e a b l y . I n t h i s t h e s i s they have

s p e c i f i c and d i s t i n c t meanings which correspond w i t h t h e i r

sociological definitions.

A n o r g a n i z a t i o n i s "an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and f u n c t i o n a l

structure".4 An i n s t i t u t i o n i s "an e s t a b l i s h e d s e t o f

procedures and r e l a t i o n s h i p s " . ' M i l i t a r y i n s t i t u t i o n s are

t h o s e procedures and r e l a t i o n s h i p s t h a t a n a t i o n has adopted

t o meet i t s m i l i t a r y s e c u r i t y needs. Thus, the A r m y of

Nicaragua has b o t h an o r g a n i z a t i o n a l and i n s t i t u t i o n a l

component.

W e b s t e r ' s New C o l l e q i a t e D i c t i o n a r y , p. 802.

= p. 594.


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 The independence o f most o f t h e L a t i n Pmerican

R e p u b l i c s had reduced European i n f l u e n c e i n t h e hemisphere.

T e s t i n g t h e bounds o f t h e Monroe D o c t r i n e , the United States

began t o r e g a r d t h e r e g i o n s s o u t h o f i t s b o r d e r a5 i t s

e x c l u s i v e sphere o f influence." P a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t was

drawn t o t h e economic and m i l i t a r y p o t e n t i a l o f Central

Amer ic a .
The growing demands o f t r a n s c o n t i n e n t a l commerce,

and t h e tremendous expense and r i s k t h a t c o u l d be a v o i d e d if

s h i p p i n g d i d n o t have t o make t h e Cape Horn passage, spurred

U n i t e d S t a t e s economic i n t e r e s t i n the region. The War w i t h

Spain gave t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s c o n t r o l o f a number o f

Caribbean i s l a n d s , i n c l u d i n g Cuba and P u e r t o R i c o . The need

t o p r o t e c t these p o s s e s s i o n s i n c r e a s e d t h e demand f o r

Pmerican hegemony i n t h e r e g i o n , and a t r a n s o c e a n i c

waterway.

The Monroe D o c t r i n e was f o r m a l i z e d i n an address b y

P r e s i d e n t James Monroe t o t h e Congress o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s
on December 2 , 1823. The d o c t r i n e was designed t o thwart.
the possi bl e attempt o f a n t i - d e m a c r a t l c European f o r c e s t o
r e e s t a b l i s h c o n t r o l o v e r t h e i r former c o l o n i e s . President
Monroe s t a t e d , i n p a r t "...any a t t e m p t on t h e i r p a r t t o
e x t e n d t h e i r system t o any p o r t i o n o f t h i s hemisphere ( w i l l
v i e w e d ) as dangerous t o our peace and s a f e t y . " See Dana
Munro, The L a t i n American R e p u b l i c s : A H i s t o r y . (New
York: A p p l e t o n , 1960) pp. 151-152.

10
 I n 1903, P r e s i d e n t Theodore R o o s e v e l t a c q u i r e d t h e

Panama Canal s i t e . I n 1905, following showdown w i t h

I m p e r i a l Germany i n Venezuela, he e s t a b l i s h e d h i s C o r o l l a r y

t o t h e Monroe D 0 c t r i n e . l T h i s p o l i c y paved t h e way f o r

m a j o r i n t e r v e n t i o n s i n t h e r e g i o n by t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s .
W h i l e many European n a t i o n s regarded t h e U n i t e d

States behavior imperialistic, most Americans looked a t

t h e i r g o v e r n m e n t s i n v o l v e m e n t i n t h e Caribbean and C e n t r a l

America i n a much more i d e a l i s t i c v e i n . They saw t h e

extension of t h e i r a u t h o r i t y as a means o f assuring the

independence o f t h e L a t i n American r e p u b l i c s , and f o s t e r i n g

t h e i r democratic growth. The U n i t e d S t a t e s adopted a

p a t e r n a l i s t i c a t t i t u d e toward t h e Caribbean and C e n t r a l

American n a t i o n s , and accepted a p o l i c y o f i n t e r v e n t i o n as

a p p r o p r i a t e and necessary t o b r i n g democracy and s t a b i l i t y

t o the region. Cuba and N i c a r a g u a r e c i e v e d s p e c i a l

attention.

I n essence, t h e R o o s e v e l t C o r o l l a r y o b l i g a t e d t h e U n i t e d
S t a t e s t o p r e v e n t t h e c o n d i t i o n s which m i g h t prompt European
i n t e r f e r e n c e i n L a t i n Pmerica. O f p a r t i c u l a r concern were
c o n d i t i o n s o f p o l i t i c a l i n s t a b i l i t y and f i s c a l
irresponsibility. Roosevelt h e l d t h a t the United S t a t e s
must i n t e r v e n e t o p r e v e n t these c o n d i t i o n s and p r e c l u d e
European i n t e r v e n t i o n . See Munro, L a t i n American R e p u b l i c s .
p.

Munro, The L a t i n American R e p u l i c s pp. 391-477.

11
 I n 1902 w i t h t h e passage o f t h e P l a t t Amendement,

the United States entered i n t o a speci al relationship w i t h

Cuba. Having s p e n t t h r e e y e a r s f r e e i n g t h e i s l a n d from

Spain and a t t e m p t i n g t o e s t a b l i s h a d e m o c r a t i c f o r m o f

government, the United States reserved the r i g h t t o

i n t e r v e n e i n Cuba t o p r o t e c t l i f e , liberty, and p r o p e r t y .

The Cuban i n t e r v e n t i o n s were e s s e n t i a l l y A r m y

enterprises. The second Cuban i n t e r v e n t i o n o f 1906-1904

drew on p r e v i o u s Army e x p e r i e n c e s o f g o v e r n i n g Cuba from

1699 t o 1902, and t h e conquest and o c c u p a t i o n o f the

Philippines, 1900 t o 1905. The Army w h i c h i n t e r v e n e d i n

Cuba i n 1906 w a s a d i f f e r e n t A r m y than t h e one t h a t d e f e a t e d

Spain. I t was a r e g u l a r p r o f e s s i o n a l peacetime m i l i t a r y

w i t h a new s e n i o r This r e v i t a l i z e d force

b r o u g h t some o f i t s b a s t t a l e n t t o bear on t h e problem o f

Cuban p a c i f i c a t i o n .

1 4 Alan M i l l e t t , The General: R o b e r t B u l l a r d and

O f f i c e r s h i p i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s A r m y . 1881-1925. (Westport,
Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1975.) pp. 379-383.
P r e s i d e n t Theodore R o o s e v e l t chose t o term t h i s
i n t e r v e n t i o n a P a c i f i c a t i o n i n an a t t e m p t t o q u e l l some o f
t h e a n t i c i p a t e d p o l i t i c a l c l a m o r o v e r o u r r e t u r n t o Cuba.
Lester Langley, The Banana Wars: A n I n n e r H i s t o r v o f
American Empire, 1900-1934. ( L e x i n g t o n , K y . : U n i v . Press o f
Kentucky, 1983.) p.34.

12
 H i g h on t h e p a c i f i c a t i o n agenda was t h e c r e a t i o n o f

an a p o l i t i c a l armed f o r c e w h i c h would p r o v i d e s t a b i l i t y i n

Cuba and b o l s t e r U n i t e d S t a t e s d e f e n s e o f t h e hemisphere.'*

This attempt f a i l e d , and e x c e p t f a r i t s b r i e f o c c u p a t i o n o f

Vera C r u z i n 1914, t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Army abandoned t h e t a s k

of b u i l d i n g armed f a r c e s , and t h e m i s s i o n o f intervening i n

L a t i n America.'7

A s t h e Army t u r n e d i t s a t t e n t i o n t o w a r d c o n v e n t i o n a l

c o n f l i c t s w i t h t h e m a j o r powers o f Europe and A s i a , the

M a r i n e Carps became t h e p r i m a r y i n t e r v e n t i o n a r y f a r c e i n the

Caribbean. Many M a r i n e Corps o f f i c e r s r e c e i v e d t h e i r

i n t r o d u c t i o n t o combat and honed t h e i r m i l i t a r y s k i l l s i n

t h e r u g g e d t e r r a i n o f N i c a r a g u a between 1912 and 1933. Yet,

i t was t h e p e r i o d from 1927 t o 1933 t h a t c h a l l e n g e d the

Corps t o subdue Sandino and b u i l d t h e G u a r d i a N a c i o n a l de

Nicaragua.

l* T a f t , W i l l i a m H . , and Bacon, R o b e r t . "Cuban P a c i f i c a t i o n :

R e p o r t o f W i l l i a m H. T a f t , S e c r e t a r y o f War, and R o b e r t
Bacon, A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y o f War, o f What Was Dane Under
t h e I n s t r u c t i o n s o f t h e P r e s i d e n t i n R e s t o r i n g Peace i n
Cuba." Department o f War. R e p o r t o f t h e S e c r e t a r y o f War,
Appendix E . U n i t e d S t a t e s Congress, House, 5 9 t h Cong.,
2nd s e s s . , Document No. 2, s e r . 1505, (Washington,
D.C., 1906)
Langley, Banana Wars, p.20.

13
 D u r i n g t h e i n i t i a l i n t e r v e n t i o n t h e M a r i n e Corps was

n o t saddled w i t h t h e task of reforming t h e N i c a r a g u a n armed

forces. Two S t a t e Department e f f o r t s t o contract out t h i s

m i s s i o n t o f o r m e r U n i t e d S t a t e s Army o f f i c e r s failed.'" In

t h e meantime, t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s M a r i n e Corps i n t e r v e n e d i n

H a i t i and t h e Dominican R e p u b l i c where t h e y e s t a b l i s h e d and

l e d n a t i o n a l constabularies.

When c i v i l war b r o k e o u t i n N i c a r a g u a i n 1925, the

U n i t e d S t a t e s sought a d e f i n i t i v e s o l u t i o n t o t h e c h r o n i c

i n s t a b i l i t y of this nation. h p r e s i d e n t i a l envoy, Colonel

Henry L. S t i m s o n , a r b i t r a t e d an end t o t h e d i s p u t e and

imposed s e v e r a l c o n d i t i o n s on t h e w a r r i n g f a c t i o n s . One was

the creation of a national a p o l i t i c a l m i l i t a r y f0rce.i'

Drawing on t h e i r decades o f e x p e r i e n c e i n H a i t i and

Dominican R e p u b l i c , and t h e i r e s t a b l i s h e d p r e s e n c e i n

Nicaragua, t h e Marines s e t o u t t o b u i l d a p r o f e s s i o n a l

a p o l i t i c a l force. The new G u a r d i a N a c i o n a l de N i c a r a g u a was

t o subdue t h e r e c a l c i t r a n t " b a n d i t " Sandino and s u p p o r t the

democratic p r o c e s s w h i c h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s hoped t o n u r t u r e

t h r o u g h s u p e r v i s e d e l e c t i o n s i n 1928, 1930, and 1932.2'''

Instead, when U n i t e d S t a t e s f o r c e s w i t h d r e w , t h e Guardia

a s s a s s i n a t e d Sandino and e l e v a t e d i t s commander, Anastasio

i n t o power.

R i c h a r d M i l l e t t , G u a r d i a n s o f t h e Dynastv: A H i s t o r y o f
t h e U.S. C r e a t e d G u a r d i a N a c i o n a l de N i c a r a p u a and t h e
Somoza F a m i l v . ( M a r y k n o l l , O r b i s Books, I n c . , 1977.)
p . 3 0 and p.52.
N e i l 1 Macaulay, The Sandino A f f a i r , ( C h i c a g o , Ill.:
Quadrangle B o o k s , p.34.
M i l l e t t , R., G u a r d i a n s , pp. 61-62.

14
 United States p o l i c y during t h i s era o f i n t e r v e n t i o n

h e l d t o a f a i r l y steady course. The U n i t e d S t a t e s a t t e m p t e d

t o e s t a b l i s h democracies i n t h e n a t i o n s o f the region, and

a s s i s t i n b u i l d i n g f i s c a l l y r e s p o n s i b l e governments. The

l a t t e r g o a l was a c h i e v e d t h r o u g h "Do1 l a r Diplomacy" w h i c h

s o u g h t t o r e f o r m t h e revenue and d e b t systems, and make

L a t i n American n a t i o n s l e s s dependent on f o r e i g n c a p i t a l . z 1

The U n i t e d S t a t e s a l s o d r a f t e d and i n s t a l l e d a

number o f c o n s t i t u t i o n s i n t h e n a t i o n s i n which i t

intervened. Convinced t h a t good l a w s l e d t o good

government, t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s employed a number o f laywers,

i n and o u t o f uniform, t o w r i t e t h e s e documents. Electoral

laws r e c e i v e d p a r t i c u l a r a t t e n t i o n .

E l e c t i o n s were t h e b a s i s o f t h e American c o n c e p t o f

democracy, but they a l s o held s i g n i f i c a n t f o r e i g n p o l i c y

benefits for the United States. Free e l e c t i o n s i n the

n a t i o n s i n t o w h i c h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i n t e r v e n e d c o u l d be

used as p r i m a e v i d e n c e t o r e p u d i a t e European

allegations of imperialism. Additionally, free elections

c o u l d a l s o be p r e s e n t e d as e v i d e n c e o f success i n d e m o c r a t i c

reforms, and t h u s used t o mark t h e c u l m i n a t i o n o f an

i n t e r v e n t i o n and t h e passage o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y back to t h e

indigenous population.

x 1 President T a f t i s credited w i t h establishing "Dollar

D i p l o m a c y " as t h e b a s i s f o r U n i t e d S t a t e s f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n
L a t i n America. F o r an e x c e l l e n t and d e t a i l e d d i s c u s s i o n o f
D o l l a r Diplomacy see Dana G. Munro, I n t e r v e n t i o n and D o l l a r
Diplomacy i n t h e C a r r i b e a n . 1900-1921. ( P r i n c e t o n , N J :
P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Press,

15
 A t t h e conceptual l e v e l t h e l i n k a g e between t h e

U n i t e d S t a t e s e f f o r t s t o b u i l d democracies and t h e a t t e m p t s

t o e s t a b l i s h professional nonpartisan a p o l i t i c a l

c o n s t a b u l a r i e s i n t h e s e n a t i o n s seems f a i r l y c l e a r . The

d e m o c r a t i c governments needed p r o t e c t i o n and a means f o r

enforcing the Since t h e United S t a t e s could curb

international conflict i n t h e area, t h e s e n a t i o n s would n o t

need c o n v e n t i o n a l armed f o r c e s . The p r i n c i p a l m i l i t a r y

t h r e a t s t o t h e s e governmnets were seen a5 coups and

revolutions.

These m i l i t a r i e s would have t o be e f f i c i e n t

o r g a n i z a t i o n s w h i c h would n o t p l a c e a burden on t h e s m a l l

t r e a s u r i e s of these n a t i o n s . Thus, a single organization

f o r e n f o r c i n g law and p r e v e n t i n g r e v o l u t i o n s was p r e f e r a b l e .

O f f i c e r e d by american t r a i n e d p r o f e s s i o n a l s , with

party a f f i l i a t i o n s p r o h i b i t e d by law, the o f f i c e r corps

would a b s t a i n from p o l i t i c s and d e v e l o p an a l l e g i a n c e t o t h e

c o n s t i t u t i o n and t h e d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s . I n o t h e r words,

these m i l i t a r i e s would a c q u i r e t h e v a l u e s t h a t c h a r a c t e r i z e d

t h e american armed f o r c e s .

The s t u d y o f the f a i l u r e of these w e l l intentioned

e f f o r t s has n o t been t h a t e x t e n s i v e . The f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n

p r o v i d e s an o v e r v i e w o f t h e l i t e r a t u r e devoted t o t h e t o p i c ,

and sources used t o d e v e l o p t h i s t h e s i s .

16
 111. REVIEW

of

ebb

1900-

of

17
 The U n i t e d S t a t e s and t h e Caribbean R e p u b l i c s 1921-

-
1933 i s p a r t i c u l a r l y good. D u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d Munro was a

f o r e i g n s e r v i c e o f f i c e r i n t h e Department o f S t a t e ' s

D i v i s i o n of L a t i n Flmerican A f f a i r s . His s o l i d historical

a n a l y s i s and p e r s o n a l o b s e r v a t i o n s b r i n g t h e d e c l i n e o f

d o l l a r diplomacy, and t h e r i s e o f t h e Good Neighbor p o l i c y

i n t o perspective. Obviously, Nicaragua, where Munro was

d i r e c t l y involved i n the policy, receives s o l i d treatment.

Munro's work has two f l a w s . i s o v e r l y r e l i a n t on

S t a t e Department m a t e r i a l , and r e f l e c t s t h e a u t h o r ' s

p r e o c c u p a t i o n w i t h t h e economic dimension o f policy. To

b a l a n c e t h e s e v i e w s R i c h a r d C h a l l n e r ' s book, Admirals,

Generals, and Flmerican F o r e i g n P o l i c y , 1898-1914, which

brings the r o l e s of t h e Departments o f War and Navy i n t o

focus, and L e s t e r L a n g l e y ' s The Banana Wars: An I n n e r

H i s t o r v o f American EmDire. 1900-1934, which d e a l s w i t h the

r o l e of u n i f o r m e d o f f i c e r s i n i m p l e m e n t i n g and shaping

p o l i c y i n the region, a r e recommended.

18


R.

of of

 N i c a r a g u a has r e c e i v e d a more t h o r o u g h e x p o s u r e , but

most o f t h e work i s devoted t o t h e M a r i n e s ' p u r s u i t of

Sandino. I n t h i s g e n r e N e i l 1 M a c a u l a y ' s The Sandino A f f a i r

i s s t i l l perhaps t h e b e s t . While h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e

events i s c l e a r l y biased i n f a v o r of Sandino, his

observations o f the i n t e r n a l s t r u g g l e s o f Sandino's

opposition, which a r e s c a t t e r e d throughout t h e work, add a

u n i q u e v i e w t o any a t t e m p t t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e r e f o r m s

a t t e m p t e d by t h e M a r i n e Corps and t h e Department o f S t a t e .

However, R i c h a r d M i l l e t t ' s Guardians o f t h e Dynasty: A

H i s t o r y of the S. C r e a t e d G u a r d i a N a c i o n a l De N i c a r a g u a

and t h e Somoza F a m i l y i s t h e a u t h o r i t a t i v e work on t h e

Guardia. His inclusion of t h e e a r l y a t t e m p t s a t r e f o r m by

t h e S c u l l and C a r t e r m i s s i o n s , have n o t been c h r o n i c l e d

elsewhere. These two s o u r c e s , when c o u p l e d w i t h W i l l i a m

Kammen's d i p l o m a t i c h i s t o r y o f the intervention, F\ S e a r c h

for Stability: U n i t e d S t a t e s Diplomacy Toward N i c a r a q u a ,

and M u n r o ' s p r e v i o u s l y m e n t i o n e d work, provide

more t h a n adequate background f o r t h i s d i m e n s i o n o f t h e

Nicaraguan i n t e r v e n t i o n .

20

 P.

of

or

source on

S. E. The

of

reforms

21
 R.

...
... of

of on

--
-- R. "

22

 The t h i r d document was a copy o f an a r t i c l e

p u b l i s h e d by D r . M i l l e t t i n The Americas. "The R i s e and

F a l l of t h e R u r a l Guard o f Cuba" p o i n t s c l e a r l y t o t h e

Permanent Army d e b a t e as t h e p o i n t a t w h i c h t h e American

efforts t o revamp t h e R u r a l Guard f a i ed. Additionally,

t h i s e x c e l l e n t a r t i c l e chronicles the e f f o r t s of one U n i t e d

S t a t e s Army o f f i c e r t a s k e d t o a d v i s e and t r a i n t h e R u r a l

Guard o f Cuba.

Dr. M i l l e t t p a i n t s a v i v i d p i c t u r e of Captain

Frank P a r k e r , t h e l a s t a d v i s e r t o t h e R u r a l Guard. This

o f f i c e r ' s s t e a d f a s t c o n v i c t i o n t h a t i f you r i d e a h o r s e you

have t o be c a v a l r y , and ify o u ' r e c a v a l r y you have t o t r a i n

and d r i l l as c a v a l r y , destroyed the l a s t vestiges of the

c o n s t a b u l a r y c o n c e p t i n t h e R u r a l Guard. The e x p l o i t s o f

Frank P a r k e r s h o u l d be mandatory r e a d i n g f o r a l l o f f i c e r 5

p r o v i d i n g m i l i t a r y a d v i s e and t r a i n i n g t o f o r e i g n n a t i o n 5 .

A s r e a s s u r i n g t o t h i s r e s e a r c h e f f o r t as D r .

M i l l e t t ' s work has been, i t i s n o t t h e consensus among

h i s t o r i a n s o r t h e mass o f a u t h o r i t a t i v e secondary s o u r c e s

t h a t establishes the v a l i d i t y o f a thesis. Instead, i s

the r i g o r o f t h e a n a l y s i s and t h e q u a l i t y o f the primary

sources.

23

IV: METHOD ANFILYSIS AND PRIMFIRY SOURCES

for

24

 With t h e s e q u e s t i o n s r e f i n e d t h r o u g h t h e e v a l u a t i o n

of t h e a f o r e m e n t i o n e d secondary s o u r c e s , the possible

answers where t h e n compared w i t h t h e f a c t s c o n t a i n e d i n t h e

p r i m a r y s o u r c e s and h i s t o r i c a l r e c o r d .

I n t h e case o f Cuba, t h e correspondence o f t h e War

Department p r o v e d most u s e f u l . These documents, held i n

v a r i o u s r e c o r d groups i n t h e N a t i o n a l Archives, were k e y i n

researching t h i s thesis. B r i g a d i e r General Herman J .

S l o c u m ' s correspondence i s of particular interest. As

o f f i c e r i n c h a r g e o f b u i l d i n g t h e R u r a l Guard u n d e r Wood,

and r e f o r m i n g i t u n d e r Magoon, h i s infrequent but candid

correspondence w i t h s u p e r i o r s , d u r i n g and a f t e r the

intervention, was an u n e x p e c t e d s o u r c e .

Archival s o u r c e s on N i c a r a g u a a r e more w i d e l y

spread. S i n c e t h e S t a t e Department had r i s e n t o prominence

i n the region following t h e F i r s t World War, the published

c o r r e s p o n d e n c e i n Papers R e l a t i n q t o t h e F o r e i q n R e l a t i o n s

of the United States, and t h o s e found i n t h e N a t i o n a l

F l r c h i v e s v a l i d a t e d many o f the observations i n secondary

sources. However, t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Marine Corps'

H i s t o r i c a l D i v i s i o n h o l d s t h e most i m p o r t a n t s o u r c e s

necessary f o r t h i s t y p e o f study. Of p a r t i c u l a r note a

d e t a i l e d study e n t i t l e d : 6 Review o f t h e O r q a n i z a t i o n and

ODerations o f t h e G u a r d i a N a c i o n a l de N i c a r a q u a :

Direction of t h e M a j o r General Commandant o f the United

S t a t e s M a r i n e Corp, p r e p a r e d by t h e n M a j o r J u l i a n C. Smith.

25

 The method o f a n a l y s i s employed i n t h i s s t u d y i s t h e

c l a s s i c a l comparison o f h i s t o r i c a l cases. Thus, one a s p e c t

of t h e s t u d y does r e q u i r e some e x p l a n a t i o n , that i s the

s e l e c t i o n o f t h e cases o f Cuba and Nicaragua.

F i r s t , my a t t e n t i o n was drawn t o t h e s e cases because

of t h e i r c u r r e n t regimes. was then s t r u c k by t h e i r o n i c

f a c t t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s had made s i g n i f i c a n t e f f o r t s a t

political-military reform i n the o n l y n a t i o n s i n the

hemisphere which today have communist regimes.

A f t e r c o n s i d e r i n g o t h e r major i n t e r v e n t i o n s i n the

region, Cuba and N i c a r a g u a were s e l e c t e d , i n part, because

of t h e i r prominence. They r e p r e s e n t e d t h e most mature and

w e l l documented examples o f t h e pre-World War a t t e m p t s by

t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Army and M a r i n e Corps t o p e r f o r m t h i s t y p e

o f mission.

Furthermore, i f a common e x p l a n a t i o n f o r t h e

f a i l u r e of t h e m i l i t a r y r e f o r m s i n two i n t e r v e n t i o n s d i d

emerge, some c o n s i d e r a t i o n had t o be g i v e n t o i t s p o t e n t i a l

spuriousness. s e l e c t i n g cases from two d i f f e r e n t

s e r v i c e s d u r i n g two d i f f e r e n t p e r i o d s t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f a

common s p u r i o u s e x p l a n a t i o n was s i g n i f i c a n t l y reduced. Of

course, t h i s a l s o l i m i t s t h e scope o f i n f e r e n c e s which can

be drawn from t h i s s t u d y .

26

 If t h e r e i s a m e t h o d o l o g i c a l b i a s i n t h i s work, i t

p r o b a b l y due t o a p r e d i s p o s i t i o n t o s e a r c h f o r

e x p l a n a t i o n s which o f f e r u t i l i t y i n t h e f o r m u l a t i o n o f

current policy, o r an i n c l i n a t i o n t o s e a r c h f o r g e n e r a l

e x p l a n a t i o n s i n t h e p o l i t i c a l and s o c i o l o g i c a l theory

associated w i t h the topic. W h i l e t r a d i t i o n a l h i s t o r i a n s may

f i n d f a u l t w i t h t h i s approach, t h e v a l i d i t y o f an

explanation r e s t s n o t w i t h i t s source, b u t whether i t can

be, and has been, tested against the h i s t o r i c a l record.

V. SCOPE FIND LIMITOTIONS

I n r e a l i t y t h e scope o f t h i s thesis i s r e l a t i v e l y

narrow. I t i s l i m i t e d t o t h e comparison o f two h i s t o r i c a l

cases. I t i s n e i t h e r a general h i s t o r y of e i t h e r Cuba o r

Nicaragua, n o r even a d e t a i l e d a c c o u n t o f the

i n t e r v e n t i o n a r y experiences o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i n these

nations. A s w i t h a l l research, t h i s work i s incomplete, and

l i m i t e d by t h e r e s o u r c e s a v a i l a b l e a t t h e t i m e . While

S p a n i s h language s o u r c e s were t r a n s l a t e d and i n c o r p o r a t e d

i n t o t h e secondary s o u r c e s used i n t h i s work, there are

S p a n i s h language p r i m a r y s o u r c e s employed i n t h e a n a l y s i 5 .

v i e w t h i s document a the s t a r t o f research i n t h i s

area, n o t t h e end.

27

 VI.

seem be

of

28

 Despite the f a c t t h a t more i s l e a r n e d from d e f e a t

that victory, American m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s have n e g l e c t e d

these e a r l y t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y a t t e m p t s a t f o r e i g n m i l i t a r y

reform. I t seems t h a t we d e v o t e f a r more a t t e n t i o n t o t h e

p o s s i b l y u n i q u e successes o f o t h e r n a t i o n s , such as t h e

B r i t i s h i n Oman, and o u r own more r e c e n t e f f o r t s i n C e n t r a l

America. I n t h e f i r s t case we r i s k l e a r n i n g l e s s o n s t h a t

can n o t be r e p l i c a t e d t o our p o l i t i c a l h e r i t a g e . I n the

second we r i s k d r a w i n g premature c o n c l u s i o n s from cases

which have y e t t o s t a n d t h e t e s t o f time, remain d i s t o r t e d

by t h e c u r r e n t p o l i t i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s o f the a n a l y s i s , and

i g n o r e t h e l o n g term consequences o f what may appear t o be

successful i n the present.

Hopefully, t h i s study w i l l r a i s e q u e s t i o n s from

h i s t o r y which preclude e r r o r s i n the f u t u r e . The cases

o f Cuba and Nicaragua, as w e l l as o t h e r s , are r i c h i n

l e s s o n s t o be l e a r n e d about t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s o f limited

ware, counterinsurgencies, and i n t e r v e n t i o n s . The U n i t e d

S t a t e s A r m y h a s t r i e d t o f o r g e t i t s l e s s o n s from L a t i n

America once a l r e a d y t h i s c e n t u r y , Perhaps t h i s s t u d y w i l l

a t l e a s t remind t h a t t h e r e a r e e x p e r i e n c e s from which

we s t i l l have t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o l e a r n .

29

 CHAPTER

CUBA (1906 - 1909)

OVERVIEW

The R u r a l Guard o f Cuba, o r i g i n a l l y formed d u r i n g

the m i l i t a r y occupation of 1899-1902, was B r i g a d i e r G e n e r a l

Leonard Wood's s o l u t i o n t o t h e m i l i t a r y needs o f Cuba.

Wood's c o n c e p t t h e Cuban m i l i t a r y r e t u r n e d t o t h e i s l a n d

i n 1906, w i t h M a j o r H e r b e r t Slocum, who had been

r e s p o n s i b l e f o r i m p l e m e n t i n g Wood's program d u r i n g t h e

occupation. PI v i a b l e c o n c e p t and p r a c t i c a l s o l u t i o n i n

1900, t h i s i d e a n e v e r succeeded i n t h e i n t e r v e n t i o n o f 1906.

30

 W h i l e Slocum and o t h e r s h e l d r i g i d l y t o t h e Wood

concept, the United States p o l i t i c a l agenda had changed.

The U n i t e d S t a t e s was more concerned w i t h l i m i t i n g t h e need

t o i n t e r v e n e i n Cuba, t h a n b u i l d i n g an i d e a l Cuban f o r c e .

The p r o v i s i o n a l government o f 1906-1909 was t a s k e d w i t h

g e t t i n g t h e Cubans t o a c c e p t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e i r own

future. Magoone a d m i n i s t r a t i o n l a c k e d t h e p r a e t o r i a n

a u t h o r i t y of Woods, b u t i t a l s o l a c k e d an a l t e r n a t i v e t o

t h e R u r a l Guard c o n c e p t .

The Wood s o l u t i o n was n o t u n i f o r m l y a c c e p t e d by t h e

U n i t e d S t a t e s Army, and was adamently r e s i s t e d by Cuban

leaders. W i t h Slocum and h i s s u b o r d i n a t e s e q u a l l y i n t e n t on

t h e i r approach, a m a j o r d e b a t e developed. Governor Magoon

searched f o r a compromise f o r n e a r l y two y e a r s . The

p r o l o n g e d d e b a t e and n e g o t i a t i o n s p r e c l u d e d t h e development

o f a c o h e r e n t and i n t e g r a t e d p o l i t i c a l - m i l i t a r y strategy for

r e f o r m i n g t h e m i l i t a r y f o r c e s o f Cuba.

Slocum proceeded t o b u i l d t h e Cuban armed f o r c e s by

expanding t h e R u r a l Guard. A s t r o n g n a t i o n a l network o f

p o l i c e f o r c e s emerged. However, t h e compromise reached by

Magoon c r e a t e d a Permanent Army which, due t o t h e imminent

w i t h d r a w a l o f American forces, would d e v e l o p w i t h o u t

American s u p e r v i s i o n . The Army e v e n t u a l l y i n c o r p o r a t e d t h e

R u r a l Guard. The p a r t i s a n p o l i t i c a l c h a r a c t e r o f this

combined f o r c e was p r e d i c t e d by t h e R u r a l Guard a d v i s e r s .

31
 When r e v i e w i n g t h e h i s t o r y o f m i l i t a r y r e f o r m i n

Cuba i t i s t e m p t i n g t o see t h e R u r a l Guard as t h e American

s o l u t i o n t o t h e prOblRm, and t h e f a i l u r e o f t h e concept as

t h e reason f o r t h e f a i l u r e o f the reform e f f o r t . This i s

n o t t h e case. I n fact, t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s d i d n o t have

c l e a r concept o f what t y p e o f f o r c e s h o u l d be developed i n

Cuba, n o r c o u l d t h e y c o n v i n c e t h e Cubans t h a t a p o l i t i c a l

p r o f e s s i o n a l n o n p a r t i s a n f o r c e s were e i t h e r v i a b l e o r i n

their interest.

The Cubans c o u l d n o t p r e v e n t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s from

b u i l d i n g m i l i t a r y organizations. Thus, relatively effective

m i l i t a r y s t r u c t u r e s emerged and s u r v i v e d . But, the

a p o l i t i c a l m i l i t a r y i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t the United States

e n v i s i o n e d f o r c o n t r o l l i n g these f o r c e s , and t h e n o n p a r t i s a n

officer c o r p s expected t o l e a d these f o r c e s d i d n o t develop.

T h i s c h a p t e r b e g i n s by r e v i e w i n g t h e development o f

t h e R u r a l Guard under t h e Wood a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and t h e

e v o l u t i o n o f Un t e d S t a t e s p o l i t i c a l o b j e c t i v e s between t h e

y e a r s 1902 and 906. The b u l k o f t h e c h a p t e r i s devoted t o

t h e Permanent hrmy debate, which b r o u g h t t h e shortcomings o f

t h e FImerican approach t o m i l i t a r y r e f o r m i n Cuba i n t o s t a r k

r e 1i e f .

 The Wood Legacy.

Reforming t h e armed f o r c e s was n o t a new American

p r e s c r i p t i o n f o r Cuban p o l i t i c a l problems. Under B r i g a d i e r

General Leonard Wood, M i l i t a r y Governor o f Cuba from

1902, t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s had disbanded t h e Cuban A r m y o f

L i b e r a t i o n and e s t a b l i s h e d t h e R u r a l Guard o f Cuba i n o r d e r

t o f a c i l i t a t e the adm i ni st rat i on o f the island.

When h o s t i l i t i e s ceased i n Cuba i n 1899, t h e Army o f

t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s took up t h e t a s k o f occupation, while i t s

political l e a d e r s h i p debated what was t o be done w i t h i t s

newly l i b e r a t e d possession. Unfortunately, Wood and t h e

other United States o f f i c e r s t r y i n g t o maintain order i n

Cuba were faced w i t h i s s u e s t h a t would n o t w a i t for a

c o n g r e s s i o n a l consensus. Among t h e more p r e s s i n g were t h e

q u e s t i o n s o f what t o do w i t h t h e Cuban F I r m y o f L i b e r a t i o n ,

and how b e s t t o m a i n t a i n law and o r d e r .

When t h e American army landed a t D a c q u i r i , t h e y were

s u r p r i s e d t o f i n d a bedraggled f o r c e , l o o s e l y organized,

composed m a i n l y o f blacks. The American o f f i c e r s

i m m e d i a t e l y doubted t h e Cuban m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s , and

resented t h e i r lack o f g r a t i t u d e . Some Americans observed

that t h e Cubans seemed more i n t e r e s t e d American r a t i o n s

than i n a s s i s t i n g t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i n d e f e a t i n g the

Spanish.

Langley, Banana Wars, p. 13.

 American s e n s l b i l i t i e s were f u r t h e r o f f e n d e d by t h e

Cuban d i s r e g a r d f o r t h e p r o p r i e t i e s o f war, i n particular

t h e i r tendency t o summarily e x e c u t e p r i s o n e r s and accused

spies.= I t became e v i d e n t t o t h e American o f f i c e r s t h a t

t h i s g u e r r i l l a army m i g h t be a t h r e a t t o t h e i r a u t h o r i t y

once t h e Spanish were d e f e a t e d . T h i s p o s s i b i l i t y was

enhanced by Cuban e x p e c t a t i o n s r e g a r d i n g t h e i r p o l i t i c a l

future.

L i k e the F i l i p i n o s , t h e Cubans had expected t h e

United States' i n t e r v e n t i o n t o r e s u l t i n t h e i r immediate

freedom. American o f f i c e r s had d i f f i c u l t y e x p l a i n i n g t h a t

they were t h e r e t o d e f e a t t h e Spanish and t h a t they d i d n o t

have i n s t r u c t i o n s o r t h e a u t h o r i t y t o e s t a b l i s h t h e

r e v o l u t i o n a r y f o r c e s as t h e government i n Cuba.

P r e c i p i t a t e d by t h e d e s t r u c t i o n o f t h e Maine, the

U n i t e d S t a t e s had i n v a d e d Cuba amid c a l l s f o r Cuban

independence and demands f o r an end t o Spanish a p p r e s s i a n ,

b u t t h e machinery o f American government had n o t worked

the d e t a i l s of t h e f u t u r e o f Cuba.4 I n t h i s p o l i c y vacuum,

t h e American m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s , seeking t o maintain c o n t r o l

i n Cuba, had been f o r c e d t o f i n d t h e i r awn s o l u t i o n s .

L o u i s A . Perez J r . , brmv P o l i t i c s i n Cuba, 1898 1958, -

( P i t t s b u r g h , Pa.: U n i v . o f P i t t s b u r g h Press, 1976) p . 5.
H. Hitchman, Leonard Wood and Cuban Independence, 1899
- 1902, (The Hague: M a r t i n u s N i j h o f f , 1971) p. 6.

 A s P r o v i n c i a l Governor o f S a n t i a g o Wood had found

t h a t t h e enforcement o f t h e l a w s and r e g u l a t i o n s emanating

from t h e m i l i t a r y government was b e s t a c c o m p l i s h e d by

Cubans.= He observed t h a t t h e r e was l e s s r e s e n t m e n t and

confusion i f l o y a l Cubans were e n t r u s t e d w i t h t h i s t a s k .

Thus, he formed a c o n s t a b u l a r y , commanded by American

officers. To man t h i s f o r c e , he c u l l e d t h e v e t e r a n s o f the

Army o f L i b e r a t i o n s e e k i n g t h e " b e t t e r e l e m e n t s " o f Cuban

society.- This r e s u l t e d i n a predominantly white hispanic

force.

T h i s s t i l l l e f t t h e problem o f t h e remainder o f the

Army o f L i b e r a t i o n -- a home grown m i l i t a r y i n s t i t u t i o n

spawned by t h e y e a r s o f revolution -- unsolved. General

Wood, S e c r e t a r y o f War R o o t , and P r e s i d e n t M c K i n l e y

considered a B r i t i s h s o l u t i o n . They t h o u g h t t h a t t h e Cubans

c o u l d be formed i n t o c o l o n i a l r e g i m e n t s and s e n t t o f i g h t i n

such p l a c e s as t h e P h i l i p p i n e s . '

A l l a n R . M i l l e t t , "The R i s e and F a l l o f t h e Cuban R u r a l

Guard, 1898 - 1912" The Americas, October 1972, p. 193.
Leonard Wood, 'I The E x i s t i n g C o n d i t i o n s and Needs i n
Cuba," N o r t h American Review, (May 1899) p. 400.
M a j o r General Leonard Wood, " C i v i l R e p o r t o f M a j o r Gerieral
Leonard Wood, V o l u n t e e r s , M i l i t a r y Governor o f Cuba."
U n i t e d S t a t e s Department o f W a r , Annual R e p o r t o f t h e
M i l i t a r y Governor o f Cuba on C i v i l A f f a i r s , U n i t e d S t a t e s
Congress, House, 5 6 t h Congress 2d s e s s i o n , House Document
no.2 s e r . 4080-4087 ( 2 v o l s . , Washington, 1 9 0 1 ) , part
p. 45. ( H e r e a f t e r c i t e d as C i v i l R e p o r t 1900)

E l i h u Root t o W i l l i a m M c K i n l e y , August 17, 1899, S e r i e s

r e e l 7, W l l l i a m M c K i n l e y Papers, L i b r a r y o f Congres5.

Routed i n M i l l e t t , A . " R u r a l Guard" p. 192.

 W h i l e t h i s i d e a had some m i l i t a r y m e r i t , i t smacked

of o l d world colonialism -- an image many i n Congress were

anxious t o avoid. Fortunately, t h e p o t e n t i a l problem o f an

i d l e and d i s a f f e c t e d former s o l d i e r y seemed t o r e s o l v e

itself, as Wood r e p l a c e d many Spanish government b u r e a u c r a t s

w i t h t h e leaders of t h e Army o f L i b e r a t i o n , and c r e a t e d

p u b l i c works j o b s f o r t h e r a n k and f i l e . -

Under t h e Wood a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , Captain Herbert

Slocum was tasked w i t h i m p l e m e n t i n g t h e concept o f a Rural

Guard t h r o u g h o u t Cuba. W i t h i n s t r u c t i o n s from t h e M i l i t a r y

Governor S l o c u m ' s R u r a l Guard focused on p a t r o l l i n g t h e

economic h e a r t o f Cuba.'"

S t a t i o n e d i n s m a l l o u t p o s t s i t secured t h e v a s t

p l a n t a t i o n s and e n f o r c e d t h e laws p r o c l a i m e d i n Havana.

T h i s o r g a n i z a t i o n met w i t h overwhelming a p p r o v a l from t h e

wealthy l a n d owners. W h i l e some l e s s s c r u p u l o u s owners t o l d

t h e i r peasants t h a t t h e R u r a l Guard was t h e r e t o i n s u r e t h a t

they worked, the population, i n general, perceived the Rural

Guard as a p o s i t i v e c o n t r i b u t i o n t o law and o r d e r . "

M i l l e t t , P., " R u r a l Guard," p. 195.

Captain Herbert Slocum, " R e p o r t o f C a p t a i n
Slocum, 7 t h C a v a l r y , S u p e r i n t e n d e n t o + t h e R u r a l Guard
and Cuerpo de A r t i l l e r i a o f t h e I s l a n d o f Cuba," C i v i l
R e p o r t 1902, (Washington, D.C., 1902) 1 1 1 , pp. 67-71.
 Under American l e a d e r s h i p , and w i t h t h e presence o f

American t r o o p s , t h i s f o r c e proved e f f e c t i v e and appeared

professional. The f o r c e was d i v o r c e d from t h e f a c t i o n a l

p o l i t i c s of Cuba t h r o u g h i t s a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h t h e U n i t e d

S t a t e s Government. W h i l e i t seemed t h a t t h e R u r a l Guard had

assumed t h e r o l e o f t h e n a t i o n a l army o f Cuba, i t

p r o b a b l y more a c c u r a t e t o say t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s A r m y

had assumed t h i s r o l e , and t h e R u r a l Guard was t h e s t a t e

police.

A t t h e h e a r t o f t h e debate t h a t e m b r o i l e d Congress

was t h e i s s u e o f Cuban s o v e r e i g n t y . The U n i t e d S t a t e s had

invaded and o c c u p i e d Cuba w i t h t h e s t a t e d purpose o f

p r o vi d i n g the b e n e f i t s o f freedom f o r i t s p o p u l a t i o n and

independence o f t h e n a t i o n from t h e f o r e i g n dominance o f

Spain. S m a r t i n g under European a c c u s a t i o n s o f c o l o n i a l i s m ,

t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s sought t o b a l a n c e i t s r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s f o r

the p r o t e c t i o n o f l i f e and p r o p e r t y i n Cuba, i t 5 growing

m i l i t a r y strategic i n t e r e s t s i n the region, and t h e Cuban

cries for independence.

1 2 E l i h u Root, The M i l i t a r y and C o l o n i a l P o l i c y o f t h e

U n i t e d S t a t e s , ed. R o b e r t Bacon and James Brown S c o t t
(Cambridge, Mass.: 1916) p. 190.
 t h e P l a t t amendment was debated Wood had

reached h i s own c o n c l u s i o n s r e g a r d i n g t h e f u t u r e o f Cuba.

was c o n v i n c e d t h a t i t must and would e v e n t u a l l y become a

member o f t h e Union. I n fact, he seemed "obsessed by t h e

dream t h a t t h e Cubans themselves would ask t o be annexed t o

t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s ift h e y c o u l d o n l y the p o s i t i v e

b e n e f i t s o f such an a s s o c i a t i o n , . . " l ~

The e x t e n t t o w h i c h Wood's c o n v i c t i o n s r e g a r d i n g

s t a t e h o o d o r t e r r i t o r i a l s t a t u s f o r Cuba i n f l u e n c e d h i s

s u b o r d i n a t e s and shaped t h e r o l e s and m i s s i o n o f the Rural

Guard i s open t o debate. What i s c l e a r i s t h a t Wood was

admired by h i s s t a f f , i n c l u d i n g Slocum, and t h a t i n t h e

y e a r s f o l l o w i n g h i s d e p a r t u r e from Wood k e p t an a c t i v e

correspondence w i t h t h e s e o f f i c e r s .

I t i s a l s o e v i d e n t t h a t Slocum shared Wood's

concept o f a R u r a l Guard, and t h a t n e i t h e r he n o r Wood s a w

t h e need f o r r e g u l a r Cuban f o r c e s t o s e c u r e t h e b o r d e r s o f

the nation. Regardless of i t s future status, t h e y were

c o n f i d e n t t h a t these t a s k s c o u l d , and s h o u l d , be performed

by t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s O r m y and Navy.l='

M i l l e t t , A., " R u r a l Guard" p. 195.

A l l a n R . M i l l e t t , The P o l i t i c s o f I n t e r v e n t i o n s : The
M i l i t a r y Occuoation o f Cuba, 1906 -
1909, (Columbus, Ohio:
1968) p. 226.
Slocum t o M c C o y , June 6 , 1907, Wood Papers.
 The U n i t e d S t a t e s w i t h d r e w from Cuba i n 1902.

P r o c l a i m i n g success, b u t h a r b o r i n g doubts, Wood d e p a r t e d . * '

Cuba was l e f t t o d e m o n s t r a t e i t s c a p a c i t y f o r democracy and

t h e R u r a l Guard g i v e n t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o show i t s

p r o f e s s i o n a l and n o n p a r t i s a n q u a l i t i e s as an a p o l i t i c a l

force i n the s e r v i c e of a d u l y e l e c t e d government.

111: The I n t e r v e n t i o n o f 1906: New S i t u a t i o n . New

O b j e c t i v e s , and O l d S o l u t i o n s .

The i n t e r n a t i o n a l scene and American s i t u a t i o n

changed r a p i d l y between 1902 and 1906. R o o s e v e l t assumed

the presidency. T a f t became S e c r e t a r y o f War. The U n i t e d

5 t a t e s Army had c o n c l u d e d a b l o o d y c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y i n the

Philippines. R o o s e v e l t a c q u i r e d t h e Panama Canal, and

e s t a b l i s h e d h i s c o r o l l a r y t o t h e Monroe D o c t r i n e . United

S t a t e s i n t e r v e n t i o n i n t h e C a r i b b e a n and C e n t r a l America was

s t i l l an a c c e p t e d p o l i t i c a l o p t i o n , b u t R o o s e v e l t was

growing conscious o f i t s r i s k s and t h e c o s t . I 7 Meanwhile,

Cuba s t r u g g l e d w i t h democracy.

Herman Hagedorn, Leonard Wood: A E i o q r a p h y , 2 v o l s . , (New

York: H a r p e r and Row, 1 9 3 1 ) , 1: 260-261.
Bacon t o S t e i n h a r t , September 10, 1906. I n W i l l i a m H.
r a f t and R o b e r t Bacon, "Cuban P a c i f i c a t i o n : R e p o r t o f
W i l l i a m H. T a f t , S e c r e t a r y o f War, and R o b e r t Bacon,
A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y o f War, o f What Was Done Under t h e
I n s t r u c t i o n s o f t h e P r e s i d e n t i n R e s t o r i n g Peace i n Cuba."
Department o f War. R e p o r t o f t h e S e c r e t a r y o f War,
Flppendix E. U n i t e d S t a t e s c o n g r e s s , House, 5 9 t h cong.. 2d
sess., House Document No. 2, s e r . 1505, (Washington,
D.C.,1906) p. 445. ( H e r e a f t e r r e f e r r e d t o as T a f t R e p o r t . )

39
 The s q u a b b l i n g s o f t h e Cuban Congress p r e v e n t e d t h e

r e s o l u t i o n o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and e l e c t o r a l issues.

F a c t i o n a l i s m ground t h e machinery o f government t o a v i r t u a l

halt.l0 The P r e s i d e n t , Tomas E s t r a d a Palma, while "not a

forceful leader o r experienced e x e c u t i v e " , faced r e e l e c t i o n

in and was d e t e r m i n e d t o r e t a i n h i s o f f i c e and g a i n a

majority i n the legislature.1T The o p p o s i t i o n p a r t y , facing

p o s s i b l e d e f e a t and d o u b t i n g t h e f a i r n e s s o f the e l e c t i o n

boycotted the p o l l s . F r a u d and c o e r c i o n f u r t h e r assured

Palma's r e t e n t i o n o f t h e presidency.

The L i b e r a l p a r t y , contending t h a t t h e P l a t t

Amendment o b l i g a t e d t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t o i n s u r e f r e e

e l e c t i o n s sought r e d r e s s o f i t s grievances w i t h t he United

S t a t e s Government.21 Palma, encountering grawing c i v i l

unrest, a l s o i n v o k e d t h e P l a t t Amendment.'= Citing a

growing t h r e a t t o t h e s a f e t y o f f o r e i g n p r o p e r t y and

citizens, he demanded American i n t e r v e n t i o n i n s u p p o r t o f

t h e government. The U n i t e d S t a t e s balked.=" Both s i d e s

attemDted t o f o r c e t h e American hand.

'I T a f t and Bacon, TaftReDort, 451.

Dana G. Munro, The L a t i n American R e p u b l i c s : A H i s t o r y ,
(New York: A p p l e t o n , p. 4 4 4 .

I': T' a f t and Bacon, T a f t R e p o r t , p. 453.

L a n g l e y , Banana Wars, pp. 35-36.

== S t e i n h a r t t o S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e , SeDtember 1 2 , 1906. I n

- --
T a f t R e p o r t , p. 445.

^ _.
*
I b i d . , p.446.

40
 The L i b e r a l s t o o k t o the f i e l d t o form a r e v o l t .

After r e p e a t e d p l e a s f o r American a s s i s t a n c e , Palma o r d e r e d

t h e C o n s e r v a t i v e congress adjourned, and r e s i g n e d f r o m

office. The V i c e P r e s i d e n t r e f u s e d t o t a k e h i s p l a c e , and

t h e Congress was u n a v a i l a b l e t o choose a s u c c e s s o r .

P r e d i c i t i n g anarchy, t h e Pmerican Consul General o f Havana,

Mr. Steinhart, c a b l e d Washington f o r i m m e d i a t e a s s i s t a n c e :

P r e s i d e n t Palma has r e s o l v e d n o t t o c o n t i n u e a t
t h e head o f t h e Government, and i s r e a d y t o
p r e s e n t h i s r e s i g n a t i o n , even though t h e p r e s e n t
d i s t u r b a n c e s s h o u l d cease a t once. The v i c e -
p r e s i d e n t has r e s o l v e d n o t t o a c c e p t t h e o f f i c e .
... The consequences w i l l be absence o f l e g a l
power, and t h e r e f o r e t h e p r e v a i l i n g s t a t e o f
a n a r c h y w i l l c o n t i n u e u n l e s s t h e Government o f
t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s w i l l a d o p t t h e measures
n e c e s s a r y t o a v o i d t h i s danger.4

the f a l l o f 1906 t h e government o f Cuba was

paralyzed. R e v o l u t i o n t h r e a t e n e d t o d e s t r o y much o f the

progress t h a t the United States f e l t i t had a c h i e v e d a f t e r

freeing t h e i s l a n d from S p a i n i n 1899. The c o n d i t i o n s o f

l i b e r t y and peace --which t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s had pledged to

enforce i n the Treaty of Paris -- were c l e a r l y i n j e o p a r d y ,

as were t h e l i v e s and p r o p e r t y o f foreign citizens, and t h e

growing s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s o f the United States.

Steinhart t o t h e S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e , September 14, 1906 -

-2.41 p.m., T a f t R e p o r t , pp. 446-447.

41
 The government o f Cuba and t h e o p p o s i t i o n l e a d e r s h i p

which began t h e r e v o l t i n p r o t e s t o f t h e 1905 e l e c t i o n s ,

b o t h requested U n i t e d S t a t e s i n t e r v e n t i o n . President

R o o e e v e l t , weary o f Caribbean p o l i t i c s , and f e a r f u l o f

another prolonged s t r u g g l e l i k e t h e P h i l i p p i n e s , sent

S e c r e t a r y o f War Howard r a f t and C l s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y o f War

Bacon t o t h e i s l a n d t o d e t e r m i n e i f an i n t e r v e n t i o n c o u l d be

avoided.

Upon a r r i v a l i n Cuba, the t i d e of events forced T a f t

t o a c t promptly. He n o t o n l y recommended i n t e r v e n t i o n , but

d e c l a r e d a p r o v i s i o n a l government, w i t h h i m s e l f as a c t i n g

governor, and sought t o b r i n g o r d e r t o t h e s i t u a t i o n . = '

T a f t q u i c k l y concluded t h a t p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y r e f o r m s

would be necessary t o r e e s t a b l i s h democracy and s t a b i l i t y i n

Cuba. C o n s t i t u t i o n a l and p r o c e d u r a l r e f o r m s had t o be made

t o a s s u r e f r e e and f a i r e l e c t i o n s . The o f f i c e o f the c h i e f

e x e c u t i v e had t o be s t r e n g t h e n e d , and t h e government had t o

have an armed f o r c e c a p a b l e o f p r o t e c t i n g i t from

rebellion.=&

W i l l i a m H.Taft, " P r o c l a m a t i o n t o t h e People o f Cuba"

September 29, 1906. I n T a f t R e p o r t , pp. 463-464.
T a f t and Bacon, T a f t R e p o r t , p. 456.

 D u r i n g h i s f i r s t a d m i n i s t r a t i o n Palma had responded

t o t h e demands o f the r u r a l e l i t e s f o r increased p r o t e c t i o n

and expanded t h e R u r a l Guard. He a l s o r e i n f o r c e d t h e token

corps o f a r t i l l e r y . = & S t i l l t h i s f o r c e was s c a t t e r e d , and

d e s p i t e t h e f a c t t h a t as much as h a l f o f t h e R u r a l Guard

owed t h e i r p o s i t i o n s t o t h e Palma government, they o f f e r e d

l i t t l e e f f e c t i v e r esi st ance i n the revol t . "7

T a f t d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e R u r a l Guard had

c o l l a b o r a t e d w i t h t h e Palma government and h e l p e d c o e r c e t h e

e l e c t o r a t e i n t o t h e l o p s i d e d v i c t o r y t h a t had k e p t t h e Palma

government i n o f f i c e . ' - Subsequent i n v e s t i g a t i o n by Major

Slocum showed t h a t t h e R u r a l Guard had, through r e c r u i t m e n t

and shared i n t e r e s t s , become p o l i t i c a l l y a l i g n e d w i t h t h e

r u r a l elites.'7

~ ~

Perez, A r m y P o l i t i c s , pp. 15-16.

Jacob SleeDer t o t h e S e c r e t a r v o f S t a t e , August 1906,

U n i t e d S t a t e s ' Department o f S t a t e , F o r e i c i n . R e l a t i o n s o f t h e

U n i t e d S t a t e s , 1906, P a r t 1, pp. 454-455.

T a f t and Bacon, T a f t R e o o r t , p. 454.

C a p t a i n C.F. C r a i n t o M a j o r H.J. Slocum, F e r u a r y 1907.
F i l e 064, Records o f t h e P r o v i s i o n a l Government o f Cuba,
N a t i o n a l A r c h i v e s , Record Group 199.

 S e c r e t a r y o f War T a f t t u r n e d o v e r t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y

of P r o v i s i o n a l Governor o f Cuba t o C h a r l e s E. Magoon, a

civilian, s e l e c t e d by P r e s i d e n t R o o s e v e l t based on

c r e d e n t i a l s a c q u i r e d i n Panama. Magoon f a c e d a d i f f i c u l t

task. American o b j e c t i v e s i n Cuba had e v o l v e d , and a q u i c k

and p e a c e f u l s o l u t i o n t o t h e problem o f Cuban i n s t a b i l i t y

was d e s i r e d . R o o s e v e l t f e l t t h a t t h e P l a t t Amendment had

become a c r u t c h f o r Cubans who would n o t a c c e p t

r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r s o l v i n g t h e i r own problems. Lacking

Wood's a u t h o r i t y , Magoon wa5 faced w i t h t h e t a s k o f getting

t h e Cubans t o a c c e p t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e i r own n a t i o n

through n e g o t i a t i o n . z u

F o r t h e most p a r t Magoon i n h e r i t e d Wood's s t a f f .

C o l o n e l Enoch Crowder w a s tasked w i t h r e w r i t i n g t h e

electoral laws. The A r m y General S t a f f , under t h e

leadership o f i t s Chief o f Staff, General B e l l , planned and

l e d t h e deployment o f t h e Army o f Cuban P a c i f i c a t i o n . This

o r g a n i z a t i o n c o n t a i n e d many v e t e r a n s o f t h e p r e v i o u s Cuban

experience. H e r b e r t Slocum, now a m a j o r , r e t u r n e d t o again

t a k e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e R u r a l Guard."i

L a n g l e y , Banana Wars, pp. 43-44.

M i l l e t t , A., " R u r a l Guard," p. 199. Other o f f i c e r s
assigned t o t h e R u r a l Guard were C a p t a i n s P o w e l l C l a y t o n ,
J r . , James A . Ryan, George C. B a r n h a r d t , Andrew J .
Dougherty, C h a r l e s C r a i n , Cary C r o c k e t t , and Edmund
Wittenmyer.

 Convinced t h a t t h e c o n c e p t o f t h e R u r a l Guard was

sound Slocum made an assessment o f i t s organizational

weaknesses and began b u i l d i n g a b i g g e r and b e t t e r R u r a l

Guard. L a r g e r detachments were p l a c e d i n t h e v i c i n i t y o f

p o p u l a t i o n c e n t e r s so t h e y c o u l d respond t o t h e p o s s i b i l i t y

of revolutions. The autonomy o f t h e R u r a l Guard was t o be

i n c r e a s e d by p r o m o t i o n t h r o u g h t h e r a n k s , and by r e d u c i n g

i t s dependence on t h e r u r a l e l i t e s f o r f a c i l i t i e s . = =

Seeing n o b a s i c f l a w s i n t h i s approach, Governor

Magoon c o n c e n t r a t e d on g e t t i n g l e g i s l a t i o n e n a c t e d w h i c h

would p r o v i d e f o r a m i l i t a r y j u s t i c e system, e s t a b l i s h the

legal basis f o r the organizational structure of this force,

and revamp t h e compensation system."" S t r o n g s a n c t i o n s were

t o be e s t a b l i s h e d f o r p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y by R u r a l Guard

members.

The P r o v i s i o n a l Governor decreed t h a t t h e r e

would be n o p a r t i s a n s h i p w i t h i n t h e g u a r d
i t s e l f . I n G e n e r a l O r d e r No. 28 (March 11. 1907)
General R o d r i g u e z announced t h a t p a r t i c i p a t i o n
i n p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y would be h e n c e f o r t h a
court-mart i a1 offense

B* Slocum t o P r o v i s i o n a l Governor o f Cuba, F e b r u a r y 26,

1907, F i l e N a t i o n a l A r c h i v e s , Records o f t h e Bureau

o f I n s u l a r A f f a i r s , Records Group 350.

,IJ C h a r l e s E. Magoon, R e p o r t o f t h e P r o v i s i o n a l Government

o f Cuba From December 1 s t . 1907 t o December 1 s t . 1908,

(Havana, 1909) pp. 15-16.

,z4 M i l l e t t , A . , P o l i t i c s o f I n t e r v e n t i o n , p. 224.

 Slocum, and h i s c a d r e o f seven o t h e r o f f i c e r s ,

i m m e d i a t e l y embarked upon t h e i r p l a n s t o improve t h e R u r a l

Guard. They were c o n f i d e n t t h a t t h e i r a c t i o n s were i n

c o n c e r t w i t h t h e needs o f t h e people o f Cuba. These

o f f i c e r s were o n l y s l i g h t l y s u r p r i s e d when t h e Cuban

p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s objected t o t h e i r reforms. They were

a b s o l u t e l y astounded when Governor Maqoon and t h e R o o s e v e l t

a d m i n i s t r a t i o n accepted a 5 v a l i d some o f t h e Cuban

arguments.

IV: The Permanent A r m y Debate.

Maqoon was o b l i g a t e d t o hear a l l p a r t i e s i n h i s

efforts t o n e g o t i a t e a Cuban r e t u r n t o s t a b i l i t y . A t

P a l m a ' s s u g g e s t i o n t h e P r o v i s i o n a l Governor met r e g u l a r l y

w i t h t h e heads o f t h e two m a j o r p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s . 3 s The

most e f f e c t i v e Cuban l o b b y was t h e L i b e r a l Committee. lhis

o r g a n i z a t i o n represented the h i e r a r c h y of the opposi t i on

p a r t y w h i c h had r e b e l l e d a g a i n s t t h e Palma a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .

To d e f e a t t h e a t t e m p t s t o r e b u i l d t h e R u r a l Guard t h e y p u t

t o g e t h e r an e l o q u e n t argument t h a t e x p l o i t e d U n l t e d S t a t e s

i n t e r e s t s i n Cuba.

W h i l e t h i s t h e s i s r e f e r s t o t h e s e p o l i t i c a l groups a
p a r t i e s , Maqoon, and s u b s e q u e n t l y M i l l e t t , have taken c a r e
t o p o i n t o u t t h a t t h e s e o r g a n i z a t i o n s were n o t comparable t o
American p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s o f t h e e r a . I t would be more
c o r r e c t t o c h a r a c t e r i z e t h e s e elements as p o l i t i c a l
f a c t i o n s , f o r t h e y performed none o f t h e p l a t f o r m o r
o r g a n i z a t i o n a l f u n c t i o n s we a s s o c i a t e w i t h p a r t i e s i n
America .

 First, t h e L i b e r a l s observed t h a t i f wanted t o

prevent a r e v o l u t i o n , needed a p r o p e r armed f o r c e , not

constabulary. Drawing on t h e i r own successes t h e y a s s e r t e d

t h a t r e v o l t s c o u l d be q u e l l e d q u i c k l y i f t h e government had

a t i t s d i s p o s a l a r e a s o n a b l y l a r g e body o f disciplined

s o l d i e r s who c o u l d make a c o n v i n c i n g show o f force. Such

t a c t i c s p r e v e n t e d t h e r e v o l u t i o n from g a i n i n g momentum and

s w e l l i n g the ranks of the revolutionaries t o the p o i n t t h a t

no f o r c e o f any s i z e c o u l d e f f e c t i v e l y oppose t h e i r mass.

They reasoned t h a t a c o n s t a b u l a r y , committed t o o t h e r t a s k s

and d i s p e r s e d t h r o u g h o u t the country, could n o t e f f e c t i v e l y

e x e c u t e such a show o f force:Ib

Second, e x p l o i t i n g t h e American c o n v i c t i o n t h a t Cuba

had t o r e m a i n a f i s c a l l y s o l v e n t n a t i o n , they pointed o u t

t h a t t h e expansion o f t h e R u r a l Guard -- mounted f o r c e

w i t h extensive dispersed f a c i l i t i e s -- was very c o s t l y

venture. conventional force of infantry, w i t h some

c a v a l r y and a r t i l l e r y would be s i g n i f i c a n t l y cheaper.37

Last, but not least, t h e y argued t h a t ift h e U n i t e d

S t a t e s wanted t h e n a t i o n o f Cuba t o behave l i k e a s o v e r e i g n

state, i t m u s t have t h e mean5 t o a c c e p t this responsibility.

A n &my, and p r o v i s i o n s f o r c a l l i n g i t s c i t i z e n r y t o a r m s ,

were b a s i c n e c e s s i t i e s f o r an i n d e p e n d e n t n a t i o n . " e

,Id " S t e n o g r a p h i c R e p o r t o f t h e Conference between M r . Juan

G u a l l b e r t o Gomez, ( e t and t h e P r o v i s i o n a l G o v e r n o r "
F e b r u a r y 6 , 1907, 062/2 , Records Group 199.

 M a j o r Slocum denounced t h e p r o p o s a l as an a t t e m p t by

t h e former r e b e l s t o b u i l d an armed f o r c e o f t h e i r own which

they c o u l d t u r n t o t h e i r own p o l i t i c a l purposes. Others

argued t h a t t h e f o r c e would s e t i d l e and i n e f f e c t i v e ,

l e a v i n g t h e most i m p o r t a n t p o r t i o n s o f Cuba-- i t s rural

a g r i c u l t u r a l base-- unprotected.Z9 Adamant t h a t Cuba d i d

n o t need a c o n v e n t i o n a l Army, these o f f i c e r s continued

b u i l d i n g a s t r o n g e r R u r a l Guard.

There were o t h e r views w i t h i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s A r m y

regarding the type of armed f o r c e needed i n Cuba. Writing

i n the Journal o f the M i l i t a r y Service I n s t i t u t e o f the

United States, C a p t a i n Matthew E. Hanna, M i l i t a r y Attache t o

Cuba, had proposed a r e g u l a r armed f o r c e f o r Cuba, and

suggested sending a p o r t i o n o f i t s o f f i c e r c a n d i d a t e s t o The

U n i t e d S t a t e s M i l i t a r y Academy a t West P o i n t . Hanna f e l t

t h a t a Cuban army c a p a b l e o f p r o t e c t i n g i t s own shores would

f r e e American f o r c e s from t h i s t a s k and a l l o w f o r the

employment o f the United States' m i l i t a r y power, elsewhere

i n t h e Caribbean.

I t i s u n l i k e l y t h a t Hanna's argument went unheeded.

R o o s e v e l t was i n s u r i n g t h a t t h e r e would be more than enough

work f o r American armed f o r c e s i n t h e Caribbean. The Panama

Canal needed p r o t e c t i o n and, s i n c e t h e announcement o f the

Roosevelt C o r o l l a r y , f u t u r e showdowns w i t h r i s i n g European

powers had become more than remote p o s s i b i l i t i e s .

Perez, A r m y P o l i t i c s , pp. 23-24: Millett, A., Politic_s_

of I n t e r v e n t i o n , pp. 23t-232.

48
 Working a g a i n s t t h e p o s i t i o n o f t h e R u r a l Guard

a d v i s e r s was t h e f a c t t h a t i t had f a i l e d t o p r e v e n t t h e

previous uprising. The L i b e r a l s a l s o p l a y e d u p t h e p o i n t

t h a t t h e R u r a l Guard had c o l l a b o r a t e d w i t h t h e Moderates i n

the e l e c t i o n o f 1905, and thus was PO i t i c a l l y t a i n t e d . 4 "

Magoon was i n a d i f f i c u l t pos t i o n . He s o u g h t

a d v i c e f r o m Washington, and r e f e r r e d t h e i s s u e t o t h e

A d v i s o r y Law Commission.41 Headed by C o l o n e l Enoch

Crowder, t h i s g r o u p was w o r k i n g on revamping t h e Cuban

c o n s t i t u t i o n and c o d i f y i n g t h e laws w h i c h would e s t a b l i s h

t h e p r o c e d u r e s and r e l a t i o n s h i p s between t h e v a r i o u s

o r g a n i z a t i o n s and i n s t i t u t i o n s o f t h e Cuban R e p u b l i c . 4 =

The d e b a t e c o n t i n u e d , as d i d t h e b u i l d i n g o f the Rural

Guard,

The argument and n e g o t i a t i o n r e g a r d i n g t h e Permanent

Army went unabated f o r t h e b e t t e r p a r t o f two y e a r s . The

q u e s t i o n was a m a j o r i s s u e i n t h e Cuban p r e s s and demanded

the a t t e n t i o n o f t h e War D e p a r t m e n t ' s Bureau o f Insular

Affairs.4" The development o f t h e R u r a l Guard o r g a n i z a t i o n

proceeded and t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n a l r e f o r m s s o u g h t by Slocum

were complete, when i n A p r i l o f 1908 a "compromise"

was reached.

Millett, A., Politics of Intervention, p. 228.

4i: Munro, L a t i n American R e D u b l i c s , p. 445.

43 M i l l e t t , A . " R u r a l Guard" pp. 200.

49
 of

44

50

 Magoon s u p p o r t e d t h e appointment o f General Guerra,

a veteran of t h e Army o f L i b e r a t i o n and a member o f the

L i b e r a l Committee, t o t h e p o s i t i o n o f command o f t h e armed

forces. Magoon'5 r a t i o n a l e f o r s e l e c t i n g Guerra r e f l e c t s

t h e s h i f t i n g emphasis on m a i n t a i n i n g o r d e r i n s t e a d o f

i n s t i l l i n g democratic i n s t i t u t i o n s .

Guerra, a p r o t e g e o f t h e g u e r i l l a g e n i u s A n t o n i o
Maceo, was a c c l a i m e d f o r h i s r u t h l e s s n e s s and
a b i l i t y : " T h i s p u t s an end t o i n s u r r e c t i o n s ;
nobody w i l l want ' P i n o ' t o go a f t e r them; he
would n o t b r i n g i n p r i s o n e r s . " Such were t h e
comments Maqoon heard, w i t h e v i d e n t a p p r o v a l . I n
any e v e n t Maqoon b e l i e v e d power, p o l i t i c s , and
t h e armed f o r c e s were problems t h e Cuban s h o u l d
h a n d l e themselves.4'

** Maqoon t o T a f t , A p r i l 9 , 1908, F i l e 15984, General

C l a s s i f i e d F i l e s , Bureau o f I n s u l a r A f f a i r s , Record Group
350. Oouted i n M i l l e t t , A. " R u r a l Guard" p. 204.

51
 V: The American Withdrawal

The d e p a r t u r e o f t h e p r o v i s i o n a l government was

keyed t o t h e g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n s o f 1908. Extensive

p r o c e d u r a l r e f o r m s had been enacted, and t h e e l e c t i o n was

c l o s e l y s u p e r v i s e d by U n i t e d S t a t e s o f f i c e r s . Once a p r o p e r

e l e c t i o n had held, the United States w a s f r e e t o

withdraw. Roosevelt, among o t h e r s was n o t convinced t h a t

democracy would succeed.

Close t o t h e end o f h i s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , when h i s

t h o u g h t s were f a r from K e t t l e H i l l and h i s
C o r o l l a r y , Roosevelt i n a conversation w i t h h i s
m i l i t a r y a i d e and Cuban v e t e r a n , C a p t a i n
A r c h i b a l d B u t t , gave h i s (and h i s n a t i o n ' s )
e u l o g y t o t h e Second I n t e r v e n t i o n . do n o t
t h i n k about Cuba now, he s a i d . " I t i s n o t o u r
f a u l t i f t h i n g s go b a d l y there..."*'

Governor Magoon t u r n e d over t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s o f

government t o P r e s i d e n t Gomez i n January o f 1909 and t h e

American a d v i s o r s who oversaw t h e development o f the Rural

Guard d u r i n g t h e b e t t e r p a r t o f t h e f i r s t decade o f the 20th

c e n t u r y were withdrawn. A s i n g l e adviser, without previous

Cuban e x p e r i e n c e , was s e l e c t e d by t h e War Department t o

a s s i s t i n t h e t r a i n i n g of t h i s o r g a n i z a t i o n i n what would

i t s f i n a l days as a semi-autonomous force.

47 C a p t a i n A r c h i b a l d B u t t t o Mrs. Lewis F. B u t t , February

1909, i n Lawrence F. A b b o t t ( e d . ) , The L e t t e r s o f A r c h i e

Butt (New York, 1 9 2 4 ) p.325. Quoted i n M i l l e t t , A . ,

P o l i t i c s o f I n t e r v e n t i o n , p.

52

 VI: On E p i t a p h f o r M i l i t a r y Reform i n Cuba: C a p t a i n Frank

P a r k e r . em

C a p t a i n F r a n k P a r k e r was a cavalryman. W i t h the

backing o f t h e P r e s i d e n t o f Cuba, a d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e share

of resources, and t h e i n d i f f e r e n c e o f the United States

Department o f War, P a r k e r made what would be t h e f i n a l

Flmerican c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e b u i l d i n g o f a profeseional

n o n p a r t i s a n a p o l i t i c a l Cuban m i l i t a r y .

F i n d i n g t h a t t h e R u r a l Guard was a mounted u n i t

P a r k e r i m m e d i a t e l y s e t a b o u t making p r o p e r c a v a l r y o u t o f

t h i s constabulary force. He c r e a t e d a d e m o n s t r a t i o n t r o o p

i n Havana f o r t h e p r o p o r t e d purpose o f t r a i n i n g the

remainder o f t h e R u r a l Guard by r o t a t i n g i n d i v i d u a l s t h r o u g h

t h i s unit. H i s s o l d i e r s and mounts l o o k e d s u p e r b b u t , in

fact, t h e s e t r o o p e r s d i d n o t r o t a t e o u t o f Havana. Instead,

t h e y became an e l i t e p a l a c e g u a r d .

T h i s f i n e c a v a l r y o r g a n i z a t i o n proved e x c e p t i o n a l l y

useful. P r e s i d e n t Gomez used them t o p u t down r i o t s by

disenfanchised black veterans o f t h e firmy o f Liberation

d u r i n g t h e Race War o f 1912. The r e m a i n d e r o f the Rural

Guard a l s o p r o v e d e f f e c t i v e i n Cuban p o l i t i c s . Intelligence

reports o f t h e e r a c r e d i t t h e R u r a l Guard w i t h a s s a s s i n a t i o n

of r i v a l p o l i t i c o s and i n t i m i d a t i o n o f o t h e r opponents.

C l e a r l y a v e r s a t i l e and e f f e c t i v e f o r c e , t h e s e u n i t s were

n e i t h e r nonpartisan nor a p o l i t i c a l .

The m a t e r i a l p r e s e n t e d i n t h i s s e c t i o n i s condensed from

M i l l e t t , A., " R u r a l Guard" pp. 208-211.

 When P a r k e r l e f t Cuba i n 1912 t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f

a d v i s i n g t h e R u r a l Guard became a p a r t t i m e t a s k f o r the

m i l i t a r y attache. I n t h a t same y e a r , Marines landed i n

Nicaragua.

 CHAPTER

NICARAGUA (1927 - 1933)

I: Overview.

I n 1927 N i c a r a g u a was i n v o l v e d i n a c i v i l war w h i c h

threatened the s t a b i l i t y of C e n t r a l America. U n l i k e most

p r e v i o u s armed c o n t e s t s f o r c o n t r o l o f N i c a r a g u a , this

dispute involved foreign powers o t h e r than t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s

or Britain. Mexico was d e e p l y involved i n supporting the

L i b e r a l cause, w h i c h was t r y i n g t o i n s t a l l V i c e P r e s i d e n t

Sacasa i n t h e o f f i c e v a c a t e d by P r e s i d e n t S o l a r z a n o and

s e i z e d by G e n e r a l Chamorro.

The L i b e r a l f o r c e s were u n d e r t h e command o f G e n e r a l

Moncada and c o u n t e d among t h e i r r a n k s G e n e r a l s Somoza and

Sandino. T h i s p a r t i s a n Army e n j o y e d c o n s i d e r a b l e s u c c e s s on

the b a t t l e f i e l d . S e e k i n g t o end t h e war t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s

f o r c e d Chamorro's w i t h d r a w a l from o f f i c e , but the L i b e r a l s

r e f u s e d t o r e c o g n i z e h i s American endorsed s u c c e s s o r , ado1 f o

Diaz. With Mexican sponsored f o r c e on t h e v e r g e o f

v i c t o r y President Coolidge dispatched a special envoy,

C o l o n e l Henry L . Stimson, t o negotiate a settlement t o the

crisis.
 S t i m s o n ' s m i s s i o n met w i t h r e m a r k a b l e success. Through

d i r e c t n e g o t i a t i o n w i t h Moncada, and t h e j u d i c i o u s

employment o f a g r o w i n g f o r c e o f Marines, Stimson succeeded

i n convincing the L i b e r a l leaders, o t h e r than Sandino, to

l a y down t h e i r arms and a c c e p t a new e l e c t i o n i n 1928. The

Stimson agreement a l s o r e q u i r e d t h e Nicaraguan n a t i o n a l

forces, then under C o n s e r v a t i v e c o n t r o l . t o surrender t h e i r

arms t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s M a r i n e Corps and d i s b a n d . The new

government, t o be e l e c t e d i n 1928, would have a t i t s

d i s p o s a l a new armed f o r c e .

The new Nicaraguan m i l i t a r y was t o be a c o n s t a b u l a r y

trained, and i n i t i a l l y l e d , by a c t i v e d u t y U n i t e d S t a t e s

officers. T h i s would be a n o n p a r t i s a n a p o l i t i c a l f o r c e . It

would p r e v e n t t h e r a i s i n g o f N i c a r a g u a ' s t r a d i t i o n a l

p a r t i s a n armies. I t would a l s o r e p l a c e t h e c o r r u p t N a t i o n a l

Army, and an American l e d c o n s t a b u l a r y w h i c h had been

coopted t o t h e C o n s e r v a t i v e cause by General Chamorro.

Obviously, t h e second i n t e r v e n t i o n o f 1927-1933 was n o t

the f i r s t attempt a t p o l i t i c a l - m i l i t a r y reform i n Nicaragua.

To u n d e r s t a n d t h e e v e n t s t h a t took p l a c e f o l l o w i n g 1927 i t

i s necessary t o r e v i e w t h e p r e v i o u s r e f o r m e f f o r t s .

Additionally, f o r a c l e a r understanding o f t h e events,

p r o p o s a l s and programs r e g a r d i n g m i l i t a r y r e f o r m . these

e f f o r t s must be examined i n t h e l i g h t o f American f o r e i g n

p o l i c y and Nicaraguan p r e s i d e n t i a l p o l i t i c s .
 T h i s c h a p t e r b e g i n s by t r a c i n g t h e development o f

U n i t e d S t a t e s i n t e r e s t s i n N i c a r a g u a and N i c a r a g u a n

r e a c t i o n s t o p r i o r attempts a t m i l i t a r y reform. The f o c u s

t h e n turns t o t h e i n t e r v e n t i o n o f 1927, and t h e complex

e n v i r o n m e n t o f N i c a r a g u a n p r e s i d e n t i a l and m i l i t a r y p o l i t i c s

which confronted U n i t e d S t a t e s o f f i c i a l s . The factors

o f Sandino and s h i f t i n g U n i t e d S t a t e s p o l i c y , which f u r t h e r

complicated t h e task o f p o l i t i c a l m i l i t a r y reform are a l s o

addressed.

The c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a t t e m p t e d

m i l i t a r y r e f o r m s i n N i c a r a g u a d i f f e r e d i n many ways from

t h o s e i n Cuba. N i c a r a g u a was an e s t a b l i s h e d s o v e r e i g n

nation, n o t a r e c e n t l y freed colony. D o l l a r diplomacy --

President T a f t s c o n t r i b u t i o n t o United States foreign

policy -- had reached i t s l o g i c a l and p r a c t i c a l l i m i t s . The

Panama Canal was i n f u l l o p e r a t i o n . The Department o f

State, n o t t h e Department o f War, was f o r m u l a t i n g policy for

the i n t e r v e n t i o n . The U n i t e d S t a t e s was a new w o r l d power.

Finally, t h e development o f t h e G u a r d i a N a c i o n a l de

N i c a r a g u a was overseen by o f f i c e r s o f t h e M a r i n e Corps, not

the Yet, t h e r e were r e m a r k a b l e e i m i l a r i t i e s .

The M a r i n e e f f o r t s were a l s o hampered by a l a c k o f

consensus as t o t h e r o l e and m i s s i o n o f t h e Guardia. The

Nicaraguan P r e s i d e n t , General Moncada, and t h e N i c a r a g u a n

Congress r e s i s t e d e f f o r t s t o e s t a b l i s h an a p o l i t i c a l force.

Again, as i n Cuba, t h e development o f t h e Guardia c o n t i n u e d

d e s p i t e t h e s e problems, and v e r y e f f e c t i v e u n i t 5 w e r e b u i l t .
 The m i l i t a r y o r g a n i z a t i o n s t h a t emerged f r o m t h e

i n t e r v e n t i o n i n Nicaragua d i f f e r e d i n one b a s i c way from

t h o s e t h a t r e s u l t e d i n Cuba. N e i t h e r t h e Army n o r t h e

M a r i n e Corps succeeded i n b u i l d i n g n o n p a r t i s a n o f f i c e r c o r p s

or apolitical institutions for t h e c o n t r o l of t h e armed

forces, b u t t h e M a r i n e s succeeded i n m a i n t a i n i n g t h e

autonomy o f t h e Guardia Nacional. T h i s was due, i n part, to

t h e demands o f c h a s i n g Sandino. Thus, when t h e M a r i n e s

departed, t h e G u a r d i a has monopoly on s t a t e f o r c e , which

i t maintained f o r n e a r l y f i f t y years.

America. Nicaraaua. and a T r a n s i s t h m i a n Passaae.

I n 1927, the basis of FImerican i n t e r e s t s i n t h e r e g i o n ,

and N i c a r a g u a i n p a r t i c u l a r , had been acknowledged f o r the

b e t t e r p a r t o f a century. A g r o w i n g demand f o r

t r a n s i s t h m i a n commerce, and N i c a r a g u a ' s c o n t r o l o f the only

f e a s i b l e sea l e v e l c a n a l r o u t e k e p t U n i t e d S t a t e s commerical

i n t e r e s t i n the nation a t a high level.'

A s i n Panama, American companies developed a system o f

f e r r i e s and r a i l r o a d s f o r c r o s s i n g t h e i s t h m u s . " With the

v a s t amount o f commercial t r a f f i c g r o w i n g each y e a r , the

U n i t e d S t a t e s was n o t a l o n e i n i t s i n t e r e s t s i n N i c a r a g u a .

Dana G. Munro, The L a t i n American R e p u b l i c s : A H i s t o r y .

(New Vork: !Appleton. 1960) 9. 391.
p A t the Panama was s t i l l a o a r t o f Columbia.

 I n t h e l a t e 1 6 t h c e n t u r y B r i t a i n had d e v e l o p e d

commercial v e n t u r e s i n s e t t l e m e n t s s u c h as B l u e f i e l d s and

c o n t e s t e d t h e Spanish c l a i m s o f a u t h o r i t y o v e r t h e Mosquito

Coast. Recognizing t h e s t r a t e g i c i m p l i c a t i o n s o f a canal i n

Nicaragua, o r e l s e w h e r e on t h e i s t h m u s , the United States

and G r e a t B r i t i a n e n t e r e d i n t o a t r e a t y i n 1850 w h i c h

forbade e i t h e r c o u n t r y t o e s t a b l i s h exclusive c o n t r o l over

such a f u t u r e waterway.=

By 1900 U n i t e d S t a t e s i n t e r e s t s i n t h e r e g i o n e c l i p s e d

those of the B r i t i s h . The U n i t e d S t a t e s was on t h e v e r g e o f

becoming a g l o b a l power. Her n e w l y a c q u i r e d p o s s e s s i o n s i n

t h e C a r i b b e a n and t h e P a c i f i c , and t h e e x p o n e n t i a l g r o w t h i n

commerce and s h i p p i n g , r e q u i r e d a major naval f o r c e .

S i g n i f i c a n t economies c o u l d be a c h i e v e d ift h i s f o r c e d i d

n o t have t o make t h e Cape Horn passage, and c o u l d , instead,

pass t h r o u g h a C e n t r a l American c a n a l . c a n a l was a

technical p o s s i b i l i t y n o t o n l y i n Nicaragua, but also i n

Panama.

__________
W i l l i a m Kamman, A Search f o r S t a b i l i t v : U n i t e d S t a t e s
DiDlomaCv Toward N i c a r a a u a . ( N o t r e Dame, I n d . :
U n i v e r s i t y o f N o t r e Dame P r e s s , 1968) p.

59
 111: A C o u n t r v and a Canal f o r Panama: A W a t c h f u l on
Nicaraaua.

I n 1901, G r e a t B r i t a i n and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s

r e c o n s i d e r e d t h e i r p r e v i o u s agreement and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s

was f r e e d from i t s p r o m i s e n o t t o a c q u i r e c o n t r o l o v e r a

canal. When P r e s i d e n t R o o s e v e l t assumed o f f i c e , a c a n a l was

top p r i ~ r i t y . ~

The F r e n c h a t t e m p t t o b u i l d a c a n a l i n t h e Panama

r e g i o n o f Columbia had f a i l e d , and N i c a r a g u a r e c o g n i z e d an

o p p o r t u n i t y t o persuade t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t o b u i l d t h e c a n a l

across i t s route. B a r g a i n i n g was s t i f f and t h e e v e n t u a l

selection of t h e Panama r o u t e i n f u r i a t e d t h e P r e s i d e n t o f

Nicaragua, Santos Ze1aya.m

Z e l a y a was n o t a f a v o r i t e o f the United States. He

s e i z e d c o n t r o l o f N i c a r a g u a i n 1893 and s o u g h t t o e s t a b l i s h

his nation t h e dominant power i n t h e r e g i o n . He b u i l t a

modern Army and a t t a c k e d Honduras.q After coming t o power

he a t t e m p t e d t o r e n e g o t i a t e m o n o p o l i e s g r a n t e d American

companies by t h e p r e v i o u s government. Under Z e y a l a

N i c a r a g u a n n a t i o n a l i s m began t o t h r e a t e n U n i t e d S t a t e s

i n t e r e s t s i n the region.

Munro, L a t i n American R e p u b l i c s . p.
Kamman, Search f o r S t a b i l i t v . p.10.
* "The N i c a r a g a u n Army" Anon. M a n u s c r i p t i n t h e N i c a r a g u a n
Records o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s M a r i n e Historical
Archives. C i t e d i n R i c h a r d M i l l e t t , Guardians o f t h e
Dvnastv: A H i s t o r v o f t h e U.S. C r e a t e d G u a r d i a N a c i o n a l
N i c a r a a u a and t h e Somoza F a m i l v . ( M a r y k n o l l . N.Y.: Orbis
Books, 1977) p. 21.

60

 I n t h e wake o f t h e c a n a l d e c i s i o n Zeyala o f f e r e d t h e

p o t e n t i a l N i c a r a g u a n passage t o o t h e r n a t i o n s , including

Japan. When C o s t a R i c a c o n t e s t e d t h e r i g h t o f N i c a r a g u a t o

offer t h e San Juan R i v e r as a p o r t i o n o f the route. Zeyala

r e f u s e d t o s u b m i t t o t h e judgement o f t h e C e n t r a l CImerican

Court o f Justice.7 T h i s f u r t h e r antagonized t h e U n i t e d

S t a t e s who had e s t a b l i s h e d t h e t r i b u n a l t o resolve

i n t e r n a t i o n a l disputes i n t h e region.-

Z e l a y a was f a l l i n g i n t o d i s f a v o r w i t h t h e Americans,

and h i s d o m e s t i c opponents r e c o g n i z e d t h i s f a c t . With t a c i t

encouragement by t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Juan J . E s t r a d a began a

r e v o l t t o t o p p l e Ze1aya.-

The s o u t h e r n bank o f t h e San Juan R i v e r was c l e a r l y i n

Costa R i c a n t e r r i t o r y , and t h e proposed c h a n n e l i n c l u d e d t h e
boarder of Costa Rica. See Kammman, A Search f o r S t a b i l i t E .
p. 10.
e

Munro, L a t i n American R e p u b l i c s . pp. 422-423.

61
 IV: I n t e r v e n t i o n and t h e F i r s t I n v i t a t i o n f o r Reform.

After Zelaya f e l l , E s t r a d a assumed t h e P r e s i d e n c y a s an

i n t e r i m e x e c u t i v e u n t i l e l e c t i o n s c o u l d be h e l d .

Unfortunately, E s t r a d a ' s c o a l i t i o n evaporated.'" Rivals for

h i s p o s i t i o n c o n t r o l l e d t h e Army and p a r t i s a n f o r c e s .

E s t r a d a proposed t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s b u i l d national

The U n i t e d S t a t e s l o o k e d f a v o r a b l y on t h i s

request, b u t b e f o r e i t c o u l d respond E s t r a d a was deposed by

G e n e r a l Mend, commander o f what remained o f t h e Nicaraguan

CIrmy.

G e n e r a l E m i l i a n o Chamorro, t h e acknowledged

Conservative p a r t y leader, w r e s t l e d c o n t r o l from Mend, and

r e l u c t a n t l y handed o v e r t h e P r e s i d e n c y t o A d o l f o D i a z . The

U n i t e d S t a t e s had r u l e d t h a t Chamarro was i n e l i g l i b l e f o r

e l e c t i o n t o t h e p r e s i d e n c y s i n c e he c u r r e n t l y h e l d t h e

p o s i t i o n s o f M i n i s t e r o f War and Commander o f t h e firmy.

However, D i a z agreed t o s u p p o r t Chamorro who would be

e l i g i b l e f o r the next election.'=

115 M i l l e t t , R. G u a r d i a n s o f t h e Dyna-. p. 27
N o r t h c o t t t o Knox, F e b r u a r y 1911, P a p e r s R e l a t i n q t o
the Foreian Relations o f the United States, P a r t
(Washington, D.C., 1911) pp. 655-656.
M i l l e t t , R., Guardians o f t h e Dynasty. 28
Munro, L a t i n Qmerican R e p u b l i c s . p. 423; Again, t h e t e r m
p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s i s used l o o s e l y and does n o t n e c e s s a r i l y
mean a p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n comparable w i t h p o l i t i c a l
p a r t i e s i n t h e Uni'ted S t a t e s . I n accordance w i t h t h e Dawson
agreements and t h e N i c a r a g u a n c o n s t i t u i o n . p r e s i d e n t s c o u l d
n o t succeed themselves, and m i l i t a r y o f f i c a l s c o u l d be
elected t o the o f f i c e .

62

 The C o n s e r v a t i v e s c o n s o l i d a t e d t h e i r c o n t r o l o f the

presidency, and t h e armed f o r c e s . Diaz passed t h e

p r e s i d e n c y t o Chamorro, and Chamorro passed i t t o h i s

A 5 f a t e would have i t , t h e e l d e r Chamorro d i e d i n o f f i c e

b e f o r e he c o u l d pass c o n t r o l back t o h i s nephew. Vice

President Martinez, a Conservative, b u t n o t a member o f the

Chamarro f a c t i o n assumed t h e o f f i c e . Thus, 1923, a new

c r i s i s developed t h a t would soon draw t h e a t t e n t i o n o f the

United States. 14

Kamman, Search f o r S t a b i l i t y . p.17

 V: The American P u r s u i t o f E l e c t i o n s and S t a b i l i t y .

The U n i t e d S t a t e s had m a i n t a i n e d a s t r o n g l e g a t i o n

guard i n Nicaragua f o l l o w i n g the intervention of 1912. This

f o r c e had i n t e r v e n e d t o s t o p a t l e a s t one coup, and t h e

U n i t e d S t a t e s l e t i t be known t h a t i t would n o t t o l e r a t e

p e r s o n s assuming t h e O f f i c e o f t h e P r e s i d e n t w i t h o u t being

e1ected.la However, t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s was n e v e r s a t i s f i e d

w i t h t h e Nicaraguan e l e c t o r a l process. The system seemed t o

i n s u r e t h a t t h e c a n d i d a t e endorsed by t h e r u l i n g P r e s i d e n t

succeeded a t t h e p o l l s . I t seemed t h a t t h i s mandate c o u l d

o n l y be b r o k e n by r e v o l u t i o n o r coup. The Chamorros had

r e b u f f e d American e f f o r t s a t e l e c t o r a l r e f o r m , but Martinez,

s e e k i n g American endorsement o f h i s e l i g i b i l i t y t o run f o r

o f f i c e i n 1923, a c c e p t e d an American m i s s i o n t o r e w r i t e t.he

electoral laws.'b

Whether M a r t i n e z had any i n t e n t i o n o f c o m p l y i n g w i t h

t h e s e l a w s i s open t o q u e s t i o n . Regardless, when t h e U n i t e d

States held t h a t i n i t s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e Nicaraguan

c o n s t i t u t i o n he was i n e l i g i b l e f o r a second term, Martinez,

d i s r e g a r d i n g t h e r e f o r m s and f o l l o w i n g N i c a r a g u a n t r a d i t i o n ,

sponsored a successor.i7

Munra, L a t i n American R e p u b l i c s . p. 424.

V. Greet-, " S t a t e Department P o l i c y i n Regard t o t h e
N i c a r a g u a n E l e c t i o n o f 1924," H i s D a n i c American H i s t o r i c a l
R w i e w . (November, 1954) pp. 445-467. Cited i n Lester
L a n g l e y . T h e Banana Wars: An I n n e r H i s t o r v o f Pmerican
EmDire 1900-1934. ( L e x i n g t o n , Ky.: U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s o f
K e n t u c k y , 1983) p.
Kamman, Search f o r S t a b i l i t y . pp. 25-29.

64
 True t o form, M a r t i n e z s nominee, C a r l o s Solarzano, was

elected. But, h i s government was based on a shaky c o a l i t i o n

which l e f t t h e C h a m o r r i s t a f a c t i o n i n c o n t r o l o f the

Nicaraguan army. Martinez convinced t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t o

r e t a i n t h e l e g a t i o n guard, which i t had been t r y i n g t o

withdraw, u n t i l a f t e r the e l e c t i o n s . Solarzano, Martinezs

hand p i c k e d successor, i m m e d i a t e l y r e q u e s t e d an e x t e n s i o n o f

t h i s force.

The U n i t e d S t a t e s r e f u s e d u n l e s s S o l a r z a n o accepted

american s u p e r v i s i o n o f t h e 1928 e l e c t i o n s and t h e

e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f an a p o l i t i c a l c o n s t a b u l a r y . Faced w i t h a

h o s t i l e army, and t h e f i r m s u p p o r t o f n e i t h e r t h e

Conservatives n o r the L i b e r a l s , S o l a r z a n o accepted. This

American f i x a t i o n on t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f a p o l i t i c a l

m i l i t a r i e s was a p r o d u c t o f the e v o l u t i o n of United States

foreign policy.

L a n g l e y , Banana Wars. p. 184.

lV T h u r s t o n t o Department o f S t a t e . L e t t e r d a t e d December
13, 1924. N a t i o n a l A r c h i v e s o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , General
Records o f t h e Department o f S t a t e , Records Group 59. File
No.

65

 VI: The R i s e o f The S t a t e Department and D o l l a r Diplomacv.

I n t h e wake o f t h e F i r s t World War, the State

Department assumed a p r o m i n e n t r o l e i n Caribbean and C e n t r a l

American a f f a i r s . I t 5 new L a t i n American D i v i s i o n

s u p p l a n t e d t h e Bureau o f Insular Affairs of t h e War

Department as t h e p o l i c y p r o p o n e n t f o r t h e Caribbean and

C e n t r a l America. The M a r i n e Corps and t h e N a v y ' s S p e c i a l

Squadron i n t h e Caribbean accepted t h e p r i m a r y

r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e c o n d u c t o f m i l i t a r y o p e r a t on6 i n t h e

region.

When t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i n t e r v e n e d i n 1912 i t had sought

s t a b i l i t y t h r o u g h t h e Dawson agreement. T h i s accord, a

product of t h e e a r l y days o f d o l l a r diplomacy, b r o u g h t some

measure o f f i s c a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y through U n i t e d S t a t e s '

s u p e r v i s i o n and c o l l e c t i o n o f custom r e c e i p t s , and

d r a s t i c a l l y reduced t h e r e l i a n c e o f N i c a r a g u a on European

capital But, t h i s approach had n o t p r o v i d e d sufficient

Munro, L a t i n American Republics.. pp. 422-423.

66

foundation f o r p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y . The n e c e s s i t y f o r

m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l , as w e l l economic r e f o r m , became

e v i d e n t to t h e f o r m u l a t o r s o f U n i t e d S t a t e s p o l i c y . 1927

the p o s i t i o n o f t h e Department o f S t a t e was c l e a r r e g a r d i n g

m i l i t a r y reform:

The e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f n o n - p a r t i s a n c o n s t a b u l a r i e s
i n t h e Caribbean s t a t e s was one o f t h e c h i e f
o b j e c t i v e s o f o u r p o l i c y from t h e t i m e i t became
c l e a r t h a t the c u s t o m c o l l e c t o r s h i p s wouldn't
a s s u r e s t a b i l i t y b y themselves. The o l d a r m i e s
were o r seemed t o be one o f t h e p r i n c i p a l causes
o f d i s o r d e r and f i n a n c i a l d i s o r g a n i z a t i o n . They
consumed most o f t h e governments revenue, c h i e f l y
i n g r a f t , and t h e y gave n o t h i n g b u t d i s o r d e r and
repression i n return. We t h o u g h t t h a t a
d i s c i p l i n e d f o r c e , t r a i n e d by Americans, would
away w i t h t h e p e t t y l o c a l o p p r e s s i o n t h a t was
r e s p o n s i b l e f o r much o f t h e d i s o r d e r t h a t o c c u r r e d
and would be an i m p o r t a n t s t e p toward b e t t e r
f i n a n c i a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and economic p r o g r e s s
generally.'t

Nor had t h e Dawson agreements r e s u l t e d i n f r e e

elections. The c o e r c i v e powers o f t h e incumbent s t i l l

d e t e r m i n e d t h e outcome o f each Nicaraguan e l e c t i o n , and

s e r i o u s o p p o s i t i o n c a n d i d a t e s found r e c o u r s e o n l y i n

revolution.

L e t t e r from Dana G. Munro t o R i c h a r d M i l l e t , d a t e d

F e b r u a r y 24, 1965. Q o u t e d i n M i l l e t t , R . Guardians o f the
Dynasty. p. 4 1 .

67

 I n a r e g i o n a l e f f o r t t o f u r t h e r democracy as a r o u t e

t o s t a b i l i t y t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s had sponsored a t r e a t y w h i c h

obligated the nations o f the United States, Costa Rica.

Guatemala, E l Salvador, Honduras and N i c a r a g u a , to refrain

from r e c o g n i t i o n o f r e g i m e s t h a t came t o power t h r o u g h

extra-legal means. Given t h e q u e s t i o n a b l e v i a b i l i t y o f a

government w h i c h c o u l d n o t s e c u r e r e c o g n i t i o n from t h e

United States, i t was hoped t h a t C e n t r a l Clmerican p o l i t i c o s

m i g h t a d o p t democracy o u t o f some sense o f n e c e s s i t y and

survival.==

Thus, w i t h Solarzano s t r u g g l i n g t o h o l d t o g e t h e r a

c o a l i t i o n o f C o n s e r v a t i v e and L i b e r a l m i n o r i t i e s , the United

S t a t e s s o u g h t t h e g u a r a n t e e o f comprehensive p o l i t i c a l

m i l i t a r y reforms. fVi mentioned, S o l a r z a n o agreed, and t h e

M a r i n e l e g a t i o n g u a r d remained i n N i c a r a g u a u n t i l flugust o f

1925.

Munro, L a t i n Clmerican R e p u b l i c s . p. 426.

68

 M a j o r C a r t e r ' s C o n s t a b u l a r y and C h a m o r r o ' s

" C o n s t i t u t i o n a l " Coup.

Through t h e good o f f i c e s o f t h e Department o f S t a t e ,

Major Calvin Carter, U n i t e d S t a t e s Army, retired, was

h i r e d as d i r e c t o r o f t h e new Guardid."" C a r t e r was faced

with formidable task. W h i l e t h e N i c a r a g u a n Army had

a t r o p h i e d d u r i n g t h e p a s t decade, i t was s t i l l a m a j o r armed

force, and c o n t r o l l e d t h e f o r t r e s s L a Loma. S i t u a t e d on t h e

dominant h i g h ground i n Managua, La Loma was a symbol o f

p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y as w e l l as t h e n a t i o n a l a r s e n a l . = 4

93 T r a n s c r i p t o f C o n t r a c t between M a j o r C a l v i n C a r t e r and
The N i c a r a g u a n Government, N a t i o n a l A r c h i v e s o f t h e U n i t e d
S t a t e s , General Records o f t h e Department o f S t a t e , Records
59, F i l e No. 817.1051/81.
Calvin C a r t e r , " T h e K e n t u c k y Fued i n N i c a r a g u a "
W o r l d ' s Work ( J u l y , 1927) 317. A l s o see Endnote 7 8
M i l l e t t , R., G u a r d i a n s o f t h e Dynasty. p. 39.

69
 While C a r t e r labored t o b u i l d a c o n s t a b u l a r y , Chamorro

who f e l t he had been d e n i e d h i s r i g h t f u l p o s i t i o n as

president, began maneuvering f o r the o f f i c e . First,

Chamorro was g i v e n c o n t r o l o f La Loma by C h a m o r r i s t a

o f f i c e r s and f o r c e d an outgunned S o l a r z a n o t o a p p o i n t h i m as

M i n i s t e r o f War. Major C a r t e r advised Solarzano t o r e s i s t ,

b u t w i t h t h e l e g a t i o n guard gone, and t h e G u a r d i a o n l y

l i g h t l y armed and p a r t i a l l y t r a i n e d , S o l a r z a n o demurred.=

Then, w i t h V i c e P r e s i d e n t Sacasa, a Liberal, out of the

c o u n t r y Chamorro persuaded S o l a r z a n o t o r e s i g n . Solarzano

was a d v i s e d t o seek t r e a t m e n t f o r h i s poor h e a l t h i n the

U n i t e d S t a t e s where he c o u l d be t h e Nicaraguan Consul

General i n San Francisco.*

== p.
Kamman, Search f o r S t a b i l i t y . pp.

70
 Chamorro then oversaw t h e d i s m i s s a l o f a l l non-

c o n s e r v a t i v e members o f t h e Congress. Next, from h i s

p o s i t i o n as M i n i s t e r o f War, he had h i m s e l f a p p o i n t e d t o

fill a v a c a n t Senate s e a t from h i s home d i s t r i c t . Finally,

h i s new congress v o t e d him f i r s t i n t h e c h a i n t o assume t h e

p r e s i d e n c y s h o u l d Sacasa n o t r e t u r n . Fearing f o r hi5 l i f e ,

Sacasa r e f u s e d t o r e t u r n , but dl50 refused t o resi gn the

Vice Presidency. C a l l i n g on L i b e r a l f o r c e s to revolt, he

c h a l l e n g e d Chamorro's p o s i t i o n and s e t up a government in

exile."'The M a r i n e l e g a t i o n Guard had been withdrawn a f t e r

C a r t e r began f o r m i n g a c o n s t a b u l a r y under S o l a r z a n o .

Chamorro. who had v i o l e n t l y opposed t h e f o r m a t i o n o f t h e new

Guardia, now assumed t h e o f f i c e o f the President, and moved

q u i c k l y t o i n c o r p o r a t e t h e G u a r d i a i n t o h i s forces."'

C a r t e r faced t h e dilemma o f a c c e p t i n g Chamorro's o r d e r s , or

by r e f u s i n g , a i d i n g t h e Sacasa cause.

The American l e g a t i o n was o f no h e l p i n r e s o l v i n g t h i s

issue. They had s t r i c t i n s t r u c t i o n s t o s u p p o r t n e i t h e r

side, w h i l e Washington decided between t h e l e s s e r o f two

evils.

=' pp.58-60.
=- p. 190.

 The U n i t e d S t a t e s d i d n o t want t o s u p p o r t what would

be c l e a r l y a weak government under Sacasa, and r e f u s e d t o

use f o r c e t o remove Chamorro. t h e o t h e r hand, Chamorros

a s c e n t t o t h e p r e s i d e n c y was b l a t a n t l y e x t r a - l e g a l , and i t s

r e c o g n i t i o n would c o m p l i c a t e s a n c t i o n s a g a i n s t coups and

r e v o l u t i o n s i n the region.v

For Carter, t h e problem was overcome by e v e n t s . The

L i b e r a l s launched a m i l i t a r y campaign on t h e e a s t c o a s t , and

t h e Guardia was f o r c e d t o f i g h t f o r t h e Chamorro

Conservatives.

D e s p i t e i n i t i a l successes, Chamorro s u f f e r e d from t h e

withdrawal o f United States support, and t h e L i b e r a l s gained

strength. The U n i t e d S t a t e s demanded t h a t Chamorro v a c a t e

t h e o f f i c e of the President, and r e s t o r e t h e Congress t o i t s

previous composition. However, the United States refused t o

a c c e p t Sacasa as p r e s i d e n t . Doing so would have been

p e r c e i v e d as a v i c t o r y f o r t h e Mexicans who were s u p p o r t i n g

the L i b e r a l e f f o r t . The L i b e r a l s r e f u s e d t o accept t h e

FImerican endorsed successor t o Chamorro, the venerable

6 l d o l f o Diaz. and c o n t i n u e d t h e f i g h t . 3

M i l l e t t , R., Guardians o f t h e Dynasty. p . 47.

Dana G. Plunro, The U n i t e d S t a t e s and t h e Caribbean
Republics (Princeton, Princeton University
Press, 1974) pp. 196-198.

72
 These e v e n t s s e t t h e s t a g e f o r t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s

i n t e r v e n t i o n i n 1927, and t h e Stimson agreement. More

importantly, t h e y show t h e h i s t o r i c a l l i n k a g e t h a t had

developed between American f o r e i g n p o l i c y , N i c a r a g u a n

P r e s i d e n t i a l p o l i t i c s , and American e f f o r t s a t p o l i t i c a l -

m i l i t a r y reform.

73

by

of

of

of

of

51 R. of
 The e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f p r o f e s s i o n a l n o n p a r t i s a n

a p o l i t i c a l c o n s t a b u l a r i e s had became p a r t o f the United

S t a t e s ' . e q u a t i o n f a r democracy and s t a b i l i t y i n L a t i n

American n a t i o n s . Circumstances f a r c e d Diaz t o accept the

m i l i t a r y reform provisions of t h e Stimson agreement.

Threatening t h e use o f U n i t e d S t a t e s Marines, Colonel

Stimson s e c u r e d t h e endorsement o f t h e L i b e r a l commander i n

the f i e l d , General Noncada."=

With Sacasa n e a t l y removed from t h e p i c t u r e , the United

S t a t e s began i t s r e f o r m a t i o n o f N i c a r a g u a . Secretary o f

S t a t e Frank K e l l o g g hoped f o r a p e a c e f u l and r a p i d

t r a n s i t i o n t o a s e c u r e democracy.3J S t i m s o n had p u l l e d o f f

what seemed t o be t h e d i p l o m a t i c coup o f t h e decade, i f not

the century.J4

--
-.- Langley, Banana Wars. p. 193.
.z3 K e l l o g g t o Munro, L e t t e r d a t e d December 8 , 1927, N a t i o n a l
A r c h i v e s o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , General Records o f t h e
Department o f S t a t e , Records Group 59, F i l e No.
817.1051/178.
C i t i n g S t i m s o n and Bundy, O n A c t i v e S e r v i c e i n Peace and
War, Kamman o b s e r v e s t h a t Stimson " . . . a l w a y s f e l t t h a t
C h a r l e s L i n d b e r g h ' s f l i g h t t o P a r i s t h e same month d e p r i v e d
t h e N i c a r a g u a n v e n t u r e o f much p u b l i c i t y . " Kammen, Search
f o r S t a b i l i t v . p. 1 1 4 .
 The T w o F r o n t War f o r Reform: Sandino and Moncada.

D i a z had been a c c e p t e d the i n t e r i m President u n t i l

the elections o f 1928. Under t h e S t i m s o n Agreement t h e

U n i t e d S t a t e s M a r i n e s i m m e d i a t e l y began d i s a r m i n g t h e

various factions, i n c l u d i n g the N i c a r a g u a n army. Lieutenant

C o l o n e l E l i a s R. B e a d l e was a p p o i n t e d t o command t h e G u a r d i a

N a c i o n a l de N i c a r a g u a , and t h e a m e r i c a n l e g a t i o n began

p r e p a r i n g l e g i s l a t i o n t h a t would p r o v i d e f o r t h e G u a r d i a ' s

l e g a l existence.3J Sandino, h i s f a r c e d e p l e t e d by t h e c a s h

i n c e n t i v e o f f e r e d f o r s u r r e n d e r i n g arms t o t h e M a r i n e s , was

w i t h d r a w i n g t o t h e rugged a r e a s n e a r N i c a r a g u a ' s n o r t h e r n

boarder."'

The o r i g i n a l commander o f t h e G u a r d i a was a C o l o n e l Rhea,

USMC, b u t he s u f f e r e d f r o m h e a l t h problems and was r e p l a c e d
L i e u t e n a n t C o l o n e l E l i a s R. B e a d l e w i t h i n a month o f t h e
f o r m a t i o n o f t h e G u a r d i a . See M i l l e t t , G u a r d i a n s o f t h e
Dvnastv. p. 61.
.-* N e i l 1 Macaulay, The Sandino a f f a i r . (Duke U n i v e r s i t y
P r e s s , 1985) 62.
 The U n i t e d S t a t e s M a r i n e Corps had f o u g h t hard t o

secure the task of t r a i n i n g and l e a d i n g t h e G u a r d i a

Nacional.s7 The N i c a r a g u a n r e q u e s t f o r t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s

Army t o be a s s i g n e d t h i s t a s k was r e j e c t e d . With the

presence o f a r e i n f o r c e d Marine B r i g a d e i n Nicaragua, and

the a u t h o r i t y f o r naval forces i n the region vested i n the

Commander o f t h e S p e c i a l Squadron i n t h e C a r i b b e a n , the

question of t o whom t h e J e f e D i r e c t o r o f the Guardia

N a c i o n a l de N i c a r a g u a , a Marine Lieutenant Colonel w i t h the

Nicaraguan rank o f General, wa5 t o r e p o r t became an

immediate i s s u e .

The American M i n i s t e r s o u g h t autonomy f o r the Marine

detachment a s s i g n e d t o t h e G u a r d i a . The M a r i n e B r i g a d e

Commander, B r i g a d i e r G e n e r a l Logan F e l a n d , and t h e Commander

of the Special Squadron, Rear A d m i r a l D a v i d F o o t e S e l l e r s ,

wanted d i r e c t c o n t r o l o f t h i s o r g a n i z a t i o n and i t s American

leaders.s

,x7 M i l l e t t , R . G u a r d i a n s o f t h e D y n a s t y . p. 62.
J u l i a n C. S m i t h , M a j o r , USMC, A Review o f t h e
O r g a n i z a t i o n and O p e r a t i o n s o f t h e G u a r d i a N a c i o n a l d e
N i c a r a g u a : by t h e D i r e c t i o n o f t h e M a j o r G e n e r a l Commandant
o f t h e M a r i n e Corps. ( W a s h i n g t o n , D.C., n.d.)

77

 The Stimson agreement had n o t been s p e c i f i c r e g a r d i n g

such m a t t e r s , and t h e p r e s i d e n t i a l o r d e r a u t h o r i z i n g t h e

assignment o f o f f i c e r s and non-commissioned officers of the

Marine was a l s o s u i t a b l y vague. The i s s u e , as w e l l as

many o t h e r s , remained u n r e s o l v e d when General Moncada

e l e c t e d P r e s i d e n t i n 1928. Predictably, t h e former r e b e l

commander sought t o e s t a b l i s h h i s p e r s o n a l a u t h o r i t y o v e r

t h e Guardia. This contest f o r a u t h o r i t y persisted f o r the

d u r a t i o n of the intervention.

Moncada r e c o g n i z e d t h a t under t h e c o n d i t i o n s he c o u l d

n o t prevent the establishment o f t h e Guardia, nor conf ro n t

t h e e n t i r e American e f f o r t . The American M i n i s t e r , Mr.

Eberhardt, and t h e J e f e D i r e c t o r o f the Guardia, Lieutenant

C o l o n e l Beadle, were adamant on f o r m i n g an a p o l i t i c a l force,

and i n c o r p o r a t i n g a l l p o l i c e and m i l i t a r y f u n c t i o n s i n t h e

Guardid."- I n order t o e s t a b l i s h much i n f l u e n c e o v e r t h e

Guardia as p o s s i b l e , Moncada c o n c e n t r a t e d on b r i n g t h e

G u a r d i a under c o n t r o l o f the Marine Brigade, and b r i n g i n g

t h e M a r i n e B r i g a d e commander around t o h i s view r e g a r d i n g

the r o l e of t h e Guardia.4"

Kellogg t o Eberhardt, L e t t e r d a t e d August 20, 1927.

N a t i o n a l Archives of the U n i t e d S t a t e s , General Records o f

t h e Department o f S t a t e , Records Group 59, F i l e No.

817.1051/159.

4c:' M i l l e t t , Guardians of t h e Dynasty. p. 108.

78
 T h i s s t r a t e g y s p l i t t h e American a u t h o r i t i e s f u r t h e r

and k e p t t h e q u e s t i o n o f how t o h o l d t h e G u a r d i a a c c o u n t a b l e

open. The i s s u e was f u r t h e r s t a l l e d by t h e N i c a r a g u a n

Congress, w h i c h r e f u s e d t o pass t h e l e g i s l a t i o n a u t h o r i z i n g

the establishment of t h e Guardia. Eventually, t h e American

M i n i s t e r was f o r c e d t o asked f o r t h e r e l i e f o f b o t h t h e

M a r i n e B r i g a d e Commander, and t h e D i r e c t o r of the

Guardia. Moncada's s t r a t e g y had p a i d a t l e a s t some

dividends. The M a r i n e B r i g a d e Commander, B r i g a d i e r General

F e l a n d made i t known t h a t he f e l t t h a t the f u t u r e o f United

S t a t e s i n t e r e s t s were w i t h Moncada, and t h a t an a p o l i t i c a l

f o r c e was i m p o s s i b l e i n N i c a r a g u a . 4 1

The d e p a r t u r e o f B e a d l e and F e l a n d d i d n o t s o l v e t h e

question of a u t h o r i t y o v e r t h e Guardia. A bureaucratic

compromise w h i c h s p l i t t h e a u t h o r i t y o v e r t h e Marines

a s s i g n e d t o t h e G u a r d i a was reached by t h e M a r i n e C o r p s '

headquarters Washington. This only allowed the

c o n t i n u a t i o n o f Moncada's s t r a t e g y . Meanwhile, the focus o f

U n i t e d S t a t e s p o l i c y i n N i c a r a g u a had s h i f t e d t o t h e d e f e a t

o f Sandino.

4 1 Memoradum o f c o n v e r s a t i o n between F e l a n d and F r a n c i s

White. U n i t e d S t a t e s Department o f S t a t e , d a t e d A p r i l 9 ,
1929, N a t i o n a l A r c h i v e s o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , General
Records o f t h e Department o f S t a t e , Records Group 5 9 , F i l e
No.

79

 no

on

was

but

*=

4=

for
p.105.

80

 The p e r s i s t e n c e o f S a n d i n o s campaigns f o c u s e d

i n t e r n a t i o n a l a t t e n t i o n on t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i n t e r v e n t i o n ,

and h e i g h t e n e d t h e p o l i t i c a l d i s s e n t i o n w i t h i n t h e U n i t e d

States regarding p o l i c y i n the region. P r e s s u r e grew t o

d e f e a t Sandino, o r t o r e p l a c e t h e M a r i n e s c h a s i n g Sandino

w i t h Nicaraguan f o r c e s . F i g h t i n g Sandino w i t h a N i c a r a g u a n

f o r c e i n v o l v e d f a r more t h a n f i n d i n g the e l u s i v e bandit.

I t a l s o meant b u i l d i n g N i c a r a g u a n s u p p o r t f o r an expanded

Guardia. A s i n Cuba, t h e r e was w i d e s p r e a d r e s i s t a n c e t o

t h i s idea. Much o f t h e i s s u e was c l o a k e d i n t h e p o l i t i c a l

f o g o f N i c a r a g u a n p o l i t i c s and t h e c o n t r o l o f the

l e g i sl ature.

The U n i t e d S t a t e s was t r y i n g t o d e v e l o p t h e l e g i s l a t i v e

p r o c e s s i n N i c a r a g u a and promote f i s c a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . The

newly e l e c t e d l e g i s l a t u r e s t i l l balked a t funding the United

States plan f o r t h e Guardia. W h i l e t h e N i c a r a g u a n i s s u e was

t h e d i v i s i o n o f p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y among t h e j e f e p o l i t i c o s

( p r o v i n c i a l governors), the executive, and t h e p a r t i e s , the

Congress and P r e s i d e n t Moncada argued t h e i s s u e w i t h t h e

Omerican o f f i c i a l s i n terms o f cost.

 Expanding t h e G u a r d i a t o f i g h t Sandino would s t r a i n t h e

budget. Forming a u x i l i a r y f o r c e s , w h i c h c o u l d be r e c r u i t e d

c h e a p l y and p l a c e d u n d e r command o f t h e Marine Brigade,

would be cheaper. Of course, t h i s would a l s o p r o v i d e t h e

President w i t h a force t h a t c o u l d responded t o t r a d i t i o n a l

Nicaraguan i n f l u e n c e w i t h i n t h e m i l i t a r y , so t h e p r o p o n e n t s

of t h e Guardia r e s i s t e d . The M a r i n e B r i g a d e however,

supported t h i s offer.4z

G u a r d i a a d v o c a t e s were f a c e d w i t h s h i f t i n g t h e i r

efforts t o d e f e a t i n g Sandino o r l o s i n g t h e i r monopoly on

N i c a r a g u a n m i l i t a r y power, The G u a r d i a moved r a p i d l y t o

b u i l d u n i t s t o f i e l d a g a i n s t Sandino.

The development o f t h e Guardia o r g a n i z a t i o n shifted to

the c r e a t i o n o f a n a t i o n a l counterinsurgency force. The

emphasis was on s m a l l u n i t l e a d e r s h i p , and t h e c r e a t i o n o f

e f f e c t i v e n a t i o n w i d e communications, logistics, and

intelligence structures. These e f f o r t s p r o g r e s s e d r a p i d l y ,

and e f f e c t i v e s m a l l u n i t s , s t i l l under M a r i n e command, took

t o t h e f i e l d a g a i n s t Sandino. M a r i n e o f f i c e r s and N C U ' s

found t h a t t h e N i c a r a g u a n made an e x c e l l e n t s o l d i e r , and

d e v e l o p e d a s t r o n g sense o f l o y a l t y t o h i s leaders.4'

P r e o c c u p i e d w i t h d e f e a t i n g Sandino, t h e Marines y i e l d e d f e w

l e a d e r s h i p p o s i t i o n s t o Nicaraguans.

ex Eberhardt t o Kellogg, L e t t e r dated J a n u a r y 1929.

N a t i o n a l A r c h i v e s o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , G e n e r a l Records o f

t h e Department S t a t e , Records Group 59, F i l e No.

817.1051/238

44 Evans F. C a r l s o n , C a p t a i n , USMC, "The G u a r d i a N a c i o n a l de

N i c a r a g u a , " M a r i n e Corps G a z e t t e . (August, p. 7.

 X:

no

of

as

45

46

 I n c o n c e r t w i t h these plans, t h e new American M i n i s t e r

i n Nicaragua, Matthew Hsnna, dropped t h e l e g a t i o n ' s

o p p o s i t i o n t o s u p p l e m e n t i n g t h e Guardia f o r c e s w i t h an

auxiliary, and proposed t h a t t h e m u n i c i p a l f u n c t i o n s o f the

Guardia be t u r n e d o v e r t o such f o r c e s . 4 7 t h i s time the

G u a r d i a had developed a v e s t e d i n t e r e s t i n t h e maintenance

of these f u n c t i o n s , and P r e s i d e n t Moncada had succeeded i n

u s i n g t h e s e f o r c e s t o a r r e s t and h a r a s s p o l i t i c a l opponents.

W i t h Sandino p l e d g i n g t o h a l t h i s r e s i s t a n c e once t h e

M a r i n e s l e f t Nicaragua, t h e American b a r g a i n i n g p o s i t i o n was

e x t r e m e l y weak.-'-

The s i t u a t i o n was made worse by t h e f a c t t h a t t h e

M a r i n e s had f a i l e d t o t u r n o v e r any s e n i o r l e a d e r s h i p and

staff p o s i t i o n s t o Nicaraguans. The r a n k i n g Nicaraguan

Guardia o f f i c e r was a f i r s t 1ieutenant.O- Stimson w a s

adamant on t h e d a t e f o r w i t h d r a w a l and had t h e f u l l s u p p o r t

of the President.

C l t t h i s p o i n t an i n t e r e s t i n g p r o p o s a l emerqed from

t h e bowels o f t h e S t a t e Department. The M a r i n e s needed o n l y

t o l o c a t e Nicaraguans w i t h e s t a b l i s h e d m i l i t a r y C r e d e n t i d l S ,

and no p o l i t i c a l a f f i l i a t i o n s , and a p p o i n t them d i r e c t l y to

p o s i t i o n s o f a u t h o r i t y i n t h e Guardid.'"

Hanna t o Stimson, L e t t e r d a t e d A p r i l 5, 1931.

pp.792-793.

Macaulay, The Sandino A f f a i r . p. 231.

e9 Laurence Duggan t o Ed Wilson Memorandum d a t e d March 7 ,

1932. N a t i o n a l A r c h i v e s o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , General

r e c o r d s o f t h e Department o f S t a t e , r e c o r d s Group 59, f i l e

No. 817.1051/612 112. C i t e d i n M i l l e t t , R., Guardians o f t h e

Dvnaetv. p.

White t o Hanna, L e t t e r d a t e d P l p r i l 17, 1932. N a t i o n a l

A r c h i v e s o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , General Records o f t h e

ax for

D.C.,

V,

 The Americans t u r n e d t h e i r a t t e n t i o n t o f i n d i n g a

l e a d e r f o r t h e Guardia. W i t h proper l e a d e r s h i p the Guardia

might maintain i t s effectiveness, and r e s i s t becoming

e m b r o i l e d i n domestic p o l i t i c s .

The American M i n i s t e r , Matthew Hanna, had a s t r o n g

and c o r d i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h t h e Deputy F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r o f

Nicaragua, A n a s t a o i o Somoza. Stimson had taken n o t e o f

Somozas t a l e n t s when he had o f f e r e d a s s i s t a n c e i n t h e

negotiations a t Tipitapa. The unanimous American c h o i c e f o r

t h e p o s i t i o n of J e f e D i r e c t o r was Somoza.*x

Somoza had been a l o y a l s u b o r d i n a t e o f Moncadas i n t h e

L i b e r a l Army. Moncada had a p p o i n t e d him t o h i s p r e s e n t

position, and Somoza and Moncada were r e l a t e d by m a r r i a g e .

Moncada was g o i n g t o h e s i t a t e on any appointment to this

position, b u t p r o h i b i t e d by t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n , and t h e

American presence, from s e e k i n g r e e l e c t i o n i n he

expected t o have a t l e a s t some i n f l u e n c e i n t h e government

ifSomoza headed t h e Guardia.S4

= I ~Kamman, FI Search f o r S t a b i l i t y . p.210.

54

86

=
87

 Yet, t h e f i n a l e l e c t i o n r e q u i r e d a s much U n i t e d S t a t e s

i n v o l v e m e n t and s u p e r v i s i o n as t h e f i r s t . As i n Cuba, the

American l e a d e r s h i p r e c o g n i z e d t h a t i t s e f f o r t s t o breed

democracy had met w i t h o n l y m a r g i n a l success. The U n i t e d

S t a t e s s u p e r v i s e d e l e c t i o n s i n 1932 were n o t t h e f i r s t s t e p s

o f a new democracy, b u t the l a s t steps i n the r e t r e a t of

d e f e a t e d American r e f o r m e f f o r t . With peaceful e l e c t i o n s ,

t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s c o u l d d e c l a r e i t s m i s s i o n t o be complete,

and t h e f u t u r e o f N i c a r a g u a t o be i n t h e hands o f i t s

people.

Among o t h e r s , A n a s t a s i o Somoza r e c o g n i z e d t h a t t h e

American agenda had changed. The U n i t e d S t a t e s was weary o f

i n t e r v e n t i o n i n t h e Caribbean, and was faced w i t h a major

domestic economic c r i s i s . S t a b i l t y i n the region of

C e n t r a l America and t h e Caribbean was more i m p o r t a n t t h a n

t h e means f o r a c h i e v i n g t h i s end. W h i l e Somoza p r o b a b l y

l a c k e d t h e a b i l i t y o r t h e m o t i v a t on t o e s t a b l i s h democracy

i n Nicaragua, t h e Guardia gave h i m t h e means t o impose h i s

own v a r i e t y o f stability. He began by o r d e r i n g G u a r d i a

o f f i c e r s t o a s s a s s i n a t e August0 Sandino.

Macaulay, The Sandino A f f a i r . pp.



of
 I n Cuba t h e R u r a l Guard expansion was a p r o d u c t o f t h e

p r i o r m i l i t a r y o c c u p a t i o n and B r i g a d i e r General Leonard

Wood's s o l u t i o n f o r t h e maintenance o f law and o r d e r . In

Nicaragua t h e o r i g i n s o f t h e c o n c e p t a r e found i n t h e

e v o l u t i o n o f d o l l a r diplomacy, and t h e M a r i n e Corps

e x p e r i e n c e i n H a i t i and t h e Dominican R e p u b l i c . I t i s worth

noting t h a t n e i t h e r o f the other constabularies created

under M a r i n e s u p e r v i s i o n had been t u r n e d o v e r t o i n d i g e n o u s

c o n t r o l p r i o r t o t h e establishment of the Guardia Nacional

de N i c a r a g u a .

I n b o t h cases t h e v i a b i l i t y o f t h i s approach was

questioned, b u t the o f f i c e r s i n charge o f implementing the

basic organizational r e f o r m s were s t e a d f a s t in their

convictions t h a t professional a p o l i t i c a l nonpartisan forces

c o u l d be b u i l t , and t h a t t h e b e s t s t r u c t u r e f o r these

o r g a n i z a t i o n s wa5 a c e n t r a l i z e d n a t i o n a l c o n s t a b u l a r y w h i c h

would i n c o r p o r a t e t h e f u n c t i o n s o f b o t h p o l i c e and defense.

Major H e r b e r t Slocum s t a u n c h l y defended Wood's concept o f

a R u r a l Guard i n Cuba. Lieutenant Colonel E l i a s R. Beadle,

USMC, a l i g n e d h i m s e l f w i t h t h e American M i n i s t e r , Mr.

Eberhardt, and championed t h e cause o f an a p o l i t i c a l

Guardia, even when i t s f e a s a b i l i t y was doubted by h i s M a r i n e

Corps s u p e r i o r , B r i g a d i e r General F e l a n d .

L e s t e r L a n g l e y , The Banana Wars: An I n n e r H i s t o r y o f

American Empire, 1900-1934. ( L e x i n g t o n , Ky.: 1983) p. 217

90
 I n N i c a r a g u a and Cuba, indigenous p o l i t i c a l leaders

challenged these e f f o r t s . Yet, i n b o t h Cuba and N i c a r a g u a ,

the establishment o f professional a p o l i t i c a l nonpartisan

armed f o r c e s became U n i t e d S t a t e s p o l i c y objectives.

When S e c r e t a r y o f War T a f t observed t h a t t h e Government

o f Cuba needed more e f f e c t i v e means o f protection, he d i d

n o t i m m e d i a t e l y s t i p u l a t e what t y p e o f f o r c e was n e c e s s a r y ,

b u t he went on t o c r i t i c i z e t h e R u r a l Guard f o r i t s lack o f

p r o f e s s i o n a l i s m and i t s p a r t i s a n i n v o l v e m e n t i n t h e

elections of 1905. 1927, when C o l o n e l Henry L. Stimson

n e g o t i a t e d h i s agreement i n N i c a r a g u a , the establishment of

a p o l i t i c a l national f o r c e s was an a c c e p t e d p a r t o f American

PO 1i c y .

There were a t l e a s t two q u e s t i o n a b l e a s s u m p t i o n s i n t h e

arguments w h i c h f a v o r e d p r o f e s s i o n a l a p o l i t i c a l n o n p a r t i s a n

constabularies t h e e x c l u s i v e armed f o r c e s o f these

nations: t h a t American m i l i t a r y i n s t i t u t i o n s and v a l u e s

c o u l d be t r a n s f e r e d t o these forces, and t h a t such

constabularies had p r o v e n e f f e c t i v e e l s e w h e r e .

91